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# The Deepening Crisis

Governance Challenges After Neoliberalism

*Edited by Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluigiian*

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## Contents

- Introduction 7  
*Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derlugian*
- 1 Crises in Parallel Worlds: The Governance of Global  
Risks in Finance, Security, and the Environment 19  
*David Held and Kevin Young*
- 2 Green Social Democracy or Barbarism:  
Climate Change and the End of High Modernism 43  
*William Barnes and Nils Gilman*
- 3 Ecologies of Rule: African Environments and the  
Climate of Neoliberalism 67  
*Michael J. Watts*
- 4 Economic Crisis, Nationalism, and  
Politicized Ethnicity 93  
*Rogers Brubaker*
- 5 War and Economic Crisis 109  
*Mary Kaldor*
- 6 A Less Close Union? The European Union's Search for  
Unity amid Crisis 135  
*Vincent Della Sala*
- 7 The Paradox of Faith: Religion beyond Secularization and  
Desecularization 157  
*Adrian Pabst*

8 Global Governance after the Analog Age:  
The World after Media Piracy 183

*Ravi Sundaram*

9 From Full to Selective Secrecy:  
The Offshore Realm after the Crisis 203

*Yatim Volkov*

Notes 221

About the Contributors 275

Index 279

## Introduction

*Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derjuginian*

In much of the world, one can simply say “the crisis,” and what is understood is the financial crisis centered on New York, London, and other major markets for capital and debt. This is so even though there are other serious social problems. Some of these—like the degradation of the environment and global climate change—are arguably more momentous. As important as it is to understand the crisis in global finance, it is also important to recognize that the financial crisis is only one dimension of a larger cluster of crises that coincide to produce turbulence and turmoil in global affairs. The current crisis thus includes a deep—though not fatal—disruption of financial markets and capital accumulation globally. But it also includes severe environmental challenges, wars and other security threats, and disarray in global governance. The economic issues raised by financial crisis are necessarily entangled in politics, large-scale social change, and basic issues of cultures and civilizations. Indeed, the struggle to cope with financial crisis reveals problems in politics and global governance and threatens to derail action on environmental concerns. While volume 1 in the Possible Futures series focused on the financial crisis itself, volume 2 focuses on these entanglements.

In this regard, the current concatenating crises remind us of something we should have known all along. Economics is always entwined with politics; both are also always matters of social organization and

The Paradox of Faith:  
Religion beyond Secularization and Desecularization

*Adrian Pabst*

Since the nineteenth century, social theorists of religion have claimed that the rise of modernity is synonymous with the decline of religion and the spread of secularism. Since the 1960s, critics have contended that modernization is compatible with faith and that the contemporary resurgence of religion marks the desecularization of the world.<sup>1</sup> While modernity is predominantly secular, it seems that postmodernity (or late modernity) has a significant religious dimension. However, the modern is not simply an exit from religion or theology but in large measure the product of shifts in theological discourse and changes within religious traditions.<sup>2</sup> So given its origins, there is no single modernity but rather alternative, rival modernities (both western and non-western) that are variously more secular or more religious.<sup>3</sup>

If, moreover, the postmodern is an intensification of certain modern trends instead of a new phase of history,<sup>4</sup> then arguably postmodernity cannot be equated with either more secularization or a sustained return to religion but in fact both. This suggests that what we are seeing is not just a growing opposition between a militant secularism and a violent religious fundamentalism (which are nonetheless conceptual mirror images of each other).<sup>5</sup> There is also an increasing bifurcation—within and across different faiths—of traditional, orthodox traditions, on the one hand, and modernizing creeds, on the other hand. Examples of this paradoxical

development include the opposition between liberal and nonliberal wings in the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion or the religious resistance to unbridled "free-market" capitalism and secular liberal democracy that is shared by various faiths.

Closely connected to this are different responses to the economic crisis of 2007–10: while some religions or denominations support the preeminence of state and market over society and religious bodies, others view the "free civil space" between those who rule and those who are ruled as more primary. Whereas the former tend to separate the idea of human contract from that of divine gift, the latter seek to transform state-administered rights or economic-contractual ties by drawing on notions of gift exchange and social bonds. Since the forces of modernity and countermodernity operate globally, the simultaneous expansion of both orthodox traditions and modernizing creeds is likely to continue in future. This encapsulates the paradox of religion in the late modern age: just as the argument that secularization has been the dominant modern reality is hard to deny, so too is the contention that religion never vanished from the public sphere and that it is once more reverting to public prominence.

In this chapter, I argue that the standard models of "secularization" and "desecularization" are theoretically problematic and empirically questionable. By essentializing religion, both theories adopt a secular perspective. This perspective ignores key sociological, anthropological, and philosophical features that can account for the specificities of different religious traditions (section I). Moreover, modernity is not a linear process that progressively replaces the religious past with a secular future. Rather, it is a dialectical process oscillating between a dominant secularism (and a variety of denominational subcultures that are positively linked to modernization), on the one hand, and an increasingly visible revival of traditional faiths that resist and seek to transform the secular outlook of global modernity, on the other hand (section II). Instead of the rather sterile debate in terms of secularization and desecularization, the future will probably consist of a contest of ideas and practices between those traditions that either embrace or challenge secular modernity. This is seen in how religious ideas on reciprocity, mutuality, and relationality are coming to the fore in public discussions on ethics, political economy, and science (section III).

## 1. Changing the Terms of Debate

1. *Deconstructing the "Secularization" and the "Desecularization" Thesis*  
The standard models of the "secularization" and the "desecularization" thesis are variants of essentially the same set of theoretical assumptions and empirical claims, though with opposite conclusions. Broadly speaking, both suggest that there is a single, linear relationship (either positive or inverse) between modernization and secularization. By producing a more differentiated economy and fragmented society, modernization tears the "sacred canopy" of religion asunder—either loosening the grip of faith or increasing the demand for religion.<sup>6</sup>

This conception is grounded in a historically dubious narrative that can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, public religion was gradually superseded and sidelined. New, progressive ideas of nature, science, technology, states, and markets gradually replaced archaic, obsolete notions of creation, theology, rituals, and the church, as well as the civil economy of guilds and cooperatives. On the other hand, it is contended that religion never really went away and that it has already returned to a position of cultural visibility and political influence. Thus, the same secularizing effects of modernization on faith have produced very different consequences. Either religions have adapted to modernity and become more like secular society, or else faiths have engendered powerful movements of countersecularization and ensured the continuity of religious belief and practice, albeit at the level of individuals and groups rather than society as a whole.

At the risk of caricaturing a little, proponents of the secularization thesis accuse their critics of underplaying the persistence of secularism. Advocates of the desecularization thesis blame the defenders of secularization for reading the whole world through the lenses of secular western Europe. My contention is that both are right about each other but wrong about religion.

## 2. *The Conceptual Limits of Both Theories*

Both theories view the historical and social evolution of religion in the modern era through an essentially secular prism that is founded on certain sociological, anthropological, philosophical, and (mostly hidden) theological concepts that are theoretically flawed and empirically

questionable (mainly measuring church attendance). Sociologically, the paradigm of (de)secularization is inextricably intertwined with socioeconomic modernization and cognate ideas such as industrialization, urbanization, rationalization, bureaucratization, individualization, privatization, and disenchantment. Linked to this is the claim that society represents a set of general, social facts and lawlike regularities rather than an association of living communities and groups. This shifts the focus from communal practice to individual belief, defined in terms of private consciousness.

