

Roman Attitudes to Peace in the Late Republican and Early Imperial Periods: from Greek Origins to Contemporary Evidence

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Abstract

Pax Romana is often seen as an aggressive force, imposing the will of Rome on her empire. Perhaps it is because of this that Roman authors are often seen as having a dismissive view of peace and an admiration, if not a love, of war. The only literary area where this has been questioned at any length is in verse, most fully by the elegists. This thesis, therefore, focuses on the concept of peace in the philosophy and historiography of late republican and early imperial Rome, drawing examples from classical Greece and early Christian texts when necessary. The first section acts as an introduction to the possibility of a more positive attitude to peace by examining the most striking negative presentations of war: just war theory and civil wars.

The second section examines the main philosophical schools from the period and argues that the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans share pacifistic views that are not merely utopian but are grounded in important tenets of their respective philosophies: *oikeiosis*, *cosmopolitanism*, and the unimportance of material and physical virtues for the Stoics and Cynics; divine self-sufficiency, the avoidance of pain, and the importance of friendship for the Epicureans. Some even willingly reject more traditionally Roman values, like *gloria*, because they conflicted with the philosophical antipathy to warfare.

An examination of the usages of the terms *pax* and *concordia* in the historians of the time argues that the dominant view, that they were suspicious of peace, is not wholly accurate. Sallust and Livy provide numerous examples that suggest a more open attitude to peace and, at times, even seem to share some of the pacifistic beliefs of the philosophers. Further, even the more militaristic historians can present peace as a state preferable to war.

Acknowledgements

I think many people skip over the acknowledgement when they read a book or thesis, but I've always found them oddly enjoyable, as they are often the only place an academic is able to show something of themselves other than their research. I'm sure, for example, that the final lines of Martha Nussbaum's acknowledgement in *The Therapy of Desire* ("Because the damages caused by anger and hatred in public life cannot be addressed by philosophy alone, the author's proceeds from the sale of this book will be donated to Amnesty International.") meant that I was predisposed to enjoy her book even before seeing the quality of her empirical research and convincing conclusions. Therefore, I hope that in the excitement of being able to write my own I have not forgotten to thank any of the many people who have helped me over the course of my studies.

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Abbreviations Used

Journal Abbreviations

Journal abbreviations used are from *L'Année Philologique*.

<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt</i>
<i>CA</i>	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
<i>CB</i>	<i>Classical Bulletin</i>
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CPh</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
<i>CSCA</i>	<i>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</i>
<i>G&R</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>JHI</i>	<i>Journal of the History of Ideas</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
<i>PBSR</i>	<i>Papers of the British School at Rome</i>
<i>PLLS</i>	<i>Papers of the Leeds Latin Seminar</i>
<i>PVS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Virgil Society</i>
<i>RGDIP</i>	<i>Revue Générale de Droit International Public</i>
<i>TAPhA</i>	<i>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</i>

Author and Text Abbreviations

Author and text abbreviations are based on the system used in the 4th edition of *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*.

App.	Appian		
		B Civ.	<i>Bella civilia</i>
		Sam.	<i>Samnite History</i>
Apul.	Apuleius		
		<i>De Deg. Plat.</i>	<i>De Dogmate Platonis</i>
Arist.	Aristotle		
		<i>Eth. Nic.</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>
		<i>Pol.</i>	<i>Politica</i>
		<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Rhetorica</i>
Asp.	Aspasius		
August.	Augustine		
		<i>De civ. D.</i>	<i>De civitate Dei</i>
Caes.	Caesar		
		BCiv.	<i>Bellum Civile</i>

	<i>BGall.</i>	<i>Bellum Gallicum</i>
Cic.	Cicero (Marcus Tullius)	
	<i>Cat.</i>	<i>In Catilinam</i>
	<i>Fin.</i>	<i>De finibus</i>
	<i>Leg. Agr.</i>	<i>De Lege Agraria</i>
	<i>Off.</i>	<i>De officiis</i>
	<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Orationes Philippicae</i>
	<i>Rep.</i>	<i>De republica</i>
	<i>Verr.</i>	<i>In Verrem</i>
Dio Chrys.	Dio Chrysostom	
	<i>Or.</i>	<i>Orationes</i>
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius	
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius Halicarnassensis	
	<i>Ant. Rom.</i>	<i>Antiquitates Romanae</i>
Epict.	Epictetus	
Epicurus	Epicurus	
	<i>Ep. Hdt</i>	<i>Epistula ad Herodotum</i>
	<i>KD</i>	<i>Principal Doctrines</i>
Eur.	Euripides	
	<i>Hipp.</i>	<i>Hippolytus</i>
	<i>Tro.</i>	<i>Troades</i>
Hom.	Homer	
	<i>Il.</i>	<i>Iliad</i>
	<i>Od.</i>	<i>Odyssey</i>
Hor.	Horace	
	<i>Carm.</i>	<i>Odes</i>
	<i>Epist.</i>	<i>Epistulae</i>
	<i>Epod.</i>	<i>Epodi</i>
	<i>Sat.</i>	<i>Satirae</i>
Iambl.	Iamblichus	
	<i>VP</i>	<i>Vita Pythagorae</i>
Jer.	Jerome Adv.	
	<i>Iov.</i>	<i>Adversus Iovinianum</i>
Luc.	Lucan	
Lucret.	Lucretius	
Muson.	Musonius Rufus	
Ovid	Ovid	
	<i>Met.</i>	<i>Metamorphoses</i>
Philo	Philo Judaeus	
	<i>Agr.</i>	<i>De Agricultura</i>
	<i>Dec.</i>	<i>De Decalogo</i>
	<i>Decal.</i>	<i>De Decalogo</i>
	<i>Her.</i>	<i>Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit</i>
	<i>Op.</i>	<i>De Opificio Mundi</i>
	<i>Pr. Et Poen.</i>	<i>De Praemiis et Poenis</i>
	<i>QG</i>	<i>Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim</i>
	<i>Spec.</i>	<i>De Specialibus Legibus</i>
	<i>Virt.</i>	<i>De Virtutibus</i>
Phld.	Philodemus	
Pl.	Plato	

		<i>Alc.</i>	<i>Alcibiades</i>
		<i>Grg</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
		<i>Leg.</i>	<i>Leges</i>
		<i>Plt.</i>	<i>Politicus</i>
		<i>Prt.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
		<i>Resp.</i>	<i>Respublica</i>
		<i>Ti.</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>
Plin.	Pliny the Elder		
		<i>NH</i>	<i>Naturalis historia</i>
Plut.	Plutarch		
		<i>Comm. Not.</i>	<i>De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos</i>
		<i>Mar.</i>	<i>Marius</i>
		<i>Quaest. conv.</i>	<i>Quaestiones convivales</i>
		<i>Quaest. Rom.</i>	<i>Quaestiones Romanae</i>
		<i>Rom.</i>	<i>Romulus</i>
Sall.	Sallust		
		<i>Cat.</i>	<i>Bellum Catilinae</i>
		<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Historiae</i>
		<i>Iug.</i>	<i>Bellum Iugurthinum</i>
Sen.	Seneca the Younger		
		<i>Aga.</i>	<i>Agamemnon</i>
		<i>Ben.</i>	<i>De beneficiis</i>
		<i>Clem.</i>	<i>De clementia</i>
		<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epistulae</i>
		<i>Herc. Fur.</i>	<i>Hercules Furens</i>
		<i>Med.</i>	<i>Medea</i>
		<i>Oed.</i>	<i>Oedipus</i>
		<i>Pha.</i>	<i>Phaedra</i>
		<i>Phoen.</i>	<i>Phoenissae</i>
		<i>Prov.</i>	<i>De providentia</i>
		<i>Qnat.</i>	<i>Quaestiones naturales</i>
		<i>Thy.</i>	<i>Thyestes</i>
		<i>Tro.</i>	<i>Troades</i>
[Sen.]	Pseudo Seneca the Younger		
		<i>HO</i>	<i>Hercules Oetaeus</i>
Sextus Empiricus	Sextus Empiricus		
		<i>PH</i>	<i>Outlines of Pyrrhonism</i>
Tac.	Tacitus		
		<i>Agr.</i>	<i>Agricola</i>
		<i>Ann.</i>	<i>Annales</i>
		<i>Dial.</i>	<i>Dialogus de oratoribus</i>
		<i>Germ.</i>	<i>Germania</i>
		<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Historiae</i>
Thuc.	Thucydides		
Vell. Pat.	Velleius Paterculus		
Verg.	Virgil		
		<i>G.</i>	<i>Georgics</i>
Xen.	Xenophon		
		<i>Hell.</i>	<i>Hellenica</i>
		<i>Oec.</i>	<i>Oeconomicus</i>

Translations

Unless stated in the footnotes, the following translations have been used.

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Part One – The Political Theory of War and Peace

When examining classical attitudes towards war and peace it is logical to begin with attitudes to war, as it is in this area where the vast majority of previous work has been carried out, although this is still surprisingly sparse when compared to the amount of works on the technical aspects of war. However, in order that the progression can be easily made from war to peace, the idea of the *just war* may prove the best starting point. For the concept of *just war* is often identified as having peculiarly Christian origins¹, and sometimes thought to have only come into being due to the new conditions that arose from the pacifist beliefs of the early Christians and the ethical conflict these beliefs created with the military aspects of Roman imperial life. Therefore, if examples of pre-Christian just war theory can be identified, it may be possible to identify a pre-Christian negativity towards war. It may, then, be possible to also assess whether peace is justified in the same way, if at all, before examining if the theories of either just war or peace are ever realised or considered during the war or peace making decisions. Having established our ideas of just war and just peace, a more specific type of war will be examined, namely, civil war, because in the view of the Romans it is most hated form of armed conflict. Civil war inspired such hatred among the Roman populace that the constitution set out at the start of the republic was laid aside and Rome became willing to once again accept the power of one man over all, as this came to be seen as preferable to the ongoing atrocities of civil war.

Just War and Justification for War

The history of the just war, and particularly just war theory, is often traced back to Saint Augustine of Hippo², although some scholars suggest that its roots are buried slightly deeper in antiquity and associate its birth with the work of Cicero.³ Augustine says that “I know that in the third book of Cicero *De Re Publica*, unless I am mistaken, he argues that war will not be waged by the best city, except in defence of its treaties or its safety” (*scio in libro Ciceronis tertio, nisi fallor, de republica disputari nullum bellum suscipi a ciuitate*

¹ Guthrie & Quinlan 2007; Elshtain 1992; Myers 1996, 115-130, to name just one recent and two of the more prominent works in the area which do not acknowledge the possibility of a pre-Christian just war theory.

² All three works above name Augustine as the originator of just war theory.

³ August. *De civ. D.*, 22. 6; Brunt 1990, 305-308, & Bellamy 2006.

optima, nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute)⁴, so Augustine himself acknowledges the contribution that Cicero made to the topic with which he himself was about to engage. The fact that Augustine refers to his intellectual predecessors means that he was clearly not the first ancient scholar to tackle the moral problems created by war. More important is the fact that Augustine has not mentioned a Christian predecessor but a pagan, who would therefore not have set about his task with the same intention or even the same problems as Augustine himself. Cicero and other classical thinkers were not bound by the New Testament doctrine of ‘turn the other cheek’⁵, and were not trying to consolidate the pacifist views of the early Christians with the military reality of their age. It is necessary, therefore, to examine those cases where justification for war is offered by pre-Augustinian and more importantly pre-Christian classical writers and to draw attention to the consistencies and inconsistencies found therein, as well as to examine the possible reasons for these parallels.

One of the most important elements of Augustinian just war theory is that killing in wars must not occur if that death is the result of revenge. Augustine states one of the real evils in war is revengeful cruelty (*ulciscendi crudelitas*)⁶, and in *De libero arbitrio* Augustine confirms this when he states that killing under command of law is only exempt from sin when committed without ire, desire, joy or in revenge. However in these passages Augustine is referring to *jus in bello* rather than *jus ad bellum* (to use twentieth century terms)⁷, but if the reader was familiar with the principal elements of Augustine’s just war theory⁸, it would probably be fair to assume that “just cause” and “right intent” in the pursuit of war would also not include the justification of revenge. Nonetheless, the reverse of this is, in fact, true. Augustine believes war is just only if it is the result of necessity, but this necessity can include “to avenge injuries...to punish wrongs committed by [the opposing cities’] citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it”.⁹ As Hartigan

⁴ August. *De civ. D.*, 22.6 (adapted from the Loeb edition).

⁵ *Matthew* 5: 38-42 & *Luke* 6:27-31.

⁶ August. *Contra Faustum*, 22.74.

⁷ “*Jus ad bellum* refers to the conditions under which one may resort to war or to force in general; *jus in bello* governs the conduct of belligerents during a war, and in a broader sense comprises the rights and obligations of neutral parties as well.” Although similar concepts can be seen in earlier works *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* were rarely used as twin terms until 1930. These definitions are from Kolb, 1997 553-562, which provides an excellent summary of the history of these concepts and traces their probable origin to Kunz’s 1934 article “Plus de lois de guerre?”

⁸ As best summarised by Turner Johnson (1981, 123) i.e. right authority, just cause, right intent, the prospect of success, proportionality of good to evil, and that it is the last resort.

⁹ August. *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, 6.10; “Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to

states, for Augustine “war is action designed above all else to restore a violated moral order”.¹⁰ Despite the need for restraint at the individual level of combat that Augustine calls for in order to avoid sin, at a governmental level revenge is seen as a perfectly acceptable reason to wage war. Most crucially however, it must be noted that whatever the justification given for going to war, the Augustinian ‘just war’ must only be “waged in a struggle for peace” (*Pacis igitur intentione geruntur et bella*).¹¹

It has been observed above that in *The City of God* Augustine recalls the contributions that Cicero made to the justifications of wars.¹² Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that we find similar views in the philosophical work of Cicero to those expressed by Augustine. Like Augustine, Cicero believes the “only excuse for going to war is that we may live in peace without injury” (*Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur*) and that “War should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that it has no object than to secure peace” (*Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur*).¹³ However, he is not consistent in this matter, as in his earlier work of *De Re Publica* Cicero states that “Those wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defence can actually be just” (*Illa iniusta bella sunt, quae sunt sine causa suscepta. Nam extra ulciscendi aut propulsandorum hostium causam bellum geri iustum nullum potest*).¹⁴ So we find that Cicero also believes that although war should always be fought for peace, and should always be seen to be such, it is also considered a just cause to enter war for the sake of revenge or defence. Therefore on these two crucial elements of just war theory Cicero has preceded Augustine by nearly 450 years.

Cicero does appear to differ in one way from Augustine, however, in that he states “If we desire to enjoy peace we must first wage war; if we shrink from war, we shall never enjoy peace” (*si pace frui volumus, bellum gerendum est; si bellum omittimus, pace numquam fruemur*).¹⁵ Augustine does not put this concept of the inevitability of war to produce peace in such a clear way. If two passages of Augustine are considered together, however, they

punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it.” *Iusta autem bella ea definiuntur, quae ulciscuntur iniurias, si qua gens vel civitas, quae bello petenda est, vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per iniurias ablatum est*

¹⁰ Hartigan 1966, 199.

¹¹ August. *De civ. D.*, 19.12.

¹² *ibid* 22.6.

¹³ Cic. *Off.* 1.23.80 *cf* 1.11.36.

¹⁴ Cic. *Rep.* 3.23.35 = Isidorus *Orig.* 18.1.

¹⁵ Cic. *Phil.* 7.6.19.

can produce a similar conclusion: “by whose labours and dangers, along with the blessing of divine protection and aid, enemies previously unsubdued are conquered, and peace obtained for the State, and the provinces pacified” (*quorum laboribus atque periculis, Dei protegentis atque opitulantis auxilio, hostis indomitus vincitur, et quies reipublicae pacatisque provinciis comparatur*)¹⁶ and “for it is the iniquity of the opposing side that imposes upon the wise man the duty of waging wars” (*Iniquitas enim partis adversae iusta bella ingerit gerenda sapienti*).¹⁷ War then has been imposed upon the wise man by the inequalities within the enemy and therefore, it is he that will need to struggle to pacify the province. For Augustine, then, the inevitability of the failings of men (albeit enemies) means that war becomes inevitable, and this inevitable war must be fought so that this enemy or “province” may be pacified. Even in this area where there was a seeming contradiction between the two authors it can be argued that Cicero and Augustine actually agree that peace may require an undesired war. Why then have they arrived at such similar conclusions with such different conditions placed upon them? And if Cicero can be shown to display a just war theory that pre-dates Augustine, can any other classical author be shown to do so?

It will perhaps be more prudent to tackle the second of these questions first as this may allow us insight into the reasons that led Cicero (and possibly other classical authors) to conclude as they did when addressing the subject of war and morality.

Aristotle’s work also includes many attempts to rationalise morality and war. He describes a life spent in pursuit of leisure and explains that to gain leisure a man must first be busy.¹⁸ Aristotle compares this to peace, saying we “make war so we might live in peace” and he confirms this by stating that “no one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war”.¹⁹ This has clear parallels with the accepted just war theory of Augustine. Aristotle does not say that peace *should* be the only motivation for war as Augustine does, but rather that peace is the true goal of war, and that we must endure one so that we may enjoy the other. Peace, then, is not seen as a justification for war but rather as a welcome reward received after the battles are over, but he does give another reason to go to war. In *Politica* 1.8 Aristotle states: “The art of war is the natural art of acquisition for it includes hunting, an art we ought to practise against wild beasts and against men who, though

¹⁶ August. *Letter 229: to Darius*, 2.

¹⁷ August. *De civ. D.*, 19.7 (adapted from the Loeb edition).

¹⁸ Arist. *Eth. Nic.*, 10.7.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

intended by nature to be governed, will not submit, for war of such a kind is naturally just".²⁰ Here we see a very different sort of justification for war to those discussed above; war for Aristotle is a civilising process at best and a process of subjugation at worst. He believes that a war against 'barbarians' is justified purely because they are beneath concern and are compared with animals, as both are to be hunted and bested, to be engaged in battle before conversation. This idea contains many similarities with the Roman belief that by spreading *pax Romana* through war they were in fact bringing civilisation to the unwitting 'barbarian hordes'.

The Pythagorean Corpus also provides an interesting example when examining justifications for war. In *The Life of Pythagoras* Porphyry claims that Pythagoras was "shocked at all bloodshed and killing; that he not only abstained from animal food, but never in any way approached butchers or hunters".²¹ Even in sacrificing, Pythagoras is said to never have shed blood and to have offered only barley bread. Porphyry says that the accounts of Pythagoras sacrificing an ox after the discovery of his most famous theorem are inaccurate and that although an ox was sacrificed, it was in fact an ox "made of flour".²² This total avoidance of bloodshed and those who made a living from blood stained employment sounds like a view of absolute pacifism, more akin to certain forms of Buddhism than those of the city states of Greece. As such we could expect to find Pythagoras giving no exceptions in reasons to go to war, but rather a blanket ban, similar to those of early Christians. However, this is not the case. Diodorus Siculus records that when five hundred citizens of Sybaris claimed political asylum in Croton, Pythagoras supported war with Sybaris rather than the handing over of the refugees. Instead of breaking the sacred laws of *xenia*, Pythagoras was willing to submit to the rigours of a justified war.²³ Therefore this could be seen as a just war by practical example rather than theory or rhetoric, showing that despite his apparently absolutist values, even Pythagoras sometimes had to try and reconcile his beliefs with the necessity of war.

Returning to revenge as just cause, it is possible to move from philosophy to historiography. In Thucydides, the speech given by Cleon in the Mytilenian debate insists that mercy should be reserved for the merciful and that revenge is a just act when

²⁰ Arist. *Pol.* 8.

²¹ Porphyry *The Life of Pythagoras*, 7.

²² *ibid* 36.

²³ Diodorus Siculus, 12.9.

performed on those who are not merciful.²⁴ Also in Thucydides, Gylippus, the Syracusan, reminds his troops before battle that “it is most just and lawful to claim the right to slake the fury of the soul in retaliation on the aggressor”.²⁵ These two examples show that centuries before Cicero and the systematic theory of just war existed; the Ciceronian belief that revenge was a just cause for the pursuit of war was being used not just as a hypothetical example but as a practical way in which to muster support for an aggressive act. Thucydides also gives more personal reasons for the pursuit of wars: e.g. when an Athenian envoy speaks to the Spartan assembly he says that men go to war for “security, honour and self-interest”²⁶ (sometimes translated as “honour, fear and interest”).²⁷ Perhaps then revenge is considered an appropriate reason to go to war because it allows for the maintenance of honour and the righting of past wrongs. Thucydides also provides an interesting example of the just war thought that war should be entered only to secure peace, which would later become an important tenet of Ciceronian and Augustinian philosophy. When trying to convince the allies of Sparta to declare war with Athens the Corinthian representative states that “war gives peace its security”.²⁸ Therefore, rather than entering war only for the sake of peace, the Corinthian argues that war may be entered for many reasons but the most secure form of peace is found after a successful war has been waged.

It appears that even before Cicero pre-empted Augustine with his own just war theory, philosophers and historians alike were attempting to justify the extreme recourse to war. However, no one created a system as structured and developed as Cicero or Augustine. We must now, therefore, return to the question posed earlier; why have these two men arrived at such similar conclusions with such different conditions placed upon them? Augustine’s reason is well attested as being an attempt to consolidate the pacifist beliefs of the early Christian church with the military demands of the Roman Empire.²⁹ Cicero obviously had neither of these concerns, but perhaps his reasons were not so different. Cicero’s philosophy, although eclectic, was influenced most by Stoicism and as such Cicero

²⁴ Thucydides, 3.40.

²⁵ *ibid*, 7.68.

²⁶ *ibid* 1.76.

²⁷ For example, Bloomfield’s 1829 translation.

²⁸ *ibid* 1.124.

²⁹ See, Lenihan 1988, 37-70; Langan 1984, 19-38 & Hartigan 1966, 195-204, which all agree on this conclusion.

would have been heavily influenced by the Stoic idea of the cosmopolis.³⁰ These Stoic ideals may have caused him to hate all acts of war because they violated this belief. Brunt also believes that it was the stoic influence on Cicero that would have caused him to justify war, stating that in this task Cicero was following and developing the work of Panaetius when he “implied that states as well as individuals should respect the just principle of *suum cuique*”³¹, and that as well as abstaining from unjust acts they should also discourage others from committing such deeds.³² So whereas Augustine was writing to convince the orthodox Christians, who had a natural hatred of war, Cicero may partly have been writing purely for the sake of moral questioning, but also partly to convince himself that the aggressive actions of the republic that he cherished, could be reconciled with his own less militaristic philosophical beliefs.

Therefore, it is apparent that centuries before Augustine, Cicero was concerned with the evils of war and more importantly with how these evils could be excused, either for the good of his own conscience or that of the Republic. It is also evident that before Cicero the speeches placed into the mouths of envoys or generals of multiple nationalities were also used to put forward ways in which their actions could appear to be justified as not only acceptable but essential for either moral or defensive reasons. This need to justify military action is significant as it demonstrates the existence of reluctance either for certain individuals to sanction war or distaste for specific conflicts. It is clear that Cicero and others would not need to justify war unless they recognised it as a negative force.³³

Just Peace, Justifications and Conditions for Peace

Livy often offers *pax* and *bellum* as equally weighted partners in the machinery of the state. Romulus brings Rome “to its strength through war and peace alike” (*non bello ac pace firmandae*), “Ancus reigned twenty-four years, unsurpassed by any of his predecessors in ability and reputation, both in war and peace” (*Regnavit Ancus annos quattuor et viginti, cuilibet superiorum regum belli pacisque et artibus et gloria par*) and Servius Tullius “instituted the census, a most beneficial institution in what was to be a great empire, in

³⁰ For example, Cic. *De Fin* 3.62-8 includes a detailed description of the cosmopolis placed into the mouth of Cicero’s contemporary, Cato. For a detailed discussion of this passage see Richter 2011, 80-86; cf Pangle 1998, 235-262.

³¹ Brunt 1990, 305.

³² Cic. *Off.* 1.20-4.

³³ Cic. *Rep.* 3.23.

order that by its means the various duties of peace and war might be assigned, not as heretofore, indiscriminately, but in proportion to the amount of property each man possessed" (*Censum enim instituit, rem saluberrimam tanto futuro imperio, ex quo belli pacisque munia non viritim, ut ante, sed pro habitu pecuniarum fierent*).³⁴ War and peace are seen as the two possible conditions of the nation; as the light and shade of state, conflicting but inseparable. Consequently, just as the Romans had varying reasons and justifications for war, ranging from the practical to the moral, and as peace can perhaps be seen as the opposite side of the coin of government, it could be expected that a similar approach may be taken with peace, with different authors from different periods offering different conditions for the conclusion of peace.

For instance, if the attainment of peace is a justification for war, then in a society where war is sometimes viewed as a constant, the march to war and (hoped for) consequent victory become a necessity for peace. Augustine is the most pertinent example of this, as it is the one at the forefront of the classical just war theory and its affirmation that war should only be fought with the goal of peace. In his letter to Boniface, Augustine reassures the general that in waging war he is not committing a sin, as he has been forced into his current position by the necessity of war, and thus he must fight this war in order to be a peacemaker (*pacificus*).³⁵ Augustine does, therefore, recognise the paradoxical but essential war that must occur for peace to prevail. This concept can also be seen in one of Augustine's Christian contemporaries, Synesius of Cyrene. In his treatise *On Kingship* he states that "for him alone who is able to inflict injury upon the evil-doer is it given to keep the peace...for if he does not war he will certainly be warred against".³⁶ In Christian doctrine, at least, this concept seems to be firmly established. Thus, for peace to be achieved war must first be waged, or at least a king must be ready to wage war for the sake of peace.

However, just as Cicero was seen as a predecessor to Augustine in his theory of just war, he can also be shown to hold a similar view to his Christian successor in the *seventh Philippic* where he states "if we desire to enjoy peace we must first wage war; if we shrink from war, we shall never enjoy peace" (*si pace frui volumus, bellum gerendum est; si bellum*

³⁴ Livy, 1.15, 1.35 & 1.42.

³⁵ August. *Letter 189: to Boniface*.

³⁶ Synesius, *On Kingship*, 16.

omittimus, pace numquam fruemur).³⁷ Therefore, at this point in his life at least, Cicero had decided that before peace could be enjoyed a war must be fought. Cicero is not the only pre-Christian thinker to note the requirement of war in the pursuit of peace, Thucydides does more than merely observe this prerequisite he actively endorses it; “War gives peace its security, but one is still not safe from danger if, for the sake of quiet, one refuses to fight”.³⁸ Thucydides here suggests that war should actively be sought in order to obtain the most lasting and desired form of peace, whereas Synesius, Augustine and perhaps even Cicero are more passive in their outlook. They have all come to realise that war is inevitable, and, as such, must be contested in order to obtain peace. Thucydides, however, does not see war as inevitable in itself but merely inasmuch as it will yield better results in the long term for the state.

However, Thucydides also offers two further conditions for peace, “in an alliance the only safe guarantee is an equality of mutual fear; for then the party that wants to break faith is deterred by the thought that the odds will not be on his side” and “there can never be a firm friendship between man and man or a real community between different states unless there is a conviction of honesty on both sides”.³⁹ This seems to contradict the earlier presumption that the ideal peace can not exist without there first having been a war. But perhaps these ideas can be reconciled, as the later clarifications could refer to a time after the completion of a war, so that when the terms of peace are concluded these are best concluded in a position of not only mutual trust but also of mutual fear, allowing for the most secure and long lasting peace.

Even as late as the Justinian War, the role of trust in the maintenance of peace is still seen as crucial. In Procopius, a Roman envoy sent to Chosroes describes the importance of oaths and the honouring of oaths in the establishment of trust and therefore peace, and that “hope in treaties is the only thing left to those who are living in insecurity because of the evil deeds of war” and that once trust has been lost there is only “war without end”.⁴⁰

The longest period of peace that Rome was traditionally thought to have enjoyed was not however attained through war, fear or trust, but rather through religious observance. This is the period of the reign of Numa Pompilius, the successor to the throne of Romulus,

³⁷ Cic. *Phil.* 7.19 (adapted from Shackleton Bailey, 2010).

³⁸ Thuc. 1.124.2.

³⁹ Thuc. 3.1 & 3.10.

⁴⁰ Procopius, *Wars of Justinian*, 2.8-9.

during which time the newly built gates of the Temple of Janus were never opened.⁴¹ Augustine, however, rejects this theory and suggests that it was not religious observance that allowed Rome to live in peace at that time but her neighbours who did not attack her during this time⁴², which seems to be a logical conclusion. However, Augustine later goes on to claim that those who show religious observance to God rather than the pagan gods will “be secure in the eternal and highest peace” (*in aeterna et summa pace securo*).⁴³ So Augustine does believe that peace can be granted by divine will and merely rejects the early Roman assumption of this because they were worshipping the incorrect deity. It is also possible that Livy’s contemporaries would not have held the association between reverence towards the old gods and peace to be specious reasoning as a modern secular reader would (and even Augustine seems to have done). When Livy was writing, Augustus was being heralded as the bringer of peace and the restorer of the old gods.⁴⁴ As a result, the connection between religious observance and peace was not one foreign to the Roman populace. Even before Augustus made his claim to have restored religion and peace to Rome it can be seen that Numa was held as an archetype for peace. Cicero says that Augustus instilled in Romans a “love of peace and tranquillity, which enable justice and good faith to flourish most easily” (*amoremque eis otii et pacis iniecit, quibus facillime iustitia et fides conualescit*)⁴⁵, showing that Cicero felt that the Romans not only required justice in their wars but had an innate longing for peace that began with Numa Pompilius.

Pliny the Elder offers another cause for the establishment of peace: the foundation of the imperial rather than republican system of rule. He asks “who would not now admit that now that intercommunication has been established throughout the world by the majesty of the Roman Empire, life has been advanced by the interchange of commodities and by the partnership in the blessing of peace?” and adds that all hopes for the future were “owing to the boundless grandeur of the Roman Peace”.⁴⁶ For Pliny then, it is the empire itself that has provided the conditions for peace. This may be due to the fact that Pliny was himself part of the early empire. Although he would not have remembered the devastating civil

⁴¹ Livy, 1.19; Plutarch, *Life of Numa*, 19 & 20.

⁴² August. *De civ. D.*, 3.9.

⁴³ *ibid* 15.4 (my translation).

⁴⁴ For Augustus as the restorer of peace see Horace, *Carm.* 4.5.17-24, for numerous examples of how Augustus restored the old gods see Carter 1906, 146-184. For Augustus’ own desire to be remembered as the bringer of peace and restorer of religion see the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 13 and 19-21 respectively.

⁴⁵ Cic. *Rep.* 2.16.26.

⁴⁶ Plin. *NH* 14.2.1 & 27.1.3; Aelius Aristides’ 26th oration (*The Encomium on Rome*) which praises the empire for the peace it has created (26.92-106).

war his grandfathers' generation would have, they would recall, aided by the shadow of Augustus' propaganda, that it had been the establishment of the Principate that had restored the golden age of peace. This was a peace not only felt in Rome but in the provinces that had witnessed and suffered first-hand the devastation of civil war.

Zampaglione believes that Seneca, writing during the same period as Pliny also sees peace as a result of the imposition of Roman laws and customs when Seneca says "Consider all the tribes whom Roman peace does not reach – I mean the Germans and all the nomad tribes that assail us along the Danube" (*Omnes considera gentes in quibus Romana pax desinit, Germanos dico et quicquid circa Histrum vagarum gentium occursat*).⁴⁷ However, it is not clear whether the "Roman peace" is intended to mean civilisation, as Basore translates, or a more literal peace. Given that Seneca then continues to dwell on the "happy" lives close to nature that the barbarian tribes lead, then it is more likely that civilisation is the correct translation rather the Zampagliones' reading of "peace". This idea continues further into the Imperial period. Florus, for example, writing in the second half of Hadrian's reign⁴⁸, sees peace as something that only the citizens of the empire could enjoy. However, in addition to this often repeated claim he adds that "peace was a new state of affairs, and the proud haughty necks of the nations, not yet accustomed to the reigns of servitude, revolted against the yoke recently imposed upon them" (*Nova quippe pax, necdum adsuetae frenis servitutis tumidae gentium inflataeque cervices ab inposito nuper iugo resiliebat*).⁴⁹ The idea of the entrapments of the empire bringing peace but also bringing servitude is seen twice more in accounts of the Roman annexation of Britain. Cassius Dio has Boudicca give a speech in which she prefers freedom to "wealth with slavery".⁵⁰ Here we can see what Florus has described as the nations' necks revolting against the yoke that has apparently brought peace. Whereas, Tacitus shows some Britons' misguided acceptance of Roman culture, he says: "the unsuspecting Britons spoke of such novelties as 'civilisations', when in fact they were only a feature of their enslavement" (*Idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset*).⁵¹ It is not only the provincials that can be seen to face this choice of peace or freedom spent waging wars. When the kings had been removed from Rome, Livy says the Senate "feared not only the enemy but even their own fellow-citizens, lest the plebs, overcome by their fears, should

⁴⁷ Sen. *Prov.* 4.14.

⁴⁸ Forster 1929, viii.

⁴⁹ Florus *Epitome*, 2.21.12.

⁵⁰ Cassius Dio, 62.3.1-3.

⁵¹ Tac. *Agr.* 21 (trans.H. Mattingly, revised by S.A. Handford. London: Penguin Classics, 1970).

admit the Tarquins into the city, and accept peace even though it meant slavery” (*nec hostes modo timebant sed suosmet ipsi ciues, ne Romana plebs, metu percussa, receptis in urbem regibus uel cum seruitute pacem acciperet*).⁵² Therefore, we can see that both the Romans (when they first won their freedom) and the Britons (when they first lost theirs) were faced with the same dilemma. It is of course the Romans who manage to overcome both their fear and their enemy and win not only their freedom but peace also, for a time at least.

There is however one classical writer who holds an entirely different view of peace from those (mainly Roman) that have so far been cited, that is the Greek philosopher Xenophon. He asserts that “Men... who sincerely desire peace ought not to expect from others a thorough compliance with their own demands whilst they manifest an ambition to engross all power to themselves”.⁵³ Here Xenophon is suggesting that peace should not be imposed by a victor upon a vanquished foe but should rather be reached via a compromise. The idea that a sincere peace can only be reached via compromise is one that seems foreign to Roman thought and can be illustrated by the Roman response to attempts made by the Nervii to reach a compromise after the Romans established winter camps in Gaul. Quintus Tullius Cicero, the brother of the famous orator, declared “that it [is] not the habit of the Roman People to accept terms from an armed enemy” (*non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem*).⁵⁴ Therefore it is clear that, at least while the Romans were in the dominant position, there was no question of compromise being reached for the sake of peace. This however does not mean that peace was out of the question but only that the peace will be made on the grounds that best suit Rome, or in this case probably grounds that best suit Caesar. The importance of the imposition of peace is commented upon by Polybius. Polybius draws a distinction between a peace made with an enemy due to their circumstances and a peace concluded when the enemy’s spirit was broken. In the former case it was necessary to remain “constantly on their guard” while the enemy waits for a change in circumstance. While in the “latter they may trust them as true friends and subjects and not hesitate to command their services when required”.⁵⁵ Therefore, Polybius would probably have approved of the tactics used by Cicero in the negotiations with the Nervii, as it must be clear that it is not only the military victory that is

⁵² Livy 2.9.

⁵³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.

⁵⁴ Caes. *BGall.* 5.41 (trans. S.A. Handford. London: Penguin Classics, 1982).

⁵⁵ Polybius 3.12.

secure but also that the spirit of the enemy is crushed so that they would not again consider violent actions against Rome. Furthermore, there may have been a third option that Polybius would have approved of more than either of those allowed by a crushing military victory; for he says that a victory is a “higher service” if achieved through “generosity and equity” rather than in armed conflict. However, the reason that Polybius gives in favour of this form of diplomatic peace is not that it does not require spilt blood, but rather that it is the work of the commander alone and not of the army at large.⁵⁶ Thus Polybius believes peace should be reached through negotiations (but not necessarily compromise) as it confers greater glory on the commander not because it has a higher moral value.

Brunt draws attention to another particularly important aspect of Roman policy, when he states that it was difficult for Rome to maintain a realistic claim on defensive motives while she so often offered friendship or protection to states that were already either threatened or under attack.⁵⁷ However, although this is certainly the case, it does not show any inconsistency. Once the friendship had been offered it was just for Rome to enter conflict on behalf of the other state for either defensive reasons or simply to honour a treaty. So again, perhaps this shows the Romans own sense of the importance of just cause. Unwilling to enter the battle without a smokescreen of justice, Rome would create a situation in which she had no choice but to act.

It seems, therefore, that peace can be justified in some of the same ways as war; fear, for example, has been used as a cause for both war and peace. The causes for peace can also be debated with views as diverse as ‘best achieved through negotiation’ and ‘most secure when imposed on an annihilated enemy’. This should not be surprising, though, when it is considered that these views are taken from varying sources spanning not only many nations but also many centuries, philosophies and religions. Even so, despite these conflicting views, it appears that there were indeed many who sought to justify the conditions for peace as others tried to with war. It is now necessary to see if the realities of Roman wars match any of these idealised views presented in this diverse group of theories.

⁵⁶ *ibid* 5.11-12.

⁵⁷ Brunt 1990, 307.

The Rhetoric of War & Peace Compared to the Ideal of Just War & Just Peace

For almost a century after the publication of Mommsen's *History of Rome* the accepted view for the causes of Roman military action was that they were practically always defensively motivated.⁵⁸ Rome did not enter large military campaigns lightly, and did so only when they felt threatened by a powerful neighbour. However, with the publication of Harris' *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC* the theory of *defensive imperialism* gained a rival. A new group of scholars began to consider Roman expansion not as an accidental policy created by necessity and fear, but as a deliberate attempt to gain both power and economic stability. Harris, in fact, describes Roman imperialism as "a shared attitude...and a common determination within the aristocracy to add to Rome's power".⁵⁹ Since then these views have continued to develop in tandem with some scholars still adamant in defence of Mommsen and a form of defensive imperialism⁶⁰ and others insisting that Harris has answered the question of whether Rome's military activity was defensive or aggressive "once and for all"⁶¹, and still more creating a combination of the two categories. Richardson, for example, points out that Rome was often slow in exploiting the financial benefits of newly conquered territory⁶², which shows that if fiscal gain was one of the prime motivating forces behind Roman expansion, it could not have been the only reason. If Roman expansion was primarily financially motivated an effective administrative system would have been installed more quickly. Rich also draws attention to the "complex phenomena" of Roman imperialism, and dismisses any "monocausal" explanation (be it defensive or motivated by greed), but does so without offering even an attempt at his own interpretation, purely highlighting the shortfalls of Mommsen's and Harris' own theories.⁶³

Given the conflicting modern theories of defensive imperialism and of war and expansion for less passive purposes, perhaps we should also expect to see both of these reasons for war presented in the texts of the period. This does not appear to be the case, barring one passage in Polybius: when Polybius recounts the reasons given for Rome to enter the

⁵⁸ For a detailed summary of the changes in opinion towards Roman imperialism see Rich, 1993.

⁵⁹ Harris 1979, 130.

⁶⁰ Sherwin-White 1980, 11-17.

⁶¹ North 1981, 9.

⁶² Richardson 1986, 178.

⁶³ Rich 1993, 65-66.

second Punic War.⁶⁴ “The first cause” Polybius says “was the anger of Hamilcar... [whose] spirit had never been broken”. This suggests that this was a war undertaken out of fear of Hamilcar, who had yet to be subdued, even by previous defeat. However, the reason described by Polybius as the most important is financial and linked with the increased tributes levied on the Carthaginians. The final reason according to Polybius is again one that seems to put Rome in a defensive position. Polybius says it was Hamilcar’s success in Spain that was the final cause of the second Punic war. The reliability of Polybius’ list of causes can, however, be called into question when it is considered that war did not actually break out until ten years after Hamilcar’s death. It does, however, indicate that Polybius felt this war was necessary for the continued safety of Rome. This is a reason used again and again in Polybius’ history. Scipio is recorded as having made this claim when he came face to face with Hannibal: he says that “in neither of the wars...were the Romans responsible” and that the gods had borne witness to this by granting victory not to the “unjust aggressors”, but, to those that “had taken up arms to defend themselves”.⁶⁵ Defense motivated by fear is also given as the prime motive in Roman military actions in many other places; the Romans aided Messana because they feared a Carthaginian success that would create “most troublesome and dangerous neighbours”⁶⁶; the Ebro treaty is concluded due to fear of increasing Carthaginian power⁶⁷; and both the invasion of Gaul in 225 and the decision to retain the consuls in Italy in 197 were the result of a fear of the Gauls⁶⁸; even the demolition of Carthage was seen “to remove the fear which had constantly hung over them”.⁶⁹ So it appears that if Polybius’ account can be considered decisive, then the Roman war machine was set in motion more often by defensive rather than offensive reasons. Furthermore, the reported speech of Scipio shows that the Romans themselves may also have believed this to be the case.

It is clear, then, that even if the Romans were not as defensively motivated as some modern scholars believe, this was at least the appearance that they wished to project and that this appearance was accepted by Polybius. An extract from Livy also confirms this when a Rhodian envoy states “Surely you are the same Romans who boast that your wars are favoured of Fortune because they are just” (*certe iidem vos estis Romani, qui ideo*

⁶⁴ Polybius 3.9-12 (Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert. London, England: Penguin, 1979).

⁶⁵ *ibid* 15.8.

⁶⁶ *ibid* 1.10.

⁶⁷ *ibid* 2.13.

⁶⁸ *ibid* 2.23, 31.7, 18.11.

⁶⁹ *ibid* 36.9 (Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert. London, England: Penguin, 1979).

felicia bella vestra esse, quia iusta sint).⁷⁰ Therefore if this speech placed in the mouth of a Greek by Livy is correct, the Romans' belief that they did not provoke war was well known enough to be referred to by a foreign envoy. Even if this speech is not accurate, it at least shows another example of a Roman (Livy) taking the opportunity to declare the just way in which the Romans felt their wars to be waged. Livy seems to have been convinced by this claim as he says, "although he had victory almost within his grasp, he was not rejecting a peace, in order that all nations might know that the Roman people acted fairly both in beginning and ending wars." (*tamen, cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat, pacem non abnuere, ut omnes gentes sciant populum Romanum et suscipere iuste bella et finire*).⁷¹

Polybius also records a debate in which Hannibal attempts to appear justified in his military actions. When envoys were sent to ask Hannibal not to interfere in Saguntum⁷², as it was in the Roman sphere of influence, he responded that he was protecting the Saguntines, as previous Roman arbitrators had caused the wrongful execution of the leading citizens. So by becoming involved in Saguntum, Hannibal claims he was upholding his ancestral tradition of taking up the "cause of the victims of injustice".⁷³ When the second Punic war finally seemed to be inevitable, Polybius records a debate between Roman envoys and Carthaginian orators.⁷⁴ The dialogue is not geared towards ceasing hostilities, but rather at laying claims to the most justified reasons to go to war, with each claiming the other had created a situation where a just war can begin. Due to the breaking of previous treaties (which are then read aloud to provide further evidence) the question is raised as to who has been the first to engage in unprovoked aggression. This debate is particularly important, as it takes place after the Senate are already set on war but both states still appear to be taking the *just* role of the defender.⁷⁵ This illustrates that there was a significant amount of importance placed on the ability to claim justification, not merely for the act of initiating hostilities, but for more theoretical and ideological purposes. This debate between the Romans and Carthaginians may only be present to illustrate the Romans' own justifications, but as there seems to be no definite conclusion as to whose claims are more compelling, this is not definitely the case. Furthermore, the importance placed upon a defensive argument by the Romans can be seen on the occasions when

⁷⁰ Livy 45.22.

⁷¹ Livy 30.16.

⁷² Polybius 3.15.

⁷³ *ibid.*

⁷⁴ *ibid* 3.20-22

⁷⁵ Polybius 3.20 says that there was no debate in the Senate and the decision to go to war was already unanimous.

blatantly false defensive excuses are given.⁷⁶ Polybius tells us that Rome distorted the Carthaginian efforts made in preparation of their Sardinian campaign so they could claim Carthage was planning a war with Rome and this was their “pretext” for war.⁷⁷ In comparison, Caesar used defensive arguments to explain his technically illegal offensive moves against the Helvetii and Belgae, when he claimed these tribes were becoming a threat to Rome by migrating near to Roman allies.⁷⁸

Book 31 of Livy contains what purports to be the only surviving recorded speech made in the Senate on the subject of whether or not to enter into war. This is illuminating on the importance the Romans placed on the defensive argument. The Second Punic war had just come to an end and Macedonian powers were increasing under Philip, P. Sulpicius, as consul, proposed that Rome attack Philip for “the injuries he had inflicted and the war he had made on the allies of the Roman people” (*ob iniurias armaque illata sociis populi Romani bellum indici*) which in itself may have been enough for military actions to be considered *just*. At the same time the effects of the Hannibalic war were still being felt in Rome and with help from the tribunes, who accused the patricians of “sowing the seeds of wars from this war” (*incusaverat bella ex bellis seri*), the proposal was almost universally rejected.⁷⁹ Before the vote in the Campus, Martius Sulpicius made a further speech in which he altered the reasons from defending Rome’s allies to defending Rome herself by introducing this false dilemma: “but whether you are to send your legions across to Macedonia or meet the enemy in Italy” (*sed utrum in Macedoniam legiones transportetis an hostes in Italiam accipiatis*).⁸⁰ This change in the reason given by the Consul led to the commencement of the Second Macedonian War. It is of course possible that other factors contributed to the change in public opinion. The personal advantages open to Sulpicius if he was successful may have caused him to pass his evening dispensing bribes, but the fact that no other speech is recorded in favour of going to war, and that no other change in circumstances is given by Polybius shows that this speech, and the arguments within, were felt at the time to be the key contributing factor.

The Ciceronian theory of just war also advocated the just use of force for the purpose of revenge. This becomes particularly evident in one example of justified war in Caesar’s

⁷⁶ Rich 1993, 62.

⁷⁷ Polybius 1.88.

⁷⁸ Caes. *B Gall.* 1.10 & 2.1.

⁷⁹ Livy 31.6 (my translation).

⁸⁰ Livy 31.7.

account of his campaigns in Gaul. Initially the Helvetii sent envoys to ask Caesar for safe passage from their territory and promised to do so “without any harm” (*sine ullo maleficio*).⁸¹ However, this request is denied them as Caesar recalled that in 107 BC. they had killed the consul Lucius Cassius. After the battle with the Helvetii had been concluded, Caesar was met by envoys from the other Gallic tribes, who congratulated him because his actions had helped Gaul as well as Rome. Though Caesar had set out with intentions of revenge, the envoys state that the Helvetii planned to “make war on Gaul and take possession of its government” (*reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur*).⁸² This may show Caesar trying to justify his actions rather than giving an honest reason for his aggression, particularly as rather than demonstrate his famous *clementia*, Caesar chose to destroy the vanquished army even putting to death many prisoners who had again asked for peace, therefore. His aggression was such that he records that the number of men, women and children had been reduced from 368,000 to 110,000.⁸³ Perhaps this shows Caesar, aware of his brutality, making use of an explanation that he knows will justify his actions, and in this episode the justification is revenge for the violence of fifty years earlier. In this case it is perhaps even more important that Caesar justify his actions by invoking the death of Lucius Cassius, because it was this tribe that had first caused him to take up arms in Gaul, and, as such, he had not only to justify his brutality but also his independent decision to enter a war without the approval of the Senate.

In many instances, therefore, it does appear that the reasons given for the pursuit of military actions match one or more of those argued as just. Fear, revenge and the attainment of peace are all mentioned as the decisive motivation for various military campaigns. However, it is also important to note that on many occasions no justification is given or seems necessary. Perhaps where they do appear it is a signal that some extra persuasion was needed either to start the war, as may have been the case with Caesar and the Helvetii, or to excuse extreme atrocities committed during the conflict. Most telling, though, are the occasions when a false motive seems to be given, as though Rome was always ready to enter any war at any time, as they are sometimes portrayed. Having examined the theories and practices behind justifying wars it is now possible to turn away from this topic and look instead at an exception to all these rules: civil wars. These were wars that many Romans felt could never be justified, to such an extent that even

⁸¹ Caes. *B Gall.* 1.7 (my translation).

⁸² *ibid* 1.30 (my translation).

⁸³ *ibid* 1.29.

generations of the Julian family rule could not shake the hatred for the civil conflict that the father of them all, Julius Caesar, wrought against his own homeland.

Republican and Early Imperial Civil War

Throughout the history of the Roman republic civil wars are presented nearly or entirely in a negative light. Whether viewed through the contemporary eyes of the Republican Cicero or through those of Augustine, who wrote with the benefit of centuries of hindsight and with the ethics of an early Christian, it is still civil, rather than external wars, that are seen as the most base and hated of conflicts. The first of the civil wars that occurred in the historic rather than semi-legendary Republican era⁸⁴ was that fought between Marius and Sulla and their respective political factions. However, even though this was apparently Rome's first taste of civil war, the Senate and the people were ardent in their attempts to avoid conflict. When Marius and Cinna returned to emulate Sulla's march on Rome they were invited to enter on the condition that they made pledges to not commit atrocities within the city.⁸⁵ What does this tell us about the Romans' attitude to civil war and civil conflict? Sulla had been the only Roman to previously march in arms on Rome in this way and he had acted with restraint once inside the city, actually punishing soldiers that he witnessed looting.⁸⁶ Even his attack had not been excessive, with only the threat of fire used against hostile civilians⁸⁷ (although Plutarch says this threat was carried out)⁸⁸. Is this willingness to welcome Marius a sign of the Senate's political alignment, favouring Marius over Sulla? Is it an attempt at self preservation, hoping that if they welcome rather than oppose Marius he would show the same restraint as Sulla? Is it the simply practical explanation that Rome had no effective military solution to Marius' and Cinna's attack? Or was there already an ideological hatred of civil war inherent in Roman society perhaps stemming from the myths of the Homeric period that stated that "The man who kills the

⁸⁴ If the early battles with the Albans and Sabines are considered, as Augustine does, as civil wars, due to the fact these battles took place between nations that would become part of the same state, "How, then, could that be a glorious war which a daughter-state waged against its mother?" (*Quo modo ergo gloriosum alterius matris, alterius filiae civitatis inter se armorum potuit esse certamen?*) (Augustine, *De civ. D.*, 3.14; adapted from the Loeb edition).

⁸⁵ Plut. *Marius*, 43.

⁸⁶ App. *B Civ.* 1.59.

⁸⁷ *ibid* 58.

⁸⁸ Plut. *Sulla*, 9.

chill horror of war within his own people is an outlaw, banished from clan and law and hearth".⁸⁹

It seems that Sulla had acted in a controlled and measured way while within the city and had not only minimised damage, but had also reconfirmed the Senate as the forefront of Roman political power.⁹⁰ Thus, it is unlikely that the Senate were either showing Marius political support, or that they feared violent reproaches, particularly as the absence of violence had been assured by oaths and the Senate, presumably, still remembered Marius for his actions to save Rome during foreign wars. The Senate's actions in not opposing Marius were therefore either caused by their inability to properly defend Rome, or an ideological hatred of civil war. I believe the first of these is probably more likely at this time. Rome may have had a hatred of civil conflicts, such as those that had been escalating over the period since the Gracchi, but they had not yet been stung by civil wars in the same way and were perhaps unlikely to fully grasp the significance of Roman-on-Roman battles. However, it was the actions of Marius, after he entered Rome that were to become hated acts. We are told by Plutarch that the most hated of atrocities were those committed by the Bardyiae who "butchered fathers of families in their own homes, outraged their children, and raped their wives" but perhaps even more importantly their "plundering and murdering" went unchecked.⁹¹ This image of Rome as an *urbs capta* is one that continues to be used into the principate.⁹² The Bardyiae were treating Rome as a captured city; their actions were indiscriminate and suitable only for barbarians. These most barbarous of acts may have been attributed exclusively to the Bardyiae purely because they were a private bodyguard made up of slaves.⁹³ This distances Roman citizens from the low points of the Marian deeds, but does little to soften the impact of them. Perhaps that is the very reverse of what is intended here, as these atrocities may become more virulent if they are committed by people that should not wield the power of life and death over a Roman. Marius' actions not only reduce Rome to an *urbs capta* but they also place citizens at the whim of barbarians, recalling the feared and hated days of the invading Gauls.

When Sulla re-enters the city, after he returns from the war with Mithridates it is in an uproar generated by fear. This is very different from the defiant scene on his first entry to

⁸⁹ Homer *Il.* 9.60-62.

⁹⁰ App. *B Civ.* 1.59.

⁹¹ Plut. *Marius* 44; App. *B Civ.* 71.

⁹² Keitel 1984, 306-325.

⁹³ Plut. *Marius* 43.

Rome, and the calculated and collected attitude present when Marius is invited within the walls. However, by now these civil wars are a familiar occurrence for the populace and they have learnt all too well what can be expected from a Roman general when he manoeuvres on the roads of Rome. The populace of Rome are perhaps a little premature in their panic however, as Sulla's soldiers take a voluntary oath not to "damage Italy except by his [Sulla's] orders".⁹⁴ This oath, combined with the fact that the majority of the confrontation did not take place in Rome, could have saved her from further damage had Sulla wished it, but following Marius' bloody example, Sulla "devoted himself entirely to the work of butchery".⁹⁵ It is important to note that it is the acts committed after the battles are finished that receive the most reprimands; the conduct of the *Bardylae* and the proscriptions of Sulla. It is the bloodshed in the forum, not the battlefield, that is lamented longest. The hatred felt for Sulla, just as that for Marius, was not forgotten at his time of death. Lepidus suggests that Sulla should not be buried and he is not a voice in the wilderness but is supported by many⁹⁶, and Marius' death created a feeling of "joy and confidence" in Rome.⁹⁷ These pockets of resentment amongst the Roman populace must have been motivated by the evils that the two once great saviours had brought within the walls, and even Sulla's constitutional attempts to revive the glory of the Republic could not help quell the resentment. If there had been any doubt as to the destructive qualities of civil wars then the proscriptions of Sulla had removed it. So when the next major civil war began between Caesar and Pompey, the presence of one of Sulla's generals at the head of an army would not have been necessary to send shock into the hearts of the people of Rome. However, by this time not only the civilians, but also the generals, had learnt from the previous destruction, and both were eager to minimise the damage to the city. Pompey did this in two ways; firstly with the decree stating that no Roman was to be killed except in battle, and by keeping the battles "at the furthest distance from the city as possible".⁹⁸ Caesar followed suit with his many acts of clemency both during and after the war. Yet even though this war was not carried out within the city walls, it was still hated. Lucan says that this war was "worse than civil"⁹⁹, either because Pompey and Caesar were

⁹⁴ Plut. *Sulla* 27.

⁹⁵ *ibid* 31.

⁹⁶ *ibid* 38.

⁹⁷ Plut. *Marius* 46.

⁹⁸ Plut. *Pompey* 65-66.

⁹⁹ Lucan, 1.1.

kin¹⁰⁰ or, more likely, as they had not been related since the death of Julia, because this war destroyed not only a faction of the state, but witnessed the state destroy itself.¹⁰¹

The contemporary evidence of Cicero is also telling, particularly his *Philippics* and the *In Catilinam*. In the third oration against Catiline, Cicero recalls the previous ills caused Rome by the Civil wars of Marius and Sulla. He says that “all this place was crowded with heaps of carcasses and flowed with the blood of the citizens” (*omnis hic locus acervis corporum et civium sanguine redundavit*) and in the same passage states that the “lights of the state were extinguished” (*lumina civitatis extincta sunt*).¹⁰² This is a recurring theme in Lucan’s epic, mourning for a lost generation.¹⁰³ In book 9 the soldiers make a plea after the death of Pompey; “suffer us to return home to our deserted households...our life time has been wasted...civil war hardly provides graves even for leaders” (*patrios permittite penates, Desertamque domum... Perierunt tempora vitae ... Bellum civile sepulchra, Vix ducibus praestare potest*)¹⁰⁴, which highlights the loss that their homelands have incurred by the continued killing. The *Philippics* and the *In Catilinam* also use the image of the *urbs capta* that have already been noted in other works. Mark Antony and his actions are compared to those of Hannibal; Cicero asks what has one done that the other has not, linking the behaviour of the Roman with that of one of the fiercest enemies of Rome, complicit in the “depopulation, devastation, slaughter and rape” (*depopulationes, vastationes, caedis, rapina*).¹⁰⁵ The Catilinarian conspirators fare no better, as they are described as viewing Rome as not their own country but the city of an enemy.¹⁰⁶ These republican images are repeated in Tacitus’ reports of the imperial civil wars. Plundering and murders are rife, people are cut down as they flee, and no distinction is made between “soldier and civilian” (*nullo militum aut populi discrimine*). Everywhere there were “lamentations, and wailings, and all the miseries of a captured city” (*ubique lamenta, conclamationes et fortuna captae urbis*).¹⁰⁷

The hatred for all civil wars is perhaps best illustrated by the tirade against all those involved in civil wars uttered by Seneca in *De Beneficiis*. In that text Coriolanus is part of a

¹⁰⁰ Duff 1969, 2.

