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The Para-State Nexus and US Statecraft in the Global South: The Evolution of Paramilitaries and Private Military Companies in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare

Andrew Thomson

A dissertation submitted for the award of PhD in International Relations from the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, September 2012.

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Abstract

This thesis examines why the US has increasingly relied on proxy forms of intervention in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations and support. Most existing studies on paramilitaries, mercenaries, and private military companies (PMCs) in US foreign policy analyze these actors separately from one another and tend to emphasize their relative newness in the post-Cold War security environment. In contrast, this thesis traces the continuity and evolution of the use of para-institutional actors in US-led and supported counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare engagements in the global South throughout the post-war period. It places this analysis in the context of US Open Door grand strategy and hegemonic role in the international system. In doing so, it develops a para-statal model of US foreign policy that is inclusive of the variegated connections between the US and para-institutional forces. The "para-state nexus", as I have labeled it, conceptualizes the intersection of the US and various parallel military formations and the ways in which they operate as a para-extension to US coercive reach. This thesis argues that the development and entrenchment of a para-state nexus is inextricably bound to US Open Door imperatives to "stabilize" favorable political and economic state arrangements in countries in the global South threatened by significant opposition "from below", conducive to US interests and the global capitalist system as a whole. Thus it posits that this "para-state nexus" is embedded in structural relations of the liberalized global order, and forms a central component of the US's managerial role in the international system. This presents an alternative historical account of the evolution of PMCs in US foreign policy, and demonstrates that practices such as the "Salvador option" have extensive historical roots in the prosecution of US modes of coercive statecraft abroad.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction: PMCs, Paramilitaries, and the Para-State Nexus in US Foreign Policy 1

Concepts and Definitions 2

Para-Institutional Actors: Paramilitaries and PMCs 3

The Para-State Nexus Explained: Definitions, Relations and Criteria 5

Global South and Global North 9

State Terror 9

Literature Review: Limitations of Existing Work 10

Private Military Companies (PMCs): The Expanding Literature 11

The Origins of PMCs: US Foreign Policy, The International System, and Market Logics? 11

PMCs, Mercenaries, and Other Irregular Forces 14

Paramilitaries and Irregular Forces in US Foreign Policy 16

Agent-Focused Studies: Paramilitaries, Death Squads, and Irregular Forces 20

Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare 21

Reflections on the Extant Literature 23

Scope, Parameters, and Limitations of the Current Study 24

Methodology 28

Chapter 2

Contextualizing the Para-State Nexus: US Hegemony and the Role of Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare 31

Introduction 31

US Hegemony and the Open Door Strategy for a Global Liberalized Order 31

Continuity in US Hegemony 40

Refashioning and Stabilizing the Global South 43

Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: Coercive Strategies of Statecraft 45

The Continuity of Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare Modes of Statecraft 48

The Para-State Nexus and US Hegemony 49

Conclusion 50

Chapter 3

The Cold War Evolution of a Para-State Nexus 51

Introduction 51

Unconventional Warfare, Covert Operations and the Para State Nexus 1950-1980. 53

Private Aero-Military Contractors and the Para-State Nexus: Precursors to the Modern PMC 56

Unconventional Warfare: Destabilization in Practice 59

The Bay of Pigs Invasion: The Sources of a Para-Statal War Against Castro 61
Counterinsurgency and the Para-State Nexus 67
The Para-State Nexus and US-Paramilitary Connections 68
Special Forces and CIA Paramilitary Policies: Direct Connections 69
US-Paramilitary Nexus: Military Training and Indirect Connections 70
US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Paramilitary Option. 71
Counterinsurgency Applied: Training, Assistance and the Paramilitary Nexus 78
Vietnam and the Evolution of the Para-State Nexus 86
PMCs: Logistics, Training, and Combat 92
The Reagan Years: Low Intensity Warfare and the Intensification of the Para-State Nexus 95
The Para-Statal War on Nicaragua 101
Conclusions 107
Chapter 4
Continuity After the Cold War and the Evolution of a Para-State Nexus 110
Introduction 110
"Stability" and the Para State Nexus in the Post-Cold War: A New World Order? 111
PMCs: From the Cold War and Beyond 115
Colombia, Counterinsurgency, and the Para-State Nexus 123
The Counterinsurgent Paramilitarization of Colombia 124
PMCs in Colombia: The Expanding Para-State Networks 126
Para-State "(In)Stability" Beyond Colombia 132
Conclusion: PMCs and the Entrenchment of a Para-State Nexus 139
Chapter 5
The "War on Terror" and the Consolidation of a Para-State Nexus 140
Introduction 140
The "War on Terror" and the Continuity of the Open Door 141
Irregular Warfare: Old Wine in New Bottles 142
The Global Proliferation of PMCs as Agents of "Stability" 146
Iraq and the US Para-State Nexus 149
Iraq and the "Paramilitary Option" 150
PMCs in Iraq: The Occupation's Senior Partner 157
The Para-State Nexus in Afghanistan: The "Indirect Approach"Applied 160
Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Warlords, Militias, and Paramilitaries 161
PMCs in Afghanistan: Force Multipliers and Sub-Contracting 165
Conclusion: The Admission of Essence 167
Chapter 6

Conclusions on the Para-State Nexus: A Systematic Summary and Analysis 168
Introduction 168
Why the Para-State Nexus and its Consolidation in US Foreign Policy? 171
US Foreign Policy and the Sources of the Para-State Nexus 171
Paramilitaries and the Logic of Violence in Irregular War 172
Historical Factors in the Evolution and Entrenchment of the Para-State Nexus 173
Strategic Rationales 176
Concluding Remarks 177
Bibliography 182

Abbreviations and List of Acronyms

AA	Air America
AAA	American Anti-Communist Alliance
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANAP	Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANMC	American National Management Corporation
ASENSAL	*Agencia Nacional de Seguridad de El Salvador* National Security Agency of El Salvador
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CAD	*Comités de Auto-Defensa* – Self-Defense Committees (Peru)
CAFGU	Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit (Philippines)
CAT	Civil Air Transport
CEA	California Eastern Airways
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSDF	Civilian Irregular Defense Forces
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Developmental Support
CORU	Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations
CMA	Civilian Military Assistance
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
EAST	Eagle Aviation Services and Technology
ELN	*Ejercito de Liberación Nacional* Army of National Liberation (Colombia)
ERU	Emergency Response Unit (Iraq)
EZLN	*Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional* Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Mexico)
FARC	*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FM	Field Manual
HN	Host Nation
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISOF	Iraqi Special Operations Forces
IW	Irregular Warfare
JCET	Joint Combined Exercise Training Program
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAS	*Muerte a los Secuestradores* – Death to Kidnappers (Colombia)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MNCs	Multi-National Corporations
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MTTs	Mobile Training Teams
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSC	National Security Council
OIDP	Overseas Internal Defense Policy
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ORDEN	*Organización Democratica Nacionalista* Nationalist Democratic Organization (Nicaragua)
PAC	Patrulla de Auto-Defensa Civil - Civil Self Defense Patrol
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
PMCs	Private Military Companies
PNAC	Project for a New American Century
PRI	*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico)
PRD	*Partido de la Revolución* (Mexico)
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (Iraq)
SAT	Southern Air Transport
SAS	Special Air Service
SAIC	Science Applications International Corporation
SANG	Saudi Arabian National Guard
SIJIN	*Sección de Investigaciones Judiciales e Inteligencia de la Policía* – Judicial Police Investigative and Intelligence Unit (Colombia)
SOA	School of Americas
SOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
TWA	Trans World Airlines
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCLA	Unilaterally Controlled Latino Asset
UK	United Kingdom (of Great Britain)
UNITA	*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* National Unity for Total Independence of Angola – (Angola)
US	United States (of America)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VC	Viet Cong
WACL	World Anti-Communist League

Chapter 1

Introduction: PMCs, Paramilitaries, and the Para-State Nexus in US Foreign Policy

Employing private military companies (PMCs) and leveraging paramilitary assets have become central to US strategies in the "war on terror" and are now integral to the US military edifice straddling the globe. Particularly noteworthy, for example, were the vast numbers of PMCs that flooded into both Afghanistan (post-2001 invasion) and Iraq (post-2003 invasion) in a variety of roles operating with, and often replacing, US military personnel, with the ratio of PMC employees to US troops around 1:1 at the peak of US involvement in each of these conflicts.[1] PMCs are also primary conduits through which the US provides military assistance to many countries around the world, often hiring PMCs for foreign military training.[2] Similarly, US reliance on Sunni tribes (in the Anbar Awakening) in Iraq, official discussions of applying a "Salvador option", and leveraging warlords and tribal militias in Afghanistan have garnered considerable controversy on the delegation of force to paramilitary groups.[3] By September 2012, this paramilitary model of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare had reportedly been applied across different areas of the Middle East, such as in US support for the Yemeni campaign against internal dissidents and in Syrian rebel efforts to destabilize the Assad regime.[4] Indeed, military planners now consider surrogate warfare and other paramilitary options fundamental to US stability operations abroad.[5] While

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[1] Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis* (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2011); Moshe Schwartz, *The Department of Defense's use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress* (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2010).

[2] See Lora Lumpe, "US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues," *Foreign Policy in Focus* (May, 2002).; Colonel Bruce Grant, "US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy," *US Army War College* (1998). For a more general approach to the topic see entries in Donald Stoker, ed., *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007* (New York: Routledge, 2008).; Deborah Avant, "Privatizing Military Training," *Foreign Policy in Focus* 7, no. 6 (2002).

[3] Farook Ahmed, *Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces* Institute for the Study of War, 2008); Austin Long, "The Anbar Awakening," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 50, no. 2 (25 March, 2008): 67-94. For "Salvador option" see Michael Hirsh and J ohn Barry, ""The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination Or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq," *Newsweek* 8 January, 2005; Max Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality* Centre for Research on Globalization, (2005). For Afghani militias see for example, Major John D. Litchfield, "Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas," *School of Advanced Military Studies* (2010), http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/litchfieldsamsmonograph.pdf (accessed May 2011).; HRW, *Just Don't Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the "Afghan Local Police"* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011).

[4] Casey Coombs, "Echoes of Iraq: Yemen's War Against Al-Qaeda Takes a Familiar Turn," *Time* 10 Aug, 2012. and for US support for Syrian rebels see Mark Hosenball, "Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret US Support for Syrian Rebels," *Reuters* 1 Aug, 2012.; RT, "WikiLeaked: Ex-Blackwater 'Helps Regime Change' in Syria," *RT* 21 March, 2012, http://rt.com/news/stratfor-syria-regime-change-063/print/. (accessed 24 July 2012)

[5] Richard Newton, "The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare," in *Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches*, eds. R. Newton and T. Et Al Homlak, JSOU Report 09-3 ed. (Halburt Field: The Joint Special Operations University Press, 2009), 1-19.; Lieutenant Colonel James Campbell, "Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare," (2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB803.pdf (accessed 8 July 2010).; Major Kelly Smith, *Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA451060 (accessed 1 Sept. 2011).

US military forces are stretched across the planet with defense expenditures exceeding 40% of the world's total and expanding training to over 150 countries,[6] US military dominance is significantly buttressed by both formal and informal alliances with PMCs, paramilitaries, and other similar non-state military forces.

These developments have prompted substantial academic interest in the field of International Relations in the privatization of US foreign policy, the devolution of violence to non-state actors, and proxy warfare.[7] Yet there has been little to no examination of the origins and evolution of the role of non-state or para-institutional forces in US foreign policy. Underpinning the majority of the existing studies on these actors is a tendency to emphasize their relative newness as a product of a post-Cold War security environment, detached from dynamics central to US foreign policy itself. In addition to this, the deployment of PMCs and the mobilization of paramilitary forces are seemingly independent and have been treated as such in discussions on outsourcing and/or US links to non-state military actors. There is little consideration of PMCs, paramilitaries, and other actors together and how and why they collectively form part of broader processes at play in US foreign policy.

In contrast, this dissertation analyzes why para-institutional agents have formed a centerpiece in US coercive strategies of statecraft in the South. It develops a para-statal model of US foreign policy that is inclusive of the variegated connections between the US and non-state armed forces within US-led or supported counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare engagements. This "para-state nexus", as I have labeled it, conceptualizes the intersection of the US and various para-institutional formations and the ways in which they operate as a para-extension to US coercive reach. This dissertation argues that a nexus between the US and various paramilitary formations has developed as an integral component of US hegemonic Open Door grand strategy in the post-war (post-WWII) period.[8] It weaves together several disparate sets of literature, including studies on PMCs, paramilitaries and death squads, counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, and works detailing the post-war ascendency of US predominance in order to situate an analysis of this nexus within the wider context of US foreign policy objectives and its hegemonic role in the international system. It draws on the rich tradition of Historical Materialism as a conceptual or theoretical framework in understanding the diverse political, economic, and social dynamics at play in the development and formation of these para-institutional forces as instruments of US policy. In this sense, it demonstrates how this nexus is part and parcel of broader processes of globalization, and is embedded in the structural relations of the US-led liberalized global order.

Concepts and Definitions

As the primary concept that animates this dissertation, this section defines the para-state nexus and delineates its core constituent parts. This not only involves providing definitions of the principal actors, but also requires elucidation of the relationships that

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[6] U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Assistance Budget Releases," http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/ (accessed 28 Aug, 2012).; Michael Ignatieff, "The Challenges of American Imperial Power," in *Strategy for Empire: US Regional Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era* (Lanham: SR Books, 2004), 43-52. For FY 2009 see Derek Reveron, "Weak States and Security Assistance," *Prism* 1, no. 3 (2010).

[7] See, for example, the following Allison Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy* (London: Yale University Press, 2009).; Tony Geraghty, *Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2009).; Geraint Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

[8] For the Open Door, see chapter two and Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

comprise the para-state nexus. This section also expands on other concepts that are central to this research.

Para-Institutional Actors: Paramilitaries and PMCs

This dissertation frequently refers to para-institutional forces as well as para-statal groups, drawing on the literature on such forms of parallel state violence in Latin America.[9] For example, the definition of para-institutional forces offered by Holden provides a model for the parallel non-state armed groups encapsulated in the para-state nexus. They are

> groups that are loosely—and usually covertly—affiliated with organs of the state, that may depend on them for support, and that may even have been created or licensed by the state itself to collaborate in the elimination or intimidation of its enemies. Some para-institutional groups may have legal status as private, state-chartered organizations that are nevertheless led, organized, and manned by agents of the state itself. Others operate without any such charter even though they typically operate on behalf of some or all of the state's coercive agencies and under their informal (if partial) sanction.[10]

This definition is broad enough to contain both direct and indirect connections between a state and para-institutional actors. Yet it is sufficiently focused to capture a variety of non-state military actors and the ways in which they can support, facilitate, or serve as surrogates for official state military forces. In this sense, while para-institutional actors may be officially sanctioned non-state groups such as PMCs, they can also include (possibly illegal) non-state armed militias or other similar forces.

Paramilitary groups fit this latter category of para-institutional actors that operate in accordance with state objectives with different levels of state complicity. Julie Mazzei offers the following definition: "Paramilitary groups are political, armed organizations that are by definition extra-military, extra-State, non-institutional entities, but which mobilize and operate with the assistance of important allies, including factions within the State."[11] Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines paramilitary groups simply as "forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission."[12] Paramilitaries are defined by what they are not: part of the regular security apparatus of the state. An even more simple definition is laid out in a US Army Training Circular on paramilitary forces: "Basically, any organization that accomplishes its purpose, even partially, through the force of arms can be considered a paramilitary organization."[13] This can include, militias, tribal groups, warlords, and civilian

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[9] See for instance, Adam Jones, "Review: Parainstitutional Violence in Latin America; Violence in Colombia, 1999-2000," *Latin American Politics and Society* 46, no. 4 (Winter, 2004): 127-148, See also Martha K. Huggins, ed., *Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).

[10] Robert Holden, *Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America 1821-1960* (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2004), 14.

[11] Julie Mazzei, *Death Squads Or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Threaten Democracy in Latin America.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 4.

[12] Armed Forces of the United States, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense: Joint Publication 3-07.1*Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), Glossary p. 8.; U.S. Department of the Army, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations: Field Manual 31-20* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), Glossary page 10.

[13] U.S. Department of the Army, *Threat Force Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics: TC 31-93.3* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003), 1-1.

self-defense forces committed to the counterinsurgent drive of the state.[14] In this case it is important to distinguish them from other parallel military forces that are created and directly administered by state structures such as carabineers, gendarmeries, border guards, or military police, which can also often carry the label "paramilitary". Paramilitary forces here refer to those non-state military actors, which is perhaps better captured by US military definitions of "irregular forces" in unconventional warfare. These include

> individuals or groups of individuals who are not members of a regular armed force, police, or other internal security force. They are usually nonstate-sponsored and unconstrained by sovereign nation legalities and boundaries. These forces may include, but are not limited to, specific paramilitary forces, contractors, individuals, businesses, foreign political organizations, resistance or insurgent organizations, expatriates, transnational terrorism adversaries, disillusioned transnational terrorism members, black marketers, and other social or political "undesirables."[15]

Paramilitaries are therefore a type of irregular force, in the sense that they are para-institutional actors that are either semi- or un-officially working with or in place of state agencies. They are also often tied to elite structures within a given country. A good example of this includes the Colombian paramilitary self-defense groups that often protected the assets of large landowners and multinational corporations (MNCs) and were committed to the Colombian state's counterinsurgency program against insurgent groups and their political allies.[16] Alternatively, such paramilitary forces can represent the principal driving force of unconventional warfare operations such as the US mobilization of Cuban exiles in the Bay of Pigs invasion and Washington's Contra war against Nicaraguan Sandinista government.[17]

Private military companies (PMCs) are "private business entities that deliver to consumers a wide spectrum of military and security services."[18] Unlike paramilitary actors, they have a much more direct relationship with their sponsors as employees contracted to perform specific services. Moreover, the contemporary PMC industry is multidimensional, undertaking a plethora of military activities, making simple categorizations difficult. For instance, similar businesses are often labeled "private military firms", "private security contractors", amongst others.[19] This thesis will use the term "private military companies" (PMCs) to refer to the broad gamut of activities undertaken by such private firms, focusing primarily on combat in place of or alongside state military forces, direct facilitation of fighting (by flying drones and/or re-supply and rescue missions), training of foreign forces, and logistics. Although part of the wider dynamics of outsourcing and privatization of the US military in general, this dissertation will not explore the privatization of US defense

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[14] See U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 31-16* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1967), 4.; U.S. Department of the Army, *Threat Force Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics: TC 31-93.3*

[15] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare: FM 3-05.130* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2008), 1-3.

[16] Doug Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia* (New York: Zed Books, 2005).; Jasmin Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009).

[17] Peter Schraeder, "Paramilitary Intervention," in *Intervention into the 1990s*, ed. Peter Schraeder (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 131-152.; Michael T. Klare, "Subterranean Alliances: America's Global Proxy Network," *Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 1 (1989): 97-118.

[18] Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 8.

[19] For a typology of PMCs and the services they offer see Ibid., 92-93.; Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies* (London: Routledge, 2007), 8-18.

production and base construction.[20] This is left as a separate sphere of inquiry related to, but not intrinsic to, the outsourcing of military missions.

The Para-State Nexus Explained: Definitions, Relations and Criteria

Collectively, these phenomena (paramilitaries, other similar "irregular forces", and PMCs) represent a principal channel through which US coercive power is exercised on both local and international levels. I term and conceptualize the combination and confluence of these forces the "para-state nexus" in the projection of US military power. The prefix "para" denotes the parallel nature of these phenomena as they form a nexus with and operate alongside or in replacement of conventional military forces. The para-state nexus describes a set of relationships and para-institutional phenomena. As will be demonstrated, it is not a given "thing" that exists at any one point or a standard set combination of forces. Rather, it involves a variety of relationships ranging from the direct delegation of US military activities to para-institutional forces, forming public-private partnerships with actors outside conventional US military means, and indirect connections with US state acquiescence to paramilitary operators working towards objectives conducive to US interests. The para-state nexus therefore functions as a bespoke package of military relations emerging within and applied to local contexts in the conduct of US coercive statecraft. These relationships are also never static and undergo constant reformulation, as US governmental agencies alter their contracts with PMCs and alliances with paramilitary groups are broken and re-created according to different circumstances. Due to this variability, the descriptions and visual representations presented below are only indicative of the possible relationships within US-supported counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. These types of relationships, moreover, will be elaborated on throughout this dissertation. Finally, since not all paramilitary forces in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare settings are necessarily part of a US para-state nexus, sets of criteria are presented below in order to establish the parameters of these relationships.

The para-state nexus, as visually represented below (figure 1), builds a more inclusive conceptualization of the links between the US state, the host nation (HN) (the given country in which a counterinsurgency campaign is waged), and para-institutional formations in the provision of counterinsurgency assistance. Counterinsurgency is defined by the DoD as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."[21] US counterinsurgency assistance to a third country is considered part of "Foreign Internal Defense"[22] a term often used to describe external support for a counterinsurgency campaign.[23] In the para-state nexus, US military assistance, rather than directly allocated to local military forces, may be channeled through PMCs, which are contracted either by US agencies or the local state military itself to provide training and other services that directly facilitate the local state's counterinsurgency initiative. As will be shown in more detail in chapter five, for example, roughly half of US military aid to Colombia in the early 2000s was directed through PMCs to train Colombian armed forces

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[20] See for example Pratap Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army* (New York: Nation Books, 2009).
[21] U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Association Terms: JP 1-02* Department of Defense, 2009).
[22] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations: FM 3-05.202* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2007).
[23] For more on military assistance relations see William Mott, *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002).; Rhonda Callaway and Elizabeth Matthews, *Strategic US Foreign Assistance: The Battle between Human Rights and National Security* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008).

and manage complex aerial surveillance machinery, often providing real-time intelligence against the country's oppositional insurgent movement and their sympathizers. At the same time, the local state or military forces may have indirect or direct links to para-institutional groups, such as paramilitaries or other militia or irregular forces. Thus the US relationship to paramilitary groups is sometimes indirect, mediated through the local military or state. There are some cases, however, where the US itself, most often through the Special Forces or the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), directly supports such paramilitary forces, which is represented by the dotted arrow to indicate the covert nature by which this usually occurs. In exceptional circumstances, assistance to and collusion with paramilitary forces may occur through PMCs under US contracts. In both instances there are clear criteria on which to establish the inclusion of paramilitary actors in a para-state nexus:

- The paramilitary forces must be functional to the US-supported counterinsurgency program. The local state or military must have a common enemy with the paramilitary groups, in this case usually an insurgency. By working towards counterinsurgency objectives, paramilitary forces, by definition operate parallel with state military and police structures.
- There also must be credible information to suggest local state support for and/or impunity to such forces. Support includes funding, training, arming, financing, and/or providing personnel from the local military to the paramilitary force. Such forms of sponsorship can be direct in these ways or it can also be indirect by providing impunity for paramilitary actions.
- This relationship must also be maintained for longer than several months or years, rather than a temporary alliance or co-optation for selected limited objectives.

Figure 1.



A para-state nexus can also arise in direct US counterinsurgency interventions, in which a significant number of militias, civilian self-defense forces, and other types of paramilitary groups are leveraged by US forces towards the pacification of opposition and insurgency with accompanying support from PMCs (figure 2). Examples of such a scenario include Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present), where US intervention culminated in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign. The figure below visually represents the myriad possible US relations to para-statal groups. Rather than perform internal policing roles alone, the US develops and sustains local state militaries through military assistance and training, such as was the case in South Vietnam with support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), as well as in the creation of new military structures in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In addition to this, US agencies often have direct relations with various paramilitary forces, and PMCs can facilitate as well as perform potentially crucial services as force multipliers. On certain occasions, PMCs also serve as the primary points of contact with paramilitary assets, providing training and directing cadres of irregular parallel non-state forces, depicted by the dotted lines. The local state military forces may have a direct association and collusion with paramilitary groups.

Figure 2.



Unconventional warfare usually posits a partnership between US agencies and irregular paramilitary groups. One US military manual (2008) defined unconventional warfare as "operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations." It lists examples of such operations: "unconventional warfare has been conducted in support of both an insurgency, such as the Contras in 1980s Nicaragua, and resistance movements to defeat an occupying power, such as the Mujahedeen in 1980s Afghanistan."[24] Unconventional warfare is further defined by the DoD as "A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or

[24] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare: FM 3-05.130,* 1-2.

surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery."[25] As will be demonstrated, during the Cold War PMCs often formed the principal point of contact with and provided logistical and combat support to paramilitary forces supported by US agencies. For example, US assistance to the Hmong tribal militias to prevent North Vietnamese forces using the Ho Chi Minh trail was bolstered by various private airline companies such as Air America and Civil Air Transport, providing transportation, search and rescue missions, and sometimes bombing raids on enemy forces.[26] Furthermore, to further obscure these para-state relationships, funding and other forms of support may sometimes be provided through a third country, such as US provision of aid to the Mujahedeen in the 1980s through Pakistan.[27]

Figure 3.



This tripartite of US forces, PMCs, and paramilitaries represented a typical format for many unconventional warfare operations during the Cold War. The criteria for such relations are similar to those in counterinsurgency settings and those laid out for proxy intervention by Geraint Hughes.[28]

- Unconventional warfare has to be predicated on a direct relationship of assistance to and/or creation of the paramilitary force. There has to be a clear level of assistance that significantly enhances local paramilitary forces. The Bay of Pigs invasion resided on the US recruitment of Cuban exiles – it was a paramilitary army fabricated by US agencies. Alternatively, US support to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua are examples where the paramilitary group existed previously but received considerable support from their US sponsors to be able to function.

[25] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07* U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), 11.
[26] Christopher Robbins, *Air America* (New York: Avon Books, 1979 [1990]).; Joe F. Leeker, "Air America in Laos III – in Combat," in *the History of Air America (Ebook)*, Fourth ed. (Dallas: University of Texas, 2010), http://www.utdallas.edu/library/collections/speccoll/Leeker/history/Laos3.pdf. (accessed 10 March 2011)
[27] See John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*, Second ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2000).; Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).
[28] Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*, 12.

