University of Kent

Negotiations with Peace Settlement Referendums:

Comparing the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Experiences

A Dissertation Submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

by

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December 2016

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Prof. Neophytos Loizides and Prof. Feargal Cochrane, for their encouragement and for allowing me to grow as a research scientist for the past four years. I truly appreciate your inspiration and guidance. I would also like to thank Prof. Thorsten Bonacker and all my incredibly supportive colleagues at the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of Marburg. Your support has been invaluable to me, especially in times of hardship. I also wish to thank the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Cyprus Centre and the Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice at Queen's University Belfast for allowing me to join their teams and granting me access to their research facilities. To all the colleagues and friends who read through the several versions of the chapters of this thesis, thank you for your insightful comments and encouragement, and a special thank you to my partner, Stephen.

Most of all, thank you to all the people in Cyprus and Northern Ireland who so kindly accepted my request for an interview back in 2014. It would have been impossible to write this thesis without your kind and generous contributions. I am, to this day, amazed at how kindly you all shared your experiences and opinions with me and at your willingness to help throughout the course of my research. I am very grateful.

Funding

The research presented in this thesis was funded by a Doctoral Scholarship from the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation from January 2015 onwards. During 2014 it was supported by a STIBET Program for Junior Researchers Scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The research undertaken in Cyprus in 2014 was funded by a fieldwork grant from the Press and Information Office (PIO) of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Cyprus.

To my grandmother, Herminia Rocha (1924-2016)

Abstract

This thesis investigates how peace negotiation processes influence peace settlement referendum outcomes. It addresses a re-occurring problem in peace processes of settlements being rejected by popular vote after strenuous political negotiations. For this purpose, it investigates and compares how the Annan Plan negotiations in Cyprus and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) negotiations in Northern Ireland culminated with the acceptance of the latter and the rejection of the former. In doing so, it effectively bridges an existing gap in academic research and literature. Research and theory on peace negotiations and mediation has traditionally focused on uncovering how the process helped the political leaders sitting at the negotiations table reduce military tensions, improve relationships, and come to different types of agreements. It had not yet considered referendum results as a crucial outcome of contemporary peace negotiation processes. Existing research on referendums, on the other hand, traditionally studies voting behaviours through public opinion polls and surveys, or the analysis of referendum campaigns, seldom considering how they are shaped by negotiation processes.

The comparative case study analysis of the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations and referendums presented in this thesis provides for unique comparative features and a novel research design. It aims, not only at understanding how the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations led to opposing overall referendum outcomes, but also how they shaped differences in support between and across the four communities. While the Annan Plan was rejected due to the low 23 percent Greek Cypriot 'yes' vote, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots actually voted for its ratification. The GFA was ratified with a similar difference in support between the local communities, the very high 96-97 per cent vote from the Nationalist community and the 51-53 per cent from the Unionist community. Bridging existing knowledge in peace negotiations and referendums literatures, this thesis compares how specific features of the negotiation process, namely, mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and the agreement's design, shaped the political parties' support for the agreement in the referendum, the organization and strength of the campaigns, and voter information and uncertainty. Its findings are based on an empirically rich analysis of interviews conducted in Cyprus and Northern Ireland during the first half of 2014, which included key political stakeholders and civil society actors. The thesis demonstrates that the secretive and exclusionist nature of the Annan Plan negotiations, and the comparatively less secretive and more inclusive GFA negotiation process, shaped the referendum campaign periods leading to the opposing outcomes of the two cases. It further shows that support for the peace settlement was higher in the communities where the mediated negotiations included more political parties and where civil society was, directly or informally, included in the negotiations.

The findings support existing claims that inclusive and participatory negotiation processes can foster support for the peace process, adding that they can deeply shape peace settlement referendum experiences and outcomes. It argues that referendums are unsuitable for traditional secretive and exclusive peace negotiation practices that fail to educate and engage the public. The contribution is novel in arguing that, as a tool of democratic politics, peace settlement referendums need to be preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad spectrum of political stakeholders and civil society and that, therefore, when referendums are used to seal a peace settlement, the entirety of its negotiation process needs to be adapted from the start.

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Peace treaties do not make peace; people make peace.

Harold H. Saunders

Introduction

Referendums have taken place in the context of peace negotiations throughout the world and for a variety of purposes. Since the year 2000 alone, referendums have taken place in peace processes in Somaliland, the Philippines, Cyprus, Iraq, South Sudan, and more recently in Colombia. Peace process referendums, or peacemaking referendums, have been held to determine the status of a territory, such as the independence, secessionist, or self-determination, referendums in East-Timor in 1999 or South Sudan in 2011. Others have been held to consult the people on specific aspects of the negotiation process, such as the apartheid referendum in South Africa in 1992, and are referred to as either *procedural,* or *mandate* referendums (Loizides 2014). Others, yet, have been used to ratify negotiated peace settlements, such as was the case in Northern Ireland in 1998, in Guatemala in 1999, in Mindanao (Philippines) in 2001, in Cyprus in 2004, in Iraq in 2005, and more recently in Colombia in 2016.

Peace settlement referendums, in particular, take place at a crucial juncture in a peace process. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA)[1] referendum put to vote a peace settlement painstakingly negotiated between a majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland. The victory of the 'yes' vote in May 1998 became a symbolic turning point in the transformation of the conflict that had lingered for decades between the Nationalist and Unionist communities. The 2004 Annan Plan referendum in Cyprus, on the other hand, represented a major setback in the decades-long peace negotiations between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The settlement aimed at allowing for the island to become a European Union (EU) member as a united country, but failed to receive the support of the Greek Cypriot community. Ten years onward, the island remains divided and negotiations on a new peace settlement are still ongoing. These two cases, compared in this study, show that referendum experiences can have opposing results that both have significant consequences for a peace process. Despite this, we still know little about how peace agreements, typically negotiated by political leaders, can be supported by the people in referendums.

[1] The Northern Ireland peace settlement is also referred to as Belfast Agreement. For simplicity, it is referred to as 'Good Friday Agreement' or 'GFA' throughout this thesis.

This thesis sets out to uncover how peace settlement referendums are shaped by the negotiation processes where, precisely, these settlements are produced and the decision to use a referendum to ratify them is taken. Its underlying aim is to uncover how peace negotiations can favour broad support for peace settlements and potentially avoid a failed referendum that hinders the peace process. Peace referendums can, in fact, serve peace negotiations in several ways. For example, by consulting popular opinion on the issues under negotiation, a referendum can provide greater legitimacy to the process. Peace settlement referendums in particular, can help ripen negotiations by functioning as a deadline and draw public[2] support for the implementation of an agreement (Loizides 2014; 2015; Haskell 2001). Furthermore, the referendum experience has the potential to reduce democratic deficits and encourage civic engagement in political life (Haskell 2001). However, referendums can also have a negative impact on peace processes. Divisive referendum campaign periods can further polarize already divided societies, exacerbate conflicts and even lead to an escalation of violence in conflict settings (Reilly 2003; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012). The South African experience in 1992 and the East Timorese in 1999 are two examples of referendums that were followed by violence upsurges.

Although referendums are increasingly used in peace processes, peace negotiation literature has only begun to study how peace referendums aid or hinder peace processes. With a few exceptions (Lordos 2009; Kaymak 2012; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 2014; Qvortrup 2014), little has yet been done within peace negotiation research and literature to understand how referendums can best serve these processes. Peace settlement referendums, in particular, can become a significant failure if the agreement reached by the representatives of the communities in conflict fails to gain acceptance by the communities they represent. However, traditionally, the success and failure of peace negotiations has been measured in terms of the outcomes produced by the bargaining process, which typically takes place between political elites and excludes the people.

This thesis begins by identifying this gap in academic research and literature between existing knowledge on peace negotiations and that on referendums. While existing academic literature on peace negotiations has not yet studied referendums as negotiation/mediation outcome, existing studies on referendums have not yet analysed how they are shaped by

[2] The 'public' refers to the ordinary citizens of the communities who do not participate directly in the negotiation process, although its process and outcomes concern them.

negotiations. Research and literature on peace negotiation and mediation originally only considered whether any other form of agreement (from a mere cease-fire to a full settlement) was reached as an indicator of success or failure in these processes (Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Bercovitch and Derouen 2004). This notion, however, has been challenged in two ways. First, especially in intractable conflicts, the ability of a negotiation process to manage a conflict by keeping conflict disputants at the negotiations table and away from battlefield, came to be recognized as a successful outcome (Andersen et al. 2001; Greig 2001). Secondly, in several peace processes around the world, settlements reached through mediated negotiations were never successfully implemented.

As peace agreements began to fall apart in Angola, Sri Lanka, and other peace processes, a concern for understanding what makes an agreement durable grew among researchers. By asking what makes for the successful peace settlement implementation, significant developments took place in research and theory around peace negotiations. Mediation literature, in particular, began to study how mediators could draft agreements that were both supported by political leaders and would provide for successful implementation and post-conflict stability (Haass 1991; Stedman 1991). Significant studies were conducted on the impact that certain provisions of peace agreements had on the success and failure of their implementation (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Pearson et al. 2006). This literature eventually became linked to the literature on consociationalism, which researches the long-term impact of the implementation of power-sharing forms of government in divided societies (for example, Lijphart 1977; Gates and Strøm 2007; Sisk 2008; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; McGarry and O'Leary 2009).

The enquiry into what makes a durable agreement gave depth to the field, which became more concerned with the impact of peace negotiations on the larger societal context in which it takes place. The most recent advances in the literature have been born out of the debate on peacemaking and peacebuilding practices. Long-term peace, peacebuilding scholars argued, is achieved by empowering and mobilizing local people to build new and constructive relationships. Thus, they criticised traditional peace negotiation practices for being elitist and producing agreements that failed to effectively address the needs of the local communities (Burton 1987; Lederach 1997; Kaldor 2000). In fact, recent research in the field has found that different forms of civil society and public participation in peace negotiations can aid and ripen negotiations as well as the development of durable

agreements (Irwin 2001; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006; Kaymak, Lordos, and Tocci 2008; Aljets, Chacko, and Jessop 2008; Nilsson 2012).

What research and literature on peace negotiations has not yet considered is that, in cases where referendums were required for ratification, peace agreements have been rejected by the people. The Annan Plan and, most recently, the referendum on the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are only two examples. Increasingly, peace negotiations can only be fully successful if the agreement negotiated between political elites is to be supported by the communities they represent. Therefore, whether or not an agreement is accepted in a referendum is a crucial negotiation outcome that has mostly been neglected by the field.

While studies on what shapes results in peacemaking referendums are still scarce, the literature on referendums is considerably wide. A significant volume of research has been done on European integration referendums. These studies tell us that referendum results are influenced by whether or not voters follow a political leader's or party's public position on the issues at stake in the referendum, or by the way they frame those issues in their referendum campaigns (Pierce, Valen, Henry, and Listhaug 1983; Hobolt 2006; Baun et al. 2006; Lubbers 2008). They also tell us that the organization and strength of the referendum campaigns, hence how able and/or effective they are at reaching and influencing the electorate, can also have a significant effect on referendum results (Strauss 1993; Schneider and Weitsman 1996; Gilland 2002). Additionally, they alert us to the fact that the degree of public information and education regarding the issues at stake in the referendum play an important role in shaping voting behaviours. Researchers have found that voter education can influence whether they follow a political leader's position or the level of influence a campaign can have on their decision-making (Leduc 2002; Hobolt 2007).

Some of these aspects have, indeed, been studied through public opinion polls on the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Referendums (Webster and Lordos 2006; Lordos 2008; Hayes and McAllister 2001; Somerville and Kirby 2012). However, these are typically quantitative studies that tell us little about how negotiation processes might shape referendum results. Research and literature on the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations, on the other hand, is typically concerned about how and why political leaders reached a negotiated peace agreement or not, and seldom considers the impact of the referendum experience itself - the works of Michael (2007) and Kaymac (2012) are a few

exceptions to this. A link between one type of explanation and the other is missing. An answer to the question of how peace negotiations can usher positive referendum results and how peace process referendums can aid conflict resolution or transformation lies in the gap between the two.

This thesis provides for a novel research design that focuses precisely on analysing the negotiation processes to explain referendum outcomes. It aims, specifically, to build a more substantial understanding of how the way peace negotiations are conducted shapes referendum experiences and outcomes. It proposes the following research question: *Do peace negotiations influence support for peace settlements in referendums and, if so, how?* The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations are selected for comparison primarily because the Annan Plan was rejected by the majority of Cypriot voters in its referendum in 2004, while the GFA was accepted by the majority of Northern Irish voters in 1998. This allows for two separate in-depth analyses of a negotiation process that culminated with the peace settlement being accepted in a referendum and one that did not. Comparing these cases, this thesis provides for a richness and reliability in its findings that could not be achieved simply by studying the two cases individually.

The two cases are also interesting to compare when the percentages of support given by the main local communities are considered. To be implemented, the Annan Plan required that a majority of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities voted 'yes' in the referendum. While the agreement only received a 'yes' vote from 24 per cent of Greek Cypriots and, therefore, was rejected, it did receive a 65 per cent support in the Turkish Cypriot community (United Nations 2004, para. 72). Although the GFA received the support of a majority of both the Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland, it is estimated that 96-97 per cent was given by the Nationalist community and 51-53 per cent from the Unionist community (Melaugh and McKenna 1998). Because it is important that peace settlements are supported by each of the communities involved, this thesis investigates not only how the Annan Plan and the Good Friday Agreement negotiations led to overall opposing referendum outcomes, but also how they shaped the differences in support between the communities. This, in turn, refers not only to how it shaped the differences in support given by the two communities in each of the cases, which are incidentally similar, but also the support levels across the four communities.

The Conflicts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland

In order for the analyses of the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations and referendums done in later chapters of this thesis to be better understood, some historical background of the two cases will be provided here. An historical overview of the conflicts and the evolution of the two peace processes, up to the point when the Annan Plan and GFA referendums take place, is given for several reasons. Overall, it is necessary to understand why the negotiations in each of the cases took place in the format that they did, as well as the motivations, interests and positions of the political leaders, or political parties, that came to participate in them. It is also important to understand the origins of the fears and the grievances between the Cypriot and Northern Irish communities and how they played out during the referendum campaign periods. The conflicts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland have distinct conflict histories, but they also share striking similarities. To highlight these similarities, the two histories will be intercalated throughout.

One of the similarities between the historical circumstances behind the two conflicts is that they have a history of British colonialism in common and in both cases the conflict erupted during the decolonization process. In the eighty-three years of British administration, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities remained culturally distinct, each speaking its own language, each with its own educational system, each practicing different religions, and each having inherited the historic mistrust and hostility of Greco-Turkish relations (Tocci 2004, 43). As the British were signalling their departure in 1950, a national movement led by Orthodox Archbishop Makarios gained the support of a growing communist movement in their struggle for *enosis*, meaning unification with 'motherland' Greece (Anderson 2008, 2). Fearing Greek Cypriot domination, Turkish Cypriots reacted to the growing *enosis* campaign with anti-union demonstrations that evolved to pursuing *taksim*, the Turkish word for division, or partition. *Taksim* was an expression of their desire for the island to be divided between Greece and Turkey (Yilmaz and Ercan 2005, 30).

With the impending threat of the communal struggles evolving into a regional war, by 1959 the United Kingdom (UK) invited Greece and Turkey to negotiations in Zurich and London on the foundation of an independent Cyprus. In the Zurich-London agreements, a power-sharing political regime was designed to safeguard the rights and autonomy of the

two ethnic groups, providing for the protection of minority rights to Turkish Cypriots and avoid supremacy of the larger Greek Cypriot community. The United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey were to become guarantors of the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the new state.

The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960. Yet, its power-sharing, constitutional arrangement collapsed merely three years later. Friction between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships over the interpretation of the constitutional provisions gave rise to a period of constant constitutional crisis, government paralysis, and increasing communal tensions (Anderson 2008, 8). Communal clashes and the impending threat of Turkish military involvement pushed the United Nations (UN) to intervene. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed to the island in 1964, with the Secretary General responsible for the peacemaking mission, aiming to bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict.

An uneasy peace prevailed under the presence of the UNFICYP until the civil government of Papandreou was overthrown by a military junta in Greece. A split between Athens and the Greek Cypriot leadership began to emerge as the, by then, Greek Cypriot President Makarios became wary of unifying Cyprus with the dictatorship (Solsten 1993). In July 1974, the Greek junta undertook a coup d'état against Makarios and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, an *enosis* advocate. Perceived as a growing threat to Turkish Cypriot aspirations, the Greek coup eventually prompted Turkey to military action. An all-out war began in Cyprus involving Greek, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish forces. To separate the opposing forces, UNFICYP established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone across the island. Significant migration took place as Greek Cypriots fled their homes in the north to escape Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriot combatants, while Turkish Cypriots in the south ran to the north for protection (Anderson 2008, 13). The Green Line, as it came to be known, has shaped the everyday life on the island since. The territory north of the buffer zone came under total control and occupation of the Turkish army and under Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was unilaterally proclaimed, although it is not internationally recognized by any state, except for Turkey. South of the Green Line, the Republic of Cyprus continued to be administrated by Greek Cypriots.

The origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland are similarly associated with British colonization. When Ireland became a Free State in 1922, the northern Ulster provinces remained part of the United Kingdom, from then, of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

While many Irish rejected the partition, the Irish government's focus at the time was on building up the new Irish State. It, therefore, distanced itself from the potentially destabilizing effect that being politically involved with Catholic Irish nationalism in the North could have on the Republic (Ruane and Todd 1996, 251). The borders of the new state of Northern Ireland were drawn to encompass the Protestant majority, who wished to remain part of the United Kingdom. This majority, however, remained fearful of Irish nationalist aspirations, which they saw as a threat to their religious and British cultural traditions, as well as to their union with Great Britain (Hennessey 1997, 3). The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, on the other hand, felt cut off from their Irish identity and trapped in a Unionist-dominated political establishment which excluded them from power (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 5-6).

Over the years, discriminated access to employment, housing, as well as to other resources and opportunities, led to an increasing unrest within the Catholic community in the North. Lack of access to the political establishment gave way to the exploration of new forms of political participation through protest. Street parades were – and are to this day - traditionally used by both communities to display and mark their distinct ideologies and cultural identities. However, these would often spiral into rising cycles of violence (Jarman 1997, 56). In 1968, a civil rights march in Derry broke down in violence and rioting after confrontations between Catholic protesters and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) – the mainly Protestant Northern Ireland police force (Lee 1990, 420-421). What followed was a succession of marches and counter-marches, sectarian rioting, and the bombing of public buildings by both Unionist and Nationalist paramilitary groups (Gidron et al. 2002, 51).

In August of 1969, with the 'troubles' spreading from Derry to Belfast and across Northern Ireland, British troops were deployed to contain the escalating violence. The government in the Republic of Ireland, on the other hand, was reluctant to get involved since within Sinn Féin, its largest political party, members disagreed on whether Irish unity should be pursued. The divisions within Sinn Féin, however, translated into a split in the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which was founded during the fight for Irish independence from Britain. Dissident members formed the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and declared war against British occupation in the north (Bew 2007, 450). In parallel, in the Unionist camp, the loyalist paramilitaries (because of their professed loyalty to the British Crown) had returned to activity during the sixties in order to defend the Protestant community (Fitzduff 2002, 8-9).

Groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF) were the most significant among these.

The activity of the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries characterizes the conflict that unfolded, with both being responsible for 90 per cent of the deaths, bombings, shootings, kidnappings, intimidation, and terror in Northern Ireland (Fitzduff 2002, 8-9). The barricades put up by the paramilitaries eventually became permanent brick 'peacelines' that drew a territorial and physical separation between the two communities (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 55-56). By March 1972, the parliament collapsed and direct rule from Westminster was established after the largest Nationalist political party at the time, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), abandoned the parliament. Unable to militarily defeat the PIRA, combined with the loss of democratic legitimacy of the political institutions, Britain came to the realization that a solution to the conflict would have to allow for a deeper transformation of the political establishment in Northern Ireland (McGrattan 2010, 59-60).

The origins of the two conflicts, therefore, were shaped by the British decolonization process and also in both armed conflict ignited between two communities divided along ethnic lines. These communities have antithetical, zero-sum nationalistic aspirations, and all share the desire to unite, or stay united, with their 'motherlands' or 'kin states'.

The Peace Processes

The Cypriot and Northern Irish peace processes also evidence similarities. For example, the enlargement of the European Community (EC), later the European Union (EU), served in both cases to ripen the moment for the peace negotiations that eventually produced the two peace settlements. On the other hand, while the United Nations (UN) has played a significant role in the peace process in Cyprus, this was not the case in Northern Ireland, where the British and Irish governments, along with the United States (US), played the more significant roles. More importantly, the way the two peace processes unfolded shaped the way the Annan Plan and GFA negotiation processes were conducted, such as who its participants were, the main conflicting issues between them, who mediated them, and other characteristics that will be analysed in this thesis.

The United Nations' mediation initiatives through the Good Offices of the Secretary General have been able to repeatedly bring the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political

leaderships to the negotiations table for the past 50 years. After the demise of the Plaza mediation in 1964[3], *intercommunal talks* intermittently took place between 1968 and 1983, mainly in secret. The self-proclamation of the TRNC and the inability of the Cypriot leaders to negotiate concrete commitments lead the Good Offices mission to begin proposing concrete solutions for negotiation from 1983 onwards. During this period, the Framework Documents and, thereafter, Boutros-Ghali's Set of Ideas were unsuccessfully negotiated.

The period that preceded - what would later become known as - the Annan Plan negotiations was one of rising tensions and military build-up on the island. The Greek Cypriot leadership grew impatient towards the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash's resistance to compromise, at the same time as the opportunity to pursue integration with the European Union emerged (Richmond 1998, 206–7). In 1992, Greek Cypriot President George Vassiliou submitted Cyprus' application to the EU. The move was strongly protested by the Turkish Cypriot leader and Turkey, who claimed that the Greek Cypriot government had no right to act on behalf of the entire island. Thereafter, the Turkish Cypriot leadership pledged to only participate in accession negotiations when Cyprus became a federal State, and to only accept EU membership if it was also granted to Turkey (Kyle 1997, 31). From this point, Turkey's own accession became entangled with the Cyprus problem. EU membership, indeed, became a pivotal issue in the Annan Plan negotiations when US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke - who had mediated the Dayton Agreements that brought an end to the war in the European Balkans in 1995 - advocated for a negotiated solution to be made a precondition to Cypriot EU accession[4] (Michael 2011, 148–49). Holbrooke's mediation strategy would set the groundwork for the Annan Plan process that unfolded thereafter.

When Kofi Annan took over as UN Secretary General in 1997, he nominated Álvaro de Soto as his Special Representative to Cyprus. At the start of the negotiations, they were able to bring the Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to commit to reaching an agreement and placing it to a referendum in both communities before the Treaty of Accession to the EU was to be signed in April 2003 (United Nations 2003, para. 43). However, Rauf Denktash refused to commit when the deadline was reached.

[3] For more on the Galo Plaza mediation and an analysis of its consequences for the Cyprus peace process, see Amaral (2013).

[4] After the end of the Cold War, Cyprus remained of strategic interest to the US. The Cyprus conflict weakened not only NATO, but also limited EU expansion. Turkey was also perceived as a crucial agent of American interests in the unstable Middle East and a vital ally geographically proximate to Iran, Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, the British military bases in Cyprus were of strategic importance for the US on the verge of the Gulf crisis (Savvides 1998, 49–50).

Consequently, when the European Commission accepted that Cyprus, along 10 other countries, would become EU states, a solution to the Cyprus conflict was no longer a pre-condition for accession. As this was occurring, major political changes were underway on both sides. Clerides lost his re-election to the Presidency of the Republic to Tassos Papadopoulos, the leader of the right-wing and traditionally nationalistic Democratic Party (DIKO). In the parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus, pro-solution Mehmet Ali Talat was elected Prime Minister. With support from Erdogan, who had pledged to strive for Turkey's membership to the EU during his election campaign, Denktash was eventually side-lined, allowing Talat to effectively lead the last phase of the Annan Plan negotiations.

In February of 2004 in New York, the new negotiation teams would agree to finalizing the Plan and hold simultaneous referendums in April, just before the date of Cyprus' accession to the EU. To guaranty that an agreement would be reached, the two delegations agreed that the Secretary General would 'fill in the gaps' in the final agreement concerning issues the parties could not agree on. However, at the last round of negotiations in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, in March 2004, Papadopoulos refused to hold face-to-face meetings with Talat's delegation (United Nations 2004).

After Bürgenstock, the political leaderships on both sides began to form and publicly display their positions regarding the Plan, which would be placed for referendum a month later. On the Turkish side, while Denktash was against the Plan, Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and Turkey strongly displayed their support for a 'yes' vote. Papadopoulos, on the other hand, called upon the Greek Cypriot community to resoundingly vote 'no' to the Annan Plan, arguing that it satisfied Turkey's concerns and ignored Greek Cypriots'. He further stated that he believed the Annan Plan would undermine the Republic of Cyprus precisely at the time its political weight would be internationally strengthened with EU accession (PIO 2004a).

In the other case, the UK and Ireland's accession to the EU (then Economic Community) in 1972, impelled the two countries to work together on a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict (Byrne, 2000, 3, 17). In March 1973, the British proposed – just as in Cyprus - the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement to substitute the majority rule of the Northern Irish parliament in Stormont. The resulting Sunningdale Agreement created a new power-sharing government, which took office in January 1974 and institutionalized cooperation with the Republic of Ireland through the Council of Ireland (McEvoy 2008, 74-

76). Protestant fears that the Council symbolized a first step towards Irish unity, and the resulting lack of support from an increasingly divided Unionist community, led the Sunningdale government to collapse just a few months later (Barton 2009, 16-17). The British government continued its attempts to find a power sharing solution between the communities throughout the seventies. British military presence in Northern Ireland was reduced, while local security forces and security measures were reinforced (Ruane and Todd 1996, 134).

In the early eighties, the use of torture and interrogation techniques led to a hunger strike among republican prisoners. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's inflexibility towards the prisoners' request for treatment as war-prisoners, rather than ordinary criminals, as well as the death of ten hunger strikers favoured a growing international sympathy for the republican cause and support for Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland (Ruane and Todd 1996, 134; McKittrick and McVea 2002, 137). Demands within Great Britain for security after the IRA London bombings of 1981-82 pushed Thatcher to search for a solution through cooperation with the Irish (McGrattan 2010, 117-118). In the *Anglo-Irish Agreement* of 1985, the British government granted Ireland a consultative role in Northern Ireland affairs. The agreement was welcomed by the Nationalist SDLP, but Sinn Féin regarded it as a British attempt to undermine Irish unity. It was also met with contempt by Unionists, especially the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Reverend Ian Paisley, who declared the agreement was a victory for terrorism and a betrayal by London (O'Leary 2004, 62-67).

The PIRA's bombing campaign, however, faced growing unpopularity among the Nationalist community. With the goal of encouraging Sinn Fein to pursue its goals politically and bring the PIRA to a cease-fire, SDLP leader John Hume initiated talks with Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams (Barton 2009, 29–31). The Hume-Adams dialogue and *the Downing Street Declaration* of 1993 were instrumental in getting the paramilitaries from both communities to agree to a cease-fire. In December 1993, British Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds declared their respect for Irish unity, if that was to be the wish of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. To offer the Unionists reassurance, the government of Ireland committed itself to changing its constitutional pledge over Northern Ireland in the event of an agreement. The PIRA announced its cease-fire in August of 1994, which was quickly followed by the loyalist paramilitaries (O'Leary 2004, 228–29; O'Dowd 2008, 75). In an attempt to take advantage of the momentum this set for the start

of peace negotiations, the British and the Irish government put forward the *Joint Framework Documents*, which defined the lines upon which a political settlement could be agreed during the All-Party negotiations (Tonge 2002, 115). The proposal, however, received mixed reactions. While the Unionist parties perceived it to undermine British sovereignty, the Nationalist parties especially welcomed its North-South bodies (Barton 2009, 32-33). Nonetheless, after the cease-fires of 1994 the expectation was that All-Party peace talks would unfold. This was, however, stalled by the British government's demand that the PIRA decommission arms before the start of the negotiations and the PIRA's refusal to do so (Tonge 2002, 168-169).

The involvement of the United States had a major impact in breaking the stalemate. The Irish community in the United States grew increasingly unsatisfied with the Republic of Ireland's moderate position on Northern Ireland and lobbied to get the US involved in the peace-process (O'Dowd 2008; Cochrane, Baser, and Swain 2009). In 1992, the newly elected President Bill Clinton took an entirely different approach to dealing with Sinn Féin than that taken by the British, with their policy of isolating the party and not talking to 'terrorists'. A visa was provided to Gerry Adams for a visit to the US as part of a strategy that intended to persuade the republicans to adhere to the political route as an alternative to pursuing their aims through violence, fully backed by a responsive and powerful external actor (McKittrick and McVea 2002, 197).

In an attempt to resolve the decommissioning issue, an *International Body on Arms Decommissioning* was set up with US Senator George Mitchell, who had been nominated by Clinton as Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, as chairman (Fitzduff 2002, 128). The report of the *Mitchell Commission,* as it became known, set the ground rules for what would come to be the Good Friday Agreement negotiations. It recommended that a simultaneous and parallel decommissioning of the republican and loyalist paramilitaries take place alongside the peace negotiations (art. 34). Importantly, the report also recommended for the negotiations to take place in an elected body (art. 56). However, when Unionists and the British government insisted that elections be held to determine which political parties would participate in the negotiations, republicans regarded it as a show of intransigence and a stalling tactic. The disagreement eventually led the PIRA to break the cease-fire in February 1996 with the bombing of Canary Wharf, London (McGrattan 2010, 147, 148).

Despite this setback, elections to the Peace Forum were held in May of 1996. 10 political parties earned seats at the Peace Forum and the mandate to negotiate a peace agreement in the *All-Party talks*. Representatives of the British and Irish governments were also present for consultation in the *talks*, chaired by George Mitchell. Since the loyalist paramilitaries had maintained their cease-fire, the political parties associated with them, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), were allowed in the negotiations, while Sinn Féin was excluded for having broken the cease-fire (Fitzduff 2002 128-129). The party was allowed to join the talks when the cease-fire was re-instated in 1997. However, Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) refused to continue the negotiations with Sinn Fein's presence and abandoned the talks.

No substantial commitments were made, however, until George Mitchell persuaded participants to agree on a deadline in March 1998. Yet, the British and Irish governments struggled to reach an agreement on the North-South cooperation institutions. When an agreement was reached between them and a draft document was presented to the parties in Northern Ireland, Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble rejected it (Mitchell 1999). This crisis precipitated British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern to join the negotiating parties at Stormont, for what would be the intense final two days of negotiations. The Belfast Agreement was finally struck on the 10th of April, the day of the Christian commemoration of Good Friday and the reason for which it came to be known as the Good Friday Agreement.

The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Referendums

In comparing how the characteristics of the negotiations shaped the referendums in the two cases, this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the two referendums. The separate and simultaneous referendums on the ratification of the Annan Plan – in the north and south of the divided island - were held roughly a month after Bürgenstock, on the 24th of April 2004. A simultaneous majority 'yes' vote was required from both communities for the agreement to come into force in what was the first referendum experience in Cyprus. As was already described, although the Annan Plan was rejected overall by 66 per cent of the

people across Cyprus, the majority of the voters in the Turkish Cypriot community supported it (United Nations 2004, para. 72). Despite the fact that the EU conferred membership to the whole island, and therefore did not *a priori* exclude the Turkish Cypriot side from being part of the Union, it continues to recognize only the Republic of Cyprus as legitimate, leaving only the Greek Cypriot south to enjoy full EU membership. Kofi Annan described the referendums as '...a watershed in the history of United Nations efforts in Cyprus.' (United Nations 2004, para. 2), which proved to be a major setback for prospects of conflict resolution in Cyprus in the decade that followed (Michael 2007).

As with the Annan Plan, two referendums were to be held simultaneously for the GFA to be ratified. In this case, a related referendum was required to amend the Republic of Ireland's constitutional claim to Northern Ireland, which was part of the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. As a result, the GFA referendum in Northern Ireland and the constitutional referendum in the Republic of Ireland took place simultaneously. Unlike in Cyprus, the majority of the people in Northern Ireland voted in favour of implementing the Good Friday Agreement on the 22nd of May 1998, with the already mentioned differences in support between the Unionist and Nationalist communities. The constitutional change in Ireland was also, overwhelmingly, accepted. After the referendum, the decommissioning issue remained problematic. While Trimble insisted that all arms be decommissioned before the new government institutions came to power, the PIRA refused to do so. Despite this, the power-sharing government was established but worked frailly for less than three years until it was suspended in October 2002. The Assembly would resume their functions only after the St. Andrews Agreement was signed in 2006.

In reviewing existing explanations for the referendum outcomes in both cases, this thesis shows that authors seldom refer to the same aspects of the negotiation process to explain the Cypriot 'failure' or the Northern Irish 'success'. In Northern Ireland, the fact that the negotiations were inclusive, taking place between the several political parties, is considered to have facilitated agreement by strengthening the more moderate positions and political parties. Plus, it allowed for the final agreement to accommodate the differing interests of both moderate parties and the more extreme republican or loyalist views (McGarry and O'Leary 2006a; Horowitz 2002). The resulting power-sharing institutions designed in the agreement have been argued as crucial for the arrival at a political commitment (Horowitz 2001; McGarry and O'Leary 2006b). George Mitchell's mediation style based on facilitating

communication and developing procedural artifices has been seen as crucial in helping the parties move slowly towards agreement (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Curran, Sebenius, and Watkins 2004). Furthermore, civil society is seen to have played a significant role in the process, leading reconciliation activities between the communities as well as exerting pressure on political leaderships to bring the negotiations to a successful end (Cochrane 2000; 2001; 2006; Bell and O'Rourke 2007).

In the case of Cyprus, some of these same aspects have been argued to have led to the failure of the Annan Plan. For example, the UN's mediation strategies have been found to have played a crucial role in the Annan Plan's outcome. The fact that the UN Secretary General was allowed to use his discretion to decide on the issues left unresolved at Bürgenstock, is considered to have allowed the political leaders to appear unaccountable for the final plan and to campaign against it (Kaymak 2012, 106). It has further been argued that the UN over-pressured the respective leaderships by using the EU accession date as a deadline (Drath 2004, 349). Importantly, authors indicate that because the Annan Plan was negotiated secretively between political elites, the mediators failed to consider, involve, and gain support from other quadrants of society (Drath 2004; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). However, although these constraints and strategies applied to both communities, authors tend to use them only to explain Greek Cypriot rejection and not the opposing Turkish Cypriot acceptance.

When existing explanations of each of the cases are compared, aspects considered in one of the cases are not analysed in the other, or used to explain its outcome. For example, negotiation secrecy has not been seriously considered by those who have analysed the GFA negotiations, and neither has the fact that peace negotiations in Cyprus was not politically inclusive been considered as an explanation to the outcome in the Annan Plan case. On the other hand, as this thesis will show, analyses on the success and failure of both processes tend to only attempt to explain why the agreement was reached by the political representatives, and not necessarily why it was accepted or rejected in the referendum. In effect, the two different outcomes are often not differentiated, and rather treated as one and the same.

Nonetheless, all of the characteristics of the negotiations mentioned in the literature on both cases can potentially have shaped the referendum outcomes in different ways. For example, representatives of a group or political party that were not included in the

negotiations can expectedly be less inclined to support an agreement in a referendum. Therefore, who mediators included in the negotiation process or the extent agreements accommodate the interests of certain stakeholders can influence whether the agreement will receive their support in the campaigns and referendum. This, however, asks whether potential referendum 'spoilers' should be excluded or accommodated during a negotiation process. Equally, the manner in which a negotiation process is conducted can have an important impact on the degree of information available to the public, both about what is being negotiated and the agreement itself. Therefore, the degree of secrecy could potentially shape the degree of voter education in a referendum and, consequently shape the extent to which voters are influenced by political leaders' cues or the referendum campaigns.

These are all potential links between the negotiations and referendum outcomes that are explored in this thesis. Taking from existing literature on peace negotiations and the two cases studies, it compares how mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement design in both the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations influenced their referendum results and experiences. It bridges peace negotiations and referendum literature, by investigating how these aspects of the negotiations shaped those aspects of the referendum experience that were found to determine referendum outcomes, namely, political support for the agreement in the referendum, the organization and strength of referendum campaigns, and public information or uncertainty regarding the issues at stake in the referendum.

Thesis Objectives and Structure

The research presented in this thesis was completed using a structured focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005) of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums. Research on referendums in peace processes has developed mainly through individual case studies. Although comparisons have been drawn between different cases, this has been done merely to illustrate certain points the authors aim to make, but not in a structured comparative process. While the qualitative study of referendum outcomes does not allow a claim to be made that the detected causal mechanisms are sufficient to explain the referendum outcomes, it allows this study to

uncover causal mechanisms upon which theory can be built. It also allows for a deeper, contextual understanding of the impact of peace negotiation practices in the external, wider, societal environment in which they take place. In this sense, it departs from traditional peace negotiation and mediation literature by looking at outcomes that surpass the political elites sitting at the negotiations table.

The research findings are drawn from the analysis of an extensive number of interviews carried out in Cyprus and Northern Ireland during the first half of 2014. The interviews were conducted with politicians who were members of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiation delegations, including some of their leaders, as well as with political representatives from parties not included in the negotiations. Individuals and representatives of civil society groups were interviewed especially, but not only, for their involvement in the 'yes' and 'no' referendum campaigns. This included the director of the civil society-led 'yes' campaign in Northern Ireland. Interviews were, furthermore, conducted with journalists who reported on the negotiations and referendums, as well as with academic experts.

Interviews were selected as the primary research method in this study mainly for allowing information to be gathered from first-hand participants. Most importantly, the kind of information/data needed is not often reflected in the official documents produced by the interveners. This includes information on the thinking or debate behind the political decision-making that negotiations entail. Similarly, media accounts and other secondary documents were not reliable or depicted biased accounts of the negotiations and referendum. The interviews used here are especially important, as they provide information not easily attained through political outcomes analysis (such as an analysis of the items in the settlements) or other primary sources (such as official or media reports on the negotiations or referendum). Nonetheless, official documents and memoirs were conjointly analysed to assist and verify interview data, especially for the purpose of triangulating information.

Thesis Structure

The five chapters of this thesis go through the different stages of the research process. The literature review presented in the first chapter will demonstrate that, although the

outcome of a peace settlement referendum can have a profound impact on a peace process, the literature on peace negotiations has not yet consider this as a significant outcome of a negotiation process. It aims to demonstrate why and how the influence of negotiation process characteristics on referendum outcomes should be studied. By bridging the literatures on peace negotiations and on referendums, it will suggest a research path that takes advantage of the knowledge developed by both fields. Several questions are made throughout the chapter that guide the search for which aspects of the negotiation process could potentially influence peace settlement referendum results. The search for answers to these questions in the literature will show that the most extensive studies on referendums have been in the context of European integration and how the present study – and peacemaking referendums in general – can benefit from what has been done there. The review of referendums literature will display what has been found to influence voter behaviours and, hence, referendum results. Those aspects are used throughout the thesis to demonstrate how certain aspects of the negotiation influenced the outcome of the referendums in the two cases.

Chapter two thoroughly describes the design of the research and methodology used, while presenting the reasoning behind the methodological choices that were made in the study. In this chapter, the choice for a comparative and qualitative case study analysis will be justified and its limitations in understanding how peace negotiations shape peace settlement referendums discussed. It will begin by arguing for the comparability of the two case studies and proceed to describe the structured and focused manner through which the two are compared. The variables that will be analysed and compared, pertaining to both the negotiation process and the referendums, will be presented and defined. Given that this study is based on interview research, this chapter will conclude with a description of interviewee selection, the resulting implications for the data and research, as well as all issues related to the data collection and analysis.

Chapters three and four present the two in-depth analyses of each of the cases. The presentation of the cases does not follow a chronological order and the Cypriot case is analysed first. This presentation respects the chronological order in which the case study research was undertaken. The two chapters conform to the same structural presentation. This reflects a concern in this research to compare, as far as possible, exactly the same aspects of the negotiations across the two cases. The undertaking is a requirement for the

structured and focused comparison method used. The analysis of the impact of each of the negotiation process conditions on the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement referendums is preceded in both chapters by a small historical description of the negotiation processes. This description aims at providing context and details of the negotiations that are important to understanding the arguments that are made in the chapter. Both chapters explain, not only how the negotiations shaped the overall result of the referendums, but also the differences in support given by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus, and the Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland.

