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War, (its) Memory & The Ethical Environment

A Critical Examination of the Battle of Britain Monument
Submitted for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

IN

Sociology

School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research

University of Kent

Canterbury

Student

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Doctoral Supervisors

Jock Young and Mike Presdee

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Abstract

This is an exploratory research project which is both empirical and interpretive in nature and which in research analysis and conduct takes a critical viewing of the normative relationship between war, its public memory and the ethical environment of late modernity. Here, the culture and situated discourse of warfare, including its public signifier in war memory phenomena, are understood as produced and consumed within social life. The preamble establishes the link between war, memory and the ethical environment. Part 1 describes the discourse of 'Risk Transfer Warfare' and illuminates how this culture of war is produced and consumed within social life and thus rests upon an elaborate ideological construction maintained in culture and through education in a system of language, law, symbols and values. Part 2 presents a 'past war thesis' of 'nostalgia militarism', which illuminates how the collective memory signifier of warfare is produced and consumed within commemorative culture. Part 3 locates this research in a situated and grounded context before describing the case study and its methodology. Part 4 uses various forms of analysis or interpretation to re-think the implications of this 'institutional presence' of war memory: The conclusions are presented in the form of questions as sociological indicators.

Acknowledgements

It is customary in such circumstances to give thanks by way of acknowledgement of debts. I would like to begin by thanking my mentors Mike Presdee and Professor Jock Young, and also past supervisors Dr Iain Wilkinson, Professor Larry Ray, Dr Barry Paskins, Professor Christopher Dandeker & Dr Claire Heritschi, without whom, this research could not have been completed. Here, words can not express my eternal gratitude: Thank You.

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Last but by no means least I would like to thank my Family. To my dear wife Michelle, thank you for your untiring courage, patience, love and finally the unrelenting faith you had in me when everyone else, including myself, didn't believe or think that this sort of normative war and memory project could be done in the way it has been done. Over the
last eight years, you have always been there to pick up the pieces and for that you will have my love for life. To my mother, Mrs Harris who by the very virtue of her lived existence in the face of societal bigotry and personal despair imbued her sons with the emotional courage to stand up against the injustices of our world. Thanks also to my children who have by their very existence and presence forced me to ask the painful questions of life. Love to my dog Mellie of 16 years who is always there in the late hours.

Note on Format:

With relation to the use of extended quotations [of which there are many] I would draw your attention to the point that when one sees any unreferenced text that is presented within [square brackets] this is always my added comments which I hope will help link said ideas to this study of war and its memory. Because the study of warfare is a somewhat unfamiliar subject matter within Sociology, there is a necessity for an extended Preamble. This explanatory introduction is not double spaced like the rest of the Thesis, so as to separate it out from the main body of text. I would like to conclude this note with a glossary of acronyms that, for ease of narration and reading, are employed throughout the narrative of the thesis. By ‘thesis narrative’, I mean the ‘story telling’ of this critical inquiry.

Glossary

ANT = Actor Network Theory
AS = Abandoned Soldier
BOBHS = Battle of Britain Historical Society
BOBM = Battle of Britain Monument
CC = Commemorative Culture
CJS = Criminal Justice System
CMR = Civil Military Relations
CSA = Commemorative Social Action
CWGC = Commonwealth War Graves Commission
CWM = Contemporary War Monumentality
IP = Institutional Presence
IWM [N] = Imperial War Museum [North]
MOD = Ministry of Defence
UKNIWM = UK National Inventory of War Memorials
PMS = Post Military Society
PHS = Post Heroic Society
RBL = Royal British Legion
WWII = World War Two.
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Preamble


This Ph D presents a critical viewing of some recent developments in British Civil-Military Relations. The intellectual aim was to critique the new 'post-military' relations; between, War, its 'cultural memory' signifier [war memorials], and the current ethical environment of late modernity. Hence: War, (its) Memory and the Ethical Environment.

"We have all learned to become sensitive to the physical environment. We know that we depend on it, that it is fragile, and that we have the power to ruin it, thereby ruining our own lives, or more probably those of our descendants. Perhaps fewer of us are sensitive to what we might call the moral or ethical environment. This is the surrounding climate of ideas about how to live. It determines what we find acceptable, admirable or contemptible. It determines our conception of when things are going well and when they are going badly. It determines our conception of what is due to us, and what is due from us, as we relate to others. It shapes our emotional responses, determining what is a case for pride or shame, for anger or gratitude, even what can be forgiven and what cannot. It governs our ethical standards and shapes the moral reasoning of acceptable behaviour" (Blackburn, S. 2001:1).

The sub-title, A Critical Examination of The Battle of Britain Monument (BOBM), clearly denotes some sort of empirically grounded and culturally situated case study investigation of WWII memory in post-Cold War Britain. Here, the case study memorial is viewed as a microcosm of 'contemporary war monumentality' (CWM), and is understood as representative of an unprecedented empirical increase in WWII monumentality projects (see Chap 3). The main elements of this aspect of the inquiry revolve around addressing three core questions; (i) why was the BOBM constructed when it was; (ii) why are we socially remembering WWII now, and finally, (iii) are these new war monumentality projects the 'right memory' of past war i.e. are they civilising or de-civilising testimonies of past war; in normative terms of shaping and influencing Western sensibilities towards how present conflicts are seen or understood. Based on the exploratory findings of case study research and the subsequent analysis or critical interpretation of observational data, I will suggest that the new 'nostalgia militarism', now associated with memorialisation, may be detrimental to the ethical environment in which we live, and by sociological association, the 'Civilising Process' (Elias, N. 2000).

To help locate this critical interpretation of CWM, the research was implicitly designed to consider four contextualising questions; provided here by Charles Tilly (2003: 344).

1. What produces the structure and content of shared references to warfare (here, the project's focus is on war memorialisation) that are available in a given population?

2. Given complex events, how and why do some elements and interpretations of those events (a) become available (b) survive? (Why is WWII so popular and why now?)

3. Given the availability of multiple elements and interpretations, what causes some to prevail and others to disappear from general awareness? (Why build a BOBM now?)

4. When people engage in public contexts over past war, how, why and with what effects do they do so? (How may CWM affect civil sensibilities towards warfare?)
In the concluding essay of States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts and Transformations in National Retrospection, Tilly (2003: 339-46) asked a very pertinent question of current ‘war memory’ phenomena. Are these “filtered records of the past or opportunistic promotion of interest-driven narratives?” He did not offer a direct answer to this difficult question, but as a concluding comment suggested that we researchers should resist the two opposite temptations: i.e. “to insist on one half of the dichotomy or to assume that truth must lie halfway between the extremes”. Such resistance may enable different kinds of answers or modes of memory enquiry.

Following this liberating suggestion, and instead of arguing either position, I want to help distinguish the ‘right memory’ questions currently at issue in the ‘sociology of war’ analysis of war memory phenomena. In terms of examining the intimacy of relations between the memory testimony of past war and the present conflicts of ‘risk-transfer warfare’, such ‘social memory’ research has a descriptive task (to explore what exists: i.e. the current boom in WWII memory), a normative task (to counterfactually consider what should exist; i.e. the right memory of war), and an exploratory task i.e. to explore how the link between past war and present conflict is constituted in public space discourse and thus help reveal its sociological influence on sensibilities. While one must attempt to take into account all three research tasks, the main focus here is on the exploratory. This is why, it is Tilly’s (2003:344) contextualising questions that this project must implicitly consider, if it is to unpack the relations between modern war, its public memory and the ethical environment.

The intellectual goals - which are by design and necessity broad in their scope - also helped to provide a critical context of ideas, within which my core questions and inquiry aims have been situated. These goals can be distilled into five key objectives. The first objective, is to build on established research and knowledge of ‘war and its memory’, in order to help raise awareness of a subject neglect within the mainstream discourse of modern sociological practice. The second, is two-fold, (i) present novel ‘ways of seeing’ War and its ‘collective memory’, and (ii) test out a ‘past war thesis’ (Shaw, 1997), with a view to a post doctoral research programme into this neglected field of inquiry, that is by conceptual definition very difficult to locate, or ground in any sort of situated or sociological context. Third, is to reveal the pernicious sociological problem of war’s perceived inescapability via a sociology of war critique of the ‘modernisation thesis’. Fourth, is to champion a type of war memory that may help counter the perceived inescapability of war; and fifth, is the promotion of what I term ‘emotional honesty’, in the way we think about war within the sociological imagination.

Clearly, such goals have their origins in the childlike curiosity of asking why. As such, this must be an inquiry which can unpack the ethnocentrism of warfare; to help us demystify ‘why’ we, whom inhabit what has been described as a post-military society (Shaw, M. 1991), may see what we see when we look at the act of war. Here, a main aim is to re-consider why the moral bankruptcy of war still appears tacitly acceptable to the general populace of the ethically educated societies of the West? i.e. Why does Western society valorise the defence of human rights, sanctify the humanist rule thou shall not kill and enshrine tolerance of all races and religions in hard-won equality and diversity policy, yet still accept the tool of ‘risk transfer war’ as a reasonable means?
Why is it, that the consequentialist rules of conduct that normally govern Western moral consciences are superseded when it comes to thinking about war or the Other?

"In the early twenty first century most western political leaders and thinkers continue to believe that they may use war justly and efficiently as a means of political action. They sometimes disagree about particular decisions: many dissented from the US and British invasion of Iraq in 2003. But they agree on the general principle: blowing up people – for this is what war mostly means today – remains a legitimate, even if regrettable, way of achieving political goals. Of course, the people they aim to blow up are those who have taken up arms for hostile and disreputable political causes. They do not intend to blow up civilians or non-combatants. That, if it happens, is by definition 'accidental'. But above all, in blowing up as many enemies and as few civilians as necessary, they aim to avoid many of their own soldiers or air crew getting killed. Indeed if averting risk to military personnel means increasing the risk to civilians, then that unfortunately is a price they [the other] must pay" (Shaw, M. 2007: 1).

At first glance, one may begin by thinking why employ such big or mature ideas (war, memory, ethical environment etc) to help locate what is by practical necessity a limited case study investigation? While a necessary task of this preamble is to help explain my logic, at the pragmatic or practical level, one's reasoning becomes much clearer, when one sees the sheer impracticality of a more terminologically precise or sociologically descriptive title. For example, it may be already clear why one could not realistically entitle it, From Past Wars to Present Conflicts: A Critical Examination of the BOBM as Cultural Memory Legitimisation for Present Asymmetrical Conflict, even though this descriptive type of project title may better help locate, situate or frame such a small scale 'case study' inquiry of war and its public memory, within a much wider and broader critical exploration of why we in the West, may see what we see, when we look at the new social form of risk-averse warfare. Even when relocated within critical 'sociology of war' terminologies, i.e. situating War with relation to its social impact, ethical influence and/or moral legacy to what sociologists term the 'ongoing civilising process', we could not re-entitle it: Risk Transfer Warfare, Public Space Testimony of Past War Memory and the Ethical Environment of The Post Military Society: Critical Interpretations of the New Battle of Britain Monument.

Indeed, why should one expect the intelligent reader (especially one not acquainted with the sociology of war) to grasp what such specialist terminology denotes. This is what I mean by 'sheer impracticalities' and while I make no such assumption about my current readership, I am advised that in introducing such a specialist topic of inquiry, I should start from the practical idea that whomever my reader may be, they may not have read what I read. With such a vast literature on war and memory, this makes good sense and because one cannot say everything at once, this preamble must identify how various mature ideas have framed one's critical thinking, and thus informed the research goals. Here, I will outline the thesis framework and situate its contribution i.e. explain how the key concepts are understood to relate to my intellectual goals and to each other in sociological terms. I will consider orientations, in presenting my opening observations of contemporary war monumentality. I also outline the approach to memory and 'ways of seeing' what war is; as fact, idea or act. Finally, I will contextualise the evolution of modern war [from the typology of total war to risk transfer war] and introduce the new 'cultural scripts' of 'nostalgia militarism'. My key aim here is to introduce the 'contextualising ideas' of the project.
Outline of thesis: The main body of the written-up thesis constitutes a ‘grounded’ but ‘critical’ examination of the recently unveiled Battle of Britain Monument [BOBM]. By ‘grounded’, I mean in the sense that this research attempts to understand the ‘why now’ reasoning behind the latest cultural trend in WWII memorialisation. By ‘critical’ I mean that War is a topical social illness that is often neglected within the mainstream sociological enterprise and thus requires a critical sociological imagination (edge-work) to help one identify the decivilising impact that war memory may have upon the ethical environment of late modernity. The novel idea here is not just to use data as a representation of social reality, but also emotional honesty about what war is, as a brutalising enterprise, to help re-interpret the implications of what we may see. With this in mind, the preamble outlines my approach to the subject matter i.e. with relation to various islands of knowledge which have helped me locate the main ideas that guide this projects approach to the study of modern warfare. Ch 1, unpacks the ethnocentrism and moral bankruptcy of Risk Transfer War, in order to re-construct a viable model of the ‘new Western way of war’ (Shaw, 2007), from which to begin a critically-minded inquiry into the relations between, ‘past wars and present conflicts’.

Ch 2, develops the inner dimensions, or human cost of man’s transgressions in war, in order to help better grasp the denial inherent within the ‘constitutional meanings’ we now commonly associate with much war memory. All these discussions will help further develop the normative thesis outlined below, including Sartre’s (2002:89) critical notion of ‘bad faith’ and ‘emotional dishonesty’; as these ideas relate to the ‘noble lies’ of WAR. Part 2 [chapter 3] will detail the research design, strategy and methodology of the case study aspect of my research: In doing so, we will have fully established the research parameters of the inquiry. The ‘Reflexive Methodology’ of the study requires ‘the intellectualisation of method’ (Alvesson, M., Skoldberg, K. 2002) and applies a ‘post disciplinary approach’ (Sayer, A. 2000) and ‘mixed method strategy’ (Creswell, J. 2003), to observe, interpret, obtain data and conduct a final analysis; note such ‘Theory of Method’ requires an extended preamble to begin with.

Part 3, builds on the foundations laid in Parts 1 & 2 as the discussions will help to re-contextualise the proposed case study examination of the BOBM with direct relation to a ‘Literature Review’ of what is termed here as the ‘war and memory’ debate. Having contextualised the institutional presence of WW2 memory in modern Britain via these debates, the final chapter of Part 3 presents a fact-finding introduction to the actual case study Monument. This surface description will present a situated snapshot of the BOBM drawn mainly from public domain and social science sources.

Part 4, conducts a critical reading of the BOBM microcosm in overlapping terms of comparative analysis of function and contextual interpretation of selectivity, content and consumption. As a critical study of war memory, these discussions will help us draw the interwoven threads of the whole inquiry together, by considering the many implications of what we see. Not only in terms of the need for future research looking at the neglected topic of war memorials, but also in terms of what questions a critical sociology of war may need to ask about the role, purpose and functionality of such modern war memory. Having done so, the closing remarks of the conclusion can finally re-consider what the ‘right memory of war’ may be, with specific relation to this project’s critical framework of ideas on the emotional dishonesty of our war memory.
In terms of the structural outline; each one of the four parts is clearly introduced and each main section is briefly surmised in terms of presenting a short 'look forward' to help maintain the coherency of the overarching narrative. The thesis narrative follows an academic format: 'Say what you are going to say' (here this extended preamble is crucial). 'Say it' (main body), and 'say what you have said' (conclusions).

In terms of style, and for reasons to do with what I now see as an inherent need for emotional honesty in a sociological viewing of human warfare, and as a novel mode of discovery or aid to verstehen comprehension; combined with the 'communicative actions' of this researcher and author, the thesis narrative is written in the first person for the most part. The aim of the thesis narrative (by which I mean the story of research) is to take you – what I perceive as a non-passive reader - on the same intellectual journey I have travelled while undertaking five years of doctoral research. I write in such a way, because one needs a humanist style in order to persuade the reader to ask the question; if we know all this about warfare then why does War still exist? while still recognising Wittgenstein's (2006: 136) keen phenomenological insight that, "I can no more think a thought for you, than you could don a cap for me".

1

A Normative Thesis

"War is organised murder and nothing else" WWI Veteran Harry Patch. 1898-2009.

In her philosophical study of Wickedness Mary Midgley (2002) points out that in waging war, "there really is a deep, pervasive discrepancy between human ideals and human conduct" and that as a consequence "we ethical primates" want to "understand how and why our conduct may go so wrong" (2002 [1984]: 69-73). As one who has experienced warfare first hand and thus participated in humankind's 'collective wrong conduct' it is understandable that the origins of this doctoral project are deeply rooted in an instinctual need to try and better understand 'that which obligates' human beings to do what they 'must' do in the prosecution of modern war.

"War is 'that which obligates' individuals to do abroad what would be illegal and immoral at home; namely, to kill strangers, persons whom we have never met and who have personally done us no harm; to hold innocent men, women and children hostage for putative crimes they did not commit; to lay waste to their environment and plunder their national treasures; and to do all of this in the name of political, economic and ideological agendas" See Donald Wells (1996) An Encyclopaedia of War and Ethics: Page VII.

Taking these ideas of 'wrong conduct' into account and looking at a multitude of factors Midgley (2006., 1984., 1978), finally concludes that 'collective wrongdoings' and 'cultural transgressions' are a vital part of our individual and collective make up. Accordingly, in the well-respected follow up to Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature Midgley talks persuasively of the positive and negative influences of manmade 'Evil' [wickedness] on the modern human condition and suggests that in order to overcome the more 'disturbing or extreme discrepancies of human-nature' we as a society need to recognise our innate barbarism, not deny it. Put in context,
“there is no document of civilisation”, wrote Walter Benjamin (1999: 258) “that is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (in Brenkman, J. 1987: 3). In these very simplistic terms, what is being suggested is that we must recognise the testimony of war and violence inherent in our artefacts of history and culture if, civilisation is to have any reasonable chance of combating the barbarism inherent to human nature.

Building on the logos of such arguments, the ‘normative thesis’ put forward in this study is as follows: That official war remembrance [what Shaw terms ‘nostalgia militarism’ and I term ‘public war memory’] is observed to be emotionally dishonest in symbolic form and narrative content. In theory, it has been suggested that this type of societal ‘bad faith’ may have a negative impact upon the ‘sensibilities’ of Society (see Shaw, 1997, 1991., Hedges 2002). I argue here, that with recognition of the inhumanity of war, we may begin to challenge that ‘which obligates’ human beings as individuals/groups to do now what they have always done in war. In presenting these opening arguments, I am really putting forward a ‘normative thesis’ for the role, purpose and function of linear time war memory; in that with a conscious and rational appeal to the notion of emotional honesty, modern civilisation may finally break free of past war’s many decivilising influences: This is the normative aspect of the inquiry.

In making such an argument, I am also presenting an alternative to the perceived inescapability of war, by suggesting a way to think about commemoration of war dead that may help a post-military society such as Britain to bridge the apparent gap between her noble ideals enshrined in the collective memory of the ‘Good War’, and her brutal conduct in the prosecution of ‘risk-transfer war’. Here, I believe that a way to help reconcile the ideals of why we may go to war with our brutal conduct in its prosecution, is in part through the memory recognition of what we may deny about our actual conduct in past war, and thus, if we can be ‘emotionally honest’ about the barbaric nature of War, we, as a civil-society, may be able to see our current conduct in ‘risk-transfer war’ for what it really is. That is to say, with emotional honesty, as a social meaning framework, we who inhabit the post-military society (Shaw, M. 1991) may be able to learn wisdom from hindsight, and acknowledge the new prosecution of asymmetrical war as non-logical behaviour, and an inherently barbaric social act.

In the case of ‘risk-averse warfare’, it is very clear that Machiavellian ideas help to provide the moral/practical certainties that may determine what we find acceptable, admirable or contemptible about war. In this respect, the influential literature On War illuminates how war, although a barbaric act, is nothing more than a rationalised tool of organized groups of individuals. As a tool, warfare is simply a dialectical facilitator of social continuity and change. In short, we human beings fight for things to stay the same or to change. Hence the cold understanding that the political aim of war is to bend an opponent’s will to one’s own. Sociologically speaking, the more the ‘inner group’ feel a perception of threat to a certain way of life, the more the ‘antagonisms’ towards the ‘outer group’. The Other can then be rationalised as one’s mortal enemy. Entire peoples are then dehumanised, only to be seen as legitimate targets for killing.

War can be both a duty and an honour to serve; but war as social fact is nothing personal, (a social fact does not change, simply because we choose to look at it in a certain way), even if the person prosecuting the mantra of war may love or loathe the what
he/she is doing. As a social fact, the nature, context and purpose of prosecuting warfare may dialectically change as society itself develops and modernises, but collectively speaking, no war in human history has ever been fought for the sake of war in itself. Here, the eternal mantra of war (kill or be killed) serves as the practical means by which the political aim of war is achieved. In short, the means to achieve the political ends of war provides the military aim of war in itself. Here, the mantra of war provides the ultimate sanction against the other as it serves only to destroy an enemy's capacity, motivation or desire to fight: This is the dialectic of war and peace!

Similarly, as a social act, war has many identifiable social forms; although such form is always determined by how socialised groupings are organised i.e. politically, culturally and ideologically etc. All typologies of war or social forms of warfare, be it terrorism, siege, total, limited, proxy, virtual, virtuous, post-modern or the new Western way of warfare share the common denominator of brutality as a means. To wage any war, is to brutalise, to dominate, to force submission upon the human Other. Thus, I argue that the legitimisation of war must inform the 'ethical environment', with relation to the way a post-military society such as Britain may actually make sense, perceive, comprehend or just plain think about what Shaw (2007) terms 'Risk Transfer Warfare'.

When looking at War, one's vision has to be informed.

Conceptual Frameworks: A Problem and a Vantage Point!

In framing this project as a conventional or mainstream sociological doctorate, it will become clear from its unconventionality, that this may be a difficult project to accept for many practitioners and that this point, may well apply on many, many levels. Not least because of its style and critical approach to an emotive subject, or even explicit normative tone of what I see and why, but also because sociologically speaking, my normative ideas surrounding the role of public war memory raises the sociological status of 'emotional honesty' to a par with reason and logic in public and political affairs. As we shall see later, such concerns about the marginalised role of emotion in our negotiations about War tells us much about the socialised problem of war's perceived inescapability and 'manipulation of morality' identified by Bauman (2000).

Accordingly, the philosophy of discovery I must apply here, is that if we researchers are armed only with our pure reason and peer-reviewed science, then we cannot hope to take into account the socially embedded orientation of a discipline; which, according to Giddens (1979) 'new rules of sociological method', is unacceptable in the wake of the 'cultural' and 'reflexive turn'. Similarly, if my unstructured readings of Kant [1724-1804] are guiding my discovery logic correctly, then there can be no truly 'objective' or God's-eye view of the 'world out there'; only snapshots and standpoints in space and time, shaped by our emotional, intellectual, ethical, ideological and cultural perspectives. To be sure, I am not advocating a pure form of relativism here, or subscribing to Kant's notion of an inherent moral imperative, as I personally believe we make our own moral identity only when one can become self-aware enough of our situated place in society; but intellectually speaking, if we are not born
with a moral compass and can never really know the 'thing in itself' and thus only infer the social disjuncture between 'appearance & reality', then the one universal in the human condition, is not our innate ability to reason and problem solve, as advocated by many of the enlightenment thinkers, but the fact that we all share the same evolutionary path here on earth and thus have the same latent and cognitive emotions as the interpretive archetypes. It is from this premise that I think about war.

To many, human emotion is the call of the living in the eternal race of life to death. "I wish I had screamed out loud but instead I found no meaning". As one who has been forced to face my mortality, I now grasp that 'existential snipers' and 'emotional mercenaries' only crack when confronted with the mortality of life; so I glean from experience that emotion is what gives us our capacity for a continued passion about life and thus our innate 'will to power'. Dialectically speaking, our passions are in part the emotional tools of warfare and in some ways, the drivers of irrational belief and thus an engine for a rationalised application of violence. However, innate emotion is also the central tool of our sensibilities and thus both driver and engine of our moral identity. In this context of making some sort of sense of war, I would suggest that to sublimate our emotional capacity to the overriding logic of pure reason, is to negate the very will to life, because if we do defer to practical reason, we simply deny what we are as feeling beings, because of who we think we are as 'rational choice actors'.

Looked at in this context, [and in accordance with Smith's (1985) theory of moral sentimentalism and Sartre's (2002) theory of human emotions], sentimentalities such as compassion, hate, pride, shame, anger, love and revulsion all dialectically inform our beliefs, values, cultural logic and inner reasoning, even if influential enlightenment thinkers may have suggested that "reason is man's central capacity, because it enables him not only to think, but also to act correctly" (see Hodderich, T. 2005: 253). Here, Kant's overlapping critiques of this pure reason and practical reasoning, combined with Adorno and Horkhiemer's (1944) critical observations of how the instrumentality of enlightenment modernity has been turned back on itself, makes me think that without the inherent capacity to balance reason with emotion and visa versa, how do researchers really evaluate what may be right or wrong, good or bad in terms of 'Civility and Propriety'. Here, I champion emotional honesty.

"Modernity would not have got where it has if it had relied on things as erratic, whimsical and thoroughly un-modern as human passions. Instead, it relied on the division of labour, on science, technology, scientific management and the power to make rational calculation of cost and effects - all thoroughly unemotional stuff" (Bauman, Z. 2000:235).

In re-considering the dominant framework of sociological viewing, I am suggesting that emotion and sentiment should not be banished in place of logic, and argue that emotional honesty can be combined with and disciplined by our reason, in order to better inform our rational action though self-understanding. Like Smith and many enlightenment thinkers labelled as romantics or idealist dreamers in the wake of the 'French Terror', I believe the logical union between reason and emotion may result in an enabling process of introspection, which as an innate capacity of all human beings, can serve to indicate to one's consciences in space and time what may be right or wrong, good or bad about the lived life (Adorno, T. 2001: 89). That is to say, in accordance with how one may intuitively feel what Smith (1985:48) terms 'sympathy'
about the happenings informing our cognitive emotions. In this respect, Charles Darwin wisely argued that 'human sympathy' is 'the noblest part of our nature' (Marr, A. 2008). Framed within this context, my inquiry is mainly concerned with exploring the ethical environment of late-modernity, which I believe has a shaping influence on our emotional and cultural responses to the various happenings of risk-averse war.

Here, the project's normative ideas about the intrinsic need for a public space recognition of what we usually deny about our cruel and barbaric conduct in warfare and thus conceiving and constructing the brutal nature of modern warfare, as both a positive and negative influence on the human condition, implies that there is already a germinating banality of transgression located in the human condition of late-modernity. That is to say, that there is an 'institutional presence of war' embedded in the living heart of modern Western society. As Zizek (2006: 1-7) points out, it is because of the embedded presence of organised violence that the objective violence of warfare becomes the 'systemic violence' inherent to the 'normal' state of things.

In this context, mainstream sociological discourse as an established meta-narrative of modern civilisation will naturally challenge such critical ideas because in cultural practice, we sociologists are important and influential inoculators of the enlightenment myth of reason and rationality as the main facilitator of modernity's developmental progress. In this grand, or meta-theory context, has the modernising project of Western enlightenment not waged a brutal and bloody war on human emotions, sentiment and feeling, and over the 150 years or so, banished such notions to the realms of mere subjectivity? Have not instrumental rationality and risk consciousness; science and technology ascended to their rightful place on the developmental throne of modern human progress? Indeed, when looked at in this way and my opening observations, that 'man's evil manners live in brass', seems to challenge the very ethos of Modernity or to be more specific what, Midgley (2006:1-13) terms 'the myths we live by'; referring to 'progress, enlightenment and science'.

Therefore, if re-locating such a critique in a situated context, or within sociological practice and when applied in terms of mainstream sociological interpretations of what modern war 'is', we would do well to remember that the marginalisation and in some cases 'omission of war and collective violence in social theory' (Giddens 1985. Shaw 1988, 1991) should not only be understood as an 'outcome of the embeddedness of social theory and sociology in particular' (see Kaspersen, L. 2003), but also as a reflection of the ideological myths we who inhabit late modernity currently live by. Re-located in this context, are not Liberalism, Marxism and even the new geo-political player on the hegemonic block Islamism, all practical ideologies which promise a peaceful new world order without inequality, injustice and warfare?

This is why the proposed acknowledgement of "warfare as a driving historical force of modernity" (Kaspersen 2003: 1-39), or even 'War' as a "force which gives us meaning" (Hedges 2002) is commonly viewed – within what I would term a traditional or conservative sociological discourse - as the antithesis of modern social theory's powerful meta-theory of advanced civilisation, modernity and human progress (see Bauman, Z. 2000., 2001). In very general terms, this 'meta-theory' is most commonly labelled, 'the modernisation thesis'. It is this type of meta-theory that we now critique.
Many past advocates of the modernisation thesis point to the pacification of territorial spaces within the recognised boundaries of the Westphalia nation-state; modernity's war on deviancy or the monopolisation of violence by the State, as sure and hard empirical evidence for the implicitly held belief in a developmental civilising process. Similarly, in modern sociological discourse, these foundational beliefs and formative ideals live on in the here and now; even if the myth of humankind's ultimate dominance over nature is a little tarnished by the Holocaust, and the new collective fear of man-made global warming; even though there has been much philosophising of 'the practico-inert', in the sense of us being 'held prisoners by our own creations' (Sartre, in Thody. 2001: 121), and feverish discussion of the 'crisis of European sciences' (Moran 2004: 164-191), there can be no real 'eclipse of reason' within the instrumental rationality of late-modernity (also Horkheimer, M. 2004 [1947]:3-40).

Varied social theory articulations introduced to me at undergraduate level, thus pointed to the separation between State and Church, the declaration of human rights, the power of science to provide the silver bullet to all our social problems, the triumph of the individual and of course, the rise of globalisation, science and technology to improve our material conditions and life expectancy. According to such re-affirming interpretations of modern civilisation and progress within late modernity, we who live in this modern world, just have to continue with what we are doing i.e. have belief or faith in the power of improving risk management and trust in what Midgley (2006) terms 'the trinity of modernity'; then war will simply wither away!

However, as Mary Midgley (2006) quite rightly points out, this type of thinking is located in a 'disorienting anthropological vacuum', and thus makes little real sense upon a closer scrutiny. Put simply; if war and revolution is a materially salient physical element and symbolic engine of the collective creativity of modern civilisation, then how can modernity as a founding idea of said civilisation help banish war as a cultural, institutional or political means of collective pacification and progress? This type of sociological thinking is why many critical theorists, who value a totality of perspective, argue that the 'modernisation thesis' makes little sense as a stand-alone meta-theory of civilisation; especially in terms of explaining the diverse tapestry of violence in our modern lives (see Adorno, T. Horkheimer, M. [1944]1997).

Located in a grounded context, and as contemporary commentators who critique 'Post Fordist' modernity have clearly pointed out, the instrumental rationality of enlightenment modernity has helped produce a 'chaos of rewards' in the ethical and cultural logic of late-modernity (Young, 1999, 2007., Kaldor, 2001). For example, when looked at in very generic historical terms, the instrumental rationality of enlightenment modernity has been identified as foundational in the prosecution of two World Wars costing millions and millions of lives; The Holocaust, and many other modern genocides are also rooted in the calculated mentality of modernity (Shaw 2004, 2006), not to mention a 40 year 'Cold War' in which 'mutually assured destruction' [MAD] was the societal norm of the day for an entire generation (Fisk, R. 2006). Some say the consequences of this type of mentality can be clearly seen as a shaping force, which subtly underpins the current all-encompassing war on terror (Chambers, R. 2003). This suggests, we need to see warfare for what it is, if we are to have any chance of combating its allure as a rational means. Indeed, looked at in
the critical way outlined above, and it seems abundantly clear, that we will need a
more comprehensive sociological model of the relations between war, self & society.

As we will see, there is influential and informative sociological research on modern
warfare [as we can and will see in subsequent chapters], but, in specific terms of
critiquing this more dominant 'modernisation thesis', one could counterfactually
argue that; if the sociological enterprise - either as vocation, discipline, practice or
discourse - fervently disagreed with the ubiquitous grand narrative of civilisation one
has articulated here, then what would the consequences be for cultural and moral
understandings of war? Counterfactually speaking, one would see powerful critiques
of the role of human warfare in every mainstream sociological textbook. As Giddens
(1985) and others have clearly pointed out, we don't. If war was viewed as a 'social
fact', like religion, crime or education, one would see scores of undergraduate and
masters modules on how to best study human warfare as fact, experience, institution
and/or phenomena. In my research for a war-studies degree, I found this wasn't the
case; indeed I found that War as a mainstream or central subject of general
sociological study, was sorely neglected by the majority of modern-day practitioners.

Similarly, if war was seen as an institutional presence, historically located and
culturally embedded in the moral and material fabric of a civil society, and not as
something that is conceived as primarily constituted in the ether of the international
community [as in the fusion model], then many well-funded and/or integrated
doctoral projects focused towards ascertaining the extent, delineation and diversity
of war's institutional presence would exist in abundance; again as we can see with
relation to current research into religion, media, crime or risk. Indeed, looked at in
this revealing counterfactual context, one could say that if the true social significance
of war for late-modernity was given its rightful place in the contemporary sociological
imagination, then extensive research programmes would now be dedicated to the
evaluation of modern warfare as a rational tool of modern civilisation. Outside the
specialist fields of war and peace studies, this is clearly not the case: Having said
this, what would the production of such mainstream sociological knowledge do for
and to the current understandings of modern warfare i.e. how would 'its' authoritative
presence help counterpoint the social acceptance of war's perceived inescapability?

For example, looked at in a lineage context and the historical sociology premise built
upon what some term the 'warfare-paradigm', clearly acknowledges the role of war
and revolution in the human history of social intercourse (see Carr, E. H. 1981.,
1986, 1996. Kaspersen, L. 2003). However, while such comprehensive studies are
very influential in terms of explaining the historical role of warfare in the constitution
of human society, in mainstream sociological discourse, the 'fusion' and 'fission'
models [such models illuminate the intimate relations between war and civilisation]
are 'sublimated' to help us better understand the processes of 'structural change and
societal reproduction' (Kaspersen, 2003:2). I do not imply that there is anything
wrong here, only that in doing so, we can miss the real social significance of warfare.

In a recent working paper presented at the European Sociological Association
biannual meeting [September 2003], Lars Bo Kaspersen (2003) explained that, 'all
through the history of social science’ a key concern has always been how to best understand the dialectical elements of social existence [change and continuity] yet war as an integral social institution of human civil society is commonly neglected as a driving force in the sociologically perceived development of advanced humanity. In Kaspersen’s (2003) ‘fission model’ of war and civilisation, he identifies many social forces; such as globalisation, education, religion, class, stratification, family, rationality, risk consciousness and others indicators, and argues that all are rightly considered dialectical elements of structural change and historical continuity and thus fully integrated into our general understandings of societal reproduction. However, as he is at some pains to point out in this very revealing but critical paper, ‘war as social fact’ is not on the fashionable list of recent sociological interests, and so yet again ‘War’ [when not represented as criminal] is woefully under-researched and theorised in mainstream sociology: i.e. looked at as materially and morally integrated, or as a powerful social institution of the ethically educated civil-society.

In summing up what I mean by ‘a problem and a vantage point’, or in terms of ‘the sociological problem of war’s perceived inescapability’ and more specifically, why this project’s thesis may be very ‘difficult to accept by some’, I can now point to a few central tenets or key themes: One can suggest that, (i) as a consequence of the psychological need to deny that which is painful to accept as lived truth; (ii) as a consequence of the human need for simple yet viable myths to help make sense of life’s vast and chaotic nature; (iii) as a consequence of what some may call intellectual malaise or disciplinary neglect born of not wanting to open Pandora’s unflattering box of home truths about modernity or (iv) as a consequence of pragmatic slavery to what is deemed as fashionable in contemporary sociology, or even for simple professional reasons of getting ahead in academia, it is a convenient truth understood within mainstream sociological discourse that even though war and violence have consistently played an important part in the development of human civilisation; the instrumental reasoning of late-modernity is still envisaged to help free humankind from the historically binding shackles of violence and the political use of innate human aggression: To critique this idea, I must now consider why war exists.

3

Why does War still exist?

"Only the dead have seen the end of War" Plato.

"The willingness with which our young people serve in any war, no matter how justified, will be directly proportional to how they perceive the veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation" (George Washington Cited in Quinlan, M.2005: XIII).

Each time I think about this difficult question, I am reminded of Washington’s insights and my recent attendance at a conference entitled Cultures of Commemoration: War Memorials, Ancient and Modern (British Academy: July 2004). This was a 2 day interdisciplinary conference which explored the commemoration of war dead and brought together experts working on Vietnam, the two World Wars of the twentieth century, post-revolutionary France, nineteenth-century England, Imperial Rome, Etruria, the Hellenistic world and Classical Greece. Here, I observed that, intentionally or un-
intentionally, each keynote speaker made explicit the implied argument proposed above: Firstly, that as long as men and women are ‘willing’ to fight in war, then war will exist; and secondly, that as long as mankind continues to commemorate the dead of war with relation to contingent ‘noble lies’ then humanity will never escape its ravages. Accordingly, in chapter 1 it is necessary to outline some contemporary understandings about the origins and continued existence of warfare, in order to help us re-locate the embedded sociological problem of war’s perceived inescapability. Here, I will suggest, sociologically speaking, that a pertinent answer may be revealed by looking at how the ‘social manipulation of morality’ (Bauman, 2000) works within models of war memory.

For example, in Britain it is observed that a central tenet of British commemorative culture is that ‘they’ died for our freedom. Such a ‘noble lie’ proscribes as a societal given the collective ‘duty to remember’ past wars. In Western society, this hegemonic narration of past war must encompass the political and psychological need to give meaning to the human cost of warfare that is above and beyond the death of the individual (James, 2002., Paris, 2000), because the ‘democratic state’ must legitimise the human cost of war in terms of ‘its’ long-standing values and beliefs (Smith, 2000).

Accordingly, it is to be clearly understood that what I term contingent ‘noble lies’ of war do not tell actual untruths about why a particular civil society or individual citizen may have been ‘willing’ to fight wars in the first place. However, the platitudes, edicts and euphemisms, that this project will show are associated with ‘modern war memory’ are understood to over-emphasise the more uplifting aspects of past warfare and in the process, help camouflage, deny or mask the long terms effects and negative impact of war’s actuality. In short, here I understand the term ‘noble lies of war’ to refer to a misrepresentation of human experience in war, not the historical accuracy of a particular past war. That said, the essence of a ‘noble lie’ also implies that both the ‘liar’ and the ‘lied to’ are in possession of the truth which they deny. In terms of one’s conscious awareness of this denial Sartre (2006: 71) points out, “a man does not deny or lie about what he is ignorant of; he does not lie when he spreads an error of which he himself is the dupe and he does not lie when he is mistaken”. From this perspective, the ideal description of a ‘noble lie’ would be a ‘cynical consciousness’, affirming the truth of war’s human cost within itself as a sacred totem of nationhood, while at the same time, still denying the lived experience and emotional legacy of War.

Although I have served in the Armed Forces, the implications of George Washington’s insights never really dawned on me. His simple sociological understanding of civil military relations, that without an institutionalised presence of an re-affirming collective memory of past war, there would be very few citizens ‘willing’ to (i) serve in the military on a voluntary basis and (ii) by association, fight in present conflicts, never gained purchase in my consciousness, when I asked myself the existential question of why, we who inhabit what has been termed ‘ethically educated civil-societies’ (Howard, M. 2001) still tacitly allow the brutalising social act of war to routinely exist as a morally acceptable social enterprise. Why do we not feel a moral horror that war still exists?

Like Sontag (2005) in Regarding the Pain of Others, I believed that “it is because war, any war, doesn’t seem as if it can be stopped that most people become less responsive to its horrors”. In other words, I believed that war was inescapable. As
a direct consequence of this perceived inescapability, many suggest that it is a form of "passivity that dulls our feeling of shame" (Sontag 2005:90). Accordingly, in the 'transgressive conduct of warfare' sociologists now talk of 'ambivalence to' and 'ambivalence of' social suffering in war and like Sontag and others have pointed to contemporary Western society's media saturation and public fascination with the disturbing imagery and conduct of asymmetrical conflict as empirical evidence of this idea (see Wilkinson, I. 2005). While this view makes perfect sense to me, I am still left with the disquieting question of responsibility Grossman (2007:4-6) is asking; i.e. is this 'societal passivity' really the only or main reason why we in the 'advanced' and 'civilised' West still tacitly accept the brutal logic of war as rational and moral, or is this problematic issue of 'ethical responsibility' something to do with the way we live.

In terms of our collective or "social states of mind", I believe this neglected ethical environment factor may be very important to reconsider when thinking about the above question of why war still exists, because when we locate these type of environmental factors in a critical context, the argument that modern life consists of a staple diet of horrors by which we are corrupted and to which we gradually become habituated is a founding idea in any social critique of modernity (see Sontag, S. 2003: 95., Adorno & Horkheimer 1997 [1944]., Schoolman, M. 2001). Hence Walter Benjamin's (1999:289) 'Critical History' assertion that there can be no document of civilisation which is not at the same time, a cultural artefact of our human barbarism.

Indeed, here one would have to agree with many modern theorists that now argue that the 'passivity' apparent in our tacit acceptance of war is constituted by a type of 'moral insensibility' (Mills 1959) or a lack of a 'moral conscience' (Ignatieff, 1999) and others who suggest that this type of insensibility and passivity is a casualty of 'modern humanities moral resources'; a casualty facilitated by the social manipulation of morality which has the consequence of de-mooring and weakening of our 'moral identity' or empathetic responses to human suffering (Glover, J. 1999).

Here, Bauman's (2000:208-221) influential understandings of the processes involved in the 'social manipulation of morality' illuminate how our innate ability for pure reasoning has been turned back on itself and thus usurped by the 'instrumental rationality' associated with the enlightenment project of modernity. Put in context, this type of instrumentality - or risk consciousnesses - renders many of the barbaric actions of modern asymmetrical warfare as adiaphoric. (2000: 215) and therefore decoupled from any moral evaluation. In the most recent post-script to Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman (2000) explains how the 'adiaphoric processes of Western modernity' may be seen as a way to help explain the instrumental or expedient reasoning of why we may see the suffering, or 'pity of war', the way we do.

In this context, Bauman succinctly points out that originally, 'adiaphoron' meant a thing declared indifferent by the Church: neither good nor evil, but measurable against rational criteria - i.e. as technical, purpose-oriented or procedural actions - but not against moral or ethical values. Applying this very insightful - and it must be said in the context of this work, revealing - idea to the cultural, social, ideological, economic or institutional cleavages of late-modernity, Bauman (2000) has argued that all social organisation consists in neutralising the somewhat disruptive and deregulating impact
of moral behaviour. To many, Bauman's revealing examination of the 'adiaphorising process' shows beyond a reasonable sociological doubt that the setting in which modern Western society renders mass or regular killing possible (Shaw, M. 1988, 2004, 2007) is indistinguishable from that which makes mass production and unstoppable technological rationalisation possible (see Bauman, Z. 2000: 247-248).

Accordingly, in this study of the civil-relations between war and its public memory signifier, I have employed this sociological line of thinking to help model how many see the 'pity of war' and to better contextualise the sociological problem of war's perceived inescapability. However, the social memory aim is to approach this idea of a social manipulation of morality from the viewpoint of memorial research; which has tentatively suggested that it is also the varied ways we collectively remember 'past war' that makes civil society seem less responsive to war's essential barbarity, cruelty and subsequent horrors. In doing so, I have attempted to move beyond yet another binary view of war's inescapability, which by implication alone suggests that 'Virtuous War' is yet another type of 'cultural racism' inherent to the 'us' and 'them' binary of much human interaction (Lawrence, P. 1997). Re-situating the perceived inescapability of war in moral terms of the ethical environment and in social terms of the ongoing civilising process, I argue that War is not immutable or inextinguishable because it is the "natural" predisposition of humankind, or in our 'evil nature', but because the varied typologies of modern warfare are commonly viewed or imagined as rational tools of human civilisation, legitimised by the old 'noble lies' of past war. This sociological understanding of why war still exists, informs my approach to the study of war, which is clearly implied by the way this study critically approaches the current relationship between past war and present conflict, as a reproductive dilemma.

The Reproductive Dilemma of War!

"Britain's last WW1 veteran dies aged 111 and another British soldier is killed in Afghanistan" (Headline of The Independent Newspaper: 26th July 2009: Page 1).

These two examples situate and exemplify the reproductive dilemma of which I speak i.e. they help locate and illuminate the reproductive or vicious circle of 'war & memory' which constitutes this project's intellectual concern. In contextualising the research topic, the content of this 2006 SSAFA post-card allows one to visualise George
Washington's sociological analysis of the previously implied 'continuum' between past, present and future warfare. Said understandings - of the reproductive relations between war and its memory - relates us directly to the social and/or cultural memory dimension of civil-military relations and thus provides one with an ethnocentric insight into Britain's current relations between past war and present conflict. This is what The Independent play on semiotics connects: the reproductive intimacy of past, present and future war. Taken together, it is hoped that this literal illustration of my concerns will provide the reader with a generalised understanding of late modernity's historically located civil-military relations (CMR's). i.e. The socially embedded inter-relationships between, modern civil-society and the military institution of a democratic nation-state.

The exploratory focus is on the paradoxical aspects of these inter-relations; by which I mean, the illusion of current post-military relations. Illusionary, because they are seen as compatible to Western liberal democratic values enshrined in the Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The paradox I wish to explore here is that national security - as we know it today - is an inheritance of the functional imperative of CMR's rather than a conscious creation of the social imperative that provides the political aim in warfare because, in social praxis, the living act of war is by sociological definition a collective enterprise. In War and the Liberal Conscience Michael Howard (2004) describes this idea as a 'Liberal Dilemma'; referring to how the 'maintenance of peace involves the continued tolerance of injustices against which the liberal conscience is first to revolt'.

"On the one hand, the liberal tradition of Western society is pacific if not pacifist. It regards war as an unnecessary aberration from the normal international intercourse and believes that in a rational, orderly world wars' would not exist: that they can be abolished, as slavery was abolished, by a collective effort of the conscience of mankind. On the other, it accepts that that wars may have to be fought, either to ensure their survival or liberation of those societies in which the liberal ethic has achieved dominance " (Howard, 2004 [1977]:3).

This is the ethical dilemma of the West's liberal consciousness. An ethical paradox of Western civilisation which suggests that the noble, virtuous or crusading social forces, political ideologies and cultural institutions dominant within contemporary Western society, can also be seen to help rationalise the role of state violence for a perceived greater good other than survival. Indeed, tainted by the binary paradigms of past wars, one of the most basic and obvious facts of the post-9/11 age, is that both security and insecurity are now perceived mainly in terms of a threat to a certain way of life. At this inter-subjective level, the intimacy of past, present and future war illuminated above, can be seen as a 'Just War' reification to legitimise the 'monopolised use of force' as a rational means/end schema. In this respect, war is seen as an agent of good; which is why Washington's disquieting qualification 'any war, no matter how justified' still holds.

The sociology of war concern is that, when one critically thinks about these every-changing relations in very specific terms of 'past war to present conflict' we can see that what is being socialised seems to encapsulate an un-stated Western assumption regarding the perceived inescapability of warfare i.e war is not Agency but structural fate. Indeed, one can infer this perilous cultural assumption from the semiotics of the SSAFA post card. Here, our sociological understanding can bring some clarity; in that without an institutionalised presence of an re-affirming collective memory of 'past war' there would be very few citizens 'willing' to (i) serve in the military on a voluntary basis
and (ii) by association, fight in present conflicts. Accordingly, it is not a empty platitude of anecdotal wisdom to acknowledge that while warfare will always exist in human interactions, as long as men and women are willing to fight, it is also true that why we fight is down to beliefs and our ways of seeing things. With this sociology of knowledge in mind, the thesis narrative will critically explore the normative connectivity between modern warfare and its public memory signifier. The exploration begins from the social memory idea that the central way by which members of civil society may 'perceive how veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation' is via what Edkins (2003) terms the linear time testimony of War Memory, referring to the traditional mnemonic processes of remembrance, memorialisation or commemoration.

These public space testimonies of past war are in social process and cultural practice the 'affect mechanisms' of modern war memory. As Coker (2003:87) points out in The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century 'in War one has to know what to look for in order to make sense of what one sees. One's vision has to be informed'. In this respect, the 'affect mechanisms' of mnemonic practice are storytellers of past war. The narrative of war memory they convey to a public can help harness our cognitive emotions into ideological safe harbours and emotional safe havens: As stated, the central tenet of noble lie testimonies in British cultural memory is that 'they died for our freedom'. As such, these storytellers provide the 'cultural script' or 'feeling rules' that shape our collective effervescence and as social animals, influence how we may make sense of war and its traumatic impact on our lived lives. As materially salient and morally integrated social meaning frameworks, or ethnocentric scripts about the current legitimacy of modern war, few could reasonably doubt the powerful influence of contemporary war monumentality on the current 'Ethical Environment' of Modernity.

"The ethical environment determines what we find acceptable, admirable or contemptible. It determines our conception of when things are going well and when they are going badly. It determines our conception of what is due to us, and what is due from us, as we relate to others. It shapes our emotional responses, determining what is a case for pride or shame, or anger or gratitude, or even what can be forgiven and what cannot. Such ideas, help shape our moral standards and our ethical code of behaviour" (Blackburn, S. 2001:11).

In shaping our moral responses to the happenings of warfare and its impact on human life; by determining what is a case for pride or shame (cognitive emotions) in the prosecution of present conflict, the role of contemporary war monumentality (CWM) and its powerful influence on the ethical environment of late modernity, is an important subject matter to reconsider. If one can tentatively agree that 'the young' are willing to kill or be killed because in part, by the way, we as a society collectively remember past wars, then a solution to the de-civilising impact of war's perceived inescapability may be located by revealing how the way we socially remember past war informs legitimatisations of present conflicts. This is my implicit goal, to help illuminate how the 'noble lies' of past war still informs present conflicts by unpacking the legitimisation of relations between war, its public memory and the ethical environment of modernity. My key focus is on the normative implications of WWII memorialisation on the way we may see and think about warfare. My main concerns - within this 'thinking about war' context - are with the decivilising impact of commemorative culture; as such culture is related to the 'linear time' discourse of modern war and 'feeling rules' of war memory. This brings one to the question of contribution i.e. how will this research contribute?
Ways of Seeing!

Envisaged Contribution of Research

In the University of Kent SSPSSR Handbook for doctoral students, it is explained that for a doctorate thesis to be considered original and thus successful in achieving generic criteria, it should contribute to existing knowledge and/or raise intellectual awareness of a neglected subject area of social science research [see University of Kent Graduate handbook: 2007-2008. page 20; cited reference No 2]. Traditionally, the intellectual contribution and disciplinary utility of a Ph D project, is usually implicit - in this case to help social science relocate war as a social illness - or it can be skillfully developed within the discourses of a specialist literature review (Hart, C. 2003:1-18).

In part, this is what I attempt to do throughout, but only with relation to a very small selection of the specialised ‘war’ or ‘social memory’ literature. However, as will become apparent, this doctoral thesis draws on many islands of knowledge outside these very specialist fields and thus cannot be traditionally structured in a conventional manner. One consequence of this structural unconventionality, is the major difficulty I have had in trying to ‘situate my study’ (see Smith 2002:1-18) and thus locate this critical research inquiry as a mainstream sociological doctorate [see above]. Another major consequence is that I must try to explain separately and out of context, how the actual study may be seen to contribute in both sociological, social memory and war studies terms and so achieve the identified criteria of a doctoral thesis. That said, the project’s envisaged methodological contribution to the sub fields of ‘war’ and ‘memory’ studies is further explained in the relevant section of Chapter 3. With this in mind, I now explain how a project such as this, may contribute to the growing fields of ‘social memory’ and ‘war’ studies, followed by a more general sociology of war consideration.

Social Memory Contribution: A Past War Thesis

In the main ‘social memory’ context, I hope to contribute to Martin Shaw’s (1991) past war thesis of ‘nostalgia militarism’. What this new form of militarism is said to be, is fully explained below, but at this stage, we can say that nostalgia militarism is in part manifest in the social processes and mnemonic practices of collective memory which is my proposed area of social memory inquiry. In this project, I have built on Shaw’s (1991) understandings of ‘nostalgia militarism’ and employed his ‘past war thesis’ to help me locate the concerns of the project I identified above i.e. current concerns with the paradoxical thinking on war, and what the ‘right memory’ of warfare may look like.

Collective Memory, in Shaw’s (1991, 1997) ‘past war thesis’ context, refers to images, feelings and beliefs, which arise primarily from individual and historical experience, although they are often socially constructed and reconstructed in terms of tradition, ceremony, ritual, script and myth (See Shaw 1991., Hobsbawm 1983). Collective Memory of ‘past war’ is thus seen here as a complex social and individual construct (see Mitzsal 2003., Bevan 2006). Similarly, the popular memories of the ‘Good War’ have and will continue to change over time and are thus seen as contested on many
levels. To use Bevan's (2006:16) words 'collective memory is a process that is always unfolding and remains ever unfinished'. Indeed, the social memory issues highlighted by Bevan and Mitzsal [malleability, contestation and continuity of memory] must be taken into account in any investigation of war memory phenomena, so in talking of 'collective memory', I am building on the arguments of many writers such as Oblick & Robbins (1998), Bevan (2006), Pierre Nora (1989), Mitzsal (2003), Ricoeur (2006) & Lowenthal (2005), rather than solely relying on Halbwach's (1992) position that individual memories interact within a broader framework of collective/group memory.

In this regard, it is of course individuals, who remember, not groups or institutions (Bevan 2006). Nor is a collective memory phenomenon some mystical group mind thing that lives in the cultural ether of our societal existence (see Ricoeur 2006, Mitzsal 2003). As Halbwach [1877-1945] explains, "while the collective memory endures and draws strength from its collective base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who socially remember" (in Coser, L. 1992: 22). Here, Halbwach's influential study of Collective Memory must make a sharp distinction between historical and autobiographical memory. As can be implied, the former is our focus and deals with the many influences on the social construction of memory which reaches the social actor only through what historians would term 'Public Testimony' (Collingwood, 2001: 7-39) and other types of Public Records such as symbolic images, photographs, film, art, literature, museums, architecture or media imagery (See Sontag, 2002., Lunn, K. 1997., Fussell, P. 1975., Hynes 1990). Halbwach's 'autobiographical memory' on the other hand, is memory of actual events that we as individuals have personally experienced and as such, it deals with the varied agency factors that in turn help socially constitute the construction of the group's memory.

It follows that there are as many social forms of collective memory as there are group affiliations within a civil society; just as there are as many autobiographical memories of WWII in Britain, as there are living memory custodians of the actual experience. In this dualistic context, individuals, nations, classes, ethnic groups, religious affiliations, families, associations, corporations, armed forces, schools or trade unions etc all have distinctive memories that constituent members have socially constructed over time. Here, the research focus is on what is termed 'national memory', so it is also worth remembering that in this 'main memory group' context 'collective memory' is not just a pre-given or totally ascribed social entity, but rather a culturally negotiated presence of public testimony; i.e. a socially constructed presence which has a 'material or moral integration' firmly embedded within the public space realms of British societal culture.

That said, if all group memory is a socially constructed phenomena, then it also stands to reason that it is the likes of structure, power, stratification and patronage that helps to determine the selection, form, content or constitutional meaning of any official memory narrative of past war. This understanding of patronage and power is implicitly developed throughout the thesis and is applied in sociological terms to what is perceived as a 'common' or 'public war memory'. In this hegemonic and socially ascribed context, individual social agents may negotiate the social construction of a memory presences' constitutional meaning, but the societal framework or institutional agenda of the said negotiations is predetermined by power, structure and convention.
This means there is always a dynamic process going on within any social memory phenomena which in this particular war related context includes the mythologizing of war memory via meaningful action, or commemorative social action (CSA) as it will be termed in this study. Drawing on Weber's notion of meaningful social action, this type of CSA includes the participating in, or performing of ceremony, ritual and tradition to give thanks, tribute, honour, re-affirm or mourn the memory of an individual/past event. Some examples of contemporary CSA's are the wearing a poppy during the remembrance season, observing the 2 min silence ritual or even consuming any type of commemorative event via any form of mediated source; such as internet, TV, press or radio. These are the mediated war memory mediums of our mnemonic practice.

From this overlapping perspective of war memory, we have constructed a conceptual tri-model [see below] of a public war memory's institutional presence, in terms of how such a collective memory phenomena can be sociologically understood as a collective representation of some selective, but significant events of past war - the collective and/or individual meaning of which is to be constantly re-negotiated in discourse, time and space. This type of triangulated model also allows one to consider how the mnemonic practices of war memory can be understood in the agency context of inter-subjectivity, rationality, emotions and/or motives. However, as we will see, until recently these inter-subjectivity factors were neglected in favour of institutional agendas, which are nearly always viewed as structured or shaped by established commemorative conventions, such as ritual and ceremony. As stated above, this type of sociological understanding will again help bring balance to our understandings of war memory phenomena, as it will allow us to re-model the 'sociological constituents' of a public memory presence in phenomenological terms of will or reason [see below].

In these terms, it is important to note for subsequent analysis and interpretation that the official, public or popular narratives of WWII memory help provide a diverse and some argue, a fragmented civil-society with an ontological security blanket, which links order with power and national identity with historical legitimacy. In the literature review, we will consider this social memory understanding in greater detail, when we begin to look at war memory as a practical ideology or social actor i.e. as 'institutional presence' which has a material salience and moral integration within British Society.

One will see from the tri-model below that this project's conceptualisation of war memory phenomena is that of a collective, group or 'public memory' that emerges, where selective and popular memories of past war interact within a social meaning framework provided and located in this case study by CSA's and the social process and mnemonic practices of CWM. However, it should also be noted here that as globalisation has gained momentum and developed, so 'history has accelerated' (see Nora, P. 1989) and thus what 'is' a current 'duty to remember' is well beyond the scope of any single individual (Bevan, R. 2006: 16). In terms of outlining the parameters of research, it is this ascribed 'duty to remember' that is of special interest, because duty and diction are part of that which obligates humankind to war.

Throughout the thesis, I will employ a 'fire triangle' model of war memory (see below), to help critically re-locate and think about the social impact, cultural extent and/or political consequences of a war monumentality presence, in terms of differing types or
kinds of fire phenomena. Think of forest, chemical or oil fires and the different characteristics these fires may have, and one begins to see how we can easily relate these differing characteristics of fire to help aid one's comprehensions of war memory.

Taking this fire analogy to its logical conclusion, I relate the three components necessary for fire to exist, to the sociological constituents of public war memory phenomena. For example, for fire to exist, it must have a main heat source, fuel or combustible material and air to breathe, if it is to maintain its existence as an entity in time and space. This is called the fire triangle. Remove one component and fire can no longer exist. In the same way, any collective memory phenomena must have a memory source, the collective will to remember the past and a cultural means to socially remember past events, if a collective memory presence is to maintain existence as a social meaning framework, or cultural prop of collective effervescence. Here, I simply overlap this understanding onto the phenomena of a public war memory presence i.e. a materially salient or morally integrated presence.

The Fire Triangle of Public War Memory

Finally, a collective memory, like a forest fire, must have a point of ignition, which in our triangulation of war memory informs the public will, or our sense of duty to socially remember - this point of ignition can be a spark or combination of social factors. Similarly, in chapter 4 I will use gardening metaphors such as the 'top soil of
war memory' to help describe the core memories of the national memory group and similar ideas about war stories and official remembrance as 'fertiliser' i.e. as a powerful cultural means of reproduction that helps root or embed war memory in the collective consciousness of the modern democratic society. I also use analogies of 'pesticide' to help aid our understanding of selectivity issues surrounding the absence or presence of certain types of contested war memory phenomena. In this context, I also talk of how 'memory gardeners' use 'pesticide and fertilisers' of popular war memory, to help maintain the societal 'duty to remember' and the hegemonic landscape of 'official' war 'remembrance' and national commemorations.

Below and in subsequent chapters, we will discuss the sociological linkage identified between will, means and reason in structural terms, of social role, cultural purpose and political function, and in agency terms with relation to the current reasons we may eulogise and socially remember WWII. As we will see, it is the contingent 'reason' for memorialisation that informs the public 'will' to socially remember, just as it is the degree that our individual thought places and locates itself within the various social meaning frameworks of collective memory. This is how society participates in and thus consumes this culture of remembering past war. Indeed, this is how Society is capable of having a public memory of past warfare. Accordingly, social remembering processes can be seen as static or dynamic in nature, because social memory can re-affirm the status quo, or challenge existing ideas, as I will explain later in Chapter 2.

If we re-conceptualise Fussel’s (1975) influential notion of war memorials as a everyday form of 'modern war memory' in these triangulated terms of action, narrative and social process, as well as in static terms of linear time narrations of mnemonic practice, convention and tradition, one can infer, sociologically speaking, that war memory is a very old cultural memory form of societal reproduction. This is a social form of war memory, which in accordance with its totemic institutional presence, by which, I mean its material salience and moral integration within civil society, is a very important collective symbol of civil society. One can make such an early argument, not only because public memory of war has a material salience and moral integration on a cultural capital par with that of the Church or monarchy, but also because war memory as narrative, process, presence or practice, clearly links the past with the present and thus our present cultural visions of the near future. Here, these affect mechanisms are viewed as socially contested sites of material and symbolic production, within which structure and agency forces coalesce the local worldview to the global and vice versa.

This much generalised model of CWM as action, narrative, process and practice provides the overall framework for this project’s thinking on modern war memory. However, to take this conceptualising deeper, we need to explain and thus model how memory phenomena work as a cultural and historical means of reproducing society. The overarching aim here is to apply this sociological knowledge of Collective Memory to help aid our interpretations of the BOBM. Indeed, re-locating the BOBM in the current ethical environment context of late-modernity, one can now observe that in recent times, the massive upheaval associated with the end of the Cold War and globalisation, has seen the cultural worth of many war memory phenomena increase in direct proportion to perceived efforts to destroy them (see Bevan, R. 2006). For example, since the end of the Cold War, new and old war memorials have become
touchstones of identity for many nations (see Lunn, K. 1997., Winters 2000). Britain
is no different in this respect, as the official processes of recent WWII monumentality
[remembrance, memorialisation and commemoration] leads, to some extent, to a
homogenisation of core WWII memories and a shared attitude to public space

In this hegemonic context, popular war memory is understood by Shaw (1997) as the
social engine of nostalgia militarism and refers to testimonies, images and symbols,
which are commonly utilised to persuade people to take a particular view of war or
support a particular policy or cause. Thus, in Shaw's Past Wars and Present Conflicts
paper, the understanding is that myth and memory of past wars are often exploited
through propaganda and via the patronage inherent in official commemorative culture.
According to Shaw (1991), this process is how 'nostalgia militarism' actually works as
a legitimising force for present conflicts. Indeed, Shaw takes this critical sociological
understanding one step further and suggests that such legitimisation is not a
'unintended consequence' or 'latent function', but the explicit function and purpose of
official war memory. Another contributory goal of my inquiry is to see if this is a viable
or realistic explanation of the current relations between past war and present conflicts.

In this social theory and war memory regard, the main focus of my inquiry is on what is
termed here as 'contemporary war monumentality' [CWM] and in particular, national or
'official' public space memorialisation of World War Two [WWII]. As we will see in
subsequent chapters, war memorialisation is also a somewhat neglected area of
empirical study in the social memory field, so the research project may also contribute
in this context. Here, the aim is to try to ascertain the social significance of a current
trend in WWII memorialisation [see table 1: Chapter 3] by considering the role,
function and purpose of a pertinent example. To achieve this exploratory goal, the
project will investigate the selection, form, content and consumption of the case study
monument as it currently stands in public space, discourse and time. What monument
I investigate is clear; why I chose it, the questions I must ask of it, and also how the
project will address them, is all presented below or in Chapters 2 and 3 of Part 2.

This is why from a general or wider sociological but distinctly 'war studies' perspective,
the conceptual themes of the my inquiry deal with the complex and thorny issues of
'the civilising process', 'war's perceived inescapability' and the 'social manipulation of
morality', in terms of the social legitimacy of war and the current ethical environment
or moral order. In these somewhat normative terms, I hope to demonstrate that what
war memorials can really tell us is often neglected, ignored or denied, and that
because of what they can say about us, they are important objects to research,
because, in their own way, such socially sanctified, sacred artefacts of material culture
are a socially integrated part of what is articulated above as the 'ethical environment'.

In the persuasive context, put forward by Blackburn (2001) it is not difficult to employ
'the sociological imagination' (Mills, C. W. 1959) to help critically theorise the social
role, cultural purpose or political function of British war memory i.e. as a powerful
framework of meaning and ideas, or as cultural representations, or even assumptions
about the current legitimacy of modern warfare i.e. a rational and/or moral means to a
contingent political end. In these normative terms, when this culturally situated study
relates these 'ethical environment' concerns with regard to 'the civilising process' it is referring to an ongoing process of European civilisation as was illuminated by Norbert Elias [1987-1990] in his influential work on the 'sociology of manners' (2000: 147-186).

Here, Elias (2000) famously argued that the "sociological history of manners" is built upon two contradictory movements: "The increasing use of shame and pride as an internal control and increasing repression of shame and pride as an external affect mechanism, on the group" (Scheff, 2003: 239-62., Sartre 2002). Clearly, such affect mechanisms are not just internally constituted, but are also part of the surrounding climate of ideas described by Blackburn (2001) and as such, can be said to help influence the way we as individuals, groups or collectives may see the happenings of the world we inhabit. As a consequence of this ubiquitous influence on our ways of seeing, these 'affect mechanisms' are said to help structure social intercourse, so that the individual brings his or her modes of behaviour in harmony with that of others. Think of this in terms of the social states of mind which are said to underpin the social acts of 'good war' or the recent changes in the 'ways of seeing' slavery, racism, drink-driving, human rights, binge drinking or even the gendered roles of men and women.

In this way, Elias (2000) argues that the harnessing of our cognitive emotions such as pride, shame, revulsion, love, embarrassment, or hate - via the varied affect mechanisms of both the individual and societal culture – in the case of war, think obligation, duty, honour or memorialisation, commemoration and remembrance – can serve to channel, shape and even progress the personality structures of what he terms 'social figurations', so that a civilising or harmonising of social manners occurs. However, this harmonising of social manners, attitudes or world views, towards a perceived greater good, can be progressive or regressive in terms of a civil society transcending the apparent gap between postmodern civilisation's noble ideals and 'its' brutal deeds: again we can think of this idea in terms of slavery, warfare or genocide.

Grounded within the current geo-political / domestic context of a distinct post 9/11 age, it could be reasonably suggested that current remembrance and commemorations of past war act as 'cultural scripts' that express how we should feel about present conflicts. In other words the many, many social forms of war memory help constitute feeling rules or affect mechanisms of both pride and shame. i.e. in terms of how we now view our current risk-averse conduct in the prosecution of modern day warfare.

Such social memory forms of past war are thus very important subjects of sociological study because, located in the 'ethical environment' context highlighted above, an examination of the latest trend in war memorialisation [see table 1: Chapter 3] may reveal insights about how and in what way the military institution serves the nation-state and how and to what extent, civil society and its members support war and the military institution. Accordingly, it has been argued that an investigation of how these so called 'affect mechanisms' are employed to justify present conflict, may help to illuminate how the paradoxical relationship between war, memory and the ethical environment is problematic, because this relationship can be seen to be contradictory to the developmental nature of the civilising process. Put very simply as a thesis 'man's evil manners live in brass'. In terms of contribution, this very distinct 'civil-military relations' consideration will help ground our thematic discussions about the
ethical environment, as it may well be able to tell us much about the civilising/ de-
civilising impact of contemporary war monumentality upon the current climate of ideas.

Sociology of war contribution

Within the specialist 'war studies' or 'sociology of war' literature, there is a good deal of current research into structural 'civil-military relations' issues (Coker, 2002., Gray, H. 1997., Dandecker, C. 1994., 2001., 2003., Shaw 1991., Moskos, C. 2000). However, it must be said that the main focus of this very specialist research would appear to be on the changing nature of the modern military institution in Western society and of course the predominantly 'political science issues' concerning 'the current inter-relations and political attitudes of military and civilian elites to one another' (Feaver, 2001: 1-12). I do not imply that there is anything wrong with such a focus only that for the normative reasons explained above, the main focus of this social memory project is on the civil side of Civil-Military Relations: this is yet another specific area of possible contribution.

However, it is outside the strictly defined confines of 'civil-military relations' and inside what I would like to term a 'critical sociology of war' that I wish this unconventional doctoral thesis to contribute. In The Barbarisation of Warfare, the editor Kassimeris (2006:18) points out that, "there is curiosity about the past, what happened, who did what, and why; but there is also the aim of understanding the present and how to place and interpret our own times, experiences and hopes for the future". In this regard and with specific reference to what this project may contribute, Kassimeris's (2006:18) also points out that, "although no-one could seriously suggest that the history of twentieth-century warfare has been neglected by academics, only a small number of social science writers have tried to deal distinctively with the denial of barbarity in warfare, examining the motives, ideology and moral resources of people in wartime". In contributing to this relatively small body of 'social science knowledge', this research project will explore the affect mechanisms of modern war memory, which are said to help camouflage or mask the inherent barbarism of warfare. In this project, one asks how these 'affect mechanisms' may be said to influence current sensibilities.

To put this contribution in very general terms of social order or moral legitimacy, if the public memory narrative of the 'Good War' (Terkel, S. 1981) in contemporary Britain is representative of the absolute values of 'Good and Evil' in present conflicts [as many in societal discourse would now suggest, (see Willcott, 2004., Shaw, 1997., Connelly 2004)] then the newly-erected WWII monument can be considered a very important social meaning framework by which British society currently makes sense of the 'War on Terror' and thus the way we may give meaning to its continuing human cost. This project will present some pertinent examples of this process, when it begins to critically analyse the selection, form and content of 'The Battle of Britain Monument'.

A General Sociological Contribution

In the eyes of some thinkers, the "ethical environment shapes our very identities" (Blackburn, 2001:1-11). In this distinctly sociological context, Simon Blackburn's view of the 'ethical environment' draws heavily on Hegel's influential thesis of self-consciousness, in that, "self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by
the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it only exists by being acknowledged or recognised" (Hegel, 2003: 97-104., 199). Blackburn (2001) explains within this Hegelian understanding that our inherent sense of identity, or consciousness of ourselves, is largely or even essentially, a self-consciousness of how we stand for other people, or outsiders. In this sense, the war memorial can be viewed as a totemic beacon of how we as a society stand for others i.e. how we as a nation wish to be seen in the eyes of the outside world. Similarly, as a materially salient part of the ethical environment, memorials are a collective representation of society; a public space means of identification for socially situated individuals and a cultural memory medium of war memory for the national memory-group. Put another way, the national war memorial is a negotiated collective statement of what we may stand for in terms of an ultimate sacrifice to absolute values, fought for during warfare.

It is in the terms of these ‘fought for’ values that we currently present ourselves to the eyes of the world. This is not a new understanding of identity formation or its negotiation, but the social and mnemonic processes involved in war memorialisation express its human agency in many revealing ways. It is in this well-established ‘social memory’ context of ‘malleability, contestation and negotiation’, which I hope to show the sociological utility of the war memorial, not only as a revealing object of national culture, but also an indicator of the factual connectivity between past and present war.

In summarising possible contributions, the main point I would wish to make, is that whatever disciplinary term we current researchers may wish to use to describe the surrounding climate of ethical ideas, the workings of this emotion-shaping environment can be strangely invisible both to the situated individual or the systematic observer of ongoing social relations. That is to say, that while the current climate of ideas on war is perennially important to investigate, regardless of the interdisciplinary context of research, such an ‘ethical environment’ is also very difficult to examine or explore in any sort of grounded context: This also applies to the notion of a ‘Civilising Process’.

