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15. Fraternity

Adrian Pabst

INTRODUCTION: ETYMOLOGY AND MEANINGS

The word 'fraternity' derives from the Latin word '*frater*' or brother. Broadly speaking, 'fraternity' refers to some group or association that is constituted by a sense of brotherhood, governed by the ties of friendship and bound together by the mutual aid among its members. In contrast with solidarity, which is impersonal and refers to an abstract community based on identity, fraternity is inter-personal and emphasises the diversity between equals based on differentiation (Bruni and Zamagni 2004). As such, it depends on the principle of reciprocity linked to mutual obligations. Fraternity so configured is like an 'artificial family' that differentiates itself from other social or civic arrangements on account of a distinct ethos that is binding upon its members (Le Bras 1940–41; Michaud-Quantin 1970; Black 2003).

Far from being confined to the fellowship of small groups, fraternities are part of a wider set of reciprocal relationships in the realm of civil society that are marked by a shared sense of mutual assistance (Bruni and Sugden 2008). Fraternity – as a communal intentionality and also as set of institutions and practices – can embed the economic and the political in the social. Thus, the practice of fraternity can give rise to a genuine commonwealth whose bonds of reciprocity are not based on blood ties or professional links (e.g. Le Roy Ladurie 1982).

Linked to this is the Christian idea of a universal body of believers and of charity for all in need, an idea that translates into parishes and guilds organised as 'confraternities'. In short, the idea and reality of a fraternity blends the civic with the religious, a fusion wherein the secular is *not* a separate, discrete space that is synonymous with the fallen world of 'pure nature', sinfulness, evil and violence. Much rather, the *saeculum* is a temporality that for catholic orthodox Christianity is ultimately structured by the liturgical cycle of praise and thanksgiving: it mediates the supernatural Good in God, offering intimations of peace and human perfectibility first fully revealed in the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. By contrast, the dominant traditions of modernity instituted the secular as the primary locus of society that restricts the remit of the sacred and redefines religion in terms of abstract belief to which people give asset based on their private consciousness – rather than the communal practice of a shared, embodied faith. As such, the notion of fraternity has roots in Greco-Roman Antiquity, whose models of association were transformed by patristic and medieval Christianity that sought to overcome the opposition between the secular and the religious on which much of modernity rests.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

Broadly speaking, the tendency to create groups and associations, which are separate from the blood ties of family and kinship and also distinct from the bonds of citizenship and nationhood, seems to be coextensive with the formation and evolution of human societies and cultures. In many tribal societies, it was particularly young men who formed such arrangements. More specifically in Europe, fraternities in ancient Greece ranged from male drinking clubs and other social structures via cultic groups and burial societies to associations that were variously more cultural or more economic. Similarly, the Roman Empire featured *collegia*, which were 'also called *corporata*, *sodalitia* [. . . and] went back "earlier than recorded history", being mentioned in the Twelve Tables as an imitation of a Greek model' (Black 2003: 3 [the indented quote is from Duff 1938: 103]).

As Antony Black has argued, in Antiquity there was no clear, constitutionally enshrined independence of fraternities. The emergence of political clubs in the late Roman Republic under the consulate of Cicero and then Caesar led to strict control and even suppression of the colleges (cf. *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, in Krüger and Mommsen 2010). Augustus protected friendly societies for religious and other non-political purposes (e.g. burial societies and other examples of mutual aid). The distinction between 'licit' and 'illicit' fraternities originated at the same time and inaugurated a tradition that exists to this date, notably subordinating fraternal arrangements to political authority and common law (Duff 1938, esp. 107–117). This involved an official licensing system, state powers to dissolve fraternities and their exclusion from politics (Black 2003: 4).