Much of the disagreement between the two theories therefore boils down to empirical evidence. Either the crisis of religious consciousness is proof for the growing secularization of modern societies (Durkheim or Weber),<sup>7</sup> or else the perseverance of religious consciousness in individuals and groups is evidence that modernization is compatible with faith and that it can even lead to desecularization.<sup>8</sup> Since both phenomena are supported by different sets of statistical data, neither theory can fully explain world religions.

Anthropologically, notions such as general social systems and inner consciousness are deeply problematic. Both theories hold to an essentialist conception of religion that uproots each faith from its unique and specific traditions and reduces all religions to a set of abstract, generalizable principles, beliefs, or emotions. These are assumed to be either inner psychological phenomena linked to human nature (rather than the entire cosmos) or outer social phenomena tied to formal institutions and general spiritual exercises (rather than specific communities and practices of worship)—or indeed both.<sup>9</sup> In any case, the secularization and the desecularization theses confidently predict that religious principles, beliefs, and emotions will either be swept away or strengthened by the process of modernization.

The conceptual problem is that such and similar conceptions—which underpin influential accounts such as Locke's idea of the reasonableness of Christianity and Kant's notion of a universal moral religion—redefine faith in one of two ways: either as a sort of innate, natural, rationalist (or reasonable) religion or as a blind, fideist belief in an external divinity (and divine, providential intervention). Both theorizations posit a unitary, transhistorical essence of faith that denies two anthropological insights: first, that religions constitute distinct forms of belief and practice

irreducible to any other sphere (nature or consciousness); and second, that religious symbols embodying models of and for reality are inextricably linked to narratives, meaning, and culture. For narratives, meaning, and culture cannot be subsumed under any abstract, disembodied concept representing general laws of natural regularity or human consciousness (or again both at once).

Philosophically, the primacy of these modern, general categories over premodern conceptions of the link between universal principles and particular practices can be traced to a variety of traditions stretching back to the late Middle Ages. In brief, this transition is characterized by the emergence of two dualisms: first, between the secular space of pure, material nature and the sacred sphere of the immaterial supernatural; and second, between experience and reason or empiricism (e.g., Bacon, Boyle, Locke) and rationalism (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz). Taken together, these dualisms undermine the theistic idea of a continuous link between God and the world (e.g., divine love for creation). Either the divine is relegated to a transcendental sphere amenable to abstract reason or blind faith (transcendentalism), or else it is reduced to purely immanent nature and the material world we directly experience (positivism).<sup>10</sup>

Theologically, the centrality of positivism in the sciences and humanities has provoked a robust critique of the secular nature of modern inquiry and the recognition that the origins of modern philosophy and social theory are distinctly theological.<sup>11</sup> The idea that philosophy (subsequently replaced by natural and social science) is the only universal discipline concerned with the data of pure nature is itself the product of redefining theology as a merely regional science investigating the supernatural gift of revelation. (By contrast, St. Thomas Aquinas developed a theory of the subalternation of all disciplines to the supreme science of theology.)

So redefined, modern thought rejects the theistic idea of an analogical participation of immanent reality in the transcendent source of being in God. It also embraces a deistic dualism whereby, first, the sacred is rendered transcendental and confined to the supernatural realm of faith and revelation (divorced from reason and nature), and second, the secular space of society is conceived as a positive "given" and equated with the purely natural sphere of material reality and human agency.<sup>12</sup> Crucially, the patristic and medieval idea of real, embodied relations between

persons and groups that somehow mirror relations between the divine persons (albeit partially and imperfectly) is abandoned in favor of nominalist poles of the individual and the collective.<sup>13</sup>

This conceptual change from the Middle Ages to modernity had far-reaching implications for religious practice in Europe and later in North America.<sup>14</sup> Instead of binding together believers in a universal brotherhood, faith was increasingly tied to either individuals or nations (or indeed both). Likewise, society was seen as an autonomous, general set of "facts" and lawlike rules rather than a whole that exceeds its parts—an "association of associations" that links individuals, communities, and groups to one another in organic and reciprocal ways (not either state-administered rights or economic-contractual ties). Since modernity redefines religion itself along secular lines, it is hardly surprising that a number of faith traditions are resisting modernization.

### 3. *Toward an Alternative Account of Religion and Secularism*

For all the reasons adduced in the foregoing, secularization and desecularization theories must be discarded in favor of alternative accounts of religion drawing on three disciplines that reject the transcendentalism and positivism in much of the modern sciences and the humanities: first, historicized and comparative sociology; second, comparative and philosophical anthropology; and third, philosophical theology.

The first replaces rather simplistic claims about unitary, ahistorical trends with a historical and comparative analysis of concepts and practices associated with different religions. Some of the key findings of this approach include (a) the profound, lasting differences between Protestant countries, where religion and the Enlightenment tended to converge, and Catholic countries, where they tended to conflict; (b) the importance of religious monopoly and degrees of pluralism, including the modalities of church establishment in the United Kingdom or Scandinavia but also in Muslim states; (c) the fusion of religion with ethnolinguistic identities and the rise of denominational plurality; for example, in parts of postcommunist eastern Europe; (d) the divergence between secularized elites and ordinary believers within and across the growing gulf between urban centers and rural peripheries, for example, in countries with strongly secular constitutions, such as France or Turkey; and (e) the rise of individualism and the privatization of social life, coupled with the resurgence of

religion in society (and even politics). Across the world, religions have become significant social and political actors precisely to the extent that they have renounced the complicit collusion with old structures of power (e.g., states/governments, oligarchic elites).<sup>15</sup> All this underscores the difference (already highlighted in the previous section) between those religious strands that embrace modernization and those that repudiate it.

Second, this also points to a different anthropological approach whereby religion is defined in terms of specific communities of believers and all-encompassing practices within a communal body such as the synagogue, the temple, the church, or the mosque—not a set of abstract doctrines, beliefs, or worldviews held by individuals on account of psychological inclinations or social needs. As such, many forms of religion are paradoxically more mediated *and* more holistic than the (de)secularization thesis can capture. This is particularly true of those faiths that reject any accommodation with the secularizing dimensions of modernity that compromise religious orthodoxy (e.g., denying universal truths or replacing religious virtues embodied in practices with abstract, secular values and formal institutions).

Third, the importance of philosophical theology is that it helps reorient the dominant accounts away from the transcendentalist emphasis on the supernatural and the focus on the facticity of "the social" toward a new accentuation of meaning, narrative, culture, and symbol. Thus, religion is no longer essentialized and equated with abstract, generalizable beliefs to which believers give assent based on either pure reason or blind faith or prerational moral sentiments—or indeed all at once. Instead, religion is an integral part of human existence that cannot be deconstructed into psychological or social phenomena but frames individual and societal life by assigning positions and roles of communal, political, and cultural significance. Whether these positions are relatively more hierarchical or more egalitarian, different faiths tend to emphasize the common realm of civic society rather than the purely private sphere in a modern sense. This shifts conventional conceptions away from secular ideas of autonomy and personal choice toward communal sense making and shared interpretations of meaning.

