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Inigo Jones's *Tempe Restored* and Alessandro Piccolomini's *Della Institution morale*

In 1949 D. J. Gordon showed in an article whose basic assumptions are still valid that with his design of the proscenium arch for *Albion's Triumph* of 1632 Inigo Jones made an explicit statement about the theoretical foundation of architecture and of his scenic designs for the court masque.¹ This theoretical foundation had been questioned by Ben Jonson, with whom the architect and designer by then had collaborated (off and on) for almost three decades in the invention and execution of the courtly spectacles. Jonson, however, had been dismissed after the season of 1631, and *Albion's Triumph* was the first masque Jones produced after the final rupture with the poet. It may be understandable that after the ugly quarrel with Jonson he sought to assert himself, although his display of confidence, exalting his own contribution to the synesthetic court masque, seems despite its thorough theoretical foundation almost like a triumphant flourish with which to taunt the disgruntled poet. The relevance of his theoretical statement for his understanding of the masque cannot, however, be stressed too much.

With his next masque, *Tempe Restored*, which closely followed the performance of *Albion's Triumph*, Jones again made a theoretical statement about the genre, about its visual character and about its relevance as a medium of moral instruction. It is the purpose of this article to trace notions of moral philosophy as expressed in *Tempe Restored* to Alessandro Piccolomini's *Della Institution morale* (1542; rev. 1560), a copy of which was owned by the architect. In the first part (I) of this article I will give a summary of the relevant chapters of the *Institution* and try to deduce the coherent meaning Jones possibly extracted from them as indicated by some of the copious annotations that he made in his copy of Piccolomini's text. In a further section (II) these will be discussed as a source for notions of moral philosophy expressed in the printed text of *Tempe Restored*. Lastly (III), relating to the theory of the perception of the good and the beautiful as well as to the method of acquiring philosophical knowledge as expounded by Piccolomini, Jones's use of scenic images or 'pictures' will be examined. It will be seen that

in the context of his quarrel with Ben Jonson the *Institution*, Aristotelian in conception rather than Platonic or Neo-Platonic, provided Jones with a welcome and solid theoretical background to justify his expressly visual conception of the masque. Images are imbued by Jones with meaning in basically three ways: (1) The image itself and its aesthetic qualities rather than the meaning it carries are of importance. (2) The iconography of the 'picture' is significant. (3) Jones relates the 'picture' to a system of reference, for example the Italian scenographic tradition; hence the pastiche-character of many of his scenic designs. Usually this reference carries a meaning which in the context of the masque acquires a new significance. Instances of all three uses may be found in *Tempe Restored* and examples of the first and third way to use 'pictures' will be discussed in some detail.

The second of the two masques produced by Jones in January and February of 1632 in collaboration with the poet Aurelian Townshend, *Tempe Restored* was performed as the queen's shrovetide masque on St Valentine's day and a commemorative booklet appeared shortly afterwards. Like most printed Caroline masques it is provided with an argument prefixed to the text proper which informs the reader of the content and invention of the masque and suggests a framework of meaning within which to read the subsequent description of the scene and the poetic text:

Circe by her allurements inamored a young Gent. on her person, who a while lived with her in all sensuall delights vntill vpon some iealositie conceived, shee gaue him to drinke of an enchanted Cup, and touching him with her golden wand transformed him into a *Lyon*. After some time shee remembring her former loue, retransformed him into his former shape. Which he reasuming tooke the first occasion by flight to quit the place and comming into the presence of his Maiestie, whose sight frees him from all feare he relates the story of his fortune.

When *Circe* had notice of her Lovers escape, it put her into a furious anger and then into a lamentation or loue passion. But being consoled by her Nymphes; shee commands that all such delights be prepared as may sweeten her sorrow: and presently all the voluntary beasts vnder her subiection are introduced to make her sport. After which the way being first prepared by *Harmony*, and the Influences; diuine *Beautie* accompanied with fouerteene stars of a happy constellation, descends to the Musicke of the *Sphaeres* and ioyneth with heroicke *vertue*, where in presence of *Ioue* & *Cupid*, *Circe* knowing the designe of the destinies on this glorious Enterview, voluntarily delivers her golden rod to *MINERVA*. So all the enchantments being dissolved. *TEMPE* which for a time had bene possess'd by the voluntary beasts of *CIRCES* Court; is restored to the true followers of the *MVSES*. [*Tempe Restored*, sig. A2r-p. 2]

The reader of this argument is alerted by the use of several keywords to a certain philosophic discourse to which the invention relates. Among them are 'sensuall delights', 'loue passion', 'voluntary beasts' and 'diuine *Beauty*'. They seem to refer the reader to a Platonic, or Neo-Platonic, discourse as it

had developed in a number of *trattati d'amore* in the early Italian *cinquecento*, among the most notable of these tracts perhaps being Pietro Bembo's *Gli Asolani* (1505) and Baldassarre Castiglione's *Il Libro del cortegiano* (1528) which had been translated into English by Sir Thomas Hoby in 1561 and was issued a second time in 1588. Sensual delights are generally deprecated in these books while spiritual love, above all things sensual, is extolled because it ennobles humankind, uniting the souls of the (Platonic) lovers and lifting them up to contemplation.²

Although the references are obvious enough there is some evidence that Jones apprehended that not all of the significant elements might be understood or, perhaps, be understood correctly by the reader even with the aid of the argument. For while the argument is a regular feature of the later masques, *Tempe Restored* is unique among the masques of Stuart culture in that the printed text also includes with the 'Allegory' a ready-made exegesis of its invention which explains the allegorical significance of the *dramatis personae* and the scenic action in detail.³ It is appended to the text proper and provides something like a corrective to the reader's understanding, spelling out the intended interpretation. Of course, the publication of Balthasar Beaujoyeulx's *Balet comique de la royne* (1582), which was an important source for the architect's invention, had also included several 'allegories', from one of which Jones even quotes. Still, one might suspect that Jones was perhaps disappointed by the reaction of the spectators during and after the performance and therefore decided to provide a further aid to the understanding of the masque in the subsequently published text; or that he did attempt the appropriation of the poet's medium with the printed text and sought, again, to assert himself against his former collaborator, making it a witness for the relevance and dignity of the visual masque.

Both reasons may have been of consequence with Jones. But there is, I think, a third reason. It seems to me that the invention of the masque, and therefore also the 'Allegory', is really not based on straightforward Neo-Platonic doctrine alone but to a certain degree also on an Aristotelian concept of ethics as transmitted not only by the ancient philosopher's tracts but also by Alessandro Piccolomini's *Della Institution morale*. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, of course, is concerned with the right and wrong of human actions and how to achieve human felicity (*eudaimonia*).⁴ An essential tenet of Aristotelian moral philosophy is the way of the just mean. Piccolomini explains, using an image coined by the ancient philosopher, that it is difficult to escape the vices since virtue is similar to the midpoint within a circle of vices.⁵ He then continues, again referring to Aristotle, to expound two remedies to which humankind may resort:

La prima è, che, douendo l'huomo per trouare il mezo, doue consiste la uirtù, fuggir da ciaschedun de gli estremi; auuertisca sempre di fuggir prima quello estremo, che piu s'opponne alla uirtù: hauendo noi gia detto, che sempre de' due estremi alla uirtù l'un piu, che l'altro, è contrario, Onde si deue incominciar da questo, &

finalmente seguir con l'altro. come, per esempio, per diuentar temperato, prima debbiam fuggire la Intemperantia, che la Insensibilita; Per esser quella maggior uitio di questa, da cui facil cosa fia poi lo scampare. L'altra uia, ouer rimedio sarà, che sempre ci sforziamo di fuggir piu di quel uitio, alqual piu ci sentiamo inclinati. [*Della Institution morale*, V.xi.205–06]

(The first is that, for finding the middle, in which consists virtue, humankind must flee from each of the extremes; it is indicated always to flee first that extreme which opposes itself more to virtue: we have already said that always, of the two extremes, one is more contrary to virtue than the other. Hence one must begin with this and finally follow with the other. Such as, for example, to become temperate, first we need to flee intemperance rather than insensibility; because this is a greater vice than that, from which [i.e. the latter] it will then be more easy to escape. The other way, or remedy, shall be that we always try harder to flee that vice to which we feel more inclined.)

The first remedy, known as the just mean is the one relevant in the present context.⁶ Humankind is advised to avoid the extremes either way and thus to act virtuously.⁷ I think that it was the practical and didactic aspect of this simple and widely-known tenet which interested Jones. It is also one of the basic differences between Platonic, or Neo-Platonic, and Aristotelian ethics. Plato, too, holds that virtue may be taught (because it is something that may be known). Human beings must gain knowledge of the idea of virtue, because only then are they able to act virtuously by participating in the idea of virtue.⁸ But it is Aristotle who first understands ethics not only as a distinct philosophic discipline but defines it as a practical science (*episteme praktike*) which is not, in the last instance, directed towards the knowledge of the idea of virtue but aims at the knowledge of how to act virtuously for the sake of acting virtuously.⁹ The just mean is therefore a practical help to acting virtuously to which everyone can resort. Although *Tempe Restored* seems to be the first masque in which Jones applied the Aristotelian doctrine thus straightforwardly, the precept of the just mean may be traced in some of his subsequent masques too, notably in *The Temple of Love* of 1635.¹⁰

I

Inigo Jones owned a copy of Bernardo Segni's translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* into Italian,¹¹ but I suggest that the immediate source for his Aristotelianism in *Tempe Restored* was Piccolomini's *Della Institution morale*. First published in 1542 in an unauthorised version by Scotto in Venice as *Della Istitutione di tutta la vita de l'huomo nato nobile, e in città libera, libri X*, a new edition, revised and enlarged by the author, was printed in 1560 by Ziletti in Venice as *Della Institution morale*. A reprint of this edition of 1575 was owned by Jones. His copy, extensively marked and annotated by the architect, is kept today in Worcester College Library, Oxford.¹² The

distribution of his underlinings and annotations suggests that Jones addressed himself to the work as a whole.¹³ At the same time the concentration of his glosses, most of which simply paraphrase the Italian text, proves his special interest both in the systematic categorisation and definition of the perceptive faculties (*potentie*) of the human soul and in the description and analysis of the eleven moral virtues (*virtù morali*), especially of temperance and constancy, of fortitude and of the virtue of prudence which is both moral and intellectual.¹⁴

It is known of Jones that he annotated several of his books at different stages.¹⁵ The handwriting of his glosses in the *Institution*, however, is fairly homogenous. According to the criteria proposed by John Newman and Gordon Higgott it may be approximately dated in the early or mid-1630s.¹⁶ It may then be assumed that Jones read or re-read his copy of Piccolomini's tract roughly at about the same time he was working on *Tempe Restored*, even though it remains conjectural when and where he actually bought it. That his perusal does indeed have a bearing on the invention of this particular masque is attested to by the accentuation that may be inferred from his annotations and underlinings. This internal evidence, in turn, confirms the criteria proposed by Newman and Higgott and suggests February 1632 as the date *ante quem* for the particular style of Jones's handwriting in his Piccolomini.