However, the unfolding of Christendom in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages changed all this. Building on the legacy of Hellenic Judaism, the Church offered a free 'space' between the citizen and the state in a break with the pagan Roman collusion of *civitas*, *imperium* and *sacerdotium*. From the outset, the idea of the Church as a universal brotherhood found institutional expression in the universal episcopate, transnational monastic networks and local parishes organised as confraternities (Michaud-Quantin 1970). First of all, the Church transformed the Roman-law *collegia* in a political direction by introducing election and consent (Black 1997). On account of greater participation beyond citizenship, class or colour, ecclesial arrangements were arguably far more democratic than associations in ancient Greece. In turn, early Christian congregations gradually gave rise to a whole host of corporate bodies, which flourished in particular after the twelfth century. These included cathedrals, monastic chapters and the new order of friars – electing superiors, managing property communally and subjecting major decisions to communal consent (Tierney 1955, 1982; Black 2003).

Second, the development of canon and civil law saw the fusion of Roman and Germanic principles with Christian notions of justice and charity. In this complex process, new forms of association and corporation emerged and blossomed, whether the conciliarist movement within the Church or corporate guild-like bodies. Over time, the latter acquired a distinct legal personality (irreducible to the individual or the state – or indeed both), their own constitutional structure and their formal incorporation into civic politics. As Black remarks, '[l]ike cities themselves and parliaments, they had formal constitutions, established procedures, could issue regulations, and their members were formally equal in decision-making rights' (Black 2003: xxii).

As such, medieval (con-)fraternities crossed the false, double divide of the political and the economic as well as the social and the religious. For they were themselves part of civil society broadly conceived – embedding the polity and the economy in relations of reciprocity, mutuality, brotherhood and friendship. What distinguished medieval fraternities from both ancient and modern ones was their constitutional status and political role. Thus, in late Antiquity and particularly in the Middle Ages, the notion of fraternity covered a wide spectrum of meanings – from organisations such as craft-guilds via associations like religious confraternities to secret societies (e.g. Freemasonry). Fundamental differences notwithstanding, all these examples have a number of key features in common: they constitute groups that are bound together by ties of friendship and ritual, offering and providing mutual support to members according to the principle and practice of reciprocal duty that ensures both equality and diversity (Zamagni 2009).

Modern fraternities, by contrast, have tended to be less tightly-knit, more private and more specialised. In this way, they shift the emphasis away from mutual duties and reciprocal responsibilities of brotherhood and friendship towards a narrower focus on common interest and members' formal entitlements. Instead of upholding the autonomy of civil society, such fraternities risk being complicit with the modern state. In the name of legal impartiality and meritocratic criteria, the modern state subjugates the self-governing organisations that mediate between individuals, families and the sovereign centre (Pabst 2010a).

This is exemplified by the French Revolution, which abolished all the intermediary institutions of civil society and recreated them under the absolute authority of central state law. Indeed, the '*Loi Le Chapelier*' of 1791 banned guilds and fraternities (or *compagnonnage*) defended by figures such as Montesquieu. The law was followed by a decree of 18 August 1792, which dissolved all types of congregations, both of the clergy and of the laity, including universities, faculties and learned societies. Taken together, the law and the decree eliminated the right to strike and they instituted free enterprise as the fundamental mode of association or corporation. That is why the revolutionaries did not put an end to the power of privilege, whether in the form of patronal clubs or monopolistic arrangements that were in league with the central state. From the outset, the bureaucratic statism of the French Revolution was complicit with cartel capitalism (Pabst 2010b).

Since the time of the French Revolution, the meaning of the term 'fraternity' has changed radically compared with late Antiquity or the Middle Ages. It is true that fraternity remains associated with more reciprocal and mutual notions: first, moral obligations rather than constitutional-legal rights; second, informal ties rather than formal rules; third, trust and gift-exchange rather than contract, central state 'policing' and enforcement; fourth, an overlapping network of corporate associations rather than the dialectical oscillation between the individual and the collective. However, according to Mona Ozouf (1997), two main modern meanings can be distinguished: one that derives from liberty and equality and is ultimately subordinate to them. The other flows from Christian notions of brotherhood and reciprocity and thus provides a basis for both free societies and equal citizens. Thus, modernity encompasses at least two senses of fraternity: 'one, that followed liberty and equality, was the object of a free pact; the other preceded liberty and equality as the mark on its work of the divine craftsman' (Ozouf 1997: 1996–97). In part, this distinction underpins the difference between a more 'organicist'

and a more 'atomistic' liberalism, with the latter dominant in much of modern political and economic thought.