Here one must go further and link these three perspectives more closely to each other. Just as sociology and anthropology add a crucial historical-comparative dimension to philosophical theology, so the latter



can reinforce the theological dimension of religious master narratives and highlight the crucial distinction within each faith tradition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. These terms are fiercely debated but nonetheless shared by communities of believers. Taken together, the three perspectives provide a compelling critique of both secular-liberal triumphalism and religious-fundamentalist triumphalism, whose uncanny similarity can be traced to their shared modern roots. Notions of community, belief, or faith are of course not identical across different world religions.<sup>16</sup> Nor does it make much sense to speak of a religious perspective "in general." What exactly is this "panreligious," shared faith position? Does it not risk amalgamating rival and perhaps incommensurable conceptions of God, theism, or the distinction between religious and political authority? Surely it is conceptually more compelling and practically more persuasive to speak of both similarities and differences within or across different religious traditions from a specific faith stance. But nonetheless, one key divide is between different religions or denominations that either embrace or contest modernity, as the following section also discusses.

## II. Beyond the Dialectic of Modernity

In this section, I link the shortcomings of "(de)secularization" to the opposition between modernizing creeds and traditional faiths. Modernity, like secularism, neither has a single line of origination nor is stable in its historical identity. Instead, both these concepts—and the realities they signify—operate through a series of tensions between the sacred and the secular as well as the premodern and the modern. In premodern cultures, for example, the sacred tended to be seen as a cosmic reality that is diffusely mediated through signs and symbols in the world inhabited by all. By contrast, modernity views the sacred as an immutable essence and the object of an internal, human experience that Durkheim calls "religious."<sup>17</sup> Likewise, premodern meanings of the secular accentuated the temporal dimension (e.g., the interval between fall and *eschaton* in Christianity)—whereas modern ideas define the secular in spatial terms as an autonomous domain separate from supernatural sanctity in God.

Thus, the modern opposition between two general categories—a supernatural "sacred" and a natural "secular"—is fundamentally different

from the premodern distinctions of the divine and the profane, the temporal and the spiritual, or earthly and heavenly powers. These and other distinctions are hierarchical in the sense that the divine, the spiritual, and the heavenly somehow comprehend or "enfold" the profane, the temporal, and the earthly. Why? Because none of the latter has any existence or meaning except with reference to the former. Crucially, premodern conceptions suggest that the natural only *is* by participating in the supernatural that created it. On the contrary, modern, dualistic conceptions claim that immanent nature can operate independently of its ultimate, transcendent cause.

### 1. Modern Secularism at the Level of Ideas

Modernity is neither synonymous with secularism nor unrelated to it. Secularism neither marks the wholesale destruction of faith nor represents a simple simulation of religion under a different guise. Rather, modernity—at least in the Christian West—is in continuity with some aspects of the late Middle Ages and also constitutes a radical departure from other medieval traditions. Concretely, the concepts and practices instituting "western" modernity reconfigure the sacred as a wholly transcendental source of authority and also as a positivized, pure space that must not be profaned. Thus, the notion of revelation ceases to signify the objective manifestation of transcendent realities (e.g., first principles and final ends) in the immanent world. Henceforth, revelation becomes an object of transcendental belief to which believers must give assent. In short, God is erased from the workings of the natural world and either relegated to an external cause (e.g., a watchmaker) or an internal force (e.g., moral religion or inner religious consciousness).

Likewise, the meaning of religion shifts from signifying a series of beliefs embodied in practices binding together communities of believers within the social body of the Church ("authorizing doctrine" and "authorized practice") toward a fixed set of abstract beliefs to which the immaterial mind/soul gives assent<sup>18</sup>—while the physical body is handed over to the centralized, modern state.<sup>19</sup> As such, the modern redefines the sacred while also inventing and instituting a number of new structures, such as the sovereign state, the disembodied free market, and the disciplining practices of centralized educational, penal, and medical organizations.<sup>20</sup> This shows that modernity is not confined to desecralization but

encompasses a new, secular economy of power and knowledge enforced by new institutions.

One can also contrast (premodern) secularity with (modern) secularism. The principle of secularism is founded on the Judeo-Christian distinction of religious and political authority. Historically, there was a constant tension within Judaism between the prophets and the kings, with the former always calling the latter back to a true righteousness untouched by the corruption of power and avarice. Similarly, the realm of the church was generally demarcated from that of the state. This is evinced by Saint Augustine's (Pauline and Neo-Platonist) juxtaposition of the earthly city and the City of God, Pope Gelasius I's teaching on the two swords, and also Saint John Chrysostom's critique of Christian attempts either to sacralize secular power or to secularize the Church. As such, the shared Catholic and Orthodox principle is to distinguish and relate the religious and political spheres without separating religion from politics or privatizing faith.

On the contrary, the modern age endorsed the partition of church and state, as it was supposed to foster tolerance between rival confessions and to create perpetual peace among the nations. After the violent events of the Protestant Reformation and the "wars of religion," a new constitutional settlement was required. However, from its inception in the sixteenth century to the present day, European secularism has subordinated the religious freedom of individuals and groups to the power of the central state. The Augsburg Peace of 1555 and the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which helped to establish national states and the modern international system, granted monarchs and their vassals a power monopoly at the expense of the supranational papacy and a transnational network of monastic orders and local churches. By codifying the principle "*cuius regio, eius religio*" (in the prince's land, the prince's religion), it was modern secularism that politicized faith and curtailed the freedom of belief.

Here one can go further and suggest that just as modernity emerged earlier than the seventeenth century, so important strands of the Enlightenment constitute a critical reaction against early modern rationalism and empiricism. This is certainly true of Italian, English, and Scottish thinkers such as Vico, Doria, Genovesi, Shaftesbury, Cudworth, and Hume.<sup>21</sup> In different ways, they retrieve an earlier emphasis on

hierarchical mediations and the participatory relation of finite creation in the infinite Creator. At the level of practice, this translates into an accentuation of reciprocity, social sympathy, and gift exchange, which contrasts sharply with the modern social-contract tradition and its focus on self-interest, economic utility, and commercial exchange—"the natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another," as Adam Smith wrote in *The Wealth of Nations*.<sup>22</sup> All of which highlights the plural nature of modernity and its contested development.

## 2. *Modern Secularism at the Level of Practice*

First, it is imperative to acknowledge the difficulty of accounting for the divergence between theoretical shifts and empirical changes. The secularization of philosophy and political theory—which we can trace to the late Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment critique of theistic religion<sup>23</sup>—was not matched by an equivalent secularization of (trans)national culture and society. Except perhaps for postrevolutionary France and some other parts of continental Europe, such as the Low Countries and northwestern Germany, Roman Catholicism and cognate denominations such as Eastern Orthodoxy and Anglicanism as well as other world religions such as Islam continued to exert their transnational sway across the globe throughout the modern age—including the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the Byzantine Commonwealth, and the Ottoman Empire.