The *Institution morale* is a compendium of moral philosophy, following Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Meant to be a practical handbook for the education of young noblemen it is, significantly, written in *volgare*.¹⁷ The tract is dated 1539 or 1540, when the Sienese philosopher and poet Alessandro Piccolomini (1508–78), together with Benedetto Varchi, held lectures at the *Accademia degli Infiammati* at Padua,¹⁸ of which he was *prencipe* in 1541. In various editions and translations it was widely distributed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and 'it established its author as an outstanding authority in the field of ethics'.¹⁹

In order to be able to appreciate Jones's appropriation of the ethical precepts propounded in Piccolomini's *Institution morale* it is necessary to give a short summary of those trains of thought suggested by the architect's annotations and markings in his copy to have been of particular interest to him. They are the make-up of the soul and its perceptive faculties (particularly the intellect and the intellectual appetite) and the generation of moral virtue.

Piccolomini describes three components of the human soul: *anima vegetativa*, *anima sensitiva* and *anima rationale*.²⁰ In this he follows Aristotle's categorisation as it had been transmitted also by Thomas of Aquinas and the scholastic tradition.²¹ The first of these *anime* is common to all living things, to plants, to animals and to humankind. However, since he is concerned with what is essentially human, Piccolomini is not interested in the *anima vegetativa* and does not enlarge on it – nor is it relevant to the present context.

The *anima sensitiva*, common to humankind and beast, may be divided according to its cognitive, appetitive and motive faculties (*potentie*) into three aspects. The cognitive faculties Piccolomini differentiates into outward and inward faculties. There are five outward faculties (the five senses) and three inward faculties: *senso comune* (common sense, which makes distinctions and judgements); *potentia imaginativa* (imagination) and *potentia reservativa* (memory). To the eight cognitive *potentie* are joined two appetitive faculties:²² *appetito irascibile* and *appetito concupiscibile*. While *appetito concupiscibile* enables humankind to desire, to love and to hate etc. it is *appetito irascibile* which lets them experience hope and makes them try to overcome all difficulties they might encounter in gratifying their desires. Within both appetites are included all the affects like love and hate, desire and fear or hope.²³

The material manifestations of the world are first perceived by the outward cognitive faculties, the senses. They then are processed by the inward faculties. By these they are referred to the appetitive faculty, which in itself is blind, as either pleasant (*dilettevole*) or unpleasant (*dispiacevole*). Finally, judged by the imaginative faculty, the stimulus is answered by either interest or flight: this function is executed by the motive aspect of the *anima sensitiva*, responding to the appetite, which is characterised as '[la] principal potentia del senso' (the principal power of the sense).²⁴

Only humankind is graced with the *anima rationale*. Like the *anima sensitiva* this is divided into two faculties, one that is cognitive, called *intelletto* (reason or intellect), and one that is non-cognitive, labelled as *volontà* or *appetito intellettivo* (desire of cognition or intellectual appetite). Jones paraphrases in his copy of the *Institution morale*: 'Powr [deleted: Porpose] of the / Reasonable soule / ar too / the first Inte- / llect, knowing / the other will, / or intellectuall / appetit not kn- / owing of it se- / lf'.²⁵ It is assigned to the intellect to perceive those images (*imagini*) which are apprehended by the imagination. In contrast with the equivalent sensitive faculty, which apprehends material manifestations, these images are not material but abstract (form in the Aristotelian sense). For their perception it is therefore necessary that there should be a 'nobilissima Intelligentia' (most noble intelligence) (God), because only this can make the abstract images tangible – as the sun makes the material world visible and tangible with its light.

Every human being is born with the intellect as a *tabula rasa* which is then informed by her or his perception: this is the *intelletto possibile*. Its basis is the *intelletto in atto* or *in habito* (active reason), which transmits the forms of things to the *intelletto possibile* and thereby makes it possible that they are inscribed on to the *tabula rasa*. Finally, Piccolomini distinguishes between *intelletto pratico* and *intelletto speculativo*:

L'ufficio dello speculatio è di non considerare alcuna cosa particolare, come tale; ma solamente le forme, & le nature, & le specie loro: lequali non particolari, ma uniuersali si domandano [. . .] ma l'intelletto pratico per contrario, douendo

applicarsi, come ho detto, alle attioni dell'huomo. [*Della Institution morale*, II.ix.70]

(The task of the speculative [intellect] is not to consider anything particular, as such, but only their forms, nature and species: which may be called not particular but universal [...] but the practical intellect, in contrast, has to apply itself, as I have said, to the actions of the human being.)

The speculative intellect is concerned with the nature of things while the practical intellect is engaged in their application to man's actions.

Right and wrong are the categories of *intelletto*, good and evil of *volontà* (intellectual appetite or free will). Both *intelletto* and *volontà* are therefore immediately relevant for acting morally, while the vegetative faculties are of no consequence to this because they are not dependent on reason (*ragione*). The same is generally also true of the sensitive faculties but does not apply to the appetitive faculties because they are subservient to the precepts of reason. They are therefore 'per participatione' (by participation), if not intrinsically, joined to the rational faculty.²⁶ It may then be said of acting morally:

Concorrono adunque essentialmente, & non per accidente, alle operationi morali l'appetito sensitiuo, l'intelletto, & la uolontà. de quali il primo è rationale per participatione d'obedientia; & gli altri due per essentia, & natura loro. Le quali potentie, quando son nell'huomo bene ordinate nel modo, che debbono essere; la uolontà, priua d'ogni corrottione, che l'appetito del senso le possa dare, sarà regina delle operationi in guisa, che, ogni uolta che l'intelletto pratico le porrà inanzi alcuna cosa, che ueramente sia buona, ella senza far contrasto con chi si sia, la eleggerà: &, a questa elettione concorrendo l'appetito, senza alcun contrasto; egli farà eseguire alla uirtù motiua, secondo che la uolontà comanda. Ma egli accade uie piu spesso, che non bisognerebbe, che l'appetito del senso, che dourebbe star soggetto alle potentie rationali, a quelle si fa rubello; &, il tutto conturbando, inquieta rende la uita nostra. [*Della Institution morale*, II.ix.72]

(Sensitive appetite, intellect and intellectual appetite concur thus essentially, and not accidentally, in [a human being's] moral operations. The first of those is rational because of its participation in obedience and the other two because of their essence and nature. If those powers are well arranged in humankind, in the way that they should be, Volontà, free of any corruption which the sensual appetite could give her, shall be the queen of the operations in that guise that, whenever the practical intellect will pose to her anything that is truly good, she, without contending with whatever it may be, will elect this: and the appetite will concur with this decision without any contradiction; it will make the motive power execute what Volontà commands. But it happens more often, as it should not be, that the sensual appetite which should be subjected to the rational powers, rebels against them; and, disturbing everything, it makes our life restless.)

Acting morally consequently results from the interaction of sensitive appetite, intellect and intellectual appetite. *Volontà* (intellectual appetite) Piccolomini compares to a sovereign queen who reigns over the actions because, whenever *intelletto pratico* proposes anything to her as good, she

decides in its favour without further questioning it. Intellectual appetite may not be corrupted by sensual appetite, but since sensual appetite rebels against reason, although it is subjected to reason, there is a potential of conflict which may disturb the harmonious equilibrium of humankind.

How to dissolve this potential of conflict Piccolomini expounds in chapter Viv ('Come si produca nell'huomo la virtù morale').²⁷ Every human being has the option, in a process of habituation, to shape her or his actions more and more virtuously and finally, as it were, to internalise virtue as a habit. Jones paraphrases: 'good worke though / at first donn with pai-/ nes and difficulti by / long youse sweete & / easye'.²⁸ In addition, however, humankind requires the aid of right reason (*diritta ragione*) which, by overcoming desires, participates in the creation of virtue:²⁹

quelle prime operationi, onde nasce la uirtù, non sono uirtuose, & sono men nobili, che non è la uirtù: & nondimeno possono produrla; non per sola possanza loro, ma con l'aiuto della diritta ragione: laquale è quella, che uincendo l'appetito, poi ch'ella ha contrastato con esso, concorre al produr d'essa uirtù. [*Della Institution morale*, Viv.188]

(Those first operations, from which virtue is generated, are not virtuous and are less noble than virtue: which, however, they nonetheless can produce; not from their own sole power, but with the help of right reason: this it is which, by vanquishing the appetite with which it is in conflict, contributes to producing this virtue.)

