
Downloaded from https://kar.kent.ac.uk/96052/ The University of Kent's Academic Repository KAR

The version of record is available from https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcis.2329

This document version Publisher pdf

DOI for this version

Licence for this version CC BY (Attribution)

Additional information

Versions of research works

Versions of Record
If this version is the version of record, it is the same as the published version available on the publisher's web site. Cite as the published version.

Author Accepted Manuscripts
If this document is identified as the Author Accepted Manuscript it is the version after peer review but before type setting, copy editing or publisher branding. Cite as Surname, Initial. (Year) 'Title of article'. To be published in Title of Journal, Volume and issue numbers [peer-reviewed accepted version]. Available at: DOI or URL (Accessed: date).

Enquiries
If you have questions about this document contact ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk. Please include the URL of the record in KAR. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our Take Down policy (available from https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies).
The critical juncture in Aotearoa New Zealand and the collective future: 
Policy issues in settler/invader colonial zombiism found in “Biculturalism”

Hemopereki Simon

About the author
Hemopereki is a Māori scholar (Tūwharetoa, Te Arawa, Waikato-Tainui, Hauraki, Mataatua) and is The Honorary Indigenous Research Fellow at The Centre for Indigenous and Settler Colonial Studies, University of Kent. He is a former Research Justice at The Intersections Research Fellow at Mill College in California.

Abstract
This research examines the settler colonial legacy of Aotearoa New Zealand. It shows that biculturalism has emerged as a discursive byproduct of neoliberalism and settler colonialism. Simon’s recent work and the Te Paparahi o Te Raki Waitangi Tribunal decision aligns with the view of a significant paradigm shift since biculturalism suppresses affirmation of and mana motuhake. Biculturalism can be viewed through Moreton-Robinson’s white possessive lens as well as Beck’s zombie concepts, which are used to prop up deteriorating and/or fictional social institutions. As a zombie concept in Aotearoa New Zealand, “biculturalism” supports settler/invader power structures. Indigenous communities disproportionately experience the destructive consequences of neoliberal policies and statecraft. Aotearoa New Zealand’s collective future requires abandoning biculturalism; to that end the author recommends revising common historiographic thought concerning Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Treaty of Waitangi) and the concept of “settling”.

Keywords
Settler colonialism; Treaty of Waitangi; biculturalism; zombie studies; white possessive; Indigenous policy
This article argues that biculturalism\(^1\) as a national platform for diversity and Indigenous inclusion policy in Aotearoa New Zealand is an artefact of a neoliberal and settler/invader colonial public discourse. It examines biculturalism through the lens of Ulrich Beck’s (2002a, 2002b; also see Brabazon 2016) notion of “zombie concepts” and in this way opens up a Kaupapa Māori research strategy for analysing and critiquing the role of the epistemic community in colonial and settler/invader colonial contexts. The article concludes that biculturalism must be discarded insofar as it does not provide for tino rangatiratanga\(^2\) (self-determination) or mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) but is instead “kept alive” (viz. as a zombie concept) by the inertia of convenience and governmental settler/invader colonial mythmaking (O’Sullivan, 2007; Simon, 2016). Therefore this article highlights a needed national conversation about our collective future, one that outlines the problematic nature of the policy platform of biculturalism by providing an Indigenous critique and reflection of the situation.\(^3\)

Developments in this area centre on compelling revaluations of the treaties that comprise the “official” history of settler/invader–Māori relations and serve as landmarks in public narratives that seek to legitimise and sustain state sovereignty. The 2014 Waitangi Tribunal decision in the Te Paparahi o Te Raki report notably affirms that signatories to Te Tiriti o Waitangi did not cede mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) to the Crown (Simon, 2016; Te Kawariki and Waitangi Network, 2012; Waitangi Tribunal, 2014). This is a major paradigm shift regarding white patriarchal state sovereignty in Aotearoa New Zealand. The Tribunal’s decision poses a significant challenge to pre-2014 discourse about the treaties, which tended to assume that Māori were only entitled to rights-based tino rangatiratanga (self-determination), which is to say, to a limited mode of self-determination derivative of and bounded by the government’s presupposed sovereign legitimacy (see Maaka & Fleras, 2005). Simon’s (2016) work extends the scope of the Tribunal’s decision to nonsignatory hapū and iwi. If signatory peoples cannot be construed as having ceded mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty), still less can nonsignatory hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people). Such research challenges the ideological foundations of the white possessive state (Simon, 2016, 2020b, 2021, 2022b). It highlights the latter’s disregard for the actual content of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Te Tiriti) and The Treaty of Waitangi\(^4\) (The Treaty) as much as the sources, processes, and histories of authoritative interpretation of such treaties within Māori communities.\(^5\)

I argue that biculturalism is a zombie concept and that an understanding of the above-mentioned treaties is required. Te Tiriti and The Treaty are considered separate treaties, but the doctrine of contra proferentem justifies privileging Te Tiriti as the legally binding version. (Simon, 2016; also see Hayward, 2018; Mikaere, 2011) As Margaret Mutu (2019a) notes, Te Tiriti was meant to augment Britain’s control over its own citizens. By 1840, the persistent lawlessness of British immigrants led the rangatira (leaders) to seek a new arrangement with the Crown. Mutu (2019a) writes the following about the ensuing agreement:

> It was a treaty of peace and friendship, one that promised what the rangatira (leaders) had asked for: acknowledgement and respect for their absolute power and authority throughout their territories, while relieving them of responsibility for lawless British immigrants. (p. 4)

The reality that Mutu describes is specific to Taitokerau (Northland iwi). Many iwi (Indigenous nation or people) had little, if any, contact with non-Māori in 1840, particularly those in the Central North Island (Simon, 2011). The idea that Te Tiriti was meant to build or strengthen relationships between Māori and the Crown is therefore misleading and alienating to nonsignatory hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people). Such a narrative reflects self-interested mythmaking on the part of the government; it reinforces institutional structures that renew and perpetuate white possession. Whereas popular and political discourse often presuppose that the Māori signed Te Tiriti as a collective Indigenous people, it was clearly and verifiably signed on a hapū-by-hapū
(clan) basis. Moreover, not every hapū (clan) and iwi signed (Simon, 2016; Mahuika, 2019). Poutini Ngāi Tahu, Te Arawa, Tūwharetoa and Waikato-Tainui did not sign and thus retain their mana motuhake (Indigenous Sovereignty) of their rohe. Regardless, as Thomas and Nikora (1992) observe “The present reality is that, having been subjected to the colonizing processes of British settlers, Māori people cannot exercise their sovereign rights over Aotearoa” (p. 2). The government’s misrepresentation of The Treaty and Te Tiriti and neglect of the treaties’ perception and interpretation among nonsignatory hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people) presents a problem for biculturalism. Mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) requires affirmation, which is impossible under conditions wherein consent was either misconstrued or altogether absent.