- While paramilitary forces in unconventional warfare may have their own sets of goals or priorities, they must be working towards common objectives if US forces are said to working "with, through or by" such surrogate groups.[29]
- This relationship must also be solidified over an extended period of time to qualify as proxy paramilitary forces.[30]

Global South and Global North

Categorizing the global system into simple dichotomies such as the "North" and the "South", at least *prima facie*, seems to be a generalization negligent of the vast variations within these groupings.[31] Yet, these terms were given by the Brandt Commission to replace the redundant first- second- and third-world terminology of the Cold War era, and the "South" generally refers to those countries that are "under-developed", "less-developed", or "developing" primarily located in the southern hemisphere compared to the advanced industrialized countries primarily located geographically in the north.[32] According to Blakeley and Sklair, the terms "North" and "South" are sensitive to geographical simplifications as well as to "a state-centric approach that excludes class differences from our conceptions of the variations within and between states, regions and hemispheres."[33] In other words, this categorization of the "South" is not determined by its geographical location, but instead reflects the historical legacy of colonialism and the processes and location of class formation which have essentially abrogated many countries and people with a shared historical experience to the periphery of the core countries that make up the "North". This categorization therefore also reflects the historical interplay between core and periphery in global political economic relations. The "global South" is used throughout this dissertation in this manner and broadly refers to those "developing" or "under-developed" countries which can range from industrializing countries such as India or Argentina to poorer less developed countries such as Afghanistan or Angola.

State Terror

This dissertation also makes frequent reference to state terror or state terrorism. In many cases (although certainly not all cases) the para-statal connections and use of death squads and similar paramilitary agents in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare settings lead to forms of state terror in which the US is directly or indirectly complicit. State terror is best understood as the "intentional use or threat of violence by state agents or their proxies against individuals or groups who are victimized for the purpose of intimidating or frightening a broader audience."[34] The distinctive characteristic that differentiates state terror from repression and other forms of state violence is the intention undertaken by the state or by its para-state allies (such as paramilitaries and PMCs) to induce a climate of fear amongst

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[29] See Travis Homiak, "Expanding the American Way of War: Working 'with, through or by' Non-US Actors," in *Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches*, eds. R. Newton and T. Et Al Homiak (Hurlburt Field: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2009), 19-39.

[30] See Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*, 12.

[31] Ruth Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (New York: Routledge, 2009) 2-3.

[32] The Brandt Commission, *North: South. A Program for Survival. The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues Under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt* (London: Pan Books,[1980]).

[33] Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*, 2-3.; Leslie Sklair, *Globalization, Capitalism, and its Alternatives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 13.

[34] Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting, "Terrorism: The State and the Study of Political Terror," in *Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 3.

a target population to alter their behavior in some way.[35] Although the agents of state terror are most often state institutions such as the military or police, as Jackson explains, it can also "frequently involve a variety of private non-state groups and individuals acting on behalf of the state or with the state's (or actors within the state apparatus') approval, whether tacit or explicit," such as through PMCs and paramilitary organizations.[36] As will be elaborated on in chapter two, the particular forms of state terror identified in this dissertation are, as Blakeley argues, embedded in the enabling structures of global capitalist relations of the division of labor, wealth, and the domination of the North over the South, and is, in simple terms, essentially undertaken in order to maintain favorable state formations in the global South necessary to secure access to resources and markets.[37] Moreover, this dissertation views the conditions of possibility for state terror as the product of intensive counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in attempts to contain threats to a desired "stability". In this respect, this analysis will contribute to McClintock's work in which he argues that US state terror is primarily derived through the counterinsurgent doctrinal application of "counter-terror", in fighting "fire with fire", as a mirror image of the terrorist tactics insurgents, terrorists, and other internal opponents to the state might use to coerce the civilian population to join their side.[38]

Literature Review: Limitations of Existing Work

This dissertation pulls together disparate sets of literature in order to address the underlying foreign policy motivations and structural conditions that gave way to the continuity and intensification of a para-state nexus. There is a substantial body of literature that examines US foreign policy and grand strategy, out of which I construct a theoretical framework in chapter two.[39] However, while there are many studies that address the means by which the US has pursued these objectives, none incorporate an analysis of the historical use of private companies and paramilitaries in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Similarly, as this section will demonstrate, while much research has been undertaken on each agent or type of actor in the US para-state nexus, no work covers the underlying conditions that gave rise to their collective emergence in US coercive statecraft. In this section I conduct a brief literature review in order to elucidate current limitations and to carve out the space in which this thesis provides its original contribution. These sets of literature have been separated according to para-institutional agents that comprise the para-state nexus rather than taxonomized with respect to the content of their arguments.

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[35] Ruth Blakeley, "State Terrorism in the Social Sciences: Theories, Methods, and Concepts," in *Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, eds. Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 18.; Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*; Ruth Blakeley, "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007): 228-235.

[36] Richard Jackson, "Contemporary State Terrorism: Towards a New Research Agenda," in *Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, eds. Richard Jackson, Murphy Eamon and Scott Poynting (London: Routledge, 2010), 230.

[37] Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*; Blakeley, *Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies*, 228-235.; Blakeley, *State Terrorism in the Social Sciences: Theories, Methods, and Concepts*

[38] Michael McClintock, "American Doctrine and Counterinsurgent State Terror," in *Western State Terrorism*, ed. Alexander George (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991).

[39] See for instance Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*; Andrew Bacevich, *American Empire* (Harvard University Press: London, 2002).; Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire* (London: Merlin Press, 2004).; Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance* (London: Verso, 1999).; William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 466.

Private Military Companies (PMCs): The Expanding Literature

The expanding literature on PMCs forms the foundation for discussions on military outsourcing in the field of International Relations. This emerging yet already vast literature provides significant insight into the PMC industry, the increasing variety of PMC services and contracts, the current procedural systems for privatization in a variety of countries, as well as how outsourcing can subvert public and Congressional oversight.[40] However, the literature on PMCs largely fails to provide three interconnected and related foci of analysis. First, rather than examine PMCs as a part of US foreign policy specifically, most studies (with a few exceptions) analyze the globalization of the PMC industry. Second, while sometimes compared to mercenaries, the literature on PMCs is divorced from analysis of other forms of outsourcing to, for instance, paramilitary groups, militias, and other irregular armed forces. Thirdly, with the exclusive focus on the growth of the PMC industry as a whole, and in conjunction with these first two points, there is little attention to the continuity and propensity of the projection of US military power to take various outsourced forms. Thus there is a lack of recognition of the importance of long-standing traditions of public-private partnerships throughout the Cold War and beyond in the context of US power.

The Origins of PMCs: US Foreign Policy, the International System, and Market Logics?

The rise of the PMC industry is typically attributed to a confluence of systemic changes in the international arena at the end of the Cold War. P.W. Singer, for instance, one of the leading experts on the subject states that "the end of the Cold War is at the heart of the emergence of the privatized military industry."[41] Another leading academic authority claims:

> The international system has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. None more so than in the area of international security. Previously, this had been the sole responsibility of state militaries. Governments are still reliant on their military forces to protect their borders and vital interests. But, with the end of the Cold War, they have started to turn for support to a new security actor, PMCs.[42]

Elaborating further on this systemic explanation of the rise of PMCs, a link is made throughout much of the literature between US (and global) military downsizing and the increased prevalence of "new wars" and state weakness in the South to a gap in the supply

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[40] See for instance Laura A. Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).; Thomas Jager and G. Kummel, eds., *Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2007).; Hannah Tonkin, *State Control Over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).; Chesterman, S. and Fisher, A., ed., *Private Security Public Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).; Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, eds., *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).; Hin-Yan Liu, "Leashing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal Implications of the Modern Private Military Company," *Journal Conflict Security Law* 15, no. 1 (2010): 141-168.; On subverting legal requirements and plausible denial see Ruth Jamieson and Kieran McEvoy, "State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering," *British Journal of Criminology* 45 (2005): 504-527.; Saad Gul, "The Secretary Will Deny all Knowledge of Your Actions: The use of Private Military Contractors and the Implications for State and Political Accountability," *Lewis & Clark Law Review* 10, no. 2 (2006): 287-312.; Peter W. Singer, "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law," *Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law* 42, no. 2 (2004): 521-549.; Marco Fanara, *Circumventing Accountability: Private Military Companies and Human Rights Abuses* United Nations Mandated University for Peace, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1749684 (accessed 9 Sept 2011).

[41] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 49.

[42] Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 1.

and demand of military capability and expertise.[43] US military downsizing in the immediate post-Cold War period meant there were large numbers of retired army personnel available to respond to a growing demand for security services globally. Crucially, this is related to changes in the international system after the Cold War, in which the absence of a bi-polar struggle for supremacy between the US and USSR gave way to a more disorganized and anarchic international system whereupon the US and other powers were less responsive to foreign internal conflicts, no longer viewing them as part of a struggle between East and West.[44] PMCs, it is argued, moved in to fill the gap between the demand for security and the dwindling supply, thus creating and fortifying a "market for force".[45] This, it is assured throughout much of the literature, has signaled a "profound shift in the way the US government projects its power overseas."[46] Some have likened this inclusion of PMCs to a "revolution" in the conduct of war.[47] Consequently, many scholars have considered this the latest and perhaps the greatest change in the nature of the state as it loses its grip on its monopoly of violence. [48] In short, there is an emerging consensus that the use of PMCs as a foreign policy tool is the product of a number of complex and interrelated changes in the post-Cold War international system, and that this represents a dramatic change in the way the US (as well as other states such as Britain) conducts its military affairs abroad.[49]

This systemic conceptualization of the emergence of the PMC industry as a product of the post-Cold War environment contains certain assumptions about US foreign policy. First, it subscribes to a particular world-view of US foreign policy perceived to undergo significant alteration in response to a new world order. In this regard, the literature largely assumes a discontinuity in US foreign policy from the Cold War and post-Cold War periods in which PMCs play a unique role. Secondly, it presents the rise of the PMC industry as extraneous to the conduct of US foreign policy. My point here, rather than to discredit or attack the notion of a globalization of the private security industry, is that the propensity to outsource military operations in US foreign policy to PMCs is depicted as one rooted primarily in the logic of international market dynamics and subsequently largely fails to grasp the underlying conditions in which this specific form of outsourcing has been accepted and used historically in US foreign policy. In this way, much of the literature overlooks the importance of US contracts during the Cold War as precursors to the current growth of the PMC industry. Some

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[43] See Kyle Ballard, "The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry," in *Private Military and Security Companies*, eds. Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2007), 40.; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 49-70. Chesterman and Lehnardt, *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*; David Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq* (Westport: Praeger, 2009).; Carlos Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 52-53.; Robert Mandel, *Armies Without States* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 56. Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War," *The Nation* 265 (1997): 12.; Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[44] Thomas Adams, "Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 13, no. 2 (2002): 54-67.; Mandel, *Armies Without States*, 40.; Juan Carlos Zarate, "The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies and the New World Disorder," *Stanford Journal of International Law* 34, no. 1 (Winter, 1998): 81.; Eugene Smith, "The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications," *Parameters* 32 (2002): 104.

[45] For a much more detailed and nuanced account of the rise of the "market for force" please see Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 30-34.

[46] Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 3.

[47] Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 95.

[48] Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 45. Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 7-9.; Ballard, *The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry*, 39.

[49] See above and Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*; Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*

scholars, however, do acknowledge that PMCs were used in place of official forces during the Cold War. According to Isenberg, for instance, "Before the 1990s privatization push, private firms had periodically been used in lieu of US forces to enforce covert military policies outside the view of Congress and the public."[50] Deborah Avant agrees that "During the Cold War, private US firms were associated with tasks "too dirty" for the US government."[51] Yet there is no analysis of these Cold War PMCs and how they might have conditioned contemporary practices of outsourcing.

The literature also touches on various complimentary drivers alongside this systemic explanation of the privatization trend, some of which are important but beyond the scope of this dissertation. For instance, Ballard and others have argued that the increased reliance on PMCs is embedded in the broader context of globalization and the retreat of the state from its traditional roles.[52] In other words, the privatization of military affairs and outsourcing coercion to private entities is part and parcel of an accelerating dynamic of globalization that erodes the traditional understanding of the state and its roles in society. Another argument that will play a minor role in this dissertation is that PMCs are part of a larger ideological current towards privatization. The privatization of coercion is consistent with the capitalist belief system in the superior efficiency of the market, first initiated as a policy priority during the Reagan administration in the US and under Thatcher in the UK in the 1980s.[53]

There are also numerous policy rationales that underpin employing PMCs depending on the situation and type of service demanded. For instance, there is a broad consensus that advancements in military technology can help explain the rise and reliance of the DoD and other agencies on the specialized technological knowledge of PMCs.[54] There are also debates as to whether it is actually cheaper to outsource in the military sphere, with questions regarding competition, fraud, etc.[55] There are also descriptions spread throughout the PMC literature on how privatization has functioned for the US government as a tool to distance itself from interventionist policies. For instance, as Singer notes: "the rationale for using [PMCs] instead of official covert action is that they give the cover of plausible deniability that public forces lack. If an operation goes awry, the activities of a firm are easier for a government to deny and the blame simpler to shift."[56] Others tend to focus on accountability and the lack of legal mechanisms available to prosecute individuals who commit violations of human rights.[57] Jamieson and McEvroy argue that PMCs and other parallel forces can be

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[50] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 3.

[51] Avant, *Privatizing Military Training*

[52] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 66. Leading to idea of "ungovernance" Susan Strange, *Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14.

[53] Elke Krahmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 10-19.; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 120.; Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 35.

[54] Ibid. Eliot A. Cohen, "Defending America in the Twenty-First Century," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (2000): 40-56.; Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 32.; Ballard, *The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry*, 37-55.

[55] See James Jay Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan. Iraq and Future Conflicts* (London: Praeger Security International, 2008). ; Jurgen Brauer, "An Economic Perspective on Mercenaries, Military Companies, and the Privatisation of Force," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1999).

[56] Peter W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2002): 218.

[57] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*; Chesterman and Lehnardt, *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*; Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications*, 186-220.; Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel, eds., *Private Military and Security Companies* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2007).; Fanara, *Circumventing*

used to distance the state from holding responsibility for certain actions through judicial "othering" in the perpetration of state crimes.[58] In other words, while not necessarily being denied, the distance created by outsourcing outside of the state structures allows for the state to conduct certain actions without being identified as the direct perpetrator. Colonel Bruce Grant argued that the use of PMCs as a US policy tool in the training of foreign forces is heavily determined by the absence of Congressional red tape and the relative lack of Congressional oversight over the contracting process.[59] This forms part of a related set of arguments based on the political benefits of employing PMCs. Kinsey argues that "the body bag syndrome, as it is sometimes called, has increased the pressure on governments to find alternative means of carrying out some types of security operations."[60] Jeremy Scahill also argues that PMCs serve to avoid domestic outcry against US troop casualties in foreign combat missions thereby absorbing some of the political costs of war.[61] Such arguments need further elaboration within a context of US foreign policy objectives.

A few focused analyses on the outsourcing of US foreign policy do exist, however, as opposed to an exclusive focus on the PMC industry as a whole. Notably, Alison Stanger in her recent book (2009) *One Nation Under Contract* is devoted to understanding the outsourcing of US government in general.[62] She provides insight into the world of privatization across sectors including administration functions, humanitarian assistance, US government development agencies, as well as defense structures. Unlike much of the existing PMC studies, she states that the "preconditions for the privatization of national security were in place before the Cold War ended," pointing to a 1922 Navy and War departments decision to outsource the construction of their ships, the creation of an all-volunteer force after Vietnam War requiring improved services to soldiers, arms build-up with USSR (and thus further outsourcing to increase efficiency of production of arms, etc.) and finally the DoD resorted to contracting to save money.[63] Yet in this case, the emphasis remains firmly on PMCs themselves and does not provide a more detailed or comprehensive examination of their historical use or their evolution in US foreign policy. Moreover, this short analysis portrays the DoD's increasing reliance on PMCs for construction and logistics rather than on the delegation of core combat and strategic services. Lastly, she does not delve into the broader spectrum of outsourcing US military operations and extend that analysis up from the post-WWII period to the present, but rather focuses specifically on the spread and depth of US privatization of military functions to corporate contractors. This is another weakness of the literature to which we will now turn.

PMCs, Mercenaries, and Other Irregular Forces

While much of the literature focuses exclusively on the privatization of military affairs to corporate entities, and to PMCs specifically, there has been little to no attention on how paramilitary forces and other non-state or semi-official forces figure into the outsourcing practices of the US. In one minor but notable exception, Laura Dickinson admits that "the portrait of contractors in Vietnam grows a bit more complex if we consider the tens of thousands of Vietnamese and other nationals essentially hired by US authorities to conduct

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Accountability: Private Military Companies and Human Rights Abuses; Oliver Jones, "Implausible Deniability," (2008), http://works.bepress.com/oliver_jones/2 (accessed 25 October 2010).

[58] Jamieson and McEvoy, *State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering*, 504-527.

[59] Grant, *US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy*

[60] Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 96.

[61] Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 433.

[62] Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy.*

[63] Ibid., 85

defensive, offensive, and counterinsurgency operations."[64] She provides a very brief analysis of what she labels "quasi-contractors" referring to the Special Force and CIA efforts to train and arm Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, volunteer hamlet militias, and Montagnard paramilitary forces as well as actions conducted by local Provisional Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) as part of Operation Phoenix. Similarly, Robert Young Pelton provides a journalistic account of the use of both PMCs and hired local militia forces in Afghanistan.[65] However, in both cases, there is little further analysis of US outsourcing to irregular and paramilitary actors and how they relate to private contractors. No existing study attempts to incorporate both sets of actors, and others, within a broader discussion of outsourcing of US military power.[66]

A separate, but related set of literature on PMCs traces their evolution from mercenary activity, which essentially compares the modern PMC to soldiers of fortune, combatants willing to fight for the highest bidder.[67] Much like the PMC literature described above, these works examine the mercenary phenomenon in general, rather than in US foreign policy specifically, paying particular attention to European and South African mercenaries in various countries across Africa.[68] One important (and useful) aspect about this literature is the way the PMC industry is said to have developed from a longer genealogy of mercenary activity. PMCs are presented as an officialized corporate equivalent to the mercenary traditions of the past. Arnold, for instance, refers to PMCs as the "new mercenary corporations" which, although exhibit subtle differences from the mercenaries in the 1960s and 1970s, share many important similarities.[69] As Isenberg points out, perhaps the primary crucial difference between pre- and post-Cold War PMCs (and what distinguishes them from mercenary outfits) is their official acceptance as a legitimate fighting force. "Instead of organizing clandestinely," he writes, "such firms now operate out of office suites, have public affairs staffs and Web sites, and offer marketing literature."[70]

This historical comparison between PMCs and mercenaries is crucial as authors such as Geraghty and Arnold offer insight into the reasons Western governments have been relatively accepting of the use of mercenaries, either covertly sending them to conduct wars

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[64] Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 24-25.

[65] Robert Young Pelton, *Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007).

[66] One author very briefly compares PMCs to militias and civilian self-defense forces but does not analyze how they are instrumental to US power. Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 18. Usually, an analysis of of these forces together is done in passing, with brief mention of the two as agents of the US state in the context of state crime or state terror amongst other topics pertaining to US foreign policy. See for example Jamieson and McEvoy, *State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering*, 504-527.; Carl Boggs, *the Crimes of Empire: Rogue Superpower and World Domination* (London: Pluto Press, 2010).; Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*; Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire* (London: Verso, 2004), 131.

[67] Geraghty, *Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare*; Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Michael Lee Lanning, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune from Ancient Greece to Today's Private Military Companies* (New York: Presidio Press, 2005); Adams, *Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century*, 54-67. Guy Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World* (New York: St Martins Press, 1999).; Burchett, Wilfred. and Roebuck, D., *The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977).; Janice Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994).

[68] See for example Lanning, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune from Ancient Greece to Today's Private Military Companies* also see Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Fayemi, eds., *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).; Jakkie Cilliers and Peggie Mason, eds., *Peace, Profit Or Plunder: The Privatization of Security in War Torn African Societies* Institute for Security Studies, 1999), http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/BlurbPPP.HTML. (accessed 12 January 2011)

[69] Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World*, 123-131.

[70] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 4.

on their behalf or turning a blind eye to their support of foreign forces.[71] Mercenaries, they argue, were used for similar reasons as PMCs, a comparison often debated in the literature.[72] Regardless of the similarities and differences between mercenaries and PMCs, and in spite of the insights offered in this literature as to Western approval of their own uses of mercenaries, the mercenary literature, in a similar fashion to the literature on PMCs, tends not to focus on US foreign policy specifically and the underlying currents and dynamics that have conditioned a favorable stance towards outsourcing coercion. Instead, these studies are agent-focused, shedding light onto the mercenary world. In addition, the rise of the PMC industry is often explained in terms of market logics. Arnold for example writes, "The new mercenary companies, however they dress up their activities and describe themselves, are a response by the North to demands for military assistance from the weak and sometimes chaotic countries of the South and they, too, will continue to operate as long as there is a market for their services in the South."[73] In this way, much like the rest of the PMC literature, there is only peripheral analysis of the underlying dynamics in US policy that has conditioned the prevalence of outsourcing coercion.

Paramilitaries and Irregular Forces in US Foreign Policy

This study will benefit greatly from a broad extant literature on the US use of and connection to paramilitary forces.[74] There are numerous sources that trace the use of paramilitaries and irregular fighters to US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrines that can loosely be categorized between those that are critical of this policy option[75] and those that view it as an essential and unproblematic feature of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare practices, with a keen eye for improving their effectiveness.[76] Other

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[71] Geraghty, *Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare*; Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World*; Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*

[72] See Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan. Iraq and Future Conflicts* Chapter "Why We Hate" for an unabashed defense of PMCs, and an argument against of their comparison to mercenaries.

[73] Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World*, 125.

[74] Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Owl Books, 2006).; R. Duvall and M. Stohl, "Governance by Terror," in *The Politics of Terrorism*, ed. M. Stohl (New York: CRC Press, 1988).; Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston: South End Press, 1979).; Noam Chomsky, *The Culture of Terrorism* (Boston: South End Press, 1988).; Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony Or Survival* (London: Penguin Books, 2007).; Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), 252.; Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*.; Staffan. Lofving, "Paramilitaries of the Empire: Guatemala, Colombia, and Israel," *Social Analysis* 48, no. 1 (2004): 156-160. Victoria Sanford, "Learning to Kill by Proxy: Colombian Paramilitaries and the Legacy of Central American Death Squads, Contras, and Civil Patrols," *Social Justice* (2003). Amongst many others

[75] Tom Burghardt, *Unconventional Warfare in the 21st Century: US Surrogates, Terrorists and Narcotraffickers* (London: Institute for Policy Research and Development, 2009); McClintock, *American Doctrine and Counterinsurgent State Terror*; Frederick H. Gareau, *State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism* (London: Zed Books, 2004).; James J. Wirtz and Michael Shafer, "Counterinsurgency Paradigms; Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy," *International Security* 14, no. 1 (1989).

[76] See for example Thomas H. Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3* (Hurlburt Field, Florida: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2010), http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/relatedpubs/documents/AfghCIA.pdf (accessed 12 September, 2010).; Robert M. Cassidy, "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency," *Parameters* (2006): 47-62.

sources place US paramilitary activities in the context of covert CIA and Special Force operations.[77]

Following US employment of Sunni tribes as part of the US counterinsurgent surge in Iraq in 2006, a flurry of official reports and other academic essays have appeared extolling the benefits of an "indirect approach" and surrogate warfare, working "with, through or by" so-called "irregular" paramilitary forces. These are written exclusively with the intent of providing practical policy lessons in order to improve US capacity to mobilize paramilitary forces.[78] An article written by Major Kelly Smith at the School of Advanced Military Studies, for example, "seeks to determine the adequacy of national security guidance for the use of surrogate forces in pursuit of US strategic objectives. The insufficiency in the current guidance for waging warfare by, with, and through surrogate forces requires development of an updated approach to maximize the strategic options available to the United States."[79] Such sources, in conjunction with US military doctrine on the subject,[80] are useful in understanding official decisions and background assumptions in implementing these practices. For instance, paramilitaries are often said to be employed because they are familiar with the local terrain, people, and customs, they are also faster and cheaper to deploy, and may preserve a modicum of plausible denial.[81] For instance, Major Allan Day writes about how the employment of surrogates and paramilitaries keeps US "footprint low", and provides the US the legitimacy it needs to intervene by working through proxy forces.[82] Moreover, he asserts, local private armies have the knowledge and experience to effectively fight on behalf of US forces and are quickly and easily deployed.[83] Another aspect of this literature is that working with, through, or by paramilitary forces is often portrayed as a new feature of US "Irregular Warfare" doctrines. One military analyst states boldly that "America is embarking on a new way of war," with the "indirect approach" as part of it, which "represent a doctrinal break from how

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[77] Colonel Richard Gross, "Different Worlds: Unacknowledged Special Operations and Covert Action," *US Army War College Report* (May, 2009), http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/gross.pdf. (accessed 10 February 2011); Richard Best and Andrew Feickart, "Special Operations Forces and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress* (2005), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS22017.pdf (accessed 5 October 2010).; James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* Free Press, 2006).; Michael. McAndrew, "Wrangling in the Shadows: The use of United States Special Forces in Covert Military Operations in the War on Terror," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 29 (2006): 153. Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

[78] See for example Will Clegg, "Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Security Challenges* 5, no. 3 (Spring, 2009): 1-25.; Major Jim Gant, *One Tribe at a Time* (Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports, Inc.,[2009]), http://rohrabacher.house.gov/UploadedFiles/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf (accessed 12 October 2010).; Litchfield, *Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas.*; Homiak, *Expanding the American Way of War: Working 'with, through Or by' Non-US Actors*, 19-39.; Newton, *The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare*, 1-19.; USJFCOM, *Irregular Warfare Special Study* Joint Warfighting Center, 2006), http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/digitalcollections/irregwarfarespecialstudy.pdf (accessed 6 September 2011).; William R. Rieper, *Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: Their Roles and Considerations* (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010).; Isaac Peltier, "Surrogate Warfare: The Role of US Army SF," in *Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches*, eds. R. Newton, T. Homiak and Et. Al. (Hurlburt Field: JSOU Press, 2009), 55-85.