Jones not only emphasises the importance of 'diritta ragione' in this passage by underlining it, but also by paraphrasing its function in a marginal gloss: '☞ / Right reason which / is that which oue-/ rcomes y^e Appetite / by striuing with it'.³⁰

In chapter X.viii ('De cinque habiti, over virtù intelletuali') Piccolomini explains among other things '☞ / what Reson / or y^e rationally / poure [i.e. power] is'.³¹ It, too, may be divided in *intelletto speculativo* and *intelletto pratico*. Jones paraphrases:

the rationally po / ure deided in / to, too parts that / is into too Intelle / cts. Specula / tiue and practi / ck / y^e first stories [i.e. stores] in / the truth found / y^e second accomod / eth y^e trowth to / humain oppera / tiones / logical dimost / ration of this / ☞ [.]³²

And:

y^e habits about th / ings necessary are in / y^e intellect specula / tiue / and habits w^{ch} con / sider contingency / ar in y^e intellect pra / ctick[.]³³

Of the five properties of reason which may be internalised by habituation three (*scientia*, *intelligentia* and *sapientia*) are speculative, while two (*arte* and *prudentia*) are practical which means that they have an immediate bearing on moral operations.³⁴

With reference to Aristotle's definition prudence (*prudentia*) is identified by Piccolomini as 'retta, & regolata ragione delle cose agibili', paraphrased

by Jones in a gloss as: 'Prudence is / right reason. / of things agi-/ ble'.³⁵ (Things agile here means those things on which the acting person is able to exert his influence.³⁶) With respect to moral operations prudence is the most important of the five *habiti intelletivi*, because its task is to weigh up and decide and consequently give the inducement for acting morally and pursuing the way of the just mean:

l'ufficio del prudente sarà di saper ben consultare, e dentro à se iudicare, & eleggere tutte quelle cose, che siano ragioneuoli, & utili à ben uiuere, & per consequentia alla felice uita dell'huomo: regolando, & dirizzado in ciascheduna uirtù le operationi uirtuose; & determinando il mezo ne gli affetti, intorno a' quali i uirtij, & le uirtù si ritrouano. [*Della Institution morale*, VIII.xv.374]

(The task of the prudent shall be to know how to consult well and within himself to judge and to elect those things which are reasonable and useful for living well and consequently also for the happy life of humankind: by controlling and directing in each virtue the virtuous operations and determining the middle between the affects, within which the vices and the virtues are to be found.)

Among the chapters of the *Institution morale* most extensively annotated by Jones is chapter VI.iii ('Come sia differente la temperantia dalla continentia').³⁷ Like prudence, which on the one hand is a virtue informed by reason (intellectual virtue), but even so emerges on the other hand as a habit reinforced by habituation and 'per esperientia' (by experience),³⁸ temperance and continence – as well as the equivalent vices of intemperance and incontinence – are characterised as habits (*habiti*). Again with reference to Aristotle, Piccolomini distinguishes between temperance and continence.³⁹ While temperance, due to sustained practice, is guided directly by reason, continence has to be achieved by actively and consciously deciding time and again in favour of moderation against the desires:

il continente, non hauendo ancor fatto l'habito nell' uirtù, dall'una parte persuado dalle lusinghe dell'appetito, & dall'altra parte commosso da' consigli della ragione, con gran fatica, dopo il contrasto di tai nemici, finalmente secondo la ragione operando, da gli offerto diletti s'astiene. [*Della Institution morale*, VI.iii.245]

(The continent, not yet having made a habit of virtue, on the one hand persuaded by the temptations of the appetite and on the other hand moved by the counsel of reason, after the conflict of those enemies with great effort finally acts according to reason and abstains from the offered delights.)

Since it therefore appears to be a process of perpetual endeavours it is laudable and worthy to attempt continence. It works in two ways, again as paraphrased by Jones: 'continence in two / maners / 1 / in ouercōming sen-/ sual delights / 2 / or in [deleted: in] not beei-/ ng ouercom by / sensual contr-/ istation'.⁴⁰ By practice and habituation the continent (*continento*) is able to internalise moderation to such a degree that finally he too reaches the state of the

temperate (*temperato*): 'Ma bene è uero, che il continente, per le sue lodeuoli operationi, assuefacedosi in quelle, a poco a poco diuenterà temperato' (But it is truly good that the continent, through his laudable actions, accustoming himself to these, little by little becomes temperate).⁴¹

Moral virtue, according to Piccolomini, is generated by acting virtuously – 'virtu is gotten by / the operations & li-/ ke to the virtuous'⁴² – and temperance, too, is for this reason a moral or ethical but not a rational or intellectual (dia-noetic) virtue. It is a decision dependent on human free will and reason which mediates between two extremes, both of which are understood to be corrupt and depraved, between the extremes of excess and defect or deficiency.

Book X.ii of the *Institution morale* ('Della differentia tra l'amicitia, & l'amore') treats among other things of the nature of love.⁴³ The categorisation of the different kinds of love is as complex as that of the soul. In accordance with the numerous Neo-Platonic *trattati d'amore* of his day Piccolomini distinguishes three principal categories: *amore ferino* (animal or brutish love), *amore humano* (human love) and *amore divino* (divine love). But again, since he is primarily concerned with humankind he refuses to deal with *amore ferino* and *amore divino* in the context of the *Institution*. For, although humankind participates in both, Piccolomini considers them of only limited relevance: 'per essergli le operationi ferine biasimeuoli; & le mere, & pure diuine impossibili' (because the animal actions are deplorable; and the merely and purely divine [are] impossible).⁴⁴ This is a marked divergence from Platonising conceptions of love and, as Viktoria von Flemming remarks, with it Piccolomini renounces the derivation of interhuman love of a divinely ordained circuit and its referring back to it: interhuman love is then not reduced to an interimistic state but is given an independent and autonomous quality.⁴⁵ Love as *amore humano* Piccolomini subsequently defines as 'un desiderio di posseder con perfetta unione l'animo bello della cosa amata' (a desire to possess in perfect union the beautiful soul of the beloved being).⁴⁶ Stimulated by the appetitive faculties of the soul expounded in the second book of the *Institution*, the longing for the known good and beautiful generates a certain pleasure or gratification (*compiacimento*). This gratification, when the object of their appetite is denied to humankind, devolves into a desire (*desiderio*) which aims purposefully at the union with the good and beautiful object. Although, initially, love is, for Piccolomini, not identical with desire he then does go on to equate *amore* and *desiderio* because he understands *amore* to be the gratification (*compiacimento*) generated by a continuous desire:

essendo l'amore, & il desiderio affetti diuersi tra loro, debbiam sapere, che, causandosi gli affetti el nostro appetito, cosi concupiscibile, come irascibile, nel modo, che nel secondo libro disopra habbiam detto, uien l'amore à causarsi, quando il concupiscibile appetito, posta che gli sarà inanzi dalla potentia conosciuta dell'anima nostra alcuna cosa buona, ò bella, (che per il medesimo intendo io per hora il

buono, e'l bello) uiene à riuolgersi uerso quella, causandosi in esso un certo compiacimento, se per caso l'huomo spera di conseguir quel tale oggetto, l'appetito uiene à mouersi uerso quello di un mouimento intentionale, ouero spirituale, che si domanda desiderio, nel qual mouimento sempre si troua quel compiacimento, che habbiam detto chiamarsi amore. [. . .] L'amore adunque si può chiamar desiderio. [*Della Institution morale*, X.ii.431–32]

(Since love and delight are affects that differ from each other we must know that – because the affects and our appetite, *appetito concupiscibile* as well as *appetito irascibile*, are caused in that manner which we have set out above in the second book – love is caused when the *appetito concupiscibile*, supposed that anything good or beautiful should be known beforehand by the [cognitive] power of our soul (for the time being I understand the Good and the Beautiful to be the same), turns towards this, causing in this a certain gratification. In case a human being by chance hopes to achieve that selfsame object, the appetite comes to move towards it with an intentional or spiritual movement which is called desire, in which movement may always be found this gratification, which as we have said is called love. [...] Love may therefore be called desire.)

In contrast with *amore ferino* which is directed exclusively towards the corporeal – ‘desiderasimo solamente di possedere, & di godere il corpo della cosa amata’ (we would desire only to possess and to enjoy the body of the beloved being)⁴⁷ – *amore humano* aims at the beauty of the soul and desires the mutual fulfillment of both lovers: ‘Desidera adunque il uero amante di possedere un'animo bello, cioè di far nascere scambieuoale compiacimento in quell'animo’ (The true lover desires to possess a beautiful soul, that is to say, to generate mutual gratification in this soul) [*Della Institution morale*, X.ii.432]. Piccolomini thus envisages a reciprocal and anthropocentric conception of love which, moreover, accepts desire as an integral part of humankind, as is expounded elsewhere in his tract.⁴⁸ According to Viktoria von Flemming, Piccolomini therefore rejects the (Platonic) definition of love as a desire for the beautiful or the good. It seems to me, however, that his repudiation is not quite as categorical as von Flemming makes it out to be. For Piccolomini, too, if only to a certain extent, understands corporeal beauty to be the manifestation of an interior beauty. It is generated by the refraction of a divine beam (*divin raggio*) in the delicate and pleasing features of a beautiful human being. From the perception of this corporeal beauty results an initial gratification (*compiacimento*) which later is transferred on to the perception of the interior beauty and both finally conjoin:

Et è d'auuertire, che, quantunque si desideri la possession dell'animo; non è però, che la bellezza corporale non è altro, che uno splendor del diuin raggio, che ripercuote, & risulta da un ben proportionato sito, & compartimento delle parti, che son nel uolto di una persona bella, & così fatta bellezza, come nuncio della bellezza dell'animo, ci commune à quel primo compiacimento. il qual non fermando in tal diminuta bellezza, ma in quella dell'animo penetrando; in essa

finalmente s'acqueta. & maggiormente, perche il piu delle uolte, secondo il corso della natura, dee la bellezza di fuori esser argomento di quella di dentro. [*Della Institution morale*, X.ii.432–33]

(And it is to be heeded that, no matter how much one would desire the possession of the soul, it is not so that corporeal beauty is nothing else but the splendour of the divine ray which reflects and results from a well proportioned place and division of the parts which are in the face of a beautiful person; a beauty of this kind lets us participate as a messenger from the beauty of the soul in that first gratification which does not limit itself to such a reduced beauty but penetrates also in that of the soul and in this finally comes to rest; and much more so, because most of the time, after the course of nature, the outward beauty must be the proof of that inside.)