¹⁰¹ Lintott 1971, 493.

¹⁰² Cic. *Cat.* 3.24 (adapted from Rolfe, 1932).

¹⁰³ Sanford 1933, 121-127.

¹⁰⁴ Lucan, 230-237.

¹⁰⁵ Cic. *Phil.* 5.25 (my translation).

¹⁰⁶ Keitel 1984, 310-311. Cic. *Cat.* 4.15-16.

¹⁰⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 4.1 cf 3.83.

treacherous, or unnatural, (*parricidio*) war; Catiline was not content with seizing Rome but set on destroying it and “sate his old inborn hatred” (*vetera et ingenita odia satiaverit*) before sacrificing Roman generals to Gallic gods; Gaius Marius becomes the symbol of atrocities committed against his own countrymen, and matches those of the Cimbrians; Lucius Sulla “marched through human blood...to the Colline gate” (*ad Collinam portam per sanguinem humanum incessisset*); Gnaeus Pompeius, in return for his three illegal consulships, reduced the Roman peoples to slaves so that they could be saved; Julius Caesar “from Gaul and Germany whirled war to Rome” (*a Gallia Germanique bellum in urbem circumegit*) and never laid down his sword; and Mark Antony wished to make the tattered remnants of Rome subject to kings, so she might “herself pay tribute to eunuchs” (*ipsa tributum spadonibus penderet*).¹⁰⁸ This vehement invective shows the passion with which all attacks on Rome were felt. Even Julius Caesar does not escape the accusations, although Augustus remains blameless. This is probably due to the fact that Augustus’ war was carefully portrayed as being against a foreign foe rather than against an opposing Roman faction, and because his victory did bring a lasting halt to the civil discord.

Therefore, the reason given for the civil wars from the late Republican period onwards was the necessity to overthrow a tyrant. This may be the case, as at the time the idea of kingship was still hated by the Roman citizens and when committing such a despised act as marching against Rome, the claim to be ridding her of a tyrant was probably the nearest to justification that it was possible to be. However, as the decades of civil wars mounted, it seems that civil war itself became more hated than the idea of reinventing the throne and, as such, the solution to reinstate an autocracy became favoured over the even more hated civil war. This can be seen in the comment of Pliny, Seneca the younger and Florus (cited above) in which they exult in the fact that peace has been returned by the Principate and the glory of empire. The notion that would have seemed most obscene to a Republican, that the rule of one man had restored the glory of Rome, was now a common cry. This fact is all the more astonishing when it is noted that Pliny and Seneca were of the political classes that had most fervently challenged the dictators only a few generations previously.

¹⁰⁸ Sen. *Ben.* 5.16.1-6.

Part Two – The Philosophers and Peace

The topics examined so far, just war theories and negative attitudes towards civil wars, represent two areas that show an ambiguity in ancient attitudes to wars and violence. There would be no need to justify wars if they were as universally accepted as some scholars have suggested, and although civil wars are without doubt a limited and exceptional form of warfare, the negativity towards them could represent the beginnings of a more general disapproval of violent actions, particularly in a period in which civil wars were becoming more common. Therefore I will now move away from these more general concepts and turn my attention towards specific philosophical schools and their presentation of peace. I will begin with philosophy, for two reasons, firstly because it will provide a theoretical framework for a later examination of historians; and secondly because it is the area which has afforded the most speculation for pacifist leanings in the past, although no consensus has so far been reached. For example, for John Ferguson the Epicureans were the foremost of the anti-war philosophical schools; “Quietist and pacifistic, they were in truth an ancient society of friends”.¹⁰⁹ Whereas, for Harry Sidebottom the Stoics embody this belief more deeply, although as we shall see, he would only say they were “verging” on the pacifistic and would not commit to the extent that Ferguson would on behalf of the Epicureans.¹¹⁰ Whilst Francis Downing believes it is the Cynics who provide the closest similarities to the ideas later found in the pacifistic Christians.¹¹¹ I will begin my examination with Plato and Aristotle in order to establish a framework by which their Roman successors may be judged. Then, in view of the assertions of Ferguson, Sidebottom and Downing, I shall turn to the three schools that have previously been attributed pacifistic beliefs. Turning first to the Stoics, due to the greater volume of surviving material and because they became the most widely influential philosophical school during the early empire.

¹⁰⁹ Ferguson 1963, 5.

¹¹⁰ Sidebottom 1993, 250, 262.

¹¹¹ Downing 1992, 128-129.

Plato and Aristotle

Plato

The hope of finding a consistent doctrine on war and peace in the Platonic dialogues is perhaps a futile one. Written over at least half a century and giving voices and opinions to numerous historical philosophers, generals, and politicians as well as still more unknown or unnamed characters, they present a confused picture of the ethical problem of state violence that is not aided by any extended or committed attempt to tackle the topic. However, both the *Republic* and the *Laws* do contain passages where the issues are discussed. Nevertheless, considering that the goal of both dialogues is to produce an ideal constitution, they present surprisingly different attitudes. The attitude towards warfare, that some scholars believe is presented by Plato in the *Republic*, is probably most clearly illustrated in the title of Leon Harold Craig's 1994 book *The War Lover: A study of Plato's Republic*. Craig argues that the *Republic* was written with the deliberate intention of countering the image of the philosopher as spending his life in passive contemplation; "impartial, disinterested, cosmopolitan" and in search of "eternal truth", and that Plato wished to show that philosophy was a practical art.¹¹² Craig asserts that Plato achieved this aim by identifying the philosopher not only with the ruler but also with the warrior¹¹³, a responsibility that was natural due to the essential philosophical quality of spiritedness.¹¹⁴ Therefore, for Craig the *Republic* is a work that will ultimately glorify war, as it is the philosopher's lot to organise the state for all possibilities and particularly, but not exclusively, for battle.

It is certainly true that in the ideal state of the *Republic* the army is to play a large and lauded part. Soldiering is seen as an art that needs a dedicated profession and indeed class in order to continue its duty to the highest degree.¹¹⁵ The brave soldier is to be rewarded with praise from all, both within the army and the *polis*, and if he dies he is to be celebrated with divine honours. Whereas the coward is to be stripped of his right to be part of the army, and even a soldier that falls into enemy hands is to be considered lost, so

¹¹² Craig 1994, 19. If it was Plato's intention to show the philosopher as a practical profession in the *Republic* then it is strange that in the *Republic* the ideal state is a wholly fictitious location, whereas it emerges that the state of the *Laws* may be implicated in an apparently genuine Cretan colony (*Leg.* 3. 702c-d).

¹¹³ Craig 1994, 21.

¹¹⁴ *ibid* 228-30 & 271-72.

¹¹⁵ Plato *Resp.* 2.374b & 4.422c.

the enemy can treat him as they wish.¹¹⁶ The importance of the military profession is such that the children of the soldiers should be made to accompany the army to battle, the danger of their possible slaughter thought worth the risk when compared with the gains of increased motivation for the army and early experience for the soldiers of the future.¹¹⁷ The reason the army in the *Republic* becomes so important is that the city described is one of luxury and great resources, so an army is essential; firstly to acquire extra land for the increasing population and then to protect them from aggressive neighbours.¹¹⁸

There is little doubt then that the *Republic* is a military state, in which the army holds a special place. However, this does not mean that they are given free rein to act as they wish; it is made clear that the enemy is to be treated with restraint (at least in the case of fellow Greeks). The army are not to burn houses, lay waste the soil or ravage territory. They are not to treat entire populations as enemies but only those who are the cause of the quarrel, “since the majority are their friends”. They will only do enough to persuade the guilty to be just, as the main goal of disputes between Greeks should be reconciliation.¹¹⁹ However this only shows the ability to maintain a level of decorum during wars and not any negative connotations to war itself, in fact it merely legitimises war further by minimising its harmful effects and maximising its positives. Even so, there are however places where war is seemingly tackled in a more negative way. Justice is a crucial part of much of Plato’s dialogues and in the *Republic* justice creates concord, agreement and love, whereas injustice creates violence and factions¹²⁰, and at first this could appear to be a plea for peace. Despite this, a passage from the *Alcibiades 1* (whether it is indeed a Platonic dialogue or later imitation¹²¹) reminds us that justice can be served in many ways, both in peace and in war; a warring society can still be just.¹²² So again this does not alter Craig’s principle that the *Republic* is a defence of philosophy through warfare and at the same time a defence of warfare through philosophy.

¹¹⁶ *ibid* 5.468a-e.

¹¹⁷ *ibid* 5.467d.

¹¹⁸ *ibid* 2.373d-374a *cf* 4.422e where wealth and greed are the causes of war.

¹¹⁹ *ibid* 5.471a-b.

¹²⁰ *ibid* 1.351c-352.

¹²¹ The authenticity of the *Alcibiades* was first questioned by Schleiermacher (1836, 329) and for a century and a half the majority of scholars accepted Schleiermacher’s conclusions. However, more recent studies of the *Alcibiades* have been more open to the possibility that it is indeed a genuine Platonic work (Denyer 2001, 14-26).

¹²² Plato *Alc.* 1.109.

In the face of all this, for Plato there is still no doubt that war can be a destructive force; it is a powerful weapon in the hands of a tyrant for example.¹²³ A tyrant will deliberately start a war so that his subjects will be in need of a leader¹²⁴ and will not be able to plot against him, due to the increased amounts of toil and tax¹²⁵; also wars allow his enemies inside the state to be killed by the enemy outside the state.¹²⁶ But these actions would cause even the tyrant's friends to suspect him and the brave to speak out.¹²⁷ As a result the bravest and best from all parts are killed and only the most cowardly and base characters are left.¹²⁸ Within a tyranny, then, war is thought a cause for great concern. There are also some hints at a more general negative image of war; there is a retelling of the Hesiodic decline of man that leads to the beginning of enmity and war¹²⁹ and also the causes of war are said to be the same as the causes of "the greatest disasters, public and private".¹³⁰ Finally, there is a discussion of how the guardians ought to treat each other: a young man should do no violence to an elder or strike him in any way, and as such they may live in "great peace" and this will prevent the creation of factions within the state.¹³¹ Therefore, despite the important and elevated role of the military class in the *Republic* and the space allocated by Plato to the details of training and regulations, there are still moments when peace seems more important than war, namely in the reconciliatory goal of all wars with fellow Greek states¹³² and the importance of harmony with the ruling classes¹³³ as well as the association with war and the evils of society.¹³⁴

Hobbs goes further still in her assessment of the *Republic*. She correctly notes that after the initial land grab of the developing society¹³⁵ all references to the need for the warrior guardians are in the context of a defensive, not expansionist, conflict.¹³⁶ This opens the way for a possible society free from the war that was essential to its creation, as long as the

¹²³ Plato *Resp.* 8.566e-577d.

¹²⁴ *ibid* 8.566e-567a.

¹²⁵ *ibid* 567a.

¹²⁶ *ibid.*

¹²⁷ *ibid* 567b.

¹²⁸ *ibid* 567b-c.

¹²⁹ *ibid* 5.465b.

¹³⁰ *ibid* 2.373e; Hobbs 2007, 177-8.

¹³¹ *ibid* 5.465a-b.

¹³² *ibid* 5.471a.

¹³³ *ibid* 5.465a-b.

¹³⁴ *ibid* 2.373e.

¹³⁵ *ibid* 2.373d.

¹³⁶ Hobbs 2007, 179; Plato *Resp.* 414d-e all citizens are told to protect their mother-city, 415d-e a city should be geographically easy to defend, 422-3 gives examples of ways to defend the Republic, and 421-3 tells us that the state must maintain a specific size, which would prevent further aggressive expansion.

Republic is surrounded by likeminded cities ruled by the same idealised philosopher kings. This is, in fact, the situation that Socrates envisions in his speech at 473c-e, when he claims only a world of philosopher kings could end the troubles of mankind.¹³⁷ Therefore, it seems that even in a city that is so willing to elevate the warrior to hero, and aggressively seize land from its neighbours as an inevitable part of its early growth can still hope for a future without peace, if all societies are ruled by the same principles.

The *Laws* is the second of Plato's works which spends any real time on the topic of war and peace, and from the first mention it seems that it will tread the same path as the *Republic*, glorifying the military and concerned more with who should wage a war than how to avoid one. Just two chapters into the work it is suggested that there is no such thing as absolute peace but only a state of undeclared war, so a state should always be prepared for attack.¹³⁸ However, this sentiment is spoken by the Cretan Clinias, not by the unnamed Athenian who fills a role similar to that taken by Socrates in other dialogues, and it soon becomes clear that the Athenian disagrees with Clinias. The Athenian suggests, contrary to the original stance of the Cretan, that any dispute is better solved with negotiation than with violence¹³⁹, and that for any legislator "the best [objective] is neither war nor faction – they are things we should pray to be spared from – but peace and mutual good will".¹⁴⁰ So rather than echoing the ideal state of the *Republic*, the *Laws* seems to display contradictory principles, at least as far as war and peace is concerned. Moreover, the idea that peace is superior to war is continued throughout the dialogue.¹⁴¹ It is said that "war is serious work" and that serious work should be undertaken for the sake of play, therefore war should only be undertaken for the sake of peace. But further to this, there is no "play or any real education worth the name [in war]...hence it is peace in which each of us should spend most of his life and spend it best".¹⁴² This is again confirmed when the state is said, like any individual, to be "preconditioned to a happy life...to commit no sin against ourselves and suffer no wrongs from others". So if either a state or an individual becomes

¹³⁷ Hobbs 2007, 191.

¹³⁸ Plato *Leg.* 1.626a-b.

¹³⁹ *ibid* 1.628 b-c.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid* 1.628c.

¹⁴¹ Hobbs 2007, 177 notes that, in fact, "any careful scrutiny of the dialogues shows that most of [Plato's] main characters' explicit appraisals of war are negative". Plato *Resp.* 373e, 378b-c, 547e-548a; *Phaedo* 66c; *Pit.* 308a; *Leg.* 628c-e, 803d. Hobbs is only able to offer one "possible exception" from *Ti.* 23c-d when Athens is said to be founded by the "war-loving" (*philopolemos*) and "wisdom-loving" (*philosophos*) Athena. This passage is discussed further below.

¹⁴² Plato *Leg.* 7.803d.

good, its “life will be one of peace, if evil, of war without and within”.¹⁴³ Thus not only is peace again the preferred route for any man or *polis*, but war is intrinsically linked to evil and peace to good. This does not mean, however, that the ideal state should reject war and all its trappings. On the contrary, the ideal state should be prepared for war at all times, even times of peace, training under arms regularly and involved in preparatory sports often.¹⁴⁴ Although it is seen as essential for the thoughts of the rulers to be often concerned with the training for battle, it is said that peaceful matters should be most important to the guardians.¹⁴⁵

However, the *Laws* is not a pacifist utopia, not merely because the army is still seen as an important part of the society, as it is in the *Republic*, but also because no society should be single minded. The Spartan and Cretan constitutions are said to be absurd because they aim purely at war not peace.¹⁴⁶ This is not a wholesale rejection of war, merely the way in which it is the sole concern of these states. In the *Politicus* a love of peace is said to be as dangerous as a love of war. Constantly driving for “peace at any price” causes the citizens and their sons to become “unwarlike...Thus they are at the mercy of their aggressor... [They] wake up to find their freedom is gone and they are reduced to slavery”.¹⁴⁷ Equally a love of war can be just as destructive. It brings the anger of powerful enemies from all sides and “they either destroy their country altogether, or else they bring it into subjection to its enemies just as surely as the peace party did”.¹⁴⁸ This seems to be refuted in the *Laws* at an individual level. At 1.627d-628a Plato considers a group of brothers, some righteous, but a majority unrighteous. It is asked whether the best route would be to kill the sinners and let the righteous rule themselves, or to place government into the hands of the righteous and bring the majority into line beneath them. It is decided that a third route is more preferable and that it would be best to reconcile the family and have them live in harmony, a route that like the first two options would be in opposition to war.¹⁴⁹ This is not used as proof that the ruler of a city should ignore the needs of war and instead focus on peace. Rather, Plato is suggesting that just as this domestic peace was provided by dealing with the domestic war, so must the peace of the polis be achieved by “legislating

¹⁴³ *ibid* 8.828d-829b.

¹⁴⁴ *ibid* 8.829a-c, 7.796a-d, 12.942a-c.

¹⁴⁵ *ibid* 1.628b-d, 7.803d.

¹⁴⁶ *ibid* 1.628d-e.

¹⁴⁷ Plato *Plt.* 307e.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid* 308a.

¹⁴⁹ Plato *Leg.* 1.627d-628a.

for war as a means to peace".¹⁵⁰ Therefore, Plato does not advocate for war to be completely neglected.

Like the *Republic*, the *Laws* also contains two passages about the development of early man. The first of these, 3.677a-679c, concerns the reestablishment of civilisation after its destruction by a flood. The inundation is said to have been of such a prolific magnitude that only those isolated herdsmen, who passed their days with their grazing flocks on mountains, could have been saved.¹⁵¹ All trace of the cities in the plain was destroyed.¹⁵² This would result in the arts of metal work being lost and that any art that relied on metal work would also be lost¹⁵³, most specifically warfare¹⁵⁴, aided by the fact that lonely men would welcome the company of others, even strangers after such depopulation.¹⁵⁵ The now comparatively abundant amounts of natural resources would mean there would be no need to war for wealth or material gain.¹⁵⁶ It is not surprising that this simpler way of life is lauded for the abundance of peace but it is surprising that the men of this time are described as "manlier" than the men of a warring polis, especially as this suggestion meets no objection from the Spartan and Cretan present, two men who earlier are proud of their warring societies.¹⁵⁷ The second description of the development of man goes back still further to the "age of bliss" under Cronus.¹⁵⁸ In this age, says the Athenian, a "superior race of spirits" ruled over men in the same way that men rule over goats, providing them with "peace and mercy" and "endowing...[mankind] with internal concord and happiness". Again unsurprisingly it is suggested that this was a superior way of life and that men should govern themselves in the manner the spirits governed them, in order to live at peace with each other.¹⁵⁹ However, despite the recourse to peace and order (backed by preparedness for war) throughout the *Laws*, it is clear that wars and violence have more power than any peace or any man can have. It is said that laws and constitutions are not in fact ever truly made by man, but rather by chance. "Constitutions are wrecked and laws revolutionised by violence and war" or change is forced upon governments by plagues and diseases.¹⁶⁰ It

¹⁵⁰ *ibid* 1.628d.

¹⁵¹ *ibid* 3.677b.

¹⁵² *ibid* 3.677c.

¹⁵³ *ibid* 3.677c-678e.

¹⁵⁴ *ibid* 678e.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*.

¹⁵⁶ *ibid* 679a-c.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid* 3.678d-e.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid* 4.713c.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid* 4.713c-714a.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid* 4.709 a-b.

is the task of the state and the legislator to employ “skill” to avoid as long as possible these negative forces and to help the city survive them, if indeed they are unavoidable.

The *Laws* and the *Republic* are the two dialogues in which Plato dedicates several passages to the topic of war and peace. The *Republic*, although not as aggressively pro-war as Craig would have us believe¹⁶¹, is a dialogue concerned with an ideal state based on the necessity of a military that was to be lauded and raised above the rest of society, and the *Laws* appears to be the antithesis of this. The ideal state of the *Laws* does not only concern its time with peace, because to do so would be destructive. However, peace is idealised in the *Laws* and it is claimed to be the most important goal of the guardians’ legislation. Before leaving Plato it may be necessary to examine the other few places where Plato discusses war to see if either the attitude shown in the *Republic* or *Laws* can be traced through his other dialogues. For example, the *Politicus* also declares that war is an art, as is stated in the *Republic*¹⁶² and the *Laws*.¹⁶³ However, this is not seen as a positive aspect of war as it is in the *Republic* but rather war is a “mighty and dreadful art” that can only be tamed by the “art of truly royal rule”.¹⁶⁴ Even so, it is not an art that should be dismissed outright, but rather one that has to be treated with the authority that only true kingship can repress. The *Protagoras* also describes war as an art, but an art that is part of the art of politics; early man was incapable of waging war on wild beasts because they did not possess the art of politics. This caused men to band together in groups for safety but again, due to their limited ability in diplomatic matters, these groups soon disbanded and man was left as prey for feral animals.¹⁶⁵ These primitive men were only saved by the divine gift of justice that was distributed evenly among all, allowing for the development of politics, cities and ultimately safety.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, although the relationship of this to more general warfare is not explicit, it can perhaps be suggested that as war, albeit war against animals, was the original reason for men to form groups, and an understanding of justice was what allowed these groups to survive, justice is inextricably linked to warfare. War cannot exist without politics, politics cannot exist without justice *ergo* war cannot exist without justice.

¹⁶¹ Craig 1994, 19-21.

¹⁶² Plato *Resp.* 2.374b & 4.422c.

¹⁶³ Plato *Leg.* 3.677a-679c.

¹⁶⁴ Plato *Plt.* 304e-305a.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid* 322a-c.

¹⁶⁶ *ibid* 322c-323c.

However, although war relies on politics, politics must also follow “moderation”¹⁶⁷, so war can now exist but this does not mean it should be rushed into.

Zampaglione says that in *Protagoras* 359e Plato sees war as a “fine thing”.¹⁶⁸ However, it seems clear that war itself is not being judged in the *Protagoras*, but rather the actions of soldiers in battle. The brave soldiers that entered battle willingly are said to have committed an honourable deed and therefore to have done ‘good’, whereas the coward has acted dishonourably and therefore has committed a negative act.¹⁶⁹ At no point is the ethical quality of war discussed independently and as such, it cannot be concluded as a “fine thing”.¹⁷⁰ There is one passage though that does show great similarities with the *Republic*, namely the opening of the *Timaeus*. In the *Timaeus* Socrates has spent the previous day describing an ideal state that appears to share its major principles with the state in the *Republic*. He has asked his companions to describe the actions of this state at war, for the purposes of his own philosophical entertainment; the city is to be shown as glorious in battles and celebrated in its victories.¹⁷¹ Critias goes on to recount a story told to him by Solon while in Egypt, about Athens before the famous deluge and the survival of Deucalion and Pyrrha. In this time Athens was said to be first in warfare, but also the noblest and fairest race with the strongest constitution.¹⁷² Athena is described as a lover of “both war and wisdom” (*philopolemos* and *philosophos*) and as such she selected a location for the city that would produce men like her who were also lovers of wisdom and warfare.¹⁷³ Unlike the tales of early man in the *Laws*, these are not visions of a peaceful society happily co-existing in a time before war. These are men made for war by divine design, but more than this they were able to be lovers of war and also lovers of wisdom. War is not then a mistake or an accident of nature but a position made tenable by wisdom.

It has been shown that the above passage of the *Timaeus* echoes the possible pro-war stance of the *Republic*. However, there is not a passage that shares the *Laws* more negative view of war as closely. Nevertheless, there are two passages that hint at a more

¹⁶⁷ *ibid* 232a.

¹⁶⁸ Zampaglione 1973, 56.

¹⁶⁹ Plato *Prt.* 359a-360c.

¹⁷⁰ *cf* Plato *Resp.* 399a, 460b, 468b-c, 607a; *Leg.* 707c, which, as Hobbs 2007, 179 states: “celebrate the courage, resolution and obedience of a certain type of soldier and acknowledge the role that war can play in forming and testing the corresponding type of courage; they do not overtly celebrate or foster war in itself”.

¹⁷¹ Plato *Ti.* 17a-20c.

¹⁷² *ibid* 23b-c.

¹⁷³ *ibid* 24c-d.

negative image of wars. Firstly, the *Gorgias* that states: it is better to be wronged than to wrong another. The man that does wrong is evil, base and wretched even if he is the wealthiest of rulers, whereas the man that is wronged is noble and good and as a result is happy.¹⁷⁴ Ethically speaking this could be described as similar to the more pacifistic philosophy of the Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean schools. However, as has already been noted, a passage in the *Alcibiades 1*¹⁷⁵ reminds us that war itself can be a force for justice and as such one that enters into war, rather than submitting, is not unquestionably in the wrong. If a war is for the good of the city then not entering a war would, in Plato's eyes, be the wrong action and therefore base, evil and miserable. This leaves only one passage that can be seen as an overtly anti-war statement. In the *Phaedo* Socrates describes wars, revolutions and battles as caused by the desires of the body, distractions of needs and wants that are driven in part by the acquisition of wealth.¹⁷⁶ This could again be dismissed as showing neither a firm positive nor negative stance on war, but rather merely identifying the causes and making no moral judgement. However, Socrates continues to describe how the needs of the body (including war) reduce the time that it is possible for man to spend in the pursuit of truth. So rather than being an important aspect of the philosopher's concern as Craig argues in *The War Lover*¹⁷⁷, war prevents the philosopher from continuing his crucial business, so far from loving war a practical philosopher cannot truly exist during times of conflict.

Aristotle

Just as two of Plato's dialogues give extended consideration to the ideas of war and peace, Aristotle also contemplates these issues in two of his works, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*¹⁷⁸. However, unlike the *Laws* and the *Republic* that show a contradictory attitude towards war and peace the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are much more consistent in their stance and so can be examined together. Like Plato, Aristotle believed that an army was a necessity when it came to establishing a city. He says in the *Politics*, that a government must be "organised with a view to military strength", because an enemy

¹⁷⁴ Plato *Grg.* 469b-471d.

¹⁷⁵ Plato *Alc.* 1.109.

¹⁷⁶ Plato *Phaedo* 66b-c.

¹⁷⁷ Craig 1994, 21.

¹⁷⁸ The *Rhetoric to Alexander* also spends some time on the practicalities of war and peace, but as it is generally accepted as spurious it will not be considered here.

state could at any time make an attack in order to gain wealth¹⁷⁹ and that the military “are as necessary as any other class, if the country is not to be the slave to every invader”.¹⁸⁰ He goes further than Plato on this point. Plato only allowed for the need for an army once the state in the *Republic* had reached a certain size and had gained some wealth.¹⁸¹ Aristotle, though, insists that even when a state is in its infancy it will need a military, as some of those citizens who are part of the commercial life of the city (farmers, shoemakers, builder etc.) would also naturally either become leaders or soldiers, or indeed both.¹⁸²

However, later in the *Politics* Aristotle contemplates an example of an isolated state. He says they would thus have no need to make any constitutional measures towards warfare, and that this shows that for other states also, war is not “the supreme end of all things”.¹⁸³ He claims at this point that warlike pursuits are generally to be considered honourable.¹⁸⁴ In this regard Aristotle again shares his views with Plato; Aristotle can envisage that deeds of warriors can be honourable actions. Aristotle sees courage as part of excellence along with justice, temperance, liberality, magnanimity, magnificence, prudence, gentleness, and wisdom.¹⁸⁵ Courage is seen as one of the two most honoured parts of excellence with justice the other, for these are the two elements most useful for others, “since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and peace”,¹⁸⁶ and it is courage that causes men to do noble deeds.¹⁸⁷

Despite the necessity of an army for any city that does not find itself in total isolation and the need for the leaders of a city to consider the needs of war, Aristotle, again following Plato, dismisses the constitutions of cities aimed simply at war as mistaken. He says the charge brought by Plato that because the Spartan state only aimed at excellence in wars, it collapsed in times of peace, is justified. He also says that “of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and have never engaged in any employment higher than war”, therefore the art of peace is considered a “higher” art than that of war.¹⁸⁸ Further to this, he adds another

¹⁷⁹ *Pol.* 2.7.1267a17-35.

¹⁸⁰ *Pol.* 4.4.129a6-7.

¹⁸¹ Plato *Resp.* 2.373b-374b. This is the first time a need for soldiers is considered. While the state Socrates was describing was modest and self-sufficient there was not requirement for expansion or self defence.

¹⁸² 1291a8-30.

¹⁸³ 7.2.1325a1-8.

¹⁸⁴ 7.2.1325a6.

¹⁸⁵ *Rh.* 1.9.1336b1-3, *Eth. Nic.* 3.6.1115a34 & *Eth. Nic.* 3.7.1116b7.

¹⁸⁶ 1366b4-7.

¹⁸⁷ 1366b11-13.

¹⁸⁸ *Pol.* 2.9.1271b1-6.

reason for the failure of the Spartan constitution: “they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the excellence which gains them”.¹⁸⁹ This is repeated again later in the *Politics*, where Aristotle says that many of his contemporaries mistakenly praise the Lacedaemonians’ constitution for their training to meet great dangers and gain great powers; that they are right to do this can “be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts”.¹⁹⁰ Aristotle goes one step further for he says that a legislator who trains his citizens to conquer his neighbours is committing an act of great harm.¹⁹¹ This is contrary to what Plato recommended in the *Republic*.

Again Aristotle follows Plato in giving soldiers an elevated social status. He says that the warrior class is the higher part of society, due to its involvement in administering justice and in deliberations, which are political activities and are more essential than those which provide the necessities of life.¹⁹² He states also that the class of warriors and councillors are at once different and the same, as men who were of the military class in their youth should be the same men who form the governing class in their old age.¹⁹³ However, just as Plato could see that war could be used as an abuse of power, so could Aristotle; tyrants wage wars not for defence or protection but so that the citizens are occupied and in need of a leader.¹⁹⁴ Therefore, it is necessary for the guardians to be not only ex-soldiers but also moderate, even towards those they do not know. It is wrong to be angry at anyone, and a high mannered soul is only angered by truly evil acts.¹⁹⁵ moderation, therefore, is as important in a leader as courage was in a soldier, and this is little wonder considering two of the other elements that make up excellence: i.e. temperance and gentleness.

However, the most important aspect of Aristotle’s beliefs about war and peace is that peace is a higher state of being than war. As has been shown, Aristotle believed it was necessary for men to be able to go to war, but “leisure and peace are better”¹⁹⁶, and the Spartan Empire failed because they had “never engaged in any employment higher than war”.¹⁹⁷ As a result war should only be entered into for the purpose of peace, “there must

¹⁸⁹ 1271b7-11.

¹⁹⁰ 7.14.1333b11-28.

¹⁹¹ 1333b29-32.

¹⁹² *Pol.* 4.4.1291a24-28.

¹⁹³ *Pol.* 7.1329a2-14.

¹⁹⁴ 5.11.1313b28-30.

¹⁹⁵ *Pol.* 7.7.1328b7-10.

¹⁹⁶ *Pol.* 7.14.13331b1-2.

¹⁹⁷ *Pol.* 2.9.1271b5-6.

be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure”¹⁹⁸, they must do what is “necessary” but what is “honourable is better”.¹⁹⁹ For Aristotle happiness is dependent on leisure, and war is an act devoid of all leisure, for no one chooses to enter a war merely for the sake of being at war, and they would seem murderous if they did.²⁰⁰ To this end Maurice Defourney believes that the goal of the state in Aristotle is peace²⁰¹, and he associates these claims that war should only be for the sake of peace with Aristotle’s statements about not subjugating men if they are not slaves by nature. It is unjust to enslave those who are not meant to be slaves²⁰² and, as such, a war cannot be just if it performs this unjust act. Therefore, war cannot be legitimised because it is an act of subjugation.²⁰³ However, this is only true in the case of wars between two Greek states, as Aristotle did believe that some men were naturally inclined to slavery while others were born masters. This divide was namely that of Greek masters and non-Greek slaves.²⁰⁴ In fact even wars that were waged with the intention of enslaving those who were by nature subordinate, but by will were free, are considered just.²⁰⁵ There are also two other reasons given for entering wars that could be considered just, firstly to “provide against their own enslavement” (defensive wars), secondly to extend the state for the good of those governed, and not merely to increase power and prestige for its own sake.²⁰⁶

Therefore, although like Plato, Aristotle believed the military to be an essential part of any state that had contact with other states, and gave warriors an elevated position within the community, he also felt that peace should be the ultimate goal for the guardians of the state, and the ultimate goal of any war. That the goal of a war should be peace was probably just as true for wars started with the intention of enslaving non-Greeks as with wars between Greeks. However, wars for the enslavement of barbarians were permitted to be initiated deliberately. So the cosmopolitan attitude found later in the Stoics and Cynics is noticeable by its absence in the doctrine of Aristotle, but as Defourney observes the “theory of peace-making wars was destined to survive...Saint Augustine, Gratian of

¹⁹⁸ 1331a35-6.

¹⁹⁹ 1331b2-3.

²⁰⁰ *Eth. Nic.* 10.7.1177b2-12.

²⁰¹ Defourney 1977, 195-201.

²⁰² *Pol.* 7.2.1324b36-7.

²⁰³ Defourney 1977, 198.

²⁰⁴ *Pol.* 1.5.1254b16-23.

²⁰⁵ *Pol.* 1.8.1256b25 & 7.14.1334a2.

²⁰⁶ *Pol.* 7.14.1333b39-1334a2.

Bologna, Saint Thomas and Victoria...repeat it incessantly"²⁰⁷, and although Plato does touch on the idea once in the *Republic*, it was Aristotle who developed and expanded it.

Having considered the attitudes of Plato and Aristotle to peace I shall now examine the major schools of the period, all of which were influenced in varying degrees by the works of Plato and Aristotle. I shall begin with the three schools that have previously been considered the most pacifistic by other modern scholars; the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans.

Stoicism

Very little has been written about Stoic attitudes to war and peace. *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, for example, does not at any point cover either topic. Where the subject is briefly approached in other authors' work the conclusions reached are vastly diverse. Arnold, writing about Roman Stoicism claimed that, although in general war was considered an evil force, it could also be a force for good as it purges the world of "superfluous population".²⁰⁸ Whereas Hicks, writing specifically about the later Stoics, says that "war was universally condemned" and was always caused by "blindness and infatuation".²⁰⁹ In this case it is the argument of Arnold that can be most easily discarded, as he bases his theory not directly on the work of a Stoic but on that of Plutarch, who says this view of the Stoic attitude to war was found in a lost work of Chrysippus. Plutarch used this as an example of the contradictions present within the Stoic beliefs. However, Chrysippus would often argue both sides of an argument and as this, like the majority of Chrysippus' work, does not survive, it is impossible to tell if this concept was to be believed or was merely put forward as one of many opposing views. However, before completely rejecting Arnold's theory, it will be necessary to examine each of the prominent Imperial Stoics, looking not only at their opinion of peace but also of war to see if there is any truth in the suggestion that, although war was evil, it could well be a justified evil sent by the gods to reduce the ever increasing population. I will begin this investigation with Musonius Rufus because of his active involvement in an attempt to stop the civil wars of AD 69, before moving to his successors Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom. Finally I will consider Seneca as his public career as tutor to Nero makes him somewhat of a special case: as such he may provide an exception to any rules, if indeed any rules can be shown to exist at all.

²⁰⁷ Defourney 1977, 201.

²⁰⁸ Arnold 1911, 207.

²⁰⁹ Hicks 1962, 142.

Musonius Rufus

None of Musonius' own philosophical writing has survived extant: instead what we know of him and his work comes from fragments contained within other scholars' work and also from the events recorded by historians, most prominently Tacitus. The majority of the fragments of his philosophical work come from the compiled extracts of Joannes Stobaeus and from within the work of Musonius' most famous pupil Epictetus, although in turn the works of Epictetus are only preserved by his own pupil Arrian. As a result, what we possess of Musonius' work is only a glimpse into his philosophical thought and not surprisingly his work on war and peace is therefore, also limited. In the majority of cases war is mentioned only in passing as an analogous example. Clothes, Musonius says, should be like armour in that they should be used only for the practical purpose of protection and not as decoration.²¹⁰ Furthermore, while proposing that women as well as men should be trained in philosophy he uses the example of the Amazons who could defend themselves from attack and possessed great courage, two traits that a philosopher should also be endowed with, although the philosopher's defence should be wisdom not warfare.²¹¹ The only other positive image of war present in Musonius' work is in his discourse on the question *Is Marriage a Handicap for the Pursuit of Philosophy?* In this discourse he encourages all men to make their "home a rampart for [the city's] protection".²¹² However, just a few lines previously Musonius strongly argues that it is man's ability to act with others and for the sake of his neighbours that allows him to be different from wild beasts, in that he does not have to live by violence, but rather by co-operation and justice.²¹³ It is unlikely then that this image of home as rampart is meant in any literal way. This is less likely when the context of the image is considered, Musonius is extolling the virtues of marriage, one of which is the fact that marriage leads to procreation, and that children allow for the continued protection of the city: "thus, whoever destroys human marriage destroys the home, the city and the whole human race".²¹⁴ Therefore the rampart created in marriage is not a literal battlement from which to ward off an enemy, but is built by marriage because

²¹⁰ Musonius 19.120.18.

²¹¹ *ibid* 4.44.29 – 46.4.

²¹² *ibid* 14.92.32.

²¹³ *ibid* 14.92.16-26.

²¹⁴ *ibid* 14.35-6

marriage allows for “just and lawful procreation”²¹⁵, which in turn allows for the preservation of man.

The nearest Musonius seems to come to discussing battle is a description of a fight between two cocks or quails, in which he praises the wounded bird for not submitting and even for fighting to the death. This, he says, is the most noble response, when the suffering is for “a good purpose”: to help friends or kin, for the good of the city or, best of all, enduring hardships so that you can become “good and just and self-controlled”.²¹⁶ This could therefore be seen to express an acceptable aspect of violence, at least on a personal level. However, it must be remembered that the purpose of this extract is to demonstrate that one should not disdain hardships. Thus, it is not extolling the benefits of violence but rather using the plight and reaction of a bird to violence merely as one example of a hardship, and comparing the bird’s response to that of men, “certain animals...shame us in enduring hardships” says Musonius.²¹⁷ Therefore it is not the violent actions that are praised, but the refusal of the bird to retreat from this hardship. If a quail can endure, then so should men. It is also interesting to note that in this example it is a cock that Musonius Rufus has picked to demonstrate such an admirable quality, as the Epicureans are said to have revered this animal, especially the white cock.²¹⁸ So perhaps, far from picking this example for purely demonstrative purposes, Musonius has been influenced in this example by the Epicureans, or perhaps the qualifier “or quail” is added to avoid the accusation of relying on an Epicurean motif.

The idea that the example of the cock has not been used to glorify violence en masse becomes more apparent when we consider the one fragment in which Musonius considers personal violence. He says men that have been met with physical violence and have done nothing to defend their rights or “proceeded against [their attacker] in anyway” have reacted in the correct way. Whereas those who meet violence with violence are no better than wild beasts and this “ignorance and misunderstanding” is the cause of “the majority of wrongs...done to men”.²¹⁹ It is possible to suggest that perhaps this is a position Musonius felt should be taken by nations as well as individuals. For in his treatise, *That Kings Also*

²¹⁵ *ibid* 14.37-38

²¹⁶ *ibid* 7.58.16-25.

²¹⁷ *ibid* 7.58.14.

²¹⁸ Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 32. 2; *Quaest. Conv.* 670 c-d; Diogenes Laertius, 8.34; Iamblichus, *VP* 84 & 147.

²¹⁹ Musonius 10.78.20-30.

Should Study Philosophy, delivered to a Syrian king, he extols the benefits of a “sober rule and seemly submission”.²²⁰ Once the lecture was finished Musonius was told the king would not refuse anything he wished for. All that Musonius required was for the king to follow his teachings.²²¹ Therefore, this submissive quality that the king was to follow could perhaps have been meant in a similar way to the submissive quality required of individuals. This is further demonstrated in a two line fragment that also muses on the role of the king: “Towards subjects one should be regarded with awe rather than with fear. Reverence attends the one, bitterness the other”.²²² Presumably this awe would have been created by the use of “seemly submission”²²³ rather than through ill judged acts of retribution which would have caused fear and bitterness among a subject nation.

The oft repeated mantra of war for the sake of glory, rejected by Cicero,²²⁴ is also disparaged in Musonius. He sees glory as unworthy²²⁵, while listing the unworthy ends for which people are willing to suffer hardships he condemns “how much suffering those who are pursuing fame endure...voluntarily”.²²⁶ Therefore, glory is dismissed as a goal not worthy of the hardships people so often endure for its vain prize. So even though its role in warfare is not considered, Musonius would almost certainly have viewed the idea of war for glory with little sympathy. The final element of Musonius’ philosophy, which could be said to show a longing for peace, is his belief that men are most wretched, if they harm their enemy. He supposes that a despicable man “is much more easily recognised by his inability to help [his enemy]” and the notion common at the time that one should “strive to harm the first enemies we meet is the mark of mean-minded and ignorant men”.²²⁷ Again we see Musonius calling for the restraint, so often present in Stoic thought, a restraint that sees Musonius willing to help rather than attack his enemies, which if elevated to the state level would again result in peace, rather than aggression.

Now the meagre remains of Musonius’ attitude towards peace have been picked over, it is possible to examine the life of the philosopher to see if any further examples can be found that confirm or contradict these opinions. The philosopher’s most important act in this

²²⁰ *ibid* 8.63.10.

²²¹ *ibid* 10.67.28-32.

²²² *ibid* 33.133.18.

²²³ *ibid* 8.63.10.

²²⁴ *Cic. Off.* 1.38; 1. 74; 3.87.

²²⁵ Sidebottom 1993, 247.

²²⁶ Musonius 7.56.15-20.

²²⁷ *ibid* 41.137.22-6.

respect is undoubtedly his “courageous”²²⁸ (or perhaps “ludicrous”²²⁹) actions during the civil wars of 69 BC. Tacitus tells us that he followed an envoy sent to the advancing army of Vespasian in order to “expiate upon the benefits of peace and the risks of war” (*bona pacis ac belli discrimina disserens*).²³⁰ Sidebottom correctly observes that, although there is no extended discourse on war or peace in the work of Musonius, this incident demonstrates that he “felt competent to lecture on war”.²³¹ However this incident demonstrates more than this, as it shows Musonius willing to risk his life to practically apply his philosophical beliefs, putting his money where his mouth was, so to speak²³², and in this case his money and mouth were both heavily invested in the spreading of concord. So Musonius was more than a theorist in the world of Philosophy: he lived by the high standards he set himself and others in his discourses.

Another incident in Musonius’ life that could show his attitudes in this area occurred in Athens, probably in the early 70s AD.²³³ Dio Chrysostom states that Musonius protested against the Athenian practice of holding gladiatorial contests in the theatre and was forced to leave the city because of his actions.²³⁴ The philosopher is said to have rebuked the city because the gladiators would often be “slaughtered among the very seats in which the Hierophant and the other priests must sit”. However, it is said to have been the location of the slaughter not the bloodshed alone that caused his disapproval. Therefore, due to the fact that either Musonius never wrote about the blood sports of Rome, or because his opinions on this do not survive, it is impossible to tell if there was any more general objection to the gladiatorial battles, as was the case with St. Telemachus’ own protest that ended in his martyrdom in 404 AD.²³⁵ As there is no evidence of Musonius making a similar protest during his time spent in Rome, it must be assumed that either it was the specific location of the theatre that disturbed him so greatly or perhaps he was displaying his

²²⁸ Hicks 1962, 142.

²²⁹ Charlesworth 1936, 33.

²³⁰ Tacitus, *Hist.* 3.81 (my translation).

²³¹ Sidebottom 1993, 243. Sidebottom, however, does not consider that this shows Musonius also felt competent to lecture on peace and not just war. However, it is clear from Tacitus that Musonius engaged the approaching army on both topics (Tacitus, *Hist.* 3.81).

²³² Cassius Dio, *Ep.* 65.18-19; Hicks 1962, 142; Lutz 1947, 15.

²³³ Lutz 1947, 17; Charlesworth 1936, 36.

²³⁴ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 31.121-122. Many older scholars and some more modern ones believe the philosopher mentioned is Apollonius of Tyana despite the fact the philosopher is clearly identified as Roman. This means that although it is probably Musonius, as no other Roman philosopher enjoyed such a high reputation at that time, it is not firmly established (Lutz 1947, 17).

²³⁵ Theodoret, *The Ecclesiastical History*, 5.26.

shrewdness, that also allowed him to leave the field of conflict when his life was repeatedly threatened while he rode among Vespasian's troops.²³⁶

Epictetus

Like Musonius Rufus, there is no extant work written by the hand of Epictetus, yet comparatively Epictetus' opinions are preserved in a much more detailed and systematic way. This is because eight books were composed by one of his students, Arrian, who claims to have recorded his teacher's words "word for word, as best I could, to preserve it for a memorial".²³⁷ Out of these eight books the first four have survived as well as the *Encheiridion*, or *Manual*, which is a summary also composed by Arrian, and gives a good indication what the four lost books may have contained. Due to the larger volume of Epictetus' work it may be expected that a more detailed view of war and peace may appear, however this is not the case. It seems that Epictetus never dedicated a discourse to war and, like Seneca, was more concerned with the ethics of the individual than those of the state or army.²³⁸ He also felt it was the job of the philosopher to focus more on issues of happiness and unhappiness or freedom and slavery than war and peace.²³⁹ Despite Epictetus not devoting a treaty to war, Sidebottom believes he would have felt negatively about war.²⁴⁰ "Control over moral purpose"²⁴¹ was truly where a man ought to focus his attention because this control would lead to "love in the household, concord in the State, [and] peace among states".²⁴² Therefore, if control over moral purpose is the way a man should spend his life, and this leads to peace among nations, then war must be a negative force created by man's failure to achieve this control. Certainly this seems to be what Epictetus implies. He gives the example of Polyneices and Eteocles, whose poor judgements about exile and kingship caused them to lose control of their moral purpose and started a war as a result.²⁴³

²³⁶ Tacitus, *Hist.* 3.81.

²³⁷ Epict. *preface* 2

²³⁸ *ibid* 4.1.86-7

²³⁹ *ibid* 3.22.84; Sidebottom 1993, 243-4.

²⁴⁰ Sidebottom 1993, 245-6. "Logically, war was generally bad because it was caused by faulty judgements (4.5.28ff.). The wise man remains at peace with all men no matter what they do (4.5.24)."

²⁴¹ Epict. 4.5.34.

²⁴² Epict. 4.5.34-5.

²⁴³ Epict. 4.5.28-30.

However, it appears that Epictetus goes much farther than merely believing peace to be a positive force, because it is promoted by those who have committed themselves to control over moral purpose. When Epictetus discourses on desire, 3.22, he considers the origins of the Trojan War and abduction of Helen. It is asked “shall we then be despised by the Trojans?” This is answered with another question: Who are the Trojans? Are they “wise men or foolish? If they are wise why are you fighting them? If foolish, why do you care?”²⁴⁴ Epictetus states, then, that wars should not be fought against either the wise or the foolish. The wise should not be warred with purely because they are wise and the foolish because they are not worthy of the attention that war would give them. For the ex-slave Epictetus, who was obsessed with the idea of freedom²⁴⁵, war should not even be waged for the preservation of freedom.²⁴⁶ But most important of all is the encouragement of Epictetus to announce that you are at “peace with all men, no matter what they do”.²⁴⁷ According to Epictetus, if you are able to make this claim then you are like the city that laughs at its besiegers, since you know you are safe and fully supplied within the walls.²⁴⁸ So Epictetus goes one step further than Musonius Rufus: as while Musonius urged others not to seek revenge for violent acts, Epictetus encouraged a proclaimed peace among all men because of the safety it creates.

Although Epictetus does not give an extended consideration to the ideas of war and peace he does, however, address one of his discourses *To Those Who Have Their Hearts upon Living a Quiet Life*, to this topic.²⁴⁹ In this discourse his opinions are perhaps surprising; he is as negative towards those who desire to live peacefully as he is towards those who desire any other object or personal gain.²⁵⁰ The desire for turmoil, property, reputation, office and freedom from office are all equal evils with a desire for peace. It is not the object of desire that is important but the desire itself, for it makes you subservient to another.²⁵¹ So it seems that although Epictetus could see no justification for war in any circumstances and also saw peace as the result of the true calling of man, the Stoic belief that emotions should

²⁴⁴ *ibid* 3.22.36-7.

²⁴⁵ Oldfather 1961, 17; Oldfather records that in Epictetus “free” and “freedom” occur more than six times as frequently as in the New Testament and more than twice as frequently as in Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations*.

²⁴⁶ Epict. 4.1.171-173; Sidebottom 1993, 248 & 250.

²⁴⁷ Epict. 4.5.24.

²⁴⁸ *ibid* 4.5.25-6.

²⁴⁹ *ibid* 4.4.

²⁵⁰ *ibid* 4.4.1

²⁵¹ *ibid* 4.4.1-2.

be controlled meant that the desire for peace was an evil force despite the fact that peace itself was ultimately good.

As well as these few instances when Epictetus deals directly with war and peace, he also uses many military images. The most positive are those that compare the role of the philosopher to a scout²⁵² and the role of God to a general.²⁵³ However, none of these images show either the scout or the general in a particularly positive light, but rather are used purely metaphorically. The philosopher is sent out as a scout to bring back information to the populace and God is only as a general because he must be obeyed and Epictetus is seen as an unquestionably loyal soldier. Whereas these images appear neutral as far as Epictetus' view of peace is concerned, there is one in which the military is possibly seen in a more negative light. Epictetus says that just as soldiers "appear before their general, all ready for service" so do animals "born for service, ready for use, equipped, and in need of no further attention. Consequently, one small child with a rod can drive a flock of sheep".²⁵⁴ This perhaps shows Epictetus not only as a supporter of peace but also someone who felt negative towards the role of the soldiers. However, this would depend on whether or not the comparison between sheep and soldiers was still intended to be considered when the idea of the child controlling the flock was introduced. Were Arrian and the rest of Epictetus' audience supposed to picture an unthinking army being beaten back by the free-willed child with a stick or was this only a comment on the inability of domesticated animals to resist any amount of coercion? Perhaps Epictetus' earlier comparison between soldiers on campaign and convicts²⁵⁵ indicates that this is a further example of the soldiers' lack of free thought, and the ease with which they can be controlled. A final point to make on Epictetus is that he uses his philosophical theories to question the motives of contemporary wars.²⁵⁶ On a personal level Epictetus dismisses the possibility that self-interest is good. It is in the individual's interest to have a farm, so it is also to take his neighbour's farm; equally it is in his interest to have a cloak so his interest can be met by stealing a cloak from the baths "this is the source of wars, stasis, tyrannies and plots".²⁵⁷ This idea is confirmed exactly a book later when the interests of Polyneices

²⁵² *ibid* 1. 24.6; 3.22.23-25.

²⁵³ *ibid* 1.29.29.

²⁵⁴ *ibid* 1.16.4-5.

²⁵⁵ *ibid* 4.1.39; *cf* 3.24.29.

²⁵⁶ Sidebottom 1993, 247-8.

²⁵⁷ Epict. 1.22.14-15.

and Eteocles are thrown between them “like a piece of meat between two dogs”.²⁵⁸ Again a misconception of the importance and magnitude of self-interest is the cause for stasis and war. Further, it is this “ignorance” that has caused the wars not only of the Athenians, Spartans and Thebans but also those, as Epictetus points out, in “our days the Romans with the Getae”.²⁵⁹ So although Epictetus did not ride out to confront an advancing army in the way Musonius Rufus may have done, in the privacy of his own classroom he was willing to question the present emperor’s motivation for going to war.²⁶⁰

Despite Epictetus’ denouncement of Trajan for his war with the Getae, which was caused by his failure to correctly gauge the worthiness of self-interest, Epictetus also shows a conflicting image of the Principate’s role in peace. “Caesar seems to provide us with profound peace”, the battles and wars have ceased, brigands and pirates no longer are a large scale nuisance, and long distance travel is safe by land or sea, “from the rising sun to its setting”.²⁶¹ Although specific imperial wars are condemned, the empire has brought peace. However, the peace provided by Caesar is very different from that given by the philosopher, which promises also peace from love, sorrow and envy: this peace may come from philosophy but is proclaimed by God not by the Emperor.²⁶² This internal peace provides a very real external benefit also, for a man in possession of such a peace says “no evil can befall me, for there is no such thing as a brigand [or] earthquake, everything is full of peace, everything full of tranquillity”.²⁶³ This peace is so profound that even murder can only harm “your trivial body”.²⁶⁴ The peace from Caesar is an absence of war at the centre of the empire and is secondary to the peace that philosophy can bring which may not banish war and violence but makes them an irrelevant force.

²⁵⁸ *ibid* 2.22.14.

²⁵⁹ *ibid* 2.22.22.

²⁶⁰ Sidebottom 1993, 248; Millar 1965, 142 who places this discourse circa 108 AD.

²⁶¹ Epict. 3.13.9.

²⁶² Epict. 3.13.10-12.

²⁶³ *ibid* 13.

²⁶⁴ *ibid* 17.

Dio Chrysostom (of Prusa)

Dio Chrysostom, like Musonius Rufus and Epictetus, often used military images and comparisons in his discourses: The loyalty of a friend is compared to a rampart²⁶⁵; Dio says each man should be ready for life as each soldier is prepared for war²⁶⁶; and the constant search for morality over depravity is described as an unremitting war.²⁶⁷ However, unlike Musonius and Epictetus, Dio engaged much more directly with the ideas of war and peace, most notably in the twenty-second discourse *Concerning Peace and War*, but also in the first four kingship orations believed to have been delivered to Trajan²⁶⁸ and the fifth kingship oration believed not to have been addressed to Trajan due to its less complete style and the repetition from orations 1 and 3. Most significant perhaps are his orations delivered to the cities of Bithynia, either theoretically promoting concord over civil strife²⁶⁹, or practically promoting peace between the cities at times of specific and genuine unrest.²⁷⁰

What we possess of Dio's twenty-second discourse *Concerning Peace and War* is sadly only a fragment, the majority of which focuses not on the question that Dio assures us will be tackled at length, but rather on the differences in the way philosophers and orators tackle such questions: philosophers in considering "their general aspect" while orators discuss "definite cases".²⁷¹ However, it is still possible to take something from this discourse both regarding Dio's attitude towards war and peace and the nature of the question itself. Dio tells us that this is a subject often addressed by philosophers and that it is one of the main questions of the age.²⁷² This is perhaps surprising given Epictetus' and Musonius' only passing references to warfare but, as it has already been noted, Musonius' confrontation with Vespasian's troops²⁷³ shows that Musonius could not only lecture on peace and concord²⁷⁴, but was also well rehearsed in the topic, as he was able to give this lecture spontaneously under the pressure of an advancing army. Dio also suggests that he will go on to ask whether or not revenge is a just cause to wage war and how serious an act must

²⁶⁵ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 1.31.

²⁶⁶ *ibid* 16.6.

²⁶⁷ *ibid* 74.3-4.

²⁶⁸ *Or.* 1, 2, 3 & 4.

²⁶⁹ *Or.* 39.

²⁷⁰ *Or.* 38, 40 & 41.

²⁷¹ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 22.3-4.

²⁷² *ibid* 22.2-3.

²⁷³ Tac. *Hist.* 3.81.

²⁷⁴ Sidebottom 1993, 243.

be committed before a war should be waged.²⁷⁵ This suggests that Dio will define a point at which war becomes a viable option. Dio sides with the philosophers' technique in the way to approach these questions, saying that it is best to have already considered the topic in the abstract form and that this will prevent hesitation and the need for rushed improvisation.²⁷⁶ Yet, not long after this, the discourse breaks off and it is never made clear where Dio would have drawn the line between just and unjust cause, or even if he would have been able to find any just cause at all.

Despite Dio's assertion that it is best to consider the general nature of war and peace in his twenty-second discourse, he often became involved in the specific examples. The thirty-eighth discourse was delivered to the Nicomedians with the purpose of ceasing hostilities between the inhabitants and their neighbours in Nicaea. The fortieth discourse was delivered with the same intent as the thirty-eighth, but in his own city of Prusa, with the aim of encouraging peace with their neighbours, the Apameians. So although Dio preferred the advantages of dealing with a theoretical conflict, he was also willing to involve himself when a specific need arose. Despite having entered into a specific dialogue about concord, he first spends some time discussing the more general nature of concord.²⁷⁷ Concord is said to find its origins in "greatest of divine things", the same origins as "friendship and reconciliation and kinship".²⁷⁸ Dio acknowledges that there are those that love strife, but Dio says this is like loving a disease of our bodies and that people that love factions and wars and diseases are evil as these things are evil.²⁷⁹ This more general appraisal of concord also contains a section on the various reasons men have chosen war over peace, including kingly power, liberty and territory, but these are all treated as equals and there have been others that have "laid war aside as an evil" and have chosen things of the "highest value" rather than war for these purposes.²⁸⁰ Dio then, like others, sees tyranny and profit as unworthy of war, but unlike others he also sees liberty as not worthy of war and concord as of more value than freedom. Worse than all these though is war without purpose (even an unworthy purpose) which is caused only by "madness".²⁸¹ Most confusing for Chrysostom is the fact that people are actually grateful for wars when they are begun. War is as destructive as an earthquake or pestilence, and these are seen as

²⁷⁵ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 22.4.

²⁷⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷⁷ *ibid.* 38.8–20.

