Collective Protest:

Emotions, Norms, and System Justification

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

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved parents,

Spyros and Marina

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigated the reasons why individuals participate in both socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest and aimed at answering the following question: Are these two forms of protest triggered equally by the same motives or is it that some motives are more important for one kind of protest than for the other? This thesis contends that disruptive protest entails higher personal uncertainty than does non-disruptive protest, hence, motives that can deal with this uncertainty should be more strongly related to disruptive protest than to non-disruptive protest. Six studies are reported, three correlational ones (Studies 1, 2, and 4) and three experimental ones (Studies 3, 5, and 6). The first two studies examined whether group-based anger, social opinion support, and group identification predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest, and whether collective efficacy and social action support predict disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. Overall, hypotheses were supported. The third study manipulated uncertainty to test its effect on protest and found that participants assigned to the high (vs. low) uncertainty salience condition were significantly less likely to advocate disruptive protest, in line with hypotheses. The last three studies introduced the ideological motive of system justification and investigated its role in predicting both types of protest. Consistently with hypotheses, the fourth study demonstrated that system justification had a significantly higher correlation with non-disruptive protest than with disruptive protest. Finally, the last two studies used two different manipulations of system justification and confirmed that system justification can indeed exert a discouraging causal effect on protest tendencies, especially disruptive protest tendencies. In conclusion, the findings provide support for the role of personal uncertainty in determining the relative impact that different motives can have on disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest.

MEMORANDUM

The research for this thesis was conducted while the author was a full-time postgraduate research student receiving a university studentship. Studies 1, 2, and 6 were conducted at the School of Psychology. Study 3 was conducted at NYU, Study 4 was based on re-analysis of pre-existing survey data on UCLA students, and Study 5 was conducted on a community sample in Athens, Greece.

The theoretical and empirical work herein is the independent work of the author. Intellectual debts are acknowledged in the text. The execution of the studies conducted by the author and reported in this thesis required minimal assistance from other people. Their role consisted only in helping with the practical aspects of the studies, such as allowing access to participants and setting up the online questionnaires.

The author has not been awarded a degree by this or any other university for the work included in this thesis.

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PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a social psychological account of different types of collective protest, in order to unveil some of the psychological motives that lead people to take part in an array of different types of protest. Because more elaborate taxonomies of protest are described in Chapter 1, it is sufficient to say here that collective protest covers a wide variety of behaviours ranging from petition-signing and leafleting to marching and rioting. Previous attempts to provide a classification of different protest behaviours (e.g., Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Corning & Myers, 2002; Klandermans, 1997, 2004; Louis & Taylor, 1999; Postmes & Brunsting, 2002) have usually adopted a cost-benefit analysis, in line with which perceived costs in terms of time, effort, or risk vary according to the type of activity in question. Thus, it makes intuitive sense that an individual who is willing to face the costs involved in one activity may not be motivated to face the costs involved in another (Klandermans, 1997).

These costs are often associated with the violation of societal norms, as is the case with non-normative forms of protest which have received a fair amount of attention in the protest literature (e.g., Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Louis & Taylor, 1999; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). So, the question becomes whether normative and non-normative types of protest are triggered by different motives. For various reasons this question has largely been ignored. Specifically, some studies have focused only on one type of protest behaviour (e.g., Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000), while other studies have combined normative and non-normative protest behaviours into an aggregated variable (e.g., Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004).

Given that the above question has not yet received adequate attention by social psychologists, this thesis seeks to address this lacuna by examining whether normative and non-normative types of collective protest are triggered equally by the same motives or whether some motives are more important for one type of protest than for the other. Note that although these two types of protest constitute the starting point of this thesis, Chapter 3 will propose that the literature should focus on socially disruptive and non-

disruptive types of protest rather than on normative and non-normative types of protest, but the normative/non-normative distinction will be used until then.

Exploring which motive is most relevant for which type of protest behaviour is interesting from an *epistemic* point of view, because it creates understanding as to the reasons behind the diversity of protest behaviour. Studying this topic is also interesting from an *applied* point of view for both decision makers and organisations, such as trade unions and non-governmental organisations that often try to mobilise their members via campaigning. Insights gained from this body of evidence can help these organisations target a specific motive, in order to channel their members into corresponding protest activities. For example, if instrumental considerations regarding the number of people who intend to take part in a non-normative form of protest are more likely to promote participation (Klandermans, 1986, 1989), then a trade union initiating such an activity (e.g., a strike) would probably have to address appraisals of expected mobilisation to maximise participation rates. On the other hand, pinpointing the motives that are more likely to spur participation in these same protest activities can help decision makers form societal policies to reduce issues of relative disadvantage whilst maintaining social order.

In order to answer the question as to whether normative and non-normative forms of protest are triggered equally by the same motives or whether some motives are more important for one type of protest than for the other, this thesis is structured in six chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 examine several theories of collective protest to discover, first of all, which motives have been found to be important in the precipitation of protest. These chapters conclude by unveiling group-based anger, collective efficacy, group identification, social opinion support and social action support as important antecedents of collective protest participation.

Chapter 3 first argues for the use of the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction, as opposed to the normative/non-normative distinction, because this seems more consistent with Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach to collective protest and because it does not carry several weaknesses associated with the concept of normativity. Subsequently, Chapter 3 contends that the core human motive of quest for personal certainty (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van den Bos, 2009) should be introduced into the field of collective protest, given that it helps explain the differential impact that

the five motives mentioned above may have on socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest activities. Chapter 3 concludes with a number of hypotheses that are related to the differential impact of these five motives and that are examined in a series of three main studies in Chapter 4.

Chapter 5 addresses whether an ideological motive that has not been widely studied in the field of collective protest, namely, the system justification motive (Jost & Banaji, 1994), is equally predictive of socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest. Three relevant main studies are reported. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the findings of this thesis and concludes that future research would benefit from a more fine-grained analysis of protest behaviour that takes into account the social disruptiveness of the behaviours under investigation and the ensuing personal uncertainty.

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Chapter 1

Defining and Predicting Collective Protest

Introduction

This first chapter begins with an in-depth definition of collective protest so as to clarify what this thesis *is* and *is not* about. Theories of collective protest are subsequently examined, in order to discover which motives have been found to be important in the precipitation of protest. Unveiling those motives is the first step towards addressing the main research question of this thesis regarding whether protest motives are equally important for participation in normative and non-normative types of protest.

1.1 Defining collective protest

What do we understand by the term 'collective protest'? This question relates to who participates, for what reason, in what way(s), and against whom.

1.1.1 Who takes part in collective protest and for what reason?

Implicit in the word 'protest' lies the assumption that there is some state of disadvantage that affects a certain group of people. Protest could then be defined as an act of dissent against a specific disadvantage. One may thus assume that the protestors belong either to the group directly affected by this disadvantage (e.g., union members on strike for salary raise) or to some other group supporting the disadvantaged group (e.g., British people marching for the Palestinian cause).

By focusing on the case of protestors that belong to the disadvantaged group one examines protest against ingroup disadvantage. In contrast, by focusing on the case of protestors that form part of some other group one examines protest against outgroup disadvantage. It is protest against ingroup disadvantage that is central to this thesis. Although both types of protest are of theoretical interest, this author finds that people should be able to be in control of their own lives and to fight for their own interests rather than hoping that someone else will do it for them. Therefore, insights from the study of protest against ingroup disadvantage may help do just that: Provide aggrieved people with some knowledge on how to become masters of their own fate.

1.1.2 In what ways does collective protest take place?

Most people would automatically think of strikes and riots as representative examples of collective protest. However, signing a petition or writing a letter for or against a certain cause would probably not spring to mind automatically when considering collective protest. Perhaps this is so, because the use of the word 'collective' implies that a protest activity has to be performed by more than one person, in order to be truly collective. Another reason might be related to the fact that collective protest has been associated with violence, disorder, and chaos. This has been so ever since protest became a matter of scientific observation, starting with Le Bon's (1896/2002) treatise on crowd behaviour, which will be discussed in section 1.2.1. Therefore, the two points raised above regarding the numbers needed for an act of protest to be considered collective and the character that an action needs to assume, in order to qualify as protest, bring us to two important features of collective protest. These features are depicted in the already mentioned framework of Wright et al. (1990) for describing different types of action in response to injustice.

1.1.2.1 Wright et al.'s (1990) framework

In keeping with Wright et al. (1990), collective protest is an act of dissent against some ingroup disadvantage that a) can be performed either *individually* or *collectively,* as long as it aims to enhance the ingroup status, rather than one's own personal status (in which case it is considered individual protest), and that b) can be either *normative* or *non-normative*, which means in line with or against established societal norms, respectively. From this point of view, petition-signing and letter-writing are examples of normative protest and, albeit performed individually, they are still collective provided they aim at the improvement of the ingroup status. Strikes and riots, on the other hand, would be considered as examples of non-normative collective protest, because they go against societal norms and have the potential of causing great disruption to the general public. In the words of Wright et al. (1990), non-normative types of collective protest are "the most socially disruptive" actions (p. 1001). This last statement is important, because it has led to the confounding of social disruptiveness with normativity, which will be more clearly explained in Chapter 3.

1.1.2.2 Louis and Taylor's (1999) framework

Louis and Taylor (1999) further refined the normative/non-normative dimensions of collective (and individual) protest by distinguishing between normative and non-normative behaviours of group organisation and normative and non-normative behaviours of group support. Group organisation behaviours have to do with those leadership behaviours associated with organising the ingroup and instigating collective protest. One may consider the creation of a lobby group and the instigation of a riot as examples of group organisation behaviours that are normative and non-normative, respectively. Group support behaviours, on the other hand, are those behaviours that require mere participation in collective protest already organised by some other ingroup member. Because individuals in their daily lives are more likely to be asked to participate in, rather than organise, a protest activity, this thesis focuses only on group support behaviours, in order to account for a much more frequent phenomenon. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis the term 'collective protest' only includes group support protest behaviours against ingroup disadvantage.

1.1.3 Against whom does collective protest takes place?

A further point to make relates to the target of collective protest. As already mentioned, for the purposes of this thesis collective protest is an act of dissent against some ingroup disadvantage. This implies that there is a specific outgroup to be held accountable for the ingroup's disadvantaged state. Indeed, Grant (2008) has found that perceptions of outgroup blame are directly related to protest participation. Therefore, this thesis focuses on cases where there is a distinct outgroup that the disadvantaged ingroup holds accountable for their disadvantage. Furthermore, notwithstanding the existence of protest activities that are in no way communicative to anyone, this thesis only examines cases where protest activities are visible either to the outgroup responsible for the ingroup disadvantage or to the general public or to both. This is consistent with Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach to collective protest, which regards the general public as the third party involved in any conflict between two groups and which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 3.

1.1.4 Collective 'protest' or collective 'action'?

It is useful to note at this point that although the literature on protest takes collective protest and collective action to have practically identical meanings, this thesis insists on using the term 'protest' rather than the term 'action'. The reason is that a protest activity is an action by definition, whereas an action is not necessarily a protest activity. Both terms are indeed characterised as collective as long as they aim at enhancing the ingroup status. However, the use of the term 'action' is rather misleading, because it can be used for actions as diverse as are celebratory parades and civil rights protests (e.g., Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006). One would probably find it difficult to argue that the same motives spur participation in either action. To illustrate, one would hardly expect the anger responsible for participation in a protest against ingroup disadvantage to lead to participation in a celebratory parade as well. Therefore, the use of the term 'protest' is deemed more appropriate here.

1.1.5 Definition of collective protest

Following the above discussion, this thesis regards collective protest as a set of behaviours indicative of dissent against some ingroup disadvantage that is perceived as the result of the activities of a distinct outgroup. These behaviours can be performed either individually or collectively, as long as they aim at the enhancement of the ingroup status, and can be either normative or non-normative. Finally, the focus is set on protest behaviours that are communicative to the outgroup responsible for the ingroup disadvantage or to the general public or to both and are only inclusive of group support behaviours, as opposed to group organisation behaviours.

1.2 Individual-level accounts of collective protest

A good deal of early psychological research into collective protest investigated the nature and character of individuals. Le Bon's (1896/2002) theory of crowd behaviour, the frustration-aggression hypothesis as first posited by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939), and Zimbardo's (1969) deindividuation theory are representative examples of such individual-level approaches to collective protest and will be critically examined in the current section. Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model is also

discussed here, because, despite its sociological origins, it reduces collective protest to a series of individual decision-making processes.

1.2.1 Le Bon's theory of crowd behaviour

In his book 'The crowd: A study of the popular mind', Le Bon (1896/2002) offers a detailed account of crowd behaviour and contemplates on its origins.

1.2.1.1 The theory

Le Bon (1896/2002) describes crowds as violent, impulsive, irrational, and primitive. Indeed, in his view crowds are barbaric, incapable of reason, and driven by instincts only. He argues that, as a consequence of the anonymity crowds provide, individuals lose their personal identities, as well as all sense of control and responsibility for their actions. As a consequence, individuals become highly suggestible to any passing idea or emotion. Le Bon (1896/2002) claims that these ideas and emotions are identical for every single individual that is part of the crowd, because they stem from a 'group mind': an unconscious, racially shared mentality which emerges each time individuals are stripped of their conscious personalities. For Le Bon (1896/2002), this group mind determines and explains the homogeneity of crowd behaviour. Thus, Le Bon (1896/2002) maintains that there is something fundamental to *all* human beings that makes them behave violently and irrationally once they join a crowd.

1.2.1.2 Critique

Albeit influential, Le Bon's (1896/2002) theory has been criticised on several grounds by Reicher (2003). For one thing, the lack of social context in Le Bon's (1896/2002) description of the crowds is a major weakness. Le Bon (1896/2002) wished to write about the events he had observed in the Paris Commune of 1871, but in doing so he omitted any references to the issues and grievances that the demonstrators were protesting about. Furthermore, he presented the crowds in complete isolation, disregarding any information as to the manner in which police and army officers influenced the course of events. By decontextualising crowd behaviour, however, Le Bon (1896/2002) wrongly attributed context-related behaviours to inherent qualities of the crowd. What is more, this

decontextualisation led Le Bon (1896/2002) to conceive of identity as solely determined by the self. Thus, he deprived social context of its capacity to influence individuals' identities and to serve as a basis of controlled and rational action (Reicher, 2003).

1.2.2 Dollard et al.'s (1939) frustration-aggression hypothesis

In an attempt to introduce some sense of social context into the study of collective protest, Dollard et al. (1939) developed the so-called 'frustration-aggression hypothesis'.

1.2.2.1 Theory and empirical support

According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939), *objective* societal states of disadvantage are considered responsible for the occurrence of collective protest, particularly non-normative protest. Dollard et al. (1939) combined learning theory and psychoanalytic concepts to propose that any frustration of a goal-directed behaviour causes an accumulation of 'psychic energy' which, in turn, leads to the individual's propensity to aggress the source of frustration. However, the individual is not always in a position of attacking the source directly, either because of social conditioning ("we must not attack those who are more powerful than ourselves") or because the source is not immediately apparent or available. In cases like that, aggression is often *displaced* onto a weaker target, chosen as less able to hit back.

Hovland and Sears (1940) provided empirical support for this hypothesis. They found that the increasing number of lynchings of Blacks in the Southern US between 1882 and 1930 was associated with the drop in cotton prices that affected White farmers. Hovland and Sears (1940) argued that Blacks were chosen as 'scapegoats' for White farmers' frustration, although they were not responsible for the economy; the reason was that Blacks had no political power to fight back. As these findings were purely correlational, there is room for the assumption that there was perhaps some third uninvestigated variable affecting both the cotton price and the lynchings.

1.2.2.2 Critique

A major criticism of Dollard et al.'s (1939) frustration-aggression hypothesis is that there is no reason to believe that objective deprivation is a necessary or even sufficient

condition for aggression to take place. If this were so, the frustration-aggression hypothesis would have to explain disadvantaged social groups that do not resort to violent protests, such as the unemployed. An additional criticism relates to the fact that this hypothesis does not offer any kind of mechanism that translates separate individual states of frustration into coordinated collective acts of aggression against a specific target. What is missing is an explanation of the criteria on the basis of which a group of people is chosen as a scapegoat from a range of weaker targets.

Thus, it becomes evident that, similarly to Le Bon's (1896/2002) theory, the frustration-aggression hypothesis suffers from a lack of attention to the intergroup context. However, the frustration-aggression hypothesis was able to take the study of collective protest one step further by raising the issue of the (objective) grievances people may protest about. The failure of this hypothesis to suggest that collective protest may flow from perception of deprivation, rather than objective deprivation per se, gave rise to the theory of relative deprivation, which is discussed in section 1.3.1.

1.2.3 Zimbardo's (1969) theory of deindividuation

Although Le Bon's (1896/2002) theory has fallen into some disrepute, some of his ideas have survived in contemporary psychology (Reicher, 2003). Notions such as anonymity and diffused responsibility, as well as their relationship to anti-social behaviour and non-normative protest, have been formally examined in Zimbardo's (1969) theory of deindividuation.

1.2.3.1 Theory and empirical support

Zimbardo (1969) defined deindividuation as a state induced by certain external factors, most importantly anonymity, and leading to a decreased concern with social evaluation, self-evaluation, and self-observation. Such decrease brings about a weaker sense of behavioural control based on commitment, fear, shame, and guilt, which in turn lowers the individual's thresholds for non-normative, anti-social behaviour. Thus, in Zimbardo's (1969) view, under conditions of deindividuation, crowd members are expected to lower their self-regulation and adherence to social norms of appropriate conduct. This process results in acts of high emotionality, impulsiveness, violence, and destruction. So, in

keeping with Le Bon's (1896/2002) theory, Zimbardo (1969) considered disinhibited behaviour to be primarily destructive behaviour. In support of Zimbardo's (1969) theory, Jaffe and Yinon (1979) found that participants were more likely to administer electric shocks to confederates when in groups than when alone, presumably due to higher lack of accountability occurring in groups.

1.2.3.2 Critique

Empirical support for Zimbardo's (1969) theory has been equivocal, however. For instance, Johnson and Downing (1979) found that deindividuation actually led to a decrease in the intensity of electric shocks in a variation of Jaffe and Yinon's (1979) experiment. Johnson and Downing (1979) asked participants to put on hoods and gowns, but individuated some by giving name badges and identifying individual responses. In one condition they told participants that the gowns were those of nurses, whereas in the other condition they told participants that the gowns were those of Ku Klux Klan. What they found was that participants in the former condition significantly decreased the intensity of shocks to be administered, and most interestingly, it was the deindividuated participants who showed the greatest decrease. But even in the latter condition deindividuation did not increase shock intensity.

Moreover, Postmes and Spears (1998) found no support for deindividuation theory in a recent meta-analysis of the deindividuation literature: If anything, they found that under conditions of deindividuation people are more likely to act in terms of a relevant group membership rather than in terms of personal norms. Therefore, in a similar vein to its predecessor, deindividuation theory has failed to take into account the role of the intergroup context. In regarding the self as the sole determinant of one's identity and the sole basis of controlled and rational action, deindividuation theory has overlooked the capacity of group categorisation to form the basis for one's identity and behaviour.

1.2.4 Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model

Unlike the individual-level accounts of collective protest reviewed above, Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model does not focus on the nature and character of individuals or on the assumed irrationality of collective protest. It has been grouped along

with those here, however, because it envisages collective protest participation as the result of a number of individual decision-making processes that are explained below.

1.2.4.1 The theoretical model

Klandermans' model is largely based on research conducted with trade unions (e.g., Klandermans, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1997, 2004) and proposes that there are two important aspects to generating support for collective protest: an attitudinal one, called 'consensus mobilisation', and a behavioural one, called 'action mobilisation'. Consensus mobilisation has to do with the efforts on the part of, say, a trade union to gain support for its cause, whereas action mobilisation is related to the trade union's efforts to convince people to take part in collective protest. In Klandermans' view both processes are necessary conditions for participation. It is not enough that a trade union obtains support for its cause; it must also convert "sympathizers into active participants" (Klandermans, 1997, p. 7). Furthermore, according to his model, there are several motivational principles that are linked to this conversion and that are related to an individual's rational decision to participate or not. These principles are based on an expectancy-value calculation: a function of the value of the expected outcomes of collective protest participation. In other words, individuals weigh the potential costs and benefits of participation before deciding what to do.

Klandermans (1984, 1997) proposes two motives involved in this calculation: collective ones and selective ones. Collective (or goal) motives have to do with the achievement of the goal set by the trade union and are all-inclusive, which means that once the goal has been reached, everyone profits regardless of whether they participated in the actual protest or not. Selective motives, on the other hand, concern only those people who decide to participate and fall into two categories, social or non-social. Social motives are related to the reactions of significant others should one decide to participate. Non-social (or reward) motives concern material considerations that potential participation entails, such as lost time or earnings. Thus, according to Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model, willingness to protest is a function of collective and selective motives: Expectations that the motives will be provided (e.g., the expectation that my colleagues will approve of my strike participation) are multiplied by the value placed on

these expectations (e.g., I care a lot what my colleagues think). The weighted sum of these considerations shapes the individual's motivational strength.

Klandermans (1984, 1997) further argues that, although selective motives (both social and non-social) are directly dependent on an individual's behaviour, collective motives are only indirectly related to behaviour. Klandermans (1984, 1997) considers the behaviour of *others* to be the mediator between collective motives and individual behaviour. For example, whether a strike will achieve its goals is partly dependent on how many others will go on strike, so the ignorance about what others are going to do complicates things. Nevertheless, Klandermans (1984, 1997) presumes that people will have expectations about what others might do and that they will act on these expectations. Apart from these expectations regarding the behaviour of others, Klandermans (1984, 1997) suggests that people may also have expectations about whether the goal will be materialised if many others participate and whether their own individual participation will make a difference in the achievement of the goal.

1.2.4.2 Empirical support and critique

There is a fair amount of empirical evidence in support of Klandermans' model (e.g., Klandermans, 1984, 1986). For example, Klandermans (1984, 1986) found that both collective and selective motives accounted for a large part of the variance in willingness of Dutch trade union members to take part in industrial action. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) yielded similar findings about the overall importance of these motives in predicting willingness of members of the Dutch peace movement to take part in a demonstration. Therefore, unlike previous approaches to collective protest, Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model provides a good description of how individuals make rational decisions about protest participation. Trade unions could use this kind of information to change the cost-benefit ratio in their favour so that participation becomes more appealing than non-participation.

However, similarly to previous approaches, Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model does not really take into account the role of the intergroup context. Although there is some consideration of the social environment, the model does not adequately theorise about the influence of the intergroup context in determining, for example, the relative importance

of the collective and selective motives in predicting participation. Furthermore, the focus of Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model on success expectations is rather extreme, resulting in an overly rationalistic and calculative view of human behaviour: It seems as if disadvantaged people will not even consider collective protest unless the achievement of their goals is almost guaranteed. It is not hard to imagine that there could be cases were non-participation is actually 'costlier' than participation. It might very well be, for example, that defending one's cherished national or cultural identity becomes of such importance that one prefers to suffer the ultimate cost and die than to lose one's identity. Therefore, a shift of focus onto the intergroup context is much needed, which is why the remainder of this chapter critically examines group- and intergroup-level accounts of collective protest.

1.3 Group- and intergroup-level accounts of collective protest

This section of Chapter 1 focuses on some of the most influential group- and intergroup-level theories in the domain of collective protest, namely, relative deprivation theory (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966), social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and Taylor and McKirnan's (1984) five-stage model.

1.3.1 Relative deprivation theory

As mentioned in section 1.2.2.2, relative deprivation theory (RDT) stems partially from the failure of Dollard et al.'s (1939) frustration-aggression hypothesis to explain the fact that objectively deprived groups and individuals do not always resort to violence and non-normative behaviour, or any kind of collective protest for that matter.

1.3.1.1 Introducing the term 'relative deprivation'

Researchers soon realised that objective deprivation was not a necessary condition for people to feel dissatisfied with their lots and thus be likely to protest. Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949) were the first to use the term 'relative deprivation' (RD) to indicate that deprivation does not depend on objective conditions, but on the standard against which people compare their own attainments. This assumption opened the way to the inclusion of social comparison processes (e.g., Festinger, 1954) into the

study of collective protest. In their study of the American Soldier, Stouffer et al. (1949) provided empirical support for the notion of RD. Among other things, they found that army personnel in units where promotions were granted slowly were more satisfied with the promotion system than were personnel in rapidly-moving units. Stouffer et al. (1949) concluded that slow-moving units did not compare themselves to rapidly-moving units, hence their lack of felt deprivation. Research such as Stouffer et al.'s (1949) gave rise to the development of RDT (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Davis, 1959; Pettigrew, 1967; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002).

1.3.1.2 Crosby's (1976) model

One of the most comprehensive RDT models to have appeared in the literature is that of Crosby (1976), according to which there are five preconditions for the experience of RD: Individuals must realise a) that they lack something someone else possesses, b) that this is something they want and c) feel entitled to, d) that possessing it is feasible, and e) that they do not hold themselves responsible for not possessing it. In the original formulation of this model, Crosby (1976) considered all preconditions to be both necessary and sufficient for RD to be experienced. However, Crosby, Muehrer, and Loewenstein (1986) later found that a simplified two-factor model fit their data better. Thus, they suggested that preconditions b and c (i.e., wanting and deserving) are the only necessary conditions for RD to arise. In a similar vein, Olson, Roese, Meen, and Robertson (1995) found that wanting and deserving were the strongest predictors of felt deprivation, although deserving did not remain statistically significant when wanting was controlled for. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that wanting and deserving are the two preconditions for RD to occur (Walker & Smith, 2002).

1.3.1.3 Distinguishing between personal and collective RD

The question of relative to whom do individuals want and deserve better conditions then arises. Crosby's (1976) model only focused on interpersonal comparisons, but Runciman (1966) was the first to propose that RD may result not only from interpersonal comparisons, but also from intergroup ones. *Egoistic* (or personal) RD arises when the individual perceives their standing to be unjust relative to other individuals, whereas

fraternal (or collective) RD develops once the individual perceives the standing of their ingroup to be unjust relative to a relevant outgroup. Empirical research supports the importance of the personal-collective RD distinction for the study of collective protest given that there seems to be conceptual fit between the intergroup comparisons collective RD stems from and the intergroup nature of collective protest (e.g., Abrams, 1990; Dion, 1986; Dubé & Guimond, 1986; Grant & Brown, 1995; Hafer & Olson, 1993; Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Olson et al., 1995; Walker & Mann, 1987). Some of the empirical evidence in support of the personal-collective distinction is now reviewed in more detail.

1.3.1.4 Empirical support for the personal-collective RD distinction

Several studies have shown that collective RD is more strongly linked to attitudes favouring collective protest than is personal RD. For example, Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) examined a sample of Francophone Canadians and found that the more the participants were dissatisfied about the situation of the Francophones as a group (in comparison to the Anglophones), the more they held favourable attitudes toward the Québec nationalist movement. In contrast, Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) found that personal RD did not predict nationalist attitudes, which was also found by Dubé and Guimond (1986) in the same intergroup context.

Both Abrams (1990) and Koomen and Fränkel (1992) have produced similar findings in different intergroup contexts. Abrams (1990) investigated the case of Scottish nationalism among young Scots and found that it was only collective RD (in relation to English people) that significantly predicted support for Scottish nationalist attitudes and voting intentions for the Scottish Nationalist Party; personal RD, on the other hand, only predicted depression. Koomen and Fränkel (1992) worked with a sample of Surinamese, a Dutch ethnic minority group, and found that collective RD (in comparison to Dutch people) was the only predictor of group militancy (approval of Surinamese's participation in protest demonstrations, in distributing anti-discrimination pamphlets and in taking political actions); personal RD was only related to personal dissatisfaction.

Several other studies have focused more specifically on protest behaviour and have shown that collective protest is more strongly predicted by collective RD than by personal RD. Specifically, Dubé and Guimond (1986), whose research was referred to

earlier, conducted a study among students in Montréal and measured personal and collective RD, as well as past participation in a number of different protest activities. In line with the research reviewed above, they found that collective RD was significantly related to levels of student activism, whereas personal RD was not. Moreover, Walker and Mann (1987) examined young unemployed Australians and found that two different types of collective RD (in comparison to peers and employed people) significantly predicted protest orientation, but not stress symptoms; the opposite was found for personal RD (in relation to best attainable position in society).

Further evidence for collective RD predicting collective protest more strongly than does personal RD comes from Hafer and Olson's (1993) research. They considered a sample of working women and measured both personal RD and collective RD (in comparison to working men) four weeks before measuring self- and group-enhancing protest behaviours that participants had engaged in during that period. In keeping with the findings reported in the previous paragraph, Hafer and Olson (1993) found that personal RD significantly predicted the occurrence of self-enhancing behaviours, whereas collective RD did not. In contrast, collective RD significantly predicted the occurrence of group-enhancing behaviours, whereas personal RD did not.

All of these studies reveal a perfectly consistent pattern: Collective RD predicts group-level attitudes and collective protest behaviour, whereas personal RD does not. Instead, personal RD predicts individual-level behaviour and exerts a negative influence on individuals' well-being via increased stress symptoms and depression. This same pattern also emerged in Smith and Ortiz's (2002) meta-analytic review of the RDT literature. Therefore, for people to protest collectively they must experience collective RD: They have to realise that their ingroup is disadvantaged in comparison to some other relevant outgroup, rather than perceiving themselves in comparison to other individuals. However, the evidence thus far cannot be entirely conclusive, because it is only based on correlational data.

Grant and Brown's (1995) experimental test came to provide this much needed causal evidence by manipulating collective RD. They had female participants expect to receive equal payment for a collective task, but for half of the participants these expectations were unfairly violated so that they received less money. In line with hypotheses and the

above mentioned pattern, participants who experienced collective RD were significantly more likely to endorse collective protest and hold more ethnocentric attitudes. This experiment thus offered clear evidence that collective RD can actually lead to preparedness for collective protest behaviour.

1.3.1.5 Distinguishing between cognitive and affective RD

Cook, Crosby, and Hennigan (1977) have made a further distinction as to the quality of the interpersonal and intergroup comparisons that give rise to personal and collective RD, respectively. They distinguished between *cognitive* RD and *affective* RD. The cognitive component of RD is related to the knowledge that one is relatively deprived, whereas the affective component of RD consists of the feelings of frustration and injustice resulting from the above knowledge. Although these two components may be correlated, one can assume that knowledge about oneself being relatively deprived does not always lead to feelings of injustice (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983): It might very well be that the inequality is not challenged or that it is considered legitimate. Hence, there is general consensus that the affective component is the more proximal predictor of collective protest (e.g., Grant & Brown, 1995; Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Tougas & Veilleux, 1988). Some of the empirical evidence in support of the cognitive-affective RD distinction is now reviewed in more detail.

1.3.1.6 Empirical support for the cognitive-affective RD distinction

Grant and Brown's (1995) research referred to in section 1.3.1.4 was useful in providing evidence about the importance of the cognitive-affective distinction as well. The uncovered effect of cognitive RD (i.e., knowing that one's expectations about equal payment were violated) on collective protest tendencies was fully mediated by the affective component of RD (i.e., discontent, dissatisfaction, and outrage as a result of the violation of expectations). This finding is consistent with the view that, for collective protest to occur, perception of collective disadvantage is not enough: People must also experience feelings of unfairness and discontent about the collective disadvantage. Similar mediated effects of cognitive RD via affective RD have been reported on women's support for affirmative action (Tougas & Veilleux, 1988) and on young Scots'

nationalist attitudes and voting intentions (Abrams, 1990). Smith and Ortiz's (2002) meta-analysis mentioned above provided additional evidence for the importance of the cognitive-affective RD distinction by showing that the relationship between RD and collective behaviour was significantly weaker when the affective component was not included in the analyses.

1.3.1.7 Critique

Having considered the theoretical premises of RDT and the relevant empirical evidence, one may find RDT to be quite useful in explaining collective protest. Indeed, the concept of *relative* as opposed to *objective* deprivation has been a major development in the field. RDT is thus able to explain instances where disadvantaged groups do not protest their situation in life: This might merely be down to the fact that they do not compare themselves to relevant advantaged outgroups.

Even so, RDT is of limited predictive value as Walker and Pettigrew (1984) have also noted. The problem is that RDT theorists cannot really predict either the referent of a group's social comparisons or the dimensions along which group members will choose to compare themselves. Of equal importance is the weakness of RDT to capture directly the psychological processes involved in the emergence of feelings of deprivation (Ellemers, 2002). In other words, RDT fails to explain why cognitive deprivation should ever turn into affective deprivation.

Specifically, Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) found that cognition is independent of affect to a certain degree. They manipulated cognitive RD by informing half of the Francophone participants that they were deprived, when compared with the Anglophones, while leaving the rest of the participants uninformed. Although cognitive RD and affective RD were significantly correlated, further analyses revealed that the informed participants did *not* express any more discontent than the uninformed ones. The authors thus proposed that individuals have to also perceive themselves as group members and feel attached to this group for affective RD to arise. Therefore, theories of intergroup relations and in particular the social identity perspective seem highly relevant at this point because they explain the link between individual and collective behaviour (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

1.3.2 Social identity theory

Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its theoretical extension self-categorisation theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) have paid close attention to the importance of group identification in intergroup contexts. By examining the construct of group identification, SIT provides a crucial link between individual and collective behaviour, as mentioned above (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). It is thus most useful in the domain of collective protest, because it offers an explanation as to why individuals decide to act as a group, even when the cost-benefit ratio (see Klandermans, 1984, 1997) seems to go against one's individual interests.

1.3.2.1 The main premises of the theory

SIT proposes that individuals categorise their social environment into groups, some of which they necessarily belong to (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Belonging to a social group becomes part of one's self-concept. According to SIT and SCT, the self-concept can be construed at various levels of abstraction, ranging from personal to social. Personal identity is about one's unique history and personality, whereas social identity is about "an individual's knowledge that he [or she] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him [or her] of the group membership" (Tajfel, 1972, p. 31). Social comparison processes (e.g., Festinger, 1954) play a critical role in determining the self-concept, and hence one's self-esteem, by providing standards against which individuals compare their personal attributes, as well as those of the groups they belong to. Depending on the outcome, these comparisons can have either a positive or negative effect on one's self-esteem. Although these comparison processes tend to be biased so that one's group membership is experienced as positive, there are instances where comparisons between the ingroup and a relevant outgroup yield inevitably negative outcomes. In such cases, one's group membership confers a negative social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

1.3.2.2 Negative social identity management strategies

In order to achieve or maintain a positive social identity, Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue, individuals employ one of three main negative social identity management strategies:

individual mobility, *social creativity*, or *social change/competition*. Individual mobility refers to the individual's transition from the lower status ingroup to a higher status outgroup, which should enhance the individual's self-esteem. Thus, individual mobility does not change the low ingroup status; it only provides a personal solution. Neither does social creativity entail any improvement for the low ingroup status, but it is a collective strategy, given that the individual creates a new comparative situation in favour of the ingroup (by changing comparative dimension or referent outgroup for example). Finally, social change or competition is a collective strategy through which ingroup members aim at improving the ingroup's position. Therefore, SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) would regard collective protest as an example of social competition and, hence, as one of the strategies individuals use, in order to cope with their negative social identity.

1.3.2.3 Determinants of strategy choice

SIT posits that one of the variables that influence individuals' choice of strategy is their level of group identification, that is, the extent to which individuals identify with their ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Ingroup members who strongly identify with their group are more likely to engage in collective protest to enhance the ingroup's low status, whereas those who weakly identify with the ingroup are more likely to prefer individual strategies. For example, Ellemers (1993) reports that in a series of experiments high identifiers were more likely to opt for collective strategies, whereas low identifiers were more likely to prefer individual strategies. Tougas and Veilleux (1988) also found that identification with women as a group increased support for affirmative action, while Tropp and Brown (2004) extended these findings by unveiling the incremental effect of group identification on both interest and actual involvement in collective protest for women's issues. Therefore, there is empirical support for the SIT prediction that identification with the disadvantaged group enhances collective protest participation.

SIT further proposes that, although identification is the proximal predictor of collective protest, socio-structural variables also influence individuals' choice of strategy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These variables are the following three structural aspects of the intergroup context: permeability of group boundaries and the stability and legitimacy of status. Permeability refers to whether it is easy or difficult to leave the low status ingroup

to enter the high status outgroup. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), if individuals endorse *social mobility* beliefs (i.e., beliefs according to which the boundaries between social groups are permeable, whereby passing into a higher status group would be rather easy to achieve), they are likely to attempt quitting the low status ingroup. But if individuals believe in *social change* (i.e., beliefs according to which the social structure is clearly stratified with groups having impermeable boundaries, thus making it impossible for individuals to move from their own group to another), they have no other option but to adopt collective strategies (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

With regard to the status stability and legitimacy, Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that these two variables refer to the *security* of intergroup comparisons. This security relates to whether low status group members can envisage *cognitive alternatives* to the present undesirable state of affairs. More specifically, status stability has to do with how likely ingroup members think it is that their group can achieve a higher status in the future, while status legitimacy refers to whether they consider their current low status as illegitimate. It is important to note that legitimacy is not about how justified, for example, the distribution of a desired commodity between the low and high status groups is: Legitimacy is far more related to how justified the overall status differentials are. Similarly, stability is more than just about how likely it is that specific outcomes of the low status group will be better or worse one day: Stability is far more about the likelihood that the overall intergroup structure can change in the future. Tajfel and Turner (1979) contend that under conditions of perceived instability and illegitimacy individuals will tend to prefer collective strategies.

1.3.2.4 Critique

To conclude, it can be said that Tajfel and Turner's (1979) SIT has advanced our understanding of collective protest by introducing group identification and socio-structural variables as important predictors of individual and collective management strategies. However, the initial formulation of SIT does not provide any precise, testable hypotheses as to the exact conditions under which the diverse collective strategies will be preferred. Neither does SIT point out the variables that could lead members of low status groups to perceive the social structure as illegitimate and unstable in the first place. These

SIT weaknesses led Taylor and McKirnan (1984) to develop the five-stage model of intergroup relations.

1.3.3 The five-stage model

Taylor and McKirnan's (1984) *five-stage model* (FSM) constitutes an extension of SIT and allows for some more testable predictions regarding collective protest.

1.3.3.1 The theoretical model

According to the FSM, relations between high and low status groups pass through five separate stages that always follow the same temporal sequence (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). In the first stage, groups are clearly stratified on the basis of ascribed characteristics, such as race and gender. This stratification though is so strong and stable that low status group members cannot question its legitimacy. In the second stage, the emergence of individualistic ideology leads individuals to perceive the previous stratification as increasingly illegitimate, so it is replaced with the notion that group membership is based on individual achievement and skills. This allows individuals to think that social mobility is possible (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984).

In the third stage, individuals adopt the individual mobility strategy (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). Those who are relatively highly skilled and educated will try to abandon their low status ingroup, become a part of the higher status outgroup, and conform to the latter's norms. Yet, those who are not accepted by the higher status outgroup will return to their previous ingroup and introduce stage four. In doing so, they will attempt to raise the consciousness of their fellow ingroup members and persuade them that the group boundaries are impermeable and that the ingroup's illegitimate status can only be changed through collective protest. Provided that fellow ingroup members are convinced, stage five finally comes into play. In this stage the low status group acts collectively and competitively aiming at a more equitable redistribution of resources (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984).

Therefore, in line with Taylor and McKirnan's (1984) FSM, low status group members will always tend to choose individual strategies over collective ones to cope with their negative social identity. Collective protest will only be preferred when group

boundaries are perceived as impermeable. This proposition renders the socio-structural variable of permeability crucial in determining strategy choice and thus the occurrence of collective protest. A series of studies, mainly experimental in nature, lend support to the FSM proposition that individual strategies will be generally preferred unless group boundaries are perceived as impermeable (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright & Taylor, 1998).

