A Double Standard when Group Members Behave Badly:

Transgression Credit to Ingroup Leaders

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**Abstract**

This research tested the hypothesis that people forgive serious transgressions by ingroup leaders, but not by other group members or outgroup leaders. They apply a double standard in judgments of ingroup leaders. A series of studies (*N* = 623), using an array of different ingroups and outgroups, tested how group members judged ingroup or outgroup leaders and non-leaders who unexpectedly transgressed or did not transgress in important intergroup scenarios. Experiments 1, 2, and 4 focused on captains and players in either soccer or netball sports competitions. Across studies, transgressive captains of ingroup teams were evaluated more favorably than captains from outgroup teams, and (Experiments 1, 2 and 4) more favorably than transgressive ingroup players. Experiment 3 demonstrated the double standard in a minimal group paradigm. Experiment 5 showed that the double standard is only applied if the leader is perceived as serving the group’s interest. Across studies, the double standard is evident in evaluations toward, inclusion and punishment of, and rewards to the transgressive targets. Implications for sport, politics, and business and intergroup conflict are discussed.

Keywords: Leadership, Deviance, Groups, Double Standard, Transgression

"Laws are applied to enemies but only interpreted as regards friends." (Giovanni Giolitti, Italian politician, 1842-1928)

A transgression is an act that breaks an accepted rule or law. Leaders can sometimes become corrupt, delinquent or deluded, resulting in serious transgressive acts. Examples range from political leaders who sanction acts that break international conventions (e.g. use of torture), to CEOs who illegally draw on pension funds, engage in dubious tax evasion, or market manipulations, and to military commanders who engage in unprovoked attacks (e.g. the My Lai massacre).

When such transgressions become public knowledge they are often met with outrage, but it seems, that until that point, leaders may be punished less immediately or less severely, or remain immune to criticism to a greater extent than regular group members that commit similar crimes. For example, in recent years pedophile priests have been prosecuted whereas the bishops who were aware of these priests’ acts, and have kept the knowledge secret, retained their tenure even though they were culpable. Organizations will often allow legal prosecution of members who engage in illegal behavior (e.g. journalists who engaged in phone tapping for News International) but resist sacrificing the leaders of the organization who have benefited from these acts or allegedly knew about them and did not stop them.

These examples seem consistent with research evidence that implies groups might treat non-conformist leaders more favorably than non-conformist non-leaders. For example, leaders are trusted and can deviate more from group norms (e.g. Fiske, 2010; Hollander, 1958); have greater influence than other group members (e.g. Pescosolido, 2001); and receive gratitude and loyalty from members (e.g. Messick, 2005). However, it is not known whether such tolerance extends to situations when leaders actually transgress established rules. Is there something special about leadership that would result in leaders’ transgressions being treated differently from similar transgressions by other group members? In particular, do people apply a double standard -- greater tolerance of transgressions committed by ingroup leaders than ingroup members, and greater tolerance of transgressions committed by ingroup leaders than outgroup leaders? To explore this question, the present article describes four experiments that focus on the sports context and one using a minimal group paradigm.

In the sports context we test whether transgressions by sports captains attract different reactions than similar transgressions by regular players. There are several salient examples of team captain transgression, ranging from Danny Almonte (Little League baseball) to world cup soccer team captains Diego Maradona (Argentina), David Beckham (England), Zinadane Zidane, and Thierry Henri (France). These transgressions are typically condemned by observers but seem to attract less criticism from the team’s supporters, suggesting that people may be particularly forgiving of transgressions by their own leaders but not those by outgroup leaders.

The sports context is well suited for testing our hypotheses. As recently reviewed by Day, Gordon, and Fink (2012), sports provide a simplified (yet reliable) context for the investigation of larger organizational processes, both in terms of structural similitude and of socio-psychological mechanisms implied. Sports teams are clearly defined and it is easy to identify the boundaries of the groups. Furthermore, sports transgressions are easy to define (in terms of the rules), and they arise in a widely understood context, that may include many different events or groups. Moreover, the rules of games such as soccer are international and therefore generalize across culture. The size of the groups and role of leader (captain) on the field of play is always the same, providing a comparable situation across studies. According to Day et al. (2012) these structural similarities are paralleled by equivalence in the psychological mechanisms implied in organizational settings. As a more stringent test of the likely generalizability of the double standard we also investigate the phenomenon in a minimal group paradigm with anonymous ingroup leaders and completely novel groups.

Transgressors in intergroup contexts can be judged through different comparisons. One comparative dimension is the ingroup versus outgroup dimension. If people are simply motivated to express loyalty to their ingroup they might judge transgressive ingroup leaders *and* members less harshly than transgressive outgroup leaders and members – an expression of ingroup bias. The second comparative dimension is role within the group. People may compare leaders with other members of the same group. If people give leaders a special advantage when they transgress we might expect leaders to be judged less harshly than members, regardless of group membership – perhaps an expression of deference to authority. However, our novel hypothesis for the present research is that it is only *ingroup* leaders whose transgressions are treated leniently because of their special status as both a leader and as a representative of the ingroup. We expect that both elements (leadership and ingroup membership) may be required in order for people to apply a double standard such that transgressions by ingroup leaders will not attract such negative responses as transgressions by either outgroup leaders or ingroup members.

**Deviance and Transgression**

Research on people’s reactions to deviant group members largely focuses on opinion deviance, likeability, or loyalty (Randsley de Moura, Abrams, Marques, & Hutchison, 2011). This research generally shows that people react especially negatively to ingroup deviants, and more so if norms are highly salient (Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998) or if deviants are more central members of the group (Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010). Indeed, people are likely to direct efforts to change the opinions of such members to preserve the consensus within the group (Kerr & Levine, 2008; Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Schachter, 1951). Ingroup members who behave undesirably are generally derogated more than normative group members, whereas undesirable outgroup members are derogated less, the so-called black sheep effect (Marques & Páez, 1994). This effect represents a more acute differentiation among ingroup members than among outgroup members. These responses make sense given that group members may vary in terms of their deviance from a group norm and that their opinions or behavior can be modified. More generally, subjective group dynamics theory (Marques et al., 1998; Pinto et al., 2010) asserts that people differentiate among group members because they are motivated to define the ingroup positively.

The present research considers a different scenario – one in which the deviance is irrevocable. Transgressions, as we define them, involve clear breaches of external rules. Once committed, the transgression is irreversible. This could have important implications both in terms of the perpetrator’s vulnerability to punishment, and in terms of the damage to the reputation of, or penalties inflicted on the group. Because such rules are explicit or well known, we expect that most people will respond negatively to transgressors under most circumstances, regardless of which group the transgressor belongs to.

One explanation for the black sheep effect is that ingroup deviants violate expectancies more than outgroup deviants (Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999). Given evidence that the black sheep effect is strong in relation to more central (e.g. full rather than marginal) members of a group, then expectancy violation could be even more marked when a leader deviates or, worse, transgresses. The expectancy violation account of the black sheep effect implies that a transgressive leader might attract harsher reactions than similarly transgressive members. Both the black sheep effect and an expectancy violation hypothesis would mean that an ingroup transgressive leader should be judged less favorably than an ingroup transgressive non leader.

An alternative prediction can be drawn from recent research on leader deviance. In a series of seven studies, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, and Hutchison (2008) showed that, under certain conditions, ingroup leaders are given more latitude to advocate counter-normative opinions than are other members – they are given ‘innovation credit’ (Randsley de Moura et al., 2011; cf. Packer, 2008, 2009). Transgressive leaders pose a greater dilemma because people recognize the importance of upholding consensual standards and rules but they also want to express loyalty to the group by supporting their leader (cf. Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). We contend that the innovation credit effect may extend to transgressions. Specifically, whereas people apply conventional standards and rules when judging transgressions by regular group members and outgroup leaders, they will be more lenient towards a transgressive ingroup leader, thereby applying a double standard. Ingroup leaders would therefore be granted what we might term ‘transgression credit’.

**Social Identity Theory of Leadership**

The social identity perspective on leadership (e.g. Haslam, 2001; Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003, van Knippenberg, 2011) proposes that leadership emerges to the extent that the leader is seen to embody the group prototype – its distinctive differences from relevant outgroups. Group leaders who are more prototypical better represent the group’s identity (Haslam, 2001; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Turner, 1991; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). More prototypical ingroup leaders are generally evaluated more positively (e.g. Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Haslam & Platow, 2001; Haslam et al., 2001; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, & Spears, 2006).

Taken at face value, the strict conceptual link between prototypicality and leadership seems to imply that ingroup leaders who act transgressively would be evaluated more negatively than comparable ingroup members. Indeed, especially in those situations where the group status is threatened (e.g. in the case of intergroup competition, see Hogg & Terry, 2000), group members may become particularly protective towards the group image. Given that central group members may impact more strongly on the perceived internal valence of the group, individuals may attempt to distance themselves more strongly from a highly central member who deviates, expressing harsher social evaluations the more central the member (cf. Pinto et al., 2010).

However, group prototypes are by definition malleable and subject to being modeled according to the circumstances (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, 2003; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). With regard to the issue of change, for instance, Abrams et al. (2008) demonstrated that future leaders are granted credit to innovate because they may reshape the perception of the group prototype and therefore retain a higher degree of representativeness in spite of the divergence between their own and the groups’ attitudes. This suggests that group members may find it psychologically difficult to reject an errant ingroup leader. Thus, by virtue of (or despite) their role and group membership, ingroup leaders may enjoy greater tolerance when they act against established norms.