The members of the body are therefore, for Piccolomini, tools of the soul (or mind), 'strumenti dell'animo', for they make its beauty tangible and thereby pave the way to gratification (*compiacimento*) and love.⁴⁹ At the same time, however, he concedes that this tenet in many cases and for various reasons fails, be it for the influence of the stars or, much more often, for the lack of a good education. Often, according to Piccolomini, humankind loves the ugly but only because, erroneously, they believe it to be the beautiful: for not only may the senses be deceived but also the intellect, 'per essere obligato in un certo modo alla imperfettion delle membra, il piu delle uolte prende il falso per il uero, & il brutto per il bello' (for it is obliged in a certain way to the imperfection of its members, which more often than not take the false for the true and the ugly for the beautiful).⁵⁰

When Jones read Alessandro Piccolomini's *Della Institution morale* some time prior to February 1632 he was obviously interested in two things especially: in the make-up of the soul and its perceptive faculties (particularly the intellect and the intellectual appetite), and in how to generate moral virtue. His annotations and underlinings show that he closely followed Piccolomini's discussion of the habit of continence and the moral virtue of temperance. Jones noted that Piccolomini considers continence, guided by right reason or prudence (*diritta ragione*, or *phronesis* in Aristotle), as instrumental in 'ouercōming sensual delights'; that continence signifies a lengthy process of internalising to act virtuously and thereby finally to achieve temperance and, with temperance, human felicity. Jones must also have read Piccolomini's chapter on the difference between friendship and love. For, although he did not gloss it, there are obvious echoes not only of the points just mentioned, but also of this chapter in *Tempe Restored*.

II

In the printed text of *Tempe Restored*, Inigo Jones is credited not only with the invention and the scenic design of the masque but also with the composition

of its descriptive passages and of its 'Allegory' while Aurelian Townshend is mentioned as the author of the poetic text only: 'All the Verses were written by M^r. Townsend. / The subject and Allegory of the Masque, with the descriptions, and Apparatus of the Sceanes were invented by *Inigo Jones*, Surveyor of his Maiesties worke'.⁵¹

It has been shown that one source of Jones's text was Balthasar Beaujoyeulx's *Balet comique de la royne* of 1582.⁵² He and Townshend, as Erica Veevers puts it, 'worked allusively from the text of the *Balet comique*, but closely enough to suggest the original'⁵³ to those familiar with it. There are, however, some marked differences. 'To fit the English masque form', Veevers continues, 'they left out the long philosophical speeches of the original, the building up of the plot, and the dramatic climax', and she concludes: 'In this simplification they somewhat misrepresent the original.'⁵⁴ As a grave instance of this 'misrepresentation' Veevers points out that in the *Balet comique* 'reason alone is insufficient to vanquish the passions without the aid of Heaven' while in *Tempe Restored* it 'is not shown being assisted by Heaven'.⁵⁵ Veevers interprets this particular 'misrepresentation' as more or less accidental, for it is essential to her argument that the masques of Queen Henrietta Maria should promote a Catholic Platonism or Platonic Catholicism: In the seventeenth century the Counter-Reformation had adapted Neo-Platonic ideals of Beauty and Love to the cult of the Virgin Mary, and Veevers plausibly demonstrates in her study that in the 1630s the French-born and Catholic Queen Henrietta Maria herself led such a cult at the mainly Protestant English court with the intention of proselytising,⁵⁶ her masques being instrumental to this purpose:

[The Queen's] masques may have been an opportunity to make a semi-public demonstration of her views, and to show, not that she was fully occupied with a personal cult of Platonic love and court theatricals, but that she was active in the interests of Catholicism, and that her sponsorship of Platonic love was a means by which her religion was made acceptable at court.⁵⁷

While I am fully persuaded by Veevers's interpretation of the Queen's intentions, I would argue that the 'misrepresentation' mentioned above was deliberate rather than accidental and that, in fact, it is typical of Jones's eclectic approach to the invention of his masques. As with his stage designs, whose pastiche character has frequently been remarked upon,⁵⁸ I propose that Jones did not favour any single coherent philosophical system but rather picked such elements as were of service to him when and where he deemed them to be of use. I would therefore challenge as a simplification the overall identification of his inventions with Platonism and Neo-Platonism which has become a commonplace in Jones criticism.⁵⁹ Instead, I suggest that the moral philosophic concept expressed in the 'Allegory' of *Tempe Restored* as well as in its whole invention has been informed more particularly by the architect's thorough study of Alessandro Piccolomini's Aristotelian *Institution morale*. That

is not to deny the obvious influence also of Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought on Jones's work in general. However, it needs to be emphasised that its lofty ideals are tempered in the architect's invention for *Tempe Restored* by the more practical approach of Aristotle. Paraphrasing Piccolomini's text, Jones had reiterated in his annotations the well-established distinction between Plato and Aristotle – 'Plato a deuine / philosofer' and 'Aristotell a sens-/ ible philosofer'.⁶⁰ In her study of the French academies of the sixteenth century Frances Yates has shown that it was a crucial concern of many Renaissance Neo-Platonists '[t]o reconcile the divine and mystical wisdom of Plato (for in this light the Renaissance viewed Plato) with the rigorous logic and the ethical common sense of Aristotle'.⁶¹ In *Tempe Restored*, Inigo Jones shifted the focus on the practical aspect of moral philosophy, enquiring into, and demonstrating to his audience and readers, the significance of his own art.

Yates claimed that Inigo Jones's 'Allegory' is a direct translation of one of the allegories appended to Beaujoyeux's *Balet comique*.⁶² While it is true that he culled the passages on Circe and her Nymphs and the transformed beasts from John Gordon's 'Autre Allegorie de la Circe',⁶³ albeit arranging them in a new order and substituting a few terms,⁶⁴ he added substantially to these passages and omitted others from Gordon's text.⁶⁵ His additions, I think, are mainly informed by his reading of Piccolomini's *Institution morale* and illustrate his attempt to imbue them with a new meaning in his own invention.

The Fugitive Favourite, according to Jones in the allegory, 'is figured an incontinent man, that striving with his affections, is at last by the power of reason perswaded to flye from those Sensuall desires, which had formerly corrupted his Iudgement'.⁶⁶ This passage is, even down to its wording, an obvious echo of the architect's annotations to chapter V.iv of the *Institution*, where Piccolomini treats of the different ways to generate moral virtue (*virtù morale*),⁶⁷ and of chapter VI.iii, where he distinguishes the habit of *continentia* from the virtue of *temperantia*.⁶⁸ *Incontinentia* had been labelled by Piccolomini as a habit which by constantly endeavouring to act virtuously, and guided by reason, may be transformed into the habit of *continentia* (the habit of endeavouring). This may then be gradually converted into the moral virtue of *temperantia* by a complete internalisation of acting virtuously.⁶⁹ The invention of the masque therefore revolves around the process of generating moral virtue, particularly the moral virtue of temperance which is realised in adhering to the just mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency.

Circe, with her allurements the distractor of the incontinent youth and responsible for disturbing his inner equilibrium, Jones characterises as 'desire in generall' – *desiderio* in Piccolomini, and in itself not necessarily base, because in the last instance subject to reason, as exemplified in the case of the fugitive favourite. 'Circe', writes Jones, 'here signifies desire in generall, the which hath power on all living Creatures, and beeing mixt of the Divine and

Sensible, hath divers effects, Leading some to Vertue, and others to Vice.⁷⁰ When he continues to describe her as 'a Queene, having in her service, and subiection, the *Nymphs*, which participate of Divinity, figuring the Vertues, and the brute Beasts, denoting the Vices',⁷¹ desire ('beeing mixt of the Divine and Sensible') is correctly shown to be constituted in the corporeal sphere by the faculty of *appetito* and in the spiritual one by that of *volontà*. The image of the queen, too, may be found in Piccolomini's tract where it is applied, however, to *volontà* alone.⁷² Incidentally, Cesare Ripa also used the same image in his *Iconologia* (appearing in a number of enlarged editions since 1593), which was one of the most important sources for Jones throughout his career.⁷³ Ripa, possibly referring to Piccolomini, says in his description of the first of three variants of *volontà*:

La volontà scriuono alcuni, che sia come Regina, la quale sedendo l'auuenimenti, ò fauoreuoli, ò contrarij, che ò riporti il senso, ò persuadea la ragione: & quando, ò da questa, ò da quello vi è malamente informata, s'inganna nel commandare, & disturba la concordia dell'huomo interiore, la qual si può ancora forse dire ministra dell'intelletto, à cui volentieri si sommette per fuggire il sospetto di contumace, & di sentimenti.⁷⁴

(Volontà, some write, should be like a queen, who rules the events, either favourable or averse, that either the sense would report or which would be counselled by reason: and when, either by this or by that, she is badly informed she is mistaken in commanding and disturbs the concord of the interior human being which may, perhaps, also be called the instrument of the intellect, for it willingly submits to this to escape the suspicion of disobedience and of feelings.)

Circe's ability to disturb humankind's inner equilibrium and to turn human beings into beasts also signifies the ambivalent nature of her corporeal beauty. Its perception leads either to vice, making humankind slaves to their sensuality and, in effect, brutish beasts, or to virtue. In the masque, Divine Beauty and Heroic Virtue – the latter of which is present in the person of His Majesty to whom the fugitive youth addresses himself⁷⁵ – prevail against the sensuous magic of Circe. Prompted by their intervention, she herself surrenders her magic wand to Minerva. With this wand – incidentally an obviously phallic symbol – she had turned the fugitive into a lion and it may therefore be understood to symbolise the potentially depraved and brutish constituent of human nature:

That divine *Beauty* accompan'ed with a troope of Stars of a happy Constellation ioyning with Heiroicke vertue should dissolue the enchantments, and *Circe* voluntarily deliver her golden rod to *Minerva*, is meant that a divine Beame coming from aboue, with a good inclination, and a perfect habit of vertue made, by the *Harmony* of the Irascible and concupiscible parts obedient to the rationally and highest part of the soule. Making man onely a mind vsing the body and affections as instruments; which being his true perfection, brings him to all the happinesse which can bee inioyed heere below. [*Tempe Restored*, pp. 18–19]

Minerva to whom Circe yields is, of course, the goddess of wisdom – doubling here for reason to which desire is shown to succumb by the token of the surrendered magic wand. The generation of virtue by habituation of acting virtuously and thereby reconciling reason and appetite (both irascible and concupiscible) is also made explicit. The divine beam with which Minerva is associated had been explained by Piccolomini as one of the necessary prerequisites to endow the corporeal with a beauty which enables humankind to perceive the beauty of the soul. Piccolomini, moreover, had therefore defined the corporeal, the body, as an instrument or tool used for the perception of the beauty of the soul. Jones takes this up, explicitly referring to the body and the affections as ‘instruments’ of the mind while he identifies the rational part of the soul governing humankind’s actions, in accordance with Piccolomini’s and Aristotle’s categorisation, as the ‘highest part of the soule’. That it should be Minerva, or reason, who is linked to the divine beam may perhaps be interpreted as an intimation of the role the intellect plays in the perception of beauty. That Divine Beauty should be accompanied by stars of a ‘happy Constellation’ seems to refer to one of the reasons for a miscarriage of perceiving true beauty given by Piccolomini (the influence of the stars), the other being a lack of education. Any mistake is prevented here *a priori* and the perception of divine beauty guaranteed by the stars. Heroic Virtue, too, joining with Divine Beauty, has some significance in this context which may be deduced from Piccolomini’s tract. Personified by the King during the performance of the masque, it seems to relate to the three ‘lodeuolissime cose’ (most laudable things) which Piccolomini explains to be necessary conditions for humankind to act virtuously: ‘la uirtù, la continentia, & quella disposition d’animo, che eroica e chiamata da Aristotele’ (virtue, continence, and that disposition of the soul which is called heroic by Aristotle).⁷⁶ The allegory thus explains the process of generating moral virtue and when Jones claimed that at the end of the consistent application of this conception there were to be found ‘all the happinesse which can bee inioyed heere below’,⁷⁷ then this is a reference to the whole idea of ethics and the *Institution morale* and, more immediately, to its essential ninth chapter of the second book (‘Delle potentie dell’anima humana, & in quale di esse la felicità si ritrovi’)⁷⁸ which Jones had annotated particularly extensively.