1.3.3.2 Experimental evidence in support of the FSM

Wright et al. (1990) were among the first to produce relevant evidence by experimentally manipulating the perceived openness of the high status outgroup so that group boundaries were open, closed, or partially open (30% or 2% quota). By crossing the individual/collective dimension and the normative/non-normative dimension Wright et al. (1990) gave participants four behavioural options in response to disadvantage (i.e., inability to enter the high status outgroup). Thereby, participants were prompted to choose among a) individual normative action (i.e., request for an individual retest), b) individual non-normative action (i.e., writing a petition demanding that the participant be accepted into the advantaged group), c) collective normative action (i.e., request for a collective retest), and d) collective non-normative action (i.e., writing a petition that would incite fellow ingroup members to collectively force the higher status group to allow access). Participants could also choose to accept their disadvantage. Note that following the definition of collective protest given in section 1.1 it is only the non-normative options that indicate protest; request for a retest does not necessarily imply dissent against one's disadvantaged position. This observation will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3, in order to discuss the incapacity of Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm to account for the occurrence of normative (or non-disruptive) protest.

Wright et al. (1990) found that when group boundaries were perceived as open, participants preferred individual normative action, whereas in the completely impermeable condition they opted for collective non-normative action (i.e., collective protest). Interestingly enough, even when access to the advantaged group was highly restricted (2% quota, which is defined as *tokenism*), the members of the disadvantaged group still preferred individual action, particularly the non-normative kind. This tokenism

effect, albeit in line with SIT and the FSM, was not explicitly predicted by either of the two theories. Still, Wright et al.'s (1990) findings underline the great impact perceived permeability of group boundaries can have on choice of identity management strategies. Their study thus lends support to the fundamental assumption underpinning the FSM: Collective protest will only be preferred under conditions of complete impermeability.

Lalonde and Silverman (1994) have provided further support for this assumption. They found that high preference for individual action, either normative (i.e., request for an individual retest) or non-normative (i.e., exiting the experimental situation), was manifested even in the closed boundary condition: Endorsement of collective action (i.e., organising a collective petition) in that condition was equal to the endorsement of individual strategies. In a replication of Wright et al.'s (1990) experiment, Wright and Taylor (1998) uncovered similar findings: Open group boundaries evoked individual action, whereas closed ones resulted in collective action. In particular, the tokenism effect was once more clearly demonstrated: Members of the low status group preferred individual non-normative action in the highly restricted condition. Thus, Wright and Taylor (1998) corroborated the contention that "tokenism can be an effective tool for reducing the likelihood of collective action directed against the discriminatory practices of the advantaged group" (p. 647). This finding could very effectively account for the fact that in many intergroup situations injustice directed towards the disadvantaged group does not lead ingroup members to question the system and engage in collective protest.

1.3.3.3 Explaining the tokenism effect

In offering an explanation of the tokenism effect, Wright (1997) has pointed out that there is inherent ambiguity involved in the tokenism context, which influences not only the perception of the permeability variable, but also that of the status legitimacy and stability variables. He argues that the success of a few tokens coming from the low status group creates uncertainty about the group's position. On one hand, low status group members may perceive tokenism as discriminatory and, therefore, illegitimate, because entry to the high status group is partially based on group membership. On the other hand, they may perceive tokenism as legitimate, because individual merit is also used as a criterion for entry. This legitimacy-related uncertainty should further blur expectations

about how fellow ingroup members understand the situation, which should lead to uncertainty regarding the extent to which there is ingroup support for collective protest. Wright (1997) claims that this kind of uncertainty should affect perceptions of stability by lowering expectations for a) ingroup support for action and b) the likelihood that the ingroup status will change in the future.

In order to provide support for the above reasoning as an explanation of individuals' preference for individual non-normative action in the tokenism condition, Wright (1997) manipulated perceptions of legitimacy and stability. He manipulated legitimacy by having an ingroup member label (or not) the advantaged group's action as discriminatory, whereas he manipulated stability by having the same ingroup member express (or not) anger about it, which was expected to increase participants' confidence that their position was modifiable. Although he found that across conditions participants still preferred the individual non-normative strategy, interest in collective strategies increased significantly in the high illegitimacy-high instability condition. Therefore, these findings provide support for Wright's (1997) reasoning that the tokenism context influences simultaneously perceptions of permeability, legitimacy, and stability.

1.3.3.4 Critique

In summary, the experimental studies reviewed thus far reveal the important role that permeability of group boundaries plays in determining the choice of negative social identity management strategies. However, three major weaknesses call into question the generalisation of the repeated finding that individual strategies are generally preferred and that collective protest will not occur unless group boundaries are perceived as completely closed.

A first weakness of the experimental evidence in support of the FSM had to do with the individualistic nature of laboratory experiments which may have consistently triggered preference for individual strategies. What usually happens in such settings is that participants are assigned to ad hoc experimental groups, seated at individual desks separated by dividers, and instructed not to interact with one another but to work independently. The problem with this is that it is not possible for these groups to elicit

high levels of group identification, which seems to play an important role in strategy choice as mentioned in section 1.3.2.3 and as will be further argued in section 1.3.4.

It should be acknowledged, though, that Wright and Taylor (1998) did try to reduce the individualistic nature of their experiment by having ingroup members interact face-to-face just before the main experimental procedure. Results, however, remained the same: Participants preferred individual action in the open and in the token 2% conditions whereas collective action in the closed condition. Yet, it is not safe to assume that a brief introduction of participants to their fellow ingroup members and a subsequent five-minute discussion on a decision task can raise identification. Most importantly, reported experiments do not usually even measure levels of group identification (e.g., Wright & Taylor, 1998; Wright et al., 1990). Had identification been measured and turned out to be low, one could easily explain the preference for individual strategies.

A second weakness of the experimental evidence in support of the FSM relates to the possibility that the high preference for individual strategies may have been due to measurement bias. Louis and Taylor (1999) argue that participants' consistent preference for individual strategies over collective ones may have been "artifactually increased by the conceptualization of collective action solely in terms of group organization behaviours" (p. 22). Indeed, the collective non-normative action that is normally offered as a choice to participants has to do with organising/writing a petition inciting fellow ingroup members to collectively force the higher status group to allow access (e.g., Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright et al., 1990). However, group organisation behaviours call for a greater level of commitment to the group, which makes them less appealing than group support behaviours (Louis & Taylor, 1999). Given that this high level of commitment is rather unlikely to have been produced in the transitory experimental groups discussed above, it is not surprising that participants usually prefer individual strategies over collective ones.

A third weakness of the experimental evidence that lends support to the FSM is associated with the lack of generalisability of this often reported high preference for individual strategies. In fact, there is research to suggest that this preference is not always the case. Specifically, preference for individual strategies was reversed in a replication of Wright et al.'s (1990) experiment by Boen and Vanbeselaere (1998): Using more

meaningful 'real-world' groups (existing high school classes) they found that collective action was generally preferred across all permeability conditions (open, minimally open, closed). They also found that participants were more likely to prefer normative over non-normative action in the open and minimally open conditions, but not in the closed one. So, in a sense Boen and Vanbeselaere (1998) replicated the tokenism effect, albeit on a different behavioural dimension, the normative/non-normative one.

This last finding was once more replicated by Vanbeselaere, Boen, and Smeesters (2003). They used groups as tokens (i.e., it was the group as a whole rather than individual members being denied entry) and found that non-normative action was only preferred in the closed condition. If anything, the experiments by Boen and Vanbeselaere (1998) and Vanbeselaere, Boen, and Smeesters (2003) seem to suggest that replacing the individual/collective dimension with the normative/non-normative dimension is perhaps in order. In that case the tokenism effect would mean that members of a disadvantaged group opt for normative action as long as the group boundaries are open, even minimally so.

In conclusion, although the FSM contributes to the study of collective protest by providing a number of testable hypotheses, its concept is too individualistic. Its assumption that collective protest will be preferred only under conditions of impermeability has been strongly contested by Boen and Vanbeselaere (1998) and Vanbeselaere, Boen, and Smeesters (2003). Moreover, the individualistic nature of the experimental research in support of this model, the measurement bias in favour of individual strategies, and the absence of any reference to group identification all reflect the individualistic ideology underpinning the FSM. Albeit an extension of SIT, the FSM fails to take into account the most important contribution of its predecessor: the role of group identification.

1.3.4 The role of group identification

We now turn to experimental and field research into group identification and its relationships to socio-structural variables (i.e., permeability, legitimacy, and stability) and collective protest (e.g, Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers et al., 1990; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg., 1993; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999). Two of the

mechanisms via which group identification promotes collective protest, namely commitment to the ingroup (e.g., Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997) and self-stereotyping (e.g., Turner et al., 1987), are also discussed here. Finally, there will also be a discussion about whether identification with a social movement organisation (SMO) is a better predictor of collective protest than is identification with the disadvantaged group in general (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon et al., 1998; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

1.3.4.1 Experimental evidence for the role of group identification

A good deal of experimental research into the relationships of group identification with socio-structural variables and identity management strategies has been conducted by Ellemers and her colleagues (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers et al., 1990; Ellemers et al., 1993). Consistent with SIT (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the general finding is that group identification is predicted by all three socio-structural variables, though independently of each other.

Specifically, Ellemers (1993) has shown that members of low status groups experience low group identification when group boundaries are permeable, in which case they tend to prefer individual strategies. In the same study she found, however, that regardless of permeability ingroup members generally show rather strong identification and prefer collective strategies when the ingroup status is perceived as unstable. This last finding comes to contest once more the FSM assumption that collective strategies will not be preferred unless boundaries are perceived as completely closed.

As far as legitimacy is concerned, illegitimate low group status enhances group identification (Ellemers, 1993). Ellemers et al. (1993) have found that the effect of illegitimacy on identification is especially pronounced when there is also instability of group status and impermeability of group boundaries. Nonetheless, legitimacy does not have a strong impact on strategy choice; stability and permeability seem to exert greater influence (Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers et al., 1993).

1.3.4.2 Field evidence for the role of group identification

An important field study conducted in East Germany by Mummendey, Klink et al. (1999) lent 'real-world' support to the findings of Ellemers and her colleagues (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers et al., 1990; Ellemers et al., 1993). Mummendey, Klink et al. (1999) examined the intergroup relations between East and West Germans after the reunification of East and West Germany, in order to investigate the impact of socio-structural variables and of group identification on identity management strategies used by East Germans. Despite the political and financial aid that West Germany had offered to East Germany, at the time of the study (and perhaps even nowadays) East and West Germans considered themselves as two separate groups of unequal status, with the East Germans experiencing a negative social identity due to their lower status. One of the major findings of Mummendey, Klink et al.'s (1999) study was that socio-structural variables predicted identity management strategies in directions consistent with SIT and independently of each other, in keeping with the experiments by Ellemers and colleagues reviewed above. So, it was not necessary that all conditions were present for collective protest to occur.

Specifically, perceived impermeability of group boundaries and illegitimacy of the low ingroup status were positively correlated with the adoption of collective strategies, although the legitimacy effects were rather weak. This was in line with Ellemers et al.'s (1993) findings. However, only when status was perceived as stable and *not* as unstable did East Germans opt for collective strategies. In explaining this finding, Mummendey, Klink et al. (1999) argued that, because politicians had promised East Germans to raise their living conditions to the West German level, instability of status represented the common ground. So, it is understandable why perceived *stability*, rather than instability, would lead to social competition between East and West Germans. If anything, the stability finding underlines the importance of the intergroup context in determining the effects of socio-structural variables on strategy choice.

Mummendey, Klink et al. (1999) also found that group identification was a powerful mediator: It fully mediated the effects of permeability, stability, and legitimacy on identity management strategy choice. Mummendey, Klink et al. (1999) specifically found that the 'assimilators' (i.e., those East Germans who perceived group boundaries as permeable and their inferior status as unstable and legitimate) identified less strongly

with East Germans and were thus more likely to engage in individual mobility. In contrast, the 'separatists' (i.e., those East Germans who perceived group boundaries as impermeable and their inferior status as stable and illegitimate) identified more strongly with East Germans and were thus more likely to opt for social competition.

Therefore, Mummendey, Klink et al.'s (1999) study provides an important field test of the role of group identification, a variable that SIT did not explicitly regard as a mediator when SIT was first postulated and that the FSM completely disregarded.

1.3.4.3 Mechanisms via which group identification promotes collective protest

One of the mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, in order to explain the effect of group identification in predicting collective protest, is related to the ensuing commitment to the ingroup. Specifically, Ellemers et al. (1997) measured group identification as an individual difference and produced the following findings using ad hoc experimental groups: When compared with low identifiers, high identifiers perceived the low status ingroup as more homogeneous, were more committed to their group, and were less likely to opt for individual mobility strategies. These findings stood, even when participants were not aware of the relative group status. In a similar vein, Doosje et al. (2002) found that, when compared with low identifiers, high identifiers were more committed to their low status ingroup even if the group faced an uncertain or bleak future. Taken together, the above pieces of research reveal that identification entails high commitment to the group. Being committed makes it much harder for the individual to abandon the group and to choose individual mobility. In other words, identification becomes an internal barrier to perceived boundary permeability, thus increasing interest in collective protest (Wright & Tropp, 2002).

From the point of view of SCT (Turner et al., 1987), group identification brings the individual and the societal together: Individuals categorise and define themselves as group members, which entails a shift from personal to social identity. This *self-stereotyping* process helps individuals internalise and conform to the norms of the group they identify with, which facilitates group behaviour and thus collective protest. The above line of thought has been explored by Reicher and his colleagues in the domain of collective protest and, in particular, of crowd behaviour (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999,

2000, 2005; Reicher, 1984, 1996, 2003; Stott & Drury, 2000). Given that crowd contexts are novel situations where there are no predefined norms for individuals to adhere to, Reicher (1984, 1996, 2003) argues crowd members will infer the nature of the ingroup identity and will behave accordingly. So, rather than *losing* their identity, as Le Bon (1896/2002) would have argued, crowd members *change* identity and exhibit behaviour consonant with the norms of the newly-adopted group identity (Reicher, 1984, 1996, 2003).

It follows that police and rioters, for example, are not one mass of disinhibited individuals; rather, they are two opposing groups with different perspectives and goals, where one group's actions form the context for further action on the part of the other group (Reicher, 1984, 1996, 2003). In contrast to previous 'irrational' accounts of collective protest discussed above (e.g., Dollard et al., 1939; Le Bon, 1896/2002; Zimbardo, 1969), Reicher (1984) in his famous study of the St Paul's riot in 1982 in Bristol provided evidence to substantiate Fogelson's (1969) observation concerning the American urban disturbances of the 1960s: "... restraint and selectivity are certainly among the most crucial features of the riots" (p. 39). Indeed, Reicher (1984) found that behaviours that did not serve the ingroup goal of evicting the police from the St Paul's area were not only generalised, but were also criticised. This observation led Reicher (1984) to state that there is nothing primitive about riots; rather, he argued, the limits of participation are the limits of identification. Identity thus becomes a guide to action and social change (Reicher, 1984, 1996, 2003).

1.3.4.4 Identification as an activist

Simon, Stürmer, and colleagues (e.g., Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) elaborated on the above role of identity and identification by positing that identification with a SMO is much more conducive to collective protest than is identification with the disadvantaged group in general. To illustrate, Simon et al. (1998) conducted field studies in two different social contexts, the elderly people's movement in Germany ('Gray Panthers') and the gay movement in the US. They found that identification with the movement in question was a much stronger predictor of willingness to participate in collective protest than was identification with the broader category of older or gay

people. Similarly, Kelly and Breinlinger (1996) examined collective protest among women and found that identification as an "activist" predicted willingness to engage in collective protest much more reliably than did gender identity. Identification as an activist was even the only significant predictor in the case of past participation in collective protest.

Further supporting evidence comes from De Weerd and Klandermans' (1999) study into farmers' protest in the Netherlands. They showed that identification with farmers as a group, rather than with farming as a profession, significantly predicted action preparedness and that it was the behavioural component only (i.e., whether the participant was part of a farmers' organisation) that had a direct effect on actual participation. By using a longitudinal design De Weerd and Klandermans also managed to show that identification with a movement can *causally* precede participation in collective protest. Stürmer and Simon (2004) extended these findings by means of a panel study in the context of the German gay movement. They uncovered a bidirectional causal relationship between identification with the movement and subsequent participation in collective protest. As such, Stürmer and Simon (2004) found that identification was a cause, as well as an effect of collective protest participation. This means that participating in collective protest may contribute to the formation of an activist identity, which is expressed and confirmed by continued participation.

Following Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach to collective protest which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3, one may consider this activist identity as a *politicised* identity. They define this concept by saying that people exhibit such identity "to the extent that they engage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the more inclusive societal context in which this struggle has to be fought out" (p. 319). Thus, by engaging in collective protest and forming politicised identities, as revealed by Stürmer and Simon's (2004) study reported above, people seem to develop a stronger "inner obligation" to participate in collective protest.

To illustrate, Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, and Jorger (2003) studied the case of the fat acceptance movement in the US and showed that a sense of inner obligation to express one's identification with the movement fully mediated the relationship between

identification and group organisation behaviours: in Simon's (2004) words, "to be is to do and to do is to be" (p. 187). Stürmer et al's (2003) finding helps explain why identification with a SMO (i.e., a politicised identity) is more predictive of collective protest than is identification with the disadvantaged group in general (i.e., a non-politicised identity). Indeed, a meta-analytic review of the literature by Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) confirmed that politicised identities yielded significantly stronger effect sizes on collective protest participation than did non-politicised identities.

Summary and Conclusion

Chapter 1 started off by clarifying that group support (as opposed to group organisation) protest behaviours against ingroup (as opposed to outgroup) disadvantage will be of interest for this thesis. The working definition of collective protest was followed by a critical examination of the main theoretical frameworks that have attempted to provide an explanation for the phenomenon of collective protest. Firstly, individual-level theories were discussed. Le Bon's (1896/2002) theory of crowd behaviour, Dollard et al.'s (1939) frustration-aggression hypothesis, and Zimbardo's (1969) deindividuation theory were criticised as inadequate to explain collective protest for two main reasons: lack of attention to the intergroup context and conceptualisation of collective protest as a primitive and irrational affair whereby individuals become disinhibited and prone to mindless acts of barbarity. Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model managed to tackle the latter criticism by endowing collective protest with a (perhaps overly) rational character. Despite its strength, Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model failed to pay appropriate attention to the intergroup context similarly to the other individual-level theories.

Subsequently, this chapter went on to discuss group- and intergroup-level theories of collective protest. RDT (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Pettigrew, 1967; Runciman, 1966) was commended for building on the concept of deprivation posited by Dollard et al. (1939) and proposing that it was relative, rather than objective, deprivation urging individuals to protest. The additional distinctions between personal and collective RD, as well as between cognitive and affective RD, were equally commendable. Nevertheless, RDT was criticised as being of limited value due to its inability to predict either the referent of a

group's social comparison or the dimensions which group members choose to compare themselves upon. RDT was also criticised for failing to capture the psychological processes involved in the emergence of affective RD.

SIT (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) was presented next and praised for distinguishing between personal and social identity and for offering the construct of group identification as the link between the personal and the social. SIT was also commended for its focus on the intergroup context and the socio-structural variables (i.e., permeability of group boundaries and status legitimacy and stability) that seem to influence levels of group identification, as well as choice of identity management strategies, collective protest being one of them. However, SIT fails to offer any concrete testable hypotheses as to the precise conditions under which collective protest will arise. Taylor and McKirnan's (1984) FSM was subsequently presented as a SIT extension that succeeded in offering those testable hypotheses by suggesting that collective protest will not be preferred unless group boundaries are perceived as impermeable. Despite the empirical support in favour, the FSM can be heavily criticised on both theoretical and methodological grounds. In particular, its utter lack of mention to the role of group identification which was the major contribution of its predecessor (i.e., SIT) was pointed out as an important weakness.

The role of group identification was subsequently reasserted by looking at research showing that high identifiers are more likely to prefer collective protest, when compared with low identifiers, and that identification can be a powerful mediator between socio-structural variables and collective protest (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey, Klink et al., 1999). The identification effect on protest was further shown to be related to increased commitment to the group and adherence to its norms, even in novel group situations, such as crowds (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002; Reicher, 1984). Chapter 1 finally distinguished between politicised and non-politicised identity and showed that politicised identity is the most proximal predictor of collective protest through increased inner obligation to participate (e.g., De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer et al., 2003).

To conclude, it becomes clear that every theory of collective protest has strengths but also shortcomings. Integration of the two most important theories in the field (i.e., RDT and SIT) is in order and this is therefore examined in the next chapter. After all, Tajfel

(1978) himself suggested that only by integrating RDT and SIT would there be a complete social psychological account of collective protest. For example, SIT helps RDT to improve its precision by making clear that it is only those group members who identify with the ingroup that will experience frustration and discontent and will thus take part in collective protest (e.g., Abrams, 1990; Tougas & Veilleux, 1988). Nevertheless, even when integrated, RDT and SIT are still inadequate, because they do not offer a convincing mechanism via which feelings of discontent and group identification are translated into action. One can easily imagine members of a disadvantaged group identifying strongly with the ingroup and experiencing deep feelings of injustice and frustration, but refraining from taking part in collective protest to redress their disadvantage, because, for example, they think they do not have the power to change reality. Therefore, the next chapter also introduces Bandura's (e.g., 1995, 1997) concept of *collective efficacy* as an additional pathway leading to collective protest.

With regards to the main research question that this thesis seeks to address, that is, whether normative and non-normative types of collective protest are triggered equally by the same motives or whether some motives are more important for one type of protest than for the other, the literature reviewed in this chapter helps in the following manner. It provides evidence to suggest that affective collective RD and group identification are two important motives in the precipitation of collective protest. However, Chapter 1 has not provided an answer as to whether these two motives predict equally normative and non-normative forms of protest. Hypotheses about the relative impact of these two motives and of the collective efficacy motive will be postulated in Chapter 3, following an integration of all three motives in one joint theoretical framework to be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Integration and the Pragmatics of Collective Protest

Introduction

Following from the inadequacies characterising RDT and SIT, the two main social psychological theories on collective protest discussed in the previous chapter, Chapter 2 focuses on previous attempts at integration of these two theories given that there are a fair amount of similarities between the two. For example, both theories contend that individuals consider themselves as members of a group and their group membership as having a number of emotional and motivational consequences. Both theories also propose that social comparison processes are crucial in determining the perceptions and feelings of injustice and inequality that lead to collective protest. Therefore, the first part of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of previous attempts at an integration of RDT with SIT.

As also argued in the conclusion of Chapter 1, however, a theoretical integration of these two theories is still inadequate to fully explain the phenomenon of collective protest. Neither one of the theories proposes the means by which their main explanations, feelings of injustice and group identification, are converted into action. An integrative theory of collective protest needs to take into account as well the role of the *pragmatics* of protest, the practical considerations that may promote or inhibit participation. The second part of Chapter 2 thus focuses on the pragmatics of protest, specifically on the role of collective efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 1995, 1997), because efficacy has been shown to be a crucial instrumental explanation of collective protest (e.g., Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).

The final part of this chapter discusses theoretical integrations of collective efficacy with RDT and SIT explanations. This way a more elaborate framework predicting collective protest will be postulated that will provide the basis for the theoretical Chapter 3 and the empirical Chapter 4 to address the main research question regarding whether protest motives are equally important for normative and non-normative forms of protest.

2.1 RDT and SIT integration

Four major attempts at theoretical integration of RDT with SIT, namely the integrative frameworks proposed by Tougas and Veilleux (1988), Abrams (1990), Kawakami and Dion (1995), and Grant (2008), will be critically examined in the following pages.

2.1.1 Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) integration

Tougas and Veilleux (1988) were among the first to attempt a theoretical integration of RDT with SIT following Guimond and Dubé-Simard's (1983) hypothesis that affective RD depends on the level of identification with one's disadvantaged group. As referred to in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.1.7), Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) manipulated cognitive RD, but produced no effect on affective RD. This led them to propose that for affective RD to arise individuals have to perceive themselves as group members and experience a certain attachment to this group in addition to perceiving intergroup inequality.

2.1.1.1 The theory

Tougas and Veilleux (1988) wished to test Guimond and Dubé-Simard's (1983) hypothesis, in order to specify whether group identification could actually be one of the underlining psychological processes responsible for the emergence of the affective component of collective RD. Tougas and Veilleux (1988) further suggested that affective RD should mediate the relationship between group identification and attitudes towards social change (i.e., support for affirmative action in favour of women). In other words, they hypothesised that individuals who strongly identify with their disadvantaged ingroup will engage in collective protest insofar as they feel dissatisfied with the ingroup's situation.

2.1.1.2 Empirical support and critique

Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) data did not lend support for the hypothesised mediating role: Identification had a direct effect on support for affirmative action, but did not influence affective RD, the latter being solely determined by cognitive RD. Tougas and Veilleux (1988) explained this finding as indicating a way for the ingroup members to

preserve their self-esteem: Rather than emphasising the dissatisfaction for being a member of a disadvantaged group which one cannot abandon, ingroup members seem to prefer focusing on how to improve the situation once inequality has been perceived. Therefore, Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) findings suggest that RDT and SIT explanations are fairly independent of each other, which goes against Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) initial intentions of providing evidence for an integrative framework where RDT and SIT explanations are intrinsically linked.

2.1.2 Abrams' (1990) integration

Although Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) study did not provide evidence for an empirical link between group identification and affective RD, Abrams' (1990) study managed to show support for this hypothesised relationship.

2.1.2.1 Theory and empirical support

As mentioned in Chapter 1 (see sections 1.3.1.4 and 1.3.1.6), Abrams (1990) examined the case of Scottish nationalism among young Scots and their deprivation in relation to English people. In extending Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) initial theorising Abrams (1990) argued that group identification should motivate feelings of outrage at the ingroup's illegitimately low status, because a strong group identity involves placing heightened importance on the outcomes of social comparisons between the ingroup and the outgroup. Therefore, Abrams (1990) predicted and found that identification with Scotland enhanced affective RD which was also influenced by cognitive RD in line with Tougas and Veilleux (1988).

Abrams (1990) also suggested two more points on which further integration of RDT with SIT was possible. Firstly, he argued that SIT helps to improve the predictive capacity of RDT by specifying that it is only those who endorse social change beliefs (i.e., Scottish nationalist attitudes) who will decide to protest collectively, in order to express their feelings of discontent against the unfair treatment that the ingroup has received. This line of reasoning implies that social change beliefs mediate the relationship between affective RD and collective protest (i.e., SNP voting intentions). Therefore, Abrams (1990) predicted and found that endorsement of Scottish nationalist

attitudes mediated the relationship between affective RD and intentions to vote for the Scottish Nationalist Party.

Secondly, in keeping with the direct effect of identification on support for affirmative action uncovered by Tougas and Veilleux (1988), Abrams (1990) reasoned that another way in which SIT enhances RDT's predictive capacity is by emphasising the importance of holding a strong group identity as a necessary condition for involvement in collective protest. In line with SCT (Turner et al., 1987; see section 1.3.4.3), Abrams (1990) argued that individuals are more likely to support the protest actions of a group with which they identify highly, because they are more inclined to self-stereotype and thus behave as a representative of that group. Therefore, Abrams (1990) predicted and found that identification with Scotland had a direct effect on intentions to vote for the Scottish Nationalist Party, in addition to an indirect effect through increased affective RD as mentioned above.

2.1.2.2 Critique

In summary, Abrams (1990) validated and extended Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) proposed integration of RDT with SIT by providing evidence for a truly integrative framework that envisages collective protest (in the form of voting intentions) as being influenced by group identification both directly and indirectly through heightened affective RD. Abrams' (1990) integration also regards social change beliefs (in the form of nationalist attitudes) as mediating the relationship between affective RD and collective protest. However, in conceptualising the above framework Abrams (1990) did not consider SIT's extension, namely SCT, to the same extent as did Kawakami and Dion (1995) whose integration is discussed next.

2.1.3 Kawakami and Dion's (1995) integration

A more comprehensive attempt at theoretical integration of RDT with SIT has been undertaken by Kawakami and Dion (1995), who have also considered the role of SCT in much more depth than did previous integrations.

2.1.3.1 The theory

In line with SCT, Kawakami and Dion (1995) argue that situational and contextual factors have a significant impact on the salience of various possible self-images and that behaviour will depend on whether personal or social identities are salient. Kawakami and Dion (1995) suggest that when personal identities are salient, individuals will make intragroup comparisons, whereas when social identities are salient, they will make intergroup comparisons. Kawakami and Dion (1995) further propose that the outcomes of either type of comparison will lead to negative identities insofar as the comparison dimension is central to the salient identities. Negative personal identities will result in feelings of personal RD, whereas negative social identities will result in feelings of collective RD. Kawakami and Dion (1995) specify that the emergence of feelings of RD depends not only on the negative identity, but also on the perception that the inequitable position is illegitimate (i.e., cognitive RD). This last specification is in line with Tougas and Veilleux's (1988), as well as Abrams' (1990), integrative frameworks.

With regard to the range of behaviours that will be preferred, Kawakami and Dion (1995) use Wright et al.'s (1990) normative/non-normative (or positive/negative) distinction, already introduced in Chapter 1 (see section 1.1.2.1). They propose that those individuals who have negative personal identities and consider their personal status to be illegitimately low will first attempt normative individual actions to improve their position. Should these attempts fail individuals will adopt non-normative individual actions. In contrast, Kawakami and Dion (1995) posit that those individuals who have negative social identities and consider their group status to be illegitimately low may think that established norms of equity have been broken and will thus attempt non-normative collective actions to improve the group status. Normative collective actions will only be preferred as a last resort.

2.1.3.2 Empirical support

Some support for Kawakami and Dion's (1995) integrative framework has been provided by Kawakami and Dion's (1993) study which was explicitly designed to examine the validity of the above framework. Kawakami and Dion (1993) made use of a role-play procedure whereby they asked participants to imagine themselves as students in a

psychology class. Following that, they manipulated perceptions of intragroup and intergroup inequalities by describing the student's grade (or the average grade of the student's tutorial group) as a little lower or much lower than the average grade of their tutorial group (or another tutorial group). The researchers also manipulated salience of the student's personal or social identity.

In line with their hypotheses, they found that, when social identity was made salient, participants reported higher levels of collective RD and were more likely to take collective actions, albeit positive (i.e., normative) ones, such as working harder and asking for more help from the teaching assistant. Also in line with their hypotheses, Kawakami and Dion (1993) found that, when personal identity was made salient, participants were more likely to exhibit individual actions, albeit negative (i.e., non-normative) ones, such as complaining to the professor, switching tutorial group, or dropping the class. However, participants were no more likely to report higher levels of personal RD when their personal identities were salient than when their social identities were salient.

2.1.3.3 Critique

The above findings are generally consistent with Kawakami and Dion's (1995) integrative framework, notwithstanding the absence of a salience effect on personal RD. Nevertheless, in closer relation to the interests of this thesis, their framework was not supported in terms of the predictions regarding preference for normative or non-normative actions. Kawakami and Dion (1995) posit that salience of a negative personal identity will first lead to the adoption of normative individual action, whereas salience of a negative social identity will first lead to the adoption of non-normative collective action.

What Kawakami and Dion (1993) found, however, was that non-normative (rather than normative) individual actions and normative (rather than non-normative) collective actions were preferred under conditions of personal identity salience and social identity salience, respectively. Despite the fact that Kawakami and Dion (1995) do not provide an adequate explanation as to why aggrieved individuals should first prefer normative (rather than non-normative) individual action under conditions of personal identity

salience, one cannot help noticing that Kawakami and Dion's (1993) study was quite weak on methodological grounds. These methodological weaknesses may have been responsible for failing to provide support for Kawakami and Dion's (1995) hypotheses regarding preference for normative or non-normative action.

Specifically, Kawakami and Dion's (1993) conceptualisation of collective action was incorrect. In line with the definition of collective protest provided in Chapter 1 (see section 1.1), the term 'collective' does not refer to the number of participants. Rather, it refers to whether the action aims at the improvement of the group's status as opposed to the improvement of one's own position (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright et al., 1990). However, Kawakami and Dion (1993) conceptualised collective action in terms of numbers rather than in terms of aims. Thus, the action items offered to participants were presented as options to improve their *own* situation either alone (which was considered as individual action) or with their tutorial group (which was considered as collective action). The failure of the above operationalisation to capture the actual meaning of collective action is mirrored in the fact that Kawakami and Dion (1993) found no correlation whatsoever between collective RD and collective action tendencies (either normative or non-normative). Therefore, Kawakami and Dion's (1993) study cannot provide any safe conclusions regarding the action items preferred by participants whose social identities were salient.

In summary, Kawakami and Dion's (1995) framework does a good job integrating insights from RDT and SIT, as well as from SIT's extension, SCT; it clearly delineates the manner in which identity salience influences comparison processes and outcomes, as well as feelings of deprivation and action tendencies. It is commendable that their framework also takes into account the distinction between normative and non-normative actions, despite the fact it does not fully explain or empirically substantiate the hypothesis related to preference for normative actions under conditions of personal identity salience. Although it focuses on identity salience rather than group identification, Kawakami and Dion's (1995) framework is in line with previous integrations by supporting the mediating role of affective RD between identity and action. However, their framework does not leave room for a direct effect of identity on action, thus disregarding the direct effect of identification on support for social change which was produced by Tougas and

Veilleux's (1988) and Abrams' (1990) studies. This direct effect was taken into account by Grant (2008), who has made the most recent attempt at integrating RDT with SIT by reconceptualising both the cognitive and affective components of RD in ways that are explained in the next section.

2.1.4 Grant's (2008) integration

The most recent attempt at theoretical integration of RDT with SIT has come from Grant (2008). He conducted a study in Canada using skilled migrants from Asia and Africa who are often underemployed as a result of credentialing problems. In line with Abrams' (1990) integrative framework, Grant (2008) posits that group identification should affect collective protest participation both directly and indirectly through affective RD. The unique contribution of Grant's (2008) integrative framework, however, lies in his reconceptualisation of cognitive and affective RD, which is now discussed.

2.1.4.1 Reconceptualising the cognitive and affective components of collective RD

Grant (2008) suggests that cognitive RD is the result of a specific combination (i.e., interaction) of a set of beliefs associated with collective protest and introduced by SIT. These beliefs have to do with the legitimacy and stability of the intergroup context, discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.2.3). To reiterate one of the main assumptions of SIT (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), low status group members will collectively protest their disadvantaged situation only if they can envisage cognitive alternatives to the current status quo. In other words, they will take part in collective protest insofar as they perceive their low status as illegitimate and unstable, which renders collective protest an effective way to bring about social change. Therefore, Grant (2008) posits that the interaction between status legitimacy and stability (i.e., illegitimacy x instability) forms the core of the cognitive component of RD.

With regard to the affective component of RD, Grant (2008) proposes that it "should be conceptualised as a combination of an attribution of out-group blame together with accompanying emotions" (p. 690). Grant (2008) argues that conceptualising the nature of affective RD as solely emotional does not seem to adequately explain how emotions, which are essentially of short duration, are expected to sustain collective protest

participation over long periods of time. Grant (2008) then goes on to observe that many studies measuring affective RD do so by tapping into emotions, such as anger and frustration, employing questions that imply that the (advantaged) outgroup is responsible for the disadvantaged position of the ingroup. According to Grant (2008), this attribution of outgroup blame becomes a much more likely candidate for motivating sustained participation in collective protest, because blaming the outgroup is considered an enduring group-based coping strategy in response to felt injustice. Due to the novel reconceptualisation of affective RD, Grant's (2008) study was exploratory in terms of whether blaming the outgroup resulted in emotions, such as frustration and anger, which in turn led to collective protest, or whether blaming the outgroup directly motivated protest activities with accompanying emotions.

2.1.4.2 The role of identification

Grant (2008) further integrates RDT with SIT by placing great importance on the role of group identification. In keeping with Abrams' (1990) integrative framework, Grant (2008) postulates that group identification can motivate participation in collective protest both directly and indirectly via the affective component of RD. Following the reconceptualisation of affective RD as a combination of blaming the outgroup together with concomitant emotions, Grant (2008) argues that group identification should influence the intensity of the negative emotional reaction through mediation of outgroup blame.

In addition to measuring identification with the disadvantaged group of skilled migrants from Asia and Africa (i.e., cultural identity), Grant (2008) also measured identification with the host country (i.e., national identity) responsible for the migrants' low status, because, after all, migrants may also experience an emerging identification with their new country. Therefore, he expected cultural identity to be a positive predictor of outgroup blame and collective protest intentions, whereas national identity was thought to be a negative predictor of those same variables, the rationale being that migrants identifying with the host country should be less willing to complain against a social injustice perpetrated by their own ingroup.

2.1.4.3 Empirical support

In line with the integrative framework described above, Grant (2008) found that the reconceptualisation of both the cognitive and affective components of RD was supported by the data. As such, cognitive RD in terms of beliefs that the low group status is both illegitimate and unstable predicted collective protest intentions, as well as past protest participation, through the mediation of the outgroup-blame component of affective RD. Accompanying emotions were also found to be strongly predicted by outgroup blame, but were not predictive of either collective protest intentions or past participation. So, it was the outgroup-blame component of affective RD that had a direct effect on protest.

Again, consistent with his hypotheses, identification with the disadvantaged (cultural) group was a positive predictor of outgroup blame, whereas identification with the nation was a negative predictor. However, no direct effects of either type of identification on protest were found apart from the effect of identification with the nation on past participation which was unexpectedly positive. Grant (2008) interpreted this last finding as perhaps indicating that migrants who identify strongly with their host country may feel more comfortable protesting unfair treatment against their cultural group given that protesting is every Canadian citizen's lawful right.

2.1.4.4 Critique

In summary, Grant's (2008) recent integration of RDT with SIT is an important contribution to the literature, because it reconceptualises cognitive RD in SIT terms (i.e., illegitimacy x instability interaction) and affective RD in terms of combining outgroup blame together with attendant emotional reactions, such as anger and frustration. Grant's (2008) integrative framework is also in line with previous integrations in that it envisages group identification as having an effect on collective protest both directly and indirectly via affective RD. Most importantly, following the reconceptualisation of affective RD, Grant (2008) also specifies outgroup blame as the part of affective RD that mediates between group identification and collective protest,. Furthermore, Grant (2008) measures identification with two groups (i.e., cultural and national) and shows how identifying with different groups may influence affective RD in opposite ways. Nevertheless, despite its merits and similarly to previous attempts at integrating RDT with SIT, Grant's (2008)

integrative framework does not offer a convincing mechanism that translates affective RD and group identification into collective protest. Such a mechanism is discussed in the following section.

2.2 The pragmatics of collective protest

As also argued in the conclusion of Chapter 1, the above absence of mechanism that can translate feelings of injustice and group identification into collective protest pertains to the inadequacy of RDT and SIT to address the pragmatics of collective protest, the more instrumental considerations that individuals need to take into account before participating. Such considerations have been proposed by Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model presented in Chapter 1 (see section 1.2.4) and have been integrated with SIT by Simon et al. (1998). Therefore, this section starts by discussing Simon et al.'s (1998) integrative framework and continues by discussing the role of an important instrumental consideration in predicting collective protest, namely the role of *efficacy*, collective efficacy in particular.

2.2.1 Simon et al.'s (1998) integration of SIT with Klandermans' (1997) expectancy-value model

As mentioned in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.4.4), Simon et al. (1998) conducted two field studies, one in the context of the 'Gray Panthers' (i.e., an elderly people's movement in Germany) and one in the context of the gay movement in the US.

2.2.1.1 Theory and empirical support

In conducting these two field studies, Simon et al. (1998) attempted an integration of SIT with Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model, in order to examine concurrently two different levels of analysis, the individual level as represented by Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model and the group level as represented by SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Specifically, Simon et al. (1998) measured identification both with the movement in question (i.e., politicised identity) and the disadvantaged group in general (i.e., non-politicised identity), as well as the three motives posited by Klandermans (1984, 1997; i.e., collective, social, and reward). They found that group identification,

especially in its politicised form, as well as the three instrumental motives, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in willingness to participate in collective protest. These findings suggest that SIT and the expectancy-value approach represent independent explanations of collective protest.

2.2.1.2 Critique

Though commendable for combining different levels of analysis, Simon et al.'s (1998) integration of SIT with instrumental considerations is not truly integrative. For one thing, it does not take into account any RDT explanations for collective protest despite RDT's significant contribution to the protest literature which was reviewed above (see sections 1.3.1 and 2.1). Moreover, in conceptualising SIT and instrumental considerations as independent pathways to collective protest, Simon et al.'s (1998) model does not allow for the two explanations to be intrinsically linked. As will be explained in section 2.3, however, this intrinsic link between group identification and instrumental considerations is possible, provided the latter explanation is conceptualised in terms of collective efficacy. Therefore, the role of efficacy is now discussed.