An important caveat based on the social identity analysis of leadership, is that the leadership potential of an individual is likely to be a function of the extent to which a leader is perceived as acting on behalf of the group. To be perceived as effective, and to depend on consensual support, a leader should be seen as standing for the group (e.g. van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005) and as acting on its behalf. For example, several studies (Haslam & Platow, 2001; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; Platow, Mills, & Morrison, 2000) have shown that leaders are endorsed more and can exercise greater influence when they are seen as championing the group interests, even when this means behaving unfairly. This suggests that tolerance of transgressing leaders may depend on their being perceived as trying to act in the group’s interests.

Even if this caveat is correct, the idea of transgression credit suggests that acting in a group serving manner may not be sufficient to warrant leniency toward a regular group member. Acting for the group seems more likely to be a requirement of leadership but only a desirable attribute of membership. If this idea is correct, then transgression credit would apply to a group serving leader but not a group serving member. Because previous studies have not directly compared evaluations of leaders and members who differ in group serving motivation they do not allow us to draw conclusions about transgression credit. We propose that leaders who transgress for the group will be evaluated more positively than a transgressive ingroup member, and specifically because they are leading the ingroup, not just because they are leaders (thus they will be evaluated more positively than an outgroup leader).

In summary, the present research expands prior research on leadership and immoral behavior by testing whether ingroup leaders are accorded a double standard when they behave transgressively, and also whether this double standard is moderated by the perception that a leader is acting on the group’s behalf.

**Idiosyncrasy Credit**

It is important to distinguish transgression credit from the well known concept tof idiosyncrasy credit. Hollander (e.g. 1958; Hollander & Julian, 1970) conceptualized leadership in terms of relations with followers and proposed that leaders gain trust from their followers based on their performance over time and from positive contributions to the group. Once sufficient “idiosyncrasy credits” have been accumulated by being loyal to the group the leader should be permitted to introduce innovation and changes.

Various commentators have noted the vagueness and difficulty of operationalizing idiosyncrasy credit (e.g., Yukl, 2006), but there seems to be a consensus that it involves displays of access to important information, intelligence, competence, conforming to group norms, and being group oriented in motivation (Hackman, 1992; Hollander 2008; Wahrman, 2010; Winkler, 2010). Idiosyncrasy credit (IC) theory argues that leaders who have sufficient credit are allowed by other members to pursue non-conformist actions as long as those actions are in line with their leadership role and contribute to the group’s objectives (Hollander, 1961, 2006). However, IC theory does not explicitly consider whether IC translates to situations in which leaders transgress and in which, regardless of the leader’s motivation, the actions might actually cause the group damage.

A recent study (Shapiro, Boss, Salas, Tangirala, & Von Glinow, 2011) asked management students to identify a leader in their organization who they felt (for any of a variety of reasons) had let them down at some time (the actions were not necessarily breaches of rules). Students who perceived a higher level of mutual support from that leader (leader-member exchange) were less punitively orientated toward that leader’s misbehavior. Moreover, leader ability and motivational inspiration (IC) was correlated with leader-member exchange, suggesting that IC may help to offset punitiveness. This evidence suggests that leaders can offset punitive and critical reactions if they are perceived to make sufficient relational contribution to the perceiver’s personal work situation.

In Shapiro et al.’s (2011) study participants only nominated and evaluated ingroup leaders that they regarded as disappointing. Therefore the study did not address whether tolerance of disappointing leaders is due to shared group membership or due to occupancy of the leadership role or whether there was a selection bias in participants’ nomination of leaders. In fact, Hollander’s theory does not suggest that there should be any difference in response to disappointing leaders versus similarly disappointing *members* with similar prior contributions. Moreover, group members in many contexts may possess no detailed record of a leader’s prior contribution to the group or the leader may be de facto, or nominated rather than elected. Therefore members may barely have a personal relationship with the leader. In these cases there might be little reason to expect any leader-member exchange or idiosyncrasy credit, and no reason to expect different IC for members versus leaders. In summary, while IC theory may not contradict the idea that people could be lenient towards transgressive leaders, it does not distinguish leaders from members, or offer an account of what would happen when there is no direct exchange or prior contribution from the leader.

A further important limitation of IC theory is that it makes no reference to the ingroup or outgroup status of leaders and it does not provide an intergroup analysis of the context of leadership. Yet, as Wahrman (2010) has observed, external judges of deviant behavior often have a very different perspective than internal judges. The social identity approach to leadership, discussed above, suggests that the intergroup context should strongly affect evaluations of group leaders. Because the present research does explicitly introduce an intergroup context, does test reactions to transgressions by both leaders and members, and does not involve direct leader member exchange, it moves research well beyond the limits of IC theory.

**Overview of the Studies**

We recognize that many variables could affect judgments of transgressive leaders. The goal in the present research is to see whether there is a double standard for transgressive ingroup leaders. We want to establish whether the effect generalizes to more than one context and determine potential boundary conditions of this phenomenon. We also consider a range of potential responses to transgression, from evaluations through to punishment and exclusion from the group.

We present evidence from five preliminary and pilot studies and five experiments. Some studies involved participants who were members of university sports clubs, some involved participants whose ingroups differed and included over 30 different soccer teams. Although our main paradigm involves sports teams, we also conducted a minimal group study that used completely novel groups with no prior history. Gender and the particular group affiliation did not affect the results so theoretical issues regarding these variables are not considered further.

The preliminary studies establish baseline evidence for our sports paradigm by developing a scenario that involves a clear transgression of the rules. We ensure that the transgression is non-prototypical and non-expected, and is not part of a team captain’s role.

Experiment 1 tests whether evaluations of ingroup and outgroup transgressive soccer captains differ from evaluations of transgressive players, and from those of normative players and captains. We also investigate whether identification with the ingroup team affects these evaluations. Experiment 2 tests the double standard using a different sports context (netball). Experiment 3 investigates whether a double standard arises in a minimal group paradigm when leaders are randomly appointed. It also examines punitiveness toward the transgressors. Experiment 4 examines participants' allocation of rewards for, and willingness to include, soccer transgressors. Finally, Experiment 5 tests whether transgressive ingroup or outgroup soccer captains’ motivation to transgress moderates the emergence of the double standard. Our overarching hypothesis is that a double standard is applied to transgressive ingroup leaders, such that they attract responses that are more favorable than responses to transgressive outgroup leaders, and more favorable than responses to transgressive ingroup members. Thus, ingroup leaders will be granted special license to transgress (transgression credit). Taken together, these five experiments assess whether there is a double standard for evaluations of transgressive ingroup leaders and test a plausible boundary condition for the effect.

**Preliminary Studies 1 to 4**

In order to embrace a sports context that is well known to most people, has cross cultural relevance, global reach, and consensual rules, the majority of the present studies tested the double standard hypothesis in the realm of soccer. To test the double standard hypothesis we needed to present participants with a transgression that constituted *a)* an unexpected and atypical behavior, that *b)* was a clear breach of the rules, and to establish that these perceptions were not qualified by *c)* either the role of the transgressor or their group membership.

Requirements for these criteria were tested in four different studies, respective *Ns =* 30, 15, 60, and 25. Across these studies participants were invited to imagine the following transgressive behavior:

The [target] disagreed with the referee’s call and began to argue with him. The [target] became increasingly frustrated, and began to shout and swear at the referee. The referee turned his back but the [target] continued to swear under his breath and played the final twenty minutes with increased aggression. At the end of the game the [target] refused to shake hands either with the referee or with members of the opposing team*.*

The first pilot study showed that this transgression was perceived (on scales from 1 = *not at all*, to 7 = *very much*) as being unexpected (*M* = 2.60, *SE* = 0.34) and atypical (*M* = 2.30, *SE* = 0.34), and as being significantly more unexpected and atypical than a minor argument with the referee (*ps*  < .01 when compared against scale midpoints).

The second pilot study first checked that all participants reported they were familiar with the rules of the soccer. They judged the transgressor overall and each component of the transgression. All the components were judged to be unacceptable, to breach the rules of the game (*p*s < .01 when compared with scale midpoints), and to be likely to result in a formal sanction (a verbal warning and yellow card; *ps*  < .02 when compared with scale midpoints); all *M*s > 5.0; *SE*s < .52.

It is likely that normative targets would be evaluated more positively than transgressive targets because they match relevant norms more closely (in this case, adhering to rules of the game). If people are more forgiving of ingroup leaders’ transgressions, one possible reason could be that people believe that there are different norms for ingroup leaders, i.e., they expect them to break rules to gain an advantage for the group. To test and rule out this idea, the third pilot study directly assessed whether people generally thought the transgression was typical for a captain or a player, and whether they would *expect* ingroup or outgroup captains to transgress on behalf of their groups.

Participants were 60 undergraduate students (32 male) who were members of various university sports societies. Participants were presented with a brief introduction describing the scenario placed in the context of a game in which the university’s team was striving to beat a team from another proximal university. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Role of transgressor: captain vs. player) between participants design. The incident involved either the ingroup team or the outgroup team, within which either the captain or a player transgressed. Participants then judged whether they would expect the target’s behavior, and whether the target’s behavior was typical (for a team captain or team player, depending on Role condition).

