Why Say Sorry? Intergroup Apologies and the Perpetrator Perspective

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Kent at Canterbury

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September 2012

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Declaration of Authorship

The research reported in this thesis is my own, except where indicated, and has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other institution.

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ABSTRACT

This research focuses on the impact of apologies and reparations on members of the perpetrator group. Seven experiments across different contexts examined three possible outcomes for the perpetrator group: satisfaction with the act, negative feelings towards the victims, and support for future assistance. This dissertation argues that perpetrator group members are satisfied with an apologetic act for two reasons: the apology improves the image of their group; and it implies an obligation for victims to "get over" the issue (obligation shifting). Realistic power gains or losses for either group were unimportant to perpetrators but in the final experiment victim empowerment emerged as relating to perpetrator satisfaction in addition to obligation shifting and image improvement. *Obligation shifting* alone related to more negative feelings about the victims and predicted reduced support for further acts of assistance. *Image improvement* perceptions did not show these effects, and sometimes was related to less negative feelings about the victims. These relationships were causal (Experiment 5) and distinct from any desire to actually satisfy victims (Experiment 6). The first four experiments also tested differences between types of acts on the three outcome variables. When differences were found, obligation shifting and image perceptions mediated these relationships. Even more, if victims feel that obligation shifting is expected by perpetrators after an apology, they are less willing to forgive (Experiment 7). This research provides the first empirical investigation into the outcomes of apologies for perpetrator group members and the results underline the importance of image improvement and obligation shifting as factors in internal support for intergroup apologetic acts.

Keywords: Apologies, reconciliation, image improvement, obligation shifting, reparations, perpetrators, satisfaction, intergroup conflict

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without support and guidance of my primary supervisor, Roger Giner-Sorolla. He has always encouraged me to trust my instincts and allowed me to forge my own path as a researcher. Without his patient teaching, not to mention his wealth of knowledge, I would never have become the researcher I am today.

I am also grateful to my second supervisor, Robbie Sutton, for his advice which has helped guide me both personally and professionally. Thank you to my officemate and dearest friend, Bonny Hartley. It has been a long journey and it has been nice having someone to share it with. I also thank the many other friends, colleagues, and staff at the University of Kent who have supported me along the way.

I want to thank my entire family who is spread across the world. They have all supported me in different ways and I am forever grateful to each of them. Thank you to my parents for always encouraging me to be inquisitive and reminding me that "there is no such thing as an Erica stopper." Above all, I want to thank my husband, whose strength kept me going to the end. I could not have done this without him.

CHAPTER 1

History is filled with examples of injustices committed against nations and disadvantaged groups, from the treatment of indigenous populations in the Americas and Australia, to apartheid in South Africa, to the forced migration of British children to Australia and Canada. Present day governments and other historically responsible groups can choose to react to their role in historical transgressions in a number of ways. Groups can respond to accusations of past wrongs by denying their role; for example, Turkey has maintained an official stance denying any part in the genocide of Armenians at the start of the 20th century, despite international condemnation ("Turkey PM says," 2012). Sometimes nations and groups try to justify the past by arguing that their actions were necessary because the enemy was dangerous or there were no other options (Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2003). For example, the US government has always maintained that, despite the mass death and destruction caused by dropping atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the means were justified because they brought an end to the war in the Pacific (Landsman, 2003). Finally, an increasingly expected response is for groups to respond by acknowledging the past with an official apology (Brooks, 1999; Olliner, 2008; Rouhana, 2004).

With an increase in apologies over the last 50 years, scholars have begun to question what role apologies play in the peacemaking process (Brooks, 1999; Marrus, 2007). The continued use by nations and other perpetrator groups to respond to both recent and historical wrongs has highlighted the importance of research in this area. This thesis focuses on the use of official apologies by perpetrator groups as a response to past harm.

"The Age of Apology"

In the past, transgressions committed against others were rarely addressed with formal apologies and little thought was given to the idea that groups should openly acknowledge past mistakes (Howard-Hassmanan & Gibney, 2007). However, the horrors of World War II brought to the forefront the wrongs that were being committed by a powerful group on less powerful minorities. Many scholars, nations, and great leaders condemned the actions of the Nazis in Germany and were forced to confront their own actions or inaction which led to six million Jews being murdered. This led to a greater reassessment by religious entities and other nation states of their own historic treatment of indigenous and minority groups; people around the world began to develop a sense that nations must become accountable for their actions (Andrieu, 2009; Howard-Hassmanan & Gibney, 2007).

World War II itself led to numerous political apologies including in 1990, when East Germany's parliament offered a long awaited apology to Jews in Israel (Jones & Marshall, 1990). Japan has offered apologies for the poor treatment of American and Canadian POWs ("Japanese Government Apologizes," 2011; Udenas, 2009) and for atrocities committed in the Philippines during the war ("Japan Envoy Apologizes," 2009). Recently, in May of 2012, Germany's modern medical association apologised for the role of German doctors in the medical experiments carried out under Nazi-rule on concentration camp victims ("German Medical Association Apologizes," 2012).

Even now, there are continued demands from victim groups for apologies from these nations for wrongs committed against them during World War II. Germans have yet to receive an apology for the bombing of Dresden (Jenkins, 1995). Japan has had difficulty repairing relations

with China and South Korea due to their refusal to apologise for war crimes committed (Johnson, 2011; Nobles, 2008).

Since World War II, it seems that acknowledgement of past wrongs has become an expected part of the reconciliation process (Andrieu, 2009). The use of apologies by governments and nations as one way to atone for past wrongs has become commonplace, with hundreds of apologies being given (Olliner, 2008). The dramatic increase in the number of formal apologies being given on a national level has even led Brooks (1999) to call this the "age of apology".

In the past 20 years, numerous apologies from nation states and governments have been given for a wide range of past crimes and injustices, spanning well beyond the actions of World War II. A few notable examples include:

1. The Queen of England apologised in 1995 to the Maori natives of New Zealand for British occupation of their land ("Queen to Say Sorry," 1995). This marked the first time any English Queen or King had made a formal apology for anything.
2. In 1998, the former US President Bill Clinton informally apologised for America's role in the slave trade while visiting Africa (Bennet, 1998a). In the same trip he issued an apology in Rwanda for the failure of the US government to intervene in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Bennet, 1998b).
3. In 2008, the United States Congress issued an official apology to African Americans for slavery in the US ("Congress Apologizes," 2008).
4. In 1997, Tony Blair apologised for British inaction during the Irish Potato Famine 150 years earlier (Marks, 1997).

5. In 2010, Gordon Brown apologised for Britain's 19th century programme which forced poor British children to be shipped to colonies for labour ("Britain PM Apologizes to 'Home Children'," 2010).
6. Both the Australian and Canadian governments have apologised for their treatment of indigenous children ("Australia Apology to Aborigines," 2008).
7. In 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron offered an apology for the killing of Northern Irish civilians in the Bloody Sunday incident of 1972 (Stratton, 2010).
8. During his reign, Pope John Paul II gave numerous apologies on behalf of the Catholic Church. One in particular exemplified the dawn of the "age of apology"; given in March of 2002, the apology was intended to cover all persecution and violence committed by the church over the last 2000 years (Carroll, 2000).
9. In 2010, Pope Benedict XVI issued an apology for the ongoing worldwide scandal of sexual abuse by priests ("Abuse Victim Responds," 2010).

Despite the increase in official apologies, there has been very little empirical research on intergroup apologies and how they impact the process of reconciliation between groups. Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, and Hagengimana (2005) argue that reconciliation after a conflict requires a change in psychological orientation towards the other group. Thus, reconciliation differs from conflict resolution because changes must be made at the psychological and not just material, political, or geographical levels after a conflict. Dwelling on past wrongs can act as a psychological barrier to reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Scheff, 1994) and it can be difficult to develop positive relations between groups when historical wrongs still fail to be addressed (Brooks, 1999; Tavuchis, 1993; Tutu, 1999). For many conflicts on the road to reconciliation, the recognition of past wrongdoings can be just as important a step as making

agreements for the future. As examples, the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the Middle East are very much rooted in memories of past wrongdoings by both sides (Lundy & McGovern, 2010; Crighton & Iver, 1991; Zembylas & Bekerman, 2008). Apologising can be a part of the reconciliation process, but the way victims and perpetrator group members receive that apology could greatly impact the way the rest of the process goes (Tutu, 1999).

The Present Research

This dissertation investigates apologies, a relatively underrepresented aspect of intergroup reconciliation research. It provides a contribution to the existing literature by exploring a side of intergroup apologies not often examined: the perpetrator perspective. Across seven experiments, the present research examines six different historical contexts for apologising and explores perpetrator group members' attitudes after an apologetic act is given. I look at the role of image improvement and power changes after an apology, and how these appraisal influence perpetrator group members satisfaction with an apologetic act. Most crucially, my work develops a novel concept, yet to be explored in social psychology: *obligation shifting*, that is, the sense that the perpetrator group has shifted the obligation of responsibility to repair relations onto the victim group. I provide evidence that obligation shifting is satisfying for perpetrator group members and that it has a unique role in apology appraisals in that it can lead to negative feelings towards and ultimately reduced willingness to support the victim group.

Furthermore, this dissertation demonstrates that appraisals of obligation shifting and image improvement can explain why certain conciliatory acts are preferred over others. In particular, I look at whether or not verbal apologies differ from financial reparations. The results of my studies suggest that differences between types of conciliatory acts on perpetrator's willingness to

support the victim group and feelings towards them can be explained by the presence of increased obligation shifting. Finally, my research begins to explore the effect of obligation shifting on victims' acceptance of apologies. The results suggest that when obligation shifting is perceived to be an expectation of perpetrators after an apology, victims report reduced willingness to forgive.

CHAPTER 2

After a transgression, there is a sense of injustice for victims (c.f. Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007). According to *Social Exchange Theory*, a transgression by one group can create a debt that needs to be paid by that group in order to restore balance (Blau, 1964; Worthington, 2003). Other scholars have argued that a transgression creates a metaphorical lowering of status for victims (Murphy & Hampton, 1998). Apologies are generally considered important because they are assumed to restore this imbalance (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Thompson, 2008) and affirm the perpetrators' commitment to justice (Lazare, 2004). Goffman (1971) argues that apologising allows a person to turn something offensive into something acceptable. In essence, an apology is seen as a way to undo damage and start again (Frantz & Benningson, 2005). Apologies are also important because they create a common political narrative in which the perpetrators take responsibility for the harm done and accept an agreement with victims about the historical narrative, which ensures that victims will not be forgotten (Marrus, 2007; Tavuchis, 1991).

Given that apologies are generally considered important and are increasingly being used, it is important to understand what effect apologetic acts really have on intergroup relations. When do they improve relations and when could they actually be making things worse? In this chapter I will present a review of the literature on apologies, which has mainly focused on interpersonal apologies and the concept of forgiveness, and discuss the problems with drawing conclusions from research on interpersonal apologies.

Interpersonal Apologies

Most research on apologies has been done on interpersonal apologies; apologies between one perpetrator and his/her victim(s). Forgiveness has often been the focus of apologies and there have been numerous studies showing that, in the interpersonal context, apologies lead to forgiveness (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Girard, Mullet, & Callahan, 2002; McCullough et al., 1998; Tavuchis, 1991). Other studies have shown that in addition to increasing forgiveness, an apology can help to reduce victim aggression (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989) and create greater empathy towards the apologiser (McCullough et al., 1998). There has been some research which has suggested that for victims, forgiveness is difficult if they feel the transgression was intentional (Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008) but regardless of forgiveness, perpetrators are still evaluated more positively by victims after they apologise (Darby & Schlenker, 1989).

In the domain of interpersonal apologies, there is also a fair amount of evidence that the type of apology provided can greatly influence its reception. For example, some research has shown that the expression of remorse and responsibility taking can greatly influence the efficacy of apologies (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Scher & Darley, 1997). Scher and Darley (1997) also found that including an offer to repair the damage improves victims' reception of an apology, independently from perceptions that the apology has expressed remorse or taken responsibility.

Rubin, Pruit and Kim (1994) argue that the level of sincerity expressed in the apology is influential in the reception of an apology by the victim. The time at which an apology is offered can greatly influence the perception that it was sincere (Mitchell, 1989; Rubin et al., 1994). Frantz and Benningson (2004) found that an apology given later was more effective at satisfying

a victim than an apology given soon after the offense. The authors argue that time allows a victim to feel more understood.

Intergroup vs. Interpersonal Apologies

It can be difficult to draw conclusions about intergroup apologies from past research on interpersonal apologies because there are just too many differences between the two contexts. One way that intergroup apologies differ from interpersonal apologies is that intergroup apologies are usually given long after a transgression occurs. In fact, it is not even necessary that those who were involved be present or even alive. Many government issued apologies have been issued for behaviour that occurred decades if not centuries before and, as a result, rarely are they given by those directly responsible for the transgression. In an interpersonal apology an individual apologises for his/her actions to the victim(s) of the transgression. In an intergroup context, the apology is given by someone who may represent the group but may not have directly engaged in the immoral behaviour. In other words, the person apologising may not themselves have engaged in the act being apologised for.

In 2008, when the US Representative Steve Cohen apologised on behalf of congress for slavery in America, this was nearly 150 years after the abolition of slavery in the country ("Congress Apologizes," 2008). The apology was not just to those who were slaves or even just those whose relatives were once slaves; it was given to all African Americans who felt they identified with the once enslaved social group. Even more, there is no knowledge that Steve Cohen himself or even if his family line ever owned slaves. Yet he gave the apology on behalf of the American government (and on behalf of all white Americans) for once institutionalizing slavery. In this way, an apology can be given for an incident which occurred hundreds of years

earlier, by people who never actually committed the transgression, to people who were not the victims. Of course, this is not to discount the suffering of present day victim group members, who often suffer from the long-term effects of historical transgressions (social injustice, discrimination, economic hardships, etc.), despite not having been the original victims of the act.

Generally, the individual transgressor provides an interpersonal apology, because he or she was directly responsible for the transgression. In the interpersonal literature there is evidence that perpetrators feel much better after apologising and show increased feelings of regret if they did not apologise for a past transgression (Exline et al., 2007). In an intergroup situation, a representative of the group might be motivated to apologise, or at the very least, justify the action in some way; however, other group members may not have wanted to apologise in the first place and might not feel better after giving an apology.

An apology given long after a transgression might be perceived as being less meaningful and be seen as manipulative (c.f. Blatz & Philpot, 2010). On the other hand, apologies immediately after an event could be interpreted as insincere as well (Blatz & Philpot, 2010; Blatz et al., 2009). Apologies can only be given when the situation is "ripe" for such an act to be made (Conner & Jordan, 2009). Blatz and Philpot (2010) suggest that apology timing may be curvilinear in the intergroup context because an apology given either too soon or far too late could do more harm than good. Furthermore, for the two sides of a conflict, apologies may be seen as ripe at different times, depending on their goals; although, this has yet to be empirically studied. Even more, for victims, it may be difficult to believe the apologiser is taking responsibility and is truly remorseful for the action because they were not the original transgressors. This difference might explain why when individuals apologise for their own

behaviour during an intergroup conflict, victim groups are willing to forgive the individual, but are still unable to forgive the entire group (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008).

It is difficult to take interpersonal research on apologies and say with any accuracy that the effects will be replicated in intergroup research. Intergroup apologies could have very different effects on reconciliation. Given the highly differing nature of intergroup apologies, there is strong reason to believe that this field should be treated as a distinct area of research from interpersonal apologies.

A Review of Intergroup Apologies

Unlike interpersonal apologies, there is very little research on the effectiveness of intergroup apologies. Even more, studies that do exist seem to offer conflicting conclusions. Most research done specifically on intergroup apologies has examined the content of the apologies (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009) and the effect of the apology on the victim group. Apologies are considered to be most complete when the content of the verbal apology includes all the elements needed for a successful apology: remorse, acceptance of responsibility, admission of injustice, acknowledgement of victim suffering, promises to change behaviour, and offers of repair (Blatz et al., 2009; Gill, 2000; Marrus, 2007). However, what makes an apology "successful" is often poorly defined.

As discussed earlier, most scholars in the interpersonal realm have looked at forgiveness as a measure of success in apologies. Forgiveness is usually considered important for reconciliation (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008) and has been shown to increase a sense of justice for victims (Wenzel & Okimoto, 2009), so this is often the starting point for research in this area. It is often assumed that intergroup contexts are similar to the interpersonal context.

As it has generally been shown that apologetic acts promote forgiveness in an interpersonal context, it seems reasonable to assume that they should lead to forgiveness in an intergroup context; however, the evidence that this is the case is somewhat unclear.

There is some evidence that after an intergroup apology victims do feel more positive about the perpetrators (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Other research has suggested that apologies can influence victims' willingness to reconcile with the other group when there is a high level of trust already present toward the transgressing group (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). However, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) found that intergroup apologies did not necessarily predict forgiveness for victim groups. Their research examined intergroup apologies in the context of five historical transgressions against Australians, manipulating if participants were informed about an apology for each instance or not. In no cases did apologies for historical injustices predict forgiveness. In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to help develop unity and foster reconciliation (Tutu, 1999). In his critical review of the outcome of the commission, Chapman (2007) argues that, if reconciliation is defined as forgiveness, the commission failed. Despite apologies being made by transgressors, Chapman claims that forgiveness was rarely mentioned as an outcome of the process for victims. These are particularly disturbing findings given that forgiveness is considered such an important predictor of reconciliation after conflict (Noor et al., 2008; Staub et al., 2005).

However, other research looking at an incident of Canadian soldiers' deaths during a friendly fire incident by US troops, found that Canadians were more likely to forgive following an apology compared to when no apology was given (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008). In research examining the reaction of university students to an apology from professors for writing an

insulting letter about the students, Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2010) also found that an apology increased forgiveness compared to not apologising.

These seemingly conflicting outcomes of intergroup apologies may be due to differences in the type of transgressions being studied. Philpot and Hornsey's (2008) studies all included cases of historical intentional harm. The apologies issued were given long after the events occurred. On the other hand, Brown and colleagues' (2008) study examined an issue in which the transgression (US troops' accidental firing on Canadian troops) was clearly unintentional and took place in the relatively recent past. The apology used in Leonard and colleagues' (2010) research on university students receiving an apology from professors was also given just after the transgression. That context also differs from the other two lines of work in severity of harm caused by the original transgression, which may greatly impact victim forgiveness levels. It is clear that the context of the apologies studied so far have differed greatly and that in all likelihood there are any number of potential moderators which could impact apology effectiveness in eliciting forgiveness from victims.

The response of the victim group to the original transgression may play a role in how victims respond to subsequent apologies given by the perpetrator group. In the experiments on university students responding to an insulting letter from professors, the researchers only found the relationship between apologising and forgiveness when ingroup members had responded strongly against the insulting letter. In a condition where participants were told that fellow group members had largely ignored the letter, apologising did not increase forgiveness (Leonard et al., 2010).

Interestingly, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) found that the same apologies that did not induce forgiveness on an intergroup level, when given on an interpersonal level (from a specific transgressor for his own actions), did increase forgiveness for victims. Wohl and colleagues (2012) also found that an apology delivered by an ingroup proxy improved victims' willingness to forgive. Therefore, another possible moderator of victim forgiveness after an apology may be who issues the apology itself.

There is also evidence that the wording of the apology can influence forgiveness. For example, an apology which contains primary emotions seems to induce more intergroup forgiveness than an apology using secondary emotions (Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennet, 2012). Other research has suggested that apologies can be more successful when they express that the perpetrator is suffering and has taken responsibility (Giner-Sorolla, Vasiljevic, Zaiser, & Zebel, unpublished manuscript 2012; Scher & Darley, 1997).

In studies looking at the long-term effects of an apology, there appears to be a link between victims' remembering apologies and forgiveness of perpetrators; the more a victim believes an apology has been made in the past, the more forgiving they feel towards the perpetrators (Philpot & Hornsey, 2010). However, members who highly identify with the victim group tend to more easily "forget" past apologies (Philpot & Hornsey, 2010). The fact that victims do not remember apologies being given can also make forgiveness less likely. These mixed findings on intergroup apologies suggest that on an intergroup level, forgiveness outcomes may be more complex and unpredictable than when given on an interpersonal level.

Although there has been some research on intergroup apologies, it has mostly focused on the members of the victim group receiving the apology (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Brown

et al., 2008; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008; Philpot & Hornsey, 2010; 2008) because intergroup apologies are usually given when victims demand them (Harris, Granger, & Mullany, 2006). As discussed, there are mixed findings on the efficacy of apologies for victim groups and it is undeniable that much valuable research still needs to be done looking at victims and apologies.

Nonetheless, conflict reconciliation is a two party process. Victims and perpetrators both must be satisfied in order for reconciliation to occur (Shnabel et al., 2009; Staub et al, 2005). When an intergroup apology is given, it is often given on behalf of a group by a leader of that group. Those who form the apologiser's social group are, in a sense, forced to be associated with giving the apology because of their identity with the group (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Because perpetrator group members may not have had a say in the decision to issue the apology, just as with victims, they also evaluate the apology either positively or negatively. Thus, the apologiser must be careful to include elements which appease both sides to avoid a potential ingroup backlash (Brooks, 1999). If an apology is demanded by members of the perpetrator group as well as the victim group, the apology might also be used by a leader of a group to restore trust within the ingroup. Thus, a perpetrator group leader might use an apology as a political tool for internal support just as much as a tool for reconciliation with the victim group.

However, given that there is evidence that perpetrator group members may support apologies more after they are given than before (see Blatz & Philpot, 2010), it is important to understand how an apology changes perpetrator group members' attitudes, even if they never supported giving it in the first place. Having a member of the ingroup give an apology could greatly impact how other ingroup members feel about the victim group afterwards, as well as how much they support further action to mend relations between the groups. Moreover, to date,

psychology research has largely ignored the potential impact of an apology on those who are part of the group apologising.

Perpetrator Perspectives

Despite the widely held belief that such acts help intergroup relations (Andrieu, 2009; Marrus, 2007; Oliner, 2008), representatives of a perpetrator group may apologise or offer reparations with other intentions than just improving relations (Marrus, 2007; see Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011). For those representative members of the group who apologise, it may be just as important to seek victim approval as it is to gain internal approval. In research examining the components of apologies, it has been seen that one of the major linguistic differences between intergroup and interpersonal apologies is that intergroup apologies often contain references to the positive attributes of both groups (Blatz et al., 2009) in order to reaffirm the social identities of both groups' members (c.f. Blatz & Philpot, 2010). There is also reason to believe that transgressors have differing needs from victims after conflict (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009) and that the response of a target group to an offered conciliatory act can evoke various reactions (Harth, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2011).

Research on the perpetrator group has mainly tested the role of group-based self-conscious emotions, showing that shame and collective guilt can increase support for apology or reparations (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi & Čehajić, 2008; McGarty, Pedersen, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005). Intergroup contact has also been shown to increase perpetrators willingness to acknowledge the past (Čehajić & Brown, 2010). However, whether perpetrator group members want to acknowledge the past and support giving an apology beforehand is often irrelevant. As discussed earlier, one of the

differences between interpersonal apologies and intergroup apologies is that people who are part of the perpetrator group (like a nation, organization, or religion) may not have been consulted before the apology is issued. They may in fact be very against apologising beforehand and yet are still somehow complicit in the apology after it is given. However, there has yet to be any research exploring the ways in which perpetrator group members evaluate an apology after it is given or what effect an apology can have on future intentions for perpetrator group members. This research attempts to bridge the gap in apology research by focusing primarily on the perpetrator group and develop an understanding of the ways in which perpetrator groups evaluate apologetic acts given on their behalf.

What Do Perpetrator Group Members Want?

After a transgression, it is not just instrumental needs that need to be fulfilled for reconciliation but there is also research suggesting that parties must have their emotional needs fulfilled (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Theories on conflict resolution at both an interpersonal and intergroup level have stressed that both sides of a conflict must have their needs met (Dovidio, Saguy, & Shnabel, 2009) in order for there to be reconciliation. According to researchers who examine negotiations, if emotional needs are not met, negotiations can often deadlock (Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, & Syna, 1992). This process of satisfying emotional needs has been called the *socio-emotional route to reconciliation* (Nadler, 2002). But there is reason to believe that victims and perpetrators may not have the same emotional needs (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009).

Past research suggests that victims, after a transgression, tend to feel powerless and therefore desire to regain status (Scheff, 1994). According to the *needs-based model* (Nadler &

Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), victims are primarily looking for ways to regain power. In studies looking at statements made by leaders of the powerful transgressor group, Shnabel and colleagues (2009) found that members of a victim group preferred statements that awarded them with power to statements which focused on making the victims look better; for perpetrators, the opposite effect was found. However, it is important to note that these studies were looking at statements made by leaders of the opposing group to their own group members and thus, differed significantly from providing an apology directly to the victims. This research will expand on previous research by applying the needs based model specifically in the cases of apologetic acts from a perpetrator group representative to the victim group. It will also look at other potential predictors of satisfaction with an apology for perpetrator group members.

Image improvement. There are several reasons a transgressing group might want to provide an apology. According to the needs-based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), transgressors do not seek power, because they are usually the more powerful group, but instead their need is mainly concerned with regaining a positive image (Shnabel et al., 2009). When members of the ingroup have transgressed against another, the public image of the entire group can be threatened, leading other groups who value morality to have a poor image of the transgressing group (Van Leeuwen, Bosch, Castano, & Hopman, 2010; Tavuchis, 1991). This parallels interpersonal research that has shown that the need to look better to others can motivate conciliatory acts among perpetrators (Risen & Gilovich, 2007; Nelissen, 2011).

It seems likely that members of the transgressing group may be motivated to support reconciliation more when they have the opportunity to improve their image and regain acceptance in the "moral community" (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Risen & Gilovitch, 2007; Shnabel et al., 2009). Some scholars have suggested that an apology may be one way that

transgressors can restore their damaged moral image (Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008; Staub et al., 2005; Van Leeuwen et al., 2010). Indeed, apologies and reparations are often interpreted as restoring the public moral image of groups (Benoit, 1995), although it has yet to be empirically tested. The only study to empirically test the importance of image improvement for perpetrator groups was the work by Shnabel and colleagues (2009), which found that perpetrator group members preferred to read statements which emphasised their positive image over empowerment statements. However, as mentioned earlier, this work never really addresses appraisals of an apology made by a perpetrator group to a victim group. Instead, the statements being appraised by participants in their studies were made by leaders of a victim group to other members of the victim group. Despite this, their studies suggest the need for image improvement (at least when compared to power) may be important for perpetrator groups.

A few studies looking at perpetrator groups' support for intergroup apologies has found that this is influenced by emotions about the transgression (Allpress, Barlow, Brown & Louis, 2010; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzl, Čehajić, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998). Allpress et al. (2010) found that image shame predicts support for apologies. Still, while those studies measured image shame and support for future apologies and reparations, none have directly assessed whether an apologetic act improves ingroup image or if image improvement lead to satisfaction with an apology after it was given. Based on this research, it seems reasonable to theorise that the extent to which members of the perpetrator group feel their image has improved after an apology, may (at least in part) predict their satisfaction with the apology. However, image concerns *per se* have not yet been empirically shown to predict perpetrator group satisfaction specifically after conciliatory acts in an intergroup context.

Image improvement is arguably a selfish rather than altruistic motive. That is, given the importance of being seen as a moral group, making an apologetic act can be seen as a good investment in the area of public relations. Nevertheless, this motive is compatible with a cooperative orientation toward the other group, or a desire to regard them well, because expressing these desires would also create continued benefits to the ingroup's image.

Obligation shifting. Besides the desire to improve the ingroup image, another (perhaps more cynical) calculation may influence perpetrator group members' attitudes towards apologetic action. After a conciliatory act, the usual social script implies a required acceptance of the act and forgiveness by the victims, regardless of the statement's substantive points (see Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Risen & Gilovitch, 2007). Victims themselves often are motivated to forgive after an apologetic act because they too want to be seen positively (Risen & Gilovich, 2007). By apologising, the transgressing group may feel they have shifted *obligation* to the victim group. In effect, the gesture "puts the ball in the other court." Thus, the implication of an apologetic act is that "we have done our part, and now it is your turn to forgive us." In this sense, an apology may carry an implied obligation for the victim group to accept the act, forgive, and end their moral claim upon the perpetrator group. So, paradoxically, offering an apology can be approved of as a long-term pragmatic move for the perpetrator group, motivated by the desire to be distanced from the victim group (see Abeler, Calaki, Andree, & Basek, 2010).

There is no research yet in the intergroup apology domain that has looked at obligation shifting as a predictor of satisfaction after apologies for perpetrators. The only research which captures the concept somewhat is the work by Greenaway, Louis, and Wohl (2011). They argue that the extent to which perpetrators expect forgiveness could be important for intergroup relations. In their studies, they find that people expect forgiveness more from victims the more

they considered the victims fellow human beings. Even more, their research found that people expect forgiveness more after a transgression that occurred far in the past compared to a more recent event. Thus, expecting forgiveness seems to be related to the context of the transgression as well as perceptions of victim group's humanity. As yet, no one has established if perpetrators expect forgiveness more after an apology or if their expectation reduces willingness to give in the future.