Defining corporeal beauty in terms of artistic theory (symmetry, colour and grace) Jones finally asserts that ‘Corporeall Beauty, consisting in simetry, colour, and certaine vnexpressable Graces’, as apparent in the beauty of Queen Henrietta Maria and not tainted by sensual desires, ‘may draw vs to the contemplation of the Beauty of the soule, vnto which it hath Analogy’.⁷⁹ This, again, corresponds to Piccolomini’s definition of *desiderio* which he explained to be the longing for that gratification which is induced by corporeal beauty and which ultimately, since the corporeal mirrors the interior beauty, facilitates the perception of the beauty of the soul.⁸⁰ Thus, referring to the analogy of material and ideal beauty expounded by moral philosophy,

Jones's masque, informed by an explicitly visual and not poetic conception, is understood to be a vehicle of philosophic knowledge and moral didaxis and, consequently, its dignity is greatly enhanced.

III

The analogy between corporeal and interior beauty proposed by Piccolomini and reiterated by Jones provides the architect with the theoretical background to justify his visual conception of the masque.⁸¹ His insistence on the morally instructive character of the visual masque needs certainly to be seen in the context of his quarrel with Ben Jonson. Even at the outset of his career with Jones, in his notorious preface to *Hymenaei* of 1606, the poet had applied the distinction between ephemeral body and everlasting soul to the relationship between scenic design and poetic invention in the masque:

It is a noble and iust advantage, that the things subjected to *Vnderstanding* have of those which are objected to *Sense*, that the one sorte are but momentarie, and meere taking; the other impressing, and lasting: Else the Glory of all these *Solemnities* had perish'd like a Blaze, and gone out, in the *Beholders* eyes. So short-liv'd are the *Bodies* of all Things, in comparison of their *Soules*. And, though *Bodies* oft-times have the ill lucke to be sensually preferr'd, they find afterwards, the good fortune (when *Soules* live) to be vtterly forgotten. This it is hath made the most royall *Princes*, and greatest *Persons*, (who are commonly the *Personaters* of these *Actions*) not onely studious of Riches, and Magnificence in the outward Celebration, or Shew; (which rightly becomes them) but curious after the most high, and hearty *Inventions*, to furnish the inward parts: (and those grounded vpon *Antiquitie*, and solide *Learnings*) which, though their *Voyce* be taught to sound to present Occasions, their *Sense*, or dooth, or should alwayes lay holde on more remov'd *Mysteries*.⁸²

With his design and description of the proscenium arch for *Tempe Restored* Jones enlarged on his conception of the visual character of the masque as he had expressed it only a few weeks before in *Albion's Triumph*. In the earlier masque he had, with the personifications of Theory and Practice, vindicated architecture and 'Ingining' as disciplines belonging to the liberal arts.⁸³ With the personifications of Invention and Knowledge, prominently figuring in the architrave of his proscenium arch and towering over Envy under the Masque of Friendship⁸⁴ and Curious Ignorance, he now claimed the equality of his visual representations to learned poesy.⁸⁵ The attributes of Knowledge, 'a booke lying open before him, and a torch lighted in his hand',⁸⁶ are obviously taken from Cesare Ripa's description of *cognitione* in the *Iconologia*:⁸⁷

Donna che stando à sedere tenghi vna torcia accesa, & appresso haurà vn libro aperto, che con il dito indice della destra mano l'accenni.

La torcia accesa, significa, che come à i nostri occhi corporali, fà bisogno della luce per vedere, così all'occhio nostro interno, che è l'intelletto per riceuere la cognitione delle spetie intelligibili, fà mestiero dell'istrumento estrinseco de sensi, & particolarmente di quello del vedere, che dimostrarsi col lume della torcia, perciòche come dice Aristotele: *Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, ciò mostrando ancora il libro aperto, perche ò per vederlo, ò per vdirlo leggere si fà in noi la cognitione delle cose. [Ripa, *Iconologia*, p. 70]

(A woman who stands to rule who should hold a lighted torch and close by she should have an open book to which she would point with the index finger of the right hand.

The lighted torch signifies that, as to our corporeal eyes the light is necessary for seeing, so also our internal eye, which is the intellect, needs for achieving the cognition of the intelligible species the outward instrument of the senses, and especially that of seeing, which is demonstrated by the light of the torch, because as Aristotle says: 'Nothing is in the intellect which was not in the senses before'. This is also shown by the open book, because, either by seeing or by listening, reading produces in us the cognition of the objects.)

Knowledge therefore is not only acquired knowledge as symbolised by the open book, but also cognition or perception as shown by the lighted torch. It thereby signifies the end of a philosophical enquiry although restricted to the material world, the world perceived by the senses, and especially by the sense of vision. A sketch of the proscenium is not extant in this case but Jones described the structure in detail in the printed masque and, augmenting his earlier statement, he identified light and motion as the distinctive features of his masque: 'indeed these shewes are nothing else but pictures with Light and Motion'.⁸⁸ They are those 'pictures' perceived by Knowledge and therefore the material for philosophical enquiry.

In the 'Allegory', paraphrasing Gordon, Jones drew the connection between the 'Beautiful aspect' of architecture as portrayed in his scenic design with Circe's Palace ('the outward Celebration, or Shew') and corporeal beauty – both may lead to the love of virtue:


The description of her [i.e. Circe's] person, of extraordinary *Beauty*, and sweetness of her voyce, shewes that desire is moved either by sight or hearing, to loue *Vertue*, or the contrary, and the *Beautiful* aspect of her inchaunted Palace, glistering with gold, and Precious Ornaments, that desire cannot bee moued without apparance of *Beauty*, either true or false. [*Tempe Restored*, p. 17]⁸⁹

Circe's Palace is thus quite explicitly a witness of the instructive quality of the visual masque and its scenic design, leading to the perception of the beauty of the soul without the mediation of the word.

But its particular aspect is significant also in another way, and it illustrates very well another layer of meaning with which Jones usually imbued his scenic images and which is in itself a justification of the visual quality of the masque. It seems to me that with his description of the palace in the masque

proper Jones intended a reference to the Italian scenographic tradition to add another aspect to the significance of the intrinsically beautiful edifice. Jones describes the structure as: ‘a sumptuous Palace, with an open Terras before [. . .] it, and a great staire of returne, descending into the lower grounds; the upper part environ’d with walles of Marble, amongst which were planted, *Cypresse* trees’.⁹⁰ The distinctive features of the palace are its terrace, its staircase, and the surrounding wall with the cypresses, all three emphasised specifically.⁹¹ With these elements Jones possibly alludes within the system of reference of Italian scenography to a scenic design illustrated by two etchings of Alfonso Parigi.

They are part of a series of four etchings⁹² with which Alfonso had illustrated his father Giulio Parigi’s *apparato* for Ferdinando Saracinelli’s *La Liberazione di Ruggiero dall’isola d’Alcina*.⁹³ Saracinelli’s ballet, which drew on the cantos VI–VIII of Lodovico Ariosto’s *Orlando furioso*, was performed in February 1625 in honour of Wladislaw IV Sigismund of Poland at the Medici villa Poggio Imperiale. The Palace of Alcina (fig. 1) designed for the second and third scenes of the ballet shows with a spacious terrace, an extended curving staircase, and the surrounding wall with four cypresses the very features



ISOLA D'ALCINA SECONDA MVTA DELLE SCENE

Figure 1 Alfonso Parigi, ‘Alcina’s Palace’, scene 2 for Ferdinando Saracinelli’s ballet *La Liberazione di Ruggiero dall’isola d’Alcina*, Poggio Imperiale, 1625. Etching, British Library, London [11715.cc.20], reproduced by permission of the British Library.

distinctive also in Circe's Palace.⁹⁴ This suggests the dependence of Jones's design on that of Parigi, although it cannot be proven since a sketch for Circe's Palace does not survive nor is it described in sufficient detail in the text of the printed masque.