For example, popular religious practice and the public influence of faith rose steadily and often quite spectacularly in North America throughout a period of accelerating modernization from about 1800 to 1950.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain featured a moral economy underpinned by the modernizing creed of Methodism common to elite and populace alike.<sup>25</sup> The secularization of British and American culture is far more recent than commonly supposed and clearly linked to certain strands of Protestantism.<sup>26</sup> For these reasons, this secularizing process is by no means linear or irreversible. Nor should one assume that the same processes will occur in other contexts with other religions.

Second, these contrary trends throughout the modern age are not limited to post-Enlightenment western Europe. Long before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 or the victory of Catholicism over Communism in

Poland (1980–89) or the events of 9/11, world faiths such as Christianity and Islam were an integral part of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century politics, both locally and globally. For example, American Protestant theologians and religious figures played a decisive role in creating the League of Nations after 1919 and the United Nations in 1946. European Christian Democrats from Italy, Germany, the Benelux countries, and even France led the way in setting up the project for European integration and enlargement in the 1950s.<sup>27</sup> They were inspired by Christian social teaching: since the groundbreaking encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891) on the Industrial Revolution, the social doctrine of the Catholic Church has viewed the supremacy of the national state and the transnational market over the intermediary space of civic society and civil economy upheld by the Church as contrary to the Christian faith<sup>28</sup>—a position shared by the other episcopally based traditions of Orthodoxy and Anglicanism.<sup>29</sup>

Likewise, Islam was the dominant political and social force in the wider Middle East and beyond until late nineteenth-century colonialism and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1922. This replaced the caliphate with secular republics (e.g., Turkey) and modern nation-states based on false borders imposed across Arabia. Elsewhere, traditional faiths such as Hinduism perverted politics and culture before economic and social modernization changed the dynamic in favor of secularism and modern creeds. This is also true for China, where Christianity was instrumental in the transition from the empire to the republic under Sun Yat-sen—only for the Communist Party to marginalize it alongside Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Even where secularizing modernization was adopted, the radical elites struggled to remake society and the populace in the image of their own secular values—as evinced by cases as different as China, Russia, Turkey, much of Latin America, and most parts of eastern (and even western) Europe.<sup>30</sup>

Contrary to claims about linear secularization, there is thus a spectrum of nineteenth- and twentieth-century religious responses to secular modernity, ranging from resistance by Muslims, Roman Catholics, and the Orthodox (and even some Anglicans) to Jewish acceptance and Protestant support—measured in terms of social integration and degrees of individualization. There is much variation across world religions and within specific traditions such as Sufi Islam, Orthodox Judaism, and Christian evangelicalism (Protestant or Catholic). But fundamental

differences between certain strands in relation to secular modernity are borne out by evidence on religious ideas and practices.<sup>31</sup>

Third, one can suggest that the twentieth century, which saw a clash of secular ideologies with unprecedented levels of violence, is arguably an exception to the enduring presence of religion in politics. One defining mark of Communism, Fascism, and National-Socialism is their shared secular messianism, underwritten by religious language.<sup>32</sup> The twentieth century can perhaps be described as the “first and last truly modern century,” with more extreme forms of secularism than before or thereafter. If so, then the contemporary global resurgence of religion marks the return to a more “normal” presence of religious ideas in (inter)national politics.<sup>33</sup> However, cultural and social secularization proceeds apace, notably the decline of traditional religious beliefs and practices as well as the rise of secular values and lifestyles with the approval and connivance of modernizing creeds (mostly variants of evangelicalism in Christianity, Islam, and other world religions).

Fourth, this growing split between faith traditions that reject or embrace secular modernity is illustrated by divisions among more and less orthodox strands of Christianity. Those traditions most marked by the Protestant Reformation are also more secularizing than other Christian traditions. This serves to qualify the rather simplistic depiction of American religiosity versus European secularism. The latter is a recent phenomenon.<sup>34</sup> And although the United States is far more religious than Europe in terms of personal observance and political discourse, it is also far more secular in terms of equating faith with private therapy and with a directed, unmediated link between the individual and God. This underplays other key aspects of religion, such as sacramentality and the communal, public character of faith. It also explains why in some important sense even observant believers uncritically embrace secular culture—for example, the idea of a “gospel of wealth” that equates the rich with the elect and sanctifies the pursuit of power and pleasure.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, America’s vague “civil religion” is governed by a post-Christian, gnostic spirituality that bears increasingly little resemblance to creedal Christianity.<sup>36</sup> Its liberal polity—based on a total church-state separation since its inception—is structured by specifically American holidays rather than universal Christian festivals. In addition, America’s more strongly privatized public sphere opens up a space for a more explicitly

politicized and moralized creed that feeds on the Manichean moralism taught in mainstream churches in order to fuel a sense of national exceptionalism<sup>37</sup>—rather than religious universalism. All of which helps account for the tendency of US Catholics (and Jews) to become more like Protestants—even though strong Catholic immigration from Central and Latin America might change this in the future.

Fifth, what we are seeing more generally is that traditional faiths such as Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Buddhism, and some strands of Sufi, Shia, and Sunni Islam are intellectually (if not as yet culturally and numerically) revived and that they are leading the way against the modern hegemony of secularism.<sup>38</sup> Thus, the idea that the secularization of thought and practice has not been the predominant modern reality is just as misguided as the idea that religion ever disappeared from the public realm or that it cannot regain political influence. For all those reasons, modernity is a dialectical process oscillating between a dominant secularism (and a variety of denominational subcultures that are positively linked to secularization), on the one hand, and the revival of traditional, nonmodern faiths that oppose and seek to correct the secular orientation of modernization, on the other hand.

Of course, the contemporary resurgence of Islam, Buddhism, and certain episcopally based Christian churches could represent but a short-lived phase prior to enduring secularization—religion in death throes and faith's last gasp. But leaving aside their current intellectual revival, strong demographic dynamics suggest that traditional, orthodox faiths will continue to grow—and not just modernizing creeds (either more liberal or more fundamentalist). That is because sustained population growth in developing countries produces many more religious people than those lost to secularism elsewhere. Thus, the world is growing more religious even as people in economically developed countries and emerging markets are becoming more secular. Believers already outnumber nonbelievers by about five to one—even though believing is of course quite different from belonging (i.e., affiliation and attendance).<sup>39</sup>

More specifically, in the West and East Asia, the ongoing population decline and aging might even be reversed at some point between 2020 and 2070, as the social conservatism shared by many Christians, Muslims, Jews, and others could combine with immigrants and other minorities to produce a demographical revival. This will be based on pronatalism,

endogamy (in-group marriage), and voluntary self-segregation, which conjointly ensure high fertility and high retention rates. The proportion of believers in the total population is bound to increase in the medium and long run. In that process, fundamentalists could gradually squeeze out moderates and ratchet up global “culture wars” with seculars.<sup>40</sup> Since the extremes tend to resemble (and cancel out) each other, the future will largely depend on more traditional faiths that reject the shared modern foundations of both religious fundamentalism and secular extremism. This, alongside other phenomena, is likely to determine the future of religion—as the final section argues.

### III. What Is at Stake

#### 1. *Conflicts and Contests between Modernizing Creeds and*

##### *Traditional Faiths*

American evangelicalism and its worldwide offspring encapsulate the complex, paradoxical nature of religions embracing global modernity.<sup>41</sup> First, evangelicalism and Pentecostalism are national, global, and local all at once. Their origin is clearly the specific cultures of the Protestant Atlantic North, but Pentecostalist movements have used global society created in the American Protestant image (with elements from the British and Spanish imperial legacy) to reach new territories, where they become rapidly enculturated and intermixed with indigenous subcultures centered on spirit-filled religiosity.