2.2.2 The role of efficacy

The concept of efficacy has been extensively investigated by Bandura (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000). He adopts an *agentic* perspective in which individuals are not just mere products of their environments, but they also actively seek to produce experiences, shape events, and influence the course of their lives.

2.2.2.1 Personal efficacy

In adopting an agentic perspective Bandura (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000) considers the belief of personal efficacy to be one of the most important mechanisms of human agency, the most important perhaps. The reason is that personal efficacy does not only affect behaviour directly, but also indirectly by its impact, for example, on goals and aspirations or the perception of obstacles and opportunities in the social environment. Bandura (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000) argues that, among other things, personal efficacy beliefs influence the goals individuals set for themselves and their commitment to them, their

persistence in the face of adversity and the accomplishments they achieve. He goes on to claim that "unless people believe that they can produce desired effects and forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act" (Bandura, 2000, p. 75).

One could extrapolate the above assertion to the domain of collective protest and argue that, regardless of their intensity of anger and identification with their ingroup, individuals will not decide to take part unless they have a high sense of personal efficacy. However, personal efficacy is related to the achievement of personal goals and outcomes, so it would be somewhat odd to expect that one's personal sense of efficacy should be related directly to goals and outcomes at the collective level. This is the reason why a number of researchers that examine collective protest have used the construct of *political* efficacy (e.g., Fiske, 1987; Kelly, 1993; Kelly & Kelly, 1994).

2.2.2.2 Political efficacy

Political efficacy has to do with the sense that an individual can exert influence on the political process (e.g., Kelly, 1993). In its formulation of collective motives, Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model presented in Chapter 1 (see section 1.2.4.1) takes into account the role of political efficacy too. Specifically, the expectation that one's own individual participation makes a difference in the achievement of the collective goal sounds very similar to one's belief that they can have an impact on the political process.

There is some evidence that political efficacy indeed plays a role in determining collective protest participation. In a review of studies regarding antecedents of nuclear activism, Fiske (1987) found that political efficacy was one of the main variables distinguishing activists from non-activists, in that activists believed that they could have an impact on government plans to reduce the chance of a nuclear war. Further supporting evidence comes from Fox and Schofield's (1989) study on the origins of anti-nuclear war activity. They measured nuclear efficacy (i.e., perceived political efficacy in issues regarding nuclear disarmament) and actual behaviour (i.e., petition-signing) and found that those participants who experienced a high sense of nuclear efficacy were more likely to take action than those who experienced a low sense of nuclear efficacy.

However, perceived political efficacy has not always been found to be related to participation in collective protest. For example, despite uncovering an effect of nuclear efficacy on actual behaviour, Fox and Schofield's (1989) study, reported above, produced no effect of nuclear efficacy on behavioural intentions to take part in nuclear activism. In addition, Schofield and Pavelchack (1989) surveyed members of the American public and found that watching a television film about nuclear war increased their intentions to take part in anti-nuclear activities even though the film had actually *decreased* their sense of efficacy. Furthermore, Kelly and Kelly (1994) worked with a sample of trade union members to investigate the role of political efficacy in predicting participation in both group support and group organisation behaviours that Kelly and Kelly (1994) defined as 'easy' and 'difficult' forms of action, respectively. They found that political efficacy did not significantly predict either type of behaviour. Finally, a more recent study into the correlates of anti-nuclear activism by Fox-Cardamone, Hinkle, and Hogue (2000) found no significant correlation between political efficacy and either behavioural intentions or actual participation (i.e., petition-signing).

One possible reason for the rather ambiguous findings concerning the role of political efficacy could be its conceptualisation at the individual level as opposed to the collective level. This distinction is very much reminiscent of Runciman's (1966) distinction between egoistic (i.e., personal) and fraternal (i.e., collective) RD, and the subsequent line of research discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.1.4), according to which it is RD experienced at the collective level that is more likely to lead to collective protest. By the same token, one should also expect efficacy experienced at the collective level to be more conducive to collective protest participation than is personal or political efficacy.

2.2.2.3 Collective efficacy

Bandura (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000) contends that just like personal efficacy is fundamental for human agency, collective efficacy (i.e., the belief that ingroup members can effectively work together to bring about desired outcomes) is in its turn fundamental for collective agency, the capacity of collectivities to shape events in desired ways. Bandura (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000) argues that people do not live their lives in isolation so they have come to realise that many of their goals can only be achieved through

interdependent endeavours. Thus, by working together they manage to attain what they cannot achieve on their own and to overcome feelings of helplessness. Bandura (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000) further maintains that, rather than being the sum of the efficacy beliefs of individual group members, collective efficacy is an emergent group-level characteristic. This is because the attainments of a group are not solely the product of shared knowledge and talents of its different members; the interaction and coordination of the transactions between members are also important for the group accomplishments.

Despite these emergent aspects, Bandura (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000) argues that collective efficacy serves functions similar to those of personal efficacy. So, among other things, collective efficacy beliefs influence the group's motivational investment in their goals and activities, the group's perseverance in the face of setbacks and impediments, and the group's performance achievements. It becomes evident that a measure of expectations regarding the ability of ingroup members to work collaboratively, in order to change their disadvantaged situation is a much more appropriate measure of efficacy in the study of collective protest.

This kind of efficacy has been also included in Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model under the concept of collective motives (see section 1.2.4.1). Specifically, the expectation that the participation of many others will make a difference in the accomplishment of the collective goal is pretty much equivalent to Bandura's (e.g., 1995, 1997) concept of collective efficacy. As mentioned above (see section 2.2.2.2), however, Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model also includes the notion of political efficacy which was shown to be inconsistently related to collective protest participation. In addition to the issues raised against his model in Chapter 1 (see section 1.2.4.2), the inadequacy of Klandermans' (1984, 1997) model in pinning down the appropriate measure of efficacy is a further issue to consider.

Some of the initial evidence in favour of the use of collective efficacy, as opposed to personal or political efficacy, in the field of collective protest comes from McKenzie-Mohr, McLoughlin, and Dyal's (1992) study of nuclear activism. McKenzie-Mohr et al. (1992) compared two groups of people holding similar anti-nuclear attitudes: One group comprised active peace campaigners, whereas the other was a community sample of non-activists. McKenzie et al. (1992) hypothesised that the first group would report a higher

sense of collective control (or collective efficacy) than would the non-activists, because very few people would actually think that they could personally have an impact on what was termed 'the arms race'.

Following a discriminant analysis, McKenzie et al. (1992) found that it was indeed the perception of collective control that was the most powerful discriminator between the two groups: Activists reported a significantly higher sense of collective control than did non-activists. Other discriminators included level of education, perception of threat, moral responsibility, personal control, and political control, in order of importance. The activists scored significantly higher on all of these measures. Thus, in line with Bandura's (1982, 1995, 1997, 2000) theory about collective efficacy, McKenzie et al. (1992) argued that the activists' focus on the collective, rather on the personal, seems to be a key factor in combating feelings of helplessness.

Ever since McKenzie et al.'s (1992) research there have been a number of attempts at integrating the pathway of collective efficacy with pathways derived from RDT and SIT (e.g., Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002; Mummendey, Kessler, et al., 1999; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). These integrative attempts have culminated with the postulation of the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) by Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008). Some of the preceding attempts at integration along with SIMCA are discussed in the following section.

2.3 Integration of collective efficacy with RDT and SIT

Four major attempts at theoretical integration of collective efficacy with RDT and SIT explanations, namely the integrative frameworks posited by Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999), Abrams and Randsley de Moura (2002), Van Zomeren et al. (2004) and Van Zomeren et al. (2008), are critically assessed in the pages to follow.

2.3.1 Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) integration

Similarly to Mummendey, Klink et al. (1999) whose study was discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.4.2), Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999) conducted another field study in East Germany, in order to test a different model predicting negative social identity management strategies. To reiterate, Mummendey, Klink et al. (1999) investigated the

impact of socio-structural variables (i.e., permeability, stability, and legitimacy) and of group identification on identity management strategies, and found that group identification mediated the effects of socio-structural variables on strategy choice.

2.3.1.1 The theory

Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999) wished to extend Mummendey, Klink et al.'s (1999) findings by adding into the equation the variables of affective collective RD and collective efficacy (or 'fraternal resentment' and 'group efficacy' as they call these constructs, respectively). Of relevance to this thesis, Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999) measured preference for collective strategies, namely social competition (e.g., "We will show the West Germans that we are the more efficient Germans") and realistic competition (e.g., "If new jobs arise in the next five years, we East Germans will have to make sure that these jobs will be established in East Germany rather than in West Germany").

In line with previous attempts at theoretical integration of RDT with SIT reviewed in section 2.1, Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999) hypothesised that the effect of group identification on strategy choice should be mediated by affective RD. They further expected that collective efficacy should mediate, at least partially, the effect of group identification on strategy choice. As such, they hypothesised that the more the participants identified with East Germans the more they should think that they could change the relation to West Germans by their own effort, thus preferring collective strategies.

2.3.1.2 Empirical support and critique

In keeping with their hypotheses, Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999) found that collective efficacy and affective RD mediated the effect of group identification on preference for social and realistic competition. However, unlike Tougas and Veilleux's (1988), Abrams' (1990) and Grant's (2008) integrative models, Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) study showed no direct effect of identification on preference for collective strategies; rather, this effect was fully mediated by increased collective efficacy and affective RD. It should be noted, though, that Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) study was only exploratory.

Therefore, the lack of a direct effect of identification on strategy choice should not be taken for granted. More importantly, Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999) were not interested in examining collective protest in particular, which would have been more relevant for this thesis. Abrams and Randsley de Moura (2002) did measure collective protest tendencies in their own research integrating collective efficacy with RDT and SIT explanations, so their integrative framework is now discussed.

2.3.2 Abrams and Randsley de Moura's (2002) integration

Following Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) addition of collective efficacy into the study of identity management strategies, Abrams and Randsley de Moura (2002) aimed to examine the independent effects of identification and collective efficacy, as well as their interaction in the case of collective protest.

2.3.2.1 Theory and empirical support

Abrams and Randsley de Moura (2002) did not have any specific hypotheses as to the direction of the potential interaction between identification and collective efficacy or as to whether the effect of identification on protest would be fully mediated by collective efficacy or not. In order to explore the above possibilities, they conducted a study among University of Kent students, who at the time were organising protests against the university management, because the latter had increased rent and food prices for students living on campus. Specifically, the student union was encouraging students to join a 'rent strike' which entailed paying their rents not to the university authorities but to the student union instead.

Abrams and Randsley de Moura (2002) measured support for the rent strike along with participants' levels of identification with fellow students and collective efficacy. They also measured affective collective RD (in relation to the participants' contemporaries who worked for a living). In line with Mummendey, Kessler et al. (1999), results showed that, when entered together with collective efficacy, group identification was no longer a significant predictor of rent strike support; rather, collective efficacy fully mediated the effect of identification. What is more, Abrams and Randsley de Moura

(2002) found that this full mediation was actually moderated by group identification. Specifically, collective efficacy predicted rent strike support among high identifiers only.

2.3.2.2 Critique

Abrams and Randsley de Moura's (2002) study lends some support to Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) finding that the effect of identification on strategy choice is fully mediated by collective efficacy, but their study also suggests that collective efficacy may only be important for high identifiers. Similarly to Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) research, however, Abrams and Randsley de Moura's (2002) study was also exploratory rather than driven by a strict theoretical framework that explicates the relationships of collective efficacy with group identification and feelings of deprivation. Such integrative frameworks have been postulated by Van Zomeren et al. (2004) and Van Zomeren et al. (2008) and are discussed in the following pages. Importantly, these two frameworks form the basis of the empirical research conducted for the purposes of this thesis.

2.3.3 Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) integration

Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) integrative model differs significantly from previous attempts at integration, because it extrapolates Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory to the group level and considers intergroup emotion theory (IET; Smith, 1993) as well. Thus, their model deems group-based anger (i.e., one type of affective collective RD) and collective efficacy as two different forms of *coping*.

2.3.3.1 Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory

According to Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory, people cope with daily events by means of appraisal, emotion, and action. Lazarus (1991, 2001) reasons that individuals first engage in *primary appraisal* of the situation, in order to assess whether, and how, it is relevant to their well-being. The situation can be deemed as 'threatening', 'challenging', or 'benign'. It is only when the situation is deemed as threatening that *secondary appraisal* will take place, Lazarus (1991, 2001) argues. This second type of appraisal concerns the evaluation of the individuals' options and resources for coping

with the threatening situation; in other words, the individuals start to wonder what they can do to deal with the threat.

Thus, secondary appraisal is expected to lead to some form of coping which Lazarus (1991, 2001) conceptualises in two distinct ways: *emotion-focused* coping and *problem-focused* coping. Emotion-focused coping regulates the emotions attached to the threatening situation and seeks to alleviate them, for example, by cognitively reappraising the situation as non-threatening. As such, when individuals engage in emotion-focused coping, they deal with the threat on a rather cognitive level. Quite differently, when individuals engage in problem-focused coping, they obtain information that would be useful for acting upon and changing reality. So, the second type of coping leads to actual behaviour aimed at alleviating the threat. Furthermore, Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory predicts that there are two different kinds of social support associated with the two types of coping discussed above. There is *emotional social support*, which contributes to the emotion-focused coping, and *instrumental social support*, which adds to the problem-focused coping.

2.3.3.2 Extrapolating Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory to the group level

By extrapolating Lazarus' (1991, 2001) theory to the group level, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) consider group-based anger to fit the emotion-focused coping, whereas they consider collective efficacy to fit the problem-focused coping. This is so, because by definition group-based anger is an emotion, whereas collective efficacy is the ingroup members' ability to handle collectively a situation that affects the ingroup. Therefore, in likening group-based anger and collective efficacy to emotion-focused coping and problem-focused coping, respectively, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) conceptualise group-based anger and collective efficacy as distinct, but complementary, pathways to collective protest.

Van Zomeren et al. (2004) further extrapolate Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory to the group level by considering the role of social support. They argue that *social opinion support*, which is social support for one's own opinion about the ingroup disadvantage, can be considered as a form of emotional social support, because it has been shown to contribute to the experience of group-based anger (Mackie et al., 2000).

Knowing that other ingroup members also appraise the situation as unfair helps define the experience as collective, thus increasing group-based anger and collective protest tendencies, as Wright (1997) has also demonstrated (see section 1.3.3.3).

Van Zomeren et al. (2004) also argue that *social action support*, which is social support for one's own intention to protest, can be considered as a form of instrumental social support. This kind of social support is not to be confused with social opinion support, because action, but not opinion, support entails the knowledge that fellow ingroup members are willing to *participate* in collective protest. Indeed, Klandermans' (1984, 1997) expectancy-value model discussed further above (see sections 1.2.4 and 2.2.2) sees expectations about the participation of others as potentially reinforcing of collective efficacy. Thus, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) regard Lazarus' (1991, 2001) instrumental social support as specific to fellow ingroup members' willingness to take part in collective protest (i.e., social action support), whereas emotional social support is considered specific to their shared appraisals of the ingroup disadvantage (i.e., social opinion support).

2.3.3.3 Intergroup emotion theory

It is worth noting that, following intergroup emotion theory (IET; Smith, 1993), Van Zomeren et al. (2004) focus explicitly on the experience of a specific emotion (i.e., anger) in response to ingroup disadvantage rather than on the experience of feelings of deprivation in general. This way, Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model becomes more specific at the same time as further expanding its theoretical background to include IET. In line with IET, once social identity is salient, ingroup members appraise events in collective, rather than in individual, terms and these group-based appraisals shape group-based emotions (Smith, 1993). Thus, consistent with RDT and SIT, IET theorists, such as Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano (1999), have found that group-based appraisals of unfairness or illegitimacy (i.e., cognitive collective RD) shape the emotion of group-based anger. This emotion is further considered to be an action-oriented emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993) and thus particularly pertinent to the study of collective protest. For example, Smith, Cronin, and Kessler (2008) have shown that anger fuels willingness to protest rather than

organisational loyalty, the latter being predicted by other group-based emotions, such as sadness.

2.3.3.4 Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model at a glance

In summary, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) extrapolate Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory to the group level and consider two complementary, albeit distinct, pathways to collective protest: the emotion-focused coping pathway and the problem-focused coping pathway. They assume that the former is consistent with RDT, SIT, and IET in that these theories underline the role of group-based anger and its related group-based appraisals of unfairness/illegitimacy in predicting collective protest. In contrast, they regard the latter as more in line with Bandura's (e.g., 1995, 1997) instrumental consideration of collective efficacy. Moreover, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) consider social opinion and action support as feeding particularly into the emotion- and problem-focused coping pathways, respectively.

2.3.3.5 Empirical support

In a series of three experimental studies that examined student samples, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) tested this dual pathway model (see Figure 2.1) and confirmed its validity. Across all three experiments they manipulated ingroup (vs. outgroup) collective disadvantage, procedural unfairness (fair vs. unfair procedure leading to disadvantage), social opinion support (high vs. medium opinion support against disadvantage) and social action support (high vs. medium). They found that under conditions of ingroup disadvantage there were indeed two distinct pathways leading to collective protest tendencies, namely group-based anger and collective efficacy. Further, consistent with their integrative framework, appraisals of procedural unfairness and social opinion support affected group-based anger, whereas appraisals of social action support affected collective efficacy. Also, under conditions of high levels on both kinds of social support, collective protest tendencies were even higher, which suggests that the emotion-focused coping pathway and the problem-focused coping pathway are not just distinct, but also complementary.



Figure 2.1. Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual pathway model predicting collective protest tendencies.

2.3.3.6 Critique

To conclude, Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) integrative framework extends previous attempts at integration of collective efficacy with RDT and SIT given that it extrapolates Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory to the group level and conceptualises collective efficacy and group-based anger as two different forms of coping with ingroup disadvantage. Their framework further expands our knowledge of collective protest by considering social support and its relationship to the two distinct, but complementary, pathways to protest. Therefore, Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) research is valuable in the sense that it integrates elements from diverse social psychological theories and demonstrates its validity across different experimental settings. Nevertheless, although Van Zomeren et al. (2004) do measure group identification, they do not explicate its relationships to the two suggested routes to collective protest. These relationships, though, have been the focus of Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA which is now discussed.

2.3.4 SIMCA

Van Zomeren et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of the collective protest literature in order to uncover the key predictors of collective protest, as well as their interrelations. In doing so, they retained the dual pathway model posited by Van Zomeren et al. (2004), added the pathway of group identification, and postulated SIMCA. This model thus considers *injustice*, *efficacy*, and *identity* as the three main predictors of collective protest participation. Most importantly, SIMCA differs from previous attempts at integration of collective efficacy with RDT and SIT explanations, because it allows all predictors to have simultaneously independent effects on collective protest, while carefully examining the relationships between all three predictors.

2.3.4.1 The vital role of identity

SIMCA attributes a key role to social identity. Thus, SIMCA considers identification with the disadvantaged ingroup to have a direct effect on collective protest, which is in line with Tougas and Veilleux's (1988), Abrams' (1990), and Grant's (2008) integrative frameworks. Furthermore and in line with the theories of self-categorisation (SCT) and intergroup emotion (IET), SIMCA considers social identity to provide the psychological basis for group-based perceptions and emotions, such as efficacy and injustice. For this reason, SIMCA regards identity as also having an indirect effect on collective protest via increased injustice and efficacy. Because the relationship of identification to feelings of injustice and affective RD has been thoroughly analysed in this chapter (e.g., Abrams, 1990; Grant, 2008; Kawakami & Dion, 1995; see section 2.1) the relationship of identification to collective efficacy is now examined.

2.3.4.2 The relationship of identity to efficacy

In line with the work by Reicher and colleagues referred to in Chapter 1 (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005; Reicher, 1984, 1996; see section 1.3.4.3), social identity interacts with the social context for social change to occur. Rather than being a constant that individuals carry with them at any given time, social identity can change according to the intergroup context. In this process of shifting identities, group members develop ideas regarding not only the *content* of their newly-adopted identity, but also the *potential* of

this identity. In other words, social identity is not just about *being*; it is also about *becoming* (Reicher, 1996, 2003). From this point of view, one may regard the expression of social identity as a strategy intended to empower group members, in order to improve their ingroup status and materialise their collective goals (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Therefore, SIMCA posits a positive relationship between identity and efficacy such that the more individuals identify with their ingroup the more efficacious in bringing about social change they will consider their group to be.

2.3.4.3 Identity as a conceptual bridge between injustice and efficacy

In deeming social identity as the basis for both the injustice and efficacy pathways, SIMCA further regards these two pathways as not sharing any other variance than the variance predicted by social identity. In other words, any correlation between the two can be explained through their shared relationship to social identity. Therefore, SIMCA considers identity as a conceptual *bridge* between the two pathways, identity thus being responsible for "the psychological connection between injustice and efficacy" (Van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 511). The lack of covariance between these two explanations of collective protest resonates with Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) and Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) integrative frameworks presented above.

2.3.4.4 Empirical support

Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analytic review has provided evidence in favour of SIMCA. They tested a model where identity was allowed to predict collective protest both directly and indirectly through injustice and efficacy and where the errors of the last two pathways were not allowed to correlate. The model fit the data well and when compared with a number of other models where, for example, there was no direct effect of identification, injustice, or efficacy on collective protest, SIMCA was found to fit the data best. The rest of the models did not fit the data well. Thereby, Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analysis lends support to the validity of SIMCA: Identity, injustice, and efficacy all independently predict collective protest, while identity exerts indirect effects too via increased efficacy and injustice. These indirect effects substantiate the role of identity as a conceptual bridge between the other two explanations of collective protest.

2.3.4.5 Critique

To conclude, when compared with previous attempts at integration (e.g., Abrams and Randsley de Moura, 2002; Mummendey, Kessler et al., 1999; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA is more useful in a number of respects. First of all, it is more inclusive given that it takes into account the role of all three predictors that the literature has identified as crucial for understanding the occurrence of collective protest. Secondly, it makes more specific predictions in that it allows a) all of the predictors to have independent effects on collective protest and b) identity to also have indirect effects via injustice and efficacy. Thirdly, it is more parsimonious, because it makes use of the role of social identity to explain why there is no need to assume any correlation between the injustice and efficacy pathways.

However, SIMCA operationalises identity both in terms of politicised identity and non-politicised identity, injustice both in cognitive (i.e., cognitive collective RD or appraisals of unfairness) and affective terms (i.e., affective collective RD or group-based anger), and efficacy both in terms of political and collective efficacy. As was shown in Chapter 1, though, it is the politicised identity and the affective component of injustice that are the most proximal predictors of collective protest (see sections 1.3.4.4 and 1.3.1.6, respectively). Furthermore, as was also demonstrated in this chapter, it is collective, rather than political, efficacy that is most relevant for predicting collective protest (see section 2.2.2.3). Finally, the coping language as extrapolated to the group level by Van Zomeren et al. (2004) is absent from the conceptualisation of SIMCA.

2.3.5 Combining SIMCA with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual-pathway model

If one takes into account the above limitations concerning the manner in which SIMCA was conceptualised and operationalised, it seems that Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual pathway model is more accurate. Nevertheless, the latter is not as inclusive due to the fact it does not consider the role of identification. For these reasons this thesis employs Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model as the basis for the empirical research to be carried out while adding the pathway of identity. In retaining the coping language, this piece of work keeps on regarding group-based anger as a form of emotion-focused coping (i.e., emotional pathway to collective protest) and collective efficacy as a form of problem-

focused coping (i.e., instrumental pathway to collective protest). To be in sync with the terms 'emotional' and 'instrumental', this thesis at times addresses the pathway of identification as the 'identity-related' pathway. In keeping with SIMCA this thesis further considers identification as a conceptual bridge between the emotional and instrumental pathways. Finally, in line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model, the two kinds of social support, social opinion and action support, are assumed to feed into the emotional and instrumental pathways, respectively.

Summary and Conclusion

This second chapter began with a critical overview of the major attempts at integration of RDT with SIT. To this end, the theoretical frameworks by Tougas and Veilleux (1988), Abrams (1990), Kawakami and Dion (1995), and Grant (2008) were critically presented and discussed. In particular, Abrams' (1990) framework was commended for validating and extending Tougas and Veilleux's (1988) integration by providing support for a direct effect of identification on collective protest tendencies (in the form of voting intentions), as well as an indirect effect via increased affective collective RD. Kawakami and Dion's (1995) framework was subsequently evaluated and considered to be laudable for integrating insights from RDT, SIT, and SCT. In integrating these, Kawakami and Dion (1995) offered a model that clearly explicates the way in which identity salience determines comparison processes and outcomes in addition to feelings of RD and action tendencies. Their framework was further commended for considering the distinction between normative and non-normative forms of protest. It was criticised, however, because it failed to make a strong theoretical case for the hypotheses postulated regarding this distinction and to provide relevant empirical support.

Following Kawakami and Dion's (1995) theory, this chapter critically assessed the most recent theoretical integration of RDT with SIT as posited by Grant (2008). Grant's (2008) framework was mainly commended for reconceptualising cognitive and affective RD. He thought of cognitive RD in SIT terms, thus considering it as an interaction of beliefs about status legitimacy and beliefs about stability. Regarding affective RD, he reconceptualised it in terms of outgroup blame accompanied by negative emotions, such as anger and frustration. This reconceptualisation further specified outgroup blame as the

part of affective RD that mediates between identification and collective protest. Grant's (2008) integrative attempt was also praised for addressing identification at two different levels of analysis (i.e., cultural and national) and for showing how identification at these different levels may influence affective RD in opposite ways.

Notwithstanding the merits of all of the frameworks integrating RDT with SIT, this chapter argued that no theory of collective protest will ever be complete unless the pragmatics of protest are also taken into account. In this respect, the integrative model by Simon et al. (1998) was first evaluated and was commended for combining the individual (i.e., Klandermans' expectancy-value model) with the group (i.e., SIT) level of analysis. Nevertheless, Simon et al.'s (1998) model was criticised for not considering any contributions from RDT and for not providing an intrinsic link between identification and instrumental considerations. The role of Bandura's (e.g., 1995, 1997) concept of efficacy in predicting collective protest was examined next. A distinction was made between political and collective efficacy, and it was shown that it is the latter form of efficacy that is most relevant to the study of collective protest.

Following the discussion of the concept of collective efficacy and its importance in determining collective protest participation, this chapter critically discussed four major attempts at integration of the pathway of collective efficacy with those postulated by RDT and SIT. To this end, Mummendey, Kessler et al.'s (1999) and Abrams and Randsley de Moura's (2002) integrative attempts were firstly assessed and found to be inclusive in that they considered all three predictors that the literature has identified as crucial in predicting collective protest: collective efficacy, group identification, and affective collective RD. One recurrent finding was that collective efficacy fully mediated the relationship between identification and collective protest tendencies. Nevertheless, both integrations were criticised on the basis that they were rather exploratory, hence, they did not provide a precise theoretical framework that delineates the relationships between collective efficacy and identification and feelings of deprivation.

For this reason, Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual pathway model and Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA were introduced and critically evaluated. Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model was commended for its specificity in that it focuses on the specific emotion of group-based anger rather than on feelings of deprivation in general. Further, their

model was praised for the fact that it extrapolates Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory to the group level, thus deeming collective efficacy and group-based anger as two different forms of coping, problem-focused and emotion-focused, respectively. Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model was also commendable for introducing social support into the equation and for explicating its relationships to the two proposed routes to collective protest. However, their model was criticised for failing to consider the role of group identification.

This latter became the key aspect of Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA and thus the conceptual bridge between the other two explanations of collective protest. SIMCA was compared with previous attempts at theoretical integration and was found to be more inclusive, specific, and parsimonious. Nevertheless, SIMCA was criticised for not using Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) coping language and for a number of limitations in the operationalisation of the three pathways to protest. Therefore, in considering the motives that are important for the precipitation of collective protest this piece of work uses Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual-pathway model, retains its coping language, and adds the identity-related pathway. Thus, this thesis postulates three main pathways that lead to collective protest: the emotional pathway, the instrumental pathway, and the identity-related pathway. In line with Van Zomeren et al. (2004), this thesis finally considers social opinion and action support to contribute to the emotional and instrumental pathways, respectively.

To conclude, Chapter 2 has taken one step further towards addressing the main research question of this thesis as to whether normative and non-normative types of collective protest are triggered equally by the same motives or whether some motives are more important for one type of protest than for the other: It has provided evidence to suggest that group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification along with social opinion and action support are among the most important motives in the precipitation of collective protest. However, it becomes evident that with the exception of Kawakami and Dion's (1995) integrative framework none of the integrations discussed in this chapter paid attention to the distinction between normative and non-normative forms of protest. Thus, none makes any predictions as to whether the three pathways and the two kinds of social support should equally predict participation in these two types of

protest. Even Kawakami and Dion (1995), who took into account the normative/non-normative distinction, did not make any predictions about the relative predictive strengths of different pathways to protest. This is the lacuna that the following chapter seeks to address by postulating relevant hypotheses to be tested empirically in Chapter 4.

Finally, one last limitation of the literature discussed so far is the fact that none of the integrative attempts considers the role of ideology in predicting collective protest participation, which also Klandermans (2004) perceives as especially important. Chapter 5 will thus attend to ideology, particularly system-justifying ideologies (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and will address the question whether endorsement of these ideologies is equally predictive of normative and non-normative forms of protest.

Chapter 3

The Role of Social Disruptiveness in Determining the Predictive Strengths of Collective Protest Motives

Introduction

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to address the main question of this thesis regarding whether normative and non-normative forms of protest are triggered equally by the same motives. To this end, Chapter 3 focuses on the three proximal motives that emerged from the literature reviewed in the previous two chapters, group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification. The three proximal motives aside, this chapter also examines the two distal motives of social opinion and action support.

Before postulating hypotheses concerning the manner in which each of the above motives relates to participation in normative and non-normative forms of protest, Chapter 3 first argues that the use of the related, albeit separate, distinction between socially disruptive and non-disruptive types of protest seems to be more preferable, because it is compatible with Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach to collective protest which is discussed in the following section. Social disruptiveness refers to those protest behaviours that go against societal norms *and* disrupt the social order and daily routine of the general public. This implies that there are non-normative forms of protest that may not necessarily be disruptive, as will be explained below. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first time in the literature of collective protest that the use of the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction is being suggested. This suggestion also serves as a springboard for Chapter 3 to identify further limitations that characterise Wright et al.'s paradigm in addition to the ones discussed in chapter 1 (see section 1.3.3.4) regarding the preference of individualistic identity management strategies over collective ones. The discussed limitations are indicative of the need to focus on social disruptiveness rather than on mere normativity.

This chapter subsequently argues that the field of collective protest should seriously consider the quest for personal certainty, one of the core human motives (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van den Bos, 2009), as integral to understanding why protest motives may differentially predict collective protest as a function of the social disruptiveness of the

protest activity under examination. Finally, this chapter postulates hypotheses with regard to the relative impact of protest motives on socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest and reviews some of the existing evidence in support of these hypotheses.

3.1 Distinguishing between normativity and social disruptiveness

To reiterate, Wright et al. (1990) define normativity on the basis of whether or not a certain action violates established societal norms. In line with their definition and as also mentioned in Chapter 1 (see section 1.1.2.1), strikes and riots would probably be considered as instances of non-normative collective protest, because these actions defy established societal norms. In contrast, petition-signing and letter-writing would be regarded as examples of normative collective protest, because such actions do not go against societal norms. Wright et al. (1990) further argue that non-normative actions are "the most socially disruptive" actions (p. 1001). Indeed, examples of non-normative protest, such as strikes and riots, are potentially very disruptive to the general public's daily routine, contrary to examples of normative protest, such as petition-signing and letter-writing. From this point of view, Wright et al. (1990) appear to see normativity and social disruptiveness as interchangeable terms. However, this does not seem to be necessarily the case either in reality or in the way Wright et al. (1990) operationalised normativity.

There are two main reasons why the terms 'normativity' and 'social disruptiveness' are not necessarily interchangeable in reality. Firstly, one may identify cases of non-normative protest that are hardly disruptive to anyone. For example, hunger strikes are instances of non-normative protest, because they violate the social norm according to which people are expected to eat in order to stay alive. However, this type of protest is not socially disruptive, because hunger strikes do not seem able to disrupt the social order or the general public's daily routine. Secondly, the use of normativity carries inherent confusion: Does it mean respect for *social* norms or for *ingroup* norms? Indeed, these two need not be identical. For example, a bomb attack is a non-normative action from a societal point of view given the attendant social disruption, but it is a normative action from the point of view of the terrorist organisation responsible for it given that such attacks are the raison d'être of this group. However, regardless of whether the bomb

attack is congruent with ingroup norms, the point is that it remains socially disruptive. This begs the question as to whether the confusion that the term 'normativity' conveys is useful for the study of collective protest.

3.1.1 Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach to collective protest

Consistent with Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach to power struggles, one would have to give a negative answer to this question. According to their approach, power struggles between two social groups, collective protest being one such struggle, are embedded into the wider social context and concerned with social norms rather than being played out in a social vacuum where only ingroup norms are of importance. This practically means that collective protest does not merely involve a bipolar conflict between two antagonistic groups, but that it also involves the general public. Simon and Klandermans (2001) thus contend that the general public is typically the third party which each of the two opposing parties tries to control or at least influence in the direction of its own objectives and interests.

These three social groups need not be regarded as mutually exclusive, Simon and Klandermans (2001) argue. Rather, each of the two opposing groups seeks to make the case that it is an integral part of the more inclusive general public so that its own goals and interests come to be seen as similar to, if not the same as, the goals and interests of the public. Returning to the earlier bomb attack example, the terrorist organisation may consider the attack not only as a means of protest against the government, but also as a way to attract the public's attention to and support for its cause. The government, on the other hand, will be quick to entice the public by framing the attack as aimed at creating chaos and thus driven against the public's interests.

Following Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar or triangulated approach to collective protest, it becomes clear that the use of the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction is preferable to the use of the normative/non-normative distinction. A tripolar approach attaches great significance to the general public and its norms and interests. This significance, however, is not effectively conveyed by the normative/non-normative distinction due to the inherent confusion regarding whether normativity refers to respect for social or ingroup norms. In contrast, the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction

places the general public at centre stage by drawing attention to the impact that a protest activity may have on the public.

3.1.2 Limitations in Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm

In addition to the weaknesses identified in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.3.4) the current section points out three more limitations in Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm. These limitations add to the argument of this thesis that the use of the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction is preferable to the use of the normative/non-normative distinction when one adopts a tripolar approach to collective protest.

3.1.2.1 Bipolar approach to collective protest

Wright et al. (1990) conceived of collective protest as a bipolar conflict between a low and a high status group and thus operationalised norms as reflecting those of the higher status outgroup rather than those of the general public. Should Wright et al. (1990) have adopted a tripolar approach to the study of collective protest they would have probably appreciated the value of the disruptive/non-disruptive distinction. The use of a bipolar approach may also help explain why Wright et al.'s (1990) definition of normativity in terms of social disruptiveness is not reflected in the way they operationalised it. Note en-passant that the same problem goes for all of the empirical studies that used their paradigm (e.g., Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998; Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994).

3.1.2.2 Operationalisation of normativity

Following from the above weakness, there appears to be a certain degree of confounding between normativity and the extent of social disruptiveness involved in the items measured in Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm. As described in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.3.2), the non-normative options consisted of writing a letter either demanding that the participant be accepted into the higher status group (i.e., individual action) or inciting fellow ingroup members to demand collectively that they are all allowed access (i.e., collective action). In line with Wright et al.'s (1990) bipolar approach, these items are indeed non-normative, because they defy the rules set out by the higher status outgroup.

However, the action of writing a letter in itself can be hardly considered disruptive to anyone, which seems to contradict Wright et al.'s (1990) definition of normativity in terms of social disruptiveness.

This contradiction is also supported by Wright et al.'s (1990) normative options which consisted of asking for either an individual retest or a collective retest. Indeed, although asking for a retest is normative, because it is described as consistent with the rules specified by the outgroup, it could be considered disruptive to the outgroup's routine, because the outgroup would be required to expend additional effort in organising the retest. It follows that normativity and degree of disruptiveness were confounded in Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm such that the normative options may have been considered disruptive rather than non-disruptive, whereas the non-normative options may have been considered non-disruptive rather than disruptive. Thus, it becomes evident that Wright et al.'s (1990) operationalisation of normativity failed to mirror social disruptiveness, despite their considering of disruptiveness in the definition of normativity, and that the use of the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction would have been much more straightforward in the first place.

3.1.2.3 Incapacity to account for the phenomenon of non-disruptive protest

A further limitation in Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm stems from focusing on collective 'action' rather than on collective 'protest', which goes back to the discussion regarding the preference of this thesis to use the term 'protest' over the term 'action' (see section 1.1.3). Consistent with the definition of collective protest given in Chapter 1 (see section 1.1), one would be reluctant to consider the normative options as indicating protest, because request for a retest does not necessarily mean to express dissent against the disadvantage. Following Grant's (2008) analysis regarding the role of outgroup blame in collective protest (see section 2.1.4), request for a retest does not imply that the disadvantaged ingroup members opting for a retest blame the outgroup for their own or their group's performance. They might very well blame themselves and hope that by asking for a retest they might get a chance to do better and thus enter the higher status outgroup. From this viewpoint, it seems to be only the non-normative options in Wright

et al.'s (1990) paradigm that clearly indicate protest. This means that their paradigm fails to account for the occurrence of normative or non-disruptive protest.

3.1.2.4 Overall critique

The preceding discussion uncovers three main limitations in Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm: a) the adoption of a bipolar approach, b) the failure of their operationalisation of normativity to reflect social disruptiveness despite their considering of disruptiveness in the definition of normativity (although non-normative protest is not necessarily disruptive, as argued above), and c) the incapacity to account for the phenomenon of normative or non-disruptive protest. All these limitations seriously call into question the ecological validity of the findings produced within the research realm that follows Wright et al.'s paradigm (e.g., Boen & Vanbeselaere, 1998; Kawakami & Dion, 1993; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Louis & Taylor, 1999; Vanbeselaere, Boen, & Smeesters, 2003; Wright, 1997; Wright & Taylor, 1998). It becomes evident that the field of collective protest would benefit from a classification that does not carry the above weaknesses. Therefore, this piece of work argues that the socially disruptive/non-disruptive classification is able to serve this exact purpose, because it is straightforward and suitable for a tripolar approach to collective protest.

3.2 Distinguishing between social disruptiveness and other classifications

Before discussing the role of the quest for personal certainty in the field of collective protest, it is important to spare a few words regarding the preference of this thesis to use the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction over other classifications that have been proposed already. Such classifications are the following: *persuasive/confrontational* (e.g., Postmes & Brunsting, 2002), *soft/hard* (e.g., Brunsting & Postmes, 2002), *moderate/militant* (e.g., Klandermans, 1984, 1986), *legal/illegal* or *legitimate/illegitimate* (e.g., Finkel, Muller, & Opp, 1989; Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1984; Opp, 1988), *costly/non-costly* (e.g., Klandermans, 1989, 1993, 2004), and *low risk/high risk or conventional/unconventional* (e.g., Corning & Myers, 2002; McAdam, 1986; Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991).

The above classifications do not seem to convey effectively the significance that Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach attaches to the role of the general public and its norms. To illustrate, costly and high risk protest activities (e.g., Klandermans, 1989; Corning & Myers, 2002) draw attention to the ingroup resources that are at stake (e.g., earnings, time, and physical effort) rather than to the extent to which the general public is affected. Moreover, legal protest implies accordance with the law but, to be sure, there are perfectly lawful protest activities that violate social norms and can thus cause great social disruption, as in the cases of lawful strikes. Furthermore, the soft/hard and moderate/militant distinctions are rather loose terms that do not give away much about the role of the general public. Finally, persuasive/confrontational activities do not specify who persuades/confronts whom, or how exactly the public is involved. It follows that the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction is the most adequate in communicating the important role that the general public seems to play in keeping with a tripolar approach to collective protest.

