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# DO MAYORAL ELECTIONS WORK? EVIDENCE FROM LONDON*

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## Abstract

The introduction of directly elected mayors potentially represents a major reform of the operation of local government in Britain. Drawing upon survey data collected at the time of the first two London mayoral elections, this article considers whether such elections necessarily deliver the advantages claimed for them by their advocates. It addresses three questions: (i) What was the basis of public support for the new institutions, (ii) Who participated in the London elections, and why; and (iii) What accounts for voting behaviour in the London elections? In particular we examine how far the election of a single person executive helps provide people with a clear choice, encourages citizens to vote on the qualities of individual candidates rather than on their party affiliation, and motivates people to vote on distinctively local issues as opposed to national ones. Our results suggest that while mayoral elections deliver some of the advantages claimed for them, they may be less successful on others. The extent to which directly elected mayors enhance the local electoral process is thus doubtful.

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One of the most noteworthy features of the current Labour Government has been its programme of constitutional reform. Few core political institutions have gone untouched since 1997: the government of Scotland and Wales, the judiciary, the second chamber, electoral systems and the law relating to political parties have all been reformed. Local government in England, too, has undergone change. In particular, the long established corporate model of decision making has been supplanted by a more explicit separation of powers, comprising distinct 'executive' and 'overview' functions. The most radical form of this separation is the directly elected mayor model, in which executive authority is invested in a single figure, selected by local voters, while councillors take responsibility for scrutinising and checking the mayor's work. This model is regarded by its supporters as the most effective means of overcoming some of the shortcomings of the previous, committee based, system. In particular, mayors are believed to provide stronger political leadership for their localities, to improve the accountability of decision making, to reduce the degree of partisan domination of council business, and to increase levels of popular engagement (Blair, 1998; Commission for Local Democracy, 1995; Hodge, Leach and Stoker, 1997; Stoker, 1996).

In spite of these perceived benefits, elected mayors have so far been introduced in just thirteen places including London, representing just 3 per cent of all local authorities in England (Stoker, 2004, p. 127). On no less than 22 occasions, a proposal to create a directly elected mayor has been rejected by local voters in a referendum. This record suggests that the idea of a directly elected mayor model has yet to achieve much popular appeal. Since 2002, only five mayoral referendums have been held (including one in Wales), in just one of which local voters supported the proposal. More recently, however, the mayoral model has once again found favour within UK central government. A White Paper in 2006 argued that there needed to be greater concentration of executive power in local government, with directly elected mayors being one way of achieving this. The requirement to hold a local referendum before introducing such a change is, however, to be dispensed with (Dept. for Communities and Local Government, 2006).

It is thus timely to examine whether the introduction of directly elected mayors yields the kind of benefits envisaged by their supporters. There are several existing studies that have evaluated the impact of directly elected mayors, focusing on such features as decision making processes, relations within the local council, and links with local stakeholders (Copus, 2004; Leach and Wilson, 2004; Lowndes and Leach, 2004; Randle, 2004; Stoker, 2004). In this paper, we consider what is arguably the key aspect of the directly elected mayoral model: the impact on the relationship between local government and local citizens. We do so by reference to the most significant example, London, where a directly elected mayor was introduced in 2000 alongside an elected assembly. We look in particular at the popularity of the new institutional arrangements in the capital, the determinants of turnout in its mayoral elections, and what influenced the voting choice of those who participated in the mayoral contests.

The introduction of the mayor and assembly in London is, however, unique in one respect. Rather than representing a change to an existing local government institution, the new institutions provided the capital with a city-wide tier of government for the first time since the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1986. In this, the creation of the mayor and assembly is more akin to the establishment of new devolved institutions in

Scotland and Wales. The Greater London Authority (henceforth GLA), comprising the elected mayor and assembly, represents a hybrid arrangement, in part a 'super' tier of local government, in part a regional tier of decision making (Bogdanor, 2001, pp. 274-5; Pimlott and Rao, 2002; Travers, 2004, pp. 8-9). Our analysis will therefore on occasion also be informed by insights from the experience of the introduction of devolution in Scotland and Wales.

## Research questions

We address three key questions about London's directly elected mayor. First, what was the level and basis of popular support for the new institutional arrangements? Did Londoners favour both the mayor and assembly, or was one institution more popular than the other? How far did people respond to concerns that the London mayor would wield too much power, subject only to weak checks and balances? And how far was support for the new institutions evenly spread across the population, or was it was concentrated among particular groups? Are the new institutions, in fact, a source of social and political division?

The second question we ask focuses on the level of abstention in the London mayoral elections. The proponents of the mayoral model claimed that a directly elected local executive figure would, in the words of the London White Paper, 'engender enthusiasm' (Dept. of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998). By giving voters a choice between named individual candidates, rather than between political parties whose local leaders are usually largely unknown, local issues and politics would be made more interesting and exciting. Personality politics would bring 'an element of fun, excitement and spirit … to local politics' (Stoker, 1996, p. 12), all of which would help bring voters to the ballot box. In practice, however, only 34 per cent of Londoners voted in their first mayoral election in 2000, and just 37 per cent in the second (which was held in June 2004 on the same day as European Parliament elections), little different from the 33 per cent who voted in the 2002 London borough elections, and below the 38 per cent who voted in the 2006 borough elections. We thus attempt to unravel why, contrary to the expectations of the mayoral advocates, the London mayoral elections failed to attract many more people to the polls than already participate in other local elections.

Our third and final question is what influences the electoral choices of those who do vote. Here we address two interrelated issues. First, do voters' choices primarily reflect evaluations of individual mayoral candidates, or of the parties for which the candidates are standing? Because mayoral elections are a choice between individual candidates, it is argued that they loosen the parties' hold on citizens' electoral calculations. For example, Stoker (1996, p. 14) argues that elected mayors '… imply a down-grading of party politics and a challenge to the process of "politicisation" in local politics'. Second, it is suggested that elections based on individuals are more likely than those dominated by national political parties to focus voters' attention on local issues. At the same time, they also make it easier for voters to identify who is responsible for policy decisions, and thus whom to hold to account (Hodge, Leach and Stoker, 1997; Stoker, 2004, pp. 136-9). Together, these attributes help ensure that mayoral elections are 'first order' affairs, where citizens vote on the basis of local issues. By contrast, many local elections have been labelled 'second order' events, where voting is motivated as much by national

considerations as by local ones (Miller, 1988; but see Rallings and Thrasher, 1997; Heath et al, 1999). We thus examine how far voting behaviour in London mayoral elections reflects the characteristics and appeal of individual candidates rather than of parties, and how far voting choices reflect the key local issues facing the electorate in London.

## Data

Our evidence comes primarily from a survey of the London population conducted immediately after the first London election in 2000. The *London Mayoral Election Survey* interviewed a random sample of 1,548 London residents aged 18 and over by telephone between early May and early July 2000.[1] The sample was obtained through random digit dialling, and yielded an estimated response rate of 36 per cent.[2] The data have been weighted to reflect the lower probability of individuals living in large households being selected for interview.[3] In order to minimise the burden on respondents and thus maximise the response rate, the length of the survey was reduced by splitting the sample into two. While most of the survey questions were administered to the whole sample, some were only asked of (different) random halves of the sample. Thus the number of respondents on which our analyses are based varies according to whether the question was asked of the whole sample or only one half. The base for the full sample is 1,548, while those for the half samples are 781 and 767. While methodologically necessary, the split sample means that we cannot analyse responses to questions asked of one half sample by those asked of the other.