This is also reflected in the Neo-Buddhist Soka Gakkai and a new generation of Muslim televangelists, such as Amr Khaled, speaking to a globalized *ummah*. The processes of globalization facilitate this spread while also acting as a catalyst for ethnonreligious resistance and a violent backlash against foreign, global forces. Here the complex dynamics between majority and minority cultures come to the fore, with charismatic strands of different world religions often appealing to subcultures that resist the domination of local majorities by linking themselves to the transnational identity of evangelical movements.

In turn, this has important implications for individualization and communal fragmentation. The evangelical emphasis on inwardness, individual choice, and direct, unmediated access to God—based on conversion

by a personal transference of emotional attachment—allows believers to escape local structures such as extended kin or religious communities and the sacramental mediation of divine grace administered by the priesthood. Depending on culture and other factors, evangelical movements can mitigate or exacerbate the communal fragmentation caused partly by the individualizing effects of their creed. Hence, social atomism, which is a problem associated with modernization, affects evangelical and secular groups much more than the adherents of traditional, orthodox faiths.

Second, evangelical and Pentecostal movements across different faith traditions exhibit a series of striking paradoxical tensions such as central authority and personal participation, formal patriarchy and informal matriarchy, work discipline and crass consumerism, and group solidarity and individual wealth. The latter is linked to the idea of a gospel of the immaterial spirit that consecrates the pursuit of material wealth. As such, evangelicalism and Pentecostalism are a harbinger of global modernity, though they nonetheless reject a number of key modern phenomena, including the total privatization of religious practice, the absolute individualization of belief, and the complete separation of spiritual inwardness from an outward orientation to the material world. Evangelical and Pentecostal movements can be termed postmodern in that their embrace of secular modernity is highly selective.

Linked to this is the prospect of rapid religious conversion coupled with growing secularization. China is a case in point. Its Protestant population has grown from less than 1 million in 1949 to something between 100 and 150 million today.<sup>42</sup> On current trends, it could reach up to 250 million by 2050—making China the (second) most populous Christian country in the world and providing (qualified) support for the expansion of the sort of secularizing capitalism that is currently promoted by the Chinese Communist Party to undermine the social relations holding together religious communities in Tibet and the Muslim-dominated northwestern province of Xinjiang. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese Catholics and Muslims has risen less spectacularly but no less steadily, with levels of about 20 million and 22 million, respectively, and projections of strong growth in the future—such that China might be the largest Christian and possibly also the largest Muslim country by 2100. Thus, the Middle Kingdom could be a prime theater for conflicts and contests between modernizing creeds and traditional faiths, with Pentecostals

broadly endorsing the socioeconomic modernization generally opposed by Muslims and Catholics.

Moreover, Pentecostalism rejects the Weberian and Calvinist routes to modernity by eschewing rationalization, bureaucratization, and iconoclast<sup>43</sup> in favor of social and cultural practices (including audiovisual and electronic media)—encompassing “story and song, gesture and empowerment, image and embodiment, enthusiastic release and personal discipline.”<sup>44</sup> This confirms the point made repeatedly throughout this chapter that modernity is not monolithic but contested by different religious traditions.

Third, more traditional faiths, such as Roman Catholicism and Islam, have in different ways either resisted or adapted to the advance of global evangelicalism and its diverse manifestations. This has taken various forms: either an attempt to reverse the earlier centralized control of local churches, which opened up a space occupied by Pentecostals, or else the creation of Christian (or Muslim) charismatic movements such as the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, wherein there is a shift of emphasis from sacramental participation and episcopal authority to a kind of reduced mediation and authority, both of which are concentrated in charismatic leadership—a description that partly applies to influential European movements and lay fraternities such as *Comunione e Liberazione*. These and other responses to evangelicalism operate both inside and outside the mainstream churches and seek to mobilize against aggressive secularism (including by giving a greater role to the laity), while also borrowing heavily from the secular ideas of evangelical modernity.

The contest of ideas between modernizing creeds and traditional faiths is already changing public debates on political economy and science, as discussed in the next section.

## 2. *After Liberalism: Religion and Political Economy*

Twenty years after the collapse of state communism, the crisis of free-market capitalism that has plunged much of the world into the worst economic turmoil since the Great Depression of 1929–32 offers a unique opportunity to chart an alternative path. Broadly speaking, the modern age marks the progressive subordination of civil society institutions, actors, and practices to the administrative and symbolic order of the national state and the transnational market. In the complex and nonlinear



process of modernization, civil society came to be seen either as an extension of the state or as being synonymous with the market. Concomitantly, social relations were redefined either as state-controlled links based on sovereign power and individual rights or as economic-contractual ties based on commercial exchange. Often this occurred with the approval and connivance of actual religions that supported absolutist (monarchical) and feudal arrangements on the basis of unequal landholding and the exploitation of wage laborers.

However, there is a religious alternative that is once more coming to the fore. Historically, the Judeo-Christian distinction of religious from political authority created a "free space" between the rulers and those who are ruled. Together with other religious communities and civic bodies, the Church often defended civil society from both political coercion and economic commodification. This gave rise to the idea that the "intermediary institutions" of civil society—such as professional associations, manufacturing and trading guilds, cooperatives, trade unions, voluntary organizations, universities, educational establishments, communal welfare, and religious communities—are more primary than either the national bureaucratic-authoritarian state or the transnational "anarchic" market. Instead of operating on the basis of either state-administered rights or economic-contractual relations, these structures are governed by social bonds of reciprocal trust and mutual assistance. Such bonds of reciprocity and mutuality are not confined to the third, "voluntary" sector but can extend to the public and private sectors, helping to "reembed" both the state and the market into the complex web of social relations. Now that the growing convergence of state and market has failed so conspicuously, the crisis of 2007–9 has the potential to eschew the bipolar order of the communist east and the capitalist west in favor of a genuine "third way" beyond centralized bureaucratic statism and unbridled free-market capitalism.

Moreover, the main world religions view the dominant models of democracy and capitalism as secular. Broadly speaking, their argument is that democratic and capitalist systems subordinate the sanctity of life and land to abstract, disembodied standards such as representation, formal rights, or commercial exchange. The religious critique goes further than the Weberian thesis about rationalization, bureaucratization, and disenchantment. Arguably, the modern state and the "free market" redefine

the sacred by gradually secularizing the public realm and sacralizing the politicoeconomic sphere. This double process tends to sideline religious conceptions of hierarchical virtues and truths in favor of abstract values and fetishized commodities. For this reason (and building on the work of Walter Benjamin), liberal democracy and modern free-market capitalism can be termed "quasi-religions."<sup>45</sup>

In response, religious leaders combine a critique of modernity with alternative ideas aimed at transcending the false divide between the purely secular and the exclusively religious. In our "postsecular" era, religious and other bodies should be able to express themselves directly in their own terms within the public square.<sup>46</sup> However, for most liberals, the norms to regulate this debate must ultimately remain secular and liberal (procedural and majoritarian). For religious figures, by contrast, there must be a plural search for a shared common good, which is not merely pregiven in natural law and abstract reason—for that is part of modern rationalism rejected by more traditional faiths.