The findings from previous chapters are then compared in chapter five. Here, it is shown how mediation strategies had an influence on whether political leaders and political parties in Cyprus or Northern Ireland supported the agreement in the referendum or not, as well as the strength of their campaigns. Interestingly, the two negotiation processes are found to differ in terms of their degree of secrecy/transparency, an element found to help explain differences in voter information across the two cases. It also finds that a political party's participation in the negotiations shaped those parties' support for the agreement in the two referendums and the strength of their 'no' campaigns. The presence of civil society groups in Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot community, alongside their consistent engagement with the negotiation process is, in both cases, associated with strong and effective 'yes' campaigns, while the fewer civil society actors in the Greek Cypriot community were attacked by the 'no' campaign. Lastly, results on the impact of the text of the agreement on the referendum outcome are ambivalent. Although the communities that were more informed about the agreement were the ones that supported them the most, the text of the agreement was not necessarily known or understood by all voters. The Greek Cypriot case, in particular, suggests that the low level of public engagement and voter information predisposed the community to be more influenced by the strong, politically backed, 'no' campaign that unfolded after the negotiations. Therefore, although the question in both referendums was on whether or not voters supported the agreements reached during the negotiations, that is not necessarily the question voters answered nor the reason they voted 'yes' or 'no' in the two referendums. The chapter ends with a discussion on the implications of the findings to existing research and literature. Revisiting the arguments found in the literature for and against the use of referendums in peace

processes, it is argued that employing referendums in peace processes requires a tailoring of the negotiation process itself.

The conclusion summarizes and further articulates how the findings of this research can inform existing literature and research on peace negotiations as well as peace settlement referendums, and indeed, the literature on both case studies. The study of the two cases shows that the GFA negotiations were a less secretive, more inclusive and participatory process than the Annan Plan negotiations. This is shown to have shaped communities' engagement and civil society mobilization in support for a peace settlement during the referendum, which favoured support for the 'yes' vote. It proves novel in demonstrating that the negotiation process in north Cyprus was more inclusive than in south Cyprus, leading to a greater mobilization of political parties and civil society in support for the agreement in the referendum. This finding is similar to what occurred in the Good Friday Agreement negotiations and resulting referendum. It then reflects on this research and suggests avenues for further research.

Originality

This thesis makes an original contribution to academic research and literature on peace negotiations and referendums. It is among the first to provide an in-depth comparative study of peace referendums and puts forward a novel research design through which referendums can be studied as an integral part of negotiation processes. The in-depth analyses of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums provided is based on a wide range of new interview data that brings together the personal accounts of the majority of political actors and voices in both cases. Although the two peace processes have been extensively researched, in analysing the two negotiation processes with a view to understanding how they shaped the referendum campaign period, it casts a new light on some of their features. In doing so, it makes a contribution to the practice of peace negotiations and mediations by demonstrating that certain features of those processes can increase or decrease public support for its outcomes. This aims at generating knowledge that can be used to avoid peace referendum results that present an obstacle to a peace processes, such as has been the case with the rejection of peace settlements. Furthermore, by paying attention to the differences in support given by the different local communities in

the referendum, it allows for an understanding on how referendums can potentially be less polarizing experiences and peace settlements be supported more equally among these communities.

The research bridges academic research and literature on peace negotiations and referendums by demonstrating why and how referendum results should be studied as negotiation outcomes. It further shows that referendum experience can be deeply shaped by the negotiation process. The contribution is novel in arguing that, when referendums are used to seal a peace settlement, the entirety of its negotiation process needs to be adapted from the start. As a tool of democratic politics, peace settlement referendums need to be preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad spectrum of political stakeholders and civil society and engage with the public at earlier stages of the process.

1. Peace Negotiations and Settlement Referendums

Peace settlement referendums have the potential to symbolise an important transitional point from conflict to peace (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012). Conversely, the rejection of a peace agreement in a referendum can have devastating consequences for a peace process. For example, the rejection of the Indigenous Rights Accords in Guatemala in 1999, or the rejection of the Annan Plan in Cyprus in 2004, brought both peace processes to a standstill. Yet, negotiation and mediation literature tends to not integrate the study of peace settlement referendums as a significant negotiation/mediation outcome. Given that the use of referendums in peace process is a relatively new practice, and one that has become more frequent in the past two decades, existing academic literature on this specific type of referendums is still small. However, numerous studies are available on other kinds of referendums, especially on European integration referendums. This research and literature on referendums consists of studies that investigate what shapes voting behaviours. It largely focuses on referendum campaign periods and seldom considers how they are shaped by negotiation process conditions. Therefore, this chapter reviews such literatures with the aim of uncovering how the existing knowledge in these groups of academic research can be used to investigate how negotiation processes influence referendum outcomes in peace processes. Aiming to bridge the gap between the two academic literatures, this research takes advantage of the knowledge developed in both fields.

The chapter begins by reviewing the evolving notion of what outcomes are produced by negotiation processes in conflict contexts. It will show that the cessation of violence or a cease-fire and the arrival at some kind of settlement (whether partial or final) have traditionally been considered as the main outcomes and success indicators of negotiations in conflict settings (Touval and Zartman 1985; Bercovitch 1986; Bercovitch and Langley 1993; 2000). However, when the arrival at a peace agreement proved to not necessarily prevent the re-emergence of conflict, researchers began to look at other outcomes. The successful implementation of an agreement, or its durability, for example, was seen as a better indicator than an agreement being reached (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; 2003; Pearson et al. 2006; Beardsley 2006; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Svensson 2007). This shift opened up the field to consider how negotiation processes are impacted by factors that are external to the negotiation process. After all, although peace agreements are often designed

at a negotiation table behind closed doors, it is precisely in that external world that those agreements are meant to be implemented. In effect, a third *wave* of research is unveiling how peace negotiations can be part of a deeper and sustained conflict transformation process able to reconcile conflict-torn societies (Lederach 1997; Väyrynen 1991; Kaldor 2000; Byrne 2001; Papagianni 2010).

The chapter subsequently reviews referendums literature. As already mentioned, the review will include literature on other types of referendums, particularly on European Union integration referendums. It aims at finding what factors have been found to influence voting behaviours in referendums and, therefore, referendum results. These factors are synthesised into three main determinants: political parties' preferences; the referendum campaigns; and public information and uncertainty. It is by understanding first what shapes a referendum outcome that we can pose the question of how negotiation process conditions might shape them. Towards this end, the following section will bridge peace negotiation and literature with referendum literature to formulate a framework under which the impact of negotiation process conditions on referendum outcomes can be studied.

The chapter then closes with a reflexion on what determinants have been considered by researchers so far when searching for explanations for the failed Annan Plan and the successful Good Friday agreement referendums. This will demonstrate that existing explanations for the success or failure of each of the cases are often given without considering those factors that referendums literature finds determinant. Furthermore, by comparing the explanations given on the two cases, it demonstrates how some of the reasons given for the failure of the Annan Plan are not considered when authors explain the success of the GFA and vice-versa. A series of questions are presented to suggest how a systematic comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations and referendums can inform the literature regarding how peace negotiations can lead to successful referendum outcomes that aid, rather than hinder, the peace process.

The Evolving Notion of Negotiation Outcomes in Peace Processes

The understanding of what outcomes are brought about by negotiations in peace processes has evolved overtime. It has, in fact, remained an object of debate particularly in

international mediation literature to this day (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Bercovitch and Derouen 2004; Bercovitch 2006). The outcome of a mediation process was initially considered to be any type of agreement reached between the negotiating parties. This was, arguably, inadvertently defined by researchers in the eighties and nineties, especially the work of Jacob Bercovitch. Bercovitch (1986; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991) used quantitative methods to investigate which characteristics of a mediation process were associated with 'successful' mediation outcomes, which were defined and coded as the observance of a cease-fire, a partial settlement, or a full settlement. The definition of 'successful' or 'effective' mediation in peace negotiations was, therefore, tied to the need for the measurability of data for quantitative treatment. Yet, as Bercovitch (2006, 301) himself wrote at that time, civil wars and ethnic conflicts challenged diplomatic missions throughout the world and mediation scholars were beginning to understand that mediation needed to affect the antagonist and mistrustful relationships between the parties in conflict.

Negotiations between the highly antagonized parties in violent ethnic conflicts meant, not only that it was more unlikely that negotiating parties would arrive at any sort of agreement, but also, even if the parties arrived at an agreement, this was not *sine qua non* to it being implemented. Angola's civil war re-escalation after the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements of 1994[5], alongside other agreement implementation failures in Sri-Lanka in 1989, Somalia 1993, Rwanda 1994, or Sierra Leone in 1998 (Stedman 2001, 12), pushed scholars to have a longer-term perspective. Scholars who delved into the study of what makes an agreement 'stick', or its 'durability', opened up the field to the study of political leaders' negotiating behaviour, particularly how domestic conditions influence their ability to commit to peace. In quantitative studies, durability was conceptualized as the non-reoccurrence of violence during a given period after an agreement is reached. Some of these studies found that the offer of security guarantees by third parties was associated with more stable agreements in civil wars (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Pearson et al. 2006, 121). Others found that mediated processes were likely to produce settlements that break-down within eight weeks of being agreed upon, unless they are supported by a peacekeeping operation and/or

[5] The Bicesse (1991) and Lusaka (1994) Agreements aimed at ending a two decade civil war in Angola between the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), but broke down after the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, refused to accept defeat in the post-agreement elections and re-escalated the conflict. The mediation process led by Portugal, the United States and Russia – the Troika – and the United Nations is criticized for failing to put in place transitory institutions and rules to guarantee the country's transition into democracy (Messiant 2004, 18).

followed by a period of economic development (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, 189). Others yet found that agreements that contain provisions for the territorial autonomy of threatened groups (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 202) and power-sharing provisions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), particularly on military and territorial issues (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), were more likely to lead to a durable peace. Therefore, although peace agreements continue to be the focal outcome, this area of research looks beyond the bivariate outcome of an agreement having been reached or not, and into the 'quality' of the peace agreements reached.

Additionally, awareness that the arrival and implementation of an agreement required a certain degree of trust to develop between disputants drew attention to relational, and more subjective negotiation outcomes (Kriesberg 2001; Bercovitch 2006). Studies emerged on conflicts with 'enduring rivalries', where the prolonged experience of conflict highly antagonized the involved parties and severely reduced the likelihood of an agreement being reached. In such cases, it was argued, it was necessary to consider that the ability to reduce violent interactions between disputants was an important mediation outcome (Andersen et al. 2001; Greig 2001). These arguments take a step back from a conflict resolution focus in the literature and highlight that it is equally important to consider successful conflict management as a significant outcome.

As peace studies scholars, on the other hand, began the search for a definition and the components of peace, peace negotiations were understood as part of a broader peace process that takes place between societies. Concurring with the development of Critical Theory, the opening up of the field to this broader political and sociological context invited criticism of the 'elitist' approach present in the practice and theory of peace negotiations and mediation (Ron 2009). Peacebuilding scholars in particular criticised peacemaking processes for being secretive and exclusionist and for consequently tending to produce agreements that only accommodate political elite's interests. These agreements negotiated by elites are then imposed on the wider society, they argue, and for that reason fail to address the wider societal conflict between the groups involved (Burton 1987; Lederach 1997; Väyrynen 1991; Kaldor 2000; Byrne 2001; Papagianni 2010). Long-term peace is, instead, achieved by empowering and mobilizing local people to reframe their zero-sum and adversarial relationships into new and constructive ones (Lederach 1997). Recent research has found that the use of participatory mechanisms that engage the grassroots and/or

include civil society in the negotiation process, have a positive impact on the sustainability of peace. To have a civil society actively engaged in a peace process has been found to be associated, not only with the arrival at peace agreements that are more balanced and widely perceived as legitimate, but also to durable agreements that are more successfully implemented (Nilsson 2012).

Peace negotiations, therefore, far from being an isolated affair between political elites, are recently beginning to be understood as playing a crucial role in reconciling societies by stimulating the wider public's interest, support, and involvement in creating their own peace (Cochrane 2000; Byrne 2001; Papagianni 2010). In effect, peace negotiations have become more porous in recent years through the involvement of civil society, as well as through public diplomacy mechanisms (Handelman 2012). Some examples of this are the public consultations process that has taken place in the peace process in Colombia (Herbolzheimer 2016, 8) and the use of public opinion polling, or 'peace polls', in Northern Ireland (Irwin 2003) and, more recently, in Cyprus (Interpeace 2014). The use of referendums, as well, has been found to have the potential to serve conflict resolution by: signifying popular approval for peace processes, reducing democratic deficits in conflict settings, and encouraging civic engagement in political life (Haskell 2001; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012).

However, despite this growing understanding that public diplomacy plays a crucial role in managing public opinion during negotiation processes, the study of referendums in peace processes is far from sufficiently researched and theorized in conflict negotiation and mediation literature. The existing body of literature is typically case study based (Strauss 1993; Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Lordos 2009; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Somerville and Kirby 2012; Loizides 2014; Morgan-Jones, Loizides, and Stefanovic 2015), with the exception of Qvortrup's (2012; 2014) broader work on all types of referendums. Although some recommendations are made on how referendums can best be used in the context of peacemaking (Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Johansson 2009; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 2015; 2014), studies that aim specifically at understanding how referendums are shaped by peace negotiation processes are missing.

To summarize, the notion of what is a negotiation outcome has evolved from considering tangible outcomes, such as cease-fires and other kinds of agreements, to more intangible outcomes such as tension reduction, the durability of the peace agreement and the improvement of the relationships between the parties and the communities in conflict. As

the understanding of what is considered a negotiation outcome changed, different aspects of the negotiation process were found to be the most important in bringing about that specific outcome. As was shown, when the outcome under focus was getting the parties to an agreement, scholars focussed in the study of political leaderships' negotiating behaviours and other aspects within the negotiations. When the outcome shifted to the durability of the agreement, the provisions of the agreement and factors external to the negotiation process became the focus. However, peace negotiations research and theory has not yet considered viewing peace settlement referendums as an outcome of the negotiation process, or a measure of its success. Yet, when a referendum is used for peace settlement ratification, its result undeniably influences the success or failure of that negotiation process. What this thesis proposes, therefore, is a study of peace negotiations as a process that culminates with the peace settlement referendum. Again, as it was shown, depending on what was considered the negotiations outcome, different aspects of the negotiations were found to be most conducive, or have a greater impact, on that type of outcome. Therefore, an analysis of a peace negotiation process that considers the referendum results as the negotiation outcome can unveil what aspects of the negotiations are more conducive, or have a greater impact, on the peace settlement referendum outcome.

Referendums in Peace Processes

While research on negotiation and mediation outcomes has not yet integrated referendums into their spectrum of outcomes, referendums have important consequences for peace negotiation processes and outcomes. On the one hand, it has been shown that the referendum experience itself has the potential to re-shape domestic politics by stimulating public and political debate on particular issues, thereby, building awareness and educating citizens (Smith and Tolbert 2009). For example, Scranton (1993) argues that, although the US-imposed democratic constitution was rejected in its referendum in Panama in 1992, the referendum encouraged political leaders to work within a democratic process and to build democratic habits and institutions. Equally, participation in pre-accession negotiations to the European Union and the subsequent integration referendum in 2003, has been found to have shaped public debates, views, and opinions in the Czech Republic in favour of

Europeanization (Baun et al. 2006, 250, 274). Yet, referendums can also be undemocratic experiences. Referendum questions can be formulated to bias results, the electorate selection manipulated, or voters coerced to vote in a certain direction in order for the referendum to yield a particular result. The Crimean status referendum of 2014, for example, raised some of these issues[6] (Biersack and O'Lear 2014; Burke-White 2014).

When used in peace negotiations, referendums can help political leaders to decide on sensitive issues. For example, Loizides (2015) uses the South African referendum case in 1992[7] to show that referendums allow political leaders to win legitimacy and credibility from the public for their position at the negotiations table. This can help ripen negotiations by increasing political leaders' accountability for the commitments and concessions, as well as avoid public opinion reversals down the line. However, referendums may also allow leaders to not engage in consensus building strategies during the negotiations (Haskell 2001). For example, the design of a referendum itself can become a contentious issue during negotiations. The UN-mediated negotiations in Western Sahara have stalemated for over two decades over the issue of who should be allowed to vote in a self-determination referendum (Solà-Martín 2007). Negotiations on a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh have, likewise, stalled over the issue of whether displaced Azerbaijani persons should be able to participate in a status referendum (Johansson 2009, 123). Furthermore, referendums may exacerbate conflict and lead to violence escalation in the short-term. Two examples of this are the South African apartheid referendum of 1992 and the UN-sponsored East Timorese independence referendum of 1999. In the East Timorese case the international community (the UN and the Australian government in particular) was heavily criticised for not having created the necessary security conditions to prevent the Indonesian government-supported militias to violently pursue those who were pro-independence following the referendums (see Cotton 2007; and Wheeler & Dunne 2001 for a counter argument).

[6] The referendum on the status of the Ukrainian province of Crimea was held on the 16th of March 2014, merely five days after the Crimean government self-declared its independence from the Ukraine. An overwhelming majority of voters supported the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. The Russian government's alleged involvement in the setting up of the referendum and the circumstances under which the referendum was held have raised questions over the legality and legitimacy of the process and its result is not recognized internationally.

[7] The South African Apartheid Referendum of 1992 aimed at getting the white community's endorsement of President F. W. de Klerk's negotiating position, particularly on the issue of the end of the *apartheid* system of discrimination against people of colour (Strauss 1993).

Critics of the use of referendums in peace processes argue that the referendum experience can become another source of rivalry and the referendum result may be regarded as yet another conflict-like win-lose situation. For example, Mac Ginty (2003) asserts that constitutional referendums are chiefly unsuitable for ethno-national conflict because they tend to present zero-sum choices around which ethnic differences can be re-ignited. The dichotomous either/or nature of voting choices can have an important negative impact in conflict contexts. The referendum experience can further polarize already divided societies by creating referendum 'winners' and 'losers'. This is because referendum campaigns may provide incentives for political leaders and other groups to mobilize support for their voting preference by appealing to the very insecurities that caused the conflict in the first place (Reilly 2003, 176). As populist-leaders or hardliners inflame public debate, the referendum campaign can, thus, become focussed on divisive issues – and not the central issue of the referendum itself – and further radicalize public opinion.

Some consensus is emerging around the idea that, in order to avoid referendum failures and their negative consequences in conflict contexts, groundwork needs to take place to prepare that context for the referendum experience (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 2015, 134). This is particularly important in the case of peace settlement referendums since they are aimed at getting a specific outcome: the victory of the 'yes' vote. Lee and Mac Ginty (2012, 59–60), for example, found that three factors have led to peace process referendum 'failures' around the world: lack of broad consultation of important constituencies during negotiations, particularly in Guatemala (1999 referendum) and Cyprus (2004 referendum); lack of information and time for public debate during the campaigns; and the existence of insecurity at the time of the referendum, for example in the Guatemalan and Iraqi (2005) constitutional referendums. They, therefore, argue that referendums can only serve peacemaking processes if a certain degree of conflict transformation and reconciliation takes place on the ground. A re-orientation of third party interventions is required, they argue, but without giving practical recommendations.

Nevertheless, as it was shown, referendums have not yet been studied as a peace negotiations outcome. Given that the outcome of the referendum has such high stakes for a peace process, and especially considering it can re-ignite the conflict, it becomes crucial to understand whether and how the negotiation process itself can shape a referendum experience and result.

What Determines a Referendum Outcome?

To understand how peace negotiations can potentially construct a positive referendum result, we first need to uncover what shapes a referendum outcome. A significant bulk of empirical studies and theoretical development in this area of study has developed through research on European Union integration referendums. This literature is particularly relevant to the present study because, like in peace settlement referendums, it examines cases of elite negotiated treaties that are ratified by a domestic referendum vote. Furthermore, it makes sense to draw on literature that studies political and voter behaviours in Europe, since the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement cases also fall into this geographical region. Overall, this literature focuses on how three interrelated factors shape referendum results: voter information and uncertainty about the issues, or the content of the agreement, at stake in the referendum; the political parties' position regarding the referendum; and the composition and strength of the referendum campaigns.

Political Party Support and Voter Alignment. Political elites have a significant influence on voter behaviour in referendums. The position political parties take on the referendum issue and their ability to mobilise their constituents and supporters, makes political parties' positioning the strongest predictor of a referendum outcome (Hobolt 2006, 641; Baun et al. 2006, 275; Lubbers 2008, 81). Political leaders are, in many instances, the most important information supplier voters have (Leduc 2002, 722). In fact, political parties in government may be constitutionally obligated to inform citizens about what is at stake in the referendum. This position gives them significant power to influence the way voters frame the choice they are being asked to make in the referendum (Hobolt 2006, 641; Vreese 2006).

A number of both quantitative and qualitative case study-based research has found that political parties' preferences had a significant influence on European Community (EC) integration referendum results (Pierce, Valen, Henry, and Listhaug 1983, 61; Hobolt 2006, 641; Baun et al. 2006, 275; Lubbers 2008, 81). For instance, 'Franklin's theory' posits that voting in a referendum is a test to the performance and popularity of governments in power, rather than about the issue at hand (Franklin et al. 1994; 1995; Franklin 2002). For example, Schneider and Weitsman (1996, 603–5) found that voters' evaluation of the government's performance, as well as their evaluation of the Maastricht Treaty itself, impacted the

referendum outcomes in Denmark, France, and Ireland. However, they also argue that, it was where information about the content of the treaty was limited that median voters tended to make their decisions based on the trust they had for the government's or the opposition's campaign messages. They found that this led to stronger and more competitive referendum campaigns. Critics of the theory argue that it views voters as incapable of formulating their own opinions, and that the salience of the issue in the referendum also has explanatory power to why voters' follow a government's cue or not (Svensson 2002). Therefore, the degree to which political elite preferences impact voting behaviours varies depending on how informed voters are on the issue/s at stake in the referendum and their degree of uncertainty regarding the impact of its outcome.

Referendum Campaigns. Referendum campaigners make use of a variety of activities in their attempts to persuade, influence, or simply inform voters. The publication and distribution of informational booklets or pamphlets is one example. More organized campaigns hold public gatherings, meetings or rallies, make use of traditional media (television, radio, and newspapers) or, in our days, the internet and especially social media. They usually support one of the voting choices in the referendum, although some hold non-partisan, purely informational campaigns. Although political leaders and parties are often involved in referendum campaigning, they are not the only ones doing it. This varies according to the type of referendum and issue at hand. Durham (2009, 192–93) found that in referendums on international treaties civil society organizations play a crucial role in informing and mobilizing the community towards engaging in an active debate around the implications of the agreement. This ultimately fostered ownership of the agreement at the local level.

Referendum campaigns can have a significant impact on a referendum by way of framing the issues at hand by highlighting certain aspects, or shifting the focus of the subject (Leduc 2002, 716–19; Vreese 2004). Ultimately, campaigns can play a role in influencing how voters interpret the referendum question/s and the voting options available to them. In fact, in cases where the public is not well informed about the stakes in the referendum, campaigns have been found to have an important impact on voter-decision. This is what Gilland (2002, 532) found to be the case in the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice in Ireland. Here, a "lacklustre 'yes' campaign" and a 'no' campaign message of 'if you don't know, vote no' is

considered to have tilted the result in favour of the 'no' vote during the three weeks leading to the referendum.

Public Information and Uncertainty. Among the factors that influence voter's decisions and referendum outcomes, are the amount and quality of information that is available to them concerning an agreement, treaty, or whichever issues the referendum is consulting the public on. Unlike in an election, referendums are not about choosing between political parties or particular candidates, but between two or more alternatives regarding a particular question, or set of questions. Referendums ask voters to form an opinion on a particular issue, or groups of issues, that can potentially affect the rules and conditions under which they live in. However, either due to the unfamiliarity or complexity of the issue/s or treaty under referendum, to cast a vote can be a particularly demanding experience on voters.

Information has an important impact on the cost-benefit analysis voters make when choosing how to vote. One important factor influencing voter behaviour in treaty, or agreement, referendums is their perception of its socio-economic impact. For example, fears regarding the impact of EU membership on agriculture, state-owned heavy industry, small and medium-sized business, and banking economic sectors have been found to have mobilized rejectionists and reduced public support for EU integration in Poland prior to its accession in 2004 (Szczerbiak 2001, 114–15). Notwithstanding, Sciarini and Listhaug (1997, 431–33), for example, argue that the Swiss rejection of European Union membership in 1994, and Norwegian rejection of the European Economic Area in 1992, were due to the fact that EU membership was not seen as an economic necessity by voters. In effect, concerns for the defence of traditions and national sovereignty became more salient during the referendum campaign periods. Similarly, Lubbers (2008, 80–83) found that the Dutch 'no' to the European Constitution in 2005 was strongly impacted by a perception of EU integration as a threat to the survival of Dutch culture, particularly among less educated voters.

Like political leaders and campaigns, the various forms of media are important disseminators of information and campaign messages to the masses and have a significant impact on the shaping of public opinion during referendums (Vreese 2006, 631–32; Hänggli and Kriesi 2010). It has been found that the less informed voters feel, the more they tend to look for voting cues from political leaders, other opinion-makers, or ideologies (Leduc 2002; Hobolt 2006). Leduc (2002, 727) finds that the less informed voters are about the issues

prior to the referendum, the more they tend to rely on the campaign period for information and, hence, the more they will be influenced by them. Consequently, because voters will tend make their decision on how to vote closer to the referendum date, the outcome of the referendum will become more unpredictable.

A referendum experience and outcome, therefore, is a product of the dynamics created by these three interconnected factors. Taken together, the less informed voters are on the issues at stake in the referendum, the more they will look to their political leaders and the referendum campaigns for information and cues on how to vote. Concomitantly, when voters are less informed, the more volatile and unpredictable their voting behaviour will likely be, and the more they will tend to leave the decision on how to vote to the campaign period. This then increases the influence of political party's positioning in the referendum on voting behaviours, at the same time as it increases the potential influence referendum campaign messages can have on the outcome of the referendum. Conversely, the more informed voters are, the less they will rely on political leader's cues and campaign messages.

How Can Peace Negotiations Influence Referendum Outcomes?

Almost three decades ago, Putnam's two-level games theory was pioneering in theorising how political leaders' negotiating behaviours are affected by public expectations or 'domestic constraints' (Putnam 1988, 454). In effect, Putnam was interested in understanding how the prospective of having the agreement ratified through a referendum strengthened, or weakened, political leaders' negotiating positions in international negotiations. In fact, the body of literature on how negotiations are influenced by 'audiences' or 'constituencies' is so extensive that the examples cited here can only be anecdotal (Iklé 1964; Rubin and Brown 1975; Fearon 1994). Yet, as Wanis-St. John (2011, 274) notes, the inverse causal relation has not received the same attention.

As was discussed above, the literature on peacemaking referendums is still novel and brief, although significant case study based research exists. Some of these are quantitative studies based on public opinion polling that test if certain provisions of the agreement influenced voting-behaviours in the referendum (Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Lordos 2008;

2009; Somerville and Kirby 2012). Nevertheless, they do not test any other factor pertaining to the negotiation process. Yet, some authors have indicated potential ways in which negotiations might influence referendum outcomes. For example, McGarry and O'Leary (2009, 15–85) contend that it was the Good Friday Agreement's ability to accommodate the interests of the main political parties, the UUP and Sinn Féin in particular, that allowed for the success of the referendum in Northern Ireland. However, going back to referendum literature, political party support for the agreement is only one of the factors found to influence voting behaviours in referendums. In their study of the failed Guatemalan referendum, Lee and Mac Ginty (2012, 59–60) suggest that negotiations with referendums require broader consultation mechanisms with the people within the communities in conflict. Taking from the Northern Ireland and South African referendums, Loizides (2015, 144) advocates that public opinion polling is one way through which this can be done. Yet, we do not know exactly if and why such mechanisms actually have an impact on referendum results.

As was described earlier, referendum results are influenced by the degree of information available to the public regarding what is at stake in the referendum, political parties' voting preferences, and the strength or shape of referendum campaigns. Considering these three referendum outcome determinants, other characteristics of peace negotiations can potentially have an impact on referendum outcomes. Which political actors are included in the negotiation can all ultimately shape whether political leaders and parties support the agreement in the referendum. To hold secretive negotiations, on the other hand, is a mediation tactic that can influence the degree and timing of the information available to the public on the issues under negotiations and the content of an agreement. The strength and organization of referendum campaigns can also potentially be influenced by negotiation process conditions, immediately so through the political parties' referendum campaigns. Whether political leaderships' interests are accommodated in the final agreement can determine, not only whether they will publicly support the agreement, but also the amount of resources they will invest in their own campaigns. Also, as was mentioned earlier, civil society groups are important peace process referendum campaigners, therefore, the degree to which they are involved with the negotiation process may have important repercussions in the referendum outcome. The inclusion of civil society actors in the negotiation process can assure that key constituencies and stakeholder's interests are considered in the

negotiations and potentially widen the level of support. Let us explore all these factors one by one.

Mediation Strategies

Earlier studies in mediation research found that negotiation processes in which directive mediation strategies were employed were more likely to reach partial and full settlements/agreements (Bercovitch 1986; Bercovitch & Houston 1993; 2000). These types of strategies represent the most powerful form of mediator behaviour, where mediators offer incentives and/or issue ultimatums to push the parties into agreement. Those studies also found that communication-facilitation strategies were the less effective, but the most employed type of mediation strategies. These refer to those types of strategies that are essentially part of any mediation process, such as facilitating the exchange of information, contact, and cooperation between the parties. Procedural strategies were not found to have a significant effect. These strategies refer to ways through which mediations control the formalities of the process, such as determining the agenda of the meetings, their time and place, and their exposure to outside influences and the media (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 175–76).

These findings on the higher effectiveness of directive - also called *manipulative* - strategies were supported by Touval and Zartman's (1985, 11–13) observation that only powerful mediators have enough resources to entice or threaten the parties into making concessions. To them, this ability to *leverage* the parties is a crucial mediator asset. Kissinger's leveraging of the Israeli and Egyptian governments between 1973-76, by threatening Israel with the withdrawal of military support and enticing Egyptian cooperation by offering closer military and economic ties with the US, is cited in the literature as proof to the theory (Sheehan 1976; Rubin 1981; Stein 1985; Mandell and Tomlin 1991). These scholars argued that mediation is a resource-intensive activity that is most effectively practiced by resourceful, or even biased (Kydd 2003) mediators, such as powerful states. Others, however, counter-argue that 'power mediation' should not be considered mediation at all because those types of behaviours question the mediator's role as an impartial broker.

With the proliferation of intra-state conflicts in the 1990s, the United Nations emerged as a crucial international mediator. Research on international and regional organizations'

mediation efforts found that the more passive communication-facilitation style employed by international and regional organizations fostered a greater trust in the mediation process (Maoz and Terris 2006). International Organizations (IOs) were also found more effective in 'softening up' (Greig and Diehl 2006) the parties' adversarial relationships and reducing conflict tensions in the long-run (Beardsley 2006; Frazier and Dixon 2006). Therefore, if States were more effective in bringing about settlements, IOs and regional organizations were proving to be effective at managing the conflict. Svensson (2007, 244) further found that, while power mediators are more effective at brokering peace agreements, the less intrusive *pure* mediation styles were more likely to yield peace agreements that contained provisions found to make agreements in civil wars more durable. Similarly, Beardsley et al. (2006, 81) found that the less intrusive facilitative strategies are more effective in reducing conflict tensions in the long run. These findings pushed for the overcoming of previous existing debates on bias vs impartiality and pure vs power mediation. This led to a growing consensus in the field that the different types of strategies are complementary and that, as multi-party mediation proponents suggested (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999), the key to mediation success rests in the adequate or timely combination of both types (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009; Carment, Yiagadeesen, and Achkar 2009; Quinn et al. 2006).

Largely, what these studies show is that, as Beardsley et al. (2006, 81) noted, the effectiveness of mediation strategies varies depending on the outcome that is considered. Therefore, can some mediator strategies be more effective if we consider a peace settlement referendum result as the mediation outcome?

Secrecy, for example, is a tactic in the realm of procedural strategies that aims to reduce the visibility of a negotiation process in order to help the participants talk more openly, cooperate more easily, and to save-face. However, secrecy and the associated need to hold the negotiations elsewhere has been found to have a detrimental effect on political leaders' ability to sell the agreement back home. For example, several authors point to the secrecy in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations of the Oslo Accords as cause of its ultimate breakdown at the Camp David Summit in 2000, and for the subsequent start of the second intifada. The negotiations of the Oslo Accords were led in complete secrecy. To decrease the visibility of the talks, the Palestinian Liberation Organization was represented by lower rank elements and a team of Academics represented the Israeli government. The secrecy, however, is

thought to have debilitated the Israeli government's capacity to gather support for the agreement at home (Pruitt 1997, 246; Kriesberg 2001; Wanis-St.John 2011).

Thus, while secrecy can reduce political leaders' ability to 'sell' an agreement in the event of a referendum, it can also have an impact on public information. When referendums are held to ratify a treaty, or agreement, Durham (2009, 192–93) argues that successful ratification, as well as implementation, is fostered by informing and educating communities, and creating a genuine discussion between ordinary people on the implications of ratifying the agreement. Political elites play an important role in educating voters on the issues at stake in the referendum, but this needs to happen allowing for sufficient time for public discussion can take place (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012). The secrecy in which the negotiation process is undertaken can potently influence the amount, accuracy, or timing of the information available to the public on the issues under negotiation, which, as has been described, can have an important impact on voting behaviours in referendums.

Spoiler Management/ Political Inclusion

Who is included in the negotiation process, or if and how agreements accommodate the interests of certain stakeholders, can determine whether political parties support an agreement in a referendum. This, in turn, can shape the organization and the strength of the referendum campaigns. However, whose interests should be accommodated in the agreement is an issue of ongoing debate in the literature. Stedman (1997; 2002) advised mediators to exclude from peace negotiations those leaders who benefit from the *status quo* and have incentives to oppose a peace process. These *spoilers* are leaders who perceive a peace process as threatening to their power, worldview, or interests, and who (are willing to) use violence or other means to undermine it. It has been found, however, that parties may not use violence necessarily because they do not desire peace. Successful 'spoiling' impacts the peace process in multiple ways: introducing new issues, diverting attention, providing marginalized groups with a voice, delaying or postponing talks, preventing implementation, or bringing new actors into the talks (Newman and Richmond 2006, 109). Secondly, spoilers may attempt to undermine peace negotiations for reasons that are not clearly directed at derailing the peace process, such as to signal their desire to be at the negotiations table or to express concerns over the agreements' implementation process

(Zahar 2003, 270). Thirdly, spoiling may not be entirely negative since it may be a sign that the process is progressing and marginalized groups fear losing their marginal relevance with the conflict's ending (Newman and Richmond 2006, 109).

The complexity and unpredictably of spoiling is a challenge to any mediator who can make a decision on, or has an influence over, which representatives get a seat at the negotiations table. To Stedman (1997, 9–11), spoilers who have limited or flexible ('greedy') goals can potentially be accommodated and should be included in the negotiations. 'Total' spoilers, on the other hand, are committed only to hegemonic goals and are unwilling to accommodate others' and, hence, should be excluded. Zahar (2003, 118–22), on the other hand, calls attention to the danger of peace negotiations themselves creating spoilers by profiling actors as such. The author contests Stedman's typology on the grounds that the attempt to profile an actor as a spoiler is risky and does not consider that the attitudes and positions of certain actors or groups are not fixed and may change overtime. To the author, a mediation process' inclusiveness is crucial to prevent parties from having incentives to renege during settlement implementation. This can be important in the event of a peace settlement referendum. Excluding certain actors can create incentives for these actors to campaign against the agreement. Therefore, which political representatives are included in a negotiation process can potentially shape political support for the peace settlement and the relative strength of the campaigns in the referendum and, thereby, potentially influence the referendum results.

Civil Society Inclusion

The existence of an active civil society has been found to favour agreement implementation and the durability of peace. To have a civil society actively engaged in a peace process has been found to be associated with the emergence of peace agreements that are more balanced and more widely perceived as legitimate (Nilsson 2012). Including these actors in peace negotiations has also been found to have had a legitimizing effect on mediation processes and resulting agreements in an extensive number of processes, such as Kenya (Zanker 2013), Congo or Northern Ireland (Rao 2010). It has also been found to have ripened peace negotiations in Sierra Leone (Aljets, Chacko, and Jessop 2008) and Liberia (Zanker 2013). The Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) mediation in

Liberia is a particularly interesting case where representatives of civil society groups were invited to take part in the negotiations and were encouraged to pressure the parties[8]. Their direct participation has been found to be associated both with the progress of the negotiations and the Liberian people's satisfaction with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Zanker 2013). Civil society groups have, in fact, led successful peace mediation processes in Mozambique[9] and, more recently, in Tunisia[10].

Civil society groups can be included in peace negotiations in several ways, ranging from direct participation, to being given observer status, or taking part in consultative forums. Regardless of the way in which they are included, civil society can serve a peace process in multiple ways. Civil society groups are in close contact with the public and can function as communication channels between the negotiations and the wider communities. Their involvement in negotiations has been found to be advantageous in two ways: first, they can more accurately communicate public opinion to the negotiations table and, on the other hand, they are able to influence the public to support the peace process (Paffenholz, Kew, and Wanis-St. John 2006, 68–70). Including civil society can guaranty that the interests of the wider society, and not only the elite's, are considered in the process, which generates greater elite accountability and grassroots ownership for the agreement (Ibid, 68, 70). Particularly in the case of referendums, civil society organisations have been found to play a crucial role in informing and engaging the public in an active debate around the implications of the agreement, which ultimately fosters ownership of the agreement at the local level (Durham 2009, 192–93).

The activities of civil society groups, therefore, have been increasingly found to aid peace processes, from ripening negotiations, to favouring implementation. Moreover, if civil society groups can shape public opinion during peace negotiations and develop information campaigns during referendums, they can also potentially shape support for a peace

[8] Representatives of the Mano River Women's Peace Network, the Inter-Religious Council on Liberia, the Liberian Bar Association and members of the Liberian Diaspora were invited by the mediator to participate in the negotiations between the Charles Taylor government, and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel groups in 2003 (Zanker 2013).

[9] The Community of Sant Egidio, a lay organization of Catholics, mediated the Rome General Peace Accords of 1992 between the Mozambique Liberation Front's (FRELIMO) government and the rebel Mozambican National Resistance, which marked the end of an almost two decade-long civil war.

[10] The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, an alliance between the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, mediated political party talks on the Tunisia's democratic transition during 2013-14.

settlement. The role that civil society plays in peace process referendums, however, has not yet received much attention from the field, nor has the question of if and how including civil society in negotiations shapes referendum results.

Agreement Design

Given that peace settlement referendums typically ask voters if they accept, or support, the implementation of the agreement reached during negotiations, the content of an agreement can expectedly have a considerable impact on referendum results. As was described earlier in this chapter, research concerning the durability of peace agreements deepened into the study of what agreement characteristics were associated with successful agreement implementation. Whether or not peace agreements contained provisions concerning certain issues, such as security guarantees (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Pearson et al. 2006, 121), was found to be associated with whether or not an agreement would be implemented. The most extensive body of literature concerning this aspect, as was described, has developed around how power-sharing provisions affect durability.

In the event of a peace settlement referendum, whether or not the provisions of an agreement satisfy the interests of the political leaderships negotiating them can naturally determine whether or not those political leaders and/or political parties will support it in the referendum. It can also determine whether or not they will campaign and, if so, if for or against it. Haas (1991) and Stedman (1991) have shown that political leaders' ability to commit to an agreement is influenced by their capacity to convince their political allies and constituents that the agreement is to their benefit. The arrival at an agreement, they found, is dependent upon how well its 'formula' is able to solve leaderships' problems in publicly committing to an agreement with former enemies. Agreement design, therefore, has an important impact on political leader's ability to 'sell' the agreement to their community in the run up to the referendum. For example, supporters of consociationalism tend to draw on the Northern Ireland case study to argue that power sharing is key in accommodating groups competing interests and is, therefore, the only realistic way to achieve a stable solution to conflict in divided societies (O'Leary and McGarry 1993; McGarry and O'Leary 2006a; 2009).

Secondly, the content of an agreement can potentially more directly shape voters' decision-making in referendums. In fact, quantitative studies of referendum outcomes

typically study, through public opinion polling and surveys, what aspects of the agreement influenced voters' decision-making in referendums (Rynhold and Cohen 2003; Lordos 2008; 2009; Somerville and Kirby 2012). However, explanations that draw on agreement provisions assume that voters were fully aware of their details and implications, whereas that might not actually be the case. Therefore, it is difficult to get a clear picture on the extent to which the voters in each community base their voting decision upon the content or the implications of the agreements.

Agreement design, therefore, can influence the political support a peace settlement receives in a referendum and, hence, the strength the referendum campaigns. Depending on how well informed voters are of the content of the settlement, agreement design can also more directly shape voters' preferences. An analysis of the referendum experience can provide a fuller picture on both cases, and a more accurate portrayal of if and how the content of the agreements had an impact on the referendum outcomes.

Comparing Explanations of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Outcomes

Several scholars hold the UN's mediation strategy as significantly responsible for the failure of the Annan Plan to be accepted in the referendum in Cyprus. The key arguments are centred on three factors: secrecy, arbitration, and pressure. Several authors argue that, because the Annan Plan was negotiated secretively between political elites, the mediators failed to consider, involve, and gain support from other quadrants of society (Drath 2004; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). The arbitration process, by which the Secretary General decided on the issues not agreed at Bürgenstock, is considered to have allowed the political leaders to appear unaccountable for the final plan, allowing them to campaign against it (Kaymak 2012, 106). In the end, it is argued, the UN over-pressured the leaderships by using the EU accession date as a deadline for agreement (Drath 2004, 349). However, although the same strategies applied to Turkish Cypriots, authors tend use them to explain Greek Cypriot rejection without considering Turkish Cypriot acceptance. Michael (2007, 597–98) is an exception to this in arguing that the major flaw in the 'Annan strategy' was that UN mediators used these strategies to side-line the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, whilst naively taking Greek Cypriot support for granted. In contrast, the strategies used by the

mediators have been considered to have contributed to the success of the GFA in Northern Ireland. The three-strand negotiation process design, and the decoupling of the decommissioning issue from the main negotiations, are two procedural strategies that are considered to have positively impacted the process (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 135–37).