KEY THINKERS AND SEMINAL TEXTS IN ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES

Contrary to much of pre-Socratic thinking on the priority of the universe over the self or the city, both Plato and Aristotle viewed families and fraternities as the most primary locus of life in society that in some way mirrors the cosmic whole. The polity is the principal locus of association that actualises the potential of the soul, the household and relations of friendship (*The Republic*, book VIII; *Politics*, book I (Plato 1937a)). Based on his metaphysics of participation, Plato argued that justice in politics is about the right ordering of relations in accordance with the Good or 'author of all things' (Plato 1937a: 508E, 511B, 516B), which endows all things with goodness (Pabst 2012). As such, both practical, manual and theoretical, contemplative activities and professions are complementary in perfecting the republic, as illustrated by the prominence of the philosopher-king and the craftsman. In addition to laws and virtues (Plato 1937b: book X), Plato's political philosophy blends metaphysical principles with doxological practices (praise of the divine) that translate into bonds of friendship and other forms of fraternal association (Planinc 1991; Pickstock 2001, 2002).

Similarly, Aristotle's idea of an associative polity reflects his ethics of virtue. Understood as the middle way between extremes, virtue mediates competitive and potentially conflictual relations, directing them away from mutually diminishing vice towards standards of excellence and the common good in which all can share. Just as courage is the middle way between recklessness and cowardice, so too justice charts an alternative course between selfishness and altruism. By linking citizens to one another in terms of mutual rights and reciprocal duties, justice is the 'bond of men in states' (Plato 1937b: I, 2, 1253^a37–38) and the ordering principle in political societies. Since friendship involves the shared pursuit of truth and also the promotion of one another's honourable and righteous aims, fraternities are central to the blossoming of the *polis*.

Cicero viewed friendship as the primary mode of human association that gives rise to the practice of politics. Like Plato and Aristotle, he also accentuated the natural sociability of man: in his *De Officiis* (*On Duties*), it is said that '[...] the bond of human community and association [...] is reason and speech, which [...] reconcile men to one another and join them in a kind of natural partnership (*naturali quadam societate*)' (*De Officiis*, book I, chap. xvi (Cicero 1991)). In this manner, cities and commonwealths reflect a wider cosmic order in which reciprocal ties are mutually augmenting. The principle that underpins the creation of public realms (*res publica*) is itself 'a kind of natural coming-together (*congregatio*) of men' (*De Republica*, book I, chap. xxv (Cicero 1928)). Crucially, Cicero linked the bonds of friendship to the 'will of the people' and common consent that are at the heart of the *res publica*. Thus, it is bonds of fraternal, corporate association that bind together the rights and shared interests of cities and commonwealths (*De Republica* I, xxv (Cicero 1928)).

Augustine and Aquinas transformed the Greco-Roman legacy by fusing it with Christian principles of justice and charity. In addition to notions of friendship and

virtue, they developed the biblical and patristic idea of an impersonal Good that fashions the *cosmos* out of chaos in the direction of a supernatural good in God that infuses nature and directs humans to their proper ends – praising the divine and perfecting the fallen world. Augustine extended Ciceronian notions of popular will by emphasising democratic virtues of consent and peace (*De Civitate Dei*, book XIX (Augustine 1998)). This position was diametrically opposed to the ancient, aristocratic virtue of *agon* (or violent contest), which Machiavelli would later retrieve. Similarly, the Bishop of Hippo broadened and deepened the scope of fraternity by linking association to the universal brotherhood in the Church.

