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Cassius Dio's Forgotten History
of
Early Rome

The 'Roman History', Books 1–21

Edited by

Christopher Burden-Strevens

&

Mads Lindholmer

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THE *HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ROME AND ITS EMPIRE* SERIES

Carsten Hjort Lange & Jesper Majbom Madsen

Brill's *Historiography of Rome and Its Empire* Series aims to gather innovative and outstanding contributions in order to identify debates and trends, and in order to help provide a better understanding of ancient historiography, as well as how to approach Roman history and historiography. We would particularly welcome proposals that look at both Roman and Greek writers, but are also happy to consider proposals which focus on individual writers, or individuals in the same tradition. It is timely and valuable to bring these trends and historical sources together by founding the Series, focusing mainly on the Republican period and the Principate, as well as the Later Roman Empire.

Historical writing about Rome in both Latin and Greek forms an integrated topic. There are two strands in ancient writing about the Romans and their empire: (a) the Romans' own tradition of histories of the deeds of the Roman people at home and at war, and (b) Greek historical responses, some developing their own models (Polybius, Josephus) and the others building on what both the Roman historians and earlier Greeks had written (Dionysius, Appian, Cassius Dio). Whereas older scholarship tended to privilege a small group of 'great historians' (the likes of Sallust, Livy, Tacitus), recent work has rightly brought out the diversity of the traditions and recognized that even 'minor' writers are worth exploring not just as sources, but for their own concerns and reinterpretation of their material (such as *The Fragments of the Roman Historians* (2013), and the collected volumes on Velleius Paterculus (Cowan 2011) and Appian (Welch 2015)). The study of these historiographical traditions is essential as a counterbalance to the traditional use of ancient authors as a handy resource, with scholars looking at isolated sections of their structure. This fragmentary use of the ancient evidence makes us forget to reflect on their work in its textual and contextual entirety.

Introducing Cassius Dio's Forgotten History of Early Rome

When we formulated the editorial statement for the *Historiography of Rome and Its Empire* series, we emphasised our aim to identify debates and trends. In addition, we wanted to help further a more diverse approach to Roman historiography, focusing also on the so-called minor writers such as Cassius Dio, a Roman senator and historian from the second and third

centuries CE. Consequently, the first volume of the series is entitled *Cassius Dio: Greek Intellectual and Roman Politician* (Lange & Madsen 2016). The pioneering work of Fergus Millar (1964), supplemented by later commentaries (Reinhold 1988; Rich 1990; Swan 2004), as well as the highly important study of Alain Gowing (1992), has done tremendous work in bringing this much neglected historian to the attention of scholars. Recent years, however, have appreciably seen a renewed and growing interest in Cassius Dio, due mainly to two facts: first, that he is still understudied and even poorly understood, and second, that his work is a vital piece of evidence for understanding Roman history. Cassius Dio is the most detailed extant source for the reign of Augustus and fundamental to the study of the Late Republic and the Principate until 229 CE, when he retired from Roman politics. A French collaboration has so far produced an edited volume (Fromentin 2016) as well as numerous new commentaries/translations in the *Budé/Les Belles Lettres* series. *The Society for Classical Studies* has just published a fine new volume (Scott 2018) and forthcoming volumes include a new historical commentary by Christopher Mallan (2019) and a full re-evaluation of the historian's speeches by Christopher Burden-Strevens (2019, to be published in the *HRE* series). Cassius Dio is also soon to benefit from his first companion volume, also to be published with Brill (Lange, C.H., Madsen, J.M. & Scott, A.G., eds.). These are undoubtedly exciting times for ancient Roman historiography.

The first volume of the series grew out of what later became the *Cassius Dio Network: Cassius Dio, Between History and Politics*. The Network, pursuing a combined historiographic, literary and rhetorical analysis of Cassius Dio's work and of its political and intellectual agendas (*contra* Millar 1964)—most notably his singular vision of an idealised form of monarchy—will publish the following volumes over the coming years: J.M. Madsen & C.H. Lange (eds.) *Cassius Dio the Historian: Methods and Approaches*; Osgood, J. & Baron, C. (eds.) *Cassius Dio and the Late Republic*; Lange, C.H. & Scott, A.G. (eds.) *Cassius Dio: the Impact of Violence, War, and Civil War*; Bailey, C. & Kemezis, A. (eds.) *Greek and Roman Pasts in the Long Second Century: The Intellectual Climate of Cassius Dio*; and Hinge, G. & Madsen, J.M. (eds.) *Cassius Dio and the Principate*. It quickly becomes evident—looking at the list of volumes—that we, the Network, forgot an essential and (even more so!) grossly understudied part of Cassius Dio, his fragmented books. Luckily the editors of this volume (*HRE* III) are both members of the Network and as a result it was possible to persuade them to publish this volume in the *HRE* series. The volume is best understood as part of growing trend of looking and at and re-evaluating fragments – pioneered by the fundamental *Fragments of the Roman Historians* project (2013) and the much-awaited results

of the *Fragments of the Republican Roman Orators* project headed by Catherine Steel. In keeping with these trends, this volume aims to help us understand the fragments as part of Cassius Dio's 80-volume *Roman History* in its textual and contextual entirety, thus allowing us to link and understand the different parts of his work. This is quite a radical departure from the traditional use of Cassius Dio's fragmentary books.

Historical writing should be defined broadly (Marincola 1997, 1-2), but in simple terms Roman historiography is the study of ancient Roman historians. These include debates about history and rhetoric and the question of whether ancient history was "literature" (with opposite positions being held by two University of Virginia scholars: Woodman 1988 vs. Lendon 2009). The genre debate also involves discussions about the boundaries between history and antiquarianism (the classic account is Momigliano 1990; cf. Oakley 1997, 33). Adding to this debate, MacRae has now convincingly suggested that the modern separation of history and antiquarianism is an anachronism that was invented by Renaissance scholars (MacRae 2018, published in volume II in the *HRE* series). There was neither a word for nor a concept of antiquarianism in ancient Rome. It might of course still be a useful term, separating the two genres: one synchronic, thus ignoring historical context, and one diachronic. Importantly, the old *dictum* stands, that we need to define what we mean by the terms and concepts. Historiography is the evolving and changing interpretations of history, including today's perceptions of previous scholarship (Louis 1999, viii). Looking at the case of Cassius Dio, it emerges that he sought to make his clear mark on early Roman history. Violence, *stasis* and civil war were integral parts of Rome's legacy and furthermore, he used the early books to explore political issues relevant to his contemporary world, including debates about monarchy. These are all issues of great importance and integral to understanding the *Roman History* in its entirety.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Christopher Burden-Strevens is Lecturer in Ancient History at Kent, having previously taught at Durham and Glasgow, where he completed his Ph.D. in 2015 as part of the *Fragments of the Republican Roman Orators* project directed by Catherine Steel. He is especially interested in speeches in historiography and their application to Roman history, on which he has published several chapters including “Reconstructing Republican Oratory in Cassius’ Dio’s *Roman History*” (in Gray *et al.*, 2018) and “Fictitious Speeches, Envy, & the Habituation to Authority: Writing the Collapse of the Roman Republic” (in Lange & Madsen, 2016). More generally he is interested in all aspects of Republican political history, currently the dictatorship in particular (on which see recently “The Republican Dictatorship: an Imperial Perspective” in Osgood & Baron, forthcoming 2019). In addition to co-editing this volume with Mads Lindholmer he is author of the forthcoming 2019 monograph, *Cassius Dio’s Speeches & the Collapse of the Roman Republic*, and is preparing a new introduction to Dio.

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Marianne Coudry (Professor Emeritus of Roman History, Université de Haute-Alsace, FR) is a specialist of the Roman Senate of the Mid- and Late Republic (thesis in 1989 and many articles), and more generally of the political culture and society of the Roman Republic. She has recently co-edited a first volume on utopia in Greece and Rome, with Maria Teresa Schettino (*L’utopie politique et la cité idéale, Politica Antica V*, 2015), the second one being forthcoming. She has written on several Roman laws for the LEPOR database (URL : <http://www.cn-telma.fr/lepor/>). She is author, with Guy Lachenaud, of the edition-translation-commentary of Cassius Dio’ *Roman History*, Books 36–37 and Books 38–40 in the Collection des Universités de France, Paris (2014 and 2011), and has written several contributions in *Cassius Dion : nouvelles lectures*, Valérie Fromentin et alii (ed.), (Bordeaux, Ausonius, 2016).

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Valérie Fromentin is Professor of Greek Language & Literature at Université Bordeaux Montaigne. Her two particular areas of interest and expertise are the history of Greek and

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Brandon Jones, Lecturer in Classical Studies at Boston University, has taught at Millsaps College, the Intercollegiate Center for Classical Studies at Rome, the University of Puget Sound and the University of Washington, where he received his Ph.D. in 2015. His chief interests lie in historiography, rhetoric and social and intellectual history during the Roman Empire. He is author of several chapter-length studies on Cassius Dio including “Cassius Dio—*Pepaideumenos* and Politician on Kingship,” also in Brill’s *Historiography of Rome and Its Empire* series. His first monograph is in progress under the working title *Greek Education, Roman Status: Studies of Paideia in Latin Prose*.

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Mads Ortving Lindholmer is a Ph.D. student at University of St Andrews where he is engaged in a project on the imperial *salutatio*. He received his M.Phil. from University of Glasgow with a thesis on Dio's Late Republic and his BA from University of Southern Denmark. Lindholmer is the author of several forthcoming chapters and articles on Cassius Dio. Lindholmer's research interests include the political history of the Late Roman Republic and the Roman Empire as well as imperial historiography.

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John Rich is Emeritus Professor of Roman History at the University of Nottingham. He is the author of *Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion* (1976), *Cassius Dio, The Augustan Settlement (Roman History 53-55.9)* (1990), and numerous

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Gianpaolo Urso

Having recently worked as postdoctoral fellow in the LabEx Sciences Archéologiques (Bordeaux), Gianpaolo Urso is the author of three monographs: *Taranto e gli xenikoi strategoi* (1998), *Cassio Dione e i magistrati: Le origini della repubblica nei frammenti della “Storia romana”* (2005), and *Cassio Dione e i sovversivi: La crisi della repubblica nei frammenti della “Storia romana”* (2013). He has published numerous articles and chapters on Roman Republican history and on the Greek and Latin historiography of Rome. He has edited the proceedings of the international conferences of the Fondazione Niccolo Canussio (2000–2014, fourteen volumes) and has co-edited, with Valérie Fromentin and others, the recent collective volume entitled *Cassius Dion: nouvelles lectures* (Bordeaux, 2016).

INTRODUCTION

Christopher Burden-Strevens

Zonaras' chief usefulness with regard to Dio is that he preserves the structure of the first twenty books. Dio's treatment of the history of Rome to 146 B.C. has never been discussed except in terms of source-criticism, and is not analysed in the present work. The task would repay anyone who attempted it.¹

More than half a century has passed since Fergus Millar opened his seminal *Study of Cassius Dio* with this emphasis on the importance of the first two decades of Dio's *Roman History*. Cassius Dio's eighty-book history of Rome, researched and written over a period of twenty-two years beginning perhaps in the 190s or 200s CE,² represents the most ambitious project in Roman historiography since Tacitus, and the fullest treatment of the history of the city since Livy and Dionysius.³ In recognition of this fact, recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in the *Roman History* from both literary and historical perspectives. Much recent work has focussed on Cassius Dio's value as an eyewitness source for the events of 182–229 CE, during which time the historian had privileged access, first as a senator, then as a provincial administrator and imperial *comes*, to the emperor and his subjects.⁴ This

¹ Millar 1964, 3.

² The proposed dates of composition for Dio's history vary. The earliest proposals envisage completion of the bulk of the work as early as the 210s CE, with subsequent revisions and additions (so Gabba 1995, 295–301; Millar 1964, 28–32; Swan 1997, 2549–2555; Swan 2004, 28–36) and the latest suggest completion even in the 220s or 230s (Letta 1979; Barnes 1984). For an up-to-date summary of the prevailing views, see Kemezis 2014, 282–293.

³ So Kemezis 2014, 92 : “His is the only work we know of from antiquity, lost or extant, to have embraced in such a detailed narrative both the entire republican period and a substantial stretch of the monarchical period. Other authors, most obviously Livy, had produced works that were much longer in terms of volume of text. Universal historians such as Diodorus or Nicolaus had covered a longer chronological span, thanks to the incorporation of large amounts of mythological and non-Greco-Roman material. No author, however, follows a single polity in detail through so many epochs.”

⁴ Millar 1964, 5–27 remains a solid summary of the historian's life and career; the main details can be found at Cass. Dio 69.1.3, 74[73].12.2, 78[72].7.2, 80[79]5.1; *IGRR* 3.654; *PIR* II C 413 and 492. For the dates of his consulship and other provincial commands see Schwartz 1899, 1684–1686; Vrind 1923, 163–168; Gabba 1955,

‘contemporary history’ (or *Zeitgeschichte*) which occupies Books 72–80 is certainly more authoritative than the *Historia Augusta*, and Dio’s deliberate claims to authority as a Roman statesman and courtier throughout these books give a radically different perspective to the comparatively anonymous Herodian.⁵ Equally, the extant sections of the direct tradition (Books 36–60), which cover the history of Rome from the middle of the Third Mithridatic War to the first five years of the reign of Claudius (69 BCE—46 CE) have enjoyed a revival. In part this emerges from the relative security of using these books: they survive in direct, not epitomated, form, and until Augustus’ death in Book 56 present only a few lacunae.⁶ But textual issues aside, the richness of Dio’s account of the final decades of the Republic and the emergence of the Principate of Augustus contained in Books 36–56 is incontrovertible, and has facilitated a tremendous growth in the scholarship. Cassius Dio was evidently less prone to abridge or compress than our other major Greek historian of this period, Appian;⁷ and recent research has shown the distinctive way in which he treated the decline of the *res publica* into autocracy, with an original attention to the corrosive effect of public speech and ineffective fora of debate,⁸ to the Republic’s institutions and their noxious impact upon political culture,⁹ and to competition for office and prestigious commands.¹⁰ Indeed, Dio’s is by far the most detailed and sophisticated historiographical account we have of the final

289–301; Reinhold 1988, 1–4; Swan 2004, 1–3. Recent studies have also done much to further our understanding of Cassius Dio as an intellectual and researcher within the Severan court, on which see Moscovich 2004 and Jones 2016.

⁵ Seminal works in the study of Dio’s contemporary history begin with Millar 1964, 119–173 and Bering-Staschewski 1981. More recently, Davenport 2012 and Scott 2015 on Cassius Dio and Caracalla, with further related material in Schulz 2016; also Gleason 2011. Dio’s claims to authority have been recently discussed, though mainly from a linguistic perspective, in Burden-Strevens 2015a. For a recent discussion of the identity of Herodian and his reticence to divulge, see Kemezis 2014, 260–272, 304–308.

⁶ See John Rich in this volume.

⁷ The major comparison of Cassius Dio and his predecessor Appian remains Gowing 1992, with special reference to their accounts of the triumviral period; see also Hose 1994. The contributions in the recent volume of Welch 2015 concentrate more on Appian on his own terms; a full treatment of Appian and Cassius Dio for those sections of the narrative not discussed by Alain Gowing remains to be done.

⁸ Vervaeke 2010; Kemezis 2014; Burden-Strevens 2015b and 2016; Mallan 2016.

⁹ Coudry 2016a and 2016b; Lindholmer 2016; Burden-Strevens forthcoming 2019. On the origin of these institutions, see Urso 2005.

¹⁰ Kemezis 2014; Hurllet 2016; Coudry forthcoming 2019.

decades of the Republic—compare, for example, with Sallust, Appian, and the *Periochae*—and so too for the Principate of Augustus.

Yet the first twenty books—a quarter of the historian’s massive project—have not generally shared in this increase in interest. They begin with the earliest myths surrounding the foundation of the city and close, in Book 21, with the final defeat of Carthage. These are, certainly, the least researched and least understood parts of all Cassius Dio’s ambitious undertaking. Historically, the most conventional approach to Dio’s earlier books up to Book 21 has been to concentrate on his dependence upon his sources, and especially Livy.¹¹ One remarkable feature of these earlier parts of the work, as discussed by Jan Libourel some fifty years ago, is their pessimistic interpretation of human nature; Dio’s is by some margin the most violent and negative account we have of the patrician-plebeian struggle which (if we are not too radical with the tradition) marked the first two centuries of the Republic.¹² Yet for Libourel, this phenomenon emerged from the historian’s sources, perhaps a now-lost annalist who was more hostile toward Rome and its early history than either Dionysius or Livy. The assumption here is that Dio was ‘following’ a source rather than making a distinctive contribution to the tradition or shaping ‘early Rome’ in deliberate ways that would interact with other sections of his *Roman History* in the pursuit of a particular rhetorical objective. The tendency to focus on Dio’s first two decades only insofar as they evince his debt to a particular source or ‘model’ continues today. Hence in the magisterial collection of 46 chapters recently published in edited format by Valérie Fromentin, Estelle Bertrand, Michèle Coltelloni-Trannoy, Michel Molin, and Gianpaolo Urso—the largest single collection of new research on our historian—the questions posed of the first two decades remain these: from which sources did Dio draw? Was he modelling himself upon Livy, Dionysius, or Polybius? Or did he draw from a variety of traditions?¹³ Naturally these are important questions, and the answers proposed for them in that landmark collaboration have been sympathetic. But the point of departure for this volume is that we will also benefit from studying Cassius Dio’s portrait of ‘early Rome’ for its own sake, and with a different set of questions in mind.

¹¹ Schwartz 1899, 1692f.; Klotz 1936; most recently Simons 2009, who devotes significant attention to *Quellenforschung*.

¹² Libourel 1968, 1974.

¹³ Briquel 2016; De Franchis 2016; Fromentin 2016; Foulon 2016; Simon 2016; Urso 2016. This list does not include Rich 2016, who uses Dio’s first three decades for a study on annalistic organisation and structure in the earlier portions of the work.

These questions are fundamentally concerned with the unity of the *Roman History* as an historiographical whole. In other words, the purpose of this volume is to consider Dio's first two decades as an integral part of the text in the round. Cassius Dio tells us himself that his history had its earliest origins in a pamphlet he had written some time after 193 CE on the dreams and portents which inspired Septimius Severus to hope for power. According to Dio, Severus was (naturally) only too pleased to find divine approbation for his new position, and after receiving a long and complimentary letter from the emperor, Dio was visited by a dream in which a divine manifestation (τὸ δαιμόνιον) commanded him to write a history. This appears to have started as a monograph on Septimius Severus' campaigns; and, finding high approval with the new emperor as well as with other members of the court, Dio decided to go back to the beginning, incorporating this monograph into a single history *ab urbe condita*.¹⁴ This was the first history of its kind since Livy, but with the addition of an extra two centuries of events. Like Livy's, Cassius Dio's project began in the aftermath of civil war. But by his own admission, it was the recent struggles of the year 193 CE, the 'Year of the Five Emperors', which inspired him to return to Rome's earliest origins. The history as a whole is thus the *product* of civil war in a way quite unlike Livy's.¹⁵ That is a story which begins with the contention between Alba Longa and Rome and the so-called Conflict of the Orders, and continuing through the upheaval of the first century BCE. Yet unlike Livy, Dio's history presses on to the contest of 69 CE and to the many internecine conflicts following Commodus' assassination. Armed with two hundred years' more hindsight than his immediate predecessor in this branch of the annalistic tradition, Dio consequently viewed *stasis* and civil war as integral parts of Rome's legacy from the beginning to its end. Accordingly, one of our questions in this volume is the extent to which Dio's account of *stasis* in his early books, especially in the patrician-plebeian struggle, intersects with his interpretation of the reasons for the decline of the Late Republic, and serves as a prolepsis to it. The result, as Carsten Hjort Lange shows in Chapter Six, is ultimately connected to government: to Dio, violence was the natural crop of δημοκρατία. The Republican 'constitution' was always brittle, and the germ of that argument is to be found in the historian's account of the earliest years of the *res publica*.

It is only through reading the first two decades that we can perceive the source of that inherent weakness in Republican government. As Mads Lindholmer explores in Chapter

¹⁴ Cass. Dio 73.23.

¹⁵ See the comments by Verena Schulz in this volume.

Seven, Cassius Dio developed a political philosophy from his earliest books which was sceptical toward fundamental democratic principles, especially *ισονομία* (equality of political privilege) and *ισομοιρία* (equality of distribution).¹⁶ This emerges from his pessimistic view of φύσις (human nature), in which it is not man's predisposition to share power, but rather to dominate. Thus in our earliest fragments of the first book, Dio writes that "it is no doubt because of his nature that mankind cannot endure being ruled by that which is like and similar to him, partly because of envy and partly because of contempt".¹⁷ The attribution of the fragment is uncertain: Boissevain associates it with Zonaras' account of Romulus' murder at the hands of the Senate. If this is correct, then Dio sought to depart from Livy quite radically at an early stage. Romulus' nebulous disappearance is not (so Livy) an example of the king's apotheosis and the divine favour of the fledgling city.¹⁸ Rather, it was a chance for the historian to reflect on the inevitable consequences of the unequal distribution of power and privilege among natural equals: envy, contempt, and (in Romulus' case) murder at the hands of an internecine Senate. These ideas recur repeatedly throughout Dio's early books, for example concerning the reign of Numa and the conflict between the Roman king Tullius Hostilius and the Alban dictator Fufetius Mettius.¹⁹ As we move into his account of the early Republic, that pessimism continues: the historian underlines repeatedly that power-sharing of the kind necessarily involved in a δημοκρατία would always be flawed owing to man's nature.²⁰ These ideas are, of course, not new: the historian's debt to Classical Athens here is undeniable.²¹ The use of φύσις as an explanatory model for historical events is equally

¹⁶ I recently explored these ideas in a paper entitled 'Reconstructing Cassius Dio's Programmatic Preface?' at the conference *Cassius Dio the Historian: Methods and Approaches* at the University of Southern Denmark, 7–9 December 2016. Granted, Fechner 1986, 37–39, 46 treats *ισονομία* and *ισομοιρία* as neutral terms in Dio, but this seems mistaken; they are loaded with hostility and irony, especially in the speeches. Hence Catulus at 36.32 and Agrippa at 52.4.1–3 extol 'democratic' virtues of *ισονομία* and *ισομοιρία* which have no relationship whatsoever with the actual tenor of the Republican narrative, and which we know (now) from the early books Dio roundly rejected in practice. See Kemezis 2014, 111–112 and 130; Burden-Strevens 2015, 21–22 and 138–195.

¹⁷ Cass. Dio F 5.12: Δίων α 'οὐτῶ που φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον οὐ φέρει πρὸς τε τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ συνήθους, τὰ μὲν φθόνῳ τὰ δὲ καταφρονήσει αὐτοῦ, ἀρχόμενον'.

¹⁸ Livy. 1.16.

¹⁹ Cass. Dio F 6.3, F 7.2–3.

²⁰ Zonar. 2.120.28–33 (Dindorf); Cass. Dio F 17.14, F 17.15.

²¹ For example, Plat. *Gorg.*; Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.*

Classical, and Dio's debt to Thucydides' pessimistic view of human nature is acknowledged throughout this volume.²² But Cassius Dio is our first interpreter of the rise and fall of the Roman Republic to have explained that process through a theoretical critique of power-sharing and equality, applying Greek political philosophy to Roman political practice. Moreover, as Mads Lindholmer's contribution shows, these ideas permeate the entirety of Dio's account of the Republic to its end with the accession of Augustus in Book 53. The early books—especially those which treat the Regal Period and the early Republic—are thus intimately connected to the remainder of the historian's narrative. These books have a programmatic function, introducing themes and ideas, such as the inevitability of destructive competition in a system based on equality, and the inevitability of pernicious envy (φθόνος) under a δημοκρατία,²³ which will be integral to Dio's interpretation of the crisis of the Republic in the remaining decades.

One of the questions posed in this volume is thus whether Cassius Dio sought to make his own mark on the city's early years, and how this account fits within his overall interpretation of Roman history as a whole. Dio's is evidently the most pessimistic account we have of these years, breaking in a distinctive way with the idealised Roman tradition—exemplified by Sallust and Livy—of moral decline from a golden age (the *Dekadenzmodell*).²⁴ What emerges from this inquiry is that Dio viewed *stasis* and civil war as integral parts of Rome's legacy, and saw competition and envy as the natural consequence of Republican government from its inception. In his narrative of the last century of the *res publica* it is clearly the latter which causes the former; and these are ideas which the historian had in mind from the very beginning of his work.

There were of course exemplary and positive figures in Rome's earlier history, too. It would be wrong to view the first two decades of the *Roman History* as uniquely and

²² E.g. in the contributions of Lange (Chapter Six), Rich (Chapter Eight) and Schulz (Chapter Ten). Rees 2011 gives the fullest study of Cassius Dio's use of φύσις in his history and its relation to Thucydides. The scholarship on Dio's debt to Thucydides is considerable; the present volume chooses to explore new areas of study and will make no attempt to repeat the arguments of an already saturated field. For Dio and Thucydides, see Melber 1891, 290–297; Litsch 1893; Kyhnitzsch 1894; Schwartz 1899, 1690–1691; Millar 1964, 42; Manuwald 1979, 280–284; Aalders 1986, 294; Lintott 1997, 2499–2500.

²³ On which see Simons 2009, 222–240 and Burden-Strevens 2016.

²⁴ Discussed in Hose 1994, 381–383, esp. 405. Hose argues that ultimately, Dio's history was not conceived according to a framework of moral decline. But this is not a question of straight affirmatives and negatives: see nn. 59–60 below and Mads Lindholmer in this volume.

consistently hostile. The figures of Scipio Africanus the elder, M. Furius Camillus, and C. Fabricius Luscinus had their place in the tradition, and the historian did not pass them by. Scipio Dio treats as an exemplary figure, virtuous and blameless;²⁵ Camillus proves his integrity by refusing to take Falerii in c.394 BC by means of treachery;²⁶ and Fabricius negotiations with the invading king of Epirus, Pyrrhus, prove his ἀδωροδοκία (incorruptibility), untempted by offers of gifts and a prestigious place in Pyrrhus' court.²⁷ As Marianne Coudry shows in Chapter Five, Dio's account of these figures is conventional, posing no challenge to the use of these characters as *exempla* in the annals of earlier Rome. However, she argues that the historian also shaped his portraits of Scipio, Camillus, and Fabricius in a meaningful and distinctive way which served two purposes. Firstly, Dio deliberately uses all three commanders as a first (surviving) opportunity to explore constitutional and political topics which will be relevant to his Late Republican narrative. These topics include, for example, extra-legal power and extraordinary commands; respect for ancestral custom; the corrosive relationship between achievement and envy; and the political impact of the Roman triumph and military success. These issues will be familiar to anyone who has read Dio's Republican books, and especially Books 36–44: they are the pillars of the historian's explanatory framework for the crisis of the Republic. This then raises a second purpose: the use of these figures as a prolepsis, or foreshadowing, of Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar. Scipio Africanus in particular is related to these figures in a deliberate way, and neither he nor Camillus, for all their excellence, are able to escape the envy of their peers, who seek to impede their success with often disastrous consequences. This evinces a consistent set of political themes and ideas.

Ultimately, the effect of this is to facilitate a critique of democratic government and to foreground the return of monarchy to Rome. Cassius Dio unapologetically believed that monarchy was the best form of constitution;²⁸ in the contributions by Carsten Hjort Lange, Mads Lindholmer, and Marianne Coudry we perceive that the historian considered the δημοκρατία untenable. But autocracy was not a panacea. How, then, to explain the presence of violence and civil war, or tyrannies and *dynasteiai*, or factional strife of the kind seen

²⁵ Cass. Dio F 63.

²⁶ Cass. Dio F 24.2–3. Throughout this volume, all dates prior to the turn of the third century BCE should be read as approximate.

²⁷ Cass. Dio F 40.33–38.

²⁸ So Cassius Dio underlines in his own voice at 44.2 and 53.19; for further discussion, see Madsen 2016.

under the Republic, within the monarchies of the Regal Period and the Principate? Dio is the only historian of early Rome within the *ab urbe condita* tradition to have witnessed the mechanisms of imperial rule under the Principate first-hand as well as reading the mytho-history of the early kings. Understandably unlike Dionysius and Livy, he included both in his *Roman History*. This raises several intriguing possibilities to be explored in this little book.

One of these is the history of the Senate. Dio did not challenge the tradition that the Senate owed its foundation to Romulus, and so believed that by the 3rd century CE the *patres* had existed as a political organisation for almost a millennium:²⁹ first as an advisory council of elders under the early kings, then as the arbiters of power in an oligarchic Republic, then as the instruments of a small cadre of dynasts under the late-Republican *dynasteia*,³⁰ and finally as powerless witnesses to a monarchy reborn. Dio's interest in the history of the Senate and its role within a truly well-governed state—which, in his view, must be a monarchy—emerges from some of the earliest fragments in the text. Thus Romulus is made to assume a harsh attitude to the Senate and circumvent it, commenting that “I have chosen you, *patres*, not for you to rule me, but for me to command you”;³¹ equally, Tarquinius Superbus is made to consider abolishing the *ordo* altogether.³² As Jesper Majbom Madsen shows in Chapter Four, Dio was prompted to reflect at length on the role of the Senate in an ideal monarchy by the turn of recent events in his lifetime: the end of the system of imperial adoption from the ranks of the Senate which had been practiced between 96 and 161 CE, the emergence of the Severan dynasty, and the persecution of senators unfortunate enough to have taken the wrong side. In that context, the giant speeches of Agrippa and Maecenas in Book 52 prior to Augustus' accession, which contain much comment on the composition and role of the Senate, take on particular weight—especially if we believe Millar's suggestion that they were declaimed *viva voce* in the court of the Severan emperor Caracalla.³³ As Jesper Madsen shows, this is all part of a narrative which begins in the early books. As a Severan

²⁹ In this volume, *patres* is used to denote the Senate or senators in general, but see Forsythe 2005, 167–170 for an interpretation of the term in its original usage.

³⁰ On *dynasteia* as a specific period in Rome's history in Dio, see Kemezis 2014, 104–112; for the definition and its use by the historian in both the singular and plural, Freyburger-Galland 1996.

³¹ Cass. Dio F 1.11: ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ πατέρες, ἐξελεξάμην οὐχ ἵνα ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἄρχητε, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐπιτάττωμι.

³² Cass. Dio F 11.4.

³³ Millar 1964, 104.

senator, Dio used his *Roman History* to record not only a version of ‘what happened’, but to address a contemporary audience with similar political concerns.

A related issue is the character of the ruler. The ideal monarchy depends as much upon the character and communication of the monarch *per se* as upon his interactions with the senatorial elite. Here, too, Cassius Dio appears to have used his early books as a means of exploring political issues relevant to the third-century context. Dio’s first two books evidently covered the mytho-history of the Roman kings from Romulus to Tarquinius Superbus. Book 3, to judge from the character of the remaining fragments, must have been a substantial series of debates broadly analogous with the ‘Republic *versus* monarchy’ theme of Agrippa and Maecenas in Book 52, and may well have occupied the entirety of the book, including an embassy from Tarquinius Superbus in exile in Caere.³⁴ In a significant change in our approach, this means that we cannot fully appreciate the Agrippa and Maecenas debate of Book 52, which closes the Republican narrative, without considering also the debates of Book 3 that open it.³⁵ This raises the question of whether we can relate the material of the first two books to later sections of the *Roman History* in a similar way. As Verena Schulz demonstrates in Chapter Ten, Dio used his account of the early kings in a distinctive way apparently unique within Roman historiography, establishing a series of criteria of evaluation which would recur in the Imperial books, and especially in Books 72–80. Thus the change in (for example) Septimius Severus’ character upon his accession recalls a similar transformation in Lucius Tarquinius Priscus; and the tale of Tanaquil, the wife of Priscus and mother-in-law and promoter of Servius Tullius, foreshadows the relationship between Augustus, Livia, and Tiberius later. Dio clearly used intertextualities, analepsis, and prolepsis to create typologies in the Regal narrative which can be recalled during the ‘contemporary’ books in a meaningful way, facilitating comparison between Rome’s ancient and contemporary kings and using the past in polemic of the present.

The kinds of question posed above and in this volume thus relate to Cassius Dio’s political and philosophical views, the way in which these were explored and articulated in *all* parts of his *Roman History*, and how Dio used these principles to explain the cause of

³⁴ See the contribution of John Rich (Chapter Six) in this volume.

³⁵ An enormous amount has been written on the long *controversia* of Book 52, but far less so about that of Book 3. For the debates on the foundation of the Republic, see briefly Fechner 1986, 39–40. For Maecenas, see Hammond 1932, 88–102; Beicken 1962, 444–467; Millar 1964, 102–118; Dorandi 1985, 56–60; Fechner 1986, 71–86. For Agrippa, see McKechnie 1981, 151–153; Fechner 1986, 71–86; Adler 2012, 477–520. For recent comparison of the two, Kemezis 2014, 130–131 and Burden-Strevens 2016. This list is by no means exhaustive.

historical events—especially the emergence and decline of the Republic and the success of emperors. One question not necessarily asked in this volume is “what happened”. Recent works on the history of early Rome to the First Punic War already fulfil this purpose; our concern has been to study Dio’s first two decads in historiographical terms and on their own account. It is remarkable, however, that important scholarship on early Rome has tended not to factor Cassius Dio’s first two decads into its comparison of the source-material. Gary Forsythe’s 2005 *Critical History of Early Rome* includes in its survey of the literary evidence sources which are entirely lost, such as Q. Claudius Quadrigarius (fl. 70s BCE), yet does not include Cassius Dio, whom we have, both in substantial fragments and in epitomated form. Similarly, Forsythe draws from Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, two of our other Greek sources for the early history of Rome, but does not mention Dio anywhere in his study. This is especially remarkable if we place the *Roman History* and Diodorus’ *Library of History* side-by-side as projects: Diodorus composed a universal history in forty books encompassing the mainland and western Greek world as well as the Persian empire, devoting comparatively scant attention to Rome.³⁶ Dio, who was far more heavily indebted to the Roman annalistic tradition, sought to write the history of the polity from its origins and on a scale not known since Livy, following decades at the centre of Roman political life.³⁷ Tim Cornell’s 1995 *Beginnings of Rome* is more conservative of the main aspects of the tradition and takes more account of Dio: Cornell has rightly recognised that the *Roman History* is partly independent of both Livy and Dionysius, including details absent in both of those sources, and summarises that “Millar’s observation (p.3) that a special study of the early books would be worth the effort still holds true”.³⁸ Nevertheless, he never draws from what remains of Dio’s first two decads and rarely from Zonaras’ epitome of them.³⁹ Forsythe’s and Cornell’s invaluable historical studies naturally ask different questions of the material to this collection. However, it is the premise of this volume that we can facilitate historical analysis

³⁶ Forsythe 2005, 69: “the oddities of Diodorus’ Roman material can usually be attributed to the author’s own carelessness and general indifference to the details of the annalistic tradition”.

³⁷ To compare Cassius Dio and Diodorus in this way does not suggest acceptance that the latter was a “slavish compiler” and an uncritical copyist of what he read; for the debunking of this view see Sacks 1990. My purpose here is to underline the relative importance of Cassius Dio as a source for Roman history (his project) in comparison to Diodorus (not his project). For the sophistication of certain of Diodorus’ techniques and his approach to history-writing in general in conversation with the Greek tradition, see recently Hau 2016.

³⁸ Cornell 1995, 3 and n.6.

³⁹ See Cornell 1995, 264, 367, 463 n.22, 465 n.20.

by understanding our sources. It remains the case that Cassius Dio's early books have never been studied for their own sake—a situation incomparable to that of other major historians of early Rome.⁴⁰ Our hope is that modern historians of this period will form a more reliable picture of early Rome, enhanced by Dio's analysis, by understanding his preoccupations and ideas. This can lead us more confidently to accept, or reject, the perspective he offers on events.

A question of understandable interest to ancient historians will be Cassius Dio's sources for the period. As already mentioned,⁴¹ *Quellenforschung* has long enjoyed a privileged position in the scholarship on the earlier portions of the *Roman History*. Moreover, the recent collection of Valérie Fromentin *et al.* explores some very fruitful possibilities for Dio's sources and/or models, including Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Dio's debt to both of these, and especially the former, has been studied dramatically less than his putative dependence upon Livy. This volume is not generally concerned with source-criticism. Nevertheless, any attempt to understand Dio's distinctiveness as a source for 'early Rome' and his hopes to develop an assertive place within the tradition must confront his relationship with Livy in a way that challenges assumptions about imitation or continuation, and indeed will profit from doing so. This forms the basis of Gianpaolo Urso's investigation in Chapter Two. As Urso states, the model which Dio necessarily had to confront as he set out on his ambitious project was, above all, Livy. He demonstrates that the first two decades of the *Roman History*, just as the Late Republican and Augustan books, evince Dio's remarkable independence and the breadth of his research. As will be clear from the peculiar flavour of Books 1–21, distinctive to Dio and reflecting his own political and philosophical concerns, our historian did not seek to rewrite or imitate his predecessor, less still write a *fine a Livii*. In fact, Cassius Dio appears to have drawn from a range of pre-Livian sources, including information wholly independent of the *Ab Urbe Condita* and giving an alternative version of the early history of Rome.

Setting this aside, if one does wish to use the *Roman History* as an historical source then the greatest drawback which must be addressed is the state of the text. For the earlier portions of the work we are wholly reliant on intermediaries who either excerpted or epitomated sections of Dio for reasons quite different to those of the historian in writing them. For example, the tenth-century *Excerpta Constantiniana*, compiled during the reign of

⁴⁰ E.g. Gabba 1991 on Dionysius; Forsythe 1999 on Livy.

⁴¹ See nn. 11–13 above.

Constantine VII in the tenth century CE, are easily the richest source of verbatim fragments of Dio for the first two decades. But the selection and arrangement of those fragments was directed by the particular interests of the Byzantine excerptors. Thus, segments of the *Roman History* were placed alongside those of other ancient authors into collections of *excerpta* grouped together by theme, for example ‘concerning virtues and vices’ (*Excerpta de Virtutibus et Vitiis*), ‘concerning conspiracies’ (*Excerpta de Insidiis*), ‘concerning moral statements’ (*Excerpta de Sententiis*) and ‘concerning embassies’ (*Excerpta de Legationibus*). These excerpts are often useful to us in identifying (for example) Dio’s possible sources, and especially the range of his moral and political thought (above all the *Excerpta de Sententiis*). Moreover, they can be supplemented by a number of other direct fragments of Dio preserved in other collections: for example, the 141 short quotations in the (possibly) seventh-century *On Syntax*, an anonymous grammatical text;⁴² and up to possibly sixty-six *sententiae* of Dio’s in the gnomological *Florilegium* erroneously ascribed to Maximus the Confessor. The contribution by Christopher Mallan in Chapter Three concerns the methodology of using these collections of fragments, and furthermore serves as a cautionary note. He warns that as we read the precious remains of ‘real’ Dio in the first two decades, we deal with material collected by scholars who had their own authorial agendas: they wove together the fragments of the *Roman History* as well as other authors in such a way as to create their *own* history of the Regal Period. That by no means indicates that our task of using these selections to understand Dio’s first two decades and their place within the history as a whole is hopeless. However, we should not treat these fragments as generally representative of the content of Books 1–21. The apparent abundance of ‘moralising’ statements, for instance, in the remains of the early books can only represent a minute fraction of the historian’s original,⁴³ and the survival of this material has been directed by the ethical and linguistic interests of an audience Dio never planned to address.

Be that as it may, the verbatim fragments that survive of the early books—thanks to the Byzantine excerptors—furnish another benefit of critical importance for our

⁴² For the dating see Petrova 2006, xxviii with fuller treatment in Christopher Mallan’s contribution to this volume.

⁴³ The term ‘moralising’, vague and insubstantial, is often used in criticism of Cassius Dio’s *Roman History*, e.g. Millar 1964, 42–43, 78–83; Lintott 1997, 2501–2502; Rogers 2008, 297, among many other examples. However, see the recent study of Hau 2016 for a reappraisal of the importance of the moral dimension in Greek historiographical explanations, and Burden-Strevens 2015b for Dio’s use of *sententiae* as a means of persuading his audience, especially regarding the validity of his arguments and interpretations.

understanding of Cassius Dio's work. That is their preservation of acts of speech, either as standalone set-pieces or clusters of debate, inserted by the historian throughout Books 1–21. Numerous fragments conserved within the *Excerpta* evidently derive from original orations written by Dio in direct discourse; often these can be easily identified by their use of the second person plural, alongside other lexical clues. The speeches composed by Dio for his *Roman History* are one of the most rich and exciting aspects of his historiographical and explanatory method. Looking forward to the first century BCE, for example, we note that Dio never states in explicit terms the reasons for the Republic's failure and Augustus' success, and certainly never in his own voice. That he leaves to his characters. In Q. Lutatius Catulus' doomed warning against conferring further extraordinary powers upon Pompey (36.31–35), or Cicero's lament at the state of the *res publica* (44.23–49), or Maecenas' recommendations to Octavian (52.14–40), we receive not only a series of statements "appropriate to the speaker and the situation",⁴⁴ but the historian's own extended reflection on the crisis of the Republic and its causes, presented in a more subtle and persuasive idiom than outright authorial assertion. In recent years there has been a move to consider the speeches the essential interpretative kernel of Cassius Dio's *Roman History*, or at least one aspect of it.⁴⁵

The contributions of Valérie Fromentin and John Rich in this volume are therefore of particular interest for scholars concerned with this aspect of Dio's endeavour. Fortunately, the detail on our historian's use of formal orations in the first decades is not only preserved in the direct fragments of the *Excerpta*, but can additionally be supplemented by the work of another Byzantine scholar, Zonaras. John Zonaras, a chronicler and theologian who served as private secretary to Alexios I Komnenos until his death in 1118 CE, used Dio directly as the source for his own work. His *Abridgement of Histories*, a universal history from Creation to Alexios I's death, relied mainly upon Dio—supplemented by Plutarch—for its Books 7–9. These books covered the period from the arrival of Aeneas in Italy to the destruction of Carthage and Corinth. Zonaras' epitome followed the *Roman History* very closely, abridging the content of twenty books of Dio into two of its own. Zonaras' text is often so close to Dio's original that, where parallel passages survive, they are nearly identical; he is accordingly an invaluable source for the original content of Dio's early books. Certain liberties taken by Zonaras elsewhere with his source-material, including the excising of entire

⁴⁴ Lucian, *Hist. Cons.* 58; Quint. *Inst. Or.* 10.1.101.

⁴⁵ So Kemezis 2014; 2016; Burden-Strevens 2015; 2016; forthcoming 2019; Coudry 2016a; further comments in Valérie Fromentin's contribution below (p.49).

passages or their abridgement to a single note,⁴⁶ do not detract from the general picture. Unfortunately for us, Zonaras was only able to use Dio for events up to 146 BCE. At this point he explains in some detail that, despite an enthusiastic search (ταῦτα πολλάκις ζητήσαντί μοι ταύτας, μὴ εὐρηκότι δ' ὅμως), his text of the *Roman History* failed somewhere in or around Book 21.⁴⁷

Until Book 21, then, Zonaras' importance cannot be over-emphasised. As a general rule it is safe to assume that material included in Books 7–9 of his *Abridgement of Histories* figured also in the early books of Dio. As Valérie Fromentin shows in Chapter One, this degree of faithfulness on the part of the epitomator can enable us to identify the general outline of an original act of speech included in Dio's text, so giving valuable testimony of the prevalence and role of set-piece orations and debates in the first two decades of the history. Indeed, Valerie Fromentin argues that Zonaras furnishes not only bare *testimonia* indicating that an act of speech occurred, but additionally identifies speakers, context, setting, and usually a brief summary of the overall point expressed. This information is invaluable. As Fromentin notes, it is regrettable that the epitomator does not seem to have appreciated the subtlety with which Cassius Dio deployed these compositions—as means of characterisation, causal explanation, or to elucidate major themes or political and constitutional topics. This only adds to our appreciation of the sophistication of Dio's use of speeches within his text. Nevertheless, Fromentin's contribution to this work demonstrates that our historian used set-piece orations in direct discourse just as fully in the early books as those surviving in the direct tradition. This can only be appreciated thanks to Zonaras' fidelity to his source.

These ideas are developed further in Chapter Eight with John Rich's study of extended and short speech episodes in Books 1–21. To this point research into Cassius Dio's use of speech in the early books has been remarkably limited;⁴⁸ such enquiries are naturally

⁴⁶ For a summary of Zonaras' treatment of Dio's original, including abridgement and summary (as well as insertion and deletion), see Simons 2009, esp. 29–30.

⁴⁷ Zonar. 9.31. For Zonaras there were two possibilities: either the ravages of time had obliterated the remaining books to which he no longer had access (τοῦ χρόνου διεφθαρκότος αὐτάς), or his remote location far from Constantinople was really the point at issue, and a more thorough search in the city might reveal them (αὐτὸς ὑπερόριος ὢν καὶ πόρρω τοῦ ἄστεος ἐν νησιδίῳ ἐνδαιτώμενος). Christopher Mallan's contribution in Chapter Three suggests that the former may have been the case, since interest in Dio after the tenth century appears to have been less for its historical narrative and more for the preservation of individual episodes and *sententiae*.

⁴⁸ See e.g. Millar 1964 79–80; Stekelenburg 1971; Fechner 1986, 29–31, 39–43; Kemezis 2014 106–107.

hampered by the discrete nature of the excerpted fragments that preserve them and by the scale of Zonaras' abridgement, notwithstanding the useful information he provides about their context and performativity. In his contribution, Rich provides the largest and most detailed study to date of the role of such compositions in the fragmentary portions of Dio's *Roman History*. John Rich identifies 16 'extended' and 36 'short' occasions of oratory in these early books: Dio appears to have made just as much (indeed, more) use of formal set-piece orations in Books 1–21 as in Books 36–56. At the same time, he appears to have envisaged a far smaller role for short and informal instances of *oratio recta* for the first two decades than for the later portions. This suggests that Dio's sophisticated method with the speeches of the surviving direct tradition may have been not only the product of his particular interest in the decline of the Late Republic and the transition to the Augustan Principate, but may also have formed part of his methodological approach to speeches from the very beginning of his history. As Rich shows, the array of topics treated in these early speeches is impressive. Thus Dio gave not only episodes well-attested within the tradition, such as the exchange between Pyrrhus of Epirus and Fabricius at Tarentum, or the debates surrounding the repeal of the *lex Oppia* in 195 BCE (present in Dionysius and Livy, respectively).⁴⁹ Rather, Dio appears—in keeping with the particular character of Rome's early conquests—to have concentrated in substantial detail on non-Roman voices. There are speeches of Samnite generals concerning the treatment of Roman captives;⁵⁰ debates at Carthage on the question of war or peace with Rome;⁵¹ and tripartite addresses to armies, involving Hannibal and Hanno at Carthage and Ticinus.⁵² Speeches of this kind are entirely absent from the *Roman History* until Boudicca's battle exhortation in Book 62 (3–5).⁵³ Perhaps, then, Dio used the first two decades to explore Rome's relationship with the peoples of the Mediterranean world in an elaborate manner unrepresented elsewhere in the surviving direct tradition of his work.

Certainly our historian was aware, especially in the early books, of the kinds of conflict and controversy that cultural interactions could provoke. Earlier studies of Cassius Dio as a hellenophone provincial from Nicaea in Bithynia have tended to describe him as a

⁴⁹ D.H. *AR* 19.13–18; Livy 34.1–8.

⁵⁰ Cass. Dio F 36.12, 14.

⁵¹ Cass. Dio F 55.1; Zonar. 8.21.9.

⁵² Cass. Dio F 55.10, F 57.4–5; Zonar. 8.22.5–7, 8.23.8.

⁵³ On which, see Gowing 1997; Adler 2008; 2011.

Greek who became “Romanised”.⁵⁴ Yet, as Brandon Jones’ study in Chapter Nine argues, while Dio may have rejected idealised traditions of the virtue of the early city, he clearly identified with the Roman historiographical *topoi* of *virtus* (ἀνδρεία) and *luxuria* (τρυφή). He associated these traits, respectively, with the period before and after Rome’s involvement in the affairs of the Greek world. This is uncontroversial within Roman historiography: like Sallust and Livy, Cassius Dio conceived of a causal relationship between the growth of empire and so *luxuria* on the one hand, and the decline of *virtus* on the other. Where Dio is more distinctive, as Brandon Jones shows, lies in his inversion of that theme in the contemporary history. Under Caracalla and other Severan emperors it is Rome which exports *luxuria* or τρυφή to the Greek world, not *vice versa*; and in these circumstances it is Dio and his peers who represent *virtus*, the characteristic trapping of true ‘Romanness’.⁵⁵ Cassius Dio’s polemic against the τρυφή of the emperors of his time, and his localisation of ἀνδρεία within himself and with the Senate, is achieved by aligning his contemporary history ideologically and linguistically with the first two decads, using verbal clues to underscore Rome’s cultural transformations past and present.

The research contained within these ten chapters demonstrates the unity of Cassius Dio’s *Roman History* in its textual entirety. The sum total of these contributions asserts our historian’s programmatic use of ‘early Rome’ to introduce major factors of history integral to his explanation of the decline of the Republic: *stasis* and civil war; competition and envy; the role of the Senate in an ideal state; and the importance of speech—especially its moral ambiguity and potential for misuse. At the same time, we show that returning to the earliest history of “this land in which we dwell” had for Dio ideological and political significance. Early Rome provided the historian with a remote, semi-mythical arena to say to his contemporaries that which he felt needed to be said.

Having epitomated the content of this volume, it remains to make some general comments on the organisation of the collection. The ten chapters are arranged by theme into three parts. Part One (‘The Text’) deals with Zonaras, the *Excerpta Constantiniana*, and Dio’s relationship with Livy. Readers unfamiliar with the textual tradition of Books 1–21 will

⁵⁴ Palm 1959, 81–82; Aalders 1986, 283; Reinhold 1986, 220; Gowing 1992, 1 and 10 n.6. For a recent reappraisal, see Burden-Strevens 2015a.

⁵⁵ Hence Kemezis 2014 148–149: “Dio’s final answer is to present as an alternative none other than himself...his model of changing Romanness as represented by the growing appropriation and adaptation of older senatorial traditions by new generations of provincial elites is an important glimpse into the distinctive mind-set of a senatorial aristocracy.”

find Part One especially helpful. But it addresses also controversies familiar to experts of Cassius Dio, and seeks to investigate the problem that all readers of the early books of the *Roman History* face: we are dealing not with one history, one author, and one agenda, but with several. Part Two ('Military & Political History') explores the historian's account of political and military events mainly between the turn of the 5th and turn of the 3rd centuries BCE, from the (alleged) first decade of the Republic to the Hannibalic War. It has in view, particularly, Dio's distinctiveness as a source for this period and his use of 'early Rome' to foreshadow developments in his account of the Late Republic, so aiding his interpretation and explanation of its decline. Finally, Part Three ('Early Rome & Dio's Project') relates the first two decades explicitly to later sections of the *Roman History*, especially the contemporary history of Books 72–80. The purpose of this part is to analyse these early books in relation to the text in the round, and not solely as a prolepsis to the Late Republican narrative. The three chapters contained within this section demonstrate the coherency with which Dio planned his *Roman History*, including a generally consistent approach to the writing of historiographical speeches and a sustained focus on themes important to contemporary political life.

On a final note, it will be apparent that this volume takes a deliberately broad definition of 'early Rome'. The events of Dio's Books 1–21, as we have already stated, guide the reader up to the destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE. This is some one hundred and twenty years later than modern histories of this era in the city's evolution tend to close: a fairly recent device has been to periodise 'early' Rome up to the outbreak of the First Punic War.⁵⁶ The reasons for our approach are partly textual, partly historiographical. On the text, since Zonaras's epitome is of such importance for our understanding of the early books of the *Roman History*, and so frequently discussed here, it makes little sense not to follow his epitome of Rome's earliest centuries to its end. To cease our enquiry with the First Punic War (Zonar. 8.8 = Cass. Dio 11 F 43)⁵⁷ would involve discarding the entire second decade of Dio's history that is as worthy of study, and scarcely researched, as the first. On the historiography, Dio's predecessors in the Latin tradition treated 146 BCE as a turning-point in the history of their polity. Sallust, whose work Dio evidently knew,⁵⁸ dated Rome's decline to the fall of its old enemy: "Carthage, the rival (*aemula*) of the Roman empire, perished from root to tip; all

⁵⁶ So Cornell 1995; Forsythe 2005.

⁵⁷ Book numbers are only approximate; see Christopher Mallan and John Rich in this volume.

⁵⁸ Cass. Dio. 43.9.2–3.

the land and sea lay open; only then did Fortune sully and disorder everything”.⁵⁹ Tacitus’ idea is similar: only when the Romans had subjugated the world and destroyed rival states (*aemulis*) did they fall into cupidity and conflict with one another.⁶⁰ These tropes are schematic and misleading, but Dio accepted the analysis even as he rejected idealistic traditions of a more virtuous ‘earlier’ Rome.⁶¹ He was simply writing a better history-book, not ripping one up.⁶²

⁵⁹ Sall. *Cat.* 10.1–6: *Carthago aemula imperi Romani ab stirpe interiit, cuncta maria terraeque patebant, saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit.*

⁶⁰ Tac. *Hist.* 2.38: *ubi subacto orbe et aemulis urbibus regibusve excisis securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit.*

⁶¹ Fechner 1986, 136–154. Hence, perhaps, the choice to emphasise the momentous occasion with the debate between Scipio Nasica and Cato, which survives now only as a *testimonium* at Zonar. 9.26, and the ‘necrology’ of Carthage at 9.31, both of which will probably have been much fuller in Dio’s original.

⁶² For recent surveys of Dio’s historiographical approach in general (and not in connection with Books 1–21) see Madsen, J.M. & Lange, C.H. (eds.). *Cassius Dio: Greek Intellectual & Roman Politician* (Leiden & Boston, 2016) and Id. (eds.). *Cassius Dio the Historian: Methods and Approaches* (Leiden & Boston, forthcoming 2019).

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Part I: The Text

DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

LA FIABILITÉ DE ZONARAS DANS LES DEUX PREMIÈRES DÉCADES DE *L'HISTOIRE ROMAINE* DE CASSIUS DION: LE CAS DES DISCOURS*

Valérie Fromentin

Pour reconstituer la trame événementielle et la structure narrative des livres 1–21 de *L'Histoire romaine*, le témoignage de Zonaras¹—le seul à proposer un récit chronologique et continu—est essentiel: sans lui, les fragments transmis par les autres sources (*Extraits Constantinien*s, Tzétzès, Souda, Maxime le Confesseur) seraient largement inexploitable, comme on peut le constater lorsque Zonaras délaisse Dion pour les *Vies* de Plutarque ou quand son modèle lui fait défaut.² Pour autant, sa fiabilité ne laisse pas de faire débat car Zonaras affiche une ambition d'historien, et non pas simplement d'excerpteur ou d'abrégiateur, et des principes rédactionnels qui impliquent une sélection et une réécriture au moins partielle du matériau-source.³ De fait, quand la comparaison avec la tradition directe

* Je tiens à remercier vivement le professeur John Rich pour sa relecture pleine d'acribie et toutes ses suggestions, ainsi que Christopher Burden-Strevens pour ses remarques.

¹ Nous disposons de deux éditions de référence pour l'*Épitomé* de Zonaras, qui utilisent en gros les mêmes manuscrits mais différemment. Aucune des deux n'est fondée sur un classement des témoins conservés. Celle de Pinder 1841–1847, continuée par Büttner-Wobst 1897, présente l'avantage de fournir un appareil critique. Cependant nous renverrons ici par commodité aux volumes et pages de l'édition Dindorf 1865–1875, plus usitée car reproduite dans le *TLG*. La division actuelle de l'*Épitomé* en (dix-huit) livres et en chapitres remonte à l'édition Du Cange 1686; la division de ces chapitres en paragraphes a été réalisée par Boissevain, mais uniquement pour la partie du texte de Zonaras correspondant aux deux premières décades (fragmentaires) de l'*HR* (1–21), pour lesquelles l'*Épitomé* est si précieuse. Cette subdivision n'est malheureusement pas reproduite dans les volumes correspondants (I et II) de l'édition Cary dans la Loeb Classical Library.

² Après 146 a.C. C'est en effet pour la première partie de l'*HR* (livres 1–21), depuis la fondation de Rome jusqu'à la fin de la troisième guerre punique, que Zonaras est le plus utile car il s'appuie quasi exclusivement sur Dion, qu'il contamine ponctuellement avec des *Vies* de Plutarque. En revanche, il n'a pas pu utiliser les livres 22 à 35 (qui allaient de 146 a.C jusqu'à la période pompéienne), apparemment déjà perdus à son époque, et bien qu'il disposât des livres 36 à 60, il leur a préféré les *Vies* de Plutarque (*Pompée*, *César*) pour l'équivalent des livres 36–43. Il ne revient à Dion qu'à partir du livre 44. 3 (Zonar. 10.12). Pour les livres 61 à 80, il avait accès à la fois à l'*Histoire romaine* et à l'*Épitomé* de Xiphilin.

³ Dans sa préface (1.2), Zonaras énumère, par la voix de ses amis, les "risques du métier" d'historien: l'abondance de détails superflus, les polémiques inutiles, les digressions hors de propos et l'abus de rhétorique (voir en dernier lieu Bellissime & Berbessou-Broustet 2016, spéc. 100–101).

est possible, c'est-à-dire pour les livres 44–60 de l'*HR*, on constate que si Zonaras est capable d'une fidélité littérale au texte de Dion, il opère également des coupes drastiques dans sa source et prend parfois de grandes libertés avec elle:⁴ il réduit *a minima* ou omet ce qui concerne les affaires intérieures de Rome, l'administration des provinces, les opérations militaires mineures et les passages où Dion, passant du particulier au général, philosophe sur la nature humaine.⁵ Il n'est donc pas surprenant que les éditeurs et commentateurs des deux premières décades de l'*HR* aient adopté à son égard une attitude prudente et circonspecte, refusant à juste titre d'accorder à son récit la même valeur qu'aux *Extraits Constantiniens*.⁶ La confrontation avec ces fragments semble du reste montrer que l'intervention de Zonaras a été tout particulièrement dommageable pour les "discours" de l'*HR*: les prises de position de ce dernier contre l'abus de rhétorique en histoire⁷ et son élimination quasi systématique des passages gnomiques et "moralisants"—heureusement préservés par les *Extraits Constantiniens De sententiis*,⁸ laissent craindre que la version zonarienne ne soit largement "dé-rhétorisée" par rapport à l'original dionien et, par conséquent, la trame discursive de ces livres irrémédiablement abîmée. Nous voudrions néanmoins revenir ici sur cette idée reçue et, sans la remettre totalement en question, lui apporter quelques nuances. Pour cela, il faut d'abord faire un détour par les livres conservés dans la tradition directe (44–60), afin de mieux comprendre le traitement que Zonaras réserve aux discours présents dans cette section de l'*HR*, d'évaluer sa fiabilité dans ce domaine et d'en tirer un enseignement pour la reconstitution des parties discursives qui figuraient dans les deux premières décades.

⁴ Ajouts, recours à des synonymes, inversion de l'ordre des mots, simplification et modification de la syntaxe (voir par ex. Fromentin 2014, xciv-xcviii).

⁵ Comme le prouve notamment la comparaison entre l'Épitomè de Zonaras et celle de Xiphilin pour le livre 54, menée par Millar 1964, 195–203. Sur le travail de "réduction" et de "compression" effectué par Zonaras, voir aussi Moscovich 1983, qui n'évoque cependant pas le cas des discours.

⁶ Sur les *Extraits Constantiniens*, on se reportera à la contribution de Christopher Mallan dans ce volume.

⁷ Zonaras condamne (*Praef.* 1. 2) parmi les historiens "ceux qui composent des histoires pour briller en public, pour montrer leur talent d'écrivain, et qui, pour cette raison, enchaînent les discours au peuple et font un usage exagérément digressif et rhétorique du langage" (τοῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν συντέθινται τὰ συγγράμματα, ἐπιδεικνυμένοι τοῖς ἐπιδεικνυμένοις ὅπως εἶχον περὶ τὸ γράφειν δυνάμει καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δημηγορίας τε μεταξὺ τιθεῖσι καὶ παρεκβατικώτερον ἢ καὶ ῥητορικώτερον κεχρημένοι τῷ λόγῳ). Et il ajoute: "En effet, quelle utilité y aura-t-il à savoir ce que ce démagogue a dit au peuple, ce que ce général a dit à ses soldats, ce que cet empereur a dit aux ambassadeurs des Perses, et cet autre à ceux des Celtes ou des Scythes (...)?"

⁸ Simons 2009, 29–30 donne quelques exemples frappants de ce procédé mais montre aussi qu'il souffre quelques exceptions.

Les discours conservés dans la tradition directe et leur traitement par Zonaras

Les livres 44–60 de l'*HR* contiennent douze discours au *style direct*, dont voici la liste: livre 44: discours de Cicéron au sénat pour demander l'amnistie après l'assassinat de César (c. 23–33); oraison funèbre de César par Antoine (c. 36–49); livre 45: discours de Cicéron au sénat contre Antoine (c.18–47); livre 46: réponse de Calenus (c.1–28); livre 50: harangue d'Antoine (c. 16–22) et harangue du jeune César avant Actium (c. 24–30); livre 52: débat entre Agrippa (c. 2–13) et Mécène (c.14–40); livre 53: discours du jeune César au sénat en janvier 27 a.C. (c. 3–10); livre 55: dialogue Auguste-Livie (c. 14–21); livre 56: discours d'Auguste au sénat (c. 2–9) ; oraison funèbre d'Auguste par Tibère (c. 35–41).

Tous ces discours, sauf un,⁹ ont laissé une trace dans la version de Zonaras. On ne peut cependant manquer d'être frappé par l'importance des réductions opérées par l'historien byzantin.

En effet, aucune partie rhétorique n'est reproduite par lui dans son intégralité et le style direct d'origine n'est conservé qu'à deux reprises: dans le passage de l'oraison funèbre de César au livre 44 où Antoine énumère avec émotion tous les noms du défunt;¹⁰ dans le dialogue nocturne entre Auguste et Livie au livre 55.¹¹

Ailleurs, Zonaras recourt à trois procédés principalement. Premièrement, la focalisation sur un passage précis de la *ῥητορεία* qui est soit repris *in extenso*, soit résumé; c'est ce qui se passe notamment avec le discours de Cicéron (44.23–33) prononcé après l'assassinat de César et demandant l'amnistie pour les meurtriers: Zonaras ne conserve que le c.32, dont il récapitule les arguments.

ὁ δὲ Κικέρων δημηγορήσας ἔπεισε πάντας μὴ μνησικακεῖν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ κἄν τισιν ἡμάρτηταί τι, παρόψεσθαι τοῦτο, ἵνα μὴ ἐμφύλιος καὶ αὖθις γένηται πόλεμος καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ὄλεθρος ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ὀλλυμένων, ὁμονοῆσαι δὲ ὁμοφύλους ὄντας καὶ συγγενεῖς. καὶ προσέθετο δεῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος πραχθέντα, εἴτε ἐν δωρεαῖς ἢ τιμαῖς εἶεν ἢ ἐν ἀρχαῖς, φυλάξαι, καὶ μὴ τι τούτων πολυπραγμονῆσαι ἢ ἀνατρέψαι. πεισθέντες οὖν αὐτῷ μηδενὶ μνησικακεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο.

⁹ Il s'agit du discours d'Auguste aux *equites* en 56. 2–9.

¹⁰ Cass. Dio 44.49 = Zonar. 10.12 (2.373.31–374.21 D).

¹¹ Cass. Dio 55.14.2–21 = Zonar. 10. 37 (2.450.1–14 D).

Zonar.10.12 (2.373.4–13 D): Cicéron prononça un discours par lequel il les persuada tous de ne pas se tenir mutuellement rancune et, même si certains avaient commis des fautes, de les oublier, afin d'éviter une nouvelle guerre civile et un carnage entre citoyens: il leur fallait préserver la concorde puisqu'ils étaient de la même race et de la même famille. Il ajouta qu'on devait conserver aussi ce qui avait été fait par César, qu'il s'agît de cadeaux, d'honneurs ou de charges, ne pas enquêter là-dessus ni revenir en arrière. Ils furent donc convaincus par lui et votèrent le décret d'amnistie.¹²

Deuxièmement, un résumé de l'ensemble du discours ou du débat, comme on le voit pour les discours de Cicéron et de Calenus, qui couvrent respectivement trente et vingt-neuf chapitres dans les livres 45–46 et dont Zonaras réduit le contenu à quelques lignes à chaque fois,¹³ et surtout pour le débat Agrippa-Mécène (52.2–40), qui donne lieu à une version très courte privilégiant les arguments de Mécène:

τὴν μέντοι γνώμην τῷ Ἀγρίππᾳ καὶ τῷ Μαικίῳ, οἷς ἐπίστευε τὰ ἀπόρρητα, κοινωσάμενος, τὴν μὲν Ἀγρίππου γνώμην ἀποτρέπουσαν αὐτὸν τῆς μοναρχίας εὗρηκεν· ὁ δὲ Μαικίῳ τὸναντίον συνεβούλευεν ἅπαν, εἰπὼν ἤδη τὴν μοναρχίαν ἐπὶ πολὺ διοικῆσαι αὐτόν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δυεῖν θάτερον, ἢ μείναι ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι ταῦτα προέμενον. τοῖς γὰρ ἅπαξ μοναρχήσασιν ἀσφαλῶς ἰδιοτεῦσαι εἶναι ἀδύνατον. ὑπέθετο δὲ καὶ ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ δικαίως ἄρξει, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνεπαχθῶς, πολὺν κατατείνας λόγον περὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως. ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ταῦτα ἐπήγαγεν “εἰ ὅσα ἕτερόν τινα ἄρξαντά σου ποιεῖν ἐβούλου, ταῦτα αὐτὸς ἀτεπάγγελτος πράττεις, οὔτε τι ἀμαρτήσεις καὶ πάντα

¹² Cf. Cass. Dio 44.32.

¹³ Discours de Cicéron *apud* Zonar. 10.14 (2. 378. 13–19 D): "Cicéron dit qu'il fallait décréter Antoine ennemi public (cf. Cass. Dio 45.43.2); mais s'agissant de César et de Decimus Brutus, qui s'opposaient à lui, on devait leur décerner des éloges pour ce qu'ils avaient accompli de leur propre chef, leur donner pouvoir pour la suite des événements, envoyer les deux consuls faire la guerre et combattre Antoine sans perdre de temps ni tarder" (cf. Cass. Dio 45.42.4 et 45.45.4). Discours de Calenus *apud* Zonar.10.14 (2.378.19–26 D): "Après que Cicéron eut exprimé cet avis, Quintus (sic) Calenus, qui lui portait la contradiction, donna les conseils suivants: envoyer dire à tous que le sénat leur ordonnait, sans faire de distinction entre eux, de déposer les armes et de se remettre en son pouvoir, eux-mêmes et leurs soldats; féliciter ceux qui auraient obéi, faire la guerre à ceux qui ne se laisseraient pas convaincre et confier la guerre aux consuls" (cf. Cass. Dio 46.27.3–4).

κατορθώσεις, ἥδιστα τε καὶ ἀκινδυνότατα ζήσεις.”

Zonar.10.32 (2.436.7–22 D): Comme il (*i.e.* le jeune César) avait fait part de ses intentions à Agrippa et à Mécène, auxquels il confiait ses secrets, il constata qu'Agrippa avait l'intention de le détourner de la monarchie. Mécène, pour sa part, lui donna un avis absolument contraire, en arguant qu'il exerçait déjà depuis longtemps la monarchie et qu'il lui fallait soit conserver ce qu'il avait, soit perdre la vie en y renonçant : "il est impossible", disait-il, "pour quiconque ayant jamais exercé la monarchie de vivre en sécurité en tant que simple citoyen". Il lui démontra comment il pourrait gouverner à la fois sans risque pour lui et dans le respect de la justice, qui plus est sans trouver cette charge trop lourde, et il s'étendit longuement sur ce sujet. A la fin, il ajouta : "si tu te comportes, de ton propre chef, comme tu voudrais qu'un autre le fasse s'il te gouvernait, tu ne commettras jamais d'erreur, tu n'auras que des succès et tu mèneras par conséquent une vie aussi sûre qu'agréable.

Enfin, ce qu'on pourrait appeler le "degré zéro" de l'abrégement et qui consiste en une simple mention du discours, dont le contenu n'est pas reproduit, même sommairement: c'est le cas des oraisons funèbres d'Auguste par Drusus et Tibère.¹⁴ C'est le cas aussi des harangues d'Antoine et du jeune César avant Actium, qui occupent l'une et l'autre sept chapitres du livre 50 et sont toutes deux évoquées *a minima* par Zonaras:

Zonar.10.29 (2.426.18–20 D): "Antoine, en s'entretenant avec ses soldats, s'efforçait de leur donner du courage pour la bataille navale."¹⁵

Zonar.10.29 (2.426.29–30 D): "César réunit son armée et, par les paroles qu'il prononça, les exhorta au combat."¹⁶

¹⁴ Cass. Dio 56.35–41 = Zonar.10.38 (2. 455. 10–12 D): "Le corps fut sorti et exposé et Tibère et Drusus prononcèrent des éloges funèbres."

¹⁵ Καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας παρεθάρρυνε πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν διαλεχθεὶς αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀντώνιος (cf. Cass. Dio 50.16–22).

¹⁶ Καῖσαρ ... συνήγαγε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ εἰς μάχην δι' ὧν εἴρηκε παρεκάλεσε (cf. Cass. Dio 50.4–30).

Or, cette présentation serait incomplète si l'on n'insistait pas sur un fait à nos yeux remarquable: quelle que soit la forme sous laquelle Zonaras restitue le discours qui figure dans sa source, il n'oublie pas d'indiquer l'effet produit sur ses destinataires. On le constate pour tous les discours au style direct (contenus dans les livres 44–60) énumérés plus haut, à l'exception des deux harangues d'Antoine et du jeune César au livre 50, sur lesquelles nous reviendrons plus loin.¹⁷

Ainsi, malgré la réduction drastique opérée sur le débat entre Agrippa et Mécène,¹⁸ Zonaras préserve—en la reformulant—la conclusion de Dion selon laquelle le futur Auguste, après avoir écouté les avis de ses deux amis, choisit de suivre celui de Mécène:

Μαικήνας μὲν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἐπαύσατο, ὁ δὲ δὴ Καῖσαρ ἀμφοτέρους μὲν σφας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πολυνοίᾳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πολυλογίᾳ τῇ τε παρρησίᾳ ἰσχυρῶς ἐπήνεσε, τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Μαικήνου μᾶλλον εἴλετο.

Cass.Dio 52.41.1: Mécène, après s'être ainsi exprimé, se tut. César les félicita vivement l'un et l'autre pour leur prolixité et leur franchise mais préféra la position défendue par Mécène.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τῷ Καίσαρι συνεβούλευσαν, ὁ δὲ ἄμφω μὲν καὶ ἐθαύμασε καὶ ἐπήνεσεν, εἴλετο δὲ τοῦ Μαικήνου τὴν συμβουλήν.

Zonar.10.32 (2.436.22–24 D): Tels furent les conseils qu'ils donnèrent à César. Ce dernier leur exprima son admiration et les félicita l'un et l'autre, mais préféra l'avis de Mécène.

Il en va de même s'agissant du long "discours d'amnistie" de Cicéron, déjà cité plus haut.¹⁹ Zonaras n'en résume qu'une petite partie (le c.32), mais sa version conserve néanmoins la phrase liminaire et la phrase finale dans lesquelles Dion insiste sur l'effet persuasif de cette intervention qui déboucha immédiatement sur un vote à l'unanimité: Zonar. 10.12 (2.373.4–13 D): "Cicéron prononça un discours par lequel il les persuada tous (= Cass. Dio 44.22.3) de

¹⁷ Voir ci-dessous, p. 46–47.

¹⁸ Voir au dessus, pp. 28–29.

¹⁹ Voir au dessus, p. 27–28.

ne pas(...).²⁰ Ils furent donc convaincus par lui et votèrent le décret d'amnistie" (= Cass. Dio 44.34.1).²¹ Prenons un dernier exemple, parmi de nombreux autres.²² Dans la version très abrégée qu'il donne de la *recusatio imperii* du jeune César devant le sénat, Zonaras résume en quatre lignes l'ensemble du discours, soit neuf chapitres (Cass. Dio 53.3–11), mais reproduit en substance le contenu du chapitre conclusif où Dion décrit les sentiments mêlés et les réactions des auditeurs (53.11):

Καὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ μάλιστα ἐπιτηδεῖους παρασκευάσας εἰς τὴν γερουσίαν εἰσῆλθεν ἑβδομον ὑπατεύων· καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι λέγων τὴν μοναρχίαν καὶ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ποιεῖν, ἐδέετο τούτων δέξασθαι αὐτοῦ τὴν τῆς μοναρχίας ἀπόθεσιν. οἱ δὲ τῆς βουλῆς, οἱ μὲν εἰδότες τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ, οἱ δ' ὑποπεύοντες, οἱ μὲν ἐλέγξαι αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐβούλοντο, οἱ δ' ἐδεδοίκεσαν. ὅθεν καὶ πιστεύειν αὐτῷ οἱ μὲν ἐπλάττοντο, οἱ δὲ ἠναγκάζοντο· καὶ ἐβίασαν δῆθεν αὐτὸν αὐταρχεῖν.

Zonar.10.32 (2.437.9–21D): Après avoir préparé ceux [des sénateurs] qui étaient le plus proches de lui, il entra au sénat en tant que consul pour la septième fois. Il déclara qu'il refusait pour lui-même la monarchie et qu'il agissait en tout sous l'influence des meilleurs, et leur demanda d'accepter son renoncement (= Cass. Dio 53.3–10). Parmi les sénateurs, les uns, qui connaissaient ses intentions, ne voulaient pas le critiquer et les autres, qui se méfiaient de lui, avaient peur de le faire. Par conséquent, soit ils faisaient semblant de le croire, soit ils y étaient poussés: ils ne lui laissèrent pas d'autre choix, paraît-il, que d'accepter le pouvoir absolu (= Cass. Dio 53.11).

²⁰ Cass. Dio: εἶπον ἄλλοι τε ἄλλα, ὡς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐγίγνωσκε, καὶ ὁ Κικέρων τάδε, οἷσπερ καὶ ἐπέισθησαν = Zonaras: ὁ δὲ Κικέρων δημηγορήσας ἔπεισε πάντας...

²¹ Cass. Dio: Κικέρων μὲν τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν ἔπεισε τὴν γερουσίαν μηδένα μηδενὶ μνησικακῆσαι ψηφίσασθαι = Zonar.: πεισθέντες οὖν αὐτῷ μηδενὶ μνησικακεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο.

²² Voir aussi: Zonar.10.37 (2.450.14–15 D): τοιαῦτα πολλὰ τῆς Λιβίας εἰπούσης ὁ Αὐγουστος ἐπέισθη αὐτῇ (cf. Cass. Dio 55. 22 1: ταῦτα τῆς Λιουίας εἰπούσης ὁ Αὐγουστος ἐπέισθη τε αὐτῇ); Zonar.10.13 (2. 374.22–25): ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ δῆμος ἐξοργισθεὶς τοὺς μὲν σφαγεῖς ἐζήτει, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ Καίσαρος ἀρπάσαντες ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἔκασαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φονέων οἰκίας ὄρμησαν... (cf. Cass. Dio 44.50.1: τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἀντωνίου λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἠρεθίζετο, ἔπειτα δὲ ὄργιζετο, καὶ τέλος οὕτως ἐφλέγημηνεν ὥστε τοὺς τε φονέας αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις βουλευταῖς ἐγκαλεῖν...).

On voit donc que si Zonaras abrège les discours—quitte à appauvrir, déformer ou trahir la pensée de Dion—²³ il ne les supprime jamais tout à fait et préserve en tout cas un élément essentiel du dispositif narratif mis en oeuvre par l'historien sévérien: le lien logique (de cause à effet) qui les rattache au récit proprement dit. Car c'est bien Dion et non Zonaras qui est l'auteur de ces "indicateurs d'impact" qui signalent, avant ou après chaque discours, la façon dont il a été reçu par l'auditoire et les décisions ou comportements qu'il a induits. Ce procédé n'a rien d'original: il est commun à tous les historiens qui, depuis Thucydide au moins, accordent à la parole publique le statut de *cause* et utilisent l'interaction entre récit et discours comme vecteur de l'explication historique.²⁴ Nous avons d'ailleurs la preuve, s'il en était besoin, que Dion partageait cette conception *performative* de l'éloquence, avec le fragment 40.40 [livre 9?]²⁵ transmis par les *Extraits Constantiniens De sententiis*, l'un des rares passages de commentaire où il s'exprime en son nom propre. Le contexte est bien connu: il s'agit du fameux discours, attesté par de nombreuses sources,²⁶ que l'ancien censeur Appius Claudius Caecus prononça en 280/279 a.C contre la paix que Pyrrhus cherchait à imposer aux

²³ Ces "infidélités" ne sont pas toujours décelables ou soupçonnables. Par exemple dans le texte cité ci-dessus (réactions des sénateurs au discours du futur Auguste en janvier 27 a.C.), Zonaras n'évoque qu'une seule catégorie de sénateurs, *ceux qui ne croient pas aux paroles de César* (soit parce qu'ils connaissent ses véritables intentions soit parce qu'ils se méfient), alors que la version originale en mentionne aussi une seconde, composée de *ceux qui croient que César est sincère*: "Pendant que César lisait son discours, les sénateurs réagissaient diversement: si quelques-uns savaient les intentions de César et applaudissaient en connaissance de cause, les autres, en revanche, soit considéraient ce discours avec méfiance, soit le croyaient sincère, etc."(Cassius Dio 53.11).

²⁴ Voir notamment Polybe 12.25b.1: "L'objet propre de l'histoire est premièrement de connaître les discours véritables dans leur teneur réelle, secondement de se demander pour quelle cause a échoué ou réussi ce qui a été dit ou ce qui a été fait, puisque la narration brute des événements est quelque chose de séduisant mais d'inutile et que le commerce de l'histoire ne devient fructueux que si l'on y joint l'étude des causes (...). Si l'on néglige les discours véritables et leurs causes, on supprime l'objet de l'histoire..." (même idée chez Denys d'Halicarnasse 11.1.3–4).

²⁵ Pour les livres 1 à 35 la division en livres adoptée par Boissevain est parfois discutable et demeure, en tout cas, très discutée. Il en va de même avec le classement et la numérotation des "fragments" établis par Bekker et repris (à quelques changements près) par Boissevain: ces 111 "fragments" résultent en fait du regroupement thématique d'unités textuelles plus petites, transmises isolément les unes des autres, la plupart par les *Extraits constantiniens* (par exemple le F 43 rassemble 27 "citations" relatives à la première guerre punique). Voir en dernier lieu l'excellente mise au point de Rich 2016.

²⁶ Voir notamment Humm 2005, spéc. 35–97.

Romains; il fit fléchir *in extremis* un sénat hésitant, sur le point de négocier avec l'ennemi:²⁷

Τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ τοῦ λόγου φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ τοσαύτην ἰσχὺν ἔχει ὥστε καὶ ἐκείνους ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τότε μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ἐς ἀντίπαλον καὶ μῖσος καὶ θάρσος τοῦ τε δέους τοῦ Πύρρου καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν δώρων αὐτοῦ ἀλλοιώσεως περιστῆναι.

Cass. Dio F 40.40 (ES 105): La nature de l'éloquence est telle et son pouvoir si grand qu'ils (*i.e.* les sénateurs/les Romains) changèrent d'avis et que la crainte que leur inspirait Pyrrhus et l'aliénation mentale qu'avaient suscitée ses cadeaux furent remplacés par la haine et le courage.

Tous ces indices concourent donc à prouver, selon nous, que l'historien byzantin, loin d'attribuer aux discours une fonction purement ornementale, bien loin de les rejeter en bloc comme inutiles, était au contraire conscient des enjeux —narratifs et explicatifs—attachés à leur usage par les historiens et soucieux, par conséquent, de préserver *au moins* la trame narrative et discursive du texte dionien.

Les discours perdus des deux premières décades et le témoignage de Zonaras

Revenons maintenant aux deux premières décades fragmentaires de l'*Histoire romaine*, qui sont l'objet même de cette enquête. Force est de constater tout d'abord qu'il manque à ce jour un inventaire complet des discours ou débats attestés pour cette partie de l'oeuvre par un ou plusieurs des témoins indirects du texte de Dion. En effet, la liste dressée récemment par A. Kemezis pour les livres 3–21 de l'*Histoire romaine* n'est pas exhaustive,²⁸ fondée

²⁷ Zonar. 8.4.9–12 (2.184.9–185.2 D) a conservé l'ensemble de l'épisode: l'allocution de Cinéas, l'émissaire de de Pyrrhus, à la curie, les débats entre sénateurs qui durèrent plusieurs jours, l'arrivée d'Appius Claudius et son intervention décisive. Le Byzantin ne reproduit pas la remarque de Dion transmise par le F 40.40 mais son récit est cohérent avec elle: "Tels furent les conseils d'Appius. Le sénat alors ne tergiversa plus mais vota à l'unanimité qu'on expulserait le jour même Cinéas hors des frontières et qu'on ferait à Pyrrhus une guerre implacable tant qu'il demeurerait en Italie (...). Ταῦτα ὁ Ἄππιος συνεβούλευσεν· ἡ δὲ γερούσια οὐκέτι ἐμέλλησεν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐψηφίσαντο αὐθημερὸν τὸν Κινέαν ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐκπέμψαι καὶ τῷ Πύρρῳ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον, ἕως ἂν ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ διάγῃ, ποιήσασθαι."

²⁸ Kemezis 2014, 106 n. 35.

essentiellement sur le témoignage des *Extraits constantiniens*,²⁹ ou sur la convergence des *Extraits constantiniens* et de Zonaras.³⁰ Pourtant, on doit à Zonaras—et à lui seul—d'avoir conservé (au moins en partie) des ῥητορεῖαι absentes du reste de la tradition textuelle de Dion:

- le dialogue entre Tarquin l'Ancien et le devin Attius Navius;³¹
- l'adresse au peuple de Tanaquil, l'épouse de ce roi, après son assassinat par les fils d'Ancus Marcius;³²
- le discours de Cinéas au sénat romain;³³
- la correspondance entre Pyrrhus et Laevinus;³⁴
- le discours de Pyrrhus à ses troupes avant une bataille;³⁵
- le débat à Carthage durant le siège de Sagonte;³⁶
- le débat au sénat carthaginois entre Hasdrubal et Hannon;³⁷
- le dialogue entre Scipion [l'Africain] et Syphax;³⁸
- les deux dialogues entre Massinissa et Sophonisbe;³⁹
- le débat entre Caton et le tribun Lucius Valerius sur le luxe des femmes;⁴⁰

²⁹ Complétés ou non par ceux de la Souda, de Maxime le Confesseur ou de Tzétzès: Cass. Dio F 36.1–7 (plaidoyer du père de Fabius Rullianus accusé par Papius Cursor); F 36.11–14 (délibérations des Samnites pendant la campagne des Fourches Caudines); F 40.15–16 (discours de Laevinus avant une bataille contre Pyrrhus, voir sur ce passage *infra* p.13–14).

³⁰ Par ex. Cass. Dio F 17.10–12 (= *Exc. Sent.* 27) et Zonar. 7.14.8–9 (parabole du corps et de l'estomac développée par Menenius Agrippa); Cass. Dio F 18.8–12 (*Exc. Sent.* 33) et Zonar.7.16.8–10 (débat entre Coriolan et sa mère).

³¹ Zonar. 7.8.9–10 [Cass. Dio, livre 2]

³² Zonar. 7.9.4 [Cass. Dio, livre 2]

³³ Zonar. 8.4.10 [Cass. Dio, livre 9]

³⁴ Zonar. 8.3.4–5 [Cass. Dio, livre 9]

³⁵ Zonar. 8.5.2–3 [Cass. Dio, livre 10]

³⁶ Zonar. 8.21.9 [Cass. Dio, livre 13]. John Rich considère cependant que le F 55.1 (*ES* 134) doit être attribué à ce débat, et non au débat entre Cornelius Lentulus, Fabius Maximus et *alii*, évoqué par Zonaras 8.22.1–3 [Cass. Dio, livre 13].

³⁷ Zonar. 8.22.5–6 [Cass. Dio, livre 13]

³⁸ Zonar. 9.13. 3–4 [Cass. Dio, livre 17]

³⁹ Zonar. 9.13. 2 et 5–6 ([Cass. Dio, livre 17]. Cf. Liv. 30.12.12–17 et 30.15. 5–7.

- le débat au sénat romain entre Caton et Scipion Nasica;⁴¹
- le débat au sénat romain pour savoir s'il faut détruire Carthage;⁴²

Plus surprenant encore, on trouve aussi chez lui une dizaine de passages qui ont, semble-t-il, échappé à l'attention des commentateurs: ils ont ceci de particulier que Zonaras y mentionne la tenue d'un discours ou plusieurs discours mais sans donner aucune information sur leur contenu. Pour cela il emploie de verbes "déclaratifs" (δημηγορεῖν, λέγειν, διαλέγεσθαι, notamment) soit absolument soit suivis d'un complément d'objet (nominal ou pronominal indéfini) avec, parfois, la mention du destinataire: πολλὰ ἐπαγωγὰ διαλεχθεῖς, πολλὰ διελέχθη τῇ γερουσίᾳ, διαλεχθεῖς αὐτοῖς, πολλὰ ἐδημηγόρησε, δημηγορήσας τινά, πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς δημηγορήσας, πολλῶν λεχθέντων, πολλὰ ἐλέγετο. Ces passages, répétons-le, sont sans correspondant ni écho dans les autres témoins indirects du Cassius Dion. En voici la liste par ordre d'apparition:

1. [Cass. Dio, livre 2] Zonaras 7.9.7 (2.109.24–29 D): Servius Tullius au peuple romain.

Ὡς δὲ χαλεπῶς εἶχον οἱ εὐπατρίδαι αὐτῷ, καὶ διεθρόουν ἄλλα τε καὶ ὅτι μηδενὸς αὐτὸν ἐλομένου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, συναγαγὼν τὸν δῆμον ἐδημηγόρησε· καὶ πολλὰ ἐπαγωγὰ διαλεχθεῖς αὐτῷ οὕτω διέθετο ὡς αὐτίκα πᾶσαν αὐτῷ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐπιψηφίσασθαι.

Comme les patriciens se montraient désagréables à son égard et répandaient, entre autres rumeurs, qu'il [*i.e* Servius Tullius] détenait le pouvoir sans avoir été choisi par qui que ce soit, il réunit le peuple et s'adressa à lui. En recourant à de nombreux arguments propres à le séduire, il le mit dans une disposition d'esprit telle qu'il décida par un vote de lui accorder la royauté pleine et entière.⁴³

⁴⁰ Zonar. 9.17.2–3 [Cass. Dio, livre 18]. Cf. Liv. 34.2–7.

⁴¹ Zonar. 9.26.4 [Cass. Dio, livre 21]

⁴² Zonar. 9.30.7–9 [Cass. Dio, livre 21]

⁴³ La précision "royauté pleine et entière" (πᾶσαν...τὴν βασιλείαν) s'explique par le fait que le roi, selon la tradition annalistique, est normalement élu par le sénat et par les comices populaires: seule cette double validation lui confère une pleine légitimité (cf. Liv. 1.17.8–9). Ici, comme chez Denys d'Halicarnasse—mais contrairement à ce qui se passe chez Tite-Live (1.41.6), où Servius est d'abord l'homme du patriciat—le "régent"

2. [Cass. Dio, livre 2] Zonaras 7.11.17 (2. 118. 22–30 D): Brutus au peuple à Rome et aux soldats dans le camp d'Ardée.

Καὶ τῷ Ποπλίῳ συμβούλῳ καὶ προθύμῳ πρὸς τοῦργον ὁ Βροῦτος χρησάμενος τήν τε γυναῖκα πολλοῖς τῶν τοῦ δήμου κειμένην ὑπέδειξε, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς δημηγορήσας τὸ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους μῖσος ἐκφῆναι πεποίηκε· καὶ μηκέτι δέξασθαι συνέθεντο τὸν Ταρκύνιον. ταῦτα δὲ πράξας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρένας τοῖς ἄλλοις, αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξιπάσατο, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ δήμῳ συνέπεισε καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ψηφίσασθαι.

Brutus, sur les conseils de Publius qui était déterminé à agir, montra à une grande partie du peuple le corps de la jeune femme (*i.e.* Lucrèce), étendu là ; <à ceux-là et>⁴⁴ à tous les autres il adressa un discours destiné à leur inspirer la haine de la tyrannie. Aussi convinrent-ils de ne plus laisser Tarquin revenir. Après quoi, il confia la ville aux autres [conjurés] et se rendit à cheval au camp, où il persuada les soldats de voter la même chose que le peuple.

Servius Tullius, contesté et attaqué par les sénateurs, se fait élire par les seuls comices curiates (cf. D.H. AR 4. 10–12 et Fromentin 2016, 186–187.)

⁴⁴ Cette formulation étrange, qui distingue entre "une grande partie du peuple" (πολλοῖς τῶν τοῦ δήμου), à qui le cadavre de Lucrèce est dévoilé, et "tous les autres/ le reste du peuple" (πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς), à qui Brutus délivre son discours, est certainement due à un maladresse ou un raccourci de Zonaras. Le passage parallèle de Denys d'Halicarnasse (AR 4.76.3–4) permet de mieux comprendre comment Brutus procéda: "Ils (*i.e.* les conjurés) sortirent pour se rendre sur le forum. Ils étaient suivis de leurs serviteurs, portant sur un lit recouvert de draps noirs le cadavre non préparé pour les funérailles et trempé de sang de Lucrèce. Après avoir ordonné qu'elle fût placée devant la curie, en hauteur et visible de partout, ils convoquèrent le peuple en assemblée. Quand la foule se fut réunie, non seulement celle qui se trouvait à ce moment-là sur le forum mais encore celle de la cité tout entière—car les hérauts s'étaient répandus dans les petites rues pour appeler le peuple au forum— Brutus monta là où il était d'usage que parlent publiquement ceux qui convoquaient les assemblées et, après avoir placé les patriciens près de lui, s'exprima en ces termes." Ainsi, alors que seulement une partie du peuple—celle alors présente sur le forum—a pu voir le cadavre de Lucrèce, c'est ensuite l'ensemble de l'assemblée curiate qui est convoquée par Brutus et à laquelle il s'adresse pour la convaincre de voter l'exil de Tarquin le Superbe et de sa famille (cf. D.H. AR 4. 71.5). Aussi avons-nous légèrement modifié le texte de Zonaras pour le rendre plus intelligible. Voir aussi Liv.1.59.3–11.

3. [Cass. Dio, livre 4] Zonaras 7.14.4–5 (2.128.2–6 D): M. Valerius Volusus au sénat puis au peuple.

Ὁ δὲ θέλων τῷ δήμῳ χάρισσασθαι πολλὰ διεiléχθη τῇ γερουσίᾳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσχε ταύτην πειθήνιον. διὸ σὺν ὀργῇ ἐκπηδήσας τοῦ συνεδρίου, δημηγορήσας τε πρὸς τὸν δῆμόν τινα κατὰ τῆς βουλῆς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀπέπειπατο. καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς στάσιν ἠρέθιστο.

Ce dernier, qui voulait faire plaisir au peuple,⁴⁵ débattit longuement avec les sénateurs, mais sans parvenir à les convaincre. C'est pourquoi il s'élança furieux hors de la curie et prononça devant le peuple un discours hostile au sénat, et se démit de son commandement.⁴⁶ Aussi le peuple fut-il encore plus porté à faire sécession.

4. [Cass. Dio, livre 9] Zonaras 8.4.11 (2.184. 18–22 D): débat au sénat sur la paix avec Pyrrhus avant l'intervention d'Appius Claudius Caecus.⁴⁷

Ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ πλείους τῶν βουλευτῶν ἠρέσκοντο διὰ τὰ δῶρα καὶ διὰ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους· οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, ἀλλ' ἐσκόπουν ἔτι πλείους ἡμέρας ὅ τι χρὴ πράξαι. καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἐλέγετο, ἐπεκράτει δὲ ὅμως σπείσασθαι.

A la suite de cela, la plupart des sénateurs étaient satisfaits, en raison des cadeaux et des prisonniers; cependant ils ne donnèrent pas leur réponse mais continuèrent pendant plusieurs jours à examiner ce qu'il fallait faire. On parla beaucoup; toutefois les partisans d'un traité avec Pyrrhus étaient près de l'emporter.

5. [Cass. Dio, livre 11] Zonaras 8.8.7 (2.196.25–32 D): première⁴⁸ ambassade à Messine du tribun militaire Gaius Claudius.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ ou " à la plèbe" (cf. ci-dessous, p. 41 n.58).

⁴⁶ Tite-Live (2.31.8–9) ne mentionne qu'un seul discours, qu'il rapporte au style direct, celui de Valerius au sénat, alors que Denys d'Halicarnasse rapporte brièvement, au style indirect, son discours au sénat (6.43.2) et longuement, au style direct, son discours au peuple (6.43.3–44).

⁴⁷ Voir au dessus, p. 32–33.