The present research will argue that obligation shifting could have important long term effects on the reconciliation process for both those giving the apology and those receiving it. If obligation shifting is a motive for perpetrator group members in apologising then the extent to which perpetrators believe that obligation has shifted to the victim group, could be a predictor of satisfaction with an apologetic action, acting independently from the desire to improve the moral image of the ingroup. Thus, such a selfish desire to impose obligation upon the victim group might predict perpetrator group members' satisfaction with an apologetic action, independently from other concerns.

This type of motive will be especially connected with a negative view of the out-group and with a desire to "close the door," viewing the issue as closed and thus denying further help or cooperation to the victim group (Nobles, 2008). Wanting to shift the obligation onto the victims betrays a desire to impose conciliatory behaviour on them, silencing their moral demands. This desire should then relate to and perhaps even encourage negative feelings toward them and their claims. Indeed, there is a relationship between expectations of forgiveness and reduced empathy for a victim group, before conciliatory acts are made (Greenaway et al., 2011).

Likewise, seeing the group's own conciliatory act as imposing an obligation on the victim group should work against support for further aid or cooperation. Someone who views apologies and reparations this way will feel justified in withholding further aid, because the obligation to act has moved from his or her own group, to the victim group. In the longer term, too, group members seeing the act in terms of obligation shifting would interpret it as discharging moral responsibility for the original transgression, further reducing the desire to help. In one previous study, members of a group that had harmed another group tended to reduce further help after learning about collective reparations, compared to a condition where no reparations were described (Maitner, Mackie & Smith, 2006). Obligation-shifting reactions to an official conciliatory statement may have paradoxical effects within the perpetrator group. They should encourage more hostile and dismissive attitudes toward the victim group, and also undermine support for further help toward that group, at the same time that they underlie increased support for the conciliatory act.

Obligation shifting could be even more problematic for intergroup relations if perpetrators expect forgiveness but victims are unwilling to give it. When victims are asked to imagine receiving an apology, they tend to overestimate the extent to which they will be satisfied with an apology compared to when they actually receive one (De Cremer, Pullutla, & Folmer, 2011). Perpetrator group members may expect forgiveness as a response from victims, but after the apology is given, victims may not see this as a necessary outcome of receiving an apology. If victims reject perpetrator attempts to repair relations, this could lead to worsened attitudes towards the victim group (see Harth, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2011).

Both image and obligation are potential selfish motives for apologising. In effect, wanting to impose an obligation on one's victims not only focuses on the outgroup rather than the

ingroup, but betrays a desire to impose conciliatory behaviour on them, silencing their moral demands. Because of this, for perpetrators, the perceptions that obligation has shifted to the victim group may reduce willingness to do more to promote reconciliation as perpetrators may feel it is no longer their "problem". Someone who views apology this way will feel justified in withholding further aid, because obligation to act is now with the victim group. Image, on the other hand, focuses on the ingroup's own desire to be moral and to appear as moral to other groups. In this way, image is ingroup focused while obligation shifting is focused on silencing outgroup demands. There are no reasons to expect that image improvement concerns will lead to the same negative outcomes as obligation shifting concerns. However, neither has been empirically studied in the intergroup apology context.

Power gains or losses. As discussed earlier, apologies could be costly. In an exchange of power for victims, some perpetrators may feel that they have lost power in the reconciliation process. As Wohl et al. (2011) point out, collective apologies can be opposed because they might oblige the perpetrator group to give material reparation (i.e., taking power away from the perpetrator group), but paradoxically also because they might distract the victim group from collective empowerment (i.e., letting the perpetrator group keep too much power). For perpetrators, giving power away to the victims could be seen as being costly and potentially dangerous. It is possible that members of the transgressor group could selfishly oppose an apology because they see it as giving away their influence and power (Mills, 2001). This could be especially problematic if an apology was seen as not being clear in its boundaries (Conner & Jordan, 2010). In other words, an apology could be rejected by the apologising groups' members if it is seen as too large in scope by suggesting a continued need to apologise for other acts (i.e. conceding on issues which were not intended to be part of the apology).

Furthermore, by apologising, perpetrators might feel that they have lost influence and control over the other group and over the reconciliation process. Conservative commentators, for example, have made much of US President Barack Obama's perceived tendency to apologise to foreign governments (e.g., Krauthammer, 2009). As one legal commentator on the role of apology in mediation puts it, under some circumstances, "apologising is difficult precisely because it entails transfer of power to the injured party and sets up the possibility that the injured party will withhold forgiveness," (Levi, 1997, p. 1183). This is a realistic concern given that one of the elements often considered important to the success of an apology is a promise to repair or provide reparations for damages done (Blatz et al., 2009; Gill, 2000). Alternatively, it is possible that perpetrator group members are motivated to support a conciliatory act when they perceive it as giving victims the power they desire (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). That is, perpetrators are actually motivated by an altruistic desire to give the victims what they seek.

While concerns about power may seem realistic, there is reason to believe that it is victims who tend to be most concerned with receiving power both in an interpersonal (Shnabel et al., 2008) and intergroup context (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009), while perpetrators – especially those already committed to making an apology – may focus instead on the indirect benefits of the apology, deriving satisfaction from what the exchange of power and resources is "buying". If this is the case, it is possible that power gains for the transgressor group will not be considered a positive outcome of an apology for perpetrator groups. In fact, gaining power could undermine the very goals of shifting obligation to the victim group and regaining moral image and status. Thus, it is very unclear how power could play a part in perpetrator group members' appraisal of apologies by their own group. Because the role of potential power gains or losses for the perpetrator group has yet to be explored empirically in the context of intergroup apologies,

this research intends to also explore the role of power concerns in apology appraisal for members of the apologising group.

Outcomes of Apologies

As mentioned, there are numerous ways in which an apology can be appraised by a perpetrator, including those which will be focused on in this research: image improvement, obligation shifting, and power for both groups. However, it is also important to identify ways in which to measure the outcomes of an apology for perpetrator group members. For victims, a successful apology has often been measured using forgiveness as an outcome (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008) with mixed findings on apology effectiveness on forgiveness. Other studies have looked at feelings like revenge (McCullough et al., 1998) or trust (Katz et al., 2008) as outcomes after transgression among victims. Nonetheless, for perpetrators, these outcomes are irrelevant. Measuring forgiveness for perpetrators would be nonsensical, as would support for revenge. Thus, this research has chosen three potential outcomes for perpetrators after apologies which seem most relevant to that group: satisfaction, feelings towards the victims, and future support.

Satisfaction. If the aim of an apology is to promote reconciliation between the two groups, there is a clear need to understand when and why gestures of reconciliation will be supported by people on both sides of the group divide (Blatz & Philpot, 2010). Although there is some evidence that perpetrator group members tend to be more satisfied with a conciliatory act than victim group members (see Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009), there is relatively little research on why perpetrator-group members are satisfied with apologies once they have been given, and how they evaluate an apologetic act as successful. Although forgiveness is a less meaningful outcome for perpetrators than victims, perpetrator group members' satisfaction with any given

conciliatory act can be measured. This research will look at satisfaction for perpetrators after an apology in order to understand how and when perpetrator group members are pleased with apologetic acts given by leaders on their behalf.

Negative feelings. Another potential outcome of apologies for intergroup relations could lie in changes to affect. After apologising, perpetrators may feel less or more negative towards the victim group, depending on a number of factors. There has been no research on this to date, but if an apology is given by a perpetrator group member on behalf of members who are overwhelmingly against apologising, this could lead to feelings of anger and resentment towards the victim group. Apologising requires admitting the group has committed a wrong, which can work to damage the moral image of the group. Thus, one possibility is that an apology could lead to perpetrator group members feeling more resentful of victims. Conversely, if perpetrators feel that their image was greatly damaged by an historical transgression, an apology allows perpetrators to improve their damaged moral image. This could lead to a decrease in negative feelings towards the victim group, as perpetrator group members may be grateful for the opportunity to reinstate their group's morality.

Even more, if perpetrator group members see their group's apology as settling matters between the two groups, then there is no need to keep up good relations with that group; any further demands from them will be seen as unjustified and could lead to increased negative feelings (Harth et al., 2011). In research by Greenaway et al. (2011) on expectations of forgiveness, the authors find that expecting forgiveness after a transgression is related to reduced empathy towards the victim group. This suggests that the more perpetrator group members expect to be forgiven the more they may feel reduced positive feelings towards the victim group, or even increased negative feelings. By contrast, if the apology is seen in the light of image

improvement, the task of keeping up a positive moral image is one that never really ends; maintaining good relations in this view would be necessary to the goal of perpetrator group image maintenance. Although there is no previous research on perpetrator affect after apologising, given that feelings can be such an important element of intergroup relations (Pettrigrew, 1998), it is important to know if and how apologies could be influencing perpetrator group members' feelings about victims.

Further support. There is some evidence that transgressor groups generally do not support an apology initially (see Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007). For example, there was much contention in the US about plans to support an apology for slavery before it was given. Many political representatives and outspoken critics argued that they shouldn't apologise, with one representative even controversially saying that black Americans need to just "get over" slavery (Lewis, 2007). Thus, some perpetrator group members may fear that apologies draw attention to issues they had hoped to put behind them because apologies could suggest an obligation to provide monetary compensation to victims (Williams, 2009).

However, after apologising, perpetrators may have as much, or even more, to gain from an apology than the victim group (Blatz et al., 2009). For example, despite fears that apologies might draw attention to an old issue which perpetrators would rather forget, conversely it might also allow perpetrators to feel that they truly can now put the issue behind them. Thus one argument against apologising has focused on the fear that apologising allows perpetrators to "wash their hands" of responsibility and that it will limit their willingness to support further collective acts to repair the relationship (Blatz et al., 2009; Wohl et al., 2001). Thus, one potential negative outcome of apologising could be that perpetrators feel less willing to support acts which may be necessary to facilitate change or repair circumstances for victim groups. For

some victims, an apology may come with an implied message that the victims will receive compensation (monetary or otherwise) which will allow them to recover from damages cause by the transgression (Gill, 2000). If victims see an apology as a step towards further acts of repair, then this could potentially be problematic for perpetrators. If perpetrators see an apology as a way to "wipe the slate clean" and shift obligation to the victim group, they may no longer feel they have to provide other compensation. In this way, perpetrators may see an apology as "closing the door" (Nobles, 2008) while victims might expect it to be an action that will "open the door" to further acts.

Without a doubt there are numerous other ways in which an apology's impact on intergroup relations could be measured, but this research will focus on the three discussed above as they cover a wide range of potential changes. Measuring satisfaction is important for understand support for the act itself and internal support for ingroup decisions. Assessing perpetrators' feelings about victims and desire to support future action are both highly pertinent to understanding if intergroup relations will improve or worsen after an apologetic act. Finally, if reconciliation is defined, in part, as being a psychological change towards the victim group (Staub et al., 2005) it is important to understand how apologies change feelings about the victim group. Therefore this research will also examine the impact of an apologetic act on negative feelings.

This thesis begins with the needs-based model as a foundation for developing a comprehensive set of studies on perpetrator needs after an apology. It forges new territory by explicitly looking at apologetic acts as a mode for satisfying perpetrator needs. Even more, it aims to go beyond the needs based model by looking at a potential predictor of perpetrator satisfaction that has been neglected thus far in the literature: obligation shifting.

CHAPTER 3

The term apology has been used thus far without much careful consideration. In reality, "apology" is often used to describe a largely diverse set of conciliatory acts. Particularly, on the political front, an apology can vary greatly in its wording and even form. For example sometimes a verbal apology is offered, as with UK Prime Minister David Cameron's apology for Bloody Sunday. The apology followed results of a report on the incident, which found unequivocally that Britain was in the wrong. David Cameron's (2010) speech expressed, through the use of emotional terms, deep sorrow and sadness as well as guilt:

> *There is no doubt, there is nothing equivocal, there are no ambiguities. What happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable. It was wrong ... The government is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the armed forces and for that, on behalf of the government, indeed, on behalf of our country, I am deeply sorry.* (para. 5)

Sometimes a very different kind of offer is given by a perpetrator group. Occasionally material aid is offered as a type of monetary apology, as seen when the US paid nearly 1.6 billion USD to Japanese Americans who were interned at US internment camps during World War II, and to their heirs. Sometimes these strategies are used alone or in combination with another strategy; after the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, BP not only apologised in words but with large expenditures both to clean up the oil spill in the US and to compensate victims.

There may be additional ways of expressing remorse, which include neither verbal apologies nor material reparations. In 1970, when West German Chancellor Willy Brandt attended a commemoration of Jewish victims of World War II, he spontaneously knelt down on his knees in what some describe as an act of penitence at a monument to commemorate the

victims of the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising. This act was considered by many to be a silent, yet powerful symbolic apology ("What People do," n.d.). Research by Nelissen (2012) suggests that self-punishment may be another way to express remorse, and that acts of self-punishment can lead to reduced guilt for perpetrators. However, this type of action has remained relatively unstudied in the literature. Though perhaps an interesting type of conciliatory act on its own, it would be difficult to study acts of self-punishment in the scope of this research. As differences between types of conciliatory acts have remained nearly entirely unstudied in the intergroup conflict context, this research will focus primarily on the two most commonly used conciliatory acts after intergroup transgressions: verbal apologies and material reparations.

Apologies vs. Reparations

There has been little empirical research assessing the differences between apologies and financial reparations. Equity Theory (Walster et al., 1973) proposes that transgressors can restore justice through either compensation or justification strategies. Compensation strategies would include actions like material reparations. Justice strategies might include acts designed to restore psychological equity, like with a verbal apology (see Exline et al., 2007). Both acts are attempts at restoring the balance between the groups.

However, some views do draw a crucial distinction between the two type acts of reconciliation. Successful apologies offer victims an acceptance of responsibility and acknowledgment of wrongdoing (Goffman, 1955; Marrus, 2007; Tavuchis, 1993). By saying "what we did was wrong and we all agree on what happened," an apology sets a common moral discourse from which to begin reconciliation (Conner & Jordan, 2009; Nobles, 2008). Some argue that an apology can imply an opening to building a relationship and a willingness to

change (Nobles, 2008). Nobles (2008) believes that by providing a common discourse on history and suggesting a willingness to accept responsibility for past actions, apologies can act to "open the door" to future relations by expressing, in effect, "we are wrong and we want to improve our relationship." Apologies aim to reconcile relations between the offender and offended (Andrieu, 2009).

Reparations, on the other hand, can provide a tangible way to improve the possible discrepancy in status between the two groups. They imply a desire to fix the situation but also tend to turn the issue from a moral issue into a trade-exchange (Tavuchis, 1993). Reparations alone also do not require any admission of being wrong and, once given, may suggest the issue has been resolved (Andrieu, 2009; Nobles, 2008) and imply that the perpetrator group intends to "close the door" on future relations (Nobles, 2008). For example, when in 2010 the British government paid reparations to Guantanamo inmates who claimed the UK was complicit in torture at the prison, the news highlighted the British government's insistence that by paying reparations, they were "drawing a line" under the issue (Cobain, 2010). The government was suggesting that by paying (but not apologising) they were no longer going to have to deal with the detainees and their demands for justice.

Both material reparation and verbal apology can be offered at the same time and some authors argue that the more elements contained in an apology, the more satisfying it will be for victims (see Blatz et al, 2009; Goffman, 1971; Marrus, 2007; Scher & Darley, 1997). Gill (2000) posits that a successful apology is usually considered to include a number of elements to be considered a full apology.

According to Gill (2000), an apology must include the following five elements:

1. The apology must include acknowledge that the incident occurred. In other words, the perpetrators must admit the transgression happened in the first place.
2. The apology must include recognition that the transgression was inappropriate or immoral.
3. The apology should admit that the perpetrator group was responsible. It is not enough for the apology to only acknowledge what happened to the victims. It must also include recognition that the perpetrator group was responsible for the incident.
4. A successful apology should express feelings of remorse or regret. It is important that the apology suggest remorse not just for the outcome but for the action itself (Smith, 2008).
5. The apology must express that the perpetrator intends to not commit the same harm again. In other words, it would be difficult for a victim to take an apology seriously if the apology occurred while the injustice continued. This is a particularly important in the intergroup context. Brooks (1999) argues that for survivors of atrocities, there is a deep fear that they will again suffer and that the actions will be repeated. Apologies must give some assurance that the action will not be repeated (Gill, 2000).

When Bob Packwood, a US senator, apologised for sexual harassment, he clearly missed the important element of acknowledging that the transgression even occurred when he said, "I apologise for the conduct that it was alleged that I did." (Gabriel, 1993, para. 10). Nixon gave a classic "non-apology" when he resigned from office saying, "I regret deeply any injuries that

may have been done in the course of the event that led to this decision." (Nixon, 1974, para. 14). He did not express remorse for the action, only of the consequences. Some scholars have also argued that in the intergroup conflict context, there must be offers to repair the damage and that this is a part of a complete apology (Blatz et al, 2009; Goffman, 1971; Marrus, 2007). However, others have argued that financial reparations can undo the open message of the apology (Nobles, 2008; Tavuchis 1993). Certainly, some research on reconciliation shows that offering material aid can backfire by being seen as insulting or controlling by the recipient group, unless very specific conditions are met (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008; Giner-Sorolla, Kamau, & Castano, 2010). Thus, it is possible that an apology could "open the door" to future relations when given alone, whereas reparations may be insulting and be seen by victims as a "pay-off" to end the relationship (Nobles, 2008).

What Should Perpetrators Prefer?

Whether to expect a preference for apology alone over reparations alone by members of the perpetrator group depends on the reasons for satisfaction with an apology, which is yet to be outlined clearly in the literature. As suggested earlier, these possible appraisals of an apology outcome (obligation shifting, image improvement, power losses) would all lead to different predictions regarding preference for material or verbal apologetic acts. From a materialistic point of view, the apology is free while the reparations are costly. Therefore, if the transgressor group is concerned about preserving its power, it should prefer the apology and be least satisfied with reparations (with or without an apology) because they give up more power. However, because past research has suggested that power is less important to the transgressing group (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), this may not be such an important measure when comparing apologetic acts.

Image concerns may lead the status gains of a verbal apology to be considered more important than handing over money. However, the same could be said for reparations being considered a more generous act (by giving up financial power) and thus could actually improve moral image concerns as much if not more than an apology. Certainly if image is a concern, a combined apology and reparations act should be seen as the most generous by third parties and therefore increase perceptions of image improvement for members of the apologising group. Obligation shifting concerns would suggest that whichever act is seen shifting obligation most, would be most satisfying. An argument could be made for reparations being most satisfying because by turning a moral issue into a monetary issue, paying reparations may be seen by perpetrator groups as a financial exchange (Tavuchis, 1993). By turning it into a monetary issue, a group can "pay" their debt and thus shift obligation to the victims to accept the payment and be done with the issue. Nobles (2008) argues that reparations ignore the symbolic emotional benefits that apologies provide by acknowledging the historical record; she believes reparations serve a very different purpose than apologies:

> *If viewed as a payoff, reparations may be seen as "closing the books," whereas apologies may be viewed as the beginning of a "new conversation." A reparations settlement says we've settled our debt, whereas an apology says, now that you've apologized, what are you going to do next to rectify the matter? (pg. 140)*

However, there are also many reasons to believe that, for perpetrators, the preference for reparations or a verbal apology may also be dependent on the context of the issue. Some issues may be perceived as being more easily addressed with a financial payment, for example a natural disaster that requires money for a cleanup like the BP oil spill. In that case, an apology without reparations may be seen as less effective in either improving image or shifting obligation than

financial reparations which are both clearly needed and requested by the victim group. However, in another context, like the historical use of black slaves in Britain and America, financial reparations may not be perceived as improving the image of the ingroup or shifting obligation to the victims any more than a verbal apology. Other differences between incidents could affect the type of response seen as most satisfying by ingroup members, for example, the length of time it has been since the incident, the extent to which the current victims still suffer, or the extent to which the damages are structural versus psychological.

This research focuses mainly on the appraisals of a response that can predict outcomes of apologies for perpetrator group members. But there is also an additional exploratory goal of this research to begin to understand how apologies and reparations differ, as this is an unstudied aspect of intergroup reconciliation. This dissertation aims to analyze a number of types of responses in varying contexts to understand if any differences in preference can be explained by the appraisals mentioned above: image improvement, obligation shifting, and/or power concerns.

CHAPTER 4

There is much that is still not understood about apologies: How do perpetrator groups view apologies given by members of their group? What makes an apology "successful" for these groups? What are the potential long term effects of an apology on future action? And, do apologies alter attitudes towards the victim group? This research examines the ways in which apologies and other apologetic acts are perceived by members of the group apologising. This chapter will present four experiments with two main objectives. The first objective is to understand what appraisals can best predict satisfaction with an apologetic act and other outcomes for perpetrator group members. The second objective will be two explore differences between different types of apologetic statements and acts of reparation on apology outcomes relevant to perpetrators.

As discussed in Chapter 2, perpetrators may seek to improve their image by apologising (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Therefore, perpetrators who perceive an apologetic act as making them look better should be more satisfied with that act. Another possible appraisal of an apology is that of power. Perpetrators may be less satisfied with an apology if it is seen as giving away too much power to the victim group. Finally, perpetrators may be satisfied with an apologetic act to the extent that it is seen as removing any sense of obligation off them and onto the victim outgroup. The more they expect the victim group to be forgiving and grateful for the response, the more satisfying they should find the act. Experiments 1-4 will address these three possible appraisals (image improvement, obligation shifting, and power gains) in predicting satisfaction and other outcomes after an apologetic act. Additionally, Experiments 2-4 will also include a fourth potential appraisal: a measure of victim power. Victim power, if important to perpetrators,

would suggest that perpetrators want to give victims the power that they seek by apologising (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).

This chapter will begin to explore differences between verbal apologies, financial reparations, and acts that provide both verbal apologies and financial reparations together. Experiments 1, 2, and 4 will compare apologetic acts with non-apology statements and also look at differences between verbal apologies and reparations given alone. Experiment 3 will explore how giving either of the single acts alone compares with a "stronger" dual act containing both the verbal and financial elements of an apology. As discussed earlier, verbal elements of responsibility taking and remorse are usually considered parts of a complete apology, but so is providing reparations to restore justice and equality. It has been argued that both elements are needed for an apology to be successful (see Blatz et al, 2009; Goffman, 1971; Marrus, 2007). Research on apology elements, however, has always focused on victims when defining success; Experiment 3 will further this line of research by examining if a stronger act (with both elements) is more satisfying for perpetrator groups. Finally, the experiments in this chapter will all examine if the appraisals perpetrators find most satisfying can explain any differences found between the types of apologetic acts presented.

Importantly, these four experiments will vary the context of the apologetic act. One problem with conflict resolution research is that it often focuses on one particular conflict or historical transgression, and neglects to take into account the high degree of variance among historical transgressions. In particular, as this research is attempting to understand the predictors of perpetrator satisfaction with an apology, it is important to know if the findings could be unique to specific perpetrators and victims or the context of the apologetic act. Experiments 1, 3, and 4 will look at cases where Britain has committed a transgression in the past against another

nation and Experiment 2 will examine the attitudes of a different perpetrator group (Americans). Across all four experiments the nature of the transgression and the victim group involved are varied in order to test if apology appraisals and outcomes differ depending on the context.

Experiment 1: "Bunce Island"

Experiment 1 aimed to unravel the motivations for apology acceptance among perpetrator group members by using the issue of Bunce Island, a former hub of the British slave trade. The primary objective of this experiment was to develop an understanding of the strongest predictors of satisfaction with an apologetic act for perpetrator members. Additionally, this experiment sought to explore if perpetrator group members are sensitive to differences between apologies containing important elements compared to a lesser "compassionate" statement which leaves out the traditionally accepted necessary elements of apologies (Blatz et al, 2009; Gill, 2000, Goffman, 1971; Marrus, 2007).

Despite the fact that there has been little research on perpetrator groups and apologies, there is some evidence that image improvement may be a concern (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), particularly because after a transgression, image related shame is a strong predictor of support for giving an apology (Allpress et al., 2010). Therefore, this experiment explores if repairing the image of the ingroup after an apology predicts satisfaction with the apology. This research also begins to try to develop the concept of obligation shifting, which has been largely ignored thus far in apology research. Despite a lack of research among psychologists on the topic, it has been suggested in the field of law that perpetrators themselves sometimes apologise because they feel obligated (Marrus, 2007). Thus, one motivation for

apologising may be to relieve the obligation burden from the ingroup and place it onto the victim group's shoulders.

Finally, power concerns, which have been shown to be important to victims (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) could be a motivator for satisfaction with an apology. If ingroup members fear a loss of power, they may be less satisfied after an apology. It was hypothesised that apologising would be more satisfying than the non-apology statement because it would repair the image of the ingroup and shift obligation to the victim group. It was also hypothesised that gaining power would not be important to perpetrators but that potential power loss after an apology might negatively predict satisfaction with it.

For perpetrator group members, an apology can do one of two things. It can either open the door to future action because apologising forces the group to take responsibility for past behaviour and therefore put the responsibility to repair relations into the hands of the apologising group (Nobles, 2008) or it could act to close the door on relations by allowing the perpetrator group to feel they have fulfilled their obligation to the victim group. Thus, an important measurement of apology success for perpetrator group members would be the extent to which the apology leads them to feel more willing to work towards reconciliation. As mentioned earlier, Nobles (2008) describes a concept of "closing the door" which she believes can be a possible negative effect of reparations and also could be a potential disruption to developing positive relations between groups. In this research, the concept will be measured as a potential outcome of apologetic acts, through a measurement on willingness to support reparations. This experiment will also therefore focus on the potential power for apologies to either increase or decrease perpetrator groups' willingness to continue mending relations between the groups.

Image improvement is arguably a selfish rather than altruistic motive. That is, given the importance of being seen internally and internationally as a moral nation, making an apologetic act can be seen as a good investment in the area of public relations. However, this motive does not preclude a cooperative orientation toward the other group, thus I did not expect image improvement concerns to be related to reduced willingness to mend relations. However, obligation shifting suggests that the perpetrator group is no longer obligated to repair relations, and even suggests that the victims are now responsible for the next move in the social script. Thus, I expected obligation shifting to be related to reduced support for future actions needed to repair the relationship.

Crucially, this experiment chose to manipulate an apology using the elements as described by past scholars necessary to consider it a successful apology (see Chapter 3). In this experiment I presented a nearly full apology (except for the promise of reparations) and compared it to a non-apology statement. The non-apology statement acknowledged that harm occurred but neglects to take responsibility or express remorse.

The issue used in this experiment was that of the British slave trade in West Africa. Bunce Island, off the coast of Sierra Leone, was once the largest hub of the slave trade in West Africa. Although slavery was abolished centuries ago, the island still stands as a representation of the slave trade and the prison, which housed slaves before being sold to New World land owners, still stands as a major reminder of the island's history. Although the slave trade was assumed to be a well known historical occurrence among British people, Bunce Island was chosen because of its relative obscurity in British common knowledge. It was important that participants not be aware of any past apology (or any lack of apology) for the issue. Furthermore, because slavery

itself is such a large issue, by using Bunce Island specifically, the scope of the apology could be limited.

Although in actuality the island is mostly uninhabited, this experiment embellished on the island's current situation by asserting that the local islanders were still greatly suffering both economically and psychologically from the effects of the slave trade. Because this research is particularly interested in willingness to support future action, it was decide that for Experiment 1 it would be crucial to stress the need for action beyond just an apology.

Method

Participants. Fifty-seven participants were recruited at the University of Kent (56% female; age $M = 19.37$, $SD = 1.46$, *range* = 18-25) through the university research participation scheme. All participants identified themselves as British citizens and received course credit for participation.

Design. Each participant was randomly assigned to read one of two responses to a past immoral behaviour by the British: an apology ($N = 28$) or a non-apology statement ($N = 29$).

Procedure. Participants completed the experiment in the laboratory. After completing some demographic measures including identity measures, participants were asked to read a brief summary of the history of Bunce Island. The story discussed the history of Bunce Island being used by Britain as a major hub during the slave trade and emphasized Britain's responsibility for Bunce Island's current social problems and the detriment to the economic development of the region (see Appendix 1). Although Bunce Island is real and was historically used a hub for slave trade, the summary of the island was embellished to stress the current demands of the island

population for an apology. This experiment added a fictitious element to the island's history by asserting that the local islanders are still greatly suffering both economically and psychologically from the effects of the slave trade. This was done in order to justify the request for further reparations used in the experiment to measure future support to victims as a potential outcome of apologies. In reality Bunce Island is mostly uninhabited.