In addition we also draw on a second survey of public attitudes among Londoners conducted immediately after the second London election in 2004. The *Greater London Assembly Election Study* interviewed a quota sample of 1,474 people in London aged 18 and over between 11th-14th June 2004.[4] Quotas were set on the age, sex, ethnicity, social class and working status of the respondent. The data were weighted to reflect the known demographic profile of the population.[5]

Unfortunately only a few of the questions asked on the 2000 survey were repeated on the 2004 survey. This makes it impossible to address with the 2004 data most of the research questions addressed in this article. However, the 2004 survey did include questions that enable us to analyse the relative impact of party and candidate evaluations on electoral choice in the second mayoral election. These data are invaluable. The first mayoral election in 2000 was dominated, and eventually won, by an independent candidate, Ken

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[1] The *London Mayoral Election Survey 2000* was funded by the Leverhulme Trust, under its 'Nations and Regions' programme, based at Edinburgh University and University College London. Data are deposited at the UK Data Archive at Essex, study number 4443. For technical details of the survey, see Thomson, Nicholaas and Bromley, 2001.

[2] The response rate is calculated as the proportion of eligible telephone numbers (ie. those relating to private individuals, not businesses) generating a response to the survey. The response rate can only be estimated since it is not always possible to ascertain whether a phone number is a private telephone number or not. The sampling for the survey is discussed in more detail in Thomson, Nicholaas and Bromley, 2001.

[3] Details of the weighting scheme can be found in Thomson, Nicholaas and Bromley, 2001.

[4] The *Greater London Assembly Election Study 2004* was funded by the ESRC, under its 'Devolution and Constitutional Change' programme. Data are deposited at the UK Data Archive at Essex, study number 5277.

[5] Details of the 2004 survey are available in Margetts, 2006. As quota samples do not have a sampling frame it is impossible to cite a response rate for this survey.

Livingstone. However, the relative importance of party and candidate evaluations can only properly be gauged in a contest in which all the main candidates stand on a party affiliation. Fortunately, the second election in 2004, at which Ken Livingstone stood as the Labour candidate, provided just such conditions.

## Attitudes towards the new institutions

We begin by examining the basis of support for the mayor and assembly. How popular were the new institutions? Did Londoners share the concern expressed by critics of the mayoral model, that the mayor would overshadow the assembly? And how far was support for the creation of the GLA spread across the population, or concentrated among particular social groups? We also examine how far having a directly elected mayor (and assembly) was regarded as a means of symbolically representing Londoners' distinct sense of identity, in much the same way that the devolved institutions were seen as expressing the distinct national identities of people in Scotland and Wales. If this were the case, it might help explain the popularity of the mayoral model in London as compared with much of the rest of England.

The principle of creating a 'regional' form of government for London was evidently widely accepted by the capital's residents. When put to Londoners in a referendum in 1998, the proposal to create a mayor and assembly passed easily; 72 per cent voted in favour of the creation of the GLA while only 28 per cent voted against, although only just over one in three (34 per cent) bothered to vote at all.[6] By the time of the first mayoral election in 2000, support for the GLA was still running high. We can see from Table 1 that around three quarters of respondents expressed support for the creation of the mayor and the assembly, although more were only 'a bit' in favour rather than 'very much' in favour.[7] In addition, when asked whether 'having a Greater London Assembly simply adds one more unnecessary level of government', only 34 per cent agreed, while 49 per cent disagreed.

TABLE 1

The data in Table 1 also show that, in 2000 at least, rather more people supported the idea of creating a mayor than did an assembly.[8] Relative support for the mayor and assembly was probed further in the survey by asking respondents whether, given the choice, they would prefer only a mayor, only an assembly, or both together. Just 8 per cent indicated they would prefer just the assembly, while double that proportion, 15 per cent, said that they would prefer just the mayor. As many as six in ten backed the combination of the two (the rest either rejected both models or did not know which option they preferred). Faced with the survey statement that 'It is important to have a Greater London Assembly to keep a check on what the London mayor does', no less than 83 per cent agreed. However, only a minority, albeit a not inconsiderable one (34 per cent), were concerned

[6] The low turnout may have reflected a perception that the result was a foregone conclusion. Yet a positive response to the Government's devolution proposal was also forecast in the Scottish referendum held a year earlier, yet this still attracted a far higher turnout of 60 per cent.

[7] The *London Mayoral Election Study* fielded questions on attitudes to the GLA to a half sample only. Therefore, the base for all these attitudinal measures is 781.

[8] The difference in proportions favouring the mayor and assembly is statistically significant.

about the amount of power given to the mayor, agreeing with our survey statement that 'having an elected London mayor will give too much power to one person'.

Thus, immediately after the first London election, it appears as though the new institutions commanded substantial popular support. But how widespread was this support? Was it dispersed generally across the population or was it concentrated among particular social groups? Previous analyses of support for constitutional change in Britain have found that support tends to be dispersed rather than concentrated; thus, for example, levels of support for various reform options do not co-vary by social groupings such as age or social class (Curtice and Jowell, 1998; Wenzel, Bowler and Lanoue, 2000). However, analysis by Curtice and Jowell (1998) has shown that popular support for some constitutional reforms is markedly higher among those educated to degree level than among those with no formal qualifications.

Another potentially significant source of variation in analysing who supported the new institutions is territorial identity. Some have argued that support for devolution in Scotland and Wales is at best weakly related to feelings of national identity (for Scotland, see Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge, 1999, pp. 124-8). However, others have suggested that national identity does make an important difference (for Scotland, see Curtice, 1999, 2005; for Wales, see Wyn Jones and Trystan, 1999). While London may be a highly 'metropolitan' area, comprising an extremely diverse population (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, pp. 5-9; Travers, 2004, pp. 155-8), this does not appear to preclude the existence of a strong sense of identity within the capital. Over three quarters of our sample (77 per cent) indicated that they felt themselves to be a Londoner, with one half (50 per cent) declaring themselves to be 'very proud' of this identity. Moreover, on the face of it, identity does appear related to support for the new institutions. Among those who felt 'very proud' to be a Londoner, almost one half (48 per cent) said they were 'very much' in favour of the London mayor, compared with just one third (33 per cent) of those who did not think of themselves as Londoners at all. Thus one potential reason why the directly elected mayor has gained more support in London than in many other English towns and cities is that the position is widely seen to symbolically represent a keen sense of identity.

One final factor that might have served to delineate attitudes to the GLA is partisanship. Labour was the only party to support the creation of both a mayor and an assembly. The Conservatives favoured the mayor but not the assembly, while the Liberal Democrats favoured the assembly but not the mayor (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, pp. 68-9; Travers, 2004, p. 64). We might anticipate that party supporters followed their party's official stance on the new institutions.

To ascertain the impact of social groups, territorial identity and partisanship on support for the new institutions, we constructed two multivariate regression models, one examining support for the creation of a mayor, the other for the assembly. This approach enables us to assess the possible role of each of our hypothesised influences, while controlling for the impact of the others. Our dependent variables are the questions detailed in Table 1. Since the responses to the dependent variables were recorded on an ordinal scale from 1 to 4 (where 1=very much against and 4=very much in favour of the

new bodies), we estimate our models using ordinal logistic regression.[9] We include amongst our independent variables those demographics that earlier studies of attitudes to constitutional reform have suggested might play a delineating role: age, education, social class, race and gender. We also include terms for whether the respondent was born in London, whether they identify with London, and party identification. The results are shown in Table 2.