In this most important contribution context, I trust that even such a small-scale project as this may help demonstrate the sheer potential for discovery that a systematic study of contemporary war monumentality may well provide. In this respect, contemporary war monumentality is a highly relevant and it must be said pertinent societal discourse, public space, social form and cultural context by which social science researchers may help modern civilisation finally demystify the legitimising climate of ideas surrounding ethnocentric justifications for warfare. One can not look at these normative relations (between past war and present conflict) in grounded terms, because without being specific, the relations would be tenuous to say the least. But we can look at the relations between war memorials and the ethical environment in very general terms. Indeed, it is by critically examining the intimately entwined post-military relations, between newly erected war memorials and the ethical environment of warfare that one hopes to help unpack some of the more intangible influences of contemporary war monumentality upon the current ethical environment of Modernity. To help contextualise this idea, one must look critically at these embedded relations.
Remembrance is not a celebration of Warfare!

War Memorials and the Ethical Environment of War

If you were to type in the term ‘war memorials’ on the WWW search engine Google Scholar, one would see instantly in the 19,100 hits that social science and military history researchers have looked at war memorials in many, many ways. However, if one looks a little deeper at this vast interdisciplinary literature, one would see that there seems to be one vitally important area that is commonly neglected i.e. we don’t seem to be looking at memorials for what they are in themselves, or what they may tell us about how we see war and why. In this ‘ethical environment’ context, we seem to look at memorials as individual or common phenomena that conform to social mores, and thus one rarely challenges what it is we may see. In so doing, I tentatively suggest that we ignore or worse still, deny ‘their’ real significance to us.

Put in context and we look at the Memorial, not in terms of what they may say about the social, cultural, ethical or moral acceptability of war within human society but, in very selective terms of what they are made of, where they are located, or what form they can take and what these various communicative designs may symbolise. We consider these objects of national culture in terms of cultural meaning, the social construction of reality; in terms of landscape, environment and material culture; in terms of memory, politics, symbolism and identity and even in terms of absence, the body, mourning, grieving and the sociology of death. In short, we look at everything about them, but not at them and the human experience of war they are taken to represent as public space testimony. In this respect, ‘our true task is to make sure the memory of war is the right memory’.¹ To re-consider this normative task in moral [ethical environment], or sociological [civilising process] terms, one must begin by considering what these materially salient, sacred artefacts of past warfare may be saying to us about ourselves, and the surrounding climate of ideas in which we live.

One would think we could find a sophisticated answer within the mainstream disciplines of art history, sociology or cultural studies, but here we tend to look at the memorial in terms of what they do with relation to mechanisms of national, ethnic or collective identity, or in terms of how a particular nation-state may wish to be viewed by the ‘other’ or cultural outsider. In this respect, we seem to be more interested in ‘why’ this may be the case in terms of geo-political or domestic factors and not with what this inherent ontological need may say about the pathology of modern civilisation. For example, in specific terms of societal reproduction, we talk about war monumentality as mnemonic practice, social process or as hegemonic narrative and even in structuring terms as cultural transmitters of ideology or beacons of nationhood and sometimes, even as material touchstones of collective effervescence. However, we rarely use such knowledge to help us think about monumentality in terms of how or why war seems so inescapable in late-modernity.

¹ The Birmingham Post (1925), commenting on the city’s memorial Hall of Memory in King (1998:3).
Thus we acknowledge their being, not as an institutional presence of warfare that is located in the public space heart of civil society, but with relation to structural change in civil military relations, or as cultural mechanisms of historical continuity and indicators of societal change. We acknowledge their entity, not with the material salience of a practical ideology or social actor, but as a somewhat neglected but well-respected object of national culture. In Britain alone, there are over 64,000 memorials which have a moral integration clearly on par with that of the monarchy or Church, yet until 1991 there was no nationwide database on record and to this day, no sociologist has conducted and published research into the social significance of this, the largest 'art history project' ever undertaken in the UK (Furlong 2002). Thus while I whole-heartily agree that current research is invaluable to bettering our understandings of ourselves, as an ethically educated society, with three total wars behind us, we seem to have stopped at some vitally important, but difficult questions.

In this respect, what can newly erected war memorials tell us about our cultural and moral relationship with modern warfare? What does how we use memorials say about how we may think and see modern war? What does the recent boom in WWII monumentality say about how we now feel about present conflicts and do these new public space testimonies of past war challenge the political prosecution of modern warfare as a socially acceptable institution of the state or do they simply reaffirm it? Is this line of pragmatic inquiry reinventing history i.e. imposing current values on the historic events of the past and in this respect, should these types of critical questions even be a consideration to those who organise commemorative events, or erect national memorials to the endeavours of the dead of past war and present conflict?

In this normative context of cultural wisdom and instructional hindsight, what do the most recent WWII memorials say we have learned about the rational use of modern war as a political tool of civilisation? Does their symbolic form and narrative content commonly reaffirm the grand 'noble lies' of official war remembrance out of myth, tradition and convention and in 'high diction' terms of sacrifice, duty and honour? Is it right and proper for our children to remain shackled to the high dictions of past war as Washington implies, or are they the ones the 'ultimate sacrifice' was given for and thus worth something more than the zero sum of our disasters and/or mistakes in war? Indeed, is it our intellectual task as sociologists to be asking such questions about the posterity of modern society, or is this idea suggesting social engineering?

Within the remit of a doctoral project, I could not hope to address these difficult questions, but as a sociologist, who has not lost all faith in the ongoing progress of humankind, I would say that I do believe this perceivable social science gap in the questions we are hot-wired to ask about ourselves is to our collective detriment, in the sense that we seem not to be looking at memorials in this very revealing manner, or as an institutional presence of war that is deeply embedded in the very heart of modern civil society. In purely counterfactual terms, the simple consideration that one can ask these questions about war monumentality suggests that 'memorials' in themselves can indicate much about collective values, ethics and beliefs and that they can therefore tell us much about why a 'ethically educated society' such as Britain may tacitly accept, or openly choose to prosecute the clearly brutal act of warfare, or even accept the political premise of 'risk-transfer warfare' (Shaw, M. 2007) as an ethical, moral or rational means to a contingent and limited political end.
The 15 rules of Risk-Transfer War

1. Wars must respond to plausible perceptions of risk to Western interests, norms and values.
2. Wars must be limited in the risks they create for Western polities, economies and societies.
3. Wars are exercises in political risk-taking, therefore they must minimise electoral risks for governments and (if possible) maximize their gains.
4. Wars must anticipate the problems of global surveillance.
5. Wars must be strictly time-limited: these are quick-fix wars.
6. Wars must be limited spatially to distant zones of war.
7. War must, above all, minimize casualties to Western troops.
8. Western forces should rely heavily on air power and look to others – as far as possible – to take risks on the ground.
9. The enemy must be killed: efficiently, quickly and discreetly.
10. Risks of ‘accidental’ civilian casualties must be minimised, but small massacres must be regarded as inevitable.
11. Wars rely on ‘precision’ weaponry to sustain their legitimacy.
12. Suffering and death must be unseen: indirect, less visible and less quantifiable life-risks are more acceptable.
13. Longer-term post-war risks must be spread as widely as possible through an international division of labour.
14. ‘Humanitarianism’ and ‘humanitarian’ organisations must be annexed to compensate for violence against civilians.
15. Media management maintains the narratives that explain the images of war.


Located within this ‘risk-transfer’ context (a way of thinking which is clearly representative of the western climate of ideas on the political role of war), and the critical idea that much discourse on war memorialisation seems to be omitting vitally important questions about what the ‘right memory’ is, tells us much about the sociologically perceived inescapability of war within contemporary Western culture, just as it tells us about the ethical, moral and intellectual malaise of late-modernity. However, this observation makes a somewhat moot point, because as Shaw (1991, 1997) points out, the overall result of this apparent blind spot in mainstream social science research is that very few contemporary researchers have directly observed the ‘latent function’ of what he terms ‘Nostalgia Militarism’, or the sociological relationship between past wars and present conflicts. In this project, I will employ a socially situated case study enquiry into the role, purpose and function of WWII memory in order to help me unpack the current nature of this relationship. As stated, the main focus is on examining the collective memory medium of the war memorial.

In this situated context, the research goal of this project is to conduct a case study investigation of the newly unveiled Battle of Britain Monument, which not only attempts to take into account ‘its’ psycho-geography and its institutional presence (Shills, E. 1975) as a materially salient and morally integrated material artifact of cultural memory (Bevan, R. 2006), but also its symbolic form, narrative content and ‘cultural script meaning’ (Furedi, F. 2007). To firmly situate this overarching research goal, I must now present my critical observations of contemporary war monumentality. It is hoped, that these opening observations will help; (i) distinguish what the ‘right memory’ questions, currently at issue in the sociology of war analysis of war memory, may be, and (ii) help the unfamiliar reader relocate the BOBM’s selection, production, reception and consumption within a situated context, relocated in contemporary space and time.
"Men's evil manners live in Brass"  

Critical Observations of Contemporary War Monumentality

In the **Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance** Alex King (1998:4) points out that "where euphemism obscures the reality of the thing being described, it may be regarded as dishonest, and thus charges of dishonesty have often be levelled against official war commemoration". However, in presenting my critical but considered opening observations, I do not mean to imply that all CWM is emotionally dishonest in symbolic form and narrative content and thus may have a de-civilising impact or effect on progression of self and civil society; indeed the opposite is clearly true in some very prominent cases. For example, the new Imperial War Museum North, opened by The Queen in 2001 and located in Manchester, which has the monumental design of a shattered globe symbolising "the impact of war in our globalised age" (see www.iwmn.com). A huge imposing structure, set against the low back-drop of canals and clad in stainless steel, the museum building is an impressive, thought-provoking and emotive sight on the British landscape. However, according to the peace research of Dungen (2004) in **Monuments of a Uniting Europe** such potent examples of what Hynes (1990) terms 'anti-monumentality' are very rare in public space and it is a little-known statistic that there are as few as 50 public peace museums world wide.

In a recent article entitled, The *Disneyfication of war allows us to ignore its real savagery*, George Monbiot (2006) of *The Guardian* argued that in Britain, "Most of our memorials sentimentalise war. Few commemorate the horror. But now we have a new category whose purpose it seems to be to trivialise it" (The Guardian. 24 10 06: P 31). This very revealing article was referring to various interlinked elements of what I am alluding to and locates the critical argument of my thesis in a concrete context. For example, he points out that the Imperial War Museum [London] was recently running an exhibit called the 'Animals at War' [2006]. "It features stuffed mascots, tales of the 'desperate plight' of 200 animals trapped by the fighting in Iraq, and photos of dogs wearing gas masks. It tells us about the 'PDSA Dickin Medal' [animal's Victoria Cross] which has been awarded to 23 dogs, 32 pigeons, 3 horses and 1 cat. The museum resounds with the public cries of 'aaah' and 'how sweet', modern warfare is now cute". To locate his critical observations in the context of public space, Monbiot (2006) points out that in 2004 a vast sculpture called *Animals at War* was unveiled by Princess Anne on Park Lane in central London. He comments that the monument cost £1.5million and was dedicated to "All the animals that served and died alongside British and Allied forces in wars and campaigns throughout time". Staying in this public space context, he illuminates further that in Liverpool, there are now "two statues commemorating a dog named 'Jet' that was used to help find victims of air raids". To link this public space trivialising of past war to current societal discourse on present conflict, he derisively argues that "I have no real objection to collectively remembering the suffering of animals but there seems to be something seriously wrong with modernity when statues of canine heroes from the WWII are still being unveiled while the death of Iraqi civilians still goes unrecorded" (The Sunday Observer. 24. 10. 2006: P 31).

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2 This epitaph is engraved on the hand rail of the south bank of the river Thames opposite the Globe Theatre [London: UK]. It is taken from Henry VIII: Act Four. Scene Two and reads in full: "men's evil manners live in brass: their virtues we write in water".
In this context of a cultural critique, the social ill that concerns me, is not the moral rights and wrongs of war per se, but the paradoxical nature of how we collectively talk and think about war and socially remember past wars. In the latter regard of how we socially remember war, I wish to examine the cultural 'constitution' of war memory [the way we as a society give meaning to representations of past war] in terms of its role, purpose and function and in terms of what is emotionally honest [civilising] or perhaps not [de-civilising] as is suggested by these opening observations. Here, the point I am making, re-visit William Shakespeare's perceptive observation of Elizabethan memory conventions drawn many hundreds of years ago and in a contemporary context follows the critical ideas of Monbiot's (2006) article which in mainstream British discourse is a rare critique of CWM. This critique illuminates Midgley's (1984) idea of glaring discrepancies between what she terms 'our noble ideals & our brutal conduct'.

In this established and critical context, many pertinent examples of my opening observations can be mirrored in the un-reflexive nature of many newly unveiled CWM projects. Indeed Shakespeare's damming observation that “man's evil manners live in brass” was recently personified by the 1992 unveiling of a war memorial to Sir Arthur Harris, chief of RAF Bomber Command in the latter part of WWII. I say this because, this life-size bronze statue of the man 'caused controversy from London to Dresden' (King, A 1998:1). To explain this revealing controversy in very simplistic terms; those that wanted to honour and pay tribute to the man, thought 'Bomber Harris' was a national hero, who had helped Britain save modern civilisation from the evil barbarism of Nazi Germany. The individuals of the Peace Pledge Union who caused the actual controversy, (by throwing 'white poppies' and 'red paint' on the memorial in protest and shouting 'shame on you' to the many dignitaries attending), thought that Bomber Harris's' doctrine (that strategic air bombing could win the war) and the military means to achieve this (calculated carpet bombing) was the antithesis of a modern civilisation.

In a similar article commenting on a subsequent 2006 'Bomber Command' memorial, in Lincoln Cathedral, The Observer wrote "For more than 60 years now individual veterans of RAF Bomber Command have sought to escape the shadow of Britain's most controversial military action in the Second World War". Their revealing example of this perceived collective shame was to present “Veteran Douglas Hudson” who was advised to take Bomber Command off his CV after the war in case it harmed his future job prospects. In his defence and in part as explanation, Mr Hudson was reported as saying, "Bomber Harris had been pressured by the government, which in turn was pressured by the Russians to target Dresden in order to ease their advance on Berlin". Mr 'Scotty' Scott, 70, who ran the campaign for the Lincoln Cathedral Memorial, agreed with this mythology of ‘the war’ and was reported as saying "They [Bomber Command aircrews] are wonderful men who did an important job and it's shameful they have not been recognised. They flew seven nights a week over Germany and were knocked out of the sky like ninepins" (The Observer 20.08.06: Pages 16-17).

In this ‘paying homage’ regard, the 2006 memorial, situated in the sanctity of a cathedral was designed as a civic tribute, honouring the 55,888 air crew who died in the long and bloody air campaign. However, even with such legitimising cultural capital from the Church and far from healing the acrimonious debate, the tribute carved in Lincoln limestone has reopened these 60 year old wounds borne of the
paradoxical relations between war, memory and the ethical environment. Yet again, the aforementioned Peace Pledge Union, the main British organisation which demonstrated against the bombings at the time, still regards the attack on Dresden as a war crime against humanity and is thus very, very dismissive of the new memorial. “This is part of a sentimental, nostalgic, crazy age we live in” said its co-ordinator Jan Melichar ‘it’s a bit like kids wearing badges, its all so childish’. In the same article, AC Grayling (2004), the moral philosopher who assessed the ethical case for the bombings in his book Among the Dead Cities, put forward a more balanced and nuanced perspective. He commented that, “the tremendous courage and sacrifice of Bomber Command is something to admire. On the other hand, area bombing was a very serious mistake and a moral crime. Somehow you’ve got to hold these two facts together. Any memorial is worthwhile, but to think of applauding Bomber Command for mass murdering civilians night after night would be wrong” (Observer 20.06.06:16).

Within the context of the opening arguments, these varied perspectives on the bombing of Dresden really force us to re-consider if these pertinent examples of CWM are really cultural documents of modern civilisation, or that of an age-old artifice of barbarism? Can we ever bring these two disaffiliated narratives together as Grayling advises? That is to say, can their contested symbolic meaning 60 years after the historic event have both these understandings located in the same space and time, or is point of view and historical context everything in interpretation? Should their socially ascribed meaning contain both understandings, no matter what the contingent context of recent history and if so, why should a nation such as Britain take such a stance in the name of posterity? Does any combatant nation ever have the emotional capacity to be truly honest about what war is, and thus enable some authentic meaning to both these types of war narrative in a Vertigo afflicted post-9/11 age of ‘shock and awe’?

These are the sort of critical sociology of war concerns and questions future and more extensive research will need to engage with, if subsequent projects are to get to the heart of such arguments. However, any insights or indicators one may be able to obtain from this limited or small-scale research project must of course be re-evaluated within the cultural wisdom of late modernity; that is to say, within the current ethical environment of Western society. In this regard, my opening observations imply that the Shakespearian adage that ‘men’s evil manners live in brass’ occurs within the symbolism and narratives of CWM because the CMR relations between modern war and civilisation are problematic to the ethical environment in which we currently live. Such observations have helped to inform the project’s approach to the paradox of war.

A Reflexive Approach to Paradox

“The sociological problem of war and society can be seen as a paradoxical dilemma.”

Having seen and participated in the brutality of modern war first hand, I have started my opening arguments from the intuitively based premise that there is a glitch in the ethical environment of the ethically educated societies of the West, and that this glitch is pathological to human progress. Here, one’s sociological imagination is inflamed by
personal troubles (how to make sense of war and its impact on life) because as an ex-soldier, what I really want is for people to feel horror about what war really is, to feel indignation that civilisation still tolerates war as rational means/end schema that can help promote a perceived greater good: Think of this idea of a perceived greater good in terms of waging war for freedom, democracy, regime change, nation building or humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, my normative/emancipatory aim is to critique the ethnocentrists of warfare by unpacking the mainstream sociological model of the modernisation thesis, in order that we may critically examine the paradoxical relationship between war and the liberal conscience of late modernity, which as Howard (2004) argues, might be defined as ‘the liberal dilemma’ of continuity/change.

In the influential work War, Dandeker (1999:109-111) points out that in the history of sociological enquiry, three main approaches to the study of war and the military establishment can be identified. A brief look at these competing but overlapping theories will help us re-locate or culturally frame this type of liberal dilemma with direct relation to Max Weber’s concept of paradox (Symonds, M., Pudsey, J. 2008:233-241).

“Two of these, the liberal theory of industrial society [modernisation thesis] and Marxism [revolutionary thesis], have been more influential, at least until recently. Both are rooted in the idea of history as ‘progress’, emphasising that the development of modern industrial society will lead to a decline of war and the military establishment. In contrast, the third, ‘realist’ or ‘neo-Machiavellian’ perspectives [pragmatic thesis] stresses that these institutions will not wither away but are part of the human condition” (Dandeker, 1999:110 -11). The point in highlighting these CMR theories in an introductory preamble is that whatever sociological model of war and civilisation one may wish to use - including my own social actor network model of modern warfare, as dialectic of social continuity and structural change - the inherent means/ends paradox identified by Weber will always raise its ugly head and ruin the utopian vista of modernity’s envisaged progress. There is no better example of this critical idea than the Holocaust. Located within the socially embedded context of what we now understand as the civilising process, I suggest that if such a thing can or does exist, then in waging war it must counter-intuitively exist in some sort of moral dilemma, because as the following insights illuminate, the ‘role of war and its preparation in modern civil society presents us with an essential paradox’.

“How is it that a society that has created such potential for human liberation – in technology, human co-operation, and ideas – can produce at the same time and with the same societal means such appalling danger? The conflict of these two sides of our civil society must ultimately be resolved, in practice as well as in theory”.

“However obvious this point is from a human point of view, it has not proved easy for thinkers to grapple with, any more than it has been easy to overcome war or conflict in the real social and political world. Most thinkers about society have not been able to grasp the huge problem that war poses for our understandings of society in general: they have marginalised it, treated it as exceptional or abnormal etc [see chapter 1]. Most thinkers about war, on the other hand, have tended to treat it as if it were self contained process, certainly depending on society for its resources [fusion and fission models or warfare paradigms] but ultimately operating under its own set of laws. Although the more intelligent of them [here Shaw is talking about the likes of Clausewitz] have recognized the implications of modern warfare for society, they have generally dealt with them much to obliquely, for fear perhaps that the implications would topple the whole edifice of military thought and practice".
"The sociological problem of war and society can be seen as a paradoxical dilemma, the horns of which have been tackled separately by social and military theory, but the heart of which has rarely been exposed" (see Shaw, M. 1988 Dialectics of War. Page 1).

In The Concept of ‘Paradox’ in the Work of Max Weber, Michael Symonds and Jason Pudsey (2008) explain that this ironic type of ‘paradoxical dilemma’ is unable to be altered or avoided by human agency – “it is, or has been, ‘fate’” (2008:237). For example, they point out within the context of ‘Weber’s paradoxical logic of modernity’ that a variety of fundamental values and ends can be pursued in the spheres of Modernity, but whichever is chosen there is no escape from the awaiting ‘fate of self-destruction’. In terms of why Weber disliked the social science practice of ‘vocational sociology’ (see Fruend 1968:17) both the ‘vocation’ lectures might be read as concluding with a warning on this very point (see Symonds, M. and Pudsey, J. 2008).

“And, if the ‘Iron Cage’ is understood in these terms, then it is not a question of prison-like determinism where our choices and liberties are limited, but rather, whatever the choice, on a fundamental level of value, there can be no realisation or resolution. Some choice must be made, but at every turn, at every end of the path in the modern world, lies the final embrace of paradox” (Max Weber cited in Symonds, M. and Pudsey, J. 2008: 237).

In this study, I have tried to highlight this ‘embrace of paradox’ with specific regards to Paul Fussell’s (1975) ‘modern war memory’ thesis of irony [that the ends achieved in war will always be disproportionate to the impact of the means] and again with regards to Michael Howard’s (1976) understandings of a liberal dilemma inherent to Western-made war. Here, I argue that the paradox of a PMS such as Britain using the alluring tool of Risk Transfer Warfare to help Western society facilitate the values and beliefs enshrined in the popular memory of the ‘Good War’, is that in waging risk averse or asymmetrical warfare upon the ‘other’ the fundamental values of liberal democracy - with relation to normative ends enshrined and desired - are inevitably undermined, lost or even reversed in the very pursuit of these values and ends. “We are here to bring you freedom and democracy” - screamed the US Marine to the rioting mob of Iraqis - “so back the fuck off before we are forced to open fire” (see The Ground Truth, 2007).

Even when situated within this most recent of fatally flawed liberal ideals to promote progress through virtuous war, it does not take a Mertonian (1957) moment of insightful realisation to argue against such determinisms: In that, ‘risk-transferee war’ - which factually speaking is only a rationalised or reified tool of Western humanity's many and varied ethnocentrism - is not culturally inescapable, or psychologically immutable and that the human and political agency of ‘choice’ becomes especially apparent if one attempts to grasp the observational idea that one of the current social engines of this ironical dilemma of warfare is the ‘meaningful social action of political agency’ re-employed within the context of ‘virtuous war’ (see Der Derian 2001) i.e. as a force for civil progress or public good. We will look closer at this idea when we begin to think about what Jock Young (2007) terms the ‘binary thesis’ and how this ‘criminalisation’ may inform the way we see war. While Symonds (2008) does not directly relate Weber’s ideas to post 9/11 means/ends paradoxes or to the current role of risk averse warfare, this article is never the less highly relevant in terms of locating the apparent banality of transgression inherent to the ‘New Western Way of Warfare’. We also give examples of this ‘banality of transgression’ in the discussions of Part 1.
The Overarching Methodology

All these considerations of paradox are vitally important to this project's final analysis of the BOBM because, as I have argued in this preamble, in order to get the best out of this very small scale examination of CWM one must ground and locate any analysis and/or interpretation within this paradoxical chaos of reward context. In short, I need to relocate any understandings within the ether of the ethical environment. To achieve this methodological aim, I will apply the Cultural Theory / Media Studies idea that all the many 'forms' of ethnocentric culture are produced and consumed within social life.

"Culture is produced and consumed within social life. Thus, particular cultural artefacts and practices must be situated within the social relations of production and reception in which culture is produced, distributed and consumed in order to be properly understood and interpreted. Contextualising cultural forms and audiences in historically specific situations helps illuminate how cultural artefacts reflect or reproduce concrete social relations and conditions – or oppose and attempt to transform them". (Kellner, D. 2003: 12).

The methodological premise of my project's analysis and interpretation is built upon this Media and Cultural Studies Thesis (see Kellner, 2003:1-29). Indeed, in applying this idea to my analysis of the BOBM, it is understood that commemorative culture is also produced and consumed within social life, and therefore particular cultural artefacts of British WWII memory and remembrance practices must be situated within the social relations of production and reception - in which this culture is produced, distributed and consumed - in order to be properly understood and interpreted. Thus, within the overlapping discussions of the project an aim of the thesis narrative is to help re-contextualise current cultural forms of modern war memory, including its public audiences, in historically specific collective memory situations, which may help illuminate how CWM projects can be shown to reflect and help reproduce concrete social relations and conditions or sometimes oppose and attempt to transform them.

To illustrate this, I also draw on what cultural criminologist Mike Presdee (2000:15) termed the 'debris of everyday life' with specific relation to the expedient calculations and emotional trauma of war and, thus, I have employed various examples, islands of knowledge (ideas) and contrasting mediated storytellers of 'past war and present conflict' in order to help ground and contextualise the social manipulation of morality process clearly apparent in the ideological appropriation of the BOBM. Looking at the selection/consumption of CWM in this way one can fulfil the normative aspect of this critically-minded inquiry by reuniting logic and reason with imagination and moral distinction: this may help unmask the de-civilising impact of our expedient calculations.

"I call this new Western way of warfare Risk-Transfer War because it centres on minimising life risks to the allied military – and hence all important political and electoral risks to their masters – at the expense not only of 'enemies' but also of those the West agrees are innocent." Source: Martin Shaw, (2007) The New Western Way of Warfare, Page 1.

It is in this context, that the Blackburn (2001) understanding of a surrounding climate of ideas - that can influence our moral and ethical behaviours in the same way that the global climate of the planet influences our geographical environments - is a tenable sociological explanation as to why we may now see what we see when we look at the
brutal act of risk transfer war and paradoxically, still see 'it' as socially acceptable to Western sensibilities on the use of force or violence. This is another reason why the main title of this exploratory thesis is: War, (its) Memory and the Ethical Environment. Accordingly, a substantial task of the preamble narrative was to introduce (with relation to some key literature) the specialist 'war studies' and 'social memory' concepts of the study; with the view that these thematic ideas of war, memory and the ethical environment can then be utilised in the final analysis, as a type of prism which may allow us to reveal the broader spectrum of our subject matter. This prism will provide a sociology of knowledge lens, by which to examine the ethnocentrism of the BOBM from varying overlapping perspectives/contexts and in the process, enable one to critically remodel the microcosm of war and memory we will have been observing.

Addressing the Research Questions

With relation to this case study investigation, the sub-title A Critical Examination of the Battle of Britain Monument clearly denotes some sort of empirically-grounded and culturally situated investigation of WWII memory in post Cold War Britain. This case study microcosm of contemporary war monumentality is understood as representative of an unprecedented empirical increase in WWII monumentality projects. The empirical elements of this case study revolve around addressing three core questions; why was the BOBM constructed when it was; why are we remembering WWII now and finally, are these the 'right memories' of war (are they emotionally honest about what war is) in terms of influencing Western sensibilities towards how warfare is seen.

In terms of framing how the research process will address these questions, this preamble must now re-consider, in particular, why this form of CWM is so important to Britain, when it is very difficult for any monument such as the BOBM to carry out its intended purpose (i.e. to remember and pay tribute to the heroic deeds and acts of the participants), because (i) the nature of war has changed and (ii) the structure of British society has changed, such that a 'collective memory of pulling together in a Blitz Spirit of 'resilience' is much more difficult to recreate. In other words, in order to illuminate how changes in the social structure of society and changes in the nature of war have influenced the production and reception of CWM - and thus its influence on the ethical environment - we need to trace the evolutions from 'total war' to 'risk transfer war': Here, Total War, refers to a typology of modern warfare in which the whole of society and its economy are collectively mobilised to help bend the enemy's will to one's own; and Risk Transfer War, refers to a typology of limited, distant or asymmetrical warfare in which the post-military nature of civil society informs the post heroic character of risk averse war, with its reliance on technology and air power for a surgical use of force.

The Expedience of War, is 'its' Calculations.

From Total Warfare to Risk Transfer Warfare

In Dialectics of War: An Essay on the Social Theory of War and Peace (1988) Shaw explains that War can be said to become 'total' in at least two main senses: on the one
hand, in the sense most used by social scientists, that it more and more completely incorporates the whole of social life; and on the other, in the military, Clausewitzian or Hegelian sense, that it increasingly becomes an 'absolute' struggle of life and death for states and peoples. He points out, that in both senses 'Total War' has three distinct phases as related to is the notion of industrialised total war in which all sections of society are fully involved and interconnected. Here, the Second World War was a 'total war' in an even fuller sense than the First World War. i.e. In the sense that 'the good war' (Terkel, S. 1988) was still a war of mass armies, based on mass-production of weapons, vehicles and supplies of all sorts, and thus WWII continued the mode of warfare of the First, but changes in politics and economics, strategy and technology, combined to create a new second phase of total war. The examples he uses are states' controls over economy and society; which were everywhere more thorough and complete, bearing strong resemblances to each other.

Similarly, strategy and weaponry underwent similar changes on all sides i.e. 'the innovations of 1914-18 became commonplace in 1939-45, and land warfare - in avoiding the trenches - was dominated by the tank with aerial warfare widely seen, both before and during 'the war', as crucial'. Here, even civilian populations, as well as the economic installations around which they lived, were seen as legitimate targets.

In introducing the third phase of total war (nuclear warfare), Shaw (1988) suggested that the use of the atomic bomb marked not just the end of the Second World War, but a turning point in war itself and a Third phase of 'Total War'. This said, and in specific terms of the changing social structure of society, it took a decade or more for the real change in the mode of warfare to develop into the third phase of Mutually Assured Destruction. 'Since at first only the US possessed atomic weapons, and in insufficient quantities for all-out war, the early period of East-West conflict was characterised by a continuation of the 1939-45 type of war-preparations while demobilising from wartime levels'. This was the beginning of what we now know as the Cold War and although war economies were rapidly converted to the purposes of reconstruction, historically speaking, high levels of 'peacetime' military expenditure were maintained and even military demobilisation was soon halted in the 1950's by the start of the Korean War.

During the early Cold War period, mass armed forces based on conscription remained universal and large resources were directed via the new military industrial complex into research for the atomic arms race. However, from the 1960s onwards, this notion of national solidarity is seen to begin to crumble due to structural changes in military culture. Indeed, after the Korean War ended in a stalemate there were no wars fought between East & West during the Cold War – fighting was limited, proxy wars fought for control of strategic spheres of influence - and because nuclear technology had made war seem impossible (MAD) this period did not have anything like the mobilisation or cohesion effects of World War II, as the social structure was also changing. Here, the old class communities were breaking down, the deference for political and military elites was weakening and the latter were becoming marginalised from society. At this point we need to move on to the next key text by Shaw (1991) entitled Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarisation and War at the End of the Twentieth Century.

The main points to take from this evolution are (i) the military becomes civilianised and faces legitimacy problems. Here, "The military, as an institution, exists ever more on
the margins of post-military society" (Shaw 1991: 134). (ii) Post-military militarism takes a cultural rather than a social structural form. Here, militarism is replaced by what is termed an 'armament culture' (a post-Fordist variety of mass culture) where the media is obsessed with militarism and valorises the means of mutually assured destruction but because this doesn't involve people being actually mobilised, militarism retreats to the realm of political rhetoric. In an important section of the book - on the causes of post-military society - Shaw identifies the push factors from the military side: the effect of nuclear technology mentioned already; the decline of national service and mass armies into residual professional armies - thus being a soldier is one occupation among many and more important for the skills you might pick up for civilian life, than any notion of 'queen and country' which would be echoed outside the military ghetto.

In the same section, he also highlights the 'pull factors' from the changing nature of civil society: "The decline of militarism is akin to the decline of aggressive nationalism, traditional religion and mass labour movements, all of which were stronger in the earlier stages of industrial society: "The transformation of militarism into armament culture is parallel to the way in which nationalism and religion have been repackaged with commercial culture" (Shaw 1991: 93). In other words, we who inhabit post-military society no longer live in a highly solidaristic culturally homogenous society, but a fragmented and diverse one in which many of the values we may hold in common are articulated by the mass media and advertising rather than in work, community etc. Such a society finds it very hard to sustain a national commitment to anything, militarism included. At this point, we can now return to Martin Shaw's (2007) most recent book The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and It's Crisis in Iraq.

If we trace the evolution of this work in relation to the previous one on post-military society we can see that the question Shaw is asking is: 'what type of war could a post-military society possibly sustain?' Answer: only a 'risk transfer war' in which most of the casualties are on the other side; hence the post-heroic character of such fighting i.e. reliance on air power, minimum infantry incursions etc. He makes the point that all armed conflict is nowadays in the full glare of the media and the 'military', in particular since the first Gulf War, have spent a lot of energy in managing and controlling the media (e.g. only 'embedded' journalists, etc. allowed near the fighting). The aim is to constantly prevent public opinion in post-military society from turning against the war. The final point made is that Iraq (and now Afghanistan) has been the graveyard of risk-transfer war. Casualties have mounted; senior officers have spoken out about shortages and defective equipment. That said the steady stream of casualties has not, yet, really galvanised public opinion so one might also say that the very fragmentation of modern society prevents any truly collective revulsion to mounting casualties of war.

In this study, these observations - that the old nostalgia of past war is becoming less and less of a possibility as the basis of collective war memory - will be further examined by making extensive reference to a new subtler form of 'nostalgia militarism' and brief references to some contemporary 'war studies' works on the transformation of modern warfare (see Black, 2001, Creveld, 2001, Der Derian 2001, Ignatieff, 2006., Coker, 2005). Here, it will be initially concluded that the construction of the BOBM was an attempt to counter the social and political divisions of British society regarding the impact of current military conflicts by drawing on a national resilience that has largely
ebbed away. For example, my case study will demonstrate (within the findings of some brief questionnaire research) that those who participated in, and celebrated the building of the BOBM can be seen to be drawn from those selective sections of British society most likely to still evince the older nostalgia of true national resilience. It is hoped that such an early contextualisation and historical contrasts will complement the case study element of my research like the contents of a club sandwich and enable the subsequent analytical discussions of the reception of the BOBM to be more firmly situated within the innate paradoxical dilemma that is modern war in late-modernity.

The Post Heroic Narrative of Risk Averse War

In On Heroes: Hero Worship and the Heroic in History it is explained that a publicly recognised war hero is defined as a person who is understood to have chosen to face the physical danger, hardship and suffering of war for a greater purpose set forward by the norms and values of the ‘in group’ (Carlisle, T. 1901). In this wider social theory context, the specialist war studies terms post-heroic or post-military society can also refer to the post Cold War nature of Western Civil Military Relations [CMR’s], with particular relation to examples of how the Western media currently presents a publicly recognised hero of war. In this ‘mediated’ and ‘post heroic’ context, International Relations theorist Christopher Coker (2005:10) points out in a revealing article entitled The Unhappy Warrior that where “Warriors were once venerated - they are no longer”. Here, Coker (2005) illuminates how, in the latest Iraq War [2003] the West has found two kinds of war heroes: “the traditional and the soldier as victim”.

As an example of the ‘traditional dynamic hero’ he sites “Captain Alexander Hornbuckle, a 29 year old staff officer who had never been in combat before. This unsung hero was caught in an eight hour firefight in which he and his men killed over 200 Iraqi soldiers”. He points out that, “Until The Wall Street Journal discovered him, Hornbuckle’s heroics were never eulogised”. In comparison Coker (2005:13) presents what he terms the ‘victim hero of the hour’. In this case “she was a woman; Private Jessica Lynch, who was one of a group of ten soldiers captured by the Iraqis in the early days of the campaign.” In his analysis of these two types of ‘hero’, he explains that while on the surface the official narrative of the Jessica Lynch story depicted in the Western media was that of a traditional type of warrior [as described above] ‘something was not quite the same’. “For example the Jessica Lynch story was initially of, a soldier who was ambushed on a road; who had fought until the last round of ammunition only to be overcome and stabbed and then sent out to an Iraqi hospital. There, she was held for nine days before finally being rescued in dramatic fashion. Consequently she became an overnight media sensation”. In the specific context of how we in the West socially remember war, Coker (2005:10) suggests that “it’s the soldier as victim that has been eulogised by the mass media and general public alike”.

Coker’s (2005:11) ’post heroic’ critique of the ‘Jessica Lynch war story’ points out the inherent irony of this most recent official narrative of war. Not in the context of the narrative being fundamentally untrue to the reality of actual events - which it was - but in the post-heroic context that this mediated heroine was not faced with an existential decision that took personal courage to act and in the course of said action would challenge her inner and bodily resolve. As Coker points out “she was simply unlucky enough to find herself in the wrong place at the wrong time”. To use his words, “she as
a self activated person did not choose to face her contingent danger and suffering for some greater purpose”, which “is what makes a true hero of an unexpected event different from an unfortunate victim of war or for that matter the rest of us” (Coker 2005).

To conclude this emotive and revealing argument, Coker (2005) points out that the post-military society of the West found it “incredibly easy to idolise Miss Lynch simply for what she had appeared to have been through and not because of her envisaged ‘heroic’ actions”. As a consequence, the focus of the ‘mediated script’ was on the vulnerability and suffering of ‘an average young girl, caught in a much larger conflict and able to survive against tremendous odds’ (Coker, C. 2005:13). To add to this post-heroic argument, I would suggest that Private Lynch’s own response to being asked about her recent heroic fame epitomises the current ‘post-heroic nature’ of CMR’s, in that she replied to the media’s question of ‘are you a hero’; “I’m not a hero. If it makes people feel good to say it, then I’m glad. But I’m not. I’m just a survivor”. In this inquiry, we shall illuminate how this new ‘post-heroic’ narrative is what currently informs and influences the selection, form, content and consumption of CWM projects.

The Post Heroic Narrative as Rhetoric of Vulnerability

These post-heroic changes in civil-military relations are well illustrated by Frank Furedi (2007) with relation to changing societal responses to flood disasters – from heroic model of ‘resilience’ to what he sees as the detrimental rhetoric of ‘vulnerability’. As we have seen, there weren’t any wars fought on home soil during the Cold War period but there were floods (1950’s and 2000), so research was able to trace the weakening of ‘resilience’ in favour of ‘vulnerability’ through responses to these types of disasters. Entitled, From the Narrative of the Blitz to the Rhetoric of Vulnerability, the article contrasts these two ‘models’ of catastrophe to help explore the cultural influences and ‘feeling scripts’ that shaped the reaction of British communities to disaster. Furedi (2007:246) found that ‘the historical comparison between these two periods indicates that the people in each period made sense of their predicament through strikingly different cultural narratives; narratives which also represented events to the general public in quite divergent ways’. In the model of resilience Furedi (2007:237-8) showed that the cultural narrative through which peoples emotional responses to adversity were represented in the 1950s was based on the heroic script of the ‘Blitz’. As we will see in chapter four, this ‘script’ celebrated the capacity of the British people, especially those in London and the South East of England, to cope when their lives were hit hard by German bombing during World War II, promoting the ideal that the ‘British can take it’, which according to the literature (see Connelly, M. 2004) exercised considerable influence over many peoples imagination. Furthermore, ‘the narrative of war-time resilience through which the experience of the 1950 floods were framed, represented a (natural) disaster as a form of collective adversity that had the potential to bring out the best in people’. In short, the British public’s strong identification with the legacy of World War II ‘ensured that the ideals of resilience, resourcefulness and adaptability’ continued to shape and influence what is termed the ‘ethnopsychology’ of the 1950’s.

“Every culture contains a set of ideas and beliefs about the nature of human beings, what motivates them to act, the way they perceive the world, how their minds work, and the emotions that are “natural” to them” (see Hewitt, M. 1998:46 cited in Furedi, F. 2007:236).
In contrasting the 1950 floods with the 2000 ones, Furedi (2007:241) suggests that although the rhetoric of the Blitz spirit continues to inform some public discourse on disaster in the present – as in the case of the 7th July 2005 London bombings - the most dominant cultural frame (through which various groups and institutions in Britain made sense of the floods of 2000) stresses the post-heroic theme of individual trauma and vulnerability. As we have just seen - with relation to the Jessica Lynch war story - this same frame is clearly apparent with relation to the post-heroic narrative of present conflict. i.e. the locus of the 'cultural script' was on the vulnerability and suffering of 'an average young girl, caught in a much larger conflict and able to survive against tremendous odds' (Coker, C. 2005:13). In developing Furedi's thesis from a focus on the sociological discourse of disaster and catastrophe, to a sociology of war focus, the pertinent point to highlight here - with relation to the man-made disaster of war - is that even though the rhetoric of vulnerability is predominant - as a discourse frame - the old cultural script of the Blitz still provides a culturally embedded discourse through which the gravity of a war disaster event are still transmitted to the general public. In this inquiry, the 'disaster' is warfare impacting upon civil society in the form of rising casualty figures; and the 'script' is the meanings we may associate with the happening of said events or the legitimisation and justifications for going to war in the first place.

De-constructing The Noble Lies of War

In unpacking the layers of these 'feeling rule' scripts, the thesis will critically examine the 2005 unveiling of the Battle of Britain Monument. Here, the BOBM is sociologically viewed as an 'ideal type' of 'totemic' war memory i.e. as a culturally prominent and symbolically powerful story teller of a more traditional or linear cultural narration of the British at War' (see Lawrence, J. 2000., Paris, M. 2002). In part, these narratives of war memory act as a type of civil-military relations theodicy which, on a psychological level, may help one make sense of social suffering in, and to the man-made disasters of modern warfare, and thus come to terms with the anxiety and emotional trauma of war. All theodicies exist to help provide an answer for suffering and pain, as no-one would prefer to believe that their loved ones could die in vain; so here the noble lies of past war provide ideological and/or emotional safe havens in which to find an answer.
"World War II has become the big war wielded to justify the waging of small wars and, as such, an all purpose rhetorical crutch, a lofty piety, a wide-screen epic constantly remade and recast. Commentators can scarcely score a point about terrorism, geopolitical struggle, or domestic politics without relying on "the good war" for an ominous parallel" (Walcott. 2004:71).

'Cast your mind back to those hazy, bygone days of 2002 and recall how loudly echoes of WWII provided the overture to the ramp-up for war in Iraq, with Tony Blair ripening into the Churchill of 'Our Time', Saddam Hussein combining the monster roles of Hitler and Stalin, and anyone fey enough to advocate diplomacy taunted in the village square as a hand-wrting, appeasing Neville Chamberlain' (Wolcott, J. 2004:70-73).

While one can understand the need for such noble lies at the micro and personal level, at the macro or linear level - especially when ideologically appropriated by state apparatus as facilitators of 'feeling rules' - these cultural scripts or story tellers of past war can be seen to help reify the age old lie of warfare (that they died for our freedom). Where such euphemisms obscure the lived reality of the thing being described - as in the above - it may be regarded as dishonest. In this project, the euphemisms of 'noble lies' are critically viewed as emotionally dishonest war stories because they are socially constructed 'scripts', which help re-locate historically rooted sensibilities about war or violence, and culturally embedded social assumptions about what warfare may be for, in ideological safe harbours and/or ethnocentric safe havens. Here, 'noble lies' of war, are seen to inform the nature of the ethical environment, and by association govern ethics, and shape the moral reasoning of acceptable behavior.

In Human Society in Ethics and Politics Bertrand Russell (2009:xx) argued that there is 'something feeble and a little contemptible' about a society that cannot face the perils of life without the help of 'comfortable myths'. Similarly, in the second 'Untimely Meditation', On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Nietzsche, explains how this highly influential monumental use of History can only lead to a moral sickness (2007:57-124). While we must evaluate this structural notion of 'bad faith' in greater detail in chapter two, at this stage an earlier point needs to be emphasised: Namely, that there are many reasons for believing that the people who support the BOBM are not wholly unrepresentative of the majority of the population, and that while the latter may, in the long run, find it difficult to respond to the BOBM as an evocation of shared historical memory sufficiently strong to produce cohesion in the face of long term conflicts, there is also ample evidence that such WWII memory can have a substantial figurative or rhetorical impact in the immediate aftermath of a global terrorist attack; i.e. like the 9/11 attacks on New York or more recent 7/7 bombing of central London in 2005; indeed the following quote also provides some observable evidence of this idea.

"After the tragic events of September 11, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani at once saw parallels in the London Blitz, the German air campaign launched against the British capital between September 1940 and May 1941. In the early press conferences at Ground Zero he repeatedly compared the bravery and resourcefulness of New Yorkers and Londoners, their heightened sense of community forged by danger, and the surge of patriotism as a town and its population came to symbolize a nation embattled. His words had immediate resonance, despite vast differences between the two situations" (Field, G. 2007: 181).

As we have just seen, Field (2007) and Walcott (2004) have helped provide situated examples of this 'nostalgia militarism' idea as related to the 9/11 attacks; but within a
purely British context this illustrated idea that war memory can help facilitate a short lived, but strong and meaningful collective effervescence will be further illuminated by pertinent British examples which will be re-contextualised to help us re-think what the 'right memory' of war may look like. In a similar vein, we will also be building on recent social memory research on the current role, purpose and function of collective memory phenomena, which will help us identify a plethora of other 'social factors' that may also help to structurally address the two 'why now' questions associated with the recent empirical increase in contemporary war monumentality (see Table 1: Ch 3).

In terms of the third and most difficult research question, my inquiry will also develop Shaw's (1997) 'past war thesis' (which suggests that the current relationship of past wars and present conflict is one of nostalgia militarism), as it attempts to demonstrate in a situated context how the legitimisation of present conflicts through the cultural and social processes of collectively remembering past wars is actually achieved, via the overlapping 'affect mechanisms' of Contemporary War Monumentality; by which I mean memorialisation, commemoration and remembrance. In very specific terms to these affect mechanisms and with indirect relation to what moral philosophers call the ethical environment, and sociologists 'the civilising process' (Elias 2001), my research into question three suggests that the very recent empirical increase in CWM projects (See Table 1: Ch 3) serves in part to help justify, rationalise and sanctify - with the noble lies of past war - a 97% non-combatant casualty rate, to what is has been called 'risk-transfer warfare' because it minimises the risk of casualties to the West (political, civilian or military), by implementing the prosecution of 'shock and awe' on the Other.

Indeed, as Shaw (2002) points out in Risk Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres and the Historical Legitimacy of War, it is never the intention of the ethically educated to participate in 'small massacres', but if this is the human cost of reducing risk, then so be it, even if the other is what many in the West routinely describe as innocents, non-combatants or collateral damage. With this damning statistical evidence of modern warfare in mind, I have undertaken to address the final question with the intention to foster debate - via peer reviewed research - which may help demonstrate how mixed methodologies and critically reflexive research into the subtle 'nostalgia militarism' role of newly-unveiled war monuments can be a very useful social indicator of a glitch in our ethical environment and a cultural context by which to explore what I perceive as a detrimental relationship between past war and present conflict from a grounded and contextualised perspective. As this is a sociological doctorate and not a war, or peace studies research project, this is my tentative way of employing a critical sociological imagination to help reconcile one's personal troubles with a public issue of Modernity: This brings our preamble discussion to the final consideration: Namely, that our ways of seeing are not value free and hence there is an explicit necessity for all researchers to try and address the social science issues of 'value neutrality and ethical orientation'.

Ways of seeing are never value free!

Addressing Issues of Value Neutrality
One can help take into account Weber's important issues of 'value neutrality' and 'ethical orientation' (see Freud, J. 1968: 37-86), by explaining that the culturally situated focus of this memory project is to be on British war memory; because 'I', the researcher, was born in Britain and served in her Armed Services for nearly twenty years. In reflecting on this past life-experience as a social science researcher, I have come to learn from my readings, that one's experience of war may bring fresh new insights to such memory inquiries, not least the grounded comprehension that British cultural assumptions of war have a 'constitutional meaning' built upon from popular cultural scripts of past war, selective images of iconic wartime events and canonised myths of the 'Good War' (see Carlisle, 1901., James, 2002., Paris, 2000., Shaw, M. 1991., Smith, 2000., Connelly, M. 2004., Eksteins, 2000., Addison, 2002).

In terms of why a critical reading against the grain; I have tried to explain this in sociological terms of the inherent link between 'private troubles and public issues' (see Shaw 1997: 31-38) in that, I have argued that one of the sociabilities that helps obligate human beings to do what they must do in war, is the mnemonic practices of past war memory. Accordingly, I am very interested in what Shaw (1991:184-191) terms the Mertonian or 'latent function' of war myth with regards to how past war may be seen to help legitimise present conflicts (Shaw 1997: 191-204), and also with Fussell's (1975) critical ideas of 'high diction' and 'modern war memory' combining to help self-perpetuate the rational use of collective violence in the modern civil society.

In this respect, this particular memory work, like many 'contemporary memory studies', has an 'explicit idealistic/moralistic tone', because a necessary part of the discovery ethos suggested by Charles Tilly (2003:344) is to explore, and thus reveal what Irwin-Zarecka (1994) terms, "questions of social significance in collective memory" (in Cammen, M. 1995). Asking questions of 'social significance' in this study equates to reading our heroic and glorious past against the grain of myth, convention, habit or tradition and employing what she terms 'purely textual readings of collective memory phenomena' to consider not only the function or purpose of modern war memory, but also the more difficult issues relating to the moral order or in this case, the 'civilising processes of modernity'. Here, I mean asking questions of social significance, which relate to the 'ethical environment' in which we live and to critical questions as to what the 'right memory' of war may look like with specific regards to what Zarecka terms the 'cultural sensibilities and norms, that help inform both the structure and texture of our current social remembering' (1994:xi). Here, Zarecka (1994:20) points out those concerns with ethnocentrism, legitimacy issues and/or moral order are what frequently drive researchers in the field of memory studies. This notion is allied to every page.

With these normative orientations in mind, the four-part thesis you are about to read is a critical-minded inquiry; which in research conduct, will be both empirical and interpretive in nature, and which in analysis and interpretation takes a critical look at the cultural memory dimensions of CMR's i.e. normative relationships between war, its public memory signifier and the ethical environment of modernity. In part one I define what 'risk transfer war' actually is in conduct, and contextualise the banality of transgression in 'its' current prosecution as asymmetrical warfare. In Chapter Two we balance this instrumental viewing of warfare by considering the existential, emotion or human legacy of modern warfare, before framing the methodological
parameters of the case study in Part 2. In Part 3, we consider what Shills (1975) described in *Centre and Periphery* as an 'institutional presence', referring here to a memory presence which has a material salience and moral integration within society. We apply this idea to CWM, via a literature review of the war and memory debate, before presenting a traditional snapshot of The Battle of Britain Monument, which is to be drawn from a variety of public domain and social science sources. In Part 4, we will employ various forms of content analysis, and a Ruskin-type interpretation, which will help us to critically reconsider the implications of what we will have seen.

From this critical standpoint, part four will suggest that, the symbolic form and narrative content of CWM may well have a detrimental influence on the ethical environment in which we live. Here, the cultural memory representations of nostalgia militarisms are said to help reproduce the age-old lies of warfare. We will show how this linear time narration of past war can actually work as an 'affect mechanism' in the cultural discourse of modern warfare i.e. I will demonstrate how the new 'post heroic' script of WWII memorials can be critically understood as selected, produced and consumed within traditional collective memory frameworks which if not balanced by what is termed by some as 'anti-monumentality projects' (Hynes, S. 1990) - referring to ‘trauma time narrations’ or ‘emotionally honesty’ memory scripts which ask the difficult question 'why' - will continue unabated to help blind, camouflage or mask Western civil-society from the cruel and brutal realities of risk-averse warfare. I therefore conclude, that the popular 'feeling rule scripts' or 'noble lies' of WWII are pathological to modernity's ongoing progress - as this notion of historical progress is sociologically understood, with relation to Elias's (2000) idea of a 'civilising process'.

1 By recent developments in CMR's, I mean 'post-military' developments within British civil society. See Martin Shaw's 1991 work, entitled *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarisation and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*. Shaw's main ideas, that relate to what I have termed recent 'post-military developments in British civil-military relations', relates us to how (i) the military institutions of the West have become more civilianised, and thus face problems of legitimacy. Here, "The military, as a social institution, exists ever more on the margins of post-military society" (Shaw 1991: 134). (ii) Post-military militarism takes a cultural rather than a social structural form. Here, traditional militarism is replaced by what is termed an 'armament culture' (a post-Fordist variety of mass culture) where the media is obsessed with modern warfare and valorises the means of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but because this doesn't involve people being actually mobilised new militarism retreats to the realm of political rhetoric. In an important section of the book - on the causes of post-military society - Shaw identifies the 'push factors' from the military side: the effect of nuclear technology, mentioned below; the decline of national service and mass armies into residual professional armies - thus being a soldier is one occupation among many and more important for the skills you might pick up for civilian life, than any notion of 'queen and country' which would be echoed outside the military ghetto. In the same section, he also highlights the 'pull factors' from the changing nature of Western civil society: "The decline of militarism is akin to the decline of aggressive nationalism, traditional religion and mass labour movements, all of which were stronger in the earlier stages of industrial society: "The transformation of militarism into armament culture is parallel to the way in which nationalism and religion have been repackaged with commercial culture" (Shaw 1991: 93). In other words, we whom inhabit what Shaw terms a 'post-military society' no longer live in a highly solidaristic culturally homogenous society but a fragmented and diverse one, in which many of the values we may hold in common are articulated by the mass media and advertising rather than in work, community etc. Thus, when I infer a recent post-military development in British civil-military relations, I am referring one to how the 'post-heroic' character of risk-transfer war, with its reliance on a surgical use of force and limited ground insertions, is informed by the post-military nature of current Civil Military Relations.
Clearly, in this situated study, civil-military relations only relate to the social, cultural and institutional relations between Western civil-society and the military institutions of the democratic nation-state. While there are many dimensions of CMR, the specified 'cultural memory' dimension refers us to how contemporary war monumentality may help shape, influence or reproduce the post-heroic nature of current post-military relations. For the seminal source on CMR's see The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. In defining the structural imperatives of CMR's Huntington (2002:1-3) argues that the military institutions of any Society are shaped by two forces: (i) the functional imperative stemming from geopolitical threats to society's international security i.e. the threat of invasion. (ii) The societal imperative of CMR's arising from the forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within society; here Huntington's structural understanding is that state apparatus are the active directing elements of modern society and are thus responsible for the allocation of resources among important values - including military security. Structurally speaking, he sees a conflict between these two societal imperatives reproduced in contemporary civil-military relations. On the one hand, military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. For Huntington, writing during the height of the Cold War, these structural, functional and/or political imperatives were to be the most important factor in his political science considerations of the problems inherent to western civil-military relations.

"The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations. The degree to which they conflict depends upon the intensity of the security needs and the nature and strength of the value pattern of society. Adjustment and balance between the two forces are not inevitable: some societies may be inherently incapable of providing effectively for their own security. Such societies lack survival value in an era of continuing threats" (Huntington, S. 2001[1957]:page 2).

What is meant by the evocative terms 'lack of survival value in a era of continuing threats' is most apparent to an era when the threat of mutually assured destruction was the lived norm for an entire generation. In contrast to the WWII era and since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990's, Western civil societies have had little cause to worry about their security in terms of invasion. Here my CMR concern revolves around the neglected idea that in the West, national security is an contingent inheritance of the functional imperative rather than a creation of the social imperative.

1 This 'mature idea', that the cultural narration of warfare is hegemonic in nature, is what Jenny Edkins (2003: 1-19) refers to, or describes as the 'linear time narrations of modem war memory*, as opposed to the emotional or trauma time narrations one would expect to see in the immediate aftermath of war and its impact on the lived life. The emotional or trauma narration of warfare always asks the question why? Where the liner time narration always takes as a societal given, the collective duty to remember. In part 4 this dualistic understanding or idea is applied in the subsequent interpretation of the BOBM.

2 Outlining the evolution modern war from 'total' to a 'risk transfer' typology is another of the implied tasks of this thesis preamble/introduction, as it is practically designed to complement the overlapping descriptions of Risk Transfer War that I will present in Chapter 1 i.e. it is presented here to help provide a sociological contrast to historically embedded notions of WWII (Total War) which gave rise to the war memory, upon which the BOBM was based (see Ch 4). It is hoped that this early sociological outline will help complement the fact-finding or case study elements of the exploratory research process, like a club sandwich, and enable the final analytical discussions of the selection/reception of the BOBM to be more firmly situated. With this contextual task in mind, I would like to take this opportunity to thank and acknowledge the great debt I owe not only to the seminal work of Professor Martain Shaw and his help in the past and who's key texts we will now use to trace the evolution from total war to risk averse war (1988, 1991, 2007), but also to my external examiner Professor John Lea, for his much appreciated feedback, including his help with my previous attempts at condensing Martin Shaw's specialist works into manageable chunks, that the lay person can understand with ease. It is from his clear, concise and very insightful written-up notes on the subject that the following section is written (see http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/crimwar.htm). In the similar vein, I would also like to thank Professor Frank Furedi (internal examiner) and Dr Keith Hayward (UoK) for their time, help and honesty in guiding me though the final revisions of this thesis.
Chapter 1

**My Country - Right or Wrong - Still My Country!**

**The Ethnocentrism of Risk Averse Warfare**

"All Cultures [of war] are produced and consumed within social life [i.e. war’s are ethnocentric enterprises]. Thus, particular cultural artefacts and practices must be situated within the social relations of production and reception, in which ‘Culture’ is produced, distributed and consumed, in order to be properly understood and interpreted. Contextualising cultural forms and audiences in historically specific situations, helps illuminate how cultural artefacts reflect or reproduce concrete social relations and conditions, or even oppose, and thus attempt to transform them" (Kellner, D. 2003: P 12).

Bearing in mind this project’s stated approach to the research topic, re-capped above, and the first task of an inquiry which has the aim of critically exploring British society’s current relations between past war, present conflict and the ethical environment, is to unpack the ethnocentrisms of Western-made warfare. In so doing, we can help unmask the moral bankruptcy of ‘risk-transfer war’, and in the process of description, critically situate the central concept of the study. Here, the social enterprise of waging risk-averse warfare is understood as a product of Western culture, which is in part, legitimised by the ethical environment, as it is consumed in social life. In this respect, by model of Western-made war I mean how, we in a ‘post-military society’ (Shaw, 1991) such as Britain, may comprehend, see, talk or even think about the ‘new Western way of warfare’ (Shaw, 2007).

Ethnocentrism, was first coined by W.G. Sumner (1906), and is commonly used by social scientists (see Rosaldo, R. 1993., Hall, S. 2003) to help describe, or contextualise prejudicial attitudes, between what Sumner (1913) terms ‘in groups’ and ‘out groups’. In the West, current world-views, cultural assumptions, attitudes, customs and behaviours, are in the main unquestionably/uncritically treated as superior to their social arrangements. Here, ethnocentrism is viewed as the tendency to judge the characteristics and cultures of ‘other’ groups by the standards defined, or reorganised by the observer’s group. Relocated within a new Western culture of war, and our view of them, is governed by our view of self.
In the methodological wake of the 'Cultural' and 'Reflexive Turn' in Social Science (Giddens, A. 1991., Lash S. 1999), the term 'Ethnocentrism' is also used to help critique embedded sociological viewings, which in practice can often unwittingly, import narrow or parochial assumptions drawn from their own society into their research. In this chapter, we will need to consider both these applications ethnocentrism, if we are to employ a critical sociology of war to unpack the ethnocentrism of risk-averse warfare. In terms of the former, we will look at the way War is mainly viewed within a binary model. In terms of the latter application of ethnocentrism, we will build on the arguments of the preamble, and re-consider the question; What of Sociology and the Study of War? Finally, to help one unpack the ethnocentrisms of the current 'War on Terror', we will take a critical look at the banality of 'our' transgressions in the prosecutions of the 'New Western Way of Warfare'.

Accordingly, the narrative task of chapter one, is to conduct a sociological viewing of war. The aim is to model war as an enterprise of both human agency and social structure. In so doing, I will suggest - from a purely sociological perspective - that the culture of Western warfare can be conceptually considered a Durkheimian 'social fact'. In attempting to construct this viable sociological model of Western warfare, I begin here, because I believe it is at this foundational level of social theory that sociologists may better view the social phenomena of war, as both human agency and social structure. It is hoped, that by
looking at Western warfare in specific terms of 'ethnocentrism and structuration' will help us gain a fuller, and deeper understanding of the cultural logic and sociological reason for modern war to still exist as a rationalised political tool of Western modernity, and will enable us to re-consider if the ancient wisdom of Plato still stands, when he suggested that 'only the dead have seen the end of war' (see Hedges, C. 2002: 1., Bowden, M. 2002: 10).

To locate, qualify and then apply this somewhat thematic principle of observation, we must first take Giddens (1984) 'theory of structuration' to its only logical conclusion i.e. all that exists in the social world, exists because it is allowed to exist as a negotiated product of human agency. This is a revealing but somewhat damning conclusion the dominant construct model of mainstream Sociology [i.e. the modernisation thesis] refuses to face, or even accept in its socially embedded discourse on the role, function or purpose of 'Modern War': Here, if the structuration thesis is accurate to our lived relations, in the sense of an 'observable truth', then the mechanism of war's enablement is cultural, political and social negotiation i.e. The locus of why ethically educated social actors may choose war as a rational tool of modernity, is societal negotiation and how we think about war. Again, with my past experience of what war is, I would have to say that the current prosecution, or discourse of Risk Transfer War, is a very pertinent and contextualised example of this premise: as is evident in the earlier quotes from Shaw and the '15 rules' of its prosecution.

Starting from this as yet untested, but still viable and logical structuration premise, and located in contextual terms of the 'ethical environment' or 'civilising process', my main modelling task is to re-consider why we, individuals appear to have an inherent addiction to war, and an seemingly pathological desire, need or want, to transgress against what Adam Smith (1985) would term 'civilised propriety', and thus in individual deed, become the rational choice actors and willing participants in the collective wrongdoings of modern war. Modelled in terms of structuration, and I will re-consider the agency of war [why man
is willing to fight in wars] in terms of structure; and structure [why man is obligated to fight in wars] in terms of agency; rather than as the conventional binary opposites presented in much of the interdisciplinary discourses on warfare and as represented in the table above.

This sociologically relocated model of the 'New Western Way of Warfare' is first and foremost informed by my own thinking on the complex subject matter of war and its eternal mantra [kill or be killed]; which, as one would expect, builds on the intellectual thinking of many theorists, including Clausewitz (1976), Giddens (1985), Mills (1959), Wright (1964), Shaw (2007), Bauman (2000, 2001), as well as the criminological 'edge-work' of Presdee (2000), Young (2007) and Morrison (2006). Here, an application of 'edge-work', referring to my application of boundary shifting perspectives and/or viewings, allows one to conceptualise War as social fact [structuration], rationalised tool [choice], or transgressive act of free will. We now begin by relocating the latter understanding of our ethnocentrism.

What of the Sociological Enterprise and the Study of War?

In trying to understand the 'instrumentality' of the War Machine and the Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age, social historian Daniel Pick (1993:28-41) points out that, 'history and philosophy' have continually 'confronted the human subject with new dilemmas', and that such dilemmas must be constantly 'confronted if civilisation is to avoid stagnation'. Sometimes, 'to avoid stagnation', mankind resorts to warfare. This is why the situated culture of warfare, is a social enterprise. This is also why, wars 'functionality' can be understood as a 'facilitator's role', in the eternal dialectic of structural change and historical continuity. However, for warfare to synthesise any notion of change, progress or development in the civilising inter-relations of humankind, requires 'that forces be engendered, fantasies allowed in, armies and weapons unleashed; mechanical, industrial and scientific process inaugurated' (Pick, D. 1993:34). This is why all warfare is an ironic paradox, and why each 'social act of war' has a contingent logic of its own. This is why, in Chapter 1
any prosecution of war, the supposedly ‘instrumental’ of the ‘war machine quickly becomes the recalcitrant deviant tormentor’. In short, the means in war, out weigh, the ends of war. In any coherent explanation of War, these paradoxical factors must be taken into account.

Accordingly, there are many differing, but overlapping theories about the origins of war as a central human enterprise. As Gray (1997: 105-06) points out in Post Modern Conflict, most use one or more of these explanatory stories: War as the first machine with men as the parts: war as a power play of unemployed hunters led by priests: war as mans equivalent to birth: war as a way of life for barbarian, nomad or warrior cultures: war as cancer (warrior cultures taking over peaceful cultures): war as health of the state: war because of elite or mass misperceptions: war as testosterone poisoning: war because humans are aggressive animals: war because human brains are an evolutionary dead end: war for profits as in money, or prophet as in Mohammed: war as ritual or spectacle: war as progress: war as self-perpetuating machine: war as cultural racism/political persecution. However, War as social fact i.e. facilitator of change and continuity, is a rare and marginalised conceptual model, even though it is implied by many of these theories. Thus, before I can even attempt to progress, one must first build on the preamble, in order to relocate what I have termed, ‘the sociological problem of war’s perceived inescapability’.

In Dialectics of War: A Social Theory of War and Peace, Martin Shaw (1988) argued that, “the spectre of modern warfare has always haunted sociological viewings of modernity”, and suggests that, “because Orwell’s ‘1984’ was not realised in ‘nineteen-eighty-four’ the role of ‘militarism and war’ has often been under-emphasised in sociological research and discourse”. In this critical study of war and its memory, the intimately entwined relations between ‘war and militarism’ are located in a social context by Wright’s (1964) conceptual definition of modern warfare as “highly artificial interpretations of socially constructed situations” and grounded by Clausewitz [1780-1831], who explained in his Theory of War.
that "war is a totality served by many activities that are quite different from it; some closely related, others far removed... All these activities concern the maintenance of the fighting forces and while their creation and training precedes their use, maintenance is concurrent with and a necessary condition of war" (Howard, 1976:128). Accordingly, in this chapter I have modelled 'war and militarism' as one and the same in terms of a 'totality': i.e. the 'maintenance of the fighting forces' in the material and symbolic realms of civil society [Militarism] and War; the abstract instrument of foreign policy famously theorised by Clausewitz, are synonymous when viewing all human warfare as an observable social fact.

Notwithstanding the importance of such understandings, Bauman, (2000) is still very sceptical about the little-asked question titling this sub-section. Indeed, to paraphrase his recent writings on this very topic (2000: 1-30), there are two ways to "belittle, misjudge, or shrug off the significance of war for Sociology as a theory of civilisation, of modernity, of modern civilisation". One way, is to present war as some thing that happens to the 'other', and the other, is to present the rational use of force as an extreme event of human interaction, usually situated in a particular society or contingent situation of history. This theoretically different, yet sociologically similar approach to the human enterprise of warfare, makes the eternal mantra of war's collective violence; "unique, comfortably uncharacteristic and sociologically inconsequential". As Bauman's (2000:2) seminal work on the Holocaust clearly illustrates, the most common example of this approach is the presentation of the 'Holocaust' as the final "culmination point of European anti-Semitism".

Bauman (2000:2) also points out that another common way of making modern warfare inconsequential to sociological enquiry, "apparently pointing in the opposite direction yet leading in practice to the same destination", is to present war as an extreme case of the wider and familiar categories of 'violence and innate aggression'. Here, the eternal mantra of war [kill or be killed], is located and classified as yet another item of natural aggression,
or as an item of inherent cultural violence. These are categories described by Bauman as surely ‘loathsome and repellent, yet social phenomena we can (and must) live with’ (2000).

According to Bauman’s critique, “we must live with these phenomena not just because of their ‘resilience and ubiquity’, but above all, because modern society has all along, is and will remain, an organisation designed to roll it back and perhaps even to stamp it out all together”. While this is the central tenet of contemporary social theory’s ‘modernisation thesis’, the point I wish to make here, with regard to the sociological problem of war’s perceived inescapability, is that either way, the rationalised act of making and waging modern war is referred to as “primal” or “irrational” and thus as ‘culturally inextinguishable’.

Lorenz’s (1980) influential theory of instinctual aggression, or Erich Fromm’s (1977) Autonomy of Human Destructiveness; evolutionary psychologist Anthony Steven’s (2004) The Roots of War and Terror, and in a way, philosopher Mary Midgley’s (1978) Beast and Man, are all influential discourses employed in this culturally inextinguishable and irrational context. As “pre-social and immune to cultural manipulation”, factors held responsible for war are “effectively removed from the area of sociological interest”. Put in context, and as Bauman (2000) critically points out, at best collective killing for a collective purpose or political cause, is sociologically located inside the most ‘awesome and sinister’ – yet still theoretically inassimilatable - category of violence, or else war is simply dissolved into the broad, all to familiar class of ethnic, cultural or racial oppression and persecution (see Lawrence, P.1997. Joas, H. 2003, Ignatieff, M. 2001, 1999, 1994, 2006. Kaldor, M. 2001, 1998., 1997., Honderich, T. 2006). These ideas are some of the intellectualised ways for sociologists in the West to make some sort of sense of the brutality that is modern warfare.

With an experience of war, this irrational or primal viewing of war seems to be in self denial in the same sense of becoming aware of our ethnocentrisms. Here, I mean the rationalised
brutality of war is very hard to see or accept within ourselves, so these type of culturally-
situated narratives will not attempt to tell us why, we in ‘ethically educated’ civilisations,
based on the principled reasoning of enlightenment modernity, would accept the inherent
 cruelty of war, as rational in any logical context. In this regard, if we are to critically
explore the current military culture of ‘risk-transfer war’ with specific relation to the intimate
connectivity between present conflict, past war and modernity, then we need to bring some
balance to our parochial perspectives, and attempt to face that which we deny to our self.

Locating this balance of perspective in pragmatic terms, if so-called advanced societies
are willing to employ brutality and violence as a rational means, how can such societies
demonise the use of violence in the ‘other’ as evil or criminal, because, as we will see,
whoever wages the enterprise of war in today’s ethical climate, is guaranteed to inflict at
least 90% civilian casualties, regardless of the motives or justness of cause. In this eternal
mantra of war context, killed by economic sanction, bomb, bullet or machete is not
different in kind or degree, only in proximity to the rationalised act of killing. If the person or
group who is doing the killing is doing it out of anger, hate or semi-detached
professionalism, this makes no difference to the mantra of warfare. Once the collective
enterprise has begun, ‘kill or be killed’ is the cultural rule and the social norm of the day.
Even the creativity of the means and act of killing is not down to the group of individuals
involved, as it is always structured or encompassed within the situated context of a lived-in
social nomos. In this socially embedded context, and encouraged by Bush, Putin, Blair or
Bin Laden, the human cost or legacy of war, is still the same, even if the targets may differ.

Thus, while I would have to initially agree with Plato, in that, “only the dead have seen the
end of war” (Hedges, C. 2002: 1), i.e. War the social institution of mankind is sociologically
inextinguishable; I would also have to agree with Shaw’s (2004, 2007) understanding that
we still have a choice in such matters. i.e. in terms of the ethical environment and the
ongoing civilising process, human warfare is not culturally inextinguishable because it is the “natural” predisposition of humankind, or in ‘our evil nature’, but because the varied typologies of war are commonly viewed, or imagined as rational tools of human civilisation.