There were no significant effects or interactions involving either Group or Role (all *F*s < 0.67, *p*s > .40). Overall, participants regarded the behavior to be significantly unexpected (below the mid-point (4), *M* = 3.28, *SE* = 0.22, *t* (59) = 3.25, *p* = .002, η2 = .34, and non-significantly below the midpoint in terms of typicality (*M* = 3.65, *SE* = 0.23), *t* (59) = 1.53, *p* = .132, η2 = .04. These findings confirm that the transgressive behavior is not regarded as particularly typical and is not expected among either captains or players, regardless of whether they are from an ingroup or outgroup team.

A further possibility is that people may believe that it is specifically part of a captain’s duty or role to transgress in the way described. In a fourth study we asked 25 undergraduate students (anonymously via an on-line survey) to read the captain’s transgression described above and to rate, using a 5 point scale (not at all to completely), the extent to which the captain’s behavior was: “just doing his duty when shouting and swearing at the referee”; “behaving as you expect any player to behave”; and “behaving in a way you would expect a team captain to behave”. We also asked to what extent the captain “risked being yellow carded or red carded” (i.e. if it is a first or second offence).

When tested against the scale midpoint, the captain was perceived as not doing his duty, (*M* = 1.16 *SD* = .47), *t* = 19.48, *p* < 001, not behaving as participants expected a player to behave, (*M* = 2.08, *SD* = 1.04), *t* = 4.43, *p* < .001, and even less as participants expected a captain to behave, (*M* = 1.32 *SD* = 0.63), *t* = 13.39, *p* < .001. The mean score for judgments of whether the captain would be carded was substantially above the scale mid-point (*M* = 3.92, *SD* = 1.0, *t* = 4.62, *p* < .001). These findings demonstrate that the transgression is not considered to be in role for a captain, and is considered to create a high risk of a significant disciplinary sanction.

In sum, these preliminary studies establish that the scenario used for the following experiments represents a transgression that is clearly perceived to break the rules, is expected to result in a significant disciplinary sanction, is not expected either among captains or players, is equally unexpected both in the ingroup and outgroup, and is not a part of the captain’s role.

**Experiment 1**

Previous research shows that people are more favorable towards other ingroup members who show ingroup bias than to outgroup members who show outgroup bias (e.g. Haslam & Platow, 2001). Given that people expect intergroup bias in competitive intergroup contexts (Abrams, 2011; Brown 2000), they might also perceive transgressive actors as showing a stronger, albeit rule-breaking, bias toward their respective groups. However, our double standard hypothesis is that when rules have been broken, this favorability will extend to ingroup leaders more than to regular members. In other words, we hypothesize that, when they transgress, ingroup leaders are treated more leniently than ingroup members.

Previous research also suggests that ingroup bias is likely to be elevated when people identify strongly with their group. The same might be true of the double standard. Therefore, the present experiment examined whether group identification affected favorability toward ingroup and outgroup captains and players who do or do not transgress.

**Method**

**Participants and Design**

Eighty six university students (43 male) who studied 25 different majors (none psychology) were recruited to participate at the end of lecture classes and at the university library. It was important to keep the group comparative context constant. For this reason participants always encountered one transgressive and one normative member, but the roles (captain, player) varied. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Transgressor Role: captain vs. player) x 2 (Target: transgressive, normative) mixed factorial design with Group and Role as between-participants factors and Target as a within-participants factor.

# **Procedure and Materials**

Participants were first asked to identify which soccer team they supported and which was its main rival. They were also asked how much they identified with their team. Next they read a description of a highly competitive game between their team and its main rival that was tied until the final 20 minutes. As described earlier, the scenario went on to describe a situation either that affected their own team or that affected the rival team, and about the behavior of two members from the respective team. A questionable penalty was awarded to the opposing team (i.e. the rival team in the ingroup condition, or the participant’s team in the outgroup condition). One of the targets (either the captain or a player) became irate, and transgressed the rules of the game by arguing vehemently with the referee, and acting offensively toward opposing players. The second target (either a player or the captain, respectively) remained calm, polite, and obeyed the referee’s instructions. Participants then evaluated the normative and transgressive targets (counterbalanced) using 7-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*).

**Team identification.**Participants responded to four items using a seven point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). These were: I am pleased to be a supporter of my football team; I am glad I am a supporter of my football team; I am proud to be a supporter of my football team, and I identify with other supporters of my football team (Randsley de Moura, Abrams, Retter, Gunnarsdottir, & Ando, 2009). These items formed a reliable scale (α = .91) and a mean score was computed.

**Evaluations***.* Participants rated how friendly, likeable, warm, and approachable each target was. These items formed a reliable scale both for judgments of the captain (α = .93) and the player (α = .93).

**Results and Discussion**

Across participants, 34 different teams were supported, and 30 different main rivals were nominated. The mean level of identification (*M* = 4.70, *SE* = 0.17) was significantly higher than the scale midpoint (4), *t* (85) = 4.12, *p* < .001, *d* = .89. However, identification had neither main effects nor significant interactions with other variables and did not vary between conditions. This might be because, having nominated a team that they support, identification was already sufficiently high that it did not vary sufficiently (between lower and higher) to affect other responses (cf. van Knippenberg, 2011). Therefore this measure is not discussed further.

**Evaluations**

We performed a Group (ingroup vs. outgroup) x Transgressor Role (captain vs. player) x Target (transgressive, normative) ANOVA with repeated measures on the Target factor. There was a significant main effect of Group, *F* (1, 82) = 21.72, *p* < .001, η2 = .21. There was also a significant main effect of Target. Normative targets (*M* = 5.34, *SE* = .12) were evaluated significantly more favorably than transgressive targets (*M* = 3.05, *SE* = .13), *F* (1, 82) = 164.51, *p* < .001, η2 = .67. Ingroup targets (*M* = 4.59, *SE* = .12) were evaluated more favorably than outgroup targets (*M* = 3.78, *SE* = .12). The main effect of Role was non-significant, *F* (1, 82) = 3.14, *p* = .08, η2 = .04. There was a significant Role x Target interaction, *F* (1, 82) = 6.36, *p* = .012, η2 = .07. There was also a significant interaction involving Group x Target, *F* (1, 82) = 3.87, *p* = .052, η2 = .05. These were qualified by a significant Group x Role x Target interaction, *F* (1, 82) = 4.044, *p* = .039, η2 = .05.

Figure 1 shows that, although transgressive targets were always evaluated more negatively than normative targets (all *p*’s < .005), the differences varied depending on role and group membership. The simple main effects of Role within levels of Group and Target showed that the ingroup transgressive captain was evaluated significantly more favorably (*M* = 4.24, *SE* = .25) than the ingroup transgressive player (*M* = 3.00, *SE* = .25), *F* (1, 82) = 12.51, *p* < .001, η2  = .13. There were no significant differences in evaluations of captains and players who were ingroup normative (*M* = 5.35, 5.77, *SE* = .23, .25, respectively), outgroup transgressive (*M* = 2.61, 2.33, *SE* = .26, .26, respectively) and outgroup normative (*M* = 5.18, 5.06, *SE* = .25, .24, respectively), *F*s < 1.65, *p*s > .20, η2 s < .02.

The interaction of Group by Role within Target is marginal for transgressive targets, *F* (1, 82) = 3.58, *p* = .062, η2 = .042, and non-significant for normative targets, *F* (1, 82) = 1.57, *p* = .264, η2 = .015. Examination of the simple effect of Group within levels of Role and Target revealed transgressive ingroup captains were evaluated significantly more favorably than transgressive outgroup captains, *F* (1, 82) = 19.28, *p* < .001, η2 = .19, whereas normative ingroup and outgroup captains were evaluated similarly, *F* (1, 82) = 0.278, *p* = .599, η2 < .01. In summary, the results are consistent with the double standard hypothesis and are not consistent with either an ingroup bias hypothesis or a leader bias hypothesis (these would predict only main effects of Group and Role, respectively). All transgressors were judged unfavorably except the ingroup captain.

**Experiment 2**

To extend Experiment 1 and to test whether the findings would generalize to a different sports setting, Experiment 2 examined evaluations of normative and transgressive members who were either captains or players within ingroup or outgroup netball teams. Netball is a popular competitive sport at the researchers’ university and participants judged team members in the context of a consequential stage of a game, where the team outcome was in jeopardy.

We predict that people will apply a double standard, such that they judge transgression more leniently when the transgressor is an ingroup captain rather than an ingroup player. Moreover, a transgression by an ingroup captain will be judged less harshly than the same transgression by an outgroup captain. However, we do not expect people to distinguish between a transgressive outgroup captain and transgressive outgroup player. This double standard would be signified by a significant Group x Role x Target interaction on evaluation as found in Experiment 1.

**Method**

**Participants and Design**

Eighty one university students (24 male) who belonged to a range of sports associations at the University of Kent (mainly Netball, Soccer, Rugby, Tennis, Cricket, and Lacrosse) were recruited to participate using an online survey. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Role of transgressor: captain vs. player) x 2 (Target: transgressive, normative) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on the Target factor.