The widespread understanding of biculturalism as an expression of yearning for a common national identity ignores the Indigenous population’s history and unequal socioeconomic situation. Biculturalism ostensibly promotes Indigenous inclusion (O’Sullivan, 2007), but its selective attention to Indigenous realities suggests that it potentially furthers the absorption of Te Ao Māori (the Māori world) into the settler/invader colonial project of “New Zealand” instead. As a policy platform and as an imagined national way of being, the white possessive government through biculturalism divorces tikanga (customary norms, law and values) from the situation and allows the white possessive government to promote itself as caring and virtuous (Simon, 2016). It could be argued that biculturalism affirms the white possessive state’s desire to invest in reproducing state ownership, control and domination by falsely mythologising the Treaty of Waitangi as a “founding document” (Simon, 2016; see also M. H. Durie, 2012).

Approaching biculturalism as one of Beck’s (2002a, 2002b) zombie concepts allows us to consider its weird, irrational and toxic aspects (see Brabazon, 2016) and to illuminate the mechanisms and motivations through which it remains “undead”, that is, overstays its relevance as a policy platform. This dead-but-alive aspect of biculturalism is particularly evident in Indigenous communities and it is in accordance with Indigenous understandings that I argue the concept must be interrogated, and potentially dismantled. In its place, it is suggested that we rethink, reconstruct, and reorganise our social notions and perspectives around the notion of “Te Ara Tika me Te Ara Hou” (the right way, the new way).

This article is an invitation to discussion, learning and growth. I have previously argued that the white possessive government must understand that the settler colonial project known as “New Zealand” must come to an end and that this terminus is prerequisite to achieving a collective future in Aotearoa New Zealand (see Simon, 2020a, 2021). Zombie concepts like biculturalism distract from the Indigenous truth that mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) is real and relevant. Treaty-based zombie concepts in Aotearoa New Zealand perpetuate the racist myth that Indigenous peoples are incapable of governing themselves. Aotearoa New Zealand needs to shape its collective future in a new, post-settler/invader colonial direction. The critique of biculturalism undertaken here ought to reinforce, as suggested by Simon (2021), that settler/invaders bear a responsibility for decolonisation; it also aims to suggest productive directions for this task.

To summarise: this Kaupapa Māori article addresses the following research question: How is biculturalism related to the denial of mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty)? To address this question, this article will outline and adopt the method of Mahi Tuhituhi as Kaupapa Māori writing inquiry, inspired by the work of Georgina Stewart (2021). Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s (2015b) concept of “the white possessive” is a major theoretical underpinning of my own work in terms of conceptualising a collective future of Aotearoa New Zealand. The article will then move to explain the concept and development of biculturalism as a policy framework and platform for Indigenous

**Mahi Tuhituhi**

Before reframing biculturalism through the “zombie” lens it is prudent to articulate the Kaupapa Māori approach\(^{10}\) that underpins the whole discussion. Mahi Tuhituhi is a (post)qualitative\(^{11}\) Kaupapa Māori research approach based on the work of Georgina Stewart (2021). Kaupapa Māori research serves the purposes of this article as a fundamental, well-established Indigenous research practice. Indigenous Mahi Tuhituhi is a form of Kaupapa Māori writing inquiry aimed at investigating the use of academic writing as a vehicle for critical Māori ideals and political goals. As a method, Mahi Tuhituhi is consistent with a view of Kaupapa Māori as a use of the written word to speak back to the Eurocentric “archive” underpinning the entire academy (Stewart, 2021).

As Stewart (2021) claims in “Kaupapa Māori Research, Understanding Writing as a Māori Method of Inquiry”, the art of writing allows Māori academics to push the bounds of academic traditions and procedures. Writing and research practices of all kinds entail serious ethical considerations and stand to benefit from Kaupapa Māori principles. Foremost among these are principles to commit: (1) to reflexive interrogation of one’s own presuppositions, ideas, and judgments over and beyond—but not to the exclusion of—empirical, qualitative research methods; and (2) to elevate and exercise Māori conceptions of community, ethics, intellectual deliberation and sovereignty within the domain of academia as a means of decentring Western epistemic norms, reclaim control of Māori representation in the public arena, and reposition research within histories and worldviews made by, for, and with Māori (Stewart, 2021).

In contemporary social science research, there is a persistent imbalance in favour of empirical qualitative research. “Conducting interviews” has become practically synonymous with “doing research”, a broader underlying confidence in “empirical data” and “method” that suggests the lingering impact of a narrow scientism (Pipi et al., 2004; Sorell, 1991; Stewart, 2021). This discrepancy is even more prominent in Māori research given the emphasis on foregrounding Māori voices and a cultural predilection for face-to-face techniques; for instance, “kanohi-ki-te-kanohi” or “kanohi kitea” (Pipi et al., 2004). As a corrective to this imbalance, Kaupapa Māori research places the activity, experience or process of Māori textual production front and centre. In part, the idea is to identify those moments in the act of textual production where calcified or insufficiently dynamic Western academic research norms surreptitiously shape one’s decisions under or as the neutrality of “methodology”. This is a step away from being the subject of—or subjected to—others’ research methods and questions and towards reflexive, critical and constructive participation.

From a Kaupapa Māori perspective, therefore, every research decision should be scrutinised, from the initial choice of topic to the minutiae of methodological and stylistic choices. A crucial part of Kaupapa Māori research is the willingness to question one’s own ideas and judgements (Stewart, 2021). As Stewart (2021) highlights:

> I am bound to write from my identity as a Māori, but my arguments also apply more generally under the umbrella category of Indigenous research … ‘writing’ (in English, Te Reo Māori or both) is a powerful method for exploring what it means to be Māori: a way to interrogate Māori subjectivities and advance Māori political aspirations. (pp. 41–42)
The approach taken in the present article consciously aligns with these principles (G. Smith, 2003; L. Smith, 2012; Simon, 2022a). Rather than explaining Kaupapa Māori theory and methods at length, the reflections here are guided by Kaupapa Māori theory, in a sense that Stewart (2021) has already elucidated.

Indigenous Mahi Tuhituhi provides me with an alternate approach to responsive Indigenous research grounded in critique. There is a need to hear the voices of Māori communities that were previously silenced or distorted by Eurocentric research or policy approaches like biculturalism. But this project is incomplete and cannot lay claim to a radical political orientation— as Kaupapa Māori praxis does— until and unless Māori ethical norms, research designs, and spiritual or philosophical orientations are respectfully integrated in the processes of writing and knowledge production. In other words, if uri (descendants) are the reflection of our tūpuna (ancestors) then those his/her stories, realities, whakaaro (thoughts and teachings), pūmanawa (traits), feelings, mātauranga (traditional knowledge), stories and preferences become visible through writing. Without this, Kaupapa Māori research risks succumbing to what Graham Smith (2012) describes as “domestication”.

Mahi Tuhituhi provides for reflexive study of Indigenous politics and policy, bearing in mind that Kaupapa Māori research is politically motivated. The reflexive aspect of this (post)qualitative inquiry extends outwards, as it were, to interrogate collective political and intellectual claims to truth and power (Stewart, 2021). This aspect is best highlighted in the next section, which outlines Moreton-Robinson’s (2015b) idea of the white possessive and problematises truth claims around Te Tiriti.