How then may we see war for what it is? Wayne Morrison (2006: 39-58), in his latest work Criminology, Civilisation & the New World Order, offers one possible way, when he illuminates the current ‘challenge of modern social theory’ in the wake of 9/11, by asking the rhetorical question; ‘wherewith criminology and its unifying sense of mission’ (See also Hayward, 2002., Young 2007). He suggests, that the ‘new science’ Emile Durkheim [1858-1917] championed in the Rules of Sociological Method, must now find ways of invoking presences of war that are absent, and of bridging the gap between ‘the observable and the invisible yet real’: put in context, if war is as much about aspirations and dreams, [invisible yet real], as it is about facts and things [observable entities], then we must consider both.

The Criminalisation Process and War

As one can infer from the revealing table below, the paradoxical relations between war and civilisation, and even the ethical polemic of war itself, is most commonly understood in discourse as a binary or opposing relationship. Indeed, I have already been suggesting that this may well be the case within most mainstream sociological discourse on warfare. i.e. Reason verses the Passions; Machiavellian Ethics over Moral Sentimentality, Nature over Nurture, Structure over Agency, Emotion over Logic, Instrumentality over Humanism, Politics over Culture, Change over Continuity etc. The list could be truly endless. But what if these socially constructed relationships [between what Morrison (2006) terms the intangible yet real entities of civil society] are not wholly binary in societal constitution; what if the sociological natures of such vital relationships are in part dialectical in their social and cultural negotiation: how would such viewings inform our understanding of War.
Discourse Models of Asymmetrical Warfare

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<th>Violent discourses</th>
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<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>Beatification</td>
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<td>Locus</td>
<td>Corporeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Known</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proximity</td>
<td>Immediacy</td>
<td>Distance</td>
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<td>Motive</td>
<td>Humiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collateral Damage</td>
<td>Maximised</td>
<td>Minimised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrators</td>
<td>Many Martyrs</td>
<td>Few Heroes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative/Discourse</td>
<td>Joy of Martyrdom</td>
<td>Unemotional, Banal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Casualties</td>
<td>Celebrated</td>
<td>Concealed</td>
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Source: Jock Young, (2007) Pages 149 & 159:

One can relocate such an idea by looking at how others have viewed social ills constituted in societal negotiation by the agendas and politics of imagined binary divisions. For example, in his most recent work, *The Vertigo of Late-Modernity* Jock Young (2007) deconstructs, unpacks and explores the seemingly ubiquitous use of the 'binary thesis' [as located within current social science thinking and public discourse on Crime] to help sociology critique the ethical environment and cultural logic of late-modernity. His concerns with, and analysis of, what is termed 'the vertigo of late modernity' is thematically conducted in sociological terms of exploring influential social theory notions of 'social inclusion/exclusion', but with specific criminological relation to how and why we as a civil society may criminalise 'transgression' within the policy context of 'social exclusion'. This idea is grounded, in empirical terms, by looking at current 'criminal justice system' policies.

In doing so, Young (2007) persuasively argues that, because of the many mediated and socially constructed 'moral panics', associated with the *vertigo* of late-modernity, such criminal justice system policies, are punitive in their nature, [i.e. they criminalise as opposed to re-habilitate], and as such propose, and in social action and cultural practice
routinely prosecute, ‘social exclusion’, which if perceived at all from the ‘dizzying effect of vertigo’ is commonly presented in cultural discourse as necessary, and for the public good.

In this regard of the dizzying impact or effect of vertigo on self and society, we can make a similar critique, and suggest that the West’s ongoing engagement with risk-transfer war prosecutes a type of Virtuous War [which Shaw (2007) terms the ‘new Western way of warfare’] for the cultural, ideological and geo-political purpose of social exclusion. In risk transfer war, this type of social exclusion is conceptualised in a simple binary context of ‘us & them’, or to what some would term the ‘Juggernaut of Modernity’ (Giddens 1991) and yet others the Clash of Civilisations (Huntington, 1993); these are the war stories of exclusion.

Looked at in this social exclusion context and the ‘noble lies of war’, currently postulated in public testimony, can be seen to help legitimatise and re-enforce the dominant ‘binary thesis’ of war against the ‘other’, and thus help licence death and loss to war and the sanctioned killing of predetermined enemies, when ‘they’ [the cultural other] are seen from the perception-altering vertigo, of current moral panics. In short, our current responses to crime and transgression are linked to our current responses to asymmetrical warfare and terrorism. This linkage or way of thinking about warfare is made apparent in the following:

"Let us turn to the notion of the binary of inclusion and exclusion ...... Note that I wish to contest this binary Thesis...... The danger of the concept of social exclusion [apply the following argument to our cultural and sociological conceptualisations of war] is that it carries with it a series of false binaries: it conveys the notion of actors being either included or excluded [friend or enemy: them and us] – being on one side or the other [my country right or wrong: my country - think Patriotism or Nationalism]; it ignores the facts that problems occur on both sides of the line [that war is as much about status, identity, dreams, hopes, aspirations and expectations as it is about power, geo-politics, grievances and things], however much one has clusters in one area [think 2nd & 3rd World] rather than another [think 1st World or post military society] and, more subtly, it conceals the fact that the ‘normality’ of the majority [that which obligates us in war] is itself deeply problematic”.

“What I am suggesting then is that both the sociology of transgression and rule breaking and the sociology of ‘realism’ [i.e. data obtained from interviews & survey questionnaires etc] where the actor accepts the world in all its injustices and limitations, retrofitting under the carapace of habit into the secure world of the daily grind, with everything in its place, falls under the same theoretical rubric. That is, passion both in the
spectacular and the common place. [Therefore] We can widen our analysis to include the sociology of war, terrorism and genocide".

"Not only is there close symmetry between the aetiology and phenomenology of crime and punishment, particularly of violent crime and state violence, but there are also close parallels with crimes occurring in war (by both sides), in terrorism and the response to it, and in the development & enactment of genocide. Further, much has been made of the striking similarities between the violence of conventional crime and the violence of war (not least being the young, mostly male, working class actors themselves) and the parallels between the war against crime and war itself. Indeed the emerging criminology of war seems to bring together the narratives of crime and of war and remedying the surprising ignoring of war {see Jamieson, 1998}, and genocide {see Morrison, 2003} by conventional criminology" (source Young, J. 2007: Pages 21-22).

With this linkage in mind, I will now conceptually model the role and purpose of war as a rational and logical means to a contingent political end, as it is in these specific terms that we can begin to progress our understandings as to the problematic relations between war, memory and the ethical environment of late modernity. To do that as part of a narrative, we need to view war from some overlapping perspectives, so we can re-consider why we may see what we see when we observe the negotiated phenomena of 'risk-transfer war'.

I began this process in the preamble, not only by reconsidering the sociological problem of war's perceived inescapability and how this idea has impacted on the production of this research project, but also on the way we may now see the human suffering, or pity of war. Similarly, in critiquing the modernisation thesis in specific terms of its mythological logic and practical viability, and in attempting to bridge what I can only perceive as a glaring gap in the mainstream sociological viewing of warfare, I start from a somewhat unfamiliar and unfashionable standpoint and suggest that there is in fact an 'institutional presence' (Shills, 1975) of war, historically embedded in the very fabric of modern civil society, and that as a consequence of 'structuration', it is social institutions, cultural narratives, memory, or other social meaning frameworks, that help 'obligate' individuals and groups to do what they can and must do in war by justifying loss or death in war and legitimising the killing of enemies.
As a consequence of this sociological premise, I view war in this critically-minded study not only as a social fact, or phenomenon, but also as a lived experience of agency and social structure, and as an institution, which has a material and moral presence firmly embedded in civil society. In short, I view the political violence of warfare as an uncivilised and unreasonable social act, but still as a reasoned enterprise of all humanity, and thus the necessary violence of war as a calculated tool of embedded social actors. Quincy Wright's (1964) conceptual model of war locates this Actor Network Theory understanding within a 'social constructivist theory'. Here, I take Wright’s model as a descriptive definition of War.

"Modern War tends to be about words more than about things, about potentialities, hopes and aspirations more than about facts, grievances, and conditions... War, therefore, rests in modern civilisation, upon an elaborate ideological construction maintained in culture and through education in a system of language, law, symbols and values. The explanation and interpretation of these systems are often as remote from the actual sequence of events as are primitive explanations of war in terms of the requirements of magic, ritual or revenge. War in the modern period does not grow out of a situation but out of a highly artificial interpretation of a situation." Wright, Q. (1964:page 356).

In terms of summing up these discussions thus far, it is clear from such critical interrogations, that if this project is to fully grasp that which 'obligates' us in war, and thus the sociological problem of war's perceived inescapability, in terms of how the modern democratic civil society sees, rationalises, promotes, maintains and reproduces the social, cultural and institutional apparatus of modern warfare; [as described by both Clausewitz (1976) and Wright (1964) and in this social memory study in terms of nostalgia militarism], then we must go deeper and ask some very difficult and at times painful questions about what it is to be human beings, in terms of our ethical and feeling selves. The following quote serves one well as an illuminating example of what is meant in this 'feelings' context.

"I have come to learn that war has its own culture. The rush of battle is a potent and often lethal addiction, for war is a drug... It is peddled by mythmakers – historians, war correspondents, filmmakers, novelists, and the state etc – all of whom endow it with qualities it does possess: excitement, exoticism, power, chances to rise above our small stations in life, and a bizarre and fantastic universe that has a grotesque and dark beauty. It dominates culture, distorts memory, corrupts language and infects everything around it.... Fundamental questions about the meaning, or meaningless, of our place on the planet are laid bare when we watch those around us sink to the lowest depths. War
exposes the capacity for evil that lurks not far below the surface within all of us. And this is why for many, war is so hard to discuss once it is over”.


In chapter 2, we will look at this ‘existential aspect of war’ in much greater detail, because these phenomenological aspects of war ‘the experience’ balance the more practical, realist or instrumental understandings of warfare presented below, and as such, may help us make sense of why, we as a society collectively remember the brutality of war the way we do. In essence, this requires breaking the West’s greatest taboo (critiquing noble lies), because on the emotional or human level, it’s just too painful to think of a loved one dying in vain. To begin this critique, we have started to unpack the ethnocentrisms of Western-warfare, in order to model risk-averse warfare for what it is, not what it appears to be. To continue, we must look with a cold critical eye at what this type of war is, as a rational tool.

Critiquing the Conduct of Risk Transfer Warfare

In order to construct a viable model of warfare, we now critique war’s legitimisations within the ethical environment. To do that, within the context of this critical study, we need to critique the transgressive conduct of asymmetrical warfare. Here, the inherent aggression of humankind - as manifest and described in the collective violence of any modern warfare - is pragmatically viewed in this study as a simple means/ends schema, employed by the collective/group, to achieve a contingent political end or social purpose i.e. descriptively speaking, war is understood to be purely instrumental in its empirical nature. It is viewed this way, because the political, and thus military aim of war, has always been to bend an opponent’s will to one’s own. In this respect, the war on terror is no different to any other war. Similarly, the mantra of war - kill or be killed - is eternal. Thus when prosecuting war to achieve a political purpose, it is essential that the military art and science of war, employ technology, violence and cruelty to achieve the political ends desired. Thus barbarism is understood as essential to all forms of warfare; this includes the new Western way of War.

Chapter 1
However barbaric, War is never fought in a vacuum, and war is not survival of the fittest, so the conduct of warfare [in all its historical and typological guises] is always social. In this socially situated context, war is understood as organised violence for a group cause, because history tells us, that no modern war has ever been fought without a contingent political cause. Hence, we state that the rationalised art of warfare employs technology, paradoxical reasoning, calculated intelligence, brute force and primal passion, to achieve the collective aims of the day: This is why Clausewitz describes the many and varied typologies of human warfare as political intercourse by another means (Howard, M. 1976).

Sociologically speaking, I think of this political intercourse in terms of sexual intercourse. In this context, sociologists understand that there are many types, or social forms of sexual intercourse, and that some types and forms are considered - for varying reasons - as deviant. In the same way, there are many differing typologies of warfare, or cultural forms of alternative political intercourse, and like sexual intercourse, some of these cultural forms can be considered deviant. In the critical sociology of war context of this study, there is one question we have to ask before we can progress. Is the new Western way of warfare deviant? If the way we prosecute war can be considered deviant or transgressive in terms of the civilising process, then this would throw a whole new light on the normative relations identified between past wars, present conflicts and the ethical environment, and thus by association, the way we in the West may see, think or talk about War in public testimony.

One can find a surface-based answer to this disquieting question by unpacking the Western discourse of warfare. In terms of description, the 'new Western way of warfare' (Shaw 2007) incorporates many typologies of modern warfare and has many names. Post Modern Conflict (Gray 1997), Virtual War (Ignatieff 1999), Virtuous War (Der Derian 2001), provide some pertinent examples. However, central to all these differing types of Western-made warfare is the role of technology and the asymmetrical nature of conflict.
and these aspects thus provide the lowest common denominator for analysis. To be clear, asymmetrical war is simply describing any form of warfare conducted between varying numbers of opposing forces of unequal military strength, means or capacities.\(^1\) While this is not a new form of warfare, it is commonly perceived as the western military's norm in the prosecution of 21st century warfare, rather than the exception. Statistically, such warfare is not normally fought according to the internationally ratified rules of 'just war doctrine', and thus the problematic distinction between combatant/non-combatant, becomes even more blurred than in 'Total War': Think of 'soft targets', 'collateral damage' and 'blue on blues'.

In this blurred context, the current 'war on terror' conflict in Iraq could easily be described as deviant, because according to reliable statistical evidence this type of warfare kills over 90% non-combatants, and thus the 'wrong conduct' required of such warfare is deviant in the sense that its prosecution does not conform to the 'just war' doctrine of 'reasonable force' and 'proportionality'.\(^2\) Located in revealing terms of the chasm between 'our noble ideals and actual conduct', and we can clearly observe that while the democratic values or ideals associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can be argued as noble or virtuous in ethnocentric terms of Western beliefs and values; the prosecution of asymmetrical warfare can also be condemned on many, many fronts i.e. legally, morally or/and ethically.

The following section will now ground these critical arguments in a deeper description of risk-transfer warfare, to help develop and locate, what I mean by banality of transgression,

\(^1\) Asymmetrical warfare is a typology of war which describes warfare conducted by two or more opposing forces of unequal strength, capacity or means. It is as old as war itself and can be dated back to the Peloponnesian wars some 400 BC. The classic example would be the city state of Athens sending some 38 warships with 10,000 men against the tiny independent island state of Melos; which had a paltry 500 soldiers. The Athenians killed all the Melos soldiers and bonded the women and children into slavery. Relocated in a late modernity context and because of the asymmetrical nature of such warfare, one side is usually a state actor the other a non-state actor. Although it can seem like this is not always the case. Russia and Chechnya would be a good example in this exception context. However, in signposting the current war on terror, here Iraq [2003] and Afghanistan [2001] are also good examples of the West's recent prosecution of such warfare.

\(^2\) In Just War Theory the Christian tradition of *ad bellum* has five main criteria; (1) There should be a just cause; (2) reasonable attempts at peaceful resolution should have been exhausted i.e. the war should be a last resort; (3) the right authority should authorise the war; (4) war should not make things even worse than they were already, proportionality is the key term; (5) war aims should be achievable. The *post bellum* question refers to the sixth and seventh criterion (6) the right attitude towards the enemy; (7) obligations after military conquest. *The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions* Edited by Sorabji, R. & Rodin, D. 2003. Chapter 1
in terms of the inherent discrepancies between 'our ideals and our conduct', and how this growing discrepancy may inform the sociological problem of wars perceived inescapability.

The Banality of Transgression in Western-made Warfare

In this regard, the earlier quotation I provided from the *Encyclopaedia of War and Ethics* provides an emotive definition of human conduct in modern war, especially in terms of that which war ‘obligates’. In so doing, Wells (1996) illuminates the consequences of our actions in war as opposed to the noble ideals of Doctrine. Indeed, taken side by side, the following quotes seem to exemplify the glaring gap between ‘ideals & conduct’ in War. This contrast shines a spotlight on the paradoxical nature of war and the human condition.

"War is that which obligates individuals to do abroad what would be illegal and immoral at home; namely, to kill strangers, persons whom we have never met and who have personally done us no harm; to hold innocent men, women and children hostage for putative crimes they did not commit; to lay waste to their environment and plunder their national treasures; and to do all of this in the name of political, economic and ideological agendas" (Wells, D. 1996:VII).

"Some of the most barbarous and unprincipled armies in history have had tremendous morale and will to fight, based on excellent motivation, leadership and management. They have won their battles and achieved their commander's purposes... This might have been a suitable doctrine for other armies in other circumstances. But the British Army from its modern origins has been rooted in the spirit of democracy. This, together with social and cultural influences, has created a very clear understanding of the necessity to act within the bounds of what is generally thought to be right... Military operations by an army of a democratic free society cannot be sustained without the support of that society. Political direction, government resourceing and recruiting depend on it because an *ethically educated society* will not give its support unless its armed forces act from a position of moral strength... (Army Doctrine Publications: 2005:143). 3

However paradoxical this contrast may be, and even though Western military analysts and subsequent strategies begin from an intellectual premise of ‘informed realism’, such thinking on war continues to deny the paradoxical dilemma of our conduct in asymmetrical warfare. Indeed, many ‘informed realists’ have commonly associated the new humane

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3 Taken from the "Army Doctrine Publications: Land operations*. Chapter 7. The Moral Component Section 7.2. The Ethical Base: Sub Section Moral Strength Paragraph 0703 - 0704: Page 143. Chapter 1
doctrine of war with the ‘neo-conservative doctrine’ of pre-emptive warfare (see Freedman, L. 2006: 48. No 4. 51-65). In accordance with such ideas, the new Western way of warfare ‘should’ only be prosecuted for reasons one would now commonly associate with the ideals of ‘peace, stability, freedom and democracy’ (see Steel, R. 2007: 49: No 1. 153-62). Here, recent examples of Shaw’s (2007) ‘risk-transfer war’ or ‘new Western way of war’, would include; the 1st Gulf War, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq [2003].

Like the multitude of limited ‘proxy wars’ prosecuted in the Cold War era, in the ‘new world order’, these so called ‘virtuous wars’ (Derian, 2001), have become almost common place (Kaldor, M. 2001). In Western intellectual discourse, these ‘post modern conflicts’ (Gray, 1997) are understood conceptually as ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, M. 2001), or ‘globalisation induced wars’ (Bauman 2001), and are commonly described in a mediated, situated or global context, as ‘limited’ and ‘distant wars’ (see Shaw 2004.., 2007.., Bauman 2001). However, while the discourse of risk-transfer warfare may suggest otherwise, it should be clearly understood that the actual war fighting and battle winning of such limited conflicts still obligates humankind to deviance, transgression or collective wrong conduct, because, as stated, all warfare still requires the uncivilised actions outlined by the quote from Wells.

In terms of Western ideals, the political function of asymmetrical warfare is clearly to bend an opponent’s ‘will’ to one’s own. In what normative direction this may lead, or to what political end, is always historically and socially contingent, as this very much depends for context, on which side of ‘Ethnocentrism’ one may sit. Here, the goal can be religious, ethnic, secular, territorial or nationalistic in nature, as in the recent strategic denial of space in the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia. It can also be ideological, as in the new Western culture of war, where our prosecution of virtuous, risk-averse or virtual warfare, is now most commonly associated with the Western narratives of, intervention, regime change and/or nation-building (Williams, 2006., Ignatieff, 1999, 2001, 2006., Shaw, 2004., 2007).
In terms of Shaw's 15 rules of conduct in the recent prosecution of asymmetrical warfare, Western military analysts have all been pointing to a 'changing culture of military conflict' (Gray, 1997, Shaw, 2007, Kaldor, 2001, Howard, 2001), and a 'waging of warfare without warriors' (Coker, C. 2002). In accordance with the 'neo-conservative' or new post-9/11 democratic doctrine of Western war highlighted above, Western casualty figures are the all-important issue for the democratic state, when it wishes to pursue war. However, that said, 'full spectral dominance' is still considered the overall military goal of modern warfare. That is to say, full control of space, air, sea, land and technology is the military goal of war.

When located in context, varied forms of modern warfare are pursued collectively to help achieve and maintain this perceived 'spectral dominance'. Some forms are psychological and/or ideological, which fight the black propaganda war of cultural persuasion in the symbolic realms of civil society. Some cleavages of 'virtuous war' are technological in design, and fight, cyber, funding, intelligence or espionage and surveillance wars, in the realms of public, private and hyper-space. Some forms of virtuous war fight the media battle or white propaganda battle of 'hearts and minds' in the fickle court of public opinion.

Other, more traditional and concrete forms of virtuous war fight the new Western way of warfare in a risk-free way, and employ 'stand off firing platforms', of all types, to launch precision munitions, 'smart bombs' or cruise missiles. Aircraft carriers, submarines, fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and remote controlled vehicles, are pertinent examples of what is meant by 'stand off' weapon platforms. However, troops on the ground is the absolute last resort in the prosecution of virtuous war, and when using Western land forces, [which are kept to a bare minimum, because of the post-heroic need for fewer casualties on our own side], the main focus is on the perceived surgical role of Western 'Special Forces', usually supported by elite home-based troops and/or locally trained military forces and/or militias.
The West's political strategy when engaging in 'virtuous war', is encompassed by an old 'carrot and the stick' approach to diplomacy, but is informed by the new post 9/11 pre-emptive foreign policy. Here, the 'carrot' takes the form of cultural/ economic incentives; the 'stick' takes various forms of military power or social disincentives such as economic sanctions. The aim, in a geo-political or domestic context, is to balance the ratio between what is termed in diplomatic lineages as, 'Hard' and 'Soft' power (see Cooper, 2004: 1-80).

In terms of 'hard power' the most common strategy in the 'new Western way of warfare' is 'shock and awe'. In a purely strategic or tactical sense, the practical notion of 'shock and awe' refers to the big stick of foreign policy, which uses the overwhelming use of precision munitions and availability of massive firepower to break an opponent's will and means to fight. The political thinking here, is little different than that of President Truman's logic in dropping the first atom bombs, with a view to ending the Second World War with less lives lost on the Allied side. Here, the social manipulation of morality is facilitated by the instrumentality of the adiaphorising process. In short Machiavellian Ethics; Rational Choice Theory and the 'Prisoners' Dilemma' are at the conceptual heart of our logic. Put in simple terms: show them [the West's pre-determined enemies] what they are up against and they will see that resistance in the face of such overwhelming 'Power' is fruitless and irrational.

In this rationalised context and now, as in past wars, technology provides the practical means for the West to wage what is perceived as a 'new form' of more humane and rational warfare. However, in historical terms it is clear to those that care to look that the current notion of 'virtuous war' is simply a revamped version of the very old fashioned Bomber Command dream. In this historically situated context, one can observe that mankind has always looked to technology to help find a Holy Grail of War (Black, J. 2000).
In locating the current 'silver bullet' understanding in a modern social theory context, we can help explain that this is the most recent 'revolution in military affairs', and that this new culture of humane warfare is given credence within the post-heroic character of what has been termed, the 'warless society' or 'post military society' (Shaw, 1991., Moskos, 1992: 3-10). This specialised 'sociology of war' description of the post industrial society, does not refer us to a Western society, which has banished the evil spectre of modern warfare from its pacified territorial spaces, but to a technology-driven society, which has comparatively smaller armed forces, and which is de-contextualised or distanced in terms of space, perception and time, from the actuality of warfare. In such a 'post heroic society' (Luttwak, 1996: 3-44), war is viewed as a necessary evil, much like a punitive CJS, and thus every citizen killed or injured in its prosecution has to be accounted for in the public domain. As Michael Howard (2001: 102) points out in *The Invention of Peace* "every soldier killed is regarded as a national martyr, to be brought home and interred with full honours. Every airman shot down in combat can rely on vast resources being devoted to his/her rescue".

In a warning to the advocates of virtuous war, Howard (2001:100) also suggests that "the paradox of what has been termed the 'post heroic age' has only been partially resolved by smart technology that makes possible the accurate destruction of enemy targets at great distance". In these unresolved terms, many commentators have recently come to realise from both Iraq and Afghanistan that the smarter we in the technology-driven West make our new weapons of warfare, the harder it becomes to clearly identify what is deemed as a legitimate target. Thus, in trying to prosecute a more humane form of modern warfare according to liberal ethics and democratic values, the West has forgotten the old adage of past warfare i.e. that technology is ambivalent and even if it is smart 'it's' still not intelligent.

In the *Logic of War and Peace*, Edward Luttwak (2001: 1-86), explains how the 'conscious use of paradox in war' always means that no technology, strategy or tactic cannot be used
in a paradoxical way against itself: The use of box-cutters in the 9/11 attacks to circumvent technological security checks, and the dual usage of aviation technology in the form of commercial aircraft employed as weapons of mass destruction; the duel usage of mobile phones as effective detonating devices for simple yet effective improvised explosive devices [IED’s], which even though primitive and cheap in design, can defeat the technology of the most modern armour. Insurgency tactics employed as a resilient countermeasure to overwhelming military power. These varied types of counter-measures are not new, but are now based on ‘grab the belt buckle’ tactics which in ‘spectral dominance’ terms re-locate what are termed ‘insurgent fighters’ within the general populace of a ‘battle space’ to help negate the massive and available firepower of the Western or ‘allied forces’ and in the process exploit the propaganda value of so-called ‘collateral damage’ in the 24 hour news cycles of the global media. When we think about the conscious use of paradox in war, in this way, even the very sanctity of human life, central to our ‘post heroic’ value system, is being turned back upon itself by the paradoxical form of the ‘Suicide Bomber’.

While these examples seem to exemplify the conscious use of paradox in asymmetrical warfare, from another grounded perspective, the ambivalence of technology in war has raised the age-old problem of ‘blue on blue contacts’ or ‘friendly fire incidents’, which in the new Western way of war are said to be compounded by the fluidity of the asymmetrical situations on the ground; and in scale of impact, by the sheer killing power of military technology. For example, on a recent Mercian Regiment tour of Afghanistan, three out of the nine ‘KIA’ were killed by friendly fire, in a single incident. However, it should be made clear that ‘blue on blues’ have always been part of warfare, but in the current risk-aware culture of Western society, such tragic incidents are no longer located in the ‘fog of war’ scenario, which were once used by commentators to help explain or even make sense of the mass killings of our own allies: To put this idea in proper context, the numbers of Allied soldiers killed on the hallowed beaches of Normandy [over 2000] pales in comparison to
the 15,000+ French men, women and children killed by the pre-emptive bombing of key installations, immediately prior to the amphibious landing/ airborne assaults. To many, this is why the struggle of man against his fate, is in part, the fight for the 'right memory of war'.

In contrast and contextually grounded in the compensation culture of today's ethical environment, the scapegoat is now the undisputed king of the unpopularity contest. Located in terms of some common media critiques; why do we kill so many civilians and why do we not have accurate numbers. Why do the best ever equipped soldiers on the modern battlefield still have deficient technology, or equipment which fails to protect them from so called 'primitive weaponry' and if current military expenditure is designed to ensure we in the West will always have full spectral dominance in the prosecution of modern warfare, then why do we regularly kill our own troops and cause such massive scale collateral damage? As implied above, I believe the logical conclusion, is that 'full spectral dominance' is simply the new 21st century myth of modern war, which in actual constitution is very similar to the British 'Bomber Command Dream' of the second era of 'Total War'.

One interpretation of why we in an 'ethically educated society' would actually believe such a blatant myth in light of humankind's recent history, is that collectively-speaking, we really want to believe that we who inhabit what has been termed 'reflexive modernity' have moved on since the disastrous mistakes of our past wars. Is this part of the reason why we don't bother to count the causalities on the other side of asymmetrical war, because to do so, tells one we haven't? In terms of our own dead or injured, we clearly live in a 'post-heroic' culture, dominated by influential notions of culpability, risk and blame, and in such a compensation culture, someone or something has to be held accountable for loss or cost.

Located in the contextualised terms of how a political elite may be able to maintain the general public's will to fight a war [think of moral high ground, allocation of societal
resources, public opinion, military retention, funding or political support], and 'Body Bag Syndrome' [as this type of risk-transfer problem is termed in the media] is a big problem in the democratic civil society. Put another way [and despite, or perhaps even because of virtual war and perceived weaponry precision], 'Collateral Damage' is a major problem if, and/or when, the democratic state wishes to prosecute what some see as 'Virtuous War'.

Finally; if we re-locate this 'body bag' problem in an ethical environment of war context, we can suggest that 'collateral damage' and 'insurgent' may be a callous and ubiquitous terms, which have no doubt helped to alter Western perceptions of the 'cultural other' (see Chambers, 2003); but pragmatically speaking, this type of terminology is nothing new in our culture of war, as these are just two more common euphemisms, used by many in Western discourse to help camouflage the casualties of modern warfare. This commonality in itself speaks volumes about the current ethical climate of ideas on War, but whatever one's personal view of the above arguments, the statistical evidence of modern warfare is very disquieting in terms of revealing the power of such discourses with direct relation to the social manipulation of morality process: i.e. when compared in a chronological context.

For example, while 5% of deaths in the 1914-1918 war were civilian deaths, 66% of deaths in the 1939-1945 war were civilians. Today, well over 90 percent of victims of war are civilian. Put another way, in the reflexive modernity in which we currently live, over 500 people a day are said to die from war and it is now estimated that 97% of all asymmetrical warfare casualties are non-combatants (Kassimeris, 2006: 21). These statistics suggest that there is a banality of transgression in all 'Modern Warfare'. In specific terms of the asymmetrical nature of present conflict - as described above - Shaw (1991, 2004, 2007) describes this transgression as a form of 'degenerate warfare'. It seems abundantly clear that once one steps outside the ideological and ethnocentric safe havens of the Western discourse on modern war; and from the revealing vantage points of these highly critical
viewings of modern warfare, that any researcher who wishes to explore the relations between war and its memory, must contextualise what they see within such a model. Indeed, this is the final aim of Chapter 1, to construct a viable social model of modern war.

A Viable Model of Modern Warfare

"War is a social fact and therefore its changes tend to be reflected in the structure of society and on the essence of social life. This thesis is more complex than it first appears because it brings to the fore the interaction of two dimensions which are usually considered opposites: "society", meaning the whole of relationships that hold human beings together, and "war", the extreme situation where they oppose each other in order to kill one another. In reality, war and society are not incompatible. Actually, it is their implications - such as between the internal and external sides of Western society, between our apparent protected or normal existence and the conflict in the rest of the world - that show us that no solution of continuity exists. This much more is true as in the case of the processes of globalisation when conflicts in every part of the world tend to overlap, to be linked and have an influence over one another". Source: Alessandro Dal Lago (2005) The social nature of war in The global state of war: Page 1.

Looking sociologically at the social nature of war, as it is described above, and freed from the limiting confines of the ubiquitous binary thesis, we can now model War as a socialised enterprise: That is to say, a learned human endeavour, institutionalised as cultural practice and historical testimony and driven by man's innate ability to contemplate change, or what is perceived by protagonists as a better or new way. In this respect, no nation state, no ethnic group, no institutional organisation, no loose affiliation of group interests has ever started, or engaged in a conflict for the sake of a war in itself. 'It', that is to say War, Genocide, Revolution, Political Violence or Militarism, always has a cultural purpose, or political goal to achieve as a collective aim. It is this notion of cause which gives warfare a reason to exist in the inter-relations of humankind. Simply put, all warfare is a means to an end, not an end in itself and is thus instrumental in its empirical nature and social conduct.

Accordingly, the social fact of war as an actual event recorded in human history is simply the manifestation of an ever-specialising institutionalised practice which serves the immediate interests of organised individuals located in a contingent social reality.

Chapter 1
geopolitical context and cultural space. Here, the historiography of war is both sign and
signifier of war's institutional presence in human civilisation: i.e. war is history because the
written-down history of humankind is mainly that of societies making and waging warfare.

Similarly, the institutionalised social act of collective violence involves a mixed combination
of intellectual, physical and technological effort. This integrated effort is driven by, and
continually employs, man's reason & rationality with creative genius; will power & labour
combined, with primal passions and irrational behaviour to achieve its contingent, but
limited goals. There is, I would argue, no primal state of war inherent in what we presently
term 'universal man'. Nor in the multicultural societies in which he now dwells and lives, or
even within the international system, in which these diverse societies have and will interact
in the future. Thus pragmatically speaking, war or not war, as a calculated rational action,
is nothing more than fallible human choice and in many cases, an act of individual free will.

In this war or not war context, we are born, like all animals, with a dominant will to fight for
survival; what Nietzsche (1968:332) would term a 'will to power'. However, what makes
the human beings will to power unique in all of nature, is mankind's inductive ability to
contemplate something more than just the prerequisites for survival. To use the words of
John Berger (1973), 'we can intuitively understand that the parameters by which we see
and perceive the world may be changeable'. Thus, we human beings may well be
creatures of natural instinct and primal desires, that is undeniably true, but we are also
mind-based vessels of high hopes and thus empirical bodies which doggedly peruse our
pleasures, dreams and aspirations. As the following suggests war is not just about facts.

"The complexities of the passion of life lie buried deep within the culture of
transgressive behaviour that confronts the boundaries with the intention of destruction.
For both Bataille and Foucault 'the suspension of taboos sets free the exuberant surge of
life and favours the unbounded orgiastic fusion of those individuals' {Bataille}. It is a life
where we become lost and frenzied in a boundaryless world ‘where the stable elements of human activity disappear and there is no firm foothold anywhere to be found’ (Bataille).4

“When we ingest the anodyne of war we feel what those we strive to destroy feel, including the Islamic Fundamentalists who are painted as alien, barbaric, and uncivilised. It is the same narcotic. I partook of it for many years. And like any recovering addict there is a part of me that remains nostalgic for war’s simplicity and high, even as I cope with the scars it has left behind, mourn the death of those I worked with, and struggle with the bestiality I would have been better off not witnessing. There is a part of me – maybe it is a part of many of us – that decided at certain moments that I would rather die like this than go back to the routine of life. The chance to exist for an intense and overpowering moment, even if it meant certain oblivion, seemed worth it in the midst of war- and very stupid once the war ended” (see Chris Hedges [2002:5] cited in Young, J. 2007:149).

At this individual level, and according to the understanding of choice and free will outlined above, the deviant act of transgression in war is an expression prosecuted against the banality or normality of civilised propriety, and is thus part of the inner tapestry of what has been described as ‘the divided self’ (see Laing, R. D. 1960). However, I must also stress, that war is an addictive drug of human beings not only in the sense of excitement or passion, but also because, individual participation in the social enterprise of warfare, allows and enables one to pursue many other personal aspirations, even if for some with the psychological inclination, engaging in war also allows the emancipation or release of what some have termed ‘primal needs’ or ‘inherent drives’ (Freud, 2002,. Lorenz, K. 1980).

For example, sociology of war research into wartime mobilisations of civil society, state conscription, abducted child soldiers, press-ganged sailors and of course, those that have recently joined the military as a career, has demonstrated how giving one’s service to a greater cause [even reluctantly] serves many ontological needs and material interests to those individuals concerned. i.e. in terms of purpose, place, identity, power, status, belonging, stability, prospects and more opportunities for advancement (Dandeker 2003).

To relocate these civil-military relations insights in a grounded context, just think of this sociology of war idea of fulfilling many ontological needs in situated terms of current

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promotional slogans for the British Armed Forces. For example, The Royal Navy: 'Life Without Limits'. Army: 'Be the best' or Royal Marines: 'Be all you can be'. Having said this, the point to be made is that raw ambition does not always provide a moral purpose, so our transgressions in war [be it individual or collective, reflexive or instrumental, constituted in denial or excess] is always going to be an inherently ambivalent enterprise when individual participation in a culture of institutionalised transgression [degenerate war], serves a greater purpose than that of the individual transgression in a collective act of wrongdoing.

As one can infer, any critical sociology of war would need to further develop this idea, or notion of transgression as a important agency of warfare, but at this early modelling stage and in Mike Presdee's (2006) specific 'passion' context, the idea for war is clearly given birth in the minds, motives, emotions and ultimately the rational actions of man; as it is mainly men who make war, even if women do fight and die in war. To suggest more, to suggest that war is inherent to mankind's sub-conscious, or evil nature, is to ignore the ambivalent role of change in nature and the role of revolution in the history of social intercourse. It is also to be an apologist for the rational conduct of human beings, as such an argument also sheds one's own responsibility for man's many destructive deeds. In terms of 'bad faith' this ethnocentric script only denies the reality of our historical existence and returns our cultural fate to something that is presumed to be outside or above our control; this is what foundationally underpins the problem of war's perceived inescapability.

In summing up this sociological model of modern warfare in very specific terms of political agency and individual choice, we are clearly not born to kill, maim and destroy, or to collectively wage war, as an organised form of collective violence used to impose one's group will on the 'other'. But we are imbued to want more from the world we inhabit, hence the vital importance of status, lack, transgression, deviancy, creativity and innovation etc in our daily lives. As conscious beings with theory of mind, we also fear death and uncertainty, which though inter-subjectivity and social association, we liken to

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'change' because dialectically speaking, everything that exists in the social world exists in the dialectic of continuity and change. This type of dialectic is why the collective enterprise of war has always and will always exist in inter-human relations, because it is a prime social negotiator of continuity or change. This gives warfare a sociological reason to exist.

Such a sociological model of war implies - in terms of structure as agency, and agency as structure - that because of such negotiations, there is always going to be an institutionalised presence of war within inter-human relations, but this in itself does not necessarily mean that the 'wrong conduct' of modern warfare cannot be considered the antithesis of what it is to be civilised, and thus its use as a rational tool of modern civilisation brought under the control of man's cognitive reason and emotions. As Martin Shaw (2007:3) has pointed out, "we have a choice: we can continue with war as a means, progressively abandoning the pretence that we are using armed force in new ways and becoming ever more mired in brutal struggles that we can not win. Or we can follow the logic of our commitments to global institutions, democracy and human rights and renew our determination to avoid the practice of war". To locate this 'normative social imperative' of 'Democratic Western Society', in the 'cultural memory' context of modern war memory influencing the ethical environment of a post-military civil society, we have to look at the legacy of past warfare to the civilising process i.e. with relation to how 'we' as a interdependent beings, make sense of the 'banality of transgression inherent to all warfare.
Chapter 2

The road to Hell is paved by good intentions.

The Legacy of Past War to Self and Society

In *Post Military Society*, Shaw (1991) continued his social theory critique of the generic sociological model [the modernisation thesis], with an exploration of demilitarisation and the roles of war, myth and memory in modern civil society. He concluded from an extensive research process, that although 'Militarism' appears to be in decisive retreat - at least in structural terms as compared with the Cold War era - “the absence of the most overt forms of militarism belies the increase of a new subtler form of nostalgia militarism”.

In terms of my expressed concerns about the emotionally dishonest ‘noble lies’ of war memory, it is what legacy this ‘new form of militarism’ may have on the ethical environment that really concerns me. Relocated in these terms, and Shaw's (1991) 'past war' critique of the 'modernisation thesis', is intellectually concerned with the 'Mertonian function of war memory'. He therefore puts forward a 'past war thesis', which in very simplistic terms, suggests; that this 'new subtle form of militarism' may be a cultural, material and symbolic barrier to what he explicitly terms, ‘transformation to a genuine post-military civil-society'.

By the term ‘genuine’, I interpret Shaw (1991), as referring to a post-military civil society that may actually help banish war as an instrument of enlightenment modernity. Here, Shaw's normative notion of 'transformation', is equated to the societal development of late-modernity, and thus in part to what Elias (2000) articulated as the 'Civilising Process'. In specific terms of situating the investigation of the case study, and at this much broader thematic level, I now employ observations to help ground Shaw's thesis of 'nostalgia militarism', by exploring the legacy of 'past war' and its current impact to Self and Society. I begin by looking at the legacy of past war with specific relation to the, Civilising Process.
The Civilising Process and Past War

According to Norbert Elias [1897-1990] the civilising of human relations is said to take its normal course unplanned, yet according to Elias, it does seem to exhibit a certain order, as it seems to maintain a progressive direction over generational periods. While this development is influenced by many social forces, this transformation of moral behaviour is neither reasonable, nor unreasonable, as its meandering direction is understood to express the normal processes of societal change. However, in specific terms of closing the perceivable discrepancy between our 'ideals and conduct', this process of civilising, is said to be achieved by advancing/regressing the collective thresholds of our cognitive emotions such as shame, guilt or embarrassment. Think of societal attitudes towards drink driving, spousal abuse or slavery. Located in the context of war and how we may prosecute the act of war, think of 'just war theory'. As determining structures of convention or 'social states of mind', such sentimentalities are said to influence our cultural/individual responses to happenings, and thus in process are said to affect the 'personality structures' of what Elias termed 'figurations'; referring to socially bonded groups of interdependent individuals.

Re-located in the context of Social Actor Network Theory, and we can state that within the many and varied, but interlinked ‘social figurations’ of modern civil society, the individual social agent, is said to bring his or her modes of behaviour, in harmony with those of other individuals. It is important to remember that this harmonising of our social manners can be civilised or uncivilised in developmental impact, even if Elias does suggest that, over time and in this way, 'Society' may achieve advancement in its civilising of social intercourse. This is why in Chapter 1, I had to begin by looking at the ethnocentrism of Western-made war, because, this highly critical idea of de-civilisation, is clearly implied in Elias's (2000) understandings of the meandering processes of high-modernity's developmental changes.\(^1\)
In this context, what is described here as the 'ethical environment' can also be said to help advance, or indeed retard the ongoing civilising process; as this 'climate of ideas' is part of, and structured by, the human interaction context of late modernity (Blackburn, S. 2001). With this in mind, and with regard to the way we may see and talk about the phenomena of war, it is perhaps important to observe that we who inhabit post-industrial or more appropriately 'Post Military Society' (Shaw 1991), are currently separated and distanced in terms of space and perception, and once removed in terms of time and physicality from the actualities of modern war. In short, we have little experienced based 'reality of war' by which to evaluate and thus empirically judge the legacy or cost of modern warfare. The consequences of this are huge in terms of how we see or think about war and its memory.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that this lack of actual experience of war is a problem in itself; to argue otherwise would be against Shaw's (1991) notion of progress towards what he terms 'transformation to a genuine post military society', and like saying a midwife can't be a perceptive midwife without first-hand experience of childbirth. However, to locate this problem in a sociological context, imagine if midwifery as a profession had no actual experience of childbirth within its general practitioners! In developmental terms, its professional view of child birth would be impoverished in the sense that no primary source of knowledge could be brought to bear in the development of 'its' professional discourse.

Midwifery, as a professional discourse, would understand childbirth solely on risk-based criteria, or as the lived experience is currently imagined in the 'bio medical model' of Western medicine, and not as it is experienced in person by the vast majority of mothers giving birth. According to the midwives I have spoken to recently as a new father, the knowledge borne of experience in assisting births, combined with intuition or empathy borne of their own child-birthing experiences, is what the vast majority of current midwife
practitioners, believe they now bring to the medical experience of Western childbirth. The point here is that learned human experience is commonly used to balance instrumentality.

In the same way, Shaw's (2007) notion of 'risk transfer warfare' is obviously understood in terms of 'risk based criteria', and is thus clearly representative of the 'adiaphorising action' Bauman's (2000:208) associates with the 'social manipulation of morality'. When we apply this line of critical thinking to our current understandings of war, one can reveal how this lack of experienced-based wisdom can be critically understood as a systemic glitch in the perception matrix of Western society, and a real problem of impoverishment; in that in a PMS such as Britain, there is little collective experience of war within its constituent members [as compared with the 1945 era] to counter the growing institutional presence and credibility of WWII's 'noble lies'. Historically speaking, and in terms of the normative civilising process closing the chasm between 'our ideals' in war, and 'our conduct' in its prosecution, this type of experience based 'collective wisdom' is one viable reason why there was such a profound societal disillusionment with 'official' monumentality in the post 1945 period (Boorman, 1995:1-11). Here, 'utilitarian memory projects' became the norm.

In terms of the stated post-heroic relations, between the PMS and the ongoing civilising process of Western civilisation, the subsequent observation I now wish to explore suggests, that at the same time as having many mediated images and representations of war in our daily life (Sontag, S. 2006), we are also trying to socially construct what Morrison (2006) terms 'civilised territorial and/or public spaces free from war and violence'.

I would suggest in doing so, contemporary British society must re-constitute the collective memory of our past wars to fit this 'exclusive society' image of late modernity (Young, 1999). Furthermore, because a charge of dishonesty can be levelled at much contemporary war monumentality (King, A. 1998), it can be said, that this observation is a prime example of a social memory understandings of the 'social manipulation of morality'.

Chapter 2
When situating the context of the inquiry in this social manipulation of morality context, one can illuminate how one consequence of war memory 'malleability', is a simulacrum image of late-modernity, that with a critical viewing can not possibly fit with the reality of our 'present conflicts' in the War on Terror and thus our modern lived existence. Put simply, men's evil manners live in brass, their virtues we write in water, for today if men are acting in the name of 'their nation', "they do not know moral limits but only expedient calculations" (Mills, 1959: 84). Located in negotiated terms of Gidden's (1984) structuration theory, and we can say that when PMS's talk about 'past war' with relation to 'present conflict' they talk about ideals or risk management, and not about actual people, responsibilities and deeds.

Accordingly, it is fair to say that how we, who inhabit post-military society, see war, is not normally associated with the negative connotations suggested by Mills (1959), Wolcott (2004), Grayling (2004) or Monbiot (2006). Indeed, Mills (1959) describes modern views of past war as the 'schizophrenic separation' between ideal and deed. This is why the problem of war's inescapability is intimately related to the institutional relationship between 'modern war memory' (Fussell 1975) and the ethical environment of late-modernity, and why my thesis may be confusing, surprising, and in some cases, difficult to accept, because such logic suggests a banality of evil. In this context of a cultural critique and as stated in the preamble, my critical inquiry is governed by a need to explore the functionality of what has been described here, as the 'affect mechanisms' of 'modern war memory'.

There are many and varied 'affect mechanisms' of British war memory, but all are said to work on harnessing the emotional storms created by the impact of war to self and society, and would include the tradition, ritual and ceremonies of remembrance. Like the hydro-electric dam which harnesses the natural power of water for public utilities, so these mnemonic mechanisms of war memory harness the natural power of our innate/ cognitive emotions for varied political, cultural, social, ideological and/or psychological purposes.
Located in a historical context and Alex King’s (1998) recent cultural history research on the many and varied public memorials to the Great War, demonstrates that these ‘public space’ mediums of war memory, “arouse a variety of emotional responses, ranging from pious devotion to outright hostility” and that as ideological fertiliser for present conflict they, “have often been taken to mean a wide variety of different things, from an exhortation to die for one’s country, to a warning that war will only be avoided in the future if its horror and suffering is not forgotten” (King 1998). In this ‘cultural script’ context, most memorials are commonly seen as “silent sentries to the human cost of war” (Furlong, J. 2002:1-34).

In this regard, the project is culturally situated and thus empirically grounded in the common understanding that in contemporary Britain, national memorials, dedicated to the events and memory of past wars, have come to be seen as social meaning frameworks by which various group affiliations and social cleavages of British civil society may assess the human cost of current war and conflict on an individual and/or collective basis (King 1998). It is within this social memory meaning framework, that the traditional British war memorial can be symbolically viewed as a ‘silent sentry to the human cost of war’ cultural narrative.

My research concern, with regards to the post-military society and the current ethical environment of war, is with the appropriation of war memory and the social manipulation of this institutionalised cultural narrative of past war. The emotional power of war memory to influence both self and society may be constituted in social, political or cultural cleavages of civil society and of course depends on many, many interdependent factors within and without civil society itself; but in purely structural terms of the ongoing civilising process, such powerful conventions of war memory are understood, by the likes of Elias (2000) and Halbwachs (1992) [and many others], to help channel our higher cogitative emotions into what I have described here, as ‘noble lies’ of Sartreian ‘bad faith’ (Sartre, J. P. 2006: 81).
If we now articulate this critical understanding of harnessing the emotional storms of war, in direct relation to the established ideas of this critical inquiry, it is in these relatively negative terms of 'latent denial' or 'emotional dishonesty' towards what war is perceived to be, and in structural terms of memory continuity [persistence of war memory], change [malleability of war memory] and conflict [contestation of war memory], that the research process will be enabled to critically explore the current social role, cultural purpose and political function of past war memory with relation to its current social function to modern civil society. To see how this complex logic is research viable, we have looked at the symbolic relationship between 'signs' of 'Nostalgia Militarism' and the Ethical Environment.

Indeed, we have located these understandings within the mechanics of Shaw's (1991) 'past war thesis' i.e. 'nostalgia militarism' is understood here, as both process and practice situated within the dynamics of commemorative culture. As stated, the inherent dynamism of war memory phenomena is constituted in British public space by the social processes and mnemonic practices of memorialisation; remembrance and commemoration. Within this triangulation of war memory - tradition, ritual and ceremony - refers us to the social construction of values and practices, within which, certain mnemonic activities (such as remembrance, memorialisation and commemoration) are approached in the present era.

Here, war stories or myths do not refer us to a falsification of reality, but an imagined version of war, as located in a collective memory of past war (see Hynes 1990). In this context, British war stories relate to the cultural narrative of past war, which has evolved with the passage of time, and thus come to be accepted as accurate in the public space testimonies of war memorialising. Even though this idea of nostalgia militarism's impact is not normally made explicit in the literature, its institutionalised presence has many names: i.e. commemorative fever, national, popular, official or hegemonic memory, as well as, public, social and of course, the collective memory of past war: Each has a relevant usage.

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This said, the symbolic form and/or narrative content of war memory phenomena can be challenging to the status quo or re-affirming to the moral and political order. Here, I focus on the latter, because as Mobiot (2006) points out, only 'a few war monuments in Britain commemorate the horror of war', or can be classified as what Samuel Hynes (1990) terms 'anti monumental'; referring to an alternative testimony of warfare. This alternative version of the war story is most commonly associated with anti-war or peace narratives. In terms of a social memory critique of modernity, this 'story of war' is crystallised by Paul Fussell's (1975) seminal understandings of 'modern war memory'. This notion of war memory contrasts what is termed 'traditional' or 'iconographic war memory' (see Winters, J. 1995), and is progressive or politically utopian in social character. As a 'cultural memory' situated in public space, anti-monumentality is formulated to make us think about what war is, and challenges existing ideas about what war is for; such narratives of past war ask why. A pertinent and evocative example of such a narrative is imbued in The Abandoned Soldier. 

![Image of The Abandoned Soldier](www.theabandonedsoldier.com)

By contrast, the more hegemonic, or previously termed 'official' narrative of British war memory, tells us why the honoured dead die in war, and that it is our collective duty to remember 'them'. This common or public war memory takes as a societal 'given' the
collective 'duty to remember' (Bauman 2000). In Britain, this hegemonic narrative of past war is encompassed by the political and psychological need to give meaning to the human cost of war that is above and beyond the death of the individual (James, L. 2002, Paris 2000), because as illuminated in the introduction, "the democratic state must legitimise the human cost of war in terms of 'its' long-standing values and beliefs" (Smith, M. 2000: 11).

In Britain, it has been observed that a central tenet of this legitimisation process is that 'they' died for our freedom. In this context, the story of warfare is also portrayed as the great adventure, a test of one's mettle and a natural rite of passage of citizen, state and its civil society (Hynes, S. 1990). Some examples of this type of narrative are the 'British Way of Warfare' advocated by Liddell Hart (1933), the 'Dunkirk Spirit', (Harper, 1997) and the popular memory of 'The Blitz' (Noakes, 1997) or 'Battle of Britain' (Connelly, M. 2004).

In this regard, Paul Fussell's (1975) influential 'memory work' is an important precursor to establishing the parameters of this research project and as they relate to the work of Martin Shaw (1991, 1997). For example, Fussell's research argued that modern warfare is inherently ironic, because the collective act of war is disproportionate to the political ends it may achieve. In making this simple means/ends argument, Fussell (1975: 114-155) was trying to challenge what he termed the 'high diction' of war memory, referring to duty, honour and sacrifice etc as the political rationalisation and self perpetuation of collective violence within modern civilisation. In terms of recognising the apparent gap between the ideals of civilisation and our brutal conduct in the prosecution of war, Shaw's (1997) work also has a similar aim to challenge 'cultural preconceptions' of traditional war memory. As such, these memory works's helped locate the normative parameters of this critical study.

In this regard, I contextualise Fussell's influential ideas in relation to the political role of modern war memory, and like Shaw (1991), locate these ideas within the situated British
context of what is now euphemistically termed by many as the 'Good War' (see Trekle, 1985). In establishing the research parameters in this way, I have linked Fussell's understandings of 'high diction' to Shaw's (1991) notion of 'nostalgia militarism'. In this study I have also referred to Fussell's (1975: 310) notion of 'high diction' [duty, honour, sacrifice etc] and Shaw's (1991) nostalgia militarism as the 'noble lies' of total war. As we will locate below, such emotive notions are critically articulated in this study as 'noble lies' mainly because personal experience of past war has taught this social science researcher that the so called 'high dictation' of British war memory simply camouflages or masks the essential brutality that is war's lived experience. However, in sociological terms, these 'noble lies' are conceptualised as emotionally dishonest cultural narratives of Sartrean 'bad faith' (Sartre 2006 [1943]: 70-94), mainly because such lies are understood to help shape, channel and harness our 'higher cognitive emotions, such as pride and shame' (see Evans 2001:1-22., Scheff, 2003: 239-262., Hochschild 2003: 211-232., Sartre 2002) into what I have critically termed 'ideological safe harbours' and 'emotionally safe havens'.

Thematically speaking, and in critical theory terms of recognising what we don't want to face about the conduct of humanity in war, this project sets its parameters by drawing on the critical arguments of Ross Chambers (2003:171-181) and Walter Benjamin (1999: 248). In doing so, it is argued that commemorative culture [CC], as a communicative form of public space testimony, is not only the pre-conceived alternative to human barbarism

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As stated in the introduction and in establishing the limits of our inquiry, it is to be perceptively understood that such narratives of past wars do not tell actual untruths about why a civil society or individual may have gone to war in the first place. However, such narratives are understood to commonly over emphasise the more uplifting aspects of war and in the process help to camouflage the long terms effects and negative impact of wars actuality. In short here we understand the term 'noble lie of war' to refer to a misrepresentation of human experience in war not the historical accuracy of a particular past war. This said, the essence of a 'noble lie' also implies that both the 'liar' and the 'lied to' are in possession of the truth which they deny. In terms of one's conscious awareness of such denial, Sartre (2006: 71) points out, "a man does not deny or lie about what he is ignorant of; he does not lie when he spreads an error of which he himself is the dupe and he does not lie when he is mistaken". Form this Sartrean perspective the ideal description of a 'noble lie' would be a 'cynical consciousness', affirming the truth of war's human cost within itself as a sacred totem of nationhood, while at the same time denying the lived experience of War.

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and violence, but also a site for their cultural and societal denial. Accordingly, in this critical exploration of how we as a nation collectively remember past war, it is implicitly suggested that there is a 'practical ideology of civilisation' (Nora, P 1989) inherent to CC which makes CWM a reproductive site for the cultural denial of human destructiveness and collective violence. Indeed, Nora's 'practical ideology' is why I am suggesting that British civil society lives in 'bad faith', with regards to its cultural testimonies of War and its collective memory.

However, one could equally argue that if CC is a site of denial, it is also a site of cultural production, where it becomes entirely possible to take into account something of which modern humanity would otherwise deny in its high culture, 'that is, its own barbaric character' (Chambers 2003: 174). This means that, in fostering denial, commemorative culture could simultaneously foster a strand of counter-denial, which Samuel Hynes (1990: 245) terms 'anti-monumentality'. The Abandoned Soldier is a very good example of this counter-denial context. This is why the project hypothesis MUST and has also put forward a normative idea for the role, purpose and function of war memory. In specific terms of examining the present boom in war memory [see table 1 below], this would be an observable attempt to be emotionally honest about what war is, and thus acknowledge, recognise or face up to human barbarism. In this inquiry, we will examine the BOBM to see if this anti-monumentality narrative is present within its symbolic form or narrative content.

The understanding I wish to examine here, is that despite the intuitive wisdom that as porous individuals, we must learn lessons from past experience, if we are to develop and grow; in sociological terms, it seems that it is always easier to dim the light within than to confront the darkness without and thus when we as group collectively/socially remember past war, we are driven by established convention to tell and accept the noble lie of war rather than to face the brutal and thus painful truth of war the experience. Accordingly, in the process of channelling our 'higher cognitive emotions' (Evans 2001:3) into ideologically

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safe harbours, such noble lies are understood to help perpetuate, legitimise, sanctify or justify the rationalised use of collective violence, cruelty or barbarism for a political cause.

Having said this and in terms of 'emotionally safe havens', it is also understood that in the immediate aftermath of war, there is a psychological necessity for such 'noble lies'. As a veteran of the Falklands Conflict, I would have been inconsolable without such affect mechanisms to help channel and shape my emotions. Indeed, we all need to believe that our loved one's do not die in vain. In this context, the 'noble lies of war' tell society socially acceptable stories of war; that the honoured dead of war died for our freedom, for our way of life, for our prosperity and for our democratic values. Similarly, 'they', the 'other', the 'enemy', are the aggressors, they started it; and thus pre-determined killing and collateral damage is understood as a necessary 'retaliatory evil' or a 'prudent' defence of the realm based on 'informed realism': here the noble lies of war suppress the legacy of its impact. Accordingly, in establishing the parameters we need to think about the scale and impact of war's mantra to both self and society: we do this through re-considering the legacy of war.

The Legacy of War upon Self and Civil Society

Plato not only tells us that the unexamined life is not worth living, he also suggests that only the dead have seen the end of war. Both these timeless edicts are important, if this project is to re-consider the actuality of war as mantra and the subsequent legacy/impact of this mantra to both the emotional self and the ethical environment of society. In terms of scale of impact the United Nations estimates that in the recorded histories of all sovereign states and empires' stretching over three millennia, humankind has only enjoyed 29 years free from warfare. This is why 'peace' is a result of the functional imperative of past wars.

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"As a consequence of warfare's profound historical legacy, we in the West talk in the post Cold War age as if we have had peace since 1945. That is, we talk about peace in such a way that peace can only mean the absence of world war. This is a bizarre conception and also a distorted picture of reality which cloaks well over 20 million violent deaths since the end of World War 2. It is estimated the 3000 people a day die as a result of war every day. That's the impact of a September 11th event every day. Absence of world war is not peace but we believe with in our collective hierarchy of knowledge that it is; using this type of inverted cultural logic asymmetrical war is not the absence of peace.\(^3\)

According to Ken Booth (1997) in *Reflections of a Fallen Realist*, the atom bomb dropped in 1945 represents the culminating point of the traditional rationality about the games nations play. "It represented in its way the triumph and vindication of mass violence against civilians as a legitimate means of the war". This, 'mental atmosphere of an age', (Benjamin, W. 1999), was "the product of several centuries of international relations dominated by the Westphalian state system, Machiavellian ethics and the Clausewitzian philosophy of war, all kitted out with the impersonal technology of science. The HUMAN cost was 55 million deaths" (Booth, 1997:87). In terms of scale or legacy, it quickly becomes apparent that Society will be in deep trouble if we cannot transcend the so-called logic or rationality illustrated by the common sense of 1945. In the first few years of this century, at least 500 people a day (mostly civilians) are killed in conflicts across the globe.\(^4\)

According to the renowned International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], the interdependent or globalised world community currently spends $2bn a day on modern weaponry (see also Andreas, J. 2002, Lovell 2001). Major wars since 1945: number more than 250, and 35 nations are currently involved in armed conflicts; possibly many more depending on one’s institutional definition of war (see Vasquez, J. A. 2000). Indeed, looking at the IISS comprehensive database on armed conflict, one can see that the last time no war of major geopolitical significance was in progress anywhere on the planet was

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\(^3\) I have had this section of hand written text written in my research diary for a number of years. Some of it is my words and some it is from a source I read but to this day, can not find where it originates from. I think it is from K Booth or Martin Shaw. These figures are of course debatable as some recent estimates place the figure closer to 3,000 a day. What is presented here I have drawn from the Indypedia: Facts and Figures of Modern Life, (Part 2: L-Z: 2008) which has been confirmed to the best of my research ability from consultation with the IISS members database on armed conflict. See [www.iiss.org.com](http://www.iiss.org.com). See also Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: World Conflict Reports Website: [http://www.sipri.se/](http://www.sipri.se/). 21/04/08.
probably 1816 and by some definitions, it was thousands of years before that. In this context of institutional presence and regardless of what we as individuals may think of war, its central place as a rationalised enterprise of civilisation is historically assured. As I explained previously, war is history, because the lived history of mankind is of war-making.

In terms of what war is for as a political and military means to an identified end, the Prussian philosopher of war, Karl Von Clausewitz, tells us that 'war is the enmity of primal violence'; a rational use of collective violence with the ultimate goal 'to bend an opponent's will to ones own'. 'Another form of political intercourse by other means', to again use his well-cited phrase (see Clausewitz, On War: Book 1 & 2 in Howard, M. 1976). The celebrated Maurice R. Davie, [cultural anthropologist], explains to us that war is at heart a cultural enterprise. "It is a clash of ideas, values, ideologies and beliefs" (2003[1929]:1-9).

According to cultural theorist Philip Lawrence (1997), war is also deemed to be racial in nature because the empirical social act of war is killing for a collective but cultural purpose closely associated with the 'us and them dynamics of social intercourse' (see also Wright, Q. 1964). In this context, Anthony Stevens (2004) in The Roots of War and Terror also presents a sophisticated 'Realist' view of the role of war in 'Nature', and explains humankind's perspicuity for war within the context of, 'aggression being a functional and natural product of all social animals'. Here, Stevens uses the work of sociologist Erik Erikinson (1984) and William Sumners (1913) to argue that there is a direct relationship between what Sumners terms 'out groups hostility' and 'in group cooperation'. The argument is that the more intensely the enemy [other] is loathed or feared, the greater the loyalty and cohesion of the group. This understanding is what underpins the binary thesis.

Eminent political philosophers and International Relations theorists such as Niccolo Machiavelli [1469-1527] and Kenneth Waltz (2001), explain to us that war is first and
foremost a state of mind; a state of mind, where the realism of state prudence overwhelms the ethics of civilisation and established moralities of the group; where the Machiavellian politics of *The Prince* and 'Rational Choice Theory' (Shelling, 1960) supersedes, what Kant termed the 'moral imperative' (Gallie, 1979:1-8) and Glover (1999) the 'moral resources'.

In terms of this legacy of war to the individual, an old Roman proverb (see Gallie, W. 1979) proclaims that while you the individual person may not be interested in the social and historical phenomena of war, war as a 'thing' that happens to individual people is very interested in you as a person. Put in sociological terms of ratio and according to a long serving civil service officer I recently interviewed from the Veterans Policy Unit [MOD], there are currently over 15 million war veterans or family dependents of veterans in Britain alone. In terms of societal ratios, that's a sixth of this nation's entire populace with which modern war currently has a personal interest. One can infer from the above discourses that war is a central human enterprise which has an legacy to both self and society that goes way beyond anything we could currently conceive from television coverage and revealing statistical analysis of risk transfer war: Here, we must view war in lived actuality.

For example, in terms of how this personal interest is manifest in the actuality of lived experience, we can say that 'War' as a 'thing' that happens to people is like 'Crime'; a very human experience, an intimate social act that is part of the much larger collective enterprise modelled in chapter 1. In the socially situated context of this human enterprise, 'aggression' is the emancipation and thus realisation of collective purpose. Inter-personal or subjective violence, as used in war, is the human agency *means* by which that realisation of social purpose is materially achieved. This is why in practice, the collective and individual mantra of warfare is always to kill or be killed. However, it is very important to note - with regard to the emotional legacy of war to both self and society - that proximity
to, and context of, the subsequent killing, helps determine the immediate pride or shame felt by those that survive the killing done in the name of a civil society's beliefs and values.

In terms of experiencing this mantra first hand; one would have to say that the first time you fire your weapon in anger one gets an implicit understanding of this mantra's meaning. The first time you are shot at and hit, you get an intimate comprehension of what the mantra actually means in terms of one's own mortality. The first time you try to kill, or kill an enemy, there's no going back to a rationalised normality; by which I mean the world 'out there' never really looks quite the same again. On the one hand, this awareness of one's mortality is the driving stimulus for Plato's re-examination of the lived life, but on the other, and to use George Orwell's (1999: 148-155) insightful but cryptic turn of phrase about the self-impact of killing another human being - 'One less Mind, One less Consciousnesses'.

While this type of description may seem somewhat trite, the point I am trying to make here, is that unless one has experienced the totally surreal environment of war at first hand, it is difficult to comprehend the impact and legacy such a brutal mantra may have on the self, and thus the way one may see, talk and think about war within the ethical environment. However, it is also important to note that while Orwell's and Plato's perceptive insights might well be the case upon postscript reflection, because of the disorienting nature of war's viscid impact on the 'self', we as individuals do not normally see with such clarity of perspective in the actuality of war. This important consideration of legacy was made abundantly clear by Chris Hedges (2002) in his work War is a Force which gives us Meaning and is put in a literal context here by the following testimony of a serving soldier:

"I wouldn't lose any sleep over it. It's not like, Oh my God, I've just killed somebody. You know, you're just returning fire to keep yourself and your mucker alive. It sounds horrible, but at the end of the day, if one of them dies and one of you doesn't, it's all for the best".

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5 These are the situated words of Private Hartley [of 3 Parachute Regiment: aged 26] talking about his recent experiences of war in Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. See The Guardian Weekend: Taking on the Taliban, 14:10:06. Page 27.

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Like Private Hartley, this is how I, the individual soldier, made some sort of sense of War at the time of my lived experience of it. I have since found this is a common sentiment expressed in most cases of the many war veterans I have spoken to over the last 30 years. I believe this may be the psychological case, because the only immediate answer to the arbitrariness, irony and mortality threat of war is to say ‘FUBAR: fucked up beyond all recognition’. However, like Orwell found with regard to his own ‘Burma Police’ experience of ‘colonial killings’, this is never enough, because in reality you have ‘just killed somebody’ and thus as an emotional being, one must make sense of the act in itself or pay the eventual cost. Located in a normative context of learning wisdom from a very hard lesson of life, the counter point I wish to make here with regards to being ‘emotionally honest’ and ‘subjectivity giving meaning’ is that at some later stage in one’s life, one has to make some sort of sense of war because if one doesn’t, a price will be paid (Budra, 2004). This idea is put in context by the perceptive words of a marine’s wife, when talking about the impact of PTSD on her marriage: They are also revealing in terms of hidden legacies.

"Its not the ones that crack up after seeing what they have seen in war, to me that’s normal, if a man has a heart that feels and a brain that thinks this is exactly what I should expect to happen. It’s the ones that don’t, that really scare me" (Ground Truth: 2007).

For each soldier [just as for you or I], the eventual cost of emotional denial is substantial indeed. In terms of recovery from the impact of war and whether it be shell shock, battle fatigue, Gulf War Syndrome or the current all-encompassing PTSD, for soldiers, the routine cost of living in ‘bad faith’ is transgression [drugs, alcohol, one-night stands, fighting etc] and what are described in the relevant literature as destructive or anti social emotions towards one’s family and friends. These ‘destructive emotions’ (Goleman, 2004) also make it very difficult for the individual concerned to form and maintain new relationships. However, the emotional cost is equally high with regards to any eventual confrontation with the barbaric truth of war’s lived experience. Here, and in specific terms of Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, one can intuitively understand the inherent
psychological need for the noble lies of war - especially in its immediate aftermath. It is these needs' that lend much authenticity to the self-evident performances in modern war.

Sociologically speaking, for some soldiers, the emotional cost of war is an unusually high suicide rate. For example, according to the BBC documentary *Ex-Service Men and Homelessness*, since the Falklands Conflict in 1982, 264 of those that fought on the British side war have since committed suicide; that's even more than KIA. For me personally, the emotional cost of war was suppressed in the name of professionalism and duty, which in turn led to denial as way of life. Indeed, my inevitable dismantling of the self only really began in earnest after discharge for transgressions and meant turning the values and beliefs I had once lived by, indeed was willing to die for, upside-down to be looked at from the context of critical reflection; who I was, what I was and what I stood for, were all called into serious question. How was I to view myself and the world I lived in, if the society which I loved, gave people medals for killing other human beings? Located in terms of a social critique, as I began to address my own personal questions of why and my intellectual readings deepened, I finally began to understand what Sartre (2001[1943]:3) had meant when he explained that, 'man is condemned to be free'. War, or not war, is nothing more than fallible human choice, which is why Sartre also believed 'man is a useless passion'.

In coming to this liberating realisation, I the individual; and me the social agent of my past and present actions, have finally settled a 'beef' with the man in the mirror. In doing so, I have somehow managed to balance the, 'I am therefore I think' [super ego] with the 'I think therefore I am' [id] to help find some sense of continuity in the continuum of my everyday life [the ego]. As a consequence of such critical reflection and introspection, I have tried to take responsibility for my own actions and the impact these have had upon others, while at the same time attempting to locate these social acts within the context of the wider whole.
This ongoing process of trying to understand my situated place in the larger tapestry of life has left me more fulfilled or happier in my personal life, even though the past experiences or ‘autobiographical memories of war’ still haunt my deep thoughts in the here and now of the everyday. In this respect, Adorno’s (2005 [1951]) ironic aphorisms in Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life hint that some forms of ‘critical introspection’ can lead to a type of public inversion. In this context, the ‘Damaged Life’ is by the very nature of its lived existence, a journey from life to death, through constant renewal. As social beings, the only alternative to renewal is nihilism and ultimately loneliness, madness or suicide. In my case, my personal existential snipers and conceptual mercenaries only cracked when the joy of life or mortality grinned at them so rebirth [public inversion born of introspection] was my latently chosen path to social contentment in the material world, and the long pursuit of happiness in the existential world of the ‘divided-self’ (see also Laing, R.D. 1960:19).

As was stated in the preamble, ‘self-interrogation’ is used in this study as a principle, method or tool of observation to aid exploration; so I have explained this somewhat personal philosophy of history, because when grounded within the normative aspect of this project’s inquiry, the same sort of pathological legacy of war, and indeed, any possibility of ‘recovery’ from ‘its’ trauma through critical introspection, applies equally well to our present general considerations of the legacy of war to modern civil society (see also Misztal 2003, Prager, J. 1998, Edkins 2003, Olick, 2003). Indeed, the only major difference at this societal level is that our current negotiations of what the larger tapestry of life ‘is’, are structurally informed by the stated processes of structuration, and in specific terms of war memory the powerful affect mechanisms David Grossman (2007) points to in Confronting the Beast: Literature and the Holocaust. Here, Grossman suggests, “Intellectually and emotionally, we now manage to detach the causal relationship between, for example, our economic affluence - in the sated and prosperous West – and the poverty of others”. In terms of war, its memory and the ethical environment, one may make similar observations.
In this context, David Grossman (2007:4-6) is also exploring this project's main intellectual concerns about the de-civilising connectivity between the ethical environment and that which 'obligates' us to do what we do in War. Like in this study, his critical 'memory work' turns inwards towards self-interrogation, before it even begins to look outward at the effect mechanisms and social structures of civil society and the powerful literary conventions he specifically looks to, for some honest answers to his difficult and painful self-interrogations.