[79] Smith, *Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century*

[80] See for example U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare: FM 3-05.130* ; U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007).

[81] Clegg, *Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1-25.; Rieper, *Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: Their Roles and Considerations*; Smith, *Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century*

[82] Major Allan Day, *Implications of Surrogate Warfare* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2002), http://dodreports.com/ada400938. (accessed 20 February 2011)

[83] See Ibid.

the United States historically waged war in its most heroic chapters."[84] While the majority of military-related research, including this particular article, acknowledges that the use of surrogate paramilitary forces has been a feature of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare practices in the past, there is an underlying assumption that Irregular Warfare – the recent doctrinal umbrella term for asymmetric engagements – represents a break from previous experiences in response to a fundamentally different strategic environment.[85] Moreover, within this set of literature there is little to no critical acknowledgment of some of the possible implications of these para-institutional practices. More importantly, this policy orientation does not provide critical analysis of the public-private divide and the implications of the civilianization of warfare. While this dissertation has policy implications, it is not directly relevant to the improvement of tactics. Consequently, it makes extensive use of this literature but does not seek to build directly onto it.

Many other authors have written on the support for guerrilla movements and other irregular forces in unconventional warfare to foster an insurgency against "unfriendly" or undesirable regimes. For example, Peter Schraeder examines US "paramilitary intervention" and the policy priorities that underpin it.[86] What is distinctive about this work and others like it[87] is the specific critical attention placed on the training, supporting, and arming of non-state actors by US agencies to conduct unconventional warfare operations conducive towards US interests. However, while such works clearly delineate and describe this paramilitary option in US policy and its continuity, there is no mention of other private forces or an analysis of paramilitary groups as a form of outsourcing. In other words, not only is there no connection in these analyses to private military contracting and the underlying impetuses in US foreign policy to contract out certain military functions, but the employment of irregular paramilitary formations is not examined under the lens of outsourcing. Instead, it is most often seen as a covert means of executing US policies. Nonetheless, these works will be extremely useful in tracing the origins of the use of paramilitary groups in US foreign policy, and this thesis makes a contribution to this literature by bringing in an analysis of PMCs as an additional form of outsourcing.

Similarly, many have written about the US connection to paramilitary formations in US-led and supported counterinsurgency campaigns. For example, this dissertation draws significantly from Michael T. Klare's descriptions of US "informal alliance system composed of proxies, surrogates, and paramilitary formations," alongside formal counterinsurgency relations comprised of significant counterinsurgency assistance and military training.[88] It also builds on Greg Grandin's *Empire's Workshop* which argues that Latin America was a staging ground for the development of a paramilitary or death squad formula which was then applied elsewhere, most recently in Iraq.[89] Stokes and Raphael also argue that paramilitarism has been a central component of US counterinsurgency strategies to maintain a particular stability

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[84] Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*, 1.

[85] For criticisms of this within this set of literature, see Alexander Vacca and Mark Davidson, "The Regularity of Irregular Warfare," *Parameters* (Spring, 2011): 18-28.; Lieutenant Colonel Frank Miller, *Irregular Warfare - perhaps Not so Irregular* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2006). see also Robert Ramsey D. III., "Some Observations on Americans Advising Indigenous Forces," in *The US Army and Irregular Warfare 1775-2007*, ed. Richard Davis (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2008), 239-249.; Barak Salmoni, "The Fallacy of Irregular Warfare," *RUSI* 152, no. 4 (2007): 18-24.

[86] Schraeder, *Paramilitary Intervention*, 131-152.

[87] See for example Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992).; Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow* (New York: Times Books, 2006).

[88] Klare, *Subterranean Alliances: America's Global Proxy Network*, 97-118. See also for instance Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda* , 252.

[89] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 89.

in countries throughout the global South for oil security since the Cold War period and beyond into the current "war on terror".[90] In addition to this, within the literature on state terrorism there is substantial reference to the use of paramilitaries as proxy agents of the US state.[91] These works recognize the importance and prevalence of such paramilitary and irregular forces in the conduct of US foreign policy, and are useful in examining the foreign policy contexts in which paramilitary or irregular forces are leveraged.

In addition, in terms of substantive material on US support for paramilitary forces, there are multiple case studies of US paramilitary operations that will be useful in attaining in-depth information on the paramilitary connection. For instance, Sanford and others have already established arguments connecting counterinsurgent paramilitary forces throughout Central America and in Colombia to US military aid, the construction of a counterinsurgent politic, and substantial military training of host country forces.[92] Stokes, Hristov, and others have made similar arguments in relation to the US influence on and connection to the paramilitarism in Colombia.[93] Many other studies highlight the US role in creating paramilitary networks in Guatemala[94], El Salvador[95], Vietnam,[96] the Philippines[97], and elsewhere, including the recent application of similar paramilitary options in Iraq.[98] In

[90] Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2010).

[91] Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*.; Cecilia Menjivar and Nestor Rodriguez, "State Terror in the US Latin American Interstate Regime," in *When States Kill: Latin America, the US, and Technologies of Terror*, eds. Cecilia Menjivar and Nestor Rodriguez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).; Luis Roniger, "US Hemispheric Hegemony and the Descent into Genocidal Practices in Latin America," in *State Violence and Genocide in Latin America*, eds. Marcia Esparza, Henry Huttenbach and Daniel Feierstein (London: Routledge, 2010), 23-44.; Michael Stohl and George. A. Lopez, eds., *Terrible Beyond Endurance? the Foreign Policy of State Terrorism* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1988).; Miles Wolpin, "State Terrorism and Death Squads in the New World Order," in *The Culture of Violence*, eds. K. Rupesinghe and R. Marcial (New York: United Nations University Press, 1994).

[92] Sanford, *Learning to Kill by Proxy: Colombian Paramilitaries and the Legacy of Central American Death Squads, Contras, and Civil Patrols*

[93] Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*; Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*; Javier S. Giraldo, *Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy* (Maine: Common Courage Press, 1996).; Mario Murillo, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004).

[94] Michael McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala*, Vol. 2 (London: Zed Books, 1985).; Mario Fumerton and Simone Remijnse, "Civil Defense Forces: Peru's CAC and Guatemala's PAC in Comparative Perspective," in *Armed Actors*, eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (London: Zed Books, 2004), 52-72.

[95] See for example Michael McClintock, *The American Connection: Volume 1 State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador* (London: Zed Books, 1985).

[96] See for example William Rosenau, *US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order* (London: Routledge, 2005).; Christopher Ives, *US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

[97] Walden Bello, "Counterinsurgency's Proving Ground: Low-Intensity Warfare in the Philippines," in *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Anti-Terrorism in the Eighties*, eds. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 158-182.; Ramsey Clark, *Right-Wing Vigilantes and US. Involvement : Report of a U.S.-Philippine Fact-Finding Mission to the Philippines* (Manila: Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, 1987).; David Kowalewski, "Counterinsurgent Paramilitarism: A Philippine Case Study," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 1 (Feb., 1992): 71-84.; Alfred McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).; E. Jr San Juan, *US Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[98] Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, *Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2006). Michael Schwartz, *War without End: The Iraq War in Context* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008). Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* Hirsh and

addition, there are numerous case studies on US sponsored and trained paramilitary forces in unconventional operations.[99] These resources, amongst others, will provide the substantive content and/or evidence of US paramilitary operations in historical context and can therefore help support arguments as to how and why a paramilitary option may be implemented.

Agent-Focused Studies: Paramilitaries, Death Squads, and Irregular Forces

Beyond the literature on US use of paramilitary agents, there is a vast array of agent-focused studies that examine militias, paramilitaries, and death squads in relation to domestic politics in various countries around the world, rather than as an instrument of US foreign policy.[100] These sources will be useful in extrapolating conjectures about why states delegate violence to death squad agents and their functionality for state power in counterinsurgency settings. For instance, in a manner similar to that of contractual arrangements with PMCs, paramilitary death squads are often said to be related to the desire for the maintenance of plausible denial. Huggins states that "international public opinion frequently condemns violent, overt state repression, making it necessary for elements in such states to relinquish some direct control over civil society to . . . death squads."[101] Campbell and others also point out that "it is quite likely... increased concern for human rights has itself inadvertently been a contributing factor in the use of covert violence by governments, and in particular, in the use of death squads."[102]

Another set of literature on "irregular" armed actors and state building highlights the ways states, particularly in the global South, often rely on para-institutional actors for purposes of domestic policing and strengthening the state's coercive apparatus. A number of scholars have argued that "irregular" armed forces such as paramilitary, militia and warlords, amongst others have been central to the consolidation of nation states.[103] Following the formation of states in the work by Charles Tilly and others, many have argued that forms of

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Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*; Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

[99] See for example S. Schlesinger and S. Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1983).; Holly Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1988).

[100] For militias see for example, Ariel Ahram, *Proxy Warriors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).; D. Davis and A. Pereira, eds., *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).; Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds., *Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America* (London: Zed Books, 2004).; Holden, *Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America 1821-1960*; Kledja Mulaj, ed., *Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).; Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Death Squad literature Bruce B. Campbell and A. D. Brenner, eds., *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).; Leigh Payne, *Uncivil Movements: The Armed Right Wing and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000).; K. Warren, "Conclusion," in *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, ed. J. Sluka (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).; Campbell and Brenner, *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*; Mazzei, *Death Squads Or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Threaten Democracy in Latin America.*; Michael. Kirkwood, ed., *States of Terror: Death Squads Or Development?* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1989).

[101] Huggins, *Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence*, 13.

[102] Bruce Campbell, "Death Squads: Definition, Problems and Historical Context," in *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*, eds. Bruce Campbell and D. Brenner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 13. See also Ibid., 16-17 Warren, *Conclusion*, 227.

[103] See the entries in Davis and Pereira, *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation*; Ahram, *Proxy Warriors*; Holden, *Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America 1821-1960*; Bryden, Alan and Marina Caparini, eds. *Private Actors and Security Governance*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006

sub-state or para-state violence have operated in ways that extend states' institutional reach and capacity. For instance, as Holden has described it, "As the power of states has expanded, so did their ideological and coercive capacities to incite collaborative killing by groups and individuals who were not technically its direct agents – death squads, semi-private militias, secret armies, and "off-duty" officers of military and police agencies."[104] Such para-institutional formations, it is argued, have provided a non-traditional means of consolidating state power. But rather than merely a formational process, such elements may also help maintain the power of a state (without a monopoly of force), and this has particularly been the case in countries in the global South with weaker official armed forces.[105] This set of literature will be important in analyzing and demonstrating the localized processes through which para-institutional agents can help forge stability in tandem with "official" state forces.

Lastly, there is a small but growing set of literature on proxy intervention.[106] Rather than focus on US foreign policy specifically, however, these studies tend to analyze why states more generally delegate force to paramilitary or proxy forces in the conduct of foreign policy. Such studies are also useful in understanding the policy motivations behind using proxy warriors. They also demonstrate that proxy war – "in which belligerents use third parties as either supplementary means of waging war or as a substitute for the direct employment of their own armed forces" – has an extended history.[107] This study makes an indirect contribution to this set of literature by examining the historical evolution of such forces, as well as PMCs, as an integral part of US grand strategy. In this sense, additionally, while the para-state nexus described in this dissertation constitutes a form of proxy warfare, it is a broader concept that, as we shall see, encompasses indirect relations to paramilitary forces as part of broader processes at play in the intersection of US counterinsurgency practices and specific localized dynamics of internal conflicts in the global South.

Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare

There exists a broader literature on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare which is indirectly relevant to this dissertation. For instance, there are a few counterinsurgency "classics"[108] which inform much of US doctrine.[109] Such resources are useful in understanding the broader contexts and rationales in which paramilitary assets are deployed. Additionally, from a much more critical perspective, McClintock's thorough and comprehensive analysis of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrines and their application around the world is an indispensable resource in understanding the broader contexts of such particular modes of warfare as well as specific policy considerations, including the use of paramilitary and irregular forces.[110]

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[104] Holden, *Armies Without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America 1821-1960*, 10.
[105] See for instance Koonings and Kruijt, *Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America.*; And Ahram, *Proxy Warriors*
[106] Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*; Michael A. Innes, ed., *Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates, and the use of Force* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2012).; Chris Loveman, "Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention," *Conflict, Security & Development* 2, no. 03 (2002): 29-48.
[107] Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*, 2.
[108] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964).; Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Westport: Praeger, 1964).; Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgencies* (Chatto and Windus, 1966).
[109] See David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," *Survival / Hosted by Small Wars Journal* 48, no. 4 (2006), http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf. (accessed 10 Sept 2011)
[110] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*

With the US and coalition forces facing growing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare has regained popularity. According to David Kilcullen, an expert on US military strategy, more has been written on counterinsurgency and related military fields in the past four years than in the previous four decades.[111] This renewed preoccupation with these forms of stability operations has produced a rich variety of literature on the subject. Much like the above literature that focuses on surrogate warfare, there is a set of conventional counterinsurgency literature which is concerned with providing practical lessons for the improvement of US tactics.[112] This literature posits that a prevailing US military culture is antithetical to the requirements of a politico-military undertaking such as counterinsurgency due to a failure of the institutionalization of counterinsurgency lessons within the US conventional military structures. Robert Cassidy, for example, argues that

> One characteristic of this preferred way of war has been an embracement of the direct use of military force, combining maneuver and firepower to mass combat power at the decisive point in order bring about the destruction or annihilation of some enemy force or army. Conversely, the U.S. Army has historically marginalized counterinsurgency as an ephemeral anomaly. Unfortunately, this military cultural propensity has prevented the U.S. Army and some other Western armies from seriously studying and learning the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare and from embedding it in their institutional memories.[113]

Similarly, Ucko begins his book *The New Counterinsurgency Era* by stating, "The US military has historically paid little attention to the nature and requirements of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Missions pitting the U.S. military against insurgents, or forcing it into stabilization tasks and policing duties abroad, have tended to be dismissed as beyond the military's remit or as "lesser-included" operations."[114] This basic argument forms the basis of much of the contemporary conventional literature on counterinsurgency, with practical lessons on how to best institutionalize such modes of warfare in the US military as well as identify best practices.[115]

Cassidy provides a historical explanation as to why the US military tended to prepare for conventional war at the expense of undertaking counterinsurgency. He argues that US defeat in Vietnam proved to be a decisive factor in the military's decision to eschew counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, delegating such operations to Special Forces and instead focus on conventional military (state to state) combat possibilities.[116] The

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[111] Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*

[112] See for example James Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq* Bloomsbury, USA, 2010).; Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency Redux*

[113] Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror* (New York: Greenwood Publishing, 2006), 3.

[114] David Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 1.

[115] David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).; David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (London: Hurst and Company, 2009).; Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars*; Adam Lowther, *Americans and Asymmetric Conflict* (London: Praeger Security International, 2007).; James Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail at Counterinsurgency* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008).; Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul: MBI Publishing, 2006).; Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).; Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 2003). This list can also include a much earlier work: D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[116] Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror*, 99-100.

"Vietnam Syndrome" complete with intense levels of domestic opposition to seemingly needless casualties of US troops led government and military leaders alike to avoid the deployment of US conventional military forces for counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare engagements, and instead prefer an advisory role to local forces and/or operate through the CIA and Special Forces.[117] In terms of tactics, as Ucko explains, an approach predicated on an advisory role by US Special Forces personnel instead of a direct commitment of conventional ground troops is theoretically coherent and confers certain benefits to the US government and military:

> It limits the deployment of combat troops and thus appears more respectful of the host nation's sovereignty. By producing a lighter "footprint," it results in interventions that are more discreet and less politically problematic, both for the U.S. and the threatened government. It also shields the U.S. military from active engagement in what were and still are considered to be the most complex and difficult types of operations: counterinsurgencies.[118]

These two arguments (one based on historical factors and one based on strategic considerations) are, however, only peripheral within these analyses, subordinate to the larger claims that the US military is unprepared for asymmetric conflicts, with practical policy-oriented lessons being the main output of this set of literature. By focusing on the underlying reasons in the use of para-institutional phenomena in the application of US military power, this dissertation builds indirectly on this literature in understanding how and why para-institutional phenomena have become central to US coercive reach in the global South.

Lastly, while this set of literature may be critical of US counterinsurgency tactics with a keen eye for their improvement, it tends to view counterinsurgency in apolitical terms, and is therefore not attentive to the underlying objectives of such forms of statecraft. In this sense counterinsurgency and related concepts in the majority of these works is de-contextualized and de-historicized as a set of un-problematic military strategies for the ultimate defeat of insurgents and other "enemies". This literature, in other words, is not concerned with the broader political and social significance and consequences of the implementation of such programs and Washington's support for them to pro-US regimes or "friendly" militaries and/or armed movements. In this sense, it differs from the objectives of this dissertation in which I also seek to provide a structural or theoretical account for para-institutional phenomena in the projection of US military power.

Reflections on the Extant Literature

In summary, there are three major interrelated themes echoed across these distinct sets of literature that are paramount to this project. First, each is focused exclusively on one type of actor, emphasizing their distinct characteristics, therefore treating each as separate. Secondly, these sets of literature are often subject to a "presentist bias", in that they tend to portray their respective object of analysis as a new feature of US foreign policy, distinct from prior phases in history. Finally, and in relation to this second point, there is an underlying assumption cut across these three sets of literature of marked discontinuities in US foreign policy. The end of the Cold War and the on-set of the "war on terror" in particular are generally depicted as fault lines in US foreign policy. This limited focus fails to capture the longer-term dynamics in US foreign policy in which para-institutional phenomena more generally have become a central feature of the projection of US military power. This study seeks to rectify this gap and contends that a nexus between the US and various parallel non-

[117] Ibid., 99-100, 29.

[118] Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars*, 37.

state armed groups, including PMCs and paramilitary assets, within the remit of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare is hardly a new trend.

Scope, Parameters, and Limitations of the Current Study

There are three primary objectives in this thesis. First, it outlines and describes the central concept that animates the project (the para-state nexus) and the ways in which it is embedded in US hegemonic role in the international system. In order to do so, secondly, it traces the development of this para-state nexus from the Cold War period up to the current "war on terror". Lastly, within this, it examines the underlying conditions that have shaped the contours of this para-state nexus and the propensity in US foreign policy to rely on such parallel means of force projection. Thus rather than focus on a particular set of actors, this study seeks to examine broader issues regarding the relationships between the US and non-state military actors. Therefore, the primary research question that has animated this study is: *Why has a para-state nexus developed as a central plank of US foreign policy in the global South?*

In answering this question and summarizing the contents of this thesis, the core arguments as to why para-institutional forces have been increasingly central to US foreign policy in the global South can roughly be broken down into three levels of analysis. First, a broader systemic structural explanation is derived from a Historical Materialist analysis of US foreign policy. This is then coupled with an examination of the historical contexts and events that have shaped the development and consolidation of a para-state nexus from the Cold War period to the contemporary "war on terror". In addition, it analyzes the strategic rationales and logics on behalf of US military planners and practitioners behind the use of non-state actors in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare settings.

First, a theoretical framework examining the US Open Door grand strategy and the contours of US hegemony is presented in chapter two which provides a context for the analysis in the subsequent three chapters (three, four, and five). Chapter two argues that US relations with much of the global South have been characterized by counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare modes of statecraft throughout the post-war period in efforts to create and stabilize specific state formations abroad conductive to mutually supportive US political and economic interests. This places US hegemonic role in the international system in relation to processes of capitalist globalization in which counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare modes of US statecraft have been employed to counter perceived threats to the desired global Open Door order. In turn, this context provides a meta-explanation for the drivers and objectives behind US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare and, by extension, the para-statal relations that often comprise these forms of coercive statecraft. This analysis therefore also helps to elucidate why the US has tended to eschew direct military intervention with US troops on the ground in favour of more indirect military means of executing statecraft abroad. As demonstrated in the literature review, most explanations for the use of PMCs and paramilitaries in US foreign policy attribute such practices to practical policy considerations. While these immediate practical policy considerations are an important facet which will be included in this analysis, none of these arguments connect these policy decisions to a theoretically informed examination of the broader international or systemic structures at work that inform foreign policy. Historical, social, and material structures such as the global political economy underpin the conditions of possibility for these practical policy decisions. It is the multiple and underlying structural contexts which ultimately drive, shape, and condition policymakers and the decisions they make. In this respect, as Robinson points out, "the whole point of theory, of social science, is to uncover the forces and processes at work in the social universe which lie beneath – indeed, epistemologically

speaking, out of the range of – sensory perception."[119] This serves as a springboard for the theorization of US foreign policy elaborated on in chapter two and a unifying macro-level explanation as an answer to this question.

Second, the core of the analysis presented in chapters three, four, and five traces the historical evolution of a para-state nexus during the Cold War (1945-1989), the post-Cold War period (1990-2001), and the "war on terror" (2001-present), respectively. This provides an historical overview of the evolution of the use of both PMCs and paramilitaries in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare practices. In so doing, it ascribes historical factors in influencing the increasingly para-statal nature of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations. It will demonstrate how certain historical trends and events have imputed into the overall receptivity of US planners over time to rely on para-institutional means to project US military power abroad. This includes, for example, a "Vietnam syndrome" after the US withdrawal from Vietnam which eschewed US military engagements and favored indirect "low intensity" forms of conflict during the 1980s. In addition to this historical focus, these core empirical chapters provide analysis of how the domestic contexts in various countries in the global South, such as colonial legacies, socio-economic inequalities and class hierarchies, amongst other factors, have shaped these para-statal relations between local agents and US counterinsurgent politics. As will be demonstrated, the para-statal relations described in this thesis are not solely the product of a "top-down" application of certain policies, but rather are dependent on the localized contexts in which these relations emerge. In this sense, this thesis analyses the symbiotic relationship between systemic and historical conditions that have driven the development of a para-state nexus and the local contingent nature of its manifestation in particular instances.

This thesis presents a linear account of the historical development of this para-state nexus in that it demonstrates empirically that para-institutional groups have become increasingly prevalent in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies across these three time periods. In particular, it traces the rise of the PMC industry in US foreign policy from the Cold War up until the current "war on terror". It also examines the development of the use of paramilitary forces by US forces in counterinsurgency and related forms of irregular warfare during these same time frames. However, it is worth bearing in mind that these historical and localised factors that have conditioned the increasing centrality of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy more generally have ebbed and flowed in importance in different contexts. Hence, outsourcing and indirect connections to para-institutional phenomena have occurred to varying extents in different contexts. In other words, in some instances of US interventions and substantial military assistance, PMCs and local paramilitary groups have been instrumental to US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare efforts to a greater extent than in others across the same time periods analyzed. This thesis does not directly tackle the issue as to why this might be the case. This would require a more extensive and focused comparative study to elucidate specific dynamics within different domestic contexts in which irregular paramilitary groups develop in countries in the global South. Yet, these differences in the intensity of a nexus between the US and para-institutional actors across time more generally will necessarily play a central role in excavating the broader currents in US military power projection and the way in which various forms of outsourcing are intertwined and share similar origins in US policy. In other words, while there is variation in the extent to which the para-state nexus is manifest across different cases, this dissertation will show that there is a discernible and definitive development of this phenomena across time in which para-institutional forces become increasingly prevalent in

[119] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, 5.

US counterinsurgent and unconventional warfare strategies more generally. In particular, it shows how these practices of leveraging para-institutional forces have become increasingly institutionalized as part of standard doctrinal policies, rather than remaining purely as a facet of covert warfare.

Third, by looking at examples of a para-state nexus, the historical analysis presented in these core chapters identifies practical policy considerations/rationales behind the employment of both PMCs and paramilitaries. An examination of stated official reasons for their employment over time (or in some cases the denial of these connections) sheds light on their evolution in the context of the conditions in US foreign policy which inform these rationales. In addition, despite their similarities in many respects, PMCs and paramilitary forces are quite distinct sets of actors and have separate relations to US agencies, and therefore many of these policy rationales differ for each type of actor. In this case, for example, each of these chapters analyze US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrine from these time periods in order to excavate continuities and changes in policy rationales behind the delegation of force to para-institutional forces as well as US documents pertaining to privatization of certain core military functions to PMCs. This thesis demonstrates that there are discernible patterns and consistencies across time with regards to officially stated policy rationales as well as changes that underscore the gradual evolution in the use of PMCs and paramilitary forces.

Overall, this study has three main purposes in answering this research question from which its original contributions to the existing literature and the field of International Relations are derived. First, it constructs a more inclusive concept of outsourcing and indirect reliance on parallel military forces - the para-state nexus - in order to elucidate the myriad connections between the US and various para-institutional formations in the conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, but also to build a foundation on which to analyze these disparate but related non-state military actors collectively. The para-state nexus is a novel concept that brings together disparate types of non-state military actors under one conceptual roof. Secondly, this analysis provides an alternative analysis of the historical evolution of para-institutional actors in US foreign policy. By placing an examination of the development of a para-state nexus within a framework explaining the drivers of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in the context of US hegemony and Open Door grand strategy, this dissertation develops a more nuanced account of the global spread and use of PMCs and paramilitaries in US foreign policy that considers the enabling structures and conditions of possibility for these actors as instruments of US policy. It therefore also demonstrates that the use of PMCs in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare has longer historical roots than is typically portrayed, and shows that this development is inextricably intertwined with imperatives within US foreign policy rather than something extraneous to it occurring in the post-Cold War era, as much of the literature on PMCs postulates. This contributes to the understanding of the origins of PMCs in US foreign policy and their contemporary use in global politics. It also analyzes disparate forces collectively and bridges the gaps between the separated sets of literature on PMCs and paramilitaries in US foreign policy. In doing this it demonstrates that PMCs and paramilitaries have similar historical origins as instruments of US statecraft in the conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Finally, this project, by extension, links para-institutional phenomena in US foreign policy to the maintenance of a liberalized global order. It will demonstrate that the para-state nexus, as an increasingly important component of US global counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare commitments, has played a central role in the processes of state formation in the South and in closing the political spaces for alternative forms of development. This builds on existing theories of US hegemony and

imperialism by demonstrating the importance of a para-state nexus, leveraging military forces outside of the conventional chains of command and co-opting local paramilitary and other irregular forces, towards the stabilization of a US-led global order.