Neither in the case of the mayor nor the assembly do attitudes vary significantly by age, race, gender or social class. The one demographic group that does show significantly higher support for both the mayor and the assembly comprises those holding a degree. In these respects our results are in line with previous research on attitudes towards constitutional reform. Interestingly, however, having a strong London identity is associated with a higher level of support for the mayor, while it is not for the assembly. It appears as though the mayor has come to be regarded by some Londoners as a symbolic expression of their identity whereas the assembly has not.[10] Finally, as anticipated, attitudes are delineated by partisanship. Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters are less favourable towards the new institutions than Labour supporters. But while the official support of the Liberal Democrats for the assembly at least finds some echo among their supporters, that of the Conservative party for the mayor does not. This may, of course, reflect Conservative hostility towards the figure who won the first mayoral election, Ken Livingstone, whose controversial role as leader of the former Greater London Council brought him into sharp conflict with the then Conservative Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher.

TABLE 2

The idea of having a directly elected mayor thus achieved widespread popularity in London. There was little public support for some of the main objections to the model put forward by its critics. The popularity of the mayoral model appears to have reflected, in part at least, Londoners' association of the office with the strong territorial identify that many felt, a process assisted perhaps by the profile of the first office holder, Ken Livingstone. We cannot tell whether the limited public acceptance of directly elected mayors elsewhere in England and Wales to date either reflects a weaker sense of 'civic identity' than exists in London, or a failure to mobilise local identity in support of having a directly elected mayor. However, those areas currently toying with the mayoral model may wish to note the association in London between support for a directly elected Mayor and people's sense of identity.

## Electoral engagement

[9] Those who said "Don't Know" or did not answer the question are excluded from the analysis. Given the distribution of the dependent variable (Table 1), we also conducted two binary logistic regression models (using as the categories of interest either favouring the mayor or assembly 'very much' and 'a bit', or just 'very much'). The substantive results were similar to the ordinal logistic model.

[10] Some analyses of support for devolution in Scotland have found that national identity becomes a weak predictor of attitudes once people's expectations of the likely performance of the Scottish Parliament are taken into account (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge, 1999, pp. 124-8; Paterson et al, 2001, pp. 112-15). Unfortunately, we cannot test this possibility in London because of the split nature of our sample. Those questions that measured attitudes to the mayor and assembly, and those that tapped expectations of mayoral and assembly performance were administered to different halves of the sample

The first London mayoral election in 2000 was marked by turnout of just 34 per cent, despite intense media coverage of the contest (Travers, 2004, p. 74). Few Londoners can have been unaware of the mayoral contest, even if some might have failed to register the simultaneous contest to the London assembly.[11] Thus, the low turnout cannot plausibly be attributed to voter ignorance of the existence of the contest. So what might explain the public's limited engagement with their new institutions?

One possibility is that people in London failed to participate because they felt too little was at stake to outweigh the 'cost' of voting. There are two reasons why this might be so. The first is that people felt the new institutions had too little power to achieve very much, reducing the incentive to participate in the election. The second possibility is that voters thought there was little difference between the candidates and parties, and thus no effective choice. Such a perception would again lower the marginal utility of registering a preference (Heath and Taylor, 1999; Bromley and Curtice, 2002).[12]

Indeed, in practice, the first London election does not appear to have provided those registered to vote with much incentive to participate. Take perceptions of the likely impact of the new institutions on various policy and governance outcomes. The *London Mayoral Election Survey* in 2000 asked respondents what impact they thought the mayor and assembly would have on transport, employment, policing and people's say in how they are governed. While very few thought the GLA would have a negative impact, more people thought the new bodies would not make any difference than believed they would have a positive impact (Table 3). Only in the case of public transport did a majority believe the creation of the mayor and assembly would yield a positive dividend. Perhaps most surprising is that just 45 per cent of respondents thought London's new institutions would give them more say in the way the capital was governed. This is markedly lower than the proportion of people in Scotland (65 per cent) and Wales (54 per cent) who, in 1999, believed that their new institutions would accord them greater say in the way their country was governed (Curtice, 2005).

TABLE 3

The choices offered by the competing parties and candidates also appear to have provided rather little incentive to vote. To test the distinctiveness of these choices, the 2000 survey asked respondents to rate each of the main mayoral candidates - Frank Dobson (Labour), Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrat), Ken Livingstone (Independent) and Steve Norris (Conservative) – together with their parties on a five point scale that ranged from 'strongly in favour' to 'strongly against'. If Londoners thought that there were major

[11] Polls conducted prior to the 2000 election found that a large number of people did not know that an assembly was to be elected alongside the mayor (Electoral Commission, 2003, p. 57).

[12] The marginal utility of participating would also be lessened if people felt that the outcome of the election was a foregone conclusion. Indeed in 2000, opinion polls put the lead of the frontrunner, Ken Livingstone, at up to 50 points over the second placed candidate just a month before polling day. However, this lead had fallen to 15 points by the time that polling day came around (Rallings and Thrasher, 2000, p. 755). Moreover, we should bear in mind that the race for the simultaneous assembly election was predicted to be much closer. In any event the survey on which we draw did not contain any measures that tapped people's perceptions of how close the election would be, perceptions that would, in any case, be contaminated in a post-election survey by knowledge of the actual result. We thus cannot formally test this rationale for the low turnout.

differences between the candidates and between their parties, we would expect them to indicate they were strongly in favour of one and strongly against the rest. Yet such divergent judgements were rare. Around a quarter of respondents gave exactly the same response about the Conservatives as they did Labour, about Ken Livingstone as Frank Dobson, and about Ken Livingstone as Steve Norris. In each case, a further one quarter gave responses that only differed by one point. In contrast, when exactly the same evaluative scale was included in the 1997 *British Election Study*, just 16 per cent of the British electorate gave the same response to the Conservatives and Labour.[13] It appears, then, that the first London election failed to provide voters with clear choices between the competing candidates and parties.[14]

Another possible reason why some people did not vote is because they were opposed to the creation of the new institutions. As we noted in Table 1, less than one in five people indicated they were against the mayor and assembly, so opposition to the new institutions cannot have been the primary cause of the low turnout at the first London election. But it might perhaps have been a contributory factor. Certainly, participation in Welsh Assembly elections (Scully, Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2004) – although not in Scottish Parliament contests (Boon and Curtice, 2003) – has been found to reflect attitudes towards the existence of new devolved institutions.

To establish what impact these various perceptions had on turnout, we examine participation in the 2000 London election among those who said they had voted in the 1997 general election. Doing so means we largely remove from our analysis those whose motivation to vote is relatively low in any election.[15] Low turnout in 2000 amongst those who voted in 1997 certainly seems to be linked to a perceived lack of difference between the candidates. For example, amongst those who did not see any difference between Livingstone and Norris, just 39 per cent participated in the London election.[16] In contrast,

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[13] Unfortunately the same question was not included in the 2001 *British Election Study*.

[14] Given the low expectations of what the institutions could achieve, and the limited electoral choices thought to be on offer, it is maybe not surprising that, when asked how much they cared who won the mayoral contest, almost as many (47 per cent) said they didn't care very much as said they cared a good deal (51 per cent). This 51 per cent figure compares unfavourably with the 64 per cent of people in Scotland who said they cared a good deal about the outcome of the 1999 Scottish Parliament election, although it is slightly higher than the proportion of Welsh respondents - 49 per cent – who said they cared about the outcome of the first Welsh Assembly election. This variable is not included in our models of voting turnout below, because it does not take us very far in explaining *why* people did not participate.