"I asked myself how an ordinary person - as most Nazi supporters were - becomes part of a mass murder apparatus" [Here he queries the banality of transgression]

"In other words, what is the thing I must suspend within myself, which I must dull, repress, so that I can ultimately collaborate with a mechanism of murder? What must I kill within me to be capable of killing another person or people, to desire the destruction of an entire people, or silently to accept it?"[Here he asks about our capacity to transgress]

"Perhaps I should ask this question even more poignantly: am I myself, consciously or unconsciously, actively or passively, through indifference or mute acceptance, collaborating at this very moment with some process that is destined to wreak havoc on another human being, or another people?" [Questioning responsibility & way we live]

I am not saying we are all murderers. Of course not. Yet it seems that most of us manage to lead a life of almost total indifference to the suffering of entire nations, near and far, and to the distress of hundreds of millions of human beings who are poor and hungry and weak and sick, whether in our own country or in other parts of the world." [Here he asks about our moral insensitivity, cultural indifference and social ambivalence]

"The death of one man is a tragedy, Stalin said, but the death of millions is only a statistic. How do tragedies become statistics for us?" [Questioning the role of testimony]

"Literature gives us the feeling that there is a way to fight the cruel arbitrariness that decrees our fate." [Highlighting the anti-monumentality role of public space testimony]

Source; Grossman Confronting the Beast: Literature and the Holocaust (Guardian 15/09/07: p 4-6)

It is becomes clear from such emotionally-honest interrogations of self and society, that if this project is to fully grasp that which 'obligates' us in war and thus the sociological problem of war's perceived inescapability, in terms of how the modern democratic civil society sees, rationalises, promotes, maintains and reproduces the social, cultural and institutional apparatus of modern war; as described by both Clausewitz and Wright and in
this study in terms of nostalgia militarism, then we must also ask some very difficult questions about what it is to be a civilised society, in terms of our ethical and feeling selves and why in this ethical environment and human agency context, we have an seemingly inherent need/desire to transgress and thus take part in the collective wrongdoings of war.

Grounded in context with the civilising process, if current figurations don’t try to make some sort of sense of the paradoxical relations between asymmetrical warfare and modern civilisation in this fluid era of late modernity, then there is going to be a long term cost that our children and children’s children will have to pay. I can say this, not only on the basis of what critical history may tell us about our recent past, but also because in sociological terms, what is borne of mankind’s rationalised actions in the here and now, is eventually borne by mankind’s personality structures in the near future. This is the collective ego of the lived life shaping the very nature [and at times direction] of the meandering civilising process, which as a ongoing force of human agency and structural change, can advance or regress our higher cognitive emotions, such as shame, disgust, pride, gratitude, duty or obligation: Is it in this harnessing of emotion that societal acceptance of war lives or dies?

In terms of critiquing war’s pathological legacy within modern civil society, Friedrich Nietzsche [1844-1900] argued in his Genealogy of Morals that because civilisation cannot be really honest about the true capacity of the ‘will to power’ and thus look Beyond Good and Evil, we who are born into modern societies are destined to live with what he terms a ‘historical and moral sickness’.6 This pathology is said to eat away at the moral hygiene of civilised society. Indeed, according to the highly critical way Nietzsche understands the ‘uses and disadvantages of history’7 the only way to maintain what he terms the ‘moral hygiene’ of a pathologically disturbed society, is to employ an ‘antiquarian or monumental

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7 I refer to Nietzsche’s (1874) polemic On the uses and disadvantages of history in which he identifies three attitudes – historical, suprahistorical and unhistorical - that are applicable to the uses and misusages of history employed within CWM.
use of history'. In these terms of maintaining moral hygiene, I have been suggesting that current civil society's answer to the impact of warfare on the self, is to construct what we have previously articulated as grand or powerful 'noble lies', which may be said to help, when infused with the 'antiquarian' use of history, to assuage guilt, embarrassment, or shame of participation in, or even our tacit acceptance of war's brutal and cruel activities.

In terms of 'monumental' uses of, and attitudes towards History i.e. holding up selective events and experiences of the past as values or benchmarks for the present (think of the Conservative Party's slogan 'Back to Basics), I would suggest on the back of these critical observations, that we as a nation have learned to be very selective in the pride associated with the 'duty to remember' (see Bauman, 2000: 222-250); or even conveniently forget altogether the paradox that is war and civilisation, as 1950's to 70's Britain did in publicly forgetting the morally questionable actions of 'Bomber Command' immediately after the 'Good War'. One could also argue on the phenomenological basis that it is much 'easier to dim the light within; than to confront the darkness without', that none of these 'noble lie' solutions are emotionally honest about the collective and/or individual's role in the cultural acceptance of war as a rational means to a contingent end and thus none of the traditional cultural testimonies of warfare advances, enhances or even develops the ongoing civilising processes of modern day humanity. I of course include my own 'noble lies' of war here.

However, if this is the case, then what is the answer to our self-perpetuating emotional dishonesty of war? How can humankind shake itself free from the clinging decivilising legacy of past wars? For some influential thinkers, the answer is in the critical use of and attitude towards history. For example, according to the critical thinking of Continental philosophers', such as Benjamin, Nietzsche or Hegel, the 'critical' use of history is a viable means by which to liberate present social reality from the grand dictions of total history's claims. To echo the critical thinking of Rousseau (1998 [1762]:5) 'man is born free, but
everywhere he is in chains'. Thus according to the likes of Jameson (2001:550-87), now is the time to break free of these chains; as the present sceptical or post-modern condition suggests, that never have we, who inhabit the West, lived in a more critically-minded age.

If this is an accurate observation, then the very presence of a 'post modern condition' begs the earth-shattering question of how this 'noble lie' understanding of war in our history i.e. its legitimising relations in collective memory, can still be socially acceptable to present day civilisation. Thinking counterfactually, are the ubiquitous 'noble lies' of warfare the last taboo of Western intellectualism, as no major research programme seems to be asking, in Nietzschean terms of a 'genealogy of morals', why it is socially acceptable for present society to bequeath the mitigating legacy of past war to its future children? Indeed, why are there only 50 peace museums in the world? Why is 'A War Imagined' not full of the emotion and sentiment of what Hynes (1990:269-336) described as ‘anti–monumentality’.

This leads us to back to our research questions of why we are currently socially remembering past wars with such gusto and what impact the way we currently eulogise the barbarism and violence of modern war may have on the ethical environment we live in.

Situated within current debates, 'dog tag nostalgia' (Willcott, J. 2004:71-74) is a much generalised notion of this 'public war memory', which attempts to describe simple 'black and white' collective representations of what this study has termed the 'Good War' (Terkel, S. 1985). As a common descriptive term, the 'good war' is now used by many to illuminate the absolute values [good against evil; right against might; peace against war; freedom against tyranny; democracy against fascism] that WWII is historically understood to have been fought for (see Connelly, M. 2004). Looked at as an ideological framework, or 'practical ideology of civilisation' and employing, what has been described in the relevant literature as a 'age of societal disillusionment with war' (see Boorman, D. 1995:1-13) as a starting point, we shall now consider, if the 'latent function' [that is to say unintended
consequences] of current war memory phenomena [either understood as 'nostalgia militarism', 'dog tag nostalgia' or 'commemorative fever'] has changed with the new role of CWM i.e. in accordance with the cultural, social or political context of how 'war' is encoded for public consumption. This research task will be re-contextualised in chapter 3 as a 'research problem' i.e. with specific relation to the case study element of this inquiry. In setting these case study parameters, I now explain how I will address my core questions.

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1 Elias attempts to demonstrate this 'provisional theory of civilisation' by unpacking Westphalian nation-state pacification with relation to conflict, structural change, stratification and the sociological history of manners (see Fletcher, J. 1997). While Shaw (1991, 1997) does not explicitly engage with the work of Elias, implied in Shaw's 'past war thesis' is the understanding that official war memory or as he terms it, nostalgia militarism, is a cultural form and social context by which modern theorists may critically evaluate how or in what direction the civilising process maybe meandering.
Establishing the Parameters of the Case Study

In *Dialectics of War: A Social Theory of War and Peace*, Martin Shaw (1988) argued that the "spectre of modern warfare has always haunted sociological viewings of modernity", and suggested that; "because Orwell's '1984' was not realised in nineteen eighty four, the role of 'militarism and war' has often been under-emphasised in sociological research and discourse". In this critical study of war and its memory, the intimately entwined relations between war and militarism are located in a social context by Wright's (1964) conceptual definition of modern warfare as, "highly artificial interpretations of socially constructed situations" and grounded by Clausewitz [1780-1831], who explained in his *Theory of War* that "war is a totality served by many activities that are quite different from it; some closely related, others far removed... All these activities concern the maintenance of the fighting forces and while their creation and training precedes their use, maintenance is concurrent with and a necessary condition of war" (Howard, 1976:128). Accordingly, in chapter one, I have modelled 'war and militarism' as one and the same in terms of a totality, i.e. the 'maintenance of the fighting forces' in the material and symbolic realms of civil society [Militarism] and War, the abstract instrument of foreign policy famously theorised by Clausewitz, are synonymous when viewing all warfare as a rationalised human enterprise.

Using this model of warfare as a contextualised point of departure, I now wish to establish the methodological parameters of the case study inquiry. I do this in situated terms, and by developing some of the questions I have highlighted as a concern in the sociological analysis of national war memory phenomena. The type of questions I refer to were clearly articulated in the pages of the introductory preamble. Drawing on the subsequent research of Shaw (1991, 1997, 2007), I have attempted to locate these main research concerns within current social theorising about the 'latent function of nostalgia militarism' (Shaw, 1991). In doing so, I have bound my intellectual concerns about the current role of war and its collective memory to Shaw's (1997, 91) revealing 'past war thesis', and implicit critique of the modernisation thesis (2004); that is to say in terms of how the latent function of 'nostalgia militarism' could be critically conceived as a possible barrier to the ongoing civilising process - as culturally situated in the ethical environment. If this is the projects guiding research logic then to formalise and thus establish the parameters of case study we had to explain what this civilising process is understood to be - in terms of individual/societal relations - and how this idea links to what Blackburn terms, 'the ethical environment' and Shaw (1991) the 'post military society'. This was the task of chapter two.

Having contextualised the inquiry in Part One, the main task of Part Two is to outline the research design and methodological approach to the case study element of my investigation. The aim is to ground the project's two 'why now' research questions in an empirical context, and by doing so, clearly establish the parameters of the case study investigation. The goal is to help identify the many, many fact-finding questions I must ask of the Battle of Britain Monument (BOBM) if I am to address all my research questions. These are not only fact-finding inquires that will help us address our 'why now' research questions as situated within Tilly's (2003) exploratory context of discovery, but also counterfactual indicators that may help us to identify what the 'right memory of war' may look like. Accordingly, the empirical increase of Contemporary War Monumentality (CWM) indicated in table 1 below, is to be re-contextualised within current social memory theorising on the cultural role, sociological function and political purpose of social memory phenomena. This is an important task which is further developed in Parts Three and Four.
Chapter 3

Islands of Knowledge

The Research Design and Methodology

The recently established, UK National Inventory of War Memorials, currently estimates that there are over 70,000 war monuments nationwide. At the last officially recorded count [2006], there were over 64,000 memorials registered, with almost every town and village in the UK having some form of public space representation of 'modern war memory' (see Furlong J. 2002: 1-34). The vast majority of these newly accounted for war memorials, were commissioned to mourn and grieve the dead of two World Wars. Indeed, the majority were unveiled in 3 mass waves of 'communal memorialisation' (Winters, J. 1995, Furlong, J. 2002): The first, just after the First (1880-1) and Second (1899-1901) Boer Wars [erected, 1899-1910]; the second and largest, after the 'Great War' [erected, 1915-35]; and the last, after what many now term the 'Good War' [erected 1945-55] (Furlong, 2002:1-35).

"The willingness with which our young people serve in any war, no matter how justified, will be directly proportional to how they perceive the veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation" (George Washington cited in Quinlan, 2005: XIII).

Located within this quoted context and my research problem was how to interpret a new WWII monumentality wave [erected, 1985-2002+], with sociological relation to Britain’s established ‘memory environment’ of past wars. Drawing on the stated insights gained from Washington’s revealing observation of the intimate relations between war and its memory, I decided to ‘contrast’ the functionality of past waves with a current trend in WWII monumentality projects, in order to help explore CWM’s impact (i.e. the legacy of past war to the civilising process), in specific terms to what may have changed in the way we as a nation socially remember ‘the war’. If not to grieve the dead of war, then what functionality do the new memorials serve? With this research problem in mind, it is noted that while the various historical, psychological or political cleavages of these ‘mass-waves’ of ‘communal
memorialisation' have been comprehensively researched (see Boorman, 1900, 1995, Winters, 1995, 2000, Borg, 1991, King, 1998, Lloyd, 1998, Gregory, 1994, Fussell, 1975, Hynes, 1990, Ferguson, 1999, Lunn, 1997, Connelly, 2004), little sociological research has gone into a grounded investigation of recent memorialisation trends (Shaw, M, 1997), and to this researcher's knowledge, only indirect research has been conducted into the latest cultural trend of WWII memory illustrated below in Table 1 (Furlong, J, 2002).

Table 1

Chronological Analysis of WWII monumentality

In Contemporary Britain

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<th>Amount of Unveilings in each 5 year interval up to 2002</th>
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<td>24</td>
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Source: UK National Inventory of War Memorials (UNIWM) Database.
When we re-locate these revealing statistics in the context of Shaw's (1991) post-military concern with a 'perceivable boom in nostalgia militarism', we can see that Table 1 does seem to illustrate a concrete increase in public space representations of WWII memory - as located within contemporary British civil society. Again we can see almost 500 WWII memorial were erected in 17 years [1985-2002], as compared to fewer than 250 memorial erections in the previous 30 years in total [1955-1985]. That's slightly more than double the amount, in just over half the time. It is hoped that the contextualising I have established in Part 1, and the mixed-method research process I have undertaken [see Parts 3-4, and below for design details or approach], will enable my thesis to consider why this most recent trend exists, so many years after the event. Why was such a culturally significant monument not conceptualised and produced nearer the time, when most other monuments to 'the war' were erected [1945-55]? Does the innate reason why have anything to do with what The Observer (2006:16) termed a 'perceived collective shame' with the actions of Bomber Command. In this contested context, I consider if not to mourn or grieve the dead of WWII, then what role or function do these new war memorials serve?

Located with relation to the preamble discussions on the normative relations between war memorials and the ethical environment, and with specific relation to Tilly's (2003) four exploratory questions, and one can see why this project must consider the selection, form, content and consumption of war memory, and why the problem of this inquiry is not only to consider 'why now?' in relation to why the current mini-boom of WWII monumentality may be said to exist on a surface level of descriptive explanation; but also to try and understand the role, purpose and function of such memory phenomena at a deeper level of sociological significance and critical interpretation. In methodological terms, the achievement of this aim has meant designing and conducting research that could look; not only, at the 'Institutional Presence' and the 'psycho-geography' of WWII memorial spaces, but also the cultural selection of meanings, or form, content and reception of war memory.
Accordingly, before we can outline the overarching methodological parameters in terms of research strategies and designs or social science approaches, one must first identify any insights gained from the relevant literature on the significance of ‘dog tag nostalgia’ and ‘commemorative fever’. This task is necessary, so that we may ground the deeper and much broader thematic explanations signposted in chapters 1 and 2, and which we will develop in subsequent analysis. Once we have considered the surface explanations for Britain’s current ‘commemorative fever’, we then need to outline this micro-investigation in terms of its actual conduct i.e. How were the many and varied sources of data, obtained?

Interlacing the Thematic with the Empirical

One descriptive or surface explanation for this significant increase is of course the 50th and 60th anniversary cycles of WWII [1989-1995 & 1999-2005]. Indeed Jane Furlong (2002) points to this type of ‘centrifugal force’ as the answer to ‘why now’, and suggests that these anniversary events served veterans as a collective means for status or identity and a cultural form for passing on what is termed ‘memory experience’ and that, in this sense, these new war monuments were in themselves ‘silent sentries to the human cost of warfare’. The initial finding of a small survey questionnaire conducted at the unveiling of the Battle of Britain Monument would seem to support this sociological understanding of intrinsic purpose. However, if this very important ‘centrifugal factor’ was the only reason for what Mitzsal (2003) terms ‘commemorative fever’, then one would see similar empirical coincidences with the memorialisation of other past wars. In specific terms of passing on memories, identity or acting as ‘silent sentries’, one would think that this type of ‘centrifugal force’ would be especially apparent with relation to the public memory of the ‘Great War’.

However, according to the empirical data sets available from the UKNIWM database, this does not seem to be the case. Indeed, looking at the statistical data, one can see that

Chapter 3
there was only a very small empirical increase in Boer War, WWI and Korean War memorials during their particular 50th and 60th anniversary periods i.e. in these 3 important cases, the empirical increase was nowhere near on the numerically significant scale of WWII monumentality projects. Why is this? Why 500 in 17 years? Here, one can theorise that WWII collective memories mean something more to us, as a ‘national memory group’ some 60 years after the fact, than the collective memories of WWI meant to the ‘nation’ in the 1960’s or 70’s. Is it because we have been directly engaged in conflict so much since the end of the Cold War, or is it because of globalisation or even a combination of factors?

In this study we will interlace such thinking with empirical research, in order to help unpack what that intangible ‘something more’ may be in terms of individual/societal relations, and we will do this, in order to help explore the deeper social significance of WWII collective memory. That is to say, in terms of why the very selective popular memories of WWII now seem so important to British society i.e. to and in this particular period of late modernity.

Misztal (2003) explains in Theories of Social Remembering that the ‘astonishing burst’ of post Cold War ‘social memory interest’ was triggered by ‘commemorative fever’, referring to the extraordinary number of civic celebrations in the 1980’s and 90s, which in turn, happened to coincided with the emergence of new data storage technology and communication media, sites of remembrance, heritage movements and reassessments of national pasts in Eastern Europe, South America and South Africa (Ray, L. in Misztal, B. 2003:X). She argues that ‘in the post Cold-War world, all societies, especially those that have recently gone though difficult, ‘heroic’ or simply confusing periods, are involved in the search for truth about their past’ (see Ray, L. in Misztal, B. 2003:X). Within the critical context outlined in Part 1, one could also suggest that what are confusing to us, are the paradoxical relations between war, memory and the ethical environment of late modernity.
Similarly, Barry Schwartz explained in *The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory* that, "to collectively remember selective aspects of the past is to place a part of the historic past in the service of cultural conceptions and ontological needs of the present" (1982: 374). In this investigation, we will look at the role and purpose of this new trend, in terms of British society's current ontological needs in the wake of asymmetrical war and with specific relation to cultural conceptions of self. For example, in ontological terms I will re-consider identity formation and moral order issues. Similarly, I will look at the functionality of the case study in terms of cultural conceptions and issues of legitimacy with regards to the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, my main overall concern here is to re-consider the institutional presence of war memory with specific relation to the social significance of WWII memory and with thematic relation to Shaw's 'past war theses' i.e. with 'nostalgia militarism' in specific terms of 'its' latent function to British civil society.

**Interlacing the Empirical with the Thematic**

As we have seen, there are various islands of knowledge which will help us interpret the social significance or role, function and purpose of CWM in these terms [see also chapter 4]. However, the Furlong (2002) article referenced above is the only academic publication [at time of writing] that deals extensively and directly with the empirical data held by the UKNIWM. This is why Table 1 only goes up to 2002 and why we will review this seminal paper later in chapter 4. However, it should be clearly understood at this parameter setting stage, that as a Cultural Trends publication with a focus on the 'historical environment', the analysis of the various data sets employed was predominantly historical in nature; comparing past trends with each other, in terms of a social history context. Indeed, the recent boom of WWII memorials is only briefly considered in terms of the trends' chronological position in a 100 year time line of British memorialisation (Furlong 2002: 34).
Within the remits of a doctoral project, I could not possibly conduct an extensive study of over 500 memorials in the above trend, so to address my methodological problem I examine a microcosm of public space monumentality in the form of a carefully selected case study monument. While it is acknowledged that carefully selected examples make for bad science, in generic terms, the methodological thinking here is that a pertinent case study examination may well provide a situated medium to help one explore and unpack the intimate connectivity between war, its public memory and the ethical environment of War.

The monument in question is the newly unveiled Battle of Britain Monument. The various reasons why I selected this particular monument are explained below. In examining this institutionalised presence of past war memory, the mixed method research process presented below will enable investigation of the selection, form, content and consumption of the monument, as it stands in public space, contemporary time and societal discourse. What is meant by these specific terms is also explained below, but in very general terms this type of grounded investigation will enable the project to gain many insights into the social role, cultural purpose and political function of CWM. In narrowing the methodological parameters still further, the next section will bind these interlaced threads of the project together, in order to help explain the conduct of the actual case study inquiry.

Conducting a Case Study Investigation of Nostalgia Militarism

"Remembrance is not a celebration of war, nor does it seek to glorify it. It is the means by which the British people pause to remember those who have fallen in time of conflict. As we near the time when the generations that fought our two world wars are no more, it becomes increasingly important that the reasons for, commemorating their wartime endeavors, should be explained to the young and set down for the benefit of future generations. Freedom is not free, and remembrance is more then renewing our bonds with the recent past. It reminds us why our ancestors fought. This is the greatest power of remembrance: the power, not only to keep alive the courage of those long dead, but also to inspire individual courage and public determination in our time." (Major General Christopher Elliott. in Quinlan, M. [2005]. 'Remembrance' Vol 1 & 2. Page IV)
Written by a serving Major General in the British Army, it is not inaccurate to suggest that the views expressed in this quote are institutionally sanctioned ideas about the current role or purpose of British war remembrance. Such ideas about the functionality and purpose of war memory are well established in British Civil Military Relations [CMR’s] and as part of war memory convention and public commemoration. Accordingly, such ideas help imbue and instil the collective motive or duty to remember selective events of past war and thus mobilise and structure the many social or private actions involved with most ‘official’ war remembrance (see Quinlan, M. 2005). From Shaw’s (1991) ‘militarism perspective’, and from the standpoint of what Bauman (2000:222) terms the ‘Duty to Remember’, this type of collective war memory is very, very selective in ‘its’ ‘form and content’, because this type of ‘hegemonic war narrative’ generally serves the greater good of civil society and freedom.

Noble ideals indeed, but as we have seen, if war is that which ‘obligates’ uncivilised conduct, then why do we in ethically educated societies socially remember the experience of War the way we do and more importantly, what are the unintended consequences of telling such noble and iconic lies. Here’s where Bauman’s social manipulation of morality thesis comes into its own, because in this ‘latent function’ context the project’s case study investigation is formulated as a way to help us think about these concerns in terms of how the self-evident denial of human barbarism in war impacts upon what moral philosophers describe as the ‘ethical environment’. Here, Simon Blackburn’s (2001) articulation of this ubiquitous climate illuminates how this ‘all encompassing environment’ is both ‘internal and external’ in constitution, and understood as the surrounding climate of ethical ideas which are said to help influence how individuals may think and feel about what they see and do.

Within the overall inquiry, varied aspects of the research process are in part designed to help us explore, examine and unpack how the harnessing of our ontological needs and emotions may actually take place within the societal mechanisms of collective war memory.
and whether or not these emotion harnessing 'affect mechanisms' can be described as a societal or cultural form of 'morality manipulation'. Within the current climate of ideas and in very specific terms of Shaw's understanding of 'nostalgia militarism', I ask how does a public memory of war affect higher cognitive emotions such as shame and pride, which according to Elias, help advance and/or regress the civilising of social intercourse. Put another way, how do the mnemonic practices and social processes of British war memory affect our current sensibilities towards warfare? Below and in the next few chapters, we will begin to think about this memory-based question, when we look at the sociological workings of contemporary war memory phenomena from varied social theory perspectives.

However, in conceptually modelling, what are termed, the 'dynamics' and 'statics' of 'social memory' (Oblick & Robbins. 1998), I also draw on direct observations of war memory conventions and ethnographic engagement in the mnemonic practices of commemoration and remembrance and in doing so, suggest that the societal mechanisms of monumentality can be considered as constituent parts of Blackburn's understanding of the ethical environment, because the socialised processes of public remembrance have evolved over generational periods to help civil society harness the emotional storms created by war and its aftermath. Put in context, after the huge losses sustained by General Kitchener's mainly 'volunteer army'; public remembrance took on the 'communal face' of 'Boer War' memorialisation. This communal face of loss and grieving gave much public space tribute not to the great and the good, as had previously been the case in the previous era of say Waterloo [1815], but to the common soldier and his sacrificial deeds.

This profound change occurred, because during the era of Waterloo/Crimea, most ordinary soldiers were clearly part of one the most professional armies in the world, but the enlisted ranks were still mainly drawn from what has been described as the 'dregs' of the barrel (Duffy, C. 1987). By contrast Kitchener's 'citizen army' was drawn from fully integrated
members of civil society [i.e. bakers, civil servants, railway-men, shop-workers or school chums etc]; thus in harnessing the emotional storms of war, ‘communal memorialisation’ was to become the social norm in the public space remembrance of Britain’s ‘Total Wars’.

In sociology of death terms, the slaughter of the ‘Pals Battalions’ meant that a collective way had to be found to take such large-scale loss into account. Not only was there no repatriation of the war dead, and so no physical object for families and loved ones to mourn and grieve over, also there was no communal or social means of grief expression. The result was Remembrance Day, the Poppy, the two minute silence and mass war memorialisation. Conversely, after the Good War of 1939-45, fought by the ‘greatest or golden generation’, there was a profound societal disillusionment with war in itself and thus ‘official monumentality. As a consequence, communal memorial projects gave way to what most term ‘utilitarian projects’ such as parks, playing fields and hospitals (Winters, J 1995).

As a consequence of this knowledge of war memory, contemporary observation of CMR’s and war memory convention informs us that in post-Cold War Britain, Remembrance Day facilitates social and personal remembrance of past war and consists of informal, official and nationally-recognised commemorative events, usually staged around publicly prominent monumentality projects. These are the public space mediums of an institutionalised collective war memory presence and in terms of our gardening analogy, provide the emotional and/or ideological fertiliser for a common, or public war memory to maintain ‘its’ negotiated existence as located in British commemorative culture [see chapter 4]. In this context, these culturally situated and historically embedded mediums of past war memory are to be the focus of my case study investigation because they provide a symbolic lens and social meaning framework, by which a ethically educated society may conceive and make sense of present conflict. In this sense, public space testimonies of past war [i.e. war memorials, commemoration or public remembrance] help unite societal values and beliefs of the present, with our contingent view of the socially constructed past.
In this regard, our methodological approach must turn to the critical thinking of Marx [1818-1883], who suggested that material conditions will always shape the cultural production of such hegemonic ideas, but would add that material conditions are themselves comprehended through this type of 'dominant ideology'. Accordingly, when we investigate the role and purpose of a war monument, in terms of its latent or unintended function to civil society, we have to take into account the ideology or 'orientation' of 'its' social existence in contemporary time and public space. Hence, a memory culture is understood as produced and consumed within social life. This discourse, is the cultural 'ideology of civilisation' I referenced earlier, and is in my fire-triangle analogy the meta-physical 'air' a common, public or collective war memory phenomena must breathe, if it is to maintain its existence as a relevant social meaning framework of the British collective effervescence.

To locate this somewhat dry and abstract theorising within a situated and grounded context, it can be said that how we as a society socially remember any past war, is going to be informed by tradition, ritual and ceremony and the material conditions of the here and now, as is how we collectively consume the collective memory of any past war. In terms of the fire triangle analogy I have related to war memory, the main aim here, is to find out which social factors actually feed these regenerative 'forest fires' of collective war memory.

Similarly, within the complexity of meaning, we may attach to a given collective memory phenomena i.e. why we socially remember wartime endeavours and what we selectively choose to collectively remember is also informed by material conditions and the surrounding climate of ideas. In this context, our observational aim is to find the spark or combination of factors that helped ignite our present forest fires of collective war memory.

To take such complex variables into account in empirical terms, we will endeavour to fully investigate our case study monument in 'critical realist' terms of the 'Actual, Empirical and the Real' i.e. in terms of the: What's, How's and Why's of 'its' production and consumption.
In this Critical Realist regard, the investigation explores the social relations, cultural ideas and structural/institutional factors, which may have informed the selectivity and creation of the monument? i.e. how did the monument come into being? Who proposed the idea for a BOB monument and why? Was this war memorial project organised by commission or committee? Who/what gave the initial idea for the monument’s patronage? How and why was this patronage bestowed? Why build a national monument to this particular collective memory of WWII and why now, some 60 years after the event it remembers? Who were the BOBM founding patrons and who is currently responsible for its maintenance? How much did it cost and why was the project funded from private contributions and donations and not public monies, such as the lottery or governmental funds? Who comprised the funding committee and why were they chosen? Why is the monument located where it is and under what criteria, and in whose authority was the culturally prominent site chosen?

All the questions asked above are answered in Parts 3 & 4, or as part of the descriptive introduction to the Battle of Britain Monument and its narrative. In chapter 5, we address some more in-depth questions, which will help us formulate a more sophisticated analytical framework for explanation. How was the symbolic form of this public space monument negotiated? How were the decisions about architectural design made, by whom and under what auspices? Whom or what was the monument envisaged to speak to? Who does it actually speak to? What cultural narrative meaning was the monument meant to convey to the British public and how is that constitutional meaning conveyed in symbolic form for historical posterity? How was the monument received in public discourse? That is to say, how is this public space testimony of past war thought of by veterans, tourists, families, and appropriated by the monarchy, press, government and Ministry of Defence?

Within the parameters established and at this mainly analytical level, this project’s micro-investigation of nostalgia militarism will consider what constitutional meanings are
associated with the monument, by whom and why? Indeed, how is the actual monument framed and decoded in societal discourse i.e. how is it used in public space and who decided how it is to be employed as a culturally prestigious artefact of commemorative culture? Finally, how is the ideological power, or to be more precise, the 'cultural capital' of the monument appropriated, by its many and varied consumers? These are the questions my research process must try to address, if it is to be successful in achieving the exploratory goals and aims of the project. Below, I explain some methodological aspects of the study in terms of how we are going to address such questions and how we conducted the various forms of social science research and analysis. However, before we can detail the methodology of the study still further, I have to first explain and thus justify why this particular memorial was selected as relevant microcosm of the 'collective memory' whole.

Why this Memory of WWII?

I have chosen to concentrate on the social memory of the Battle of Britain, as this institutionalised narrative of the 'Good War' would seem to have a pride of place in the generalised memory group known as the British nation [see chapter 4 for details or context] and as such, is a prime example of what Shaw (1991) terms nostalgia militarism. Other core national memories of 'the War' include The Blitz, Dunkirk or VE Day (Connelly, M. 2004). However, while these popular memory narratives are also crucial to current hegemonic notions of British nationhood (see Smith, M. 2000), they do not exemplify the socially constructed image of warfare within our popular culture, like the Battle of Britain.

In this context of culture, image, myth and narrative, Paris's (2000:8) Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture 1850-2000 demonstrates how past wars have been presented as 'just' and the men who fought in them as 'heroic agents of retribution who took up the sword only when peaceful methods of resolution had failed'. This is why I
chose the Battle of Britain Monument, because it is a clear memory microcosm of the modern war memory whole: In short, this public monument is a Weberian ideal type and in a cultural narrative sense, is a powerful cultural memory 'storyteller' of the 'British at War'.

This ideal type of 'noble lie', war story, myth or cultural narrative, epitomises Shaw's notion of Nostalgia Militarism, and is thus the conceptual reason why this social memory medium was chosen and why the situated focus of the study is only on this popular memory of the 'Good War' (see Connelly, M. 2004., Terkel, S. 1985). Put simply, the 'dog tag nostalgia' (Wollcott. J. 2004:70-72) content of this popular cultural narrative is why I choose to utilise the newly unveiled BOBM as the methodological vehicle of the inquiry/study. However, I pragmatically chose London's monument, over the RAF's national monument to the battle located on a panoramic cliff edge in Kent, not only because it was yet to be unveiled at the time of this research [2005-8] but also because, it was to be located directly opposite MOD Main Building on the culturally prominent Victoria Embankment of the River Thames. I say culturally prominent, because this location already has a large number war monuments dating back to before Waterloo, signifying the psycho-geography and cultural significance of this particular location with regards to facilitating Britain's 'official' narrations of past war.

Employing this monument as the methodological medium by which to examine CWM, I intend to further explore this particular memory presence from a stratified standpoint of how the main collective memory group known as the nation-state is affected by a combination of sociological factors relating to the processes of war, modernity and globalisation. At this social theory level, the case study investigation constitutes the main body of observational research into the factual connections between war, memory and the ethical environment and is designed to explore the Second World War's deeper ontological meaning within contemporary British society, by considering the role, purpose and function of one of its most popular memories, as 'it' is situated in public space, time and discourse.

Chapter 3
In looking at this 'bit part' in order to better understand the 'whole tapestry', it is conceptually useful to think of the Battle of Britain Monument as a Weberian 'ideal type' and/or as symbolic 'story teller' (Benjamin, W. 1999:83), that engages those who consume its narrative with what Benjamin describes as, a 'dialogue with the past' (see Lash, S. 1999:320). In this 'narrative' context, the goal of the case study is to investigate the sociological nature of this dialogue, in terms of role, purpose and function. This would include what Robert Merton (1957) termed the 'latent function' of social phenomena, referring to the unintended consequences of its presence. In this context I ask; who is doing the social remembering, in what context, with whom and most importantly why now?

However, while the 'who' and in 'what context' can be investigated with empirical methods of social science enquiry, the 'why' requires that we think with experience and see with theory, if we are to consider the significance of this, the most, recent cultural trend of war memory. This is why in terms of research design, strategy and methodology, I needed to formulate a phased and mixed method case study. With this in mind, the next narrative task of this chapter, is to help explain the actual conduct of the research process in these terms of a phased investigation, and with implied sociological relation to Tilly's (2003) four exploratory questions, that this study must ask, if it is to see if the 'past war thesis' has sociological merit as a theory of the relations between present conflict and past war. In this context, one must continue here with a brief summary of the methodological contribution.

**A Mixed Method Research Design**

In methodological terms, the identified 'why now' problem broadens the parameters of our case study enquiry into the function and mechanics of nostalgia militarism, as it requires that the project incorporate and engage with wider social theory concerns, which address the eternal collective memory issues of 'malleability, persistence and contestation' of
meanings (See Olick 1998., Mitzsal, B. 2003). In this wider context, the thesis will engage with current memory debates, which are trying to explain the recent boom in social memory phenomena. This is the research task of the literature review in chapter 4, but in empirical research terms the analysis of my collated data will help me tentatively explore the significance of the new trend in WWII memorialisation, as situated within a grounded context of 'why' this most recent cultural trend may be said to exist; in relation to 'its' present social role (what it does to or for society and individual relations), cultural purpose (in what context) and political function, (to serve what political end, or institutional agenda).

Thus, while the questions we have identified above are located in various interdisciplinary cleavages and are diverse and many, they are not addressed individually, but from the overall findings of one's investigation into the selection, form, content and consumption of the case study monument. The bullet points presented below represent the four phases of this investigation. As such, this methodological section is only designed to explain the mixed methods used to conduct a phased or sequential and transformative investigation. These mixed methods are ethnographic research methods, observation, comparison, semi-structured interviews, survey questionnaires and content analysis, which allows me to consider issues of image, text, discourse and architectural form. I also use statistical analysis of the UKNIWM, and the 'methodology of psycho-geography' (Coverley, M 2006).

The mixed method strategy identified, allows this research project to take into account a socially significant WWII memory presence from varied perspectives and will illuminate how this particular memory of the 'good war' was selected, appropriated and consumed by individuals, groups and various social institutions of the nation-state, such as the media, MOD, monarchy and government. This empirical aspect of the research will also enable the project to consider the views and opinions of various kinds of people who are presently involved in the construction of 'commemorative ceremony' and war memorials. This mixed
method approach is the methodological means by which I engage with my concerns and consider the research problem of 'why now?' in the deeper context I have outlined above.

In these terms:

- The project will consider the selectivity, bias and 'Source' of the current WWII memory trend, by investigating how this prestigious monument was actually selected and received patronage as public space collective representation of WWII.

- The project will consider the cultural, societal and rational social action 'Means' by which the main memory group 'the nation' collectively remembers the historical events of WWII by exploring the particular monumental form this collective representation of the past takes and by considering the mnemonic practises and social process involved in cultural production, or inauguration to the public domain.

- The project will consider the contingent reason or current collective 'Will' of British civil society to socially commemorate very selective WWII events by analysing the social content [ascribed, contested and negotiated constitutional meanings] associated with BOB Monument's symbolic form and narrative content.

- And finally, the project will consider consumption issues in terms of who or what is actually doing the social commemorating of past war in order to re-consider how the monument is used and consumed in public space: both collectively in societal discourse and subsequently, how associated mnemonic practices were appropriated at time of study by the powerful, social institutions or state apparatus.

Survey Questionnaires and Interview schedules

As stated, one method employed is semi-structured interviews. These selective interviews were conducted with people 'in the know', and who were involved in the monument's construction, or have some professional or personal interest in the memorial project itself. The first interview was a joint venture with Mr Guy Brewer and Mr Mark Quinlan. The former a civil service officer working for the MOD in the Veteran's Policy Unit as part of the re-vamped Veterans Agency. The latter is author of Remembrance and British War Memorials, both of which have been invaluable secondary sources of knowledge and information to this research project. While the data obtained has not been employed as extensively as was first envisaged, the blank script for this interview schedule is presented in appendix 2 to give the reader some insight into the background information gained. The
second semi-structured interview was with Mr Edward McManus, who is the deputy chairman of the Battle of Britain Historical Society. Mr McManus helped me validate what is presented on the BOBHS website and in doing so, informed me of the anecdotal stories behind who founded the idea and some admin issues surrounding the organisation and production of the monument. This interview lasted almost six hours and was conducted over two days. Here, the blank script of the interview schedule is presented in appendix 3.

In addition to these intensive interviews, 70 survey questionnaires were mailed out to members of the 'Battle of Britain Historical Society' (BOBHS) who actually attended the September 18th unveiling ceremony [see appendix 1 for content of questionnaire]. As only 700 carefully selected individuals attended the unveiling ceremony, this figure equates to about 10% of those who were there on the day. It was my intention to hand out 30 similar questionnaires in order to take into account a small sample of subsequent visitors to the monument. These were due to be handed out in person over the period of this research (2005-08). However, I could not gain formal permission to conduct this research. I have received nearly 50% of the survey questionnaires back from the BOBHS [31 with 3 voids]. The collated data from these 28 responses will be presented in Part 3 in order to help us determine, from varying perspectives, what was thought of the monument by its varied consumers and how it was used and appropriated at the time of writing by various groups and social institutions. A generalised consideration of the mediated response i.e. in the media and press - will help provide us with a generic reflection of the public inauguration.

Having said this, the sample population is clearly not representative of multicultural Britain, as there are no sampling frames which would be feasible when applied to such a case study microcosm. Similarly, the 70 questionnaires sent to attendees of the unveiling ceremony did not include any individuals outside the BOBHS membership, as I could not gain access to a formal mailing list from the MOD for what was described at the time as
security measures in the wake of the 7/7 attacks (London: 05). However, even with such limitations, the sample population did include men/women of varying social economic and ethnic backgrounds, age variables, regional variables, service and ex-service personnel, memorial committee members and current governmental advisors who have knowledge and expertise on all manner of remembrance, memorialisation or commemorative issues.

Exploring and Unpacking the Selectivity Issues

To consider the selection of the monument, I will look at the role of the BOBM commission which was brought into being by the BOBHS in September 2001. The research process will also consider the institutionalised process of commemoration selection which in part informs how significant historical events of past wars are actually selected for high profile MOD, governmental and monarchy participation and/or patronage (See Quinlan, M. 2005: Vol 1). This descriptive aspect of the research process will help us consider the varied institutional factors, processes and relations by which the monument was actually selected as a significant ‘cultural memory’ artefact of ‘the war’ and thus enable an ‘institutional’ consideration of the official decision-making processes involved in this selection process.

In short, this aspect of the investigation will provide indicators as to how and why this specific monument was chosen as a public space collective representation of WWII memory. To consider further the issue of patronage, one can also look at the various types and forms of prestige and patron support given to this memorial project as compared with other recent CWM projects, such as the ‘Women at War’, ‘Australian’ and new ‘Armed Forces’ and ‘Commonwealth’ memorials. These various types of patronage include public discourse in the regional and national press and media, high profile involvement by the monarchy, MOD, government and ex-politicians. I will also give an indirect consideration.
to the patronage roles of local councils, authorities and various veterans' associations or affiliations, such as the Imperial War Museum [IWM] and the Royal British Legion [RBL].

Content Analysis: Form, Content and Consumption

The mixed method approach also employs 'content analysis' commonly associated with 'Cultural Studies' to interpret the 'symbolic message', 'cultural form' and negotiated 'content' of the monument, by way of a conceptual consideration of the semiotic relations between 'sign', 'signifier' and 'signified' (see Barthes, R. 2000: 109-159., Kellner, D. 2001; 109-216., McGuigan, J. 1997:12-62). By common definition and used synonymously with seminology, the social science term 'semiotics' is defined as the structural study of Signs and Symbols (see Abercrombie, N. 1994:273). Thus semiotics has some influence in those areas of sociology which deal with communication in any form, for it seeks to provide a social science method for the analysis of messages, both verbal and non-verbal as in the critical context of this memory study. Within the context of this study, the Sign is representative of the iconic image of the Battle of Britain as depicted in the popular literature or film on the subject. The historical Signifier is the appropriate mythological narrative of the 'British at War' (James, L. 2002: 594-612., Paris, M. 2000:222-262) and the Signified object is the cultural presentation of this memory presence as situated in public space; in this case, the Battle of Britain Monument itself (See Ch 5). By considering the interplay between these cultural/social meaning frameworks, we can better understand the 'form' and 'content' of the BOBM as 'it' is situated in time, discourse and public space.

The Use of Ethnographic and Observational Data

Ethnographic methodology has been invaluable as it helped me the researcher to immerse myself in my difficult-to-ground subject matter. This methodology includes participant and
direct observation techniques. Similarly, I learned much about my subject matter just by being a member of some relevant organisations. I discuss how and in what context, as is relevant to the thesis narrative. These observational forms of data included the following:

- As participant observer or consumer of many, many commemorative events
- As guest of various unveiling ceremony's e.g. Armed Forces Memorial
- As member of War Memorials Trust and as member of IWM Friends society
  - Attendance at IWM Annual General Meetings
  - Volunteer duties [part time work for UKNIWM]
  - English Heritage memorial tours
  - Behind the scenes visits to museums e.g. Cabinet War Rooms.
- As member of South Atlantic Medal Association, RMA and TRBL.
- As holder of phenomenological data: i.e. experience of warfare
- As member of IISS e.g. book launches, lectures and discussion meetings

Incorporating Statistical Data in analysis

In any sociological enquiry, statistical analysis is a vital tool and this project is no different. How and in what context is clearly apparent as and when statistics are used. Thus the varied types of statistical data listed below are simply presented here to help signpost the sources of the varied data sets I subsequently employ in my overall research and analysis:

- UKNIWM Database.
- IISS: Members Armed Conflict Database and various revealing figures drawn from pertinent International Relations journals and publications: including Adelphi Papers, Survival, and relevant RUSI & MOD publications.
- Poppy Factory Statistics: Numbers of poppies sold: 34 million in 2005
- RBL Remembrance Statistics: Estimated 73% observance in 2004 & 05
- Contrasting Imperial War Museum (IWM) visiting numbers in recent years as compared to pre-1987 refurbishment.
Islands of Knowledge and Other Sources

There are many other sources of knowledge or data that I have obtained and employed to help me get a firm grasp on my subject matter. In this context and as stated, the BOBHS website is an invaluable resource, especially in terms of interviews and press releases. However, personal experience as a memorial committee member, part-time volunteer work for the UKNIWM, talking to people informally as they stop and look at a memorial and of course the systematic surveying of the capital's national memorials and mapping the specialist literature are all miscellaneous sources of knowledge, just as conversations with mentors and attendance at various conferences have been very important to the ongoing development of my views and ideas: These islands of knowledge are listed as follows:

- BBOM website, posters, brochures, advertisements, events and DVD of Unveiling.
- Documentary films, relevant Internet Sites, TV and Press-related testimonies.
- Taking in the psycho-geography of war memorials by walking the landscape.
- English Heritage 'memorial tours' of the capital's significant memorials.
- Public Records Office, Mass Observation Archive, IWM archives and UKNIWM.
- Ccommemorative Events; Including many war memorial unveilings, varied Remembrance Days over the last 30 years, Falklands 25th Anniversary, Battle of Britain Day, ‘East End at War’ (Pilot study) and battlefield tours of France & Belgium both as an individual, or as a member of Kings College War Studies class.
Pertinent Public Testimony: Including observation of visitor comment books in IWM and anecdotal evidence from my many conversations with war veterans, as well as my own personal experience of commemorating the dead of recent past wars.

In terms of what can't be directly, observed, counted or measured [intangible yet real], my main means of obtaining and analysing data are as follows. Semiotics, Comparative and Interpretive Sociology, Reflexivity, Self-Interrogation, Hermeneutics and Textual Readings:

- Interpretive analysis of image, text, discourse, form and narrative content.
- Comparative analysis of various historical data sets and cultural trends.
- Interpretive and content analysis of commemorative social actions observed.
- Cultural Studies analysis of varied remembrance observations.
- Comparative analysis with other post-Cold War monuments in the Capital.
  - These included: The Abandoned Soldier, Women at War, Memorial Gate, Animals at War and the new 'Armed Forces' and 'Australian' memorials.

**Analysis and Interpretation of Case Study Microcosm**

In terms of my overarching analysis of the various data sets obtained and in summary of this 'methodology chapter', we can now infer that the analytical aspect of the overall research process is to be located throughout the narrative of the thesis and that the thematic content of this thesis is informed by selective cleavages of Theory introduced thus far and in subsequent chapters. In terms of a 'post disciplinary' approach and thinking within the many philosophies of social science, this also includes employing critical reflexivity and contemporary understandings of hermeneutics, as a way to help in the analysis of my concrete and conceptual subject matter i.e. in employing experience and sociology of knowledge as analytical frameworks used to enable a reflexive principle of discovery. Similarly, I employ personal experience of past war to help challenge or critique the 'noble lies of war'. Indeed, we apply this idea of self interrogation throughout.
Therefore, many islands or types of knowledge are to be employed to help analyse, interpret and contextualise the varied social processes and mnemonic practices observed in the case study investigation. This will enable interpretations of data within the broader narratives on the social character and relations between modernity, war and memory. To better explain the methodological contribution of the research design in these terms, I must re-cap the project goals and aims. As stated, the overall methodological goal of the project is to conduct ‘exploratory research’ (see Tilly, 2003:344) into a very specific memory phenomenon [see Table 1: Ch 3], which takes into account what some critical theorists would describe as a ‘totality’ of perspective (Sayer, 2001). Put simply from this social science perspective, marriage the social institution, and marriage the human experience are two very different entities, yet both entities are understood as part of the totality of what it is to be married. In this project, the same sort of conceptual approach is applied to the study of ‘war’ (Shaw, 1991., Wright, 1964., Howard 1976) and ‘militarism’ (Mann, M. 1987).

Drawing on the influential views of historical sociologist Michael Mann (1987) in The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism, one models modern militarism as a set of beliefs, views, attitudes and social practices which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity. As Mann quite rightly points out “this is a broader definition than is common among scholars, as it qualifies people other than John Wayne as militarists. But in an age when war threatens our survival, it is as well to understand any behaviour, however mild in appearance, which makes war seem natural or desirable”.

In terms of outlining this project’s methodological contribution to the study of war and its public memory as a social totality, it should be made clear that I have not chosen to approach this difficult-to-ground research topic from this somewhat Cubist perspective out of choice, but out of pure methodological necessity, as I have recently come to learn from my ongoing research process that ‘War’ like crime or religion is a ‘rendezvous’ subject.
matter. In short, war is a mature subject which has many ways of being seen. War is a state of mind and a practice; it is both a process and an act. Indeed, when writing my ‘war studies’ research Masters thesis, this was the methodological and conceptual problem I set for myself; how best to research war as a social fact and agency of humanity and thus here I have argued from the premise that the social phenomena of war can only be adequately grasped when viewed from overlapping perspectives within a modelled totality.

In this study, a modelled totality perspective equates to a re-consideration of war and its memory within the all-encompassing ‘ethical environment’ of late modernity (see Blackburn 2001). However, acquiring and grounding such a reflexive perspective in research practice is very complex, because as we now know any multilayered viewing of one’s subject matter requires the mixing up of epistemological frameworks and the crossing of ontological barriers. Thus to fully understand how the project may contribute in methodological terms, I have to explain how the project overcame such complex problems.

In this ‘mixing up’ or ‘crossing barriers’ regard, I have drawn on three main methodological texts that have helped immensely in my research design. From the work of Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (2003), I applied what they term the ‘magpie approach’ to Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry and Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials. In short, I have appropriated many key ideas and advice from the varied golden nuggets of research practice and advice contained in their influential three-volume methodological reference. From Mats Alvesson and Kaj Skoldberg (2000), I got the ‘Critical Theory’ research design idea of a ‘Reflexive Methodology’, which would enable ‘the intellectualisation of research method’ and in the process, enable me to follow a ‘template’ research strategy that would be able to incorporate varied methodological and social science tools, within the overlapping frameworks of a pertinent case study investigation.
The intellectual argument for this formulation of a research design is that the inherent flexibility of a 'reflexive methodology' provides an appropriate social science means for the envisaged 'case study' investigation into Contemporary War Monumentality. In Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research the co-authors (2000) address the four currents of methodology within the philosophies of Social Science inquiry which they regard as important inspiration for the production of a 'reflexive methodology'. These are 'empirically' oriented currents (in particular grounded theory such as database analysis), hermeneutics (in this case applying reflexivity and sociology of knowledge), critical theory (i.e. a totality perspective situated within a late modernity context) and post-modernism (addressing the varied issues of power, representation, patronage and discourse). In doing so, Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) put forward a 'novel' research design argument:

"These four orientations indicate the reflexive areas in which the social science researcher should be intellectually engaged, regardless of the specific research methods he or she prefers. The reader may perhaps regard as incommensurable the different theoretical positions linked to the four themes introduced above and in some cases one could easily suggest they are. However it is still possible to envisage research strategies which reinterpret ideas from one or more of these positions and thus transform them and put them in new contexts. Admittedly there are considerable differences between our four orientations, but the point here is not to integrate typical research from, for example, grounded theory and post-modernism, but to try to abstract principles and ideas from hermeneutics, critical theory and post-modernism, with a view to endowing research with a more reflexive character while also stressing the importance of the empirical" (2000: 28).

In the context of this case study investigation, applying such a reflexive methodology means employing what John Cresswell (2003) terms a 'mixed method' approach to social science research. In this investigation, the mixed method approach to data collection includes, direct and participant observation, semi-structured interviewing, and survey questionnaires, as well as statistical and thematic-based analysis. The aim is not just to produce a snapshot of social reality represented by the data, although inevitably this is what we do, but also to construct what Denzin (2003) terms a 'brocalage representation of the social world', which has many epistemological view points and deep ontological layers.
In research practice, this means that the varied forms of data one has collected from the field research [see Part 3] will be augmented in collation, analysis and presentation with interpretive sociology approaches, most closely associated with Max Weber’s notions of *Verstehen* explanation and Durkheim’s understandings of how ‘collective representations’ or ‘social facts’ constrain and inform the individual in terms of social structure [see Part 4]. Such an approach will allow this research process to unpack and deconstruct the social significance of the BOBM in relation to the wider contours of the commemorative whole.

However, in formulating a methodological strategy of research, I also build on what I have already grasped from past research projects and thus complement this reflexive design with the social science philosophy of Andrew Sayer (2001). Sayer’s emantionist approach to sociological research advocates a viable form of *Critical Realism*. Fine-tuning the seminal work of Roy Bhaskar (1975) in *A Realist Theory of Science* this diverse field of social science inquiry stratifies ‘social reality’ into what is termed by practitioners as the ‘empirical’, the ‘real’ and the ‘actual’. In the grounded context of this limited study, this stratification of the ‘social’ refers to our observation of war in terms of modelling and unpacking the 15 rules of risk transfer war. With general regard to social memory phenomena, this stratification means investigating in terms of examining collective will, cultural means and the memory source of collective memory. Finally, in empirical terms of investigating a war memorial’s material and moral presence in public space, this means unpacking the actual selection, form, content and consumption of the case study, all of which was fully expanded upon within the written-up narrative of these first three chapters.

However, in terms of maintaining coherency, the fluidity of such an approach causes some other methodological problems and means that in obtaining data for such an analysis, it is necessary to apply what Sayer (2001) terms a ‘post disciplinary’ research mentality. Within such a transformative mentality, the interdisciplinary theories and philosophies of social
science are seen as a type of conceptual toolbox which is employed, as is here, to help conduct a phased, but sequential and thus transformative research process which is conducted at different ontological levels and from differing epistemological positions. This means of course, that there can be no single research question and that varied and mixed social science methods are required to conduct the investigation as explained above. In this overlapping context, Sayer (2001) also suggests that regardless of one’s personal preference of ‘research method’ one should be creative in one’s research endeavor and so employ whatever methodological tool is required for the particular research task at hand.

In terms of summing up: the many overlapping methodological considerations I have just highlighted above, has meant re-designing a complex and sophisticated methodological strategy as a general template for conducting a grounded theory investigation into a relevant memory phenomena [see table 1], which could then be conceptually situated within the wider context of established thematic inquires ‘on war’, in order to help test out the provisional hypothesis of the project. Taken as a whole, this is a somewhat novel and untested approach to the social science study of war and its collective memory and I am hoping that this ‘triangulation’ type of ‘mixed method research template’ combined with a ‘reflexive methodology’ and ‘post disciplinary mentality’ will help provide other social memory researchers with a viable methodological blueprint for further research into this woefully under-researched area of commemorative culture. In terms of the stated methodological contribution, and in following Sayer’s (2001) Critical Realist template, I have attempted to build on the shoulders of some established social theorising on war and its memory, by formulating and conducting my own grounded investigation into a specific war memory phenomenon that may well provide interpretive and empirical insight into the social role, cultural purpose and ideological function of British war memory. While much depends on the ‘peer review process’, at this stage, and in very specific methodological terms, this ‘gaining of insight’ goal, is to be the main methodological aim of this research.
Part 3

Presenting the Observational Data

Having now established the thematic, observational and methodological parameters of the project's overarching critique of the normative relations between past war and present conflict, the narrative is now ready to present a grounded and situated snapshot of the BOBM. This will provide the observational data for our proposed analysis of CWM. However, before this final transformative phase of the project can start in Part 4, there is still some important descriptive work to do in the next two chapters of Part 3. First, we need to ground what Shills (1975) and Burk (2001) term the 'institutional presence of social phenomena under study' - in this case WWII nostalgia militarism - and secondly I must factually describe the BOBM microcosm. In so doing, we can then begin to address and/or answer many of the fact-finding questions that were identified in the previous discussions. To this end, we begin Chapter 4 with some situated considerations of WWII.

"Culture is produced and consumed within social life. Thus, particular cultural artefacts and practices must be situated within the social relations of production and reception in which culture is produced, distributed and consumed in order to be properly understood and interpreted. Contextualising cultural forms and audiences in historically specific situations helps illuminate how cultural artefacts reflect or reproduce concrete social relations and conditions – or even oppose and attempt to transform them".


In this situated context of cultural production and societal consumption, Part 3 will also endeavor to build on what has been presented in our previous discussions. Here, the narrative not only provides the introductory description of the case study monument, as drawn from various public domain and social science sources, but also addresses many of the fact-findings questions highlighted in chapter 3. Taken together, the grounded observations of Part 3 are presented to help establish the institutionalised, or self-evident 'duty to remember' perspective identified earlier, but with direct relation to what Edkins (2003) would term the conventional vantage point of 'linear time narration' of warfare. As we will see, this traditional vista is a selective but very popular image of the 'British at War', which is located within historically rooted and culturally embedded social meaning frameworks i.e. grounded in public discourse via the mnemonic practice of social memory.

In this regard, the literature reviews I now present helps provide the historical and social science perspectives on war memory i.e. our points of departure, by which we may begin to further, analyse and/or interpret the BOBM microcosm. The many examples, ideas and varied islands of knowledge presented will thus help us better understand the BOBM as it is received in public space. The final chapter of Part 3 will also help locate, explain and contextualise the psycho-geography of the monument as it currently stands in cultural discourse and time. In short, Part 3 identifies, locates and grounds the observational foundations of the inquiry in preparation for the subsequent analysis/ interpretation that is conducted in Part 4. We begin with the aforementioned 'war and memory' debate which will help us contextualise the institutional presence of the social phenomena under investigation. Considering institutional presence will help us identify how many in modern Britain may wish to traditionally view this particular institutional presence of WWII memory. This will inform us of how this BOBM storyteller may be understood in normative terms of re-affirming ethnocentric scripts, cultural narratives or public space discourses on warfare.
Chapter 4

Exploring the Institutional Presence of WWII Memory

"WWII has become the big war wielded to justify the waging of small wars and, as such, an all purpose rhetorical crutch, a lofty piety, a wide-screen epic constantly remade and recast. One can scarcely score a point about terrorism, geopolitical struggle, or domestic politics without relying on 'the good war' for an ominous parallel" (Walcott. J. 2004:71).

In post Cold War Britain, it is not unreasonable to suggest that WWII memory has achieved a kind of iconic, even sacred status, and that the popular narratives of Dunkirk, D Day, The Blitz and the Battle of Britain are this nation's 'core' social memories of 'the war' (see Connolly, 2004: 1-27). In this 'Institutional Presence' (IP) context and at this time of writing - just after the 60th anniversary cycle of WWII (1999-2005) - the collective memory of the Good War would appear to be manifest in almost every aspect of British cultural life.

Watch the local, regional or national news broadcasts, or read any of the syndicated newspapers over a period of, say a week; tap in the search terms 'WWII' on any mainstream internet search engine, or better still, visit the BBC, MOD or Channel Four's websites and do the same; visit one of the many newly-opened or refurbished war themed museums around the country such as the IWM, IWMN or the Eden Camp; go to almost any of the major art galleries such as the Tate Modern or Britain; look at a recent best-sellers list or better still, browse around any franchised book shop; go to the cinema, glance at your TV planner or even consider what blockbuster DVD to watch and you will no doubt find varied popular narratives of WWII memory featuring heavily on the menu.

In this much generalised IP context, WWII memory can arguably be said to hold a pride of place in Britain's commemorative culture. Higher even than that of the Great War of 1914-1918 or, Lord Nelson's famous victory at Trafalgar. However, as we have seen, much of the West's mediated discourse on this type of war memory presence tends not to question certain presumptions that elevate what is remembered to a powerful place in our symbolic...
universe, or more importantly why the ‘Good War’ (Terkel, S. 1985) seems so important to the present ontological sense of national well-being (see Winters, J. 1995., 2000). Indeed, it would seem from observations that because of the sacred status of WWII, we as a nation, like many other combatant nations, are inclined not to challenge the selectivity, appropriation, determinativeness and significance of this ‘past war’ for the present era.¹

In this respect, David Bevan (2006) points out that the societal prominence of many monumentality projects has increased in direct proportion to culturally perceived efforts to destroy them. Consider the feverish public debates and party discussions in both Houses of Commons, concerning what war memory should, or should not be included in our school curricula, and similar concerns surrounding the role of WWII memory in the Home Office’s *Life in the United Kingdom* view of ‘A Journey to Citizenship’ (Home Office, 2005).

According to cultural historian Malcolm Smith (2000), “the problem” with this selective “nostalgia of past war”² is that when the popular memory of ‘the war’ is invoked as the basis for group membership — “as is often the case in public discourse whether through shared memory of the experience or identification with those who have suffered and sacrificed” — then the group’s identity or collective sense of self, and even the individual’s identification with the Good War, are presumed to be “self-evident” (Smith, 2000:111-130).

In terms of considering the social memory issues of persistence, malleability and contestation, this type of ‘self-evident assumption’ is what this chapter will explore via a 

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² Like the public discourse of ‘Dogtag Nostalgia’ this recent cultural history discourse has a very similar descriptive terminology which in very, very generic terms describes a simple or unsophisticated or ‘black and white’ cultural images and narratives of the Second World War i.e. as good versus evil or right over might etc, (see also James Wolcott. 2004:71-73).
selective review of the literature. In this respect, collective memories of past war, like history, will always be partial and problematic (see Bevan 2006: 18., Lowenthal, 2005), because “the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting” (Kundera, M. 1988., Ricoeur, P. 2006: 96-120). It is thus pertinent to begin our exploration of IP by considering the integration of WWII: That is to say, the degree to which the presence of this memory has to be taken into account as a social actor within the normative order of a civil society: to do that, we must engage with the war memory debate.

Engaging with the Debate - Imagining Community

Within the broadest context of the social memory debate, established and well-respected research into nationalism, myth, collective memory and ethnic identity, all influence the current understandings as to the social, historical and/or political significance of this sort of institutionalised memory presence (For specific examples see Anderson, B. 1991., Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. 1983., Nora, P. 1989., Winters, J. 1995., Halbwachs, M. in Coser, L. 1992., Smith, A. D. 1998). Within these broad parameters, many social science researchers would strongly dispute any cultural discourse that suggests that the meaning of collective memory, myth or national identity are non-negotiable, ascribed entities, static in time, or fixed to some self-evident ‘historical fact’ (Carr, E. 1990: 56-97). Accordingly, and in keeping with the ‘structuration of war’ premise of chapter 1; Shaw’s ‘past war’ thesis articulated in chapter 2 and in compliance with the ‘reflexive methodology’ of chapter 3, this analysis starts from the social memory premise of memory as a negotiated presence combined with the phenomenological view that memory is of something and for someone.

In the negotiated context of WWII memory, cultural historian Geoff Eley (1997) outlines in the foreword to a series of conference papers entitled War and Memory in the Twentieth Century how the recent post Cold War era [prior to 9/11] had seen an unprecedented boom...
in WWII memory phenomena. His comparative observations suggest this war memory presence is variable to the present temporality of late-modernity and thus the normative influences of this 'official memory narrative' are almost palpable to the situated individual.

Similarly, in the preface to the same discussion, social historian Ken Lunn (1997) identified the British national events marking the fiftieth anniversaries of the war as a cycle of commemorative events, which began in September 1989 and ended in August 1995 with the anniversary of VJ Day. He suggested that such a sustained popular expression of collective remembrance has no precedent within recent British history. In using French historian Pierre Nora's (1989: 7-24) theorising about 'historical transitions' and 'the shifting realms of memory' he argues that these 'practical ideologies' as he terms them, were essential to a self-fragmenting British consciousness trying to reaffirm its shared norms and values while at the same time, trying to renegotiate some sense of national identity in the uncertain wake of a 40-year Cold War. These Britain's so called "confusing periods" which Barbra Mitzsal (2003) clearly refers to in *Travels of Social Remembering*, although the eye of Lunn's pre-9/11 memory work was on the increased acceleration of globalisation.

Martin Evans, co-editor of the above compilation and professor of European Studies would seem to support this cultural history theory that collective memory, identity and temporality cannot be conveniently detached from each other. His opening argument illuminates how British attitudes to 'the war' have changed and evolved as Britain the nation state has gone from global empire, to bi-polar NATO alliance member and finally to interdependent state actor in a multi-polar system with a singular dominant hegemony. Evans' argument points out that during the nineteenth century, whether it is Trafalgar, Waterloo or the Crimean campaign, the collective memory of a past war soon lost public purchase and even the men who fell for their country were quickly forgotten (See also Furlong, J. 2002: 1-35). In contrast, he points to the current public interest in these particular 'past wars' which in turn
is clearly overshadowed by the hundreds of thousands of WWII memory consumers who attended the 'official' Victory over Japan celebrations in Aug 1995, and the 1.5 million who were present in Hyde Park for the VE Day commemorations, in May 1995 [London]. The point I wish to make here, is that while the contents or narrative of WWII memory may be contested or malleable, the memory of WWII still has much residue and meaning for many.

The Military History Debate

In the 'Military History' [MH] context of the social memory debate there are some insightful and perceptive historical studies, which have also influenced the current understandings as to this social significance of WWII memory. Within this specialist field, there are varied historical perspectives on the subject of commemorating the dead of war. These include oral, social, cultural, European, comparative, total and contemporary history approaches. MH memory studies mainly look at monumentality and commemoration from a selection and consumption perspective, i.e. at the selectivity of certain popular narratives of war in commemorative culture (King 1998., Llyod 1994, Boorman 1995, Borg, A. 1991), and by association, they must also consider the omissions, absences or silences identified as inherent in 'official narratives of war memory' (Gregory 1994, Winters 1995., Fussell 1977).

Alex King's (1998) comprehensive review of this specialist literature suggests that such writers have discussed public commemoration of those killed by war historically and comparatively, and goes on to suggest that despite their varying approaches to the subject matter, all seem to fall into two broad groups (see King 1998: 6). Some argue that the principal force behind the public commemoration of war dead was and still is the affirmation and propagation of political ideas about past wars and the nations which fought them (Olick 2003., Hynes 1990., Mosse 1990). In short, the political intentions of the state are what socially inform the institutional/ structural imperatives of commemorative culture.
Others would argue (Edkins 2003., Lloyd 1998., Gregory 1994., Winters 1995), from a psychological perspective, that the human need to express and resolve the emotional traumas caused by war is the principle force shaping the commemoration of our war dead.

To locate this debate in sociological terms, MH studies suggest that it is either the political intentions of the state, or psychological needs of the individual and group that inform the cultural form and moral content of commemorative culture and thus the societal meaning one may associate with the war memorial. Both these MH understandings have been very influential in my thinking on the institutional presence of WWII memory. As a consequence, foundational knowledge drawn from many of the MH studies referenced thus far, have been used in this case study investigation, to help illuminate important political and psychological insights about the functionality of war memory. Indeed, these MH insights are in part what we have been contextualising, so we are now in a position to employ such insights, in order to help better understand the form and content of the BOB monument [see Part 4]. However, it should be noted that the conceptual primacy given to a single psychological drive or political intention of the state, as in the above referenced texts, only serves to better highlight a further need for a sociological perspective that when combined with said revealing insights, can provide a more complete account of the role, purpose and function of WWII memory, as situated in public discourse, time and space.

Accordingly, the most important insight one can draw from a distinct military historical perspective is that in order to better locate, ground and thus more comprehensively investigate the institutional presence of the case study microcosm, one must also look at the social history of WWII memory, with relation to the mythology of ‘the war’ in order to fully comprehend this past war’s sacred status in the historical consciousnesses. To contextualise this social history aspect of the debate and to locate the study with particular relation to the ‘ascendant meaning frameworks’ of ‘the war’ this study will employ the most
recent work of Mark Connolly (2004) as a means to help engage in this important aspect of
the war memory debate. In this context, 'ascendant meaning frameworks' would include
historicised myths of war and nationhood that can be said to have helped constitute and/or
maintain popular memories of this particular past war (in James, L. 2000., Paris, M. 2002).

The Social History Debate

This highly relevant aspect of the war memory debate explores how the image, myth and
collective memory of the Second World War, continues to affect and influence British
contemporary life in the 21st century. Here, Connolly (2004) considered why "British
mythology of the war holds such an important place in British culture, history and identity".
Through historical analysis of various cultural mediums, [comics, literature, film and art] he
sought to demonstrate that a recognisable collective memory of the Second World War
does actually exist, by revealing the "depth and breadth of a national consensus on the
cultural image of this iconic war" i.e. as seen through the sheer homogeneity of the cultural
artefacts that constitute this significant memory in the public sphere (see Connolly, 2004).

In this most recent work on the subject, We can take it: Britain and the Memory of the
Second World War Connolly illuminates how the British myth and popular memory of 'the
war' was created during the war from lived-experience, rooted in historical myths of British
nationhood and maintained afterwards, through cultural mediums and artefacts of
commemorative culture such as film, comics, art, literature and toys.3 In Connolly's (2004)
analysis of these "popular cultural forms of WWII memory", it was never assumed that this
memory and its associated myth was owned and perpetuated by a particular group within

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3 It should be noted at this stage that what is missing in this research, with specific regards to this study, is a
consideration of war memorials as a representative cultural artefact of WWII myth and memory. In this narrow
context of WWII monumentality, Connolly reinforces the academic rationale of this study by suggesting that
'the memorial forms in which this particular interpretation of memory has been handed down and the media in
which is carried need to be studied' (2004:3). This is the conventional 'fill the gap' rationale of the project.
British society; or that popular memory could be ascribed absolutely and without qualification to all British people. However, like in this study, it was argued that the broad outlines and salient points can be easily applied, collectively because there are in actuality many sub-collective memories, contributing to one over-arching national myth of 'the War'.

Like any national mythology, the constitution of this 'good war' myth defies precise definition, but in this memory study it is generally associated with what Connolly (2004) terms the 'big facts' of 'the War'. These 'big facts of WWII' are what this study employs to help ground what the BOB Monument was in part created to communicate, or signify in public space testimony and representation: a description of these 'big facts' is as follows:

"... in 1939 Britain falls into war ill prepared and lacking a genuine leader. In 1940, Britain gained the leader it deserved in Winston Churchill, faced humiliating defeat in France but thanks to an extraordinary rallying of the nation, an armada of small boats across the Channel to rescue the soldiers on the beaches of Dunkirk. Britain then stood alone, without allies, surrounded by the enemy. The Battle of Britain was won by The Few in the skies over the rolling countryside of southern England. Defeats in this battle forced the Germans into an indiscriminate bombing campaign. Far from causing the collapse of Britain, the people drew together in that even tighter bond and they embarked fully on their people's war. Surviving the Blitz did not bring about victory, and Britain went on to suffer defeats in virtually every theatre of war until Montgomery came along and won a decisive victory in the desert. After that, with new allies, it was a glorious adventure. On D-Day, Monty led the way back to France, and the war culminated in the suicide of Hitler and the defeat of the Third Reich. In the Pacific, the Americans dropped an atomic bomb, thus ending the war completely, but it has been said that events in the Far East have not had a prominent profile in the British myth." (see Connolly, M. 2004:1).

The salient points of Connolly's (2004) understanding of WWII mythology are representative of what is now commonly termed British notions of 'fair play' or 'sense and sensibility' (see Milstaed, D. 1999: 407-504); in that the mythological narrative of the war - as interpreted by Connolly - invokes the British sensibility to stand up to 'bullying aggressors'. According to some (see James, L. 2002., Paris, M. 2000), this contemporary myth of the war is substantiated and constituted in popular culture, because the selective British history of war demonstrates, 'right always overcomes might' in the end (see Liddle Hart, 1933., Freedman, L. 2001., Lunn, 1997., Bond, 2001., Smith, 2000., Shaw, 1997).
Lawrence James' (2002) historical analysis of the 'British at War' locates Connolly's 'right against might' understanding of WWII mythology in historical context. In the highly respected *Warrior Race: A History of the British at War*, James explicitly suggested that Britain's mythological narrative of past war tells a war story of 'good against evil' which, in terms of present conflict, helps assure situated members of society that with God on the nations' side, Britain will always be victorious in war, as long as it stands "united together against the outside aggressor". Other historically located myths of 'the British at war' which James (2002) highlights in common with Connolly's (2004) interpretation, are that the British nation will always start off badly in war, because "we Britain's are intrinsically a peaceful race and not an overt militaristic or bellicose nation" (see Orwell, 1941: 252-278).

Similarly, James (2002) identifies another common collective memory, or cultural narrative of the historicised British war myth. This cultural narrative suggests that the 'few' of this 'privileged island race' will face overwhelming odds from 'outsiders and foreigners' and that in such times of threat and hardship, the nation will all pull together with a cheerful resilience and what would now be termed 'British Bulldog' character as in the Dunkirk Spirit or Blitz Mentality (James, L. 2002: 594-612). As we have seen, some have used the term 'dog tag nostalgia', to describe the current constitution of this well-established war memory narrative; others suggest 'nostalgia militarism' to highlight the political function of such war memory and yet others use the term 'commemorative fever' to help describe the current public interest in, and societal extent of such memory phenomena. However, in Charles Tilly's (2003) exploratory terms of observing and describing what actually exists in the situated context of public space, discourse and time, I prefer the more sociological term 'public war memory' to help us grasp the continuity of such war memory narratives.