²⁷⁸ *ibid.* 38.11–14.

²⁷⁹ *ibid.*

²⁸⁰ *ibid.* 16–17.

²⁸¹ *ibid.* 17.

punishment from the gods. Yet, wars are caused not by the gods, but are chosen by men. Rather than being a meeting of “evil for evil” they are the cause for rewards and honours. This, Dio says, is “witless” as it shows that men are able to be thankful for the evil they cause themselves.²⁸² This is a concept at odds with other sections of Dio’s work where war is said to be given by Zeus, the creator and inspirer of war²⁸³, but Dio himself says that this sort of god is not possible to be “represented by his art” but was possible to be portrayed by Homer.²⁸⁴ Perhaps, at this point, Dio was claiming modesty and saying his talent was not equal to Homer and, as such, he could not do justice to the image of the warring god. However, perhaps instead the meaning is that the philosopher deals with truth and the poet with fiction, so that Dio’s art cannot describe god as the bringer of war as he is dedicated to truth and the Stoic Providence would not cause such evils among men. That the latter possibility is more likely is suggested by the announcement made to the Nicaeans, in *Orations* 39, in which Chrysostom proclaims that it is right for men, descended from gods, to live in peace and concord.²⁸⁵ This is further supported by Dio’s speech made while at Prusa, where he states that the heavens and gods are in a state of “order and concord and self-control which is eternal” just as the elements are in balance and through this “stable, righteous, everlasting concord” they preserve not only themselves but also the universe.²⁸⁶ Therefore, it is likely that Dio declined to present the gods as the creators of wars on philosophical, not purely artistic, grounds.

Also in the Prusa orations, Dio tells his own people that it is better to show reluctance to make war than peace and that it is preferable to be seen as weak than base.²⁸⁷ He even tells the crowd that “any peace...is better than war” for peace and concord have “never damaged at all those who have employed them”.²⁸⁸ It seems then that the advice Dio gave to Nicaea and Nicomedia was not merely acceptable for other towns, but was also the path he would urge his own town to take: willing to make compromises to the point at which he would appear weak rather than engage in a war. This idea continues at 40.30 when Dio asks “How much, then, is it worth to avoid experiencing these things? How much more to avoid inflicting them on others?” For Dio, the crime of inflicting military defeat on an enemy comes at a greater cost than experiencing one. He is as keen to avoid the moral

²⁸² *ibid* 20.

²⁸³ *ibid* 12.78.

²⁸⁴ *ibid* 12.79.

²⁸⁵ *ibid* 39.2.

²⁸⁶ *ibid* 40.35.

²⁸⁷ *ibid* 40.24.

²⁸⁸ *ibid* 40.26.

stain of victory as he is the practical hardship of loss. However, despite these passages in which it seems Dio is convincing his townsmen that a subservient life is favourable to any situation, he is keen to confirm he does not wish to be “wholly submissive”.²⁸⁹ Instead he claims that he is merely suggesting that when Apamea have made steps towards peace that Prusa are quick to appear eager in the negotiations.²⁹⁰ However, it is unclear whether this passage is added in an attempt to allay the concerns of the more aggressive in the crowd or whether the more total pacifistic arguments are the result of rhetorical hyperbole.

Unlike the orations delivered to Nero by Seneca, Dio Chrysostom’s orations to Trajan often broach military topics. The first kingship oration opens with Dio comparing himself to Timotheus, the favourite flautist of Alexander the Great. Timotheus’ playing was capable of inspiring “courage and high-mindedness”.²⁹¹ Dio says that had Timotheus been able to both call men to arms and also to live in pursuit of “peace and concord”, to not only honour gods but also give consideration to men²⁹², then he would have been of far greater use to Alexander. Dio, then, is suggesting that whereas Timotheus roused Alexander to courageous acts, Dio will inspire Trajan to concord.

Dio’s preference for concord does not mean that he does not consider military ideas and focuses purely on peace. He advocates fair treatment and familiarity between king and army saying that a good ruler is by nature fond of his soldiers.²⁹³ This is explained fully in an analogy of the shepherd and his sheepdogs; one that distorts the previous positivity, as the image of the sheepdogs is not one that portrays soldiers in a peaceful light as they were “renowned for their viciousness”.²⁹⁴ But the good king is also said to be only warlike because it is with him the responsibility of war lies and, even in war, should be described as peaceful as there “is nothing left worth fighting for”. The king must be prepared for war only because this makes it more possible to attain peace.²⁹⁵ This is reconfirmed when Dio uses the example of Hercules. Dio states that men who claim that Hercules travelled without an army are mistaken for it is not possible to overthrow tyrants without an

²⁸⁹ *ibid* 40.22.

²⁹⁰ *ibid* 40.23; Jones 1978, 92.

²⁹¹ *ibid* 1.4.

²⁹² *ibid* 1.6.

²⁹³ *ibid* 1.28.

²⁹⁴ Sidebottom 1993, 253.

²⁹⁵ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 1.27.

army.²⁹⁶ Here, again, then we see Dio embracing the necessity of an armed force for the conflicting purposes of removing tyrants and maintaining peace.

Dio does again turn to peace towards the end of his first kingship oration in the invented etymological myth that explains the reason men so often choose tyranny over peace.²⁹⁷ In this tale Hercules is led by Hermes to a mountain with the twin peaks of Royalty and Tyranny. The high peak (Peak Royal) is the home of the “blessed lady Royalty”. Royalty is attended by three women; Justice, Civic Order and Peace, who is the most important of the three, and one man; Law (also called Right Reason, Counsellor, and Coadjutor by Dio), without whom none of the others can act. Peace then can only be brought about through Law and Right Reason and in the presence of Royalty. This is why peace is the concern of the good king: it is with him that the responsibility for peace must finally rest, as Dio has already stated earlier.²⁹⁸ As Hercules descended, he reached the lower of the two peaks, Peak Tyranny. Here Hermes explained that only the path to one peak was easily viewed (that to Tyranny), the other was more perilous and hidden from plain sight. Once Hermes had escorted Hercules to Tyranny, she was seen to be imitating Royalty but on a more elaborate throne, carved and bejewelled but more unstable than that of Royalty, and beside her were her companions Cruelty, Insolence, Lawlessness, and Faction. Tyranny, then, is chosen by men because they are deceived by her illusion of Royalty. True Royalty however comes with Peace; Tyranny only with Factions.

Peace is not considered again in such detail in the other kingship orations (perhaps because peace forms such a key role in the first oration), but the third oration²⁹⁹ does return to the topic. In a section that extols the virtues of friendship, Dio says that “arms, walls, troops, and cities” are our “greatest necessities”, but they are useless without friends to control them, whereas friends are useful even without arms.³⁰⁰ Thus Dio says that a king should value his friends above his armoury and, moreover, in unbroken peace these items become a burden. However, Dio himself questions the reality of this image, asking whether “such a thing [as unbroken peace can] be possible”, and stating that even if it can exist there is no

²⁹⁶ *ibid* 1.63.

²⁹⁷ *ibid* 1.64–77.

²⁹⁸ *ibid* 1.27.

²⁹⁹ The third kingship oration is also believed to have been delivered to Trajan and includes a comparison of Trajan and Darius II Nothus, in which it is shown that Trajan, unlike his Persian counterpart is a ‘true’ king.

³⁰⁰ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 3.94.

stability in peace without friendship.³⁰¹ The change in attitude seen here is probably due to the change of focus: Dio is not commenting on peace here, but on friendship, by employing an image of war and peace and friendship's role in each, so he does not need to promote peace here in the same way as he did in the first kingship oration. Even so, it is important to note that although Dio's focus is not peace, it is not portrayed negatively but merely more practically, without the utopian hue it is given in other places.³⁰²

Sidebottom highlights another important aspect of Dio's orations to Trajan.³⁰³ Like Musonius Rufus³⁰⁴, Dio Chrysostom did not view glory as worthy cause for war: he saw glory as foolish³⁰⁵ and wrote orations 66 and 68 against the concept of glory. Trajan is seen by other writers of the Imperial period to be heavily motivated by glory.³⁰⁶ As a result, Moles says that oration four, with its discussion on the problems of ambition and attack on militarism, is "a warning against certain aspects of Trajan's character and policy".³⁰⁷ Dio is, therefore criticising the vain pursuit of military glory under an emperor who is accused of just that.³⁰⁸

A final point of interest can be found in the life of Dio Chrysostom as recorded in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*. Philostratus recounts a tale similar to that of Musonius Rufus berating Vespasian's troops in Tacitus, but rather than riding towards an advancing army Dio, after the assassination of Domitian, is said to have removed his beggar disguise while quoting from the *Odyssey* "then Odysseus of many counsels stripped him of his rags".³⁰⁹ Dio, realising that the army may mutiny and throw Rome into further civil strife, compelled them to cease hostilities and, unlike Musonius he was successful.³¹⁰ It seems likely that there was a real fear of mutiny at this time, as Suetonius records it in his *Life of Domitian*.³¹¹ However, rather than the involvement of Dio Chrysostom, Suetonius says the reason the mutiny did not fully materialise was due to the lack of adequate leaders, which seems much more plausible especially given that the time scale involved makes Dio's

³⁰¹ *ibid* 3.94.

³⁰² *ibid* 1.6, 1.72-74, 40.26.

³⁰³ Sidebottom 1993, 247.

³⁰⁴ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 7.56.19-20.

³⁰⁵ *ibid* 38.29.

³⁰⁶ Fronto, 2.213; Cassius Dio, 68.17.1.

³⁰⁷ Moles 1983, 252.

³⁰⁸ Sidebottom 1993, 247.

³⁰⁹ Hom. *Od.* 22.1.

³¹⁰ Philostratus *Lives of the Sophists*, 7.487-8.

³¹¹ Suet. *Dom.* 23.

presence nearly impossible.³¹² Yet, despite the unlikely reality of Dio's plea, it does show the type of man Dio was, that is "a man of peace"³¹³, like Musonius Rufus, committed not only to the theory of peace (seen in the first kingship oration) but also to the practicality of concord (demonstrated by his four orations given in Bithynia). It may have been this attitude, nearing the pacifistic³¹⁴, that caused Dio to write a discourse, now lost, praising the Essenes, a Jewish sect from the Dead Sea area who were renowned for their own pacifist beliefs and lives.³¹⁵

Seneca the Younger

Philosophical Works

From the discussion above on the three most prominent first century Stoic philosophers, it seems clear that Harry Sidebottom was not only correct in his conclusion that they were verging on the pacifistic³¹⁶, but perhaps he does not go far enough. Musonius Rufus, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom rejected not only personal aggression³¹⁷, but the violence of wars also. The Stoics not only condemned the commonly criticised motives of greed³¹⁸, power³¹⁹ and glory³²⁰, but also freedom³²¹ and self defence.³²² This is because they believed that violence would cause impiety³²³, financial and moral bankruptcy³²⁴, and the collapse of normal society.³²⁵ War was also denounced because it conflicted with the fundamentals of Stoic metaphysics; i.e. that the gods live in supreme peace and the universe is centred on concord, peace, friendship and justice – a precarious balance that stasis and war can only destroy, so man must also be intended to live in peace, as this is the only way he may achieve a state close to god and maintain the balance of nature.³²⁶ Musonius and Dio both apparently risked their own lives to preach peace to Rome's

³¹² Jones 1978, 51.

³¹³ Berry 1983, 79.

³¹⁴ Sidebottom 1993, 25.

³¹⁵ Syncellus, 24-26.

³¹⁶ Sidebottom 1993 250, 262

³¹⁷ Muson. *fr.* 10.78.20-30; Epict. 1. 22. 14-15.

³¹⁸ Epict. 1. 22. 14, 2. 22. 22; Dio Chrys., *Or.* 13. 35, 17. 10.

³¹⁹ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 4.

³²⁰ Muson. *fr.* 7. 56. 15-20. Dio Chrys., *Or.* 66, 68, 38.29.

³²¹ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 38.16-7, 80.3; Epictetus 4.1.171-3.

³²² Muson. *fr.* 4.44.29-46, 10.78.26-32; Dio Chrys., *Or.* 40. 24-30.

³²³ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 36. 4-6, 38, 14.

³²⁴ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 17. 10, 31. 101-2.

³²⁵ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 38. 19, 36. 4-6.

³²⁶ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 1. 42-3, 12.79, 38. 8-20, 39. 2, 40. 35; Sidebottom 1993, 245.

armies.³²⁷ Furthermore, the violent reaction of the soldiers to Musonius' own attempts to calm their passion for battle, coupled with the general objections to warfare already stated, means that the critical depiction of soldiers should not be surprising. It is only soldiers from the distant past or from foreign lands that are praised.³²⁸ Contemporary soldiers are compared to vicious dogs and the lowest level of labourers. Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus viewed them as a threat not a sign of security.³²⁹ Given all this, perhaps Sidebottom does not go far enough, when he states that the imperial Stoics had a "flirtation with pacifism".³³⁰ However, regardless of whether these three philosophers were merely flirting with pacifism or were more committed to this belief, the pattern is clear. Therefore, if these three near-contemporaries can be taken as representing the standard Stoic view of the period then when the works of Seneca are examined a similar outlook should be expected.

Some scholars have previously concluded that the pacifistic views of the Imperial Stoics can also be found in the philosophical works of Seneca. For example, Anna Motto believes that "Seneca absolutely condemns war"³³¹, and in some places it certainly seems that Seneca does share this total rejection of wars with his fellow Stoics. In *Ep.* 95 Seneca asks why it is that the crime of murder is punished by the state, but at the same time wars and genocides are praised.³³² He sees murder and war as comparable, and claims that it is madness for an action to be condemned when carried out in private, but praised when it is performed by a uniformed officer.³³³ It is apparent that Seneca believes that not only should soldiers not be praised, but he asks whether they should not be treated in the same way as murderers and punished with loss of life.³³⁴ This is an idea similar to that which appears in the tale of Philip of Macedon and his dishonest soldier, where it is said that it is "not possible for any

³²⁷ Musonius at Tac. *Hist.* 3.81; Cassius Dio, *Ep.* 65.18-19; Hicks 1962; Lutz 1947, 15. Dio at Philostratus 7.

³²⁸ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 31. 19-20 tries to shame the Rhodians with tales of their glorious ancestors, the Alexandrians are also told of the achievements of the Greek soldiers from a more moral time (*Or.* 31. 72, 32. 92-3), and the remote inhabitants of Olbia are described in terms of Homeric heroes and as armed philosophers (*Or.* 36. 4-8; Sidebottom 1993, 251).

³²⁹ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 1. 28-9, 12. 18-9, 6. 60, 9. 1, 20. 8, 32. 51, 7. 114; Epict. 4. 1. 39, 3. 24. 29, 4. 27. 7; Sidebottom 1993, 252-3.

³³⁰ Sidebottom 1993, 250 & 262.

³³¹ Motto 1955, 315.

³³² This is still a question troubling philosophers today and is the contradiction that Richard Norman addresses in the opening to his book on the ethics of killing and war (1995, 1). *cf* Dio 30.18-20 where he is equally baffled by those how are grateful for war when it is as destructive as forces they despise.

³³³ Sen. *Ep.* 95. 30-32. "*Homicidia compescimus et singulas caedes: quid bella et occisarum gentium gloriosum scelus?*"

³³⁴ Sen. *Ep.* 95. 31.

mortal to be a good man and a good general at the same time.” (*non potest quisquam eodem tempore et bonum virum et bonum ducem agere*).³³⁵ A comparable idea (though more moderately phrased) is even suggested to Nero in *De Clementia*, the first book of which closes with the thought that “true happiness consists in giving safety to many...not [in] trophies torn from a vanquished enemy, nor chariots stained with barbarian blood, nor spoils acquired in war” (*Felicitas illa multis salutem dare... non hostilia arma detracta victis, non currus barbarum sanguine cruenti, non parta bello spolia*).³³⁶ Seneca, then, does not tell Nero not to enter wars, but does warn him that they will not make him happy, and that killing multitudes without distinction will only cause him ruin. Also, in *Ep.* 90 Seneca states that wisdom plays no part in wars or arms, but instead “her voice is for peace, and she summons all mankind to concord” (*Non arma nec muros nec bella utilia molitur, paci favet et genus humanum ad concordiam vocat*).³³⁷ According to Seneca, war is the interest of fools, and as such philosophers are thankful when they may be excused from a role in it.³³⁸

Just as Musonius, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom rejected the importance of glory in all relations, especially as a motivation to go to war, Seneca is at times also dismissive of *gloria*. He states that, if a soldier wants glory, he must pray for war³³⁹, but if Scipio prayed for war purely so he could win *gloria* by ending it, then he is not deserving of praise.³⁴⁰ In this way, although *gloria* is not itself belittled, the desire for war in order to win *gloria* is considered worthy of condemnation. Seneca also praises the “great-souled” actions (*quantum animi*) of men that reject the need for political and military glory and instead offer no prayers to *Fortuna*.³⁴¹ Furthermore, Seneca believes that man has misused the gifts of nature in a vain lust for glory that has caused them to harness the winds so that they may attack other nations, nations that they had previously had no contact and no quarrel with. These men, so desperate for glory that they will risk their lives in perilous journeys and seek out new enemies, are described as both mad and evil, just as Dio describes men that lust for war as mad and evil.³⁴² This passage also contains further ideas akin to those of Dio Chrysostom. Seneca maintains that the gods are not, in fact, the cause of wars, and their

³³⁵ Sen. *Ben.* 4. 37.

³³⁶ Sen. *Clem.* 1. 26. 5.

³³⁷ Sen. *Ep.* 90. 26.

³³⁸ Sen. *Ep.* 73. 9.

³³⁹ Sen. *Ben.* 6. 38. 3.

³⁴⁰ Sen. *Ben.* 6. 36. 2.

³⁴¹ Sen. *Ep.* 118. 4.

³⁴² Sen. *QNat.* 5. 18. 6-12; Dio Chrys., *Or.* 38. 11-14, where Dio compares men that love war to those that love disease. Both war and disease are evil and to love an evil is both mad and itself an evil action.

presentation in myth that affirms this role is rejected. Instead, Seneca says that although the gods created the wind they did not do so with the intention of causing wars but rather merely to prevent the air from becoming stagnant and to provide rain in order that life could be sustained. The gods did realise that the wind would allow men to travel between foreign lands, but the intention was to create communication so men from disparate societies could benefit each other not bring destruction.³⁴³

Although none of Seneca's treatises were delivered in a similar situation to *Orationes* 38 and 40 of Dio, where they are intended to calm localised parties intent on warfare, Seneca is often particularly damning of the evils of civil war.³⁴⁴ In *De Beneficiis* a list of generals is given, who are invariably described as "cruel" (*crudelis*), "ungrateful" (*ingratus*) and as suffering from "inborn hatred" (*ingentia odia*) and it is said about Marius that he "not merely gave the signal, but was himself the signal for civil disasters and butcheries" (*nisi civilis exitii et trucidationis non tantum dederit signum, sed ipse signum fuerit*).³⁴⁵ It is clear from the members of this list, which includes Coriolanus, Catiline, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Julius Caesar and Mark Antony that it is specifically civil wars not the universal act of war that Seneca demonises. Earlier in *De Beneficiis* Seneca also describes civil war as *insania*, and states that it defiles all that is holy (*qua omne sanctum ac sacrum profanetur*).³⁴⁶

Yet, despite what seems to be a comprehensive rejection of civil war in *De Beneficiis*, Seneca is able to praise Cato for his role in the civil wars. He says in *Ep.* 95 that he would describe Cato as Vergil describes the brave man, because he was "unterrified amid the din of civil war" and was first to attack a retreating enemy and he "plunged face-forward into the civil conflict".³⁴⁷ Cato is not only said to have thrown himself into civil war but also to have created a third faction against Caesar and Pompey, a faction fighting for freedom and for the Republic.³⁴⁸ Cato is praised in similar terms in *De Providentia*, Seneca says that Nature chose Cato to not only endure the hardship of civil war, but to fight the whole world

³⁴³ Sen. *QNat.* 5. 18. 1-4; cf Dio Chrys., *Or.* 1. 42-3, 12. 79, 38. 8-20, 39. 2, 40. 35.

³⁴⁴ The localised importance of *Orationes* 38 and 40 of Dio Chrysostom mean that often the focus turns away from the general characteristics of warfare and violence and towards the more specific impact of war on a certain area and the value of concord.

³⁴⁵ Sen. *Ben.* 5. 16. 1-6.

³⁴⁶ Sen. *Ben.* 1. 10. 2.

³⁴⁷ Sen. *Ep.* 95. 69. "Si mihi M. Cato exprimendus sit, inter fragores bellorum civilium inpavidus et primus incessens admotos iam exercitus alpibus civili que se bello ferens obvium: non alium illi adsignaverim vultum, non alium habitum."

³⁴⁸ Sen. *Ep.* 95. 70-71.

“for a just cause” (*pro causa bona*).³⁴⁹ For Seneca, then, freedom and the preservation of the Republic are considered just cause for war. In the case of Cato, at least, Seneca’s call for peace is not as absolute as those Stoics that followed him. Just causes for war also find their way into *De Clementia*, where Seneca says that a wise man will let his enemies not only go free but will also praise them if they have warred against him for honourable motives, whether loyalty, a treaty or liberty.³⁵⁰

Perhaps most surprising of all is Seneca’s apparently contradictory treatment of wars for glory. As we have seen, Seneca rebuked soldiers that prayed for war in order to win glory and despised men for using the god given gift of wind for the purpose of carrying out a war for glory. Nevertheless, Seneca says in *De Beneficiis* that for a young man to act in a way that bestows glory on his father is a great and laudable act. He goes on to say that there are no greater glories than those won in war.³⁵¹ Also in *De Beneficiis*, Scipio is praised for bringing glory to his parents and the city, he is said to have brought more glory than protection, and Aeneas, Amphinomus and Anapius, Antigonus and Manlius are all also presented as examples of upstanding men who obtained *gloria* through their actions in battle.³⁵² However, as we have seen, Seneca states in book 6 of *De Beneficiis* that a general should not pray for wars for the sake of glory.³⁵³ Perhaps, then, although glory is an admirable thing if won in a war for self-preservation, it should not be a motivating force in and of itself and peace should be seen as more admirable still than *gloria* won in war. However, the more complex relationship with *gloria* is perhaps to be expected due to the Roman aristocratic traditions that strongly associate *gloria* with *virtus*.³⁵⁴ Therefore, Seneca’s position within the elite at Rome means that rather than being surprised to find a watered-down version of the absolute dismissal of *gloria* that is present in the Stoics of Greek origin from this period, we should rather, perhaps, be impressed by the extent to

³⁴⁹ Sen. *Prov.* 3. 14. “*Grave est civilibus bellis interesse; toto terrarum orbe pro causa bona tam infeliciter quam pertinaciter militet.*”

³⁵⁰ Sen. *Clem.* 2. 7. 2. “*hostes dimittet salvos, aliquando etiam laudatos, si honestis causis pro fide, pro foedere, pro libertate in bellum acciti sunt.*”

³⁵¹ Sen. *Ben.* 3. 22. 2.

³⁵² Sen. *Ben.* 3. 22. 2, 3. 37. 1-4.

³⁵³ Sen. *Ben.* 6. 38. 3.

³⁵⁴ Earl 1967, 7-11; McDonnell 2006; Balmaceda & Comber 2009, 10-27. For a more positive aristocratic attitude towards *gloria* in warfare see Plaut. *Capt.* 689-90; Cato *Orig.* 83. For a more nuanced attitude see Sall. *Hist. fr.* 1.8 where *gloria* is seen as less worthy than *libertas* but more worthy than *imperium* and McGushin 1992, 75-76 for a brief discussion on this passage. Finally, for a more total rejection of *gloria* as a motivating force from a Roman source see Lucretius 2. 37-54, 3. 59-78, 5. 1129-30, 3. 832-42, 5. 50; Gale 1998, 108; Minyard 1985, 36-42; Nussbaum 1994, 275.

which Greek philosophical ideas have been able to overcome the more traditional ethical theories of aristocratic Rome.

Anger also plays a contradictory role in the portrayal of wars in Seneca's philosophy. In *De Ira* Seneca says that anger is the most base, evil and deadly of emotions, and war is the result of the anger of the powerful, yet even when the lowly give in to anger, it is still war, but war without arms.³⁵⁵ In the same work, anger is also rejected as beneficial in warfare. Seneca quotes an unknown work of Aristotle, which claimed anger was necessary in conflict, but dismisses it saying that a soldier must also listen to reason, and as such cannot be spurred on by anger.³⁵⁶ Therefore, Seneca believes anger to be a destructive force that not only causes war, but also should not be employed in battle.³⁵⁷ As such one might expect a total condemnation of warfare to follow, but it does not. Interestingly, there is an explanation as to why it is necessary to remain calm in warfare. In *De Ira*, both Cornelius Scipio Aemelianus and Fabius Cunctator are praised for their tactical decisions, they did not allow themselves to be controlled by anger, but rather carried out a controlled and calculated plan, which brought security and safety to Rome, and destruction to Carthage.³⁵⁸ Therefore, when Seneca seems to create an opportunity to dismiss the evils of warfare due to their being caused by anger, he instead praises two great generals and suggests the best ways to enter and win a major engagement.

To Summarise, Seneca, consequently, presents a more complex picture of war and peace than the other Stoics of his era. While, like them, he could reject glory as a reason to initiate war, he differs from the other Stoics by praising the glory won in wars. Moreover, while he shares their view on anger, he goes on to say how the control of anger can be of particular use for soldiers, a group that the Greek Stoics had no interest in, other than to attack. Although the attitudes of Seneca are complex, they nonetheless seem more negative than positive towards warfare. Even the traditional aristocratic virtue of *gloria* is questioned, when Seneca's Stoic beliefs force him to re-evaluate it. Furthermore, though

³⁵⁵ Sen. *De Ira*, 3. 5. 6. “*Nihil est simultatibus gravius: has ira conciliat; nihil est bello funestius: in hoc potentium ira prorumpit; ceterum etiam illa plebeia ira et privata inerme et sine viribus bellum est.*”

³⁵⁶ *ibid* 1. 9. 2. “*‘Ira’ inquit aristoteles’ necessaria est, nec quicquam sine illa expugnari potest, nisi illa inplet animum et spiritum accendit; utendum autem illa est non ut duce sed ut milite’. Quod est falsum: nam si exaudit rationem sequitur que qua ducitur, iam non est ira, cuius proprium est contumacia.*”

³⁵⁷ Seneca's attitude to anger in warfare reflects his “absolutism” in his approach to *ira* (Harris 2002, 381-2; Sen. *De Ira*, 1.7.2; *Ep.* 116)

³⁵⁸ Sen. *De Ira*, 1. 11. 4-7.

soldiers are encouraged to act in a measured way in warfare Seneca can also ask, whether it is right that they are treated differently than murderers purely because they are wearing a uniform.

Tragedies³⁵⁹

Having concluded that the presentation of war, peace and violence in the philosophy of Seneca shares many of its features with his near-contemporaries, I will now turn to the tragedies of Seneca, as his plays contain large amounts of Stoic doctrine and numerous Stoic lessons. This view became most prominent in the 1940's, when C.W. Mendell claimed it was "the tone of Stoic doctrine that gives to the plays a certain unity of atmosphere".³⁶⁰ However, its most extreme advocate was Berthe Marti, who suggested that the order of the texts preserved in MS E was first conceived by Seneca personally, with the specific intention of delivering Stoic lessons on progressing themes.³⁶¹ Despite the fact that the majority of work on Senecan tragedies in the years since Marti's most radical claim about Stoic doctrine have believed that there is at least some crossover from philosophy to tragedy, not all have been persuaded. For example, when reviewing Elaine Fantham's edition of the *Troades*, A.E. Douglas claimed "there is no Stoicism here, only a dreadful emptiness".³⁶² Bearing this in mind, if the similarities found between Musonius, Epictetus, Dio and Seneca can be taken as representing the standard doctrine of the Stoics of this period, we should also find similar themes among the violence of Seneca's tragedies. In order to examine this hypothesis, I will focus on *Troades*, *Phaedra* and *Thyestes*, as I believe it is these three plays that best illustrate the connection between Seneca's philosophy and tragedy in relation to warfare. It is worth noting, however, that similar ideas and concepts can be found in Seneca's other tragedies,³⁶³ particularly the *Hercules Oetaeus*, which has been left aside due to its possible spurious composition.³⁶⁴

³⁵⁹ Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Classical Association of Canada West conference and at the joint Classical Association and Classical Association of Scotland conference.

³⁶⁰ Mendell 1941, 153.

³⁶¹ Marti 1945, 216. Marti claimed that the series are framed by the pair of plays about the Stoic hero *Hercules*, and that within this frame the *Troades* and *Phoenissae* are centred on the problems of life, death and destiny (225-229), *Medea* and *Phaedra* are concerned with the passions (229-234) and *Oedipus*, *Agamemnon* and *Thyestes* impart lessons on free will and sin and retribution (234-241). The problems implicit in Marti's theory were soon pointed out by Norman T. Pratt, but he still asserted that there is an "organic relationship" between the tragedies and philosophy of Seneca and that "the Stoic ideas condition the nature of these plays right from the primary point" (Pratt 1948, 1-2).

³⁶² Douglas 1985, 34.

³⁶³ Sen. *Herc. Fur.* 27-29, 30-35, 91-99, 159-60, 250-251, 341-344, 360-369, 374-376, 399-401, 401-408, 441-443, 693-6, 739-747, 882-890, 929, 967-975, 1072, 1187; *Phoen.* 53-6, 274-5, 290-294,

In the *Troades* the first scene to examine the ethics of violence and warfare is the *Fürstenstreit* between Pyrrhus and Agamemnon.³⁶⁵ In this dispute Agamemnon several times expresses a Stoic attitude towards warfare and violence.³⁶⁶ He says that “to not be able to govern violence is a fault of youth” (*juvenile vitium est regere non posse impetum*) and “the more you are capable of doing, the more you should have the patience to endure” (*quo plura possis, plura patienter feras*).³⁶⁷ He even regrets that Troy has been razed to the ground (*ruere et aequari solo etiam arcuissem*),³⁶⁸ for he believes the victor who shows no restraint and still lusts for blood once his sword is stained is suffering from madness (*vecors*).³⁶⁹ This contrasts strongly with the opening speech of Pyrrhus³⁷⁰ who is derisive of the Greek armies for so quickly forgetting the deeds of war. While Agamemnon and the rest of the Greeks are anxious to start the journey home, Pyrrhus is still revelling in the brutality of war, even celebrating the great wars waged by Achilles “while preparing for war” (*tanta gessit bella, dum bellum parat*).³⁷¹ The dichotomy of attitudes seen in the two great generals can be compared with Dio *Oratio* 38.³⁷² Just as Agamemnon sees Pyrrhus’ lust for blood after the war as madness, so Dio explained to the Nicomedians that war without purpose is madness.³⁷³ Interestingly, this scene is often thought to be derived from the *Polyxena* of Sophocles.³⁷⁴ However, the corresponding scene in Sophocles is between Agamemnon and his brother Menelaus, not Pyrrhus, who is thought not to have been a character in the *Polyxena* at all.³⁷⁵ Therefore, if the *Fürstenstreit* of Seneca was inspired by that of Sophocles, it must be asked why he has decided to remove this extra dimension by eliminating the added fraternal bond, particularly when the motif of brother

295-298, 350-356, 401-402, 434-439, 483-488, 493-494, 556-565, 622-625; *Med.* 62-66, 415-416, 579-582; *Oed.* 89-91, 105-108, 237, 645-646, 731-750; *Aga.* 192-193, 229-230, 323-326, 589-604.

³⁶⁴ [Sen.] *HO.* 1-4, 233-234, 282-283, 299, 424, 472, 538-544, 652-657, 794, 1541-1543, 1560-1563, 1589-1592, 1684-5, 1689-1707, 1820-1821, 1868-1871, 1989-1991. See King 1971, 215-222 for a more general account of the Stoic lessons in *HO*, although sadly the issue of authorship is not discussed.

³⁶⁵ *Sen. Tro.* 203-359.

³⁶⁶ *ibid* 250-291.

³⁶⁷ *ibid* 250, 254 (my translations).

³⁶⁸ *ibid* 278-279

³⁶⁹ *ibid* 284-285.

³⁷⁰ *ibid* 203-249.

³⁷¹ *ibid* 233.

³⁷² *Or.* 38 was delivered to the Nicomedians for the purpose of ceasing hostilities with their neighbour Nicaea.

³⁷³ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 38. 11-20. Dio states that love of unnecessary wars is like loving a disease of the body and both are evil as well as mad

³⁷⁴ Calder 1970, 75.

³⁷⁵ Calder 1966, 38, 46-48.

turning on brother is associated with unnatural lusts and crimes in other plays.³⁷⁶ Perhaps Seneca chose Pyrrhus and Agamemnon because they embody the conflicting states of war and peace more explicitly than Agamemnon and Menelaus, both of whom are older and wiser than Pyrrhus whose youthful aggression is often used as a foil to Agamemnon's more considered and measured responses.

Nevertheless, despite Agamemnon's chastisement of Pyrrhus' youthful violence, he is not, and could not be, described in totally pacifistic terms throughout the *Troades*. At line 319 Agamemnon derides Achilles for his time spent in the camp. His thoughts turned away from war and instead focused on the quill and lyre.³⁷⁷ This scene also shows Agamemnon, himself a perpetrator of human sacrifice, preaching the brutality of such a practice.³⁷⁸ Seneca could have selected to emphasise the same version of the Iphigenia myths present in Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis*. In Euripides version of the sacrifice Agamemnon is reprieved at the last moment and ultimately kills a deer rather than his own daughter³⁷⁹, however, Seneca repeatedly makes it clear that Agamemnon has killed his own daughter in order to start the war.³⁸⁰ Therefore, Seneca's choice not to present Agamemnon as innocent in this matter emphasises that it has been the years of war that have taught him the importance of restraint.³⁸¹ It should, however, be noted that Agamemnon should not necessarily be thought of as new to the arguments against human sacrifice. In Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis* Agamemnon argues against such brutality, and by the Neronian period this topic was a popular choice for rhetorical declamation.³⁸² Therefore, just as Pyrrhus is an understandable choice to show the futility and arrogance of violence, so too Agamemnon could be a logical character to embody the fatigue of warfare and the cruel nature of human sacrifice.

The next scene where Seneca discusses war and peace is also a debate, this time between Andromache and Ulysses. In Euripides' *Trojan Women*, Talthybius says that Astyanax must

³⁷⁶ Sen. *Pha.* 555; *Thy.* 40; *Phoen.* 290-294, 401-402. A motif found in other ancient authors also, Sallust for example at *Jug.*, 79. 1-10, 56-54, 10. 5 or Herodotus at 1. 31; Weidemann 1993, 52.

³⁷⁷ Sen. *Tro.* 319-321. "Amidst the carnage of Greece and the burnt ships he lay idle, forgetting war and weapons, striking his tuneful lyre with a dainty pick" (*interque caedes Graeciae atque uistas rates segnis iacebat, belli et armorum immemor, levi canoram verberans plectro chelyn*).

³⁷⁸ Sen. *Tro.* 293-300, 330-352.

³⁷⁹ Eur. *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 1561-1613.

³⁸⁰ Sen. *Tro.* 245-249, 331, 349-363, 551-555.

³⁸¹ *ibid* 263-279.

³⁸² Boyle 1994, 162.

die or the Greeks will always fear that Hector's son may become their master.³⁸³ However, his reason is given only once, and seems to be of little importance as long as the child is killed.³⁸⁴ In Seneca's version Ulysses appears to reason with Andromache. He says:

*sollicita Danaos pacis incertae fides
semper tenebit, semper a tergo timor
respicere coget, arma nec poni sinet,
dum Phrygibus animos natus eversis dabit,
Andromacha, vester....*

*...si tamen tecum exigas,
veniam dabis, quod bella post hiemes decem
totidemque messes iam senex miles timet
aliasque clades rursus ac numquam bene
Troiam iacentem.*

(A fretting mistrust of uncertain peace will always possess the Danaans, and fear ever will force them to look behind and not let them lay down their arms, so long as your son, Andromache, shall give heart to the conquered Phrygians...if you reflect, you will forgive a soldier if, after ten winters and as many harvest seasons, now veteran he fears war, fears still other bloody battles and Troy never truly at rest.)³⁸⁵

Ulysses employs the same argument as Dio uses in his *Or.* 40, when he assures his home town of Prusa that 'all peace so they say is better than war' (πᾶσα γὰρ, ὡς φασιν, εἰρήνη κρείττων πολέμου).³⁸⁶ Ulysses' task, in comparison, is made impossible as the peace he wishes to win is his own and will not benefit Andromache. That said, Ulysses still hopes Andromache will reach this conclusion, sacrificing her son for a lasting peace as Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter for a prolonged war.

It is also worth noting that although in his analysis of *Troades* Calder gives little credit to Seneca as far as originality is concerned, the prologue is considered his own invention.³⁸⁷ For this prologue he chose Hecuba a character that, as Calder says, was "easily recognised as a tried and tested symbol for the horrors of war".³⁸⁸ Consequently, it appears that from the opening of the *Troades* Seneca wanted the audience to have the horrors of war at the forefront of their minds.

³⁸³ Eur. *Tro.* 713.

³⁸⁴ Eur. *Tro.* 219 – 242.

³⁸⁵ Sen. *Tro.* 529-533, 546-550 (trans. F.J. Miller, London: William Heinemann (Loeb), 1917).

³⁸⁶ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 40. 26.

³⁸⁷ Calder 1970, 75-82.

³⁸⁸ *ibid* 78.

In the *Phaedra* it is again a debate scene that allows Seneca to consider Stoic ideals. This time, however, one character alone does not promote Stoic beliefs. Instead, the Nurse attacks Hippolytus for his belief that “you believe that it is man’s task to endure harsh times... and wage fierce battles in bloody war” (*hoc esse munus credis indictum viris, ut dura tolerant...et saeva bella Marte sanguineo gerant?*).³⁸⁹ The Nurse goes on to question the metaphysical problems that his lifestyle will create. She assures Hippolytus that love “supplies and renews the impoverished race” and without it “the globe will lie foul in vile neglect” (*quae supplet ac restituit exhaustum genus: orbis iacebit squalido turpis situ*).³⁹⁰ This idea is present in Dio’s *Orationes* 3 and 40³⁹¹, so Dio Chrysostom and the Nurse both voice the Stoic metaphysical belief that without love there can be no order in the world.

Hippolytus’ response, however, has different ideals at its heart, while still presenting ideas seen in the other 1st century Stoics and closely linked to warfare and violence. He is not a slave to kings, because he has given up the pursuit of kingship, which holds only empty honours or elusive wealth. His heart is inflamed by no unnatural desires, and he is devoted to harmless roaming.³⁹² Just as Epictetus explained; greed is the cause of many evils in the world, including wars, stasis tyrannies and plots,³⁹³ Hippolytus has defeated his own self-interest and as such, by Epictetus’ logic, he will not become involved in wars, the very accusation that the Nurse has levelled at him.³⁹⁴ Thus, it is evident that not only do both characters base their arguments on Stoic ideals, but that they have also used Stoic doctrine closely related to war and peace in their attempts to convince the other that they are living the morally correct lifestyle.

For Hippolytus it is of prime importance that his actions echo those of the golden age, a period when:

*... non vasto aggere
crebraque turre cinxerant urbes latus;
non arma saeva miles aptabat manu
nec torta clausas fregerat saxo gravi*

³⁸⁹ Sen. *Pha.* 463-465 (my translation)

³⁹⁰ *ibid* 471-471.

³⁹¹ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 3. 94, 40. 26-35. Dio explains that friendship and love are the heart of the living universe, and within this universe are peace, justice and concord.

³⁹² Sen. *Pha.* 485-490

³⁹³ Epict. 1.22.14-15.

³⁹⁴ Dio and Musonius Rufus also rejected the worthiness of self-interest; Dio dedicated the 66th and 68th orations to this very cause, and described a war for primacy as a foolish vain glory in the 38th oration (*Or.* 38.29), Musonius also saw glory as unworthy and is dismissive of men who endure hardships for the pursuit of fame (*fr.* 7.56.15-20.).

ballista portas,

("cities were not surrounded with massive walls, set with many towers, no soldier applied his fierce hand to arms, nor did hurling engines burst through closed gates with heavy stones")³⁹⁵

This aspect of the golden age is not directly relevant to Hippolytus' defence. It is true that he does not become involved in war, but in Euripides' version of the myth his defence of his wild life (as seen in his opening ode sung with his followers) is based on purity and piety, not on any pacifistic elements.³⁹⁶ In Seneca, however, peace and war become the most important part of Hippolytus' reply, and the sentiments in his speech become increasingly Stoic. It was "unholy passion for gain that broke up [this peaceful life], headlong wrath and lust which sets men's hearts aflame" (*Rupere foedus impius lucri furor et ira praeceps, quaeque succensas agit libido mentes.*)³⁹⁷ He goes on to say that lust for power increased, breeding violence, firstly with naked fists before turning to stones and rough clubs for weapons, and that it was rage that furnished arms. This violence escalated, creating wars which in turn produce new crime and strife leading to the unbalancing of natural orders. Brother slays brother, father is slain by son, husband by wife,³⁹⁸ and it is this imbalance that has allowed Phaedra to commit her own crime. Again, war and violence have been heavily emphasised despite the lack of direct relevance to the point that Hippolytus is making. He could have made the same claim but focused on purity and sexual morality as he did in Euripides, but Seneca has placed the blame for Phaedra's crime in a progression of violent not sexual corruptions. It is this decline of man that allows Hippolytus to turn his attention back to Phaedra and the topic of women, and once more the central arguments against her and her sex are military not merely moral. Women have been the cause of wars and the fall of nations; "by her foul adulteries so many cities smoke, so many nations war, so many people lie crushed beneath the ruins of their kingdoms, utterly overthrown" (*huius incestae stupris fumant tot urbes, bella tot gentes gerunt et versa ab imo regna tot populos premunt*).³⁹⁹ Not only does the most powerful argument made against women stem from the anti-war attitudes prevalent in the Stoics, but this accusation finds a parallel in Seneca's own *De Matrimonio*, in which he says "all the bombastic themes of tragedy, the overthrow of households, cities and kingdoms is but

³⁹⁵ Sen. *Pha.* 531-535.

³⁹⁶ Eur. *Hipp.* 60 – 85.

³⁹⁷ Sen. *Pha.* 540-542.

³⁹⁸ *ibid.* 540-557.

³⁹⁹ *ibid.* 560-562.

strife over wives and concubines" (*quidquid tragoediae tument, et domos, urbes, regnaque subuertit, uxorum pellicum que contentio est*).⁴⁰⁰

The *Thyestes* opens with a violent and warlike atmosphere, very similar to that created by Hecuba in *Troades*. In the *Thyestes*, the Fury calls for swords to be drawn and for rage and passions to be enflamed. As in the *Phaedra*, this violence is to be used unnaturally, brother against brother, father against son, wife against husband. Foreign wars are also to be waged "streaming blood drench[ing] every land" (*effusus omnes irriget terras cruor*).⁴⁰¹ The ghost of Tantalus, hearing what must be done, begs to return to Hades rather than be a part of such a scheme,⁴⁰² but the Fury refuses until he has "[brought] battles with you and a lust for the sword that is evil for kings" (*inferque tecum proelia et ferri malum regibus amorem*)⁴⁰³. This again contains parallels with the work of the first century Stoics. For example, Dio knew that although the king was the only man with whom the power of war and peace could rest, this was not so the King could lust for war, but merely to be prepared for war, because it made for an increased chance of peace⁴⁰⁴

In the *Thyestes*, as in the *Troades* and *Phaedra*, it is a debate scene that allows Seneca to explore the Stoic attitude to war, peace and violence. As with *Phaedra*, the debate is between a master and a servant, although here it is an attendant rather than a nurse. The scene begins with Atreus desperate for war. He cannot believe that the whole world is not already at arms in order to carry out his revenge.⁴⁰⁵ Atreus, then, is the very antithesis of what the Stoics believed a ruler should be. The Stoics would argue that Atreus has not been harmed in any real sense by the actions of his brother, but is now harming himself with his own passion for hatred. Rather than trying to help his enemy, as Musonius Rufus advocates,⁴⁰⁶ he is desperate for revenge – another cause of violence that these Stoics rejected.⁴⁰⁷ The attendant's response is also filled with allusions to Stoic attitudes to warfare and violence. He says that a true king will win hearts and not merely be feared. If the king chooses the right course so will his subjects, and that with no shame, no care for

⁴⁰⁰ Sen. *De Matr. fr.* 67 (Haase) = Jer., *Adv. Iov.* 1.48; Coffey and Mayer 1990, 142.

⁴⁰¹ Sen. *Thy.* 38-47.

⁴⁰² *ibid* 70-83.

⁴⁰³ *ibid* 84-85.

⁴⁰⁴ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 1.1-28, 64-67.

⁴⁰⁵ Sen. *Thy.* 181-191.

⁴⁰⁶ Muson. *fr.* 41.137.22-6.

⁴⁰⁷ Musonius in the tenth fragment, Dio in his 40th oration and Epictetus in book 3 discourse 22.

right, no honour, no virtue and no faith then sovereignty is insecure.⁴⁰⁸ After expressing this Stoic view, the attendant also calls for Atreus to refrain from his lust for violence, for “this is a greater evil than anger” (*Maius hoc ira est malum*),⁴⁰⁹ but Atreus will not restrain his intentions even calling his own plans “wars of hatred” (*bella odia*).⁴¹⁰

Thyestes, in stark contrast to his brother, has learnt as much from his years in exile as Agamemnon did from his years at war in the *Troades*. He has learned to love the simple life, he knows that “poison is drunk from gold” (*venenum in auro bibitur*),⁴¹¹ he has no need for weapons and his estate may be small but has a profound peace.⁴¹² He tells his son that the height of power is nothing if you do not desire power⁴¹³, this is the same boast made by Hippolytus in the *Phaedra* when he proudly proclaims that he has given up the race for kingships.⁴¹⁴ Thyestes, then, will not make the same mistake of judgement that Epictetus says Polyneices and Eteocles made, when they judged Kingship to be greater than exile. This misjudgement caused them to lose control of their moral purpose and as a result begin a brutal war, and as we have seen this war would be even more hated because it involved the unnatural element of fratricide.⁴¹⁵ Thyestes, unlike Oedipus’ sons, has not misjudged exile as an evil. Rather, he understands a deeper peace, a peace not found in gold and arms. It seems that the Attendant must have some understanding of the character of Thyestes, as he had suggested earlier that Thyestes will only be persuaded if he can be convinced to have “confidence in peace” (*fidem pacis*).⁴¹⁶ Even once peace has persuaded Thyestes to share the throne, he accepts only the title and specifically rejects laws and arms (*sed iura et arma servient mecum tibi*).⁴¹⁷

The choral ode at lines 546-622 also shares many of the Stoic attitudes to war and violence. Love and friendship are said to be the strongest powers in the universe: “No force is greater...those it has held, true love holds” (*nulla vis maior...quos amor verus tenuit*,

⁴⁰⁸ Sen. *Thy.* 215-217. This is very similar to the idea at the heart of Musonius’ 33rd fragment, “towards subjects one should be regarded with awe rather than with fear. Reverence attends the one bitterness the other” (Πειρατέον καταπληκτικὸν μᾶλλον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἢ φοβερὸν θεωρεῖσθαι· τῷ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότης, τῷ δὲ ἀπίνεια παρακολουθεῖ.) (*fr.* 33.133.18.) *cf* The advice given to Alexander the Great in Dio Chrys., *Or.* 4.63-65.

⁴⁰⁹ Sen. *Thy.* 259 (my translation).

⁴¹⁰ *ibid* 328-329 (my translation).

⁴¹¹ *ibid* 453 (my translation).

⁴¹² *ibid* 468-469.

⁴¹³ *ibid* 470.

⁴¹⁴ Sen. *Pha.* 485-490

⁴¹⁵ Epict. 2.22.14; Sen. *Pha.* 555; *Thy.* 40; *Phoen.* 290-294, 350-356, 401-402.

⁴¹⁶ Sen. *Thy.* 294.

⁴¹⁷ *ibid* 543.

tenebit) as the Nurse in *Phaedra* and Dio Chrysostom agree.⁴¹⁸ The Chorus explain at 552-9 that even once friendship has been cast aside by the mad god of war, Love can stop violence at the very point that two battle-lines meet. Even if these men want war, love will clasp their hands in peace.⁴¹⁹ They also recall the uselessness of weapons during peace time, symbolised by the sword that has rusted and the battlements that are in a state of disrepair.⁴²⁰ The chorus ends by reminding the audience that a king does not have true power, but is subject to a weightier power, recalling Thyestes' advice to his son.

Finally, when Thyestes' children are killed, it is not surprising that Seneca recalls the cycle of violence in the history of the house of Atreus by the presence of the Myrtoan Chariot. But the image of war is also present in equal measure, for the grove is full of the trophies taken from barbarians⁴²¹ which are listed with the chariot as evidence of the "race's every crime" (*omne gentis facinus*).⁴²² The chorus, then, see wars against barbarians as comparable to the atrocities committed in the family's past. At this point Atreus believes that he has found happiness in his crime, but as Seneca told Nero "true happiness consists in giving safety to many...not [in] trophies torn from a vanquished enemy, nor chariots stained with barbarian blood, nor spoils acquired in war" (*Felicitas illa multis salutem dare... non hostilia arma detracta victis, non currus barbarum sanguine cruenti, non parta bello spolia*),⁴²³ and as Seneca's audience knew, the happiness of Atreus was not assured by these crimes but rather, they merely perpetuated the curse on his household and foreshadowed his own death at the hands of Aegisthus.

It is apparent that the pacifistic arguments found in the other Stoics in the Imperial period are also found in the philosophy of Seneca. He rejects not only individual, but also

⁴¹⁸ *ibid* 549-551 (my translation); Sen. *Pha.* 471-471; Dio Chrys., *Or.* 3.94, 40.26-35.

⁴¹⁹ Sen. *Thy.* 552-559. Although the general tone of this passage fits the Stoic objection of warfare and their belief that love was an essential part of the universe the closest equivalent for the specific idea (that love is a force that can overcome Mars) is found in Lucretius. However, in Seneca it is Pietas, not Venus that is the goddess said to be powerful enough to defeat Mars. This is perhaps due to the added emphasis of family love inevitably created by the conflict between the two brothers (Lucr. 1.1-49).

⁴²⁰ Sen. *Thy.* 565-570. *cf* Dio Chrys., *Or.* 3.94. When, like the chorus, Dio is discussing friendship and love; in times of peace weapons and defences become a burden while they appear a necessity in times of war, and like the chorus he also understands that friendship is a stronger force than war; a man's weapons and defences are worthless without friends to wield them but even without weapons friends are of the greatest value.

⁴²¹ Sen. *Thy.* 663-4. *hic praeda hostium et de triumpho picta barbarico chlamys*.

⁴²² *ibid* 602. Here I believe that the list of items within the grove and their association with the crimes committed there mean that *facinus* should be taken as a specifically evil act rather than the more general 'deed'. *Facinus* is often used in this way particularly by Cicero, for example, *Verr.* 2.5.66; *Mil.* 16.4, 27.73; *Leg. Agr.* 2.28.77; *Fin.* 2.29.95; *Cat.* 1.10.26.

⁴²³ Sen. *Clem.* 1.26.5.

institutional violence, and further dismisses the more aggressive causes for war. The traditional Roman virtue of *gloria* is not worthy of a war of aggression and his metaphysical beliefs led him to conclude with his contemporaries that the corrupting forces of war threaten the universe's natural *concordia*. Unlike the other Stoics, however, he is not consistent in this stance. While he can be dismissive of *gloria* he also extols its benefits for one's family and lineage, and he openly praises Cato for his involvement in the civil wars. Equally, the tragedies of Seneca show many of the same themes present in Stoic philosophy, with many characters using pacifistic arguments – even if the discussion is not directly related to ideas of war and peace. Perhaps it is Seneca's own contradictory attitude to war and peace that caused him to incorporate the majority of references to this theme into the scenes of debate, working through the ideas in his tragedies that he found difficult to resolve in his philosophy due to the conflicting nature of contemporary Stoic doctrine and traditional aristocratic Roman virtues.

Therefore, it is apparent that all of the pacifistic arguments found in the other Stoics in the Imperial period are also found in the philosophy of Seneca: he rejects not only individual but also institutional violence; he dismisses the more aggressive causes for war, even on occasion the traditional Roman virtue of *gloria*; soldiers are often described in hostile tones and his metaphysical beliefs led him to conclude with his contemporaries that the corrupting forces of war threaten the universe's natural *concordia*. Unlike the other Stoics, he is not so consistent with this stance; he can be dismissive of *gloria*, but, he can also extol its benefits for one's family and lineage, and he openly praises Cato for his involvement in the civil wars. Equally the tragedies of Seneca also show many of the same themes as Stoic philosophy, with many characters using pacifistic elements to convince others, even if the discussion is not directly related to ideas of war and peace and some characters are also described in terms of the Stoic anti-war doctrine. Perhaps it is Seneca's own contradictory attitude to war and peace that caused him to incorporate the majority of reference to this theme into the scenes of debate, working through the ideas in his tragedies that he that he finds difficult to resolve in his philosophy due to the conflicting nature of contemporary Stoic doctrine and traditional aristocratic Roman virtues.

Cynicism

The ethics of the Stoics are often traced back to the Cynics, through the founder of the school Zeno. Zeno is traditionally said to have been a pupil of Crates, who was the most famous follower of Diogenes of Sinope, and after Diogenes became the most prominent Cynic of his day. As such, at this time it will be useful to explore the beliefs of the Cynics next. This is because the shared heritage of the Schools' ethics means that a comparable attitude towards war and peace may be expected.

The problems involved in deducing what is truly 'believed' by any ancient philosophy are found more in Cynics than in many other of the classical schools: in part because there was no real 'school' to speak of (compared to the formally structured Academy or even the loosely structured Stoa for example).⁴²⁴ Cynicism's very nature, as a philosophy, described by Trapp as being based on a "manifest in-society-but-not-of-it-ness"⁴²⁵, meant that the core values were more those of moral strength than larger ethical debates. Furthermore, very few self-penned Cynic sources survive and many of those sources that do survive from the Roman period are written either with the intention of using one of the founders, such as Diogenes of Sinope, as a moral example or for the purpose of damning 'street corner Cynic' en masse or portraying one in particular as "a charlatan or opportunist".⁴²⁶ Many scholars have manoeuvred around these problems by using the better recorded Stoics as examples of Cynic ethics. For example, Dudley uses the Cynicising-Stoic Dio Chrysostom⁴²⁷ or Branham and Goulet-Cazé's even more optimistic inclusion of Dio, as well as his predecessor Musonius Rufus and the satirist Meleager.⁴²⁸ This inclusion of Stoic material to answer Cynic questions is undoubtedly dangerous if handled imprecisely. However if the Stoic sources with the most clear Cynic influence (for example those which describe the ideal Cynic or use Diogenes as the protagonist) are focused on and if they show a similar doctrine to the fragmentary evidence of the earlier Cynics, then this does seem to be the most efficient way to plug the gap in our knowledge of Cynic philosophy.

This methodological tendency, coupled with the fact that early Stoic ethics were heavily influenced by the Cynics, means that a great similarity may be expected between the Cynic

⁴²⁴ Kennedy 1999, 27.

⁴²⁵ Trapp 2007, 198.

⁴²⁶ *ibid* 2007, 199.

⁴²⁷ Dudley 1967, 148-158.

⁴²⁸ Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996, 394-399; Trapp 2007, 193-4.

and Stoic attitudes to war and peace. The rejection of individual violence and vengeance is certainly present in the many Cynic sources.⁴²⁹ In Lucian's life of the Cynic philosopher Demonax, he is struck on the head with a rock for wearing the clothes of an athlete. When the massed crowds urge him to seek redress by legal measures he replies, with the typically dry wit of the Cynic, by proclaiming that he would rather visit a doctor.⁴³⁰ Demonax is also said to have never become angry when faced with incorrect behaviour of any kind: he "corrected the sin, but forgave the sinner".⁴³¹ In Epictetus' treatise on the good Cynic he says that "while he is being flogged he must love the men who flog him, as though he were the father or the brother of them all".⁴³² These two descriptions of imperial Cynics profess to an attitude of non-retaliation, and there are precedents in the earlier Cynics and their forbears also. The two most important influences on Cynic ethics were Socrates and Antisthenes, both of whom are reported by Diogenes Laertius to have held the same attitude to physical attacks. Socrates is said to have been regularly abused and beaten "yet bore all this ill-usage patiently" and would not take either physical or legal revenge.⁴³³ When asked if he found "so-and-so very offensive" he replied "No, for it takes two to make a quarrel".⁴³⁴ Antisthenes, too, advised his followers to endure being slandered and pelted with stones.⁴³⁵ However, the evidence for the first Cynic is slightly more complicated. On several occasions Diogenes of Sinope shows the same temperance and forgiveness as Lucian's Demonax and Epictetus' ideal Cynic. For example, when he is punched in the street he merely jokes that he was foolish to have forgotten his helmet.⁴³⁶ On another occasion he refuses to retort in kind but prefers to shame his attackers by hanging a tablet round his neck naming his attackers.⁴³⁷ On a third occasion however, when he was attacked and told "there are 3000 drachmas to your credit", he returned with boxing gloves and after beating Meidas said "there are 3000 blows to your credit".⁴³⁸

Nevertheless, when Dio Chrysostom described Diogenes in his ninth discourse, he says that he was like a king dressed as a beggar who, like Odysseus disguised by Athena, "moved

⁴²⁹ Downing 1992, 128.