Κὰν τούτω Γάιος Κλαύδιος χλιαρχῶν ναυσὶν ὀλίγαις ὑπὸ Ἀππίου Κλαυδίου προπεμφθεὶς εἰς τὸ Ῥήγιον ἀφίκετο· διαπλεῦσαι δὲ οὐκ ἐθάρρησε, πολὺ πλεῖον τὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ὀρῶν ναυτικόν· ἀκατίῳ δ' ἐμβὰς προσέσχε τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ διειλέχθη αὐτοῖς ὅσα ὁ καιρὸς ἐδίδου. Ἀντειπόντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων, τότε μὲν μηδὲν πράξας ἀνεκομίσθη·

Pendant ce temps-là, le tribun militaire Gaius Claudius, qui avait été envoyé en avant avec une flotte réduite par Appius Claudius, arriva à Rhégion. Cependant, il n'osa pas traverser le détroit, voyant que la flotte des Carthaginois était beaucoup plus nombreuse. Il monta dans une petite embarcation et débarqua à Messine, où il parlementa avec eux aussi longtemps que le permettait la situation. Comme les Carthaginois s'étaient opposés à ses arguments, il repartit sans avoir rien obtenu.

6. [Cass. Dio, livre 11] Zonaras 8.9.3 (2.198.9–14 D): à Messine, débat entre le Carthaginois Hannon et les Mamertins lors d'une assemblée convoquée par le consul Appius Claudius.⁵⁰

Φοβηθεὶς δὲ μὴ οἱ Μαμερτῖνοι ὡς ἀδικούντος αὐτοῦ νεωτερίσωσιν, ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν· καὶ πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν μάτην λεχθέντων συνήρπασέ τις τῶν Ῥωμαίων αὐτὸν καὶ ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὸ δεσμοτήριον, συνεπαιούντων τῶν Μαμερτίνων.

⁴⁸ Cette première ambassade à Messine ne doit pas être confondue avec la deuxième, conduite pas le même tribun peu après: ce dernier prononce à nouveau un discours dont le contenu est cette fois rapporté, en grande partie au style indirect, à la fois par Zonaras 8.8.8–9 (2.197.1–17 D) et par les Extraits constantiniens (F 43. 5–6 = ES 113).

⁴⁹ Cet officier—probablement un *gentilis* du consul Appius Claudius—n'est mentionné que par Dion/Zonaras mais il n'y a pas lieu de mettre en doute son existence ni la réalité de son action dans la mesure où les autres sources soit se contentent d'un récit synthétique (Polybe), soit ne nous sont parvenues qu'à l'état fragmentaire (Diodore). Le récit d'Orose (4.7.1) fait d'ailleurs lui aussi état d'un renfort dépêché par les Romains aux Mamertins ayant précédé l'armée du consul Appius Claudius. L'arrivée de ce dernier à Messine et ses pourparlers avec les Mamertins et les Carthaginois sont relatés un peu plus loin par Zonaras (8.9.2) et le F 43.10 (= *Exc. Sent.* 117). Voir ci-dessous, pp. 44–45.

⁵⁰ Pour le passage immédiatement précédent, voir ci-dessous, pp. 44–45.

Comme il [Hannon] craignait que les Mamertins ne se révoltent en pointant sa responsabilité, il se rendit à l'assemblée. Après que de nombreuses paroles eurent été prononcées des deux côtés sans résultat,⁵¹ un Romain se saisit d'Hannon et le jeta en prison avec l'approbation des Mamertins.

7. [Cass. Dio, livre 14] Zonaras 8.23.8 (2. 240. 20–22 D): discours d'Hannibal et de P. Cornelius Scipio à leurs soldats avant la bataille du Tessin.⁵²

Ἐδημηγόρησε, τοὺς οἰκείους στρατιώτας ἐπιρρωννὺς καὶ παραθήγων εἰς πόλεμον· τοῦτο δ' ἐτέρωθεν καὶ ὁ Σκιπίων ἐποίησεν.

Hannibal harangua ses soldats⁵³, les encourageant et les excitant au combat. Dans l'autre camp Scipion fit [vel avait fait]⁵⁴ la même chose.

8. [Cass. Dio, livre 15] Zonaras 9.2.9 (2. 256. 28–32 D): Hannibal aux habitants de Capoue.

⁵¹ Ce passage de Zonaras n'est pas totalement sans écho dans les Extraits constantiniens, puisque le F 43.10 (ES 117) fait lui aussi état du refus d'Hannon de descendre de la citadelle pour se rendre à l'assemblée qui se tient au port, et rapporte l'une des phrases prononcées par Appius Claudius pour condamner cette attitude: "Claudius répéta avec insistance: "Si cet homme avait le moindre droit en sa faveur, il serait venu parler et il ne tiendrait pas la ville par la force" (πολὺς ἐνέκειτο κατατρέχων καὶ λέγων ὅτι, εἰ δὴ τι καὶ τὸ βραχύτατον δικαίωμα εἶχεν, πάντως ἂν ἐς λόγους οἱ ἀφίκετο καὶ οὐκ ἂν βία τὴν πόλιν κατεῖχεν). En revanche, rien n'est conservé par les ES du débat long et vain qui, selon Zonaras, opposa ensuite Mamertins et Carthaginois (πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν μάτην λεχθέντων) et aboutit à l'arrestation d'Hannon.

⁵² On a conservé grâce aux *Extraits De sententiis* 147–149 (F 57. 5 et 6a) des éléments de la δημηγορία d'Hannibal à ses soldats évoquée ici par Zonaras. Mais ce dernier est le seul à mentionner une harangue symétrique de Scipion à ses soldats.

⁵³ Il leur a auparavant offert un "spectacle" présenté comme un exemple à imiter, celui des prisonniers gaulois risquant leur vie lors de combats singuliers pour obtenir leur liberté en cas de victoire (Zonar. et F 57.4 = ES 147; cf. Liv. 21.42), afin de les inciter à préférer eux aussi la mort à la servitude.

⁵⁴ Notre hésitation sur la traduction de l'aoriste ἐποίησεν est motivée par le parallèle livien: chez Tite-Live, c'est Scipion qui s'adresse le premier à ses soldats (21.40–41), l'intervention d'Hannibal (combat de prisonniers puis harangue) lui faisant suite (21.42–44). Il est donc possible que Dion ait suivi le même ordre mais que Zonaras ait escamoté le premier discours, celui de Scipion, n'en faisant mention que dans cette formule récapitulative et conclusive qui, d'ailleurs, rappelle celle de Tite-Live (21.45.1: "De part et d'autre ces harangues enflammèrent l'ardeur des soldats").

Καὶ ὅς διὰ ταχέων ἀπαναστὰς ἐκ τῆς Νεαπόλεως ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν Καπύην, καὶ διαλεχθεὶς αὐτοῖς ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἶπεν ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν σφίσι τῆς Ἰταλίας δώσειν ὑπέσχετο, ἴν' ἐν ἐλπίσι γενόμενοι ὡς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς πονήσοντες προθυμότερον ἀγωνίσωνται.

S'étant retiré rapidement de Naples, il se rendit à Capoue où, s'entretenant avec eux,⁵⁵ il leur tint bien des propos séduisants et leur promit notamment de leur donner commandement sur l'Italie, afin qu'ils combattent avec plus d'ardeur, croyant travailler à leur propre intérêt.⁵⁶

9. [Cass. Dio, livre 17] Zonaras 9.14.2 (2.289.27–290.3 D): discours d'Hannibal et de P. Cornelius Scipio à leurs soldats avant la bataille d'Utique.

Καὶ ὁ Ἀννίβας ὡς ἦσθετο προσίοντα τὸν Σκιπίωνα, προαπήνητησεν αὐτῷ· καὶ ἀντιστρατοπεδευσάμενοι οὐκ εὐθὺς εἰς χεῖρας ἦλθον, συχνὰς δ' ἡμέρας διέτριψαν, καὶ ἕκαστος τῷ οἰκείῳ διειλέχθη στρατεύματι καὶ πρὸς τὴν μάχην αὐτὸ παρεθάρρυνεν.

Hannibal, quand il s'aperçut que Scipion approchait, alla à sa rencontre. Lorsqu'ils eurent installé leurs camps l'un en face de l'autre, ils n'engagèrent pas tout de suite le combat mais laissèrent passer quelques jours; et chacun d'eux s'adressa à son armée et lui prodigua des encouragements en vue de la bataille.

10. [Cass. Dio, livre 18] Zonaras 9.17.2–3 (2. 299.10–300.2 D): débat entre Caton et le tribun Lucius Valerius à propos de la loi Oppia sur le luxe des femmes.⁵⁷

Ὁ δῆμος, εἰ χρή καταλῦσαι τὸν νόμον, βουλὴν ἐποιεῖτο. καὶ περὶ τούτου ὁ Κάτων ἐδημηγόρησε, δεῖν κατασκευάζων τὸν νόμον κρατεῖν, καὶ τέλος ταῦτα ἐπήγαγε. ἄκοσμεῖσθωσαν οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες μὴ χρυσῷ μηδὲ λίθοις ἢ τισιν ἀνθηροῖς καὶ

⁵⁵ Le contexte ne permet pas de savoir si Hannibal s'adresse au sénat de Capoue (comme chez Tite-Live 23.10.1–2) ou, plus largement, à une assemblée populaire.

⁵⁶ Cf. Liv. 23.10.1–2.

⁵⁷ Cf. Liv. 34.2–7.

ἀμοργίνοις ἐσθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ σωφροσύνη, φιλανδρία, φιλοτεκνία, πειθοῖ, μετριότητι, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις, τοῖς ὅπλοις τοῖς ἡμετέροις, ταῖς νίκαις, τοῖς τροπαίοις.’ Λούκιος δὲ Οὐαλέριος δήμαρχος ἀντιλέγων τῷ Κάτωνι διειλέχθη, ἀποδοθῆναι συμβουλευόν ταῖς γυναῖξι τὸν κόσμον τὸν πάτριον καὶ πολλὰ περὶ τούτου πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εἰπών· εἶτα πρὸς τὸν Κάτωνα τὸν λόγον ἀπέτεινε καὶ ἔφη ‘σὺ δ’, ὦ Κάτων, εἰ ἄχθη τῷ κόσμῳ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ βούλει φιλόσοφόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπές, ἀπόκειρον αὐτὰς περιτρόχαλα, καὶ χιτωνίσκους καὶ ἐξωμίδας ἔνδυσον (...). καὶ ὁ μὲν Οὐαλέριος ταῦτα ἐπισκώπτων εἶπεν, ἀκούσασαι δὲ αἱ γυναῖκες, ἐγγὺς γὰρ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πολλαὶ διέτριβον πολυπραγμονοῦσαι τὸ γενησόμενον, εἰσεπήδησαν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καταβοᾶσαι τοῦ νόμου.

Le peuple tenait une assemblée pour savoir s'il fallait abolir cette loi⁵⁸. A ce sujet, Caton prononça devant lui un discours visant à démontrer qu'il fallait rendre force à la loi, et il le termina par ces mots: "Faites donc en sorte que vos femmes aient pour parures non pas de l'or, des pierres précieuses, des vêtements brillants ou transparents, mais la modestie, l'amour conjugal, l'amour maternel, la persuasion, la modération, les lois établies, nos armes, nos victoires, nos trophées !" Le tribun Lucius Valerius prit la parole contre Caton, en conseillant de rendre aux femmes leurs ornements ancestraux, et il développa longuement ce point à destination du peuple; ensuite, il poursuivit en s'adressant à Caton et lui dit : "Toi, Caton, si tu es choqué par les parures de nos femmes et si tu veux accomplir quelque chose de grandiose et digne d'un philosophe, eh bien, coupe-leur les cheveux à ras tout autour de la tête, et habille-les de tuniques courtes et des tuniques à une manche, etc. (...)". Valerius dit cela pour plaisanter mais les femmes, qui l'avaient entendu (beaucoup passaient leur temps à proximité du forum curieuses de savoir comme l'affaire tournerait), se précipitèrent vers l'assemblée en protestant contre la loi.

⁵⁸ Dans ce passage, ὁ δῆμος désigne nécessairement "la plèbe" (par opposition au patriciat) et l'expression ὁ δῆμος ... βουλὴν ἐποιεῖτο un *concilium plebis*, étant donné le contexte (le projet d'abolir la loi est porté par les tribuns de la plèbe qui veulent obtenir un plébiscite). Nous avons néanmoins conservé la traduction par "peuple" car Dion recourt rarement à τὸ πλῆθος/ὁ ὄμιλος (équivalents traditionnels de *plebs*, cf. Freyburger-Galland 1997, 84–87), et tend à utiliser ὁ δῆμος (*populus*) pour toutes les assemblées, qu'on y débattre seulement (*contiones*) ou qu'on y vote (*comitia, concilia plebis*). Voir Coudry 2016, spéc. p. 494–495.

11. [Cass. Dio, livre 21] Zonaras 9.30.7–9 (2.335.25–336. 10 D): débat à Rome: faut-il détruire Carthage?

Ἐλὼν οὖν οὕτω τὴν Καρχηδόνα Σκιπίων τῇ γερουσίᾳ ἐπέστειλε τάδε ἑκαρχειδὼν ἐάλω· τί οὖν κελεύετε; Ἀναγνωσθέντων οὖν τούτων βουλὴν ἔθεντο περὶ τοῦ τί δεόν ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁ μὲν Κάτων κατασκάψαι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐξαφανίσει δεῖν ἐγνωμάτευσεν, ὁ δὲ Νασικᾶς φείσασθαι τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ ἔτι συνεβούλευε. κάντεϋθεν εἰς ἀντιλογίαν πολλὴν προήχθη καὶ ἀμφισβήτησιν τὸ συνέδριον, ἕως ἔφη τις ὅτι εἰ καὶ δι' οὐδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ γε ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα φείσασθαι αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον νομίζοιτο ἂν (...) Ἐκ τούτων οὖν τῶν λόγων πάντες κατασκάψαι τὴν Καρχηδόνα ὠμογνωμόνησαν, μήποτε εἰρηνήσειν ἐκείνους πιστεύσαντες ἀκριβῶς.

Après avoir pris Carthage, Scipion écrivit au sénat en ces termes: "Carthage est prise. Quels sont maintenant vos ordres?" Après lecture de ce message, les sénateurs tinrent conseil pour savoir ce qu'il fallait faire. Caton était d'avis qu'on devait raser la ville et faire disparaître les Carthaginois, tandis que Nasica conseillait encore de les épargner. Alors le conseil se laissa entraîner dans un grand débat contradictoire, jusqu'à ce que quelqu'un déclare qu'il était nécessaire d'épargner les Carthaginois ne serait-ce que dans l'intérêt des Romains (...).⁵⁹ Ces discussions aboutirent à la décision unanime de raser Carthage car les Romains avaient la certitude que la paix entre eux et les Carthaginois était désormais impossible.

Ces deux derniers exemples (n° 10 et 11) sont un peu différents des précédents car il s'agit de morceaux rhétoriques longs, complexes, de structure antilogique, séquencés en plusieurs moments. Ainsi, la réponse de Valerius au discours de Caton se déploie en deux temps (une tirade destinée au peuple puis une adresse à Caton) ; le débat sur Carthage en comporte trois (le discours de Caton, celui de Scipion Nasica, une discussion générale). Il est évident que Zonaras a beaucoup élagué. Dans le n°10, en effet, le discours de Caton est réduit à son idée générale ("il faut rendre force à la loi") et à sa phrase de conclusion; de celui de Valerius n'est conservée que la seconde partie destinée à Caton, avec sa provocation finale; de la première,

⁵⁹ C'est nous qui coupons: Zonaras rapporte les arguments développés par cet orateur anonyme.

adressée au peuple, nous n'avons que le thème ("il faut rendre aux femmes leurs ornements ancestraux"), assorti d'une indication sur sa durée ("il développa longuement ce point à destination du peuple"). Dans le n°11, les thèses respectives de Caton et de Nasica sont résumées en quelques mots et, du "long débat contradictoire" qui fit suite, seule la dernière intervention, due à un orateur que Zonaras ne nomme pas, est reprise. Cependant, ces coupures n'ont pas été faites à l'aveuglette: si une grande partie des arguments avancés par les orateurs ont disparu, en revanche, le déroulement et le sens général de ce débat, sa structure et sa logique interne, ont été préservés.

Dans tous les passages rassemblés ci-dessus (n°1 à 11), les tournures indéfinies et généralisantes du type *καὶ ἐλέχθη μὲν πολλά / καὶ διαλεχθεὶς αὐτοῖς/ πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν λεχθέντων/ καὶ ἄλλα τε εἶπεν ἐπαγωγὰ/* servent à marquer en creux la présence de morceaux rhétoriques (harangues, débats au sénat) dont Zonaras ne juge pas utile de rapporter le détail—ni même la teneur générale— mais dont il signale l'existence à cause du rôle qu'ils ont joué dans le déroulement des événements, par leur influence sur la décision politique ou sur la motivation des troupes. A chaque fois, en effet, Zonaras souligne le lien de cause à effet (souvent immédiat) qui relie la prise de parole individuelle ou collective à l'action publique, comme on le voit notamment dans les exemples 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 et 11:⁶⁰

1. συναγαγὼν τὸν δῆμον ἐδημηγόρησε· καὶ πολλά ἐπαγωγὰ διαλεχθεὶς αὐτῷ οὕτω διέθετο ὡς αὐτίκα πᾶσαν αὐτῷ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐπιψηφίσασθαι.
2. καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς δημηγορήσας τὸ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους μῖσος ἐκφῆναι πεποίηκε· (...) καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ δήμῳ συνέπεισε καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ψηφίσασθαι.
3. πολλά διεiléχθη τῇ γερούσια, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσχε ταύτην πειθήνιον.
5. διεiléχθη αὐτοῖς ὅσα ὁ καιρὸς ἐδίδου. Ἀντειπόντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων, τότε μὲν μηδὲν πράξας ἀνεκομίσθη·
6. καὶ πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν μάτην λεχθέντων.
11. κἀντεῦθεν εἰς ἀντιλογίαν πολλὴν προήχθη καὶ ἀμφισβήτησιν τὸ συνέδριον (...). Ἐκ τούτων οὖν τῶν λόγων πάντες κατασκάψαι τὴν Καρχηδόνα ὁμογνωμόνησαν...

⁶⁰ Dans le cas du n°10 il semble que ce soit la deuxième partie du discours de Valérius, adressée à Caton (et rapportée au moins partiellement au style direct par Zonaras) qui déclenche la réaction des femmes, et non pas la première partie destinée au peuple et escamotée par l'abréviateur.

A ce stade, cependant, une question se pose: comment peut-on être sûr que c'est Zonaras lui-même qui a supprimé le contenu de ces discours, ne laissant que des coquilles vides? Ne peut-on imputer ce procédé à Dion lui-même? Autrement dit, ces discours "fantômes" ont-ils jamais été rédigés par Dion?

Un premier élément de réponse est fourni par deux passages de Zonaras présentant le même type d'abrègement mais pour lesquels nous disposons également du témoignage plus complet des *Extraits Constantiniens*: il est évident, dans ces cas précis, que la disparition des discours ne peut être que l'oeuvre de Zonaras.

Le premier exemple concerne l'affaire dite des Mamertins, à l'origine de la première guerre punique, dont il a déjà été question plus haut (n°5 et 6). Le consul Appius Claudius Caudex est envoyé par le sénat avec une flotte pour porter secours aux Mamertins, retranchés dans leur base de Messine, qui sont attaqués à la fois par les Carthaginois et par Hiéron de Syracuse. Au moment où Claudius débarque dans le port avec ses troupes, la situation est critique pour les Mamertins car le général carthaginois Hannon occupe la citadelle avec une garnison. Ce dernier finit par descendre au port pour parlementer avec les Mamertins et les Romains (voir *supra* n°6), mais dans un premier temps Claudius, sitôt débarqué, s'adresse aux seuls Mamertins. Cette première assemblée est évoquée non seulement par Zonaras mais aussi par les Extraits constantiniens, ce qui permet la comparaison:

Ἵτι ὁ Κλαύδιος καταλαβὼν τοὺς Μამερτίνους ἐν τῷ λιμένι συνεστραμμένους ἐκκλησίαν τε αὐτῶν ἐποίησε καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι 'οὐδὲν δέομαι τῶν ὄπλων, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς ὑμῖν διαγνῶναι πάντα ἐπιτρέπω,' ἔπεισέ σφας μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Ἄνωνα.

Cass. Dio F 43.10 (= *Exc. Sent.* 117) [livre 11] : Claudius, qui avait trouvé les Mamertins en armes dans le port, les réunit en assemblée et ayant déclaré: "je n'ai nullement besoin des armes mais je vous confie le soin de décider de tout", il les persuada d'aller chercher Hannon.

[Ὁ Κλαύδιος] εὐρὼν οὖν ἐν τῷ λιμένι τοὺς Μάμερτινοὺς— ὁ γὰρ Ἄνων προὔποπτεύσας αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει καθῆστο φυλάττων αὐτήν—ἐκκλησίαν συνήγαγε, καὶ διαλεχθεὶς αὐτοῖς ἔπεισε μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Ἄνωνα.

Zonar. 8.9.2 (2. 198.5–9 D): Claudius, qui avait trouvé les Mamertins dans le port—Hannon, qui se méfiait d'eux, s'était établi dans la citadelle et la gardait—les réunit en assemblée, et ayant discuté avec eux, les persuada d'aller chercher Hannon.

On voit ici que les mots prononcés par Ap. Claudius ont été supprimés par Zonaras et remplacés par un simple *διαλεχθεὶς αὐτοῖς*. En revanche, la relation de cause (discours) à effet (*ἔπεισε μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Ἄννωνα*), clairement marquée dans la syntaxe du texte-source, est conservée.

Le deuxième exemple a pour contexte la bataille d'Héraclée (280 a.C.), où le consul Publius Valerius Laevinus affronta les troupes de Pyrrhus et de ses alliés et essuya une défaite mémorable [Cass. Dio, livre 9?]. Zonaras donne un récit continu de l'épisode, où il est notamment question d'une harangue prononcée par Laevinus pour galvaniser ses troupes qui redoutent l'affrontement:

Αὐτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Λαοῦινος λογιζόμενος ἔσπευδε συμμίξαι· τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πύρρου φήμην καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἐκπεπληγμένων, συγκαλέσας αὐτοὺς πολλὰ πρὸς θάρσος παρακαλοῦντα ἐδημηγόρησε, καὶ παρεσκευάζετο καὶ ἄκοντι τῷ Πύρρῳ συμμίξαι. ὁ δὲ γνώμην μὲν οὐκ εἶχε μάχεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ μὴ δόξη τοὺς Ῥωμαίους φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖς οἰκείοις διαλεχθεὶς ἐπώτρυνεν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον.

Zonar. 8.3.6 (2. 179.16–24 D): Laevinus, qui réfléchissait à cela, avait hâte d'en découdre. Comme ses soldats étaient terrifiés par la réputation de Pyrrhus et à cause des éléphants, il les réunit et les harangua, les exhortant longuement à avoir confiance; et il les préparait à combattre Pyrrhus, bien que ce dernier s'y refusât. Ce dernier n'avait pas l'intention de se battre mais craignant de paraître avoir peur des Romains, il s'entretint_lui aussi avec ses soldats et les poussa à la guerre.

Les arguments développés par le consul pour donner confiance à ses soldats ne sont pas rapportés par Zonaras mais nous avons de bonnes raisons de penser qu'ils figuraient dans le texte-source puisque les Extraits constantiniens *De sententiis* ont conservé des

développements gnomiques qu'on attribue généralement à ce discours:⁶¹ les défauts et les faiblesses propres aux tyrans;⁶² les limites du pouvoir du général, qui ne peut rien faire sans la coopération de ses hommes;⁶³ Zonaras a donc fait le choix de les passer entièrement sous silence, se bornant à évoquer l'effet recherché (πολλὰ πρὸς θάρσος παρακαλοῦντα) et obtenu (παρεσκευάζετο) par l'orateur: comme dans l'exemple précédent, le discours est escamoté par le Byzantin mais sa fonction performative mise en évidence.⁶⁴

Il faut néanmoins se garder d'extrapoler à partir de ces deux seuls exemples: nous ne prétendons pas que tous les passages cités plus haut relèvent du même procédé d'abrègement et que cet abrègement est *dans tous les cas* imputable à Zonaras. En effet, on rencontre chez Dion également, dans les livres conservés dans la tradition directe ou dans les *Extraits Constantinien*s, quelques exemples de discours "fantômes", c'est-à-dire mentionnés mais non rapportés, même *a minima*:

Cass. Dio 46.56.2: Après avoir convoqué les soldats (...), ils leur firent un discours en ne prononçant que les paroles qu'il était convenable et sûr pour eux de dire (τοὺς στρατιώτας συγκαλέσαντες ἐδημηγόρησαν ὅσα καὶ εὐπρεπὲς καὶ

⁶¹ Nous ne prenons en compte ici que les *Extraits de Sententiis* 91 et 92 (F 40.15–16) et non l'ensemble constitué par F 40.14–16 car l'assignation à cet épisode du fragment F.14 (= pseudo-Maxime le Confesseur, c.6 Περὶ φίλων καὶ φιλαδελφίας, F -/86 édition Ihm, p. 135) repose uniquement sur le fait qu'il est situé dans le *Florilège* juste avant les deux γνῶμαι (F -/87 et -/88, p. 135–136) qui recourent *ES* 91 (F 40. 15). Quant aux *ES* 91 et 92, leur place dans le *De sententiis* prouve qu'ils concernent un épisode situé entre l'arrivée de Pyrrhus en Italie (*ES* 90) et la bataille d'Ausculum (*ES* 93), mais le discours de Laevinus n'est pas, en théorie, la seule hypothèse possible: *ES* 91 et 92 pourraient procéder d'un commentaire "gnomique" de Dion lui-même, comme nous l'a suggéré John Rich, que nous remercions d'avoir attiré notre attention sur les différentes difficultés posées par ce passage.

⁶² F 40.15 (*ES* 91): Ὅτι ἢ τε φιλοτιμία καὶ ἢ ἀπιστία ἀεὶ τοῖς τυράννοις σύνεστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη μηδένα αὐτοὺς ἀκριβῆ φίλον ἔχειν· ἀπιστούμενος γὰρ καὶ φθονούμενός τις οὐδένα ἂν καθαρῶς ἀγαπήσειε. πρὸς δ' ἔτι καὶ ἡ τῶν τρόπων ὁμοιότης ἢ τε τοῦ βίου ἰσότης καὶ τὸ τὰ αὐτά τισι καὶ σφαλερὰ καὶ σωτήρια εἶναι καὶ ἀληθεῖς καὶ βεβαίους φίλους μόνα ποιεῖ. ὅπου δ' ἂν τούτων τι ἐνδείξη, προσποιητὸν μὲν τι σχῆμα ἐταιρείας ὁράται, ἔρμα δ' οὐδὲν αὐτῆς ἐγγύουον εὐρίσκεται.

⁶³ F 40.16 (*ES* 92): Ὅτι στρατηγία ἂν μὲν καὶ δυνάμεις ἀξιοχρεῶς λάβῃ, πλεῖστον καὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν σφῶν καὶ πρὸς ἐπικράτησιν φέρει, αὐτὴ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐν μέρει <ἐστίν>· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἄλλη τις τέχνη χωρὶς τῶν συμπραξόντων καὶ συνδιοικησόντων αὐτῇ ἰσχύει.

⁶⁴ Voir aussi Zonar. 9.22.11–23.4 (ὕπερφηάνως γὰρ οὗτοι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις διαλεχθέντες τυχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκόλυσαν τῶν σπονδῶν), où l'existence du débat est garantie par un extrait constantinien conservé (Cass. Dio F 66.2).

ἀσφαλὲς ἦν αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν).

Cass. Dio 46.29.2: Après que de nombreux orateurs eurent parlé dans l'un et l'autre sens le lendemain et le surlendemain, les partisans de César l'emportèrent (τῇ δ' οὖν ὑστεραία καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων ἐφ' ἑκάτερα λεχθέντων ἐκράτησαν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος πράττοντες).

Cass. Dio 44.22.2: Lépide, qui avait appris ce qui s'était passé, prit possession du forum avec ses soldats et, le matin, fit au peuple une harangue contre les meurtriers (ὁ Λέπιδος μαθὼν τὰ γεγενημένα τὴν τε ἀγορὰν μετὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῆς νυκτὸς κατέλαβε, καὶ κατὰ τῶν σφαγέων ἅμα ἕφ' ἐδημηγόρει).

Cass. Dio 50.3.2: Lorsque les consuls eurent agi de la sorte, qu'en outre César eut réuni le sénat en leur absence, qu'il eut lu et dit tout ce qui lui plaisait, quand Antoine à cette nouvelle eut réuni lui aussi une sorte de sénat avec ceux qui étaient là, et après avoir longuement pesé le pour et le contre, pris l'initiative des hostilités et répudié Octavie, Titius et Plancus (...) désertèrent (ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ταῦτά τε οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐπέπρακτο, καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ αὐτῶν ὁ Καῖσαρ τὴν τε γερούσιαν συνήγαγε καὶ ἀνέγνω καὶ εἶπεν ὅσα ἠθέλησε, καὶ αὐτὰ ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἀκούσας βουλήν τε τινα ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἤθροισε καὶ λεχθέντων ἐφ' ἑκάτερα πολλῶν τὸν τε πόλεμον ἀνείλετο καὶ τὴν τῆς Ὀκταουίας συνοίκησιν ἀπεῖπε, προσκρούσαντές τι αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνοι (...) ἠῦτομόλησαν.).

Il semble en tout cas que Zonaras ait utilisé la même méthode d'abrègement dans d'autres sections de son *Epitomè* que celle dédiée à l'histoire de Rome proprement dite. Pour rédiger son histoire du peuple juif (livres 1 à 6), il s'est, entre autres sources, appuyé sur Flavius Josèphe et son *Bellum Judaicum*: la comparaison entre le texte original, bien conservé dans la tradition directe, et le résumé de Zonaras montre que ce dernier a fait subir aux discours le même traitement que celui observé pour Dion. Par exemple, au livre 6 de la *BJ*, les §95–128 sont consacrés à une longue séquence oratoire où Titus lui-même ou par le truchement de Flavius Josèphe qui lui sert d'interprète s'adresse à Jean de Gishala et aux assiégés retranchés dans la forteresse de l'Antonia, à Jérusalem, pour les supplier de se rendre aux Romains. Zonaras ne rapporte aucun de ces discours, mais en mentionne l'existence et, comme Flavius

Josèphe,⁶⁵ en souligne l'inefficacité:

Ἰουδαῖοι μὲν οὖν τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὡσάμενοι κατακλείουσιν εἰς τὴν Ἀντωνίαν, ὁ Τίτος δὲ πολλὰ καὶ διὰ Ἰωσήπου παρακαλέσας τοὺς στασιαστὰς καὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς ἀμειλίκτους ἐώρα, πάλιν ἐχώρει καὶ ἄκων πρὸς πόλεμον.

Zonaras 2. 63.14–18 D: Les Juifs, pourchassés par les Romains, s'enferment dans l'Antonia. Titus, après avoir longuement exhorté les factieux, soit par l'intermédiaire de Josèphe, soit en s'adressant lui-même à eux, comme il voyait qu'ils étaient inflexibles, revint, contre sa volonté, aux actes de guerre.

De même, le long discours adressé par Titus à ses troupes pour les galvaniser avant un assaut, (*BJ* 6. 33–53)⁶⁶ est résumé en une ligne, qui signale à la fois la harangue et son effet sur les soldats: "Titus, s'étant adressé à ses soldats, raviva leur courage" (ὁ Τίτος δὲ τοῖς στρατιώταις διαλεχθεὶς ἐπήγειρεν αὐτῶν τὰ φρονήματα).⁶⁷

Conclusion

Il vaudrait sans doute la peine de mener l'enquête à l'échelle de l'oeuvre de Zonaras tout entière. Elle confirmerait probablement que a) le Byzantin a conservé, en totalité ou en partie, un certain nombre de discours ou de débats présents dans ses sources, sans doute parce qu'il jugeait *leur contenu* "utile" pour l'intelligibilité de son récit ou pour l'instruction — morale, politique — de ses lecteurs;⁶⁸ b) qu'il a réduit les autres à l'état de "coquilles vides" — sans doute parce qu'ils ne répondaient pas à ces critères—, mais sans les supprimer tout à fait car

⁶⁵ Cf. *BJ* 6. 129–131: Ταῦτα τοῦ Ἰωσήπου διαγγέλλοντος ἐκ τοῦ Καίσαρος, οἱ ληστὰι καὶ ὁ τύραννος οὐκ ἀπ' εὐνοίας ἀλλὰ κατὰ δειλίαν γίνεσθαι τὰς παρακλήσεις δοκοῦντες ὑπερηφάνουν. Τίτος δὲ ὡς οὔτε οἶκτον ἑαυτῶν τοὺς ἄνδρας οὔτε φειδῶ τοῦ ναοῦ ποιουμένους ἐώρα, πάλιν πρὸς πόλεμον ἄκων ἐχώρει.

⁶⁶ "Titus, pensant que l'espérance et les discours excitent le mieux l'ardeur des combattants, que les exhortations et les promesses font souvent oublier les dangers, parfois même mépriser la mort, réunit les soldats les plus vaillants et fit ainsi l'épreuve de leur courage: "Camarades", dit-il, "exhorter à une action qui ne comporte pas de danger immédiat, est chose sans gloire"....etc.

⁶⁷ Zonaras 2. 62.5–6.

⁶⁸ Cette notion d'utilité, topique chez les historiens antiques, est très présente dans la préface de Zonaras (voir *supra* note 8).

ils constituaient, eux aussi, à ses yeux, des maillons indispensables de la chaîne des causes et des effets reconstituée par l'historien-source. On doit donc reconnaître à Zonaras le mérite d'avoir conservé cette trame discursive, au moins partiellement, c'est-à-dire pour les séquences des livres 1 à 21 de l'*HR* qu'il a choisi de résumer. Cela tient du miracle quand on songe que, contrairement à Xiphilin, il ne s'était pas donné pour objectif de rester fidèle à sa source dionienne mais de faire lui-même oeuvre d'historien!

Il est regrettable, cependant, que Zonaras n'ait pas été sensible à —ou conscient de— l'usage varié et subtil que Dion fait des discours et qui dépasse largement l'articulation logique *récit/discours* dont il a été question tout au long de cet exposé. L'élucidation des actions par les discours prend chez l'historien sévérien, comme chez nombre de ses prédécesseurs, à commencer par Thucydide, d'autres formes que celle-là.⁶⁹ les ῥητορεῖαι servent à caractériser les personnages historiques, directement (ce qu'ils disent) ou indirectement (ce qu'on dit d'eux),⁷⁰ et donc à expliquer leur comportement et leurs décisions; les analyses abstraites et les γνῶμαι contenues dans les discours fournissent les clés d'interprétation des événements, comme cela a été montré excellemment dans un ouvrage récent pour les livres tardo-républicains de l'*HR*.⁷¹ En supprimant des discours entiers ou des pans entiers de discours, Zonaras a donc éliminé également cette dimension explicative et interprétative.⁷²

Mais ce n'est pas tout. Chez Dion, les discours ne sont pas seulement des *outils* narratifs dont l'usage par les historiens a été discuté et codifié depuis des siècles par la tradition historico-rhétorique: leur présence au sein de l'*Histoire romaine* est censée refléter une *réalité* et documenter une *pratique*, celle de l'éloquence publique, qui était effectivement un rouage essentiel de la *démokratia* romaine. Or, comme l'a bien montré A. Kemezis, Dion nous fait assister, dans les livres médio et tardo-républicains, à la dégradation progressive de cette pratique, à mesure que se multiplient les entorses aux institutions et que s'exacerbe la compétition entre les *imperatores*. Alors que dans les deux premières décades de l'*HR*, on

⁶⁹ Ces différentes fonctions "explicatives" de l'histoire sont bien décrites par Marincola 2007.

⁷⁰ On le voit par exemple avec la réécriture par Dion de la harangue de César à ses officiers à Vesontio (*HR* 38.36–46) qui vise à révéler la nature profonde des intentions de César (Kemezis, 2016).

⁷¹ Burden-Strevens, forthcoming. Voir aussi, Burden-Strevens 2016.

⁷² Simons 2009, 29: "Zonaras kann also durch Kürzungen tief in den Text seiner Vorlage eingreifen. Er verzichtet vielfach auf Begründungszusammenhänge, die Cassius Dio konstruiert, vor allem wenn sie von allgemein menschlichen Eigenschaften und moralischen Vorstellungen abgeleitet sind."

voit les orateurs—patriciens ou plébéiens—généralement inspirés par le souci du bien commun, persuader sans difficulté leurs concitoyens et obtenir le vote d'une décision collective, elle-même immédiatement traduite en actions concrètes,⁷³ à l'inverse, dans les livres suivants, la parole publique, confisquée par un petit groupe de "dynastes", s'avère rare, mensongère et incapable de convaincre. Cette dénaturation du *logos*, à la fois cause et symptôme du dysfonctionnement du régime républicain,⁷⁴ n'est pas seulement perceptible à Rome mais aussi sur les champs de bataille de Pharsale, Philippes et Actium, où les harangues des *imperatores* n'ont qu'un impact très limité ou pas d'impact avéré sur les soldats romains.⁷⁵ Tout se passe donc comme si la *fréquence* des discours et leur *degré d'efficacité* constituaient, tout autant que l'argumentation déployée par les locuteurs, leur niveau de moralité, leur sincérité ou leur hypocrisie, des marqueurs de l'état de santé de la République romaine. Les rapports que ce tableau entretient avec la vérité historique importent peu puisqu'il s'agit d'une reconstruction, mise au service d'une démonstration: chez Dion, tous les discours sont fictifs, même quand ils ont été réellement prononcés, puisqu'ils sont systématiquement (re)composés dans cette perspective, avec cette intentionalité.⁷⁶

Or, c'est ici que Zonaras, que nous avons fait sortir par la porte, revient par la fenêtre! En effet, c'est sur son témoignage (et, secondairement, celui des Extraits constantiniens) que

⁷³ Kemezis 2014, 105–107.

⁷⁴ Kemezis 2014, 111.

⁷⁵A Pharsale et Philippes, Dion résume et commente ces harangues, en soulignant le caractère topique et interchangeable de l'argumentation déployée par les orateurs (41.57.1; 47.42.3) et la réticence des citoyens romains à livrer une bataille fratricide (41.57.3–4; 47.45.3 et 46.2) : ils ne sont finalement poussés au combat que par une sorte de réflexe disciplinaire, déclenché par le signal des trompettes et l'initiative des alliés (41.58.1–3 et 47.43.1–3). A Actium, Dion fait parler longuement Antoine puis le jeune César au style direct (50.16–22 et 24–30), mais ne mentionne aucune réaction de leurs auditoires respectifs (en 56.10.1; en 50.23.1 et 31.1): ce silence consacre, pensons-nous, l'échec d'une éloquence réduite à des slogans de propagande, instrumentalisée par les ambitieux et devenue inaudible par les citoyens. Chez Zonaras, les *παραινήσεις* de Pharsale sont absentes puisqu'il s'appuie uniquement sur la *Vie de Pompée* de Plutarque pour cet épisode, faute de disposer du texte de Dion ; celle de Philippes ont disparu sans laisser aucune trace, peut-être parce qu'elles étaient narrativisées par Dion; pourtant les harangues d'Antoine et du jeune César à Actium, rédigées au style direct, sont à peine mieux traitées, puisque réduites à une seule phrase. Sans doute Zonaras était-il à la fois conscient du caractère convenu, topique et redondant de ces morceaux d'éloquence, d'ailleurs pointé par Dion lui-même, et peu intéressé par ces deux tirades de propagande.

⁷⁶ Si cette hypothèse est juste, la distance est considérable entre Polybe, par exemple, pour qui seuls les discours dont l'historicité est avérée avaient droit de cité en histoire (voir Marincola 2007, spéc. 120–127).

repose l'analyse que nous venons d'exposer; c'est lui qui nous donne une idée, même approximative, de la quantité de discours insérés dans le récit (nombre et fréquence d'apparition) et du degré de *performativité* de chacun d'eux.

Ainsi, en préservant le fin maillage discursif tissé solidement par Dion, Zonaras n'a pas seulement révélé la structure du récit dionien: il nous a donné accès à plusieurs niveaux de lecture, et donc d'interprétation. Le paradoxe est qu'il n'en avait certainement pas conscience mais notre dette envers lui n'en est pas moins grande pour autant.

DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

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DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

CASSIO DIONE E LE FONTI PRE-LIVIANE: UNA VERSIONE ALTERNATIVA DEI PRIMI SECOLI DI ROMA

Gianpaolo Urso

In un noto frammento, tratto dall'introduzione alla *Storia romana* (F 1.2 = ES 1), Cassio Dione rivendica l'esaustività delle sue letture (<...> πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τισι γεγραμμένα) e l'originalità della selezione degli argomenti da lui operata (συνέγραψα δὲ οὐ πάντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐξέκρινα). Certo, lo storico vuole richiamare l'attenzione soprattutto su questo secondo punto: lo conferma l'accenno successivo a ciò che è "degnò di memoria" (ἀξίως μνήμης) e "necessario" (τῶν ἀναγκαίων: F 1.1 = EV 2). Ma la pretesa di aver letto "praticamente tutto" resta notevole e sembrerebbe scoraggiare qualsiasi tentativo di indagine sulle fonti di Dione. Fergus Millar, nel suo *Study of Cassius Dio* del 1964, ha sostenuto l'inutilità, se non proprio l'irrelevanza, di una ricerca di questo tipo.¹ D'altra parte, dopo l'analisi di Schwartz nell'articolo su Dione per la *Realencyclopädie*,² l'unico studio di rilievo sulle fonti dello storico bitinico era stato quello di Klotz, sulla seconda guerra punica.³ Ma per quanto deprecabili fossero certi eccessi della *Quellenforschung* tardo-ottocentesca, cui lo stesso Schwartz non era riuscito a sottrarsi del tutto,⁴ la reazione di Millar, accantonando del tutto il problema, pareva viziata dal pregiudizio opposto.⁵

Per Dione, come per qualsiasi storico antico, il problema delle fonti resta ineludibile, se si vuole valutare il suo metodo di lavoro, la finalità della sua opera e l'attendibilità delle informazioni che egli fornisce. Non si tratta ovviamente di "dare un nome" alle fonti cui attinge il nostro autore, né tanto meno di negare che egli sia in grado di formulare giudizi

¹ Millar 1964, 28 ("Scholars have perhaps done themselves less than justice in assuming, as so often, that the most important thing to discover about a classical historian is the books from which he has copied"), 34–35.

² Schwartz 1899, 1692–1717.

³ Klotz 1936.

⁴ Quello di Schwartz è soprattutto un articolo sulle *fonti* di Dione: a questo tema sono dedicate ben 18 colonne (1685–1692) su 25. Sull'apporto di Schwartz alle ricerche su Dione e sui suoi limiti, cf. ora De Franchis 2016, 192–194.

⁵ Cf. Zecchini 1978, 189 n. 5; McDougall 1991, 616.

personali sugli eventi e sui personaggi da lui descritti.⁶ Il problema è stato lucidamente delineato da Bleckmann. La riflessione dello studioso tedesco prende spunto da un precedente volume di Fechner dedicato a Dione, nel quale il problema delle fonti viene esplicitamente messo da parte:⁷

In einer Arbeit zu “Cassius Dios sicht der Römischen Republik”, für deren Gegenstand die Trennung der Perspektiven von Quellen und Bearbeiter auch bei einer durchaus legitimen wrilimmanenten Betrachtung ein methodisches Grundproblem darstellt, hat D. Fechner wegen der vermeintlichen Aporien sogar die Frage nach den Quellen Dios dezidiert ausgeblendet. Fechner geht dabei von der insbesondere in der angelsächsischen Welt verkürzten Sichtweise aus, in der Quellenforschung handle es sich nur darum, in spekulativer Weise eine Tradition mit dem Namen eines Autors zu etikettieren. Dies mag für gewisse Exzesse insbesondere im 19. Jahrhundert zutreffen. Im Vordergrund steht aber in Wirklichkeit die vom Autorennamen unabhängige Bestimmung des Zeit- und Deutungshorizonts bestimmter Traditionen, die nur noch indirekt—in Fragmenten bzw. Übernahmen durch jüngere Historiker—erhalten geblieben sind. Eine solche hermeneutische Arbeit, die die Tiefendimension der erhaltenen historiographischen Quellen zur Kenntnis nimmt, ist methodisch zwingend geboten, wenn Ereignisgeschichte aus diesen Quellen rekonstruiert wird.⁸

Ora, è vero che Dione, prima di redigere la sua opera, dedicò dieci anni alla raccolta del materiale (73[72].23.5) e alla preparazione delle note, necessarie in vista della stesura del

⁶ In tal senso, cf. per esempio Hose 1994, 375. La tendenza a contestare la legittimità della *Quellenforschung*, per i motivi descritti nel testo, è molto diffusa ma anche assai opinabile, nonostante abbia avuto tra i suoi sostenitori studiosi di riconosciuta autorità. Si veda ad esempio il giudizio di Syme 1945, 104 sul volume di A. Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger*: “The method he adopts bears primarily upon the origin and validity of historical statements: it may have little to tell about the historian himself. In the meantime a younger generation, turning aside from these austere delectations, from dogma, dispute, and nihilism, prefers to analyse the literary technique of Livy and endeavours to situate him more precisely in his spiritual environment”. Millar, allievo di Syme, ne ha pienamente condiviso il punto di vista.

⁷ Fechner 1986, 15–16.

⁸ Bleckmann 2002, 36–37.

testo.⁹ Ed è vero anche che Dione non è un compilatore e che ciò che leggiamo nella *Storia romana* è proprio *Dione* e non la mera trascrizione di autori più antichi.¹⁰ Inoltre l'articolazione stessa di questo metodo (lettura – note – stesura) implica che egli raramente seguiva *una sola* fonte per volta. Questo però non significa che egli miscelasse le informazioni provenienti dalle fonti più disparate senza operare delle scelte: ci dovevano essere insomma autori cui Dione attribuiva, volta per volta, maggiore rilevanza.

Tra gli autori che Dione di sicuro conosceva c'era naturalmente Livio, l'ultimo storico prima di lui che aveva redatto una grande opera *ab urbe condita* (142 libri sino al 9 a.C.)¹¹ e quindi era il modello con cui bisognava necessariamente confrontarsi: i due terzi dell'opera di Dione (i libri 1–55) comprendevano il periodo già trattato da Livio. Sul problema dei rapporti tra Livio e Dione molto è stato scritto, anche di recente. È quindi opportuno ribadire fin da subito che Livio *non* è fonte di Dione o, per lo meno, non è annoverabile tra le fonti cui Dione attribuiva una particolare rilevanza. Possiamo anzitutto affermare che Dione non ha utilizzato Livio per il periodo per cui egli poteva massimamente servirgli, cioè per l'età augustea: decisiva in tal senso appare la dimostrazione di Manuwald.¹² La stessa considerazione si applica al periodo tardo repubblicano (Lintott), e in particolare alla guerra gallica di Cesare (Zecchini) e alla guerra tra Cesare e Pompeo (Berti):¹³ l'influsso liviano su Dione è stato negato o almeno fortemente ridimensionato, arrivando anzi a presentare Dione come un “anti-liviano” programmatico e pienamente consapevole.¹⁴ L'infondatezza della teoria, sostenuta ancora da Schwartz, che faceva di Dione un “liviano” per la sezione tardo-repubblicana e proto-augustea della *Storia romana*,¹⁵ appare oggi chiaramente dimostrata.

⁹ Su tale metodo di lavoro cf. Vrind 1926, 324; Millar 1964, 30, 32–33; Letta 1979, 183; Barnes 1984, 251; Gowing 1992, 43–44; Fromentin & Bertrand 2008, xxxiv–xxxvi.

¹⁰ È stato appunto Millar ad aprire la strada per una rivalutazione complessiva della personalità e dell'opera di Dione, oggetto in questi ultimi decenni di numerosi commenti e studi specifici: cf., da ultimo, Fromentin, Bertrand, Coltelloni-Trannoy, Molin & Urso 2016; Lange & Madsen 2016.

¹¹ In età tiberiana ci fu, certo, ancora Fenestella; ma l'ampiezza dei suoi *Annales* non è paragonabile a quella degli *Ab urbe condita libri* (nel libro 22, Fenestella parlava dell'anno 57 a.C.: cf. *FRH* 70,2).

¹² Manuwald 1979, 168–272; cf. Reinhold 1988, 7–8.

¹³ Zecchini 1978, 188–200; Berti 1988, 7–21; Lintott 1997, 2519–2521. Per le fonti di Dione sul periodo triumvirale, cf. ora Fromentin & Bertrand 2014, xvi–xxi.

¹⁴ Zecchini 1979, 86–87.

¹⁵ Schwartz 1899, 1697–1705.

Ma l'originalità dell'indagine di Schwartz riguarda le prime decadi di Dione. Lo studioso tedesco sosteneva la piena indipendenza di Dione da Livio (e da Dionigi di Alicarnasso) per l'età monarchica e per i primi secoli della repubblica, vale a dire per i libri 1–21, per i quali disponiamo anche dell'epitome di Zonara.¹⁶ La tesi di Schwartz si basava su un confronto sinottico tra un certo numero di passi di Dione, trasmessi dagli *Excerpta Constantiniana* o da Zonara, e i passi paralleli di Livio e di Dionigi. Per quanto basata su una selezione di esempi non esaustiva, la dimostrazione dello studioso tedesco resta ancora oggi convincente. Essa è stata confermata da diversi studi anche recenti, che citerò più avanti, dedicati a singole sezioni del testo dioneo.

Per quanto riguarda il periodo della monarchia, oggetto dei primi due libri della *Storia romana*, l'analisi esaustiva che ancora mancava è ora disponibile grazie a Briquel, che ha sottoposto a un confronto puntuale tutti i passi di Dione (e di Zonara) relativi ai re di Roma e le fonti parallele.¹⁷ Lo studioso francese non si spinge, a dire il vero, a negare l'utilizzazione *anche* di Livio e di Dionigi per questa prima sezione dell'opera. Egli rileva però come, al di là delle occasionali (e inevitabili) analogie, “le récit de Dion ne garde pas la moindre trace de ce qui pourrait apparaître comme un héritage des orientations des histoires de Tite-Live ou de Denys dans ce qu'elles avaient de plus original”.¹⁸ Nessuna delle “innovazioni” apparentemente introdotte da Livio rispetto alla tradizione più antica trova riscontro in Dione.

In una breve analisi sulle fonti di Dione non si può non accennare alla ricostruzione, assai originale, delle origini della repubblica. Per Dione, dopo la caduta di Tarquinio il Superbo, i Romani nominarono al suo posto un “magistrato” (ἄρχων), assistito da un “collega” (συνάρχων) (Zonar. 7.12.1; cf. anche Cass. Dio F 13.2; Zonar. 7.12.4; 7.13.9). A partire dall'inizio del V secolo a.C. questi due magistrati sono chiamati “pretori” (στρατηγοί)¹⁹ (Cass. Dio F 18.3; 20.3; 21.3; Zonar. 7.14.3; 7.17.1; 7.17.2; 7.17.5; 7.17.6; 7.19.1). Nel 451 vulg. il primo collegio decemvirale risulta composto da “due pretori dotati di pieni poteri” (Zonar. 7.18.2: στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες) e da altri otto membri (ἄνδρες ὀκτώ):

¹⁶ Schwartz 1899, 1692–1697.

¹⁷ Briquel 2016, 130–136.

¹⁸ Briquel 2016, 134 n. 30.

¹⁹ Urso 2011, 53–54.

il principio della collegialità diseguale, indirettamente suggerito dalla denominazione dei magistrati del 509 vulg. (ἄρχων e συνάρχων), è qui esplicitamente enunciato. Esso viene però superato l'anno successivo, nel collegio del 450 vulg., i cui dieci membri “governavano su un piano di parità” (Zonar. 7.18.4: ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἤρχων). La notizia sul collegio del 450 vulg. anticipa a sua volta quella del 449 vulg., dopo l'abolizione del decemvirato: secondo Dione, fu appunto a partire da quell'anno che i due primi magistrati di Roma furono chiamati “consoli” (Zonar. 7.19.1: τότε γὰρ λέγεται πρῶτον ὑπάτους αὐτοὺς προσαγορευθῆναι, στρατηγούς καλουμένους τὸ πρότερον). Questo insieme di notizie costituisce un *unicum*, che inquadra cronologicamente un dato molto antico, cui le altre fonti a noi pervenute dedicano solo cenni vaghi, occasionali e fuori contesto (Cic. *Leg.*, 3.3.8; Liv. 7.3.5; Plin. *NH*, 18.3.12; Gell. *NA*, 11.18.8; Fest. p. 249 Lindsay). Dione qui segue una fonte eterodossa, che egli ritiene particolarmente affidabile, una fonte che conserva il ricordo di una “tradizione scomparsa”: forse la stessa tradizione da cui dipende la notizia di Livio (3.9) sulla *rogatio* di C. Terentilio Arsa (tribuno della plebe nel 462 vulg.) *ut quinque uiri creerentur legibus de imperio consulari scribendi*.

Ma l'interesse del nostro storico si estendeva anche alle altre magistrature repubblicane, cui egli dedicava una serie di *excursus* (Zonar. 7.13.3 [questori]; 7.13.12–14 [dittatori]; 7.15.1–9 [tribuni della plebe]; 7.15.10 [edili]; 7.19.4–5 [tribuni *consulari* *potestate*]; 7.19.6–9 [censori]).²⁰ Questi *excursus* forniscono numerose notizie non attestate altrove e sono caratterizzati dall'impiego frequente di una terminologia formulare, tipica del linguaggio giuridico; dalla tendenza a distinguere tra i poteri *de iure* dei magistrati e la loro pratica attuazione *de facto*; dalla loro coerenza interna.²¹ Non credo che Dione abbia elaborato lui stesso questi *excursus*, basandosi su una molteplicità di fonti. È probabile invece che egli abbia utilizzato (almeno come fonte principale) un testo giuridico, forse un *liber de magistratibus*,²² che si può datare, sulla base di diversi dettagli interni, poco dopo la metà del

²⁰ Questo argomento, che ho studiato in Urso 2005, è stato ripreso in seguito da Simons 2009, 33–119, senza tenere conto del mio lavoro e con conclusioni parzialmente diverse.

²¹ Per esempio, al richiamo (anacronistico) ai tribuni della plebe nell'*excursus* sui dittatori (Zonar. 7.13.3), corrisponde il richiamo ai dittatori nell'*excursus* sui tribuni (7.15.3). Si rilevano invece contraddizioni tra i singoli *excursus* e il loro contesto narrativo: Urso 2005, 167–171.

²² Sull'impiego, per gli *excursus* sui magistrati, di una fonte “giuridica”, cf. Urso 2005, 163–193 (in particolare p. 167–171). Questa conclusione è condivisa da Smith 2012, 109. A una fonte unica pensava già Cornelius 1940, 31; *contra*: Millar 1964, 181–182; Libourel 1974, 384. Sull'utilizzazione di una fonte giuridica cf. anche Simons 2009, 108–109, che la identifica con Ulpiano.

I secolo a.C.:²³ un'epoca in cui la "costituzione" romana fu oggetto di un acceso dibattito da parte degli *interpretes iuris*. Come attesta Livio (3.55.8–12), questo dibattito riguardava appunto l'origine delle magistrature, ma anche questioni più tecniche, come la distinzione tra la *sacrosanctitas* tribunizia, sanzionata dal giuramento della plebe al momento della prima secessione, e la condanna come *sacer* di chi oltraggiava i tribuni (distinzione ammessa da Dione: cf. Zonar. 7.15.5); o come l'origine del tribunato, che alcuni facevano risalire a un accordo tra patrizi e plebei (Liv. 2.33.1; D.H. AR 6.89.4, 11.55.3), ma che gli *interpretes iuris* (Liv. 3.55.10) attribuivano a un'iniziativa della sola plebe, attraverso una *lex sacrata* (quest'ultima era appunto la versione di Dione: Zonar. 7.15.1).

La narrazione delle vicende interne di Roma tra il V e il IV secolo mostra la tendenza di Dione a valorizzare "tradizioni scomparse", attingendo talvolta alle stesse fonti di Livio, talvolta a fonti diverse.²⁴ Lo si riscontra già nei frammenti sul "primo anno della repubblica", che descrivono una situazione molto tesa,²⁵ che per poco non sfocia nel linciaggio di L. Tarquinio Collatino prima (Zonar. 7.12), di P. Valerio Publicola poi (Cass. Dio F 13.2): due episodi assenti nelle fonti parallele (D.H. AR 5.10–12; 5.19; Liv. 2.2; 2.7.5–12; Plut. *Publ.*, 10). Questa tensione caratterizza sin dall'inizio i rapporti tra i magistrati (Cass. Dio F 13.3–4; diversamente Liv. 2.8; D.H. AR 5.35.3; Plut. *Publ.*, 14) e si ritrova nella narrazione della lotta tra patrizi e plebei, che comprende diversi episodi "inediti" (Cass. Dio F 17.1–3; Zonar. 7.14.1–2 [cf. Liv. 2.23–24; D.H. AR 6.22.1–29.1]; Cass. Dio F 17.9 [cf. Liv. 2.32.4; D.H. AR 6.47.2; Plut. *Cor.*, 6.1]) e culmina nell'uccisione di nove tribuni della plebe bruciati vivi (Cass. Dio F 22.1–2; Zonar. 7.17.7).²⁶ Dietro a questi episodi si ritrova la traccia di tradizioni

²³ Sulla cronologia della fonte di Dione, cf. Urso 2005, 171–175; Urso 2016a, 145. Alla metà circa del I secolo a.C. sembrano rimandare l'insistenza sulla *transitio ad plebem* (Zonar. 7.15.9; 7.19.3), l'allusione alla *lex Clodia de censoria notione*, che restò in vigore dal 58 al 52 (Zonar. 7.19.9; cf. Cass. Dio 38.13.2; 40.57.1), la polemica sulla *οἰωνοσκοπία* dei tribuni (Zonar. 7.19.2; cf. Cass. Dio 38.13.3–6; Libourel 1974, 390). Se l'accenno a Cesare, alla fine dell'*excursus* sui dittatori (Zonar. 7.13.14), si trovava già nella fonte di Dione, esso ci rimanderebbe al medesimo contesto cronologico.

²⁴ Urso 2016a.

²⁵ Libourel 1974, 384–386; Urso 2016a, 146–147.

²⁶ Su questi episodi cf., in questo volume, il contributo di M. Lindholmer.

eterodosse,²⁷ che si è proposto di far risalire a una o più fonti di epoca sillana o cesariana. Questo vale in particolare per due famosi esempi di *adfectatio regni*: quello di Spurio Cassio e quello di M. Manlio Capitolino. Mi limito qui a un breve accenno su Cassio. Costui è presentato come un benefattore del popolo romano, vittima dell'ingratitude e dell'invidia (F 19): un quadro ben diverso da quello delle fonti parallele (Diod. Sic. 11.37.7; D.H. AR 8.69.2–4, 8.77.1–79.1; Liv. 2.41.8–12),²⁸ ma conforme al giudizio che Dionigi (10.38.3) attribuisce, fuori contesto (sotto il 453 vulg.), a L. Siccio Dentato. Nel discorso di Siccio si ritrova la traccia di un'antica versione favorevole a Cassio, del tutto diversa da quella liviana.²⁹ Questa versione “scomparsa”, di cui Dionigi conserva l'eco indiretta, era certamente la versione di Dione.³⁰

Un episodio su cui il racconto di Dione doveva presentare numerose varianti rispetto al resto della tradizione è l'attacco gallico a Roma del 386 a.C.³¹ Qui mi limito a due esempi. Il primo esempio è l'atteggiamento degli ambasciatori *Fabii* nell'episodio di Clusium, antefatto dell'attacco a Roma (F 25.2): secondo Dione (F 25.2), gli ambasciatori non presero le armi contro i Galli (cf. Diod. Sic. 14.113.4; D.H. AR 13 F 12; Liv. 5.36), né incitarono i Clusini a farlo (cf. Plut. *Cam.*, 17.6), ma furono quasi “trascinati” in battaglia dai Clusini stessi. La versione di Dione, che implicitamente assolve gli ambasciatori dall'accusa di aver violato lo *ius gentium*, sembrerebbe la versione originale della *gens Fabia*.³² Il secondo esempio è l'episodio del centurione, il cui grido *Hic manebimus optime!*, inteso come *omen* favorevole, induce i Romani a rinunciare al progetto di trasferirsi a Veio. In Livio (5.51–54), l'episodio è preceduto da un lungo discorso di Camillo (cf. Plut. *Cam.*, 32.1–2); in Zonara (7.23.8) leggiamo che il popolo non avrebbe prestato ascolto οὔτε τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὔτε τῆ γερουσίᾳ, se non avesse udito la frase del centurione: Camillo non è nemmeno menzionato. Questo silenzio è strano, perché Camillo è per Dione il protagonista indiscusso della lotta

²⁷ Libourel 1974, 392–393: “Obscure and unusual traditions”.

²⁸ Libourel 1974, 387–388.

²⁹ Smith 2006, 52.

³⁰ Anche sulla morte di Manlio Capitolino, la versione di Dione (F 26.1–2; Zonar. 7.23.10) risulta molto diversa (Oakley 1997, 20: “Surprisingly different”) rispetto a quella delle fonti parallele (Liv. 6.18–20; Plut. *Cam.*, 36). Cf. Urso 2016a, 147–148. Dalla stessa tradizione di Dione potrebbe peraltro dipendere Diodoro (15.35.3): cf. Lintott 2006, 15.

³¹ Per una discussione articolata cf. Schettino 2006; per una sintesi, Urso 2016a, 148–149.

³² Schettino 2006, 69.

contro i Galli nei decenni che seguirono.³³ L'episodio del centurione gioca un ruolo centrale rispetto all'immagine di Camillo come "secondo fondatore di Roma" e precursore di Augusto: il silenzio di Dione sembra rappresentare uno stadio della tradizione più antico di quello attestato da Livio e nel quale Camillo non è ancora assimilato ad Augusto.³⁴

Per quanto riguarda le vicende interne di Roma nella prima metà del IV secolo a.C., si constata numerose divergenze significative tra Dione e le fonti parallele, sulle quali non mi soffermo in questa sede.³⁵ La presenza in Dione di tradizioni eterodosse si mostra comunque con particolare chiarezza nel racconto riguardante la seconda metà del IV secolo.³⁶ La versione di Zonara (7.26.1–8) sulle operazioni del 340 vulg. contro i Latini è simile nelle sue grandi linee a quella di Livio (8.6.8–12.1), ma presenta numerose varianti.³⁷ Secondo Oakley,³⁸ le possibilità sono due: Dione ha utilizzato Livio e un'altra fonte; oppure Livio e Dione hanno fatto ricorso, in modo indipendente, a fonti comuni. A mio avviso l'ipotesi di una fonte comune è la più probabile. Lo suggerisce, per esempio, il frammento di Dione in cui i Sanniti sono presentati come alleati infidi dei Romani (F 35.4): essi attendono l'esito di una battaglia già in corso tra Latini e Romani, prima di intervenire al fianco di questi ultimi. La notizia si trova anche in un frammento di Dionigi (15 F 4.3) e nel racconto liviano sulla battaglia *ad Vesperim*, che permette di contestualizzarla. Ma per Livio si tratta di una versione alternativa (8.11.2: *apud quosdam auctores invenio*) a quella da lui accettata, secondo la quale i Sanniti parteciparono alla battaglia sin dall'inizio (8.10.7).³⁹ Come già per la notizia sui primi tribuni della plebe,⁴⁰ qui Dione segue la seconda versione menzionata da Livio,⁴¹

³³ Schettino 2006, 64–65.

³⁴ Schettino 2006, 70.

³⁵ Cf. Urso 2016a, 149.

³⁶ Qui la sintesi di Zonara non comprende nessuna allusione alla "prima guerra sannitica", che la tradizione data al 343–341 vulg. e la cui storicità è stata in passato contestata. Purtroppo non è possibile stabilire se questa omissione sia dovuta ad un taglio considerevole del testo originale o se essa rifletta il silenzio di Dione su questo conflitto, che si aggiungerebbe in tal caso al silenzio di Diodoro (cf. Diod. Sic. 19.2.1).

³⁷ Oakley 1998, 425, 438.

³⁸ Oakley 1998, 438–439.

³⁹ La versione di Livio è chiaramente la più antica e attendibile (Salmon 1967, 207; Buonocore & Firpo 1991, 66–67; Brizzi 1997, 97, 99, 102; Urso 2013b, 81).

⁴⁰ Cf. sopra, p.58.

⁴¹ Liv. 2.33.1, 3.55.10; Zonar. 7.15.1. Per altri passi, in cui la versione di Dione corrisponde alla versione "alternativa" di Livio (o di Dionigi), cf. Schwartz 1899, 1693.

ma è chiaro che egli non la trova in Livio, ma consultando direttamente la sua stessa fonte.⁴² Si tratta molto probabilmente della medesima fonte comune che si può riconoscere dietro al commento che concludeva, in Dione, l'esposizione della guerra latina (F 35.10): l'allusione alla concessione ai Latini, dopo la loro sconfitta, del diritto di cittadinanza, che i Romani avevano loro rifiutato prima della guerra, sembra in realtà un'allusione alla guerra sociale. Ora, questa stessa sovrapposizione storiografica della guerra sociale alla guerra latina si trova anche in Livio, ma in un contesto diverso. In Livio essa non riguarda la *conclusione* della guerra latina, ma i suoi *antefatti*: mi riferisco al noto episodio del pretore latino Annio di Saetia (8.5–6), il cui legame col ricordo della guerra sociale è stato da tempo riconosciuto.⁴³ Il tema è chiaramente lo stesso, ma esso viene evocato, da Livio e da Dione, in due momenti differenti del loro racconto. Possiamo concludere che qui Dione ha utilizzato una fonte di I secolo impiegata anche da Livio, ma senza la mediazione di Livio.⁴⁴

Nell'esposizione sulle guerre sannitiche, il testo di Dione non solo fornisce a più riprese una versione dei fatti alternativa a quella di Livio, ma sembra anche conservare il ricordo di “tradizioni scomparse”. Mi soffermo qui su due episodi: la battaglia di Caudio e la campagna del 311 vulg.

Per quanto concerne Caudio, Dione riprende in gran parte la versione tradizionale, ma si differenzia per numerosi dettagli,⁴⁵ tra cui possiamo ricordare: (i) la descrizione dell'antefatto, i negoziati del 322 vulg. (F 36.8), con una significativa ripresa dell'espressione di Appiano ἄσπονδος καὶ ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος (*Samn.*, F 4.3, 4.13, 4.16), che non ha riscontro in Livio e sembra rimandare all'impiego di una fonte comune, forse in lingua greca;⁴⁶ (ii) lo svolgimento della battaglia, dove si constata la compresenza di due tradizioni differenti, di cui la prima parlava di una battaglia mancata (è la versione dominante in Dione, come in Livio e nel resto della tradizione), la seconda di uno scontro vero e proprio (F 36.15:

⁴² Va comunque escluso che questa fonte sia Dionigi: a parte l'allusione all'atteggiamento ambiguo dei Sanniti, non c'è nessun punto di contatto tra il frammento di Dionigi e l'epitome di Zonara. Cf. Urso 2016a, 151 n. 37.

⁴³ De Sanctis 1960, 259–260; Gabba 1956, 27; Gabba 1967, 129 n. 176; Bernardi 1973, 56–57; Dipersia 1975; Oakley 1988, 408–411.

⁴⁴ Urso 2013b.

⁴⁵ Cf. Oakley 2005a, 9.

⁴⁶ Urso 2016b, 152.

ἤττηθήντες);⁴⁷ (iii) il passaggio sotto il giogo, dove Livio (9.6.2) parla dell'uccisione di alcuni soldati romani, negata esplicitamente da Dione (Zonar. 7.26.11). Ma il dettaglio più originale sono le considerazioni degli abitanti di Roma, nel momento in cui appendono la notizia della sconfitta. Secondo Dione (F 36.16), in un primo tempo i Romani considerarono gli eventi di Caudio come un'autentica vergogna, al punto che avrebbero preferito la morte dell'intero esercito armi in pugno; ma dopo aver riflettuto che, se così fosse successo, Roma stessa avrebbe rischiato di essere distrutta, "essi non furono dispiaciuti di apprendere che si erano salvati" (οὐκ ἀκουσίως ἤκουον ὅτι ἐσώθησαν). Con queste parole si conclude l'*excerptum* costantiniano (ES 65), mentre in Zonara (7.26.13) leggiamo che i Romani "si rallegrarono (ἤδοντο) della loro salvezza". La testimonianza di Dione sul "sollievo", se non sulla "gioia" dei Romani, a prima vista sconcertante, pone lo stesso problema dell'attribuzione al console Sp. Postumio del soprannome *Caudinus*, attestata dai *Fasti Capitolini* e dal *Cronografo del 354*: si tratta del solo esempio di *cognomen ex clade* registrato nei *Fasti* e come tale non ha mancato di suscitare perplessità.⁴⁸ Inoltre il famoso denario di Ti. Veturio (discendente dell'altro console di Caudio, T. Veturio), databile alla fine del II secolo a.C., riproduce la scena dell'accordo, teoricamente "infamante", concluso sul campo di Caudio.⁴⁹ Il *cognomen Caudinus* nei *Fasti*, il denario di Veturio, la notizia di Dione sul "sollievo" dei Romani dopo la battaglia: tutto questo suggerisce l'esistenza di una tradizione molto antica, secondo la quale l'accordo concluso sul campo aveva permesso di salvare l'esercito romano ed era stato in seguito accettato dal popolo e rispettato.⁵⁰ Di questa versione, nella quale il giogo manteneva il suo carattere originario di "esorcismo rituale" e non comportava di per sé l'umiliazione del nemico vinto,⁵¹ il frammento di Dione è la sola

⁴⁷ Da questa tradizione sembrano dipendere Cic. *Sen.* 12.41, *Off.* 3.30.109; App. *Samn.*, F 4.18. Cf. da ultimo Oakley 2005a, 25–26; Grossmann 2009, 65–66 (secondo cui la versione di Cicerone sarebbe la più antica: *contra*, Briquel 2010, 425).

⁴⁸ Urso 1997, 241–243. Cf. Firpo 2012, 471. Degrassi 1947, 107 riteneva giustamente che in questo contesto il *cognomen* non potesse avere che carattere onorifico. Degrassi però ipotizzava che i discendenti di Postumio avessero cercato di riscattare in qualche modo l'infausto ricordo della *clades Caudina* attribuendo al loro antenato il *cognomen Caudinus*: una spiegazione a mio parere poco convincente.

⁴⁹ Mommsen 1870, 306; Münzer 1920, 131–132; Beloch 1926, 397; Heurgon 1942, 227–228; Breglia 1947, 68–70, 77; Gundel 1958, 1885; Thomsen 1961, 278; Crawford 1973, 5–6; Lintott 1994, 61.

⁵⁰ Urso 1997, 243–244.

⁵¹ Questa funzione originaria del giogo sembra in qualche misura ancora conosciuta da Giugurta nel 110 a.C., come ha mostrato Brizzi 1990.

attestazione storiografica. Questa tradizione è probabilmente “scomparsa” in età post-sillana, quando si impose definitivamente la versione, rielaborata dopo gli avvenimenti di Numanzia del 137 a.C., che parlava di una *deditio foede facta* (Liv. 9.7.7), rifiutata dal popolo romano e immediatamente vendicata. È evidentemente impossibile identificare la fonte seguita da Dione, ma è molto probabile che si tratti della stessa fonte da lui impiegata per il racconto del dibattito sul *foedus Numantinum*, che vedremo tra poco.⁵² Mi pare in ogni caso certo che egli ha conservato qui la traccia di una “tradizione scomparsa”.⁵³

Un'altra variante di notevole rilievo riguarda la campagna di C. Giunio Bubulco, nel 311 vulg. Su questi avvenimenti, oltre a Diodoro (20.26.3–4), che parla di una sequenza di vittorie romane, abbiamo le testimonianze di Livio e di Zonara, che concordano su parecchi particolari, ma si contraddicono sul punto essenziale: mentre Livio (9.31.7–16) parla di una vittoria stentata di Bubulco, in Zonara (8.1.1) la battaglia si conclude con una pesante sconfitta romana. Quest'ultima versione è evidentemente la più credibile.⁵⁴ I dettagli come l'imboscata dei Sanniti e le difficoltà dovute al terreno, noti anche a Livio, conservano in Zonara (cioè in Dione) il loro significato originario: vogliono spiegare la sconfitta romana. Dione è qui testimone di una tradizione più antica di quella attestata da Livio.⁵⁵ In questo caso, Dione non solo è indipendente da Livio, ma ci trasmette la versione autentica dell'episodio.

Per quanto concerne la terza guerra sannitica, oltre a diverse varianti “minori”, che sono state spiegate con l'impiego da parte di Dione delle stesse fonti di Livio,⁵⁶ possiamo brevemente segnalare il racconto riguardante il 295 a.C., l'anno di Sentino: qui è notevole in particolare che Zonara (8.1.5), parlando dell'assegnazione dei rispettivi fronti di guerra ai

⁵² Cf. sotto, p. 69.

⁵³ Grossmann 2009, 71: “Es scheint wahrscheinlicher dass Dio hier auf eine ältere Tradition zurückgeht”; *contra* Loreto 1989–1990, 661, secondo cui le considerazioni attribuite da Dione ai Romani non esprimerebbero che l'opinione dello storico.

⁵⁴ Da ultimo Grossmann 2009, 205–206. Cf. già Sordi 1969, 73–74; Briquel 2001, 143–145.

⁵⁵ Libourel 1973, 78 (“This tradition probably dated from the time of the battle or at least from the following century and found its way into one of the earlier annalists”); Grossmann 2009, 106 (“Der Bericht des Zonaras geht hier somit auf eine ältere Tradition zurück als jener des Livius”). Più incerto al riguardo Oakley 2005a, 403–404.

⁵⁶ Oakley 2005b, 382.

consoli Q. Fabio Rulliano e P. Decio Mure, accolga la versione “alternativa” cui Livio accenna alla fine del suo racconto (10.26.5: *invenio apud quosdam...*).⁵⁷

Per il III secolo a.C. i due episodi di riferimento sono ovviamente le prime due guerre puniche. In questo caso il problema delle fonti di Dione è stato oggetto, dopo Schwartz, di studi sistematici e approfonditi: in particolare, quello già citato di Klotz, del 1936, sulla seconda guerra punica; e quello di Bleckmann, del 2002, sulla prima.⁵⁸ Basterà perciò un richiamo sommario al loro contenuto.

Per quanto concerne la seconda guerra punica, Klotz ha dimostrato che Dione si è servito di due fonti impiegate anche da Livio, Celio Antipatro e Valerio Anziate, ma utilizzandole direttamente e senza la mediazione liviana:⁵⁹ dunque una monografia sulla guerra annibalica e una storia *ab urbe condita*. Naturalmente il fatto che Dione abbia utilizzato Celio Antipatro e Valerio Anziate non implica che egli si sia servito *soltanto* di queste due fonti, ma la dimostrazione di Klotz rimane indispensabile anche nel contesto di una più ampia valutazione del lavoro di Dione sui primi secoli di Roma. Da un lato, infatti, è evidente che Valerio Anziate dovrà essere considerato come una delle fonti di Dione per *tutta* la storia di Roma, dalle origini al I secolo a.C.: e in effetti tracce di Valerio Anziate sono state individuate in altre parti dell’opera dionea, dalla storia dei re (l’etimologia del nome di Anco

⁵⁷ Urso 2016a, 155.

⁵⁸ Quest’ultimo è un ampio capitolo (“Cassius Dio als Quelle für die Geschichte des Ersten Punischen Krieg”) del volume dedicato da Bleckmann alla *nobilitas* romana (Bleckmann 2002, 35–56; cf. anche 125–131 e 147–149).

⁵⁹ Klotz 1936. La stessa ipotesi era ammessa, ma non discussa, già da Soltau 1897, 190. Tra i tanti esempi ricavabili dall’esautiva analisi di Klotz, ne citerò qui uno solo, notevole proprio perché affine ad altri sopra citati per il V e IV secolo. Si tratta del passaggio del Po da parte di Annibale nel 218 a.C. (cf. Klotz 1936, 71–72). Secondo Dione (Zonar. 8.24.1), Annibale, non disponendo di barche, ordinò al fratello Magone di attraversare il fiume a nuoto con i cavalieri e di lanciarsi all’inseguimento dei Romani, mentre egli avrebbe disposto in fila gli elefanti, per rompere la forza della corrente e permettere ai soldati un più agevole passaggio. Questa versione corrisponde al racconto di Celio Antipatro (*FRH* 15,13), che Livio cita a 21.47.4–5, ma che giudica difficilmente ammissibile per coloro che conoscano il Po (*ea peritis amnis eius uix fidem fecerint*). Livio accetta qui una versione differente, attestata già in Polibio (3.66.6–8). Come ha mostrato Klotz, è molto improbabile che Dione abbia tratto da Livio la versione di Celio: qui Dione utilizzava Celio direttamente, privilegiando, come in altri casi sopra citati, la “versione 2” di Livio.

Marzio: Zonar. 7.7.1)⁶⁰ alla campagna asiatica di Cn. Manlio Vulzone (Zonar. 9.21.10–15).⁶¹ D'altra parte, è significativo che tra le fonti di Dione ci fosse un'opera così risalente (ultimo terzo del II secolo a.C.), come appunto la monografia di Celio Antipatro.⁶²

Il tema della prima guerra punica, trattato da Schwartz in modo alquanto sbrigativo,⁶³ era stato occasionalmente ripreso nel corso del '900 da diversi studiosi, che avevano sottolineato l'originalità del racconto dioneo, ipotizzando che esso rispecchiasse la tradizione di Filino di Agrigento (attraverso la mediazione di un tardo annalista).⁶⁴ Nel suo lavoro del 2002 Bleckmann ha ripreso l'argomento in modo esaustivo, sostenendo, con argomenti a mio parere convincenti, che in Dione è confluito, in modo indipendente da Livio e dallo stesso Polibio, materiale molto antico, al più tardi del II secolo a.C.:⁶⁵ frammenti di tradizioni contemporanee (“zeitgenössische Zeugnisfragmente”),⁶⁶ e di tradizioni in ogni caso anteriori a Polibio.

Per quanto concerne in particolare il rapporto con Livio (meglio, in questo caso, con la cosiddetta “tradizione liviana”), si possono in particolare citare quattro esempi:⁶⁷ (i) la spedizione di L. Cornelio Scipione in Corsica e Sardegna del 259, su cui la “tradizione liviana” (Liv. *perioch.* 17; Val. Max. 5.1.2; Oros. 4.7.11), secondo cui essa fu coronata da un pieno successo, è smentita da Dione (Zonar. 8.11), secondo cui la Sardegna fu abbandonata; una versione, questa, che trova riscontro nell'iscrizione funeraria del console (*CIL* I² 9); (ii) la pace di Lutazio, dove alla versione nota a Livio, che menziona l'immediata cessione della Sardegna (22.54.11; cf. Ampel. 46.2; Eutrop. 3.2.2; Oros., *hist.*, 4.11.2; *vir. ill.* 41.2),⁶⁸ si contrappone quella più attendibile di Dione (Zonar. 8.17.4; cf. già Polyb. 1.63.3), che parla delle “isole” tra Italia e Sicilia; (iii) la spedizione di Ap. Claudio Caudex contro Ierone, dove

⁶⁰ Schwartz 1899, 1693.

⁶¹ Simons 2009, 167–177.

⁶² Briscoe 2013, 256–267.

⁶³ Schwartz 1899, 1694.

⁶⁴ Klotz 1952, 330; De Sanctis 1967, 229–233; De Sensi Sestito 1974, 30, 38; Frézouls 1980, 966. Che il “mediatore” fosse addirittura Cincio Alimento era l'opinione di La Bua 1981. Diversamente Rizzo 1980, 1900–1903 faceva di Dione un “liviano” senza discussione alcuna.

⁶⁵ Bleckmann 2002, 35–56.

⁶⁶ Bleckmann 2002, 44–50.

⁶⁷ Bleckmann 2002, 41–42.

⁶⁸ Cf. De Sanctis 1967, 272.

Dione (Zonar. 8.9.8–9) parla dell’insuccesso della marcia su Siracusa, contro la “tradizione liviana” (Flor. 1.18.6; Eutr. 2.18.2; Oros. 4.7.2); (iv) la sconfitta di A. Atilio Calatino alle Lipari, che diventa una vittoria nella “tradizione liviana” (Oros. *Hist.* 4.8.5; *Vir. Ill.* 39.2).⁶⁹ Tra le tracce di “tradizioni contemporanee”, possiamo annoverare le analogie tra l’elogio di Duilio e il testo di Zonara (8.10.6–11.5),⁷⁰ riguardanti la gerarchia dei comandanti cartaginesi nel 260⁷¹; il bottino raccolto nella battaglia di Milazzo;⁷² il fatto che Duilio sia stato il primo console romano ad avere armato e allestito una flotta⁷³.

Mi sembra significativo che a conclusioni identiche a quelle di Bleckmann sia giunto nello stesso anno Zecchini, a proposito di un episodio della seconda guerra punica: il ritorno di Scipione Africano a Roma nel 206 a.C.⁷⁴ La versione di Dione (F 57.53–56), secondo la quale il senato ordinò a Scipione di abbandonare la Spagna, rappresenta una tradizione anteriore all’immagine idealizzata dell’Africano, già completamente elaborata in Polibio e ripresa in seguito da Livio. Anche in questo caso Dione conserva la traccia di una *tradizione* “scomparsa” pre-polibiana, che può evidentemente aver trovato in una *fonte* successiva a Polibio (che Zecchini identifica con Valerio Anziato).

Per quanto riguarda la prima metà del II secolo a.C., un’analisi esaustiva delle fonti di Dione ancora manca. Schwartz individuava, in questa sezione, chiare tracce di Polibio: egli lasciava

⁶⁹ Per altri esempi cf. Bleckmann 2002, 208 n. 3.

⁷⁰ Bleckmann 2002, 125–131. Bleckmann è perfettamente consapevole che si tratta di *tradizioni* molto antiche, ma che Dione può avere recepito tramite *fonti* più recenti. In alcuni commenti critici si è erroneamente attribuita allo studioso tedesco la tesi secondo cui Dione farebbe ricorso a *fonti* pre-polibiane.

⁷¹ Da Zonar. 8.10.6 risulta che dei due generali cartaginesi, Annibale (lo sconfitto della famosa battaglia navale di Milazzo) e Asdrubale (battuto a Segesta), il superiore gerarchico era quest’ultimo: Asdrubale è appunto il *maximus magistratus* cartaginese nell’iscrizione di Duilio (l. 3).

⁷² Al bottino, ampiamente descritto nell’iscrizione, Polibio non dedica cenno alcuno: vi accenna invece Zonara (8.11.3).

⁷³ Il dato dell’iscrizione (l. 6: [*c*]lasesque navales primos ornavet pa[ravetque]), trova riscontro in Zonara (8.11.1), ma non in Polibio (1.21.1–3), secondo cui Duilio assunse il comando della flotta già pienamente allestita.

⁷⁴ Zecchini 2002, 99–103.

aperto il problema dell'impiego diretto oppure mediato,⁷⁵ ma escludeva in ogni caso che l'eventuale mediatore fosse Livio. Più recentemente Simons si è soffermato su alcuni episodi particolari, escludendo che Dione dipenda qui da Polibio/Livio. Un esempio può essere l'episodio della sosta di Antioco III a Calcide, nel 191, per il quale alla critica di Polibio (20.8.1–5), di carattere politico-militare, Livio (36.11.1–5) affianca *anche* quella morale, incentrata sulla rilassatezza delle truppe, che Livio trae da un'altra fonte (secondo Simons, Valerio Anziate): la critica morale è la sola presente in Dione (F 64),⁷⁶ che dunque continuerebbe a usare qui una delle fonti pre-liviane da lui impiegate per la seconda guerra punica. Si può aggiungere che anche per la guerra acaica (F 71.1–2), Dione non ha utilizzato Polibio.⁷⁷ Egli non sembra interessato a una ricostruzione dettagliata delle schermaglie diplomatiche tra Achei e Spartani; per l'ambasceria di L. Aurelio Oreste, ammette la storicità dell'aggressione contro i *legati* Romani, che Polibio (38.9.1) nega; parla esplicitamente della loro "fuga": questo dettaglio è ovviamente assente in Polibio e si ritrova invece in Giustino (34.1.8), cioè nella sua fonte Pompeo Trogo. Dione condivide con Giustino/Trogo anche la riflessione sulla necessità di "dividere in qualche modo il mondo greco per indebolirlo" (38.1.5) e in generale sembra considerare l'intervento in Acaia e a Corinto come un conflitto regionale, specie se confrontato con la contemporanea guerra punica. In definitiva, quello di Dione è un punto di vista pienamente "romano" (proprio come pienamente "romano" appare il suo punto di vista sulla prima guerra punica, se accettiamo l'analisi di Bleckmann). È stato del resto osservato che la "compressione narrativa",⁷⁸ che sembra caratterizzare la seconda decade di Dione (il periodo 264–150 a.C. era trattato in soli undici libri: 11–21), può essere spiegato proprio col fatto che Polibio rimaneva il modello di riferimento per questo arco cronologico: "On pouvait donc le parcourir à nouveau un peu hâtivement, on pouvait aussi chercher d'autres versions que la version polybienne et les insérer dans sa narration, mais on gardait désormais conscience que la version de Polybe était "la" version établie de la conquête romaine de l'hégémonie mondiale."⁷⁹

Per la seconda metà del II secolo a.C., infine, alle difficoltà consuete, legate allo stato frammentario del testo di Dione, si aggiunge l'assenza dell'epitome di Zonara (che si

⁷⁵ Schwartz 1899, 1696–1697.

⁷⁶ Simons 2009, 150–152.

⁷⁷ Urso 2013a, 35–43.

⁷⁸ Moscovich 1983.

⁷⁹ Zecchini 2016, 119.

interrompe col libro 21) e la perdita di Livio.⁸⁰ Tuttavia anche qui sono numerose le divergenze rispetto alle *periochae* e alle fonti della cosiddetta “tradizione liviana” (e comunque con Orosio, che è certamente “liviano”).⁸¹ Oltre alla guerra acaica, cui ho accennato sopra, vale la pena di richiamare l’attenzione sul frammento riguardante il dibattito senatorio del 136 sul *foedus Numantinum* (F 79.1–3).⁸² Questo frammento ci trasmette l’unica versione comprendente anche gli argomenti dei sostenitori di C. Ostilio Mancino e dei Numantini stessi. Questa versione esprime uno stadio più antico della tradizione, rispetto a quello della principale fonte parallela, cioè Appiano (*Iber.*, 83.358–360), il cui resoconto è incentrato sul concetto di “pace ignominiosa”, presente anche in tutte le altre fonti.⁸³ Questo frammento va confrontato con quello sul *foedus Caudinum* (F 36.16), che costituisce il precedente anche “storografico” del *foedus Numantinum*: anch’esso un *unicum*, nel senso che conserva il ricordo di una versione in cui l’accordo con i Sanniti dopo Caudio non solo era stato rispettato, ma era anche stato accorto con un certo sollievo.⁸⁴ I due frammenti dipendono forse dalla stessa fonte, che per il dibattito del 136 rimanda indubbiamente alla testimonianza oculare di un senatore: la versione di questo testimone può essere giunta a Dione direttamente o tramite la mediazione di una fonte abbastanza risalente da non essere influenzata dalla *vulgata* post-sillana.

Le affinità, non numerose, dei frammenti della terza decade di Dione con Diodoro (p.e. Cass. Dio F 73.1 / Diod. Sic. 33 F 1.1–2; Cass. Dio F 75 / Diod. Sic. 33 F 19), con Plutarco (p.e. Cass. Dio F 83.8 / Plut. *Ti. Gr.* 13.6) e con Appiano (p.e. Cass. Dio F 70.7 / App. *Lib.* 101.474–475) si spiegano con il ricorso a fonti comuni. Vale la pena di citare il frammento sugli ultimi giorni di vita di Tiberio Gracco, dove Dione (F 83.8) commette lo stesso errore di Plutarco (*Ti. Gr.* 13.6), cioè la menzione dei *figli* di Tiberio, condotti dal

⁸⁰ Le oggettive difficoltà di un’analisi sulle fonti di questa sezione indussero Schwartz a desistere dall’impresa: “Die spärlichen Reste der Bücher XXII–XXXV mit den ebenfalls sehr kümmerlichen übrigen Trümmern anderer Historiker zu vergleichen, um danach auf irgend “Quelle” zu raten, ist ein Beginnen, für das ich keine Zeit habe und haben will” (Schwartz 1899, 1697; il corsivo è mio).

⁸¹ Urso 2013a, 19–20.

⁸² Urso 2013a, 75–84.

⁸³ Diversamente, secondo Rosenstein 1986, 236–237, il racconto di Appiano e quello di Dione si integrano. Ma in Appiano il dibattito verte sulla responsabilità della sconfitta e del conseguente trattato, che Mancino attribuisce al suo predecessore Quinto Pompeo. Che il trattato sia infamante e vada rigettato, non viene posto in dubbio (cf. Urso 2013a, 80–81).

⁸⁴ Cf. sopra, pp. 62–63.

tribuno nel foro (si trattava in realtà del *figlio*: Val. Max. 9.7.2; App. B. Civ. 1.14.62). La collocazione dell'episodio in Plutarco e in Dione è però diversa: Dione lo pone nell'immediata vigilia dell'uccisione del tribuno (è la versione corretta, già attestata in Appiano), Plutarco lo anticipa di diverse settimane. È perciò chiaro che Dione non ha utilizzato Plutarco, ma che i due autori dipendono da una fonte comune. Ora, secondo Gellio (2.13.1; 2.13.5), Sempronio Asellione utilizzò appunto il plurale *liberi* per indicare il *figlio* di Tiberio Gracco, “secondo l'uso degli antichi oratori e scrittori di storia o di poesia”. L'errore di Plutarco e di Dione risale dunque ad Asellione, anche se questo non significa che Dione lo utilizzasse direttamente.⁸⁵

Una fonte contemporanea che Dione poté forse utilizzare è invece Rutilio Rufo:⁸⁶ *tribunus militum* sotto Scipione Emiliano a Numanzia, *legatus* di Metello in Numidia, giurista, discepolo di Panezio, autore di una *Storia romana* in greco e di un'autobiografia in latino, Rutilio fu fonte di Plutarco (*Mar.* 28.8; *Pomp.* 37.4) e di Appiano (*Iber.* 38.382), e ancora Gellio poteva leggerlo direttamente (come dimostra 6.14.10): almeno alcune delle analogie fra Dione e Plutarco e fra Dione ed Appiano potrebbero derivare da questa fonte comune.⁸⁷ Il ritratto di Mario (F 89.2) è un'autentica invettiva, certo il più severo tra quelli che l'antichità ci abbia trasmesso, in linea con la costante tendenza anti-mariana dei frammenti di Dione.⁸⁸ La presentazione di Mario come un “sovversivo ... amico di tutta la plebaglia” (F 89.2), contrapposto a Metello “vincitore morale” della guerra giugurtina (F 89.3), si adatta perfettamente a Rutilio, che Plutarco (*Mar.* 28.8) definisce come uno storico del tutto degno di fede, tranne quando parlava di Mario. Plutarco cita al questo proposito l'accusa di Rutilio a Mario, di aver “comprato” la sua elezione al consolato per il 100. Ora proprio poche righe prima di questa citazione, nello stesso capitolo (28.6), Plutarco afferma che Mario non sopportava Metello, il quale nella sua strenua opposizione al suo avversario incarnava l'*ἀρετὴ ἀληθής*. Queste parole richiamano l'affermazione che chiude il F 89.2 di

⁸⁵ Briscoe 1974, 126; Urso 2013a, 108–111.

⁸⁶ Urso 2013a, 144–149.

⁸⁷ Con tutta la prudenza del caso, credo che non vi siano elementi per ammettere che Dione abbia utilizzato Posidonio. Nella terza decade c'è un solo frammento, cui si possa accostare un frammento *sicuro* di Posidonio: mi riferisco all'episodio dell' “oro di Tolosa” (Cass. Dio F 90; Posid., *FGrHist* 87,33 *apud* Strab. 4.1.13.188). Qui Posidonio polemizza con l'opinione corrente ai suoi tempi, secondo cui l'oro di Tolosa proveniva almeno in parte dal saccheggio di Delfi del 279 e dimostra che si tratta di una versione falsa. Questa versione falsa è appunto quella accettata da Dione.

⁸⁸ Weynand 1935, 1366; Van Ooteghem 1964, 59; Urso 2013a, 136.

Dione, sulla ἀρετῆς δόξα di Mario, intesa come una reputazione infondata, frutto della sua περιτέχνησις (la *calliditas*) e dell'ἀγαθὴ τύχη.⁸⁹ un'affermazione che non trova riscontri in tutto il resto della tradizione. A mio parere, la “vera *virtus*” di Metello e la “falsa *virtus*” di Mario dovevano essere originariamente contrapposte e trovarsi nella stessa fonte e nel medesimo contesto. Come chiarisce Plutarco, il contesto sono le elezioni consolari per il 100, dove si fronteggiarono appunto Mario e Metello, e il primo non solo ottenne la rielezione ma riuscì a non fare eleggere il rivale; la fonte è un testimone diretto, e fazioso, degli avvenimenti: appunto il *legatus* di Metello e nemico di Mario, Rutilio Rufo,⁹⁰ che Plutarco cita. Non è forse un caso che la testimonianza più ampia sullo “scandaloso” processo a Rutilio del 94/93, sia proprio quella di Dione (F 97.1; 97.2–4).