Naturally, authors generally take the 'failure' or the 'success' to mean the agreement being accepted or not in the referendum. However, there is usually no analysis of the referendum process, whilst academic research on voting behaviours in referendums has found that the referendum campaign period can have a profound impact on public opinion. Therefore, these assessments of the impact of mediation strategy may not actually explain referendum results as some claim to do.

The transformation of spoilers into agreement stakeholders has also been found to explain successful agreement implementation in Northern Ireland, specifically regarding the inclusion of Sinn Fein in the GFA negotiations (Darby 2001, 15–26). In fact, the overall inclusivity of the negotiations is considered to have facilitated agreement by strengthening the more moderate positions and political parties (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 150–51). Additionally, by 'allowing' the hardliner DUP and UKUP parties to leave and continuing the negotiations, George Mitchell is seen to have successfully side-lined potential spoilers (Durkan 1999, 36–43). In the Annan Plan negotiations case, the side-lining of Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, is considered to have been a necessary means to a final agreement being reached (Michael 2007, 598). However, these explanations concerning the inclusion and exclusion of political groups are only actually explaining why the negotiation processes succeeded in getting the parties to an agreement, but not necessarily the impact that political inclusion/exclusion had on the referendum results.

Civil society's involvement and public engagement is indicated as an important explanatory factor of the referendum outcomes in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, civil society effectively contributed to forging intercommunal contacts and back-channel communication avenues during the negotiations (Hancock 2001; Cochrane 2000; 2006). Plus, the civil society-led 'yes' campaign in Northern Ireland is considered to have been vital in raising the 'yes' vote in the Unionist community (Hancock 2011). The lack of engagement with the grassroots and of civil society inclusion are, on the other hand, seen to have contributed to the failure of the Annan Plan in Cyprus, with the public having a very limited influence on the negotiation process (Lordos 2009). The scarcer civil society

initiatives in Cyprus, it has been argued, were not properly recognized as a valuable policy option at the political level (Hadjipavlou 2002, 15). However, a more developed and active Turkish Cypriot civil society is seen as important in delivering the high 'yes' vote in North Cyprus (Bryant 2004). In fact, during the Annan Plan negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot community engaged in mass demonstrations in support for the process.

Civil society mobilization has explanatory potential for the positive result in Northern Ireland and the negative referendum result in Cyprus, and can potentially explain the differences in the support given by the two Cypriot communities. Did the negotiation process involve or stimulate civil society differently in the two cases? How can understanding the participation of civil society in the GFA negations and their impact on the referendum experience help understand how the same dynamic did, or did not, develop in the two separate and simultaneous referendums in Cyprus?

The design of the agreements has been found in the literature to explain the Annan Plan and GFA referendum 'failure' and 'success', respectively. The constructive ambiguity of the GFA has been said to have allowed the leaders on both sides to better sell the agreement to their constituencies. Yet this explanation does not account for the 40 per cent difference between the support given to the GFA by each of the two communities in Northern Ireland. Mac Ginty (2000, 124–28, 133) argues that the far-reaching security sector reforms provided by the GFA have been considered as crucial for the high support from the Nationalist community. Additionally, he argues, Gerry Adams' exploitation of the peace process for political propaganda collaterally contributed to the Nationalist community's confidence and sense of ownership of the peace process, while making Unionists regard provisions of the agreement as republican victories. In the Cyprus case, the security provisions of the Annan Plan are frequently indicated as the cause for the Greek Cypriot 'no' vote victory. In fact, the main reason stated at exit polls for the 'no' votes among Greek Cypriot voters was security, namely the desire for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island (Lordos 2009). However, this was the very reason that President Papadopoulos pin-pointed when asking Greek Cypriots to vote 'no' in the referendum (PIO 2004a).

In sum, mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement design are all part of existing explanations for the 'failed' Annan Plan referendum and the 'successful' Good Friday agreement referendums. However, upon a closer analysis, existing explanations tend to equate success or failure in getting the political leaderships to an

agreement at the negotiations table, with the success or failure of the agreement being accepted in the referendum. Drawing from research and literature on referendum outcomes, with a few exceptions (Michael 2007; Kaymak 2012), one can criticise such explanations for assuming that there is a perfect political party alignment in voter behaviour in peace process referendums. Although this might actually be the case, without acknowledging that this assumption is being made, mediation and/or negotiation-focused explanations neglect that the referendum campaign period can deeply shape voting behaviours. On the other hand, while explanations drawn from opinion polls can reveal how certain provisions of the agreement shaped voting behaviours, they have a limited ability to uncover the impact other negotiation and mediation process conditions had on the referendum results. A link between one type of explanation and the other is missing. Additionally, the fact that some of the explanations presented for the failure of the Annan Plan are not considered when authors explain the success of the GFA and vice-versa suggests that comparing the two cases has the potential to allow the cases to inform each other.

In reviewing the academic literature on peace negotiations and referendums, this chapter has shown that there is a gap between the two literatures that can be bridged to build an understanding on how negotiations shape referendum outcomes. As was demonstrated, this gap is due to the fact that research on peace negotiations has not yet studied peace process referendum results as a negotiation outcome. It is also due to the fact that academic research and literature on peace process referendums is a relatively new field of inquiry. As was shown, although scholars writing on peace process referendums often make recommendations on how negotiation processes can potentiate a positive referendum result, their impact on the latter has not yet been consistently studied. The comparison of the case studies' literature also evidenced the larger gap in the literature. Existing explanations for the 'success' or 'failure' of the two negotiation processes, it was demonstrated, seldom analyse referendum campaign periods and voting behaviours.

While the review of the wider academic literature on referendums was used to ascertain what determines a referendum outcome, peace negotiations literature was used to find which specific aspects of the negotiations can potentially shape those determinants. Both greatly inform the research design and methodology of the research, which is described in detail in the next chapter.

2. Research Design and Methodology

The previous chapter has demonstrated that there is a gap in academic research and literature concerning how peace negotiations shape referendum outcomes. This chapter proposes a research design that sets out to bridge this gap. In order to answer the question *do peace negotiations influence support for peace settlements in referendums and, if so, how (?),* the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums were selected for a qualitative comparative case study analysis. This chapter will carefully describe and discuss all the methodological choices that were made in designing and conducting this type of research. It will further report how the research was carried out and discuss the advantages and limitations of the data collected.

The first methodological choice made concerned the option for a qualitative research design and methodology. Studies of referendum results have been done both employing quantitative and qualitative methods. While quantitative studies involve public opinion polling and surveys, qualitative studies are based on the study of the referendum campaigns (for example, Strauss 1993; Schneider and Weitsman 1996; Gilland 2002). Although studies based on public opinion polls and surveys will be relevant to the data analysis done here, quantitative methods cannot sufficiently answer the research questions posed. A qualitative study is needed to explore the links between the negotiations and campaign processes, whose complexity cannot be assessed by merely asking and determining what influenced individual voting decisions. The disadvantage of a qualitative study of referendum outcomes, however, is that it does not allow a claim to be made that the detected casual mechanisms are sufficient to explain the referendum outcomes in terms of support percentages. Conversely, one of its advantages is that, by exploring which conditions may affect the outcome, suggestions can be made on how public opinion research can help better understand what characteristics of the negotiations shape support for peace processes and settlements.

Importantly, the in-depth study of both the negotiation process and the referendum campaign periods allows for a richer understanding of how peace negotiations may shape the broader peace settlement referendum experiences. In doing so, it allows this thesis to uncover how characteristics of peace negotiations may have an influence on whether peace

settlement referendums are more or less polarizing experiences for the divided societies in which they take place.

The second significant methodological decision made concerned opting for a comparative study. A two-case comparison, in particular, has the advantage of allowing for a more detailed study than a larger, or even statistical, analysis would. At the same time, it allows for greater care to be taken in considering how changes in the wider socio-political and international context might have impacted the outcomes under examination. Although this smaller comparison only allows for 'contingent generalizations'(Collier et al. 1996, 56–91), or in other words, for results that are applicable only to socio-political contexts that are similar to the ones selected here, it has the advantage of producing results that are more reliable and generalizable than a single case study analysis would. Certainly, comparability issues can be argued, which are inherent to the fact that there are no two social or political realities that are exactly the same. However, there is a serious attempt made here to make use of more comparable cases of peace negotiations with settlement referendums. This is discussed in the next section.

Case Study Selection and Comparability

The comparison between the Cyprus and the Northern Ireland conflicts is increasingly common in the study of divided societies as well as in the field of negotiation and mediation (for example: Byrne 2000; Irwin 2005; Tannam 2012; Moore et al. 2013; Kocadal 2016). As it will be shown here, the comparison of the Good Friday Agreement and Annan Plan negotiations and referendums is particularly valuable to understanding what shapes referendum results in peace processes. In fact, there are few existing cases of peace settlement referendums that could be selected for comparison. The referendums in Guatemala in 1999, East Timor in 1999, Iraq in 2005, and South Sudan in 2011 were other possible cases. Yet, these do not offer the comparability benefits of the regional focus that Cyprus and Northern Ireland offer. On the other hand, the referendums in Bosnia in 1994, or those in the Basque Country and Catalonia were not universal plebiscites, with only certain groups eligible to vote - the Serbs in the Bosnian case, and the citizens of the (thereafter) autonomous regions in the Spanish case. In addition, the referendums in East Timor and

South Sudan were independence referendums and not constitutional. The referendum in Quebec in 1992, on the other hand, was a non-binding referendum, unlike the Annan Plan and the GFA referendums, which can potentially have influenced the referendum experiences and results differently.

More importantly, the two cases were selected for comparison based on the variation of the outcome of interest: they are two instances of mediated full settlements placed for ratification through referendums, where one was accepted and the other was not. The selection of two cases with opposing outcomes aims to overcome potential selection bias effects that could result from choosing cases with equal results, which could lead to the overestimation of certain explanatory factors (Landman 2003, 45).

The case selection follows the logic of a most similar systems design (Faure 1994). Both cases took place in democratic political systems (although differences in democratic credentials could be argued between the cases) and both were shaped by European Union enlargement. Specifically, the GFA negotiation process was shaped by the UK and Ireland's accession to the EU, and the Annan Plan negotiations, profoundly so, by Turkey's attempted accession, as well as Cyprus' own accession process. Secondly, regarding conflict-context characteristics, the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus exhibit several similarities regarding their origins, characteristics and dynamics. As was described in the introductory chapter, they share similar causes, particularly a British colonial history and subsequent local struggles for self-determination and political independence. In both, the conflict emerged between two communities that are divided along ethnic lines and that are asymmetrical in size: the Unionist and Greek Cypriot communities are majoritarian, while the Nationalist and Turkish Cypriot communities are the minorities. They are/were both longstanding intractable conflicts, where physical separation lines have further increased segregation and intractability. An important factor enhancing this intractability has been the involvement of external actors. The Nationalist and Unionist communities regard Ireland and Britain, respectively, as supporters of their mutually exclusive interests, and as their guardians against a perceived threatening 'other' community. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots regard Greece and Turkey, respectively, as protectors and supporters of their causes.

One important difference between the cases, however, is that while the Cyprus conflict is a *frozen* conflict, where violence has not taken place since 1975, paramilitary violence was a feature of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process well beyond the referendum

(although there was a change in intensity and type of violence with the start of the negotiation process). Another vital distinction is that, while the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have not lived together since the buffer zone was created in 1975, this has not been the case for the communities in Northern Ireland. Although there were segregated areas, it can fairly be stated that the communities in Northern Ireland have lived together. The Cypriot communities, on the other hand, only regained limited contact after the first crossing point was opened in the buffer zone in 2003. The most significant impact of these differences is that, while in Cyprus there were two referendum processes – one in each of the communities – there was no such division in Northern Ireland.[11] These contextual differences undoubtedly shaped the negotiations and referendums in each of the cases and their impact is considered in the case study analyses performed in thesis.

Fourthly, regarding the mediation processes, both took place in a post-Cold War context, where the international community became committed to the peaceful management of conflict and to democratic transition (Maney et al. 2006). In effect, both the Good Friday Agreement and the Annan Plan offered a democratic solution and both provide for power-sharing consociational forms of government. Both negotiation processes faced stalemates over issues and time-consuming negotiations over procedural matters, evaders, or media leakages, and keeping the negotiations ongoing became an important concern and goal for both mediators and their teams (Mitchell 1999; United Nations 2003). However, the reasons for this differed. George Mitchell needed the negotiation process to survive and succeed in order to avoid the re-escalation of paramilitary violence, while Annan and De Soto needed it in order to seize what was perceived as a historically ripe moment for agreement with Cyprus' candidacy to the EU. Under pressure to get the parties to an agreement, the mediators employed different mediation strategies and tactics. These differences are important to the present research since it aims to test if and how these behaviours shaped the referendums.

In terms of the referendum outcomes, the comparison of these cases is interesting not only because one was rejected and the other accepted, but also due to other factors. Voter turnout in both cases was over 80 per cent (United Nations 2004, para. 72; Melaugh and McKenna 1998). Adding to the pertinence of the comparison, the differences in the rates of support between the communities in the two cases are similar. Although the Annan Plan was

[11] The implications of this difference are discussed when the cases are compared in chapter 5.

rejected due to the low 24 per cent support from the Greek Cypriot community, the 'yes' won with 65 per cent of the votes in the Turkish Cypriot community (United Nations 2004, para. 72). Similarly, while approximately 96-97 per cent of the Nationalist community voted 'yes' in the GFA referendum, there was a lower 51-53 per cent support rate given by the Unionist community (Melaugh and McKenna 1998). Therefore, the difference between the rates of support given by each of the two communities in their respective referendums is similarly of around 40 per cent. In fact, considering the Annan Plan case, it would be inaccurate to state that the agreement was rejected completely in the referendum. As was stated earlier in this thesis, this study will take into account that the majority of Turkish Cypriots actually supported the Plan, which is often neglected. This study, therefore, aims to explain both the overall outcomes of the referendums and the differences in support between the four communities, namely, the Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland, and the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus. While in the Annan plan case a majority from each of the communities was required for the agreement to be ratified, the same was not the case in the GFA referendum. However, it was only formally that the GFA referendum only required an overall majority. As Rynhold and Cohen (2003, para. 90) argue, it was crucial for the legitimacy of the agreement, and a concern during the referendum campaign period, that a majority in both communities supported it, as will be described later in this thesis. Therefore the ratification of the agreements was, to an extent, dependent on majority support rates from each of the communities in both cases.

Applying the research question to the two case studies, therefore, this research asks *did the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations lead to opposing referendum outcomes and the differences in support between the different local communities and, if so, how (?)*. Common analysis of peacemaking referendum outcomes examine the causes for the approval or rejection of a peace settlement. However, to look into what influenced support in each of the communities provides insight into what polarizes support. Additionally, this disaggregation of the analysis into the results from across the four communities allows for a full spectrum of results to be studied. Presented in a descending order, they are:

- the Nationalist community's support for the GFA as case of very high support for the agreement (96 - 97 per cent);

- the Turkish Cypriot community's high support for the Annan Plan (65 per cent);
- the Unionist community's divided support for the GFA (51- 53 per cent);
- the Greek Cypriot community's low support for the Annan Plan (24 per cent).

Therefore, the secondary question is to be understood as asking, not only what explains the differences between the rates of support given between the two communities within each of the cases, but also across the four communities when the two cases are compared.

Methodology

The main aim of this research is to demonstrate that negotiation process conditions influence communities' support for peace settlements in referendums. Therefore, the analyses of the negotiation process and campaign periods aim at examining how referendum outcomes (DV) were influenced by negotiation process conditions (IV). The period of analysis in both cases begins at the start of the negotiations until the settlement referendums. In the Annan Plan case, it focuses on the period starting with Kofi Annan's appointment as United Nations Secretary-General on the 1st of January 1997, until the Annan Plan referendum on the 24th of April 2004. The period of analysis in the Northern Ireland case considers the events between the elections to the Peace Forum on the 30th of May 1996, until the day of the Good Friday Agreement referendum on the 22nd of May 1998. Importantly, the periods of time from the day the agreement is reached until the day of the referendum are referred to as *referendum campaign periods* and are not to be confused with *referendum campaign/s,* which refers to the actual 'yes' and 'no' campaigns. The referendum campaign period in the Annan Plan case took place from the last round of negotiations on the 31st of March 2004 until the day of the referendum. In the GFA case, it refers to the period of time between the day the agreement was reached on the 10th of April 1998 and the day of the referendum.

The controlled comparison method of George and Bennett (2005) is followed to compare the two cases. To ensure the comparability of the individual case findings, each of the case study analyses are focused on answering strictly the same research question and objectives, and exactly the same variables are analysed in each of the cases. Therefore, the Annan Plan and GFA referendum case studies will first be analysed individually. The results of the

individual case analyses are then compared in a separate chapter. Each of the individual case analyses are strictly structured in the same way and, for additional clarity, its results presented in the same order in each of the three chapters. In both the individual case study analyses and their comparison it is examined and compared how mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion and agreement design influenced the referendum results. This is done by demonstrating how each of these characteristics of the process influenced any of the three referendum outcomes determinants put forward by referendums literature, namely, political party support for the agreement, the composition and strength of the 'yes' and 'no' referendum campaigns, and the information available to the public on the issues at stake in the referendum.

Although the structure of the chapters presents the analysis of each of the negotiation process variables independently, it by no means aims to suggest that they have an independent impact on the referendum outcome. As it will become evident in the analyses themselves, there are significant interactions between these variables that are crucial to understanding how the negotiations shaped the referendum results. Additionally, as has already been mentioned, there is no intention to claim that only these particular characteristics of the negotiation process shaped the referendum outcomes. Rather, it is to test if and how these specific aspects had a significant influence. Further, it must be acknowledged that the referendum outcomes were influenced by external factors that do not pertain to the negotiation process. While there is an effort to consider the impact of contextual factors on the referendum outcomes, they are not the focus of this research, although their impact is considered and discussed where relevant.

Negotiation Process Variables

Mediation Strategies. One of the aims of this research is to explore and test how and what kind of mediator behaviours can potentially influence support in a referendum. Therefore, this variable is to be understood in broad terms and to encompass all types of mediator behaviours, not only to the three types of mediation strategies typified in the literature. One aspect included in this variable is the arbitration, or *meditration,* procedure used in the Annan Plan negotiations, which has not been categorised in the existing types of mediation strategies. This is because it is not consensual among scholars whether the use of

arbitration practices in Cyprus, and also in Kosovo, surpass or not the boundaries of a mediator's role (see, for example, Belloni, 2009; Ker-Lindsay, 2009; Ross & Conlon, 2000).

Communication and coordination with external parties with close relationships to local communities is fundamental to the progress and success of a mediation initiative, and crucial mediator task. For this reason, this variable is also sensitive to how the mediators involved the 'kin states' in the negotiations. Taking Kocadal's (2016, 172) definition, the term refers to 'those states whose dominant ethnic group identifies with a co-ethnic population that transcends the borders of that state'. The degree to which Greece and Turkey were involved in the Annan Plan negotiations was substantially different to what was the case during the GFA negotiations. In Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland were pragmatic in working together to expedite the arrival at an agreement during Mitchell's mediation and, for this reason, have been described as 'quasi-mediators' (Byrne 2000). Understanding if and how these parties' involvement in the negotiations affects support for the peace settlement in the referendum is therefore considered in the analyses of the impact of mediation strategies.

It must be noted that, both in the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations, the roles played by De Soto and Mitchell are not officially referred to as 'mediation'. In Cyprus, De Soto provided the 'good offices' of the Secretary General, while George Mitchell chaired the All-Party talks. Nonetheless, they both played mediating roles and, like commonly done in the literature (for example, Curran & Sebenius, 2003; Curran et al., 2004; Michael, 2007; Richmond, 1998), they are referred to and analyzed in this thesis as such.

Political Inclusion. Another aim of this research is to ascertain whether differences in the participation of political stakeholders in each of the cases had an impact on the referendum outcomes. This variable, therefore, refers to if and how the different political parties across the political spectrum in each of the cases were included in the negotiation process. This research is, however, also interested in investigating beyond formal forms of participation. Therefore, a political party or political leader, will be considered to have been included in the negotiations if more indirect or covert forms of participation took place, specifically informal or formal consultation with mediators. For this reason, the term 'inclusion' is preferred to 'representation', since political representation typically refers to having a seat at the negotiations table. However, political inclusion has here a slightly different meaning to that

meant by McGarry and O'Leary (2006b, 256–57). In their work, the authors used the term 'inclusivity' as a quality of the institutions created by the agreement, whereas in this thesis it is used as a quality of the negotiations *per se*. Although one stems from the other, the considerations the authors make about inclusivity are about the implementation of the agreement and not the negotiation process as it is meant here.

Civil Society Inclusion. The term civil society can be understood to encompass a varying array of actors depending on how the concept is defined. For example, the United Nations defines civil society as 'the third sector' of society, distinct from government and business (United Nations, n.d.). The World Bank defines civil society as 'a wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations' that publicly express the ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic interests and values of their groups (World Bank, n.d.). Civil society actors, therefore, can encompass many kinds of individuals or organisations, from private citizens to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or from citizens associations to religious organisations, or worker and business unions.

Paffenholz and Spurk (2006, 13) find that civil society develops seven types of functions: protecting citizens; monitoring political accountability; advocacy and public communication; socialization; community-building; intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state; and providing services to citizens, particularly in cases where the state has become unable or unwilling to do so. Further, although the term civil society is commonly associated with constructive, non-coercive and non-violent practices, not all authors agree on this point. For example, Cochrane's (2006, 255) definition of civil society includes non-governmental groups or associations which can negatively affect a peace process, such as paramilitary or certain ethnocentric organisations. Despite this perspective, armed groups are not considered as part of the fabric of civil society in this thesis for two reasons. First, while armed groups may emerge within a similar dynamic as civil society groups, groups who take up arms have claims to political power, whereas this is not typically the purpose or aim of civil society groups' activities. Secondly, and more specifically in this study, paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland were represented, albeit never assumedly in the case of Sinn Féin, by political parties in the negotiation process. Therefore, their inclusion in the peace negotiations is already accounted for in the 'political inclusion' variable.

For the purpose of testing if and how the inclusion of civil society actors has an influence on the referendum outcomes in the selected cases, the term civil society is defined here to comprise non-violent organizations or groups (both civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations), whose civic voluntary activities are separate from state institutions, but not necessarily political parties. This derives from the need to include the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition as part of civil society inclusion variable, since the party was created precisely for the purpose of representing women's and civil society groups' interests at the negotiations. Again, to be highly sensitive to the existence of any type of contact and relationship between civil society actors and negotiators or mediators, inclusion is understood in broad terms. Taking from Paffenholz (2014, 76–77), the following forms of participation or interaction will be considered as forms of inclusion of civil society actors in the negotiation process, ordered from the most to the least direct: direct representation at the negotiations table; observer status at the negotiations (informal presence at the negotiations); participation in official consultative forums that run parallel to the negotiations; less formal consultations with negotiators and mediators; inclusion in post-agreement implementation mechanisms; and high-level civil society initiatives that aim at supporting the negotiation process. The author also considers any kind of mass action, like protests, demonstrations or petitions, as forms of civil society participation. Further forms of public participation include, for example, public hearings or public opinion polls and referendums. However, this research takes the view that forms of public participation are better understood as a category of their own, rather than a form of civil society participation. Therefore, forms of wider public participation are not included in the civil society inclusion variable.

Agreement Design. Peace settlement referendums typically ask voters whether they accept or reject the agreement reached in the negotiations. Given that the text of the agreement is the central focus of the referendum, it is relevant to investigate if and how the types of issues negotiated and the compromises reached during the negotiations shape the referendum campaign periods and its outcome. This variable, therefore, encompasses all the negotiated issues reflected in the final agreement, which vary depending on the conflict context at hand. Nonetheless, negotiated settlements typically contain provisions on issues relating to territory, security, power-sharing institutions, or human rights.

Referendum Outcome Variables

The negotiation process variables' impact on the referendum result will be determined by analysing if and how each of them shaped political support for the agreement, the shape and strength of the referendum campaigns, and public information and uncertainty. Although the impact of the negotiation process variables on each of these determinants is studied and presented individually, the referendum outcome is rather a product of the interplay between them. As explained in the previous chapter, the less informed the public is about the issues under referendum, the higher the likelihood that voters will follow their political parties and leaders' position in the referendum and the more competitive and influential the campaigns will be. This interplay will be considered in the analyses.

Political Party Support. Studies on referendums using quantitative methods frequently look at whether voters follow their political parties or political leaders' voting preference in the referendum, in other words, voters' *political alignment*. Through the qualitative research done here, however, it was not possible to determine whether voters followed their political parties or not. Nevertheless, this has already been done for the two cases (Lordos 2008; Hayes and McAllister 2001). The research presented in this thesis, therefore, investigates its antecedent condition of whether or not political parties supported the agreement in the referendum and, hence, is what is to be understood by *political party support*. Therefore, this study examines if and how the negotiation process variables shaped political leaders' and their parties' decisions to support the agreement in the referendum. The existing quantitative studies on voter political alignment, nonetheless, will be used to critically assess and fill any gaps in this research's findings. By differentiating political party support from voter political party alignment, this research is sensitive to the fact that whether political leaders support an agreement does not necessarily translate to votes in the referendum, which is often confused in the analysis of peace negotiations.

Referendum Campaigns. Political parties are important campaigners in referendums, but they are not necessarily the only ones campaigning. As was stated in the previous chapter, civil society actors play a crucial role as campaigners in informing and mobilising a community towards engaging in an active debate around the implications of the agreement,

(Durham 2009, 192–93). Depending on who is involved in them, how well organized they are, and the resources that they use, campaigns can be more or less effective in influencing voters. Therefore, this research looks at how those negotiation process conditions might have shaped the composition and strength of the 'yes' and 'no' campaigns in the two cases. The composition of the campaign refers to which political or civil society actors were active in them. Strength is measured through the resources available to them and their capacity to mobilize people.

Public Information and Uncertainty. Given that a qualitative study is being conducted, this research is concerned primarily with whether the information was *available* to the public. Nonetheless, this study also makes use of quantitative surveys in order to ascertain whether or not the public was informed. Given the nature of the type of referendums under examination, the texts of the agreement are categorized as public information since it is the agreement itself that is being placed for referendum. However, despite the public nature of an agreement, the secrecy of the negotiation process can potentially affect both when and how much information is available to the public prior to the agreement being made public. Therefore, this research is interested not only in the availability of information about the text of the agreement during the referendum, but also in the information available about what was being negotiated during the process.

Data Collection and Analysis

The interview data analysed in this thesis was collected through semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews conducted in Cyprus and Northern Ireland during the first semester of 2014. A total of 46 semi-structured interviews were conducted with political leaders, civil society groups and individuals involved in the negotiations or campaigns, as well as academic experts and journalists. Interviews were selected as the main method of data collection for several reasons. Firstly, it was crucial for this research to uncover the political decision-making process behind political leaders' and parties' decisions to support or not support the agreement in the referendum. These elite interviews were also critical to test the theory beyond official accounts. Interview-making allowed for information to be

acquired that only the people involved in the negotiation process and referendum campaigns could provide: how they behaved and how they explain/justify their own behaviour during the negotiations and referendum; what a negotiator remembered and perceived of other's negotiating behaviours and why; how they understand and explain the trajectory of the negotiation process and referendum results and why; what succeeded or failed, from the person's vantage point. Secondly, it was through referendum campaigners' personal accounts that this study was able uncover how negotiation process conditions influenced the organization and strength of the referendum campaigns. This was done by asking interviewees what helped or constricted their ability to develop their campaigning activities and to organise and mobilise the people in support, or against, the agreement.

While the personal accounts collected through interview-making are the more suitable data for the analysis intended by this research, other sources, such as official documents, memoirs, and media reports, are used in the case study analyses particularly to test interview data through triangulation. The interviews also served to provide new information to advance (and bridge) research on mediation and referendum processes and to demonstrate the casual relations between them. Above all, interview data allowed a reconstruction of the negotiations and the referendum campaign periods – targeted in the interviews through direct and focused questions – that was sensitive to the potential causal relationships between the two. This approach allowed this study to 'stitch together' interviewees' personal accounts with other sources that serve to produce a more detailed picture of those relationships.

Interview Subject Selection

The interview subjects were selected based on the independent and dependent variables. This meant that subjects were selected for either having participated in the negotiation process or having been involved in the referendum campaigns. In addition, journalists who reported on the negotiations and referendums were interviewed for two reasons. First, this allowed for the secrecy of the negotiation processes to be tested by comparing the access journalists had to information on the negotiations in each of the cases. Additionally, it was important to take into account and compare the role that the media played in each of the referendums, given that the media can play a significant role in

informing the public and shaping opinion during the referendum campaigns. Academics and other officials, including members of the UN Good Offices Mission in Cyprus, were interviewed for their expertise as well as to explore alternative perspectives and explanations.

Of the 46 interviews undertaken in 2014, 22 were conducted either face-to-face or via telephone with political leaders. Among these were a total of 20 members of the Annan Plan and GFA negotiation teams. The remaining 26 interviews were conducted with representatives of civil society groups and individuals who were active in the 'yes' and 'no' campaigns, journalists and academics.

The fieldwork in Cyprus was conducted from the 15th of January to the 28th of February 2014. A total of 27 face-to-face interviews were conducted both in the Republic of Cyprus and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 13 were conducted with political party representatives from both communities, including 3 who were members of the Greek Cypriot negotiation teams and 2 of the Turkish Cypriot negotiating team. Another 2 interviewees were current staff of the UN Good Offices Mission, however not part of the mediation team during the Annan Plan negotiations. 16 were individuals or representatives of Civil Society and NGOs who were active in the 'yes' and 'no' campaigns or bi-communal activities about the Annan Plan, as well as academics and journalist.

The fieldwork in Northern Ireland was carried out from the 27th of May to the 6th of July 2014. A total of 19 interviews were conducted, from which twelve were political party delegates representing the several political parties who negotiated the GFA. Two NI Women's Coalition delegates were interviewed both for their activity as politicians and as civil society representatives. The remaining subjects were other civil society activists - one of which was the director of the civil society-led 'yes' Campaign - journalists and academics.

The sampling process was done differently on the two variables. On the negotiation process variable, subjects were specifically targeted for having participated in the negotiations as members of a negotiation team/delegation. Although this represented a wide political spectrum in the Northern Ireland case, this was not the case in the Annan Plan negotiations. In Cyprus, politicians from political parties who did not directly participate in the negotiations were also interviewed. Their testimony was still relevant because their parties led referendum campaigns and, most importantly, because it was an aim of this research to determine if they were included in the negotiations in an informal way. At this

political level, therefore, the selection of interview subjects aimed at including all the political parties existing during the periods of analysis, meaning, during the negotiations and up until the referendums. The selection was, of course, also determined by accessibility and availability of the target (elite) population at hand.

In both cases, all political leaders were interviewed for information regarding the referendum campaigns. They were asked about their personal and their parties' positioning in the referendum, as well as their campaigning activities. Additionally, because not only politicians were involved in the campaigns, individuals and groups who were active in the referendum campaigns were selected through a snowballing process. The aim here was to access those who were most active during, and able to provide information about, the referendum process. By doing this, the 'field' informed the researcher on potential sources of information and interview subjects. As a result, representatives of civil society and NGOs, as well as individuals who were active in the 'yes' and 'no' campaigns were selected for an interview. Civil society actors were specifically asked about their possible involvement in the negotiation process. This was significant since it is one of the variables of interest in this research.

Importantly, there was an effort to collect opinions from both the 'yes' and 'no' campaigns from each of the communities. The resulting sample of participants is in itself significant. It was not possible to find 'no' voices in the Nationalist community and attempts to contact political leaders who supported the 'no' in the Turkish Cypriot community were fruitless. The sample, however, reflects the fact that there was no 'no' campaign within the National community and, in the other case, that there was a reduced number of actors in the 'no' campaign in the Turkish Cypriot community - which was mainly led by one political party. Furthermore, it reflects the weight of the referendum results in each of the communities. Therefore, the resulting sample selection does not present any significant bias concern.

To increase the transparency and convey the validity of the samples made, a table of interview subjects is provided for each case in annexes 1 and 2. The resulting sample was also constrained by a few factors. Some of the preferential interview subjects were already deceased, for example, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Papadopoulos and Denktash. It was also not possible to find contact information to reach some of the subjects, or some did not respond to contacts. Only one of the persons contacted declined the

request for an interview due to illness. Interestingly, there was a very positive rate of acceptance to participate in the interview research among political leaders. As a result, this research has gathered rich interview data from members of the negotiating teams in both cases. The great majority of the interviews were performed in Nicosia and Belfast.

Access to Subjects and Data Collection Methods

All interviewees consented to the interview in writing. Each subject was asked to consent to an audio recording of the interview as well as to the publication of their identity. Anonymity was provided upon request. The majority of the interviewee data was recorded in digital audio files, unless permission to record was not granted. In such cases, which amounted to only 3 interviews, information was collected through written notes.

Several strategies were used to reach interview participants. The great majority of subjects, especially in Cyprus, were contacted first via e-mail and the meeting arranged through e-mail exchanges. Several contacts were established through snowballing or by casual contact with local people. Interview participants at the grassroots level and personal integration with the local and academic community were crucial to gaining access to some political figures. When contact information was provided by a third person, most frequently phone numbers, 'cold calls' were made to the prospective participant. No interviews were declined when subjects were contacted via telephone. Overall, interview participants themselves were extremely helpful, both in Cyprus and Northern Ireland, in reaching other potential interview subjects.

To ensure the comparability of the data acquired in both studies, the same interview scripts were used for the interviews conducted in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Scripts of the interviews are presented in annexes 3 and 4. The length of the interviews varied, depending on the time constraints of the participant or the amount of information he/she was able/willing to provide. The shortest interview is 21min long and the longest took place over 1h32min. The majority was around 40-50min long.

Interview Data Analysis

Since this research's focus is on the (historical) process that begins with the negotiations of the text of the agreements and culminates with the days of the referendums, the interviews served to uncover a chain of events. More importantly, interviews were necessary to learn about the subjects' experiences and motivations. Interview data was generated, not to serve as mere illustrations of the cases at hand, but as evidence. Therefore, care was taken to generate reliable information and to perform a rigorous analysis of the interview data. Towards this end, a critical evaluation of the subjects was made during the sampling process: who they are, to whom and for what purpose they are speaking – agenda – and the circumstances and position they are speaking from (George and Bennett 2005, 99).

Both before and during the analysis and documentation of the findings, an assessment of the data gathered was undertaken, as suggested by Davies (2001). During this, hearsay was discarded and first-hand information was valued. The access of the interviewee to the events was considered, together with the interviewee's track record of reliability – this was ascertained by gathering information on subjects and enquiring about them in the larger field. Additionally, as suggested by Dexter (2006), the comprehensibility, plausibility and consistency of the testimony given was controlled. This critical assessment of the reliability and validity of the data, whether documental or interviewee data, will allow the level of uncertainty of the findings to be discussed and established. Additionally, the multitude of sources for data collection aims at improving this very reliability of the findings since a wide range of, sometimes competing, perspectives were gathered. The reliability of the findings is also believed to have been improved by the way the sample was drawn to capture 'yes' and 'no' perspectives (being that the limitations of the resulting sample have already been considered).

To assure the most rigorous research possible, there was an effort in this thesis to convey that reality is being reported in the analysis (Bleish and Pekkanen 2013). In this sense, quotations are not used as an adornment but to communicate and represent what was, or was not, the direction of a participant's response. Some quotations are made to compare responses in order to detect agreement, expose extremes amongst responses, or to explain

the participant's actions. Uncertainty about the data is reported by displaying divergence, or range of dissonance, of opinion in responses.

The two case studies will be analysed in depth in the two upcoming chapters. The interview data collected in each of the two locations will be analysed together with other documental data to demonstrate first, how the Annan Plan negotiations shaped the referendum results in Cyprus. This analysis will, actually, show that the negotiation process and referendum experiences were different in each of the communities and these differences in the negotiation experiences can explain the divergent referendum results between the Cypriot communities. The chapter thereafter will follow the same research procedures and abide by the same structure in presetting the findings on the Northern Ireland case study.

3. The Annan Plan Negotiations and Referendum

The rejection of the Annan Plan in its referendum is precisely an example of the re-occurring problematic event in peace negotiations that this thesis addresses. In the search for an understanding on how negotiations influence peace settlement referendum outcomes, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Annan Plan negotiations and referendum in Cyprus. The aim of the analysis is to ascertain if the specific characteristics of the negotiation process under study shaped the overall result of the referendum. However, because the Annan Plan was rejected due to Greek Cypriot, but not Turkish Cypriot rejection, this chapter also aims to determine if the features of the negotiation process considered in this study had an impact on the victory of the 'yes' vote in that community.

The Annan Plan negotiations were launched by the UN Good Offices mission in 1999 in an effort to reach a peace settlement that would allow Cyprus to join the European Union (EU) as a united country. From 1999 until March 2004, Secretary General Kofi Annan and his Special Representative, Álvaro de Soto, mediated the negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders. As agreed in the negotiations, the final text of the agreement did not require their endorsement. Rather, it was left to each of the communities at large to refuse or accept it in separate, but simultaneous, referendums - north and south of the divided island. The Annan Plan referendums were held on the 24th of April 2004 and were the first ever referendum experience in Cyprus. For the Plan to come into force a majority 'yes' vote was required from the both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities to the question:

> Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?

The results were nearly polar opposites: in the Greek Cypriot-administered Republic of Cyprus, the plan was rejected by 75.8 per cent of voters, while 64.9 per cent of voters in North Cyprus voted in favour (United Nations 2004, para. 72). In fact, the physical and psychological separation between the two communities allowed for, not only very different results in each of the communities, but also two very different referendum experiences that will be analysed in this chapter. The 'no' given to the Plan by the Greek Cypriot community on the 24th of April prevented the island from unifying prior to the date set for EU accession.

A divided Cyprus acceded to the European Union and, although the EU takes the whole of the territory of the island to be part of the EU, only the Republic of Cyprus has enjoyed full membership, later becoming part of the EURO currency area.[12]

Characteristics of the negotiation process, such as the arbitration procedure, the secrecy of the process, the use of the EU deadline to apply pressure, and the failure to involve civil society groups in the negotiations, have all been pin-pointed as explanations of why the Annan Plan was rejected (Lordos 2009; Drath 2004; Michael 2007). However, these explanations are limited in two ways. First, while they help us understand how the negotiations shaped the outcome in the Greek Cypriot community, they do not for the Turkish Cypriot. This chapter will demonstrate that the negotiations mediated by the UN Good Offices Mission helped shape the differing referendum experiences and results on each side of the island. It will show that political party support for the plan, the shape and strength of the 'yes' and 'no' campaigns, and the information available to voters during the one-month campaign period, between the last round of negotiations and the day of the referendum, differed in the communities.

Secondly, with a few exceptions (Kaymak 2012; Michael 2007), authors typically do not analyse the referendum campaign periods. Given these deficiencies, existing explanations of why the Annan Plan negotiations 'failed' do not fully explore how specific aspects of the negotiation shaped the campaign period and, potentially, voting behaviours. The case study analysis done here will demonstrate that mediation secrecy, coupled with the arbitration process, not only influenced political leaderships' support for the Annan Plan in the referendum, but also helped the highly politically-backed 'no' campaign to influence a poorly engaged and poorly informed Greek Cypriot community. The reverberation of negative messages from the 'no' campaign among the community, it is argued, was counteracted by a more inclusive process, and a much earlier start of public and media debate on the Annan Plan in the Turkish Cypriot community.

This chapter begins by describing the Annan Plan negotiation process, from the first round of *proximity talks* in 1999, until the final round of negotiations at Bürgenstock, Switzerland, in March 2004. It then proceeds to analyse how those aspects of the negotiations under comparison, namely, how the mediation strategies, political party

[12] A number of EU programs have, nonetheless, financially supported the economic development and infra-structure development in North Cyprus in an effort to reduce the economic gap between the communities.

inclusion, civil society inclusion, and the agreement's design, shaped the referendums in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. It concludes with a synthesis of the case analysis' findings and its discussion with existing academic research and literature on the Annan Plan.