After reading the summary of the history of Bunce Island, participants read a fictitious back-dated news article describing a visit by former Prime Minister Tony Blair to Bunce Island during the 20th anniversary of laws abolishing the slave trade. Participants were randomly assigned to read about Blair either offering a full apology expressing shame and remorse for the actions of the British on Bunce Island or they read a statement by Blair that discussed the history of the slave trade and, although recognizing the suffering of the victims, falls short of apologising. The verbal apology was constructed to include all the elements identified as necessary to a successful apology (Goffman, 1971; Gill, 2000, Marrus, 2007), except for the promise of financial aid – it expressed acknowledgement of the harm to Bunce Islanders, of Britain's responsibility for the harm, and remorse for such action. It also expressed suffering and responsibility taking, which have been shown to be important to victims (Giner-Sorolla et al., under review). The statement was called an apology in order to make clear the intentions:

> *Mr. Blair issued a formal apology to those places and peoples most affected by slave trading. In his statement, he expressed "profound shame" for the slave trade and went on to say, "To those who suffered at the hands of the British, we apologise. We were directly responsible for the brutal capturing and torturing of innocent men, women, and children. Even more, we are deeply sorry that there are consequences for our involvement in the*

history of this region, which are seen so clearly here on Bunce Island, and continue to plague the ancestors of those we harmed.

By contrast, the non-apology condition presented a statement of "sorrow". It attempted to remain as closely parallel to the apology statement as possible and only manipulate the use of apologetic phrasing but still maintaining the same sentiment and references to history by expressing acknowledgment of harm to the victims caused by slavery and that there are continued problems facing Bunce Island. However, the statement never expressly apologises and uses language which avoids taking responsibility for the issue. The control statement was not called an apology and referred to only as a "statement":

Mr. Blair issued a formal statement to those places and peoples most affected by slave trading. In his statement, he expressed "profound sorrow" about the slave trade and went on to say, "To those who suffered, we recognize your pain. We remember on this day the brutal capturing and torturing of innocent men, women, and children. Even more, we are saddened to see that there are consequences for the history of this region, which are seen so clearly here on Bunce Island, and continue to plague the ancestors of those involved.

Although presented as genuine news, the articles were fictitious and constructed to manipulate the type of response attributed to the British government. Although it would have been possible to ask participants to imagine giving an apology, past research has suggested that imagining receiving an apology leads to different outcomes than actually receiving one (De Cremer, Pullutla, & Folmer, 2011). Although their research looked at victim groups, this experiment specifically wanted to address the outcomes of an apology after it was given; I chose

not to ask participants to imagine an apology in order to avoid potential differences in effects for ingroup members as well. Participants were told that this was a summary of actual news and lead to believe that the response was real.

After reading the article, participants completed the following measures on seven point Likert scales. Scales intended to be mediators (image improvement, obligation shifting, and ingroup power) and those intended to be outcomes (satisfaction and further support) were counterbalanced in order to avoid order effects.

Satisfaction. Satisfaction was measured with two items (i.e. "*How satisfied are you with the response of the British government to the situation in Bunce Island*?" (on a scale of *very dissatisfied* (1) *to very satisfied* (7)) and "*The British government has done a good job*" on a scale of *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (7)). The two items were correlated at, $r = .60$, $p < .001$, and were averaged together to create a measure of satisfaction with the statement ($M = 3.69$; $SD = 1.18$).

Image improvement. Four items measured perceived moral image change due to the response of the government (i.e., "*How will the statement affect Britain's reputation in other countries?*"; "*How will the statement affect Britain's reputation in Bunce Island?*"; "*How will the response by the British government change the moral standing of the British?*" (1 *greatly decrease* to 7 *greatly increase*); and "*I think that the statement has demonstrated to the world that the British value morality.*" (1 *strongly disagree* to 7 *strongly agree*)). Composite scores were created and together formed a reliable scale (Chronbach's $\alpha = .68$; $M = 4.59$; $SD = 0.75$).

Outgroup obligation. Three items were intended to measure shifting obligation to the outgroup: the idea that those receiving an apology now have an obligation to change their

attitudes and perceptions in return (i.e. "*The Bunce Islanders should be grateful to Britain for their response to the current situation on the island*"; "*The Bunai people ought to forgive Britain for colonizing the island,*" and "*Britain does not need to do more to repair its relationship with Bunce Island*" on scales of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)). Composite scores were created using the four items and the scale was very reliable (α = .63; M = 3.05; SD = 1.14).

Ingroup power. Three items were used to measure potential power and influence change for Britain after the statement on scales of 1 (*greatly decrease*) to 7 (*greatly increase*) (e.g. "*How much will the statement increase or decrease the political power of Britain?*"; "*How much will the statement increase or decrease Britain's international influence?*"; "*How much will the statement increase or decrease British influence over Bunce Island?*"). Together the four items proved reliable (α = .64; M = 4.15; SD = 0.71).

Further support. One item was used to measure further willingness to support the victim group. This was measured using an item which tapped into agreement to support financial reparations for the Bunce Islanders ("*How much, if any financial reparations do you think the British government should give to Bunce Island*?"), with possible answers including: (1) *None*; (2) *less than 250,000*; (3) *250,000-500,000*; (4) *500,000 -1m;* (5)*1m -5m*; (6) *5 - 10m*; (7) *10-15m*; (8) *more than 15m* (GBP). These were re-coded as 1 (*none*) through 8 (*more than 15 million*). Thus high numbers mean more support for reparations (M = 4.71; SD = 2.33).

After answering questions on other measures not related to the hypotheses of this experiment, participants were debriefed. Debriefing included information about the Bunce issue

and participants were informed about the real status of the situation in Bunce and that there has never been an apology on the island by a British official.

Results

Looking at correlations between the predictor variables (image improvement, obligation shifting and power for the ingroup) and outcome variables (satisfaction and further support), satisfaction was positively correlated with obligation shifting and image improvement. Further support was negatively correlated with obligation shifting and satisfaction. Power for the ingroup (Britain) was not correlated with satisfaction or obligation, but was somewhat positively correlated with image improvement (See Table 1).

Table 1. *Correlation table for Experiment 1.*

	Satisfaction	Further support	Obligation shifting	Image improvement
Further support	.29**			
Obligation shifting	.37**	-.44**		
Image improvement	.42**	.17	.09	
Ingroup power	-.03	.20	.03	.35**

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Apology versus no apology. First, ANOVA analyses were used to test the differences between conditions (with no apology coded as -1 and the apology statement coded as 1) on the two outcomes and on the predictors. There were no significant differences between conditions on satisfaction or on support for reparations (all *p*s > .112). In other words, British participants' satisfaction did not differ whether they read about the former Prime Minister making a statement with a full apology or the non-apology statement which included recognition of the outgroup's suffering and history. ANOVAs were also run to see if either statement suggested more ingroup image improvement, power for Britain, or outgroup obligation shifting. Again, image, power for Britain, and obligation shifting were all not significantly different across the two conditions (all *p*s > .403).

Because participants viewed the two statements as the same, the two conditions were collapsed across for all future analyses. The next analyses focused on the outcome of satisfaction and support for future relations. For each outcome, the influence of the three predictors - image improvement, outgroup obligation, and power for the ingroup on the outcome were examined across the whole sample using linear regression.

Satisfaction. Image improvement ($\beta = .44$; $p < .001$) and outgroup obligation ($\beta = .41$, $p < .001$) significantly, positively and independently predicted participants' satisfaction with the statement. In other words, the more perpetrator group members felt their image had improved following the statement, the more satisfied they were. Likewise, the more participants felt that the victim group was obligated to forgive and that the ingroup was no longer responsible, the more satisfied they were with the statement. Power for the ingroup was not a significant predictor of satisfaction ($p = .125$). The overall regression model was significant, $F(3, 56) = 10.74$, $Adj.R^2 = .34$, $MSE = 0.91$, $p < .001$.

Further support. Only obligation shifting (β = -.42, p = .001) significantly, negatively and independently predicted participants' willingness to give reparations after either statement. The more participants saw the statement as shifting obligation to the victim group, the less support they expressed for providing reparations to the victims. Ingroup power and image improvement were not significant predictors of support for reparations (*ps* > .189). The overall regression model was significant, $F(3, 55) = 4.94$, $Adj.R^2 = .18$, $MSE = 4.45$, $p = .004$.

Discussion

In this experiment there were no differences between an apology and a non-apology statement on any of the outcome variables. After collapsing across conditions, image improved emerged as a positive predictor of satisfaction with either statement but potential power gains or losses for the British were not. In other words, the more participants felt that a statement made on their behalf by the British government helped to improve the image of Britain, the more satisfied they were with the statement. This finding is consistent with the research and theory of Nadler and Shnabel (2008; Shnabel et al., 2009) insofar as it suggests that members of the powerful transgressing group are more concerned with their image than with gaining power.

Perhaps the most interesting and novel finding of this experiment is that obligation shifting also predicts satisfaction, independently of image improvement. In other words, the more perpetrator group members felt the victim group was obligated to "forgive" and be "grateful" after the statement, the more satisfied they were with the statement. This suggests that one way in which an ingroup feels an apology is successful is that it has shifted responsibility to the victim group. Furthermore, obligation shifting, but not image or power, positively predicted the desire to "close the door" on the issue by reducing willingness to give reparations.

Given the small amount of past research on ingroup responses to apologies, this experiment provided a starting point for investigation into how apologetic actions may be received by ingroup members, and how verbal apologies differ from reparations in their impact on support for future action and negative affect towards the victim group. Although Experiment 1 failed to find experimental differences between conditions, it is still valuable by providing correlational evidence that image improvement and obligation act as separate and distinct predictors of satisfaction. This first experiment presented one of the first studies of ingroup reactions to apologies and greatly expands on previous research on the needs of transgressor groups in the reconciliation process (Shnabel et al., 2009). The results suggest that there are two self-serving motives that are used to assess apologies by ingroup members: image improvement and obligation shifting, and that improving the image of the group does not necessarily lead to a reduced willingness to do more for the victims.

Past research on apologies has suggested that an expression of regret or remorse is often considered a crucial part of an apology (Gill, 2000; Marrus, 2007). Without expressing remorse, victims may perceive that although a perpetrator admitted to doing something wrong, he may have been pleased with his actions (Blatz et al., 2009). This is suggested in research on emotional statements by Giner-Sorolla and colleagues (under review) suggesting that in addition to responsibility taking, victims are more satisfied when they feel that the perpetrator is suffering. In the studies I conducted, this was a key element missing from the difference between an apology and a non-apology. However, it is possible that perpetrator group members do not see any difference between the statements because this is not an important concern for perpetrator group members in evaluating an apology. Perhaps perpetrators are less sensitive to subtle differences in wording than victims.

One potential remedy would be to have nothing be said at all, but this would prove difficult in asking participants to assess a statement when none is given. Most of the items used in this experiment specifically wanted to address, for example, image improvement after a statement. It would be difficult to understand how image has improved afterwards if there is no statement to compare it to. Another option is to have a statement which explicitly refuses to apologise, although this too could be problematic. Denying an event and not apologising for an event are quite different and would likely have very differing impacts on perceptions of the nature of the event or even their responsibility to apologise at all. The next experiment will therefore try to include a control condition which does not deny the event occurred but makes clear that there is no intention to provide either an apology or reparations.

It would also be valuable to know if the same elements of apologies which are satisfying for victims (see Blatz et al., 2009; Gill, 2010) are perceived as important for members of the perpetrator group, or if indeed any statement of acknowledgment is equally satisfying to the extent that it is believed to improve the image of the ingroup and shift obligation to the outgroup. Given that apology making is rarely in the hands of the entire ingroup and is usually given because victims demand it (Harris, Granger, & Mullany, 2006), it perhaps it is equally important to examine the ways in which types of conciliatory acts differ in their extent to meet the needs of the perpetrator group (to improve image and shift obligation), even if it is still unclear how apologising is beneficial over not-apologising.

From this first experiment, it becomes apparent that there is a need to understand what elements of an apologetic act lead to more obligation shifting, because this is the aspect of an apology which seems to relate to the potential negative outcome of closing the door. If there are differences between types of apologetic acts (namely verbal versus monetary apologies) then

understanding how they meet the needs of perpetrators could be important for predicting the outcome of an apologetic act for intergroup relations.

Experiment 2: "Guatemalan Medical Experiments"

Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings of the first experiment, by looking at the appraisals which predict satisfaction for perpetrators, but it expands on the previous work by looking at a different context with a different perpetrator population. In this experiment, I confronted American participants with different statements attributed to US officials as responses to a historical fact: that in the 20th century, the US conducted medical tests on Guatemalans without consent, deliberately injecting them with sexually transmitted diseases. As with the first experiment, this experiment looks at the outcome of satisfaction with the statement and tests if perpetrators are sensitive to the difference between an apology and a non-apology statement. However, this difference was made more obvious by using a statement which clearly communicates a lack of intent to provide either an apology or reparations. Additionally it will aim to understand if the type of conciliatory act given may differ in the degree to which they shift obligation and restore image, by including an apology condition as well as a reparations condition.

Based on the results of the first Experiment, I expected image improvement and obligation shifting to both increase satisfaction but ingroup power concerns would be unimportant to perpetrator group members in evaluating an apology. Even though power for the perpetrator ingroup was unrelated to satisfaction in Experiment 1, this experiment will again measure perceptions of the shift of material power and influence as a result of the act. It is possible that

some contexts lend to power being more important than others. Additionally, a fourth predictor was included in order to greater understand the motivations for ingroup satisfaction with an apology. As mentioned in Chapter 2, victims have been found to be most concerned with regaining power and status during a reconciliation process (Shnabel et al., 2009). A less cynical notion, one that was not explored in the previous experiment, is that ingroup members apologise for the simple, and highly altruistic reason, that they want to provide victims with the power they are so concerned with regaining. Perhaps ingroup members genuinely want to provide the victim group with the power and status improvement they seek. If so, then potential power gains for victims should positively predict satisfaction. Thus, this experiment also included measurements of potential power (both influence and resource power) gains or losses for the victim outgroup.

Unlike the previous experiment, this experiment included the outcome measure of *negative feelings* of insult and anger towards the victim group. While image improvement can exist without producing negative feelings toward the out-group, judging the conciliatory act in terms of obligation shifting implies a wish to remove the legitimacy of the victim group's moral claim upon the perpetrator group, and to exert a corresponding moral claim upon them. Perpetrators feeling that victim's are now obligated to fulfil their part of the social script could lead to more hostile feelings about the victims, given that the expectation of forgiveness has been linked to more negative feelings about victims in past research (Greenaway, Louis & Wohl, 2011). Therefore, I expected negative feelings toward the victims (Guatemalans) to be predicted primarily by obligation shifting perceptions. Because one of the conditions explicitly included providing financial reparations, I did not use support for reparations as an outcome variable as it was inherently part of one of the conditions of apology. Instead I looked at the potential for providing an apology or reparations to lead to negative feelings about the victims as another

possible outcome. Consistent with the results on future support seen in Experiment 1, I did not expect image improvement to be related to the outcome of negative feelings either.

Finally, I tested whether image, obligation, and power concerns would mediate differences between the types of statements made and the outcome of satisfaction. I presented verbal apologies and reparations as separate responses. That is, to the extent that people preferred a statement of apology to a statement with no apology, or a statement of reparations to a statement of no reparations, this preference should be explained by those variables already shown in the previous experiment to predict satisfaction: image improvement and obligation shifting. Similarly, I expected that if one conciliatory act creates more negative feelings toward the target group than another, this would be explained principally by obligation shifting perceptions.

To the extent that people preferred a statement of apology to a statement with no apology, or a statement of reparations to a statement of no reparations, this preference should be explained by those mediators already shown to predict satisfaction: according to the predictors, image improvement and obligation shifting. Similarly, I expected that if one conciliatory act created more negative feelings toward the target group than another, this would be explained principally by obligation shifting.

Method

Participants. Participants for this experiment were recruited through Amazon's MTurk crowd-sourcing service (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2011). One-hundred and sixty seven American citizens completed the experiment online using Qualtrics survey management software. Six participants were removed for self-identifying as members of

the victim group (Guatemalan) and a further four participants were removed for invariant responses throughout the data set. A further 21 participants responded incorrectly to the manipulation check question at the end of the experiment asking what response the US government gave in the news article and were removed. This left remaining 136 participants for analysis (92 female; age $M = 36.24$, $SD = 12.96$, *range* = 18-78).

Design. Participants were randomly assigned to read either an apology statement, a reparations statement, or a control statement by the US government about its past support for medical testing performed on Guatemalan citizens without their consent.

Procedure. The experiment was conducted online. All participants read a short historical summary telling how the US government in the 1940's supported a project in which American scientists purposefully injected Guatemalan orphans, prisoners, and military transcripts with sexually transmitted diseases in order to test the effect of penicillin (See Appendix 2). The information provided to the participants about the event was truthful and based on real news sources (e.g., Bazell, 2010).

At the end of the news story, participants read that the US government was made aware of the studies in 2010 and that a response was made after the studies came to light. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the following three conditions which each presented a different response to the issue:

Apology condition:

> *In 2010 the US government said it had been made aware of the studies after they were rediscovered by a graduate student. The government has issued an official and formal apology to the victims of the experiment. The statement called the experiments*

"shocking", "tragic", and "reprehensible." The statement went on to say, "We deeply regret that it happened, and we apologise to all the individuals who were affected by such abhorrent research practices." The government has given no indication on if it plans to provide any financial reparations to victims of the studies.

Reparations condition:

In 2010 the US government said it had been made aware of the studies after they were rediscovered by a graduate student. The government has issued a statement saying they will issue financial reparations to the victims of the experiment. The US government has provided nearly $500,000 to be disbursed among victims still living or their families. The government has given no indication on if it plans to provide any official apology to victims of the studies.

Control condition:

In 2010 the US government said it had been made aware of the studies after they were rediscovered by a graduate student. The government issued a statement saying that at the moment given other pressing matters, there are no plans to provide either any official apology or financial reparations to victims of the studies.

After reading one of the three articles, participants completed the following measures on seven point Likert scales.

Negative feelings. Two items assessed negative emotions about the victim group (Guatemalans) following the statement ("*I feel angry with the Guatemalans*" and "*I feel insulted by the Guatemalans*" on a scale of strongly *disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (7)). Together these two items formed a measure of negative feelings ($r = .45$, $p < .001$; $M = 1.44$; $SD = .76$).

Satisfaction. Two items (i.e. "*The US government has done a good job in responding to the situation in Guatemala*" on a scale of *strongly disagree* (1) *to strongly agree* (7); "*How*

satisfied are you with the response of the US government?" on a scale of *very dissatisfied* (1) to *very satisfied* (7)) were used for assessing satisfaction with the statement. The items were correlated, $r = .82$, $p < .001$. The two items were averaged together to form a composite scale measuring satisfaction ($M = 2.71$; $SD = 1.66$).

Participants then completed the four measures of potential mediators:

Image improvement. Three items were used to measure perceived image change due to the response of the government but were changed to reflect the America as the perpetrator group (e.g. "*How will the statement affect America's reputation in other countries?").* The scale was highly reliable *($\alpha = .85$; $M = 2.99$; $SD = 1.26$).*

Obligation shifting. This experiment used the same three items as in Experiment 1 and included one additional item to make a four item scale intending to measure the concept of obligation shifting (i.e., "*The Guatemalans should be grateful to the US for their response*"; "*The Guatemalans should forgive the US following the response*"; "*The Guatemalans should want to be closer allies with the US following the response*"; "*The US does not need to do more to repair its relationship with Guatemala.*"). Composite scores were created and the scale proved very reliable ($\alpha = .84$; $M = 2.78$; $SD = 1.35$).

Ingroup power. The same items used to measure ingroup power in Experiment 1 were used to measure the power changes of the perpetrator group but were changed to reflect power changes for the US (e.g., "*How much will the statement increase or decrease the political power of the US?*"; "*How much will the statement increase or decrease US international influence?*"; "*How much will the statement increase or decrease US influence over Guatemala?*"). The scale was reliable ($\alpha = .82$; $M = 3.58$; $SD = 0.84$).

Outgroup power. Three items were used to measure potential power change for the victim group (Guatemalans) after the statement. These items were the same as those for ingroup power but were changed to address the victim group (Guatemalans) (e.g., "*How much will the statement increase or decrease the political power of Guatemala?*"). Together, these three items formed a measure of outgroup (victim) power. Composite scores were created and the scale was reliable (α = .84; M = 4.01; SD = 0.84).

Finally, as a manipulation check question, participants were asked to confirm what they read in the news article presenting the US response to the STD studies. Participants selected whether they had read about the US giving an apology, reparations, both an apology and reparations, or neither an apology or reparations. After providing demographic information, participants were debriefed. Debriefing included information about the actual response from the US government, which included an apology from President Obama and other US officials but no clear plans for reparations.

Results

Just as with the first experiment, I examined correlations between the predictor and outcome variables (Table 2). Obligation shifting was positively correlated with satisfaction and negative feelings as well as the other predictor variables. Image improvement was positively related to satisfaction and ingroup power but not negative feelings. Outgroup power was not related to either outcome variable but the more that people saw the victim group as getting power the more they also saw their own group getting power.

Table 2. *Correlation table for Experiment 2.*

	Satisfaction	Negative Feelings	Ingroup Power	Outgroup Power	Obligation Shifting
Negative Feelings	.15				
Ingroup Power	.29**	.18*			
Outgroup Power	.14	.06	.31**		
Obligation Shifting	.67***	-.26**	.45***	.19*	
Image Improvement	.56***	.16	.47***	-.01	.61***

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

For each outcome DV, I examined the independent effects of the four predictors across the whole sample using linear regression. The analyses then focused on differences between conditions on outcome variables (satisfaction and negative feelings). I tested for omnibus differences on each variable between conditions using ANOVA omnibus tests. Where differences between conditions were found, I examined which conditions differed from each other using Tukey HSD post-hoc tests. Finally, for the outcome variables of satisfaction and negative feelings, any significant differences found between the conditions in the post-hoc ANOVA tests, were used to create contrasts. These contrasts were used to conduct multiple mediation bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to test simultaneously those variables that predicted the DV in the regression as mediators between the contrast and the outcome DV itself.

Satisfaction.

Overall regression analysis. I conducted a simultaneous multiple regression with satisfaction as the DV and the four predictors (image improvement, obligation shifting, ingroup power, and outgroup power) as IVs. Image improvement ($\beta = .28$, $sr^2 = .21$, $p = .001$) and obligation shifting ($\beta = .53$, $sr^2 = .40$, $p < .001$) significantly, positively and independently predicted participants' satisfaction with the statement. Neither ingroup nor outgroup power were significant ($ps > .196$) in this model. The overall regression model was significant, $F(4, 135) = 31.63$, $Adj.R^2 = .48$, $MSE = 1.45$, $p < .001$.

ANOVA post-hoc tests. The three conditions differed from each other on the outcome of satisfaction, $F(2, 135) = 6.92$, $MSE = 2.54$, $p = .001$. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed that the apology statement ($M = 3.11$, $SD = 1.66$, $p = .003$) and the reparations statement ($M = 3.01$, $SD = 1.66$, $p = .007$) were both significantly more satisfying than the control statement ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 1.44$), but found no significant difference between the apology and the reparations statement ($p = .956$).

Control vs. either conciliatory act. Because the control statement was less satisfying than either conciliatory act, in the ANOVA test, I created a contrast based on this difference with the control coded -2 and each conciliatory act condition (apology and reparations) coded 1. I then used a multiple mediator bootstrap test (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to test whether those predictors of the outcomes significant in the regression (image improvement and obligation shifting) mediated the difference between the conditions on the outcome satisfaction. Because neither type of power showed a relationship with satisfaction, they were excluded from the analyses.

Obligation shifting and image improvement perceptions were significant independent mediators of the relationship of the contrast with satisfaction (confidence intervals of each indirect path did not include 0). There was a significant total effect of mediators and contrast on satisfaction, but the direct effect was non-significant, showing full mediation (see Figure 1). Thus, obligation shifting and image improvement completely and independently accounted for the greater satisfaction with either conciliatory act compared to the control statement.

Negative Feelings.

Overall regression analysis. A second linear regression analysis tested the four predictors but with negative feelings as the DV. In this regression, only obligation shifting ($\beta = .24$, $sr^2 = .18$, $p = .032$) significantly predicted participants' negative feelings about the Guatemalans. The more participants felt obligation had shifted the more negative they felt towards the Guatemalans. Image and the two types of power were non-significant (all $ps > .35$). The overall regression model was significant, $F(4, 135) = 2.60$, $Adj.R^2 = .05$, $MSE = .57$, $p = .039$.

ANOVA post-hoc tests. The three conditions did not differ from each other on the extent to which participants felt negative feelings towards the victim group, $F(2, 135) = 1.87$, $MSE = 0.57$, $p = .158$. Because there were no differences between conditions in the ANOVA omnibus test, no mediation bootstrapping test was conducted.



Figure 1. Mediation analysis for Experiment 2 testing mediators of the relationship between the condition contrast and satisfaction.

Discussion

In this experiment, the most powerful predictor of group members' satisfaction with an official apologetic act was the perception that the act had shifted a burden of obligation to the victim group. Supporting the view that obligation shifting is compatible with a negative attitude toward the victim group, obligation shifting was related to negative feelings, while image improvement concerns were unrelated to this outcome. This experiment also showed that perceiving a statement as improving the perpetrator group's image predicted satisfaction for members of the perpetrator group, while perceiving it as losing or gaining power for the perpetrator group had little to do with satisfaction.

In this experiment, satisfaction also had little to do with a collective altruistic desire to give the victim group power. The perception that a conciliatory act provides more power for the victim group had no relationship with satisfaction for perpetrator group members. Together with the lack of concern with gaining power for the ingroup, this finding reinforces the needs-based model's view that power is not a concern to the more powerful perpetrator group that already possesses it (Shnabel et al., 2008; 2009).

Additionally, in this experiment, American participants were more satisfied with their own government's response when it was a statement including either a verbal apology or financial reparations, compared to a control statement which indicated no plans to offer redress. Moreover, this preference for any conciliatory act over a control statement was fully explained by image improvement and obligation shifting as mediators. It seems that any conciliatory act (financial or verbal) allowed perpetrator group members to feel they had shifted obligation to the victim group and improved their own image, more so than a control statement.

Interestingly, there were no differences between the conciliatory acts and the control statement on the outcome of negative feelings, despite the relationship observed between obligation shifting and increased negative feelings. There may be other reasons why a control statement which suggests refusing to apologise or give reparations might lead to negative feelings, despite the lesser ability to shift obligation. Perpetrator group members might feel hostile toward the victim group after a refusal statement is given, feeling perhaps that there was no need to apologise or give reparations in the first place and the victims' claims are unfair. Likewise, they may get just as angry if a conciliatory act is seen as shifting obligation, leading to the hostile consequences (Viles, 2002).

Apologies may not be desired in the first place because they require admitting the ingroup has engaged in an immoral activity, which is threatening (Leeuwen, Bosch, Castano, & Hopman, 2010; Tavuchis, 1993). However, they also may work to restore moral status at the same time (Staub et al., 2005; Tavuchis, 1993). In other words, imagining that groups fall somewhere on a scale of moral image, the simple act of apologising both demotes and then restores the group's moral status at the same instance. Therefore, it may be less important to see differences in outcomes after an apology compared to no apology, but more important to understand the ways in which apologies are appraised, which according to this and the previous experiment is due mainly to image improvement and obligation shifting perceptions.

The next experiment sought to generalize these tests of the role of image improvement and obligation to a different population and issue. Additionally, the design of Experiment 3 will address a potential explanation for power's lack of effects in Experiments 1 and 2. Perhaps in Experiment 2, the individual elements of a verbal apology separate from material reparations were not seen as making enough of a contribution to losing the perpetrator group's power, because they did not individually constitute a full conciliatory act (see Blatz et al., 2009). The next experiment will provide a full apologetic act and compare it to giving either a verbal apology without reparations or financial reparations without a verbal apology.

Experiment 3: "Egyptian Landmines"

The next experiment looked to replicate the findings of image improvement and obligation shifting predicting satisfaction found Experiments 1 and 2, but in yet another context. This experiment confronted British participants with the issue of landmines left behind in Egypt by

the British government. During World War II, a number of nations, including Britain, were responsible for the placement of millions of landmines in the Egyptian desert (Hawley, 2000). After the war, most of these unexploded mines were left behind. Some estimate that up to 20 million landmines continue to make the desert dangerous, hindering the local economy and killing Egyptian civilians (Hawley, 2000; Oppong & Kallepeni, 2005). In this experiment I presented information on Britain's role in the placement of mines and on the subsequent calls for an apology and reparations to Egypt. This experiment examines how members of the transgressing group (Britain) respond to their government providing an apology, reparations, or both in response. Unlike the first two experiments, this one examines the difference between a stronger conciliatory act (one which includes both an apology and reparations) and the individual acts given alone.

As mediating variables, the same possible appraisals of the apology measured in Experiment 2 were used: that the act would improve Britain's *image* and that the act would impose an *obligation* on the Egyptians to accept it and be grateful. Even though British power was not significant at all in the previous studies, for this experiment potential (resource and influential) power gains or losses for Britain or the victim group (Egyptians) were still included as a possible predictor of the outcomes.

Like Experiment 2, this experiment examines differences between the types of acts on the outcome variables negative feelings and satisfaction. Chapter 3 discussed the differences between types of apologies, including Nobles' theory that reparations are more of a "door closing" act than apologies. This was tested in Experiment 2, but no differences were found between material reparations and an apology given alone. For this experiment, I decided that instead of comparing verbal apology and financial reparation offers to a refusal statement as

control, it would be better to compare the two acts to a dual act that contains both verbal apology and reparation. Reparations without apology can be seen as a pragmatic way to save face; apology without reparations can be seen as a cynical public relations move; but a statement combining both would have the greatest possibility of being seen as a genuine loss of power, levying both material and public relations costs upon the perpetrator group. If this were so, then comparing single- to multiple-element statements would provide a stronger test of the role of power loss in satisfaction.