Come si è detto all'inizio, il modello con cui Dione doveva necessariamente confrontarsi era Livio. Considerato che più della metà della *Storia romana* di Dione (i libri 1–55) sarebbe stata consacrata agli otto secoli trattati da Livio (che era arrivato, in 142 libri, al 9 a.C.), il progetto di comporre un'opera originale implicava necessariamente lo sforzo di andare “al di là” di Livio, ossia l'impegno a valorizzare il più possibile fonti che questi non aveva utilizzato o comunque a fare ricorso alle sue stesse fonti, ma in modo diretto e attraverso una selezione originale del materiale. Tra queste fonti, vi erano certamente Valerio Anziato e, per la seconda guerra punica, Celio Antipatro. A questi possiamo aggiungere con ogni probabilità Q. Elio Tuberone. Già individuato da Zecchini come fonte di Dione per la guerra gallica di Cesare (di cui Dione conserva “l'unica, organica versione anticesariana”),⁹¹ Tuberone era però storico *ab urbe condita*, suscettibile quindi di essere impiegato da Dione per l'insieme della sua opera: l'impiego di Tuberone sembra per esempio probabile per il racconto relativo

⁸⁹ Sulla connotazione negativa della *calliditas* di Mario, cf. Passerini 1934, 264–268 = 1971, 113–118.

⁹⁰ A prescindere da questa possibile identificazione, non c'è dubbio che Dione qui riprende la polemica di una fonte vicina agli avvenimenti e particolarmente avversa a Mario. Questo non significa ovviamente che il nostro autore si limiti ad accogliere passivamente l'opinione di questa fonte: l'opposizione di Mario all'autorità del senato e la sua origine “non nobile” ne fanno il tipo ideale di quel personaggio che Dione ritiene particolarmente pericoloso per lo stato (cf. 52.8.7). Ma in altri contesti dell'opera l'immagine di Mario è più in chiaroscuro: nel discorso di Catulo, ad esempio, Mario è un ἄριστος divenuto κάκιστος, a causa dei molti poteri di cui è stato investito successivamente (36.31.3); il Mario dei frammenti è, per così dire, κάκιστος φύσει.

⁹¹ Zecchini 1978, 189.

al supplizio di M. Atilio Regolo (Zonar. 8.15.6–7) (per cui non si può peraltro escludere l'impiego di C. Sempronio Tuditano, quindi di un altro autore del II secolo a.C.).⁹² Più in generale un autore come Tuberone poteva attirare l'attenzione di Dione, tenuto conto della sua attività di giurista e dei suoi interessi per lo *ius publicum* (cf. Pompon. *Dig.* 1.2.2.46), considerato che l'evoluzione delle istituzioni è un nucleo tematico fondamentale di tutta la *Storia romana*.⁹³

Ma non intendo ovviamente aggiungere nomi: rischieremmo di ritrovarci negli “eccessi” della *Quellenforschung* ottocentesca, di cui parla Bleckmann nel testo da me citato all'inizio.⁹⁴ Ciò che mi preme qui è il ricorso sistematico a *fonti* pre-liviane e la valorizzazione, ove possibile, di *tradizioni* molto antiche: fatto che implica, da parte dello storico, una precisa scelta. In questo non c'è nulla di sorprendente. Il recupero delle fonti pre-liviane era un'esigenza avvertita da tempo: già nel II secolo d.C., storici come Appiano ed eruditi come Gellio si erano caratterizzati per la loro tendenza a “risalire alle fonti”, superando per così dire Livio e la tradizione augustea sull'età repubblicana.⁹⁵ Questa stessa tendenza è ancora visibile, in epoca severiana, nei frammenti di Ulpiano, nei quali le citazioni dei testi dei giuristi repubblicani sono particolarmente numerose.⁹⁶ È in questo contesto che trovano giustificazione il progetto dioneo di una grande storia romana *ab urbe condita*, la ripresa di un modello storiografico abbandonato dopo Livio e la ricerca di tradizioni “scomparse”, che quest'ultimo non aveva valorizzato.

Questo sforzo di risalire alle fonti di Livio, o a fonti che Livio non aveva utilizzato, non implica ovviamente che Dione sia sempre attendibile: il racconto della battaglia *ad Vesperim* ne costituisce un chiaro esempio.⁹⁷ Del resto è chiaro che alcune delle fonti più antiche, che Livio poteva ancora consultare, non saranno più state disponibili al tempo di Dione. Ma se il ricorso a fonti pre-liviane non è una garanzia di attendibilità, esso però colma in qualche modo il divario cronologico tra Livio e Dione. In altre parole: il fatto che Dione scriva due secoli dopo Livio perde in parte la sua importanza, poiché le fonti di cui egli si

⁹² Per l'impiego di Tuditano (possibile) e di Tuberone (probabile): Schettino 1987, 136–137; Bleckmann 2002, 42.

⁹³ Urso 2005, 190–192. Lo stesso Tuditano, peraltro, fu autore di almeno quindici *Libri magistratuum*.

⁹⁴ Cf. sopra, p. 2.

⁹⁵ Cf. per esempio Hahn 1982 (per Appiano); Schettino 1986; Schettino 1987 (per Aulo Gellio).

⁹⁶ Crifò 1976, 713; Schiavone 1992, 58. Su Ulpiano e Dione: Millar 2005; Urso 2005, 175–180.

⁹⁷ Cf. sopra, n. 39.

serve si situano *allo stesso livello cronologico* delle fonti di Livio e poiché le *tradizioni* che esse conservano possono essere in taluni casi *anteriori* a quelle attestate da Livio.⁹⁸

Gli esempi qui presi in esame, che comprendono diversi passi che Schwartz non aveva preso in considerazione, confermano le sue conclusioni, vale a dire l'indipendenza di Dione rispetto a Livio: la stessa indipendenza che Dione mostra anche nei suoi libri “tardo-repubblicani” e “augustei”. Le varianti della versione dionea, di cui ho qui fornito alcuni esempi, sono non solo numerose, ma soprattutto ben distribuite in tutto l'arco dei libri “repubblicani”, frammentari e no. Quella di Dione non fu dunque una *imitatio* né una *continuatio Livii*,⁹⁹ ma un lavoro di riscrittura della storia romana repubblicana. Il ricorso preferenziale a fonti pre-liviane era parte integrante del suo stesso metodo di lavoro e del suo progetto. In questo senso, come dicevo all'inizio, per comprendere Dione non si può mettere da parte la *Quellenforschung*: è proprio Dione a metterci sulla strada, dato che il primo frammento (F 1.2) riguarda proprio l'esaustività delle sue letture, ossia appunto le sue *fonti*. Nel suo sforzo programmatico per andare “al di là” di Livio, Dione elabora una versione alternativa della storia di Roma, basata, da un lato, su una documentazione inedita o trascurata e vista, dall'altro, attraverso una lente originale, quello dei regimi politici e delle istituzioni,¹⁰⁰ della loro origine e della loro evoluzione.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ In questo senso, le considerazioni di Bleckmann 2002, 36–50 restano a mio avviso imprescindibili. *Contra*, Hoyos 2004, 488.

⁹⁹ Zecchini 2016, 123.

¹⁰⁰ L'interesse di Dione per questa tematica era già sottolineato da Cary 1914, xvi; Vrind 1923, 1. Esso è stato ribadito in diversi studi recenti. Cf. in particolare Urso 2011, 41–45 (con ulteriore bibliografia).

¹⁰¹ Su questo punto in particolare, cf. Urso 2005.

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THE REGAL PERIOD IN THE *EXCERPTA CONSTANTINIANA* AND IN SOME EARLY BYZANTINE EXTRACTS FROM DIO'S *ROMAN HISTORY**

Chris Mallan

For the writers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the reign of Constantine VII was a failure. Coming to the throne as a boy, the immature Constantine appears as little more than a cypher in the hands of his relatives and court chamberlains. Later he was dominated by his father-in-law, his co-emperor Romanus I. When he eventually began ruling in his own right, malevolent historians, like the eleventh century polymath, Michael Psellus, accused him of indolence and apathy. Others, such as Scylitzes, Cedrenus, and Zonaras, added the vices of bibulousness and political maladministration. But when we turn to verdicts of Constantine's coevals, we get a different picture. One contemporary, with perhaps a whiff of Thucydidean rhetoric, called him "by natural inclination and intention a lover of beauty and the most learned of all the emperors that have ever been" (ἄλλως τε φιλοκάλου τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ τῶν πώποτε βασιλέων λογιωτάτου).¹ An anonymous poet, writing in neat Byzantine dodecasyllabic verses, addressed Constantine as "the discoverer and provider of

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All references to the *Excerpta Constantiniana* are from the only modern edition of the work, that of U.P. Boissevain, C. de Boor, T. Büttner-Wobst, and (later) A.G. Roos, published under the universal title, *Excerpta Historica iussu Imp. Constantini Porphyrogeniti confecta* (Berlin 1903–1910). The following abbreviations will be used throughout:

EV = *Excerpta de Virtutibus et Vitiis* [*Excerpts concerning virtues and vices*]

EI = *Excerpta de Insidiis* [*Excerpts concerning conspiracies*]

ES = *Excerpta de Sententiis* [*Excerpts concerning gnomic statements*]

EL = *Excerpta de Legationibus* [*Excerpts concerning embassies*]

Byzantine authorities are cited by page number in either the relevant *CSHB* ('Bonn') edition, or by the page number in the most recent edition of the text. References to Cassius Dio are from the edition of U.P. Boissevain.

¹ Genesis 1. *proem.* [ed. Lesmüller-Werner and Thurn].

every department of culture and wisdom”.² The impulse for flattery, of course, may infuse these judgements. Yet perhaps these words were not entirely undeserved.

It is a matter of historical fact that the tenth century was a period of energetic intellectual activity centred on the imperial court at Constantinople, a reality not overlooked by the otherwise ambivalent Scylitzes.³ The age of Constantine VII was the heroic age of copying and compilation. History, and more specifically, classicising history was back in vogue.⁴ With this in mind, the words of Constantine’s encomiasts do reveal something of the spirit of the age. Indeed, modern judgements have been more in-line with the views of Constantine’s contemporaries, than those of his eleventh and twelfth century detractors. Like the legacies of Constantine’s occidental precursors, Alfred the Great and Charlemagne, the cultural legacy of Constantine VII and his father Leo VI transcended the political or military successes (and setbacks) of their lifetimes.

This chapter considers the most ambitious historiographical products of that age—the *Excerpta Constantiniana*. Alongside the invaluable *Epitome of Histories* by Zonaras,⁵ the *Excerpta* provides our most useful and important source for reconstructing the lost books of Dio’s Regal and Early Republican narratives.⁶ Despite the important work recently devoted to the *Excerpta* and their place in the literary culture of Constantinople under the Macedonian dynasty, there are still many questions that need addressing—not least the degree to which this great work may be approached as a self-contained work of history.⁷ My chapter falls into three sections. First, as a prolegomenon to the study of the *Excerpta*, and indeed to many of the contributions to this volume, I shall look briefly at the preservation of Dio in late-Antique and Early Byzantine works before the tenth century in order to provide a degree of context

² Janus 1895, 285. For the identification of the ‘Constantine’ of the poem with Constantine VII, see Cameron 1984. The translation is that of Cameron.

³ Skylitzes [pp. 237–238 Bonn].

⁴ For trends in tenth-century historiography, and in particular the adaptation of classical biographical forms, see Jenkins 1954; Scott 1981.

⁵ For Zonaras and Dio, note the contribution of Fromentin in this volume, and the general study of Mallan (forthcoming). Note also, Moscovich 1983; Simons 2009, 25–32.

⁶ Brief outlines of the presence of Dio in the excerpta has been given by (*inter alios*) Mazzucchi 1979, 131–134 and Millar 1964, 1–2.

⁷ Since the important work of Büttner-Wobst 1906 and Lemerle 1971, the study of the *Excerpta* has benefitted greatly in recent years from the studies of Roberto 2008; Treadgold 2013, 153–165; and especially the palaeographical and interpretative work of Németh 2010; Németh 2013; and Németh 2015.

for the following discussion about the ways in which Dio was tackled by the Constantinian excerptors. The second section will turn to the extant corpus of the *Excerpta* itself, and specifically the possible methods employed in its compilation. In the third and final section, I will consider the patterns of material preserved in the *Excerpta*, specifically that which is derived from the historians of Rome's Regal past, and what these patterns might tell us about the place of the Regal Period in mid-tenth century Byzantine thought.

Reception and Transmission of Dio from Late Antiquity to the Tenth Century

Little is known about the fate of Dio's history following its completion some time after 229. It seems reasonable to assume that, following the usual practice for the circulation of texts in antiquity, copies of Dio's history were distributed among Dio's immediate circle of friends—perhaps those in Italy as well as those in his native Nicaea.⁸ Writing perhaps as early as the 240s, Herodian seems to have been well aware of Dio's history, although the precise relationship between the two historians remains contentious.⁹ At any rate, Herodian's interests lay with the later books, and he may not have bothered with Dio's pre-Imperial narrative. By the later fourth century we may assume that Dio's work was copied in Constantinople and elsewhere in the Eastern Roman Empire, but also seemingly in the West as well. Our earliest manuscript, the late fifth century *Codex Vaticanus graecus* 1288 appears to be of Italian provenance.¹⁰ Jordanes cites Dio three times, perhaps via Cassiodorus's *Getica*, which may provide a further link to the survival of Dio in late antique Italy, if not for the direct use of our Vatican manuscript. After this, Dio seems to have been unread in the west until the time of Cardinal Bessarion in the fifteenth century, and the fragmentary early books not until much later.

In the east by the sixth century the picture is very different. Petrus Patricius had access to a text of Dio. The fragments of Petrus' work, where we can make a comparison, indicate that he worked closely with the text of the *Roman History* in front of him, although

⁸ For the circulation of texts in the Roman world, see Starr 1987; Johnson 2010, 85–88.

⁹ For Herodian's familiarity with Dio, note Sidebottom 2007, 80 for the debate.

¹⁰ Wilson 1983, 211. This manuscript contains Dio's account of the emperors Macrinus and Elagabalus, in somewhat lacunose form.

he does occasionally deviate from his model in terms of diction and emphasis.¹¹ Yet the imperial scope of Petrus' history meant that he seems to have used Dio's narrative only from the period of Julius Caesar onwards. But Petrus' coeval, John Lydus, provides two fragments from Dio's early history of the kings: the first in the *de Magistratibus* (F 6.1^a) concerning Romulus, the second in the *de Mensibus* (F 6.7) on the month January.¹² A third fragment from Dio's Regal narrative (F 5.8), which is preserved in the legal *scholia* on the tenth century law code, the *Basilica*, may too be traced back to sixth century Constantinople, and specifically to that circle of legal scholars working on the codification of Roman Law.¹³

At the turn of the seventh century we come across the first important collection of extracts from the Regal and pre-Pompeian narratives of the *Roman History* in the form of the anonymous grammatical text titled *περὶ συντάξεως* (*On Syntax*). The manuscript which contains the *On Syntax*, amongst other grammatical texts, dates to the late tenth century,¹⁴ but the texts included in the collection are of far greater antiquity. In the case of the *On Syntax*, it has been argued convincingly by Petrova in her new edition of the text that its origins lie in the grammatical and rhetorical schools of late sixth or early seventh century Gaza, thus confirming the speculation of Mazzucchi regarding the date of the work.¹⁵ The *On Syntax* preserves some 141 short quotations from Cassius Dio. The texts excerpted by the anonymous *grammaticus* are exclusively historical texts, and the fragments are arranged alphabetically according to a keyword principle. More importantly, our *grammaticus* appears to have taken care to record the specific book number from which the extract was taken. *Prima facie*, this provides a boon to those wishing to reconstruct a lost narrative, such as in the case of Cassius Dio. However, as has been demonstrated long ago by Boissevain in the case of the Dio fragments, and more recently by Brodersen in the case of those from Appian, these numbers are not always reconcilable with the book divisions in the transmitted texts of

¹¹ Petrus' style is criticised by Menander Protector (F. 6.2 Blockley = *ES* (Menander) F 11). Indeed, some of the fragments of Petrus' paraphrases of Dio show a certain penchant for Latin loan words.

¹² The fragment from the *de Magistratibus* would seemingly provide the earliest *testimonium* for the erroneous attribution of the cognomen Cocceianus to Dio. *Pace* Gowing 1990, 49, who identifies Photius as the earliest surviving source for this error. Boissevain (1.14) assigns the second of these fragments (F 6.7) to Cedrenus. However, he neglected to point out that Cedrenus (or perhaps better Cedrenus' source, pseudo-Symeon) excerpted the passage from Lydus (*Mens.* 4.2 [= p. 66 ed. Wuensch]).

¹³ For the Justinianic origins of much of the *scholia* on the *Basilica*, see Schiller 1978, 61–62.

¹⁴ For the date, note Brodersen 1990, 49; Petrova 2006, xiii.

¹⁵ Petrova 2006, xxviii; cf. Mazzucchi 1979, 123.

these authors.¹⁶ Indeed, 21 of the book citations for the Dio fragments are demonstrably false, whereas by way of contrast, only 36 are demonstrably correct. While this does limit the usefulness of these book numbers, it should not cause us too much dismay. The transmission of Greek numbers is notoriously susceptible to corruption,¹⁷ and it seems that this is the most likely explanation for these discrepancies.

Also of the seventh century is the *Historical Chronicle* of John of Antioch. Like Petrus Patricius, John seems to have drawn heavily from Dio's history as a subsidiary source for Roman history, but mainly for the Caesarian and post-Caesarian narrative.¹⁸ For the Regal Period John seems to have preferred to work from a (presumably) Greek translation of Eutropius.¹⁹ Two fragments, one pertaining to the character of Romulus, the other to Tarquinius Superbus, are patently drawn from a source independent of Eutropius.²⁰ Dindorf, and later Boissevain and Cary, assigned the first of these fragments to an ultimately Dionian provenance (Cass. Dio F 6.1^{aa} = EI (John) 6 = Joh. Ant. F 11 Mariev). However, as this is the only passage of supposed Dionian provenance included by John in his Regal or Early Republican narrative, it would appear safer to consign it to a category of dubious fragments of Dio's history.

Chronologically speaking, the next collection which contains fragments from the early books of Cassius Dio, although (curiously) not his Regal narrative, is that ascribed erroneously to the seventh century theologian, iconophile, and occasional (albeit unsuccessful) political player, Maximus the Confessor. The textual tradition of the *Florilegium* of commonplaces is complex, and is the product of several generations of redaction, similar to the transmission of the *Greek Anthology*.²¹ Indeed, the textual tradition of the *Florilegium* is something of a mare's nest and defies succinct exposition. Essentially,

¹⁶ Dio: Boissevain 1, liv-lvi; Appian: Brodersen 1990. See also Rich 2016, 6–8.

¹⁷ Hall 1911, 180.

¹⁸ Cf. Mariev 2009, 35.

¹⁹ Several translations of Eutropius were produced in late Antiquity, although the most famous (extant) one by Libanius' pupil, Paeanius, does not appear to have been used by John.

²⁰ Joh. Ant. F 110 [Mariev] = F 67.2 [Roberto]. Roberto 2005, 134 suspects the passage may be a conflation of Eutr. 1.8 and D.H. AR 4.41.1–4.

²¹ Sibylle Ihm's new edition of the *Florilegium* must replace the hitherto standard (albeit inadequate) seventeenth century edition of François Combefis reprinted in J.P. Migne PG 91 cols. 721–1018. Ihm's text is primarily a critical edition of one of the MaxII group texts, MaxU, which is in some ways unique in its order and selection of material. Her method of double citation is to MaxU and to the MaxII tradition.

the text of the *Florilegium* has been transmitted in two major recensions, designated by Ihm as MaxI and MaxII. The fragments from Dio are found only in the MaxII. The putative *Ur*-text for these two recensions may date to as early as the second half of the seventh century, although the origins of the MaxII collection as we have it may be dated to some time between the late ninth and early eleventh centuries. For convenience, it seems best to refer to the whole tradition as that of pseudo-Maximus.

The *Florilegium* may be viewed generally as a gnomological work—insofar as it is a collection of morally edifying quotations. As with many similar commonplace books and collections of *sententiae* throughout the ages, the *Florilegium* is sub-divided and its contents arranged according to category (i.e. κατὰ γένος), such as *Concerning the life of virtue and vice* (περὶ βίου ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας) or *Concerning marital fidelity and chastity* (περὶ ἀγνείας καὶ σωφροσύνης). In and of themselves, such divisions were not radical and in many cases overlap with those employed by John of Stobi in his fifth century *Florilegium*, and in fact, it is clear that pseudo-Maximus drew upon Stobaeus' collection for his citations from philosophical texts.²² Yet it seems possible that pseudo-Maximus worked with at least some texts directly rather than through intermediary sources. Within his rubrics, pseudo-Maximus excerpted short passages from the Bible, patristic writers and commentators, and also classical secular texts—ranging from works of philosophy to history and rhetoric.²³ The identities of the cited authorities were important for pseudo-Maximus, and most of the fragments contain an acknowledgement of the author of the particular excerpt. Thus, Dio is variously styled “Dio the chronographer” or more frequently “Dio the Roman”,²⁴ and is thus differentiated from Dio Chrysostom. Of historical writers, pseudo-Maximus most frequently turns to Cassius Dio, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, although there is a stray reference to Procopius, who may or may not be the historian we know of that name, as well as Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Arrian.

There are as many as sixty-six references to Dio in pseudo-Maximus, although the authenticity of several of these fragments is disputed.²⁵ The arrangement of the fragments within each individual rubric gives no indication as to their original narrative context, although excerpts from individual authors do tend to be clustered together within each rubric.

²² Ihm 2001, xix.

²³ Ihm 2001, xvii-xxii.

²⁴ For the former, note ps.-Max. *Flor.* 67.20/22 [= Ihm 2001, 988].

²⁵ Boissevain 1, xli-liv.

The interpretation of these fragments is difficult and highly problematic. Most of the fragments fall between books 8 and 15 (according to Boissevain's division) and 52 and 56. This might tell us something about the range of books to which the compiler(s) had access.²⁶ But there are sporadic fragments from outside of these books, which must qualify (or confound) any dogmatic theory. However, the total absence of material from the Regal and Early Republican periods seems to be due to the absence of the physical material from which the compilers could work, rather than a lack of interest.²⁷ Indeed, there was much material, especially the speeches from these books, which would have been consonant with the types of material found in the *Florilegium*.

Where we can compare pseudo-Maximus with the original we can see, as did Boissevain long ago, that the compilers were especially attracted to the speeches. Indeed, for the extracts from books 52 to 56, which we can verify against Dio's original text, all of the extracts come from the Agrippa-Maecenas debate from Book 52, Augustus' speech to the senate in Book 53, the Livia-Augustus dialogue of Book 55, and Augustus' speech to the *equites* in Book 56.²⁸ The work on pseudo-Maximus is still ongoing, but it is a text which has the potential to reveal much about the speeches in Dio's early history and the reception of Dio's work in the Byzantine Dark Ages.²⁹

Finally, we may note the presence of extracts from Dio in another grammatical/lexical text, probably from the eighth or ninth century, which is also included in the same tenth century collection of grammatical texts as the aforementioned *On Syntax*.³⁰ The so-called *Synagoge* (Συναγωγή λέξεων χρησίμων) contains some twelve or thirteen fragments from Dio's history, of which all but three contain a book attribution. Seven belong to Dio's second

²⁶ We do not know for certain how Dio's work was divided into codices in this early period. Photius tells us that his copy of the 24 books of Appian's *Roman History* was divided over three volumes (Phot. *Bib. cod.* 57). Based on this analogy, we may assume that one codex may have contained between eight and ten books of Dio's history. The source of the *Suda*'s entry on Dio (Δ 1239) notes the division of the work into decades. Whether this reflects the division into codices or the structural division of the text is uncertain.

²⁷ The same may be said for post Julio-Claudian material as well.

²⁸ Boissevain I. lii- liii.

²⁹ Note the contribution of Rich in this volume on Maximus and the speeches in the early books of Dio's *History*.

³⁰ For the text and date of this collection, see Cunningham 2003.

decade (books 13–17), whereas five (or six) belong to books 38–53.³¹ Unlike the *On Syntax*, the book references in the *Synagoge* appear to have been preserved more accurately, judging by the instances where we can check the citation against the book numbers transmitted in the manuscripts of Dio's history. Photius' *Lexicon*, a product of the ninth century, contains ten extracts from Dio, yet these are of no independent value, as all are derived from the extracts contained in the *Synagoge*.³²

What may we say in summary at this point? Between the time of the initial circulation of Dio's work in the mid-third century down to the age of Justinian, the *Roman History* seems to have been read as a historical narrative—that is to say for its historical content. In the period from the dawn of the seventh century to the beginning of the tenth, Dio received attention from grammarians as well as moralists, who were not, on the whole, concerned with the historical content of Dio's work. This coincides with the general dearth of classicising historiography during this period. Unlike the compilers and historians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, men such as Cedrenus and Zonaras, the chroniclers from the period of the Byzantine Dark Ages whose works partially overlapped with Dio's *Roman History*—George Syncellus and George the Monk—do not reveal any degree of familiarity with Dio's narrative,³³ preferring instead to extract material from Eusebius, Diodorus and even Dionysius. The partial exception to this general rule is, as we would expect, Photius. The patriarch's description of Dio and his work is brief yet characteristic of Photius' interests, and perhaps by extension, those of his circle.³⁴ Content-wise, the only portions of Dio's work that Photius describes in any detail are the beginning and the end of the work. Yet, like the compilers of pseudo-Maximus or the *grammaticus* responsible for the *On Syntax*, Photius

³¹ Cunningham (2003, 734) identifies six passages belonging to books 38–53. However, there appears to be an error in Cunningham's concordance, as ε 659 does not appear to correspond to Cass. Dio 44.2 as claimed.

³² Whether the quotations from Dio preserved in the *Synagoge* derive from the fifth (?) century lexicon attributed to St. Cyril or whether they were inserted at the time of the *Synagoge*'s composition seems impossible to tell from the available evidence. Certainly, most (if not all) of the Dionian quotations are absent from the parts of Cyril's lexicon which have been published. Yet until a full edition of the lexicon is published, this will be impossible to determine. See further Cunningham 2003, 43–49.

³³ Scott 1981, 73 makes this point more generally with respect to the general absence of material from Dio preserved in the tradition of the Byzantine *Weltchronik*, of which Syncellus and George the Monk are representative.

³⁴ Phot. *Bib. cod.* 71 [ed. Henry I. p.104]; for Photius, see Wilson 1983, 89–119.

shows an interest in Dio's style—his syntactical constructions and the rhetorical quality of his speeches.

Authorial Preferences, Patterns, and Method of Compilation in the Excerpta Constantiniana

With an outline of the textual reception of Dio up to the tenth century now established, we are now in a position to appreciate something more about the way in which the Constantinian excerptors approached Dio's *Roman History*. Originally, the *Excerpta* comprised some fifty-three volumes,³⁵ but only four or five survive to this day (depending on how we view the two-part *EL*).³⁶ We do know, however, of the titles of other volumes that were once part of the collection owing to internal cross-references within the surviving volumes. The contents of each volume was determined by a specific rubric or *hypothesis*, such as "Concerning virtues and vices", or "Concerning public speeches". In many cases, the material which fitted into each collection would have selected itself. However, in other cases, such as in the collection 'Concerning gnomic statements' (*ES*), it is difficult to spot any particular consistent selection principle. The excerptors made an attempt to order each collection of excerpts by arranging the contents according to the cited authority. The order of authors that appear in each collection was not apparently determined by any uniform organising principle,³⁷ and we do not always find the same authors equally represented across the individual volumes. Constantine VII's involvement in the project is clear enough from the *Preface* to the work, and it is likely that the work was carried out in the library of the imperial palace.³⁸ We may note in support of this thesis that the two works of Xenophon represented

³⁵ We know this number from the *Preface* to the entire collection (cf. *EL* Proem. [ed. de Boor, p.2 line 6]. For the possible significance of the number fifty-three, see Németh 2010, 65–71; Németh 2013, 245–247.

³⁶ The collection of siege narratives in the so-called Mynas codex (*Paris. supp. gr. 607*) from the later tenth century may also derive from the *Excerpta* or be an independent compilation.

³⁷ However, in the *EV* there does seem to be a general grouping of texts according to genre: thus there is Universal History (Josephus, Malalas, George the Monk, John of Antioch, Diodorus Siculus); Greek History (Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Arrian); Roman History (Dionysius, Polybius, Appian, Dio). Cf. Büttner-Wobst 1906, 92–93.

³⁸ Németh 2013, 241–243.

in the *Excerpta*—the *Anabasis* and the *Cyropaedia*—are texts known to have been owned by Constantine’s father, Leo VI.

On the surface, the method of the excerptors was laborious and straight-forward. From what we can tell, based on excerpts from surviving authors, each excerptor read through a text and noted passages to be copied. Indeed, *Codex Vaticanus gr. 977*, which contains the history of Theophylact Simocatta, has marginal notations which correspond (in many but not all cases) to the excerpts of Theophylact in the surviving *Excerpta*.³⁹ Cross-references to similar or related passages of text are occasionally supplied in the form of simple direct statements in the *Excerpta*, for example, “Search in the volume concerning Public Speeches” (ΖΗΤΕΙ ΕΝ ΤΩΙ ΔΗΜΗΓΟΡΙΩΝ).⁴⁰ However, these cross-references seem to have been included at the whim of the particular compiler. For example, let us consider the distribution of these cross-references in the *EI*. There are five cross-references in the passages from Nicolaus of Damascus, three from John of Antioch, two from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, one from Diodorus, but none for Malalas or George the Monk. Other times, when we do have duplicate passages, as occurs with the fragments of Cassius Dio in the *EV* and *ES*, there are no cross-references.⁴¹

The excerptors seem to have worked with their source texts as they came to hand.⁴² Sometimes an excerptor will begin extracting not from the start of the work but from a later book, as in the case of the extracts from Dionysius in the *EI*, where the first extract is from Book 12. Occasionally, this method yields surprises for the modern reader. For example, of

³⁹ Schreiner 1987; Treadgold 2013, 158.

⁴⁰ These notes are inserted in a majuscule script, in contrast to the minuscule employed in the main body text.

⁴¹ E.g. *EV* (Dio) 9 = *ES* (Dio) 38, 39, *EV* (Dio) 18 = *ES* (Dio) 54; *EV* (Dio) 21 = *ES* (Dio) 78 (highly abbreviated). I am not convinced by Németh’s argument (2010, 207–210) that these cross-references are the excerptors’ working comments which were mistakenly copied into the final text due to scribal incompetence.

⁴² Thus the suggestion that the excerptors worked from fascicules, made by physically breaking up the codices containing their source texts (Németh 2015, 305 following a suggestion made by Jean Irigoien). If this is how they worked, then presumably such a method would only have been used for those authors of longer works, such as Nicolaus of Damascus, Diodorus, Polybius, and Cassius Dio. Further evidence of this may be seen in the extracts from Diodorus Siculus. The *EI* preserve no material from books nine to 30, which may indicate that the excerptor did not have access to the physical copies of those books of Diodorus’ history at the time of compiling the *EI*, although these books were available since fragments of those books are preserved elsewhere in the *Excerpta*. This, in turn, suggests that excerptors were assigned responsibility for particular collections rather than specific authors (see below).

the twenty-four extracts from Thucydides in the *EV*, six are from Marcellinus' *Life of Thucydides*—which, it may be thought, would be less relevant than than the history of Thucydides itself. This suggests our scribe was in possession of a manuscript which began with the *Life* then proceeded to the *History*.

However, there is a sound logic behind this method, even though the results may occasionally seem strange to us. In each collection, the order of extracts corresponds to their order in the original source text. This has proved to be a boon for those attempting to reconstruct a now lost text, as is the case with those now working on Cassius Dio, although we cannot always determine with certainty the position of two or more fragments preserved in different collections. Perhaps more interestingly, the method of the compilers provides for the reader a reading experience which is not totally divorced from a sense of historical narrative, unlike the entirely timeless excerpts in the collection of pseudo-Maximus, which we looked at earlier.⁴³ Furthermore, the cross-references, when we do have them, seem to indicate a readership aware of and interested in linked historical narratives.⁴⁴

In his recent study of the problem of the methodology employed by the excerptors, Umberto Roberto has argued that each excerptor read one or more authors, noting passages which were to be copied under each of the fifty-three headings.⁴⁵ These were then collated by a copyist who was responsible for assembling a particular volume. As at least twenty-six texts were excerpted (texts we may add, of varying lengths) we might envisage perhaps as many as ten to twenty scholars working on the project. This might explain the idiosyncratic character of many of the collections. Yet, it also leaves questions. In the preface to the whole work, the anonymous author notes how, as an aid to intelligibility and ease of access to the historians of the past, the works of history would be broken up according to themes (sc. ὑποθέσεις), so that “nothing was left over”.⁴⁶ This cannot be true in a literal sense. But it does raise questions about inconsistent distribution of fragments from different authors across the surviving corpus.

⁴³ Németh 2013, 236.

⁴⁴ E.g. *EV* (Josephus) 27 [= Joseph. *AJ* 8.225–226], describing Jeroboam's plan to prevent his people returning to Jerusalem, concludes before Jeroboam's speech (Joseph. *AJ* 8.227–228). The scribe (or excerptor) has added ΖΗΤΕΙ ἘΝ ΤῶΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΔΗΜΗΓΟΡΙΩΝ, thus directing the reader to the collection which contained Jeroboam's speech.

⁴⁵ Roberto 2009, 78. In this, Roberto is essentially following Büttner-Wobst 1906, 99–100. Cf. Németh 2010, 242–245; Németh 2013, 236–245.

⁴⁶ *EV Praef.* p. 2.

In contrast to the scholarly consensus,⁴⁷ I think that the surviving sections of the *Excerpta* may admit the possibility of a different method of approach to composition. Certainly there are patterns of material which seem unlikely to be the result of independent excerptors working with one or two authors.⁴⁸ For example, if we consider the *ES*, we see a preference for the copying of programmatic statements for most of the authors represented in the collection. Thus we have such statements from Dio, Agathias, Arrian, Polybius, Dexippus, Theophylact Simocatta, Menander Protector, and Eunapius of Sardis.⁴⁹ In addition to this we find the retention of the closing comments of Polybius and Diodorus—otherwise unremarkable comments, except, that is, for a would-be writer of history. Programmatic statements are far less common in the *EV*, although we do have one such statement of Dio's in that collection (Cass. Dio F 1.1 = *EV* (Dio) 2), which could be read as a statement of intent for the selection from Dio's history in the *EV*.⁵⁰

To explain these patterns, we may reconstruct the method of the excerptors somewhat differently from that proposed elsewhere. In fact, we may reverse the existing model, and propose that excerptors were responsible for specific collections, rather than specific authors. As there were fifty-three divisions, it is possible that each excerptor was responsible for two or perhaps three collections. After reading and excerpting a text, they would then pass that text on to another excerptor and receive a new text to excerpt in return. The initial form of the excerptor's labours would be collections of verbatim excerpts or notes (ὕπομνήματα) which would be assembled, copied, and adapted (where needed) by a scribe or group of scribes.⁵¹ If this were the case, then we may begin to appreciate the presence of idiosyncratic trends within individual collections. In particular, this model allows us to explain how it is that we do not see the same authors represented across all surviving collections, which we would be able to see if a single excerptor were responsible for dividing up a single text fifty-three ways. Moreover, we may note in support of this alternative thesis the marginal note in the second folio (fol. 2^r) of the Brussels codex of the *EL*, where we find the presence of a certain

⁴⁷ See those scholars noted above in footnote 45.

⁴⁸ See also footnote 41, above.

⁴⁹ E.g. *ES* (Theophylact) 1 = Theophyl. Proem 1–16; *ES* (Arrian) 2 = Arr. Anab. 1.12.1–5; *ES* (Eunapius) 1 = Eunap. F 1 Blockley; *ES* (Polybius) 1, 2 = Polyb. 1.1.2–2.2, 1.2.8–4.2; *ES* (Agathias) 1, 2 = Agath. *Praef.*; *ES* (Menander) 11 = Menander F 6 [Blockley].

⁵⁰ Note too *EV* (Thucydides [Marcellinus]) 1 = Marcel. *Vita* 1.

⁵¹ If this reconstruction is correct, then we might better appreciate how the excerpts from Dionysius were interpolated among the excerpts of Nicolaus in the *EV*. See footnote 52, below.

Theodosius the Younger, who claims to have assembled that particular collection (ὁ ἐρανίσας τὸ παρὸν Θεοδοσίος ἐστὶν ὁ μικρός).⁵²

Yet another alternative, which is co-extensive with the theories presented above, is that the whole process was conducted under supervision. Indeed, it has been suggested that Constantine himself took part in the excerpting process,⁵³ and we may envisage the production of the *Excerpta* as being akin to an imperial seminar group—with the scholars and scribes of the imperial court gathered around the emperor reading out their texts and deciding what was to be copied down. This too would explain the trends noted above.

Unfortunately, the precise method of composition will remain elusive, and the foregoing must be considered as speculation. What we can say is that the cost in terms of materials (vellum) and skilled manpower required to produce the *Excerpta* is indicative of the imperial nature of the project, as few if any individuals aside from the emperor would have the resources to carry out such an enterprise.⁵⁴ Indeed, as has been pointed out, it is almost certain that there was only one complete edition of the full work, which would have been kept in the palace library in Constantinople.⁵⁵ If the emperor had a particular readership in mind, it was undoubtedly men like himself—would-be antiquarians who were engaged with the struggles and pressures of high politics in the imperial court, and who looked to the past for political guidance and moral edification.

More can be inferred about the intellectual horizons of Constantine and his court from the results of the excerptors' labours. The presentation of material from Dio in the *Excerpta* reveals, I think, a new way of reading Dio's *Roman History* in Byzantium. We may see this in terms of the treatment of speeches. Unlike the extracts from speeches in pseudo-Maximus, many in the *Excerpta* are accompanied by a short introduction providing context, such as the speech of Romulus' wife Hersilia (Cass. Dio F 5.5–7 = *ES* (Dio) 7) in the *ES* and the Speech of Lucretia in the *EV* (Cass. Dio F 11.13–19 = *EV* (Dio) 7). This sort of approach is found

⁵² Pace Potter 1999, 72–73, it does not seem plausible that this obscure individual was responsible for the entire project. Note, however, Németh's (2013, 243) attractive suggestion about the involvement of the royal eunuch Basil Lecapenus in the production of the *Excerpta*. Cf. de Boor 1903, x; Büttner-Wobst 1906, 100; Treadgold 2013, 164.

⁵³ Toynbee 1973, 576; Cameron 1993, 297; cf. Németh 2015, 305. More generally, Lemerle 1971, 268–270.

⁵⁴ As observed by Wilson 1983, 145; followed by Németh 2013, 245.

⁵⁵ Németh 2013, 245.

across the authors represented in the *Excerpta*.⁵⁶ At other times there are notes in the margins which indicate if a passage comes from a speech, such as the excerpts of a speech in the *ES* which contains the note (again in an authoritative majuscule hand) ‘From the public speech of the father Rullus’ (ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΔΗΜΗΓΟΡΙΑΣ ΡΟΥΛΛΟΥ).⁵⁷ Yet at other times there is no firm indication whether a passage of text is from a speech or not, and the excerpts stand as self-supporting *sententiae*.⁵⁸ Be this as it may, the presence of introductory material for at least *some* speeches suggests that the historical context of a speech did matter to the excerptors, and that the excerptors saw the dramatic or perhaps even morally edifying value to presenting a speech in at least part of its narrative and historical context. We may go further to say that these notes suggest a readership with some knowledge of their own Roman history and therefore who recognised who these various historical figures were and thus who were cognisant of the latent exemplary potential of the words and deeds of these men and women of the distant Roman past.

What of the treatment of the Regal Period in the *Excerpta*, and the excerptors’ engagement with Cassius Dio as an authority for this period? Twenty-one fragments from the first two books of Dio’s history are preserved in two of the collections—the *EV* (seven) and the *ES* (fourteen). We can play with these numbers in various ways. First let us compare these figures with the number of fragments from other authors who cover the same period. The excerptors preserve eleven fragments from Diodorus dealing with the Regal Period (five in the *ES*, five in the *EV*, and a further one in the *EI*); five from John of Antioch (four in the *EI*, one in the *EV*), and two from Appian (one in the *EV*, one in the *EL*).⁵⁹ The absence of Dionysius is at first surprising. The lacunose state of the *EV* is doubtless partly responsible: the earliest fragment is from Book 7 and begins mid-sentence, and it appears that several folia have been lost from the portion of the *EV* containing the extracts from Dionysius. Be this as it

⁵⁶ E.g. the ‘Letter of Decius’ from Dexippus: *FGrH* 100 F 26 = *ES* (Dexippus) 23.

⁵⁷ Cass. Dio F 36.1–5 = *ES* (Dio) 59–60.

⁵⁸ Cass. Dio F 12.1, 2, 3^a, 8, 9, 10 = *ES* (Dio) 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. It is likely that these fragments do in fact belong to a speech: Boissevain 1.35.

⁵⁹ Diodorus: *ES* 9 = Diod. Sic. 8.2, *ES* 10 = Diod. Sic. 8.6.1–3, *ES* 74 = Diod. Sic. 10.1, *ES* 100 = Diod. Sic. 10.21.1–5, *ES* 101 = Diod. Sic. 10.22. *EV* 25 = 7.4.1–4, *EV* 26 = Diod. Sic. 7.7.1, *EV* 35 = Diod. Sic. 8.14, *EV* 42 = Diod. Sic. 8.31, *EV* 59 = Diod. Sic. 10.2, *EV* 79 = Diod. Sic. 10.20.1. *EI* 24 = Diod. Sic. 8.3. John of Antioch: *EV* 10 = Joh. Ant. F 18, *EI* 9 = Joh. Ant. F 19, *EI* 8 = Joh. Ant. F 16, *EI* 7 = Joh. Ant. F 15, *EI* 6 = Joh. Ant. F 11. Appian: *EV* 1 = App. *Reg.* 12, *EL* 1 = App. *Reg.* 5.

may, we cannot assume that the early books of Dionysius were excerpted thoroughly.⁶⁰ Indeed, the next fragment from Dionysius which appears in the *EV* after the fragment from Book 7 is from Book 11. As for the *ES*, it appears from what survives from our mutilated copy that Dionysius was not included among the authors excerpted. Thus, it would seem that Dionysius, the ancient author who provided the most detailed account of the Regal Period, was not readily consulted by the compilers of the *Excerpta* for his history of that period—either out of design, or because a complete text of Dionysius was unavailable to the excerptors.

The material we do get from these authors about the Regal Period presents not only some tantalising patterns, but also difficulties. For an example of the latter, the only fragment from Appian's book *On the Kings* preserved in the *EV* concerns the story of the migration of the Sabine Claudius to Rome; thus memorialising Claudius as an upholder of treaties, as well as providing an aetiology for the *gens Claudia*.⁶¹ On the other hand, certain individuals are consistently included. Take the legendary seven kings of Rome. Ancus Marcius and Tullus Hostilius appear only in the Dio fragments, and Romulus in Dio and Nicolaus of Damascus. Tarquinius Priscus appears in both Dio and Diodorus, similarly Numa, whereas Tarquinius Superbus appears in Dio, Diodorus, Appian, and John of Antioch. The secondary figures are also interesting. For example, the story of Brutus and Lucretia is represented in the excerpts from Dio, Diodorus, and John of Antioch.⁶² In the case of Dio's version the story occupies a continuous fragment in the *EV*, whereas Diodorus' account is split between two fragments, one in the *ES* and the other in the *EV*. The story of Lucretia from John of Antioch (following the Eutropean rather than Dionian tradition) is also found, not in the *EV* or the *ES*, but rather (and not unreasonably) in the *EI* – a collection where Dio does not seem to be represented. The fact that our compilers did not place all this material in the same collection may indicate that there was little consensus between excerptors as to where these stories belonged, but also that it was down to personal choice. Alternatively, it might suggest a concerted effort to spread out popular stories among different collections. By doing so the same general

⁶⁰ That Dionysius was excerpted for his Regal narrative in the *Excerpta Constantiniana* may be inferred from the survival of two misplaced excerpts from the *Antiquities* which are preserved in amongst the excerpts from Nicolaus of Damascus in the *EV*: *EV* 30 = *FGrH* 90 F 69; *EV* 31 = *FGrH* 90 F 70. Cf. Németh 2010, 211–212.

⁶¹ For the story, see App. *Reg.* F 12 = *EV* (App) 1; cf. Livy 2.16; D.H. *AR* 5.40.3–5; Suet. *Tib.* 1.1.

⁶² Thus Treadgold's comment (2013, 162–163) that, '[d]uplication of parallel passages in two or more authors seems also to have been avoided by choosing just one of the passages each time', needs to be qualified.

narratives are presented through different interpretative lenses. Thus the excerptors' preservation of the Lucretia narratives of Dio, Diodorus, and John of Antioch reveal that these Byzantine readers looked to interpret the story variously as a discussion of feminine virtue (*EV*), a notable example of aristocratic defiance (*ES*), or an example of a trigger for the overthrow of a tyrant (*EI*).

Further on this theme, if we turn to the series of fragments from Dio's first two books in the *EV*, we may get something of a sense of the Byzantine reading experience. The first seven fragments read as follows: 1) Numa's establishment of a house on the Quirinal and his respect for the gods; 2) A programmatic statement about Dio's selection of the items worthy of memory concerning peace and war; 3) The positive effects of Numa's god-fearing rule on the Roman people; 4) Tullus' skill at war, his neglect of the gods, until the advent of a pestilence, which fostered in the king a new religiosity exemplified by his establishment of the Salian Priesthood; 5) The character of Tarquinius Priscus; 6) The tyrannical rule of Tarquinius Superbus; 7) Brutus' overthrow of Tarquinius following the rape of Lucretia. The fragments would have presented pitfalls for the unwary—the two Tarquinius are not differentiated from each other and it is only internal references to Ancus Marcius and Servius Tullius in fragments 5 and 6 which allow the reader to differentiate the two. Even so, the very selection of these seven particular excerpts reveals an inner logic of imperial decline—from the exemplary heights of Numa to the tyranny of Tarquinius Superbus. Indeed, the impression is not dissimilar at all to Syncellus' highly selective treatment of the period almost one hundred years before. Syncellus' few narrative excerpts pass from Romulus, Numa (as lawgiver), Tullus Hostilius (as the first to wear purple), then Tarquinius Superbus (and the reason for his overthrow).⁶³

Returning to the fragments from the *EV*, we may note that three of the fragments have a religious message, namely the importance of a god-fearing ruler – the significance of which would not have been lost on Constantine “the most orthodox” of emperors (ὁ ὀρθοδοξότατος). In both Syncellus and the *EV* fragments, there is a bias towards the aetiological – the origins of places, practices, cults, and institutions. This material was certainly recondite – few in Constantine's circle would have visited Rome, and the old pre-Christian cults had only academic interest. Yet this is (perhaps) exactly the point: clearly these things mattered to our readers, who were after all the heirs of the ‘empire of the Romans’. There may be an ideological message behind these fragments as well. As has been

⁶³ Sync. pp. 230–231 [ed. Mosshammer], 250–251 [ed. Mosshammer], 283–285 [ed. Mosshammer].

argued by Paul Magdalino, for Constantine VII, the symbolic control of the Roman past was crucial for the control of the Roman present.⁶⁴

Furthermore, I do not think we can assume that tenth century readers did not appreciate the historical contexts of the various passages. At least for the individuals involved in the project, who actually read through the texts they were excerpting, it may well be that the *Excerpta* functioned as *aides-memoire* and as individually pertinent historical gobbets.⁶⁵ To understand the *Excerpta Constantiniana* we need to think in terms of a narrow world comprising a small group around the emperor Constantine VII, a group of men who were devoted to the study of the past and who believed in its intrinsic relevance.

Historiographical Contexts

The authors of the tenth and eleventh centuries were the heirs of the Roman exemplar-tradition.⁶⁶ The early history of Rome might well have presented our middle byzantine historians with exemplary figures with which they could draw edifying comparisons or moral lessons. This is certainly what we get in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Michael Attaleiates famously made a comparison between the Roman (Republican) heroes of the past with the not-so-heroic Romans of his own day. Psellus provided a comparatively detailed treatment of the Regal Period in his *Brief History*—drawn from the *Roman Antiquities* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, or perhaps more likely from the now lost epitome of that work, which was known to Photius.⁶⁷ Zonaras, writing some time after 1118, represents the highpoint in the resurgence of interest in the period, with his detailed treatment of Roman history down to the fall of Carthage and Corinth in 146 B.C. If we turn to the tenth century, however, we see a very different picture. The historical biographies that comprise the continuation of Theophanes, including Constantine’s own *Vita Basilii*, make no use of the

⁶⁴ Magdalino 2013, 208: “History writing for him [sc. Constantine VII] was an exercise in imperial authority.”

⁶⁵ Németh 2015, 299 sees the *Excerpta* being used by policy makers, “courtly readers who sought historical analogies when making decisions”.

⁶⁶ Mallan 2014, 760.

⁶⁷ Phot. *Bib. cod.* 84 [= ed. Henry II.8–9]. We may speculate that the traces of Dionysius which Roberto (2005, cxxxiv) detected in John of Antioch, may well derive from this lost epitome of the *Roman Antiquities*.

Regal or Republican past—at least to provide direct exemplary material.⁶⁸ The same goes for the contemporaneous history of Genesisius. This is not because these authors refrain from using exemplary figures—far from it. But the figures they tend to use are imperial (that is to say Roman Emperors, and that honorary Roman, Alexander the Great), or biblical characters, not the great men of the Republican past, and still less the seven kings of Rome. Only in the decades after the death of Constantine VII do we see a resurgence of interest in Regal and Republican history, and indeed indications of the use of Dio to supply this material, namely in the history of Leo the Deacon, and in a single, yet tantalising comment in the late tenth century poem *On the Capture of Crete* (Ἀλωσις τῆς Κρήτης) of Theodosius the Deacon.⁶⁹

The state of the chronographical tradition prior to the 950s might offer some clues as to why this was. The tenth century chronicle of Symeon Logothetes elides the Regal and Republican periods of Roman History prior to Julius Caesar—a trend that will continue through some of the popular chronicles of the twelfth century and beyond, such as that of Michael Glycas. It is a practice that has its origins in the earlier *Weltchroniken* of Malalas and George the Monk. In this context, the *Excerpta* represents a significant reversal of this trend. But as suggested by the foregoing discussion, the historical extracts from Dio’s Regal narrative in their own way represent an attempt to reconstruct Rome’s Regal history. The biographical or aetiological biases in the excerpted material point towards a readership that was interested and perhaps even anxious to reclaim its memory the (non-Christian) origins of the political and moral traditions of Rome. The work of Dio, the consular historian, with its classicising prose-style, abundance of constitutional detail, and moralising tone, was eminently suited to fulfilling this aim.

Conclusions

According to the great French Byzantinist, Paul Lemerle, the *Excerpta* could not be counted as a work of history—it was fundamentally “*anti-histoire*”.⁷⁰ Such a view has come under

⁶⁸ Cf. the use of Plutarch’s Republican lives as models by *Theophanes Continuatus* and the *Vita Basilii*: Jenkins 1948; Jenkins 1954.

⁶⁹ For the general resurgence in interest in the Republic as seen in the *Excerpta*, see Németh 2010, 254. More generally, note Markopoulos 2006; Krallis 2012, 52–69, 192–199; Kaldellis 2012 (for the Byzantine preference for Roman historiography).

⁷⁰ Lemerle 1971, 287–288 (quote on 288).

attack in recent years, and not without cause. In this chapter, I have argued that the fragments of the *Excerpta* are not divorced from a sense of history and historical narrative. Indeed, the choice of fragments within a collection such as the *EV* have an inner logic which allow them to be read as a history, albeit an impressionistic one, of the Regal Period. As a work of historiography, the *Excerpta* are not dissimilar to the works of the chroniclers of the previous centuries, such as George Syncellus—the only difference being that whereas the guiding organisational principle in Syncellus is chronology, in the *Excerpta* it is theme.⁷¹ On the whole, the *Excerpta* represent a typically Byzantine mixture of the conservative and the innovative. In arrangement, it recalls the moralising *florilegia* of earlier centuries, such as that of pseudo-Maximus. On the other hand, the preservation and disjointed presentation of texts within each rubric has strong links to the Byzantine chronographic tradition, exemplified by Syncellus in his *Selection of Chronologies*.

It seems probable that the *Excerpta* were intended to augment, not replace, the study of the original authors. It is worth remembering that it was probably during the reign of Constantine VII that our two most important manuscripts of Dio's history were copied: *Marcianus Graecus* 395, quite possibly by the same scribe who was responsible for the *Codex Ravennas* 429 of Aristophanes; and the Laurentian codex of Dio (*Codex Laurentianus Plut.* 70.8). The surviving manuscripts from this period show further interest in the historians of early Rome: the Vatican Polybius (*Vaticanus graecus* 124) is dated to 947, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Roman Antiquities*, including the first four books, were also copied during this century.⁷² This shows that Dio, like these other historians, was again being read as a work of history, and not only as a source of edifying maxims or interesting grammatical constructions, as seems to have been the case for period following the history of John of Antioch.

Finally, as a coda to this paper, some tentative comments may be offered with respect to the possible origins of the *Excerpta*. I think the clue may come from the hand of Constantine VII. In the prologue to the *Vita Basilii*, the author, presumably Constantine himself, professes his desire to write a history of “the more noteworthy deeds accomplished throughout the entire duration of Roman rule in Byzantium: the deeds of emperors, of

⁷¹ For a similar observation, see Treadgold 2013, 164.

⁷² Fromentin 1998, liv-lx.

officials serving under them, of generals and their subordinates, and so on in detail”.⁷³ Constantine laments that he was not able to realise such a project owing to various constraints on his time, so he contented himself with writing a biography of his grandfather. We may wonder how far Constantine had progressed with his reading for his *magnum opus*. It may be coincidence that the historical material in another of Constantine’s works, the *De Administrando Imperio*, completed around 952,⁷⁴ and in particular its use of extracts from Theophanes and George the Monk, correspond generally to the scope of Constantine’s original work. Is it not possible that the origins of the *Excerpta* too lie with the reading and note-taking for this original work? Of course, the scope of the *Excerpta* exceeds that of Constantine’s projected history, but it may be that the *Excerpta*—which, is, after all a work fundamentally concerned with noteworthy deeds of kings, officials, and generals—was conceived as a grander substitute for this earlier unfinished work.

⁷³ Const. *VB* 1 [ed. Sevckenko]. I do not see this (*pace* Toynbee 1973, 579) as being evidence that for Constantine VII the “history [of the Roman Empire] before the reign of Constantine I is almost beyond his historical horizon”.

⁷⁴ The date of composition was established by Bury 1906, 574. Cf. Toynbee 1973, 576–577 fn. 5.

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Part II: Military & Political History

DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

FROM NOBLES TO VILLAINS: THE STORY OF THE REPUBLICAN
SENATE IN CASSIUS DIO'S *ROMAN HISTORY**

Jesper Majbom Madsen

In his concluding remarks about Caesar's dictatorship, Cassius Dio criticises the Senate for what he saw as a deliberate strategy to undermine the dictator's authority by offering a shower of extraordinary, unprecedented honours and for creating an atmosphere in which the plot against dictator became an acceptable next step (Cass. Dio 44.1.1–2):

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Καῖσαρ ταῦθ' οὕτως ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς Πάρθους στρατεύσων ἔπραξεν, οἷστρος δέ τισιν ἀλιτηριώδης φθόνῳ τε τοῦ προήκοντος καὶ μίσει τοῦ προτετιμημένου σφῶν προσπεσῶν ἐκεῖνόν τε ἀνόμως ἀπέκτεινε, καινὸν ἀνοσίου δόξης ὄνομα προσλαβὼν, καὶ τὰ ψηφισθέντα διεσκέδασε, στάσεις τε αὔθις ἐξ ὁμονοίας καὶ πολέμους ἐμφυλίους τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις παρεσκεύασεν· ἔλεγον μὲν γὰρ καθαιρέται τε τοῦ Καίσαρος καὶ ἐλευθερωταὶ τοῦ δήμου γεγονέναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἐκεῖνῳ τε ἀσεβῶς ἐπεβούλευσαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὀρθῶς ἤδη πολιτευομένην ἐστασίασαν.

All this Caesar did as a preliminary step to his campaign against the Parthians; but a baleful frenzy which fell upon certain men through jealousy of his advancement and hatred of his preferment to themselves caused his death unlawfully, while it added a new name to the annals of infamy; it scattered the decrees to the winds and brought upon the Romans seditions and civil wars once more after a state of harmony. His slayers, to be sure, declared that they had shown themselves at once destroyers of Caesar and liberators of the people: but in reality they impiously plotted against him, and they threw the city into disorder when at last it possessed a stable government.

Dio goes on to discuss why monarchy was to be preferred over democracy, particularly for a

* All translations of Cassius Dio's *Roman History* are from Earnest Cary's Translation in the Loeb Classical Library.

state the size of Rome, and he reminds his readers that the grant of absolute power to a single ruler—even a man of average talent—was better than the reign of many (Cass. Dio 44.1.3).¹ The historian here reaches one of the key conclusions in the *Roman History*, namely that modesty in a democracy was an impossibility in Rome; this was because a relatively limited number of wealthy families competed with each other to get or maintain their share of political power, magistracies, and military commands to secure or improve their position in the city's social and political hierarchy.

Caesar is criticised for accepting the many honours and for believing he deserved them (Cass. Dio 44.3.2). Yet, Dio leaves no doubt that Caesar's fall and the subsequent civil war were the responsibility of those who deliberately set him up by tempting him with honours such as the perpetual right to act as if he were celebrating a triumph; this was something that bordered on divine pretensions (Cass. Dio 44.3.1–2):²

οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀναίτιον πάντη τὸ ἐπίφθονον ἐκτήσατο, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον αὐτοὶ οἱ βουλευταὶ ταῖς τε καινότησι καὶ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τῶν τιμῶν ἐξάραντές τε αὐτὸν καὶ φυσήσαντες ἔπειτα ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἐκείναις καὶ ἐμέμφοτο καὶ διέβαλλον ὡς ἠδέως τέ σφας λαμβάνοντα καὶ ὀγκηρότερον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ζῶντα. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὅτε καὶ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἤμαρτε, δεξάμενός τέ τινα τῶν ψηφισθέντων οἱ καὶ πιστεύσας ὄντως αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι, πλεῖστον δὲ ὅμως ἐκεῖνοι, οἵτινες ἀρξάμενοι τιμῶν αὐτὸν ὡς καὶ ἄξιον, προήγαγον ἐς αἰτίαν οἷς ἐψηφίζοντο.

He [Caesar] had aroused dislike that was not altogether unjustified, except in so far as it was the senators themselves who had by their novel and excessive honours encouraged him and puffed him up, only to find fault with him on this very account and to spread slanderous reports how glad he was to accept them and how he behaved more haughtily as a result of them. It is true that Caesar did now and then err by accepting some of the honours voted him and believing that he really deserved them; yet those were most blameworthy who, after beginning to honour him as he deserved, led him on and brought blame upon him for the

¹ Dio is probably referring to members of the political elite, the senatorial class, not the average citizens, who apart from the right to vote always stood at the margin of the decision-making process.

² On Caesar's ambivalence when offered kingship see Cass. Dio 44.10–11. See also 44.11.2–3. Cf. Suet. *Caes.* 76–79.

measures they had passed.

For Dio, Caesar's death marked a low point of Republican history. In the middle of the 40s, the city was left with a political elite that had killed its leader without any plans for how to proceed and with no motive other than envy, hatred and the fear of unfulfilled ambitions, as indicated by the quotations above. To Dio, the first reasonably stable form of government Rome had had for almost a century was replaced by a decade of anarchy and civil war, more gruesome and devastating than any of the previous ones. Had they known the consequences of their actions, those behind Caesar's murder would probably have paused, Dio speculates, before they removed what he saw as a saviour figure and the stability Caesar's firm grip of power ensured Rome and its people (Cass. Dio 44.2.5).

In the following discussion, I argue that one of Dio's main aspirations was to promote monarchical rule as the only reliable constitution for Rome; and that he shapes his narrative to prove that democracy was unstable, since human nature would always lead to competition between members of the elite—in the case of Rome the senatorial elite—and so was bound to corrupt both the political system and the individual protagonists. Dio's view was inspired by Thucydides' views on human nature and the notion of how the political ambitions of powerful individuals would always lead to greed, envy, hunger for power, lack of modesty and so to *stasis* in the sense of inner political strife and outright civil war.³ In Dio's version of Rome's early history it is the senate or more accurately the most influential members of the council who in competition with each other drew the state to the brink of dissolution, chaos and civil war. What Dio describes is a gradual process, where Roman politics, in the course of the Early and Middle Republic, changes from a form of government, where Rome, its people and elite, were fighting together to conquer, stabilise and defend the city's control over the Italian peninsula to a state of political instability and war between Romans. What drove the Roman elite into what Dio characterises as unhealthy competition between members of the city's political elite was the ambition to supersede ones' peers politically, militarily and financially and to enjoy the glory and commemoration that followed decisive

³ Thuc. 3.82.83; Cass. Dio 44.2. For human nature in Dio and the inspiration from Thucydides see Ress 2011, 79–80. See also Macleod 1979, 58–59. One of the essential passages is Thuc. 3.81–85, where the Athenian historian focuses on greed (3.81) and envy (3.84) as the part of human nature that is mostly responsible for hostility among fellow citizens; see Rhodes 1994, 129–137. On Thucydides' study of human nature, see Price 2001, 12. On how Thucydides' views of human nature influenced many later Greek and Roman writers see (Reinhold 1985, 22–23, 27, 30–31). See also Millar 1964, 6 and Rich 1990, 11.

military achievements. The germ for unhealthy political competition was already part of the early and middle republic; but it was contained or handled by men of virtue who managed to lead the Romans by setting the right example—leading the people by their conduct and by the show of modesty, compassion and rightfulness. A few good men had eyes for the greater good and managed to set the needs of the state above their own ambition. At a closer look, the early Rome was not a sort of ideal, which was then replaced by the horror of the Late Republic; rather it was a time in which men with the right intentions were still capable of keeping Rome politically stable.⁴

Dio was eager to write Rome's history as accurately as possible.⁵ He tells his readers that it took him ten years to gather the material and he regrets that in the imperial period, when most decisions were taken behind closed doors, it had become increasingly difficult to access the right sources.⁶ But as I hope to show in this chapter, Dio also felt a strong urge to demonstrate that peace and stability were achievable only in a monarchy and only if the monarch was willing or even keen to include the Empire's best men as his advisors.

To form a more stable political environment, the old form of democratic rule, where members of the senate competed for a seat in the senate and to ensure personal influence on the political agenda, had to be replaced. Instead, senators were to be recruited among men from across the Empire; but they should not in any way be the equals of the emperor or share his powers but instead assume the role of his advisors on all sorts of political questions, such as issues of government, legislation and military matters.⁷ This governmental form was for Dio the only possibility, and the books on the Early Republic need therefore to be seen as pieces in a larger puzzle carefully put together to illustrate the flaws of a constitution where political power was divided between the people and a political elite that needed popular

⁴ For the view that Dio contrasts a more stable early Rome with the chaotic period of the Late Republic see Simons 2009, 304–305; Kemezis 2014, 105.

⁵ Rich 1990, 8–9, 13–14.

⁶ See Edmondson 1999, 54–55 for discussion of Dio's ambition to offer a qualified historical account; for Dio's own account of the composition of his work see 72.23.5. Additionally, note the famous passage describing the lack of sources for the imperial period relative to Republican Rome at 53.19.4. See also Millar 1964, 37; Reinhold 1988, 9–10; Murison 1999, 20–21.

⁷ Cass. Dio 52.15. See Cass. Dio 52.19.1–2 regarding the anachronistic proposal that Augustus was to select men from the provinces.

support to both govern and succeed.⁸

Another key theme in the *Roman History* is the destabilisation of the state by the competition between the strong dynasts on the one hand—that is those characterised by *δυναστεία* (men like Sulla, Marius, Pompey and Caesar)—and on the other hand between the dynasts and what Dio describes as an envious and weak Senate. Pompey's use of popular support to secure first his command against the pirates and a year later to replace Lucullus in the war against Mithridates is an example of the conflict between the Senate and the dynasts: the dynast got his way at first but was later blocked when the Senate, led by a hateful Lucullus, refused to ratify Pompey's acts.⁹

The point Dio tries to make is that a quest for wealth, power and prestige corrupted both the elite and political culture more generally, as military glory became increasingly available while Rome extended its sphere of interest beyond the borders of Italy. In order to prove the connection between democracy and an unregulated competition for political power, Dio offers a narrative in which both the elite and the political system as a whole changed as Rome expanded—a new development in Roman politics that took armies and members of the political elite to regions with unprecedented wealth and military prestige for those who had the fortune to win these wars. The version Dio offers in the first half of the *Roman History* is therefore also the story of how the elite of a city state lost track of their modesty and moral values as the Empire expanded and their wealth grew, and of how the new conquests forced men of political ambition to outdo each other in the hope that their part in history would be particularly memorable. The essential moment in Dio eyes was the fall of Carthage, which freed Rome for the external threat, which had kept the elite united hitherto. With Carthage out of the way, Rome's ambitious elite was now free to turn on each other in their pursuit of power and military prestige. Dio was not alone in seeing the fall of Carthage as a turning point in Roman politics. Sallust, who Dio references in his text, offers a shorter but similar analysis and Tacitus sums up the same point in the *Histories*.¹⁰ The destruction of Carthage may have been a key moment in the history of Rome, which allowed Rome's political elite to

⁸ See Cass. Dio 52.20.2 and 52.31.2 for the view that the people should never be allowed to vote for magistrates.

⁹ Kemezis 2014, 109–112; Vervaeke 2014, 216–222; Coudry 2016, 33–36; Madsen 2016, 143–146.

¹⁰ For the fall of Carthage as a defining moment in Rome's political history see Cass. Dio F. 52. For Sallust's similar view, see Sall. *Cat.* 10–12; Tac. *Hist.* 2.38.3. See also Libourel 1968, and the contributions by Lindholmer and Lange this volume.

shift its focus from the struggle to conquer and defend Italy from external threats to further expand the empire. But as Dio tries to show in the books on Rome's early history, excessive ambition, greed, and political strife had always been a part of city's political history.

The Tyranny of Monarchs

Dio's strong support for monarchical rule did not include the form of monarchy under which the city was founded. Rome's early kings manipulated their way into power and are, except for Numa perhaps, protagonists who sought power to satisfy their own ambitions. Rome's first king Romulus is criticised for not cooperating with the Senate and for treating the senators as his subjects (Cass. Dio F 1.11):

Ἵτι ὁ Ῥωμύλος πρὸς τὴν γερουσίαν τραχύτερον διέκειτο καὶ τυραννικώτερον αὐτῇ προσεφέρετο, καὶ τοὺς ὀμήρους τοῖς Οὐηιένταις ἀπέδωκε καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ κοινῆς γνώμης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ ἐγίγνετο· ἀγανακτοῦντάς τε ἐπὶ τούτῳ αἰσθόμενος ἄλλα τε ἐπαχθῆ διελέχθη καὶ τέλος εἶπεν ὅτι “ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ πατέρες, ἐξελεξάμην οὐχ ἵνα ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἄρχητε, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐπιτάττοιμι.”

Romulus assumed a rather harsh attitude toward the senate and behaved toward it much like a tyrant; he returned the hostages of the Veientes on his own responsibility and not by common consent, as was usually done. When he perceived that they were vexed at this he made a number of unpleasant remarks, and finally said: "I have chosen you, Fathers, not that you may rule me, but that I might have you to command."

King Tarquinius Priscus, on the other hand, is portrayed as a more righteous man who treated both the people and the Senate with respect. He is praised for his ability to share his success with the people around him and for taking the blame himself whenever something went wrong (Cass. Dio F 9.2); and he appears to take notice of criticism without interest in retaliation or revenge (Cass. Dio F 9.3). But even Priscus appears in the narrative as someone who manipulates his way into power. After the death of Ancus Marcius, Priscus convinces the Senate to insert him as regent instead of announcing Marcius' sons as successors, as was the original plan (Zonar. 7.8). His power was consolidated by the failure to prepare the boys

for kingship and by adding his own supporters among the senators. Another element in the attempt to consolidate his power was his move to give his illegitimate son by a slave-woman, Servius Tullius, a prominent position in the state, promoting him above all others—a move that later inspired the plot against Priscus and the accession of Servius (Zonar. 7.8).

Servius is portrayed in much the same way. He too acts (ostensibly) as regent, now for Priscus' sons, which he was not too keen to promote. He favoured the people with land and money, and freedmen too, but established the patron-client relationship by demanding that freedmen still owed services to their former masters. When the patricians later questioned Servius' legitimate right to rule, the people voted him king (Zonar. 7.9).¹¹ Dio's or Zonaras' account of how the people elected Servius differs from Livy who maintains that kingship was never formally bestowed upon Servius, neither by popular vote nor by the Senate. The practice of illegitimate rule culminates with the death of Servius and the accession of Priscus' son, Tarquinius. Servius is said to have promoted liberty and democracy but was killed in public by his own daughter, whom he had married to Tarquinius in order to strengthen the ties to the sons of Priscus.¹² Tarquinius' reign, on the other hand, is described as a tyranny (Cass. Dio F 11.2):

Ὅτι ὁ Ταρκύνιος, ἐπεὶ ἰκανῶς ὡς καὶ ἀκόντων τυραννήσων παρεσκευάσατο, τοὺς δυνατωτάτους πρῶτον μὲν τῶν βουλευτῶν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συλλαμβάνων, πολλοὺς μὲν φανερῶς, οἷς γε αἰτίαν τινὰ εὐπρεπῆ ἐπενεγκεῖν ἐδύνατο, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ λάθρα ἀπεκτίννε, καὶ τινὰς ὑπερώριζεν.

Tarquinius, when he had made sufficient preparations to rule over them even against their will, first proceeded to arrest the most influential of the senators and next some of the other citizens, putting many to death publicly, when he could bring some plausible charge against them, and many others secretly, while some he banished.

And later in the same paragraph (Cass. Dio F 11.4):

καὶ τὴν γε γερουσίαν καὶ καταλῦσαι παντελῶς ἐπεχείρησεν, πᾶν ἄθροισμα

¹¹ Livy 1.41 and 1.46.

¹² On Servius' democratic tendencies, see Zonar. 7.9.

ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπιλέκτων καὶ πρόσχημα προστατείας τινὸς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ ἐχόντων, πολεμιώτατον τυράννω νομίζων εἶναι.

In fact, he even undertook to abolish the senate altogether, since he believed that every gathering of men, particularly of chosen persons who possessed some semblance of authority from antiquity, was most hostile to a tyrant.

When seen together, Dio's portrait of Rome's early monarchy is the story of personal ambitions, a strong urge for power and a time in which the city's political protagonists manipulated, killed or tricked their way into power.¹³ Priscus and perhaps Servius were not as brutal as Tarquinius or as arrogant as Romulus but they still pursued power to satisfy their own ambitions. The story Dio offers is of the misuse of power by strong individuals in order to sidestep the senators who had the right to approve the king and to speak as advisors drawn from that body. The form of government Dio describes is a form of monarchy in which the king could bypass the Senate or manipulate the senators into agreeing either by inserting his own supporters in the council, by relying on help from personal friends, or by prosecuting members of the Senate.

It may well be that Dio's intention was to write the history of Rome under the kings as accurately as he could. But it is equally evident that he shapes a story of the kings in a way that fits the bigger picture of how power corrupts and how under those circumstances the political elite (that is, the Senate) is left in a position where they can do very little to prevent Rome from turning into a tyranny. In Dio's version, it is the king himself who was to blame every time the monarch became a tyrant, and this occurred whenever he was not approved by the senate or the moment he chose to rule without including the senators in decision-making.

Dio's reference to Romulus' reminder to the Senate that they were chosen so that he could rule them and not the other way around is particularly interesting. What is noteworthy here is that Dio seems to question the monarch's right to choose the senators and also that they, as his loyal advisors, were to follow his bidding. This point seems at odds with his own recommendation in book 52, where Augustus is encouraged to choose both his senators and the most important magistrates without any form of election.¹⁴ It is telling that, in his positive

¹³ See the contributions by Lange and Lindholmer in this volume.

¹⁴ Cass. Dio 52.20.2 and 52.31.2. See Reinhold 1988, 190, 204; Rich 1990, 13–14; Kemezis 2014, 132; Madsen 2016, 146–149.

approach to monarchical rule in the age of Augustus, Dio emphasises that nothing was decided if the *princeps* did not agree.¹⁵ In the reign of Augustus, what Dio recommends is precisely a constitution under which the Senate has a limited influence on the political process, serving the emperor as his advisors—an ideal not that different from what he has Romulus suggest was the reason for establishing the Senate in the first place. What troubles Dio in the case of Romulus is perhaps not so much that the Senate were to obey the king's bidding but the disrespect and lack of acknowledgement of the senators' value as reliable partners in the decision-making process. When Romulus bypassed the Senate and returned the hostages of Veii without first consulting it, he not only ignored practice, but also acted as a tyrant.

The attempt to establish Dio's attitude towards the Senate and the political role that the council should have been allowed is hampered by the fragmentary state of books one and two. Yet the impression one gets from what is left and from Zonaras' text is that the Senate stood in the background with very little actual power, at least from the moment the king had been elected by the people. The example of Romulus humiliating the senators by reminding them of the hierarchy suggests that it was common practice in Dio's account of the Regal Period to hear the Senate on different matters. Unlike Livy, who claims that Tarquinius was the first king not to include the Senate in the government, Dio's text, or what is left of it, leaves the impression of a form of government where the kings ruled either as enlightened sole rulers, like Numa, Priscus and Servius, or as tyrants, like Tarquinius and, at least to some extent, Romulus (Livy 1.41). But it is characteristic that whenever they enter the narrative, the senators are on their heels. They had to listen to the abuse from Romulus and face the humiliation of being outmanoeuvred first by Priscus, who added his own supporters to their numbers, and later by Servius, who based his legitimate right to rule on the people alone. With the last king Tarquinius, things went from bad to worse when in order to secure his own position, he persecuted and killed many of the senators in an attempt to dissolve the Senate altogether.

Tarquinius marks the low point of the early Roman monarchy and the first time Rome's political system reached rock bottom. Use of violence and abuse and the attempt to break the Senate with political murders and creative prosecutions reflect the kind of illegitimate rule that was fuelled by personal ambitions. It is that kind of ambition and lust for power that Dio classifies as tyranny and as an almost natural part of human nature and which

¹⁵ See Cass. Dio 53.17 and 53.21.

he warns against throughout the entire *Roman History*. In what seems to serve as the conclusion of the history of the early kings, Dio offers his own thoughts on the challenges that every monarch had to face when he accepted the throne (Cass. Dio F 12.9):

Ἵτι τὸ τῆς βασιλείας πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἀρετῆς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ συνηθείας, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο, πολλῆς δεῖται, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστὶν ἄνευ ἐκείνων ἀψάμενόν τινα σωφρονῆσαι. πολλοὶ γοῦν ὥσπερ ἐς ὕψος τι μέγα παρὰ λόγον ἀρθέντες οὐκ ἤνεγκαν τὴν μετεώρισιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τε καταπεσόντες ὑπ' ἐκπλήξεως ἔπταισαν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων πάντα συνηλόησαν.

The business of kingship, more than any other, demands not merely excellence of character, but also great understanding and experience, and it is not possible without these qualities for the man who takes hold of it to show moderation. Many, for example, as if raised unexpectedly to some great height, have not endured their elevation, but being overcome with giddiness, have fallen and not only brought disaster to themselves but at the same time shattered all the interests of their subjects.

The paragraph relating to the history of Rome's early kings may be read as a verdict on a period in Rome's political history in which individuals acquired the throne either by manipulating their way into power or by the use of violence. This pessimistic view of Roman politics during the reign of the kings was not shared by Livy who mostly sees the reign of Tarquinius as the beginning of the crisis. In Livy's version, Tarquinius was guilty of killing numerous senators either because he disagreed with them or because he wanted their money. He ruled on his own account and was the first king, Livy claims, to abolish the custom of asking advice of the Senate and the first to rule by consulting only his personal friends.¹⁶

This brings us back to Dio's own values and to his view of Roman history. There is a warning to be read in the first books, namely how young and unprepared monarchs, like Tarquinius, pose a threat not only to themselves but to the state as a whole. Dio may have had Caracalla and some of the other young emperors in mind when he wrote about the importance of education, understanding, and moderation, values he saw as absent from the reign of Tarquinius and, much later, men like Caligula, Nero, Domitian, Commodus and, of course,

¹⁶ Livy 1.49.

Caracalla.

A Few Good Men

The fall of Tarquinius marks the beginning of a new era, when monarchical rule gave way to democracy. The reader is introduced to a number of righteous senators who are praised for setting aside their own ambitions to do what was in the best interest of the commonwealth but also to a number of individuals whose ambitions for power and prestige threaten to destabilise the entire state as well as Rome's leading role on the Italian Peninsula. One example of an ideal Roman senator is L. Quinctius Cincinnatus who appears briefly in the fragments of book five. Here Dio tells the moving story, set about 458 BCE, of the election of a modest and undemanding senator who was elected to the dictatorship and his call to rescue the Roman general Minucius and his army which was trapped by the Aequi. Dio tells the story of how Cincinnatus was working the land with his own hands when the news of his appointment was handed to him by a delegation of senators.¹⁷

The story of Cincinnatus leaving his small farm and quickly winning the war only to return to finish his work is the stuff legends are made of.¹⁸ The story of the modest Cincinnatus fits Dio's narrative of the Early Republic, where men with the right values ensured the right balance during an age marked by competition among members of the elite and the struggle between Rome's elite and the people. To Dio, Cincinnatus was the personification of the highly qualified leader who did not desire power for its own sake but used it as a tool to serve the state when asked to step in. That Cincinnatus refrains from using his newly-won powers and popularity and that he gave up his command in order to return to his previous life is a quality, real or not, which Dio juxtaposes with the chaos in Late Republican Rome, where, Dio claims, all the protagonists save Cato the younger were involved in politics for their own benefit (Cass. Dio 37.57.3).¹⁹

¹⁷ Cass. Dio 5 F 23.2. For a far more detailed description of the events, see Livy 3.26–29; also Scullard 1961, 69; Cornell 1989, 288; Cornell 1995, 307.

¹⁸ Cornell 1995, 307.

¹⁹ See Cass. Dio 37.57.3 where Dio mentions Cato as an exception. However, Cato was also prone to envy or at least to the fear that Caesar would become too powerful. In Dio's version, Cato opposes Caesar's land reforms in 59 BCE because he opposed such changes out of principle. Cato is referred to as a upright man but at the same time as someone who opposed a necessary law, which he himself saw the need for, because it would grant

Another of Dio's model senators was Marcus Furius Camillus who, after the capture of Veii and Falerii, was faced with envy both from his peers and the people, and at the end was forced to leave Rome to live with the Rutuli (see Coudry in this volume). Dio's Camillus is punished for being righteous and god-fearing. After the spectacular capture of Veii, where the Roman troops had entered the city by a tunnel dug through a hill, Camillus gave a tenth of the booty to Apollo to honour a vow he had made to the god, and then celebrated his victory with a spectacular triumph in Rome, riding into the city in a chariot driven by white horses. The people were angered because of the sum that was set aside to the god and they hated Camillus for celebrating his success in the manner he did (Zonar. 7.21; cf. Cass. Dio F 24.4–6). In the war against the Faliscans, Dio describes how a just and upstanding Camillus, firmly rooted in Roman values, refused to take the city's children as hostages when a traitor handed them over to him. Dio describes how Camillus sends the children back to the city; struck by the general's gesture, the Faliscans then laid down their weapons and signed an agreement with the Romans without any fighting. The success at Falerii made Camillus even more envied both by the people and, perhaps more surprisingly, by his close friends, who refused to assist him in the trial that the tribunes were putting together (Cass. Dio F 24.2).²⁰

Camillus' story is illustrative of the way Dio saw Roman politics in the age of the democracy or, in broader terms, how Roman society in his eyes operated in the early 4th century BCE. That the people, and more surprisingly Camillus' close friends, opposed a righteous and morally-grounded general out of envy, criticising him for keeping his promise to Apollo, is to Dio an example of how envy and political ambition was already part of the political reality in the Early Republic. Democracy in the Roman form was from the start malfunctioning—even in the age of the Early Republic—troubled by free competition, strife over political rights between Rome's social classes, personal ambitions among members of the elite and, as in the case of Camillus, by jealousy.²¹ What in Dio's mind holds the state together or what prevents the Romans from engaging in open political strife or full-scale civil war was precisely men like Camillus and Cincinnatus who tried their best to do what was in the best interest of the state. Cincinnatus, by winning the war and handing his powers back to

Caesar much popularity within the public. On the account of this see Cass. Dio 43.3. See also Burden-Strevens forthcoming.

²⁰ Cornell holds that Camillus is an historical person but notes that the account of the sack of Veii is mythical (1995, 311–312); Harris 2016, 20 ; Scullard 1961, 73–75. For the account by Livy, see 5.21–28; see also Lange 2016, 94–97 on Camillus' triumph after Veii.

²¹ Burden-Strevens 2015, 180; Rees 2011, 19–20; on the process against Scipio see Simons 2009, 234–237.

the state as a good example of correct leadership; and Camillus, in solving the situation with the Faliscans by showing mercy and sending the children back to their parents, thereby avoiding a bloody attempt to take the city. The point is further illustrated by the example of Cincinnatus who, late in life, accepted the election as dictator to solve a food crisis and to prevent Spurius Maelius from setting up a tyranny.²²

Moderation and an eye for the greater good is another theme to which Dio often returns. The quarrel between Lucius Papirius Cursor and Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus, his master of horse, in the war against the Samnites in 325 BCE is used as another example of how great men were able to disregard personal ambitions to solve problems. In a brief fragment Dio describes how Rullianus supported Papirius' consular election. The fragment does not include the account of Papirius' and Rullianus' contention when the latter, as Papirius' master of horse, had fought and defeated the Samnites against his direct orders.²³ This crisis between the two generals is instead offered by Livy who explains that Papirius went up against both the Senate and the people by demanding that Rullianus be executed for having disobeyed direct orders. The crisis was put to rest when Rullianus' father and the people's tribunes asked the dictator for forgiveness.²⁴ Judging from Dio's account, the incident was still an issue when envoys from Rome asked Rullianus to set aside his differences with Papirius and support his election for the dictatorship in 310. Rullianus, who was consul at the time, put off the decision until nightfall but then announced his support. The fragment brakes off and the reasoning behind Rullianus' decision to support Papirius (if Dio offered it) is now lost. Yet, the reference to Rullianus' agreement to support Papirius implies that the former knew his enemy would be the right man to solve the crisis.²⁵

Rullianus is here the bigger man who puts aside his hatred against one who tried to have him killed in order to ensure Rome the best possible command in the war to come and so the best available course to victory. In Livy's version of the events, where envy is said to have fuelled Papirius' rage, the dictator went up against the entire political establishment in the city, arguing that Rullianus had to be punished in order to maintain discipline in the

²² On Cincinnatus' later dictatorship, see Cass. Dio 6 F 20.1.

²³ Cass. Dio F 36.26.

²⁴ At 8.29–8.36 Livy offers a long and dramatic account of the political crisis that followed Rullianus' decision to disobey the order of Papirius and how the latter asked for a capital punishment for Rullianus.

²⁵ Cass. Dio F 36.26; see also Livy 9.38.

army.²⁶ The point Dio wants to make is that despite the bad blood between them, Rullianus was able to set his personal feelings aside and act rationally when accepting the senators' proposal to appoint Papirius dictator.

Gaius Fabricius was another example of a modest senator with a healthy attitude toward the prestige and power of commands. Dio emphasises that the honest Fabricius downplayed Rufinus' lack of honesty in connection with supporting him in the quest for a command against Pyrrhus; he also emphasises that Rufinus was less firm against bribes but argues that Fabricius supported him regardless, as Rufinus would be the right man to lead the army against Pyrrhus (Cass. Dio F 40.1–2):

Ὅτι Γάιος Φαβρίκιος ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅμοιος ἦν Ῥουφίνῳ, ἐν δὲ δὴ τῇ ἀδωροδοκίᾳ πολὺν προέχων· ἦν γὰρ ἀδωρότατος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκείνῳ οὐτ' ἠρέσκετο καὶ ἀεὶ ποτε διεφέρετο. ὅμως ἐχειροτόνησεν ἐπιτηδειότατον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν τοῦ πολέμου χρεῖαν ἐνόμισεν εἶναι, καὶ παρ' ὀλίγον τὴν ἰδίαν ἔχθραν πρὸς τὰ κοινῇ συμφέροντα ἐποιήσατο, καὶ δόξαν γε καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἐκτήσατο, κρείττων καὶ τοῦ φθόνου γενόμενος, ὅσπερ πού καὶ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν πολλοῖς ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐγγίγνεται. φιλόπολις τε γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὢν, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ προσχήματι ἀρετὴν ἀσκῶν, ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τό τε ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸ δι' ἑτέρου τινός, κἂν διάφορός οἱ ᾗ, εὖ τι τὴν πόλιν παθεῖν ἐτίθετο.

Gaius Fabricius in most respects was like Rufinus, but in incorruptibility far superior. He was very firm against bribes, and on that account not only was obnoxious to Rufinus, but was always at variance with him. Yet he appointed the latter, thinking that he was a most proper person to meet the requirements of the war, and making his personal enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the commonwealth. From this action also he gained renown, in that he had shown himself superior even to jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by reason of emulation. Since he was a true patriot and did not practice virtue for a show, he thought it a matter of indifference whether the state were benefited by him or by some other man, even if that man were an opponent.

²⁶ On Papirius' jealousy of Rullianus' success, see Livy 8.31.

Here the fragment breaks off and it is not known whether Dio went on to describe the example Fabricius set when, as censor in 275 BCE, he expelled Rufinus for being in possession of silverware—the first time a censor expelled a member of the Senate for ethical reasons. But even if the two never came to terms, Fabricius' support of Rufinus in the war against Pyrrhus emphasises the extent of Fabricius' ability to disregard his personal attitude towards Rufinus.

Quintus Fabius Maximus, a great grandson of Rullianus, is the last model senator to be considered here. When dictator in the Second Punic War, Fabius decided to meet the request of Marcus Minucius Rufus, his master of horse, to share the command. The people backed the proposal and Fabius is said to have held no anger either against Rufus or the assembly.²⁷ Instead, he apparently believed that the desire to divide the command was a natural reaction and Dio assures his readers that Fabius would be happy if only the commonwealth emerged from the war unscathed.²⁸

Again, the model politician is portrayed as someone more concerned with the safety and success of the state than the glory of winning the war as sole commander. Yet, there is a catch. Rufus is voted the command but is defeated because of his excessive ambition and desire for power and victory. The episode is an example of how Dio claims that ambition and the competition to obtain prestigious commands were becoming a more and more apparent factor in Roman politics.

In Dio's version, Rome or Roman politics benefited in the Early and Middle Republic from the leadership of good men who stepped up to save the Romans whenever the political system was challenged by the personal ambitions of Rome's political elite, a Roman people captured by populist arguments or threats from outside forces. Both the ambitious individuals who hope to secure a glorious career for themselves and prestigious commands with important victories and those who slowed the political crises by show of modesty, wisdom and by setting good examples were members of the Senate. The political climate Dio describes is therefore one, where personal ambition and quest for glory encouraged the most influential members of the Senate to try to supersede their fellow senators. Dio's account of the Early and Middle republic is therefore the story of how a democratic form of constitution was per definition unsustainable as it would always generate a political environment that

²⁷ See also Livy 22.26–27.

²⁸ Cass. Dio F 57.16. See also Briscoe 1989, 50–51 and Zimmermann 2011, 285–286. Scullard (1961, 193–194) holds that Rufus was not failing as much as ancient historiography wants its readers to believe.

would lead to competition and jealousy between members of the elite followed by hatred, broken laws and in the end chaos and political dissolution.

What kept the senators together was, apart the threat from other people on the Italian Peninsula and the wars with Carthage, a larger degree of equality between members of the elite. As Rome moved overseas and the campaigns were longer and more rewarding the ideals of equality elite of equals was no longer obtainable, which then forced men with ambition into a struggle for magistracies and prestigious commands. In the attempt to ensure as much political influence as possible, Rome's laws and its constitutional traditions were the first victims. Dio does not say it explicitly, but the reason why Rome stays on the right track, up until the third Punic wars, was because of the limits to the wealth and glory members of the Senate were able to obtain from fighting other Italian states and by defending Rome and Italy from outside enemies. In other words, it was easier to stay modest when there was not *that* much to gain from fighting in the first place.

The Punic Wars and other wars overseas changed Roman politics to the worse. Dio describes how Appius Claudius Pulcher (consul in 143 BCE) draws Italy as his province where no enemies were assigned and, out of envy of his colleague, Quintus Caecilius Metellus, stirs up a war against the Salassi to ensure himself the opportunity for a triumph (Cass. Dio F 74.1). Claudius' behaviour announces that new times in Roman politics were on their way, where members of the political elite were promoting their own agenda in pursuit of military commands and prestigious enemies to defeat, paying little attention to the needs of the state or to the damage their hunt for glory was causing the commonwealth. As part of the same tale, the Gracchi are introduced to the reader as populists who worked to overturn the political order only to fulfil their own ambitions. Tiberius is said to have been ambitious but with an aim of making things better, while Gaius comes across as a demagogue and as someone who attacks the constitution and would have overthrown both the aristocratic elite and the senatorial order had he lived long enough to carry out his plans (Cass. Dio F 83.1, 83.4–6, 83.7).

With the removal of the Punic threat, the Roman elite was freed from the danger that kept them united. In the paragraph that marks the transition from the Middle to the Late Republic. The reader is told how Rome's political system, or its political culture, was falling apart leading to a political:²⁹

²⁹ Kemezis 2014, 94–95 and Lange in this volume. See also Cass. Dio 52.1.1.

Ὅτι Μάρκος Ὀκτάουιος τῷ Γράκῳ διὰ φιλονεικίαν συγγενικὴν ἐκὼν ἀντηγωνίζετο. καὶ ἐκ τούτου οὐδὲν μέτριον ἐπράττετο, ἀλλ' ἀντιφιλονεικοῦντες περιγενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ κοινὸν ὠφελῆσαι, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ βίαια, ὥσπερ ἐν δυναστείᾳ τινὶ ἀλλ' οὐ δημοκρατία, ἔπραξαν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄτοπα, ὥσπερ ἐν πολέμῳ τινὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰρήνῃ, ἔπαθον. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἷς πρὸς ἓνα, τοῦτο δὲ πολλοὶ κατὰ συστάσεις λοιδορίας τε ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ μάχας, οὐχ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ τῇ τε ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, τῇ μὲν προφάσει τῇ τοῦ νόμου χρώμενοι, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διασπευδόμενοι, ὥστε ἐν μηδενὶ ἀλλήλων ἐλαττοῦσθαι. κάκ τούτου οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐν κόσμῳ συνέβαινε οὔθ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὰ νενομισμένα ἔπρασσον, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια ἐπέπαυτο καὶ συμβόλαιον οὐδὲν ἐγίνετο, ἄλλη τε ταραχὴ καὶ ἀκρισία πανταχοῦ πολλὴ ἦν· καὶ ὄνομα πόλεως ἔφερον, στρατοπέδου δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπεῖχον.

Thereafter there was no semblance of moderation; but zealously vying, as they did, each to prevail over the other rather than to benefit the state, they committed many acts of violence more appropriate in a despotism than in a democracy, and suffered many unusual calamities appropriate to war rather than to peace. For in addition to their individual conflicts there were many who banded together and indulged in bitter abuse and conflicts, not only throughout the city generally, but even in the very senate-house and the popular assembly... The result was that none of the usual business was carried on in an orderly way: the magistrates could not perform their accustomed duties, courts came to a stop, no contract was entered into, and other sorts of confusion and disorder were rife everywhere.

With this rather pessimistic remark on the state of Roman politics, Dio opens the account of what he describes as the beginning of the end of Rome's democracy, where influential protagonists used the constitution to circumvent their peers and so to disconnect the Senate from the decision-making process. According to Dio, this was the period when an ambitious political elite fought each other in civil wars to surpass their peers and to enhance their own chances, or at the very least to ensure the political status quo.

The Rebirth of the Senate and the Moral of Dio's History

Dio's story of the Roman Senate is the tale of an elite that was competing for the power and prestige of military and political achievements. The early kings won the throne by killing their opponents or by manipulation, such as when they, in the role of regents, slowly bypassed their predecessors' sons or tricked the Senate into accepting them as kings. The political environment Dio describes in the Regal Period is characterised by personal greed and untenable ambitions, such as when Tarquinius killed Servius Tullius. Several of the kings in the fragments are described in ways that resemble tyrants who, in the same way as Romulus, either remind the senators of their inferiority or, like Tarquinius, worked to undermine the Senate through reducing its numbers by killing off its members in unlawful prosecutions, or by refusing to replace deceased or fallen members.