# **Procedure and Materials**

Participants were presented with a brief introduction describing a highly competitive netball game in which the university’s team was striving to beat a team from another proximal university. They read a description of an incident in which, 20 minutes before the end of the game, two players (either from the ingroup or outgroup team) were frustrated by an event on the field. One of the targets (either the captain or a player) became irate, and transgressed the rules of the game by arguing vehemently with the referee, and acting offensively toward opposing players. The other target (either a player or the captain, respectively) remained calm, polite, and obeyed the referee’s instructions. Participants then made judgments about the normative and transgressive targets (counterbalanced) using 7-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*).

**Evaluations.** Participants rated how friendly, likeable, warm, and approachable each target was, as in Experiment 2. These items formed a reliable scale both for judgments of the captain and the player (αs = .97) 1.

**Results and Discussion**

We performed a Group x Role x Target ANOVA on the evaluations with repeated measures on the Target factor. Table 1 shows the means for all cells. There was a significant main effect of Target, *F* (1, 77) = 69.16, *p* < .001, η2 = .47. Normative targets (*M* = 4.76, *SE* = .13) were evaluated significantly more positively than transgressive targets (*M* = 3.25, *SE* = .12). The main effect of Group was also significant, *F* (1, 77) = 40.63, *p* < .001, η2 = .35. Ingroup targets (*M* = 4.56, *SE* = .13) were evaluated more favorably than outgroup targets (*M* = 3.46, *SE* = .12). There was also a significant interaction involving Group x Target, *F* (1, 77) = 14.81, *p* < .001, η2 < .16, but not Role x Target, *F* (1, 77) = 0.08, *p* = .78, η2 < .01.

These effects were qualified by a Group x Role x Target interaction, *F* (1, 77) = 3.94, *p* = .051, η2 = .05. We hypothesized that the ingroup transgressive captain should be evaluated more favorably than either an ingroup transgressive player or an outgroup transgressive captain. Examination of the simple effects of Role within levels of Group and Target revealed that the transgressive ingroup captain (*M* = 4.68, *SE*  = .25) was evaluated significantly more favorably than the transgressive ingroup player (*M* = 3.62, *SE*  = .25), *F* (1, 77) = 9.20, *p* = .003, η2 = .11. Simple effects of Group within Role and Target showed that the transgressive ingroup captain was evaluated significantly more favorably than the transgressive outgroup captain (*M* = 2.35, *SE*  = .24), *F* (1, 77) = 45.27, *p* < .001, η2 = .43.

Finally, the Group by Role simple interaction is significant for transgressive targets, *F* (1, 77) = 4.95, *p* = .029, η2 = .060, whereas that for normative targets is not significant, *F* (1, 77) = 0.49, *p* = .485, η2 = .006. Thus, the ingroup transgressor captain was given especially favorable treatment relative to other targets.

**Experiment 3**

The previous studies were developed to test our hypotheses in the sports context. In order to test the wider generality of the transgression credit effect we used the minimal group paradigm (MGP; see Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In the MGP participants are categorized on the basis of trivial criteria. They have no prior relationship with one another, do not know one another as individuals and the group has no history. Moreover, we explicitly assigned the leadership role randomly, ensuring that participants could not infer from prior evidence why the leader occupied that role. Because members were all categorized at the same time as the participant this study allowed us to rule out the possibility that leaders had previously established higher prototypicality (or gained more idiosyncrasy credit) than members. In addition it tested the wider generalizability of transgression credit.

In Experiment 3 the transgressive act involved cheating on a group task. We hypothesized that individuals would apply a double standard in their evaluations of a transgressive ingroup leader as compared with a transgressive ingroup member, or transgressive outgroup leader. Experiment 3 also included a further dependent variable, punitiveness. It is conceivable that people might be hesitant to punish an ingroup member. Abrams et al. (2008) observed that under some conditions participants gave nonconformist ingroup leaders more rewards than similar nonconformist members. However, in the case of transgressions it could also be that people may be especially punitive towards a regular ingroup member who transgresses, as implied by the black sheep effect. The present experiment therefore tests whether a double standard is applied not just to evaluations but also to punitiveness towards transgressive ingroup leaders.

**Method**

**Participants and Design**

Seventy five participants (48 males, 26 females, 1 not reported) from India were recruited to participate to this study. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Role of the Transgressor: leader vs. member) x 2 (Target: transgressive, normative) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on the Target factor.

# **Procedure and Materials**

Individuals were invited to take part in a study on ‘the relation between thinking style and group level reasoning’ via an online survey tool (Qualtrics). The experimental survey was administered through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and consisted of two phases. In the first phase, participants were randomly allocated to one of two categories, inductive thinkers or deductive thinkers, and (to check that they valued their group membership) were asked about their identification with the group. In the second phase, they were asked to observe a chat room interaction either between four ingroup or four outgroup members. They were informed that the chat-room was led by a randomly appointed leader. Finally, participants evaluated the targets. At the end of the study, participants were thanked, debriefed and compensated for their time.

Participants were presented with a brief introduction describing the cognitive differences between two thinking styles, namely Inductive Thinkers and Deductive Thinkers. They read that cognitive psychology had established that people could be described by one of the two styles and that these styles were equally distributed in the population and across genders. They were also told that, while it had been already established that people with each style perform equally well at individual level, the study was designed to investigate how the two styles would perform as groups. Participants were therefore asked to observe how members of Inductive Thinkers (or Deductive Thinkers, randomized) performed on a group-solving task.

To establish participants’ group membership, they were instructed that, ‘in order to improve the reliability of the study we need to understand which category best describes your style of reasoning’. They were then prompted to take a brief survey consisting of nine items (including two graphic items drawn from the Stencil Task), allegedly tapping their style of reasoning. In reality, they were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. They read ‘Inductive Thinkers approach new information carefully and systematically before making a decision. In contrast, Deductive Thinkers form a general picture of the events which inform their subsequently analysis of single episodes’. Participants were then asked about their identification (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), using 3 items matching those from Experiment 1: I am pleased think of myself as a Deductive (Inductive) Thinker; I am glad I am a Deductive (Inductive) Thinker; I identify with Deductive (Inductive) Thinkers. These items formed a reliable scale (α = .98) and a mean score was computed.

Subsequently, participants were assigned randomly to observe a Chat Room (in fact always Chat Room G) that involved either four ingroup or four outgroup members. The normative context was reinforced through the description of the type of task that individuals were asked to observe. Participants read that the group had to work out a solution to a logic puzzle. They were informed that it was important to observe which cognitive processes were employed by members of the group. The rules of the task were stated explicitly: “It is very important that the participants work out a solution through social interaction. No other methods are allowed”.

Each group member was assigned a random numerical label (e.g., Participant 27). Participants then selected two members that they would focus on and evaluate. One of these was always subsequently identified as having been randomly selected to be leader. Participants first read the logic puzzle that the members of the group would have to solve. This presented statements by three fictitious characters, of which only one was true. The task was to determine which statement was true.

Participants then followed the Chat Room interaction. Each member of the chat room was represented with a specific font color and a specific portion of the screen. The leader of the chat room was highlighted with the following label ‘Participant XX - the leader of the chat room’, whereas the other member was described as ‘Participant YY - a member of the chat room’.

The interaction started with the participants greeting each other and concluded with the normative and deviant manipulation. Care was taken that, independently from the choice of the participants, each chat room member contributed a similar amount to the chat-room discussion. Typographical errors were included in the text to increase perceived authenticity of the transcript. Furthermore, before the deviant/manipulation both targets offered a (normative) suggestion for solving the puzzle. Finally, participants read either the member or the leader (according to the condition) saying: “Well… it’s about which statements to exclude from the list in [sic] only one must be true. If only one is true, then it can’t be Bud’s, because otherwise also Sam’s statement is true…” (i.e., normative statement). At which point, the other target wrote: “Ok!! Never mind! I’ve found the solution on the internet.. the robber is Jim.. it’s the only way this riddle works.. this whole chat room is anonuymous [sic], who cares about the experimenters?? Let’s submit this one… so we win”.

Participants were then informed that the allotted observation time was over and that they should now complete the dependent measures.

**Manipulation check.** Because this was a different scenario from the sports transgression, we included a check to ensure that the target behavior was perceived as transgressive. Participants were asked to rate to what extent each target was "breaking the rules of the situation" (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *completely*).

**Evaluations.** Participants rated how likeable, warm and nice each target was on a seven point scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *completely*). These items formed a reliable scale both for the judgments of the leader (α = .90) and of the member (α = .87).

**Punitiveness.** Participants to what extent they believed that the targets should be punished vs. rewarded for their actions. The question was answered using a slider from -50 (punished) to +50 (rewarded).

**Results**

We performed a Group x Role x Target ANOVA on the dependent variables with repeated measures on the Target factor. One case on the punitiveness item was an outlier and was deleted. Degrees of freedom differ slightly in for different dependent variables owing to missing data. Means for the effects are shown in Table 2. The mean level of identification (*M* = 5.52, *SE* = 0.11) was significantly higher than the scale midpoint (4), *t* (74) = 13.16, *p* < .001, η2 = **.**70. However, because there were no main effects or significant interactions involving identification and because it was not affected by condition, this measure is not discussed further.

**Manipulation check**

There was a main effect of Target, *F* (1, 67) = 38.38, *p <* .001, η2 = .36. As expected, this effect was not qualified by further interactions, *Fs* (1, 67) < 2.52. Transgressive targets (*M* = 4.62, *SE* = .24) were perceived as having broken the rules more than normative targets (*M* = 2.87, *SE* = .18).