[15] This step reduces our base N to 970 respondents. While some respondents are likely to have misrecalled whether or not they voted in 1997, our - not unreasonable - assumption is that there is no association between misrecall and the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in the model such that our results might be seriously biased. In any event, it should be noted that the proportion in our sample who claimed to have voted in 1997, 71 per cent, is only slightly higher than the official turnout in London in 1997, at 68 per cent.

[16] It is possible that people who are politically aware and engaged are more likely both to have perceived differences between the parties and the candidates, and to have participated in the London election. As a result the relationship between perceived party/candidate differences and turnout could be an artefact. The London Mayoral Election Survey did not include any measures of political engagement or interest, so we cannot test this possibility directly. Note, however, that because our analysis is confined to those who claimed to have voted in 1997, the least politically interested have already been disproportionately excluded from our analysis. In addition, the survey did carry one measure of political knowledge, in the form of a four item 'quiz' that tested knowledge of the GLA, a measure that we can anticipate being related to political interest. The relationship between this knowledge score and perceived party/candidate difference proves to

among those who perceived a large difference between the two main candidates[17], turnout was twice as large, at 80 per cent. The picture is not dissimilar, albeit not quite as stark, in relation to evaluations of Livingstone and Dobson, and Labour and the Conservatives.[18] In contrast, low expectations of the new institutions are not generally associated with non-participation. The one exception is expectations about one of the GLA's most important responsibilities, public transport. Among those who believed the GLA would improve public transport, 66 per cent of those who voted in 1997 also turned out at the London contest, while among those whose expectations were more limited, just 48 per cent voted.

Thus, turnout seems to have been depressed at the first London election by the perception that the choices on offer were limited, though rather less so by low expectations of what the new institutions could achieve. Popular opposition to the creation of the mayor and assembly seems to have played some role, too. Among those who strongly favoured a mayor, 69 per cent participated in the election, compared with just 40 per cent among those who were 'a bit' or 'very much' against a mayor. Equally, turnout was 72 per cent among those who strongly favoured an assembly, but was just 41 per cent among those opposed to it.

If we proceed to estimate the effects of these factors simultaneously in a multivariate regression model, we find broad confirmation of the picture we have painted so far. As our dependent variable is dichotomous (did not vote in London election=0, did vote in London election=1), we employ binary logistic regression. The modelling proceeds in three stages. In the first model (based on the whole sample), we consider whether demographic position, identity and partisanship shaped participation. The demographic variables we include reflect those factors – such as age, housing tenure, education and ethnic origin – that are often found to affect turnout and/or political participation (Swaddle and Heath, 1989; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, 2004; Saggar, 2001). Given that we are looking only at those who said they voted in the 1997 general election, this means that our model ascertains whether any of these variables were more strongly associated with turnout in the 2000 GLA election than they are with turnout in a general election. In the second model, we add the role of attitudes towards the creation of the mayor and assembly. In the third model, we introduce variables measuring candidate and party evaluations, and expectations of what the new institutions would achieve. Note, however, that the survey questions added in our second model were administered to a different half of the sample than those added in the third model. This means that the variables added in the second model cannot be included in the third model. Thus, the three models are based on different selections of cases.

TABLE 4

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be a minor one. For example, among those who said they voted in 1997, there was only a weak relationship between the perceived difference between Steve Norris and Ken Livingstone and the score on our GLA knowledge quiz (Cramer's V=0.09, significant only at the 10 per cent level).

[17] Defined as being strongly in favour of one candidate/party while being strongly against another.

[18] Of those who felt the same about Dobson and Livingstone, just 49 per cent made it to the polls compared with 72 per cent among those who felt very differently about them. Equally, just 49 per cent who felt the same about Labour and the Conservatives participated, against 66 per cent who felt very differently about the two parties.

The first of our models shows that some characteristics commonly associated with non-voting in general elections, such as youth and being a member of an ethnic minority, were yet further associated with non-voting in the first London election. However, model I also shows that, while social identity might have been associated with support for the London mayor (see Table 2), it is not a significant predictor of participation in the mayoral election (for a similar result in respect of Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections, see Boon and Curtice, 2003; Scully, Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2004).

In our second model, the coefficients for favouring the mayor and assembly are correctly signed, suggesting that opponents of the mayor and assembly were less likely to vote. True, neither achieves statistical significance at the 5 per cent level, but attitudes to the mayor at least are significant at the 10 per cent level, and it should be borne in mind that this analysis is only based on a half sample, making it less likely that statistical significance will be achieved. Finally, in our third model, we see that the greater the perceived difference between Ken Livingstone and Steve Norris, the more likely someone was to vote, though once this has been taken into account perceived differences between other pairs of candidates or parties do not make a difference. At the same time, expectations of the likely impact of the new institutions on public transport also seem to have influenced turnout, while other performance expectations did not do so.[19]

Thus, it appears that the limited turnout at the first London election primarily reflected the limited incentives on offer to citizens. Those who doubted the capacity of the GLA to have much impact on the key issue of public transport were inclined to stay at home. So too were those voters, relatively large in number, who felt that there was little difference between the candidates or the parties. In this election at least, the contest failed to stimulate the enthusiasm, and thus the level of participation, that the mayoral model's advocates anticipated. Our findings indicate that low turnout may not be a necessary feature of mayoral elections. But if people are to participate, they need to be offered clear electoral choices and powerful elected institutions.

## Voting behaviour

In the final section of our analysis, we focus on the behaviour of the minority of the electorate who did participate in the London elections in 2000 and 2004. In particular we examine two issues. First, did the direct election of a single person executive (ie. the mayor) encourage people to vote on the basis of candidate evaluations rather than on the basis of party labels? Second, to what degree did people vote on the basis of their attitudes towards policy issues over which the mayor and assembly had some influence?

We can address the first issue by comparing the relationship between vote choice and both candidate and party evaluations in the mayoral election with the same relationship

[19] However, evaluations of the difference between Livingstone and Norris were marginally more important for turnout than expectations about public transport. The Wald score for perceived difference between Livingstone and Norris (10.591) is slightly greater than that for expectations about public transport (9.744). Readers will note that the $R^2$ of model III is, at 18 per cent, surprisingly lower than that of model II (26 per cent). This arises because the $R^2$ for model I for the half sample on which model III is based is far lower (7 per cent) than it is for the half sample on which model II is based (23 per cent). Thus, the addition to $R^2$ provided by model III is, at 11 per cent, in fact much greater than that delivered by model II (3 per cent).

in the assembly election. If candidate evaluations are a particularly strong determinant of mayoral voting behaviour, we should find a closer relationship between candidate evaluations and vote choice in the mayoral election than in the assembly election. In contrast, party evaluations should be more closely related to vote choice in the assembly election than in the mayoral contest.

There is, however, an obvious limitation on how far this approach can be taken in 2000. Ken Livingstone, the winner of the mayoral election, stood as an Independent, having been expelled from the Labour Party. Of course, his success can itself be regarded as testimony to the degree to which having a directly elected mayor increases the importance of individual candidates as opposed to parties.[20] However, Livingstone's status as an Independent means we have to exclude from our analysis those who supported him in 2000, since there is no party evaluation whose impact can be compared with that arising from evaluations of Livingstone himself.[21] In contrast, this problem does not arise in 2004, since by this point Livingstone had been readmitted into the Labour Party and stood as its official candidate. As noted earlier, we have data from the 2004 *Greater London Assembly Election Study* to assess the relative impact of candidate and party evaluations in the second mayoral and assembly election.