⁴³⁰ Lucian, *Demonax*, 16.

⁴³¹ *ibid* 7

⁴³² 3.22.53-4.

⁴³³ Diog. Laert. 2.21.

⁴³⁴ *ibid* 2.35.

⁴³⁵ *ibid* 6.7.

⁴³⁶ *ibid* 6. 41.

⁴³⁷ *ibid* 6.33.

⁴³⁸ *ibid* 6.42.

among his slaves and menials while they caroused in ignorance of his identity”.⁴³⁹ However whereas Odysseus took bloody revenge, Diogenes is said to have borne his abuse with patience⁴⁴⁰, so regardless of the true nature of Diogenes’ attitude to violent revenge, by the first century AD he was described in the same way as the passive Demonax and Antisthenes.

This insistence on non-retaliation is present at the social level as well as the personal.⁴⁴¹ A fragment of the poetry of Crates shows an idealised state that has managed to rid itself of warfare:

There is a city Pera in the midst of wine dark vapour,
Fair, fruitful, passing squalid, owning nought,
Into which sails nor fool nor parasite
Nor glutton, slave or sensual appetites,
But thyme it bears, garlic, and figs and loaves,
For which things’ sake men fight not with each other,
Nor stand to arms for money or for fame.⁴⁴²

From this it is evident that in Pera, where there are no wars and no greed there are also no fools and no parasites, thus Crates not only sees greed for material possessions as causes of wars but also equates warfare with fools and those enslaved to their appetites. Diogenes Laertius also attributes the following saying to Crates: “we should study philosophy to the point of seeing generals as nothing but donkey-drivers”.⁴⁴³ This demonstrates that, like the Stoics, the Cynics were negative in their presentation of both contemporary soldiers and generals. This attitude towards warfare is also seen in the pseudo-Lucian *The Cynic* in which the unnamed Cynic tries to persuade Lucian that luxurious possessions are immoral because they are the cause of wars and violence. The Cynic asks Lucian “how much they [luxuries] cost in trouble, in toil, in danger, or rather in blood, death and destruction for mankind”. The wars created by the desire for luxuries are said to be the causes of an unbalancing of the natural order in the same way that the Stoics claimed, as they set “friends against friends, children against fathers, and wives against husbands”.⁴⁴⁴ For this reason the Cynic wishes that he can remain free from the desires that cause these ills and

⁴³⁹ Dio Chrys., *Or.* 9.8.

⁴⁴⁰ *ibid* 9.9

⁴⁴¹ Downing 1992, 128

⁴⁴² Diog. Laert. 8.85.

⁴⁴³ *ibid* 6.92.

⁴⁴⁴ [Lucian] *The Cynic*, 8.

thus remain free from “civic strife, wars, conspiracies and murder”.⁴⁴⁵ Finally, there is some evidence that Diogenes could also have rejected warfare in the same way as Crates and the unnamed philosopher in *The Cynic*; firstly there is the reference to Diogenes’ *Republic* in the fragments of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara’s work *On the Stoics*. Philodemus states that Diogenes taught the uselessness of weapons, but he has only gained this knowledge second-hand through the works of the Stoic Chrysippus.⁴⁴⁶ As a third-hand fragment of Cynic thought filtered first through a Stoic and then through an Epicurean, this detail is far from definite, especially considering that the very existence of Diogenes’ *Republic* has at times been doubted.⁴⁴⁷ Nevertheless, again we have a tale preserved in Dio Chrysostom, which shows that whatever the attitudes of Diogenes at the time, by the first century he was assumed to have held a pacifistic belief. In the fourth discourse on kingship Dio includes the tale of the meeting of Diogenes and Alexander the Great. In this version Diogenes tells Alexander that he cannot be a true king, since a king has no fear and as such no need for weapons, just as the king⁴⁴⁸ bee has no sting because he is safe in his position within the hive.⁴⁴⁹ Indeed, Moles has suggested that the main purpose of the fourth kingship oration of Dio Chrysostom is to “curb Trajan’s military ambition”.⁴⁵⁰ Even Onesicritus, a Cynic who joined the army of Alexander as a steersman and was active in military service, is said to have lauded the people of Musicanus in India, because they regarded some of the “sciences... as wicked; for example military science and the like”.⁴⁵¹ Therefore, just as Dio Chrysostom is said to have written a discourse lauding the pacifistic Essenes, Onesicritus is reported to have done something similar with the country of the Musicianians despite his own involvement in the military sphere.

The Cynics therefore, can be shown to have held many of the same beliefs as the Stoics in rejecting wars and extolling the virtues of peace. Like Dio Chrysostom, Onesicritus is said to have written a work praising a pacifistic society; Crates, as well as writing poetry that commended a pacifistic society was disapproving of those who saw benefits in a life in the military: Many of the Cynics are presented as suffering personal violence rather than taking retribution; and Diogenes of Sinope could even be used as a foil to the all-conquering Alexander, and advise that he give up his armies. As the Epicureans are the

⁴⁴⁵ *ibid* 15.

⁴⁴⁶ Phld. *On the Stoics*, c. cols. 15-17 = *fr. m* in Dawson 1992, 170-1

⁴⁴⁷ Dawson 1992, 146-8.

⁴⁴⁸ The ancient Greeks believing the queen bee was in fact a male.

⁴⁴⁹ Dio Chr. 4. 62-4.

⁴⁵⁰ Moles 1995, 148.

⁴⁵¹ Strabo, 15.1.34.

third of the three groups that have previously been credited with pacifistic beliefs they will be considered next, then the schools that have been described in this way are also examined; the Platonists, Peripatetics and Sceptics.

Epicureanism

Lucretius

In his 1963 survey of *Peace and War in the Ancient World* John Ferguson proclaimed that the Epicureans were foremost among the groups of the ancient world that renounced war and compared their ethics to the anti-war beliefs of the Society of Friends.⁴⁵² Nussbaum more recently has seen *De Rerum Natura* as a rejection of violence at all levels from within the soul to between individuals and also in society at large.⁴⁵³ From the prologue this seems to be the case: rather than evoking the muses at the opening of his philosophical epic Lucretius appeals to Venus. She is said to strike all creatures with “alluring love” (*blandum amorem*), and it is this love alone that can bless man with peace for Venus can even overcome Mars with wounds of love, creating for Rome a “quiet peace” (*tranquilla pace*). But this peace is also more selfishly for Lucretius’ own purposes for he cannot fully continue his work while there is still civil war.⁴⁵⁴ As *De Rerum Natura* continues, various parallels can be found with the Stoic and Cynic anti-war statements.

One of these parallels is present in the invocation of Venus in the opening of book 1. Like Dio⁴⁵⁵, Lucretius describes the heavens as peaceful.⁴⁵⁶ This belief in peaceful gods reappears twice more in book 2. Firstly, a parade for Cybele, performed with the intention of showing that they are ready to protect their homeland is dismissed as unfounded. Lucretius says that this is “removed from true reasoning” (*a vera ratione repulsa*)⁴⁵⁷; as it is the nature of the gods to live a deeply peaceful life detached from the troubles of men. Then, when Lucretius appeals to the gods towards the close of the second book, he does so with these words: “For I appeal to the holy hearts of the gods, which in tranquil peace pass untroubled days and a life serene” (*nam pro sancta deum tranquilla pectora pace quae*

⁴⁵² Ferguson 1963, 5.

⁴⁵³ Nussbaum 1994, 239-279.

⁴⁵⁴ Lucretius 1. 1-49.

⁴⁵⁵ *ibid* 38.8-20 & 12.78-9.

⁴⁵⁶ *ibid* 1.9.

⁴⁵⁷ *ibid* 2.644-5.

placidum degunt aevom vitamque serenam).⁴⁵⁸ This image appears again in books 3 and 6; in book 3, the gods can pass their time with untroubled peace because they are supplied with all their needs by nature.⁴⁵⁹ The passage in book 6 is perhaps the most important because, as well as again describing the gods as living “quiet in their placid peace” (*placida cum pace quietos*)⁴⁶⁰, it also explains that if man does not understand that the gods are at peace and will not inflict mortal lives with vengeance then man himself can never be at peace, not because the gods will not allow them, but because if you cannot imagine the gods at peace then you can never attain peace yourself. Paranoia will grip those that misunderstand the nature of the gods and as such they will not be able to “receive the tranquil peace of spirit” (*suscipere haec animi tranquilla pace valebis*) which is attained through the understanding of what divine shapes are.⁴⁶¹ The reasons that the gods are able to live in this state of peace can be seen in both Lucretius and earlier Epicurean doctrine. The first of the *Principal Doctrines* states that, “A blessed and indestructible being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being; so he is free from anger and partiality, for all such things imply weakness”.⁴⁶² This idea is repeated in the *Letter to Herodotus*, when Epicurus states that “nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature”.⁴⁶³ The Epicurean god was a complete and self-sufficient being, and so could not be affected by any events in our (or their own) world; rage, anger and aggression are not conceivable behaviours for such a divine and superior being.⁴⁶⁴ Lucretius certainly agreed with this interpretation of the gods. He says in book 1 that:

*omnis enim per se divum natura necessest
immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur
semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe;
nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,
nec bene promeritis capitur nec tangitur ira.*

(Every one of the gods, by the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed and separate from our troubles; for without pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own resources,

⁴⁵⁸ *ibid* 2.1093-4.

⁴⁵⁹ *ibid* 3.22-4.

⁴⁶⁰ *ibid* 6.73.

⁴⁶¹ *ibid* 6.68-79.

⁴⁶² Epicurus, *KD*, 1.

⁴⁶³ *Ep. Hdt.* 78 = Diog. Laert. 10.78.

⁴⁶⁴ Nussbaum 1994, 242-3; 251-2.

needing us not at all, it is neither propitiated with services nor touched by wrath.)⁴⁶⁵

Lucretius also states that the gods do not affect nature and are not affected by it.⁴⁶⁶ If we cannot understand this, then we do more damage to ourselves in our attempts to conceptualise the gods than if we knew their true state of tranquillity and indifference towards humanity.⁴⁶⁷ Therefore, although the Epicureans have reached the same conclusion as Dio Chrysostom about the nature of divinity, they have done so through their own doctrine and have not merely appropriated the tranquil gods from the Stoics (or indeed the Stoics from the Epicureans).

However, although these passages invoke the same positive attitude to peace as the initial invocation of Venus, in which she is able to directly intervene in human affairs by defeating Mars with the “ever-living wound of love” (*aeterno vulnere amoris*)⁴⁶⁸, they also contradict the Epicurean image of self-sufficient gods unmoved by mortal misery. As the image of gods unmoved by war or troubles of any kind shows a more conventional Epicurean representation of the gods as a neutral presence, unaffected by human forces and not willing to influence the lives of man, then it is likely that Lucretius wanted his readers to believe the philosophical not mythological presentation of the gods. This being the case, why has Lucretius decided to open his philosophical epic with such conflicting and conventionally mythological depictions? Throughout the *De Rerum Natura* Lucretius makes it apparent that he wishes the work to be read “as an epic in the tradition of Homer and Ennius”.⁴⁶⁹ In the first book Lucretius tells us that Ennius credited Homer with unfolding “the nature of things” (*rerum naturam expandere*)⁴⁷⁰, this is the very task which Lucretius has set himself, and as such he could not do much more to affirm his place in the epic tradition. However, at the opening of book 6 there is a second invocation, this time not for Venus but for Calliope, the standard muse of heroic poetry.⁴⁷¹ It is within these appeals to epic tradition that we find the answer to our question since; as well as continuing the epic tradition, Lucretius also subverts it.⁴⁷² We are told that this will be the epic of Epicurus,

⁴⁶⁵ This actually appears in the manuscript twice, at 1.44-49 and 2.646-51, but is occasionally included only once by editors (adapted from Rouse and Smith, 1992)

⁴⁶⁶ *Lucr.* 2.1090-1102.

⁴⁶⁷ *ibid* 6.70-81.

⁴⁶⁸ *ibid* 1.34.

⁴⁶⁹ Gale 1998, 107; *cf* Murley 1947, 336-46 and Mayer 1990, 35-43.

⁴⁷⁰ *Lucr.* 1.116-126; *cf* Ennius *Annales* 1.fr.2-7 where Ennius makes his own debt to Homer apparent.

⁴⁷¹ *Lucr.* 6.93.

⁴⁷² Gale 1998, 107.

that the philosopher, not the warrior, will take centre stage⁴⁷³, and Lucretius invites the reader to join him following Epicurus, waging a war on false religion and foolishness rather than a foreign or mythical enemy.⁴⁷⁴ As Gale states, by replacing the hero with the philosopher, Lucretius “devalues its traditional subject matter, war” whilst still respecting the genre as the highest literary form.⁴⁷⁵ This is precisely what we see in the invocation of Venus. Whilst the standard language and form of the appeal to a Muse are present, leaving the reader in no doubt that what will follow will be epic, the use of Venus instead of the Muses, as well as the sharp focus on peace rather than war, invert the values of epic tradition whilst still staying within its boundaries. As such, the use of an active rather than passive Venus and Mars are purely poetic not philosophical and, once the true nature of the gods has been established, it becomes hard to view these two gods as anything more than metaphors for war and aggression, and love and peace.

Also, like the Stoics, Lucretius rejects the idea of wars for material gain. Lucretius says that men waste their lives in war for purple and gold, but even before the era of such riches wars were fought for what little possessions they did have, all this is done in vain, and from the misunderstanding of what true pleasure is. It is the inability to judge when we have enough that breeds discontent and war.⁴⁷⁶ He also declares wars ineffective at banishing superstitions, fears and anxieties which only reason can defeat, so war cannot benefit our minds or bodies any more than riches can.⁴⁷⁷ Again, the same conclusion has been reached as the Stoics; nonetheless, once more Lucretius finds cause for this belief in Epicurean doctrine, the fifteenth principal doctrine tells us “the wealth required by nature is limited and is easy to procure; but the wealth required by vain ideals extends to infinity”.⁴⁷⁸ Lucretius builds on this by saying that if men attribute false irrational qualities to wealth, poverty feels like a state close to death; in turn wealth is then wrongly thought to be close to the self-sufficient security of the gods.⁴⁷⁹ This can be seen in the myth of the development of man in book 5, based on the theory of ages in Hesiod.⁴⁸⁰ Early man is described as hardier “with bones larger and more solid, fitted with strong sinews throughout the flesh” (*solidis magis ossibus intus fundatum, validis aptum per viscera*

⁴⁷³ Lucr. 1.62-79.

⁴⁷⁴ *ibid* 3.3, 1.926, 2.677-9.

⁴⁷⁵ Gale 1998, 107.

⁴⁷⁶ Lucr. 5.1425-35.

⁴⁷⁷ *ibid* 2.38-55.

⁴⁷⁸ Epicurus *KD* 15.

⁴⁷⁹ Lucr. 3.59-69; Nussbaum 1994, 261-2.

⁴⁸⁰ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 109-201.

nervis).⁴⁸¹ They are compared with beasts and though their harsh life must involve violence for preservation, there is no sign of rage and Lucretius has already said that when situations are limited then some primitive aggression can be an excusable response.⁴⁸² However, once families and societies form, neighbours agree not to attack each other, and a thought is always given to the weak as they should be protected. Man was only able to survive because it kept to these agreements⁴⁸³ and as such man's survival was reliant on the ability to inhibit aggression.⁴⁸⁴ However, these new societal bonds caused far more ills than they solved as they created the conditions and provided the structures that would eventually lead to more structured violence and the desire for unnecessary wealth.⁴⁸⁵ So the new society based on noticeably human rather than animal qualities introduces friendship and agreement that are so crucial for humanity, but at the same time it also sows the seed of *discordia* to come.

Lucretius' stages of man show that even in its most primitive and in its developed civilized state violence and aggression are an ever present threat, albeit in very different forms. However, there is hope for a more profound peace, one that can exist in the developed society created by friendship; this is the peace of Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus' victories are those of words not arms⁴⁸⁶ and it is these victories and Epicurus who can provide a life that is not fearful to man and not rife with aggression.⁴⁸⁷ Epicurus is described as bettering the heroic deeds of Hercules; the mythical monsters that Hercules destroyed would be of little significance in Lucretius' time because they have improved protection from armour and civilisation.⁴⁸⁸ The monsters that Epicurus teaches man to defeat are the monsters of greed and rage that are the true cause of man's problems.⁴⁸⁹ Without the monsters now killed by Hercules, there are still troubles for men, still irrationality and fear, but without the false perceptions defeated by Epicurus, man can live in peace and tranquillity even if monsters are round every corner. So it seems for Lucretius societal bonds are crucial if man is to enjoy philosophy, which in turn is crucial to enjoy the new societal bonds free from paranoia and anxiety.

⁴⁸¹ Lucr. 5.925-8.

⁴⁸² *ibid* 932-59, 988-93; Nussbaum 1994, 265.

⁴⁸³ Lucr. 1009-1026.

⁴⁸⁴ Segal 1986, 21.

⁴⁸⁵ Lucr. 5.1026-1130; Nussbaum 1994, 267.

⁴⁸⁶ Lucr. 5.50.

⁴⁸⁷ Segal 1986, 21.

⁴⁸⁸ Lucr. 5.21-43.

⁴⁸⁹ *ibid* 5.43-8.

Epicurus, then, acts as the Herculean hero of Lucretius' epic, but more significant still in the presentation of Epicurus is the role he plays in historical rather than mythological epic. This is most clearly present in the triumphal scene where he is the Roman general parading his spoils.⁴⁹⁰ Nussbaum observes that the image of victory illustrates the victory of the peaceful arts over the arts of war, a victory that is vital for Memmius and Rome if either are to enjoy their own victory.⁴⁹¹ This is further emphasised by the repeated reduction of the Roman values of conquest and *gloria*.⁴⁹² In the proems of books 2 and 3 we are told that the lust for military power and *gloria* are erroneous attempts to escape the fear of death, just as the aggressive accumulation of wealth was.⁴⁹³ The clearest example of this is found in Lucretius' development of man when he states "it is indeed much better to obey in peace than to desire to hold power over affairs and to rule kingdoms" (*ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere*)⁴⁹⁴, and the Punic Wars are treated as an irrelevance not a source of pride.⁴⁹⁵ As Nussbaum notes "the triumph of philosophy...is a triumph not through political action...but within each human soul"⁴⁹⁶ and as Lucretius has told us this is a triumph of words not arms.⁴⁹⁷

So it seems that as Nussbaum, Segal and Gale state the *De Rerum Natura* is a poem that universally condemns war, violence and aggression and offers an escape from such a life through the rejection of traditional Roman values and an acceptance of Epicurus and the victory of words not arms. However, there are two ways in which this attitude is called into question. The first is the use of war imagery in the description of atoms and is tackled by Gale, although not by Segal, as it is not directly relevant to 5.1308-49, which is the focus of his attention, nor by Nussbaum, perhaps because her main area of interest is aggression and the wars of the atoms are not seen as aggressive or hateful. Gale notes that the use of this militaristic language to explain cosmological phenomena is not found in earlier Epicurean works and is much more similar to the Presocratic Empedocles.⁴⁹⁸ However, unlike Empedocles, the war between the atoms is seen as a creative as well as disruptive

⁴⁹⁰ Sykes 1931-2, 25-42.

⁴⁹¹ Nussbaum 1994, 274.

⁴⁹² Gale 1998, 108; Minyard 1985, 36-42.

⁴⁹³ *Lucr.* 2.37-54, 3.59-78.

⁴⁹⁴ *ibid* 5.1129-30 (adapted from Rouse and Smith, 1992).

⁴⁹⁵ *ibid* 3.832-42.

⁴⁹⁶ Nussbaum 1994, 275.

⁴⁹⁷ *Lucr.* 5.50.

⁴⁹⁸ Gale 1998, 104.

force, and these forces cannot exist separately.⁴⁹⁹ This then means that the imagery of warfare used to describe the atoms in *De Rerum Natura* is not as wholly negative as that found within Empedocles, and although it is more neutral than it is positive, the use of the war image is perhaps more likely reliant on the poem's place in the epic than the philosophical tradition. Lucretius may have borrowed this use of language from Empedocles because it would fit the genre rather than the doctrine. This indifference towards war can also be seen in Lucretius' use of 'accident' (*eventa*). He says that "servitude, poverty, riches, freedom, war and concord" (*servitium paupertas divitiaeque, libertas bellum concordia*)⁵⁰⁰ are *eventa* as they do not affect the essence of things, whereas weight, heat and fluidity are properties and cannot be removed without destroying matter. *Eventa* cannot exist without matter but matter can exist without any *eventa*. The Trojan War was an accident of the atoms that make up that tract of land, even the most pitiless of wars cannot exist independently without matter but matter can exist independently without wars.⁵⁰¹ As an *accident* such as a bloody and brutal war leaves the essential balance of the world unchanged, the matter that allowed the war to exist is still intact, matter continues to exist and nature is left unchanged and unaffected. So rather than presenting a natural image of war, this in fact merely shows an indifference towards it. Even the Trojan War has had no effect on nature, so this does not show that war is an acceptable pastime but rather that it has no value and no impact on nature, and if an individual has followed the way of Epicurus he will not be affected by the battles any more than the atoms in the swords.

The second passage of the *De Rerum Natura* which proves difficult for Ferguson's 'society of friends' image of the Epicureans is Lucretius watching with pleasure "great encounters of warfare arrayed over the plains, with no part of yours in the peril" (*suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli*).⁵⁰² This causes more trouble than the use of war imagery for atoms, as this seems to be a joyful rather than indifferent aspect of war for Lucretius. There are two possible explanations for this, both found in Epicurean doctrine. Firstly, the pleasure of observing a war from a distance could come from the knowledge that the Epicurean himself is free from pain. This is an important part of Epicurean doctrine, and the explanations of the reasons why pain should be avoided

⁴⁹⁹ Lucr. 2.569-80, 1.31-40.

⁵⁰⁰ *ibid* 1.455-6 (my translation).

⁵⁰¹ *ibid* 1.455-478.

⁵⁰² *ibid* 2.4-6.

are the subject of eight of the principal doctrines of Epicurus.⁵⁰³ However if the avoidance of pain was alone the reason for Lucretius' pleasure at observing the battle then this would mean he has misunderstood this key part of Epicurean doctrine, as Epicurus tells us that bodily pleasure does not increase because pain has been removed but because fear of these pains has been rejected.⁵⁰⁴ So it is more likely that Lucretius' pleasure comes from knowing he is not afraid of (and therefore not affected by) the wars of other men. Later in the same book he compares watching the movements of armies to watching the grazing of sheep, as Gale says "the violence of the military manoeuvres is no more troubling to the detached philosophical observer than the attractive pastoral images in the first part of the analogy".⁵⁰⁵ The true follower of Epicurus is just as the self-sufficient gods; they do not affect nature and are unaffected by it. They are merely happy in their own community based on friendship and agreement, shrouded in peace. This is a point Lucretius specifically makes himself immediately preceding the description of the armies on the plain. He notes that the joy of watching a ship in a storm is derived from knowing that you are not affected.⁵⁰⁶

Lucius Torquatus in Cicero

The *De Finibus* of Cicero is a brief explanation and defence of the ethics of the Epicureans delivered by Lucius Torquatus, and although even here there is not as much time spent on war and peace as in Lucretius, it also shows a longing for peace similar to that of the opening invocation of *De Rerum Natura*. Wisdom is contrasted with desire, coupled with the misunderstanding of good and evil, as the main cause of misery to man. Desires cannot be satisfied, and lead men into "hatred, quarrelling, and strife, of sedition and of war" (*odia, discidia, discordiae, seditiones, bella*) whereas wisdom can banish fear and allow man to live in peace free from desires⁵⁰⁷ and also shows the way to moderation, which again leads to peace and calmness.⁵⁰⁸ Just as Lucretius and the Stoics rejected wars for the purpose of material gain so does *De Finibus*. Possessions lead to a greed for further

⁵⁰³ Epicurus *KD* 3, 4, 10, 11, 18, 21, 26, 30.

⁵⁰⁴ *ibid* 18.

⁵⁰⁵ Gale 1998, 106.

⁵⁰⁶ *Lucr.* 2.1-4. *Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas,
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suavest*

⁵⁰⁷ *Cic. Fin.* 1.13.

⁵⁰⁸ *ibid* 1.14.

possessions; this lust for possessions is seen as an evil in itself, so any attempt to pander to greed be it war or theft would be seen as a further evil. But generosity creates true affection and goodwill and thus is the true route to peace, moreover any natural desire can be satisfied without wronging another individual.⁵⁰⁹ As such true peace is not attained through wars or greed but by generosity and compromise. The most absolute refutation of discord is that neither civil strife, household arguments nor even disputes within the mind can exist and still allow for a life of peace.⁵¹⁰ It is not only war that is here seemingly rejected by the Epicureans but also private violence. Finally it is concluded that with these rules for life Epicurus has “guided all sane-minded men to peace and happiness, calmness and repose” (*omnes bene sanos in viam placatae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceret*).⁵¹¹ Therefore the teachings of Epicurus inherently contain the path to peace, through the avoidance of disputes and physical pain and the understanding of wisdom.

Epicureanism in Horace

As a philosophically eclectic author, who also worked in many different styles, it is not surprising that the attitudes of Horace towards war are more confused than those of the men that belonged to just one of the philosophical schools. The *Odes* and *Epodes* for example contain ideas ranging from those near to Stoic pacifism to others that revel in the chances given in war and glory in the possible outcomes. In the *Odes* Horace prays to Apollo for he will drive out war, hunger and disease (*bellum famem pestemque*)⁵¹², he states that the wise man has no need for arms⁵¹³, that wise counsel shows the way to peace⁵¹⁴, that peace is a true happiness that riches cannot help attain⁵¹⁵, and that civil wars are dismal, unholy strife.⁵¹⁶ However, at times the message is mixed. In *Odes* 1.12.32-41 Horace states that he will tell of peaceful reigns, but proceeds to praise the deeds of great generals and men of war, not actions that lead to or prolong peace. At 4.5.17-24 Augustus is praised for when he is at Rome all is at peace, but then Horace goes on to say at 4.5.25-8 that there is no need to fear war with Spain or Germany, so here peace is not praised as absence of war but rather as a state of martial security. However this also works the other

⁵⁰⁹ *ibid* 1.16.

⁵¹⁰ *ibid* 1.18.

⁵¹¹ *ibid* 1.21 adapted from Rackham, 1913.

⁵¹² Hor. *Carm.* 1.21.13.

⁵¹³ *ibid* 1.22.

⁵¹⁴ *ibid* 4.4.73.

⁵¹⁵ *ibid* 2.16.1.

⁵¹⁶ *ibid* 2.1.33.

way, as in 4.14.34 Augustus' ancestors are praised for their deeds in war and in extending the empire, but this is all because they bring an end to war. Moreover Horace even openly praises the military establishment of Rome. 3.2.6 tells of the excellence of Roman youths hardened in active service and their ability to endure hardships and proclaims "it is sweet and fitting to die for one's country" (*dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*). The *Epodes* also show a similar, although less detailed view. Again civil strife is seen as a woeful state, but this time even this is portrayed as a positive as Horace praises Rome for she can only be defeated by herself⁵¹⁷, and Horace is pleased by the fact that wars are undertaken gladly to win favour.⁵¹⁸ This is in total contrast to the ideas of the Stoics, that wars for glory are to be completely abandoned.

As the *Epistles* are said to be the most highly influenced by the philosophers of all Horace's works and the most serious of his philosophical endeavours, it is surprising that they contain no more opinions on war and peace than the *Epodes* and are no more negative towards warfare either. In *Epistle* 1.20 Horace says that he found favour in war and peace, so he does not distinguish between the needs of either situation or between the ethical problem of profiting in (if not from) war.⁵¹⁹ In *Epistle* 2.1 Horace is openly negative toward a state of peace, although he states that peace allows time for leisure. Instead of praising this in a way that may be expected from an author with Epicurean sympathies he dismisses this leisure as opening the way for fickle arts that reduce the moral fibre of the state.⁵²⁰ Only once does Horace come close to the attitude which may have been envisaged, this is when he advises that men should study the words of wise men as they bring tranquillity.⁵²¹ However, this is clearly an internal personal peace rather than pacifism or even an absence of war.

It is in the *Satires* that the most conventional philosophical views are present. The third satire in book 1 contains a description of the golden age that includes ideas which are found in Lucretius' Epicurean work and also in Seneca's tragedies. As in Seneca, it is women who are blamed for causing wars, but like Lucretius it is the establishment of towns and the beginning of laws that brings about peace.⁵²² Even more purely Epicurean is the

⁵¹⁷ Hor. *Epod.* 16.1.

⁵¹⁸ *ibid* 1.23.

⁵¹⁹ Hor. *Epist.* 1.20.19.

⁵²⁰ *ibid* 2.1.5-11 & 93-102.

⁵²¹ Hor. *Epist.* 1.18.52.

⁵²² Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.99.

description of Horace as a lover of peace, and his following plea that “let no man injure me, a lover of peace” (*nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis*).⁵²³ This seems to be based on the Epicurean avoidance of physical pain. If Horace was a lover of peace for Stoic rather than Epicurean reasons he may have been more likely to insist that ‘no man is able to injure me’ rather than “may no man injure me”.

The three schools examined above have all previously been associated with pacifistic beliefs. However, this pacifistic attitude has not been found in the later Platonists or the Peripatetics, it is to these two schools this work will now turn in order to discover if there is any connection with the more peaceful ethics of the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans.

Later Platonism and the Peripatetics

Maximus of Tyre

Maximus of Tyre is the only middle-Platonist who dedicates a specific work to the topic of war and peace. In *Orationes* 23 and 24 he argues firstly that the soldier is more important to the state than the farmer and then in 24 that the converse is in fact the case. This pair of essays has received little attention but Zampaglione suggests that they form a work of an obviously Sophist type, and that the presence of arguments for both sides means that “its [the 24th *Oration*’s] importance and its power of conviction must inevitably suffer”.⁵²⁴ Whereas Trapp, in his edition of Maximus’ *Orationes*, says that “it is clear the second of the two speeches wins”.⁵²⁵ However, the Platonic view of war often calls for a middle line that is neither too pacific nor too militarist, so perhaps neither oration is meant to wholly convince and therefore allow the audience to reach this Platonic conclusion. A detailed analysis of these orations is needed before any conclusion can be reached.

The twenty-third *Oration* argues in favour of the soldier over the farmer and is split into five main subjects: chapter one uses examples from Homer and the Trojan War more generally, chapters two to four give examples from history of warring compared to farming societies, chapter five uses similar examples but from the divine not mortal world. Chapter six argues that the choice is one of freedom over slavery and that eternal injustices mean that there is really no choice at all but the decision is forced upon man, and chapter seven

⁵²³ *ibid* 2.1.34.

⁵²⁴ Zampaglione 1973, 169.

⁵²⁵ Trapp 1997, 195.

argues that farming cannot exist without soldiers and farming itself is a cause of wars. The twenty-fourth *Oratio* is also split into five main points of contention: chapter one argues that farmers are as brave as soldiers, chapters two to four are all centred on ideas of justice and injustice, chapter five asks which creates the greatest evils and desires and which the greatest virtues. Chapter six argues that farmers are not only stronger but more inclined to wisdom than soldiers and chapter seven concludes that farmers are not only more useful for a state, but also that they make the best warriors. So if quantity carried any weight in philosophical debate then it is clear that neither one has carried the day.

The first argument in *Oratio 23* is based on Homeric examples. Firstly, Maximus states the warriors in Homer were born of Zeus and therefore divine, secondly that it was the warriors that Homer chose to make kings, thirdly that while the men fight they are happy, and fourthly that Odysseus says that the crop of Ithaca is young men; “A rough land, but a good nurse of young men”.⁵²⁶ These arguments vary in philosophical quality, as a middle-Platonist Maximus would have been influenced by the importance of the *telos* (*telos agathôn* – the end of goods) which for many middle-Platonists had come to be “Likeness to God”.⁵²⁷ Thus a divine heritage would presumably allow for a more literal “Likeness to God” and permit man to be one step closer to achieving the end of goods. This point also finds support in Plato and Aristotle, which asserted that leaders should be warriors.⁵²⁸ However, happiness of the soldiers as a Platonist’s argument is less philosophically sound, because the happiness for these warriors is achieved through a solely bodily pleasure, not one of the soul, and although the degree to which bodily qualities mattered to happiness varies between middle-Platonists, it is never seen as able to create happiness without a deeper internal virtue.⁵²⁹ The final point, based on a quote from Odysseus carries the least weight as it relies purely on semantics and has no deeper quality or value.

⁵²⁶ Hom. *Od.* 9.27. Instances of other Platonists using this form of the *Telos* include Eudorus of Alexandria (Dillon 1977, 122); Plutarch *De Sera* 550d; Albinus *Theaetetus Commentary*, 7. 14. Also see footnote 490 below for Platonists who clarified the *telos* with the added phrase ‘through closeness to nature’.

⁵²⁷ Dillon 1977, 44; Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176b.

⁵²⁸ Arist. *Pol.* 4.4.1291a24-28, 7.1329a2-14; Plato, *Leg.* 1.628b-d.

⁵²⁹ The Old Academy view is found in Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* which records that Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, Aristotle and Theophrastus said that some level of external good was necessary for complete happiness, but that internal virtue had a more prominent role (*fr.* 58 Lang; Dillon 1977, 18). However middle Platonists’ views varied depending on if they chose to side with the Peripatetic or Stoic idea of virtues, Antiochus of Ascalon for example felt that all forms of good must be considered; both internal and external (Cic. *De Leg.* 155). Whereas Eudorus of Alexandria saw external matters only as “preferred” not as essential to happiness (Arius, *Stob.* 2, 116-52 Wachs).

The element which is given the most space is historic example.⁵³⁰ Chapters two and three focus mainly on Sparta and Crete; their military constitutions are lauded and it is said they were free while they fought but became slaves once they put their weapons aside. Chapter four gives the same points again, but for a wider number of nations; Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Lydia and Scythia. This, however, is in total contradiction to the Platonic views of these constitutions, which Plato saw as too one sided and which were, in fact, the cause of the Spartan and Cretan failures; as they could not live in peace and stability but only while engaged in active service.⁵³¹ From a Platonist's point of view it seems clear that far from dedicating the majority of the text to the strongest arguments, Maximus has committed nearly half the dissertation to an argument that is rejected by Plato and Aristotle. The force of this argument is further reduced by a more logical point. The final example given is that of the Lydians, who were warriors when they were free but farmers once enslaved. So it was not farming that caused them to be enslaved, but rather their militarism caused their downfall. Farming was not the cause of their woes but rather the result of them.

Chapter five provides divine examples, and as we shall see seems to lack any real persuasive power, in part because it is self-contradicting, but also because it has no basis in the realities of the day. The main point is that the most powerful gods are all warriors, and that even those gods that became farmers began as warriors. It continues with an example from the golden age; it claims that in the age of Cronus, farming was not important and that great quantities of food were still available growing wild. However, this contradicts Maximus' own argument about the gods that converted to farming; if it was necessary for the gods to become farmers then presumably to maintain a "likeness to God" it is also necessary for man to turn to agriculture. Also, the abundance of wild food lacks any influence in an age which was so reliant on mass agriculture, particularly for supplying the army, and as will be shown, this is directly and convincingly answered in *Oratio* 24 chapter 5.

Chapter six argues that military action is freely chosen but that farming is forced upon us and that, as this is the case, becoming a soldier must be a virtue. However, this argument is again contradicted, as Maximus goes on to say that the debate being held is not one between war and peace and furthermore, if it was, then we should all farm; but there is

However, no Platonists of either the old academy or the Roman period ever saw bodily virtues as a sole path to happiness independent of the soul (Dillon, 1977, 43-45).

⁵³⁰ 2-4.

⁵³¹ Plato, *Leg.* 1.628d-e; Arist. *Pol.* 2.9.1271b5-6.

injustice and conflict in the world. Men are roused by desires and greed, and armies are always on the march in some areas of the world. So it seems that it is not farming that is forced upon man, but war caused by the greed and violence that are a constant elements of the world. It is also important to note that even in this oration, which argues for the importance of the army, it is still stated that if there is a choice between war and peace, peace should be the obvious option.

The final chapter⁵³² asks where it is possible to farm in peace. Generals are seen as having a desire and greed for distant lands, so farming actually causes wars as it increases the desirability of the land. Poor soil is said to produce more stable communities because no one desires to possess them. So again, here we see the supposed champion of the military solution arguing that farmers are not beneficial because they themselves increase the chance of wars occurring. Therefore, the final point made is not a battle cry but a call for peace: “You hear how it is that wars start? Don’t be a farmer... You are laying the grounds for civil strife and war!”

The arguments in *Oratio* twenty-three are not only self-contradictory but also conflict with the ideas present in Plato’s own works; as such, for the Platonist Maximus, it is surely philosophically unconvincing. But does *Oratio* twenty-four fare any better? Chapter one begins in a similar vein as *Oratio* twenty-three, first by claiming that a farmer is no less skilled with weapons than a soldier (a topic that is covered more fully in chapter six) and then with examples from poetry. However, rather than using Homer, *Oratio* twenty-four quotes from Aratus on the loss of the golden age and the hated onset of wars.

Who were the first to forge the sword of the highwayman,
The first to eat of the flesh of the ploughing-ox.⁵³³

However, having concluded that the argument derived from Homer in *Oratio* twenty-three carries little weight it must also be decided that this poetic section must be of equal value.

As in *Oratio* twenty-three, the most detailed extended argument is found in chapters two to four. Here, however, the examples are not historic, but rather the focus turns to philosophical theory and the concept of justice. Here the tone becomes very Stoic.

⁵³² Maximus of Tyre *Or.* 23.7.

⁵³³ Aratus *Phaen.* 131-2.

Maximus asks “do the just fight with the just?”⁵³⁴ And the answer given is inevitably “by no means... what need could they have of war?”⁵³⁵ This is very similar to the argument put forward in Epictetus who claims that wise men should not war against other wise men.⁵³⁶ Only the unjust are the cause of wars, for they will start a war with other unjust nations or with just nations that must then defend themselves. Maximus says that the just maintain a “perpetual truce and peace” and that the just would forgo all military activity if they could, but at times they must enter into battle for defence or to maintain the state of justice.⁵³⁷ Chapters three and four continue to focus on justice. It is said that both farmers and soldiers may show justice, therefore comparing just farmers with just soldiers is irrelevant as both will be good, and comparing unjust farmers with unjust soldiers is also irrelevant as both will be evil. Therefore it is decided that the rest of the oration will compare men who are neither wholly just nor unjust, in order to see which profession encourages men to pursue justice.⁵³⁸

Chapter five examines the virtues of each profession and the effects they would have on a man from the middle ground. This chapter asserts that desire is the greatest evil, war is insatiable in its desire while farming is thrifty, and that war and weapons increase anger, which should be moderated. These arguments are based on existing Platonic ideas about the moderation of passions and, as such, seem more convincing than those in *Oratio* twenty-three.⁵³⁹ When virtues are considered, then farming is seen as more productive for the improvement of virtues; armed men cannot afford to show self restraint as they appear cowardly if they do. War is also said to teach injustice, as justice is a lesson of peace. However, in Plato’s and Aristotle’s works justice can be found in both war and peace, so on this theme Maximus disagrees with his predecessors.⁵⁴⁰ War is also a source of greed, and as a result increases injustices. Then Maximus turns to the Platonic theme of friendship:⁵⁴¹ the farmer is more inclined to be a friend to all as he needs to maintain friendly relationships and is innocent of blood and slaughter, so continues to be holy and consecrated. Thus, although not all of these arguments concur with the Platonic dialogues

⁵³⁴ Maximus of Tyre *Or.* 24.2.

⁵³⁵ *ibid.*

⁵³⁶ Epict. 3.22.36-7.

⁵³⁷ Maximus of Tyre *Or.* 24.2.

⁵³⁸ A doctrine attributed to Plato by Alcin. *Didasc.* 30. 183. 31, Apul. *De Dog. Plat.* 2. 3. 224 & 2. 19. 246 and in Philo *Praem.* 62-5 as a way of dismissing the Stoic idea that everyone who fails in perfect virtue is equally vicious; Trapp 1997, 203.

⁵³⁹ Plato *Resp.* 232a, for example.

⁵⁴⁰ Arist. *N.E.* 1366b4-7; Plato, *Prt.* 322c-323c.

⁵⁴¹ Maximus of Tyre *Or.* 24.5.

they do, at least, take their cues from them and continue to use philosophical arguments. The final section of chapter 5 addresses points made in *Oratio* twenty-three, about the divine elements of life. He says that, far from not wishing men to farm, the gods prefer the farmer. For it was farmers who were the origin of the most important religious rites⁵⁴² and, as such, the gods prefer offerings that show the “love for fellow men; their sacrifices are well-omened and spring from their own labours, with no taint of calamity or misfortune” and are not “acts of piety based on human disaster”.

Next, the virtue of wisdom is considered⁵⁴³ and Maximus states that soldiers are wise in acts that are “disruptive and dismaying”, whereas the wisdom of farmers relates to natural matters; seasons, weather and the heavens. The farmers’ areas of wisdom cause them to attain another version of the Platonic *telos* ‘Likeness to God, through closeness to nature’⁵⁴⁴. Whereas the soldiers’ area of expertise requires them to work against nature and also against philosophical goals; as Speusippus says that good men aim at “freedom from disturbance”⁵⁴⁵ and Xenocrates also says that philosophy is the “elimination of all causes of disturbances in life”.⁵⁴⁶ So whereas *Oratio* twenty-three’s only claim to the *telos* is seen in reference to warriors being born of gods, *Oratio* twenty-four shows soldiers as defying both the *telos* and the work of philosophy more generally, by disregard to nature and the creation of disturbances, whereas farmers are creators of tranquillity, who attain the *telos* through their daily routine.

The remainder of chapter six and chapter seven echo a similar transformation of topic as was seen in *Oratio* twenty-three. *Oratio* twenty-three ended with a cry for peace. *Oratio* twenty-four turns surprisingly to the topic of war. In this oration it is said that farmers are physically fitter than soldiers and are better trained for battle.⁵⁴⁷ However, although similar to parts of *Oration* twenty-three in its use of many examples from history; unlike the earlier dissertation, here we see some solid philosophical backing in echoes of

⁵⁴² An idea found in Xen. *Oec.* 5. 12; Philemon *fr.* 105; Cic. *Off.* 1. 48; Verg. *G.* 2. 460; Musonius *fr.* 11 Hense; Trapp 1997, 204.

⁵⁴³ Maximus of Tyre *Or.* 24.6.

⁵⁴⁴ The Platonic *telos* that requires a closeness to nature is found in Speusippus’ views preserved in Clement of Alexandria *fr.* 57 Lang; Antiochus of Ascalon’s views in Cic. *Fin.* 5. 26-7; Philo *Decal.* 81 and this form of the *telos* may also have been a key theme in the lost work of Polemon *On Life According to Nature*.

⁵⁴⁵ Clement of Alexandria *fr.* 77 Lang.

⁵⁴⁶ Xenocrates *fr.* 4 Heinze.

⁵⁴⁷ Maximus of Tyre *Or.* 24.6.

Xenophon's Socratic dialogue *Oeconomicus* which extols the life of a farmer for physical fitness and training.⁵⁴⁸

Therefore, having examined both of these dissertations in detail, it does seem that farmers have emerged triumphant, as the arguments put forward on their behalf have a more Platonic basis and are formed around eternal virtues, not historic and poetic examples. However, it is surprising that both dissertations change emphasis as they reach their conclusion: the first suddenly taking a pacifistic stance and the second, which had previously rejected the necessity of any war in a world of justice, arguing that farmers are a greater benefit because they perform the acts of soldier with greater efficiency and skill. This could, perhaps, show the median way of life recommended by earlier Platonic philosophers. However, in other places where Maximus turns his attention to warfare, he often seems wholly negative. He concludes that nothing is more disagreeable than war and is amazed that it found any "lovers", for he cannot understand how war could ever be seen as a source of happiness.⁵⁴⁹ He regards the use of war or becoming a mercenary (along with money, assault, bribes, song and affairs) as a means for happiness as "treacherous and dangerous paths".⁵⁵⁰ Moreover, the inability of men to distinguish a correct route to happiness is the cause of wars, cavalry charges, and naval battles, as well as men becoming mercenaries, so the rejection of the Platonic *telos*, as performed by the soldiers in *Orationes* twenty-three and twenty-four, are the cause of man's ills.⁵⁵¹ Even the gods are attacked for their inadequacy in preventing wars. Apollo's oracles are dismissed for they can only tell of the coming of wars, but a truly great oracle, like philosophy, would tell how to prevent war, not when to plan for one.⁵⁵²

The group of five dissertations collectively entitled *The True End of Life: Virtue or Pleasure?*⁵⁵³ also show an interestingly contradictory attitude to war and peace, similar to that seen in the pair concerning farmers and soldiers. In *Oratio* thirty-two, the Epicurean is given a chance to reply to the accusations made against his hedonism. His arguments include two centred on warfare: firstly that pleasure must be a virtue because men are willing to go to war for pleasure⁵⁵⁴; secondly, that pleasure can be gained through warring

⁵⁴⁸ Xenophon, *Oec.* 5.8, 6.9, 7.7, 6.6-8.

⁵⁴⁹ Maximus of Tyre *Or.* 29.2.

⁵⁵⁰ *ibid Or.* 29.3.

⁵⁵¹ *ibid Or.* 29.6.

⁵⁵² *ibid Or.* 29.7.

⁵⁵³ *ibid Or.* 29-33.

⁵⁵⁴ *ibid Or.* 32.6.

acts. The Spartans, for example, drew pleasure from the eradication of fear brought about by constant battle and military training.⁵⁵⁵ However, these arguments are intended to be found wanting. The purpose of allowing the Epicurean to speak at this point is not so that he can convince the audience, but rather to allow him to show his own deficiencies as a philosopher, and the Platonist is able to attack the Epicurean with a military image of his own “But Epicureans... I cannot bear, nor will I tolerate philosophy playing the wanton, any more than I will tolerate a general who abandons his post”.⁵⁵⁶ Also the Epicurean argument is turned on its head: far from proving that pleasure is a virtue, the pursuit of pleasure conducted through warfare is seen as a folly and a curse brought about by greed and lust.⁵⁵⁷

Philo of Alexandria (Judaeus)

Philo of Alexandria spends a great deal of time not only debating the ethics but also the practicality of warfare. This may be due to the fact that he feels “the greater portion of the human race lives rather [than in peace] in war and among all the evils of war”.⁵⁵⁸ He often returns to the topic of the causes of wars, and also what will bring about the end of war. In *De Praemiis et Poenis* he divides wars into two types - ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’. ‘Ancient’ wars are those with beasts, while ‘modern’ wars are brought about by man’s “covetousness”.⁵⁵⁹ However, despite the differences in these wars, they will be ended by the same phenomenon, namely the taming of the animals. Once the animals have been tamed the ‘ancient’ wars would naturally end, while the ‘modern’ wars would also end, as men would not want to appear more barbarous than the animals which they used to fight.⁵⁶⁰ In *Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres* Philo also differentiates between two types of war; not ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ but, ‘external’ and ‘domestic’. External wars are caused (as one would expect) by desire for reputation or for the improvement of status, but domestic are caused by weakness, or evils of the soul, such as passion, disease and injustice.⁵⁶¹ The end of these wars is brought about by the prosperity of all things surrounding an individual,

⁵⁵⁵ *ibid Or.* 32.10.

⁵⁵⁶ *ibid Or.* 33.3.

⁵⁵⁷ *ibid Or.* 33.4.

⁵⁵⁸ *Philo Her.* 58.284.

⁵⁵⁹ *Philo Praem.* 16.91 *cf* 16.85-90.

⁵⁶⁰ *Philo Praem.* 16.91.

⁵⁶¹ *Philo Her.* 58.284.

allowing for glory and wealth through great abundance.⁵⁶² However, the peace Philo refers to here is not “the peace that cities enjoy”. Abraham, for example is said to have triumphed in many wars and yet he still enjoyed peace, because he was able to live with an “absence of the passions”.⁵⁶³ Here, Philo starts with a Platonic principle, which he then adapts through his knowledge of the Pentateuch, but by doing this he has arrived at a strongly Stoic conclusion about the extirpation of the passions and the internal peace of God. That true peace comes from internal affairs is also seen when Philo says that the only men who accord with divine laws can live at peace.⁵⁶⁴

In *De Specialibus Legibus* 4 Philo does not consider the general causes of wars but rather uses a specific biblical example from *Deuteronomy* 20:1: in preparation for war the young men should arm themselves and fortify the city, but while doing this the herald should be sent to negotiate peace, for “peace, even if it be very unfavourable, is more advantageous than war”.⁵⁶⁵ Again here we see an example from the Pentateuch, leading Philo to a conclusion most fervently echoed in Stoicism rather than middle-Platonism. However, this Stoic ideal is quickly pushed aside as it is concluded that if peace can still not be reached then it will be necessary to fight, and to fight well.⁵⁶⁶ Then, the subject becomes more ethical than practical, and it is decided that the Jews are a race allied with justice and friendship. As a result any similar civilisation that is also “Peaceful in their intentions” will live at peace with the Jews.⁵⁶⁷ Again, it is swiftly clarified that this is not a sign of weakness but that Jewry is willing to “go forth to defend itself”. But although they are willing to defend themselves they do so in a just way, not killing indiscriminately and not taking the women into slavery.⁵⁶⁸ So, although the more Stoic attitude towards warfare is seen as an ideal state, the more practical Platonic militarism still allows for justice to be maintained through temperance of aggression. *De Opificio Mundi* also has a similar Stoic resonance; Philo says that when the violence of passions succumbs to justice and temperance then ambition and vice will be overcome by virtue.⁵⁶⁹ This would end the “war of the soul” and create a lasting tranquillity.⁵⁷⁰ There are also other elements of Stoic influence in *De*

⁵⁶² *ibid* 58.285-6.

⁵⁶³ *ibid* 58.286-9.

⁵⁶⁴ Philo *Spec.* 4.16.95.

⁵⁶⁵ *ibid* 4.41.219.

⁵⁶⁶ *ibid* 4.41.222-3.

⁵⁶⁷ *ibid* 4.41.224.

⁵⁶⁸ *ibid* 4.41.224-5.

⁵⁶⁹ Philo *Op.* 26.81.

⁵⁷⁰ *ibid.*

Opificio Mundi, for example Philo twice describes the creation of Genesis in a cosmopolitan manner.⁵⁷¹ Most surprising about this Stoic-influenced cosmopolitanism is the way that it causes Philo to reconsider one of the most fundamental principles of Judaism; the idea of ‘chosenness’. Whereas, conventional Jewish thinking, as typified in *Deuteronomy* and *Exodus*, stated that the Jews were the people chosen by God as first among the peoples of the world⁵⁷², Philo altered this to accept a more philanthropic and universal idea of man.⁵⁷³ Therefore, although Philo still maintained that the Jews were the chosen people, he believed that they were chosen to “offer prayers on behalf of the whole human race”.⁵⁷⁴

We have seen that the Stoics, while occasionally praising the bravery of a warrior from distant history or mythology, were much more pacifistic when discussing contemporary conflicts. However, the converse seems to be the case for Philo. While the biblical example prompts Philo to promote unfavourable peace over violence⁵⁷⁵, when it comes to more immediate examples he seems to push for more military solutions. In *De Virtutibus* (which reports Philo’s attitude towards an embassy from the emperor Gaius after a statue of the emperor has been erected in the Temple); first it is considered whether the present problem has been sent by God to test the virtue of a new generation⁵⁷⁶, then it is hoped that this could cause a deeper long lasting peace.⁵⁷⁷ However, despite these hopes for peace and virtue, it soon becomes apparent that Philo feels that there should be no doubt that the Jews “will fight on behalf of our laws, and die in defence of our national customs”.⁵⁷⁸ However, as this war would be for the preservation of divine laws, rather than eliminating peace it would, in fact, be promoting a deeper, truer tranquillity similar to that described in *De Specialibus Legibus*, and to that of Abraham. This more military attitude is also apparent when Philo lists the legal reasons why a man may be exempt from the army in the Jewish levy according to the laws of *Deuteronomy* 20.4-7 in *De Agricultura* 34.149. The accepted reasons are these; if a man has built a house but not dedicated it, if a man has planted a vineyard and not harvested it or if he “has espoused a wife , and has not received her yet”. Philo, however, felt that these men would most likely become loyal soldiers, for they would have the most to lose from defeat in war. He says “it is rather

⁵⁷¹ *ibid* 3 & 142-3; Pangle 1998, 240.

⁵⁷² *Deuteronomy* 14:2; *Exodus* 19:5-6.

⁵⁷³ Philo *QG* 2.60; *Spec.* 4.14; *Decal* 132-134; *Virt.* 166, 169.

⁵⁷⁴ Winston 1984, 398; *Spec.* 1.96-97.

⁵⁷⁵ Philo *Spec.* 4.41.219.

⁵⁷⁶ Philo *Virt.* 29.196-6.

⁵⁷⁷ *ibid* 30.197.

⁵⁷⁸ *ibid* 31.208.

fitting that those, whom the danger chiefly concerns, should seize their arms and stand in the front battalions and hold their shields over their allies, fighting cheerfully and with a spirit which even courts danger".⁵⁷⁹

Peripatetics

All works that consider the philosophical schools in the period of the late republic and early empire are faced with the same problems when it comes to the Peripatetics; this is because very few original treatises survive from the followers of Aristotle on any subject. The Peripatetics seem to have preferred the commentary and doxographical methods to larger more original treatises.⁵⁸⁰ This problem is compounded when the treatises that do survive are surveyed. The largest Peripatetic treatises extant from the relevant period are the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo*, usually thought to be from the later 1st century AD and the *Geography*, *Almagest*, and *Harmonics* by the Egyptian Ptolemy at the end of the 2nd century. All four of these works are dedicated to the problems of mathematics and astronomy and contain no political or ethical philosophy of any serious nature. The greater group of peripatetic works from this age are the commentaries and summaries. The three most complete summaries are those of Nicolaus of Damascus which have survived in Syriac⁵⁸¹, the fragments of books 7 and 8 of Aristocles of Messene's *On Philosophy*⁵⁸², and that of Arius Didymus whose handbook was preserved in the anthology of Stobaeus. However, the summaries and handbooks show the same inclination towards physics and logic as the treatises of Ptolemy and *De Mundo* with the categories of Aristotle's philosophy being the most popular subject for the commentators and doxographers to examine, followed by the physical works.⁵⁸³ Therefore, when it comes to the political and ethical issues of war and peace, there are few works that can be of any genuine use. Of those that remain, it is only the *Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics* of Arius Didymus, the summary of Peripatetic ethics in Cicero's *De Finibus* (that shows the theories of Antiochus), and the two commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* – one by Aspasius and one by an anonymous commentator, which although usually believed to be from the 2nd century may be from a

⁵⁷⁹ Philo Agr. 34.151.

⁵⁸⁰ Gottschalk 1987, 1080.

⁵⁸¹ The surviving Syriac translation is in itself probably a summary of a summary (Drossaart Lulofs 1965), and may have been written by any one of a number of philosophers named Nicolaus perhaps as late as the 4th century (Sharples 2007, 509).

⁵⁸² Chiesara 2001.

⁵⁸³ Gottschalk 1987, 1101.

later period – that may broach the topic, and even then only from an ethical rather than political perspective.

One section of commentary which could perhaps be expected to provide some pertinent information is that from Aspasius' commentary on book 3 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is in book 3 of that work that Aristotle's views on the honourable acts of soldiers and the demonstration of courage are found. However, Aspasius is more concerned with defining what Aristotle meant by courage and how this impacts on other elements of Aristotle's ethics. Nevertheless, there are some very clear expressions of attitudes towards wars and soldiers. Aspasius states that an act is only courageous if it is carried out for a noble purpose which forces the perpetrator to endure a terrible situation.⁵⁸⁴ The most explicit example that Aspasius gives for this is the courage found in the noblest deaths, such as at war for one's country or one's "dearest ones".⁵⁸⁵ This is expanded further when he says that experience can often be mistaken for courage and again soldiers are used as the example here.⁵⁸⁶ He says that the experienced soldier who holds the line can often be mistaken as courageous and emphasises the fact that, for Aristotle, a soldier was a hired professional who had become used to the "vain things of war".⁵⁸⁷ Therefore, the professional soldier will not be frightened by what would appear to most to be a threatening situation, thus the 'soldier' does not perform any noble act.⁵⁸⁸ Aspasius, in that case, does not differ in any way from Aristotle on the act of war; in as much as it is defined by courage, although this examination of courage does seem outdated by the time of Aspasius, as it is so heavily influenced by the city-state system and the idea of the free Greek soldier.