 **Evaluations**

There was a significant main effect of Target,*F* (1, 70) =10.91, *p* < 0.01, η2 = .11. Overall normative targets (*M* = 5.14, *SE* = .11) were evaluated more positively than transgressive targets (*M* = 4.60, *SE* = .16). This main effect was qualified by a marginal two-way interaction of Target x Role, *F* (1, 70) = 3.70, *p* = .09, η2 = .04. This was further qualified by a Target x Role x Group significant three way interaction, *F* (1, 70) = 5.30, *p* < .05, η2 = .06.

The simple effects of Role within Target and Group showed that the transgressive ingroup leader (*M* = 5.40, *SE* = .33) was evaluated more favorably than the transgressive ingroup member (*M* = 4.21, *SE* = .32), *F* (1, 70) = 6.74, *p* = .01, η2 = .08. Other simple effects of Role were non-significant *Fs* < 2.54.

An inspection of the simple effects of Group within Role and Targetshowed that the transgressive ingroup leader (*M* = 5.40, *SE* = .33) was evaluated more positively than the transgressive outgroup leader (*M* = 4.13, *SE* = .33), *F* (1, 70) = 7.49, *p* < .01, η2 = .09. No other simple effects of Group were significant, *Fs* < 1.03.

Finally, the Group by Role simple interaction was significant for transgressive targets, *F* (1, 70) = 7.01, *p* = .01, η2 = .091, whereas that for normative targets was not significant, *F* (1, 70) = 0.22, *p* = .64, η2 = .003.

**Punitiveness**

There was a significant main effect of Target, *F* (1, 68) = 29.51, *p* < .001, η2 = .30. Participants indicated that normative targets (*M* = 26.96, *SE* = 6.40) should be punished less than the transgressive targets (*M* = 6.40, *SE* = 3.39). There were non-significant two-way interactions between Target x Group, *F* (1, 68) = 2.80, *p* = .099, η2 = .04 and Target x Role, *F* (1, 68) = 3.18, *p* = .079, η2 = .05. These effects were qualified by a significant Target x Group x Role interaction, *F* (1, 68) = 4.31, *p* < .05, η2 = .06.

The simple effects analysis of Role within Target and Group revealed that the normative ingroup leader (*M* = 31.28, *SE* = 3.59) was rewarded more than the normative ingroup member (*M* = 22.28, *SE* = 3.59), *F* (1, 68) = 3.15, *p* = .08, η2 = .04. At the same time the transgressive ingroup leader (*M* = 22.67, *SE* = 6.78) was rewarded significantly more than the transgressive ingroup member (*M* = 2.44, *SE* = 6.78), *F* (1, 68) = 4.45, *p* < .05, η2= .06. Participants were more generous to the normative outgroup leader (*M* = 32.89, *SE* = 3.49) than to the normative outgroup member (*M* = 21.41, *SE* = 3.69), *F* (1, 68) = 5.07, *p* < .05, η2 = .07, but did not differentiate between the outgroup transgressive member and outgroup transgressive leader, *F* (1, 68) = 2.03, *p* > .10, η2 = .03.

The simple effects of Group within Role and Target showed that the transgressive ingroup leader (*M* = 22.67, *SE* = 6.78) was treated significantly less punitively than the transgressive outgroup leader (*M* = -6.59, *SE* = 6.98), *F* (1, 68) = 9.04, *p* < .01, η2 = .12. There were no other simple effects of Group, *Fs* < 2.43.

Finally, the Group by Role simple interaction is significant for transgressive targets, *F* (1, 68) = 6.25, *p* = .015, η2 = .08, whereas that for normative targets is not significant, *F* (1, 68) = 0.12, *p* = .73, η2 = .002.

**Discussion**

Experiment 3 shows the application of double standard in a minimal group paradigm. Normative targets were evaluated more positively than transgressive targets but the transgressor's role and group membership moderated this pattern. The ingroup transgressive leader elicited more positive evaluations and less punitive responses than the ingroup transgressive member and the outgroup transgressive leader or member -- a double standard. In addition, these responses were paralleled by punitiveness toward each target.

These results add two important elements to our overall findings. First, they show a double standard in the context of an entirely novel group membership. Establishing these effects using the MGP paradigm, and involving small group interaction, rather than an imagined sports scenario, boosts our confidence that the double standard effect generalizes. Second, Experiment 3 showed that evaluations are paralleled by feelings of punitiveness/reward, and show that people are less punitively oriented to transgressive ingroup leaders than other transgressors.

**Experiment 4**

Given that our previous experiments have established that a double standard is applied to transgressive ingroup leaders, we wanted to explore in greater depth both in what ways and why an ingroup transgressive leader is judged less harshly than an ingroup transgressive member. Thus, the present experiment focuses only on ingroup transgressors. This experiment returns to the sports scenario. It introduces a further dependent variable (inclusion) and a different measure of punishment/reward.

Experiment 3 asked about feelings of punitiveness but did not actually give participants an opportunity to act punitively. The present study operationalized punitiveness more directly in terms of a financial allocation measure that enabled participants to distribute rewards between the transgressive and normative targets.

To further examine ways in which transgressive leaders may be affected by a double standard Experiment 4 also included a measure of whether the target should continue to be included in the team. Exclusion has potentially serious consequences for a target, because it is known to be a painful experience and also has consequences for the target’s future opportunities and prospects (Abrams & Christian, 2007; Kerr & Levine, 2008; Williams, 2007).Whereas financial punitiveness could reflect the normal types of penalties imposed on transgressive players by authorities (e.g., the sports’ governing bodies), inclusion may more clearly reflect a type of punishment that can be assigned by other group members and thus seems a useful index of the extent to which the transgression actually makes the target ineligible for group membership.

**Participants and Design**

Fifty eight university students (24 male) who studied 23 different majors (none psychology) were recruited to participate at the end of lecture classes and at the university library. Participants were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (Role of transgressor: Captain vs. Player) x 2 (Target: Normative, Transgressive) design with Target as a within-participants factor.

# **Procedure and Materials**

The procedure matched that of Experiment 1 except that only ingroup targets were presented. Participants were first asked to identify which soccer team they supported and which was its main rival.

**Evaluation***.* Participants completed the evaluation scale from Experiment 1 (αs > .89).

**Inclusion***.* Participants were asked how much they thought the target should be included in the team in the future. (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much*).

**Bonus distribution***.* Participants were told that if their team won, the captain and the player would share a bonus with a total value of £30000. They were asked to indicate how much bonus they would recommend each should receive from this amount. Responses were given on a seven step scale ranging from £0/£30000 to £30000/£0 in steps of £5000. Thus, responses reflect participants' preference for one target over the other (normative over transgressor), where £15000 would reflect equal allocation to both targets.

**Results and Discussion**

Across participants, 19 different teams were supported, and 21 different main rivals were nominated. We performed a Role x Target ANOVA on the dependent variables with repeated measures on the Target factor. Means for the effects are shown in Table 3. Because Group is not a factor in this design, the double standard hypothesis is tested by the Role x Target interaction.

**Evaluations**

There was a significant main effect of Target. Normative targets (*M* = 5.34) were evaluated significantly more positively than transgressive targets (*M* = 3.05), *F*  (1, 55) = 89.04, *p* < .001, η2 = .62. There was also a significant main effect of Role, *F*  (1, 55) = 18.28, *p* < .001, η2 = .25. Captains (*M* = 4.96, *SE* = .18) were evaluated significantly more favorably than players (*M* = 3.93, *SE* = .16).

As predicted by the double standard hypothesis, there was a significant interaction between Role x Target, *F* (1, 55) = 38.43, *p* < .001, η2 = .41. The simple main effects analyses showed that the transgressive captain was evaluated significantly more favorably (*M* = 4.66, *SE* = .25) than the transgressive player (*M*  = 2.49, *SE* = .22), F (1, 55) = 42.81, *p* < .001, η2  = .44, whereas the normative captain (*M* = 5.26, *SE* = .20) and player (*M* = 5.38, *SE* = .18) were judged similarly, *F* (1, 55) = 0.21, *p* = .65, η2  < .01. Also, the difference in evaluations of normative versus transgressive player was larger, *F* (1, 55) = 139.35, *p* < .001, η2  = .72, than the difference in evaluations of normative versus transgressive captains, *F* (1, 55) = 4.66, *p* = .035, η2  = .08.

**Inclusion**

There was a significant main effect of Target. Participants felt it was more important to include normative targets (*M* = 5.87) than transgressive targets (*M* = 4.33), *F* (1, 55) = 37.68, *p* < .001, η2 = .41. There was also a significant main effect of Role, *F* (1, 55) = 7.92, *p* = .007, η2  = .13. Captains (*M*  = 5.50, *SE* = .21) were included more than players (*M*  = 4.70, *SE* = .19).