In addition, it must be mentioned at this point that outsourcing or contracting to non-state or semi-official assets is not unique to US power. A number of other countries delegate foreign military functions to private and irregular forces such as PMCs, paramilitary groups, or mercenary outfits. Many Western countries, particularly the United Kingdom (UK) and France, have historically held similar attitudes as the USA towards mercenaries and pseudo-PMCs.[120] The UK, for instance, is currently second to the US in military outsourcing to PMCs abroad.[121] The UK also has a long historical record, especially during the height of the colonial British Empire, of delegating its imperial violence and policing roles not only to native troops but also to mercenaries, pirates, and other irregular forces.[122] Iran is also deeply involved in foreign proxy intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, asserting its foreign policy objectives through local paramilitary forces. There are many examples in which both major powers and weaker states have used para-institutional mechanisms as a form of proxy war in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. In this sense Hughes is correct in asserting that more critically minded scholars who "indict the USA and other Western countries for employing what they regard as a form of indirect aggression which breaches international norms of international behavior… are under an intellectual obligation to acknowledge that there are few states within the international system which can claim innocence of such activity."[123]

However, there are certain characteristics of the para-state nexus that make it unique and an important focus of analysis. First and foremost, the US is at present the sole global superpower and the sheer scale of PMC operations and connection to various paramilitary organizations via its myriad military relations worldwide for the purposes of preserving "stability" is unsurpassed by any other country. The global reach of US military power and influence is supported and bolstered by para-statal connections to an unprecedented degree. Moreover, secondly, as will be demonstrated in chapter two, while other countries may have used para-extensional means to complete limited objectives abroad, para-institutional actors and structures have now become central to US Open Door grand strategy. In this sense they are central to US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies towards unstable areas in the global South. This, thirdly, has wider significance as integral to processes of the stabilization of specific state formations throughout much of the global South. Counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare interventions and the para-statal relations that have accompanied them have had considerable influence over the conditions for specific developmental pathways in the global South conducive to US political and economic interests. What makes a US para-state nexus worthy of research, then, is not the mere fact that the US uses PMCs and various paramilitary forces in supporting foreign policy objectives, but the scope, location, and centrality of these forces in the coercive component of US managerial role in much of the global South. The para-state nexus is unique to US foreign policy in the specific ways it contributes to processes of the formation of the contemporary

[120] See for example Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World*, 147-161.
[121] See Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies.* Also see the following for British use of mercenaries in the African continent during the 1970s. Burchett, Wilfred. and Roebuck, D., *The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today.*
[122] See for instance, Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*, 131.; Alejandro Colas and Brian Mabee, eds., *Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires* (London: Hurst and Company, 2010).
[123] Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*, 6.

liberalized global order. It is a central aspect of US hegemonic relations and forms a conduit through which US-led globalization is underpinned.

Methodology

As briefly outlined above, this dissertation will present a detailed historical narrative of the evolution of the use of non-state military actors in US foreign policy in the post-war era. To do this, it borrows from a simple "detailed narrative" form of process tracing.[124] As George and Bennet outline, this basic type of process tracing entails detailing certain processes in the form of a story or chronicle instead of an analytical test of theories and/or generalizable causal explanation.[125] In other words, rather than use this method to identify links in a causal chain or to develop causal inferences, both of which are usually central to process tracing methodologies,[126] this form of process tracing will be employed to sketch the historical currents in US foreign policy that helped entrench the para-state nexus as an instrument of US statecraft. This narrative is descriptive and therefore if taken by itself is merely indicative of the developmental processes that led to the centrality of such non-state military phenomena.

In order to better elucidate the factors that helped propel a para-state nexus to the forefront of coercive US hegemonic strategies towards the global South, this dissertation will also borrow from the method of a structured, focused comparison.[127] This approach, as Alexander George explains, is "structured" in that it asks systematic questions that reflect research objectives and is "focused" in the sense that it deals with specific aspects of the cases examined.[128] This approach will be embedded in the historical narrative mentioned above to tease out in a more systematic manner the complex interaction of the variables that help to explain the evolution of a para-state nexus using examples of such phenomena from different time periods. So while the historical chronology presents a meta-analysis of developments in a para-state nexus more broadly, this comparative element nestled within it helps to draw out underlying explanations for these changing dynamics. In that sense, rather than "cases" *per se,* each chapter will focus on examples of the broader dynamics that give rise to para-statal relations in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare throughout different historical periods. In this sense, the "comparative" element of this design entails an implicit comparative perspective between the same type of phenomena over time in order to draw out differences and similarities in explaining certain dynamics in the para-state nexus. However, like the historical narrative in which it is situated, this is not geared specifically towards locating generalizable causal patterns, but rather instead presents idiographic examples of the types of patterns occurring.

The three primary research objectives (describing the para-state nexus, documenting its evolution, and explaining this evolution) necessarily entail examination of cases in which the phenomena of study occur. This thesis therefore examines different examples of the para-state nexus in significant US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations over

[124] Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, *Case Studies and Theory Development* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 210.
[125] Ibid., 210
[126] Pascal Vennesson, "Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices," in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences*, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation," in *Case Studies and Theory Development* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 205-232.
[127] Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 43-69.; George and Bennet, *Case Studies and Theory Development*
[128] Ibid., 67

three separate time periods (the Cold War, post-Cold War and "war on terror"). It will do this by analyzing multiple cases of US counterinsurgeny and unconventional warfare operations throughout this historical time-frame, with a more detailed and focused examination of one major intervention in each time period. With respect to the latter, I have chosen the most significant US countersinurgency and unconventional operations and/or support during each time period in terms of the level of US involvement and the size of the counterinsurgent or unconventional warfare operation. Furthermore, as the evolution of this para-state nexus follows a linear developmental pattern as described above, these cases have been carefully selected on the basis of their importance for this developmental process. For instance, Vietnam represented the first major case during the Cold War in which PMCs and paramilitary agents were mobilized in tandem with paramilitary assets as a central feature of US counterinsurgency strategies. As analyzed in chapter three, these experiences in Vietnam led to the creation of formalised institutional mechanisms designed to implement such practices, which was distinct from the covert nature of previous engagements. During the post-Cold War period, Colombia represented the primary location for continued US counterinsurgent activity in the form of training and assistance through para-institutional actors. With very limited counterinsurgent and unconventional warfare activities elsewhere during this time period, US intervention in Colombia provides the best opportunity to analyze the continued development of a para-state nexus in its institutionalization phase.[129] This is the primary focus in chapter four. Finally, US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan during the "war on terror" provide scope for analysis of the consolidation of these practices. These two simultaneous interventions underscore the extent to which the para-state nexus has now become a central feature of US counterinsurgent and unconventional warfare strategies, and the structural and local dynamics that have conditioned this consolidation. While these cases are not the only instances in which this para-state nexus has emerged, they represent major turning points in the evolution of this para-state nexus and therefore help to excavate and understand its evolution.[130] The research objective in adopting this structured, focused comparison is not to draw out causal inferences, but instead to draw out explanations as to the continuity and rise of a para-state nexus by drawing from the most likely cases in which we might be able to observe its development.

In analyzing this para-state nexus, this thesis also aims to contribute to the understanding of the way coercion has been used to bolster US hegemony. As such, this thesis seeks to build on existing theoretical understandings of the means through which the US extends its hegemonic reach by elucidating the historical evolution of the use of non-state military phenomena. This will serve as a "Building Block study",[131] in this regard, in which I will examine the phenomena in question within the specific subsets of US military operations (counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare) which will in turn be used to develop or contribute to existing theories of US foreign policy. These theoretical perspectives will be the subject of the next chapter.

The questions I seek to ask in order to carry out a "structured" analysis in each case are as follows: 1. What were the specific roles of these actors? How were they used and for what purposes? 2. What types of idiosyncratic behaviors did these agents display? 3. What were the context specific factors or dynamics that might contribute to the use of these actors?

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[129] For a list of such interventions see William Blum, *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower*, Second ed. (London: Zed Books, 2003)

[130] Other cases in which the US has leveraged para-institutional actors as a major component of its military interventions, such as in Yugoslavia or Croatia (see Avant 2005 for instance), have not been included because they were not clearly delineated as a counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare.

[131] Ibid., 76, 78

4. What were the policy motivations of employing such forces rather than operating through regular armed forces? For example, in the case of PMC foreign force training, were there any specific policy reasons in each case that led to the delegation of responsibility? 5. In what ways were these forces functional to US military in each context (i.e. limiting casualties, plausible denial, limiting costs of war)? 6. What do the answers to the above questions tell us about the phenomena of outsourcing of certain aspects of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare programs?

This research will rely on extensive readings of the relevant literature on US foreign policy. It will use secondary sources and existing analyses to collate empirical evidence to substantiate my analysis, as indicated in the literature review. To further corroborate these sources it will also make substantial use of primary documentation, including US foreign policy directives, US military doctrine, US government reports and communications, and other policy documents from various governmental bodies, NGOs, and media outlets. The use of such primary materials constitutes an important element of this research in revealing official policy decisions in particular settings towards the delegation of force to para-institutional actors. It partly forms the basis of this research into the marginalized histories of para-institutional actors in US foreing policy and provides a contribution to the field by drawing on US military documents and doctrines as a fundamental part of the analysis of the evolution of this para-state nexus.

Chapter 2

Contextualizing the Para-State Nexus: US Hegemony and the Role of Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare

Introduction

This chapter provides a theoretical context for the analysis of the para-state nexus. It does this by examining the objectives of US foreign policy, particularly towards the global South, in relation to US grand strategy and its hegemonic role in the international system. Crucially, it explains the role of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in US foreign policy as part of a wider stratagem to preserve a semblance of a global order and within it, US hegemony. By extension, this presents an underlying explanation for the continuity and development of a para-state nexus. I contend that an adequate explanation of the para-state nexus, and therefore US connection to PMCs and paramilitary forces, is impossible outside of an understanding of the objectives behind counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. The evolution of a nexus between the US and para-institutional phenomena is, in simple terms, inextricably intertwined with the imperative in US foreign policy to forge and maintain "stability" abroad towards sustaining a liberalized global order. This chapter therefore seeks to build a framework for understanding US strategy in which this para-state nexus is embedded, but also as part of the explanation for it.

Before proceeding a caveat is needed. It is difficult to capture the multiplicity of forces at play in determining the course of US foreign policy. Not only are there different drivers of US policy, such as power politics and counterbalancing potential rivals (Realist interpretations), ideological roots (Liberal conceptions), and material imperatives (Marxist informed analyses), but scholars of US policy within each camp have created an almost endless array of nuanced accounts of these independent but potentially intersecting dynamics. In that sense, I do not wish to be mired in debates on the distinctive details of the origins of US foreign policy and its applications. My aim here is to provide an indicative account of how counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare and therefore the para-state nexus are situated within US hegemony. It is not a definitive analysis, nor has it surveyed the entirety of the vast and rich extant literature on the subject. However, I have been careful to carve out this depiction of US hegemony in relation to concrete concepts drawing from some of the leading scholars in the field in order to present a theoretical foundation for the subsequent analysis on the para-state nexus.

US Hegemony and the Open Door Strategy for a Global Liberalized Order

Debates on the nature of US foreign policy power have recently been propelled to the forefront of academic discussions partly due to the tumultuous interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) in the "war on terror". With this, the terms "empire" and "hegemony" have re-entered mainstream lexicon in describing US grand strategy, the relative uni-polar power position of the US in the international system, and its relationship to the promotion of liberalized forms of economic and political governance abroad.[132] This chapter borrows from

[132] See for example John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005).; John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (September, 2002): 44-60.; Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*; Also see the various entries in Brian Loveman, ed., *Strategy for Empire* (Lanham: SR Books, 2004).; Carl Boggs, "Introduction: Empire and Globalization," in *Masters of War: Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire*, ed. Carl Boggs (New York: Routledge, 2003).

numerous scholars, but principally Christopher Layne's Open Door strategy and Doug Stokes' "dual logic" thesis, to argue that the US has pursued a hegemonic agenda throughout the post-war era, and that this Open Door grand strategic ambition has undergirded much of US foreign policy towards the global South.[133] This thesis therefore draws conceptually from the existing literature on US hegemony which posits that US policies have been underpinned by the prerogative to expand and preserve a global liberalized order with the United States at its apex.[134] It argues that the US plays a managerial role in the international system in underwriting and supporting the "stability" of capitalist economic and liberalized arrangements in foreign countries for its own political and economic benefit as well as that of the wider global capitalist system. Counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare have constituted the primary coercive modes of statecraft within the global South in this quest. Hegemony is therefore conceived (in contrast to Gramscian variants[135]) as the relative preponderance of the US militarily and economically vis-à-vis its rivals but more importantly in relation to its ability and willingness to secure an international order beneficial primarily to its own interests and those of other core capitalist countries.[136] In agreement with Agnew, (and borrowing from Gramscian variants) the term "hegemony" better encapsulates the contours of the various relationships between the US, other states in the international system, and international governmental organizations, than does the term "empire" primarily due to the absence of centralized command and territorial acquisition.[137] American hegemony is not just the exercise of coercion, although it comprises certain levels of military power, but is primarily enabled through the socialization of other states into the order the hegemon leads and their acceptance of the norms implicit in this global framework.

As numerous scholars have demonstrated, the US is the most powerful player in the international system, and throughout the post-war era Washington has consistently worked to preserve its hegemonic dominance against potential candidates that might challenge its uni-polar position. For instance, Christopher Layne states that "Following World War II, the United States possessed overwhelming material capabilities relative to all other states in the international system (including the Soviet Union)."[138] This preponderance of power only increased at the end of the Cold War whereupon "US policy makers repeatedly have stated their global hegemonic ambitions."[139] As an example of this, many analysts point to the Pentagon's *Defense Planning Guidance* reports in the early 1990s which detail the objective to preserve US dominance in the international system by preventing the emergence of a great

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[133] See Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* and Doug Stokes, "The Heart of Empire?: Theorising US Empire in an Era of Transnational Capitalism," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (2005): 217-236.

[134] I will primarily be using Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* Bacevich, *American Empire*; Simon Bromley, "The Logic of American Power in the International Capitalist Order," in *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' After the Cold War*, eds. Alejandro Colas and Richard Saull (London: Routledge, 2006), 44-64.; Stokes, *The Heart of Empire?: Theorising US Empire in an Era of Transnational Capitalism*, 217-236.

[135] For a concise overview of these differences see Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, "A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order, and Historical Change," *Capital & Class* 28, no. 1 (2004): 85-113. See also Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Methods," in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations*, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 49-66.; Robert Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[136] For further discussion on Hegemony see Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 4. For a critique of different understandings of hegemony: Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 31-49.

[137] Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*, 1-6, 13-20.

[138] Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 8, and 41-45.

[139] Ibid., 25

power contender.[140] Similarly, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a well-known influential document with signatories such as Paul Wolfowitz, claimed that in the post-Cold War, the US enjoyed a privileged position as the preeminent superpower, with few if any close rivals and that "America's grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible."[141] Indeed, US military aspirations, according to one US official document compiled by the 1997 United States Space Command, *Vision for 2020*, included attaining "full spectrum dominance" and "superiority" in space, "land, sea and air" to contain and deter potential rivals.[142] Hence, one dimension of US military dominance has been to assure its preponderance in the international system by preventing the rise of a potential rival to its hegemonic position.

Consistent with such official stated objectives, the US remains the preeminent military power with military expenditures more than that of all other major powers combined.[143] US military presence is also global with "around a half million troops stationed at over 395 major bases and hundreds of minor installations in thirty-five foreign countries; more than 8,000 strategic nuclear weapons and 22,000 tactical ones; a naval strike force greater in total tonnage and firepower than all the other navies of the world combined, consisting of missile cruisers, nuclear submarines, nuclear aircraft carriers, and destroyers that sail every ocean and make port at every continent."[144] This military presence, as Michael Ignatieff and others have pointed out, has an important role in the architecture that binds the contemporary global order.[145] Not only does this afford an ability to project military power across the world to deter perceived threats, but the role military presence plays in upholding the norms of international conduct is part of US grand strategy that has consistently functioned towards preserving this position against potential rivals. Layne labels these facets of US power "extraregional hegemony" in which the US has a hegemonic role as a "peacetime regional stabilizer".[146] Maintaining this uni-polarity, however, is not only pursued through military dominance internationally alone.

Beyond this predominant uni-polar power position in the international system, US hegemony has been predicated on its relationship to the spread and defense of capitalism and supporting its ancillary forms of political and economic state organization abroad. It is this facet of US power that is most important to the development and evolution of a para-state nexus. US coercion and military assistance have been used to insulate allied states from internal forces jockeying for political and economic change inimical to US interests. Since the end of WWII with US ascendance as a world power, planners in Washington have played an integral role in "opening up" the economies of states in the global South (as well as across the world) and integrating them into a liberalized political and economic system. Although there are differences in the understanding of the origins and ways in which this aspect of US power operates, specifically between Realist and Marxist informed analyses, there has

[140] Ibid., 25 Also see Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 24.
[141] Project for a New American Century, *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: 2000).
[142] United States Space Command, *Vision for 2020*US Space Command, 1997), http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf (accessed 11 June 2012).
[143] Michael Parenti, "The Logic of US Intervention," in *Masters of War*, ed. Carl Boggs (London: Routledge, 2003), 19. Also see Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*, 29.
[144] Parenti, *The Logic of US Intervention*, 19.
[145] See Ignatieff, *The Challenges of American Imperial Power*, 44. This is an important element of neorealist theories and hegemonic order theories see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 26-30. Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, "What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate," *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 2 (May, 2007): 254.
[146] Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 27-29.

emerged a consensus in much of the literature that the US plays a managerial or coordinating role in the global capitalist system by stabilizing pro-US and capitalist state formations abroad. It is primarily this role, moreover, through which US hegemony is asserted. Stokes and Raphael, for instance, have forcefully argued that US Open Door grand strategy "has evolved steadily throughout the post-war era, and it is an unwavering commitment to the policing and reproduction of this particular form of global-capitalist political economy that has allowed the US to consolidate its position within the system."[147] Similarly, scholars such as Panitch and Gindin have demonstrated how the US has asserted its power in the post-war era in "managing the international capitalist order" whereupon the US ensured and promoted "free trade and free enterprise internationally" as well as domestically through various mechanisms.[148] Bromley agrees that this is the primary logic driving much of US foreign policy.[149] Michael Cox also argued that the "underlying aim" in US grand strategy has been to "create an environment in which democratic capitalism can flourish in a world in which the US still remains the dominant actor."[150] Throughout the post-war era, the US has been the lead force for the stabilization of forms of political and economic organization favorable to US interests as well as those of the liberalized core.

This is an enduring feature of US grand strategy recognized by Realist scholars of US foreign policy. Christopher Layne, for example, argues that the US Open Door grand strategy works as a "geopolitical stabilizer" in which "US hard power forms the bedrock of an open economic system."[151] An important aspect of this strategy is thus the promotion and support of economic openness and liberalized markets, sometimes through force if necessary. "To preserve this needed geopolitical stability," he asserts, "the United States has taken on the role of hegemonic stabilizer in regions it has important economic interests... to remove or block the coming to power of regimes whose policies are or would be inimical to openness, and to prop up friendly regimes."[152] Bacevitch agrees that US hegemony is constituted by "a commitment to global openness—removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms."[153] This involves, according to Bacevitch, a number of means (economic, political and military power) by which it pursues this overarching agenda. Such a conception of the role of the United States in the international system was also made explicit in Thomas Friedman's famous statement that "the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist... And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps"[154] Thus, the US works towards mutually supportive and reinforcing political and economic goals abroad which have entailed the stabilization of state formations abroad conducive to US political and capital interests as well as maintaining the fluid functioning of the global liberalized order as a whole for the benefit of other core states.

Indeed, this has been, and remains, an important component in Washington's official declared strategic design for the preeminent role of the US in the global political economy.

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[147] Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 18.
[148] Panitch and Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire*, 42.
[149] Bromley, *The Logic of American Power in the International Capitalist Order*, 44-64.
[150] Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission?* (London: RUSI, 1995), 5.
[151] Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 36. also see Robert Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
[152] Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 34.
[153] Bacevich, *American Empire*, 3.
[154] Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 466.

For instance, NSC-68 (National Security Council), issued in 1950, considered one of the most important policy announcements informing much of US policy during the Cold War, saw that one of the guiding objectives of US foreign policy was its design for and position in the global political and economic system. It stated, "we must make ourselves strong.... In the development of our military and economic strength," in order to "foster a world environment *in which the American system can survive and flourish*... we would probably pursue [this policy] even if there were no Soviet threat."[155] This perspective was also a guiding rationale of one of the first approved strategic blueprints towards dealing with revolutionary movements in the global South. President Kennedy's *The United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy* (OIDP) commissioned in 1962 stated that the US has a "political and ideological interest in assuring that developing nations evolve in a way that affords a congenial world environment for international cooperation and the growth of free institutions." This was partly because, it stated, Washington had an "economic interest in assuring that the resources and markets of the less developed world remain available to us and to other Free World countries."[156] This has continued as one of Washington's official declaratory policy aims beyond the Cold War up until the present "war on terror". The 1997 *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, for example, stated that at the core of the US "national security strategy" was a commitment to "promoting a world of open societies and open markets that is supportive of U.S. interests and consistent with American values." Moreover, this strategy depends, the report continued, on whether or not the United States is "able to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence. It is that engagement and influence that helps ensure the world remains stable so that the international economic system can flourish."[157] US security strategy under Obama has not been altered significantly in this respect, and his 2010 *National Security Strategy* details how the ultimate objective in US security strategy is to "underpin and sustain an international economic system that is critical to both our prosperity and to the peace and security of the world," by building international cooperation towards these goals.[158]

This explicit function of US power is important with respect to the way it has worked towards creating and maintaining conditions abroad conducive to US political and economic interests as well as the global liberalized economic system as a whole. However, three contentious aspects in this conceptualization must be briefly clarified before moving on to articulate how counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare represent the core coercive modes of statecraft towards these objectives. First, although many Realist and Historical Materialist examinations of US strategy agree on this restructuring capacity of the US, they differ in their accounts as to the motivations that underpin this strategy. This has implications for further distinguishing these interpretations and the effects of US foreign policy. Realist interpretations such as Christopher Layne's, for instance, tend to argue that this position emerged through an intersection of power politics, material interests, and dedication to liberal (Wilsonian) principles. Layne provides an inclusive account of the origins of this Open Door imperative by arguing that this grand strategy not only has an element of preserving US relative dominance in a hierarchy of states, a material basis (access to raw materials, free trade and safe areas for foreign direct investment), but is also ideologically motivated in

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[155] NSC 68 as quoted in Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 21.

[156] U.S Office of the President, *United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy* (Washington D.C.: National Security Action Memorandum 182, 1962), 8.

[157] United States Office of the President, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1997), http://www.fas.org/man/docs/strategy97.htm (accessed 10 June 2012).

[158] United States Office of the President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2010), 29, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. (accessed 11 June 2012)

relation to perceived threats to American "core values".[159] In other words, not only is there a power political foundation and a material basis on which these interests and the Open Door policy are formed, but these also sprout from Wilsonian idealism. Andrew Bacevitch has a similar description in which "In the eyes of American policymakers, an open world that adheres to the principles of free enterprise is a precondition for continued American prosperity. An open world that is friendly to liberal values seemingly assures American security."[160] Thus this managerial role of the US is part and parcel of its privileged position in the hierarchy of states but also revolves around mutually reinforcing political and economic goals with certain "core values" constituting a driving force underpinning the formation of such grand strategies. Although essentially Realist, interpretations such as Layne's and Bacevitch's contain within them an ideational (liberal) understanding of the Open Door grand strategy as being rooted in Wilsonian idealism.

On the other hand, Historical Materialist or Marxist analyses such as those provided by Panitch and Gindin, Harvey, and William I. Robinson, amongst many others, argue that the US holds a distinctive structural position in relation to the inevitable and inexorable expansion of capitalism.[161] The sources of US foreign policy are primarily located within its position to capitalist structures, and the specific ways in which capitalist development has occurred in the last 60 years. For this reason, scholars such as Ellen Wood and Ruth Blakeley understand the roots of contemporary capitalist globalization with respect to the coercive domination and interventions by the North in the South as one with extensive historical roots that pre-date the ascendance of US power, as exemplified by European colonization of countries in the South.[162] Blakeley argues that the US has gradually assumed the managerial mantle (in its own unique forms distinguished from direct colonial administration and territorial conquest) from its European colonial predecessors over a long stretch of time through a series of complex dynamics and historical moments.[163] For example, she asserts that this is epitomized by US policy towards Latin America in the 1800s with the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in which "the US declared itself the protector of the independent nations of the Americas, with the role of protecting the Western hemisphere from European states, seen as potential sources of threat which might undermine that position of the US in the hemisphere."[164] This logic was later applied globally after World War II whereupon US supremacy was to be pursued through and within an Open Door system.[165] Panitch and Gindin agree that "The central place the United States now occupies within global capitalism rests on a particular convergence of structure and history," but more

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[159] Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 8-9.

[160] Bacevich, *American Empire*, 3.

[161] See Doug Stokes, "Marxism and US Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in US Foreign Policy*, eds. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda Miller and Mark Ledwidge (London: Routledge, 2009), 62-76.; David Harvey, *New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).; Fred Halliday, "The Pertinence of Imperialism," in *Historical Materialism and Globalization*, eds. Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 75-89.; James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century* (London: Zed Books, 2001).; Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, eds., *Socialist Register 2005: The Empire Reloaded* (London: Monthly review Press; Fernwood Publishing, 2004).; Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, 466.; William I. Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational World* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004).

[162] For a more complete analysis of the expansion of capitalist imperialism see Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Empire of Capital* (London: Verso, 2003). For further analysis on the use of coercive mechanisms by the North in the South in this context, see Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*, 54-60.

[163] Ibid., 61-65

[164] Ibid., 65

[165] Ibid., 63 see also Laurence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Authors Choice Press, 2004 [1977]).

specifically this "was not a matter of teleology but of capitalist history."[166] In short, Marxist-informed analyses usually place the coordinating and disciplinary power of the US and its military in relation to the structural imperatives of the expansion of capitalism.