Note that although there is some overlap between socially disruptive protest and the above classifications, such that socially disruptive protest largely coincides with confrontational, hard, militant, illegal, costly, and high risk protest activities, this overlap is not extensive enough to justify the consideration of social disruptiveness as equivalent to any of the above classifications. For example, strikes can be either legal or illegal; they remain, though, socially disruptive, because they go against societal norms and disrupt the social order. Furthermore, hunger strikes are undoubtedly among the hardest, and most militant, costly and high risk protest activities, given that protesters face the ultimate cost of losing their lives; however, as argued above, hunger strikes are hardly disruptive to anyone. Finally, confrontational activities, such as sabotage, blockading and rioting (e.g., Postmes & Brunsting, 2002) seem to be the only classification that fits the definition of social disruptiveness, because these activities defy social norms and disrupt the social order. Therefore, this thesis adjusts the definition of social disruptiveness (see intro to this chapter) so that it refers to those protest behaviours that go against societal norms and disrupt the social order and daily routine of the general public, *usually as a result of confrontation between the disadvantaged ingroup and another party (i.e., the outgroup responsible for the ingroup disadvantage and/or the general public).*

3.3 Social disruptiveness, personal uncertainty, and protest motives

As mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 3, this thesis argues that the three pathways to protest along with the two kinds of social support predict protest as a function of the social disruptiveness of the activity in question. In order to understand why different motives may relate differently to socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest, it is crucial to acknowledge that disruptive protest entails a higher degree of *personal uncertainty* than does non-disruptive protest. Before elaborating on this point, the role of personal uncertainty in human life should be made clearer.

3.3.1 Personal certainty as a core human motive

The literature comprises several versions of the notion of personal uncertainty, such as *subjective uncertainty* (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999), *self-conceptual uncertainty* (e.g., Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007), and personal or *self-uncertainty* (e.g., Van den Bos, 2009). Nevertheless, all versions are defined in practically the same manner. For the purposes of this thesis personal uncertainty is defined as "a subjective sense of doubt or instability in self-views, worldviews, or the interrelation between the two" (Van den Bos, 2009, p. 198).

According to Van den Bos (2009), personal uncertainty encompasses the explicit and implicit feelings that people experience as a result of being uncertain about themselves. However, uncertainty is aversive or at the very least uncomfortable given that it creates feelings that range from unease to fear (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Lopes, 1987; Sorrentino & Roney, 1986). These feelings thus motivate behaviour that either reduces or makes uncertainty cognitively manageable (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van den Bos, 2009). The reason for personal uncertainty being an aversive state has to do with the fact it is associated with decreased control over one's life. In contrast, certainty about oneself, the social world and one's place within it "renders existence meaningful and thus gives one confidence about how to behave, and what to expect from the physical and social environment within which one finds oneself" (Hogg & Mullin, 1999, p. 253). Therefore, there seems to be a fundamental human need to feel certain about the world and one's place within it such that too high levels of personal uncertainty may threaten the very meaning of one's existence (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van den Bos, 2009).

Of course people do not strive for certainty about every single aspect of their lives, but only about those aspects that are subjectively important (Hogg & Mullin, 1999). For example, one may be more interested in politics than in fashion and so one would be more motivated for certainty about politics than about fashion; being uncertain about fashion would matter much less. As such, all uncertainties are not the same and cannot be expected to have the same effects; not to mention that there are even instances in which people strive for uncertainty rather than certainty (e.g., Hogg et al., 2007; Van den Bos, 2009). For example, it is not unlikely for young people to engage in risky hobbies and activities that are specifically designed to raise one's level of adrenaline, such as parachuting and bungee jumping. But even in such cases where uncertainty is sought, it still remains manageable, at least to some extent (Van den Bos, 2009). Uncertainty, therefore, plays a very important role in human life, particularly in group behaviour. The role of uncertainty in group behaviour has been looked at in detail by Hogg and Mullin's (1999) uncertainty-reduction theory.

3.3.2 Uncertainty-reduction theory

Based on Tajfel's (e.g., 1969) initial suggestion about there being dual motives for positive social identity and for a meaningful and well-structured world, Hogg and Mullin (1999) went on to consider uncertainty reduction as one of the most important group motivations on which other motives, such as self-esteem, rest. The basic tenet of their theory is that people identify with groups, in order to reduce uncertainty about themselves, the world and their place within it. This is understandable if one considers SCT's (Turner et al., 1987) self-stereotyping process explained in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.4.3). To reiterate, this process involves a shift from personal to social identity and helps individuals define themselves as group members and thus to act as representatives of the group. It becomes clear that such a process 'transforms the "uncertain self" into a "certain self" governed by an ingroup prototype that is consensually validated by fellow ingroup members' (Hogg & Mullin, 1999, p. 269). Thus, individuals know how they ought to behave and interact with one another, which eventually helps them assume their place in the world and feel certain about it.

A number of minimal-group experiments reported by Hogg and Mullin (1999) have provided good evidence to show that people identify more strongly with groups when they are categorised under uncertainty (about the task or the situation) than not categorised or categorised under reduced uncertainty. These experiments also show that the effect is strongest when the dimension of personal uncertainty is subjectively important and when the group is relevant to uncertainty reduction. Recently, Hogg et al. (2007) extended these findings by demonstrating that personal uncertainty motivates identification, but only when the group is high in entitativity, hence, clearly defined and distinctive. The reason is that a clearly defined group facilitates the self-stereotyping process by providing a clear-cut ingroup prototype that individuals can aspire to adopt. Group identification thus becomes a particularly efficient way to reduce or deter feelings of personal uncertainty, especially when the group is high in entitativity (Hogg et al., 2007).

3.3.3 Personal uncertainty and collective protest

Given the great importance that personal uncertainty plays in human life and group behaviour in particular, this thesis contends that the field of collective protest not only can benefit from the consideration of this core human motive, but it must also take this motive seriously into account. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first time that personal uncertainty is formally introduced to the study of collective protest.

3.3.3.1 Collective protest as an uncertainty-enhancing behaviour

A starting point for the study of personal uncertainty in this field is to recognise that protest in itself enhances uncertainty, because protest brings the uncertain prospect of social change. Though desirable from a disadvantaged group's point of view, social change is inherently associated with uncertainty. It is simply not possible for any group engaging in collective protest to know beforehand the outcome of their struggle given that there are three main scenarios that render the ending uncertain: The group's status could improve, worsen, or remain the same. Therefore, ingroup members in protest cannot be certain about themselves, the world and their place within it. In other words, to

engage in collective protest is to embark on a journey the destination of which is unknown.

3.3.3.2 Socially disruptive protest as a particularly uncertainty-enhancing behaviour

This piece of work argues that the uncertainty that collective protest brings is exacerbated in the case of socially disruptive protest. By definition (see section 3.2), disruptive forms of protest go against societal norms and disrupt the social order and daily routine of the general public. Defying the social order is likely to increase uncertainty about one's place within the world, because such defiance may entail unpredictable and sometimes undesirable consequences. Following Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach, one may argue that these consequences are related primarily to the possibility of losing the potential support of the general public if the protest activity in question is experienced as impeding public goals and going against public interests. It might even be the case that the public actively seeks to oppose socially disruptive protest, especially when the ingroup directly confronts the public (e.g., angry drivers attacking protesters that block the traffic).

Disruptive protest may also involve, at least, three further types of losses that may lead to heightened uncertainty about one's place within the world: a) loss of physical safety, b) loss of freedom, and c) loss of social standing. To illustrate, participation in violent demonstrations and riots directly jeopardise one's physical safety, while participation in these same activities as well as in other disruptive activities, such as site occupations, may even incur loss of freedom if protesters are arrested. Moreover, loss of social standing may come, for example, as the result of strike participation if protesters are fired. However, non-disruptive protest, such as petition-signing and letter-writing, seems less likely to heighten uncertainty, because it does not entail the risks discussed above. It becomes clear, then, that when compared with non-disruptive protest socially disruptive protest is more likely to give rise to feelings of personal uncertainty about the world and one's place within it.

3.3.4 Social disruptiveness and protest motives

The assumptions above beg the question as to why disadvantaged ingroup members would ever wish to take part in socially disruptive forms of protest. One reason may be related to the perceived effectiveness of such activities: Costly protest activities are generally perceived to be more effective (Klandermans, 1997). One other reason may have to do with the trust individuals lay on the governmental system: Untrustworthy governing systems may elicit protest activities outside the traditional political channels (Bandura, 1997). Notwithstanding the reasons why people would ever consider participation in socially disruptive forms of protest it is common knowledge that such activities do occur in the real world. Thus, the issue of interest for this thesis becomes how well the three pathways to collective protest (i.e., emotional, instrumental, and identity-related), along with the two kinds of social support, deal with the heightened personal uncertainty that socially disruptive protest brings.

Therefore, the aim of this section is to explain why different motives may relate in different ways to socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest. For this reason, each of the three pathways is now discussed in terms of how well they can do in the face of the personal uncertainty that socially disruptive protest activities entail. First the identity-related pathway is discussed followed by the instrumental and emotional pathways. For additional evidence that lends support to the hypotheses concerning the last two pathways, the two related kinds of social support are also discussed with regard to how they may predict participation in the two forms of collective protest. Empirical evidence in line with the hypotheses to be postulated is reviewed at the end of this section.

3.3.4.1 Social disruptiveness and the identity-related pathway

In keeping with the uncertainty-reduction theory presented in section 3.3.2, people join groups and identify with them as a way to reduce or prevent feelings of personal uncertainty (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Hogg et al., 2007; Van den Bos, 2009). In other words, group identification is particularly useful in helping individuals maintain some certainty about themselves, the world and their place within it. Considering that engaging in socially disruptive protest is more likely to reduce this kind of certainty than is

participation in non-disruptive protest, this thesis argues that group identification should be less predictive of disruptive protest.

To illustrate, group identification serves two competing functions: a group-enhancing function (via promotion of collective protest participation) and an uncertainty-reduction function as explained above. In line with its group-enhancing function, the more individuals identify with their group the more likely they are to protest. At the same time, consistent with its uncertainty-reduction function, the more they identify the more likely they are to manage to overcome their personal uncertainty. By promoting collective protest behaviours, however, group identification also promotes uncertainty-enhancing behaviours, particularly in the case of socially disruptive protest, which goes against the uncertainty-reduction function of identification. Due to these competing functions, identification should be less predictive of protest behaviours that are more likely to increase uncertainty, socially disruptive protest that is. Therefore, identification should predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest. This is the *identity-related pathway hypothesis.*

3.3.4.2 Social disruptiveness and the instrumental pathway

As mentioned already in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.2.3), collective efficacy serves a number of group-enhancing functions. To reiterate, the more the ingroup members appraise their collective efficacy as high, the more motivated they are to pursue their group-related goals and activities, the higher their performance achievements are, and the more they persevere in the face of setbacks and impediments (e.g., Bandura, 2000). The personal uncertainty involved in protest activities, socially disruptive ones in particular, constitutes one such setback that ingroup members have to deal with. Considering the fact that collective efficacy provides ingroup members with staying power in the face of obstacles, one may assume that collective efficacy also acts as a buffer against uncertainty that may result from the several types of losses referred to above (see section 3.3.3.2).

Thus, collective efficacy should encourage especially protest activities that entail particularly high levels of uncertainty, namely socially disruptive protest activities. In other words, the more ingroup members appraise their collective efficacy as high, the

more likely they are to persevere in the face of uncertainty, and, thus, to go that extra mile and take part in particularly uncertainty-enhancing behaviours. Put differently, appraisals of collective efficacy do not seem to be as relevant for non-disruptive protest activities, because there are fewer obstacles to be overcome, given the reduced uncertainty involved in such activities. Therefore, collective efficacy should predict socially disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. This is the *instrumental pathway hypothesis.*

3.3.4.3 Social disruptiveness and the emotional pathway

As was discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.3.3) that focused on Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual pathway model to collective protest, group-based anger is considered to be an action-oriented emotion in the sense that it prepares ingroup members to move against the outgroup responsible for the ingroup disadvantage (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). Group-based anger only serves an adaptive role as an emotion: It helps individuals deal with changes in the environment by eliciting a specific behavioural intention, which in the case of anger is to move against the source of frustration (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Mackie et al., 2000). Therefore, unlike collective efficacy, group-based anger does not seem equipped to address the uncertainty that protest activities involve, socially disruptive ones in particular.

Following Lazarus' (1991, 2001) appraisal theory, the coping process may inhibit the biological impulse to attack when there are for example social or personally acquired taboos against this impulse. To extrapolate to the field of collective protest, one could argue that the unpredictable consequences that socially disruptive protest involves, as discussed in section 3.3.3, may inhibit the action tendency to attack the outgroup. Given though that failure to take action is likely to intensify the experience of anger (e.g., Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006), one may assume that group-based anger is particularly predictive of less uncertainty-enhancing forms of protest, non-disruptive ones that is. This is not to say that group-based anger does not predict disruptive protest; rather, this thesis argues that group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest. This is the *emotional pathway hypothesis.* Although this hypothesis

appears counterintuitive, given that anger is anecdotally associated with violence, it will be shown further below that there is accumulated evidence in favour of this hypothesis.

An important point to make here is related to the comparison of the predictive strengths of group-based anger and collective efficacy. It seems that when social disruptiveness is not taken into account their predictive strengths are equal. Supporting evidence comes from Van Zomeren et al. (2008) who found that injustice and efficacy equally predicted collective protest (.28). Given this finding and the hypotheses postulated above, two hypotheses follow: a) the emotional pathway predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does the instrumental pathway and b) the instrumental pathway predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does the emotional pathway. Hypothesis (a) is the first part of the *non-disruptive protest hypothesis*, whereas hypothesis (b) is the first part of the *disruptive protest hypothesis*. The following section considers the second part of these hypotheses.

3.3.4.4 Social disruptiveness and social support

In line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) research, there are two different kinds of social support that feed into the emotional and instrumental pathways to collective protest. Social opinion support (i.e., social support for one's own opinion regarding the disadvantaged situation of the ingroup) contributes to the experience of group-based anger. In contrast, social action support (i.e., social support for one's own tendency to take part in collective protest) reinforces collective efficacy beliefs.

Following the hypotheses regarding the relationships of the emotional and instrumental pathways to socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest, one may thus expect social opinion support to predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest. This hypothesis is the *social opinion support hypothesis*. Knowing that other ingroup members share one's own anger does little to deal with the heightened uncertainty involved in socially disruptive protest. This knowledge may only help increase the intensity of the emotion (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) and thus the related biological impulse to attack (Frijda, 1987). This impulse, however, can be inhibited by the heightened uncertainty that socially disruptive protest entails, as argued for the

emotional pathway hypothesis, hence the stronger expected relationship between social opinion support and non-disruptive protest.

In contrast, one may expect social action support to predict disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. This is the *social action support hypothesis.* Knowing that other ingroup members share one's own willingness to take part in collective protest can be particularly helpful in dealing with the uncertainty involved in socially disruptive protest. This knowledge may act as a buffer against uncertainty, because it raises appraisals of collective efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). This knowledge thus provides ingroup members with staying power in the face of adversity brought about by uncertainty-inducing behaviours, such as socially disruptive protest activities; hence the stronger expected relationship between social action support and disruptive protest.

In line with the comparison of the predictive strengths of the emotional and instrumental pathways, one might also expect a) social opinion support to predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than does social action support and b) social action support to predict disruptive protest more strongly than does social opinion support. Hypothesis (a) is the second part of the *non-disruptive protest hypothesis,* whereas hypothesis (b) is the second part of the *disruptive protest hypothesis.*

3.3.5 Empirical findings in support of the postulated hypotheses

There is some research to support the hypotheses postulated above. Note, however, that the majority of the studies to be reported were either exploratory or not interested in the relative impact of protest motives. Hence, they did not make specific predictions regarding the relationships between protest motives and the two forms of protest. Also note that none of these studies used the socially disruptive/non-disruptive classification. Therefore, for the purposes of the review to follow, this thesis generally considers counternormative, high risk, illegal, militant, hard, and costly protest activities to entail greater personal uncertainty as opposed to normative, low risk, legal, moderate, soft, and non-costly protest activities and thus to coincide with socially disruptive forms of protest.

3.3.5.1 Emotional pathway and social opinion support hypotheses

There seem to be no studies providing relevant data to examine the validity of the social opinion support hypothesis (i.e., social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest). There are, though, a number of studies with findings that are consistent with the emotional pathway hypothesis (i.e., the emotional pathway predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest).

Olson et al. (1995), whose research was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.1.2) in relation to Crosby's (1976) RDT model, measured women's tendencies to take part in normative and counternormative forms of protest to raise awareness about women's issues. In keeping with the emotional pathway hypothesis, they found in Study 2 that group discontent (in comparison to men) predicted normative protest tendencies more strongly (.56) than counternormative protest tendencies (.32). Moreover, Corning and Myers (2002) developed a measure of activism orientation that loaded on two separate factors: high-risk actions and conventional actions. In order to test the validity and reliability of this measure, they examined in Study 2 female students' opinions with regards to women's issues and administered subscales of the two factors. In line with Olson et al. (1995) and the emotional pathway hypothesis, they found that collective RD was significantly correlated with tendencies to take part in conventional actions only (.34); the correlation with high-risk actions was non-significant (.06).

Furthermore, Brunsting and Postmes (2002) examined tendencies of members of the environmental movement to take part in both online and offline forms of protest. In keeping with the findings above, they found that, albeit a weak predictor, RD significantly predicted only soft (.08) and not hard forms of offline protest tendencies. The extremely low predictive value of RD was perhaps related to the fact it was measured with five items tapping into the cognitive component and only one item into the affective component (i.e., "It makes me feel angry that environmentalists are in general hardly listened to compared with opponents of the environmental movement"). Consistent, however, with the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.1.6), it is the affective component which is the most proximal predictor of protest participation (e.g., Grant & Brown, 1995; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Had they measured affective RD

rather than cognitive RD, Brunsting and Postmes (2002) might have uncovered an even stronger effect of RD on soft protest tendencies.

Evidence in support of the emotional pathway hypothesis comes from two more studies, one into the anti-nuclear movement by Opp (1988) and one into German citizens' general dissatisfaction with governmental policies by Finkel et al. (1989). Both pieces of research measured legal and illegal forms of protest and found, respectively, that discontent with nuclear energy and dissatisfaction with governmental policies (e.g., policies related to crime, unemployment, and cost of living) exerted stronger effects on legal forms of protest than on illegal ones. The relative impact of discontent was specifically predicted by Opp (1988). Starting from the theoretical viewpoint that people choose protest actions rationally for political reasons and that legal forms of action are generally considered as more efficacious in achieving political goals than are illegal forms of action, Opp (1988) postulated the so called *instrumentality proposition.* According to this proposition, the more individuals regard legal forms of protest as more efficacious than illegal forms, the stronger will be the effect of discontent on legal protest. Although Opp's (1988) prediction was confirmed, his model did not specify how collective efficacy or identification should relate to the two forms of protest.

In conclusion, despite its counterintuitive character, the emotional pathway hypothesis, according to which the emotional pathway predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest, is strongly supported by the studies reviewed above.

3.3.5.2 Instrumental pathway and social action support hypotheses

There appear to be no studies measuring collective efficacy and the two types of collective protest at once so that one could ascertain the validity of the instrumental pathway hypothesis (i.e., the instrumental pathway predicts socially disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest). There are, however, a number of studies lending support to the social action support hypothesis (i.e., social action support predicts socially disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest).

Brunsting and Postmes (2002), whose research was also mentioned in the previous section, found that expectations regarding the number of people intending to take part in

offline protest significantly predicted participation in hard actions (.15); in contrast, these expectations did not significantly predict participation in soft actions. Another study that produced similar results was conducted by Klandermans (1986) among Dutch trade union members. He intended to explore the differences between those members who were only in favour of moderate action and those who were in favour of militant action too. He found that the latter were significantly more optimistic about the potential number of members taking part in militant action.

Findings from Spears, Lea, Corneliussen, Postmes, and Ter Haar's (2002) research are further in line with the social action support hypothesis. Spears et al. (2002) manipulated social action support information, kept social opinion support information constant, and measured willingness to undertake actions punishable by a relevant outgroup. They found that participants were more likely to endorse punishable behaviours when they had high social action support information, thus knowing that the majority of fellow respondents were willing to stand up for the interests of the group. Although punishable behaviours are not fully equivalent to socially disruptive protest activities given that the latter are not necessarily punishable (e.g., lawful strike and demonstrations), for the sake of the argument, Spears et al.'s (2002) findings are taken to be in line with the social action support hypothesis.

One more study that provides indirect support to the instrumental pathway and social action support hypotheses is the simulated study conducted among women by Martin, Brickman, and Murray (1984). Martin et al. (1984) ran an experiment where participants were asked to imagine that they were sales managers at an oil company that discriminated against female managers such that female managers were paid less than male managers. Martin et al. (1984) manipulated the presence or absence of a number of mobilisation resources available to female managers (e.g., female sales managers having frequent formal and informal contact with each other, and their sales management skills being critical for the survival of the company). One may assume that these resources boost collective efficacy beliefs, which is why this experiment is being reported here.

The dependent measures consisted in tendencies to take part in both legitimate and illegitimate collective protest behaviour, legitimacy being defined in terms of respect for norms of politeness, ethics, or company loyalty. In a vein similar to the instrumental

pathway hypothesis, Martin et al. (1984) found that the presence or absence of resources did not affect reported levels of legitimate protest tendencies; rather, it only had a significant main effect on illegitimate protest tendencies such that the more resources were present the more likely participants were to express willingness to protest illegitimately.

In conclusion, the studies reviewed above provide strong support for the social action support hypothesis and some indirect support for the instrumental pathway hypothesis.

3.3.5.3 Identity-related pathway hypothesis

There seems to be no direct or indirect evidence in support of the identity-related pathway hypothesis, according to which group identification predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest. In fact, to the best of the author's knowledge, it is only Brunsting and Postmes' (2002) study that provides relevant data to suggest, however, that identification predicts soft and hard offline actions to the same extent (.15). Note though that Brunsting and Postmes' (2002) study was only exploratory so they made no specific predictions as to the magnitude of the effects that their measured predictors had on soft and hard offline protest actions. It is hoped that the empirical research conducted for the purposes of this thesis will shed some light on the validity of the identity-related pathway hypothesis.

3.3.5.4 Disruptive protest and non-disruptive protest hypotheses

Scarce are the studies that can provide the necessary data for someone to compare directly the effects of the emotional and instrumental pathways or those of social opinion and action support on either of the two types of protest. Abrams and Randsley de Moura's (2002) study, which was thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.3.2), provides evidence in support of the first part of the disruptive protest hypothesis (i.e., the instrumental pathway predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does the emotional pathway). As mentioned already, Abrams and Randsley de Moura (2002) measured collective efficacy beliefs, affective collective RD, and students' tendencies to participate in a rent strike. This protest activity was not explicitly characterised as non-normative or socially disruptive, but it is evident that this activity can be considered as such given the

great disruption caused to the university authorities. The researchers found that, when entered together, collective efficacy predicted rent strike support more strongly than did affective collective RD (.68 and .25, respectively); in fact, the unique contribution of affective collective RD reached only marginal levels of significance. Therefore, Abrams and Randsley de Moura's (2002) study provides strong support for the first part of the disruptive protest hypothesis.

Some indirect support for the first part of the non-disruptive hypothesis (i.e., the emotional pathway predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does the instrumental pathway) comes from Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) research. Across their three experimental studies, a consistent pattern emerged: Group-based anger predicted collective protest tendencies more strongly than did collective efficacy (the respective values were .42 and .32 for ingroup disadvantage condition, Study 1; .58 and .25, Study 2; .58 and .30, Study 3). Although Van Zomeren et al. (2004) did not mean to measure non-disruptive protest tendencies, one could argue that this is what they actually did.

To illustrate, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) measured collective protest tendencies using three items in Study 1 and an additional item in Studies 2 and 3. These four items were "I would participate in some form of collective action to stop this proposal", "I would participate in raising our collective voice to stop this proposal", "I would participate in a demonstration against this proposal", and "I would do something together with fellow students to stop this proposal". However, the demonstration item aside, this measure of collective protest tendencies did not tap into any specific protest activities, so it did not reflect the uncertainty involved in socially disruptive forms of protest. From this point of view, one may assume that Van Zomeren et al. (2004) measured non-disruptive protest tendencies. Therefore, Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) findings seem to be in line with the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis: the emotional pathway predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does the instrumental pathway.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter first argued that the use of the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction is preferable to the use of the normative/non-normative distinction, because the former is consistent with Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach to collective protest

and helps overcome limitations in Wright et al.'s (1990) paradigm. Chapter 3 subsequently contended that the field of collective protest should take into serious consideration one of the core human motives, the quest for personal certainty (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van den Bos, 2009). The reason is that socially disruptive forms of protest entail a higher degree of personal uncertainty which helps explain why protest motives should differentially predict the two types of collective protest. Finally, this chapter postulated hypotheses with regard to the relative impact of protest motives on socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest and reviewed some of the existing evidence that lends support to these hypotheses.

Therefore, Chapter 3 is able to provide an answer to the key question that this piece of work seeks to address as to whether socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest are triggered equally by the same motives or whether some motives are more important for one type of protest than for the other. It is hypothesised that group-based anger, social opinion support, and group identification predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest. In contrast, it is hypothesised that collective efficacy and social action support predict disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. In comparing the predictive strengths of group-based anger and collective efficacy, this chapter has also argued that anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does efficacy and that efficacy predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does anger. Similar hypotheses have been postulated regarding the role of social opinion and action support. As such, it is hypothesised that social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest; by contrast, social action support is expected to predict disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. All of the above hypotheses are tested empirically in a series of three main studies to be reported in the following chapter.

Chapter 4

Studies 1-3: Empirical Evidence for the Role of Social Disruptiveness in Determining the Predictive Strengths of Collective Protest Motives

Introduction

The purpose of Chapter 4 is to provide empirical evidence for the hypotheses postulated in the previous chapter. To this end, three main studies are reported. Studies 1 and 2 were correlational in nature and aimed at examining the research hypotheses through the use of three different samples. Correlations between protest motives and protest tendencies are generally reported, as well as results from multiple regression analyses. Because social opinion and action support are considered to causally precede the emotional and instrumental pathways, respectively (Van Zomeren et al., 2004), they are always entered in the first step of the regression analyses. Group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification are thus entered in the second step. Path analyses were not preferred, because this thesis is not interested in the interrelationships between the protest motives; rather, the relationship of each predictor to the two types of protest is of exclusive interest. Thus, multiple regression analyses are reported here, so that the unique contributions of each predictor in the variance of the two types of protest are revealed.

For reasons of external and ecological validity, two of the samples came from real-world industrial action contexts (Studies 1b and 2). Finally, Study 3 was experimental in nature and aimed at demonstrating that it is indeed differing levels of personal uncertainty associated with socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest that drive the differential predictive strengths of protest motives.

Before moving on to the actual studies, note that all of the reported studies focus on cases of *incidental* disadvantage (i.e., issue-based or situation-based disadvantage, such as a pay dispute between a union and the government). The reason has to do with a specific finding from Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analytic review. To reiterate, these researchers postulated SIMCA (see section 2.3.4) and examined a number of moderator variables. One such variable was type of disadvantage which was coded either as incidental or *structural*, the latter being related to "structural low group status or

discrimination based on membership of a social group or category" (p. 509). Blacks and gay men can be considered as examples of structurally disadvantaged groups.

Van Zomeren et al. (2008) found that the predictive strengths of injustice and efficacy varied as a function of type of disadvantage. Specifically, they found that injustice and efficacy were more likely to motivate participation against incidental disadvantage than against structural disadvantage; identity was found to be of equal importance. Therefore, in order to control for type of disadvantage and to make sure that the effect sizes were strong enough for meaningful comparisons to be made, the studies reported here only examined cases of incidental disadvantage.

Study 1

4.1. Introduction

Given the scarcity of supporting evidence for the disruptive and non-disruptive protest hypotheses, Study 1 examined the validity of both parts of these two hypotheses by means of two separate sub-studies: Study 1a examined non-disruptive protest, whereas Study 1b focused on disruptive protest. To investigate the rest of the hypotheses, two of which seem to be well supported in the literature (i.e., the emotional pathway hypothesis and the social action support hypothesis), the unique contribution of each predictor in the variance of non-disruptive protest (Study 1a) was compared with the contribution of the same predictor in the variance of disruptive protest (Study 1b).

In summary, Study 1a tested both parts of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis: a) group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does collective efficacy and b) social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does social action support. Study 1b, on the other hand, tested both parts of the disruptive protest hypothesis: a) collective efficacy predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does group-based anger and b) social action support predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does social opinion support.

In comparing the predictive strengths of the predictors across the two sub-studies, Study 1 also tested the emotional pathway hypothesis (i.e., group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest), the instrumental pathway

hypothesis (i.e., collective efficacy predicts disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest), the identity-related pathway hypothesis (i.e., group identification predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest), the social opinion support hypothesis (i.e., social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest), and the social action support hypothesis (i.e., social action support predicts disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest).

Study 1a

4.2a Introduction

Data for this study were collected among students by means of a web-based questionnaire. A similar paradigm (see section 4.3.1a) to the one introduced by Van Zomeren et al. (2004; Studies 2 and 3) was adopted.

4.3a Method

Information about the participants, the design, the procedure, and the measures used is provided below. Preliminary analyses are also reported.

4.3.1a Participants, design, and procedure

One hundred and ninety-one psychology students (168 women and 22 men - one participant did not report gender - mean age 20 years) at the University of Kent participated in a web-based survey, ethically approved by the same university, for partial course credit. Similarly to Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) paradigm, all participants read that a committee consisting of four professors of psychology had recently proposed a 50% increase (additional 6 hours) in the amount of lab testing time psychology students would be required to complete during their degree. Following research on procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988) according to which people perceive higher injustice when they are denied voice as opposed to when they are provided voice, it was made explicit that students had not been given the chance to influence the professors' proposal. Having read the bogus scenario, participants completed a number of measures.

4.3.2a Questionnaire/Measures

All questionnaire items were measured on 7-point Likert-type scales unless otherwise stated. Single indices were calculated for those variables measured with several items by averaging responses over items for each participant.

4.3.2.1a Predictor variables

All items for the predictor variables were adapted from Van Zomeren et al. (2004). There were reliable three-item measures of *group-based anger* (α = .85; "Because of the professors' proposal, I feel angry/irritated/furious"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *definitely*), *collective efficacy* (α = .91; "I think together psychology students are able to change this situation/make the professors change position on the RPS system/stop this proposal"; poles anchored as 1 = *I disagree strongly*, 7 = *I agree strongly*), and *group identification* (α = .78, I view myself as a UKC psychology student/I feel connected to other UKC psychology students/I am glad to be a UKC psychology student; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *definitely*).

Single items measured on 9-point scales ranging from 10% to 90% were used for *social opinion support* ("I think that the proportion of psychology students that disagree with the professors' proposal is approximately:") and for *social action support* ("I think that the proportion of psychology students that are willing to protest against the proposal is approximately:").

4.3.2.2a Criterion variable

Non-disruptive protest tendencies were measured through the use of two items, considered persuasive in nature by Postmes and Brunsting (2002) [r (190) = .28, p < .001; "I would sign a petition to be sent to the departmental staff-student liaison committee about stopping the proposal"; "I would write a letter together with fellow students to be sent to the Head of Department about stopping this proposal"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *definitely*].

4.3.2.3a Demographics

Finally, participants were asked to indicate their gender and age, and were fully debriefed. Neither gender nor age was significantly correlated with the criterion variable, *r*s (190) < |.10|, *p*s > .10, so they were excluded from subsequent analyses.

4.3.3a Preliminary analyses

Before carrying out the main analysis, hierarchical regression analysis that is, a factor analysis was performed to confirm that the constructs were distinguishable from each other. Subsequently, the data were checked for missing cases and restricted range, including floor and ceiling effects; these effects can have weakening influence by lowering the power of a study to yield significant effects (Runyon, Coleman, & Pittenger, 2000). Finally, assumptions in multiple regression analysis were tested: a) number of cases, b) normal distribution of criterion variable, c) outliers in predictor and criterion variables, and d) multicollinearity (Runyon et al., 2000).

4.3.3.1a Factor analysis

A factor analysis was performed using a maximum likelihood method of estimation. Three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged. The solution explained 57.39 % of the variance. Group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification items loaded strongly on their respective factor (factor loadings > .67). The items measuring non-disruptive protest tendencies loaded on a fourth factor, the eigenvalue of which was less than 1 (= .79). Although the item measuring letter-writing tendencies did not load as strongly on that factor (= .32) as one would have hoped for, it was still used with the item measuring petition-signing tendencies to calculate the single index of the criterion variable on conceptual grounds, in line with Postmes and Brunsting (2002), and also because it did not load strongly on any other factor (factor loadings < .24). Finally, neither kind of social support loaded strongly on any of the four factors (factor loadings < .33). A scree test also supported a four-factor solution for the present data. Therefore, one can be confident of the construct validity of the measures employed, consistently with previous research where the questionnaire items were adapted from (i.e., Postmes & Brunsting, 2002; Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

4.3.3.2a Data checking

There were two missing cases for group identification and one missing case for the criterion variable; this is not problematic given that the variables were not missing for more than 1% of the sample which is equivalent to two cases for the present study. Moreover, none of the variables had restricted range. However, there was a ceiling effect of social opinion support at 90% and of group identification at 6. This suggests that the sample tended to report high levels of social opinion support and group identification (see also means and standard deviations in Table 4.1). Therefore, true significant effects of these variables may appear to be non-significant in the present study.

4.3.3.3a Assumptions in multiple regression analysis

(a) Number of cases: With listwise $N = 188$ all analyses fell above the 104+number of predictor variables point (109 with 5 variables), so there was a sufficient number of cases to detect medium effects (> .30) 80% of the time. (b) Normality of criterion variable: The criterion variable of non-disruptive protest tendencies was normally distributed (skewness = -.15, stand. error of skewness = .18). (c) Outliers: For all variables there were no outliers in either direction apart from group identification and social opinion support. Two outliers lower than 2.77, three *SD*s from the mean of group identification, and one outlier lower than 41.31, three *SD*s from the mean of social opinion support, were winsorised, because these scores seemed consistent with the rest of those participants' scores. (d) Multicollinearity: No correlations among the predictor variables were higher than .90, so the variables were not multicollinear (see Table 4.1 for intercorrelations).

It follows that regression fulfilled the assumptions of sufficient number of cases, normality of dependent variable, and non-multicollinearity, while there were no outliers in either direction after winsorisation of the sole outlier in social opinion support and of the two outliers in group identification. Therefore, multiple regression analysis was considered to be appropriate for testing both parts of the non-disruptive hypothesis.

Table 4.1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Non-disruptive Protest Tendencies, Social Opinion Support Winsorised, Social Action Support, Group-based Anger, Collective Efficacy, and Group Identification Winsorised (Study 1a, Listwise N = 188)

Variable	*M*	*SD*	2	3	4	5	6
1.Non-disruptive protest tendencies	4.90	1.08	.22*	.33**	.46**	.28**	.09
2. Social opinion support winsorised	80.19	12.62		.23*	.29**	.07	.14†
3. Social action support	63.60	16.00			.25**	.23*	.26**
4. Group-based anger	4.31	1.37				.10	.05
5. Collective efficacy	4.51	1.33					.24*
6. Group identification winsorised	5.75	.96					

Note. Scores can vary between 1 and 7 for all variables apart from social opinion and action support for which variables scores can vary from 10% to 90%. Higher means indicate higher protest tendencies, higher support, and so on.

†: $p < .10$; *: $p < .01$; **: $p < .001$.

4.4a Results and discussion

Correlations between the predictor variables and non-disruptive protest tendencies, as well as results from the hierarchical regression analysis, are now reported and discussed, in order to test the two parts of the non-disruptive hypothesis.

4.4.1a Correlations

Table 4.1 shows that all of the predictor variables correlated positively with non-disruptive protest tendencies. In line with the first part of the non-disruptive hypothesis, one can already see that the criterion variable was positively and moderately correlated with group-based anger, $r = .46$, $p < .001$, but less so with collective efficacy, $r = .28$, $p < .001$; the difference between the two correlations was statistically significant, t (185) = 2.06, $p = .04$, two-tailed. However, the hypothesised pattern did not emerge when comparing the correlations of the criterion variable with social opinion and action support: It was social action, rather than social opinion, support being correlated more strongly with the criterion variable, although the difference was not statistically significant, t (185) = 1.28, $p > .10$, two-tailed. The weaker than predicted influence of social opinion support on the criterion variable might be due to the ceiling effect reported above (see section 4.3.3.2a). The same ceiling effect of group identification might also account for the fact that group identification was not significantly correlated with the criterion variable; in fact, it was not significantly correlated with group-based anger either.

Nevertheless, one needs to also examine the predictor variables' partial correlations with the criterion variable for a more stringent test of the validity of the two parts of the non-disruptive hypothesis.

4.4.2a Hierarchical regression analysis

A hierarchical regression analysis on non-disruptive protest tendencies was performed with social opinion and action support in the first step and group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification in the second step (see Table 4.3 for results; section 4.4.3b). The first step of the model explained 13% of the variance in the criterion variable, which was significant, F (2, 185) = 14.32, $p < .001$. However, against the

second part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of social opinion support was lower than the contribution of social action support although the difference was not statistically significant, t (185) = -1.46, $p > .10$, two-tailed. As mentioned above, the ceiling effect of social opinion support may have accounted for the weaker than predicted influence of this variable on non-disruptive protest tendencies.

The change in percentage of variance explained by the second step of the model, from 13% to 30%, was significant, F (3, 182) = 14.48, $p < .001$. Most importantly, in line with the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of group-based anger was nearly double as much as the contribution of collective efficacy and the difference was statistically significant, albeit marginally so, t (182) = 1.88, $p = .06$, two-tailed. Group identification, however, was found to have no significant contribution in the variance of the criterion variable which might be due to the yielded ceiling effect as argued above.

Thus, the findings lend strong support to the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis according to which group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does collective efficacy. However, the second part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis with regard to social opinion support being a stronger predictor of non-disruptive protest when compared with social action support was not supported. Perhaps this was due to the ceiling effect of social opinion support, which means that true significant effects of this variable may have appeared to be non-significant in the present study as explained in section 4.3.3.2a.

Before drawing any strong conclusions, it is necessary to examine the validity of the disruptive hypothesis too.

Study 1b

4.2b Introduction

To reiterate, Study 1b focused only on disruptive protest thus examining the two parts of the disruptive protest hypothesis. Data for this study were collected by means of a web-based questionnaire administered on registered members of the UK Association of University Teachers (AUT) who were about to go on strike. The main issue of the dispute

was about how universities were going to use the extra revenue from increased tuition fees and additional grants. As early as April 2004, university vice-chancellors had promised that at least a third of that money would be invested into the salaries and conditions of their staff. However, as of October 2005, that promise had not yet been honoured. The AUT gave the Universities and Colleges Employers' Association (UCEA) a deadline of the end of November 2005 to respond to their claim that at least one third of extra income be used to boost staff pay. Following a negotiating meeting where AUT and UCEA were unable to reach an agreement, AUT went on a one-day strike in March 2006 that disrupted the function of many universities across the country (AUT, 2006; Gibson, 2006; UCEA, 2006).

4.3b Method

Information about the participants, the design, the procedure, and the measures employed is provided below. Preliminary analyses are reported as well.

4.3.1b Participants, design, and procedure

Seventy-seven AUT members (30 women and 47 men, median age 41-50 years) of the University of Kent participated in a web-based survey, ethically approved by the same university. All participants volunteered for the study after receiving an email sent by an AUT representative a few days before the strike. The invitation email invited AUT members to complete a brief anonymous online questionnaire about their views relating to the strike. Having read the email and clicked on the survey link, participants completed a number of measures. No reward was offered for their participation.

4.3.2b Questionnaire/Measures

All items were derived from Study 1a, adapted to the strike context, and measured on 11-point Likert-type scales unless otherwise stated. To maximise participation rates the questionnaire had to be kept as brief as possible and thus fewer items were used. Single indices were calculated for those variables measured with two items by averaging responses over items for each participant.