As predicted by the double standard hypothesis there was a significant interaction between Role x Target, *F* (1, 55) = 11.79, *p* < .001, η2 = .18. The simple main effects analyses show that the transgressive captain was included significantly more (*M* = 5.16, *SE* = .32) than the transgressive player (*M* = 3.50, *SE* = .29), F (1, 55) = 14.84, *p* < .001, η2  = .21, whereas the normative captain (*M* = 5.84, *SE* = .24) and player (*M* = 5.91, *SE* = .21) were included similarly, *F* (1, 55) = 0.04, *p* = .84, η2  < .01. The difference in inclusion of normative versus transgressive players was larger, *F* (1, 55) = 52.22, *p* < .001, η2  = .49, than the difference in inclusion of normative versus transgressive captains, *F* (1, 55) = 3.26, *p* = .077, η2  = .06.

**Bonus Distribution**

An equal bonus to the transgressor and normative would be £15000/£15000. We were interested in how much of that would be withheld from a transgressive captain and a transgressive player, and instead allocated to the normative counterpart. For comparability with other measures we report both the mean amount and the rescaled (1-7) responses. Consistent with the double standard hypothesis, although transgressive targets were always given less bonus than normative targets, the transgressive captain was awarded a higher bonus (*M*  = £12400, *M* = 3.48, *SE* = .22) than the transgressive player (*M* = £9194*, M* = 2.84, *SE* = .20), *F* (1, 55) = 4.62, *p* = .036, η2 = .08.

**Experiment 5**

Experiments 1 to 4 demonstrated that individuals apply more lenient judgments when they evaluate a transgressive ingroup leader than when evaluating a transgressive ingroup member or outgroup leader. In Experiment 5 we test a potential boundary condition of this double standard. Specifically, we test the idea that the double standard will only be applied to an ingroup transgressive leader who is perceived as acting on behalf of the group.

The SIT analysis of leadership holds that a leader must be seen as ‘*doing it for us*’ in order to trigger the basic psychological processes that relate social identity to leadership (e.g., Haslam, et al., 2011; Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012). Indeed, one way to ensure the perception of centrality within the group, and the consequent ability to lead, is to act in a group-serving manner. For instance, van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2005) showed that being perceived as altruistic towards the group is a key element in the perception of leadership effectiveness, especially in those situations where the leader is not considered to be prototypical.

The present study examines whether acting with a group-serving as opposed to a self-serving motive is sufficient to provide a further benefit for leaders, in the form of increased tolerance of their transgressions. Using a scenario similar to that in Experiment 1, we further manipulated whether leaders (vs. members) transgressed the rules for their own self-interest or to serve the group. We also modified the context in which the transgression arose. In the previous experiments using sports contexts, the incident that sparked the transgression was a penalty awarded against the whole team. In the present experiment, the instigating event was a yellow card awarded against the subsequent transgressor. We predicted that the double-standard would emerge only for an ingroup transgressive leader who is perceived as acting on behalf of the ingroup.

**Method**

**Participants and Design**

 One hundred and sixty participants (40 females) from the USA were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Motive: group-serving vs. self-serving) x 2 (Role of the Transgressor: leader vs. member) x 2 (Target: transgressive, normative) mixed factorial design, with repeated measures on the Target factor.

**Procedure and Materials**

 Participants were invited to take part in a study on soccer via an online survey tool (Qualtrics). The study was advertised on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Materials and procedure were similar to Experiment 1. Participants were asked to indicate a soccer team they supported the most and its main rival. In addition, participants were asked to imagine a captain and member from one of these teams (either ingroup or outgroup) and write down their initials. Qualtrics automatically applied the names of the relevant teams and the relevant targets’ initials throughout the questionnaire. Participants were presented with a scenario depicting a competitive match between their team and its rival. In the scenario, the referee assigned a questionable yellow card to the (about to transgress) target. The transgressive target was described as vehemently arguing with the referee in a transgressive manner similar to those described in previous studies. Depending on the condition, this reaction was described as either because ‘the team’s trainers and support staff were due to receive a 10% bonus if the team received no yellow cards’ and [Target] believed ‘the referee is biased against the team’ (group-serving behaviour) or because ‘[Target] was due to receive a personal 10% bonus if he received no yellow cards that month’ and [Target] believed ‘the referee is biased against him personally’ (self-serving behaviour). In contrast, the normative target was described as remaining calm and abiding by the decision of the referee2. After reading the scenario, participants completed the dependent measures, were debriefed and compensated for their time.

**Evaluation.** Participants rated how friendly, likeable, warm and approachable each target was, as in Experiment 1. These items formed a reliable scale both for judgements of the captain (α = .95) and the player (α = .94).

**Manipulation Check.** To check if the manipulation of Motive was perceived correctly, participants were asked to what extent [Transgressive Target] had behaved in this way for self-serving reasons and to what extent [Transgressive Target] had behaved in this way for team-serving reasons. Both the items were measured using a 1 to 7 scale (*not at all – completely*).

**Results**

Across participants, 36 different teams were supported, and 36 different main rivals were nominated. Five participants were excluded from the analysis because they failed to indicate either an ingroup or an outgroup team. Three scores were outliers and were deleted. Small differences in the degrees of freedom are due to missing cases.

**Manipulation Check**

We performed a Group x Role x Motive x Reason ANOVA on the manipulation check items, with repeated measures on the Reason variable. There was a significant main effect of Reason, *F* (1, 146) = 33.91, *p <* .001, η2 = .19. Overall, the transgressor’s behavior was perceived as being motivated more by self-serving reasons (*M* = 5.05, *SE* = .11) than team-serving reasons (*M* = 3.87, *SE* = .13). In addition, there was a significant Reason x Group interaction, *F* (1, 146) = 4.14, *p =* .044, η2 = .03. The simple effects of Group within Reason showed that ingroup transgressive targets were perceived as behaving in this way for team-serving reasons (*M* = 4.72, *SE* = .13) more than were outgroup transgressive targets (*M* = 4.23, *SE* = .13). There were no significant differences between group in the self-serving reason item, *F* (1, 146) = .56, *p =* .046, η2 = .004.

Most importantly for our manipulation, there was the expected significant Reason x Motive interaction, *F* (1, 146) = 12.93, *p <* .001, η2 = .08. The simple effects of Motive within Reason showed that the self-serving transgressive target was perceived as acting for self-serving reasons (*M* = 5.40, *SE* = .16) significantly more than the team-serving transgressive target (*M* = 4.70, *SE* = .16), *F* (1, 146) = 9.80, *p =* .002, η2 = .06. Conversely, the team-serving transgressive target was perceived as behaving for team-serving reason (*M* = 4.25, *SE* = .18) more than the self-serving transgressive target (*M* = 3.49, *SE* = .18), *F* (1, 146) = 8.72, *p =* .004, η2 = .05. The other effects were non-significant, *F* (1, 146) < 3.58.

**Evaluation**

 We performed a Group x Role x Motive x Target ANOVA on evaluation, with repeated measures on the Target factor. Means for the four-way interaction are presented in Table 4. There was a significant main effect of Target, *F* (1, 144) = 192.16, *p <* .001, η2 = .57. Overall, normative targets (*M* = 4.80, *SE* = .09) were evaluated more positively than transgressive targets (*M* = 3.31, *SE* = .09). There was a main effect of Group, *F* (1, 144) = 64.92, *p <* .001, η2 = .31. Ingroup targets (*M* = 4.62, *SE* = .10) were evaluated more positively than outgroup targets (*M* = 3.50, *SE* = .10).

These results were qualified by a significant three way interaction of Group x Role x Target, *F* (1, 144) = 5.049, *p =* .026, η2 = .03. The double standard hypothesis predicts that the transgressive ingroup captain should receive more positive evaluations compared to a transgressive ingroup player and outgroup captain. In line with the double standard hypothesis, the ingroup transgressive captain (*M* = 4.20, *SE* = .17) was evaluated more positively than the ingroup transgressive player (*M* = 3.69, *SE* = .18), *F* (1, 144) = 4.24, *p =* .041, η2 = .03 and the outgroup transgressive captain (*M* = 2.63, *SE* = .17), *F* (1, 144) = 41.80, *p <* .001, η2 = .22.

In addition, the three way interaction was further qualified by a significant four-way interaction, *F* (1, 144) = 4.19, *p =* .04, η2 = .03. Other effects were non-significant, *Fs* (1, 144)< 1.64.

In order to test our hypotheses we inspected simple three-way Group x Role x Target interactions within each level of Motive. As predicted, the three-way interaction was significant only in the group-serving condition, *F* (1, 144) = 9.164, *p <* .001, η2 = .13. We therefore proceeded to test the critical comparisons for the double standard hypothesis. In the group-serving condition, the simple effects of Role within Target, and Group showed that the ingroup transgressive leader was evaluated more positively than the ingroup transgressive player, *F* (1, 144) = 3.77, *p =* .054, η2 = .03. No other effects were significant, *Fs* (1, 144)< 2.29. The simple effects of Group within Target, and Role showed that, relevant for the double standard hypothesis, the transgressive ingroup leader was evaluated more positively than the transgressive outgroup leader, *F* (1, 144) = 33.99, *p <* .001, η2 = .19. Finally, the Group by Role simple interaction in the group serving condition was significant for transgressive targets, *F* (1, 144) = 7.43, *p* = .13, η2 = .087, whereas that for normative targets was not significant, *F* (1, 144) = 2.36, *p* = .13, η2 = .02.

In the self-serving condition, the three way interaction was not significant, *F* (1, 147) = 0.019, *p =* .89, η2 < .001. The Group by Role simple interaction in the self-serving condition was non-significant for transgressive and normative targets, *Fs* (1, 144) < .001.