Although I would argue that it would be a mistake to completely disregard ideational motivations behind US foreign policy, it is my contention throughout this thesis that it is primarily material interests that constitute and condition the Open Door strategy. In this sense, while I do not present a strictly Historical Materialist analysis in that I do not elaborate significantly on capitalist structures as driving forces of US hegemony nor do I extensively analyze elite control of the state or transnational elite and class relations, this thesis aligns itself more closely with the view that material interests often take priority in determining the course of US policies. One example of the precedence that such interests have taken is US support for allied authoritarian regimes, especially throughout much of the 1980s, in pursuit of economic objectives.[167] The US has a long track record of favoring authoritarian state forms rather than jeopardize significant economic, geopolitical, and/or political interests for the sake of endorsing liberal democratic values. It is worth pointing out, however, that in an ideal world, US leaders, officials and strategists would prefer liberal democratic state forms abroad that uphold a high standard of human rights.[168] But this is not always attainable, and it is correct to assert that the US has to work with existing regimes. Yet the subordination of certain fundamental principles, such as in some cases democracy and human rights, to material pursuits and the political and economic structures advocated as part of US hegemony forms a central thread in this thesis and further evidence for it will be provided throughout. Thus there is often a tension between US idealistic principles and material interests within the Open Door grand strategy. Having said this, however, it is the contours of US foreign policy towards the South in a broader sense rather than the motivations that underpin it that are most relevant for the central task of explaining the para-state nexus. What is important here is this managerial role rather than its underlying drivers. Irrespectively, throughout this thesis reference will be made to the material basis that has underscored US interventions and counterinsurgency military aid. Access to raw materials, establishing trade partnerships and blocks, and stabilizing states for beneficial investment climates, regardless of the complex sources of these objectives, continues to dominate as a central facet of US policy towards the South.[169]

In relation to this difference in motivations, Realist and Historical Materialist interpretations also tend to differ on the emphasis placed on the use of coercion in pursuing these objectives and the effects of US hegemony.[170] Realist theories, for example, typically understand the use of coercion as a necessary component of US hegemonic strategies. For Layne, US hegemonic power in the international system in response to national security

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[166] Panitch and Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire*, 24.

[167] See David Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).; Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, 466.; For further discussion on US support for authoritarian regimes see Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* (November, 1979).

[168] Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony,* 57-59 and 217; See also Steven Hook, "Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad," in *Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric versus Reality* (ed.) Peter Schraeder (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2002). Pp. 109-131

[169] See Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*; Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*; Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).; David S. Painter, "Explaining US Relations with the Third World," *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 3 (Summer, 1995): 525-549..

[170] For a more complete discussion of these differences see James Meernik, *The Political use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

threats is a structural (i.e. neorealist) explanation for US Open Door hegemonic agenda.[171] US military preponderance and therefore coercive power are the (largely unproblematic) results of international power politics and US position within the hierarchy of states. Coercion is ultimately a rational and defensive action to deter threats. In relation to that view, there is a theme throughout much of the Realist and Liberal conceptualizations of the *desirability* of US hegemony in preserving peace internationally and preventing conflict by helping to maintain stability in many unstable areas in the global South. US hegemony and its ancillary global military supremacy is often understood as benign, and in many respects a positive influence in upholding peace in a structured hierarchical order amongst states. Thus not only is coercion often understood as the result of positioning within an international system, but it is also often viewed as constitutive of benign global structures.

On the other hand, Historical Materialist interpretations are usually predicated on a critique of the use of coercion in the entrenchment of unjust disparities in wealth and power on a global scale.[172] Thus there is critical element implicit (and very often explicit) in many Historical Materialist analyses of US hegemony and its effects, and the two approaches differ quite significantly in the ways state coercion is understood. It is within this Historical Materialist context that the concept of state terror is employed in this dissertation alongside analysis of the processes that help foment para-statal relations. As Blakely argues, the promulgation of state terror and its facilitation by countries in the North is inextricably bound to maintaining elite privilege and control within countries in the South as well as stabilizing liberalized capitalist economic arrangements conducive and beneficial to the interests of those in the North.[173] It is the explicit use of coercion in order to terrorize populations into submission and forge consent for incumbent governments that qualifies certain acts and series of actions as state terror. But it is in the context of preserving a powerful position for the elite and maintaining capitalist socio-economic relations in the global South and a liberalized global order in which this often occurs. In this sense this thesis follows in the footsteps of a broader literature that is critical of the way coercion has been used at the expense of many people in the global South within processes of conserving specific forms of stability.

Secondly, although the US holds a predominant position in the international system, US power is not totalizing or omnipresent, and other core states contribute to the reinforcement of the global capitalist order. No state can have absolute uni-polarity. Therefore, the degree to which the US is able to exercise power and influence over and within this order in relation to other core states is important. As Bromley notes, "the logic of capitalist accumulation, innovation and competition increasingly depends on *many* states, such that each state – including increasingly even the United States – is compelled to take responsibility for managing its domestic order in ways that sustain the international conditions of capitalist development."[174] A similar logic is captured in Barkawi's work in which he argues that states bare significant responsibility for neo-liberal forms of globalization, indicating that it is the work of states themselves that operate towards their dissolution in their integration into global capitalist circuitry, but with the US currently occupying a central position in influencing those states, military alliances (such as NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and international organizations (such as the IMF, the

[171] Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 8.
[172] See for instance Stokes, *Marxism and US Foreign Policy*, 62-76.; Halliday, *The Pertinence of Imperialism*, 75-89.; Wood, *Empire of Capital*; Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, 466.
[173] Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* also see Jackson, *Contemporary State Terrorism: Towards a New Research Agenda*, 228-238.
[174] Bromley, *The Logic of American Power in the International Capitalist Order*, 48.

International Monetary Fund) to push for these reforms.[175] In other words, there is a "many states" problem to this context of US hegemony in which other core states may have influence and/or power in this liberalized order as well as benefit from it. For this reason, Blakeley has adopted a "multiple agents approach" in understanding state agency in relation to the perpetuation of the globalization of capital, alongside the extent to which these states all benefit from it. This approach, she argues, "provides a theoretical framework for exploring the role of the US state which does not preclude the other actors as agents in the process of reproducing the global capitalist system."[176] Thus states such as Great Britain and Japan may have in different circumstances influence in driving this liberalized economic order. Moreover, as indicated in the introduction of this thesis, other states may also employ proxy forms of coercive intervention that rely on mercenaries and paramilitaries in a fashion similar to the para-state nexus towards similar objectives, such as the British covert wars in Yemen from 1962-1967[177] or Britain's junior partner role in the 2003-2011 counterinsurgent engagement in Iraq (Basra).[178]

However, while multiple state agency is important to acknowledge in conceptualizing the potency and balance of US hegemonic power in the global economic system, the way other states influence these processes resides largely outside of the purview of this thesis. Instead, this thesis focuses only on US coercive practices in relation to the para-state nexus and its role in stabilizing favorable state formations in the global South, and thereby largely assumes US leadership in these processes. For example, in chapter five, in an analysis of the para-state nexus in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, although Britain and other countries as well as a multinational NATO force are integral (albeit junior partners) in the US-led counterinsurgency efforts, I focus only on US military operations and the relations between the US state and various para-institutional formations towards the pacification of the insurgency and other forms of opposition and the stabilization of Iraq. While this ignores the role and impact other state actors (or inter-state actors such as NATO) may have on the developmental course of these processes, it allows for more focused attention on US para-statal relations. Moreover, the US, as we shall see throughout this thesis, has been the primary guarantor of a global order through coercive mechanisms and highly militarized policy stance towards "unstable" areas of the global South.

A similar and related issue, thirdly, revolves around the extent to which the US and US capital (i.e. US-based MNCs and domestic producers and investors) benefit from this managerial role. While some scholars describe US grand strategy as an inter-imperialistic rivalry whereupon the US works to maintain a system beneficial to itself against potential rivals,[179] others emphasize the extent to which US power plays a particular role in the transnational capitalist system for the benefit of other core capitalist powers (ultra-imperialism).[180] The work of William I. Robinson is instructive in this regard. He argues that rather than an inter-imperialistic logic driving US foreign policy in which the US asserts its influence in creating conditions favorable to its interests against those of other core capitalist states (zero-sum) he develops a de-territorialized conceptualization of a transnational state in which a transnational class has worked towards the maintenance of a global liberalized

[175] Tarak Barkawi, *Globalization and War* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006).
[176] Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*, 73.
[177] Geraghty, *Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare*, 79-89. and Clive Jones, "Britain Covert Action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1967," in *Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner*, eds. Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 253-257.
[178] See Herring and Rangwala, *Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy*
[179] See for example Ikenberry, *America's Imperial Ambition*, 44-60.
[180] See Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational World* also see Stokes, *Marxism and US Foreign Policy*, 62-76.

economic system for their collective benefit.[181] While as some critics have posited, Robinson may under-estimate the power and role of the US in these processes, it underscores the way in which the global capitalist system and its maintenance collectively benefits other core capitalist powers and agents (positive-sum).[182] In this regard, this thesis draws from Stokes' "dual logic" thesis, in conceptualizing a balance between the inter-imperialist rivalry as a part of the driving force of US power in benefiting US interests and hegemony, and a transnational component whereupon the US also works in favor of other capitalist powers. Thus, Stokes writes that the United States "has long occupied a dual role that has been subject to both a 'national' logic seeking to maximize US national interests and a 'transnational' logic whereby it has played a coordinating role that has sought to reproduce a global political economy conducive to other core capitalist states."[183] The US state may have to reconcile these sometimes conflicting logics as the US attempts to expand and maintain the global order whilst simultaneously perpetuating its own dominance within it.[184] Other scholars have made similar observations about the way in which US power is geared towards the maintenance of a semblance of order for the benefit of (primarily) its own interests and those of other capitalist states or rather the system as a whole.[185] The point here is that this represents a specific view of the way in which and how US foreign policy is not only predicated on exclusively pursuing and preserving its own capital (and imperialistic) interests at the expense of other core capitalist powers. Rather, this coordinating facet of US Open Door hegemony has the effect of preserving US dominance within the system in which the US is the primary beneficiary, but simultaneously maintaining a transnationalized system that is beneficial to state and capital interests elsewhere.

Continuity in US Hegemony

Crucially, what this examination of US Open Door strategy does present is a succinct explanation for broader continuities in US foreign policy, particularly in its application towards the global South. This is important as it provides a context in which the para-state nexus has evolved since the beginning of the post-war era and continued to develop beyond the Cold War framework well into the "war on terror". According to Bacevitch, there emerged a "conventional wisdom" during the 1990s and early 2000s among many analysts and scholars that the US lacked a grand strategy in the immediate post-Cold War environment.[186] Doug Stokes also points to a dominant discontinuity thesis that has pervaded scholarship on US foreign policy which posited that the end of the Cold War had dispelled the previous era's East-West tensions and ushered in a radically different agenda.[187] Similarly, Stokes has noted a widespread understanding of US policy post-9/11 constituting a "new" imperial strategy.[188] Thus examinations of US policy tend to emphasize ruptures in US foreign policy at the end of the Cold War and the "newness" of US strategies in the "war on terror". This, as mentioned in the literature review, is also an implicit understanding of US

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[181] Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational World*, 10.
[182] Stokes, *The Heart of Empire?: Theorising US Empire in an Era of Transnational Capitalism*, 217-236. and Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*, 72.
[183] Stokes, *The Heart of Empire?: Theorising US Empire in an Era of Transnational Capitalism*, 230.
[184] Also see Bromley, *The Logic of American Power in the International Capitalist Order*, 46.
[185] Ibid., 47 Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a Transnational World*, 140.
[186] Bacevich, *American Empire*, 2. For an example, see Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002*, Ninth ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002).
[187] Doug Stokes, "Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia," *Review of International Studies* 29 (2003): 569-585.
[188] Stokes, *The Heart of Empire?: Theorising US Empire in an Era of Transnational Capitalism*, 217-236.

foreign policy that informs much of the existing literature on the rise of PMCs, and, to a lesser extent, the US use of paramilitaries.

In contrast to these conventional depictions of US foreign policy undergoing transformations between distinct historical moments, this dissertation aligns itself with the understanding of US Open Door grand strategy as a durable feature of US hegemony.[189] In rejecting an inherent periodization of US foreign policy, this analysis of the US Open Door provides an account for the underlying continuity in US strategies towards the global South. The Open Door grand strategy has remained intact since the immediate post-war era and has largely dictated the course of US policy towards the South in which challenging opposition to US-led reforms and hegemony retained precedence.[190] This continual prioritization of "stability" in US policy posture towards the global South will therefore be threaded through the subsequent analysis on the para-state nexus.

This continuity thesis is predicated on a revisionist understanding of the Cold War, which in contrast to orthodox interpretations, posits that US policy towards the South was not exclusively shaped by containing an inherently antagonistic Soviet threat and presence.[191] Instead, the East-West tensions of the Cold War were largely subsidiary to the dynamics of North-South relations in which US policy was shaped predominantly by the expansion and maintenance of a global capitalist system in which the US enjoys a privileged position. Furthermore, the revisionist position therefore largely rejects an understanding of a defensive US reaction to an inherently expansionist USSR, and conceives of US policy as following an unwavering commitment to a grand strategic design for a global political economy as located within the Open Door. As Layne explains, "Washington's ambitions were not driven by the Cold War but transcended it. The Cold War was superimposed on an existing hegemonic grand strategy that the United States would have pursued – or attempted to pursue – even if there had been no rivalry with the Soviet Union."[192] Similarly, Bacevitch agrees that "To conceive of U.S. grand strategy from the late 1940s through the 1980s as "containment"—with no purpose apart from resisting the spread of Soviet power—is not wrong, but it is incomplete."[193] This limited orthodox conception, he continues, "actively impedes our understanding of current US policy."[194] Hence this aspect, the continuities in the Open Door position, follows in the footsteps of Noam Chomsky's revisionist historiography which, in the words of Stokes, "traces the basis of these post-Cold War continuities to the interests and institutions that have remained in place to preserve a world order conducive for US capital

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[189] Stokes, *Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia*, 569-585. Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980*, x-xiii.; Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*, 61-67.; Noam Chomsky, *Year 501: The Conquest Continues* (London: Verso Press, 1993). See also Cox, *Approaches to World Order* and David N. Gibbs, "Pretexts and US Foreign Policy: The War on Terrorism in Historical Perspective," in *The Politics of Empire: War Terror and Hegemony*, ed. Joseph Peschek (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 47. For an overview and critique of the revisionist position see Richard Saull, *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power, and Social Revolution* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 111-119.

[190] Stokes, *Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia*, 569-585. and Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*

[191] For a more detailed discussion on the differences and nuances in the Revisionist position and Orthodox see Richard Saull, *The Cold War and After: Captialism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 53-54. see also Saull, *Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power, and Social Revolution*

[192] Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, 3.

[193] Bacevich, *American Empire*, 4.

[194] Ibid., 4

and that largely dictate the direction and forms that US foreign policy takes."[195] This thesis adopts this perspective in which North-South relations are the predominant focus of analysis and is attentive to the international disparities in wealth and power between the dominant capitalist powers of the North and underdeveloped South.[196] The work of Gabriel Kolko is also instructive in this regard, viewing anti-capitalist revolutionary movements in the South as largely independent from Soviet machinations, and US policy reactions primarily concerned with access to raw materials, resources, and markets in the South for the benefit of the global economy.[197]

Beyond the end of the Cold War, the objectives that underpin US foreign policy have been relatively consistent and continue to be manifest in the conduct of the current "war on terror". With the attacks of 9/11 heralding in a US rearmament and further militarization of its foreign policy, the ultimate and underlying goals of military expansion and increased intervention were not solely the destruction of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Rather, the "war on terror" is consistent with previous priorities in line with the US post-war grand strategy. The threat of terrorism has been used as a pretext (of which there is a long historical precedence for[198]) to contain further threats to the stability of the functioning of the global order and to assert US primacy in the international system. Therefore, in contrast to analyses that posit the "war on terror" constitutes a new form of US imperialism, this thesis aligns itself with those that locate the "war on terror" as another moment of US interventionism designed to maintain its primacy and advance its hegemonic position in the international system.[199] This does not signify that terrorism and al-Al-Qaeda do not represent a threat to US national security and that of its allies or that part of the "war on terror" is not about counter-terrorist operations, but rather it is within a specific context that these elements threaten the stability of a globalized liberal order. It is not the nature of threat that is important, whether it be communism, nationalism, or Islamic radicalism, but rather the way in which such movements and/or agendas threaten "stability" and the desired parameters of the political and economic orientation of states in the South.

However, outlining these broader continuities does not mean that US foreign policy has been completely static despite obvious changes both in the international system (external) and within the US government (domestic) over the last 60 years or so. Rather, it is this specific role that the US has played as the primary geopolitical stabilizer upon which its hegemony is based that has been relatively consistent as well as, as we shall see further below, the coercive tools used to pursue these objectives. Indeed, even within this enduring commitment there have been considerably important developments in the ways in which these strategies have been pursued. For example, Peter Gowan writes about how US financial tools to assert its hegemonic role in the international economic system have slowly transformed and grown in response to certain financial developments.[200] Alternatively, Gilpin

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[195] Stokes, *Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia*, 570. see Chomsky, *Hegemony Or Survival*

[196] See for example Petras and Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century*

[197] Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980*; Gabriel Kolko, *The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

[198] Gibbs, *Pretexts and US Foreign Policy: The War on Terrorism in Historical Perspective*, 25-54.

[199] See Bromley, *The Logic of American Power in the International Capitalist Order*, 44-64.; Stokes, *The Heart of Empire?: Theorizing US Empire in an Era of Transnational Capitalism*, 217-236. Also see Jim Glassman, "The New Imperialism? on Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy," *Environment and Planning* 37, no. 9 (2005): 1527-1544.; Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance*; Susanne Soederberg, "The War on Terrorism and American Empire: Emerging Development Agendas," in *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' After the Cold War*, eds. Alejandro Colas and Richard Saull (London: Routledge, 2006), 155-179.; Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 25.

[200] See Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance*

has analyzed the ways US economic tactics to assert its dominance have slowly evolved over time, using various different economic forms of statecraft to preserve its influence and maintain stable trading regimes.[201] In both these rather limited examples, however, the tools of statecraft have been economic and/or financial in nature and represent different components of a larger set of US hegemonic strategies through which to exert influence and power. It is the broader aspects of US Open Door strategy and its continuity that have driven the coercive facets of US power towards much of the global South.

Refashioning and Stabilizing the Global South

Consistent with US Open Door grand strategy and with it the continuity of US hegemonic role as the enforcer of a global order, the promotion of liberalized political and economic state forms conducive to US interests has formed the bedrock of US policy towards the global South. Planners in Washington have taken on a lead role in transforming or stabilizing the liberalization of political economies in the South. As Panitch and Gindin phrase it, "The need to try to refashion all the states of the world so that they become at least minimally adequate for the administration of global order is now the central problem for the American state."[202] Thus as Gabriel Kolko argues, the United States' vision for the future of its relations with the global South "was far less the result of a conscious policy focused on the poorer and colonial regions than the by-product of its grand design for the entire global political and economic structure."[203] Consequently, in the post-war era the US adopted a hegemonic mantle as a "praetorian guard" or enforcer of liberalized state forms across much of the globe.[204] Within this the US has operated to restructure and liberalize nascent state forms in the South in efforts to support their integration into the US-led global order conducive to US security and business interests.

Therefore, as demonstrated by Stokes and Raphael, "stability" runs through Washington's official policy discourse towards the South, and in particular, but by no means limited to, those states rich in oil reserve deposits or significant material and geopolitical interests.[205] During the Cold War, this took the form of anti-communism embodied in the policy of containment in response to internal threats. For example, as Lars Shoultz documents, "instabilities" including generalized violence, revolutionary movements, and inimical structural reforms were of primary concern to US policy makers towards Latin America during the Cold War period (as well as after it).[206] For instance, Kennedy's *Overseas Internal Defense Policy*, an official US foreign policy document outlining US policy stance towards internal insurgencies in the global South, claimed that

> The susceptibility of developing societies to dissidence and violence which can be exploited by the communists requires the development of indigenous capabilities to cope with the threat to internal security in each of its forms. Reasonable stability is necessary for healthy economic growth, and the evolution of human liberties and representative government.[207]

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[201]Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 227-254.
[202]Panitch and Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire*, 39.
[203] Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980*, 11.
[204] See John Stockwell, *The Praetorian Guard: The US Role in the New World Order* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1991).
[205] Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 56-58.
[206] Lars Shoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America* (London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 34-67.
[207] U.S Office of the President, *United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy*, 3.

In the post-Cold War environment, "stability" has continued to constitute a principal concern for policy makers in Washington. The 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, for example, another official US military planning document, outlined the twin priorities for "ensuring peace and stability in regions where the United Sates has vital or important interests and to broadening the community of free market democracies."[208] Reference to this strategic ambition to maintain a specific form of "stability" in countries in the South will be threaded throughout this thesis in order to support these central claims about US policy towards the global South. To do this, this thesis will draw extensively on primary US government and military reports, documents, doctrine, and speeches.

Efforts to forge and preserve "stability" have often taken highly interventionist forms as localized historical pressures, inequalities, and social dislocations have helped to foment instabilities within the global South including calls for political and economic reform considered inimical to US interests. In refashioning states towards mutually supportive political and economic objectives, the US has had to contend with unfolding internal political dynamics within many countries that threatened to steer them away from US sphere of influence and their integration into the US-led order. Undesirable political and economic changes, whether in the form of leftist armed insurgencies, popular political and social movements, or other "radical" attempts to attain power, have presented significant obstacles to US Open Door strategies. Alternatively, the nationalization of key industries, closing local economies to foreign direct investment and absorption of US products, and the creation of exclusionary trading blocs (regionalism), and other moves threatened US interests in the international order as well of those of US business. Westad summarizes this point: "Third World domestic political conditions often needed to be changed first, before US-inspired reform could begin to take hold. Such change generally meant the defeat of radical attempts at controlling the political order, and it was in order to produce such a result that most US interventions took place."[209] Thus the deterrence of revolutionary movements and other nationalistic calls for change and/or the support for functioning liberalized political and economic architecture formed the basic frameworks of US "stability" operations.

In this way, coercion was often perceived necessary to deter centrifugal social and political forces. In response, "American officials deployed their nation's superior resources to ensure that the markets and raw materials of the periphery remained accessible to the industrial core of Western Europe and Japan as well as to the United States."[210] Gabriel Kolko recognized the importance of US coercive statecraft in creating conditions congenial to the ultimate goal of global economic integration with countries in the South in which it has substantial material or political interest.[211] Barkawi also asserts that rather than diminish the power of states around the globe, processes of globalization have required the internal orientation of state actors (including often repression of opposition and sometimes war), with the US as one of the main progenitors pushing for this state military facilitation.[212] Put differently, Grosscup states that throughout the post-war era "the indigenous roots of low intensity conflicts throughout Third World societies produce an endemic security problem for the United States on local, regional, and global levels. As the architect, enforcer, and principal beneficiary of the new global order, unfavorable results at the low-level of conflict threaten United States access to strategic resources and undermine the global "suitable

[208] William S. Cohen, *Secretary of Defense Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/qdr/ (accessed 5 March 2012).
[209] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111.
[210] Painter, *Explaining US Relations with the Third World*, 534.
[211] Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980*, 55.
[212] Barkawi, *Globalization and War*, 8.

business environment" for profitable trade and investment."[213] This has therefore often required, in the eyes of strategists in Washington, a militarized response to pacify growing discontents and deter moves to alter the developmental pathway of states away from US-led order.

Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: Coercive Strategies of Statecraft

Counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare have constituted the principal coercive modes of statecraft in pursuit of US hegemonic strategy towards the global South.[214] Both counterinsurgency military assistance to pro-US regimes as well as support to insurgent movements and other "irregular" forces against hostile regimes form a centerpiece of Washington's coercive strategy towards the South, each with its own methods for the reengineering of state formations in line with a globalized economic order. Counterinsurgency is not solely a military tactic to eradicate armed insurgent forces. It is a protracted politico-military affair designed to attain legitimacy for the local host nation. The aim in this quest for legitimacy in counterinsurgency warfare is stabilizing "friendly" government control and insulating it from oppositional subversion and dissent "from below". This specific focus on establishing legitimacy for the host government means, according to American counterinsurgency doctrine, that "the support of the people then is the center of gravity."[215] As such, counterinsurgency is clearly delineated across US strategy military doctrines on the subject as a "population-centric" affair.[216] As will be demonstrated, counterinsurgency thus constitutes a form of coercive social engineering to simultaneously pacify dissent and create a modicum of consent for the prevailing order and its ancillary political and economic structures. This is a central facet of US hegemonic relations with allied states in the South. US counterinsurgency assistance to allied countries has helped to reorient recipient state militaries internally to oppose and patrol for insurgent, political, and social groups deemed inimical to the prevailing order.

While counterinsurgency is aimed at stabilizing certain state forms and socio-economic relations employed as a response to internal "subversion" in pro-US or client states, unconventional warfare is the ultimate tactic in destabilizing "unfriendly" or "hostile" regimes. Unconventional warfare is a coercive instrument of political statecraft used to depose leaders that direct their countries (or threaten to) towards alternate political and economic futures unfavorable to US interests and the demands of global capital circuitry. Unconventional warfare has most often been employed as a reaction to maneuvers by state leaders in the South to fashion their political economies and acquire greater state or popular control over natural resources. Successful unconventional warfare operations have the effect of ousting recalcitrant state leaders and replacing them with ones more malleable to US interests. In this sense, like counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare amounts to an

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[213] Beau Grosscup, "The American Doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict in the New World Order," in *United States Third World Relations in the New World Order*, eds. A. Grammy and K. Bragg (New York: Nova Publishers, 1996), 58.

[214] For a detailed analysis of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrines and practices see McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*

[215] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations: Field Manual Interim 3-07.22* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2004), 1-13.