There is another important aspect on his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aspasius places an outdated importance on the *polis* and the anonymous commentator of books 8 and 9 does the same. When both commentators discuss the idea of love and concord, they begin with what sounds like a universal vision of mankind.⁵⁸⁹ Aspasius says that love is natural between all human beings and gives an Aristotelian example of the traveller being directed by a stranger⁵⁹⁰, whereas the anonymous commentator begins with

⁵⁸⁴ Aspasius 82.27-83.5.

⁵⁸⁵ *ibid* 81.20-25.

⁵⁸⁶ *ibid* 84.27-85.5.

⁵⁸⁷ *ibid*.

⁵⁸⁸ *ibid* 84.27-85.5.

⁵⁸⁹ Asp. 159.25-160.4; Anon. 196.14-18.

⁵⁹⁰ *N.E.* 1155a22-3.

a description of consensus which he says can exist between any people, even strangers with no common bond. Nevertheless, soon it becomes apparent that they have drawn the same divide as Aristotle himself, that morality and justice are very different for those within the *polis* compared to those from without.⁵⁹¹ Although Aspasius starts from a universally binding concept of love he quickly turns this to concord, which he confines within a group of loving friends or a city.⁵⁹² Concord and love become civic and familial virtues that impart justice, forgetting the universal standing that began this line of thought.⁵⁹³ The same is even more correct for the anonymous commentator, who has started from the weaker position of consensus, rather than love, and quickly moves towards a civic concord based on a mutual love of one's associates in a city or group of friends.⁵⁹⁴

It is apparent then that the Peripatetic commentators did not develop or evolve any ethical doctrine that could affect their attitude towards war and peace. However, the doxographical work of Arius Didymus and the ethics of Antiochus preserved in Cicero's *De Finibus*, show an important development of Peripatetic ethics absent in Aspasius and our anonymous commentator - the adoption of the Stoic doctrine of 'social' or other-directed *oikeiosis*.⁵⁹⁵ For the Stoics and early Peripatetics, *Oikeiosis* starts from the natural affection felt towards ourselves and our children from birth,⁵⁹⁶ as our rationality is better understood, then our affection spreads outwards until it becomes an affection for all humanity.⁵⁹⁷ Antiochus and Arius Didymus take the opposite approach to the commentators, starting from the *polis* and then pushing its boundaries out, rather than starting with a human affinity and localising it in the city walls. Antiochus says that human nature has an innate civic virtue, but this and all virtues are not "incompatible with the human fellowship" and that they embrace the "whole human race". Similarly Arius begins with the idea of immediate family but then expands this idea to the tribe or city before

⁵⁹¹ Annas 1995, 79.

⁵⁹² Asp. 160.5- 15.

⁵⁹³ *ibid* 160.16-33.

⁵⁹⁴ Anon. 196.18-197.7. Interestingly, Michael of Ephesus also confines the relations of love and concord to within the *polis* (489.25-491.30) showing that the commentary style of the Peripatetics created an outdated and artificial political view that was little altered even by the 12th century and the influence of nearly a millennium of Christian ethics.

⁵⁹⁵ For a full account of the progression of the theory of *oikeiosis* and its movement from Stoic to Peripatetic schools see Gottschalk (1987) and Pembroke (1971) and a more detailed analysis of the use of *oikeiosis* in Arius Didymus see Görgemanns (1983).

⁵⁹⁶ The fact that this affection comes from birth is intended to show that it is a natural, instinctive emotion not that we feel this emotion from the time of our birth rather than the birth of our offspring (Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1038b; Annas, 1995, 77).

⁵⁹⁷ *Fin.* 5. 65-6; Arius Didymus = Stobaeus *Ant.* 2.116.19-152.25.

ending with all humans, because he says it makes no difference if people are near or strangers.⁵⁹⁸ Arius moves even further from the ethical system based on the *polis*, by his emphasis on the communal nature of human affairs, which, is in strange contrast to the strictly demarcated boundaries of the *polis*.⁵⁹⁹ Annas clearly defines the crucial ethical outcome of the Stoic other-directed *oikeiosis* as ‘impartiality’ because it forces the agent not to weigh their own interests higher, purely because they are one’s own interests, and also not to do the same with their own attachments and commitments.⁶⁰⁰

Before the final effects of this development are considered, it will be of value to take a step back and examine the theories of Dicaearchus of Messana, who is believed to have studied directly under Aristotle at the Lyceum. In one of his works *De Interitu Hominum*, which, like Antiochus, has been preserved in part by Cicero, he notes that the most deadly force on earth is man, who has killed more in wars and revolutions than floods, disease, famine and wild beasts.⁶⁰¹ Baldry believes that, like Cicero, Dicaearchus must have thus concluded that men should try to minimise this damage by winning co-operation and friendship in order to benefit humanity rather than destroy it.⁶⁰² Furthermore, there is Dicaearchus’ view of the early stages of man from his work *Bios Hellados* preserved in Porphyry’s *De Abstinencia*, 4.2.⁶⁰³ In this we see an attitude familiar from Plato in which, before the acquisition of wealth and possessions worth fighting for, men lived a life of “leisure, easy fulfilment of their essential needs, good health, peace and friendship”.⁶⁰⁴ However, Baldry noted that the title of Dicaearchus’ work strongly suggests that the life of early man and its development was centred in Greece and was unlikely to include a wholly universal notion of mankind⁶⁰⁵ and, as such, was unlikely to include a Stoic notion of the ‘social’ *oikeiosis*.

Therefore, it seems that of the Peripatetic philosophers who considered ethical issues, there is a divide between those that based their ideas firmly on the *polis* based political structure used by Aristotle and those that were able to look to the larger world of the empire. The more progressive thinkers, embodied by Antiochus and recorded by Arius Didymus and Cicero, saw that the inward looking ethical theory of Aristotle was no longer

⁵⁹⁸ 120.8-200.

⁵⁹⁹ 125.15-126.11; Annas 1995, 86-7.

⁶⁰⁰ Annas 1995, 78.

⁶⁰¹ *Off.* 2.5.16 = *fr.* 24 Wehrli.

⁶⁰² Baldry 1965, 146.

⁶⁰³ Mirhady 2001, 56.

⁶⁰⁴ *De Abstinencia*, 4.2 = *fr.* 49 Wehrli.

⁶⁰⁵ Baldry 1965, 146-7.

viable, and they adopted some of the universalising attitudes of the Stoics, in order to correct this inconsistency and to make their philosophy more relevant to the political realities of the day. Despite the fact that this theory is never directly applied to war and peace, perhaps the more humanitarian attitudes found in Dicaearchus, in relation to concord and violence, suggest that if they had also accepted this earlier Peripatetic compassion, and combined it with the newer Peripatetic *oikeiosis*, then they could have reached a similar conclusion to the Stoics who also shared both of these elements and were more explicit in relating them to ideas of war and peace.

Scepticism

The nature of Scepticism (also known as Pyrrhonism) and its focus on the metaphysical and logical qualities of knowledge and reality means that little time is spent on ethical issues. If it can never be decided whether an action that appears virtuous is really so, it becomes nearly impossible to draw ethical conclusions on any topic. The most important *trope* for the issue of Sceptical ethics is the tenth.⁶⁰⁶ But war and peace do not only have to be considered in relation to ethics. As we have seen the metaphysical theory of the Stoics and Cynics could be used just as powerfully as their ethical and political doctrines in order to reject warfare. Consequently, the lack of ethical attention does not mean that the tenth is the only *trope* that can be used to examine the Sceptical attitude to war and peace. Therefore, I will examine each of the ten *tropes* in turn and see how each could be applied to the question of war and peace.

The first *trope*⁶⁰⁷ considers the different perceptions of animals to different stimuli. Man can only decide his impression of an object and cannot know the way in which any other animal perceives the same object or situation.⁶⁰⁸ This provides us with little or no information on an ethical level, but merely considers the nature of reality. However, it is still possible to apply the concept of war to this *trope*. Although the human perception of violence cannot be judged as either evil or good, the possibility that any issue can be qualitatively judged by an animal alters the very nature of these judgements. If we assume that man would usually perceive wars as either worthy or corrupting then this does not affect the way in which other species could perceive them. If any form of scavenger insect,

⁶⁰⁶ Hankinson 1995, 263; Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 145.

⁶⁰⁷ Sextus Empiricus *PH* 40-78.

⁶⁰⁸ *ibid* 40-41.

mammal or bird is considered, it is probable that a war between men would be seen as a possible food supply and therefore undoubtedly positive. This being so, even if Sextus would expect rational humans to dismiss war, then they could not do so with confidence, since their own awareness is not the only way of perceiving this topic.

The second *trope*⁶⁰⁹ is centred on the different perception between different groups of people. There are more examples than in the first, however these examples again do not focus on ethical issues, but rather on physical phenomena and the senses. Sextus does not refer to any race as explicitly more violent or warlike than others, but this does not mean that they would not perceive violence in different terms to other races or individuals, as the idea that some races naturally find war more pleasurable, or are generally more violent than others; is common in ancient literature.

The third *trope*⁶¹⁰ examines the contradictory messages that one man's senses may provide. Sweet oils please the sense of smell but not taste, honey is pleasant to eat but not to the eye, or a painting can appear to have depth but feel flat to the touch. It seems less straight-forward to apply this to concepts of peace and violence. Surely any man that objects to war would object to the image as much as the sound of war, and equally the war-lover would embrace every aspect of the battle lines, the hardships as much as the glory.

The fourth *trope*⁶¹¹ becomes more relevant, however. It argues that circumstances change the perception of the same event or object. Hunger changes the importance of food when compared to an overly full stomach. In the same way conditions such as "natural or unnatural, waking or sleeping, motion or rest, hatred or love, drunkenness or sobriety... fear or joy"⁶¹² will alter the appearance of many different objects. Although little new is to be gained by comparing the effects these varying dispositions would have on the perception of war and peace, it is interesting to note that they are themselves states of circumstance. So while some acts would seem barbaric in times of peace, they would seem heroic in war, and what may appear moderation in peace could be construed as cowardice in war.

⁶⁰⁹ *ibid* 79-91.

⁶¹⁰ *ibid* 92-99.

⁶¹¹ *ibid* 100-117.

⁶¹² *ibid* 100-101.

Again, the fifth *trope* takes all its examples from the physical world.⁶¹³ It is said that relative distance and location change the perception of certain objects. Closer objects appear larger than those farther away, objects viewed from the middle can appear straight but curved if seen from a corner. Like the fourth *trope* this also contains similarities to ethical issues of warfare in another ancient philosopher, this time an Epicurean. Lucretius says there is no greater pleasure than watching a battle from afar⁶¹⁴, but in all other instances he condemns wars. Thus it could be argued that rather than showing the aversion to pain, or the distance the Epicureans felt could be achieved from society through self-sufficiency, Lucretius instead is commenting on how the perspective can greatly alter the perception of the qualities of war. However, this would be hard to confirm as he shows little sympathy with the Sceptics in the *De Rerum Natura* and, as we have seen, the description of the soldiers is similar to that which is used to illustrate the detachment of the gods from men. As such it is more likely that for the Sceptic the perspective has changed the perception. For the Epicurean the reverse is true; it is the altered perception of what is and is not important that has changed the perspective he has of the battle lines.

The sixth *trope*⁶¹⁵ is that of 'admixture', and states that no object can be observed in isolation but is always perceived in conjunction with others. Weight is altered by water, hot still air will increase the intensity of certain smells, and smell and taste work in conjunction, each influencing the other. This again does not immediately appear relevant to the issues of warfare, but if this is expanded to the political world then there is some correlation. Conflicts cannot be examined in isolation but the background and political and social context will inevitably influence the perception of each violent event. So it is not only the physical context of each object that influences the appearance but also the historical and social context. A war started through aggression may be perceived very differently than one started for self-defence, for example.

The seventh *trope*⁶¹⁶ examines quantities rather than qualities. Iron filings will look black on their own but silvery in large piles, small amounts of wine will not cause damage but in large quantities they will paralyse. It is plainly possible to apply the issues of quantity to violence. As we have seen at times Cicero and even Caesar limit levels of violence, and in Sallust soldiers are reluctant to limit their violence if they are in a dominant position. This

⁶¹³ *ibid* 118-123.

⁶¹⁴ *Lucr.* 2.1-6.

⁶¹⁵ Sextus Empiricus *PH* 124-128.

⁶¹⁶ *ibid* 129-134.

does not, however, bring us any closer to a general theory of Sceptic violence. Inevitably we must again suspend judgement.

The eighth *trope*⁶¹⁷ is very similar to the fifth and sixth, in that it relies on the concept of relativity, but combines the issues of “in relation to the thing which judges” and “in relation to accompanying percepts”. In fact Sextus admits that he has already considered the idea of relativity⁶¹⁸, but combines both here as part of a larger idea of related objects and perceptions.

The ninth *trope*⁶¹⁹ returns to the issue of quantity addressed in the seventh, but here in relation to time and number of occurrences. For example, earthquakes seem less fearsome if you live in an area where they occur often. This could easily be applied to wars or battles as well, and the battle-hardened soldier will not shirk from the fight as much as a new recruit might, a point that the Peripatetic commentators frequently made in relation to bravery. They said that a soldier would often appear brave because he was used to the situation of battle. But this does not allow us to draw any ethical conclusions.

As mentioned above, the tenth *trope*⁶²⁰ is that most associated with ethical issues. It says that the customs, habits, laws and legends of a people will influence their attitude towards ethical situations, whereas the second *trope* compared different cultural backgrounds to physical perceptions. Matters related to violence are considered. It is said that the Scythians would commit human sacrifice, but the Greeks would not⁶²¹; the anger and violence of the gods is also said to be subjective. Sextus says that he is in the “habit” of rejecting the violent myths since he “reveres the gods as being good and immune from evil”⁶²²; some customs allow the striking of a free born man and some do not⁶²³; though homicide is forbidden, gladiators kill each other without retribution⁶²⁴; and whereas some philosophers see glory as worthless, athletes compete purely for this goal.⁶²⁵ However, Sextus does not tell us his own perception of all of these situations. Even when he does so (as with the violent images of the gods), he does not allow himself to even hint at the

⁶¹⁷ *ibid* 135-140.

⁶¹⁸ *ibid* 135-6.

⁶¹⁹ *ibid* 141-144.

⁶²⁰ *ibid* 145-163.

⁶²¹ *ibid* 149-50.

⁶²² *ibid* 154.

⁶²³ *ibid* 156.

⁶²⁴ *ibid* 156-7.

⁶²⁵ *ibid* 158.

correct attitude, but rather records both possibilities and suspends judgement. As we have shown, though, the schools that believed the gods lived in a state of peace were most likely to accept violence among men, but Sextus does not insist that his concept of divine peace is correct in the same manner as the Stoics and Epicureans did, so his judgement would have been suspended on this issue too, meaning that he would be less likely to insist on non-violence in human relationships also.

So, unsurprisingly, the *tropes* leave the ethicist interested in warfare in a state of suspended judgement. The issues of violence are evident in the tenth *trope* but no final judgement is made, as Weidhorn says in his own attempt to conclude on violence through modern sceptical examples: “Whether violence in any given circumstance is justified is ... yet another matter to be added to the sceptic’s growing list of insoluble questions”.⁶²⁶ But despite this, the sceptical life is in itself one devoted to peace and tranquillity; “We assert still that the Sceptic’s End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable” and that “tranquillity follows on suspension of judgement”.⁶²⁷ Although the Sceptics are not able to conclude the worthiness of any given situation, they do seem to withdraw from all conflict by the suspension of judgement. As such, although they cannot and will not draw ethical conclusions about the nature of conflicts, they have fully removed themselves from such conflicts by the means of this very refusal, living a life of quietude, without concluding if this life is indeed the correct way to live.

Philosophers and Peace – Conclusion

In conclusion, it seems that Sidebottom, Ferguson and Downing were all correct in their attributions of pacifistic beliefs to the Stoics, Epicureans and Cynics respectively. All of these groups held much stronger beliefs than merely a vague notion that peace was a preferable state compared to war. They advocated non-violence in both personal and state relationships; they rejected any reason for entering into violence, including in some instances self-defence and freedom; warfare was rejected on both ethical and metaphysical grounds; and soldiers are treated with contempt and mistrust. It is also interesting to note that, although the Epicureans’ theoretical basis was different to that of the Stoics and Cynics, these anti-war attitudes are always set in the context of the relevant

⁶²⁶ Weidhorn 2006, 161.

⁶²⁷ Sextus Empiricus *PH* 31.

school; Stoics and Cynics drawing these conclusions from a belief in *oikeiosis*, *cosmopolitanism*, and the unimportance of material and physical virtues; and the Epicureans in divine self-sufficiency, the avoidance of pain, and the importance of friendship.

What is perhaps most surprising is the way in which some Roman thinkers would willingly reject more traditionally Roman values because they conflicted with the philosophical antipathy to warfare. This is particularly true of Lucretius and Seneca, both of whom condemned *gloria* as a cause worth fighting for, despite its role in the traditional aristocratic virtues expounded by most Romans of this period.⁶²⁸ Seneca and Lucretius, who have here been influenced by their Greek predecessors into questioning Rome's own ethical framework, are convinced to such an extent that they are willing to dismiss warfare as a legitimate tool. This development is admittedly more complete for Lucretius than for Seneca, but even the chief advisor to Nero at times sees *gloria* as overrated, while in others he still acknowledges its importance for aristocratic families.

Although, it is the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans who are most totally condemning of violence and wars, the other schools also seem to have been influenced in this area. For example, the more eclectic nature of all the schools in this period seems to have produced a more peace-loving attitude than was present in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Some of the Peripatetics, for instance, adopted *oikeiosis*, one of the most relevant ethical theories from the Stoics. Interestingly it seems to have been the Peripatetics, a group most interested in the political realities of the day, who adopted *oikeiosis* as a core doctrine. The more backward looking commentators, like Aspasius, still based their ethical and political doctrine on the outmoded importance of the *polis*. Arius Didymus and Antiochus, who modified Aristotle's work to the new imperial system, were more willing to accept the universal nature of man. Therefore, while it may have been expected that pacifistic beliefs would be most likely to exist in the works of those who looked back to an idealised state, they are actually found more in the philosophers who considered the full implications of new political systems. Thus this universal image of man was accepted more by the practical than the theoretical philosophers. This eclecticism is also equally present in the two Platonists examined above. Maximus reverses the image of the soldier found in Plato's *Republic*: he sees them not as Plato did, as the best men and guardians of the state but as

⁶²⁸ For *gloria* as a crucial part of Roman *virtus* see Earl 1967, 7-11.

corrupted by violence and unjust in their actions as a result. Philo even transforms one of the cornerstones of Judaism in order to broaden his area of concern. The Jews are not only God's chosen people, they are those chosen by God to help and protect and benefit all humanity through acts of universal kindness.⁶²⁹ Even the Sceptics, who are so relentless in their refusal to make a judgement, find themselves believing in the basic peaceful nature of the life of the gods and, through their refusal to judge, live a life of peace through non-involvement.

Finally, it seems that not only were all schools in this period moving towards a more pacifistic ethical and political theory, but the accusation of war-lover is an insult used between different schools in an attempt to discredit their opposition. Maximus of Tyre chooses to illustrate the doctrinal problems of the Epicureans by putting a pro-war argument into the mouth of an unnamed Epicurean who argues that there is pleasure to be had from taking part in battles, because it can eradicate fear. Maximus does this despite the fact that Lucretius specifically rejects battles as a misinterpreted way of vanquishing fears. Plutarch uses a similar argument to attack the Stoics; in *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* he says that Chrysippus found positive elements in warfare through the eradication of surplus population.⁶³⁰ A conclusion, which given the evidence examined above, seems a highly unlikely conclusion for a Stoic to reach.

⁶²⁹ Winston 1984, 393-399.

⁶³⁰ Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 32-33.

Part Three – The Historians and Peace

Having analysed the attitudes towards peace of the major philosophical schools of the late republic and early empire, the major Latin historians of this period will now be studied. This analysis will consider the passages of the texts that record the conclusions of treaties and debates about war and peace, and will use these parts of the texts in order to examine attitudes towards peace. These attitudes may represent those of the authors of the texts, or those of the historical figures they purport to record. However, even if the ideas found within the histories are not accurate records of the beliefs of the authors or historical figures the presence of these arguments in the texts can still provide evidence that beliefs of this type were held at the time the works were written. I shall also examine and analyse the context of the uses of words related to peace (for example *pax*, *concordia*, and *quietus*) in order to determine how uniform the use of these words was and if that can tell us anything about the different attitudes of the Latin historians.

Sallust⁶³¹

Each of Sallust's three works opens with a moralising preface that focuses not on what the work will cover, but rather on why history is written at all. Each work also contains long digressions on the decline of virtue and the corruption of the city. Although the purpose of this could be to act as an *apologia* for Sallust's own progression from politician to historian⁶³², they nevertheless show plausible approximations of just causes for this migration, even if they do not show genuine personal reasons.

Most notable for the present investigation is Sallust's rejection of a military, as well as political career. Sallust says that intellectual pursuits are as worthy and as difficult as public

⁶³¹ Elements of the chapters on Sallust and Velleius Paterculus were presented at the Classical Association conference, 2011.

⁶³² Indeed some have argued that it is his need to explain his actions that has motivated Sallust in his prologues. Paul for example suggests that the moralistic tone of the winning of *gloria* through *bonae artes* inspired by a true *virtus* is expanded upon more than is usual in earlier Greek and Roman historians specifically because of the "events of his own earlier public career" (Paul 1968, 90). While Syme appears to be so convinced that the purpose of the prologue is to act as *apologia* that no mention is made of other possibilities for the prologues, or even that other explanations could possibly exist he merely states that "he [Sallust] is not going back to the remote past (antiquarian or romanticised) for a subject to convey his own *apologia*" (Syme 1964, 56-7).

efforts.⁶³³ This is an idea which seems to evolve in the period between writing the *Bellum Catilinae* and the *Bellum Jugurthinum*. In the *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust's explanation begins with a general analogy on the dual nature of man. The mind is shared with the gods, but the body has more bestial qualities⁶³⁴, and in both the *Bellum Catilinae* and the *Bellum Jugurthinum* the efforts of the intellect are seen as a "splendid and lasting possession" (*virtus clara aeternaque habetur*) and "like the soul everlasting" (*sicuti anima immortalia sunt*).⁶³⁵ However, Sallust laments that kings do not use their intellects as effectively in peace as in war, although he is willing to accept the validity of both paths leading to glory.⁶³⁶ Although the mind is more effective than physical strength, action and eloquence are both seen as noble ways to serve the state, and both of these noble paths will find fame through an admirable gift. It is particularly worth noting that Sallust expresses part of his *apologia* in terms of war and peace: "one may become famous in peace as well as in war" (*vel pace vel bello clarum fieri licet*).⁶³⁷ So Sallust considers the act of writing history as an act of peace, even though he is concerned with the recording and describing of acts of warfare and mass political violence.

However, despite all of this, Sallust only finds a personal rejection of the political life in the *Bellum Catilinae*. He says that he allowed himself to be corrupted and, as we have seen, did not reject the path of politics altogether.⁶³⁸ By the time Sallust began to write the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, either his attitude had developed⁶³⁹ or he felt more confident in his position, as he is more willing to make broader, wide-ranging remarks on the subject. He says that the holding of all political and military office is "least desirable in these times" (*minime hac tempestate cupiunda*)⁶⁴⁰ because ruling by force is the cause of revolution, which in turn causes massacres, banishments and "other acts of war" (*aliaque hostilia*).⁶⁴¹ This is perhaps the most significant point of all. In the *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust rejects politics due to the corrupting influence it had on his own virtue, but by the *Bellum Jugurthinum* he rejects any political and military office because of the violence they inflict

⁶³³ *Cat.* 1-2; *Iug.*, 1-3.

⁶³⁴ *Cat.* 1.1-1.4.

⁶³⁵ *ibid* 1.4; *Iug.*, 2.2.

⁶³⁶ *Cat.* 2.3-5

⁶³⁷ *ibid* 3.1

⁶³⁸ *ibid* 3.3-3.5 & 3.1.

⁶³⁹ A development in attitude is noted by several scholars, Syme for example sees in the prologue of the *Iug.*, "a writer more confident in the value of his task and vocation" (1964, 128), whereas Scanlon also sees a development, but one from ethical (*Cat.*) to political (*Iug.*) to a refined combination of the two (*Hist.*) (Scanlon 1981, 18)

⁶⁴⁰ *Iug.*, 3.1.

⁶⁴¹ *ibid* 3.2-3 (my translation).

and cause. Therefore, by rejecting political office, Sallust claims he is rejecting the path of violence, not merely the path of corruption. In the *Bellum Iugurthinum* Sallust also widens the scope of the passive life, which in the *Bellum Catilinae* is only framed in his own circumstances and political career. After describing the acts of the Gracchi and the response to them he says that “good men should be prepared to submit even to injustice rather than do wrong in order to defeat it” (*bono vinci satius est quam malo more iniuriam vincere*).⁶⁴²

As Sallust has aged, he has rejected the military as a legitimate source of *gloria*, his youthful misjudgements have now been put aside and a life of *pax* and scholarship lie ahead.⁶⁴³ That the wisdom of an older generation results in a less bellicose outlook is also seen elsewhere in the works of Sallust. Book 2 of the *Historiae* contains two examples that reflect this theme. Firstly, *fr.* 69⁶⁴⁴ contains the details of the defeat of two towns in the Isaurian campaigns of Servilius. After the first, unnamed town is destroyed, the inhabitants of Isaura Nova send envoys to arrange terms of surrender to Servilius. These are accepted and activities are begun to ensure the town’s safety. However, there is a split in the town’s population, the young “claiming that as long as they had breath they would never surrender their arms or their allies” (*neque se arma neque socios, dum animae essent, prodituros firmabant*)⁶⁴⁵, whereas the elder of the townsfolk are more intent on peace, even if it means surrender.⁶⁴⁶ Secondly, *fr.* 75⁶⁴⁷ tells of the events in a Celtiberian town during Pompey’s advances in the Sertorian war. On hearing of Pompey’s advance the elders canvass for peace, the men agree, but the women (who we have been told at *fr.* 2.73McG = 2.91M are particularly fond of the acts of war, so much so that it was the sole attribute desired in a husband) take up arms themselves and are successful in convincing the younger men to enter battle, while the elders are scorned. That age brings a distaste for war is made explicit in the description of the elders as of a “less warlike age” (*aetas imbellior*).⁶⁴⁸ Therefore, this shows that for Sallust it is not merely the elders of these towns that are less favourable to warfare, but he associates advanced years with loss of appetite for war. Further, this phenomenon is not peculiar to Sallust. As we have already seen, in Seneca’s *Thyestes* and *Troades* individuals become weary of warfare as their years

⁶⁴² *ibid* 42.3 (Trans. S. A. Handford. Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1963).

⁶⁴³ *Cat.* 3.3-3.5 & 3.1; *Iug.*, 3.1-3.

⁶⁴⁴ *Hist. fr.* 2.69 McGushin = 2.87 Maurenbrecher.

⁶⁴⁵ *ibid* 2.69cMcG = 2.87cM.

⁶⁴⁶ *ibid* 269dMcG = 2.87dM

⁶⁴⁷ *ibid* 2,75McG = 2.92M.

⁶⁴⁸ *ibid* 269dMcG = 2.87dM

advance. Thyestes and Agamemnon both wish to see an end of violence, as one has drawn this conclusion while in exile rather than at war, it is perhaps the years that have taught this lesson as much as the horrors of war themselves.⁶⁴⁹

This pacifist argument by Sallust is, however, weakened by elements of the introductions of the *Historiae* and the *Bellum Catilinae*. In *fr.* 1.8 of the *Historiae*⁶⁵⁰ Sallust says that wars are caused by a defect of human nature, thus they are inevitable. If there is no necessary struggle for liberty, man will fight for glory, and once glory is lost, then man will fight for power.⁶⁵¹ This is an idea also present in the *Bellum Catilinae* and the *Bellum Iugurthinum*: Sallust states that after the fall of Carthage the lack of an external enemy caused Rome to look inwards for an enemy and to fight for profit not defence.⁶⁵² It is, however, vital to note that this is not purely human nature, but a *defect in* human nature. This is part of the animal element that Sallust attributes to man in the *Bellum Catilinae*, rather than part of the godly intellect.⁶⁵³ Therefore, if man chooses the intellectual path, as Sallust has himself, and as he advocates others to do in the *Bellum Iugurthinum*⁶⁵⁴, then perhaps this could defeat this defective element and avoid conflict and discord. As Scanlon notes, "Sallust shows a disdain for violence as an effective or necessary solution; the constantly changing situation of events recommends a reliance on the spiritual *ingenium* by which fame and eternal life may be purchased".⁶⁵⁵

The moral decline of Rome from 146 BC evident in Sallust's writing has caused some to suggest that, unlike Cicero (his contemporary), and Thucydides (his main stylistic influence), Sallust sees history as a linear progression rather than a cyclical pattern.⁶⁵⁶ Or, as Earl suggests, in the monographs Sallust sees history as a linear decline but this view is modified in the *Historiae* to alternating periods of peace and discord.⁶⁵⁷ However, both of these views ignore the presence of earlier decline and periods of discord in Sallust's monographs. For example, in the *Bellum Catilinae* Sallust records two versions of the myth of the development of man that are similar to those of the golden age in other ancient

⁶⁴⁹ Sen. *Tro.* 250, 263-279; *Thy.* 453, 468-469, 470.

⁶⁵⁰ Sall. *Hist. fr.* 1.8McG = 1.7M.

⁶⁵¹ McGushin 1992, 75-6.

⁶⁵² *Cat.* 10-11; *Iug.*, 41; *Hist. fr.* 1.12, 13 & 14McG = 1.12, 16, 13M.

⁶⁵³ *Cat.* 1.1-4.

⁶⁵⁴ *Iug.*, 3.1-3.5.

⁶⁵⁵ Scanlon 1980, 41.

⁶⁵⁶ *ibid* 33.

⁶⁵⁷ Earl 1967, 41.

literature.⁶⁵⁸ In the first he says that man used to be free from covetousness and it was Cyrus the Great and the wars of Athens and Sparta, driven by “lust for dominion” (*lubidinem dominandi*), that first drove men into wars.⁶⁵⁹ However, this historic sixth century dating for the decline of man is quickly rejected and instead it is seen that wars began in Italy when the roaming Trojans and the “rustic folk” (*genus hominum agreste*) of Italy had united together creating envy from neighbouring tribes.⁶⁶⁰ Hence the decline of man seems to stem from the wars between Rome and her rivals in Italy. Therefore, a date of somewhere in the 12th or 11th century is meant here to also contain a period of decline and discord after a more peaceful period in which the foreign Trojans worked closely with the native Latins. Further to this, Sallust is evidently aware that it has been the Trojan War that has caused the Trojans to flee to Italy.⁶⁶¹ Consequently, the wars in archaic Italy cannot be meant as the inception for the decline of man, for Sallust certainly knew of the Trojan War that predates the Trojan settlement in Italy and therefore knows that wars have existed before this time. So, like Cicero and Thucydides, Sallust also sees a recurring, if not cyclical, pattern of history and perhaps we have these examples (Cyrus, the Peloponnese and the early Roman wars) to illustrate the inherent defect in human nature that is stated more explicitly in the *Historiae*.

The prologue of the *Bellum Catilinae*, as well as containing ideas common to the *Bellum Jugurthinum* and *Historiae* noted above, also involves a large digression on the earlier glory of Rome in which Sallust contrasts the behaviour of the historic Romans with that of the Rome he knew.⁶⁶² In this digression it is apparent that Sallust has no reservations regarding wars, and the actions within wars, from the distant past. It is the early entry into military service, the discipline and the attitudes within the army that Sallust sees as one of the causes of Rome’s past greatness.⁶⁶³ Sallust’s belief that the military was part of Rome’s glorious past, coupled with his laudation of *gloria*⁶⁶⁴, means that he praises violent acts in battle. He admires the bravery of the young men, who strove to be the first over ramparts and strike the first blow to the enemy, but only because this was done to win *gloria*.⁶⁶⁵ Sallust also says that “good morals were cultivated at home and in the field” (*domi*

⁶⁵⁸ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 109-201; Ovid *Met.* 1.89–150.

⁶⁵⁹ *Cat.* 2.1-2.

⁶⁶⁰ *ibid* 6.1-5.

⁶⁶¹ *ibid* 6.1.

⁶⁶² *Cat.* 2-13.

⁶⁶³ *ibid* 7.3-5.

⁶⁶⁴ Earl 1967, 7-11.

⁶⁶⁵ *Cat.* 7. 6-7.

militiaeque boni mores colebantur)⁶⁶⁶, so it is apparent that Sallust did not see wars as an obstruction to *virtus*, a concept which he often links to *boni mores*.⁶⁶⁷ It is more important to Sallust that “quarrels, discord, and strife were reserved for their enemies” (*iurgia, discordias, simultates cum hostibus exercebant*).⁶⁶⁸ This, he says, allowed *concordia* to reign in Rome⁶⁶⁹, so it seems that *concordia*, is a peace that only requires stability between fellow Romans and is not reliant on relationships with outsiders. Wars actually help maintain *concordia* at Rome. The benefits of the *metus hostilis* are seen throughout Sallust’s work and are most commonly associated with the destruction of Carthage.⁶⁷⁰ This can be seen further by examining the other places in which Sallust uses *concordia* rather than *pax* to explain ideas related to peace.

Sallust specifically uses *concordia* independently from *pax*⁶⁷¹ in seven places⁶⁷² and uses both terms together in four.⁶⁷³ In all eleven of these cases either Sallust, or the character whose words Sallust purports to record, is clearly referring to an internal situation. In the speech of Micipsa that was delivered to Jugurtha and his own sons, for example, the peace (*concordia*) that is threatened is an internal one and the speech is intended as a warning to Jugurtha not to disrupt the stability of Numidia.⁶⁷⁴ In the speech of Memmius, *concordia* is used to describe a state of peace between the mob and the nobles⁶⁷⁵ and Philippus says that Lepidus has claimed that restoring the powers of the tribunes, an undoubted internal matter at Rome, would return *concordia*.⁶⁷⁶ Even the one instance of *concordia* being used for different nationalities supports, rather than weakens this argument. The Trojans and native Italians are not described as living in *concordia* until “after they had come together behind a single wall” and had “easily merged into one” (*Hi postquam in una moenia*

⁶⁶⁶ *ibid* 9.1.

⁶⁶⁷ Earl 1967, *passim*: Balmaceda & Comber 2009, 20-27.

⁶⁶⁸ *Cat.* 9.2.

⁶⁶⁹ *ibid.* 9.2-5.

⁶⁷⁰ *ibid* 10-11; *Iug.*, 41; *Hist. fr.* 1.12, 13 & 14McG = 1.12, 16, 14M; Earl 1967, 13, 15, 52; Levene 2000, 78-9; Jacobs 2010, 123-6.

⁶⁷¹ All these totals refer only to the *Bella* and *Historiae* and do not include any of the pseudo-Sallustian works, although the uses of *concordia* and *pax* in the spurious works do not contradict any of the conclusions reached here.

⁶⁷² *Iug.*, 10.6, 31.23; *Cat.* 6.2, 9.1; *Hist. fr.* 1.67.14&15McG = 1.77.14&15M (*Oratio Philippi*), 1.9McG = 1.11M.

⁶⁷³ *Hist. fr.* 1.48.24McG = 1.55.24M (*Oration Lepidi*), 1.67.5, 10 & 13McG = 1.77.5, 10 & 13M (*Oratio Philippi*).

⁶⁷⁴ *Iug.*, 10.6.

⁶⁷⁵ *ibid* 31. 23.

⁶⁷⁶ *Hist. fr.* 1. 67.14McG = 1.77.14M.

convenere... est quam facile coaluerint).⁶⁷⁷ Therefore, Sallust refrains from attributing *concordia* to the Trojans and Italians until they had become one people.

It is also of interest that when Micipsa is encouraging his heirs towards concord, he does so in a way that echoes ideas seen in some of the more pacifistic philosophers. He says that “Neither armies nor treasure form the bulwarks of a throne, but friends” (*non exercitus neque thesauri praesidia regni sunt, verum amici*).⁶⁷⁸ This speech is also recalled by Adherbal, when he appeals to the Roman Senate for assistance in the Numidian civil wars. However, although he speaks of both peace and friendship, he does not merely draw the philosophical conclusion that friendship will bring concord, as Micipsa did. Rather, the friendship in which he hopes to find peace and security is that of a political alliance and friendship with Rome. He says his father told him to strive to be of use to Rome; if he did he “would have the kingdom’s army, riches and defences resting on Rome’s friendship” (*in vostra amicitia exercitum, divitias, munimenta regni me habiturum*).⁶⁷⁹

All but one of Sallust’s uses of *discordia* also show this rule.⁶⁸⁰ The Numidian people are said to be prone to *discordia* in a section that tells of them betraying the Roman leaders within a captured town. Therefore, although this is *discordia* between two peoples, they are at this point both living within the same walls in what the Romans believed was a state of mutual agreement.⁶⁸¹ In a further example, the Sidonians had been forced from their land by *discordias civilis*, which emphasises the internal nature of the problems they had fled from.⁶⁸² Catiline is a figure who is, unsurprisingly, often discussed in relation to issues and accusations surrounding internal disputes, and in two passages where he and his followers are characterised, the *discordia* of the earlier civil wars and proscriptions are recalled.⁶⁸³ Also, in both instances that *discordia* is used in the extant sections of the *Historiae*, it is again within a civil context. The first of these is Macer’s speech, in which he

⁶⁷⁷ *Cat.* 6. 2 (my translation).

⁶⁷⁸ *Iug.*, 10.4. Dio Chrysostom notes that friendship and concord both have their origin in the “greatest of divine things” (38.11-14), and that while arms are only of use if you have friends to wield them friends are useful even without arms (3.94). The chorus in Seneca’s *Hippolytus* also emphasise this point, they echo the ideas that weapons become rusted and are of no value in periods of lasting peace, but friendship and love are a true source of worth and support (548ff) and the Epicureans also find concord in friendship and knowledge of Epicurean doctrine.

⁶⁷⁹ *Iug.*, 14.1 (my translation).

⁶⁸⁰ Sallust had used *discordia* with *concordia* at *Iug.*, 10.6; *Hist. fr.* 1.67.14McG = 1.77.14M and uses it in isolation at *Iug.*, 66.2, 78.1; *Cat.* 5.2, 9.2; *Hist.* 3.34.17McG = 3.48.17M (*Oratio Macri*), 1.10McG = 1.11M.

⁶⁸¹ *Iug.*, 66. 2.

⁶⁸² *ibid* 78.1.

⁶⁸³ *Cat.* 5.2, 9.2.

rebukes the accusations that his motive is to stir the Roman mob into rebellion.⁶⁸⁴ The second is within a similar context but from further back in the annals of Roman history, when Sallust recalls the successions of the plebs and the confrontations on the Mons Sacer and the Aventine.⁶⁸⁵

The possible exception to the way that Sallust uses *concordia* comes in the prologue to the *Bellum Catilinae*.⁶⁸⁶ Sallust is recounting the golden age of Rome and says that *lurgia, discordias, similtates cum hostibus exercebant*, the Loeb edition translates this as “Quarrels, discord and strife were reserved for their enemies”. This means that this example of *discordia* is used in an external rather than internal context. McGushin has noted that *discordia* and *similtates* are not necessary here but are merely an example of Sallust’s love of lists, but just because it is unnecessary does not mean it should be ignored. But another possible meaning of *exerceo* is to practice, or to train for something. Sallust uses this himself in other places, for example at *Iug.* 63.3 when he says that Marius had not trained himself in eloquence but in active service. And at *Cat.* 2.1 where he says some kings trained their minds others their bodies. If this is the case, then perhaps this is not real *discordia* but rather training or practice for the genuine discords that will inflict Rome as this example comes as part of a longer section on the importance of *concordia* to the early Romans. But even if this example of *discordia* used in an external context can be partly explained away, it still shows Sallust extending the use of *discordia* to an external enemy: a context that it is apparently never used in.⁶⁸⁷

It has previously been noted that *concordia* is an important theme in the works of Sallust. Scanlon identifies this importance with that which Thucydides places on *stasis*⁶⁸⁸, and Weidemann takes this idea further, stating that not only is the idea of *discordia* central to Sallust’s work⁶⁸⁹ but also shows that the three digressions in the *Bellum Iugurthinum* are all designed to illustrate the themes of *concordia* and *discordia*.⁶⁹⁰ Of these three digressions it is the second⁶⁹¹ that is easiest to identify as illustrating the theme of *concordia*⁶⁹², as it purports to record the history of political factions and hostilities in Rome after the

⁶⁸⁴ *Hist. fr.* 3.34.19McG = 3.48.17M

⁶⁸⁵ *ibid* 1.10McG=1.11M. As recorded in a slightly different version by Livy (3.52).

⁶⁸⁶ *Cat.* 9.2.

⁶⁸⁷ Rosenstein 2007, 232.

⁶⁸⁸ Scanlon 1980, 99, 122 & 174-5.

⁶⁸⁹ Which Sallust tells us himself at *Iug.*, 5.1.

⁶⁹⁰ Weidemann 1993, 48-57.

⁶⁹¹ *Iug.*, 41.1-42.5.

⁶⁹² Weidemann 1993, 51.

destruction of Carthage. Weidemann notes that Sallust relates the earlier ethnographic digression⁶⁹³ to *discordia* and *concordia* by using an alternative version recorded in Numidia by King Hiempsal.⁶⁹⁴ This version emphasises the role played by the followers of Hercules⁶⁹⁵ in the *discordia* found in north Africa and is used purely because of the “moral point it makes”.⁶⁹⁶ This theme is revisited throughout the latter stages of the *Bellum Iugurthinum* when the varying degrees and times of discord are emphasised.⁶⁹⁷ The third digression⁶⁹⁸ tells the story of the Philaeni, the Carthaginian brothers who allowed themselves to be buried alive in order to end the war and help their country. Weidemann notes that the footrace that preceded the brothers’ sacrifice requires only one participant from each army and Sallust picks brothers at this point so that he can contrast them with the brothers Albinus, Aulus and Spurius.⁶⁹⁹ The fraternal element is key as it represents the highest form of virtue⁷⁰⁰, and the idea of cooperation between brothers is one used by Sallust elsewhere when Micipsa reminds Jugurtha of the importance of the sibling bond.⁷⁰¹ Weidemann sees parallels also in the dysfunctional relationships between other pairs of supposed collaborators, including Metellus and Marius, Marius and Sulla, Jugurtha and Bomilcar and Jugurtha and Bocchus.⁷⁰² So it is clear that even the history of an external, rather than internal, Roman conflict is still heavily concerned with the idea of *concordia*. However, as I have stated, for Sallust *concordia* is usually a purely localised state and as such probably cannot be said to show any general ethical objection to warfare (such as those seen in some of the philosophers considered earlier) and should not be used to generalise about Sallust’s views on a more universal idea of peace as seen in Sallust’s use of *pax*.

As *concordia* and *discordia* are then used for purely internal and civil struggles, so perhaps *pax* should be expected to be used for only external circumstances. In its various forms *pax*

⁶⁹³ *Iug.*, 17.1-19.8.

⁶⁹⁴ Weidemann 1993, 52-4.

⁶⁹⁵ Hercules is seen here as the bringer of peace and the founder of cities, an image common in the western Mediterranean, not the brutish Hercules of the eastern Mediterranean (Weidemann 1993, 52; Galinsky, 1972).

⁶⁹⁶ Weidemann 1993, 52.

⁶⁹⁷ *ibid* 53.

⁶⁹⁸ *Iug.*, 79.1-10.

⁶⁹⁹ Weidemann 1993, 54-56.

⁷⁰⁰ *ibid*, 55; Herodotus, 1.31 the story of Cleobis and Biton for example; or Eteocles and Polynices, Acrisius and Proetus and Romulus and Remus for examples of the dangers of *discordia* between brothers.

⁷⁰¹ *Iug.*, 10.5.

⁷⁰² Weidemann 1993, 56.

is used in 62 places⁷⁰³, and on many of these occasions it is, indeed, used to express a situation existing between two different peoples. For instance, in the *Bellum Iugurthinum*, *pax* is always used rather than *concordia* whenever an end to hostilities between Rome and Numidia is suggested or achieved.⁷⁰⁴ However, as I have noted above, *pax* is also used on occasions with *concordia* when Sallust is focused on an internal dispute so cannot be referring to an external enemy. Interestingly, each of these is taken from an oration, one from Lepidus⁷⁰⁵ and three from Philippus.⁷⁰⁶ The example that best illuminates the intention in these passages is the last in Philippus' speech. Philippus states that "nowadays peace and harmony are disturbed openly, defended secretly; those who desire disorder are in arms, you are in fear" (*nunc pax et concordia disturbantur palam, defenduntur occulte; quibus illa placent in armis sunt, vos in metu*).⁷⁰⁷ *Pax* is directly contrasted with men at arms (*quibus illa placent in armis sunt*), so rather than referring to an internal peace in the same way that earlier uses refer to an external treaty, *pax* is rather used as a contrast to men at arms⁷⁰⁸ so refers to a practical absence of war and battles. This is supported by some of the other occasions when *pax* is used as an antonym for war. In the *Bellum Iugurthinum* it is said that "all the Moors were ruled by King Bocchus, who knew nothing of the Roman people save their name and was in turn unknown to us before that time either in peace or in war" (*Mauris omnibus rex Bocchus imperitabat, praeter nomen cetera ignarus populi Romani itemque nobis nomen bello neque pace antea cognitus*)⁷⁰⁹, and in the *Bellum Catilinae* it is said that Catiline and his followers "preferred certainty to uncertainty, war to peace" (*bellum quam pacem*).⁷¹⁰ So it seems that although *concordia* always refers to a situation within one nation, city or peoples, *pax* can refer to either a treaty between two peoples, or merely an absence of war between any groups either nationally or internationally. Sadly, this very practical second use of *pax*, as an antonym of *bellum*, makes it difficult to discern if there is any more general or ethical purpose in mind.

In some cases this issue is easily resolved. For example the normally warlike attitude of Jugurtha means it is highly unlikely that when Sallust says that Jugurtha "conceived a strong

⁷⁰³ Again, this figure does not include any of the spurious works. In four of the uses of *pax* it is used with *concordia*, as stated in the *concordia* discussion above.

⁷⁰⁴ *Iug.*, 29.3, 29.7, 31.19, 31.24, 38.10, 36.2.

⁷⁰⁵ *Hist. fr.* 1.48.24McG = 1.55.24M.

⁷⁰⁶ *ibid* 1.67.5, 10 & 13McG = 1.77.5, 10 & 13M

⁷⁰⁷ *ibid* 1.67.13McG = 1.77.13M.

⁷⁰⁸ This type of antithesis is one that Scanlon believes Sallust has adopted from Thucydides (Scanlon 1980, 766-84, 141-4 & 188-192)

⁷⁰⁹ *Iug.*, 19.7.

⁷¹⁰ *Cat.* 17.6

hope of gaining peace” (*in maxumam spem adductus recuperandae pacis*)⁷¹¹ that the peace wanted is anything more than an immediate end to this particular period of battles and to suggest this was a more general rejection of warfare and longing for peace would be erroneous. However, there are uses of *pax* that could imply more than an absence of wars and battles. For example, Sulla’s secret meeting with Bocchus where Sallust says that Sulla “spoke at length about peace and their common interests” (*de pace et de communibus rebus multis disseruit*)⁷¹², which suggests an element of cooperation and understanding involved in *pax* not merely an end to battles, or when Memmius says that “they treat our allies as enemies and our enemies as allies. Are peace and friendship compatible with sentiments so unlike?” (*postremo sociis nostris veluti hostibus, hostibus pro sociis utuntur. potest ne in tam divorsis mentibus pax aut amicitia esse?*).⁷¹³ Again it seems that friendship and alliance are as much a part of *pax* as treaty and armistice. Further, the verb used with *pax* can have a co-operative implication. For example when Aulus found he was in an untenable situation “peace was accepted on the kings terms” (*sicuti regi libuerat pax convenit*).⁷¹⁴ This is not only the case when the Romans find themselves in a position of weakness. While Metellus was prosecuting the war with more success he is said to have ‘offered’ peace to Jugurtha.⁷¹⁵ Peace can even be made *with* an enemy most plainly expressed in *pax cum Romanis fieret*, a situation that implies a certain amount of mutual respect and agreement.⁷¹⁶

Considering the greater variety of meanings that *pax* implies, it is hardly surprising that the attitude that it presents towards peace is more complex. As I have noted above, at times Sallust seems critical of *pax*. The creation of *pax* in 146BC by the destruction of Carthage is seen as the tipping point that started Rome’s slide to *discordia*.⁷¹⁷ However, in the speech of Adherbal, 146BC is seen as the beginning of a golden age in Numidia, “After Africa had been freed from the pestilence [war with Carthage], we were delighted to pursue peace, since we had no enemy save any whom you might have ordered” (*postquam illa pestis ex Africa eiecta est, laeti pacem agitabamus, quippe quis hostis nullus erat, nisi forte quem vos*

⁷¹¹ *Iug.*,29.3.

⁷¹² *ibid.*,111.1.

⁷¹³ *ibid.*,31.23-4.

⁷¹⁴ *Iug.*,38.10.

⁷¹⁵ *ibid.*,48.1.

⁷¹⁶ *ibid.*,61.5.

⁷¹⁷ *Cat.* 10-11; *Iug.*,41; *Hist. fr.* 1.12, 13 & 14McG = 1.12, 16 & 13M; Earl 1967, 13, 15, 52; Levene 2000, 78-9.

iussissetis).⁷¹⁸ So the Numidians were able to prosper in the aftermath of the fall of Carthage, and do not seem to have suffered the same moral bankruptcy as occurred at Rome. As Earl notes, the *virtus* of Jugurtha is not corrupted until his ambition is enflamed by his time spent amongst the Roman generals during the war in Numantia.⁷¹⁹ As Balmaceda and Comber state, “Rome, which should be the home of *virtus*, appears as the influence for its destruction”.⁷²⁰ It is the corruptive influence of the already corrupted Romans that starts Numidia on its road to *discordia*, not the creation of *pax* after 146BC. It is problematic to compare these two concepts: One is reported directly and repeatedly by Sallust, the other is in what purports to be direct speech from Adherbal and is only mentioned once and then only briefly. Yet, when used in conjunction with Earl’s conclusion on the influence of young Romans on the *virtus* of Jugurtha, as well as the consequent *discordia* this new immorality caused, it seems that perhaps it is not the absence of war in itself that can solely account for the decline of *virtus* at Rome as it did not affect the Numidians in the same way. There must, therefore, have been something specific about the Romans that caused them to deteriorate in this way. If this is the case then perhaps the *metus hostilis* should not be considered evidence enough on its own to suggest that Sallust was as wholly negative about *pax* as he was positive about *concordia*.

However, although the negative implications of *pax* suggested by the *metus hostilis* can be questioned, it has already been noted that Sallust is at times very positive about certain aspects of warfare. It would, then, be wrong to use this re-evaluation of *pax* to paint Sallust as a pacifist historian. Nevertheless, Sidebottom notes that although the Stoic philosophers he examined were verging on the pacifistic and described soldiers from their own period in hostile terms, they would often exalt soldiers and generals from earlier eras.⁷²¹ Some sections of Sallust’s work could also be suggested to show a similar difference between the soldiers of the idealised past and those from the less virtuous period of Rome’s history. The passage that would most support this idea has already been mentioned, namely the description of the corruption of Jugurtha during his time amongst the Roman Army.⁷²² Also, none of the Generals during the Jugurthan war are seen as an archetype of *virtus* in the same way that the soldiers from before 146 are. Nonetheless, Caesar is depicted as an archetypal virtuous Roman and is compared with the other

⁷¹⁸ *Iug.*, 14.10 (adapted from Rolfe, 1931).

⁷¹⁹ Earl 1967, 63; *Iug.*, 8.1.

⁷²⁰ Balmaceda & Comber 2009, 11.

⁷²¹ Sidebottom 1993, 250, 262.

⁷²² *Iug.*, 8.1.

pinnacle of morality, Cato. In the passage that compares the two men, Caesar's desire for military life and success is noted and this is not intended in any way to reduce the power of the praise that Sallust freely allots both men. If, as Mommsen would have it, Sallust is nothing more than a political pamphleteer for the Caesarian cause⁷²³, then this could explain the fact that Caesar is the only military leader of this period to not be seen in an ambiguous light. It must be noted, though, that as Cato and Caesar are the only leaders of any kind that Sallust allows to escape criticism, it is more likely that it is not warfare that has tainted the Romans. Rather, the Romans in the army are, like all other Romans, already tainted by the luxury and immorality that Sallust believed were rife in this period. So the possibility that Sallust shared a distrust of the military similar to that of the imperial Stoics is unlikely, though not impossible, especially if Mommsen is right about Sallust's chief purpose.

If a final term derived from *pax* is also considered, Sallust's attitude to peace is further emphasised. In his examination of defensive imperialism Linderski states that "Republican Latin is rich in words pertaining to war, poor in praise of peace. Its equivalent of peaceful is *pacatus*, subdued. In Rome even peace was aggressive".⁷²⁴ However, the one use of *pacatus* in Sallust is not explicitly connected with military victory, but rather used merely to describe friendly countries that have been plundered by poorly disciplined Roman troops.

"While this was going on at Rome, those who had been left by Bestia were in command of the army in Numidia, and, following their general's example, were guilty of many shameless misdeeds... part plundered those who were at peace with us: so strong was the love of money which had attacked their minds like a pestilence."

*Dum haec Romae geruntur, qui in Numidia relictī a Bestia exercitui praeerant, secuti morem imperatoris sui, plurima et flagitiosissima facinora fecere... pars ex pacatis praedas agebant; tanta vis avaritiae in animos eorum veluti tabes invaserat.*⁷²⁵

As well as describing an area at peace with Rome, the condemnation of the troops that exploit the pacified areas (the accusations of greed, the disease of the mind that caused these deeds, the example of an immoral general and Sallust's own description of the acts

⁷²³ Mommsen 1894-5, 4.489.

⁷²⁴ Linderski 1984, 152.

⁷²⁵ Iug.,32.3.

as ‘shameless’) shows an equality⁷²⁶, or at least an empathy, with the areas described that should not be expected given Linderski’s definition of *pacatus*.

Another point of interest found in Sallust is the use of non-violence as a means of direct action as seen in the speeches of the tribunes of 111 and 73 BC, Memmius⁷²⁷ and Macer.⁷²⁸ Each of these tribunes argues for the rights of the plebs and bases their rhetoric on the idea that *libertas* and *pax* are merely disguises for slavery and domination. Memmius’ primary motive is reported to be the prosecution of those nobles who have either, entered into peace with Jugurtha due to personal profit, or have acted heinously in Africa towards towns with which Rome was at peace. To achieve this he suggests that Jugurtha be brought to Rome to give evidence against the guilty. Memmius says that to achieve this goal the plebs should not use violence stating; “I do not urge you to take up arms against your oppressors, as your fathers often did; there is no need for violence, none of secession. They must go to ruin their own way.”⁷²⁹ He goes on to say “let those who have betrayed their country to the enemy be punished, not by arms or violence, which is less becoming for you to inflict than for them to suffer, but by the courts and Jugurtha’s own testimony.”⁷³⁰ Macer in very similar terms says, “I demand restitution according to the laws of nations...I do not advise war or secession, but merely that you should refuse longer to shed blood for them”.⁷³¹ The similarity between the two speeches could either show that this non-violent argument was a standard piece of rhetoric for the tribunes to employ, or rather Sallust’s own preoccupation with *concordia*. McGushin believes that the “content and form...probably reflect in a significant way the oration delivered by Macer”⁷³², so this would suggest that perhaps the appeal to *concordia* in tribunicial speeches was a common theme in this period. The possibility of this being a traditional element of plebeian rhetoric is added to by the fact that both Memmius and Macer relate the current struggle at Rome

⁷²⁶ The idea that once an area has been taken as an ally it is worthy of some sort of equality is also present in the later Greek author Aelius Aristides. He says that in the Roman Empire there is “great and fair equality between weak and powerful, obscure and famous, poor and rich and noble” (26.39), although the presence of this idea at such an early stage and in a Roman author is more surprising.

⁷²⁷ *Iug.*, 31.

⁷²⁸ *Hist. fr.* 3.34McG = 3.48M.