**Discussion**

Experiment 5 shows acting in a self-serving manner creates a boundary condition for the application of a double standard to ingroup leaders. As one would expect, ingroup targets were evaluated more positively than outgroup targets, and normative targets were evaluated more positively than transgressive targets. However, the transgressor’s role, group, and motivation moderated this pattern. Ingroup transgressive leaders were evaluated more positively than ingroup trangressive members and outgroup transgressive leaders *only* when they were told the motivation of the transgression was group serving. In other words, the double standard emerged only when the transgression was attributable to group-serving motivations.

Interestingly, in the self-serving condition, both a transgressive ingroup leader and a transgressive ingroup member were evaluated more positively than comparable outgroup target. This suggests that selfishness in the context of team competitions is regarded negatively and perhaps selfish outgroup members are liable to be derogated even more than selfish ingroup members. This is a potential question for further research.

**General Discussion**

Taken together, these experiments show a clear pattern of results that demonstrate a double standard operates when people judge transgressive ingroup leaders. Just as previous research shows that some deviant ingroup leaders are granted 'innovation credit' (Abrams et al., 2008), the present findings show that this double standard means that some transgressive ingroup leaders may be granted ‘transgression credit’ – their transgressions receive responses that are less harsh than responses to other types of transgressor. This effect was demonstrated with a large set of different ingroup-outgroup pairs (self-nominated by participants), two different sports (soccer and netball), in three different countries (UK, India and USA), two different types transgressions (sports and cheating) and reactions to events that either affected the group as a whole or just the transgressor, and using both sports and minimal groups.

We focused on two specific predictions from the double standard hypothesis. The tests of these predictions can be summarized meta analytically. First, transgressive ingroup leaders should be evaluated more favorably than transgressive ingroup members. The meta analytic *Z*, weighted by sample size (*N* = 220) = 7.59, mean *R*2 = .24, mean Fisher's Z = .54, one tailed *p* = 6.24 E-14. The failsafe number (*p* = .05) was 92. Second, ingroup transgressive leaders should be evaluated more favorably than outgroup transgressive leaders. The meta analytic *Z*, weighted by sample size (*N* = 162) = 8.48, mean *R*2 = .38, Mean Fisher's Z = .72, one tailed *p* = 1.68, E-16. The failsafe number (*p* = .05) was 102.

We tested a potential boundary condition for the transgression credit. Experiment 5 showed that individuals are prone to ‘turn a blind eye’ to leaders only when their actions are framed as being group-serving. An important element of this study concerns the context in which the transgression arose. The rule that was broken was essentially the same as in the preceding experiments (i.e., arguing with the referee). However, while in the earlier studies the transgression followed a penalty assigned against the team, in Experiment 5 the penalty was assigned against the transgressive target himself. This has two important consequences. First, in terms of the rules of soccer, this potentially heightens the potential harm that the transgression does to the group (e.g., if the transgressor incurs a second yellow card he will be sent off and the team will be disadvantaged). Nevertheless, people still granted the leader a transgression credit.

In addition, the behavior in the present study could be construed as always selfish to some extent because the target was described as having a personal quarrel with the referee, (as indeed the main effect of Reason on the manipulation check in Experiment 5 suggests). Yet, regardless of this, the double standard still emerged, but only when the transgressive leader was described as having the interests of the group at heart. This highlights that it is not the nature of the action per se that determines whether people turn a blind eye to the ingroup transgressive leader. Rather, it is the perception of the transgressor’s motivation that seems to matter.

In everyday life, leaders’ transgressions are usually more ambiguous than those presented in these studies. Group members might not have direct access to important information concerning how the events have unfolded or regarding the frame of the leaders’ actions. Does a bishop conceal a scandal to protect his or the church’s reputation? Did Diego Armando Maradona score the ‘hand of God’ goal for his own or for Argentina’s glory? Transgressions are intrinsically ambiguous and it might be in a leader’s interests to obfuscate them even more. This point is reminiscent of the importance of rhetoric in shaping group’s perception of leaders’ actions (cf. Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; see also Haslam et al., 2011). Specifically, leaders who want to ‘get away’ with their misdeeds may need to frame their behaviour in a way that reflects their willingness to serve the group interests, shaping therefore the perception of their followers and obtaining a safe-conduct not available to other ingroup members.

Indeed, this tactic may be quite effective for some leaders. During several trials across his political career, the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi carefully orchestrated communication to convey the impression that his personal problems with the justice system were framed as attack against his party. By recasting personal issues as group struggles, Berlusconi was able to present himself as championing the group interests, rather than his personal ones. In turn, this might have made his attacks against the judges and his questioned actions more acceptable in the view of his followers.

**Theoretical Contribution and Implications**

The present findings raise important questions for the social identity and IC approaches to leadership. They also reveal effects that are highly relevant to the black sheep effect and the subjective group dynamics model. The first task for future research is to clarify which psychological mechanisms underlie the emergence of the double standard.

**Social identity approach to leadership.** We demonstrated that reactions to transgressors are affected both by group membership of the transgressors and by whether they occupy a leadership role. In terms of social identity analysis of leadership, a priority is to understand the role of perception of prototypicality in these reactions. Reicher and Hopkins (2003) suggest that group members, including leaders, must work to ensure their prototypicality as a means of securing their position and influence. Abrams et al. (2008) argued that one reason ingroup leaders gain innovation credit is because they are perceived as having accrued sufficient prototypicality that they are entitled to lead the group in new directions (cf. Hogg, 2001). It seems plausible that a double standard might arise because extant transgressive ingroup leaders are perceived as having accrued sufficient prototypicality and that that even following transgressive acts their centrality to the group is still greater than that of other members, protecting them from criticism.

A double standard might also reflect that people infer that ingroup leaders deserve their unconditional support by virtue of the respect due to their role, in combination with their group membership (see also Reicher and Hopkins’, 2003, ideas regarding leaders as entrepreneurs of identity). This possibility was raised by Abrams et al. (2008), and was labeled the ‘conferral’ hypothesis. Consistent with this idea Experiment 4 showed that the double standard emerged even when the group membership and leader role were both new, with no prior history or relationships among members. Future research should explore how accrual and conferral processes relate to the double standard and how they interact in the perception of transgressive ingroup leaders.

**IC theory.** Our findings add to recent applications of IC theory to trangressive leaders (Shapiro et al., 2011). IC theory is silent with regard to outgroups and so we assume that it is implicitly only concerned with ingroups. As noted, Shapiro et al.’s (2011) study showed that a disappointing self-nominated leader received less punitive reactions if members felt the leader contributed more to their relationship. However, we found that even though ingroup membership is necessary for the double standard, leader member exchange does not appear to be necessary. We found that sharing the same group, even when there is no interpersonal relationship between the leader and the participant, is sufficient for a transgressive leader to be treated less punitively.

**The black sheep effect, expectancy violation and subjective group dynamics.**  The black sheep effect (Marques & Páez, 1994) highlights that ingroup deviants are often derogated more than outgroup deviants (relative to normative targets). In addition, if people generally expect ingroup members to be more virtuous than outgroup members, expectancy violation could have produced a black sheep effect too (cf. Biernat et al., 1999). The present studies focused on transgressions – clear violations of external rules. These are different from opinion deviance or likeability because transgressions are irreversible and potentially threaten the group in terms of possible sanctions and reputational damage. Therefore, both ingroup and outgroup members who transgress are vulnerable to the same external constraints or punishments. Given that people accept that transgressions should generally be criticized or punished, the issue for group members is not whether to derogate targets, but whether to attenuate derogatory or punitive reactions. The present findings show that the black sheep effect did not arise in the case of transgressions by ingroup and outgroup members. This suggests that because transgressions are unambiguously ‘bad’, both ingroup and outgroup members who transgress are judged similarly.

Our preliminary studies showed that the transgression we used for the experiments was equally unexpected regardless of whether it was committed by an ingroup or outgroup or leader or member. Moreover, participants were similarly negative to both outgroup and ingroup transgressive members but were more, rather than less, favorable to ingroup leaders who transgressed, compared with their reactions to other transgressors.

Subjective group dynamics theory (Abrams & Rutland, 2011; Marques et al., 1998) holds that people are motivated to sustain positive social identity and do so, in part, by differentiating among group members to express support for those who best sustain the group’s prescriptive norms. Loyalty is generally a strong prescriptive norm to which group members are expected to adhere (cf. Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). Transgressive leaders may present a dilemma for group members because they create a tension between upholding important consensual standards and rules and demonstrating loyalty to the group by supporting their leader (Lewis, 2010). It appears from the present findings that the dilemma is generally resolved in the form of transgression credit to the ingroup leader.

**Implications, Limitations, and Conclusions**

The present research has implications for sport, banking, business, and politics. In contexts where groups face competition, leaders may find themselves gradually propelled toward disreputable, transgressive, and possibly illegal actions in support of their groups (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Leaders may engage in transgressive acts because of their desire to benefit the group, but it seems plausible that these acts are facilitated if fellow group members turn a blind eye (Near & Miceli, 2011). In periods of turmoil or instability, members’ unwillingness to mete punishment upon transgressive ingroup leaders might be taken by those leaders as implying tacit endorsement of their transgressions.