Crucially, the polity is not a human artifice that regulates the violent 'state of nature' (as for most theorists of social contractalism). Rather, for Augustine (as for Aquinas) it reflects in some partial and imperfect way the divinely created universe: the body politic represents both God's punishment and God's remedy for sin (*remedium peccatorum*), while the ecclesial body embodies the peace and reconciliation revealed in Jesus Christ. Within the universal brotherhood of the Church, fraternal relations are connected with the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity that translate into practices of reciprocal giving and mutual aid. In the Middle Ages, this was exemplified by the radical continuity between the liturgy, processions and the associative ties of guilds, universities as well as other intermediary institutions (Bossy 1983). Insofar as it upholds the dignity of each person and the autonomy of corporate bodies, the ecclesial body transforms the earthly city in accordance with the City of God.

Aquinas and other high medieval theologians accentuated the profound links between the ideal of friendship and charity, on the one hand, and the reality of life in society, on the other hand. Just as manual, material work mirrors in some sense the creative work of God (*Summa Theologiae* I^a–II^{ae} q.95 a.1 resp. (Aquinas 1964–75)), so too fraternal relations translate into practices of mutual help. Unlike pre-Christian Antiquity, the Middle Ages viewed the activity of craftsmen and peasants in terms of vocation and sanctifying works (*Summa Theologiae* I^a q.96 a.3 (Aquinas 1964–75)). In a clear difference with later feudal arrangements, the Church supported the development of new orders of friars who combined theological study with agriculture and handicraft.

Rather than viewing theoretical and practical work as separate, medieval thinking stressed the importance of creative perfectibility, honourable practices, excellent products and the proper treatment of workers. As such, fraternity was indissociable from notions of justice, profession, *officium* (lit. duty), each with its own sense of dignity. Thus, Aquinas rejected the practice of usury and argued for just prices and fair wages: 'just purchases, sale and suchlike, without which men cannot live together', as 'derived from natural law' (*Summa Theologiae* I^a–II^{ae} q.95 a.4 (Aquinas 1964–75)). While defending individual property as 'necessary for human life' for the purposes of social order and individual industriousness (*Summa Theologiae* I^a–II^{ae} q.66 a.2 concl.), Aquinas also championed the communal sharing of land and other assets as a way of mitigating the will of the individual and the sovereign (e.g. *De Regno*, book I, chap. VI, XI–XIV (Aquinas 2002)).

As the historian Otto Gierke documented, craft-guilds embodied in some measure the universal brotherhood of the Church in the particular fraternal relations of its members. Guilds mediated between families, households and the state: they 'embraced the whole man', represented 'for its members a miniature commonwealth (*Gemeinwesen* in

Kleinen) and 'united its members with one another like brothers' (Gierke 1868: 359, 383, 387, quoted in Black 2003: 12). Likewise, guilds sought to uphold standards of excellence and honourable practices. They 'made the colleagues have, in relation to one another, an earnest brotherly love for duty' (Gierke 1868: 387, quoted in Black 2003: 13), if necessary by means of punishment and exclusion based on an ethos that combined extensive rights with strict duties and moral codes. Frequently organised as confraternities that were variously more or less religious, craft-guilds participated in the life of the polity based on their own distinct 'legal personality'. Thus, the late Middle Ages saw the development of a new theology of work (Hughes 2007) that blended notions of contract with practices of fraternal gift-exchange – a vision that Renaissance figures such as Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino further developed in different directions (Bruni and Zamagni 2004).

For example, Francesco Patrizi of Siena spoke of 'social or civil friendship (*socialis seu civilis amicitia*)' as the moral pillar of the state. Such friendship is the least specific and most diffuse form of fraternity, based as it is primarily on individual advantage (*utilitas*), but it may 'as days go by through use and customs become more abundant (*accumulator*), until advantage is mostly set aside and gracious benevolence and friendship remain' (*On the Kingdom*, quoted in Black 2003: 97). Following the medieval fusion of contract with gift, Patrizi and other Renaissance thinkers viewed fraternity as a sentiment and virtue that underpins the whole of civic life, including political and economic relations. As Black documents, '[b]y sharing a market-place and other civic facilities, citizens can achieve "a wonderful charity", a "common friendship" among themselves' (Black 2003: 97). As such, neither the polity nor the economy was separated from the intermediary institutions of civil society and the fraternal bonds of mutual benevolence that were themselves inscribed in a liturgically ordered cycle.