Michael Paris, in *Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture 1850-2000*, also showed the societal continuity of this public war memory. As stated earlier, Paris's (2000)
view of British war memory in popular culture, illuminates how our ‘past wars’ are mostly seen in public narratives as ‘just’ and the men who fought them as ‘heroic agents of retribution who took up the sword of justice only when peaceful methods of resolution had failed’ (Paris, M. 2000:237). This popular narrative of the ‘British at War’ is the epitome of ‘manifest destiny’ and ‘standing up to the bully’ (see also Sheffield, P. 2001: 1-87) and is one of the historical reasons why memory of the ‘good war’ holds such public purchase. When looked at from these varying ascendant contexts, one can indeed identify the salient memory points of ‘the war’ and thus clearly identify how the overarching memory of the ‘good war’ can be broken down into various ‘sub memories’ for further detailed analysis.

In this sub-memory context, Connolly’s (2004) insight for our engagement with the debate links these specific war myths of British nationhood to the popular memories of the Second World War. For example, those of evacuation, seafaring and sea power as in Dunkirk and the Battle of the Atlantic; resilience and stoicism as in the collective experience of The Blitz and individual bravery of British fighting troops in the face of overwhelming odds, as in the Battle of Britain and the Far East campaigns. Connolly concludes that “along with its other 1940’s stablemates, the collective memory of the Battle of Britain, which is the focus of this enquiry, is vital to the contemporary sense of British national identity” (2004:128). In the third chapter, entitled The fewest of a few: The Battle of Britain, June to September 1940, Connolly describes this particular WWII memory in the following way (Connolly, 2004:95).

“the Battle of Britain is a potent reminder of our finest hour, it was the moment when the very few did their bit against the many. It helped perpetuate the perception that England is indeed the new Jerusalem, a green and pleasant land blessed by summer suns. The struggle in the skies of southern England seem to provide further proof of the qualities of the island race in its continual struggle against foreign tyrants. In this moment of destiny, Churchill deployed his rhetorical skills to create the blueprint of history. Moreover, the battle revealed, yet again, that the best way to fight a war is from an initially awkward position with the odds stacked against the home team. The British national myth cast it in this way, the experience did nothing to disprove it and the British have remained deaf to alternative explanations”

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4 See also Arthur Marwick, Print, Pictures, and Sound; The Second World War and the British Experience (1982:135-153) which looked at how these British mythologies are reinforced in film & television. Geoff Hurd (1984:1-50) National Fiction: World War Two in British Film and Television which looked at how a cultural sense of the past is constructed in our present.
With specific regards to our engagement with the social memory debate, it must be said that because we as a nation have 'remained deaf to alternative explanations' (Connolly, M. 2004: 95) does not imply that the mythology of British nationhood and the collective memory of 'the war' have remained static in time, or in societal meaning. Indeed, as we have and shall see, Connolly's (2004) work illuminates the fluidity of the WWII mythology in recent British history and demonstrates with social history examples how the popular memory of 'the war' has changed and continues to evolve some 65 years after the event.

Structured, shaped and channelled within the patronage of the state, the so called 'big facts' of World War Two have had two main manifestations since 1945. One Conservative, which emphasises the leadership of Churchill and cultural uniqueness of being British; the other, with left wing features, emphasises the 'people's war' as the foundation of modern Britain, the European Union and the Welfare State (see Smith, M. 2000: 91-110., Marwick, A. 1970: 329-447). The crucially important point of continuity between these two party political faces of 'the war' is that they both very much conform to the mythological, historical and popular cultural image of the 'British at War' (James, 2002., Paris, M. 2000).

In Connolly's (2004) final chapter, entitled Gotcha!: recasting the Second World War, 1945 to 2002, the narrative shifts to help illuminate the historical and social forces at play behind this ongoing evolution of Britain's popular memory of the 'good war'. Here, Connolly suggests that since 1945, Britain has entered into a process of decline and readjustment and that this new declining process was, in part, a direct result of the Second World War.

"Britain has been forced to accept the loss of empire, the loss of economic superpower status, the loss of naval supremacy, and the need to see European nations as partners. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Britain's manufacturing days were declining and then suffered a catastrophic blow from the policies of the Conservative government of the 1980s. Realigning itself as a service sector economy has provided some stability for Britain but the need to produce and export remains a problem. Alongside this, the nation has witnessed great demographic and racial changes, which include a questioning of the union itself. The United Kingdom today is a much looser institution than it was in 1939 or 45; separate parliaments represent Scotland and Wales and Northern Ireland has redesigned its own assembly" (Connolly 2004. pages 288-297).
“Nevertheless, Britain still plays an influential role in world affairs. Its armed forces are respected for their professionalism and have been present in many of the world’s hotspots. The shadow of the Second World War is a vital prop to this image as a victim nation…” “As victor nation in 1945, Britain held a reputation as a military power and gained a permanent place on United Nations Security Council, a position the nation has striven to maintain. This reflects our continuing appetite for major player status, but the maintenance of that position depends largely on US approval to sustain. At the same time, Britain’s closer ties with the European partners have resulted in some realignments of foreign and defence policies. Surprisingly this process has served to confirm the nation’s military credentials. Despite the much larger army and navy of France, Britain is the soldier of the European Union and Tony Blair has been just as forceful in this role, as his Conservative predecessors. Culturally the Second World War underpins this position” (Connolly 2004. pages 288-297).

Connolly (2004: 268) concluded, from this social history understanding of the ‘national decline’, that the ‘endless re-running of the Second World War through the media in every way possible’ has provided Britain with a historical ‘security blanket’ in a changing world. As a prime ‘past war’ example, he cites the Falklands War of 1982, during which time, the British press and TV media freely compared the ‘national crisis situation of the Falklands Conflict’ to the 1940 ‘big facts’ of the Second World War and even suggested that Britain’s subsequent victory was perceived to have restored the ‘great power’ status of Britain – ‘which had been so ignominiously lost since 1945’ (Connolly 2004:11., See also GUMG. 1985). In the more recent post Cold War context, the re-evaluation of the nation’s sense of self is understood as linked through cultural and institutional discourse to the Conservative face of ‘the war’, which according to some observations, still holds much of the cultural purchase in ‘New Labour’s’ political led culture (see Smith, M. 2000:111-130).

However, although Connolly’s analogy with a ‘security blanket’ in a changing world is very insightful, with regards to advancing our understanding of the institutional presence of WWII memory, within the ongoing debate, there is a big difference between a ‘security blanket’ theory of art, literature, film and comics and this project’s memory enquiry into role, purpose and functionality of WWII memory, as situated in public space. This is not to say that the war memorial does not provide a type of ontological comfort in the same sense as Connolly’s historical security blanket, but the main difference becomes apparent.
Developing the Social Science aspect of the Debate

Located outside the dominant historical tradition of war memory research and within this much broader interdisciplinary social science context, there are many research studies, which have looked indirectly at the 'form' and 'content' of past war and its collective memory - as this relationship is represented in public space and cultural discourse. These varied studies include media and news studies (Chomsky 2001., Dahlgren 1998., Allan 1999), literary studies (Chambers, R. 2003), film studies (Mast, 1992., Macdonald, 1996), visual cultural studies (Evans & Hall 1999), as well as art history studies (Collins, M. 2008).

However, the relatively new History and Memory Journal is considered "the main flag bearer of the social science development within the debate" (See Eley in Lunn 1997: x). The home of the journal is Tel Aviv University, which is again significant when one considers the purpose of this journal in relation to this study's investigatory aims and thus its major influence on one's social science thinking; for example, the journal was designed to raise fundamental questions about different processes of memorialisation. In particular, cultural studies research investigates the various 'sites of memory', exploring 'public' ways of remembering, expressed in Film, television, public monuments, museums, war crimes trials, as well as more 'private' ways of remembering, such as testimonies, letters and diaries. As such, this journal and the Lunn (1997) text is identified as a pool of knowledge.5

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5 In this context, the interdisciplinary approaches the social science bibliographies have opened up have been an invaluable secondary source for this research project. Although it should be understood that the main impetus of this influence has...
Similarly, drawing specifically on the architectural theory aspect of the debate (see Bevan 2006), we can easily deduce much from the cultural analysis of the ‘form and content’ of a collective memory presence [see Part 4: Chapter 7]. For example, we will demonstrate how the symbolic image and cultural narrative of ‘the war’ - most commonly associated with the erection of post Cold War WWII memorials - can be said to institutionalise and generalise not the collective experience of ‘the war’ as lived by the vast majority of those participants, but the cultural narrative socially constructed with the slow passing of time.

Here, I have already tried to argue that this cultural and social process helps form or re-affirm morally acceptable categories of war with direct relation to the legitimisation inherent in the noble lies of war memory. However, it should be made clear at this point and in this political or normative context, that memorials in themselves are not political in nature or constitution, but are politicised by why and how they are built, regarded, used, consumed and even destroyed (see Bevan 2006:12). As a pertinent example [see below], think of the inference when the iconic statue of Saddam Hussein was being toppled at the very end of the Iraq War - who was doing the destruction and why, was what made this iconic monument political. This is why our analysis must take into account the cultural studies’ understanding of a war memory presence; which is of ‘something’, and thus for ‘someone’.

This understanding of war memory does not mean that the design and production of war monumentality is free from ideological content: quite the opposite, it is saturated with it, just like any form of cultural art, or public space testimony. In the image below, we see the ideology of ‘regime change’ represented in the literal destruction of monumental presence. It is satire, because it is ironic, in that the virtue of a built recorder to this method of ideological production is the apparent permanence of say granite, or Portland stone. Here,
Bevan (2006) has again pointed out, “it is the ever changing content of meaning brought to brick and stone, rather than some inbuilt quality of the materials or the way they are assembled, that need to be emphasised”. Accordingly, this is our main focus in Part 4, because “fundamentally it is the reason for a memorial presence, or indeed, absence”, that really matters in our analysis of current relations between past wars and present conflicts.

In this respect, we have already discussed the issues of reproduction and identity associated with the mnemonic practices involved in commemorative culture and suggested that it is within such social meaning frameworks that a collective, memory group or individual, can internally organise not only one’s personal feelings about the ethics of war and our private losses to it, but also one’s individual or collective sense of place in the wider world of change and continuity (Winters 1995, Borg 1991, Moriarty 1991:1-3).
These are the overlapping 'structure and agency' issues we will be considering in chapter 7 when we begin to look in detail at the form and content of the Battle of Britain Monument. Accordingly, we can develop our debate and suggest that, in mnemonic practice and social process, war monumentality is our most explicit public form and cultural expression of public war memory phenomena and as such, is a pivotal aspect of the commemorative whole. Using the monument as a case study, one can thus apply these varied types of analyses in various ways to consider the form and content of WWII collective memory. Of course to get the best benefit from such analysis, we would need to re-locate and ground our considerations within the context of current debates on present conflicts: At time of writing – 5 years after the start of the Iraq War - this includes national retrospection on war.

Here, a consideration of Coker's (2005) 'post heroic' argument is revealing, in that the interplay between 'signs' of the heroic can reveal that in contrast to the 1920-1935 monumentality trend, when over 15,000 memorials were erected which epitomised collective loss, suffering and pain (See Furlong 2002: 1-35., Borg, A. 1991) today's interplay between sign, signifier and the signified tends to marginalise such traumatic meaning frameworks and value uplifting episodes of bravery, participation and unity (see Connell, M. 2004., Winters, J. 2000). As we will see, we can clearly observe this relatively new interplay in CWM projects, whether or not the political face of the monument is based on representations of the 'few' or the 'people's war' (see Smith, M. 2000:111-129). In this 'uplifting' context, some social commentators would go as far as to suggest that Western WWII monumentality projects are nothing more than the; "...kitschification of history, the Disneyfication of national experience and the anesthesia of popular memory set stone". 

6As stated, this is why I specifically chose this particular cultural medium of British war memory, as opposed to that of remembrance rituals and ceremonies, or even large scale commemorative events. Indeed, both remembrance and commemorative events are difficult to observe, but are usually organised around the symbolic sign of the war memorial, so I get to kill three birds with one throw of the stone so to speak. In this context and as explained in chapter 3, the second reason I chose memorials is methodological, in that the monumentalised cultural form of British war memory [what is termed in the literature as 'cultural memory'] always represents memory as a symbol (Sign), historical narrative (Signifier) and cultural image (Signified) (Borg, A. 19901-18) and as such, is easily accessible to semiotic analyses (See Barthes, R. 2000: 109 - 158).
"Today's WWII memorials are solemn and unserious, the perfect niche for a Nation that wants both to make a sad face and feel good about itself. To walk from the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial, to the 60th anniversary WWII memorial, as I did one afternoon this June, is like leaving a prayer room and stumbling into a fairground." (Wolcott, J. 2004:71).

Regardless of one's personal views, this cultural studies and art history aspect of the war memory debate illuminates what has changed in the post Cold War era of memorialisation, as compared with previous monumentality trends, which were born of psychological imperatives informed by the intrinsic need to mourn the dead of war. The post 1945-1955 memorialisation trend (see Furlong 2002) was also fuelled by this psychological imperative to mourn the dead. However, coming a mere 20 years after the end of the Great War - "fought to end all wars" - the post 1945 trend was also shaped by what Derek Boorman (1995) termed 'disillusionment' with the morality of war as an institution of the nation-state.

An explicit example of the impact of this disillusionment can be seen in the responses to a Mass Observation Directive (See MOA: 1946 Directive), which asked the respondents to put their views forward on the subject of WW2 memorial erection. The overwhelming reply was a wish to see 'no more grand monuments' which seemed to glorify war as a rational means to a moral end. The most common alternative suggestion was utilitarian projects, such as hospitals, schools and parklands (See Quinlan, M. 2005: Vol 1). It was hoped that such projects would highlight the cause the soldiers died for, as opposed to the glorified war they fought in. Because of this deep-seated view of the role of memory, 'utilitarian projects dominated monumentality for a number of years after 'the war' (Furlong, J. 2002).

This response was contrary to a influential Royal Society of Arts report, commissioned by the government of the day, to assess the British nation's monumental needs in wake of the 1939-1945 war (Quinlan, M. 2005: Vol 2). This report advised in favour of 'traditional monumentality' as 'utilitarian projects' could not and would not, over the passage of time, be remembered for what they were designed i.e. to remember the dead of a modern war.
Just by considering a few concrete examples of British CWM (remembrances, commemoration and memorialisation), one can reveal the contrast to this distinctly utopian ideal. Thus by contrast, the present cultural trend of WWII monumentality is positive in a different way and can be said to be uplifting, inclusive, interactive and affirmative in nature. It is also clear that the trend is continuing to grow; in that new monuments, museums and commemorative events reflecting the cultural diversity of citizen participation in the Second World War are being erected, opened and held at cultural sites of national importance.

Consider, the Australian Memorial unveiled by that nation’s prime minister in 2003 or the new Commonwealth Memorial on ‘The Mall’, unveiled by the Queen and dedicated in 2001 to the 100,000 Dominion and Empire troops who fought and lost their lives in both World Wars. In a Home Front context, there is the Civil Fire Fighters/ Air Raid Wardens memorial recently erected close by St Paul’s Cathedral: This is just one of many erected nationwide.

Similarly, in 2005 the nation erected its only national memorial to the British women who endured, fought or lost their lives in WWII. This is located 200 yards from the Cenotaph at a prominent location on Whitehall. This is a very significant monumentality event when we consider that until now, there have been no British war memorials solely dedicated to the women of war. In Manchester, the culturally celebrated Imperial War Museum North (IWMN) also puts forward a very prominent gendered perspective on War, and opened its doors in 2001 using the globalised slogan ‘war shaped our world and still shapes it today’.

The architect who designed the IWMN is the same individual who designed the Holocaust Museum in New York and has more recently, received a joint commission to build the national memorial that will monumentalise the ‘Twin Towers’ at Ground Zero. The museum’s monumental design (based on a broken Globe) and interior exhibits, in particular the ‘big picture show’, are quite simply perception altering (www.iwmn.co.uk). Similarly, the nation’s, self-proclaimed, top visitor attraction Eden Camp opened in 1997
and promises 6 acres of living history situated in an old POW camp. “You will experience the sights, sounds, even the smells of those dangerous years” (www.edencamp.co.uk). Clearly a semiotic and comparative examination of ‘Form’ and ‘Content’ can reveal much.

With regards to the recent 60th anniversary events, the choice of examples to locate the uplifting and affirmative nature of CWM is almost endless, but published social memory research into recent British events is as yet limited. Thus to help me engage in this commemorative event aspect of the debate, I conducted a small participant observation of the West End at War event. This was a very popular anniversary event, staged over two days (12th-13th June 2004) in the heart of central London (Leicester Square) and billed as part of this London borough’s contribution to the nation’s commemorations of World War 2.

The huge promulgation banner at the open gates of this famous London landmark read; ‘Westminster Council welcomes you to the West End at War’. Outside the clearly established boundaries of this memory event were all the trimmings and speed of modern life one would expect of a consumer-centered 21st century Britain. However, inside this small oasis of ‘dog tag nostalgia’ was a world dedicated to things past, and a simpler less complicated life - where good was Good, and evil was Evil. The specially commissioned master of ceremonies announced that it was time "to take a sentimental journey back in time as we commemorate 1940's London". The flyers that were handed out upon entrance read; ‘Fun was not rationed in 1940's Britain so why should it now’. The commemorative air was filled with the music of In the Mood and dancing all around us where what seemed like, ‘stereotypical characters’ in Noel Coward’s famous war-time film This Happy Breed.

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7 It was as if I had walked seamlessly from a globalised impersonal world into a friendly nostalgia time bubble. It was seamless, because the laser pulse TV screens of the consumer world were used like the familiar pages of a Readers Digest book I own entitled Yesterday's Britain. In this book - like the giant TV screens of Leicester square - came the complete illustrated story of how we lived, worked and played during those wartime years.

8 Noel Coward, as film director, returned to his roots in this story of working class Britain between the wars; a thought provoking and poignant David Lean drama made in 1944. Part of this weekend’s commemoration was the communal watching of war time movies. For example, 'Mrs. Miniver', 'Carve her Name with Pride', and the 'Battle of Britain' or 'A Bridge too Far'. There is a huge literature on the subject of war movies/films, but for concise discussions on these particular films and what they may mean as a new social memory form of CWM see Evans, A. Brassey's Guide to War Films (2000).
All available space in front of the raised temporary stage was filled with occupied deck chairs and a boisterous interactive crowd of all ages and socially diverse groups. The sweet summer smell of ice cream, toffee apples and candy floss was intoxicating and greatly added to the tangible communal atmosphere of national thanksgiving, promoted by the various stage acts and entertainment. In short, this special WWII commemorative event was a temporal time and physical locality where two worlds, the past and the present, met and reaffirmed each other. What I would call the 'gardener of war memory' had worked hard to prepare for this event, and as a consequence, this popular flowerbed of public war memory looked beautiful - even if did smell of manure and taste of pesticide!

At the heart of the event’s display was what I term, ‘the top soil’ of British war memory. In this particular case, the top soil is the engine remains of a fighter plane which prevented a devastating attack on Buckingham Place during the Battle of Britain. An ecstatic Tim Owen - Head of Special Events at Westminster Council – explained how, “The council has pulled out all the stops to facilitate this historic excavation and is honoured that the remains of a fighter plane will be on public display at the West End at War event of music, exhibits, film and theatre to commemorate WWII and the 60th anniversary of D-Day.”

In reproductive terms, this prestigious cultural heritage of ‘the war’ is the symbolic ‘top soil’ in which the traditional flower of British nationhood and collective identity continues to be culturally embedded and historically rooted. This is my abstract way of engaging in social memory issues of persistence and malleability and to think about the link between identity and appropriation of war memory, within the political mechanisms of Commemorative

9 For details of this iconic event see The War Facsimiles: The Battle of Britain. August – October 1940: Uncovered Editions; The Stationary Office. 2001. Locating this top soil of war memory in another grounded context and we can observe that Christopher Bennett - a professional photographer who runs a restoration shop that rebuilds Spitfires and Hurricanes - and aviation archaeologist Steve Visarde have been on the trail of this valuable cultural heritage since 1991. Indeed, these two individuals were the masterminds behind the recent 'Time Team' type excavation project (Searching for the Lost Fighter Plane: Channel Five September. 2005). A final consideration is that this particular fighter plane has a special significance in British history because it is the only Allied plane ever lost over central London during WW II.

10 The words of Tim Owen' are quoted from a Westminster Council Article entitled Hurricane in the West End see Website at: www.westminster.gov.uk/news/PR-2006.cfm (Accessed on 14/06/04).
Culture (CC). These political mechanisms obviously include patronage given or withheld and the institutionalised selectivity inherent in state and/or officially organised commemoration of war. In this context, the top soil metaphor and garden analogy also allows one to consider the semiotic means by which the denial of distressing memory is marginalised within the popular narrative of "the war", and highlights the political, institutional and cultural functionality of much post Cold War monumentality, with specific sociological regards to its reaffirmation or uplifting significance in the "here and now" of late modernity. In a thematic sense, this garden and top soil metaphor can help illuminate the current relations between past, present and any possible future war. Think of the new Armed Forces Memorial which has a whole series of 'blank panels' for future 'namings'.

Within this cultural studies context, we can apply this type of gardener's analogy in overlapping terms to the traditional, contemporary or corporate patriarchs and/or sponsors of British war memory. One very relevant example is the Imperial War Museum (IWM), which is a co-sponsor of the Battle of Britain Monument and even with today's more interactive and non-passive audience, is a national or state-sponsored museum, following in the tradition of the 1845 Museums Act.11 As a 'material culture' site, the museum was set up in 1917 largely to educate its visitors in an inclusive sense of national history and collective identity.12 A similar hegemonic ethos was central to the establishment of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC), patronised by state apparatus in 1917.

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11 The Museums Act of 1845 heralded an explosion in the creation of museums. Almost 300 were founded in Britain between 1850 and 1914, many of them in the urban industrial centres of the North of England. The same period saw a growth in the number of large state museums in London. The British Museum, the National Gallery founded in 1824. The National Portrait Gallery 1856, the Science Museum, 1833. The Tate Gallery, 1896 and the Victoria and Albert Museum of Design, Manufacture in 1899. This growth in the numbers of museums coincided with a growth in the economic, cultural and political power of the middle classes. Admission to the museums was free and it was hoped that the urban working class, in the light of so much bourgeois anxiety, would be improved by entering the museums and looking at the exhibits. Museums become authoritative sites for this exhibition of the ideal nation, because the authority of the museum was embedded in the form and content of the public space. As I implied in my gardeners analogy, this type of patronage of war memory can be applied to any number of other institutional bodies and interested parties. Such as the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and even the Royal British Legion. See Lucy Noakes Making Histories: Experiencing the Blitz in London's Museums in the 1990's In Evans M. & Lunn, K. editors (Berg; Oxford. 1997). Pages 89-105.

12 From its inception, the Imperial War Museum was consciously a National Museum with the aim of creating a sense of inclusion and membership of the nation and its members. As many members of the nation as possible were to be included in the museums' presentation of a nation of all, including munitions workers and Land Army girls. These goals were made explicit in the King's dignitary speech at the opening of the museum in 1920, when he explained that it stood 'not for a group of trophies won from a beaten army, nor for a symbol of the pride of victory, but as an embodiment and lasting
These institutionalised patrons of war memory can be re-located in the present context when we relate my 'top soil' metaphor to a more contemporary example i.e. the West End at War commemorative event. I say this because, this special event was sponsored and given patronage by the IWM, RBL and CWGC (each had an interactive site at the event) and the commemorative event itself, provided one big advertising platform for the forthcoming unveiling of the Battle of Britain monument, as the BOBHS also had an interactive site. This, I would suggest, is a prime example of the gardening process in action because this seeding of a popular memory was exactly the task the many and varied gardeners had set out to explicitly achieve. This seeding of war memory is in accordance with the current MOD Services Secretary mission statement of 'Remembrance' we identified in an earlier quote (see Elliott, C. H. in Quinlan, 2005: Vol 1).

This type of commemorative event was not an isolated example of the gardening process in action. Just as in the 50th anniversary cycle of WWII [1989-1995], all over the country similar commemorative events to Westminster Council's The West End at War had been taking place during the preceding few weeks. All were designed to coincide with the international commemorations of the 60th anniversary of D-Day. Over the previous weeks, the British culture industry i.e. the nation's commercial and digital TV, its entertainment industry, media, tabloid and quality press and in particular the BBC, The memorial of common effort and common sacrifice. (The Kings Dedicator speech, Crystal Palace, 9th of June 1920, cited in Cordell, 1985, page 149). In 1989, the newly renovated Imperial War Museum started to cater for interactive viewers and welcomed the first visitors to the new 'Blitz Experience'. Publicised as an opportunity for the inhabitants of the late 20th century to experience the sites, smells and sounds of the Blitz in the London of 1940, the 'Blitz Experience' formed the new interactive centrepiece of the museums' Second World War display. Through the museum tour experience, the Blitz is presented as a central part of the body of knowledge, which the exhibit is meant to impact upon its visitors, thus continuing the tradition set in 1920. The only difference is now in late modernity the visitors are interactive and not presumed to be passive attendees. For pertinent discussions See Lucy Noakes in Lunn 1997: pages 89-104.

Corporate sponsors of this event were many and varied. They include, HMV, Selfridges & Co, Burger King, Channel Five and the ODEON. Other none corporate sponsors included the Battle of Britain Monument Committee which had its own tent, BBC World War Two People's War Road show, The Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Evacuees Reunion Association, First Aids Nursing Yeomanry (FANNY), IWM, IWMN and the Cabinet War Rooms, The National Army Museum, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Automobile Club, the Royal British Legion, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association (SSAFA), the Westminster Community Reminiscence and Archive Group, the Women's Royal Auxiliary Air Force, the Women's Land Army and Timber Corps and finally the Governmental sponsored Veterans' Agency.

The following are three Websites that provide representative lists of similar events that were held all over the country in the run up to and immediately after the official D-Day commemorations. The lists these websites provide are not the exhaustive list as they are only provided to supplement the assertion that there were many events taking place. http://www.dday-overlord.com/MMJlinZeng.htm provides a list of Official Local Ceremonies; http://www.guardian.co.uk/secondworldwar/dday provides a list of unofficial local events; http://travel.timesonline.co.uk/displayPopup/0,,30282,00.html provides a list of national and international events.
History Channel, and Channel 4 had been saturated with extended coverage of such uplifting and inclusive commemorative events: they became a byline for many news items.

This type of saturated coverage was hotly discussed prior to this event, at a recent conference held by the Historical Research Institute (HRI): entitled History and the Media (18th – 19th Dec 2002). Interestingly, this academic conference was solely sponsored by the 'History Channel'. The central theme of the HRI conference was the dramatic increase and popular interest with the historical medium of past wars. Many empirical comparisons were made, with previous anniversaries’ events; in which statistics showed how the 60th cycle of events has surpassed dramatically those of the 50th. Furthermore, this most recent increase of viewing numbers was considered by those in the media industry as remarkable in comparison with the previous 30th and 40th Cold War anniversary cycles.¹⁵

Two years on from this conference and the centerpiece of National Commemorations for WWII (June 2004) focused mainly on the 25,000 thousand Britons who had travelled on pilgrimage to the hallowed Normandy beaches, to mark the 60th anniversary of this nationally important historical event. According to Labour MP Ivor Caplin (the then Minister for Veterans' Affairs) “their commemorative mission was to say thank you to the hundreds of thousands of Service personnel who took part in the D-Day Landings by planting flags in their honoured memory on the beaches where so many young lives were lost”.¹⁶ As was reported in every daily newspaper at the time, Her Majesty The Queen, Prime Minister Tony Blair, President George Bush, President Jacques Chirac, President Vladimir Putin and for the first time, a German chancellor (Gerhard Schroder), were some of the state dignitaries that attended a further mass ceremony on the sacred beaches at Arromanches. The high-profile state patronage at such events and the massive public participation in them signifies the national importance of WWII memory for the present.

¹⁵ Unfortunately no conference publication is available at this time of writing from which to produce a table of statistics.
¹⁶ See MOD Speeches at OFFICAL MOD Website: www.veteransagency.mod.gov.uk. Accessed on 29/05/04.

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Drawing from these most recent examples of CWM to advance our engagement in the debate, one could suggest that the present selective memory of 'the war' is culturally and institutionally designed to be an uplifting reaffirmation of the past for the present. In the context of advancing our understanding of the popular memory represented in the Battle of Britain Monument, we could also say that what is represented in the monument is not inaccurate with regards to the 'big facts' of 'the war', but as we will see, the form and content now seems to emphasise certain elements of a popular narrative, which in Connolly's (2005) historical 'security blanket' context provides ontological comfort. To explore this notion of comfort, we have to reconsider within the memory debate, how the negotiation of national identity actually works, in order to fully understand the internal and social processes by which one may reaffirm one's identification with, or within civil-society.

**Incorporating the sociological debate**

In this sociological context, the soothing comfort of a 'security blanket' depends on the deep-seated cultural sentiment and emotional residue associated with the popular memory of 'the war' or its iconic mythology (See Anderson, B. 1991., Nora, P. 1989). Drawing on the influential Anderson (1991) argument, one can deduce that in 'Imagined Communities' such as Britain, 'the War's' temporal purchase and cultural grasp on society is dependent on whether the cultural representation of 'the war' is recognisable to the general public and/or intrinsically part of 'who we are' as contemporary British citizens. Put another way, as a 'practical ideology' the public residue we personally invest and the public sentiment we may hold or express, depends on what we as individuals think it means to be 'British'.

However, this subjective notion of a 'constitutional meaning' of intrinsic Britishness, has always been a negotiated discourse of identity formation and a contested matter of academic debate, as well as an ever-present personal uncertainty. Indeed, Professor
David Binoman - guest curator at Tate Britain - organised a recent art exhibit around the
tentative assertion that, 'British identity has never been more topical' (see History of British
Identity Exhibit. Dec 2004, RM 5: Tate Britain). Accordingly, one can infer from such
contestation that in this duel 'identity and/or identification' context, the soothing comfort
provided by CWM, either as symbol, myth, process, practice or narrative, depends not only
on one's belief in the mythology of British nationhood, but also very much on how much
one actually invests in the notion of a fixed identity, impervious to the eternal force of time.

Having said this, even with these inherent limits to the societal purchase of a mythological
'security blanket', the effect of collective memory on the social self is different from the
effect of identification on the politics of self-identity. I say this, because from a classical
sociological perspective, one can argue that social states of mind are qualitatively different
from that of individual reasoning (see Durkheim, E. in Bellah, R 1973:149-163). In this
dualism context, sociologist Martin Shaw (1991, 1997) illuminates in his 'past war thesis'
(see Shaw, M. in Lunn, K. 1997: 191-204) how the immense cultural power of a reified
war memory can easily influence what sociologist Garfinkel, (1967) terms our 'un-stated
cultural assumptions'. Moreover, according to Shaw, this power to influence our cultural
assumptions is enhanced during contingent times of moral tension and/or social upheaval.

17 Within the mechanics of Shaw's Past War thesis, 'Tradition', refers to the collective construction of values and practices,
 arising from past experience, with which certain social activities - such as war remembrance and commemoration - in the
present are approached (see also Hobsbawm, 1983). 'Myth' does not refer to a falsification of reality, but an imagined
version of it (see Hynes 1990). In this case, the story of war that has evolved with the passage of time and thus come to be
accepted as true in the collective memories of what Shaw (1991) terms a 'post military civil society'. The important point to
note in this post military context is that the nature of a war myth can also be what Samuel Hynes(1990) terms 'anti
monumental' referring to an alternative vision of war's dominant meanings. This alternative version of the story is most
commonly associated in the 'war and memory* literature with Paul Fussell's 1977 seminal notions of'modem memory'. This
conceptualisation of war myth is avant garde and politically utopian in social character. The other more dominant version of
Britain war myths is encompassed by the examples presented above (See Lawrence 2001). In this traditional context, the
story of war is portrayed as the great adventure, a test of one's mettle and a natural rite of passage of citizen, state and its
civil society. A good example of this type of discourse is the 'British Way of Warfare' advocated by Liddell Hart (See
Freedman 1993), the 'Dunkirk spirit', (see Harper, 1997) and the popular memory of the 'Blitz mentality' (see Noakes 1997).
The multi formed myth as it is described by Connolly (2005) is conceptualised by Shaw (1991) as 'nostalgia militarism' and
refers to specific stories and beliefs about the past, which are commonly constructed and play a part in our contemporary
culture. For example, a recent advert on British TV designed to promote the launching of the new 'UK History* channel,
suggested that the 'Dunkirk Spirit' is 'Why we are what we are' (BBC Dec 2003). 'Memory' in this context refers to images,
feelings and beliefs, which arise primarily from individual experience, although they are often socially constructed and
reconstructed in terms of tradition and myth (See Locke 1971., Hobsbawm 1983). Collective Memory of the War in this 'past
war thesis' context is thus seen as a complex social and individual construct (see also Fussell 1977). 'Propaganda' as used
by Shaw is a type of social engine and refers to the images and statements, which are utilised to persuade people to take a
particular view and usually support a particular policy or cause. Within the context of Shaw's 1997 'Past Wars, Present
Conflicts' study the understanding is that tradition, myth and memory are often exploited through propaganda via the practice
and patronage of commemorative culture. According to Shaw this process is how the 'past war thesis' actually works in
mnemonic cultural practice and commemorative social action. See preamble and chapter 2 for full explanations of this thesis.
Located in these terms, one could suggest that the power of war memory to influence cultural assumptions about present conflict is only limited by the anxiety perceived by the situated individuals of society. In short, the more frightened and anxious we as individuals perceive we are, the tighter we hold on to our myths, and thus the more important the concept of group identity and self-identification with the symbols of nationhood becomes. Shaw's past war thesis insight to the debate illuminates that in the present post-September 11th context of fear, anxiety or uncertainty, one could even suggest that the intrinsic need to belong also applies to those very general holders of the nation's mythology. One observational example of this process in action can be seen in the British culture industry's response to the 7/7 attacks on central London [2005]. Similarly, at the individual level many examples are available at website We are Not Afraid (www.wearenotafraid.com).

This sociological perspective illuminates that the politics of identity and the internal process of self-identification facilitated within the cultural practices and social processes of CWM are extremely important in the formulation of a sense of ontological security in the present societal climate of change and uncertainty. Similarly, one could add that because of the sceptical nature of late modernity, it could also be reasonably suggested that the mythology of British nationhood, represented in the 'Good War' popular memory, can be understood to have cultural purchase and societal appeal within an individualistic and inauthentic consumer mentality. In this cultural studies context of identification with past war symbolism, one could even suggest that it is this deep-seated psychological appeal to genuine sentiment and an authentic historical experience that continues to draw the British public's immense current interest in the many and varied WWII monumentality projects.

**Grounding the War Memory Debate**

To situate this 'sentiment and authenticity' argument in a historical context, we have to now reconsider what one can glean from the UKNIWM. In this monumentality context,
historians, sociologists and cultural theorists have all shown that as 'symbolic artefacts' memorials are an important cultural medium to consider the way in which societal expectations of war are entered and renegotiated in the collective consciousness (Smith. A, 1999., Borg 1991., Hynes 1990., King 1998., Shaw 1991., Boorman 1995). In this context, the memorial can also be said to be a cultural means by which the sentiments, emotions, aspirations and rhetoric of war are granted physical shape and tangible form in public space, discourse and popular memory (Hobsbawm 1983., Fussell 1975., Gregory 1994., Winters 1995, Nora 1989., Lloyd 1998). Accordingly, war memorials, both as a subject of study and as an object of culture, effectively constitute primary as well as secondary evidence of Civil-Military Relations (CMR). These relations express and include societal attitudes and expectations of war (Furlong 2002: 34. Bond, 2002: 75-101).

We can thus deduce that whether a memorial takes the form of a monument or a simple plaque, it can reveal a considerable amount about those who participated in 'past war', the circumstances and origins of the war and even attitudes towards war in general at a particular time in a society's development (Smith 1999: 3-27., Borg 1991). Sometimes, the location and inscriptions of the monument can reveal the greatest amounts of data (Gregory 1994). At other times, the design of the memorial itself is the most revealing aspect (King 1998). In other instances, the supporting documentation, such as newspaper reports, sponsors lists, or mass observations of the unveiling ceremony provide the insights one may be seeking (Moriarty 1991., Winters 1995). Finally, how these cultural artefacts are used or consumed in public space, as well as private locales, can also provide a great deal of sociological information about a community, society or institution at a particular point in 'its' history (in Nora, 1989., Lunn, 1997., Winters, 2000., Bond, 2002).

Furlong's (2002) seminal publication locates this overlapping 'monumentality aspect' of the debate in a culturally situated context, because the three co-authors analysed the cultural
trends of Britain's war memorialisation over the last 100 years or so. It is thus worth reviewing their findings in more detail, to help illuminate how the deep-seated sentiment or emotional residue, with which we normally associate war monumentality, is sociologically embedded and culturally rooted. In this context, the findings of the Furlong (2002) study demonstrate that war memorials are the most numerous and widespread of all our public monuments. The dedicated staff of the UKNIWM estimate between sixty and seventy thousand monuments nationwide and the present input on the database stands at over sixty five thousand entries, as at July 2004. A brief review of the impressive database shows that every town and most villages in Britain have one, often many more than one. In metropolitan London alone, there are over 4,000 individual memorials, with almost every municipal building in the nation's capital having some type of memorial on public display.

The findings of their 'cultural trends' study also demonstrates that there are many different types and styles of memorials - from national sites of collective pilgrimage, to local plaques of personal commemoration: from everyday working institutions such as dedicated hospitals or school wings which benefit civic society in general, to individual studentships and trust funds that benefit the local community or individuals in particular. There are dominant 'sites of memory' and denominated 'sites of mourning' (Winters, J. 1995). The first, is spectacular and triumphant, imposing and generally imposed upon, either by national authority or by the established interests, but always from above i.e. one attends them, rather than visits them. Examples would include the Cenotaph and the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey. The second are more intimate places of refuge, or sanctuaries of spontaneous devotion and silent pilgrimage: "Where one finds the living heart of memory" (see Nora. P. 1989:25). Equally, there can be a mixture or combination of both these types - as in the Commando Memorial at Spean Bridge in the Scottish Highlands, which can be observed as a sacred place of annual pilgrimage for many Royal
Marine Commandos over recent years. Because of such diversity, war monumentality is described by Borg (1991) as 'the largest communal arts project ever undertaken in Britain'.

The co-author's detailed analysis of this diversity discusses ways in which 'war memorials' demonstrate changing cultural or societal trends in the UK - through their various forms, roles and functions and through the evolution of memorialisation itself. Some examples of which, vary from being a focus of grief for those whose friends and relative's bodies were not returned after the Great War 1914-1918; to varied WWII veterans' groups [women, ethnic minorities, and civil servants etc] asserting their identity many years after the conflict. All the overlapping discussion in the study is based on the empirical data with detailed examples being taken from the 47,000 records, which at the time of publication [2002] were input on the database. The methodology employed in this seminal study is described by the co-authors as 'simple in design' and uses secondary sources such as the referenced 'war and memory literature' (see Lunn, 1997., Boorman, 1995., Winters, 1995., King, 1998., Gregory, 1994., Moriarty, 1996) and the department's many empirical records to explore and examine memorials commemorating the Boer War, the First and Second World Wars and the Korean War (Furlong, J. 2002: 1-34., see also Borg, A. 1991).18

Section one of the Furlong article considered Civil Military Relations issues regarding the moral integration of war memorials in the UK. In particular, the ways in which memorial styles have changed, and how these reflected changing attitudes towards those who served in the Armed Forces in the 19th and 20th centuries. The second section discusses the material pragmatics of memorialisation. This descriptive narrative focused on the significance of where war memorials are located, or positioned with regards to locale. For example, whether located inside or outside, or within public or private spaces. This section

18 However, it should be reiterated that there was a notable lack of discussion on Contemporary WWII monumentality which, as we have seen, towers over these other most notable past wars. This one would suggest is by necessity and thus understandable in a Cultural Trends periodical that had a focus on the historical environment, as this 2002 edition did.
also discussed the perceived increases in secularisation, the geographical spread of memorials and issues related to urban and rural memorialisation. The third section is most relevant with regards to this project’s research problem of ‘why now’ because it considered the evolution of war memorials as a process of British culture over the last 100 years.

As such, this aspect of the Furlong debate is very revealing to this study’s research aims, as it demonstrated in empirical terms that in modern Britain, prominent national memorials to those who fought and died during both World Wars have been established by the social processes of commemorative culture, state patronage and governmental patriarchy. For example, the comprehensive analysis of the database showed that in many instances, the ‘selectivity’ of national monuments presented the ‘official narrative of war’ in public space and discourse and thus became, over the passage of time and through tradition and ceremony, national sites of popular war memory (Winters, 1995: 1-13., Hobsbawm, 1983).

Looked at in the context of a ‘commemorative time-line’, this very important selectivity issue identifies how the commemoration of the First World War became the analytical model for any historical comparison and as such, the comparative starting point of my investigation. In this modelling context, the specialised literature clearly demonstrates, "that this first truly modern industrialised war of man against machine drove a wedge between traditional and modern mentalities" (see Hynes, 1990, Winter, J. 1995, Fussell, P. 1975). As a consequence of this ‘fracturing mentality’, the social remembering of the Great War set the subsequent model for the commemoration of most modern wars fought by Western nations thereafter (see also Lloyd 1998, Winters 2000). This includes both the pattern of actions that are prescribed in commemoration and in the communal attitudes expressed within it (see King 1998). It is because of this institutionalised history of commemorative culture, that much of today’s contemporary war monumentality projects are invested with such an ‘aura’ of deep-seated public sentiment and/or emotional residue.
However, the public sentiment and emotional residue we presently hold for monumentality is not just historically embedded in top-down commemorations. For example, the findings of the Furlong (2002) study also illuminated past cultural trends in private or communal monumentality: Starting with the Boer War, the first era of mass memorialisation in Britain, and especially after the First World War, (2nd era) when over fifteen thousand memorials were erected in three sub waves over the period 1915-1935. During this distinct interwar period, there was a widespread need in British civil society to commemorate the part played by particular individuals at a personal and local level (see also Borg 1991: 69-86). This aspect of British war monumentality is alive and present in today's commemorative boom. The most explicit examples in popular culture can be seen in recent TV Dramas such as the BBC popular drama 'Dunkirk' (June 2004), which looked at individual stories within the context of this historic event; Channel 4's 'Not Forgotten' (November 2005) which utilised and popularised the UKNIWM database to highlight individual tragedies of WWI; and finally Richard Holme's very poignant 'The Last Tommy' (BBC. October 2005).

The intrinsic reason for this can be explained with relation to the psychological needs of civil society (See Edkins, J. 2003), but the structural reason, both then and now, also has to do with Civil Military Relations (CMR) and the societal participation in what has been termed 'citizen' or 'total warfare' (see Mann, M. 1987., Duffy 1998). This growing societal participation in modern warfare is also a structural explanation for why there was a change in civilian attitudes towards the Armed Forces (Furlong, J. 2002). In this sociological context, many empirical examples on the UKNIWM database show how most communities commemorated those from their neighbourhood or workplace who were killed on active service. Other examples show how many schools also built memorials to masters and 'old boys'. The fourth and final section of the Furlong (2002) article pulls together the various threads drawn throughout the study, analysing memorials chronologically, geographically, and stylistically in terms of their relevant popularity. What can we grasp that is pertinent?
In reviewing the Furlong study's contribution to the monumentality aspect of the debate and with a generalised regard to its comprehensive analysis of Britain's sixty five thousand war memorials one can highlight, at a glance, what is lacking in this seminal article with regards to this project's research goals, by noting the lack of sociological analysis in the post Cold War monumentality era i.e. 1990 - 2002+. This tangible gap in the seminal literature reiterates the academic rationale for this research project. For example CWM, as I term this most recent era, in its own right as an independent area of sociological study, was not given any primacy in the historical scope of this analysis and only became a factor of the discussion with regards to the chronological referencing of WWII memorials.

Within the narrow analysis of this contemporary era, the insight the Furlong study brings to the ongoing war and memory debate, suggests that although localised monumentality projects continue to flourish, with 400 WWII memorials erections in twelve years (see Furlong 2002: 29), these new war memorials only gain national prominence at major anniversaries such as the 50th and 60th commemorations of WWII and otherwise, once a year in month of November, when the thoughts of the nation turn to those commemorated.

According to the co-authors, the remainder of the time "they stand as silent sentries providing a daily reminder of the Human cost of war and conflicts" (see Furlong 2002: 34). This 'silent sentry' analysis does seem to imply that Contemporary War Monumentality does not have a significant sociological impact on society, but such a passive analysis of CWM seems to miss the massive cultural impact and societal significance of 400 memorial erections in just over ten years. This final point has been strongly supported by the many examples of CWM presented above and the overlapping discussions I have presented with regards to describing the current IP or social significance of British WWII memory. With these observations in mind let us conclude this chapter where we began by re-evaluating the 'cultural capital' and 'institutional presence' of WWII memory phenomena.
Evaluating the *Institutional Presence* of WWII Memory

The 'Institutional Presence' (IP) of WWII Memory refers - in this culturally situated study - to the material salience and moral integration of WWII memory phenomena, as located within British civil society. Material salience thus refers to the degree to which such memory phenomena have to be taken into account as a social actor of material culture. Moral integration refers to the degree to which such memory phenomena have to be taken into account as a normative influence with the symbolic universe of British civil society. According to the sociological research of Shills (1975) and more recent work of Burk (2001) a consideration of institutional presence in these terms of 'moral and material dimensions' enables the researcher to make a normative consideration [always imperfect] of how such phenomena may inform the structuration of what Burk terms a 'good' society. In relational terms of the ethical environment of war and the civilising process, this is how the project will conclude its discussions as to the sociological significance of war memory.

However, in Tilly's (2003) descriptive terms, this selective review of the literature has looked at current 'war and memory' debates on the 'social memory issues of malleability, contestation and continuity of memory phenomena' and thus has considered the material and moral dimensions of WWII's institutional presence in these established social memory terms, i.e. in terms of collective identity, moral order and societal needs. In doing so, this chapter has also provided some varied and observed examples of war memory's institutional presence within contemporary British society, with a general focus on WWII popular memory and a specific focus of the social history of the 'good war narrative'. In so doing, this engagement has enabled us to consider how the myth/memory of 'the war' has evolved and transformed over the last 65 years and described what form it takes now. This helped us to take into account what Tilly (2003) termed 'that which exists in memory'.
In contextualising the case study within this descriptive model, I have clearly identified war memory sources of secondary or established knowledge to be employed within the case study interrogations. For example, Mark Quinlan’s (2005) informative two-volume study of British commemorative culture provides an important pool of knowledge from which to draw, because this recent work illuminates within its mainly descriptive narrative the many and varied social processes, mechanics, patronage, and selectivity issues discussed in part 2. Other examples include the work of Lunn (1997), Winters (1995) and King (1998). When combined with the seminal work of Furlong (2002), Shaw (1991) and Fussell (1975) these overlapping sources of information are duly employed as the most relevant factual texts to date on the nebulous subject matter of commemoration, remembrance and war memorialisation. However, before one can re-employ this knowledge as a tool for analysis, we have to introduce and describe the cultural artifact we wish to investigate and examine.

In this fact-finding regard, the following chapter explores the social relations, cultural ideas and structural/institutional factors which may have informed the selectivity and creation of the monument? i.e. How did the monument come into being? Who proposed the idea for a BOB Monument and why now? Was this memorial project organised by commission or committee? What is the difference? Who/what gave the idea for a monument patronage? How and why was patronage bestowed? Why build a monument to this particular collective memory of WWII and why now some sixty years after the event it remembers? Who were its founding patrons and who is currently responsible for its maintenance? How much did it cost and why was the project funded from private contributions and donations and not public monies, such as the lottery or governmental funds? Who comprised the funding committee and why were they chosen? Why is the monument located where it is and under what criteria and in whose authority was the culturally prominent site chosen? As stated these are the questions we must answer, if we are to indirectly consider Tilly’s ‘contextualising questions’ in readiness to address the core questions asked of the BOBM.
Chapter 5

“This Monument is to their Glorious Memory”.

Description of the Case Study Microcosm

In June 1940, the forces of the Third Reich stood poised to invade the British Isles. Conquerors of France, Belgium, Holland, Poland, Norway, Denmark and Luxembourg, only Britain stood between Hitler and total domination of western Europe.

Before an invasion could be launched, it was essential for the German Luftwaffe to gain control of the skies over the Channel, London and southern England. The Luftwaffe were combat hardened following bombing campaigns in Spain, France, Poland and the Low Countries, compared with the Allied pilots, the majority of whom lacked experience and were greatly out-numbered.

THE PILOTS AND AIRCRAFT
In July 1940 Fighter Command had around 50 squadrons (the basic flying unit was 12 pilots and aircraft) based in airfields as far north as Scotland and as far west as Northern Ireland. The pilots were young, aged mostly between 19 and 25. Although most were British, many other nationalities served. New Zealanders, Australians, Canadians, South Africans and Americans flew with Polish, Free French, Czechs and Belgians.

Air Marshal Dowding, the Commander in Chief of Fighter Command, had fought to conserve his resources of aircraft and men for the battle he had long foreseen.

At the start of the battle the RAF had around 600 front line fighters. about 400 of them Spitfires and Hurricanes, the remainder Blenheims, Beaufighters, Defiants and even Gladiators. The Spitfire was faster than the Hurricane which was more robust and better suited for attacking bombers. The Luftwaffe had about 1200 fighters and 1700 bombers.

The pilots of RAF Fighter Command fought bravely and tenaciously, eventually overcoming the Luftwaffe, giving Hitler his first military defeat and causing the Germans to postpone and eventually cancel invasion plans.

2,936 British, Irish, European, Commonwealth and American airmen fought and 544 died in the battle. A further 814 failed to survive to see the final victory in 1945. Their gallantry was matched by the many others in Bomber and Coastal Commands who also carried the battle to the enemy during that summer of 1940.

It is. however, in honour of the spirit and sacrifice of "The Few" - as the Battle of Britain airmen were immortalised - that this monument, like that on the cliffs at Capel Le Fan, is erected.

"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."
Winston Churchill 20 August 1940. Prime Minister

BATTLE OF BRITAIN AIRCREW

<table>
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</tr>
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<td>United States</td>
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Total: 2,936

The aircrew names commemorated on the Monument were arrived at by collating all previous research and matching the results with records held by the Royal Air Force and the Public Records Office. We are indebted to the late John Holloway, Ken Wynn, the late Bruce Burton and group Captain J R Young AFC of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association.

Paul Day's sketch and clay models for the bronze

Granite cut down from the sections of the walls removed to open up the walkway has been re-used to form plinths for the bronze reliefs (main contractor for the works: Stonewest). The bronze reliefs are lit from above from fibre-optic light sources with beam angles set by the sculptor (supplier: Light Projects, designer: Light Matters) sealed inside a textured stainless steel bracketed canopy, with the central sculptural feature "Scramble" being lit from light sources concealed inside low stainless steel bollards, either side (canopy and bollards supplier: Woodhouse, fabricator: Syspal).

The outer walls of the monument are surrounded by large bronze plaques with the names of the airmen who flew in the Battle, grouped according to their country of origin, and their squadron badges, raised against flat back-plates, featuring engravings of Spitfires, Hurricanes and other Battle of Britain aircraft. At the end of the monument, facing the RAF Memorial, the plaques frame a large bronze badge of Fighter Command.

Sculptors Sketch of Monument to the 'Few': Source www.bobm.org.uk January 2003

As Patron of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association, I am delighted that there is now a fitting tribute in London to the remarkable men who fought with such courage sixty five years ago. I know that the Monument Appeal Committee and many others have worked tirelessly to make this project a reality and, in particular, we thank Bill Bond, the Founder of the Battle of Britain Historical Society, who conceived the idea six years ago.

Drawn from fifteen nations, our Battle of Britain pilots were very heavily outnumbered, and in early July 1940 it seemed inconceivable that against such overwhelming odds they would prevail. But during the next three and a half months these young men, some of whom were still teenagers, defended this country day after day, night after night, from the relentless German onslaught. They fought with great skill and tenacity to defeat the Luftwaffe and to regain control of the skies over southern England and London, making the planned invasion of Britain impossible. We also remember the vital contributions of those on the ground who supported our pilots so ably, and of course R J Mitchell and Sydney Camm, the designers of the Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft.

The Battle of Britain pilots have earned a very special place in this Nation’s history - and in its heart - and so this magnificent monument will provide a lasting tribute to their bravery for very many generations to come.
It was the founder of The Battle of Britain Historical Society, Bill Bond, who originally conceived the idea of a monument to those who won the battle that we now know was the turning point of the Second World War. Had it been lost, Britain would have been invaded - and all Europe would have been under Nazi, Fascist or Communist rule.

The Monument will ensure that, so long as London remains, this historic battle - and those who fought and won - will not be forgotten. Sited on Victoria Embankment, by Westminster Pier and The Houses of Parliament, it is at the heart of the city that suffered so much from bombings and saw so much of the Battle.

Once the site for the monument had been identified, with the help of English Heritage, and generously made available by Westminster City Council, architects were appointed, fundraising began and a design competition was arranged. The contest was won by Paul Day, a young English sculptor working in France. Amongst the sources of inspiration for Paul in this work was the Bayeux Tapestry, describing the story of the Battle of Hastings. Paul's magnificent bronze panels tell the story of the Battle of Britain, fought at times over Hastings itself, depicting not only scenes of air combat but events on the ground below.

A group of pilots leap out of the bronzes, larger than life. The friezes show anti-aircraft gunners, Spitfires being built and serviced for flight, civilians in the shelters and casualties being dug from the rubble of bombed buildings.

The monument also includes the squadron badges and the names of all the people who flew in action, together with those of R J Mitchell and Sydney Camm, designers of the Spitfires and Hurricanes that carried the brunt of the fighting.

There can be no doubt about the historical significance of the Battle. While it did not determine the outcome of the Second World War, it succeeded in halting the previously unstoppable Nazi war machine, giving the Allied Democratic Nations time to gather strength to defeat Nazi Germany.

Thus was the future of the continent of Europe saved from what Churchill called "the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister by the lights of perverted science". The Battle was won by the 2,936 airmen he called "The Few". In his words, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."

This monument is to their glorious memory.

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Origins of the Battle of Britain Monument

When the Luftwaffe's 2,500 aircraft commenced a focused attack on British shipping, ports and airfields in July 1940, the subsequent air battle became known as the Battle of Britain. At that time, Fighter Command had close to 600 first-line fighter planes in 30 Hurricane and 29 Spitfire squadrons (The War Facsimiles. 2001). Accordingly, this iconic battle has been described as 'the most crucial intervention of the war', because Fighter Command managed to maintain control of the skies over southern England and prevented Germany obtaining air superiority, which would have enabled the launch of Operation Sealion, - the seaborne invasion of Great Britain (Quinlan, M. 2005). The British and Allied pilots who flew at least one authorised sortie with an accredited unit of RAF Fighter Command - in the period 10 July to 31 October 1940 - are known to British history as: 'The Few' (Clayton, T. 1999). Many of these young pilots had no combat experience and in the end only 25% of those who actually fought in the Battle of Britain survived WWII (see Arthur, M. 2005: 4).

The initial idea for a London-based monument was to commemorate this historic event and the human loss incurred. This idea was proposed by Bill Bond of the Battle of Britain Historical Society (BOBHS) which was founded in early 1996. The BOBHS members felt 'it was important to secure recognition in London of one of the key battles of the Second World War' and believed 'that victory in the Battle of Britain was a tremendous achievement which had not been properly recognised in the capital'. The aim was to help address a perceived lack of awareness and recognition of the battle in order to secure its importance amongst subsequent generations. To promote this awareness, the Society proposed a new war memorial to The Few and 'the many' (www.bobm.org.uk. July 2004). The aim of this chapter is to provide and develop a fact-finding or surface description of the Case Study that will help address the questions asked in Chapter 3. To do so, I draw on public domain sources and social science data collated from interviews and surveys.
Location and Psycho-geography of Landscape

The final location suggested by English Heritage for the new monument was on the Victoria Embankment of the River Thames, situated between Hungerford and Westminster Bridges, where it would be placed on an existing plinth, which was formerly an 80 foot-long smoke vent for the London Underground, dating from the old days of steam (see figure 3).

If the psycho-geography of this prestigious setting is to be understood, not just in literal terms as 'the point where psychology and geography meet' (Coverley, M. 2006: 13), but in descriptive terms of a 'sense of place' (Coverley, 2006: 16); that is to say a landscape with 'a kind of historical consciousness' [as described by Coverley (2006) and other practitioners of this philosophical and methodological approach to urban re-mapping (see
Debord, G. 2002[1994]), then we must also remember what was signposted above and in chapter three, with regards to the cultural, institutional and historical significance of this particular location i.e. a monument situated on the eternal banks of old Father Thames, right next to the Houses of Parliament and Big Ben, literally couched between an symbolic statue of Boudicea’s chariot and the imposing MOD Main Building. A central location with 'a sense of place', not only steeped in the ontological resonance which celebrates the spiritual city behind London - exemplified in the writing of poems such as William Blake's *New Jerusalem* - but also a public space and thoroughfare that in the every-day setting of a living city, is used as a picture opportunity for many tourists and a starting or talking point for varied coach and walking tours: All this exposes the 'psycho-geography' of landscape.

To gain permission from local authority to use this socially significant location, members from the BOBHS attended a number of steering meetings at City Hall with officials from Westminster Council. On one notable occasion, “the BOBHS committee members were somewhat taken aback to be asked by one of the Council's senior female officials: to explain the connection between London and the Battle of Britain”. Of course, this only served to unexpectedly reinforced the committee’s 'point of argument' about "the current need to educate subsequent generations about the significance of what took place in the skies of southern England in the summer of 1940" (source [www.bobh.org.uk](http://www.bobm.org.uk). July 2005).

**High Relief Imagery of the Monument**

Having gained authority/permission in 2001, the BOBHS ran an open competition to select a symbolic design for a memorial to both ‘The Few’ and the many. The initial winner was a Scottish neo-classical sculptor named Alexander Stoddart. His design proposal consisted of two naked male figures either side of a pyramid. However, this allegorical concept did not meet with the approval of the memorial committee, or the appointed architects, Donald
Insall Associates. Thus after further consultations with Westminster Council, a new design (see figures 1 & 2) and sculptor emerged. The Morris Singer Foundry was appointed to cast the bronze panels of the new design from the Dijon-based British sculptor Paul Day.

**MORRIS SINGER FOUNDRY**

Morris Singer is delighted to have been chosen to cast the bronze sections for this most prestigious – and long overdue – monument honouring the valiant airmen of the Battle of Britain, bringing to life Paul Day’s excellent sculpture.

Throughout the process of creating the bronze castings, our skilled craftsmen have been honoured to be able to meet so many of the surviving Pilots, to see their reaction to the Monument as it has evolved and to hear their heroic, often harrowing stories from the days of the Battle. Their experiences and their stories must not be forgotten and this magnificent monument is an excellent commemoration of their contribution to our history. Meeting these proud and dignified veterans has been a major highlight of this project for all at Morris Singer.

As the oldest established art foundry in the world, Morris Singer has specialised in delivering major military, royal and sporting monuments, whilst building a worldwide reputation amongst sculptors and architects over 150 years. We have cast the works of virtually all the major British sculptors and many international artists. The Fountains and two of the Lions in Trafalgar Square came from our foundry, as did other London landmarks such as the figure of Justice on the Old Bailey, the Horses of Helios at Piccadilly Circus, the Royal Tank Regiment in Whitehall, Boadicea and the Chariots outside the Houses of Parliament and St George and the Dragon by Lords Cricket Ground.

More contemporary works include the statue of HM The Queen at Windsor Great Park to commemorate the Royal Jubilee, the World Cup Champions Statue at West Ham, Sir Matt Busby at Old Trafford, the monument to Raoul Wallenberg in London and the Monument to Freedom unveiled in August for the Government of Barbados.

An industry leader in bronze architectural metalwork, we recently completed the piazza furniture and bronze work in Trafalgar Square and other examples of the quality and craftsmanship of our architectural work are to be found in the doors to the Cathedral in Washington DC and the doors to the Bank of England and RIBA buildings.

The Directors, Sharon Pink and Chris Boverhoff, and staff at Morris Singer would like to extend our congratulations and thanks to the Battle of Britain Monument Committee, in particular Lord Tebbit. Tony Dyson of Donald Insall Associates and Edward McManus of the Battle of Britain Historical Society for their excellent support during the realisation of this project.

[www.morrissinger.co.uk](http://www.morrissinger.co.uk)

**DONALD INSALL ASSOCIATES, Architects & Planning Consultant**

Tony Dyson of Donald Insall Associates has been involved with the project since 2000 when the Practice was approached by the Battle of Britain Historical Society about their project for a Monument in London to commemorate the Battle of Britain. The Society had been lobbying Westminster City Council for an appropriate site for some time and at the suggestion of English Heritage a site on the Victoria Embankment was proposed. Westminster City Council told Bill Bond, the Society’s then Chief Executive, that he would need an architect to guide them through the complicated planning process and deal with design and constructional matters.

To find a suitable sculptor, Tony formed a selection committee and with the help of the Cass Sculpture Foundation at Goodwood, organised a limited competition. A list of 20 potential names was whittled down to six, two were shortlisted and further consultation with Westminster City Council led to the choice of Paul Day. Paul’s extraordinary ability to communicate detailed information in his reliefs also fulfilled the Historical Society’s requirement that the Monument should educate people about the Battle of Britain whilst creating a remarkable and unique work of art of the highest quality.

Over the past five years Tony’s role has developed into that of Project Manager. In addition to collaborating with Paul Day on the design of the monument, he and his team have dealt with a multitude of organisations and committees in connection with the applications for Listed Building Consent and Planning Permission. He has designed the plaques that surround the Monument and has become involved with the production and presentation of an accurate list of names of the 2,936 pilots and aircrew who flew in the battle, their names being grouped on the plaques according to the airmen’s country of origin and presented against engravings of the aircraft involved. Insalls have also designed the lighting system and administered the building contract.

Similar designs by Donald Insall Associates have been the settings for seven sculptures in Conservation Areas in Central London, including three in Belgrave Square, the In-pensioner Statue at the Royal Hospital Chelsea, the setting for the Raoul Wallenberg Memorial near Marble Arch and the Animals in War Memorial at Brook Gate in Park Lane.
To commemorate both The Few’ and ‘the many’ one of the brass friezes sculpted by Mr Day depicts the heroic achievements of Fighter Command, whilst the other frieze, focuses on the ‘everyday’ people of London. Accordingly, to give recognition to The Few the plinth beneath the ‘dog fight’ relief is engraved with Sir Winston Churchill's now famous phrase:

“Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”

The new paving in the centre of the monument, which is illuminated at night, used different coloured stone to depict the famous bull’s-eye insignia of the RAF’s roundel. To give recognition to ‘the people’s war’ the other frieze, features St Paul’s Cathedral contrasted with an Anderson air-raid shelter. The following passages and quotes are directly drawn from an interview with Mr Day and are presented here to help highlight the collective memory influences that helped inform this design (Source www.bobm.org.uk. Sept 2005).

“St Paul’s became the symbol of resistance during the Blitz having remained standing while all around was demolished. The famous photo collage of the Cathedral inspired this sequence. Although, not part of the Battle of Britain as such, the Blitz was the direct result of Air Marshal Dowding’s successful strategy to save the RAF and keep fighters in the air at all costs. German attacks passed from airfields and factories to almost any other legitimate and less legitimate target.”
"I think one of the most troubling aspects of the Battle was the bombing of heavily populated areas using inaccurate means and the subsequent horrors that befell certain cities. The suddenness of loss through bombardment is dramatically portrayed in Guy Weston's film version, "The Battle of Britain" (1968). That people could wake up the morning after a bombardment and find their home blown away is terrifying. Of course some weren't to wake up at all. The follow scene is sculptured in homage to the rescue services and a reminder that, although the British people were tried by fire, the nation was never to be put through occupation and the trauma that entailed. In any case, had we lost this battle, the war in the West would have been definitively lost, and probably the war".

Accompanying this symbolic relief is a number of other plaques inscribed with the names of the 2,936 pilots and ground crew from Britain and 15 other countries. The BOBHS compiled the comprehensive list of names that were to go on the memorial. Unusually for
a war memorial, this list not only featured those who were killed, but also every pilot who flew in the Battle of Britain. These names were grouped by nationality, alphabetically and listed according to rank. ‘Naming’ on war monuments can demonstrate the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of a memorial design, so in line with the ‘sculptor’s vision’ the consumption of ‘naming’ was designed to be exclusive in nature, but inclusive by practice.

Symbolic Content of the monument

In an another descriptive article for the Society’s website entitled The Sculptor’s Vision (www.bobm.org.uk Aug 2005) Mr Day explained how the narrative content of this ‘sculptor’s vision’ had been shaped by the monument’s location itself; his research into the subject and what the memorial was supposed to achieve in terms of commemoration. If we observers are to understand the envisaged meaning or content of the physical form, we must first look at the sculptor himself and then identify and consider the three main influences on the production and design of this monument. We begin with the craftsman.
PAUL DAY - SCULPTOR

Having first studied art at Colchester and then Darlington art schools, Paul Day completed his training at Cheltenham in 1991. It was there that he turned his attention from painting to sculpture and where he first started to explore the representation of the figure in architectural space using high relief, an art form that combines drawn composition and fully rounded sculpture.

Upon finishing his education, Day began working professionally at once, aided by a grant from the Prince of Wales Business Trust. There followed a commission from the Gloucestershire authoress Jilly Cooper to make a large scale relief-sculpture for her home. This, coupled with a commercially successful show at the Cheltenham Museum Art Gallery, enabled Day to move to France and establish a base there for himself and his French wife.

Since then Day has developed a form of art singularly difficult to categorise in terms of contemporary artistic idioms. His high relief sculptures in terracotta, resin and bronze depicting all manner of subjects, have been exhibited widely in Europe and are appreciated not least for their peculiarly personal approach to perspective. His exhibitions attract considerable interest from both the public and media alike, his Paris Exhibition in 2000 had over 8000 visitors and another in the Brussels the following year, 5000. This appeal of an artist who is unquestionably of his time but whose work links up with a long standing tradition is rare. Day has replaced the themes of Urbanity and the City at the heart of his artistic practice and, in order to represent them, has elaborated a 'perspective of subjectivity'. Early on, his work attracted the attention of the Pompidou Centre's architectural curator and a collaborative relationship has sprung up between the two, leading to various events and exhibitions.

Since his first solo show in Paris in 1995, Paul Day has undertaken many commissions and exhibitions in France, Germany, Belgium and the UK. Perhaps the most notable of these to date is the 25 metre long terracotta frieze recently commissioned by the Royal St Hubert galleries. 'Brussels - an urban comedy' depicts life in the Capital City of Europe with acidity. The continuous image of juxtapositions and fusions, like a contemporary Bayeaux Tapestry, has captured the spirit of the place and contains a language for the initiated that addresses many of the complexities in Brussels' recent past.

STONEWEST

Acting as Principal Contractor, Stonewest is both delighted and privileged to be part of the team constructing the Battle of Britain memorial, committing its full resources, skills and knowledge for the benefit of all involved. Our dedicated Conservators, Masonry Cleaners, Stone Carvers and Stone Masons relish the opportunity of working on unique projects such as this. Stonewest has been established for over 50 years and during this period has developed into one of the UK's leading masonry companies.

Specialising in building restoration, conservation and new build masonry, Stonewest’s highly skilled, directly employed labour force has been employed to renovate/conservate some of Britain’s most important national monuments and buildings of historical importance. We have had the privilege of working on buildings such as: Houses of Parliament, Wellington Arch, St Paul’s Cathedral, Royal Pavilion Brighton, St Pancras Chambers, Mârble Arch, Nelson’s Column, Buckingham Palace, London Coliseum, Windsor Castle, Bank of England, Foreign & Commonwealth Building, Westminster Abbey and the Cenotaph in Whitehall.

In order to achieve our principal corporate objective of offering our clients an ever-improving service, we continue to maintain a strong focus on Best Practice. We have ensured the realisation of this objective by actively pursuing and achieving our ISO 9001 upgrade and committing to achieve Investor in People status, which reflects our commitment to development and training of all those who work for us.

In addition, we remain proactively engaged in implementing our Health and Safety, CDM and Environmental policies to ensure we deliver the best possible service whether we are engaged as Principal Contractor, Specialist or Trade Contractor.

Whilst the remodelling of the existing structure was demanding, this will be a project from which we know great satisfaction will be derived. We believe that this landmark project will leave a long lasting legacy for not only the Battle of Britain Historical Society but also the general public – and all involved in the project can be immensely proud of this work.

The setting

"From the outset the form of the Monument was dictated by the nature of the available space and by planning constraints along the Thames Embankment. When I first walked along the river between Westminster and Hungerford Bridges, my ideas about the future Monument were, unbeknown to me, in harmony with these practical restrictions. I observed a panorama of major architectural landmarks on a grand scale: the Palace of Westminster, the old GLC building, the Ministry of Defence building, the London Eye, etc".

"The river walk is also awash with various sculpted monuments that look great from a distance, but that do not really bear close inspection. What was needed here, thought I, was something on a human scale that would offer the passer-by something rich in detail when seen up close and not just another monolith to be admired from afar, of which there are plenty already. The existing plinth, being low and long, would serve my purposes precisely. It could be used as a wall on which to tell the tale of the Battle of Britain with a sculpted storyboard in high relief and which would present itself to the viewer at eye-level, thus being accessible to all ages and intimate rather than grand and distant."

The Research

"I proceeded to research the subject as thoroughly as possible and during a three month period did nothing but read books, watch films and interview veterans, with a view to being totally immersed in the battle. Of course, encountering the veterans meant not only hearing of the extraordinary feats of courage from the lips of pilots and gunners, but also those other veterans and the aircraft themselves, which all spoke volumes about the exhilaration and physical challenge of 1940's air combat. The chance to fly with my RAF namesake and Squadron Leader of the BOB Memorial Flight was too good an opportunity to miss. An hour in the air with Squadron Leader Paul Day brought home to
me with force just how physically trying it was to sustain hard maneuverings in the air, albeit without the canon shells flying around my ears."

The Commemoration

"The Monument is made up of two relief panels facing in opposite directions. On the one I wished to commemorate the unique achievement of Fighter Command and give the entire space over to telling their story. On the other, I wished to portray something of the wider experience, of the Nation as a whole at war. The few thousand pilots, gunners, ground crews and Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) are undoubtedly the heroes of the hour, but I felt it important for future generations to remember the other countless acts of self sacrifice and heroism among the British people without which the RAF could not have so well defended the Nation."

"I feel it important to add that my desire has been to create a work of contemporary art and not to adopt the manners of a previous period or style which has so often been the case with public monuments in the past. Conservativism is not the best way to give life to an historic subject in art. The thing has to take on a life of its own if it is to speak now and to future generations and not to look "past it" from the beginning. The Battle of Britain is an epic moment in History, but one of modernity where new technology was vital. The Monument is not the representation of a tomb where hundreds of thousands lie dead. It is the celebration of excellent organisation, youthful enthusiasm, devotion to duty, and National unity. I hope it will remind my generation of the hardship that was endured by our grandparents to preserve the British people and their traditions which could so nearly have been irrecoverably lost to fascism".1

1 The source of all the above quotes from Paul Day are taken directly from pertinent interviews: 'The Sculptors Vision' Website www.bbm.org.uk/int-vision.htm Accessed Aug 2005)
In bringing this ‘sculpture’s vision’ to material fruition the sculptor commenced work at his studio near Dijon, France and by May 2004, the two panels had been duly completed in clay ready for casting by the Morris Singer Foundry. Interviewed at the time by Lewis Smith of *The Times* he said: ‘I’ve tried to put across in a simple snapshot something of what the people then were going through - the determination, the courage, the fear, the pounding hearts and the bursting blood vessels.’ ‘High relief sculpture’ is a rarely used but is very an interesting form which consists of figures emerging ‘face on’ from the relief.