The Annan Plan Negotiations

In 1999, following the European Council's decision to grant candidacy status to Turkey, Kofi Annan and his Special Adviser, Álvaro de Soto, launched a new effort to reach a settlement that would, hopefully, allow for the Treaty of Accession to the EU to be signed by a reunited Cyprus. When the talks began, the Greek Cypriot community was represented by President Glafkos Clerides, the leader of the centre-right Democratic Rally (DISY). Clerides became President in a coalition government with former President Vassiliou's centre-left United Democrats (EDI). Rauf Denktash, the head of the centre-right National Unity Party (UBC), represented the Turkish Cypriot community, as he had since UN-sponsored talks began in 1964. Between December 1999 and November 2000, five rounds of 'proximity talks' were held in Geneva and New York. These proximity talks were, however, unsuccessful in getting the leaders to agree to hold face-to-face negotiations on a comprehensive settlement. Blocking progress, the UN stated, was Denktash's demand that the TRNC be recognized as an independent state before any direct talks take place. Denktash believed that the UN Security Council had put Turkish Cypriots at a disadvantage in the negotiations by recognizing the Republic of Cyprus as a legitimate state, and thus not treating both parties on an equal basis (United Nations 2003, para. 24).

It was not until December 2001 that Denktash would agree to hold direct talks. The breakthrough was possible due to two events: first, the Secretary General's public statement that the 'equal status' of the two parties must be recognized in the final plan; and secondly, Denktash's hostility to EU accession was swayed by the European Union's statement that it would accommodate any special arrangements needed to reduce economic disparities between the two sides (United Nations 2003, paras. 30–32). It was thereafter agreed that the talks would start with 'no preconditions' and with all issues back on the table. Procedurally, the negotiations would rely on the issuing of draft proposals by

the UN Good offices mission that would continuously be revised after consultation with the parties. They would take place under the principle that 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' (United Nations 2001).

In Paris in November 2002, the Secretary General presented the 'Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem' to both Cypriot leaders, and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. According to the document, the negotiations would take place in a three-track framework: *track I* negotiations between the Cypriot leaders; *track II* negotiations on security issues between Greece and Turkey regarding their military presence on the island; and *track III* negotiations on specific issues between technical committees. During the negotiations, technical committees were created to work on cooperation and agreement in specific conflict issues. This allowed for the main political negotiations process to focus on core issues.[13] Importantly, all parties would commit to reaching a final agreement by the 28th of February 2003, to then submit the plan to separate and simultaneous referendums on the 30th of March 2003. This would allow for a reunited Cyprus to sign the Treaty of Accession to the EU at the Copenhagen European Council Summit on the 16th of April of 2003 (United Nations 2003, para. 43).

The decision to have the final agreement ratified by a referendum and not by the leaders, the Secretary General writes, was based on 'A concept (…) that the act of reunification of Cyprus should be an act not of the leaders but of the people on each side' (*ibid*, para. 72). However, Michaelis Papapetrou, who was a member of Clerides' delegation, stated in the interview conducted for this research, that to hold a referendum was a decision aimed at bypassing the need for Denktash's endorsement of the final plan (Papapetrou 2014). The document, therefore, was designed to have the leaders sign, not the entire agreement itself, but a two-page commitment to submit it to the separate and simultaneous referendums (United Nations 2003, para. 55).

The events that took place at the Copenhagen summit, however, marked an important shift in the dynamics of the negotiation process. Denktash declined to attend the final round of negotiations set to take place in the days preceding the Summit (United Nations 2003, para. 47). At the Summit, with Greece threatening to veto the 10 country accession package, EU leaders accepted Cyprus as a new member. This meant that, since reunification

[13] The Committee on Missing Persons, for example, has been considered the most successful committees in the negotiations (Kovras 2014, 46).

was no longer a pre-condition for accession, the strategy originally devised by Holbrooke to use EU accession as an incentive for the leaders to reach a political solution to the Cyprus problem was no longer in place.

Track I negotiations resumed in January 2003 and were briefly interrupted by the Presidential elections in the Republic. Christophoros Fokaides, who was interviewed in the quality of spokesperson for DISY at the time and expert on Clerides' political career (Fokaides 2014b)[14], explained that, due to old age, Clerides had promised to not run for another term and support Alecos Markides' candidacy for DISY's party leader. However, due to external pressures, Clerides decided to re-run to govern for the 19 months necessary to finish the Annan Plan negotiations and reunify the island (Fokaides 2014). With the DISY constituency divided over Markides' and Clerides' candidacies, Clerides lost his re-election to Tassos Papadopoulos, the leader of the right-wing and traditionally nationalistic Democratic Party (DIKO). With the support of AKEL, the communist party led by Demetris Christofias, Papadopoulos ran his presidential campaign affirming that, like Clerides, he wished that Cyprus accede to the EU as a united country, but that he could get Greek Cypriots a better agreement (Fokaides 2014a; Faustmann 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014).

On the 10th of March 2003 at The Hague, Papadopoulos and Denktash were to decide on the signing of the two-page covering-document that committed them to putting the plan to a referendum. Papadopoulos agreed to sign the document, as long as the gaps regarding federal legislation and constituent state constitutions would be filled before the referendum. Denktash had fundamental objections to the plan and requested a re-start of negotiations from square one, since the Greek Cypriot counter-part had changed (United Nations 2003, para. 57). Faced with the deadlock, Kofi Annan announced the end of the negotiation process and held Denktash responsible for its dismay (*ibid*, para. 135-138).[15] However, he left the Plan 'on the table' in case the leaders were to have the political will to carry it forward in the future (*ibid*, para. 60).

Despite the failed negotiations, the Treaty of Accession to the EU was signed by Papadopoulos on the 16th of April 2003. In North Cyprus, the lost opportunity to become part of the EU fuelled opposition to Denktash's governance (Elcil 2014). In an attempt to

[14] Christophoros Fokaides is also the current Minister of Defense of the Republic of Cyprus.

[15] Kofi Annan describes Denktash position as one that, being consistent throughout the decades, failed to recognize the confrontational atmosphere of 1960 had undergone a 'sea change' to the Europe that Cyprus was about to join (*ibid*, para. 135).

appease his community, Denktash took the unilateral decision to open crossing points along the Green Line. For the first time since 1974, the communities were able to visit the other side of the island. Still, the parliamentary elections later that year would reflect Denktash's decreasing popularity, when pro-solution politician Mehmet Ali Talat was elected Prime Minister. To form a government, however, Talat, leader of the pro-solution Republican Turkish Party (CTP) had to form a coalition with the Democratic Party (DP) led by Serdar Denktash, son of Rauf Denktash. In parallel, in January 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdogan had become Prime Minister of Turkey and began actively pursuing EU membership, which was dependent upon a solution to the Cyprus problem. Consequently, Turkey no longer supported Denktash's uncooperative stance at the negotiations, but instead chose to back the opposition and pro-solution parties in the TRNC. Consequently, Denktash's influence within the Turkish Cypriot delegation was progressively reduced (Talat 2014), as will be further demonstrated in this chapter.

With the new political configuration on the Turkish side, Annan invited the respective leaders to New York in February 2004. The goal was now to ensure that the negotiations would be completed by the 31st of March to allow the referendum to take place before the 1st of May - the day the treaty of accession to the European Union would come into force. Both sides would come to agree that a first phase of negotiations would take place in Cyprus until the 22nd of March. If by then no agreement had been reached, the Secretary General would call on the participation and collaboration of Greece and Turkey for a final round of negotiations in Bürgenstock, Switzerland (United Nations 2004, para. 10). This three-phased negotiation, Annan writes, was proposed by Denktash's delegation (now including Talat and Serdar Denktash) and envisioned the novel arbitration procedure. In the case that no finalized agreement was reached, and after consultation with the parties, the Secretary General was given the power to 'fill in the blanks' of the agreement and present a final plan that the leaders would place for referendum in their respective communities (*ibid*, para. 12). During phase one, however, a *volte-face* occurred. Kofi Annan wrote that while '…, the Turkish Cypriot side, was generally prepared to engage on Greek Cypriot proposals (…) and sought to make counter-offers and compromise deals' (*ibid*, para. 21), Papadopoulos' delegation was stalling by presenting 'dense and lengthy papers' in a paced manner and 'regularly insisted on full satisfaction of its demands…' (*ibid*, para. 22).

With still no agreement reached and breaking the previously agreed deadline of March 22nd, the talks moved to phase two. A fourth version of the Annan Plan was presented to the Cypriot leaders in Bürgenstock, on the 27th of March 2004. As planned, the Prime Ministers of the 'guarantor powers', Greece, Turkey, and the UK, as well as representatives of the European Commission for Enlargement, joined in this final round of negotiations. Under pressure from Turkey and his own community, Denktash declined to participate in this final round of negotiations, but gave Prime Minister Talat and Foreign Affairs Minister Serdar Denktash full negotiating powers. Papadopoulos, however, refused to hold face-to-face meetings with Talat's delegation (United Nations 2004, paras. 31–40). A communiqué from the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus reads that Papadopoulos refused to negotiate after being pressured by the UN Secretariat to negotiate new demands from Turkey (PIO 2004a), a version of events that is not corroborated by the UN.

Negotiations then moved to the final third phase, at which it was left to the Secretary General to finalize the Plan. Important issues relating to the sovereignty of the federal state and the powers given to constituent states, the functioning of the executive, the territorial delimitation of the constituent states, property and residency rights, and security guaranties were left to be decided by the Secretary General (United Nations 2004, paras. 65–122). The fifth and final version of the plan was presented to the parties by the Secretary General on the 31st of March. Roughly a month later, the Annan Plan was rejected by Greek Cypriots and accepted by Turkish Cypriots in the separate and simultaneous referendums. The Secretary General condemned Greek Cypriots for the loss of a significant opportunity to solve the Cyprus problem and called on the Security Council and all States to work to eliminate Turkish Cypriot isolation (United Nations 2004, 1–2). The Republic of Cyprus has since enjoyed full membership of the European Union.

Mediation Strategies

The Annan Plan mediation process is an especially rich case in terms of the range of mediation strategies that were employed. Chiefly, the process was unique in allowing for a hybridisation of mediation with the arbitration procedure. Several aspects of Annan and De Soto's strategy have been criticised by scholars and found to have led to the failure of the

Annan Plan initiative (Drath 2004; Lordos 2004; Michael 2007; Kaymak 2012). Indeed, the 'filling in the gaps' by the Secretary General, is pin-pointed as one of its problematic features. It is seen, on the one hand, as leading the UN Good Offices Mission to produce an agreement that failed to address the Greek Cypriot leaderships' concerns (Drath 2004) or, on the other hand, to have allowed Papadopoulos to appear unaccountable for the agreement, enabling him to campaign against it (Kaymak 2012). Additionally, authors argue that because the Annan Plan was negotiated secretively between political elites, the mediators failed to consider, involve, and gain support from other quadrants of society (Drath 2004; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009).

However, beyond generating a negotiation process that did not engage with other stakeholders and groups outside the negotiations, secrecy shaped an important aspect of the referendum. Interviews in Cyprus suggest that, in the Greek Cypriot community, secrecy and lack of engagement with the public meant that voter education did not significantly occur until the start of the referendum campaign period – which was set off by Papadopoulos' negative appraisal of the Annan Plan. Furthermore, although the same mediation conditions applied for the Turkish Cypriots, authors tend to use them only to explain Greek Cypriot rejection, but not Turkish Cypriot acceptance. As it will be argued here, if arbitration and secrecy can explain the low level of support from the Greek Cypriot community, the earlier and greater engagement with the negotiations in the North helps explain why the Turkish Cypriot community was not equally affected.

Impact on Political Leaders Support and the Referendum Campaigns

Upon his return from Switzerland, Papadopoulos spoke to the Greek Cypriot media stating that at Bürgenstock, 'Turkey added eleven new demands (…). These demands, through the procedure of the Secretary-General using his discretion to finalize the text were met either fully or to some extent' (PIO 2004a). This set the tone of the 'no' campaign in the Republic of Cyprus, whose main messages were that the plan was unfair and being imposed on the community (Kentas 2014; Petasis 2004; Faustmann 2014; Epaminondas 2014). The various politicians and campaigners supporting the 'no' vote that were interviewed for this research argued that Turkey had 'won' at Bürgenstock and that, under pressure from the UK and the US, the Good Offices mission were biased in favour of the Turkish side when drafting

the agreement (Kentas 2014; Petasis 2004; Tzionis 2014; Lillikas 2014). To them, the Annan Plan was a biased agreement produced by a biased arbitration process. For example, Tasos Tzionis, who was a member of Papadopoulos' delegation and an opponent of the Annan Plan, stated: 'He (De Soto) expected at the end to be allowed to fill the gaps, meaning that he would be able to impose his will (…)' and that the UN, pressured by the United States, 'wanted a victory for Erdogan, and he was triumphant at the end.' (Tzionis 2014). The same view was expressed by Aris Petasis, an academic who actively campaigned for the 'no': 'There was no mediation processes. It was a big fraud. (…) They were building the block to arrive at the result they had already decided.' (Petasis 2004).

However, it was only in his report to the Security Council in May 2004, a month after the referendum, that the Secretary General described in detail how the gaps between the two sides on the issues left unagreed at Bürgenstock were filled (United Nations 2004). Information on how the gaps were filled by the mediators was, therefore, not available during the referendum campaign and the only other potential source for this information were the members of the Greek Cypriot delegation themselves. Thus, this did not allow the public to effectively judge whether there was mediator bias, as was claimed by the Greek Cypriot campaign. Nonetheless, Papadopoulos' statements resonated with the Greek Cypriot community's fears since, for historical reasons, the two Cypriot communities were (and still are) distrustful of external actors' involvement in the Cyprus problem.[16]

If arbitration allowed Papadopoulos to campaign against the Plan, the same was the case in the Turkish Cypriot community, where Denktash also campaigned for the 'no' vote. However, the Turkish Cypriot community's engagement with the negotiations had been diametrically different to the Greek Cypriots'. Sener Elcil, leader of the Turkish Cypriot Teachers Union (KTOS) and influential figure in Turkish Cypriot civil society, recalled that opposition to Denktash's government had been growing since 2000 and that the breakdown of the negotiations at The Hague meeting in 2002 triggered a series of demonstrations. Eager to put an end to its isolation and dependency on Turkey through EU membership, a section of the community grew impatient with Denktash's negotiating behaviour (Elcil 2014; Özuslu 2014). The 'This Country is Ours' platform was created initially by 47 civil society organizations, business groups and political leaders in 2000, with the aim of putting pressure

[16] The Zurich-London Agreements that led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 were agreed between the UK, Greece and Turkey, and are largely seen as having been 'imposed' on the Cypriot communities. American and Russian involvement during the Cold War increased the pool of actors towards whom the communities have grown distrustful.

on Denktash to negotiate. The platform became the arena for a close cooperation between the pro-solution political party leaders on the left and civil society, particularly Ali Talat and Mustafa Akinci[17] (Elcil 2014; Talat 2014; Akinci 2014).[18] Referring to the period between December 2002 and the referendum, Talat stated when interviewed for this research: 'Mobilizing the people was very important because it actually caused Denktash's withdrawal. (...) Every day and every night there was something for the Annan Plan'(Talat 2014). By the time the Bürgenstock negotiations took place, the Turkish Cypriot community was already largely mobilized and collectively organized to support the negotiations and the Annan Plan in the referendum.

Political leaderships' support for the agreement can highly shape referendum campaigns and affect referendum results. Therefore, an agreement that is not endorsed by important political figures in the community – and especially by those who negotiated it – can naturally struggle to receive support in the referendum. This is one of the main lessons from the Annan Plan process that authors have put forward (Kaymak 2012; Drath 2004). However, the lack of support from leaderships alone does not suffice in explaining the negative outcome in the Greek Cypriot community, especially since the Turkish Cypriot leader also campaigned against it and the Plan still received the support of 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriot voters. The arbitration procedure, by itself, might not have been as flawed as portrayed in the literature. It, in fact, accomplished its original aim of removing the need for Denktash's support for the Plan to allow for the Turkish Cypriot community to decide in the referendum on whether they wanted an agreement or not. On the other hand, if the arbitration process allowed Papadopoulos to appear unaccountable for the agreement and to campaign against it (Kaymak 2012), this does not explain if and why the Greek Cypriot community potentially followed their leader. The lack of the information needed to more critically evaluate the 'no' campaign's messages regarding the bias and unfairness of the mediation process explains why those messages potentially resonated in the Greek Cypriot community.

[17] Mustafa Akinci is the current leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, following his election as President of the TRNC in 2015.

[18] For a more detailed account of the political transformation and civil society mobilization in North Cyprus during the Annan Plan negotiations see Kizilyürek (2012).

Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty

Secrecy was an important part of the UN's mediation strategy, particularly during the *proximity talks* of the early stages of the negotiations. Between June 1999 and April 2003 no reports on the Good Offices mission were issued by the Secretary General and the Security Council was only orally briefed on the negotiation process (United Nations 2003, para. 2). Arguing for the advantages of secret negotiations, Álvaro de Soto stated in an interview in 2002:

> 'Just as there exists the fog of war in which the first victim is the truth, there should exist the fog of diplomacy, or the fog of Good Offices, in which the truth should only come out in the end result.'
>
> De Soto (2002, 89)

Throughout the course of the negotiations, the Good Offices mission would only provide limited information to the media regarding the proceedings. The journalists interviewed for this research explained that the UN mediators would rarely talk to the media. Consequently, politicians became the main source of information for journalists on both sides of the divide (Özuslu 2014; Pavlowitch 2014; Kutay 2014). The choice for secrecy, however, allowed political leaders to withhold, or misgive, information on the negotiation process. In an interview given to two Cypriot TV channels on the 9th of February of 2004, Álvaro de Soto claimed that there was a disparity between what the political leaders were communicating to the public and how the negotiation process was progressing:

> '…from hearing what one side or the other says in public, you get the impression that nothing is happening at all. And there again, I believe that that impression is deceptive. I would not rely much on it.'
>
> De Soto (2004a).

Marios Epaminondas, who campaigned for the 'yes' in the Republic of Cyprus, stated that the secrecy of the negotiations allowed politicians to 'keep the people ignorant about what was being negotiated', 'blame the other side for everything that goes wrong', as well as the UN mediators (Epaminondas 2014). Similarly, Maria Hadjipavlou, an academic, civil society activist, and 'yes' campaigner, believed that the lack of information on how the main issues were being discussed at the negotiations prevented public debate and discussion to begin before the referendum in the Greek Cypriot community (Hadjipavlou 2014). Additionally, the physical separation between the two communities was believed, by several interviewees

who were 'yes' supporters, to have made it easier for Greek Cypriot politicians to withhold or misgive information about the negotiation process, since there was no counter-perspective from the other side of the Green Line reaching their community (Pavlowitch 2014; Pericleous 2014; Epaminondas 2014).

If during the negotiations there was a lack of information available to the public, the referendum campaigns in the Greek Cypriot community were permeated with misinformation. Kosta Pavlowitch, journalist and editor of the *Cyprus Mail* at the time of the Annan Plan negotiations and referendum, stated that at the Bürgenstock negotiations, he witnessed Greek Cypriot journalists 'not cross-checking of sources and running stories on leaks that were made in order to undermine the process.' (Pavlowitch 2014). This misinformation by the media was also found by Yiouli Taki (2009, 187–88) in her analysis of the Greek Cypriot broadcast media reports on the Annan Plan during the referendum campaign. She writes that, particularly on television broadcasts, there was a reliance on distorted information coming from unnamed sources, as well as presentation of uncorrected misinterpretations of the Plan's provisions favouring the 'no' campaign. Also strongly linked to political parties, with the exception of *Politis*, *Alithia* and the *Cyprus Mail,* the majority of the Greek Cypriot printed press was supporting the 'no' vote during the referendum campaign period.

In fact, and too late to overturn it, in the week leading to the referendum, De Soto asked Papadopoulos to publicly dispel misinformation being given by government officials. This misinformation regarded potential negative implications of the Annan Plan regarding civil servants job security in the new state which bolstered teachers unions' support for the 'no' campaign. Papadopoulos categorically refused to fulfil De Soto's request. He wrote to De Soto on the 20th of April:

> 'You ask me publicly to state through the media that the public and the civil service are being misinformed. I do not believe that your assignment gives you any legitimate right to ask me or suggest what my position should or not be.'
>
> Papadopoulos (2004)

After this exchange of letters, and just a few days before the referendum, De Soto was prevented from speaking on the state-funded Greek Cypriot television channel CYBC (De Soto 2004b). Reporting to the Security Council after the referendum, Kofi Annan mentioned this event and stated that 'The efforts of the United Nations to provide explanations and

clarifications about the plan to the public at large were hampered by the media climate on the island' (United Nations 2004, para. 71).

In North Cyprus, on the other hand, by the time the Bürgenstock negotiations took place, the community was already largely mobilized in support of the negotiations. Furthermore, unlike in the Republic of Cyprus, the majority of Turkish Cypriot media was supportive of the Annan Plan. Sami Özuslu, working for SIM at the time, a private radio station that was popular during the referendum, explained that the media cooperated with politicians, academics, and civil society organizations to inform and engage the community in a discussion of the benefits and shortcomings of the Plan (Özuslu 2014). Consequently, especially in the weeks leading up to the referendum, a well-organized 'yes' campaign was effectively reaching the community and framing the Annan Plan as offering a better future for Turkish Cypriots as citizens of the European Union (Kutay 2014).

If negotiation secrecy made for a poorly engaged and misinformed Greek Cypriot community, the same did not occur in the Turkish Cypriot community. The communal uprising against Denktash's brought the negotiation into public discussion as early as 2002. If the use of arbitration and the secrecy of the negotiation process worked to convince 'no' supporters that, as Papadopoulos publicly stated, the Plan was a negative outcome for Greek Cypriots, this was not the case in the North. There, in spite of the secretive negotiations, Turkish Cypriots became engaged and mobilized by the prospect of uniting with the south and becoming part of the EU. Ergo, while secrecy prevented public debate on the Annan Plan to occur in the Greek Cypriot community, the same was not the case in the Turkish Cypriot community.

Political Inclusion

Since the UN-led negotiations first started in 1964, the two Cypriot communities have been traditionally represented by their elected leaders. As a result, the respective delegations are, to this day, formed by the governing party, or coalition of parties who happen to be in power at a given time. The political parties in the opposition would formally be informed on the content and progress of the negotiations through members of the delegations and seldom by the UN Good Offices Mission in both communities (Fokaides

2014a; Akinci 2014). During the Annan Plan negotiations, as per tradition in the South, the Presidents convened National Council meetings to brief all political leaders and former Presidents, as well as receive advice regarding the negotiations. In the North, members of the delegations prepared reports that were made available to all political parties in the Parliament (Akinci 2014).

The exclusion of other parties held, and still holds important consequences for the negotiations. First, as twice occurred during the Annan Plan process, negotiations were delayed or interrupted by election periods. The election of new leaders has hindered compromises previously made by other leaders, or even took negotiations back to square one, as Denktash wanted when Papadopoulos was elected. Furthermore, while elections in the North allowed for a more pro-solution and cooperative Turkish Cypriot negotiation team, a more conservative and less compromising the Greek Cypriot team was put in place.

As will be described in this section, compared with the Greek Cypriot community, political circumstances and mediator behaviours made for an overall more politically inclusive negotiation process in the Turkish Cypriot community. Both, it is argued, shaped political parties' decisions in both communities on whether to support the agreement in the referendum and, consequently the organization and strength of their campaigns.

Impact on Political Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns

After Bürgenstock, the political parties across Cyprus began to publicly display the direction of their support for the peace settlement. In the Republic of Cyprus, Papadopoulos' public positioning against the Annan Plan was determinant to the positioning of the remaining political parties. With the anti-Annan Plan sentiment growing in the Republic, AKEL leader, Demetris Christofias, struggled to maintain the party's support for a solution. Before announcing the parties' position on the referendum, Christofias had unsuccessfully requested that the Security Council offer a guarantee that Turkey would respect the Annan Plan. He asked the Secretary General to delay the referendum until after the date of accession to the EU (Papapetrou 2014). A delay, however, could have jeopardized support in the North (Erel 2014). As AKEL switched its traditionally pro-solution stance to a 'soft no' (AKEL Politician 2014), the move was mimicked by the centre-left Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK).

In DISY, the decision to support the 'yes' was a divisive one. Christoforos Fokaides explained that, when DISY leaders decided to support the 'yes' vote, they had access to polls indicating that the 'no' vote would be more than 60 per cent. Yet, unlike what might have been the case within AKEL, the party members took a vote and decided to support the 'yes'. This decision, he stated, was influenced by Clerides' political stance and the fact that he was the historic leader of the party, as well as former President of the Republic, who had, inclusively, negotiated the first versions of the plan (Fokaides 2014a). However, the decision led some of its members to abandon the party and campaign for the 'no' vote. The split subsequently weakened the party's 'yes' campaign since, as Fokaides explained, 'DISY was careful not to impose the leadership's position, and the support for the Plan was framed as a recommendation'. Consequently, he further concluded, '…it was not possible to develop a full-fledged campaign' (Fokaides 2014a).

During the referendum campaign in the Greek Cypriot community, therefore, the political leaderships of DIKO, AKEL, EDEK and DISY dissenters supported the 'no' vote. In the 'yes' camp there were only two parties, Cleride's DISY and former President Vassiliou's centre-left United Democrats (EDI). Although they collaborated in a few campaign events, DISY and EDI led their own independent campaigns (Hadjidemetriou 2014; Vassiliou 2014).

In the Turkish Cypriot community, a split similar to the one in the DISY beset Serdar Denktash's Democratic Party, leading him to expel prominent members of the party just three days before the referendum (PIO 2004b). The party's involvement in the Annan Plan negotiations challenged its traditional hard-line stance against the federal solution enshrined in the agreement. Levent Kutay, a journalist for the VRT (national) Broadcast corporation during the referendum, explained that the party eventually adopted a 'soft no' stance during the referendum campaign and advised constituents to decide for themselves (Kutay 2014). In effect, the 'no' campaign was led by the National Unity party (Denktash's former party) and elements of the Turkish military present on the island (Özuslu 2014). Like the 'yes' campaign, the 'no' campaign organized demonstrations against the Annan Plan and distributed pamphlets door to door. However, as Talat explained, the 'yes' campaign was more effective than the 'no' campaign because it had been based on long-term continuous mobilization at the grassroots level (Talat 2014). In fact, all interviewees involved in the 'yes' campaign in North Cyprus described it as taking place, not only during the one month time-span between the Bürgenstock final round of negotiations and the day of the referendum,

but as occurring across a wider period starting as early as 2003, or even 2002 (Talat 2014; Akinci 2014; Elcil 2014).

While in the Greek Cypriot community the political parties outside the negotiations waited until the final version of the agreement was made public to announce their position, in the Turkish Cypriot community political parties' public support for the Annan Plan was known much earlier. In fact, it had been the pro-Annan Plan/EU election campaign that led Talat's CTP to victory in 2003 (Hatay 2004). Additionally, not only did the last negotiation team include political leaders from three different parties, Talat and Akinci were consulted by the UN Good Offices mission personnel before Talat was elected Prime Minister (Talat 2014; Akinci 2014). Talat stated that 'Actually, the opposition was negotiating the Plan with the UN instead of the Turkish Cypriot official leader in 2002' (Talat 2014). Akinci further explained that he met with De Soto, upon De Soto's request, during the negotiations to talk '… not about the details, but to give me a general understanding of where the negotiations stood' (Akinci 2014). Therefore, there was a greater and earlier inclusion of Turkish Cypriot political parties in the negotiations than was the case towards Greek Cypriot political parties.

Comparing the two communities, the 'no' campaign was more politically backed in the South than the 'yes' campaign. Under the pressure created by Papadopoulos' strong rhetoric against the agreement and a growing negative public opinion, AKEL's support for the 'no' vote and DISY's split meant that the 'yes' received little political support in the South. In the Turkish Cypriot community, where political parties outside the negotiations had been engaged with the negotiation process - and were, in fact, informally consulted by the UN Good Offices mission at earlier stages of the negotiations - political parties' support for the Annan Plan was more evenly distributed.

Civil Society Inclusion

UN mediation in Cyprus had never formally included civil society groups and the Annan Plan negotiations were no exception. Albeit, as already described, the Annan Plan period witnessed an uprising of civil society movements in support of the negotiations and the Plan in the Turkish Cypriot community. In the South, civil society did not engage with the negotiations to the same extent, nor became particularly mobilized during the referendum campaign period, with the exception of a few groups. Beyond differences in the size and

activity of the civil societies in each of the communities, the interviews conducted in Cyprus revealed that civil society leaders in North Cyprus participated in informal consultations with UN Good Offices personnel. Furthermore, they were generally more mobilized under an umbrella 'yes' campaign that was born out of the This Country is Ours platform. On the other hand, the civil society actors involved in the 'yes' campaign in the South faced significant difficulties in reaching the Greek Cypriot community during the referendum campaign period.

Impact on the Referendum Campaigns

In August 2002, with the aim of putting pressure on Denktash to negotiate, eighty six Turkish Cypriot civil society organizations wrote a declaration of support for the negotiations to the Secretary General. Created within the This Country is Ours platform, *The Common Vision of the Turkish Cypriot Civil Society* urged that a solution be found before the December Copenhagen Summit – where Cyprus' accession was decided. The civil society leaders interviewed, who were signatories of *The Common Vision* declaration, stated that they attended meetings with Good Offices Mission personnel, including De Soto, while the negotiations were ongoing (Erel 2014; Elcil 2014). During the meetings, Sener Elcil, head of the Turkish Cypriot Teacher's Union and active member of the This Country is Ours platform, explained:

> 'They were giving us (the platform) information about the negotiations, on their expectations on progress and the benefits of a solution, but there was no information about positions or compromises that were being made. Just general information'
>
> Elcil (2014).

The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce served as the meeting point. Ali Erel, who was the head of the Chamber between 2001 and 2005, stated 'We had Mr. De Soto visiting us very often, and then Thomas Weston, the representative of the USA was speaking to us as well, and all the ambassadors of the member states'. The civil society and opposition party leaders who participated in these meetings were, Erel added, informing the mediators of 'the communal point of view' and 'helping them, in a way, to recognize the needs of the people better' (Erel 2014).

In his reports to the Security Council, Kofi Annan rarely mentions civil society. However, the following citation, referring to the period before the Copenhagen summit, confirms the interviewees' testimony that informal consultations did take place during the period when Denktash was refusing to negotiate:

> 'Regrettably, the substantive input from the Turkish Cypriot side was extremely general and largely conceptual – leaving the United Nations to seek inspiration for concrete improvements from concerns publicly voiced by a cross section of Turkish Cypriot civil society.'
>
> Annan (United Nations 2003, para. 45)

The Secretary General confirms, therefore, that not only input from civil society leaders in the North was taken, but that it also influenced the agreement's drafting.

During the referendum campaign in the Turkish Cypriot community, the same unions and organizations, as well as political parties, who were part of the This Country is Ours platform cooperated in leading a strongly organized 'yes' campaign. Between December 2002 and March 2004, among other activities, the Platform organized demonstrations, rallies, and 'peace fires' where people linked to the Platform would gather locals to talk about the Annan Plan (Talat 2014; Elcil 2014). In addition, the campaigns created and distributed pamphlets that explained the Annan Plan in a one hundred question-and-answer format.

As far as this research was able to find, the same contact between political leaders or the mediation team members and civil society did not take place among the Greek Cypriot community. This may be explained by the fact that only a handful of NGOs, involved in peacebuilding activities, were found to have mobilized in support for the Annan Plan negotiations as part of their reconciliation work in Cyprus (based on statements by Faustmann, 2014; Hadjipavlou, 2014; Potier, 2014).[19] Marios Epaminondas, who campaigned for the 'yes' in the Greek Cypriot community, described the campaign as being loosely organized and mainly enacted – aside from EDI and DISY's lacklustre support - by individuals and NGOs fostering bi-communal activities (Epaminondas 2014). Yet more importantly, those who campaigned in favour of the Annan Plan were attacked by the 'no' camp. Several Interviewees described how in the weeks leading up to the referendum there was a 'demonization' of 'yes' campaigners and the 'yes' vote (Epaminondas 2014; Hadjipavlou 2014; Papapetrou 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014). Papapetrou (2014), who campaigned for the

[19] The opening of the crossing points, and the Annan Plan referendum experience would, however, have a bolstering effect on civil society mobilization in the south after the referendum (Hadjipavlou and Kanol 2008, 18–19).

'yes' with EDI, stated that he and NGO's campaigning for the 'yes' were accused by politicians in the 'no' camp of being 'traitors' and 'the servants of foreign actors'. Maria Hadjipavlou an academic and civil society activist who also campaigned for the 'yes' gave a personal account: 'The 'yes' vote became the unpatriotic voice (…). It was terrible. I felt that I was a traitor.' (Hadjipavlou 2014). Interviewees in the 'no' camp did, in fact, describe the 'yes' campaign as being enacted and financially backed by external actors, mainly the United States and Britain, in an attempt to impose the Plan upon Greek Cypriots (Kentas, 2014; Lillikas 2014; Petasis 2004).

Civil society groups were also involved in the 'no' campaign in the Greek Cypriot community. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus, although it did not engage in campaigning activities, was publicly against the Annan Plan (US Senate, 2004, 316). The Pancyprian Citizens Movement played an active part in the 'no' campaign by organizing events and distributing campaign materials (Kentas 2014). The group had been created in 2002 and was not initially opposed to the Annan Plan. Georgios Kentas, who was one of the movement's leaders explained: 'We had a strategy. We would not reject the Plan until the final version of it was submitted' (Kentas 2014). Therefore, although the intent of the movement was to mobilize people against the Annan Plan from the start, it was not until the start of the referendum campaign that it became publicly part of the 'no' campaign.

Therefore, although civil society was not as mobilized in the Greek Cypriot community as it was in the Turkish Cypriot, there were groups and individuals who were involved in the 'yes' and 'no' campaigns. However, the greater mobilized civil society in the North made for a comparably more civically inclusive mediation process than in the Greek Cypriot community, even if unintentionally. Although it cannot be said that it was their inclusion per se that caused civil society to engage in the campaign, this suggests that the presence of an engaged civil society, that collaborates and mobilizes the community around the negotiations, can favour their mobilization during the referendum campaigns.

Agreement Design

Officially titled *The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,* the 'Annan Plan' provided for the foundation of the 'United Cyprus Republic', a federal state with two constituent states of equal political status (United Nations 2004, para. 42). Taking from the

Swiss and Belgian constitutions, the Annan Plan proposed a state with a single international personality and sovereignty, where partition and secession were prohibited, but without hierarchy between federal and constituent state law-making (United Nations 2003, paras. 74–76). On the functioning of the executive government, again inspired by the Swiss constitution, the Annan Plan provided for a Presidential Council with a rotating Presidency, meaning that the Presidency would alternate between the election of a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot (United Nations 2004, para. 44). The Plan furthermore provided for a gradual lifting of limitations on the freedom of settlement on the island and a scheme of incentives, compensations, and bonds for displaced or dispossessed land owners that would need to give up their properties in the other constituent state to current occupants (*ibid,* para. 48-50, 55). Given that the previous provision would have been most unfavourable to Greek Cypriots, it was compensated by a territorial adjustment that had the UK ceding Sovereign Base Areas mainly to the Greek Cypriot constituent state (United Nations 2003, para. 116). The Plan laid groundwork for a longer transitional period in the application of the *aquis communautaire* in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state to favour the growth of its fragile economy (United Nations 2004, para. 57). On security guarantees, Greece, Turkey, and the UK would remain as guarantor powers. The number of foreign troops present on the island would be progressively reduced to symbolic numbers, even in the event of Turkey's accession to the EU (*ibid*, para. 47). A UN peacekeeping operation would monitor the agreement's implementation (*ibid,* para. 45).

Especially after the referendum, scholars from each of the communities in Cyprus have examined the merits and shortcomings of the Annan Plan (see, for example, Coufoudakis and Kyriakides 2004; Moulakis 2007; Loizides 2009). At the root of the debate is the question of whether the Annan Plan was a balanced and fair outcome to both communities. However, the information gathered from the interviews conducted in Cyprus suggests that the content of the Plan itself, because it was extensive and complex, might not have directly influenced the Cypriot public on both sides. One reason was that it was an almost 200 page-long complex text of the agreement that Kofi Annan described as 'a truly comprehensive proposal' (United Nations 2003, para. 61). In fact, the Secretary General himself was concerned with how the Annan Plan was being portrayed to the public and the potential impact this could have on the referendum. Less than two weeks before the referendum, he wrote to the Security Council:

> ‘The outcome (of the referendum) is far from certain. The plan is complex and delicately balanced. Inevitably, as in any negotiation, it is a compromise. The presentation of the contents of the plan to the public has not always been equally balanced.’
>
> Annan (United Nations 2004, para. 51)

While the text of the agreement can inevitably and directly shape political leaders’ and parties’ support for an agreement in the referendum, its impact on voting behaviours depends on how well informed voters are about its content and potential implications. Therefore, the extent to which the provisions of the agreement itself have an impact on voter decisions in the referendum, as well as whether voters were more influenced and informed by the campaigns, must be questioned.

Impact on Political Leader/Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns

The fact that the Annan Plan did not require the Cypriot leaders’ endorsement proved to be a significant hindrance for political support for the Annan Plan and is indeed one of the most often pin-pointed reasons for the Annan Plan’s demise (Kaymak 2012; Drath 2004). Both Papadopoulos and Denktash publicly stated that the agreement did not accommodate their interests and both were unwilling to support it. A negotiator in Papadopoulos’ team stated that the Greek Cypriot leader, as well as DIKO, did not support the Annan Plan because the UN Good Offices mission failed to create an agreement that sufficiently addressed Greek Cypriot interests. He argued:

> ‘We never accepted Turkish guarantees and the continuation of the stationing of Turkish troops on the island and bi-zonality as interpreted by the UN. (...) When we accepted a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, we meant something else.’
>
> Tzionis (2014)

This account suggests that Papadopoulos and DIKO did not support the Annan Plan because it did not allow them to ‘sell’ it to their community. However, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, this might have not actually been the case. Among the political leaders interviewed, there was a common perception that Papadopoulos mislead those involved in the negotiation process into believing that he would support the agreement (Papapetrou 2014; Talat 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014; Vassiliou 2014; AKEL Politician 2014; Demetriou 2014).

Former President George Vassiliou and EDI politician Takis Hadjidemetriou, who were involved in the negotiations on the provision of the agreement for the EU harmonization process, stated that they were surprised and felt 'cheated' when Papadopoulos announced he was against the Plan after Bürgenstock (Vassiliou 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014). In fact, it was widely believed among the politicians interviewed in the Greek Cypriot community that Papadopoulos was unwilling to agree on a solution that would not provide for a unitary state where Greek Cypriots would enjoy majority rule and led all to believe that he supported the creation of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. Denktash's intransigence, some argued, had allowed Papadopoulos to maintain a cooperative appearance during the negotiations (AKEL Politician 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014). For this reason, they also believed that Papadopoulos did not negotiate with the aim of getting an agreement that he would be willing to support. For example, Hadjidemetriou described Papadopoulos' delegation's negotiating behaviour as follows:

> 'I noticed that they were examining the Annan Plan in a very strict way, they were scrutinizing everything. In the beginning I thought that this was a good way of negotiating and that a negotiator needs to find all the weak points and negotiate them. Actually, their aim was just the opposite: it was to undermine and destroy the Annan Plan.'
>
> Hadjidemetriou (2014)

On the other hand, those parties who supported the Annan Plan believed that it was not perfect, but that its deficiencies could be addressed after the referendum. For example, Panayiotis Demetriou, deputy-leader of DISY during Clerides' Presidency, further explained that DISY leaders had concerns regarding the implementation of the Plan, but believed it could be improved during its implementation (Demetriou 2014). As was already described, both DISY's and EDI's decision to support the Annan Plan in the referendum had to do with issues of accountability for having been part of its negotiations. This was not the case, however, for AKEL and EDEK, who supported the 'no' vote.

To explain Greek Cypriot political parties' decisions to support the plan based only on whether or not the agreement accommodated their interests is unsatisfying. The fact that the parties announced their positioning on the referendum later in the campaign, lends some support to a thesis that the political parties outside the negotiations felt pressured to position themselves against the Annan Plan due to the anti-Annan Plan propaganda that

grew in the Republic following Bürgenstock. The text of the agreement might not have been the central cause.

Like Papadoupoulos, Denktash purportedly did not support the Annan Plan because, according to his political advisor Ergün Olgun, '…he believed that the provisions in the agreement did not make it sustainable in the long run for the two sides' (Olgun 2014). He further explained that Denktash believed residential properties should belong to the communities administrating the territory, which was not the case in the Annan Plan, and that he was not satisfied with the economic inequality safeguards therein (Olgun 2014). However, unlike Papadoupoulos, Dentash did not negotiate the final version of the Annan Plan. As has been described, by the end Talat was leading the negotiation team with Turkey's support (Talat 2014). Akinci's PDM party keenly supported an agreement that provided for '…a solution on the basis of the principles which had been put down for many years, such as bi-zonality, bi-communality, political equality. (…) we wanted a solution along those lines' (Akinci 2014).

It has been argued that, by bypassing the need for the leaders to endorse the agreement before the referendum, or the use of the arbitration procedure itself, the UN Good Offices mission failed to produce an agreement that satisfied the Greek Cypriot communities' interests and concerns (Drath 2004). However, there is doubt that Papadopoulos would have been willing to 'sell' an agreement that provided for a federal state. In effect, it is also believed that his team did not negotiate with the intent of finding an agreement that would have been 'sold' to the community.

Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty

Irrespective of their community and the direction of their support, all the individuals interviewed for this research in Cyprus believed that the content of the Plan itself, being too long and extensive, was not a significant source of information for the general public. Hubert Faustmann, an academic and President of the Cyprus Academic Forum, explained that Greek Cypriots were faced for the first time with what a solution to the Cyprus problem looked like in the Annan Plan referendum (Faustmann 2014). Chrysostomos Pericleous, a free-lance

journalist during the referendum and President of the Cyprus Academic Dialogue[20] at the time of the interview, explained that Greek Cypriot political leaders had always held a nationalist rhetoric and failed to tell the people that a federal state was the solution being negotiated, rather than the return to a unitary centralised state (Pericleous 2014). Kosta Pavlowitch, editor of the *Cyprus Mail* at the time, agreed that '…there had not been any debate about it, therefore it came as a shock to the Greek Cypriot community' (Pavlowitch 2014). Álvaro de Soto himself has more recently expressed the same view that '…Greek Cypriots had not fully understood, from lack of explanation from their leaders, what a federal system involved.' (De Soto 2012, 402). Additionally, Epaminondas, a 'yes' campaigner, also described how he faced resistance when he attempted to distribute booklets explaining the Annan Plan.[21] He stated: 'They (Greek Cypriots) were positive that it was a bad Plan and (…) they were not ready to listen to any other opinion' (Epaminondas 2014). Therefore, and returning to the argument made earlier in this chapter, the Greek Cypriot community was likely not well informed, and was rather misinformed about the content and implications of the Annan Plan.

Studies based on public opinion surveys have found that the victory of the 'no' vote in the Greek Cypriot community conveyed people's dissatisfaction with specific provisions of the plan, such as those relating to Turkish military presence on the island, financial, property issues, or providing citizenship to Turkish settlers (Georgiades 2007; Lordos 2008). However, these studies have two limitations. First, they do not consider when or how those opinions were formed. Secondly, they do not account for the possibility that, because the surveys were conducted after the referendum, respondents' opinions on the content of the Plan might have been influenced by the campaign period. Lordos (2009; 2004) does tap into the issue of whether Greek Cypriots were informed voters, however, the findings are based on respondents' self-assessment of whether they consider themselves to have been informed about the Annan Plan or not, whereas it would have been important to ask what was/were the respondent's information sources. For example, dissatisfaction with how the Plan dealt with security issues, particularly the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, has been

[20] The Cyprus Academic Dialogue is a pro-unification, bi-communal organization of academics that, since 2010, makes proposals to political leaders and the UN on intractable issues and confidence building measures with the goal of influencing policy-makers and the Cypriot communities alike (Pericleous 2014).

[21] The booklet has been published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo and can be found under the reference: Alexiou, Alexis; Gürel, Ayla; Hatay, Mete; & Taki, Yiouli (2003) The Annan Plan for Cyprus: A Citizen's Guide. Oslo: PRIO.

found to have deeply shaped the 'no' vote. However, the 'no' campaign and Papadopoulos made their case against the Plan by fuelling those precise fears. Less than two weeks before the referendum, in a tearful televised speech, Papadopoulos pleaded with the Greek Cypriot community to strongly vote 'no' to the Annan Plan. The arguments he used would deeply resonate among 'no' supporters, especially that the agreement had 'dangerous obscurities' regarding the issue of security and the presence of Turkish troops on the island. These, he argued, would promote Turkish 'colonization' and division among the communities. 'With the final Annan Plan Cypriots have not been satisfied, however Turkey's pursuit to control and dominate Cyprus has been fully met', Papadopoulos stated (PIO 2004a). Therefore, it is not clear that Greek Cypriots in general were dissatisfied with those provisions of the plan or whether they 'learned' the concern during the campaign. The alternative explanation that Greek Cypriot community was uninformed or misinformed about the agreement is more convincing.

While the interviewees who supported the 'yes' vote in the Republic of Cyprus believed that the one month period between Bürgenstock and the referendum was insufficient to inform the public or lead a sufficient public debate about the plan (Fokaides 2014; Hadjipavlou 2014), it was not seen to have negatively impacted the results in the North (Talat 2014; Elcil 2014). In the Turkish Cypriot community, interviewees believed that the community generally understood the document because it was deeply discussed, particularly on the radio and in newspapers during the two years prior to the referendum (Akinci 2014; Talat 2014; Özuslu 2014; Elcil 2014). Sami Özuslu, a journalist who led a TV show dedicated to the Annan Plan, explained that the media cooperated with politicians and civil society in informing the community about the Plan. Politicians and academics, he recalled, would read and analyse the different versions of the Plan on the radio and in the newspapers (Özuslu 2014). Scholars who have written on the Turkish Cypriot perspectives and experience in the Annan Plan referendum also defend that Turkish Cypriots were informed voters (Bryant 2004; Kaymak 2009), and that this was a direct consequence of the dissemination of information on the Plan since 2002 (Kaymak 2009, 143; Hatay 2004). In the North, therefore, a more engaged community, with a more collectively mobilized civil society and media encouraged public debate on the negotiations for longer and at an earlier time.

Comparing the two communities, the much earlier public debate and civil society engagement in the Turkish Cypriot community suggests that this community was more familiarized with the content of the Plan at the time of the referendum than the Greek Cypriot. A lower level of public information and debate about the negotiations and the content of the plan in the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, suggest that the Greek Cypriot vote was more influenced by political party support and campaign cues.

Process Determinants in the Annan Plan Referendum: a Tale of Two Stories

What emerges from the analysis made in this chapter is that the Annan Plan negotiations and referendum consisted, in fact, of two distinct experiences for the two communities in the north and south of the Cypriot divide. The Annan Plan referendum is, in fact, not only a case of rejection of the peace agreement, but also one of approval. Therefore, it was sensible to consider, not only the negotiation process' influence on the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Plan, but also Turkish Cypriot approval. Surprisingly, it was found in this research that there were differences in mediator behaviours towards each of the leaderships and the communities. Scholars have been fast in judging Kofi Annan's and De Soto's mediation through the rejection of the Plan and not its acceptance by Turkish Cypriots. The fact that these differences in mediator behaviours and in political and civic engagement during the negotiations could be found, further empirically strengthens the overarching argument of this thesis that referendum results are also influenced by how peace negotiations are conducted.

The findings in the analysis partially supported arguments in the literature that mediation strategy contributed to the rejection of the Annan Plan (Drath 2004; Lordos 2004; Michael 2007; Kaymak 2012). However, existing analyses typically did not fully explain how those aspects of the negotiations actually shaped the campaign period and, potentially, voting behaviours. If arbitration effectively allowed President Papadopoulos to not be accountable for the final settlement as is argued in the literature (Kaymak 2012, 106), this chapter contended that it alone does not explain why Greek Cypriots were convinced by the 'no' campaigns' arguments. The secrecy of the negotiation process, it argued, potentially allowed Papadopoulos' unaccountability towards the Plan to be perceived as legitimate. In fact, the

mediation strategies themselves were part of 'no' supporters' arguments in making the case that the Annan Plan was a biased imposition from abroad and a bad outcome for Greek Cypriots, while the UN's credibility as a mediator was undermined. The campaign period, in turn, was dominated by a 'no' campaign, headed by political leaders, that capitalized on the lack of information available to the public to discredit the mediation process. Therefore, if arbitration allowed political leaders to appear unaccountable for the process and outcome of the negotiations, secrecy predisposed an ill-engaged and ill-informed community to follow the cues of the stronger and highly politically backed 'no' campaign, as opposed to a stifled 'yes' campaign.

As previously stated, the argument that Greek Cypriots did not support the Plan because it did not sufficiently address Greek Cypriot concerns is, in view of this research, too simplistic. On the one hand, the Annan Plan was created after four decades of negotiations, with the issues on the table exhaustively negotiated. The argument that the plan was unbalanced is also dangerous for two reasons: it takes responsibility away from political leaders to negotiate agreements that correspond to the will of the majority of people they represent, and secondly, it risks us forgetting that an agreement is a compromise. On the other hand, the interviewees' reports suggested that the content of the Plan itself – extensive and complex – was not directly in the hands of the Cypriot public on either side of the Green Line. What was communicated about the Plan, or the perceptions created about it, thus contributed more to shaping support for the plan in the referendum than the content of the Plan itself.

Like the Greek Cypriot community, Turkish Cypriots were also involved in the same mediation process with arbitration and secrecy. Furthermore, like Papadopoulos, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, also campaigned for the 'no', even adopting a similar rhetoric (Bryant 2004). Still, the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Plan. This chapter found that several factors explain the outcome in the Turkish Cypriot community. The prospect of EU membership certainly motivated support for the 'yes' vote in the Turkish Cypriot community at a time of economic turmoil (Bahcheli 2004; Lordos 2008). Yet, it also triggered an upsurge of political and civic mobilization that affected the negotiation process and shaped the referendum experience in the North. Such an explanation goes further than existing arguments that state Turkish Cypriots supported the Annan Plan because EU accession would bring their decade-long isolation and economic dependency on Turkey to

an end. This diminishes the fact that the implementation of the Annan Plan also signified that Turkish Cypriots would have to live together with Greek Cypriots, from whom they historically feared domination. Secondly, it dismisses the remarkable mass mobilization that took place in North Cyprus in support, first for the negotiations and thereafter for the resulting agreement in the referendum. One additional aspect that contributed to support for the 'yes' in the North was Erdogan's support for the Annan Plan, which is seen to have increased the 'yes' vote among Turkish migrant population. The fact that the agreement provided the possibility of citizenship in the new federal republic to a considerable portion of these settlers, was considered by Talat to have also played an important role in having a portion of them vote 'yes' (Talat 2014). Additionaly, as Sener Elcil explained, the 'yes' campaign in the North also particularly targeted Turkish settlers (Elcil 2014).

What had not been considered before is how the negotiation process was comparatively more inclusive in the Turkish Cypriot community than in the Greek Cypriot community. In the Greek Cypriot community, the secrecy of the negotiation process and the lack of public debate left an uninformed and disengaged public to rely on political leader's cues and the campaign period to make their voting decisions. In the Turkish Cypriot community, on the other hand, there was a much higher and earlier engagement of opposition parties and civil society groups with the negotiations that successfully mobilized the community in support of the Annan Plan. In the North, by the time the referendum took place civil society had been highly mobilized in support for the plan and actively engaged in a strong 'yes' campaign. All while Denktash had been effectively side-lined by Talat and Turkey in the negotiations. In turn, the earlier and higher degree of engagement with the negotiations allowed for a stronger 'yes' campaign, backed by civil society groups, to reach the community during the referendum.

Some of the aspects and dynamics found to have shaped the victory of the 'yes' vote in North Cyprus, it will be shown in the next chapter, evidence strong similarities with the Good Friday Agreement experience. As it will be described, the negotiation process in Northern Ireland also included a larger number of political stakeholder and civil society, and both are found to have favoured the 'yes' vote in the referendum.

4. The Good Friday Agreement Negotiations and Referendum

After the analysis of how the negotiations shaped the rejection of the Annan Plan and the sharp difference in support between the two Cypriot communities in the referendum, we now turn the 'successful' Northern Irish case. As in the previous chapter, the main aim of the analysis of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) negotiations and referendum is to understand how specific characteristics of the negotiations shaped the referendum results. The same features of the negotiations that were studied the Annan Plan case will be investigated in this chapter, which is done for the purpose of allowing the findings in each case to be compared in chapter 5. Equally to the Annan Plan analysis, this chapter aims to uncover if these features of the negotiations can explain the difference in support given to the GFA by the Unionist and Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland.

The *Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations,* also known as Good Friday Agreement or Belfast Agreement, was painstakingly mediated by United States Senator George Mitchell amidst ongoing disruptive paramilitary violence. It was negotiated between an elected group of Northern Irish political parties and took place in Belfast over a period of two years – from June 1996 to April 1998. The tumultuous negotiation process would, however, culminate with the unexpected announcement on the 10th of April of 1998 that a peace agreement had been reached. On the 22nd of May, roughly a month and a half later, the agreement was placed for referendum. Unlike the Annan Plan, the GFA received the support of 71.1 per cent of voters in Northern Ireland. However, while 96-97 per cent of the Nationalist community voted 'yes' in the referendum, the 51-53 per cent support from the Unionist community is comparatively lower (Melaugh and McKenna 1998) – a similar difference to that observed between the Cypriot communities in the Annan Plan referendum. Although the implementation of the agreement was dependent only on an overall majority vote, as will be described in this chapter, it was important for the legitimacy and implementation of the agreement that it received a majority of voter support in each of the communities.

This chapter begins with a description of the GFA negotiation process, from early 1996 to the day the agreement was reached in April 1998. The GFA negotiations became possible and were deeply shaped by the negotiation attempts led by the British and Irish governments in the decades prior. For this reason, scholars use different starting points

when describing the peace process that led to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, or the previously established Sunningdale power-sharing system in 1973, are commonly pin-pointed as the start of the process. Indeed, as it will be described, these events undoubtedly shaped the negotiations agenda and the content of what would come to be the Good Friday Agreement. However, since the focus of this research is on the dynamics of the negotiation process from which the referendum unfolds (and is an inherent part of), the description of the negotiation process begins with the elections to the *Peace Forum* in 1996, which determined which parties would be part of the All-Party talks. Following the description of the negotiation process, the chapter investigates the impact mediation strategy, political party inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement design had on the GFA referendum outcome in that order. It, therefore, mirrors the structure of the previous chapter. The findings are then summarized and discussed with existing academic literature on the case study.

Several characteristics of the mediation/negotiation process have been found to have led to the success of the peace process in Northern Ireland. George Mitchell's mediation style (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Curran, Sebenius, and Watkins 2004), the fact that the negotiations included a majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland (McGarry and O'Leary 2006a; Horowitz 2002), the ground-work led by civil society (Cochrane 2006; Cochrane 2001; Cochrane 2000; Bell and O'Rourke 2007), or the institutions designed in the agreement (Horowitz 2001; McGarry and O'Leary 2006b), have all been shown to have favoured the Northern Irish 'success'. It will be demonstrated in this chapter that, indeed, some of these aspects also favoured support for the agreement in the referendum. Straightforwardly, the fact that the process accommodated the interest of several political parties meant that political support for the Good Friday Agreement was high during the referendum campaign. It will be demonstrated that inclusivity challenged the secrecy of the process, as well as for the participation of civil society actors. This aspect is, in fact, novel in the literature. The less secretive and more inclusive and participatory character of the negotiations, it will be argued, shaped a referendum campaign period where the majority of the political parties campaigned for the 'yes' vote, alongside a virtually professionalized civil society-led 'yes' campaign. Also, in accounting for what aspects of the negotiations and the referendum could help explain the difference in support given by the two communities, the British government's involvement is seen in a less positive light than they have in the

literature. The pressure applied on Ulster Unionist Party Leader, David Trimble, to accept the agreement and the ambiguity of the text of the agreement are both found to have hampered the Unionist community's support in the referendum.

The Good Friday Agreement Negotiations

The GFA negotiations marked a departure from previous attempts led by the British and Irish governments to manage the Northern Ireland conflict. The failure of the Sunningdale power-sharing experience of 1973-1974 brought the realization that an agreement would not be sustainable without the inclusion of the political parties associated with the paramilitary groups (Horowitz 2002, 194, 203; McGarry and O'Leary 2006b, 262). Consequently, and recapturing what was already described in the introductory chapter, the decommissioning of the paramilitaries and their pledged rejection of violence became the preconditions for this more inclusive approach. Yet, while Unionist parties and the British government demanded that paramilitary organizations give up their arms before any negotiations began, the PIRA defended that it would not hand-in any arms prior to the start of the talks (Mitchell 1999, 29). In an attempt to break the stalemate, an independent commission was set up. United States Senator George Mitchell was invited by President Clinton to chair the *International Body on Arms Decommissioning*. The *Mitchell Commission*, as it became known, reported on the 22nd of January 1996 recommending that a simultaneous and parallel decommissioning of the republican and loyalist paramilitaries take place, alongside the talks (art.34, 47).

The Commission's report also recommended that elections be held to decide which political parties would participate in the forum for All-Party talks, where discussions on a political settlement would take place (art.56). The elections to the *Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue,* also known as the *Peace Forum,* were held on the 30th of May 1996. Five seats were ascribed for each Westminster Parliamentary constituency of Northern Ireland, under the D'Hondt method of party-list proportional representation, and an extra two seats were ascribed for the ten parties polling most votes. The electoral system was designed by the British government in order to allow the small loyalist parties to participate

in the negotiations, since it was expected that Sinn Féin[22] would get enough votes, being the fourth largest political party in Northern Ireland at the time (Mitchell 1999, 43). In the election, 10 political parties were granted seats at the Forum and the mandate to negotiate in the *All Party Talks*, where representatives of the British and Irish governments would be present for consultation. The parties and the size of their delegations were as follows:

Political Party	**Number of delegates**
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	30
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	24
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)	21
Sinn Féin	17
Alliance Party	7
United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP)	3
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)	2
Ulster Democratic Party (UDP)	2
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition	2
Labour Party	2

Fig. 1. Number of delegate seats per political party in the *Peace Forum* [23]

Headed by David Trimble, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), was the largest Unionist political party at the time and, hence, gained the highest number of seats in the Forum. The UUP was reluctant to accept any form of power-sharing with the Nationalist community, especially with Sinn Féin, or to allow the involvement of the Irish government in Northern Ireland politics. The second largest party, founded the Presbyterian Church leader Reverend Ian Paisley, was the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP pursued a harder political line in advocating for the dominance of unionism and of the Ulster identity in Northern Ireland.

[22] Sinn Féin is widely believed to be the political arm of the PIRA, although the connection between the two has always been denied by its leaders.

[23] Source: 'The 1996 Forum Elections' available at *Northern Ireland Elections* website: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/

The DUP and the smaller United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP), led by Robert McCartney, were ideologically resistant to power-sharing.

As a result of the electoral system, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) (linked to the Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commandos) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) (linked to the Ulster Defence Association) gained seats at the negotiations. Having a loyalist paramilitary constituency, the release of prisoners became an important issue for these parties when the topic was introduced by Sinn Féin later in the negotiations. Also, unlike the remaining Unionist parties, the PUP and the UDP accepted Sinn Féin's participation in government (Horowitz 2002, 208).

The two existing Nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin, both gained seats in the Forum. Led by John Hume, the SDLP was the largest Nationalist political party at the time. Born out of the civil-rights movement of the 1970s, the party professed a more moderate version of Irish nationalism that did not preclude the end of Stormont (McGrattan 2010, 39). SDLP supporters were, nonetheless, divided over whether unity with the Republic of Ireland should be understood as the long-term goal, or whether they preferred to remain in the United Kingdom. The second largest party, Sinn Féin, originally represented the republican stance of immediate unity with Ireland and promoted the strategic necessity of the PIRA armed struggle against British rule (Ruane and Todd 1996, 67,70). By the start of the GFA negotiations, however, the party's position was softened and articulated as being part of an Irish Peace initiative aimed at removing the need for violence (Adams 1997).

Two moderate, but organically different, political parties also gained seats in the Forum, namely; the older bi-communal Alliance Party and the, also bi-communal but civil society-led, Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC). The Alliance Party was founded in April 1970 by members of the Catholic and Protestant communities who were against political sectarianism (Close 2014). Promoting the unity of the two Christian Churches and gathering support across the two communities, the Alliance Party supported a pragmatic union with Britain within a power-sharing arrangement, and represented a small percentage of the Protestant community (Ruane and Todd 1996, 60–61). The Alliance Party representatives' capacity to communicate with both sides made the party leaders, Lord John Alderdice and Deputy-leader Seamus Close, key participants in the negotiations (Mitchell 1999, 44).

The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, on the other hand, was set up for the specific purpose of participating in the negotiations. A group of Catholic and Protestant women created the party in 1996 in a bid to take advantage of the electoral system created for the Peace Forum, which favoured the inclusion of smaller parties in the negotiations. Their main aim was to have women participating in the negotiations to represent and advocate for women's issues. The Women's Coalition's constituency was composed of women from both denominations who were active in civil society. The internal structure of the party was that of a Coalition - not a traditional party – with two leaders, Monica McWilliams, a Catholic, and Pearl Sager, a Protestant. Its members were originally concerned about the absence of women in politics, and particularly in the negotiation process. However, the party's negotiating agenda broadened as the negotiations progressed, explained Avila Kilmurray and Jane Morrice, founding members of the Women's Coalition (Kilmurray 2014; Morrice 2014). Morrice stated:

> 'We did not want to pigeonhole ourselves into only dealing with women's issues. (…) The economy, jobs, education, health, and welfare, were the sort of issues we thought should have been on the negotiations table, not just the military and paramilitary issues.'
>
> Morrice (2014)

The treatment of victims, the integration of former prisoners, integrated education, and the participation of civil society in political life became important issues during the course of negotiations for the party (Kilmurray 2014).

Although the elections to the Peace Forum determined which parties would negotiate the agreement, the negotiation process which eventually produced the GFA did not, in fact, take place in the Peace Forum[24]. While the Peace Forum discussed some of the issues under negotiations and put forward proposals to the main talks, the agreement was actually negotiated between the delegations of the different parties in the *All Party talks*. In addition to the representatives of the Northern Ireland Political parties, representatives of the British and the Republic of Ireland's governments were present at the talks. In fact, the groundwork and basis for agreement of the All-Party negotiations had been laid by the agreements reached between the governments in the decades prior. They determined that Northern

[24] The Peace Forum, nonetheless, contributed to the inclusiveness of the process. To the PUP in particular, the possibility of making proposals to the *All-Party* talks through the Forum, allowed those connected to the PUP to become involved in the negotiations and to feel part of the political process (Irvine 2014). In the DUP and UKUP case, because the Nationalist parties refused to participate in the Forum and, therefore, Sinn Féin did not take its seats in the Forum, it allowed it to continue to be involved in the negotiation process when they abandoned the Multi-Party talks.

Ireland would be based on a power-sharing model, and that there would be North-South and British-Irish institutional arrangements to facilitate a three-way cooperation between the two governments and the local government in Northern Ireland. Therefore, in terms of substance, the All-Party talks focused on negotiating the detail of how those overarching institutions would come to be.

Procedural aspects of the negotiations were agreed between all the parties before the first session of the talks. Subsequently, just as the Annan Plan negotiations would come to be years later, the negotiations in Northern Ireland were based on the principle that 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'. Another important procedure suggested by the British and Irish governments and agreed by the parties in Northern Ireland was the three-strand negotiation structure. The separation of the negotiations into three strands meant that each strand encompassed negotiations between different actors: Strand One covered the negotiations between political parties of Northern Ireland regarding relationships within Northern Ireland; Strand Two referred to negotiations on the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; and, finally, Strand Three referred to negotiations on the relationships between the British and Irish Governments. Yet, unlike in the Annan Plan negotiations, it involved a triple-lock ratification system that required both the political leaderships' and the communities' endorsement of the final agreement, plus that of the two governments. The triple-lock system[25], set that the process of ratification would be incremental: first it would have to receive the support of the political parties in the negotiations; then from the British parliament and the Irish government and parliament; and lastly, it would have to be supported by a simple majority of the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum.

After chairing the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, George Mitchell was invited by the British and Irish governments to chair the plenary sessions of the All-Party talks (Mitchell 1999, 45). Once more, he teamed-up with his co-chairs from the Commission on decommissioning: John de Chastelain, a Canadian diplomat retired from the Canadian Defence Forces chosen by the British government, and Harri Holkeri, a former Finish Prime Minister chosen by the Irish government. The first plenary session of the talks took place on the 10th of June 1996 at the Castle Buildings in Stormont, Belfast. Since the loyalist

[25]Taken from the 'Consultation Paper - Ground Rules for Substantive All-Party Negotiations' issued by the British Government on Friday 15th of March 1996.

paramilitaries had maintained their cease-fire, the political parties associated with them were allowed in the talks. However, Sinn Féin was excluded for the PIRA's breach of the 1996 cease-fire (Fitzduff 2002, 128–29). The cease-fire was restored in 1997, allowing Sinn Féin to enter. At this point, however, Ian Paisley's DUP and the UKUP refused to take part in the negotiations including Sinn Féin and abandoned the talks. This meant that a fringe portion of the Unionist community would not be represented at the peace talks from then on.

The distrustful relationships between the Nationalist and Unionist leaderships, and continued paramilitary violence, meant that the negotiation process did not produce any commitments on specific issues until the last week of the proceedings. Additionally, while the 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' principle allowed the parties to negotiate more freely, it also allowed them to not commit to any concessions or proposals during the negotiations, as SDLP delegate Sean Farren explained:

> '… the parties could re-open an issue in the light of further developments and it was necessary that that principle be there. It safeguarded every party's position. What was happening, however, was that the parties were not committing themselves to what was on the table and it was important that the Chair state that it was time to commit.'
>
> Farren (2014)

In early 1998, Mitchell decided that 'an early, hard deadline' was necessary (Mitchell 1999, 143). The deadline, however, was not imposed. He writes in his memoir: '…I didn't impose anything on the participants. I didn't have to. They accepted the deadline because they were eager as I was to get an agreement' (Mitchell 1999, 146). The calendar agreed on by all, was that the parties would meet continuously from the 30th of March to the 9th of April, the deadline for agreement. During this period, all parties and governments would communicate their final comments on the agreement to the mediation team. In between, a first draft of the comprehensive agreement would be drawn by the mediation team and presented to the parties on the 3rd of April. It would then be reviewed after consultations. A second draft would be presented on the 6th and the final 4 days (and nights) would be dedicated to the final negotiations. These would culminate with agreement on the 9th of April, on Easter weekend (ibid, p.145). The date was an important religious celebration for both communities, but more importantly, Mitchell (1999, 145) wanted the referendum to be held in late May and for the new power sharing Assembly to be in place before the peak of

the July parades, or *marching* season, which typically brought an upsurge of violence in Northern Ireland.

The final 48 hours of negotiations were the most crucial to the outcome. The independent authority given to the North-South bodies agreed by the governments on strand two arrangements was unacceptable to Trimble. It raised Unionist parties' fears that it would become the precursor of a united Ireland and had to be renegotiated. The early release of paramilitary prisoners was another divisive issue, with both Sinn Féin and the loyalist parties pushing for it, against the UUP's resistance. Decommissioning remained a crucial issue as well. Unlike what the Mitchell Commission had recommended, no arms were decommissioned during the negotiation process. The UUP insisted that a provision be included in the agreement, that would set decommissioning as a requirement for participation in the new Assembly, which was unacceptable to Sinn Féin and did not feature in the final agreement (Mitchell 1999, 171–81). Despite these differences, an agreement was reached on the 10th of April 1998, just one day after the previously set deadline.

The referendum campaign took place over the one month period between the announcement and the day of the referendum, the 22nd of May. All the political parties who were signatories of the agreement supported the 'yes' vote, while the DUP and UKUP became the 'no' campaign. As part of the agreement, it was required that the Republic remove its constitutional claim to Northern Ireland, and because any change to the constitution of the Republic of Ireland required a referendum, the GFA referendum was held simultaneously with a constitutional referendum in the Republic. In the south, 94 per cent voted in favour of changing Ireland's constitutional claim on Northern Ireland. With a high 81.1 per cent turnout, 71.1 per cent of voters in Northern Ireland voted 'yes' to the implementation of the agreement (Northern Ireland Elections 2001). The referendum campaign period and how it was shaped by negotiation process conditions is analysed next.

Mediation Strategies

Among the several members of the different party delegations interviewed for this research, there was an overall extremely positive view of George Mitchell and his contribution to the peace process. Interestingly, they do not regard Mitchell as a mediator

because his facilitative and procedural mediation strategies are not considered to be mediation *per se.* As will be demonstrated in this section, the negotiation delegates interviewed for this research rather view the role of a mediator as one where the actor exercising mediation has more power over the process. The British and Irish governments, on the other hand, are regarded as having been the powerful agents in the process. In particular, the Blair government is seen to have interfered with Mitchell's mediation. The US, the Irish government and the British government provided crucial incentives and pressure for an agreement to be reached - and even later in the implementation of the agreement. However the pressure applied to the UUP during the last phase of negotiations, it will be shown, shaped the referendum and particularly affected the Unionist community's support for the agreement. The British and Irish governments were instrumental in getting the political parties of Northern Ireland to accept the agreement. However, when the impact this had on the campaign period and the outcome of the referendum is considered, the consequences of the role played by the Blair government in particular can be seen as less benign.

Another aspect of the negotiations analysed here, is the negotiations secrecy and how it shaped public information and uncertainty in the referendum. Secrecy was a significant feature of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The back-channel secret negotiations between the British government and the republican movement have been found to have played a crucial role in forging communication and trust between the two actors, which ultimately favoured the politicization and inclusion of Sinn Féin in the peace process (O'Kane 2015; Dochartaigh 2011). Nonetheless, and surprisingly, the degree of secrecy of the All-Party talks themselves has been given little attention in the literature. It is argued here that, although the GFA negotiations in Northern Ireland were typically political-elite-driven negotiations, they cannot be said to have been secret. The findings suggest this and other features of the process allowed for there to be information available to the public and less uncertainty about the outcome of the negotiations, and hence the issues at stake in the referendum among the communities in Northern Ireland.

Impact on Political Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns

George Mitchell's personal characteristics and his mediation skills are considered to be largely associated with the success of the negotiations by all the negotiations delegates interviewed for this research. SDLP delegate, Alban Maginnes referred to his neutrality and credibility:

> '…his character, gentle but firm, professional and realistic. I think that people built up confidence in him as a Chair, that he was genuinely neutral and concerned with their individual political positions and wanted to try and do his best for them.'
>
> Maginnes (2014)

UUP chairman, Lord Empey, emphasised his personal skills: 'George was excellent. He had been a judge and he understood processes and the minutia of our arrangements and he and his team served us well'. Jane Morrice, delegate for the NIWC, referred to him as 'an amazingly valuable mediator (Morrice 2014). The mediation team's work was, in fact, so highly appreciated that Jeffrey Donaldson, a UUP delegate in the negotiations, believed that it should have continued onto the implementation process because '(…)they were the ones who acquired the knowledge and understanding of the needs of both sides' (Donaldson 2014).

Interestingly, all negotiators described Mitchell's role in the talks as that of a 'facilitator', rather than a 'mediator'. Yet, the descriptions provided by the interviewees match the facilitative and procedural mediator strategies categorized in the literature. For example, Lord Empey, stated that Mitchell did not perform mediation, but he does describe Mitchell's work as facilitative and procedural: 'to coordinate the talks, to have a process, to ensure that meetings were called, held, recorded properly, and to some extent you were batting ideas across the table' (Empey 2014). Several interviewees mentioned Mitchell's communication-facilitation skills, such as his ability to listen and then sum up the parties' statements 'encapsulating all in a few words to allow us to move on', said Alliance Party delegate Seamus Close (Close 2014). NIWC delegate Avila Kilmurray further explained how this allowed the parties to focus on *what* was being said instead of *who* was saying it, which helped find common ground between the different parties' positions (Kilmurray 2014).

Among the negotiators interviewed, however, there was a consensual perception that Mitchell was limited by the two governments during the last week of negotiations, when

Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern joined the talks in Belfast. Lord Alderdice (2014), leader of the Alliance Party at the time, explained that Mitchell was limited by the fact that he came to mediate as a request from the two governments, which made it difficult for him 'to make an agreement proposal that the two governments would not support' and allowed them to 'interfere' with his work (Alderdice 2014). The UUP delegates interviewed believed that Mitchell was pressured and side-lined by the governments after the setting of the deadline. Indeed, in his memoir, Mitchell states that the governments' requested that the draft proposal on strand two arrangements be put forward to the parties when he personally believed the proposal was unacceptable to Trimble:

> 'To add to my already high anxiety, the government officials now requested on behalf of the prime ministers that we include in our comprehensive document what they had agreed on *without any changes*. They did not want a single word or a single comma altered. And we were told it should go in as *our* draft, not theirs.'
>
> Mitchell (1999, 160)

Mitchell also writes that he and his team decided to respect the governments' request because they understood that part of their job as mediators was to 'absorb blame' (Mitchell 1999, 156).

On the day the agreement was reached, Trimble put the agreement draft to a vote within the UUP delegates. A small majority supported the agreement (Donaldson 2014) and just hours before the agreement was announced, the media reported on UUP delegates abandoning the Castle Buildings. Two of these delegates (today in the DUP) believed the agreement was biased towards the Nationalist community (Weir 2014; Donaldson 2014). Peter Weir, for example, stated that 'it was biased towards those who were connected with paramilitary activity. It certainly did not create a level play between Unionists and Republicans.' To them, the Irish and British governments side-lined George Mitchell and took over the negotiations during the final week of the talks, where Prime Minister Tony Blair pressured David Trimble into supporting an agreement that was bad for the Unionist community:

> 'The dynamic of the peace process for the British government, and probably for the Irish government, was to keep Sinn Fein on board. Their priority was not about satisfying Unionist requirements but about satisfying Sinn Fein's, and there is no doubt that it undermined David Trimble's position.'
>
> Donaldson (2014)

Although all regarded the governments' participation as both necessary (after all, the agreement required legislation from Dublin and Britain) and positive, the UUP delegates interviewed believed that the British government's eagerness to put an end to the paramilitary threat to Great Britain, pushed Unionists to concede more than they were ready to at the time (Weir 2014; Empey 2014). The split over the agreement meant that the UUP's support for GFA in the referendum was divided. Members of the party did not participate in the campaign and others were publicly vocal on their views against the agreement. Consequently, the campaign period had an important impact on the referendum results and has been found to have deeply shaped the Unionist community's vote. Hayes and McAllister (2001, 78–80) demonstrate that right after the agreement was reached, public opinion polls showed a higher than 80 per cent rate of support for the agreement. Overall support then markedly dropped to between 50-60 per cent due to a decrease in support in the Unionist community. They argue that support in the community shifted when Ulster Unionist leaders began to publicly express reservations towards the agreement.

McGarry and O'Leary (2006a, 48–54) do recognize that pressure was responsible for the lack of support from 'unionism' to the agreement and '…remains its chief political weakness'. Nonetheless, this negative impact is largely downplayed via the argument that it allowed an agreement to be reached. While applying pressure can be effective in getting negotiation parties to arrive/accept an agreement, this can have significant implications on support for the agreement in a referendum. As was the case in the GFA negotiations, pressure created internal divisions in the Ulster Unionist party that inevitably weakened the parties' support for the agreement, its campaign and, ultimately the Unionist communities' support for the agreement.

Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty

With the exception of the 'lock-down' during the last 48h hours of negotiations, during which none of the delegates were allowed to leave the Castle Buildings, all of the Northern Ireland delegates interviewed for this research rejected the idea that the GFA negotiations were held in secret. For example, Winston Irvine, a delegate for the PUP, stated that 'They were private, rather than secret.' (Irvine 2014), but confidentiality was the term preferred by virtually all the delegates interviewed. For example, within the UUP delegation, Peter Weir

stated that 'Confidentiality is the more appropriate term (…)' (Weir 2014) and Lord Empey also believed that 'There rather was a degree of confidentiality (…)' in the talks. Confidentiality was described as necessary by all. For example SDLP delegate Alban Maginness stated:

> 'Confidentiality was important. I would not call it secrecy. (…) People have to be able to talk frankly. However, if they talk frankly and it is leaked and exposed, it can be very damaging.'
>
> Maginness (2014)

Sinn Féin delegate Alex Maskey agreed:

> 'There are times you need to have conversations which might be uncomfortable for anybody or everybody. (…) There is a need for people who are involved in a negotiation to, A, get to know each other, B, to explore each others' positions.'
>
> Maskey (2014)

Nonetheless, keeping confidentiality was still problematic. Mitchell valued the secrecy of the talks because leaks could lead to increases of violence, which would disturb the negotiations by generating distrust and resentment between participants. However, he states in his memoire that eventually, 'The leaks became so common that we joked about them' (Mitchell 1999, 145).

Still, confidentiality was 'a balance to be struck because you have to manage expectations', explained Jeffrey Donaldson (Donaldson 2014), but also to keep the public informed. For example, SDLP negotiator Sean Farren (2014) perceived the negotiation process as being relatively open because the parties were eager to give daily accounts to the media on the negotiations progress. The Alliance Party, as well, was keen to have the media around the negotiations: 'We wanted, as far as possible, for the community to know what was going on and to feel positive about that', Lord Alderdice explained (Alderdice 2014).

It could be argued that political leaders' willingness to speak to the media does not necessarily accrue to there being more information available to the public about the negotiations since, as Mark Devenport, who was a BBC correspondent to the GFA negotiations explained, political leaders tended to 'spin' information to influence public opinion:

> 'When you are covering negotiations you have to be aware that some of the things that you are being told are maybe the truth of what was happening, some

> of the things are being said in order to influence the progress of negotiations inside the building.'
>
> Devenport (2014)

However, the number of participants in the talks was believed to have favoured journalistic access to information on the negotiations. For example, when comparing the GFA negotiations to the *Haass talks*[26]*,* Devenport stated that it was easier to get information on the negotiations during the former than the latter, because the former had a greater number of participants (Devenport 2014).

The inclusion of more political parties, therefore, meant that it became harder to control what would become known to the public about the negotiations and that there were more sources of information for journalists. Additionally, including a more varied type of political parties meant that these parties related differently with their constituencies and some were keener on informing their constituencies, than others. For example, the Women's Coalition would request expert opinions on specific negotiation issues from the civil society and NGO's that were part of its constituency. As NIWC delegate Avila Kilmurray explained, 'The purpose was both to get expert views from the outside, but also to get buy-in for the (negotiations) process' (Kilmurray 2014). Other interviewees also described a closer engagement with their constituencies during the negotiations, particularly the smaller parties. This was the case with Sinn Féin and the PUP (Irvine 2014; Maskey 2014). Sinn Féin delegate Alex Maskey (2014), explained that the party organized local area and town hall meetings where party leaders would feel the need to filter and demystify information circling in the media about the negotiation process:

> 'We would go to the social club and community centre and invite people who were our supporters. They would be keen to know where things were at and what was happening at the moment, within the boundaries of the confidentiality or sensitivity (…).We had a position that our community and our membership should not have any surprises with the negotiations.'
>
> Maskey (2014)

Overall, precisely due to their size, the smaller parties of Northern Ireland were more engaged with their constituents, and were more consistently informing and engaging with them during the negotiations, mainly to draw and keep their support.

[26] At the time the interviews in Northern Ireland were conducted in 2014, the All-Party talks on remaining divisive issues of flags, parades, and the past, had come to an unsuccessful end. The talks were mediated by George Mitchell's successor as United States Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, Richard Haass and are commonly referred to as the 'Haass talks'.

Additionally, the overall lines of agreement were not new to the people in Northern Ireland. As was stated earlier in this chapter, the agreements that had been reached over the previous decades between the British and Irish governments laid the foundations for the GFA. Therefore, the constitutional issues had been in the realm of public discussion as far back as the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973. Furthermore, public opinion polls were conducted to aid the negotiations and the agreement drafting process. They also had the intent of increasing public participation and the transparency of the process (Irwin 2001, 62). Confidentiality, nonetheless, allowed the most controversial aspects of the agreement to be announced to the public as a whole, or a package – which was a necessary consequence of the negotiations being led under the 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' principle. One of these aspects was the release of prisoners, whose impact on the referendum campaign and outcome are analysed later in this chapter.

Although there has been interest in the study of back-channel negotiations, the 'confidentiality' of the All-Party negotiations has not yet received attention in the literature. What emerges from the analysis made here is that this lesser degree of secrecy of the All-Party talks is also associated with the number of participants in the process. Firstly, the number of participants made it difficult for the mediator to control the outbound of information to the public. Secondly, it allowed for the inclusion of political parties more willing to have an open negotiation process, particularly the Alliance Party and the Women's Coalition, as well as the smaller loyalist and republican parties who were more engaged with their constituencies during the negotiations. Thirdly, it meant that journalists had a larger pool and more diversified sources of information on what was happening at the talks - information that would then become known to the public. The inclusivity of the negotiation process and its implications on the referendum will be more closely analysed in the next section.

Political Inclusion

The political inclusiveness of the GFA negotiations is largely seen as one of the merits of the process within the literature. Inclusivity has been generally understood to have allowed for the strengthening of moderate parties (Horowitz 2002, 218). It is also considered to have

provided for the moderation of the more extreme parties involved which, in turn, is found to have allowed the agreement to be reached and to have favoured its durability (McGarry and O'Leary 2006b, 262). The inclusion of republican and loyalist paramilitaries reduced the possibility of the peace process being destabilized by paramilitary violence, which had sabotaged compromises in the past and polarized society (*ibid*). By engaging these groups, particularly republicanism, and granting legitimacy to their claims, the peace process has been found to have created incentives for them to adhere to the nonviolent, political pursuit of their claims (Toros 2008, 416–17). This has led other scholars to argue against labelling such groups as spoilers, since they might not be necessarily against peace (Cochrane 2008, 109), but also that pre-conditions for their inclusion must be introduced to ensure their commitment to it (O'Kane 2010, 249–50).