There is, however, also a correspondence of motifs which would not only have made the allusion tangible but makes it probable that it was indeed intended: in Ariosto and in *La Liberazione di Ruggiero* the lecherous sorceress Alcina lures errant knights to her island. But once she has enjoyed the delights of love with them she grows weary of them and turns them into plants and beasts:

E perché essi non vadano pel mondo
di lei narrando la vita lasciva,
chi qua chi là, per lo terren fecondo
li muta, altri in abete, altri in oliva,
altri in palma, altri in cedro, altri secondo
che vedi me su questa verde riva,
altri in liquido fonte, alcuni in fiera,
come più agrada a quella fata altiera.⁹⁵

(And, to prevent their spreading about the world the story of her wanton ways, she transforms them, every one, planting them here and there in the fertile soil, changing one into a fir-tree, another into an olive, another into a palm or cedar, or into the guise in which you see me on this verdant bank; yet others the proud enchantress changes into liquid springs, or into beasts, just as it suits her.)⁹⁶

Even Ruggiero, one of the central characters of Ariosto's epic, is 'changed from his true self by sorcery'⁹⁷ – 'tanto / da l'esser suo mutato per incanto':⁹⁸ although not yet changed into tree or beast the valiant warrior appears to be turned into a dissolute debauchee. Owing only to the intervention of the good sorceress Melissa he reverts to his proper nature. In a similar way, although on his own initiative and '*Gouern'd by Reason*',⁹⁹ Circe's fugitive favourite realised the pernicious and corrupting power of sensual delights. To escape sensuality is to control the animal part of human nature and to subject the appetitive to the intellectual faculties: 'Making man onely a mind vsing the body and affections as instruments'¹⁰⁰ – for:

*It is consent that makes a perfect Slaue;
And Sloth that binds us to Lusts easie Trades.* [Tempe Restored, p. 5]

A similar use of images may also be observed in Jones's design for the first scene of *Tempe Restored*, the Vale of Tempe, extant in the description included in the printed text but also in a drawing by the architect (fig. 2). As a source Stephen Orgel and Roy Strong reproduce an etching by Giulio Parigi (fig. 3).¹⁰¹ This shows Parigi's design for the third of the six intermezzi to Michelagnolo Buonarroti's *Il Giudizio di Paride* performed in Florence in 1608 on occasion of the wedding of Cosimo de' Medici (later Cosimo II). The intermezzo which was invented by Giovanni de' Bardi was called 'Il Giardino




Figure 2 Inigo Jones, 'The Vale of Tempe', scene 1 for *Tempe Restored*, Whitehall, 1632. Drawing, Devonshire Collection, Chatsworth, reproduced by permission of the Duke of Devonshire and the Trustees of the Chatsworth Settlement. Photograph: Photographic Survey, Courtauld Institute of Art.

di Calipso' and parts of Jones's drawing clearly derive from it. In fact, his side wings almost seem to be faithful copies of those in the etching. Significantly, the description in the printed text of the masque, too, corresponds in detail to the 'Giardino':

A Curtaine being drawne vp, the Lightsome *Scene* appear'd, shewing a delicious place by nature and art; where in a Valley inviron'd with Hills a farre off was seated, a prospect of curious Arbours of various formes. The first order of marble Pillasters. Betweene which were neeces of rocke worke and Statues: some spurt- ing water received into vazes beneath them, and others standing on Pedestals. On the returnes of these Pillasters run slender Cornishments. From which was raised a second order of gracious termes with womens faces which beare vp the orna- ments[.] Vnder this to a leaning height was a Ballestrata inricht. All this second story seem'd of silver worke mixt with fresh Verdures which on the tops of these arbours covered some of the returnes, in the forme of tipes with tender branches




Figure 3 Giulio Parigi, 'Il Giardino di Calipso', third intermezzo to Michelagnolo Buonarroti's pastoral *Il Giudizio di Paride*, Florence, 1608. Etching, British Library, London [745.a.4], reproduced by permission of the British Library.

dangling downe: others were cover'd flatt and had flower pots of gold for finishing: behind these appear'd the tops of slender trees, whose leaues seem'de to moue with a gentle breath comming from the farre off Hills. [*Tempe Restored*, pp. 3–4]

Even the 'tender branches dangling downe' which may be discerned in Parigi's etching (hanging over the cornice of the first portico on the left) but not in Jones's unfinished sketch are mentioned here. It seems almost as if Parigi's etching were being described in the English text and as if it were intended that the informed reader, too, would recognise the Italian model.

There are, however, no correspondences of Jones's descriptive text to that describing the 'Giardino di Calipso'. Camillo Rinuccini was the anonymous author of the *Descrizione delle feste fatte nelle reali nozze* which appeared in two editions and various reprints in 1608 and 1609 in Florence.¹⁰² There the Garden of Calipso was described as 'vn bel giardino pien d'ogni sorte di delizie, alberi co' pomi d'oro, spalliere di variate verzure, muri con vasi pieni di fiori, grottesche di spugne stellanti, fonti in mezzo de prati, e simili delizie vincitrici de' sensi' (a beautiful garden full of all sorts of delights, trees with golden apples, espaliers of various vegetables, walls with vases full of flowers, grotesques of starred sponges, springs in the middle of meadows, and similar delights that vanquish the senses).¹⁰³ However, although this description does

not find an immediate echo in Jones's text the reader familiar not only with the etching but perhaps also with Rinuccini's *Descrizione* would be able to relate to the Italian model: the Florentine Garden of Calipso illustrates the very same insouciant sensuality which is also significant in the context of *Tempe Restored*. Evoked also, of course, by the epic master narrative developed in the *Odyssey*,¹⁰⁴ and repeated here, the nymph's garden is a chiffre which, if interpreted correctly, presages the release of the love prisoner and his escape from the pitfalls of sensual delights. In both Homer and in de' Bardi's poetic text for the intermezzo of 1608, Mercury, the messenger of the gods, conveys Jove's order to Calipso, 'che licenziasse il prigionero Ulisse' (that she should let go the prisoner Ulysses).¹⁰⁵

To be sure, the English masque commences with the escape of the prisoner, who enters from the Vale of Tempe, so obviously associated with the Garden of Calipso. In this case, however, it is not Calipso but Circe who had turned the youth into a lion and imprisoned him. Here too, of course, the invention refers back to the master narrative of the story in the *Odyssey*,¹⁰⁶ which differs from that of the generally analogous Calipso episode among other ways in that Circe had turned Ulysses's companions into swine – a far cry from the regal lion. The choice of the animal is significant because, extending the fiction of the masque to the spectators, the Fugitive Favourite stepped down from the stage into the hall and addressed himself directly to Charles I, recounting his story and saying that he was afraid of one thing only: 'to be Retransform'd, into a Beast'.¹⁰⁷ But:

*Which while I was, although I must confesse,
I was the Brauest: What could shee doe lesse,
That saw me Subiect, to no base desire.* [*Tempe Restored*, p. 5]

Orgel and Strong argue that Townshend 'did not understand Jones's point',¹⁰⁸ because the poet mentions the desire of the fugitive – characterised by Jones as 'incontinent' – to have been not base. In the purely Neo-Platonic context they suggest their criticism would seem justified. But in the context of Piccolomini's *Institution* there is a gradation possible between the extreme of base desire and that desire which finally, subjected to reason in a lengthy process, leads to the perception of the beauty of the soul, and I therefore do not see a real discrepancy between the 'Allegory' and Townshend's poetic text. After all, the fugitive then refers to just this subjection to reason which finally leads to the habituation of virtue:

*Yet was there in me, a Promethean fire,
That made me covet to be a man againe,
Gouern'd by Reason, and not rul'd by Sense.
Therefore I shunne this place of Residence,
And flye to Vertue: in whose awfull sight,
She dares not come, but in a Maske, and crouch,
As low as I did, for my liberty.* [*Tempe Restored*, p. 5]

IV

Inigo Jones read his Piccolomini thoroughly, and he obviously read it at the time he was working on *Tempe Restored*. There may have been other sources for this particular masque, but the moral philosophic concept which is expounded didactically in the 'Allegory' and which had been presented in pictures of light and motion to the spectators' eyes seems to originate quite clearly with the Aristotelianism of the Sienese philosopher. In fact, Jones's knowledge of moral philosophy as extracted from Piccolomini's *Institution morale* (probably complemented by his reading of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*) informed most of the architect's masques invented after 1632. But *Tempe Restored* is the first masque of Jones's in which, after the rupture with Ben Jonson, its direct influence can be traced, and only the last of the Caroline masques, *Salmacida Spolia* of 1640, refers back to the *Institution morale* with a similar immediacy.

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Appendix: The 'Allegory'¹⁰⁹ from *Tempe Restored*, pp. 16–19
The Allegory.

In the young Gentleman, who *Circe* had first enamored on her Person, and after, through [16/17] Jealousie conceiued, Transformed into a *Lyon*. And againe remembring her former Love, retransform'd into his former shape, is figured an incontinent man, that striving with his affections, is at last by the power of reason perswaded to flye from those Sensuall desires, which had formerly corrupted his Iudgement.

Circe here signifies desire in generall, the which hath power on all living Creatures, and beeing mixt of the Divine and Sensible, hath divers effects, Leading some to Vertue, and others to Vice. Shee is described as a Queene, having in her service, and subiection, the *Nymphs*, which participate of Divinity, figuring the Vertues, and the brute Beasts, denoting the Vices. The description of her person, of extraordinary *Beauty*, and sweetnesse of her voyce, shewes that desire is moved either by sight or hearing, to loue *Vertue*, or the contrary, and the *Beautifulfull* aspect of her inchaunted Palace, glistening with gold, and Precious Ornaments, that desire cannot bee moued without apparence of *Beauty*, either true or false.

The *Dryades*, and *Nayades*, *Nymphes* of the Woods, and Waters, that is to say; the good spirits defused through all the Vniverse, are servants to this Queene, and liue with her in all Liberty [17/18] and pleasure, whose employment is to gather the most exquisite Herbes, and Flowers of the earth for the service of their Mistres; Figuring the *Virtues* and *Sciences*, by which the desire of Mans Spirits are prepared and disposed to good, the beasts, in part

transformed, who contrary to their Natures, make her sport, represents vnto vs that Sensuall desire makes men loose their *Vertue* and *Valour*, turning Parasites and Slaues to their *Bruitish* affections. That these Intemperate Beastes of *Circes* Court, should for a time possesse *TEMPE*. The happie retreat of the Muses and their followers, is meant, the enchantments of vitious impostures, that by false meanes, seeke to extirpate the true Louers of Science and *Vertue*, to whom of right only that place belongs.

That diuine *Beauty* accompan'ed with a troope of Stars of a happy Constellation ioyning with Heiroidicke vertue should dissolue the enchantments, and *Circe* voluntarily deliver her golden rod to *Minerva*, is meant that a diuine Beame comming from aboue, with a good inclination, and a perfect habit of vertue made, by the *Harmony* of the Irascible and concupiscible parts obedient to the rationall and highest part of the soule. Making man onely a mind vsing the bo-[18/19] dy and affections as instruments; which being his true perfection, brings him to all the happinesse which can bee inioyed heere below.