How people vote can, of course, be influenced by the structure of the ballot. The assembly elections in 2000 and 2004 took place under the Additional Member System, whereby voters had two votes, one for a member for their assembly constituency, the other for a London-wide party list. We use reported list vote in our analysis because this is less likely to be influenced by strategic considerations or the popularity of a particular candidate; it is thus arguably the better gauge of party preference. The mayoral elections in 2000 and 2004 were run using the Supplementary Vote system, under which voters are invited to express a first and second preference, the latter coming into play should no candidate secure a majority of first preference votes. Under this system, a voter's first preference vote is unlikely to be affected by strategic considerations; a voter concerned about wasting their vote or wishing to deny electoral victory to a particular candidate can still opt to back a more popular candidate with their second preference.[22] We thus measure vote choice in the mayoral election by reference to reported first preference vote. Evaluations of candidates and parties are measured in 2000 using the same five point scale ('strongly in favour' to 'strongly against') we introduced in the previous section. On the 2004 survey, they are measured by a similar scale, albeit a seven point one that ranged from 'like a lot' to 'dislike a lot'.

Simple bivariate statistics provide some support for the view that candidate evaluations matter more in the mayoral contest than in the assembly election. Thus, in 2000, 80 per

[20] Indeed, we should note that, outside London, independents have secured election as directly elected mayors on no less than five occasions. Only twice did this occur on a council with a substantial representation of Independent councillors.

[21] Thus, in the analysis that follows, and in Tables 5 and 6, those among our sample who voted for Livingstone in 2000 are wholly excluded from the calculations.

[22] True, if a voter is confident that their preferred candidate will be one of the top two candidates, they could decide to cast their first vote for another candidate who they think might fill the other top two position but who is unlikely to attract many second preference votes. Such behaviour might increase the chances of their preferred candidate being elected. But the sophistication required to engage in such behaviour is considerable, and we would suggest that few Londoners behaved in this way.

cent of those who favoured Steve Norris voted for him in the mayoral contest,[23] whereas only 56 per cent of this group also voted for Norris's party, the Conservatives, in the assembly contest (Table 5). Granted, those who favoured the Conservatives were also more likely to have voted for Norris (82 per cent) than for his party (67 per cent), but the gap between the two statistics is smaller. The position is even clearer in respect of voting for Frank Dobson and Labour. Thus, far more people who favoured Dobson voted for him (81 per cent) than went on to support his party (63 per cent). But there was no premium for the candidate among those who favoured the party, 61 per cent of whom voted for Dobson against 60 per cent who voted Labour. At the second GLA elections in 2004, far more of those who favoured Labour's mayoral candidate, Ken Livingstone, voted for him than voted for the Labour party (85 per cent to 66 per cent), while the equivalent gap amongst those who favoured Labour is rather smaller. There is no discernible 'candidate' or 'party' effect in 2004 for the Conservatives and their mayoral candidate, Steve Norris.

TABLE 5

We can evaluate more rigorously the relative importance of candidate and party evaluations in the mayoral and assembly elections by modelling vote choice in the two sets of elections against these evaluations. This requires us to construct two models for each election. In the first model the dependent variable is whether or not the respondent voted (on the first preference mayoral vote) for the mayoral candidate of one of the three main parties - in 2000, Frank Dobson (Labour), Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrat) and Steve Norris (Conservative); in 2004, Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat), Ken Livingstone (Labour) and Steve Norris (Conservative). In the second model the dependent variable is whether the respondent voted for the Conservatives, Labour or the Liberal Democrats on the assembly (list) vote.[24] Since the dependent variable in both models represents a choice between three options, we estimate the parameters using multinomial logistic regression. The results show the effects of candidate and party evaluations on the (log) odds of voting for the Conservatives or Labour, and for their respective mayoral candidates, as compared with the (log) odds of voting for the Liberal Democrats, and for their mayoral candidate.

The results, in Table 6, confirm those of our bivariate analysis. Note first that the odds of voting for a party or candidate are predominantly related to evaluations of that party and candidate, rather than to those of another candidate or party. We have therefore highlighted these results in the table. Examination of the results reveals that, in general, candidate evaluations are stronger predictors than party evaluations of vote choice in the mayoral election, while party evaluations matter more when it comes to the assembly vote. Because candidate and party evaluations are measured on the same scale in the mayoral and assembly vote models (five point in 2000, seven point in 2004), their relative effects on voting behaviour can be gauged by comparing the size of their coefficients. So, if we take as an example voting for Frank Dobson in 2000, we see that evaluations of the candidate are a more powerful predictor of voting than evaluations of his party (the

[23] Favouring a candidate or party is defined as giving them a rating of five ('strongly favour') or four ('favour') on the five point scale in 2000, and as giving them a rating of six or seven on the seven point scale (1=dislike a lot, 7=like a lot) in 2004.

[24] We exclude from the analysis all those who voted for a party other than Labour, the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats, or for a mayoral candidate not standing for one of these parties.

coefficients being 1.69 and 1.24 respectively). When it comes to voting for the Labour Party, however, evaluations of the party are a stronger predictor than evaluations of the candidate (the respective coefficients being 0.74 and 0.43). Comparison of the results in 2004 for Norris and the Conservatives and for Livingstone and Labour reveals a similar pattern. The one exception is for Norris and the Conservatives in 2000, when evaluations of Norris were a stronger predictor of voting for the Conservative party on the assembly list vote than were evaluations of the party itself (albeit that candidate evaluations were somewhat weaker in the case of the assembly vote than for the mayoral vote).[25]

TABLE 6

It could, of course, be argued that the circumstances of the first two London elections, and in particular the undoubted personal popularity of Ken Livingstone, meant that candidate evaluations played a greater role in 2000 and 2004 than is likely in future contests. But equally, Livingstone's success could be regarded as clear affirmation that mayoral elections have the potential to focus voters' minds on whom they judge would make the best chief executive of their local council, rather than on their party label. Certainly our analysis of the first two London contests substantiates the mayoral model's advocates in their claim that such contests encourage voters to focus on personal qualities more than on partisan ones.

But this still leaves an important question. Do mayoral contests also encourage people to vote on the issues confronting the mayor and the assembly, rather than treating the London election as a chance to register their dissatisfaction with the national Government at Westminster? After all, the low turnout and poor performance by the incumbent party at Westminster (Labour) meant that the 2000 election bore many of the hallmarks of a 'second order' contest, where the election is used by voters to protest against the policy and performance of the national government (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Clearly, if mayoral elections are used by voters to express a judgement on the national government, as often appears to be the case in local council elections (Miller, 1988; Heath at al, 1999), then their introduction will do little to enhance the accountability or responsiveness of local government.