The white possessive doctrine

The objective here is to comprehend the white possessive doctrine in relation to the state’s denial of mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty). The critical notion of white possession—what I will call “the white possessive doctrine”—has emerged through a number of Moreton-Robinson’s publications (2004, 2005, 2006, 2011, 2015a, 2015b, 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2020, 2021, 2022). It is helpful in the present context insofar as it allows us to recognise the problems with biculturalism. Adapting Moreton-Robinson’s white possessive doctrine to Aotearoa New Zealand reveals the following: through colonisation, the British promoted a system in which race and British superiority shaped the law. They created a society based on white possession, where traditional Indigenous law, tikanga (customary norms, law and values), was butchered and suppressed through its incorporation into general law. This was done in ways that suited the coloniser and catered to the needs and desires of the colonising population over and against those who originally held mana whenua (those with Ancestral authority over the land). This pathway was shaped and approved by the judiciary and government policy. The principles of the Treaty of Waitangi were confirmed by the Court of Appeal, for example, and have been incorporated into government policy regarding Māori issues and rights ever since (Simon, 2016, 2020b, 2022b).

In this system, the Crown holds exclusive possession of territory within the nation state. Successive governments dehumanised hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people) to legitimise their actions, and then sought to perform benevolence and virtue through a project of making the Indigenous population “fully human”, doling out “rights” in proportion to collective Māori integration or assimilation into Western power structures. This benevolence is evidently a kind of smoke screen; the government needs to appear virtuous to plausibly nullify, obscure or erase the moral position held by hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people), that is, to cast already
existing and sovereign traditional Indigenous ethical, legal and political norms as irrelevant to proper statecraft. The possession works ideologically (as a set of beliefs) to render and neutralise the nation as a white possessive (i.e. sovereignty is ceded to the Crown). “White patriarchal sovereignty” is the ultimate outcome of this possessive act, given a succession of administrations that are predominantly white and male (Moreton-Robinson, 2015b; Simon, 2016, 2020a, 2022b). In essence, the government wielded law as a weapon, legislating the theft of Indigenous lands through the New Zealand Land Wars and incidents such as Ngatapa and Rangiaowhia (Coromandel-Wander, 2013; RNZ, 2019; Wynsley, 2019).

These issues highlight the problematic nature of “society” in Aotearoa New Zealand; above all, the absurdity of construing the population as a unified whole, or even—as in the case of biculturalism—as two such wholes in search of unification. The current sociopolitical system is built on the dispossession and removal of power from the Indigenous population under a legal fiction known as the “doctrine of discovery” and is dubiously justified though the colonial mythmaking of “treaty-truth” (Simon, 2016, 2020b). The white possessive doctrine offers a first tool for the dismantling of biculturalism insofar as its stated aims as a policy platform cannot be taken seriously so long as several of the component pieces of white possession in Aotearoa New Zealand—suppression of tikanga (customary norms, law and values) by way of “rights” discourse and the promotion of “treaty-truth”—remain unaddressed. The next section will outline the conceptual matrix of biculturalism, anticipating its reframing as a zombie concept.

**Biculturalism in Aotearoa New Zealand**

Over the past 40 years, Aotearoa New Zealand’s political system has moved to recognise the Indigenous population and the non-Indigenous population as distinct equal partners who: (1) share kaitiakitanga (guardianship) of the resources; and (2) give to and uphold the country’s identity and culture (Grant, 2016; Johnson, 2008; Sibley & Liu, 2007). The self-conscious public discourse that has developed around these understandings is known as “biculturalism” (Bell, 2006; Grant, 2016; Maletino, 2014; O’Sullivan, 2007; Peach, 2018; Turrruhn, 2019). For the government, biculturalism has served as a policy framework geared towards building an “imagined community” of nationhood (Anderson, 1983), thereby realising what may be termed a “postcolonial nation.” To move beyond the settler/invader colonial society in which Māori have found themselves relegated to powerlessness and poverty, biculturalism must be questioned (see Kake, 2016; Poata-Smith, 2002, 2013; Walker, 2004).

The current orthodox position considers The Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840, the founding document of biculturalism. Due to settler/invader misconceptions about the Treaty or Te Tiriti, the latter had no legal status throughout the bulk of the 20th century (Culpitt, 1994; Jones, 2016; Tate, 2004a, 2004b; Williams, 2013). That situation changed as a result of civil rights struggles from the 1960s to the 1980s, and the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. Over these 40 years, Canada, Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand slowly abandoned their respective assimilation policies; but while Australia and Canada followed sovereignty politics, Aotearoa New Zealand pursued bicultural ideals (Armitage, 1995; Grant, 2016). The Treaty states that governance in Aotearoa New Zealand should be administered in cooperation with Māori. This promise was not upheld; all government agencies were structured as nationwide organisations and were not tailored for Māori (Grant, 2016). However, following lawsuits such as the Māori Council cases in the 1980s and 1990s, “under the ideal of bicultural politics Māori demanded a partnership role in the governance of each [government department]” (Grant, 2016, p. 43). Thus, while Australia and Canada’s approaches to Indigenous politics kept Indigenous peoples contesting the government’s white
patriarchal sovereignty, New Zealand’s bicultural politics attempted to create a broader view of how Indigenous peoples might influence the state (Grant, 2016).

In theory, broader inclusion should yield greater political power. In practice, the patina of biculturalism merely hides the devastating effects of the government’s neoliberal policies. On this count, it is important to highlight the work of LeFevre (2015), Maletino (2014), O’Sullivan (2007), and Turruhn (2019). These theorists provide explanations as to the disavowed underside of biculturalism. Their work is essential to broader understandings of this concept. Maletino (2014), for instance, suggests that biculturalism is shaped and understood within a neoliberal framework that severely restricts Māori aspirations for autonomy. O’Sullivan (2007) likewise argues that bicultural state policy stymies Māori self-determination. Māori inequality is actively exacerbated through a neoliberal economic model, and class is obscured as a central contributing factor via the rhetoric of individual responsibility and cultural nationalism (Maletino, 2014). In this vein, we should refrain from using the common treatyist rhetoric that “we are all a treaty people” (see Simon, 2016, 2020b, 2021, n.d. b).

As Turruhn (2019) has noted, there is no exact date or piece of legislation that can be used to pinpoint the introduction of biculturalism as a policy framework. Instead, numerous discourses, practices and pieces of law have been introduced over time and continue to develop. Perspectives and techniques have shifted in response to shifting political contexts. While biculturalism is primarily predicated on the premise that the state should fulfil its Treaty responsibilities, a lack of agreement in understanding the Treaty has been one of the primary causes of debate about its meaning. To this end, Johnson (2008) describes a definitional spectrum for biculturalism ranging from “soft” techniques on one end, through “moderate”, “inclusive” and “strong” approaches, arriving finally at “hard” versions on the other end. “Soft” techniques include mainstreaming Māori culture and eliminating discrimination and prejudice. Moderate, inclusive, and strong versions strive to reduce disparities, to be culturally appropriate, and to provide Māori some autonomy. Proponents of hard definitions, by contrast, aim to reform society in order to achieve tino rangatiratanga (self-determination). Observing the contestation of meaning and purpose vis-à-vis biculturalism Turruhn (2019) observes:

In practice, biculturalism has largely revolved around the middle ground of responding to, and accommodating Māori needs and the key goals, as defined by the settler state, has revolved around reconciliation, economic development, and recognition. (p. 8)

The development of Tiriti-based biculturalism coincided with another significant reform agenda by the fourth Labour government, which aimed to dismantle the welfare state and introduce a neoliberal free market system (Bargh, 2007; MacDonald & Muldoon, 2007; Mitchell, 2017; L. Smith, 2020; Turruhn, 2019).