No single study or series of studies can possibly explore all types of instance of leader transgression. However, the present studies suggest that we should be unsurprised by the almost daily revelations, across a wide range of contexts, that groups and organizations have tacitly or actively accepted their leader’s transgression. Our evidence is consistent with the observation that organizations may sacrifice their transgressive members before they sacrifice equally or more complicit transgressive leaders (see the progression of resignations following News International's UK *News of the World* newspaper phone hacking scandal). Some chief executives have resorted to dubious schemes to keep their companies’ stock market position buoyant (e.g. the Enron and sub-prime lending and Libor rate fixing scandals). Some countries or arms manufacturers use bribes to win military contracts. Some company managers pay insufficient attention to safety regulations (resulting in serious accidents or environmental disasters), some military commanders have turned a blind eye to the use of inhumane and extreme methods on enemies (e.g. Abu Gharaib, extraordinary rendition). Some political leaders have attempted to manipulate elections (e.g. refusal to accept election results in the Ivory Coast), sports team captains have infamously cheated to win competitions (e.g., Maradona’s ”hand of God” goal in Argentina’s soccer match against England; Thierry Henri’s handball goal against Ireland).

Importantly, although people perhaps feel comfortable overlooking their own leaders’ transgressions, as long as the act is perceived as being enacted for the benefit of the group, people seem quite willing to condemn transgressions by outgroup leaders (e.g. powerful governments’ decisions to ‘take down’ foreign despots politically or militarily, and sports team managers’ depictions of rival teams as cheats, dirty players etc.).Likewise, external agencies or observers seem likely to visit significant sanctions on transgressive leaders. For example, star players in soccer are more likely to receive bookings for offenses than are less stellar players in the same teams (Miguel, Saigh, & Satyanath, 2011).

The application of a double standard for ingroup leaders is dangerous on at least two counts. First, it may create the potential for group leaders to normalize their extreme and corrupt acts so that these go unchecked by their own members. Second, transgressive leadership ultimately renders a group vulnerable to criticism and attack from outside observers and from external groups to which the corruption may be more apparent. These two dangers could in turn create strong intergroup tension, sowing the seeds for conflict and conflict escalation if a self-righteous leader of one group becomes viewed as the incarnation of evil in the eyes of an opposing group. Thus, transgression credit may have significant implications for the establishment of extremism (cf. Hogg & Blaylock, 2012), and intractable intergroup conflict (Bar Tal, 2013).

We are aware that the present research also has limitations. It would be useful to examine additional contexts, and to conduct studies with real groups. There is also plenty of scope to explore archival evidence in future research. For example, it would be interesting to examine the extent to which severity of transgression moderates the double standard. It could be that truly awful criminality or atrocity limits people’s tolerance of ingroup leaders’ transgressions. Nonetheless, most transgressions are not at those extremes and so the present research provides insight into transgressions that are plausible and likely.

There is also scope for cross cultural research into transgression credit. For example, it may be that more collectivist and more closed communities have a harder time criticizing transgressive ingroup leaders. Alternatively, they may place tighter constraints on their leaders and thereby be more effective at preventing them from breaching rules.

It would also be interesting to investigate the social developmental processes that may contribute to the double standard. Arguably, young children, who are more inclined to use morality based reasoning (right vs. wrong, fair vs. unfair) might be more likely to treat all transgressors similarly, whereas older children and adolescents may be more likely to accept transgression from ingroup leaders and to justify by recourse to social conventions and the importance of preserving group functioning (cf. Abrams & Rutland, 2011; Abrams et al., 2008; Killen, 2007; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011).

We have suggested that ingroup leaders could benefit from conferral – people’s sense that they should support their leaders unconditionally. One reason for this could be that people admire their leaders more because of the traits they are assumed to possess – an effect of leader stereotypicality (cf. Lord & Hall, 2003). Even though both ingroup *and* outgroup leaders might be assumed to possess these traits, it is understandable that people may value them more strongly when held by an ingroup member, and that this might explain why they feel an ingroup leader deserves group support. Thus, it may be that both leader prototypicality and beliefs based on leader stereotypes contribute to the double standard (cf. van Knippenberg, 2011).

In conclusion, the present findings have implications for the way teams, organizations and countries deal with illegal, dishonest and corrupt behavior by their leaders. In line with Giovanni Giolitti’s observation, people may apply a double standard when judging their own leaders’ transgression. Conceivably, people may find themselves tacitly colluding with increasingly transgressive behavior by their leaders until a crisis is reached, with potentially catastrophic results for the group.

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Footnotes

1. The measures of evaluations in this study also included two negative items, conflictual, and malevolent. Factor analysis confirmed that these were on the same dimension as the positive items, and the scale reliability was marginally lower (to α = .92 and .95 for the captain and player, respectively). Results of the ANOVAs are the same regardless of whether these two items are included, and for continuity and comparability with the other studies in this paper they were omitted from the evaluation measure. Some additional measures were included in some of the studies in this paper. Following consultation with the editor these are not reported for economy of presentation. Further details are available from the corresponding author.

2. The suitability of these manipulations was tested in a pilot study with 33 British participants. Individuals were asked to read a scenario in which the referee assigned a yellow card against a soccer team player. The player was then described as arguing against the referee for either the group or self-serving motives described above. In contrast, the normative target was described as abiding by the referee’s decision. Participants were asked to rate to what extent the two targets were supporting their group as a whole, and their personal interests, and to what extent they were breaking the rules of the game (1 - *not at all* to 7 - *completely*). Motive moderated both the perception of group serving, *F* (1, 31) = 9.52, *p =* .004, η2 = .24 and self-serving behaviors, *F* (1, 30) = 3.846, *p =* .059, η2 = .11. The group-serving target (*M* = 3.93 *SE* = .35) was perceived as supporting his group significantly more than the self-serving target (*M* = 2.29 *SE* = .34), *F* (1, 31) = 11.41, *p =* .002, η2 = .27, but his personal interests less (*M* = 4.50 *SE* = .33), than the self-serving target (*M* = 5.69 *SE* = .33),*F* (1, 30) = 6.33, *p =* .017, η2 = .17. Motive did not moderate the perception of transgression, *F* (1, 30) = .49, *p =* .49, η2 = .02.

Table 1.

*Experiment 2. Mean and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Evaluations of Transgressive and Normative Netball Team Members as a Function of their Group and the Role of the Transgressor.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Group | Ingroup | Outgroup |
| Role | Captain(SE) | Player (SE) | Captain(SE) | Player (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Transgressor | 4.68(.25) | 3.62(.25) | 2.35(.24) | 2.36(.23) |
| Normative | 5.18(.27) | 4.74(.27) | 4.96(.26) | 4.15(.24) |

Table 2.

*Experiment 3: Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for effects of Role and Group on Evaluations and Punitiveness Toward Transgressive and Normative Targets in a Minimal Group.*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Target | Ingroup | Outgroup |
|  |  | Leader(SE) | Member (SE) | Leader(SE) | Member (SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Evaluation | Transgressor | 5.40(.33) | 4.21(.32) | 4.13(.33) | 4.65(.32) |
| Normative | 5.35(.22) | 5.15(.23) | 5.23(.22) | 4.83(.23) |
| Punitiveness | Transgressor | 22.67 (6.78) | 2.44 (6.78) | -6.59 (6.98) | 7.10 (6.60) |
| Normative | 31.28 (3.59) | 22.28 (3.59) | 32.89 (3.49) | 21.41 (3.69) |

Note: Evaluation is measured on a 7-point scale, where 7 is most favorable. Punitiveness is measured on a scale from -50 to +50 in steps of 10, where lower scores are more punitive.

Table 3.

*Experiment 4: Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Effects of Transgressors' Role on Judgments of Normative and Transgressive Ingroup Soccer Team Members.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Paired Targets | Paired Targets |
| Role | Transgressor Captain | Normative Player | Transgressor Player | NormativeCaptain |
| Evaluation | 4.66(.25) | 5.38(.18) | 2.49(.22) | 5.26(.20) |
| Inclusion | 5.16(.32) | 5.91(.21) | 3.50(.29) | 5.84(.24) |
| Bonus distribution  | 12400(1109) | 17600 | 9194(996) | 20806 |

Note: Evaluation and inclusion are measured using a 7 point scale where higher scores are more favorable. Bonus distribution is scored from £0 to £30000 in steps of £5000, where £15000 represents equal distribution between targets. Means for paired targets are interdependent so standard errors are only provided for transgressors and analyses only used their means.

Table 4.

*Experiment 5: Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Effects of Motive, Role and Group Membership on Evaluations of Transgressive and Normative Soccer Team Members.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Motive | Group-Serving | Self-Serving |
| Group | Ingroup | Outgroup | Ingroup | Outgroup |
| Role | Captain | Player  | Captain | Player  | Captain  | Player  | Captain  | Player  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transgressor | 4.45(.25) | 3.78(.24) | 2.38(.26) | 2.88(.26) | 3.94(.23) | 3.61(.26) | 2.88(.24) | 2.64(.27) |
| Normative | 5.44(.24) | 5.19(.24) | 4.56(.25) | 4.15(.25) | 5.21(.25) | 5.33(.28) | 4.22(.27) | 4.33(.23) |

*Figure 1.*

Experiment 1. Effects of Group and the Role of Transgressor on Evaluations of Transgressive and Normative Soccer Team Members.