In the Early and Middle Republic, the Senate is free from the tyranny of kings and responsible for the government of Rome. The impression Dio passes on is of a political system characterised by inner political stability in a time of need and pressure, first from the wars with the Italian peoples and later with Carthage. Rome's political elites were still the victims of their own personal ambitions; they were envious and like Papirius, Rufus and Claudius Pulcher found it difficult to handle the success of other senators. Dio offers examples of how individual senators pushed their peers and the political system to the limit in order to obtain certain commands, as when Rufus was finally allowed to share the command with Fabius. But what makes Dio's narrative of the Early and Middle Republic different from his account of the Late Republic is that Rome could still lean on good and just men—senators like Rullianus who did not block the election of Papirius, or Gaius Fabricius, who recognised the military talents of Rufinus. Rome's elite was certainly just as ambitious as they had been under the kings or were to become in the Late Republic. But in Dio's version the senators were able to set aside their own ambitions to do what was right at that specific moment, whether it was to support the command or appointment of a political enemy, share a command or, like Cincinnatus, to accept one only to resign again the moment the war was won. Compared to the situation of Late Republican Rome, the political elite in the Early and Middle Republic may appear less ambitious or at least less ruthless than seems to have been the case when men like Marius, Sulla, Caesar and later Octavian fought each other and as part of the struggle unleashed their armies against Rome to get their way, or when Pompey used

his popular support to fulfil his political and military ambitions.³⁰

Late Republican Rome is, on the other hand, described as a period of greed and political instability. Cato the Younger was one of a few men in politics doing what was in the best interest of the state. But even he failed when he chose not to back Caesar's land reforms in 59, even if he knew reforms were needed.³¹ Dio describes a political climate where the senators were looking to win as much power and influence as possible with no eyes for the interests of the state. Dio now portrays a culture where members of the Senate were forced to set themselves apart from their peers. One way to stand out was to support laws that would ensure backing from the people, exemplified by Tiberius Gracchus' and Caesar's land reforms or Cicero's support for the *lex Manilia*. Another strategy was to win important victories over prestigious enemies, which generals could then convert into political capital. Pompey was first involved in the civil wars between Sulla and Marius' supporters; his victory in Spain and conquest of the East are examples of how he built his popular support on military success. It is in the unregulated competition for prestige and political influence that Dio sees the limits of *demokratia*. It was in the struggle between men with excessive ambitions and considerable popular support, which allowed them to bypass the Senate, that Dio sees *demokratia* being replaced by *dynasteiai*.³²

The account of the Senate in the time of the Republic is part of a larger argument in which Dio hopes to demonstrate the flaws of democracy. At the fall of Tarquinius, when Rome was a Latin city-state, the democratic government was reasonably stable. The nature of man provided that personal ambitions and the desire for recognition and glory was always a liability. Yet, in Dio's view, the political elite was able to face pressing military challenges because they were guided by morally well-equipped men. From the moment Rome transformed into an empire with provinces and spheres of interest far beyond Italy and the Tiber valley there was too much at stake in terms of power, prestige, and wealth for which the elite had to compete. The people and their demands for land and political influence are here seen as part of the problem and Dio has Maecenas warn Augustus that he ought to

³⁰ Kemezis 2014, 105–106 notes that Dio offers a more idealised description of the political elite in this period, less ambitious and more morally grounded than politicians during the Late Republic.

³¹ Dio offers a long description of how the Senate was well-informed about the law designed to free up land for Pompey's soldiers and he describes how Cato and the Senate opposed the law out of fear that Caesar would become too popular if it passed (Cass. Dio 38.1–2). See also Madsen 2016, 144–145.

³² Kemezis 2014, 110.

include the people in the decision-making process.³³

Dio's history of the Senate and the argument against Rome's democratic constitution come together in the books on imperial Rome, where the dissolution of democracy and free political competition led to a more stable political system—but only when the new monarchs ruled responsibly with the senators as their associates.³⁴ In Dio's eyes, the Principate introduced a new age in Roman politics. It ushered in a new political reality, in which Augustus and later emperors were responsible for implementing the laws and for governing the state.³⁵ Now, Dio uses a lot of space in his account of Augustus to demonstrate how Augustus included the Senate by listening to their opinions, but at the same time he underlines both that nothing was decided against his will and that, after a century of civil war and political recklessness, the senators had to be schooled to reassume their role as the advisory board of the magistrates. In other words, the previously incapable and greedy senators had to transform their role from protagonists and political actors to a more limited function as the emperor's trustees with whom he would discuss politics before making his decision. Any advice implies an element of disagreement and criticism, which is what the senators, in Dio's view, are expected to deliver.³⁶ What Dio describes is a gradual process through which Augustus tries to include what is described as a reluctant or indifferent Senate in the political process by making Senate meetings compulsory and by giving them a real opportunity to prepare for the meetings by announcing new laws well in advance.³⁷ The decision to meet with a smaller number of senators and the consuls was another way to

³³ Cass. Dio 52.20.2–3.

³⁴ On Dio's criticism of Severus for choosing the support of his army over his associates in the Senate, see e.g. Cass. Dio 74.2.3; Madsen 2016, 146–149.

³⁵ Dio has Maecenas advise Augustus to take advice from the best men in the state and to implement the laws without including the masses (52.15). That Augustus was to be given absolute power is underlined by Maecenas' assertion that he was to select both the senators and the magistrates without an election process (52.19–22; Reinhold 1988, 190, 204; Rich 1990, 13–14; Kemezis 2014, 132).

³⁶ That Augustus withheld his own opinion until the senators had been given a chance to speak their mind freely is an example of that ideal (Cass. Dio 53.21). The exchange of ideas is repeated in the paragraphs where e.g. Vespasian and Nerva are praised for the praxis of always conferring with the senators before making their decisions (Cass. Dio 65.10.5 and 68.2.3).

³⁷ On how Augustus made an effort to involve the Senate in the government see Cass. Dio 55.3–4, 55.34.1. See also Madsen 2016, 146–147.

include the Senate more directly in the political process.³⁸

The Senate's ability to restore itself under the guidance of Augustus is another key element in Dio's narrative and is further outlined in the account of Tiberius' early years. Up until the time of Germanicus' death, Dio describes a period of reasonable political stability, where the Senate played a constructive role. Even if Tiberius' intentions were not sincere, Rome and the Empire still benefited from the cooperation between the *princeps* and the Empire's political elite. After the death of Germanicus, Dio describes Tiberius as a tyrant, freed from opposition, who showed his brutal, devious and unreliable character. *Maiestas* trials became an integral part of Roman politics and a tool to manage an elite frustrated by being excluded from a political process in which they were now accustomed to take part.³⁹

There is a rhetorical element in the way Dio stages Tiberius as a devious personality who, in competition with the more popular Germanicus, acted as if he respected the competencies of the Senate and its role as an important political institution, only to show himself as a tyrant the moment Germanicus was out of the way. In other words, the Senate may not have been as involved in government in Tiberius' early years as is suggested by Dio, nor did the senators necessarily feel the freedom to speak their minds as openly as Dio claimed they did.⁴⁰ But to make the case for Augustus restoring the Senate to the point where the members realised the need to leave aside personal ambitions, to do what was in the best interest of the state, Dio needed the Senate to be fully functional as a core institution in Roman politics at the time of Tiberius' accession. If the Senate was not ready to take political responsibility by the time of Augustus' death, Dio's ideal of an emperor had not managed to restore the Senate as a reliable political institution. Certainly Tacitus made no such point: he would not recognise Dio's claim that Augustus made an effort to include the Senate as a trusted partner in the government of the Empire (*Tac. Ann.* 1.1–10). In Dio's narrative, it was in the imperial period, under monarchical rule and under the guidance of Augustus, that the Senate found its true form. Freed from the agony of political competition, overly ambitious peers and a constant need to assert one's standing through military glory and popular but

³⁸ Cass. Dio 53.21.4

³⁹ Cass. Dio 57.23.3; Madsen forthcoming.

⁴⁰ On *parrhêsia* see Mallan 2016, 269–272. Dio is here likely to have been inspired by the thoughts of Marcus Aurelius in the *Meditationes*, where the emperor acknowledges the need of free and frank speech (*Med.* 1.6). For Tiberius' attempt to bring the Senate back into the decision-making process and to force them to take part in the government, see Levick 1976, 75–77; Seager 1972, 129–131; Wiedemann 1996, 204–206.

controversial legislation, the senators would finally assume the role as the emperor's partners—but not his equals—ready to offer their support.

In his account of the imperial period, Dio shapes a narrative where competent emperors include the Senate or recognise the council's right to be heard and so play an active part in the decision-making process. Dio's account follows a narrative that is well known from the writing of ancient authors. Julio-Claudian emperors are criticised for ruling through fear and the terror of unpredictable persecutions.⁴¹ Vespasian, another civil war champion, is praised for bringing stability to a political system in crisis and for including the Senate in most of the decisions. The new emperor is said to have listened to the thoughts of others (even to the more unreasonable criticism) and is praised for putting an end to the *maiestas* trials, which his predecessors had used as a tool to suppress the Senate while the senators had used them as a means to promote themselves in the hope that they would win the emperor's gratitude.⁴² Elected by the Senate after the fall of Domitian and Rome's second dynasty, the old emperor is celebrated for having stabilised Rome when he appointed Trajan, another experienced and well tested senator, for ending a new period of political trials initiated by Domitian and, as we saw above, for always including the advice of his former peers. In Dio's version, it was under Nerva that Roman politics entered its golden age which was characterised by the practice of emperors adopting their successors among members of the Senate. He was the first to choose talent over family when he adopted Trajan, a man with Spanish ancestry, disregarding his own male relatives (Cass. Dio 68.4.1–2).

In this line of thought—even if it was an illusion—with the adoptive emperors the Senate was back at the centre of Roman politics; not in the same way as in Republican Rome, where the strongest members of the Senate competed for political influence, military commands, and glory to set themselves apart from their peers, but rather as a pool of talent from which the next emperor was selected. It is here, according to Dio, in the combination of a proven emperor who was chosen from among the most experienced senators and a monarchical form of government that the ideal constitution for Rome materialises. It should be underlined, however, that it was never the intention that the emperor was to share his powers with the Senate. They were his former peers and a council of experts who should be

⁴¹ For example, Tiberius' terrorising the Senate (Cass. Dio 57.11.6), Caligula's killing of senators (59.10.7), and Nero's brutality and general lack of interest in governing the empire (61.5.1).

⁴² For Vespasian's efforts to include the Senate see Cass. Dio 65.10.5; for his rejection of *maiestas* trials see Cass. Dio 66.19.1–2.

heard, but Dio's senate had no legislative powers or any means to challenge the emperor's decisions. That Dio believed ambition for power and prestige lay just below the surface, also in the case of the imperial Senate, is testified by the remark in book 52 where Maecenas suggests that the emperor select the magistrates precisely to avoid competition (Cass. Dio 52.20.1–3).

With the emperor as the absolute monarch it was his responsibility, as in the time of the kings, to include the senators in the decision-making process by listening to the advice and criticism they expressed freely without fear of being punished or prosecuted. As the senators had no power on their own, other than experience and wisdom, they were not to blame should emperors choose to ignore the senate and rule alone as tyrants supported by the army, their prefects, freedmen, other trustees or their ambitious mothers. It is interesting to note that Dio keeps the senators blameless every time there is a conflict between an emperor and the Senate. Dio rarely comments on Senate-meetings, nor offers detailed accounts of debates where the emperor and larger parts of the Senate profoundly disagreed. There are a few isolated references to senators who ask the emperor a question that could be interpreted as criticism. One example is the incident where Asinius Gallus questions Tiberius' proposal to divide the burden of the *princeps* in three parts: Rome and Italy, the legions, and the provinces, which is met with considerable opposition in the senate (Cass. Dio 57.2.5–7). Another example is when Helvidius Priscus goes up against Vespasian who ends up executing him. In Dio's version it is here Priscus not the emperor who is to blame for the course of events that finally forced Vespasian to impose the death sentence.⁴³

Conclusion

Dio is still seen as an author who reproduced the writings of earlier historians with no or only a few ideas of his own.⁴⁴ But it is no longer the consensus among Dio scholars that he was too occupied with the task it was to write Rome's history to fully understand the challenges

⁴³ On Tiberius' suggestion to share his powers and how Asinius Gallus questioned the sincerity of that proposal, see Cass. Dio 57.2.5–7. For Helvidius Priscus, Cass. Dio 65.12.2–3.

⁴⁴ For example, see Simons 2009, 303–304 for the view that Dio's perspective on the early Republic is drawn from Posidonius. For other recent studies in which Dio's *Roman History* is studied from the perspective of *Quellenforschung* see Foulon 2016; de Franchis 2016; Fromentin 2016.

Rome faced or to make his own analysis of why Roman history took the turns it did.⁴⁵ A more common approach is to see the historian as a product of his own time and the senatorial order of which he was an integrated member.⁴⁶ Dio wrote his Roman history in the shadow of the Severans, where the influence and the status of the Senate were threatened by a new dynasty that chose to rely on the support of the army. Troubled by a political reality where the army and the equestrians became increasingly prominent factors in Roman politics, Dio wrote a defence for the senatorial order by emphasising the importance of including the senators in the decision-making process as well as in the administration.⁴⁷

Like all other historians, Dio was a product of his time. His writing suggests that he felt threatened by the growing influence of the army and of the equestrian order, and the accession of Macrinus, Rome's equestrian emperor, marked an absolute low-point in the history of Rome (78.40–41). The Agrippa-Maecenas dialogue is therefore in many ways a text that challenges the political reality of Dio's time and the suggestion by Fergus Millar that it was read aloud, at least in part, at the court with Caracalla in the audience is tempting.⁴⁸

Now, much suggests that Dio had higher hopes with this writing than to defend the status and safety of the senators. There is a paradox in the way Dio promotes a form of constitution where the emperor is given unlimited power at a time where one emperor after another ruled without including the Senate. The praise of monarchy in book 52 in particular suggests that he was driven more by an overall conviction that monarchy was superior to other constitutions. He differs from commentators like Tacitus and Pliny, who advocate a form of government where the Senate was allowed more influence on affairs. Neither Pliny nor Tacitus seems to support a constitution under which the emperor chose the senators and the most influential magistrates. They both support the principate but emphasise that the Senate was to take real political responsibility. Pliny has Trajan encourage it and Tacitus describes the early second century as a moment of freedom, precisely because the Senate was

⁴⁵ *Contra* Millar 1964, 73.

⁴⁶ Again, see Millar 1964, 73–74. See also Reinhold 1988, 12–13; Murison 1999, 22–23. On the view that Dio is not simply writing history from the perspective of his own time, see Rich 1990, 14. See also Lindholmer 2016 106; Burden-Strevens 2015, 304–305; see also Reinhold & Swan 1990, 168–173.

⁴⁷ See Swan 2004, 5–7 for Dio's disapproval of the increasing influence of the equestrian order and the reign of Macrinus.

⁴⁸ Millar 1964, 104.

given the opportunity to interact politically.⁴⁹

Dio's criticism of the evolution of Roman politics during the Republican period contains profound scepticism about a system where an overly ambitious and very resourceful political elite was wealthy enough to meet the people's needs on their own and to raise armies in the pursuit of personal glory and prestige. Dio's coverage of the Senate illustrates that his perspective was one of a Roman senator. From Maecenas' suggestion that Augustus was to select the best men from all over the Empire, it could be understood that Dio had an eye for a more Greek form of monarchy where the monarch ruled with a court of advisors and trustees. Dio mentions the *concilium principis* in the narrative of imperial Rome but not as a better alternative or a more influential council than the full Senate. Members of the *concilium* were perhaps closer to the emperor and therefore more able to influence the emperor's decisions but in the material we have seen, they do not outrank the full Senate and, for that matter, do not seem to have been more privileged or more servile than the other senators. Dio does not promote or celebrate the formation of smaller councils, which would have been natural had he thought that selected advisors were to be preferred over a larger council, and he did not credit any of the emperors with seeking advice in smaller fora. Augustus' decision to form the *concilium principis* is treated in neutral terms and there is no praise for Septimius who even added Dio among his *amici*.⁵⁰

Dio's reservation towards Roman politics in the age of the Republic needs to be seen in the spirit of a profound scepticism towards democracy, which he, in the case of Rome, defines as a form of constitution where popular votes determine the election of magistrates and the passing of laws. To fulfil their ambitions, members of the political elite would need to secure popular support and follow a populist strategy such as when the Gracchi and Caesar proposed land reforms, when Marius reformed the army by promising land to his soldiers after demobilisation, or when Pompey worked closely with the people's tribunes to ensure that he would be given the commands he wanted. Like most other intellectuals, Dio was sceptical towards a form of constitution in which the people had the final say and questioned the elite's ability to remain modest; and he sees political strife, broken laws and civil wars as a natural consequence of free and unregulated competition. To make his point, Dio uses his *Roman History* to show that political ambitions and desire for glory and prestige were key but also destabilising components in political systems where access to power was decided by

⁴⁹ Pliny *Pan.* 2.3; Tac. *Hist.* 1.2; for discussion, see Madsen 2014, 26–28.

⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 53.21 and 74.2.3.

open competition, and he reminds his readers that unmanaged ambitions posed a constant threat to political stability—even in the imperial period when civil wars and politically-motivated murders of senators and emperors continued to threaten the existence of Rome and the Empire as a whole.

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THE 'GREAT MEN' OF THE MIDDLE REPUBLIC IN CASSIUS DIO'S
ROMAN HISTORY

Marianne Coudry

One of the stated aims of this collective work on Cassius Dio's first books, in particular those which describe the Early and Middle Republics, is to address their specific features, and ask whether they reveal an original representation of this period. In other words, to situate this section of Dio's work within the text of the *Roman History* as a whole as well as within the tradition of writing early Republican history. One possible means of inquiry may be to apply these questions to the "great men" of that period: Roman statesmen, magistrates, and generals who as conquerors or politicians played a part in its history. Are they depicted in a distinctive manner, contrasting with what can be observed in the preserved books? Or conversely, are the ways in which their actions are described and inserted into the narrative similar across diverse periods, and how can we relate these figures to the general interpretation of the history of Rome in which they appear?¹

Such a purpose may appear over-ambitious, considering the poor remains of these books, but a first look at the references collected in the index of the last volume of the Loeb Classical Library edition suggests that the material is not so meagre as to hinder this enquiry. The names of most of the great men of the Early and Middle Republic do appear, either in preserved fragments belonging to the Byzantine collections of *Excerpta* or in Zonaras' epitome, often in both.² Moreover, for some of them, the distinctive episodes of their lives recorded in these books of Dio, as testified by their remains, are not less numerous than those known from the rest of the tradition, as will be seen later in the case of Fabricius, for instance. Naturally, the results will be limited: the methods of literary analysis applied to the preserved books, which permit the identification of a wide range of devices used for character portrayal, cannot be valid for fragments and epitomes. However, identifying Dio's particular manner of associating characters with general ideas and historical analyses reveals possible

¹ For Dio's shaping of portraits in the preserved Republican books, see Coudry 2016b.

² Missing great men are very few: Horatius Cocles, Servilius Ahala, Valerius Corvus (but not Valerius Corvinus). As Christopher Mallan underlines in his contribution to this volume, some of the Byzantine authors of the tenth and eleventh centuries "were the heirs of the Roman exemplar-tradition" because of the resurgence of interest, at this time, in Regal and Republican Roman history.

and sometimes even significant similarities in such associations between the first fragmentary books and the subsequent preserved ones.

Before undertaking such a study, a look at Dio's use of *exempla* may be a rewarding initial approach in the round. In Greek and Roman culture, as we know, great men of the past were not half-forgotten figures from distant times, but familiar names present in everyday life, mainly to propose examples of good or bad behaviour to follow or to avoid. This occurred particularly in public life, where political discussions provided occasions for arguing in general terms and illustrating the point by recording the actions of some well-known figure of the past. Orators often made use of this device, called *exempla*; they were trained in schools of rhetoric, and had at their disposal written collections of stereotyped anecdotes, where they could find the right *exemplum* for the right occasion. Many of these, for instance, take place in Cicero's orations, and Cassius Dio, whose Republican and Augustan books include many discourses, naturally followed this widespread literary tradition.³

At first glance, this does not seem to deserve special attention: *exempla* are an ordinary feature of speeches. But, knowing how carefully Dio elaborated those pieces of oratory, which he located at precise moments of his narrative with the clear purpose of underlining in this manner some of the most important turning points of the Roman history, a closer examination is worthwhile. Actually, his use of *exempla* is often quite conventional: several great men are cited together in a very allusive way, and present a series obviously familiar to his audience, a technique exemplified also in Cicero's preserved speeches, from which the *exempla* are usually borrowed.⁴ These figures are generally taken from the remote past of Rome, that is the Regal Period or the beginnings of the Republic, like Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, Brutus, and Valerius Publicola. However, sometimes more recent ones are added from the Middle Republic and down to the end of the second century, like

³ The use of *exempla* happens, mostly, in the long speeches of Cicero to the senators, when he calls for concord after the Ides of March (44.23–33), and when he tries to unite them against Antony at the beginning of 43 BC (45.18–47), but also in Caesar's speech to quiet the senators' anxiety after his victory over the Pompeians at Thapsus in 46 BC (43.15–18), in Octavian's discourse pretending to lay down his powers in January 27 BC (53.3–10), and even in the dialogue between Cicero, driven to exile, and Philiscos in 58 BC (38.18–29) as well as in Agrippa and Maecenas' well-known speeches to Augustus in 29 BC (52.2–13 and 14–40). But Dio never produces *exempla* in the narrative or reflective parts of his *History*. They are strictly reserved for rhetorical contexts. On the use of *exempla* in Dio and other Greek historians see Gowing 2009, with n. 21 for Dio.

⁴ The best example is Cicero's speech in January 43 (45.32.1–4).

Regulus and other great generals. They are included to illustrate some commonplaces of political oratory, namely the hatred of kings,⁵ the tragic consequences of civil strife,⁶ or, more simply, Roman ancient virtues.⁷ But these speeches can also include *exempla* of a clearly different kind: then, the characters are not just names, related to conventional ideas; their actions are recollected and commented, obviously, to call forth more elaborate ideas. Moreover, they are gathered in series which, contrary to those mentioned above, are quite homogeneous. All belong to the period of the civil wars of the Late Republic, from Marius and Sulla down to Caesar and his murderers, and all are related to precise topics such as the effects of military victory in civil conflicts,⁸ the desire or refusal of sole power, or the dangers it entails.⁹ Here we can easily recognise some of Dio's favourite ideas which constitute the backbone of his interpretation of the passage from Republic to Empire. In other words, when Dio endeavours to formulate political analysis of his own, the actions of great men are the starting point of his reasoning, instead of the adornment of a *topos*: his use of *exempla* becomes less conventional, and departs from rhetorical habits.

This particular use of *exempla* also appears in a passage of Agrippa's speech to Augustus, often mentioned because it conveys one of the various formulations of Dio's interpretation of Caesar's murder and the rejection of his attempt at monarchical rule. But it comprises something more, and actually unusual in the *Roman History*: it puts side by side three characters belonging to widely different periods of the Roman Republic, Caesar, Scipio—the conqueror of Hannibal at the end of the third century—and Camillus, who stormed Veii and saved Rome from the Gauls at the beginning of the fourth century. All three are mentioned as examples of the inescapable fate in a democracy of great men who are believed to aspire to supreme power. Thus it provides an interesting insight into 1) Dio's general reflections about Rome's constitutional history, 2) the broad chronological perspective of his work, and 3) his use of characters to convey an understanding of his historiographical purpose. This text may be a convenient starting point for our study of great men in the Republican lost books.

⁵ 45.32.1–3.

⁶ For instance in Philiscos' consolation (38.27.3)

⁷ Octavian to the Senate (53.8.3).

⁸ Cicero after the Ides of March (44.28.1–3).

⁹ For instance in Maecenas' speech (52.17.3–4) or in Augustus' funeral oration (56.39.2).

A brief presentation of the passage will illuminate its originality. It mentions, first, two series of statesmen of the Late Republic who made opposite political choices, with opposite results:

τεκμήριον δέ, Μάριος μὲν καὶ Σύλλας καὶ Μέτελλος, καὶ Πομπήιος τὸ πρῶτον, ἐν κράτει τῶν πραγμάτων γενόμενοι οὔτ' ἠθέλησαν δυναστεῦσαι οὔτ' ἔπαθον παρὰ τοῦτο δεινὸν οὐδέν· Κίννας δὲ δὴ καὶ Στράβων, ὃ τε Μάριος ὁ ἕτερος καὶ ὁ Σερτώριος, ὃ τε Πομπήιος αὐτὸς μετὰ ταῦτα, τῆς δυναστείας ἐπιθυμήσαντες κακῶς ἀπώλοντο.

Marius and Sulla and Metellus¹⁰ and Pompey at first, when they got control of affairs, not only refused to assume sovereign power, but also escaped disaster thereby; whereas Cinna and Strabo,¹¹ the younger Marius and Sertorius and Pompey himself conceived a desire for supreme power and perished miserably (52.13.2).¹²

Here Dio makes a quite conventional use of *exempla*: names arranged in series and related to the topic in a schematic manner.¹³ Then comes Dio's explanation, formulated through a general rule:

δυσχερὲς γὰρ ἐστὶ τὴν πόλιν ταύτην, τοσοῦτοις τε ἔτεσι δεδημοκρατημένην καὶ τοσοῦτων ἀνθρώπων ἄρχουσαν, δουλεῦσαι τινὶ ἐθελῆσαι.

For it is a difficult matter to induce this city, which has enjoyed a democratic government for so many years and holds empire over so many people, to consent to become a slave to anyone (52.13.3).

¹⁰ Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, consul with Sulla in 80 BC.

¹¹ Cn. Pompeius Strabo, Pompeius Magnus' father, who fought Cinna and died in 87.

¹² The translations are those of the Loeb Classical Library with some minor emendations.

¹³ As for its structure, this passage is identical to the corresponding passage in Maecenas' speech, opposing two series of statesmen regarding the topic of the danger of giving up supreme power (52.17.3–4).

In other words, democracy and domination of a single man are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the three characters mentioned above, Camillus, Scipio and Caesar, are called upon with a precise commentary for each:

καὶ ἀκούεις μὲν ὅτι τὸν Κάμιλλον ὑπερώρισαν, ἐπειδὴ λευκοῖς ἵπποις 4 ἐς τὰ ἐπινίκια ἐχρήσατο, ἀκούεις δὲ ὅτι τὸν Σκιπίωνα κατέλυσαν, ἐπειδὴ τινα πλεονεξίαν αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν, μέμνησαι δὲ ὅπως τῷ πατρὶ σου προσηνέχθησαν, ὅτι τινὰ ὑποψίαν ἐς αὐτὸν μοναρχίας ἔσχον. καίτοι τούτων μὲν ἀμείνους ἄνδρες οὐδένες ἄλλοι γεγόνασιν.

You have heard how the people banished Camillus just because he used white horses for his triumph; you have heard how they deposed Scipio from power, first condemning him for some act of arrogance; and you remember how they proceeded against your father just because they conceived a suspicion that he desired to be sole ruler. Yet there have never been any better men than these (52.13.3–4).

The implication of this last part of the passage seems clear: although separated by numerous generations, Camillus, Scipio, and Caesar belong to the same category of statesmen; they made the same political mistake, and from that point of view the Middle and the Late Republic are not two different ages. The recurring problem of individuals suspected of desiring sole power, and the reactions it caused, mean that the Republican period is to be considered as a whole. Camillus and Scipio are clearly conceived as forerunners of Caesar.¹⁴

Such observations are an incitement to scrutinise the fragmentary part of the Republican books covering the Early and Middle Republic (books 3 to 24) and address two related questions: do the preserved passages concerning these two characters also allude to the broad topic of overly powerful individuals and democracy? Do they also underline the difficulty of accommodating and including these individuals in a democracy? In other words, do the passages give confirmation of what the above extract of Agrippa's speech clearly states? More widely, we should ask whether Dio's treatment of prominent magistrates and

¹⁴ In the different literary context of Philiscos' consolation, Camillus and Scipio are associated with Cicero by the Greek rhetor, to enhance the orator's voluntary exile (38.26.3). The same idea appears in 38.27.3.

generals' actions and behaviour—a subject which has been rather neglected—¹⁵reflects his historical analysis in that part of his *History* too. A brief inquiry into these earlier books already allows us to notice a contrast between (what appears to be) Dio's view of two categories of statesmen. On one side, a few figures—Camillus, Scipio Africanus, and also Fabricius—who seem to benefit from Dio's particular attention: they appear more frequently in the narrative and often with specific comments related to political and constitutional topics. On the other side, actors who make only episodic appearances without comments, and are merely allowed conventional portraits. Included in this group are Cato, Marcellus, Aemilius Paullus, Mummius, and even Scipio the younger.¹⁶

Of course, the fragmentary nature of these books and our dependence on Byzantine excerptors and epitomators, whose purposes were not the same as Dio's, point to frustrating limitations for this inquiry. One cannot exclude that the relative paucity of our information on these (apparently) backstage actors like Marcellus and some others does not reflect Dio's choices, and we may have a mistaken view of their importance in the original narrative. Consequently, our selection of the three prominent figures of Camillus, Fabricius and Scipio is intended rather as taking advantage of their wider occurrence in what remains of books 3–24 than asserting that Dio had a lesser interest in other figures.¹⁷ But it seems altogether worthwhile, moreover because Dio's narrative of early Rome differs in a number of passages from what we read in the rest of the tradition. This divergence is especially noticeable in the case of the three statesmen mentioned above. We may expect that it results from a deliberate choice of sources on the part of Dio, and reveals a particular interpretation of the behaviour of these statesmen.

For these reasons, I will focus on the specificities of Dio's presentation of these three great men so far as we can perceive them from what remains of those fragmentary books. That implies a selection from the material provided by the fragments and by Zonaras'

¹⁵ In recent studies about great men, what has been stressed is rather the historical and literary construction of their figures, and these inquiries have concerned mostly authors from the Republic and early Principate (Coudry & Späth 2001; Torregaray 1998; except Gowing 2009 who focuses on imperial Greek historiography. In studies about Cassius Dio, instead, statesmen have been considered as part of wider topics, mainly the place of oratory and its relation to narrative (Fechner 1986 on Fabricius' answer to king Pyrrhus, Kemezis 2014). Only Mallan 2014 provides a case study developed along the same lines as ours.

¹⁶ Although in his case our information is very meagre since we lack Zonaras' epitome and depend just on the fragments.

¹⁷ See Caire 2006 on the choices of the excerptors and Christopher Mallan's contribution in this volume.

epitome, putting aside all obviously factual mentions—that is, deprived of any comments or suggested significance—which would not be relevant for the perspective chosen here and which might blur the analysis.

Scipio Africanus

Scipio is far ahead of other statesmen in terms of frequency of appearance in Dio's *History*. Thus these instances provide a convenient springboard for exemplifying the various sorts of contexts in which prominent figures may occur in the books under scrutiny. The passages selected,¹⁸ excluding all those where Scipio is just a name,¹⁹ (all the events of his political and military career are actually mentioned more or less briefly in Dio's fragments or Zonaras' epitome)²⁰ can be divided into three groups: 1) Narrative passages where Scipio's actions are described in a quite neutral mode, for instance his negotiations with Carthage after Zama.²¹ These are to be found mostly in the *Excerpta de legationibus* and we will leave them aside because they appear as deprived of any suggested significance. 2) Narrative passages intending to exhibit the moral qualities of the character, for instance when describing Scipio's campaign in Spain, his behaviour towards the soldiers or the Celtiberian chiefs or his treatment of king Syphax when the latter has been defeated and captured. These passages, to be found—unsurprisingly—in the *Excerpta de virtutibus et vitiis*, are in some way an expansion of the portrait painted by Dio when introducing Scipio in the narrative of the Spanish war (F 57.38), when he is sent there to take over the army after his father's and uncle's deaths. 3) Passages describing political conflicts involving Scipio. These occur at three points: on the occasion of his planned landing in Africa directly from Spain (F 57.53–56); on the occasion of his stay in Sicily when he has been elected consul (in 205 BC) and instructed to cross to Africa (F 57.62); on the occasion of the trial involving first his brother Lucius and then himself, which he escaped by retiring to his Campanian villa at Liternum (F

¹⁸ See table 1, below: Scipio Africanus, occurrences.

¹⁹ An instance among many others is his embassy to Antiochos when the king harboured Hannibal (Zonar. 9.18.12–13)

²⁰ Selected for inclusion were even his first achievement (rescuing his father during the battle on the river Ticinus when still an *adulescens* at the beginning of the Hannibalic war) and his last (his retirement at Liternum). See references in Etcheto 2012, *Prosopographie*, n°12, 161–165.

²¹ F 57.82.

63). All these passages should be examined, because they provide comments on the reactions brought about by Scipio's behaviour, formulated in general terms and echoed in other parts of the *Roman History* where they surface again.

The most interesting of these three passages is the first one. It is the longest, part of the so-called *Paris fragments* which describe events of the years 207 to 200 BC,²² and its peculiarity has already been noticed because it provides an account which is clearly different from what we read in Polybius, Livy and Appian.²³

Σκιπίων δὲ ἐπειδὴ πάντα τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ Πυρηναίου τὰ μὲν βία, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὁμολογία προσεποιήσατο, τὸν στόλον τὸν ἐς τὴν Λιβύην ἡτοιμάζετο, οὐπὲρ αἰεὶ ἐφίετο· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καίτοι πολλῶν ἀντιλεγόντων ἐπετράπη τότε, καὶ τῷ Σύφακι συγγενέσθαι ἐκελεύσθη. κἂν ἐξείργαστό τι τοῦ φρονήματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἄξιον (ἢ γὰρ Καρχηδόνα εἶλεν ἂν τὸν πόλεμον αὐτῇ περιστήσας, ἢ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐξήγαγεν, ὅπερ ὕστερον ἔπραξεν), εἰ μὴ οἱ ἐν οἴκῳ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ μὲν φθόνῳ αὐτοῦ, τὰ δὲ καὶ φόβῳ ἐμποδῶν ἐγένοντο· τό τε γὰρ νέον πᾶν μειζόνων αἰεὶ ἐπορέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ κατορθοῦν πολλακίς ἄπληστον τῆς εὐπραγίας εἶναι νομίζοντες χαλεπώτατα ἂν ἠγοῦντο νεανίσκου ψυχὴν ἀυχήματι προ . . . (four lines wanting in Ms.) χ . . ρ οὐκ ἐκείνῳ πρὸς τε δυναστείαν καὶ δόξαν ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῖς πρὸς τε ἐλευθερίαν καὶ σωτηρίαν συμφέρη χρῆσθαι, κατέλυον αὐτόν, καὶ ὄν αὐτοὶ προῆγον ἐς τὰ πράγματα ἐν χρεῖα αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι, τοῦτον ἐθέλονται καθήρουν, ὅτι μειζῶν τῆς κοινῆς ἀσφαλείας ἐγεγόνει· καὶ τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅπως Καρχηδονίους παντελῶς δι' αὐτοῦ καταπολεμήσωσιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ ἑαυτοῖς τύραννον ἀθαιρέτον ἐπασκήσωσιν ἐσκόπουν. τῶν οὖν στρατηγῶν δύο αὐτῷ διαδόχους πέμπσαντες ἀνεκάλεσαν αὐτόν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπινίκια οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο οἱ, ὅτι ιδιώτης τε ὢν ἐστράτευτο καὶ ἐπ' οὐδεμιᾶς ἐννόμου ἡγεμονίας ἐξήταστο, βουῶς μέντοι ἑκατὸν λευκοῦς ἐν τῷ Καπιτωλίῳ θῦσαι καὶ πανήγυριν τινα ἐπιτελέσαι τὴν τε ὑπατείαν ἐς τὸ τρίτον ἔτος αἰτήσαι ἐπέτρεψαν· αἱ γὰρ ἐς νέωτα ἀρχαιρεσίαι νεωστὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν.

²² See Boissevain Vol. I, xxxv–xli and Cary's introduction to Dio's *Roman History* in the Loeb Classical Library collection Vol. 1, xix, xxviii.

²³ On this episode, see also Mads Lindholmer's contribution in this volume. Moscovich 1988 pointed out the peculiarity of this text and proposed to trace it back to Valerius Antias, following Klotz See also Zecchini 2002, 99–101. The most detailed study is to be found in Simons 2009, 222–240, who goes beyond the *Quellenforschung* perspective of his predecessors and, although his analyses are sometimes disputable, tries to reveal how Dio built his narrative according to his own idea of the function of jealousy in political events. For a wider appraisal of Dio's treatment of the Spanish campaigns of Scipio and their end, see Rich 2016.

F 57.53. [...] Scipio, after winning over the whole territory south of the Pyrenees, partly by force and partly by capitulation, was preparing for the expedition to Africa, which had always been his goal; for this campaign had now (τότε) been entrusted to him, in spite of much opposition (πολλῶν ἀντιλεγόντων), with instructions to join Syphax. **54.** And he would certainly have accomplished something worthy of his intelligence (τι τοῦ φρονήματος ἄξιον)—either bringing the war home to the gates of Carthage and capturing the place, or drawing Hannibal away from Italy, as he later did—had not the Romans at home, through jealousy (φθόνῳ αὐτοῦ) and through fear (φόβῳ) of him, stood in his way. They reflected that youth without exception is always reaching out after greater things and that good fortune is often insatiate of success, and thought that it would be very difficult for a youthful spirit through self-confidence [four lines lost in Ms.] **55.** [...] to treat [him in such wise]²⁴ as would conduce not to his power and fame (δυναστείαν καὶ δόξαν), but to their own liberty and safety (ἐλευθερίαν καὶ σωτηρίαν), they dismissed him (κατέλθον). Thus, the man whom they themselves had put in charge of affairs when they stood in need of him, they now of their own accord removed because he had become too great for the public safety (μείζων τῆς κοινῆς ἀσφαλείας). They were no longer considering how they might utterly vanquish the Carthaginians with his aid, but only how they might escape training up for themselves a self-chosen tyrant (τύραννον αὐθαίρετον). **56.** So they sent two of the praetors to relieve him and called him home. Moreover, they did not vote him a triumph, because he had conducted the campaign as a private individual (ιδιώτης), not having been appointed to any legal command (οὐδεμίας ἐννόμου ἡγεμονίας); but they allowed him to sacrifice a hundred white oxen upon the Capitol, to celebrate a festival, and to canvass for the consulship for the second year following (since the elections for the next year had recently been held).

Summing up very briefly, this passage provides, on the one hand, factual information: Scipio, having conquered the whole Spanish territory, is preparing an assault on Africa but the Romans (that means the Senate) dismiss him,²⁵ call him back to Rome and send two

²⁵ As Zonaras tells it, they depose him from his command (9.11.4: ὁ μὲν οὕτω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπαύθη).

magistrates to relieve him.²⁶ On the other, it provides a detailed explanation: they fear that he might become politically dangerous and give priority to their own preservation, as if he were threatening the city itself. Nothing of this sort appears in Polybius', Livy's and Appian's narratives: they present Scipio's return to Rome in a much more peaceful mode, omitting any such controversy,²⁷ and they record only the meeting of the Senate where Scipio was given audience when he arrived in Rome, as does Cassius Dio too a little further on (end of § 56).

Moreover, all of the passage reveals special care to literary presentation, contrasting with the style of the rest of the narrative. By recurring remarks, the construction underlines the stubborn opposition of the senators, suggesting how far this opposition is misguided. Dio firstly contrasts their decision to recall Scipio, and thereby to impede his landing in Africa, with their previous resolution, although hotly discussed, to entrust this campaign to him (end of §53 and again middle of §55). Thus their contradictory or at least fluctuating guidance is made manifest. Then he contrasts the recall of Scipio with the chances of success of his enterprise which could have driven Hannibal out of Italy and resulted in definitive victory over Carthage, as happened later (beginning of §54). So, in Dio's view, recalling Scipio appears inadequate and, ultimately, it is the wrong decision. Equally noticeable is the use of a clearly rhetorical mode of expression to present the objections to Scipio's design. The words "They reflected that..." which introduce the arguments either allude to a speech or speeches actually delivered in the Senate or are only to be taken as a literary device intended to warn the reader of the issue at stake, and give appropriate weight to the ideas expressed.

The next step is to elucidate Dio's aims in this passage, in particular by noticing that it focuses on two aspects of Scipio's Spanish command, namely its institutional character and the controversies which it repeatedly caused, and that these topics also surface in other passages of his narrative of Scipio's career. Dio's particular interest in the status of Scipio's Spanish command is clearly attested: twice he underlines that it was not a regular one, using in both passages the same expression, *ennomos hegemonia*, which refers to constitutional legality. The first example is when he reports Scipio's arrival in Spain to take up the war: "Scipio, although he did not receive the regular title of commander (μη ἐννόμου ἡγεμονίας λαβὼν ὄνομα) at the time of his election ..." (F 57.40). The second instance is when Dio mentions that on coming back to Rome, Scipio was refused a triumph due to the irregularity

²⁶ In Zonaras' words: δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν διαδόχους αὐτῶι πέμψαντες (9.11.3).

²⁷ Consequently, Moscovich 1988 dismissed Dio's account as "unlikely"; Zecchini 2002 instead used it to confirm his view of Scipio's actions in Spain.

of his command: “they did not vote him a triumph, because he had conducted the campaign as a private individual (ιδιώτης), not having been appointed to a regular command (οὐδεμίαν ἐννόμου ἡγεμονίας)” (F 57.56).²⁸ Dio then adds, in relation to the meeting of the Senate which denied the triumph, information not to be found in other sources, namely that Scipio was allowed to canvass for the consulship (probably with an error regarding the year of his candidacy). This may be understood as revealing Dio’s particular attention to the return to normal constitutional practice in matters of *imperium* concerning Scipio.²⁹

Equally revealing is the attention given to the controversies which occur several times in connection with the task entrusted to Scipio at different moments of the Hannibalic War. Already his appointment to the Spanish command by popular vote in 211 BC, when he was not even 24 years old and had previously held only the office of *aedilis*, arouses division: Zonaras records that Scipio “was chosen at once, but not long afterward they regretted their action because of his youth (he was in his twenty-fourth year) and also because his house was in mourning for the loss of his father and uncle”. Then, by a speech delivered to the people, “he put the senators to shame, so that he was not deprived of the command, although Marcus Iunius, an elderly man, was sent with him” (Zonar. 9.7.4). It is clear from Zonaras’ epitome that in Dio’s eyes the controversy was instigated by the senators, who wished to nullify the popular vote. Livy, instead, who records the same events, only mentions anxiety among the citizens as a reason for Scipio’s speech and the renewed enthusiasm that it achieved (26.18.10–19.1).³⁰ The second conflict mentioned by Dio arises from Scipio landing in Africa

²⁸ What Dio probably means here is that Scipio’s command, his *imperium*, was not achieved through a regular magistracy. See next note.

²⁹ The *imperium* Scipio held during his Spanish campaign did not result from election to a magistracy with *imperium*, i.e. praetorship or consulship, but from a law voted by the *comitia centuriata* in 211 BC (Liv. 26.18.4; 18.9). When he came back in 206 he was denied a triumph on that ground: only promagistrates who had previously been elected to a regular magistracy with *imperium* were usually granted this honour, until Pompey in 81/80. On the way Dio presents that point here, see Vervaeke 2014, 103–104.

³⁰ The fragment F 70.2–3, which comes from a speech, should probably be inserted in this context. Boissevain I, 313, (followed by Cary, II, 389, n. 1), not without hesitation, assigned the fragment to book 21, connecting it to Scipio Aemilianus’ election to the consulship for 147 BC. The orator vigorously asserts that young men of high spirit must not be discouraged from “looking for both honours and offices even before they reach old age”, and that commands should be conferred on any citizen on the basis of “innate excellence”. Such arguments fit much better with the appointment of Scipio Africanus to the Spanish command in 211 BC, as is also asserted in this volume by John Rich - to whom I address my acknowledgements for the discussions we had on that matter.

directly from his conquests in Spain: “This campaign had now (τότε) been entrusted to him, in spite of much opposition (πολλῶν ἀντιλεγόντων)” (F 57.53). This controversial decision, which Dio records at the beginning of the long passage cited above where he gives voice to the arguments of the senators who cancelled it and, putting an end to Scipio’s command, summoned him back to Rome, is otherwise unattested. But, even if dubious, it shows Dio’s concern for this topic. Well-known, instead, are the contests between Scipio and his opponents at the beginning of his consulate in 205 BC. These started when his project of landing in Africa from Sicily was hotly debated in the Senate where Fabius Maximus vigorously opposed it. Livy provides the fullest account of the very famous speeches uttered for and against this plan (28.40–44). Zonaras does not mention them, nor is any fragment preserved, which makes their presence in Dio’s narrative questionable—we will come back to this point later on. But a short indication in Zonaras’ epitome about the resources given to Scipio for his campaign is highly revealing: “He received neither an army of any account nor any allowance for triremes, owing to the jealousy aroused by his excellence (δία τὰς ἀριστείας φθονούμενος)” (9.11.6). Here again, it seems that Dio followed a tradition which insisted on the reluctance among the senators to support Scipio’s plans. Livy’s account is far from such an abrupt affirmation: he only mentions the number of war ships gathered by Scipio and his appeal to volunteers for the army (28.45.8; 13–21), hereby alluding only indirectly to the paucity of military means supplied by the Senate. The second contest between Scipio and his political opponents, also fully treated by Livy (29.19.3–20.10), is the violent reaction of Scipio’s adversaries in Rome due to his management of the scandal that occurred in Locri, because of the wrongdoings of his lieutenant Pleminius, and because of his pretended “Greek” behaviour. This results in a subsequent proposal to recall Scipio and deprive him of his command. It is reported by Dio who, significantly, stresses the motives behind these attacks: “It was principally at the instigation of men who all along had been jealous of him (φθονοῦντων) that they wished to summon him” (F 57.62).

These different events surrounding Scipio’s command in Spain and then in Sicily were recorded rather briefly in Dio’s *History*, as far as we can see, but with a strikingly repeated focus: jealousy and envy as the motive of his political enemies’ moves. The topic appears again when Dio relates the famous trials which involved both Scipio and his brother Lucius more than fifteen years later and put an end to Scipio’s political career. Dio clearly

For a detailed examination of the three possible contexts, see Moscovich 1992, whose choice of 206 BC is less convincing—as Urso 2013, 7, n. 1, also judges.

ascribes the conviction of Scipio to this motive of jealousy, although he underlines that he himself considers the Scipios innocent from the charges: “Many were jealous (ἐφθόνου) of the Scipios because the two brothers, distinguished alike for birth and integrity (γένους τε καὶ ἀρετῆς), had accomplished all that has been related and had secured such titles (ἐπικλήσεις). For that they were guilty of no wrong-doing is made plain even by my former statements, and was shown still more conclusively” (F 63).

So it appears that Dio, in all these passages describing the conflicts arising at every step of the public life of Scipio, was aware of a strand in the tradition which stressed on one side his monarchical behaviour,³¹ his arrogance, his so-called tyrannical aspirations and the threat it posed to the *res publica*, “a stock set of anti-Scipionic themes raised again and again during Scipio’s long career”,³² and on the other side the *invidia* it caused among his opponents.³³ But Dio insists mostly on this second topic and never criticises Scipio’s behaviour. His main concern seems to be the reactions of senators to Scipio’s outstanding excellence.

Our last step, with the aim of bringing out the coherence of Dio’s thought throughout his *History*, is to look for occurrences of the same topics—aspiration to political domination, exceedingly powerful statesmen in a democracy, jealousy and envy as a response—in other parts of it. A convenient means of doing this may be to locate other mentions of the words related to these topics and present in the set of texts we have collected about Scipio, like *dynasteia*, *tyrannos* and *phthonos*. As such an inquiry has already been conducted by other scholars,³⁴ it will suffice to briefly underline the most relevant results. *Dunasteia*, when used in connection with a particular person, occurs only in the narrative of the period beginning with the Gracchi and in moments of deep political conflict. It is applied to Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, Livius Drusus, Sulla, Marius, Pompeius Strabo and Cinna, Pompey and Caesar, and the triumvirs. This pattern is not a surprise, as one original feature of Dio’s political vocabulary consists in using the word to qualify the period itself as a regime where the

³¹ On this topic, see Martin 1994, 142–145, who heavily relies on Livy, and Etcheto 2012, 121–125, who is mostly interested in finding signs of contemporary controversy about Scipio’s aspiration to sole power. Neither takes into account Dio’s interpretation.

³² As Moscovich 1988, 109 convincingly argued.

³³ A recurrent topic in Livy’s narrative too, as Etcheto 2012 noticed, 124, n. 58. On the origin of this topic, see Torregaray 1998, 177–187.

³⁴ By Fechner 1986, 161–162 for *dunasteia*; Freyburger 1997, 133–136 for *tyrannos*; and Simons 2009, 228, n. 83 and Burden-Strevens 2016 for *phthonos*.

domination of one or a few statesmen prevents the regular democratic rules from operating.³⁵ What is more unexpected is to find *dunasteia* applied to Scipio in a supposed controversy from the end of the third century BC. *Tyrannos*, when it does not describe the last king of Rome, Tarquinius, is used in polemic contexts: when Pompey and Caesar accuse each other of oppressing the Romans; when Caesar, after his last victory over the Pompeians in Spain, promises to the senators not to behave like Marius and in Cicero's and Fufius Calenus' mouths in January 43, referring to Caesar and Mark Antony. As noticed for *dunasteia*, for the Senate to apply the label *tyrannos* to Scipio in the account of his successes in Spain and expedition to Africa is an exception in Dio's work. *Phthonos*, when used in a Roman context, appears mostly in connection with Pompey and Caesar as an inescapable effect of their excess of power. But it also occurs, although scarcely, in relation to a few other figures in the fragmentary books: remarkably, 3 out of the 8 occurrences concern Scipio.

So, by broadening our investigation through Dio's vocabulary, we find parallels between this very peculiar passage describing the fears which Scipio's project of attacking Africa directly from Spain raised among the senators and evocations of deep conflict due to exceedingly powerful statesmen of the Late Republic accused of oppressing their fellow citizens and imperilling democracy. Strikingly, for instance, Scipio's command in these fragmentary books is presented in the same light as Pompey's is in the debate of 67 BC about the *lex Gabinia*.³⁶ Against that background, it cannot be doubted that Dio's intention was to shape this controversy of 206 BC as an anticipation of those which occurred repeatedly at the end of the Republic when extraordinary commands made some *imperatores* so powerful that they were perceived as a threat to the political system.

That does not mean, however, that he actually considered Scipio as a potential dynast. Never does Dio suggest that Scipio possessed an unlimited ambition (*epithumia*), as he regularly does for Pompey, Caesar or Octavian, and he portrays Scipio in positive terms as we saw in his record of the latter's trial (F 63) and in Agrippa's speech (52.13.4). It must be noticed too that the figure of Scipio is used in a rather impersonal mode: the conflict described in these passages is not treated as political rivalry, and Fabius Maximus, whom Livy puts in the limelight, seems absent from Dio's narrative. The point is not, in fact, Dio's appreciation of Scipio himself, but rather his interest in political reflection. He seems to have

³⁵ For modern discussions of the matter, see Kemezis 2014, 107–110, and most recently the Ph.D thesis of Christopher Burden-Strevens in 2015 and thesis of Mads Lindholmer in 2016.

³⁶ See Coudry 2016a.

deliberately utilised this event to articulate fundamental questions about the control of the authorities at home over generals fighting abroad and about the political stability of the Republican constitution.

This concern with the Roman *politeia* explains why he chose, among his sources, authors who described this controversy which was neglected by Livy. They provided material for his own reflection. It may even be suggested that he used in this passage a literary device to be found in other parts of his *History*: to locate a debate at the moment when a question of some kind is discussed for the first time and later to record only briefly subsequent debates on the same issue or even to omit them. We noticed above that the senatorial debate of the beginning of 205 BC about Scipio's project of landing in Africa, so extensively treated by Livy, does not appear in what remains of Dio and Zonaras.³⁷ This is how Dio manages his narrative about extraordinary commands at the end of the Republic: allowing plentiful space to the debate surrounding Pompey's command against the pirates in 67 BC, but giving only concise information about the other commands successively allocated to Pompey, Caesar and the triumvirs during the civil wars, which were no less hotly debated as we know from other sources.³⁸ Here, Scipio's project to cross directly to Africa from Spain, which he had just brilliantly subdued, provides the appropriate circumstance for introducing, and expounding with appropriate literary elaboration, a controversy about its political and constitutional implications, as they were supposedly conceived by the senators at Rome.³⁹

To sum up: this quite singular passage of Dio's *History*, describing a violent controversy springing up at Rome due to Scipio's project to cross directly from Spain to Africa, which resulted in the abolition of his command, clearly appears to illustrate Dio's particular manner of writing history. It seems that he picked up, among different episodes of harsh conflicts concerning Scipio's political position during and after the Hannibalic War, this one which was neglected by most of the authors writing before him. It further seems that Dio used this episode as an opportunity to present, in the shape of arguments from Scipio's opponents, his own ideas about the dangers of commands conferred by extraordinary

³⁷ Although we cannot exclude the possibility that it was mentioned by Dio but omitted by Zonaras. For a comparison between Dio and other authors concerning the narrative of political conflicts surrounding Scipio, see table 4 below: Cassius Dio and the tradition on Scipio Africanus' *dunasteia*.

³⁸ See Bertrand & Coudry 2016.

³⁹ It is worth noting that Agrippa's reference, in the passage cited above where he puts Camillus, Scipio and Caesar side by side as they all pay for their supposed aspiration to supreme power, is precisely to this event.

processes for the stability of the political system. This is a device he uses in other parts of his narrative for the same purpose, which reveals the recurrence of political topics of this kind throughout his account of the Roman Republic as a whole. The figure of Scipio is used mostly to bring to light a structural feature of Republican regime, not to eulogise his achievements, and the insistence on his personal qualities, such as his *arete*, is devised mainly to enhance the point, not to make him an example to imitate.

Camillus

Camillus is not allowed a position as important as Scipio's in Dio's *History*, at least as far as the preservation of the text suggests.⁴⁰ But in fact, the relative paucity of preserved passages may be primarily a result of Dio's own more selective treatment in his books covering the 4th century. As established recently by John Rich,⁴¹ for the period running from 443 BC—the institution of the censorship—to the 3rd Samnite War, Dio's narrative seems to have been organised not along an annalistic scheme with a year by year record but around a few famous episodes. Concerning Camillus, these are, in particular, the war against Veii and the Falisci, the Gallic sack and the Licinio-Sextian agitation. However, though the narrative is far more abridged concerning Camillus than it was for Scipio, almost all the main events of his career are mentioned—the exceptions are probably deliberate, as we shall see.⁴²

When reviewing all these passages in order to estimate whether Dio's account is consistent with the main lines of the tradition about Camillus or not,⁴³ a rather clear division can be observed. In one group, that is those passages concerning the first half of his career (ending with the recovering of Sutrium from the Etruscans in 389 BC), Camillus appears on the front stage and his actions are described as provoking either admiration or criticism. This is attested in a number of fragments, mainly from the *Excerpta de virtutibus et vitiis*. But in

⁴⁰ A crucial fact to be noted is that Zonaras borrowed much material from Plutarch's *Life of Camillus* for his narrative and detecting where he is indebted to Dio is therefore difficult. This has been attempted with different results: see Boissevain and most recently Bellissime forthcoming.

⁴¹ Rich 2016, 279.

⁴² On the specificities of Camillus' figure, its historical basis and its construction along the evolution of Rome's history, see Martin 1982, 360–378, and the three contributions of M. Coudry, Th. Späth and J. von Ungern-Sternberg in Coudry & Späth 2001.

⁴³ This has been attempted in a brief article by Schettino 2006 and more extensively in Gowing 2009.

the other group of passages, relating to his subsequent career, the narrative focuses not on Camillus but on others, namely Manlius Capitolinus, Manlius Torquatus, and Licinius Stolo. Rather strangely, Camillus appears a second-rank character, and we know of his presence only through Zonaras' epitome, as if the excerptors were no longer interested in his actions.⁴⁴ This surprising contrast between two clearly different kinds of passages requires an explanation, to which I will return after a closer scrutiny to appraise what part of the tradition Dio's narrative seems to follow in each passage.⁴⁵

In the first group, five episodes are included. First, the capture in 396 BC by Camillus as dictator for the first time, of Veii, the powerful Etruscan city which resisted Rome's assaults for 10 years—according to tradition—which ended with Camillus setting apart a tenth of the (enormous) booty and receiving the triumph. Zonaras concludes: “Now the people became indignant and angry at Camillus (τῶι δὲ Καμίλλῳ προσώχθισεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἐνεμέσησε), partly because he had set aside the tenth of the booty for the god, not at the time of its capture, but after a considerable interval, and partly because he not only celebrated his triumph with great magnificence generally, but was the first Roman to parade with a team of four white horses” (Zonar. 7.21.3). Here Zonaras' account does not differ from Livy's and Plutarch's—the most detailed narratives we have—but it stresses more insistently the unpopularity of Camillus due to these actions,⁴⁶ and Dio places precisely at this point his long excursus on the Roman triumph, the last of the series of institutional developments which were inserted in the narrative of the beginnings of the Republic. Other Greek authors used the same device to describe the peculiarities of the triumph, but with different choices of generals: Romulus for Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Scipio for Appian, and Marcellus for Plutarch.⁴⁷ The reasons for Dio's specific choice will be discussed shortly.

The second episode including Camillus is the surrender of Falerii in 394 BC, resulting from Camillus' famous refusal of the proposition of its schoolmaster to betray his city to the Romans (F 24.2–3). Here Dio's account, preserved in a long fragment, is not original:

⁴⁴ See table 2 below: Camillus, occurrences.

⁴⁵ The comparison will be conducted principally with continuous narratives such as those of Livy and Plutarch. Diodorus or Dionysius of Halicarnassus often present different strands of the tradition which are not easy to estimate.

⁴⁶ Cf. Liv. 5.23.5–6 (triumph), 23.11 (a tenth of the booty); Plut. *Cam.* 7.1 (triumph), 7.6 and 8.2 (a tenth of the booty). Zonaras gives a very abridged version which preserves precisely the idea of unpopularity.

⁴⁷ Actually describing *ovatio*, not triumph. On this set of texts, see Itgenshorst 2005, 14–21.

following the tradition, he presents Camillus' actions very positively as embodying Roman virtues and the Faliscans as yielding to his justice. It is worth noticing that this benevolent attitude is ascribed to Rome's enemy and contrasts with the feelings of Camillus' fellow citizens.

The third episode brings us back to the Roman scene. It is the trial and voluntary exile of Camillus in 391 BC, which was generally recorded in the tradition but often in divergent ways, in particular regarding the indictment. This episode is presented by Dio with valuable information, but, again, with a heavier insistence upon Camillus' unpopularity and political isolation than other sources. This tone appears in the two preserved fragments, which, interestingly, belong to two different collections.⁴⁸ The text preserved in the *Excerpta de virtutibus et vitiis* offers a rather succinct formulation: "Accordingly, Camillus became on this account an object of even greater jealousy (ἐπιφθονώτερος) to the citizens (τοῖς πολίταις), and he was indicted by the tribunes on the charge of not having benefited the public treasury with the plunder of Veii; but before the trial he voluntarily withdrew" (F 24.4). In the *Excerpta de sententiis* the fragment preserved provides much more precise information, some of which appears nowhere else in our sources: "To such a degree did not only the populace (τὸ πλῆθος) and all those who were somewhat jealous of his reputation (οὐδ' ὅσοι φιλοτιμίαν τινὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀξίωσιν αὐτοῦ εἶχον), but even his best friends and his relatives (φίλοι συγγενεῖς τε), feel envy (ἐβάσκαινον) toward him that they did not even attempt to hide it" (F 24.6). The version of these events which is closest to Dio's is to be found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (13.5), who insists on the ill will of the tribunes, but not at all on the jealousy of Camillus' circle of friends and clients. As for Plutarch, he repeatedly insists on the hostility aroused by Camillus' behaviour among the *demos*, but not among all the citizens.⁴⁹

The fourth episode, Camillus' return one year later when recalled to expel the Gauls from Rome, is not presented by Dio in an original mode: "This same man, when urged to let the leadership (ἡγεμονίαν) be entrusted to him, would not allow it, because he was an exile and could not take the position according to time honoured usage (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια)" (F 25.7). Some other authors, too, insist on Camillus' desire to be chosen as a dictator only if legal

⁴⁸ See the remarks of Caire 2006, 99.

⁴⁹ *Cam.* 7.6; 8.2; 11.1–2; 12.2 and 4.

forms were respected,⁵⁰ but the very special formulation of this idea by Dio, at the end of the fragment, must be underlined: “He showed himself so law-abiding and scrupulous (νόμιμος ἀκριβής) a man that in so great a danger to his native land he made duty a matter of earnest thought and was unwilling to hand down to posterity the example of an illegal act (παράδειγμα... παρανομίας)” (F 25.7). This image of a great man consciously wishing not to be an *exemplum* of misconduct for posterity is a beautiful case of literary reconstruction of the past.

The fifth and last episode, Camillus’ restoration of Sutrium in 389 BC to its inhabitants after it had been captured by the Etruscans the same day and his subsequent triumph, about which traditions are rather discordant,⁵¹ is briefly treated by Zonaras who, seemingly always attentive to Camillus’ popular standing, only notes: “He celebrated a triumph and was exalted to great honour (μέγα δόξης)” (7.23.9).

Therefore, from the capture of Veii in 396 BC to the victory at Sutrium in 389 BC, Dio’s account remains very close to the traditional record, but repeatedly underlines the fluctuations of Camillus’ popularity according to his actions. The focus is on his relation to his fellow-citizens in circumstances which placed him at the front stage of public life.

The second group of passages shows quite the opposite: Camillus is no longer the target of violent criticism and gradually ceases to be under the spotlight.⁵² That probably explains why we can only read these passages in Zonaras’ epitome: the excerptors probably found no proper passages that could be selected. But at the same time, Dio’s account radically deviates from the tradition on important points.⁵³

Already Zonaras’ record of the liberation of Rome from the Gauls is emblematic of this change: Camillus’ actions, his confrontation with Brennus, his victory over the Gauls, and his triumph are described rather flatly without any commentary, unlike Plutarch’s

⁵⁰ Livy (5.47.7–11) focuses on the institutional question while Valerius Maximus (4.1.2) and Plutarch (*Cam.* 24.3–4) eulogise Camillus’ *moderatio*.

⁵¹ Diodorus’ account testifies to divergent traditions, one telling that the tribunes, moved by envy, prevented Camillus’ triumphal celebration, another that he celebrated a triumph with white horses and was later inflicted a heavy fine for this (14.117.6). Livy makes no comment (6.4.1) and Plutarch writes that this triumph brought Camillus as much popularity and glory as the two previous ones (*Cam.* 36.1).

⁵² On that particular point, I disagree with the view of Schettino 2006, 66–68, that Camillus is a central figure of book 7.

⁵³ See the review of these discrepancies in Urso 2016, 147–149, with previous bibliography.

account.⁵⁴ Although it proves difficult to assert what part exactly of the epitome is to be referred to Dio,⁵⁵ it seems that Camillus' character was no longer given the same prominence as before in Dio's narrative. Moreover, Camillus is not involved at all in Zonaras' text in the question of leaving Rome for Veii or not, which is, in a large part of the tradition, one of the important occasions for Camillus to show his patriotism. This may appear as a deliberate choice of Dio not to follow Livy and the trend which tended to present Camillus as a proto-Augustus.⁵⁶

This happens again regarding the context and chronology of Camillus' fourth and fifth dictatorships. The fourth dictatorship is, in Dio's account, linked to Manlius Capitolinus' attempt to exercise tyranny, but in a quite vague manner: having recorded how Capitolinus and the populace seized the Capitol, Dio proceeds: "As a result, Camillus was chosen dictator for the fourth time" (Zonar. 7.23.10). This contrasts with Livy's and Plutarch's narratives: both ascertain that Capitolinus' motive was envy towards Camillus' glory (Liv. 6.11.3–6; Plut., *Cam.* 36.2–3), and ascribe Camillus' fourth dictatorship to 368 BC, 16 years later than Dio, when Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius were fighting for their political reforms. As for Camillus' actions against Manlius Capitolinus, Zonaras describes them without any comment in a very factual manner. Camillus' fifth dictatorship is correctly placed in 367 BC by Dio and associated with a sudden attack from the Gauls, but again discrepancies can be noticed. In Dio's account, Torquatus' duel happened at that moment, a tradition rejected by Livy.⁵⁷ And, more importantly, Camillus is not involved in the end of the conflict between the two tribunes, Licinius and Sextius, and the patricians (Zonar. 7.24.10–12). The same is to be found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' and Livy's narratives, but in Plutarch's biography Camillus brings back *concordia* between patricians and plebeians. So, the end of the career of Camillus is recorded by Dio in a mode that is very different from the beginning as well as from the other literary accounts.

How can these peculiarities be explained? The first important point to stress is that in Dio's narrative, the political figure of Camillus is emphasised, whereas the military figure is almost disregarded, although his victories are mentioned up to the end of his career. Obviously, Camillus as a brilliant general and saviour of Rome in time of war and distress

⁵⁴ For instance regarding the triumph: *Cam.* 30.2–3.

⁵⁵ See the differences between Boissevain's and Bellissime's edition of Zonaras.

⁵⁶ On all this, see Schettino 2006, 70, with previous bibliography.

⁵⁷ As being Claudius Quadrigarius' version which Livy presents as marginal: Liv. 6.42.5.

was not a matter of interest for Dio. More precisely, this military aspect is presented in a specific context: in the framework of the rules of the triumph, a celebration precisely designed to publicise the political results of military success. We have already noticed that among the Greek-speaking authors, Dio alone inserted a general presentation of the Roman triumph in connection with Camillus (Zonar. 7.21.4–11). Moreover, his excursus clearly contrasts with those found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and Appian in matters of length, of abundance and comprehensiveness of information, and of space allowed to institutional matters.⁵⁸ Like his excursuses on magistracies, this one also ends with a brief account of the subsequent evolution of the triumph until the end of the Republic: “Such were the triumphs in olden times; but civil strife and domination of a few (αἱ δὲ στάσεις αἱ τε δυναστεῖαι) effected many changes in them” (7.21.11).⁵⁹ The negative tone of this conclusion is strikingly coherent with a wide range of remarks inserted by Dio here and there in his narrative of the Republic, which aim to stress all the deviations of triumphal celebrations from legal precedent that occurred at different moments. Camillus’ triumph after the capture of Veii, recorded just before the excursus, was in Dio’s eyes one remarkable step in this long process of growing neglect of traditional rules: he was “the first Roman to parade with a team of four white horses” (Zonar. 7.21.3), which is presented in Agrippa’s speech, as we saw, as the reason for his banishment (52.13.3). As Carsten Hjort Lange has demonstrated, many other steps are pointed out in Dio’s narrative before the innovations of the Late Republic, and they reveal, in a wider perspective, “the problematic triumphal history of Rome”.⁶⁰ In this context, Caesar’s triumph of 46 BC appears as a turning point, foreshadowing the disappearance of the Republican triumph. Several passages from the preserved books mention decrees of the Senate awarding various triumphal privileges to Caesar after his final victory over the Pompeians at Thapsus, which were increasingly excessive (42.20.5; 43.14.3; 44.4.2–3), and hereby recall the final remark of Zonaras’ excursus: civil strife and the domination of a few—now reduced to the one single man who defeated his rivals—deeply affected the traditional triumph. The question of the white horses was but one of the

⁵⁸ All these peculiarities have been underlined in Lange 2016—the first study, since Ehlers 1939, to give Dio-Zonaras’ excursus its due place in our information about the Roman triumph, and considering it in relation to Dio’s whole narrative of the Republic and Empire. The other ancient authors are more interested in the triumphal *pompe*. As for Valerius Maximus’ well-known chapter ‘*De iure triumphi*’ (2.8), it is partly unreliable and its scope is limited.

⁵⁹ Translation by author.

⁶⁰ Lange 2016, 7.

encroachments upon Republican practice and does not seem to have attracted much attention during the Caesarian celebration itself; but Dio probably underlines this feature because of its regal and tyrannical associations⁶¹ (which, in Agrippa's speech, fit both Camillus and Caesar), and because it seems to have become an ordinary practice from Augustus' time onwards.⁶²

Now, if we sum up our previous observations, we may suggest that regarding Camillus, Dio primarily focused on the relation between an outstanding personality and his fellow citizens, the question in the background being his acceptance of the traditional rules of the political system, which he defied by his first triumph with white horses and his strange management of booty. That might explain why the events of his career are presented in two very different sequences: first, his glory, spoiled by growing unpopularity and ending in trial and exile; then his recall, respectful of legal conditions, opening a sequence of trustful relations where he becomes a protection against the threat of the dreadful political ambition of Manlius Capitolinus. This schematic organisation of Camillus' portrayal is clearly borrowed from Plutarch's biography, which is built on the same contrast between two phases of Camillus' public life.⁶³ But contrary to Plutarch, whose aim was to show exile as a painful test necessary to allow reintegration of an arrogant patrician into the civil community, Dio's intentions are less moralistic than political.

Essentially, Camillus appears as a two-sided figure, a paradigm of first transgression and then acceptance of the institutions and traditions of the Republic. He is a more elaborate figure than Scipio, but an illustration of the same topic: the place of a great man of outstanding military skills in a democracy. In this respect, we may surmise, as with Scipio, that Dio used the description of Camillus' fate as a means to presenting a broad political reflection about the conditions required for the stability of the Republican system. The point is neither the virtues of Camillus nor his ambition, but the general issue that his actions highlight: in a democracy, concord is possible only if statesmen submit to the common rules. His figure is fashioned along these lines.

⁶¹ The habit of the Syracusan tyrants to parade on chariots with a team of white horses was known at Rome for a long time (Liv. 24.5.3–4 for 215 BC).

⁶² See Ehlers 1939, 503–504, for the *topos* of the white horses in elegiac poetry of the Augustan age, and for the use of white horses in imperial triumphs. On the question of the reliability of the tradition ascribing to Camillus the use of white horses, and its ties with Caesar, the best account remains Weinstock 1971, 71–75. See also Beard 2007, 234–236.

⁶³ See Coudry 2001, 70–71.

Fabricius

Scipio and Camillus' figures, as we have just seen, share many similarities in the way they are shaped by Dio's careful selection of information from his sources and insertion in the narrative to illustrate a political point pertaining to the Republic as a whole.

Compared to them, Fabricius is not a prominent character in Roman culture, although he is cited by a variety of authors from the Republic to the 4th century. And his relative importance in Dio's *History* has a partly circumstantial cause, namely the fact that the narrative provides a detailed treatment of the Roman war with Pyrrhus,⁶⁴ in which Fabricius played a notable part more as a negotiator than as a warrior. But he merits interest because his figure is very different from those of Scipio and Camillus in two respects: his behaviour meets complete consensus in the city, and his character embodies a uniquely particular virtue, namely incorruptibility.⁶⁵ In other words, a schematic and positive figure.

As we did for Scipio, we shall leave aside a number of plainly factual passages where Fabricius' actions are recorded in a neutral mode (for instance some of his embassies to Tarentum or to Pyrrhus), and comment only on those where his figure is deliberately emphasised.⁶⁶ Two of them are particularly interesting, especially as clear instances of Dio's reworking of the tradition: he makes use of the same devices as his predecessors, long speeches and witticisms, but twists them in his own way to give Fabricius' figure a genuine coloration.

The first passage concerns a minor event recorded only by a few ancient authors, namely Cicero, Quintilian and Gellius, but selected by Dio.⁶⁷ It tells how Fabricius, although he harshly criticised Cornelius Rufinus, favoured his election as consul because he saw him as the only candidate with military skills. And, as ancient authors usually do when they present an *exemplum*, Dio adds a commentary:

ὅμως ἐχειροτόνησεν ... παρ' ὀλίγον τὴν ἰδίαν ἔχθραν πρὸς τὰ κοινῇ συμφέροντα ἐποίησατο, καὶ δόξαν γε καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἐκτήσατο, κρείττων καὶ τοῦ φθόνου

⁶⁴ See Rich 2016, 279.

⁶⁵ See Berrendonner 2001 on the building and evolution of his figure in Roman culture.

⁶⁶ See table 3: Fabricius, occurrences.

⁶⁷ Cic. *De or.* 2.268; Quint. 12.1.43; Gell. 4.8.

γενόμενος, ὅσπερ πού καὶ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν πολλοῖς ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐγγίγνεται. φιλόπολις τε γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὤν, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ προσχήματι ἀρετὴν ἀσκῶν, ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τό τε ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸ² δι' ἐτέρου τινός, κἂν διάφορός οἱ ᾗ, εὖ τι τὴν πόλιν παθεῖν ἐτίθετο.

he appointed the latter...making his personal enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the community. From this action also he gained renown, in that he had shown himself superior even to jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by reason of emulation. Since he was a true patriot and did not practise virtue for a show, he thought it a matter of indifference whether the state were benefited by him or by some other man, even if this man were an opponent (F 40.2).

It happens that Gellius' account of the story is as detailed as Dio's and allows a fruitful comparison because both aim to shape ethical models for public life.⁶⁸ On one point both authors agree: by helping Rufinus' election, Fabricius placed "the advantage of the community" above his own feelings of hatred. But to this lesson, Dio adds two comments which reveal how he diverges from the facts to advance his own ideas. First, introducing the story, he announces that it will exemplify Fabricius' higher "incorruptibility" (ἀδωροδοκία). But, as Gellius tells, and as is shown by the witticism reported in the second fragment and already cited by Cicero, the concern was not Rufinus' taking bribes, but his greed: "Gaius Fabricius, when asked why he had entrusted the business to his foe, praised the general excellence of Rufinus, and added that to be spoiled by the citizen is preferable to being sold by the enemy" (F 36.33). So, what appears in the other accounts of the story as greed is presented by Dio as corruption. Actually, corruption, and in particular electoral corruption but not greed, was a major theme of Dio's reflection about politics, and recurs repeatedly in his narrative of the Late Republic as a cause of disturbance during elections for magistracies and influencing the whole political system.⁶⁹ Furthermore, in the middle of the passage there appears another comment about jealousy resulting from emulation, omitted by Gellius.

⁶⁸ Cicero and Quintilian, instead, use the anecdote in a different context, namely that of rhetorical practice and devices.

⁶⁹ See for instance 36.38–41; 40.45–50

Jealousy is fundamental to Dio's political views⁷⁰ and is best expounded in the well-known foreword of book 44 where, speaking in his authorial voice, he ascribes Caesar's murder to jealousy, and exposes it as a cause of ruin for the democracy.⁷¹ So, starting from a standard story about Fabricius putting the good of the Republic before his own desires, Dio gives it further significance by linking Fabricius' character to other fundamental topics that are widespread in his narrative of the Republic.

The second passage is the longest preserved concerning Fabricius: it is his famous private discussion with Pyrrhus, when, during the negotiation about the Roman prisoners after the defeat at Heraclea, the king urges Fabricius to become his counsellor and general and to accept his presents (F 40.33–38). Among a rich literary tradition, Dio's account seems mostly indebted to Dionysius of Halicarnassus,⁷² who widely developed the discourses of the protagonists, and even included in Fabricius' a possible future intervention by the censors. When putting the two dialogues side by side, many similarities appear, particularly concerning Pyrrhus' speech: in both texts the king praises Fabricius' virtues and reputation, asks for his help to secure peace with the Romans, and offers him to be his adviser and general (D.H. AR 19.14; Cass. Dio F 40.33).⁷³

However, Fabricius' response in Dio is not particularly close to its (likely) Dionysian model. Some of the topics are identical: a royal adviser cannot be chosen from a democracy (meaning, for Dio, Republican government) because monarchy and democracy are quite opposite regimes, with incompatible *ethea*; and a Roman ambassador cannot accept presents without being deemed corrupt. But the ordering of the arguments is not the same,⁷⁴ and some of those put forward in Dionysius' account do not appear in Dio's but are replaced by others absent from Dionysius. Surprisingly, this happens with the long development inserted by

⁷⁰ Burden-Strevens 2016, on the centrality of *phthonos* to political life in Dio's view of the Late Republic, and Mads Lindholmer's contribution in this volume.

⁷¹ 44.1.1; 2.3–4.

⁷² As happens elsewhere in his *History*. On this *imitatio*, which went far beyond the literary form, see Fromentin 2016. The other preserved parallel accounts are those of Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 20.8–9) and App. (*Samm.* 10.4). Both are very brief and include only a concise answer from Fabricius.

⁷³ Dio even uses the same words as Dionysius: σύμβουλος and στρατηγός / ὑποστράτηγος.

⁷⁴ Dio puts in first place the problem of a royal adviser from a democracy (40.34), which appears at the end in Dionysius (19.18.7–8), and in second place the impossibility for an ambassador of receiving gifts (40.34), a topic which Dionysius inserts in the fictitious dialogue between Fabricius and the censors (19.17.3) in the middle of Fabricius' answer.

Dionysius about the uselessness of money to achieve a brilliant position in public life at Rome. None of these themes, which involve institutional specificities familiar to Dio such as access to magistracies, use of booty or duties of the censors regarding the behaviour of senators (19.14.5; 16.3–5), appear in Dionysius' account. And the long depiction by Fabricius of the fate he might suffer if he ever accepted Pyrrhus' proposal, exile and disenfranchisement (19.18), is reduced in Dio's account to a few words. Instead, Dio devotes plentiful space to moral ideas about wealth and poverty in general, which in fact are more carefully developed than Fabricius' response itself (F 40.36–38).⁷⁵ Philosophical matters seem to have precedence over political reflection to such a degree that Fabricius looks more like a Stoic than a statesman.⁷⁶ It seems that Dio, in this part of Fabricius' answer to Pyrrhus, ceased to follow Dionysius' text (or the Dionysian tradition), and included instead topics which were commonplace in Roman rhetorical tradition, while also connecting Fabricius' figure with *paupertas*.⁷⁷ In other words, Fabricius, in this long fragment, is not presented mainly as a model of civic morality, but rather as a model of virtue in general. His contentedness with what he has is opposed to Pyrrhus' *pleonexia*, a recurring theme in Dio's *History*.

The other occurrences of Fabricius in the narrative are to be found not in fragments from the *Roman History* but in Zonaras' epitome, and they concern two other well-known events, namely Fabricius' refusal of the treacherous proposal from Nicias, Pyrrhus' friend, to assassinate the king (8.5.8), and his decision, when censor, to expel Rufinus from the Senate because of the silver plate he owned (8.6.9). In both cases, Fabricius' behaviour is described in a very conventional manner. In the first fragment it provides an *exemplum* of Roman *fides*—Rome fights with arms, not by treason—and in the second an *exemplum* of *paupertas*. Dio's accounts do not seem, as far as can be supposed from Zonaras' epitome, to have deviated from the literary tradition, but the lack of fragments from the *Excerpta* may lead to fallacious conclusions.

In any case, the figure of Fabricius delineated by Cassius Dio strikingly contrasts with those of Scipio and Camillus. All the preserved passages allow the display of his virtues and the shaping of a definitely positive image: a statesman whom neither corruption nor envy can

⁷⁵ The same appear in Zonaras' corresponding passage (8.4.8).

⁷⁶ See Berrendonner 2001, 107–108.

⁷⁷ Fabricius' refusal of Pyrrhus' gifts appears in such literary contexts as Sen. *Controv.* 2.1.29, and Sen. *Ep.* 20.120.6.

spoil, devoted to the common good and loyal to democracy and its values. Contrary to Scipio and Camillus, he never appears in the context of internal conflict. Moreover, his character is used as a model of virtuous conduct, presented to his fellow citizens and to Rome's enemies as well. So, political and constitutional topics are related to his figure in a very different way to Camillus and Scipio: in the dialogue with Pyrrhus, monarchy and democracy are confronted on a moral field, and Fabricius depicts himself as embodying values basically irrelevant to a king and his counsellors. In this way, Fabricius' character contributes to the creation of a different image of the Republic than Scipio and Camillus; Fabricius rather reflects the ideal Republic than "the muddy city of Romulus".

Should we think, as has been proposed, that Fabricius is shaped as the model of the statesman of the Middle Republic, a period of political harmony⁷⁸ that is definitely forgotten when civil strife and domination of powerful politicians—*staseis* and *dunasteiai* as Dio says—brought the Republic to its collapse?⁷⁹ And that Fabricius hereby is idealised to the extent that no other figure belonging to another age of Rome's history can be put side by side with him? In fact, Fabricius' figure does not appear in the preserved books, as if for Dio any comparison with statesmen of later periods was unthinkable.⁸⁰ However, one of the topics associated with Fabricius—that is what sort of man the adviser of a king should be—surfaces again in the Augustan books regarding Agrippa.⁸¹ Several passages underline Agrippa's attitude in a way that reminds us of what was said about Fabricius: he avoids ambition (*πλεονεξία*), and so is not the target of jealousy (*φθόνος*), and he places the public good ahead of other considerations (*πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον ἐδελεχοῦς σπουδῆς*).⁸² But in all these passages, his conduct is described in the frame of his relation with Augustus, not with his fellow citizens, and determined above all by consideration of his position as adviser of a

⁷⁸ See the well-known passage where Dio describes that state of "absolute harmony (*ὁμονοία*) between themselves [the Romans]" at the beginning of the Second Punic War (F 52).

⁷⁹ Kemezis 2014, 106–110.

⁸⁰ Significantly, Dio denounces Caracalla's misuse of the example of Fabricius as a model for his own conduct in relation to some barbarian enemies of Rome (78.20.3).

⁸¹ I express my acknowledgements to John Rich for this idea, suggested during the symposium and discussed later on.

⁸² 53.23.3–4 (dedication of the *Saepta*); 53.27.4 (his new buildings on the *Campus Martius*); 54.29.3 (eulogy by Dio when he dies).

monarch.⁸³ The first of these occurrences (53.23) is very revealing: Dio, after having praised Agrippa who was careful to behave like an efficient but modest and respectful adviser, describes in opposite terms the insolence (ἐξύβρισεν) of Cornelius Gallus, who exhibited his power and glory in his province of Egypt and paid for that.⁸⁴ The lesson is clear: Agrippa's behaviour, as described by Dio, is adapted to the monarchy established by Augustus. He is presented as devoted both to Augustus and to the *demos*, and he perfectly fits the ideal Augustan monarchy as Dio conceived it, that is a mixture of monarchy and democracy.⁸⁵ His virtues revive the virtues of Fabricius, which had become out of place in the Late Republic: Dio's Late Republican narrative presents great men like Catulus, Cato the Younger, Brutus or Cassius as devoted to the common good, like Fabricius, but their actions are described as ineffective: democracy is no longer viable when Rome is subject to *dunasteiai*. Agrippa instead embodies, in Dio's view, the return to the ideal republican statesman as Fabricius had been, in the new constitutional frame of the Augustan monarchy. Both figures are idealisations of the Roman statesman in two different periods of Rome's constitutional history. So, although they are not explicitly put side by side by Dio, as far as we know, we could at least imagine that he had Agrippa's figure in mind when he wrote Fabricius' haughty refusal of Pyrrhus' proposal to become his general and adviser.

Conclusion

The question raised at the beginning of this paper was whether Roman statesmen of the Middle Republic were depicted by Dio in a particular manner, different from what can be observed in the preserved later Republican books of his *Roman History*. In these later books the shaping of characters is closely associated with general historical analysis, and figures of prominent generals and politicians of the Late Republic are connected, through specific comments, with political and constitutional topics, like extra-legal power, respect for

⁸³ For instance, his placing a statue of himself together with Caesar and Augustus in the *pronaos* of the Pantheon is commented by Dio in these words: "This was done not out of any rivalry or ambition (φιλοτιμίας) on Agrippa's part to make himself equal of Augustus, but from his hearty loyalty (λιπαροῦς εὐνοίας) to him and his constant zeal for the public good (πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον ἐδελεχοῦς σπουδῆς)" (53.27.4)

⁸⁴ He had his actions inscribed upon the pyramids, which probably appeared as rivalling Augustus' *res gestae*, and consequently he was disgraced by Augustus and later convicted by the Senate, which caused him to commit suicide.

⁸⁵ On Dio's conception of the Augustan monarchy, see Coltelloni-Trannoy 2016.

ancestral custom and stability of the Republican regime. A second question naturally followed: are the great men of the Middle Republic whom Dio chose to foreground given the function to advertise the same range of themes, which would mean that he viewed the Republic as a unity and stressed continuity, instead of contrast, between the Middle and Late Republic? Or, on the other hand, are these great men fashioned along different lines in order to underline the specificity and uniqueness of the Middle Republic?

The passage from Agrippa's speech, which we took as a starting point, presented Camillus, Scipio and Caesar as three examples of the danger in Roman politics of seeming like a potential dynast, someone who behaves with arrogance and is thought to aspire to domination over his fellow citizens and to sole power. And it suggested that Camillus and Scipio could be considered as forerunners of Caesar and, more generally, of the dynasts who, from Marius and Sulla to Pompey, Caesar and the triumvirs, were responsible for the downfall of the Republic. By gathering all the significant preserved passages from the books which described the careers of the two prominent statesmen, Camillus and Scipio, we have tried to test whether the same idea was conveyed. Examination of these texts, mostly those transmitted by excerptors but also passages from Zonaras' epitome, achieved a confirmation of this by showing striking similarities with central issues of the Late Republic: Camillus and Scipio are described in connection with particular topics, mainly the management of victory and the celebration of triumph for Camillus and the attribution and use of military command for Scipio. These issues are also central in the Late Republic, and Camillus and Scipio as figures can therefore usefully be put side by side with Pompey and Caesar. And, while Dio certainly stresses the jealousy which arises from Camillus and Scipio's military successes—again a feature recognisable in the dynasts of his Late Republic—the historian does not suggest their ambition. Indeed, he clearly asserts that “there have never been any better men than these” (52.13.4). The question at stake is not a moral one—they are not denied civic virtues—but rather a “systemic” one: their outstanding achievements affect the basis of democracy. Fabricius' figure, on the other hand, is not directly compared to any statesman of the Late Republic. His foremost features are incorruptibility and such a devotion to the common good that he is out of reach from ambition and envy. Consequently, his behaviour meets perfect consensus. He embodies the ideal statesman in a time of concord between the Romans, and therefore his figure can be used to define the distinctive political identity of Rome as a *δημοκρατία* among the Mediterranean states when for the first time she confronted Hellenistic kings such as Pyrrhus. Thus, he also embodies the *ethos* of the Roman citizen which is at odds with the *ethos* of the subject in a monarchy, even if that subject—as an

adviser of the king—were the most distinguished of them. As we saw (and although Dio, as far as we know, never explicitly puts him side by side with Agrippa), some of the comments he inserted about the latter as a counsellor of Augustus are related to exactly the same topic.

So, the three figures under review are clearly shaped within the framework of a reflection about Rome's long-term history, and articulated with general political themes in order to support a particular interpretation of the working of the republican system and the weaknesses that lead to its final downfall, as also happens in the Late Republican books.⁸⁶ Dio's approach to the Roman exemplary canon proves more original than could be presumed. Furthermore, his reworking of old inherited models entailed a careful selection of information, as we have seen, and a choice of items which were sometimes quite conventional, sometimes clearly picked from diverging strands of the tradition.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ And, apparently, in the books describing the beginnings of the Republic: see the conclusions of Mallan 2014 about Lucretia.

⁸⁷ We may wonder, besides, whether these three figures are not also designed, in Dio's mind, to point to important moments in the history of the Roman Republic: Camillus is connected to the end of attempts at creating a tyranny (Manlius Capitolinus is the last of the three famous *adfectatores regni* after Spurius Cassius and Spurius Maelius) and the beginning of a more pacific political life; Fabricius is linked to Rome's affirmation of her power abroad, based on typically democratic virtues, when facing the first Greek king she had to fight; Scipio, lastly, embodies the appearance of a threat to political stability in the shape of successful generals acting far from Rome.

Tables

Table 1: Scipio Africanus (occurrences excluding strictly factual passages)

Reference	Paris fragments / Other	<i>Exc. De Virt. Vit.</i>	Zonaras
F 57.38–39 Boiss. I, 240–241 Loeb II, 188–190	from Paris fragments	sent to Spain (in 210): qualities, education, ties with Jupiter	9.7.3: offers himself for command in Spain, and is chosen; his qualities
F 70.2–3 Boiss. I, 313 Loeb II, 386–388	youth should not prevent honours and commands (Max. Conf.; Ioann. Dam.)		9.7.4: his youth causes anxiety: speaks to people and shames senators
F 57.40 Boiss. I, 241 Loeb II, 190–192	from Paris fragments	behaviour towards the Roman army in Spain and L. Marcius	—
F 57.42–43 Boiss. I, 243–244 Loeb II, 198–200	from Paris fragments	calms mutiny; Celtiberian towns and chiefs join him; gives back Celtiberian maiden	9.8.3–5: he takes (New) Carthage; (then, same as in the fragment)
F 57.48 Boiss. I, 245 Loeb II, 200–202	from Paris fragments	his military skills; the Spaniards name him Great King	9.8.6–7: victory over Hasdrubal; (then, same as in the fragment)
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 249–251 Loeb II, 212–220	—	—	9.10.1–4: meeting with Syphax, victory over the Iliturgi, funeral games in Carthage, illness, mutiny; 5–8: mutiny repressed, Celtiberian chiefs submit
F 57.53–56 Boiss. I, 254–255 Loeb II, 224–228	Massinissa on Roman side; Scipio's African landing prevented by Romans; dismissed, return to Rome; triumph denied	—	9.11.3–4 (same as in the fragment)
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 257–258 Loeb II, 232–234	—	—	9.11.6–9: consul (205), sent to Sicily and Africa; takes Locri; 11: allowed a larger army
F 57.62 Boiss. I, 258–259 Loeb II, 236	—	scandal of Locri and other grievances; attempt to recall for trial	—
F 57.63–69 Boiss. I, 259–262 Loeb II, 238–244	beginning of the campaign in Africa	—	9.12.1–5 (same as in the fragment)
F 57.72 Boiss. I, 263 Loeb II, 246–248	—	captures and releases a Carthaginian vessel; negotiates with Syphax	9.12.6–7: year 203 (same as in the fragment)
F 57.73 Boiss. I, 264–265 Loeb II, 252–254	—	Scipio treats captured Syphax with respect	9.13.3: Masinissa, Sophonisbe, Syphax (same as fragment)
F 57.86 Boiss. I, 272 Loeb II, 272–274	Scipio becomes prominent as conqueror of Carthage; opposed fate of Hannibal	—	9.14.13 (same as in the fragment)
F 63 Boiss. I, 290 Loeb II, 322	—	qualities and successes of the Scipios envied; their innocence	9.20.12–13 (same as in the fragment)

Not mentioned: *Suda* (XVI, F 57.48 = Boiss. I, 25, Loeb II, 218): speech to rebelling soldiers in Spain.

Table 2: Camillus (all occurrences)

Reference	<i>Exc. De Sententiis</i>	<i>Exc. De Virt. Vit.</i>	Zonaras
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 71–72 Loeb I, 190–192	—	—	7.21.1–3: dictator, Veii, dedication of spoil and popular anger, triumph with white horses; 4–11: description of the Roman triumph
F 24.2–3 Boiss. I, 75–76 Loeb I, 200–202	—	refuses treason of Falerii's schoolmaster; the city surrenders	7.22.1–6 (same as in the fragment)
F 24.4 Boiss. I, 76–77 Loeb I, 202	—	jealousy towards Camillus; indicted by the tribunes, leaves Rome	7.22.7–8 (same as in the fragment)
F 24.6 Boiss. I, 76–77 Loeb I, 202	jealousy of even his friends and relatives, leaves Rome	—	—
F 25.7 Boiss. I, 81 Loeb I, 214	—	refuses Gallic command in exile unless legal precedent is respected	—
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 82 Loeb I, 216	—	—	7.23.9: restores Sutrium to its inhabitants; triumph, great reputation
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 82 Loeb I, 216	—	—	7.23.10: dictator for the fourth time because of Manlius Capitolinus
F 28.1–2 Boiss. I, 84 Loeb I, 220	—	campaigns against the Tusculans who welcome the Roman army and are made citizens	7.24.7: Roman campaigns, some conducted by Camillus
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 86 Loeb I, 226	—	—	7.24.10–12: dictator for the fifth time, against the Gauls; Torquatus, victory, Camillus resigns
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 86 Loeb I, 228	—	—	7.24.13: consuls chosen among both orders, pestilence, Roman grief at Camillus' death

Not mentioned: *Suda* (F 24.4 = Boiss. I, 76–77, Loeb I, 202): Camillus indicted by the tribunes, withdraws before the trial.