However, Mr Day’s ‘vision’ and use of realistic ‘high relief’ form did not meet with universal approval and was critically condemned by Gavin Stamp, architectural critic of *Private Eye*. Mr Stamp wrote: ‘It is like something out of a cartoon strip, like “Paddy Payne - Fighter Pilot” in the old *Lion* boy’s comic. Why such trite vulgar realism is necessary in the age of photography and film is hard to understand’ (*Private Eye* No. 1115, 17 Sept 2004).
THE DONATIONS THAT MADE IT HAPPEN

War memorials and monuments to the great battles which have marked our history are, in this country, expressions of the feelings and generosity of our people, not those of the state. This Monument was financed not by Government, nor even by National Lottery funds, but by the public through voluntary subscription. Like those who fought in the battle, the majority of the donations came from the United Kingdom. However, many others came from the Commonwealth and the other countries whose airmen fought alongside ours in 1940.

Of the overseas donors, the most generous was the Government of the Czech Republic to whom the Appeal Committee expresses its particular gratitude.

A number of charitable funds and livery companies were also major donors, together with thousands of individuals and families.

Every living ex-Prime Minister, as well as the late Jim Callaghan, the leaders of the opposition parties and numerous former Secretaries for Defence and other prominent Parliamentarians have contributed. Many donations, although small relative to the total costs of almost £2 million, were clearly very large compared with the incomes of the donors - and the Appeal Committee is mindful of the parable of the widow’s mite.

The names of all donors will be recorded in a capsule buried within the Monument and in a book to be deposited in the Royal Air Force Museum at Hendon.

The 25 largest donors are listed below by category and alphabetically:

NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
The Czech Republic

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
Lady Foxley-Norris
Sydney Frank
Sir Jack Hayward
David Lewis CBE FCA
Sir Paul McCartney
Hilary E. Robinson
Dr Heinz Samson
Bernard Warren
Anonymous Donations (2)

CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND COMPANIES
B.A.E. Systems plc
Bursha Holdings (David Shamoon)
Garfield Weston Foundation (Guy Weston)
The Headley Trust
Highstone Group Ltd (Paul Sykes)
Jimmy Savile Trust (James Collier CBE & Harold Gruber)
The Joron Charitable Trust (Bruce Jarvis & Lady Jarvis)
Linbury Trust
News Corporation (Rupert Murdoch)
P & O Steam Navigation Company (Lord Sterling)
The Archie Sherman Charitable Trust
Charles Stey Charitable Trust
The Westminster Foundation
The Wolfson Foundation
In 2002 the monument was first estimated to cost 1.5 Million. It ended up costing 1.65 million and like many recently erected WWII memorials, caused some public controversy in terms of its funding. At the ‘grass root’ level, contributions to the BOBHS ‘memorial fund’ were by private individuals and organisations and these donations ranged from £2 to £100,000. However, other possible sources of fundraising were not so forthcoming. On the 15th May 2004 The Times reported that: ‘The chairman of the Heritage Lottery Fund was accused yesterday of “spitting in the faces” of the “Few” who won the Battle of Britain’.

The Times was referring to the words of Lord Tebbit who had launched this scathing attack on the lottery fund, after being told that there was no chance of the lottery contributing to the then £1.5 million cost of a Battle of Britain memorial. He was said to be furious that the fund had pledged £1 million to a Women at War Memorial but would not honour the men and women who saved the nation during the Battle of Britain. Lord Tebbit, a former RAFVR pilot, who at the time was leading the fund-raising campaign, said he was shocked at being given the ‘brush-off’ by the fund’s refusal to help. ‘I’m amazed that she [Ms Forgan] is not prepared to talk to me and even listen to the case,’ he said. ‘I regard it as spitting in the face not merely for the pilots but all the others who took part in the battle.’

Ms Forgan said she had explained to Lord Tebbit that the lottery did not fund new memorials, but that Women at War was an “exceptional national monument.” In comparison the Battle of Britain Memorial was “an admirable project” (Times. 15/05/04: 6).

The Daily Mail, which sponsored the monument and promoted its own fundraising appeals for the BOBHS, also pointed out ‘the embarrassment of the Government’ which refused to help fund the project when in acknowledgement of the role played by Czech pilots, the Government of the Czech Republic donated 2.5 million crowns towards the cost of the £1.65m monument. Other Charitable Trusts and Companies who subscribed included: BAE Systems Plc, Bursha Holdings (David Shamoon), Garfield Weston Foundation (Guy
Public Inauguration of Monument

The BOBHS carefully selected Sunday 18th September 2005 as the date for the inauguration ceremony. That calendar date was chosen, not only because it is Battle of Britain Day (annually), but also to avoid conflicting with the special Battle of Britain Sunday in July (2005) and other Second World War 60th anniversary commemorations. At some point after the 7/7 attacks of 2005, the BOBHS delegated responsibility for the actual organisation of the unveiling ceremony to Ceremonial Branch of the Royal Air Force. The immediate consequence of this institutionalised involvement was that the RAF unilaterally compiled its own 'guest list' of 700, which mainly consisted of Press, Royalty, VIPs, senior RAF officers and veterans of the battle. A formal list of guests was not available to the public in the light of the 7/7 attacks. However, based on observation, some 70 veterans did attend the actual ceremony. There were also specially invited guests, such as Dame Vera Lynn and luminaries of the BOBHS, and a few next of kin of The Few and ‘the many’.

On 18 September 2005 the commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the Battle of Britain commenced at 1100, with a Service of Thanksgiving and Rededication in Westminster Abbey. The Prince of Wales (dressed in the uniform of Air Marshal) and The Duchess of Cornwall, dressed in a complementary shade of dark blue, attended a special service at
Westminster Abbey. During the Act of Remembrance, Air Vice-Marshal the Venerable Ron Hesketh, RAF Chaplain-in-Chief urged the congregation to recall: 'those whose sacrifices were just as great.' The fighter pilots of old joined the latest generation of young RAF pilots in presenting the Fighter Command Silk Ensign and Battle of Britain Roll of Honour for rededication. Interestingly, the BBC, being the nation’s public service broadcaster, chose not to air the event and instead transmitted a programme of a domestic golf championship.

The dignitaries and veterans then adjourned for lunch and later that afternoon, the focus switched to Victoria Embankment, where the unveiling ceremony was to take place. In a speech before the unveiling, the Prince said: ‘Of course the pilots were so very young, many even younger than my sons are now, and for me this makes their sacrifice even more poignant. I hope that today’s generation, and those to come, will be inspired by this and above all, will be able to reflect on the self-sacrifice of these courageous young men.’

The unveiling ceremony took place at 1300 and was attended by delegates from 14 countries. These included the Australian Defence Minister Robert Hill, Czech Defence Minister Jaroslova Pribylova, members of the fundraising committee chaired by Lord Tebbit and other guests, including Paul Day and the actor Edward Fox, who had famously
starred in the iconic film of the battle. After the unveiling, a well-received address was delivered by the Prince of Wales and Lord Tebbit. The official ceremony was concluded with a low fly-past of a Spitfire and Hurricane from the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight.

Veterans at Unveiling Ceremony: Source www.bobm.org.uk September 2005

Mediated Reception of Monument

The limitation on the numbers permitted to attend the ceremony was no doubt the consequence of the heightened security state – immediately post 7/7. The immediate upshot of this security consideration was that a considerable number of people who thought they would be the happy recipients of invitations, found out at a fairly late stage that this was not to be so. Accordingly, the ceremony itself took place in a 'sterile' environment, with the Victoria Embankment, from Westminster Bridge to Horse Guards Avenue being barricaded off by two tightly controlled security cordons: The inner cordon being policed by RAF Police and the outer cordon, policed by the Metropolitan Police.

One of the effects of this cordon was that the veterans and guests were able to proceed in a secure environment to the reception in the Pillared Hall of the MOD Main Building immediately after the ceremony. But this also meant that the public were effectively
excluded from seeing, or participating in the unveiling event. Indeed, some members of the general public I spoke to expressed outrage at being kept away. Public access to Victoria Embankment was restored at around 1520hrs. Accordingly, general reception and public consumption of the site was initially through other indirect sources, such as TV or media.

In this mediated context, the commemorative event was shown on all news channels that evening. In an ITV interview, carefully staged on site, the then UK Secretary of State for Defence, Dr John Reid said: ‘I am delighted to see this magnificent monument erected in acknowledgement of all those who fought so bravely during the Battle of Britain. It is a fitting tribute to their selfless commitment and determination that are still exemplified by our Armed Forces today, and their personal and collective sacrifices that gave the nation hope and heart at this critical time in our history. I am also delighted to be joined by my Australian and Czech colleagues today and official representation from the other countries that fought alongside Britain, reflecting our unity ‘then and now’ in the face of adversity. I salute all those who took part in this memorable victory and also all those who have worked so hard to raise funds to erect this wonderful tribute in the heart of London.’

On Channel Four News, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup said: ‘This splendid monument is a fitting tribute to the bravery of the aircrew who fought in the Battle of Britain, and to their ground crews, support staff and the many others who together won such a seminal victory against overwhelming odds. Today, as we mark these heroic achievements, our air and ground personnel continue to follow their forebears' finest traditions in operations around the world. The Battle of Britain demonstrated unequivocally the critical importance of air power, and the need for agility and adaptability. These lessons remain as relevant today as in the 1940's, and we continue to build on this proud heritage in preparing for the tasks of tomorrow.’ Here, past, present and future are united.
Sculptor Paul Day put forward a personalised perspective and told BBC News, that he had been touched deeply by stories about the battle: "I've had some veterans come up to me in the last few days who have been moved by visiting the site and seeing their names. That was one of my first concerns - to make something that was going to be approachable and that would connect with the people that lived through this." The daily newspapers hailed the monument with great acclaim. In a 'Saturday Essay' (September 16th) written by Robert Hardman, The Daily Mail said, "CAST IN GLORY: It's taken 65 years to honour the Battle of Britain's heroes, now thanks in no small part to Mail readers, a magnificent monument capturing their courage and sacrifice will be unveiled. And not before time!"

On Monday 19th September the Mail read, "IN PRAISE OF THE FEW: Charles unveils Battle of Britain memorial, paid for by the public and by Mail readers (but not Labour or the Lottery)." The Telegraph read, "Honoured at Last: 'The Many' of the Battle of Britain" (The Daily Telegraph, Monday 19th September. P6). The Daily Mirror read, "Thanks to the Few: Tribute of Battle of Britain Heroes." The Sun read, "We salute you" but seemed more interested in hats, "Camilla you must have a mad hatter!" (see 18 & 19th September 2005).

However, the public reception of the monument was not without some contention. Observed on the actual day of the unveiling, Martin Sugarman, Archivist of the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen pointed out that the name of 'Flying Officer George Ernest Goodman' who was born in Palestine, was not listed on the monument under either Palestine or Israel, but was listed as being British, which would suggest a degree of wishful thinking on the part of BOBHS. Mr Sugarman openly voiced the opinion that there were a considerable number of names missing off the memorial. This contestation was not reported in any media outlets or press reports, even though Mr Sugarman was heard.
Interestingly on September 20th he returned on behalf of the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen and placed a small CWGC Star of David poppy peg on the Monument with a typed note “In undying memory of the 52 Jewish, British and Allied air crew who are not named on this memorial – and especially George E Goodman, who was born in Haifa, Israel/Palestine, and whose place of birth has been deliberately omitted from this memorial.” According to Mr Sugarman, the peg was removed within ten minutes - by whom and why is not known! The following quotes are drawn from comments made on a questionnaire I asked Mr Sugarman to complete once I learned of this ‘naming’ protest.

“The Roll is wrong. If you see my article "Jewish Aircrew in the Battle Of Britain" on the internet (google search under title) it explains that a book I discovered at the IWM reading room, published by the Air Ministry in 1947 entitled "Battle of Britain Roll of Honour", includes hundreds of names NOT on the memorial".

“Also the Battle of Britain Historical Association deliberately excluded Israel/Palestine from the list of participating nations, even though GE Goodman was born in Haifa in 1920 and I have a copy of his Hebrew birth certificate. The Israelis says that even though he may not have been Jewish (and this is still not proven, as his British parents went to live there in 1918 and may be of Jewish origin) they regard him as their "first ace"; all the books on the BoB describe him as Palestinian or Israeli and yet the "committee" for political reasons have chosen to exclude his place of birth on the memorial. However, they have chosen to include one pilot from Newfoundland (part of Canada, whichever way you look at it technically) and have not delved into the true nationalities of many Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, and Rhodesians, who would for sure have been of British nationality, taken to those countries as babies or whose parents were from Britain, just like Goodman! This is an appalling double standard”.

“As a result – despite the splendid memorial and its aims – long overdue – it is to me a historical travesty of the truth so far as the namings are concerned” (Sept, 2005).

This important consideration of what consumers thought of the Monument is what we must consider next, before we can sum up the surface description of the case study. To do that we must move from public domain sources of description to social science representation.
The following discussion presents some responses drawn from what can be accurately described as a 'limited in scale survey questionnaire'. By design, the respondent audience is mainly made up of BOBHS members with the exception being Mr Sugarman. Accordingly, the sample of the survey must be described as a selective audience. Finally, the actual means of surveying was produced in much haste, which may also distract if not further explain i.e. I enrolled on the 12th September 2005; I sent out the survey on the 15th.

Such circumstances, as an impending unveiling date and discussions to gain permission from the BOBHS, meant that the questionnaires actual production was hastily conducted over the short academic summer of 2005 and only once I had gained a position at Kent and thus formal permission to conduct my research proposal. As a dyslexic student, I had not yet had chance to set in place ‘proof reading facilities’ and as a consequence, there were glaring spelling mistakes and grammatical errors. Once this was brought to my attention - by respondents - I asked for apologies to be made on my behalf and took full responsibility, so that my parent University was not brought into disrepute. This initial lack of research preparation on my part belies the amount of actual preparation that went into its conceptual production - as a lot of differing factors helped to inform the content and tone of the questions asked - even if I needed more time to polish the final presentation.

Here, I refer to what one can only describe as essential background research, which entailed immersing oneself in the subject matter. Building on what I had come to learn and grasped from self-interrogation, oral history and participant observation approaches to grounded ethnographic research - such as talking to veterans and participants at many, many commemorative events - I employed a questionnaire design that was pragmatically inspired by the 'Values and Beliefs' research pioneered by Stamford University in the 70's.
Such an approach to surveying asked overlaying questions about how the respondent personally felt about the subject matter at hand. As a bonus, questions about one's own feelings consistently produce over 70% response rates. As I would get only one chance at this survey method, I needed a template that not only promised to give results, but I also needed data that would help illuminate the social states of mind of those involved i.e. in specific terms of values & beliefs related to the public memory of this narrative of past war.

As a critically minded study and in empirical terms of methodologically unpacking respondents' 'values and beliefs' with relation to an observable connectivity between war, memory and the ethical environment, I have looked to see what was thought of this culturally significant monument when the respondent was asked to consider this particular institutional presence of past war slightly outside of the normal emotional safe havens of a 'security blanket' understanding as outlined by Connolly (2004). Thus I had to ask some difficult and contrasting questions that would enable the respondent to engage with a powerful and selective war memory subject from the varying contexts of 'what the right memory is' i.e. what we discussed in the preamble. Here, my thinking builds on Berger's (1971) influential thesis that there is no single all seeing storyteller - only 'ways of seeing'.

Some recognised the inherent irony of what was being asked of them and responded with well-considered answers and in-depth qualifications to their stated responses. In this respect, I received some heartfelt letters of support and encouragement. As anticipated, a small number where angered and even enraged about the implications of some questions asked. In this context, explanatory notes showed that it was not the 'difficult questions' in themselves that were thought to be 'wrong or inappropriate' by such individuals, but that the nature of the questions asked seemed to challenge the 'ethos' or 'intrinsic purpose' of the BOBM. Here, commemorative social actions or mnemonic practices were conceived by many respondents as 'self-evident' to participation in the collective 'duty to remember'.

Chapter 5
Others explicitly saw the post heroic paradox of post Cold War British war memory narratives and in accordance with what was perceived as a 'change', expressed emotional articulations of why they had responded they way they had with relation to the BOBM. Indeed, all comments on the secondary questions of 'why' were laden with other connotations much wider than the questions asked, and as a result what was articulated in short evocative comments was impassioned, heartfelt and authentic in the sense that self-interrogation had clearly taken place as part of the process of addressing said questions.

In this respect, such questions were primarily asked to help gain an overlapping and wider insight into some of the most relevant attitudes expressed towards this particular CWM project. By relevant, I mean revealing insights pertinent to the exploratory goals of this case study investigation. The full questionnaire is in appendix one, with a covering sheet brief to those that chose to participate. This cover sheet contextualises the paradoxes I allude to above, and thus sets the agenda for the survey. Conforming to the current ethical considerations and criteria of social science research, 'Informed Consent' is made explicit to participation in response i.e. it is made clear in the covering brief (Appendix 1).

Seventy surveys were given to the Chairman of the BOBHS for a pre-arranged 'mailing date' prior to the unveiling of which I am informed only 41 reached their destination for varying reasons, not least that there were fewer invites than anticipated for the 7/7 security reasons explained above. From the 41 known to have received a questionnaire, I received 31 full returns with three voids and seven nil responses. This 'nil response' says something in itself, but is open to interpretation and context. Without further information to help make sense of this, what follows only concerns the 28 respondents who gave full answers to all the questions asked; those that didn't constitute the three voids. Here, I will also make reference to fact-finding questions asked in the semi structured interviews [Guy
Brewer, Mark Quinlan and Ted McManus] and some of the qualifications articulated by the respondents themselves. Audio and originals are available for post-doctoral research.

Like the above presentation of fact-finding data drawn from public domain sources, here I make little or no attempt at sociological analysis beyond surface description, as this analytical research task is the main discussion aim of part four [see summary of part 3 below]. Collated details of participant demographics - questions asked - can be found detailed in the relevant appendix, but not specific details of those that I have quoted from below. What descriptive criteria I used to help determine whom to quote and why, is governed by the privilege of discovery identified within the content and context of the question asked i.e. by the point being made by the respondent with relation to the question being asked. We must begin by considering first impressions of the BOB Monument.

**Question 1: On first impression what did you think of the monument?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree by ticking (✓) the appropriate response.</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. It is important that we have a national Monument to commemorate the BoB.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Monument is not an appropriate Form to commemorate the BoB.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The inscription is an appropriate way to remember the dead of war.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. The design is an appropriate way to remember the deeds of 'The Few'</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. The monument's 'symbolic message' is a 'peoples' warning of the destruction and human cost of war.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. The message is a re-affirmation of national unity, resilience and identity.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bearing in mind the important critique of one respondent, that respondents are in essence agreeing or disagreeing with the words I have written, in this section, we can see that all respondents agreed that there was an important need for the monument and similarly all disagreed with Gavin Stamp's architectural critique for *Private Eye*: in that 'high relief is an
inappropriate monumental form to commemorate the BoB' (In Quinlan M. 2005 Vol1).
Similarly, all but one agreed with Winston Churchill's (1940) iconic epitaph that 'Never in
the history of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few'. The same
can also be said of the iconic imagery symbolised in the monument's homage to The Few.

However, while most agreed with Furlong's (2002) 'silent sentry' understanding of the war
memorial's inbuilt or intrinsic symbolic message, five of the respondents neither agreed
nor disagreed that this was the symbolic message intended, one clearly suggesting that
this was not part of its envisaged cultural purpose. Indeed, 2 respondents whole-heartedly
disagreed that this had anything to do with the symbolic message of the monument.
Finally, in ontologically re-affirming terms, most agreed that the message of The BoBM
said something about what it is to be British. In short, the first impression of the monument
is positive and even self-evident to most of these early consumers of its public presence.

**Question 2: What did you think of the unveiling ceremony?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree by ticking (✓) the appropriate response.</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. I thought the formality, tradition and ritual was wholly appropriate and was in accordance with the established conventions of remembrance.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. I thought the formality, tradition and ritual was out of date and should have taken a more interactive format like in the 1997 remembrance of Lady Di.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The ceremony and speeches made me feel part of something bigger and proud to be in attendance.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. The ceremony and speeches made me feel like a visiting spectator and uncomfortable about my attendance.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. The unveiling event was geared towards the dignitaries and not the BoB families and general attendees.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This intangible type of ontological re-affirmation is also apparent within the collated responses to the five questions asked about how the respondents felt and thought about
the unveiling ceremony: Here self-evident social states of mind are apparent with relation to a 'duty to remember' narrative, with just one respondent expressing thinking against the conventionality of the event. Here some suggested that The Queen should have done the honours and another wrote "bloody hell!!" with relation to Lady Diana. Two respondents made clear that they were aware of the irony of agreeing to feeling both proud and uncomfortable about the unveiling ceremony i.e. with relation to sub - questions 2 c & d. This irony was also apparent within the response context of the questions asked in 3a & b.

Question 3a: At the symbolic level the monument tells us something about how we as a society feel about war. In your opinion what do you think the monument says about the historical institution of war?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Importance</th>
<th>Please select five important messages you think the monument leaves for historical posterity. Rank your responses in order of their significance from 1-5 (1 being high importance and 5 being low).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1. That war is bad and nobody wins in the end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2. That war can be fought for good and a better society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3. That sometimes war is necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4. That war is a rational and moral means to a political end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5. That it is the ultimate test of man, state and society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6. That war is dependent on the ideas of an age or era.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7. That war is the fault of the politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8. That we are all responsible for the act of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9. That to fight in war is a duty and an Honour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10. That war is natural to human society and eternal to human history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. That we can each learn from the lessons of war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 3b: Having established what you think the message of the monument says about war what would you like it to say?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Importance</th>
<th>Please select the five most important messages you would want the monument to leave behind for your children's children. Rank your responses in order of their significance from 1-5.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1. That war is bad and nobody wins in the end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2. That war can be fought for good and a better society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3. That sometimes war is necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4. That war is a rational and moral means to a political end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>5. That it is the ultimate test of man, state and society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>6. That war is dependent on the ideas of an age or era.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>7. That war is the fault of the politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8. That we are all responsible for the act of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. That to fight in war is a sacred duty and an Honour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. That war is natural to human society and eternal to human history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. That we can each learn from the lessons of war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The novel conceptual idea behind Stamford University's 'lifestyles' research was to ask overlapping questions in such a way as to reveal hidden contradictions in core values and illuminate common edits in public attitudes and societal beliefs. Regardless of the subject matter - be it fashion or war memory - this discovery task is achieved by asking the same type of questions in different ways and from different contexts. As a whole, this project's survey questionnaire is designed to do just this, but nowhere is this aim more apparent then in Questions 3a & b. Here, the same question about 'opinion and feeling' on the 'institution and origins of war' is asked from the overlapping context of what the respondent feels the BoB monument can convey to historical posterity; contrasted by what they would really like it to say about war to their children's children. In this respect, all respondents but one, understood that war memorials are de-facto story tellers of past war and as such, will always have a 'silent sentry' metaphor contained somewhere in the semiotic message.

The respondent that wouldn't acknowledge the semiotic message of the BoB monument simply wrote “who thought these up. The monument records the Battle of Britain – none of these” and subsequently only ticked the box which said 'war is the fault of politicians'.

In conducting background research to try to figure out the most common types of silent sentry metaphor contained in the traditional British war memorial, I spent a lot of time simply observing as a consumer and talking to people as a participant. I talked to experts such as Mark Quinlan and Guy Brewer from the MOD Veterans Policy Unit; I attended many unveiling ceremonies and consulted visitors' books at the IWM London and North on numerous occasions, just to try to get a grasp on how the central tenets of this message are manifest in monumentality. I would go on memorial tours with English Heritage, and even conducted a couple of tours myself as a volunteer. In this regard, I was able to contrast and compare what I was seeing, with what others would see in the same artifact. I would spend my lunchtimes while studying in London sat next to prominent memorials and talk to people when they stopped to look for themselves. I went on many road trips all
around the country on battlefield tours to visit specific memorials. Anywhere I would come across a memorial, I would take a picture and ask ‘what is it saying to me’, and why. The result of this research is an understanding of the ‘silent sentry’ metaphor that can generally be associated with ways of seeing war and the type of established edits asked about here.

In terms of surface description, I wanted to find out what the respondents saw in the case study with relation to the eleven most common silent sentry metaphors I had identified in my background research. Having established what they may see as the message of the monument, Question 3b is my way of asking the respondent what they feel or think the ‘right’ message or memory of war ‘should be’ with personal relation to their children’s children. In this respect, the results of questions 3a & b are very revealing. For example:

Only three respondents signified that they saw ‘that we are all responsible for the act of war’ but nine said they wanted to see this message. Nine signified that they saw ‘war is bad and nobody wins in the end’ in the monument and ten that this message should be symbolised. In this respect, all but four respondents had discrepancies between what they saw and what they would have liked to have seen. One respondent that wanted to see the message that ‘we are all responsible ...’ wrote a heartfelt letter explaining that her fiancé had died in the battle and that her two sons attending with her were from a subsequent marriage to a fighter pilot also honoured on the memorial. Interestingly, her sons both signified that the monument should express ‘that to fight in war is a sacred duty and an honour’, although the son not in the Armed Forces scratched through ‘an honour’.

The four respondents that did not change their responses to 3a or b signified the five most common edits signposted by the respondents as a whole: these were edits 3,2,11,10 & 1 with relation to levels of significance expressed. With direct relation to question 3a, the edit ‘that sometimes war is necessary’ was signified 24 times by respondents and the edit...
‘that war can be fought for good and a better society’ 22 times. This compares with four significations for the edit ‘that war is a rational and moral means to a political end’ and 13 significations for the edit ‘that war is the ultimate test of man, state and society’. Edit ‘11’ was signified 22 times & edit ‘10’ a total of 11 times, as compared with edit 1’s nine counts.

With direct relation to question 3b, the edit that ‘we can each learn the lessons of war’ was signified 25 times, with the vast majority indicating a high relevance with regard to this message and only one giving this edit a significance level of 5. This compares with the 22 significations rated at a mid to low level significance in what they saw in 3a. Here edit ‘10’ also receive nine significations of low significance, as compared to the 11 significations for what they saw in 3a. Indeed, the only stand out constant I can see concerns the edit ‘that war is the fault of politicians’ which received six here and seven in 3a and so remained consistent. Looking at these overall discrepancies - between what the respondents may see in the symbolic message and what they would like to see with relation to this public space testimony of war - it is somewhat surprising to see the overwhelming degree to which most respondents re-affirm a high satisfaction with the BOBM.

Question 4: In the above context of Historical posterity how satisfied are you with the monument?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied you are by ticking (V) the appropriate response.</th>
<th>Highly satisfied</th>
<th>I am satisfied</th>
<th>Ambivalent</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How would you judge the satisfaction of the monument in terms of what you would want it to say to your children’s children?</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keeping in mind the psychological idea behind the design of this survey questionnaire, we see that the final question simply asks what has already been asked, only this time from a more direct and forthright approach. Again, we can see that when collated together all the responses represent ‘ways of seeing’ war and are thus very revealing and even self-
evident in purely descriptive terms. This observation clearly applies on many, many levels but is especially apparent here in terms of expressing our un-stated cultural assumptions.

**Question 5:** In your opinion, what cultural purpose does the monument serve for society and what is the memorial's social function as an artifact of collective memory?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree by ticking (✓) the appropriate response.</strong></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The high relief tapestry is a national statement of Britishness and community and serves to remind ‘others’ of the nation's ability to wage war when provoked by aggressors.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Monument is a beacon for the Nation that belongs to all and serves as a reminder of the human cost of freedom.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The physical form is a token of national thanksgiving and serves as a public and private site of remembrance.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. In times of crisis and anxiety the Monument serves as an iconic example of national strength through unity.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. The narrative of the Monument serves as an example of British values and stoicism for future generations.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. The Monument is a representation of our cultural heritage and serves as symbol of British identity.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. The Monument is a ‘Public Space’ for mourning, contemplation and reflection by the families of the Fallen and various veterans associations.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Erecting the BoB Monument is a societal way of passing on popular memories of the war from generation to generation.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. The Monument is a legacy of war and serves to legitimize and justify the cultural institution of war.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. The Monument stands as a testament to patriotism, duty and sacrifice and thus is designed to remind the young of their duty when the nation is called to arms.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of Observations

In Part 3 we have employed a review discussion and a surface description of the recently unveiled Battle of Britain Monument as a methodological medium for observation. We have illuminated the selection, patronage, form, content and consumption of this particular collective memory presence, from the standpoint of various perspectives within the main memory group known as the nation. It is the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the project's mixed-method findings - as to who is doing the social remembering, how, in what context and for what reason - that will allow this project to examine, unpack and explore how this particular public war memory is affected by the varied combination of factors we have been discussing in part 2. Thus in summing up our fact-finding description of the case study, I would like to recap with an earlier quote as an analytical point of departure.

"Remembrance is not a celebration of war, nor does it seek to glorify it. It is the means by which the British people pause to remember those who have fallen in time of conflict. As we near the time when the generations that fought our two world wars are no more, it becomes increasingly important that the reasons for commemorating their wartime endeavours, should be explained to the young and set down for the benefit of future generations. Freedom is not free, and remembrance is more then renewing our bonds with the recent past. It reminds us why our ancestors fought. This is the greatest power of remembrance: the power, not only to keep alive the courage of those long dead, but also to inspire individual courage and public determination in our time."

Written by a serving Major General in the British Army, it is not inaccurate to suggest that the views expressed in this quote are institutionally sanctioned ideas about the current role or purpose of British war remembrance. As we have seen, such ideas about the role, functionality and purpose of war memory are well established in Civil Military Relations [CMR's] as part of remembrance convention and public commemoration. Accordingly, such ideas help imbue and instil the collective motive or duty to remember selective events of past war and thus mobilise or structure the many public/ private actions involved with much 'official' war remembrance (Quinlan, M. 2005). As we have seen in Parts 1, 2 & 3 and from the standpoint of what Bauman (2000:222) terms the 'Duty to Remember', this
type of public memory is very selective in 'its' form or content, because this type of 'official war narrative' generally serves the greater good of civil society, democracy and freedom.

The Battle of Britain Monument exemplifies this type of official commemoration. As an institutional presence of past war, the monument provides various situated contexts in which the collective memory of the 'Good War' can be appropriated by current social institutions. At the grass-roots level, the origins and funding of the monument highlight how there is a 'powerful collective will' to remember 'the war' in the national psyche (Lunn, K. 1997). Finally, in the sociological context of identity formation and identification with the symbols and images of past war, one can now see why I have suggested that the selective and institutionalised narratives of the 'Good War' help construct and maintain powerful 'social meaning frameworks' which are clearly morally integrated within hegemonic notions of what it means to be British (see Tilly, C. 2003., Oblick, J. & Robbins, J. 1998: 105-140).

As an 'ideal type' of this well-established cultural narrative, the BOBM can be viewed as a symbolic story teller of Our Finest Hour (Clayton & Craig, 1999). During which time 'our brave' Fighter Boys (Bishop, 2004) saved Britain from The Most Dangerous Enemy (Bungay 2001) and gained in an historic air battle Your Freedom and Ours (Olson & Cloud 2004). It has been argued by many, that such narratives symbolise a shared mythological vision of British nationhood that resonates deep within the collective consciousness (see Smith, M. 2000). In accordance with the above mission statement of remembrance and as a cultural memory artefact, which implicitly connects the Anglo/American 'good war' with the post 9/11 present, the iconic imagery and symbolism of the monument is explicitly designed to invoke a sense of 'national community' (Day, P. 2004) forged in the societal knowledge and viscid memory experience that We Can Take it (Connolly, 2004). Indeed, as a 'cultural memory' in monumental form, the artefact was designed by its creators to
convey a soothing narrative of unity and present an understanding of belonging which was realised in the nations' psyche while waiting for the all clear during the Blitz (Wicks, 1990).

In this context, our surface description illuminates various aspects of the memory debate discussed in chapter 4 and which in part reinforces the mainstream public discourse on the topic of WWII memory i.e. that the collective memory of the Second World War is commonly understood as empathically reaffirmed in the present (Lunn, K. 1997). In these much generalised terms, this descriptive view of the monument also illuminates the potential for political and institutional appropriation of war memory, which we can now infer is an important aspect of the monument's social significance in the present. In this regard, relevant war memory research in the History and Memory Journal demonstrates how these culturally embedded and historically rooted narratives of past war can be seen to help constitute a very powerful legitimisation of war, which in times of uncertainty and anxiety, can become an extremely powerful weapon, wielded in various ways to generate various kinds of personal and political attachments to groups, movements or even causes.

Bearing all this in mind - and we have implicitly addressed many of the questions asked in chapter 3 and thus know why the monument exists in descriptive terms i.e. to help raise a sagging public awareness of a culturally significant historical event; pay tribute to the many participants involved in the iconic battle and of course, to honour the collective memory of the listed dead in the name of societal values such as freedom and democracy. Similarly, drawing on the knowledge presented in chapter 4, we can infer the monument's current politics of identity and practical ideological significance as a nationally significant totem of collective effervescence – a view reinforced from the overwhelmingly positive responses to the pertinent questions we asked in our survey questionnaire and the main inauguration speeches made at the unveiling ceremony [written in the immediate wake of the 7/7 attacks]. We can also infer a public discourse affirmation of a 'security blanket' narrative of
past war and the apparent cultural capital or symbolic status of the monument from the culture industry's unilaterally positive reception to this artefacts 'en-coding' inauguration.

Noble ideals indeed, but critically speaking, if War is that which 'obligates' uncivilised conduct, then why do we in ethically educated societies socially remember the experience of past war the way we do and more importantly, what are the unintended consequences of telling such noble and iconic lies. In this 'latent function' context the forthcoming analysis is formulated as a way to help us think about these concerns in terms of how the self-evident denial of human barbarism in war may impact upon what moral philosophers describe as the 'ethical environment'. Here, Simon Blackburn's (2001) articulation of this ubiquitous climate illuminates how this 'all encompassing environment' is both 'internal and external' in constitution and understood as the surrounding climate of ethical ideas which are said to help influence how individuals may think and feel about what they see and do.

Look Forward to Analysis and Interpretations

In this respect, the next few chapters present the analytical discussions of the research project. As was clearly explained in Part 2, this final analytical aspect of the thesis is constituted in narrative form by an observational and thematic re-evaluation of the role, purpose and function of the Battle of Britain Monument. The methodological aim of Part 4 is to bring to bear the many and varied forms of established knowledge discussed in the literature review, so we may begin to critically analyse the subject matter described above.

Here, my narrative goal is to promote novel ways of seeing and thus help provide the reader with an ontologically deeper or 'Critical Realist' re-evaluation of the inherent reason for the existence of the monument in public space. That is to say, a deeper analysis of 'its' sociological presence in comparative, structural or content analysis terms of how this particular microcosm of WWII memory has been empirically presented to us in the fact-
finding context of surface description. By surface description, I of course mean the varied forms of social science and public domain data I have presented, with direct relation to describing the psycho-geography and institutional presence of WWII memory phenomena.

How these varied forms of critical analysis are finally integrated within the exploratory and wider context of the formalised research process has already been situated and contextualised within the interlinked discussions of previous chapters. Thus, in accordance with the transformative research strategy of this project, chapters 7 & 8 will draw together and bind the interpretative and observational findings of this overarching analysis, in order to help us reconsider the main exploratory problems of the project from Tilly's (2003) varied standpoints of concern identified in the introductory preamble and chapter 2. In short, the concluding analysis will re-evaluate the institutional presence of war memory in specific terms of the civilising process and thus will consider the implications of our critical viewings in terms of the normative relations between CWM and the ethical environment.

Situated in the alternative model of war outlined in chapter 1 and looked at from the critical context of this project's observational hypothesis on the emotional dishonesty of war's noble lies; located in Martin Shaw's (1991) critical social theory understandings of nostalgia militarism and the mechanics of his past war thesis and finally, methodologically approached from a very revealing cubist perspective of critical realism, we now delve much deeper into the identified social memory issues of patronage, selectivity, appropriation and consumption, as these are all issues of societal reproduction concerning the sociological source [continuity and change in 'post-military' civil military relations] which I have implied may inform the present boom of WWII memory phenomena. From this distinct post-heroic perspective, I can now begin to de-construct the semiotic, ideological, and public discourse connectivity between the memory of this particular past war and the new 'risk-transfer' mentality of warfare in the current ethical environment of late-modernity.
To situate the deconstruction of our microcosm in these terms, we will need to engage with public discourse on national retrospections of war with specific relation to the Iraq War five years on. To locate this, I will employ Mark Quinlan’s (2007) description of the mediated inauguration of the Abandoned Soldier as a comparative, but contrasting model of CWM. Accordingly, the aim of Part 4 is to contrast the purely surface descriptions of the Battle of Britain microcosm in chapter five with an 'emotionally honest' anti-monumentality project.

This re-contextualisation will enable the project to gain a much clearer and deeper insight into the various structural forces at work, in the production of war monumentality; in particular, the shaping roles of bureaucracy, political agency, institutional patronage and power in the selectivity and cultural production of Contemporary War Monumentality projects. Such a revealing contrast will help highlight what happens in praxis when the legitimacy of war is challenged and patronage, or power is withheld from such projects. I will thus clearly demonstrate in a grounded-context how the so called 'noble lies of war' are rarely challenged within the existing social meaning frameworks of British war memory.

Building on this transformative understanding Part 4 will then analyse the form and content of the monument in terms of the semiotic relations between our perceived societal will to socially commemorate, not just the deeds, but ideals of this past war through the current cultural means of collectively remembering 'the Good War'. We thus analyse the semiotic and material culture relations between the sign, signified and signifier and ask how these social meaning frameworks influence the way we now see, perceive and comprehend present conflicts. We can then ask if this way of seeing war contributes to the problem of war's perceived inescapability. Located in this wider context, we re-consider if the way we socially remember this past war is in essence a subtler form of nostalgia militarism, promoting a type of morality manipulation towards what asymmetrical war is in act or deed i.e. does what we see in our analysis re-enforce the memory mechanics of Shaw's thesis?
Finally, to contextually consider the perceived civilising/de-civilising connectivity between the public memory of this particular past war and an implied normative relationship with ongoing present conflicts, Part 4 will critically analyse the ideological tone and political manner of war memory appropriation; i.e. we will re-consider how this culturally prestigious and thus very powerful collective memory of ‘the good war’ was actually consumed in terms of legitimising war and current civil military relations. In short, we will analyse how the reproductive function of the Monument has been appropriated by the powerful as a cultural means of justification and legitimisation. Here, we will also see how the emotional power of war memory can be harnessed and thus appropriated within the main institutional cleavages of British civil society i.e. though media, monarchy, military, and government.

Here, we will achieve deep analytical insight by employing sociology of knowledge as a means of de-constructing and unpacking the monument’s form and content in terms of its symbolic discourse on warfare and as located in mnemonic practice, social process and cultural narrative or national myth. We will then re-locate our ‘social states of mind’ analysis with direct relation to examples of how the dog tag nostalgia of WWII has recently been appropriated with specific relation to our present conflicts and then contrast this constructed comparison of the other with current research on the way modern Britain and a united Germany retrospectively view each other as past combatants of Good and Evil.

As stated in the methodological discussions, it is hoped that such an ontologically layered and in-depth content analysis of the war memory subject matter at hand will enable us to reconsider Tilly’s (2003) framing questions in a contextual manner. In this regard, Part 4 corresponds to the established parameters of our critical examination of the selection, form, content and consumption of the BOBM, as this artefact of British ‘cultural memory’ is historically located as a powerful social meaning framework within in our collective or social states of mind i.e. un-stated cultural assumptions of war’s perceived inescapability.
There is no single storyteller, only ways of seeing.

Analysis and Interpretation of Case Study Microcosm

The thematic premise of this project's analysis and interpretation is built upon Kellner's (2003:1-29) Media and Cultural Studies thesis. As stated, the applied understanding of this idea is that commemorative culture is also produced and consumed within social life and therefore, particular cultural artefacts of British WWII memory and remembrance practices must be situated within the social relations of production and reception - in which this culture is produced, distributed and consumed - in order to be properly understood and interpreted. Within the overlapping discussions of the next two chapters, the overarching or main analytical aim is to re-contextualise current cultural forms of modern war memory, including its public audiences, within socially constructed situations, which will help illuminate how contemporary war monumentality projects reflect and help reproduce concrete social relations and conditions – or even oppose and attempt to transform them.

To this end, chapter six will consider some selectivity issues and other factors appertaining to the form or functionality of the BOBM. Chapter seven will build on this analysis and re-consider meanings, content, consumption and appropriation, first as a process of ideology construction and secondly as a contested negotiation of ethics, morals, values and beliefs. Having done so, one can finally begin to re-think what the ‘right memory of war’ could be.
I was informed on a recent English Heritage tour, that a memorial, like the Battle of Britain Monument [BOBM], “is like any form of public art which is built and set in our landscape to illustrate ideas to the public and affect the public consciousness”. In this respect, “more often than not they are simply seen as a tool used to help the public remember a person or act every time someone walks past them; such as a memorial to Winston Churchill or Lady Diana”. In many ways Contemporary War Monumentality [CWM] does conform to this ideal of remembrance. However, as one could easily infer from the varied examples, presented above via the public medium of a recent Washington D.C. Postcard, there are also a number of other reasons why war memorials are now built. These social functionalities span from celebration, to healing and to illustrating the cultural story of war: It is this ‘Form’ to functionality that we now re-examine in the situated context of social life.
Chapter Five presented a conventional viewing of the case study memorial in an attempt to understand why it was made and what it is trying to say to its consumers. In short, we looked at who was doing the social remembering, in what context, why and with whom. Moving beyond this surface level of description, what I need to do here is unpack the semiotic message that the memorial is trying to convey to posterity about warfare. I do this by employing various methods of interpretation such as sociology of knowledge viewing; historical, comparative, contextual and structural analysis. Each 'way of seeing' is put in context before it is applied to conduct analysis. Finally, if the message is in the medium, then another way to aid critical interpretation is to view war memorials as part of an artistic tradition: like that of art or sculpture. Within these commutative forms there are techniques, movements or influences, which all have had an effect on the next generation.

From the classical depiction of the actual to the Impressionists view of the imagined real; from the brutal harshness or conformity of 'social realism' to the utopia of romanticism and the potential of 'futurism'; from the sedate comfort of the conventional and traditional to the speed and shock of the 'new modernism'; from the insight of the abstract to the existentialisms of the 'surrealist'; from the simulacrum of the 'model of the real' to the hyper-reality of the 'image of the real', from the solidity of the past in 'high-modernity' to the liquidness of the present within 'late-modernity'. Looked at in this 'tradition' context and each technique, period, movement or influence is looking to convey something positive/negative about the moral hygiene of human civilisation. With knowledge of how to read an artistic tradition [i.e. an understanding of influences and currents of thinking] one can make an informed judgment as to what such a statement could be saying to us about ourselves.

As I stated, this type of consideration can be easily made with regards to war memorials and their makers and because Contemporary War Monumentality can be judged as part of such a tradition; thus what has gone before is very important to consider, as was explained.
in Chapter 4 with regards to 'antecedent meanings of WWII'. I therefore start this analysis with a brief but descriptive recap of British war memorialisation up until the present era.¹

The Changing Functionalities of British War Memory

In Ancient Rome and Greece, war memorials were built to commemorate 'the war' itself and specifically, the victory that was achieved. These memorials were built to celebrate the efforts and achievements of the nation and in particular, the efforts of the leaders and generals. In short, they memorialised the great and good of society. In this respect, they were a type of propaganda tool, used to illustrate the success of a nation and the wisdom and power of their leaders. Thus a common sight in modern society is one of huge statues of leaders and generals, and of huge architectural statements, all illustrating the greatness of past regimes. These themes have continued throughout the centuries as many public testimonies of war were commissioned and can now be seen throughout Europe and Britain. The main conflict that illustrates this continuity is the Napoleonic Wars, which in London led to the building of Trafalgar Square, Nelson's Column, and the Wellington Arch.

Example 1 from English Heritage Tour: The Duke of Wellington Monument -1889

After the removal in 1883 of the huge equestrian statue of the Duke of Wellington by Matthew Cotes Wyatt that stood on top of the Wellington Arch, there was a feeling that there should be a replacement to honour Britain's greatest general. Considering the harsh reception of Wyatt's statue and the controversy over his choice, a competition was held to choose the best design. The victor was Joseph Edgar Boehm. Boehm was born in Vienna in 1834 and studied in London at the British Museum, in Italy & France and then back in Vienna before settling in London in 1862, and acquiring British citizenship in 1865. On completion, Boehm wasn't happy with the statue of the Duke of Wellington in his studio, but was consoled by seeing it in the open air, and by the great public approval that

¹ By the kind permission of the IWM volunteer tour guide all nine examples below and all unreferenced quotes are drawn from said transcripts of this English Heritage War Memorial Tour: London. Dated: June 17th 2005.
greeted it. One thing to note is that the pose is slightly inaccurate, as the Duke was known for riding sat very far back, his thighs almost horizontal, with a short stirrup.

As depicted in the monument, the Duke is sat on his charger Copenhagen, watching the Battle of Waterloo, after which he was nearly kicked by his own horse. Around the base of the monument are four soldiers: 1, Grenadier, 1st Guards, English. 2, Highlander, Black Watch, Scottish: 3, Sergeant, 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Welsh: 4, Trooper, 6th (Enniskillen) Dragoons, Irish. All these regiments of course fought at Waterloo. It was unveiled on the 21st December 1889, and was paid for by public donation and subscription.

Chapters 3 & 4 illuminated how the next mass period of War Memorial construction came about due to the Boer Wars and First World War. In postscript, WW1 began with a huge call to arms and was genuinely met with great excitement; a sense of Edwardian duty and a naive certainty that it would be all over by Christmas. Here, the impact of war was to dramatically change society as the sheer loss of life came from its mainstream body and thus the vibrations of the Great War were felt equally strongly in every city, town, village and school. Indeed, the shattering effects of this war and the loss that was experienced by most citizens' helps explain the reasoning behind why the war memorial’s functionality changed. As one will see from the example below, at this time it was far more common to see memorials concern themselves with illustrating the sacrifices of war, the loss of life and the suffering of individual soldiers, rather than the ‘Great and Good’ of a civil society.

Example 2 from English Heritage Tour: The Royal Artillery Monument -1925

The Royal Artillery Memorial was unveiled in 1925. It stands to commemorate the “might of the Artillery” and also the 49,000 gunners and artillerymen “who gave their lives for King and Country in the Great War”. The memorial caused great controversy on its unveiling due to the realistic depiction of the brutality of war in the stone carvings. Also, the north side features a dead artilleryman next to the inscription “Here was a royal fellowship of death.” This too sparked criticism. The person responsible for the sculpture was Charles Sargeant Jagger. He served on the Western Front in the War and was present at the Battle of the Somme. His own experience obviously compelled him to depict the true nature and horror of war.
The artillery piece is a 9.2 inch howitzer, and it is aligned so that if it were theoretically to fire a shell with sufficient charge, it would land on the Somme. In the 1960s a group of students calculated that with a standard charge it would land in a Dulwich duck pond. The idea that the howitzer points to the Somme is significant, as this battle saw some of the most horrific scenes of the war. The battle also became a symbol of the failure and arrogance of men in charge, as plans were followed and persisted with, despite huge losses of men. The first day (July 1st 1916) saw the loss of 20,000 men. This figure was 600,000 by November. There was criticism that stone instead of bronze was used for the howitzer. Jagger argued that a great dark mass would "kill" the white stone beneath.

The use of artillery was the central focus in every major action of the First World War and led to the Western Front being ploughed by shells. Bombardment after bombardment was used to break the enemy and in the end, it was deadlock that plagued the war. It was thought that after a prolonged artillery attack, infantry would move forward to occupy ground already conquered by artillery. This was not the case, due to the strength of German trenches some 30 metres deep. One significant feature that bombardment brought to the First World War was the condition ‘shellshock’. It was thought that this came about due to the impotence of the individual in the face of shellfire. The feeling was described, "to die from a bullet, seems nothing, parts of our being remain intact; but to be dismembered, torn to pieces, reduced to pulp, this is the fear that the flesh cannot support and which is fundamentally the great suffering of the bombardment".

Three bronze panels were added to the memorial in 1949 to commemorate 30,000 soldiers of the Royal Artillery who died in the Second World War. In recent decades, British public opinion has shifted on its meaning, and the memorial is now praised as a rare example which demonstrates and evokes the true horror and suffering of warfare.

One can see from the concluding comments of example 2, how the commemorative experience was repeated a mere twenty years later, as the world went to war again and "endeavoured to destroy itself". Although there was an artistic response to illustrate disillusionments with the suffering experienced in war, there were still strong elements of traditional war monumentality perceived as a statement of glory and a justification for fighting the so called ‘Good War’. The following list of monumental styles illuminates this functionality of war memorials, in terms of their popularity and ‘silently sentry’ story of war.
As one can infer from this revealing list of types, the functionality a monument may provide is as diverse as the many types of memorials alluded to in reviewing the war and memory debate. In this regard, the above list is presented to help illuminate some of the diverse forms of war memorialisation. However, please note that the list only shows 14 of the 58 types of war memorials identified by Furlong (2002) from the comprehensive UKNIWM database. Looked at in the same way as an artistic tradition, we can intuitively deduce each specific style or form of war memorial has a discernable purpose, political intention and/or sociological function to fulfil within a given civil society i.e. they all have a job to do.

Religious overtones are apparent with relation to chapels; public duty and private needs with relation to boards, plaques or tablets; celebration of the national cause (obelisk), thanksgiving (Stone of Remembrance or Cross) and reaffirmation of nation (pillar/column) and of course, debt (cenotaph/hall). Finally, popular memory representations of a people's war are clearly discernable in the symbolic content of clock towers, clinics and pavilions.
Looked at in this way and one could reasonably suggest that the pragmatic selection of a particular type of war monument is governed by cultural and societal necessities and, in terms of form to function, the needs a particular war memory form may fulfil within a given community/society. In terms of emotional scale and impact of war - as was illuminated in Chapter Two - this of course includes the psychologically specific needs of the individual that must be fulfilled - such as mourning and grieving - in order for one to eventually gain acceptance of a deep felt loss or social anomie. In applying this functional type of logic to the case study analysis, our first step was to categorise the memorial case study with regards to a particular type of existing form. In this way and by applying Durkheim's knowledge, one can theorise an idea of what the public and private consumption of the artefact means in general terms of social cohesion, system integration and shared norms.

This process of functional analysis began when I identified the two main types of public memorials which have been described as 'Dominant and Dominated' sites of memory and mourning (See Winters 1995). The first austere and imposing on its human consumers, 'one attends them rather than visits ...' the latter constituting sacred sites of mourning, 'where one finds the living heart of memory...' (see Nora 1989). As we have seen, the case study monument is pragmatically designed to be a combination of both these types. In this functionality context, it is very important to also note the locality and sitting of such monumental projects. Here, the Furlong (2002) analysis of UKNIWM database shows that the vast majority of war memorials patronised by institutional bodies are situated in highly prominent or public locations. The Battle of Britain Monument is no exception to this rule, being both visually prominent and geographically sited in the living heart of central London.

Similarly, in this form to function context, the BOBM can be analysed as both a Wall and a Mosaic Mural signifying above all community strength in national unity. It is also a private site with a Roll of Honour for the individual to mourn over and a public 'Stone of
Remembrance’ for the nation to heal. Although we can learn a lot about the case study in this way, this level of analysis only tells the researcher about the sociological functionality of the monument with regards to the public and private usage of its physical form. As the detailed review of Mark Connolly’s (2004) recent research on the topic illuminated, one also needs to look, in some depth, at the war memorial’s mythological and ideological content.

This shifts the case study analysis from pure functionality to the realm of semiotic relations and to the social construction of reality via the politics of identity and myths of nationhood. Previous discussions have shown that this mythologising is vital to the processes of war monumentality. Indeed, from a Straussian (1960) perspective any functional ‘cultural form’ created by a society is governed by the domestic imperatives appertaining to that society’s needs to reproduce. Dialectically speaking, these societal needs inform the ethical environment, and the ethical environment helps inform what ‘we’ deem are societal needs.

In other words, varied structural imperatives of society are what help constitute and inform the selectivity of the physical form, as well as the social content ascribed to the monument through its public consumption. In commemorative culture terms, these imperatives or intrinsic needs appertain to self-consciousness, the political intensions of the state, the psychological needs of the individual and/or the sociological imperatives of society as the thing in itself. As has been suggested, these structure and agency imperatives must be clearly distinguished and then investigated separately in the analysis of the case study.

As one can infer from this very brief recap of war memorialisation, there has been another shift in the realms of war memory since the end of the Second World War. Of course, this has come about for the reasons which have been highlighted above, but also, and as Mitzsal (2003) and Lunn (1997) point out; it is to do with the influence of the culture industry. As critic Gavin Stamp (2005) pointed out with relation to the ‘high relief realism’
of the BOBM, now that the suffering is seen daily in the news, there is little need for a sculptor to incorporate it into a war memorial design. This view implies that the 'silent sentry' need to tell the story of the war and its suffering has been made redundant, as political power and spin has made the need for war memorials to be a propaganda tool redundant. Even the celebration of war is no longer appropriate, due to the way war is perceived or the reasons we now go to war. However, such a view neglects to take into account the immense authority of a monumental narration of war located in public space.

This brings us back to the current analytical focus on functionality: What use is a memorial today and how are they seen? In this respect, one can deduce from the many points raised so far that the role of war memorials has changed and their designs have become far more poetic to illustrate their message. The meaning behind them has also changed, as a common aim is how to remember the efforts of all and to heal the loss to those that fell in war. In this respect, they are now built to provide a place for people to spend time; a place for reflection, and are designed in a way to create an area or environment for this. This is done in a number of ways through shape, images, figures, words, material or what story the monument is trying to convey about; war, soldiering, the healing process etc. To locate these points in a grounded context, we need to look at relevant examples of CWM.

**Example 3 from English Heritage Tour: The Australian War Memorial – 2003**

On the 11th November 2003, Her Majesty The Queen, and the Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable John Howard, dedicated the Australian War Memorial. The memorial commemorates over a million Australians who fought alongside Britons during the First and Second World Wars and particularly, more than 101,000 Australian Service men and women who gave their lives in the two World Wars.

In July 2000 the Australian and British prime ministers announced the concept for an Australian War Memorial in London during celebrations marking the Centenary of Australian Federation. In 2001 it was agreed that the memorial would be located at Hyde Park Corner. The memorial features a long curving wall of green-grey Australian granite.

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The stone and the colour of it is typically Australian, and intends to evoke the essence of the bush. There are 540 pieces of granite, all of which were individually shaped and finished in Australia. The wall is set with 24,000 names of the hometowns of Australian men and women who served during the two World Wars. Superimposed on these place names are 47 battle sites representing some of the major theatres of war that Australian servicemen experienced such as Singapore, Crete, Gallipoli, Gaza and Normandy.

Through the listing of the place names and the shape of the memorial, the wall aims to chart the progress of life from birth, to growth, maturity and then to sudden death. The shifting play of light and shade and glistening water is ephemeral, mysterious, over the enduring memory of stone. There is the sense that the memory and the sacrifice will endure, that the water washes away the personality of the suffering. The memorial bears the inscription, “Whatever burden you are to carry, we also will shoulder that burden.”

Example 4 from English Heritage Tour: Commonwealth Memorial Gates -2002

The Commonwealth Memorial Gates commemorate the five million servicemen and women from the Caribbean, Africa and the Indian sub-continent who fought for and assisted Britain in the Two World Wars. India, in particular was the driving force behind the project. The four massive Portland stone columns and commemorative pagoda were designed by the architect Liam O'Connell, who some of you may know from his work on Prince Charles's Poundbury Estate in Dorset. This monument is inextricably linked to the late Queen Mother, who was supposed to have unveiled the foundation stone, but was too ill, her task being filled by The Queen. The monument was finished except for one of the vases on one pillar when she passed away, and for the funeral the building site was entirely cleared so that the procession could pass through, the work being completed afterwards, and the monument was inaugurated by The Queen on the 6th November 2002. Despite having been built recently, many people who see it think it has been there longer, and I think this is a tribute to its design, which is formal, as befits a royal processional route. The memorial bears the inscription: “Our future is greater than our past.”

Example 5 from English Heritage tour: The Canadian War Memorial -1994

Unveiled by the Queen on 3rd June 1994, it commemorates the one million Canadians who travelled to Britain and fought in the First and Second World Wars, of whom most were volunteers. 110,000 would not return. The design of the memorial is very modern. It tells the story of the journey of Canadian servicemen. Firstly, the two halves of the monument...
represent Britain and Canada. The line through the centre indicates the direction of Halifax in Nova Scotia, which was the port most Canadian servicemen departed from. The maple leaves represent the individual Canadian Servicemen. The material is Canadian Red granite, with water flowing across to represent the healing process of time. The inscription, a war-time broadcast by The Queen, is a message from the British people to the Canadians: “From danger shared, our friendship prospered”

Example 6 from the English Heritage Tour: The Ghurkha Memorial-1997

Ghurkhas were first taken in to service in 1816. This monument depicts a Ghurkha in a WW1 uniform, holding a Kukri, a distinctive weapon of choice for the regiment. Very traditional form, despite being very new, as it was unveiled by The Queen in 1997. It has a simple image of a Ghurkha, with no message or story. Quite a contrast with other new memorials. Perhaps this silence is a comment on the relationship the Ghurkhas have with Britain. The inscription, composed by a former Ghurkha officer, reads: ‘Bravest of the Brave, Most Generous of Generous, Never had country, More faithful friends than you.’

Example 7 from the English Heritage Tour: The Royal Tank Regiment - 2000

Depiction of a Comet tank crew of the WW2. Each individual role is highlighted by the equipment that the soldier carries. But, the statue is meant to symbolise the close bond between crew members, because despite their individual roles and standings, they are leaning on and supporting one another. The soldiers are also looking the same way which illustrates that they shared the same thoughts, dreams and passions. Surprisingly, there is a lack of a tank in the memorial, enhancing the thought that it is the people and not the actual machine that is important to the war effort and these are the things that should be valued instead of weapons; the inscription, “From mud through blood to the green fields beyond,” is an interpretation of the Royal Tank regiment’s colours of brown, red and green.

Example 8 from English Heritage Tour: The Royal Marines Memorial -1903 & 2000

Designed by Adrian Jones, this monument dates from 1903, commemorating the Royal Marines killed in the Boer War and in the Boxer Rising in Peking in 1900. The bronze statue depicts a marine defending an injured comrade. This tells the story of the campaigns. It is a very strong image, one that illustrates both the conditions in which these men suffered, but also the strength of the marines in fighting for one another. The bronze reliefs successfully illustrate bloody battle scenes. For its time, the memorial was extremely controversial as it aimed to depict the realities of warfare. This memorial was
rededicated in 2000 to honour Marines from all wars. This illustrates that its message is still respected and considered relevant today.

Example 9 from English Heritage Tour: The Women's Memorial 2005

This national memorial designed by John Mills to honour the seven million service and civilian women who made a contribution to the war effort during WW2. It depicts the uniforms worn by women in their various roles during the war. Conscription for women began in 1941 and by 1943 nine out of ten single women aged 20-30 were working in factories, on land, or in the armed forces. Baroness Boothroyd and Dame Vera Lynn both worked tirelessly for the public erection of this thoroughly modern war memorial.

Comparing and Contrasting the BOBM

While these very informative English Heritage examples have provided a much-needed grounded context and have helped to identify the paradox, continuity and contestation inherent within the production of any war memorial, they can also be misleading in the sense that to take the BOBM at face value is to view it in a sociological vacuum as it tells us little about the role of political agency, institutional patronage, inter-subjectivity or agendas. With this in mind, in order to proceed with the analysis, one needs to compare and contrast the case study monument with something that is not so conventional. Here I will re-contextualise the case study with relation to its antithesis. To do this, I will now employ Mark Quinlan's (2007) description of the mediated inauguration of the Abandoned Soldier as a comparative but contrasting microcosm of CWM. In this respect, the aim of the next sub section is to allow the reader to contrast the purely surface descriptions of the Battle of Britain - as presented in chapter five - with an emotionally honest CWM project.

This re-contextualisation will enable the interactive reader to gain a much clearer and deeper insight into the various structural forces at work in the production of war monumentality; in particular the shaping roles of bureaucracy, political agency, institutional
patronage and power in the selectivity and cultural production of Contemporary War Monumentality projects. Indeed, such a revealing contrast will help one grasp what actually happens in praxis when the legitimacy of modern warfare and its official memory is challenged and the patronage of the power elite or government is withheld from such controversial projects. In these terms, the following example of CWM will help highlight in a grounded and situated context how the so called ‘noble lies of war’ are rarely challenged within the existing ‘linear time narrations’ of British war memory (see Edkins, J. 2003: 19).

**THE ABANDONED SOLDIER**

At the beginning of 2007 the BBC commenced shooting its ‘Power To The People’ TV series. In one episode, presenter Tim Samuels assembled a platoon of former soldiers, sailors and airmen, who had been injured or disabled during their Service careers, to tell their stories of the neglect they endured at the hands of the MoD, when returning from war seriously injured.

In making the documentary, Samuels sought to bring to the attention of the viewing public the shortcomings in the MoD’s after-care of these Servicemen and
Servicewomen, some of whom had served in the Falkland Islands Campaign, the First and Second Gulf Wars, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and during peacekeeping roles in Belize and Iraq. A brief segment of the programme was shot in the civilian NHS hospital at Selly Oak, Birmingham, where Service personnel were treated. In an unscripted departure from the narrative previously agreed with the MoD’s public relations officers, Samuels took the opportunity to ask the Service personnel working there what they thought of the arrangements in place for dealing with wounded service personnel. At this development, the MoD public relations ‘minder’ in attendance went ballistic, ranting: ‘You can’t ask questions like that! This wasn’t agreed.’ The MoD’s sensitivity on the subject may be understood from the fact that the misnamed ‘Royal Centre for Defence Medicine’ at Selly Oak had previously featured in a number of lurid stories in the media exposing the frankly shaming conditions under which Service personnel were being treated. After this ‘money shot’ in journalistic terms, the programme moved onto the ‘Abandoned Soldier’ section of the programme.

As part of the series, the BBC had previously approached the sculptor James Napier to seek his involvement in the making of the programme and commissioned him to produce a sculpture that would reflect the programme’s theme. Coming from a distinguished Service family, Napier did not need much prompting and over a period of four months he produced the ‘Abandoned Soldier’ based on cavalryman Lance Corporal Daniel Twiddy, who had been wounded in Basra, Iraq by friendly fire in 2003 and sustained serious injuries, including facial wounds from shrapnel. Working at the Art Bronze Foundry in Fulham, Napier took a cast of Twiddy’s face and worked his maquette into a stark five-metre tall resin face surmounted by an infantryman’s helmet. In Napier’s words: ‘The sculpture of The Abandoned Soldier has been created to honour those who have fought valiantly for our country, but are not being treated as the heroes they truly are.’

The platoon of veterans gathered by Samuels then planned and executed a clockwork military operation to erect the ‘Abandoned Soldier’ in Trafalgar Square on 20 January 2007. Despite the fact that the square is controlled by Greater London Authority security staff, it was in effect ‘flash mobbed’ by a couple of hundred of ex-Servicemen and women wearing combat jackets and military headdress. This caused considerable confusion, as the security staff initially believed that the gathering was an official event which someone in the ‘glass testicle’ had forgotten to inform them about. When the truth eventually dawned, the ‘goons’ chose discretion as the better part of valour and busied themselves with attempting to extract leadership from their radios. To add to their confusion, the ‘Abandoned Soldier’ then arrived on a four ton army truck, which was parked on the square and the statue was erected. The image was carried on the front page of the Independent newspaper the next day and subsequently was featured on the Newsnight current affairs programme on BBC2.

The documentary titled: ‘The Battle of Trafalgar Square’ was broadcast by BBC2 on 21 May 2007. It generated a surprising response from the general public, who were by and large, unaware that all of Britain’s Service hospitals had been closed by the MoD, in a Treasury-driven cost-cutting exercise, and that Service personnel who had been seriously injured in combat were now being treated on NHS wards, alongside the general public. Even more surprisingly, the image of the Abandoned Soldier struck a chord with the veterans’ community that neither
sculptor nor commentators have been able to explain. An e-petition was
subsequently lodged on the government’s No. 10 Downing Street website to have
the sculpture erected permanently on the vacant fourth plinth in Trafalgar Square.

Napier then sought assistance from the various Service charities in getting a
copy of the sculpture cast in bronze and erected in a meaningful location. The ex-
Services mental welfare charity ‘Combat Stress’ were approached and they
suggested that a project to erect a bronze copy of the statue at the National
Memorial Arboretum at Alrewas in Staffordshire be got underway. Concurrently,
they became excited at the prospect of gaining a distinctive logo for their
organisation, for free. Napier then came under pressure to change the name of the
sculpture, a compromise in artistic terms he was unable to accept. Napier then
explored the concept of producing affordable lapel pin badges bearing the image of
the ‘Abandoned Soldier’.

At the same time, he worked with the writer Mark Quinlan to design the
Abandoned Soldier Website which clearly set out the narrative of the sculpture, the
project and its terms of reference. Negotiations with Combat Stress continued
throughout the summer of 2007, but showed no progress. The charity and its
representatives became firstly evasive, then uncontactable. The project was by
November ‘dead in the water’. Early that month, Napier and Quinlan attended a
social event, where they encountered a representative of the Royal British Legion,
who volunteered the information that the reason for Combat Stress dragging their
feet on the project was because the charity had, during negotiations for the
renewal of their tri-annual grant from the MoD, been threatened by the Minister for
Veterans Affairs Derek Twigg with having their funding cut, if they continued to
associate themselves with the image.

Britain’s Labour Government was by that point singularly aware of the
growing disquiet their cutting of the armed forces was generating among both the
public and the ex-Service community. In September the Royal British Legion
launched its ‘Broken Covenant Campaign’ which asserted that the government had
broken the military covenant between the nation and its Service personnel. By
November that year, ex-Service chiefs were conducting a guerrilla campaign
against the government in both the House of Lords and the popular press. That
month, both ex-Service chiefs and politicians founded the UK National Defence
Association to lobby inside and outside parliament for increased defence spending.

In December 2007 Napier and Quinlan established the Abandoned Soldier
Fund for Service-related charities by the sale of Abandoned Soldier lapel badges
and they established an Abandoned Soldier Management Committee for the
raising of funds. The committee was dominated by ex-rankers. Given their previous
experience with Combat Stress, they made a conscious choice to operate outside
the existing Service/veterans establishment and began the production of the lapel
badges advertising them for sale on the website, with all proceeds going to Service
charities chosen by the committee. As part of its remit, the committee still hopes to
obtain a place of public prominence in London will be found for a bronze cast of the
statue, so that the public are reminded of the soldiers who put themselves in
perilous situations for their country and allow them to express gratitude for their
bravery and selflessness.²

² This descriptive text is presented here by the kind permission of Mark Quinlan: Dated 7th December 2007.
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Comparing and Contrasting Vantage Points – Ways of Seeing

In comparing and contrasting the form of these two memorials, one can start by saying they are as distinct as Cain and Abel, or liken them to siblings born of the same maternal mother, but sired by different fathers. Indeed, the BOBM and the Abandoned Soldier [AS] are very different CWM entities which portray a storyteller’s view of war from overlapping, but competing vantage points. I begin this section by comparing the vistas one can see.

On the one hand, the BOBM has the vista of more traditional war monumentality which has been re-invented in fashionable accordance with a sceptical post-modern condition and thus is designed to appeal to residues, sentimentalities and authenticity. Yet while its iconic form may appeal to a consumer mentality and laud the cult of the individual in its friezes, its content is maternally imbued with a cultural narrative about core values instilling the need for continuity in the face of societal change. Unlike the empirical social fact of war, this memorial is not a cultural facilitator of both continuity and change, only continuity.

While this culturally prestigious monument is a very selective but popular public space testimony of British war memory, the contingent reason for its presence is informed by what many perceive as a type of ‘cultural backlash’ against what Nora (1989) terms ‘the acceleration of history’ and Mitzsal (2003) the fragmenting forces of globalised change. The BOBM is thus a ‘collective representation’ of a distinct and current social state of mind - think of ‘dog tag nostalgia’, as represented in the current cultural trend of WWII memorialisation - and as such, has the cultural capital of a national totem. In this respect, the symbolic form and narrative content of many contemporary WWII monumentality projects are understood as ontologically re-affirming ‘security blankets’: This is a discourse of war which is grounded in the present post Cold War era, and constituted within what some social theorists have described as ‘commemorative fever’ and ‘nostalgia militarism'.

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On the other hand, 'the form' of the AS seems to wear the very mark of Cain and is clearly representative of what some have described as a 'Post Heroic Society' and others a 'Warless' or 'Post Military Society'. As such, the ideas behind its conception are in part informed by what Howard (1976) termed the 'liberal dilemma of war' referring to the ethical polemic of war in itself, and in grounded terms to the disquieting gap between our noble ideals and our brutal conduct as located in 'the banality of transgression' that one can now associate with what Martin Shaw (2007) critically describes as a form of 'degenerate war'.

Accordingly, while the BOBM embraces continuity, the AS laments it and demands accountability from its democratically elected leaders. It has a vista of warfare which is reflexively negotiated, ethically educated, globally situated, economically interdependent, technologically advanced and risk aware. This 'post heroic' vantage point nevertheless still presents a legitimising view of war i.e. as a necessary evil and the ones who do the killing and dying as unfortunate individuals, who have been caught up in a much larger social enterprise though no fault of their own. Think of the Jessica Lynch story. Here our soldiers are eulogised as 'victims of war', because within a PMS such as Britain, the rationalised act of war is contextualised with relation to a binary thesis of 'us and them' and mediated with relation to current moral panics and fears born of vertigo-afflicted reasoning.

Thus the ideas informing this monument are like its sibling, varied and complex, but can be seen to solidify around a 'chaos of rewards' endemic to the 'Exclusive Society' (see Young 1999). This has now combined with a blame and compensation culture to help produce a representation of present conflict which in retrospective terms is sceptical of 'full spectral dominance' and dissatisfied with the ideological promise of 'risk transfer warfare'. In short, the Abandoned Soldier is a new war monument which encompasses Hynes' (1990) notion of 'anti-monumentality' and thus challenges the status quo. Accordingly, one could now continue to interpret and analyse these two contrasting testimonies of war memory in many revealing ways; as the following list of analytical possibilities would seem to suggest.
Some Ideas for Contextual Analysis

1. Comparing the agendas of public commemoration – what is history?
   a. Selectivity Issues – memory, history and forgetting
   b. Location of monuments – the past is not a foreign country the present is
2. Influences on the architectural design – comparing psycho-geography of monuments
3. Funding issues – Governmental policy and its controversy – comparing societal resources
4. How the monument was promoted – content analysis of image – comparing what is signified.
5. Unveiling ceremony: How the monuments were hailed for public consumption,
   a. Comparing roles of patronage: Church, Media, Monarchy, Government, MoD.
6. Comparing Ascribed Meanings: speeches made and what they said – roles of remembrances
   a. Ideology of the monument’s form:
   b. Their post heroic nature and post military character – in naming, epitaph, imagery
   c. Rhetoric of monuments: the link between past wars and present conflicts
   d. Media and Press responses: encoding and re-affirming the story teller
8. Comparing how the monuments are used both in ritual and in the everyday
9. Comparing the cultural capital of the monuments

When one employs a reading of the AS monument in this way to help promote contextual analysis and looked at in the context of post-doctoral research, one can get a glimpse of the potential for discovery that a systematic study of war memory phenomena may bring that is on par with the seminal work of Nora (1989) in the ‘shifting realms of memory’. However, while this type of analysis will reveal much about the factual connectivity between war, memory and the ethical environment in contextual terms, it should also be clear from the preamble discussions that this is not the exploratory aim other than to raise awareness of a neglected area of sociology of war study. This is because whatever the apparent differences between these monumental and anti-monumental ‘social forms’, both are still de-facto storytellers of war memory, and thus both are part of what Furlong (2002) and Borg (1991) describe as ‘the largest cultural arts project ever undertaken in Britain’.