Ideologically, this shift prioritised the power of the free market, globalisation, and the privatisation of public services. Many Māori leaders were optimistic about these sweeping economic changes at the time. Māori were disillusioned with past administrations’ paternalism and racism and hoped that the planned economic and social changes, with their promise of choice, would benefit Indigenous people. The devolution of public services, in particular, was viewed as a chance to build by-Māori-for-Māori services capable of better meeting the Māori community needs through self-determination and more control over their own affairs (L. Smith, 2020; Turruhn, 2019). One unforeseen consequence of the neoliberal reform program, however, was a vast increase in socioeconomic inequality over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The reforms had far-reaching material consequences for all New Zealanders, but they hit Māori and Pasifika communities the hardest. These younger and less-educated populations were more vulnerable to economic...
restructuring than were non-Māori communities when jobs in low-skilled occupations disappeared en masse during the 1980s (Bargh, 2007; MacDonald & Muldoon, 2007; Poata-Smith, 2013; L. Smith, 2020). Between 1988 and 1992, Māori unemployment rose from 13.5% to 27.3% (Poata-Smith, 2013), contrasting with a rise in the general unemployment rate from 5.7 to 10.8% in the same period (OECD, n.d., as cited in Terruhn, 2019).

This inequitable scenario played out most dramatically in communities where Māori were a significant portion of the overall population. The impact of privatisation under neoliberal reform is still felt today; for example, in rural Bay of Plenty communities. At one point in the late 1980s, unemployment reached 95% in Murupara and Minginui, and today a large proportion of their populations continue to sustain their livelihood via government welfare assistance (Birchfield & Grant, 1993; NMCSA, 2012; Pomeroy & Tapuke, 2016). Rewi and Hastie (2021) highlight this stark disparity in quality of life and observe that in Murupara today: “46% of the residents are one-parent families and the median income is $17,100 per annum” (p. 66). This affirms Terruhn’s (2019) point that Māori continue to be overrepresented in many negative social indicators. While there have been significant gains for all New Zealanders in some areas, the disparities between Māori and Pākehā have remained, and in some cases worsened.

In the wake of neoliberal reforms, biculturalism has become increasingly focused on Māori economic development. Settlements for breaches of Te Tiriti fall into this paradigm in that redress for grievances consists primarily of financial compensation aimed at strengthening iwi economies (Bargh, 2012; Terruhn, 2019). Mutu (2018) points out that significant critiques of treaty settlement processes are well established in legal scholarship at this point (Bargh, 2012; Chen, 2012; Coyle, 2011; Coxhead, 2002; Jones, 2016; Joseph, 2012; Mikaere, 1997, 2011; Miller et al., 2010; Mutu, 2011; Rumbles, 1999; Te Aho, 2017; Vertongen, 2012). More recently, substantial commentary questions the power dynamics in the settlement process and the adequacy of the amounts provided to claimants (Māori Television, 2019; Mutu, 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Little, 2018; Simon, 2016, 2020b, 2021; Te Aho, 2017). As awareness of Treaty settlements and policies specifically aimed at Māori has increased, so too has non-Māori resentment (Barber, 2008; Meihana, 2015, 2017; Simon, 2020b; L. Smith, 2020; Terruhn, 2019). Many Pākehā settlers/invaders observe an emerging general “refusal” to see and acknowledge “poverty, racism, discrimination, and marginalization” (L. Smith, 2013, p. 230, as cited in Terruhn, 2019), as the pervasive social problems they are (Meihana, 2015; Simon, 2020b).

The settler colonial nature of biculturalism extends beyond its economic or class dimensions. Terruhn (2019) writes that “The Treaty of Waitangi has been amenable to the settler government because it paved a way to re-legitimizing the presence of settlers and the sovereignty of the settler state” (p. 15). Pearson (2000) confirms this utility of the “treaty-driven myth of the co-founding origins of New Zealand” and notes its central importance “within a bicultural vision of a common destiny with its accompanying ideological and political framework” (p. 102). Terruhn (2019) further contends that “[r]econciliation, while arguably important, in some ways also protects the sovereignty of the settler state by aiming to subdue Indigenous aspirations for sovereignty in favor of subsuming them into the reconciled nation” (p. 15). It is noted that “Treaty settlements are important but cannot be the end point because they do little to enable Māori autonomy” (Hill, 2016, as cited in Terruhn, 2019, p. 15). In summary, Terruhn (2019) writes:

The conclusions about the measures that can be said to encompass contemporary biculturalism can only be mixed. While processes of reconciliation and redress through the Waitangi Tribunal, efforts to revitalize te reo Māori, and initiatives to tackle inequalities have made some difference to iwi and Māori more broadly, the main problem is that they fall short of granting the sovereignty Māori never ceded when they signed [or did not sign] Te Tiriti o Waitangi. (p. 15)
Sissons (2004) and J. Smith (2011) also question whether biculturalism has really transformed New Zealand into a “post-settler” nation (as cited in LeFevre, 2015).

As Sibley and Liu (2007) note, symbolic types of biculturalism that affirm this “post-settler” status appeal to the majority since Māori culture is viewed as contributing to the positive cultural definition of Aotearoa New Zealand. Without Māori, Aotearoa New Zealand culture would be merely a colonial derivative of Great Britain, a mother nation that has abandoned Aotearoa New Zealand and is no longer considered a sufficient source of identity (Sibley & Liu, 2007, p. 4). As a result, Pākehā may promote a positive and distinct identity as a New Zealander on the international stage by adopting symbolic parts of Māori culture. However, it is difficult for Pākehā as settler/invaders to claim bicultural heritage unilaterally; it must also be acknowledged and accepted by Māori (Sibley & Liu, 2007).

According to Mead (1994), Pākehā approaches typically offer one solution to many diverse problems; this is an “all or nothing” syndrome, driven by a need to see results in one’s own lifetime (short-term goal setting). This approach highlights the need to experience something first hand to understand it and/or to want to protect it. The immediate focus is on compartmentalising, listing, and subdividing issues, and the ultimate focus is on providing for the rights of the individual (Mead, 1994; Simon, 2016; 2020b). By contrast, the Indigenous approach in Te Ao Māori (The Māori world) emphasises developing policy on an iwi-by-iwi (or even hapū-by-hapū) basis and is underpinned by intergenerational responsibility. Mauri (life force), ihi (existential force), wehi (awe) and mana (power, authority); Māori protect these intangibles without firsthand experience (Mead, 1994). This approach reaffirms the holistic interdependency of social, cultural, environmental and economic factors. Moreover, collective rights are the legitimising norms and standards in Te Ao Māori (the Māori world; Mead, 1994; Simon, 2016, 2021).