In the case of Catholicism, a reinvention of constitutional corporatism in a more pluralist guise against modern liberalism is linked to an insistence on the dignity and autonomy of persons, communities, and associations. By upholding real relations, these intermediary institutions provide an indispensable mediation between the modern, nominalist poles of the individual and the collective. Equally, such a nonsecular political economy is linked to the argument that education as the transmission and exploration of truth is as fundamental a dimension of politics as is the will of a democratic majority or the authority of the executive. Secularists, by contrast, defend variants of liberalism that maintain a secular separation of state, market, and civil society.<sup>47</sup>

The modern political Right has always focused on the absolute power of "the one" and the prerogative to decide on the state of exception (Carl Schmitt) while the modern Left has insisted on an equally absolute right of "the many" to give and withdraw legitimacy (Michel Foucault).<sup>48</sup> Both uproot state and market from the social relations that (should) embed them. Therefore, the Left and the Right ignore the primacy of real, embodied relations and also the mediating role of "the few" concerned with truth and virtue—not some privileged socioeconomic class but rather a meritocratic hierarchy committed to an ethos of excellence across all spheres of human activity.

A political economy focused on the latter would be at once more mediated and holistic, defining the secular realm as concerned with things in time and with necessary coercion. So defined, the secular is linked to the sacred through an outlook toward transcendent norms. Only such norms can supply ultimate standards beyond the will either of "the one" or of "the many." Different religious leaders are asking nothing less than whether the politics of "right" and "left" remain caught within shared secular, liberal axioms. These axioms are *à la* those of theocratic fundamentalisms since they equally deal in a politics of the indifferent will, inherited (as is also the case in the end for liberalism) from the late medieval and early modern focus on volition (rather than the intellect).<sup>49</sup> There is a parallel with the contemporary centrality of individual will, self-determination, and personal taste—a predicament that Joseph Ratzinger, shortly before his election as Pope Benedict XVI, described as "dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and desires."<sup>50</sup>

A nonsecular political economy is a quest for a way that cannot be charted on our current conceptual map. Instead of formal representation and commercial exchange, the emphasis shifts toward notions of real relationality, the common good, and principles that can determine appropriate "mixtures" of government as between a whole variety of instances: "the one," "the few," and "the many"; the center and localities; political government and prepolitical society; international community and nations; education in time and government in space; absolute right and free decision; economic freedom and just distribution—and finally, secular and religious authorities.

The task for religions is not to embrace particular modes of political or economic governance but rather to promote models that protect the sacredness of life and uphold hierarchically ordered virtues. Notions of goodness and justice trump individual freedom, negative liberty, and the pursuit of happiness reduced to utility, power, or pleasure. Thus, different faiths dispute the secular claim to universal validity and seek to change the terms on which public debates about political and economic choices are conducted.

### 3. Science, Atheism, and Religion

Today's militant atheists brand religious faith as repressive, irrational, and fundamentalist. Although these cultured despisers of religion are once again making strident appeals to secular values and unmediated reason, they do not realize that the religious absolutism they denounce is but a variant of their own fundamentalism returned in a different guise.<sup>51</sup> For true faith is never separate from proper reason, as all world religions hold. In Pope Benedict's controversial 2006 Regensburg address, he defends the "grandeur of reason" against the fanatical faith of religious fundamentalists and the crude rationalism of secular extremists. Extending Pope John Paul II's 1998 encyclical *Fides et Ratio*, Benedict argues that faith and reason require each other and are mutually augmenting. Theologically, just as faith habituates reason to see transcendence at the heart of immanence and thus broadens the scope of rationality, so reason binds faith to cognition and thereby helps believers explore the intelligible dimension of revelation—faith seeking understanding (St. Anselm's Augustinian dictum *fides quaerens intellectum*). Politically, without each other's import, both principles can be distorted and instrumentalized at the service of egoism or absolute power. Just as rationality acts as a controlling organ that binds belief to knowledge, so faith can save reason from being manipulated by ideology or applied in a partial way that ignores the complexity of the real world. Without each other's corrective role, distortions and pathologies arise in both religion and secularism—either religious extremism that uses faith as a vehicle of hatred or the secular, totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century that legitimated genocide and total warfare.

Moreover, faith and reason are intimately intertwined in beneficial ways. Faith can reinforce trust in the human capacity for reasoning and understanding. Secular rationality can help religious belief make sense of its claims and give coherence to its intuitions. Crucially, reason and faith can assist each other's search for objective principles and norms governing both personal and political action. What binds rationality to belief is the shared commitment to universal standards of truth, even if these are never fully known and always deeply contested. As such, the relatedness of reason and faith is not merely a concern for religion but in fact lies at the heart of politics, the economy, and society.

By contrast, contemporary atheists defend an account of reason that is conceptually impoverished. Richard Dawkins's philosophically illiterate

polemic *The God Delusion* declares that religion is irrational without ever explaining the source of rationality. Sam Harris's diatribe *The End of Faith* has to falsify history by claiming that Hitler and Stalin were religious to make its case for the malign influence of faith. The attacks on religion are becoming ever more shrill and desperate, a clear sign of atheist anxiety about the status of their first principles and explanatory frameworks.

This atheist apprehension is well founded, as the latest developments in biology, physics, philosophy, and ethics open the door to a revived theology and a renewed import of religion in debates on the universe and human nature. Hitherto, it had been assumed by most mainstream scientists that forms of life are the product of essentially natural, random processes—such that if we ran evolution again, life would look very different.<sup>52</sup> However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that evolution shows biological convergence and is not random: if it ran again, the world would look much as it does.<sup>53</sup> Here one can go beyond old divides (creation versus atheism; intelligent design versus natural evolution) and argue that recent research sheds new light on the teleology (or finality) of life. Natural selection is no longer thought to be the main driver of biological change. Rather, life displays a certain kind of inherency, such that the beings that come about are *also* a product of their own, intended integrity—intimating the possibility of being linked to transcendent principles and finalities.

All of which means that there is no necessary conflict between evolution and religion. In fact, different religious traditions provide a defense of evolution against the atheism of certain Darwinists and the fundamentalism of creationists.<sup>54</sup> Arguably, evolution is no more purely naturalistic than God is totally deterministic—both can be shown to be compatible in the sense that the process of evolution does not conclusively refute the idea of an absolute beginning and a final end in a creative source. Just as creationists cannot reject scientific evidence on natural evolution, so scientists such as Dawkins cannot pretend that evolution justifies atheism.

Similarly, in cosmology and physics, the idea that the world was produced by chance has long been dismissed. The extreme precision of the gravitational constant that allows a universe such as ours to exist requires an explanation in terms of first principles and final ends. But rather than exploring the world as an intended creation, secular physics posits infinite numbers of multiverses existing alongside our own. The

sheer uniqueness of our universe is qualified by the existence of all other possible universes. This supposition sounds no more reasonable than the religious idea of creation *ex nihilo*.