Table 3: Fabricius (occurrences excluding strictly factual passages)

Reference	<i>Exc. De Sententiis</i>	<i>Exc. De Virt. Vit.</i>	Zonaras
F 40.1–2 Boiss. I, 109 Loeb I, 286–288	shows himself superior to the jealousy which results from emulation of others	votes for Rufinus as consul, shows himself superior to jealousy resulting from emulation and truly virtuous	—
F 36.33 Boiss. I, 109–110 Loeb I, 288	witticism of Fabricius about his praise of Rufinus	—	—
F 40.33–38 Boiss. I, 129–131 Loeb I, 338–344	offer to become Pyrrhus' adviser; Fabricius refuses the offer as well as gifts and praises poverty	—	8.4.7–8: Pyrrhus asks Fabricius to help secure peace; Fabricius explains refusal of gifts and praises poverty
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 134–135 Loeb I, 354	—	—	8.5.8: refuses Nicias' proposal to assassinate Pyrrhus
No direct fragment Boiss. I, 138 Loeb I, 364–366	—	—	8.6.9: as censor, expels Rufinus from the Senate

Table 4: Cassius Dio and the tradition on Scipio Africanus' *dynasteia*

Circumstances	Livy	Appian	Cassius Dio	Zonaras
return from Spain (206 BC)	28.38.1–4: Scipio reports his Spanish campaign to the Senate and asks for triumph	<i>Ib.</i> 38.155: glorious reception at Rome, even by those who envied him; allowed a triumph	F 57.54–56: recalled to Rome and deprived of his command by those senators anxious about his <i>dunasteia</i>	9.11.3–4: idem
Scipio elected consul, debate in the Senate about his command (beginning 205)	28.40.3–42.22: speech of Fabius against assigning Africa to Scipio (<i>regio more, superbia</i>)	<i>Pun.</i> 7: debate only on strategic choice	—	9.11.6–7: sent to Sicily and Africa, but with few troops and ships because of jealousy
scandal of Locri (204)	29.19.5–6: Fabius criticises Scipio (<i>externo et regio more</i>) and proposes to recall him and annul his command	—	F 57.62: Romans, indignant, try to remove his command and call him back for trial	—
trial of Lucius and Publius Scipio (187)	38.51.4: accusation by the tribunes of monarchical behaviour (<i>unum hominem caput columenque imperii Romani</i>) 38.52.4: (idem) arrogance (<i>superbia</i>)	—	F 63: qualities and successes of the Scipios envied; their innocence	9.20.12–13: idem

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DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

CASSIUS DIO ON VIOLENCE, *STASIS*, AND CIVIL WAR: THE EARLY YEARS

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There has been a recent increase in scholarly interest in the early books of Cassius Dio. Two areas that have attracted particular attention are the excursus on magistracies (Urso 2005; 2013; Simons 2009) and the triumph (Zonar. 7.21; Lange 2016a), and the annalistic structure of the narrative (Rich 2016).¹ However, Dio also appears to use the early books to describe other features, including violence and civil strife. Kemezis suggests that Dio downplayed the negative aspects of early Rome in order to make his account of the later *dynasteia* all the more unflattering. However, the reverse seems the case; Dio in no way played down the elements of violence, an integral part of civil strife and civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Lange forthcoming 2017b; 2018, focussing on Dio).² According to Kemezis' view, there is a marked contrast between Dio's presentation of the *dynasteia* of the Late Republic and his account of the Early Republic (2014, 104). But Kemezis focuses primarily on the fragmentary stories of republican heroes rather than the actual internal troubles in Rome before the Late Republic: "The features of Dio's Republican fragments are less interesting in themselves than for the contrast they make with his portrait of the later Republic" (107).

Dio famously emphasised that in 29 BCE the Romans reverted to monarchical government (52.1.1): "Such were the achievements of the Romans and such their suffering under the kingship (*basileia*), under the *demokratia* [Republic], and under the dominion of a few (*dynasteiai*), during a period of seven hundred and twenty-five years". In the extant books of Cassius Dio, *stasis* and *dynasteia* seem to be phenomena that alternate in such a way that it is hard to have one without the other. Individual *dynasteiai* are not stable forms of rule and thus inevitably create the conditions for *stasis*, from the Gracchi onwards; at the same time *dynasteia* is the concept used to define the period until monarchy, a period of civil war.³

¹ On other aspects of Dio's early books see Hose 1994, 356–451; Kemezis 2014, 104–107; Rich forthcoming.

² Lange 2016c: civil war became a 'normal' feature of Roman political and social life during the Late Republic.

³ The word *dynasteia* becomes common in the Gracchi fragments; see Kemezis 2014, 109. In fragment 83.4, discussing the rivalry between the tribunes Tiberius Gracchus and Octavius, Dio remarks upon *dynasteia* (cf. App. *B. Civ.* 2.17; 2.19 on Caesar, Pompeius and Crassus in the 50s): "[they were] committing much violence as

But the periodization in book 52 in no way suggests that the tendencies noticeable during the Late Republic did not originate in earlier times.

Tendencies toward internal strife do indeed appear to date to the founding of the city, and constitute, at least in Dio's narrative, an important part of Rome's legacy. This chapter seeks to address these issues of violence and *stasis* in the early books of Dio, whilst at the same time problematising the connection between violence, internal strife, and *bellum civile*, emphasising that differences between these phenomena are at least partly semantic in nature. The first part of this chapter is consequently the foundation for the second part: with a flexible and inclusive definition of civil war in hand it will be possible to show *why* Dio conceived of most of Republican history as riddled with civil strife from the start. This is not, as has been claimed, the product of a lost annalistic source (*pace* Libourel 1974). Rather, this is the product of human nature, with Thucydides as Dio's model.⁴ Civil strife and civil war was an integrated part of Republican political life; the solution came with the monarchy with Augustus. This is the story of Dio's conception of the Republic as an unworkable system, either causing or caused by the inevitable presence of internal problems such as violence, *stasis*, and *bellum civile*.

Stasis and bellum civile: the case of Appian and Cassius Dio

In order to approach the problem of *stasis* and civil war in antiquity one must reflect on the flexibility apparent in our ancient evidence. There are Greek words equivalent to *bellum*

though in a *dynasteia* rather than a *demokratia*". Violence thus becomes the product of *dynasteia* and ultimately of civil war. Desire for *dynasteia* is attributed to Drusus and Caepio, Metellus Creticus and Crassus (F 96.1; 36.18.1; 37.56.5). Rich (forthcoming): "Although Dio makes both Caesar and Octavian insist that they had not sought *dynasteia* (41.35.4; 53.4.4), he repeatedly asserts that desire for *dynasteia* had in fact impelled both them and their opponents in civil war, apart from Brutus and Cassius [41.17.3, 57.4; 42.8.2; 43.25.3; 46.34.4; 47.39.2]."

⁴ For Thucydides' views on human nature see esp. 3.81–85. On Dio and his use of Thucydides see Reinhold 1985, 30–31, emphasising that Dio refers to "human nature" more frequently than any other ancient historian (Reinhold also focuses on the general appearance of "human nature" in ancient historiography). Millar 1964, 76 talks of pessimistic comments (*contra* Rich 1990, 13–18: "Dio Cassius' portrayal of the early career of Young Caesar is not hostile: he was seeking monarchy and thus acted in the best interest of Rome"); Rich 1989, 89 n.9; Rich 1990, 11; Gowing 1992, 265–266; Hose 1994, 381; Swan 1997, 2525; Pelling 2010; Adler 2011; Rees 2011; Price 2015.

civile: polemos emphylios and *oikeios polemos*.⁵ Appian remarks in the preface of the *Emphylia* (6):⁶ “the Roman state came through from multifarious civil disorders (*staseis*) to concord (*homonoia*) and monarchy”; and reflecting Thucydides’ “realist view” on human nature, revealing as it were the realities of power, he states: “men’s limitless ambition (*philotimia*), terrible lust for rule (*philarkhia*), indefatigable perseverance, and countless forms of evil” are a central feature of the period (*B. Civ.* 1.6.1). Appian viewed it as Rome’s greatest achievement to survive the civil war (Price 2015, 45). Significantly, *Stasis* is used to describe the period of civil war, not *polemos*.

Appian distinguishes three phases of *stasis* at Rome: At *B. Civ.* 1.1–2 he distinguishes between the *staseis* of the early Republic—which he believes to have been bloodless—and the bloodshed in internal disorders from the Gracchi onwards. At *B. Civ.* 1.55 he marks the beginning of civil war as 88 BCE: from that point the stasiarchs fought one another with great armies in the fashion of war (πολέμου νόμῳ), and with the fatherland as their prize. The point is reiterated at 1.58: the battle between Marius and Sulla at Rome in 88 BCE was the first fought in the city not ὑπὸ εἰκόνι στάσεως (“in the guise of *stasis*”), but “unambiguously with bugle and standard, in the fashion of war” (ἀπροφασίστως ὑπὸ σάλπιγγι καὶ σημείοις, πολέμου νόμῳ).

However, Appian (*B. Civ.* 1.58), discussing a possible transition from *stasis* to *polemos*, also shows that both are part of the same development—the essence of which is violence, whether in strife or war—and thus civil war is an integral part of the *Emphylia*; indeed, he uses the word *stasis*, as mentioned, to describe the Roman civil war in its entirety. Does this mean that the *Emphylia*, books 1–5, should be entitled *Civil War*? This would depend upon our definition of civil war as opposed to *stasis*, and whether we accept a period of strife before the outbreak civil war proper. As in the approaches of both Thucydides and Kalyvas (see above), civil war is undoubtedly part of Appian’s description of violence in Roman society (see mainly App. *B. Civ.* 1.60). Appian’s choice of language later, at *B. Civ.* 5.132, is extremely revealing. Describing the termination of the civil war in 36 BCE, he writes: “This seemed to be the end of the civil dissensions” (τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν τότε στάσεων ἐδόκει τέλος εἶναι). The word *stasis* is used by Appian to describe this process.

⁵ Interestingly, *polemos emphylios* appears more often in the early books of Dionysius, for example as a threat in the Struggle of the Orders, and notably in the Coriolanus narrative.

⁶ I deliberately use the Greek appellation here, rather than the OCD *Bella civilia* (see below).

The fragmentary state of the early books of Dio makes any interpretation of his account more difficult,⁷ but it would appear that he took much the same view as Appian. The term *polemos emphylios* (and *oikeios polemos*, another Greek phrase for civil war) does not appear in his extant work until 38.17.4. At 52.16.2 Dio says that the discord arising after Rome's world conquest was at first merely *stasis* "at home and within the walls", but was then carried "into the legions", implying, like Appian, 88 BCE as a turning point:⁸

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἴκοι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους κατὰ συστάσεις ἐστασιάσαμεν,
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰ στρατόπεδα τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο προηγάγομεν.

At first it was only at home and within our walls that we broke up into factions and quarreled, but afterwards we even carried this plague out into the legions.

Nevertheless, at 52.15.4–5 foreign wars and *stasis* are mentioned together ("...instead of being embroiled in hazardous wars abroad or in unholy *stasis*"), thus implying two kinds of war, later specified at 52.16.2. However, in defining the strife that was carried "into the legions", Dio mentions factions, another hallmark of civil war. *Stasis*, factional politics and civil war are closely interrelated and part of the same phenomenon of (civil) war (cf. Asconius 64C). Dio's definition may even in this case suggest that internal strife was a precursor, even a necessity, for civil war to develop (see Thucydides below).⁹

Whatever differences and nuances there may have been between *stasis* and *bellum civile*, Dio (41.14.2), to give an example, remarks: ὄντως γὰρ που ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐν ταῖς στάσεσι τὸ κοινὸν βλάπτεται ("for there is no doubt that in civil wars the state is injured by both parties"). Στάσις/*Stasis* is used to describe the beginning of the civil war after Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon (similar uses of *stasis*: 39.58.2; 41.46.2). In contrast, however, 52.27.3 refers to "*staseis* and war" (στάσεις καὶ πόλεμοι). In this part, Dio refers to a standing army, suggesting that "if, on the other hand, we permit all the men of military age to have

⁷ See Juntunen 2013; Fromentin 2013, 23–26; Mallan 2013, 737–738; 2014, 760–762; Mallan in this volume in general on the survival of the lost books of Dio in the Constantinian *Excerpta*.

⁸ On the connection between foreign war and subsequent civil war in Roman historiography, see Jacobs 2010, 124–126.

⁹ Joseph. *BJ* 6.6.2 sees a development from *stasis* to πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος, but clearly *stasis* is the phenomenon that results in civil war.

arms and to practise warfare, they will always be the source of seditions and civil wars.” However, in this case Dio wanted to explain a whole range of possibilities.

To consider Roman history through the lens of Greek historians such as Appian and Dio may of course complicate matters of *stasis* and *bellum civile*. I would suggest that they used words to describe civil war that were already known for similar phenomena, including *stasis*. More striking, it seems much more important to emphasise that both Appian and Dio used Thucydides as their model when writing about Roman civil war.

The question thus arises as to why we should name a violent domestic conflict “civil war” rather than revolution, *stasis* (if this is indeed different to civil war at all), tumult, sedition, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare. As concepts they differ only marginally. Furthermore, more often than not, more than one label was used to describe a specific conflict (Rosenberger 1992; Cic. *Phil* 12.17). In principle, the question is simple: if ‘civil war’ is a meaningful concept,¹⁰ then we must be able to identify its defining characteristics and how it can be distinguished from other forms of violent civil dissension. Is Dio not sufficiently immersed in Latin civil war literature to recognise the difference, if any, between *stasis* and *bellum civile*? Whatever we do with this, we cannot ignore that our ancient evidence at times almost elides the differences between the concepts of *stasis* and civil war and then virtually uses them as synonyms. We may of course always begin by considering how the Romans themselves defined and termed various conflicts. However, words and concepts are always difficult and often controversial, and may involve competing definitions, in ancient times as well as today. Flexibility is required in defining war and civil war, due in part to (modern) changes in the fighting of wars and even in the approach to warfare.¹¹ These approaches may ultimately help us understand ancient texts in new and, perhaps, more compelling ways.

As with “civil war”, warfare is difficult to define (Lange 2016c, esp. 20–27).¹² Simpson (2012) redefines the traditional paradigm of war (Clausewitz) as, firstly, those fought to establish military conditions for a political solution, and secondly, those that directly seek political, as opposed to military, outcomes, which lie beyond the scope of the traditional paradigm. Roman civil war relied to some extent, although never exclusively, on

¹⁰ Which it might not be, at least not anymore (see Newman 2014, esp. 4).

¹¹ In both Latin and Greek literature the mutability and flexibility of words was seen as a symptom of, *above all*, *stasis* and civil war: hence Thucydides (3.70–85) but also Tacitus (*Hist.* 1.30.2; 1.37.4; 1.49.3 etc.).

¹² Civil war is a subcategory of the broader phenomenon of war (cf. Melander 2016, 203).

conventional warfare. Furthermore, in some conflicts there was no clearly defined front line. As a result, much of the violence in civil wars was unrecorded, as the focus remained on pitched battles.¹³ However we approach this matter, much of the violence in the Late Republican civil war occurred beyond conventional battlefields.¹⁴

Indeed, many of Rome's conflicts would fit modern definitions of asymmetrical warfare (see now Dart 2014; Howe & Brice 2015; Rawlings 2016). A good example is the Jewish insurgency against Rome as described by Josephus. In the *Bellum Judaicum* Josephus mentions ληστρικός πόλεμος, a bandit-like war, or guerrilla war (2.65: "...; but at the period of which we are speaking, these men were making the whole of Judaea one scene of guerrilla warfare"; see Russell 2015, 261–265; cf. Tac. *Hist.* 4.58 on insurgent tactics in war, that is, non-conventional warfare). This was an unconventional war, an insurgency, but Josephus nevertheless labels it a war. Similarly, Polybius in a very modern portrayal of insurgency talks of a war without war with no pitched battles, but "small events" (14.12.4–5). Rome often possessed disproportionate military resources, organisation, reach, manpower, and levels of training. As a result opponents used a mixture of conventional and guerrilla fighting, including insurgency (an armed rebellion against a constituted authority, similar to guerrilla warfare; see Lange 2016c, 22–23), as for example in the Spanish engagements of Viriathus and Sertorius or the successive slave wars in Sicily and Italy.¹⁵ Both the concept of "war" and "civil war" are flexible, in particular when related to types of warfare. Importantly, *bellum* does not necessarily mean conventional warfare between two opposing armies; neither in an ancient nor a modern context (see Lange 2017a). In several cases one party was besieged after retreating to a fortified place—such as an acropolis or the Piraeus (e.g. *FGrHist* 257 F 1–3)—for a longer period of time, which would hardly have been possible without some sort of military infrastructure and actual fighting. In Sicily, there was continued fighting after Agathocles had taken over Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 19.1–10, with Agathocles using soldiers in the struggle), as there was in Cyrene (Diod. Sic. 18.19–21; esp. 18.21, partly using

¹³ See Osgood 2014, 16: fighting neighbours and opposing warring groups with small (private) armies was an integral part of the Late Republican period, while armed gangs were also roaming the countryside. Cf. Osgood 2006 on the impact of civil war.

¹⁴ Lange 2016b; for a more developed argument, see Lange 2016c.

¹⁵ For Sertorius, see esp. Plut. *Sert.* 12–13; Livy F 18 (book 91); see Sampson 2013, for further evidence. On the servile wars see Bradley 1998 and Lange 2016c, esp. 37.

mercenaries and foreign intervention; see Polybius below) and Termessus (Diod. Sic. 18.46–47).

One might object that while *bellum civile* has an obvious military element *stasis* does not. But civil war carries many characteristics other than war in the traditional sense of the word, including the often extreme use of violence in non-battlefield contexts—¹⁶undeniably similar to the actions of many invading foreign armies on civilian populations. Of course, most *polis* conflicts were on a comparatively small scale, and Roman imperial history may be viewed as contests between leaders rather than citizens. However, to suggest that these are not civil wars, or at least not “true” civil war, would leave us with a rather too exclusive, indeed virtually pointless, definition.

The scale of the civil wars may have changed during the Late Republic and the term *bellum civile* certainly belongs to the same period, but the phenomenon of civil war is much older. Parallel evidence on *stasis* and *polemos* provides some context for the question. In *The Laws* Plato speaks of (*Leg.* 1.628a–e, the Athenian):¹⁷

...that internal *polemos* called *stasis*, which occurs from time to time and which everyone would wish never to come to pass in his city and, if it does, would wish to end as soon as possible (628b; trans. Price 2015; cf. 2001, 70).¹⁸

Terms similar to *oikeios polemos* are in principle an oxymoron (see Loraux 1987, with evidence; 1997), but more than anything this suggests that we need to be careful with foregone conclusions: as shown by the quote from Plato, *polemos* can be used to describe a *stasis*. Internal war (πόλεμος) can thus be termed *stasis* (στάσις)—and *polemos* is not only about what is external.

Polybius provides a further example. He suggests (1.65–88) that the Carthaginian mercenary revolt (*stasis* = 1.66.10; 1.67.2; 1.67.5) during the First Punic War was an internal problem as well as an internal war (1.65.2; 1.71.8: *emphylios polemos*; see Dreyer 2015, 90).

¹⁶ Kalyvas 2006. On violence in Roman society in general, see Lintott 1982; 1999; Zimmermann 2013.

¹⁷ See Gehrke 1985, 6–8: “Ich spreche also von ‘inneren Kriegen’ oder—als Synonym—‘inneren Kämpfen’, ‘Bürgerkriege’ o.ä. Ferner verwende ich auch das Wort *Stasis* in diesem Sinne, ...” (8); Loraux 1987; Loraux 2001, 10, 24–26, 64–67, 104–108, defining *stasis* as “... the Greek term for what is simultaneously partisanship, faction, sedition, and—as we say in an expression with very Roman connotations—civil war” (10); Price 2001, 67–72 on *stasis* and *polemos*.

¹⁸ Cf. Pl. *Menex.* 243e–244a on the *stasis* at Athens in 404 BCE: “Our war at home” (ὁ οἰκεῖος ἡμῶν πόλεμος).

Polybius used the words *tarache*, *stasis*, as well as *polemos* to describe this conflict. These examples reveal the considerable flexibility of definitions in the ancient evidence as well as the continuing problems in conceptualising and approaching civil war both in antiquity and today (Dreyer 2015; cf. Rosenberger 1992). It might be claimed that in Polybius civil war has a wider usage, not limited to or even primarily relating to warfare between fellow citizens. A similar usage is found in Appian (*B. Civ.* 1.40.1), who speaks of the Social War as “great and *emphylios*”. However, the war against the *socii* is at the very least close to a civil war (See also Lange 2016c, esp. 25; Dart 2014). Certainly the difference between “civil” and “internal”, as in from the same polity or from other relatively close parties, became increasingly difficult to determine during the Late Republic.

Even if we accept that a typical Greek *stasis* is smaller in scale than the civil war of the Late Republic, Thucydides’ description of conflict in Corcyra (3.81–85; cf. 4.46–48) remains the most important ancient description of civil war as a concept. His discussion goes well beyond the battles themselves to issues such as the role of human behaviour, the impact, the nature of the violence and so forth. The Corcyra conflict was to some extent fought beyond the battlefield, but the opposing Athenian and Spartan fleets played an important part in the *stasis* at Corcyra, providing as it did—through foreign intervention—the context in which personal and political animosities ultimately resulted in the killing of fellow citizens (see Lange 2017a). Importantly, *stasis* was only possible due to war. The central feature of Thucydides’ description of Corcyra is the disintegration of the *polis* due to *stasis*.¹⁹ Such disintegration is also central to the Roman civil war of the Late Republic.²⁰

In the end the oligarchs rebel (3.70.1) and attack the people, defeating them (3.72.2). Each side appeal to slaves to join them and 800 mercenaries are brought in by the oligarchs from the mainland. Fighting follows. The oligarchs are then defeated, but a Peloponnesian fleet arrives (3.76.1: *stasis*). A naval battle follows; the Corcyraeans lose, but the intruders later flee, as a larger Athenian fleet approaches. A massacre of the oligarchs and their faction follows (the Messenian hoplites and fleet of Eurymedon make this possible). This equals a foreign intervention, as well as a proxy war between oligarchic vs. democratic rule, Sparta vs. Athens. There is a struggle in the city and the factions reach outside for help. Whether we call

¹⁹ Idea of disintegration from Wassermann 1954, 46: political and moral crisis.

²⁰ On Thucydides’ account as a description of civil war see Price 2001; 2015; Kalyvas 2006, 8; Kagan 2009, 12–13; Hawthorn 2014, 96–100. On Thucydides’ description of the Peloponnesian War and *Realist Theory*, see Levy and Thompson 2010, 28–29 (on civil war and *Realist Theory*, see Christia 2012).

this civil strife during wartime and civil war proper, they are inseparable. Whilst there was *stasis* earlier in Greek history (Thucydides 3.34, on Notium), it here becomes closely related to warfare.²¹

While there seems to be a difference in scale to Roman *bellum civile*, this is mainly a question of an historical development and the size of the polity—although that was not so different from the total war during the Peloponnesian War. “Factionalism”—according to Thucydides a flaw in human nature—is a central theme of Thucydides’ Corcyra description.²² It is also an essential feature of civil war.²³ It is not an integrated part of warfare *per se*, but always and logically an integrated part of *stasis* and *bellum civile*. Nevertheless, even in Thucydides things are not what they appear to be: the conditioning circumstance in 427 BCE was war, which again worsened the phenomenon of *stasis*.²⁴ He did not call it *bellum civile* or *polemos emphylios*, but it was precisely that; or it was at least close to being the same, a clearly related phenomenon. More importantly, the historian famously opines at 3.82.2—and significantly, just after mentioning *stasis*—that:

ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ,

...war, which takes away the comfortable revisions of daily life, is a violent schoolmaster and tends to assimilate men’s character to their conditions” [trans. Hornblower 1997].

This is a description either of the *stasis* at Cocyra, or alternatively, a description of a phenomenon similar to *stasis* (why else mention it?). This suggests that Thucydides saw

²¹ Thucydides offered a detailed description of *stasis*, as this was only the first of many civil wars to follow (3.81.4–5; cf. 3.82.1: of the wars to follow; see Hornblower 1997, 479). This may suggest that 427 BCE constituted a change, perhaps because it became closely related to warfare.

²² Hornblower 1997, 478–479; he uses the word revolution for *stasis* (480–481).

²³ Christia 2012; a reference to the domination of a faction had clear civil war connotations, and in late republican Rome a *factio* was associated with oligarchy (*RG* 1.1; *Sall. Jug.* 31.15; *Caes. BC* 1.22.5; *BG* 6.11.2 etc.).

²⁴ Hornblower 1997, 479, 490: “...the first serious wartime instance of what would become a general phenomenon”; this suggests that whilst there was *stasis* earlier in Greek history, it now became more closely related to warfare.

stasis as something related to *polemos*. Thucydides emphasises that the *stasis* occurring when the Corcyraeans were at war—that is, caught up in the war between Athens and the Peloponnesians—made their own *stasis* worse and more violent (see esp. 3.82.1–2). Labels are notoriously difficult; but this is a description of civil war, using a fitting word, *stasis*. According to Macleod (1979) ‘war’ and ‘faction’ are closely connected and the growth of *stasis* was a natural consequence of war; 3.82.2 emphasises that war foments *stasis*. Furthermore, in *stasis*, as in war, human nature is revealed. Consequently, even if we would conclude that they are not entirely the same, they are certainly similar. This is war, or, alternatively, *stasis*—which was only possible due to war.

Violence, factions, personal animosities, revenge and so forth are all features that traditionally occur in civil wars. Furthermore, there is the impossibility of neutrality (3.82.8; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8.5; Cic. *Att.* 10.1.2): people who maintained it were destroyed by either warring group—there is a personal element to this conflict, something common in civil wars.²⁵ Thucydides thus emphasises that *stasis* has a dynamic of its own. Wickedness and personal animosities reflect human nature (3.82.1–3): according to Thucydides, *stasis* is a thing that will always happen, as long as human nature remains the same. Comparing Thucydidean *stasis* to the Roman civil wars of the Late Republic, a difference in the scale and bloodiness of the civil war may be discernible; but the two are in essence manifestations of the same phenomenon. Once more this shows the importance of approaching (civil) war in a more inclusive manner than just focusing on conventional armies and battles. And, significantly, these labels (war, *stasis*, and *bellum civile*) were as flexible and as slippery in ancient times as they are today.

Where does this leave us? There is no denying that a new name was used during the Late Republic—*bellum civile*—which might suggest a new kind of warfare, or perhaps more likely, that the Romans now regularly witnessed something similar to *stasis*, sometimes, but not exclusively, involving even larger opposing armies (than Greek warfare). Consequently and logically a Latin name was invented. But what about Dio? How does his writing fit this development? The mutability and flexibility known from Greek and Latin writers is also visible in Dio, but there is more to it: Dio wanted to explain the republican origins of internal

²⁵ Kalyvas 2006, claiming that there is a logic to violence. He challenges the conventional view of violence in civil wars as something irrational: it is generally not driven by the conflict itself, but by previous disputes and hostilities among the population and participants (389: “For the many people who are not naturally bloodthirsty and abhor direct involvement in violence, civil war offers irresistible opportunities to harm everyday enemies”); cf. Martin 2014.

struggles and ultimately civil war, something that in the end brought about monarchy, the only possible solution in his view to Rome's problems. Whatever we make of the 88 BCE turning point, in Dio this was only part of the story; a story of violence, *stasis* and *bellum civile*. Dio's narrative has the Late Republic take centre stage, but this was in consequence of a Republic that did not function; this was the story of violence, *stasis* and *bellum civile*—all products of human nature—but at the same time also a necessity in order to bring about monarchy.

Cassius Dio on violence and stasis (and civil war)

There are too many examples of *stasis* and violence in the early books (1–25) for a detailed analysis of them all. It is crucial to say, with Libourel (1974), that there is a surprising amount of violence and strife in these books, certainly in comparison with parallel sources on early Rome.²⁶ One might even go as far as to talk of an obsession with violence in Dio (cf. Bessel 2015). Libourel offers a compelling list of instances of violence in the early books (384–391: "... [Dio is] a good deal more violent and melodramatic than the other surviving accounts" (384)). The most relevant stories include the following:

- (1) Tarquinius Collatinus was almost killed by the people after being deposed from the consulship (Zonar. 7.12; contrary to Livy 2.2; Plut. *Publicola* 7.6; see also D.H. *AR* 5.11.1–12.3).
- (2) P. Valerius Publicola was allegedly aspiring to be king – Dio is the only version (F 13.2) where Publicola is almost killed (*contra* Livy 2.7.5–12; D.H. *AR* 5.19; Plut. *Publicola* 10).
- (3) Debtors in 495 BCE ended up rioting in the Forum, attacking the Senate and as a result almost killing all the senators (F 17.1–3; Zonar. 7.14.1–2; the parallel evidence only presents indications of violence: Livy 2.23.9; cf. 23–24; D.H. *AR* 6.26; cf. 26–29).
- (4) The first secession of the plebs in 494 BCE was, it seems, accompanied by violence (F 17.9; *contra* Livy 2.32.4; D.H. *AR* 6.47.2; Plut. *Coriolanus* 6.1).

²⁶ For a list of *stasis* in Dio, see the *Index Graecitatis* (compiled by W. Nawijn) which forms the fifth volume of Boissevain's edition of Dio.

(5) Spurius Cassius was wrongly put to death by the people (F 19; *contra* D.H. *AR* 8.69.3–4; 8.78.3, claiming he wanted to establish a monarchy in Rome; cf. Diod. Sic. 11.37.7; see also Livy 2.41).

(6) A secret campaign was conducted by the patricians to terrorise the plebs, including the burning to death of nine tribunes (F 22.1–2; Zonar. 7.17.7; Libourel 1974, 389–390, emphasises mob violence; cf. Val. Max. 6.3.2; Diod. Sic. 12.25.3; Festus 180L) – this tradition is not found in the parallel evidence (Livy and Dionysius).

(7) M. Manlius Capitolinus was captured during a revolt on the Capitoline in 384 BCE (F 26.2; Zonar. 7.24.10; cf. D.H. *AR* 15.353; *contra* Livy 6.18–20 (*Manliana seditio*; see Lintott 1970, 23 for more evidence); Plut. *Camillus* 36).

Libourel emphasises that these stories were unfavourable to the Romans (1974, 387; 390–393). This may however be too simplistic if we accept that Dio wrote in the “realist” tradition of Thucydides (see above).²⁷ Libourel is right, however, in emphasising that Dio did not produce an idealised past (1974, 391; *contra* Kemezis, as above). He also suggests that these are not Dio’s own inventions, but must derive from his evidence (391–393). But Dio was a figure in his own right, a historian who created a narrative that suited his overall political objectives and structural understanding (Lange & Madsen 2016). The violent details in Dio that contrast with other versions do not go back to a single source (*contra* Libourel). Rather, some of his points are more likely to be his own touches, reflecting his preconceptions: hence his stress on the rough handling of Collatinus and Publicola and the pillaging for food during the First Secession. Others are stories he found in sources (not necessarily the same one) and chose to use where Livy and others passed them over: hence the burning of nine tribunes and Capitolinus’ seizure of the Capitol. There is an abundance of violence in the early books of Dio. The question remains as to how *stasis*, violence, and civil war fit his narrative project. It is thus time to look at Dio’s narrative in greater detail.²⁸

²⁷ Lintott 1999 (cf. Nippel 1995, on late republican violence) takes the view that Rome was inherently violent (cf. Lintott 1970, mainly on the struggle between the *patres* and *plebs*). Raaflaub 2005 hardly uses Dio at all.

²⁸ Later in his narrative (52.2.6): men are selfish and resort to violence for self-aggrandisement; 77[76].5.1: men are incapable of enduring excessive honours (cf. Caesar 44.3–4; cf. 42.19); 52.18.1: ambition for sole power is not inconsistent with human nature; 36.31.4: those who hold positions tend to deviate from ancestral practices; 79[78].15.3: if in mortal danger, men destroy those who endanger them; etc. (see list in Reinhold 1985, 30); 39.6.1: human nature can change.

He begins on familiar territory: Romulus' killing of his brother Remus. The reason behind the killing is, according to Zonaras, the struggle for the sovereignty of the city (7.3), which in turn is related to human nature (F 5.12). This in many ways sums up Roman history until the time of Augustus, at least according to Dio. The fragmented Dio text also emphasises a state of discord related to factional politics (στασιάζσαντες).²⁹ Factional politics of course is related to the question of dynasts and indeed *stasis* and *bellum civile*.

Dio continues with the story of the Sabine women.³⁰ However, unlike Livy, Dio does not explicitly associate them with civil war. Fratricide is, however, a common trope for civil war even though actual brothers rarely kill one another (cf. Plato *Laws* 869c–d; Thuc. 3.81.5, sons killed by fathers; Sall. *Cat.* 43.2; Plut. *Sull.* 31). The story of the Sabine women is in many ways the Roman civil war *par excellence*, certainly in historiographical terms. Appian, in an unrelated story, sees a development from the centrality of family ties to factions (*B. Civ.* 1.5.18, echoing Thuc. 3.82.6: family bonds became less significant than factional bonds; Price 2015, 57). In Appian's view, family is replaced by factions. Dio continues by describing the early civil war of families killing each other (F 5.5–6, the speech of Hersilia; on Greek *stasis* and family ties, see Loraux 1997). This is of course an iconic scene,³¹ but it also sets the scene for the story Dio wants to tell, namely that Roman history was a history of civil strife and civil war—and thus of violence. Furthermore, there is an obvious military element to this story, with opposing armies. This is an early edition of a Roman *bellum civile*. This is *polemos*. This is a mythological version of Roman civil war.

The next story is similarly iconic and tells of the Albans and the Romans. Livy (1.23.1) relates the ever-great impact of civil war: *haec nuntiant domum Albani. et bellum utrimque summa ope parabatur, civili simillimum bello, prope inter parentes natosque...* (“With this answer the Albans returned to their city, and both sides prepared for war with the greatest energy—very like a civil war, almost as if fathers were arrayed against sons...”). This is again an almost mythical *bellum civile*.³² One might say, then, that this conflict was

²⁹ Cass. Dio F 5.3: ὅτι στασιάζσαντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους Ῥέμος καὶ Ῥωμύλος ἐκδηλον ἐποίησαν ὅτι τινὲς καὶ πάνυ ἀσφαλέστερον τοὺς κινδύνους τῶν εὐτυχιῶν συνδιαφέρουσιν (“Romulus and Remus by their mutual strife made it plain that some go through dangers together with far less risk than through prosperity”).

³⁰ See Beard 2015, 60–64; Dutton 2007, 124–129: in a military situation, the chance of being punished for rape is almost non-existent.

³¹ Cf. Livy *Per.* 79, brother killing brother during the civil war between Marius and Sulla.

³² Albeit not mythical for the Romans of course. The Romans did not believe their kings to be mythical. See Smith 2011.

not a civil war given that Rome and Alba were independent cities, but it did in fact resemble a civil war greatly as the citizens of the opposing sides had the closest of ties, since Rome had been founded from Alba. But why did Livy choose to depict the story in this way? If it was not at all a civil war, why then use *bellum civile*, “very like” or otherwise? Dio adds (F 7.3; cf. Zonar. 7.6, suggesting fighting in battle between two armies):

δι’ οὖν ταῦτα τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐκείνης ἀπέστησαν, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἡγεμονίας διηρέθησαν: ἀστασιάστους γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις ἀσφαλῶς συμβῆναί σφας ἀδύνατον ἑώρων ὄν, ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἐτέρων ἐπιθυμίας.

For these reasons they gave up that contention but disputed about the leadership. They saw that it was impossible, on the basis of equal sovereignty, for the two peoples to form an alliance that would be safe and free from strife, owing to the inherent disposition of men to quarrel with their equals and to their desire to rule others.

This is almost a normative (Thucydidean) statement from Dio: it implies the inevitable inability to create a *demokratia* undisturbed by factions (ἀστασίαστος; cf. Thuc. 1.2; App. *Hisp.* 72; Eus. *Mynd.* 26), here centred around the conflict between Tullus Hostilius and Mettius Fufetius, the two opposing leaders. Dio tells us that factions are always part of Republican political life; and that the only way to avoid them, in principle, is one-man rule—that is monarchy with Augustus as the anticipated answer.³³ Furthermore, according to Dio, factions, and thus civil war or potential civil war, are an integral part of Roman history. As in the excursus on magistracies and the triumph, Dio uses the early books (and the known

³³ Cass. Dio 44.2.3: “For successes have always been greater and more frequent in the case both of cities and of individuals under kings than under popular rule, and disasters do not happen so frequently under monarchies as under mob-rule. Indeed, if ever there has been a prosperous democracy, it has in any case been at its best for only a brief period, so long, that is, as the people had neither the numbers nor the strength sufficient to cause insolence to spring up among them as the result of good fortune or jealousy as the result of ambition” (τά τε γὰρ ἀμείνω πολὺ μείζω καὶ πλείω καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ιδιώταις ἐκ βασιλέων ἢ δήμων αἰεὶ ποτε ἐγένετο, καὶ τὰ δυσχερέστερα ἐν ταῖς μοναρχαῖς ἢ ταῖς ὀχλοκραταῖς συμβαίνει. εἰ γὰρ που καὶ δημοκρατία τις ἦνθησεν, ἀλλ’ ἐν γε βραχεῖ χρόνῳ ἤκμασεν, μέχρις οὗ μήτε μέγεθος μήτ’ ἰσχὺν ἔσχον ὥστε ἢ ὕβρεις σφίσιν ἐξ εὐπραγίας ἢ φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας ἐγγενέσθαι).

stories) to portray the Romans in a specific way: inherently violent and with factional issues which are typical of Republican rule. This is also famously referred to in the speech of Maecenas (thus referencing both earlier and later events), in which Augustus is advised to neutralise the factional elements in the senatorial class by hand-picking them personally (Cass. Dio 52.19.3; Burden-Strevens 2016). Augustus should appoint magistrates and governors himself, because, as Maecenas argues, this would prevent “the same things happening all over again” (ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ αὖθις γένηται) and give ambitious commanders no opportunity to march on Rome (52.20.3; 20.4). While this reflects the state of affairs in the Late Republic, it is also, I would claim, about a general Roman (and even human) problem. Hose points out (1994, 405) that the violent and often bloodthirsty account of the Struggle of the Orders does seem at odds with the comment in Maecenas’ speech that the problems of the Romans began in earnest with expansion and foreign empire (52.15.4–16.2). Be that as it may, but Dio also focuses on the early tendencies to strife, faction and civil war, as well as *dynasteia*. However, Dio does often appear to contradict himself and change his mind on specific matters during the process of writing, and this is not always down to his sources (see Lange 2016a, on a related issue).

Related to the question of dynasts, the fragmentary state of the early parts of Dio (until book 36) makes it almost impossible to judge the importance of individual dynasts in these books. As I have argued recently (Lange 2016a, 94–97), focusing on the example of Camillus, Dio will surely have gone into some detail about Camillus’ triumph before proceeding to the excursus (Zonar. 7.21). He must have mentioned the novel white horses, and we can infer from the later reference in Zonaras (9.24.3) that he mentioned Camillus’ prayer that an evil should befall only him and not the state.³⁴ In the surviving fragments, Dio (F 57.40) mentions that Scipio made the army his friend: ὅτι ὁ Σκιπίων καὶ μὴ ἐννόμου ἡγεμονίας λαβὼν ὄνομα ἐξ ὧν ἐχειροτονήθη, τὸ στρατόπεδον προσφιλές ἐποίησατο, καὶ ἥσκησεν ἐξηρηγηκότας ἐκ τῆς ἀναρχίας καὶ ἀνεκτίσατο κατεπτηχότας ἐκ τῶν συμφορῶν (“Scipio, although he did not receive the legal title of commander at the time of his election, nevertheless made the army his friend, drilled the men who had become sluggish through want of a commander, and brought them out of the terror with which their misfortunes had filled them”).³⁵ If anything, this is only a clue.³⁶

³⁴ For further discussion of these themes, see Coudry in this volume.

³⁵ Kemezis 2014, 106 sees a more idealised description than in the Late Republican narrative.

There are however some trends detectable: according to Simons (2009, see 187–299 for a discussion of individuals during the Middle Republic in Dio’s narrative), Dio acknowledges the Republican past, certainly the pre-Late Republic, as relevant, as *exempla*, due to the personalities of the period, including Scipio Africanus.³⁷ Personalities, Romans and well as enemies (such as Hannibal), appear to be introduced mainly at the point at which they become significant for Roman history (Simons 2009, 279; imitating Thucydides, see Rhodes 2015, 17). Whatever we make of these personalities, their portrayal was dependent not only on the sources Dio used, but also, I will claim, on Dio’s identification of trends that look forward to the Late Republic: his *Roman History* is not exclusively annalistic in nature, but may also have been formulated as a series of imperial biographies, beginning with the dynasts of the Republic.³⁸

Returning to the chronology of the narrative, Dio turns to Tarquin the Proud, the tyrant, a man who almost abolishes the Senate. This is followed by a story of violent behaviour, with Romans killed in the Forum Romanum in front of their fellow citizens (F 11.4–6; 7: a tyrant and a breaker of treaties; cf. Zonar. 7.10). Here we are closer to the better-known descriptions of violence during the Late Republic. After that follows a section summing up the Tarquins and their violent ways (Zonar. 7.11).

This is followed by a description of crowds and their leaders (the mob), and the statement that changes, and especially changes in government, are dangerous (F 12.1–3; cf. F 17.6). The fragment comes from the account of the first year of the Republic.³⁹ It may be constitutional conservatism, but probably reflects Dio’s Thucydidean tendencies. Changes, from monarchy to Republic and from dynasts to monarchy, were in fact all too dangerous for the (Roman) state.⁴⁰ This is all related to a basic premise in Dio’s early books: human nature

³⁶ F 57.42 mentions a mutiny of the soldiers of Scipio. In the end, the distribution of gifts—similar to the behaviours of dynasts during later periods—saved the day. The mutiny is called a *stasis* (similar to Polybius, as above).

³⁷ He also focuses on the envy of his opponents (F 57.54: φθόνος; one fascinating aspect is the triumph-like celebrations of Scipio, after his triumph proper was refused (F 57.56; cf. Livy 28.38.1–5)) and on Scipio Aemilianus (F 70.4–9; Zonar. 9.26.1–27.7, Scipio is characterised by modesty and humility).

³⁸ Lange & Madsen 2016, 2.

³⁹ See Rich in this volume: probably this comes from the speech of Tarquin’s embassy, rather than being an authorial statement as is usually supposed.

⁴⁰ The transformative effect of violence upon the constitution seems to predate Appian (Polyb. 6.10.12–14). Violence is viewed as transformative in both Appian and Dio, on which see Bessel 2015, 107.

and tendencies towards strife; again emulating Thucydides, especially in relation to the description of the Corcyrean *stasis*. Human nature is also at the centre of the next entry (F 17.7: ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως): “Justice is often worsted in an encounter with human nature and sometimes suffers total extinction, whereas expediency, by parting with a mere fragment of justice, preserves the greater portion of it intact. Thus the uncompromising attitude of the rich class toward the poor was responsible for very many ills that befell the Romans.” This is a very Thucydidean description of human nature.

The story continues as we move further into the crisis of the First Secession (F 17.14): “Whenever a large number of men band together and seek their own advantage by violence, they have for the time being some equitable agreement and display boldness, but later they become divided and are punished on various pretexts.” (ὅτι ὅταν πολλοὶ καθ’ ἓν γινόμενοι πλεονεκτήσωσι βιασάμενοι, παραχρῆμα μὲν ὁμολογία τινὲ ἐπιεικεῖ θρασύνονται, διαλυθέντες δὲ ἄλλος κατ’ ἄλλην πρόφασιν δικαιῶνται.”). This once again seems a rather cynical portrayal of human nature by Dio (another example is Cass. Dio 36.20.1–2, echoing Thuc. 3.82.2; see Pelling 2010, 106–107), befitting of his ideas of Roman history, in this case again from the story of the Struggle of the Orders.⁴¹ Zonaras adds that there was a relationship between foreign wars and internal problems, in this case the question of public land (7.17). War abroad meant less trouble at home. In an extreme case, this means internal and external wars are intertwined. In 473 BCE, the Fabii are defeated and the Romans lose to the Etruscans. As a result the foreign war turns into *stasis* (Zonar. 7.17).

In Zonaras 7.18 the word *polemos* is used: “The Romans, however, now had a war (πόλεμος) on their hands at home, in which the adversaries were slaves and some exiles...”. Two questions arise: is this a civil war, and furthermore, if so, does the word *polemos* derive from Dio?⁴² The rebels are finally defeated, but with the Romans losing many men (a discussion often related to claims for a triumph). This may relate to Appius Herdonius in 460 BCE and the fragment is thus out of place.⁴³ Livy (3.15–19) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (10.14–16) relate the story of Appius Herdonius, a Sabine who tried to orchestrate a putsch during the Struggle of the Orders (*FRHist.* 3.76, F 25 (TJC)). For this purpose, he was helped by exiles (Livy 3.15.9: wrongfully expelled). They are *hostes/enemies* (3.16.2) and slaves

⁴¹ According to Kemezis 2014, 106, this is a rather generic account, based on real class struggles. This seems to underestimate somewhat the implications of the struggle.

⁴² On Zonaras’ abridgement practices, see Mallan 2013; 2014; Simons 2009, 29–32.

⁴³ Cary 1914, 167 (Loeb Classical Library Vol. 1).

seeking freedom. The story thus relates to an internal struggle at Rome, fought by slaves and exiles (led by a Sabine: Livy 1.10 above) and also to a civil war). It is thus similar to the mercenary war mentioned by Polybius, in which a slave war is an internal war. Whatever the answer, this relates to the issue of flexibility in the definitions of warfare and civil war in ancient times. In modern terms, this constitutes foreign intervention in a civil war, with the use of exiles to gain the upper hand. If this is accepted, *polemos* is used to describe *bellum civile* in 460 BCE. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (10.14.3) even emphasises that Herdonius used the civil dissension between patricians and plebs in order to start the uprising, which could constitute foreign intervention.⁴⁴

The term ‘civil war’ (or *polemos emphylios*) is thus absent from the extant parts of Dio’s account of the Struggle of the Orders—although much has of course been lost—except in his reference to Herdonius’ coup (if *oikeios polemos* in Zonar. 7.18, as mentioned, accurately reflects Dio): this may of course describe an assault from outside by a force of slaves and exiles, which was different from the internal disorders. This would then be the reason for calling it a *polemos*. However, foreign war or not—possibly a semantic confusion—this was still a civil war, or an *oikeios polemos* (foreign intervention is often part of civil war; cf. Thucydides’ description of Corcyra).

Zonaras (7.19), referring to 445 BCE, again talks of discord and acts of violence (carrying on from 460 BCE). Factional problems are once more at the centre of controversy during the Struggle of the Orders (F 29.4). Such problems and the concomitant violence serve as a precursor to the faction-driven period of the Late Republic when they are used by dynasts. The order of the state was undermined and as a result, the great foreign wars of Rome are contrasted to periods of civil strife. Factional quarrels may have occurred in these wars, but nothing comparable to *stasis* (i.e., the Struggle of the Orders): ἀεὶ γὰρ τι τοῦ τῆς πολιτείας κόσμου στασιάζοντες παρέλκον, ὥσθ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς πολέμους πρὶν τοὺς μεγίστους ἀνηροῦντο, ταῦτ’ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ σύμπαντα ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἀστασιάστως μὲν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ χαλεπῶς κατακτήσασθαι (“For by their disputes they were constantly undermining in one way or another the good order of the state; as a rule, nearly all these objects for which they were formerly accustomed to wage the greatest wars, they gained in time—not without factional quarrels, to be sure, but still with small difficulty”) (στασιάζω = generally, to be in a

⁴⁴ At 9.31, Zonaras talks of civil strife and civil war amongst the Greeks themselves. They are obviously interrelated.

state of discord; ἀστασίαστος στασιάζω = not disturbed by faction). This is a description of what, according to Dio, is an inherent problem in Roman history.

Zonaras (7.26; see Rich in this volume) then presents us with a splendid description of what is in principle a definition of civil war: the Romans and the Latins are at war, fighting one another, looking alike, were equipped alike, and even spoke alike. This was a problem when fighting each other. Who is who is always an issue in civil war, even if this description is not related to an actual civil war. This carries on (8.2) with reference to a sedition (related to annulment of debts).

Dio's description of foreign war is essential for understanding civil strife and civil war (cf. Zonaras 7.19, on foreign wars). He emphasises the unity during the Second Punic War (F 52.1: ὁμονοία = *concordia*):

ὅτι οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἤκμαζον καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοία ἀκριβῶς ἐχρῶντο, ὥσθ' ἅπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐκ μὲν ἀκράτου εὐπραγίας ἐς θάρσος, ἐκ δὲ ἰσχυροῦ δέους ἐς ἐπιείκειαν φέρει, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς τότε διαλλαγῆναι: ὅσα γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εὐτύχησαν, ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἐσωφρόνησαν, τὸ μὲν θράσος, οὗ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέχει, πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἐνδευκνύμενοι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικές, οὗ κοινωνεῖ ἢ εὐταξία, κατ' ἀλλήλους παρεχόμενοι.

The Romans were at the height of their military power and enjoyed absolute harmony among themselves. Thus, unlike most people, who are led by unalloyed good fortune to audacity, but by strong fear to forbearance, they at this time had a very different experience in these matters. For the greater their successes, the more were they sobered; against their enemies they displayed that daring which is a part of bravery, but toward one another they showed the forbearance which goes hand in hand with good order.

This means *stasis* and civil war was not a linear process in Roman history, at least according to Dio. It explains why there is very little *stasis* in Dio's books relating to foreign wars (indeed, the patricians using foreign wars to *suppress* στάσις during the Struggle of the Orders supports this assertion). And it certainly is at odds with the early narrative in general. Then there was restraint and tolerance between citizens, in contrast to times of civil war. Again, returning to the above, Dio (F 55.3) emphasises that peace destroys what war has secured (cf. Zonar. 8.22: peace equates to slavery). This also leads to internal struggles, *stasis*

and full-blown civil war. Dio is, however, it must be remembered, an opponent of continuous Roman expansion (52.15.4–16.2). Finally, there is the story of the Gracchi at the beginning of the Late Republican period (F 83.1: Tiberius):

ὅτι ὁ Γράκχος ὁ Τιβέριος ἐτάραξε τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καίπερ καὶ γένους ἐς τὰ πρῶτα πρὸς τὸν πάππον τὸν Ἀφρικανὸν ἀνήκων, καὶ φύσει ἀξία αὐτοῦ χρώμενος, τὰ τε τῆς παιδείας ἔργα ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἀσκήσας, καὶ φρόνημα μέγα ἔχων. ὅσα γὰρ πλείω καὶ ἰσχυρότερα ταῦτα ἐκέκτητο, μᾶλλον ἐς τε φιλοτιμίαν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προήχθη, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἅπαξ ἔξω τοῦ βελτίστου παρετράπη, καὶ...

Tiberius Gracchus caused an upheaval of the Roman state notwithstanding the fact that he belonged to one of the foremost families through his grandfather, Africanus, that he possessed a natural endowment worthy of the latter, had received a most thorough course of education, and had a proud spirit. For in direct proportion to the number and magnitude of the advantages he possessed was the allurements they offered him to follow his ambition; and when once he had turned aside from what was best, he drifted, quite in spite of himself, into what was worst.

Rome is in a state of disorder or anarchy (ταράσσω). This was due to Gracchus’ ambition (clearly related to the idea of dynasts; cf. 85.1 on his brother). Dio continues (4–6):

Ὅτι Μάρκος Ὀκτάουιος τῷ Γράκχῳ διὰ φιλονεικίαν συγγενικὴν ἐκὼν ἀντιγωνίζετο. καὶ ἐκ τούτου οὐδὲν μέτριον ἐπράττετο, ἀλλ’ ἀντιφιλονεικοῦντες περιγενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ κοινὸν ὠφελῆσαι, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ βίαια, ὥσπερ ἐν δυναστεία τινὶ ἀλλ’ οὐ δημοκρατία, ἔπραξαν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄτοπα, ὥσπερ ἐν πολέμῳ τινὶ ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰρήνῃ, ἔπαθον. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἷς πρὸς ἓνα, τοῦτο δὲ πολλοὶ κατὰ συστάσεις λαιδορίας τε ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ μάχας, οὐχ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ τῇ τε ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, τῇ μὲν προφάσει τῇ τοῦ νόμου χρώμενοι, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διασπευδόμενοι, ὥστε ἐν μηδενὶ ἀλλήλων ἐλαττοῦσθαι. κακὸν τούτου οὐτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐν κόσμῳ συνέβαιεν οὐθ’ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὰ νενομισμένα ἔπρασσον, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια ἐπέπαυτο καὶ συμβόλαιον οὐδὲν ἐγένετο, ἄλλη τε ταραχὴ καὶ ἀκρισία³ πανταχοῦ πολλὴ ἦν· καὶ ὄνομα πόλεως ἔφερον, στρατοπέδου δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπεῖχον.

Marcus Octavius, because of a family feud with Gracchus, willingly became his opponent. Thereafter there was no semblance of moderation; but zealously vying, as they did, each to prevail over the other rather than to benefit the state, they committed many acts of violence more appropriate in a despotism than in a democracy, and suffered many unusual calamities appropriate to war rather than to peace. For in addition to their individual conflicts there were many who banded together and indulged in bitter abuse and conflicts, not only throughout the city generally, but even in the very senate-house and the popular assembly. They made the proposed law their pretext, but were in reality putting forth every effort in all directions not to be surpassed by each. The result was that none of the usual business was carried on in an orderly way: the magistrates could not perform their accustomed duties, courts came to a stop, no contract was entered into, and other sorts of confusion and disorder were rife everywhere. The place bore the name of city, but was no whit different from a camp.

We are (again) closing in on outright war between citizens, and violence flourishes in a manner more suitable to *dynasteiai* (δυναστεία = oligarchy or better, *dynasteiai*) than democracy (δημοκρατία). This may not be full-blown *bellum civile* as yet (Thuc. 3.82.8, on greed and ambition), but all of this parallels our modern as well as ancient knowledge of civil war: (1) the importance of family ties, and so too personal animosities; (2) a lack of moderation; (3) the centrality of violence; (4) warlike conditions; (5) individual conflict and factions (dynasts); (6) and the resultant state of discord in which the state no longer functions and the magistrates can no longer perform their duties (cf. Cass. Dio F 85.3: here the little brother is hated even by his own followers and undone by his own methods). Again, these tendencies towards internal strife date to the founding of the city, as an integral feature of Rome's legacy.

Conclusion

Dio has unsurprisingly revealed himself as a cynical observer of human affairs, with Thucydides as his model. But he is also an historian with a singular vision: he explains that while democracy may appear good and monarchy bad, monarchy, when not tyrannical,

works, while democracy does not. This is exemplified with the story of Caesar's assassins who had forgotten this basic political fact (44.2.1–5):

πόλιν δὲ αὐτὴν τε τηλικαύτην οὖσαν καὶ τοῦ τε καλλίστου τοῦ τε πλείστου τῆς ἐμφανοῦς οἰκουμένης ἄρχουσαν, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ διάφορα κεκτημένην πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ μεγάλους πλοῦτους ἔχουσαν, ταῖς τε πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς τύχαις παντοδαπαῖς καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ χρωμένην, ἀδύνατον μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ σωφρονῆσαι, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ μὴ σωφρονοῦσαν ὁμοιοῆσαι.

But for a city, not only so large in itself, but also ruling the finest and the greatest part of the known world, holding sway over men of many and diverse natures, possessing many men of great wealth, occupied with every imaginable pursuit, enjoying every imaginable fortune, both individually and collectively, — for such a city, I say, to practise moderation under a democracy is impossible, and still more is it impossible for the people, unless moderation prevails, to be harmonious.

Here we have the story of the failure of the Republic, not just the Late Republic. Violent and selfish behaviour is typical for a democracy (reflecting Thuc. 3.82 on political factions). We may ask how different the civil strife and civil war of the Late Republic was to the *staseis* of early Rome. It appears that the difference is only one of scale, if at all, and that these features were the product of a long development that originated with the kings—who, unlike Augustus, were tyrants. Looking at Dio's *Roman History* as a universal history, it becomes apparent that Dio wants to understand Roman history, to explain how the Late Republic came to be, and as a result how the Augustan principate saved the Roman world from internal struggle, at least for a while. An inclusive definition and approach to *stasis* and civil war is required to appreciate the way in which Dio unfolds the story in his narrative. *Dynasteia* and *bellum civile* may primarily be factors related to the outgoing Republic, but only as an expression of inherent problems within the system, mainly connected to democracy. The Late Republic should never be looked at in isolation, and certainly never was by Dio. Violence, factional issues, civil strife and full-blown civil war were an integral feature of Roman history, perhaps never more so than in the narrative of Dio.

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DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

BREAKING THE IDEALISTIC PARADIGM: COMPETITION IN DIO'S EARLIER REPUBLIC

Mads Lindholmer

Much recent scholarship has asserted that Dio's account of early Rome functions as an idealised contrast to the Late Republic.¹ This alleged moral decline from Early to Late Republic is almost canonical in Roman literature and the two main sources for the earlier Republic, Dionysius and Livy, also idealise this period. Furthermore, the abovementioned works and most other scholarship on Dio in the last few decades often echo older criticisms in not affording Dio an interpretative framework, and in criticising him for a lack of understanding of the Republic and for excessive influence from his own time.² Although some challenges to this critical perspective have been mounted lately, it is still widespread and the Early and Mid-Republic are almost completely ignored in this newer research, except as the subject of traditional *Quellenforschung*.³ Furthermore, I have shown elsewhere that Dio in fact incorporates a sophisticated interpretation of the Late Republic centred on political competition but the role of this competition in the earlier Republic has so far eluded attention.⁴

I will show that Dio retains the canonical idea of the Late Republic as distinctly negative and degenerative while still managing to break with the traditional idealisation of the earlier Republic seen in Dionysius and Livy, hereby creating a two-layered portrait of the Republic. Competition is present and important from the beginning of the Republic and it is exactly in this respect that Dio is distinctive. Competition is mainly internal in Dio's Early Republic and then switches to the external sphere during the Mid-Republic before degenerating in the Late Republic. This continuity also underlines that the problems of the Late Republic involving Caesar and Pompey were not an abnormality but rather the

¹ Fechner 1986, 141–143; Schettino 2006, 66–68; Simons 2009, 304–305; Rees 2011, 40–54; Kemezis 2014, 24, 102–106; Burden-Strevens 2016, 176–177. See, however, Hose 1994, 404–405 and Sion-Jenkis 2000, 90–91 who briefly counters this view.

² Millar 1964, 46; Gowing 1992, 292–293; Lintott 1997, 2514–2517; Schettino 2006, 70–72; Kemezis 2014, 93 among others.

³ Rees 2011; Burden-Strevens 2015; Lange and Madsen 2016; Fromentin 2016.

⁴ Lindholmer 2016; Lindholmer forthcoming 2018.

culmination of an institutional problem which had been consciously presented by Dio as inherent from the very inception of the Republic. This emphasis and continuity of factors thus evinces a sophisticated and coherent reading of the development of the Republic that stands in stark contrast to the criticisms of many modern scholars.⁵

Strikingly, Dio's rejection of an idealised vision of early Rome—and his argument that competition is germane to the Republic, proceeds to degenerate with catastrophic consequences—has in fact numerous parallels with modern interpretations of Republican history. Likewise, Dio's presentation of an Early Republic beset by internal strife in the absence of an empire and a Middle Republic where competition moves to the external sphere after the Struggle of the Orders and imperial expansion is well-known from modern interpretations of these periods. Dio's historical interpretation is thus, to our modern eyes, not revolutionary. However, in historiographical terms, Dio's interpretation is a radical shift, breaking away significantly from the previous source tradition. In short, Dio rejects the common idealisation and focuses on political competition as a problem inherent to the Republic from its inception. Since this interpretation, which focuses on the degenerative effects of competition, so closely resembles modern approaches to this period, sceptical critiques of Dio as a poor historian appear problematic.⁶ Essentially, political competition is central to modern interpretations and Dio is actually our best source for this interpretation; he gives a far better insight into the problem of competition than any of the parallel sources.

Competition in Dio

Before the analysis of the earlier Republic, however, it is important to set out Dio's conception of competition which will form the basis for my own examination of this problem in his narrative.⁷ Since Dio's history is essentially politically focused, the competition herein also becomes political in nature: individuals struggle for different types of political resources such as prestige, offices, military victories, commands, alliances, money and other elements that can be used to further the political goals of one's political group, family, or oneself. This political competition can often be identified by its egoistic aspect as the good of the state is frequently disregarded and the political advancement of the individual or his group is

⁵ Millar 1964, 46; Lintott 1997, 2514–2517; Simons 2009, 301–302; Kemezis 2014, 93.

⁶ See e.g. Lintott 1997.

⁷ See Lindholmer 2016, 13–18.

prioritised instead. This egoism is regularly highlighted through linguistic markers of which the most prominent are φιλοτιμία and φθόνος. It should be noted that φιλοτιμία is typical of classical Greek philosophy where it in fact also had a positive meaning,⁸ and occasionally competition in Dio does indeed manifest itself positively.⁹

Dio's history, and therefore the competition therein, is essentially split into an internal and an external sphere in line with the practice of (some) Roman annalists:¹⁰ internally, competition revolves around the political world of elections, laws and decrees, and is organised around Rome. Externally, on the other hand, competition is fundamentally focused on wars and the attainment of prestige, alliances, and monetary resources through military victories. It is important at this point to note that Dio himself never includes an explicit definition of competition and one should therefore be careful not to construct an overly rigid or categorical definition. I have therefore chosen to operate with a broad definition where acts based on political ambition and attempts to attain political goals, both internally in Rome and externally among the generals, as well as efforts to hinder the attainment of these by others, are seen as competition. More specifically, competition most often, but not always, manifests itself in the pursuit of offices and foreign commands.

However, this definition is not merely conjured up for argumentative convenience but is instead rooted in the Republican institutional composition itself. Firstly, the Republican governmental form with a limited number of offices naturally meant that a large number of politicians strove for the same goals and any act by an individual to obtain these therefore affected numerous other actors who would oppose and compete with this individual and each other.¹¹ Secondly, Dio in fact describes political competition as a zero-sum game where all attempts to further one's own interest impinge upon other political actors. This is clear from the following quote where Dio uses Pompey to set out his own view of human nature: "For he [Pompey] held that there were two things which destroy people's friendship, fear and

⁸ *LSJ* s.v. φιλοτιμία.

⁹ This, however, is rare in Dio. For an example from early Rome, see the story below of Decius and Torquatus (*Zonar.* 7.26.1). For other examples, see the speech of Agrippa 52.6.2, and that of Catulus 36.36.2. It should be noted that their positive conception of φιλοτιμία is fundamentally at odds with the actual narrative of the Late Republic.

¹⁰ On Dio's complex use of the annalistic tradition, see Lindholmer 2016, 38–60; Lindholmer forthcoming 2018.

¹¹ See e.g. Steel 2013, 49–53 as well as Lintott 1968. It is also commonly accepted that competition intensified after the reforms of Sulla which exactly limited the number of offices: See e.g. Steel 2013, 108f.

envy, and that these can be prevented by nothing except an equality in fame and strength. For as long as persons possess these last in equal shares, their friendship is firm, but when one or the other excels at all, then the inferior party becomes jealous and hates the superior, while the stronger despises and insults the weaker; and thus [...] they come to strife and war in place of their former friendship.”¹² Competition is here presented as a complex relative system where the successes of all actors are connected. Roman politics is thus described as a zero-sum game: in that respect, all attempts to secure political advancement or hinder others can be defined broadly as political competition.

In modern scholarship, Dio’s Early and Middle Republic are almost exclusively seen as an idealised contrast to the Late Republic, which would be a clear continuation of the idealised presentation of other sources.¹³ However, the idea that competition proliferated even in these periods is not surprising given Dio’s view of human nature as expressed in relation to Romulus and Remus: “so, no doubt, it is ordered by Nature that whatever is human shall not submit to be ruled by that which is like it and familiar to it, partly through jealousy, partly through contempt of it.”¹⁴ This is of course not really a comment on the problem of coregency, which plays a relatively limited role in Dio’s work, but rather on human nature and on the Republic since this governmental form in Dio’s eyes was fundamentally based on equality, especially equality of opportunity (ἰσομοιρία) and equality before the law (ἰσονομία).¹⁵ According to Dio’s assertion above, it is no surprise that competition would particularly proliferate in all periods of the zero-sum, equality-based Republic. Any attempt to increase one’s influence would diminish that of others, which would in turn engender jealousy and more competition. This notion that equality breeds competition is yet again clearly seen when the Roman king Tullius fights the Alban Mettius after he realises that an alliance is impossible, “owing to the inherent disposition of men to quarrel with their equals (ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας) and to desire to rule others.”¹⁶ These examples are of course from the regal period but Dio emphasises that the lessons to be learned about the problems of power-sharing are universal through his focus on

¹² Cass. Dio 39.26.1–2.

¹³ See n. 1 above.

¹⁴ Cass. Dio F 5.12.

¹⁵ On this area, see Fechner 1986, 37–39.

¹⁶ Cass. Dio F 7.3.

human nature. These problems would logically flourish in the Roman Republic since this system was fundamentally based on power sharing through the offices and their collegiality.

Dio articulates these views even more assertively in the aftermath of the murder of Caesar: “if ever there has been a prosperous democracy (δημοκρατία), it has in any case been at its best for only a brief period (γε βραχεῖ χρόνῳ ἤκμασεν), so long, that is, as the people had neither the numbers nor the strength sufficient to cause insolence to spring up among them as the result of good fortune or jealousy as the result of ambition (φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας).”¹⁷ This “βραχεῖ χρόνῳ” cannot be held to cover the whole Republic before the fall of Carthage and Dio even underscores the brevity by the emphatic γε. Furthermore, Dio asserts that competition, here seen in the shape of φθόνος and φιλοτιμία, is inherently linked to the δημοκρατία. This quote and Dio’s view of human nature are central as they show that competition was part of the very fabric of the Republic and Dio thereby breaks with the common idealisation of this period. Dio’s view of δημοκρατία, grounded as it is in his philosophical conception of ἰσομοιρία and ἰσονομία, is important: it suggests the presence of rational, overarching principles in Dio’s view on government for which I will argue in the following.

Although egoistic competition is inherent in Dio’s Republic, it does, however, change over time and is divided into three distinct phases. First, in the Early Republic external competition is scarce and it is instead internal, negative competition that is dominant. The negative competition of individuals is often countered through upright characters, the remorse of the perpetrator himself or the inability through lack of power to create problems. Another important inhibitor is, surprisingly, the δῆμος, who forcefully stop overly ambitious individuals—a sharp contrast to the Late Republic. Second, in the extant narrative of the Middle Republic, internal, negative competition is far less dominant and is instead portrayed as mostly an external phenomenon among the generals. However, as the traditions and laws are rarely overstepped, this competition never becomes threatening to political culture and institutions. The one central exception is Scipio who becomes a catalyst for internal discord in the narrative and thus underlines that internal problems as a result of competition were a constant presence, even during the generally harmonious Middle Republic.¹⁸ Finally in the

¹⁷ Cass. Dio 44.2.3.

¹⁸ The great power of the Scipios described by Dio is of course part of a long tradition. However, Dio still incorporates significant deviations compared to the parallel sources, as I set out below.

Late Republic, on the other hand, political competition becomes increasingly threatening and starts undermining the foundations of the state.

An important factor in this development is the increase in wealth and empire, which is supported by Dio's above assertions after the murder of Caesar and by Dio's Maecenas who in his speech highlights the problems of empire in a similar mode: "ever since we were led outside the peninsula and crossed over to many continents and many islands, filling the whole sea and the whole earth with our name and power, nothing good has been our lot."¹⁹ The expansion of empire is thus incompatible with the historian's conception of the δημοκρατία of the city-state, and the increase of resources available for competition through conquest fuels destructive στάσις. Dio thus clearly draws on the canonical idea of degeneration in the Late Republic which is, however, coupled with the continuity of competition in all Republican periods. This continuity is central: in fact, recent research has suggested that Dio downplays the importance of individual causes for the downfall of the Republic and the institutional problem of political competition is instead presented as the central destructive driving force.²⁰ Late Republican decline is of course common both in the source tradition and in modern scholarship. However, in Dio this decline is not a sudden Late Republican phenomenon but is rather rooted in the Republic itself as Dio had consciously portrayed competition as a problem throughout both the Early and Mid-Republic. Dio's distinctive presentation of these two periods thus makes the Late Republic the culmination of an inherent institutional problem rather than the product of abrupt moral decline, as often seen in other sources.²¹

The Early Republic

As this chapter is fundamentally based on the fragmentary part of Dio's history, a short methodological note is in order to set out the relative faithfulness of the excerpts and Zonaras. Recently, Simons greatly built on the work of Moscovich to show that Zonaras has three main methods of working, namely omission of Dio's moralising remarks, paraphrasing and summarising or near verbatim reproduction.²² Most importantly, Simons has found Zonaras

¹⁹ Cass. Dio 52.16.1–2.

²⁰ Lindholmer 2016; Lindholmer forthcoming 2018.

²¹ On Dio's relationship with the parallel sources, see Lindholmer 2016, 20–37; forthcoming 2019a.

²² Moscovich 1983; Simons 2009, 29–32.

to be mainly faithful to Dio, which has further been supported by Valérie Fromentin and Chris Mallan (with further contributions in this volume).²³ Furthermore, Simons has argued that the content of the Constantinian excerpts is close to Dio's original but warned against the possible presence of Byzantine aims in the choice of text.²⁴ These methodological considerations are important to establish as the following will be dependent on Zonaras and the excerpts in the absence of Dio's own text.

Against this background, let us now turn towards the Early Republic where destructive internal competition is surprisingly widespread. The first piece of narrative in Book 3 describes the internal struggle between the two consuls, Brutus and Collatinus: "Some of these [conspirators put to death by Brutus] were relatives of Collatinus, who was angry on their account. Accordingly, Brutus so aroused the people against Collatinus that they all but slew him with their own hands".²⁵ Collatinus seemingly puts family relations over the good of the Republic in this fragment but is incapable of creating problems as he is isolated and unable to utilise the power of the populace in the same way as is frequently attested in the Late Republic. One factor here could be the lack of resources. Dio, in the material quoted above from Maecenas' speech and the opening of Book 44, has presented this element as central to destructive competition. The problematic situation is solved as Collatinus must accept the judgement of the populace which is uniquely violent in Zonaras' narrative. Livy by contrast writes that Spurius Lucretius "with mingled entreaty and advice"²⁶ persuaded Collatinus to resign. This is paralleled closely by Dionysius²⁷ while in Plutarch, Publicola "saw that he was altogether obnoxious, and withdrew secretly from the city."²⁸ In all the parallel sources, Collatinus resigns peacefully, whereas Dio presents a far more violent narrative. It seems that Dio was keen to present important elements of his interpretation of the Republic as early as possible and a violent, assertive populace was fundamental.²⁹ However, it is striking that the populace here function as a check on competition and an arbiter, albeit through violence, in rivalry. This is not to argue that Dio viewed the populace necessarily

²³ Fromentin 2013, 23–26; Mallan 2014, 760–762.

²⁴ Simons 2009, 27–29.

²⁵ Zonar. 3.12.1.

²⁶ Livy 2.2.9.

²⁷ D.H. *AR* 5.12.1.

²⁸ Plut. *Publ.* 7.4.

²⁹ Libourel 1974. See, however, Kemezis 2014, 24, 102–106 who argues for a more idealised picture.

positively, but rather to emphasise that the mechanisms of competition are different compared to the Late Republic: Both modern scholars and Dio view the people in the Late Republic as a vehicle for aristocratic competition insofar as they are (ab)used by politicians in the pursuit of self-interest.³⁰ However, Dio presents the people as important for competition already in the Early Republic where they act far more independently and function as an inhibitor to aristocratic ambition rather than its instrument.

In a subsequent fragment, it is the new colleague of Brutus who is threatened by the people. We know the context from other sources: Brutus had died and Valerius Publicola, consul without a colleague, was building a house in a position well-suited for a fortress. The people suspected that Publicola was aiming for sole sovereignty “and they would indeed have slain him, had he not quickly anticipated their action by courting their favour.”³¹ Publicola only avoids the wrath of the people by humbling himself and thus here again the populace act as an inhibitor on the alleged ambitions of an individual who is forced to submit. It is also remarkable that Dio again is the only source to include that Publicola was almost ripped apart by the people; the accounts of Dionysius, Livy and Plutarch have none of this violence.³² Dio, then, seems from the outset to have rejected an idealised version of the Early Republic often found in other sources in favour of a more violent portrait,³³ indicating that he had a distinctive perspective on the period guiding his narrative.

Book 3 is indeed highly fragmentary. However, it remains striking that the last story in this book also explores the problem of internal competition. Publicola deceitfully tries to acquire the dedication of a new temple from Horatius by announcing the death of the latter’s son during the dedication, thereby rendering him polluted through grief: “Horatius [...] did not, however, surrender his ministry; on the contrary, after bidding them leave unburied the body of his son, as if it were a stranger’s, in order that it might not seem to concern his sacred office, he then performed all the necessary ceremonies.”³⁴ Here Dio presents two important types of politician in his history: the egoistic individual who, driven by personal ambition, attacks his rivals and deems his own good more important than that of the state, and the opposite who faithfully carries out the business of the state, considering Rome of more

³⁰ On the people in Dio, see e.g. Lindholmer 2016. For modern interpretations of their role, see Millar 1998.

³¹ Cass. Dio F 13.2.

³² Livy 2.7.5–12; D.H. AR 5.19; Plut. *Publ.* 10.

³³ Libourel 1974.

³⁴ Cass. Dio F 13.3–4.

importance than himself. The uprightness and strength of Horatius is here sufficient to offset the destructive ambitions of Publicola. This again contrasts sharply with the Late Republican narrative, where Cato's efforts to keep the dynasts in check are perpetually futile.

There is again here an interesting contrast to other sources where Publicola is off campaigning for the glory of Rome. Dionysius has no base tricks in his narrative whereas Livy and Plutarch assert that the story of the son is a scam made by associates of Publicola.³⁵ In short, Dio's account is far more dichotomised than the other sources; Publicola and Horatius are presented as two opposites. Book 3, the first of the Republic, thus puts forth a remarkably violent and less idealised picture of the Early Republic where competition is far more present than in the other accounts, yet functions very differently from φιλοτιμία in the Late Republic. Dio, then, seemingly presents his historical perspective on the Republic and its nature already in Book 3: competition is omnipresent and indeed at the base of Republican politics but because of the lack of funds to influence the people and the upright character of opposing individuals, the factor remained relatively unproblematic. Here we clearly see the two-layered nature of Dio's Early Republic: on the one hand he breaks with idealising traditions; on the other hand, the contrast with the Late Republic is clear in the presence of exemplary virtue.

A further example of Dio deviating from the common ideal is the story of Coriolanus. Here the historian introduces another important inhibitor on Early Republican competition, namely the remorse and virtue of the perpetrator himself. Coriolanus dislikes the people because he is not elected praetor and is banished when he refuses to distribute grain sent as a gift from Sicily. He proceeds to march against Rome with the help of the Volscians and ultimately only his mother and leading women of the family can convince him to turn back: "through fear of the multitude and shame before his peers, in that he had ever undertaken an expedition against them, he would not accept even the restoration offered him, but retired among the Volsci, and there died".³⁶ Strikingly, it is here the perpetrator himself who is overcome with remorse and desists from his undertaking—a story that is of course unparalleled in Dio's account of the Late Republic.

However, even this positive story has negative overtones not seen in the other sources: "When, now, this news [i.e. of an impending attack] was brought back to them, the men, for their part, were no more moved than before (οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες οὐδὲν μᾶλλον

³⁵ Livy 2.8; D.H. AR 5.35.3; Plut. *Publ.* 14.

³⁶ Cass. Dio F 18.12.

ἐκινήθησαν); they were, indeed, so bitterly at variance (κακῶς ἐστασίαζον) that not even dangers could reconcile them. But the women (αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες) [...] came (ἤλθον) to him in camp”.³⁷ In Dio’s account, then, the plebs and patricians blame each other for the exile, continuing their internal struggle (κακῶς ἐστασίαζον) even in the face of overwhelming danger and it is only the actions of the women that save Rome.³⁸ Instructively, Dio creates a contrast between the static men (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐκινήθησαν), even using στάσις to describe their struggles, and the active (ἤλθον) women resolving the danger.³⁹ The other sources describing this event are far more positive: Dionysius portrays the Romans as actively trying to solve the problem together⁴⁰ while Livy even argues that the fear of the enemy (*externus timor*) was in fact their strongest bond of concord (*maximum concordiae vinculum*) and the senate yields to the demands of the plebs in agreeing on a plan of action.⁴¹ In both Livy and Dionysius, the Romans are thus portrayed far more positively than in Dio and the women’s actions become a singularly heroic deed. In Dio, on the other hand, the women’s deeds are absolutely necessary as the internal struggle for political advantage between plebs and patricians has paralysed the state. The fact that Rome’s women rather than its men have to save the day is a forceful emphasis of this problem. Again, Dio’s portrayal is a far cry from the traditional ideal.

That competition was indeed a general problem in the Early Republic is further supported by Dio’s inclusion of a law in Book 7 “that the same man should not hold two offices at the same time nor hold the same office twice within ten years.”⁴² This is the *lex Genucia* duly noted also by Livy.⁴³ However, since Dio has consciously infused his narrative with numerous instances of destructive competition, the law appears a necessary measure to curtail this problem and its inclusion therefore reinforces Dio’s portrait of the Early Republic.⁴⁴

³⁷ Cass. Dio F 18.7.

³⁸ Zonar. 5.16.1; Cass. Dio F 18.7–8.

³⁹ Cass. Dio F 18.7–8.

⁴⁰ D.H. AR 8.22.5; 8.36–38.

⁴¹ Livy 2.39.7–9.

⁴² Zonar. 7.25. On restrictions on office holding in Dio’s Early Republic, see also Cass. Dio F 22.2.

⁴³ Livy 7.42.1–2.

⁴⁴ The inclusion of such laws was of course also important for Dio in order to appear a credible historian.

This picture of the need to inhibit that competition which was germane to the historian's conception of the Early Republic is further strengthened by his description of the origins of the quaestorship:⁴⁵ "And the management of the funds he [Publicola] assigned to others in order that the men holding the consulship might not possess the great influence that would spring from their having the revenues in their power. Now for the first time treasurers began to be appointed, and they called them quaestors."⁴⁶ Instructively, Dio here indicates that the access to large amounts of money for the leading men would be destructive for the state and this is exactly what happens in the Late Republic as politicians can woo the people and pay their own armies. Strikingly, no other sources portray the formation of the quaestorship in this way: the formation is absent in Livy and Dionysius whereas Tacitus and Ulpian focus on the constitutional developments in themselves rather than their underlying motivations, and Publicola is not mentioned.⁴⁷ Plutarch is the only source who approximates Dio: the former writes that Publicola made the reform to avoid having "the public moneys brought into any private house."⁴⁸ Dio is thus the only source to write that the quaestors were specifically meant to inhibit the influence and power of the consuls. That this was necessary is a continuation of Dio's rejection of the idealised Republic in which leading members were inherently virtuous; however, he still retains a dichotomy with the Late Republic where political problems always remain unsolved. Furthermore, this suggests that the increase in wealth was a central factor in the change of the mechanisms of competition.

A large part of the Early Republic, Books 4–8, is dominated by the so-called Struggle of the Orders which historians would commonly, and correctly, denote as *στάσις*. However, in Dio's narrative *στάσις* and political competition overlap as patricians and plebs are competing collectively for political advantages in a zero-sum game in much the same manner as individuals do.⁴⁹ This contrast between the collectivity of the earlier Republic and the individuality of the Late Republic is indeed a general theme in Dio's narrative.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Dio utilises the struggle between patricians and plebs in this period to again reject the parallel source tradition: as patricians and plebs compete collectively in the stasiotic

⁴⁵ On the origin of the quaestorship and other magistracies in Dio, see Urso 2005.

⁴⁶ Zonar. 4.13.1.

⁴⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 11.22.4–7; Ulp. *Dig.* 1.13; Libourel 1968, 70–73.

⁴⁸ Plut. *Publ.* 12.2.

⁴⁹ On *στάσις* in Dio in this period, see Lange in this volume.

⁵⁰ Kemezis 2014, 102–111.

environment, Dio presents a far more negative and violent picture than found in any other source. This is clear already during the disturbances of the debtors in 495: Livy asserts that “numerous bodies ran shouting through all the streets”⁵¹ and that nearby senators were in danger but no open violence occurred.⁵² Dionysius’ account is more violent; as the debtors run through the streets, “if anyone so much as touched them, he was forcibly torn in pieces”.⁵³ However, in Dio, this violent political competition between plebs and patricians is even more extreme: “all the senators would then and there have perished at the hands of the inrushing mob, had not some persons reported that the Volsci had already invaded the country. In the face of such news the populace became calm [...] because they expected that body to be destroyed forthwith by the enemy.”⁵⁴ Here it is not the occasional bystander who is threatened but rather all senators, who are almost attacked and killed and the plebs are even prepared to let Rome be defeated by the Volsci in their pursuit of political advancement.

Dio’s narrative is thus less idealised than the other sources’ which is paralleled in his representation of the first secession in 494: the people took possession of a hill and then “proceeded to secure their food from the country exactly as from enemy territory (ὡσπερ ἐκ πολεμίας ἐλάμβανον), thereby demonstrating that laws were weaker than arms”.⁵⁵ Dio is here using many typical civil war elements, such as the transformation of native land into hostile territory, naturally asserting clearly the use of violence by the plebs in their rivalry with the patricians. Livy, by contrast, writes that the plebs “quietly maintained themselves”⁵⁶ without giving provocation and Dionysius echoes this by writing that the plebs were not “laying waste to the country, nor doing any other mischief”.⁵⁷ Plutarch, lastly, writes that the plebs “committed no acts of violence or sedition”.⁵⁸ In short, all other sources emphasise that the secession happened completely without violence, whereas Dio presents a contrastingly violent portrait. Dio hereby again breaks with the idealisation of the Early Republic as his collective competition between plebs and patricians is far more violent than in the parallel

⁵¹ Livy 2.23.9.

⁵² Livy 2.23.9.

⁵³ D.H. *AR* 6.26.2.

⁵⁴ Zonar. 4.14.1.

⁵⁵ Cass. Dio F 17.9. Adapted from Cary 1914–1927.

⁵⁶ Livy 2.32.4.

⁵⁷ D.H. *AR* 6.47.2.

⁵⁸ Plut. *Cor.* 6.1.

sources. However, there is still a contrast to the Late Republic; the competition is collective and the people independently strive for needed reforms.

Further examples from the period only support this picture. Regarding the events around the consul Appius and his reforms of 471, Livy and Dionysius give the common story that Appius' reforms were opposed and tumult broke out in Rome which was stopped by Quinticius.⁵⁹ In Dio, by contrast, this is not an isolated incident: "the populace did not refrain from attacking even the praetors. They beat their assistants and shattered their fasces and made the praetors themselves submit to investigation on every pretext, great and small. Thus, they actually planned to throw Appius Claudius into prison in the very midst of his term of office, inasmuch as he persistently opposed them at every point".⁶⁰ Dio presents a Rome where the people are engaged in constant violent pursuit of advances and where the consuls, who are meant despite Dio's use of "praetors",⁶¹ are consistently and violently harassed. This portrait of collective political rivalry is further supported as Dio asserts that the plebs desired to imprison Appius specifically because he opposed them whereafter they even succeeded in enacting political reforms that favoured their own side "to the prejudice of the patrician interests (κατὰ τῶν εὐπατριδῶν)".⁶² Whereas Dionysius and Livy present an isolated problematic incident, Dio here portrays Roman society in general as permeated by violent and problematic political competition.

This serves as the stepping stone for Dio to include some completely unique narrative elements, namely that the patricians undertook a secret terror campaign against the leaders of the plebs: "they secretly slaughtered a number of the boldest spirits." Hereafter, Dio includes that "nine tribunes on one occasion were delivered to the flames by the populace",⁶³ and the struggle between patricians and plebs subsequently intensified. Coming as they do immediately after the abovementioned struggles between plebs and patricians, these narrative elements would appear to be a continuation of the reforms of Appius. Valerius Maximus does have a story of nine tribunes being burned but this is in relation to Spurius Cassius;⁶⁴ Livy and Dionysius have no parallels to these stories. Dio, then, has included some completely

⁵⁹ D.H. AR 9.48; Livy 2.56.

⁶⁰ Zonar. 5.17.

⁶¹ Urso 2011, 50–54.

⁶² Zonar. 5.17.

⁶³ Cass. Dio F 22.1; Libourel 1968, 120–124.

⁶⁴ Val. Max. 6.3.2.

unique and highly violent elements of political competition and thus succeeds in creating a far more negative portrait of the Struggle of the Orders than seen in the parallel sources.

Dio has thus incorporated a range of examples of negative political competition in the Early Republic. However, these negative examples actually have a positive counterpart when heroic Romans compete to sacrifice themselves for Rome. An example is the two consuls Decius Mus and Torquatus who before a battle against the Latins both have a dream that if one of the consuls devoted himself—that is committed ritual suicide in battle—the Romans would be victorious: “And there was so great rivalry (φιλοτιμία) between them in regard to the self-devotion that each of the consuls prayed that he might [...] obtain the right to devote himself”.⁶⁵ Here competition is shown to be not inherently negative but rather an unavoidable part of Roman society that can have both positive and negative consequences depending on the character of the individuals and the resources involved. This could be due to the ambiguity of the word φιλοτιμία, mentioned above, which had a positive dimension both on an individual and a collective level. However, it should be noted that this positive manifestation of φιλοτιμία is extremely rare in Dio. Besides its use in idealised speeches which do not accord with the actual narrative, the above story is in fact the only positive use of individual φιλοτιμία in the surviving parts of Dio’s Republic.⁶⁶ However, even in this seemingly idealised story, Dio has incorporated a telling deviation. In Livy, Decius is informed of his imminent death by the *haruspex* and thereafter decides to devote himself.⁶⁷ In contrast to Dio, Livy thus incorporates no competition. Dio thus appears to have deviated purposefully from tradition in order to underline that competition was inherent in the Roman Republic even in its most idealised moments.

Dio has, then, from the very outset infused his internal narrative with destructive competition which can be countered through the people, the general laws, or the upright character of a competitor or the perpetrator himself. This internal focus and the lack of external competition are unsurprising in the absence of empire and one should not underestimate the uncertainties as a consequence of the fragmentary state of the text. However, Dio’s Early Republic still contains far more destructive competition than the parallel sources and is so consistently different that it testifies to a conscious attempt to reject much of the tradition and to put political competition centre stage. Competition also has more

⁶⁵ Zonar. 7.26.1.

⁶⁶ For the use in idealised speeches, see for example the speech of Agrippa (52.6.2) or that of Catulus (36.36.2).

⁶⁷ Livy 8.9.1–3.

positive aspects when individuals vie to do service for Rome. Dio, then, presents a view of the Early Republic where uprightness, traditions and devotion to Rome counter problematic competition, but where this aspect is far more pervasive than in other sources. In the Late Republic, on the contrary, the base characters far outnumber the virtuous ones and they have infinitely greater resources at their disposal to win over the populace and destructively satisfy their own ambition. Dio thus succeeds in breaking with the idealised tradition while still maintaining the rupture with the Late Republic that is so central to the overall character of his work.

The Middle Republic

A noteworthy change in the Middle Republic, starting with the Pyrrhic War, is that internal political competition largely disappears from the extant narrative and the focus is shifted towards the competition among generals. Despite the caution needed with this fragmentary text and the loss of the narrative of the *lex Hortensia*, Dio appears to be accepting the tradition that Rome achieved internal stability after the resolutions of the plebs became binding upon the whole *populus* in 287. However, in Dio's perspective, problematic competition was inherent in the Republic and must be present also in the more idealised 'Middle' Republic. He therefore utilises the emergence of empire and the narrative of its development to incorporate and highlight destructive competition. Dio in part follows the common source tradition of the Middle Republic as a virtuous age. Indeed, he praises the Roman moderation after the victory over Pyrrhus: "Though the Romans were achieving such results as these and were ever rising to greater power, they showed no haughtiness as yet".⁶⁸ However, Dio again goes to great lengths to deviate from parallel sources and to include destructive competition which undermines the common idealisation. This competition manifests itself mainly in relation to the generals and their quest for glory and political advancement through military victories. These victories, in turn, foster another central aspect of competition which seems practically absent from the surviving Early Republican text, namely envy (*φθόνος*).⁶⁹ Dio's Middle Republic thus continues the previous interpretative focus of the Early Republic on competition but does so through new elements.

⁶⁸ Cass. Dio F 42.

⁶⁹ On jealousy in Dio's Middle Republic, see also Simons 2009, 222–240. On jealousy in Dio's Republic more generally, see Rees 2011, 30–33; Burden-Strevens 2015, 175–188; 2016, 207–214.

Dio's focus on the competition of generals is evident already in the very beginning of the First Punic War when the consul Gaius Cornelius rejects the senate's orders as he sees the opportunity of taking a city.⁷⁰ However, his selfish ambition has swift consequences as the Romans become surrounded and the whole army is captured "without their so much as lifting a weapon."⁷¹ This is clearly paralleled closely hereafter as Quintus Cassius is ordered to besiege Lipara and avoid battle but "Quintus, disregarding orders, made an attack upon the city and lost many men."⁷² Both Cornelius and Cassius here exemplify how commanders, even in the Middle Republic, attempt to use their position to achieve glory and thereby political influence but in the process of satisfying their ambition, injure Rome instead. A further example can be found at the end of the war where the Carthaginians sue for peace and Catulus, the consul contacted, accepts for selfish reasons: "Now he was disposed to end the war, since his office was soon to expire; for he could not hope to destroy Carthage in a short time, and he did not care to leave to his successors the glory of his own labours."⁷³ Catulus here disregards the interests of Rome and instead attempts to maximise his own glory, thus using his command for political advancement. The actions of these generals are a noteworthy parallel to the Late Republic where commanders consistently act out of self-interest and commands function as tools in political competition.

The incorporation of ambitious generals locked in political competition continues also in the interim period between the First and Second Punic Wars. Due to a range of threatening omens, the consuls, Flaminius and Furius, are called home but Flaminius refuses and argues "that in their jealousy (φθόνον) of him the nobles (τοὺς δυνατοὺς) were even misrepresenting (καταψεύδεσθαι) the will of the gods."⁷⁴ Flaminius is yet another example of a problematically ambitious general but, strikingly, the δυνατοί are here connected to φθόνος, a typical marker of egoistic rivalry. This focus on ambitious generals and on the general problem of φθόνος will continue in the Second Punic War and the interim period thus functions as a linking narrative where Dio keeps the problem of political competition in focus.

⁷⁰ Zonar. 11.10.

⁷¹ Zonar. 11.10.

⁷² Zonar. 11.14.

⁷³ Zonar. 12.17.

⁷⁴ Zonar. 12.20.

However, Dio at the start of the Second Punic War asserts that the Romans became more virtuous the more they succeeded: “For the greater their successes, the more were they sobered; [...] and they did not allow either their good fortune to develop into arrogance or their forbearance into cowardice.”⁷⁵ This praise could appear an odd assertion right after the example of Flaminius and also against the background of the destructive competition during the First Punic War. Yet, this competition has, as mentioned, moved to the external sphere in the Middle Republic while internally Rome is at peace. This legitimises Dio’s idealising praise which is, however, tempered by the consistent presence of problematic competition. This is supported in the opening part of the Second Punic War where Longus suffers a crushing defeat at the river Trebia: “Longus, [...] influenced by ambition (ὕπὸ φιλοτιμίας), presented himself in battle array.”⁷⁶ Φιλοτιμία plays an important part here which is paralleled as the Romans are crushed at Lake Trasimene because “Flaminius alone pursued, eager that he alone should have the credit for the expected victory”.⁷⁷ The Romans almost suffer another crushing defeat, which was chiefly brought about through Rufus’ youthful impetuosity: “Rufus, the master of horse, who possessed the vain conceit of youth, was not observant of the errors of warfare and was angered by the delays of Fabius”.⁷⁸ After having his army saved by Fabius, Rufus lays down his powers and submits to the former, who is constantly described as virtuous and devoted to Rome rather than to himself.⁷⁹ Here we again see the pattern established by Coriolanus where an ambitious and problematic individual is brought to his senses. The criticisms of the losing generals are paralleled in both Livy and Polybius but in their accounts these appear to be attempts at deflecting blame away from Rome and onto one problematic individual.⁸⁰ In Dio’s account, on the other hand, the egoistically ambitious generals are, against the background of the earlier narrative, a societal problem since they become further manifestations of the competition that was inextricably linked to the Republic, even during its most positive period. We here again see a two-layered representation where Dio maintains the difference between the Late Republic and earlier times while still incorporating competition.

⁷⁵ Cass. Dio F 52.

⁷⁶ Zonar. 14.24.

⁷⁷ Zonar. 14.25.

⁷⁸ Zonar. 14.26.

⁷⁹ E.g. Zonar. 14.26.

⁸⁰ Livy 21.53; Polyb. 3.70.7.

This is further seen as Scipio is relieved of his command after his victories in Spain and just before moving into Africa. Dio comments: “he would certainly have accompanied something worthy of his aspirations [...] had not the Romans at home, through jealousy (φθόνῳ) and through fear of him, stood in his way.”⁸¹ Φθόνος here seems to be a permeating feature and the narrative is striking in its contrast to Appian, Livy and Polybius as Scipio in all these accounts returns to Rome naturally and of his own accord as his task in Spain was over.⁸² Strikingly, Appian asserts that even those who had been jealous of Scipio admired and lauded him. Furthermore, in Livy it is in fact Scipio who is portrayed negatively and the senate is right to question him, which Livy does through the speech of Fabius, described as “appropriate to the circumstances [...] and backed up by the weight of his character”.⁸³ Livy and Polybius thus deflect the guilt of the problems onto Scipio, whereas Dio is more critical towards the political system in general and presents jealousy as an important factor.