If losing power is at all a concern for perpetrators, then a dual act should be the most threatening and thus the least satisfying to perpetrator group members. However, if, as suggested by the results of the first two Experiments, power is not a strong concern for perpetrator groups, a combined apology and reparations statement would be most satisfying because it both addresses moral image concerns as well as the financial pay off, which together should lead to a shift in obligation to the victim group.

Despite the lack of differences between an apology and reparations in Experiment 2, this experiment will continue to explore possible differences between giving a verbal apology alone versus giving financial reparations. In the context of the previous experiment (unethical medical studies in Guatemala), reparations without an apology may have appeared to be less appropriate as a response than in another context, given the highly immoral behaviour that needed to be acknowledged. One possibility is that, in cases where the issue is less moral and more of a monetary problem, reparations may be more satisfying for perpetrators. In the case of landmines in Egypt, the British left the landmines behind not on purpose, but during what is often considered a very moral war (World War II). In other words, British participants may feel less satisfied with an apology because they may not feel a verbal apology is an appropriate response,

given that the British did not intentionally leave landmines behind in the first place and they were fighting on the morally "right" side of the war. If motivated to shift obligation to the victim group, financial reparations might be seen as more important for "resolving" the issue. To the extent that reparations both shift obligation effectively and improve the ingroup's image compared to apologies, and assuming that material power is not an important ingroup concern (Shnabel et al, 2009), then reparations should also create greater ingroup satisfaction than mere verbal apologies.

It was hypothesised that reparations would be more satisfying than an apology but that the dual (apology with reparations) act should be more satisfying than either single act given alone. It was also expected that the appraisals of improving the image of the ingroup and shifting obligation to the victim group to predict satisfaction but for power concerns to remain unimportant to perpetrators. Obligation shifting was expected to lead to more negative feelings about the victim group but not image improvement and power concerns were not expected to demonstrate that relationship. Primarily, this research aimed to see if the appraisals that predict the outcomes (satisfaction and negative feelings) could explain differences between the conditions. Most importantly, I expected any differences in satisfaction or negative feelings about the victims following an apology, reparations, or the dual act to be explained by the mediators of image improvement and obligation shifting.

Method

Participants. One hundred and five participants were recruited at the University of Kent. As an incentive, participants were entered into a prize drawing of 50 GBP (about $75). One

participant was excluded because of non-British citizenship. The 104 remaining participants were used for analysis (72 female; age $M = 21.68$, $SD = 4.35$, range = 18-52).

Design. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three conditions and read about a statement made by the British government in response to the issue of landmines in Egypt: apology with no reparations; reparations with no apology; or a dual act with both reparations and an apology ($N = 34$-36 per cell).

Procedure. The experiment was conducted online. After completing some initial measures not relevant to the current hypotheses, all participants read a half page summary of the history of landmines left in Egypt after World War II (See Appendix 3). The report discussed the estimated numbers of people killed and hurt by landmines, the detriment to the economic development of the region, and the difficulty and expense of removing landmines. Most importantly, the summary placed emphasis on Britain's role in the placement of landmines. All information in the summary was factual and taken from various news sources (e.g. Hawley, 2000).

After answering a number of questions not relevant to the present hypotheses, participants were then randomly assigned to read one of three news articles outlining the response of the British government to the landmine situation in Egypt (See Appendix 4). Although presented as genuine news, the articles were fictitious and constructed to manipulate the type of response attributed to the British government. Each of the three conditions presented a different response from the British government to the issue: an apology alone, reparations alone, or a combined statement with both an apology and reparations provided. The response was given by the leader of the British government at the time, Gordon Brown (see Appendix 2). The verbal apology was

constructed to include the elements identified by various scholars as necessary to a successful apology, except for the promise of aid – it expressed acknowledgement of the harm to Egyptians, of Britain's responsibility for the harm, and remorse. By contrast, the reparations-only condition presented a similar statement but without the verbal apology elements, and with an expression of plans to provide Egypt with a 2 million pound assistance package for victim compensation and mine clearance. Finally, the combined statement provided both the full apology and the financial reparation plans. In order to be sure that participants did not assume other previous action had been taken, all statements specified that this statement marked the first time Britain had responded to the landmine situation in Egypt.

After reading the article, participants completed the following two outcome measures on seven point Likert scales.

Satisfaction. The same two items as in Experiments 1 and 2 were used to measure satisfaction with the statement and were correlated, $r = .68$, $p < .001$ ($M = 3.77$; $SD = 1.31$).

Negative feelings toward Egyptians. The same two items used in Experiment 2 were used to measure negative feelings about the Egyptians but changed for the context (e.g. *"I feel angry with the Egyptians."*). The two items were highly correlated ($r = .80$, $p < .001$; $M = 1.98$; $SD = 1.17$).

After completing the outcome measures, participants then completed measures of the four mediating variables.

Image improvement. The same three items used in Experiment 2, but changed for the British context, were used to measure image improvement perceptions (e.g. "*How will the*

statement affect Britain's reputation in other countries?") and were very reliable (α = .88; M = 4.13; SD = 1.06).

Obligation shifting. The same four items as in Experiment 2 were used to measure shifting obligation to the victim group but were changed to match the Egyptian/British context (e.g. *"The Egyptians should be grateful to Britain for their response to the land mine situation"*) and the scale was very reliable (α = .81; M = 3.21; SD = 1.19).

Outgroup power. The same three items as in Experiment 1 and 2 were included to measure potential power change for the victim group but changed to match the context and I added two additional items which tapped into potential economic and resource power changes (e.g. *How much will the statement increase or decrease the economic power of Egypt?").* The five item scale was reliable (α = .72; M = 4.13; SD = .68).

Ingroup power. The same five items used to measure outgroup power were used to measure potential power change for Britain but were changed to address the perpetrator ingroup (e.g. "*How much will the statement increase or decrease the political power of Britain?*"). However, the two items that tapped into changes in the economic and resource power of Britain were removed due to low item-total correlation (< .23). The remaining three items were the same as in Experiment 1 and proved reliable (α = .73; M = 4.04; SD = 0.70).

After providing some demographic information, participants were debriefed. Debriefing included information about the actual response from the UK government to the landmine issue. In reality, the British government has provided some financial reparations and assistance over the years but has never provided a formal apology on the issue.

Results

Correlations between predictor (image improvement, obligation shifting, ingroup power, and outgroup power) and outcome variables (satisfaction and negative feelings) can be seen in Table 3. My analyses focused on each of the two outcomes, following a similar analytic strategy as in Experiment 2. I tested which predictors were significant in multiple linear regressions and if there were differences between conditions on the two outcomes. Contrasts were created for any differences found between conditions. Finally they were tested in multiple mediation bootstrapping models to see if the predictors could explain in part or fully conditional differences.

Table 3. *Correlation table for Study 3.*

	Satisfaction	Negative Feelings	Ingroup Power	Outgroup Power	Obligation Shifting
Negative Feelings	.22*				
Ingroup Power	.12	-.11			
Outgroup Power	.37***	.12	-.02		
Obligation Shifting	.73***	.36***	.23*	.19*	
Image Improvement	.69***	-.03	.42***	.39***	.67***

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Satisfaction.

Overall regression analysis. As with Experiment 1 and 2, across all conditions, image improvement (β = .45, sr^2 = .30, $p < .001$) and obligation shifting (β = .46, sr^2 = .34, $p < .001$) independently predicted participants' satisfaction. Ingroup power also had a relationship with satisfaction, but unlike the other variables, this relationship was negative (β = -.17, sr^2 = -.15, p = .014). The more the conciliatory action was perceived as improving Britain's power, the less satisfying it was. Outgroup power was not a significant predictor of satisfaction (p = .79). The overall regression model was significant, $F(4, 103) = 42.53$, $Adj.R^2$ = .62, MSE = 0.66, $p < .001$.

ANOVA post-hoc tests. The three-condition ANOVA on satisfaction was significant, $F(2, 103) = 22.08$, MSE = 1.22, $p < .001$. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed that the financial reparations act ($p < .001$) and the dual act ($p < .001$) were both more satisfying than an apology given alone (apology: M = 2.79, SD= 1.11; reparations: M = 3.97, SD = 1.07; dual act: M = 4.51, SD = 1.13). There was a trend towards the dual act being more satisfying than the act with reparations alone, but this was not significant (p = .103).

Apology vs. reparations and dual act. Next, as with Experiment 2, I tested if the significant predictors from the regression mediated the relationship between the different conditions and the satisfaction DV. I created a contrast with the more satisfying conditions (reparations and the dual act) coded positively (1) and apology coded negatively (-2). In a multiple mediation bootstrapping model, image improvement and obligation shifting were significant independent mediators (CI not including 0) of the contrast on satisfaction but ingroup power was not (CI included 0; see Figure 2). Power was a small and, in agreement with the regression model, negative predictor of satisfaction but was not significantly predicted by the

contrast. There was a significant total effect of mediators and contrast on satisfaction. The direct effect was reduced but still significant, suggesting that, for this issue, image improvement and obligation shifting partially mediated the preference for acts including reparations over a verbal apology given alone.



Figure 2. Mediation analysis for Experiment 3 testing mediators of the relationship between the condition contrast and the outcome satisfaction.

Negative feelings.

Overall regression analysis. I next tested the basic regression model on the outcome variable of negative feelings. As with Experiment 2, obligation shifting (β = .66, sr^2 = .48, $p <$ .001) was a significant positive predictor of negative attitudes towards Egyptians. Image improvement, however, negatively predicted negative attitudes towards Egyptians (β = -.46, sr^2 =

-.31, $p = .001$). In other words, the more the statement was seen as improving the perpetrator group's image, the less negative one felt about Egyptians. Neither ingroup nor outgroup power was significant (all $p > .30$). The overall regression model was significant, $F(4, 103) = 8.75$, $Adj.R^2 = .23$, $MSE = 1.06$, $p < .001$.

ANOVA post-hoc tests. The three-condition ANOVA on negative feelings was significant, $F(2, 103) = 6.28$, $MSE = 1.25$, $p = .003$. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed that the apology condition led to significantly reduced negative feelings about the victim group ($p = .002$) compared to the dual act. There was no significant difference between the reparations act and either the apology act ($p = .13$) or the dual act ($p = .27$) on negative feelings (apology: $M = 1.49$, $SD = 0.78$; reparations: $M = 2.01$, $SD = 1.04$; dual act, $M = 2.43$, $SD = 1.41$).

Apology vs. dual act. A contrast was created between the apology and the dual act, with the more negative condition (dual act) coded as 1 and the other (apology) as -1. The reparations act was excluded from the bootstrapping models because it was not significantly different from the other two acts. In a multiple mediation bootstrapping model with the significant predictors from the regression, image improvement and obligation shifting perceptions were significant independent mediators (CI not including 0) of the contrast on negative feelings (Figure 3). There was a significant total effect and the direct effect of the contrast was also still significant, suggesting that, for this issue, obligation shifting partially mediated the increase in negative feelings. In contrast, image improvement helped to suppress obligation's mediating effect, reducing rather than increasing negative feelings after reparations.



Note. Standardized regression weights are shown.
*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Figure 3. Mediation analysis for Experiment 3 testing mediators of the condition contrast and the outcome negative feelings.

Discussion

The results of this experiment were similar to those of Experiment 1 and 2. Obligation shifting was again an independent predictor of satisfaction for perpetrator group members, while image improvement also remained an important predictor. In spite of improving the potential power threat of the apology by including a condition with both verbal apology and promises of material reparations, concern for the perpetrator group's power relations was again not a factor in the satisfaction of the perpetrator group. In this experiment, perpetrator group members were so unconcerned with their own power, that satisfaction with a conciliatory act slightly increased the more British power was seen as being given away. This small negative effect was unexpected,

but may have been due to the understanding that if a conciliatory act was seen overtly as helping Britain to gain power, it could be less effective.

Moreover, perceptions of obligation shifting explained why a stronger conciliatory act, involving reparation in addition to mere apology, led to increased negative feelings toward the victim group. Image improvement, meanwhile, did not lead to this negative outcome. In fact, greater image improvement from the stronger conciliatory act was associated with lower negative feelings, partially suppressing the obligation shifting path's effect. It seems that in one way, describing an apology plus reparations did create more of a threat to perpetrator group members, as expressed by this increased hostility toward Egyptians. Experiment 2, which described either an apology or reparations alone, did not find effects of the type of act described on negative attitudes.

In this experiment, the acts which contained financial reparations were more satisfying than an apology given alone. This differs from Experiment 2, which showed no differences between a verbal apology and financial reparations given alone. This suggests that different acts may be preferred in some situations and not in others, depending on the issue and its context. This finding may specifically reflect the nature of the issue of landmines in Egypt. Landmines present a clear need for financial reparations, as there is a need for funding to remove landmines. Moreover, the funds, once spent, are in theory able lead to effective resolution of the problem. Reparations for truly horrific or long-past historical injustices, however, may allow only a token compensation. In such cases (e.g. slavery, women's oppression, or war crimes), apologies may be seen as more appropriate, therefore more satisfying. Furthermore, in this experiment, the apologetic acts was for landmines left during World War II, which participants may have seen as a morally justified conflict.

Moreover, the mines were not left with the explicit intention to harm Egyptians. Other issues, like the abuse of medical research in Guatemala in Experiment 2, may be more moral in nature, and harder to repair; in such a case, reparations may not be deemed a more appropriate response than a verbal apology. Despite these differences, both studies so far have shown that satisfaction with acts increases the more they are seen as shifting obligation to the victim group and improving the perpetrator group's image. These results also highlight a potential negative consequence of stronger conciliatory acts: to the extent that they are seen as shifting obligation to the victim group, they can also create more negative feelings toward that group.

Image improvement and obligation shifting were also strong mediators of the difference between giving both a combined statement or providing either single act alone. Consistent with most theoretical views on apology, it was found that a promise of reparations accompanied by an apology was more satisfying than either element given alone. The combined apologetic action, however, also led to more of a desire to close the door on future relations and more negative feelings about the victim group than giving either single act alone. These differences in satisfaction were again explained by image and obligation, and not by perceived power changes for the perpetrator or the victim group. Obligation shifting alone mediated the differences between the dual action and individual apologetic actions on closing the door and, as with the previous contrast, image improvement and obligation shifting had opposing mediation effects.

British participants were neither more or less satisfied by the recognition that reparations provided more power to the Egyptians. This suggests that ingroup members are not more satisfied with an apology because it meets the needs of the victims. This, along with the continued finding that there is a lack of concern with ingroup power, reinforces the theory that these types of power concerns are unimportant to an apologising group (Schnabel et al, 2009).

The results also highlight the potential negative consequence of one standard for evaluating perpetrator group leaders' actions: a satisfactory settlement, to the extent that it is seen as shifting obligation to the victim group, can also be accompanied by more negative feelings toward that group. However, unlike Experiment 2, this experiment also found (somewhat hopefully perhaps) that image improvement actually predicted less negative feelings about the victims. Thus, image improvement is not inconsistent with positive outcomes of apologetic actions. However, obligation shifting seems to be a more cynical and even hostile motive for partaking in a process of reconciliation. While obligation shifting has not yet been studied as such in experimental social psychology, it seems that it may have important implications for future work on apologies and reconciliation. Obligation shifting in a way can be a contemptuous process. It suggests that perpetrators have finished their responsibility for reconciling and permits them to wash their hands of the issue. Furthermore, the more British people in this experiment felt that they had shifted obligation to the Egyptians, the more they felt a sense of indignation towards the victims. This attitude of "we apologised, now you had better get over it and forgive us" actually led to feelings of anger and insult for ingroup members.

I next sought to extend these findings by looking at another potentially negative outcome of conciliatory acts. Conciliatory acts can sometimes as described by Nobles (2008), signal a desire to "close the door" on the victim group, denying them further help or cooperation. By shifting obligation to the victim group, perpetrator group members may feel that they have ended their responsibility to the victim group. Someone who views apology this way will feel justified in withholding further aid, because obligation to act is now with the victim group. Therefore, the next experiment expanded on the previous by examining another potential outcome of obligation shifting: the desire to "close the door" on the relationship with the victim group.

Experiment 4: "The Irish Famine"

Experiment 4 attempted to show the differential outcomes of image improvement and obligation shifting (as seen in the first three experiments) by again looking at different types of apologetic acts following a transgression. However, unlike the first experiments, this work aimed to include both potential negative outcomes of apologies for perpetrators: negative feelings and reduced support. Experiment 1 suggested that perpetrators are less willing to provide reparations to victims following an apologetic act which is seen as shifting obligation to the victim group. Image improvement did not have this effect. Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that obligation shifting can lead to more negative feelings about the victim group, but failed to measure future support because the studies included a condition of financial reparations. In order to examine future support as a potential outcome of reparations, a new measure of future support is included in this experiment.

For this experiment, I explored another historical context: the Irish Famine. During the years 1845-1849, the Irish potato blight caused widespread starvation for nearly half of Ireland's population which depended on potatoes for subsistence. The British government failed to respond to the disaster and their systematic discrimination against Irish Catholics led to as many as 1.5 million Irish deaths due to starvation; these deaths in conjunction with the mass emigration of Irish, Ireland lost nearly one-third of its population. This experiment took these events as its topic, and looked again at both types of conciliatory acts (apologies or reparations given alone), but as with Experiments 1 and 2 compared these to a non-apology statement. The Irish famine was chosen as the context for this experiment because, in addition to testing the previous model in a variety of contexts, it is important to vary the relationship between the perpetrator and victim group. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, it could be argued that the victim group is somewhat removed

from the perpetrator group. In other words, Bunce Islanders and Egyptians for the British may seem a particularly distant group (culturally and geographically). Similarly, the Guatemalans for Americans may not feel to be a very close victim group. This experiment chose to look at the Irish for the British, because historically this has been a close group to the British. The Irish are culturally much more similar, and it would be hard to deny the importance of Ireland in British history and current events. Additionally, Ireland could be considered a western country, whereas the other victims groups may be seen much more as "the other".

In this research, one aim has been to understand if perpetrators are aware of, or sensitive to the needs of victims. If perpetrators were altruistically apologising for victims, or if they believed the needs of victims were important for future relations, then power for the victim group should be an important predictor of satisfaction. Furthermore, another difference between this issue and the previous contexts used is that, it could be argued, the previous contexts have all dealt with power relations that are vastly unequal. Ireland may not be seen as having much less power than Britain, at least when compared to the perceived power of Egypt or Bunce Island. Thus, it is also important to see if the model holds up in contexts where power differences are somewhat less extreme. I still predicted that my model of image improvement and obligation shifting would remain consistent across different contexts of apologies; however, it is important to test this model in contexts which vary both the issue and the relative closeness of the victim group.

Again, I expected that the model of image and obligation shifting as predictors of satisfaction should stand, even in contexts where power differences may be more ambiguous. Obligation shifting should again predict negative feelings, as well as reduced support (similar to Experiment 1). However, unlike Experiment 1, this experiment measures reduced support not through willingness to support the victims on the present issue, but instead measures willingness

to support the victim group in an unrelated future issue and provide participants with an opportunity to give or not give to the victims in a different context. In other words, participants were not measured on how much they are "closing the door" on the current issue, but measured on their willingness to "close the door" on relations with the victim group in general. I expected that obligation shifting should not only lead to a desire to close the door on the current issue, but that this experiment would show that perpetrators feel that obligation shifting justifies reducing support on future help as well. I also expected that image improvement should not lead to increased negative feelings or reduced support for the victim group, if anything, perhaps there would be a negative relationship between these variables (as in Experiment 3).

Furthermore, I predicted that when presented with a summary of past transgressions, perpetrator group members would be more satisfied with either an apology or reparations versus a control statement. Like Experiment 2, I also expected that either conciliatory act would lead to less support for future giving. Most importantly, it was hypothesised that any differences between an apology, reparations, and the control statement would be explained by image and obligation shifting as mediators, rather than by their alternatives.

Method

Participants. This experiment had 165 British participants complete an online questionnaire. Participants were recruited through the University of Kent's research participation scheme and received course credit in exchange for participation. Two participants were removed for invariant responses throughout the questionnaire. The remaining 163 participants were used for analysis (135 female; age $M = 19.83$, $SD = 3.41$, *range* = 18-47).

Design. Participants were randomly assigned to read an apology, reparations, or a non-apology statement in response to the British involvement in the Irish potato famine (N = 52-56).

Procedure. The experiment was conducted online. All participants read a short summary of the history of the Irish potato famine (see Appendix 5). The news summary discussed the responsibility of the British for failing to response to the famine and the inability of the Irish to ever completely recover the population loss suffered because of the famine. All the information about the history of the famine was factual. The news summary discussed how Britain's former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, went to Ireland for an event commemorating the famine and made a statement during the event.

Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three statements made by Blair on behalf of Britain: an apology, reparations, or a control statement (see Appendix 6). In the apology condition Blair gave a full apology saying he was "sorry about the deep scars left by the famine" and expressed feeling guilty and in deep pain over the British government's failure to act. The summary also explicitly stated that there were no clear plans to provide reparations. In the reparations condition, Blair made a statement offering "nearly £1 million in financial reparations to the descendants of the potato farmers affected by the famine." This summary explicitly stated that there were no clear plans to provide an apology. In the control condition, Blair attended the same event and gave a statement, but in this version, his statement said he was "'honoured to be invited' but that there were not currently any plans to provide an official apology for Britain's role in the famine or provide financial reparations to descendants of those who suffered during the famine. In reality, Blair did apologise for the famine during his visit. However, for this experiment, participants read either that Blair apologised or that he issued a statement which explicitly expressed that there were no plans to apologise.

After reading the article, participants completed the following measures on seven point Likert scales.

Satisfaction. The same two items as in Experiments 1 and 2 were used for assessing satisfaction with the statement and were correlated at $r = .58$, $p < .001$ ($M = 3.23$; $SD = 1.17$).

Negative feelings. The same two items used in Experiment 2 measuring negative feelings were used to assess negative feelings about the victim group but were changed for the Irish context. The two items were correlated at $r = .68$, $p < .001$ ($M = 2.25$; $SD = 1.15$).

Image improvement. The same three items used in the previous experiment measured perceived image changes for Britain and the scale was highly reliable ($\alpha = .86$; $M = 3.99$; $SD = 0.97$).

Obligation shifting. The same four items used in the previous two experiments were used to measure obligation shifting but changed for the Irish context. Two items, one measuring the obligation to forgive and the other measuring the obligation to become a closer ally, were changed slightly to use the word "ought" (e.g. "*The Irish ought to forgive the British for what happened.*") in order to reflect more of a sense of obligation and not just an expectation. The scale was reliable ($\alpha = .71$; $M = 3.59$; $SD = 0.98$).

Ingroup power. Four items were used to measure potential power change for Britain, including the three items used in Experiment 2, plus one item which tapped into general life improvement for the ingroup ("*How will the statement improve or worsen people's lives in Britain?*"). The scale was reliable ($\alpha = .66$; $M = 4.00$; $SD = 0.52$).

Outgroup power. The same four items measuring ingroup power were changed to be directed towards the victim outgroup (the Irish) ("*How will the statement improve or worsen people's lives in Ireland?*") and was reliable (α = .60; M = 4.02; SD = 0.48).

After completing these items, participants were given another article to read about British Irish relations and asked to respond to the questions which followed. The second article described the present day (November 2010) banking crisis in Ireland (see Appendix 7). Participants were told that, due to a banking crisis, the budget in Ireland was facing a deficit of 32% GDP and that in response Britain would be providing nearly 7 billion GBP in order to support Ireland because "*failing to reach out to the Republic could result in very bad consequences for Northern Ireland*". Participants were then asked the following question:

Further support. In order to measure support for future aid to the victim group, participants read the following single item: "*The UK has offered 7bl GBP to Ireland. Is this amount adequate?*" Participants indicated if they: (1) *did not support assistance*; (2) *supported assistance but would have given less*; (3) *supported assistance but would not give more*; (4) *supported assistance and would give more*. Thus high numbers indicate increased support for the aid and even a desire to give more, while low numbers indicated reduced willingness to support aid (M = 2.93, SD = .86).

After providing some demographic information, participants were debriefed. Debriefing included information about the actual response from the UK government to the Potato Famine. In reality, Blair had apologised on behalf of Britain although no financial reparations had been paid.

Results

As with the previous experiments, my analyses focused separately on each of the outcome variables (satisfaction, negative feelings, and future support). First, I tested which of the predictors (image improvement, obligation shifting, power for the ingroup, or power for the victim outgroup) predicted each outcome. Next, I tested differences between the conditions (apology, reparations, or no-apology) on that outcome variable. When differences were found, contrasts were created based on those differences and multiple mediation bootstrapping models were used to test if the successful predictors of each outcome in the regression model could explain the relationship between the contrasted conditions and the outcome variable (for correlations between variables see Table 4).

Satisfaction.

Overall regression analysis. In a multiple linear regression with image, obligation and the power variables, on satisfaction, as predicted, image improvement ($\beta = .22$, $sr^2 = .17$, $p = .008$) and obligation shifting ($\beta = .52$, $sr^2 = .46$, $p < .001$) significantly, positively and independently predicted participants' satisfaction with the statement. Neither power measures were significant ($ps > .300$) in this model, $F(4, 158) = 26.30$, $Adj.R^2 = .39$, $MSE = 0.85$, $p < .001$.

ANOVA post-hoc tests. The three-condition ANOVA on satisfaction was significant, $F(2, 162) = 6.01$, $MSE = 1.29$, $p = .003$. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed that, similar to Experiment 1, the apology condition ($p = .006$) and the reparations condition ($p = .011$) were both significantly more satisfying than the control statement (control: $M = 2.78$, $SD = 1.12$; apology: $M = 3.46$, $SD = 1.19$; reparations: $M = 3.42$, $SD = 1.10$). There was no significant difference between the apology act and the reparations act ($p = .98$).

Table 4. *Correlation table for Experiment 4.*

	Satisfaction	Negative Feelings	Further Support	Ingroup Power	Outgroup Power	Obligation Shifting
Negative Feelings	.33***					
Further Support	-.14	-.17*				
Ingroup Power	.26**	-.02	-.09			
Outgroup Power	-.03	-.12	-.11	.15		
Obligation Shifting	.73***	.32***	-.28***	.32***	.02	
Image Improvement	.42***	-.02	.13	.56***	.20***	.67***

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Control statement vs. conciliatory acts. As with the previous experiments, multiple mediation bootstrapping models were used to test whether differences between the acts could be explained by the significant predictors from the regression. A contrast was created between the control condition and the two types of conciliatory acts, with the more satisfying conditions coded positively (apology and reparations conditions, 1, vs. control, -2). Image improvement and obligation shifting both significantly mediated (CI not including 0) the relationship between the condition contrast and satisfaction. The direct effect was reduced to non-significance suggesting full mediation (Figure 4).



Note. Standardized regression weights are shown.
*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Figure 4. Mediation analysis for Experiment 4 testing mediators of the condition contrast and satisfaction.

Negative feelings.

Overall regression analysis. In a similar regression, with negative feelings as the DV, only obligation shifting ($\beta = .41$, $sr^2 = .36$, $p < .001$) significantly, positively and independently predicted participants' negative feelings about the Irish. Image and the two power variables were all non-significant (all *p*s > .11). The overall regression model was significant, $F(4, 162) = 6.77$, $Adj.R^2 = .13$, $MSE = 1.16$, $p < .001$.

ANOVA post-hoc tests. In this experiment, there were no differences in negative feelings between conditions (control: $M = 2.29$, $SD = 1.13$; apology: $M = 2.33$, $SD = 1.24$; reparations: $M = 2.13$, $SD = 1.09$; $p = .648$). Thus, no bootstrapping test was conducted.

Further support.

Overall regression analysis. In a similar regression on the DV of support for aid to the Republic of Ireland, obligation shifting was the only predictor, and was negative in direction (β = -.29, sr^2 = -.26, $p < .001$). Across all statements, the more a perpetrator group member perceived obligation shifting, the less they supported giving present-day aid to Ireland. Image and the two types of power were all non-significant in this model (all ps > .15). The overall regression model was significant, $F(4, 162) = 3.94$, $Adj.R^2 = .07$, $MSE = 0.69$, $p < .001$.

ANOVA post-hoc tests. A three-condition ANOVA on support for aid was significant, $F(2, 162) = 3.59$, $MSE = 0.72$, $p = .030$. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed that the apology condition led to significantly ($p = .047$) less support for aid than the control statement. The control statement led to marginally significant greater support for aid ($p = .063$) compared to the reparations statement. There was no significant difference ($p = .990$) between the apology act and the reparations act (control: $M = 3.19$, $SD = 0.86$; apology: $M = 2.80$, $SD = 0.85$; reparations: $M = 2.82$, $SD = 0.83$).