⁷²⁹ *Iug.*, 31.6; *Neque ego vos hortor, quod saepe maiores vestri fecere, uti contra iniurias armati eatis. nihil vi, nihil secessionem opus est; necesse est suomet ipsi more praecipites eant.*

⁷³⁰ *Iug.*, 31.18; *vindicandum in eos, qui hosti prodidere rem publicam, non manu neque vi, quod magis vos fecisse quam illis accidisse indignum est, verum quaestionibus et indicio ipsius Iugurthae.*

⁷³¹ *Hist. fr.* 3.34.17McG = 3.48.17M; *Neque ego uos ultum iniurias hortor, magis uti requiem cupiatis; neque discordias, ut illi criminantur, sed earum finem uolens iure gentium res repeto; et, si pertinaciter retinebunt, non arma neque secessionem, tantummodo ne amplius sanguinem uostrum praebeatis censebo.*

⁷³² McGushin 1994, 87.

to the events of third century BC when the plebeians conducted a non-violent strike at Rome on the *Mons Sacer* would force the Senate to improve their position in society.⁷³³ Although Memmius' actions ultimately lead to the resumption of the war with Jugurtha, this does not appear to be his intention; he only wishes to see the guilty punished for robbing the people of their role in the important decisions of the Republic. Jugurtha is even invited to Rome under a promise of immunity, and Sallust presents Memmius as a strong protector of this promise even in the face of public anger.⁷³⁴

There are, however, possible reasons to suggest that Memmius' insistence on non-violent means could be more for effect than crucial to his, or other plebeian, beliefs. For example, the matter at hand is not one that *must* be addressed; it does not affect the people at Rome directly, but rather only weakens their political position by the reduction in their standing. This being the case, it would be extraordinarily inflammatory to provoke the mob to violent uprisings to rectify this matter alone. It would also prove very dangerous for Memmius personally if he were considered to be acting with revolutionary intentions. The issue at hand for Macer is more serious however; the powers of the tribunes had been seriously reduced by Sulla and had been a contentious issue at Rome since 78 BC. The argument around personal safety still applies as a possible reason for the insistence on non-violence, but in this instance the appeal to tradition is even more relevant. It was the passive resistance on the *Mons Sacer* that had led to the creation of the tribune of the plebs originally and the appeal to the traditions of the creation would remind the people of its importance.

A speech by an ex-tribune can also be considered relevant here, despite the fact that the circumstances and contents of the speech are not closely related in the same way those of Memmius and Macer are. In the Catilinarian debate⁷³⁵ Caesar appeals to a tradition of non-violence and restraint⁷³⁶, however as he is addressing the Senate rather than the assembly the tradition he recalls is senatorial rather than plebeian and as a result is more focused on laws and proclamations than mass action. Yet the product is the ultimately the same:

⁷³³ Memmius recalls the peaceful secession at *Iug.*,31.16-17; While Macer reminds the assembled crowds of the secession of the plebs at *Hist. fr.* 3.34.1McG = 3.48.1M and urges a peaceful withdrawal as a solution to the current troubles at *Hist. fr.* 3.34.17McG = 3.48.17M. "I do not advise war or secession, but merely that you should refuse any longer to shed your blood for them" (*non arma neque secessionem, tantummodo ne amplius sanguinem uostrum praebeat censebo*).

⁷³⁴ *Iug.*,33.3.

⁷³⁵ *Cat.* 51.

⁷³⁶ *ibid* 51. 4-7 & 40-43.

Caesar, Memmius and Macer all use the rhetorical appeal to tradition in order to elicit a pacifistic response. So within the works of Sallust we have three examples of plebeian orators appealing for peaceful means to the current situation which perhaps either illustrates a common theme in plebeian oratory or rather is further evidence of Sallust's own attitude to *concordia*.

The final aspect of war and peace in Sallust that I will examine is just war and justifications for war. As a historian, albeit one with strong philosophical and moralistic leanings, it is not surprising that Sallust does not present a structuralised form of the just war. However, the reasons given for the causes of wars in his works follow some of the same standards presented in other sources. In the *Bellum Catilinae* the early Romans are said to fight for liberty, out of necessity, brought about by the covetousness of their neighbours who envied the new wealth in Rome.⁷³⁷ After the moral decline of Rome, however, the reasons Sallust gives for Rome to enter wars are not created by necessity. Catiline and his followers are said to want bloody revolution because they are struck by the same greed that once forced Rome's enemies to attack them. The reception to Catiline's first speech is uncertain until he promises the "abolition of debts, the proscription of the rich, offices, priesthoods, plunder and all the other spoils that war and the license of the victors can bring" (*tum Catilina polliceri tabulas novas, proscriptionem locupletium, magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas, alia omnia, quae bellum atque libido victorum fert*).⁷³⁸ Equally, as we have seen, Jugurtha only lusts for war once he has been corrupted by the greed and immorality of the Roman army, so again it is greed that is said to cause these immoral and unjust wars, just as Cicero, and many other philosophers, see greed as an unjust reason to enter a war.

One way that Sallust however differs from some philosophers on what constitutes a just reason to go to war is related to the concept of *gloria*. Sallust sees the desire for *gloria* as part of the model of *virtus*.⁷³⁹ Although Sallust notes that *gloria* can be won in ways other than military service to the state⁷⁴⁰, he says that in the golden age of Rome it was the desire for *gloria* that helped Rome to achieve its preeminent position in the world. This was the case both in wars, where Sallust is proud of the young men who strove to be first into battle to gain *gloria* from their general, or in politics, where the *gloria* of the council was such that the greatest men in Rome increased the speed of progress by their

⁷³⁷ *ibid* 6.3-5.

⁷³⁸ *ibid* 21.2.

⁷³⁹ Earl 1967, 18-40; particularly see 18, 22, 29, 31 & 34; Balmaceda & Comber 2009, 23-4.

⁷⁴⁰ Balmaceda & Comber 2009, 23-4.

achievements.⁷⁴¹ Equally, even in Sallust's own time, both Caesar and Marius are praised for their desire to become generals in order to win *gloria*, because this was their main goal, not the spoils or power that would accompany their success.⁷⁴² As we have seen, the idea of war for glory was rejected by the majority of the first century imperial Stoics as well as the Epicurean Lucretius, and also by Augustine, as it would contradict the key foundation of his just war theory that all wars must be defensive and waged to redress a moral imbalance. The importance that Sallust places on *gloria*, as well as the fact that for Sallust glory itself seems to be a just reason to enter warfare, is probably related to the aristocratic tradition of *virtus* that is a prominent influence on Sallust's own concepts of morality.⁷⁴³ This purely Roman version of what is, and is not, virtuous means that *gloria* has a greater significance than is afforded glory in either modern western society or the world of Greek ethics. Even Cicero, who owed his renown to public speaking and judicial excellence rather than military skill, admits that the greatest glory is that won in warfare and as such would seem to agree with Sallust on the significance of *gloria* to military service.⁷⁴⁴ This could explain why it is that while Musonius Rufus, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, the three most prominent first century Stoics, reject glory as a reason to enter violent disputes, Seneca, their closest Roman equivalent, does not dispense with the idea altogether. It becomes apparent from an examination of the letters and speeches of Catiline that Sallust also sees *gloria* as an acceptable reason to participate in a war. Catiline tells his followers in both addresses that this revolution will return the *gloria* that is currently denied them by the monopoly of the oligarchy.⁷⁴⁵ So Sallust not only sees *gloria* as a just aspect of warfare but also uses it as the justification for the revolutionary battle of Catiline.

One way in which Sallust may prove more interesting than the philosophers on the topic of just war, is that he has included several speeches and letters that concern the reasons and justifications for wars. Although these are almost certainly rhetorical inventions on the part of Sallust, they will at least provide further evidence for Sallust's own thought and possibly also highlight genuine Roman propaganda methods from this period. Most notable, due to its frequency of use, is the idea of *libertas*, which is often related to defence. As we have already noted, the protection of *libertas* is seen by Sallust as an

⁷⁴¹ *Cat.* 7.1-4.

⁷⁴² for Caesar: *Cat.* 53.2-5; for Marius: *Iug.*, 53.3.

⁷⁴³ Earl 1967, 28-40; particularly see 29, 31 & 34.

⁷⁴⁴ Cicero, *pro Murena*, 9.22.

⁷⁴⁵ *Cat.* 20.14, 58.2, 58.8.

admirable reason for his ancestors to have participated in the early Italian wars.⁷⁴⁶ The claim to be the protector of *libertas* is seen again and again in the speeches and letters of both generals and politicians. Catiline stresses the necessity that has forced him to resort to violence in both of his speeches and the intercepted letter. His first speech both opens and closes with the concept of *libertas*⁷⁴⁷ and, although he also mentions the wealth and power that will also be won, Catiline stresses that they have only been denied this because they have been first denied their liberty through the greed and selfishness of the oligarchy. The letter of the conspirator Manlius also insists that the loss of status they have suffered is in fact an attack upon their liberty and as such has forced their hand, he says that “none of us has been allowed to resort to the law according to ancestral customs nor, retain our personal liberty after being stripped of our patrimony, such was the inhumanity of the moneylenders and the praetor” (*neque cuiquam nostrum licuit more maiorum lege uti neque amisso patrimonio liberum corpus habere: tanta saevitia faeneratorum atque praetoris fuit*).⁷⁴⁸ Again, this is stated in terms of division and seen as having been created by the greed of the nobility. The second speech of Catiline, given before his final battle, again returns to the same themes it is liberty that his army fight for⁷⁴⁹, and they must fight now because they have no other option⁷⁵⁰, the opposing army fight only to uphold the powers of a minority at Rome and so will not fight as fiercely as those who have liberty at stake.⁷⁵¹

In the *Historiae* the revolt of Lepidus provides a parallel with the conspiracy of Catiline, and the justifications of Lepidus are striking in their similarities to Catiline’s. Lepidus claims that Sulla has forced the people of Rome into squalor so that “your wretchedness may wipe out your concern for freedom” (*quo captis libertatis curam miseria eximat*)⁷⁵² and that Sulla’s supporters have exchanged dominion over the poor for their own freedom as they “prefer this state of affairs to living as free men according to the highest principles of justice”.⁷⁵³ Then Lepidus directly appeals to Roman tradition when he argues, just as Sallust did in the preface to the *Bellum Catilinae*, that their forefathers fought for no other reason than to

⁷⁴⁶ *ibid* 6.5.

⁷⁴⁷ *ibid* 20.7, 14.

⁷⁴⁸ *ibid* 33.1 (adapted from Rolfe, 1931).

⁷⁴⁹ *ibid* 58.8-12.

⁷⁵⁰ *ibid* 58.4-7. However, this time they are physically trapped by the opposing armies and not merely bound by the jealousy and pride of the nobles.

⁷⁵¹ *Cat.* 58.9-12.

⁷⁵² *Hist. fr.* 1.48.1McG = 1.55.1M.

⁷⁵³ *ibid* 1.48.2McG = 1.55.2M.

defend their liberty.⁷⁵⁴ In his insistence on *libertas* there is one key difference between Lepidus and Catiline and Manlius: Lepidus does not associate this slavery with the power of the few old noble families, he sees it as the result of one man alone, Sulla. There are two reasons this might be the case firstly, Lepidus is speaking as a consul, and so was unlikely to claim that there was a monopoly on these positions, as this would turn him into a figure of hatred. Secondly, the constant reminders of the power of one man would exploit the deep-seated fear of kings that was prevalent at Rome and would thereby strengthen his own argument by allusions to Sulla's kingly power. The rebuttal to Lepidus in the speech of Philippus again uses the Idea of *libertas* as one of its core ideals. In the speech of Philippus Rome is already enjoying the fruits of liberty, and Lepidus is not seen as the liberator but rather as a possible slave master⁷⁵⁵ and Lepidus is not motivated by the just cause of liberty but by the universally unjust cause of greed⁷⁵⁶, so Philippus says that he has been forced into war by Lepidus and must fight from necessity.

In the just war doctrines of Augustine and Cicero, restoring or maintaining peace is equal in importance to the just cause of liberty, and again we find that many of the generals who Sallust purports to record are keen to show that they fight for peace. Catiline, in his final speech, reminds his men that if they are victorious they will enjoy the benefits of peace, but if they are unsuccessful then they will not as they will continue in their wretched state.⁷⁵⁷ So Catiline uses peace (*pax*) as a means to spur on his army and not in the same way that he used *libertas* as a justification; "none save the victor" he says, "exchanges war for peace" (*nemo nisi victor pace bellum mutavit*).⁷⁵⁸ Lepidus and Philippus, however, do use *pax* as a justification, not merely a motivation. Lepidus, for example says that he does not wish to start a war but merely to return the rights of peace⁷⁵⁹, and he says that the peace that Sulla claims to have restored is in fact not a true peace but rather "guilt and treason" (*sceleri et parricidio*).⁷⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the restoration of a true peace is obviously secondary to the rights of *libertas* as he says himself he "regarded freedom united with danger preferable to peace with slavery" (*potiorque visa est periculosa libertas quieto servitio*)⁷⁶¹, although he does claim that by fighting for *libertas* both *libertas* and a true *pax*

⁷⁵⁴ *ibid* 1.48.3McG = 1.55.3M.

⁷⁵⁵ *ibid* 1.67.3 & 6McG = 1.77.3 & 6M.

⁷⁵⁶ *ibid* 1.67.7McG = 1.77.7M.

⁷⁵⁷ *Cat.* 58.13-17.

⁷⁵⁸ *ibid* 58.16.

⁷⁵⁹ *Hist fr.* 1.48.16McG = 1.55.16M.

⁷⁶⁰ *ibid* 1.48.24McG = 1.55.24M.

⁷⁶¹ *ibid* 1.48.26McG = 1.55.26M

can be restored. Philippus, places even more weight on the preservation of peace, his first words tell us that “I wish above everything, Fathers of the Senate, that our state might be at peace” (*Maxime vellem, patres conscripti, rem publicam quietam esse*).⁷⁶² He tells the Senate repeatedly that the only way to preserve peace is by taking to the field, Lepidus has given them no choice and the longer they wait the bloodier the war will be.⁷⁶³

In summary, the speeches and letters examined so far show that whenever a Roman is given the chance to defend his war he does so by following just war arguments found in other ancient authors, relying heavily on *libertas*, *pax* and the notion of defence as well as the more Sallustian justification of *gloria*. In contrast, Sallust also professes to record a letter of one of the enemies of Rome, written from Mithridates to King Phraates III of Parthia. This letter follows the same three justifications seen in the Roman generals. Firstly he cites *libertas*; this is not the clear central justification as it is in the other speeches, it is only mentioned briefly. Mithridates says that it was his refusal to be a slave to Roman that caused them to provoke him into war⁷⁶⁴ and that, in strong contrast to the Roman rhetoric, “few men desire freedom, most are content with masters who are just” (*namque pauci libertatem, pars magna iustos dominos volunt*).⁷⁶⁵ However, although *libertas* is not used as a justification, the insistence that this is a defensive war is. Mithridates repeatedly stresses that Rome has forced him into this position, it is they that have attacked him it is the unjust motivations of greed and lust for dominion that have inspired them.⁷⁶⁶ *Pax* is also a common theme for Mithridates, who urges Phraates III to consider his offer because it is the only way that he can enjoy a life of peace.⁷⁶⁷ As is glory, he assures Phraates that this would be a notable way to win “distinguished fame by defeating the Romans” (*egregia fama, si Romanos oppresseris*).⁷⁶⁸ So the rules of just war are followed by a Pontic King as closely as they were by the Roman generals.

The Sallustian principles for *jus ad bellum* have been established, but what of *jus in bello*? Again we see that Sallust conforms to the system present in Cicero and Augustine. In the *Bellum Catilinae* just actions in warfare are discussed as part of the preface. One of the virtues of ‘old Rome’ admired by Sallust was that the soldiers were moderate in victory. It

⁷⁶² *ibid* 1.67.1McG = 1.77.1M

⁷⁶³ *ibid* 1.67.2, 3, 13 & 17McG = 1.77.2, 3, 13 & 17M.

⁷⁶⁴ *ibid* 4.67.10McG = 4.69.10M.

⁷⁶⁵ *ibid* 4.67.18McG = 4.69.18M.

⁷⁶⁶ *ibid* 4.67.1, 5, 10 & 16McG = 4.69.1, 5, 10 & 16M

⁷⁶⁷ *ibid* 4.67.1-2, 16 & 23McG = 4.69.1-2, 16 & 23M.

⁷⁶⁸ *ibid* 4.67.2McG = 4.69.2McG.

is said that they took nothing from their enemy except the power to harm Rome.⁷⁶⁹ It is also stated that the Romans were fair in peace-time and “established friendly relations rather by conferring than by accepting favours” (*magisque dandis quam accipiundis beneficiis amicitias parabant*).⁷⁷⁰ They also “in time of peace, ruled by kindness rather than fear, and when wronged preferred forgiveness to vengeance” (*in pace vero quod beneficiis magis quam metu imperium agitabant et accepta iniuria ignoscere quam persequi malebant*).⁷⁷¹ However, after the fall of Carthage, and the influx of luxury into the armies of Sulla, Sallust says that they have become cruel and affected by greed.⁷⁷² The armies started to pillage from the enemy as well as their allies⁷⁷³ even to loot shrines and desecrate sacred places.⁷⁷⁴ So the just actions within and at the closing of battles are seen as closely linked to the concept of *virtus* and the decline of Roman morality after 146 BC.

A final point of interest on just wars in Sallust is the author’s own attitude to these justifications. He admits that the reasons given to enter wars after 146 BC, whether given by *optimates* or *populares*, were only pretexts and in fact the goals were less honourable. Sallust asserts that whether the public motive was defence of the rights of the Senate or the mob at Rome, these were merely a pretence (*simulantes*).⁷⁷⁵ In the *Historiae* this theme is broached again, although this time with only Sulla in mind when he states that, “a return to the republican constitution had been sought for the acquisition of booty, not for the restoration of freedom” (*Quo pate factum est rempublicam praedae, non libertati repetitam*).⁷⁷⁶ Sallust then says that the justifications of *libertas* and the rights of the nobility or crowds were used only as arguments known to be acceptable and were justifications not just causes.

⁷⁶⁹ *Cat.* 12.4.

⁷⁷⁰ *ibid* 6.5.

⁷⁷¹ *ibid* 9.5.

⁷⁷² *ibid* 10.4.

⁷⁷³ *Cat.* 11.4-12.3 & 13.5.

⁷⁷⁴ *ibid* 11.7.

⁷⁷⁵ *ibid* 38.3.

⁷⁷⁶ *Hist. fr.* 1.42McG = 1.51M.

Caesar

The reasons that Sallust gives for writing history could not be further from those expressed by Caesar. Whereas Sallust tells us that he has taken up the pen after putting down the sword⁷⁷⁷, Caesar never dropped his weapon while composing the *Gallic Wars*, and as such, his attitude to peace is much more consistent with the military *pax* expected of a soldier and attributed to the Romans by the majority of modern scholars. This is most clearly seen in the events that precede any declaration of peace in Gaul. The Helvetii's petition for peace is only accepted after they have given over their weapons and hostages:

“Upon arrival there Caesar demanded the surrender of hostages and arms, and the slaves who had deserted him.”⁷⁷⁸

Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos per fugissent poposcit.

The same requirements can be seen in Britain, where:

“The enemy were overcome in the fight; and as soon as they had recovered from the rout they at once sent deputies to Caesar to treat for peace”.⁷⁷⁹

Hostes proelio superati, simul atque se ex fuga receperunt, statim ad Caesarem legatos de pace miserunt.

Galba's campaigns end in an identical fashion:

“Galba, having fought some successful battles and stormed several of their forts, after deputies were sent to him from all sides and hostages given, concluded a peace”.⁷⁸⁰

Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis, missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta.

Even when the Helvetii offered to submit to Rome and relocate wherever Caesar wishes, he refused to consider the offer until hostages had been presented.⁷⁸¹

⁷⁷⁷ Sall. *Cat.* 1-3; *Iug.*, 1-3.

⁷⁷⁸ Caes. *BGall.* 1.27.2-3.

⁷⁷⁹ *BGall.* 4.27.1; Similar examples can be seen at: 1.14.6, 1.37.1, 1.44.4, 3.28.1, 4.18.3, 4.27.5, 4.36.1, 6.6.2-4.

⁷⁸⁰ *BGall.* 3.1.4 (translated by W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1869).

⁷⁸¹ *ibid* 1.14.6.

Further to this, when Caesar refers to bringing peace to a tribe or country, it is often described as the result of military victory.

“After these events Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was at peace again, for the Belgae were defeated, the Germans driven out, and the Seduni in the Alpine region conquered”.⁷⁸²

His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret, superatis Belgis, expulsis Germanis, victis in Alpibus Sedunis,

Or, it is the fear of impending military action that compels the Gauls to seek peace? The Atuatici, in fact, waited until they had seen the approaching siege weapons before they “sent deputies to Caesar to treat for peace” (*legatos ad Caesarem de pace miserunt*).⁷⁸³

This militarised form of peace in Gaul is repeated by Caesar in an exhortation to his troops in the first book of the *Civil War*. He calls on his soldiers to protect the reputation of their leader, who had – alongside them – “fought many successful battles, and pacified the whole of Gaul and Germany” (*gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint*).⁷⁸⁴ So even in a reported public address Caesar equates success in battles with the bringing of peace: this is pacification in its most nakedly aggressive form.

In the *Gallic Wars*, however, Caesar is much more eager to present himself as a proponent of peace reached through compromise.⁷⁸⁵ He repeatedly emphasises the offers he made to Pompey that would have seen both men disband their armies.⁷⁸⁶ Caesar makes this most explicit when he refers to the agreement as “*aequis condicionibus*”⁷⁸⁷, and even claims that he delayed his levies in the hope that a peace could be agreed (1.11.1). As an end to hostilities here would mean not only a civil peace between two Roman armies, but also a personal peace between Caesar and Pompey, it is surprising that this is never described as *concordia*, but rather Caesar uses *pax*⁷⁸⁸, *pactum*⁷⁸⁹, *quietus*⁷⁹⁰, and even *otium*⁷⁹¹ when the possibility of peace is presented. This could perhaps be related to Caesar’s efforts to

⁷⁸² *ibid* 3.7.1.

⁷⁸³ *ibid* 2.31.1.

⁷⁸⁴ *BCiv.* 1.7.7.

⁷⁸⁵ Sirianni 1993, 219-237.

⁷⁸⁶ *BCiv.* 1.26.2, 1.26.5, 1.85.12, 3.10.7.

⁷⁸⁷ *ibid* 1.26.5.

⁷⁸⁸ *ibid* 1.11, 1.26, 1.39, 1.74, 1.85, 3.10, 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, 3.57, 3.90.

⁷⁸⁹ *ibid* 3.19.

⁷⁹⁰ *ibid* 3.57.

⁷⁹¹ *ibid* 1.5.

emphasise his position as the embodiment of Rome and the republic while stressing the ‘otherness’ and barbarianism of his enemies.⁷⁹² Like the Gauls, this enemy can only be brought to peace after military victory (even one Caesar tried to avoid), and like the Gauls the Pompeians are contrasted with Caesar’s Roman army.⁷⁹³ Therefore, like the Gauls, these are a foreign enemy⁷⁹⁴ and as there can be no concord between Rome and barbarians, then there can be no concord between Caesar and Pompey.

Caesar further emphasises his personal desire for peace with Pompey by repeatedly presenting Pompey’s generals as hungry for the war he is so desperate to prevent. Labienus makes this clear in a barbarous threat; *nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest* (“There can be no peace for us until Caesar’s head is brought in”).⁷⁹⁵ In contrast, Afranius and Petreius are said to have “observed the rights neither of conference nor of truce, and with utmost cruelty have slain men who through want of experience were deceived by a pretended colloquy” (*eos neque colloquii neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse*).⁷⁹⁶ This has the purpose of contrasting Caesar’s desire for peace with the cruelty of the Pompeian generals⁷⁹⁷, who not only refuse conferences but kill men through treachery and urge decapitation, both traits that will be seen in the barbarian slaying of Pompey in Egypt.⁷⁹⁸

Despite Caesar’s efforts to present Pompey’s generals as intent on war, he portrays the Pompeian troops as enthusiastic for reconciliation. For example, at *Bellum Civile* 1.74⁷⁹⁹, the army of Afranius and Petreius mix with Caesar’s army, “so that the two camps seemed already fused into one” (*adeo ut una castra iam facta ex binis viderentur*). When this happened, the lower level officers and even the Spanish chieftains and Afranius’ son began to negotiate terms of peace. However, when Afranius received news of the fraternising he immediately dispersed the meeting in his camp and executed the Caesarian troops. It is only by intimidation, punishment and forced oaths that Afranius and Petreius are able to convince their soldiers to continue the war (*Sic terror oblatus a ducibus, crudelitas in*

⁷⁹² This is a well attested point in many modern works, some of the more notable examples are: Goldsworthy 1998, 211; Henderson 1998, 48-64; Tronson 2001, 77-80; Batstone & Damon 2006, 34-40; Grillo 2012, 210-211.

⁷⁹³ Batstone & Damon 2006, 34.

⁷⁹⁴ Goldsworthy 1998, 211.

⁷⁹⁵ *BCiv* 3.19.8.

⁷⁹⁶ *ibid* 1.85.3.

⁷⁹⁷ On the cruelty of Pompey’s generals see Tronsons 2001, 95-7 or Batstone & Damon 2006, 106-8 specifically on Labienus.

⁷⁹⁸ Plutarch, *Pompey*, 79-80; Cassius Dio, 42, 4-5; Appian, *B Civ.* 90; Caesar, *BCiv.* 3.104.3.

⁷⁹⁹ This can also be seen at 1.85, 3.18, 1.19.

supplicio, nova religio iurisiurandi spem praesentis deditiois sustulit mentesque militum convertit et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit).⁸⁰⁰ In this episode we not only see the Pompeian generals contrasted with their soldiers, but we see a further contrast between them and Caesar. While the Caesarian troops in Afranius' camp are executed, the enemy troops in Caesar's camp are treated with respect and allowed to return without punishment, or stay with Caesar and retain their rank.⁸⁰¹ Caesar makes the cruelty of Afranius' and Petreius' acts explicit when communications are finally conducted between the generals, and he specifically contrasts their cruelty with his desire, and that of his soldiers, for peace.⁸⁰² This means that in this single incident Afranius and Petreius are not only distanced from Caesar and his troops, who acted with honour and restraint, but also from their own officers, soldiers and tribal chieftains, who were willing to attempt reconciliation with Caesar. The only people who act for Petreius are his personal guard, slaves and barbarians (*Armat familiam; cum hac et praetoria cohorte cetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis*) so their otherness is again associated with their refusal to seek peace.

However, while it is not surprising to see Pompey's troops attempting reconciliation (they would, after all, be joining the 'right' side by doing so, in terms of Caesar's narrative), what is perhaps more unexpected is the desire of Caesar's troops for battle. Immediately before the mingling of the armies (discussed above) Caesar is urged from many within his own ranks to push for decisive victory. "*Legati, centuriones tribunique militum*" all crowd

⁸⁰⁰ *BCiv.* 1.76.

⁸⁰¹ *ibid* 1.77.1-2.

⁸⁰² *ibid* 1.85. *Ad ea Caesar respondit: nulli omnium has partes vel querimoniae vel miserationis minus convenisse. Reliquos enim omnes officium suum praestitisse: se, qui etiam bona condicione, et loco et tempore aequo, conflagere noluerit, ut quam integerrima essent ad pacem omnia; exercitum suum, qui iniuria etiam accepta suisque interfectis, quos in sua potestate habuerit, conservavit et texerit; illius denique exercitus milites, qui per se de concilianda pace egerint; qua in re omnium suorum vitae consulendum putarint. Sic omnium ordinum partes in misericordia constitisse: ipsos duces a pace abhorruisse; eos neque colloqui neque indutiarum iura servasse et homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse.* "To this Caesar replied: "No one in the whole army could have played this part, whether of querulous lament or of self-commiseration, less suitably than you. All the rest have done their duty: I, who was unwilling to fight even when conditions were favourable, time and place suitable, that there might be absolutely nothing to prejudice the chances of peace; my army, which preserved and protected those whom it held in its power, even when it had been injured and its soldiers slain; lastly, the men of your army who voluntarily pleaded for reconciliation, a matter wherein they thought it right to have regard to the life of all their comrades. Thus the part played by all ranks has been based on compassion, but the leaders themselves have shrunk from peace; they have observed the rights neither of conference nor of truce, and with utmost cruelty have slain men who through want of experience were deceived by a pretended colloquy." (1.85.1-3)

around him and encourage Caesar to strike.⁸⁰³ However, Caesar refuses to enter open battle, not only because he does not want to risk the lives of his own men⁸⁰⁴, but also because he did not want to inflict a massacre on Roman citizens.⁸⁰⁵ This point is repeated in Caesar's speech before the Battle of Pharsalus, where he reminds his army (again clamouring for battle) that he has made every effort not to expose his troops to bloodshed or destroy either army.⁸⁰⁶ Again, this point is closely associated with Caesar's attempts to make a bloodless peace. We are told the speech consisted of three parts, the loyalty and services they had done him⁸⁰⁷, and his desire for peace and to avoid battle.⁸⁰⁸ The reasons for Caesar presenting his army in this way are uncertain. However, it is possible that it is used to further emphasise Caesar's restraint in comparison to Pompey's generals who refuse negotiations and are not concerned for the safety of their troops or the armies of Rome. Caesar also states that his army's desire for battle is caused by their loyalty to him⁸⁰⁹, whereas the desire for peace by Pompey's army is in direct opposition to their generals' wishes. This allows Caesar to not only emphasise his army's loyalty to him, but also his ability to control an army calling for blood.⁸¹⁰ Again we are presented with a Caesar who embodies *virtus* in stark contrast to the Pompeians.⁸¹¹

Returning to *Bellum Gallicum*, there are three places where Caesar refers to peace in ways that are less military and more co-operative and, therefore, much more similar to the way he refers to peace when describing his desire to end the civil war on equitable terms. The first of these examples is at 1.3. The Helvetii are preparing to march out of their old territory and decide they need first to spend two years stock-piling resources for the march and "establish peace and amity with the nearest communities" (*cum proximis civitatibus pacem et amicitiam confirmare*).⁸¹² The second example is in a brief ethnographic digression on the Aduatuci. Caesar says that they were descended from a small group of Cimbri and Teutoni settlers, who "were harassed for many years by their neighbours, and

⁸⁰³ *BCiv.* 1.71.1-2.

⁸⁰⁴ *ibid* 1.72.1.

⁸⁰⁵ *ibid* 1.72.3. *Movebatur etiam misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat*; He was moved, moreover, by compassion for his fellow citizens whose slaughter he saw to be inevitable.

⁸⁰⁶ *Neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse*; He had never, he said, wished to squander the blood of his soldiers or to deprive Rome of either of its armies (*BCiv.* 3.90.2-3).

⁸⁰⁷ *ibid* 3.90.1.

⁸⁰⁸ *ibid* 3.90.1-3.

⁸⁰⁹ *ibid* 3.90.3.

⁸¹⁰ *ibid* 1.71-2.

⁸¹¹ Grillo 2012, 51-57.

⁸¹² *BGall.* 1.3.1.

fought sometimes on the offensive sometimes on the defensive; then by general agreement among them peace was made, and they chose this place to be their home" (*Hi post eorum obitum multos annos a finitimis exagitati, cum alias bellum inferrent, alias inlatum defenderent, consensu eorum omnium pace facta hunc sibi domicilio locum delegerant*).⁸¹³ The third example is very similar to the first and describes an envoy sent from the Aedui to Vercingetorix to secure peace and friendship.⁸¹⁴ These are the only places in the *Bellum Gallicum* where peace is explicitly connected with ideas of agreement; *amicitia* at 1.3.1 and 7.55.4, and *consensu* at 2.29.5. However, in all these examples Rome is nowhere to be seen, although peace can be connected with friendship and consensus in Gaul, this is only the case when it is a civil peace, and in the context of the *Bellum Gallicum* this must be a peace between Gauls.

For a further point concerning Caesar's presentation of peace to be considered we need to return to Sallust. As stated above, when Sallust uses the term *pacatus*, he seems to imply a sense that the area is not merely pacified by force but has become an ally and should be treated with respect by Roman citizens.⁸¹⁵ However, in Caesar it is clear that in the majority of its uses *pacatus* refers to an area brought to peace through force, and nowhere is any resulting respect for that area suggested. For example, we are told that Caesar's military achievements created peace through all Gaul⁸¹⁶, or that because of the defeats of the Belgae, Germans and Alpine tribes Caesar believed all Gaul was pacified.⁸¹⁷ Thus, like *pax*, *pacatus* is essentially a military status.

The only times Caesar refers to foreign tribes and lands using words derived from *pax* in a way that does not express dominance is when he gives details of troop numbers supplied by *pacified* tribes. Caesar, unlike Sallust, does not even display any obvious sympathy for the pacified areas in this context. In the *Bellum Civile* the troops from Gaul are only mentioned as part of a list when we are told that troops also came from Gaul *quam ipse pacaverat* (which he had himself pacified).⁸¹⁸ Therefore, here it seems that the use of *pacare* is about Caesar emphasising his own achievements in Gaul, not the protected status of the peaceful area. In the other two examples of this type it seems that *pacare* is used

⁸¹³ *BGall.* 2.29.5 (adapted from Edwards, 1986).

⁸¹⁴ *pax et amicitia*; *ibid* 7.55.4.

⁸¹⁵ *Sall. Iug.*, 32.3.

⁸¹⁶ *BGall.* 2.35.1. *His rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata.*

⁸¹⁷ *ibid.* 3.7.1. *His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret.* See also, 1.6.1, 2.1.2, 3.28.1, 6.5.1.

⁸¹⁸ *BCiv.* 1.39.2.

for the practical purpose of differentiating the conquered tribes from those still at arms. “Decimus Brutus the younger was put in charge of the fleet and of the Gallic ships already ordered to assemble from the territory of the Pictones, the Satoni and the others now pacified” (*Decimum Brutum adulescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat*).⁸¹⁹ While Caesar “sent across the Rhine into Germany to the states which he had reduced to peace in previous years, and fetched horsemen from them and light armed infantry” (*trans Rhenum in Germaniam mittit ad eas civitates quas superioribus annis pacaverat, equitesque ab his arcessit et levis armaturae pedites*).⁸²⁰ So in each case it is made clear that only tribes already conquered by Caesar are supplying troops. These are not an independent barbarian force or mercenaries. It should also be noted that it is unlikely that these troops were sent by the Gauls voluntarily. The supply of troops was a common condition imposed on a defeated enemy by Rome. This is evident in the use of *iubere* (to order) and *arcessere* (to summon). These are supplied at Caesar’s command and the imposition of this levy is a statement of Gallic subservience, not of any amicable relationship between them and Caesar.

Despite the obvious disparity between Caesar’s and Sallust’s presentation of peace, there is one event in *BG* that shares similarities with Sallust. This is in the description of Caesar’s march to Bratuspantium to face the Bellovaci. When the army was five miles from the town all the old men surrendered to Caesar and promised not to take up arms against Rome.⁸²¹ This passage shares striking similarities with the descriptions at *fr.* 2.69 and 2.75 from Sallust’s *Historiae*, where it is the elders of Isaura Nova and an unnamed Celtiberian town that are the first to ask Rome for peace. However, whereas Sallust associates advanced age more generally with distaste for war⁸²², Caesar does not make that connection. In fact as his army continues its approach towards Bratuspantium, more pleas are made from within the town and also by Diviciacus, a prominent member of Caesar’s Gallic retinue, and the town is allowed to surrender without battle.⁸²³ So this episode is not used by Caesar to make a general point about increasing age causing a dislike for war, as no one from the town, whatever their age, ultimately shows any military resistance.

⁸¹⁹ *BGall.* 3.11.5.

⁸²⁰ *BGall.* 7.65.4.

⁸²¹ *BGall.* 2.13.3. *Omnes maiores natu ex oppido egressi manus ad Caesarem tendere et voce significare coeperunt sese in eius fidem ac potestatem venire neque contra populum Romanum armis contendere.*

⁸²² *Hist. fr.* 2.69d; *Cat.* 3.3-3.5 & 3.1; *Iug.*, 3.1-3.

⁸²³ *BGall.* 2.13-15.

At the opening of this chapter, Caesar's repeated offers of peace based on compromise and agreement during the civil war were contrasted with the peace he created in Gaul through military victory and dominance. The possible reason for this dissimilarity will now be considered. The most likely reason for Caesar to appear open to peace (and therefore reluctant for war) in the *Bellum Civile* is that the Romans had a well-established fear and hatred of civil wars.⁸²⁴ Knowing this, therefore, Caesar needed to present himself as being forced into battle. Every time he offered to end the war, one of the Pompeian generals made this an impossibility⁸²⁵ and Caesar could not surrender to allow a Pompeian victory to prevent the war because this would result in the end of the Republic.⁸²⁶ However, there was no similar need to appear desperate for peace during the pacification of Gaul.

Opinion is divided on whether or not Caesar had any interest in justifying his conquest of Gaul. Some argue that Caesar's admission that he left his province ready for battle, before Rome's allies had asked for help⁸²⁷, shows he had no interest in justifying his actions, but rather wished to highlight his initiative and skill.⁸²⁸ While others contend that Caesar's reasons for his refusal to allow the Helvetii passage through the province (namely, the Helvetii defeat of Lucius Cassius in 107 BC, and to protect Roman territory from possible harm)⁸²⁹, are ample evidence that he did wish to provide justification for his actions.⁸³⁰ If the first possibility is correct, then it is clear that if Caesar felt he could provoke this war without just cause, he need show no remorse in his execution of it.⁸³¹ Yet if Caesar did in fact wish to justify his actions, it must be noted that he was justifying them to his audience at Rome, not the Gauls or Germans⁸³², so even this justification shows no reason to think that Caesar should shy-away from this war as he must the civil war.

A final point of interest can be found in the contrasting ways that Caesar treats a defeated enemy in the *BG* and the *Bellum Civile*. As has already been stated, in many cases Caesar

⁸²⁴ See chapter, *Republican and Early Imperial Civil War*, above.

⁸²⁵ *BCiv.* 1.11.1, 1.26.2, 1.26.5, 1.85.3-12, 3.10.7, 3.19.8.

⁸²⁶ *ibid* 1.6.5-6, 1.8.1, 1.6.3, 1.7.8; see Batstone & Damon 2006, 53-72 for a discussion of the importance of these passages in Caesar's attempts to present Pompey as an enemy of the republic.

⁸²⁷ *BCiv.* 1.10.5.

⁸²⁸ Most notably see Collins 1972, 927.

⁸²⁹ *BGall.* 1.7.4.

⁸³⁰ Riggsby 2006, 175-89; Brunt 1990, 309-314. *cf* his similar reasons given for his war with German tribes at *BGall.* 1.33 & with the Venetii at *BGall.* 3.10.

⁸³¹ Rambaud 1953, 130.

⁸³² Powell 1998, 132. Caesar may have felt a genuine need to defend his actions from accusations being made against him in Rome, both Suetonius (*Div Jul.* 24.3) and Plutarch (*Caes.* 22.4) record Cato's accusation that Caesar's war was unjust.

secures peace with an enemy in the *BG* by first demanding arms and hostages be surrendered to him before peace is declared⁸³³, and in situations where he feels this will not suffice, he is willing to commit massacres to prevent further revolts.⁸³⁴ In the *Bellum Civile* Caesar was much less destructive in his treatment of a defeated enemy and enthusiastically recorded his acts of clemency.⁸³⁵ Nonetheless, it has frequently been asserted by modern scholars, such as Braund, Milnor and Earl, that “what we might regard as a Roman equivalent of ‘forgiveness’ turns out to be inextricably associated with absolute power”.⁸³⁶ To accept Caesar’s offers of *clementia* acknowledges his position of power over his fellow senators⁸³⁷, and by offering his personal clemency to Roman generals Caesar subverted the concept of *clementia* which, until his time, had been a benefaction of the Roman state.⁸³⁸ In so doing, Caesar lowered the status of those he forgave to that of defeated barbarians⁸³⁹, while once more equating himself with the governance of Rome and raising his own status above that of other senators. He emphasised this point further by creating the cult of *Clementia Caesaris*⁸⁴⁰ therefore suggesting his clemency had divine authority.⁸⁴¹

In conclusion, Caesar envisions a much more militaristic and dominant peace than Sallust does in his writings. In Gaul peace is always on his terms, either allowed only after his dominance has been acknowledged by the giving of arms and hostages or after the enemy has been all but wiped out in a crushing defeat. Even once these areas have been conquered by brutal means, they are only referred to as *pacatus* in contexts that highlight the obligation these tribes must fulfil now that they are subject to Roman imperialism. Further, while Rome’s hatred of civil war made it necessary for Caesar to appear intent on finding a bloodless solution for the impending war with Pompey, his presentation of his enemy is such that the war must still be fought in order to save Rome from tyranny. Then, once the Pompeians are defeated, peace is granted because of his *clementia*, which again allows Caesar to use *pax* to call attention to his own dominance, both militarily (as in Gaul) and also politically.

⁸³³ *BGall.* 1.14.6, 1.27.2, 3.1.4, 4.18.3, 4.27.1-5, 6.6.2.

⁸³⁴ For example, the massacre at a German camp which followed a refusal from Caesar to discuss an enemy surrender at *BGall.* 4.13-15; Powell, 1998 125-8.

⁸³⁵ *BCiv.* 1.72, 1.74, 1.85, 3, 3.98; Coulter, 1931, 515.

⁸³⁶ Braund 2012, 4; Milnor 2012, 97-114; Earl 1967, 60.

⁸³⁷ Syme 1958, 414.

⁸³⁸ Braund 2012, 88-89.

⁸³⁹ Dowling 2006, 22.

⁸⁴⁰ Appian, *B Civ.* 2.106; Dio, 44.6.4.

⁸⁴¹ Braund 2012, 89.

Livy

Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* originally consisted of one hundred and forty-two books covering over seven hundred years of history. It comprises events from before the founding of the city, to Livy's own lifetime.⁸⁴² However, of the original work, only books 1-10, and 21-45 survive in near complete condition: books 1-10 cover the early history of the city to the Samnite Wars; and books 21-45 record the wars with Hannibal and Macedon. This accident of survival means that a direct comparison with the earliest history of Rome, as recorded in Sallust, will be possible. This can then be used not only to consider how standardised the role of peace was in the legends surrounding the formation of the city, but, if a stark difference is noted, how the authors use of peace in this period may be representative of their attitudes found elsewhere in their works.

Before examining the details of these myths it should be noted that there are several purported similarities in the reasons Sallust and Livy wrote histories and why they selected the topics they did. Livy, like Sallust, saw part of the purpose of history as providing a moral lesson for the reader. Just as Sallust chose the Catilinarian Conspiracy for the topic of his monograph because it highlighted the depth of immorality to which the Roman nobility had sunk and acted as a warning from recent history, so Livy believed contemporary readers should welcome his own work because it could provide examples of great men from the past who should be remembered and imitated.⁸⁴³ Both authors also believed that Rome had undergone a sharp decline in morality since the strong principles of the city's founders. However, while Sallust fixed this decline in 146BC and the destruction of Carthage that allowed Rome to luxuriate in the safety that came from having no dangerous foreign enemy, Livy adopts the less chronologically specific "theory of a progressive degeneration of society from primitive purity of manners and simplicity of life".⁸⁴⁴

As has been noted above, in Sallust's version of the founding of Rome he stated that early man lived in peace, free from greed and is at pains to emphasise the importance of *concordia*, while minimising the role of the military, in the city's early successes. Therefore, considering the similarities highlighted above, in Sallust's and Livy's aims and methods,

⁸⁴² Livy, *praef.* 4-7.

⁸⁴³ Livy, *praef.* 10; Kapust 2011, 81-110; Chaplin 2000, 1-3; Forsythe 1999, 65.

⁸⁴⁴ Laistner 1947, 92.

perhaps we should expect a similar emphasis in Livy. If we first examine Livy's account of Aeneas' flight from Troy and his time in Italy peace is indeed an important factor in this legend. Aeneas and Antenor were the two Trojans allowed to leave the city uninjured "because they had always been advocates for peace and the return of Helen" (*quia pacis reddendaeque Helenae semper auctores fuerunt*).⁸⁴⁵ It is *pax* that Livy says has allowed Aeneas to depart for Italy, and he also states that his sources are in general agreement on this matter.⁸⁴⁶ Once Aeneas arrives on the shore of Italy Livy tells us that the agreement in the sources has ended and there are two available traditions from which he could draw.⁸⁴⁷ The first is a much abbreviated version of the myth recorded in Virgil's *Aeneid* books 7-12, which tells of a battle between Latinus and Aeneas, which the Trojan wins, followed by peace terms and marriage of alliance between Aeneas and Latinus' daughter.⁸⁴⁸ The second account has Latinus approach Aeneas between the battle lines and question him on his origins and plans. Latinus is so impressed by Aeneas' nobility "and at his spirit, prepared alike for war or peace" (*et animum vel bello vel paci paratum*)⁸⁴⁹, that they make a mutual alliance without bloodshed and the armies saluted each other before this agreement was sealed with the marriages, common to both descriptions.⁸⁵⁰ So it seems that by providing the reader with two versions of this myth - one emphasising Aeneas' military supremacy, the other the agreement of the two sides - Livy has not allowed for an evaluation to be made. However, not only is the second account noticeably longer, which in itself could add credibility to the tale⁸⁵¹, but it also reaffirms the characterisation of the first description of Aeneas at 1.1.1 and his connection with the civilised world of the Greeks. While, by recording Latinus' evaluation of Aeneas (as both ready for war and peace), Livy maintains Aeneas' reputation for courage "while confirming other qualities

⁸⁴⁵ Livy, 1.1.1 (adapted from Foster, 1919).

⁸⁴⁶ *ibid.*, *omnium satis constat*.

⁸⁴⁷ Livy, 1.1.6. *duples inde fama est*.

⁸⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁴⁹ Livy, 1.1.8.

⁸⁵⁰ Livy, 1.1.7-10.

⁸⁵¹ The first account being only 11 words long (*alii proelio victum Latinum pacem cum Aenea, deinde affinitatem iunxisse tradunt*; 1.1.6), while second is 115 (*alii, cum instructae acies constitissent, priusquam signa canerent processisse Latinum inter primores ducemque advenarum evocasse ad conloquium; percunctatum deinde qui mortales essent, unde aut quo casu projecti domo quidve quaerentes in agrum Laurentinum exissent, postquam audierit multitudinem Troianos esse, ducem Aeneam, filium Anchisae et Veneris, cremata patria domo profugos sedem condendaeque urbi locum quaerere, et nobilitatem admiratum gentis virique et animum vel bello vel paci paratum, dextra data fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisse. inde foedus ictum inter duces, inter exercitus salutationem factam; Aeneam apud Latinum fuisse in hospitio; ibi Latinum apud penates deos domesticum publico adiunxisse foedus filia Aeneae in matrimonium data. Ea res utique Troianis spem adfirmat tandem stabili certa que sede finiendi erroris. oppidum condunt*; 1.1.7-10).

that set him apart from most other Trojans, and indeed from most of the heroes in the Hellenic tradition his readiness for peace".⁸⁵² Livy echoes the development of this co-operation seen in Sallust, when he says that "trusting in these friendly spirits of the two peoples, which were growing each day more united" (*fretusque his animis coalescentium in dies magis duorum populorum Aeneas*).⁸⁵³ Further, also following the same path as Sallust, Livy explains how this new alliance was crucial to the Latins (as the Trojans settlers now called themselves and their Italian allies)⁸⁵⁴ in their ability to defend themselves militarily.⁸⁵⁵

The next passage of interest, following a brief summary of Aeneas' descendants⁸⁵⁶, is the life and reign of Romulus and the associated myths.⁸⁵⁷ We are told very little about the early life of Romulus and his twin, except for their fondness for hunting and how it helped train them physically and mentally for attacking bandits, which quickly became their favoured pastime (1.4.8–9). From their rustic beginnings Livy emphasises their strength and aggression, as well as their ability to lead men⁸⁵⁸, and it is this strength and aggression that is further emphasised in the recounting of Remus' death. As with the meeting of Latinus and Aeneas, Livy once more provides his reader with two conflicting versions of Remus' death.⁸⁵⁹ The first version sees the twins take up positions on separate hills waiting for Auspices; Remus reserves a sign of six vultures, before Romulus' sign is of twelve. In the dispute between the two groups of followers over which was more important: the number or occasion of the vultures, Remus was killed.⁸⁶⁰ The second account has Romulus kill Remus in a fit of rage after Remus mockingly jumped over Romulus' half-built walls.⁸⁶¹ It is less clear in this instance which of the two versions is favoured by Livy (if, indeed, either is favoured), although Miles again believes the second myth in intended by Livy to be the most likely as it supports the characterisation we have seen of Romulus in the account of his early life as aggressive and reckless.⁸⁶² Moreover, in Levene's more detailed intertextual analysis of these myths he also concludes that the purpose of these parallel accounts is to

⁸⁵² Miles 1995, 64.

⁸⁵³ Livy, 1.2.5; *cf* Sall. *Cat.* 6.2.

⁸⁵⁴ Livy, 1.2.4.

⁸⁵⁵ Livy, 1.2.5-6; *cf* Sall. *Cat.* 6.3-4.

⁸⁵⁶ Livy, 1.3.

⁸⁵⁷ Livy, 1.4-16.

⁸⁵⁸ Stem 2007, 443.

⁸⁵⁹ Livy, 1.6.3-1.7.3.

⁸⁶⁰ Livy, 1.6.4-1.7.2.

⁸⁶¹ Livy, 1.7.2-3.

⁸⁶² Miles 1995, 144-145.

“present Romulus as a warrior king, whose vices are ones of violence and haste rather than deceit”.⁸⁶³ Therefore, whichever of these accounts Livy intended his readers to favour⁸⁶⁴, it seems that he has highlighted the militaristic and aggressive aspects of his reign and character.⁸⁶⁵ The emphasis of Romulus as a warrior king is further achieved by removing non-military religious aspects from his reign.⁸⁶⁶ It is generally accepted that by magnifying the military aspects of Romulus’ character and reign, while diminishing his religious role, Livy has created a stark contrast between Romulus (the warrior king) and Numa Pompilius (the priest king).⁸⁶⁷ Therefore, it is necessary to contrast the reign and character of Romulus with Numa in order to determine what Livy’s intention may have been in relation to his presentation of peace. However, before turning to Numa, there is one more event from Livy’s reign of Romulus that must be considered in any examination of peace in ancient historiography: the ‘Rape of the Sabines’.⁸⁶⁸

The bones of the story are the same in all the ancient accounts: Romulus’ new settlement had an abundance of men but lacked the required number of women to grow as a community, so the Roman’s abducted women from neighbouring tribes in order to meet this need. Miles sees Livy’s version of this myth as archetype of Roman marriage, the bride is separated from her old family and inculcated into her new family, a process by which authority is passed from the father to the husband. As well as acknowledging the importance of intermarriage in the forming of alliances that aided the spread of Roman power in Italy, it also echoes the political importance of political marriage unions in Livy’s own time.⁸⁶⁹ He then focuses on the versions in Livy and Ovid, who provide much more detail on the induction of the women into the Roman community than Cicero, Dionysius and Plutarch. In these two authors Miles notes a contrast in the ‘male’ and ‘female’

⁸⁶³ Levene 1993, 131. Levene reaches this conclusion by highlighting the differences between Livy’s accounts and those of other authors. Livy adds an element of doubt in the first version, over who should take precedence between the twins, by including Remus’ sighting, which is not present in Ennius (*Annals* 72-91Sk = 77-96V.) or on the relief on the Temple of Quirinus (*ibid* 130; Evans 1992, 97-100), and by excluding elements that involve Romulus attempting to trick his brother by lying about what auspices he has received Livy removes the possibility that Romulus could be accused of deceit (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.86-7; Diodorus 8.5). While in the second Livy has Romulus as the unjustified murderer of Remus, rather than the more conventional choice of Celer (Diodorus 8.5; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.87.4; Ovid, *Fasti* 4.837-48; Plutarch *Romulus* 10.1-2) or seek to justify Romulus’ actions (Plutarch, *Quaest. Rom.* 27; Levene 1993, 129-132.).

⁸⁶⁴ If, indeed, either is intended to be favoured; Stem 2007, 446-7.

⁸⁶⁵ Levene 1993, 131; Miles 1995, 145-6.

⁸⁶⁶ Levene 1993, 131-2.

⁸⁶⁷ Levene 1993, 131; Blair DeBrohun 2007, 260; Penella 1987, 234-5; Liebeschuetz 1967, 48.

⁸⁶⁸ Livy 1.9-13. Also found in varying forms in Cic. *Rep.* 2.12-14; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.30-47; Ovid *Fasti* 3.167-258; Plutarch *Romulus* 14-20; Brown 1995, 291-319; Milnor 2012, 101.

⁸⁶⁹ Miles 1995, 179-219.

perspective highlighted by Ovid and Livy respectively. Miles concludes that Ovid's dehumanising of the Sabines is meant as a challenge to the ideology of marriage based on unequal force, while Livy's emphasis on the women's role in the legend shows an acceptance of the ideology of traditional Roman marriage, but one that "exposes limitations inherent in the Roman practice of trying to base ideal social and political unions on a relationship of inequality between men and women".⁸⁷⁰ However, although Miles convincingly argues that Livy increases the focus on the experience of the women, the reason he chose to do this may not purely be as an attempt to make a judgement about traditional marriage. Milnor, for example, sees Livy's focus on the experience of the Sabine women as "another example of the ways in which female forgiveness could be seen as originating in the private world of women but having profound effects on the public world of men."⁸⁷¹

Brown focuses more fully on the importance of Livy's promotion of the women to the heart of the legend.⁸⁷² Brown notes that as well as maximising the importance of the role of the women, Livy also contains several other disparities with other accounts on the abduction. He minimises the political element of Romulus' motivation⁸⁷³, ignores the possibility that Romulus was motivated purely by a love of war⁸⁷⁴, and "places the spotlight purely on the women themselves".⁸⁷⁵ Once the women are abducted there are further contrasts between Livy's accounts and those in other ancient texts. Livy's Romulus is concerned much less with justification and more with healing and reconciliation with the women⁸⁷⁶, there is much greater "informality and intimacy"⁸⁷⁷ between the Roman men and Sabine women, and the role of private desires is all but eliminated⁸⁷⁸, which means "[m]en and women in each case bridge the gulf between them".⁸⁷⁹ Most importantly of all, only Livy "attributes the intermediate reconciliation to the initiative of Hersilia"⁸⁸⁰, whereas Plutarch's

⁸⁷⁰ *ibid* 218.

⁸⁷¹ Milnor 2012, 104.

⁸⁷² Brown 1995, 291-319.

⁸⁷³ *ibid* 295; cf Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.30.2; Plutarch *Rom.* 14.1-2.

⁸⁷⁴ Brown 1995, 296. This is suggested in Dionysius as a possible motive it is not actually adopted as a preference by any ancient author, although it is hinted at by Ovid's emphasis on the role of Mars in the decision.

⁸⁷⁵ Brown 1995, 195.

⁸⁷⁶ *ibid* 296-7; cf Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.30.4-6; Plut. *Rom.* 14.2, 6; Miles 1995, 191-193.

⁸⁷⁷ Brown 1995, 298.

⁸⁷⁸ *ibid* 299; Livy 1.9.11-15.

⁸⁷⁹ Brown 1995, 300.

⁸⁸⁰ *ibid* 201.

and Dionysius' versions both highlight Romulus' own politic prowess⁸⁸¹, unlike Livy who shows Romulus still exulting in his victories when Hersilia approaches him.⁸⁸² Hersilia is the first person in Livy to use the word *concordia* when she "begs [Romulus] to forgive their parents and receive them into the state; which would, in this way, be able to gain in strength by harmony" (*orat ut parentibus earum det veniam et in civitatem accipiat; ita rem coalescere concordia posse*).⁸⁸³ The way that the women instigate the peace also allows the negotiations to be entered on equal terms.⁸⁸⁴ Thus, Romulus can create the *concordia* Hersilia has requested without showing any military weakness in a request for peace that would have contradicted the characterisation Livy had been at pains to emphasise from Romulus' early life.⁸⁸⁵ Livy has moved the first *concordia* in Rome from the early settlement of the Trojans⁸⁸⁶, to the Rape of the Sabines in order to present it as an exemplary lesson on the importance of harmony and unity both in marriage and at socio-political level.⁸⁸⁷

It has already been stated that the non-military elements of Romulus' reign were deliberately minimised in order to create a striking contrast with Numa Pompilius, Rome's second, and most peaceful, king. Levene sees this contrast as one "between warrior-king and priest-king".⁸⁸⁸ However, it can be demonstrated that Livy carefully selects the available traditions surrounding Numa in order to increase the importance of peace in his reign, even at the expense of the importance of religion. For example, the fetial priesthood and all associated rituals were often described as instigated by Numa.⁸⁸⁹ In Dionysius' account of the founding of the fetials he explicitly states that Numa established the priesthood when he was on the verge of making war with Fidenae⁸⁹⁰, and while Plutarch does not include this detail, his description of the role of the fetial priests as only required when war was expected means that Dionysius explains, and Plutarch implies, that at least once in his reign Numa was considering undertaking a war. However, the fetials do not

⁸⁸¹ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.35.2-3; Plutarch *Rom.* 16.4

⁸⁸² Livy 1.11.2; Brown 1995, 302.