To help establish the 'first order' or 'second order' status of the London election in 2000, the *London Mayoral Election Survey* asked its respondents how they would have voted if a Westminster election had been held on the day of the mayoral election. The results suggest that Labour's share of the vote would have been ten points higher in such a contest than it actually was on the assembly list vote. Similar findings have also been found in respect of devolved elections in Scotland and Wales (Curtice, 2003) and is, of

[25] There were two instances where evaluations of a party or candidate other than the one the respondent voted for appear to have mattered. Both these cases support our general argument. They show that evaluations of a party are significantly associated with voting in the assembly contest, while evaluations of the party's mayoral candidate have no such effect. Thus, in 2000, the odds of voting Conservative on the assembly list vote were significantly (negatively) affected by evaluations of Labour, while at the same election the odds of voting Labour were significantly (negatively) affected by evaluations of the Conservatives. In neither case did evaluations of the opposition party's mayoral candidate have any significant effect.

course, precisely what we would anticipate if voters were using the London election to send the Government a protest note.

But if Labour's performance in the London election is to be explained by widespread protest at the national party, then we should find that Labour sympathisers' failure to vote for the party is associated with negative evaluations of government performance. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Granted, those who said they would have voted Labour in a general election and who thought that the standard of the National Health Service had fallen since 1997 were only half as likely to vote for Frank Dobson, Labour's mayoral candidate, as those who thought the standard of the health service had improved (8 per cent as compared with 16 per cent). A similar picture also emerges in relation to evaluations of the general standard of living. However, those who perceived a decline in performance on healthcare or the standard of living were no more likely to vote for Ken Livingstone than were those who thought performance had improved. Thus, it does not appear that the key to Livingstone's success in the 2000 election was disaffection with the Government's performance amongst Labour supporters. Rather, Labour supporters who were unhappy with their party's record in office (who, in the case of the NHS, only constituted one in four Labour supporters anyway) seem to have been more inclined to stay at home.[26]

So if people did not turn against Labour in the 2000 London election in order to signal dissatisfaction with the national government, did they decide how to vote on the basis of the issues facing the capital? The most high profile issue in the election campaign was the funding of the London Underground (Rallings and Thrasher, 2000). While Frank Dobson backed the Government's proposals for a private-public partnership, Ken Livingstone favoured retaining public control of the Underground. There is some evidence that these differences of approach were reflected in the voting behaviour of those who said they would have voted Labour in a general election. Thus, among those Labour general election supporters who believed that the London Underground should remain wholly within the public sector, 38 per cent voted for Livingstone. In contrast, among those who believed that the private sector should play some role, only 26 per cent turned out for Livingstone. The equivalent figures for Dobson are 10 per cent and 13 per cent. Even here, however, we should note that, among Labour supporters who favoured the private-public option, twice as many backed Livingstone as Dobson. Thus Ken Livingstone's victory in the mayoral election does not appear to be a reflection of popular support for his position on what at the time was the key issue facing the capital.[27]

There is also little evidence that the issue which subsequently became the most distinctive policy pursued by Ken Livingstone as mayor, the introduction of a congestion charge (a policy opposed by Dobson), had much influence on the way Labour general election supporters voted in 2000. Those in favour of the congestion charge were only slightly

[26] Abstention in the London election in 2000 among Labour supporters unhappy with the Government's performance on the NHS was 55 per cent, as against 40 per cent among those happy with NHS performance. In the case of the standard of living the equivalent figures were 54 per cent and 43 per cent.

[27] Indeed, just 40 per cent of Londoners backed Livingstone's policy of a publicly owned and operated Underground, while slightly more – 45 per cent – backed the public-private partnership. Even among people who indicated they would have voted Labour at a general election, as many backed the public-private partnership as did the public sector solution.

more likely to vote for Livingstone (31 per cent) than were opponents of the charge (28 per cent). Moreover, opponents of congestion charging were actually less likely to turn out for Dobson (11 per cent) than those who strongly favoured this policy (20 per cent).[28]

Yet if Livingstone's electoral success cannot be attributed to his stance on the key policy issues facing London, this does not mean that local concerns were wholly absent. The 2000 survey shows that Livingstone was trusted more than Dobson to represent London's interests, and that this perception significantly shaped Livingstone's electoral success. Among Labour general election supporters, two in three trusted Livingstone to work in London's interests, while only one half said the same about Dobson (among Londoners as a whole, Livingstone's lead in this respect was even greater: 56 per cent to 33 per cent). Moreover, 54 per cent of Labour supporters who said they 'just about always' trusted Livingstone to work in London's interests turned out to vote for him, compared with just 10 per cent of those who trusted him 'only some or the time' or 'almost never'. Among those who trusted Dobson to work in London's interests, 27 per cent turned out to vote for him, compared with just 3 per cent of those who did not trust him. Thus, what appears to have mattered to voters were not the particular policies promoted by the candidates, but a more synoptic view of which candidate would best stand up for the capital's interests. In this, there are echoes of what happened in the devolved elections in Scotland and Wales (Curtice, 2001; Paterson et al, 2001, pp. 30-44).

In order to identify what effects these various factors had when considered simultaneously, we constructed a multivariate regression model of voting at the 2000 London election. Specifically, we examined which factors explained voting for either Frank Dobson or Ken Livingstone among people who indicated they would have voted Labour if a general election had been held simultaneously. We modelled voting behaviour as a three way choice: voting either for Dobson or for Livingstone or for neither (that is for another candidate or not voting in the mayoral contest at all). Given this three way electoral choice, we estimate parameters using a multinomial logistic regression. Table 7 reports the parameters for those who voted for either Dobson or Livingstone, with those voting for neither candidate as the reference category. Our independent variables tap potential discontent with the national government (as measured by retrospective evaluations of the health service and standard of living), attitudes towards local issues (namely the funding of the Underground, congestion charging and the extent to which the capital gains its 'fair share' of government spending) and evaluations of how far each candidate could be trusted to represent London's interests. Full details of these variables and their coding are given in Annex 1.

The results confirm our earlier analysis that Livingstone's electoral success did not derive from discontent with the Labour Government. Voting for Livingstone was not significantly affected by judgements about policy performance on such national issues as the NHS and living standards. But nor did Livingstone benefit from the electorate's views on local issues. Only on the issue of public transport did he derive support on a distinctively London issue. Instead, Livingstone drew electoral support most strongly – as did Dobson – from those who trusted him to represent London's interests.

[28] Indeed, Livingstone's position on congestion charging commanded the support of less than half of Londoners in 2000 (43 per cent).

TABLE 7

So while the first London election was clearly not a 'second order' contest (decided primarily by views about the performance of the government at Westminster), neither was it wholly a 'first order' contest (decided primarily by specific local issues).[29] Instead, the result of the mayoral election reflected voters' assessment of who would best represent the capital's interests more generally. Mayoral elections may be an effective means of securing a champion for a local area, but they are not necessarily an effective means of ensuring that voters focus on the key issues facing their locality.

## Conclusion

The establishment of a directly elected mayor in London is the most prominent example of the Government's reform of executive arrangements at the local level. Even though London's citizens expressed some doubts over how much impact their new institutions would have, the move was clearly a popular one, contrasting with the position in two-thirds of the places elsewhere in England to have held referendums on directly elected mayors. This popularity seems to have been generated because the London mayor became linked to people's feelings of territorial identity, thereby providing an important 'reservoir' of diffuse support for the institution.[30] However, repeating that link in other towns and cities may be more difficult. Here, elected mayors will sit alongside an existing council with strong prior claims to represent an area. In London, by contrast, the elected mayor was part of a new set of institutions with unique claims to represent and symbolise the whole of the city. If so, this rationale might help explain why much of the rest of the country has been reluctant to follow London's example in introducing directly elected mayors.