4.3.2.1b Predictor variables

There were reliable two-item measures of *group-based anger* [r (77) = .65, p < .001; "Because of the employers' position on pay, I feel angry/irritated"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 11 = *definitely*], *collective efficacy* [r (77) = .82, p < .001; "I think together AUT members are able to change this situation/make UCEA change position on pay"; poles anchored as 1 = *I disagree strongly*, 11 = *I agree strongly*], and *group identification* [r (77) = .61, p < .001 "I view myself as a member of the AUT/I am glad to be a member of the AUT"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 11 = *definitely*].

Single items measured on 9-point scales ranging from 10% to 90% were used for *social opinion support* ("I think that the proportion of AUT members at Kent that agree with the case AUT is making is approximately:") and for *social action support* ("I think that the proportion of AUT members at Kent that are willing to protest against UCEA is approximately:").

4.3.2.2b Criterion variable

Disruptive protest tendencies were measured through the use of two items, considered confrontational in nature by Postmes and Brunsting (2002) [r (77) = .47, p < .001; "I intend to go on strike"; "I intend to attend an AUT picket line on campus"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 11 = *definitely*].

4.3.2.3b Demographics

Finally, participants were asked to indicate their gender and age, and were fully debriefed. Neither gender nor age was significantly correlated with the criterion variable, rs (77) < |.14|, ps > .10, so they were excluded from subsequent analyses.

4.3.3b Preliminary analyses

Similarly to Study 1a, before carrying out the main analysis, a factor analysis was conducted to assess construct validity. Subsequently, the data were checked for missing cases and restricted range, including floor and ceiling effects. Finally, assumptions in multiple regression analysis were tested (Runyon et al., 2000).

4.3.3.1b Factor analysis

A factor analysis was conducted with Oblimin rotation (allowing factors to be correlated) using a maximum likelihood method of estimation. Two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged (intercorrelation between the two factors: r = -.31). The solution, which was also supported by a scree test, explained 60.50% of the variance. Collective efficacy items loaded strongly on the first factor (factor loadings > .82). However, group identification items also loaded on the same factor, though to a lesser extent (factor loadings < .65). The social action support item loaded very strongly on the second factor (= -.90), but the social opinion support item loaded on the same factor, though to a much lower degree (= -.67). The items measuring group-based anger loaded on a third factor (factor loadings > .60; intercorrelation with factor 1, r = .51, and with factor 2, r = -.15), the eigenvalue of which was less than 1 (= .77). Finally, neither kind of disruptive protest tendencies loaded strongly on any of the three factors (factor loadings < |.42|). Although collective efficacy and social action support did not seem empirically distinguishable from group identification and social opinion support, respectively, these last two variables loaded on the collective efficacy and social action support factors to a much lesser extent. This justified the use of these four variables as distinct theoretical constructs, consistently with previous research where the items measuring the predictor variables were adapted from (i.e., Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

4.3.3.2b Data checking

There were no missing cases for any of the variables. Moreover, none of the variables had restricted range and neither floor nor ceiling effects were observed (see also means and standard deviations in Table 4.2).

4.3.3.3b Assumptions in multiple regression analysis

(a) Number of cases: With N = 77 all analyses fell above the 27+number of predictor variables point (32 with 5 variables), so there was a sufficient number of cases to detect large effects (> .50) 80% of the time. (b) Normality of criterion variable: The criterion variable of disruptive protest tendencies was significantly and negatively skewed (skewness = -.66, stand. error of skewness = .27), which could have had a weakening or

biasing effect; therefore, the results must be interpreted with caution. (c) Outliers: For all variables there were no outliers in either direction. (d) Multicollinearity: No correlations among the predictor variables were higher than .90, so the variables were not multicollinear (see Table 4.2 for intercorrelations).

Table 4.2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Disruptive Protest Tendencies, Social Opinion Support, Social Action Support, Group-based Anger, Collective Efficacy, and Group Identification (Study 1b, N = 77)

Variable	*M*	*SD*	2	3	4	5	6
1. Disruptive protest tendencies	7.19	2.71	.35*	.42**	.46**	.63**	.55**
2. Social opinion support	59.35	15.33		.61**	.32*	.33*	.13
3. Social action support	51.04	18.68			.18	.37*	.06
4. Group-based anger	8.26	2.16				.45**	.42**
5. Collective efficacy	6.49	2.47					.54**
6. Group identification	8.78	2.12					

Note. Scores can vary between 1 and 11 for all variables apart from social opinion and action support for which variables scores can vary from 10% to 90%. Higher means indicate higher protest tendencies, higher support, and so on.

*: $p < .01$; **: $p < .001$.

It follows that the data met most of the assumptions in multiple regression analysis. Apart from the criterion variable, which was significantly skewed, regression fulfilled the assumptions of sufficient number of cases and non-multicollinearity while there were no outliers in either direction. Therefore, multiple regression analysis was considered to be suitable for examining both parts of the disruptive hypothesis.

4.4b Results and discussion

Correlations between the predictor variables and disruptive protest tendencies, as well as results from the hierarchical regression analysis, are reported and discussed here, in order to examine the validity of the two parts of the disruptive hypothesis. Comparisons of the predictive strengths of all five protest motives across Studies 1a and 1b are provided at the end of this section, in order to test the emotional, instrumental, and identity-related pathway hypotheses, along with the social opinion and action support hypotheses.

4.4.1b Correlations

Table 4.2 shows that all of the predictor variables correlated positively with disruptive protest tendencies. In line with the first part of the disruptive hypothesis, one can observe that the criterion variable was positively and strongly correlated with collective efficacy, $r = .63$, $p < .001$, but only moderately with group-based anger, $r = .46$, $p < .001$; the difference between the two correlations was statistically significant, albeit marginally so, $t\ (74) = 1.81$, $p = .07$, two-tailed. With regard to the second part of the disruptive hypothesis, it can be seen that the criterion variable was more strongly correlated with social action support, $r = .42$, $p < .001$, than with social opinion support, $r = .35$, $p < .001$, but the difference was not statistically significant, $t\ (74) = .76$, $p > .10$, two-tailed. Moreover, group identification was found to be positively and strongly correlated with the criterion variable.

The correlational findings are generally in line with the disruptive hypothesis, but one has to examine as well the predictor variables' partial correlations with the criterion variable for a more stringent test of the validity of the two parts of the disruptive hypothesis.

4.4.2b Hierarchical regression analysis

A hierarchical regression analysis on disruptive protest tendencies was performed with social opinion and action support in the first step and group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification in the second step (see Table 4.3 for results). The first step of the model explained 19% of the variance in the criterion variable, which was significant, F (2, 74) = 8.64, $p < .001$. In keeping with the second part of the disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of social action support was more than double as much as the contribution of social opinion support, although the difference was not statistically significant, t (74) = 1.26, $p > .10$, two-tailed.

The change in percentage of variance explained by the second step of the model, from 19% to 54%, was significant, F (3, 71) = 17.69, $p < .001$. In line with the first part of the disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of collective efficacy was more than double as much as the contribution of group-based anger, although the difference was not statistically significant, t (71) = 1.36, $p > .10$, two-tailed. Furthermore, group identification was found to have a significant contribution in the variance of the criterion variable when the rest of the predictor variables were accounted for.

To conclude, the findings lend support to both parts of the disruptive protest hypothesis according to which collective efficacy and social action support predict disruptive protest more strongly than do group-based anger and social opinion support, respectively. This support, however, is tentative because the relevant t-tests did not reach acceptable levels of significance, which was perhaps due to the fairly low sample size.

4.4.3b Comparisons of predictive strengths across Studies 1a and 1b

In order for one to test the emotional, instrumental, and identity-related pathway hypotheses, as well as the social opinion and action support hypotheses, the contribution of each predictor in the variance of non-disruptive protest (Study 1a) had to be compared with the contribution of the same predictor in the variance of disruptive protest (Study 1b). For this reason, z-tests for differences between independent betas were conducted, using unstandardised regression weights given that Studies 1a and 1b were quite different in terms of the issue and the sample size (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).

Table 4.3

Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Non-disruptive and Disruptive Protest Tendencies Across Studies 1a and 1b

	Protest tendencies					
	Non-disruptive (Study 1a, Listwise $N = 188$)			Disruptive (Study 1b, $N = 77$)		
Variable	β	*t*	*p*	β	*t*	*P*
Step 1						
Social opinion support	.16	2.21	.03	.15	1.10	>.10
Social action support	.30	4.23	<.001	.33	2.49	.02
Step 2						
Group-based anger	.37	5.61	<.001	.15	1.56	>.10
Collective Efficacy	.21	3.17	.002	.31	2.81	.006
Group identification	-.04	-.59	>.10	.30	3.00	.004

Note. For non-disruptive protest tendencies: $R^2 = .13$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .17$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); once all variables were entered in the second step, social opinion support dropped to non-significance, $\beta = .06$, $p > .10$, but social action support remained significant, $\beta = .19$, $p = .006$. For disruptive protest tendencies: $R^2 = .19$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .35$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); once all variables were entered in the second step, social opinion support dropped to non-significance, $\beta = .003$, $p > .10$, but social action support remained significant, $\beta = .26$, $p = .018$.

Regarding social opinion and action support, it was of no use to conduct any comparison tests given that the predictive strengths of these two variables were practically identical across the two sub-studies (see Table 4.3). This does not lend support to either the social opinion support hypothesis (i.e., social opinion support predicts non-

disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest) or the social action support hypothesis (i.e., social action support predicts disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest). However, no safe conclusions can de drawn with regard to these two hypotheses due to the ceiling effect of social opinion support in Study 1a. This may have substantially weakened the predictive strength of social opinion support, which in turn may have inflated the predictive strength of social action support. No safe conclusion can be drawn for the identity-related pathway hypothesis either (i.e., group identification predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest) due to the ceiling effect of group identification; this may have accounted for the fact this variable did not significantly predict non-disruptive protest tendencies in Study 1a.

With regard to the emotional pathway hypothesis, group-based anger predicted non-disruptive protest tendencies (B = .29) more strongly than disruptive protest tendencies (B = .19), but the difference was not statistically significant, $z = .76$, $p > .10$. As far as the instrumental pathway hypothesis is concerned, the unique contribution of collective efficacy in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies (B = .33) was almost double as much as its unique contribution in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies (B = 17), but the difference was not statistically significant, $z = -1.25$, $p > .10$.

In summary, the findings provide only tentative support in favour of the emotional and instrumental pathway hypotheses, given the non-significant *z*-tests. Furthermore, no safe conclusions can be drawn for the social opinion and action support hypotheses, as well as for the identity-related pathway hypothesis, due to the ceiling effects of social opinion support and group identification in Study 1a.

4.5 General discussion

In considering the results from Studies 1a and 1b together, one can see that Study 1 lends tentative support to the emotional pathway hypothesis, which is in line with pieces of research cited in Chapter 3 (e.g., Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Olson et al., 1995; see section 3.3.5.1). Study 1 lends further tentative support to the instrumental pathway hypothesis and the two parts of the disruptive hypothesis (i.e., collective efficacy and social action support predict disruptive protest more strongly than do group-based anger and social opinion support, respectively), and strong support to the first part of the non-

disruptive hypothesis (i.e., group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does collective efficacy). This is the first time that there is some empirical support for these hypotheses. This is an important point to make particularly when it comes to the disruptive and non-disruptive protest hypotheses: Given the scarcity of supporting evidence in the literature, it was these two hypotheses that Study 1 mainly aimed to provide evidence for. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine whether one can replicate all of the above findings in a different context. Additional data are therefore indispensable.

One more reason why a further study is essential has to do with the fact that no safe conclusions could be drawn either for the second part of the non-disruptive hypothesis (i.e., social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does social action support) or for the identity-related pathway hypothesis and the social opinion and action support hypotheses. As argued above, these limitations may have been related to the ceiling effects of social opinion support and group identification that appeared in Study 1a.

An additional study would also address one final limitation of Study 1. It was not clear that the research participants perceived the protest items as non-disruptive in Study 1a and as socially disruptive in Study 1b. Although striking and picketing (Study 1b) can cause objectively far more social disruption than can petition-signing and letter-writing (Study 1a), there is room for doubt as to how socially disruptive participants perceived these actions to be. Thus, a pre-test seeking to measure perceptions of social disruptiveness of several protest activities would have been useful.

For the above reasons, an additional study where social disruptiveness of protest activities is pre-tested is much needed, in order to see whether one can replicate effects from Study 1 and provide support for those hypotheses that were not supported here.

Study 2

4.6 Introduction

Study 2 aimed at replicating the effects produced in Studies 1a and 1b and at examining whether lack of support for the rest of the hypotheses was due to a Type II error (i.e.,

failure to reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact not true; Runyon et al., 2000). The present study tapped into both disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies and tested all hypotheses within the same design. For reasons of heightened external and ecological validity a real-world context was once more preferred. Thus, Study 2 focused on another trade union dispute, having first established by means of a pre-test the degree of social disruptiveness of the protest activities to be used as the criterion variables. To make sure that the effect sizes produced in Study 1 were not particular to the protest tendencies measured, Study 2 used multiple items to measure the criterion variables of socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies.

Data for this study were collected by means of a web-based questionnaire administered on registered members of the UK National Union of Teachers (NUT). The main issue of the dispute was about teachers' salaries. Following the decision of the government for a pay increase below the rate of inflation, NUT authorised a one-day strike that disrupted the function of many schools across the country and aimed at pay increase equal or higher than the rate of inflation (NUT, 2008).

4.7 Method

Information about the pre-test, the participants, the design, the procedure, and the measures employed is provided in this section. Preliminary analyses are reported too.

4.7.1 Pre-test for social disruptiveness

Prior to the main study a pre-test measuring the social disruptiveness of several protest activities was conducted. Eighteen teachers (13 women and 5 men, mean age 30 years, registered members of NUT) participated in a web-based brief questionnaire and evaluated how disruptive for the functioning of schools each of eight protest activities would be. Participants rated the following items adapted from Corning and Myers (2002), and a list of protest behaviours suggested by the union (NUT, 2008) on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from -3 (*not disruptive at all*) to +3 (*very disruptive*): (a) signing a petition about teachers' pay to be sent to the government, (b) sending a letter/email message with NUT colleagues to the local MP regarding teachers' pay, (c) attending a local NUT meeting to discuss teachers' pay and the strike action, (d) handing out leaflets

to the public with NUT colleagues, (e) attending a demonstration/rally regarding teachers' pay, (f) attending a NUT picket line at one's school gate, (g) going on strike, and (h) taking part in occupying one's school building.

In line with Study 1, items (a) and (b) were expected to be considered non-disruptive, whereas items (f) and (g) were expected to be rated as socially disruptive. Given that items (c) and (d) are not likely to cause any social disruption, they were expected to be thought of as non-disruptive, whereas items (e) and (h) were expected to be deemed socially disruptive. As such, items (a) through (d) were expected to be rated negatively, which means that teachers considered those items non-disruptive. In contrast, items (e) through (h) were expected to be rated positively, which means that teachers considered those items socially disruptive. Indeed, the mean scores of disruptiveness per item were consistent with these expectations. The means for items (a) through (d) ranged from -1.13 to -.17, whereas the means for items (e) through (h) ranged from .78 to 2.33. All means differed significantly from zero, *t*s (17) > |2.30|, *p*s < .04, apart from the mean of the leafleting item, t (17) = -.40, p > .10. Because this item had been rated positively and because it is conceptually closer to the non-disruptive items than to the disruptive ones, it was still classified as non-disruptive.

4.7.2 Participants, design, and procedure

Forty-two teachers (35 women and 7 men, mean age 34 years), registered members of NUT, participated in a web-based survey, ethically approved by the University of Kent. The procedure was similar to Study 1b; all participants volunteered for the study after receiving an email sent by a NUT representative a few days before the strike. The invitation email invited NUT members to complete a brief anonymous online questionnaire about their views concerning the strike. Having read the email and clicked on the survey link, participants completed a number of measures. No reward was offered for their participation.

4.7.3 Questionnaire/Measures

All items were derived from Study 1 (hence from Van Zomeren et al. (2004) unless otherwise stated), adapted to the NUT strike context, and measured on 9-point scales.

Single indices were calculated for those variables measured with multiple items by averaging responses over items for each participant.

4.7.3.1 Predictor variables

There were reliable three-item measures of *group-based anger* (α = .89; "Because of the government's position on pay, I feel angry/irritated/furious"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 9 = *definitely*) and *collective efficacy* (α = .95; "I think together NUT members are able to change this situation/make the government change position on pay/to achieve their goals on pay"; poles anchored as 1 = *I disagree strongly*, 9 = *I agree strongly*). There was also a reliable five-item measure of group identification derived from Van Zomeren et al. (2004) and Kessler and Hollbach (2005; α = .90; "I view myself as a member of the NUT/I am glad to be a member of the NUT/I feel connected to other NUT members/I am proud to be a member of the NUT/Being a NUT member is important to me"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 9 = *definitely*).

Single items measured on 9-point scales ranging from 10% to 90% were used for *social opinion support* ("I think that the proportion of NUT members that agree with the case NUT is making for pay is approximately:") and for *social action support* ("I think that the proportion of NUT members that are willing to protest against the government's position on pay is approximately:").

4.7.3.2 Criterion variables

Non-disruptive protest tendencies were reliably measured through the use of the pre-test items (a) through (d), α = .78. *Disruptive protest tendencies* were also reliably measured through the use of the pre-test items (e) through (h), α = .80.

4.7.3.3 Demographics

Finally, participants were asked to indicate their gender and age, and were fully debriefed. Gender was not significantly correlated with either one of the criterion variables, *r*s (42) < -.23, *p*s > .10, so it was excluded from subsequent analyses. Age was also non-significantly correlated with non-disruptive protest tendencies, r (42) = -.18, p > .10, but was significantly correlated with disruptive protest tendencies, r (42) = -.33, p <

.03, such that younger participants were more willing to take part in disruptive protest activities than were older participants. A similar finding was uncovered in Cameron and Nickerson's (2006) field survey, conducted in the middle of an anti-globalisation protest: Older participants were found to be less likely to report willingness to take part in non-normative forms of protest.

In order to examine whether age remained a significant predictor once controlling for all five hypothesised predictors, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed with age in the first step and the five main predictors in the second. Results revealed that age did not have a significant independent contribution, $\beta = -.07$, $p > .10$, in predicting disruptive protest tendencies once the five predictor variables were controlled for. Therefore, age was excluded from subsequent analyses.

4.7.4 Preliminary analyses

Similarly to Studies 1a and 1b, before carrying out the main analysis, a factor analysis was conducted to assess construct validity. Following that, the data were checked for missing cases and restricted range, including floor and ceiling effects. Finally, assumptions in multiple regression analysis were tested too (Runyon et al., 2000).

4.7.4.1 Factor analysis

A factor analysis was conducted with Oblimin rotation (allowing factors to be correlated) using a maximum likelihood method of estimation. Three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged (intercorrelation between factors 1-2, $r = .45$; factors 1-3, $r = .61$; factors 2-3, $r = .55$). The solution, which was also supported by a scree test, explained 69.99 % of the variance. Collective efficacy items loaded strongly on the first factor (factor loadings > .80). Group identification items loaded strongly on the third factor (factor loadings > .56), while items measuring group-based anger loaded strongly on a fourth factor the eigenvalue of which was just less than 1 (= .96; factor loadings > .75; intercorrelations with the first three factors: $r = .43$ with factor 1, $r = .52$ with factor 2 and $r = .47$ with factor 3). Social opinion and action support did not load on any factor. Thus, one can be confident of the construct validity of the predictor variables,

consistently with previous research where the items measuring the predictor variables were adapted from (i.e., Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

Regarding the criterion variables, all of the disruptive protest items loaded on the second factor (factor loadings ranging from .33 to .92) with the exception of the building occupation item, which did not load on any factor. However, two of the non-disruptive protest items (i.e., attending a meeting and leafleting) also loaded on the second factor (factor loadings = .42 and .62, respectively), while the other two non-disruptive protest items (i.e., petition-signing and letter-writing) loaded weakly on the group-based anger factor (factor loadings = .42 and .32, respectively). Although the non-disruptive items did not seem empirically distinguishable from either group-based anger or disruptive protest tendencies, the initial classification for both disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies was retained on conceptual grounds and in line with the results of the pre-test. A further subsidiary analysis just using petition-signing and letter-writing as the non-disruptive items replicated the above results. As such, these two items still loaded weakly on the group-based anger factor (factor loadings = .38 and .33 for petition-signing and letter-writing, respectively) and on no other factor, while there was no change in the disruptive protest factor.

4.7.4.2 Data checking

There were no missing cases for any of the variables. Also, none of the variables had restricted range and neither floor nor ceiling effects were observed (see also means and standard deviations in Table 4.4).

4.7.4.3 Assumptions in multiple regression analysis

(a) Number of cases: With $N = 42$ all analyses fell above the 27+number of predictor variables point (32 with 5 variables), so there was a sufficient number of cases to detect large effects (> .50) 80% of the time. (b) Normality of criterion variables: Non-disruptive protest tendencies were normally distributed (skewness = -.17; stand. error of skewness = .37) and so were disruptive protest tendencies (skewness = -.26; stand. error of skewness = .37). Therefore, one cannot expect any weakening or biasing effects for either type of protest tendencies. (c) Outliers: For all variables there were no outliers in either direction

apart from group-based anger. One outlier lower than 2.15, three *SD*s from the mean, was winsorised, because this score seemed consistent with the rest of that participant's scores. (d) Multicollinearity: No correlations among the predictor variables were higher than .90, so the variables were not multicollinear (see Table 4.4 for intercorrelations).

Table 4.4

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Disruptive and Non-disruptive Protest Tendencies, Social Opinion Support, Social Action Support, Group-based Anger Winsorised, Collective Efficacy, and Group Identification (Study 2, N = 42)

Variable	*M*	*SD*	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Disruptive protest tendencies	4.58	1.99	.78***	.50**	.58***	.58***	.72***	.72***
2.Non-disruptive protest tendencies	4.51	1.81		.51**	.44**	.63***	.55***	.63***
3. Social opinion support	66.19	17.66			.37*	.35*	.47**	.42**
4. Social action support	55.24	21.33				.39*	.51**	.54***
5. Group-based anger winsorised	7.26	1.48					.54***	.47**
6. Collective efficacy	5.43	2.13						.69***
7. Group identification	7.17	1.71						

Note. Scores can vary between 1 and 9 for all variables. Higher means indicate higher protest tendencies, higher support, and so on.

*: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$; ***: $p < .001$.

In summary, the data met all of the assumptions in multiple regression analysis. Regression fulfilled the assumptions of sufficient number of cases, normality of criterion variables and non-multicollinearity, while there were no outliers in either direction after winsorisation of the sole outlier in group-based anger. Therefore, multiple regression analysis was considered appropriate for testing the research hypotheses.

4.8 Results

Correlations between the predictor variables and the two criterion variables, as well as results from the two hierarchical regression analyses, are reported here.

4.8.1 Correlations

Table 4.4 shows that all of the predictor variables correlated positively and significantly with both disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies. For ease of presentation, this subsection is divided into further subsections each devoted to one specific hypothesis.

4.8.1.1 The disruptive protest hypothesis

Correlational findings lent only tentative support to the disruptive protest hypothesis. With regard to the first part, disruptive protest tendencies were correlated more strongly with collective efficacy than with group-based anger, but the difference between the two correlations was not statistically significant, $t\,(39) = 1.35$, $p > .10$, two-tailed.

Concerning the second part of the disruptive protest hypothesis, disruptive protest tendencies were correlated more strongly with social action support than with social opinion support, although once more the difference between the two correlations did not reach acceptable levels of significance, $t\,(39) = .57$, $p > .10$, two-tailed.

4.8.1.2 The non-disruptive protest hypothesis

Correlational findings lent weak support to the non-disruptive protest hypothesis. Regarding the first part, non-disruptive protest tendencies were correlated more strongly with group-based anger than with collective efficacy, but the difference between the two correlations was not statistically significant, $t\,(39) = .69$, $p > .10$, two-tailed.

With regard to the second part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis, non-disruptive protest tendencies were correlated more strongly with social opinion support than with social action support, although once more the difference between the two correlations was not statistically significant, t (39) = .47, p > .10, two-tailed.

4.8.1.3 The social opinion support hypothesis

Correlational findings did not provide clear support for this hypothesis. Social opinion support seemed to be correlated to the same extent with both disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies rather than being correlated more strongly with the latter.

4.8.1.4 The social action support hypothesis

Correlational findings lent some support to this hypothesis. Social action support was correlated more strongly with disruptive protest tendencies than with non-disruptive protest tendencies; the difference between the two correlations approached marginal statistical significance, t (39) = 1.61, p = .12, two-tailed.

4.8.1.5 The emotional pathway hypothesis

Correlational findings supported this hypothesis only weakly. Group-based anger was correlated more strongly with non-disruptive protest tendencies than with disruptive protest tendencies, but the difference between the two correlations did not reach acceptable levels of significance, t (39) = .61, p > .10, two-tailed.

4.8.1.6 The instrumental pathway hypothesis

Correlational findings were in keeping with this hypothesis. Collective efficacy was correlated more strongly with disruptive protest tendencies than with non-disruptive protest tendencies; the difference between the two correlations was statistically significant, t (39) = 2.30, p = .03, two-tailed.

4.8.1.7 The identity-related pathway hypothesis

Correlational findings did not provide support for this hypothesis. Group identification correlated more strongly with disruptive protest tendencies than with non-disruptive

protest tendencies, although the difference was not statistically significant, t (39) = 1.23, $p > .10$, two-tailed.

4.8.2 Hierarchical regression analyses

Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted on both disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies, in order to examine the validity of the disruptive and non-disruptive protest hypotheses, respectively. These analyses are first reported followed by comparisons of the predictive strengths of all five protest motives across the two types of protest tendencies, so as to test the social opinion and action support hypotheses, along with the emotional, instrumental, and identity-related pathway hypotheses.

4.8.2.1 Hierarchical regression analysis on disruptive protest tendencies

A hierarchical regression analysis on disruptive protest tendencies was performed with social opinion and action support in the first step and group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification in the second step (see Table 4.5 for results). The first step of the model explained 43% of the variance in the criterion variable, which was significant, F (2, 39) = 14.92, $p < .001$. Regarding the second part of the disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of social action support was higher than the contribution of social opinion support, but the difference was not statistically significant, t (74) = .68, $p > .10$, two-tailed.

The change in percentage of variance explained by the second step of the model, from 43% to 67%, was significant, F (3, 36) = 9.03, $p < .001$. Concerning the first part of the disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of collective efficacy was higher than the contribution of group-based anger, but the difference was not statistically significant, t (36) = .61, $p > .10$, two-tailed. Moreover, group identification was found to have a significant contribution in the variance of the criterion variable when the rest of the predictor variables were accounted for.

Table 4.5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Non-disruptive and Disruptive Protest Tendencies (Study 2, N = 42)

	Protest tendencies					
	Non-disruptive			Disruptive		
Variable	β	*t*	*p*	B	*t*	*p*
Step 1						
Social opinion support	.41	2.91	.006	.34	2.62	.013
Social action Support	.29	2.05	.048	.45	3.51	.001
Step 2						
Group-based anger	.39	2.96	.005	.19	1.65	>.10
Collective efficacy	-.02	-.95	>.10	.27	1.89	.07
Group identification	.35	2.22	.03	.30	2.18	.04

Note. For non-disruptive protest tendencies: $R^2 = .33$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .25$ for Step 2 ($p = .001$); once all variables were entered in the second step, social opinion support dropped to marginal significance, $\beta = .23$, $p = .07$, and social action support to non-significance, $\beta = .02$, $p > .10$. For disruptive protest tendencies: $R^2 = .43$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .24$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); once all variables were entered in the second step, both social opinion and action support dropped to non-significance, βs = .13 and .16, $p > .10$, respectively.

4.8.2.2 Hierarchical regression analysis on non-disruptive protest tendencies

A hierarchical regression analysis on non-disruptive protest tendencies was performed with social opinion and action support in the first step and group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification in the second step (see Table 4.5 for results). The first step of the model explained 33% of the variance in the criterion variable, which was

significant, F (2, 39) = 9.80, $p < .001$. With regard to the second part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of social opinion support was higher than the contribution of social action support, but the difference was not statistically significant, t (39) = .66, $p > .10$, two-tailed.

The change in percentage of variance explained by the second step of the model, from 33% to 58%, was significant, F (3, 36) = 7.10, $p = .001$. In line with the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis, the unique contribution of group-based anger was higher than the contribution of collective efficacy and the difference was statistically significant, t (36) = 2.65, $p = .012$, two-tailed. In fact, the contribution of collective efficacy was negligible. Furthermore, group identification was found to have a significant contribution in the variance of the criterion variable when the rest of the predictor variables were accounted for.

4.8.2.3 Comparisons of predictive strengths across protest types

In order for one to test the emotional, instrumental, and identity-related pathway hypotheses, as well as the social opinion and action support hypotheses, the contribution of each predictor in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies had to be compared with the contribution of the same predictor in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies. For this reason, z-tests for differences between independent betas were conducted (Cohen et al., 2003).

The contribution of social opinion support in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher than its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies and vice versa for social action support, but the differences were not statistically significant: for social opinion support, $z = .36$, $p > .10$, and for social action support, $z = .88$, $p > .10$. With regard to the emotional pathway, the contribution of group-based anger in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher than its contribution in disruptive protest tendencies, but the difference was statistically non-significant, $z = 1.14$, $p > .10$. Concerning the instrumental pathway, the contribution of collective efficacy in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was negligible while its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies was only marginally significant. Note, however, that the size of this last contribution was comparable to the

corresponding contribution uncovered in Study 1b ($\beta = .31$). The difference between the contributions of collective efficacy in this study was non-significant, $z = 1.31$, $p > .10$. Finally, the unique contribution of group identification in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher than its contribution in disruptive protest tendencies, but the difference did not reach acceptable levels of statistical significance: $z = .22$, $p > .10$.

4.9 Discussion

Taken together, correlational findings and results from hierarchical regression analyses were generally in line with the research hypotheses and are now discussed by drawing parallels to findings and implications from Study 1.

4.9.1 Summary of findings

Firstly, one can observe that Study 2 lends strong support to the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis. As such, non-disruptive protest tendencies were found to be predicted significantly more strongly by group-based anger than by collective efficacy. This is important if one takes into account the scarcity of supporting evidence in the literature of collective protest. However, support for the second part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis and the two parts of the disruptive protest hypothesis is only tentative. As such, the contributions of collective efficacy and social action support in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies were found to be higher than the respective contributions of group-based anger and social opinion support while the contribution of social opinion support in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher that the contribution of social action support. Nevertheless, the relevant *t*-tests came out statistically non-significant, which was perhaps due to the low power of this study, so collection of further data is much needed in order for the current findings to be more conclusive.

Study 2 provides further tentative evidence for the identity-related pathway hypothesis. Specifically, the contribution of group identification in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher than its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies, but the difference was not statistically significant or as great as one would have hoped for. Therefore, an additional replication of this finding seems to be

much needed for results to be more conclusive and this is what the following study will partially focus on.

Furthermore, Study 2 provides once more tentative support to the social opinion and action support hypotheses. The contribution of social opinion support in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher than its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies while the opposite pattern emerged for social action support: Its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies was higher than its contribution in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies. Nevertheless, the relevant z-tests came out statistically non-significant, so additional data are needed for the present findings to be more conclusive. Note, however, that correlational findings showed that the difference between the correlations of social action support with disruptive and non-disruptive tendencies was in line with expectations and approached marginal significance. This is in line with research cited in Chapter 3 (e.g., Klandermans, 1986; Spears et al., 2002; see section 3.3.5.2).

Last but not least, Study 2 lends fairly strong support to the instrumental pathway hypothesis. As such, collective efficacy was found to predict disruptive protest tendencies more strongly than non-disruptive ones and it is worth noting that the *t*-test for the difference between the correlations of collective efficacy with disruptive and non-disruptive tendencies came out statistically significant. This finding is notable if one considers the absence of direct support in the literature. With regard to the emotional pathway hypothesis, there was only tentative support: The contribution of group-based anger in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was double as much as its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies, but the difference was not statistically significant.

In conclusion, Study 2 replicates some of the findings that were produced in Study 1 and provides only tentative support to most of the research hypotheses, which is perhaps due to the low sample size. Replication of the current findings by means of larger samples is necessary for the findings to be more conclusive.

4.9.2 Implications

An important implication of the present study, as well as of Study 1, relates to the potentially vital role of social disruptiveness and personal uncertainty in collective protest. Indeed, the predictive strengths of group-based anger, collective efficacy, group identification, and social opinion and action support were shown to differ somewhat as a function of the degree of social disruptiveness. By extension, heightened personal uncertainty involved in socially disruptive protest activities seems a likely candidate for explaining the reason why protest motives in Studies 1 and 2 were tentatively shown to differentially predict participation in collective protest and will be examined more closely in the following study. Therefore, the present study along with Study 1 provides some support for the contention of this thesis that it is imperative to introduce into the field of collective protest one of the core human motives, the quest for personal certainty (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van den Bos, 2009).

Furthermore, the fact that Studies 1 and 2 provide strong support in favour of the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis and some tentative evidence in line with both parts of the disruptive hypothesis is consistent with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analytic review which became the springboard for the postulation of these hypotheses. Considering the differential predictive strengths of the emotional and instrumental pathways in determining participation in disruptive and non-disruptive protest and the above meta-analysis according to which the contributions of the emotional and instrumental pathways to protest are equal, this piece of work hypothesised and found the following: Group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does collective efficacy, whereas collective efficacy predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does group-based anger. Also in line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model that envisages social opinion and action support as feeding into group-based anger and collective efficacy, respectively, this thesis further hypothesised and found that social action support seems to predict disruptive protest more strongly than does social opinion support. However, the evidence for social opinion support predicting non-disruptive protest more strongly than does social action support was not strong enough.

A further implication of the present findings has to do with the usefulness of measuring specific behavioural tendencies rather than using generalised items, such as "I

would participate in some form of collective protest" or "I would participate in raising our collective voice" (see Van Zomeren et al., 2004). When coming across such items, respondents are not as likely to deliberate on instrumental aspects of protest participation as they would if they were asked to report specific behavioural tendencies. The use of generalised items appears to inflate the role of the emotional pathway, which perhaps explains why Van Zomeren et al. (2004) found that group-based anger predicted collective protest tendencies more strongly than did collective efficacy.

Finally, the present findings tentatively inform practices of both those who wish to maintain social order (e.g., decision makers) and those who may wish to 'disturb' it (e.g., trade unions). Regardless, however, of whether one wants to instigate or prevent protest, the current findings support a more nuanced understanding of the motives that seem to be particularly important for disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest. As such, the key practical implication of the findings from Study 2 along with Study 1 is that group-based anger may drive participation in non-disruptive protest activities. In contrast, collective efficacy and social action support may drive participation in disruptive protest activities. Therefore, if participation in non-disruptive protest is of interest, it is likely to be increased by raising people's anger (e.g., by providing information about social opinion support). If, on the other hand, participation in socially disruptive protest is of interest, then participation is likely to be increased by raising perceptions of social action support.

4.9.3 Limitations

An important limitation of the present study is related to the low sample size which may have been responsible for the lack of statistically significant comparison tests as mentioned above. Nevertheless, Study 2 compensates for this limitation by offering evidence that was produced under conditions that offered heightened external and ecological validity. Samples from both Study 1b and the present study were drawn from real-world industrial action contexts, which helps with the generalisation of findings and endows questionnaires with psychological realism that is often absent from social psychological research. It is also important to note that Study 2 measured a wider variety of protest behaviours than that measured in Study 1 so one can be more confident about the robustness of the effect sizes across Studies 1 and 2. Finally, although the items

measuring non-disruptive protest tendencies did not load on a separate factor, social disruptiveness of the protest items was established by means of a pre-test administered on a small sample drawn from the targeted population.

Nevertheless, two crucial limitations of both Studies 1 and 2 have to do with their correlational nature and the lack of conclusiveness regarding the identity-related pathway hypothesis. Regarding the former, although the data so far lend support to the idea that the predictive strengths of protest motives differ, because of some characteristic attached to the protest activities under investigation, the data have yet to show that the assumed characteristic is social disruptiveness and the ensuing personal uncertainty. With regard to the identity-related pathway hypothesis, results were not conclusive either in Study 1, perhaps due to the ceiling effect of group identification, or in Study 2 given that the difference between the contributions of group identification in predicting non-disruptive and disruptive protest tendencies was not large enough. The following study thus aimed to address these two limitations, the personal uncertainty limitation being the focal point.

Study 3

4.10 Introduction

The goals and context of Study 3 are explained in the following two subsections.

4.10.1 The goals of Study 3

The main goal of the present study was to examine whether it is indeed heightened personal uncertainty associated with social disruptiveness that may drive the differential predictive strengths of protest motives. To this end, personal uncertainty salience was experimentally manipulated. Consistent with the theoretical analysis in Chapter 3 (see section 3.3), a) uncertainty is an aversive experience that motivates behaviour that reduces it or makes it cognitively manageable (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999) and b) collective protest, socially disruptive protest in particular, is an uncertainty-enhancing behaviour given that it carries with it the uncertain prospect of social change. If this reasoning is correct one should expect individuals to report lower willingness to take part in collective protest, especially disruptive protest, when they are reminded of their

personal uncertainties than when they are not. In other words, personal uncertainty salience should have a negative effect on collective protest tendencies, especially disruptive ones, being, as they are, uncertainty-enhancing. This is the *uncertainty hypothesis*.

A further goal of the present study was to provide some more conclusive evidence regarding the validity of the identity-related pathway hypothesis. Thus, group identification was also measured in this study to see how it correlated with disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies. Specifically, group identification was measured in the beginning of the study with personal uncertainty being manipulated next. The reason for measuring identification before manipulating uncertainty salience is related to the fact that uncertainty has been shown to enhance group identification. In line with research supporting Hogg & Mullin's (1999) uncertainty-reduction theory discussed in Chapter 3 (see section 3.3.2), uncertainty (about the task or the situation) raises group identification, especially when the group in question is high in entitativity (Hogg et al., 2007). By measuring identification first, one can thus test its 'clean' effects on the two types of protest.

4.10.2 The context of Study 3

In keeping with the real-world industrial action contexts employed in Studies 1b and 2, this study also used a real-world scenario concerning the recent bailouts funded by the U.S. government to prevent failing banks from going bankrupt. As of now (May 2010) the world economy is still struggling to recover from what has been dubbed "the deepest post-World War II recession by far" (International Monetary Fund, 2009, April, p. xii). Beginning with massive losses at several U.S. mortgage banks at the end of 2007 the crisis peaked in September 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the multi-billion dollar rescue of Merill Lynch and the giant insurance firm AIG. Soon after that, on October 3, 2008, the U.S. Congress approved a $700bn bailout, which constituted "the biggest financial rescue in U.S. history" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2009).

For many Americans, the consequences of the financial crisis were dramatic in terms of both housing and employment. According to *The Economist* (2009, August 20), foreclosures had reached record levels by August 2009: 1.8m homes had been already

repossessed, with one in 355 of U.S. homes receiving a filing in July 2009 alone. Further data reveal that by January 2009, one of every five mortgage holders had a home worth less than the mortgage on it ("The crash", 2009). Employment figures are no less bleak: According to the International Institute for Labour Studies (2009), there were 4,100,000 jobs lost in the U.S. in the twelve months leading to February 2009.

Given that the crisis led millions of people to lose their homes or jobs or both, public reactions do not seem to have been commensurate with the manner in which the U.S. government decided to deal with it. The bailouts undertaken by the U.S. government represent massive instances of 'upward redistribution' from U.S. taxpayers to large multinational corporations that have continued, in the intervening months and years, to reward their executives with enormous bonuses. This means that not only did a great number of people suffer the consequences of the crisis, but they were also asked to bail out those considered most responsible for it, the bankers. Albeit unfair, this policy did not trigger as many or sizeable protests as one might have expected.

Therefore, in keeping with the rationale of this thesis regarding the potentially vital role that personal uncertainty plays in determining collective protest participation, the present study examined the idea that perhaps Americans were not that willing to protest against the bailouts, especially in disruptive ways, for reasons of heightened personal uncertainty. Arguably, the loss of their jobs or homes or both must have prompted high levels of uncertainty about the world and their place within it. To test this idea, Study 3 considered a student sample. Although they are not necessarily taxpayers themselves, many students receive loans to cover tuition and other fees, and (unlike the bankers' debts) their own debts were not cancelled by the government. From that point of view, students represent a relatively disadvantaged group, at least in comparison to bankers.