EARLY AND LATER MODERN IDEAS

While there is no single break in the history of the idea of fraternity, the work of William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua deviates markedly from ancient, patristic and high medieval thinking. Both Ockham and Padua introduced three new elements: first, the rupture between general sociability and political association; second, the artificial character of the body politic; third, the absolute (unconstrained) character of political authority vis-à-vis the corporate bodies of civil society (Pabst 2010a). There can be little doubt that Machiavelli's vision of politics marks a fundamental rupture compared with late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The key point is that there simply was no secular, neo-pagan default model of city states, eschewing clerical control in favour of an unrestrained economic and political power. As John Milbank has argued:

recent research (for example, by Augustine Thompson OP) utterly belies this: the earlier Italian republics were not founded on pagan models, but were more like 'confraternities of confraternities'; citizenship was liturgically linked to baptism (as the free-standing baptisteries of Italian cities still attest today) and participation in local church and civic life (often astonishingly and directly democratic in character) were so complexly interwoven as to be inseparable. Suspicion of the Pope and even of the clergy does not here amount to 'secularity' [. . .]. Moreover, the emergence of a more pagan republicanism with Machiavelli coincided with an evolution of the

city-states towards princedoms and local imperialism. (Milbank 2004: 218; the reference is to Thompson 2005)

Another critical juncture occurred with the influential Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1616), who eschewed the shared patristic and medieval Neo-Platonist idea of a universal brotherhood governed by fraternal bonds in favour of a modern formalistic account of popular unity. For Suárez, the people constitute a 'single mystical body' (*unum corpus mysticum*). That body is a purely human unity that is prior to the *ecclesia*, the universal Church founded upon the Body of Christ. Contrary to Aquinas's distinction between the church as *corpus mysticum* and the state as 'body politic', Suárez's conception of the population as a 'single mystical body' replaces the patristic and medieval primacy of the ecclesial community over the state with the early modern supremacy of the state over the people (e.g. *De Legibus, Ac Deo Legislatore*, Book III, chap. ii, para. 3 (Suárez 1856–87)). Though Suárez rejects the divine right of kings, he emphasises absolute state sovereignty and the primacy of the governing king over the church. This provides the conceptual basis for the sacralisation of the state and the subordination of civic institutions to political power (Pabst 2012).

In the later seventeenth century, Johannes Althusius sought to recover the earlier Neo-Platonist vision of a universal brotherhood and mutual and reciprocal ties of fraternity. He spoke of civil society as the primary form of association that is based on family and friendship, embedding both the body politic and the economy. As Carl Friedrich wrote:

[b]eginning with the family [. . .] Althusius suggested that on successive levels of political community those who live together in order and harmony [. . .] are united by a pact, expressed or implied, to share things in pursuit of common interests and utility. The village was for him a federal union of families, as was the guild; the town a union of guilds, the province a union of towns and villages; the kingdom or state a union of such provinces; and the empire a union of such states and free cities. (Friedrich 1964, p. ix)

In this manner, Althusius combined the Catholic Christian principles of subsidiarity and solidarity with the Greco-Roman emphasis on association governed by reciprocal ties of brotherhood and friendship.