This theme of jealousy is continued by Dio. He later asserts that the senate was displeased with Scipio and wished to summon and remove him from command since “he was said to be turning over the property of the allies to the soldiers for plunder, and he was suspected of delaying his voyage to Carthage purposely in order that he might hold office for a longer time; but it was principally at the instigation of men who had all along been jealous (οἱ φθονούντων) of him that they wished to summon him.”⁸⁴ Dio here again rejects the idealisation by presenting the Roman senate as undermining common affairs due to their jealousy of Scipio. However, he also creates a contrast with the Late Republic as the accusation that Scipio wished to perpetuate his command is seemingly unfounded. This clearly contrasts with the Late Republic where commanders exactly strive to prolong their commands in order to satisfy their ambition.⁸⁵

Although Scipio is often the victim of jealousy and generally is portrayed positively, he too is part of the often egoistic competition. This is seen in Scipio’s attack on Hannibal just before the arrival of reinforcements: “Scipio, in fact, had been afraid that Nero might be so prompt as to appropriate the glory of his own toils, and so at the first glimmer of spring, he

⁸¹ Cass. Dio F 57.54.

⁸² App. *Hisp.* 38; Livy 28.38; Polyb. 11.33.7–8. On jealousy in Dio’s Middle Republic, see also Simons 2009, 222–240. On Scipio in Dio, see Coudry in this volume.

⁸³ Livy 28.43.

⁸⁴ Cass. Dio F 57.62.

⁸⁵ Burden-Strevens 2016, 14–15.

had advanced against Hannibal”.⁸⁶ Scipio here attacks Hannibal despite the imminent arrival of potential reinforcements merely to retain the glory for himself. This is not due to a personal fault with the generally praised Scipio but is rather the consequence of a problematic competitive system that endures even during the positive Middle Republic. During the Second Punic War, Dio’s Romans are indeed often virtuous. However, destructive competition, manifested in ambitious commanders and a general climate of jealousy unmatched in the parallel sources, again shows Dio’s rejection of the canonical idealisation of the period.

This presentation is clearly continued after the Second Punic War as Africanus lets concern for his captured son as well as personal ambition influence his peace treaty with Antiochus after defeating the latter in battle: “Africanus was well disposed toward him for his son’s sake, and the consul, moreover, did not wish to have the victory left to his successor, who was now drawing near; consequently they laid upon Antiochus conditions no more severe than those they had originally made before the battle.”⁸⁷ In the previous narrative, overly ambitious generals were normally penalised with defeat. However, here Africanus’ desire to retain the glory of his victory rather manifests itself negatively in the form of excessively lenient peace terms for a threatening enemy. Nonetheless, Africanus’ behaviour is a clear continuation of the previous problem of competition among ambitious commanders.

However, φθόνος remains the most prominent manifestation of destructive competition in the period after the Second Punic War and features consistently in the narrative. This is clear already in Book 18, that is the book following the Carthaginian defeat: the praetor Furius won an important victory in 200 against remaining Carthaginians and their allies, and hereafter made peace terms with some of the allies and desired a triumph. However, “Aurelius the consul, who was jealous (φθονήσας) of the praetor’s victory, conducted a retaliatory campaign”⁸⁸ and opposed Furius’ bid for a triumph.⁸⁹ This is yet a further example of φθόνος, which is fundamentally connected to competition, playing an important role, even in the Middle Republic. Φθόνος again becomes central when it drives groundless attacks on Scipio Africanus and Scipio Asiaticus. Dio does note other formal reasons such as the excessive appropriation of spoils by Asiaticus “but the true cause of their

⁸⁶ Zonar. 17.14.

⁸⁷ Zonar. 19.20.

⁸⁸ Zonar. 18.9.

⁸⁹ Cass. Dio F 57.81.

conviction was jealousy (φθόνον).”⁹⁰ Significantly, the jealousy is not ascribed to anyone in particular as Dio merely notes that “many were jealous (ἐφθόνουν [...] πολλοί) of the Scipios”,⁹¹ which indicates that this was a general problem, which is indeed supported by the previous narrative. Livy by contrast lengthily portrays the conviction of Africanus as the doings of the Petillii who “had tried to become conspicuous by darkening another’s [Africanus’] reputation” and “the whole [senatorial] order” consequently assailed the Petillii with abuse.⁹² Regarding Asiaticus, Livy argues that no certainty about the details of the case can be established but asserts that there was “general delight at the news of Scipio’s release”.⁹³ Livy here creates a picture of a generally virtuous Rome with a few corrupted individuals. Dio, by contrast, presents a Rome that is permeated by jealousy and where this problematic feature of competition, rather than a few individuals, is the main driving force behind the convictions.

Jealousy was indeed omnipresent in the Middle Republic according to Dio: “[Scipio Aemilianus] alone of men, or at least more than others, escaped the envy of his peers, as well as of everyone else.”⁹⁴ Here Dio again breaks with the idealistic tradition of the Middle Republic by asserting that no one, except perhaps Scipio Aemilianus, avoided jealousy which in this portrayal becomes an unavoidable part of Roman society and human nature. However, jealousy remains far more prominent in the Late Republic⁹⁵ and Dio still includes idealised stories such as Paulus who sacrifices his own family to avoid divine enmity against Rome.⁹⁶ Dio hereby achieves the contrast to the Late Republic while still creating continuity by breaking with the idealised tradition.

Thus in the Middle Republic, negative competition is mainly presented in the external sphere and only in relation to Scipio does the focus switch to internal, destructive political rivalry in Rome. This shows that the Middle Republic was presented as an unusually positive period where the strict observance of constitutional precedence and the general virtuousness, both of individuals and of Rome as a whole, suppress internal struggles. However even in this

⁹⁰ Zonar. 19.20.

⁹¹ Cass. Dio F 63.

⁹² Livy 38.50–53

⁹³ Livy 38.50–60, 38.60.7.

⁹⁴ Cass. Dio F 70.9. For a commentary on Books 21–30, see Urso 2013.

⁹⁵ Burden-Strevens 2015, 175–188, 236–248; 2016, 11–16.

⁹⁶ Zonar. 20.24.

period Dio emphasised that competition was ever present under the surface, merely needing a catalyst. It is intriguing that Scipio functions precisely as the catalyst for such destructive competition: he is the one general to enjoy important, exceptional treatment in the Middle Republic, being given a generalship at only twenty-three.⁹⁷ This could be a foreshadowing of the problems of the Late Republic where exceptional treatment in the form of extraordinary commands becomes so deleterious.⁹⁸ The φθόνος and problems surrounding Scipio are, then, arguably an early warning against the dangers of violating *mos maiorum* and also function to show the constant threat of destructive competition, even in the Middle Republic; it was an unavoidable part of Dio's conception of the *res publica*.

Yet the fragmentary first part of the Late Republican narrative still heralds a shift. In what remains of Books 22–24, no one is portrayed positively: the reader is immediately met with a barrage of destructive competition.⁹⁹ The first consuls mentioned, Metellus and Claudius, are involved in destructive competition to a degree not seen before: “Claudius, the colleague of Metellus, impelled by pride of birth and jealousy (φθονῶν) of Metellus, since he had chanced to draw Italy as his province, where no enemy was assigned to him, was eager to secure by any means some pretext for a triumph; hence he set the Salassi, a Gallic tribe, at war with the Romans”.¹⁰⁰ Claudius here provokes war for his own ambition in a move similar to that of Caesar during his command in Gaul.¹⁰¹ Several other incidents could be mentioned such as Lucullus refusing to give back statues borrowed from Mummius; Caepio attempting to destroy his own soldiers because of insults from them; or Furtius taking Pompeius and Metellus on campaign, despite their hostility to each other and him, merely in order to have reliable witnesses for his own successes.¹⁰² This leads down to Gracchus and Octavius attacking each other for personal reasons (ἀντιφιλονεικοῦντες) and “there was no semblance of moderation.”¹⁰³ Here competition has clearly moved into the domain of the Late Republic. It has become thoroughly destructive and through the constancy and exclusiveness of this

⁹⁷ Zonar. 16.9. On Scipio, see Coudry in this volume.

⁹⁸ Coudry 2016; Burden-Strevens 2016.

⁹⁹ Zonaras did not use this part of Dio's narrative and we are therefore wholly reliant on fragments.

¹⁰⁰ Cass. Dio F 74.

¹⁰¹ See e.g. Cass. Dio 38.43.

¹⁰² Cass. Dio F 76, F 78, F 82.

¹⁰³ Cass. Dio F 83.4.

aspect, the Late Republic is presented as a clear break from the time before the fall of Carthage.

Conclusion

In the above I have traced the development of competition in the Early and Middle Republic of Dio's work and shown that this is a constant element in the historian's view of the Republican system. The consistent presence of problematic competition in the earlier portions of the *Roman History* amounts to a fundamental rejection of idealising historiographical traditions for the period. One could object that the fragmentary state of Dio's text undermines or even precludes such conclusions. However, Dio consistently focuses on competition throughout the Early and Middle Republic and, as I have shown elsewhere,¹⁰⁴ competition is likewise absolutely central to Dio's Late Republic. Furthermore, comparisons of Dio's narrative with the parallel sources demonstrate constant deviations and unique narrative elements that are thoroughly informed by Dio's broader interpretative focus on competition. Consequently, the coincidences of survival can not fundamentally undermine the conclusion that Dio had a premeditated and distinctive interpretation centred on competition.

Dio's seeming distinctiveness, moreover, could be explained away by the supposed existence of a source no longer extant today but followed by Dio.¹⁰⁵ However, Dio's interpretative focus on competition spans the entire Republic and is unparalleled among the other Late Republican sources as well.¹⁰⁶ Dio thus had a very different interpretative framework from other writers and from the outset manipulated his material to support it. The idea that a single source furnished Dio with this interpretation and all the necessary narrative material is therefore highly speculative and implicitly accepts Nissen's 'law' which assumes that ancient historians generally worked from one principal source at a time.¹⁰⁷

One reason for Dio's focus on competition is the Greek historian's idea of human nature where competition is a central aspect. However, Rees and Burden-Strevens have

¹⁰⁴ Lindholmer 2016; forthcoming 2018; forthcoming 2019a; forthcoming 2019b.

¹⁰⁵ So Libourel 1968; 1974.

¹⁰⁶ On Dio's relationship with the parallel sources for the Late Republic, see Lindholmer forthcoming.

¹⁰⁷ This often unsupported idea continues to permeate studies of Dio despite the hazy state of modern knowledge about ancient working methods. See e.g. Simons 2009 or Westall 2016. For a contrasting view, see Rich 1989, 89–92; Lindholmer 2016, 21–23, 36–37.

shown that in the Augustan age, problematic competition almost vanishes or changes drastically, and its negative manifestations in the Early and Middle Republic therefore remain striking and in contrast to other sources.¹⁰⁸ It furthermore suggests that the destructive competition of this period emerges from and is facilitated by the Republican governmental form in itself rather than merely from human nature or the character of individuals. Nevertheless, competition in Dio's Early and Middle Republic always stays within the overall boundaries of republican tradition. This is a clear contrast to the Late Republic and Dio thereby manages, in a sophisticated and premeditated manner, to emphasise the differences in severity and perniciousness between competition in the earlier and Late Republic. However, Dio simultaneously succeeds in breaking with the historiographical 'ideal' of these earlier periods by consistently including destructive competition and hereby creates a two-layered presentation of the age. Through the constant inclusion of problematic competition also in the earlier Republic, Dio achieves continuity and coherence in his interpretation of Republican political culture.¹⁰⁹

The change in competition in the Late Republic could also constitute the main reason for the fall of the Republic itself.¹¹⁰ This is supported in the first fragments of the Late Republic which are completely dominated by a far more severe and destructive competition than seen previously in the narrative, which is the most central transformation as we move into this period. Furthermore, it was essential for Dio to show that the problems of the Republic were not just the doings of Caesar or Pompey but rather inherent in the political structure from the start. In this argument, the rejection of the ideal of the earlier Republic was absolutely fundamental. Dio thus puts together a coherent and premeditated overarching interpretation that undermines the arguments of Millar and Lintott and even defies the more cautious criticisms by Simons or Kemezis.¹¹¹ It furthermore undermines Kuhn-Chen's and Rees' arguments that Dio's account was primarily created through a moralising perspective.¹¹² Human nature was certainly important but is subordinated to the workings of the political structure which is Dio's central arena of investigation.

¹⁰⁸ Rees 2011, 242–261; Burden-Strevens 2016, 14–15.

¹⁰⁹ See Lindholmer 2016.

¹¹⁰ See Lindholmer 2016; forthcoming 2019a.

¹¹¹ Millar 1964, 46; Lintott 1997, 2514–2517; Simons 2009, 301–302; Kemezis 2014, 93.

¹¹² Kuhn-Chen 243–246.

This conclusion suggests that Dio's work is not merely the result of his own time but a distinctive historical interpretation that deserves attention in its own right.¹¹³ Dio emerges as an independent and assertive historian who has been unfairly criticised for his lack of interpretative skill. Dio has also often been criticised for not understanding the Roman Republic and been seen as an inferior source for the Early and Middle Republic compared to for example Livy or Polybius.¹¹⁴ However, Dio's focus on competition as a central part of the Roman political system from the start and on the consequent problems parallels modern interpretations of the period to a larger degree than any other source. Dio, then, is our most developed source for the absolutely central problem of Republican competition. Arguably we have underestimated the importance of Dio in shaping modern ideas about the Republic and will profit from taking his broader interpretation of this period into account.

¹¹³ *Contra* e.g. Gowing 1992, 292–293 and Schettino 2006, 70–72.

¹¹⁴ See e.g. Lintott 1997, 2514–2517. See, however, Urso 2002; 2005; 2011 for a contrasting view.

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Part III: Early Rome & Dio's Project

DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

SPEECH IN CASSIUS DIO'S *ROMAN HISTORY*, BOOKS 1–35

John Rich

The speeches in the fragmentary early books of Dio's *Roman History* have received relatively little attention, and judgements passed on them have tended to be unfavourable. Millar, for example, speaks dismissively of the "rhetorical moralizings of the early books".¹ Recently, however, Kemezis has presented a much more positive assessment of these speeches, in the course of his subtle discussion of Dio's handling of historical periodization (Kemezis 2014, 90–149). Kemezis draws a strong contrast between the speeches in Dio's account of the collapse of the Republic in the extant books and those in the earlier books covering the period when republican government was still operating effectively. In the earlier books, in his view,

speeches appear to have been more numerous and to have been arranged in more complex clusters of debate...Dio chooses to dramatise a decision-making process based on apparently genuine deliberative oratory. There is no evidence that the speakers in these Republican debates are speaking in their own personal interests or in those of men who control them, and they appear to believe...that the courses of action they advocate are...in the public interest...Results of these debates are not pre-determined from an internal perspective, and...people act differently and positively based on reactions to speakers.²

By contrast, in the extant books,

speeches will be relatively sparse, and few if any of them will inform decisions that lead to effective action. Most...consist either of the dynasts presenting transparent lies or of figures such as Cicero making arguments that turn out to have no influence on the actual course of events. Dio's purpose in relating these speeches is not, as before, to explain the reasoning and motivation behind key decisions. Rather, he means to portray rhetoric itself, and how it functioned, what

¹ Millar 1961, 13. For his assessment of the speeches in these books see Millar 1961, 12–14; 1964, 78–83.

² Kemezis 2014, 106–107.

sorts of propaganda were effective, and how impotent more enlightened forms of discourse might be.³

Kemezis (2014, 106–107 n. 35) supports his interpretation with a listing of speeches in the fragmentary books which is fuller than that given by Schwartz (1899, 1718), but still admittedly selective. A further listing has recently been provided by de Franchis (2016, 203–204) of the speeches in these books which are paralleled in Livy.

For a closer assessment of Dio's use of speech in the early books a fuller investigation is required of the individual speech episodes and their reconstruction from the fragmentary remains. No such inquiry has yet been undertaken, and the present paper offers a first attempt.⁴ The first two sections provide some preliminary observations on speech in Dio's extant books and a consideration of the methodological issues posed by the identification and assessment of the speech episodes in the fragmentary early books. In the following sections the traceable speech episodes in these books are discussed by the successive historical periods covered.

Speech in Dio's Books 36–60

Dio's Books 36–60, covering the years 69 BC to AD 46, are preserved in one or more manuscripts, although with a few gaps in Book 36 and numerous gaps from 55.9 (6 BC) on. These books, as preserved, contain fourteen extended speech episodes, tabulated in Table 1, and scholarly discussion of Dio's use of speech in these books has concentrated almost exclusively on these episodes. They comprise eight single speeches, four multi-speech debates, and two dialogues, of which one (Cicero/Philiscus) consists just of shorter exchanges and in the other such exchanges lead into a longer speech by Livia. The episodes thus include eighteen extended speeches overall.

Caesar's four-chapter speech to the senate is much the shortest of these extended speech episodes; most range from seven to fourteen chapters, and there are two monsters

³ Kemezis 2014, 111. The contrast which Kemezis draws between these two groups of speeches is linked to his view that Dio portrays the Late Republic as a time of *dynasteia* (personal power) rather than *demokratia* (republican government), a distinction which, as he acknowledges, is rather sharper than Dio's own usage (Kemezis 2014, 104–112).

⁴ See also Fromentin's discussion in this volume of Zonaras' evidence for speech in Dio's early books.

(nos. 8, 10), each almost the equivalent of a book's length. The episodes are also very unevenly distributed across Books 36–60: thus substantial parts of Books 38, 44–46 and 52 are taken up by extended speech episodes, but there are none at all in Books 39–40, 47–49 and 57–60, covering the periods 57–50 and 42–32 BC and from Augustus' death to AD 46.

Another notable feature is that all the speech in these episodes is in direct discourse. Other writers, Greek as well as Latin, often move between indirect and direct discourse and have extended passages or whole speeches in indirect discourse, but Dio uses exclusively direct discourse for extended speech.⁵

There is a wide variation in the audiences for these episodes. Three are private conversations (nos. 2, 10, 12), and three take place in army camps (nos. 3, 4, 9). The remaining episodes all take place on public occasions at Rome, but even here deliberative oratory plays a relatively small part. Only four of these episodes relate to meetings at which decisions are taken (nos. 1, 6, 8, 11), and even here much of the oratory is in other modes, for example invective in the Cicero/Calenus debate.

Dio nowhere in his extant work makes any statement about the principles he observed in composing speeches.⁶ He would probably have paid lip service to the requirement of appropriateness to speaker and subject, as enunciated, for example, by Lucian.⁷ However, he could handle even this with considerable freedom, as when he makes Maecenas present patently anachronistic recommendations. For almost all of his extended speech episodes he seems to have had some evidence that one or more speeches were made on the occasion, and perhaps only the Cicero/Philiscus dialogue is a complete invention. The endings of several speeches conform to well-established traditions, for example that the audience responded 'You' when Catulus asked them who could take over the pirate command if anything happened to Pompey; that Caesar at Vesontio made an effective threat to rely just on the Tenth Legion against Ariovistus; and that Antony used Caesar's honours and his bloodstained

⁵ On ancient historical writers' use of direct and indirect discourse see Laird 1997, 116–152; Foster 2012; Zali 2015, 4–5, 45–99, 317–326.

⁶ *Contra* Fomin 2016, 228–229, no reference to speeches can be intended at F 1.2, where Dio insists that his use of fine style is not incompatible with veracity.

⁷ Lucian, *Hist. Consc.* 58: ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ λόγους ἐροῦντά τινα δεήσῃ εἰσάγειν, μάλιστα μὲν εὐοικότα τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τῷ πράγματι οἰκεῖα λεγέσθω, ἔπειτα ὡς σαφέστατα καὶ ταῦτα. πλὴν ἐφεῖταί σοι τότε καὶ ῥητορεῦσαι καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι τὴν τῶν λόγων δεινότητα. For earlier assertions of the principle of appropriateness to speaker and subject see Callisthenes, *FGrHist* 124 F 44; D.H. *Thuc.* 36; Quint. 3.8.48–49. Marincola 2007 is an excellent general discussion of speeches in ancient historians.

toga to provoke the funeral crowd to riot.⁸ For the greater part of his speeches, however, Dio evidently felt free to invent, and just how radically he was ready to depart from versions given in earlier histories (where they existed) is shown by the only instance where one of his extant speeches can be compared with its likely source, namely Caesar's speech at Vesontio.⁹

After instructing his aspirant historian on the need for appropriateness and clarity in speeches, Lucian allows that "then you can play the orator and show your eloquence". Dio's rhetorical education certainly shows through strongly in his extended speeches. They make heavy use of commonplaces, and many of them conform to standard patterns which served as typical exercises in the schools, while Dio's predilection for echoing classical Greek authors, above all Thucydides, is here at its most marked.¹⁰ Such features have prompted negative assessment: thus for Millar (1961, 15) Dio in composing his speeches usually sought 'not to illuminate the situation, but to write a rhetorical elaboration...of the moral issues involved in it'.¹¹ More recent work, however, has shown that Dio used his extended speeches both for dramatic purposes and to explore historical issues he regarded as important.¹²

A key part of most of these speeches' function is dramatic irony. Dio's narrative often brings out the disingenuousness of speakers' claims: thus both Pompey and Octavian profess to decline powers which they are eager to hold (36.24.5, 53.2.6), and Caesar at Vesontio justifies as in the public interest the extension of the warfare in Gaul to which he is in fact impelled by personal ambition (38.31.1, 34.1–3). Other speeches yield ironies of a different kind. Catulus, whom Dio has commended as disinterestedly concerned for the common good (36.30.5, 37.20.2), points out the dangers of Pompey's great command for the Republic, but the alternative solutions he proposes for the pirate problem are impractical, and we know that his opposition must fail. Philiscus warns Cicero that return to political life may lead to his

⁸ Catulus: 36.36a (Xiphilinus) ~ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 59; Sall. *Hist.* 5.24 M; Val. Max. 8.15.9; Vell. 2.32.1; Plut. *Pomp.* 25.10 (Cicero's reference need not show that this incident took place at the debate over the *lex Manilia*, not the *lex Gabinia*, as argued by Lintott 1997, 2521–2522, and Rodgers 2008, and in any case the other sources show that its association with the *lex Gabinia* was established in the tradition long before Dio). Caesar: 38.46.3–47.2 ~ Caes. *BG* 1.40.14–41.3; Plut. *Caes.* 19.4–5; Frontin. *Strat.* 1.11.3. Antony: 44.48–49 ~ App. *B. Civ.* 2.144–146; Plut. *Ant.* 14.7; *Brut.* 20.4 (variant version at Suet. *Iul.* 84.2; see Pelling 1988, 153–154).

⁹ For comparison of Dio's version with Caesar's at *BG* 1.40 see Lachenaud & Coudry 2011, lxi–lxvi; Kemezis 2016.

¹⁰ On the rhetorical elements in Dio's speeches see now Bellissime 2016; Fomin 2016.

¹¹ Similar judgements also at Millar 1964, 79; Gowing 1992, 264.

¹² See especially Burden-Strevens 2015; 2016; Coudry 2016; Kemezis 2014, 104–135; 2016.

death, as we know that eventually it did. Cicero in his Amnesty speech makes a powerful plea for a return to ancestral concord, but we know that this is no longer viable, and, as Calenus points out, Cicero himself plays a crucial part in destroying concord by his intemperate assault on Antony. The ironies which accumulate across these speeches thus all serve to reinforce Dio's view that the downfall of the Republic (in his terminology, *demokratia*) was made inevitable by the pressures of ambition and jealousy, and stability could only be restored through the establishment of a monarchical system structured on the lines which he has represented Maecenas as recommending.¹³

Although scholarly discussion of speech in Dio's extant books has been concerned almost exclusively with the extended speech episodes considered so far, these books in fact contain many shorter speech episodes, ranging from brief interjections and single sentences to longer passages, a few of which are up to about a chapter in length. Unlike the extended episodes exclusively in direct discourse, these shorter episodes display a range of modes: some are just in direct discourse, some just report speech, and some mix reports with passages in direct discourse. Moreover, speech reports may range in their detail from mere statements that speech occurred to full representations of what was said in indirect discourse.¹⁴

Many of the very short direct-discourse episodes are in effect 'one-liners'—notable remarks of a sentence or less, typically made by a Roman magistrate, senator or emperor or by humbler folk exhibiting frankness (*parrhesia*).¹⁵ While some will be Dio's own invention, many will have been attested *bon mots*, and quite a number are found in other sources as well.

A good many of these shorter episodes are records of speeches made on public occasions in Rome or to armies, and thus represent opportunities for extended speeches which Dio chose not to take up. Often we are told merely that a speech was made or little more. Some of these accounts, however, include both a report of what was said and one or more passages in direct discourse, as for Pompey's speech in support of Caesar's agrarian law (38.5.1–4), Crassus' ill-omened speech to his soldiers at the start of his Parthian campaign (40.19.1–3), and Gaius' speech praising Tiberius and restoring *maiestas* (59.16.1–

¹³ For Dio's belief in monarchy as the only viable system for Rome once it had acquired its empire see 44.1.2–5, 47.39.4–5, 53.19.1, 54.6.1.

¹⁴ For refined discrimination of speech modes see Laird 1999, 87–101.

¹⁵ On *parrhesia* in Dio see Mallan 2016.

7). Other notices are quite full, but include no direct discourse, as for Caesar's speeches to the senate and people on his arrival in Rome at the start of the civil war (41.15.2–16.1), or for the commanders' speeches to their armies before the battles of Pharsalus and Philippi (41.57.1–3, 45.42.2–5). Dio's awareness of their inevitable similarity evidently led him to limit the number of extended pre-battle speeches he included, and for these civil wars he graced only the decisive conflict at Actium with full-dress orations.

Sometimes, too, short passages in direct discourse occur as part of a report of extended exchanges, either in public, as for Caesar's quelling of the veteran mutiny in 47 (42.53–54), or in private, as when Porcia wounds herself to convince her husband Brutus that she could be trusted (44.13.2–4) and Cleopatra attempts to seduce her captor Octavian (51.12.2–13.1). The last two passages show Dio exploiting speech to the full for vivid narration of scenes of high emotion.¹⁶

Table 2 tabulates the distribution of direct-discourse speech across Dio's extant books, distinguishing between the extended speech episodes, all of which occupy several chapters and are exclusively in direct discourse, and the short speech episodes of no more than a chapter in length, of which some are just in direct discourse and others mix direct discourse with speech report. The books are here divided into units of four to six books to take account of content, with Books 45–50 grouped together because the Cicero/Calenus debate straddles Books 45 and 46 and Books 51–56 as covering the sole reign of Augustus.

The most notable feature of the table is the different pattern of Books 57–60, covering the years after the death of Augustus. These four books contain no extended speeches, a longer continuous stretch without such speeches than at any earlier point in the extant books, but, despite the imperfect preservation of these books, they contain a much higher number of short direct-discourse speech episodes than their extant predecessors.

Enough is preserved of Books 61–80 in the fragments and epitomators to show that they continued this new pattern established in Books 57–60. Extended direct-discourse speech episodes were now very infrequent: only two such episodes, as preserved, occupy multiple chapters, namely Boudicca's and Suetonius Paullinus' addresses to their troops before their battle (62.3–11) and Marcus Aurelius' speech to his army at the time of Avidius Cassius' revolt (71.24–26).¹⁷ However, shorter passages in direct discourse remain frequent.

¹⁶ On Dio's, and Plutarch's, handling of Cleopatra's encounter with Octavian see Reinhold 1988, 134–135 (noting unusual diction); Pelling 1988, 313–315.

¹⁷ On Tacitus' and Dio's speeches for Boudicca see Adler 2008 and 2011, 119–161.

Many of these are brief remarks, but some passages are somewhat fuller: thus Vindex's speech rousing the Gauls to revolt is reported with a direct-discourse peroration (63.22.2–6), Otho's exchanges with his soldiers before his suicide are reported with several passages in direct discourse (64.11–14), and Hadrian makes a direct-discourse deathbed speech announcing the adoption of Antoninus (69.20.2–5).¹⁸

Although it has often been noticed that extended speeches played little part in Dio's narrative after Augustus, it has generally been overlooked that this was compensated by substantially greater use of short utterances. The reduction in extended speeches is hardly to be attributed, as by Millar (1961, 12), to Dio's maturing as a historian or to a lack of models in earlier accounts. Rather, the new, post-Augustan pattern surely reflected Dio's view of the different character of imperial history and how it should be handled. His narrative was now dominated by individual emperors' character as rulers, and he included extended assessments of each emperor at the beginning and end of their reign.¹⁹ In view of the greater secrecy of political life, on which he remarked at 53.19, Dio seems to have regarded extended speeches as now less appropriate, but instead enlivened his narrative with the emperors' (often shocking) remarks and the ripostes of subjects bold enough to answer back. The worse the emperor the richer the conversational crop they were likely to yield, and the reign of Nero unsurprisingly wins the prize (39 short direct-discourse episodes). It is notable, however, that Dio switched to this new mode not with the start of Augustus' sole rule, but only after his death.

We shall need to take account of the phenomena noted in this section when attempting to reconstruct Dio's use of speech in the fragmentary early books. We must seek not only to identify speech episodes, but also to determine their type, discriminating between extended direct-discourse episodes and shorter speech episodes.

Reconstructing speech episodes in Dio's Books 1–35: methodological issues

Dio's first 35 books survive for us mainly in verbatim fragments preserved as extracts in Byzantine anthologies or lexica, and in epitomised form in the world history of John Zonaras, and our knowledge of Dio's use of speech in these books depends on these sources. Our main sources of verbatim fragments, and the only sources preserving fragments with direct

¹⁸ On Hadrian's speech see Davenport and Mallan 2014.

¹⁹ On biographical elements in Dio's account of the imperial period see Pelling 1997; Coltelloni-Trannoy 2016.

discourse, are three of the four surviving volumes of historical excerpts made for Constantine VII, two lexica with the titles *Περὶ συντάξεως* ('On Syntax') and *Συναγωγή χρησίμων λέξεων* ('Collection of Useful Expressions'), and the *Florilegium* falsely ascribed to Maximus the Confessor.²⁰ Some fragments preserved in these sources are also cited in later works such as the *Suda*.

The distribution of the direct-discourse fragments across these sources is shown in Table 3. Some fragments are cited by more than one of these sources, and the overall total for citations is accordingly higher than for fragments. For many of these fragments the presence of direct discourse is made clear by context or by matching with other fragments or Zonaras' narrative, but for others direct discourse is indicated only by grammatical features like first or second person verbs. In the table, italics indicate fragments whose attribution to direct discourse should be regarded as doubtful, and which are accordingly totalled separately. These comprise fragments which Dio's editor Boissevain assigned to speeches, but for which this attribution is in my judgement questionable (36.13; 40.14–16; 55.3a, 57.6a), and others which I would be inclined to assign to speeches, but Boissevain does not (12.1–3a, 8–9, 11).

It should be noted that the unsatisfactory conventional numeration of the fragments, established by Bekker and retained by Boissevain in his still standard edition, fails to differentiate the individual fragments as they are preserved by the excerpting sources, and instead groups them together by topic, so that, for example, the 27 fragments relating to the First Punic War are all assigned to F 43 and the 53 fragments relating to the Second Punic War to F 57. Moreover, although retaining Bekker's numeration, Boissevain rejected some of the fragments he had included and made changes to his ordering. The fragments are listed in Table 3 in Boissevain's order.

As Table 3 shows, our most fertile source for direct-discourse fragments is the Constantinian collection of excerpts on *γνώμαι* (maxims), now usually known as the *Excerpta de sententiis* (hereafter, *ES*). This collection is also the most productive of Dio fragments overall, but for direct-discourse fragments the disparity is more marked, with the excerpts on embassies of foreign peoples to the Romans (*Excerpta de legationibus gentium ad Romanos*, hereafter *ELg*) and on virtues and vices (*Excerpta de virtutibus et vitiis*,

²⁰ For further discussion of these sources see Mallan, this volume. On the Constantinian Excerpts see also Flusin 2002; Roberto 2009; Németh 2010; 2013; Treadgold 2013, 153–165. Modern editions are now available for the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* (Petrova 2006), the *Συναγωγή* (Cunningham 2003), and the *Florilegium* of Ps.-Maximus (Ihm 2001), and references below are to the numerations of these editions (with the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* cited as *Synt.*).

hereafter *EV*) yielding just three such fragments between them.²¹ The value of *ES* is enhanced by the fact that, like the other Constantinian collections, its excerpts are arranged in the order in which they appeared in Dio's original, greatly assisting the identification of context. Sadly, however, this collection survives only in a defective manuscript: there are four-page gaps in the middle of the account of Pyrrhus' consultation with his advisers in 280 (between F 40.30 and 31 = *ES* 101–102) and between the years 256 and 236 (between F 43.21 and 46.2 = *ES* 124–125), and the manuscript breaks off altogether in late 216. As a result, we have far fewer direct-discourse fragments for the period after 216.

The passages selected by the excerptor of *ES* vary widely in character, from generalising reflections to passages of narrative whose relevance to a collection of γνῶμαι is not readily apparent. While some of the collection's direct-discourse extracts are merely short passages from speeches, others are quite lengthy, and sometimes include not just full utterances but also their narrative context. As with the other Constantinian collections, the extracts are verbatim, but liable to certain modifications, in particular distortion at the beginnings and ends of extracts and deletions elsewhere of material which the excerptor deemed superfluous.²²

The manuscripts of the surviving Constantinian collections include cross-references to a number of the lost collections, and one of these had the title *On Public Speeches* (Περὶ δημηγορίων).²³ This was evidently the primary repository in the Constantinian Excerpts for extracts from speeches made in public contexts, and its loss has greatly impoverished our knowledge of the speeches in the fragmentary parts of Dio and other Greek historians. As we shall see, one such cross-reference attests an otherwise unknown Dio speech for Valerius Publicola (F 13.2), and the inclusion of another speech in this collection can be inferred from the wording of a surviving extract (F 36.6–7).

The Συναγωγή yields only one direct-discourse fragment (F 57.47), but a good number are preserved by the lexicon Περὶ συντάξεως. These are all short extracts cited

²¹ No direct-discourse fragments from Dio are preserved in the *Excerpta de legationibus Romanorum ad gentes*.

²² On the excerptors' techniques of modification see especially Roberto 2009, 79–82.

²³ On these cross-references see Büttner-Wobst 1906, 107–120; Németh 2010, 207–210; Mallan, this volume. As Büttner-Wobst notes (1906, 109–110), the two cross-references to the Περὶ δημηγορίων which relate to surviving histories concern speeches by or before rulers, thus confirming that the collection was not limited to speeches in popular assemblies, but drew on speeches made in any public context.

merely as grammatical illustrations, and, while the context of some can be established, for others it remains obscure.

Most of the Dio fragments preserved in these two lexica are cited by book number, and this constitutes our sole evidence for the book structure of the fragmentary books. However, book numbers are particularly vulnerable to scribal error, and no fewer than 21 of the 57 citations from extant books of Dio in the *Περὶ συντάξεως* give false book numbers. Thus this evidence can only be used with complete confidence to establish the book in which Dio dealt with any particular set of events when two or more fragments with cited book numbers provide corroboration. I have discussed elsewhere (Rich 2016) the limited conclusions which can be drawn for the book distribution of Dio's first 35 books. The precise allocation of fragments to individual books made in Boissevain's edition and taken over largely unchanged by subsequent editors goes far beyond what the evidence permits.

The *Florilegium* of Ps.-Maximus is a collection of generalised moralising reflections ascribed (not always accurately) to their authors and arranged under various ethical headings. The work exists now in three recensions, which its recent editor Ihm has termed respectively MaxI, MaxII and MaxU. Only the last two include extracts from Dio. The full set of Dio extracts is given by MaxII. MaxU is a modified version of MaxII with many chapters reordered and many extracts omitted, including some of the Dio extracts. Ihm's work is primarily an edition of MaxU, but also gives details of each extract's presentation in the other recensions. For each extract she gives a double reference number, according to its position first in MaxU and then in MaxII.²⁴

Some of the *Florilegium*'s Dio fragments can be confidently assigned, from context or overlap, to identifiable speeches. For others the context is uncertain and in some cases it is not clear that they derive from a speech at all. Boissevain assigns some of these to a specific speech simply because an adjacent fragment in the *Florilegium* can be assigned to that speech or nearby. He acknowledges the weakness of this argument, but later scholars have accepted these attributions unquestioningly, and this has contributed to the appearance of bland moralizing in some of Dio's fragmentary speeches. In what follows the *Florilegium* fragments will be discounted except when a good case can be made for their assignment to a specific speech.

²⁴ On the *Florilegium* and on the principles of her edition see Ihm 2001, i–iii, cv–cvii, with the helpful review of Christidis 2002.

Zonaras used Dio as his principal source for Roman history down to 146 BC, and provides a crucial complement to the fragments for our knowledge of Dio's early books. Comparison of Zonaras' version with extant parts of Dio shows that, although abridging Dio throughout, he often reproduces him quite fully, borrowing much of his language, but elsewhere omits substantial amounts of material or summarises it thinly. Unfortunately, Zonaras preferred to use Plutarch's lives of Romulus, Numa, Publicola, and Camillus as his main source for the periods they covered, adding only a few details from Dio, and so for these periods little of Dio's original can be discerned from his account. Worse still, Dio's account of the years after 146 BC was not available to Zonaras, and he accordingly omitted this period from his work altogether. His narrative resumed in 70 BC, but initially drew just on Plutarch's lives of Caesar and Pompey. Zonaras returned to Dio as his main source from the death of Caesar, making some use also of Plutarch's lives of Antony and Brutus, and then continued to depend on Dio up to the reign of Nerva, after which he turned instead to Dio's epitomator Xiphilinus.²⁵

In his preface Zonaras contrasted his own summary history favourably with more grandiose works whose features included rhetorically elaborated speeches.²⁶ However, speech is in fact by no means absent from his work. Valuable insight into how he handled this aspect of Dio's history may be obtained by comparing Zonaras' use of speech in his account of the period between the deaths of Caesar and Augustus, when he was again using Dio as his main source, with Dio's extant original.²⁷ Zonaras, like Dio, liked to enliven his narrative with short passages in direct discourse, and a good number of the utterances of this kind included by Dio are reproduced by Zonaras, either verbatim or with only minor changes.²⁸ Of the nine extended direct-discourse episodes in this part of Dio's work (Table 1, below nos. 6–14), Zonaras omits altogether Augustus' address to the *equites* (no. 13), and for two others merely reports that speeches were made (nos. 9, 14), telling us just that Antony and Octavian

²⁵ On Zonaras' sources see Schmidt 1875; Büttner-Wobst 1890. In general on Zonaras and his use of Dio see now Simons 2009, 27–32; Fromentin 2013; Treadgold 2013, 388–399; Bellissime and Berbessou-Broustet 2016; Mallan, forthcoming.

²⁶ *Praef.* 1, 1.2 (this and subsequent page references for Zonaras are to Dindorf's edition).

²⁷ See also the similar comparison by Fromentin, pp. 27–33 above, with quoted passages.

²⁸ E.g. Octavian at the tomb of the Ptolemies (51.16.5 ~ Zonar. 10.31, 2.434), Maecenas on the advancement of Agrippa (54.6.5 ~ Zonar. 10.34, 2.441–442), Augustus to Vedius Pollio (54.23.3 ~ Zonar. 10.34, 2.443), giantess's warning to Drusus (55.1.3 ~ Zonar. 10.35, 2.445), veteran's complaint (55.4.2 ~ Zonar. 10.35, 2.445).

each made a speech encouraging their forces before the Actium battle, and that Drusus and Tiberius each delivered a funeral speech for Augustus.²⁹ For the other six episodes Zonaras gives summaries of the speeches, sometimes focusing in particular on their conclusions and recommendations: thus for the Cicero/Calenus debate (10.14, 2.378) Zonaras passes over the polemic which occupies the bulk of the speeches, and reports just Cicero's proposal that Antony be declared an enemy and recommendations for the opposing commanders (drawing on Cass. Dio 45.42.4, 45.4) and Calenus' concluding advice to the senate to call on both sides to lay down their arms (closely following Cass. Dio 46.27.3). In three cases Zonaras includes passages in direct discourse drawn from Dio's originals: thus his version of Antony's speech at Caesar's funeral (10.12, 2.373–374) summarises the earlier part, but reproduces verbatim, with a few minor omissions, the whole of Dio's concluding chapter (44.49); Maecenas' assurance towards the end of his speech that, if Octavian acts as he would wish another to do as his ruler, he will be safe (Cass. Dio 52.39.2), is reproduced mostly verbatim (10.32, 2.436); and, in Zonaras' version of the Augustus/Livia dialogue (10.36, 2.450), Augustus' opening question (Cass. Dio 55.14.2) is reproduced quite closely and Livia's concluding response is paraphrased from Cass. Dio 55.21.2.

Thus, when considering Zonaras' use of speech in the section of his work corresponding to Dio's fragmentary books, we must bear in mind that the absence of any reference to speech in Zonaras does not show that there was no speech at the corresponding point in Dio's original, and that, at points where Zonaras merely reports that a speech was made, Dio may have given a full, direct-discourse speech. However, a speech report in Zonaras does not necessarily indicate the presence of a full speech in Dio, but sometimes corresponds just to a speech report in Dio's original.³⁰ When Zonaras gives not just a bald report that a speech was made, but a fuller summary of its contents, this is likely to indicate the presence of a direct-discourse speech in Dio, particularly when Zonaras himself includes a passage in direct discourse. However, Zonaras' summaries should be taken as at best indicators of the bare gist of a speech or its concluding recommendations, and cannot be regarded as sound evidence for its overall character as it stood in Dio.³¹

²⁹ Zonar. 10.29, 38 (2.426, 455). Thus Zonaras puts Drusus' and Tiberius' speeches on an equal footing, whereas Dio merely reports that Drusus spoke (56.34.4), but gives Tiberius a full direct-discourse oration.

³⁰ E.g. Lepidus' speech against Caesar's assassins (44.22.2 ~ Zonar. 10.12, 2.378); the prospective triumvirs to their troops (46.56.2 ~ Zonar. 10.16, 2.385); Gaius' speech on his bridge (59.19.7 ~ Zonar. 11.5, 3.17).

³¹ For a salutary warning on the limitations of epitomes as evidence for lost originals see Brunt 1980.

For much of the fragmentary early books, what survives of Dio's speeches can be compared with the versions given by other sources, especially Livy and Dionysius. Recent studies have reinforced the conclusions reached long ago by Schwartz on the relationships between these writers and these books of Dio.³² Dio is likely to have been familiar with both their works, but also made use of other, mostly earlier histories, and often opts for versions of events at odds with those given by Livy and/or Dionysius. Urso (2016) has suggested that he was consciously offering an alternative to Livy's account—with further discussion in this volume—while Fromentin (2016) has reaffirmed Schwartz's observation that he is in some respects closer to Dionysius than Livy. Nonetheless, comparison with Livy's and Dionysius' use of speeches will help to illuminate the choices which Dio himself made.

The Regal Period

Sufficient fragments with identifiable context are cited in the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* to show that Dio devoted his first two books to the regal period.³³ The traditions about Rome's kings provided historians with plenty of occasions for vivid speech, and enough survives of Dio's account to show that he exploited the opportunities for brief speeches and exchanges in direct discourse. A fragment shows that Dio stressed Romulus' turn to tyranny at the end of his reign and made him tell the senators: "I have chosen you, Fathers, not for you to rule me, but for me to command you".³⁴ Direct-discourse passages in Zonaras which must derive from Dio occur when Tarquin the Elder puts the augur Attus Navius to the test, Tanaquil misleads the people to smooth Servius Tullius' path to power, and Roman envoys trick the Etruscan *haruspex* over the Capitol portent.³⁵

Julius Proculus' announcement of Romulus' apotheosis may have been presented by Dio as a brief speech in direct discourse, but here our evidence is less secure. Proculus' declaration is presented in this way in a fragment of John of Antioch which Boissevain (1895, 10–12) held to derive from Dio and printed as F 6.1^{aa}, but John here may have been drawing

³² Schwartz 1899, 1692–1697; Urso 2016 and this volume; Fromentin 2016; Franchis 2016; François 2016. See also my brief remarks at Rich 2016, 278, 281.

³³ Book 2 including the reign of Tarquin the Proud: F 11.1, 7, 11, 20. See further n. 45 below; Rich 2016, 275–276.

³⁴ F 5.11 (= *ES* 9): ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ πατέρες, ἐξελεξάμην οὐχ ἵνα ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἄρχητε, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐπιτάττοιμι.

³⁵ Zonar. 7.8.9–10, 9.4, 11.6–7.

on several sources, and the only element which there is reason to ascribe to Dio is his description of Proculus as an *eques*.³⁶ A direct-discourse fragment cited as from Dio's first book was attributed to Proculus' speech by Gutschmid (1894, 555), but the context is quite uncertain and the book attribution may be wrong.³⁷

In two Constantinian fragments Dio supplies short, impassioned speeches for female speakers at moments of high drama, as he was later to do for Porcia and Cleopatra. Each fragment preserves not just the speech, but the narrative context in which it was embedded. In the first, Hersilia and the other Sabine women intervene between the opposing armies to reconcile their fathers and their Roman husbands, speaking as follows:³⁸

τί ταῦτα ποιεῖτε, πατέρες; τί ταῦτα, ἄνδρες; μέχρι ποῦ μαχεῖσθε; μέχρι ποῦ μισήσετε ἀλλήλους; καταλλάγητε τοῖς γαμβροῖς, καταλλάγητε τοῖς πενθεροῖς. φείσασθε πρὸς τοῦ Πανὸς τῶν τέκνων, φείσασθε πρὸς τοῦ Κυρίνου τῶν ἐκγόνων. ἐλεήσατε τὰς θυγατέρας, ἐλεήσατε τὰς γυναῖκας· ὡς εἶγε ἀκαταλλάκτως ἔχετε καὶ τις ὑμᾶς σκηπτὸς μανίας ἐσπεσὼν οἰστρεῖ, ἡμᾶς τε, δι' ἃς μάχεσθε, προαποκτείνετε, καὶ τὰ παιδιά ταῦτα ἃ μισεῖτε προαποσφάζετε, ἵνα μηδὲν ἔτι μήτ' ὄνομα μήτε σύνδεσμον συγγενείας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχοντες κερδάνητε τὸ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν, τὸ τούς τε πάππους τῶν παίδων καὶ τοὺς πατέρας τῶν ἐκγόνων φονεύειν.

Why are you doing this, fathers? Why, husbands? Till when are you fighting? Till when will you hate each other? Be reconciled with your sons-in-law, be reconciled with your fathers-in-law. By Pan, spare your children. By Quirinus, spare your grandchildren. Pity your daughters, pity your wives. If indeed you are unreconcilable and some bolt of madness has struck you, slaughter us first, over whom you are fighting, and slaughter these children first whom you hate, so that, keeping no name or bond of kinship between each other, you may reap the reward

³⁶ John of Antioch F 59 Roberto = 11 Mariev (from the Constantinian *Excerpta de insidiis*, John 6). See Roberto 2016, 72–73; Mallan, this volume.

³⁷ F 5.13 (= *Synt.* π38): “in which, staking both his body and his life, he bore the risk for you” (ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παραβαλλόμενος ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκινδύνευσεν).

³⁸ The episode: F 5.5–7 (= *ES* 7). The speech: F 5.5–6.

of the greatest of crimes, killing the grandfathers of your children and the fathers of your grandchildren.

Opening with simple paratactic sentences and well deployed anaphora, Dio here shows his ability to give effective expression to powerful emotion, in a version of the speech which compares well with those given by other ancient writers.³⁹

The second fragment reports the rape and suicide of Lucretia. Lucretia's speech to her father immediately before stabbing herself is another powerful and simply worded utterance.⁴⁰ Unlike other versions, Dio's contrives to include both a succinct account of what has befallen her and a call to her menfolk to liberate themselves from the tyrants.⁴¹

Thus Dio's regal narrative was enriched by numerous and varied short passages in direct discourse. It may well, however, have included none of the extended and rhetorically elaborated direct-discourse episodes which are such a notable feature of the extant books, as listed in Table 1. Only one occasion where such an episode may have been included is indicated by Zonaras. Zonaras' account of the accession of Servius Tullius shows that, like other sources, Dio reported him as taking power with the support of Tanaquil and subsequently inducing the popular assembly to elect him as king, but Servius' demagoguery was even more marked here than in the other versions: only in this account is Servius said to have promised citizenship to slaves. Zonaras' report of the electoral assembly runs as follows: "summoning the people, he addressed them (ἐδημηγόρησε), and, by saying many attractive things, ensured that they at once voted the whole kingship to him".⁴² As shown above, such a notice in Zonaras may take the place of an extended speech in Dio, but may simply echo Dio's own report that a speech was made. If Dio did write an extended speech for Servius Tullius, it will have been as disingenuous as many of those in the extant books, but

³⁹ Livy 1.13.2–3 (passing from indirect to direct discourse); Plut. *Rom.* 18.4–7 (more long-winded). An alternative version in which the women address themselves to the Sabine king Titus Tatius in his camp is followed by Cn. Gellius, *FRHist* 14 F 5; D.H. *AR* 2.45; App. *Reg.* 5.

⁴⁰ The episode: F 11.13–19 (= *EV* 7). The speech: F 11.18–19. Zonaras (7.11.16) summarises the first part of the speech as 'she related all that had happened' (τὸ δράμα πᾶν διηγῆσατο), and then reproduces the final sentence verbatim, with a few omissions.

⁴¹ For an excellent discussion of Dio's handling of the episode, including the speech, see Mallan 2014.

⁴² Zonar. 7.9.7: συναγαγὼν τὸν δῆμον ἐδημηγόρησε· καὶ πολλὰ ἐπαγωγὰ διαλεχθεὶς αὐτῷ οὕτω διέθετο ὡς αὐτίκα πᾶσαν αὐτῷ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐπιηφίσασθαι.

it is perhaps more likely that he merely reported the speech in much the same terms as Zonaras.⁴³

One speech opportunity which Dio did not exploit was the staged attack made on Tarquin the Proud by his son Sextus as the pretext for his feigned defection to Gabii: a fragment shows that Dio merely reported him as “uttering much foul abuse against his father as a tyrant and breaker of oaths”.⁴⁴

The Foundation of the Republic

Citations in the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* make it clear that, having dealt with the events up to the reign of Tarquin the Proud in his first two books, Dio devoted the whole of his third book to the first year of the Republic: fragments with identifiable context attributed to the third book all belong to that year, and two fragments attributed to the fourth book relate to the next year.⁴⁵ Dio evidently chose to accord ample space to the establishment of republican government, just as he was later to do for the restoration of monarchy by Octavian/Augustus.

The traditional narrative of the establishment of the Republic provided many speech opportunities, from the overthrow of the Tarquins on. Zonaras’ brief report of the aftermath of Lucretia’s death (7.11.17) shows that in Dio’s account, as in others, Brutus displayed her body in the Forum and by an address to the people (*δημηγορήσας*) induced them to expel the Tarquins, and then went to the army at Ardea and ‘persuaded’ (*συνέπεισε*) them to vote the same. Dio may, like Dionysius (4.77–83), have supplied an extended direct-discourse speech rather than a mere report for Brutus’ address to the people, but no trace of such a speech has survived.

As has usually been supposed, Tarquin’s overthrow probably concluded Dio’s second book. A fragment attributed to that book must relate to his expulsion.⁴⁶ This is not in itself

⁴³ Dionysius supplies Servius with two successive speeches (4.9–11), and Fromentin (2016, 185–187) conjectures that Dio did the same.

⁴⁴ F 11.7 (= *Synt.* λ3): τὸν γὰρ πατέρα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ὡς καὶ τυραννοῦντα καὶ παρασπονδοῦντα ... λοιδορήσας (reproduced in abridged form at Zonar. 7.10.6).

⁴⁵ Book 3: F 12.4, 5a, 5b, discussed below. Book 4: F 14 (Cloelia), 15b (institution of the quaestorship). See above, n. 33.

⁴⁶ F 11.20 (= *Synt.* π29): “departing from the Romans’ land, he made appeals widely among their neighbours” (καὶ ἐκχωρήσας ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων γῆς πολλαχῆ μὲν τῶν προσοίκων ἐπέιρασεν).

decisive, since the book attribution could be false, but it is likely that Dio, like Livy and Dionysius, made the overthrow of the Tarquins the end of a book and started a new book with the appointment of L. Iunius Brutus and L. Tarquinius Collatinus as the first consuls.

The next episode in the traditional story was an embassy from Tarquin and the young nobles' conspiracy to restore him at the embassy's incitation. In Dionysius' account (5.4–6), the ambassadors (reported in indirect speech) ask in the senate for Tarquin to be allowed to return to Rome, to stand trial, to resume the kingship if the people agreed, and, if they did not, to live there as a private citizen. Brutus speaks against this in a short direct-discourse speech, insisting that the decision to banish Tarquin and his family and the communal oath against their restoration must stand. The ambassadors then (also in direct discourse) request just the handing back of Tarquin's property. This too is opposed by Brutus, but supported by Collatinus. The request is referred by the senate to the assembly, which narrowly decides for the restoration of the property, rescinded after the exposure of the conspiracy. Plutarch's version (*Publ.* 2.3–3.3) is broadly similar, with minor divergences.⁴⁷

Dio probably gave substantially the same account. Zonaras (7.12.1) reports the arrival of Tarquin's embassy seeking his return, a detail which must be from Dio, but then unfortunately turns to Plutarch as his source for the rest of the year, adding only a few details from Dio.⁴⁸ However, three fragments cited as from Book 3 by the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* were clearly spoken by Tarquin's embassy. Of these one certainly belongs to an initial speech requesting Tarquin's return ("That he loves you, you could get no better proof that he desires to live among you"),⁴⁹ and a second fragment is probably from the same speech ("Whose father also ruled you blamelessly").⁵⁰ The third too could belong to this speech, but is perhaps more likely to come from a second speech seeking the restoration of Tarquin's property ("and he particularly wants to recover his previous possessions").⁵¹ Two further direct-discourse fragments cited as from Book 3 by the lexicon have a less certain context, but are perhaps most likely to come from a speech or speeches against the embassy by Brutus (F 12.6–7 =

⁴⁷ Livy's brief statement (2.3.5) refers just to the request for the return of property, and implies that no decision was reached.

⁴⁸ Boissevain 1895, 36–37.

⁴⁹ F 12.5a (= *Synt.* ε31): ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ ὑμᾶς, οὐδὲν ἂν μείζον τεκμήριον λάβοιτε ἢ ὅτι τοῦ τε βίου τοῦ παρ' ὑμῶν ἐφίεται.

⁵⁰ F 12.4 (= *Synt.* α14): οὗ γε καὶ ὁ πατήρ ἀμέμπτως ὑμῶν ἤρξεν.

⁵¹ F 12.5b (= *Synt.* π30): καὶ πρὸ πολλοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ προῦπάρξαντά οἱ ποιεῖται.

Synt. λ6, ε32). That must certainly be the context of another direct-discourse fragment cited in the *Excerpta de sententiis* from about this point in Dio's narrative, in which listeners are urged to judge men by their deeds, not by the deceptive professions they make as suppliants (F 12.10 = *ES* 20). Thus Dio wrote at least one and probably two direct-discourse speeches for the embassy and one or more direct-discourse responses for Brutus. The sequence may have constituted an extended episode of direct-discourse speeches, with at least some being the equivalent of several chapters in length. However, it remains possible that Dio, like Dionysius, dealt with it more briefly, with only quite short passages in direct speech.⁵²

The five preceding fragments cited by the *Excerpta de sententiis* all consist of general reflections relating to the replacement of monarchy by republican government.⁵³ In accordance with the Constantinian excerptors' regular practice, they will have stood in the same sequence in Dio's original. The first fragment observes that 'all crowds judge measures by those responsible for them ...' (F 12.1 = *ES* 15: οἱ ὄμιλοι πάντες τὰ πράγματα πρὸς τοὺς μεταχειρίζοντας αὐτὰ κρίνουσι ...), and the second that 'everyone prefers the untried to the familiar ...' (F 12.2 = *ES* 16: πᾶς γὰρ τις τὸ ἀπείρατον πρὸ τοῦ κατεγνωσμένου προαιρεῖται ...). The third states the case against constitutional change (F 12.3a = *ES* 17):

πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ μεταβολαὶ σφαλερώταται εἰσι, μάλιστα δὲ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πλεῖστα δὴ καὶ μέγιστα καὶ ιδιώτας καὶ πόλεις βλάπτουσι. διὸ οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ, κἂν μὴ βέλτιστα ἦ, ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμμένειν ἢ μεταλαμβάνοντες ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ἀεὶ πλανᾶσθαι.

For all changes are very risky, and changes in constitutions cause the greatest and most frequent damage to both individuals and cities. Thus the prudent always prefer to retain their existing arrangements, even if they are not ideal, rather than make successive changes and so continually go astray.

The fourth fragment opines that everyone's wishes and opinions are determined by their fortunes (F 12.8 = *ES* 18), and the fifth that many kings are inadequate to the requirements of the role (F 12.9 = *ES* 19):

⁵² On the likely context of F 12.4–7, 10 see Gutschmid 1894, 555; Boissevain 1895, 35; Macchioro 1910, 349–354; Fechner 1986, 21–29.

⁵³ In *ES* these follow an excerpt dealing with Brutus' embassy to Delphi (F 11.12 = *ES* 14).

ὅτι τὸ τῆς βασιλείας πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἀρετῆς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ συνηθείας, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο, πολλῆς δεῖται, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστὶν ἄνευ ἐκείνων ἀψάμενόν τινα σωφρονῆσαι. πολλοὶ γοῦν ὥσπερ ἐς ὕψος τι μέγα παρὰ λόγον ἀρθέντες οὐκ ἤνεγκαν τὴν μετεώρισιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τε καταπεσόντες ὑπ' ἐκπλήξεως ἔπταισαν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων πάντα συνηλόησαν.

The business of kingship, more than any other, requires not only great excellence of character, but also great knowledge and experience, and without these qualities it is impossible for anyone acquiring kingship to show moderation. Many indeed, as though raised to a great height contrary to expectation, have not endured their elevation, but they themselves have failed because overwhelmed by shock, and have ruined all their subjects' interests.

A further fragment, cited in the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* as from Book 3 and probably from the same context, asserts that “it is done not only merely by their kings, but also by those who hold power alongside them” (12.11 = *Synt.* β2, π31: οὐχ ὅπως πρὸς αὐτῶν τῶν βασιλευόντων σφῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τῶν παραδυναστευόντων αὐτοῖς γίγνεται).

These fragments may derive from authorial observations by Dio himself on the change to republican government.⁵⁴ However, although the fragments include no grammatical indications of direct discourse, such extensive reflections are more likely to have found their place in a debate. Dionysius reports that, after Lucretia's suicide and their oath to overthrow the Tarquins, Brutus and his associates debated the best form of constitution: some advocated rule by the senate and some a democracy, but Brutus himself successfully argued, in a speech given in direct discourse, for the retention of monarchy with modifications, in particular that the king should be replaced by two rulers holding power just for a year and with a new title (4.72–75). It is thus possible that Dio reported a similar debate at this point, and that our fragments derive from one or more speeches from the debate, and Fromentin has recently argued that the warning against constitutional change in F 12.3a echoes the opening of Brutus' speech in Dionysius (4.73.1).⁵⁵ If this is their context, the five *ES* fragments must derive from Dio's second book, unless we are to suppose that it ended not with Tarquin's

⁵⁴ So Boissevain 1895, 35; Fechner 1986, 21–23, 27–28, 89–91.

⁵⁵ Fromentin 2016, 184–185. Boissevain (*loc. cit.*) acknowledged this alternative possible context for the fragments. See, however, Fechner 1986, 21 n. 11.

expulsion, but at or before Lucretia's suicide. However, an alternative, and perhaps more likely, possibility is that these fragments derive from the debate between Tarquin's ambassadors and Brutus: Dio could well have expanded the debate to include a defence of monarchy by the ambassadors, from which F 12.1–3a could derive, and a counter-argument by Brutus, which would then be the source of at least F 12.9, and perhaps also F 12.8 and 12.11.⁵⁶ If so, the speeches will certainly have been lengthy.

The young nobles' conspiracy is followed in Dionysius' and Plutarch's accounts by the ousting from the consulship and banishment of Collatinus at Brutus' urging, whereas Livy puts this earlier, before the arrival of Tarquin's embassy.⁵⁷ Both Livy and Dionysius accord Brutus a speech, brief in Livy (2.2.7), longer in Dionysius (5.10). Zonaras, in a detail which is not in Plutarch and so must have come from Dio, tells us that 'Brutus so aroused the people against Collatinus that they nearly killed him with their own hands'.⁵⁸ This presents a more extreme version of Brutus' hostility to his colleague than the extant accounts, but whether Dio supplied a speech for Brutus at this point we cannot say.

The traditional story continues with an Etruscan invasion to restore Tarquin which Brutus and his new colleague, P. Valerius, repel, at the cost of Brutus' life. His house on the Velia and his failure to have Brutus replaced make Valerius suspected of aiming at monarchy, but he disarms the popular anger by addressing the assembly with lowered *fasces*, having his house demolished and M. Horatius elected as his fellow consul.⁵⁹ He later carries popular legislation, including the first *provocatio* law, so earning the *cognomen* Publicola. A fragment preserves Dio's account of the hostility against Valerius and his appearance in the assembly and shows that his version again presented emotions as raised to a higher pitch than any of our other accounts (F 13.2 = *ES* 21):

ὅτι Οὐαλέριον τὸν συνάρχοντα Βρούτου, καίπερ δημοτικώτατον ἀνδρῶν γενόμενον, ὅμως αὐτοεντία μικροῦ ὁ ὄμιλος κατεχρήσατο· ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ αὐτὸν μοναρχίας ὑπετόπησαν. καὶ ἐφόνευσαν ἄν, εἰ μὴ σφας διὰ ταχέων φθάσας ἐθώπευσεν. ἐσελθὼν γὰρ ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὰς τε ράβδους ἔκλινεν, ὀρθαῖς

⁵⁶ Cf. Millar 1964, 79–80; Hose 1994, 391; Simons 2009, 35.

⁵⁷ Piso, *FRHist* 9 F 20; Livy 2.2.3–11; D.H. *AR* 5.10–12; Plut. *Publ.* 7.

⁵⁸ Zonar. 7.12 (Boissevain 1895, 37): ὁ Βρούτος οὕτω κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸν δῆμον παρῴξυνεν ὡς μικροῦ καὶ αὐτοχειρία αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν.

⁵⁹ Cic. *Rep.* 2.53; Livy 2.7.5–8.5 (with speech for Valerius); D.H. *AR* 5.19; Plut. *Publ.* 10.

πρότερον ταύταις χρώμενος, καὶ τοὺς πελέκεις τοὺς συνδεδεμένους σφίσι περιεῖλε· σχηματίσας δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἑαυτὸν ἐς τὸ ταπεινότατον ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἐσκυθρόπασε καὶ κατεδάκρυσεν, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐφθέγξατό ποτε, σμικρᾶ καὶ δεδιῶα τῇ φωνῇ ὑποτρέμων εἶπεν.

Valerius, the colleague of Brutus, although no man was more devoted to the people, was nearly done to death by the crowd with their own hands, since they suspected him of desiring monarchy. They would have killed him, if he had not quickly forestalled them by courting their favour. Coming into the assembly, he lowered the *fascēs*, which he had previously had carried upright, and removed the axes which were bound with them. Moreover, comporting himself with the utmost humility, for a long time he looked sad and wept, and, when finally he broke his silence, he spoke with a quaver and in a soft and fearful voice.

At this point the excerpt breaks off, but a marginal note by the excerptor refers readers to the excerpts *On Public Speeches* (Περὶ δημηγορίων).⁶⁰ Thus Dio must have written what was no doubt an extended direct-discourse speech for Valerius at this point, and the absence of any extracts in the surviving Constantinian collections is explained by its being excerpted for this lost collection.

Thus direct discourse will have taken up a good deal of the full book which Dio allocated to the Republic's first year, with speech episodes on a probably extended scale for the debate between Tarquin's embassy and Brutus and for Valerius' speech to the people, and perhaps other extended speeches as well. The presentation of arguments for and against monarchy in the embassy/Brutus debate (if that was their location) enabled Dio to canvass for the first time the issue to which he was to return most fully in the great Agrippa/Maecenas debate in Book 52. To this extent the treatments of the establishment of the Republic in this book and of the restoration of the monarchy in Book 52 were comparable, and this has sometimes been seen as accounting for Dio's decision to devote a whole book to the Republic's first year.⁶¹ However, we do not know how much space was devoted here to the arguments for and against monarchy, and in other respects the two books will have been very different. Almost the whole of Book 52 was taken up with the debate, and both Agrippa and

⁶⁰ τέθειται περὶ δημηγορίων (Boissevain 1895, 38, *app. crit.*). See above, n. 23.

⁶¹ So Hose and Simons (above n. 56).

Maecenas were represented as speaking from disinterested concern for the welfare of both Octavian and the Roman people. The debate between Tarquin's embassy and Brutus was only one episode in a book full of vivid incident. The embassy's speeches were probably the first of Dio's set pieces of dramatic irony: the ambassadors' claim that Tarquin was motivated by love for the Roman people (F 12.5a) was patently disingenuous. Dio no doubt intended his readers to credit Brutus and Valerius with sincere concern for the people's welfare, but he portrayed them also as passionately engaged and hardly disinterested actors. As depicted by him, both Brutus and Valerius exploited oratorical art to achieve their ends, with Brutus rousing the people's passions to get Collatinus ousted and Valerius skilfully manipulating their feelings to restore himself to their favour.⁶²

The Early Republic

The tales of heroic resistance to Porsenna are likely to have provided Dio with opportunities for brief passages in direct discourse, as they did for Livy and Dionysius. No relevant fragments survive, and Zonaras did not turn back from Plutarch to Dio as his main source until the death of Publicola. However, Tzetzes drew on Dio for his account of Mucius Scaevola's encounter with Porsenna, which includes lively spoken exchanges probably deriving from Dio's original.⁶³

Dio gave a quite extensive account of the political crisis which led up to the First Secession in 494 (Varr.), from which we possess four fragments (F 17.1–8 = *ES* 23–26) and the fairly full report of Zonaras (7.13.12–14.6). However, at only one point in what survives is there any trace of speech. The dictator, M. Valerius Maximus, is said to have resigned because the senate would not agree to concessions to the *plebs* after his successful campaign.⁶⁴ Zonaras reports his resignation as follows (7.14.4):

⁶² Cf. Cicero's claim that Brutus must have been an effective orator (*Brut.* 53, but contrast *De orat.* 1.37). Dio (F 13.3–4) stressed Valerius' self-interestedness in the final episode of the year, the dedication of the Capitoline temple by the new consul Horatius: unlike our other sources, Dio represents Valerius as intervening personally in the hope of transferring the dedication to himself. On this and other divergences from the rest of the tradition in Dio's account of this year see Urso 2016, 146.

⁶³ Tzetzes, *Chil.* 6.201–223; Boissevain 1895, 39.

⁶⁴ Dio, like several other sources, wrongly gave his *cognomen* as Marcus: Zonar. 7.14.3; Ogilvie 1965, 306.

ὁ δὲ θέλων τῷ δήμῳ χαρίσασθαι πολλὰ διειλέχθη τῇ γερουσίᾳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσχε ταύτην πειθῆνιον. διὸ σὺν ὀργῇ ἐκπηδήσας τοῦ συνεδρίου δημηγορήσας τε πρὸς τὸν δῆμόν τινα κατὰ τῆς βουλῆς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀπέπατο.

Wishing to reward the people, he spoke at length to the senate, but was not able to persuade them. He therefore rushed in anger out of the senate house, made a speech to the people attacking the senate, and resigned his command.

Livy (2.31.9–10) gives Valerius a brief direct-discourse speech to the senate, but does not mention a speech to the people. Dionysius, to whom, as Fromentin (2016, 187) has observed, Dio is in this respect closer, gives Valerius speeches to both bodies, with a report of his address to the senate being followed by a full direct-discourse speech to the assembly (6.43.2–44.3). Dio may well have written a direct-discourse speech for Valerius to either or both audiences, but, alternatively, he may, like Zonaras, merely have reported that the speeches were made.

It was a long established feature of the tradition that the *plebs* were persuaded to end their secession by the envoy Menenius Agrippa's telling them the parable of the Stomach and the Limbs (in fact of Greek origin).⁶⁵ Livy and Dionysius could not avoid the tale, but evince some embarrassment. Livy (2.32.9–11) introduces Menenius' speech with the apologetic statement that “in that ancient and uncouth mode of speaking he is said to have told them nothing but the following” (*prisco illo dicendi et horrido modo nihil aliud quam hoc narrasse fertur*) and then summarises his telling of the fable in rapid indirect discourse. Dionysius (6.83.3–86.5) embeds the fable in a conventional direct-discourse oration. Dio, to his credit, opted to take it on its own terms, allowing Menenius to give a simple and vivid narration of the fable, opening in indirect discourse, but moving into direct speech.

Dio's account survives both in an excerpt (F 17.10–11 = *ES* 27) and in Zonaras (7.14.8–9). Unusually, Zonaras is a good deal fuller than the excerptor, who evidently found Dio's version longer than the γνώμη for which he had selected the passage required and so opted to abridge it. Thus Zonaras opens as follows, reduced in the excerptor's version to a

⁶⁵ Dionysius says that “his speech ... is reported in all the old histories” (6.83.2: ὁ λόγος ... φέρεται ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρχαίαις ἱστορίαις), and it no doubt went back to Fabius Pictor (so rightly Ogilvie 1965, 312–313). However, an alternative tradition credited Valerius Maximus with ending the secession (Cic. *Brut.* 54; Val. Max. 8.9.1; *Inscr. Ital.* 13.3.78; Plut. *Pomp.* 13.1).

bland summary:

...εἶπε στασιάσαι πρὸς τὴν γαστέρα τὰ μέλη πάντα τοῦ σώματος, καὶ φάναι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὡς ἡμεῖς τὰς τε χεῖρας ἐνεργοὺς εἰς ἔργα καὶ τοὺς πόδας πρὸς πορείαν τιθέαμεν, τὴν γλῶσσαν δὲ καὶ τὰ χεῖλη ὅτι δι' ἡμῶν τὰ τῆς καρδίας βουλευόμενα διαγγέλλονται, τὰ ὅσα δ' αὖ ὡς δι' ἡμῶν οἱ ἐτέρων λόγοι τῷ νοῦ παραπέμπονται, τὰς δὲ χεῖρας ὅτι ἐργάτιδες οὔσαι ἡμεῖς περιποιούμεθα πορισμοὺς, τοὺς πόδας δ' αὖθις ὅτι ἅπαν ἡμεῖς τὸ σῶμα φέροντες κοπιῶμεν κἀν ταῖς πορείαις κἀν ταῖς ἐργασίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς στάσεσιν· ἡμῶν δ' ἐνεργούντων οὕτω σὺ μόνη ἀσυντελής οὔσα καὶ ἀεργὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ἡμῶν ὡς δέσποινα τις ὑπηρετῆ καὶ τῶν ἐκ καμάτου πάντων ἡμῶν πορισμῶν ἀπολαύεις αὐτή. ἡ δὲ γαστὴρ συνέθετο...

He said that once all the limbs of the body rebelled against the stomach. The eyes said: "We make the hands able to work and the legs to walk." The tongue and the lips said: "By us the heart's wishes are made known." The eyes said: "By us others' words are conveyed to the mind." The hands said: "We are workers and provide supplies". The feet said: "We carry the whole body and tire ourselves out on journeys, at work, and while standing." "While we work, you alone contribute nothing and do no work and are served by us all like some mistress, and enjoy all that we provide by our labours." The stomach agreed...

No doubt Zonaras made some omissions, but his version of Menenius' speech (just over 200 words long) evidently gives an accurate impression of Dio's original. In its brevity and vivid simplicity (and also in its passage from indirect to direct discourse), it was quite different from the extended and rhetorically elaborated speeches with which we are familiar from Dio's extant books and which he had probably already introduced in Book 3.

The Coriolanus saga was the next major episode in the traditional story. A fragment (F 18.3–6 = *ES* 32) happens to preserve Dio's account of the events leading up to Coriolanus' exile, and shows that, unlike our other sources, Dio included no speech in this narrative. The next fragment (F 18.7–12 = *ES* 33) recounts the decisive encounter between Coriolanus and his mother Veturia which led him to stop his attack on Rome.⁶⁶ Tradition obliged Dio to write a short direct-discourse speech for Veturia (F 18.8–10): this is a feature of all the extant

⁶⁶ Zonar. 7.16.7–10 reproduces this account with only a few omissions.

accounts, and it gave him yet another opportunity for impassioned utterance by a female speaker. Dio also supplies a direct-discourse response for Coriolanus (F 18.11), short, but not as crisp as Dionysius' version (8.54.1). Both writers make him tell Veturia "You have conquered".⁶⁷ This too was probably a traditional feature, which Livy (2.40.9) chose to suppress. In a crude detail which is probably his own contribution, Dio ratchets up the pathos even further by making Veturia bare her breast and touch her womb.

After this episode, hardly any traces of speech appear in what survives of Dio's narrative until we reach the mid fourth century. The only exceptions are a few brief utterances: the excursus on the triumph includes the slave's injunction to the triumphing commander to "Look behind you", and the narrative of the Gallic Sack includes two utterances taken as omens.⁶⁸ More passages at least of short speech must have occurred, particularly in the accounts of the capture of Veii and the Gallic Sack, for which Zonaras again turned to Plutarch, using his life of Camillus as his main source and adding only a few details from Dio. However, the inadequacy of our sources is not likely to be the only reason for this silence. Another factor may have been a change in the character of Dio's coverage: various indications suggest that he may have given year-by-year coverage down to the mid-fifth century, but then turned to more selective recording until the beginning of the third century (Rich 2016, 278–279).

There are thus no strong grounds for supposing that Dio included any extended speech episodes in his account of the early Republic after its first year. The surviving speech episodes are mostly brief utterances and exchanges, and, although Menenius Agrippa's speech is somewhat longer, it is still markedly different in length and character from Dio's extended speeches. Of course, some extended speech episodes may have occurred: Dio may have given the resignation speeches of Valerius Maximus such treatment, and others may have left no trace. Nonetheless, it is hard to resist the conclusion that Dio did little or nothing to exploit the opportunity for extended speeches which was offered by the Struggle of the Orders and of which Dionysius made such copious use.

The Lacus Curtius and the Samnite Wars

⁶⁷ So also Plut. *Cor.* 36.5 and App. *Ital.* 5.5, but these accounts both follow Dionysius. Cf. Fromentin 2016, 188.

⁶⁸ Slave: Zonar. 7.21.9; Tzetzes, *Epist.* 107, *Chil.* 13.53. Omens: Zonar. 7.23.3, 8.

One of the competing aetiologies for the Lacus Curtius in the Forum ran as follows. In 362 (Varr.) a fissure was said to have appeared in the Forum, which an oracle declared could only be closed by throwing in the Romans' most precious possession. M. Curtius declared that this must mean their menfolk, and sacrificed himself by leaping in on his warhorse, so closing the chasm.⁶⁹ In Livy's brief account (7.6.1–6) Curtius' words are reported as follows: "they say that M. Curtius...reproved those who doubted that there was any greater Roman good than arms and valour...and devoted himself" (*M. Curtium...castigasse ferunt dubitantes an ullum magis Romanum bonum quam arma uirtusque esset;...se deuouisse*). Dionysius' version, as preserved by his excerptor, is also succinct, but includes a brief speech for Curtius in indirect discourse, in which he states the greatest Roman good as "the valour of their men" (ἀνδρῶν ἀρετή) and claims that his sacrifice would make the earth yield many good men.⁷⁰

Dio recounted the story in his seventh book.⁷¹ Although, like Livy, he expressed some scepticism, he nonetheless gave it much greater prominence than the other versions, writing an extended direct-discourse speech for Curtius, the first securely attested after those of Book 3. Zonaras' account (7.25.1–9) is itself quite lengthy, including a 157-word version of the speech, all in direct discourse.⁷² Part of the speech is also preserved by Ps.-Maximus (F 30.2–4 = Ps.-Max. 52.17/59.20), and this fragment brings out how much of Dio's speech Zonaras omitted.

In other versions Curtius is an appropriate sacrifice as a representative of the manpower and valour on which the Roman state depends. In Dio's speech this is replaced by a philosophical argument that man is the most precious thing in existence. The fragment preserves the culmination of the argument (only the underlined words are retained by Zonaras):

⁶⁹ On the tale and its presentation in our sources see Oakley 1998, 96–100. The earliest source is Varro, *Ling.* 5.148, citing Procilius, according to whom the god of the dead demanded "the bravest citizen" (*ciuem fortissimum*) in restitution for an unpaid sacrifice.

⁷⁰ D.H. *AR* 14.11 Kiessling-Jacoby = 14 L Pittia. Dionysius' history survives only in excerpts after Book 11, and this fragment survives in the Ambrosian Excerpts (on these excerpts from his history, preserved in two manuscripts in Milan, see Pittia 2002, 105–142). Pittia ed. 2005 is a new edition of Dionysius' Books 14–20, with a reclassification of the fragments.

⁷¹ Fragments attributed to the seventh book deal with events of 381 (F 28.3) and 340 (F 35.2). No fragments are attributed to Books 5–6 (Rich 2016, 275).

⁷² A much briefer version of Dio's account is given by Tzetzes (= F 30.1; Boissevain 1895, 88–89).

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ζῶον θνητὸν οὐτ' ἄμεινον οὐτ' ἰσχυρότερον ἀνθρώπου. ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾶτε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κάτω κέκυφε καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀεὶ βλέπει, πράττει τε οὐδὲν ὃ μὴ τροφῆς καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἔχεται (οὕτω καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως ἐς ταῦτα κατακέκριται), μόνοι δὲ ἡμεῖς ἄνω τε ὀρῶμεν καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ αὐτῷ ὀμιλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπερφρονοῦμεν, τοῖς δὲ δὴ θεοῖς αὐτοῖς ὡς καὶ ὁμοίοις οὖσιν ἡμῖν σύνεσμεν, ἅτε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ποιήματα αὐτῶν οὐ γήινα ἀλλ' οὐράνια ὄντες; ὑφ' οὗ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους πρὸς τὰ ἡμέτερα εἶδη καὶ γράφομεν καὶ πλάττομεν· εἰ γὰρ δεῖ δὴ τι καὶ θρασυνόμενον εἰπεῖν, οὐτ' ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ θεὸς σῶμα θνητὸν ἔχων, οὔτε θεὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀσώματος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀθάνατος. ταῦτά τοι καὶ συμπάντων τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων προφέρομεν· καὶ οὔτε τι πεζόν ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ τάχει καταληφθὲν ἢ ἰσχύι δαμασθὲν ἢ καὶ τέχναις τισὶ συλληφθὲν δουλούμεθα, οὐτ' ἔνυδρον οὐτ' ἀεροπόρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ βυθοῦ μηδ' ὀρῶντες ἀνέλκομεν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μηδὲ ἐξικνούμενοι κατασύρομεν.

No mortal creature is better or stronger than man. Do you not see that all the others are bent downwards and look always to the ground, and their doings are only for nourishment and sex (for nature itself has restricted them to these), and that we alone look up and consort with heaven itself, despise the things on earth, and keep company with the gods themselves as being like us, since we are their offspring and creation, not earthly but heavenly? This is why we paint and sculpt them in our forms. To speak boldly, a man is nothing other than a god with a mortal body, and a god nothing other than a man without a body and therefore immortal. It is this which makes us superior to all other living beings. All the beasts of the land are our slaves, either overcome by our speed or subdued by our strength or trapped by our arts. As for the creatures of water or the air, we draw up the former from the deep without seeing them, and sweep the latter from the sky without approaching them.

The speech shows Dio as at his rhetorical worst, and is rightly stigmatised by Oakley (1998, 99) for its “vacuity”. Earlier versions had set the tale in the ethical tradition of Roman *virtus*. Dio jettisoned this to produce a set-piece display of his *paideia*, deploying Platonic echoes

and exploiting the rich Greek tradition of anthropocentric commonplaces.⁷³ Nonetheless, in according Curtius one of his (at this point still rare) extended speeches, Dio was not merely taking advantage of an opportunity to show off his culture and literary talent, but also stressing a theme which was to be of continuing importance in his history, exemplary self-sacrifice for the sake of the Roman people. Curtius is cited repeatedly among such exemplars in Dio's later speeches. Particularly notable is the reference in Cicero's denunciation of Antony, where Curtius is bracketed with Postumius and Regulus, for whose sacrifices Dio also, as we shall see, provided speeches (45.32.4).⁷⁴

The warfare of the later fourth century gave Dio opportunities for a number of brief utterances and exchanges, attested for T. Manlius Torquatus' execution of his disobedient son and refusal to accept re-election to the consulship in 340 (F 35.2, 9; Zonar. 7.26.4–5), defiant responses by the Privernates to the consul who had defeated them in 329 (F 35.11), and L. Papirius Cursor's justification of his drinking habit in 319 (F 36.23).

The two most celebrated episodes of the Second Samnite War were the quarrel between the dictator Papirius Cursor and his *magister equitum* Fabius Rullianus in 325/4 and the Samnites' humiliation of the Roman army at the Caudine Forks in 321 and the Romans' subsequent repudiation of the treaty under which the army had been spared. Dio appears to have given the rest of the war only cursory treatment, but recounted these two episodes at length, taking the opportunity, like Livy, for extended speeches.⁷⁵

Rullianus (or Rullus, the form of his name adopted by Dio) was said to have won a victory over the Samnites in Papirius' absence and in disregard of his instruction not to engage the enemy.⁷⁶ The furious Papirius threatened Rullianus with execution, first in the camp, and then at Rome, but was eventually induced to show leniency. Livy's lengthy account (8.30–36) includes numerous speeches, in both direct and indirect discourse. What survives from Dio's version comprises two separate fragments from the direct-discourse speech of Rullianus' father (M. Fabius Ambustus) appealing for clemency (F 36.1–3 = *ES* 59,

⁷³ Platonic echoes: Jones 2016, 299–300. Renehan 1981 collects Greek anthropocentric *topoi*.

⁷⁴ Other citations at 44.30.4 (with the Decii); 53.8.3 (with Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, the Decii and Regulus); 56.5.5; 64.13.2 (with the Decii and Regulus).

⁷⁵ Cursor and Rullianus: F 36.1–7, Zonar. 7.26.9 (omitting their dispute). The Caudine Forks defeat and its sequel: F 36.8–25, Zonar. 7.26.10–16. Brief references to two episodes of 311–310 (Zonar. 8.1.1; F 36.26) are all that survives of the rest of Dio's account of the war.

⁷⁶ For the variant testimony on Rullianus' name see Boissevain 1895, 96.

Ps.Max. 48./55.20a; F 36.4–5 = *ES* 60), followed by a narrative fragment describing Papirius' relenting (F 36.6–7 = *ES* 61).

The fragments of Ambustus' speech show that it was extended and rhetorically elaborated. The first fragment presents general arguments from human nature for the superiority of leniency over severity, a theme Dio was to develop repeatedly, most notably in Livia's dialogue with Augustus, while the second appears to introduce an impassioned coda. Although delivered before the popular assembly, at least in these fragments the speech is addressed not to them, but to Papirius. The corresponding speech in Livy is addressed to the assembly, and Millar (1964, 79) has insisted on its superiority: "Livy's speech belongs in its setting", whereas Dio's "is no more than a series of generalities about human nature" and "could have been put in at any point ... at which the relevant moral situation occurred". This is a fair criticism of the first fragment, but we should beware of inferring from this to the speech as a whole. The fragment reporting Papirius' change of heart opens as follows (F 36.6):

τό τε γὰρ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς περιεβέβλητο ὄκνει καταλῦσαι· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔμελλε τοῦ Ῥούλλου φείσεσθαι (τὴν γὰρ σπουδὴν τοῦ δήμου ἐώρα), ἐκείνῳ τε ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀντισχῶν χαρίσασθαι καὶ τοὺς νέους ἐπιστρέψαι μᾶλλον, ὥστε ἐξ ἀδοκίτου αὐτῷ συγγούς, ἠθέλησε. τό τε οὖν πρόσωπον συστρέψας καὶ τὸν δῆμον δριμύ ὑποβλέψας τὴν φωνὴν ἐνέτεινε καὶ εἶπε.

He shrank from undermining the name and form of the office with which he was invested. Since he intended to spare Rullus (for he recognised the strength of the popular feeling), he wanted to enhance the favour and convert the young men more effectively by holding out longer and so making his pardon a surprise. Accordingly, knitting his brows, and glaring at the people, he raised his voice and spoke.

The fragment then passes to the audience's sullen reaction and Papirius' ensuing change of manner. However, Dio himself cannot have passed over Papirius' words so baldly. As Boissevain (1895, 97) acutely observed, the quoted passage must have introduced a direct-discourse speech for Papirius, and, although no cross-reference has survived, it is likely that here, as for Publicola, the compiler of the *Excerpta de sententiis* omitted the speech itself because it had been included in the excerpts Περὶ δημηγορίων.

Thus Dio used the tale of Papirius' quarrel with Rullianus as the occasion for an extended speech episode, with direct-discourse speeches before the assembly not only for Rullianus' father, but also for Papirius himself. In this debate, as in Livy's version of the dispute, the conflicting imperatives of valour, ambition, discipline and leniency must have been explored.⁷⁷

A well-established feature of the Caudine Forks narrative was the advice said to have been given by Herennius Pontius, father of the Samnite commander Gavius Pontius, about how the trapped Roman army should be treated: he recommended that they should either be dismissed unharmed to win Roman goodwill or, if this was deemed unacceptable, should be slaughtered, but his son rejected both proposals, opting instead to release them on humiliating terms. Versions of Herennius' speech survive in both Livy (9.3.9–13) and Appian (*Samn.* 4.3–4). Appian also supplied a speech in response for his son, as did Dionysius (16.2.2–4), here as elsewhere probably Appian's source for this period.⁷⁸ Dio appears to have provided a dialogue for the pair comprising at least Herennius' opening speech with its alternative proposals, his son's response stating his decision, and a further (no doubt shorter) speech by Herennius warning against this course of action: a fragment arguing that "quarrels are ended by benefactions" and that the Romans would respond to such treatment (F 36.12 = *ES* 63) is clearly from Herennius' opening argument for releasing the Romans without ignominy, while a second fragment, in which Herennius closes his advice by warning that "all men by their nature feel greater resentment over insults than gratitude for benefactions" (F 36.14 = *ES* 64), is best interpreted as from a second speech responding to his son's choice.

Herennius' dialogue with his son was clearly an extended speech episode, and the two fragments show that the arguments were developed in terms of general considerations about human nature in Dio's characteristic manner. Millar (1964, 79) criticises his speech for Herennius as another generalising exposition of the case for leniency, but this overlooks that the second part of Herennius' opening speech (not represented in the fragments) will have argued for exterminating the trapped Romans, and accepts Boissevain's attribution to the speech of two further fragments from Ps.-Maximus. The opening words of F 36.14 are cited

⁷⁷ On Livy's version see Oakley 1998, 704–707.

⁷⁸ Oakley 2005, 69–70, holds that the shared sources of Livy and Dionysius included a speech for Herennius' son, which Livy chose to omit, but the speech could have been Dionysius' innovation. For Dionysius as Appian's main source on the Samnite Wars see Hannak 1869, 76–102; Oakley 2005, 8–9; Rich 2015, 66–67, 113.

not only by the *Excerpta de sententiis*, but also by Ps.-Maximus in his chapter of excerpts ‘On benefaction and gratitude’ (Περὶ εὐεργεσίας καὶ χάριτος, 8.-/63). Boissevain (1895, 98–99), following Mai, assigns to Herennius’ speech the two preceding citations from Dio in this chapter on how men should respond to benefactions (F 36.11 = Ps.-Max. 8.59/61; F 36.13 = Ps.-Max. 8.60/62), although acknowledging the weakness of the attribution. In fact, these fragments hardly fit the requirements of Herennius’ case, and there is no good reason to assign them to his speech, while at least F 36.13 may not be from a speech at all.

Herennius and his son are the first enemies of Rome known to have been assigned speeches by Dio. As we shall see, this was the first of several speech episodes in which Dio portrays enemy speakers as exploring options for responding to Roman power, all to no avail.

According to the tradition, the senate in 320 decided to repudiate the agreement under which the Roman army had been released, claiming to have made good the breach of oaths by surrendering to the Samnites those who had sworn them, including the consuls of 321 who had held the joint command, Sp. Postumius Albinus and T. Veturius Calvinus. Cicero tells us that Postumius himself was the “advocate and proposer of this surrender” (*Off.* 3.109: *huius deditiois...suasor et auctor*), and Livy (9.8–9) provides him with two speeches, in the first proposing the repudiation and the surrender of the oath-takers, and in the second responding to objecting tribunes.

In Zonaras’ account (7.26.14–15), “those in the city”, wishing to repudiate the agreement, called on the former consuls to give their view:

καὶ πρῶτω γε τῷ Ποστουμίῳ τὴν ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον, ὅπως αὐτὸς καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφίνηται, αἰσχύνῃ τοῦ μὴ πάντα ἀδοξίας ἀναπλήσαι. ὁ δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἔφη μὴ δεῖν κυρωθῆναι τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πεπραγμένα παρὰ τῆς γερουσίας καὶ τοῦ δήμου· μηδὲ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκουσίως πρᾶξαι αὐτά, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη συνεχομένους, ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐπήγαγον οἱ πολέμοι οὐκ ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐκ δόλου καὶ ἐξ ἐνέδρας. οἱ γοῦν ἀπατήσαντες, εἰ ἀντηπατήθησαν, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο δικαίως ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς ἀνταπατήσασιν. ταῦτα τοίνυν εἰπόντος καὶ τοιαῦτα πολλά, ἐν ἀμηχανίᾳ ἢ γερουσία ἐγένετο· τοῦ δὲ καὶ τοῦ Καλουίνου εἰς ἑαυτοὺς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναδεχομένων, ἐψηφίσθη μῆτε κυρωθῆναι τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἐκείνους τε ἐκδοθῆναι.

They first called on Postumius to vote, so that he should express his view against himself, from shame at bringing dishonour on them all. He came into the middle

and said that their actions should not be ratified by the senate and people, since they had carried them out not willingly, but under duress, which the enemy had imposed on them not by valour, but by trickery and ambush, and those who deceive, if deceived in their turn, could not justly accuse the counter-deceivers. After he had said this and much of the same kind, the senate was at a loss. But when he and Calvinus took the blame on themselves, it was voted that the agreement should not be ratified and they should be handed over.

Zonaras' quite full summary and his statement that Postumius added "much of the same kind" indicates that in Dio's version Postumius began with an extended speech, and two short extracts from the speech are preserved by the *Excerpta de sententiis*.⁷⁹ Both these fragments and Zonaras' account show that the speech defended the commanders' conduct and argued that the settlement need not be upheld on the casuistical grounds that it had been imposed by trickery and accepted only under duress. However, the senate, according to Dio, only felt able to proceed with the repudiation when (as they had originally hoped) Postumius and Calvinus accepted responsibility and agreed to be surrendered. A further fragment, preserved by the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως*, comes from a speech by one of them accepting the blame.⁸⁰ Probably the speaker is again Postumius, and the speech much briefer. The fragment is cited as from Dio's eighth book, and, since it coheres with other indications, this attribution may be accepted as correct (Rich 2016, 275).

As already noted, Postumius is the second of Dio's speakers to sacrifice himself in the public interest, but, whereas Curtius was presented as wholly admirable, Postumius is shown as flawed and initially self-interested. In Livy's account it is Postumius who first proposes the repudiation and his speeches are mainly concerned to demonstrate that the surrender of the oath-takers would absolve the Roman people from blame. In Dio's version, however, he at first deploys specious arguments to justify his own conduct and argue that the treaty can be

⁷⁹ F 36.17a (= *ES* 66): ὅτι τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς ἑαυτῶν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀνεμέσητόν ἐστι προνοεῖσθαι, κἂν ἐν κινδύνῳ τινὶ καταστῶσι, πᾶν ὅτιοῦν ὥστε σωθῆναι πράττειν ("it is both necessary and blameless for all men to plan for their own safety, and, if they fall into danger, to take any steps to be saved"). F 36.17b (= *ES* 67): ὅτι συγγνώμη καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων δίδεται τοῖς ἀκούσιόν τι πράξασιν ("forgiveness is granted both by gods and by men for actions taken involuntarily").

⁸⁰ F.36.18a (= *Synt.* π35): καὶ προσποιούμαι τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ ὁμολογῶ τὴν ἐπιπορκίαν ("I both take upon myself the injustice and confess the perjury").

simply disregarded, and only subsequently agrees to become the scapegoat.⁸¹ Moreover, whereas Livy is studiously ambivalent on the justice of the repudiation itself (Levene 1993, 229–230; Oakley 2005, 17–19), Dio makes his disapproval explicit. In the sequel the Samnites are said to have indignantly refused to accept the oath-takers' surrender (reported by Dio only in indirect speech: F 36.19) and the Romans then to have won a victory and sent Samnites under the yoke in their turn. Dio comments that this shows that there is no justice in war (F 36.21).