Control statement vs. conciliatory acts. Because differences between the act of reparations and the control statement approached significance at $p = .063$ under the conservative Tukey HSD test, but the reparations act did not differ from the apology act, I still include the reparations act along with the apology act in a contrast against the control to test mediation. The condition leading to more support was coded positively (control, 2; apology and reparations conditions, -1). Obligation shifting was a significant independent mediator between the contrast and further support (CI did not include 0). Obligation shifting fully mediated the decrease in support for aid to the Irish after either an apology or reparations, when compared to the control (Figure 5).



Figure 5. Mediation analysis for Experiment 4 testing mediator of the condition contrast and further support for aid to Ireland.

Discussion

In this experiment, as with Experiments 1, 2 and 3, obligation shifting and image improvement independently predicted satisfaction with the apologetic act, while obligation shifting alone predicted increased negative feelings about the victim group. Similar to Experiment 2, image improvement and obligation shifting mediated the preference for either conciliatory act over the statement which ruled out providing any apology. Unlike the results of Experiment 3, there were no differences between giving an apology and giving reparations on the outcome variables.

Although speculative, this could be because this experiment returned to an issue which (like Experiment 2) can be seen as a moral issue for which an apology might be just as appropriate of a response as material reparations. The current situation in Ireland may suggest that reparations are less important than in the situation of Egyptian landmines where money is crucial to assisting Egyptians remove the landmines. The differing results of this experiment

compared to Experiment 3, suggest that only in some cases are reparations more image improving and obligation shifting than an apologetic act. The differences between apologies and reparations may be very situation dependent. Of course, it would be beyond the scope of this research to outline all of the reasons why apologies and reparations may be more or less appropriate in different circumstances, but nonetheless this research provides evidence that differences are not always present.

There were no differences between the conciliatory acts and the control statement on negative feelings; however obligation shifting across all conditions predicted increased negative feelings about the victim group. This is similar in finding to Experiment 1; suggesting that a statement which suggests refusing to provide any conciliatory act may have other reasons for relating to negative feelings.

Additionally, this experiment expanded on the previous experiments by including the additional negative outcome of obligation shifting: reduced support for victim groups. Unlike Experiment 1, which looked at willingness to give reparations for the same issue, this experiment looked at willingness to support the victim group in a seemingly unrelated issue. In this experiment, giving a verbal apology led to reduced support for providing financial aid to Ireland during the present day banking crisis, and this was mediated by obligation shifting only. In other words, evidence that the British government had provided an apology to Ireland for the past satisfied the perceived obligation to the Irish for the famine, and undermined the motivation to provide support for Ireland in the present day. The results of this experiment highlight the potential negative effects of obligation shifting on the future of intergroup relations after an apologetic act.

General Discussion of Chapter 3

The results of Experiments 1-4 suggest that image improvement and obligation shifting are important predictors of satisfaction for perpetrator groups. This has remained true across a variety of contexts and among American and British perpetrators. Furthermore, this research has been the first to provide evidence that, for perpetrators the perception of obligation shifting could potentially be tied to negative feelings about the victim group and can lead to reduced willingness to support future acts of reconciliation. Image improvement, although also satisfying, did not show the same positive relationship with reduced support for aid or negative feelings. If anything, the results of Experiment 3 suggests that image improvement may actually improve feelings about the victim group.

There is no evidence that gaining influence and power is important to perpetrators after an apology and there is also no evidence that providing power to victims is important to perpetrator either. It is important to note, however, that despite showing that victim power is unimportant to perpetrators, this research has not ruled out the possibility that perpetrators are not interested in satisfying victims. It may be that perpetrators are either unaware of victim needs for power or that they have not seen the power measure used thus far as providing victims with the right kind of power. This issue will be addressed further in Chapters 6 and 7.

Additionally these four experiments are the first in the field of apology research to examine differences between verbal apologies which vary in their strength, financial reparations, and combined acts across a variety of contexts. Experiment 1 neglected to show differences between a statement which would usually be considered an incomplete or poorly worded apology and a nearly full emotive apologetic statement. The apology statement stated that the perpetrators group took responsibility and felt remorse for their actions, whereas the non-apologetic statement

expressed sadness and acknowledgement of harm, but avoided taking responsibility for the harm and never explicitly apologised. Perpetrators seem insensitive to these subtle manipulations of words and seemed to believe that both statements equally led to ingroup image improvement and obligation shifting equally.

Experiments 2 and 4 compared apologies and reparations to statements which clearly refused to give either. In both those experiments, apologies and reparations were more satisfying than the refusal statement and this was mediated by the impression that either apologetic act improved the ingroup's image and shifted obligation more successfully than the refusal statement. In those experiments, which looked at unethical American medical studies in Guatemala and Britain's intentional worsening of the effects of the famine in Ireland, there were no differences between giving an apology and giving reparations on perpetrator satisfaction, both were seen as equally image improving and obligation shifting responses. Whereas in Experiment 3, which examined landmines left in Egypt after World War II, reparations given with or without an apology were more satisfying than giving just a verbal apology alone. The context of that experiment differed from the others in that it addressed an act that was clearly unintentional and also where the need for present day financial assistance is perhaps a more obvious need for victims, compared to a request for verbal acknowledgement and remorse. However, it is interesting to note that even if perpetrators felt that reparations was a more appropriate response in that context, this was not explained by the expectation that reparations give more power to the victim group. Instead, the acts seen as the most satisfying were explained by the impression that they improved the ingroup's image and shifted obligation off the ingroup.

Despite the inconsistent differences found between types of apologetic acts, my work has so far consistently demonstrated the importance of image improvement and obligation shifting

perceptions in perpetrators' appraisal of a conciliatory act/statement. One major criticism of the findings thus far lies in the fact that correlation cannot prove causation. In other words, there is no evidence that the appraisals of apologies (image improvement and obligation shifting) cause the outcome variables (satisfaction, negative feelings, and future support). It could be argued, for example, that satisfaction leads to the perception that obligation has shifted, that image of the ingroup has improved, or that negative feelings cause one to shift obligation to the victim group. However, a key purpose of this research is to establish the outcomes of apology appraisals for perpetrators. Because it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that image and obligation shifting are causal of satisfaction, negative feelings and/or future acts of support, it becomes important to experimentally manipulate this difference. The next Chapter will aim to demonstrate the causal relationship between image improvement and obligation shifting appraisals and the outcome variables.

CHAPTER 5

My previous four experiments have all shown a relationship between impressions that the ingroup's image has improved and the obligation has shifted and increased satisfaction with an apologetic act for members of the perpetrator group. The more perpetrators feel their ingroup looks better after apologising the more satisfied they report feeling with giving the apology. Additionally, the more perpetrator group members feel that they are no longer obligated to the victim group and that, in fact, the victims ought to forgive and be grateful, the more satisfied they are with the apologetic act.

My experiments have also all shown that obligation shifting is linked to increased negative feelings about victims and decreased willingness to support providing additional support to the victim group. Experiment 4 even suggested that obligation shifting may predict less willingness to support the victim group in ways unrelated to the original transgression. However, across all four experiments, there is no evidence of image improvement being a predictor of negative feelings or reduced support. In fact, if anything, image improvement may have a positive effect on intergroup relations, reducing negative feelings about the victim group (as seen in Experiment 3). The results highlight the importance of image improvement and obligation shifting as appraisals of apologies for perpetrator group members; even more, they shine a light on the potential negative outcomes of apologetic acts unique to obligation shifting appraisals.

Causation, not just Correlation

One limitation of my experiments so far is that the mediational effects shown do not establish the causal role of image improvement and obligation shifting. Although I have shown

links between these two mediators and satisfaction, these could be explained by a reverse account: being satisfied with the apology could have increased the impression that the perpetrator ingroup looks good and is no longer obliged to the victim group. Likewise, the presumed outcome of negative feelings towards the victim group could be a pre-existing variable that caused the perception of obligation shifting, rather than obligation shifting causing the change in feelings. To more conclusively establish the key mediating variables as causal factors, Experiment 5 directly manipulates obligation shifting and image improvement before measuring the effects of the manipulations on the outcome variables (cf. Spencer, Zanna & Fong, 2005).

Experiment 5: "Bunce Island II"

This experiment used the same issue used in Experiment 1, which was relevant to British citizens: the history of African slavery and relations with Bunce Island. As in Experiment 1, participants read a news article on the issue and learned that this island, off the coast of Sierra Leone, was once the largest hub of the slave trade in West Africa.

This experiment presents apologetic statements together with assessments of their impact in order to manipulate the key appraisals found to be satisfying in the previous studies: image improvement and obligation shifting. These assessments vary experimentally by stating either that the British had improved their image or that the British had effectively shifted obligation to the islanders, while a control condition presents the same statement without any assessment. Experiment 5 directly manipulates obligation shifting and image improvement while keeping the apologetic act constant.

If image improvement causally enhances satisfaction with a statement, then the image improvement statement would be more satisfying than a control apology which did not suggest any image changes. Additionally, an apology which described as shifting obligation to the victim group should also increase satisfaction compared to the control group. Furthermore, I expected that the obligation-shifting assessment would not merely reflect pre-existing negative feelings, but would actually increase negative feelings about the islanders, compared to the control apology, but that this difference in negative feelings would not be found as a result of the image improving apology. This experiment also includes measures of support for additional aid to Bunce Island, and I expected that in line with Experiment 3's findings, only the obligation-shifting manipulation should reduce such support compared to the control group. These predictions follow from the correlational findings in the previous three experiments.

Method

Participants. One hundred and ten British citizen participants were recruited on campus at the University of Kent. All participants were offered 3 GBP (about 5 USD) for participating. Thirteen participants were removed for self-identifying as non-white British. Only white British participants were included for analysis because the issue was about Britain's role in the slave trade; non-white British participants may identify less with the perpetrator group and more with the victim group receiving the apology. All participants were asked to read an article outlining a British apology to Bunce Island for the slave trade. A further twenty-five participants were excluded because they incorrectly stated that the article they read did not discuss Britain apologising; this indicated that they were not paying attention to the crucial apology context of

the experiment. The remaining 72 participants were included for analysis (41 female; age M = 22.63, SD = 5.53, *range* = 18-50).

Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: an apology only; the same apology but with an expert's evaluation of it as being likely to improve the reputation of Britain; or the same apology, but with an expert's evaluation of it as shifting obligation to the victim group.

Procedure. The experiment was conducted online. Participants read the same short summary of the history of Bunce Island presented in Experiment 1 (see Appendix 1).

After reading the summary of the history of Bunce Island, participants read a fictitious back-dated news article from the Guardian Online newspaper describing a visit by former Prime Minister Tony Blair to Bunce Island and an apology made to the islanders during the 20th anniversary of laws abolishing the slave trade. Participants all read the same apology, but the news article varied in its description. Participants were either given a control condition which did not include additional information or, within the news article, read one of the following additional assessments, either intended to increase the perception that the apology has shifted obligation to the victims or that the apology has improved the image of Britain:

Obligation shifting statement:

Historian and expert on West Africa, Michael Price, suggests that by giving this apology, Britain has "put the ball in the court of the islanders." According to a Guardian online poll 78% of readers believe that the islanders ought to accept the apology and begin to work towards their future.

Image improving statement:

Historian and expert on West Africa, Michael Price, suggests that by giving this apology, Britain is "greatly improving its reputation in Africa and abroad." According to a Guardian online poll 78% of readers believe the apology has improved Britain's image around the world.

After reading the article, participants completed the following measures on seven point scales embedded among filler items.

Negative feelings toward Bunce Islanders. The same two items as in the previous 3 experiments assessed negative feelings towards the victim group (Bunce Islanders) ($r = .72, p < .001$; $M = 1.82$; $SD = .99$).

Satisfaction. The same two items as in previous experiments measured satisfaction, plus one more item which clearly targeted satisfaction with the act (e.g. *"How pleased are you with the response of the British government."*). The scale was reliable ($\alpha = .92$, $M = 4.00$; $SD = 1.30$).

Image improvement. The same three items measured perceived image change for Britain following the response but were altered to fit the Bunce Island context. The scale was reliable *($\alpha = .83$; $M = 4.53$; $SD = .88$).*

Obligation shifting. The same items as in previous experiments were used, except for one item which previously measured the obligation for the victim group to consider itself an ally; it could be argued that that item implies improving the relationship, which is not a component of obligation shifting. The item was replaced with another item (*"The 'ball is in the court of the Islanders' to move forward from their history of slavery.")* in order to more accurately capture

the concept and reflect agreement with the specific use of the phrase in the obligation manipulation condition used for this experiment. The four-item scale was reliable (α = .67; M = 3.66; SD = 1.05).

Further support. Participants were asked if they supported the British government providing reparations, "*yes*" or "*no*". The next question then asked how much they would want to provide with choices including: (1) less than £500,000; (2) £500,000 to £1m; (3) £1m - £5m; (4) £5m - £10m; (5) £10m - £15m; or (6) more than £15 million. People who answered "*no*" to the question of whether or not they supported reparations were coded as 1; anyone who answered "*yes*" was given a score based on the amount of money to be provided (coded as 2-7 for each increasing amount). Thus, low numbers indicated less support for reparations and high numbers indicated more support (M = 3.51; SD = 1.83).

After providing some demographic information, participants were asked whether or not they had read about an apology being given by Britain to Bunce Island. Because all participants read about an apology, those who answered "no" were excluded for possibly not understanding or thoroughly reading the information given to them. All participants were debriefed in writing. Debriefing included information about the actual state of Bunce Island and information about the real apology made by Tony Blair for the slave trade.

Results

Descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 5. First, collapsing across conditions, I tested whether, as in previous experiments, the manipulation checks of obligation shifting and image improvement perceptions were distinct predictors of each DV using multiple linear regressions.

Table 5. *Means (and standard deviations) of each apology condition on outcome variables for Experiment 5.*

	M (*SD*)		
	Outcomes		
Condition	Satisfaction	Negative feelings	Further support
Control apology	3.04 (1.29)	1.33 (0.62)	4.44 (1.82)
Obligation shifting apology	4.11 (1.03)	2.06 (1.14)	2.79 (1.64)
Image improving apology	4.39 (1.36)	1.63 (0.82)	3.53 (1.78)

Satisfaction. Image improvement (β = .32, sr^2 = .32, p = .004) and obligation shifting (β = .30, sr^2 = .30, p = .007) were both significant independent predictors of satisfaction with the apology, $F(2, 71) = 8.82$, $Adj.R^2 = .18$, $MSE = 1.47$, $p < .001$.

Negative feelings. Obligation shifting was a significant and positive predictor of negative feelings toward the Bunce islanders (β = .24, sr^2 = .24, p = .037). As with Experiment 2, image improvement was a significant predictor of the outcome variable negative feelings (β = -.27, sr^2 = -.27, p = .020), but in a negative direction. The more people judged the apology as improving image, the less negative they felt about the victim group, $F(2, 71) = 4.90$, $Adj.R^2 = .10$, MSE = 0.78, p = .010.

Further support. Obligation shifting was a significant, negative predictor of further support for reparations (β = -.46, sr^2 = -.46, $p < .001$). The more participants felt that the statement shifted obligation off the perpetrator group, the less they supported giving financial

reparations to the victim group. Image improvement was not significant ($p > .251$). The overall model was significant, $F(2, 71) = 9.89$, $Adj.R^2 = .20$, $MSE = 2.68$, $p < .001$.

The manipulations were checked to see if participants who read the image improvement apology actually saw more image improvement compared to the control and, similarly, if those in the obligation shifting apology condition saw more obligation shifting than the control. The obligation shifting apology ($M = 4.08$, $SD = 0.93$) successfully led to the perception that more obligation had shifted than the control ($M = 2.97$, $SD = 0.86$), $F(1, 41) = 15.42$, $MSE = 0.82$, $p < .001$. Likewise, the image improving apology ($M = 4.96$ $SD = 0.61$) successfully led to increased perceptions that the apology had improved Britain's image compared to the control apology ($M = 4.13$, $SD = 1.06$), $F(1, 47) = 11.78$, $MSE = 0.65$, $p = .001$. Next, each condition was compared the control to the manipulated apologies on each DV.

Control vs. obligation shifting. In contrast of the control apology (-1) versus the obligation shifting apology (1), as predicted, the obligation shifting apology was more satisfying ($F(1, 41) = 9.03$, $MSE = 1.31$, $p = .005$), led to more negative feelings ($F(1, 41) = 6.05$, $MSE = 0.90$, $p = .018$), and less willingness to provide further support in the form of reparations ($F(1, 41) = 9.49$, $MSE = 2.96$, $p = .004$) than the control (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations).

Control vs. image improvement. . In the second planned contrast, of the control apology (-1) versus the apology which suggested that Britain's image had been improved (1), as predicted, the image improving apology was more satisfying than the control apology, $F(1, 47) = 11.50$, $MSE = 1.79$, $p = .001$. Unlike the obligation shifting apology, the image improving apology did not differ significantly from the control apology on negative feelings ($p = .187$) or

willingness to give further support in the form of financial reparations ($p = .095$) (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).

Discussion

This experiment looked to show a causal relationship between obligation shifting and image improvement and the outcome of satisfaction. It also looked to see if obligation shifting could be said to lead to more negative feelings and reduced support for helping the victim group and rule out possible alternative explanations of the correlation between the predictors and outcomes. By manipulating instead of merely measuring the key mediators of obligation shifting and image improvement, it becomes clear that both perceptions have a causal, positive impact on satisfaction with an apologetic statement, supporting the correlational findings of Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4. The manipulation also established that the suggestion that an apology would shift obligation when supported by expert and public opinion, experimentally increased negative views of the other group and decreases willingness to give reparations. Additionally, this experiment expanded on the previous studies by including a new item for measuring obligation shifting which closely captures the concept using the words "the ball is in the court". By using these words, the concept of obligation shifting is more explicitly framed: the obligation moves from the perpetrator onto the victim group.

Crucially, this experiment kept the act of apology constant, thus showing that perceptions of obligation shifting and image improvement can be altered regardless of the specifics of the act. This supports the findings across Studies 1 - 4 which show inconsistencies in the differences between types of apologetic acts. It is not necessarily that reparations are more obligation shifting than an apology; it may depend on perceptions of the act itself as well as the framing of

the apologetic act. This suggests that how the apologetic act is framed, commentary on the act from expert sources, or spontaneous expressions of public opinion may lead perpetrator group members to believe that obligation has shifted more. In the first four experiments, people were left to guess to what extent each act had successfully shifted obligation, which may have mean that participants relied on other contextual clues to make assumptions about each scenario. However in this experiment, by explicitly expressing obligation shifting in one condition, it is apparent that perceptions can be changed within the same apology context.

These findings expose obligation shifting as a negative side-effect of apologies and reparations. Obligation shifting is not just embraced by people who started out with a negative view of the victim group, but when proposed, actually leads to a more negative view of them. And the ultimate effect of shifting responsibility to the other group, as demonstrated, is to undermine support for further expressions of aid. Even more, the results of this experiment reiterate the findings on image improvement from the previous four experiments. It seems that image improvement does improve perpetrator satisfaction with an apology but does not insinuate the more negative outcomes of worsened feelings about the victims and reduced support. This suggests that it may be possible for perpetrators to be satisfied with an apology without necessarily leading to worsened relations between the groups.

CHAPTER 6

The first five experiments have all demonstrated the effect of obligation shifting and image improvement on satisfaction after an apologetic act. Perhaps most interestingly, the research conducted up to this point suggests that obligation shifting, unlike image improvement, is also related to two potentially negative outcomes: negative feelings about the victim group and reduced support for the victim group. Experiment 3 suggested that obligation shifting could even explain the increase in negative feelings after certain types of apologetic acts, with (in that case) a dual reparations/apology act leading to more negative feelings than just an apology alone. Experiment 1 also showed that obligation shifting after an apology is linked to less support for providing financial reparations, while Experiment 4 expanded on this finding to show that obligation shifting predicts perpetrator groups' reduced support for the victims in general and not just on that specific issue. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that obligation shifting precedes satisfaction, negative feelings and reduced support, and thus the previous findings are not better explained by a reverse explanation (that obligation shifting is caused by satisfaction or that negative feelings lead people to obligation shift more).

An Alternative Explanation?

The concept of obligation shifting rests on the idea that perpetrators are satisfied to remove the responsibility of repairing relations off of their shoulders and onto the victim group's. Obligation shifting captures the sense that "we have done our part" and "now you owe us." Perpetrators are satisfied to feel that they are no longer responsible and that they are now owed forgiveness and gratitude. One potential criticism of the concept of obligation shifting could lie in the possibility of alternative explanations for its relationship to satisfaction. The items used

thus far have tapped into perpetrators' beliefs that the victim group owes forgiveness, gratitude, etc. The term "ought" was used specifically because it intended to capture perpetrators' beliefs that they are owed forgiveness and gratitude. Experiment 5 improved on the measure by including an item referring to the "ball in the victim group's court", which was thought to better capture the concept of obligation shifting. Even so, there is still room for criticism of this measure. It is possible that participants are expressing their belief that the apologetic act is actually better in quality, and therefore more worthy of more forgiveness and gratitude. In other words, perhaps it is not that people believe that victims "ought" to forgive, be grateful, and move on from the issue, but that they perceive that victims will in actuality be more forgiving, grateful, and move on. Perpetrators could be making the assumption that if victims are truly satisfied, they will be ready to put the issue behind and work to repair relations. In this case, perpetrators are expressing a desire to genuinely satisfy victims with their response.

That alternative explanation, however, fails to explain why obligation shifting would be related to negative feelings, as there is no reason for perpetrators to feel more negative about victims after satisfying them. It also fails to explain why perpetrators reduce their willingness to provide support to victims for an unrelated issue to the original transgression (see Experiment 4). If perpetrators are motivated by a desire to satisfy victims, if anything, they should be more motivated to satisfy the victims by providing additional restorative acts. Whereas, if perpetrators just want to be done with their own responsibility to the victim group, it follows logically that they would no longer want to work to repair relations, even on unrelated issues (as seen in Experiment 4). Even more, perpetrators who shift obligation are likely to feel more negative because they feel they are owed something by the victim group, which could lead to feelings of anger (Harth et al., 2011).

Nonetheless, to rule out any possible relationship between obligation shifting and perceptions of victim satisfaction, another experiment was conducted to address possible confounds. Experiment 6 aims to examine the role of perceived victim satisfaction as a possible motive for perpetrator satisfaction. It also examines the relationship between obligation shifting and negative feelings and future support even when perceptions of victim satisfaction are controlled for.

Experiment 6: "Bhopal Disaster"

Experiment 6 aimed to understand if obligation shifting is a unique predictor of satisfaction, even when including a variable intending to measure victim satisfaction. This experiment chose to look at the issue of the 1984 Bhopal disaster in India. Often considered one of the world's worst industrial catastrophes, the Bhopal disaster was a gas leak incident in India in which chemicals from a US company owned plant resulted in the exposure of hundreds of thousands of people and an estimated death of over 15,000 people ("Seven Convicted Over 1984 Bhopal Disaster," 2010). Despite convictions in India for negligence, the CEOs of the company have not been forced by American authorities to return to India to face charges. Additionally, the US government has provided little assistance with either bringing justice to those responsible or assisting the region in cleaning up.

The same predictors found to be important in predicting satisfaction in the previous experiments were included (obligation shifting and image improvement) but it also looked to expand on the previous work by also including a new measure of *victim satisfaction*. Two conditions were included in this experiment: a non-apology statement and a full apology including financial reparations.

I expected that obligation shifting should remain a predictor of satisfaction even when controlling for victim satisfaction. Furthermore, I expected obligation shifting to remain a predictor of negative feelings and a negative predictor of further acts of support, even when controlling for victim satisfaction. There is no theoretical reason to believe that victim satisfaction should be related to these negative outcomes. However, it is plausible that victim satisfaction will also predict ingroup satisfaction as well. It seems reasonable that people would express being more satisfied with an act the more they assume victims are likely to be satisfied with it. In fact, this may be a more reasonable "altruistic" expectation than power for victims ever was. Power is a somewhat vague concept which, when measured as influence or political power (as it has been in the previous studies), may be dependent on the existing context of power relations between the groups. Nonetheless, this research expects that regardless of any effect of perceived victim satisfaction, obligation shifting will remain a predictor of perpetrators' satisfaction with the statement and will uniquely mediate the preference for the full apology over the non-apology statement.

Method

Participants. For this experiment, 66 Americans completed the online experiment, recruited through Amazon's MTurk crowd-sourcing service in America (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2011). Participants were paid 0.50 cents (USD) for their participation in the experiment. Two participants who identified with the victim group (Indians) were removed from the experiment. A further two participants were removed for invariant responses. After reading the news summary crucial to the experiment, participants were asked to summarize the news in their own words. One participant who did not write about anything related to the topic was

assumed to be non-serious and removed from the experiment. Additionally, a check question was included towards the end of the experiment, which asked participants to just select "disagree" participants who checked any other option were to be excluded from analysis. Six participants were excluded because they indicated a different answer on this question, suggesting they were not reading the questions when responding. This left remaining 55 participants for analysis (33 female; age $M = 35.09$, $SD = 12.13$, *range* = 19-64).

Design. In this experiment participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a non-apology statement ($N = 26$) or a dual act which included both a full verbal apology and financial reparations ($N = 29$).

Procedure. American citizen participants were recruited through Amazon's MTurk. They then completed the experiment online through the online survey management software Qualtrics. All participants first gave consent and were asked to confirm if they were US citizens.

All participants then read a news summary which outlined the history of the Bhopal disaster in India (see Appendix 8). The article took care to discuss America's involvement in dealing with the aftermath of the disaster and emphasized America's lack of assistance and refusal to extradite the CEOs from the company Union Carbide to India. After reading this, all participants were asked some questions about the news article to confirm they read it. First they were asked to summarize the article in their own words. Participants who did not write about anything related to Bhopal or the disaster were excluded from the experiment. They were also asked three check questions about the article to assess if they read it carefully, including questions about whom the victims were and which country the Union Carbide CEOs were from.

Next participants were told they were going to read a response from the US government taken from multiple news sources in 2012. Participants were randomly assigned to read either a non-apology statement (control):

> *We recognize the importance and sensitivity of the Bhopal issue in India. We are committed to building a strong and deep strategic partnership between India and the United States.*

Or participants read that the US government gave a statement including both a verbal apology and offers of financial reparations (dual act):

> *It is clear that the US made mistakes after the Bhopal tragedy, and that it was poorly handled. We failed at responding swiftly. We should have provided aid to the region and sought justice for the victims. For our inaction, we are truly sorry. We recognize the importance and sensitivity of the Bhopal issue in India. We are committed to building a strong and deep strategic partnership between India and the United States." Furthermore the US government has agreed to provide 20 million USD to the Indian government for cleaning up the region.*

The non-apology statement which was included in both conditions was based on an actual statement made by a representative of the US government in response to questions about the Bhopal disaster. It was carefully worded to not reject or outright refuse to apologise in order to be a true control statement and not a refusal to apologise statement. The dual act condition added to that statement using information from other historic government apologies. In reality the US government has never apologised, offered reparations, or agreed to extradite the American CEOs.

After reading the article, participants completed the following measures on seven point scales:

Satisfaction. Satisfaction with the statement by the American government was measured with the same three items as the in the previous experiment (i.e. *"How satisfied are you with the response of the American government?", "How pleased are you with the response of the American government?", "America has done a good job in responding to the incident."*). High numbers indicated greater satisfaction. The three items together formed a reliable scale of satisfaction (α = .92, M = 3.25; SD = 1.44).

Victim satisfaction. Perceptions of how satisfied victims were with the statement were measured with one item, "*How satisfied do you think Indian citizens felt about the statement made*?" on a scale of 1 (*Very Dissatisfied*) to 7 (*Very Satisfied*) (M = 2.18; SD = 1.43).

Negative feelings. The same two items used in previous studies to assess negative feelings towards the victim group were used but changed to specify the government of India as the target group (i.e. "*I feel angry towards the Indian government*" and "*I feel insulted by Indian government.*"). Additionally, this experiment included another item to tap into more feelings about the outgroup ("*I feel pleased with the Indian government*"). That item was reverse coded, so that higher numbers indicated being "less pleased" with the Indian government. The three items were used to create composite scores which formed a reliable scale of negative feelings (α = .96; M = 2.64; SD = 0.98).

Image improvement. Four items measured perceived changes in the image of America due to the response of the US government, these items were similar to those used in the previous studies ("*How will the statement affect America's reputation in other countries?*"; "*How will the*

statement affect America's reputation in India?"; "*How will the statement affect the moral standing of America?*" on scales of 1 *greatly decrease* to 7 *greatly increase* (with 4 meaning no *change)*; and "*Please assess the current moral image of the US around the world.*" on scales of 1 *Very poor* to 7 *Very good*). Together these four items formed a scale measuring image improvement of America and the scale was reliable (α = .93; M = 3.71; SD = 1.17).