As a government policy framework, biculturalism seeks to foster Indigenous inclusion. I argue, however, that biculturalism is founded on a possessive form of power that rationalises an “all or nothing” syndrome (see Mead, 1994). The white possessive government could instead use Indigenous approaches to recognise the validity of the Te Tiriti and provide for mana motuhake (Indigenous Sovereignty). This could be done on a case-by-case basis, acknowledging the existence of diverse histories and realities between different hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people). This approach would dispense with the myth that “Māori signed the Treaty”. Since biculturalism does not provide for mana motuhake (Indigenous Sovereignty) or tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) and entrenches the treaty principles, it is effectively a form of short-term thinking, an attempt to solve issues based on today’s understandings, not what is best for future generations (see Simon, 2016). As a result, it enables the continuation of settler colonial power structures. As such, this policy framework enables the permanence of whiteness and white possessiveness in the settler colonial system (Simon, 2016; see also Fung 2021; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Having outlined the history and socio-economic realities of biculturalism, we now move to consider it through the lens of “zombie concept”.

Zombie concepts

Zombie concepts were born out of the work of Ulrich Beck. Beck described them as forms that are familiar, taken for granted, naturalised and assumed, but bearing within weird, odd, irrational, unpredictable and toxic content (Brabazon, 2016). While he considered class the paradigmatic zombie conce cited in Brabazon, 2016), this is not sufficient to understand the notion of zombie
concepts in the state of Te Ao Māori (The Māori world). Rutherford (2000) offers a helpful clarification of the term:

There is a paradox. Changes are occurring faster in people’s consciousness than in their behaviour and social conditions. This mixture of new consciousness and old conditions has created what he [Beck] describes as Zombie categories – social forms such as class, family or neighbourhood, which are dead, yet alive. (p. 37)

Zombie concepts are ideas or propositions that “have lost their social purpose” but still allow for a certain ‘we’ to “gain from their perpetuation”. They are “terms of safety, understanding and compliance…. Things or ideas that moved from the 19th century and continue to live in our present” (Brabazon, 2016, p. 5). Liotta and Shearer (2008) argue that a concept is in a zombie state if it “emphasize[s] the state and thereby fail[s] to engage the multiple and interdependent processes of change we now face” (p. 9). In other words, these are “dead” concepts that regulate our thinking but fail to grasp the modern situation in its complexity. Like zombies, Chan (2013) explains, “there are social concepts that are dead and yet kept alive in their use by scholars to describe the growing fiction of traditional social institutions” (p. 1059).

With these criteria in mind, the zombie features of biculturalism are easy to identify. While biculturalism has been a meaningful frame of reference for Pākehā and Māori alike, it relies too heavily on these groups as static legal and/or demographic entities. “Treaty-truth” insists on a singular and relatively narrow interpretation of history, not to mention its ethical and political renegotiations and recoceptualisations. Finally, it can be argued that biculturalism was only ever “alive” in the imagined community of Aotearoa New Zealand so long as neoliberal reforms still held out a plausible promise of a kind of market-based intercultural equality. Biculturalism is effectively the ideological companion to neoliberalism—it is irrational, toxic, and weird to hold out hope in the symbolic promises of the former in light of the material failures of the latter (see Brabazon, 2016).

I posit that what Aotearoa New Zealand truly needs to do is rethink, reconstruct, and reorganise our social notions and perspectives to bring these up to speed. In the application of zombie concepts to the current state of Te Ao Māori (The Māori World), I would highlight that a number of zombie concepts emerged in the wake of the 2014 Waitangi Tribunal decision (see Simon, 2016, 2020b, 2021, n.d. b) and Waitangi Tribunal’s (2014) assertions around mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) created a seldom-explored paradigm shift. I argue that the appellation “zombie concept” now fits the treaty principles; the argument that kāwanatanga means complete government or government; the idea that the people of Aotearoa New Zealand are a “treaty people”; the assertion that the treaty is a founding document; and the notion of biculturalism as such. I believe that the Treaty/Te Tiriti should be openly questioned because the white possessive mythmaking that promotes the Treaty and its bicultural byproducts is no longer relevant to the reality of Te Ao Māori and Aotearoa New Zealand (Simon, 2016, 2020b, 2021, n.d. b). They are used to perpetuate and benefit government power and are to be considered zombie concepts in Māori–non-Māori relations. In the next section I unpack the reasons using settler/invader colonialism, which underpins and adds an additional critical perspective to the arguments presented here.

**Settler/invader colonialism**

In Māori literature on the topic, Simon (2020a) notes concerning a mōteatea in 1850 by Puhiwahine that,
it was foreseen that mana and the culture would slip away from the people, thereby undermining their sense of identity. In relation to the following line, “mimiti” means to be diminished, while ‘pakore’ explains that it will become nothing. In this case, “Ki te waha o te parata” is used to denote oblivion, in the literal sense … Part of the commentary of this mōteatea is the fact that, unlike with Te Arawa waka, there is no one with powers like Ngātoroirangi to save us—in this case, the culture, hapū (clan), iwi (Indigenous nation or people) and Māori—from the oblivion of the ‘Parata.’ (Sea monster) The Parata in this case could also account for an understanding of Britishness and the notion of greed that accompanies it. This is due to the fact that a Parata consumes all. (p. 75)

In my Pacific Dynamics paper I described the idea of settler-invader colonialism from a traditional Māori viewpoint. In traditional Māori stories, Ngatoroirangi saved Te Arawa by preforming a karakia (ritual chant to control the Parata [Sea monster]). The passage speaks to an extensively theorised idea regarding settler/invader colonialism, the erasure of indigeneity from Indigenous lands, and the total sum of settler/invader colonial desire to usher in the total destruction of the Indigenous population. It also challenges narratives about who first theorised the concept. I have previously concluded that it was Puhiwahine in 1850 (Simon, 2021). This conclusion ultimately frames the concept in a uniquely mātauranga (traditional knowledge) way.

Settler/invader colonialism is a transnational and global phenomenon. It is conceptually, politically, and geographically distinct from colonialism because it is a project of empire facilitated by white supremacy (Wolfe, 2006). Rather than emphasising imperial expansion motivated solely by martial or economic goals (which ultimately necessitate the coloniser’s departure), settler colonialism promotes the permanent occupation of a territory and removal of Indigenous peoples with the express purpose of building an ethnically distinct national community. The foundation of settler colonialism is the presupposition of permanence; it is an indefinitely perpetuated structure requiring continuous maintenance in order to implement genocidal logics, i.e., a permanent removal of the Indigenous population (Bonds & Inwood, 2016; Veracini, 2010; Wolfe, 2006). Cavanaugh and Veracini (2010) comment, however, that Indigenous labour can be put to good use before they are obliterated. The presupposition of permanence, however, can arguably account for the undead character of biculturalism as a policy platform; the never-fulfilled symbolic unity functions as a stalling mechanism and a panacea for Pākehā–Māori tensions.