Thus in specific terms of raising awareness of the sociological problem of war’s perceived inescapability, or in social memory terms of identifying questions of social significance in the sociological study of war memory, or in a purely moral or classical sociological context and especially looked at from the Marxian perspective of a ‘dominant ideology’, it is very important that we now focus on this socially embedded ‘ideal type’ of ‘practical ideology’.
However, if one is to analyse and interpret the selectivity and form of these phenomena in these sociological terms i.e. with direct relation to social states of mind and the role, purpose or latent function of this latest cultural trend in memorialisation, then one must conduct varying forms of analysis commonly associated with the ideas of cultural studies, sociology of knowledge, art history and visual culture approaches to critical social inquiry.

**Looking at Contemporary War Monumentality with Critical Eyes**

As stated, the promotion of novel ‘ways of seeing’ the ‘affect mechanisms’ of warfare and thus illuminating the decivilising/civilising impact of war memory narratives on the ethical environment is the main critical task of Part 4. As I explained in the preamble, I believe we must look with different eyes, if we are to gain some critical insight or wisdom from the ‘official memory’ of past war. Accordingly, any observations I may make here must also be sociologically located within current ‘social states of mind’ so that one can subsequently analyse the inherent paradoxes of war memory in ‘sociology of knowledge’ terms and with relation to what Berger (1967) terms the ‘symbolic universe’; referring to an objectified framework of ideas which help legitimise and reproduce the moral order of a civil society.

However, because this ideal type of ‘cultural memory’ is not situated within any critical understandings of the reproductive and legitimising relations between war, memory and the ethical environment, one must not only look with different eyes, but also try to acknowledge John Ruskin’s critical philosophy of art which suggests that ‘any public art is a social enterprise that can help show us what it is to be civilised’ (see Collins, M. 2008). This idea of public art as a communicative means of societal awakening and change is central to much ‘Critical Theory’ and is an idea which clearly underpins Grossman’s (2007) normative thinking with direct relation to the social and political role of the Holocaust writer.
The structuration thesis implies that the diverse existence of this type of critical agency illuminates how we live not in a true ‘false consciousness’ as is argued with relation to the ‘dominant ideology thesis’, but more of a ‘selective’ or ‘cynical consciousness’ one has discussed with relation to Sartre’s notion of ‘Bad Faith’ or the emergence of the ‘post modern condition’ said to characterise the cultural logic of late-modernity. This type of ‘Critical Theory’ thinking illuminates why monumentality / anti-monumentality can and must co-exist side by side as dialectical parts of the larger process of societal reproduction. Accordingly, I will employ this approach in Chapter 7 in the hope of revealing much insight about, ‘the latent function of nostalgia militarism’ in a ‘post-military society’ such as Britain.

This ‘latent function’ or ‘bad faith’ issue brings the current analysis to the question of what the right memory of war should be. In terms of trying to consider selectivity and form in terms of what the right memory of war could be, I like to think about how one may also compare and contrast these monuments in terms of how Ruskin compared and contrasted Gothic and Renaissance Art (see Collins, M. 2008). Working from a similar premise to this project’s hypothesis, that art is an enterprise that can show us what it is to be civilised, Ruskin identified a mythology of the past in relation to what he perceived as a zeitgeist of dissatisfaction and emptiness and as a consequence of this social anomie suggested that ‘we are blinded by habit, convention and familiarity’ and have now ‘learned to live with lies’.

As I have shown with relation to the scale, impact and legacy of war to self and society, this damning critical insight into the moral hygiene of Western civilisation is of course the central tenet of much critical theory and is implied in Martin Shaw’s (1991,1997) critical ‘past war thesis’ understanding of ‘Nostalgia Militarism’ and also fits perfectly with Paul Fussel’s (1975) profoundly critical understanding of ‘high diction’ as an emotion harnessing mechanism by which ‘modern war memory’ becomes a cultural means of justifying a mass killing of pre-determined enemies, while legitimising the heartfelt loss of loved ones to war.
However, to really test out the viability of this insight, the analytical idea presented here is that the normative relations between the production and subsequent influence of public space art – to both self and society - can be critically contrasted in sociology of knowledge terms with ‘what it is to be civilised’ i.e. in normative terms of the ethical environment and with structural relation to how this surrounding climate of ideas helps to inform what we may see as right or wrong. This approach to analysing social states of mind relates John Ruskin’s normative idea of public space art as a medium for change directly to Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘sociological history of manners’ understanding of a ‘the civilising process’.

One can say this, because in semiotic and material culture terms, this ‘the largest cultural art project ever undertaken in Britain’ is one way we as a nation may represent or hail ourselves to posterity in terms of our current values and belief systems. Here the mores of the British symbolic universe can be compared or even contrasted and opposed to the collective memory representations of the socially constructed past. This is a foundational sociological understanding of societal and cultural reproduction which in memory studies terms underpins any art history explanation of how the current relations between war and its collective memory are socially negotiated within the ethical environment of modernity.

In contrasting Form and Selectivity in this way, Ruskin really illuminates how in praxis any artefact could in his words ‘awake consciousness’ (Collins M. 2008) and force us to look in the mirror and to open our eyes to see with moral distinction. In these critical terms, one could argue that the BOBM is a current mythology of past war. A mythology historically linked to iconic war stories of good versus evil, which through habit, convention and familiarity have helped blind us to the brutal conduct required in the prosecution of war. In terms of how Ruskin sees the difference between Gothic and Renaissance art, the BOBM only serves to highlight how much we have learned to live with the ‘noble lies’ of past war.

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3 However this viewing of ‘modern war memory’ as a reproductive model may not become apparent until we have conducted a Functional analysis of its material salience and moral integration within contemporary society (see my discussions below).
By contrast, the selectivity or form of the AS confronts the brutal reality of war and breaks with habit, convention and familiarity to help challenge the way one may see war in public space art. According to this critical philosophy of art, it is not what the 'subject matter' is as a 'thing in itself' that concerns the artistic sensibility, fashions or societal trends of a civil society, but more how the situated artist may see, interpolate and present what he perceives, so that we consumers of the product are ontologically reaffirmed, or in Ruskin's critical context, challenged by what we have consumed. As John Berger (1973) clearly points out this critical idea about our subjective ways of seeing is evident in all forms of art.

Accordingly, this project's concluding analysis of the AS and BOBM will take a distinct sociology of knowledge approach to ways of seeing and will look at any CWM project as a possible 'counter point' to the 'social manipulation of morality' (Bauman 2000). This may provide a perspective which can help us in this 'post heroic age' critically conceive how one war memorial can be better than another; that is to say, one which is healthy and one which could be critically considered as sick or pathological. In semiotic terms, art critic John Ruskin's illuminating and, it must be said, emancipating philosophy of art allows an observer to use his novel 'ways of seeing' to help analyse how one war monument can be right and another wrong, in terms of its symbolic message to posterity. Thus, in keeping with the project's statement of intent and just like art historians comparing and contrasting the Gothic with the Renaissance, I will now begin to compare and contrast the BOBM and AS in new ways of seeing, which I hope may help reveal what these iconic storytellers of past war and present conflict may be actually conveying about the ethical environment of late modernity. In short, we reconsider what CWM may be saying to us about ourselves?

Contrasting Selectivity Agendas

Born of creative fathers who have no direct experience of war and its memory paradoxes and, despite the differing influences on their production, the commemorative agenda of

Chapter 6
these two war monuments are very similar in terms of their 'silent sentry' functionality. That is to say, both memorial projects are imbued with similar commemorative interests and remembrance needs - least we forget that 'they' died and fought for our freedom. In Napier's own words "The Abandoned Soldier has been created to honour all those who have fought valiantly for our country, but are not being treated as the heroes they truly are" (in Quinlan 2007); and in Lord Tebbit's words "This monument is to their glorious memory".

Considering the apparent fidelity of both memorials to the central tenets of British war memory, it may be surprising to see the disparity between how each has been received. Of course, if one were to look at this discrepancy between how each has been received in conventional or dualistic terms i.e. as a 'filtered recording of the past or opportunistic promotion of interest-driven narratives' then there is no real surprise in discovery, because in realist and empirical terms, this is the way things are in a pragmatic world of patronage and power relations. However, looked at in more fluid terms of memory, history or forgetting, combined with a social theory understanding of a tangible 'chaos of rewards' and the intrinsic reason why the BOBM was championed by all and the AS was not, becomes a more complex issue of the emotions which requires a more intimate answer.

Located in this emotional context and put very simply, I believe that the intrinsic reason one was championed and the other was not, was that the BOBM makes us feel proud and the AS makes us feel ashamed. For example, the championed story teller talks about the 'British at War' with relation to duty, unity, community, resilience, sacrifice, gratitude and eternal remembrance. The other, laments the loss of such societal virtues in the present and testifies to a chaos of rewards in civil military relations; to broken covenants and neglect; to indifference and abandonment i.e. the AS is emotionally honest about Warfare.
Looked at in these terms of pride or shame and the sociological explanation for why one has influential patrons and cultural capital and the other is at time of writing, dumped in the creator's garden has to do with legitimising the social and moral order of things. In this classical sociological context, the function, status or cultural capital of each monument is in part determined by its cultural purpose and reason for being. Building on our model of how war memory works, the purpose of a monument can be analysed by what it does to or for individual and societal relations and how it makes us feel about ourselves and the things that are important to us. Similarly, moving back and forth from the generalised to the particular, from the universal to the contingent and one can reconsider this problem of selectivity or bias in terms of the sociological imagination, or even the ethical environment.

In The Sociological Imagination Mills (1959) illuminates how; "the personal problem of war, when it occurs, may be how to survive it or how to die in it with honour; how to make money out of it; how to climb into the higher safety of the military apparatus; or how to contribute to the war's termination. In short, according to one's values, to find a set of milieux and within it to survive the war or make one's death in it meaningful. But the structural issues of war have to do with its causes; with what types of men it throws up into command; with its effects upon economic and political, family and religious institutions, with the unorganised irresponsibility of a world of nation-states". This revealing understanding of one's constituted place in civil society illuminates the inherent link between the public issues of civil society and the private troubles of the individual in that there exists social states of mind, that are qualitatively different from that of the individual.

Starting from this social state of mind context, my next aim is to provide a contrasting analysis of the selectivity or bias involved in the production of the BOBM as compared to the AS, by showing what the BOBM may do to help legitimise the social order with implied relation to what the AS does not do i.e. an analysis of social states of mind not in terms of Chapter 6.
institutional patronage or political agency, but in terms of promoting continuity. In this context, such analysis enables a sociological consideration of 'commemorative fever' and 'dog tag nostalgia' in a post-military, post-heroic, risk-averse society such as Britain. This application of 'sociological method' utilises the functional concept of 'social necessity' (see Merton 1957), to explore the universal need for a common set of signs and symbols in order to communicate with each other. Within this 'symbolic universe' (Berger, 1969) socialisation is seen as providing a framework for moral identity and a culturally specific vocabulary of normative ideals, without which the ethically thinking agent would not be possible. In this sense, monumentality helps to legitimise the established order of things.

A Functional Analysis of the Dysfunctional

Anthony Giddens (1986:39) points out that the functional explanation in classical sociology i.e. as it is applied in *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1955), has been remarkably influential as a prism with which to investigate our social world. The sociological method employed in this type of structural analysis is most commonly associated with the *Functionalism* of Emile Durkheim [1857-1917] which tends to focus its analysis on 'society' in terms of social facts, states of mind, social forms and ideas of collective representations.

The functional premise of this viewing is that society is more than just a collection of individuals, because every individual is born into a society, which is already organised, and which thereby moulds the individual's personal and social development. Society, as the 'thing in itself' is viewed as a determining influence on the I, me and we, and is understood to consist of social institutions and established patterns of behaviour, like fashions in dress, a system of currency, or a shared language, which are derived from society, rather than the individual and therefore in praxis, shape the way we may comprehend the social world we inhabit and the every day business of living life (Glover., Strawbridge 1985:13).
Accordingly, it is said to be our attachments to social forms and collective representations which in praxis, help to form the basis for a public world of shared values, beliefs and ideas. In this respect, society is constituted by interaction, social forms and collective representations. While 'social forms' are constituted in activity, 'collective representations' are clearly external to the individual member of society and are thus determining to both collective and individual i.e. on the social conduct and moral character of any particular society through structural association to its constitute members. In this respect, it is 'collective representations' which help constrain and inform social states of mind as well as the individual's understanding of the social world. This understanding has consequences on the meanings one may attach to social actions observed in the public and private spheres of life. Here, social states of mind are the 'social facts' of the lived experience of human life, and as such, influence the politics of self and national identity, as well as our collective identification with something bigger than the self - be it god, community or national cause. Located in a moral context, if the ethical environment is a climate of ideas, then social facts are the metrological forces that influence the moral patterns of figurations.

In The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions Durkheim (1973:149-163) points out that our intelligence, like our activity, presents two very different forms: on the one hand are sensations and sensory tendencies hotly discussed in most sociology of emotion debates (Craib, 1995) and on the other are conceptual thought and moral activity.

"Each of these two parts of ourselves represents a separate pole of our being, and these two poles are not only distinct from one another but are opposed to one another. Our sensory appetites are necessarily egotistic: they have our individuality and it alone as their object. When we satisfy our hunger, our thirst, and so on, without bringing any other tendency into play, it is ourselves, and ourselves alone, that we satisfy. Conceptual thought and moral activity are, on the contrary, distinguished by the fact that the rules of conduct to which they conform can be universalised. Therefore, by definition, they peruse impersonal ends. Morality begins with disinterest, with attachment to something other than ourselves" Durkhiem, E. (1973) Page 151.
When looked at from this ‘disinterest’ perspective, commemorative culture can be seen as a moral representation of a civil society. Put this way, the collective representations of war in cultural memory help constitute the ethical environment of war within the very fabric of a civil society. Here, the reified sign of war is signified to us as a collective experience of loss understood in social states of mind as a duty, sacrifice, or necessity. This ‘noble lie’ or institutionalised theocracy of war is symbolically represented to future generations in our commemorative culture via war memorials, remembrance and commemorative events.

As demonstrated in the contextualised examples presented earlier, this material representation of war’s collective experience is actualised in public acts and social action as a form of mnemonic practice via myth, tradition, custom and ritual and conceptualised in public and private discourse as a negotiated social reality. Here, WWII monumentality is a social state of mind representing imagined and reified notions of identity within which situated individuals can identify. In short, as a sacred ‘totem’ of contemporary civil society the culturally significant WWII memorial is synonymous within present societal evaluations of the symbolic universe as it is a clear signifier of our perceived moral identity. In this normative respect, war memorials can state what we may stand for in terms of a parochial ethical environment and who we are in terms of an ascribed or born into collective identity.

In this context, the rules of sociological method suggest that the ‘function’ of a collective representation, that is to say the ‘social necessity’ it fulfils in society, must be clearly distinguished from the political ‘intention’ and psychological ‘purpose’ of associated social actions or patterns of behaviour. Indeed, this is a rationale of the project as drawn from critical observations and the landscape overview of the other literature [chapter 4]: which, as I have shown, gives much research primacy to political intentions and psychological purposes understood to be fulfilled by monumentality processes. This focus, subsequently informs the thematic logic and historical thinking of the identified war and memory debate.
In contrast, I have argued that the sociological components of CWM, as they relate to the societal necessities of reproduction, need to be clearly distinguished from the political intentions of state apparatus and the psychological needs of the individual, in order to consider the functionality of a war monument in structural terms of civil reproduction, or in latent function terms of unintended consequences. This analytical application of sociological thinking provides a pivotal perspective I have shown as missing from the Furlong (2002) analysis of CWM. This in turn, allows a sociological explanation of an institutionalised presence of war memory phenomena that goes way beyond the purely surface considerations of a 'silent sentry' metaphor. Located in this deeper context, and it does not really matter from this 'holistic' perspective of explanation what I, the individual, think I am commemorating in my participation in or consumption of CWM, because in the lived actuality of mnemonic practice, my social actions are in part helping to legitimise the social enterprise of modern warfare as a morally acceptable tool of the ethically educated.

While the nature of this legitimising process is by functional definition impersonal, as it is understood to serve a perceived greater good, on a deeply personal level, this acquired knowledge of legitimisation is why I can no longer publicly acknowledge wearing a poppy even though as an ex-soldier I want to pay my respects and thus place my poppy out of sight. Similarly, this is why I talk about 'noble lies' as emotionally dishonest expressions of 'bad faith' or as a type of socially integrated theodicy which in ideological discourse, cultural narrative, national myth or collective memory helps justify and rationalise the necessity of cruelty and brutality in war and through association, the pity or suffering of war. This applies even though such 'noble lies' help one make some sense of modern war.

Here, if we paraphrase the social construction thinking of Peter Berger (1969:30) in The Sacred Canopy it will be clear from the above considerations of legitimacy that in one sense, all 'socially objectivated knowledge' is legitimising, as the 'nomos' of a society first
of all legitimises itself by simply being there. The same is true of the social fact of war. That is to say, social facts, collective representations or social forms of war manifest and constituted in institutional practice and social process, structure human activity in warfare and its meaning. Put in Berger’s (1969) terminology, ‘as the meanings of institutions are nomically integrated, the institutions of civil society are ipso facto legitimated to the point where the social actions of individual agents appear “self evident” to their performers’.

Moving from the generalised to the particular and with contextual relation to what Bauman (2000) terms the ‘duty to remember’ we could apply this understanding of ‘self-evident performances’ to the respondents of the survey questionnaire as well as to the dignitaries.

According to Berger’s (1967) ‘social construction of reality thesis’ this level of legitimisation is already implied in speaking of the objectivity of social order. In his words, ‘the socially constructed world legitimates itself by virtue of its objective facticity’ (1969:30). However, he also points out that ‘additional legitimatisations are invariably necessary in any society’. In The Sacred Canopy Berger is specifically talking about theology and the role of theodicy in the legitimisation of social orders, but this point of additional frameworks of thinking is especially apparent with relation to what Michael Howard ([1974] 2004) terms the “Liberal Dilemma” of Western civilisation - referring to the problematic relationship between “war and the liberal conscience” (see also Williams, A. 2006., Marcuse, H. 2005., Morrison, W. 2006., Honderich, T. 2006). In the preface to the paperback edition Howard explains that:

“On the one hand the liberal tradition, as defined in these pages, is pacific if not actually pacifist. It regards war as an unnecessary aberration from international intercourse and believes that in a rational, orderly world wars would not exist: that they can be abolished as slavery was abolished, by a collective effort of the conscience of mankind. On the other hand it accepts that wars may have to be fought, either to ensure the liberation of groups suffering under alien oppression, or to ensure the survival of those societies in which the liberal ethic has achieved dominance” (Howard, M. 2004: 3).

Advancing on from this 1974 understanding of the liberal dilemma and when relocated in the risk-transfer mentality of the ‘new Western way of warfare’ we can now easily infer that...
the maintenance of ‘geo-political peace’ and ‘world order’ clearly involves the continued
tolerance of injustices against which the liberal conscience is first to revolt. This type of
‘tolerance’ is the legitimisation for capital punishment, because it deals with sanctioned
killing and is a foundational legitimisation of ‘virtuous war’ and current neo-con doctrines of
‘shock & awe’, as was modelled in chapter 1. Ignatieff (2006), Shaw (2004) and Morrison
(2006) all make this very point with relation to our current responses to War and Genocide.

Indeed Andrew Williams’ (2006) recent research on the current relationship between
Liberalism and War, illuminates that military power is now the main vehicle for regime
change. Similarly, Smith’s (2006) The Utility of Force factually locates this in humanitarian
intervention terms of how the US army has been used on more than 30 different occasions
in the post-Cold War world, compared with just 10 during the whole of the 40 year Cold
War. This frequency of war makes the brutality of ‘self evident performances’ during war
very important to reconcile in terms of us propagating a predominately liberal ethic of war.

Because of this type of dilemma, there is clearly an additional necessity for legitimisation
which is why ‘Just War Theory’ and a consideration of deviancy and transgression was so
important to the earlier discussions on the role of war as a social factor of both continuity
and change. However, this additional necessity for legitimisation of war is also grounded
in the inherent problems of socialisation and social control. In Ideology and Utopia Karl
Mannheim (1936) articulates this as the inherent problem of ‘generational knowledge’
referring to how established ‘ideologies’ as a reproductive form of social order
legitimisation are in essence ‘outmoded ways of thinking’ that are defended by the ‘power
elite’ in order to block social changes that may actually be occurring. Here, the selectivity
or bias of the BOBM as compared to the AS would seem to epitomise this idea in practice.
In this ideological context, the social fact of war; its collective representation in official memory as public space testimony and the social forms and mnemonic contexts of national commemoration not only structure the public and private activities of remembrance, but also the situated way we can and, according to the previous arguments, do conceive and visually comprehend what war is, in act and deed with relation to the ideology of civilisation i.e. with relation to regime-change or new world order, or even the liberal ethic of humanitarian intervention. It is best to think about this problem in terms of why men are willing to fight in a war, as opposed to why men may be obligated to fight.

Here, Berger (1969) explains such legitimising formula thus; "If the nomos of society is to be transmitted from one generation to another, so that the new generation will also come to ‘inhabit’ the same symbolic universe, there will have to be legitimising formulas to help answer the questions that, inevitably, will raise in the minds of the new generation" (1969:30). For example children raised in an ethically educated society will at some stage want to know “why” it is socially acceptable to fight and kill on the battlefield, when it is not even acceptable to fight for what is perceived to be right in the playground. Here our sense of justice, values, teachers, traditions and, in the context of this inquiry, our public and collective memory of past war must also supply convincing answers. In this war memory context and to utilise the perceptive words of General George Washington to recap my previous arguments: “the willingness with which our young people serve in any war, no matter how justified, will be directly proportional to how they perceive the veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation" (in Quinlan, M. 2005: Pg XIII).

Finally, approaching the difficult subject matter of Memory, History and Forgetting from a viable phenomenological perspective which suggests that ‘all memory is of something and for someone’ Paul Ricoeur (2006) illuminates Berger’s (1969) understanding of how primary and secondary socialisation is never a completed process, as not only children, Chapter 6
but adults forget the legitimising answer when it comes to a 'self-evident' or 'right memory' of past war. Notwithstanding the idea that the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting – "who will remember the Armenians" – and as was contextualised in terms of a hegemonic or historicised cultural narrative on past war, we must ever be reminded that 'they' died for a 'just' or 'noble cause' i.e. they died for our freedom. In Berger's (1969:31) words, "these legitimising formulas must be repeated" and located in a monumentality setting of cultural authority and material permanence. Clearly, this is what the BOBM does in cultural praxis and which, as I have demonstrated with regards to the descriptive origins of the monument i.e. it was conceived by the BOBHS in a generalised context of when the danger of "forgetting" was perceived to be most acute.

Summary of Form to Functionality Analysis

In summing up Chapter 6, my analysis has started by unpacking the selectivity, bias and 'form' of the BOBM i.e. I have begun by ascertaining what the case study memorial was envisaged to do in terms of functionality. Based on what was described in Ch 5 and what we have looked at here in terms of legitimating the social order, The Battle of Britain Monument is now considered as a public space testimony of an iconic event of past war, which as 'social process' of modern war monumentality reconstructs a national experience of warfare as a symbol or sign of nationhood, while at the same time, emphasising the cultural significance of this past societal experience of war for the present age of conflict.

Accordingly and building on the key findings of Mark Connolly (2004) and Barbra Mitzsal (2003), this functional analysis of the case study suggests that what this sacred totem of civil society provides in terms of 'societal necessities' is a type of comfort blanket which in times of tension can help facilitate collective effervescence and in terms of identity crises, provide ontological security in an anxious, uncertain and ever-changing globalising era.

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While I must look in depth at how and in what situated context this legitimising process actually works in chapter 7, at this mid-way stage of final analysis, this functionality understanding is our first indication of the BOBM's social significance to civil society and thus a wider social indicator of the sociological reason for the identified empirical increase in WWII monumentality. However, there are limits to this functional context of discovery.

To highlight these limits within the normative context of what I have described as the ethical environment and with relation to the critical thinking of Ruskin, one must now look at the reproductive issue of legitimisation from other sociology of knowledge perspectives. After all, if the New Western Way of Warfare is deviant in prosecution and if it is noble ideals for which people kill each other, then one must challenge the viability and morality of such legitimising ideas of the nomos. In terms of the ethical environment, it is because of this surrounding climate of ideas about what others are like, or who we are, or what our interests or rights require that we go to war, or even oppress others with good conscience.

When these ideals become a euphemism, they involve a lack of imagination or the 'sleep of reason'. Here, critical awaking is one antidote to producing monsters (see Goya, F. 1967). Indeed, Goya's full edict for his famous 'disaster of war' etching is "imagination abandoned by reason produces impossible monsters: United with her, she is the mother of the arts and the source of her wonders" (Blackburn, 1999:13). Thus my next aim is to help reunite reason with the imagination, in order that one may gain a similar insightful reflection on the ideological appropriation and/or latent function of CWM. This type of analytical insight is drawn from critical interpretation and readings of contexts, which, when employed as a critical way of seeing war and its public space testimony, may enable we who inhabit this PMS to step back, to see our perspective on the traditional role of war memory or the duty to remember as perhaps distorted or blind, or at the very least, to see if there is an argument for preferring one form of memory over another in terms of civility.
With this final goal in mind, I will continue the interpretation and analysis of the case study microcosm with a critical reading of these legitimising formula, as is represented in the content, consumption and appropriation of war memory, in order to help highlight the many paradoxes in our 'ways of seeing' warfare and the unintended consequences of CWM. To this normative end, I must begin the final discussions in Chapter Seven by outlining this project's situated approach to the 'textual reading' of war memory paradox. This includes reiterating the varied types of knowledge I have thus far needed to employ, in order to help the project enable new ways of seeing 'War', and thus achieve the analytical aims stated.
Chapter 7

How is the semiotic message appropriated?

Content and Consumption of British War Memory

The aim of this chapter is to unpack further how commemorative culture is produced and consumed within modern social life. My goal is to illuminate the influence of what Jock Young (2007) termed the ‘chaos of reward’ in the cultural logic of modernity. Here, we look at the power of the criminalisation/legitimisation process on the way ‘we’ as a post-military society may see, talk and thus think about the paradox of war and by association the content, consumption or appropriation of CWM projects. To that end, I will re-employ the criminological vantage points identified in chapter 1 and bring to bear some alternative or ‘subaltern’ comprehensions of the ‘war on terror’, in order that we may contrast the conflicts of meanings apparent between, ‘trauma and linear time narration’ (Edkins, 2003: 241).
20-56) of war and its impact on the ethical environment. In this regard, 'trauma time narration' is referring to personal, critical and emotive discourses of war; as were 'linear time narrations' are referring us to what Durkhiem (1973) termed 'disinterested moral activity', which as we have seen is perceived to serve the greater good of society. I also look at content/consumption through sociology of emotion; civil-military relations issues appertaining to loss, and finally a Cultural Theory analysis that may help demonstrate how the 'content' of WWII memory is consumed through the encoding and decoding (Hall, S. 2001) frameworks of official remembrance. I conclude this analysis with a brief summary of Part Four, and begin the discussion by relocating what is termed here as a 'war memory paradox of appropriation'. By relocating, I mean within the context of the previous analysis.

The War Memory Paradox of Appropriation

'World War II has become the big war wielded to justify the waging of small wars and, as such, an all purpose rhetorical crutch, a lofty piety, a wide-screen epic constantly remade and recast. Commentators can scarcely score a point about terrorism, geopolitical struggle, or domestic politics without relying on "the good war" for an ominous parallel.'

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'Cast your mind back to those hazy, bygone days of 2002 and recall how loudly echoes of WWII provided the overture to the ramp-up for war in Iraq, with Tony Blair ripening into the Churchill of Our Time, Saddam Hussein combining the monster roles of Hitler and Stalin, and anyone fey enough to advocate diplomacy taunted in the village square as a hand-wringing, appeasing Neville Chamberlain' (Wolcott, J. 2004:70-73).

Wolcott’s observations are re-presented here to illuminate the final topic of discussion and to help make explicit what has thus far only been talked about in the abstract throughout the thesis narrative. Namely, that past war and present conflict are not separate entities, as could be inferred from the discrepancies identified between the BOBM and AS memorials, but are in fact part of the paradoxical totality that is War; as one can now see from the linkage within these two quotes. Situated within the Western context of commemorative culture, one can also infer from the above appropriation of past war memory that the iconic history of the ‘Good War’ is well-known and written by the winners. In this distinct context of memory, history and forgetting, our previous analysis of the BOBM has thus far highlighted how the inclusion or integration of ‘subaltern stories’ of warfare has not been managed ‘without a simple reversal of the privileged, authoritarian account’ (Lawler, S. 2006:9). In this respect, the previous analysis of the BOBM seems to indicate that the past is not a foreign country as Lowenthal (1986) exposes, the present is!

This idea would seem to be epitomised by The Sun epitaph, but this is only one paradox of appropriation that needs to be re-located before analysis can progress. To this end and as stated, one must employ varied sociology of knowledge perspectives to help unpack this paradox of unintended consequences - as is apparent in the content and consumption of British war memory. Starting from a surface description of the BOBM, which informed us of the role, purpose and function of the case study microcosm, in terms of what was being remembered, why, by whom and to serve what commemorative purpose, the previous chapter looked at the form of the monument in terms of some selectivity issues and thus analysed the BOBM symbolic form in functional terms of what job it could be
seen to do as a cultural product of its own selectivity criteria. Earlier chapters all helped identify these selectivity criteria in terms of societal needs. Here, the previous analyses focused mainly on the 'selectivity' and 'form' of the case study monument - as compared to the AS and English Heritage Tour examples - and thus only really looked at this almost intangible relationship between 'past war and present conflict' in very structural and functional terms of 'reproductive needs', 'social-states of mind' 'self-evident performances' and 'legitimisations of the nomos', all of which I briefly contrasted in art history terms with critical relation to the established 'ways of seeing' things. Thus, in accordance with stated methodologies we began to analyse the BOB from overlapping epistemological positions.

In this chapter, I build on this transformative analysis in order to look at content in terms of how the 'linear time narration of past war' has been duly consumed by the public; both as a way to help aid recovery from the anomie of present conflicts and employed by the powerful as a cultural means to help justify and legitimise an ubiquitous banality of transgression identified as inherent in 'degenerate' warfare. As I pointed out earlier, there is no document of civilisation which is not at the same time a testimony of barbarism: So here, I look at the appropriation of the values enshrined in the symbolic content of the BOBM as a semiotic justification for brutal conduct in present conflicts. In short, I look at differing ontological layers of the case study's 'content' - by which I mean, the semiotic meanings one may now attach to the BOBM; and 'consumption' - by which I mean, how and in what way the contested content of such popular war memory projects, may be appropriated within a distinct post 9/11 'culture' and 'politics of fear' (Bauman 2007). In doing so, my narrative task is to help ground our analysis within the all-encompassing ether of the ethical environment. Thus, I must begin by contextualising what is meant by a culture and politics of fear, as located within the said ethical environment of late modernity.

I contextualise first with regards to what is termed here 'a trauma time narration of a Post
9/11 Culture of Fear, and then with direct relation to a more authoritative construction of the 'War on Terror'; this represents a linear narration of the new Post-9/11 'politics of fear'.

The Chaos of Reward in the Cultural logic of Late Modernity!

The following extract is from an 'urban poem' written by a 19 yr old rapper. It is presented here to help contextualise a 'trauma time narration' of what I mean by a distinct post 9/11 chaos of reward, and as a contrast to the linear narration or authoritarian discourse of war.

"This is the ballad of the fall of man. Have I done all I can? My life seems miniscule as a grain of sand. Elected leaders, who appear more ape than man, lead us over seas so companies can rape the land. My bloody hand is as guilty as the next, I'm not trying to get respect, these lyrics are depressed. We're possessed by a dollar sign, so life is hopeless, like two kids from Columbine, killing to be noticed.

Trying to keep my focus but my psycho sense is slipping; its love in the house of god, but I'm locked in hell's kitchen. Serving up the death warrants, like no tomorrow, as these violin strings, sing sweet notes of sorrow.

Sombre fine citizens, play follow the leader, and take their information from the station news reader. I can't be the man who sits back in disdain, with all this Citizen Kane shit in my brain. Got fight back, field concepts, retribution; because every revolution started with an execution. I'm using these words to disturb this fantasy, as world war three hangs like the sword of Damacles.

Creeping in your manner, to step off the bus, too afraid you'll end up on the pavement, spilling your guts. Who to trust? Well it says God on the dollar bill, but the Jihad is the reason that they wanna kill.

We swallow pills like Morpheus, to make the choice. Ignore the truth, and listen to the vacant voice - blasted over TV stations and newspaper, everybody kneeling to George Bush, the new saviour.”

Repeated Chorus:

"The sun's rising in the East and its setting in the West. There are men running round with bombs on their chest. I'm trying my best, but the world is depressed; we swallow pills to ignore the war on our steps”.


Like Bauman (2007: 15) in Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty, for our present purposes, it is pertinent that we resituate this articulation of a Culture of Fear (Furedi, 1997, 2005) with relation to what Curtis (2004) recently described as The Power of Nightmares.
Indeed, this critical viewing of the West's logic for the 'War on Terror' is a highly relevant example of how in Wright's (1964:364) words, "modern war tends to be about words, more than about things, about potentialities, hopes and aspirations more than about facts, grievances, and conditions". In this respect, and whether one actually agrees or disagrees with Curtis's (2004) thesis of how the 'precautionary principle' serves only to feed a 'politics of fear' - where all we really have to fear is fear itself - it nevertheless serves to illustrate how war rests in civilisation, upon an elaborate ideological construction maintained in culture through education in a system of language, law, symbols and values. A situated consideration of the linear narration of the current war on terror will help make this social constructivist idea explicit within the socially constructed context of British 'Foreign Policy'.

**Linear Time Narration of the Power of Nightmares: The Roots of Extremism**

"The roots of global terrorism and extremism are indeed deep. They reach right down through decades of alienation, victimhood and political oppression in the Arab and Muslim world. This is not the place to digress into a history of what subsequently happened. But by the early 20th century, after renaissance, reformation and enlightenment had swept over the Western world, the Muslim and Arab world was uncertain, insecure and on the defensive. Some countries like Turkey went for a muscular move to secularism. Others found themselves caught between colonisation, nationalism, political oppression and religious radicalism. Muslims began to see the sorry state of Muslim countries as a symptom of the state of Islam. Political radicals became religious radicals and vice versa.

Those in power tried to accommodate the resurgent Islamic radicalism by incorporating some of its leaders and some of its ideology. The result was nearly always disastrous. The religious radicalism was made respectable; the political radicalism suppressed and so in the minds of many, the cause of the two came together to symbolise the need for change. So many came to believe that the way of restoring the confidence and stability of Islam was the combination of religious extremism and populist politics. The true enemies became "the West" and those Islamic leaders who co-operated with them. The extremism may have started through religious doctrine and thought. But soon, in offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Wahhabi extremists and taught in some of the Madrassas of the Middle East and Asia, an ideology was born/exported around the world.

On 9/11 2001, 3,000 people were murdered. But this terrorism did not begin on the streets of New York. Many more had already died, not just in acts of terrorism against Western interests, but in political insurrection and turmoil round the world. Its victims are to be found in the recent history of many lands: Russia, India, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Indonesia, Kenya and countless more. Over 100,000 died in Algeria. In Chechnya and Kashmir, political causes that could have been resolved became brutally incapable of resolution under the pressure of terrorism. Today in 30 or 40 countries, terrorists are plotting action, loosely linked with this ideology. Though the active cadres of terrorists are relatively small, it exploits a far wider sense of alienation in the Arab and Muslim world".

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"These acts of terrorism were not isolated incidents. They were part of a growing movement. A movement that believed Muslims had departed from their proper faith, were being taken over by Western culture, were being governed treacherously by Muslims complicit in this take-over, whereas the true way to recover not just the true faith, but Muslim confidence and self esteem, was to take on the West and all its works.

The struggle against terrorism in Madrid, or London, or Paris, is the same as the struggle against the terrorist acts of Hezbollah in Lebanon, or the PIJ in Palestine, or rejectionist groups in Iraq. The murder of the innocent in Beslan is part of the same ideology that takes innocent lives in Saudi Arabia, the Yemen or Libya. And when Iran gives support to such terrorism, it becomes part of the same battle, with the same ideology at its heart...."


From a post Cold War world where those in the West had no real or visible enemy to fear; to a post 9/11 era, were we fear uncertainty as much as a pre-determined enemy - that is not known to us outside the abstract idea of an 'Islamist fundamentalist'. In this unseen or intangible context, the 'precautionary principle' was envisaged in the 1980's by environmental researchers in the USA worried about global warming, but who had no real evidence; so working from worst case scenario the environmentalists lobbied governments with the intuitive idea that 'they' (governments), had a public duty to take action and protect the citizenship against global warming, even though at that stage there was very little hard data to support these apocalyptic theories. Curtis (2004) argued that in using the 'power of nightmares' to work from a 'worst case scenario' the normative neo-conservative doctrine of 'revolutionary democracy' has enshrined a brand new proactive or pre-emptive 'preventative paradigm' where military action without evidence is justified on the grounds of what could happen. In this 'utility of force' the 'last resort' criterion of 'just war theory' is now obsolete, as the human imagination – informed by fear – has combined with Machiavellian politics to help produce a period of perpetual war and conflict. As Wright (1964:356) again points out “War in this modern period does not grow out of a situation but out of a highly artificial interpretation of a situation” which is why the explanation and interpretation of warfare’s ‘legitimising formula’, “are often as remote from the actual sequence of events as primitive explanations of war are, in terms of the requirements of magic, ritual or revenge".

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As the then Prime Minister Blair (2006:3) pointed out in the cited Foreign Policy pamphlet entitled *A Global Alliance for Global Values* "the consequence of this 'interventionist thesis' is a foreign policy of engagement rather than isolation: active, not reactive. This is why Britain has pursued a strongly activist foreign policy. We have based those actions at least as much on our values as on our interests. It is our values that link our military action in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, with our diplomatic action on climate change, world trade, Africa and Palestine". However, as I have tried to highlight with regards to Paul Fussell's (1975) thesis of irony [that the *ends* achieved in war will always be disproportionate to the impact of the *means*] and again with regards to Howard's (1976) understandings of a liberal dilemma inherent to war; the real paradox of a PMS such as Britain using the alluring tool of 'Risk Transfer Warfare' to help Western society facilitate the values and beliefs enshrined in the popular memory of the Good War, is that in waging asymmetrical warfare the fundamental values or ends enshrined and desired are inevitably undermined, lost or even reversed in the very pursuit of those values and ends. "We are here to bring you freedom and democracy" screamed a US Marine to the rioting mob of Iraqis, "so back the fuck off before we are forced to open fire" (*The Ground Truth*, 2007).

In the preface to this Foreign Policy Pamphlet, Stephen Twigg (2006) attempts to put this paradox in context and explains how Blair's 1999 'Chicago speech' set out the rationale for what has been termed a 'liberal interventionist' approach to foreign policy. "Chicago came at the end of a decade which witnessed genocide in Rwanda and 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia. The abject failure of the international community to prevent these atrocities led many to question the prevailing 'realist' orthodoxy in foreign policy. Blair's first term in office saw the UK interventions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Both enjoyed widespread support; for many they were a positive example of what Robin Cook described as the 'ethical dimension' of foreign policy. Then came 9/11. The subsequent intervention in Afghanistan had clear UN sanction and, in the UK, strong cross-party support. In contrast,
the invasion of Iraq was the most controversial decision taken by Tony Blair’s government.

In this pamphlet, the Prime Minister acknowledges that mistakes have been made, but makes a plea for supporters or opponents to unite in support of democracy in Iraq today”.

“Globalisation is a fact. But the values that govern it are a choice. Another great challenge today is to articulate a common global policy based on common global values. It is our task to fashion an international community that both embodies and acts in pursuit of the values we believe in: liberty, democracy, tolerance and justice”.

“To win the battle of values, we must prove beyond any question that our worldview is based not just on power but on justice; not just on what is necessary, but on what is right. That is why I say this struggle is one about values. Our values are our guide. Our values are worth struggling for. They represent humanity’s progress throughout the ages. At each point we have had to fight for them and defend them. As a new age beckons, it is time to fight for them again” Tony Blair A Global Alliance for Global Values (2006: 6).

As we have seen, these truly noble ideals are now firmly enshrined in British Army doctrine with direct relation to fighting from the moral high ground, but in terms of an inherent chaos of rewards, the most damning criticism of Western foreign policy is that it displays ‘double standards’ – for example, intervention in Iraq, but not in Darfur. Indeed, Bill Clinton has described the Rwanda genocide as the greatest failure of his presidency and Tony Blair explains in this publication that he feared, ‘leaving things as they are in ad-hoc coalitions that tend to stir massive controversy about legitimacy; or paralyse us in the face of crises’.

In trying to explain the origins and main concerns of this project, I have implicitly linked this type of ‘crisis’ or ‘double standard’ - though two comparative quotes of Army doctrine verses the ‘Obligations of War’ - to the concept of paradox as seen in Weber’s views of modernity and political agency. In the influential work War, Dandeker (1999:109-111) points out that in the history of sociological enquiry, three approaches to the study of war and the military establishment can be identified. A brief recap of these CMR theories will help to locate (in context) what is meant by “Weber’s concept of paradox” (see Symonds, M. and Pudsey, J. 2008:233-241). “Two of these, the liberal theory of industrial society [modernisation thesis] and Marxism [revolutionary thesis], have been more influential, at
least until recently. Both are rooted in the idea of history as 'progress', emphasising that
the development of modern industrial society will lead to a decline of war and the military
establishment. In contrast, the third, 'realist' or 'neo-Machiavellian' perspectives
[pragmatic thesis] stresses that these institutions will not wither away, but are part of the
human condition" (1999:11). My point in highlighting these CMR theories is that whatever
sociological model of war and civilisation one may use - including my own 'social actor'
network model of modern warfare as facilitator of both continuity and change - the inherent
means/ends paradox identified above will raise its ugly head and ruin the utopian vista of
Modernity's envisaged progress. Remember, if such a thing as 'utopia' can exist, then in
waging war it would literally exist in this sort of dilemma, because as Shaw (1988:1) points
out, "the role of war and war preparation in society presents us with an essential paradox".

"How is it that a society that has created such potential for human liberation – in
technology, human co-operation, and ideas – can produce at the same time and with the
same societal means such appalling danger? The conflict of these two sides of our civil
society must ultimately be resolved, in practice as well as in theory".

"However obvious this point is from a human point of view, it has not proved easy
for thinkers to grapple with, any more than it has been easy to overcome war or conflict in
the real social and political world. Most thinkers about society have not been able to grasp
the huge problem that war poses for our understandings of society in general: they have
marginalised it, treated it as exceptional or abnormal etc [see above and chapter 1]. Most
thinkers about war, on the other hand, have tended to treat it as if it were self contained
process, certainly depending on society for its resources [fusion and fission models or
warfare paradigms] but ultimately operating under its own laws. Although the more
intelligent of them [here Shaw is talking about the likes of Clausewitz] have recognized the
implications of modern warfare for society, they have generally dealt with them much to
obliquely, for fear perhaps that these implications would simply topple the whole edifice of
military thought and practice".

"Thus the problem of war and society can therefore be seen as a paradoxical
dilemma, the horns of which have been tackled separately by social and military theory,
but the heart of which has rarely been exposed" (Shaw. 1988 Dialectics of War. Page 1.

In The Concept of 'Paradox' in the Work of Max Weber Michael Symonds and Jason
Pudsey (2008) explain that this type of paradox is unable to be altered or avoided by
human agency – "it is, or has been, 'fate"' (2008:237). It does not take a Mertonian (1957)
moment of realisation to grasp that the cultural and social engine of this ironic paradox is the meaningful social action of political agency employed as a virtuous force for civil progress or public good. While Symonds and Pudsey (2008) don’t directly relate these means/ends paradoxes to the current role of ‘Risk Transfer Warfare’ this interesting article is nevertheless revealing in terms of explaining the apparent banality of transgression inherent to the new Western way of war. For example, they point out within the context of ‘Weber’s paradoxical logic of modernity’ that a variety of fundamental values and ends can be pursued in the spheres of modernity, but whichever is chosen, there is no escape from the awaiting ‘fate of self-destruction’. In terms of why Weber distains the social science practice of vocational sociology (See Freund, 1968:17) both the ‘vocation’ lectures might be read as concluding with a warning on this very point (Symonds,. Pudsey. 2008).

“And, if the ‘Iron Cage’ is understood in these terms, then it is not a question of prison-like determinism where our choices and liberties are limited, but rather, whatever the choice, on a fundamental level of value, there can be no realisation or resolution. Some choice must be made, but at every turn, at every end of the path in the modern world, lies the final embrace of paradox” (see Symonds, M. and Pudsey, J. 2008: 237).

All these considerations of paradox are vitally important to this analysis, because as stated in the preamble, in order to get the best out of a small-scale examination of the case study microcosm, one must ground and locate the analysis/interpretation of the BOBM within this paradoxical chaos of reward context. In short, I need to locate these understandings within the ether of the ethical environment. To do that, I have drawn on what criminologist Mike Presdee (2000:15) termed the ‘debris of everyday life’ with relation to the expedient calculations and emotional trauma of war and, thus, I have employed novel mediated storytellers of ‘past war and present conflict’ in order to help ground and contextualise the social manipulation of morality process clearly apparent in the political appropriation of CWM. Looking at content and consumption in this way, one can finally fulfil the normative aspect of this critically-minded inquiry by reuniting logic and reason with imagination and moral distinction, in order to help unmask the latently de-civilising monster of past warfare.
In this wider but still situated context, I will now revisit the difficult issues of Justification and Legitimisation from some other sociology of knowledge perspectives including Cultural Theory, Civil Military Relations [CMR] and Cultural Criminology perspectives; identified in Chapter 1 with regards to the 'edge work' of Presdee (2000), Morrison (2006) and Young (2007). Building on our previous criminological observations, here we will liken the way we criminalise an act or deed i.e. through the social and cultural processes of the powerful (see Presdee 2000) to the way we currently see, rationalise, legitimise and justify the banality of transgression shown as inherent to degenerate war i.e. The New Western Way of Warfare or Risk Transfer War (see Shaw, M. 1988, 1991, 2004, 2007., Morrison 2006).

As was explained in Chapter 1, the most important point to remember here with regards to the way one may view and think about the BOBM content and consumption, is that if the way we now prosecute war can be considered deviant or transgressive in terms of the ongoing civilising process [as I have suggested it is], then this would throw a whole new light on the legitimising processes of the nomos including the justifying relations now identified between past wars, present conflicts and the ethical environment of modernity and thus by association, the way we may see, think or talk about past war in public space testimony. It is this very insightful but critical idea that I now follow up on in this analysis.

**Linking the Criminalisation Process to the Ethical Environment**

There are children standing here; arms out-stretched unto the sky, tears drying on their face; 'he' has been here!

Houses burnt beyond repair; the smell of death is in the air, a woman weeping in despair; says, he has been here!

Tracer lighting up the sky: it's another family's turn too die: a child too afraid to even cry out; says, he still lives here!

Brothers lie in shallow graves; fathers lost without a trace, a nation blind to its disgrace; since, he has been here!
Old men kneel to accept their fate; wives and daughters caught and raped, a generation drenched in hate; but no one asks the question why; does he is still live here?

And I see no bravery; no bravery in your eyes anymore; only sadness.


To locate and ground such observations with direct relation to how we socially construct the linear narration of warfare - euphemisms seen to be imbued within the form or content of the BOBM - one must now triangulate this idea within the criminological vantage point that was identified in Chapter 1. To recap this new ‘way of seeing’: War is likened to the way we may see and think about crime. Utilising the cultural criminology thinking of Young (2007), Morrison (2006) and Presdee (2000), I can begin to re-locate this ‘edge-work’ idea in the following way: Like in previous cases of extended quoting, I have added my own comments in brackets to help contextualise said ideas with relation to war and its memory.

“Like all those interested in crime [war] and the effects of crime [war] on the victim [with 97% of casualties of asymmetrical war thought to be civilian or non-combatants we can reasonably look at the vast majority of Western-made casualties of war as victims], the criminal [self evident performers: I don’t think of myself as a criminal what I was doing was just like screwing in light bulbs] and Society [legislator of the subjective violence required of wars eternal mantra and the instigator of the systematic and objective violence of all western made warfare], cultural criminology is interested in the larger movements of Society. That is, the social context in which crime [war] comes into being and is played out: in short the criminalising processes [the legitimisation process]. What is important to cultural criminology is to examine ‘everything that happens before crime [war] occurs’, as ‘the question of what precedes crime [war] is far more critical to our understanding [of its institutional presence] than the act of crime [war] itself’ (Quinney 1994:1 in Presdee 2000).

Mike Presdee (2000:17) explains that “the criminalisation process is that cultural process whereby those with power come to define and shape dominant forms of social life and give them specific meaning. More importantly, it is the way that the powerful have the ability to define both how and what we see and, in doing so, the manner in which we may perceive the social behaviour of others”. Here, the apparent link between the ethical environment of asymmetrical warfare and the above criminalisation process is undeniable. In this respect and to again paraphrase the insightful words of Presdee (2000:16), “we need continually to
remind ourselves of a single simple statement; that a criminal act has to be defined through social and cultural processes that are themselves played out separate from the essence of the act itself. Replace ‘criminal act’ with ‘act of war’ and theorists of warfare [Clausewitz (1976) and Shaw (1988)] make this very point with factual relation to the apparent disparity between the concurrent activities required of war and the legitimising frameworks that enable the phenomena to exist. Here, Presdee (2000:16) relates this seminal observation in a criminological way before he makes the comparison with warfare.

"The act of taking a life does not become ‘murder’ until defined as such through the discourse of the powerful. It is these cultural discourses that both define and designate any particular act as criminal. Until the context has been designated and defined by the powerful as a criminal one, the act of taking life may be defined as right, desirable, even good...... To kill in the Balkans was defined by Tony Blair as the ‘right’ thing to do, no matter how ‘regrettable’, no matter if we kill the wrong person. In this context the act of killing becomes defined by those in power as ‘right’. The political processes of the powerful have the ability to make criminals of us one day and heroes, the next" (see Presdee, M. 2000:16).

In other words, the legitimisation process is also that cultural process whereby those with power come to define and shape dominant forms of social life and give them specific meanings and more importantly, this is the way the powerful have the ability to define both how and what we see and, in so doing, the manner in which we may comprehend or perceive our social actions and moral behaviour in war. Looked at in relocated terms of how ‘Western Society’ may construct linear time narrations of warfare and grounded within the political context of commemorative culture, and one can infer that the social processes and mnemonic practices of memorialisation are one ‘cultural means’ whereby those with power and patronage come to define and shape our understanding of ‘right and wrong’ in modern warfare and in so doing, harness our emotional responses to the trauma of war by framing reified meanings to loss, death and killing that are abstracted from the actual and located above and beyond that of a individual need to grieve. Here, the emotional trauma narration of war i.e. the very act of feeling emotional, be it anger, rage, guilt, pride or shame, all can or have been harnessed as a form of justification, or as a reason to forget.
The observational point I am trying to foreshadow here, with regards to this analysis of content and consumption, is that while content can be constituted by trauma or linear time narrations of war [i.e. monumental or anti-monumental stories of warfare] the actual consumption and subsequent appropriation of war memory is always influenced by these legitimisation and criminalisation processes. We will see two situated examples of this process in action below, but in the meantime, it should be clear that these dual processes are what help hide the eventual paradox of political agency in modern war. In terms of the precautionary principle and the power of nightmares, these two interlinked processes of the ethical environment ensure that the trauma time narration of a perceived culture of fear can be harnessed, employed or re-incorporated in a linear narration of the politics of fear.

Put another way and the trauma time narrations of war apparent in the anti-war movement which in Feb 2003 saw millions of people all over the world protest against an invasion of Iraq have, through the processes identified above, become a linear time justification of the war, via the values being fought for. We are told, thank God we live in a society where such powerful collective expressions are allowed and celebrated. If we were talking about an increase in the reporting of crime to the police [i.e. an increase in crime] then we would be told thank god we live in a society in which ‘citizens’ trust the police enough to actually report crime. It is through this sort of negotiation process that War, the abstract instrument of ‘Foreign Policy’, becomes about upholding the ‘rights of free speech’ and protecting the weak, marginalised and vulnerable of the other world, outside our own ‘Exclusive Society’.

Because of these processes, war monuments to the ‘Good War’ - such as the BOBM - are not conceived, designed, promoted and given patronage by some evil band of brothers that wants to hide the actual truth of war from a naive and trusting body politic, but are ‘emotionally dishonest’ in selectivity, form, content and consumption through the power of the ‘affect mechanisms’ to harness our emotions and the apparent authenticity of ‘self-
evident performances' which help mask from ourselves the nostalgia militarism paradox that our brave pilots are now doing unintentionally what the German pilots did intentionally to us. Remember, if 97% of casualties in present conflict are thought to be civilian or non-combatants, then it is almost academic to make a 'risk-transfer' distinction between intentional and unintentional victims. Indeed, to do so, is only another form of social manipulation of morality where how one may personally feel about something like this is decoupled from the instrumentality of the act. Here, to reconcile the liberal dilemma such narrations are the 'age old lies' told to make us feel better about what must be done in war.

Anthropologist Renato Rosaldo (1993: 68-90) in Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis locates these 'old lies' of war in a type of 'Imperialist Nostalgia', which, according to this anthropological viewing of 'nostalgia', revolves around another historically located paradox of political agency in war i.e. a person kills somebody and then mourns the victim.

"In more attenuated form, someone deliberately alters a form of life, and then regrets that things have not remained as they were before the intervention. At one more remove, people destroy their environment, and then they worship nature. In any of its versions, imperialist nostalgia uses a pose of 'innocent yearning' both to capture people's imaginations and to conceal complicity with often brutal domination" (Rosaldo, 1993: 70).

When one re-locates this idea within the sociological model of modern warfare I have constructed in Chapter 1, we can infer that this type of nostalgia militarism - as manifest in the social form of imperialist nostalgia - occurs alongside a peculiar sense of mission, what Rosaldo (1993) describes as the 'white man's burden', where 'civilised nations stand duty-bound to uplift so-called savage ones'. Indeed in this ideologically constructed world of ongoing progressive change, Rosaldo (1993: 68-90) points out that "putatively static savage societies have become a reference point for defining the felicitous progress of civilised identity" as was implicit in Blair's 1999 Chicago speech on 'Humanitarian Intervention', and is explicit in current discourses on 'Regime Change' or 'Nation Building'.

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To again paraphrase Rosaldo's words, "We, who believe in progress valorise innovation, and then yearn for more stable worlds, whether these reside in our own past, in other cultures, or in a conflation of the two. Such forms of longing thus appear closely related to secular notions of progress. When the so-called civilising process destabilises forms of life, the agents of change experience transformations of other cultures as if they were personal losses" In other words, "nostalgia is a particularly appropriate emotion to invoke in attempting to establish one's innocence and at the same time talk about what one has destroyed. Don't most people feel nostalgic about childhood memories? Aren't these memories genuinely innocent? Indeed, much of imperialist nostalgia's force resides in its association with (indeed its disguise as) more genuinely innocent, tender recollections of what is at once an earlier epoch and a previous phase of life". Here, "the relatively benign character of most nostalgia facilitates imperialist nostalgia's capacity to transform the responsible social agent of war into an innocent bystander" i.e. If such nostalgia were not perceived as fairly harmless, the imperialist variety would not be nearly as effective as it is.

When this understanding of imperialist nostalgia is combined with Presdee's (2000) understandings, one can finally begin to conceive/ comprehend how these dual processes of legitimisation have much power to influence our 'ways of seeing things', including war and its memory. For example, this dual legitimisation and criminalisation process ensures that there is still no perceived paradox in the public consciousness when 1.5 million march to the banner of 'no war' [Feb 2003] and 1.5 million celebrate a popular past war in Hyde Park [2006]. Indeed, at the time of writing and despite my best efforts to find one, I have not located any mainstream articles, books or academic journals that attempt to explain or address this type of past war/present conflict paradox and could therefore suggest that this type of refusal to recognise paradox in war is what helps maintain the 'glitch in the perception matrix' [see chapter 2] of a Post Heroic Society even though war - as a thing that happens to people - has had a personal interest in a quarter of this nation's populace.
Similarly, this dual process of legitimisation and criminalisation helps to marginalise the many trauma time narrations of modern war that exist; which if not harnessed into emotional safe havens, or ideological safe harbours by the varied affect mechanisms of British commemorative culture, may well be able to help challenge the viability of the privileged or authoritarian accounts of risk-transfer war. Put in context, and one could deduce from the uproar and surrounding controversy of how the emotionally honest Abandoned Soldier or Royal Artillery Monument were received at the time of their public inauguration, that the proper or socially acceptable place for such public space expression of the living trauma of war is to be conveyed in other more appropriate mediums such as art, literature or poetry. However, such woolly and creative mediums have no real authority or constituted place in the risk-transfer politics of the actual world and thus their innate power to influence ways of seeing is again marginalised or removed from the real negotiations. Before we progress, let me provide two brief but revealing and grounded examples of this non-rehabilitating and/or impoverishing process in both action and praxis.

When the then, US Secretary of State Collin Powell (2003) gave his now infamous speech, explaining why war was necessary in Iraq, at the UN Building in Feb 2003, the subsequent press conference to the world was given in the main reception of this iconic building. Behind the press podium was a life-size frieze of Picasso's trauma time narration of Guernica (1937) which was hastily covered up, in case it caused embarrassment to those making the factual case [sic] for risk transfer war (see Schama, S. 2006). Similarly, in Survivor Memories and the Diagnosis of Trauma Edkins (2003:20-56) explains how post traumatic stress [PTS] is constructed and produced in public discourse as a degenerate disorder that can be diagnosed and cured. Within the context of the Vietnam War, Edkins (2003) points out that in the case of the Vietnam veterans the effect of this process was “to de-politicise their memories” and argued that “a form of disciplinary control was instigated which is an example of how hegemonic power can control and subjugate war memory”.

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Re-locating this idea within the politically unpopular context of present asymmetrical warfare and we have already seen what happens in praxis when CWM projects such as the AS monument try to re-politicise the trauma time narration of present conflict: Here, a form of disciplinary control was instigated against Combat Stress and order was resumed. These are all examples of how hegemonic power can control and subjugate war memory not only in terms of its public space testimonies, but also the private testimonies that if taken into account and not marginalised as ‘degenerate’ may help us see war for what it is. Looked at this way and PTSD considerations should be the norm in the negations of war and its memory and not marginalised in such public space testimonies because, after all, if a human being has a heart that feels and head that thinks how could s/he be affected any other way: here the latent power of ‘self evident performances’ now becomes clearer to us.

Within this wider world of the ‘actual’ and in contrasting this critical viewing with relation to the previous articulations of the ‘empirical’ [the surface level description of BOBM] and ‘real’ [the status quo analysis of its form and selectivity issues], we can now review the BOBM within a much more contested context i.e. a consumer centred civil society with all its associated vertigo-afflicted logic and inherent chaos of rewards and/or criminalisations.

Here, our cultural criminology viewing can indirectly build on the ‘edge-work’ premise of boundary shifting perspectives, in that to see asymmetrical war for what it is, in terms of a socially acceptable collective wrong-doing; a degenerate, transgressive, deviant and criminal act - or in our particular case, as a decivilising social action which is legitimised by war memory - then we need to contextualise both the tangible [facts and things] and intangible [social and cultural processes of criminalisation] with relation to the real, actual and empirical of the new Western way of warfare: In short, we now take on board the insightful understanding that there is a distinct link between the way we see crime and war.
Looked at though the prism of criminology and one can see the inherent subjectivity of the official ‘ways of seeing’ war and its collective memory, because just like the shifting realms of memory or the changeable edicts of war’s ethical environment, the political processes of the powerful have the ability to make criminals of us one day and heroes the next: Think of the recent state pardons bestowed upon 316 souls shot for transgressions during WW1.

If we think about past wars to present conflict in this way, one can see that along with state education curricula, commemorative culture, cultural narratives and the primary and secondary processes of socialisation, the cultural and social processes of criminalisation help provide the cornerstones for the current rationalisation, legitimisation and justification for virtuous war to exist as a socially acceptable means within the post 9/11 ethical environment of late-modernity. Working from this structuration premise, or looking towards the ‘societal awakening’ end identified in the summary of Chapter 6, I now intend to look through the eyes of a critical sociological imagination to help re-interpret the legitimising and justifying content of the BOBM and the ideological appropriation of war memory. I will reinterpret first through the prisms of CMR and then through the lenses of Cultural Theory.

The CMR Influence on Content and Consumption

Here, I begin the analysis by unpacking the justifications of warfare in CMR terms of how we talk about and make sense of our loss to war. I do this by re-locating the ‘self evident assumptions/performances’ identified in chapters 4 to 6 with direct relation to the apparent political miss-usage of war memory’s ‘silent sentry’ aura and the ideological appropriation of popular WWII narratives – as is indicated above and with overlapping relation to our previous in-depth discussions and the further examples I present below. In specific terms of the previously identified post military and post heroic issues, my immediate focus is on Chapter 7.
unpacking the apparent past war justifications for present asymmetrical conflicts. That is justifications of warfare that are culturally harnessed from the raw emotional power of pride or shame as was described with relation to the 'affect mechanisms' of British war memory.

Within these overlapping discussions on the role, purpose and function of war memorials, I have been suggesting that the post military nature and post heroic character of British civil military relations is a major factor to consider with relation to analysing the form, content and consumption of CWM projects. To this end and in accordance with the 'fire triangle model' of 'public war memory' this project's sociological approach to collective memory analysis has considered both the 'statics' [issues of persistence/continuity or linear time cultural narration of warfare] and 'dynamics' [issues of malleability/contestation or trauma time narration of warfare] of war memory phenomena (Robbins, 1998, Edkins 2003:1-19).¹

In this context, an important point to note for our present analysis is that all fires have unique effects and presences dependent on the nature of the mixture of fuel, air and heat. In the same way and as we have seen, public war memory may have differing effects upon changing the personality structures of social figurations, dependent not only on the nature of the mixture between, memory source, group will and cultural means, but also the very

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¹ As we have discussed this type of social memory approach was advocated in Theories of Social Remembering and has enabled this research project to utilise "social theory of memory that draws on classical studies such as Halbwachs (1992)" but also to regard the negotiated construct of "social memory as the embodied accomplishment of agents in a complex world" (Misztal, 2003:6). As such our 'fire triangle' model of public war memory has enabled both a 'functional' and 'inter-subjectivist' approach to analysis which draws heavily on Berger's 'social construction of reality' thesis (See Berger, P. 1967) which in turn draws heavily on Hegel's thesis of consciousness briefly outlined in the preamble. Because of the inherent constructivist aspect of this analytical approach, collective memory as a sociological concept is very abstract in its application to observational research and as a consequence does not seem to enjoy an independent standing in our methodological thinking and thus has the social science status of an ephemeral concept (see Misztal, B. 2003:4., Olick & Robbins, 1998: 105-42). In order that we may better contextualise this residual understanding of memory as social actor, I have suggested that in order to view collective memory in concrete terms, it is useful to understand a war memory presence as something that must have a combination of sociological factors to exist. Like the ephemeral phenomena of fire, which must have a heat source, combustible fuel and air to breathe in order to exist as fire, so the negotiated presence of memory must have a historic source, a group will and a means to remember, if it is to sustain its existence/aura as a meaning framework from generation to generation. This methodological idea can be applied in observation to help a researcher gain knowledge, insight and understanding of any social phenomena that is considered ephemeral in nature-context. Indeed this is what we are and have been doing throughout our analyses of the case study. Chapter 7
reason for its being. This so called ‘contingent reason’ is shaped and framed by the dual processes identified above. Knowing this, allows a researcher to consider how and in what way war memory may be considered with relation to a long term process of civilising or indeed de-civilising, as is argued by the project thesis. Moving from the general to the particular, all one has to do to apply this logic is to consider the microcosm with relation to the whole just as we did in chapter 4 when the institutional presence of WWII memory was explored. However, in the conclusion to chapter 4 I summed up ‘institutional presence’ in terms of ‘material salience’ and pointed out that I would reconsider ‘moral integration’ later.

In this moral context, a prerequisite of fire’s existence is also an intelligent agency or natural force to cause ignition. This spark can be a causal event or a combination of factors, but either way, a spark must be present if fire is to exist. Here, I am going to build on our understanding of the criminalisation and legitimisation process to suggest that part of the ‘reasoning’ for the present boom in CWM is not just the highly important social factors of rapid social change, globalisation, or our seemingly constant engagement with asymmetrical war in the post Cold War era or even that soldiers die in war, but also ‘Civil Military Relations’ factors appertaining to how they die, in what number, for what reason and to what end, in a globalised interdependent world characterised by a chaos of reward.

A CMR Interpretation of Linear and Trauma Time Narration

Afghan troop death toll reaches 100: Military leaders and politicians have paid tribute to the 100 British troops killed in Afghanistan since 2001 after a suicide blast claimed another three soldiers’ lives. The sad milestone came when a lone insurgent detonated an explosive device as a foot patrol from 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was returning to base. Four soldiers were involved in the attack in the Upper Sangin Valley, Helmand Province. They were evacuated to Camp Bastion for treatment.

One was pronounced dead on arrival, and despite medics’ efforts another two died from their wounds. The fourth soldier is expected to make a good recovery. Next of kin have been informed and the soldiers are likely to be named tonight, the MoD said.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff, said: "Every one of those deaths is a tragedy. Nothing can ever compensate for the loss felt by their loved ones and to them all I extend my deepest sympathies. But make no mistake, the Taliban influence is waning, and through British blood, determination and grit, a window of opportunity has been opened." But he warned that this progress could "quickly unravel" without a "continuing and energised" international commitment.

Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, commander of Task Force Helmand, said the 100th death "needed to be set in the perspective of what we are seeking to achieve here". He said the use of suicide tactics showed the Taliban "no longer enjoy the popular support of the Afghan people".

While the Defence Secretary Des Browne expressed his sympathy for the relatives, comrades and friends of the three soldiers killed on Sunday, the father of a British soldier killed in Afghanistan two years ago predicted that the conflict would turn into "as big a disaster as Iraq". Anthony Philippson, from St Albans, Herts, said: "They have never learnt from Vietnam. The trouble with guerrillas is they never wear uniforms - they disappear into the trees then come back and fight when they want to. The whole thing is an utter waste of time, resources, money and most of all our soldiers' lives."


The factual content of this Press Association article is appertaining to a contestation of justification; which is signified to the reader in the contrasting of 'public' [disinterested] and private' [intimate] explanations relating to Britain's latest '100th death toll' in a limited and distant, asymmetrical war. This contestation of justification for their deaths is located and grounded in terms of the ideological [peace, freedom and democracy] and pragmatic [how can we possibly win] reasoning of why our men/women are currently dying in Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the article can be said to provide a contextualised example of war memory contestation in terms of what Jenny Edkins (2003), in Trauma and the Memory of Politics, describes as 'Linear Time and Trauma Time Narration'. However, while I have already employed this very useful demarcation as a springboard for this final analysis of content, I must now explain the inner-reasoning behind the thinking, before we can progress this type of content analysis still further. Here, the idea Edkins (2003) presents, illuminates how one of the most authentic things about 'being human' is our capacity to create, to overcome, to endure, to transform, to love and to be greater than the sum of our suffering.
In this respect, Edkins has some emancipating things to say about national retrospections on war and how collectively as a 'main memory group' we can and do socially remember, or forget the traumatic events of wars and terrorism. Like in this project's 'post disciplinary approach' to social science research into war memorials, Edkins' wide-ranging exploratory study embraced literature, philosophy, history, politics and international relations, in what is described by the 'Cambridge University Press' (2007) as 'an wholly original contribution to the study of war and memory'. In this 'original contribution' respect, she argues that war remembrance does not have to be nationalistic, but can instead challenge the political systems that help to produce war and violence in the first place (see also Zizek, S. 2006).

To help demonstrate how this ongoing civilising process is constituted, she asked us to look at war memorialisation and mnemonic practice in dialectical terms of linear and trauma time narration of warfare. Here, the latter is an emotionally honest narrative of war which does not normally possess material permanence in public space, but is anti-monumental in its role and purpose. Singer James Blunt's lyrics are a good example of this trauma time narration of warfare. The linear time narration, one can associate with an official or hegemonic narrative of British war memory. The 'death toll' example shows this is a narration of warfare which can be said to help explain, legitimise or justify a heartfelt loss in terms of a bigger picture and thus is produced and consumed to help legitimise the moral order of a status quo and thus aid recovery of state over that of the individual. Sir Jock Stirrup, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith and then Defence Secretary Des Browne all presented linear time narrations in sharp contrast to the trauma time narrative of N.O.K.

In using situated examples from both World Wars, Vietnam, the Holocaust, Kosovo and September 11th, Edkins (2003) analysed the mnemonic practices of war memory rituals through memorials, museums and remembrance ceremonies (see chapter 2) and found
that while power seeks to control memory - 'to keep it in the realm of politics' - and even though the 'ongoing process of contestation' (Winters 2000) is one of 'the permanent features of remembrance', the power to determine what is built as a war memorial was not entirely possessed by those in authority, nor was it something that could be captured by their opponents. Building on the arguments of Winter and Sivan (2000: 6-39) in War and Remembrance in The Twentieth Century Edkins (2003: 57-108) argues that rather than seeing contestation as a consequence of a dialogue between agents in 'civil society' and 'state apparatus' one should perhaps view this dialogue not as a battle between agents and agendas, but more as a 'dialogue with the past' (Benjamin 1999) which in terms of societal recovery from the trauma of war helps produce and constitutes a social and discursive practice that can build both people and their institutions after a period of crisis.

Here, I am going to use Edkin's argument to suggest that this is one way how the liberal dilemma of asymmetrical war is reconciled or marginalised after the shattering trauma of its effect or prosecution. In this context, it has been made clear that after traumatic events - such as war, genocide or terrorism – there is going to be a struggle over the production of memory phenomena with relation to selectivity issues, meaning and consumption. In terms of selectivity, the struggle is mainly between power and forgetting; in terms of content and meanings, the struggle is constituted in the contestation between 'linear time' narrations and 'trauma time' narrations of war memory. Finally, in terms of consumption, the struggle is over patronage given or withheld, or has to do with political appropriation.