Our analysis of London's experience of mayoral elections to date provides only limited evidence that they work in the manner claimed by their advocates. These elections failed to generate sufficient enthusiasm to yield a turnout higher than in other local elections.[31] We have shown that there were widespread doubts among London's citizens in 2000 about whether the new institutions would make much difference to policy and governance outcomes. An element of excitement was therefore required for Londoners to be persuaded to participate in the mayoral contest. In the event, however, such excitement appears to have been lacking, with many people perceiving little difference between the candidates. Evidently, mayoral elections in themselves do not guarantee voters the kind of incentives and choices that encourage participation.

The evidence from London also casts doubt on the role of mayoral elections as a means of addressing local policy issues. Granted, the experience of London suggests that mayoral

[29] Although we have less data by which to gauge the 'first'/'second order' status of the second London election in 2004, there are some indications that this contest, too, hardly revolved on national level issues. Thus, asked which factors were important to them in voting in 2004, twice as many respondents answered 'choosing the best people to run London' (51 per cent) as answered 'letting the national government know what you think about national issues' (24 per cent).

[30] For the importance of such 'diffuse' support in the context of devolution to Scotland, see Curtice, 2005.

[31] The same is also true of mayoral elections elsewhere (Dept for Communities and Local Government, 2006)

elections can help focus the public's attention on who is best suited to provide local leadership. In doing so, mayoral elections also seem to encourage a focus on the qualities of the candidates on offer, and not simply on their party labels. Equally, mayoral elections are not clearly 'second-order' contests, in which the outcome is determined by the popularity of the incumbent national government. Yet, with the partial exception of attitudes towards the London Underground, we have uncovered little evidence that the first London election was decided on the key local issues facing the capital. In this, mayoral elections may be little different from other local elections. Certainly, our evidence suggests that mayoral elections – supposedly high profile and candidate-oriented contests – are not necessarily more effective than other forms of election in ensuring that local votes are based on local issues.

Of course, the Labour Government's recent proposal to extend directly elected mayors more widely across England reflects more than just the perceived effectiveness of mayoral elections. In other respects, directly elected mayors may be regarded as a success and provide sufficient justification for their adoption. But our analysis of the experience of mayoral elections in London - so far at least - lends little weight to the case for change. The claim that mayoral elections can strengthen the electoral link between local government and local citizens remains to be proven.

## ANNEX 1: Details of variables and coding for Table 7

*Retrospective evaluations*

Thinking back to the last general election in 1997, would you say that since then the standard of the health service/general standard of living has:

Fallen a little/Fallen a lot (coded 1)
Stayed the same (coded 2)
Increased a lot; Increased a little (coded 3)

*London issues*

Do you agree or disagree that motorists who want to drive into central London should have to buy a permit?

Five point scale, from strongly disagree (coded 1) to strongly agree (coded 5)

Which of these options would be best for the future of the London Underground?

It should be run by the public sector alone (coded 1)
It should be run by the private sector alone / By the public and private sector in partnership (coded 2)

Would you say that compared with the rest of Britain London gets more than its fair share of government spending, less than its fair share or is London's share of government spending about right?

Less than its fair share (coded 1); More than its fair share / About right (coded 2)

*London leadership*

How much would you trust Frank Dobson/Ken Livingstone to work in London's interests?

Trust always (coded 1); Trust most of the time (coded 2); Trust only some of the time/almost never (coded 3)

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**TABLE 1: Attitudes to the new institutions in London, 2000**

| How much are you in favour or against having a London mayor/a Greater London assembly? | | |
|---|---|---|
| % | Mayor | Assembly |
| Very much in favour | 36 | 31 |
| A bit in favour | 42 | 41 |
| A bit against | 9 | 10 |
| Very much against | 8 | 7 |
| Don't know/not answered | 6 | 11 |
| N | 781 | 781 |

Source: *London Mayoral Election Survey 2000.*
Note: Responses based on half sample only.

**TABLE 2: Model of attitudes towards the London mayor and assembly, 2000**

| | Mayor | | Assembly | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | se | B | se |
| Age (60 and above) | | | | |
| 18-24 | 0.02 | .33 | -0.61 | .33 |
| 25-44 | -0.13 | .25 | -0.39 | .25 |
| 45-59 | 0.05 | .27 | 0.27 | .28 |
| Education (no qualifications) | | | | |
| O level/foreign | 0.18 | .23 | 0.29 | .23 |
| A level | 0.06 | .25 | 0.48 | .26 |
| Degree | 0.78 | .26** | 0.93 | .26** |
| Social class: Registrar-General (V Unskilled) | | | | |
| IV Partly skilled | 0.38 | .40 | 0.62 | .43 |
| III Skilled: manual | 0.61 | .40 | 0.46 | .42 |
| III Skilled: non manual | -0.30 | .38 | -0.38 | .40 |
| II Managerial/technical | 0.39 | .39 | 0.15 | .41 |
| I Professional | 0.70 | .47 | 0.28 | .48 |
| Race (white) | | | | |
| Non white | 0.18 | .20 | 0.10 | .25 |
| Gender (female) | | | | |
| Male | 0.28 | .16 | 0.08 | .16 |
| Born in London | -0.31 | .17 | -0.02 | .18 |
| London identity (not a Londoner) | | | | |
| Very proud Londoner | 0.75 | .22** | 0.19 | .22 |
| Somewhat proud Londoner | 0.28 | .22 | 0.32 | .22 |
| Not very proud | 0.25 | .32 | -0.15 | .23 |
| Party identification (Labour) | | | | |
| Conservative | -1.17 | .20** | -1.06 | .20** |
| Liberal Democrat | -0.89 | .25** | -0.47 | .26 |
| Other/none | -0.82 | .25** | -0.92 | .26** |
| Likelihood ratio $x^2$ (*df*) | 123.120 (20)** | | 97.964 (20)** | |
| Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ | 0.20 | | 0.17 | |
| N | 634 | | 605 | |

Ordinal logistic regression model, showing parameter estimates and associated standard errors.
Categorical independent variables show reference category in parentheses.

*p<0.05 **p<0.01
Source: *London Mayoral Election Survey 2000*

**TABLE 3: Expectations of the London mayor and assembly, 2000**

| What do you think the London mayor and the Greater London Assembly will actually achieve for London? | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| % | Positive outcome | No difference | Negative outcome | Don't know |
| Traffic congestion | 38 | 52 | 3 | 8 |
| Public transport | 55 | 38 | 2 | 5 |
| Employment opportunities | 33 | 57 | 3 | 7 |
| Quality of policing | 42 | 49 | 3 | 6 |
| Ordinary people's say in how London is governed | 45 | 45 | 6 | 3 |

Row N in each case=767

Source: *London Mayoral Election Survey 2000*.