The fragments and Zonaras show that Dio gave a more comprehensive account of the Third Samnite War than of the previous conflict, and he may well have given a year-by-year narrative for the war from its outbreak in 298 to the peace settlement of 290 (Rich 2016, 279). However, there is no trace of direct speech in what survives. Several fragments record *bons mots*, but all in indirect discourse.⁸²

The Pyrrhic War

Like his predecessors, Dio gave ample treatment to the Pyrrhic War. Fragments preserve several brief direct-speech utterances: warnings to the Tarentines by the Roman envoy Postumius and their fellow-citizen Meton, a remark by Pyrrhus after his costly victory at Heraclea, and drunken youths' mockery of the king. Further remarks by Pyrrhus are reported in indirect speech.⁸³

Zonaras briefly reports addresses to their armies by both commanders before the battle of Heraclea (8.3.6–7): Laevinus “called them together and delivered a speech making

⁸¹ As Oakley (2005, 114–115) notes, Dio's version may draw on Dionysius' (lost) account, but its development in Postumius' speeches may be his own.

⁸² F 36.27 (the consul L. Volumnius Flamma's riposte to his colleague Ap. Claudius Caecus in 296, cf. Livy 10.19.8); F 36.30, Zonar. 8.1.13 (Fabius Rullianus' defence of his son, the consul of 292); F 36.33 (Fabricius' justification of his support for P. Cornelius Rufinus' consulship, wrongly applied by Dio to Rufinus' first consulship in 290 rather than his second in 277, cf. Torelli 1978, 192–193); F 37.1 (Curius Dentatus on his conquests in 290).

⁸³ Warnings to Tarentines: F 39.8, 10; Zonar. 8.2.3. Pyrrhus after Heraclea: F 40.19, two remarks, one in indirect, one in direct speech; Zonar. 8.3.12 gives both in direct speech. Later reported remarks by Pyrrhus: F 40.27–28; Zonar. 8.4.3. Drunken youths: F 40.47; Zonar. 8.6.7. A further short speech fragment, cited from Book 10 but without identifiable context, will belong to the Pyrrhic War period or the immediately following years if the book attribution is correct (F 40.46a = *Synt.* v12).

many exhortations to courage” (συγκαλέσας αὐτοὺς πολλὰ πρὸς θάρσος παρακαλοῦντα ἐδημηγόρησε) and Pyrrhus “addressing his men, urged them on to the war” (τοῖς οἰκείους διαλεχθεὶς ἐπώτρυνεν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον). Such notices might reflect direct-discourse orations in Dio, but need not do so, and, as we saw above,⁸⁴ in the extant books Dio often contents himself with indirect-discourse reports of pre-battle speeches.

Three fragments (F 40.14–16) have been tentatively attributed by Dio’s editors to a direct-discourse speech by Laevinus before the battle.⁸⁵ Two of these fragments occur in the *Excerpta de sententiis*: the first (F 40.15 = *ES* 91) concerns the impossibility for tyrants of forming real friendships and the second (F 40.16 = *ES* 92) insists that generalship is only of value when supported by adequate forces. F 40.15 is also preserved as three separate extracts in Ps.-Maximus’ chapter ‘On Friends and Brotherly Love’ (Περὶ φίλων καὶ φιλαδελφίας, 6./87–89). The preceding extract, also cited as from Dio (F 40.14 = Ps. Max. 6./86), is similar in argument, and so Boissevain, following Mai, conjectured that it came from the same context. The sequence in the *Excerpta de sententiis* shows that F 40.15–16 stood in Dio’s original between the Romans’ learning that Pyrrhus was coming to Italy (F 40.13 = *ES* 90) and their first battle at Heraclea (F 40.18 = *ES* 93). The narrowness of this window makes Laevinus’ speech an attractive context, but the content of the fragments hardly suits a pre-battle exhortation, and there is no internal indication that they come from a speech. An alternative and perhaps more likely possibility is that these two fragments (and perhaps also F 40.14) come from general remarks by Dio on tyranny and generalship prompted by Pyrrhus’ arrival in Italy.⁸⁶

Zonaras gives a rather fuller report (8.5.2) of a speech made to his troops by Pyrrhus before the battle of Ausculum, urging them not to be discouraged by rumours that the commander P. Decius Mus would follow the family tradition of performing a *devotio* in the battle. This too might reflect a direct-discourse oration in Dio, but does not necessarily do so.

Dio’s Pyrrhic War narrative did include at least one extended speech episode, namely Pyrrhus’ encounter with a Roman embassy seeking to recover prisoners and including Fabricius, of which a good deal is preserved for us in fragments (F 40.29–38) and Zonaras (8.4.4–8). Our sources give conflicting versions of the sequence of events involving this embassy and the abortive peace mission to Rome by Pyrrhus’ envoy Cineas. Both Dio and

⁸⁴ See p. 271.

⁸⁵ “Desumpta fortasse ex oratione a Laevino ad milites habita” (Boissevain 1895, 122).

⁸⁶ Cf. Dio’s introductory account of Pyrrhus à propos of the Tarentine appeal (F 40.3–6), passed over by Zonaras.

the Livian tradition put the Roman embassy after the withdrawal from central Italy to Campania which ended Pyrrhus' campaign in 280 and make Cineas' mission its sequel. By contrast, Appian (*Samn.* 10) puts the Roman embassy at the same point, but places Cineas' mission earlier—after the battle of Heraclea, but before Pyrrhus' advance into central Italy. Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 18–20) too makes Cineas' mission precede the Roman embassy, and both were probably following Dionysius (whose account survives only for the Roman embassy). Yet another version of events is supplied by Justin (18.1.10–2.8).⁸⁷

Dio's account of the Roman embassy opens with a very short statement by Fabricius: "The Romans have sent us to bring back those captured in the battle and pay the ransom which we both agree on" (F 40.30 = *ES* 101: Ῥωμαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἔπεμψαν τοὺς τε ἐαλωκότας ἐν τῇ μάχῃ κομιουμένους καὶ λύτρα ἀντ' αὐτῶν ἀντιδώσοντας, ὅσα ἂν ἀμφοτέροις ἡμῖν συμβῆ). This surprises Pyrrhus, who had expected a peace proposal, and he accordingly takes counsel with his courtiers. Two speeches follow, summarised by Zonaras (8.4.5):

ὁ μὲν οὖν Μίλων μήτε τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀποδόσθαι μήτε σπείσασθαι συνεβούλευεν, ἀλλ' ἤδη τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἠττημένων καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πολέμῳ προσκατεργάσασθαι, ὁ δὲ Κινέας τούναντίον ἅπαν αὐτῷ συνεβούλευε· τοὺς τε γὰρ αἰχμαλώτους προῖκα ἀποδοῦναι συνήνει καὶ πρέσβεις εἰς Ῥώμην καὶ χρήματα πέμψαι τῆς εἰρήνης ἕνεκα καὶ σπονδῶν.

Milo advised him not to return the prisoners or make peace, but, now that the Romans had been defeated, to end their resistance by war. Cineas gave completely the opposite advice, urging him to return the prisoners without ransom and send ambassadors and money to Rome to seek peace and a treaty.

Extracts from these speeches were given in the *Excerpta de sententiis*, but are lost in the first of its lacunae except for the end of Cineas' speech (F 40.31 = *ES* 102). The same fragment continues with Pyrrhus' acceptance of Cineas' advice and his brief speech to the Roman embassy: "I did not make war on you before willingly, Romans, and I would not do so now. I

⁸⁷ Caire 2009 provides an excellent analysis of the source traditions, convincingly arguing for Dionysius as the likely common source of Appian and Plutarch. Torelli 1978, 137–163, gives a full citation of sources. Other analyses and attempted reconstructions of events include Lévêque 1957, 345–370; Lefkowitz 1959; Schietтино 2009; Stouder 2009.

wish above all to become your friend, and so release all the prisoners without ransom and make peace” (F 40.32: οὔτε πρότερον ἐκὼν ὑμῖν, ὧ Ῥωμαῖοι, ἐπολέμησα, οὔτ’ ἂν νῦν πολεμήσαιμι· φίλος τε γὰρ ὑμῶν γενέσθαι περὶ παντὸς ποιοῦμαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τούς τε αἰχμαλώτους πάντας ἄνευ λύτρων ἀφήμι καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην σπένδομαι).

Dio now passes to the celebrated tale of Pyrrhus’ private conversation with Fabricius, and his account survives in a lengthy excerpt (F 40.33–38 = *ES* 103), as well as in Zonaras’ summary (8.4.7–8).⁸⁸ Besides offering gifts, Pyrrhus makes a brief speech claiming to regret the war with Rome, asking for Fabricius’ help in making peace and inviting him to come to Greece as his adviser and general (F 40.33).⁸⁹ The rest of the excerpt is taken up by Fabricius’ reply, the longest preserved passage of direct discourse from the fragmentary books. Fabricius briefly promises to help Pyrrhus obtain peace if it is in the Roman interest and declines his offers (F 40.34). He then turns to contrasting Pyrrhus’ circumstances with his own (F 40.35–36):

εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθ’ ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ πάνυ πολλὰ ἔχω καὶ οὐδὲν δέομαι πλειόνων· ἀρκεῖ γάρ μοι τὰ ὄντα, καὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμῶ· σὺ δ’ εἰ καὶ σφόδρα πλουτεῖν νομίζεις, ἐν πενία μυρία καθέστηκας· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὔτε τὴν Ἥπειρον οὔτε τᾶλλα ὅσα κέκτησαι καταλιπὼν δεῦρ’ ἐπεραιώθης, εἴγε ἐκείνοις τε ἠρκοῦ καὶ μὴ πλειόνων ὠρέγου. ὅταν γάρ τις τοῦτο πάσχη καὶ μηδένα ὄρον τῆς ἀπληστίας ποιῆται, πτωχότατός ἐστι.

Be well assured that my possessions are ample and I wish for no more: what I have is sufficient for me, and I desire nothing that belongs to others. You, however, think that you have great wealth, but are in dire poverty. You would not have left Epirus and your other possessions and crossed here, if you were satisfied with them and did not hunger for more. When someone is in this plight and sets no limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars.

The remainder of the excerpt elaborates this theme. How long the speech continued beyond the end of the extract we cannot say.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Part of F 40.35 is also cited by Ps.-Maximus (12./114).

⁸⁹ Pyrrhus’ offer of gifts is omitted by the excerptor, but included by Zonaras.

⁹⁰ Zonaras’ version of Fabricius’ speech (8.4.8), also in direct discourse, is abridged from F 40.34–35.

Dio's version of Fabricius' speech appears to have departed significantly from those of his predecessors and took up a theme of central significance in his history. One tradition made Fabricius respond briskly that it would not be in Pyrrhus' interest to have Fabricius at his court, for his subjects would then prefer him for their king (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 20.9; App. *Samn.* 10.14). Another centred the speech on Fabricius' celebrated (if perhaps unhistorical) poverty. Thus the lengthy oration supplied by Dionysius insists that he has no regrets about his poverty, which has not prevented him attaining the highest offices, and the proffered wealth could have no attraction for him.⁹¹ Dio, however, at least in what survives of his treatment of Fabricius, makes no reference to his being poor in comparison with his peers, and his speech focuses instead on the ethical *topos* of the evil of 'greed for more' (*pleonexia*), as exemplified by Pyrrhus, and the importance of being satisfied with what one has, like Fabricius himself. Already when introducing Pyrrhus and his expedition to Italy, Dio had attributed it to his desire to rule the world and reported Cineas as trying to dissuade him and convince him to be content with what he had (F 40.5 = *EV* 22). Later, when reporting Fabricius' expulsion, when censor, of Rufinus from the senate for possessing ten pounds of silver, Dio (as echoed by Zonaras 8.6.9) interpreted it as showing that "the Romans deemed poverty to be not lacking many possessions, but wanting them". *Pleonexia* and its dangers for both individuals and states serve as a recurrent motif in Dio's history, and this evil and the collapse of the values which Fabricius exemplified are presented as among the chief factors which came to undermine the Roman Republic's viability.⁹²

Important as Fabricius' speech was for Dio's purposes, it was only the third extended speech in this episode. Although little survives of the speeches of Pyrrhus' advisers Milo and Cineas, they must together have occupied a good deal of space in Dio's original. The excerpt preceding the lacuna in the *Excerpta de sententiis* breaks off during the report of Pyrrhus' consultation and so shortly before the beginning of Milo's speech (F 40.30 = *ES* 101), and our manuscript resumes in an excerpt giving the close of Cineas' speech and its sequel (F 40.31 = *ES* 102), and so the material lost in the lacuna will have come almost entirely from these two speeches. The lacuna comprised four pages, and each page of the manuscript held 16 lines, each of 46–54 characters.⁹³ The lost material thus comprised some 3200 characters.

⁹¹ D.H. *AR* 19.15–18 Kiessling-Jacoby = 19.S-T Pittia, briefly echoed at App. *Samn.* 10.13.

⁹² On *pleonexia* in Dio's history see Kuhn-Chen 2003, 165–168; Rees 2011, 18–23. Dio held that among his contemporaries the younger Cato was unique in acting "purely and without some personal *pleonexia*" (37.57.3).

⁹³ Boissevain 1906, vii, xiii.

Even the *ES* excerpts from these speeches were thus quite lengthy overall, and we cannot, of course, say how much of the original speeches they included.

Dio could hardly have avoided an incident so well established in the tradition as Fabricius' private interview with Pyrrhus, but he was under no such obligation to treat Pyrrhus' council, and may indeed have invented its details. Our only other reference is by Dionysius, who merely states that Pyrrhus replied to the embassy "after deliberating with his friends" (19.13.7). Cineas' earlier opposition to Pyrrhus' expedition was well attested (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 14), and Dio may have taken this and his role as Pyrrhus' ambassador as sufficient justification for making him the spokesman for the peace policy, and then picked on Milo, otherwise known just as one of Pyrrhus' commanders, as the advocate of war. Dio's motive for including this debate may have been partly literary: he may have presented Milo as a bluff military man, and will surely have taken the opportunity for rhetorical display afforded by Cineas, who, as Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 14.1) tells us, was a renowned orator and had studied with Demosthenes. However, Dio clearly attached importance also to the debate's theme, which reprises the speech of Herennius Pontius. Once again, advisers to the Romans' enemies propound alternative responses, offering them a choice between harsh and mild policies. Herennius' son erred by opting for an unviable middle way. Now Pyrrhus chooses the mild option, but with no greater success.

Dio's account of Cineas' peace mission survives only in Zonaras' summary (8.4.9–12). Cineas, he tells us, first visited senators' houses, seeking to seduce them with presents and talk. Other sources claim that all refused the presents, but Zonaras implies that they were accepted.⁹⁴ Zonaras continues:

καὶ ἐπειδὴ πολλοὺς ἠκείωσατο, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ συνέδριον καὶ εἶπεν ὡς “Πύρρος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι οὐχ ὡς πολεμῆσων ὑμῖν ἦκεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς καταλλάξων Ταραντίνους αὐτὸν ἰκετεύοντας· ἀμέλει καὶ τοὺς ἀλόντας ὑμῶν λύτρων ἀφῆκεν ἄτερ, καὶ δυνάμενος πορθῆσαι τὴν χώραν καὶ τῇ πόλει προσβαλεῖν, ἀξιοῖ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑμῶν ἐγγραφεῖναι, πολλὰ μὲν ὠφελήσεσθαι ἀφ’ ὑμῶν ἐλπίζων, πλείω δ’ ἔτι καὶ μείζω εὐεργετήσιν ὑμᾶς.”

When he had won over many, he entered the senate and said: “King Pyrrhus offers as his defence that he came not to make war against you, but to reconcile you with

⁹⁴ Refusal: Diod. Sic. 22.6.3; Val. Max. 4.3.14; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 18.5.

the Tarentines, at their entreaty. Moreover, he has released your prisoners without ransom, and, although able to sack your land and attack the city, he asks to be enrolled among your friends and allies, hoping to receive much benefit from you and perform even greater services for you.”

The senators, Zonaras tells us, deliberated for several days and were inclined to make peace, until Ap. Claudius Caecus intervened:

μαθὼν δὲ τοῦτο Ἄππιος ὁ τυφλὸς ἐκομίσθη ἐπὶ τὸ βουλευτήριον ... καὶ εἶπε μὴ συμφέρειν τὰς πρὸς τὸν Πύρρον συμβάσεις τῇ πολιτείᾳ, παρήνεσε δὲ καὶ αὐτίκα τὸν Κιννέαν ἐξελάσαι τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ δηλᾶσαι τῷ Πύρρῳ οἴκαδε ἀναχωρήσαντα ἐκεῖθεν ἐπικηρυκεύσασθαι περὶ εἰρήνης αὐτοῖς ἢ καὶ περὶ ἐτέρου ὅτου δέοιτο.

Learning this, Appius the Blind was carried into the senate-house ... and said that the agreement with Pyrrhus was not in the state’s interest, and urged them to expel Cineas from the city at once and through him to show Pyrrhus that he should return home and send them a mission from there about peace or anything else he sought.

Appius’ proposal was accepted: Cineas was ordered out and the war immediately resumed.

It is likely that Zonaras’ direct-discourse statement for Cineas reflects a comparable statement in Dio’s original, but the manner in which Zonaras presents it, without any hint of summarizing a larger speech, suggests that, although Dio’s version may have been somewhat fuller, it was nonetheless a relatively short statement, rather than an extended speech, which would have suffered from duplication with Cineas’ earlier speech in Pyrrhus’ council. In keeping with Cineas’ argument there, Dio evidently presented the offered peace terms as mild, rather than the harsher option requiring the Romans to give up alliances with non-Latins reported by some sources.⁹⁵

Appius Claudius Caecus’ decisive intervention was much celebrated, and a text purporting to be his speech was extant in later times (Cic. *Sen.* 16, *Brut.* 61; *Sen. Ep.* 114.13; Tac. *Dial.* 18.4, 21.7). Direct-discourse versions of the speech were given at least by Ennius

⁹⁵ Thus *Ined. Vat.* 2; *App. Samn.* 10.3. Milder terms also at *Plut. Pyrrh.* 18.6.

(*Ann.* 199–200 Skutsch, cited by *Cic. Sen.* 16) and by Greek writers (*Ined. Vat.* 2; *Plut. Pyrrh.* 19.1–4; *App. Samn.* 10.5). Dio too may have given Appius a direct-discourse speech, but Zonaras' bald summary gives no encouragement for this conclusion, and Dio too may have contented himself with a mere speech report, perhaps sharing the reluctance of many earlier historians to compose a version of a speech of which the purported original was available in published form (Brock 1995). A striking fragment (F 40.40 = *ES* 105), rightly stressed by Kemezis (2014, 107), comments on the change of heart brought about by Appius' intervention as an illustration of the power of oratory:

τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ τοῦ λόγου φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ τοσαύτην ἰσχὺν ἔχει ὥστε καὶ ἐκείνους ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τότε μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ἐς ἀντίπαλον καὶ μῖσος καὶ θάρσος τοῦ τε δέους τοῦ Πύρρου καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν δώρων αὐτοῦ ἀλλοιώσεως περιστῆναι.

Such is the nature of speech and so great a power does it have that it even led them then to change to the opposite and substitute hatred and courage for the fear of Pyrrhus and the distraction wrought by his gifts.

However, its placing in the *Excerpta de sententiis* shows that this fragment did not immediately follow the report of Appius' speech, but came after Dio's account of the further measures to which it gave rise, such as fresh levies (F 40.39 = *ES* 104), and so this passage is not an indication that Dio himself gave a direct-discourse version of the speech.

The First Punic War

The first two wars with Carthage were the most important external conflict which Dio had to narrate, and, like his predecessors, he accorded them correspondingly ample space: the First Punic War (264–241 BC) and the immediately following years occupied Books 11–12, and the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) took up Books 13–17. Dio gave a year-by-year narrative throughout these books, except for a few years of relative inactivity (Rich 2016, 276, 280–281). In the absence of Livy, Dio-Zonaras provides our fullest witness to the Roman historical tradition for the years 264–219, providing a valuable supplement and occasional corrective to Polybius (Bleckmann 2002, 35–56).

Fragments (F 43.1–4 = *ES* 111–112; cf. Zonar. 8.8.3) show Dio analysing the causes of the First Punic War in a manner clearly modelled on Thucydides’ explanation of the Peloponnesian War (1.23.5–6), contrasting the expressed grievances with the truest cause. However, whereas Thucydides’ analysis is one-sided, attributing his war to Spartan fear of Athenian expansion, Dio’s is reciprocal: both the Romans and the Carthaginians were motivated by a natural desire for expansion and by mutual fear. This realist interpretation seems to have led Dio to reject the opportunity for a major speech episode at the start of the war. Zonaras (8.8.4) tells us that in response to the appeal of the Mamertines of Messana (which for Dio was merely the spark which started the war) the Romans “readily voted to send them help” (ἐτόίμως ἐπικουρῆσαι αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο), knowing that otherwise the Carthaginians would get Messana, complete the conquest of Sicily and cross to Italy. Both Polybius and Livy reported a great debate at Rome, with the Romans torn between the Mamertines’ unsavoury reputation and the imperatives for war.⁹⁶ Dio apparently opted to reject this tradition and assert instead that the Romans went ahead without hesitation.

By the time the Roman commander, Ap. Claudius Caudex, consul in 264, reached the Straits, a Carthaginian garrison had been installed in Messana. Dio recounted at some length how Claudius succeeded in ousting the Carthaginian garrison, crossing the Straits, and defeating the combined forces of Carthage and the Syracusan king Hiero. A good deal of this narrative survives in fragments (F 43.5–11 = *ES* 113–118) and Zonaras (8.8.7–9.5), including reports of several speeches: the military tribune C. Claudius, who had been sent ahead, addresses the Mamertines’ assembly (F 43.5–6, Zonar. 8.8.7–9); Hanno, the Carthaginian garrison commander, threatens not to allow the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea (F 43.9; Zonar. 8.9.1); Ap. Claudius addresses the Mamertines (F 43.10; Zonar. 8.9.3), and subsequently encourages his troops (F 43.11).⁹⁷ All but one of these (sometimes quite lengthy) speech reports are preserved in fragments, and these are solely in indirect discourse, except for a single sentence in which Appius tells the Mamertines that “I have no need of arms, but leave everything to you yourselves to decide” (F 43.10: οὐδὲν δέομαι τῶν ὅπλων, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῖς ὑμῖν διαγνῶναι πάντα ἐπιτρέπω). The one report not preserved in a fragment concerns Appius’ confrontation with Hanno in the Mamertine assembly, for which Zonaras (8.9.3) simply states that, “when many words had been spoken in vain on both sides”

⁹⁶ Polyb. 1.10.3–11.3; Livy, *Per.* 16.

⁹⁷ F 43.11 on the Romans’ acquisition of naval skills echoes the Corinthians at Thuc. 1.121.4 (Kyhntzsch 1894, 72–73).

(πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν μάτην λεχθέντων), one of the Romans threw Hanno into prison. It is possible that Dio composed direct-discourse speeches for Appius and Hanno at this point, but perhaps more likely that he too merely reported that the speeches were made. Gutschmid assigned to Hanno's speech a direct-discourse fragment preserved by the lexicon Περὶ συντάξεως with attribution to Book 11.⁹⁸ However, the content of the fragment lends no support to this conjecture and the book attribution itself may be false.

Two short direct-discourse utterances are preserved from Dio's account of the rest of the war, both by Carthaginians, namely their commander Hannibal, in a message to the Carthaginians which led them to spare him from execution after his naval defeat in 260, and the envoy Hanno, dissuading the Romans from arresting him in 256. The first is preserved in a fragment (F 43.18 = *ES* 122) as well as Zonaras (8.11.4); the second survives in Zonaras (8.12.9), but the corresponding fragment (F 43.21 = *ES* 124) is interrupted just before Hanno's remark by the second four-page lacuna in the *Excerpta de sententiis*. The manuscript of *ES* only resumes with an excerpt relating to the year 236 (F 46.2 = *ES* 125). The lost portion will doubtless have included several direct-discourse excerpts.

The only other surviving traces of direct discourse in Dio's account of the First Punic War are from its only known extended speech episode, Regulus' address to the senate.⁹⁹ The famous tale of the captive Regulus' return to Rome, disbelieved by most modern scholars, was a staple of the Roman historical tradition from at least the later second century.¹⁰⁰ Having been taken prisoner by the Carthaginians after his defeat in 255, Regulus was said to have been sent back to Rome in 251 as part of a Carthaginian mission, with instructions (in the version followed by Dio) to seek either a peace settlement or (failing that) a prisoner

⁹⁸ F 43.32c (= *Synt.* 58a): σὺ μὲν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς τι πλημμελήσασιν ἐπεξέρχῃ, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συγγινώσκω (“You attack even your friends when they make some error, but I forgive my enemies”); Gutschmid 1894, 556. Boissevain 1895, 147, inserts the fragment at this point in his sequence, judging Gutschmid's proposal “haud improbabiler”.

⁹⁹ Schwartz 1899, 1718, attributes F 43.13–15 to a speech of uncertain context. However, these general observations on the dangers of unreasoning boldness may be authorial rather than from a speech, and, whereas F 43.15 survives not only in Ps.-Maximus (69./40.20) but also in *ES* (120, in its sequence between Ap. Claudius' victory in 264 and Duilius' in 260), F 43.13 and 14 are preserved only in the same chapter of Ps.-Maximus (69./40.18–19) and so may well not come from the same context at all (cf. Boissevain 1895, 149).

¹⁰⁰ The story is known to have figured in the histories of Sempronius Tuditanus and Aelius Tubero (Gell. 7.4 = *FRHist* 10 F 8, 38 F 12), and is frequently mentioned by Cicero and later authors. On the tradition see Klebs 1896, 2088–2092; Gendre and Loutsch 2001, 136–164. Nisbet and Rudd 2004, 80–82, withhold judgement on its historicity.

exchange.¹⁰¹ A fragment (F 43.26–27 = *ELg* 5) preserves the start of Dio’s account, but stops before Regulus speaks. In Zonaras’ version Regulus, on entering the senate, first gives a brief direct-discourse statement of the Carthaginians’ requests (8.15.2). After being asked to give his own view and permitted to do so by the Carthaginian envoys, he makes a longer speech urging the rejection of the Carthaginian proposals and declaring his determination to go back to Carthage, as he had sworn to do if the mission failed (Zonar. 8.15.4–5). He then returns to the anticipated death by torture.

Zonaras’ version of Regulus’ main speech opens and closes with passages in direct discourse, the first declaring that, although his body belongs to the Carthaginians, his spirit is still Roman and the second insisting that he must return to Carthage. Between them a short linking passage adds that “he also stated his reasons for opposing the agreement” (καὶ τὰς αἰτίας προσέθηκε δι’ ἧς τὰς συμβάσεις ἀπηγόρευε). Zonaras’ wording shows that Regulus was given an extended speech in Dio’s original. Zonaras’ direct-discourse passages will have been merely selected from the opening and closing sections of the original, and his linking notice suggests that Dio’s speech dilated at some length on Regulus’ objections both to a peace settlement and to returning Carthaginian prisoners. The *Excerpta de sententiis* probably included several extracts from the speech, now lost in the lacuna.

Parallels with Zonaras identify two fragments cited by the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* as coming from this Regulus episode: F 30 (= *Synt.* ε38a), cited as from Book 11, reports the Carthaginian envoys’ permission for Regulus to speak, and F 43.32d (= *Synt.* α47), cited as from Book 12, comes from the opening section of his speech. If these book attributions are correct, the speech will have opened Dio’s Book 12.¹⁰² Boissevain (1895, 166–168) attributes three further citations in the lexicon to this context, assigning F 43.32a (cited as from Book 11) to Dio’s introduction to Regulus’ speech and F 43.31 and 32e (the former cited as from Book 11, the latter from Book 12) to the speech itself, but, although the last two must come from a speech, the context of all three fragments is uncertain.

Dio will have been following his predecessors’ example in composing this speech for Regulus. Surviving direct-discourse versions of his speech happen to come only from poets (Hor. *Carm.* 3.5.18–40, Sil. *Pun.* 6.467–489), but some historical writers too will surely have risen to the challenge. However, Dio’s decision to include it also reflects the importance which he attached to its themes. The acceptability of compromise peace settlements and of

¹⁰¹ Our sources differ as to whether the Carthaginians sought peace, the return of prisoners or both.

¹⁰² So Boissevain, disputed by Cary 1914, 444–445 (Loeb Classical Library Vol. 1).

prisoner returns had already been given prominence in connection with the Caudine Forks and Pyrrhus' negotiations, and would recur with the Hannibalic War. Regulus is also the third of Dio's speakers to sacrifice himself for the public good. Unlike Curtius, he is flawed, since the defeat which led to his predicament, like Postumius', was the result of arrogance over his earlier successes (Zonar. 8.13.5–7). However, like Curtius (and unlike Postumius), he shows heroic selflessness, and is accordingly repeatedly cited as an exemplar in Dio's later speeches, as by other authors.¹⁰³

Only one direct-discourse passage can be traced in what survives of Dio's account of the period between the first two Punic wars, namely a sharp remark to the Roman senate by the Carthaginian ambassador Hanno when (according to Dio) the peace treaty was renewed in 236 (F 46.1 = *ELg* 6).

The Origins of the Second Punic War

The extant remains show that Dio devoted ample space to the origins of the Second Punic War, as was fitting for the greatest external conflict in his history (F 52, 54–56; Zonar. 8.21–22). His account probably opened Book 13 and took up the greater part of the book (Rich 2006, 276, 281).

Polybius (3.6–33) is our earliest and most reliable source on the war's origins. His account differs in various significant respects from the Roman historical tradition, represented for us particularly by Livy, Silius Italicus, Appian and Dio/Zonaras, each of which shows further individual divergences. Chronology was one of the Roman tradition's weaknesses: Dio, like the other Roman sources, narrated the siege of Saguntum, which precipitated the war, under 218, the first year of the war, whereas the eight-month siege in fact took place the previous year. However, one respect in which the Roman tradition may be preferable to Polybius is its stress on internal disagreements at Rome and Carthage, a factor which Polybius was concerned to minimise.¹⁰⁴

All our sources agree in making Hannibal the prime mover in the war. Polybius (3.15) tells us that a Roman embassy went first to Hannibal in Spain and then to Carthage to warn against an attack on Saguntum, to which Hannibal responded by laying siege to the town. By contrast, the Roman accounts, including Dio (as summarised by Zonaras), represent the

¹⁰³ Cass. Dio 45.32.4; 53.8.3; 64.13.2.

embassy as sent in protest after the start of the siege, and most report a debate at Carthage on how to respond.¹⁰⁵ Zonaras reports the embassy's reception at Carthage as follows (8.21.9):

γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας οἱ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους συνεβούλευον, οἱ δὲ τῷ Ἀννίβα προσκείμενοι τοὺς μὲν Ζακυνθίους ἀδικεῖν, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους τὰ μηδὲν σφίσι προσήκοντα πολυπραγμονεῖν ἔλεγον. καὶ τέλος ἐπεκράτησαν οἱ πολεμῆσαι σφᾶς ἀναπέιθοντες.

When an assembly had been called, some of the Carthaginians advised maintaining peace with the Romans, but the supporters of Hannibal said that the Saguntines were in the wrong and the Romans were meddling in matters which did not concern them. Eventually those who were urging them to make war prevailed.

No doubt Dio, like our other sources, represented the debate as taking place in the Carthaginian senate, with Zonaras' use of the word ἐκκλησία being a mere slip. Zonaras' narrative then returns to Saguntum and its fall in the eighth month of the siege. He then continues (8.22.1–3):

καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οἱ τε Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπολέμησαν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀννίβας καὶ συμμάχους συχνοὺς προσλαβὼν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἠπέιγετο. πυθόμενοι δὲ ταῦθ' οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι συνήλθον εἰς τὸ συνέδριον, καὶ ἐλέχθη μὲν πολλά, Λούκιος δὲ Κορνήλιος Λέντουλος ἐδημηγόρησε καὶ εἶπε μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλὰ πόλεμον κατὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ψηφίσασθαι, καὶ διχῆ διελεῖν καὶ τοὺς ὑπάτους καὶ τὰ στρατεύματα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς τὴν Λιβύην πέμψαι, ἵν' ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἢ τε χώρα αὐτῶν πορθῆται καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κακουργῶνται καὶ μήτε τῇ Ἰβηρίᾳ βοηθῆσαι δύνωνται μήτ' ἐκεῖθεν αὐτοὶ ἐπικουρηθῶσι. πρὸς ταῦτα Κύντιος Φάβιος Μάξιμος ἀντέθετο μὴ οὕτως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὸν πόλεμον δεῖν ψηφίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ πρεσβεία χρήσασθαι πρότερον, κἂν μὲν πείσωσιν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦσιν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, ἂν δ' ἀδικοῦντες ἀλῶσι, τότε πολεμῆσαι αὐτοῖς, ἵνα καὶ

¹⁰⁴ On the origins of the war see especially Rich 1996; Hoyos 1998; Beck 2011. Giovannini 2000 offers a radical reconstruction of the diplomacy drawing heavily on the Roman tradition.

¹⁰⁵ Cic. *Phil.* 5.27; Livy 21.9.3–11.2; Sil. *Pun.* 2.1–24, 270–390; App. *Iber.* 11; Eutrop. 3.7.3; Zonar. 8.21.7–9.

τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ πολέμου ἐς αὐτοὺς ἀπωσώμεθα. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοῖν δόξαι τοιαῦται ἦσαν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἶπεῖν.

On account of the Saguntines the Romans and the Carthaginians went to war. Hannibal, taking with him many allies, hastened to Italy. Learning this, the Romans convened in the senatehouse, and many speeches were made. Lucius Cornelius Lentulus made a speech in which he said that they should not delay, but vote war against the Carthaginians and deploy the consuls and their armies separately, sending one force to Spain and the other to Africa, so that simultaneously the Carthaginians' own territory would be ravaged and their allies would suffer, and they would be unable to send help to Spain or receive aid from there. Quintus Fabius Maximus replied to this that they should not thus vote war outright, but should first send an embassy, and, if the Carthaginians convinced them that they had done nothing wrong, they should take no action, but, if they were proved to have done wrong, the Romans should then make war on them, 'in order that we may cast the responsibility for the war on them'. Such in outline were the opinions of these two men.

The senate, as we learn from a fragment (F 55.9 = *ES* 141) as well as Zonaras, then decided to make preparations for war and also send an embassy to Carthage to demand Hannibal's surrender and, if it were refused, declare war. A further debate at Carthage followed the embassy's arrival, reported by Zonaras as follows (8.22.5–6):

καὶ τις Ἀσδρούβας, εἷς τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀννίβου προπαρασκευασμένων, συνεβούλευσε σφίσι χρῆναι τὴν τε ἀρχαίαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνακτήσασθαι καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς εἰρήνης δουλείαν ἀποτρίψασθαι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ δυνάμεσι καὶ συμμάχοις συγκεκροτημένοις, ἐπαγαγὼν ὅτι “κὰν τῷ Ἀννίβῳ μόνῳ ὅσα βούλεται πρᾶξαι ἐπιτρέψητε, καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ἔσται καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοὶ πονήσετε.” τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος Ἄνων ὁ μέγας ἐναντιούμενος τοῖς τοῦ Ἀσδρούβου λόγοις γνώμην εἰσήνεγκε μῆτε ῥαδίως μῆτε μικρῶν καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἐγκλημάτων ἕνεκα τὸν πόλεμον ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐπισπάσασθαι, παρὸν τὰ μὲν λῦσαι, τὰ δὲ ἐς τοὺς δράσαντας αὐτὰ τρέψαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἐπαύσατο, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι καὶ τοῦ πρὶν μεμνημένοι πολέμου αὐτῷ συνετίθεντο, οἱ δ' ἐν ἡλικίᾳ καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσοι τὰ τοῦ Ἀννίβου ἔπραττον ἰσχυρῶς ἀντέλεγον.

A certain Hasdrubal, one of those who had been primed in advance by Hannibal, maintained that they should recover their ancient freedom and shake off the slavery resulting from the peace through their combined wealth, forces and allies, urging that ‘if you permit Hannibal on his own to act as he wishes, what is needed will be done without your taking any trouble’. When he had spoken thus, Hanno the Great, in opposition to Hasdrubal’s words, expressed the view that they should not draw the war on themselves lightly or for trivial grievances which did not concern them, when they could resolve some and divert others on to those responsible. Having spoken thus, he stopped, and the older Carthaginians, who remembered the previous war, sided with him, while the younger men and especially all the partisans of Hannibal strongly opposed him.

Dio’s account of the sequel is preserved in a fragment (F 55.10 = *ES* 142) as well as Zonaras (8.22.7). The ambassador M. Fabius, holding folds of his toga in each hand, makes a brief direct-discourse statement: “I bring you here, Carthaginians, both war and peace: choose straightaway whichever you want” (ἐγὼ μὲν ἐνταῦθ’, ὃ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην φέρω, ὑμεῖς δ’ ὁπότερον αὐτῶν βούλεσθε, ἄντικρυς ἔλεσθε). Told that they would accept either, he then declares war.

M. Fabius’ embassy after the fall of Saguntum, demanding Hannibal’s surrender and declaring war, is also reported by Polybius and by other Roman sources. However, none of these associate it with debate at Rome or Carthage.¹⁰⁶ Polybius (3.20) insists there was no dispute at Rome about going to war after the fall of Saguntum, criticizing the Greek writers Chaereas and Sosylus who had reported such a debate. Other sources mention debates at Rome and Carthage only in connection with the earlier Roman embassy before Saguntum’s fall.¹⁰⁷ These issues remain in dispute: thus for the Lentulus/Fabius debate, some scholars regard it as a fiction (e.g. Harris 1979, 204, 269–270), and, of those who accept it as

¹⁰⁶ Polyb. 3.20.6–21.8, 33.1–4; Livy 21.18; App. *Iber.* 13. Sil. *Pun.* 2.270–390 conflates this embassy with the earlier mission before Saguntum’s fall. Dio’s Marcus is to be preferred to Livy’s Quintus for the *praenomen* of the embassy’s leader, to be identified as M. Fabius Buteo.

¹⁰⁷ Livy 21.6.3–8, 10.1–11.2; App. *Iber.* 11; Sil. *Pun.* 1.672–694, 2.270–380. The speakers at Rome are identified as Lentulus and Fabius by Silius, but unnamed in other sources. Both Livy and Silius name Hanno as speaking against war at Carthage; Silius calls his opponent Gestar.

historical, some date it during the siege of Saguntum (e.g. Hoyos 1998, 226–232) and others after its fall (e.g. Rich 1996, 12–13, 30–33).

Zonaras' account of the debate in the Roman senate is itself detailed enough to indicate that Dio wrote extended direct-discourse speeches for Lentulus and Fabius, and several fragments can be certainly identified as from these speeches. Lentulus warns at some length against a mild policy towards the Carthaginians in the light of their past experience of these opponents (F 55.2 = *ES* 136), and in a second, briefer fragment he generalises in favour of war (F 55.3 = *ES* 137, Ps.-Maximus 66.-/37.15):

ὁ μὲν πόλεμος καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖά τισι σώζει καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια προσκτᾶται, ἡ δὲ εἰρήνη οὐχ ὅπως τὰ πορισθέντα δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὴν προσαπόλλυσιν .

War both preserves men's own possessions and acquires those of others, but peace destroys not just what war has provided but itself as well.

Fabius urges Lentulus not to arouse the Romans' anger before he can show that war will really be to their advantage (F 55.3b–5 = *ES* 138, Ps.-Maximus 2.38/38), discusses the best way to learn from setbacks (F 55.7 = *ES* 139, Ps.-Maximus 18.-/70), and insists on the importance of avoiding the appearance of starting a war (F 55.8 = *ES* 140).

The position of these fragments in the *Excerpta de sententiis*, along with their content, puts their attribution to the Lentulus/Fabius debate beyond doubt. They show that, whereas Zonaras merely summarised Lentulus' and Fabius' recommendations, the speeches Dio composed for them deployed lengthy moralising and rhetorical argumentation in his characteristic manner, with some Thucydidean echoes (Kyhntzsch 1894, 71–73). Nonetheless, except for F 55.7, whose relevance is less clear, they are all evidently to the point.

Boissevain and the Loeb editor Cary also print under Fabius' speech several further Dio fragments preserved only in Ps.-Maximus, namely F 55.3a and 6 (= Ps.-Maximus 2.37/37, 18.-/68) and F 57.12 (in fact two separate fragments: Ps.-Maximus 66.11/37.12, 66.-/37.13). The only basis for printing these fragments here is that they come from the same chapters of Ps.-Maximus as fragments which also occur in the *Excerpta de sententiis* and are accordingly known to come from Fabius' speech. In his notes Boissevain (1895, 196–197) fully acknowledges the fragility of this argument. However, subsequent discussions have generally assumed without question that these fragments come from Fabius' speech, and this

is in large part responsible for the common dismissals of Dio's debate as merely vacuous moralising.¹⁰⁸ There is in fact no good reason to ascribe any of these fragments to this debate, and F 55.3a and 6 may indeed be authorial statements rather than in direct discourse.

Scholarly attention has been devoted almost exclusively to Dio's version of the debate at Rome, from which the bulk of the fragments certainly come. However, Zonaras' narrative shows that this was only one of three debates in Dio's account of the origins of the war, being framed by two debates at Carthage. Zonaras' lengthy summaries of those debates (including some direct discourse for the second) make it likely that in Dio's original these too were extended direct-discourse speech episodes.

F 55.2, whose content identifies it as certainly from Lentulus' speech, is preceded in the *Excerpta de sententiis* by two short excerpts (F 55.1 = *ES* 134, 135) which have also been ascribed by Dio's editors and in all subsequent discussions to the debate in the Roman senate. However, both fragments are in fact much more likely to come from the earlier debate at Carthage summarised by Zonaras (8.21.9, cited above).

The first of these fragments is an epigrammatic praise of peace: ἡ μὲν εἰρήνη καὶ πορίζει χρήματα καὶ φυλάσσει, ὁ δὲ δὴ πόλεμος καὶ ἀναλίσκει καὶ διαφθείρει ("Peace both provides and guards wealth, but war both consumes and destroys it"). Lentulus' closely parallel praise of war (F 55.3, cited above) is a response to this earlier speaker's claim. It has been generally supposed that this fragment comes from a first speech in the Roman debate, arguing against the war. However, although Zonaras does say that "many speeches were made" there, it is unlikely that Dio provided direct-discourse orations for speakers other than Lentulus and Fabius and allowed another speaker to make the case against war before Fabius. The first debate at Carthage, however, provides an entirely satisfactory context for this fragment. Zonaras' summary tells us that "some of the Carthaginians advised maintaining peace with the Romans". Dio's version of the debate evidently included a first speech making the case for peace, from which this fragment derives.

The second fragment runs as follows: πέφυκε πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον δεσπόζειν τε ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν ὑπεικόντων καὶ τῇ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ῥοπῇ κατὰ τῶν ἐθελουδουλούντων χρῆσθαι ("it is all mankind's nature to desire to hold mastery over those who submit and to employ the turn of fortune's scale against those willing to be enslaved"). This has been generally

¹⁰⁸ E.g. Millar 1964, 82 ("Fabius gives the conventional arguments for caution...The debate is...solely a development of commonplace moral attitudes"); Harris 1979, 270 ("the unimpressive character of the speeches"). For more sympathetic analyses see Fechner 1986, 231–233; Hose 1994, 370–373.

attributed to Lentulus' speech. If this is correct, Dio portrayed him as making an amoral realist case for expansionist war in contrast with the other fragments from his speech, which present a largely defensive argument.¹⁰⁹ A much more plausible context is provided by the first debate at Carthage, at which, according to Zonaras, "the supporters of Hannibal said that ... the Romans were meddling (πολυπραγμαεῖν) in matters which did not concern them". Dio's first Carthaginian speaker championing peace will have been answered by a second speaker taking Hannibal's side, and part of his case will have been the need to resist Roman expansionism, concern about which had, as we have seen, been identified by Dio as a factor leading to the first conflict with Carthage (F 43.2). The fragment presents one of Dio's clearest echoes of Thucydides: Hermocrates, warning the Sicilians about Athenian expansionism and desire to rule others, had remarked that πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν μὲν τοῦ εἴκοντος (Thuc. 4.61.5: "it is mankind's nature always to rule him who submits").¹¹⁰ Dio, it would seem, made the Carthaginian advocates of war portray the Romans as expansionist meddlers in terms evoking the similar portrayal of the Athenians attributed by Thucydides to their opponents.

An apparent obstacle to this reassignment of the two fragments comprising F 55.1 is Boissevain's claim (1895, 191) that Dio introduced his extended character sketch of Hannibal (F 54) at the point when, after capturing Saguntum, Hannibal began his march to Italy (corresponding to Zonar. 8.22.1, cited above). The opening part of this sketch is preserved by the *Excerpta de sententiis* as the fragment immediately preceding F 55.1 in its sequence (F 54.1–3 = *ES* 133), and so, if Boissevain is right that Dio inserted the sketch after the fall of Saguntum, F 55.1 cannot derive from the debate held at Carthage while the siege of Saguntum was still continuing.¹¹¹ However, Boissevain's claim is based simply on the fact that the fragment including the character sketch opens by alluding to the rebellions of ὅσοι ἐντὸς τῶν Ἄλπεων ἐνέμοντο (F 54.1: "peoples living on this side of the Alps", i.e. in Italy). There is no real connection between this and Zonaras' reference to Hannibal hastening to the Alps. Dio's assessment of Hannibal's character is more likely to have been inserted earlier, as part of a wide-ranging introduction to his account of the Second Punic War and preceding his narrative of the war's origins.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Millar 1964, 82: "Lentulus' arguments echo those of the Athenians in the Melian debate".

¹¹⁰ Noted by Kynhitzsch 1894, 72. Cf. Hose 1994, 371.

¹¹¹ The rest of the character sketch is preserved by *EV* 31.

Dio's account of the origins of the Second Punic War will have been one of the most ambitious deployments of extended speech in his early books, presenting three extended episodes, with the debate in the Roman senate framed by earlier and later debates at Carthage. Earlier writers had supplied debates both at Rome and Carthage, but Dio may have been the first to present two Carthaginian debates. He evidently refashioned the debates in his own way, broadening them into general arguments about war, peace and empire. They will also have been interrelated, with speakers answering each other across debates, as when Lentulus rebuts the first Carthaginian speaker's praise of peace. The debates developed a theme which Dio had already stressed for the Samnites and Pyrrhus, namely the different choices open to Rome's enemies about how to respond to Roman expansion. They also expanded on the Thucydidean analysis of the underlying dynamics of the conflict between Rome and Carthage which Dio had given when introducing the First Punic War.

The meagre surviving fragments from these debates show Thucydidean echoes, and there were no doubt many more in the original speeches. However, Dio's debt to Thucydides here was surely not just at the level of verbal echoes, but also structural. In exploring the origins of Rome's greatest war in a series of interlinked debates, Dio will have been deliberately inviting comparison with the great debates in which Thucydides explored the origins of the Peloponnesian War in his first book. Those debates had at their heart the growth of Athenian power which Thucydides had identified as the truest cause of the war. In the same way, Dio's debates will have explored the expansionism and mutual fear of both Rome and Carthage, which he had earlier identified as the root cause of their conflict. They will also have looked ahead to Dio's version of Caesar's speech at Vesontio, where he again explored such issues in Thucydidean terms. However, Caesar there deployed those themes in a form perverted to serve his own ambition, just as Pericles' arguments were to be reused by Thucydides' Alcibiades (6.16–18).¹¹²

The Second Punic War

Dio, like Polybius (3.62–64) and Livy (21.40–44), composed army addresses for Hannibal and the Roman commander P. Cornelius Scipio before the first battle of the war, the cavalry encounter at the River Ticinus, with Hannibal's speech preceded by single combat between

¹¹² On Dio's debt to Thucydides in the Vesontio speech see Kyhnitzsch 1894, 9–25; Lachenaud and Coudry 2011, lxii–iii; Kemezis 2016, 248, 253.

Gallic prisoners which he had staged to inspire his men to fight for victory or death. Zonaras follows his account of this display with the brief statement that “he made a speech, encouraging his own soldiers and urging them on to war, and Scipio did the same on his side” (8.23.8: ἔδημηγόρησε, τοὺς οἰκείους στρατιώτας ἐπιρρωννὺς καὶ παραθήγων εἰς πόλεμον· τοῦτο δ’ ἐτέρωθεν καὶ ὁ Σκιπίων ἐποίησεν.). This in itself would not be sufficient evidence for direct-discourse speeches, but fragments show that Dio wrote such a speech for Hannibal, and it is thus likely that he supplied a comparable response for Scipio.¹¹³ Speeches on this occasion, along with the story of the combat display, probably featured in numerous accounts of the war: neither Polybius nor Livy appears to be Dio’s primary source here.¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, given Dio’s sparing provision of pre-battle speeches, his inclusion of them now served to mark out the pre-eminent importance of the conflict, and, like his predecessors, he probably used the speeches to highlight its significance. If, as argued above, Dio included no such speeches in his account of the Pyrrhic War, this is likely to have been the first speech-episode of its kind in his history, just as the culminating conflict at Actium was the only civil war battle to be adorned with pre-battle speeches.

Our information on Dio’s use of speech in the rest of his ample account of the Second Punic War is very patchy, and has no doubt been much impaired by the loss of our richest source for direct-discourse fragments, the *Excerpta de sententiis*, whose sole manuscript breaks off with F 57.26 (= *ES* 161), in the immediate aftermath of the great defeat at Cannae.

Surviving fragments from Dio’s narrative of the war report brief remarks only in indirect speech (F 57.10 = *ES* 153, F 59 = *ELg* 10). However, Zonaras includes a number of brief direct-discourse utterances (some of them famous sayings) which are likely to have been treated in the same way in Dio’s original: in Hannibal’s dream, his guide promises the sack of Italy (8.22.9); Hannibal laments “O Cannae, Cannae” (9.1.16, 6.4, cf. 9.9.12); Archimedes makes characteristic remarks as Syracuse is sacked (9.5.5); T. Manlius Torquatus refuses the consulship of 210, echoing the words previously attributed to his ancestor (9.5.6); Vibius Virrius calls for volunteers to join him in suicide as Capua falls

¹¹³ Hannibal’s speech: F 57.4 (= *ES* 147, start of the speech); 57.5 (= *ES* 148, Ps.-Maximus 66./37.11). For the possibility that F 57.6a (= *ES* 149) is from this or Scipio’s speech and F 57.6b (= *ES* 150) from Scipio’s see Boissevain 1895, 204, 206.

¹¹⁴ Polybius has just a single pair of prisoners fighting, whereas Livy and Dio speak of multiple combats, but Dio, like Polybius, has Hannibal speak first, while in Livy he speaks second (probably Livy’s own change, for rhetorical effect). For a comparison of Polybius’ and Livy’s speeches see Adler 2011, 61–72, 83–98. On Dio’s sources for the Second Punic War see briefly Rich 2016, 281, and Urso (this volume), with further bibliography.

(9.6.6); Alinius of Salapia informs on a rival (9.7.7); Scipio (the future Africanus) prophesies the date on which he will seize enemy stores (9.8.10).¹¹⁵ The most vivid use of brief direct speech in this part of Dio's work was no doubt in the tragic tale of Sophonisba (whom he called Sophonis): Zonaras' version (9.13.2–6) includes a number of such utterances, for Masinissa, Scipio, Syphax, and the dying Sophonisba herself, and invites comparison with Dio's dramatic handling of the words of Hersilia and Lucretia earlier, and later Porcia and Cleopatra.

Zonaras' narrative of the war includes several reports of speeches or conversations: on arrival at Capua after its revolt, Hannibal "addressed them, saying many other attractive things and promising to give them the leadership of Italy" (9.2.9); before setting off for Africa, Scipio addressed his army, telling them disingenuously that "the Carthaginians were still unprepared, and previously Masinissa and then Syphax were summoning them and complaining at their delay" (9.12.2); before the battle of Zama (in an account diverging sharply from that given by Polybius and Livy), Hannibal and Scipio "each addressed their army and encouraged it to battle" (9.14.2), and then had an interview at which Scipio's evasive replies tricked Hannibal into moving camp (9.14.5). Dio too may have given mere speech reports at these points, but at least some of Zonaras' notices may take the place of extended direct discourse in Dio's original.

In his account of Scipio's suppression of their mutiny, Zonaras (9.10.7) tells us that, in his address to his troops, Scipio "made many reproaches and threats", and then gives in direct speech his closing words, in which he told them that they all deserved to die, but he would execute only those already arrested. Dio's original of this closing sentence happens to survive in a lexical fragment (F 57.47), but we cannot say whether he too contented himself with giving just this passage in direct speech or, like Polybius (11.28–29) and Livy (28.27.1–29.8), he gave Scipio an extended speech.

Two fragments preserved by Ps.-Maximus and so without indication of context can nonetheless be identified by their content as from speeches in Dio's Second Punic War narrative. F 57.11 (= Ps.-Max. 66.10/37.10) evidently comes from a speech in the senate by the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus in 217 responding to criticisms of his delaying strategy after

¹¹⁵ Archimedes' remarks are also cited from Dio by Tzetzes (F 57.45 = *Chil.*2.136–149) and by Ps.-Maximus (32.–/23a, omitted by Boissevain).

the apparent success won by his *magister equitum* M. Minucius Rufus.¹¹⁶ Livy mentions his making such speeches (22.25.15), but without supplying an oration.

F 70.2–3 is from a speech arguing that youth should not be a bar to office.¹¹⁷ Boissevain (1895, 313–314), following Melber, identified it as supporting the election of Scipio Aemilianus to the consulship of 147 below the legal age; however, Zonaras' statement (9.29.2) that Aemilianus' election was approved by all suggests that Dio passed over the controversy reported by other sources, and in any case a speech in its support would have required justification of this exception to the rules rather than arguments for the advancement of youth. A much better fit is provided by the alternative context considered by Boissevain, namely the appointment of the young Scipio Africanus to the command in Spain in 210 (wrongly dated by Dio, as by Livy, to 211).¹¹⁸ Both Livy (26.19.1–2) and Zonaras (9.7.4) tell us that misgivings were felt after his appointment, but Scipio dispelled them in a speech to the assembly; Zonaras says that the concern was partly about his youth, and Livy that Scipio's speech dealt with this topic.

Thus for Scipio here, as earlier for Fabius, Dio opted to compose a speech for an occasion for which Livy (and perhaps all his predecessors) had been content merely to mention the making of a speech. Both speeches will have evoked what for Dio were the perennial questions of ambition and its checks: Fabius' dispute with Minucius echoed Papirius Cursor's with Rullianus, and Dio gave prominence later to anxieties about Africanus' youthful aspirations.¹¹⁹

From the Second to the Third Punic War

Dio gave relatively brief treatment to the period 200–150 BC, covering it in a mere three books (Books 18–20). Zonaras' summary shows that most space was devoted to the three

¹¹⁶ F 57.18 (= *ES* 155) must be from authorial reflections on the agitation against Fabius, not a speech (as suggested by Cary 1914, 2.119 n. 1, misinterpreting Boissevain 1895, 214).

¹¹⁷ F 70.2 and 70.3 are cited as two separate extracts by Ps.-Maximus (70.-/41.23–24) and as a single extract by John of Damascus. As Boissevain noted, they are clearly from the same speech, but some intervening material may have been omitted.

¹¹⁸ So rightly Urso 2013, 7 n. 1; Coudry, this volume. Moscovich 1992 associates the fragment with Scipio's consulship in 205, but dispute turned then not on his election, but just on whether he should be permitted to advance to Africa.

¹¹⁹ F 57.54–55; see Coudry in this volume.

great eastern wars, and suggests that for the later part of the period Dio abandoned annual narration and even turned away from Rome altogether, narrating instead the affairs of eastern kingdoms (Rich 2016, 283–285).

Only scanty traces of speech survive from these books. A brief excerpt cited by the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* as from Book 19 (F 62.1a = *Synt.* π40) is in direct discourse, but its context is unknown.¹²⁰ Zonaras (9.19.12) cites the Aetolian Damocritus' arrogant response to Flamininus in direct discourse.

One extended speech episode is known from this part of Dio's work, namely the debate on the repeal of the *lex Oppia*. This law restricting women's luxury had been passed during the Second Punic War and was repealed in 195 in spite of opposition by tribunes and the consul Cato, with the women's own protests carrying the day. Livy (34.1–8) had composed speeches for Cato and for the tribune L. Valerius who was one of the proposers of the repeal, and may well have been the first historian to do so.¹²¹ Zonaras (9.17.1–4) recounts the incident at some length, including summaries of Cato's and Valerius' speeches with the ending of each speech quoted in direct discourse. Dio evidently provided each speaker with an extended direct-discourse oration, setting himself here in direct competition with Livy. Dio will have relished the opportunity for literary display and vivid exploitation of the episode's comic potential: with echoes of Plato and Aristophanes, he makes Valerius accuse Cato (of all people) of wanting to play the philosopher and suggest that he consider turning the women into soldiers and voters.¹²² By contrast with Livy's sober conclusion (34.8.1–3), in Dio's version the women demonstrators celebrate the repeal by immediately donning the now permitted ornaments and dancing out of the assembly (Zonar. 9.17.4). A fragment cited by the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* as from Book 18 must come from Valerius' speech.¹²³

Dio probably devoted the whole of Book 21 to the Third Punic War (149–146) and the contemporary conflicts in the East. Zonaras makes two references to the celebrated dispute over the fate of Carthage. When reporting the Carthaginian mission following the

¹²⁰ Gutschmid 1894, 557, conjecturally assigned it to a speech by Flamininus to the Aetolians in 191; cf. Boissevain 1895, 287.

¹²¹ On Livy's debate see especially Milnor 2005, 154–179.

¹²² Moscovich 1990 discusses sources which Dio may have drawn on for these speeches.

¹²³ F 57.80c (= *Synt.* δ20): καὶ πάντα μὲν τὰ βέλτιστα τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἄνθη δρεπόμενος (“and reaping all the best flowers of philosophy”). The fragment was attributed to this context by Gutschmid 1894, 557, and its authenticity was wrongly rejected by Boissevain 1895, 270.

Roman declaration of war on Carthage in 150, he tells us (9.26.4) that Scipio Nasica advised making peace and Cato argued for the continuation of the war, but the senate decided on a settlement incorporating the staged demands which the Carthaginians eventually rejected when required to move their city. It is possible that Dio included speeches at this point, but more likely that he too merely reported the differing views. Then, after Scipio's sack of Carthage in 146, Zonaras (9.30.7–8) tells us that he wrote to the senate asking for instructions; Cato urged the destruction of the city and extermination of its inhabitants and Nasica once again advised that the Carthaginians be spared; debate continued in the senate, until an unnamed senator argued that the Carthaginians should be spared for fear lest, without a worthy antagonist, the Romans would turn from military pursuits to pleasure and luxury; the senate then unanimously decided for the destruction of Carthage. This is an oddly anachronistic account, since Cato died in 149, and there can have been no question of preserving Carthage as a state by the time of the sack: Zonaras may perhaps have misunderstood Dio as to the timing of the debate. However, the view of the anonymous senator (which other sources attribute to Nasica himself) is stated at such length by Zonaras as to indicate that Dio himself presented it in a direct-discourse speech. He may also have supplied speeches for Cato and Nasica, but is again perhaps more likely to have merely reported their views. For Dio's readers, the anonymous senator's speech will have served as one of several pointers marking stages in Rome's decline.¹²⁴

146–70 BC

Dio devoted Books 22–35 to the turbulent years from the sack of Carthage and Corinth in 146 to Pompey's first consulship in 70 BC. He will no doubt have composed speeches for several of the protagonists in the political upheavals of the time, and perhaps also for some of Rome's leading enemies or their advisers. However, virtually no trace of speech survives from these books: Zonaras did not have access to them and accordingly omitted these years from his history, and the surviving fragments, although often illuminating, include hardly any

¹²⁴ See further Simons 2009, 177–186.

speech.¹²⁵ The only exceptions are three direct-speech fragments cited by the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* without identifiable context, two from Book 33 and one from Book 35.¹²⁶

Conclusion

The preceding sections have shown that, although virtually nothing is known of Dio's use of speech in Books 22–35, a good deal can be established about how he used it in Books 1–21, covering the period down to 146 BC. Tables 4–5 below set out the results of this enquiry for direct-discourse speech episodes in those books. Table 4 lists the extended direct-discourse speech episodes which can be identified as certainly or probably included in these books, and which will have been similar in character to the multi-chapter speech episodes in the extant books listed in Table 1. Table 5 gives the totals over successive periods of Dio's narrative both for these extended speech episodes and for shorter speech episodes employing direct discourse, as was done for the extant books in Table 2.

As shown above, the extended character of the speech episodes listed in Table 4 can be inferred from indicators such as the length of Zonaras' reports (sometimes including direct speech) and/or the nature of the surviving fragments, often similar to Dio's extant extended speeches in their deployment of rhetoric, generalizations and commonplaces. Most of these episodes are attested both by fragments and Zonaras. However, four are attested only by fragments, with no corresponding reference in Zonaras (nos. 1, 4, 5, 13), and one is attested only by Zonaras (no. 16).¹²⁷ Two extended speeches (nos. 2, 4b) have no surviving fragments and are not mentioned by Zonaras, but excerpts can be shown to have been included in the lost Constantinian collection *Περὶ δημηγορίων*.

It is very likely that this part of Dio's history included more extended speech episodes than the sixteen listed in Table 4. Some such episodes may have disappeared without trace. Others may lie behind some of the thirteen reports of speech episodes given by Zonaras which are too brief to constitute strong evidence for the presence of extended direct discourse in Dio. Five of these notices report speeches made at Rome, by Servius Tullius (7.9.7),

¹²⁵ Urso 2013 provides an excellent edition and commentary for the fragments of Books 21–30.

¹²⁶ F 107.2–3, 111.3b (= *Synt.* υ13, π12, π 35). Gutschmid 1894, 558, attributed the first two fragments to an army address by Sertorius, and the third to the Cretans' deliberations on war with Rome.

¹²⁷ For the final debate at Carthage in 218 (no. 11), F 55.10 preserves only M. Fabius' concluding intervention, and we rely just on Zonaras for the preceding speeches.

Valerius Maximus (7.14.4), Ap. Claudius Caecus (8.4.13), and Cato and Nasica in 149 (9.26.4) and 146 (9.30.7). The remainder report speeches in widely scattered locations, by Laevinus and Pyrrhus at Heraclea (8.3.6), Pyrrhus at Ausculum (8.5.2–3), Ap. Claudius Caudex and Hanno at Messana (8.9.3), Hannibal at Capua (9.2.9), Scipio in Spain and Sicily (9.10.7, 12.2), and Hannibal and Scipio at Zama (9.14.2, 5).¹²⁸

The totals in the ‘short’ column in Table 5 comprise direct-discourse passages in the fragments and similar passages deriving from Dio in Zonaras and Tzetzes which do not appear to have stood in extended speech episodes in Dio’s original. As with the short speech episodes in his extant books, most are very brief remarks or exchanges, often in effect ‘one-liners’. This category also, however, includes some utterances of high emotion, comparable to those Dio later composed for Porcia and Cleopatra, namely the brief speeches of Hersilia and Lucretia, and the exchanges of Veturia and Coriolanus and of the various protagonists in the drama of Sophonisba. Another highly distinctive short episode is the speech of Menenius Agrippa, a vivid version of a traditional theme markedly different in character and length from Dio’s rhetorically elaborated extended speeches. Our knowledge of Dio’s use of such episodes in this part of his work must, nonetheless, be only partial: a good many short direct-discourse episodes must have left no mark in what survives of these books.

One indicator of the limitations of our knowledge of Dio’s use of direct speech in these books is the number of fragments identified by grammatical features as in direct speech, but whose context cannot be identified. Boissevain acknowledged eight such fragments cited by the lexicon *Περὶ συντάξεως* (5.13, 40.46a, 43.32c, 62.1a, 107.2–3, 111.3b, *inc. sed.* 1). A further five direct-speech fragments which Boissevain assigned to known speeches on inadequate grounds would be better regarded as of unknown context, two cited by the lexicon and three by Ps.-Maximus (36.11, 43.31, 43.32e, 57.12a, 57.12b).

The incidence of extended and shorter direct-discourse episodes in Dio’s first twenty-one books was evidently broadly comparable to that in the twenty-one largely extant books covering the years 69 BC to AD 14 (Books 36–56), by contrast with the post-Augustan books in which a dearth of extended episodes was compensated by a greatly increased total of short episodes. Although only 36 short direct-discourse episodes are preserved from Books 1–21, the true total may well have been at least as high, if not higher, than the 55 found in Books

¹²⁸ As noted above, the fragments usually ascribed to Laevinus’ speech (F 40.14–16) are better regarded as of uncertain context, and, although Dio closed Scipio’s speech to the mutineers with direct discourse (F 57.47), he, like Zonaras, may have limited himself to an indirect-discourse report for the rest of the speech..

36–56. Despite the limitations of survival, we can identify sixteen extended direct-discourse episodes from Books 1–21, by contrast with the fourteen in Books 36–56. At least in respect of extended episodes, Kemezis (2014, 106) was right to claim that “speeches appear to have been more numerous” in Dio’s early books.

It is of course impossible to determine the length of the extended direct-discourse episodes in Books 1–21. While some may have been shorter, many of these episodes may have been comparable in length to most such episodes in Books 36–56, which typically occupy between seven and fourteen chapters. However, there are no indications that the early books contained any speech episodes rivalling the two later monsters, the Cicero/Calenus and Agrippa/Maecenas debates.

As in the later books, the extended speech episodes present a mix of single speeches, debates (usually with two speakers), and dialogues. Also as later, such episodes appear to have been very unevenly distributed across the early books. As Table 4 shows, there were high concentrations of such episodes in Dio’s treatment of the first year of the Republic (in Book 3), the Second Samnite War (partly and perhaps wholly in Book 8), and the origins and first year of the Second Punic War (mainly and perhaps wholly in Book 13). By contrast, no such episodes can be certainly identified in Dio’s narrative of the regal period or of the years 508–363, and some quite lengthy gaps occur later. To some extent these lacunae may result from the accidents of survival, but it is hard to resist the conclusion that the lack of such episodes for the regal period and for most of the early Republic reflects Dio’s interests and his judgement of what was appropriate for those periods. Although he evidently found that Rome’s early history lent itself to shorter episodes like the speeches of Hersilia, Lucretia and Menenius Agrippa, Dio may have felt that extended speech would not have been fitting for the regal period and may have been disinclined to include it in relation to the political struggles of the early Republic.

In the early books, as later, Dio may have sought to avoid repetitiousness by being sparing with direct-discourse exhortations to troops before battles. We can be certain of only one pair of speeches of this kind in these books, for Hannibal and the elder Scipio before the first battle of the Second Punic War, the greatest of his external wars. It seems likely that elsewhere, for example in the Pyrrhic War, Dio contented himself with reporting that such speeches were made, just as he was to do with the civil war battles until the culminating conflict at Actium.

As in Books 36–60, the majority of the extended speech episodes in the early books take place in Rome and in public: six are set in the senate, and five have the Roman people as

their audience. The remainder of the episodes in these, as in the later books, are set in widely scattered locations, but there is a striking difference in the identity of the speakers. From Book 36 on Boudicca is the only non-Roman known to have been accorded a speech of any length. Rome's external wars played a much more central part in Dio's early books, and this was reflected in his choice of speakers: enemies of Rome speak in five of the extended speech episodes in these books, either on their own or with Romans. However, it is for the most part not the enemy leaders, but advisers and policy formers who are given this prominence: Hannibal's speech before the battle of the Ticinus is the only extended speech accorded to an enemy commander.

As in the later books, for almost all of these extended speech episodes Dio can be seen to have had some evidence that one or more speeches were made on the occasion in question: the only exception is the debate in 146 on whether Carthage should be preserved (no. 16), where Dio appears to have postdated an earlier controversy. The earlier tradition is better preserved here than for the later books, and for all but four of these speech episodes (nos. 11, 13, 14, 16) one or more corresponding speeches survive in at least one earlier source. However, Dio's versions can usually be seen to be strikingly different from those of his predecessors, composed in his own distinctive style and reflecting his own particular interests and concerns. In some cases he opted to compose extended speeches for occasions which his predecessors had, to the best of our knowledge, passed over briefly, as for Curtius and for Pyrrhus' advisers Milo and Cineas (nos. 3, 7).

Dio's high literary ambition contributed much to the shaping of these speech episodes, as to those of the later books. His rhetorical manner and penchant for commonplaces and psychological generalisations are throughout in evidence. In some cases, the literary opportunities it offered may have been his principal reason for including an extended speech episode: he clearly relished the chance to display his *paideia* in his speech for Curtius, with (for us) tedious results, and his version of the *lex Oppia* debate seems to have been composed in deliberate rivalry with Livy's. Dio's literary aspirations could, however, also serve more serious historical purposes, as when emulation of Thucydides impelled him to explore the origins of the Second Punic War and the underlying motives of imperialist greed and fear across three linked debates.

The detailed examination conducted above has not, in my view, substantiated the sharp contrast which, as we noted at the outset, Kemezis has drawn between the speeches in these books and in Dio's extant books covering the Late Republic and the transition to the Principate. Kemezis (2014, 107) claims that in the speeches in his early books Dio chose "to

dramatise a decision-making process based on apparently genuine deliberative oratory”, with speakers motivated just by the public interest and the subsequent decisions determined by the speeches themselves. In fact, several of the meetings at Rome for which Dio chose to supply extended speeches were not deliberative at all (so nos. 2, 3, 13), and at another the decision did not rest with the audience (no. 4, where it was up to Papirius himself, not the Roman people, to determine the fate of Rullianus). Where decisions were taken by the body addressed, they were sometimes contrary to what Dio’s chief speakers had advocated: thus Postumius, in Dio’s version, had argued for the repudiation of the Samnite settlement without offering to be surrendered, while the anonymous senator in 146 argued unsuccessfully for the preservation of Carthage. Even when the decision was in accordance with what the final speaker had urged, it was not necessarily his speech which determined the outcome: thus it was not Valerius’ speech but the women’s invasion of the assembly which finally secured the repeal of the *lex Oppia*. Dio did stress the impact of Ap. Claudius Caecus’ oratory in changing the outcome of the debate on Pyrrhus’ peace offer (F 40.40), but we lack positive evidence that he included a direct-discourse version of Caecus’ speech. Nor were all Dio’s Roman speakers exclusively motivated by the public interest: the protestations of Tarquin’s loyalty made by his envoys were as disingenuous as any of the speeches in the later books; Postumius’ weasel words did him no credit; and other speakers with personal interests at stake include Publicola, Fabius Ambustus defending his son, and the young Scipio justifying his appointment to Spain. Here, as in other respects, Dio portrays the early Republic in a way which is less idealised and has more in common with his view of the Late Republic than Kemezis has allowed.

Dio did, however, use extended speeches in these books, as later, to illustrate themes to which he attached importance. As in the later books, republican government (*demokratia*) and its inherent tensions provide one such thematic nexus. The case for republican government and its establishment and initial shaping are explored in extended speeches in Book 3 in a fashion comparable in some respects to the treatment of the restoration of monarchy in Book 52. Fabricius in his response to Pyrrhus is presented by his freedom from *pleonexia* as an exemplar of the statesman required for a stable *demokratia*. Other speeches, such as the Rullianus/Papirius debate, Fabius Maximus’ defence of his strategy and Scipio’s of his Spanish appointment, explore individual ambition, its checks, and the jealousy it provoked, which, for Dio, were to prove key factors in the Republic’s eventual fall.

Other themes of importance for the Republic’s internal workings also figure in these speeches. Two extended speech episodes touch on luxury and Roman decline, namely the *lex*

Oppia debate and the anonymous senator's argument for the preservation of Carthage. Another recurrent theme is individual self-sacrifice for the sake of the Roman people, one of the best established exemplary topics in the Romans' cultural memory. Dio accords extended speeches to three of these martyrs and makes later speakers repeatedly allude to their example. However, his handling of the theme is not without ethical complexity: only Curtius is presented as a wholly admirable figure; Regulus is heroically self-sacrificing as a Carthaginian captive, but owes his plight to his own arrogance; Postumius, in Dio's account, seeks by casuistical argument to evade the self-sacrifice to which he is later obliged to consent, thereby enabling the Romans to renege unjustly on their undertaking to the Samnites.

The greater importance of external wars in these books is reflected not just in Dio's choice of speakers, but also in the themes of the speeches. Many of his Roman speakers deal with issues relating to warfare and external relations, such as the choice of war or peace, strategy in war, and the desirability of recovering prisoners. On the enemy side, successive debates explore alternative means of dealing with the Roman threat. Herennius Pontius presents options of extreme leniency and harshness and rightly warns against the intermediate course chosen by his son. Milo and Cineas present a similar choice to Pyrrhus; he opts for mildness, to no avail. The successive speakers in the Carthaginian debates before the Second Punic War again present similar alternatives. This time the harsh option of all-out war is selected, but, although Hannibal brought it closest to success, this too ultimately fails. Thus Dio used these speeches to illustrate the dilemmas faced by their opponents as the Romans advanced to empire, as through later speeches he explored the fatal consequences of that empire for the Republic itself.

Tables

Table 1: Extended speech episodes, Books 36–60

No.	Date	Reference	Chs.	Speaker(s)	Place	Audience	Subject
1	67 BC	36.25–26	2	Pompey	Rome	<i>Demos</i>	Lex Gabinia
		36.27–29	3	Gabinus			
		36.31–36a	5+	Catulus			
2	58 BC	38.18–29	12	Cicero; Philiscus	Athens	—	Exile
3	58 BC	38.36–46	11	Caesar	Vesontio	Officers	Ariovistus
4	49 BC	41.27–35	9	Caesar	Placentia	Army	Mutiny
5	46 BC	43.15–18	4	Caesar	Rome	Senate	Reassurance
6	44 BC	44.23–33	11	Cicero	Rome, Tellus	Senate	Amnesty
7	44 BC	44.36–49	14	Antony	Rome, Forum	<i>Demos</i>	Eulogy
8	43 BC	45.18–47	30	Cicero	Rome	Senate	War against Antony
		46.1–28	28	Calenus			
9	31 BC	50.16–22	7	Antony	Actium	Army	Battle exhortation
		50.24–30	7	Octavian		Army	
10	29 BC	52.2–13	12+	Agrippa	Rome	Octavian	Retention of monarchy
		52.14–40	27+	Maecenas			
11	27 BC	53.3–10	8	Octavian	Rome	Senate	Resignation
12	AD 4	55.14–21	8	Augustus; Livia	Rome	—	Clemency
13	AD 9	56.2–9	8	Augustus	Rome, Forum	<i>Equites</i>	Procreation
14	AD 14	56.35–41	7	Tiberius	Rome, Forum	<i>Demos</i>	Eulogy

Table 2: Direct-discourse speech episodes, Books 36–60

Books	BC/AD	Extended	Short
36–40	69–50 BC	3	11
41–44	49–44 BC	4	17
45–50	44–31 BC	2	9
51–56	31 BC–AD 14	5	18
57–60	AD 14–46	0	44
36–60	69 BC–AD 46	14	99
36–56	69 BC–AD 14	14	55

Table 3: Direct-discourse fragments, Books 1–35

Citing works	Direct-discourse fragments (<i>Doubtful in italics</i>)	Certain	Doubtful
<i>Excerpta de sententiis</i> (ES)	5.5–6, 11; <i>12.1</i> , 2, 3a, 8, 9, 10; 17.11; 18.8–11; 35.9, 11; 36.1–3, 4–5, 12, 14, 17a, 17b, 23; 39.8, 10; 40.15, 16, 19, 30, 31–32, 33–38, 47; 43.10, 18; 55.1a, 1b, 2, 3, 4–5, 7, 8; 57.4, 5, 6a	32	8
<i>Excerpta de legationibus gentium ad Romanos</i> (ELg)	39.8; 46.1	2	0
<i>Excerpta de virtutibus et vitiis</i> (EV)	11.18–19	1	0
Lexicon Περὶ συντάξεως (Synt.)	5.13; 12.11, 4, 5a, 5b, 6, 7; 35.2; 36.18a; 40.46a; 43.32c, 32d, 32e, 31; 57.80c; 62.1a; 107.2, 3; 111.3b; <i>inc. sed.</i> 1	19	1
Συναγωγή χρησίμων λέξεων	57.47	1	0
<i>Florilegium</i> of Pseudo-Maximus (Ps.-Max.)	30.2–4; 36.3, 11, 13, 14; 40.14, 15, 35; 55.3, 3a, 3b–4, 6, 7; 57.12a, 12b, 5, 11; 70.2–3	13	5
Total citations		68	14
Total fragments		59	13

Table 4: Certain or probable extended speech episodes, Books 1–21

No.	Fragments	Zonar.	Book	BC	Speaker	Place	Audience	Subject
1	12.4–7, 10, (12.1–3, 8–9, 11?)	—	3	509	Tarquin's envoys; L. Junius Brutus	Rome	Senate	Tarquin; monarchy vs. Republic
2	(13.2)	—	3	509	Publicola	Rome	<i>Demos</i>	Reassurance
3	30.2–4	7.25.2–5	7	362	M. Curtius	Rome	<i>Demos</i>	<i>Devotio</i>
4	36.1–5 (36.6)	—	8?	325	Ambustus; Papirius Cursor	Rome	<i>Demos</i>	Rullianus' fate
5	36.12, 14	—	8?	321	Herennius (Gavius) Pontius	Caudium	Samnite council	Treatment of Roman captives
6	36.17, 18a	7.26.14–15	8	320	Postumius Albinus	Rome	Senate	Against treaty
7	40.30, 38	8.4.4–8	9?	280	Fabricius, Milo, Cineas, Pyrrhus	Tarentum	Senate	Negotiations, Epirote council, Pyrrhus' offer
8	43.32d	8.15.2–5	12?	251	Atilius Regulus	Rome	Senate	Against ransom
9	55.1	8.21.9	13	218	2 <i>anonymi</i>	Carthage	Senate	War vs. peace
10	55.2–3, 55.3b–5, 7–8	8.22.2–3	13	218	Cornelius Lentulus; Fabius Maximus	Rome	Senate	War vs. embassy
11	55.10	8.22.5–7	13	218	Hasdrubal, Hanno, M. Fabius	Carthage	Armies	War vs. peace
12	57.4–5	8.23.8	13?	218	Hannibal; Scipio	Ticinus	Senate	Battle speeches
13	57.11	—	—	217	Fabius Maximus	Rome	<i>Demos</i>	Defence of own strategy
14	70.2–3	9.7.4	16	211	Scipio	Rome	<i>Demos</i>	Justifies own command
15	57.80c	9.17.2–5	18	195	Cato; Valerius	Rome	<i>Demos</i>	<i>Lex Oppia</i>
16	—	9.30.8	21?	146	<i>anonymus</i>	Rome	Senate	Carthage

Table 5: Certain or probable direct-discourse speech episodes, Books 1–21

Date BC	Books	Extended	Short
pre-509	1–2	0	6
509	3	2	0
508–488	4–?	0	3
487–363	?–7	0	3
362–290	7–?8	4	4
289–265	?8–10	1	5
264–219	11–12	1	4
218	13–?	4	1
217–201	?–17	2	9
200–146	18–21	2	1
To 146	1–21	16	36

DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

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DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

CULTURAL INTERACTIONS AND IDENTITIES IN CASSIUS DIO'S EARLY BOOKS

Brandon Jones

Cassius Dio's reflection of cultural identities—his own especially—has not lacked in interest from modern scholars.¹ His early books, however, have been mostly neglected with respect to such exploration. Yet, as Jan Assmann (1995, 130) has shown, cultural identity is formed in great part through memory: “The objective manifestations of cultural memory are defined through a kind of identificatory determination in a positive (‘we are this’) or in a negative (‘that’s our opposite’) sense.” Because identity is determined in this positive or negative sense, or in other words, relative to others’, instances of interaction across cultures provide particularly fine points for construction of identity. It follows that the early books and Dio’s performance of remembering the early interactions therein are integral to a cultural analysis in the *Roman History*. This chapter, therefore, begins by examining selected interactions between Romans and others in the first twenty-one books of the *History* with the aim of elucidating what Dio saw as the qualities most essential to the cultural identity of early Romans.

The significance of identity-formation in the early books, however, is not limited to the first two decades of Dio’s *Roman History*. To return to Assmann (1995, 130), “cultural memory works by reconstructing, that is, it always relates its knowledge to an actual and contemporary situation.”² Assmann’s conclusions here could equally be applied to Dio’s historiographical method. Roman behaviour at turning points in Dio’s history, such as the triumviral or the Severan periods, is only fully understood in relation to markers of early Roman cultural identity. So, Dio’s definition of Romans as ‘x’ in the contemporary books bears on their definition as ‘y’ in the early books, and *vice versa*. In this respect, he may present a Dionian version of Roman cultural memory and, furthermore, of what Roman

¹ Aalders 1986; Ameling 1984; Ameling 1997; Burden-Strevens 2015a; De Blois 1984; Jones 2016; Kemezis 2014; Madsen 2009; Millar 2005; Reardon 1971 and Swain 1996 represent only a small portion of such studies.

² Another potentially useful model, originally applied to rhetoric in Dio’s Republican books, but, in ways, applicable to questions of identity-formation throughout, might be “Type 2 and 3 moralising,” posited in Burden-Strevens 2015b, 117–135.

cultural identity ought to be. A second part of this chapter, then, focuses on Roman cultural identity as it appears throughout the whole *History* with respect to two qualities that are integral to Dio's representation of early Roman identity-formation and that appear consistently up through the contemporary books—*τροφή* and *ἀνδρεία*.³ The first, which may be defined as “delicacy,” changes, in Dio's account, from a quality that is utterly foreign to Romans to one that is all-too-characteristic of their leaders, while the second, which may be defined as “manliness,” undergoes the very opposite transformation.⁴ Through this case-study, it will become clear that while Dio's presentation of Roman identity illustrates historical shifts, that same presentation reveals his sustained interest in these themes throughout, and so the historiographical unity of the *Roman History* as a whole.

Romans and Non-Romans on the Italian Peninsula

The first twenty-one books of Dio's *Roman History* span from the city's foundation to 146 BCE. In this time Rome expanded outward, transforming itself from a small city in Latium to a Mediterranean power. Inevitably, this expansion brought political and military conflict between Rome and those with interests in the contested regions—Etruscans, Gauls, Samnites, Tarentines, Carthaginians, Illyrians, Greeks, to name a few. These interactions, however, were not only political and military, even if they were motivated by such spheres.⁵ Cultural interactions occurred as well. And such interactions, as I shall argue, form the bases of Dio's construction of identity for both Romans and non-Romans. While the fragmentary nature of Dio's early books makes it impossible to analyse definitively all of his narrative preferences and techniques, the evidence that we do possess suggests that Dio had an affinity for defining

³ Dio's interest in manly and non-manly qualities as crucial to Roman identity is not unique. In fact, such preoccupations reached unprecedented levels during Dio's time. See, e.g., Gleason 1995 on manliness and the sophists who were Dio's contemporaries. Dio, however, as this study aims to show, provides exceptional temporal scope in his examination of these qualities.

⁴ Definitions follow primary entries in *LSJ*. Yet, studies such as McDonnell 2006 and Rees 2011, 45–54 show that these terms are far more complicated than can be treated by simple definition.

⁵ On Dio's representation of foreign interactions with respect to civic status, see Sørensen 2016, 76–84. On military interactions in the early books, see Urso 2002.

identity during cultural interactions and through the comparisons that those interactions encourage.⁶

Roman expansion on the Italian peninsula leads to some of the earliest instances of conflict and interaction in the *Roman History*. The Samnite Wars, for example, bring Romans and Samnites together and provide the opportunity for character description. The Samnites, after their defeat in 322 BCE, sought a treaty with the Romans. Yet, the Samnites “did not obtain peace; for they were regarded as untrustworthy and had the name of making truces in the face of disasters for the purpose of cheating any power that conquered them” (οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἔτυχον τῆς εἰρήνης· ἄπιστοί τε γὰρ δόξαντες εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὰς συμφορὰς ἐς παράκρουσιν τοῦ ἀεὶ κρατοῦντός σφωον σπένδεσθαι (Cass. Dio F 36.9)).⁷ The Romans come away not much better in this case, for Dio links their overly proud rejection of Samnite envoys directly to the disaster at the Caudine Forks (Cass. Dio F 36.10). The Samnites, then, as Dio identifies them, are the Cretans of the peninsula—liars and cheats. The Romans are identified by their rash pride.⁸ One group, however, behaves flawlessly (Cass. Dio F 36.15):

οἱ Καπηνοὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἠττηθέντων καὶ ἐς Καπύην ἐλθόντων οὔτ’ εἶπον αὐτοὺς δεινὸν οὐδεν οὔτε ἔπραξαν ἀλλὰ καὶ τροφήν καὶ ἵππους αὐτοῖς ἔδωκαν καὶ ὡς κεκρατηκότας ὑπεδέξατο· οὓς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλοντο διὰ τὰ προγεγονότα σφίσις ὑπ’ αὐτῶν νενικηκέναί, τούτους κακοτυχήσαντας ἠλέσαν.

The Capuans, when the defeated Romans arrived in Capua, neither said nor did anything harsh, but on the contrary gave them both food and horses and received them like victors. They pitied their misfortune the men whom they would not have

⁶ It must be noted that a significant portion of the preserved text of Dio’s early books is drawn from *de Virtutibus et Vitiis* and *de Sententiis*—sources which lend themselves toward pithy summation of cultural identities. But the fragments and summaries from other sources, including the *Excerpta Ursiniana* and Zonaras’ epitome, provide similar information, *pace* Simons 2009, 29. See Valerie Fromentin and Christopher Mallan’s contributions in this volume on Zonaras and the *Excerpta Constantiniana*, respectively.

⁷ Text, translation, placement of fragments and book numbering follow that of Cary 1914–1927 with some modification.

⁸ Millar 1964, 76 views this as one piece in a pattern of commonplace judgments in the early books, emphasizing over-confidence and resulting disaster. Exceptions, however, as noted below, should not be overlooked.

wished to see conquer on account of the treatment those same persons had formerly accorded them.

The inclusion of a Capuan people who could pity and help defeated Romans in the aftermath of the Battle of the Caudine Forks may not be incidental. We know from Dio himself that he held Capua in high esteem as his preferred place of work while writing his *Roman History* (Cass. Dio 77[76].2.1). His connection to the city, then, is potentially established quite early in his *History* when he asserts a regional quality of compassion among the Capuans.

While the Capuans are identified by their pity, the Romans once again are presented as proud, but this time nobly so rather than rashly. Instead of being haughty and falling into defeat, they are too proud to rejoice at the survival of their soldiers following a shameful disaster (ἀπαξιοῦντες ἄλλως τε τοῦτο καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Σαυνιτῶν πεπονθέναι, καὶ ἐβούλοντο ἄν πάντες αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλέναι) (Cass. Dio F 36.16)).⁹

Roman pride comes to the fore again, and more positively, during the conflict with Tarentum. The Roman general Lucius Valerius, while innocuously anchoring off of Tarentum, was attacked by the Tarentines, who were guilty of previous transgressions and suspicious of Roman revenge (Cass. Dio F 39.5):

Λούκιος ἀπεστάλη παρὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐς Τάραντα. οἱ δὲ Ταραντῖνοι Διονύσια ἄγοντες, καὶ ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ διακορεῖς οἴνου τὸ δειλῆς καθήμενοι, πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτὸν ὑπετόπησαν, καὶ παραχρῆμα δι' ὀργῆς, καὶ τι καὶ τῆς μέθης αὐτοὺς ἀναπειθούσης, ἀντανήχθησαν, καὶ προσπεσόντες αὐτῷ μήτε χεῖρας ἀνταιρομένῳ μήθ' ὅλως πολέμιόν τι ὑποτοπουμένῳ κατέδυσαν κάκεινον καὶ ἄλλους πολλούς.

Lucius was dispatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentines were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the theatre one afternoon, they suspected that he was sailing against them. In a passion and partly

⁹ An interesting microcosm of this rash vs. noble pride comes later in the story of Regulus. According to Zonaras (8.13), “he became filled with boastfulness and conceit” (αὐχήματος μεστός ἐγένετο καὶ φρονήματος) to the extent that he took Xanthippus, Carthaginian ally, lightly and met disaster and capture. When sent on embassy to Rome, pride in Romanness and shame at defeat leads Regulus to “act in all respects like a Carthaginian, and not a Roman (καὶ ὅς τά τε ἄλλα καθάπερ τις Καρχηδόνιος ἀλλ’ οὐ Ῥωμαῖος ὢν ἔπραττε) (Cass. Dio F 43.27)). In short, surviving defeat is so un-Roman that Regulus will not even acknowledge his origins. See below on Flaminius for further discussion of individuals as representatives of whole cultures.

under the influence of their intoxication, they set sail in turn; and thus, without any show of force on his part or the slightest suspicion of any hostile act, they attacked and sent to the bottom both him and many others.

In one of the first descriptions of Greek culture in the *Roman History*, the Tarentines' aggressive attack is linked to a lack of restraint and sobriety associated with the Dionysia, wine and theatre. Their lack of σωφροσύνη is contrasted further with the moderation and dignity of the Romans, who upon sending envoys in response to the attack on Lucius received nothing of a friendly audience (Cass. Dio F 39.6–8):

γέλωτα τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὴν στολὴν αὐτῶν ἐποιοῦντο. ἦν δὲ ἡ ἀστική, ἣ κατ' ἀγορὰν χρώμεθα· ταύτην γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι, εἴτ' οὖν σεμνότητος ἕνεκα εἴτε καὶ διὰ δέος, ἴν' ἕκ γε τούτου αἰδεσθῶσιν αὐτούς, ἐσταλμένοι ἦσαν. κατὰ συστάσεις τε οὖν κωμάζοντες ἐτώθαζον (καὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε ἑορτὴν ἤγον, ὑφ' ἧς καίτοι μηδένα χρόνον σωφρονοῦντες ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον ὕβριζον), καὶ τέλος προστάς τις τῷ Ποστουμίῳ καὶ κύψας ἑαυτὸν ἐξέβαλε καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα αὐτοῦ ἐκηλίδωσε. θορύβου δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων γενομένου, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἐπαινούντων ὥσπερ τι θαυμαστὸν εἰργασμένον, ἐς δὲ δὴ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους πολλὰ καὶ ἀσελγῆ ἀνάπαιστα ἐν ῥυθμῷ τοῦ τε κρότου καὶ τῆς βαδίσσεως ἀδόντων.

[The Tarentines] made sport of their dress. It was the city garb, which we wear in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on either for the sake of dignity or else by way of precaution, thinking that this at least would cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers accordingly jeered at them—they were then also celebrating a festival, because of which, though they were at no time noted for temperate behavior, they were still more wanton—and finally a man planted himself in the way of Postumius, and stooping over him, relieved his bowels and soiled the envoy's clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who praised the man as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they sang scurrilous verses against the Romans, accompanied by applause and capering steps.

Once again, the Tarentines are found inebriated and well beyond any sense of shame during yet another festival. Their behavior is remarkable on its own; and they are characterised by one of the worst stereotypical aspects of eastern culture—intemperance. The Romans stand in

sharp contrast, not only as distant from drunken revelry, but as calm statesmen. Their toga-clad embassy represents the proper use of *negotium* as much as the Tarentines' behavior encapsulates the improper use of *otium*. To use Assmann's model again, Dio when remembering third-century Roman predecessors, asserts one aspect of Roman identity: "we are controlled, conservative statesmen." In fact, Dio even uses the first person plural in discussing the toga and Forum in the quote above, thereby connecting himself with these predecessors. By comparison with the Tarentines, he makes it clear that "we, the Romans, are not drunk Dionysian revelers without a sense of propriety." In this respect, Dio sets up an aspect of Roman identity and presents it in a complicated, yet relatively positive sense.

Early interactions on the peninsula in general, however, seem to bring out the worst in those involved. The Greek Tarentines have no control. The Samnites are liars. The Romans are proud, but such that it leads to undesirable outcomes, whether it may be defeat at the Caudine Forks or the embarrassment of having their togas defecated upon. In these samples from the peninsula, Capua seems to be the only group which displays qualities that sum up to a commendable identity.¹⁰ If we fix our gaze outwards and beyond Italian affairs, however, we will see that Rome often asserts exceptional qualities during cultural interactions in the early books of Dio.¹¹

Romans and Non-Romans to the North

Moving north of Rome, we encounter the Gallic Insubres, who, after making an initially inspired attack on Rome, became immediately deflated and dejected when the Romans were

¹⁰ The Capuans appear again, where Zonaras (9.2) describes their defection to Hannibal. While on the surface this appears to be a negative characterization, it does not necessarily challenge the qualities and resulting identity constructed by Dio earlier in the *History*. For, aside from the fact that the account comes in epitome, the defection is the work of the populace after the senatorial aristocracy—the group with which Dio would most likely have identified—had been ejected.

¹¹ This view is nuanced in this volume by Lange, who outlines a number of ways in which the behavior of Dio's early Romans is characterised by violence and faction and, therefore, is less than ideal. See also Libourel 1974, 390–393. Yet, those violent behaviors, as Lange illustrates, are born out of *stasis* and, as I would emphasise, are isolated from foreign entities and cultural interactions.

well-prepared and positioned. Dio seizes the opportunity to observe the natural inclinations of the Gallic race (Cass. Dio F 50.2–3):¹²

τὸ δὲ δὴ Γαλατικὸν πλέον τι ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὀξύτατα μὲν ὄν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν ἀντιλαμβάνονται καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα τῶν προχωρούντων αὐτοῖς ἀντέχονται, ἂν δ' ἄρα τι καὶ βραχύτατον προσκρούσωσιν, οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐς τὰ λοιπὰ ἐλπίζουσι, πρόχειροι μὲν ὑπ' ἀνοίας πᾶν ὃ βούλονται προσδοκῆσαι, πρόχειροι δὲ ὑπὸ θυμοῦ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἐγχειρίσωσιν ἐπεξελεθεῖν ὄντες. καὶ ὀργῇ ἀκράτῳ καὶ ὀρμῇ ἀπλήστῳ χρῶνται, καὶ δι' αὐτὰ οὔτε τι διαρκὲς ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχουσιν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ προπετῶς θρασυνόμενον ἀνταρκέσαι), κἂν ἅπαξ ἀλλοιωθῶσιν, οὔτ' ἀναλαβεῖν ἑαυτοὺς ἄλλως τε καὶ δέους τινὸς προσγενομένου δύνανται, καὶ ἐς ἀντίπαλον ἔκπληξιν τῆς πρόσθεν ἀδεοῦς τόλμης καθίστανται· δι' ὀλίγου γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ὀξυρρόπως, ἅτε μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἐχέγγυον ἐς μγδέτερον αὐτῶν παρεχόμενοι, φέρονται.