Obligation shifting. The same four items used in previous studies were intended to measure shifting obligation to the victim group. Similar to the other studies, this measure intended to measure the extent to which obligation is seen as shifting from the perpetrator (American) group onto the victim (Indian) group. The items were similar to those in previous studies but were changed to reflect America as the perpetrator group (e.g. *"The US does not need to do more to repair its relationship with India."; "The ball is now in the court of the Indians to deal with the incident."; "The Indians ought to forgive the US following the response."; "The Indians ought to be grateful to the US for the response.*"). This experiment included one additional item to further develop the concept of obligation shifting as putting an obligation on the victims to move on ("*The Indians ought to get over what happened in the past*"). Together the five items formed a measure of obligation shifting and the scale was very reliable (α = .85; M = 2.69; SD = 1.21).

Further support. For this experiment, two types of future action were measured. One, like with previous experiments, tapped into a willingness to provide additional financial support to the victim group. This was measured with one item, "*Should the US government use taxpayer money to provide assistance to the victims of the disaster?*" (M = 3.09; SD = 1.78). This item measured willingness to support giving money directly to the victims as opposed to the money provided in the dual act condition which was given to the Indian government for cleaning up the

region. The second item addressed a second type of further support, willingness to support extraditing the American CEOs to India to face charges (i.e. "*Should the US government return the American executives to India to face prison?*") ($M = 5.20$; $SD = 2.02$).

Americans were then asked if they considered themselves Indian and several demographic questions. After the experiment participants were thanked and fully debriefed. Debriefing included being informed of the deception used in the experiment and why. Participants were told that in reality no apology has ever been issued by the American government for the disaster and that America continues to refuse to extradite the CEOs of Union Carbide.

Results

Correlations between variables can be seen in Table 6. As with the other studies, first I tested the ability of the obligation shifting and image improvement as well as the new variable victim satisfaction to predict each outcome variable (satisfaction, negative feelings, and the two types of further support) using multiple linear regressions. Next, I tested if there were differences between the conditions on each outcome variable using ANOVA tests. Finally, I used multiple mediation bootstrapping models to see if differences between the conditions on each outcome variable could be explained by the apology appraisals as mediators.

Satisfaction.

Overall regression analysis. In a regression with image improvement, obligation shifting, and victim satisfaction, on the DV satisfaction with the statement, as predicted, obligation shifting ($\beta = .27$, $sr^2 = .23$, $p = .026$) was a significant independent predictor of the outcome satisfaction. Image improvement was also a significant predictor ($\beta = .25$, $sr^2 = .20$, $p = .045$). Victim satisfaction also significantly, positively and independently predicted participants'

satisfaction with the statement (β = .35, sr^2 = .29, p = .006). The overall regression model was significant, $F(3, 54) = 17.07$, $Adj.R^2$ = .47, MSE = 1.10, $p < .001$.

Negative feelings.

Overall regression analysis. In a regression with image improvement, obligation shifting, and victim satisfaction, on the DV negative feelings about the victims, as predicted, obligation shifting (β = .32, sr^2 = .27, p = .048) was a significant independent predictor of the outcome negative feelings. Image improvement (p = .940) and victim satisfaction (p = .480) were not significant predictors of negative feelings about the victims. The overall regression model was not significant, $F(3, 54) = 1.63$, $Adj.R^2$ = .03, MSE = 0.93, p = .195. In a regression including only the significant predictor of obligation shifting, the overall model was significant $F(1, 54)$ = 4.45, $Adj.R^2$ = .06, MSE = 0.91, p = .040.

Further support - reparations to victims.

Overall regression analysis. In a regression with image improvement, obligation shifting, and victim satisfaction, on the DV of reparations to victims, as predicted, obligation shifting (β = -.35, sr^2 = -.29, p = .027) was a significant independent negative predictor of support for reparations to victims. In other words, the more participants felt that the statement had shifted obligation, the less support they felt for the plan to use taxpayer money to provide reparations directly to victims. Image improvement (p = .536) and victim satisfaction (p = .969) were not significant predictors of support for reparations to victims. The overall regression model was significant, $F(3, 54) = 3.33$, $Adj.R^2$ = .11, MSE = 2.80, p = .027.

Table 6. *Correlation table for Experiment 6.*

	Satisfaction	*Negative feelings*	*Further support (reparations)*	*Further support (extradition)*	*Obligation shifting*	*Image improvement*
Negative feelings	.19					
Further support (reparations)	-.30*	.10				
Further support (extradition)	-.49***	-.04	.24			
Obligation shifting	.55***	.28*	-.40**	-.43**		
Image improvement	.60***	.12	-.27*	-.28*	.59***	
Victim satisfaction	.59***	.04	-.20	-.21	.45***	.52***

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Further support - extradition of Union Carbide employees.

Overall regression analysis. In a regression with image improvement, obligation shifting, and victim satisfaction, on the DV of extradition of Union Carbide employees, as predicted, obligation shifting (β = -.39, sr^2 = -.33, p = .012) was a significant independent negative predictor of support for extraditing the UC employees to India. In other words, the more participants felt that the statement had shifted obligation, the less support they felt for America returning the Union Carbide employees to India to face their prison sentence. Image improvement (p = .554) and victim satisfaction (p = .929) were not significant predictors of

support for extradition. The overall regression model was significant, $F(3, 54) = 4.02$, $Adj.R^2 = .14$, $MSE = 3.50$, $p = .012$.

Differences between conditions. In order to test the differences between conditions on the outcome variables, the control (no-apology) condition was coded -1 and the dual act (apology/reparations) was coded 1.

Satisfaction. In an ANOVA on satisfaction, the difference between the conditions was significant, $F(1, 54) = 8.97$, $MSE = 1.82$, $p = .004$. The dual act was significantly more satisfying than the no-apology statement (control: $M = 2.69$; dual act: $M = 3.77$). In a multiple mediation bootstrapping model using the IVs significant in predicting satisfaction in the regression, obligation shifting and victim satisfaction were significant independent mediators (CI not including 0) of the contrast on the DV satisfaction. Image improvement was not a significant mediator (CI included 0) although both paths were significant. The total effect was significant and the mediators reduced the direct effect to non-significance. Obligation shifting and victim satisfaction fully mediated the preference for the dual act over the control statement (Figure 6).

Negative feelings. In another ANOVA on negative feelings, the difference between the conditions was not significant, $F(1, 54) = 0.31$, $MSE = 0.98$, $p = .581$. The dual act was not significantly different than the no-apology control statement on the outcome negative feelings (control: $M = 2.56$; dual act: $M = 2.71$). Since there were no differences between conditions, no bootstrapping model was run.

Note. Image improvement path was not a significant mediator in the model (CI included 0).
Standardized regression weights are shown.
*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Total effect = .54**

Direct effect = -.06 *n.s*

Figure 6. Mediation analysis for Experiment 6 testing mediators of the condition contrast and satisfaction.

Further support - reparations for victims. In an ANOVA on support for reparations the difference between the conditions was not significant, $F(1, 54) = 0.00$, $MSE = 3.22$, $p = .957$ (control: $M = 3.08$; dual act: $M = 3.10$). Since there were no differences between conditions, no bootstrapping model was run.

Further support - extradition of Union Carbide employees. In an ANOVA on support for extradition of UC employees, the difference between the conditions was not significant, $F(1, 54) = 0.60$, $MSE = 4.12$, $p = .444$ (control: $M = 5.42$; dual act: $M = 5.00$). Since there were no differences between conditions, no bootstrapping model was run.

Discussion

This experiment set to rule out perceptions of victim satisfaction as a possible alternate explanation for the effects of obligation shifting on satisfaction, negative feelings, and lack of support for assisting the victim group. After controlling for perceived victim satisfaction, the results suggest that obligation shifting remains a predictor of satisfaction. In other words, the extent to which people feel they are no longer responsible and that the victims now owe forgiveness remained a predictor of satisfaction even when taking into account any desire to actually satisfy the victims.

Victim satisfaction, however, also emerged as a positive predictor of perpetrator satisfaction. The results suggest a link between victim satisfaction and perpetrator satisfaction. Obligation shifting and victim satisfaction both mediated the preference for the dual act over no apology on the outcome satisfaction. Image improvement also remained a unique predictor of satisfaction, although it failed to mediate the preference for the dual act over no apology. Furthermore, the perceptions that victims were satisfied with the response was not linked to negative feelings about the victim group or reduced willingness to support plans to extradite those responsible or provide reparations to the victims. Obligation shifting, however, still predicted negative feelings and reduced willingness to support both types of restorative actions, supporting the theory that obligation shifting is a unique predictor of outcomes for perpetrators after apologetic acts.

This experiment showed differences between giving the dual act and giving a non-apology statement on satisfaction. Perpetrator group members were more satisfied with an apology than no apology. However, there were no differences on the outcome negative feelings; similar to the

results observed in Experiments 1, 2, and 4. In all of those experiments (as with this one) the control statement has been a non-apology statement or even an outright refusal to apologise (Experiment 4). There may be reasons that perpetrators feel negatively (or less positively) towards victims when the statement is clearly not an apology which are unmeasured in this research. Interestingly, this experiment is the first to demonstrate no differences between a full apology and a non-apology on measures of future support. It is possible that participants who read the non-apology statement felt that the government was in effect denying its responsibility for the Bhopal disaster. In experiments 1-5, the contexts all involved historical actions clearly committed by the perpetrator group. Unlike the previous experiments, the context for this experiment was perhaps less clear in implicating the US as the perpetrator group. Union Carbide, a private company may be seen as the primary group responsible for dealing with the disaster. If that is the case, refusing to apologise may have been seen by some participants as sufficient in allowing the US to deny responsibility for the incident-- lending obligation shifting an unnecessary act. If the US is not responsible for the incident in the first place, it would be easy to see why American citizens would not feel the US needs to provide any further support to the victim group.

Nonetheless, the idea that perpetrators are pleased when they have removed the responsibility from their shoulders and placed an obligation of forgiveness and gratitude onto the victims is demonstrated in this experiment as being a distinct predictor of satisfaction. Thus, the story for obligation shifting is much stronger, with evidence that obligation shifting cannot be explained away by perceptions of actual victim satisfaction. Even more, it is that perception which is linked to negative feelings about the victim group and reduced support for future action.

It is also an important finding that in this experiment victim satisfaction uniquely predicts satisfaction with the statement for perpetrators, independently of image improvement and obligation shifting. This could suggest that to some extent perpetrators do want the victims to be pleased with the response. In other words, perpetrators motives may not be entirely selfish, as the first five experiments suggested. Perpetrator group members were satisfied when they believed that the victim group was satisfied, and this partially explained the preference for the dual act over the control statement. It is interesting that power for victims was never important to perpetrators but that they are still interested in victims being satisfied. Perpetrators may not be making the connection between power and victim satisfaction- either because they are unaware of victim needs, or because the measure of victim power is not actually what victims need. One problem with the needs-based model is that it discusses power as a need of victims in a very general sense, but neglects to define precisely what type of power it refers to. Perhaps influence and political power are not the most relevant types of power for a victimized group. One goal of the next experiment will be to measure how important power is for victims and to also improve upon the previous measure of power used and include a more general item intending to capture a sense of empowerment.

One crucial piece of the apology puzzle is to examine if victims are aware of perpetrator expectations in apologising. If they are aware of perpetrator desires to shift obligation, that may help explain why victims show no intentions to forgive after receiving an intergroup apology (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). The next chapter will aim to explore how victims, as well as perpetrators, perceive apologies. In particular it will look at obligation shifting and image improvement as expectations of perpetrators after an apology and if these perceptions influence forgiveness.

CHAPTER 7

Most research on intergroup apologies has focused on the victims. There is no doubt that how victims respond to apologies is crucial to the process of reconciliation. In my research, a key finding has been that perpetrators are not motivated by any altruistic desire to provide victims with the power they seek; instead perpetrators are motivated by reasons of improving their image and shifting obligation onto the victim group. Experiments 1-5 all showed support for image improvement and obligation shifting as satisfying perpetrators after an apology. Experiment 6 also showed these two appraisals to be distinct from any desire to actually satisfy the victims. However, there remains the possibility that both victims and perpetrators can get what they want from an apology, so long as victims can accept a perpetrator's goal in apologising. It was apparent that the next step for my research was to explore in greater depth how the transgressor group's motives of image improvement and obligation shifting are seen by the recipients of their apologetic acts.

Returning to Victims

It may indeed be that victim groups, as Nadler and Shnabel (2008) suggest, are primarily looking for power; perhaps because of this they are completely indifferent to the expectations of transgressors. However, if victims are sensitive to expectations of perpetrators, this could work to explain the conflicting findings on forgiveness among victims in the intergroup apology literature. If victims themselves are seeking closure and a distancing from the crime, then "closing the door" on relations may be exactly what they want. As long as the act is seen as satisfactory, the transgressors' motives may be disregarded, or even seen as consistent with the goal of increasing distance. However, if victims want a closer relationship, or if the two groups

are forced to live together, then being seen as motivated by image management or obligation shifting may instead undermine the transgressor's gestures towards true reconciliation. The preference by victims for shame expressions over guilt, at first glance suggests that some amount of image concern on the part of the perpetrators might be seen as a good thing (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008; 2010). However, victims could perceive perpetrators trying to improve their image as being insincere. If their concern with image improvement is seen as superficial, this is likely to reduce the trust needed to carry forward reconciliation (see Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). However, there is also the possibility that the perception of perpetrators trying to improve their image will be seen as a positive goal by victims. After all, if you are trying to improve your image, you may also be actually trying to improve your morality. Victims may be encouraged by a perpetrator's motivation to be truly more moral.

More potentially harmful is the attitude of obligation shifting, which exists side by side with outright resentment for the victim group, and is likely to be rejected as a controlling and offensive motive (cf. Nadler & Livaitan, 2006). Having established the importance of obligation shifting in the previous five experiments, it is apparent that obligation shifting could have important long-term effects on reconciliation, for both those giving and receiving apologies. In their work on the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) argue that there is little relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness for victims. Their research suggests that after an apology, victim group members are more satisfied but not more willing to forgive compared to after getting no apology. For victims, forgiveness does not necessarily follow being satisfied with an apology.

The perception that obligation shifting is expected by perpetrators could help to explain why victims show no increase in willingness to forgive after receiving an apology. The extent to

which people identify themselves as being victimized more than the other group has been shown to be negatively related to forgiveness after conflict (Noor et al., 2008). If obligation shifting is seen as an attempt to discredit the claims of victim-hood, this may be threatening victims' desires to be recognized. A recent apology given by drug makers of thalidomide to victims of the drug's harmful effects in the 1950's and 60's was rejected outright by victims. Victims of the birth-defect inducing drug argued that the apology was an "insulting" attempt by the drug makers to avoid their responsibility to pay damages (McKie, 2012). If apologetic acts are perceived as an attempt by perpetrators to shift obligation and deny victim-hood, victims may be less willing to forgive.

Despite their finding that forgiveness levels did not change after an apology, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) did find that satisfaction for victims increased after an apology. Thus, it seems important to understand the predictors of satisfaction for victim groups. The needs-based model suggests that power is important to victims (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). For this next experiment, I will re-examine power for victims and test if power changes predict victim satisfaction with an apology. Unlike forgiveness, victims may be satisfied after an apology despite the expectation of perpetrators that the apology should improve their image or shift obligation because of the power that an apology provides them. Forgiveness, in a sense, requires accepting that obligation has shifted. Satisfaction on the other hand, is simply an evaluation of the act; it does not imply any agreement to accepting that the perpetrators are no longer responsible nor does it inherently suggest that victims relinquish their right to victimhood. For victims, just because they are satisfied with receiving an apology does not mean that they will see forgiveness as a requisite outcome.

Empowerment

Although the results of the first five experiments suggest that perpetrators are unconcerned with victim power needs, results of Experiment 6 suggest that perpetrators' satisfaction is linked to the satisfaction of victims. However, according to the needs-based model, power is precisely what victims need to be satisfied (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). One possibility is that perpetrators are either unaware of the needs of victims to gain power or that victims do not in fact want power. Another possibility is that perpetrators are acutely aware of what victims want, and that the measure of power used in the previous studies was not capturing what victims need.

Nadler and Shnabel (2008) argue that perpetrators are concerned with image and victims with power and yet have never tested their appraisals of these changes after an apology. The next experiment aims to establish the importance of power for victims in evaluating an apology. If, the needs based model is correct, victims should be most satisfied with an apology gives them power (either realistic or a sense of empowerment). The previously used power measure included items which tapped into influence and political power- very real types of power. The Needs-Based Model describes power in a very general sense, describing it as a need for status and influence (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). In later work, in the context of intergroup apologies, power is loosely described by Shnabel and colleagues (2009) as a "sense of empowerment". Thus, the previous experiments may have failed to operationalize power needs in the most relevant way for victim groups.

Experiment 7: "Friendly-Fire"

Experiment 7 examines victim as well as perpetrator responses to an apologetic act. The primary goal of this experiment is to measure the perception of victims that perpetrators expect both their obligation to shift and they will improve their image. Given that obligation shifting encompasses an expectation of forgiveness and gratitude, I test if this expectation reduces willingness to actually forgive. Likewise, this experiment addresses the finding in the previous experiment that perpetrators are also genuinely interested in satisfying the victim group by reintroducing and improving victim power as a measure. Finally, it also examines the extent to which victims and perpetrators differ in their assessment of an apologetic act.

In real cases of transgression, there can be many differences between perpetrator and victim groups' perspectives of an issue. They may have different historical knowledge about the issue, come from different places with differing economic and political climates, have culturally different attitudes towards apologies, and/or differing linguistic strategies in structuring the language of apologies (Barnlund & Yoshioka, 1990; Giner-Sorolla et al., manuscript in preparation 2012; Howard-Hassmanan & Gibney, 2007; Kasanga & Lawanga-Lumu, 2007). This could mean that the victims' and perpetrators' differences in reaction to an apology could be moderated or mediated by any number of other factors.

Of course, in real life these factors are important influential elements of reconciliation which cannot be ignored. For this experiment, however, I wanted to understand the effect of obligation shifting and image improvement as expectations for victims and also still measure the extent to which perpetrators felt obligation had shifted and their image had improved while controlling for the many other factors which are specific to every individual conflict. This experiment will manipulate whether participants see themselves as victims or as transgressors of

the incident. By using a fictitious issue, this experiment will control how much victims and perpetrators know about the issue and explore how being the give or receiver of an apology alters perceptions of its effectiveness.

This experiment uses the issue of friendly-fire during the war in Afghanistan. The choice to use friendly-fire in Afghanistan was mainly because of the ease of manipulating participants' knowledge about an incident. This experiment required choosing an incident in which participants could believe that they had been either the victims or perpetrators in the transgression. Obviously certain types of transgression could never be manipulated in this way. For example it would be near impossible to convince British participants that they had been the victims of slavery or that landmines had been left behind by another nation in their country. Friendly-fire is a context in which British participants might believe that the incident had indeed occurred and that Britain could be either the perpetrator or victim group involved.

Furthermore, it is important to note other research on apologies which has looked at friendly fire incidents. Research by Brown and colleagues (2008) on Canadian victims of a friendly fire incident in Afghanistan looked at subsequent forgiveness levels for Canadian participants. Contrary to the findings of Philpot and Hornsey (2008) (which suggested no relationship between apologising and forgiveness) participants in their research who read about an apology did show greater levels of forgiveness. In a review on apologies, Blatz et al. (2010) discuss those findings and suggest that the difference in these two lines of research may lie in the nature of the act. They argue that the friendly fire incident was unintentional; whereas Philpot and Hornsey's (2008) work focused on historical transgressions (including issues like Australians held in POW camps in Japan and nuclear testing in the South Pacific), which could all be interpreted as intentional in their harm against the Australian victims. However, there has

been no research testing the difference between intentional an unintentional acts on forgiveness after apologies for victims. An alternative explanation for differences in findings on victims' willingness to forgive could be due to the closeness of the groups. The transgressions against Australians used in the research by Philpot and Hornsey (2008) referred to perpetrator groups that are generally seen to be culturally, geographically, and politically distant from the victim group. The work by Brown et al. (2008) examined an apology made to Canadian victims by American perpetrators.

For this next experiment, it is less clear if forgiveness will be an outcome of apologising for victim groups. This experiment will be using a friendly-fire incident similar to that of Brown and colleagues (2008) but will be using a more distant victim group, similar to the contexts used in Philpot and Hornsey's (2008) work. If the results demonstrate that victim groups express greater forgiveness after an apology (replicating the findings of Brown and colleagues (2008)), this would suggest that, as Blatz and colleagues (2010) posited, the intentionality of the incident moderates willingness to forgive after an apology. However, if, as in Philpot and Hornsey's (2008) work, forgiveness is not increased after an apology, this may open further questions about differences between the contexts as, for example, the closeness of the two groups.

Nonetheless, assessing whether victims do or do not forgive, following a transgression, is not the primary purpose of this experiment. The primary goal is to understand if victims perceive perpetrator expectations of obligation shifting and image improvements and if these perceptions explain unwillingness to forgive after an apology. This experiment also revisits the concept of power by examining if victims' sense of empowerment is important to either those giving or receiving an apology.

This experiment aims to address the following hypotheses:

1. The perception that obligation shifting is expected by perpetrators will reduce victims' willingness to forgive; image improvement expectations will not have this effect.
2. Victims and perpetrators will be more satisfied with an apology than a non-apologetic statement.
3. Perpetrators will be satisfied with an apology when it improves their image and shifts obligation. These appraisals will mediate the preference for an apology over a non-apology.
4. Victims will be satisfied with an apology when it gives them power (real power and/or empowerment). This appraisal will mediate the preference for an apology over a non-apology.

Method

Participants. One hundred and fifty British citizen participants, recruited through the research participation scheme at the University of Kent for course credit and through Amazon's MTurk for payment (50cents USD), completed the online experiment. Participants all took part in an online experiment through Qualtrics survey software but were directed from either MTurk or the university research participation scheme online sign-up page. This allowed for a more representative sample of British citizens. Six participants were removed due to identifying with the outgroup (Romanians). One additional participant was removed due to incorrectly identifying the victim and perpetrator group used for their condition, which was crucial to the manipulation

used for this experiment. This left a remaining 143 British participants for analysis (85 Female; age $M = 23.99$, $SD = 8.95$, *range* = 18-59).

Design. Each participant was randomly assigned to either read that Britain was the victim or the perpetrator in an incident. They were further assigned to read that the perpetrator group gave either an apology or a non-apology control statement in response. Thus the experiment was a 2 (victim/perpetrator) x 2 (apology/control) design.

Procedure. Participants completed the experiment online through the online survey management software Qualtrics. Participants gave consent and were asked about their identity as a British citizen. Then participants were randomly assigned to read a fictitious news article which either expressed that the British were the perpetrators of an incident in which Romanians died or that the British were the victims of an incident in which Romanians were the perpetrators. In the Britain-as-perpetrator condition, participants read that Romanian troops were killed by British soldiers in an incident of friendly-fire in Afghanistan. The article stressed that the deaths were due to negligence of the British military in communicating important information about the troops' location and that the British troops could have avoided the incident with better communication (see Appendix 9). Participants who were assigned to the Britain-as-victim condition read a parallel story which described the same outcome of a friendly-fire incident but expressed that it was Romanian troops at fault and British soldiers who were victims (see Appendix 10). Both articles were designed to look like real newspaper articles to encourage believability.

After reading this, participants were asked two questions about the news article to confirm they read it, including one question which asked them to identify the victim and perpetrator

groups involved in the incident. Participants who did not accurately identify both the victim and perpetrator nationalities for their assigned condition were removed from the experiment for analysis as this was critical to the manipulation of the experiment. Although presented as genuine news, the articles were fictitious and constructed to manipulate the victim and perpetrator groups for the purposes of this research. However, many of the details used in the article were based on real incidents of friendly fire between allied nations in Afghanistan.

Apology support. Participants were asked one question to measure if they believed the perpetrator group should apologise for the incident but the question was changed to reflect either the British or Romanians as the perpetrator group depending on the condition (i.e. "*Do you believe Britain/Romania should apologise for the incident?*" with responses on a scale of 1 [*not at all*] to 7 [*very much*]) ($M = 6.29$; $SD = 1.00$).

Next, participants were again randomly assigned to read one of two responses by the perpetrator group, an apology or a non-apology statement. Participants who had been given the news article describing Britain as perpetrator were told that a representative of the British government gave the statement, while participants in the Britain as victim conditions read that a Romanian representative gave the statement. Participants read one of the following two statements from either the Romanian or British Chief of General Staff:

1) Apology statement

It is clear that we made mistakes. We sincerely apologise to the family members of those who died. We are truly sorry for what happened and deeply regret the loss of life which occurred as a result of our negligence.

2) Control statement

It is clear that mistakes were made. It is unfortunate that the incident occurred and it is always sad to see soldiers lose their lives in the call of duty.

The apology statement expressed responsibility taking and explicitly stated that the perpetrator group was sorry for what happened and felt deep regret. The control statement admitted that mistakes were made without directly taking responsibility and referred to the incident as unfortunate but neglected to express an apology.

After reading the article, participants completed the following measures on seven point Likert scales. All questions were phrased to address the condition participants were in.

Satisfaction. Satisfaction with the statement by the perpetrator group representative (either the British or Romanian government depending on condition) was measured with three items (i.e. "*How satisfied are you with the response of the British/Romanian government?*", "*How pleased are you with the response of the British/Romanian government?*" on scales from 1 [*very dissatisfied*] to 7 [*very satisfied*], and "*Britain/Romania has done a good job in responding to the incident*" on scales from 1 [*strongly disagree*] to 7 [*strongly agree*]). The parallel worded items referring to either Britain or Romania as giving the statement were combined and the three items together were used to measure satisfaction with the statement (α = .92, M = 3.48; SD = 1.50).

Perpetrator image improvement. Four items measured perceived changes in the image of the perpetrator group due to the response of either the British or Romanian government. The items were worded to always reflect the perpetrator group depending on the condition (i.e. Britain-as-perpetrator: "*How will the statement affect Britain's reputation in other countries?*";

"How will the statement affect Britain's reputation in Romania?" on scales of 1 [*greatly decrease]* to 7 [*greatly increase*] with 4 meaning "*no change*", and "*How will the statement affect the moral standing of Britain?*" "*Please assess the current British moral image.*" on scales from 1 [*Very poor*] to 7 [*Very good*]; Britain-as-victim: "*How will the statement affect Romania's reputation in other countries?*", "*How will the statement affect Romanian's reputation in Britain*?" on scales of 1 [*greatly decrease*] to 7 [*greatly increase*] with 4 meaning "*no change*", "*How will the statement affect the moral standing of Romania?*", "*Please assess the current Romanian moral image.")*. Together these four items formed a scale measuring ingroup image and were reliable (α = *.89; M = 3.16; SD = 1.21*).

Obligation shifting to victims. Five items were intended to measure shifting obligation to the victim group. The items were very similar to those used in Experiment 6. They were changed to reflect the perpetrator shifting obligation to the victim group depending on the condition (e.g. *"Britain/Romania does not need to do more to repair its relationship with Romania/Britain."; "The ball is now in the court of the Romanians/British to deal with the incident", "The Romanians/British ought to forgive the British/Romanians following the response", "The Romanians/British ought to be grateful to the British/Romanians for the response.*" and "*The Romanians/British ought to get over what happened and move on*"). Together the items formed a measure of obligation shifting and the scale was very reliable (α = .83; *M* = 3.08; *SD* = 1.18). It is important to note that participants in the condition in which Britain was the victim would have read the items from the perspective of the group receiving the obligation. Thus, many of the items can be interpreted as an acceptance of obligation shifting after a conciliatory statement. For example, in the statement "*The British ought to forgive the Romanians following the response",* high numbers would indicate a strong agreement on the part of a British participant to believing

that the ingroup ought to forgive the Romanian perpetrator group. Therefore, for victim groups, this measure can be interpreted as "acceptance of obligation shifting."

Victim power. The same three items used in the previous studies were used again to measure power for victims after the statement on scales of 1 [*greatly decrease*] to 7 [*greatly increase*] but the items were changed to reflect the victim groups depending on the condition (Britain-as-victim: "*How much will the statement increase or decrease the political power of Britain?*", "*How much will the statement increase or decrease Britain's international influence?*" and "*How much will the statement increase or decrease Britain's influence in Romania*"; Britain-as-perpetrator: "*How much will the statement increase or decrease the political power of Romania?*", "*How much will the statement increase or decrease Romania's international influence?*" and "*How much will the statement increase or decrease Romania's influence in Britain*"). An additional item was created to measure victim empowerment (i.e. "*How empowered does the statement make the families of the victims feel?*"). However, due to low item correlation ($r = .022$), it was decided to keep it separate from the other items as a unique measure of empowerment. Composite scores were created using the three original items for each participant using either the three Britain as perpetrator or three Romania as perpetrator items, depending on the condition, and the three item scale proved reliable ($\alpha = .79$; $M = 4.30$; $SD = 0.70$).

Victim empowerment. The one item which was not related with the other measures of power, was retained as a single item measure of *victim empowerment* ($M = 2.99$; $SD = 1.43$).