[216] See U.S Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf. (accessed 7 March, 2011)

opposition of political forces considered to run against a liberalized global order. It forms the centerpiece of US policies of regime change.[217]

Counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare have formed a central plank in US military assistance and covert operations in the global South, as politico-military strategies to re-orient states and bring them within US political and economic orbit. This is reflected in a 1990 US military "Low Intensity Conflict" (which includes both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare) training manual which concedes that "unfavorable outcomes" could result in: "The loss of US access to strategic energy reserves and other natural resources; The loss of US military basing, transit, and access rights; The movement of US friends and allies to positions of accommodation with hostile groups; The gain of long-term advantages for US adversaries."[218] Successful counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare relations, on the other hand, can "advance US international goals such as the growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies."[219] Primary documents such as this one help to elucidate the underlying principles and objectes behind unconventional warfare strategies, revealing the overlapping political, economic and geo-political priorities in US foreign policy. As will be analyzed throughout this thesis, similar official documentation and military doctrine point to these underlying goals in the use of unconventional warfare.

Military assistance to pro-US regimes has been one of the most important features of US strategy towards allied states in the global South and is a central mechanism through which US hegemony has traditionally been exerted. The cultivation of military ties and partnerships is a significant objective of US military assistance, but is also important in helping allies to maintain their own stability, with foreign military aid often directed towards "Foreign Internal Defense". Since the end of the World War II, the US has spent around $240 billion in training and equipping around 2.3 million members of foreign militaries from well over 80 countries worldwide.[220] Courses in counterinsurgency and in unconventional warfare operations were taught in US military bases, in facilities across the globe, as well as on-the-location training programs. The School of Americas (SOA – now renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security), for instance, originally established at Fort Gulick in Panama in 1961 and then later moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, was responsible for training over 61,000 soldiers and civilians during the course of the Cold War.[221] Stokes and Raphael point out further that "the highest profile training program (International Military Education and Training, or IMET) has seen over 700,000 "friendly" officers pass through its courses since 1950, in an effort costing over $3 billion."[222] According to another study, around 400,000 officers have graduated from US military institutions, the majority in counterinsurgency and related forms of stability operations between 1955 and 1981 alone.[223] The purpose of this training, according to Michael Parenti, is "not to defend these nations from outside invasion but to protect ruling oligarchs and multinational corporate investors

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[217] See Kinzer, *Overthrow*

[218] U.S. Department of the Army, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Warfare: FM 100-20* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990), 1-1.

[219] Ibid., 1-1

[220] Parenti, *The Logic of US Intervention*, 19-36.

[221] For more on the SOA see Ruth Blakeley, "Still Training to Torture? US Training of Military Forces from Latin America," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 8 (2006): 1439-1461.; Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).; Jack-Nelson Pallmeyer, *School of Assassins: Guns, Greed, and Globalization* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2001).

[222] Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 60.

[223] Stephanie Neuman, *Military Assistance in Recent Wars* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 28-29.

from the dangers of domestic anti-capitalist insurgency."[224] Lora Lumpe found that since the early 2000s, "U.S. forces have been training approximately 100,000 foreign soldiers annually. This training takes place in at least 150 institutions within the U.S. and in 180 countries around the world."[225] "Moreover," she asserts, "this training still focuses on central Cold War-era counterinsurgency doctrine—called foreign internal defense (FID)—rather than on new peacekeeping or defensive strategies."[226]

Funding for some of the primary outlets for training programs has accelerated in recent years. For example, the IMET program grew 38% from 2001 to 2003 from $58 million to $80 million,[227] and expanded the delivery of training exercises from 96 countries in 1990, to 133 in 2002.[228] This has grown significantly more recently, with the Government Accounting Office recording a rise in funding appropriated for IMET programs from around $62 million in 2000 to $108 million in 2010.[229] Although classes conducted as part of IMET have a broad range including language instruction and military resource management amongst many other possible courses of instruction, the purpose of IMET according to the State Department is to strengthen military-to-military ties with US allies, and therefore also reinforce international security cooperation, but also to support the professional development of the recipient country's military.[230] Another channel of military training, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), was enacted in 1991 to allow Special Forces to hold joint training sessions in counterinsurgency and other related tactics with members of foreign militaries.[231] JCET, according to declassified US military reports, has increased significantly since the September 2001 attacks, experienced significant growth in operations in 2008, and budget requests for the Special Forces including JCET engagements are set to increase in 2013.[232] Similarly, "Section 1206" of the *National Defense Authorization Act* for 2006 provided the Secretary of Defense a special mandate to authorize training programs in counterterrorism and stability operations. Through this additional channel of funneling military assistance, $1.574 billion was spent between FY 2006 and 2011 on training foreign forces primarily in the global South.[233] These examples underscore the extent of US military assistance and how the fortification of pro-US government's security forces through the provision of counterinsurgency assistance in order to police for internal insurgency, subversion, and unrest has been a significant facet of US foreign policy towards the South in the post-war era.

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[224] Parenti, *The Logic of US Intervention*, 20.
[225] Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*, 1.
[226] Ibid.: 27
[227] Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*, 132.
[228] Ibid., 132
[229] GAO, *International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations United States Government Accountability Office*, 2011).
[230] U.S. Department of State, "International Military Education and Training (IMET)," http://www.state.gov/t/pm/65533.htm (accessed 26 July, 2012).
[231] For information on JCET see John Rudy and Ivan Eland, "Special Operations Military Training Abroad and its Dangers," *Foreign Policy Briefing: CATO Institute 53* (June, 1999).
[232] USSOCOM, *Joint Combined Exchange Training Program Annual 2011* (Report to Congress United States Special Operations Command, 2009). ; Also see U.S. Congress, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013* (112th Congress 2nd Session, 2012). For 2013 see USSOCOM, *FY2013 Budget Highlights United States Special Operations Command* (Tampa Point: USSOCOM, 2012), http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_FY_2013_Budget_Highlights.pdf (accessed 20 April 2012). Also see Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, "U.S. 'Secret War' Expands Globally as Special Operations Forces Take Larger Role," *The Washington Post* 4 June, 2010.
[233] Nina M. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress* (Congressional Research Service, 2012).

The Continuity of Counterinsurgency and Unconventional warfare Modes of Statecraft

Over time, the US military has ostensibly redefined its counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare and related military doctrines under various titles such as Small Wars, Counterinsurgency (counterinsurgency), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Stability Operations, and most recently, in the "war on terror", Irregular Warfare.[234] This shift in terminology, however, has not significantly altered US counterinsurgent strategies towards the South. On the contrary, while there have been nuanced adjustments to Washington's approach to counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, in lieu of advancements in technology (such as the use of drones) and variations in the nature of the political threat (such as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism), amongst other considerations, the core concepts underlying these forms of intervention, as well as the methods they employ, have remained notably consistent. There is considerable continuity in the basic assumptions and principles which undergird the conduct of such instruments of statecraft, and as I will demonstrate, this has consistently included the delegation of force to para-institutional groups. Crucially, there is also continuity in the way in which and the extent to which the US has used counterinsurgency and related forms of intervention in the South to respond to problems of "instability" and insurgency. Counterinsurgency specialist Jochen Hippler, for instance, found that

> The important point here is that while US ideologies and legitimations for Third World military involvement and intervention have been extremely variable over the last 80 years, the strategies and concepts in regard to them have been remarkably stable. Military interventions have been undertaken on a continuous basis for much more than a century, while their legitimations and ideologies have kept changing fundamentally. Also, the number of military interventions did not change with the changing ideological context. [235]

According to Hippler, despite changes in the international system, the US has responded to instability and insurgency in the South in a consistent manner. Moreover, the extent to which these interventions and counterinsurgency support has taken place has also not significantly altered.

Similar conclusions regarding the consistency of US counterinsurgency practices have been made by other analysts. Michael McClintock argued that "The end of the Cold War did not eliminate at a stroke the Cold War attitudes, ideology, and military doctrine that fuel the secret war on the periphery; there is little to show that the United States has modified its use of special warfare in any discernible manner."[236] Furthermore, he states that "The overarching threat which once welded American special warfare into a cohesive and comprehensive program may be gone, but special warfare remains a principal instrument of low intensity conflict in the new world order."[237] Although writing in 1992, he is pointing to some the long-term importance of such strategies to US hegemonic ambitions and its managerial role in the international system which is relatively unaltered in response to the

[234] See Jochen Hippler, "Counterinsurgency and Political Control," *INEF Report 81* (2006).; See also James Kiras, "Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World,* eds. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin Gray, Third ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 187.

[235] Hippler, *Counterinsurgency and Political Control*, 53.

[236] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990,* xix.

[237] Ibid., xix

decline of the US Cold War adversary, the USSR. Hence, despite the end of the Cold War and the decline of the threat of communist-inspired revolutionary movements in various countries in the hemisphere and around the globe, the US have often continued to respond to "instabilities" and popular calls for major political and economic reforms using the same coercive techniques. counterinsurgency has also moved to the forefront of US military strategies in the "war on terror". These claims will be further supported throughout this thesis.

This presents an interesting puzzle in light of claims for an alleged new form of warfare and discontinuity in much of the US foreign policy literature. While the end of the Cold War and the onset of the "war on terror" were meant to spell fundamental ruptures in the international environment and therefore significant fissures in US grand strategy and the role of counterinsurgency practices within it according to some interpretations,[238] such forms of intervention continue to be employed to address "instability" and subversive insurgencies. Burnett and Whyte note this inconsistency between the identification of new types of warfare and the strategies implemented to address them: "In political terms, the claim is that the new terrorism represents a break from the past. [...] [I]t is highly illuminating [...] that we see, in the example of Iraq, a simultaneous call for a return to the old counterinsurgency strategy. Despite all of the hyperbole surrounding the new 'netwar' and the new terrorism, it is being argued that this enemy should be dealt with in precisely the same manner as 20th century colonial rebellions."[239] This continuity of US counterinsurgency practices, in turn, has significant implications for the underlying prerogatives behind employing such forms of interventionism, as Hippler acknowledges:

> The conclusion we can deduct obviously is that the ideological settings colored and influenced military thinking and strategy, but that they were of little importance compared to the stable practice of US military intervention and the approaches in carrying them out. If US interventions and their strategies hardly change over time and happen independently of their ideological context, these ideological contexts cannot explain these interventions and their character.[240]

This insight brings us full-circle back to the depiction of US foreign policy sketched out above.

The Para-State Nexus and US Hegemony

As explained in the introduction, the para-state nexus captures the multiplicity of relationships the US has formed with a variety of parallel military actors in the promulgation of US-supported counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations. Within the context of US Open Door strategy outlined here, these public-private partnerships constitute an important facet of US hegemony. Firstly, para-statal armed actors often constitute the primary or ancillary coercive agents in US-supported counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare towards the suppression or elimination of counter-hegemonic forces unfavorable to US interests. In this sense, PMCs, local paramilitary forces, mercenaries, and other para-institutional actors are integral to forging or maintaining certain forms of "stability" in countries in the global South. Secondly, the nexus between the US and these para-statal groups serve as force-multipliers in the projection of US military power abroad. Para-

[238] See for instance Steven Metz, "Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability," *Strategic Studies Institute* (February 28, 1995).
[239] Burnett and Whyte 2005, p. 14 as cited in Hippler, *Counterinsurgency and Political Control*
[240] Ibid.: 54

institutional actors help bolster US military power as para-extensional means of exerting US influence in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare settings. Thus as this thesis will set out to argue, a variety of "private"/non-state groups can be understood as part of, and integral to US hegemonic power.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the foreign policy context in which the para-state nexus is situated. It has explained how the Open Door grand strategy pursued since the beginning of the post-war era has informed counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare assistance and intervention in the global South. Specifically, it has argued that counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare are the primary coercive modes of statecraft employed towards the stabilization of favorable frameworks abroad conducive to US interests and the wider global liberalized economic order. This is important as it provides a specific context for the underlying objectives that underpin counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. By extension, this thesis will argue that the relations formed between the United States and parallel military armed actors, as exemplified in the para-state nexus, are integral to its Open Door hegemonic role. This not only helps to describe the sets of relations and objectives in which the para-state nexus is located, but also aids in explaining how the para-state nexus is part and parcel of the managerial role the US plays in global order and its continual development. This therefore gives the para-state nexus a specific understanding of power relations that distinguishes it from other forms of para-institutional violence.

The next chapter begins the core empirical analysis of the para-state nexus in its early Cold War manifestations and an examination of its roots as a primary para-extensional projection of US hegemony. It traces the evolution of the propensity in US foreign policy to outsource or delegate force to para-institutional groups. By examining these developments in US foreign policy, I demonstrate how and why the para-state nexus has formed as a central plank in US statecraft abroad. The thesis then proceeds to highlight and empirically evaluate the continuity of a para-state nexus beyond the Cold War framework, examining its evolution across time. In this manner, the following analysis also lends further support for the arguments made in this chapter.

Chapter 3

The Cold War Evolution of a Para-State Nexus

Introduction

The ascendance of the US in the post-war international system helped propel the para-state nexus as an increasingly important phenomenon in the projection of US military power. As covered in the previous chapter, US policy towards much of the South during the Cold War sprouted from efforts to stabilize liberalized state formations as bulwarks against the advancement of communist and Soviet influence, as part of an Open Door grand strategy. Counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare formed the primary instruments of statecraft in this quest, strategies in which para-institutional forces were indispensable and direct intervention limited. Throughout the Cold War military planners in Washington presided over networks of parallel non-state military forces including paramilitaries, militias, and PMCs often used in place of the commitment of US armed forces in efforts to forge the desired forms of "stability". This nexus has been an important and continuous phenomenon (albeit with some modifications) in US policy. The delegation of force to non-state actors constituted a principal channel through which US coercion and influence were exerted. As well as helping to determine the political developmental pathway of entire countries, private-public partnerships have sometimes formed the primary means through which entire wars have been fought. As historian Greg Grandin put it, US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare specialists in the 1960s "transformed anti-communism from a parochial reflex into a world-historical paramilitary movement with pretensions no less universal than those of Marxism."[241]

This chapter describes this nexus, the evolving multiple layers and vinculums between the US and para-institutional formations, and examines the conditions that gave rise to it. It demonstrates how such a para-state nexus originated in Cold War strategies towards much of the global South, inextricably bound to the long-term US strategic Open Door imperative to forge "stability". It does so by drawing on substantial primary documentation from US military doctrines, communications, and other official policy reports. Within this context, while manifestations of the para-state nexus during the 1950s and 60s were associated primarily with covert and clandestine operations, this nexus between the US and various para-institutional forces was increasingly entrenched in US foreign policy. It will be argued, for example, that the Vietnam War represented a turning point in the development of the para-state nexus. During and after the war in Vietnam, the use of private contractors and paramilitary assets was conducted in a much less clandestine fashion compared to previous para-statal engagements. By the time of the low intensity conflicts of the 1980s there was a consolidation of such para-extended means of exerting US military power. This chapter examines this progression. In so doing, it demonstrates that the propensity to make use of and the infrastructure for private capabilities such as PMCs existed well before the end of the Cold War. One implication of this analysis is that companies such as Blackwater, MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated), or DynCorp have a longer historical development in US foreign policy than is typically portrayed in the literature on the subject. Another implication is that the origins of PMCs and other parallel military forces, or rather

[241] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 111.

their use in US foreign policy, share a common historical legacy within the remit of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.

This chapter further argues that a confluence of factors in US foreign policy conditioned the emergence of a para-state nexus. On a broader level, the structural logics in US foreign policy, the rise of the US state and its managerial role in the emerging global order described in the previous chapter helped constitute these para-statal arrangements. The para-state nexus was an important feature in maintaining US hegemony. Within this context, indirect action was deemed necessary for a variety of reasons which will be weaved through this analysis in examining the entrenchment of the para-state nexus. Plausible denial was important for evading an escalation of conflict with the USSR, and avoiding "charges of intervention and colonialism," for example, according to the Kennedy administration's *Overseas Internal Defense Policy.*[242] Such considerations were incorporated into US strategies that aided in sculpting para-statal arrangements. Those same dynamics that bequeathed proxy warfare provided the impetus and rationale for forging private-public partnerships in the conduct of US military operations.[243] Moreover, such forces were often considered cheaper and more efficient means of executing US statecraft rather than the direct commitment of US troops. As will be demonstrated, certain trends and events were also influential in the cementing of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy. For example, in the late 1970s, after Vietnam, numerous oversight mechanisms and policy restrictions were gradually mounted on the Executive, and outsourcing provided scope to evade these Congressional conditions. However, this chapter also analyzes how localized domestic conditions within countries in the global South enabled and shaped the use of parallel non-state military actors. In other words, it argues that a para-state nexus was forged within local settings as much as it was design product of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare types of coercive statecraft.

In short, although a complex range of dynamics including the search for logistical capabilities in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare helped constitute a para-state nexus, this phenomenon during the Cold War revolved around three central inter-related themes. First, paramilitary forces were seen by US military officials as instrumental in the conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. These politico-military strategies were understood to require such local and private actors in order to build support for "friendly" local governments and consolidate control, or alternatively, in the case of unconventional warfare, exert pressure on or depose "unfriendly" regimes. Moreover, in relation to this, it was often viewed as practically expedient and economical to rely on such private forces rather than deploy massive contingencies of US forces to conduct such forms of warfare. In other words, there are significant strategic reasons for the formation of para-institutional phenomena in US foreign policy. Second, US policymakers, although committed to defend and pursue US interests abroad, deemed it critical for the role of the US to remain hidden or at least divest responsibility for actions if involvement was not fully possible to conceal. This means that the para-state nexus emerged or formed partly as the result of the desire to preserve plausible deniability and avoid certain political costs of war (such as negative domestic public opinion over seemingly unnecessary US troop deaths). In conjunction with this, during the later stages of the Cold War there were an increasing number of Congressional restrictions and human rights conditions imposed on the ability to conduct and support such counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare campaigns. This helped further propel outsourcing of certain capabilities. Finally, and perhaps ironically,

[242] U.S Office of the President, *United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy*, 10.

[243] See for example Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*; Loveman, *Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention, 29-48.*

although initially the para-state nexus was a product of covert operations, the mechanisms and connections between the US state and para-institutional groups gradually gained further acceptance as standardized means by which the US could extend its coercive reach.

Unconventional Warfare, Covert Operations and the Para State Nexus 1950-1980.

During the early stages of the Cold War (roughly 1950 to 1980), the use of para-institutional actors as an instrument of US power was often associated with covert paramilitary operations within the remit of unconventional warfare. Early paramilitary and PMC ventures represented a proxy use of force that was intended to distance the US from ultimately bearing responsibility for military action. The NSC10/2 directive (1948) established the paramilitary capacity of the CIA, which involved "preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world."[244] This directive specified that such actions should be "so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."[245]

Such principles informed the CIA policy procedures for regime change as exemplified in the CIA training manual *Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government* (1970). This manual details possible maneuvers to overthrow enemy foreign governments with the training and organization of local paramilitary assets into "saboteurs," "shock teams" in order to "lead commando style attacks," "Tactical Psy-war teams," amongst others.[246] It also advocated a total resistance war amongst the population by "stimulating the unorganized more or less apathetic majority of the people to political consciousness, then to passive resistance, and ultimately to aggressive action."[247] Such indigenous paramilitary capabilities, whether exiled communities or latent resistance forces, it outlines, not only have local knowledge and may be able to induce the defection of the incumbent government[248] but their use also distances the US from interventionist charges. It states that a cover story for such paramilitary operations must be elaborated because of "other friendly powers or Western countries who would find serious objection if it became known that the United States covertly supported the overthrow of a small foreign government, despite its communist character."[249] Thus, unconventional warfare and insurgency capabilities were designed to covertly instigate local populations to resist governments deemed unfavorable to US interests.

Similar operational parameters informed US Special Force unconventional warfare capability. A 1958 training manual detailed that the "primary mission of Special Forces units is to develop, organize, equip, train, support, and control guerrilla forces and to conduct guerrilla warfare."[250] In other cases, Special Forces themselves were directly involved in unconventional warfare operations with a "complete integration of U. S. Army personnel

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[244] National Security Council Directive NSC 10/2 (Washington D.C.: US National Security Council, 18 June 1948), http://www.a-ipi.net/article163480.html. (accessed 10 March 2012)
[245] Ibid.
[246] CIA, *Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government* (CIA, 1970), 21, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000919937/DOC_0000919937.pdf. (accessed 14 April 2011)
[247] Ibid., 23
[248] Ibid., 16
[249] Ibid., 18
[250] U.S. Department of the Army, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations FM 31-21* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, 1958), 18.

with indigenous guerrillas," to "work, fight, and live with the indigenous personnel."[251] This "people's war" not only comprised of guerrilla factions, however. Entire populations were often viewed as a source of potential insurgent paramilitary action throughout much of this unconventional warfare doctrine. Another manual titled *Special Forces Operations* (1969) saw that "A resistance movement generally is composed of a hard-core resistance leadership, clandestine element (underground.), overt militant element (guerrilla force), and a supporting civilian population (auxiliary)."[252] As such, training resistance forces and paramilitary action occupied a broad spectrum of activities including "political action, psychological operations, espionage, sabotage, assassination, traffic in contraband, and the gathering of intelligence."[253] Insurgent paramilitary training, however, further included the use of improvised explosives, booby traps, and other unorthodox munitions for terrorist attacks, sabotage, raids, and other guerrilla tactics.[254] The training and direction of such guerrilla forces was akin to a proxy intervention designed explicitly, according to the US military authors of these manuals, to "avoid formal military confrontation."[255]

These proxy relationships had significant variation. In some cases US agencies directed aid to existing paramilitary forces where US interests coincided with the ambitions of such groups. US unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare manuals examine causes and methods of guerrilla factions with the ultimate objective to "organize, train, and further develop *existing and latent guerrilla potential* into guerrilla forces."[256] On these occasions, the US merely formed a nexus with existing forces for their mutual benefit. For example, the Kuomintang in China were a highly organized political party and movement that had become a guerrilla force led by Chiang Kai-Check after the formation of the People's Republic of China, which the US aided in pursuit of its own interests.[257]

Other guerrilla or paramilitary units supported by US agencies more closely resembled mercenary forces as they were created and hired specifically to support US objectives. The same 1958 Special Forces manual explained that in these cases "The existence of organized guerrilla forces is not assumed since in many situations Special Forces teams will be required to establish contact with local inhabitants *to initiate the development* of friendly elements into effective guerrilla forces."[258] One example of this includes the Nung minority groups who were trained and paid as a supplementary paramilitary force during the Vietnam War.[259]

Which paramilitary assets to train and employ towards achieving US objectives depended on existing capabilities and the local inhabitants' willingness to fight. This is

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[251] Ibid., 20

[252] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations: FM 31-21* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1969), 3-2.

[253] Ibid., 3-9

[254] See for example U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operational Techniques: FM 31-20* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1965), 272.; Also see both U.S. Department of the Army, *Unconventional Warfare Devices and Techniques: TM 31-200-1* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1966).; U.S. Department of the Army, *Unconventional Warfare Devices and Techniques: Incendiaries TM 31-201-1* (Washingotn D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1966).

[255] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations: FM 31-21*, 3-1.

[256] Emphasis mine. Quote from *U.S. Department of the Army, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations FM 31-21*, 20. also see U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations: FM 31-21* and *CIA, Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government*

[257] Richard Gibson and Wenhua Chen, *The Secret Army: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Drug Warlords of the Golden Triangle* (Hoboken: Wiley and Sons, 2011).; Sarah-Jane Corke, *US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman Secret Warfare and the CIA 1945-1953* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 114-119.

[258] Emphasis mine U.S. Dept of the Army, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations FM 31-21*, 19.

[259] Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program* (Lincoln: iUniverse.com, 2000), ch 3, p. 45, 94 and 231.

further explained in another training document: "The number of guerrillas which may effectively be trained and employed by a Special Forces operational detachment will vary in accordance with the geographical locations, the ethnic groups encountered, their general level of illiteracy, and whether they have been exposed to previous military training."[260] Despite diverse origins and objectives, paramilitary forces of these kinds formed a nexus with the US where demanded, and sections of the local populations were organized into guerrilla factions or paramilitary structures.

Proposed training programs were also projected to forge long-lasting and durable protection against take-over by "unfriendly" governments, and underscored the ways in which "stay-behind" forces were envisioned to transition from a counterinsurgency role to one of waging an unconventional warfare insurgency. A 1961-1963 training document entitled *Concepts for US Army Counterinsurgency Activities*, for instance, outlined that "Indigenous Special Force type units should be trained for operations within their own country as stay behind forces in seizing control of the government. These forces would be a nucleus upon which to develop a large-scale irregular force for the overthrow of the hostile regime or occupying government."[261] It continues to detail that in the event that such training should prove impractical, "unconventional warfare forces of a *similar ethnic grouping* could be trained in adjacent countries, within the United States, or in some other host country. These forces would be a deterrent to indirect aggression by hostile political forces."[262] When these lessons were implemented, the resulting relationships constituted an important part of the para-state nexus.