Moreover, positing this secular-scientific paradigm leads to the *Matrix* hypothesis that we are only a virtual simulation run by other universes more powerful and real. So religion finds itself in the position of defending a certain account of reality against those who suggest that nature and humanity are either purely material or almost entirely virtual—or once again somehow both. Of course, there will also be gaps between theistic and naturalistic accounts of the world. But equally there are eminent scientists such as Simon Conway Morris and others who see no contradiction between religious conceptions of a Creator God and scientific accounts of evolution deriving from Darwin. This changes the terms of debate on science and religion and also casts doubt on secular claims to reality and universal validity.

Different world faiths, in particular Christianity and Islam, can draw on the historical links between theology and science to correct purely secular interpretations of evolution and to argue for a broader account of reason beyond the boundaries of immanent finitude. Ultimately, this challenges the modern claim that nature is divorced from the supernatural—a foundational assumption that underlies the (de)secularization thesis and misinforms much of the public understanding of religion.

### Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the secularization and desecularization theses are self-reflexive, secular theories that are inescapably wedded to the dominant secular logic of modernity. Neither can conceptualize the religious roots of the modern or the nature of the “postmodern” religious revival. By reducing religions to an ahistorical essence, both ignore the differences between faiths and the specificities of each tradition—different conceptions of the nature of God, relations between the divine and the human, or links between religious virtues and social practices.

Christianity and Islam are a case in point. Christian accounts of God stress the relations between the three divine persons of the Holy Trinity. Therefore, the belief that we are all made in the image and



likeness of a personal, "relational" Creator God translates into an emphasis on the strong bonds of mutual help and reciprocal giving within civil society. By contrast, the Muslim God is disembodied and absolutely one. This accentuation of unity is reflected in a priority on absolute unitary authority (compared with intermediary institutions) and a premium on territorial conquest or control, while also imposing strong norms on economic exchange (including bans on speculation and similar practices).

For this reason also, neither secularization nor desecularization can explain how or why certain religions embrace the sort of modern secularism rejected by others. Since modernity is itself the product of theological shifts and changes within religious traditions, it is unsurprising that some faiths are integral to modernization, such as certain strands of Calvinism, Puritanism, and Pentecostalism. By contrast, more traditional, orthodox faiths, such as Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and certain Muslim traditions such as Sufi Islam, resist modernization and seek to transform the secular outlook of global modernity.

Thus, the master narratives about the universal validity of secular values that dominated the modern age are breaking down. We have already entered a phase of history that is not properly captured by labels such as "postmodern" or "postsecular." The false universalism of secular principles is not merely being contested, as was the case throughout the modern period. Nowadays religious ideas and practices are changing the terms of public debate and putting forward concrete alternatives in virtually all spheres of human activity. Notions of reciprocity, mutuality, and relationality are coming to the fore in public discussions on ethics, political economy, and science. We are witnessing a real intellectual return to religion that cannot be reduced to the spread of fanaticism. "Programmatic secularism" that relegates faith to the private sphere or co-opts it as part of secularizing modernization reinforces rather than overcomes both religious fundamentalism and militant atheism.

The false opposition between secularization and desecularization opens the way for an alternative account that rejects their shared modern logic and analyzes religion on terms beyond the false divide between a purely secular and an exclusively religious perspective. There is in fact a "middle" position: faith can lead to a strong notion of the common good and a belief that human behavior, when disciplined and directed, can start to act more charitably. There can also be secular intimations of this:

the more faith-inspired practices are successful even in narrow secular terms (e.g., more economic security, more equality, more sustainability), the easier it will be for nonreligious institutions to adopt elements of such an overarching ethical framework without, however, fully embracing its religious basis.

The paradox of faith is this: Not only is secularism a religious invention, linked as it is to the Judeo-Christian distinction between secular and religious powers and authorities. After the failure of modern secularism, it is also clear that religions are indispensable in upholding "secular" values of freedom and happiness by relating them to transcendent, final standards of truth and goodness in God.

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  9. The modern shift from objective revelation to subjective belief redefines religion as "a set of propositions to which believers gave assent, and which could therefore be judged and compared between different religions and as against natural science." Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*

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10. Andrew Wernick, *Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity: The Post-theistic Program of French Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Positivism shapes the dominant contemporary conceptions of religion, including the atheism of Russell and Dawkins but also the religious fundamentalism of Al Qaeda's intellectual fathers. See Aziz Al-Azmei, *Islam and Modernities* (London: Verso, 1993); and John Gray, *Al Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern* (London: Faber and Faber, 2003).

11. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Taylor, A Secular Age*. Cf. Gillespie, *Theological Origins of Modernity*.

12. André de Muralt, "Kant, le dernier occanien: Une nouvelle définition de la philosophie moderne," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 80 (1975): 32–53; André de Muralt, *L'unité de la philosophie politique: De Scot, Occam et Suarez au libéralisme contemporain* (Paris: Vrin, 2002); and Pierre Manent, *Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme: Dix leçons* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1987).

13. Adrian Pabst, "Modern Sovereignty in Question: Theology, Democracy and Capitalism," *Modern Theology* 26 (2010): 570–602.

14. John Bossy, "The Mass as a Social Institution," *Past and Present* 100 (1983): 29–61; and John Bossy, *Christianity in the West, 1400–1700* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

15. José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and José Casanova, "Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective," *Hedgehog Review* 8 (2006): 7–22.

16. On the contrary, Rémi Brague shows that notions such as "Abrahamic faiths" or "monotheism" overlook fundamental differences between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. See Rémi Brague, *Du Dieu des chrétiens: Et d'un ou deux autres* (Paris: Flammarion, 2008).

17. Émile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. J. S. Swain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1915), 37.

18. Asad, *Genealogies of Religions*; and Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

19. Cf. William T. Cavanaugh, "A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State," *Modern Theology* 11 (1995): 397–420; and William T. Cavanaugh, "Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State Is Not the Keeper of the Common Good," *Modern Theology* 20 (2004): 243–74.

20. Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); and Michel Foucault, *Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978–1979* (Paris: Seuil, 2004). Cf. Pabst, "Modern Sovereignty in Question."

21. Cf. John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Cf. Adrian Pabst, *Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011).

22. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, intro. D. D. Raphael (London: Random, 1991), Book I, chapter ii, 1.

23. See Janet Coleman, "Ockham's Right Reason and the Genesis of the Political as Absolutist," *History of Political Thought* 20 (1999): 35–64; C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962); John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (London: Routledge, 1999); Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Quentin Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

24. Jon Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Michael Young, *Bearing Witness against Sin: The Evangelical Birth of the American Social Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

25. E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 18th Century," *Past and Present* 50 (1971): 76–136; and E. P. Thompson, *Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture* (London: Merlin, 1991). Cf. David Hempton, *The Religion of the People: Methodism and Popular Religion, c. 1750–1900* (London: Routledge,

1996); and David Hempton, *Methodism: Empire of the Spirit* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).

26. The Protestant powers of England, Holland, and the United States rejected the overarching ecclesial and social unity of their Catholic rivals, in terms of national self-conception and as a principle of social organization. This led to successive waves of secular modernization of religion and later culture (c. 1590s–1660s; c. 1790s–1850s; after 1900), culminating in Pentecostal awakenings, "themselves harbingers of global society," and "their spread corresponded to the movement of lay people around the globe, to South Africa, Norway, Sicily, Korea or the Southern Cone of Latin America." Martin, *On Secularization*, 27. Cf. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *God Is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith Is Changing the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 213–42.