**TABLE 4: Models of turnout at the London election, 2000**

| | Model I | | Model II | | Model III | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | se | B | se | B | se |
| Age (60 and above) | | | | | | |
| 18-24 | -1.96 | .38** | -2.65 | .81** | -1.74 | .64** |
| 25-44 | -0.98 | .22** | -1.07 | .35** | -1.06 | .39** |
| 45-59 | -0.39 | .22 | -0.29 | .36 | -0.77 | .38* |
| Education (no qualifications) | | | | | | |
| O level/foreign | 0.18 | .20 | 0.32 | .33 | -0.29 | .32 |
| A level | 0.52 | .24* | 0.56 | .38 | 0.19 | .39 |
| Degree | 0.78 | .21** | 0.36 | .32 | 0.59 | .34 |
| Race (white) | | | | | | |
| Non white | -0.37 | .19* | -0.76 | .29** | -0.10 | .32 |
| Tenure (home owner) | | | | | | |
| Non home owner | -0.41 | .16** | -0.95 | .28** | 0.06 | .26 |
| London identity (not a Londoner) | | | | | | |
| Very proud Londoner | -0.13 | .20 | -0.45 | .31 | -0.08 | .33 |
| Somewhat proud Londoner | 0.18 | .21 | -0.04 | .33 | 0.50 | .34 |
| Not very proud | 0.09 | .30 | 0.35 | .48 | 0.05 | .52 |
| Party identification (Labour) | | | | | | |
| Conservative | -0.57 | .17** | -0.62 | .30* | -0.11 | .29 |
| Liberal Democrat | -0.53 | .25* | -1.15 | .39** | 0.44 | .42 |
| Other/none | -0.53 | .28 | -0.65 | .45 | 0.39 | .49 |
| Favour London mayor | | | 0.31 | .18 | | |
| Favour London Assembly | | | 0.29 | .19 | | |
| Performance expectations (no difference/worsen performance) | | | | | | |
| Reduce traffic congestion | | | | | -0.11 | .29 |
| Improve public transport | | | | | 0.93 | .30** |
| Improve employment | | | | | 0.12 | .27 |
| Improve quality of policing | | | | | -0.28 | .27 |
| Give people more say in London | | | | | -0.24 | .27 |
| Difference in evaluations | | | | | | |
| Livingstone-Norris | | | | | 0.35 | .11** |
| Livingstone-Dobson | | | | | 0.04 | .10 |
| Conservative-Labour | | | | | 0.03 | .09 |
| Constant | 0.13 | .14 | -1.63 | .53** | -0.58 | .34 |
| Model $x^2$ (df) | 80.649 (14)** | | 88.228 (16)** | | 52.106 (22)** | |
| Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ | 0.12 | | 0.26 | | 0.18 | |
| N | 888 | | 416 | | 367 | |

Binary logistic regression model, showing parameter estimates and associated standard errors.
Categorical independent variables show reference category in parentheses.
Sample confined to those who said they voted in the 1997 general election.
*p<0.05 **p<0.01
Source: *London Mayoral Election Survey 2000*

**TABLE 5: Party/candidate evaluations and vote choice in London, 2000 and 2004**

| | Favour Norris | Favour Conservative | Favour Dobson/ Livingstone | Favour Labour |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2000** | | | | |
| Voted Norris | 80 (110) | 82 (89) | | |
| Voted Conservative | 56 (84) | 67 (75) | | |
| Voted Dobson | | | 81 (75) | 61 (77) |
| Voted Labour | | | 63 (74) | 60 (157) |
| **2004** | | | | |
| Voted Norris | 82 (133) | 87 (133) | | |
| Voted Conservative | 80 (98) | 87 (104) | | |
| Voted Livingstone | | | 85 (220) | 86 (166) |
| Voted Labour | | | 66 (136) | 74 (120) |

Favour = 'Strongly favour' and 'favour' a candidate/party on a five point scale (2000) and points 6-7 on a seven point scale (1=dislike a lot, 7=Like a lot) (2004).

Figures are column percentages, with the base N in parentheses.

Source: *London Mayoral Election Study 2000, Greater London Assembly Election Survey 2004*.

**TABLE 6: Models of party/candidate evaluations and vote choice in London, 2000 and 2004**

| | Voted Norris | | Voted Conservative | | Voted Dobson /Livingstone | | Voted Labour | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2000** | | | | | | | | |
| Favour Norris | 1.80 | (.31)** | 1.11 | (.23)** | 0.10 | (.30) | 0.04 | (.17) |
| Favour Con | 0.98 | (.28)** | 0.85 | (.23)** | 0.58 | (.33) | -0.48 | (.18)** |
| Favour Dobson | 0.00 | (.25) | 0.03 | (.21) | 1.69 | (.30)** | 0.43 | (.16)** |
| Favour Labour | 0.25 | (.27) | -0.60 | (.22)** | 1.24 | (.34)** | 0.74 | (.20)** |
| **2004** | | | | | | | | |
| Favour Norris | 1.03 | (.17)** | 0.14 | (.16) | 0.04 | (.12) | -0.02 | (.12) |
| Favour Con | 0.61 | (.13)** | 1.03 | (.16)** | -0.02 | (.12) | 0.14 | (.13) |
| Favour Liv'ston | -0.06 | (.12) | -0.08 | (.13) | 0.74 | (.10)** | 0.31 | (.12)** |
| Favour Labour | -0.15 | (.13) | -0.10 | (.13) | 0.24 | (.09)** | 0.62 | (.11)** |

Multinomial logit models showing parameter estimates and standard errors in parentheses.
The reference category is voted Kramer/Hughes (mayoral model) and voted Liberal Democrat (assembly model).

Model summaries:
*2000*
Mayoral model: likelihood ratio test ($x^2$) of 343.151 with 8*df*, significant at the 0.001 level. N=266
Assembly model: likelihood ratio test ($x^2$) of 319.249 with 8*df*, significant at the 0.001 level. N=350
*2004*
Mayoral model: likelihood ratio test ($x^2$) of 590.178 with 8*df*, significant at the 0.001 level. N=521
Assembly model: likelihood ratio test ($x^2$) of 419.305 with 8*df*, significant at the 0.001 level. N=405

**p<0.01 *p<0.05
Sources: *London Mayoral Election Study 2000* and *Greater London Assembly Election Study 2004*

**TABLE 7: Models of vote choice at the London mayoral election, 2000 amongst Labour supporters**

| | Voted Dobson | | Voted Livingstone | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B | se | B | se |
| *Retrospective evaluations* | | | | |
| Standard of the NHS since 1997 | | | | |
| Fallen | -0.86 | .51 | -0.34 | .36 |
| Stayed same | -0.50 | .39 | -0.25 | .29 |
| (Increased) | | | | |
| Standard of living since 1997 | | | | |
| Fallen | -0.15 | .58 | 0.15 | .38 |
| Stayed same | -0.57 | .37 | 0.15 | .25 |
| (Increased) | | | | |
| *London issues* | | | | |
| How much agree that motorists should pay for driving into London | 0.08 | .11 | 0.06 | .07 |
| Public sector is best for London underground (private or public/private sector is best) | 0.06 | .34 | 0.67 | .23** |
| London gets less than its fair share of government spending (London gets fair share or more than fair share) | -0.12 | .35 | 0.03 | .25 |
| *London leadership* | | | | |
| Trust Dobson to work in London's interests | | | | |
| Always | 2.41 | .54** | -0.43 | .40 |
| Most of the time | 1.80 | .46** | -0.29 | .24 |
| (only some of the time/never) | | | | |
| Trust Livingstone to work in London's interests | | | | |
| Always | -1.28 | .50* | 2.28 | .37** |
| Most of the time | -0.50 | .38 | 1.46 | .35** |
| (only some of the time/never) | | | | |
| Constant | -1.92 | .63** | -2.08 | .47** |
| Model $x^2$ (df) | 116.26 (22)** | | | |
| Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ | 0.27 | | | |
| N | 436 | | | |

Multinomial logistic regression model, showing parameter estimates and associated standard errors.
Categorical independent variables show reference category in parentheses.
Table is confined to those who said they would have voted Labour in a Westminster general election.
*p<0.05 **p<0.01
Source: *London Mayoral Election Survey 2000*