In summary, Study 3 aimed to determine whether uncertainty salience could plausibly explain why people were willing to bear the brunt of Wall Street failures and government bailouts and to provide more conclusive evidence for the identity-related pathway hypothesis (i.e., group identification predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest). Following the measurement of group identification and the manipulation of personal uncertainty salience, Study 3 had participants read an article about one of the bailouts performed by the U.S. government. Having read the article,

participants were asked to report their willingness to participate in disruptive and non-disruptive protest against the bailout.

4.11 Method

Information about the participants, the design, the experimental procedure, and the measures employed is provided in this section. Preliminary analyses and manipulation checks are also reported.

4.11.1 Participants, design, and procedure

One hundred and eight NYU psychology students (45 men and 63 women, mean age 20 years) participated in a paper-and-pencil questionnaire for partial course credit. All participants arrived at a specified laboratory and first completed a reliable three-item measure of group identification adopted from Study 2, hence from Kessler and Hollbach (2005) and Van Zomeren et al. (2004; α = .85; "I view myself as NYU student/I am proud to be NYU student/Being NYU student is important to me"; poles anchored as 1 = *I disagree strongly*, 7 = *I agree strongly*).

Subsequently, participants were exposed to the manipulation of personal uncertainty salience. In line with Van den Bos, Van Ameijde, and Van Gorp's (2006) paradigm, participants were asked to answer questions about their feelings and thoughts of either being uncertain or watching TV. As such, participants were asked to write down their responses to the following three questions: "Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your *being uncertain/watching TV* arouses in you", "Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think physically will happen to you as you *feel uncertain/watch TV*", and "Please briefly describe in what kind of situations you *experience a lot of personal uncertainty/like to watch TV*".

After giving their answers to the above questions participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS comprises two 10-item subscales, one measuring positive affect and one measuring negative affect. Both subscales were reliable (αs = .85 and .87, respectively). Consistent with previous studies that have manipulated uncertainty salience (e.g., Van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet, & Maas, 2007; Van den Bos et al., 2006) the uncertainty

manipulation had no effect on either subscale ($Fs < 1.19$, $ps > .28$). Moreover, neither of the subscales was related to any of the two types of protest tendencies ($rs < |.05|$, $ps > .65$). Thus, affect cannot serve as an alternative explanation for the potential effect of personal uncertainty salience on protest tendencies.

After the administration of the PANAS participants were asked to read a recent newspaper article. The article was about one of the bailouts performed by the U.S. government and was adapted from a New York Times article entitled "U.S. Expands Plan to Buy Banks' Troubled Assets". This is the newspaper article participants read:

WASHINGTON — The US administration's new plan to liberate the nation's banks from a toxic stew of bad home loans and mortgage-related securities is bigger and more generous to private investors than expected, but it also puts taxpayers at great risk. Taken together, the three programs unveiled on Monday by the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, could buy up to $2 trillion in real estate assets that have been weighing down banks, paralyzing credit markets and delaying the economic recovery. Investors reacted ecstatically, with all of the major stock indexes soaring as soon as the markets opened. The Dow Jones industrial average ended the day up nearly 500 points, or 6.84 percent, to 7,775.86. The thundering response was the mirror opposite of the bitter disappointment by investors when the plan was first vaguely described on Feb 10. "For the first time in seven months, I can say they've done it right," said T. Timothy Ryan Jr., president of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. Administration officials outlined a three-part Public-Private Investment Program that offers private investors vast amounts of cheap, taxpayer-supported financing for every dollar they put up of their own money. In essence, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve will be offering at least a tablespoon of financial sugar for every teaspoon of risk that investors agree to swallow. "There is no doubt the government is taking a risk," Mr. Geithner acknowledged at a briefing for reporters. "The question is how best to do it."

Finally, participants completed measures of their behavioural intentions about the bailout, as well as manipulation checks and demographics.

4.11.2 Dependent measures

Seven-point scales (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*) were used to measure *disruptive* ("I am willing to take part in occupying a NYU building as a sign of protest") and *non-disruptive protest tendencies* ("I am willing to send with fellow NYU students a letter/email message of protest to the government").

4.11.3 Manipulation checks

In line with Van den Bos et al.'s (2006) paradigm, there were four manipulation checks, two that were specific to uncertainty salience, r (108) = .93, $p < .001$, and two that were specific to television salience, r (108) = .98, $p < .001$. Thus, participants were asked whether (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very much so*) and to what extent (1 = *very weak*, 7 = *very strong*) they had been thinking about uncertainty and watching television while writing down their answers. A pair of ANOVAs confirmed that the manipulation was successful ($Fs > 162.00$, $ps < .001$). Participants assigned to the uncertainty-salience condition reported significantly higher levels of uncertainty ($M = 6.25$, $SD = .79$) than did those in the television-salience condition ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.67$). Similarly, participants assigned to the television-salience condition reported thinking about watching television significantly more ($M = 5.66$, $SD = 1.40$) than those in the uncertainty-salience condition ($M = 1.22$, $SD = .73$). Thus, the manipulation was successful.

4.11.4 Demographics

At the end of the study, participants were asked to indicate their gender and age, and were fully debriefed. Disruptive protest tendencies were not significantly correlated with either gender or age, rs (107) < -.07, $ps > .10$. However, non-disruptive tendencies were significantly correlated with both gender, r (107) < .20, $p = .04$, and age, r (107) = -.22, $p = .03$. These correlations indicated that females and younger participants were more likely than males and older participants, respectively, to write a letter/email message of protest. To account for these effects, gender and age were entered as covariates in the ANOVA regarding non-disruptive protest tendencies.

4.11.5 Preliminary analyses

Similarly to the previous studies, before carrying out the main analysis, which was ANOVA, a factor analysis was conducted to assess whether group identification and the two types of protest tendencies were empirically distinguishable. Following that, the data were checked for missing cases and restricted range, including floor and ceiling effects (Runyon et al., 2000).

4.11.5.1 Factor analysis

A factor analysis was conducted using a maximum likelihood method of estimation. One factor with eigenvalue greater than 1 emerged. The solution, which was also supported by a scree test, explained 55.90 % of the variance. Group identification items loaded strongly on this factor (factor loadings > .67). The item measuring non-disruptive protest tendencies (letter-writing) loaded on a second factor the eigenvalue of which was less than 1 (= .70; factor loading = .74). Finally, the item measuring disruptive protest tendencies (building occupation) loaded only weakly on the second factor (=. 35). Thus, one can be confident of the construct validity of group identification but only fairly confident of the construct validity of the two types of protest tendencies.

4.11.5.2 Data checking

There was one missing case for non-disruptive protest tendencies; this is not problematic given that the variable was not missing for more than 1% of the sample, which is equivalent to one case for the present study. Furthermore, none of the variables had restricted range. However, there was a floor effect for disruptive protest tendencies at 1 (see also means and standard deviations in Table 4.6). This floor effect suggests that the sample tended to report low levels of disruptive protest tendencies. At a closer look there were two outliers in this variable higher than 5.23, three *SD*s from the mean. These outliers were winsorised, because the scores did not seem erroneous. Because of the floor effect, one might expect either biasing or weakening effects on this variable.

4.12 Results and discussion

The identity-related pathway hypothesis was assessed, followed by the uncertainty hypothesis. Limitations and implications of the present study are also discussed.

4.12.1 Identity-related pathway hypothesis

As one can observe from Table 4.6, group identification was not significantly correlated with either one of the two types of protest tendencies. Perhaps this was so because the NYU student identity was not relevant enough; if identification with a more activist group forming part of NYU had been measured, the correlations might have turned out statistically significant, in line with the earlier discussion regarding identification as an activist (see section 1.3.4.4).

Table 4.6

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Disruptive Protest Tendencies Winsorised, Non-disruptive Protest Tendencies, and Group Identification (Study 3, Listwise N = 107)

Variable	*M*	*SD*	2	3
1. Disruptive protest tendencies winsorised	1.57	1.12	.28*	-.12
2.Non-disruptive protest tendencies	2.78	1.81		.04
3. Group identification	5.45	1.18		

Note. Scores can vary between 1 and 7 for all variables. Higher means indicate higher protest tendencies and higher group identification.

*: $p = .004$.

It is worth noting, however, that group identification was positively correlated with non-disruptive protest tendencies but negatively correlated with disruptive protest tendencies against the bailouts. As such, the correlation of group identification with non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher (i.e., more positive) than its correlation with disruptive protest tendencies, but the difference between the two correlations was not statistically significant, t (107) = -1.37, p = .17. This only provides tentative support for the identity-related pathway hypothesis.

4.12.2 Uncertainty hypothesis

The uncertainty hypothesis was assessed by conducting two ANOVAs (one on non-disruptive protest tendencies and one on disruptive protest tendencies) with experimental condition as the independent variable.

In line with the significant correlations of gender and age with non-disruptive protest tendencies, these two variables were entered as covariates in the ANOVA on non-disruptive protest tendencies. This ANOVA revealed significant effects for gender and age only, F (1, 103) = 5.88, p = .02, η^2 = .05, and F (1, 103) = 5.80, p = .02, η^2 = .05, respectively; experimental condition did not exert a significant effect on non-disruptive protest tendencies, F (1, 103) = 1.02, p > .10, η^2 = .01. Thus, although inspection of means was in line with the hypothesised negative effect of personal uncertainty salience on non-disruptive protest tendencies, participants assigned to the condition of personal uncertainty salience did not report significantly lower tendencies to write a letter/email message of protest against the bailouts (M = 2.54, SD = 1.75) in comparison with those assigned to the condition of television salience (M = 3.04, SD = 1.85).

A second ANOVA was conducted on disruptive protest tendencies, which revealed a significant effect of experimental condition, F (1, 106) = 4.30, p = .04, η^2 = .04. In line with hypotheses, inspection of means indicated that personal uncertainty salience had a negative effect on disruptive protest tendencies: Participants assigned to the condition of personal uncertainty salience reported significantly lower tendencies to take part in a building occupation as a sign of protest against the bailouts (M = 1.36, SD = .82) in comparison with those assigned to the condition of television salience (M = 1.80, SD =

1.34). In fact, this effect was four times stronger than the (non-significant) effect of uncertainty salience on non-disruptive protest tendencies.

Thus, consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, personal uncertainty salience decreased willingness to protest disruptively against the bailouts. In other words, participants who were reminded of their personal uncertainties were significantly less likely to occupy a building as opposed to those who were not reminded of their personal uncertainties. Although the effect of uncertainty salience on letter-writing was non-significant, this finding is still in line with the uncertainty hypothesis according to which uncertainty salience would relate most strongly to disruptive protest tendencies.

4.12.3 Limitations

A limitation of the present study is related to the fact that both disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies were only measured with one item each. Due to time constraints it was not possible to run a pre-test on a sample drawn from the targeted population (i.e., NYU students) that would examine social disruptiveness perceptions of an array of different protest activities. Therefore, in order to make sure that the operationalisation of social disruptiveness would match participants' perceptions of social disruptiveness, the present study chose building occupation and letter-writing as two protest activities that would be considered socially disruptive and non-disruptive, respectively, in a western context. This is in line with the results of the pre-test reported in Study 2 and with the factor analysis conducted for the purposes of this study, although the disruptive item loaded weakly on the same factor as the non-disruptive item. However, this is not too problematic, because one would expect different protest behaviours to be correlated somewhat assuming they have common predictors, such as anger and collective efficacy.

However, a related problem to the choice of building occupation as the item tapping into socially disruptive protest tendencies was the fact that there was a floor effect, which is hardly surprising given the concomitant societal disruption, the almost illegal character of this protest activity and the risk of being expelled from university. The floor effect of disruptive protest tendencies may have had either a weakening or biasing effect. This means that the floor effect may have decreased or increased, respectively, the power of

this study to yield significant effects (Runyon et al., 2000). If there was a weakening effect, then it is commendable that personal uncertainty salience affected disruptive protest tendencies in a statistically significant way in spite of the weakening effect. However, if there was a biasing effect, it is dubious whether the statistically significant effect means anything. This noted, one may argue that it is unlikely that there was a biasing effect given that group identification also correlated with both types of tendencies in ways that were meaningful and consistent with results from Study 2. Therefore, it would not be parsimonious to consider the statistically significant effect of personal uncertainty salience on disruptive protest tendencies as an artefact of the potentially biasing effect brought about by the floor effect of disruptive protest tendencies.

4.12.4 Implications and ideas for future research

First of all, the identity-related findings illustrate only tentatively the balance achieved between the two competing functions of group identification analysed in Chapter 3 (see section 3.3.4.1). On the one hand, group identification seems to have served a group-enhancing function by promoting participation in non-disruptive protest against the bailouts, albeit in an unreliable way. On the other hand, group identification appears to have served an uncertainty-reduction function by discouraging participation in a protest behaviour that was particularly uncertainty-enhancing, disruptive protest that is, though again in an unreliable way. Thus, by promoting the less uncertainty-enhancing protest activity over the more uncertainty-enhancing protest activity group identification seems to have fulfilled simultaneously both its group-enhancing and uncertainty-reduction functions.

Also, the fact that group identification was *negatively* correlated with disruptive protest tendencies seems to go against SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the widespread finding that group identification is always a positive predictor of collective protest participation (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Mummendey, Klink, et al., 1999; Simon et al., 1998). In line with the findings of the present study, it is worth considering the idea that group identification may in fact be a negative predictor of collective protest participation when this concerns protest behaviours that are likely to create particularly high levels of personal uncertainty. Serving as it does two competing

functions, group identification seems to be "torn" when it comes to group-enhancing behaviours (such as collective protest) that involve exceptionally high levels of personal uncertainty (such as site occupations). This constitutes an excellent idea for future research.

Furthermore, on the basis of the uncertainty-related findings, it seems reasonable to consider the widespread uncertainty that accompanied the financial crisis as a factor that helps to explain why people have been willing to bear the brunt of the bailouts. If extrapolated to the wider political arena, this finding may become particularly worrisome for those most disadvantaged, because it provides decision-makers with a powerful tool to maintain social order by creating social conditions that promote uncertainty.

Most importantly, Study 3 provides the first piece of empirical evidence that demonstrates an effect of personal uncertainty on willingness to take part in collective protest, disruptive protest in particular. This finding is highly supportive of the reasoning of this piece of work according to which socially disruptive protest entails higher personal uncertainty than does non-disruptive protest (see section 3.3.3). In demonstrating the causal discouraging effect that personal uncertainty may have on collective protest participation, the present study offers the missing link that can explain why Studies 1 and 2 found that the predictive strengths of protest motives differed as a function of social disruptiveness.

As argued in section 3.3.4 where research hypotheses were postulated, protest motives are more likely to facilitate participation in one of the two types of collective protest, because they are more or less suitable in dealing with the differing levels of personal uncertainty involved in the two types of protest. Specifically, group identification is born out of a need to reduce uncertainty about the world and one's place within it (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999) This explains why the present study along with Study 2 lent support, albeit tentative, to the idea that identification may predict participation in particularly uncertainty-enhancing protest behaviours (i.e., disruptive behaviours) less strongly than participation in less uncertainty-enhancing protest behaviours (i.e., non-disruptive behaviours). Furthermore and in accordance with literature substantiating collective efficacy as a group-based appraisal that provides group members with staying power in the face of setbacks (e.g., Bandura, 1997, 2000), personal

uncertainty being one such setback, collective efficacy was shown, though not always in a reliable way, to predict socially disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest across Studies 1 and 2.

Also in line with literature that envisages group-based anger as an adaptive emotion linked to a biological impulse to attack (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Mackie et al., 2000; Maitner et al., 2006) and that sees this impulse as subject to environmental or other constraints (Lazarus, 1991, 2001), personal uncertainty being one such constraint, Study 2 demonstrated that the contribution of group-based anger in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was double as much as its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies. Moreover, consistent with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model that conceptualises social opinion and action support as contributing to the experience of group-based anger and collective efficacy, respectively, the contribution of social action support in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies was shown in Study 1b to be more than double as much as the respective contribution of social opinion support

To conclude, it becomes evident that Study 3 highlights the causal effect that personal uncertainty can exert on collective protest tendencies. This effect is captured in the words of one of the participants: "When I feel doubtful or uncertain, I want to retreat. I feel immobile like making a move could be dangerous". The quote illustrates very eloquently how uncertainty may even motivate inertia as a way to deal with the feelings of unease and fear that uncertainty brings (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Sorrentino & Roney, 1986). Future research would do well to examine processes that mediate the effect of uncertainty on protest. In keeping with research that shows that personal uncertainty has a causal incremental effect on identification (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Hogg et al., 2007), one may argue that identification becomes a likely candidate for mediator between uncertainty and protest. It might also be the case that personal uncertainty exerts a causal discouraging effect on protest by lowering perceptions of collective efficacy.

Together, the current findings speak to the social psychological reasons why people may be willing to bear the brunt of policies that are at least arguably unfair and to decrease participation in collective forms of protest, especially when the latter are likely to produce disruption and therefore to create uncertainty if not chaos.

Summary and Conclusion

Using a variety of measures, scales, samples, and methodologies across three main studies Chapter 4 has marshalled evidence for the hypotheses postulated in the previous chapter, thus providing an answer to the main research question of this thesis: Do socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest tend to be elicited by different motives?

First of all, Study 1 lent support, though often tentative, to a number of hypotheses consistent with the reasoning of this thesis regarding the relative impact of protest motives as a function of social disruptiveness. Study 1 comprised two sub-studies: Study 1a, conducted among a student population, and Study 1b, conducted among members of a union on strike. Study 1a provided supporting evidence for the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis according to which group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does collective efficacy. Results regarding the second part of this same hypothesis (i.e., social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does social action support) were not conclusive, perhaps due to the ceiling effect of social opinion support. Following Study 1a, Study 1b lent tentative support to both parts of the disruptive protest hypothesis in line with which collective efficacy and social action support predict disruptive protest more strongly than do group-based anger and social opinion support, respectively.

Furthermore, by comparing the predictive strengths of each predictor across the two sub-studies, Study 1 was able to lend some support to the emotional and instrumental pathway hypotheses: group-based anger seems to predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest, whereas collective efficacy seems to predict disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. The social opinion and action support hypotheses (i.e., social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest whereas social action support predicts disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest) and the identity-related pathway hypothesis (i.e., group identification predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest) were not confirmed possibly due to the ceiling effects of social opinion support and group identification.

Study 2, conducted among members of a different union on strike and preceded by a pre-test that established social disruptiveness perceptions, produced findings in line with

some of the hypotheses supported in Study 1 and marshalled further evidence consistent with those hypotheses that were not supported in Study 1. Specifically, Study 2 managed to demonstrate, albeit tentatively, that social opinion support may predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than may do social action support (i.e., the second part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis) and that group identification may predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest, although the difference between the two contributions was not as large as one would have hoped for. Finally, Study 2 provided tentative support for the social opinion and action support hypotheses.

Following Study 2, Study 3 offered rather weak evidence for the identity-related pathway hypothesis and seemed to contest the widespread notion that group identification is always a positive predictor of collective protest participation. It is for future research to decide whether identification consistently discourages participation from protest activities that bring about exceptionally high levels of personal uncertainty, such as site occupations. Most importantly, in producing evidence for the causal negative effect that personal uncertainty may have on collective protest participation, Study 3 substantiated the theoretical claim of this thesis that it is heightened personal uncertainty associated with socially disruptive protest that may drive the differential predictive strengths of some of the protest motives examined in Studies 1 and 2. Thus, this piece of work contends that it is imperative that the literature of collective protest takes into serious consideration the core human motive of quest for personal certainty.

To conclude, Chapter 4 has presented and discussed empirical work that is consistent with previous literature that suggests either explicitly (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; Opp, 1988) or implicitly (e.g., Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002; Olson et al., 1995) that different protest activities may be driven by different motives. Research conducted for the purposes of this chapter, however, offers more conclusive results for the following three reasons: It clearly defines and operationalises social disruptiveness, it measures five different motives (i.e., group-based anger, collective efficacy, group identification, and social opinion and action support) to test their distinctive contributions in predicting willingness to protest, and it postulates an elaborate framework that considers quest for personal certainty as central in understanding the relative impact of different protest motives. Therefore, this chapter highlights that future research would benefit from a more

fine-grained analysis of protest behaviour that takes into account the social disruptiveness of the behaviours under investigation and the ensuing personal uncertainty. This approach has both theoretical and applied value: It unveils which motives are particularly important for which type of protest and allows both decision-makers, as well as trade unions, to use this knowledge in their advantage.

Nevertheless, as also mentioned at the end of Chapter 2, the field of collective protest has largely ignored the role that ideological motives play in determining participation in protest activities. This is the lacuna that the following chapter will address by explaining how the endorsement of system-justifying ideologies (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) may be differentially related to participation in socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest.

Chapter 5

The Role of Ideology and System Justification in Determining Participation in Socially Disruptive and Non-disruptive Collective Protest

Introduction

The purpose of Chapter 5 is to address the neglected role of ideology in determining participation in both disruptive and non-disruptive forms of collective protest. To this end, the term 'ideology' is first defined, followed by previous attempts to introduce ideology into the field of collective protest. System justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) is proposed as particularly useful in framing the study of ideology. The system justification motive is subsequently discussed in relation to the two types of protest, thus offering a further answer to the main research question of this thesis as to whether the same motives predict equally participation in socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest.

Because this is the first time that the system justification motive is formally introduced into the study of collective protest and conceptualised as one of its antecedents, Chapter 5 also investigates how system justification relates to the more proximal motives of collective protest participation, namely group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification. The moderating role of ingroup status is also discussed with respect to the relationships of system justification to the two types of protest and their antecedents. For reasons of simplicity, however, system justification is not examined in relation to the more distal motives of social opinion and action support. Finally, three studies are reported in Chapter 5, one quasi-experimental (with ingroup status, in terms of ethnicity, as a moderating variable) and two experimental ones, whereby varied levels of system justification are induced in two different ways for the causal effects of system justification on collective protest and its antecedents to be ascertained.

5.1 Defining ideology

The term 'ideology' first appeared in the 18th century to indicate the science of ideas, a discipline that is now widely known as the sociology of knowledge (Jost, 2006). Marx

and Engels (1846/1970) later adopted this term in their book 'The German Ideology' and used it in two different ways. On the one hand, Marx and Engels (1846/1970) imbued ideology with a derogatory sense, in which ideology encompasses a network of ideas that are distorted, invalid, and thus subject to what they termed *false consciousness*. On the other hand, Marx and Engels (1846/1970) used the term ideology in a fairly neutral sense, in which ideology indicates any symbolic or abstract system of ideas that create understanding as to the reasons why society, economy, and politics function the way they do.

This last definition is quite common today and is close to the definition of ideology that this thesis employs. According to Tedin (1987), political ideology is defined as "an interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved" (p. 65). Tedin (1987) further claims that "an ideology has two distinct and at least analytically separate components – affect and cognition" (p. 65). Thus, ideology is not merely a set of beliefs; rather, it involves emotionally-laden cognitions. To illustrate, a person who believes that society should be organised in a way that places people above profits should also experience some kind of positive emotion when imagining that this belief is being materialised. Klandermans (2004) and Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007) adopt a similar stance in conceiving of ideology as a set of values, the violation of which creates negative emotions, such as anger and moral indignation.

Jost (2006) extends Tedin's (1987) definition of ideology to include a motivational component, in addition to the cognitive and affective components. In doing so, he argues that *every* belief is to a certain extent motivated by subjective considerations, such as existential needs for safety and reassurance, epistemic needs for knowledge and meaning, and relational needs for affiliation and social identification (e.g., Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b; Kruglanski, 2004; Landau et al., 2004). This line of thought fits very nicely with the theoretical stance this thesis adopts, according to which the epistemic need for uncertainty avoidance not only affects beliefs, but also behavioural tendencies, as Study 3 showed.

5.1.1 The left-right and core-peripheral distinctions

So far, most treatments of political ideology have examined the left-right distinction or, especially in the United States, the liberalism-conservatism distinction (Jost, 2006). The left-right distinction seems to be the single most useful and parsimonious tool to categorise political beliefs and attitudes for more than 200 years (Jost, 2006). To illustrate, Jost (2006) analysed data from the American National Election Studies database, in order to examine the effect of political orientation on voting behaviour between 1972 and 2004. He found that responses to this single left-right self-placement item explained 85% of the variance in self-reported voting behaviour over the course of that time period. Specifically, 80% of respondents who classified themselves as 'liberal' or 'extremely liberal' reported voting in favour of Democratic candidates, whereas 80% of respondents who classified themselves as 'conservative' or 'extremely conservative' reported voting for Republican candidates. These data are compelling and thus demonstrate the crucial role that ideology plays in the political arena.

Nevertheless, the liberal/left-wing and conservative/right-wing distinction is not always accurate in predicting specific issues and opinions, because some of these issues and opinions that were once referred to as left-wing and right-wing have changed over the years and from place to place (Jost, 2006). Therefore, distinguishing between core and peripheral aspects of ideological belief systems can prove more useful (Jost, 2006). Specifically, Jost et al. (2003a, 2003b) have identified attitudes towards inequality and attitudes toward social change versus tradition as two fairly stable, core dimensions that appear to portray the most enduring and meaningful differences between conservative and liberal ideologies. Peripheral issues concerning, for example, attitudes regarding immigration policies or the size of the government, seem to fluctuate in their ideological weight across time and place.

5.2 The relationship of ideology to collective protest

Following the two core aspects of ideology, one should find ideology particularly useful in explaining collective protest participation. Consistent with the definition of collective protest provided in Chapter 1 (see section 1.1), collective protest is an act of dissent against some kind of disadvantage or inequality. Thus, attitudes towards inequality, the

first core dimension of ideology, should be expected to influence strongly how a specific state of inequality is perceived and evaluated. If one is in favour of social inequality, it would probably be quite hard to imagine this person being willing to protest against unequal treatment. Furthermore, attitudes toward social change versus tradition, the second core dimension of ideology, should also be expected to have an effect on collective protest participation, given that collective protest is a means of bringing about social change. After all, as already mentioned in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.2.2), collective protest is one example of the social change/social competition strategy, one of the three main strategies to deal with one's negative social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, it becomes evident that beliefs and attitudes about the two core aspects of ideology should be particularly relevant for the study of collective protest.

A number of studies have investigated the role of ideology in the perception of injustice and the concomitant tendency to take part in collective protest. Kinder and Sears' (1981) theory of *symbolic politics* and Battersby's (1996) construct of *structural/atomistic ideology* are critically presented next, along with relevant empirical support.

5.2.1 Kinder and Sears' (1981) theory of symbolic politics

The theory of symbolic politics places ideology at the heart of collective protest. The theory posits that what motivates individuals to protest certain social conditions is not any personal disadvantage that these conditions may cause. Rather, it is a set of some general and highly symbolic attitudes that motivate protest participation (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Specifically, Kinder and Sears (1981) found that symbolic racism was more predictive of action than any threat individuals perceived towards their own well-being. They further report a number of other studies that also showed that it was symbolic attitudes, rather than experience of personal disadvantage, that influenced political behaviour regarding several issues, such as racial busing, support for black political candidates, and the Vietnam war (e.g., Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979; Lau, Brown, & Sears, 1978; Sears, Tyler, Citrin, & Kinder, 1978). In a similar vein, Vanneman and Pettigrew (1972) found that, when comparing the economic conditions of Whites and

Blacks, Whites who scored high in racism reported higher collective RD than did less prejudiced Whites.

On a positive note, Kinder and Sears' (1981) theory of symbolic politics is commendable for taking ideology into serious consideration and showing how important it can be for explaining specific political attitudes and collective protest tendencies. Nevertheless, this theory does not provide a framework that explicates the relationships of ideology to the protest motives examined in the previous chapters and the two kinds of collective protest, namely disruptive and non-disruptive protest. Chapter 5 specifically addresses these limitations. Before doing so, it is useful to consider a more recent attempt at introducing ideology into the field of collective protest.

5.2.2 Battersby's (1996) structural/atomistic ideology

As part of her doctoral dissertation, which was supervised by Prof. D. Abrams, Battersby (1996) introduced the construct of structural/atomistic ideology into the field of protest and investigated how well it predicts both individual and collective protest.

5.2.2.1 The theory

Following Kinder and Sears' (1981) theory of symbolic politics, Battersby (1996) reasoned that there must be some overarching attitudes about society that predict specific political attitudes and behaviour. Thus, she proposed that individuals' perceptions of the organisation of society, and their own place within it, will have an effect on how they might choose to redress perceived injustices. Consistent with her reasoning, society may be conceptualised either in structural terms, hence, as a system of interconnected groups with their own compatible or incompatible interests, or as a collection of individuals capable of being masters of their own fate regardless of societal factors, such as mode of government and recession. Specifically, Battersby (1996) posited that 'atomists' would be more likely to adopt individual protest, because they see themselves as largely responsible for their own fate and the running of society. By contrast, she predicted that 'structuralists' would be more likely to adopt collective protest, because they consider themselves incapable of significantly altering structural relations between social groups.

5.2.2.2 Empirical support and critique

Battersby (1996) devised two separate scales, one for structural ideology (e.g., "Unions are necessary to represent employees' interests/Unions are essential for maintaining employment security and protection of manual workers") and one for atomistic ideology (e.g., "There is no way society will improve unless people's attitudes change/The people who generally get the best deal at work negotiate it themselves"). By considering students (Study 2) and teachers on strike (Study 7) she provided partial support for the hypothesised effects. Consistent with her hypotheses, the structural ideology scale correlated positively and significantly with both past participation and willingness to take part in collective protest, and it was unrelated to measures of individual protest among teachers. The student sample, however, failed to provide any support for the hypothesised effects; neither atomistic nor structural ideology significantly predicted willingness to participate in individual and collective protest, respectively.

As also Battersby (1996) admits, a reason why the structural ideology scale was so closely related to collective protest among teachers might have been the nature of some items in that scale, given that those items referred to the role of unions. Such statements must have been rather abstract for the student respondents, but quite relevant for the teacher sample. Therefore, it becomes evident that Battersby's (1996) structural/atomistic ideology should have been measured at a more abstract level, in order to predict a wider array of cases of collective protest. Even so, it can be said that Battersby's (1996) conceptualisation of ideology fails to address the two core aspects of ideology as postulated by Jost (2006). Structural/atomistic ideology appears to be about whether it should be individuals or collectivities who should be taking part in protest once inequality is perceived. Thus, this ideological construct does little to explain where attitudes towards inequality and social change come from.

System justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) seems highly relevant at this point, because it offers these kind of explanations and takes into account the role of uncertainty, which is central for this thesis. Therefore, SJT is discussed below in relation to collective protest, its social disruptiveness, and its motives.

5.3 System justification theory

SJT (Jost & Banaji, 1994) partially originated from SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and aimed to address some of its limitations. To reiterate, one of the criticisms of SIT discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.2.4) was related to the fact that SIT did not specify the variables that may influence perceptions of the legitimacy and stability of the intergroup context, and thus lead members of disadvantaged groups to imagine cognitive alternatives to their low status in life. This limitation was one of the reasons why Taylor and McKirnan (1984) developed the five-stage model of intergroup relations, which, however, was criticised in Chapter 1 for overpredicting individual protest (see section 1.3.3.4). In positing the existence of a system justification motive SJT seems to be better equipped to address the above SIT limitation (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002).

5.3.1 The main premises of the theory and relevant empirical support

Jost and Banaji (1994) define the system justification motive as a socially acquired motive whereby people justify the system, the status quo in other words, and try to endow it with a sense of legitimacy and, perhaps even, stability. Note that legitimacy and stability here refer to the overarching social system rather than to the intergroup structure, part of which forms the low status group in question, along with the corresponding high status group (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). To illustrate, the social system encompasses an array of diverse intergroup situations where two groups oppose each other, such as Whites-Blacks, men-women, and gay-straight. Therefore, the motive to justify existing social arrangements is not exclusive to one particular intergroup situation; rather, it determines general attitudes towards inequality and social change (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002).

For example, Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, and Hunyady (2003) uncovered that endorsement of fair market ideology, according to which market-based procedures and outcomes are fair and legitimate, was associated with the inclination to minimise the seriousness of ethical scandals where business corporations were involved. Furthermore, Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, and Chen (2005) found that increased system justification (either measured as a dispositional variable or manipulated via the temporary activation of a "rags to riches"

mindset) led to decreased support for the redistribution of resources and the desire to help the disadvantaged, ultimately contributing to a withdrawal of support for social change.

Certainly, the most intriguing aspect of SJT is that not only members of advantaged groups exhibit this motive, but also those of disadvantaged groups despite the fact it may go against their personal and group interests (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Specifically, Jost and Thompson (2000) showed that, for members belonging to the disadvantaged group of African Americans, endorsement of social inequality was significantly associated with decreased self-esteem and ingroup favouritism, on the one hand, and increased depression and neuroticism, on the other. The question arises then as to the reason why disadvantaged groups would prefer to suffer these consequences than to contest the system.

As noted above with respect to ideology, the system justification motive may originate partially in the need to reduce personal uncertainty (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b). Consistent with this notion, Wilson's (1973) dynamic theory of conservatism was one of the first to point out that fear of uncertainty is the main factor underlining conservatism. The reason is that preserving the status quo provides reassurance and structure, whereas social change entails uncertainty and unpredictability, as also argued in Chapter 3 (see section 3.3.3). In fact, Jost et al. (2007) demonstrated that uncertainty avoidance predicted conservatism and that this effect was fully mediated by resistance to change. As Jost and Hunyady (2005) put it, "for many people, the devil they know seems less threatening and more legitimate than the devil they don't" (p. 262).

5.3.2 The relationships of system justification to collective protest and protest motives

It follows from the above that the system justification motive serves to inhibit the underprivileged from protesting. Consistent with RDT and SIT, already discussed in Chapter 2 (see sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2), people's perceptions of fairness and legitimacy hold a pivotal role in whether they protest collectively against ingroup disadvantage (e.g., Abrams, 1990; Grant, 2008; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Therefore, disadvantaged ingroup members who regard the social arrangements to be fair should also consider their lower status in life to be legitimate, and should thus be expected to have no reason to blame

either the high status outgroup or the system for their disadvantaged position. Initial evidence comes from Rubin and Peplau (1973). They found that the belief in a just world (i.e., the belief that the world is a just, orderly, and predictable place; Lerner, 1980) is negatively correlated with self-reported participation in social and political activism, as well as with global self-ratings of social and political involvement.

5.3.2.1 The moderating role of ingroup status

Having postulated the negative effect that system justification may have on collective protest on the part of the disadvantaged, this thesis contends that the ingroup's relative status in a given hierarchy moderates the effect of system justification on protest and its antecedents. The reason is related to research that highlights the compatibility and incompatibility of group justification (or group-enhancing) and system justification motives across high- and low-status groups in society, respectively (e.g., Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Group justification motives include motives for positive social identity and the enhancement of ingroup status (e.g., Abrams, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1979); collective protest, as well as its antecedents, can be considered group justification motives, given that they aim at the enhancement of the ingroup status. In contrast, system justification represents the tendency to justify the overarching system and status quo, as mentioned above (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Turning to the moderating role of ingroup status, there seems to be a positive relationship between group justification and system justification motives for members of high status groups and a negative relationship for members of low status groups (e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Thompson, 2000). To illustrate, by justifying and supporting the system that is responsible for the higher ingroup status, members of high status groups also promote their group-related interests. Thus, for high status groups, system and group justification motives work in concert. However, members of low status groups may experience the following two conflicts. By believing that the system is fair, they exonerate it and perhaps blame the ingroup for their disadvantaged position. Conversely, by refusing to blame the ingroup (or the self), low status group members have no other option but to consider the system unfair (Jost et al., 2001).

Arguably, these psychological conflicts render the mindsets of low status group members prone to personal uncertainty. Free as they are from such conflicts, members of high status groups are expected to go about their daily lives experiencing relative certainty, rather than uncertainty, about their place within the world. This basic difference between members of high- and low-status groups inhibits the latter's ability to (a) take "clear and direct action against the sources of inequality in society" (Jost & Burgess, 2000, p. 304), and (b) defend their group interests adequately, which is referred to as the *behavioural asymmetry hypothesis* (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This hypothesised effect of uncertainty on behavioural tendencies was clearly shown in Study 3, where an uncertain state of mind discouraged participation in collective protest, especially disruptive protest.

Relevant to this thesis, one should thus expect the group justification variables of collective protest against ingroup disadvantage, group identification, and group-based anger, to be positively correlated with system justification among high status group members and negatively correlated among low status group members. No correlation is expected, however, between system justification and collective efficacy, despite the latter being a group justification variable. These hypotheses, along with relevant empirical support, are now discussed in more detail.

5.3.2.2 System justification and collective protest

For low status group members, system justification should be negatively correlated with tendencies to take part in collective protest against ingroup disadvantage. This is the *low status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis* and was extensively discussed above. To reiterate, low status group members who endorse the system that is responsible for their disadvantaged position in life should have no reason to blame the high status outgroup or the system, and should thus refrain from taking part in collective protest. In other words, the desire to justify the status quo should quell low status group members' tendencies to protest their disadvantaged situation in life. For high status group members, however, system justification should be positively correlated with tendencies to participate in collective protest. This is the *high status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis.* Put differently, the desire to justify the status quo should enhance high

status group members' to actively advocate the status quo that protects their advantaged position in life.

At first glance, this last hypothesis may sound odd, because one might expect high status group members to have nothing to complain about, given their higher status in a specified hierarchy. This is true to a certain degree, but it is conceivable that their high status, and thus the integrity of the status quo, *can* be threatened. This means that high status group members will only take part in collective protest once they perceive their privileged position as being under threat. A recent example comes from the banking sector, which the U.S. government is planning to reform by cutting the size of banks, crimping future profits, and protecting taxpayers from paying the costs of any future financial crises ("President prepares to cut Wall Street down to size", 2010). This example clearly depicts how the financial privileges of the high status group of bankers are being put at risk. Consistent with the high status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis, one might thus assume that bankers' endorsement of the current financial system enhances their tendencies to protest against the reforms announced by the U.S. government.

Although there seems to be no direct empirical support for the asymmetrical relationship of system justification to collective protest, there is some indirect support. The closest example is recent work by Deaux et al. (2006), where ethnicity (White vs. Black/Latino) and immigrant status (native vs. immigrant) were used as proxies for ingroup status in a U.S. sample. Deaux et al. (2006) uncovered that endorsement of inequality was positively correlated with collective action among the high status groups of White natives and immigrants and negatively correlated with collective action among the low status groups of Black/Latino natives and immigrants. Deaux et al. (2006), however, did not focus specifically on collective protest against ingroup disadvantage; rather, they measured collective acculturation orientation to gauge support for strategies that benefit the ingroup's status. This thesis addresses this lacuna by focusing directly on protest against ingroup disadvantage across Studies 4 through 6.

Hafer and Olson (1993), whose research was also discussed with respect to the personal-collective RD distinction in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.1.4), provide further indirect support for the asymmetrical relationship of system justification to collective

protest. They surveyed a sample of working women in Canada and found that belief in a just world was negatively correlated with both self- and group-enhancing protest behaviours, such that the more the participants believed in a just world, the less likely they were to have engaged in protest, either individual or collective. Given that women are generally disadvantaged in comparison to men (e.g., Major, 1994; McCoy & Major, 2007), these correlations are consistent with the low status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis. If Hafer and Olson (1993) had allowed for comparisons to a male sample, their research might have provided support for the high status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis too. This piece of work attends to this limitation by considering both a high- and a low-status group in Study 4.