⁸⁸³ Livy 1.11.2 (adapted from Foster, 1919).

⁸⁸⁴ Brown 1995, 307.

⁸⁸⁵ Livy 1.13.8. "From this time forth the two kings ruled not only jointly but in harmony" (*inde non modo commune, sed concors etiam regnum duobus regibus fuit*).

⁸⁸⁶ Sall. *Cat.* 1.6.2.

⁸⁸⁷ Livy's use of *concordia* elsewhere *Ab Urbe Condita* will be considered further below.

⁸⁸⁸ Levene 1993, 131.

⁸⁸⁹ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.72; Plut. *Numa* 12; Penella 1987, 233.

⁸⁹⁰ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.76.3.

appear in Livy until the Reign of Tullus.⁸⁹¹ It seems peculiar that Livy, who more often emphasises Numa's role in the establishment of Roman religion⁸⁹², should choose to remove this priesthood from the mythic tradition, unless he did so in order to remove even the idea of war from Numa's reign.

The argument for peace, rather than religion, being the theme of Numa's reign, to contrast with the era of war under Romulus, is not only an *argumentum e silentio*. The most striking evidence for this is that Numa sees "war itself [as] degrading"⁸⁹³, the Romans' had grown "wild and savage through warfare" and this fierce race "needed to be softened by disuse of arms" (*efferari militia animos...mitigandum ferocem populum armorum desuetudine ratus*).⁸⁹⁴ This is the antithesis of the more common prevailing attitude in antiquity that the softening of men caused by peace had a negative impact on man's *virtus*.⁸⁹⁵ However, Numa accepts that prolonged periods of peace can have a negative impact on discipline, even if the military is not required for *virtus*.⁸⁹⁶ Therefore, he decided that the citizens must be kept occupied so as not to become idle: the first example given for this is the building of the temple of Janus as "an indicator of peace and war" (*indicem pacis bellique*).⁸⁹⁷ Numa does not believe that a bellicose nation, such as the Romans, can maintain a prolonged peace without fear, but he sets out to replace a "fear of the enemy" (*metus hostium*) with a "fear of the gods" (*metus deorum*), in order to create peace and stall the degrading nature of warfare.⁸⁹⁸ Further, just as it is Rome's new piety that subdues their anger and maintains discipline, it also prevents her neighbours from attacking, as they would consider it sacrilege to harm such a place.⁸⁹⁹

Livy closes his account of Numa with a reminder of the double foundation of Romulus and Numa:

⁸⁹¹ Livy 1.24; Penella 1987, 233.

⁸⁹² Liebeschuetz 1967, 48.

⁸⁹³ Ogilvie 1965, 95.

⁸⁹⁴ Livy 1.19.2.

⁸⁹⁵ Ogilvie 1965, 95; cf Tacitus *Hist.* 3.25, 31, 33; Sallust's belief that a foreign enemy was essential see, *Cat.* 10-11; *Iug.*, 41; *Hist. fr.* 1.12, 13 & 14 McG = 1.12, 16, 14M; Earl 1967, 13, 15, 52; Levene 2000, 78-9; McDonnell 2006, 375-7.

⁸⁹⁶ Livy 1.19.4; Ogilvie 1965, 94-5; Blair DeBrohun 2007, 261.

⁸⁹⁷ Livy 1.19.2 (my translation).

⁸⁹⁸ Livy 1.19.4.

⁸⁹⁹ Livy 1.21.2.

“Thus two successive kings in different ways, one by war, the other by peace, promoted the nation's welfare... The state was not only strong, but was also well organized in the arts both of war and of peace.”⁹⁰⁰

ita duo deinceps reges, alius alia via, ille bello, hic pace, civitatem auxerunt... cum valida tum temperata et belli et pacis artibus erat civitas.

This makes the contrast between the first two kings of Rome as one between war and peace even more explicit than it had been in the original descriptions. Moreover, it shows Livy emphasising neither war nor peace, but insisting on the necessity of balance between the two forces for the survival of the state. Therefore, perhaps Blair DeBrohun is right in suggesting that “Livy offers a subtle challenge to Augustus, whose own recent closure of Janus’ gates, with its accompanying proclamation of universal peace, raised hope that he would now himself follow the example of Numa”.⁹⁰¹

Staying with Numa and the temple of Janus, we can see a very important aspect of Livy’s use of *pacatus* that distinguishes him from Caesar’s totally militarists ‘pacification’. Livy states that “when open [the temple] might signify that the nation was in arms, when closed that all the peoples round about were pacified”⁹⁰² (*apertus ut in armis esse civitatem, clausus pacatos circa omnes populos significaret*).⁹⁰³ He then recalls that this has occurred three times in Rome’s history, once in the reign of Numa, once when Manlius concluded the First Punic War, and once after Augustus’ victory at Actium.⁹⁰⁴ Admittedly, two of these three examples do indeed refer to the military pacification of an enemy by a Roman army (Carthage in the First Punic War and Mark Antony and Cleopatra at Actium). However, this should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that the first time the gates of the temple were closed was during the uniquely peaceful reign of Numa. Furthermore, Livy explicitly states that “Numa closed the temple after first securing the good will of all the neighbouring tribes by alliances and treaties” (*clauso eo cum omnium circa finitimorum societate ac foederibus iunxisset animos*)⁹⁰⁵ and that the neighbouring tribes maintained

⁹⁰⁰ Livy 1.21.1.

⁹⁰¹ Blair DeBrohun 2007, 262. Augustus was often equally keen to associate himself with the peaceful Numa, as well as the military Romulus (Galinsky 2006, 34-7, 282, 346).

⁹⁰² “Pacified” is the Loeb (Foster 1919) translation of *pacatos*, the Penguin (De Selincourt 1960) edition opts for “closed [means that] war against all neighbouring peoples had been brought to a successful conclusion”. However, as will be shown this is not a satisfactory translation, particularly in a retelling of the reign of Numa.

⁹⁰³ Livy 1.19.2.

⁹⁰⁴ Livy 1.19.3-4. It is Livy’s lack of knowledge about the later two occasions when Augustus again closed the gates that “provides a *terminus ante quem* of 25BC for this passage, Blair DeBrohun 2007, 276; Syme 1979, 189-190.

⁹⁰⁵ Livy 1.19.4.

their peace with Rome due to their piety not their military prowess.⁹⁰⁶ Thus the peoples around Rome have become *pacatus* due in no way to any military intervention on behalf of Numa.⁹⁰⁷ *Pacatus*, then, can in this instance have no implicit military or forceful requirement, but can be built on a purely political and religious footing. That a state of *pacatus* can be created both through peaceful, equal negotiations and through military dominance is even more explicitly stated when Livy states:

“It was a custom with the Romans, observed from ancient times, not to exercise any authority over others, as subject to them, in cases where they did not enter into friendship with them by a league and on equal terms, until they had surrendered all they possessed, sacred and profane”⁹⁰⁸

Mos uetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia diuina humanaque dedidisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbibus imposita forent.

Here it is suggested that a community would be considered *pacatus* either if they entered “into a friendship with them by a league and on equal terms”, or, if they chose to fight, “until they had surrendered all they possessed”.

The dual use of *pacatus* in this passage to refer to situations of military victory and negotiated peace maintained through mutual respect can be seen elsewhere in Livy. For example, after a series of Latin revolts in 338 BC, the Fundani and Formiani were offered citizenship “because they had always afforded a safe and peaceful passage through their territories” (*quod per fines eorum tuta pacataque semper fuisset via*).⁹⁰⁹ Therefore, these tribes are offered benefits because they had stayed *pacatus* without the need to violence or aggression. However, a more military form of *pacatus*, like that found in Caesar, and those created by Manlius and Augustus, is also present at times in Livy. When Hannibal is in Italy “the [other tribes] were pacified through fear or bribery” (*ceteris metu aut pretio pacatis*)⁹¹⁰, and when the Sabines were chased from the Capitol it is said to be *pacatus*.⁹¹¹ The most common use in Livy of terms derived from *paco* helps explain why he can see it as both a forced, military state and one peacefully negotiated. This is when Livy uses *pacatus* in a neutral sense, simply to differentiate a place or people as not at war, or not violent.

⁹⁰⁶ Livy 1.21.2.

⁹⁰⁷ This is further emphasised by the removal of even possible wars from Livy’s account of Numa’s reign, see above; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.76.3.

⁹⁰⁸ Livy 28.34.

⁹⁰⁹ Livy 8.14.10.

⁹¹⁰ Livy 21.26.6.

⁹¹¹ Livy 3.18.6.

This includes those instances when Livy is using it purely as an adjective for peaceful, or an adverb for peacefully. For example, the tradition of the “peaceful departure” of the Etruscan king (*pacatae profectioni*)⁹¹², when a camp is pitched on “peaceful land” (*pacato agro*)⁹¹³, or, Scipio’s speech arguing that the war should be carried to Carthage because while Italy is at stake, Africa is at “peace” (*Africam pacatam esse*)⁹¹⁴, meaning simply, free from the violence that Italy had experienced. Therefore, Livy is content to use forms of *paco* to describe both military and non-military peace because he uses it elsewhere to mean any peaceful, non-violent, or undisturbed condition or place.

Despite Livy using *pacatus* in a more neutral way than Caesar, the *Ab Urbe Condita*’s account of the Battle of the Caudine Forks shows the most sustained, negative presentations of *pax* in any of the Latin historians. The Roman army, finding themselves surrounded and unable to offer any resistance, surrender six hundred equestrian hostages, hand over all their weapons, and pass under a yoke to symbolise their submission.⁹¹⁵ Livy is at pains to emphasise that this capitulation was only a *sponsio* not a *foedus*, and therefore only a personal guarantee by those who made the peace and not binding, politically or religiously, because the names of the fetials were not included on the treaty.⁹¹⁶ However, whatever the technical aspects of the legal form the treaty took, Livy and the speakers he purports to record all refer to the event as a *pax*.⁹¹⁷ Further, this *pax* is the cause of great shame for Rome, it is called “dishonourable” (*ignominiosae pacis*)⁹¹⁸ and “hateful” (*obnoxia pace*).⁹¹⁹ Moreover, those who negotiated the peace are not praised for saving the lives of the soldiers but are punished for agreeing to the terms.⁹²⁰ However, it should be noted that Livy, probably following one of his sources, sees the Caudine Forks as “retribution for the arrogant refusal of a Samnite offer of peace”.⁹²¹ This means that it is not peace with the Samnites that Livy finds distasteful, nor even the equality of the peace, merely the way in which this peace was forced upon the defeated and disgraced army. As Herennius

⁹¹² Livy 2.14.1.

⁹¹³ Livy 2.59.9, no specifics are given here to explain how this land became friendly.

⁹¹⁴ Livy 28.44.12.

⁹¹⁵ Livy 9.5-6.

⁹¹⁶ Livy 9.5.2-3; Liebeschuetz 1967 46; Bederman 2001, 224; Crawford 1973, 1-7; Salmon 1929, 12.

⁹¹⁷ Livy 9.3.10, 9.4.2, 9.4.3, 9.7.4, 9.7.6, 9.7.9, 9.8.1, 9.8.3, 9.8.11, 9.9.12, 9.8.15, 9.9.9, 9.9.12, 9.9.13, 9.10.3, 9.10.7, 9.11.5, 9.11.7, 9.11.8, 9.12.3.

⁹¹⁸ Livy 9.7.6 & 9.8.2.

⁹¹⁹ Livy 9.10.4.

⁹²⁰ Livy 9.8-10.

⁹²¹ Liebeschuetz 1967, 46; Bederman 2001, 224. Livy 9.1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 15.9; Dio 8.8-10; App. *Sam.* 1-2.

Pontius says; if the Roman army is allowed to leave equally and respectfully they may “establish lasting peace and friendship” (*perpetuam firmare pacem amicitiamque*).⁹²²

Apart from the event of the Caudine Forks, Livy can often present *pax* as a one sided consequence of a Roman military victory. The most common formulations used in Livy at the end of a war is either an enemy seeking or asking for *pax* with Rome (using forms of *patere pax*)⁹²³, or the enemy sending legates about peace in order to admit their defeat and negotiate terms (using variations on *legatos de pace mittunt*).⁹²⁴ In reply to this request for peace the Romans, acting from a dominant position, grant peace to their enemies (most commonly with forms of *dare pax*).⁹²⁵ Often Livy makes this Roman dominance in negotiations explicit in the same way that Caesar did: with the demand of arms and hostages, or even more forceful acts like the carving up of Macedon.⁹²⁶ It is in these more traditional, military forms of *pax* that the reason for the shame caused by the Caudine Forks is found. Rome, in Livy, are the setters of terms, the rejecters of advances for peace, the victors who take arms from the defeated, but the Caudine Forks have left them in the position of the lowly defeated. Rome’s hatred for this status is seen again in the Hannibalic War. No matter how desperate the situation becomes in the city the “disasters and the falling away of the allies could not move the Romans anywhere to mention peace” (*nec tamen eae clades defectionesque sociorum moverunt ut pacis usquam mentio apud Romanos fieret*)⁹²⁷

Continuing the examination of Livy’s use of *pax*, he introduces a concept (or at least phrase) that is not present in Sallust or Caesar: *pax deorum*. First it should be noted that for Livy the normative state of the gods was peaceful, or benign.⁹²⁸ However, Livy still saw the maintenance of the *pax deorum*, through correct religious observance, as essential to

⁹²² Livy 9.3.10.

⁹²³ Livy 1.15.5, 1.37.5, 2.49.12, 3.1.8, 8.36.11, 9.43.20, 9.45.2, 10.14.3, 10.16.5, 10.37.4, 10.46.12, 21.13.1, 22.20.8, 27.21.8, 30.16.15, 30.22.4, 30.22.5, 30.23.3, 30.28.10, 30.30.23, 30.30.29, 30.31.7, 30.36.4, 31.11.16, 34.41.10, 36.27.1, 37.49.6, 38.3.2, 38.8.7, 40.25.1, 40.27.8, 41.10.4, 42.62.10, 43.4.2.

⁹²⁴ Livy 2.18.10, 2.39.10, 5.23.12, 9.1.3, 9.16.3, 9.37.12, 9.43.21, 9.45.1, 10.5.12, 30.21.11, 42.46.1, 42.62.12.

⁹²⁵ Livy 3.2.3, 5.27.15, 30.43.1, 30.43.3, 31.5.1, 31.13.6, 33.24.7, 34.40.7, 37.34.1, 37.36.9, 37.55.1, 38.15.5, 39.2.6,.

⁹²⁶ Livy 4.10.3, 30.37.6, 32.33.3, 34.16.4, 37.1.5, 38.8.9, 39.3.1, 40.25.3, 45.30.7.

⁹²⁷ Livy 22.61.13 (adapted from Foster, 1929).

⁹²⁸ Davies 2005, 99; Livy 5.20.3, 7.13.5, 8.5.3, 8.13.11, 24.38.2, 26.41.14, 28.25.7, 29.15.1, 31.31.20, 37.54.10, 39.9.4, 41.24.8, 45.23.1. The innate peacefulness of the gods has already been seen in the Stoics and Epicureans. Walsh believe that Livy demonstrates Stoic beliefs throughout his work but does not use this attitude as one of his examples, Walsh 1958, 355-375; 1963, 46-82.

the expansion and success of Rome's empire.⁹²⁹ For example, before the war with Perseus "it was decreed that portents should be expiated and prayers offered to win the peace of the gods, namely, those who were mentioned in the books of fate" (*priusquam id susciperetur prodigia expiari pacemque deum peti precationibus, qui editi ex fatalibus libris essent, placuit*).⁹³⁰ Moreover, as we have already noted, military defeat could be attributed to a lapse of the *pax deorum*.⁹³¹

There is also a term related to *concordia* present in Livy that has not been used by Caesar or Sallust: *concordia ordinum*. Livy was probably influenced in his use of this concept by Cicero, who is the only other surviving source from this period in which *concordia ordinum* occurs, and was probably the originator of the term.⁹³² However, whereas Cicero's *concordia ordinum* seemed to be limited to the wealthy and influential (the equites and senators)⁹³³, Livy takes Cicero's late republican ideal and uses it for the Struggle of the Orders in the early republican period.⁹³⁴ However, because all of Livy's later books have been lost, it is impossible to ascertain whether he would have adopted a more Ciceronian use of *concordia ordinum* when he turned to the late republic, and as such it is impossible to decide if any significance should be given to Livy using *concordia ordinum* for relationships between the plebs and senators.

Other than his unique adoption and interpretation of *concordia ordinum*, Livy's uses of *concordia* are often similar to its use in Sallust.⁹³⁵ His occasional tendency to specify that

⁹²⁹ Orlin 2003, 16.

⁹³⁰ Livy 42.2.3 (adapted from Sage, 1938). cf 3.5.14, 3.8.1, 7.7.2; Orlin 2003, 16.

⁹³¹ The events at Caudine considered above, Livy 9.1-10. See Rosenstein 1990, 54-91 for the relation between the breaking of the *pax deorum* and military defeat.

⁹³² Lobur 2008, 51.

⁹³³ Scullard 1963, 115; Lobur 2008, 50; Eagle 1949, 15.

⁹³⁴ Livy 3.58.4, 3.68.11, 3.69.4, 4.7.5, 4.60.3, 5.3.5, 5.7.1, 5.12.12, 6.42.12, 7.21.4, 7.22.7, 7.27.1.

⁹³⁵ Livy's uses of *concordia* and *discordia* always refer to an internal relationship, except in two cases which will be discussed below. For example, he uses *con/dis-concordia* twenty-four times for personal relationships between Romans (1.13.8, 3.33.8, 4.26.6, 4.26.7, 4.32.1, 4.45.8, 6.6.17, 8.29.10, 10.13.12, 10.22.3, 10.22.4, 10.22.4 10.24.2, 10.24.6, 22.44.5, 22.32.1, 22.41.5, 27.38.10, 32.7.3, 38.57.7, 40.40.14, 40.46.10, 40.51.1, 42.10.4); eight times for personal relationships between non-Romans (21.31.6, 26.41.20, 40.7.7, 40.8.11, 40.7.16, 42.16.8, 45.12.7, 45.19.9, 45.19.9); eighty-seven times for within the Roman state or army (*concordia* 1.11.2, 2.1.11, 2.9.7, 2.31.9, 2.32.7, 2.33.1, 2.33.11, 2.39.7, 2.48.1, 2.57.3, 2.60.2, 3.1.4, 3.16.3, 3.24.11, 3.52.1, 3.54.7, 3.57.7, 3.58.4, 3.65.7, 3.67.7, 3.68.11, 3.69.4, 4.2.6, 4.7.1, 4.7.5, 4.10.8, 4.43.11, 4.60.3, 5.3.5, 5.3.10, 5.7.1, 5.7.8, 5.9.4, 5.12.12, 5.18.2, 6.42.12, 7.21.4, 7.21.5, 7.22.7, 7.27.1, 7.40.4, 7.41.7, 7.42.5, 7.42.6, 9.19.15, 9.46.12, 23.35.9, 34.49.9, 34.54.4, 40.8.15; *discordia* 2.1.6, 2.23.1, 2.24.1, 2.25.1, 2.29.8, 2.31.10, 2.34.2, 2.39.5, 2.42.3, 2.43.1, 2.44.7, 2.45.3, 2.54.2, 2.57.2, 2.60.4, 2.63.1, 3.17.12, 3.19.5, 3.38.3, 3.40.10, 3.65.6, 3.66.2, 3.67.6, 3.67.10, 4.2.12, 4.43.3, 4.46.4, 4.47.7, 4.48.14, 4.52.8, 4.56.9, 5.17.10, 6.31.6, 23.35.7, 6.42.10, 8.18.12, 34.49.10); fifteen times within a non-Roman state or army (4.58.2, 5.1.3, 24.22.16, 28.20.10, 34.62.1, 35.39.6, 39.48.5, 41.25.2, 42.2.2, 42.4.5, 42.5.11, 9.14.5, 9.20.5,

concord or discord is *domi* could perhaps suggest that there could be such a situation as international concord in contrast to *domi concordia*. However, Moore notes that Romans often used *domi* in order to distinguish domestic affairs from military ones.⁹³⁶ This certainly seems to be the case with Livy, as his uses of *domi concordia* or *domi discordia* are always contrasting a situation at home and abroad; for example it can be contrasted with a foreign peace or war, often with the explicit use of *foris* or *externus* in order to differentiate the internal discord or concord from the lack or existence of foreign wars.⁹³⁷

Despite his unremarkable use of *concordia* Livy does often note an interesting relationship between *concordia* and *pax*. Whenever there is a respite from foreign wars Rome has to contend with either disease or discord.⁹³⁸ This idea shares some similarities with Sallust's conclusion that when there are no necessary wars, man will fight for glory.⁹³⁹ However, whereas Sallust associates this with a defect of human nature, Livy seems to imply that this is in some way an inevitable situation, often passing from war to civil disturbance with a sense of accepted inevitability created by his use of 'final clauses'.⁹⁴⁰ For example, Livy States: "Nevertheless, that tranquillity might not be found everywhere, a quarrel among the first men of the state was stirred up by the plebeian tribunes Quintus and Gnaeus Ogulnius, both patrician and plebeian" (*tamen ne undique tranquillae res essent, certamen iniectum inter primores civitatis, patricos plebeiosque, ab tribunis plebis Q. et Cn. Ogulniis*).⁹⁴¹

As well as this connection between the end of wars and the start of concord, there are also several examples that show internal disputes being overcome by threats from outside. For example, Livy states that in 488 BC *Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus'* plan to ravage only land owned by plebeians would have turned them against the Senate "but dread of invasion, the strongest bond of harmony, tended to unite their feelings, however they might suspect and dislike one another" (*sed externus timor, maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis suspectos infensosque inter se iungebat animos*)⁹⁴², and in 484 BC "domestic strife was interrupted by war, while with one mind and purpose patricians and plebeians met the

24.22.2, 33.48.11); and eight times when referring to the goddess Concordia or her temple (9.46.4, 22.33.7, 23.21.7, 24.22.1, 24.22.13, 26.23.4, 39.56.6, 40.19.2).

⁹³⁶ Moore 2010, 76.

⁹³⁷ Livy 2.34.1, 2.43.1, 2.60.4, 2.63.1, 4.7.1, 4.47.7, 4.52.8, 7.27.1.

⁹³⁸ Walsh 1958, 359. Livy 10.6.3, 6.34.5, 6.43.3.

⁹³⁹ *Cat.* 10-11; *Iug.*, 41; *Hist. fr.* 1.12, 13 & 14McG = 1.12, 16, 13M.

⁹⁴⁰ Walsh 1958 359-360.

⁹⁴¹ Livy 10.6.3 (adapted from Foster, 1926); cf 6.34.5.

⁹⁴² Livy 2.39.7.

rebellious Volsci and Aequi and, led by Aemilius, defeated them in a successful action” (*bello deinde civiles discordiae intermissae, uno animo patres ac plebs rebellantes Volscos et Aequos duce Aemilio prospera pugna uicere*).⁹⁴³ Further, it is clear that both Rome and her enemies were aware of the advantages to be gained from attacking opponents while there was discord in their ranks. This is most apparent when the Volsci decided to ravage all the land surrounding Rome, but leave the farms of the patricians untouched in order to create the discord they knew would benefit them.⁹⁴⁴

Velleius Paterculus

Despite the initial *lacuna* at the opening of Velleius Paterculus’ *Historiae* it seems clear from the surviving remains that, like Sallust, Velleius began his work with a brief synopsis of history until the period that will be the focus of his narrative. As his work survives however, Velleius begins with Greece rather than the founding of Rome. Despite the different topic, Velleius’ attitude towards war and peace is clear from the beginning, just as Sallust’s preoccupation with *concordia* and the rejection of politics and the military are clear from the openings for both the *Bellum Iugurthinum* and the *Bellum Catilinae*. For example, 1.1.1-3 of Velleius’ *Historiae* clearly shows an unquestioned acceptance of violent vengeance as a motivating force. Telamon is not chastised for disowning his son after Teucer has failed to avenge his brother, and the vengeance of Orestes is also passed over with full but swift approval. Even a war of pure aggression perpetrated by “a warlike youth named Thessalus” (*belli iuuenis nomine Thessalus*) is not judged as a foolish or vainglorious act.⁹⁴⁵ This emphasis may be due to the speed at which Velleius covers this introductory passage, but Sallust still found time when moving at a similar pace to chastise when he felt the need was great. This digression on Greek history also provides an interesting parallel to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, who both blame the collapse of Sparta on its single-minded constitution – unable to sustain in peace what it had won in war.⁹⁴⁶ Velleius takes

⁹⁴³ Livy 2.42.3.

⁹⁴⁴ Livy, 2.39.5 *cf.* 2.25.1, 2.44.7, 3.38.3, 3.65.6, 6.31.6, 22.41.5.

⁹⁴⁵ Vell. Pat. 1.3.1.

⁹⁴⁶ Plato, *Leg.* 1. 628d-e; Aristotle, *Pol.* 2. 9. 1271b1-6.

the polar opposite view, stating that it was its traditional constitution that led to the period of Spartan supremacy.⁹⁴⁷

When Sallust turned to the topic of the founding of Rome, his focus was on the *concordia* created among neighbouring tribes that allowed Rome to flourish. Velleius, himself, greatly praises Sallust later in his work, when he describes the epoch of Roman talent. Most men are merely listed by name, including Cicero, Hortensius, Crassus, Cotta, Brutus and even Caesar, Varro, and Lucretius. Sallust, however, is marked out among this list as “the rival of Thucydides” (*aemulumque Thucydides Sallustium*).⁹⁴⁸ So perhaps the stark difference between his version of early Rome and that of Sallust should come as some surprise, as rather than emphasise the passive elements that allowed for greatness, he instead stresses the military and aggressive details that are minimised by Sallust. Velleius even goes much further in emphasising the importance of military action for Rome’s expansion than Livy, who noted that both war and peace, Romulus and Numa, were an essential part of Rome’s success. Firstly, Romulus is described with only two specific qualities, namely that he is the son of Mars, and the avenger of his grandfather, both of which recall the violent aspects of his character.⁹⁴⁹ Whereas Livy had questioned the tale of Romulus’ ancestry, instead saying that Rhea Silvia was raped, and that she claimed Mars was the assailant “whether actually believing so, or because it seemed less wrong if a god were the author of her fault” (*seu ita rata, seu quia deus auctor culpae honestior erat, Martem incertae stirpis patrem*).⁹⁵⁰ Secondly, rather than conclude that it was the co-operation and *concordia* with the local tribes that lead to Rome’s pre-eminence⁹⁵¹, Velleius instead focuses on Romulus’ need for support from Latinus’ troops, for “with the Veientes and other Etruscans, as well as the Sabines, in such close proximity, he could scarcely have established his new city with an unwarlike band of shepherds” (*cum aliter firmare urbem novam tam vicinis Veientibus aliisque Etruscis ac Sabinis cum imbelli et pastorali manu vix potuerit*).⁹⁵² This, again, although allowing for the inclusion of the co-operation between Romans and Latins, accentuates the importance of the military in the founding and stability of the city.

⁹⁴⁷ 1.6.3.

⁹⁴⁸ 2.36.2.

⁹⁴⁹ 1.8.4.

⁹⁵⁰ Livy 1.4.2; Miles 1995, 138-141.

⁹⁵¹ Sall. *Cat.* 6.2-3; the importance of which is also recalled by Livy in the Rape of the Sabines 1.9-13.

⁹⁵² Vell. Pat. 1.8.5.

Further, following Sallust, rather than Livy's depiction of a more general decline in morality, Velleius Paterculus views the fall of Carthage as the turning point in the Roman Republic.⁹⁵³ On this issue Velleius and Sallust are closer than on the founding of Rome. Velleius also saw the destruction of Carthage as the end of the period of Roman virtue and the start of a lust for luxury, "The older discipline was discarded to give place to the new. The state passed from vigilance to slumber, from the pursuit of arms to the pursuit of pleasure, from activity to idleness" (*vetus disciplina deserta, nova inducta; in somnum a vigiliis, ab armis ad voluptates, a negotiis in otium conversa civitas*).⁹⁵⁴ Both Sallust and Velleius Paterculus see the personal lusts for luxury and glory as part of the cause of the start of civil bloodshed. Sallust had identified the removal of fear with the beginning of strife between the orders.⁹⁵⁵ Yet, while Velleius is less interested in the clash between nobles and plebs, he still associates freedom from fear and increased luxury with the start of political violence. He is, however, more interested in the individual than the social. For Velleius it is merely another form of personal immorality, "for precedents do not stop where they begin...and when one path of right is abandoned, men are hurried into wrong in headlong haste" (*non enim ibi consistent exempla, unde coeperunt... et ubi semel recto deerratum est, in praeceps pervenitur*).⁹⁵⁶ Thus, the precedent of luxury and excessive wealth means that anything that may maintain this wealth is seen as a good in itself. As a consequence, civil violence which helps an individual is considered a desirable thing by the now luxury obsessed political class at Rome, "nor does any man think a course is shameful for himself which has proven profitable to others" (*nec quisquam sibi putat turpe, quod alii fuit fructuosum*).⁹⁵⁷ Although the importance that Sallust places on the nobles and plebs as groups is not present in Velleius, the fate of Tiberius Gracchus allows for one of the most Sallustian passages in Velleius.

"This was the beginning in Rome of civil bloodshed, and of the licence of the sword. From this time on right was crushed by might, the most powerful now took precedence in the state, the disputes of the citizens which were once healed by amicable agreements were now settled by arms, and wars were now begun not for good cause but for what profit there was in them."⁹⁵⁸

⁹⁵³ Jacobs 2010, 123-6.

⁹⁵⁴ Vell. Pat. 2.1.1.

⁹⁵⁵ *Iug.*, 41.2-5.

⁹⁵⁶ Vell. Pat. 2.3.4.

⁹⁵⁷ *ibid* (adapted from Shipley, 1927)

⁹⁵⁸ *ibid* 2.3.3.

Hoc initium in urbe Roma civilis sanguinis gladiatorumque impunitatis fuit. Inde ius vi obrutum potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaeque civium antea condicionibus sanari solitae ferro diiudicatae bellaque non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit.

This passage not only contradicts the sections of the preface where aggressive wars were condoned, but is also one of the rare examples of Velleius' use of *discordia* (an important point which will be discussed further below).

Velleius also says that after the fall of Carthage, Rome entered into a "disastrous and disgraceful" war⁹⁵⁹ (*triste deinde et contumeliosum bellum*).⁹⁶⁰ However, it is clear from the description that follows that it was not the motive for the war, or the evils inherent in war more generally that made this a "disgraceful" act, but rather the way in which the war was waged. Although the war with Viriathus is passed over only briefly, it is associated with the same attitudes that the contemporary war in Numantia roused in Velleius, in which it is the leniency of the terms reached and the lack of vigour with which the war is conducted that are the source of Rome's shame.⁹⁶¹ This recalls the Samnite War recorded in Livy, where the terms reached and the manner in which they were accepted caused great shame for the army and indeed the whole city.⁹⁶² Therefore, a disgraceful war for Velleius is not filled with slaughter or waged for aggressive purposes, but rather it is fought with a lack of valour and ends with unfavourable terms for the Senate. There is an important distinction between this and the Caudine Peace seen in Livy, namely that Livy saw this disgrace as a punishment for Rome's earlier refusal to accept an equal peace, whereas Velleius does not suggest that any peace should have been previously concluded.⁹⁶³

In contrast to Livy's one hundred and forty-four, and Sallust's twenty-two (twenty-five if the spurious works are included) uses of the term, the works of Velleius contain only nine instances of the varying forms of *concordia*⁹⁶⁴, and when these examples are examined in more detail it can be seen that not only does he use *concordia* much less frequently than Sallust and Livy, he also uses it in different ways. Sallust will only use *concordia* if the dispute is raised above the personal to the state or city level. Whereas, half of Velleius'

⁹⁵⁹ This was the war in Spain against Viriathus, which was actually started two years before the destruction of Carthage in 148 BC (Livy, *Epitome* 52)

⁹⁶⁰ Vell. Pat. 2.1.1-5.

⁹⁶¹ *ibid* 2.3.3-5.

⁹⁶² Livy 9.5-12.

⁹⁶³ Liebeschuetz 1967, 46; Bederman 2001, 224. Livy 9.1.

⁹⁶⁴ Vell. Pat. 2.3.3, 2.37.3, 2.47.2, 2.48.5, 2.53.3, 2.62.3, 2.65.1, 2.95.3 & 2.126.2.

uses refer to a personal conflict, in comparison less than a third of Livy's do so.⁹⁶⁵ For example, at 2.53.3 Velleius says "such was the inconsistency (*discordante*) of fortune in this case, that he who but a short time before had found no more lands to conquer now found none for his burial" (*in tantum in illo viro a se discordante fortuna, ut cui modo ad victoriam terra defuerat, deesser ad sepulchrum*). This use of the present participle form of the verb *discordo* is not found in Sallust and stresses the more uncommon meaning of 'inconsistency' between the two parties, rather than 'discord'. Also at 2.37.3, 2.47.2, 2.65.1 and 2.95.3 we again see a usage not present in Sallust. 2.47.2 tells us of the breakdown of the relationship between Caesar and Pompey after the death of Julia. 2.65.1 recalls an offer of friendship made between Antony and Augustus, 2.95.3 states that the censorship of Plancus and Paulus was carried out in mutual discord, and finally 2.37.3 recounts the disagreements between Tigranes and Mithridates. It is also interesting to note that Velleius uses a slightly different form of discord when referring to non-Romans, allowing them only *discors*, and not full *discordia*.

Therefore, these four examples use *concordia* to demonstrate a strained personal relationship, rather than general states of violence or harmony between groups within a society, as is the case with Sallust. This means that Velleius uses *concordia* in the same way as Sallust merely four times: for the banishing of discord from the Senate house⁹⁶⁶, when Brutus and Cassius make their (disingenuous) offer to go into voluntary exile "for the sake of ensuring harmony within the republic" (*dum rei publicae constaret concordia*)⁹⁶⁷, when it is said that Cicero tried to preserve the harmony of the republic⁹⁶⁸, and when it is used to describe the period of civil disorder that was initiated with the death of Tiberius Gracchus.⁹⁶⁹ It is this last example that is most reminiscent of Sallust, coming as it does in the middle of a historical digression that is used to illustrate a turning point not only historically, but also morally. It was this one death that Velleius says changed the mentality of the people of Rome: "From this time on right was crushed by might, the most powerful now took precedence in the state, the disputes of the citizens which were once healed by amicable agreements were now settled by arms, and wars were now begun not for good cause but for what profit there was in them" (*inde ius vi obrutum potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaequae civium antea condicionibus sanari solitae ferro diiudicatae bellaque*

⁹⁶⁵ Livy uses *con/dis-cordia* 102 times for states or armies, but only 32 for personal relationships.

⁹⁶⁶ Vell. Pat. 2.126.2.

⁹⁶⁷ *ibid* 2.62.3.

⁹⁶⁸ *ibid* 2.48.5.

⁹⁶⁹ *ibid* 2.3.3.

non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit). However, it is important to note that even in this most Sallustian of contexts it is clear that, although the passage ends with the starting of wars, it begins with the idea of personal quarrels, rather than a larger atmosphere of societal *discordia*.

Just as he uses varying forms of *concordia* much less frequently, Velleius also uses forms of *pax* less often, only thirty-one times compared with sixty-two uses in Sallust, which is twice as many times in a work only 1.37 times the length.⁹⁷⁰ Further, just as many of the usages of *concordia* are not the same as those in Sallust, *pax* also often has a different meaning for Velleius. The example that is least related to war and peace, and therefore to Sallust's usages, is the figurative use of *pax*, meaning "in due regard/with due respect" which Velleius uses three times.⁹⁷¹ Of the remaining times a form of *pax* is used in Velleius, nine refer to internal circumstances⁹⁷², ten to external⁹⁷³, and for nine the meaning is neither definitely external nor internal. Of these nine, two describe a state where all wars, both internal and external have ended⁹⁷⁴, three describe someone who is either equally good or evil in both war and peace⁹⁷⁵, and four are used poetically, for a state of peaceful prosperity.⁹⁷⁶

Looking first at the uses of *pax* in external conflicts it seems that peace is something that the provinces are, at best, brought into and at worst subjugated to. For example at 2.90.4 Augustus is explicitly said to have *brought peace to* the provinces "*ad eam pacem ... perduxit*". In Thrace Tiberius is also said to *bring* the provinces back to peace "*nunc expugnationibus in pristinum pacis redegit modum*", and return peace to Macedon "*Macedoniae pacem reddidit*".⁹⁷⁷ Even when peace is sought, rather than brought, it is inevitably the enemy that seeks peace and only then after they have already been defeated in war: "The winter brought the reward of our efforts in the termination of the war, though it was not until the following summer that all Pannonia sought peace, the remnants of the war as a whole being confined to Dalmatia" (*Hiems emolumentum patradi belli distulit, sed insequenti aestate omnis Pannonia reliquiis totius belli in Delmatia manentibus pacem*

⁹⁷⁰ Sallust's works are 36,546 words long (21,556 for *Iug.*, 10,804 for *Cat.* and 4,186 for the fragments of the *Historiae*), while Velleius' *Historiae* is only 26,705 words in length.

⁹⁷¹ Vell. Pat. 1.7.4, 1.17.3 & 2.129.3.

⁹⁷² *ibid* 2.48.5, 2.49.3, 2.58.3, 2.76.3, 2.77.1, 2.77.2 & 2.86.3 and twice at 2.25.1.

⁹⁷³ *ibid* 1.12.6, 2.91.1, 2.92.2, 2.110.2, 2.114.4, 2.117.4, 2.123.1, 2.125.5 and twice at 2.98.2.

⁹⁷⁴ *ibid* 2.38.3 & 2.89.3.

⁹⁷⁵ *ibid* 1.13.3, 2.11.1, 2.113.1,

⁹⁷⁶ *ibid* 2.103.5, 2.131.1 and twice at 2.126.3.

⁹⁷⁷ *ibid* 2.98.1.

petiit).⁹⁷⁸ It should be noted that, although the provinces are brought to peace, Velleius does not see the subjugation as a negative influence on the inhabitants of the provinces. We are told that *circumferens terrarum orbi praesentia sua pacis suae bona*, so rather than peace being an imposition Augustus brings not only peace through subjugation, but also the benefits of peace by his own presence.⁹⁷⁹

It has already been noted that in Sallust peace with a foreign enemy can be connected closely with common interest⁹⁸⁰, or can be agreed or offered⁹⁸¹, or made on mutual terms.⁹⁸² Further, although due to both authors' use of *variatio* there is no direct similarity in the Latin used for the pursuit or achievement of peace in civil conflict in Velleius and foreign conflict in Sallust, there is still a correlation between the two. Civil peace in Velleius and foreign peace in Sallust are both often agreed or arranged; *composita, inita, coalescens, placet* in Velleius⁹⁸³ and *convenit, nuntiatur, fiet, conventa* in Sallust.⁹⁸⁴ Therefore just as *concordia* is much more likely to be reduced to a personal level in Velleius than in Sallust, so *pax* is more likely to be reduced to an internal rather than external level, consistently used in places where we could expect Sallust to have preferred to use *concordia*.

Although we have seen that Sallust is much more likely to use forms of *pax* and *concordia* than Velleius, Velleius uses forms of *pacatus* five times compared to only one in Sallust. As Linderski told us⁹⁸⁵, *pacatus*, in its more common form, entails an implication that an area or enemy had been pacified, rather than that it has been taken as an ally, and, as such, given Velleius' aggressive usages of *pax*, it is not surprising to see that this is clearly what is implied: Dalmatia, the Spains, the west, the Desiadates, the Perustae and even the whole world are pacified.⁹⁸⁶ The aggressive nature of these pacifications is emphasised by the military efforts that have caused them. The Spains are pacified after many and various wars⁹⁸⁷, Dalmatia is pacified to the point of acknowledging Rome's empire⁹⁸⁸, the Perustae

⁹⁷⁸ *ibid* 2.114.4.

⁹⁷⁹ *ibid* 2.92.1. “[He will bring] to the world by his personal presence the blessings of Augustan peace.”

⁹⁸⁰ *Iug.*, 111.1, 112.3.

⁹⁸¹ *ibid.*, 38.10, 48.1.

⁹⁸² *ibid.*, 61.5.

⁹⁸³ *ibid* 2.76.2, 2.77.1, 2. 48.5, 2.77.2.

⁹⁸⁴ *Iug.*, 38.10, 48.1, 61.4, 122.3.

⁹⁸⁵ Linderski 1984, 152.

⁹⁸⁶ *Vell. Pat.* 2.90.1, 2.91.1, 2.115.4, 2.89.6.

⁹⁸⁷ *ibid* 2.90.1. *multo varioque Marte pacatae.*

⁹⁸⁸ *ibid* 2.90.1. *ad certam confessionem pacata est imperii.*

and Desiadatae are pacified by the armed prowess of Tiberius⁹⁸⁹, and the world is pacified by Tiberius' military victories.⁹⁹⁰

Despite the constant glorification of Rome's military achievements in Velleius, it must still be noted that he chooses to end his work with a prayer for the preservation of peace.⁹⁹¹ However, the prayer is made not to the goddess Concordia, or Pax or even Venus (as is the case in Lucretius's prayer for the quieting of Mars), but rather the three divinities invoked are Jupiter Capitolinus, Mars Gradivus and Vesta. These are all closely associated with the safety of Rome specifically, and not a more general end to war as is present in Lucretius. Rome's destiny, function and permanence are symbolised in Jupiter Capitolinus⁹⁹², the titles of *auctor* and *stator* emphasise the importance of Mars in the founding of Rome and also his continued role in protecting the state⁹⁹³ and Vesta signified the continuity of both Rome's religious feeling and the eternity of the city of Rome itself.⁹⁹⁴ Therefore, each god emphasises the importance of Rome in the empire, while at the same time this Roman centric triad is again a prime example of the consistently internal nature of *pax* for Velleius. However, the most significant element of the invocation is Mars' epithet *Gradivus*. As the presence of Mars as "he who precedes the army into battle" removes any doubt that *pax* is to be won and maintained through military means, and still accentuates the divide between Roman and non-Roman, a divide that Sallust, through his uses of *pax*, *concordia* and *pacatus* has consistently tried to minimise.

⁹⁸⁹ *ibid* 2.115.4. *manibus atque armis ipsius Caesaris tum demum pacati sunt.*

⁹⁹⁰ *ibid* 2.89.6. *Bella sub imperatore gesta pacatusque victoriis terrarum orbis...omne aevi sui spatium impensurum in id solum opus scriptorem fatigarent.*

⁹⁹¹ *ibid* 2.131.1-2. *cf* Aelius Aristides' 26th oration (*The Encomium on Rome*) which shares aspects with Velleius' closing prayer. For example, Aristides emphasises the benefits of peace that Roman rule has bought to the empire (26.92-106), but while doing so he also praises the qualities of Rome's military (72-89) and notes the gods' approval (105).

⁹⁹² Ogilvie 1969, 16; Woodman 1977, 276.

⁹⁹³ Woodman 1977, 277-9.

⁹⁹⁴ Woodman 1977, 279-80; Warde Fowler 1911, 137.

Tacitus

The Monographs

Tacitus' uses of variations on *concordia* seem, at first appearance, to share more in common with Sallust than Velleius Paterculus. Six of the eight passages where variations of *concordia* are used refer explicitly to internal political situations above the level of the individual and instead within or between differing groups.⁹⁹⁵ The Roman army in Britain creates *discordia* when they become idle under Trebellius Maximus: "but there was mutiny and trouble when the army, accustomed to the field became riotous and idle" (*sed discordia laboratum, cum adsuetus expeditionibus miles otio lasciviret*)⁹⁹⁶, and Calgacus notes that the disagreement in the colonies will aid the Britons' cause.⁹⁹⁷ This point is echoed by Tacitus in the *Germania*, when he explains that the Germans were able to use the opportunity created by Roman *discordia* to their advantage.⁹⁹⁸ Also, unlike Velleius, Tacitus can also see that *concordia* can exist between the inhabitants of foreign nations. The British tribes can "[learn] at last that a common danger must be repelled by union" (*docti commune periculum concordia propulsandum*)⁹⁹⁹ or Calgacus can remind his men that their disunity helps the enemy. He says, "it is our dissention and feuds that bring them fame: their enemy's mistake becomes their army's glory" (*nostris illi dissensionibus ac discordiis clari vitia hostium in gloriam exercitus sui vertunt*).¹⁰⁰⁰ This idea, as with Calgacus' previous example, is again repeated by Tacitus in the *Germania*, when he prays that if nations will not love Rome, they will hate each other, for "fortune can guarantee us nothing better than discord among our foes" (*praestare fortuna maius potest quam hostium discordiam*).¹⁰⁰¹ Tacitus only uses variations on *concordia* in one passage of the monographs, where the meaning relates to a political relationship between two individuals rather than in the more Sallustian way to refer to societal groups. This occurs where the grievances of the Britons are recounted by Tacitus during his summary of Agricola's

⁹⁹⁵ Tacitus actually uses variations on *concordia* or *discordia* nine times but two of these are in the same line; *Agr.* 15.2.

⁹⁹⁶ *Tac. Agr.* 16.3.

⁹⁹⁷ *ibid* 32.3.

⁹⁹⁸ *Tac. Germ.* 37.5; Mellor 1993, 108.

⁹⁹⁹ *Tac. Agr.* 29.3.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *ibid* 32.1.

¹⁰⁰¹ *Tac. Germ.* 33.2

predecessors. He says that they used to have one king but now have two forced upon them, the legate and procurator, and that whether *concordia* or *discordia* exists between the two makes no difference to the lot of the locals.¹⁰⁰² Therefore, although this does refer to two individual political offices, it does not specify two named historical figures, and so does not appear as personal as the use of *concordia* often does in the works of Velleius, who is more likely to see concord or discord between two named and known people. Despite the majority of instances falling into the pattern set by Sallust, there is one example where Tacitus uses *concordia* in a way more personal and private, even than Velleius' examples of personal relationships between political figures. This is when Tacitus describes Agricola's marriage as singularly harmonious (*mira concordia*).¹⁰⁰³ When compared to the otherwise purely political meaning of *concordia* in Tacitus, Sallust and Velleius, it seems an odd choice for a marital bond. However, political language is commonly used to describe romantic relationships, particularly in the Latin elegists, and Ogilvie and Richmond note that this passage is conventionally eulogistic, and that the themes within it are common in epitaphs.¹⁰⁰⁴

Pax is used much less often by Tacitus in the monographs than by any of his predecessors, but his fifteen usages of variants of *pax* share many similarities with the earlier historians. The most obvious of these is the use of *pax* as an absence of, or an antonym to, wars.¹⁰⁰⁵ Also, *pax* can be a state that exists with foreign states as well as between external enemies, distinguishing it from *concordia*. Rome can be seen as willing to enter a battle with the assistance of British troops because their loyalty had been proved through years of peace.¹⁰⁰⁶ This peace must explicitly refer to their relationship with Rome, because the context of an impending battle with another British tribe means that they are not at peace with all inhabitants of the island, only those in togas. However, although this shows that, like Sallust, Tacitus can refer to a period of absence from war between Rome and a foreign tribe as *pax*, Tacitus is more like Velleius when describing peace with external enemies. He never explicitly states that this *pax* is one between equals, made by mutual negotiation and compromise. Rather, when peace is made, it is the Britons who must petition for it when it

¹⁰⁰² Tac. Agr. 15.2.

¹⁰⁰³ *ibid* 6.1.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Ogilvie & Richmond 1967, 148-9; cf CIL iii. 4592 "*vixit concorditer*"; Lattimore 1962, 280.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Tac. Agr. 11.4, 13.2, 18.5, 20.1, 20.2, 29.2, 30.4, 32.1; Germ. 13.3, 14.2, 18.3, 22.2, 31.3, 36.1, 40.3.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Tac. Agr. 29.2.

is clear that they have lost the military struggle, as was the case at the Island of Mona.¹⁰⁰⁷ As Mellor states “the Roman Peace is an imposed peace. Peace is not the goal; it is merely the by-product of subjugation”.¹⁰⁰⁸ Moreover, whereas Velleius saw this imposed *pax* as wholly praiseworthy, Tacitus is much more cynical about its benefits to the local population. Agricola must parade the attractions of peace before the Britons but this is merely slavery masquerading as peace.¹⁰⁰⁹ This is something that Calgacus reiterates when he says “they make a desolation and call it peace” (*solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*).¹⁰¹⁰ Therefore, Tacitus develops the model of enforced peace seen in Velleius by minimising the positive effects that this peace has on the local population and emphasising negative aspects of the imposition of *pax* and equating it to a loss of liberty. The influence of Sallust is equally visible; however, just as Sallust could highlight the degenerating effect of years of *pax*, so could Tacitus. Tacitus notes that the British have not been emasculated by years of peace¹⁰¹¹, and he admires both the German youths who will leave a peaceful tribe in order to seek out wars¹⁰¹² and also the men of the Chatti who deliberately endure hardships in times of peace in order not to be softened by the period of inaction.¹⁰¹³ Perhaps most telling of all is the description of the Cherusci, who are described as a wilfully pacifistic tribe. Whereas, similar societies are met with praise and adulation when recounted by philosophers, Tacitus says that “for long years they have been unassailed and have encouraged an abnormal and languid peacefulness” (*nimiam ac marcentem diu pacem inlaccessiti nutrierunt*).¹⁰¹⁴ He rejects this policy as pleasant rather than sound, and it is the embrace of peacefulness that presumably caused the fall of the Cherusci at the hands of the Chatti.¹⁰¹⁵ Although, it should be noted that Tacitus qualifies the foolishness of the Cherusci with reference to the aggressive nature of the surrounding tribes, it is only the lawlessness of their neighbours that means the Cherusci are wrong to place their hopes in a pacifistic policy: “between lawlessness and powerful men, peacefulness is vanity” (*quia inter inpotentes et validos falso quiescas*).¹⁰¹⁶

¹⁰⁰⁷ *ibid* 18.5.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Mellor 1993, 105; Liebeschuetz 1966, 137.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Tac. *Agr.* 20-21.

¹⁰¹⁰ *ibid* 30.4.

¹⁰¹¹ 11.4.

¹⁰¹² Tac. *Germ.* 14.2.

¹⁰¹³ *ibid* 31.3.

¹⁰¹⁴ *ibid* 36.1.

¹⁰¹⁵ *ibid* 36.2-3

¹⁰¹⁶ *ibid* 36.1 (my translation).

Therefore, Tacitus has taken the most negative aspect of Sallust's presentation of peace (the enervating effects) and expanded upon them. In Sallust it is only the Romans who are corrupted by the loss of an external enemy, while the Numantians are able to benefit from the collapse of Carthage. However, in Tacitus all races can become indolent in times of inaction, be they British, German or Roman armies. Added to this he has also adapted Velleius' insistence to see *pax* as a Roman imposition, not something gained by cooperation as in Sallust, yet this is made more extreme in the works of Tacitus. Whereas, Velleius seems to genuinely exalt the glories of *pax* and the benefits it can bring to the whole empire, Tacitus views *pax Romana* more cynically and sees it as incompatible with *libertas*. However, this attack on *pax* is coupled with an obvious admiration for the local population of Britain and Germany, so perhaps we should expect the use of *amicitia* to imply an equality akin to that in Sallust that is not present in the use of *pax*. At first appearance this seems to be the case, as *amicitia* is twice used to describe the relationship between the Britons and Romans.¹⁰¹⁷ However, in each of these cases it is apparent that neither is a true friendship. The Irish prince is only kept under the pretence of friendship, (*specie amicitiae*).¹⁰¹⁸ The second example comes from Calgacus who again echoes the attitude already articulated by Tacitus. Calgacus says that even if the British women escape the lust of enemy soldiers "they are defiled by those called friends and guests" (*nomine amicorum atque hospitem polluuntur*).¹⁰¹⁹ It is clear then that Tacitus and Calgacus both know that true *amicitia* cannot exist between a Roman and non-Roman, and the pretence of friendship is merely used as part of a larger deception. Further, the fact that Calgacus associates this false friendship so closely with loss of *libertas*¹⁰²⁰ again emphasises the negative impact the *pax Romana* has had on the local population.

Dorey notes that the *Agricola* partially follows the pattern set by Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*. The most striking way in which it is said Tacitus' work resembles Sallust's is the prologues. Both authors describe "a contemporary society that is corrupt and hostile to virtue, and sets out the obstacles that confront the writer".¹⁰²¹ However, despite this point of similarity, each author draws very different personal conclusions and morals from these difficulties and failings. Whereas, Sallust concluded in the *Bellum Catilinae* that retirement from public life into the arts can be as difficult and worthy as pursuing a political or military

¹⁰¹⁷ Tac. Agr. 24.3, 31.1.

¹⁰¹⁸ *ibid* 24.3.

¹⁰¹⁹ *ibid* 31.1 (my translation).

¹⁰²⁰ *ibid* 31.2-3.

¹⁰²¹ Dorey 1969, 8.

career¹⁰²², and by the time of writing the *Bellum Iugurthinum* had rejected military and political careers fully¹⁰²³, Dorey sees Tacitus' central theme as "the greatness of the hero's achievements and the nobility of his life".¹⁰²⁴ It is apparent that although Tacitus begins his monograph with a similarly bleak attitude towards his own period, his conclusion is almost the polar opposite. Tacitus, rather than reject the possibility of a good political career in a time so devoid of *virtus*, instead regularly praises Agricola for his own ability to conduct a virtuous and laudable career in service to the empire despite the obstacles that lay in his way. In a famous passage he explicitly states that "great men can live even under bad rulers" (*posse etiam sub malis principibus magnos viros esse*).¹⁰²⁵ It is this overriding theme in the *Agricola*, combined with the positive attitude towards aggressive imperialism and the framework of a laudatory biography of a great military governor, thus, the consistent praise for military men is to be expected. When Tacitus recalls the governors who preceded Agricola, he notes that Vettius Bolanus was too mild for this warlike province¹⁰²⁶, and he and Trebellius Maximus both allowed their own inaction to affect the soldiery in a negative way, leading to mutinies and riots in the camps.¹⁰²⁷ Further, it is the most aggressive and expansionist governors who are afforded the highest praise; Aulus Plautius, Ostorius Scapula, Suetonius Paulinus, Petilius Cerialis and Julius Frontinus are all praised as strong soldiers who took the battle to the tribes in order to expand the empire.¹⁰²⁸ Good emperors for Tacitus were also required to be good generals and have an expansionist outlook¹⁰²⁹ and he is equally likely to praise the military ability and bravery of the Britons, Gauls or Germans as he is those of a Roman governor.¹⁰³⁰

As well as praising bravery in the military sphere and extolling the benefits of an aggressive expansionist empire, Tacitus also shows no remorse or disdain for acts of mass violence. Tacitus praises Agricola for his ability to use warfare to distract his mind from the sorrow of his son's death¹⁰³¹, and he is grateful that he was able to witness a battle between opposing German tribes in which sixty thousand were killed just to delight Roman eyes

¹⁰²² Sall. *Cat.* 1-2.

¹⁰²³ Sall. *Iug.*, 3.1.

¹⁰²⁴ Dorey 1969, 2.

¹⁰²⁵ Tac. *Agr.* 42.4.

¹⁰²⁶ *ibid* 8.1.

¹⁰²⁷ *ibid* 16.3-5.

¹⁰²⁸ *ibid* 14.1-3 & 17.1-2.

¹⁰²⁹ *ibid* 39; Mellor 1993, 105.

¹⁰³⁰ *ibid* 11.4, 37.3-4; *Germ.* 3.1-2, 7.1.

¹⁰³¹ Tac. *Agr.* 29.

(*oblectationi oculisque ceciderunt*).¹⁰³² Moreover, rather than the slaughter of innocents, or wars for greed or revenge, Tacitus sees the most unjust feature of wars as the allotting of praise and censure: “this is the most unjust feature of wars: everyone claims victories; reverses are attributed to one man only” (*iniquissima haec bellorum condicio est: prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni imputantur*).¹⁰³³

There is only one place in the *Agricola* where the glory and renown of military men can be seen to be, perhaps, questioned. This is on Agricola’s return to Rome where it is said that “in order that he might try to mitigate by other qualities the offence – to civilians – of a soldier’s fame, he drank the cup of peace and idleness to the dregs” (*uti militare nomen, grave inter otiosos, aliis virtutibus temperaret, tranquillitatem atque otium penitus hausit*).¹⁰³⁴ It is not made clear why Agricola would want to reduce the effect of his fame, particularly if his success was as great as Tacitus suggests. However, both Ogilvie-Richmond and Campbell state that the envy and dislike of soldiers by civilians was commonplace.¹⁰³⁵ Campbell gives no other examples however, and Ogilvie-Richmond only offers Lamachus in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, and it should also be noted that dislike is not necessarily inspired by envy. Although, due to Tacitus’ general descriptions of Agricola’s greatness and the envy he says was felt by Domitian, in this instance Tacitus probably does wish to suggest that the dislike of civilians was inspired more by envy than any other motivation, though this is not explicitly stated.