Participants who were randomly assigned to read that Britain was the victim of the friendly fire incident were asked a series of further questions which were relevant to only the victim

group. The questions which follow were only presented to participants in the Britain-as-victim condition, with the following instruction: *"The following questions are about what the Romanians might be expecting from the British after giving the statement."*

Obligation shifting expectations. The extent to which victims see the perpetrator group as "expecting shift obligation onto the victim group by making the statement" was measured using five items parallel to the obligation shifting measure. Victims (British) were asked about the extent to which they think that the perpetrator group (Romanians) expect obligation to have shifted following the statement (e.g., "*The Romanians are expecting the British to be grateful following the statement*" and "*The Romanians believe they do not need to do more to repair their relationship with the British*" on scales of 1 [*strongly disagree*] to 7 [*strongly agree*]). The five item scale was reliable (α = .84; M = 4.29; SD = 1.19). This measure is intended to capture the idea that victims feel that perpetrators expect obligation shifting to occur.

Perpetrator image expectations. The extent to which victims see the perpetrator group as "expecting to improve their image by making the statement" was measured with two items. Victims (British) were asked about the extent to which they think that the perpetrator group (Romanians) expect their image to have improved following the statement (e.g., "*The Romanians are expecting to improve their image by making the statement*" and "The *Romanians are expecting to improve their reputation by making the statement*" on scales of 1 [*strongly disagree*] to 7 [*strongly agree*]). The two items were highly correlated (r = .82, p < .001; M = 4.99; SD = 1.30).

Forgiveness. Participants in the Britain-as-victim condition were also presented with a single item forgiveness measure, which has been used in other research on forgiveness (see

Enright, Rique, & Coyle, 2000; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). The item was altered to reflect the specific groups in this experiment (i.e. "*To what extent do you feel you can forgive the Romanians for what happened in Afghanistan?*") and used to measure victims' (British) willingness to forgive the perpetrators (Romanians) following the incident ($M = 4.03$; $SD = 1.47$).

At the end of the experiment, all participants were debriefed; the nature of the experiment as well as the deception used in it was explained fully. Participants were told that the news article and incident were created for the purposes of this experiment and there are no cases of friendly fire which match this incident exactly, though many of the details were taken from real incidents which have occurred in Afghanistan.

Results

Initial apology support. In a one-way ANOVA, I first examined if there was a difference between the Britain-as-perpetrator and Britain-as-victim conditions on their expectation that the perpetrator group should provide an apology for the friendly-fire incident. There was no significant difference between who read that the ingroup (Britain) was victim ($M = 6.16$, $SD = 1.11$) and those who read that the ingroup (Britain) was perpetrator ($M = 6.41$, $SD = 0.84$) on the extent to which they expected the perpetrator group to give an apology, $F(1, 142) = 2.26$, $MSE = 0.99$, $p = .135$.

Apology appraisals. Next, I tested the differences between groups (Britain-as-victim vs. Britain-as-perpetrator) and statements (apology vs. control) on the measures which were shared

by victims and perpetrators. I also tested the effect of an apology on forgiveness, obligation shifting expectations, and perpetrator image expectations for victims only.

Perpetrator image improvement. Using the GLM method, I conducted a 2 (victim/perpetrator) x 2 (control/apology) ANOVA on the DV perpetrator image improvement. There was a significant main effect of statement. Giving an apology ($M = 3.47$, $SD = 1.32$) led to the impression that the perpetrator group had improved its image more than the control statement ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 1.00$), $F(1, 139) = 10.86$, $MSE = 1.39$, $\eta\rho^2 = .073$, $p = .001$. There was no significant main effect of group (Britain-as-victim: $M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.33$; Britain-as-perpetrator: $M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.09$), $F(1, 139) = 0.11$, $MSE = 1.39$, $\eta\rho^2 = .001$, $p = .739$. There was no interaction between group and statement, $F(1, 139) = 0.03$, $MSE = 1.39$, $\eta\rho^2 = .000$, $p = .873$.

Obligation shifting. In another GLM, but with obligation shifting as the DV, there was a significant main effect of group (Britain-as-victim: $M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.18$; Britain-as-perpetrator: $M = 2.87$, $SD = 1.14$), $F(1, 139) = 5.29$, $MSE = 1.36$, $\eta\rho^2 = .037$, $p = .023$. Participants in the Britain-as-victim condition felt that obligation had shifted to them more than those in the Britain-as-perpetrator condition. In other words, victims felt accepted the obligation to forgive and be grateful, and that the ball was in their court after either statement, more than perpetrators felt victims ought to. There was no significant main effect of statement (apology: $M = 3.15$, $SD = 1.18$; control: $M = 3.02$, $SD = 1.17$), $F(1, 139) = 1.01$, $MSE = 1.36$, $\eta\rho^2 = .007$, $p = .317$. There was no interaction between group and statement, $F(1, 139) = 0.03$, $MSE = 1.36$, $\eta\rho^2 = .000$, $p = .858$.

Victim power. In another GLM, but with victim power as the DV, there was no significant main effect of the difference between giving an apology ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 0.70$) or the control

statement ($M = 4.25$, $SD = 0.70$) on perceptions of power changes for the victim group, $F(1, 139) = 0.61$, $MSE = 0.50$, $\eta\rho^2 = .004$, $p = .438$. There was also no significant main effect of group (victims: $M = 4.29$, $SD = 0.80$; perpetrators: $M = 4.32$, $SD = 0.58$), $F(1, 139) = 0.01$, $MSE = 0.50$, $\eta\rho^2 = .000$, $p = .886$, and no interaction between group and statement, $F(1, 139) = 0.99$, $MSE = 0.50$, $\eta\rho^2 = .007$, $p = .321$.

Victim empowerment. In another GLM, but with *victim empowerment* as the DV, there was a significant main effect of the difference between giving an apology ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 1.37$) or the control statement ($M = 2.29$, $SD = 1.11$) on perceptions of empowerment for the victim group, $F(1, 138) = 41.43$, $MSE = 1.58$, $\eta\rho^2 = .231$, $p < .001$. Participants in both the Britain-as-perpetrator and Britain-as-victim conditions felt that the apology gave the victims' families a greater sense of empowerment compared to the control statement. There was no significant main effect of group (victims: $M = 2.82$, $SD = 1.48$; perpetrators: $M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.37$), $F(1, 138) = 0.40$, $MSE = 1.58$, $\eta\rho^2 = .003$, $p = .526$, and no interaction between group and statement, $F(1, 138) = 0.51$, $MSE = 1.58$, $\eta\rho^2 = .004$, $p = .476$.

Satisfaction. I then conducted another two-way ANOVA using GLM, to test the main effects of group and statement and test for any interactions on the outcome variable satisfaction. Statement had a significant main effect, with the apology ($M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.31$) being more satisfying than the non-apology ($M = 2.73$, $SD = 1.32$) for both participants in the Britain-as-victim and Britain-as-perpetrator condition, $F(1, 139) = 76.81$, $MSE = 1.75$, $\eta\rho^2 = .240$, $p < .001$. There was no significant main effect of group (victims: $M = 3.41$, $SD = 1.54$; perpetrators: $M = 3.55$, $SD = 1.47$), $F(1, 139) = 0.10$, $MSE = 1.75$, $\eta\rho^2 = .001$, $p = .747$, and no interaction between group and statement, $F(1, 139) = 0.00$, $MSE = 1.75$, $\eta\rho^2 = .000$, $p = .979$.

Obligation shifting expectations. Because only people in the Britain as victim condition completed the measure on obligation shifting expectations, I next conducted an ANOVA comparing the two types of statements on the variable of obligation shifting expectations on the Britain-as-victim group only. There was no significant difference between giving an apology (M = 4.32, SD = 1.03) or a control statement (M = 4.27, SD = 1.32) on how much victims felt that perpetrators expected them to accept an obligation shift, $F(1, 72) = 0.02$, $MSE = 1.44$, $p = .881$.

Perpetrator image expectations. As with the previous analysis, I conducted another ANOVA comparing the two types of statements on perpetrator image expectations for the Britain –as-victim group only. There was significant difference between giving an apology (M = 5.50, SD = 0.84) and the control statement (M = 4.60, SD = 1.45) on how much victims felt that perpetrators expected their image to improve, $F(1, 72) = 9.74$, $MSE = 1.50$, $p = .003$. Victims felt that perpetrators expected their image to improve more following an apology than the control statement.

Forgiveness. As with the previous analysis, I conducted another ANOVA comparing the two types of statements on forgiveness. There was no significant difference between giving an apology (M = 4.09, SD = 1.33) or a control statement (M = 3.98, SD = 1.59) on the outcome of forgiveness, $F(1, 72) = 0.11$, $MSE = 2.19$, $p = .736$.

As with the previous studies, I wanted to explore what predicts satisfaction for perpetrators as well as satisfaction and forgiveness for victims after either statement. I split the file and conducted multiple regressions on each group separately.

Perpetrator outcomes. See Table 7 for means, standard deviations, and correlations between predictor and outcomes variables for the Britain-as-perpetrator condition.

Table 7. *Correlation table with means and standard deviations for "perpetrators" in Experiment 7.*

	Mean	*SD*	*Satisfaction*	*Obligation shifting to victims*	*Perpetrator image improvement*	*Victim power*
Satisfaction	3.55	1.47				
Obligation shifting to victims	2.86	1.14	.62***			
Perpetrator image improvement	3.17	1.09	.67***	.63***		
Victim power	4.32	0.58	.00	-.02	-.08	
Victim empowerment	3.17	1.37	.62***	.47***	.52***	.089

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Satisfaction. In order to understand what predicts satisfaction for perpetrators in this experiment, I used only the Britain-as-perpetrator condition participants in the split file and conducted a multiple linear regression on the DV satisfaction. Using just the Britain-as-perpetrator condition participants, I included obligation shifting, perpetrator image improvement, power for victims, and empowerment for victims as predictor variables in a regression on the DV satisfaction. As predicted, ingroup image improvement ($\beta = .35$, $sr^2 = .25$, $p = .002$) and obligation shifting ($\beta = .26$, $sr^2 = .20$, $p = .016$) significantly, positively and independently predicted participants' satisfaction with the statement. Power for victims, as with previous studies, was not a significant predictor of satisfaction ($p = .956$). Empowerment for victims,

however, was a significant predictor of satisfaction with the statement ($\beta = .31$, $sr^2 = .26$, $p = .002$). The overall model was significant, $F(4, 69) = 23.14$, $Adj.R^2 = .56$, $MSE = 0.95$, $p < .001$.

In a multiple mediation bootstrapping model using the IVs significant in predicting satisfaction in the regression, image improvement was a significant independent mediator (CI not including 0) of the contrast on the DV satisfaction (Figure 7). Obligation shifting and empowerment were not significant mediators (CI included 0). In this model empowerment failed to predict satisfaction although it was significant in the regression. Image improvement partially mediated the preference for the apology over the control statement.



Figure 7. Mediation analysis for Experiment 7 testing mediators of the condition contrast and perpetrator satisfaction for "perpetrators".

Victim outcomes. Keeping the file split, the next analyses were performed only on participants who read that British troops were victims of the friendly-fire incident. See Table 8 for means, standard deviations, and correlations between predictor and outcomes variables for victims.

Satisfaction. In order to understand what predicts satisfaction for victims, a slightly altered regression model was used, including the variables most relevant to victim groups. To examine if obligation shifting and image improvement expectations reduce victim satisfaction, this regression included the victim specific variables of obligation shifting expectations and image improvement expectations; additionally, I included power for victims and empowerment because of the predicted importance of power for victims in the Needs-Based Model.

In the regression (using only participants from the Britain-as-victim condition), power for victims ($\beta = .18$, $sr^2 = .17$, $p = .031$) and victim empowerment ($\beta = .76$, $sr^2 = .72$, $p < .001$) positively predicted victim satisfaction. Obligation shifting and image improvement expectations were not significant (all $ps > .633$) in this model. The extent to which victims see perpetrators as expecting to shift obligation or improve their image did not impact the extent to which victims were satisfied with the statement. The overall model was significant, $F(4, 71) = 23.16$, $Adj.R^2 = .56$, $MSE = 1.02$, $p < .001$.

In a multiple mediation bootstrapping model using the IVs significant in predicting satisfaction in the regression, empowerment was a significant mediator (CI not including 0) of the contrast on the DV satisfaction (Figure 8). Power was not (CI included 0). The total effect was significant and the mediators reduced the direct effect, although it remained significant. Empowerment partially mediated victims' preference for an apology over the control statement.

Forgiveness. In another regression, with the same predictors as the previous regression but with forgiveness as the DV, obligation shifting expectations was a significant negative predictor of forgiveness (β = -.24, sr^2 = -.22, p = .017). The more that the victim group felt the perpetrators expected obligation to shift after making the statement the less victims felt they could forgive. Power for victims also predicted forgiveness but in a positive direction (β = .27, sr^2 = .26, p = .005) as did empowerment (β = .56, sr^2 = .53, $p < .001$). The more the victims felt that their own group had gained power and felt empowered the more they forgave. Image improvement expectations was a marginally significant, negative predictor (β = -.19, sr^2 = -.17, p = .067). The model was significant, $F(4, 71) = 13.14$, $Adj.R^2 = .41$, $MSE = 1.30$, $p < .001$. Because there were no differences between conditions, no bootstrapping model was run.



Note. Standardized regression weights are shown.
*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Total effect= .72***

Direct effect= .31*

Figure 8. Mediation analysis for Experiment 7 testing mediators of the condition contrast and victim satisfaction for "victims".

Table 8. *Correlation table with means and standard deviations for "victims" in Experiment 7.*

		Mean	*SD*	*Satisfaction*	*Obligation shifting Acceptance*	*Perpetrator image improvement*	*Victim power*	*Victim empowerment*	*Forgiveness*	*Obligation shifting expectations*
Victims	*Satisfaction*	3.41	1.54							
	Obligation shifting acceptance	3.29	1.18	.57***						
	Perpetrator image improvement	3.14	1.32	.73***	.65***					
	Victim power	4.29	0.80	.19	.21	.02				
	Empowerment	2.82	1.47	.74***	.57***	.73***	-.01			
	Forgiveness	4.03	1.47	.65***	.64***	-.64***	.21	.53***		
	Obligation shifting expectations	4.29	1.19	-.04	.00	-.08	.10	-.10	-.32**	
	Image improvement expectations	4.99	1.30	.18	.21	.14	.17	.24*	-.08	.29*

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

Discussion

This experiment expanded on previous studies by manipulating if participants saw their group as either the victims or perpetrators of the transgression. By using the issue of friendly-fire in Afghanistan, participants were led to believe that either British troops had mistakenly killed ally troops or that British troops were the victims. The main purposes of this experiment were to examine if the expectation of obligation shifting led to reduced willingness to forgive for victims and see if there were differences between victims and perpetrators on the various appraisals of apologies. This experiment also revisited the possibility that perpetrators want to satisfy victim power needs by improving the original measure with an additional item on victim empowerment.

The results suggested that before reading either government response, both perpetrators and victims strongly supported an apology being given for the incident, with means well above 6 (on a scale of 1 to 7). After reading the response from the government, both victims and perpetrators found the apology more satisfying than the non-apology control statement. There were no differences between perpetrators and victims on the extent to which they felt that victims received realistic power following either statement, however, both perpetrators and victims felt that an apology provided victims with a greater sense of empowerment. Both groups also thought that the apology statement led to significantly more improvement of the perpetrator group's image than the control statement. Interestingly, and somewhat unexpectedly, victims felt that obligation had shifted more than perpetrators across both conditions. In other words, victims were more willing to say they ought to forgive and be grateful than perpetrators actually expected them to.

The measure of empowerment did not reliably relate to the other items measuring power and influence changes, so I looked at empowerment separately. In this experiment, obligation shifting and image improvement remained unique predictors of satisfaction for perpetrators, but victim empowerment also emerged as a positive predictor of satisfaction. In other words, perpetrators were more satisfied when they felt that victims were more empowered. Perpetrators were also more satisfied when they felt their image had improved and when they thought obligation had shifted, consistent with the findings of the previous experiments.

Like Experiment 1, this experiment included a non-apology statement which still suggested acknowledgement of the issue and expressed sadness about the results; it did not contain a refusal to apologise, as seen in Experiments 2 and 4. But contrary to the results of Experiment 1, in this experiment, the apology was more satisfying for perpetrators than the non-apology statement. Image improvement mediated the preference for an apology compared to the non-apology-- perpetrator group members felt the apology led to more image improvement than the non-apology and in turn felt this was more satisfying. However, and somewhat surprisingly, unlike all the previous experiments, obligation shifting did not mediate the preference for the apology over the non-apology. Perpetrators, although satisfied when the perceived obligation shifting after either statement, did not see the apology as being more obligation shifting than the non-apology.

The apology manipulation was much more subtle in this experiment than in previous experiments, which did find differences between conditions on obligation shifting; this suggests that obligation shifting might be less impacted by subtle uses of language within statements. Put plainly, perpetrators may see any statement of concern as shifting their obligation, despite recognizing that a lesser statement fails to improve their image as much as a complete apology

does. Alternatively, given that the means for obligation shifting were so low, it is possible that (unlike in previous studies) this apology worked to improve ingroup image without greatly influencing obligation shifting. In other words, something specific about this apology context or the apology wording may have failed to allow perpetrators to feel they have successfully shifted obligation. This could be a hopeful finding which should be examined further in future work, if an apology can be given which improves ingroup image but minimizes obligation shifting, the negative outcomes of apologising could be reduced.

In the results on victim satisfaction, power (both realistic and empowerment) was important to victims, predicting greater satisfaction and increased forgiveness. This is consistent with the theory presented in the needs-based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). Victims were more satisfied after an apology compared to the non-apology and this was mediated by empowerment. In other words, victims saw the apology as more empowering than the non-apology statement and this partially explained their greater satisfaction with it.

However, receiving the apology had no effect on victims' willingness to forgive. The perception that obligation shifting was expected, however, significantly reduced victims' willingness to forgive. In other words, when victims perceived that perpetrators expected them to forgive, be grateful, and be done with the issue, the less they reported being willing to forgive. Perpetrator image improvement expectations were marginally related to victims' reduced forgiveness. Further research would need to be done to see if image improvement expectations are a negative predictor of satisfaction for victims.

It seems that for victims, apologies can be satisfying but do not necessarily lead to forgiveness. These findings are consistent with Philpot and Hornsey's research (2008), which

found that victims were willing to express greater satisfaction after an apology but not greater forgiveness. The results of this experiment suggest that resistance to forgive may be, in part, because victims feel that they are expected to. If victims agree to forgive after an apology, in a way, they accept the obligation shift. Victims may see an apology as satisfying but not want to be obligated to forgive as a result. As some scholars have argued, reconciliation is a process not an end state (Andreiu, 2009). In other words, for victims, apologies may start a process not end it; if they perceive perpetrators attempting to end the process with an apology, the work of the apology may be undone.

Unlike the first five experiments, which presented a rather bleak picture of perpetrators and apologies, the results of this experiment suggest that perpetrators may be somewhat concerned with the needs of the victims, at least when it comes to giving them a sense of empowerment. Perhaps perpetrators do not see real influential/political power as important. Victims, however, were uniquely satisfied with both real influential/political power and empowerment. This could suggest that perpetrators are either only aware of half the story and so they fail to recognize that real power is important to victims, or they are uninterested in giving victims real, influential power.

Perpetrators may see empowerment as a way of satisfying victims, without any possibility of real power relationships changing. However, given that empowerment did not emerge as a mediator explaining the preference for the dual act over the non-apology statement, a more likely explanation is that although empowerment for victims related to perpetrator satisfaction, it is not influencing satisfaction directly, but instead is either increased by satisfaction (i.e. the more satisfied perpetrators feel with an apology the more they feel that victims have been empowered)

or shares a relationship with a third, yet unmeasured appraisal which would explain away the relationship between empowerment and satisfaction.

CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION

This line of research set out to understand how perpetrators perceive apologetic acts. The primary goal was to understand what perpetrator group members find satisfying about apologising. In the first four studies, my research suggests that there are two consistent predictors of satisfaction for perpetrator group members: image improvement and obligation shifting. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 show that obligation shifting has a unique impact on negative feelings about the victim group. Experiments 1 and 4 also suggested that obligation shifting reduces a perpetrator group's willingness to support further acts of reconciliation with the victim group. My findings in Experiment 5, which manipulated the two appraisals within the framing of the apology, provided evidence that obligation shifting and image improvement are causal of, and not just related to, greater satisfaction

Experiment 6 added to the previous findings in two ways. First, it replicated the findings of Experiments 1-5 by showing that image improvement and obligation shifting predict satisfaction in yet another context. Secondly, it demonstrated that these two appraisals were independent from the belief that the apology had actually satisfied victims. Finally, the results of Experiment 7 suggest that victims who perceive perpetrators as trying to shift obligation after apologising are less willing to forgive.

Gaining or losing power and influence was never a real concern for perpetrators. This supports the needs-based model, which proposes that perpetrators are looking to improve their moral image and gain acceptance and are not concerned with power (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). In Experiment 3, power for the ingroup was actually associated with less satisfaction. If anything, perpetrators did not want to appear to be gaining power after an apologetic act.

However, one surprising finding in the first five experiments was that perpetrator group members seemed unconcerned about victim needs for power; the extent to which victims received power after an apology had no relationship to a perpetrator group member's satisfaction with the act. The results of those experiments suggested that perpetrators are indifferent to victims' need to regain status and power. Experiment 7, however, demonstrated that, in addition to image improvement and obligation shifting, perpetrators find giving victims a "sense of empowerment" satisfying. Victims themselves wanted both power and influence but also a sense of empowerment. Perpetrators may not be completely disinterested in victim needs, but perhaps they only want to give away a feeling of power to victims and are not satisfied with victims gaining any real economic, political, or influential power. Perhaps for perpetrators, victim "empowerment" allows victim needs to be met, without threatening the status quo of power differences.

Across the first five experiments any differences in satisfaction between acts were explained by image improvement and obligation shifting independently. In general, findings on the differences between types of acts were inconsistent. Apologies were more satisfying than control statements which either refused to apologise (Experiment 2 and 4) or provided a non-apology statement (Experiment 7). The exception was seen in Experiment 1, where participants saw no differences between an apology and the control statement. That experiment used a control statement which was less distinguishable from the apology statement, thus the lack of differences in that experiment were likely due to the control statement still expressing strong concern and acknowledging harm. Experiments 2 and 4 suggested that there are no differences between verbal apologies and financial reparations. In contrast, Experiment 3 showed that (at least in some contexts) reparations can be more satisfying than a verbal apology and Experiments

3 and 6 showed that a dual act (consisting of both an apology and reparations) is the most satisfying. Uniting all these findings, however, was the principle that higher satisfaction after any conciliatory act was explained by the impression that it had shifted obligation and improved the ingroup image more than the other acts. Obligation shifting alone explained any increase in negative feelings or reduced support for reparations after a conciliatory act. Only Experiment 7 was somewhat inconsistent with the first five experiments, in that it suggested image improvement alone explained greater satisfaction with the apology over the control statement.

Importance of Findings

Image improvement emerged as an important predictor of satisfaction with apologetic acts across all seven experiments. Image concerns were suggested by the Needs Based Model as being important to perpetrators but had never really been tested in a true apology context. For perpetrators, the impression that an apologetic act (be it a verbal apology or material reparations) has improved the image of the ingroup was directly and positively related to satisfaction with the act. Furthermore, the previous research on the Needs-Based model has suggested that image improvement when compared to gaining power is usually preferred by perpetrators. But the research conducted before has always measured the preference for image compared to power but has never allowed for the possibility that both could be important to perpetrators. My research has consistently shown that image improvement is a unique predictor of satisfaction for perpetrators, gaining power and influence for the ingroup is not, supporting the Needs-Based model.

Perhaps the most important finding in the first four studies of this research is that of obligation shifting. Obligation shifting as a predictor of perpetrator satisfaction is a concept yet

to be measured in psychology research. Obligation shifting suggests that the perpetrator group feels it is no longer responsible after a transgression, but even more, it suggests an expectation that the victim group owes forgiveness and gratitude. My research also shows a relationship between perceptions of obligation shifting and negative feelings about the victims. Some political scientists have argued that apologetic acts allow perpetrators to feel they are no longer responsible for repairing relations with the victim group (Nobles, 2008, Rouhana, 2004). Most concerning is the consistent finding in my research that the perception that obligation has shifted leads to real consequences of reducing support for victim groups receiving financial reparations. One experiment even suggested that perpetrators who shift obligation feel less willing to support the victim group in ways unrelated to the original transgression (Experiment 4). In that experiment, British perpetrator group members showed less willingness to give to Ireland during the present day banking crisis after an apology for the potato famine was seen as shifting obligation.

A sceptical view of obligation shifting could have argued that the measure was actually capturing an expectation that victims were truly satisfied with the act and therefore would feel grateful and want to forgive; the measure of obligation shifting could instead be measuring perpetrators' perceptions that victims were truly satisfied with the response not their expectation that they should be. However, the results of Experiment 6 show that being pleased when victims are satisfied after an apology is distinct from the perception that the victims now owe forgiveness and gratitude. Even more, the results of that experiment show that obligation shifting alone is related to negative feelings about the victim group and reduced support for future acts; perceptions of victim satisfaction have no relationship with these other outcomes. In other words, just the expectation that victims will be pleased with the apologetic act does not

automatically mean perpetrators feel less desire to work towards reconciliation. Obligation shifting, on the other hand, directly leads to perpetrators feeling that they no longer need to provide the victim group with support.

Victims are less willing to forgive when they feel that the perpetrator group is motivated by the desire to shift obligation. The results of Experiment 7 demonstrated that the more victims felt that they were expected to forgive, the more they were unwilling to. Obligation shifting after an apology has potentially negative consequences for intergroup relations; perpetrators feel less willingness to support the victims and feel more negatively towards them, while victims are less willing to forgive when they perceive obligation shifting intentions. In other words, obligation shifting makes perpetrators want to do less but may lead victims to feel that perpetrators need to do more. This is an important finding for both intergroup relations and for future research on intergroup apologies. It brings to light a darker side of apologising, which must be examined more closely in future work.

Although perpetrator group members may expect victims to forgive and be grateful, if victims perceive the perpetrator group's motives as being such they may feel indebtedness and not gratitude (Ames, Flynn, & Weber, 2004). Indebtedness has been shown to differ from gratitude (Grey, Emmons, & Morrison, 2001; Tsang, 2006) and has been linked to negative emotions like discomfort (Greenberg, 1980). In one study on reactions to assistance, people were more positive towards a helper if they believed the person helped because of positive feelings about them as opposed to feeling that the helper desired to get something in exchange (Ames, Flynn, & Weber, 2004). Due to its unpleasant nature, victim group members may resist feelings of indebtedness. Unlike gratitude, feelings of indebtedness are not linked to willingness to give back to a benefactor (see McCullough, Kimeldorf, & Cohen, 2008 for a review of indebtedness

versus gratitude). In an investigation into the power constructs of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, Rouhana (2004) suggests that one of the barriers to reconciliation is the continued belief by Israelis that any concession on their part immediately suggests gratitude and indebtedness from Palestinians. She argues that this belief by Israelis that Palestinians are obligated to be grateful is continually challenging the reconciliation process. This may explain why help from perpetrator groups is so often rejected (e.g., Nadler & Halabi, 2006).

Obligation shifting could then be most problematic when perpetrator group members feel that victims refuse to accept the obligation shift. There is already research to suggest that victim attitudes before and after an apology may differ; victims generally want an apology before it is given but are less satisfied than they expect they will be afterwards (De Cremer, Pullutla, & Folmer, 2011). Given that apologies do not induce forgiveness (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008) and that forgiveness may only be possible long after the apology (McCullough, Fincham, & Tang, 2003), if perpetrator groups expect immediate forgiveness and gratitude for their apologetic act, they may be very disappointed by the outcome.

If perpetrators have an expectation that obligation shifting has put the onus of forgiveness on the victim group and yet victims reject the apology (at least when it comes to giving forgiveness), relations between the groups could become more strained. The findings by Harth and colleagues (2011) suggest that when perpetrators are aware of a rejection of their reconciliation offer, they feel angrier and want to compensate victims less in the future. The link between this research and my research is easily apparent. In those studies participants who represented the perpetrator group were informed that victims had rejected their offer and this led to the negative outcomes of anger and reduced support for compensation. In my studies participants were never told how the victims responded to the apologetic act but it is possible that

those participants who shifted obligation most either anticipated rejection, or perhaps interpreted the lack of response from victims as being a rejection.

I can only speculate, but it is possible that obligation shifting could help to explain some of the findings in the work by Harth et al. (2011). If perpetrators were asked about the extent to which they expect victims to accept or reject the apology, perhaps this would moderate the relationships between obligation shifting and the outcomes of negative feelings about the victim group and reduced support. In other words, perhaps obligation shifting is linked to negative feelings about the victims in cases where they expect the offer to be rejected. A future study could look to replicate their work by manipulating victim acceptance or rejection of the offer but include measures of obligation shifting before receiving the acceptance or rejection.

Image improvement, like victim satisfaction, did not show reduced willingness to give to the victim group or increased negative feelings about them. If anything, image improvement perceptions seemed to decrease negative feelings (Experiments 3 and 5). Experiment 5 showed that framing an apology as being more image improving led to perpetrators being more satisfied with it but did not increase negative feelings about or alter willingness to support the victim group. This provides a more hopeful suggestion that perpetrators can have their emotional needs met without further damaging intergroup relations. If an apologetic act could be constructed to improve the ingroup's image but minimise perceptions of obligation shifting, the apology might satisfy perpetrators without the negative side-effects from obligation shifting. Even more, image improving apologies may even improve attitudes towards the victim group.