5.3.2.3 System justification and group identification

Being, as it is, a group justification variable, group identification is expected to have a positive correlation with system justification among high status group members, such that the more they justify the system (and their higher status within it) the more they identify with their ingroup. This is the *high status part of the system justification-identification hypothesis.* By contrast, group identification is hypothesised to have a negative correlation with system justification among low status group members, such that system justification comes at the expense of disidentification with their ingroup. This is the *low status part of the system justification-identification hypothesis.*

There exists a substantial body of evidence that supports the asymmetrical relationship between system justification and group identification (e.g., Deaux et al., 2006; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) measured several forms of system justification (e.g., political conservatism and nationalism) and found that all forms were positively correlated with ethnic identification among European Americans, but were negatively correlated among African- and Latino-Americans. Sidanius et al. (1997) and Levin et al. (1998) have replicated the above relationships in the Israeli culture as well (with Jews and Arabs as the high- and low-status groups, respectively). However, there appears to be no published evidence as to whether system justification can be actually considered a *cause* of (dis)identification.

Therefore, an important contribution of this piece of work will be to provide an experimental test of the causal effect of system justification on group identification in Studies 5 and 6.

5.3.2.4 System justification and group-based anger

Given that group-based anger is a group justification variable that motivates behaviour against the outgroup responsible for the ingroup disadvantage (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2008), it is expected to be negatively correlated with system justification among low status group members. As such, the more they justify the system (and thus their own low status, along with the outgroup's high status), the less likely they are to get angry against the outgroup responsible for their lower position. This is the *low status part of the system justification-anger hypothesis.* Conversely, anger is hypothesised to be positively correlated with system justification among high status group members, such that the more they justify the system (and thus their own high status), the more likely they are to get angry against the outgroup that challenges their higher status. This is the *high status part of the system justification-anger hypothesis.*

There is some indirect empirical support for the asymmetrical relationship between system justification and group-based anger. For example, McCoy and Major (2007) found that, when primed with meritocracy, low-status group members (women) justified their collective disadvantage by decreasing perceptions of discrimination, whereas the opposite pattern was observed among men: When primed with meritocracy they rejected ingroup disadvantage by increasing perceptions of discrimination. To the extent that experience of discrimination fuels the emotion of anger (e.g., Smith et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004), these findings should be taken as supportive of an asymmetrical relationship between system justification and group-based anger.

Closer to the purposes of this thesis, Hafer and Olson (1993) found that belief in a just world was negatively correlated with group discontent among a sample of working women in Canada. This is consistent with the low status part of the system justification-anger hypothesis. As referred to above though, if Hafer and Olson (1993) had also considered a male sample, their study might have lent support to the high status part of

the system justification-anger hypothesis too. This thesis deals with this limitation by examining both a high- and a low-status group in Study 4.

Furthermore, in one of the few experimental demonstrations of the effect of system justification on emotions, Wakslak et al. (2007), whose research was also mentioned in section 5.3.1, manipulated system justification and found that high levels thereof decreased moral outrage (i.e., feelings of distress over inequality), as well as willingness to help the disadvantaged. However, Wakslak et al. (2007) examined emotional and behavioural reactions to outgroup, rather than ingroup, disadvantage. Therefore, since there seems to be a gap in the literature regarding how ingroup status moderates the relationship between system justification and group-based anger, and regarding whether system justification can be considered a causal precursor of anger, Studies 4 through 6 seek to address these questions as well.

5.3.2.5 System justification and collective efficacy

Although collective efficacy is a group justification variable, given that it provides ingroup members with the necessary psychological stamina to achieve their group-related goals (e.g., Bandura, 1995, 1997), it is not assumed to be asymmetrically related to system justification as a function of ingroup status. In fact, collective efficacy is not expected to be correlated at all with system justification. It is true that considering the system to be legitimate and stable might make one believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, to change it; nevertheless, this does not imply that none of the aspects of the system can change. After all, ever since the declaration of human rights, most societies have legal systems and constitutions that protect people's rights and determine the means by which one can redress perceived inequalities. Therefore, collective efficacy is expected to remain fairly unaffected by endorsement of the system. This is *the system justification-efficacy hypothesis*, for which there seems to be no direct or indirect empirical support. Studies 5 and 6 will address this lacuna.

5.3.2.6 System justification and social disruptiveness

Relevant to the main question of this thesis regarding whether the two types of collective protest are equally predicted by the same motives, this section discusses whether system

justification should equally decrease or enhance participation in disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest on the part of low- and high-status groups, respectively. To the extent that the system justification motive serves an uncertainty-reduction function, as argued above (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b), it should be expected to have a lower correlation (i.e., more negative or less positive correlation) with disruptive protest, because this latter is more likely to raise personal uncertainty than is non-disruptive protest. This is the *system justification hypothesis* and is highly reminiscent of the identity-related pathway hypothesis, according to which group identification is less strongly related to disruptive protest than to non-disruptive protest, because of its uncertainty-reduction function.

In taking into account the moderating role of ingroup status the system justification hypothesis is divided into a *high status part* and a *low status part.* In line with the high status part, system justification predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest among high status groups; in other words, the correlation of system justification with disruptive protest should be less positive than its correlation with non-disruptive protest among high status groups. Returning to the bankers' example (see section 5.3.2.2), bankers have expressed their dissent against the plans of the U.S. government to curb their financial privileges by using non-disruptive political channels, such as lobbying, rather than taking to the streets ("President prepares to cut Wall Street down to size", 2010). Consistent with the low status part of the system justification hypothesis, system justification discourages disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest among low status groups; in other words, the correlation of system justification with disruptive protest should be more negative than its correlation with non-disruptive protest among low status groups. Therefore, when considering the prevalence and consensuality of system justification among the disadvantaged (e.g., Ridgeway, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), it is not surprising that disruptive forms of protest, such as riots and revolutions, are relatively rare reactions to human suffering (e.g., Zinn, 1968).

Perhaps the only study that has considered how system justification may relate to disruptive and non-disruptive protest comes from Cameron and Nickerson's (2006) field survey, conducted in the middle of an anti-globalisation protest and briefly mentioned in Study 2. They measured participants' levels of social dominance orientation (i.e., the

tendency to bolster group-based hierarchical systems; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and inclinations towards both non-disruptive and disruptive protest (*indirect* and *non-normative* as they call them respectively). Although they expected social dominance orientation to be negatively correlated with both forms of protest, Cameron and Nickerson (2006) had no specific predictions regarding the differential strengths of these two correlations.

What Cameron and Nickerson (2006) found was that social dominance orientation was significantly and negatively correlated only with non-disruptive but not with disruptive protest inclinations. One can only speculate as to the lack of association between social dominance orientation and disruptive protest, all the more because of the great number of intervening variables that field research cannot account for. It is hoped that this thesis will provide more conclusive results with respect to both parts of the system justification hypothesis across Studies 4 through 6.

5.4 Research overview and summary of hypotheses

In summary, Chapter 5 hypothesises that system justification has a lower (i.e., more negative or less positive) correlation with disruptive protest than with non-disruptive protest, that it is not related to collective efficacy, and that the ingroup status moderates the relationships of system justification to protest, group identification, and group-based anger, such that among high- and low-status groups these relationships are positive and negative, respectively. Thus, Chapter 5 aims to tackle four important issues. Firstly, it addresses the question of how system justification relates to disruptive and non-disruptive protest. Secondly, it considers the relationship of system justification with collective efficacy. Thirdly, it focuses on the moderating role of ingroup status in the relationships of system justification to both forms of protest, group identification, and group-based anger. Finally, it examines whether system justification exerts causal effects on protest and its antecedents. Therefore, the research conducted for the purposes of Chapter 5 is the first to investigate formally the causal effects of system justification on both disruptive and non-disruptive protest, as well as on group identification and group-based anger.

In order to test the above hypotheses, three studies were conducted. Study 4 was based on re-analysis of pre-existing survey data on students in California. Given that

these data focused on feelings and attitudes about ethnic groups in the United States, ethnicity was used as a proxy for social status. Because of the ethnic taxonomy the survey employed (see Method in Study 4) and because groups of colour are lower in terms of economic status or social regard as opposed to White groups (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), non-Jewish White Americans and Chicanos/Latinos (who are henceforth called Whites and Latinos, respectively, for the sake of brevity) were considered to experience relatively high and low status in life, respectively.

To test the causal role of system justification, two additional experimental studies were conducted where levels of system justification were varied through the use of two different manipulations. Study 5 employed a *complementary stereotype* manipulation (Kay & Jost, 2003) among protesters in a May Day march in Athens, Greece. Study 6 employed a new manipulation, which the author calls *system disconfirmation*, among school teachers on strike in the UK. To the extent that these different manipulations produce a pattern of results across Studies 5 and 6 that replicates the relationships yielded in Study 4, this will provide convergent evidence that the effects are attributable to system justification rather than to the particular situations or groups under investigation.

Study 4

5.5 Introduction

The main goal of Study 4 was to marshal direct evidence for the system justification hypothesis, according to which system justification has a higher correlation with non-disruptive than with disruptive protest because of its uncertainty-reduction function. A further aim of Study 4 was to investigate the moderating role of ingroup status and thus to examine whether ethnic status moderates the relationships of system justification with participation in the two types of protest and ethnic identification. Unfortunately, there were no items measuring anger directed at the ethnic outgroup and collective efficacy, so their relationships with system justification could not be examined in the present study.

In summary, Study 4 tested the system justification hypothesis and the moderating role of ingroup status. With regard to the latter, the following hypotheses were examined: For the low status group of Latinos, system justification is negatively correlated with

identification with Latinos and participation in protest, especially disruptive protest. For the high status group of Whites, the exact opposite pattern was expected: System justification is positively correlated with identification with Whites and participation in protest, especially non-disruptive protest.

5.6 Method

Information about the participants, the design, the procedure, and the measures used is provided below. Preliminary analyses are also reported.

5.6.1 Participants, design, and procedure

Data for this study were collected as part of a mail survey sent to UCLA undergraduate students from all educational levels (i.e., first-year students to seniors). The respondents were recruited by the offer of 12 $25 prizes. Eight hundred and twenty-three students (55.7% female, mean age 21 years) mailed back the survey. The sample was ethnically diverse: There were 161 Whites (49.1% female), 133 Latinos (63.9% female), 42 Jewish White Americans (47.6% female), 10 Middle Eastern (60% female), 5 Native Americans (40% female), 127 African Americans (66.9% female), 12 White Non US citizens (50% female), and 200 Asian Americans (50% female). Seventy-seven respondents identified themselves as other (59.7% female) and 48 did not report ethnicity (51.8% female).

5.6.2 Questionnaire/Measures

All questionnaire items were measured on 7-point Likert-type scales. There were reliable two-item measures of the following: a) *system justification* [r (815) = .64, $p < .001$; "Whatever its faults may be, the U.S. form of government is still the best for us/I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of"; poles anchored as 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*], b) *disruptive protest behaviour* [r (817) = .73, $p < .001$; "How seriously have you considered participating in the following activities: physical confrontation with the police or government authorities/civil disobedience"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all seriously*, 7 = *very seriously/have done so*; these items would be considered confrontational by Postmes and Brunsting (2002)],

and c) *non-disruptive protest behaviour* [r (817) = .69, p < .001; "How seriously have you considered participating in the following activities: signing petitions/sending letters to government officials and organizations?"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all seriously*, 7 = *very seriously/have done so*; these items would be considered persuasive by Postmes and Brunsting (2002) and are very similar to the non-disruptive items used across Studies 1-3]. Respondents rated their protest participation amid a number of measures relating to feelings and attitudes toward ethnic groups in the American society. Therefore, there is good reason to think that they had the enhancement of their ethnic group status in mind while reporting their protest participation.

Finally, respondents rated their *ethnic identification* immediately after they were asked to classify themselves into one of the ethnic categories mentioned above. A four-item reliable measure was used, similar to the ones used across Studies 1-3 (α = .89; "How strongly do you identify with other members of your ethnic group? / How important is your ethnicity to your identity? / How often do you think of yourself as a member of your ethnic group? / How close do you feel to other members of your ethnic group?"; poles anchored as 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very strongly/important/often/close* respectively).

5.6.3 Preliminary analyses

Before carrying out the main analysis, zero-order correlations that is, a factor analysis was performed to confirm that the constructs were distinguishable from each other. Subsequently, the data were checked for missing cases and restricted range, including floor and ceiling effects.

5.6.3.1 Factor analysis

A factor analysis was performed with Oblimin rotation (allowing factors to be correlated) using a maximum likelihood method of estimation. Three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged (intercorrelations between factors: factors 1-2, r = -.07, factors 1-3, r = .39, and factors 2-3, r = -.18). The solution, which was also supported by a scree test, explained 61.83 % of the variance. System justification, ethnic identification, and disruptive protest behaviour loaded strongly on their respective factor (factor loadings >

.67). The items measuring non-disruptive protest behaviour did not load on any of the three factors (factor loadings < .24). Therefore, one can be confident of the construct validity of the measures employed, measures that were similar to the ones across Studies 1-3 or to the ones used in previous research (i.e., Postmes & Brunsting, 2002).

5.6.3.2 Data checking

All of the variables, along with the demographic questions, had missing cases. There were 8 missing cases for system justification, 13 for ethnic identification, and 6 for each of the two types of protest behaviour. There were also 10 missing cases for gender, 12 for age, and 48 for ethnicity. The two types of protest behaviour and system justification aside, the variables were missing for more than 1% of the sample, which is equivalent to eight cases for the present study. For this reason, missing marker variables were created and were then correlated to the major variables to see if being "missing" on a variable was itself significantly related to any of the major variables. Given the high sample size, most of the correlations turned out statistically significant, but none was greater than .10. Therefore, missing data did not form a particular pattern that could affect the interpretation of the main findings. Finally, none of the variables had restricted range.

5.7 Results and discussion

The system justification hypothesis was examined first, followed by the moderating role of ingroup status in determining the relationships of system justification with both types of protest and ethnic identification.

5.7.1 The system justification hypothesis

In order to test this hypothesis, according to which system justification has a lower correlation (i.e., more negative or less positive) with disruptive protest than with non-disruptive protest, zero-order correlations between system justification and the two kinds of protest were computed across the whole sample (listwise $N = 808$). Disruptive ($M = 2.01$, $SD = 1.55$) and non-disruptive protest behaviour ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 2.06$) were positively correlated with one another, $r = .49$, $p < .001$, and in turn correlated in meaningful ways with system justification ($M = 5.09$, $SD = 1.46$). As expected, system

justification had a lower (i.e., more negative) correlation with disruptive protest behaviour, $r = -.18$, $p < .001$, than with non-disruptive protest behaviour, $r = -.09$, $p = .012$. The difference between the correlations was statistically significant, $t\ (805) = 2.69$, $p = .007$, two-tailed. This is consistent with the uncertainty-reduction function of system justification for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b).

The fact that both correlations turned out to be negative is of no consequence, because the net effect of system justification on protesting may vary depending on the number of individuals coming from high and low status groups. In the present sample, the one group that was clearly of high status consisted of Whites, but only counted about a fifth (19.56%) of the total number of participants. Given that system justification is expected to be negatively correlated with protest behaviour among members of low status groups, this explains why the net effect of system justification came out negative.

5.7.2 The moderating role of ingroup status

In order to examine the rest of the research hypotheses regarding the moderating role of ingroup status, zero-order correlations were computed for Whites and Latinos separately (see Table 5.1 for means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations).

5.7.2.1 System justification and collective protest

As expected, disruptive and non-disruptive protest participation correlated with system justification in meaningful but opposite ways as a function of status. In line with the two parts of the system justification-protest hypothesis, both types of protest correlated with system justification positively among Whites but negatively among Latinos. Also consistent with the two parts of the system justification hypothesis, system justification, both among Whites and Latinos, correlated with disruptive protest behaviour significantly lower (i.e., less positively and more negatively, respectively) than with non-disruptive protest behaviour. The difference between these two correlations was statistically significant for Whites, $t\ (153) = 1.79$, $p = .04$, one-tailed, and marginally so for Latinos, $t\ (126) = 1.53$, $p = .06$, one-tailed.

5.7.2.2 System justification and ethnic identification

Consistent with both parts of the system justification-identification hypothesis, ethnic identification correlated with system justification in meaningful but opposite ways as a function of status.

Table 5.1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for System Justification, Nondisruptive and Disruptive Protest Behaviour, and Ethnic Identification as a Function of Status (Study 4, High Status: Listwise N = 156, Low Status: Listwise N = 129)

Variable	High Status	Low Status	1	2	3	4
1. System Justification				.24**	.06	.21**
M	5.42	5.07				
SD	1.27	1.44				
2. Nondisruptive Protest Behaviour			-.20*		.19*	.23**
M	2.33	4.36				
SD	1.85	1.92				
3. Disruptive Protest Behaviour			-.33***	.50***		-.03
M	1.30	2.30				
SD	.84	1.88				
4. Ethnic Identification			-.24**	.55***	.39***	
M	4.03	4.81				
SD	1.33	1.64				

Note. Scores can vary between 1 and 7 for all variables. Higher means indicate greater system justification, protest participation, and identification. High status intercorrelations are located above the diagonal, whereas low status intercorrelations are located below the diagonal.

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Ethnic identification correlated with system justification positively among Whites and negatively among Latinos. It is noteworthy that the absolute sizes of these two correlations were comparable across groups. Therefore, in line with hypotheses, Latinos' ingroup identification decreased the more they justified the system, whereas Whites' ingroup identification increased the more they justified the system.

5.7.3 Summary of findings and limitations

To sum up, Study 4 provided strong support for all hypotheses examined. First of all, it yielded evidence consistent with the system justification hypothesis by showing that system justification has a lower (i.e., more negative) correlation with disruptive protest behaviour than with non-disruptive protest behaviour. The data also lent support to the moderating role of ingroup status in the correlations between system justification and protest behaviour and identification. Indeed, among Whites these correlations were positive, whereas among Latinos these same correlations were negative. These findings constitute the first empirical demonstration of how the consensuality of system justification among the disadvantaged (e.g., Ridgeway, 2001) inhibits them from engaging in disruptive forms of protest, such as rebellions and revolutions.

However, there are a few limitations to what can be concluded from this study alone. Firstly, there were no direct measures of anger or collective efficacy. Secondly, the protest items did not indicate a specific context, so one cannot be entirely sure of the kind of disadvantage respondents had in mind when reporting their protest participation. Thirdly, the measure of disruptive protest behaviour had a floor effect, especially among Whites, which may have weakened its relationship with system justification. Therefore, before drawing any strong conclusions, it is necessary to tap protest against ingroup disadvantage more directly and it is also important to examine the relationships of system justification to anger and collective efficacy. Finally, it is crucial to investigate whether system justification can actually exert causal effects on both forms of protest, identification, and anger. Studies 5 and 6 were, therefore, designed to address these limitations by focusing on groups that were relatively low in economic status: people protesting for state pensions (Study 5) and school teachers protesting for better pay (Study 6).

Study 5

5.8 Introduction

The main goals of Study 5 were to replicate the low-status related findings from Study 4 and to allow for causal inferences. In this respect, levels of system justification were systematically varied through the use of Kay and Jost's (2003) *complementary stereotype* manipulation. This type of manipulation exposes one set of people to complementary stereotypes, such as 'poor but happy/rich but miserable', and another set of people to non-complementary stereotypes, such as 'poor and miserable/rich and happy'. Kay and Jost (2003) found that people who were exposed to complementary stereotype exemplars scored higher on system justification than did those exposed to non-complementary exemplars. The idea is that in lay thinking the most just society would be one in which groups hold offsetting strengths and weaknesses, so that no single group enjoys only benefits or suffers only burdens (see also Lerner, 1980). The complementarity effect has been replicated on both gender, and regional and ethnic stereotypes (Jost & Kay, 2005; Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005). There is also evidence to suggest that people need not endorse these stereotypes for the effects to emerge; it is mere stereotype activation that accounts for the effects of stereotype exposure on system justification scores (Jost & Kay, 2005).

For reasons of internal and external validity, a real-world group was considered for the investigation of the impact of 'poor but happy' and 'poor and miserable' stereotype exemplars on tendencies to take part in collective protest against ingroup disadvantage, group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification. Therefore, actual protesters at a pre-march rally that took place in Athens, Greece, on May Day (May 1st) in 2008 were recruited. Individual protesters were approached on a random basis by two experimenters, a male one and a female one. By disguising the manipulation as an impression formation task, the experimenters asked protesters to first read about a poor protagonist varying in happiness (happy vs. unhappy). Thus, the experimental design entailed a single factor with two conditions.

Next, protesters answered a very brief set of questions regarding a pension bill that the Greek government was at the time trying to pass; the bill sought to increase the age at

which Greek citizens would have the right to draw a state pension. Questions focused on that bill, because its announcement largely coincided with May Day, so the majority of organisations that took part in the demonstration made the governmental bill their focal issue. Protesters were asked how angry they were with the government, how much they identified with the protestors gathered at the rally, how much they thought they had the power to stop the bill, and how willing they were to protest against the bill (in both disruptive and non-disruptive ways). On the basis of the findings from Study 4 and the hypotheses postulated in this chapter, participants assigned to the 'poor but happy' condition were expected to be significantly less angry with the Greek government, less identified with the protesters, and less willing to protest, especially in disruptive ways, as compared to those assigned to the 'poor and unhappy' condition. No effect was expected on appraisals of collective efficacy, in line with the system justification-efficacy hypothesis.

5.9 Method

Information about the participants, the design, the experimental procedure, and the measures employed is provided here. Preliminary analyses are also reported.

5.9.1 Participants, design, and procedure

Twenty-five protestors (10 women and 15 men, mean age 38 years) were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. There was no reward offered for their participation.

The experimental manipulation was introduced by disguising the study as one that addressed the way people form impressions of others and how that might be related to their attitudes about the demonstration. Specifically, protesters first read a short vignette about a character named Nick, who was described as either poor but happy or poor and unhappy. The vignette was similar to the one used by Kay and Jost (2003), but it was translated into Greek and slightly adapted to the Greek context, so that it would be more believable. The wording of the vignette is provided below, translated back into English. Protesters in the 'poor but happy' condition read the words in italics, whereas protesters in the 'poor and unhappy' condition read the words in brackets:

Nick is from a large Greek city. He is married and has two children, has brown hair, and is 1.80m tall. Nick liked to play football as a child and still closely follows the matches of his local team. Nick *enjoys almost all aspects of his life* [is not particularly happy with most aspects of his life], *but* [and] because of his low salary he has trouble getting the bills paid and keeping food on the table. In June, Nick will be turning 41.

After reading the passage, protesters used 9-point scales ranging from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 9 (*very likely*) to rate how likely or unlikely they thought it was that Nick was arrogant, funny, generous, content, socially competent, fulfilled, likeable, and modest. The contentment ratings were used to check on the manipulation of perceived happiness; the other items were only included to strengthen the cover story. On the page following the vignette, there was an item checking whether this manipulation had also affected protesters' system justification scores. Thus, protesters were asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with the one item from the Kay and Jost (2003) system justification scale that was considered most relevant to the situation (i.e., "Most governmental policies serve the greater good"; a 9-point scale was used with poles anchored 1 = *disagree strongly* and 9 = *agree strongly*). Following the manipulation checks, protesters completed the dependent measures and demographics.

5.9.2 Dependent measures

Given the limited amount of time protesters could provide at the pre-march rally, single items were used to tap into *protest tendencies* ("How willing are you to do the following in order to protest against the pension bill? Sign a petition/take part in occupying a public building" for non-disruptive and disruptive protest tendencies, respectively), *group-based anger* ("When I think about the pension bill the government is trying to pass, I feel angry"), *collective efficacy* ("I think that the people who are gathered here today are able to stop this bill"), and *group identification* ("Being part of the people gathered here today is important to me"). All items were measured on 9-point scales with both poles anchored (1 = *not at all*, 9 = *very much*).

5.9.3 Demographics

Finally, protesters were asked to indicate their gender, age, political orientation, and organisation membership (i.e., whether they were members of any of the trade unions or political parties attending the march; "yes" was coded as one and "no" was coded as zero; protesters were then asked to specify which organisation(s) if they replied "yes"). Political orientation was measured on a 9-point scale (1 = *left-wing*, 9 = *right-wing*). Slightly more than half (54.2%) of the protestors who took part in the experiment belonged to some trade union or political party: A large majority reported being left-wing (87.5% located themselves to the left of the scale midpoint; $M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.62$). Given that May Day is a traditionally left-wing, working-class holiday, this leftist skew was expected. This is one reason why it was decided to show participants the 'poor but happy' stereotype exemplar rather than the 'poor but honest' exemplar. Kay, Czaplinski, and Jost (2009) found that the former had an impact on left-wingers' levels of system justification, whereas the latter affected right-wingers' system justification scores.

5.9.4 Preliminary analyses

Before carrying out the main analysis, ANOVA that is, the data were checked for missing cases and restricted range, including floor and ceiling effects (Runyon et al., 2000). There were only two missing cases, one for political orientation and one for organisation membership but, given the low sample size, creating missing marker variables and correlating them with the major variables would not be very informative. Furthermore, the following four variables had restricted range: system justification (range: 1-3), group-based anger and group identification (range: 4-9) and non-disruptive protest tendencies (range: 5-9; see also means and standard deviations in Table 5.2). This suggests that the sample tended to report low levels of system justification and high levels of group-based anger, group identification, and petition-signing tendencies. Because of the restricted range, one might expect either biasing or weakening effects on these variables.

Table 5.2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for System Justification, Non-disruptive and Disruptive Protest Tendencies, Group-based Anger, Collective Efficacy, and Group Identification (Study 5, N = 25)

Variable	*M*	*SD*	2	3	4	5	6
1. System justification	1.32	.56	-.15	-.19	-.22	-.09	-.03
2. Non-disruptive protest tendencies	8.32	1.25		.49*	.52**	.41*	.74***
3. Disruptive protest tendencies	6.68	2.91			.36†	.30	.38†
4. Group-based anger	8.12	1.36				.54**	.72***
5. Collective efficacy	5.52	2.66					.61**
6. Group identification	7.72	1.77					

Note. Scores can vary between 1 and 9 for all variables. Higher means indicate higher system justification, higher protest tendencies, higher group-based anger, higher collective efficacy, and higher group identification.

†: $p < .10$; *: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$; ***: $p < .001$.

One can also see from Table 5.2 that the manipulation check measuring participants' system justification scores was negatively, albeit nonsignificantly, correlated with all of the dependent measures. These weak relationships may have been due to the restricted range of system justification.

5.10 Results and discussion

For all of the following analyses main effects of demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, political orientation, and organisation membership) were included as adjustment variables and are reported separately, followed by manipulation checks and the main effects of system justification condition. Means as reported are not adjusted by demographic variables.

5.10.1 Effects of demographic variables

None of the demographic variables exerted reliable main or interaction effects on ratings of contentment, group-based anger, collective efficacy, group identification, and protest tendencies, either disruptive or non-disruptive, and the general pattern of results was the same whether or not demographic variables were included as adjustment variables. However, a main effect of political orientation and a main effect of organisation membership on system justification indicated that those protesters aligned with the right-wing, as well as those who were members of trade unions or political parties, were more likely to consider that most government policies serve the greater good: $F(1, 17) = 10.29$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .38$ for political orientation, and $F(1, 17) = 5.60$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .25$ for organisation membership. Age and gender were unrelated to system justification scores and none of the four demographic variables interacted with other variables to predict system justification.

5.10.2 Manipulation checks

To assess the impact of the manipulation two ANOVAs were conducted, one on the trait rating of the protagonist as 'content' and one on the system justification item. An ANOVA on ratings of contentment with experimental condition as the independent variable confirmed that the unhappy protagonist was indeed rated as significantly less content ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.69$) than the happy protagonist ($M = 5.75$, $SD = 2.56$), $F(1, 17) = 8.07$, $p = .011$, $\eta^2 = .32$. Also as expected, there was a significant main effect of condition on system justification, $F(1, 17) = 6.18$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .27$. Protesters in the 'poor but happy' condition scored significantly higher on system justification ($M = 1.50$, $SD = .67$) than protesters in the 'poor and unhappy' condition ($M = 1.09$, $SD = .30$). The

above findings confirmed that the manipulation was successful, thus underscoring the usefulness of Kay and Jost's (2003) complementary stereotype manipulation of system justification.

5.10.3 Protest tendencies

A repeated-measures ANOVA with disruptiveness of protest tendencies as a within-subjects variable and experimental condition as a between-subjects variable was conducted in order to test the low status parts of the system justification-protest and the system justification hypotheses.

5.10.3.1 Low status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis

According to this hypothesis, system justification discourages participation in both disruptive and non-disruptive protest on the part of low status groups. As expected, the main effect of condition on protest tendencies was significant, though marginally so, F (1, 17) = 4.37, p = .052, η^2 = .20. Regardless of disruptiveness, protesters assigned to the 'poor but happy' condition were less willing to protest (M = 6.79, SD = 2.79) than protesters assigned to the 'poor and unhappy' condition (M = 8.45, SD = 1.22). Therefore, consistently with the low status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis, increased system justification lowered protesters' willingness to take part in any type of protest.

5.10.3.2 Low status part of the system justification hypothesis

In line with this hypothesis, system justification among low-status groups discourages disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. Following from the repeated-measures ANOVA reported above, the expected interaction between disruptiveness and experimental condition was marginally significant, F (1, 17) = 3.82, p = .067, η^2 = .18. Simple effects analyses revealed that protesters assigned to the 'poor but happy' condition were much less willing to take part in a public building occupation (M = 5.33, SD = 3.45) than protesters assigned to the 'poor and unhappy' condition (M = 8.09, SD = 1.64), F (1, 17) = 5.22, p = .04, η^2 = .24. However, the effect of condition on non-disruptive protest tendencies did not reach statistical significance, possibly due to low

sample size, F (1, 17) = 1.45, $p > .10$, $\eta^2 = .08$. The means were in the expected directions, though: Protestors assigned to the 'poor but happy' condition were less likely to sign a petition ($M = 7.92$, $SD = 1.62$) than those assigned to the 'poor and unhappy' condition ($M = 8.82$, $SD = .41$). Looking at the effect sizes, one notices that the effect of condition on disruptive protest tendencies was three times stronger than the (unreliable) effect of condition on non-disruptive protest tendencies. This finding lends strong support to the low status part of the system justification hypothesis.

5.10.4 Group identification, group-based anger, and collective efficacy

Consistent with the low status parts of the system justification-identification and system justification-anger hypotheses, protesters assigned to the 'poor but happy' condition reported lower levels of identification with the protesters ($M = 7.08$, $SD = 2.07$) and less anger against the government ($M = 7.42$, $SD = 1.68$) than did those assigned to the 'poor and unhappy' condition (Ms = 8.18 and 8.82, SDs = 1.33 and .41, respectively). The effect was reliable for anger, F (1, 17) = 6.37, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .27$, but not for identification, F (1, 17) = 1.24, $p > .10$, $\eta^2 = .07$, possibly due to low sample size. Also in line with the system justification-efficacy hypothesis, the effect of condition on collective efficacy was not significant, F (1, 17) = 1.04, $p > .10$, $\eta^2 = .06$, although the means showed a tendency for the protesters assigned to the 'poor but happy' condition to report lower levels of collective efficacy ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 2.89$) than those assigned to the 'poor and unhappy' condition ($M = 6.27$, $SD = 2.33$).

The present results support the notion that for members of a relatively disadvantaged group (i.e., protesters agitating for their state pensions) heightened levels of system justification decrease identification with the ingroup, as well as anger against the outgroup responsible for the disadvantage (i.e., the Greek government). Support for the absence of an effect of system justification on collective efficacy was not entirely conclusive.

5.10.5 Summary of findings and limitations

Taken together, the present findings replicate in a completely different setting the relationships observed among the low status group of Latinos in Study 4. Furthermore,

findings from Study 5 extend those from Study 4, because they allow for causal inferences. Through successful variation of levels of system justification among protesters in a May Day rally in Athens it was shown that, following exposure to a complementary, 'poor but happy' stereotype exemplar, protesters were less likely to (a) report willingness to protest, (b) identify with their 'co-protesters' (albeit not reliably so), and (c) feel angry against the Greek government than when they were exposed to the non-complementary stereotype of 'poor and unhappy'. Although there was no reliable support for an effect of system justification on non-disruptive protest tendencies, the means were in the predicted directions; more importantly, the effect on disruptive protest tendencies was three times stronger than that for non-disruptive, in line with hypotheses.

Because of the fairly small sample size and the single-item measures, it was decided to conduct one more experimental study using multiple-item measures and a larger real-world sample. Data for the last study, conducted for the purposes of this thesis, were collected from English school teachers in dispute with the UK government.

Study 6

5.11 Introduction

Data for this final study were collected from the same long-standing real-world group that was investigated in Study 2: registered members of the National Union of Teachers (NUT). To reiterate, the main issue of the dispute was salaries. Following the government's decision for pay increases below the rate of inflation and aiming at a pay increase that would be equal to or higher than that, NUT authorised a one-day strike that was disruptive to the function of many schools across the country (NUT, 2008).

Study 6 sought to replicate the effects observed in Study 5. However, rather than focusing on how *high* system justification may *decrease* levels of protest, group identification, and group-based anger, this last study examined how *low* system justification may *increase* both types of protest, as well as identification and anger, among the relatively low in economic status group of teachers fighting for better pay. This was done through the use of a different manipulation of system justification. A

replication of the effects would cast doubt on alternative explanations of findings that stem from the peculiarities of any single type of manipulation.

To this end, a *system disconfirmation* manipulation was devised. Conceptually, this is similar in some ways to system-threat manipulations that have been employed in previous research (e.g., Jost et al., 2005; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005), whereby participants read a (fictitious) account describing the social and economic down-turn of a particular system. For example, Kay et al. (2005) found that following a system-threat manipulation, as opposed to a no-threat manipulation, participants scored lower on Kay and Jost's (2003) system justification scale, but subsequently exhibited greater stereotyping behaviour. This is understandable because, just as threats directed against the self give rise to ego-defensive mechanisms (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997), threats directed against the social system one belongs to tend to heighten system-defensive or system-justifying responses (e.g., Kay et al., 2005).

In the present study, NUT members were asked to engage in system disconfirmation. They were thus instructed to generate some negative aspect of the British system that other countries should not follow. In this way, rather than having to react to (and defend against) an externally imposed system threat, NUT members willingly reflected on the faults of the system. Because these criticisms of the system were self-generated, rather than externally generated, it was expected that they would temporarily lower participants' system justification tendencies. In other words, by willingly thinking against some aspect of the system they were part of, participants were expected to convince themselves that they had good reason why they should withdraw support for the system, which should then facilitate behaviour against it.

Thus, the design included a single factor with two conditions, a system disconfirmation condition and a control condition. NUT members assigned to the system disconfirmation condition were expected to score lower on system justification and thus to be higher on protest tendencies, especially disruptive forms of protest. They were also expected to score higher on identification with the union, and anger against the UK government, but no effect of condition was expected on collective efficacy.

5.12 Method

Information about the participants, the design, the experimental procedure, and the measures used is provided below. Preliminary analyses are also reported.

5.12.1 Participants, design, and procedure

Fifty-nine NUT members (79.7% female, mean age 34 years) took part in a web-based experiment and were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. All participants volunteered for the study after receiving an email sent by a NUT representative a few days before the strike. There was no reward offered for their participation.

The experimental manipulation was introduced by disguising it as a 'warm-up' question that would allow participants to think about some issues before they answered a number of questions about the NUT strike. Specifically, NUT members in the system disconfirmation condition received the following instructions:

> Please think about ways that things are organised or arranged politically, legally, socially or economically in the UK. Which of these things would you strongly recommend other countries should NOT follow because they work particularly *badly* and are *bad* ways to run things for the country *as a whole*? You might think of laws, policies or institutions, such as parliament, employment, education, family, social norms and roles, cultural traditions or religion. Please write a few lines about one of these things that you would recommend other countries should NOT follow and why.

So as to keep instructions across conditions as equivalent as possible, NUT members assigned to the control condition received the following instructions:

> Please think about different teaching methods you have used with primary or secondary school children. Which of these methods would you strongly recommend other teachers should NOT follow because they work particularly *badly* for children's learning? Please write a few lines about one of these methods that you would recommend other teachers should NOT follow and why.

After writing a paragraph in response to one of the above prompts, NUT members were taken to the next webpage, where they completed Kay and Jost's (2003) 8-item system justification scale, which was adapted to the British context ("In general, I find British society to be fair/In general, the British political system operates as it should/The UK is

the best country in the world to live in/Most government policies serve the greater good/Everyone in the UK has a fair shot at wealth and happiness/British society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve/British society needs to be radically restructured/Our society is getting worse every year"). Following reverse-coding of the last two items, higher scores on this scale indicated higher system justification.

NUT members also completed a shorter 10-item version of Jost and Thompson's (2000) economic system justification scale ("The existence of widespread economic differences does not mean that they are inevitable/There are many reasons to think that the economic system is unfair/Poor people are not essentially different from rich people/Economic differences in the society reflect an illegitimate distribution of resources/It is unfair to have an economic system which produces extreme wealth and extreme poverty at the same time/It is virtually impossible to eliminate poverty/Most people who do not get ahead in our society should not blame the system; they have only themselves to blame/There will always be poor people, because there will never be enough jobs for everybody/Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people's achievements/Equal distribution of resources is unnatural"). Following reverse-coding of the first five items, higher scores on this scale indicated higher economic system justification.

Both the system justification and the economic system justification scales were reliable ($\alpha = .80$ and $\alpha = .71$, respectively) and were measured on 9-point scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The inclusion of these two scales made it possible to check on the manipulation of system disconfirmation on both diffuse and specific forms of system justification. Following completion of these two scales, NUT members completed the main dependent measures, as well as demographic information.

5.12.2 Dependent measures

All items were derived from Study 2 and measured on 9-point scales with poles anchored as 1 = *not at all* and 9 = *definitely*. There were reliable two-item measures of *group-based anger* ($r = .64$; Because of the government's position on pay, I feel angry/irritated) and *collective efficacy* ($r = .91$; I think together NUT members are able to make the government change position on pay/to achieve their goals on pay). Group identification

and protest tendencies, both disruptive and non-disruptive, were measured with the same exact items used in Study 2. All scales were reliable (αs = .94, .77, and .82, respectively).

5.12.3 Demographics

Finally, NUT members were asked to indicate their gender, age, and political orientation, which was measured on a 9-point scale (1 = *left-wing*, 9 = *right-wing*). Unlike the predominantly left-wing sample of protesters in Study 5, this time the sample was rather moderate (M = 4.19, SD = 1.33), with slightly more than half (52.5%) of the NUT members using the left half of the scale.

5.12.4 Preliminary analyses

Before carrying out the main analysis, ANOVA that is, the data were checked for missing cases and restricted range, including floor and ceiling effects (Runyon et al., 2000). There were no missing cases or restricted range (see also means and standard deviations in Table 5.3). One can also see from Table 5.3 that the manipulation checks measuring participants' system justification and economic system justification scores were meaningfully correlated with most of the dependent measures, though statistical significance was not always reached, possibly due to low sample size. Both scales were negatively correlated with disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies, as well as with group identification, in line with expectations. Also consistent with hypotheses, neither scale was correlated with collective efficacy, while system justification was negatively correlated with group-based anger. Economic system justification, however, was not correlated with anger, perhaps because this scale was not directly relevant to the context investigated. By contrast, the system justification scale included items that were related to the British political system and the government, hence its significant correlation with anger against the British government.

Table 5.3

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for System Justification, Economic System Justification, Non-disruptive and Disruptive Protest Tendencies, Group-based Anger, Collective Efficacy, and Group Identification (Study 6, N = 59)

Variable	*M*	*SD*	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.System justification	4.11	1.30	.04	-.24†	-.23†	-.40**	.14	-.11
2. Economic system justification	3.79	1.10		-.18	-.24†	.02	-.08	-.28*
3. Non-disruptive protest tendencies	4.97	2.07			.70***	.51***	.29*	.52***
4. Disruptive protest tendencies	4.38	2.05				.32*	.28*	.60***
5. Group-based anger	6.92	1.73					.06	.43**
6. Collective efficacy	5.07	2.10						.45***
7. Group identification	7.09	1.87						

Note. Scores can vary between 1 and 9 for all variables. Higher means indicate higher system justification, higher protest tendencies, higher group-based anger, higher collective efficacy, and higher group identification.

†: $p < .10$; *: $p < .05$; **: $p < .01$; ***: $p < .001$.

5.13 Results and discussion

For all of the following analyses main effects of demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, and political orientation) were included as adjustment variables and are reported separately, followed by manipulation checks and the main effects of system justification condition. Means as reported are not adjusted by demographic variables.