Dialogue on Oratory

It is apparent from the usage of *pax* in the *Agricola* and *Germania* that Tacitus, like Velleius Paterculus, predominantly saw peace as inseparable from conquest, and that despite recognising the negative impact this peace could have on the inhabitants of Western Europe, Tacitus still maintained support for an expansionist imperial policy. Laruccia does not see the *Dialogus* as inconsistent with this view.¹⁰³⁶ He bases this argument on two passages in the *Dialogus*; the first, 38.2, certainly takes the meaning Laruccia attributes to

¹⁰³² Tac. *Germ.* 33.2.

¹⁰³³ Tac. *Agr.* 27.1 (adapted from Hutton, 2006).

¹⁰³⁴ *ibid* 40.4.

¹⁰³⁵ Ogilvie & Richmond 1967, 289-90; Campbell 1975, 11.

¹⁰³⁶ Laruccia 1980, 408-9.

it, that the principate and peace have limited eloquence¹⁰³⁷, (whether Laruccia's change from *alia pacaverat* to *depacaverat* is accepted or not). However, the second passage is not so clear. In this passage Maternus says "Meanwhile, only one or two persons stand by you as you are speaking, and the matter is dealt with in a *solitudo*, as it were" (*unus inter haec dicenti aut alter assisit, et res velut in solitudine agitur*).¹⁰³⁸ Here Laruccia takes *solitudine* to mean a wasteland or desolation, however, although in other instances it is clear that Tacitus does use *solitudo* to mean a wasteland¹⁰³⁹, here the meaning may simply be the more literal loneliness, as the rest of the passage emphasises the literal emptiness of the courtroom in comparison with an earlier period when the room would have been filled with concerned citizens and supporters. "But the orator wants shouts and applause. He must have what I call his stage. This the ancient orators could command day after day" (*Oratori autem clamore plausuque opus est, et velut quodam theatre; qualia cotidie antiquis oratoribus contingebant*).¹⁰⁴⁰ So this *solitudo* is not contrasted with a political freedom, but with the physical presence of a crowd, this *solitudo* is not enforced by the power of the principate but created by the practicalities of the new judicial system.

If, then, these two passages alone cannot be used to conclude that the same attitude to *pax* is present in the *Dialogus* as in the *Agricola* and *Germania*, is there any other evidence that supports the presence of the same pessimistic attitude towards peace? Perhaps the most significant point to make when answering this question is that often in the *Dialogus*, when Tacitus discusses the changing political climate and its effect on oratory, he does not in fact refer to *pax* at all, instead the emphasis is on *quietus*. Orators are said to have achieved all that is possible in this period of *quieta et beata*.¹⁰⁴¹ Oratory is an art that flourishes in times of *turbidis et inquietis*¹⁰⁴², the decline in oratory is traced back to Augustus' reign *postquam longa temporum quies*.¹⁰⁴³ Oratory is not an *otiose et quieta* art¹⁰⁴⁴ and it is impossible to have *magnam famem et magnam quietem*.¹⁰⁴⁵ Whereas the

¹⁰³⁷ Tacitus is not the only ancient text to claim that imperial peace changes oratory, Aelius Aristides also suggests that the new government has encouraged some to be more prudent when speaking publically (2.430; Pernot 2008, 193-195).

¹⁰³⁸ Tac. *Dial.* 39.3 (trans. in Alfred Church, William Brodribb and Sara Bryant. New York: Random House, 1873)

¹⁰³⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 11.32, for example.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Tac. *Dial.* 39.4 (trans. in Alfred Church, William Brodribb and Sara Bryant. New York: Random House, 1873).

¹⁰⁴¹ *ibid* 36.2.

¹⁰⁴² *ibid* 37.6.

¹⁰⁴³ *ibid* 38.2.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *ibid* 40.1.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *ibid* 41.5.

decline of oratory is related in only two places to *pax*, in the first of these instances *pax* and *bellum* are used only analogously, *pax* is more beneficial than *bellum* but *bellum* produces more skilled fighters, while hazardous conditions will also produce more great orators than security.¹⁰⁴⁶ The second of these instances sees the conditions for great oratory in the state listed;

“likewise at Rome, so long as the constitution was unsettled, so long as the country kept wearing itself out with factions and dissensions and disagreements, until there was no peace in the forum, no harmony in the Senate, no restraint in the courts of law, no respect for authority, no sense of propriety on the part of the officers of state, the growth of eloquence was doubtless sturdier”.¹⁰⁴⁷

Nostra quoque civitas, donec erravit, donec se partibus et dissensionibus et discordiis confecit, donec nulla fuit in foro pax, nulla in senatu concordia, nulla in iudiciis moderatio, nulla superiorum reverentia, nullus magistratum modus, tulit sine dubio valentiorum eloquentiam.

From this it is apparent that it is not *pax* that has facilitated the decline of eloquence, but rather *pax* in the forum is but another symptom of the *quietus* that Maternus actually sees as the quality of the state that brought about this decline.

Therefore, if the same pessimism could be found in the *Dialogus* as in the *Agricola* and *Germania* towards a state of peaceful existence, as Laruccia claims¹⁰⁴⁸, then in the *Dialogus* this peace is certainly *quietus* and not *pax*. And when *pax* is used it is never associated with forceful imposition in the same ways as it is in the earlier monographs, rather it is firstly spoken of merely as a state preferable to war.¹⁰⁴⁹ Secondly it is used to describe the new tranquillity of the forum since the collapse of the republican system.¹⁰⁵⁰ If, then, it is not *pax* that can be seen in this light perhaps it is *quietus* that has created the ‘wasteland’ which Laruccia says is the Tacitean consequence of *pax Romana*. However, although the decline of oratory is lamented by all the speakers except Aper, Maternus seems happy to forgo this eloquence in return for peace. He sees the same conditions that allowed for great oratory also bringing about the destruction of the state; “In each case the state was torn to pieces” (*Quae singula etsi distrahebant rem publicam*)¹⁰⁵¹, after listing the great crimes which required oratory to match the occasion he says, “It is better, of course, that

¹⁰⁴⁶ *ibid* 37.7.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *ibid* 40.4.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Laruccia 1980, 408-9.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Tac. *Dial.* 37.7.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *ibid* 40.4.

¹⁰⁵¹ *ibid* 36.4 (my translation).

such horrors should not occur at all, and we must regard that as the most enviable political condition in which we are not liable to anything of the kind" (*Quae mala sicut non accidere melius est, isque optimus civitatis status habendus in quo nihil tale patimur*).¹⁰⁵² He also emphasises that he does not wish for bad citizens in order to furnish more great oratory: "I do not mean that it was worth the country's while to produce bad citizens, just in order that our orators might have an ample supply of material" (*non quia tanti fuit rei publicae malos ferre cives ut urberem ad dicendum materiam oratores haberent*)¹⁰⁵³, and that "the eloquence of the Gracchi did not make up for what the country suffered from their laws" (*nec tanti rei publicae Gracchorum eloquentia fuit ut pateretur et leges*).¹⁰⁵⁴ Therefore, it is apparent that, as Peterson states, "here lies a consolation for the decay of speaking: peace recompenses for the loss".¹⁰⁵⁵

Yet if peace, both as *pax* and *quietus*, is viewed here in far less cynical terms than in the *Agricola* and *Germania*, and this peace has been brought about by the change from republic to principate, what has happened to the Maternus from the beginning of the *Dialogus*? The Maternus who had so proudly asserted his intentions to not only refuse to edit his inflammatory *Cato* but also to publish a *Thyestes* that he says will say anything left unsaid by his *Cato*?¹⁰⁵⁶ This Maternus is often associated with either the Maternus who was executed for offending Vespasian¹⁰⁵⁷ or another Maternus who was killed for delivering a speech against tyrants under Domitian¹⁰⁵⁸ and whether either of these identifications is correct or not, the deaths of two Materni in recent memory, coupled with the clearly inflammatory nature of plays mentioned at the start of the *Dialogus*, would undoubtedly identify the Maternus of the *Dialogus* as an outspoken opponent to the principate. This means, firstly, that the description of the principate as *sapientissimus et unus* (one wise above all others) should be "tainted by irony"¹⁰⁵⁹ and secondly, what at first appears as unrestrained praise for the principate and *pax* becomes more difficult to understand. There are several possible explanations for this seeming inconsistency. Firstly, the speaker after the lacuna may not be Maternus at all but rather another of the

¹⁰⁵² *ibid* 37.5.

¹⁰⁵³ *ibid* 37.6.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *ibid* 40.4.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Peterson 1970, 226.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Tac. *Dial.* 3.1-3.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Murgia 1980, 102, 122; Luce 1993, 24.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Cass. Dio 67.12.5; Matthiessen 1970; Barnes 1986, 238-44.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Dominik 2007, 328.

guests.¹⁰⁶⁰ These arguments, however, have long since been rejected due to the lack of any evidence that the speaker changes between the lacuna and *Finierat Maternus, cum Messalla*.¹⁰⁶¹ Secondly, the possibility that like the description of the wise emperor, discussed above, this whole passage should be read ironically. However the examples above of the praise of the *quietus* of the current era, seem unlikely to be meant in any way other than they are spoken. If these are to be read ironically then Maternus would be wishing for a return to civil unrest and political violence, which even an outspoken opponent of the principate would shy away from. The third option is put forward by Saxonhouse, who asks if Maternus' conclusions "concern the state of oratory in relation to tranquillity and not the political situation as a whole?"¹⁰⁶² This appears to be the case, as after the passage that praises peace and notes its role in the decline of eloquence¹⁰⁶³ he then highlights the imperfections in the system of his own era. He notes that provinces still quarrel with their governors, criminals still call upon lawyers, and countries still need protection from neighbours and internal strife, he says that the conditions in Rome are still far from perfect and that it would be better if there were no grievances and no-one sought redress.¹⁰⁶⁴

Therefore, although Maternus is grateful for the *quietus* of this period, and he knows that it is the principate that has brought this *quietus*, he is not wholly laudatory when it comes to the principate. Not only has he composed tragedies to question the regime but he also questions its effectiveness even after praising what it has achieved. It is clear then that Maternus envisages a state with the stability of the principate but without an emperor, and also that he does not look back to the Republic for this state, as he sees the republic as a more unsettled time to live than under the principate. Saxonhouse suggests that this means that what Maternus wants is a philosopher-king in the Platonic mould.¹⁰⁶⁵ However, although Maternus' Utopia, where oratory is unnecessary because all crime and strife have been banished, shares some similarities with those in the *Republic* and *Gorgias*, it seems unlikely that Maternus would make his plea for a philosopher-king in such veiled terms,

¹⁰⁶⁰ As argued by Peterson 1893, xxxviii; Gudeman 1894, 72; Costa 1969, 34.

¹⁰⁶¹ Tac. *Dial.* 42.1; Gillis 1972, 512-518.

¹⁰⁶² Saxonhouse 1975, 65.

¹⁰⁶³ Tac. *Dial.* 36-40.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Tac. *Dial.* 41.1-2. *Sic quoque quod superest [antiquis oratoribus fori] non emendatae nec usque ad votum compositae civitatis argumentum est. Quis enim nos advocat nisi aut nocens aut miser? Quod municipium in clientelam nostram venit, nisi quod aut vicinus populus aut domestica discordia agitat? Quam provinciam tuemur nisi spoliata vexatamque? Atqui melius fuisset non queri quam vindicari.*

¹⁰⁶⁵ Saxonhouse 1975, 66.

particularly as the *Dialogus* has already stressed the importance of examples from philosophy in the discussion on what made the republican oratory so successful.¹⁰⁶⁶ If he wanted to argue for a philosopher-king surely he would take his friend's advice on examples from philosophy. Just as Tacitus could praise the empire without praising the emperor, so Maternus can enjoy the stability of the principate without praising the princeps. Maternus does not put forward an alternative because that is not what the discussion on oratory requires; he only makes points relevant to the discussion. The criticisms he does make are made in relation to the topic; reasons why oratory still exists at all, in a period that should have ended all strife.

The *Historiae*

It is noted in the introductory chapter on civil wars that a common theme in civil war narratives is that of the *urbs capta*. In his 'sketch' of the theme, Paul makes use of only one passage from Tacitus, and this is from the *Annals*.¹⁰⁶⁷ However, like Plutarch, Appian, Cicero and Lucan¹⁰⁶⁸, Tacitus also makes extensive use of the image of Rome, and the whole of Italy, as a captive city in the *Historiae*. The presence of the image of Rome as an *urbs capta* is not surprising, as the extant sections of the *Historiae* include three examples of violent accessions to power. The first of these is Otho's small scale armed revolt, the second is Vitellius' victory in open battle, and the last is the attack on Rome by Vespasian's generals. The most interesting aspect of Tacitus' use of the *urbs capta* motif is the way he is able to use the image not only in the conventional manner for the attacks on Rome itself¹⁰⁶⁹, but also using specific events in smaller parts of the city to create an *urbs capta* in microcosm¹⁰⁷⁰, and also to extend the image in order to show all Italy as a captured city.¹⁰⁷¹

¹⁰⁶⁶ Tac. *Dial.* 31.5-7.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Paul 1982, 151; Tac. *Ann.* 4.32.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Plut. *Marius* 44; *Sulla* 31; App. *B Civ.* 71; Cic. *Cat.* 3.24; Lucan, 5.25.

¹⁰⁶⁹ The Praetorians who revolted in order to crown Otho rushed to kill an old emperor as if they were invading Persia (Tac. *Hist.* 1.40). Vitellius approached Rome wearing a military cloak but was convinced to change to a toga, so as not to treat Rome as an *urbs capta* (*ibid* 2.89). However, the next day he still addressed the senate and people as if they were a foreign enemy (*ibid* 2.90). Antonius attempted to persuade his troops not to treat Rome like a captured city (*ibid* 3.82), but the next day his troops committed slaughter in the streets, forum and temples (*ibid* 4.1).

¹⁰⁷⁰ For example, the siege on the Capitoline in which the troops of Vitellius captured Flavius Sabinus, the brother of Vespasian. This description of the siege shares many of the features of the *urbs capta* motif. Not only are large parts of the Capitoline consumed by fire (*ibid* 3.71), a common aspect of the *urbs capta* motif (Paul 82, 144-8), but temples are destroyed (Tac. *Hist.* 3.72). Further, the presence of women at the battle (*ibid* 3.69) and description of many of the defenders as unarmed (*ibid* 3.73) increases the sense that this is not a battle but an attack on a city populace. Once again the

As well as the *urbs capta* there is another civil war theme present in the *Historiae* – the killing of kinsmen. In the literary tradition of civil war, the killing of a close relation is seen as a reversal of natural order. The first such incident in the *Historiae* does not emphasise this reversal of nature but rather has the accidental parricide, the Spaniard conscript, Mansuetus, bury his father on the field of battle after realising his crime.¹⁰⁷² Mansuetus and his dying father both recognise the cruelty of a war that causes such crimes and the son cries that the crime was down to the state not his own role in the war. However, despite the denouncing of this crime by the nearby soldiers, Tacitus states that they did not slow their killing and robbing of kinsmen and brothers (*nec eo segnius propinquos adfinis fratres trucidant spoliant*). The second such incident is even more lamented by Tacitus, for not only did a soldier kill his own brother, but he also tried to claim a reward for doing so.¹⁰⁷³ We are told that the nature of civil war meant that the man could not be punished and the best that the generals could do was to avoid paying the reward. Whereas in the republican civil wars a Sullan soldier committed suicide on realising that he had killed his brother. Therefore, not only are civil wars an environment where the natural order can be overturned and brother can kill brother, or son kill father, but even the moral qualities of soldiers in civil wars have deteriorated since the republican civil wars. While a republican soldier in civil war would commit these crimes, he would never revel in them as the imperial soldier does, and would recognise the gravity of his actions. This chronological comparison is also matched in book 4 by cultural comparison between Roman and German. While the Romans are occupied with civil wars and violent disputes, the Germans, in contrast, are involved in negotiation and compromise.¹⁰⁷⁴ This contrast is made all the more stark because Tacitus allows for the Germans to recognise the injustice of the very

worst crimes are saved until after the battle is concluded, when Vitellius is unable to control his troops and, as a result, Sabinus is cut down in front and his mutilated body dragged towards the forum (*ibid* 3.74). The second of these *urbs capta* in microcosm is the attack by the Flavian troops on the Praetorian camp (*ibid* 3.84). In this chapter the camp is described as the soldiers' "country and household" (*illam patriam, illos penatis*) and the aggressors used weapons and tactics more commonly associated with the taking of a foreign city than with the slaughter of Roman troops. There is also the common atrocity of pollution of religious ground. The Praetorians know their resistance will cause the Flavian troops "to defile the houses and altars with blood" (*domos arasque cruore foedare*). Furthermore, it is not until the last Praetorian is killed that Tacitus declares the city taken: "On the capture of the city Vitellius was carried on a chair through the rear of the palace to his wife's house on the Aventine" (*Vitellius capta urbe per aversam Palatii partem Aventinum in domum uxoris sellula defertur*). Therefore, in ten chapters and a few days, we have moved from the image of the Capitoline, a captured city within a city, to the Praetorian camp as a captured city within a captured city.

¹⁰⁷¹ *ibid* 1.11, 2.12, 2.56, 2.73, 2.87, 3.15, 3.27, 3.28, 3.33, 3.49, 3.53, 3.82-4.1.

¹⁰⁷² *ibid* 3.25.

¹⁰⁷³ *ibid* 3.51.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *ibid* 4.65; Wellesley & Ash 2009, 303.

crimes the Romans are calling for rewards for: “nor can we think that you are so unjust as to wish us to kill our own parents, brothers, and children” (*nec vos adeo iniquos existimamus ut interfici a nobis parentes fratres liberos nostros velitis*).¹⁰⁷⁵ Whilst it is an extreme case when a Roman does not recognise the repulsive nature of his own crime¹⁰⁷⁶, the majority either cannot punish these acts¹⁰⁷⁷ or still partake in them.¹⁰⁷⁸

Tacitus’ use of *concordia* shows no change from that of his earlier works, or the works of Sallust and Velleius Paterculus. For example, he uses variations on *concordia* and *discordia* thirty-eight times to describe the condition of a state.¹⁰⁷⁹ It is used on ten occasions for personal relationships of particular agreement or disunity¹⁰⁸⁰, twice for disagreement within the Senate¹⁰⁸¹, once in reference to the temple of Concord¹⁰⁸² and it is also used seventeen times for relationships between a legion or army.¹⁰⁸³ None of these seem to use *dis/con-cordia* in any way other than for the sort of internal relationships we have already seen. There are instances where it refers to two groups from different nations. For example, in book 2 there is said to be *discordia* between the Batavian auxiliaries and the Legionaries, however, as the two were joined in the same army, this is still a dispute internalised in one group.¹⁰⁸⁴ Although the way that *concordia* is used is not of any great significance, the number of times it is used and the ratio of *discordia* to *concordia* is perhaps more interesting. As noted elsewhere, Sallust’s concern with *concordia* has often been commented on, but the *Historiae* of Tacitus uses variations on the term sixty-seven times compared to only twenty times in the *Bella* and *Historiae* of Sallust. Even given that Tacitus *Historiae* is roughly 1.44 times as long as the *Bella* and *Historiae* of Sallust combined, this is still an impressive total.¹⁰⁸⁵ This is even starker if only the uses of *discordia* are considered, as Tacitus’s *Historiae* have fifty-three to only nine in Sallust. However, this should not be surprising, as Syme notes that “the theme of the *Historiae* of

¹⁰⁷⁵ Tac. *Hist.* 4.65.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Tac. *Hist.* 3.51.

¹⁰⁷⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁸ *ibid* 3.25.

¹⁰⁷⁹ *ibid* 1.2, 1.11, 1.29, 1.53, 1.56, 1.59, 1.62, 1.65, 1.74, 1.83, 2.6, 2.8, 2.10, 2.20, 2.23, 2.32, 2.37, 2.38, 2.75, 2.76, 3.5, 3.7, 3.45, 3.48, 3.53, 3.57, 3.70, 3.80, 4.1, 4.3, 4.18, 4.50, 4.55, 4.73, 4.80, 5.12 and twice at 1.51.

¹⁰⁸⁰ *ibid* 1.13, 2.5, 2.92, 3.36, 4.41, 4.48, 4.52 and twice at 1.60.

¹⁰⁸¹ *ibid* 4.11, 4.43.

¹⁰⁸² *ibid* 3.68.

¹⁰⁸³ *ibid* 1.46, 1.54, 1.84, 2.7, 2.66, 2.86, 2.88, 2.99, 3.10, 3.12, 3.15, 3.53, 3.79, 4.26, 4.37, 4.69, 4.72,

¹⁰⁸⁴ *ibid* 2.66, *cf* 2.88 where although the auxiliaries and legions are in discord they unite against the locals.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Sallust’s works are 36,546 words long (21,556 for *Iug.*, 10,804 for *Cat.* and 4,186 for the fragments of the *Historiae*), while Tacitus’ *Historiae* is 52,558 words in length.

Tacitus is the murderous story of civil war and despotism".¹⁰⁸⁶ So the specifically internal meaning of *discordia* is perfect for the theme of civil conflict, and its repeated use to describe the state emphasises the self inflicted nature of the problems at hand.

In the *Historiae* the extent to which variations on *concordia* were used to indicate a state of military mutiny is also of interest. The causes of this discord, however, can be very distinct. Otho's troops are said to be on the brink of mutiny due to poverty and ill-discipline¹⁰⁸⁷ as are Vocula's army whose mutinous feelings are accelerated by their lack of pay and grain.¹⁰⁸⁸ Despite the description of Otho's troops at 1.46 as being on the verge of mutiny due to poverty, in the summary offered at 2.7 of the causes of the Emperor's death, Otho dies due to the mutiny (*discordia*), sloth (*ignavia*) and luxury (*luxuria*) of his troops.¹⁰⁸⁹ Vitellius' army was equally affected by the luxury the soldiers experienced once their general became emperor. The army that had entered Rome could face heat, dust, storms and toil, but that which leaves is no longer ready for hardships and is more ready for *discordia*.¹⁰⁹⁰ Therefore it can be neither poverty nor wealth that are themselves the cause of *discordia*, instead it must be the collapse in discipline to which both these circumstances lead.¹⁰⁹¹

This lack of discipline leading to *discordia* within an army is also commented on several times in relation to the damage it has on the effectiveness of an army. When Otho wants to calm the dissent in the ranks, he reminds them that the enemy would want to find them in a state of *discordia*.¹⁰⁹² Antonius Primus makes an almost identical plea when he stops a mutiny by openly praying to "the standards and the gods of war (*signa et bellorum deos*) that madness and *discordia* would rather inflict the enemy's forces.¹⁰⁹³ When Antonius' prayers were answered, he hastened his attack, wanting to strike while the enemy was weak.¹⁰⁹⁴ So ill-discipline not only increases the chances of *discordia* within an army, but this discord in turn improves the chances of enemy success.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Syme 1957, 167.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 1.46.

¹⁰⁸⁸ *ibid* 4.26.

¹⁰⁸⁹ *ibid* 2.7.

¹⁰⁹⁰ *ibid* 2.99.

¹⁰⁹¹ *ibid* 1.46.

¹⁰⁹² *ibid* 1.84.

¹⁰⁹³ *ibid* 3.10.

¹⁰⁹⁴ *ibid* 3.15.

There is one particularly interesting passage in the *Historiae*, which clearly highlights several different usages for *con/dis-cord*: the reconciliation of Vespasian and Mucianus at 2.5. Here we see two generals who begin in a state of personal discord¹⁰⁹⁵ who are united in concord by Titus, who acts as a go-between.¹⁰⁹⁶ This concord then allows them to succeed in the discord of civil war, after which Vespasian will go on to create a new concord at Rome.¹⁰⁹⁷

Given Tacitus' insistence on using *quietus* rather than *pax* in the sections of the *Dialogus* that praises the stability of empire¹⁰⁹⁸, it is surprising how often *pax* is used in this way in the *Historiae*. In total *pax* is used to indicate stability 59 times¹⁰⁹⁹ compared to the use of *quietus* for this purpose only six times¹¹⁰⁰, further highlighting Tacitus' choice to use *quietus* not *pax* in the *Dialogus*. Therefore, the *Historiae* unsurprisingly shares more in common with the negative presentation of *pax* seen in the *Agricola* and *Germania*. For example, when Cerialis addresses the Treviri and Lingones he reminds them that they must bear the cost of *pax*¹¹⁰¹, while Civilis tells the Gauls that this *pax* is nothing more than servitude.¹¹⁰² Whereas the monographs focused on the negative impact of *pax* on the inhabitants of the provinces, in the *Historiae* even peace in Rome can have a negative and violent element. In the prologue to book 1 Tacitus says that "The work I am embarking on is that of a period rich in disasters, terrible with battles, torn by civil struggles, horrible even in peace" (*Opus adgredior opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace saevum*)¹¹⁰³ and after Galba's death, talk turns to civil wars not the "recent horrors of cruel peace" (*recentia saevae pacis exempla*).¹¹⁰⁴

Most interesting in Tacitus' use of *pax* in the *Historiae* is the way that he plays with the concept of peace. We have already seen examples of this in the negative and violent effects of *pax* on the provincials and in Rome, but just as peace can be as violent as war,

¹⁰⁹⁵ *ibid* 2.5.2.

¹⁰⁹⁶ *ibid* 2.5.3.

¹⁰⁹⁷ *ibid* 4.80.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Tac. *Dial.* 36.2, 37.6, 38.2, 40.1, 41.5.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 1.18, 1.50, 1.51, 1.54, 1.56, 1.62, 1.63, 1.67, 1.75, 1.77, 1.84, 1.86, 1.89, 2.4, 2.6, 2.12, 2.17, 2.20, 2.67, 2.77, 2.82, 2.84, 2.86, 2.101, 3.19, 3.31, 3.46, 3.68, 3.70, 3.71, 3.75, 3.81, 4.15, 4.17, 4.26, 4.35, 4.49, 4.51, 4.52, 4.67, 4.69, 4.71, 5.10, 5.12 and twice at 1.88, 2.37, 4.1, 4.22, 4.74, 5.16.

¹¹⁰⁰ *ibid* 1.15, 1.85, 1.88, 1.90, 2.37, 4.1.

¹¹⁰¹ *ibid* 4.74.

¹¹⁰² *ibid* 4.17.

¹¹⁰³ *ibid* 1.2.

¹¹⁰⁴ *ibid* 1.50.

the boundaries between war and peace can also be blurred in other ways. For example, after the massacre at Divodurum had taken the Gauls by surprise, they came to meet the advancing army with pleas and prostrations “all else that might appease an enemy's fury was offered, though there was no war, to secure peace” (*quaeque alia placamenta hostilis irae, non quidem in bello sed pro pace tendebantur*).¹¹⁰⁵ When Otho's army marched through Italy, the Italians were met with much the same aggression as when the owners of estates went to meet the army *securitate pacis et belli malo circumveniebantur* (in the security of peace, [they] were overwhelmed by war)¹¹⁰⁶ and we are told at the death of Vitellius that it was the end of war not the beginning of peace (*interfecto Vitellio bellum magis desierat quam pax coeperat*).¹¹⁰⁷ This last example is repeated in the many images of the *urbs capta* we have seen earlier, where the worst of the violence is saved for after the war is over, rather than carried out for its success. So Tacitus blurs the lines between war and peace by allowing for the brutality to continue into *pax* and also for Gauls to act as if they were at war in a time of peace and for Italians to be greeted by war when they expect a peaceful welcome.

The *Annals*

Tacitus' use of *concordia* and *discordia* in the *Annals* show the same tendencies as in the *Historiae*. For example, the uses of *discordia* heavily outweigh those of *concordia*: by fifty-one¹¹⁰⁸ to thirteen.¹¹⁰⁹ Further, Tacitus often uses *concordia* in relation to personal relationships, between politically powerful individuals¹¹¹⁰, or even husband and wife¹¹¹¹ or mother and child.¹¹¹² Further, the same relationship can still be seen between the loss of discipline within an army and the increase in *discordia*. For example, at the death of Augustus, Junius Blaesus allows his troops to cease their usual duties to allow time for the proper mourning and festivals. “The ranks grew insubordinate and quarrelsome – gave a

¹¹⁰⁵ *ibid* 1.63.

¹¹⁰⁶ *ibid* 2.12.

¹¹⁰⁷ *ibid* 4.1.

¹¹⁰⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 1.1.1, 1.9.4, 1.16.2, 1.27.1, 1.34.4, 1.38.1, 1.50.1, 1.54.2, 1.55.3, 1.72.4, 2.26.3, 2.39.1, 2.43.5, 2.56.1, 2.58.1, 2.62.1, 2.76.2, 3.28.1, 3.38.3, 3.40.3, 3.42.3, 3.48.2, 4.17.3, 4.32.1, 4.40.3, 4.50.1, 5.11.1, 6.3.2, 6.4.3, 6.16.1, 11.6.1, 11.8.1, 11.16.2, 11.17.2, 12.1.2, 12.28.2, 12.29.1, 12.32.1, 12.41.3, 12.44.5, 12.54.2, 12.4.1, 13.9.3, 13.17.1, 13.25.4, 14.16.2, 14.38.3, 15.2.4, 15.27.2, 16.7.2, 16.22.2.

¹¹⁰⁹ *ibid* 1.55.3, 2.32.2, 2.43.6, 2.64.3, 3.27.1, 3.33.1, 3.64.1, 4.4.1, 6.42.2, 11.37.3, 13.2.1, 13.48.1, 14.39.1.

¹¹¹⁰ *ibid* 2.43.6, 2.64.3, 13.2.1, 14.39.1.

¹¹¹¹ *ibid* 1.55.3, 3.33.1.

¹¹¹² *ibid* 3.64.1, 11.37.3.

hearing to any glib agitator – became eager, in short, for luxury and ease, disdainful of discipline and work” (*eo principio lascivire miles, discordare, pessimi cuiusque sermonibus praeberere auris, denique luxum et otium cupere, disciplinam et laborem aspernari*).¹¹¹³ This is a particularly clear example of Tacitus’ connection of a loss of discipline and *discordia*. The general has no intention to rouse his troops to rebel; he is not relaxing their duties because of any pressure from weary soldiers, or any personal shortcoming. Rather, the pause occurs for the mourning of Augustus and the celebration of his successor. There is no force acting on this army pushing it to revolt except inertia itself.

In the opening chapter of the *Annals* Tacitus also makes explicit what has been implicit in the horrors of the *urbs capta* and the inversions of the civil wars. He explains that Augustus was able to establish his rule only “when all were wearied by civil discords” (*cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa*).¹¹¹⁴ An idea that is repeated more fully when he says:

“Then came Pompey’s third consulate. But this chosen reformer of society, operating with remedies more disastrous than the abuses, this maker and breaker of his own enactments, lost by the sword what he was holding by the sword. There followed twenty crowded years of discord, during which law and custom ceased to exist: villainy was immune, decency not rarely a sentence of death. At last, in his sixth consulate, Augustus Caesar, feeling his power secure, cancelled the behests of his triumvirate, and presented us with the laws to serve out needs in peace and under a *princeps*.”¹¹¹⁵

Tum Cn. Pompeius, tertium consul corrigendis moribus delectus et gravior remediis quam delicta erant suarumque legum auctor idem ac subversor, quae armis tuebatur armis amisit. exim continua per viginti annos discordia, non mos, non ius; deterrima quaeque impune ac multa honesta exitio fuere. sexto demum consulatu Caesar Augustus, potentiae securus, quae triumviratu iusserat abolevit deditque iura quis pace et principe uteremur.

Tacitus’ assertion heavily connects the periods of discord with Augustus’ establishment of the principate. However, the movement from discord to peace is not lauded. Instead Tacitus immediately connects the *pax* of the principate with servility: “Thenceforward the fetters were tighter” (*acriora ex eo vincla*),¹¹¹⁶ which instantly undermines the benefits of concord implied in the claim that Augustus provided laws fit for this new period of peace. This connection between servility and *pax* are seen elsewhere in the *Annals*. For example, Tacitus says that “Nobody had any present worries, so long as Augustus retained his physical powers, could maintain his own position, that of his house, and the peace” (*nulla*

¹¹¹³ *ibid* 1.16.2.

¹¹¹⁴ *ibid* 1.1.1.

¹¹¹⁵ *ibid* 3.28.1-2.

¹¹¹⁶ *ibid* 2.28.3.

in praesens formidine, dum Augustus aetate validus seque et domum in pacem sustentavit) but that this meant “equality is lost and all follow the princeps’ commands” (*omnes exuta aequalitate iussa principis aspectare*).¹¹¹⁷ This comparison brings to mind a passage of the *Agricola* where the Britons willingly accept aspects of the Roman peace, which are a disguised element of their slavery.¹¹¹⁸ Thus, Tacitus presents both the Senate and a barbarian race as shackled by peace.

The similarity between the servility of Rome and Britain is further seen in the rebellion of Caratacus; the tyrannies pollute the oppressed, long servility cause the loss of noble spirit, which causes government to deteriorate, if opposition is attempted it is crushed and if there is no opposition the exploitation worsens.¹¹¹⁹ Moreover, this slavery is again connected with *pax* as once Caratacus was “joined by all who feared peace with [Rome], he resolved on a final struggle” (*additisque qui pacem nostram metuebant, novissimum casum experitur*).¹¹²⁰ Laruccia notes that a rebelling army can also be subdued if they are made accustomed with *pax*. However, this is not merely peace, but a peace that is clearly associated with the servility at Rome.¹¹²¹ Tacitus tells us: “ample provisions had been made for the servitude of Rome: It was time to administer some sedative to the passions of the soldiers, so that they might wish peace” (*satis prospectum urbanae servituti: militaribus animis adhibenda fomenta ut ferre pacem velint*).¹¹²²

Laruccia also highlights the connections between peace and fear in Tacitus.¹¹²³ We have already seen that Sallust believed the fear of an external enemy helped maintain peace at Rome¹¹²⁴, an idea that was also followed by Velleius.¹¹²⁵ Also, we have seen that Livy noted *metus hostilis* as something helpful to internal peace and he added to that the idea of *metus deorum*.¹¹²⁶ Tacitus elaborates still further on the connection between peace and fear. Added to the this list of ‘the enemy’ and ‘the gods’ are the emperor’s own fears of losing his dominance: the “tyrant is especially fearful of men who may be capable of

¹¹¹⁷ *ibid* 1.4.1; Wirszubski 1950, 164 suggests that the blame for this acceptance of slavery falls equally on the subjects as on the emperor.

¹¹¹⁸ Tac. *Agr.* 21. “The simple natives gave the name of culture to this factor of their slavery” (*idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset*).

¹¹¹⁹ Walker 1952, 228.

¹¹²⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 12.33.1.

¹¹²¹ Laruccia 1975, 113.

¹¹²² Tac. *Ann.* 1.46.1.

¹¹²³ Laruccia 1975, 114-5 *cf* Syme 1958, 529.

¹¹²⁴ Sall. *Cat.* 10-11; *Iug.*, 41; *Hist. fr.* 12, 13 & 14.

¹¹²⁵ Vell. *Pat.* 2.1.1.

¹¹²⁶ Levene 1997, 129; Ogilvie 1965, 94-5; Livy 1.19.4.

leading a rebellion, and so he is slow to entrust armies to men of ability and displeased by any military success except his own.”¹¹²⁷ Augustus advised the restriction of the empire “due to fear or jealousy” (*incertum metu an per invidiam*)¹¹²⁸, Corbulo’s military successes are a threat to peace because they provoke the jealousy of Claudius¹¹²⁹ and by 55AD generals expect more praise from peace than from conquest because the triumphal honours have been diluted.¹¹³⁰

Turning to *concordia*, Tacitus particularly admires of two examples of *concordia* between two powerful individuals. The first of these is the relationship between the brothers Germanicus and Drusus; we are told that “the brothers maintained a singular unanimity, unshaken by the contentions of their kith and kin” (*fratres egregie concordēs et proximorum certaminibus inconcussi*).¹¹³¹ This is in stark contrast to the reaction to Nero after the murder of Britannicus; “which many were even to forgive when they remembered the ancient discord between brothers and the throne not to be bound in friendship” (*cui plerique etiam hominum ignoscebant, antiquas fratrum discordias et insociabile regnum aestimantes*).¹¹³² However, Tacitus has already told his reader that shared rule was not impossible; firstly with the brotherly example of Drusus and Germanicus, and again with Seneca and Burrus, “These two men guided the emperor’s youth, in concord, a rare occurrence when power is shared” (*hi rectores imperatoriae iuventae et, rarum in societate potentiae, concordēs*).¹¹³³ Although this harmony is rare it is not impossible, so the logic of those who excused Nero is shown to be patently false.¹¹³⁴

Turning to *pax*, Syme notes that *longa pax* is used in Tacitus to allude to negative impact of imperial peace.¹¹³⁵ Laruccia, however, correctly observes that of the seven uses of *longa pax* in Tacitus not all are detrimental.¹¹³⁶ Of those, two observe that long peace has allowed for small towns to prosper, towns that are subsequently destroyed by civil war; therefore the *longa pax* appears even more beneficial when contrasted with the

¹¹²⁷ Walker 1952, 207

¹¹²⁸ Tac. Ann. 1.11.4.

¹¹²⁹ *ibid* 11.19.3.

¹¹³⁰ *ibid* 13.53.1; Laruccia 1975, 115.

¹¹³¹ Tac. Ann. 2.43.6.

¹¹³² *ibid* 13.17.1 (my translation).

¹¹³³ *ibid* 13.2.1 (my translation), cf 4.4.1.

¹¹³⁴ Laruccia 1975, 138.

¹¹³⁵ Syme 1958, 218; Kajanto 1970, 701 “*longa pax* was in general a deprecatory term in Tacitus”.

¹¹³⁶ Laruccia 1975, 141, states that only four are detrimental, however, as we shall see not even four can be said to certainly show that *longa pax* is damaging.

destruction that follows.¹¹³⁷ Another positive aspect of *longa pax* is that Agricola knows which British troops are loyal to Rome because of their actions during the long peace.¹¹³⁸ At *Historiae* 5.16.3 there is a very neutral use of *longa pax*. We are told that “A joyful shout arose from all, some after their long peace were eager for battle, others weary of war desired peace; all hoped for rewards and rest thereafter” (*Alacrior omnium clamor, quis vel ex longa pace proelii cupido vel fessis bello pacis amor, praemiaque et quies in posterum sperabatur*).¹¹³⁹ Therefore there are only three examples of Tacitus using *longa pax* in a negative way; in the *Germania* when he says that German tribes can become dulled (*torpeo*) by inaction¹¹⁴⁰, in the *Historiae* when the Senate and equites have become indolent and weak due to the long peace so cannot defend Rome from the coming attacks¹¹⁴¹ and finally the lack of discipline in the camp caused by *longa pax*.¹¹⁴² However, it should be noted that although these examples do problems with sustained peace, that does not mean that *longa pax* is a detrimental force in and of itself. For example, in Livy’s account of Numa we have seen a successful, although legendary, attempt to control discipline through a long peace. Further, in this last example from Tacitus it is clear that the peace is not the problem, but the ill discipline that is permitted to develop as a result. Once these troops are under the control of Corbulo he is able to return the troops to discipline while still at peace.¹¹⁴³

The destructive nature of peace in some of the passages discussed above has caused a number of scholars to conclude that Tacitus must therefore be an expansionist, who regrets the time Rome spent away from war (a conclusion this study also made when examining the monographs in isolation).¹¹⁴⁴ There is further evidence for this also, most tellingly at *Historiae* 3.46:

“The Dacians also, never trustworthy, became uneasy and now had no fear, for our army had been withdrawn from Moesia. They watched the first events without stirring; but when they heard that Italy was aflame with war and that the whole empire was divided into hostile camps, they stormed the winter quarters of our auxiliary foot and horse... They were already preparing to destroy the camps of the legions and would have succeeded in their purpose if Mucianus had not placed the Sixth legion across their path. He took this step

¹¹³⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 1.67.2, 4.22.1.

¹¹³⁸ Tac. *Agr.* 29.2.

¹¹³⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 5.16.3 (adapted from Moore, 2006).

¹¹⁴⁰ Tac. *Germ.* 14.2.

¹¹⁴¹ Tac. *Hist.* 1.88.2.

¹¹⁴² Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.1.

¹¹⁴³ *ibid* 13.35.3-36.1.

¹¹⁴⁴ Kajanto 1970, 718; Parks, 1969 17-20; Mehl 2011, 142.

because he had learned of the victory at Cremona, and he also feared that two hordes of foreigners might come down upon the empire... Fronteius Agrippa was transferred from Asia, where as proconsul, he had governed the province for a year, and put in charge of Moesia; there he was given additional troops from the army of Vitellius, which it was wise from the point of view of both policy and peace to distribute in the provinces and to involve in war a foreign foe."

mota et Dacorum gens numquam fida, tunc sine metu, abducto e Moesia exercitu. sed prima rerum quieti speculabantur: ubi flagrare Italiam bello, cuncta in vicem hostilia accepere, expugnatis cohortium alarumque hibernis... iamque castra legionum excindere parabant, ni Mucianus sextam legionem opposuisset, Cremonensis victoriae gnarus, ac ne externa moles utrimque ingrueret... Fonteius Agrippa ex Asia (pro consule eam provinciam annuo imperio tenuerat) Moesiae praepositus est, additis copiis e Vitelliano exercitu, quem spargi per provincias et externo bello inligari pars consilii pacisque erat.

This brief event shows many of the elements of Tacitus' attitudes to war and peace already discussed, and adds one more to the list. Firstly the Dacians consider hostilities when fear was removed by the withdrawal of Rome's army (fear causing peace), then they act on this idea when they hear of the civil conflict in Italy (*discordia* aiding an enemy') and Mucianus returns troops when he hears news of the victory at Cremona (as the civil conflict is ending, it empowers Rome in foreign wars). Next comes a new idea; Tacitus says that redistributing Vitellius' troops in the east is good for peace as it involves them in a foreign war. Although parts of this are familiar, foreign wars helping domestic peace and fear of foreign enemy, parts are also new. This is said to be 'policy' and demonstrates a Roman army being deliberately scattered in the provinces in order to maintain concord.

This passage, it seems, supports Mehl's claim that "Tacitus represented himself as an expansionist in terms of foreign policy, which accorded well with Rome's elite senatorial tradition, and for this reason did not assign great value to peace, because peace levelled what was unequal."¹¹⁴⁵ However, we have already seen that Tacitus' view is not so one sided. Syme notes that there are passages of the "*Annals* that convey the argument for diplomacy instead of war and battle beyond the Rhine and Euphrates."¹¹⁴⁶ This is plainly seen in the letter of Tiberius to Germanicus; he provides a compelling argument for Germanicus' return, all of which find support in Tacitus' own narrative.¹¹⁴⁷ They have suffered great losses, both in the field and by natural cause, and if left to their own devices the German tribes may turn to discord, leaving own presence unnecessary and the Cherusci

¹¹⁴⁵ Mehl 2011, 142.

¹¹⁴⁶ Syme 1958, 496.

¹¹⁴⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 2.26.

and Suebi do indeed turn to discord once the Roman's have left.¹¹⁴⁸ Further, in this passage and again at 2.64.1 we can see Tiberius' joy and pride at establishing peace through wisdom not force "with no disparaging comment".¹¹⁴⁹ The Parthians are even convinced to withdraw from Armenia by Tiberius without the need for battles.¹¹⁵⁰

Historians and Peace – Conclusion

The vast majority of modern scholars have emphasised the military and aggressive nature of Roman peace. According to Woolf, Roman peace is "simply a component of wider patterns of violence, a concomitant of other structures of domination."¹¹⁵¹ Syme notes that "The word *pax* can seldom be divorced from the notion of conquest...It was Rome's imperial destiny to compel the nations to live in peace."¹¹⁵² Mellor, too, notes that "The Roman Peace is an imposed peace. Peace is not the goal; it is merely the by-product of subjugation".¹¹⁵³ Linderski states that, "Republican Latin is rich in words pertaining to war, poor in praise of peace. Its equivalent of peaceful is *pacatus*, subdued. In Rome even peace was aggressive."¹¹⁵⁴ Barton not only agrees that peace was an aggressive force in Roman history but claims that, "Peace and prosperity led directly to civil strife and the destruction of the social contract."¹¹⁵⁵ Further, individual Latin historians are believed to be equally suspicious of peace. Kapust asserts, that, in Sallust "peace becomes a problem not a blessing, because of conflict and sedition"¹¹⁵⁶ and Mehl states that "[Tacitus] did not assign great value to peace, because peace levelled what was unequal."¹¹⁵⁷

However, this study of Latin historiography has found that the situation is not as one-sided as these quotes suggest. Sallust rejected a political and military career because of the violence inherent in such an office¹¹⁵⁸, he viewed his own undertaking to write history as a peaceful task¹¹⁵⁹, he can encourage others to endure wrongs rather than react violently¹¹⁶⁰,

¹¹⁴⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 2.44.2.

¹¹⁴⁹ Laruccia 1975, 145.

¹¹⁵⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 6.36.

¹¹⁵¹ Woolf 1993, 171.

¹¹⁵² Syme 1939, 304.

¹¹⁵³ Mellor 1993, 105.

¹¹⁵⁴ Linderski 1984, 152.

¹¹⁵⁵ Barton 2007, 246.

¹¹⁵⁶ Kapust 2011, 42.

¹¹⁵⁷ Mehl 2011, 142.

¹¹⁵⁸ Sall. *Cat.* 1-2; *Iug.*, 1-3.

¹¹⁵⁹ Sall. *Cat.* 3.1

¹¹⁶⁰ Sall. *Iug.*, 42.3.

he associated advancing age and wisdom with a growing distaste for war¹¹⁶¹ and states that wars are caused by a defect in human nature.¹¹⁶² In his retelling of the founding of the city he emphasises the importance of *concordia*, while downplaying the importance of Rome's military strength, while recalling the equality of the peace of early Rome¹¹⁶³ and describing a golden age free from war. Furthermore, he praises the art of peace¹¹⁶⁴ and encourages respect for *pacatus* territory.¹¹⁶⁵

Equally, in Livy, Aeneas' promotion of peace with the Greeks is the reason he is permitted to escape the sacking of the city.¹¹⁶⁶ Once Aeneas arrives in Italy Livy, favours the tradition that minimises the violence of this myth.¹¹⁶⁷ Livy's account of the Rape of the Sabines also emphasises the role of concord more than any other account.¹¹⁶⁸ Even the reign of Numa – always a peaceful period in Roman history – is altered to emphasise the importance of peace: Livy does not include the founding of the fetial priesthood with Numa's reign because this would imply the possibility of war.¹¹⁶⁹ Numa is able to maintain peace without any hint of military threats but only through respect from his neighbours¹¹⁷⁰ and views war itself as degrading.¹¹⁷¹ Moreover, Livy shows the normative state of the gods to be peaceful and benign¹¹⁷² and shows further evidence for the possibility that *pacatus* can have a non-military meaning.¹¹⁷³

Even the more militaristic historians can at times present a more positive peace. Caesar is frequently at pains to emphasise that he desired an equal peace during the civil war, even at the detriment to his military preparation.¹¹⁷⁴ Tacitus is not averse to peace in and of itself; rather, he shows that peace without virtue is often destructive. The Chauci are able to maintain peace and renown through discipline and just dealings¹¹⁷⁵, and if discipline is

¹¹⁶¹ Sall. *Hist. fr.* 2.67 McG = 2.87 M & 2,75McG = 2.92M.

¹¹⁶² Sall. *Cat.* 10-11; *Iug.*,41; *Hist. fr.* 1.12, 13 & 14McG = 1.12, 16, 13M.

¹¹⁶³ *Cat.* 9.3.

¹¹⁶⁴ *Iug.*,41.2.

¹¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*,32.3.

¹¹⁶⁶ Livy, 1.1.1

¹¹⁶⁷ Livy 1.1.8

¹¹⁶⁸ Livy 1.9-13.

¹¹⁶⁹ cf Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.72; Plut. *Numa* 12.

¹¹⁷⁰ Livy 1.21.2.

¹¹⁷¹ Livy 1.19.2.

¹¹⁷² Livy 5.20.3, 7.13.5, 8.5.3, 8.13.11, 24.38.2, 26.41.14, 28.25.7, 29.15.1, 31.31.20, 37.54.10, 39.9.4, 41.24.8, 45.23.1.

¹¹⁷³ Livy 1.19.2. / Livy 28.34./ Livy 8.14.10.

¹¹⁷⁴ Caes. *BCiv.* 1.26.5.

¹¹⁷⁵ Tac. *Germ.* 35.1-2.

maintained in a Roman army then they too will not disturb the peace.¹¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, Tacitus is not wholly expansionist in his outlook, as is often stated, but he allows Tiberius' joy and pride at his diplomatic successes to go unchallenged and seems to support the removal of troops from Germany.¹¹⁷⁷ Remarkably, Velleius Paterculus, the most militaristic of the Latin historians, ends his history with a prayer for the preservation of peace.¹¹⁷⁸ Despite the violence implied in elements of this prayer, it is still significant that it seems wholly genuine in this least cynical of historians.¹¹⁷⁹

However, it is not the intention of this study to suggest that the Latin historians were pacifistic or utopian in their presentation of peace, nor to claim, like Gibbon, that "the tranquil and prosperous state of the empire was warmly felt and honestly confessed by the provincials as well as Romans."¹¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, it is apparent that peace was not the enemy of the Latin historians, not one presents a militaristic narrative without at least some concession to the benefits of peace, even if these benefits are only for the residents of the empire.

Furthermore, it should not be surprising that war takes a prominent position over peace in Latin history. Rome was almost constantly at war¹¹⁸¹ and the surviving histories are often the histories of wars and sedition. Both of Sallust's extant works are monographs on wars, as are both of Caesar's. Tacitus' *Agricola*, although nominally a biography, is in essence a record of the conquest of Britain, far more time is used describing the events in Britain that occur before Agricola arrives, or that do not involve him, than on recounting his life before his posting there. The *Historiae*, as it survives, is a record of the civil wars following Nero's death. In the *Annals* Tacitus laments that his topic will not be as exciting as the histories of great wars and the killings of kings (*Ann.* 4.37), yet, despite his protests wars and killings are plentiful in his work, and his lamentation further highlights the connection between the Roman historical tradition and the recording of wars. It may have been difficult to include any exhortation to peace in a tradition so heavily committed to recording the great deeds of war, yet, to one degree or another, we have seen that this is indeed what each of the Latin historians does.

¹¹⁷⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.3-36.1.

¹¹⁷⁷ *ibid* 2.26, 2.64.1.

¹¹⁷⁸ Vell. Pat. 2.131.1-2.

¹¹⁷⁹ Gowing 2001, 411.

¹¹⁸⁰ Gibbon 1897, (*vol. 1*), 56.

¹¹⁸¹ Note the rarity of the closing of the gates of Janus. Plut. *Numa* 20; Augustus, *Res Gestae* 13; Suet. *Nero* 13.2; Stern, 2006 467-498.

Conclusion

This study has traced the attitudes towards peace of the major ancient philosophical schools and the prominent extant late republican and early imperial Latin historians. Despite the differences in aims, intentions and genre of these two groups the similarities of the conclusions reached in the work above show a consistent trend through this study. Not only do all the major schools studied show an increased acceptance of pacifistic arguments and a growing rejection of violent conflict throughout the period studied, but the work of each individual historian contains examples that illustrate different aspects of the importance of peace. However, despite these two aspects of philosophy and historiography having been considered separately there are significant areas of similarity in places.

For example, this study has noted that Dio Chrysostom praised those who rejected war as a means to gain glory, and although Seneca is happy to praise those who fought for the Republic, he also lauded those who rejected the gaining of *gloria* through military and political careers in his philosophical works and used this trait to emphasise the virtues of Thyestes in his tragedies. This theoretical praise of the quiet life is taken to a higher level by Sallust who boasted that he had rejected violent public life as part of his *apologia*. Further, just as Sallust's advancing age has given him the wisdom he needs to move away from the life of a general, the connection between aging, wisdom and longing for peace is also shown elsewhere in this study. Firstly in Sallust's own accounts of the Isaurian campaigns of Servilius, these include two examples of the elders of a town petitioning the war-hungry youths to put down their weapons, and secondly in Seneca's *Troades* where Agamemnon tells Pyrrhus that his desire for violent revenge is a youthful fault.

If the myths of the golden age are considered then, again, some similarities appear. Seneca's Hippolytus diverges from his Euripidean model and emphasises the peaceful aspects of his lifestyle shared with the golden age, while Maximus of Tyre's twenty fourth oration also follows the Hesiodic golden age as a period of peace, before the forging of weapons. Like these philosophical and literary authors, Sallust and Livy both emphasise the importance of *concordia* in an idealised golden age. However, unlike the more chronologically vague notion of the golden age in the other examples cited, the two

historians both place this peaceful age more firmly in the myths of the settling of Italy by the Trojan survivors. Also, just as the philosophers used the accusation of being a war-lover as an insult towards the other schools, Caesar repeatedly emphasises his own longing for peace in the civil wars while highlighting the Pompeians' desire for war. In addition to this Livy seems to share Lucretius' and Sextus Empiricus' belief in the peaceful nature of the gods.

However, this study has also shown that peace could be presented as a negative force in this period. Tacitus' and Aelius Aristides' works both contain reference to the deterioration of rhetoric in long periods of peace. While Tacitus, Caesar and Velleius all emphasised the one sided nature of peace with Rome in their works through their choice of verbs used with *pax*, which showed that the peace was made only when Rome decided and often only once the enemy had laid down their arms. Caesar, Velleius and Horace's *Epistles* all suggest that long periods of peace can cause a weakening of a population deemed detrimental to society, an idea which even Sallust, the most pacifistic historian, emphasises in the notion of the *metus hostilis*. However, counter arguments can also be found within the works of these authors; Maternus, in Tacitus' *Dialogue on Oratory*, seems to conclude that peace is ultimately worth the loss of eloquence, Livy and Sallust both allow for peace to be praised when won through treaty rather than aggression. Livy uses the example of Numa's reign to demonstrate that morality and discipline can be maintained in the *longa pax*, and Sallust's contrast of the period of peace in Numidia with the decline of Rome after 146BC suggests that an external enemy is not always necessary for concord.

Finally, there is one last point that must be addressed; this is the fact that just because these ideas have been found in the works of the historians and philosophers, it does not mean that they always represent the personal views of the authors. Whether this refers to the words of Thyestes in Seneca, Maternus in Tacitus, Adherbal in Sallust or in some cases even the first person philosophical treatises of Maximus of Tyre, whose readiness to present arguments both for and against proposals, shows that not all his written opinions were actually truly held. However, even though this is the case, for the purpose of this thesis it is significant enough that differing attitudes to peace have been found in such quantity. Moreover, peace is frequently used in a more nuanced way than previous scholarship has noted, as this scholarship often emphasised the aggressive nature of the language and policy of *pax*. Therefore, even if the examples presented in this thesis do not represent the beliefs of the authors studied, the pacifistic arguments they contain were

clearly a part of the literary, historiographical, philosophical and rhetorical traditions. The weight of examples examined here could even possibly suggest that peace would be a standard topic for rhetorical training. The similarities in the praises of the empire found in Pliny, Aulus Aristides and Velleius Paterculus could act as evidence of this, as could the similarities between the appeals to *concordia* in the Greek cities in both Dio Chrysostom and Aulus Aristides.

Further evidence of this could be the way that peace is often presented in the form of a debate. Dio's discourse on peace and war, as it survives, actually spends more time discussing the different ways that orators and philosophers approach the subject of peace, thereby creating a dichotomy of positions which would perhaps have been continued throughout the work. This is shown more clearly in Maximus of Tyre's pair of orations on the farmer and the soldier, which follow a traditional rhetorical pattern of claim and counter-claim. Finally, in his tragedies Seneca chooses the debate scenes to house the bulk of the contents pertaining to peace. Therefore, in each of these three authors the most sustained focus on peace is found in the form of debate.

The Roman Empire, like all empires, was built and sustained on the backs of the army, and written accounts of Rome's histories are a chronicle of wars. However, this study has shown that despite this, the thinkers of the period that witnessed the establishment and consolidation of an empire could be equally troubled by the brutality of their kinsmen and awed by the magnificence of their achievement. At a time when the ideas of *oikeiosis* and *cosmopolitanism* were spreading through the philosophical schools and Stoicism was becoming the dominant philosophy of the elite, it should perhaps be unsurprising that as the empire welcomed more people into its citizenship, her philosophers and historians should both question the value of war.

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