In Heiroidicke vertue is figured the Kings Maiestie, who therein transcends as farre common men, as they are aboue Beasts, he truly being the prototipe to all the Kingdomes vnder his Monarchie, of Religion, Iustice, and all the *Vertues* ioyned together.

So that Corporeall *Beauty*, consisting in simetry, colour, and certaine vnexpressable Graces, shining in the Queenes Maiestie, may draw vs to the contemplation of the *Beauty* of the soule, vnto which it hath Analogy.

Notes

- 1 'The Intellectual Setting of the Quarrel between Ben Jonson and Inigo Jones' was first published in the *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* in 1949 and was reprinted in *The Renaissance Imagination: Essays and Lectures* by D. J. Gordon, ed. Stephen Orgel (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975), pp. 77–101; subsequently, references are made to this edition. See also Aurelian Townshend, *Albion's Triumph. Personated in a Masque at Court by the King's Majesty and his Lords, the Sunday after Twelfth Night, 1631* (London, Printed by Aug[ustus] Matthews for Robert Allet, 1631). See esp. p. 3.
- 2 For the development in Italy see, for instance, Jill Kraye, 'The Transformation of Platonic Love in the Italian Renaissance', in Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (eds), *Platonism and the English Imagination* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 76–85.
- 3 Inigo Jones and Aurelian Townshend, *Tempe Restored. A Masque Presented by the Queen and Fourteen Ladies to the King's Majesty at Whitehall on Shrove-Tuesday, 1631* (London, Printed by A[ugustus] M[atthews] for Robert Allet, and George Bakek [sic], 1631). For the 'Allegory' see pp. 16–19; see also the Appendix to this article which reprints the text of this edition. Only George Chapman's *Memo-rable Masque* of 1613 has what the poet calls 'The applicable argument of the

- Maske*, see *The Memorable Masque of the Two Honourable Houses or Inns of Court, the Middle Temple and Lincoln's Inn* (London, Printed by G. Eld for George Norton, 1613), sig. a4r. But this is not as detailed as Jones's 'Allegory'.
- 4 For a wide-ranging discussion of the reception of Aristotle's *Ethics* in the Italian Renaissance, see David A. Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300–1650): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education*, Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 13 (Leiden etc., Brill, 2002).
 - 5 Alessandro Piccolomini, *Della Institution morale di M. Alessandro Piccolomini libri III. Ne' quali egli levando le cose soverchie, & aggiugnendo molte importanti, ha emendato, & à miglior forma, & ordine ridotto tutto quello, che già scrisse in sua giovinezza della Institution dell'huomo nobile* (Venice, Ziletti, 1575), V.xi.205. Cf. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1109a25–27.
 - 6 Cf. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106a14–1107a27 and 1109b1–8.
 - 7 Aristotle differs from Plato (who supposes opposite pairs of vices and virtues, for instance, cowardice and courage) in that he assumes triads of a deficiency of something, an intermediate or mean state and an excess, for instance, cowardice, courage and rashness. For the differences between Plato and Aristotle see, for example, Charles M. Young, 'Aristotle on Temperance', in John P. Anton and Anthony Preus (eds), *Aristotle's Ethics*, Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 4 (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 107–25, p. 108 or Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, p. 61.
 - 8 See, for example, Jan Rohls, *Geschichte der Ethik* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1991), pp. 49–51.
 - 9 See *ibid.*, p. 64.
 - 10 See my article 'Between Tiger and Unicorn: The Temple of Love', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 61 (1998), 176–97; see also my 'The Arduous Path to the Temple of Love', *Research Opportunities in Renaissance Drama*, 42 (2003), 34–61.
 - 11 *L'Ethica d'Aristotile tradotta in lingua vulgare fiorentina et commentata per Bernardo Segni* (Venice, Imperadore, 1551). Jones's copy is today in Worcester College Library, Oxford, with the pressmark LR.A.2.1.
 - 12 With the pressmark LR.A.2.14. Jones's name on the undated title page has been deleted. I am very grateful to the librarian of Worcester College Library, Mrs Joanna Parker, who gave me permission to examine, and quote from, the architect's copy.
 - 13 Jones marked most of the chapters with a horizontal line in the margin.
 - 14 Underlinings and annotations may be found in twelve chapters of the book. Especially heavily annotated are the chapters II.ix ('Delle potentie dell'anima humana, & in quale di esse la felicità si ritrovi'), V.iii ('Del numero delle virtù morali, & de' soggetti di quelle'), VI.iii ('Come sia differente la temperantia dalla continentia'), VIII.x ('De' cinque habiti, over virtù intellettuali') and VIII.xv ('Dell'habito della prudentia'); less numerous annotations may be found in the chapters II.x ('Delle due felicità speculativa, & pratica, over ciuile & della differentia, che è tra Platone, & Aristotele intorno à quelle'), III.vi ('Di cio, che in luogo di favole & novelle si dee raccontare a' fanciulli'), IV.xi ('Discorso per modo di digressione intorno alla facultà della Poesia'), V.iv ('Come si produca nell'huomo la virtù morale'), VI.i ('Della fortezza'), VI.xv ('Dell'affetto della verecondia & de' suoi estremi') and IX.ix ('Delle querele, che possono occorrere tra gli amici; & per qual causa').

- 15 See John Newman, 'Italian Treatises in Use: The Significance of Inigo Jones's Annotations', in Jean Guillaume (ed.), *Les traités d'architecture de la Renaissance*, Actes du colloque tenu à Tours du 1^{er} au 11 juillet 1981. De Architectura (Paris, Picard, 1988), pp. 435–41, p. 437.
- 16 See John Newman, 'The Dating of Inigo Jones's Handwriting', in 'Essays Presented to Peter Murray', Senate House Library, University of London, 1980 [unpublished manuscript], pp. 9–10 and Gordon Higgott, 'Inigo Jones in Provence', *Architectural History*, 26 (1983), 24–34, 25–6 and n. 13.
- 17 The text, which was first distributed in manuscript, originated within the movement to promote the Italian language against Latin: see Florindo V. Cerreta, *Alessandro Piccolomini, letterato e filosofo senese del cinquecento*, Monografie di storia e letteratura senese, 4, Humanistic Studies, 9 (Siena, Accademia Senese degli Intronati, 1960), pp. 36–7.
- 18 Piccolomini was not a professor of moral philosophy at either Padua or Pavia in the early 1540s, as he is sometimes still said to have been. He was, however, for a short period, professor of moral philosophy in Siena in 1545: see Florindo V. Cerreta, 'Alessandro Piccolomini, Teacher of Moral Philosophy', *Italica*, 33 (1956), 22–5, 23–4 and Cerreta, *Alessandro Piccolomini*, pp. 20–22.
- 19 Cerreta, 'Alessandro Piccolomini', p. 22. For the genesis of the text of 1560 see Cerreta, *Alessandro Piccolomini*, p. 81, for the many reprints of both editions and for translations into French and Spanish, pp. 184–6, and for a complete list of Piccolomini's writings, pp. 175–96.
- 20 The following passage is based on *Della Institution morale*, II.ix.63–73 ('Delle potentie dell'anima humana, & in qual di esse la felicità si ritrovi'); this chapter was glossed by Jones particularly extensively. The passage on the division of the three souls he marked with underlinings and with marginal marks and paraphrases, see *ibid.*, II.ix.64, lines 13–20; in line 20 he paraphrased: 'the soul y^t / giues life or / vegetatio'.
- 21 For the Aristotelian definition see the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1102a27–1102b29. Aristotle's initially bipartite division of the soul into a rational and an irrational principle is complemented by his explanation that the vegetative element is purely irrational while the appetitive or desiring element shares in both the irrational and the rational principles. He refers back to this definition at the outset of his discussion of the intellectual virtues, and here he explains that the rational principle itself is also divided into a scientific and a calculative part and that there are three things in the soul which control action and truth: sensation, reason and desire, see *ibid.*, 1139a4–1139b13. For a definition of the soul see also Aristotle's *Poetics*, 413a18–413b8. For Aquinas's definition see, for instance, *Sentencia libri primi de anima*, 402b9.
- 22 With reference to various authorities Piccolomini mentions *potentia cognitiva* as another faculty only to dismiss it afterwards, arguing that it is already included in *potentia imaginativa*, see *Della Institution morale*, II.ix.67.
- 23 See *ibid.*, V.vii.183–84. Both appetites are associated with the eleven moral virtues. Of these only Justice (*giustitia*) is located in *volontà*. Magnificence (*magnificenza*), fortitude (*fortezza*), gentleness (*mansuetudine*) and generosity (*magnanimità*) belong to *appetito irascibile*, temperance (*temperantia*), liberality (*liberalità*), desire of honour (*desiderativa dell'honore*), affability (*affabilità*), truthfulness (*verità*) and courtesy (*urbanità* or *piacevolezza*) to *appetito concupiscibile*.