Before the impact of political inclusion on the referendum outcome is considered, it is important to discuss what this politically inclusive process meant in terms of actual negotiation dynamics. Due to the initial absence of Sinn Féin and the DUP's and UKUP's *walk-out,* the *All-Party* talks were never held between all the 10 elected parties at the same time. For this reason, they are often rather referred to as *Multi-Party* talks. The Multi-Party negotiations were also not a multilateral give-and-take process and relied on mediators shuttling mainly between the SDLP and the UUP (Horowitz 1985, 202; Alderdice 2014). Avila Kilmurray, for example, described the negotiations as follows:

> '…a lot of shuttle diplomacy was really done on a bilateral party basis between representatives of the Irish and British governments and the various parties. Only when there was a possibility of getting some sort of agreement were the multi-party talks actually held.'
>
> Kilmurray (2014)

Nonetheless, the politically inclusive process that, as explained earlier, emerged from the wish of the British government to include the smaller Unionist parties associated with the loyalist paramilitaries, set the stage for a multi-party negotiation process that, as will be argued next, favoured wide political support for the agreement in the referendum.

Impact on Political Party Support and the Campaigns

When the GFA was reached in 1998, the Nationalist community was fully represented with both the SDLP and Sinn Féin endorsing the agreement. The Unionist parties still at the

table were the UUP, the PUP and the UDP. Gathering support from both communities, the Alliance Party and the Women's Coalition were also agreement signatories. All the political parties who signed the agreement supported and campaigned for the 'yes' vote. However, while the two Nationalist political parties were fully in support of the 'yes' vote, support among political unionism was divided. While the loyalist and smaller PUP strongly campaigned for the 'yes' (Irvine 2014), the split in the UUP weakened its support. Members of the party were unwilling to participate in the 'yes' campaign and some were publicly vocal about their opposition to the agreement.

It has been argued in the literature that the DUP's self-exclusion from the negotiations allowed Trimble to hold a more compromising position that ultimately allowed an agreement to be reached (Horowitz 2002, 218). However, the DUP's and UKUP'S self-exclusion had a significant impact on the referendum experience and outcome. Both Ian Paisley and Robert McCartney campaigned using emotive and 'apocalyptic' language to appeal to the Unionist community's fears and patriotic feelings (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 249). Political inclusion, hence, is particularly significant in explaining the differences of support between the communities in the referendum. As Lord Alderdice explained:

> 'All the parties on the Nationalist side, all the parties in the republic of Ireland, everybody was supportive of it. On the Unionist side you had two political parties who were completely opposed to it - the UKUP, and more importantly the DUP - with very articulate leaders.'
>
> Alderdice (2014)

The fact that the Nationalist community was fully represented in the negotiations and that both the SDLP and Sinn Féin supported the agreement meant that political support for the agreement was high in the Nationalist community. In the Unionist political camp, on the other hand, the absence of the DUP and the UKUP made political support for the agreement comparatively lower. It also meant that, unlike the Nationalist community, the Unionist community was targeted by a 'no' campaign.

In sum, all the political parties who remained in the process supported the agreement in the referendum and, although in different ways and tones that are described in more detail later in this chapter, campaigned for it. The fact that only the two parties who were not part of the last phase of negotiations – the DUP and the UKUP – supported the 'no' vote, helps make the case for the argument that the inclusive negotiations favoured political support for the agreement in the referendum since their absence had a negative impact on Unionist

support. Furthermore, the difference in inclusion between the Nationalist and Unionist political parties in the negotiations bore important consequences for differences between Unionist and Nationalist political parties' support for the agreement. Yet, the lesser degree of political inclusion of Unionist leaders, by their own accord, meant that there was a discrepancy in political support for the agreement between the two sides during the referendum campaign. This helped feed the division within the Unionist community in terms of support for the agreement.

Civil Society Inclusion

Northern Ireland had an active civil society which strove to be involved in the negotiations and pushed for the success of the peace process (Cochrane 2006). Civil society organizations spurred from the need to address issues of poverty and deprivation during while political institutions were paralyzed by the conflict. With the exception of some organizations, such as the Unionist Orange Order, the majority of civil society actors and organizations in Northern Ireland, whether in business, trade unions, churches, charities and voluntary groups, were overall engaged and mobilized in peacebuilding and reconciliation activities (Kilmurray 2014; Cochrane 2000).

Whether the All-Party talks in Northern Ireland included civil society is, however, not consensual. On the one hand, as Professor John Brewer described, the agreement was reached within a process that 'was almost an elite level negotiation, it did not involve civil society. (…) it was just agreement amongst the political parties and their nominated representatives' (Brewer 2014). Nonetheless, as it has been described, the electoral system created to involve the paramilitaries in the negotiations had the 'collateral' effect of including the Women's Coalition in the negotiations. Although the Coalition became a political party, it emerged from civil society and its delegates indeed describe it as a civil society party (Morrice 2014; Kilmurray 2014). It is, however, true that the NIWC was only able to participate directly in the negotiations because they were a political party and not because the Multi-Party talks were open to civil society participation. Although this was not a product of a clear desire or a strategic decision made by neither the governments nor the

mediation team, civil society engagement and participation was a result of a clear desire of civil society groups to be involved and influence the negotiations.

Furthermore, while there was no formal consultation process with civil society, organizations such as the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA), a representative umbrella body for the voluntary and community sector in Northern Ireland, had an existing partnership with trade unions for the purpose of intervention with the government on socio-economic issues. This was 'used during the two years of the talks to offer information to the parties and to communicate back out to our constituencies of interest', explained Quintin Oliver who worked for NICVA at that time (Oliver 2014). 'But that was informal. There was no formal organism to do that. We did it because we were aware of the importance of so doing', he further explained. Plus, UUP, SDLP and Alliance negotiators interviewed stated to have been aware, during the negotiations, that civil society was pushing for an agreement (Weir 2014; Maginness 2014; Farren 2014; Alderdice 2014; Donaldson 2014). For example, Alliance Party delegate Lord Alderdice stated:

> 'There were times when various elements in civil society would say or do things that were helpful in terms of the church, business or trade union leaders saying positive things about the talks or telling politicians to get on with the job.'
>
> Alderdice (2014).

Another significant statement was given by SDLP delegate Sean Farren:

> 'Many organizations came to us to express their support and urge us to reach a settlement. Employers and trade unions combined. The main employer organizations, the Northern Ireland section of the Confederation of British Industries, and the main trade unions, all came to us to say they wanted us to succeed in the talks. There was a very high degree of support for the talks to be successful.'
>
> Farren (2014)

These statements support Cochrane's (2000; 2001) claim that civil society helped sustain the momentum in the negotiations. Therefore, although civil society was not formally included in the GFA negotiations, the process did include civil society by way of, as Paffenholz (2014, 76–77) categorizes, *direct representation* in the negotiations through the Women's Coalition direct participation, and of holding *less formal consultations* with political leaderships. That said, and turning now to the referendum process, civil society's continuous engagement with the negotiations eventually provided for the emergence of an active and successful civil society-led 'yes' campaign. The campaign, which unsuccessfully attempted to bring all the

political parties supporting the agreement under the same umbrella campaign, is considered by political leaderships in Northern Ireland and scholars to have contributed to the high overall 'yes' turnout (Hancock 2011).

Impact on the Referendum Campaigns

The civil society-led 'yes' campaign was organized by a group of individuals and NGOs who anticipated that political leaders would not be able to run a cross-community campaign for the referendum, since they would have to compete in the elections to the Assembly thereafter (Oliver 2014). Quintin Oliver, who was the campaign's director, believed that 'The best referendum campaign, in theory, is to have a unified cross-party and non-party coalition running the campaign, and that was the model we wanted to build' (Oliver 2014). Although voters in referendums tend to vote according to the position of their parties, 'they feel less bound to the party's position than in elections because it is easier for them to separate the issues from the people', he further explained. However, as already mentioned, the 'yes' campaign struggled to convince the political parties to join their platform. Lord Empey, who coordinated the UUP's 'yes' campaign, explained that the party did not accept the invitation to campaign under their umbrella due to the party's internal split in support of the agreement: 'We had to get our own party to agree first, so our priorities were somewhat different (…)', he stated (Empey 2014). Because the UUP was concerned about losing the support for its constituency due to the internal divisions of the party, joining another structure was considered impossible at the time (Empey 2014). Similarly, Lord Alderdice (2014) explained that the parties had their own campaigns to run for the referendum and to the Assembly elections thereafter, therefore, he did not feel it was a realistic proposition to accept at the time. The Women's Coalition, on the other hand, joined the civil society-led 'yes' campaign and had members of the party supporting the campaign's efforts (Brian 2014). In the end, all parties, with the exception of the Women's Coalition, declined the 'yes' campaign platform's invitation, and led their own independent campaigns.

As a result, the 'yes' campaign was led as an independent campaign, and not the cross-party and cross-communal campaign it originally intended to be. Oliver believed that this fact, however, allowed people from NGOs and other professional bodies to have a freer range over the campaign. These people, Oliver stated, were 'the ones who understood

campaigning and public discourse, who tended to be the ones with creative ideas, and who knew how to mobilize people' (Oliver 2014). During the six weeks between the day the agreement was announced and the referendum on the 22nd of May, the campaign strove to create good positive debate around the referendum. 'Some of that was done through educating ' since 'There was a certain amount of public information that we knew we had to provide as well as a framework for public digestion of the 20000 word international treaty', said Oliver. The campaign made use of professionalised campaign techniques and the London-based advertising company, Saatchi & Saatchi, to effectively deliver the campaign's messages. It was "mostly through campaigning techniques which highlighted particular reasons to vote 'yes' that the campaign was done", Oliver explained.

The active role that civil society had played, whether from within or outside the negotiations, in influencing and in pushing for an agreement to be reached was carried-on into mobilizing support for the agreement in the referendum. As described, civil society's long-term engagement in the peace process in Northern Ireland sprouted into a resourceful and professionalized 'yes' campaign. As Hancock (2011) describes, the campaign played an important role in delivering a coherent message based on the benefits of the 'yes' vote and the negative consequences of a 'no' vote, at a time when the political parties' campaigns were using mutually exclusive arguments. The more divisive campaign messages of some of the political parties' campaigns are closely analysed in the next section.

Agreement Design

As was already mentioned, the Good Friday Agreement was endorsed by the eight political parties participating in the negotiations when the agreement was reached in April 1998, as well as by the British and Irish governments. On Strand One arrangements, the document provided for a power-sharing Assembly with executive and legislative authority. Strand Two provided for the establishment of a North/South Ministerial Council and implementation bodies aimed at developing cross-border cooperation between the Northern Ireland and the Irish executives. Lastly, Strand Three provided for the establishment of a British-Irish Council through a new British-Irish agreement, comprised of representatives from the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and

representatives of the British and Irish governments. The agreement further provided for the safeguard of human rights and equality, such as the freedom of expression of religion and to pursue political aspirations, the right to equal socio-economic opportunities among the communities and the right for women's equal participation in politics.

Regarding the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, like the *Sunningdale Agreement* of 1973, the GFA acknowledged that the majority of the people in Northern Ireland wished to preserve its union with Great Britain, but provided for its status to be altered if the majority of its people consented to this change in a referendum. This allowed both Unionist and Nationalist political parties to claim that their right to self-determination was safeguarded. Adjoining this ambiguity, the text of the agreement did not provide for concrete compromises on some of the most divisive issues. The reform of the Northern Ireland police - the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which predominantly employed Protestants - and decommissioning were two of the most sensitive issues under negotiation left to be resolved through independent commissions after the referendum. Women's Coalition delegate Jane Morrice explained that, given the 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' rule and the impossibility of an agreement being reached on these issues, the only possible compromise was that independent commissions would be established to independently decide on how they be resolved (Morrice 2014).

The so called 'constructive ambiguity' of the text of the agreement is seen in the literature as crucial to enabling political leaders to sign the agreement on the 10th of April. This is particularly because it allowed political leaders to 'sell' the agreement to their constituencies in the referendum (Tonge and Evans 2002, 62; Dixon 2013, 114). However, in hindsight, this ambiguity has also proven to have been less constructive. Aughey (2005, 147) argues that, although constructive ambiguity facilitated agreement, it harmed the implementation process by removing the need for important political commitments to be made. This was problematic, he argues, because it did not require more trustful relationships to develop between the parties[27]. What will be shown in this section is that, regarding the referendum results, the text of the agreement and its ambiguities had a mixed impact. On the one hand, the ambiguities of the agreement allowed both Unionist and

[27] The discussion on why the Good Friday Agreement faced implementation problems following the referendum is though much wider. A significant debate in the literature exists particularly around the electoral system forged by the Agreement and whether it has contributed to segregation or integration in post-Agreement Northern Ireland (McGarry and O'Leary 2006b; Dixon 2005; Horowitz 2001).

Nationalist political parties to endorse the agreement and helped them 'sell' it to their constituencies in their campaigns. However, it also allowed for the campaign period to be populated by divisive messages and for a win-lose sentiment to arise. Additionally, the ambiguities of the agreement suggest that voters were highly influenced by political leader's positions and campaign messages, which was, in the end, not problematic because political support for the 'yes', and the 'yes' campaigns, was higher and stronger than the 'no'.

Impact on Political Party Support and the Referendum Campaigns

All the political parties who were signatories of the final Agreement supported the 'yes' vote in the referendum, while the political parties who were outside the negotiations, the DUP and the UKUP, became the 'no' campaign. On the Unionist political spectrum, therefore, there was a division between the 'yes' and the 'no' camp. The DUP , the UKUP and a number of loyalist organizations - including the Loyalist Volunteer Force who dissented from the Ulster Volunteer Force over the agreement – campaigned for the 'no' vote (Irvine 2014). Ian Paisley and Robert McCartney's campaign played on the Unionist community's fear that the agreement would lead to a united Ireland and portrayed it as Unionist surrender to republican terrorists. Somerville and Kirby (2012, 249–50) describe them as fear-inducing and patriotism-appealing campaign messages. Conversely, the smaller loyalist PUP fully campaigned for the 'yes' vote, while the UUP's support was divided.

Several elements of the agreement were particularly hard to sell for the UUP, especially prisoner releases and police reform (Empey 2014). Lord Empey described the provisions on the police reform and prisoners' release as 'toxic' and 'traumatic' for Unionists. However, he stressed that the agreement was 'a very good outcome on the constitutional side' because 'We got the Irish constitution changed, we got the international recognition of our constitutional positions'. It was particularly on the constitutional issue, namely that the agreement secured Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom that the UUP's 'sober' 'yes' campaign looked to draw support from its constituency (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 245). Also, by leaving issues to be decided by an independent commission, the agreement allowed Unionist leaders to claim that decommissioning would take place before the establishment of the executive. Dixon (2013, 119–21) argues that Tony Blair played a part in 'honourably' deceiving the Unionist community during the referendum campaign by publicly

speaking of decommissioning provisions in ambiguous terms. To those in the UUP who did not support the 'yes' vote, the Irish and British government were seen as having pressured David Trimble into supporting an agreement where Ulster Unionists were forced to concede too much to Sinn Féin, particularly on the early release of republican (and loyalist) prisoners and the paramilitary decommissioning issues (Weir 2014; Donaldson 2014).

In contrast, as we have seen, the Nationalist political parties were fully in support of the 'yes' vote, with the SDLP and Sinn Féin leading their own independent campaigns. As was explained by SDLP delegates Alban Maginness and Sean Farren, the party fully supported the agreement because it created a new political dispensation that guaranteed the Nationalist parties' and the Catholic community's access to the political establishment, as well as it allowed for potential Irish unity with the people's consent (Maginness 2014; Farren 2014). Because the agreement would bring about the political change that the Nationalist community desired, it was expected that there would be high support for the agreement coming from it (Maginness 2014). What was also crucial to the high support was the holding of the simultaneous referendum in the Republic of Ireland, which allowed the Nationalist parties to frame the two referendums as an all-Ireland referendum. Alban Maginness explained:

> '…it was very important for us to have the concurrent referendums. It was one referendum in fact, although within two jurisdictions, and there were concurrent majorities north and south. In the South a massive majority voted in favour and in the north a substantive majority. (…) Why was that important? It was the first time since 1918 that the Irish people as a whole could determine the shape of the island and make an agreement that would transform Irish politics, create new institutions north and south and between Ireland and Britain, that would have real potential to radically change our politics.'
>
> Maginness (2014)

The SDLP's 'yes' campaign, nonetheless, was led in a reconciliatory tone that could draw support, or at least not alienate, voters in the Unionist community. In their analysis of the SDLP's campaign, Somerville and Kirby (2012, 242–44) found that the campaign messages aimed to appeal to all in Northern Ireland by portraying the agreement as a win-win outcome and pointing to a new partnership and reconciliation between the communities.

Despite the SDLP's reconciliatory tone, the overall tones of the political parties' 'yes' campaigns were divisive. As we have seen, while Unionist political parties stressed the success in keeping Northern Ireland in the UK, Nationalist parties stressed the success in getting the principle of consent in the agreement. Importantly, it is argued here, this is the

result of the different degrees of political support coming from political parties on the Unionist and the Nationalist side, and the differing interpretations and framing of the agreement in their individual campaigns. Hayes and McAllister (2001, 78–80), as already mentioned, demonstrated that the public expression of reservations towards the agreement by Ulster Unionist leaders depressed the Unionist community's support for the agreement at the beginning of the campaign period. Others point to Sinn Féin's campaign tactics, which have been shown to have negatively affected the Unionist community's 'yes' vote (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 246–47; Breadun 1998). One particularly damaging publicity stunt was a 'triumphant' welcoming of PIRA prisoners at a Sinn Féin special convention held just twelve days before the referendum (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 246–47). The stunt was meant to bolster support within the republican community, where a fringe was not supporting the agreement. However, since the early release of prisoners was one of the most controversial provisions of the agreement for the Unionist community, the event had a negative impact on the Unionist community's public opinion at the time (Breadun 1998). Additionally, Sinn Féin's campaign and political exploitation of the peace process has been found to have had a negative impact on the Unionist community's perceptions of the agreement and the peace process (Mac Ginty 2000; Breadun 1998). PUP leader Winston Irvine described Sinn Féin's campaign and the Unionist community's reaction to it as follows:

> 'Republicans would come out saying that it was a victory for them and that they got everything that they need and the reaction to that from the other (Unionist) side was that 'we must be losing.'
>
> Irvine (2014).

Sinn Féin's campaign in favour of the agreement framed as a 'victory' and a step towards Irish unity, is also seen to have had a negative impact on the Unionist community's vote (Irvine 2014; Clarke 2014). It was because support was dropping among the community during the campaign that Trimble accepted to partner with the SDLP and attend a pop-rock concert by the Irish band U2. On stage, John Hume and David Trimble publicly shook hands and the gesture worked as a symbol of unity that strengthened the 'yes' camp (Somerville and Kirby 2012, 247–48).

In conclusion, if constructive ambiguity in the GFA helped both Unionist and Nationalist parties 'sell' the GFA to their constituencies, it also allowed for the Unionist and Nationalist political parties to use mutually exclusive messages in their campaigns. As Somerville and Kirby (2012, 251–52) argue, the fact that the UUP and Sinn Féin's 'yes' campaign was

focused on selling the agreement to their own constituency weakened the 'yes' campaign overall. Therefore, although constructive ambiguity might be positive in getting the political leaders to support the agreement and to help them 'sell' the agreement to their constituencies and communities, the absence of a coherent message on the agreement had negative repercussions for the Unionist community's vote, which was already divided. Yet, if it has been attested that the content of the negotiated document shaped political support for the agreement and the referendum campaigns, it is not straightforward that it directly shaped voters' decisions, as is analysed next.

Impact on Public Information and Uncertainty

During the referendum campaign period, there was wide public and media discussion about the agreement in Northern Ireland, even about the ambiguity of the document (Devenport 2014). Additionally, the local media largely supported the 'yes' vote during the referendum campaign. Unprecedentedly, the *Irish News*, a Catholic newspaper, and the *Belfast News Letter*, a Unionist newspaper, issued a joint editorial in support for the agreement, explained William Graham, former reporter for the *Irish News* (Graham 2014).

Aside from media and public debate, a copy of the document was sent to every household in Northern Ireland by the British government, making information on the text of the agreement readily available to every citizen. Additionally, a civil society group called Democratic Dialogue created a booklet where the content was translated into everyday language to facilitate its understanding. However, although the text of the agreement might have been known to the majority of the people in Northern Ireland, it cannot be assumed that the text itself shaped voter decision in the referendum. While negotiations secrecy raised the question of whether or not information about the negotiations shaped the referendum, the question posed here is whether or not information about the document itself had an impact.

Quintin Oliver from the civil society-led 'yes' campaign, believed that the people were 'unready' for a referendum and 'When they were presented with the 20000 word document, they were confused, shocked, surprised and, mostly, suspicious.' Also, as Liam Clarke, journalist for the Belfast Telegraph, explained 'the agreement was written in a way that you could not really have a detailed knowledge. It depended upon interpretation' (Clarke 2014).

For this reason, Oliver believed that people looked for information, not from the content of the agreement, but rather from what was said by politicians, businessmen, church leaders, artists and other public figures whose opinion they trusted (Oliver 2014).

Notwithstanding, it can be said that the people of Northern Ireland were generaly knowledgeble of the agreement. Hayes and McAllister (2001, 82–83) actually found a correlation between voters knowledge of the agreement and support: they found that 'no' voters were less knowledgeable of the agreement than 'yes' voters, with Catholic voters being more knowledgeable and Protestant 'no' voters being less knowledgeable in general. Overall, there was information readily available to citizens regarding the agreement, as well as wide public and media discussion. But the fact that the language of the agreement was ambiguous and some of the issues were left to be resolved in independent commissions, suggests that it was not possible for the people, or anyone for that matter, to have a full understanding of its implications. Therefore, although the public might have been informed about the agreement, it was not necessarily its content that shaped their vote.

One important finding across both communities is that those who supported the GFA, whether grassroots or elites, viewed and publicly portrayed the agreement as a point in a process, rather than a definite, unchangeable, outcome. For example, Lord Empey stressed that 'it (the GFA) is work in progress to an extent' (Empey 2014). Like Wier, he mentioned the difference between how the Unionist and republican communities and political parties view the agreement:

> 'We (Unionists) tried to look at it as a settlement, republicans are looking at it as a process (…) because they cannot admit to their supporters that their ultimate objective (of a united Ireland) is not achievable without Unionist consent'.
>
> Empey (2014)

From the Alliance Party, Lord Alderdice explained, 'we did not spend the time in the referendum campaign telling people in the referendum about our reservations because the main aim was to get it through and then work on it' (Alderdice 2014). Hayes and McAllister (2001, 82–83) also found that what influenced the 'yes' vote in the Protestant community was a view of the agreement as 'a new beginning'. This actually contradicts the intuitive idea that the Unionist community would be more averse to the agreement because it represented a change in the status quo, whereas change would be mostly welcomed by the Nationalist community.

In conclusion, the findings on whether and how the content of the agreement shaped the referendum results are complex. They suggest that, while the constructive ambiguity of the agreement favoured political support for the agreement in the campaigns, it also allowed for antithetical campaign messages coming from the Unionist and Nationalist parties to co-exist during the referendum campaign period. The different tones of the campaigns and, particularly Sinn Féin's campaign, helped divide support in the Unionist community. The ambiguity of the agreement, on the other hand, meant that voters were more reliant on information from the campaigns and, hence, were more influenced by them. This was, however, not problematic for overall support because the majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland were supporting the 'yes' and there was an independent and strong 'yes' campaign in place.

Process Determinants in the Good Friday Agreement Referendum

The Good Friday Agreement negotiations were able to bring to the table those involved in paramilitarism and transform a violent conflict into, arguably, a solely political one. Undoubtedly, the process of negotiations itself, the contact and communication between the leaderships fostered by the process, successfully transformed the relationships between the participating leaders (Close 2014; Alderdice 2014). As a result, life in Northern Ireland has changed since the GFA was agreed upon and put to the referendum in 1998. Paramilitary violence and fear is no longer a part of the everyday life experience. The referendum was indeed a success and an important symbolic turning point in the transition from violent conflict to peace in Northern Ireland (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012, 44). Constant implementation setbacks, however, have generated a prevailing sense in Northern Ireland that the agreement has not yet delivered its promises and that it might collapse at any time, a fear that has kept politics polarized. Therefore, while the negotiations and referendum were successful in engaging and mobilizing the communities around the search for peace, it is unfortunate that more has not been done at the political level to continue to harness it.

The political inclusiveness of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations, not only had a positive impact in allowing for the agreement to be reached and, arguably, its implementation (Horowitz 2002; McGarry and O'Leary 2006b), it also played an important

role in generating support for a positive outcome in the referendum. The fact that several political parties across the communal political spectrums participated in the negotiations and endorsed the final agreement meant that political support for the agreement was widespread. The negotiation process was, however, comparatively less inclusive in the Unionist community than in the Nationalist. The DUP and UKUP *walkout* and subsequent rejection of the agreement meant that the 'no' campaign was only composed of Unionist political parties and targeted the Unionist community. The Nationalist community, on the other hand, had both political parties, the SDLP and Sinn Féin, endorsing the agreement and supporting the 'yes' vote during the campaign.

The negotiation process included civil society, which was found to favour support for the agreement. On the one hand, there was direct involvement of civil society through the Women's Coalition participation in the negotiations and, on the other hand, a pre-existing willingness from active civil society groups to reach and pressure the political leaderships in the negotiation process. Their involvement is, nonetheless, a product of Northern Ireland's civil society's push for participation rather than a pre-existing willingness or preoccupation of those in the political process to include them. Nonetheless, civil society was engaged with the negotiation process and this evolved into it a crucial role in the referendum, helping to deliver a strong, organized, and even professionalized 'yes' campaign that delivered unified campaign messages.

Although the GFA referendum had a positive outcome, this research was interested in understanding what shaped the difference of support between the two communities. For that reason, it was demonstrated that the British government's involvement in the negotiations was found to have had negative repercussions on the Unionist community's support for the agreement. Tony Blair's pressure on Trimble to accept the agreement ultimately drove the UUP to a split that weakened the party's support for the 'yes' vote and its referendum campaign. As the majoritarian community, and given that an agreement would always mean that Unionists would have to share power with Nationalists, it could be argued that the Unionist community would always be less supportive of the final agreement. However, a majority of the community was supportive of the process until the agreement was reached and the referendum campaign began (Hayes and McAllister 2001, 78–80). Additionally, if the ambiguous text of the agreement allowed for the political leaders to 'sell' the agreement to their community and/or constituency, it also allowed for those same

political parties to campaign for 'yes' vote with different tones and arguments. These divisions during the campaign served to foster perceptions among both communities that the Nationalists were the 'winners' and the Unionists were the 'losers' in the negotiations and the agreement, which had a negative bearing on the referendum results.

The process was *confidential* rather than secret. Again, this is not to be confused with the secret back channel negotiations which, in hindsight, are seen today to be harming the implementation process. In fact, during the time that the interviews for this research were undertaken in Northern Ireland, it had become public that the Blair government had developed a secret 'On the Run' letters scheme that allowed escaped PIRA prisoners, and others concerned they might be arrested, to freely return to the UK (Kearney 2014). This had created, or rather intensified, a sentiment among Unionist political leaders that the bilateral negotiations and secret deals between the two gave Sinn Féin the upper hand in the GFA negotiations. Lord Empey, UUP delegate in the negotiations and current chairman of the party explained:

> '…that is one of the main reasons why we have difficulties now, because people do not believe that they are being told the truth, we do not believe that there are not other deals out there. The credibility of the (British) government and its commitments and statements is low with the people who support us.'
>
> Empey (2014)

The inclusivity of the process also played a determinant role in the lesser degree of secrecy of the *talks*. Therefore, while some aspects of the final agreement might not have been known to the public (the early release of prisoners, for example), it was known to the Northern Ireland public what an agreement would entail. Previous agreements between the Irish and British governments, and even the early public participation of the public in choosing who would take seats in the negotiations, allowed for a generally unsurprising outcome. Further, the text of the agreement itself was readily available to all in Northern Ireland. Yet, when asked why the 'yes' won in Northern Ireland, most interviewees stated that it was because people were tired of violence and wanted peace, not necessarily because they supported the text of the agreement. Liam Clarke explained his sentiment over the GFA referendum: 'I think people were voting for peace and at that level it was an informed decision, that this was the way to achieve peace' (Clarke 2014). What would be important to further research is if information on the negotiation process prevented a greater fluctuation of public opinion during the referendum and given this, if the successful

ratification of the agreement became more expectable, as well as whether access to information affected support for the agreement during the negotiations themselves.

Some of the findings of the in-depth analysis of the GFA negotiations and referendum conducted in this chapter present similarities and differences to those reached in the Annan Plan case. For example, where political and civil society was included in the negotiations, there was more support for the agreement. The next chapter will take on the task of comparing the findings of the two cases. It will show that differences between the Annan Plan and GFA negotiation processes regarding the aspects under study, indeed, contributed to the contrasting rejection/acceptance of the agreements in the two cases. Interestingly, as it will be discussed, several similarities can be observed between the GFA negotiations and referendum processes and the ones in the Turkish Cypriot community, while the same aspects are not observed in the Greek Cypriot case. The comparison of the cases will allow an understanding on how peace negotiations can favour public support for peace settlements in referendums.

5. Comparing the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Experiences

As presented in the previous chapters, characteristics of Annan Plan and GFA negotiation processes helped shape the referendum experiences and results in each of the cases. One important difference at the onset of the two negotiations was that, while the GFA negotiations in Northern Ireland took place under the knowledge that the agreement would be ratified through a popular referendum, this was not the case in Cyprus. The decision to hold a referendum came at a later stage in the Annan Plan negotiations and had the aim of bypassing the need for the political leaders' endorsement of the agreement. While a more inclusive and private (rather than secret) process in Northern Ireland was both cause and consequence of the fact that the agreement reached would have to be accepted by the communities, the Annan Plan negotiations were a traditionally exclusionary process that eventually culminated in a referendum. The differences and similarities between the two are explored in this chapter with the aim of developing a deeper and more nuanced understanding of how peace negotiations can shape peace settlement referendum outcomes, and how holding the latter can better serve peace processes around the world.

This thesis aimed not only at understanding how the negotiations shaped the general outcomes of the two referendums, but also the differences in support between the communities. It, therefore, also aimed at understanding why there was a circa 40 per cent difference in the support given by the two communities in Northern Ireland and in Cyprus, which was presented in the two previous chapters. In this chapter, along with the main comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA cases, as two instances of negotiations with peace settlement referendums where in one case the agreement was rejected and accepted in the other, the results across the four communities are also compared. To recapitulate, it aims at exploring how the negotiation process conditions shaped the different levels of support observed in each of the communities: the very high 96-7 per cent support from the Nationalist community, the 65 per cent support from the Turkish Cypriot, the 51-3 per cent from the Unionist community and, lastly, the low 24 per cent support from the Greek Cypriot community.

The first section of this chapter is dedicated, precisely, to performing those comparisons. Following the same structure of as the two previous chapters, it compares the case study analyses' findings on each of the same four aspects of the negotiation process: mediation

strategy, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement design. The comparison reveals that the GFA negotiations were comparatively less secretive, and more representative and inclusive, which increased public engagement, political parties' support for the agreement, and civil society campaign mobilisation for the 'yes' vote. In Cyprus, the secrecy of the negotiations left Greek Cypriots dependent on information coming from the campaigns, while the more exclusionist process failed to secure political party support for the agreement or to foment or mobilise civil society around it. In the Turkish Cypriot community, on the other hand, a strong mobilisation of opposition parties and civil society organisations made for a more representative and inclusive negotiation process and a strong 'yes' campaign.

The second part of the chapter discusses the implications of the comparative study to existing literature. Drawing from the two case studies compared here, it argues that peace settlement referendums require less secretive and more inclusive and participative negotiations that can help educate voters and prepare communities for the next stages of the peace process. Peace negotiations that are exclusive and secret can marginalize and alienate the public. Unless there is a higher degree of political inclusion and an engaged civil society, whose concerns political leaderships hear, the small time periods between the end of negotiations and the day of the referendum does not suffice to educate the public. Importantly, it will be argued, civil society is more likely willing and prepared to lead non-partisan campaigns. These help reduce win-lose perceptions of the agreement among the communities and help avoid a polarising referendum experience. Revisiting arguments in the literature against the use of peace settlement referendums, the chapter concludes that, it is not that referendums are unsuitable to conflict contexts, but that they are rather not suitable to all kinds of peacemaking processes. Therefore, when a referendum is used to ratify an agreement, peace negotiations must be tailored to that requirement.

Mediation Strategies

As was stated earlier in this thesis, authors have argued that one of the (main) causes for the Annan Plan's failure was that it was secretively negotiated between political elites, during which the mediators failed to consider, involve, or gain support from other quadrants

of society (Drath 2004, 341–52; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). If process secrecy could explain the rejection of the Annan Plan in the Greek Cypriot community, it remained to be explained why the Turkish Cypriot vote was not equally affected. In addition, if negotiations secrecy had shaped the Annan Plan referendum outcomes, it was important for this research to ask if and how it affected the GFA referendum. It, indeed, found that the GFA negotiations were not secret but, rather, 'confidential' and that the inclusivity of the process itself shaped a less secretive negotiation process. The secrecy of the Annan Plan negotiations, it was argued, was counteracted in the Turkish Cypriot community by a greater, earlier public interest and debate in the Annan Plan negotiation process. It will, therefore, be discussed here how these differences in the degree of secrecy played out comparatively in the referendums.

The second set of mediation tactics compared in this section is the use of arbitration and pressure. The cases show that both mediation strategies reduced political accountability for the agreement, had an impact on political parties' support for the peace settlement and, hence, the shape and strength of the referendum campaigns. Lastly, in both case studies, the participation of external actors had varied implications on the referendums that will be briefly discussed.

Secrecy, Confidentiality, and Public Information and Uncertainty

In mediation studies, procedural strategies have been found to not have a significant effect in getting parties to an agreement (Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 175–76). However, this research found in the two cases studies that, when a referendum is used to ratify a peace agreement, the degree to which negotiations are exposed to the domestic environment is a procedural aspect that has important consequences for the referendum. Both the negotiations in Cyprus and Northern Ireland were typically political elite-driven and 'closed door' negotiations. Both negotiations also took place under the principle that 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' which, while facilitating the bargaining process between political leaders, renders negotiation processes 'very hard to publicise', as Quintin Oliver explained (2014). However, the GFA negotiations were comparatively less secretive. Interestingly, what made for a less secretive process in Northern Ireland was the inclusiveness of the process itself. The inclusion of more political parties meant that some of

these parties were keener on informing their constituencies on the progress and content of the negotiations. The Alliance Party and the Women's Coalition not only provided a middle ground for dialogue between the main Unionist and Nationalist parties, but were also keen on increasing the negotiations exposure to the public. The Women's Coalition closer engagement with its constituency during the negotiations, alongside that of the PUP and Sinn Féin, also contributed to a lesser secrecy of the negotiation process. As was found, a more inclusive process also meant that journalists had a larger pool of diversified sources of information on what was happening *behind closed doors* than was the case in the Annan Plan negotiations. In Cyprus, because only the leader's negotiation teams were represented at the table and because the mediation team decided to have a more secretive process, journalists had limited access to information and the people were generally uninformed, or misinformed, about the negotiations, but to different degrees in the two communities.

It has been shown that voters tend to rely on information coming from the campaigns when the issues at stake in the referendum are new or unfamiliar (Leduc 2002, 713). The more voters look for, and wait for, information from the campaigns, the more volatile their voting decision-making will be. Secrecy predisposed an ill-engaged and ill-informed Greek Cypriot community to follow their leaders and the cues of the stronger and highly politically backed 'no' campaign. This was, however, counteracted in the Turkish Cypriot community by a greater level of political inclusion and civil society engagement. It can be counter-argued that it was rather the prospect of EU membership that motivated support for the 'yes' vote in the Turkish Cypriot community (Lordos 2008; Bahcheli 2004). Accession to the EU was undeniably the main theme and framing of the 'yes' campaign in North Cyprus. While this might have been the main motivation for 'yes' voters, it also fundamentally helped unleash a wave of political and civic mobilisation during the negotiations. This allowed for a greater degree of public discussion of the Annan Plan in the community. As interviewees in the 'yes' camp stated, the fact that Denktash's political opponents, civil society, and the media worked to stimulate public discussion about the Annan Plan helped dispel fears in the community about the aftermath of the referendum (Talat 2014; Elcil 2014). In fact, the Nationalist and the Turkish Cypriot communities were comparatively more informed voters than their counterparts (Hayes and McAllister 2001, 82–83; Bryant 2004; Kaymak 2009), as well as the communities that more strongly supported the agreement in the referendum.

Given that negotiation's secrecy can lead to less informed publics in peace settlement referendums, voters will be more vulnerable to 'referendum spoilers' and 'no' campaigns' fear-inducing messages. With voters more dependent on the campaigns, the greater the incentives there will be for political parties to invest in the campaigns, and the more politicised and competitive the referendum will be. The Greek Cypriot case illustrates this chain of events the best, but other cases show similar dynamics at play. The recent EU membership referendum in the UK took place after a renegotiation of UK membership was held behind closed doors by the Council of Ministers, without any kind of public or civil society participation – which is more broadly lacking in the European Union institutions. What followed was an eight-month long campaign during which the 'Leave EU' campaign assumedly misinformed UK voters on the benefits of leaving the EU (BBC News 2016).

As the negotiation delegates and leaders interviewed in this research explained, a certain degree of secrecy, or rather, confidentiality is crucial to allowing political representatives to discuss their positions and interests openly. Yet, in cases where the peace settlement will be put to a referendum, it is important that negotiations create public debate and engagement, which can be curtailed by secrecy, as was the case in the Greek Cypriot community. As Michael (2011, 187) argues in his analysis of the Annan Plan negotiation, mediators need to design, preferably in cooperation with the leaders, a public communication strategy. This is especially important because political leaders are often the most important source of information for voters in referendums. Conversely, the extent to which political leaders taking part in peace negotiations will be willing to inform the public during the negotiations depends on the secrecy of the process, as well as on the inclusivity of the process.

Arbitration, Pressure and Political Party Support

While mediation research has found that directive mediation strategies are the most effective in getting political leaders to reach a negotiated settlement (Bercovitch 1986; Bercovitch and Houston 1993; 2000), the use of pressure can be damaging to political support for peace settlements in referendums. As both cases show, when agreements are not reached by the political leaderships on their own terms, this decreases their incentive to support the agreement during the referendum. This took place in rather different ways in the two negotiation processes and indeed, with quite different mediation tactics and actors

involved. Despite the obvious differences, it makes sense to compare the impact of these tactics since both the arbitration procedure in the Annan Plan mediation and British pressure on Trimble had a negative impact on political leaders' support for the peace settlement, which shaped the strength of the referendum campaigns.

As was already stated in the case study chapter, what the Annan Plan case further illustrates, is that a peace settlement referendum is unlikely to succeed when the agreement is not endorsed by political leaderships (Kaymak 2012; Drath 2004), particularly if those leaderships participated in the negotiations. However, the arbitration procedure had another important consequence that was not yet mentioned in this thesis. The interviews with members of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot delegation at Bürgenstock revealed that arbitration offered the two delegations an incentive to harden their positions in view of getting the best possible outcome. At the same time, it removed the need for a 'give and take' process and finding common ground. Tasos Tzionis, who was part of Papadopoulos' delegation, stated that he disliked describing the process as 'negotiations' because 'it was a process, especially after February, that would get a Plan to be submitted to separate and simultaneous referendums, with or without negotiations. (Tzionis 2014). The delegation had refused to have face-to face negotiations at Bürgenstock, which would have allowed for direct negotiations to take place. Nonetheless, in the Turkish Cypriot delegation, Talat's description was similar, in that the process of give and take between the delegations was reduced. Talat explained that, on the one hand, 'we were not negotiating with the Greek Cypriots (…), we were trying to persuade the UN to take our part.' and, consequently:

> 'We were keeping our positions at an acceptable level, not demanding too much, but also not compromising easily, whereas if the negotiations would have been between the two sides (…) we would have had to compromise.'
>
> Talat (2014)

Using arbitration, nonetheless, took away the negotiation teams' need to bargain directly for a compromise solution, and instead shifted their focus to persuading the mediation team to support their positions. Arbitration, therefore, created an incentive for the parties to maintain an adversarial relationship.

Consequently, in Cyprus, not enough trust or cooperative engagement developed between the sides. In Northern Ireland, as was demonstrated, the delegates interviewed consensually regarded the ability to change relationships between the parties by establishing a trust based on a mutual perception of the fairness of the negotiation process as one of the

merits of Mitchell's mediation. It is certainly impressive that the setting of a deadline for agreement was welcomed by all the political parties involved. Yet, if the pressure of a deadline was not divisive, the British government's pressure on David Trimble to accept an agreement that, most importantly, did not provide for a precise calendar for decommissioning, helped split the UUP. The UUP's split, consequently, weakened the party's 'yes' campaign and further divided voters in the Unionist community.

As political parties split, it has been found, voters lose confidence in the agreement (Schneider and Weitsman 1996, 604) and tend to rely on information coming from the campaigns to make their voting decisions (Leduc 2002, 713). Internal splits, therefore, make voters more dependent on the referendum campaign in deciding on how to vote, making the referendum more competitive and the result more unpredictable. The UUP's, DISY's, and Serdar Denktash's DP divisive internal decision-making process are varied examples of this. In the DP's case, however, the split occurred in a party that was supporting the 'no' vote, which might have also favoured the 'yes' in the Turkish Cypriot community.