With settler/invader colonialism, settler normativity is fundamental; settlement processes literally and discursively institutionalise settler privileges, establishing settlers and their culture as superior and contemporary, whereas Indigenous nations and their cultures are inferior and primitive (Steinman, 2015, p. 3). An asymmetrical settler/invader–native dichotomy is maintained, with strict isolation between settlers and Indigenous populations. When assimilation is promoted, it is aimed towards the extinction of Indigenous communities rather than the formation of hybrid or mestizo groups or the survival of Indigenous nations that may combine cultures and individuals in a self-determining way (Steinman, 2015). Settler/invader colonialism aims to create a new version of the home or metropolitan society in a different land; settler suppression of Indigenous nationhood and presence is the underlying goal for settler colonial societies (Steinman, 2016; Wolfe, 2006). In this situation, the establishment of new settlements entails the annihilation of Indigenous peoples, the expropriation and privatisation of their lands, and the exploitation of disadvantaged peoples under a capitalist system founded on and supported by racism. The United States, Canada, Israel, Australia, Aotearoa New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil are all instances of settler/invader colonial societies (Bonds & Inwood, 2016).

A shift away from the terminology of “settler colonialism” is desirable under the present circumstances. This phrase does not adequately describe the situation from an Indigenous
perspective. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the designation “settler” strips that person from their connection and responsibility to history and obscures their privileged position in settler/invader society (Simon, n.d. a). Lawson (2004) notes that “a focus on settler independence [as patriarchal white sovereignty] allows a ‘strategic disavowal of the colonising act’ and a concomitant transformation of ‘invaders’ into ‘peaceful settlers’” (p. 160). A conceptual reframing is necessary, at least until a time when settler/invaders come to terms with their position. Deploying the term “invader” expunges myth of fictionalised accounts of Indigenous land being settled peacefully, it engages attitudes of acceptance and responsibility, and it accurately identifies the place of settler/invaders on Indigenous lands as manuhiri (visitors). It has the potential to drive thinking and awareness of settler/invaders toward the actual act of “settling” as critiqued and described by Veracini (2013). The following section considers Veracini’s commentary to outline a helpful and exemplary step in this direction. Proper understanding of “settling” is key for the collective future of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Veracini’s commentary on On Settling

Veracini (2013) provides valuable observations about Goodin’s (2012) book, On Settling. Goodin’s last phase of settling, phase 5, is “settling on” and refers to settling on a belief or a value, a project or a commitment, a way of being or a way of living. Without undergoing phases 1 to 4, however, there can be no genuine political capacity for the Indigenous population. Veracini observes that, for Goodin, “settling” remains territorial, and, even if it no longer refers to “empty lands”, it should not be understood metaphorically (Veracini, 2013; see also Simon, 2020b, 2021).

Veracini (2013) states that if settled people are seen as exclusively able to “craft narrative identities and live up to them,” (p. 236) the displacement of an Indigenous population and the assumption of patriarchal white sovereignty become intimately linked. In the contemporary context, no project has attempted to consolidate values and commitments important to Aotearoa New Zealand society as a whole. There is no provision for the political equity and equality of the Indigenous population and thus no genuine political capacity for the displaced Indigenous population (Simon, 2020b). In Aotearoa New Zealand, principles such as mana (power, authority) and mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) must be clearly understood and applied. It is important for the constitution, as Veracini (2013) suggests, to express such shared societal values and commitments. Constitutional transformation would enable the settler-colonial society to begin the process of “settling for” because such amendment could be considered a project related to values (Simon, 2021). Again, for constitutional transformation to occur, the values of governance must be established by consensus. Current treaty-based discourse relies too much on the presupposition of a foundational document between three static entities: the state, society at large, and Indigenous groups. On the whole, this discourse confuses the issue of Indigenous development and rights. In this, tino rangatiratanga, as self-determination, for example, gets confused for mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty; see Hawksley & Howson, 2011), making it difficult to reach māramatanga, or understanding (Simon, 2021).

Part of this transformation necessarily rests on consciousness of white possessiveness, ignorance, belonging, and fragility (see Simon, 2020b). But to achieve a truly postsettlement colonial society, the values of a constitution or a society must be built on the base culture, as Ranginui Walker compellingly argues. In Aotearoa New Zealand these can only be Māori values (Treaty Project, 2015; also see Simon, 2020b, 2021). Jones’ Māori Constitutional values based in tikanga (customary norms, law and values) provide direction to a set of values that can be easily integrated by Aotearoa New Zealand society. Jones’ constitutional values can and should serve as the key values that Veracini (2013) discusses in relation to phase 5 of On Settling. I argue that the
Māori values of whanaungatanga (relationality, kinship), mana (power, authority), utu (reciprocity), manaakitanga (care), tapu (sacred) and noa (without restriction), which Jones (2014) suggests as Māori Constitutional values, should serve as the basis for moving Aotearoa New Zealand towards a collective future (Simon, 2020b, 2021). They might helpfully be retermed “The Foundational Constitutional Values of Aotearoa New Zealand” (Simon, 2021, p. 15–16; see also Simon, 2020b). This reframing recognises the deconstruction of the settler/invader colonial project known as “New Zealand”. Allowing the settler to settle (after taking real responsibility) may allow everyone in Aotearoa New Zealand to move constructively towards a collective future.

Discussion

Since 2014 and the Waitangi Tribunal decision, we need to move away from the outdated notion that “Māori” as some magically conceived, homogenous and racialised group signed the Treaty and thus signed over sovereignty. Aotearoa New Zealand must remember that pre-2014 dialogue assumed that all Māori could enjoy is tino rangatiratanga (self-determination; Maaka & Fleras, 2005). This ignores the reality of mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) and the recent paradigm shift. This is why in the bicultural dialogue, mana whenua (ancestral authority to speak for the territory) and mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) are dismissed as irrelevant. Bicultural dialogue assumes that these are exercised and held by the white possessive government alone in the form of patriarchal white sovereignty.

The prominence and favourable notion of “Tāngata Tiriti” has been popularly accepted among liberal Pākehā as a concept that was created by biculturalists and supported by prominent Māori. This is problematic to the extent that it constitutes a continuation of Indigenous peoples’ erasure by settler/invaders. It is an attempt to claim an identity of Indigeneity and connection, an irreconcilable, illogical and ahistorical genealogical link via a treaty to the whenua (Simon, n.d. b). Biculturalism is often presented as a desire for a shared nationhood fuelled by a demand for shared belonging. However, this notion is devoid of historical recognition and neglects the subordinate position the Indigenous population holds in that shared vision.