With the invention of 'political economy' in the eighteenth century, much of liberalism shifts the emphasis away from notions of fraternity to the idea of instrumental utility. Linked to this is a greater accentuation of the 'free' market and the strong state at the expense of civil society and its intermediary institutions. As Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden have shown (Bruni and Sugden 2008), the difference between Adam Smith's 'political economy' and Antonio Genovesi's 'civil economy' encapsulates these developments. Smith views market relations predominantly in terms of self-interest subject to the law of contract, thereby separating the pursuit of profit from the practice of gift-exchange (cf. Pabst 2011). Connected with this is Smith's critique of guilds and other intermediary institutions, which he blames for price-fixing and other anti-commercial practices: 'people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices [. . .]' (Smith 1991, Book I, chap. x, para. 2, p. 117). Smith judged guilds not to defend the excellence of products or the equality of their members but rather as privileged corporations that promote monopoly.

Thus, Smith tended to equate the competitive market with a morally neutral space that is free from the constraints of moral and civic virtues, which govern the ‘thick ties’ of family, friends and associations (Bruni and Zamagni 2004). As such, he viewed market relationships as distinct from the bonds of civil society. That is why Smith’s political economy stands half-way between the model of ‘civil economy’, on the one hand, and the model of ‘commercial society’, on the other hand – an idea that can be traced to Locke and Hobbes (Macpherson 1962) and also Mandeville who in different ways privileged purely instrumental relationships over above non-instrumental relationships of fraternity.

By contrast, Genovesi rejects the separation of self-interest from notions of sympathy and instead argues for wider reciprocal relationships in civil society that are marked by shared intentions for mutual aid: ‘for Genovesi, there is no fundamental distinction between market relationships and those of other domains of civil society. This conception of economics is expressed in the name Genovesi tries to give to the discipline: *civil economy*’ (Bruni and Sugden 2008: 46 [orig. ital.]). Crucially, the form and content of such reciprocal relationship is that of fraternity. For Genovesi, fraternity binds together interpersonal, particular dimension of ‘friendship’ with the universal outlook of ‘brotherhood’ – a form of unity and equality in diversity that is expressed by the principle of reciprocity (Zamagni 2009). Fraternal relations are connected with common membership in groups (such as guilds, religious communities or the body politic) that embed instrumental relations within non-instrumental relations. This idea was recovered by various thinkers and movements in the nineteenth century but marginalised in much of the twentieth century by the convergence of political and economic liberalism, which coincided with the collusion of the strong state and the unbridled ‘free market’.

CONTEMPORARY DEBATES AND POLICY ISSUES

Since the collapse of state communism and the ongoing crisis of ‘free-market’ capitalism, both academic research and public policy-making have been concerned with alternative economic models (cf. Pabst and Scazzieri 2012) and also transformations of the welfare state away from state paternalism or private contract delivery towards civic participation and community-organising. Whilst it has provided some much-needed minimum standards, statist-managerial welfare subsidises the affluent middle classes and undermines (traditional or new) networks of mutual assistance and reciprocal help amongst workers and within local economies (Beito 2000). One reason is that the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century centralised welfare state risks trapping the poor in dependency while simultaneously redistributing income to middle-income groups. Moreover, the neo-liberal ‘structural reforms’ of the 1980s and 1990s that rationalise welfare compensate the failures of capitalism by promoting freely-choosing reflexive and risk-taking individuals who are removed from the relational constraints of nature, family and tradition.

Today, by contrast, there is a renewed emphasis on the principles of reciprocity and mutuality, which translates into policies that incentivise the creation of mutualised banks, local credit unions, and community-based investment trusts. Beyond redistributive policies, alternatives to the centralised bureaucratic state and the unfettered ‘free market’ include asset-based welfare and decentralised models that foster human rela-

tionships of communal care and mutual help – rather than state paternalism or private contract delivery (Bruni and Zamagni 2004). For example, there is a compelling case for a system that combines universal entitlement with localised and personalised provision, e.g. by fostering and extending grassroots’ initiatives like ‘Get Together’ or ‘Southwark Circle’ in London that blend individual, group and state action. Both initiatives reject old schemes such as ‘befriending’ or uniform benefits in favour of citizens’ activity and community-organizing supported by local council – instead of being determined by central target and standards.