Those of the Gallic race more than all others, seize very eagerly upon what they desire, and cling most tenaciously to their successes, but if they meet with the slightest obstacle, have no hope at all left for the future. In their folly they are ready to expect whatsoever they wish, and in their ardor are ready to carry out whatsoever they have undertaken. They are men of ungoverned passion and uncontrolled impulse, and for that reason they have in these qualities no element of endurance, since it is impossible for reckless audacity to prevail for any time; and if once they suffer a setback, they are unable, especially if any fear also be present, to recover themselves, and are plunged into a state of panic corresponding to their previous fearless daring. In brief time they rush very abruptly to the very opposite extremes, since they can furnish no sound motive based on reason for either course.

¹² Dio is not the only historian who attributes fickleness to the Gauls. A possible source both in terms of events and in terms of stereotypes may be Polybius who provides similar descriptions of Gauls and Celts at 2.32.8, 3.70.4 and 3.78.1. On Polybius and Dionian *Quellenforschung*, which Foulon 2016 has recently deemed an aporetic exercise, see also Schwartz 1899, 1694–1697; Urso 2013, 38–43; Vulic 1929; Zahrnt 2007; Ziegler 1952, 1572–1574.

Dio returns again to Gallic fickleness throughout the *History*, including the early books. When Hannibal allies with Gauls only to find them impossibly volatile, Dio comments, “the whole Gallic race is naturally more or less fickle, cowardly and faithless. Just as they are readily emboldened in the face of hopes, so even the more readily when frightened do they fall into a panic” (κοῦφον γάρ τι καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἄπιστον φύσαι πᾶν τὸ Γαλατικὸν γένος ἐστίν· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐτοιμῶς θρασύνεται πρὸς τὰς ἐλπίδας, οὕτως ἐτοιμότερον φοβηθὲν ἐκπλήττεται (Cass. Dio F 57.6b)). While outlining this aspect of identity for the Gauls, Dio also further illuminates it in the case of the Romans: “those Gauls are fickle. And in contrast, we Romans are determined.”

If we take these descriptions, however, with an earlier account of conflict between Rome and Gaul, we discover another facet of Dionian interactions and identities. During the Gallic invasion of Rome in 391 BCE, the Gauls are again described as quick to action and anger. Yet, in this case, their quickness has a negative effect on their Roman opponent: “panic-stricken by the unexpectedness of the invader’s expedition, by their numbers, by the huge size of their bodies, and by the strange and terrifying sound of their voices, they forgot their training in military science and hence lost the use of their valor” (πρὸς τε γὰρ τὸ ἀδόκητον τῆς ἐπιστρατείας αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν σωμάτων, τὴν τε φωνὴν ξενικὸν τέ τι καὶ φρικῶδες φθεγγομένην ἐκπλαγέντες, τῆς τε ἐμπειρίας ἅμα τῆς τῶν τακτικῶν ἐπελάθοντο, καὶ ἐκ τούτου καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς προήκαντο (Cass. Dio F 25.3)). The Romans, here, though well-trained, are characterised by panic during adversity. In terms of identity, there are two possible interpretations to draw from this. The first: exceptional behavior that is contrary to one’s identity is possible. The Romans, characterised by orderliness and self-control, are capable of uncontrolled panic. The second and perhaps more significant in terms of Dio’s conception of human nature: identity can change.¹³ The Romans of 391 BCE lacked self-control in the face of a Gallic attack. By the end of the third-century BCE, however, the Romans and Gauls behave in the opposite manner—Romans are ordered, Gauls are panic-stricken. As might be expected of a Roman history running a thousand years, elements of Roman identity are complicated, seeming both fluid and innate. The Gauls, on the other hand, mere players in Roman history, can be summed up in a paragraph and instances that run contrary to that characterisation are flipped over as anomaly.

¹³ See further Kuhn-Chen 2002 and Rees 2011.

Romans and Non-Romans across the Adriatic

If we turn our attention across the Adriatic to Greece, we find a similar shift in identifying characteristics after cross-cultural interaction. Macedonian domination in Greece had changed the natural spirit of the Greeks such that after victory at Cynoscephalae in 197 BCE, Flamininus made a truce with Philip V of Macedonia, as Dio explains, “because of his fear that if Philip were out of the way, the Greeks might recover their ancient spirit and no longer pay court to the Romans” (αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἐφοβήθη μὴ οἱ τε Ἕλληνας ὑπεξαίρεθέντος αὐτοῦ τό τε φρόνημα τὸ παλαιὸν ἀναλάβωσι καὶ σφᾶς οὐκέτι θεραπεύσωσι (Cass. Dio F 60)).¹⁴ Flamininus was right about Greek recovery of ancient virtues. The Rhodians, for example, thinking that they were the conquerors of Philip, redeemed their prior spirit (φρόνημα) for a short period of time before once again becoming anxious to be allies of Rome (Cass. Dio F 68.1–2). This shift in behavior reflects Assmann’s view of cultural memory and the accompanying identificatory determinations as forever in a state of reconstruction with one eye on the present and another on the past—“Greeks were once full of spirit and courage”; “Greeks now lack spirit and courage.”

Identity across cultures up to this point in our discussion has belonged to whole groups—the Samnites are liars, the Capuans are sympathetic, the Tarentines lack self-control, the Gauls are fickle, the Greeks have (or do not have) fighting spirit. It is around this period, turning into the second-century BCE, that individual leaders, both Roman and “other”, have a greater presence in Dio’s narrative and discussion of identity across culture.¹⁵ To a certain extent, Flamininus comes to represent facets of Roman identity. Instead of “Romans are determined” during Cynoscephalae, Dio asserts that “Flamininus, a Roman representative, is determined.” Powerful individuals, then, might positively contribute to the definition of cultural identity.

Yet, they might also illustrate cultural identity by their departure from expected behaviors. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus provides one such example.¹⁶ His enemies in

¹⁴ See further Aalders 1986, 285.

¹⁵ See further Kemezis 2014, 105 with an emphasis on political expediency. Lindholmer in this volume sees a similar trajectory of “collective” to “individual” in terms of competition in the Early to Late Republic.

¹⁶ See Coudry and Lindholmer in this volume for further discussions of Scipio. See also Aalders 1986, 284–285; Simons 2009, 200–240. There had already been some hint that non-Roman and potentially eastern behaviors ran in the Scipio family. The success of Africanus’ father, Cornelius Scipio, in earlier stages of the

the Roman senate, perhaps inspired by their envy (φθόνος),¹⁷ criticise him for negligence and ambition. In addition, Dio remarks, “they were further exasperated because he adopted a Greek lifestyle, wore a *himation*, and frequented the palaestra” (προσπαραξυνθέντες ὅτι τῆ τε Ἑλληνικῆ διαίτη ἐχρῆτο καὶ ὅτι ἱμάτιον ἀνεβάλλετο, ὅτι τε ἐς παλαίστραν παρέβαλλεν (Cass. Dio F 57.62)). Scipio’s rivals mark him as one who has transgressed the defining *mores* of Roman identity. One such signal is his non-Roman dress, which contrasts with that of his aforementioned predecessors while on embassy at Tarentum.¹⁸ As with the case of the nasty Tarentines, the contrast here is between Roman moderate behavior and imported Greek immoderate behavior.¹⁹ Scipio behaves like a Greek, not a Roman: Romans do not take up Greek lifestyles, Romans do not wear *himatia*, Romans do not go to the palaestra. By this point in Dio’s narrative, even with a fragmentary record, Roman identity has been established well enough to illustrate that Scipio was different. His transgressive behavior serves to cement Republican Roman identity further.

Romans and Non-Romans South of the Mediterranean

The Scipiones are not the only individuals who challenge their own cultural identity. If we sail south to North Africa, we find Massinissa behaving disparately from his native Numidians. Dio reports of the Roman ally that “in point of loyalty he excelled not only the men of his own race—who are most faithless as a rule—but even those who greatly prided themselves upon this virtue” (καὶ ἐς πίστιν οὐχ ὅτι τῶν ὁμοφύλων (ἄπιστοι γὰρ οὗτοι γε ὡς πλήθει εἰσὶ) ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πάνυ μέγα ἐπ’ αὐτῆ φρονούντων προέφερον) (Cass. Dio F 57.50)).

war in Spain had led the Spaniards to call him Great King (οἱ δὲ Ἰβηρες καὶ βασιλέα μέγαν ὠνάμαζον (Cass. Dio F 57.48)).

¹⁷ See Coudry and Lindholmer in this volume. Burden-Strevens 2015b, 180–192 and 2016 provides rich discussions of φθόνος in Dio, but with a focus on the Late Republic. See also Kuhn-Chen 2002, 179–181; Rees 2011, 30–35.

¹⁸ On the significance of dress and appearance to social and cultural identity, though with scanty discussion of the early books, see Freyburger-Galland 1993; Gleason 2011. Freyburger-Galland equates the *himation* with the toga, though it is clear in the case of F 57 that a distinction is being drawn between the two.

¹⁹ Greek behavior by Greeks receives little attention in the fragments as we have them. The emphasis, rather, appears to be on imported Greekness, raising the potential question of whether there is something inherently wrong with eastern behavior or if the problem is in taking up a behavior that is contrary to one’s own supposed cultural identity. We shall return to this question in the second part of this study.

His divergence from typical Numidian behavior, in a manner similar to Scipio's departure from Roman *mores*, serves not only as an individual characterisation, but also as a basis for describing Numidian identity in general.

The interaction that brings Massinissa into contact with the Romans, of course, is the Second Punic War. It is during the Punic Wars and the interactions between Carthage and Rome that Dio defines Roman Republican identity at its most noble.²⁰ As early as the beginning of the First Punic War, the consul Claudius harangues his troops by means of a discussion of their natural virtue (Cass. Dio F 43.11):

διδάσκων αὐτοὺς ὅτι τε αἱ νῆκαι τοῖς ἄμεινον παρεσκευασμένοις γίνονται καὶ ὅτι ἡ σφετέρᾳ ἀρετῇ πολὺ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων τέχνης προέχουσα εἶη· ἑαυτοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ναυτικῶν δι' ὀλίγου προσλήψεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ δὴ Καρχηδονίοις μηδέποτε τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου σφίσις ὑπάρξειν ἔφη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κτητὸν διὰ βραχέος τοῖς τὸν νοῦν αὐτῶ προσέχουσι καὶ καθαιρετὸν μελέτη εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τῶ προσεῖη οὐκ ἂν διδαχῇ πορισθῆναι.

He showed them that victories fell to the lot of the better-equipped, but that their own valor was far better than the skill of their opponents. They would soon acquire knowledge in seafaring, whereas the Carthaginians would never have manliness equal to theirs. For skill was something that could be obtained in a short time by men who gave their minds to it, and could be mastered by practice; but manliness, in case it were lacking in a man's nature, could never be furnished by instruction.²¹

Defining Roman identity in terms of ἀνδρεία becomes a motif in Dio's coverage of the Punic Wars, and one addressed not only by Roman generals. Dio himself narrates at length on Roman ἀνδρεία, linking it with another Roman characteristic that is frequently displayed in the early books—moderation. He narrates as follows (Cass. Dio F 52.1–2):

²⁰ So Burden-Strevens 2016, 211 and Kemezis 2014, 106–107, who see this period as a relative golden age, especially in terms of rhetoric. But see Rich in this volume for a re-interpretation of the deliberative rhetoric in the early books and Lindholmer and Lange also in this volume for a discussion of the abundance of competition, violence, and *stasis* in the early books.

²¹ Polybius offers a similar description of Roman valor in spite of lack of naval experience. See 1.20.11–12. On Romans as more courageous than Phoenicians and Carthaginians, see Polyb. 6.52.8–10.

οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἤκαμαζον καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοίᾳ ἀκριβῶς ἐχρῶντο, ὥσθ' ἅπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐκ μὲν ἀκράτου εὐπραγίας ἐς θάρσος, ἐκ δὲ ἰσχυροῦ δέους ἐς ἐπιείκειαν φέρει, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς τότε διαλλαγῆναι· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εὐτύχησαν, ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἐσωφρόνησαν, τὸ μὲν θάρσος, οὗ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέχει, πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἐνδεικνύμενοι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικές, οὗ κοινωνεῖ ἡ εὐταξία, κατ' ἀλλήλους παρεχόμενοι· τὴν τε γὰρ ἰσχὺν πρὸς μετριότητος ἀκινδύνου ἐξουσίαν καὶ τὸ κόσμιον πρὸς ἀνδρείας ἀληθοῦς κτῆσιν ἐλάμβανον, μήτε τὴν εὐπραγίαν ἐς ὕβριν μήτε τὴν ἐπιείκειαν ἐς δειλίαν ἐξάγοντες. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ τό τε σωφρονοῦν ἐξ ἀνδρείας καὶ τὸ θαρσοῦν ἐκ δέους φθείρεσθαι, ἐκείνως δὲ τὸ μέτριον ὑπ' ἀνδρείας ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ τὸ εὐτυχοῦν ὑπ' εὐταξίας βεβαιότερον γίνεσθαι ἐνόμιζον.

The Romans were at the height of their military power and enjoyed absolute harmony among themselves. Thus, unlike most people, who are led by unalloyed good fortune to audacity, but by strong fear to restraint, they at this time had a very different experience in these matters. For the greater their successes, the more were they self-controlled; against their enemies they displayed that daring which is a part of manliness, but toward one another they showed restraint which goes hand in hand with good order. They used their power for the exercise of safe moderation and their orderliness for the acquirement of true manliness; and they did not allow either their good fortune to develop into arrogance or their restraint into cowardice. They believed that in the latter case sobriety was ruined by manliness and boldness by fear; whereas with them moderation was rendered more secure by manliness and good fortune surer by good order.

The repetition of statements of Roman virtue herein, even when paradoxical, leaves little doubt about the centrality of ἀνδρεία in Roman self-conception. Furthermore, the Roman identity at this period, as characterised by ἀνδρεία, is strong enough that even Hannibal recognises it and uses it to shame his soldiers. He questions his men as follows after giving Roman captives the option of slavery or mortal combat: “Now is it not shameful, soldiers, when these men who have been captured by us have such manliness as to be eager to die in place of becoming slaves, that we on the other hand, shrink from incurring a little toil and danger for the sake of not being subservient to others—yes, and of ruling them besides?” (εἴτ'

οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὃ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, τούτους μὲν τοὺς ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐαλωκότας οὕτω πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχειν ὥστε καὶ ἀποθανεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ δουλεῦσαι ἐπιθυμῆσαι, ἡμᾶς δ' ὀκνησαι πόνον τινὰ καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἄρχειν ἄλλων ὑποστῆναι; (Cass. Dio F 57.4)).

From fragments 43 to 57, covering the First and Second Punic Wars, we find the Romans characterised by ἀνδρεία no fewer than five times. The repetition underscores the importance of this virtue to Roman identity. Its use by Romans, Carthaginians, and Dio himself during various cultural interactions is unmatched by other terms of virtue in the fragments of the early books.

Yet, as Assmann notes, identity is formed not only by positive formulations, but negative as well. Dio employs both elements of identity-definition as the early books wind down. While ἀνδρεία is inherent in Roman identity, τρυφή—a conflicting characteristic—is alien.²² Thus, when in 187 BCE Asiatic luxury sets upon the Romans, it is as a foreign entity that challenges their innate cultural identity.²³ Dio reports (Cass. Dio F 64):

οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς τρυφῆς τῆς Ἀσιανῆς γευσάμενοι, καὶ μετὰ τῆς τῶν λαφύρων περιουσίας τῆς τε παρὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐξουσίας ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἠττηθέντων κτήμασιν ἐγχνονίσαντες, τὴν τε ἀσωτίαν αὐτῶν διὰ βραχέος ἐζήλωσαν, καὶ τὰ πάτρια ἔθνη οὐ διὰ μακροῦ κατεπάτησαν. οὕτω τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτ' ἐκεῖθεν ἀρξάμενον καὶ ἐς τὸ ἄστυ ἐνέπεσε.

The Romans, when they had had the taste of Asiatic delicacy and had spent some time among the possessions of the vanquished amid the abundance of spoils and the license granted by success in arms, rapidly came to emulate the prodigality of these peoples and to trample under foot their own ancestral character. Thus this terrible thing, starting in that quarter, invaded the city as well.

²² On τρυφή in Dio, see Rees 2011, 45–54. He views τρυφή in F 64 as a moral issue *contra* Hose 1994, 402–403, who sees the ἀρετή / *virtus* that was lost as a result of the importation of τρυφή / *luxuria* as military in nature. As McDonnell 2006, 110–111 observes, ἀρετή / *virtus* was compared with τρυφή in a moral sense from this period onward—not only in Dio, but in Polybius as well. Yet, the effect of moral deficiency on the military must not be overlooked, on which see below for further discussion.

²³ On the dating of the actions described in this fragment, see Hose 1994, 400–401; Rees 2011, 45; Simons 2009, 144–145. For the purposes of this discussion, the two disputed dates—189 and 187 BCE—are insignificant.

The import of foreign delicacy as detrimental is widespread in the *History*.²⁴ Such observation and analysis is not entirely unique to Dio, of course. Livy, for example, likewise places the seeds of foreign delicacy at the same point in history, preceding a list of luxurious items with the assertion that “the origin of foreign delicacy was brought into Rome by the Asiatic army” (*luxuriae enim peregrinae origo ab exercitu Asiatico invecta in urbem est*) (Livy 39.6.7). For Livy too, this would only be the beginning. Yet, though Livy discusses changes in taste and use (*aestimatio et usus*) of certain luxuries such as fine dining, he does not claim explicitly that *luxuria* changed Roman identity. For Dio, conversely, this seems to be the main point: καὶ τὰ πάτρια ἔθῃ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ κατεπάτησαν.

Such changes in identificatory qualities as a result of cultural interactions occur elsewhere in Dio. For example, to some extent, the discussion above of Greek loss of φρόνημα is the result of such interaction. Later in the early books, the Cimbri suffer a corrupting external cultural influence similar to the τρυφή that invades Rome. They lose their fiery spirit when houses, hot baths, cooked dainties and wine infect their culture (Cass. Dio F 94.2). By 55 BCE the import of such delicacy in Rome was serious enough that the consuls considered setting laws to curb its influence on Romans: ἐπεχείρησαν μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα τὰ κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν ἐπὶ μακρότατον προηγμένα συστειλαί, καίπερ ἐς πᾶν αὐτοὶ καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ἀβρότητος προκεχωρηκότες (Cass. Dio 39.37.2). While they ultimately aborted the idea, even the temptation to outlaw τρυφή immediately marks it as an element that Romans considered to be contrary to their culture.

Roman identification with ἀνδρεία and disassociation with τρυφή encapsulates both elements of Assmann’s definition of cultural identity. First, the Romans are manly. They are not Carthaginians, who lack manliness in spite of their naval technology. They are not soft like those from the east.²⁵ Second, as we shall see below, their association with manliness and rejection of delicacy up through the Middle Republic is constantly held up as a prism through which they view themselves in the periods following. As they remember their ἀνδρεία and the rejection of its opposites during the Middle Republic, they make comparisons to their current states. This use of memory, then, comes to play a key role in Dio’s analytical programme as he moves through later periods in Roman history.

²⁴ See further Fechner 1986, 136–154, who views this as a piece of general moral decline after the loss of *metus hostilis*.

²⁵ Assmann’s “positive / negative” paradigm is highlighted nicely by Rees 2011, 52, who notes that the loss of self-control after 187 BCE made Romans no different than other peoples.

Among a number of elements that Dio combines in his early books to define Roman cultural identity, innate ἀνδρεία, to which τρυφή is foreign, maintains a significant station. In treating the periods that follow, Dio often assigns value to behaviors and qualities, or shows the Romans about which he writes to do so, based on assimilation to or rejection of this ἀνδρεία-based cultural identity.²⁶

Ἀνδρεία and Τρυφή in the Crisis of the Republic

During the competition that characterised the period from 146 BCE until the Augustan settlement and in particular during the triumviral periods,²⁷ Dio's statesmen display an awareness that appropriate Roman identity was tied closely with manliness and rejection of delicacy. The emphasis on moderation as identifier of Romanness would not have been specific to Dio's *History*. Here, as Christopher Burden-Strevens (2015b, 28–29; 2018) has argued of Dio's approach to Republican speech composition, Dio likely maintains rhetorical and argumentative strategies of Republican oratory. Invective between Cicero and Antony may serve as an example.²⁸ In his *Second Philippic* Cicero asserts Antony's status as enemy of the state in part because of the latter's sexual and sumptuary immoderation. It is through his reckless consumption that Antony transforms his *toga virilis* into a *toga muliebris* and himself into Charybdis.²⁹ For Dio, accusations of τρυφή become a preferred method of capturing such invective against Antony.³⁰ Among the complaints leveled against him by Cicero is the former's use of Caesar's money to maintain luxurious living. Cicero inveighs:

²⁶ Kemezis 2014, 107 notes that certain features of the Republican fragments are most interesting for the contrast they make with Dio's portrait of the later Republic. As I hope the first section of this chapter shows, the fragments are in fact interesting in their own right. But Kemezis' point is still well-taken: we understand Dio's presentation of the period of *dynasteia*, for example, much better because of the fragments that precede it.

²⁷ See Lindholmer in this volume for a discussion of competition in the Early, Middle and Late Republic.

²⁸ See Burden-Strevens 2015b, 58–70 for a survey and analysis of verbal and rhetorical parallels between Cicero's *Philippicae* and Dio's presentation of the invectives of Cicero and Antony; also Burden-Strevens 2018. See also Fischer 1870, 1–28; Gowing 1992, 96 n. 3, 119, 244.

²⁹ Cic. *Phil.* 2.44, 2.66. For other instances of Antony's lack of moderation, see Cic. *Phil.* 2.45, 2.58, 2.63, 2.67, 2.104–105.

³⁰ The use of τρυφή in Dio's representation of invective appears as early as F 104, in which Fimbria accuses Flaccus of τρυφή in order to overthrow him. Rees 2011, 20 has evaluated Dio's "Philippic" with a focus not on τρυφή, but on πλεονεξία.

“Though ordered to search out and produce the public money left behind by Caesar, has he not seized it, paying a part to his creditors and spending a part for delicacy?” (οὐ τὰ χρήματα τὰ κοινὰ τὰ καταλειφθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐπιζητῆσαι καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι κελευσθεὶς ἤρπακε, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς δανεισταῖς ἀποδέδωκε τὰ δὲ ἐς τρυφήν κατανάλωκεν; (Cass. Dio 45.24.1)). Octavian follows Cicero’s suit in his harangue prior to Actium,³¹ pointing to Antony’s delicacy: “If these things happened which you do not believe even when you hear about them, and if that man in his luxurious indulgence does commit acts at which anyone would grieve who learns of them, how could you but rightly go past all bounds in your rage?” (εἰ γὰρ ἂ μὴδ’ ἀκούσαντες πιστεύετε, ταῦτ’ ὄντως γίνεται, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις οὐκ ἂν ἀλγήσειε μαθὼν, ταῦτ’ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ τρυφῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ὑπεροργισθεῖητε; (Cass. Dio 50.25.5)). Octavian continues his polemic, making explicit the contrast between manliness and delicacy, Roman and foreign (Cass. Dio 50.27.1, 3–4):³²

μήτ’ οὖν Ῥωμαῖον εἶναι τις αὐτὸν νομιζέτω, ἀλλὰ τινα Αἰγύπτιον, μήτ’ Ἀντώνιον ὀνομαζέτω, ἀλλὰ τινα Σαραπίωνα· μὴ ὑπάτον, μὴ αὐτοκράτορα γεγονέναι ποτὲ ἠγείσθω, ἀλλὰ γυμνασίαρχον [...] εἰ δ’ οὖν ποτε καὶ ἐκ τῆς σὺν ἡμῖν στρατείας ἀρετὴν τινα ἔσχεν, ἀλλ’ εὖ ἴσθ’ ὅτι νῦν πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ τοῦ βίου μεταβολῇ διέφθορεν. ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι βασιλικῶς τέ τινα τρυφῶντα καὶ γυναικειῶς θρυπτόμενον ἀνδρῶδες τι φρονῆσαι καὶ πράξαι, διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην εἶναι, οἷοις ἂν τις ἐπιτηδεύμασι συνῆ, τούτοις αὐτὸν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι.

Therefore let no one count him a Roman, but an Egyptian, nor call him Antony, but rather Serapion; let no one think he was ever consul or emperor, but only a gymnasiarch [...] And even if he did at one time attain to some valor through campaigning with us, be well assured that he has now spoiled it utterly by his changed manner of life. For it is impossible for one who leads a life of royal delicacy and enfeebles himself with womanly behavior to have a manly thought or deed, since it is an inevitable law that a man assimilates himself to practices of his daily life.

³¹ See Gowing 1992, 121; Stekelenburg 1971, 99–106.

³² See Gowing 1992, 117–118 n. 67 for a list of similar anti-Antonian propaganda in other sources.

Octavian's attack against Antony as foreign and non-Roman hinges closely on the latter's indulgence in delicacy and the impossibility of simultaneously maintaining a manly lifestyle. Antony's behavior contrasts with the Roman cultural identity that Dio makes explicit in the early books. According to Octavian, Antony does not belong in Rome or as a Roman leader because he does not understand how to behave like a Roman. His indulgence in foreign τρυφή spoils his Roman identity.

The target of these invectives was equally aware of the constitutional elements of Roman identity. In his funeral oration for Caesar, Antony made the same contrast between manliness and delicacy in order to illustrate Caesar's Romanness and defend him against imputations of foreign softness. He summarises Caesar's victory over Pontus and Armenia as follows (Cass. Dio 44.46.2, 5):

ἀφ' ὧνπερ οὐχ ἥκιστα διέδειξεν ὅτι οὐδὲν χείρων ἐν τῇ Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τρυφῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνεχρόνισε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ῥαδίως ἐκεῖνα ἔπραξε μὴ πολλῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ διανοίας πολλῇ δὲ καὶ ῥώμῃ χρώμενος; [...] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ τοὺς ἀλλοφύλους κατηγωνίζετο.

This better than anything else showed that he had not become weaker in Alexandria and had not delayed there for the sake of delicacy; for how could he have won that victory so easily without having great mental vigor in reserve and great physical strength? [...] Therefore by his manliness he overcame foreigners in war.

Through such speeches, Dio captures an historical and rhetorical climate in which political leaders attempted to stigmatise their rivals by imparting on them behaviors that were not Roman, while promoting themselves and their allies by highlighting Romanness. Yet Dio does so while maintaining a nuance that is his own: as the attacks leveled at Antony and the praise given to Caesar show, ἀνδρεία stood out as a crucial element of Roman identity, τρυφή as its opposite. Such a definition of Roman identity relies heavily on Dio's treatment of virtue in the early books.

Ἀνδρεία and Τρυφή under the Principate

Continuity extends further, as the embodiment of ἀνδρεία is a defining characteristic of a good Roman interacting with non-Romans in Dio's treatment of the principate. Thus, for example, Dio describes Germanicus as most beautiful in body and noble in mind partly because "while being most manly against the enemy, he carried himself most gently at home" (ἐξ τε τὸ πολέμιον ἀνδρειότατος ὢν ἡμερώτατα τῷ οἰκίῳ προσεφέρετο (Cass. Dio 57.18.6)). Other noble Romans follow suit: Corbulo resembles early Romans because of his ἀνδρεία while in Parthia and Armenia (Cass. Dio 62.19.2), Trajan strikes fear in Decebalus of Dacia partly because of his ἀνδρεία (Cass. Dio 68.6.2) and Pertinax displayed ἀνδρεία when dealing with foreigners and rebels (Cass. Dio 75[74].5.6).

There is, however, also some discontinuity in Dio's coverage of ἀνδρεία and τρυφή. The first lies in the context in which these virtues and vices are presented. During the Crisis of the Republic, ἀνδρεία and τρυφή often appear in speeches, primarily political invective. Perhaps due to the shifts in public debate that took place along with shifts in political systems, Dio's presentation of these virtues and vices under the principate accordingly moves from reported oratory to his own narrative.

The second discontinuity lies in the use of contrasts when presenting ἀνδρεία and τρυφή. To be sure, ἀνδρεία continues to be a positive attribute, τρυφή a negative one. But τρυφή less frequently appears in the environment of cultural interactions and, in so, it loses some of its utility as signifier of cultural identity.³³ To display τρυφή is no longer to be non-Roman, but simply to be morally bad. Thus, for example, within a context that lacks cultural interaction, Vitellius, while in Rome "addicted to delicacy and licentiousness, no longer cared for anything else human or divine" (αὐτὸς δὲ τῆ τε τρυφῆ καὶ τῆ ἀσελγείᾳ προσκείμενος οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὔτε τῶν θεῶν ἐφρόντιζεν) (Cass. Dio 64[65].2.1)).³⁴ Other bad rulers behave similarly, often in contexts that are isolated from foreigners: we find Caligula bringing trappings of τρυφή to his faux battle on the Rhine (Cass. Dio 59.21.2), Agrippina behaving with excessive τρυφή toward Claudius (Cass. Dio 61[60].31.6), Nero delighting in τρυφή without the resistance of Seneca and Burrus (Cass. Dio 61.4.2), Commodus collecting goods to expand his τρυφή (Cass. Dio 74[73].5.5) and Macrinus beginning to live in τρυφή once he becomes emperor (Cass. Dio 79[78].15.3).

³³ Roman expansion and cosmopolitanism, of course, changed the way cultures interacted by the imperial period. The ever-increasing multi-culturalism in the Mediterranean would make strict identity-formation on the basis of region or ethnicity, for example, nearly impossible.

³⁴ See also Cass. Dio 64[65]10.1.

Over the course of the principate, τροφή, which was once foreign and could only be imported, transforms into an element that can just as easily be found within the city. Meanwhile, for example, Corbulo's virtues—highlighted by his ἀνδρεία—are not measured in relation to foreigners'—as may have occurred in Dio's account of the Punic Wars—but to earlier Romans': "For he was similar to the early Romans, not only because he was distinguished in birth or strong in body, but also because he was skilled in intelligence and showed great manliness, justice and faithfulness to all, both friends and enemies." (ὅμοια γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρώτοις Ῥωμαίων, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ γένει λαμπρὸς ἢ τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀρτίφρων ἦν, καὶ πολὺ μὲν τὸ ἀνδρεῖον πολὺ δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τό τε πιστὸν ἐς πάντας καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους εἶχεν (Cass. Dio 62.19.2)). In accordance with Assmann's suggestion, Roman cultural memory—here related through Dio—views cultural identity with an eye to its contemporary political world. Early Roman identity defined by manliness becomes relevant to an imperial Roman because Corbulo's behavior recalls that of his ancestors.

Ἀνδρεία and Τροφή under Caracalla

By the time Dio reaches the contemporary books and his treatment of Caracalla in particular, a full shift in Roman cultural identity takes place, at least insofar as it is displayed by the emperor.³⁵ The change in imperial cultural identity is posted explicitly in a passage from the *Excerpta Valesiana* (Cass. Dio 78[77].6.1a):³⁶

τρισὶν ἔθνεσιν ὁ Ἀντωνῖνος προσήκων ἦν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν τὰ δὲ δὴ κακὰ πάντα συλλαβὼν ἐκτήσατο, τῆς μὲν Γαλατίας τὸ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ δειλὸν καὶ τὸ θρασύ, τῆς Ἀφρικῆς τὸ τραχὺ καὶ ἄγριον, τῆς Συρίας, ὅθεν πρὸς μητρὸς ἦν, τὸ πανοῦργον.

Antoninus belonged to three races, and he possessed none of their virtues at all, but combined in himself all their vices; the fickleness and recklessness of Gaul

³⁵ On Dio's portrayal of Caracalla and the potential motivations behind it, see Davenport 2012; Jones 2016; Letta 1979; Meckler 1999; Schmidt 1997; Schmidt 1999; Schulz 2016, 295–296.

³⁶ See further Millar 1964, 151.

were his, the harshness and cruelty of Africa, and the craftiness of Syria, whence he was sprung on his mother's side.

Dio had established the fickleness of the Gauls and the savagery of the Numidians on numerous occasions in the early books, as explored above. Thus, when he writes here that Caracalla belongs to these various cultural groups, we have some expectations as to what behaviors will follow.

In addition to embracing all the worst parts of foreign identities, Caracalla rejects what was once a crucial and innate part of Roman identity—*ἀνδρεία*. Cultural interactions with non-Romans reveal the absence of *ἀνδρεία* rather than its presence among Romans. Thus, it is through the cultural interaction with the Germans that Caracalla is discovered to lack manliness.³⁷ Dio imputes that “the Germanic nations, however, afforded him neither pleasure nor any claim to wisdom or manliness, but proved him to be a downright cheat, a simpleton, and an utter coward” (οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὰ Κελτικὰ ἔθνη οὐθ' ἡδονὴν οὔτε σοφίας ἢ ἀνδρείας προσποίησίν τινα ἤνεγκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ καὶ ἀπατεῶνα καὶ εὐήθη καὶ δειλότατον αὐτὸν ἐξήλεγξεν ὄντα (Cass. Dio 78[77].13.3)).

Failing to display *ἀνδρεία*, Caracalla is instead guilty of exporting what was once imported—*τρυφή*. His cultural interactions show him bringing delicacy *to* the east.³⁸ Dio

³⁷ A similar revelation with respect to Nero is pointed out by Boudica at Cass. Dio 62.5.2, on which see Adler 2011, 141–160; Gillespie 2015; Gowing 1997, 2580–2583.

³⁸ While luxury had in fact been brought by Romans elsewhere before, it was an imperialistic tool used to soften enemies. The weakening of the Cimbri is a good example: “The Cimbri, when once they had halted, lost much of their spirit and consequently became enfeebled and sluggish in both mind and body. The reason was that in place of their former outdoor life they lodged in houses, and instead of their former cold plunges they used warm baths; whereas they had been wont to eat raw meat, they now gorged themselves with richly spiced dishes and relishes of the country, and they steeped themselves, contrary to their custom, in wine and strong drink. These practices extinguished all their fiery spirit and enervated their bodies, so that they could no longer bear toils or hardships, whether heat or cold or loss of sleep” (ὅτι ὡς ἄπαξ ἐπέσχον, πολὺ τοῦ θυμοῦ οἱ Κίμβροι παρελύθησαν, κακὰ τούτου καὶ ἀμβλύτεροι καὶ ἀσθενέστεροι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐγένοντο. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἔν τε οἰκίαις ἐκ τῆς πρόσθεν ὑπαιθρίου διαίτης κατέλυον, καὶ λουτροῖς θερμοῖς ἀντὶ τῆς πρόσθεν ψυχρολουσίας ἐχρῶντο, καρυκείας τε καὶ ἡδυσμάτων ἐπιχωρίων διεπίμπλαντο, κρέα πρότερον ὠμὰ σιτούμενοι, καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ τῇ τε μέθῃ κατακορεῖς παρὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐγίγνοντο. ταῦτα γὰρ τό τε θυμοειδὲς αὐτῶν πᾶν ἐξέκοψε καὶ τὰ σώματα ἐθήλυνεν, ὥστε μήτε τοὺς πόνους ἔτι μήτε τὰς ταλαιπωρίας, μὴ καῦμα, μὴ ψῦχος, μὴ ἀγρυπνίαν, φέρειν (Cass. Dio F 94.2)). Caracalla, conversely, exports *τρυφή* for his own pleasure; and its effects, as discussed below, are detrimental not to foreign enemies, but to Roman senators and soldiers.

reports that in addition to mercilessness in gladiatorial games, Caracalla indulged in delicacies at Antioch to such an extent that he reached what may be the epitome of evil in Dio's estimation—disregarding the senate (Cass. Dio 78[77].20.1):

καὶ μέντοι τοιαῦτα ποιῶν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιοχείᾳ τρυφῶν ὥστε καὶ τὸ γένειον πάνυ ψιλίζεσθαι, αὐτὸς τε ὠδύρετο ὡς ἐν μεγάλοις δὴ τισι καὶ πόνοις καὶ κινδύνοις ὄν, καὶ τῇ γερουσίᾳ ἐπετίμα, τὰ τε ἄλλα ῥαστωναύειν σφᾶς λέγων καὶ μήτε συνιέναι προθύμως μήτε κατ' ἄνδρα τὴν γνώμην διδόναι. καὶ τέλος ἔγραψεν ὅτι “οἶδα μὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀρέσκει τὰ ἐμὰ ὑμῖν: διὰ τοῦτο μέντοι καὶ ὄπλα καὶ στρατιώτας ἔχω, ἵνα μηδὲν τῶν λογοποιουμένων ἐπιστρέφωμαι.”

Nevertheless, while he was thus occupied and was indulging in luxurious living at Antioch, even to the point of keeping his chin wholly bare, he not only bewailed his own lot, as if he were in the midst of some great hardships and dangers, but he also found fault with the senate, declaring that in addition to being slothful in other respects they did not assemble with any eagerness and did not give their votes individually. And in conclusion he wrote: “I know that my behavior does not please you; but that is the very reason that I have arms and soldiers, so that I may disregard what is said about me.”

While in Syria and Mesopotamia, Caracalla took up foreign dress, from which he earned his nickname, and thereby abandoned one of the symbols of Roman identity as shown in the early books of the *History* both by the appropriate dress of the envoys to Tarentum and by the transgression of Scipio (Cass. Dio 79[78].3.3). Furthermore, he indulged his soldiers in such delicacy that they became ineffectual (Cass. Dio 79[78].3.4–5):

αὐτόν τε οὖν τοιοῦτον οἱ βάρβαροι ὀρῶντες ὄντα, καὶ ἐκείνους πολλοὺς μὲν ἀκούοντες εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῆς προτέρας τρυφῆς (τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις ἐχείμαζον, πάντα τὰ τῶν ξενοδοκούντων σφᾶς ὡς καὶ ἴδια ἀναλίσκοντες) καὶ ἐκ τῶν πόνων τῆς τε ταλαιπωρίας τῆς τότε αὐτοῖς παρούσης οὕτω καὶ τὰ σώματα τετραχωμένους καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τεταπεινωμένους ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν λημμάτων ἔτι, ἃ πολλὰ ἀεὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐλάμβανον, προτιμᾶν [...]

The barbarians now saw what sort of person he was and heard that his troops, though numerous, had in consequence of previous delicacy (among other things they had been passing winter in houses and using up everything belonging to their hosts as if it were their own) and of their toils and present hardships, become so exhausted in body and so dejected in mind that they no longer cared at all about the donatives which they were constantly receiving in large amounts from Antoninus.

The Romans here, like the Cimbri in the early books, lose their cultural identity in exchange for delicate living. Caracalla and his soldiers are identified *by* barbarians as living in a state of τρυφή that would have been unimaginable to a Roman prior to 187 BCE. The moral descent runs a full course throughout the *History*, culminating with a bit of Dionian autobiography, as it was this type of soft living among the soldiers that led the Pannonian legions, so says Dio, to complain of his own command (Cass. Dio 80.4.1):³⁹

τοσαύτη γὰρ ἄμα τρυφῆ καὶ ἐξουσία ἀνεπιπληξία τε χρῶνται ὥστε τολμῆσαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Μεσοποταμίᾳ τὸν ἄρχοντα σφῆν Φλάουιον Ἡρακλέωνα ἀποκτεῖναι, καὶ τοὺς δορυφόρους πρὸς τῷ Οὐλπιανῷ καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσθαι ὅτι τῶν ἐν τῇ Παννονίᾳ στρατιωτῶν ἐγκρατῶς ἦρξα, καὶ ἐξαιτῆσαι.

They indulge in such delicacy, license and lack of discipline, that those in Mesopotamia even dared to kill their commander, Flavius Heracleo, and the Praetorians complained of me to Ulpian, because I ruled the soldiers in Pannonia with a strong hand; and they demanded my surrender.

As might be gleaned from Dio's autobiographical insertion during the later Severan period, Caracalla's acquisition and display of τρυφή marks another shift in Roman history that lasted beyond his reign.⁴⁰ The emperors' inability to embody proper Roman virtue affects the government more widely. He does not just export τρυφή to the east, but he infects his own soldiers with it, making it impossible for Romans like Dio to expect ἀνδρεία of them. What in

³⁹ On this passage and Dio's late career, see Markov 2016.

⁴⁰ So too does Dio's polemical treatment of Elagabalus suggest, on which see Osgood 2016.

prior periods had been an individual problem of embodying the characteristics that were essential to Roman identity threatened to become a culture-wide concern.

Conclusion

As cultural interactions in the early books indicate, ἀνδρεία was once a quality innate to Rome and exported outward, while τρυφή was once foreign and had to be imported. In the Late Republic, as individuals frequently came to represent Roman culture as a whole, rivals were quick to point out those who were either importing or traveling in search of τρυφή. In the imperial period, good political leaders embodied ἀνδρεία and rejected τρυφή—both of which had become equally available in and out of the city. By the third century, a full shift from the early and mid-Republic occurs: τρυφή is exported by the Roman emperor and no manliness is innate in him.

The changes in Roman cultural identity as illustrated by the changes in τρυφή and ἀνδρεία may simply be historical, Dio reporting them without further motivation. More likely, Dio intentionally underscores an ongoing shift in Roman cultural identity: a single vicious imperial representative who lacks essential characteristics of Roman identity threatens what was once a collective embodiment of manliness and rejection of delicate living. As Adam Kemezis (2014, 148–149) has shown, Dio confronts Romanness in his time by recognising multiple stages and changes amidst a number of key constants. In the face of Caracallan attempts to change the definition of Roman identity, “Dio’s final answer is to present as an alternative none other than himself [...] His model of changing Romanness as represented by the growing appropriation and adaptation of older senatorial traditions by new generations of provincial elites is an important glimpse into the distinctive mind-set of a senatorial aristocracy.” Virtues such as ἀνδρεία or rejection of τρυφή, clearly missing in Rome’s leader and fading from Roman identity, might not be totally lost. If Romans remember their early history and, with it, the significance of the aristocratic collective, appropriate Roman identity could be reclaimed.

Whatever Dio’s personal motivations may have been, the shift in the representation of cultural interactions and identities over the course of the *History* reveals historiographical unity. Particular virtues and vices that are best displayed while interacting with others serve as barometers throughout Rome’s history. Roman ἀνδρεία or τρυφή may change, but evaluating Romans based on these elements remains constant. Without the foundational

selection, display and interpretation of such virtues and vices in the early books, the cultural identity of Dio's contemporaries cannot be fully understood, if it can be established at all.

DRAFT: MAY CONTAIN ERRORS

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DEFINING THE GOOD RULER: EARLY KINGS AS PROTO-IMPERIAL FIGURES IN CASSIUS DIO*

Verena Schulz

Cassius Dio is rarely used as a source for historical knowledge about early Roman kingship. The relevant part of his work, counted as books 1 and 2 of his altogether 80 books on Roman history, has come down to us only in fragments and epitomes. Scholars usually prefer Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy as sources, and they do so with good reasons: their accounts of the Roman kings are fully preserved and were composed more than 200 years earlier than that of Cassius Dio. But neither Dionysius nor Livy provides us with ‘true facts’ about the beginning of Roman history.¹ It has been convincingly shown that the versions of the past presented by these two Augustan writers are determined by their own present.² While Dionysius creates an idealising account of the Regal Period, in which all the Roman (i.e. Greek) virtues are there from the beginning,³ Livy depicts a time that is not uniquely virtuous and the process that converts the people into responsible citizens.⁴ Different as these literary narratives may be, they both fulfil an important role at the beginning of each work: Dionysius describes the (Greek) basis of virtuous Roman behaviour, whereas Livy creates a starting point for the development of Roman liberty towards the Republic. By contrast, the function of Dio’s literary account of the Roman kings has not yet been analysed.

This chapter argues that Cassius Dio’s depiction of the Regal Period of Rome is likewise informed by the author’s own time, but that its purpose is fundamentally different

* All fragments cited in this article refer to Cassius Dio. I have used the edition of Boissevain 1895–1901 for Zonaras as well as Dio. Translations and paraphrases of text passages follow Cary’s Loeb translation (1914–1927). For Zonaras’ epitome of Dio cf. Millar 1964, 2–3; Simons 2009, 25–32; Fromentin 2013 (focusing on the preface); Mallan 2014, 760–761; for Byzantine excerpts of Dio’s regal period cf. Mallan in this volume.

¹ Cf. e.g. Forsythe 2005, 78–79, who compares the ancient literary tradition concerning the early kings with Hollywood movies.

² See Fox 1996.

³ See esp. Fox 1996, 49, 94–95, 139.

⁴ See esp. Fox 1996, 83, 97, 139.

from Livy and Dionysius.⁵ Cassius Dio is a senator in the early third century AD, who considers monarchy as the best form of government possible,⁶ and who evaluates emperors based on the way they fulfil their political role. His identity as a senator determines his view on history and on political rulers.⁷ The most important aspect for Cassius Dio for deciding whether a monarch was good or bad is his relationship with the senate. The following analysis will show that in his portrayals of the Roman kings and their age, Cassius Dio foreshadows (contemporary) emperors and the political issues of Severan times. He does, of course, make use of sources, but he selects and shapes them so as to fit his own purposes.⁸ The main approach of this analysis will hence not be to compare details in Cassius Dio to the versions of Livy and Dionysius, but to understand why narratives about the Roman kings, taken from sources and adapted to his narrative, were important and relevant for a senator in the early third century.

Starting from general observations about the unity of the *Roman History*, we will see that its very beginning forms an integral part of the work as a whole and that Dio did not just include it for the sake of completeness (§1). More specifically, we can compare Roman kings and emperors with regard to structural similarities of their reign, namely their forms of representation, the role of women at court, and genealogies and typologies created in the text (§2). Most importantly, we will find the literary and political discourse about the good and bad monarch, which prevailed in the second and third centuries under Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, and the Severans,⁹ foreshadowed in Dio's depiction of Roman kingship (§3). We

⁵ For contemporary history as focal point for Dio's *Roman History* in general cf. Bleicken 1962, 445–446, 450, 454; Flach 1973, 133–134; Gowing 1992, 293–294; Gowing 1997, 2560; Reinhold 1988, 14–15; Hose 2007, 465–467.

⁶ For Dio's attitude towards monarchy see Flach 1973, 133; Ameling 1997, 2479–2482; and the overview provided by Simons 2009, 10–12.

⁷ For Dio's senatorial self-consciousness or 'ethos' cf. Flach 1973, 141–142; Gowing 1992, 19–32; Kemezis 2012, 388; Kemezis 2014, 149; Burden-Strevens 2015, 290–296 on Dio's "consular voice" throughout his work.

⁸ For *Quellenforschung* on Cassius Dio cf. Schwartz 1899/1957, 394–446; Millar 1964, 34–38; Martinelli 1999, 25–30; Simons 2009, 5–9; on Dio's dependence on Livy cf. Mallan 2014, 759–760 with further references.

⁹ The exact time of composition of Dio's *Roman History* is debated; cf. the overview in Kemezis 2014, 282–293. Even if we follow the early dating (ca. 194–223), Dio may have revised the books that he had written earlier for publication, which may explain possible allusions to later emperors such as Elagabalus and Severus Alexander in his early books. However, I will confine this analysis almost completely to parallels between Roman kings and emperors not later than Caracalla.

will finally see that the guiding line for Dio's versions of both kings and emperors is his senatorial perspective (§4).

'The Roman History': Unity and Continuity

The depiction of the early kings in Cassius Dio forms part of an extensive work that is meant as a unity. This unity is supported by presenting both history and humanity as continuous or constant. There are two aspects in particular of the narrative that interconnect the almost 1000 years presented in 80 books and support its connective structure: first, Cassius Dio constructs continuity between past and present; second, he has certain ideas of human character in general, which he applies to explain human behaviour in every epoch, which is portrayed in the universalising language of human nature.

Although we have only a few fragments of Cassius Dio's books on the Regal Period, they do allow us to realise that he emphasised the unity of his work from its beginning. Dio underlines the continuum from the beginning of his depiction to his own times by referring explicitly to four elements of the narrative, namely place, people, topic, and time. Explaining when and where his narrative begins, Dio states that he chose the onward point from which he obtained the clearest accounts of what is reported to have taken place. He then gives a geographical specification of his topic which will be "this land which we inhabit" (τήνδε τήν γῆν, ἣν κατοικοῦμεν, F 1.3), "this land", the text seems to go on, "in which the city of Rome has been built" (τήν χώραν ταύτην, ἐν ἣ τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἄστυ πεπόλισται, F. 1.3). The land that Dio discusses at the beginning of his work is also his land and the land of his readers, who are indirectly addressed in the first person plural of κατοικοῦμεν. It is the land of the city of Rome. The topic of the work is the history of its inhabitants, the Romans (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πάντα). Dio announces that he will recount things that do not fall within this focus only if they have a bearing on the Romans' affairs (τῶν δὲ δὴ λοιπῶν τὰ πρόσφορα αὐτοῖς μόνα γεγράφεται, F 2.4). More precisely, Dio wants to write about everything the Romans did in peace and war that is worth remembering (πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ εἰρηνοῦσι καὶ πολεμοῦσι ἀξίως μνήμης ἐπράχθη, F 1.1), and he gives a clear definition of his readership which is presented as consisting of every Roman and non-Roman who does not want to miss any of the essential facts (ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μήτε ἐκείνων τινὰ μήτε τῶν ἄλλων

ποθῆσαι, F 1.1).¹⁰ If we take these statements presented at the very beginning of his work seriously, the portrayal of early kingship is to be understood as an integral part of the *Roman History*: its narrative is about the same place, Rome, and the same people, Romans, as in Dio's times. He obviously considered this early period of Rome as worth remembering for his contemporaries.

The continuity and coherence of time is underlined in the narrative by explicitly mentioning earlier and later events. Cassius Dio applies such analeptic and proleptic references throughout his work,¹¹ and his early books are no exception. So Dio points out that Numa was said to have been born on the day that Rome was founded (ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν ᾗ ἡ Ῥώμη ἐκτίσθη γεγεννησθαι, F 6.5). He applies his general interest in aetiologies also in his early books, in which he touches upon the origin of the name of the river Tiber (Zonar. 7.1.7), of the name of the *comitium* (F 5.7), of the name of the month January (F 6.7), the punishment of the Vestal Virgins (Zonar. 7.8.11–12), the punishment for patricide (Zonar. 7.11.4), and the name of the Capitol (Zonar. 7.11.8). And Dio's idea of the continuity of time does not stop at his own time. He even prophesies that the Romans can in future only lose their power if they are brought low by their own contentions (ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄλλως εἴτ' οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως εἴτ' οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς στερηθεῖεν, εἰ μὴ δι' ἀλλήλων σφαλεῖεν, F 17.3).

The second narrative element that helps to create unity in a work of 80 books is Cassius Dio's view of human nature, a Thucydidean substrate.¹² Throughout the work, Dio inserts general statements about the human character to explain behaviour. In the early books, we immediately learn a lot about the consequences of his views on human nature for the workings of communities. Humans, so Dio, do by nature not want to be ruled by what is like them and familiar to them, partly because they are jealous, partly because of contempt (οὕτω που φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον οὐ φέρει πρὸς τε τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ συνήθους, τὰ μὲν φθόνῳ τὰ δὲ καταφρονήσει αὐτοῦ, ἀρχόμενον, F 5.12). He puts the same idea differently when he

¹⁰ In this passage, Dio clearly aims at a broad readership. There is, however, a vital debate on his readership: senators and (contemporary and later) emperors are mentioned as envisaged addressees e.g. by Fechner 1986, 247, 250; Gowing 1992, 292–293; Ameling 1997, 2491–2493; Hose 2007, 466. Another group of addressees is proposed by Wirth and Aalders: according to Wirth 1985, 13 the *Roman History* is meant primarily for the educated Roman population living far away from the capital of Rome; Aalders 1986, 290–291, 302, thinks of well-educated Greeks in the imperial cities.

¹¹ See for example the reference to Julius Caesar and his dictatorship in Zonaras 7.13.14, or to the triumph and its developments in Zonaras 7.21.4–10.

¹² Cf. Dio's view of human nature in F 30.2–4. For Thucydides as Dio's model, see Flach 1973, 130–131; Aalders 1986, 291–292; Lintott 1997, 2499–2500; Swan 1997, 2525.

says that it is the inherent disposition of human beings to quarrel with equals and to desire to rule others (ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἐτέρων ἐπιθυμίας, F 7.3). What is more, Dio considers it natural for the majority of the human race to quarrel with an opposing force even beyond what is to its own advantage (ὅτι ἔοικε τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀνθιστάμενον καὶ παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλονεικεῖν, F 20.4).

Monarchs Now and Then

Apart from these general narrative elements of unity and continuity, there are several motifs that suggest connections between the portrayals of the early kings and later, contemporary emperors.¹³ Such motifs feature also in Dionysius' and Livy's accounts. But they have a different meaning for the Severan audience. Unlike Dionysius' and Livy's readers, Dio's readers looked back at 200 years of Roman emperors. Cassius Dio lived and wrote in a time in which the role of the emperor had to be negotiated again. After the relatively quiet reign of the Antonines, there were again stronger tensions between the Severan emperors and the senators, who had different concepts of the ideal emperor.¹⁴ The first period in which Rome was ruled by monarchs, the Regal Period, was thus loaded with a new meaning at the beginning of the third century. It was now not only the beginning of Roman history, but also a period that was directly comparable to the previous two centuries. The surviving text on the Regal Period includes some passages in which Dio appears to allude to individual contemporary emperors by constructing direct parallels, to which I will turn later. First, we can look at general structural features of Severan rule that already appear in Dio's depiction of early Roman kingship, and not only from his depiction of the Principate onwards: forms of imperial representation, the role of women at court, and the construction of genealogies and typologies.

Generally speaking, a Roman monarch needs to fulfil his tasks and to present himself and his reign in different areas of representation. For the Roman emperor, such fields of imperial representation are mainly military victories, building endeavours, the organisation of

¹³ Cf. Mallan 2014, esp. 770, who mentions the monarchs' "interaction with external enemies ..., Roman sub-groups ..., and royal women" as topic for both kings and emperors in Dio.

¹⁴ Cf. Hose 2011, 123–124. For the new critical discourse about the past under the Severans cf. also Kemezis 2014, esp. 30–89.

entertainment (spectacles, games, and feasts), and expressions of sacrality or divinity.¹⁵ The media in which this representation is enacted are statues, coins, buildings, inscriptions, panegyric literature, and also historiography. These media differ with regard to how much they are influenced by the emperor, and historiography is certainly the most critical one. Cassius Dio depicts Roman emperors in their fields of representation and evaluates them accordingly. When we look at the Roman kings from this perspective, we will see that Dio also portrayed them fulfilling their roles in these fields of representation and he evaluated them accordingly.

To give some examples, military success is an important field of representation for Dio's emperors as well as for Romulus and Tullus Hostilius (Zonar. 7.6.1). Servius Tullius is said to have conducted a few wars, in the course of which nothing was done worthy of record (Zonar. 7.9.10); a temple for Diana in Rome is mentioned for him too (Zonar. 7.9.11). The building of a temple on Mons Tarpeius by Tarquinius Superbus has negative connotations as the king is said to have waged war against the inhabitants of Ardea because he needed money for it, an action which leads to his being driven out of his kingdom (Zonar. 7.11.9). Similarly, Nero's methods to gain money for his buildings are later associated with murder (62[61]17.1–2). The depiction of the relationship between kings and the divine is a further literary device that creates a certain character image of them. Tullus Hostilius does not revere the gods and even absolutely despises and neglects to worship them. Only when he falls sick during a pestilence does he hold the gods in the highest regard (F 7.5). For Dio's Romulus and Numa, what other people think about their relationship with the gods seems especially important. Outside tribes think that they were both provided for them with the aid of a god (καὶ ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἄθεεῖ σφισι ἐξ ἴσου τῷ Ῥωμύλῳ ὑπάρξαι ἔδοξεν, F 6.5). The representation of the king himself as a god during his lifetime is ascribed to Dio's Amulius, Numitor's brother (Zonar. 7.1.8). He even answers real thunder with artificial thunder, lightning with lightning, and hurls thunderbolts, and thus resembles Dio's Caligula who plays the part of several gods and goddesses (59.26.6; 29.27.6; 59.28.5). When Dio's Amulius is then said to have died from a sudden overflow of the lake beside his palace, this reads like nature's or gods' revenge, even in Zonaras' epitome.

Other elements of imperial representation are the organisation of the calendar and clothing. Emperors are criticised for re-naming the months of the year (see e.g. Commodus in 73[72].15.3), and also for inappropriate clothing (see. e.g. Elagabalus in 80[79].11.2). In his

¹⁵ In my definition of 'representation' I follow Weber & Zimmermann 2003, 33–40, and Bönisch-Meyer *et al.* 2014, 438–439 (on media of representation).

depiction of early kingship, Dio's Numa—without any negative connotation—is said to have placed January at the beginning of the year (Zonar. 7.5). Dio's Romulus, however, is characterised negatively through his eccentric dress. He not only has a crown and a sceptre with an eagle on the top, but also wears a white cloak striped with purple from the shoulders to the feet, as well as red shoes (F 6.1^a).

Besides the forms of representation of the monarch himself, an important element in the portrayal of a reign is the role of imperial women. In the third century, we may expect a contemporary reader who is prepared to read about royal female family members without too much surprise. In the Severan dynasty, two women play a crucial political part¹⁶: Julia Domna is the wife of Septimius Severus and the mother of Caracalla and Geta, who tried to mediate between her two antagonising sons and who was Caracalla's counsellor during his reign;¹⁷ after the reign of the usurper Macrinus it is her sister Julia Maesa who promotes first Elagabalus and then Alexander Severus, both of them her grandsons. So even if Dio did not invent new narratives about the women surrounding the Roman kings, the reader is invited to compare their central function with the function of later mothers and wives of emperors. In his depiction of the family of the Tarquins, two stand out: Tanaquil, wife of Lucius Tarquinius Priscus as well as mother-in-law and promoter of Servius Tullius; and Tullia, daughter of Servius Tullius and wife of Tarquinius Superbus. Both of them want to have their share of power and make sure that the next king is the one they favour. After the death of her husband, Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, Tanaquil cooperates with Servius Tullius (Zonar. 7.9.1–6). She helps him achieve power under the condition that he would make her sons kings when they come of age. So Tanaquil pretends that her husband, the king Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, is still alive and gives a speech to the people in which she claims that the king wants Servius Tullius to manage the public weal for the present, so that he can become healthy again. Only much later when Tullius has already shown that he can manage the public affairs well does he reveal the death of Lucius Tarquinius Priscus and openly take possession of the kingdom. But the king who rose to power thanks to his mother-in-law is later deprived of it by his own daughter who conspires with her sister's husband, Tarquinius Superbus, Tullius' son-in-law and son of Lucius Tarquinius Priscus. Tullia first kills her husband, Tarquinius Superbus'

¹⁶ For the importance of Julia Domna and Julia Maesa for Severan representation cf. Hekster 2015, 143–159, who mentions parallels between Julia Domna and Livia (146), Julia Domna and Agrippina (148), and Julia Domna and Faustina (153).

¹⁷ For the depiction of Julia Domna in Cassius Dio and its moralising functions cf. Mallan 2013; cf. also Mallan 2014, 764–765.

brother, to be free of him. Then she arranges a plot with Tarquinius Superbus against her father. She is even said to have driven a chariot over her father's dead body (Zonar. 7.9.13–17).¹⁸

A reader of the early third century may compare the portrayal of these regal women striving for power with the portrayal of Livia or Agrippina, although their relationships with their imperial sons are much worse.¹⁹ But more contemporary empresses would come to mind too—women whom Dio consciously and deliberately depicts in excessively prominent roles they enjoy. When Marcus Aurelius has fallen ill, his wife Faustina—also the daughter of his predecessor Antoninus Pius—is afraid that her husband might die and that the throne would then not be given to her young and simple-minded son Commodus, but to an outsider (72[71].22.2). She worries about her own position. Therefore she induces the Roman general Avidius Cassius to make preparations so that in the case of Marcus Aurelius' death, he might obtain her as wife and the imperial power. Similarly, Dio's Julia Domna, another mother of a scarcely pleasing son, grieves for Caracalla's death merely because this means that she has to return to private life (ὅτι αὐτὴ ἰδιωτεύουσα ἤχθετο, 79[78].23.1). Dio even claims that she hoped to become sole ruler to make herself equal to Semiramis and Nitocris (79[78].23.3).²⁰

The portrayal of women and successions of monarchs is connected with the depiction of genealogies (family relationships) and the literary creation of typologies (character or structural relationships). Dio's description of the imperial age shows a clear interest in both genealogies and typologies. After a non-hereditary period of the Roman Empire (with the exception of Commodus being Marcus Aurelius' own son) genealogy becomes a crucial issue for the Severan dynasty again. Dio's Septimius Severus is depicted as searching for a father (cf. 77[76].9.4) and finally styles himself as the brother of Commodus (76[75].7.4).²¹ Caracalla, to whom Dio has referred as "Antoninus" in the narrative depicting his lifetime, is never mentioned by this name in the narrative after his death. In a kind of literary *damnatio*

¹⁸ The story of Tullia inciting Tarquinius Superbus to go after her father's (and his father-in-law's) kingdom is also told by Ovid (*Fasti* 6.587–610). In Valerius Maximus, Tullia is mentioned as the first example of *dicta improba aut facta scelerata* (9.11.1).

¹⁹ For Livia's high position under Tiberius see e.g. 57.12.1–6, for Agrippina under Nero see e.g. 61.3.3–4; 61.7.1–3

²⁰ For Semiramis and Nitocris as symbols of female power cf. 62.6.2–3: Dio there has his Boudicca construct a disgraceful genealogy of Nero: she depicts him as a woman, and puts him in a series together with Nitocris, Semiramis, Messalina, and Agrippina. On Julia Domna's interest in Semiramis cf. Moscovich 2004, 366.

²¹ For Septimius Severus approaching an Antonine genealogy cf. Gleason 2011, 56.

memoriae, the people, so Dio says, refuse to use the name that expresses Caracalla's place in his dynasty and genealogy and call him "Bassianus", "Caracallus", and "Tarautas" instead (cf. 79[78].9.3).²² Thus Cassius Dio shows how genealogies can be constructed and deconstructed both in reality and in texts. Even more important for his version of contemporary history than family relationships are similarities between the emperors based on their understanding of the imperial role. Commodus, Caracalla, and Elagabalus are shown as not resembling the figures they claim to resemble (e.g. Augustus or Alexander the Great), but as incorporating character traits from Caligula, Nero, and Domitian.²³ The emperors are thought of in types, not in personalities.²⁴

The same is true for the kings depicted in the first two books. The sons of Aeneas are presented in genealogical order (Zonar. 7.1.6–8; Tzet., *ad Lyc.* v. 1232) since descent from Aeneas is crucial. The first two kings, Romulus and Numa, figure as two different types of kings, namely the king of war (τὰ πολεμικά) and the king of peace (τὰ εἰρηνικά, F 6.6). While the third king Tullus Hostilius is said to have followed Romulus (Zonar. 7.6.1), the fourth king, Ancus Marcius who pursues war only as a means of peace (Zonar. 7.7.3), supposedly resembled his grandfather Numa in his reverence for the gods (Zonar. 7.7.5). At least in the epitomes, the first four kings thus appear as two pairs of opposites (Romulus and war/Numa and peace) and their repetition (Tullus Hostilius and war/Ancus Marcius and peace). The next and last three kings, Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, Servius Tullius, and Tarquinius Superbus, are all part of the same family, connected by the women and their doings mentioned above. Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, at the beginning of this dynasty, is an ambiguous figure (F 9.1–4). The relationship between him and his successor, who is also his son-in-law and promoted by his wife, resembles the relationship between Augustus, Tiberius, and Livia.²⁵ As the description of the last king, Tarquinius Superbus, recalls that of Romulus (e.g. Zonar. 7.10.1), Dio comes full circle and ends the period of Roman kingship as it began. The order and general characterisation of the kings are, of course, not an invention by Dio.²⁶ But it is highly

²² See also Gleason 2011, 66.

²³ See Schulz 2014, 427–430.

²⁴ See also Kemezis 2014, 140, 143.

²⁵ Cassius Dio has people say that Livia secured Tiberius' rule even against the will of Augustus (57.3.3). He also has her declare herself that she made Tiberius emperor (57.12.3). Cf. Agrippina claiming the same thing for Nero (61.7.3).

²⁶ Cf. Forsythe 2005, 93–108, on the ancient literary tradition about the Roman kings.

probable that due to the similarities just mentioned, he found these characters especially appealing when he could compare them with imperial and contemporary times.

The Discourse of the Good Ruler

Another contemporary discourse that must have triggered Cassius Dio's interest in early Roman kingship is the one about the definition of the good emperor. I have mentioned above that the shift from the Antonine to the Severan dynasty, which included the civil war with Pertinax, Didius Julianus, and Clodius Albinus, resulted in renewed tensions between emperors and elite, and raised new questions about imperial behaviour and acceptable forms of representation. These questions are part of the discourse that negotiates the definition of a good ruler and his opposite.²⁷ When we look at that discourse in Dio, we can see that his conception of the good monarch and the bad tyrant in imperial times is foreshadowed in his depiction of early Roman kings.

Cassius Dio states that the business of kingship demands, more than any other job, not only an excellent character, but also understanding and experience (ὅτι τὸ τῆς βασιλείας πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἀρετῆς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ συνηθείας, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο, πολλῆς δεῖται), and he argues that only the king who possesses these qualities can show moderation (καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐστὶν ἄνευ ἐκείνων ἀψάμενόν τινα σωφρονῆσαι, F 12.9). An example of a leader in the regal period who comes close to these requirements and who is considered as good by Dio is the early king Lucius Tarquinius Priscus. Dio describes a clear change of his behaviour at the moment when his predecessor Ancus Marcius dies. During Marcius' lifetime, however, Lucius Tarquinius Priscus appears to be the perfect candidate for rule. To illustrate in what way the depiction of a (potentially) good king overlaps with Dio's contemporary discourse about the good emperor, we can compare the portrayal of Lucius Tarquinius Priscus with the qualities of Dio's Marcus Aurelius, and point out how the themes that they raise play out in other emperors, e.g. Domitian, Pertinax, and Septimius Severus. Marcus Aurelius was the historian's favourite emperor: according to the historian, he did not only possess all the virtues, but also ruled better than any other in any position of power (72[71].34.2).²⁸

²⁷ See Schulz 2016, 295–296.

²⁸ For Marcus Aurelius as Dio's ideal emperor cf. Kemezis 2012, 387; Scott 2015, 160–161, 170, 175. For Dio's idea of the ideal emperor cf. also the catalogues of virtues in Fechner 1986, 249; Kuhn-Chen 2002, 243.

Lucius Tarquinius Priscus and Marcus Aurelius are both portrayed as excellent and as generous (F. 9.1–3; 72[71].32.3; 72[71].34.4). In order to structure the narrative of the acts and behaviour of a monarch, Dio employs the standard distinctions between peace and war, and between cases of success and of failure. Dio obviously considers it difficult for a human being to be excellent in the arts of both war and peace (έν έκατέροις άμα τοϊς τε πολεμικοϊς και τοϊς ειρηνικοϊς πράγμασιν άρετην έχειν, F 18.2). The emperor Pertinax, who for Dio comes quite close to Marcus Aurelius, is explicitly described as competent in both (άμφότερα κράτιστος όμοϊως έγένετο, φοβερός μέν πολεμησαι σοφός δε ειρηνευσαι ών, “[Pertinax] excelled equally in both respects, being formidable in war and shrewd in peace”, 75[74].5.6). Marcus Aurelius, the philosopher king, is styled as a successful military leader too.²⁹ To look at some more examples, the king Ancus Marcius, mild by nature, has to realise that in order to achieve or retain peace, aggressiveness may be necessary and hence he changes his policy when he acquires power (F 8.1; cf. Zonar. 7.7.1).³⁰ In the surviving text, Lucius Tarquinius Priscus is depicted as exemplary in cases of success as well as of failure (F 9.2). If something goes well he ascribes the responsibility not to himself, but to other people, and he places the positive effects within the reach of the public for anyone who desires them. When encountering setbacks or other problems, however, he never lays them to the charge of anyone else and he does not attempt to divide the blame. Dio’s Domitian, one of the worst emperors in his narrative, does the exact opposite. He claims all the success for himself, even if he does not contribute to it, and he blames other people for his own failures and defeats (67.6.4).

The relationship of the monarch’s achievements, his successes and failures, with the way he presents them to his subjects is crucial to Dio’s assessment of his emperors and obviously also of his kings. From a clearly senatorial perspective, Dio prefers a monarch who presents himself in a position that is lower than his actual one, a monarch who is manifestly modest.³¹ In this respect, Marcus Aurelius is again exemplary. He is already loved by everyone for his virtues when Hadrian adopts him, but he does not become haughty, stays loyal, gives no offence, and honours others who were foremost in the state (και τοϋς άλλους

²⁹ See e.g. Cass. Dio 72[71].3.1² and 72[71].35.6.

³⁰ Also Sulla’s behaviour changes dramatically after the Colline Gate: “But after this event he changed so much that one would not say his earlier and his later deeds were those of the same person.” (F 109.2) Dio obviously uses the depiction of the handling of power not only to evaluate kings and emperor, but also for great Republican statesmen.

³¹ For modesty as a virtue in Dio cf. Kuhn-Chen 2002, 149–152.

τοὺς πρῶτους ἀνεπαχθῶς ἐτίμησεν, 72[71].35.3). Similarly, Lucius Tarquinius Priscus is initially accepted as leader and deemed agreeable, because he does not get presumptuous when he takes measures from which he could derive strength, and even humbles himself despite his prominent position (αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι πάντα ἀφ' ὧν ἰσχύειν ἔμελλε πράττων οὐκ ἐξεφρόνει, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πρῶτος ὧν συνεστέλλετο, F 9.2).

The image of the ruler who presents himself as modest is complemented by the depiction of his generous and mild treatment of others, including enemies. Again, Marcus Aurelius is pictured as extremely beneficent (e.g. 72[71].34.3). He offends no one and does nothing amiss, neither voluntarily nor even involuntarily (72[71].34.3). Successful people receive honours from him (72[71].3.5), and he even treats his most stubborn foes humanely (72[71].14.1; see also 72[71].27.3²). The early Lucius Tarquinius Priscus is in this respect quite similar. Although he undertakes all the laborious tasks, as mentioned above, he willingly gives the pleasures to others, and obtains himself either nothing or only little, which then happens unnoticed (τῶν δὲ δὴ ἡδέων τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἐθελοντῆς παρεχώρει καὶ [γὰρ] αὐτὸς ἢ οὐδὲν ἢ ὀλίγα, καὶ ταῦτα λανθάνων, ἐκαρπούτο, F 9.2). He does not say or do anything unkind to anyone, and does not on purpose become someone's enemy (φαῦλον δὲ <τι> ἐς οὐδένα οὔτε ἔλεγεν οὔτε ἔπραττεν, οὐδὲ ἐς ἀπέχθειαν ἐκὼν οὐδενὶ καθίστατο, F 9.3). He exaggerates the favours that he receives from others, and he either ignores or minimises unpleasant treatment. If someone offends him, he even confers kindnesses on the offender to win him over completely (F 9.3).

But Lucius Tarquinius Priscus does not stick to this behaviour when he comes to power himself. In this point, he is fundamentally different from Marcus Aurelius, who shows himself pure and excellent from the beginning to the end (72[71].30.2). Tarquinius' change and deterioration has an enormous effect on the understanding of trust among human beings in Dio's narrative (F 9.4). Dio claims that by his subsequent behaviour (ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἔπειτα) Lucius Tarquinius Priscus brought it about that the majority of men were not trusted anymore (ἀπιστεῖσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν), either because men are truly deceitful by nature (ὡς ἦτοι δολεροῦς φύσει ὄντας) or because they change their disposition according to their power and fortunes (ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς τε τύχας καὶ τὴν γνώμην ἀλλοιουμένους). This is a very strong contention that puts emphasis on the distrust stemming from character change or change of behaviour. There is no similar statement in Livy referring to Lucius Tarquinius Priscus. In Dionysius he is even praised explicitly for his conduct both

before he became king and during his kingship.³² The change of behaviour and its enormous negative social results thus appear as even more significant in Cassius Dio's narrative. A contemporary reader of Dio might here recall another story of a change of behaviour accompanying the acquisition of power that we learn about more than 70 books later. Septimius Severus, the emperor whose rise to power inspired Cassius Dio to finally write the *Roman History* (73[72].23.1–5), likewise shocks the senators after his victory in the war against Clodius Albinus by his sudden reverence of Commodus and his autocratic behaviour (76[75].7.4). The idea that a reader in the third century may have compared Lucius Tarquinius Priscus to Septimius Severus here is supported by more structural similarities between the king and the emperor: both of them are not from Rome, but from areas that had not produced emperors so far (Etruria and Africa); both of them have to fight with rivals for their position; and both of them stand, together with their strong wives, at the beginning of a new dynasty.³³ The later Lucius Tarquinius Priscus and especially his son, Tarquinius Superbus, act and think very similarly to Dio's typically bad emperors. Their reigns are often characterised by an atmosphere of fear and hate.³⁴ The fear is usually two-sided. So Dio's Commodus is not only feared (73[72].20.2; 21.1), he is also himself the greatest coward who at times becomes terrified (73[72].13.6). The king Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, even after he side-lined his rivals, the sons of Ancus Marcius, still feels anxious, and strengthens himself in the senate (Zonar. 7.8.6). Tarquinius Superbus and his wife live in fear of other people after their murder of Servius Tullius, and therefore the king surrounds himself with body-guards in the manner of Romulus (Zonar. 7.10.1). Body-guards, a typical feature of the Greek tyrant already, are also a prevailing topic in imperial times as we can learn from Dio's negative discussion of Septimius Severus' body-guards (75[74].2.4–6).³⁵

³² After praising Tarquinius' character in general, Dionysius explains that he became the most illustrious of all Romans during Marcius' lifetime, and that after the king's death—when Dio asserts the change of behaviour—he was considered worthy of the kingship by all (καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἐκείνου τῆς βασιλείας ὑπὸ πάντων ἄξιός ἐκρίθη, D.H. *AR* 3.49.1). So Dionysius also differentiates between the time before and after his acquisition of kingship, but he explicitly claims that Tarquinius stayed the same.

³³ For the different question whether the historical Tarquinius is to be put at the beginning of a new phase of Roman history see Cornell 1995, 127–130.

³⁴ For fear as typical of the relationship between emperor and senators cf. Gowing 1992, 21–22.

³⁵ Regarding Septimius Severus, however, the criticism focuses on another aspect of the body-guards, namely their origin.

Different from good monarchs who, as we have seen, style themselves as modest, Dio's bad emperors and kings apply autocratic forms of representation. We may look at the example of Commodus, the emperor under whom Dio entered the senate.³⁶ Commodus orders that Rome should be called *Commodiana*, gives his name to the legions and to the day that he ordered these measures; he wants Rome to be regarded as his settlement; he has a heavy golden statue erected representing himself with a bull and a cow; he names all the months after himself, to indicate, so Dio says, that in every respect he absolutely surpassed all mankind. Dio interprets these eccentric forms of representation as indications of the superlative madness of an abandoned wretch (οὕτω καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐμεμήνει τὸ κάθαρμα, 73[72].15.2–4). Along similar lines, among the eccentric forms of Lucius Tarquinius Priscus' representation, Dio mentions a triumph in which a four-horse chariot was paraded and twelve *lictors* that he kept for life (Zonar. 7.8.7). He is also said to have altered his raiment and his insignia to a more magnificent style, as a reaction to the fear he feels after his forced acquisition of power. The new habitus consists of a toga and a tunic, purple and gold, a precious golden crown, and an ivory sceptre and chair (Zonar. 7.8.7). The explicit addition that these elements of monarchic representation were later used not only by his successors but also by the emperors (Zonar. 7.8.7) may be the epitomator's or Dio's own. In any case, Dio's contemporary readers, whose attention Dio frequently directs to the eccentric dress of emperors (see e.g. 73[72].17.3–4 for Commodus), will have recognised the imperial elements here. When Lucius Tarquinius Priscus' forms of representation and actions are referred to as innovations (Zonar. 7.8.8) we have to keep in mind that Dio is in general critical of innovations.³⁷

It is a standard reproach of tyrannical regimes that they kill and banish a lot of innocent people. This motif becomes more forceful when reasons for the emperors' or kings' murders are given and prove to be vain and unsuitable or inappropriate. In Dio, many people die under bad regimes because of their excellence and their virtues. Dio's Commodus kills people (openly and secretly) who were eminent during his father's and his own reign (73[72].4.1). He puts the two Quintilii to death because they have a great reputation for

³⁶ Cf. Dio's statement about his status as eyewitness in 73[72].4.2.

³⁷ This is implicitly suggested e.g. by his positive description of Cato's opposition to innovation (38.3.1), and by his statement on Elagabalus' innovations in 80[79].8.1 that are described as not too harmful. Political change in general is described as dangerous (πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ μεταβολαὶ σφαλερώταταί εἰσι) and sensible people are therefore said to avoid change and to choose to remain under the same forms of governments, even if they be not the best (διὸ οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ, κἂν μὴ βέλτιστα ἦ, ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμμένειν, F 12.3a).

learning, military skill, brotherly accord, and wealth (73[72].5.3). Caracalla is depicted as holding people in contempt who possess anything like education (78[77].11.2) and, to give a general impression of his dislike of virtue, as hating all who excelled in anything (78[77].11.5). The reasons given for Tarquinius Superbus' murders are similar. People are put to death and banished because they love his predecessor Servius Tullius more than him, because they have family, wealth, or spirit, and display conspicuous bravery and extraordinary wisdom (ὅτι γένη καὶ πλούτους ἢ καὶ φρόνημα εἶχον, ἀνδρεία τε ἐπιφανεῖ ἢ καὶ σοφία διαπρεπεῖ ἐχρῶντο, F 11.3). In the narrative, Tarquinius Superbus' disapproving attitude towards these positive character elements is underlined by the fact that his reign is brought down by Brutus, a man who feigned stupidity in order to survive (F 11.10)—a connection that is not made as clearly in Livy or Dionysius.³⁸ There is even a striking parallel between two scenes in which tyrants execute a symbolic beheading: Tarquinius Superbus announces death by the beheading of poppies (Zonar. 7.10.8);³⁹ Commodus threatens the senate by his beheading of an ostrich (73[72].21.1–2).⁴⁰

Such behaviour can be considered as an extreme form of tyrannical communication. It is indicative of the communicative system of monarchical rule as perceived by Cassius Dio (and similarly by Tacitus): emperors are in control of communication; they communicate also by symbolic acts, such as attending the theatre, organising dinners, accepting honours offered to them by the senate; and the senate depends on their policy of communicating information. Dio himself laments that, compared to Republican times, information is inaccessible or, if made public, unverifiable under the emperors (53.19.1–6). He evaluates emperors also by their way of communicating and their accessibility: Tiberius is explicitly evaluated for his communication skills and accessibility (e.g. negatively in 57.6.3; positively in 57.7.1–6; 57.11.1); Vitellius and Caracalla are evaluated for their accessibility during imperial dinners (64[65].7.1; 78[77].18.4), important platforms for communication. Also the king Tarquinius Superbus is judged by his communicative behaviour: he does not pursue his aims openly and

³⁸ In Livy (1.56.7–8) Brutus' simulation is mainly motivated by his social, family, and financial status, and there is no direct statement about Tarquinius Superbus' hatred of wise people. In Dionysius (4.68.2; 69.1–2) the narrator explains that feigning stupidity saved Brutus from suffering any harm in a time when many good people died. Tarquinius Superbus is said to have despised Brutus for his stupidity, and to have considered it entertaining to laugh at him.

³⁹ The story also features in Livy (1.54.6) and is similarly told of the tyrant Periander in Herodotus (*Hist.* 5.92ζ–η1).

⁴⁰ For this scene cf. Hose 2011, 117; Beard 2014, 1–8.

he communicates nothing of importance, even to the senators he had not killed so far (οὔτε τοῖς καταλοίποις λόγου τι ἄξιον ἐπεκοίνου, F 11.5). It is difficult to get access to him and to talk to him (δυσπρόσοδός τε καὶ δυσπροσήγορος ἦν, F 11.6).⁴¹ He is thus the opposite of the good emperor Pertinax who is easy of access, listens readily to anyone's requests, and answers by giving his own opinion in a kind way (καὶ γὰρ εὐπροσήγορος ἦν, ἤκουέ τε ἐτοίμως ὅ τι τις ἀξιοίη, καὶ ἀπεκρίνετο ἀνθρωπίνως ὅσα αὐτῷ δοκοίη, 74[73].3.4).

The literary creation of bad emperors in the imperial books is accompanied by certain rhetorical devices.⁴² Lastly, I would like to show through the example of three such devices that Dio applies these techniques in his books on the Regal Period too, which adds to the unity of the work on a literary level. One device that Dio employs to create persuasive depictions of bad rulers is focalisation. Looking into the bad ruler's head and recreating his view of events supports his wickedness as depicted in the narrative by the narrator and other figures featuring in it. So Tarquinius Superbus is shown as having the same opinion of himself as that presented by the narrator. He considers himself a tyrant when he wants to abolish the senate because in his view, every gathering of men is hostile to a tyrant (πολεμιώτατον τυράνῳ νομίζων εἶναι, F 11.4).⁴³ He also believes that he is hated by the entire populace (F 11.4). When the narrator presents Tarquinius Superbus' reasons for killing and banishing the wealthy, spirited, brave, and wise people, he makes the king acknowledge his own difference from their virtues as he is suspicious that their dissimilarity of character must force them to hate him (φθόνῳ τε καὶ ὑποψία ἅμα μίσους ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίηθους ἔφθειρεν, F 11.3). Tarquinius Superbus here foreshadows Dio's Commodus who gets rid of two brothers because their great reputation for learning, military skill, brotherly accord, and wealth makes them suspect to him (73[72]5.3).

A second device applied by Dio, when describing death and banishment under Tarquinius Superbus, is that of climax (F 11.2–4). First we learn about his arresting the most influential of the senators and others citizens, his putting many to death, and banishing some. Second, this killing is augmented by Dio saying that he slew all his closest friends. Third and finally, his murders are so effective that he does away with the most powerful element among

⁴¹ Mallan 2014, 762, compares Dio's own experience with Caracalla in Nicomedia (78[77].17.3).

⁴² I analyse these rhetorical mechanisms in greater depth in my habilitation (in progress) on the deconstruction of imperial representation in Roman historiography and biography.

⁴³ Dio uses the term τυράννος in a clearly negative way to refer to a ruler with excessive power (with the exception of 42.4.3 where the term appears in a citation of Sophocles), see Freyburger-Galland 1997, 134. So, strictly speaking, Dio's Tarquinius Superbus here thinks negatively of himself.

the senators and the knights. The climactic structuring of the text, more by rubrics than chronologically, is a standard device in the imperial books. We find the climactic structuring of the text by social groups again, for example, in the description of Domitian's reign: in a section about death at events organised by Domitian, Dio presents Domitian's behaviour towards the people first (67.8.2–4), then his behaviour towards senators and knights (67.9.1–5).

A third and final literary device that is also used in the depiction of both the regal and the imperial period is the involvement of nature in the narrative. In Dio, natural forces sometimes stand and fight against bad rulers. For example, when Dio's Nero plans to murder Agrippina by a manipulated ship on the sea but the plan is not successful, Dio ascribes this to the sea that did not want to endure the tragedy that was to be enacted on it, nor submit to be liable to the false charge of having committed the abominable deed (62[61].13.3). And when Dio's Romulus is, unlike Livy's first king (1.16.1–4)⁴⁴, killed by the senators in the senate-house, nature seems to support this murder: "They were favoured in their desire for concealment by a violent wind storm and an eclipse of the sun,—the same sort of phenomenon that had attended his birth" (F 6.1^{aa}). Nature's revenge against the king Amulius, who presented himself as a god during his lifetime, (Zonar. 7.1.8) was already mentioned above (§2): he dies from a sudden overflow of the lake beside his palace.

The Regal Period as 'Hot' Senatorial Memory

This analysis of the discourse of the good ruler has touched upon several passages in Dio in which the relationship of the emperor or king and the senate was described; more can be further explored. Unlike Dionysius and Livy, Dio, who was consul under Septimius Severus and Severus Alexander, considers the emperors' behaviour towards the senate as the main category of judgement. But this relationship is also a topic in Dio's depiction of the regal period in which it is used as a device to evaluate the kings.⁴⁵ So, the first reaction of the anxious Lucius Tarquinius Priscus after his acquisition of power and change of behaviour is that he wants to strengthen his position in the senate. By enrolling those of the populace who

⁴⁴ Plutarch expresses uncertainty about Romulus' death (Plut. *Rom.* 27.3); Dionysius presents the murder in the senate-house as one of several versions of events (2.56.1–7, esp. 4).

⁴⁵ Cf. Mallan's analysis of Dio's narrative of the rape of Lucretia, which is framed "in terms of the persecution of the senatorial elite" (Mallan 2014, 762).

are friendly towards him among the patricians and senators, Dio's Lucius Tarquinius Priscus brings people and senate under his control (Zonar. 7.8.6). In the narrative, a ruler who feels anxious about his position reacts by treating the senate badly and by diminishing its power.

Tarquinius Superbus is depicted as extreme in this behaviour. Convinced that no one else should have any power (F 11.6), Dio's Tarquinius Superbus treats the senators with humiliation and contempt. When he calls them, so Dio writes, it is only to give them proof of their small numbers (F 11.5):

συνεκάλει μὲν γὰρ αὐτούς, οὐ μὴν ὥστε καὶ συνδιοικεῖν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρὸς τε τὸν ἔλεγχον τῆς ὀλιγότητός σφω καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ταπεινότητα καὶ καταφρόνησιν ἐξεπίτηδες ἐποίει.

He used to call the senators together, to be sure, yet it was not to gain their assistance in the conduct of any important business; nay, this very act was designed to furnish a proof of their small numbers and thereby to bring humiliation and contempt upon them.

Similarly, in the climax describing Tarquinius Superbus' murders (and banishments), the senators are the first to be mentioned in the first element of the climax (τοὺς δυνατωτάτους πρῶτον μὲν τῶν βουλευτῶν ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συλλαμβάνων, "first ... the most influential of the senators and next some of the other citizens", F 11.2) and the first in the last group as well (καὶ τούτου τὸ κράτιστον τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τῆς ἰππάδος ἀπανάλωσεν, "so he made away with the most powerful element among the senators and the knights", F 11.4). Finally, Dio's Tarquinius Superbus plans to abolish the senate altogether (F 11.4). When Dio here characterises the senate from Tarquinius' perspective as a "gathering of men, particularly of chosen persons who possessed some semblance of authority from antiquity", this sounds almost like a Severan definition (πᾶν ἄθροισμα ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπιλέκτων καὶ πρόσχημα προστατείας τινὸς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ ἐχόντων).

With his hostile policy towards the senate, the last king Tarquinius Superbus recalls the first, Romulus. Dio's Romulus also behaves harshly towards the senate and like a tyrant (ὅτι ὁ Ῥωμύλος πρὸς τὴν γερουσίαν τραχύτερον διέκειτο καὶ τυραννικώτερον αὐτῇ προσεφέρετο, F 5.11). After returning the hostages to the Veientes on his own responsibility and not by common consent, as was usually done, he receives a number of unpleasant remarks, to which he answers: "I have chosen you, Fathers, not that you may rule me, but that

I might have you to command” (“ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ πατέρες, ἐξελεξάμην οὐχ ἵνα ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἄρχητε, ἀλλ’ ἵνα ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐπιτάττωμι”, F 5.11). Cassius Dio’s contemporary emperor Didius Julianus sounds similar when he comes to the senate after the soldiers made him emperor “in order that you may ratify what has been given to me by them” (ἵνα μοι τὰ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων δοθέντα ἐπικυρώσητε, 74[73].12.4). But Didius Julianus does at least ask the senators, though only after the soldiers. Romulus’ behaviour is different towards different groups. He is good in military campaigns and kindly disposed to his soldiers, but his attitude towards the senate and the citizens is arrogant (F 6.1^{aa}). Dio depicts the problems of his time along similar lines. Septimius Severus is shown to trust more in his soldiers than in his associates in the government (75[74].2.3).⁴⁶ Regarding the senators, Dio’s Septimius Severus claims that he will not kill any senator (ἐσελθὼν δὲ οὕτως ἐνεανιεύσατο μὲν οἷα καὶ οἱ πρόην ἀγαθοὶ αὐτοκράτορες πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡς οὐδένα τῶν βουλευτῶν ἀποκτενεῖ, “Having entered the city in this manner, he made us some brave promises, such as the good emperors of old have given, to the effect that he would not put any senator to death”, 75[74].2.1). But then Severus goes on to act entirely differently (πρῶτος μέντοι αὐτὸς τὸν νόμον τουτονὶ παρέβη καὶ οὐκ ἐφύλαξε, πολλοὺς ἀνελών, “Yet he himself was the first to violate this law instead of keeping it, and made away with many senators”, 75[74].2.2). Again, Septimius Severus is depicted as a promising emperor who builds up trust in the senate but who ultimately fails to live up to his initial promises.

This strong senatorial perspective adds once more to the unity of the work and supports the reading of the regal period as an integral part of the *Roman History*. The most important discourse that determines Dio’s account of both the regal and imperial period is the discourse about the good ruler, presented from the perspective of a senator. The virtues of good emperors, such as modesty, clemency, and reliability, are also the virtues of good kings.⁴⁷ The elements of bad principates such as fear, autocratic representation, vain reasoning and lack of communication characterise bad kingships too. The surviving text is too fragmentary and epitomated to see how similarly to single emperors Dio depicted his individual kings. What we do recognise, however, is that Dio’s early Lucius Tarquinius Priscus is relatively close to his Marcus Aurelius and Dio’s concept of a good monarch,

⁴⁶ For Dio’s biased depiction of the Severans and their relationship with the soldiers see Davenport 2012, 798, 803–808, 815.

⁴⁷ For the status and functions of imperial virtues in general see Wallace-Hadrill 1981, who underlines that there was no generally accepted ‘canon’ of virtues. For *modestia/moderatio* (restraint of power) cf. Wallace-Hadrill 1982, 41–43, who also briefly discusses this virtue as a Roman pattern in Cassius Dio (44).

whereas the later Lucius Tarquinius Priscus and especially Tarquinius Superbus foreshadow Dio's bad emperors such as Commodus and Caracalla, but also Caligula, Nero, and Domitian. The change of behaviour of Lucius Tarquinius Priscus and the distrust this caused among the senators prepares ground for Dio's later description of Septimius Severus.⁴⁸ I do not deem it improbable that more parallels between the two founders of dynasties were further developed in the original text.

Dio writes about Rome's early kings from the perspective of a similarity of political structures which naturally invites his reader to compare contemporary times with the origin of the Roman monarchy. He is thus different from Dionysius who, as stated at the beginning, depicts the Regal Period as the civilised Greek origin of Rome and her virtues, and from Livy whose Regal Period is a stage in the development towards Republican liberty. Where Dionysius sees continuity and Livy development, Cassius Dio emphasises similarity. The senator Dio is less concerned with the relationship between Rome and Greece (as in Dionysius)⁴⁹ and less with the relationship of kings and people or senate and people (as in Livy)⁵⁰, than with the relationship of senate and emperors or kings. The focus of the Augustan writers composing their works under a Principate that was just about to establish itself is not the same as Dio, who lived in a 200 year old monarchical system that he accepted and favoured. Looking for answers to the political issues of his time also influenced his perspective on Rome's first monarchy. Thus in Dio's *Roman History*, the Regal Period is not simply copied from sources and remembered purely for its own sake. It is, to borrow a term from cultural memory studies, 'hot memory',⁵¹ memory that uses the depiction of a shared (imagined or 'real') past to contribute to the development of present issues and intentions, and to the identity of the social group that remembers—that is, the senators. In Dio's case, the 'hot' memory of the early Roman kings helps to define a good monarch in the third century AD.

⁴⁸ For Septimius Severus in Dio cf. Scott 2015, 172–173; Madsen 2016, 136–158. For Dio's relationship with Septimius Severus (and Caracalla) cf. Davenport 2012, 799–803.

⁴⁹ For Dionysius see Fox 1996, 53, 71, 91.

⁵⁰ For Livy see Fox 1996, 119, 121, 127.

⁵¹ See Assmann 2011, 62–69, who coins this term referring to the concepts of 'cold' and 'hot' societies by Claude Lévi-Strauss (esp. Assmann 2011, 51–53).

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