One early example of these types of measures occurred not in US policy towards areas of the global South, but in post-war efforts to defend European countries against autochthonous political developments. President Truman's authorization for the CIA, in close collaboration with British MI6 and NATO, to help create, train, and arm paramilitary networks throughout much of Western Europe is instructive of the type of paramilitary action envisaged by US strategists. Ostensibly designed as a dormant stay-behind unconventional warfare (insurgent) force with hidden caches of weapons sprawled across many countries in Europe in case of a Soviet invasion, these paramilitary forces instead helped steer some European countries away from a communist political path when such an invasion failed to materialize. According to Ganser, these civilian secret armies were:

> involved in a whole series of terrorist operations and human rights violations that they wrongly blamed on the communists in order to discredit the left at the polls. The operations always aimed at spreading maximum fear among the population and ranged from bomb massacres in trains and market squares (Italy), the use of systematic torture of opponents of the regime (Turkey), the support for right-wing coup d'états (Greece and Turkey), to the smashing of opposition groups (Portugal and Spain).[263]

These forces remained intact, operational and well hidden up until 1990 when threads of such a paramilitary network began to be unraveled, with the last known meeting of the organizational committee in 1990 in Brussels.[264] Very similar forces were secretly supported

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[260] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations: FM 31-21* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1965), 77.
[261] As quoted in McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 219. Italics as in original.
[262] As quoted in Ibid., 219
[263] Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 2.
[264] Ibid.

in the late 40s and early 50s throughout much of the Baltic, some of Eastern Europe (such as partisan movements in Ukraine) and in Russia itself.[265] This type of operation followed the US unconventional warfare model in which "irregular" forces were commissioned to conduct military operations to influence political developments favorable to their US sponsors. They also set the stage for similar paramilitary actions throughout much of the global South in countries threatened by "communist subversion". However, it was not until the Eisenhower administration that such operations formed a principal component of the exercise of US power.[266]

Private Aero-Military Contractors and the Para-State Nexus: Precursors to the Modern PMC

While US Special Forces and CIA were posted to train designated local paramilitary forces for unconventional warfare, CIA-controlled private companies such as Civil Air Transport (CAT) and Air America (AA) amongst many others[267] were often the principal support infrastructure and point of contact with those groups. This ensured that entire operations were outsourced, with both logistical and combat initiatives delegated to private non-state forces. Such airlines have had a long and interesting history in US foreign policy, with complex ties to the CIA and other US government agencies. [268] As Christopher Robbins records: "Sometimes an airline would be wholly owned by the CIA, like AA, sometimes it would be partially funded by the Agency, and sometimes it could just be counted on for favors."[269] Similar disparate and often shadowy relationships between the US government, the CIA and CAT, one of the first CIA "proprieties", has been detailed by William Leary, one of the leading authorities on the history of these airlines.[270] CAT formed out of an "American Volunteer Group" fighting for the Chinese during the Second World War known as the Flying Tigers,[271] but in 1950 according to numerous recently declassified CIA documents, the CIA and US Armed Forces saw potential in utilizing such a private business for covert operations.[272] The CIA website summarized the Cold War relationship between CAT and the Agency in the following way:

> In August 1950, the Agency secretly purchased the assets of Civil Air Transport (CAT), an airline that had been started in China after World War II by Gen. Claire L. Chennault and Whiting Willauer. CAT would continue to fly commercial routes throughout Asia, acting in every way as a privately owned commercial airline. At the same time, under the corporate guise of

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[265] John Prados, *President's Secret Wars* (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), 30-60.
[266] See Schraeder, *Paramilitary Intervention*, 131-152.
[267] Air America (henceforth AA), the principal CIA propriety airline, was often the umbrella name given to a conglomeration of CIA propriety and/or sponsored airlines that the CIA had at its disposal. Other airlines used by the CIA included Civil Air Transport (CAT), Intermountain Aviation, Southern Air Transport, Bird Airlines, even Air Ethiopia, Air Jordan, and Iran Air were some of the airlines the CIA subsidized around the world. See Robbins, *Air America*, 47.
[268] For the history of many of these companies see Ibid. Joe F. Leeker, *The History of Air America* (Ebook), Fourth ed. (Dallas: University of Texas, 2010), http://www.utdallas.edu/library/collections/speccoll/Leeker/history/index.html. (accessed 2 June, 2011) the reading list found at University of Dallas, "Air America and CAT Reading List," http://www.utdallas.edu/library/collections/speccoll/Leeker/bibi.pdf. (accessed 3 June, 2011)
[269] Robbins, *Air America*, 47.
[270] William Leary, *Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia,* Second ed. (University Alabama Press, 2006).
[271] For a complete history of the Flying Tigers see Flying Tigers Association, "American Volunteer Group: Flying Tigers," http://www.flyingtigersavg.com/ (accessed 11/10, 2011).
[272] CIA, "Air America: Upholding the Airmans Bond," http://www.foia.cia.gov/airAmerica.asp (accessed 27 June, 2011).

CAT Incorporated, it provided airplanes and crews for secret intelligence operations.[273]

Similarly, Air America (AA), the principal and most famous CIA "proprietary" functioned like a private business and was officially owned by a separate private entity. A former CIA agent George Doole, for instance, was the founder and CEO of AA and other private businesses set up with the CIA.[274] A 1966 *Newsweek* article reported that "although in practical terms it is an operating arm of the CIA, AA is owned by a private aviation investment concern called Pacific Corporation," further noting how George Doole had denied his companies' involvement with the CIA.[275] In effect, these aero-contractors were privately owned companies directed to varying degrees by the CIA.

Other companies were only either partially owned or funded by the CIA. Southern Air Transport (SAT), for instance, initially had an arrangement with the CIA that gave it ownership of only half its shares.[276] Much like other airline companies associated with the CIA, SAT also had a longer history as a private airline before its long-term stint as a CIA and US government contractor.[277] Finally, numerous other airlines were supported and contracted by the CIA and other US government agencies during the Cold War including even Continental Airlines, Northwest, Air Ethiopia, and Air Jordan.[278] The entire CIA air wing, in short, was essentially a vast collection of private companies with various ties to the Agency and the US government. These examples of the various relations between the CIA and such companies underscore the way in which these were indeed privately run companies that formed a nexus with US agencies through contractual agreements and share-holding, rather than just CIA business "fronts" used explicitly for covert operations. In other words, they were for-profit businesses much like modern PMCs.

Aero-military contractors such as CAT and AA were the principal precursors to contemporary PMCs, and have a continuing legacy in US foreign policy. Numerous private airline companies were contracted by the State Department, the DoD, and other US government branches, but the CIA in particular, for various logistical, support, and combat roles throughout the Cold War. These enterprises were created and sustained by a private network of military personnel which formed the basis out of which much of the PMC industry of the 1990s grew. Airlines such as these would also later become instrumental in the CIA's rendition program in the "war on terror", as part of a wider pattern of outsourcing in US coercive foreign policy.[279] Some of the same airlines used to facilitate paramilitary operations during the 1980s were used in the expansion of the rendition program in the early 1990s, with significant increase of shadow flights contracted with the onset of the "war on

[273] William M. Leary, "CIA Air Operations in Laos 1955-1974," http://www.air-america.org/About/History.shtml (accessed 4 September, 2010).
[274] Evan Thomas, "In Arizona: A Spymaster Remembered," *Time*7 April, 1986, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,961036,00.html; http://www.air-america.org/Articles/Doole.shtml (accessed 18 Sept 2011).
[275] Newsweek as quoted in Robbins, *Air America*, 173.
[276] See for example C. Fred Moor, *Then Came the CIA: The Early Years of Southern Air Transport* CreateSpace, 2011).
[277] Ibid.
[278] Robbins, *Air America*, 47-54.
[279] Stephen Grey, *Ghost Plane: The Inside Story of the CIAs Secret Rendition Program* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 95-97. See also Scott Shane, Stephen Grey and Margot Williams, "C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights," *New York Times* 31 May, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/31/national/31planes.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5090&en=6087acc3480a296c&ex=1275192000 (accessed 14 Oct 2011).

terror".[280] In sum, outsourcing to private airlines was a cornerstone of US military projection overseas and a fundamental part of the para-state nexus during the Cold War and beyond.

The fact that many of these private airliners were created and sustained by networks of retired military personnel also had some important implications. Private airline companies were often started and owned by retired military personnel who, using existing contacts and connections in Washington, made their own proposals for company involvement in US supported wars. For instance, Claire Chennault, a retired military aviation officer who had established CAT, went to Washington with a proposal for US military assistance to the Kuomintang, a nationalist guerrilla movement, in China after the 1949 establishment of a communist-inspired People's Republic of China.[281] Similarly, as well documented by Marshall, Scott, and Hunter, numerous individuals at the highest echelons of the US military had "set up in business after military retirement with Pentagon contracts that "offloaded" sensitive SOF [Special Force] logistics missions onto their private companies. These firms, in turn, provided the essential infrastructure for contracting out foreign policy," during the Iran-Contra affair.[282] These included counterinsurgency gurus Theodore Shackley, General Richard Secord and General John Singlaub, all of whom were involved in numerous paramilitary operations in their private capacities.[283] Richard Secord and Richard Gadd, for instance, were both instrumental in setting up the private airline companies that ran Contra resupply and arms shipments in the Iran-Contra case.[284] It has long been the case that retired servicemen could continue to work for the government as a contractor.

While many of these aero-military contractors were created by ex-military servicemen, they also usually hired either "sheep-dipped" or retired US military personnel, leveraging their expertise and services outside official military spheres. "Sheep-dipping" refers to a complex process of "civilianizing" a member of the armed force, often involving the creation of false retirement documents, so that they can operate in a "private" capacity while denying they are members of the US military.[285] Such a process was used for many of the Air America and affiliated airline companies. Unlike traditional mercenaries, rather than selling services to the highest bidder, CIA airline proprieties and contracted companies remained an instrument of US power. As Robbins describes, the pilots of CIA airline proprieties saw themselves as extensions to US policy rather than mercenaries, playing crucial roles in achieving US objectives.[286] This is similar to contemporary PMCs such as MPRI which is noted for its "loyalty to US foreign policy objectives", and employing a high number of US generals with the firm's headquarters located a few miles from the Pentagon.[287] In this way, the CIA air empire served as a private parallel network with policy direction firmly situated in Washington. These public-private partnerships fomented a parallel network of retired personnel willing to take on contracts for their previous public employers.

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[280] Grey, *Ghost Plane: The Inside Story of the CIAs Secret Rendition Program*, 112-113.
[281] See for example Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 62.
[282] J onathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott and Jane Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era* (London: South End Press, 1987), 196.
[283] Ibid. 196-198
[284] Ibid, 196-198; Also see Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 256-258; Ken Silverstein *Private Warriors* (New York: Verso, 2000), 187. See primary material at Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (Washington DC: US house of Representatives and US Senate, 1987)., 61.; Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran Contra Matters.* (Washington D.C.: United States Court of Appeals, 4 August, 1993) see Volume 1 Part V Chapter 9. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/ [Accessed 7 February 2012]
[285] See Robbins, *Air America*, 1. and Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 258.
[286] Robbins, *Air America*, 12.
[287] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 120.

Despite normally being associated with CIA covert operations, contracting to private airline companies (as well as to other PMCs) was not an insignificant or small venture. Air enterprises were contracted for a variety of missions both covert and overt by various branches of the US government throughout the Cold War. For example, CAT was contracted by the US Army and Air Force to help resupply French troops in Indochina in the 1950s.[288] William Leary notes how "While reluctant to commit American military personnel to the war in Indochina, the Eisenhower administration was anxious to assist the French. This led to a decision to use CAT pilots to fly an airlift in US Air Force-supplied C-119s."[289] Then, during US direct involvement in the Vietnam War, US Air Force, CIA, and the DoD, often hired AA to transport troops and supplies in various locations as well as occasionally run bombing missions and rescue operations of stranded military personnel in enemy territory.[290] So ubiquitous was AA that according to Robbins, at its height it was the biggest airline in the world in terms of how many planes it owned or had at its disposal.[291] The 1975 "Church Committee" report (a Senate inquiry into intelligence activities of the previous two decades), concluded that these companies were important components of US foreign policy in general (rather than simply tools of CIA covert activity), stating that the "use and past expansion of the proprietaries was a direct result of demands placed upon the Agency by Presidents, Secretaries of State and the policy mechanisms of government. This is particularly true of the large air proprietary complex used to support paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia."[292] Thus, public-private partnerships of this kind were an important facet of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations during the Cold War.

This very brief introduction to private aero-military companies has sought to highlight their relationship to US agencies. It claimed not only that they were important components of a broader para-state nexus in US foreign policy but were also the primary precursors to contemporary PMCs. The next sections will provide further empirical evidence supporting these claims and expand on the evolving relations between the US and private entities of various kinds in the conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.

Unconventional Warfare: Destabilization in Practice

In the early Cold War period, there were patterns to the way coercion was delegated to various parallel forces. Although local conditions colored the para-state nexus, resembling a bespoke package of outsourced statecraft, these relations usually consisted of combinations of paramilitary forces and mercenaries with a supporting infrastructure of CIA airlines. These airlines were an integral component in US paramilitary operations, delivering supplies to, training, and sometimes leading combat missions, militarily supporting US-sponsored guerrilla armies and paramilitary assets in Burma (Chinese nationalists brought to the country to invade China) (1951-1961), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Laos (1955-1974), Tibet (1956-1966), Cuba (1961), Vietnam (1962-1975), and many other locations.[293]

The US direction and support for a coup that overthrew Guatemala's democratically elected leader Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 serves as an example of these para-institutional

[288] Robbins, *Air America*, 37-39.
[289] Leary, *CIA Air Operations in Laos 1955-1974*
[290] Robbins, *Air America*, 37-39 and 239-241.
[291] Ibid., xii
[292] Church Committee Reports, *United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* (Washington D.C.: United State Senate, 1975), book 1, p. 206.
[293] For a detailed history of CIA propriety airlines and their connection to various CIA paramilitary operations see Robbins, *Air America.*; Leeker, *The History of Air America* (Ebook) Leary, *Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia*; also see Prados, *President's Secret Wars*. There is also a more complete reading list available at University of Dallas, *Air America and CAT Reading List*

arrangements. Threatened by the agrarian reform policies of the Arbenz government, the United Fruit company played an instrumental role in the overthrow of Arbenz by soliciting the support of the US to protect its economic interests against land appropriation as well as by helping to finance the Guatemalan generals who would ultimately lead an insurgency against the government.[294] Numerous recently declassified documents detail the CIA's covert role in the coup, titled Operation PBSUCCESS.[295] The CIA provided training and support in the creation of hit teams and the guerrilla armies which were responsible for conducting the coup composed of former Guatemalan military personnel and "foreign mercenaries" from neighboring countries such as Honduras.[296] Alongside this paramilitary capability, the CIA contracted CAT to conduct bombing raids on Guatemala.[297] Carlos Castillo Armas, the leader of the pro-US guerrilla force, did not have his own pilots or planes. The CIA hired pilots, some of them Chinese nationalists and others retired US military personnel from CAT, reportedly at $2,000 a month (roughly the equivalent to $17,000 today).[298] While not necessarily a decisive factor in the eventual overthrow of Arbenz, it is clear that the CAT combat air support was an important part of the insurrectionary force against Arbenz, bombing and attacking Guatemala's armed forces.[299] It had a psychological effect on the Arbenz government as an indication of the will and power of the guerrilla army. After this US unconventional warfare episode, Guatemala experienced 40 years of dictatorship complete with paramilitary death squads, torture, disappearances, supported with continued US counterinsurgency assistance against internal dissent.[300]

The covert status of these secret wars did not necessarily mean that they were small-scale operations. The protracted unconventional war in Laos, the largest paramilitary operation ever surmounted by the CIA up to that point, is another good example of the nexus between the US state and para-institutional phenomena. The US sought to counter Soviet and North Vietnamese influence in the region and in order to circumvent the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements on the expulsion of all foreign troops from Laos, Hmong tribes were trained and paid by the US military in the early 1960s. The famous Hmong leader Vang Pao, under agreements with the CIA managed to mobilize an army of around 40,000 Hmong tribesman at its height in the 1960s, trained and directed by the CIA and Special Forces.[301] This giant and elaborate paramilitary operation, known as the "Secret War" was conducted covertly, with concerted efforts made to conceal US involvement.

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[294] Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*

[295] K. Doyle and P. Kornbluh, "CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents," *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book*, No. 4, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/ (accessed April/10, 2011).

[296] See for example Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, 8-9.

[297] Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1989), 26.

[298] Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 71. Currency value updates performed by author.

[299] Ibid., 98-99

[300] See McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala*; Robert Parry, "History of Guatemala's Death Squads," *Consortium News* 11 January, 2005, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2005/011005.html (accessed 11 May 2011).; Also see National Security Archive, *The Guatemalan Military: What the US Files Reveal*, ed. Kate Doyle, 2000), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB32/index.html (accessed 11 May 2011).

[301] For a brief synopsis see "Laos," Globalsecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/laos.htm (accessed 1 Dec, 2011).; Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 261-296. For more detailed accounts see Thomas L. Jr Ahern, *Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos: 1961-1973* (Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam.asp (accessed 27 June 2011).; Kenneth Conboy, *Shadow War: The CIAs Secret War in Laos* (Paladin Press, 1995).

As was the case in other similar paramilitary operations, the US provided logistical support to the Hmong cadre through private aero-military contractors. The Hmong depended on Air America and Bird and Sons, which air-dropped food and equipment as well as served as a paramilitary transport air-wing for the "secret army" and US trainers and officials. These contractors were often put in the line of fire and sometimes conducted military missions. For example, CIA contracted planes reportedly flew clandestine bombing raids over Laos, dropping "hot soup", a concoction similar to napalm.[302] According to an official CIA historian, in 1964 Air America was "bombing and strafing enemy positions both east and west of the Plain of Jars" in place of US military to preserve an image of neutrality towards Laos in accordance with international treaties of the time.[303] The 1962 Geneva agreement was established to make Laos neutral. Yet the treaty was circumvented by both the North Vietnamese and the US.[304] The US, instead of intervening directly, violated the spirit of the Geneva agreements by operated through para-institutional means. Maintaining a perception of US neutrality and non-involvement was not, however, the only rationale behind forming and preserving links to parallel military structures. As former CIA Director Richard Helms pointed out, contracting in this way "was a much cheaper and better way to fight a war in Southeast Asia than to commit American troops."[305] However, the extent of the devastation for the Hmong people was immense, prompting hundreds of thousands of deaths and refugees: "For the Hmong, America's "war on the cheap" was a costly ordeal."[306] A more in-depth look at the delegation of force to para-institutional forces in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion against Castro's Cuba in 1961 provides further insight into the conditions that helped propel the formation and growth of the para-state nexus.

The Bay of Pigs Invasion: The Sources of a Para-Statal War Against Castro

The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba is illustrative of the early Cold War para-state nexus. The entire operation was based on the use of para-institutional forces outside conventional US military channels. These forces consisted of Cuban exiles (following the overthrow of Batista by Castro in 1959) used as irregular soldiers, support for guerrilla groups inside Cuba, complete with a supporting network of private airline companies for logistics and airborne attacks. Declassified US government and military documents as well as those from the CIA and other official sources at the higher echelons of government, reveal the strategic imperatives that helped forge the delegation of violence to para-institutional forces rather than the deployment of US troops.[307] The implementation of a para-institutional military plan was largely predicated on the success of previous paramilitary actions against Arbenz in Guatemala, and served as a model for future operations against Nicaragua in the 1980s.[308] Much like other unconventional warfare operations, it was designed specifically to ensure the perception of US non-involvement. Moreover, this case is representative of the way the use of parallel armed forces was borne out of covert CIA activity to steer the political

[302] See Leeker, *Air America in Laos III – in Combat*; and Robbins, *Air America*, 113.
[303] Ahern, *Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos: 1961-1973*, 191.
[304] Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 268.
[305] As quoted in Leary, *CIA Air Operations in Laos 1955-1974*
[306] James Dunigan and Albert Nofi, *Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), 185.
[307] See analysis below and Peter Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Bay of Pigs* (New York: New Press, 1998).; CIA, "CIA Bay of Pigs Release," CIA FOIA, http://www.foia.cia.gov/bay_of_pigs.asp (accessed December/9, 2011).; Peter Kornbluh, "The Ultrasensitive Bay of Pigs," *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book* No. 29, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB29/ (accessed December 11, 2011)
[308] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 5.

development of a small nation towards conditions more favorable to US objectives and interests.

The Eisenhower administration had supported the Batista government in Cuba throughout much of the 1950s in order to preserve "economic and political stability in Cuba as a means for promoting both U.S. commerce and security in the Caribbean world."[309] Yet Cuba during Batista's reign was characterized by repression and unstable inequalities in wealth when Castro's forces took control of the government in January 1959. Once in power, Castro proceeded to violently rid Cuba of Batista supporters, and under his direct control of the economy aimed at expropriating around $1 billion of American properties as part of an agrarian reform initiative.[310] These heavy handed tactics and communist-leaning modifications to Cuban society and economy incensed the Eisenhower administration and set in motion plans for the removal of Castro through paramilitary action.

On August 18, 1960, roughly a year after Castro's revolution, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to train, equip, and direct a collection of Cuban paramilitary fighters (Brigade 2506) and instructed the Pentagon to aid the CIA in training these fighters in guerrilla warfare in secret training camps in the US and Guatemala.[311] According to a declassified document of the 5412 Committee (the US committee in charge of devising a proposal for paramilitary action against Castro's Cuba) a number of proposals were designed for the "replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention."[312] However, despite the stated justification and assumption that the US would be operating in the "true interests of the Cuban people," the primary means through which the "replacement of the Castro regime" was to be accomplished was to "induce, support and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative."[313] In other words, rather than merely support existing revolutionary processes within and outside of Cuba to rid the country of Castro, the US planned to conduct a paramilitary war under its own initiative and direction. According to 5412 Committee report, *A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime*, the paramilitary operation was to be supplemented by "mechanisms for the necessary logistic support."[314] These "support mechanisms" were constituted primarily by private aviation companies connected to the CIA. In addition to this, the document further states that a "powerful propaganda offensive" should be initiated so that "Castro's basis of popular support [is] undermined."[315]

Because using official military aircraft for logistical purposes in preparations for the invasion would reveal US complicity, Allen Dulles (the then director of the CIA) approved the purchase of the outstanding shares of Southern Air Transport (SAT), for $307,506.[316] Much like other similar existing companies at that time, such as CAT or AA, purchasing the shares of SAT effectively rendered it under CIA control. While still technically a private business run on a for-profit basis by former military members or ex-CIA personnel, it was directed by the CIA for the purposes of logistics, and its planes would be used later for

[309] H. Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9.
[310] Ibid., 10
[311] Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 180.
[312] 5412 Committee, *A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime* (Washington D.C.: Department of State,[1960]), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cable/cable-3-16-60.htm. (accessed 24 January 2012)
[313] Ibid.
[314] Ibid.
[315] Ibid.
[316] See Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 184.

combat and bombing operations.[317] SAT (which later became a subsidiary of Air America and used in various other paramilitary operations[318]) provided airplanes for the transportation of Cuban paramilitary fighters and supplies to a secret training base in Guatemala.[319] Under CIA direction, further planes were leased or bought from similar CIA affiliated companies such as Air Asia and AA. These airlines procured "non-attributable" (to the US) planes, which meant removing any identification such as serial numbers that could trace it to any company in the US or to the CIA.[320] As Fletcher Prouty explains, the planes assembled for the invasion from various companies "had been 'sanitized' and was the pride of the clandestine operators' art. It could have been flown anywhere in the world, and if it had been lost on some clandestine mission, the finder – whether he was Cuban, Congolese, or Russian – might have assumed that it had been operated by Americans, but he would not have been able to prove it."[321] Such airlines were also used for resupply missions to a guerrilla underground movement in the Escambray mountains within Cuba which had conducted numerous terrorist attacks against the Castro regime with CIA support.[322] Finally, at the direct request of the President, no Americans were allowed in combat roles to prevent revealing the US role in the invasion.[323] Consequently, the CIA collaborated with the US Air Force and private businesses to train Cuban pilots and mechanics for aerial combat operations during the invasion under a para-institutional air force called the *Fuerza Aérea de Liberación.*[324] In short, the primary support mechanisms for this operation, like others after it, were constituted by non-governmental private entities with contractual obligations under the CIA and DoD.

The desire to maintain the perception of US non-involvement was one of the principal factors in delegating the Cuban intervention to para-institutional forces. US planners made specific efforts to ensure US involvement would not be exposed, but Kennedy in particular demanded that no US personnel was to be directly involved to avoid US casualties and US exposure in the plot.[325] So much so was the preoccupation with denying US involvement that the CIA initially told members of the Cuban paramilitary force that it was a Cuban millionaire who was paying and directing the invasion, not the US.[326] Inevitably, of course, it became clear to the members of Brigade 2506 that the US was in fact bank-rolling and directing the operation.[327] According to one declassified report, US personnel were forbidden to pilot planes and thereby actively participate in hostilities for fear of disclosing the US role behind the scenes. Instead, US contractors were initially allowed to pilot planes, but this was then later prohibited as well[328] (these rules were broken and a few US contractors from Air America did participate in the end).[329] Similarly, CAT, which was earlier hired for bombing

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[317] Joe Leeker, "Air America at the Bay of Pigs," in *The History of Air America* (Dallas: University of Texas, 2010), http://www.utdallas.edu/library/collections/speccoll/Leeker/history/BayOfPigs.pdf.

[318] Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 329.

[319] Leeker, *Air America at the Bay of Pigs*, 2-3.; Moor, *Then Came the CIA: The Early Years of Southern Air Transport*; Colonel J. Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba 17 March 1960 - May 1961* (Washington D.C.: CIA, 1961), 12.

[320] See Leeker, *Air America at the Bay of Pigs*, 3.

[321] Fletcher Prouty, *The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control of The United States and the World*, 1997), Chapter 2, http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/ST.html#TOC. (accessed 12 November, 2011)

[322] Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba 17 March 1960 - May 1961*, 12.; Leeker, *The History of Air America* (Ebook), AA in the Bay of Pigs p. 8-9.

[323] See for instance Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 184.; Jones, *The Bay of Pigs*

[324] Leeker, *Air America at the Bay of Pigs*

[325] See for example Prados, *President's Secret Wars,* 180.

[326] Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1965), 37.

[327] Ibid., 81

[328] Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba 17 March 1960 - May 1961*, 7, 13, 43.