Biculturalism was born out of a desire to be inclusive of Indigeneity. Its modern outcome is probably unintentional and so cannot be entirely blamed on the settler/invaders themselves. A large portion of the responsibility must lie with the white possessive government and its creation of a hyper-focused policy regime and framework based on the Treaty of Waitangi, biculturalism and the treaty principles (Simon, n.d. b). Part of this has been the faulty development of biculturalism as a means of including Te Ao Māori (the Māori world). However, such inclusiveness generally furthers the absorption of Te Ao Māori (the Māori world) into the settler/invader colonial project. Biculturalism as a policy platform and way of being has become normative. The white possessive government’s fixation with “the treaty” reiterates the settler colonial status quo. It has become a default narrative about Aotearoa New Zealand’s putative inclusivity. The current paradigm shift and awakening to mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) challenges the validity of the white possessive government and the basis of biculturalism.

When the white possessive government assigns excessive importance to “the treaty”, particularly to the treaty principles as a policy platform underpinned by the notion of biculturalism, it purposefully creates a normative perspective on the treaty as the foundational document. But the treaty cannot be treated as a foundational document without ignoring the historical experiences and understandings of nonsignatory hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people; Simon, 2016). Mirroring Moreton-Robinson’s approach (2011), which prioritises, for example, the provision of rights as a path to virtue, the rollout of biculturalism as a basis for Indigenous policy and
inclusion, treaty-centrism enacts the same result—an elimination of collective awareness of mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) and an obstruction of hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people) control over their own sovereign destiny. It promotes the idea that whānau ((extended) family), hapū (clan) and iwi (Indigenous nation or people) are different subgroups of the generic category “New Zealander” and nothing more. Biculturalism has sought to create a more inclusive Aotearoa New Zealand without substantive Indigenous empowerment; it divorces tikanga (customary norms, law and values) from the situation and allows the white possessive government to look kind, giving, and virtuous (Simon, 2016). If biculturalism after 40 years has not delivered equality and equity, then there needs to be change or, as I argue, total abandonment of the policy platform.

In this regard, biculturalism can be considered “as [a] yet unfulfilled promise” (Johnson, 2008, p. 48). J. Durie (2005) highlights that one flaw of biculturalism is an emphasis on material poverty and individual needs rather than Māori as a collective with Indigenous rights. O’Sullivan (2007) similarly comments that biculturalism keeps Māori in the position of a junior partner dependent on the government. These perspectives underscore Awatere’s (1984) insistence that “the kaupapa is [and has always been] Māori Sovereignty. It must not be biculturalism. All efforts at biculturalism have only resulted in integration and assimilation, bitterness and tears” (p. 60).

From the perspective of nonsignatory and signatory hapū (clan), biculturalism does not bring equilibrium; it is still far from what nonsignatory and signatory hapū (clan) originally wanted. Biculturalism affirms the white possessive state’s excessive desire to invest in reproducing and reaffirming its ownership, control and domination. The white possessive state created a normative narrative that serves as a continuation of white possession via the Treaty of Waitangi and its false mythologisation as a “founding document” of New Zealand’s settler/invader colonial state (Simon, 2016). It allows settler/invaders to further indulge their historical amnesia and possessiveness (Simon, 2020b; Kidman & O’Malley, 2020, as cited in Simon, 2021). Simon (2021) therefore asserts that settler/invaders must also take responsibility for decolonisation; this is not a job for the Indigenous population alone.

Veracini’s work on settling is key to this progress in Aotearoa New Zealand. Simon (2020b, 2021) argues that this should be based on the Māori Constitution values espoused by Jones (2014), namely whanaungatanga (relationality, kinship), mana (power, authority), utu (reciprocity), manaakitanga (care), tapu (sacred) and noa (without restriction) with the underlying process tikanga (customary norms, law and values), values of aroha (compassion, love, empathy), tika (right, correct), and pono (true, valid, honest, genuine, sincere). The true nature of biculturalism in relation to mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) raises questions, particularly in the area of professional practice—that need to be explored further. How are biculturalism and treaty-based practice an extension of settler/invader colonialism and the denial of mana motuhake (Indigenous Sovereignty)? Additionally, how do those that identify as Tāngata Tiriti decolonise their identity? The assertion that “We [Māori] must also not forget that the Treaty is not just a Bill of Rights for Māori. It is a Bill of Rights for Pākehā, too. It is the Treaty that gives Pākehā the right to be here” (E. T. Durie, 1990; see also Bargh, 2021) needs to be addressed as well. Such statements from respected Māori are not helpful after the 2014 paradigm shift. Statements like this perpetuate the treaty-driven myth of the cofounding origins of New Zealand (see Simon, 2016, 2020b, 2021) without recognising that in large parts of the country there is no legal basis for the presence of settler/invaders or for the patriarchal white sovereignty claimed by the white possessive government (Simon, 2016).
Zombie concepts, again, are concepts that “have lost their social purpose … they are terms of safety, understanding and compliance” (Brabazon, 2016, p. 5). Biculturalism is precisely this kind of “undead” concept that regulates our thinking but fails to grasp the reality of the present situation. It has been made familiar, taken for granted, and naturalised, but in reality it is weird, odd, irrational, and toxic—particularly to the Indigenous population. It must be restated that the white possessive government’s treaty-centric view is a way to retain ill-gotten power. What is really needed is to rethink, reconstruct, and reorganise the social notions and perspectives in Aotearoa New Zealand. In previous work, Simon (2021) has proposed the notion of “Te Ara Tika me Te Ara Hou” (the right way, the new way).

Ultimately the creation of a society more inclusive of and more equitable towards indigeneity is unequivocally necessary and this is the time to illumine for everyone the problems endemic to biculturalism. Highlighting biculturalism’s status as a zombie concept also reveals that Aotearoa New Zealand is at a crossroads or what I describe as a “critical juncture” as a society. Aotearoa New Zealand is becoming more accepting and inclusive of Te Ao Māori (the Māori world). If we are to create an inclusive and equitable society, then we should work to establish the above constitutional values as the basis for our society and collective future, a future that is not treaty-centric but mana-centric. Such change would be groundbreaking and the present moment in time affords unique and crucial opportunities to move forward. With the momentum established by the 2014 paradigm shift, there is potential here to break the settler/invader colonial foundations of Aotearoa New Zealand. The resultant future would recognise and include nonsignatory hapū (clan) and recognise their mana or sovereignty to their rohe; it would provide for all tāuiwi (foreigner, European) or manuhiri (visitors) and mana whenua (those with Ancestral authority over the land) alike. This article is a call to constitutional transformation(s) and for us as a collective of people here in Aotearoa New Zealand to awaken to our reality.

**Implications from this research**

This line of research is an invitation to discussion, learning, and possibly growth. I have argued that the white possessive government must come to an understanding that the continuation of the settler colonial project known as “New Zealand” and its perpetuation must come to an end, which would mean an abandonment of biculturalism. The ending of the settler/invader project would be a prerequisite to achieving a collective future in Aotearoa New Zealand. Treaty-based zombie concepts distract from the Indigenous truth that mana motuhake (Indigenous sovereignty) is real and still relevant. Biculturalism perpetuates the colonial racist myth that Indigenous peoples are incapable of exercising government of themselves. There is a need to shape our collective future apart from the false life offered by biculturalism. Aotearoa New Zealand must also create a future that is post-settler/invader colonial. That future must not have Te Tiriti at its centre, in order to be truly inclusive and the recognition of mana motuhake (Indigenous Sovereignty) that was neither given nor ceded. I argue that in terms of Māori settler/invader relations this would be an end to the notion of biculturalism, which is settler/invader colonial and neoliberal in nature, working only to cement the power of the white possessive government in Aotearoa New Zealand.
References


Grant, D. (2016). *When research is a dirty word: Sovereignty and bicultural politics in Canada, Australia and New Zealand ethics* [Doctoral thesis, University of Otago].