5.13.1 Effects of demographic variables

None of the demographic variables exerted reliable main or interaction effects on ratings of system justification, group-based anger, and non-disruptive protest tendencies, while the pattern of results was the same whether or not adjustment variables were included. However, a main effect of political orientation on economic system justification indicated that right-wing NUT members were more likely than left-wingers to justify the economic system: F (1, 54) = 13.16, p = .001, η^2 = .20. Although age and gender were unrelated to economic system justification, they were both related to union identification and disruptive protest tendencies, such that female and older NUT members were less likely to (a) identify with the union, F (1, 54) = 5.21, p = .03, η^2 = .09 for gender, and F (1, 54) = 5.61, p = .02, η^2 = .09 for age, and (b) report willingness to take part in disruptive forms of protest, F (1, 54) = 6.77, p = .012, η^2 = .11 for gender, and F (1, 54) = 11.04, p = .002, η^2 = .17 for age. The significant effects of age and gender on willingness to take part in disruptive protest replicate findings from Cameron and Nickerson's (2006) study.

5.13.2 Manipulation checks

To assess the impact of the manipulation two ANOVAs were conducted, one on the system justification scale and one on the economic system justification scale, with experimental condition as the independent variable. The ANOVAs confirmed that NUT members assigned to the system disconfirmation condition scored significantly lower on both the system justification (M = 3.71, SD = 1.27) and economic system justification measures (M = 3.47, SD = 1.16) in comparison with those assigned to the control condition (Ms = 4.52 and 4.11, SDs = 1.21 and .94, respectively), F (1, 54) = 5.19, p = .03, η^2 = .09 for system justification, and F (1, 54) = 5.67, p = .02, η^2 = .10 for economic

system justification. These findings confirmed that the manipulation was successful in varying levels of both diffuse and specific forms of system justification.

5.13.3 Protest tendencies

A repeated-measures ANOVA with disruptiveness of protest tendencies as a within-subjects variable and experimental condition as a between-subjects variable was conducted in order to test the low status parts of the system justification-protest and the system justification hypotheses.

5.13.3.1 Low status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis

In line with this hypothesis, high system justification inhibits participation in both disruptive and non-disruptive protest on the part of low status groups. In other words, low system justification facilitates participation in both types of protest. As expected, there was a significant main effect of condition on protest tendencies, F (1, 54) = 11.73, p = .001, η^2 = .18. Regardless of disruptiveness, NUT members assigned to the system disconfirmation condition were significantly more willing to protest (M = 5.47, SD = 2.21) than NUT members assigned to the control condition (M = 4.41, SD = 1.80). Therefore, in line with the low status part of the system justification-protest hypothesis, lowered system justification boosted NUT members' willingness to take part in both types of protest.

5.13.3.2 Low status part of the system justification hypothesis

Consistent with this hypothesis, high system justification among low-status groups discourages disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. Put differently, low system justification encourages disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. Following from the repeated-measures ANOVA reported above, the expected interaction between disruptiveness and experimental condition was almost marginally significant, F (1, 54) = 2.51, p = .119, η^2 = .04. Simple effects analyses revealed that NUT members assigned to the system disconfirmation condition were much more willing to take part in disruptive forms of protest (M = 5.10, SD = 2.17) than NUT members assigned to the control condition (M = 3.62, SD = 1.64), F (1, 54) = 16.40, p < .001, η^2 =

.23. The effect of condition on non-disruptive protest tendencies was also significant, F (1, 54) = 5.22, p = .03, η^2 = .09, which was not the case in the previous study, probably due to low sample size. NUT members assigned to the system disconfirmation condition were more willing to participate in non-disruptive forms of protest (M = 5.47, SD = 2.21) than those assigned to the control condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.80). Looking at the effect sizes, one observes that the effect of condition on disruptive protest tendencies was nearly three times stronger than the effect of condition on non-disruptive protest tendencies. It is interesting to note that the effect sizes of experimental condition on disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies across Studies 5 and 6 were comparable: η^2 = .24 and .23, respectively, for disruptive protest, and η^2 = .08 and .09, respectively, for non-disruptive protest. This observation lends further support to the low status part of the system justification hypothesis, given that Studies 5 and 6 produced similar effect sizes per type of protest through the use of two different manipulations.

5.13.4 Group identification, group-based anger, and collective efficacy

In line with the low status parts of the system justification-identification and system justification-anger hypotheses, NUT members assigned to the system disconfirmation condition reported higher levels of group identification (M = 7.53, SD = 1.78) and group-based anger (M = 7.37, SD = 1.61) when compared to those assigned to the control condition (Ms = 6.62 and 6.47, SDs = 1.88 and 1.76, respectively). The effects were reliable for both identification, F (1, 54) = 6.44, p = .014, η^2 = .11, and anger, F (1, 54) = 4.23, p = .045, η^2 = .07. In line with the system justification-efficacy hypothesis, there was no significant effect of condition on collective efficacy, F (1, 54) = .01, p > .10, η^2 = .00. Means confirmed that NUT members in the system disconfirmation condition did not report significantly different levels of collective efficacy from those assigned to the control condition (Ms = 4.90 and 5.24, SDs = 2.50 and 1.62, respectively). These findings bolster the idea that, for members of a disadvantaged group (in this case teachers claiming pay increases after several years of pay decreases), lowered levels of system justification increase group identification and anger against the outgroup that is primarily responsible for the disadvantage (i.e., the British government). By boosting sample size, it was possible to address the non-significant effect of system justification on group

identification observed in Study 5 and to clarify that there was no effect on collective efficacy.

5.13.5 Summary of findings and limitations

In summary, Study 6 succeeded in varying levels of both diffuse and specific system justification among NUT members through the use of a novel experimental manipulation and in replicating effects from Study 5 using multi-item measures. This provides one with greater confidence in attributing the results in Studies 5 and 6 to varied levels of system justification tendencies rather than to the particularities of one type of sample or manipulation. Taken together, the present findings demonstrated that, after generating some negative aspect of the UK system, NUT members were more likely to (a) report willingness to protest both disruptively and non-disruptively, (b) identify with the union, and (c) feel angry against the British government, as opposed to when they were asked to write about a 'bad' teaching method. Most importantly, the effect of system justification on disruptive protest tendencies was almost three times stronger than its effect on non-disruptive protest tendencies, consistently with the uncertainty-reduction function of system justification (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b).

A limitation of Study 6 has to do with the fact that the manipulation produced the desired effects on the two types of protest tendencies, but that their correlations with the manipulation check of system justification did not differ significantly from each other (see Table 5.3). This inconsistency was perhaps due to the system justification scale not being relevant enough to the economic character of the issue (i.e., protest for salary raise). This explanation is tentatively supported by the fact that the economic system justification scale was more negatively related to disruptive protest tendencies than to non-disruptive protest tendencies, in line with expectations. A further limitation of Study 6 was related to the fact that some of the issues NUT members in the system disconfirmation condition were asked to write about, such as family, cultural traditions, and religion, were not relevant in any way to the conflict at hand; they were only added so that NUT members did not suspect the research hypotheses. However, this point is important because Kay, Gaucher et al. (2009) have shown that individuals are more motivated to defend and justify the system they are most motivated to justify.

Specifically, in Study 2 of their line of research, Kay, Gaucher et al (2009) activated the system justification motive through the use of a system dependency manipulation, in which they manipulated the extent to which one of two systems (i.e., either the participants' university or federal government) was described as controlling the participants. They crossed this with a manipulation that varied the context in which a certain policy had been implemented (i.e., a university or a federal funding policy). What they subsequently found was that participants were more likely to consider the university funding policy as the most fair and desirable funding policy, when they had been made to feel dependent upon the university system. By contrast, participants who had been made to feel dependent upon the federal government tended to deem the federal funding policy as the most fair and desirable funding policy. Therefore, Kay, Gaucher et al. (2009) provided evidence to suggest that individuals tend to justify the specific system they are most motivated to justify rather than extend their support to other systems too.

Following Kay, Gaucher et al.'s (2009) findings, this author inspected NUT members' answers in the system disconfirmation condition, in order to see whether there were cases that had not chosen to criticise aspects of the British system that were somehow related to the conflict. It was observed that this was not the case. Perhaps due to the high salience of the dispute with the government at the time of completing the questionnaire, NUT members in the system disconfirmation condition wrote about some aspect of the British system that was, in one way or another, related to the conflict at hand. To illustrate, NUT members did not self-generate criticisms against policies relevant to culture, family life, or religion; rather, they tended to criticise specific educational or financial policies. Thus, no cases had to be removed from the dataset for the condition effects to be recalculated.

To conclude, findings from Study 6 speak to the ways in which endorsement of the ideological motive of system justification among groups that are low in economic status dampens the motivation to engage in collective protest, especially disruptive protest, as well as the tendency to identify with one's group and feel angry against the outgroup responsible for the low status of the ingroup.

Summary and Conclusion

Using a range of national samples (i.e., U.S., Greek, and British), contexts (i.e., ethnic and labour settings), measures (i.e., single- and multi-item scales), and methodologies (i.e., quasi-experimental and fully experimental designs) Chapter 5 has produced evidence of a certain degree of generalisability for all hypotheses postulated in this chapter. Most importantly, the research described here constitutes the first formal empirical investigation of the causal effects of system justification on both disruptive and non-disruptive protest against ingroup disadvantage, as well as on ingroup identification and anger directed at the outgroup responsible for the disadvantage. Chapter 5 has also marshalled evidence for the moderating role of ingroup status.

Study 4, based on pre-existing data collected with respect to a large U.S. sample, provided initial support for most of the hypotheses. Overall, system justification (in terms of support for the U.S. form of government) had a lower (i.e., more negative or less positive) correlation with disruptive protest than with non-disruptive protest, which was in line with the system justification hypothesis and the uncertainty-reduction function of system justification (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b). This finding provided a further answer to the main research question of this thesis as to whether the same protest motives predict equally participation in disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest.

Separate analyses comparing members of a high status ethnic group (i.e., Whites) and a low status group (i.e., Latinos) lent support to the moderating role of status in determining levels of protest and group identification. Whites' endorsement of system justification was associated with increased levels of identification with Whites and participation in protest, especially *non-disruptive* protest. Conversely, Latinos' endorsement of system justification was associated with decreased levels of identification with Latinos and participation in protest, especially *disruptive* protest. No measures of anger or collective efficacy were included in Study 4, so the system justification-anger and system justification-efficacy hypotheses could not be investigated.

Studies 5 and 6, conducted among May Day protesters in Greece and school teachers on strike in the UK, respectively, yielded converging evidence to suggest that system justification can exert causal effects on protest tendencies, group identification, and group-based anger, and that it is unrelated to collective efficacy. Indeed, participants

assigned to a 'poor and unhappy' condition (Study 5) and those assigned to a system disconfirmation condition (Study 6) were more likely than those assigned to the 'poor but happy' (Study 5) or control (Study 6) conditions to (a) report willingness to protest, (b) to identify with their ingroup (protesters in Study 5 and the union in Study 6), and (c) to feel angry with the outgroup responsible for the ingroup disadvantage (Greek and British governments, respectively). Furthermore, neither one of the studies produced a significant effect of system justification on collective efficacy, in line with the system justification-efficacy hypothesis. Last but not least, across Studies 5 and 6 the effect of system justification on willingness to protest disruptively was nearly three times stronger than its effect on willingness to protest non-disruptively, consistent with the system justification hypothesis.

The findings produced in Chapter 5 point to the necessity of considering ideology, broadly defined, when studying the phenomenon of collective protest, in line with previous research showing that system-justifying ideological beliefs are negatively correlated with willingness to protest (Cameron & Nickerson, 2006; Rubin & Peplau, 1973). Given that the present findings indicate that system justification especially dampens the highly uncertain prospect of participating in genuinely *disruptive* protest among low status groups, they are also consistent with the uncertainty-reduction function of system justification and the inhibiting role of personal uncertainty in disruptive protest participation, demonstrated in Study 3. It follows that it is crucial for collective protest researchers to distinguish between forms of protest that differ in their degree of uncertainty (i.e., disruptive and non-disruptive protest).

One further theoretical implication of the present findings concerns the moderating role of ingroup status with respect to the study of ideology and collective protest against ingroup disadvantage. More specifically, findings from Chapter 5 concur with the behavioural asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and with literature pointing to the (in)compatibility of group justification and system justification motives among members of low- and high-status groups (e.g., Jost et al., 2001). Indeed, Study 4 revealed how two group justification variables (i.e., protest participation and group identification) related to system justification in opposite ways for the high status group of Whites and the low status group of Latinos.

Furthermore, Chapter 5 conveys an important practical implication concerning why it is so rarely the case that the disadvantaged rebel or revolt against those responsible for their suffering (e.g., Zinn, 1968). Given that the disadvantaged may hold system-justifying ideologies that are consensually held in society (e.g., Jackman, 1994; Ridgeway, 2001) and that these ideologies discourage especially motivation to participate in disruptive protest, as Studies 4 through 6 show, it is not surprising that the disadvantaged only rarely decide to take part in disruptive forms of protest. Nevertheless, the most drastic social changes in human history have at least arguably been the result of revolutions undertaken by the disadvantaged, albeit often with the assistance of others (e.g., French and Russian Revolutions). Perhaps this means that as long as the disadvantaged endorse system-justifying ideologies it seems unlikely that their lower status in life will improve dramatically.

A limitation of the findings from Chapter 5 is the fact that the experiments of Studies 5 and 6 were only conducted among members of groups that were low in economic status. However, it was deemed much more socially consequential to investigate some of the ways in which endorsement of the system on the part of the disadvantaged may contribute to the perpetuation of their lower status in life. Such an understanding may then act as a springboard to the alleviation of social inequality. Future research would do well to manipulate system justification also among members of high status groups in order to investigate whether endorsement of system justification can indeed have causal incremental effects on tendencies to take part in protest, especially non-disruptive protest, group identification, and group-based anger. Until then, the motivation which drives members of high status groups to protest will very much remain an open question. Therefore, Chapter 5 highlights that the literature could benefit from the sustained study of system justification, the disruptiveness of protest, and the moderating role of ingroup status.

To conclude, an important contribution of Chapter 5 is that it has demonstrated the causal effect of system justification on both disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest, as well as on group identification and group-based anger, which have been found to be crucial antecedents to willingness to protest, as also Chapter 4 showed. Moreover, this was done with the use of two different manipulations of system justification,

including an established method in Study 5 and a novel paradigm in Study 6. Chapter 5 has further contributed to the literature by investigating the moderating role of ingroup status concerning the relationship between system justification and collective protest, as well as its antecedents. Finally, sampling from real-world groups of different nationalities and pursuing different political causes endows the research findings with a certain degree of generalisability. Together, findings from Chapter 5 address the neglected role of ideology, and system justification in particular, in determining participation in both socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest.

Chapter 6

General Discussion

Introduction

Are socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest triggered equally by the same motives or is it that some motives are more important for one kind of protest than for the other? This is the question that this thesis set out to investigate empirically. The following pages explain how each chapter helped to address the above question. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed, along with limitations and directions for future research.

6.1 Chapters 1 and 2

With regard to the main research question that this thesis aimed at examining, Chapters 1 and 2 were very useful, because they pinpointed those social psychological motives that have been found to be particularly predictive of participation in collective protest. Specifically, it was argued that a combination of Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual-pathway model to collective protest is the most accurate and inclusive attempt at explaining collective protest. Hence, this thesis considered three main pathways to collective protest, namely, an emotional pathway, an instrumental pathway, and an identity-related pathway. Group-based anger and collective efficacy were examined as representative motives of the emotional and instrumental pathways, respectively. Social opinion support was regarded as feeding into the emotional pathway, whereas social action support was considered as contributing to the instrumental pathway. The identity-related pathway, that is, group identification, was thought of as a conceptual bridge between the other two pathways, in line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA.

However, both SIMCA and Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual pathway model were criticised for not examining whether the postulated motives, namely, group-based anger, collective efficacy, group identification, and social opinion and action support, predict equally participation in normative and non-normative forms of protest, which is an

established distinction in the literature (e.g., Wright et al., 1990; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Louis & Taylor, 1999).

6.2 Chapter 3

Given the criticism of Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004, 2008) models, Chapter 3 aimed at investigating how each of the five motives should relate to the two types of protest. To this end, Chapter 3 first proposed that the use of the socially disruptive/non-disruptive distinction was preferable to the use of Wright et al.'s (1990) normative vs. non-normative distinction. It was argued that the use of the former was consistent with Simon and Klandermans' (2001) tripolar approach, which attaches great significance to the role of the general public as the third party in any conflict between two opposing groups. It was also argued that the concept of normativity is of limited value due to a number of weaknesses related to its operationalisation and to its incapacity to account for the phenomenon of non-disruptive protest.

In order to explain why different protest motives should relate differently to the socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest, Chapter 3 introduced the core human motive of quest for personal certainty (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van den Bos, 2009). In doing so, Chapter 3 contended that participation in collective protest enhances personal uncertainty, because protest carries with it the uncertain prospect of social change. It was further argued that uncertainty should be particularly high for socially disruptive types of protest due to the unpredictable and, perhaps, undesirable consequences that these types of protest may entail. Thus, Chapter 3 reasoned that motives able to tackle this uncertainty should be more strongly related to disruptive protest than to non-disruptive protest. Chapter 3 went on to postulate relevant hypotheses and to review some of the existing evidence in favour of these hypotheses.

Therefore, Chapter 3 hypothesised that group-based anger, social opinion support, and group identification predict non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest. In contrast, it was hypothesised that collective efficacy and social action support predict disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. Following from these hypotheses and Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analytic findings, according to which the predictive strengths of injustice and efficacy are equal, Chapter 3 further hypothesised

that anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does efficacy and that efficacy predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does anger. Similar hypotheses were postulated regarding the role of social opinion and action support, because of their conceptualisation as antecedents of the emotional and instrumental pathways, respectively. Thus, it was hypothesised that social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest and that social action support predicts disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest.

Perhaps the most controversial of the above hypotheses are the ones related to the role of group-based anger, given that, intuitively, one would expect the emotion of anger to be particularly predictive of participation in more violent, hence, socially disruptive protest activities. Chapter 3, however, reviewed accumulated evidence that started to make sense in the light of these counterintuitive hypotheses (e.g., Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002; Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Corning & Myers, 2002; Olson et al., 1995). For a direct test of the hypotheses related to group-based anger, as well as to the rest of the motives, three main studies were conducted and reported in Chapter 4.

6.3 Chapter 4

Through the use of diverse samples (i.e., students and teachers and lecturers on strike) and methodologies (i.e., scenario-based and field studies, and experiments), Studies 1 through 3 marshalled evidence for most of the research hypotheses postulated in Chapter 3. Support for each one of the hypotheses is considered now separately.

6.3.1 The emotional pathway hypothesis

Both Studies 1 and 2 lent some support to this counterintuitive hypothesis, according to which group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest. It is noteworthy that the unique contribution of anger in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was double as much as its contribution in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies in Study 2.

6.3.2 The instrumental pathway hypothesis

Studies 1 and 2 yielded some support for the instrumental pathway hypothesis, in line with which collective efficacy predicts disruptive protest more strongly than non-disruptive protest. Support from Study 1 was only tentative, but Study 2 showed that the unique contribution of collective efficacy in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was negligible (= -.02), even though the contribution of efficacy in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies was only marginally significant perhaps as a result of low power of that study.

6.3.3 The identity-related pathway hypothesis

Findings related to this hypothesis, according to which group identification predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest, were not entirely conclusive. Group identification had a ceiling effect in Study 1a, which may have accounted for the fact it was not significantly correlated with either non-disruptive protest tendencies or group-based anger. Study 2, on the other hand, produced results tentatively supportive of this hypothesis, given that the difference between the unique contributions of group identification in disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies was not statistically significant or as large as one would have hoped for. In Study 3, although group identification was not significantly correlated with either type of protest tendencies, the difference between the two correlations, albeit non-significant, was in line with expectations.

Because of these mixed findings with regard to the role of group identification, it is useful to consider further evidence stemming from Chapter 5. Indeed, information from the correlation matrices from both Studies 4 and 5 provide strong support for the identity-related pathway hypothesis and bolster findings from Studies 2 and 3. Specifically, Table 5.1 shows that, for both Whites and Latinos, ethnic identification was correlated more strongly with non-disruptive protest behaviour than with disruptive protest behaviour. Two-tailed *t*-tests showed that the differences were statistically significant, $t\,(153) = 2.60$, $p = .01$, for Whites, and $t\,(126) = 2.15$, $p = .03$, for Latinos. It is worth noting that, in line with findings from Study 3, Whites' ethnic identification was positively correlated with non-disruptive protest behaviour but negatively, though non-significantly, correlated with

disruptive protest behaviour. Finally, Table 5.2 provides further evidence in favour of the identity-related pathway hypothesis, given that identification with co-protesters was correlated significantly higher with non-disruptive protest tendencies than with disruptive protest tendencies, t (22) = 2.42, p = .02, two-tailed. On a less positive note, Table 5.3 from Study 6 shows that the correlation of identification with non-disruptive protest tendencies was lower than its correlation with disruptive protest tendencies, but the difference was not statistically significant, t (56) = -.98, p > .10, two-tailed. Regardless of whether the relevant tests across studies achieved statistical significance, it seems that, on the whole, results from the majority of the studies (Studies 2-5) were in line with the identity-related pathway hypothesis.

6.3.4 The social opinion and action support hypotheses

Perhaps due to the ceiling effect of social opinion support, Study 1 did not lend support to these hypotheses, in line with which social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest and vice versa for social action support. Furthermore, Study 2 produced findings that were only tentatively consistent with both hypotheses, given that the comparison tests did not reach acceptable levels of significance, possibly as a result of the low sample size.

6.3.5 The non-disruptive protest hypothesis

This hypothesis has two parts. According to the first part, the emotional pathway predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does the instrumental pathway, while in line with the second part, social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does social action support. Both Studies 1 and 2 lent strong support to the first part of this hypothesis: The unique contribution of group-based anger in the variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was significantly higher than the contribution of collective efficacy.

Although the second part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis was not supported by Study 1, perhaps due to the ceiling effect of social opinion support, it was only tentatively supported by Study 2: The unique contribution of social opinion support in the

variance of non-disruptive protest tendencies was higher, albeit non-significantly so, than the unique contribution of social action support

6.3.6 The disruptive protest hypothesis

This hypothesis has also two parts. In line with the first part, the instrumental pathway predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does the emotional pathway, while according to the second part, social action support predicts disruptive protest more strongly than does social opinion support. Both Studies 1 and 2 produced findings that were somewhat in line with both parts of this hypothesis, given the non-significance of the relevant statistical tests. Therefore, the unique contributions of collective efficacy and social action support in the variance of disruptive protest tendencies seemed to be somewhat higher than the unique contributions of group-based anger and social opinion support, respectively. In fact, in Study 1 the contributions of collective efficacy and social action support were more than double as much as the contributions of group-based anger and social opinion support, respectively.

6.3.7 The uncertainty hypothesis

Study 3 produced evidence in favour of this hypothesis, according to which personal uncertainty salience should have a negative effect on collective protest tendencies, especially disruptive ones. Indeed, participants assigned to the high (vs. low) uncertainty salience condition were significantly less likely to advocate disruptive protest against the Wall Street bailouts. Although the effect of uncertainty salience on non-disruptive protest tendencies was non-significant, the means were in the predicted directions. Furthermore, this finding is still consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, given that uncertainty salience was most strongly related to disruptive protest tendencies.

6.3.8 Overview of findings

Overall, Chapter 4 lent some support to the emotional and instrumental pathway hypotheses, as well as to the non-disruptive and disruptive protest hypotheses, and the uncertainty hypothesis. Support was rather equivocal for the social opinion and action support hypotheses, possibly due to the weakening influence of the ceiling effect of social

opinion support in Study 1a. With regard to the identity-related pathway hypothesis, although findings derived from Chapter 4 were mixed, additional findings from Chapter 5 lent further support in favour of this hypothesis.

6.4 Chapter 5

Following evidence tentatively in favour of the relative impact of group-based anger, collective efficacy, group identification, and social opinion and action support as a function of the social disruptiveness of the protest activities in question, Chapter 5 aimed at addressing the neglected role of ideology. Given that ideology is mainly about attitudes towards inequality and social change (Jost, 2006), it was considered particularly useful for the study of collective protest. It was further argued that Jost and Banaji's (1994) SJT seems highly relevant, because it helps explain where ideology comes from by positing a system justification motive that all people exhibit to a greater or lesser extent. According to SJT, this motive aims at justifying the system and endowing it with a sense of legitimacy, and perhaps even, stability. The system justification motive originates partially from the need to reduce uncertainty about the world and one's place within it (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b), which is one more reason why this motive was considered particularly helpful in explaining collective protest, given the central role that uncertainty assumes in this thesis.

Because this was the first time that the system justification motive was formally introduced into the field of collective protest, it was examined not only in relation to collective protest, but also in relation to its three most proximal antecedents, namely, group-based anger, collective efficacy, and group identification. To this end, the moderating role of ingroup status was also investigated. Following the behavioural asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and research supporting the (in)compatibility of group justification and system justification motives across low- and high-status groups in society (e.g., Jost et al., 2001, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), Chapter 5 postulated a set of hypotheses.

Specifically, it was hypothesised that among high status groups system justification should be positively correlated with both types of protest, group-based anger and group identification; by contrast, system justification was expected to be negatively correlated

with the same variables among low status groups. No relationship was expected between system justification and collective efficacy, while, in line with its uncertainty-reduction function, system justification was hypothesised to have a higher correlation with non-disruptive protest than with disruptive protest. By extension, system justification was expected to be particularly predictive of *non-disruptive* protest among high status groups and particularly discouraging of *disruptive* protest among low status groups. For a direct test of these hypotheses, results from three main studies were reported. Support for each one of the hypotheses is considered now separately. It should be noted that all hypotheses have two parts, a low status part and a high status part.

6.4.1 The system justification-protest hypothesis

Study 4 provided support for both parts of this hypothesis, according to which system justification is positively correlated with both types of protest among high status groups, whereas it is negatively correlated among low status groups. Indeed, Whites' endorsement of system justification was positively correlated with both socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest, whereas Latinos' endorsement of system justification was negatively correlated with these same variables. Experimental evidence from Studies 5 and 6 lent further support to the low status part of this hypothesis by allowing for causal inferences, such that low levels of system justification can lead to increased willingness to take part in both types of collective protest.

6.4.2 The system justification hypothesis

Study 4 lent strong support to this hypothesis, in line with which system justification has a lower (i.e., more negative) correlation with disruptive protest than with non-disruptive protest. Study 4 provided evidence in favour of the low- and high-status parts of this hypothesis too. Indeed, it was shown that among Whites system justification was significantly more predictive of non-disruptive protest than of disruptive protest; in fact, its correlation with disruptive protest was non-significant. In contrast, among Latinos system justification was significantly more discouraging of disruptive protest than of non-disruptive protest. Studies 5 and 6 produced findings further consistent with the low status part of the system justification hypothesis: Low levels of system justification were

shown to have an incremental effect on disruptive protest tendencies that was nearly three times stronger than the effect on non-disruptive protest tendencies.

6.4.3 The system justification-identification hypothesis

Study 4 yielded strong support for both parts of this hypothesis too, according to which system justification is positively correlated with group identification among high status groups and negatively correlated among low status groups. Indeed, Whites' endorsement of system justification was positively correlated with ethnic identification, whereas Latinos' endorsement of system justification was negatively correlated with ethnic identification. Experimental evidence from Studies 5 and 6 lent further support to the low status part of this hypothesis: Low levels of system justification led to increased identification with co-protesters in Study 5 (albeit not reliably so) and fellow NUT members in Study 6.

6.4.4 The system justification-anger hypothesis

Study 4 did not include measures of anger, so the high status part of the system justification-anger hypothesis could not be examined. Studies 5 and 6 lent though support to the low status part of the system justification-anger hypothesis by demonstrating that low levels of system justification led to increased levels of anger against the Greek and the British government, respectively.

6.4.5 The system justification-efficacy hypothesis

According to this hypothesis, there should be no relationship between system justification and collective efficacy. Indeed, neither Study 5 nor Study 6 yielded a statistically significant effect of experimental condition on collective efficacy.

6.4.6 Overview of findings

Overall, Chapter 5 produced evidence in favour of all of the hypotheses. As such, system justification among the high status group of Whites was positively correlated with ethnic identification and collective protest, especially non-disruptive protest. In contrast, system justification among the low status group of Latinos was negatively correlated with ethnic

identification and collective protest, especially disruptive protest. More importantly, Studies 5 and 6 provided additional support for the low-status related findings derived from Study 4 by allowing for causal inferences. As such, it was shown that, among groups that were low in economic status (protesters agitating for their state pensions and teachers fighting for better pay), low levels of system justification led to increased levels of a) willingness to take part in collective protest, especially disruptive protest, b) group identification, and c) group-based anger. Collective efficacy remained unaffected, in line with expectations.

6.5 Theoretical implications

One of the most important theoretical implications of the findings that this thesis has produced is related to the need of distinguishing between disruptive and non-disruptive types of protest. The reason is related to the assumption that, when compared to non-disruptive protest, participation in disruptive protest activities entails heightened uncertainty about the world and one's place within it, and this uncertainty is an aversive experience that may create feelings of unease or even fear (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Lopes, 1987; Sorrentino & Roney, 1986; Van den Bos, 2009; Van den Bos et al., 2006, 2007). In providing evidence suggesting that personal uncertainty salience may exert a causal negative effect on collective protest tendencies, especially disruptive protest tendencies, this thesis has shown that socially disruptive protest involves indeed a heightened sense of personal uncertainty. Thus, in distinguishing between socially disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest, this thesis contends that it is imperative that the literature of collective protest takes into serious consideration the core human motive of quest for personal certainty.

Related to this, a further theoretical implication of this thesis is associated with the role of social disruptiveness and the ensuing uncertainty in determining the relative impact of different motives on socially disruptive and non-disruptive protest. In producing evidence demonstrating that the predictive strengths of diverse protest motives may differ as a function of the social disruptiveness of the protest activities in question, this thesis has corroborated the following contention: Some protest motives seem to be more important for one type of protest than for the other, because they are more or less

suitable in dealing with the differing levels of personal uncertainty involved in the two types of protest.

Specifically, the current findings are consistent with Hogg & Mullin's (1999) uncertainty-reduction theory and Jost and Banaji's (1994) SJT, according to which group identification and system justification, respectively, are born out of a need to reduce uncertainty about the world and one's place within it. This explains why identification (particularly in Studies 4 and 5) and system justification (across Studies 4 through to 6) were found to be less predictive of participation in particularly uncertainty-enhancing protest behaviours (i.e., disruptive behaviours) than of participation in less uncertainty-enhancing protest behaviours (i.e., non-disruptive behaviours). In further accordance with literature conceptualising collective efficacy as a group-based appraisal that provides group members with staying power in the face of setbacks (e.g., Bandura, 1995, 1997, 2000), personal uncertainty being one such setback, it was tentatively demonstrated across Studies 1 and 2 that collective efficacy predicted socially disruptive protest somewhat more strongly than non-disruptive protest.

Further in line with literature that regards group-based anger as an adaptive emotion associated with a biological impulse to attack (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Mackie et al., 2000; Maitner et al., 2006) and that considers this impulse as subject to environmental or other constraints (Lazarus, 1991, 2001), personal uncertainty being one such constraint, it was tentatively shown that group-based anger was significantly more predictive of non-disruptive protest tendencies than of disruptive ones across Studies 1 and 2. Moreover, in accordance with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) dual-pathway model that envisages social opinion and action support as contributing to the experience of group-based anger and collective efficacy, respectively, social action support was shown to be somewhat more closely related to disruptive than to non-disruptive protest tendencies.

An additional implication of the present findings has to do with the role of group identification. The fact that it turned out to be a *negative* predictor of disruptive protest tendencies in Studies 3 and 4 is not in line with SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the widespread finding that group identification is always positively correlated with collective protest participation (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Mummendey, Klink, et al., 1999; Simon et al., 1998). In both Studies 3 and 4 disruptive

protest was operationalised in terms of illegal and violent protest activities (i.e., site occupation, civil disobedience, and physical confrontation with the police), which may suggest that, once disruptiveness and the ensuing uncertainty exceed a certain threshold, group identification may in fact become a negative predictor of collective protest participation due to its uncertainty-reduction function. Of course, this threshold is for future research to set.

Furthermore, the fact that this thesis has yielded some support for both parts of the disruptive hypothesis and strong support for the first part of the non-disruptive protest hypothesis is in line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) meta-analytic review. Considering the differential predictive strengths of the emotional and instrumental pathways in determining participation in disruptive and non-disruptive protest and the above meta-analysis according to which the contributions of the emotional and instrumental pathways to protest are equal, this piece of work hypothesised and found the following: Collective efficacy predicts disruptive protest somewhat more strongly than does group-based anger, whereas group-based anger predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than does collective efficacy. Also in line with Van Zomeren et al.'s (2004) model, according to which social opinion and action support causally precede group-based anger and collective efficacy, respectively, this body of evidence further found that social action support predicts disruptive protest somewhat more strongly than does social opinion support.

An additional implication of the findings produced in this thesis concerns the necessity of considering the role of ideology, when studying the phenomenon of collective protest, which is in line with previous research showing that system-justifying ideological beliefs are negatively correlated with protest tendencies and behaviour (Cameron & Nickerson, 2006; Hafer & Olson, 1993; Rubin & Peplau, 1973). One further theoretical implication of the present findings is related to the moderating role of ingroup status with respect to the study of ideology and collective protest against ingroup disadvantage. In demonstrating how two group justification variables (i.e., protest participation and group identification) may relate to system justification in opposite ways for Whites and Latinos, this thesis has provided evidence that concurs with the behavioural asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and with literature pointing

to the (in)compatibility of group justification and system justification motives among members of low- and high-status groups (e.g., Jost et al., 2001).

To conclude, this thesis has presented and discussed empirical work that is consistent with previous literature that proposes either explicitly (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; Opp, 1988) or implicitly (e.g., Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002; Corning & Myers, 2002; Finkel et al., 1989; Olson et al., 1995) that different protest activities may be driven by different motives. Nevertheless, results offered by this thesis are much more conclusive for three main reasons: a) The definition and operationalisation of social disruptiveness is much clearer and does not carry the weaknesses related to the concept of normativity (e.g., Wright et al., 1990), b) six different motives are measured (i.e., group-based anger, collective efficacy, group identification, social opinion and action support, and system justification) and their distinctive contributions in predicting willingness to protest are tested, and c) the core human motive of quest for personal certainty is conceptualised as a parsimonious explanation of the relative impact of the above motives.

6.6 Practical implications and implications for research

An important implication for research is related to the usefulness of measuring specific behavioural tendencies rather than using generalised items, such as "I would participate in raising our collective voice" or "I would participate in some form of collective protest" (see Van Zomeren et al., 2004). When answering such questions, respondents are not as likely to ponder on instrumental aspects of protest participation as they would if they were asked to respond to items tapping into specific behavioural tendencies. However, this seems to lead to the inflation of the role of the emotional pathway, which perhaps explains why Van Zomeren et al. (2004) consistently found that the emotional pathway was more predictive of collective protest tendencies than was the instrumental pathway.

It is crucial to note that the findings produced in this thesis speak directly to the political arena and inform practices of both those who aim at maintaining social order (e.g., decision makers) and those who may wish to 'disturb' it (e.g., trade unions and non-governmental organisations). In doing so, the present findings lend support to a more nuanced understanding of the motives that are especially important for participation in disruptive and non-disruptive forms of protest. Specifically, the key practical implication

of the current findings is that group-based anger may drive participation in non-disruptive protest activities. In contrast, social action support may drive participation in disruptive protest activities. Therefore, if participation in non-disruptive protest is of interest, it is likely to be boosted by raising people's anger (e.g., by providing high social opinion support information or by forming arguments that challenge the status quo and expose its illegitimacy). If, on the other hand, participation in socially disruptive protest is of interest, then participation is likely to be boosted by providing high social action support information.

A further practical implication concerns the reason why it is only rarely that those who suffer most in this world decide to revolt or rebel (e.g., Zinn, 1968). Considering that system-justifying ideologies are consensually held among the disadvantaged (e.g., Jackman, 1994; Ridgeway, 2001) and that these ideologies are particularly discouraging of disruptive protest participation, as Studies 4 through 6 show, one may no longer find surprising that the disadvantaged only rarely take part in disruptive protest activities. Similarly, societal conditions, such as financial crises and unemployment, that arguably promote what is one of the origins of the system justification motive, namely personal uncertainty, may dampen tendencies to participate in protest, especially disruptive protest, as Study 3 suggested. Nevertheless, it is typically after revolutions undertaken by the disadvantaged that the latter's situation in life radically improves (e.g., French and Russian Revolutions). Perhaps this means that, as long as the disadvantaged succumb to the uncertainties of their times by endorsing system-justifying ideologies, it seems unlikely that their lower status in life will improve considerably.

6.7 Limitations and directions for future research

An important limitation of this thesis is related to the fact that it has not yielded unequivocal support for the social opinion and action support hypotheses, according to which social opinion support predicts non-disruptive protest more strongly than disruptive protest and vice versa for social action support. As already mentioned, the ceiling effect of social opinion support in Study 1a may have had a weakening influence on the relationship between social opinion support and non-disruptive protest, which, in turn, may have inflated the proportion of variance predicted by social action support.

Although Study 2 provided some support for these hypotheses, the comparison tests did not reach acceptable levels of statistical significance, perhaps due to low sample size. Therefore, one direction for future research is to examine further the impact of social support on disruptive and non-disruptive protest through the use of larger samples and multiple-item measures.

A further limitation of this thesis concerns the uncertainty hypothesis tested in Study 3, according to which personal uncertainty salience should have a negative effect on collective protest, especially disruptive protest. As already noted, the single-item variable of disruptive protest tendencies had a floor effect, which may have influenced the impact of uncertainty-salience condition in a biasing manner. As already argued, however, group identification correlated with both disruptive and non-disruptive protest tendencies in line with expectations and results from Studies 2, 4, and 5. Therefore, the most parsimonious explanation for the effect of uncertainty-salience condition on disruptive protest tendencies is to attribute it to the manipulation rather than to the biasing influence of the floor effect. Nevertheless, a replication of this finding through the use of multiple-item measures would further bolster the uncertainty hypothesis, so future research could tend to this matter.

Future research could also examine processes that may mediate the effect of uncertainty salience on protest. In line with research that shows that personal uncertainty has incremental effects on group identification and system justification (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Hogg et al., 2007; Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b), one may argue that these two variables become likely candidates for mediators between uncertainty and protest. It might also be the case that personal uncertainty exerts a discouraging effect on protest by lowering perceptions of collective efficacy, an idea that also deserves further exploration.

One final limitation of this thesis is associated with the fact that the last two experimental studies only focused on members of groups that were low in economic status. Therefore, future research would benefit from manipulating system justification among members of high status groups as well, in order to investigate whether endorsement of system justification can indeed have causal incremental effects on group identification, group-based anger, and collective protest, especially non-disruptive protest. Though counterintuitive, it is worth considering the idea that also high status

groups may resort to collective protest, when their privileges are being put at risk, and that they will tend to protest in non-disruptive ways. Real-world evidence suggests that this may be the case. As already noted in sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.6, the recent decision of the U.S. government to cut the size of banks and crimp future profits is putting bankers' financial privileges at risk. More importantly, rather than taking to the streets or participating in other kinds of disruptive protest activities, bankers have so far protested through the use of traditional and non-disruptive political channels, such as lobbying, which is in perfect line with the hypotheses postulated in this thesis ("President prepares to cut Wall Street down to size", 2010).

6.8 Conclusion

To conclude, this thesis highlights that future research would benefit from a more fine-grained analysis of protest behaviour that takes into account the social disruptiveness of the behaviours under investigation and the ensuing personal uncertainty. This approach has both theoretical and applied value: It unveils which motives are particularly important for which type of protest and allows decision-makers, as well as trade unions and non-governmental organisations, to use this knowledge in their advantage.

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