For example, due to patronage, the consumption of official war memory is mostly seen to be a sacred duty to remember; whereas the consumption of an emotionally honest trauma time narration is inherent in and destabilises any production of this linearity and is said to help aid individual recovery of trauma, by enabling full acknowledgment of the traumatic
events that as a consequence, are understood to have led to human suffering (Edkins 2003:1-19). By contrast, we have seen how linear time forms of social remembering [official war monumentality] can be understood as ways of forgetting or masking the inherent brutality, destruction and cruelty of modern warfare. Here, the consumption of our cultural 'noble lies' is seen as an antiquarian way to recover from wars' traumas by putting its hard lessons to one side, refusing to acknowledge that anything has changed, in order to resume the pretence that the normal order of things has nothing to do with wars causes.

Again moving from the generalised to the particular and if we were to take the Afghan troop death toll reaches 100 article as a medium of societal dialogue, then one could say that Sir Jock Stirrup's comments represent the agendas of the military institution, or that of the state apparatus and the dismissive comments by Anthony Philipsson [N.O.K. father of a dead soldier] the anti-monumental or discursive vantage point of the critical social agent of civil society. However, while power, patronage and shame influence whose voice will be heard in posterity, taken together as part of a dialectical totality, we can see that both vantage points may help provide a framework for national retrospection on war and thus the possibility of recovery from the emotional and ontological trauma of war? Here, my concern is with the blocking effect or unintended influences of the 'linear time' thinking on healing retrospections of warfare, as seen with relation to the euphemisms of memory.

In this respect, we have already seen how in the most part, current memorialisation of past war is a mnemonic practice that can help reproduce historically embedded war stories of national glory and heroism. In short, official memory narration - such as Sir Jock Stirrup's mission statement - produces linear time retrospection on war, that is to say introspection from the state vantage point. However, in these terms, I have thus far focused on Selectivity or Form and thus only foreshadowed these sorts of Content and Consumption.
factors in favour of holistic explanations in functionalism terms of social cohesion and more
grounded terms of what the BOBM can be said to do for society with sociological relation
to continuity, reproduction and individual/societal relations. With my immediate concerns
about the unintended consequences of linear narration in mind, I now change tack and
focus on seeing the consumption of war memory in dysfunctional terms, through a critical
reading and interpretation of CWM examples with relation to their semiotic meanings.
That is to say, ascribed meanings served from above, which in public consumption help
harness the cognitive emotions of pride or shame. Indeed, because of the previous
arguments one may now associate this with new interventionist thinking on the role of war.

However, before I can attempt to make sense of the appropriation of WWII memory in
these terms of legitimisation and reproduction and thus provide a more sophisticated
explanation of 'content' or 'tacit acceptance of emotional dishonesty' in relational terms of
Weber's' paradox and collective shame, one first needs to put the complexity of these
'moral integration' issues in context with this project's previous discussions on the subject
matter of form and selectivity. For example, in grounding the war memory debate, it was
argued that in this monumentality context, historians, sociologists and cultural theorists
have all shown that as 'symbolic artefacts' memorials are an important cultural medium to
consider the way in which societal expectations of war are entered and renegotiated in the
in Lincoln Cathedral and the bronze statue of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris are all
very pertinent examples of this process i.e. with relation to what the Observer termed a
'collective shame' with the morally questionable actions of Bomber Command (Oct. 2006).

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In this respect, we have now seen how memorials can be said to be a cultural means by which the sentiments, emotions, aspirations and rhetoric of war are given physical shape and tangible form in public space, discourse and popular memory (Fussell 1975., Gregory 1994., Winters 1995, Nora 1989., Lloyd 1998). Accordingly, I have argued that 'War Memorials', effectively constitute primary and as well as secondary evidence of 'Civil-Military Relations' (CMR) in that the mnemonic conventions of CWM tend to express and include societal attitudes and/or emotions of war (Furlong 2002: 34. Bond, 2002: 75-101).

With this knowledge, I deduced that whatever form it may take - be it monumental or a simple plaque - 'it' can reveal a considerable amount about those who participated in warfare, the circumstances and origins of a war and even attitudes towards war in general and at a particular time in societal development (Smith 1999: 3-27., Borg 1991). However, 'it' can also tell us much about our emotions at this time. Here, I have shown in the previous considerations of the BOBM, AS, English Heritage and participant examples, that sometimes the location and inscriptions of a cultural memory artefact may reveal the greatest amounts of data on how we may feel about war (Gregory 1994). At other times, the design of the memorial itself may well provide the most revealing aspect for discovery or comparison (King 1998). In other instances, the supporting documentation, such as newspaper reports, sponsors lists, or mass observations of the unveiling ceremony provide the pure insight one may be seeking (Moriarty 1991., Winters 1995). Finally, how these cultural memory artifacts are used or consumed in public space, as well as in private locales, can also provide a great deal of pertinent information about a community, nation, or institution at a particular point in 'its' history (see Nora 1989., Lunn 1997., Winters 2000).

However, while these sorts of considerations have been vital to a project which has the aim of exploring the 'war & memory' relations, between 'past wars & present conflicts'; and
indeed, has in part informed the factual base of the descriptive introduction to the BOBM and AS memorials, such social indicators of CWM's 'material salience' in themselves, tell us very little about the 'moral integration' of such war memory phenomena. Indeed, only the last consideration of appropriation of meaning and content can give one a real glimpse into the emotional integration and/or unintended consequences of war's institutional presence in contemporary British society. This said, if we now build on the foreshadowed ideas of 'appropriation', 'content' and 'consumption' highlighted in the above analytical discussions, then I may now clearly associate this difficult to locate or ground issue of war's current legitimisation and justification within a sociology of emotion analyses of the moral integration of warfare; first with direct relation to the harnessing of our cognitive emotions through the affect mechanisms of war memorialisation and finally, with factual relation to cultural encoding/decoding of memory content for consumption or appropriation.

The following quote gives us a pertinent starting premise for sociology of emotion analysis.

The Emotional Selectivity of War Memory

"I would argue that it is impossible to fully understand the attempts of governments to govern a population and direct conduct, along with the resistance and opposition to this, without acknowledging the central place of emotions in these power relations.

Emotions are powerful collective forces involved in the reconstruction of social groups and, as such, in the maintenance of the status quo. Because of this, governments will always be tempted to stir powerful emotions in their strategies for directing conduct: inciting, inducing and seducing a people. Yet powerful emotions are not only involved in the reproduction of the social order, they also threaten its very existence, especially when they are acted out in collective ritualistic performances. In contemporary societies, such collective performances can express the desire to exercise political capacities in a civic arena and, in so doing, present the possibility of creating new political affiliations in a more active public space.

The potential revolutionary power of emotion does not stem from its irrationality, but rather from its 'relational logic' which follows the pattern of people's attachments to others, to symbols and to ideals. Because emotions are ambivalent and alternating they are not predictable in advance, especially when the people and things we value highly are threatened or lost. Then, powerful emotions play a part in political judgments, just as here anger and grief were inextricably linked to the assessment of governments that were deemed to have not listened to a large section of their people and acted irresponsibly.

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Thus, emotions have a complex relational logic and are embedded in relations of power, affording different positions and possibilities for government, opposition and resistance. Any analysis of power, government and politics that doesn't consider emotion misses its essential element. Burkitt, I. (2005: 692).

In Powerful Emotions: Power, Government and Opposition in the ‘War on Terror’ Ian Burkitt (2005: 679-695) sought similar aims to this project with relation to the envisaged sociology of emotion analysis in that, he was trying ‘to understand how emotions are integral elements in relations of power and government’, with particular reference to war. He analysed two incidents within this: the peace demonstration against the Iraq War in London, 2003, and the aftermath of the Madrid train bombings in Spain, 2004. Using newspaper reports, he considered how emotions were used by governments to try to direct the conduct of the population. Employing Foucault’s (1982) insights on power, along with the theoretical work of Durkheim (which I have been referring to), he argues that “the emotions which run through relations of power are complex and ambivalent, motivating resistance and opposition to government as much as compliance”. Because of the similarities in aims and findings, here we will employ four theses contained in this recent BSA article to conduct our own sociology of emotion analysis of the BOBM content. Having done so, I will conduct a final Cultural Theory analysis to highlight what is missing.

**Thesis 1**

“One of the antecedents to the approach known as the sociology of emotions is to be found in the works of Emile Durkheim, who believed that ‘collective representations, emotions, and tendencies are caused not by certain states of the consciousness of individuals but by the conditions in which the social group in its totality is placed’ (1938: 106) and thought that collective emotional forces were irrational and too powerful for individual consciousness to resist. In that sense they were ‘social currents’, like currents of opinion, which acted as coercive forces upon individual behaviour and consciousness, shaping conduct and thought. However, in his study of religion, Durkheim (1915) developed a more fully rounded view of emotions as forces that act in the constitution and reconstitution of social groups through the heightened emotional intensity of collective

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religious rituals and performances. The symbols of the group – such as the totem – became emblems in which the emotions of dependence and vitality created in collective rituals were invested. That is because the group is ‘too complex a reality to be represented in all its complex unity’ (Durkheim, 1915:220), and so ends up being represented by totems, flags, beliefs or ideas” (Burkitt, L. 2005: 680-81).

This is exactly how I have analysed/viewed the BOBM case study at the descriptive and functional levels. I talked about the continuity of the ‘British at War’ cultural narrative; the emotional residue of the ‘Good War’s’ aura and its mythological presence in British society: About its form and symbolic design in terms of the ‘social currents’ that informed the ‘sculptor’s vision’ to produce a narrative of unity, and see the ‘Mural Wall’ in terms of continuity and community. I talked about ‘it’ as an ontological beacon, put up as a backlash against societal forgetting and the acceleration of history i.e. in terms of an ‘ideal type’ of ‘storyteller’ and a totem of British identity and identification in the wake of 7/7. I have discussed the comfort blanket role ‘it’ played on our emotions, and how ‘it’ was encoded at the public inauguration to facilitate a collective effervescence of well-being and belonging.

In many ways, the unveiling was like a day out at the races in terms of the rigid stratification of guests and emotional expressions of the collective. In accordance with the lessons learnt by the patrons and landscape gardeners of war memory, all was by prior design and expected of such a linear time narration of warfare. Which leaves us with the question asked earlier, why isn’t our CWM filled with the raw sentiment or emotion of anti-monumentality? We now know that this emotion is here – war memorials will always raise strong emotions from outright hostility to pious devotion - only here it has been harnessed by the ambivalent affect mechanisms of British commemorative culture, and channelled by power relations and government, through the legitimisation and criminalisation processes.

In this regard, the sociology of Emile Durkheim [1858-1917] analysed these physical props of material culture with specific sociological regard to what he termed the ‘collective

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effervescence' of society; referring to the communal glue that helps bind society together as a cohesive group of individuals (see Giddens, A. 1978:80-101). He found that such totemic icons of society helped assure historical continuity in times of social upheaval and thus provided the individual with a symbolic way to help reconcile the continuity of past with the discontinuity present. Accordingly, from this sociological perspective, the role/purpose of the war memorialisation process [as situated within the dialectics of collective memory] can be understood to help establish a symbolic and material presence of a public or common war memory as located in cultural space, discourse and time. In terms of the politics of identity, social order and hierarchal power relations, this hegemonic war memory presence can then be appropriated as a symbolic beacon when the moral integrity or social cohesion of the group is threatened, either from within, or without. In this individual/societal relations context, the constitutional meaning we may reify upon a public war memory presence is constantly renegotiated by the dynamics of memory. However, as we have and will see, cognitive emotions still play a big part in the selectivity processes.

**Thesis 2**

"However, the emotional 'effervescence' produced in collective rituals serves not only to reproduce the unity of the group, it can also threaten to tear it apart through the irrational emotional forces it unleashes. The morality of the everyday world, which is composed of dispersed activities acted out with mediocre levels of emotional intensity, is threatened with being overturned by ceremonial and ritual gatherings that 'produce such a violent super-excitation of the whole physical and mental life that it cannot be supported very long' (Durkheim, 1915: 216). Although temporary, such effervescent gatherings give the participants an inkling of a possible world beyond the everyday order. Yet Durkheim could also see the role played by powerful effervescent emotions in times of permanent social change, where 'under the influence of some great collective shock, social interactions have become much more frequent and active. Men look for each other and assemble together more than ever. That general effervescence results which is characteristic of revolutionary or creative epochs" (1915: 210-11).

Few would deny that the post Cold War world is an era of massive and seemingly permanent social change and upheaval or that 9/11 and 7/7 provides the type of influence
“some great collective shock” - where social interactions have become much more frequent and active. In this sociology of emotion context, the current ‘dog tag nostalgia’ boom in commemorative culture [see Table 1: Chapter 3] is men looking for each other and commemorative fever as seen in the ‘West End at War’ ideal type event is a collective representation of the apparent desire for men to assemble together more than ever. Even the nostalgia militarism of the past war thesis can be located in these sociology of emotion terms with relation to Wolcott’s quotes and front page spread of the Sun i.e. In times of collective uncertainty, ‘the nostalgia of past war’ is a safe and simple place to take refuge.

**Thesis 3**

“It was Max Weber who observed that action in political relations is ‘determined by highly robust motives of fear and hope’ (Weber, 1970: 79, quoted in Barbalet, 2004). How prescient his comments now seem, because those two emotions have figured largely in political rhetoric and relations post-11 September 2001. Fear has been used by Western governments, especially in Britain and the United States, when they repeatedly warn of threatened and imminent terrorist attacks; and hope is raised that action in the ‘war on terror’ will remove these threats to peace and security” (Burkitt, I. 2005: 680-81).

As per the remembrance mission statement of Sir Jock Stirrup, all the raw and cognitive emotions evoked by the many speeches made at the unveiling ceremony, by the press and by the respondents or veterans where systematically harnessed as a source of inspiration and power to motivate actions in the present with regards to the ongoing war on terror. The young age of the airmen then and now who have sacrificed; the raw determination and courage in the face of difficult conditions harnessed pride, as did the co-operative nature of this iconic war with the coalitions of today’s limited and distant wars. Self-evident performances they may have been, but they were still performances of pride.

The cited quotes of this chapter are taken from a revealing article entitled *Colour me Khaki* by James Wolcott (2004) and can be viewed here as a figurative way to illuminate just
such a justification dialogue. This is a retrospective dialogue of past war memory which is
figuratively related to the current ideologies, or the currents of thinking now associated with
present conflicts [peace through war] and in rhetorical terms, to the ubiquitous ‘us and
them’ logic of the binary thesis i.e. with semiotic relation to ‘good verses evil’ as in direct
relation to the current 9/11 appropriation of ‘dog tag nostalgia’ and ‘commemorative fever’.

While one may have needed to provide such disquieting examples to help make explicit
the appropriation of British war memory in a distinct justification context, we also have had
many other situated examples from which to draw. For example in accordance with the
identified ‘mission statement’ of remembrance, every mediated speech made at the public
inauguration of the BOBM explicitly linked this particular ‘past war’ with recent post 9/11
conflict. Indeed James Wolcott’s (2004) scathing comments on the intangible but intimate
link between past war and present conflict (see quotes above) seems to epitomise Mann
(1987) and Shaw’s (1991) critical understanding of Militarism and thus brings the ‘past war
thesis’ observations in part three into a more disturbing and distinct post-heroic focus. As
does the more recent imagery of this linkage presented above [Sun] and which when I saw
on holiday outside of any other situated context could only assume that this was presented
to help us left at home make some sort of sense of a limited/ distant war with direct relation
to the loss of the latest ‘100th’ soldier to be killed in action, in a unpopular post-9/11 conflict.

This said, one can also see the clear implication of Wolcott’s damning quotes in many if
not all of Britain’s post-WW2 conflicts. Indeed, we have already located this very idea with
relation to Mark Connolly’s (2004) direct social history examples that duly demonstrated
that the same sort of past war edicts were also employed to help justify the Falklands
Conflict of 1982. In this sense, my interview with Quinlan and Brewer illuminated how as
the living custodians of WWII are no longer with us, so governmental and MOD veterans’
policy is gearing towards replacing the growing absence of ‘Good War’ veterans with
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Falkland veterans, because of the emotional connection of how this conflict is now perceived: This became apparent to me when I attended the recent 25th anniversary event.

**Thesis 4**

"However, in a recent piece on the emotional responses to 11 September, Kemper (2002) broadens this out to make predictions about six emotions—anger, sadness, fear, joy, shame, and guilt—and how they affected different groups in the US depending on their relation to the events of that day. Furthermore, these emotions are linked to power relations because anger results from a loss of status; fear from the loss of power relative to the other; sadness from a loss of status which is irremediable; and joy from a gain in status. Likewise, guilt is felt when one feels one has used excess power on another; and shame when one has acted in a way that belies one's status in the eyes of another. In this relational view, then, the emotions are linked to one's place in the power and status structure of society" (Burkitt, I. 2005: 680-81).

In the previous chapter we also discussed perceivable notions of pride and shame in terms of some selectivity issues associated with form and functionality. Here, I argued that the powerful cognitive emotions of pride and shame—i.e. how we felt about ourselves in terms of self-consciousness or our sense of collective being—was a very big factor to reconsider in the comparative analysis of the selectivity and bias apparent between the cultural capital of the AS and BOBM projects. Building on this observation, I argue that with the eventual but slow passage of time and through the social and cultural processes of the powerful, 'linear time narration' of war, will always incorporate these omitted 'trauma time' narratives as an emotion harnessing means of legitimisation and justification for the shattering effect and personal suffering of modern warfare. In this sociology of emotion context, we can now suggest, with relation to the shame and controversy associated with the morally questionable actions of Bomber Command, that after 65 years, sufficient time has passed to blind us from the means/end paradox of 'men's evil manners' living in granite and brass.

However, there was 'anger' expressed by Mr Sugarman as located in a 'loss of status' for a number of Jewish pilots not named correctly, or omitted altogether. In terms of 'fear' the
monument was designed to be a totem which could deny Britain's perceived decline as a world player: a status that it still perceives within its post 9/11 foreign policy agendas. There is sadness too; sadness encompassing as sense of loss epitomised by the nostalgia of the monument's high relief imagery. Joy was present in the sense that consumers were and are, able to feel happy and sad at the same time, but guilt was not present; nor was shame, which stands good testament to the social manipulation of morality process. The idea that we did the same to them and are doing 'it' now to what we in the West all agree are 'innocents' (Shaw, M. 2007: 7) is a matter of expedient calculation and criminalisation.

In summary of this sociology of emotion analysis, this final social manipulation of morality point illuminates what is missing from this otherwise revealing and pertinent examination of how the emotional residue or symbolic narrative of the war memorial is systematically appropriated by power and state through the social action process of consumption and self-evident performances. Such analysis also illuminates the latent role of emotional dishonesty and the linear time narration of warfare in the legitimisation and justification of present conflict. However, this very discovery raises the question of how the social manipulation of shame and pride actually takes place, not within the individual, as was discussed in Chapter 2 with relation to why we tell 'noble lies', theocracies of war, bad faith and the emotional legacy of war to self and society, but with structural relation to the social engine of the legitimisation and criminalisation process. In short how does this idea work?

Because of our criminological viewing, we know how this dual process works with relation to public policy, but how is this process manifest in the cultural selectivity of form and content for linear time appropriation? Here, I have already argued with relation to the project hypothesis that when euphemisms obscure, hide or camouflage the reality of the thing being eulogised, as in the Sun's euphemisms of 'the few', then charges of emotional
dishonesty can be levelled at the story-teller. With this in mind, we now conclude this analysis of ‘Content and Consumption’ with a pertinent example which I believe can unintentionally illustrate the power of pride/shame in the selectivity issues associated not only with the inherent biases of CWM projects, but also illuminate the post heroic nature of current CMR’s and thus will help us re-locate and ground a final analysis of these moral integration issues. In these classical sociological terms of exploring and examining the overlapping moral dimensions of war’s institutional presence, I must now explain how the liberal dilemma is reconciled in terms of ‘legitimising formula of the nomos’ and in emotional terms with relation to how the cognitive emotions such as embarrassment, pride or shame are harnessed within and by the so called ‘affect mechanisms’ of war memory.

A Cultural Theory Viewing of Content and Appropriation

To achieve these analytical aims, we will now undertake a very general cultural theory reading of the following Financial Times article in terms of what it does not mention about the AS contrasted with what it does say about the content and consumption of the BOBM.

The spoils of war and a sense of hope By Peter Aspden

Last Tuesday, the drab skies of southern England were treated to the throbbing sounds of two famous aircraft: a Hurricane and a Messerschmitt 109, flying deftly overhead before landing at Biggin Hill airport. This was no exercise in happy nostalgia - the weaving duels between such aircraft are one of the most glorious parts of modern British mythology - but part of a campaign to honour one of the most notable heroes of the Battle of Britain, Sir Keith Park.

This admirable but misguided campaign, which has united lifelong political foes such as Tony Benn and Lord Tebbit, is pressing for Sir Keith to be remembered in a memorial in one of Britain’s most prominent public spaces, the Fourth Plinth of Trafalgar Square.

Regular visitors to central London will know that this is the space that has been reserved in the past few years for pieces of contemporary art. At present, there is a rolling programme that changes the pieces every couple of years. The current incumbent is Thomas Schütte’s abstract “Model for a Hotel 2007”, which last year replaced Marc Quinn’s “Alison Lapper Pregnant”, a conspicuously bright, white model of a disabled pregnant woman proudly
taking her place among her upstanding colleagues on the other three plinths, Generals Napier and Havelock and King George IV.

The campaign to honour Sir Keith has therefore automatically acquired a sharp and controversial edge. I doubt that it would have encountered any resistance if it had taken place 20 years ago, when the empty plinth (the original 19th-century project to build an equestrian statue ran out of funds) went largely unloved and unnoticed. But the plinth has a place in the public's consciousness now. It is the focus of a regular, stimulating debate over contemporary art, and a small shrine of surprise and wonderment in a space that is otherwise grey and dreary.

The tourists and pigeons may flock to Nelson's Column but true Londoners have never really taken Trafalgar Square to their hearts. For many years, it was the focus of little but violent brawls and drunken revelry. It has been one of Ken Livingstone's better initiatives to attempt to revivify the area, with only partial success. It remains dull and forbidding, lacking the vivacity and colour that characterise the great squares of Europe.

The shortlist for the next Fourth Plinth commission is the most impressive yet, including such heavyweights of British sculpture as Anish Kapoor and Antony Gormley, and the ever-surprising Tracey Emin. Jeremy Deller has conceived the most radical proposal of all: a crumpled car entitled "The Spoils of War (Memorial for an Unknown Civilian)" which the artist describes as "not an artwork, but the remains of a vehicle that has been destroyed in an attack on civilians in Iraq". One can sense Generals Napier and Havelock quivering with indignation at the prospect.

I would be amazed if Deller won the commission - there is healthily controversial, and there is suicidally controversial - but can't help but admire the presence of his proposal on the shortlist at all. Britain is, after all, still in Iraq. Whatever your stand is on that - and there are ever fewer unreserved defenders of the British presence - it is undeniable that to place Deller's forlorn vehicle in such a prominent position sends an extraordinarily subversive message to Britain's enemies.

I love the way the Fourth Plinth debate has mobilised discussion around such important national themes. It is symptomatic of the way that political subjects are more imaginatively discussed these days in the cultural arena than in the narrower political sphere. But the supporters of the Sir Keith Park campaign have a different view. There is a road named after the pilot near Biggin Hill airport but they claim that this is woefully inadequate as a tribute. They want to give him a more fitting home, joining his antecedents to form a giant military mausoleum in the centre of London. But there are two things wrong with this.

First, and ironically, works that are conceived as permanent memorials, transmitting timeless and universal values, turn out to do anything but. The statue of General Havelock is dedicated, for example, to him "and his brave companions in arms during the campaign in India, 1857". Havelock may have been the most courageous soldier in Britain's history but this was hardly Britain's finest hour. The good general has been overtaken by a revolution in our way of thinking about the world.

The devotion of the Fourth Plinth to more ephemeral forms of expression perfectly suits our uncertain and unconfident times. The swagger of 19th-century militarism is irrelevant today. I don't suppose the Battle of Britain will ever be conceived as anything but
important and moving victory over the forces of evil, but a little humility over the subject would not go amiss.

Second, Britain must rid itself of its curious addiction to glorifying its own past, and learn once more to embrace the future. Some of that spirit is brilliantly illustrated, by coincidence, at the Science museum's new show Dan Dare and the Birth of Hi-Tech Britain. It covers the years 1945-70, when Britain was anything but content to reflect on war-time glory and anxious to improve the peace-time present. It was a high point of cultural, technological and scientific achievement for a country that was as concerned with social welfare as it was with innovation and progress.

We need to find that sense of optimism once more. Britain should celebrate its creative talents, in art, design, fashion and "smart" manufacturing, and look forward. The Battle of Britain should not be forgotten, just gently displaced from the centre of attention. There is nothing more depressing than thinking that our golden eras are all behind us. And Sir Keith Park? Why not make that parade of fighter planes an annual memorial event, over in a brief and thrilling moment? We should be sure enough of our past to acknowledge its effervescence, and have the generosity to allow the contemporary to impress itself upon our future. Source: Financial Times: Sunday May 4th 2008: Page 6

Dealing with some very difficult topics about war, self and society - including taking into account apparent notions of collective shame and pride in collective memory - it would seem on the surface that this insightful and very well articulated article on the moral integration of war memory is a very poor example to illuminate the structural power of pride and shame i.e. to latently influence current selectivity of British war memory phenomena. Indeed, it seems to dispel any critical hint at the notion of tacit passivity, denial, emotional dishonesty or even that we as a reflexive and globally aware citizens may be blinded by convention, tradition or habit and thus unilaterally accept the 'noble lies' of War as current meaning frameworks i.e. nothing here is taboo and all is considered.

For example, while acknowledging an admirable but misguided Park's project, the authors narration sees through the simple 'good versus evil' promise of an ontological 'security blanket', and even the cultural allure of a permanent presence/monument to 'the great and the good' of a 'golden generation' (Terkel, S. 1985). Here, the proposed statue of Sir Keith Park would be whole-heartily conforming to the traditional war memory conventions of this particular public space. Think of this in terms of the Greek or Roman artistic traditions of
commemoration, or in purely ideological terms of sustaining what Mannheim (1936) would
describe as ‘outmoded ways of thinking’. One could even see such a project in terms of
our ‘top soil’ analogy, and thus locate ‘it’ in culturally embedded terms of reaffirming the
historical continuity of ‘British at War’ myths afforded stature by the cultural capital, sense
of place or psycho-geography of this most culturally prominent of all British landscapes.

Similarly, as a negotiation of ‘public space’ meanings and perceived shared values, this
article’s tone celebrates, with unashamed pride, the discontinuity of recent and possible
future occupants of the famous Fourth Plinth: From the re-affirmation of the emotionally
honest or somewhat disquieting depiction of Alison Lapper, to the much lauded possibility
of a potent ‘memorial to the unrecorded dead of Iraq’. Indeed, there is apparent pride with
such vibrant public space expression and contentment with the unconventionality of
‘content’ as it seems to epitomise idealised notions of the ‘open society’; just as there is an
acknowledgement of the perceived vulnerability of such civil societies in the current
climate of fear signified by the ‘informed realists’ warning about the ‘subversive message’
such a memorial may give to Britain’s pre-determined enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Here the edict is simple ‘my country right or wrong, my country’ (Hearts and Minds; 2001).

However, in terms of illuminating how pride and shame are latently harnessed as agency
forces that may be seen as internal constants and externally at work in terms of influencing
varied selectivity issues in the cultural production or negotiations appertaining to CWM
projects, this light-hearted public narrative of British war memory – which it must be said,
originates from a professional journalist of a prestigious and well-read national newspaper
and thus its author is accountable to the editor and consumer ethic of ‘sell them what they
want’ – also shines a spotlight on how ‘the past’ is not a ‘foreign country’ as the creative
title of David Lowenthal’s (1995) influential work would seem to imply; but the present is.

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As I have argued, this observation has a huge connotation with direct regards to what may become a public space testimony of past war or present conflict. Looked at in this distinct E.H. Carr (1990: 7-31) context of how and/or why a ‘Historical Fact’ is structurally constituted, both within and by the world-view of the author, which is directed and shaped from outside the self in the form of public consciousness and ethical environment. In these terms, one can re-consider what was said and how it was said with relation to the article’s soothing content and style, editorial omissions or its relational context to the author’s own inherent selectivity of fourth plinth examples that may have been used with better effect to make his point. In this way, much is revealed that could illustrate the selectivity of what we remember about war, in terms of what makes us feel good about ourselves and what does not, in terms of feeling collectively ashamed or even intrinsically guilty for our past actions. My point is that, either way ‘cognitive emotions’ play a crucial part in selectivity and bias.

For example, the noble inclusion of the memorial to the ‘unrecorded’ could be seen as clear evidence of emotional honesty on a surface or appearance level, but when one reconsiders that this short list inclusion was encoded in the idea that this contemporary art project shouldn’t be included as it is ‘suicidally controversial’ and furthermore, with relation to the instrumentality of the informed realist world view encapsulated within the warning about what such a CWM project might say to an abstracted Islamic fundamentalist and we again see how this trauma time narrative is subjugated within a linear narration of warfare.

Moreover, in comparative relation to how the Abandoned Soldier Monument would have served the author as a much better example to make his overlying points, then we can begin to see how CWM is selectively encoded. Having worked in the media industry as a researcher, I know from experience that such articles are thoroughly researched and as such, both author and the editor must have been aware of the public inauguration of the Chapter 7
AS just a few months earlier and the subsequent 'E – Petition' [well supported] requesting the present Government to have 'it' erected permanently on the prestigious fourth plinth.

Website details of The Abandoned Soldier E-Petition:

"A magnificent and poignant bronze sculpture by James Napier, a gifted young British artist, reflects the deplorable state of post service support given those who have served our country in combat zones. A substantial proportion of those with no proper home who live on the streets, are ex-servicemen unable to cope when returning to civilian life after experiencing the horrors of action. Yet the Government and MOD, have callously fallen short in responding to the needs of so many who have suffered physically and mentally, in serving our nation in combat. Hence, this sculpture has been titled “The Abandoned Soldier”, and its impact says more than mere words! I urge you to support this petition to have this moving work erected permanently on the "vacant" plinth in Trafalgar Square to honour and remind us all of those who have given so much in the service of our country. This has nothing to do with whether you support any, all, or none of the actions to which our servicemen have been assigned – it is to recognise their fulfilment of their "DUTY", and the "DUTY" we all have to ensure that they are properly and sympathetically looked after when they need our help." Source: http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page16453.

With respect to what the author describes as a cultural shift from just 20 years ago, the AS would symbolise just how much things have changed with regards to the way we may see our actions in asymmetrical warfare, as represented in this particular article, with relation to the mainly negative connotations the narrative alludes to with relation to Britain’s military presence in Iraq. Nor would the self-evident performances of these media encoders of public discourse be unaware of the irony of the AS Sculptor’s [James Napier] family background with relation to General Sir Charles Napier. Looked at in this omission and selectivity context and one can infer the power of shame/pride to influence selectivity issues when relocated within the hegemonic power of the legitimisation processes. Even if these critical assumptions of the editorial process are completely inaccurate, the glaring omission of the AS monument in this article speaks volumes about our moral sense of self.

One could apply this type of ‘omission’ critique at a number of levels. For example with regards to the simple ‘Dog Tag Nostalgia’ of the Battle of Britain memory only ever being

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understood in *our* popular memory as a 'good versus evil' narrative. Here, and as was suggested in chapter 4, there is no consideration of certain presumptions that elevate what is remembered to a powerful place in *our* symbolic universe. i.e. there is no challenge to this 'self evident assumption' about *our* old enemies' even though current research by the British Council and Goethe Institute (2003) into how young Germans and Britons now view and feel about each other, seems to positively re-affirm the 'looking to the future' and 'sense of hope' content of the article. Similarly, in not acknowledging the selectivity, appropriateness, determinativeness or apparent social significance of this Battle of Britain presence for the present era of conflict, terrorism and war, the article sees no inherent memory paradox in the simple observation that in the prosecution of deviant asymmetrical warfare *we* are now doing to 'others' what was done to *us* during the Blitz. Here, instead of getting the BoB 'Memorial Flight' to fly over Trafalgar Square once a year – as is recommended - why not let it fly over St Paul's and Dresden Cathedrals dropping poppies, as this evocative act of public remembrance for the dead would enable the young people who now perceive each other favourably, to learn from the irony that is modern warfare.

In this respect, I ask, would such a memorialising act of humility inform and feed a much needed comprehension of what war is, in action and deed, and in the process, help imbue a new sense of hope for the future generations of Europe in an era of seemingly perpetual 'war and terror'. Indeed, when we relocate this cultural theory reading within the normative terms expressed in the conclusion of Chapter 6 and again one could suggest that the inherent emotional dishonesty of the article is made apparent in that its light-hearted style, tone and manner, combined with what we can now consider a bias in the selectivity of examples, that seems to camouflage, or worse, deny the paradox of human agency in war. This how the CWM is encoded within our cultural life: This is why the medium of war memory is a message from the past for the future. But is this a good memory of warfare?
Summary of Analysis and Interpretation

In Part Four we have analysed the selection, form, content and consumption of the BOB Memorial in overlapping terms of the semiotic relations between a perceived societal will to commemorate, not necessarily only historic acts, but also the ideals and values of the past, through the current cultural means of socially remembering this very popular war i.e. through memorialisation of WWII memory. In so doing, I have analysed the institutional presence (Burk 2001) of this memory, in terms of ‘material salience and moral integration’. That is to say, I have analysed the moral dimensions of this presence and its material culture relations between sign, signified and signifier and in doing so, structurally considered how these social meaning frameworks actually influence the way we may see, perceive or comprehend present conflicts. In employing various sociology of knowledge viewings and critical readings, one can now infer, from our critical interpretation of the case study microcosm, that the mostly linear ‘way of seeing’ this ‘past war’ memory contributes to the social problem of war’s perceived inescapability at least in this particular microcosm.

Indeed, one could now suggest with some degree of confidence that by using the varied and overlapping sociology of knowledge viewings employed in this critical analysis of appropriation through consumption, we are now in a better position to make a normative, but comparative judgement about how one CWM Project [in this case the AS] can be seen in a better light in terms of truthfulness than another [in this case the BOBM] in terms of its ‘silent sentry’ message to posterity i.e. one form of memory could be seen as emotionally honest and thus inherently more civilising upon the ‘personality structures’ of ‘social figurations’, and how another more socially acceptable type, can be seen as pathological in terms of widening the inherent gap between our ideals in the ‘interventionist call to arms’ and our cruel, brutal but socially ambivalent actions in the prosecution of ‘virtuous’ warfare.

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Located in this wider context, and one could reasonably suggest that the way we in the West currently commemorate this iconic past war is in essence a subtler form of nostalgia militarism or imperialist nostalgia, promoting a type of moral manipulation towards what asymmetrical war is in act or deed i.e. what we have seen in this analysis does seem to re-enforce the memory mechanics of Shaw’s (1997) ‘past war thesis’, although an extensive research study would be required to put some flesh on my somewhat limited explorations.

It is with this insight and interpretive knowledge of war’s many paradoxical understandings that one has tried to contextualise Tilly’s (2003) four exploratory questions outside the limiting dualism of ‘filtered records of the past or opportunistic promotion of interest-driven narratives”. In post doctoral terms of future research, how could one build on this sort of research project, and what are the ‘moral implications’ of my observations and findings. Indeed, how could this sort of critical reading influence the production of sociology of war questions that I have argued urgently need to be asked about the normative relations identified between war, memory and the ethical environment? Were does what we have observed leave us with regard to the project hypotheses. Is it still valid or viable? In the conclusion, I will sum up the project by using what we have observed to think about Tilly’s concerns, before concluding this doctoral project by addressing the above considerations.
Conclusion

Is there a ‘Right Memory of War’?

1. What produces the structure and content of shared references to warfare (here, the project’s focus was on war memorialisation) that are available in a given population?

2. Given complex events, how and why do some elements and interpretations of those events (a) become available (b) survive? (Why is WWII so popular and why right now?)

3. Given the availability of multiple elements and interpretations, what causes some to prevail and others to disappear from general awareness? (Why build a BOBM now?)

4. When people engage in public contexts over past war, how, why and with what effects do they do so? (i.e. How may CWM effect civil sensibilities towards modern warfare?)

In considering these core questions, this somewhat unconventional doctoral thesis has presented examples, data and a series of observations, interrogations, wisdoms, ideas, insights, social indicators and sociological understandings of how commemorative culture and the discourse of War is ideologically produced, legitimised, justified and consumed within the social life of late-modernity. As stated, such a viewing is necessary, if one is to help identify a viable way by which social science and history researchers may begin to readdress Charles Tilly’s (2003: 339-346) four exploratory questions from alternative viewings or perspectives i.e. other than that of ‘filtered records of the past or opportunistic promotion of interest-driven narratives’. Here, and in terms of exploring the intimate relations between the memory testimony of past war and the present conflicts of ‘risk-transfer warfare’, such a ‘social memory project’ has had a descriptive task (to explore what exists), a normative task (to counterfactually consider what should exist), and an exploratory task i.e. to explore how the link between ‘past war and present conflict’ is constituted in public space discourse and thus help identify its influences. In this respect, and while one has made a clear attempt to try and take into account all three overlapping research tasks, the main focus of the thesis has been on the exploratory aspect i.e. identifying what exists in terms of ‘presence’ and then considering the ‘unintended consequences’ of this war memory presence, with relation to influencing the ethical environment. I concluded, that maybe our first act of resistance - when confronting the pernicious influence of ‘past war’ on the current ethical environment - should be, to refuse to allow ‘our’ collective memories of ‘past war’ to remain white-washed.
With this in mind, this was a 'social memory inquiry', which in research conduct has been both empirical and interpretive in nature and in critical analysis, has cut against the grain of the 'reproductive relationship', between War, its public memory and the ethical environment.

To that end, the opening discussions formalised the porous parameters of the inquiry and then situated the case study examination of the BOBM in terms of current theorising on the sociology of war and its memory. In so doing, I identified a research problem [why now?] to be addressed in preparation for the analytical aspect of the case study. Combined with the discussions of preamble, these opening narratives helped to contextualise how the culture of warfare and its public memory is produced and consumed within 'our' social life. This in turn, helped us locate the project in both sociological and memory terms, while at the same time, developing the intellectual topics of concern; which are stated, as evolving around the way we in the West see, talk and think about the impact of war, to both self and civil-society.

In this study, the specialist war memory literature was reviewed in chapter 4. Limited by the necessity of space, this was a review of only the most relevant literature of a wide and intellectually diverse field. Exploring the institutional presence of CWM, and WWII memory in particular, this discussion started from the established historical premise that the official commemoration of the 'First World War' set a model for the commemorations of most wars subsequently fought by Britain: both in the pattern of actions it prescribed and in the attitudes expressed (King, A. 1998:7). In this respect, chapter 4 helped identify established knowledge on the main social memory issues of malleability, contestation and continuity with specific relation to the mythological contours of Britain's collective memory of 'the war'.

In terms of my thesis describing or grounding the nature of WWII memory phenomena, this review chapter also provided some pertinent examples of contemporary war monumentality within British civil society, but focused on WWII popular memory with a specific focus on the social history and lineage of the 'Good War' narrative (see Terkel, S. 1985). In so doing, we were able to consider the psycho-geography of WWII monumentality and in the process,
consider how this public space memory of ‘the war’ has transformed over the last 60 years and thus analysed its ‘institutional presence’ as a ‘collective memory of past war’. Building on this understanding, the narrative of Chapter 5 provided us with an introductory description to the case study monument as drawn from various public domain and social science sources. In this snapshot context, the BOBHS website has been an invaluable resource, especially in terms of images and interviews with the producers of the monument. However, I have also drawn on other sources of reference such as posters, brochures, advertisements and the unveiling ceremony, as reported in various mediated testimonies.

Chapters 3 to 5 also dealt with some of the more pertinent methodological issues of the investigation at a much more in-depth level. Taken together, these varied contextualising narratives established the many vantage points of the thesis, in terms of how we may view WWII memory and thus provided the observational points of departure from which we presented the case study. In doing so, the discussions cleared the conceptual ground and laid down the empirical foundations for the subsequent analysis of the BOBM microcosm.

Building on these foundations and in purely analytical terms of examining and unpacking some of the selectivity issues and meanings surrounding this war memory phenomena, part 2, 3 and 4 explored what actually makes the selective events of the ‘Good War’ such a important ‘memory’ source for the present era of late-modernity? In so doing, I highlighted a plethora of sociological factors that may have contributed to the public space erection of over 500 WWII memorials in 17 years [1985-2002] as compared to the less than 200 for the previous 30 years [1955-1985]: What I discovered about this ‘contingent reason’ seems to support current research on this topic, which I have made very clear on a number of levels.

However, in terms of examining the intangible ‘something more’ identified in Chapter 3, I also asked what civil-military factors may be said to have informed the current cultural trend [see table 1] in terms of reconsidering the ‘societal will’ to collectively remember the ‘Good
In doing so, the analytical and interpretative narratives of Part Four relocated the 'textual content' and 'symbolic or semiotic form' of the monument in terms of sign, signified and signifier, and thus reconsidered who or what was being social remembered, in what context and most importantly why right now. Finally, in terms of public, private, local or institutional consumption of this memory, that is to say in terms of how the monument was appropriated and received within the socially stratified 'main memory group' we sociologists term the 'Nation-State'; the thesis also asked how this culturally prestigious monument was symbolically, ideologically and figuratively produced and consumed by 'the body politic' and in so doing, considered how the symbolic form and narrative content of the monument was ideologically appropriated by various social institutions, the powerful and the government.

Accordingly, the binding narratives of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have helped illuminate the unintended consequences of CWM and have thus provided some of the conclusions of the project. In doing so, I have drawn together the many interlaced threads of a critical research process, which as a coherent body of work, considered Tilly's (2003: 314) four central questions implicitly and in the process explored, unpacked and deconstructed the somewhat paradoxical relations between modern war, past wars and the current ethical environment of modern war; as represented here by the 15 rules of 'Risk-Transfer Warfare'.

Building on my conceptualised understandings of warfare, collective memory, emotional dishonesty, 'noble lies' and the empirical and interpretative observations of the role, function and purpose of the case study microcosm, this conclusion must recommend or suggest that further and extensive research into the social significance of contemporary war monumentality is necessary, if we are to fully consider the implications or indications of this critically minded inquiry. Here, it will be clear to the reader that I believe this 'limited in scale' research is indicating that CWM is indeed 'a new subtler form of nostalgia militarism' and the way we currently remember 'the war' has the latent function of contributing to the social problem of war's perceived inescapability and also that the way sociologists study War and Conclusion
its collective memory also seems to latently contribute to this pernicious problem: But to highlight what I really mean by implications and indications in very specific terms of the normative relations between war, its memory and the ethical environment of late modernity, we must conclude these discussions with a very brief recap of the objectives. A brief recap summary of the five intellectual goals will not only allow us to make a final consideration of this study's research aims in specific terms of my 'normative thesis' on war memorialisation [is it viable or not], but also a tentative re-consideration of what the right memory of war is?

As was explained in the preamble i.e. with relation to an inherent need for self-interrogation of self and civil society in the objectified study of warfare and as a novel mode of discovery or aid to verstehen comprehension; combined with the 'communicative actions' of this researcher and author, the thesis has been written in the first person for the most part. Here, the aim of the thesis narrative was to take you - my non passive reader - on the same journey of discovery I have been undertaking. In this respect, a friend recently said, life without knowledge is not life! This is undeniably true, but life with knowledge also seems to leave a somewhat bitter aftertaste. In this case, my prior ignorance was really a blessing in disguise, because the more I come to think I may perceive, comprehend or understand about the phenomena of war, the more disconcerted I am. Indeed, before I started on this long voyage of self-destruction, Freudian slip, self-interrogation, all the things I held to be true were self evident to such an extent that I would kill or be killed to uphold what I believed in. Now my situated place in the self-evident performances of social life simply terrifies me.

In this respect, my research has opened Pandora's Box for me, so that now the basic principles of what I thought was right and wrong in war have no real standing in my life. That is not to say that the principles of honour or duty are not valid because they are and still guide what Jonathan Glover (1999) would call my moral resources, but the world in which they were created is not as narrow as my experience first perceived it i.e. the world I was born into hasn't changed, beyond what any of us can really perceive, but my Conclusion
perspective of it has. Where I once saw only fatal acceptances, I now see alternatives. What I once professionally understood as the 'mantra of war', I now see as a sociologist, is a multitude of factors that with the will and imagination to overcome, can be overcome. I do not mean that human beings or civilisations need to overcome being fallible or human, what a mistake that would be, despite Heidegger's (2002) persuasive assertions, but that we need to 'overcome' our illusions of our selves. It is these many illusionary certainties that we now impose on the uncertainty of life that feeds the civilising paradox that is our living fate.

"There are two parts to the human dilemma. One is belief that the end justifies the means. That 'push button' philosophy, that deliberate deafness to suffering has become the monster of the war machine. The other is the betrayal of the human spirit, the assertion of dogma that closes the mind that turns a person, a nation, a civilisation into a regiment of ghosts, obedient ghosts, and tortured ghosts" Jacob Bronowski (1973) The Ascent of Man.

In this respect, the goals of the project were by design or necessity overlapping and broad in their scope. Here, the first objective of the research project was to build on established knowledge of 'war and memory' while raising awareness of woeful subject neglect within the mainstream discourse of 'scientific' sociological practice. While only you the reader can make your own decision as to the degree of success or failure here, the 'Hawthorn Effect' (1932), in that you have had to think about this critique, serves one's intellectual purposes.

The second goal was to present novel 'ways of seeing' war and its collective memory. Here, I offered a sophisticated methodological template [incorporating a reflexive methodology, a post disciplinary design and mixed method strategy] for future research into this neglected field of inquiry that is by conceptual definition very difficult to locate or ground in any sort of situated or sociological context: Hence the need for a sophisticated template. While there are clear drawbacks to such methodological approaches - that would need to be addressed in post doctoral research - this inquiry would seem to indicate a potential for discovery in application to a wider and more extensive sociological study of contemporary war memory.
The third goal was to critique the logic and viability of the dominant modernisation thesis in the sociological enterprise with relation to the pernicious sociological problem of war's perceived inescapability, and fourth was to propose a normative thesis of 'our' war memory, that if viable, may help civilisation counter this perceived inescapability of warfare. The fifth goal was the proposed integration of what I have termed 'emotional honesty' i.e. in the way one may see, think or engage in the topic of warfare, within the 'sociological imagination'.

With regards to these final goals and to summarise the critical ideas of this project, or even to locate my arguments in conventional sociology, Bauman (2000:3) succinctly points out; that the overall result of current sociological approaches to the study of modern warfare is theoretical complacency. "Nothing has really happened to justify yet another critique of the model of modern society that has served so well as the theoretical framework and the pragmatic legitimisation of sociological practice". As we can now infer from the varied overlapping discussions I have presented, including the contextualising considerations of the preamble, the complacency highlighted by Bauman (2000) has had many impacts and thus consequences on the formulation of this project not least in terms of considering how I may make the invisibility of war's institutional presence visible within the sociological imagination? Here, emotional honesty can help overcome the sociological invisibility of War.

Similarly, and in accordance with the structuration premise and indirectly supporting Hedges (2002) normative idea that our all encompassing addiction to war can be better managed but not cured, the preamble has presented a 'social memory' specific thesis on the paradoxical relations between 'war, memory and the ethical environment of late modernity', and identified the materially salient medium of war monumentality as a grounded context by which the sociological enterprise may examine these problematic CMR's. When relocating this idea, I have suggested that part of the problem of war is the emotionally dishonest way we who inhabit post industrial societies see, think or talk about past war. I would term this concern the 'emotional problem of war's perceived inescapability'. In doing so, I have
implied that the way we socially remember the very selective events of 'the war' does not appear to take into account the 'gap between our ideals and our conduct'. I thus describe the public testimony of 'our' war memory as the 'noble' or 'old' lies of war, [common stories of warfare which help camouflage the brutality of violence and seen as inherent within linear war monumentality], which can be seen - in societal constitution – as very, very subtle social memory forms of what Martin Shaw (1991) descriptively termed 'Nostalgia Militarism'.

As a typology of militarism, such 'public space war memory' is one of Hedges (2002) many 'mythmakers', but as we have also seen, this newly packaged form of war memory can take varied commemorative forms and thus functions on a number of levels, some deeply personal i.e. "It will mean different things to the ex-serviceman, comrade, the spouse, family, friends, children and grandchildren, not forgetting the ordinary member of the wider society paying homage to the sacrifices of the fallen" (in Quinlan, 2005, 2007: vii). As was explained above, the project's research design, interpretive strategy and phased mixed method investigation of the actual case study [see Chapters 3 to 8] was primarily designed to help take such varied views into account: see Chapter 3 for details and main resources.

However, thematically speaking and looked at as hegemonic testimony, collective memory, commemorative social action, mnemonic practice, institutional presence, memorialisation process, national myth or cultural narrative of popular war memory, this materially salient and morally integrated type of 'dog-tag nostalgia' [black and white cultural representations of past war as good versus evil or right against might] is understood here as a very powerful war monumentality form, which based on my past experience, I believe can be observed as being emotionally dishonest to that which it represents as an official testimony of 'past war'.

Located within these critical understandings of my overlapping concerns, and the normative aspect of the written-up thesis has been suggesting that the war memorial is a 'cultural story teller of war' which can help communicate the re-affirming noble lies of war in symbolic form.
and narrative content. Thus in Parts 1 to 4 I have tried to highlight the impact and legacy of warfare with relation to the ‘past war thesis’ and how the channelling and harnessing of our innate or cognitive emotions may actually take place within British commemorative culture.

As we have seen, my foremost concern in modelling war and its collective memory in this progressive way was not directly related to Howard’s (2001) understanding of an ‘post heroic imbalance’, or with the ‘ethics of modern warfare’ (Wells, D. 1996), or even how we should, or should not try to enforce the so-called ‘new world order’ (Cooper, 2004); but with the moral impact, scale and legacy of war to both self and society and with relation to what Bauman (2000) terms the ‘social manipulation of morality’ in the prosecution of organised violence. In this context, if we can statistically agree that asymmetrical warfare can be considered as deviant in terms of its prosecution and in accordance to what is considered as civilised in terms of ‘just war theory’, then we can reasonably argue in terms of identifying a cultural transgression that the barbaric actions that are now required in the prosecution of ‘risk-transfer warfare’ are conducted by “men and women like the functions of social machinery” (Bauman 2000: 208-221). “I don’t think of myself as a war criminal, what I was doing was just like screwing bulbs into light sockets” (Bourke, J. in Kassimeris, G. 2006:19).

In this type of ‘autobiographical memory’, one can infer how the West’s de-contextualised or ‘imperialist nostalgia’ perception of past war’s institutionalised inhumanity to man, is also conceived as a sort of ‘virtual war’ (Ignatieff, M. 2001: 3-11), which is encoded, condoned and ultimately sanctioned in contemporary democratic civil society by men and women who are said to be “possessed by an abstracted view of war which hides from them the human beings who are their victims [the other] as well as their own humanity” (see Mills, C.W. 1959: 89). From this critical perspective of the West’s contemporary moral hygiene, the commonly accepted acts required of modern warfare are inhuman acts of barbarity and cruelty simply because they are so very impersonal in deed (Collingwood, R. 1946: 76-111). In this ‘social manipulation of morality’ context, the strangers or others we in contemporary
post-military society have, and still do, kill in the name of ideals such as, Liberty, Peace, Freedom or Democracy, mean very little to us as free-willed human beings, and even subsequent ‘blue on blue’ incidents or ‘collateral damage’, are easily explained away to our emotions; not as the ‘fog of war’, but as unfortunate human errors or technological failures, but never the natural by-products, of what is by a raw necessity, a brutal human enterprise.

In this culturally embedded and historically rooted context, Bauman (2000) succinctly points out that “War has more to say about sociology as a theory of modernity and civilisation than sociology has to say about role of organised violence in modern civil society”. Even if we exclude the Holocaust, war is still inseparable from cruelty or barbarism, yet the sociological enterprise and ‘collective memories’ don’t seem to look or talk about ‘it’ in this emotionally honest way. Therefore, I have suggested that this ‘sin of omission’ is a reproductive part of war’s perceived inescapability, especially when contextualised and combined with the ethnocentric way we study War and socially remember the selective ‘noble lies’ of past war.

Accordingly, my goals have forced me to move beyond the marginalisation of war within the current sociological imagination and try to design novel research which may well help us to better understand what it is that obligates ‘us’ to do what we do in war. Put in context, as a former soldier, I know why it is socially acceptable to kill on the battlefield, but sociologically speaking, why is it morally acceptable to kill on the battlefield? What is it about past war and its ubiquitous public memory that helps obligate us, as individuals, to do what we do in war?

Located in the context of what the ‘right memory of war’ may be, I ask if these questions are not ‘first order’ questions for a reflexive sociology of war; especially if the marginalised field of war-studies wants to help better inform mainstream sociological discourse about why rational, and ethically educated, people don’t feel and express horror about what war really is, and thus help better understand or explain the apparent lack of indignation that many in civilised society still tacitly accept or tolerate war as a rational political tool. Located within Conclusion 295
the context of Anthony Gidden's 'theory of structuration' (1979); if everything that exists in
the social world is negotiated, then what exists, exists because it is allowed to exist. If this
is the logical conclusion to influential social theory, then why is the sociological enterprise
not exploring why we now allow warfare to exist, in the deviant form that it currently exists?

When we re-locate these questions in a 'critique of the modernisation thesis', the big
'sociology of war' question for post 9/11 modernity is not only concerned with understanding
the origins and/or causes of human conflict [as we have seen the current reasons given are
as broad as the imagination itself], but to ask why we as ethically educated human beings
still wish to use the brutal enterprise of war as a socially acceptable tool of civilisation. The
Vilfredo Pareto (1935) question of our 'non-logical action' in these generalised meta-theory
terms of the civilising process, is to ask why advanced civil-societies still tacitly accept this
barbaric social enterprise as reasoned in any socially acceptable terms. Why do we give
our soldiers medals for killing total strangers? Why pat people on the back for brutalising?

To locate this thinking in terms of a critique of the ethical environment; if we choose to look
only at the political aims of war from a solely parochial perspective of good and evil
[mythological or ideological], as is commonly the case in the West [see binary models], or
even from a purely calculating position of instrumentality, then the parameters of the 'big
question' [why choose war] can never be adequately addressed in terms of emotional
honesty [how we may feel about the brutal act of war] because in these subjective terms,
the expedient logic of modernity has proclaimed war on our innate ability to be emotional
about such happenings, and in the process, has inserted a cold calculating reason in its
place. To echo the words of C.W. Mills (1959: 84), and to sum up Bauman's (2000) social

1 The critique put forward by Pareto pointed to an intimate link between cultural mythologies, innate emotions and classical
models of sociological discourse on civilisation (see Aron, R. 1990[1967] 109-184). Pareto couches this inter-connectivity in
social theory terms of logical and non logical social action. Humankind, as seen by Pareto, is at the same time unreasonable
and reasoning. To Pareto, we human beings rarely act in a logical manner, but will always try to convince our fellows that we
do (see Aron 1990: 109). In a way this is what all current research into the 'social' is doing, including mine; using many forms
of data, past experience and what Pareto describes as 'residues', which are the sentiments most frequently present in the
human consciousness [love, pride, shame, anger, revulsion, happiness etc] and 'derivation' which can transform our
perspectives quickly and consist of various intellectual systems of justification which individuals, researchers, groups and
institutions all use to camouflage their passion or give an appearance of rationality to propositions or acts which may well have
none but to serve the ontological interests of the self or the social actors involved (see Pareto, V. in Aron, R. 1990: 124-144).

Conclusion
manipulation of morality thesis: "war is absurd and war is total, because if men are acting in the name of ‘their nation’, they do not know moral limits, but only ‘expedient’ calculations”.

As we have seen, these concerns are by no means new (see Fussell 1975) and have more recently been articulated by sociologist Martin Shaw (1997) in a conference paper entitled Past Wars and Present Conflicts (see also Lloyd 1998, Winter 1995, Gregory 1994, King 1998). In such specialised memory works, the overlapping ‘affect mechanisms’ of ritual, custom, tradition, memory, myth, commemoration, remembrance or memorialisation are understood to help harness the emotional storms of war’s painful aftermath for ideological, political or psychological purposes. They are thus seen, in this critically-minded project, as a powerful cultural means by which the killing of predetermined enemies is justified by the power elite of civil-society, and the death of our own in war is legitimised as above and beyond the loss of the individual. In short, War like Religion has its own socially constructed commemorative culture. It is this culture that we have examined in context, role and praxis.

As one can now no doubt infer from the sheer repetitiveness of the Kellner quote, the methodological and thematic premise of this project’s analysis and interpretation was built upon Kellner’s (2003:1-29) Cultural Studies Thesis. Here, the applied understanding of this ‘Cultural Theory’ was that commemorative culture is also produced and consumed within social life. Thus, particular cultural artefacts of British war memory and remembrance practices had to be situated within the social relations of production and reception - in which this culture is produced, distributed and consumed - in order to be properly understood and interpreted. Therefore, my main analytical aim, within the overlapping discussions of the previous chapters, was to contextualise our current cultural forms of modern war memory and their public audiences in historically specific ‘collective memory’ situations which would help illuminate how CWM projects often reflect, and in the most part, help reproduce concrete social relations and conditions but can also oppose and attempt to transform them.
With this in mind, the transformative and sequential sections of the written-up thesis constituted a ‘grounded’ but ‘critical’ examination of the recently unveiled Battle of Britain Monument. By grounded I do mean in the sense that this examination has attempted to understand the societal reasoning behind the latest cultural trend in WWII memorialisation. By critical I mean that War is a current social problem that is neglected within a mainstream sociological enterprise, and thus required a critical sociological imagination [edge-work] to help us identify the decivilising impact war memory may have upon the ethical environment of late modernity. In this respect, our final analysis has helped us re-situate this inquiry, so that we may now make the final consideration of what the ‘right memory of war’ should be.

Let us consider this issue, not just in direct terms of what exists, or whether the ‘normative thesis’ is viable or not, but also in more fluid terms of our innate capacity or strength to overcome the zero sum of our suffering, in and to warfare. For example, if I had died in the Falklands Conflict, I would have wanted my mother to have the comfort of our ‘noble lies’ to help her come to terms with my loss and absence in her life, but I would also want my son to know the paradox and futility of why many men and women die in war for a perceived greater good. In other words, I would want the ones I died for to have the ability to see the self-evident performances of war for what they are i.e. habits, conventions, dogmas and illusions which help mask and camouflage the non-logical action of ‘collective acts in war’.

Put another way, if men or women can have the courage to die for what they believe in, then should not the living have the courage to be ‘emotionally honest’ about what war is. In terms of this project’s opening hypothesis on what the right memory of war should, or even could be, this idea about being emotionally honest about war, should be the central tenet of the modern democratic civil-societies covenant with the post-military institution of warfare.

To echo the words of Jacob Bronowski (1973) whilst stood in dank pool of mud and water containing the ashes of some 4 million Jews, including his own relatives, “we have to cure
ourselves of the itch for absolute knowledge and power. We have to close the distance between the push button order and the human act; we have to reach out and touch people”.

Blunt’s (2005), emotionally honest lyrics about the ‘bedlam’, or lived reality of warfare, really reach out and touch ‘you’, because ‘we’ have a heart that feels and mind that thinks. So does the anti-monumentality ‘feeling scripts’ associated with the ‘Artillery’ or ‘Abandoned Soldier’ monuments. Does the Battle of Britain Monument? Does this powerful antiquarian and monumental ‘storyteller’ of the BOB, help promote any understanding of the paradox or dilemmas of modern warfare, or even better, a verstehen comprehension of the human cost of past war. Or is it simply a post-heroic script, informed by ‘our’ new post-military relations?

In this respect, if ‘we’ are to have any hope of closing the growing distance between the expedience, certainty or risk-consciousness of the post-modern ‘push button order’, and the ‘human act’ of warfare, then CWM must now aim to inform future generations of the irony and paradox that is modern warfare. This becomes especially apparent when we remember that the ‘new Western way of war’ is presented as a ‘humane form’ of ‘virtuous war’. That is to say, ‘risk-transfer warfare’ is now seen as a moral force employed for the greater good of civilisation. In this context, the AS monument demonstrates that CWM can help us grasp how the paradox of war is ideologically located within a perceived ‘chaos of reward’ context. Indeed, this example of a ‘new anti-monumentality project’ would seem to lend some weight to the ‘normative thesis’ of this critically-minded inquiry; in that, the AS monument does seem to evoke its situated consumers to ask some very difficult questions i.e. about current post-military relations and the new military covenant. Similarly, by evoking ‘us’ to think about the impact of war on our own soldiers i.e. as ‘victims’, it unintentionally questions the ethnocentrism of all war, in semiotic terms of ‘its’ impact on, or to the ‘other’. With the result of a 97% non-combatant casualty rate to the ‘other’, this is what the ‘right memory of war’ should attempt to promote, if we are to be ‘emotionally honest’ about what war is, and thus have a progressive civilising legacy of hope, relocated within the social memory of past war.

Conclusion
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Appendices
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN MONUMENT.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1990 there have been nearly 500 WWII war memorials erected nationwide across Britain. This compares with less than 300 for the previous 35 years combined. This PhD research into the 'social role of WWII collective memories' considers why there has been this significant increase. It asks, why now in the wake of the Cold War? Part of the tangible answer is of course the 50th and 60th anniversary cycles, but if this was the only reason then there would be similar coincidences with the memorialisation of the Great War. Looking at the UK National Inventory of War Memorials database; no such 'significant' coincidence exists. I conclude that WWII collective memories mean 'something more' to us as a nation 60 years after the fact than WWI collective memories meant to our nation in the 60's and 70's. I want to explore what that intangible 'something more' is. Is it that WWII is generally considered the 'Good War' fought by a 'Golden Generation' and as such has 'inspirational value' for the present age of anxiety? We saw a recent example of this 'inspirational value' with regards to the appropriation of the 'Blitz Spirit' in the aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist bombing of London. In addressing this matter, my research aims to understand what such public space monuments may mean to us as a nation by considering the public and private response to the inauguration of a prominent case study. That case study is the Battle of Britain Monument. Public responses will be drawn from what the press and media have to say about the monument. Private considerations are to be drawn from those involved in the memorial project; interviews with Veterans of the Battle of Britain and others such as relatives and friends of Veterans who attend the unveiling ceremony. Here, I am asking for your voluntary assistance as members of this Public to help me better understand our current attitudes to this symbolic icon of WWII collective memory.

Aim

The aim of this survey questionnaire is to obtain your views and opinions on what you think about the Monument. In what capacity are you here today and why is it important to you and who you are. What do you think of the Monument’s design and unveiling ceremony? What symbolic message do you think the monument presents and to whom? What would you hope this Monument says to your children and their children’s children? What does it say to someone who is not British? What would it say to a Young German, for example? What social or cultural role does it serve for you, the BOBHS and the community? What ideological function, if any, does it provide for the nation and what legacy does it leave to historical posterity. These are the sort of questions I will be asking for your help with. The responses you give will form part of my thesis looking into the social significance of WWII memories in contemporary Britain.

Answering the questionnaire

Any personal information you provide is strictly confidential. That is to say that the demographic information you give will be kept secure, anonymous and not shared in accordance with data protect act [1998]. You are not expected to fill in your name on the questionnaire but please answer all the questions asked. Here, there are no correct or incorrect answers. It is important that you answer all questions as frankly and honestly as possible. Be assured that as a student of Kent University I guarantee your responses to the questions will be used appropriately and in strict accordance with University of Kent guidelines for ethical research. (www.kent.ac.uk/sspssr-local/Ethical.htm).

Appendix 1 - i
The questionnaire is divided into two parts:

1. Part A: General demographic information
2. Part B: Questions pertaining to my research project and your opinions.

There are three kinds of questions. In most cases, you are asked to answer the question by making a tick (✓) in a box, but on occasion you are asked to rank your response in order of preference. The third type of question has an open format and asks why you gave the response you gave to a previous question. This type of question requires a short written response. Instructions on how to answer any specific question are given at the start of each section. Each individual section corresponds with the Aims of my proposed research. If you require additional space to answerer any question please feel free to attach extra sheets referencing the specific section and question number so I may know to which question you are referring too. Thank You.

What to do on completion.

After completing the questionnaire simply place your responses and any additional sheets in the self addressed envelope and pop it in the post. There is no need to attach a stamp as it is a pre paid envelope. If you inadvertently lose the SAE my university postal address is below. If you wish to see how your answers have been used within the research please let your preference been known below and please enclose a self addressed envelope when you send your response to me. If you would be interested in taking part in a follow up interview please make your willingness be known below by indicating 'yes' or 'no' and by filling in the relevant address form at the end of the questionnaire. Finally, I would like to make clear at this stage, prior to completion, that you can stop participation in the Survey at any time by not filling in the questionnaire and that I am assuming that your prior consent to use your responses as part of my research has been given in the voluntary act of returning the completed questionnaire to me.

Would you be interested in participating in a follow up interview?

Yes .................. Please fill in contact details at end of Questionnaire

No...................

Do you wish to see how your responses have been used in the finished article?

Yes .................. Please enclose a SAE with your response.

No ...................

Postal Address:  Mr Kevin Lee Harris.

University address

University Email

Thank you very much for your help and participation!

Appendix 1 - ii
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN MONUMENT

PART A: GENERAL INFORMATION

Section 1. How were you selected to be here today?

*Please complete the following by making a tick (√) in the relevant box below and by filling in the details where appropriate.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Office use only</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are you a Civilian?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you a Veteran of WWII or any other war since?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you a Veteran of the Battle of Britain?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you a current serving member of the Armed Forces?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you a member of any Veterans association? <em>(i.e. Royal British Legion)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes: Details of Association and nature of membership.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In what way are you affiliated, associated or connected with today's unveiling of the Battle of Britain Monument?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you attending the ceremony in a personal or official capacity?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Personal through choice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) In an official capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please briefly explain your 'personal' or 'official' reason for attending the unveiling ceremony.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why do you personally think you are on the invitation list for today's prestigious event?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part A: Section 2. Demographic information about you.

Please complete the following by making a tick (✓) in the relevant box below and by filling in the details were appropriate.

What Country are you from?

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<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Canada</th>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
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Arm of Service (If appropriate)

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<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Mustering (Please fill in mustering, i.e. infantry, armour, engineering, Wrens etc)

Rank (If appropriate)

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<th>Sub Lt/Lt</th>
<th>Capt/Lt(SAN)</th>
<th>Maj/Lt Cdr</th>
<th>Lt Col/Cdr</th>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Gen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSM/CSM</td>
<td>SNCO</td>
<td>JNCO</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Other   =</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If attending as a civilian but in an official capacity, please detail organisation, post and responsibility.

If attending though family association, please provide details of the next of kin context and number of family attending ceremony including their present ages.

If you are a civilian and attending in an unofficial or unaffiliated capacity please tell us what you do for a living?

Racial group: Please fill in your racial/ethnic identity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African, Caribbean heritage</th>
<th>Mixed Asian</th>
<th>White European</th>
<th>Oriental Asian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Age (in years)

Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Separated</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Widowed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

What daily newspaper would you usually read?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telegraph</th>
<th>Times</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Mail</th>
<th>Express</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mirror</td>
<td>Sun</td>
<td>Star</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART B: YOU'RE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN MONUMENT (BoBM).

Section 3. On first impression what did you think of the monument?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. It is important that we have a national Monument to commemorate the BoB.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Monument is not an appropriate Form to commemorate the BoB.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The inscription is an appropriate way to remember the dead of war.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The design is an appropriate way to remember the deeds of the 'Few'.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The monument's 'symbolic message' is a 'peoples' warning of the destruction and human cost of war.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The message is a re-affirmation of National unity, resilience and identity.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To help me understand your answers please briefly explain why you gave the above responses.

1. Why?

2. Why?

3. Why?

4. Why?

5. Why?

6. Why?
Section 4. What did you think of the unveiling ceremony, how did it make you feel and who was it for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree by ticking (✓) the appropriate response.</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I thought the formality, tradition and ritual was wholly appropriate and was in accordance with the established conventions of remembrance.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I thought the formality, tradition and ritual was out of date and should have taken a more interactive format like in the 1997 remembrance of Lady Di.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ceremony and speeches made me feel part of something bigger and proud to be in attendance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ceremony and speeches made me feel like a visiting spectator and uncomfortable about my attendance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The unveiling event was geared towards the dignitaries and not the BoB families and general attendees as a whole.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 5: a. At the symbolic level the monument says something about how we as a society feel about war. In your opinion what do you think the monument says about the historical institution of war?

Please select five important messages you think the monument leaves for historical posterity. Rank your responses in order of their significance from 1-5 (1 being high importance and 5 being low).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Importance</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>That war is bad and nobody wins in the end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>That war can be fought for good and a better society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>That sometimes war is necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>That war is a rational and moral means to a political end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>That it is the ultimate test of man, state and society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>That war is dependent on the ideas of an age or era.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>That war is the fault of the politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>That we are all responsible for the act of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>That to fight in war is a duty and an Honour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>That war is natural to human society and eternal to human history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>That we can each learn from the lessons of war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 5: b. Having established what you think the monument says about war what would you like it to say?

Please select the five most important messages you would want the monument to leave behind for your children's children. Rank your responses in order of their significance from 1-5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Importance</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>That war is bad and nobody wins in the end.</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>That war is the fault of the politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>That we are all have a responsibility for the act of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>That tofight in war is a sacred duty and an Honour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>That war is natural to human society and eternal to human history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>That we can each learn from the lessons of war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 6. In the above context of Historical posterity how satisfied are you with the monument?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied you are by ticking (✓) the appropriate response.</th>
<th>Highly satisfied</th>
<th>I am satisfied</th>
<th>Ambivalent</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How would you judge the satisfaction of the monument in terms of what you would want it to say to your children’s children?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section 7. In your opinion what cultural purpose does the monument serve for society and what is the memorial's social function as an artifact of collective memory?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree by ticking (✓) the appropriate response.</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree or Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The high relief tapestry is a national statement of Britishness and community and serves to remind ‘others’ of the Nation's ability to wage war when provoked by aggressors.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monument is a beacon for the Nation that belongs to all and serves as a reminder of the Human cost of freedom.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Physical form is a token of national thanksgiving and serves as a public and private site of remembrances.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In times of crisis and anxiety the Monument serves as an iconic example of National strength through unity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The narrative of the Monument serves as an example of British values and stoicism for future generations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monument is a representation of our cultural heritage and serves as the symbol of British Identity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monument is a ‘Public Space’ for mourning, contemplation and reflection by the families of the Fallen and various Veterans associations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erecting the BoB Monument is a societal way of passing on popular memories of the war from generation to generation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monument is a legacy of war and serves to legitimize and justify the cultural institution of war.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monument stands as a testament to patriotism, duty and sacrifice and thus is designed to remind the young of their Duty when the Nation is called to Arms.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 8. The questions you have been asked have not been easy to answer. As explained at the beginning there is no 'Right or Wrong'; 'Good or Bad' answer. In this context some of the questions are emotive and some are provocative precisely because there is no correct answer. If you have been offended please accept my apologies and know that this was not my intention. I just want to understand why the collective memories of WWII mean so much to us as a nation so I can understand their social significance to us in the present. Perhaps this has provoked you to add extra comments with regards to how you responded to specific questions. At this final stage I would like to ask you if there is anything you would like to add that we have not asked?

Please comment in the space provided below.

Once more, thankyou for your participation

Your views are very much appreciated.
Your contact details should you be willing to participate in a follow up interview.

Name:

Address:

Contact Details

Phone:

Email:

All information will be strictly confidential in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.