What emerges from the comparison of the cases in these aspects is that the need for tactics that generate artificial agreement on certain issues between political leaders signals unwillingness or inability to support or 'sell' the agreement in the referendum, and vice-versa. It is also a symptom that relationships between the parties are still distrustful and polarised, whereas a degree of trust between political elites is desirable to avoid polarisation during the referendum.

Managing Kin-States' Involvement

Authors have a benign outlook on the involvement of the kin-states in the negotiations in Northern Ireland (McGarry and O'Leary 2006a, 48; Byrne 2000). Similarly, the Turkish government is seen to have played a crucial role in making the Annan negotiations possible by pressuring, and ultimately, side-lining Denktash (Kocadal 2016). Conversely, it has also been argued that the UN mediators in Cyprus wrongfully assumed that the Greek government's support for the Annan Plan would enhance Greek Cypriot political leaders' and the communities' support for the agreement (Michael 2011, 185). Undeniably, the kin states played a major role in getting the political parties to an agreement in both cases and their support of the agreement during the referendum campaign was important in raising support

in the local communities. However, when we consider the impact of kin state involvement on the referendum campaign period, their participation in the negotiations themselves can be seen as less benign. In Northern Ireland, the British government's 'quasi-mediator' (Byrne 2000; Kocadal 2016) role and its pressure on the UUP ultimately reduced Unionist political support for the GFA in the referendum. Similarly, in Cyprus, Turkey's participation in the last round of negotiations, particularly Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's speech to the media at Bürgenstock, fuelled 'no' campaign messages that Turkey had 'won' at the negotiations table.

It can be challenging for a mediator to manage the involvement of kin states in negotiations. As we have seen, this was a challenge that George Mitchell faced in his own efforts. However, it is also unlikely that peace negotiations even take place between the local communities' representatives without the support of these parties. Equally, their support for the peace agreement during the referendum can increase support for the agreement in the referendum – as it did, in particular, among the Turkish Cypriot and Nationalist communities. Likewise, as Sandal and Loizides (2013, 418) argue, the UUP's and DISY's interaction with their allies in the international arena played an important role in socialising more conservative actors to the cause of peace. However, the GFA and Annan Plan referendums suggest that less intrusive types of kin states' involvement in peace negotiations are more desirable when agreements will need to be ratified in a referendum. Taking Kocadal's (2016) typology, this would mean that kin states act only as *promoters*, rather than *quasi-mediators, powerbrokers*, or *enforcers* in the negotiations, merely supporting and/or pressuring their 'kin-community' to cooperate. Ideally, as authors who have studied the GFA negotiations suggest (Kocadal 2016, 187; Byrne 2000, 17), the kin states should be able to cooperate with each other, as was the case in Northern Ireland, although this is likely a rare event. It remains, however, to be empirically tested whether kin states' involvement in the negotiations, or their leaders' public positions towards the agreement, directly influenced public perceptions of the agreement or referendum voting behaviours.

Political Inclusion and Referendum Spoilers

Political inclusion is one of the most striking differences between the Annan Plan and GFA negotiations. The GFA negotiations were decidedly more politically inclusive (not to be confused with multilateral) than the Annan Plan negotiations since, while the negotiations in Northern Ireland included the elected political parties from each of the communities, only the leading parties elected in each community negotiated the Annan Plan. However, as it was demonstrated, Turkish Cypriot opposition parties were informally included in the negotiations by the UN Good Offices mission in Cyprus from 2002. Additionally, after the 2003 elections, Talat's CTP was actually part of the Turkish Cypriot delegation. Indeed, political inclusion has shown to have had an effect on all three referendum determinants in each of the cases: it influenced political support for the agreement in the referendum, strengthening the referendum campaigns and, as was shown in the GFA negotiations, also shaped the degree of public information and uncertainty by reducing negotiation secrecy.

In Northern Ireland, the Nationalist community was fully politically represented at the negotiations and both the SDLP and Sinn Féin supported the 'yes' vote. This led the community to deliver a higher support for the agreement in the referendum. Comparing across all four communities, the degree of political inclusion, in fact, is strongly related to the comparative level of support coming from each of the communities in the referendum. The Nationalist community, then the Turkish Cypriot community, then the Unionist community, and, lastly, the Greek Cypriot, are, in descending order, the most politically represented communities in the negotiations and with higher percentages of 'yes' votes.

Excluding political parties, on the other hand, had important repercussions on the degree of political support for the agreement and the strength of the referendum campaigns. One of the arguments put forward in the literature is that the negotiation process in Northern Ireland successfully sidelined potential spoilers and strengthened the more moderate positions and political parties by allowing the DUP and UKUP to leave (Curran and Sebenius 2003, 150–51). However, their self-exclusion eventually removed any incentive for the UKUP and the DUP to support the agreement. Thereafter, their 'no' campaign helped divide support for the agreement in the Unionist community. Therefore, if to side-line 'spoilers' can facilitate agreement at the negotiations table, excluding 'spoilers' can, in fact, backfire if a referendum is used for ratification.

Similarly to the Northern Ireland case, side-lining Rauf Denktash, the main 'spoiler', is considered one of the 'successes' of the Annan mediation (Michael 2007, 598). However, the process was also successful in managing Denktash as a referendum spoiler. Like Papadopoulos, President Denktash campaigned for the 'no', even adopting a similar rhetoric (Bryant 2004). Therefore, it was important to ask how the two Presidents' support for the 'no' had opposing impacts in the communities. On the one hand, the political changes in the TRNC and Turkey meant that there was greater political support for the Annan Plan in the Turkish Cypriot community than in the Greek Cypriot. However, it was argued, the differing degrees of public information and engagement during the negotiations and referendum also explain the opposing communal behaviours. In the Turkish Cypriot community Denktash's political opponents, civil society, and the media worked to stimulate public discussion about the Plan and to dispel fears in the community about its aftermath. A more inclusive process and engaged community, especially its earlier engagement with the negotiations, helped prepare the community for the referendum and diluted the impact of Denktash's support for the 'no' vote and of the 'no' campaign.

In the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, when Papadopoulos opened the campaign period by reneging on the Annan Plan, the parties outside the negotiations struggled in their decisions to support the Plan during the referendum campaign. This was the case for DISY and AKEL in particular. After all, except for DISY, who had negotiated the first two versions of the Annan Plan, and EDI, whose members negotiated the application of the *acquis communautaire* with the European Union, AKEL and EDEK had not participated in the negotiations that led to the agreement.

Furthermore, a form of inclusion that has not been considered in the Cyprus negotiations is that of other minority communities. Although they are much smaller than the Turkish Cypriot community, the Latin, Armenian, and Maronite communities have never been formally included in the negotiations. Antonis Hajiroussos, who has represented the Maronite community in the Republic's parliament for more than 20 years, believed the UN could have included other minorities in negotiations and look less at the Cyprus problem as concerning only Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. He explained how it was only after insistence that the UN mediation team accepted to meet with him regarding the Maronite communities' concerns, particularly on territory (Hajiroussos 2014).

Therefore, these findings support arguments in spoiler management literature that mediation processes should be inclusive (Darby 2001; Zahar 2003; McGarry and O'Leary 2006b), adding that it also favours support for the peace settlement in a referendum. Nonetheless, several arguments can be made against inclusive negotiation processes. For example, Horowitz (2002, 202, 218) argues that, although the process was inclusive, the GFA agreement was mainly negotiated by the SDLP and the UUP and, therefore, was not a product of a multilateral negotiation process. This is considered by the author to be a positive feature of the process because, he argues, it allowed for a more coherent and implementable agreement to be reached. However, George Mitchell writes in his memoir that the Alliance Party's capacity to communicate with both Unionist and Nationalist parties helped build a good network of relationships at the table (Mitchell 1999, 44). On the other hand, both the Alliance Party and the Women's coalition held greater concerns about the implementation of the agreement and its longer-term societal impact (Alderdice 2014; Kilmurray 2014). The inclusion of the Women's Coalition in particular meant that other issues beyond those concerning the distribution of power, which could also be more easily agreed on, were brought to the negotiations table[28]. Therefore, Horowitz (2002) does not consider the role that the bi-communal parties had in shaping the negotiation dynamics that brought about the agreement, nor their impact in bringing about an implementable one.

When the negotiation dynamics are analysed for the purpose of understanding what led to the referendum outcome, as opposed to what led the political parties to reach an agreement, the lack of a more multilateral process diminished the possibility of a cross-communal, united 'yes' campaign. This, it was argued, could have reduced the negative impact of the campaign period on the Unionist community's support for the agreement. As Quintin Oliver explained, 'We struggled with getting all the parties on board because they were still not talking to each other. The talks had not been a multilateral process' (Oliver 2014). Conversely, in the Turkish Cypriot community, the greatest strength of the 'yes' campaign was that political parties and civil society groups were part of the same umbrella campaign created by the This Country is Ours platform.

[28] For example, the Women's Coalition proposed the creation of a Civic Forum, which would function as a second chamber to the Assembly and would operate through electoral colleges (i.e. the women's sector, the farmers' sector, the labour sector). They believed the forum to be particularly useful in dealing with more politically divisive issues during the implementation of the agreement by allowing civil society to discuss solutions without engaging in the stereotyped divisions of the political system (Kilmurray 2014). Unfortunately, the Civic Forum failed to fully materialize due the stagnating political period that came about with the implementation of the agreement.

Having more parties at the negotiations table complicates the number of issues and interests to be addressed and agreed upon at a negotiations table and can make agreement more difficult to reach. At the same time, it may give legitimacy to terrorist groups, allow certain groups to instrumentalize the process to advance their own agendas, or lead to a greater polarization between participating parties. However, even if an agreement is easier to reach between a smaller number of parties, it could be rendered useless if it is rejected in a referendum. If the agreement is to be ratified through a referendum, the Annan Plan and the GFA cases suggest that wider political inclusion is desirable so that more political parties have stakes in the agreement and will subsequently support it. Secondly, inclusivity may be necessary to manage/prevent the emergence of referendum spoilers, or at least to weaken their campaigns. The more political parties are involved in negotiating an agreement, the higher is the likelihood that those political parties will endorse the agreement during a referendum and, therefore, the wider the political support for it will be. After all, the way through which negotiation process conditions can influence political party support is, foremost, by influencing a political leader or political party's decision whether to support an agreement or not. Ergo, the greater the number of political parties supporting a 'yes' vote to the peace settlement's implementation, the stronger the 'yes' campaign will be.

Civil Society Inclusion and the Referendum Campaigns

In Northern Ireland and the Turkish Cypriot community, there existed a mobilised civil society that strove to influence the negotiations. Both in the GFA and the Annan Plan negotiations, civil society was accidentally, rather than intentionally included: in Northern Ireland through the presence of the Women's Coalition and informal consultations with political leaderships, and in North Cyprus through the This Country is Ours platform. In both cases, civil society actors were important referendum campaigners and their engagement with the negotiation process had important repercussions on the shape and strength of the 'yes' campaigns.

In the Turkish Cypriot referendum, the same unions and organisations who were part of the This Country is Ours platform cooperated in leading the 'yes' campaign. The involvement of civil society groups coming from different sectors of society, from business to education,

and their cooperation with pro-solution parties, drew support for the success of the negotiations from different quadrants of society. The earlier and higher degree of engagement from these groups with the negotiations, on the other hand, allowed for a stronger 'yes' campaign, backed by civil society groups, to reach the community during the referendum campaign period.

Similarly in Northern Ireland, the civil society-led 'yes' campaign played a crucial role in pushing support for the agreement. As Rao (2013, 10) argues, it compensated the more hesitant support coming from some of the political parties who were fearful of the political risk and cost of committing their support to an agreement and having it not be supported by their constituencies in the referendum. However, what did not take place in Northern Ireland, which was the case in the Turkish Cypriot community, was the cooperation of civil society groups and political parties during the campaign. The Women's Coalition would be the exception, but it was, in any case, a civil society-led party. Unlike in the Turkish Cypriot community, in Northern Ireland the intention to create an umbrella campaign did not materialise and each of the parties framed the 'yes' in different ways. Given the ambiguity of the agreement, these frames became contradictory. The epitome of this problem was Sinn Féin's 'victory' claims, which ultimately helped alienate voters in the Unionist community (analysed more closely in the next section). Nevertheless, the 'yes' campaign was important in delivering unified messages of support for the agreement.

In the Greek Cypriot community, we see the opposing dynamic taking place, with the strong politically backed 'no' campaign taking momentum and muffling the 'yes' campaign that was mainly lead by individuals in civil society with the help of NGOs. Scarcer civil society bi-communal initiatives in Cyprus were never properly recognised as a valuable policy option by the macro political level (Hadjipavlou 2002). Additionally, as Kanol and Kanol (2013) argue, UN officials have often ceded to political pressure to withdraw UN support for civil society bi-communal cooperation reconciliation initiatives, worrying that doing so would ignite Greek Cypriot fears that its support would signal international recognition of the TRNC. Whereas in the Turkish Cypriot community, civil society mobilised in collaboration with opposition parties and was part of the strong 'yes' campaign, in the Greek Cypriot case the 'yes' campaign was mainly composed of civil society activists whose resources were no match to the highly politically backed 'no' campaign - although they were condemned by the 'no' campaign for receiving funds from the UN for their campaigns.

The literature on civil society consistently argues that including civil society actors in the negotiations can lead to more durable agreements and stable peace in conflict settings (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). They echo recent claims that the inclusion of civil society groups increases public support for the peace negotiation process, particularly by enhancing public perceptions of the legitimacy of the process (Zanker 2014; Nilsson 2012; Belloni 2008; Barnes 2002). This research contributes to the findings in this literature in adding that civil society inclusion can also increase public support for a peace settlement in a referendum, particularly through the crucial role it can play in the referendum campaigns. What we see in both the negotiations in Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot community is that civil societies that are engaged in the negotiations tend to be highly mobilised in the 'yes' campaigns. Civil society actors are important campaigners and having these groups engaged in the negotiations can stimulate them to establish platforms for collaboration that can used to generate stronger 'yes' campaigns down the line. Of course, a very benign view of civil society is being presented here, which may not be the case in each community where there were also civil society groups who did not support the peace settlement during the referendum. The example given of the Pancyprian Citizens Movement in the Greek Cypriot community, however, confirms the dynamic that earlier mobilization of civil society can make these groups more effective campaigners, even if 'no' campaigners. Yet, including these groups in the negotiations, in one or more of the broad array of ways in which this can be done, can potentially increase the likelihood that they will campaign for the 'yes'. Nonetheless, because civil society in conflict settings tends to develop with the purpose of assisting the population while the political establishment is frozen by the conflict, it might be prone to support efforts that aim at solving the conflict.

In sum, civil society groups can aid the development of stronger 'yes' campaigns that make up for less enthusiastic political party campaigns, or serve as platforms that unite them. They are also better suited to deliver campaigns that are less divisive in making use of more reconciliatory messages that can help reduce polarization in the referendum. Additionally, the inclusion of civil society in the peace negotiations tends to favour more transparent negotiations, allowing for more information about the process to be disseminated, as opposed to between political elites which typically only reveal the outcome that was reached. Given that civil society actors are closer to the people, they are also crucial disseminators of information and can promote voter information in the communities.

Agreement Design: Content versus Process Information

The Annan Plan and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) are two very different documents. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Annan Plan was described by the Secretary-General as 'a truly comprehensive proposal, including all legal instruments necessary, and leaving nothing to be negotiated subsequently.' (United Nations 2003, para. 61). The GFA is virtually its polar opposite. In the GFA, the political parties of Northern Ireland 'agreed to disagree', as SDLP delegate Sean Farren described when interviewed (Farren 2014), and left some of the most divisive issues in the Northern Ireland conflict to be agreed subsequently. Consequently, while the Annan Plan is more than 192-pages long (plus 250 pages of annexes) (United Nations 2003, para. 17), the GFA is comparatively much smaller, only 40 pages.

Comparing the two referendums, there was overall more information available about the content of the agreement in Northern Ireland than in Cyprus. In Northern Ireland, every household was sent a copy of the final agreement, which was not the case in Cyprus, although smaller and more 'readable' versions of the Annan Plan were distributed. Similarly, across the communities, the ones with the more informed voters delivered the higher rate of support in the referendum. Regarding Northern Ireland, Hayes and McAllister (2001, 79, 82) tested their respondent's knowledge of the provisions of the agreement and found 'no' voters were less knowledgeable of the agreement than 'yes' voters, with voters in the Nationalist community being the most knowledgeable. Similarly, in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots were believed to have been better informed about the Annan Plan than the Greek Cypriot community (Bryant 2004; Kaymak 2009), who was also found to have been misinformed by political elites. It could be argued that the Nationalist and the Turkish Cypriot communities were both the two minority communities and, for that reason, welcomed the changes that a power-sharing arrangement would bring and, therefore, would vote 'yes' in the referendum in any case. While this may partially explain the referendum outcome in the communities, it dismisses the antecedent condition that, because these communities were more motivated for changes, they were more engaged and informed than their counterparts.

All things considered, it is important for support that the community is generally informed about the content of the agreement and its implications. This is, nonetheless, a challenge for the reasons described in the case studies. The campaigners interviewed in Cyprus and

Northern Ireland did overall believe that people, in general, were not well informed about the content of the agreement and followed their leaders and/or others in their community. In Northern Ireland, the ambiguity of the agreement was the main justification cited, while in Cyprus interviewees spoke of the length and legalistic language of the agreement. As was shown, regardless of the direction of their support or which community they belonged to, all interviewees were dissatisfied with the length of the Annan Plan. On the one hand, it made it difficult for the people to understand it and, on the other, a source of suspicion due to the general public's difficulty in fully grasping its text and implications.

In exploring the impact of the referendum campaigns on voter information and potential voting behaviour, this thesis shows that caution is needed in reading an immediate link between referendums results and the content of the plan. This is one of the aspects where there is a tendency in the literature to assume that there is symmetry between political leader's positions and the people's voting behaviours. For example, Kaymak (2012, 89) argues that the Greek Cypriot veto of the Annan Plan signifies that 'the Greek Cypriot voters would be keen to see substantively different elements embedded in any settlement package'. While this was voiced by Greek Cypriot political leaderships, it does not necessarily reflect public opinion in the community. As has also been stated, other authors have argued that the Annan Plan did not sufficiently address the Greek Cypriot communities' security concerns (Lordos 2009; Michael 2011, 186). However, if the people did not have a clear understanding of the content of the agreement and were effectively misinformed by their President about what a post-Annan Plan Cyprus would come to be, we cannot linearly interpret the referendum result as Greek Cypriot voters manifesting dissatisfaction with agreement provisions.

It is not to say, however, that what is agreed at the negotiations table is irrelevant in the referendum. The content of a peace agreement is important in getting political party support for the agreement during the campaign period and, for this reason, political leaders need to be able to 'sell' the agreement to their communities. However, as the GFA case shows, while creating ambiguous commitments might favour political support, it can be damaging if antagonist interpretations of those provisions co-exist during the referendum campaign. As it was demonstrated, scholars argue that the 'constructive ambiguity' in the provisions of GFA allowed political leaders to 'sell' the agreement to their constituencies (Tonge and Evans 2002; Dixon 2013, 114). It allowed Sinn Féin to state that there would be no

decommissioning prior to the establishment of the power-sharing government, while the UUP claimed that it would take place beforehand. It also allowed Unionist political parties to campaign for an agreement that kept Northern Ireland in the UK, while republicans claimed to be a step closer to Irish unity. Yet, it was demonstrated, if ambiguity allowed the leaders to better 'sell' the agreement during the campaign, it also allowed for divisive views and disagreements to remain between the leaderships and, consequently, for win-lose views of the agreement to negatively impact support for the peace settlement. Therefore, if ambiguity can facilitate the reaching of an agreed document between political leaders, it can negatively impact support for it in the referendum if the political leaders are unable to uphold less contrasting, or zero-sum views.

Amongst the campaigners interviewed in both Cyprus and Northern Ireland, there was a clear and consistent division between how 'no' and 'yes' supporters viewed the agreement. While Annan Plan and GFA supporters described the agreement as a point in a process, or a way to move forward, those who campaigned for the 'no' had static views of the agreement and described them as endpoints. For example, Ali Erel, who supported the 'yes' in the Turkish Cypriot community, stated that 'The agreement is just the start, the basis to work on and it is bound to have mistakes' (Erel 2014). Similarly, Marios Epaminondas, who campaigned for the 'yes' in the Greek Cypriot community stated 'This plan is good enough, it is not perfect but it is a way of moving forward.' (Epaminondas 2014). In Northern Ireland, Lord Empey described the GFA as 'work in progress to an extent' (Empey 2014) and Hayes and McAllister (2001, 82–83) claim that 'yes' voters tended to view the agreement as 'a new beginning'. However, 'yes' supporters believed in the possibility that relationships between the parties would be healed enough to negotiate in the future, on aspects of the agreement that they were less happy with. 'No' supporters, on the other hand, were more suspicious of the other and believed they were the 'losers' in the final agreement. This suggests that, while knowledge of the content of the agreement can influence voting behaviours in peace settlement referendums, how they are viewed in the overall context of the peace/reconciliation process can markedly divide support.

Agreement design is, indeed, the determinant that delivered the more surprising and complex results. Although the question of the referendum is on the text of the agreement, it is surprising to find that the text of the document itself appears to be less important factor in shaping voter's decisions. While agreement design is naturally crucial to political parties

support for the agreement in the referendum, the content of the agreement itself cannot be found determinant when it is not an important source of information to voters. Of course, the content of the peace agreement shapes the debates that take place in the public realm during the referendum campaign, but that seemed to happen indirectly in the two cases, by the way political leaders and the campaigns framed the agreement to their constituencies and how the media disseminated this information. The findings of this qualitative research are, however, limited since they are based on political leader's and campaigners' personal experiences. As it was shown, they sometimes contradict findings from quantitative studies and, perhaps more importantly, they raise new questions that these studies are more equipped to address.

Bridging Peace Negotiations and Referendums Literature

Similar to what was the case in the Annan Plan referendum, the victory of the 'no' vote in the recent peace settlement referendum in Colombia came as a surprise. Defying all expectations, the peace agreement reached by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana was rejected by a slight majority of voters, in a referendum with a low voter turnout. Public opinion polls had led many to believe that, similarly to the Good Friday Agreement referendum, the 'yes' would win by a robust margin (Murphy and Cobb 2016). While failed peace settlement referendums may prompt the question of whether they should be held in the first place, the findings of this research suggest that referendums might not in themselves be the problem.

Instead of a traditional focus on how peace agreements can be reached by political leaders in peace negotiations, the focus of this research was on how peace negotiations affect communities' support for the resulting peace settlements in a referendum. In analysing why negotiation processes end in successful or failed peace settlement referendums, instead of why political leaders reached or did not reach a peace agreement, this research highlighted different aspects of the negotiation process. It found that, although agreement design might be crucial in accommodating political elites and designing implementable and durable post-conflict institutions, the process of negotiations itself and the wider societal setting in which it takes place can play a more important role on whether

the agreement is supported or not. Less secretive and more inclusive peace negotiations can potentially both help depolarise relationships between political leaderships as well as mobilise civil society and the wider communities in support for the peace settlement, which can aid the reconciliation process.

This section will further discuss how the comparison of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums can inform existing academic literature and the practice of peace negotiations and mediation. Two questions and broad debates are addressed here. First, it discusses how the findings of this research contribute to the growing debate on whether referendums, and peace settlement referendums in particular, should be used in peace processes. It then puts forward the argument that peace negotiations with referendums require a type of process that is different from what has been traditionally conducted in negotiations where the agreement only required political leaders' endorsement to be ratified.

To Hold, or Not to Hold, a Peace Settlement Referendum

In discussing how the in-depth analyses and comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA experiences inform literature and practice on peace negotiations and referendums, this section explores the question of whether a peace settlement referendum should be held in the first place. It reviews existing arguments in the literature that are for and against the use of referendums in peace processes and contributes to this debate by discussing them with the findings of the case comparison.

Addressing peace settlement referendums specifically, Loizides (2015, 142) contends that, where politically feasible, referendums are risky and should not be used to ratify negotiated agreements. 'Silent elite pacts' are a preferable alternative because, he argues, the public will eventually support it when the benefits of the agreement emerge during implementation. This has recently been found to be the case regarding Bosnian support for the US-mediated Dayton Accords (Morgan-Jones, Loizides, and Stefanovic 2015). However, this requires that the implementation of the agreement leads to a relatively peaceful post-conflict situation, which is not always the case. Elite pacts more frequently create implementation problems and can lead to the re-emergence of conflict. In his study of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation of the Oslo Accords, Wanis-St. John (2006, 141; 2011, 271–72,

286) found that the implementation of the agreement was undermined precisely by the conditions of mistrust and rejectionism that created the need for secret negotiations in the first place. Importantly, the exclusionist process fed negative reactions to the agreement from those who were outside the negotiations, exacerbating spoiler problems and negatively influencing public opinion. Also, more inclusive, and less elitist, negotiation processes are the ones that produce more durable agreements (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Nilsson 2012).

As an alternative to a peace settlement referendum, Loizides (2015, 145–48) recommends the use of South African-style mandate referendums. In a mandate referendum, a leader asks the community to support his/her efforts in reaching an agreement at the negotiations table. In this sense, mandate referendums can play a crucial role in allowing political leaders to balance democratic accountability with their legitimacy and credibility at the negotiations table. The elections to the Peace Forum in Northern Ireland, have actually been seen to have functioned as a mandate giving exercise (Cochrane 2000). Therefore, as this research found to have been the case in Northern Ireland, mandate referendums can work to familiarise the public with the content of the negotiations and, indeed, bring the negotiation issues into the realm of public debate. They can also serve to familiarize the public with the referendum process if the final agreement will be placed for referendum. Yet, a less secretive and more participatory peace negotiation process can potentially bring the same benefits with less risk involved.

Another argument against the use of a peace settlement referendum is one that exists in the larger literature on referendums: that the public is not apt to make decisions on complex policy issues. As largely upheld in referendums literature (Hobolt 2007, 175–76; Schneider and Weitsman 1996), a referendum can only be a true instrument of direct democracy and expression of democratic will if it is exercised by well-informed voters. The cases compared here suggest that more transparent peace negotiation processes that engage with civil society and the public can promote voter education. This has further important implications for the timing of the referendum. Usually peace settlement referendum take place soon after the agreement is reached in order to take advantage of the momentum created by the public announcement of the agreement. This was the case in both the Annan Plan and GFA referendums, which took place around a month after the agreements were reached or announced. Lee and Mac Ginty (2012), for example, contend that these campaign periods

are too short to allow voters to understand the issues at stake in the referendum, as they argue to have been the case in Guatemala. The alternative option is to set a longer campaign period to allow more time for voter education and public debate on what is at stake in the referendum.

The Northern Ireland and Turkish Cypriot experiences suggest that, to hold the peace settlement referendum soon after the agreement is reached can best build on its momentum if a less secretive and more inclusive process takes place. The comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA cases further suggest that, unless there is a higher inclusion of stakeholders and an engaged civil society, the small time periods between the end of negotiations and the day of the referendum, indeed, do not suffice to educate the public. This type of process allows for public debate on the issues under negotiations to take place at an earlier stage and pushes political leaders to educate their constituencies. Although longer campaign periods could ideally function to inform voters, as we have seen, referendum campaigns tend not to be purely informational campaigns and can, in fact, work to misinform voters. Uninformed referendum voters can be easy targets for opportunistic political leaders who may manipulate the public and use the referendum to further their own political agendas (Schneider and Weitsman 1996, 584). In any case, the need for a longer referendum campaign period already signals that the public is unready for a referendum, likely due to lack of public and civic participation and/or secretive politics.

There is yet one last important argument made against the use of referendums in peace processes: that the referendum experience runs the risk of stirring conflict by further radicalising public opinion (Mac Ginty 2003, 16–17). Peace settlement referendums can be particularly prone to polarising referendum experiences because the question asked requires a dichotomous 'yes'/'no' answer that is prone to create' winners' and 'losers'. Rynhold and Cohen (2003, 101–2) argue that a referendum should not be held in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process because it risks doing more harm than good, by risking exacerbating existing tensions. This is likely to be the case. However, the reason for this may not necessarily be because the referendum process in inherently problematic, but because the negotiation process has relied on secrecy (Wanis-St.John 2011). Nonetheless, Israel's increasingly hard-line politics suggest that an agreement, let alone a referendum, is still not in sight. A certain degree of de-radicalization must take place before a referendum can be used to benefit the peace process. Essential to this de-polarization process is that a

conciliatory, win-win, or middle-ground discourse can co-exist with more radically different perspectives during the referendum campaign. This research suggests that this needs to start during the negotiation process. In peace settlement referendums, as the cases compared in this research suggest, it is desirable that a certain degree of reconciliation takes place during the negotiations so that communities can say 'yes' to an agreed future in the referendum. Social transformation does seem to be desirable for an agreement to be supported in a referendum and for the referendum experience itself to not further polarise society and politics. Additionally, while the goal should be that the majority votes 'yes', as we have learned from the Northern Ireland case, the ideal would be that agreements are equally supported by the communities in conflict. However, for that to happen, it is necessary that a certain degree of political reconciliation take place before the referendum is held. Yet, this is where peacemaking processes often fail, by keeping the leaders' potential accommodative behaviours away from the public eye and allowing for radical views to linger in the communities.

It is not, therefore, that referendums are inherently problematic and for that reason should not be held in a peace process, but rather that peace negotiations need to be adapted when there is a desire, choice, or a requirement for a peace settlement to be ratified through a referendum. How the process can be adapted is the question explored in the next section.

The Challenge of Tailoring Negotiations for Settlement Referendums

In finding that negotiation process conditions shaped the peace settlement referendum outcomes in the Annan Plan and GFA cases, there is an underlying claim in this thesis that the seeds for a successful outcome can be planted at earlier stages of the process - rather than during the referendum campaign period. To ratify a negotiated peace settlement through a referendum, therefore, requires that the negotiation process itself is conducted in a way that will favour public support for the agreement. Let us explore how this can be done.

Lee and Mac Ginty's (2012) study of the Guatemalan referendum of May 1999, in which the peace agreement reached between the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was rejected, reaches conclusions that are consistent

with the cases compared here. In fact, the authors compare specific features of the Annan Plan and GFA cases with the Guatemalan case. In opposite to the Annan Plan and GFA cases, however, the referendum in Guatemala had an overwhelming 81,5 per cent rate of abstention. The failure of the Guatemalan referendum, the authors argue, was caused by a the lack of meaningful consultation with indigenous communities, lack of public information, and the exacerbation of fears by right-wing groups opposed to the agreement during the referendum campaign. The Guatemalan case, in all three aspects, resembles the Annan Plan's referendum in the Greek Cypriot community. However, while the authors find that the existence of security concerns was also a cause for the referendum failure, it is unlikely that these concerns will not exist in a peace process referendum. On the other hand, security concerns regarding the decommissioning of paramilitaries and prisoners releases were part of the referendum campaign debates in Northern Ireland and, yet, did not prevent the majority of both communities in Northern Ireland from voting 'yes'. Furthermore, as was argued in the Greek Cypriot case, security concerns may be inflated by 'no' campaigns and, hence, their impact may depend on the impact the 'no' campaigns have themselves. Finally, whereas the authors are sceptical of the role that third party interveners can have in improving the chances of peace process referendums being positive and successful experiences, the findings of this research supports a contrasting view.

During negotiation processes that culminate in a peace settlement referendum, mediators can promote successful peace settlement referendum by leading more inclusive and open negotiation processes that foster public interest, participation, and education. Mediators can encourage negotiators to gain support from their communities for the commitments that are being made at the negotiations table. This requires changes in political discourse. As Ramsbotham (2011, 61; 2010) has criticised, the discursive and linguistic intractability of conflict is a crucial dimension of conflict transformation that has consistently been ignored in peacemaking practices. How well this dimension of the conflict is addressed during the negotiation process, can in fact, have important consequences for a referendum campaign period. However, the greatest challenge to it is that political leaders fear losing public support during peace negotiations if they do not retain an adversarial public posture. As Horowitz (1985, 343–346) explains, especially ethnic political party leaders fear the stigma of being accused of betraying the community's cause, from which they can struggle to recover. Christopher Mitchell's (2012, 674) concept of 'political

entrapment' illustrates this dynamic well. The author explains that peace mediations have traditionally been led with the aim of helping political leaders escape this trap by creating face-saving devices, like secrecy, that would allow parties to make concessions without being seen as traitors by their supporters. Although this may help parties reach an agreement, face-saving allows relationships between leaderships and their political attitudes or discourses to remain adversarial, or even hostile. When the agreement will be ratified in a referendum, this is even more unfeasible. Even in the case of Northern Ireland, where the referendum was a 'success', as Cochrane (2000) argues, the opposite campaign messages given by the UUP and Sinn Féin during the referendum highlighted the fact that little consensus-building and ideological transformation of the conflict had occurred. If an agreement emerges between parties that are viewed as highly adversarial, voters are likely to be suspicious of the negotiations outcome and believe that their representatives have betrayed them. It is, therefore, important that the communities are prepared to support the concessions that their political leaders have to make at the negotiations table.

The need to change hostile political discourse into a more compromising one and hostile public attitudes into more reconciliatory ones is an important dimension of conflict resolution in ethnic conflicts that authors have argued to be consistently missing in practice (Kaufman 2006, 202; Ron 2009). In this regard, Ramsbotham (2011b, 19–21; 2011a, 72) argues for a more interventive role of the mediator. He suggests that the mediator's, or peacemaker's, own public discourse needs to aim at transforming the discourses of the political leaderships by 'competing' with them in the public 'discursive space'.

Mediators can play an important role in generating more transparent politics that citizens can be more aware of and participate in. Engaging civil society can serve to balance confidentiality with the need for public awareness and participation (Wanis-St. John 2008), and mediators can have the capacity to create spaces that foster contact between the civil society and political leaderships during negotiations. Civil society actors and groups that are engaged with the negotiation process can shape the referendum campaign experiences and promote a discourse of compromise, tolerance, peace, and views of a common future.

The main lesson that can be drawn from comparing the Annan Plan and the GFA negotiations and referendums, therefore, is that successful peace settlement referendums require a negotiation process that can foster public support for the agreement. More concretely, they need to be preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad

spectrum of political stakeholders and civil society. It is perhaps unsurprising to find that the use of a direct democracy, participatory tool, demands that a more transparent and participatory negotiation process takes place. One that breaks away from the traditional elite and 'behind closed doors' negotiations model. Therefore, it is not that referendums are inadequate for peace processes or the ratification of peace agreements, but rather that they are not adequate for traditional types of peace negotiation processes.

Conclusion

Peace negotiations had not yet been analysed with the purpose of understanding how they shaped referendum results. This thesis has achieved this aim by comparing how the Annan Plan negotiations in Cyprus contributed to its rejection in the referendum of April 2004, with how the Good Friday Agreement negotiations shaped its successful referendum in May 1998. Its findings have confirmed that support for the peace settlements in the referendums was also shaped by the way the negotiation processes were conducted in each of the cases. The less secretive, more politically and civically inclusive process in Northern Ireland was found to have led to a higher level of political party support for the agreement and a stronger 'yes' campaign, while the opposing dynamic was true in the rejection of the Annan Plan. In Cyprus, the secret and exclusionary negotiation process left Greek Cypriot voters vulnerable to the misinformation and cues provided by a highly politically backed 'no' campaign which led them to overwhelmingly reject the Annan Plan.

However, the striking similarities between the GFA case and the findings on the Turkish Cypriot community case were, perhaps, the most interesting results from the comparison. Although the Annan Plan negotiations were more exclusionary than the GFA negotiations, this research found that the UN Good Offices mission consulted with Turkish Cypriot political parties outside the negotiations at earlier stages of the negotiations. These consultations were found to include civil society actors. The strong mobilization of opposition parties and civil society in support for the Annan Plan negotiations was found to have made for a more politically and civically inclusive negotiation process than was the case in the Greek Cypriot community. In both the Northern Ireland case and in the Turkish Cypriot community, those characteristics of the process were found to have favoured support for the agreement in the referendum.

Qualitative research methods were used to develop and explore the links between the negotiations and the referendums in both processes. Given the reduced number of cases of peace negotiations with peace settlement referendums, the two cases presented themselves as the best suited for comparison. The Cyprus and Northern Ireland conflicts and subsequent peace processes share historical features, such as their British colonial history and the European Union enlargement process, that hardly could be matched by other cases. Most importantly, their selection allowed for the comparison of a case of peace negotiations

where a peace settlement was rejected in a referendum with one where it was accepted. Plus, the differences in support given by each of the local communities were interesting to compare. First, there was a similar difference in the percentages of support given between the local communities in each of the cases and, secondly, the results across the Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Nationalist, and Unionist communities allowed for a unique comparison of a wide range of different rates of support.

The extensive interviews conducted with negotiation delegates, political leaders, campaigners, civil society representatives, journalists, and academic experts were crucial to the research aim of exploring the links between the negotiation process and the referendum outcomes in both cases. Interviews with negotiation delegates and other politicians who were not included in the negotiations, allowed this research to explore what shaped their and their political parties' decisions to support, or not support, the agreement in the referendum. This approach also allowed this thesis to explore how that shaped the campaigns led by their political parties. Interviews with individuals and civil society groups gave further insight into how civil society inclusion shaped the referendum campaigns. All interviews offered insights into the kind of information available to the public on the negotiation process and the content of the agreements themselves, as well as how it reached, or not, each of the communities.

This concluding chapter brings together the findings of this study, along with its main implications for researchers and practitioners. It begins by recapturing the main proposition of this thesis concerning the relevance of studying peace settlement referendums as negotiation outcomes. It reviews how this was achieved and what it revealed. Thereafter, an overview of the findings relating to each of the aspects of the negotiations under study is presented. Each of the subsections sums up the findings reached in each the case studies analyses and their comparison. They conclude that the referendum outcomes were shaped by mediation strategies and by whether political parties and civil society groups were included in the negotiations. The agreements' design, on the other hand, while shaping political support for the agreement, was found to have a relative influence on the referendum outcome, hence, this section concludes by arguing that the referendum results did not necessarily reflect voters' opinions on the agreement itself. Lastly, this chapter presents a reflexion on the contribution and limits of the research and highlights the implications for existing research and peace mediation practice, along with numerous

suggestions on avenues for further research. It stresses the importance of the course of the negotiation process in building referendum results and revisits the argument made in the previous chapter that the use of a referendum to ratify a peace settlement is not suitable for all types of peace negotiation processes.

Peace Settlement Referendum Results as Negotiation Outcomes

Academic research on peace negotiations traditionally examined how different sorts of agreements were reached in peace negotiations, or whether they are able to abate crisis and reduce military tensions in conflict settings (for example, Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Anderson 2008; Beardsley 2006). In recent years, researchers moved to understand how peacemaking processes affect and are affected by the wider society in which the negotiations take place. This shift revealed that other actors beyond the political elites who traditionally negotiate peace settlements can shape the outcome of a negotiation process. Involving civil society groups and engaging the wider public has been increasingly argued in recent years to be crucial for the successful implementation of peace settlements and the establishment of an enduring peace (for example, Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Belloni 2008; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Paffenholz 2009; Nilsson 2012). As research and literature on peace processes has become more interested in instruments of civic and public engagement, the benefits and risks of using referendums in peacemaking processes have started to be assessed (for example, Johansson 2009; Lee and Mac Ginty 2012; Loizides 2014; Qvortrup 2014). Although some of this embryonic research suggests that certain features of the negotiations have shaped referendum experiences and results in peace processes around the world, a systematic and in-depth study of negotiations aiming to trace their impact on referendums had not yet been conducted.

More research had been done on other types of referendums than on those taking place in peace processes. The fact that this is a relatively recent phenomenon helps explain why this is the case. As it was shown, the most significant bulk of research has been done on European integration referendums (a few examples from the numerous works cited in this thesis are: M. Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Schneider and Weitsman 1996; Hobolt 2006; Hobolt 2007; Baun et al. 2006). In effect, there remained a significant gap between

peace negotiations and referendums literature. On the one hand, research on referendums tended to analyse referendum results and campaign periods and, therefore, said little about how they were impacted by negotiation processes. On the other hand, while research on referendums has shown that the referendum campaign periods themselves have a crucial impact on voting behaviours in referendums (for example, Leduc 2002; Vreese 2004; Hänggli and Kriesi 2010), this had not been fully considered in connection with existing analyses of peace negotiations with settlement referendums. Consequently, success or failure in peace negotiations has sometimes been indiscriminately used to refer to either an agreement being reached by the political leaderships in the negotiations, or an agreement being accepted in a referendum.

The comparison of the in-depth analysis of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations presented in this thesis proposed a way to bridge the outlined gap between the two types of research and explanations. To answer the research question *do peace negotiations influence support for peace settlements in referendums and, if so, how (?),* it asked *did the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations lead to opposing referendum outcomes and the differences in support between the local communities and, if so, how (?)*, and developed a novel research design. Gathering from referendums literature that referendum results are shaped by political leader's and parties' position on the referendum, the impact of the referendum campaigns, and public information and uncertainty about the issues or the agreement at stake in the referendum, this thesis looked at what aspects of peace negotiations could have shaped these referendum outcome determinants. Taking existing knowledge from negotiations literature and the two negotiation processes, it compared, in a structured and focused manner, how mediation strategies, political inclusion, civil society inclusion, and agreement design shaped them. From the analysis of the extensive interview data and other primary data, the following conclusions were reached on each of the different aspects of the negotiations analysed.