Another question this research explored was that of the differences between types of apologetic acts. As discussed earlier, there has been some discussion in the literature about the

appropriateness of verbal apologies versus reparations in reconciliation (Andrieu, 2009) as well as their differing outcomes for future relations between groups (Nobles, 2008). In her work in the political science field, Nobles (2008) discussed how reparations are a "door-closing" behaviour, which are used by perpetrators to put the issue behind. This theory is conceptually related to the concept of obligation shifting and suggestive that, unlike apologies, reparations should lead perpetrators to think they have shifted obligation more than verbal apologies given alone. Apologies on the other hand, she argues, imply a desire to repair the relationship and therefore should lead to more of an "open door" to additional actions supporting reconciliation between the groups. However, in practice, the results of these studies suggest that the story of apology and reparations may not be so simple.

Experiments 2 and 4 failed to find differences between giving an apology or giving reparations in the context of the Guatemala STD studies conducted by the US and the issue of Britain's responsibility for the Potato Famine in Northern Ireland. In those experiments, in which participants either read about a verbal apology, financial reparations, or a control statement, both an apology and reparations were more obligation shifting and more image improving than the control statement. However, there were no differences between the apology and reparations conditions on the two appraisals or on satisfaction with the statement. In other words, participants were equally pleased with giving either an apology or reparations in that context.

Conversely, Experiment 3, which presented an apology and a reparations condition (as well as a dual act including both), found experimental differences between giving an apology and giving reparations on the extent to which participants perceived obligation as shifting. Participants in that experiment were presented with the issue of landmines left behind in Egypt after World War II by British troops. Reparations (with or without an apology) were more

satisfying to ingroup members than just an apology in that experiment. This may, however, reflect the nature of the issue of landmines in Egypt. Landmines present a clear need for financial reparations, as there is a need for funds to work to remove landmines. Moreover, the funds, once spent, are in theory able lead to effective resolution of the problem.

Reparations for truly horrific or long-past historical injustices, however, may allow only a token compensation. In such cases (e.g. slavery, women's oppression, or war crimes), apologies may be seen as more appropriate, therefore more satisfying. Furthermore, the apologetic acts were given for landmines left during World War II, which participants may have seen as a morally justified conflict. Moreover, the mines were not left with the explicit intention to harm Egyptians. Whereas in the case of the Irish potato famine and the Guatemala STD studies, there is a much clearer case for an intention or at least obvious acceptance of the harm that would come to victims because of the actions of the perpetrators.

The findings on types of conciliatory acts and their differences are somewhat inconclusive given the many potential moderators which could affect when apologies or reparations are preferred in different contexts. Nonetheless, this research provides important evidence that, unlike Nobles' (2008) claims, reparations are not always more "door closing" than apologies. It is likely that the type of act which is seen as most satisfying is highly dependent on the context. Despite differences in which acts are preferred, my research consistently shows that obligation shifting and image improvement can explain any preferences for one act over another.

Critique of Current Research and Future Directions

One potential critique of this research thus far is that despite evidence that apologetic acts lead to more obligation shifting and image improvement than non-apologies (as demonstrated in Experiment 2 and 4), it is less clear how apologetic acts compare to completely not addressing the issue in the first place (i.e. providing no statement or even mentioning in the public discourse). There is evidence that perpetrators generally do not support apologising beforehand (see Blatz & Philpot, 2010) and that may be, in part, due to concerns that an apology could be leading to a re-opening of an old issue that perpetrators feel is already closed. In that case, apologies may actually be less obligation shifting than truly doing nothing. However, this is difficult to measure experimentally, because simply providing participants with information about the issue could be suggesting that the issue is not "closed", which could lead to an apology being better supported because the issue was reopened. This means that paradoxically, apologies may open and close the door on the issue simultaneously.

It is also important to conduct further studies comparing victim and perpetrator preferences for varying acts. My work has suggested that for perpetrators, the preference for reparations or an apology may be based on numerous situational and context dependents clues. It would be revealing to conduct further studies on whether or not victims have the same preference as perpetrator groups when it comes to choosing an apologetic act. It is possible that despite appraising the acts differently, in many cases both groups may be in agreement that one act is better than another, as seen in the results of Experiment 7. Conversely, victims may perceive certain apologies as coming with more or less of an expectation of obligation shifting attached. Research by Giner-Sorolla and colleagues (2008) found that expressing shame can help reduce insult after receiving reparations; the communication of obligation shifting may be reduced when

self-conscious emotions like shame are expressed, compared to an offer of reparations that does not include such terms. Further research should examine if certain elements of an apologetic act are perceived by victims as carrying more or less of an obligation to forgive.

Another critique which could be made about the current research is that, in a case of a highly "effective" response, perhaps obligation truly has shifted from the perpetrator group. In other words, if an apologetic act is truly good, why shouldn't victims forgive and be grateful to the perpetrator group and allow the issue to be closed? There is no one-size fits all for conflict resolution. Indeed, there may be times when the victim group is happy to move on from an issue. In fact, forgiveness may provide psychological benefits for victims (Bono, & McCullough, 2006). However, the results of Experiment 7 suggest that when victims feel expected to forgive, they are even less likely to do it.

In a way, obligation shifting takes away the very sense of empowerment that victims are seeking. As some scholars have pointed out, the choice to forgive should be entirely in the victims' hands, not the perpetrators' hands (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011) and forgiveness should not be the focus in the process of reconciliation because this puts "too much pressure on victims without addressing the deeper roots of the conflict" (Andrieu, 2009 pg. 7). However, future work could look at cases where victims are more motivated to let the issue "close" compared to situations where victims feel that an apology should be leading to more action, not less. It would be worthwhile to compare victim expectations after an apology to perpetrator expectations. In circumstances where they match, perhaps relations can still improve in the long term; in situations where the two sides prefer different outcomes, tensions would likely be further strained.

Across the first four experiments, obligation shifting was an independent mediator of differences between types of conciliatory statements and outcomes. In other words, when one statement compared to another is more satisfying, reduces support, or increases negative feelings, obligation shifting often explains some of that relationship. However, in Experiment 7 image improvement alone explained the preference for the apology compared to the less satisfying non-apology statement. Despite the apology being more satisfying, and the existing relationship between obligation shifting and increased satisfaction, the stronger apology preference was not explained by obligation shifting. For some reason, the apology itself was successful at improving the ingroup image without shifting obligation.

This result could be seen as a very positive finding for the future of intergroup apologies. If researchers can learn more about when and how apologies can improve the image of the ingroup, without shifting obligation to the victim group, apologies could be used to satisfy victim and perpetrator needs with neither an increase of negative feelings nor a minimizing of the perpetrators' sense of responsibility. This could have something to do with the apology itself. The wording of an apology no doubt has a great affect on the way it is perceived and the message it communicates (Giner-Sorolla et al., manuscript in preparation 2012). Perhaps there were specific words or phrases used in that apology which were successful at improving the image but did not allow perpetrator group members to feel they could shift obligation any more than the non-apology statement.

There are reasons to expect that the ability of an apology to improve the ingroup image or shift obligation to the victims may be dependent on a number of factors, including the pre-existing relationship between the groups, the context of the apology, and the nature of the transgression. Examining these differences may help to explain when and why some conciliatory

acts are more effective than others, and they may be especially important to further understanding how and when obligation shifting emerges as a potential block on the road to reconciliation. For example, one interesting finding in Experiment 7 was that in general participants supported giving an apology, with mean responses well above six on a seven-point scale assessing how much they supported an apology being given beforehand. Unfortunately, this was not measured in the other studies, but it is possible that the extent to which participants support apology giving beforehand influences the relative importance of image improvement and obligation shifting in evaluating it afterwards.

There is also some evidence that how perpetrator groups view the humanity of the victims could impact the extent to which they attempt to obligation shift following an apology. Research by Morton and Postmes (2011) suggests that perceptions of shared humanity with the outgroup increases perpetrators' expectations of forgiveness. This suggests that the more perpetrators see the victim group as sharing humanity with them, the more they might obligation shift after an apology. My measure of obligation shifting includes forgiveness expectations but also includes a sense that the ingroup is no longer responsible. Thus, there is still room for experiments that test the effect of perceived humanity on obligation shifting after an apology.

The relationship between perceived humanity and expectations of forgiveness has been shown to increase when the transgression is seen as being temporally distant (Greenaway et al., 2011). In other words, the more people perceive the transgression as being in the distant past, the more they expect forgiveness. A future study should test if temporally distant transgressions lead to more obligation shifting than recent transgressions. Transgressions which occurred far in the past may also differ from recent transgression in the extent to which perpetrators see the victim group as still suffering. Typically, historic transgressions might be seen as having less of an

effect on current victim group members; a very recent transgression may have living victims still suffering as a consequence. Of course, there are some historical transgressions in which future generations may still be suffering from injustice in the social hierarchy, for example slavery in America. There is no denying that black Americans are still socially disadvantaged in present-day America, even long after the end of slavery (Sears & Henry, 2003). Thus, the extent to which perpetrators feel that the victim group is still suffering could impact the importance of obligation shifting after an apology. A future experiment should look to directly manipulate the degree to which present-day victims are perceived to be suffering from the transgression to test if perpetrators shift obligation less when they feel that the current victim group is still suffering from the effects of the historical transgression.

Image improvement may be relatively more important than obligation shifting when appraising an apology for recent transgressions, especially if perpetrators view recent transgressions as a more noticeable stain on their moral image. In Experiment 7, the issue of recent friendly-fire was used. This differed from the first six experiments, which all dealt with more historic crimes. Although not explicitly tested between studies, a cursory examination of the relative power of image improvement in predicting satisfaction suggests that, in Experiment 7, image had a relatively greater effect on satisfaction than obligation shifting; whereas in the previous studies, obligation shifting demonstrated a larger or similar effect size to image improvement. Although only speculative, there may be important research to be done on the relative importance of image improvement and obligation shifting following apologies for different types of transgressions.

After conflict, willingness to work to improve relationships has been shown to be positively related to commitment to the relationship (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovak, &

Lipkus, 1991). Obligation shifting may be dependent on perpetrators' relationship to the victim group. In other words, perpetrators may be more willing to keep working towards improving the relationship if they feel committed to maintaining that relationship. Therefore, studies on intergroup transgressions between groups that see value in maintaining a positive relationship may present different results than studies that look at groups with little motivation or desire to work towards a positive relationship. For perpetrators this could be apparent in the extent to which they obligation shift after an apologetic act. If perpetrators feel that the relationship is unimportant, they may more readily obligation shift, however, if they desire a close relationship with the victim group, image improvement may emerge a more important and relevant appraisal. Future studies should examine the pre-existing relationship between groups and how this impacts image improvement and obligation shifting perceptions for perpetrators.

Even more, the findings from Experiment 7, which demonstrated that empowerment for victims is also important for perpetrators, should be examined further across a wide variety of contexts. It is possible that the relative importance of satisfying victims is also dependent on the pre-existing relationship between the groups. That experiment presented the issue of friendly-fire on allied troops; in this case, perpetrators may have felt that a relationship with the victims (as allies in war) is particularly important to maintain. In other contexts, if commitment to the relationship is low, perpetrators may be less concerned with victim needs. There is still a great deal of room to explore the importance of victim needs in perpetrator satisfaction with apologies.

Given the findings that obligation shifting leads to negative outcomes that image improvement and victim empowerment are not related to, it is apparent that more research must be conducted to explain these links. Future research should address the reasons that obligation shifting leads to negative feeling about victims and reduced support for them. A likely possibility

is that perpetrators are assuming that their offer is being rejected by victims automatically, and rejections of offers of support have been shown to be linked to feelings like anger (Harth et al., 2011). However, this link must be experimentally tested.

It is also possible that obligation shifting is the process which allows perpetrators to reduce their feelings of collective guilt. Research has suggested that collective guilt, but not shame, is linked to victim empathy and a desire to improve relations (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004). Past research has also suggested that image improvement needs cannot explain the positive relationship of guilt on reparations support (Brown et al., 2008). If collective guilt is being reduced following an apology, perhaps this is leading to an increase in obligation shifting and ultimately reduced willingness to support further action. This might explain differences between contexts and apologetic acts on the extent to which they are seen as increasing obligation shifting. Some acts may do more than others to reduce collective guilt. Image improvement, on the other hand, may satisfy perpetrators but do little to reduce feelings of collective guilt (Brown et al., 2008). Further research should examine the relationship between guilt and shame on image improvement and obligation shifting perceptions.

Finally, this research investigated the relationship between apologising and perpetrator satisfaction, negative feelings about the victims, and willingness to support the victim group in the future. Certainly there are other outcomes also relevant to perpetrators after apologies that are important to explore. For example, apologies may alter how ingroup members feel about their own group. Apologising may lead perpetrator group members to feel greater collective self-esteem (Long, Spears, & Manstead, 1994) or improve attitudes towards leaders of the ingroup. Conversely, if ingroup members would have preferred not to issue an apology in the first place, apologies could lead to greater internal dissent and intragroup conflict.

Concluding Remarks

Throughout this research, it become apparent that perpetrators are most satisfied with apologies when they feel they have improved their image and shifted obligation to the victim group, and possibly when they feel they have given the victims a sense of empowerment (but not real influential power). Image improvement, unlike obligation shifting, does not seem to inherently worsen relations between victims and perpetrators. Even more, victims seem to be less concerned about perceptions that perpetrators are trying to improve their image when it comes to evaluating the apology themselves. In other words, when it comes to image improvement, perpetrators and victims may both be able to get what they want out of an apology without any negative consequences on reconciliation between the groups. However, this research also brings forward a potentially negative and concerning appraisal of apologies on the apart of victim groups: obligation shifting. Not only is obligation shifting linked to less willingness to support conciliatory actions, it also leads to more negative feelings about victims. Even more, victims aware of obligation shifting as a motive for perpetrators react with reduced forgiveness.

Having established the role of obligation shifting, it is important to acknowledge that this finding could contribute to pessimism about the prospects of improving intergroup relations. After all, my research suggests that a major motive for satisfaction with conciliatory acts is linked to hostility toward the victim group, and tends to close off relations with that group rather than "opening the door" to further help. Despite this, I would be careful to emphasise that my findings do not argue against providing public apologies or giving financial reparations. There are a number of reasons why collective statements of apology and offers of reparation should be made, unrelated to the motivations of the perpetrator group.

Wohl et al. (2011) outline a number of reasons why apologies should be given, arguing that apologies should be considered a moral imperative. Perhaps an apology should be given regardless of its potential forgiveness or improved relations. Giving an apology simply might be the "right" thing to do. Even more, apologies are thought to help determine shared historical narratives (Wohl et al., 2011), which can be important for reconciliation to begin in protracted conflicts (Inanc & Kizilyurek, 1990). Research by Bilali, Tropp, and Dasgupta (2012) suggests that perpetrator groups usually attribute greater responsibility for the instigation of a conflict to victim and to third party groups. An apology may increase perpetrator willingness to admit that the ingroup was responsible for instigating conflict and lead to a re-examination of the historical record, bringing attention to issues that may not be widely acknowledged (Nobles, 2008). Although my research suggests that apologising can lead to perpetrators feeling reduced responsibility for dealing with the consequences of the transgression, it does not necessitate that an apology cannot still lead to increased acceptance of responsibility for the original action.

Finally, it appears that image improvement, although considered a selfish motive, is also a relatively benign one for the victim group. It does not imply the potential negative outcomes of reduced support or negative feelings, and in some of my experiments actually worked against these. Thus, it seems that encouraging the interpretation of conciliatory acts in terms of image rather than obligation is critical, to make sure that conciliatory acts do not lead the members of the group making them away from the goals of reconciliation.

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APPENDIX 1

Experiments 1 and 5: Bunce Island News Summary

All participants read the following:

In 1670 Bunce Island, off the West coast of Africa, was invaded by English slave traders who were financed by the British government. The British built the largest British slave castle on the West African coast. As a result, the island became central to slave trading operations in Africa, with tens of thousands of slaves being transported to and from the island. Many local Bunai people were captured and auctioned off as slaves around the world. Those who did not cooperate were brutally tortured into submission. Many slaves were sent to work on rapidly developing rice plantations in the New World, as owners were willing to pay high prices for the islanders' rice farming expertise. In its present state, the island is now greatly under-populated because of the British invasion and slave exportation. Due to Britain's harsh treatment of the land, and the condition they left the island in, agricultural development on the island has been difficult. The presence of Great Britain is still greatly felt on the island, as the original 18th century castle used to house the slaves still stands today as a reminder of their oppression.

In a recent book documenting the history of Bunce Island, Femi Tuwanda, a resident of Bunce Island described the current situation on the island:

> *"Many of my ancestors were taken and sold off as slaves, leaving their families to fend for themselves. The castle that remains here is a constant reminder of the brutalities our people suffered, even though we now have our freedom we feel the past weighing heavy on our shoulders and we have to battle everyday to preserve our culture. They destroyed our island and sold my people off as slaves. Then they left the island in a state of ruin, which will take many more years of hard work and suffering to repair."*

APPENDIX 2

Experiment 2 - Guatemalan Medical Studies

News article on Guatemalan medical studies (all participants read the following):

From 1946-1948 the US Public Health Service conducted an experiment on sexually transmitted infections. The experiment was carried out in Guatemala and the subjects for the experiment were orphans, prisoners, military conscripts and prostitutes. The US government, worried about American GIs returning home with sexual diseases, wanted to test the effect of penicillin as a potential treatment. An estimated 1,500 Guatemalans were deliberately infected with sexually transmitted diseases as part of the US government run experiment. The experiment provided no useful results and was hidden for decades. However, the documentation on the study was rediscovered a few years ago.

"They never told me what they were doing, never gave me a chance to say no," said Orellana, who was a 9 year old, living in an orphanage in Guatemala City, when she was infected with syphilis as part of the experiment. Orellana never knew what she was infected with and only, at the age of 78, was diagnosed, "I've lived almost my whole life without knowing the truth." Many Guatemalans suffered their entire lives due to the experiment and may never have received adequate treatment for the diseases they were given.

APPENDIX 3

Experiment 3: Egyptian Landmines News Article

All participants read the following information:

November 13, 2007

According to Egyptian officials, a landmine explosion in northern Egypt killed a six-year-old boy and critically injured two others on Monday. Abu Zeid Salama, six, was killed outright and two other boys aged five and two were hospitalized by the blast from a landmine in the town of Al-Arish. The accident comes a week after three Egyptian brothers were killed by another mine blast elsewhere in the Sinai Peninsula.

The UN estimates that Egypt may have more than 20 million landmines. This works out to be nearly one landmine per every three Egyptians. Most of the mines were left in the Egyptian desert by the British after the Second World War.

In the last 20 years, Egypt has lost 3,200 people due to land mines and 4,723 people have been handicapped. Many of these victims are children who are drawn to the mines, which resemble toys. Landmine explosions normally tear off the victim's foot and the lower part of the leg and often the explosions affect the other leg, genitals, arms, chest and face. In addition to the loss of life, the mines make the former battleground unusable. The land is rich in natural resources and could have a flourishing future in tourism if the mines were not there.

"We had nothing to do with this war [but...] World War II is still claiming the lives of Egyptians" said Egyptian Minister of International Cooperation Faizabul Naga in a statement on Tuesday. Although a number of human rights groups in Egypt are working towards removing the mines, Egypt's Assistant Foreign Minister, Sayed el-Masri, says that removal is a very difficult process which requires advanced technology and a great deal of money.

APPENDIX 4

Experiment 3: Conditions for Egyptian Landmines

All participants read one of the following three articles (non-italicized text remained the same across conditions):

Apology Condition:

On Tuesday, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown issued [*an apology to Egyptians for the damage caused by landmines left in the Egyptian desert. Brown expressed, "deep regret" that Britain abandoned its landmines at the end of the Second World War. "We are sorry for the physical and emotional suffering caused by the mines that we left behind and we sincerely apologise to the victims of the mines and their families. So many innocent Egyptians have had to suffer as a result of our actions, and for this we are very sorry," Brown said in his official apology on behalf of Britain.*]

Egypt is thought to have the largest number of landmines in the world – nearly a quarter of the worlds landmines can be found in the Egypt's Western Desert. The area is the former scene of the major world war battle of El Alamein and is still littered with 20 million mines--many of which were left by the British army. Every year hundreds of Egyptians die or are injured because of the landmines. Due to chronic under-reporting of incidents, the true number per year may be in the thousands. Even more, vast areas of Egypt's resource rich desert are completely inaccessible due to the mines.

[When asked about providing compensation to victims of the mines and funds to assist in the removal of the mines, the UK government said that there are no plans for this.] This statement marks the first time the government has acknowledged the landmine situation in Egypt.

Reparation Condition:

... [*a statement expressing plans to provide Egypt with a £2m assistance package to help eradicate landmines in the country. According to Brown's statement, nearly a quarter of the money provided will be used to compensate victims of landmine explosions. The remaining funds will be used to assist in removing the landmines and in developing areas affected by mines.*]

[*When asked about providing an official apology to victims of the mines the UK government said that there are no plans for this.*]

Combined Statement Condition:

... [*an apology to Egyptians for the damage caused by landmines left in the Egyptian desert. Brown expressed, "deep regret" that Britain abandoned its landmines at the end of the Second World War. "We are sorry for the physical and emotional suffering caused by the mines that we left behind and we sincerely apologise to the victims of the mines and their families. So many innocent Egyptians have had to suffer as a result of our actions, and for this we are very sorry," Brown said in his official apology on behalf of Britain. The Prime Minister also expressed plans to provide Egypt with a £2m assistance package to help eradicate landmines in the country. According to Brown's statement, nearly a quarter of the money provided will be used to compensate victims of landmine explosions. The remaining funds will be used to assist in removing the landmines and in developing areas affected by mines.*]

APPENDIX 5

Experiment 4 - Irish Famine News Article

All participants read the following:

The Irish Potato Famine occurred during the years 1845-1849. At the time, about half of Ireland's population depended on potatoes for subsistence. Under British rule, Irish Catholics could not purchase land and instead had to rent from British Protestant landlords. Much of the potatoes they produced were sent back to their landlords in Britain. When a fungus on the crops of potatoes (commonly known as blight) started destroying the crops, there were very few potatoes being harvested. Even though there was so little being produced, the Irish continued to be required by Britain to export much of their crop and livestock to England. Even more, because of the discrimination against Catholics by the British, there was very little done to help the Irish during the famine.

Thus, the actions of the British landlords and the lack of response to stop the crop destruction led to as many as 1.5 million Irish deaths due to starvation. The deaths themselves account for about 10 - 20% of the population in total. Even more, approximately 1.5 to two million people emigrated to other countries to escape the mass starvation. Because of Britain's lack of response to the famine, Ireland lost nearly one-third of its population. The country has still not recovered completely as the current population of Ireland is still less than its pre-famine population.

APPENDIX 6

Experiment 4 - Conditions for Irish Famine

Participants randomly assigned to read one of the following:

Apology:

During an event commemorating the potato famine the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair offered an official apology to Ireland on behalf of Britain. In the statement Blair said that on behalf of Britain, he was "sorry about the deep scars left by the famine" and felt guilty that Ireland was greatly changed because of Britain's neglect at the time. He also admitted that the British government failed the Irish and said he felt "deep pain" that so many innocent Irish were allowed to die. There was no mention in his statement about if there were any plans to provide reparations to descendants of those who suffered during the famine. His statement marked the first time that the British acknowledged their role in the Irish potato famine.

Reparations:

During an event commemorating the potato famine the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair offered a statement to Ireland on behalf of Britain. In the statement Blair presented nearly £1 million in financial reparations to the descendants of the potato farmers affected by the potato famine. There was no mention in his statement about if there are any plans to provide an official apology for Britain's role in the famine. His statement marked the first time that the British addressed the Irish potato famine.

Control statement:

During an event commemorating the potato famine the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair offered a statement to Ireland on behalf of Britain. In the statement Blair said he was "honoured to be invited". There was no mention in his statement about if there were any plans to provide an official apology for Britain's role in the famine or provide reparations to descendants of those who suffered during the famine. His statement marked the first time that the British addressed the Irish potato famine.

APPENDIX 7

Experiment 4: Irish Famine - Second News Article

All participants read the following article on Ireland's banking crisis:

Monday 22 November 2010

In the space of the last three years the Irish Republic has gone from boom to almost bust. Much of its growth was built around the property market, but since 2008 this has suffered a dramatic collapse. House values have fallen by between 50% and 60%, and bad debts - mainly in the form of loans to developers - have built up in the country's main banks. This has opened a huge hole in the Irish government's finances - which will see it run a budget deficit equivalent to 32% of GDP this year. The British government confirmed this week that Britain would provide around £7bn to support Ireland as part of the international rescue package requested last night. In an interview with the Belfast Telegraph, the Prime Minister warned how failing to reach out to the Republic would have resulted in "very bad consequences" for Northern Ireland. "Not acting to help the Irish economy would have very bad consequences for Northern Ireland," Mr Cameron said.

APPENDIX 8

Experiment 6: News Article on Bhopal Disaster

All participants read the following:

The Bhopal disaster was a gas leak incident in India, considered one of the world's worst industrial catastrophes. It occurred on the night of December 2, 1984 at the US corporation, Union Carbide's pesticide plant in Bhopal, India. A leak of chemicals from the plant resulted in the exposure of hundreds of thousands of people. The toxic substance made its way in and around the towns located near the plant. The official immediate death toll was 2,259 but nearly 11,00 may have since died from gas-related diseases. Some estimates suggest that the leak may have caused more than half a million injuries. Many people continue to live in close proximity to the abandoned plant at Bhopal, where chemical residues and waste materials remain.

There is evidence that the plant's owners were aware, before the tragedy took place, that faults existed in the plant. The American CEO of Union Carbide, Warren Anderson, and other executives were convicted in India and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Despite this, the U.S. government and American courts have repeatedly blocked attempts by survivors' groups and the Indian government to bring the executives to account. So far all requests by India for Warren Anderson's extradition have been turned down by the American government.

Survivors have been campaigning for compensation and the cleanup of the factory site and contaminated water supplies. Campaigners for the issue say that the US government has done nothing to provide assistance to the Indian people nor has it required those responsible to clean up or provide adequate compensation.

APPENDIX 9

Experiment 7: Friendly-Fire News Article for Britain-as-Perpetrator

Participants in the Britain-as-Perpetrator condition read the following fictitious article:

Romanian Soldiers Killed by British Friendly-Fire

By: Robert Dawnay

Twelve Romanian troops killed in Afghanistan in September died at the hands of British troops who mistakenly identified the friendly Romanian soldiers' position as a Taleban compound, an official investigation has concluded.

The Romanian soldiers were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and had been on operations north of Gereshk, trying to combat the Taliban, when they were killed. British troops in the area misunderstood the information which identified positions of Taleban insurgents and mistakenly fired on the troops, killing twelve and injuring a further fifteen.

Yesterday the Romanian Ministry of National Defense formally blamed the British government for the deaths and presented their report into the incident. According to the report, investigators of the scene of the incident found fragments of three Javelin missiles, which are used by British infantry units in Afghanistan, in the bodies of the soldiers.

According to the report, there is no doubt about the evidence that the soldiers were killed by British troops and that no Romanian personnel were at fault for the accident. Furthermore, the report found that the information passed to the British troops was incomplete. The report suggested that at higher levels in the military negligence lead to poorly compiled information being passed on, which may have added to the confusion in interpreting the location of the target.

At a memorial for the victims of the attack, a mother of one Sergeant killed expressed her anger with the situation, saying, "My son was taken away from me. Now I will never hear his voice again because they couldn't bother to take their time and check their information." A Romanian military spokesman said that he was "severely disappointed" with the British for allowing such a careless mistake to occur.

APPENDIX 10

Experiment 7: Friendly-Fire News Article for Britain-as-Victim

Participants in the Britain-as-victim condition read the following fictitious article:

British Soldiers Killed by Romanian Friendly-Fire

By: Robert Dawnay

Twelve British troops killed in Afghanistan in September died at the hands of Romanian troops who mistakenly identified the friendly British soldiers' position as a Taleban compound, an official investigation has concluded.

The British soldiers were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and had been on operations north of Gereshk, trying to combat the Taliban, when they were killed. The Romanian troops in the area misunderstood the information which identified positions of Taleban insurgents and mistakenly fired on the troops, killing twelve and injuring a further fifteen.

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According to the report, there is no doubt about the evidence that the soldiers were killed by Romanian troops and that no British personnel were at fault for the accident. Furthermore, the report found that the information passed to the Romanian troops was incomplete and that at higher levels in the military negligence lead to poorly compiled information being passed on, which may have added to the confusion in interpreting the location of the target.

At a memorial for the victims of the attack, a mother of one Sergeant killed expressed her anger with the situation, saying, "My son was taken away from me. Now I will never hear his voice again because they couldn't bother to take their time and check their information." A British military spokesman said that he was "severely disappointed" with the Romanians for allowing such a careless mistake to occur.