Crucially, the ‘civil economy’ model differs from both statist and free-market welfare in that it focuses on human relationships of mutuality and reciprocity (rather than formal rights and entitlements or monetarised market relations). Citizens join welfare schemes like social care as active members who shape the service they become part of rather than being reduced to merely passive recipients of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ top-down model. Southwark Circle works on the principle that people’s knowledge of their neighbourhood, community and locality is key to designing the provision and delivery of welfare. Services are delivered involving civic participation, social enterprise (e.g. the company Participle) and the local council. This can be linked to ‘time banks’ where voluntary work by members of the community can lead to certain entitlements that reward their contribution (e.g. by reducing their local tax).

A new dimension of fraternity appears in the emerging information network society. Non-interested forms of cooperation, which are linked to the practice of fraternal gift-exchange, are fundamental to the operation of new communities such as Wikipedia and widely used tools like open-source software programs, among many other initiatives.

By contrast, state paternalism or private contract delivery cost more to deliver less, and they lock people either into demoralising dependency on the state or financially unaffordable dependency on outsourced, private contractors. The reason why civic participation and mutualism costs less and delivers more is because it cuts out the ‘middle man’ – the growing layers of gate-keepers such as managers, social workers and bureaucrats who assess people’s eligibility and enforce centrally determined standards and targets instead of providing services that assist genuine individual needs and foster human relationships.

The vision of civic participation and mutualism is inextricably linked to the decentralisation of the state in accordance with the twin Catholic Christian principles of solidarity and subsidiarity (action at the most appropriate level to protect and promote human dignity and flourishing). A genuine alternative to the prevailing options eschews both conservative paternalism and liberal *laissez-faire* in favour of something like an organic pluralism and a radical communitarian virtue ethics that blends a hierarchy of values with an equality of participation in the common good.

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16. From arts patronage to cultural philanthropy: collaborating with granting foundations

Elisa Bortoluzzi Dubach and Pier Luigi Sacco

PREMISE

Miguel de Unamuno y Yugo, a great thinker and rector of the University of Salamanca, once wrote: 'Only by aiming for the unattainable can the attainable be achieved. Only if one's goal is impossible can the possible be achieved.' The choice of this particular quotation as an *incipit* for this chapter is not incidental. Foundations and nonprofit associations worldwide put themselves on the line each and every day as they strive to support, manage and promote cultural and social activities whose goals are to change the lives of those who may benefit from them. Although the purposes and funding methods quite often differ – from subsidies to grants, from capital expenditures to microloans – what these bodies all have in common is an unassailable determination and passion for giving both time and themselves to achieve pro-social goals.

It is to all these realities that this chapter is dedicated, its aim being to stimulate dialogue and allow anyone who so wishes to discover the fascinating world of foundations, to explore their strategies and practices, and thus provide a simplified description of their decision-making and operational logic to the advantage of aspiring grant-seekers. This chapter has therefore to be taken as a short guide to successful application to grant-making foundations for the cultural practitioners.

FROM ARTS PATRONAGE TO INSTITUTIONAL PHILANTHROPY

In order to understand the role of foundations in the contemporary context, it is necessary to provide a sketchy account of the relationship between the cultural and economic spheres in a historical perspective. In the pre-industrial economy, cultural production was typically not a source of economic value, but was rather absorbing resources generated in other fields of activity, such as landlord rent collecting, banking, or commerce. The reason was that the forms of cultural production that prevailed in the pre-industrial context were not structured in ways that could ensure profitability in an organized way. The size of potential cultural markets was very limited in that very few people could afford to buy cultural artifacts, and also because most of them would be unique copies (such as in the case of artworks), or could be produced in a very limited amount of copies (such as in the case of pre-Gutenberg books) or would require hiring entire groups of performers (such as in the case of music, theatre, or dance, i.e. all forms of live performance). Even when (slow) technological progress allowed some early form of mechanized production, such as in the case of post-Gutenberg book publishing, the