The Conditions that Shape Referendum Outcomes are Influenced by Mediation Strategies

Mediators can, through the mediation strategies that they use, significantly shape the conditions under which peace negotiations take place. This research demonstrated that, for the very same reason, mediator behaviours ultimately shape communities' support for the

peace settlement. It echoes other's findings that the arbitration procedure and the secrecy of the negotiations were among the factors that contributed to the failure of the Annan Plan process (Drath 2004; Michael 2007; Lordos 2009). However, the findings reached here are more detailed and nuanced since they explain how the negotiation process had an impact on the Annan Plan referendum campaign periods and, ultimately, the referendum results. In explaining how specific mediation strategies shaped the referendum experience, this study demonstrated that, firstly, it is actually the mixing of the two strategies that ultimately had a negative impact on the rate of support given to the agreement by the Greek Cypriot community. Secondly, unlike previous explanations, it questioned why those mediation strategies did not have an equal negative impact on the Turkish Cypriot community's support. In doing so, this study showed that a potentially negative impact was counterweighed in the Turkish Cypriot community by the pro-solution parties' and civil society groups' engagement and involvement in the negotiations. The three-year long period of effective mobilization of the community in support of the negotiations collaterally set the seeds for the victory of the 'yes' vote in the referendum.

The analysis of how mediation strategy might have shaped the GFA referendum in Northern Ireland showed that, although confidentiality was an important feature of the process, the negotiations were not secret *per se*. Importantly, the lesser degree of secrecy of the process was not a result of a mediator decision, but rather due to the sheer number of political parties participating in the negotiations and, more importantly, the contact that the smaller parties maintained with their constituents. The involvement of kin states, on the other hand, interfered with George Mitchell's mediation, as was stated by the Northern Irish delegates interviewed (Alderdice 2014; Empey 2014; Weir 2014). The pressure on Trimble to accept the agreement and the subsequent split in the Ulster Unionist party created divisions among Unionist politicians on the benefits and shortcomings of the agreement. This had a negative impact on the community's support for the GFA right at the start of the referendum campaign period.

By differentiating between the impact of mediation strategies on referendum outcomes and the outcome reached at the negotiations table *per se*, this study showed that mediation strategies that work to get political leaders to an agreement might affect support for that same agreement in the referendum. When the two cases were compared, it emerged that procedural strategies had a greater impact in shaping the referendums in both cases. Studies

on the effectiveness of mediation strategies have looked at what strategies are more effective in getting political leaders to a cease-fire, to reduced military tensions, or to an agreement of some sort. For this reason, directive and facilitative strategies were found to be the most effective (for example, Touval and Zartman 2001; Bercovitch and Derouen 2004; Beardsley 2006). The fact that this study looked, instead, at whether those mediation strategies would help or hinder the chances of the agreement being accepted by the people in a referendum, showed that procedural strategies relating to the degree of exposure of the negotiations to the outside were the most relevant. It supports others' findings that negotiation secrecy comes with a cost (Wanis-St.John 2011; Babbitt et al. 2013). Information about the negotiation process and the agreement is necessary to rebuff or counteract the misinformation campaigns led by spoilers - such as the ones led by Papadopoulos and Denktash in Cyprus, or Ian Paisley in Northern Ireland -, especially during peace referendum campaigns. Secret negotiations might be advantageous in getting the political leaders to agree, but can be counterproductive when a referendum is used for ratification. While mediators might find it beneficial to isolate leaders from, for example, less accommodative party carders, they run the risk of alienating the public.

The comparison further showed that, while pressure - a tactic within the spectrum of directive mediation strategies - may be effective in getting negotiating parties to an agreement, it can have a negative impact on support for the agreement in the referendum. Pressure can be counterproductive because it may push leaders to support an agreement that does not have grassroots backing. Now, this backing may not exist for a variety of reasons, but if the public is not aware of what is being negotiated, or if negotiators did not search for their constituents' support for the concessions they were making at the negotiations table, pressuring leaderships to accept an agreement can have negative repercussions on the peace settlement referendum down the line.

This study of the impact of mediation strategies on support for the Annan Plan and GFA in their respective referendums, therefore, provided insight into the tension between the mediation strategies deployed to allow for progress in the negotiation process and the potential prejudicial impact on the communities' perception of the benefits and shortcomings of the settlement. Additionally, it demonstrated that some of the conditions that shape communities' support for the peace settlement are malleable to the mediator, lending support to others in mediation literature who have called for a greater recognition of

the mediator's role in peace processes (Stedman 1991; Greig 2001). It suggests that mediators should be careful in the choice and mix of strategies that they deploy, so that they are sensitive to the impact these may have on the local context. Peace mediations do not, indeed, occur in a 'political vacuum' (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2004, 23). Therefore they must be conducted in a way that takes into account its impact on the wider communities' perceptions of the peace process. Strategies that increase leaderships' accountability for the peace process and favour public information are particularly important. It is also important that leaders change adversarial discourses and that the improvement of leaderships' relationships during the negotiation process is perceived and trickles-down to the communities. Strategies that aim at increasing transparency and civil society inclusion can potentially favour this effect, at the same time as they can potentially generate ownership and responsibility for the success of the peace process, among both the leaderships and the communities. In fact, the use of a referendum can itself be seen as a mediation strategy that aims to engage the public. However, as it has been shown, other strategies are necessary to complement it.

Political Party Participation in the Negotiations Favoured Support in the Referendums

One significant difference that was evident between the two cases from the start of the research process was the number of political parties that were formally included in the negotiations. From the outset, a total of 10 political parties participated in the GFA negotiations (although it can be argued that negotiations between the UUP and the SDLP were more central), while only the elected leaderships of each of the Cypriot communities and their delegations were part of the negotiations in Cyprus. To compare this aspect of the negotiations made sense, on the one hand, because the inclusivity of the negotiation process is one feature of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations that has been time and again pointed out has having contributed to the success of the process (for example, Darby 2001; Curran and Sebenius 2003; McGarry and O'Leary 2006b). On the other hand, research on referendums indicates that political leaders/party's public positioning on issues at stake in a referendum has often the most impact on a referendum result (for example, Schneider and Weitsman 1996; Hobolt 2006; Vreese 2006). Therefore, it was important to understand

if and how participation in the negotiations impacted political leaders' or political parties' decisions to support, or not support, the agreement in the two cases.

In the Annan Plan, the 'pro-solution' political parties in the Turkish Cypriot community, who were outside the negotiations until 2003, actively looked to influence and shape the negotiations. While their original purpose was to put pressure on Denktash to negotiate, as Denktash began to lose popular support within the community, these parties came into increasingly more substantial contact with UN mediators. By 2003, Talat eventually became the Turkish Cypriot delegation's leader at the Bürgenstock negotiations. While the moderates rose to the negotiations table in the Turkish Cypriot community, the opposite was the case in the Greek Cypriot. Papadopoulos' election meant that the pro-solution DISY and EDI were out of the final stages of the negotiations. As the highly politically backed 'no' campaign resonated and gained momentum in the community, AKEL's switch to supporting the 'no' vote coupled with the split in DISY, meant that only a few politicians were involved in the 'yes' campaign. Seemingly, if Papadopoulos' position and public statements against the Annan Plan had an impact on the low Greek Cypriot support for the Annan Plan in the referendum, Denktash's support for the 'no' was counterweighted by a stronger 'yes' campaign in North Cyprus.

Contrary to the Annan Plan case, all the parties that took part in the last stages of the GFA negotiations supported the agreement in the referendum, while the DUP and the UKUP, who abandoned the negotiations in the year prior, were against it. By including a larger number of political parties, the negotiation process favoured political support for the agreement during the referendum. Concomitantly, this support was significant in explaining the difference in support between the Unionist and the Nationalist communities. The self-exclusion of the DUP and the UKUP meant that the 'no' campaign was exclusively targeted at Unionist voters.

Comparing the two cases, the more inclusive negotiation dynamics towards the Turkish Cypriot political parties and the GFA negotiations suggested that including more political parties in the negotiations favoured the 'yes' campaigns and political support for the settlements in Northern Ireland and North Cyprus. Inclusive negotiations may, therefore, prevent referendum spoilers from arising, or limit the impact of their 'no' campaigns. The comparison of how political inclusion shaped differences in support between the communities also showed that, particularly in the Northern Irish case, that the tone in which

the agreement is supported by political leaderships can shape referendum outcomes. This was salient in the negative impact that the victorious tone of Sinn Féin's campaign had on the Unionist community's support.

In short, the study of how political inclusion shaped community support for the agreement in the two referendums demonstrated that having more political parties at the negotiations table favoured support for the settlement in the referendum. Nonetheless, the results also show that political parties' campaigns can still be divisive when supporting the same outcome. The fact that political parties will likely have to run for election after the referendum reduces their incentive to cooperate with other parties in a 'yes' campaign. For this reason, unified campaign platforms and umbrella campaigns, such as the one led in North Cyprus and the civil society-led 'yes' campaign in Northern Ireland, are desirable in peace settlement referendums. These campaigns are better suited to sell the agreement under a unified frame and help dilute the impact of winner-loser campaign messages on voters.

Having a greater number of parties at the negotiations, with competing interests and differing views on a solution to the conflict, may represent a greater challenge to an agreement being reached. A negotiation process that includes a greater number of groups with claims to political power runs the risk of leading to further fragmentation within the parties at the table. The inclusion of armed groups alone is an enormous challenge to any peace process that requires clear rules for interaction and the promotion of their transformation into non-violent actors (Dudouet 2010; Planta and Dudouet 2015; O'Kane 2015). However, the exclusion of political parties and/or groups that legitimately represent the interests of a community, or section of that community, can backfire when a referendum is used to ratify the agreement. This does not imply that all should be granted a sit at the negotiations table since meaningful consultation with mediators can also be an option. As this research has found that support for a peace settlement in referendum does not necessarily reflect public opinion on the text of the agreement, peace negotiations can be geared towards improving the relationships and public discourse of adversarial groups and political representatives. Less focus on the final agreement and a greater focus on the process can potentially facilitate negotiations between a larger number of parties and increase the chances of the settlement being accepted in a referendum.

Civil Society Inclusion was Associated with Stronger 'yes' Campaigns

Recent academic literature has increasingly been finding the manifold roles that civil society can play in helping divided societies recover from conflict. Including civil society groups in negotiations has been shown to ripen negotiations, increase grassroots support and political accountability and, consequently, bring about more durable agreements (Paffenholz, Kew, and Wanis-St. John 2006; Nilsson 2012; Aljets, Chacko, and Jessop 2008). The comparative study of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums has contributed to this blossoming field by showing that an active civil society can play a crucial role in generating support for peace settlements in referendums.

The similarities in the degree of engagement with the negotiations between civil society in Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as the absence of this dynamic in the Greek Cypriot community, were striking. In the Annan Plan case, while civil society in the Greek Cypriot community did not significantly mobilize or engage with the peace process, the opposite was the case in the Turkish Cypriot. The push to pressure Denktash to cooperate in the negotiations set in motion a movement that, together with pro-solution political parties, was able to influence its course. The letter written to the UN Secretary General expressing civil society's unified support for the success of the negotiations, plus the informal consultations that civil society leaders were able to have with UN mediators, were the ways through which Turkish Cypriot civil society was able to influence the negotiations. The same civil society groups and political parties who organized in support of the Annan Plan negotiations then translated, during the referendum, into a well-organized and resourced 'yes' campaign. In the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, the efforts of the individuals and few civil society groups that were active in the 'yes' campaign were waned by the stronger and highly politically backed 'no' campaign.

Although the forms of inclusion in the negotiations were different, a similar dynamic to that observed in the Turkish Cypriot community took place in the GFA negotiations and referendum. Unlike the communities in Cyprus, the communities in Northern Ireland had to live together, and it was in the effort to reconcile the communities that civil society emerges as a crucial actor in the peace process. As was the case in Cyprus, there was no intent on the part of the mediators or political leaderships to include civil society in the negotiations. Rather, it was civil society itself that made the effort to be included. In the GFA negotiations,

this took place through the Women's Coalition and civil society groups' informal consultations with delegates from the several political parties participating in the negotiations. Members of these civil society groups then went on to form the 'yes' campaign. The campaign had been originally intended to unify the campaigns of all the political parties who endorsed the agreement, but the majority of the parties refused the invitation. Nonetheless, the 'yes' campaign was able to deliver a more unified message to both communities and help raise the Unionist vote in particular. In Cyprus, there was some cooperation between the 'yes' campaigns in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, but it was very small and came too late (Erel 2014).

In Northern Ireland and in the Turkish Cypriot community, the existence of an engaged civil society was an important asset to the 'yes' campaigns in the referendums. The people, contacts, organizations, and platforms created and marshalled during the negotiations mobilized and served, thereafter, to support the activities of the campaigns during the referendums. The insipient and disengaged civil society in the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, engaged in the referendum in a poorly organized fashion that was no match for the rampant 'no' campaign. What emerged from the comparison, therefore, is that including (in its broadest sense) civil society groups in peace negotiations favours support for peace settlements in referendums.

The Referendum Results did not Necessarily Reflect Opinion on the Peace Settlements

The initial intent of this research was to compare which aspects of the Annan Plan and the Good Friday Agreement might have shaped support from each of the communities in the two cases. Surprisingly, it emerged that, although voters in both referendums were asked if they would accept the implementation of these agreements, it could not be established that the texts of the agreements themselves were a significant source of information to voters. Rather, it was how these texts were presented or framed by political leaders and others during the campaigns that appear to have played a more significant role in shaping support in the referendum. Still, others have argued and/or found that the Nationalist and Turkish Cypriot communities were more knowledgeable of the agreements than their counterparts (Hayes and McAllister 2001; Bryant 2004). This suggested that information about the agreement is, nonetheless, important for support.

Within the Greek Cypriot community, the text of the agreement did not necessarily determine either the positioning of all the political parties in the referendum, nor support from the community in the referendum. Whereas the agreement might have not satisfied Papadopoulos' or the Greek Cypriot delegation's positions, it cannot be assumed that it would not be supported by the community. Equally, AKEL's support for the 'no' vote or DISY's split support were not essentially due to dissatisfaction with the agreement. While Papadopoulos' position was that he was handed an agreement that the Greek Cypriot community should not 'buy', the interviews conducted in Cyprus suggested that the Greek Cypriot delegation did not negotiate with the intention to reach an agreement that they would be able to 'sell' to their community (Hadjidemetriou 2014; Papapetrou 2014; Talat 2014). Papadopoulos was, however, effective in 'selling' the idea that he had been handed a bad deal.

One explanatory factor to why Papadopoulos' position resonated with Greek Cypriot voters, it was found, resided in a larger and older problem of the negotiations. A lack of communication to the public on the compromises needed to reach an agreement had created false expectations among the community regarding what a compromise agreement could consist of. On the other hand, it left the community, at large, with only the one month referendum campaign period to learn about and digest the agreement, while the 'no' campaign gained momentum. This was not the case in the Turkish Cypriot community. The protest movement unchained by Denktash's rejection of the third version of the Annan Plan at the Hague led to a more engaged and informed community. Public and media discussion of the implications of the Annan Plan began to take place as far back as 2002, when the third version of the Plan was released. In fact, as was mentioned in the case study chapter, some of the interviewees who were part of the campaign referred to it as being inseparable from the antecedent campaign to support the negotiations, in other words, that the 'yes' campaign was the natural continuation of the movement's activities (Talat 2014; Akinci 2014; Elcil 2014).

While the Annan Plan was a comprehensive agreement that aimed at not leaving issues to be negotiated after the referendum, that was not the case in the Good Friday Agreement. While the 'gaps' in the Annan Plan were filled by the Secretary General, some of the most divisive issues were left to be decided by independent commissions after the referendum in the Good Friday Agreement. Importantly, by providing for the possibility of Northern Ireland

uniting with Ireland, if that wish is expressed by majority of its citizens in a referendum, it allowed Unionist political leaders to claim the agreement kept Northern Ireland in the UK and republicans to claim it was a step towards Irish unity. Ambiguity regarding the decommissioning issue also allowed Ulster Unionists to claim decommissioning would take place immediately after the referendum, while allowing Sinn Féin to claim otherwise. As other authors have stated, constructive ambiguity was fundamental in getting to an agreement on Good Friday (Dixon 2013; Tonge and Evans 2002). It was furthermore crucial in getting all those same political parties to support it during the referendum.

However, if the ambiguity of the agreement facilitated the political leader's endorsement, it also allowed them to campaign under antagonistic interpretations of the agreement. The political parties' focus on selling the agreement to their own community allowed for the co-existence of antithetical campaign messages during the campaign period. This fuelled, in turn, winner-loser perceptions of the agreement that had a particularly negative impact on the more divided Unionist community. Furthermore, even though the agreement was sent to all those residing in Northern Ireland, its ambiguities suggest that the content of the agreement itself was not a major source of information, nor itself alone shaped voter's decisions.

The findings reached in comparing the two cases were not straightforward in this aspect. They are, in fact, quite complex and open to different interpretations, and could benefit from more detailed research. Regardless, by examining if and how the respective agreement designs shaped the referendum results, it brought to attention to the fact that the result of the peace settlement referendum does not necessarily indicate voters' support or rejection of the content of the agreement itself. Because it accommodates political interests, the agreement is fundamental to having political leaders' and party's support for the settlement in the referendum. For this reason alone, it has a strong influence on the referendum outcome, since political leaderships and parties' opinions and positions is what tends to shape voters' decisions the most. Yet, it is also a function of how well educated voters are about the agreement and its, likely uncertain, implications. Precisely because the implementation of an agreement is bound to be an arduous process with an unpredictable outcome, whether trust has developed in the political and communal relations is likely to play a role in voters' decisions. After all, the will to make a deal also depends on the belief one has that the other side will keep its end of the bargain.

What is interesting and surprising about these findings is that they suggest that, although the question asked in both referendums was whether voters accepted or rejected the peace settlements, the 'yes' and 'no' votes given by voters were not necessarily answers to that same question. The recent peace settlement referendum experience in Colombia, in October 2016, is another example of this in the sense that the question in the referendum asked voters whether they supported the agreement and the building of 'a stable and lasting peace'. From the victory of the 'no' vote, however, we cannot interpret that the people of Colombia, who have been through decades of conflict, do not want peace. In much the same way, we cannot reduce the result of a referendum to a clear answer to the question it posed.

Written agreements undeniably influence a referendum vote, if only because they deeply shape political support, the referendum campaigns, and the issues that are part of it. Yet, this points to another important finding of this research: information about the negotiation process is more important to propelling support for an agreement in a referendum than information about the agreement. Informing and educating the public about the terms of a peace agreement naturally occurs only after the agreement is reached and is, of course, bound to occur only during the campaign period. The campaign period, then, might be too short to allow the voters to come to grips with agreements that are complex and whose implications are difficult, if not impossible, to grasp. This thus leaves voters to try to grasp the implications of a 'yes' or 'no' vote amidst sometimes aggressive campaign messages. As was discussed in the last chapter, extending campaign periods may not actually serve to generate more informed and educated voters, as well as they may allow the momentum created by the agreement being reached to be diluted. It also does not mean that negotiations should be completely open processes. These findings do, however, lend more support to the thesis that, as observed in the Turkish Cypriot and Northern Ireland cases, communication between political leaderships, civil society groups and the public during the negotiation process is important to getting peace settlements supported in referendums.

The Importance of Process: Contribution and Limits of the Study

This research has provided the first comparative in-depth study of peace referendums. It has contributed to research and literature on peace negotiation by introducing peace

settlement referendums as a negotiation outcome. It has, simultaneously, contributed to research and literature on peace process referendums by showing how negotiation process conditions impact referendum experiences and outcomes. It further provided a research design through which this relationship can be studied and further demonstrated that, although referendums happen outside the negotiation process, they are not independent from what happens behind their closed doors. The research design created and applied in this research can be used to investigate other cases of peace negotiations with referendums and to increase our understanding of how referendums can best serve peace negotiations. Importantly, by using the same design, or improving it, findings that are comparable across the cases can be generated, which is largely lacking in the literature on peace process referendums.

The study of the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement referendum results as negotiation outcomes allowed this research to break away with traditional analyses of peace negotiations, which have focused on explaining political elites' negotiating behaviours and the outcome of negotiations as something that is only produced by them. This had led authors to often equate the behaviours, preferences, etc. of political leaderships to those of the groups or communities that they represent, referring to 'Greek Cypriots', 'Turkish Cypriots', 'Unionists', or 'Nationalists', without discriminating whether it refers to the communities or to their political representatives, or both. What is problematic here is that there is no questioning of whether these leaderships are actually representing the group or community 'accurately'. The ousting of Denktash, after he refused to actively negotiate the Annan Plan when the community at large supported it illustrates this. By analysing the negotiation process with the view that political leaderships' endorsement and public support for an agreement in a referendum are two different negotiation outcomes, this thesis separated the public, or the communities, from the political leaders. Taking the referendum results across the communities as the outcome of interest it, therefore, allowed for the analysis of whether negotiations favoured or hindered the communities' acceptance of the agreement, and not the political leaders' as has been traditionally done.

Although the literature on peacebuilding and peacemaking has been increasingly pointing to the need for instruments to address the local community's relationships, literature and research on high-level mediation continues to resist this tendency. As a result, mediation research and literature have ignored that referendum results are a dimension of mediation

success and, therefore, mediators should care about how the negotiation process might influence public perceptions of the agreement. Despite high-level mediation still being practiced in the mainstream international traditions, changes have begun to occur with, for example, the growing involvement of civil society in negotiations. Civil society groups, this research has shown, are important peace process referendum campaigners and therefore, the degree to which they are involved with the negotiation process has important repercussions for the referendum outcome.

One important take away from this study is that a positive result, or a 'successful' peace settlement referendum, should not only be understood as an overall percentage result, but that differences in support between the communities are also important. These differences reflect, and fuel, winner-loser perceptions of the agreement that can make for more polarizing referendum experiences. To avoid this polarization, it is important that political leaders change adversarial and zero-sum discourses during the course of the negotiations. The major barrier to this, however, is that political leaders are often reticent to reveal to the public the concessions made at the negotiations table for fear that it may threaten their political survival. While secret negotiations protect political leaders, they allow them to maintain a public adversarial image that hampers the communities' possibility of viewing the agreement as a compromise, rather than a winner-loser outcome. It can both be positive in terms of support for the agreement and societal reconciliation if the message in the campaigns is that the solution found is the best possible solution in which each side gains and losses. It is important therefore, that the negotiation process is successful in reconciling elites and grassroots as far as possible, so that the referendum does not re-ignite the conflict.

After demonstrating the way in which the negotiation processes affected the referendums in both cases, this study made the case that a peace settlement referendum requires that a certain type of negotiations take place. This is at odds with the traditional secretive and exclusionist or elitist way in which peace negotiations are typically conducted. To make this case, it was important to address existing arguments in the literature that peace settlement referendums, or referendums in general, should not be used in peace processes in the first place. The findings here suggest that a way through which a referendum result can be constructed, is through negotiations that are more open, politically representative, and engaged with civil society. Therefore, it might not be that

referendums are unsuitable to conflict contexts, but that they are rather not suitable to all kinds of peacemaking processes.

In sum, the comparison of the Annan Plan and GFA cases suggest that more open and inclusive peace negotiations can potentially help depolarize relationships between political leaderships, and help mobilize civil society and the wider communities in support for the peace settlement, which can aid the reconciliation process. Therefore, referendums in peace processes are better understood and have a greater chance of succeeding if they are understood as a point in a process, to be more precise, as a very crucial point in the reconciliation and transformational process that the transition from conflict to peace entails. The findings support an existing push in peace and conflict studies literature for more inclusive negotiation processes and suggest that mediators can lead a negotiation process that is more conducive to successful ratification processes by limiting secrecy, including political parties, and creating opportunities for civil society participation and contact with the wider public. It is by generating negotiations that are more open and both politically and civilly inclusive, that peace processes can enjoy positive referendum experiences and avoid further polarizing conflict communities.

Limits of the Study and Avenues for Further Research

The findings of this study present some limitations. To begin with, there are limitations in terms of the generalizability of the findings, since the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement negotiations and referendums both took place in societies with democratic regimes – although their democratic credentials could be argued. This limitation was inherent to the case study selection process, but whether the same results would hold in conflict settings with other types of regimes could be the focus of future research (or even whether referendums are considered in these peace processes at all).

An aspect that this research only had a glimpse at, relates to the impact of the type of issues at play in the referendum and the campaigns. Security issues have been pointed out as problematic to support for peace settlements in referendums (Lee and Mac Ginty 2012), and indeed they were salient in both the Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement experiences. As was described in this thesis, the continued presence of Turkish troops post-referendum on the island was a significant security issue that was debated during the

referendum campaign period in the Greek Cypriot community, as was the decommissioning of the paramilitaries in the GFA referendum. However, to understand comparatively how specific issues shaped voting behaviours is an analysis that deserves future work. For example, it could be explored how the security versus economic benefits, or human rights issues, played out in voter decision-making. Another aspect that received limited attention was whether or not the question asked had an impact on the referendum results. While the two cases compared here suggested that a 'yes' or 'no' vote does not clearly signify support for the text of an agreement, the reasons for this can be manifold, from lack of voter information to simply votes for peace or change. In other words, we could benefit from learning more about the motivations behind voting in peace process referendums.

In attempting to bridge a gap, this research has highlighted yet further gaps in our knowledge of how peace negotiations affect referendums. A considerable amount of research remains to be done on peace process referendums and especially in analysing them as an extension of the political process that peace negotiations are. Future research could make use of surveys conducted on the day of the referendum to ascertain how perceptions of mediation/negotiation processes influenced voting behaviours more directly. A foreseeable second peace settlement referendum in Cyprus could provide an ideal opportunity. As noted earlier in this thesis, further research could be done regarding the involvement of kin states in the negotiations and the impact of such involvement on public opinion. Another area where more research, or more nuanced research, is still needed is on whether the content of a peace agreement directly influences voters in peace settlement referendums. As was argued in this thesis, studies based on public opinion polling can benefit from ascertaining what sources informed voters' opinions, so that we can better understand *who*, *what*, *when* and under what circumstances they are informed and influenced.

Nonetheless, because this research was concerned for how process conditions affected the referendum results, it remains to be more profoundly studied if and how they are affected by contextual conditions. One particularly important aspect to study that this research suggested, and one which could further test the results of this research, would be to look at how the degree of societal reconciliation, or absence thereof, shapes voter behaviours.

Additionally, since this study was based on research and literature from European integration referendums, it potentially can, in turn, inform that literature. European treaties, bailout agreements, and other deals have been traditionally negotiated by European political elites behind closed doors. Examination on the level of secrecy/openness, political inclusion/exclusion, and engagement with civil society actors in different European institutions, and its impact on referendum outcomes could offer insights on whether transparent EU institutions could foster greater support for European integration.

Lastly, this research has only had a glimpse at how journalists' and overall media behaviours during the referendum campaign periods shape the outcome of the referendum. The media plays a crucial role in informing the communities and in shaping public opinion, from the start of negotiations to the day of the referendum. In conflict settings, they can become important allies of the peace process, as they were described to have been in by interviewees in the Turkish Cypriot community and in Northern Ireland. In fact, some of the journalists interviewed explained that, as citizens of their community, they felt they had the responsibility to support the peace process (Graham 2014; Özuslu 2014). Regardless, as described, the media appears in both referendums as an interested actor and, in both referendums, the media is considered to have played an important role in shaping public opinion. At the same time, they were seen as biased in both Cyprus and Northern Ireland. The media did not act as a neutral actor, merely aiming to inform the public and reporting the campaign, but rather favoured the 'yes' in Northern Ireland and North Cyprus, and the 'no' in South Cyprus. Important research remains to be done regarding the role of the media in peace process referendums.

Final Thoughts and Future Prospects

This research has been among the first to provide a comparative in-depth study of peace referendums. It created a novel research design that allowed it to focus on how the negotiation processes shaped the referendum campaign periods and the referendum outcomes in the two selected cases. While studies of peace negotiations had not yet looked into how they might shape referendum experiences and outcomes, studies on peace referendums had not yet analysed in-depth how referendums were shaped by negotiation

process conditions. The gap in academic research defied the reality that peace negotiations and peace process referendums are inseparable phenomena. After all, referendums ask voters about specific aspects of the negotiations, as is the case of whether they accept a resulting peace settlement. In doing so, it put forward a novel argument that when referendums are held to ratify a peace settlement, the process of their negotiation and mediation needs to be adapted from the start. As a tool of democratic politics, peace settlement referendums need to be preceded by inclusive negotiations that involve a broad spectrum of political stakeholders and civil society, and engage the public at earlier stages of the process.

The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement referendum results can now be more clearly understood as an outcome of the political peace negotiations that preceded them. Indeed, their opposing results had very significant and opposing impacts on the Cyprus and Northern Ireland peace processes. The Annan Plan referendum result meant that a historical opportunity for re-unification was lost and for the past 13 years the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships have not been able to come as close to an agreement again. In the south, the economic upheaval and stability brought by EU accession further disengaged the Greek Cypriot community from the negotiation process, while the Turkish Cypriot community grew sceptical that the peace process would deliver its promises. The victory of the 'yes' in Northern Ireland, on the other hand, was a tremendous achievement within the peace process that came to mark a crucial period in the transition to peace. Still, as was discussed earlier in this thesis, the momentum brought by the agreement and the greater mobilization of people during the referendum offered a momentum for reconciliation that was not ideally harnessed. Win-lose perceptions of the agreement that had their roots in the negotiations and the campaign period were further intensified by difficulties in the agreements' implementation. As a result, politics have remained polarized and divisions between the two communities have persisted.

In Cyprus, the profound impact that the euro currency crisis in the Republic of Cyprus' economy in 2013 and the election of two pro-solution leaders in both communities, however, has provided for a renewed momentum that had not existed since the Annan Plan negotiations. The current President of the Republic, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci both supported the Annan Plan and have just recently began to negotiate some of the thorniest issues of the Cyprus problem, raising hopes that a

referendum will take place in 2017. Changes that have taken place since 2004 provide cause for a moderate optimism to the prospect of another referendum. In particular, civil society is more mobilized in support for a solution in the Greek Cypriot community than it was during the Annan Plan. One symbolic example of this is the unprecedented joint support that the religious leaders of the two communities have been publicly offering to the negotiation process (Andreou 2016). It is, however, unlikely that the physical separation will end before another referendum takes place. Nonetheless, cooperation between the 'yes' campaigns on each side is still possible and should take place. Civil society groups in each community could play a crucial role in delivering reconciliatory messages to the communities on both sides, but cooperation needs to take place much earlier and to an entirely different extent than was the case in 2004.

2016 was, in fact, a year marked by dramatic and surprising referendums. The close results of the 'Brexit' referendum gave a slight majority of votes in favour of the UK's exit of the European Union and, later in the year, a peace settlement was rejected in Colombia. In fact, the referendum in Colombia shows similar dynamics to those found in the Annan Plan negotiations and referendum. Similarly to the Annan Plan negotiations, the peace negotiations took place between the leaders of the two sides, the President Santos and FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño. It thereby excluded other parties, leaving Álvaro Uribe's Democratic Centre Party with an incentive to spoil the referendum for political gain (Tellez and Beardsley 2016). Similarly to the Annan Plan case as well, the negotiations were held, not in Colombia, but in Cuba, leaving the forces opposing the peace process at home while the peace settlement was being negotiated abroad (Medina and Loizides 2016). Similarly to what has been described in the Greek Cypriot case, this has been argued to have disengaged the Colombian public at large and partly explain the very low 37 per cent turnout in the referendum (Newman 2016). Although there was a greater concern for transparency than was the case in Northern Ireland (Oliver 2016), the process still failed to effectively mobilize support in the referendum. The public consultations process that took place during the negotiations, Paffenholz (2015) alerted, had not been geared towards gaining public support. Similarly to what has been the case in the 'Haass talks' in Northern Ireland, which ended with no agreement in 2014, the consultations only aimed at getting civil society and public input to the negotiations. There was no mechanism in place for output to be returned back to the public, or any obligation for the leaders to actually consider the inputs in the first

place. Unlike in Northern Ireland and the Turkish Cypriot community, there was insufficient mobilization among civil society in support for the peace process during the negotiations, which also broadly lacked effective ways of informing and engaging the public (Paffenholz 2015). Therefore, although a successful Good Friday Agreement-like result was expected in Colombia (Murphy and Cobb 2016), the negotiations more closely resembled the failed Annan Plan referendum in the Greek Cypriot community.

The Colombian case further exemplifies how relevant research on peace settlement referendums still is, and will likely increasingly be. We are only recently beginning to understand how the phenomenon of peace negotiations can more positively shape the societies and communities within which they take place. Studying the referendum results of these two cases as the outcome of the negotiations offered a glimpse into how negotiations have an impact on those communities and societies. Having a deeper knowledge of how the negotiations of these two agreements shaped these two disparate referendum results has shown that support for a peace agreement cannot be gained overnight. It hopes to bring about greater consciousness for the more profound role that negotiations can have in reconciling divided societies. Just as these communities are affected by the events of the conflict, they are also affected by the unfolding events within the peace process and are not immune to what takes place at the negotiations table.

The findings of this research have provided a rich basis for further investigation and other directions of inquiry. Its research design, in particular, can hopefully be applied and further developed to compare more cases. As peace process referendums - and peace settlement referendums in particular - are consistently held around the world, this field of research is growing in importance. Additionally, as the occurrence of peace settlement referendums increases, the greater the number of cases that can be compared and the greater knowledge we can build on how peace negotiations can positively make use of them. Referendums can be opportunities for an aggravation of divisions or a collaborative step towards a common future, and the process of negotiations can play a fundamental role in shaping that experience.

Annexes

ANNEX 1

Interview subjects: Cyprus

SUBJECT	INTERVIEWED AS	INTERVIEW STATUS	SOURCE	LENGTH	REC
MICHALIS PAPAPETROU	Member of Greek Cypriot delegation; DISY politician; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	43min	Audio recording
UN GOOD OFFICES MISSION PERSONEL 1		In person	Additional	40min (approx.)	Written notes
UN GOOD OFFICES MISSION PERSONEL 2		In person	Additional	50min (approx.)	Written notes
AKEL POLITICIAN		In person	Sample frame	30min (approx.)	Written notes
MARIA HADJIPAVLOU	Academic ; civil society activist; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	50min	Audio recording
TAKIS HADJIDEMETRIOU	Member of Greek Cypriot delegation in the negotiations with the EU; EDI politician	In person	Sample frame	49min	Audio recording
TASOS TZIONIS	Member of the Greek Cypriot delegation; DIKO politician; 'no' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	1h05min	Audio Recording
YIORGOS LILLIKAS	DIKO Politician; 'no' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	55min	Audio Recording
SAMI ÖZUSLU	Turkish Cypriot Radio Journalist	In person	Sample frame	53min	Audio Recording
LEVENT KUTAY	Turkish Cypriot Newspaper journalist	In person	Sample frame	1h03min	Audio recording
PANAYIOTIS DEMETRIOU	Member of Greek Cypriot delegation; DISY politician	In person	Sample frame	1h11min	Audio recording
MEHMET ALI TALAT	Turkish Cypriot delegation; CTP politician; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	1h26min	Audio recording
ANTONIS HAJIROUSSOS	Political representative of the Maronite Community	In person	Additional	45 min	Audio recording
ALI EREL	President of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	58min	Audio recording

KOSTA PAVLOWITCH	Greek Cypriot journalist, Editor of the Cyprus Mail	In person	Sample frame	40 min	Audio recording
GEORGE VASSILIOU	Member of the Greek Cypriot delegation in negotiations with the EU; EDI politician; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	55 min	Audio recording
CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS	Greek Cypriot journalist and writer; President of the Cyprus Academic Dialogue	In person	Additional	52 min	Audio recording
MUSTAFA AKINCI	DP politician; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	1h20min	Audio recording
ERGÜN OLGUN	Member of the Turkish Cypriot delegation; Political Advisor to Rauf Denktash	In person	Sample frame	53min	Audio recording
CHRISTOFOROS FOKAIDES	Spokesperson for DISY	In person	Sample frame	52min	Audio recording
HUBERT FAUSTMANN	Academic and NGO representative	In person	Additional	47min	Audio recording
MARIOS EPAMINONDAS	Greek Cypriot Civil Society activist; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	1h	Audio recording
ARIS PETASIS	Greek Cypriot 'no' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	35min	Audio recording
ACADEMIC		In person	Additional	30min (approx.)	Written notes
GIORGOS KENTAS	Pancyprian Citizens Movement; 'no' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	1h32min	Audio recording
TIM POTIER	Civil Society; Executive Director of the European Rim Policy and Investment Council (ERPIC)	In person	Sample frame	1h	Audio recording
SENER ELCIL	President of the Turkish Cypriot Teacher's Union; 'yes' campaigner in the Turkish Cypriot community	In person	Sample frame	57min	Audio recording

ANNEX 2

Interview Subjects: Northern Ireland

SUBJECT	INTERVIEWED AS	STATUS	SOURCE	LENGTH	REC
SEAN FARREN	SDLP delegation; 'yes' campaigner	Telephone	Sample frame	30min	Audio recording
JANE MORRICE	NI Women's Coalition delegation; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	39min	Audio recording
LORD REGINALD EMPEY	UUP delegation; UUP 'yes' campaign director	In person	Sample frame	33min	Audio recording
JEFFREY DONALDSON	UUP delegation; DUP Politician	In person	Sample frame	53min	Audio recording
SEAMUS A. CLOSE	Deputy-Leader of the Alliance Party delegation; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	1h12min	Audio recording
ALBAN MAGINNESS	SDLP delegation; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	42min	Audio Recording
MARK DEVENPORT	BBC correspondent to Northern Ireland	In person	Sample frame	41min	Audio Recording
LIAM MASKEY	Civil Society activist	In person	Sample frame	55min	Audio Recording
AVILA KILMURRAY	NI Women's Coalition delegation; Director of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	38min	Audio recording
LORD JOHN ALDERDICE	Leader of the Alliance Party delegation	In person	Sample frame	1h13min	Audio recording
LIAM CLARKE	Belfast Telegraph journalist	Telephone	Sample frame	21min	Audio recording
DOMINIC BRIAN	Academic; NI Women's Coalition delegation; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	1h07min	Audio recording
QUINTIN OLIVER	Director of the civil society-led 'yes' campaign; NICVA	In person	Sample frame	42min	Audio recording
PETER WEIR	UUP delegate; DUP politician	In person	Sample frame	50min	Audio recording
JOHN BREWER	Academic	In person	Additional	54min	Audio recording

WINSTON IRVINE	PUP delegate; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	48min	Audio recording
WILLIAM GRAHAM	Irish News Journalist	In person	Sample frame	1h04	Audio recording
ADRIAN GUELKE	Academic	In person	Additional	50min (approx.)	Written notes
ALEX MASKEY	Sinn Féin delegation; 'yes' campaigner	In person	Sample frame	59min	Audio recording

Annex 3

Interview Script: Politicians

- **Background/personal history:** Can you describe your political activity during the Annan Plan/GFA negotiations? How would you describe the Annan Plan/GFA negotiations? Were you involved in the yes/no campaign?

- **On the negotiation process:** What were the more important negotiation issues to your delegation and why? What is your opinion of the mediator's performance? What did he, or his team, do that was helpful/unhelpful to you during the negotiations and the campaign? How do you regard the governments'/ Greece and Turkey's involvement in the process? Was secrecy important? Why? Did you engage with your community during the negotiations? How?

  <u>If not negotiator:</u> Do you consider yourself to have been well informed about the negotiation process? How were you informed? Did you/your party at any time try to reach out to the mediation team or influence the negotiations in any way?

- **On the referendum campaign:** Did you participate in a referendum campaign? Why? How did you and your party campaign? Did you expect the referendum results to be what they came to be? Did your expectation impact your attitude/actions? What do you think had a greater impact on your community's support? Did the timing of the referendum influence your campaign? Were your constituents informed about the agreement and its potential implications? Did the media play a role in the referendum?

Annex 4

Interview Script: Civil Society Actors/Campaigners

- **Background/personal history:** What was the movement/organisation you were/are involved in? Why was it formed? Why did you take part in it? Was it/you involved in the yes/no campaign?

- **On the negotiation process:** How would you describe the Annan Plan/GFA negotiation process? What in the negotiation process was helpful/unhelpful to your campaign? Do you consider yourself to have been well informed about the negotiation process? How/ where did you find information? Did you/your movement/organization have contact with the mediation team or attempted to influence the negotiations in any way? Did you attempt to influence the political leaders' positions at the negotiations table? When and how'?

- **On the referendum:** Did you participate in a referendum campaign? Why? How did you campaign? What do you think influenced the referendum results in your community and in the other community? Were the people informed about the agreement and its potential implications? Did the timing and the way the referendum take place influence your campaign? What role did the media play?

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