27. Wolfram Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

28. Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (Dublin: Veritas, 2009). Cf. Adrian Pabst, ed., *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Caritas in Veritate and the Future of Political Economy* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011).

29. The episcopal churches differ on important issues, such as church-state relations, but are united in their opposition to modern secularism, as evinced by their agreement on moral and social teaching. See, for instance, the forewords by the Metropolitan Kirill (now Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church) to the book on the common good by Cardinal Bertone and to the Russian translation of Pope Benedict's *Introduction to Christianity*. Tarcisio Bertone, *The Ethics of the Common Good in Catholic Social Doctrine* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008).

30. See Martin, *On Secularization*, 47–74, for a survey of supporting evidence. See Paul Froese, *The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), on the endurance of religious faith in the Soviet Union despite violent campaigns of atheism and persecution.

31. In addition to Berger, *Desecularization of the World*, see Steve Bruce, ed., *Religion and Politics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); and Martin, *On Secularization*; see Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*, for a global overview of contemporary patterns of secularization and religious resurgence.

32. For example, see Geoffrey Hosking, *Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 3–35, for evidence of the secular messianism of Soviet Communism.

33. Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (London: Palgrave, 2003); and Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Palgrave, 2005).

34. Despite violent clashes between state and church in France up to separation in 1905, the population remained predominantly Catholic until the late 1950s, when “French Christendom” (*christienté*) began to disappear from the regions and countryside, as depicted in the writings of George Bernanos. In Britain, the “de-christianization” of the public sphere and social life did not take off until the late 1960s. Cf. Callum Brown, *The Death of Christian Britain* (London: Routledge, 2001); and Callum Brown, *Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2006). Scandinavia and the Mediterranean countries only became markedly more secular from the mid-1970s onward. After decades of atheist rule, central/eastern Europe and Eurasia are characterized by profound contrasts between a strong and sustained religious revival in countries such as Poland and Russia and a growing tendency toward agnosticism and atheism in countries such as the Czech Republic. See Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*; Martin, *On Secularization*, 47–90; and Peter L. Berger, Grace Davie, and Effe Fokas, eds., *Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008), 23–122.

35. Cf. William E. Connolly, *Capitalism and Christianity, American Style* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 17–68.

36. Will Herbert, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology*, rev. ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1960); Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Harold Bloom, *The American Religion* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); and Nancy Ammerman, *Congregation and Community* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997).

37. Cf. Mark A. Noll, *America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 227–367.

38. On Catholicism: George Weigel, “Roman Catholicism in the Age of John Paul II,” in Berger, *Desecularization of the World*, 19–35; and Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). On Islam: Kepel, *Revenge of God*; Fazlur Rahman, *Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism*, ed. Ebrahim Moosa (Oxford: OneWorld, 2000); and Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004). On Buddhism: Charles S. Prebish and Martin Baumann, eds., *Westward Dharma: Buddhism beyond Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

39. Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Norris and Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular*; and Eric Kaufmann, “Breeding for God,” *Prospect* 128 (November 2006), <http://www.sneps.net/RD/uploads/06prospect-Kaufmann.pdf>. In recent research, Grace Davie has qualified the distinction between believing and belonging by theorizing the idea of “vicarious religion.” See Grace Davie, “Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge,” in *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religion Lives*, ed. Nancy Ammerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21–36; and Grace Davie, “Vicarious Religion: A Response,” *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 2 (2010): 261–67.

40. Christopher Caldwell, *Reflection on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West* (London: Allen Lane, 2009); and Eric Kaufmann, *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Profile Books, 2010).

41. David Martin, *The World Their Parish: Pentecostalism as Cultural Revolution and Global Option* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); and Martin, *On Secularization*, 26–43, 141–54.

42. Jenkins, *The Next Christendom*; David Aikman, *Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity Is Changing the Global Balance of Power* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003).

43. James Noyes, *The Politics of Iconoclasm: Religion, Violence and the Culture of Image-Breaking in Christianity and Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012).

44. Martin, *On Secularization*, 142.

45. Walter Benjamin, “Capitalism as Religion,” in *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings—Volume 1 (1913–1926)*, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 288–91.

46. For example, Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, *Dialektik der Säkularisierung: Über Vernunft und Religion* (Freiburg: Herder, 2004), translated by Brian McNeil as *The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2007).

47. Jürgen Habermas, *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: Philosophische Aufsätze* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), translated by Ciaran Cronin as *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008).

48. For Schmitt's account of sovereign power, see Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität* (Munich/Leipzig: Duncker und Humboldt, 1922); Foucault, *Naissance de la biopolitique*.

49. De Muralt, "Kant, le dernier occamien"; and de Muralt, *L'Unité de la philosophie politique*.

50. Joseph Ratzinger, "Homily during the Mass *pro eligendo romano pontifice*," Vatican, April 18, 2005, [http://www.vatican.va/gp11/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice\\_20050418\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/gp11/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_20050418_en.html).

51. For compelling critiques of the new militant atheism, see Terry Eagleton, *Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); and David Bentley Hart, *Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

52. Stephen Jay Gould, *Ever since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History*, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1991); Stephen Jay Gould, *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Stephen Jay Gould, *Punctuated Equilibrium* (London: Belknap, 2007).

53. Simon Conway Morris, *The Crucible of Creation: The Burgess Shale and the Rise of Animals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Simon Conway Morris, *Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe*, new ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Simon Conway Morris, ed., *The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal?* (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2008).

54. Nihal Guessoum, *Reconciler l'islam et la science moderne: L'esprit d'Averroès* (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 2009), translated by Alessia Weil as *Islam's Quantum Question: Reconciling Muslim Tradition and*

*Modern Science* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); and Comor Cunningham, *Darwin's Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists Both Get It Wrong* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010).

#### Notes to Chapter 8

1. Even in a country such as India, a growing number of Internet users are on social-networking sites. Comscore, "Facebook Captures Top Spot among Social Networking Sites in India," August 25, 2010, [http://www.comscore.com/Press\\_Events/Press\\_Releases/2010/8/Facebook\\_Captures\\_Top\\_Spot\\_among\\_Social\\_Networking\\_Sites\\_in\\_India](http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/8/Facebook_Captures_Top_Spot_among_Social_Networking_Sites_in_India).

2. Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

3. Elizabeth Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 470.

4. For a critique of Eisenstein's book, see Adrian Johns, *The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

5. Siegfried Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays*, trans. and ed. Thomas Y. Levin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

6. Yochai Benkler, *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).

7. Johns, *Nature of the Book*.

8. D. N. Rodowick, *The Virtual Life of Film* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

9. *Ibid.*, 93.

10. *Ibid.*, 94.

11. For the simplest of technical introductions to the differences between analog and digital media, see Marshall Brain, "How Analog and Digital Recording Works," *HowStuffWorks*, <http://communication.howstuffworks.com/analog-digital.htm>.

12. Lev Manovich summarizes this process as the variability of the digital: "Old media involved a human creator who manually assembled textual, visual and/or audio elements into a particular composition or a sequence. This sequence was stored in some material, its order determined