RNZ. (2021). NZ wars: Stories of Tainui an extended interview. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rLxajGE-rQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rLxajGE-rQ)


Smith, L. (2020). The native and the neoliberal down under: Neoliberalism and “endangered authenticities”. In M. de la Cadena & S. Orin (Eds.), *Indigenous experience today* (pp. 333–352). Routledge.


### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hapū</td>
<td>Clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihi</td>
<td>Essential force, excitement, thrill, power, charm, personal magnetism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwi</td>
<td>Indigenous Nation, People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai ti atanga</td>
<td>Guardianship, Stewardship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaupapa</td>
<td>Purpose, Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mana</td>
<td>Power, Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mana Motuhake</td>
<td>A form of indigenous power or authority that is derived from Ngā Atua which,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>like an island, is separate, independent, special and unattached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maanakitanga</td>
<td>Hospitality, kindness, generosity, support—the process of showing respect,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>generosity and care for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mātauranga Māori</td>
<td>Māori traditional knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauri</td>
<td>Life principle, life force, vital essence, special nature, a material symbol of a life principle, source of emotions—the essential quality and vitality of a being or entity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muru</td>
<td>To plunder, confiscate, take ritual compensation—an effective form of social control, restorative justice and redistribution of wealth among relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noa</td>
<td>Without restriction, without conditions, normal; opposite of tapu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngāpuhi</td>
<td>A northern Iwi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pākehā</td>
<td>White person or people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangatira</td>
<td>Leader, Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangatiratanga</td>
<td>Chieftainship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tāngata Tiriti</td>
<td>An identity for non-Indigenous people in Aotearoa created from biculturalism era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapu</td>
<td>Sacred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taurite</td>
<td>Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Tiriti</td>
<td>Also known as Te Tiriti o Waitangi. The Te Reo Māori version of the Treaty. It is recognised as the official version because of the legal doctrine contra preferentum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Whakaminenga o ngā Hapū</td>
<td>The Declaration of Independence 1835. (Refer to Hayward, 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utu</td>
<td>Revenge, vengeance, retaliation, reciprocity—an important concept concerned with the maintenance of balance and harmony in relationships between individuals and groups and order within Māori society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wānanga</td>
<td>Indigenous/Iwi Higher education institutions similar to tribal Universities in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wehi</td>
<td>Dread, fear, something awesome, a response of awe in reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whanaungatanga</td>
<td>Relationship, kinship, sense of family connection—a relationship through shared experiences and working together which provides people with a sense of belonging. It develops as a result of kinship rights and obligations, which also serve to strengthen each member of the kin group. It also extends to others to whom one develops a close familial, friendship or reciprocal relationship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is known that there is not a clear definition of biculturalism because as a term it is bounded in conflict. To achieve this the author focuses on a useful Ministry of Social Development definition, which defined biculturalism as “understanding and sharing the values of another culture” (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988, p. 20). However, as a contested concept, the author recommends the Anglican Church's Bicultural Commission's understanding, as found in Spoonley (1995). For a well-accepted generic understanding and its meaning refer to Cullen (1996). However, it is noted that Māori scholars (M. Durie, 2001; Johnston, 2001; O'Sullivan, 2007; G. Smith, 1990 as cited in Jenkin, 2017), regarded biculturalism as yet another form of colonisation and appropriation of indigenous culture and language. For more information refer to Jenkin (2017).

For the purposes of this article, Te Reo Māori is the Indigenous language of New Zealand. It will not be treated as a foreign language and italicised as is normal practice within academic writing. Translations will be provided where possible throughout the paper and in the glossary. Where quotations are used with translations provided, in all cases where it is necessary to convey Māori cultural understandings, Te Reo Māori (Māori language) words will be privileged over English.

For the purposes of brevity, the concept of a collective future is not discussed in this article. For understanding on this please refer to the Simon’s previous works (2020b, 2021a).

For a point of reference in terms of what is generally termed “The Treaty of Waitangi” it is generally held that it is two distinct treaties according to the language they were signed in. In this case the Te Reo Māori version, “Te Tiriti o Waitangi” and the English version, “The Treaty of Waitangi”. For the purposes of understanding which version is used in this article, “Te Tiriti” or “The Treaty indicate the version being discussed. For more information on these differences and their meaning and implication please refer to (Hayward, 2018; Mikaere, 2011; Mutu, 2004, 2010; Simon, 2016; Te Kawariki and Waitangi Network; Waitangi Tribunal, 2014).

It should be noted, for instance, that the predecessor of Te Tiriti—He Whakapūtanga—guaranteed the mana motuhake of the rangatira and their hapū (Hayward, 2018).

The white possessive government is a key idea taken from Moreton-Robinson’s theorem that is the theoretical basis of this article. In this important theory the expression is utilised to describe government and its true intent and nature on Indigenous land. For more understanding on this refer to the section on “The White Possessive Doctrine” in this article.

This idea of a “founding document” is an example of what Simon refers to as a “Treaty-based zombie concept”, a dead-but-alive aspect of biculturalism that qualifies as a zombie concept. For more information on zombie concepts see Brabazon (2016).

For more thinking around “Te Ara Tika me Te Ara Hou”. Refer to Simon, 2021.

The purpose for outlining this method and research theory is not only because it is a customary to do so in research outputs but because this article aims to begin a national conversation about the place of biculturalism in the collective future of Aotearoa New Zealand. Additionally, the approach to the research is unusual in that the method being undertaken here is a (post)qualitative inquiry. It is important to provide a baseline understanding and development of Kaupapa Māori Writing Inquiry. The purpose of utilising Mahi Tuhi Tahi as Kaupapa Māori Writing Inquiry is because the method allows for the author to reflect and provide critique of, in this case, settler/invader colonially imposed power structures. The author acknowledges that this is not a research method per se but an approach to posthuman qualitative research. See endnote 11.

For more information on Kaupapa Māori Research and its approaches refer to Henry and Pene (2001); Pihama (2010); Simon (2022a); L. Smith (2015).

(Post)qualitative inquiry is methodological, but without methods, as a critique of redescribed qualitative methods is at the core in post-qualitative inquiry. For an understanding of the author’s use of “(post)qualitative” see Le Grange, (2018), Østern et al. (2021), and Ulmer (2017).

The Bay of Plenty region is on the east coast of the North Island of New Zealand. For more information see Bay of Plenty Regional Council (2022).

See endnote 6.

For understanding of “Constitutional transformation” in the context of Aotearoa New Zealand refer to (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016; Mutu et al., 2021; Potter, 2018).