- 24 *Ibid.*, II.ix.68.
- 25 Inigo Jones in *ibid.*, II.ix.68, line 3.
- 26 *Ibid.*, II.ix.72. Cf. also the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1102b12–1103a3.
- 27 The following passage is based on this chapter, see *Della Institution morale*, V.iv.187–89.
- 28 Jones in *ibid.*, V.iv.189, line 6.
- 29 See *ibid.*, V.iv.188.
- 30 Jones in *ibid.*, V.iv.188, line 32. In the text Jones emphasised ‘*diritta ragione*’ by underlining it, *ibid.*
- 31 Jones in *ibid.*, VIII.x.366, line 19.
- 32 Jones in *ibid.*, VIII.x.366, line 21.
- 33 Jones in *ibid.*, VIII.x.367, line 21.
- 34 See *ibid.*, VIII.x.368. See also Jones’s marginal gloss: ‘of thinges conting-/ ent. as humane / free operations / th[are/ase (?)] [inserted: bgot] too w^{ch} produc / eth. 2. habits of y^e / Intelect praktick / 1 / arte / 2 / prudence’, *ibid.*, VIII.x.368, line 19.
- 35 *Ibid.*, VIII.xv.374 and VIII.xv.374, line 18. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* this is the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (*phronesis*), see 1140a24–1140b30 and esp. 1140b5–8.
- 36 ‘Agible’ means ‘proper or possible to be done; practicable, practical’, see *OED* (1989), I, s.v. ‘agible’.
- 37 The following passage is based on this chapter, see *Della Institution morale*, VI.iii.243–47.
- 38 *Ibid.*, V.iv.187.
- 39 Continnence is, for Piccolomini, both a disposition and a method of achieving virtue, see *ibid.*, VI.iii.244; cf. also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145a15–1152a25. Temperance is limited for Aristotle to certain pleasures of touch, see the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1117b23–1118b8; for Piccolomini it is rather a general virtue of moderation, see *Della Institution morale*, VI.iii.244: ‘la temperantia ancora è quella [uirtù], che tai diletta [i.e. i diletta sensuali] regola, & frena’ (temperance is, after all, that [virtue] which controls and reins in such delights [i.e. the sensual delights]).
- 40 See *ibid.*, VI.iii.245, Piccolomini repeats here the sentence paraphrased by Jones on VI.iii.244, line 28 almost verbatim; Jones emphasised ‘*due maniere*’ (two manners) by underlining it.
- 41 *Ibid.*, VI.iii.245.
- 42 Jones in: *Della Institution morale*, VI.iii.245, line 20; Jones emphasised ‘*che le uirtù si generano*’ by underlining it.
- 43 The following passage is based on chapter X.ii of the *Institution morale*, which Jones did not annotate, see *ibid.*, X.ii.423 [i.e. 429]–34.
- 44 *Ibid.*, X.ii.431.
- 45 Viktoria von Flemming, *Arma Amoris: Sprachbild und Bildsprache der Liebe. Kardinal Scipione Borghese und die Gemäldezyklen Francesco Albanis*, Berliner Schriften zur Kunst, 6 (Mainz, von Zabern, 1996), pp. 134–5.
- 46 *Della Institution morale*, X.ii.431.
- 47 *Ibid.*, X.ii.432.
- 48 See, for instance, *ibid.*, ‘Proemio’, pp. 2–3 and von Flemming, *Arma Amoris*, p. 135.
- 49 See *Della Institution morale*, X.ii.433.

- 50 *Ibid.*
- 51 *Tempe Restored*, p. 19.
- 52 See, for instance, Stephen Orgel and Roy Strong (eds), *Inigo Jones: The Theatre of the Stuart Court*, 2 vols (London etc., University of California Press, 1973), I, 61, and Erica Veevers, *Images of Love and Religion: Queen Henrietta Maria and Court Entertainments* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 130 and 191–5. For the *Balet comique*, performed on 15 October 1581 in the Great Hall of the Louvre, see, for instance, Margaret M. McGowan's introduction to her facsimile edition, *Le Ballet comique by Balthazar de Beaujoyeux, 1581*, *Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies*, 6 (Binghamton, NY, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), pp. 9–49 or Frances A. Yates, *The French Academies of the Sixteenth Century*, *Studies of the Warburg Institute*, 15 (London, The Warburg Institute, 1947), pp. 239–74.
- 53 Veevers, *Images of Love*, p. 194.
- 54 *Ibid.*
- 55 *Ibid.*
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 92.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- 58 See, for instance, Enid Welsford, 'Italian Influence on the English Court Masque', *Modern Language Review*, 18 (1923), 394–409 or Orgel and Strong, who even in 1973 criticised the architect's declining originality of vision; see, for instance, their *Inigo Jones*, I, 36 and 43. John Peacock has argued in several articles that Jones's 'plagiarism' should be interpreted rather as the attempt to appropriate critically, and to connect to, the European tradition of festival design; see, for instance, his 'Inigo Jones's Stage Architecture and its Sources', *Art Bulletin*, 64 (1982), 195–216 and, more recently, his essential *The Stage Designs of Inigo Jones: The European Context* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- 59 See, for instance, the chapters 'The Mechanics of Platonism' and 'Platonic Politics' in Orgel and Strong, *Inigo Jones*, I, 15–27 and 49–75.
- 60 Jones, in *Della Institution morale*, II.x.74, line 29 and II.x.75, line 12.
- 61 Yates, *French Academies*, p. 111. See also Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, pp. 282–4 where this claim is somewhat modified.
- 62 See Yates, *French Academies*, p. 264; see similarly also Veevers, *Images of Love*, p. 193.
- 63 See McGowan's facsimile edition, fols 74v–75v.
- 64 Jones has, for instance, 'Sensuall desire' instead of 'desire brutal' and 'British affections' instead of 'volupté', see *Tempe Restored*, p. 18 and *Balet comique*, fol. 75r.
- 65 See the Appendix for corresponding passages, marked in bold type in my reprint of Jones's text.
- 66 *Tempe Restored*, pp. 16–17.
- 67 See *Della Institution morale*, V.iv.188 and line 32.
- 68 See *ibid.*, VI.iii.245 and line 28.
- 69 See *ibid.*, VI.iii.244–5.
- 70 *Tempe Restored*, p. 17; cf. *Balet comique*, fols 74v–75r.
- 71 *Tempe Restored*, p. 17; cf. *Balet comique*, fol. 75r.
- 72 See *Della Institution morale*, II.ix.72.
- 73 See Orgel and Strong, *Inigo Jones*, I, 43.

- 74 Cesare Ripa, *Iconologia, ovvero descrizione di diverse imagini cavate dall'antichità, e di propria inventione* [rpt. of the ed. Rome, 1603], introd. Erna Mandowsky (Hildesheim etc., Olms, 1970), p. 518.
- 75 See *Tempe Restored*, p. 19.
- 76 *Della Institution morale*, VI.iii.243.
- 77 *Tempe Restored*, p. 19.
- 78 *Della Institution morale*, II.ix.63–73.
- 79 *Tempe Restored*, p. 19; cf. *Della Institution morale*, X.ii.432–33.
- 80 See *ibid.*, X.ii.432–33.
- 81 Piccolomini's view, of course, meets Platonic and Neo-Platonic doctrine which has long been recognised as being relevant for Jones, too. See, for instance, Orgel and Strong, *Inigo Jones*, I, 61–3.
- 82 Ben Jonson, *Hymenaei. Or the Solemnities of Masque, and Barriers* [. . .] (London, Printed by Valentine Sims for Thomas Thorp, 1606), sig. A3r.
- 83 See *Albion's Triumph*, p. 3 and Gordon, 'The Intellectual Setting', pp. 90–91.
- 84 In chapter IX.ix ('Delle querele, che possono occorrere tra gli amici; & per qual causa') of the *Institution* Piccolomini named ingratitude as the only true reason for a quarrel between friends, see *Della Institution morale*, IX.ix.409. In line 23 Jones underlined 'ingratitude' and it is possible that he did so with his quarrel with Jonson in mind which also may have been his reason for displaying the personification of Envy under the Masque of Friendship, thereby proclaiming himself to be the injured party.
- 85 See Gordon, 'The Intellectual Setting', pp. 93–6, esp. p. 93.
- 86 *Tempe Restored*, pp. 2–3.
- 87 Jones's rendering of the personification differs from Ripa's only in its gender.
- 88 *Tempe Restored*, p. 3.
- 89 Cf. *Balet comique*, fol. 75r.
- 90 *Tempe Restored*, pp. 5–6.
- 91 A similar layout of staircases and terraces is also a feature of the Medici villas of Pratolino (although here the staircases are not curved but straight) and of Poggio a Caiano, see the painting by Justus Utens reproduced, for instance, in Emma Micheletti, *Family Portrait: The Medici of Florence*, transl. Paul Blanchard (Florence, Becucci, 1995), p. 68.
- 92 A fifth etching shows the Villa Poggio Imperiale. On the etchings Alfonso Parigi identifies himself as the inventor but contemporary documents suggest that it was rather his father Giulio who was responsible for the scenic design; see A. M. Nagler, *Theatre Festivals of the Medici, 1539–1637*, transl. George Hickenlooper (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964), p. 137.
- 93 Ferdinando Saracinelli, *La Liberazione di Ruggiero dall'isola d'Alcina. Balletto rappresentato in musica al Serenissimo Ladislao Sigismondo, Principe di Polonia e di Svezia, nella villa imperiale della Serenissima Arciduchessa d'Austria, Gran Duchessa di Toscana* ([Florence,] Alle Stelle Medicee, 1625) [etched title-page].
- 94 The illustration of the third scene shows the identical palace consumed by flames. Alcina's Palace is described by neither Saracinelli nor Ariosto. In the *Orlando furioso*, Alcina's island and her palace are the location for the action of the cantos VI–VIII.
- 95 Lodovico Ariosto, *Orlando furioso e cinque canti*, eds Remo Ceserani and Sergio Zatti, 2 vols, *Classici Italiani* (Torino, Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1997), canto VI.51.

- 96 Ludovico Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, transl. with an introd. by Guido Waldman (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 56.
- 97 Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, transl. Guido Waldman, p. 66.
- 98 Ariosto, *Orlando furioso*, eds Ceserani and Zatti, canto VII.55.
- 99 *Tempe Restored*, p. 5.
- 100 *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.
- 101 Orgel and Strong, *Inigo Jones*, II, no. 216 and fig. 86.
- 102 Camillo Rinuccini, *Descrizione delle feste fatte nelle reali nozze de' Serenissimi Principi di Toscana, Don Cosimo de' Medici e Maria Maddalena, Arciduchessa d'Austria* (Florence, Giunti, 1608). The first and second editions have the same title-page, quotes are from the second edition.
- 103 Rinuccini, *Descrizione*, pp. 43–44[n.p.].
- 104 See Homer, *Odyssey*, V.1–268.
- 105 Rinuccini, *Descrizione*, p. 45; cf. Homer, *Odyssey*, V.97–115.
- 106 Cf. also Gordon's 'Allegorie' in *Balet comique*, fol. 74v.
- 107 *Tempe Restored*, p. 5.
- 108 See Orgel and Strong, *Inigo Jones*, I, 61.
- 109 Printed in bold type are those passages translated more or less directly from John Gordon's 'Autre Allegorie de la Circé' from Balthasar Beaujoyeux's *Balet comique de la royne*, although their order is rearranged in Jones's text; cf. McGowan's facsimile edition, fols 74v–75v.

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