[329] Leeker, *Air America at the Bay of Pigs*

raids in the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala, had recruited Chinese nationalists to train some of the Cuban exile pilots in order to limit the amount of US personnel involved in the operation.[330]

The Schlesinger Memorandum, a memo provided to Kennedy by one of his senior aides, Arthur Schlesinger, one week prior to the invasion, underscored the extent to which policy makers in Washington valued the ability for the US to appear uninvolved in the attempts to overthrow Castro: "Our problem is how to protect the… impression of the United States as a mature and liberal nation, opposed to imperialism and colonialism and dedicated to justice, peace and freedom. The operational contribution to this effort – i.e. Cubanizing the operation and doing nothing which would be inconsistent with a spontaneous Cuban effort – has been worked out with skill and care."[331] One of the primary concerns behind avoiding US direct complicity in the Bay of Pigs invasion and thus the delegation of the operation to para-institutional forces was preserving an image of US restraint to international audiences. Colonel Hawkins, in his official military report on the lessons learnt from the failed invasion, goes as far as to argue that the preoccupation with maintaining plausible denial obstructed operational success by limiting the number of US personnel and divesting responsibility to paramilitary fighters with less combat experience.[332]

Part of this concern was the lack of domestic and international support for conducting such an operation. It is worth citing the Schlesinger Memorandum at length here:

> However 'Cuban' the operation will seem to be, the US will be held accountable for it before the bar of world opinion: Our own press has seen to that. Beyond this, there is an obstinate fact: A great many people simply do not at this moment see that Cuba presents so grave and compelling a threat to our national security as to justify a course of action which much of the world will interpret as calculated aggression against a small nation in defiance both of treaty obligations and of the international standards we have repeatedly asserted against the communist world.[333]

This contributed to the decision to attempt to keep the paramilitary operation secret. While more generally, Schlesinger's memo reveals a lack of popular support for an invasion, public approval for a paramilitary operation was also scant. In this particular case, as in others, keeping the operation covert by operating through private entities was a strategic imperative. However, despite efforts to secure secrecy and deny US involvement, before the event even took place much evidence suggesting US complicity had already surfaced. Plans for the invasion in 1960 began to emerge through leaks with those involved in the plot and exposed through various media accounts of training locations in Guatemala.[334]

A further aspect of denying US responsibility was shielding the President from harboring the ultimate responsibility for authorizing the plan. The Schlesinger memorandum further suggests that in order to shield the President from criticism and to preserve a favorable image in US public and world opinion, "someone other than the President make the final decision and so in his absence - someone whose head can later be placed on the block if things go terribly wrong."[335] Again, however, as John Prados points out, "Mechanisms

[330] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*, 27.
[331] Arthur Schlesinger, *Memorandum for the President*, (1961), http://www.parascope.com/articles/1296/baydocs.htm#memo (accessed 9 Sept 2011).
[332] Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba*
[333] Schlesinger, *Memorandum for the President*, 2.
[334] See for example Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 188, 194.
[335] Schlesinger, *Memorandum for the President*, 6.

designed to preserve plausible deniability had deteriorated to such a degree that the President allowed himself to become a principal participant in special group discussions of the Cuban operation."[336] Indeed, according to Jones, President Kennedy was intimately involved in the planning process and the authorization of the invasion in April 1961.[337] Similarly, during private conversations within the Executive, questions concerning the legality of promoting an invasion by a private militia force were dismissed by terminological obfuscation. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy rebuffed claims that it might be against US neutrality laws as well as international law by stating that the Cuban exiles were "patriots", (much like the "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua during the 1980s), and claimed that these laws were outdated for the requirements of the contemporary international situation.[338]

Avoiding escalation of conflict with the USSR was also calculated into the decisions to outsource this operation to para-institutional agents. Kennedy's official stance that US troops were not to be used was largely based on avoiding major conflagration with the USSR and jeopardizing US interests elsewhere.[339] Again, according to the Schlesinger memo, if the US were forced to commit US troops, it "would have presented the Soviet Union with an American Hungary." Therefore, it was argued in this US governmental report that steps should be made to protect against involvement and "convince the Cuban leaders that in no foreseeable circumstances will we send in US troops."[340] Moreover, this memo further states that "If Castro flies a group of captured Cubans to New York to testify that they were organized and trained by the CIA, we will have to be prepared to show that the alleged CIA personnel were errant idealists or soldiers of fortune working on their own."[341] During the Bay of Pigs operation itself, Soviet leader Khrushchev issued a warning to Kennedy proclaiming that "It is not a secret to anyone that the armed bands which invaded that country have been trained, equipped and armed in the United States of America. The planes which bomb Cuban cities belong to the United States of America... We shall render the Cuban people and their Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba."[342] In response, Kennedy restated earlier claims that "The United States intends no military intervention in Cuba," and urged the Premier to avoid escalation of conflict.[343] This exchange perhaps epitomizes the sensitive nature of Cold War realities, but also serves to highlight the ways in which para-institutional agents and organizations were used as an alternative to direct military action, and ultimately, in this case, avoiding a large-scale war with the USSR.

When the recently elected President Kennedy authorized the invasion in April 1961, around 1,500 irregular Cuban troops attempted to storm a number of beaches in Cuba reinforced with their own privately run air support and fleet of boats with US gunboats remaining in the background.[344] The Cuban paramilitaries, assembled, trained, armed and directed by US personnel, functioned like a private proxy force in support of US objectives. Moreover, a layer of private institutions such as CIA air suppliers was deemed a central component of the operation.[345] While the ground forces largely failed to secure Cuban

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[336] Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 192.Ibid., 192
[337] See Jones, *The Bay of Pigs*
[338] Taken from McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*
[339] See Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs*, 9.
[340] Schlesinger, *Memorandum for the President*, 8.
[341] Ibid.
[342] As quoted in Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs*, 151.
[343] See Ibid., 152
[344] Alejandro de Quesada, *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009).
[345] Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 184, 195.

beaches, CAT crew and Cuban pilots continued bombing assaults on the second day of the invasion in attempts to demobilize Castro's Air Force and Army.[346] CAT used two American contract pilots (amongst six planes) to attack and bomb Cuban forces at "Red Beach" in support of the militia invasion force, violating the Presidential demand for US personnel non-involvement.[347] Despite the intense efforts of the irregular forces when the invasion failed the US and its role was ultimately exposed.[348]

Although the Bay of Pigs invasion failed to achieve the desired objectives, it represented a step towards the formation of a para-institutional infrastructure on which the US would later increasingly rely. For instance, the CIA purchase of SAT shares further established a precedent and basis to conduct covert aviation operations through private means. SAT would immediately go on to expand operations in South East Asia and Latin America, winning a 3.7 million dollar contract with the US Air Force in the mid 1960s to transport passengers and cargo in Asia.[349] Contracts for private airlines affiliated with the CIA rapidly expanded in the early and mid-1960s and according to a *Time Magazine* article at its peak was around double the size of TWA, "employing nearly 20,000 people (as many as the CIA itself) and operating some 200 planes."[350] SAT also continued to operate in Latin America in various missions, such as in Nicaragua, as well as further afield in Angola, amongst others. But at least as important were the long lasting public-private connections in and out of the government that were forged through such public-private alliances. For instance, George Doole, who was the CEO of AA, CAT and others, was not only a former US Army pilot, but also a CIA officer, working with private operators to manage and direct these airline assets.[351]

Furthermore, some of the surviving members of the Cuban paramilitary invasion force went on to serve as contractors for the CIA and other US agencies. Others continued to operate under their own initiatives. The para-state nexus in this second case took on an extended life of its own, as many of the individuals affiliated with the Bay of Pigs invasion continued their various activities long after the official abandonment of the regime change policy. Successor anti-Castro groups emerged such as Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU), Alpha 66 and Omega 7. Some of these individuals and private organizations were later used for subsequent covert operations elsewhere in Latin America, others were private initiatives the US were unaffiliated with but turned a blind eye to. Felix Rodriguez, for instance, worked as a paramilitary organizer and trainer in subsequent operations in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, the Congo and Nicaragua, and was involved in the tracking and assassination of Che Guevara in Bolivia alongside US agents.[352] Luis Posada, perhaps the most famous former CIA asset (1961-1967) as part of the brigade 2506 invasion force at the Bay of Pigs and a trained demolition expert was later acknowledged to be the mastermind behind the bombing of a Cuban Airline killing 73 people in 1976, with, according to declassified documents, full CIA advanced knowledge of the plan.[353] Posada was also involved in a number of other bombing plots and terrorist attacks against Castro and

[346] Leeker, *Air America at the Bay of Pigs*, 18.
[347] Jones, *The Bay of Pigs*, 115.
[348]Ibid., 101, 131
[349] Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 231.
[350] Thomas, *In Arizona: A Spymaster Remembered*
[351] Ibid.
[352] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*, 74.
[353] Peter Kornbluh, "Luis Posada Carriles: The Declassified Record," *The National Security Archive*, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB153/index.htm (accessed 2 August, 2011). Peter Kornbluh, "The Posada File: Part II," *The National Security Archive*, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB157/index.htm (accessed 2 August, 2011).

Cuban nationals.[354] One of these included planting bombs in Panama for which he was arrested and sentenced to 8 years in prison.[355] Despite this, he was kept in cahoots with the CIA and was later hired by Col. North to aid the Iran-Contra resupply efforts in the late 1980s.[356] Another "freedom fighter", ex-CIA operative, and friend of Posada, Orlando Bosch headed another anti-Castro terrorist organization. CORU continued operations, and have been linked to the same bombing attack on the Cuban airline as well as terrorist activities in the Miami area.[357] According to a 1993 US Department of Justice report, many of these actors operated under the assumption that they had tacit or implicit support from the US government, based on the fact that they had received training and direction to commit these types of acts in the past.[358]

In sum, the Bay of Pigs invasion was conducted by a collection of Cuban citizens and a selection of private airline companies with long-term connections to the CIA, DoD, and other US agencies. In other words, the operation was delegated or outsourced both "downwards" (to Cuban paramilitaries) and "outwards" (to the airline companies that procured planes and pilots). This formed only part of a wider dynamic: that of a nexus between the US state and a variety of para-institutional phenomena in the projection of US military capability abroad. Such patterns continued throughout many covert interventions in the 1980s including Nicaragua (1981-1989), Afghanistan (1979-1990), and Angola (1975-1976).[359] The delegation of force to para-institutional groups formed the backbone of many US covert operations offering the plausible deniability and avoiding the political complications that the commitment of US troops would not. Similar dynamics informed the paramilitarization of counterinsurgency warfare.

Counterinsurgency and the Para-State Nexus

While US unconventional warfare practices relied almost exclusively on surrogates and private airlines, para-institutional phenomena such as paramilitaries, self-defense forces, militias and indigenous tribes represented a significant component of the counterinsurgent dimension of US political warfare during the Cold War. Given the threat of communist-inspired and nationalist subversion and insurgency and thus the potential for "radical" groups to pressure for unfavorable reforms, the stabilization of pro-US regimes through counterinsurgency assistance formed a centerpiece of US coercive strategy towards the South. Although much of this aid went to host country security forces to bolster their internal policing capabilities, US military doctrine imparted to recipient countries through military training and funding emphasized the importance of the creation of paramilitary forces and recruiting local civilians into "self-defense" roles and other methods of civilianizing the counterinsurgency effort. There is an extended history in which the US has directed, trained, and/or supported a variety of paramilitary agents and supported the use of "irregular" assets in concert with "official" local forces. The historical record demonstrates that these forces, often operating as death squads, have proved to be an integral component of US *supported* counterinsurgency campaigns (as opposed to direct counterinsurgency intervention)

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[354] Tim Weiner, "Cuban Exile could Test US Definition of Terrorist," *New York Times* 9 May, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/09/national/09exile.html (accessed 1 August 2011).
[355] P eter Kornbluh and Erin. Maskell, "The CIA File on Luis Posada Carriles," *The National Security Archive*, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB334/index.htm (accessed March, 2011).
[356] Documents 14 and 15 at Kornbluh, *Luis Posada Carriles: The Declassified Record*
[357] Kornbluh, *The Posada File: Part II* Document 12 of Kornbluh and Maskell, *The CIA File on Luis Posada Carriles*
[358] US Department of Justice, *Omega 7* (Washington DC: US Department of Justice and FBI, 1993), http://cuban-exile.com/doc_001-025/doc0011.html (accessed 12 March 2011).
[359] See for instance Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 341-348, 357-360.

throughout the global South including in Greece, the Philippines, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Argentina and others. In some cases, and in US directed counterinsurgency campaigns such as in South Vietnam, these counterinsurgency lessons were implemented directly by the CIA, Special Forces, and other US agencies that mobilized, trained, and directed local paramilitary surrogates to support the overall counterinsurgency effort. Much like unconventional warfare operations, these counterinsurgency endeavors were also often supplemented by private military companies and mercenary outfits. The way in which these parallel forces sprouted from and functioned in accordance with efforts to stabilize pro-US state formations constitutes an important component of the para-state nexus.

This section seeks to explain how the paramilitarization of US directed and supported counterinsurgency constitutes a central feature of a para-state nexus in which para-institutional phenomena play a crucial role in the projection of US coercive strategies and ultimately in the constitution and maintenance of US hegemony. The delegation of force to para-institutional groups either directly through US agencies' coordination or indirectly through local militaries is consistent with patterns of delegation of coercion to non-state forces in the preservation of state formations conducive to US foreign policy objectives. Paramilitary fighters, although inextricably intertwined with localized dynamics, are central to the US Open Door strategy as covered in chapter two. Thus this para-state nexus during the Cold War was part of US "Foreign Internal Defense" policy towards "friendly" countries deemed to be threatened by internal "subversion" and insurgency. The US connection to paramilitary forces in counterinsurgency roles reflected a nexus between the US and para-institutional forces in which US coercive reach was extended outside conventional military means.

The Para-State Nexus and US-Paramilitary Connections

US para-state connections have already been documented extensively by numerous reporters and scholars. Chomsky and Herman, for instance, have argued in a number of studies that the US state has presided over networks of shadowy individuals and groups in the conduct of its foreign policy.[360] More explicitly, historian Greg Grandin has argued that outsourcing to paramilitary counterinsurgent groups in Latin America and Vietnam was consistent with broader patterns in US policy "to farm out its imperial violence."[361] The paramilitarization of US-supported counterinsurgency efforts is generally explained in two ways. First, as was often the case, US Special Forces and CIA were directed to liaise with indigenous "irregular" paramilitary groups and militia organizations to supplement the "regular" host countries' counterinsurgency campaigns.[362] Secondly, and more indirectly, the counterinsurgency lessons imparted to foreign military personnel through counterinsurgency training outlined the need to create paramilitary groups under concepts such as "counter-organization" and mobilizing civilian self-defense forces. In other words, there is an indirect US-paramilitary connection in the training of foreign forces to use such groups, with local official armed forces, being the main beneficiaries of US counterinsurgency assistance, serving as a conduit through which this nexus is formed.

While the direct relationship in outsourcing in unconventional warfare operations to private airline companies and paramilitary assets is clear in the cases outlined in the previous section, the picture of US connection to and use of paramilitary formations in

[360] Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*; Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda* , 252.
[361] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 88.
[362] See for instance Rosenau, *US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order*

counterinsurgency settings is often more complex, and further explanation of how paramilitary groups constitute or help form part of a para-state nexus functioning towards a US-led global order is needed. Unconventional warfare operations represent a more direct form of US interventionism with US agencies contracting private enterprises and training paramilitary groups as a para-extension of its coercive apparatus, but the US-paramilitary connection in support of foreign internal defense is less straight forward. The issue of assessing the US role in the formation and use of paramilitary forces in US supported counterinsurgency operations is complex, and most existing analyses reside on the impact of US training of foreign forces in counterinsurgency and the framing of the threat of subversion through a Cold War lens.[363] However, while it may be important to qualify these various relations between US counterinsurgency assistance and local paramilitary forces for analytical purposes, the para-state nexus itself more closely describes the ways in which para-institutional phenomena are central to the constitution of a US-led global order. In essence, regardless of the different types of US-paramilitary connections in counterinsurgency situations, such localized counterinsurgent para-institutional forces are instrumental to the overall host-country counterinsurgency effort, and by extension the stabilization of state arrangements geared towards US interests.

The conceptualization of a para-state nexus thus encompasses a wider spectrum of privatized violence. It is not limited to instances of determinable US-paramilitary connections (although in many cases there are), but rather describes a nexus between US counterinsurgency coercive strategies and para-institutional forces as a broader concurrence of force. This ample conceptualization of a nexus between US foreign policy and counterinsurgent paramilitary formations allows for a broader understanding of their coincidence. It also helps avoid the necessity of a detailed analysis of the causal relationship between US agencies and paramilitary formations (as there may be many complex histories). Indeed, in some cases no direct relation may exist. At times this association may also seem contradictory as US forces simultaneously condemn the actions of paramilitary agents whilst preserving the possibilities for their existence (this will be clear in the next chapter in examination of US connections to paramilitary groups in Colombia). The para-state nexus within US-supported counterinsurgency campaigns is therefore an amorphous phenomenon in US foreign policy substantiated and sustained through various connections between the US counterinsurgency coercive strategy and paramilitary groups. Yet, as we shall see, the lessons for paramilitary proscriptions in US counterinsurgency doctrine and training imparted to local host country militaries serves as the best indicator of the broader counterinsurgency framework in which paramilitary formations arise.

Special Forces and CIA Paramilitary Policies: Direct Connections

In the first instance, US Special Forces and the CIA were often dispatched to liaise directly with and mobilize, train, direct, and sometimes even fight alongside indigenous paramilitary groups. The Special Forces were designed specifically as an elite military institution to train both official host country military forces in counterinsurgency as well as paramilitary forces. As Michael McClintock describes, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), which are a contingent of Special Forces dispatched to the counterinsurgency theatre "worked with both conventional forces and the civilian paramilitary irregulars that would become the

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[363] Blakeley, *Still Training to Torture? US Training of Military Forces from Latin America*, 1439-1461.; Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*, 49-50. See also Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas*; *McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*; Mott, *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective*

mainstay of counterinsurgency."[364] Special Force training manuals of the early Cold War detail their role in training and directing paramilitary groups, in both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare settings. For example, FM 31-21 (1969) details Special Forces role in training paramilitary groups to operate according unconventional warfare principles: "Organizing, equipping, training, and directing paramilitary or irregular forces in stability operations has many similarities with the activities in the development and combat employment of a guerrilla force for which Special Forces detachments are trained."[365] Moreover, many official Special Force training manuals had blatant titles relating to their paramilitary roles. Manuals such as *Covert Paramilitary Training Course* (1952) and *The Para-Military Manual Field Handbook* (FM-8000-1, May 1954) amongst other classified handbooks detail how to mobilize, train and direct paramilitary groups.[366] Thus there was often overt and/or covert support for parallel-military organizations outside of the official chains of command of either the US or the militaries it was sustaining.

The relative importance of paramilitary operations as a coercive tactic or tool has ebbed and flowed in accordance with the prominence of counterinsurgency in US foreign policy. Under the Kennedy administration for example, with the concomitant emphasis on counterinsurgency, financing of Special Forces increased to augment US paramilitary capabilities. More specifically, this Special Force build-up was geared towards the augmentation of US paramilitary capabilities and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was ordered to re-direct $100 million "to expand and reorient the existing forces for 'paramilitary and sub-limited or unconventional wars,' such as require guerrilla fighters with special skills and foreign language fluency."[367] The CIA was also instructed to covertly support paramilitary action. As we shall see, such paramilitary proscriptions were a significant component of the Reagan administration's national security agenda through another Special Force build-up.

US-Paramilitary Nexus: Military Training and Indirect Connections

US counterinsurgency doctrine and training to countries in the South during the Cold War openly advocated the cultivation of ties between local state security forces and paramilitary groups. Paramilitary units were envisioned as a principal outsourced means for the state security apparatus to extend its coercive reach, often with plausible deniability, as well as an expedient counterinsurgency method to separate insurgents from the local population. Thus, US training programs and military aid to pro-US regimes are important in framing the counterinsurgent initiative in particular ways that facilitate its paramilitarization. The application of counterinsurgency lessons and the resulting organization of host security forces is part of this process. In this way, there is an indirect manner in which the US state and counterinsurgency strategies can be said to form a nexus with paramilitary forces and other non-state military agents.

Although it is difficult to accurately assess the impact of military training and financing on the likelihood that such tactics will necessarily be used[368] such training frames the problems of insurgency in particular ways and the methods to counter it, including the

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[364] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 187.
[365] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations: FM 31-21*, 10-2.
[366] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 44.
[367] As quoted in Ibid., 163
[368] See for instance Blakeley, *Still Training to Torture? US Training of Military Forces from Latin America*, 1439-1461.

paramilitary option. US military planners envisioned and planned for the entire restructuring of local security forces in the South according to US counterinsurgent models. One SOA manual, for instance, highlighted the perceived influence of military to military ties:

> Even when the military forces of the host country are not organized in accord with the United States military system, the doctrine developed and tested by United States agencies can prove useful in many of the world's nations. The Chief of Mission and brigade commandeers should encourage the military chiefs of the host country to adopt organizations similar to those that have been proven to be efficient in countering guerrilla forces.[369]

Indeed, the extent of the influence of US doctrine and training in terms of both military organization as well as proclivity for use of paramilitary units is evident in the internal security structures of allied counterinsurgent countries during this time, including South Vietnam and many others in Central and South America.[370] The US counterinsurgency doctrine served as a virtual blueprint for the military organization of local security forces. Thus an examination of this doctrine will further elucidate the logic and motivations behind the perceived need to work with paramilitary groups.

US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Paramilitary Option.

The paramilitary option forms a central plank of the counterinsurgency blueprint as envisioned by US military planners. The mobilization of the local population into paramilitary formations as projected within the concept of "counter-organization" against insurgent forces and their political project is a vital component of US counterinsurgency theory. As counterinsurgency expert Michael McClintock explains, "counter-organization" was an unambiguous politico-military strategy to bolster local "official" or "regular" security forces as well as a "basis through which a neutral – or suspect – population could be regimented and controlled" through the "mobilization of sympathetic social sectors on the counterinsurgent's behalf."[371] A cursory review of this US counterinsurgency doctrine reveals three interlinked strategic logics underpinning the use of paramilitary agents. Firstly, local indigenous civilians and other civil groups had a unique advantage in counter-guerrilla action and intelligence gathering missions as their knowledge of the local population, culture, and terrain made them important assets in "separating the fish from the sea". Secondly, as para-institutional military forces were sometimes not directly associated with the regular military or armed forces, paramilitary formations were well positioned to conduct the coercive and unconventional measures perceived necessary to eliminate the insurgency and dissolve its civilian support base. Much like in unconventional warfare, by distancing itself from the actions undertaken by paramilitary forces, the state can plausibly deny responsibility for them. This was deemed critical in the struggle to win the support of the local population. An intended function of paramilitarism arises out of the tension between the objective of gaining legitimacy and support from the local population for the host government and the coercive tactics perceived necessary to defeat an insurgency. Finally, mobilizing and arming local civilian "self-defense" organizations as paramilitary fighters was an explicit strategy to persuade the members of these forces and others in the local area to actively support the government.

[369] US Army School of the Americas, *Operaciones de Conraguerrilla FM 31-16* Fort Gulick, Panama, June 1968 As quoted in McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990,* 244.
[370] Ibid., 243
[371] Ibid., 243

US counterinsurgency instruction manuals imparted to pro-US regimes during the Cold War thus advocated the mobilization of the civilian population into paramilitary self-defense, civil defense, and other "irregular" forces in order to support or supplement official or "regular" counterinsurgency forces. For example, alongside the local military, civil police and other "official" structures US Army field manual (FM) 31-15 (1961) advocates training of both self-defense forces and "friendly" guerrillas in the military and political defeat of the insurgency. It states that "agents are recruited among the local residents of the operational area. They have an intimate knowledge of the local populace, conditions, and terrain, and often have prior knowledge of, or connections with members of the irregular force."[372] Similarly, a US marine manual highlights the need to use "allied forces" wherever possible which are "native to the area" under the rationale that "their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable."[373] Another training document, FM 31-16 (1967), states that "the organization of the paramilitary force may be similar to regular armed forces," yet is to be "constituted from indigenous volunteers whose knowledge of the terrain and people is equal to that of the guerrilla." This manual continues to detail the role of "irregular forces" which "include organized youth groups, auxiliary political organizations and part-time, armed civilian militia... may be mobilized, trained, and armed to supplement the military."[374] Amongst the other para-institutional actors or non-state groups it advises using are "tribal groups" and "friendly guerrilla forces".[375] Similarly, FM 31-23 (1972) sees that "Paramilitary forces may be organized or expanded to augment the police or the armed forces."[376] Therefore, as part of this paramilitary capability, counterinsurgency planners are instructed to implement "counter-organization"[377] or "consolidation"[378] campaigns, which actively involve civilian "irregular", "paramilitary", or "friendly guerrilla" forces and "self-defense units" in support of the "regular" armed forces.[379] "Counter-organization", in this way, envisages networks of civilian paramilitary fighters, local self-defense units, and informants to be used at all levels of the counterinsurgency effort. One manual advises exploiting "schoolboy patrols" and using children in intelligence-gathering networks.[380] The use of paramilitary and civilian self-defense forces and other "irregular" groups outside of the conventional military chain of command was a central tenet throughout the US counterinsurgency doctrine during the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond.[381] As extensively documented by McClintock, this often constituted a form of "counter-terror" in order to

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[372] U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations Against Irregular Forces: FM 31-15* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1961), 36.

[373] U.S. Department of the Navy/Marine Corps, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces FMFM 21* (Washington D.C.: Department of Marine Corps, 1962, 1965), 74.

[374] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 31-16* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1967), 4, 40.

[375] Ibid., 40

[376] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: FM 31-23* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1972).

[377] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 31-16*, 40. and U.S. Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces: FM 31-22* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1963), 19, 82.

[378] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: FM 31-23*, 8-8.1..

[379] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 31-16*, 40. and U.S. Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces: FM 31-22*, 19, 82.; U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: FM 31-23*, Section 8.

[380] U.S. Department of the Army, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations FM 31-21* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1961).

[381] See for instance U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 90-8* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986). U.S. Department of the Army, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Warfare: FM 100-20*; U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict: FM 7-98* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1992).

challenge the entire social, political, and ideological components of an insurgency, and served as a virtual recipe for the paramilitary "death squad" agents that were operational in El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, and Guatemala.[382]

As already covered above, paramilitary forces were either mobilized by US agencies directly, normally the Special Forces, or by local host nation military structures. FM 31-20 (1965) titled *Special Forces Operations Techniques* describes how Special Forces are particularly tailored to "Train, advise, and provide operational assistance to indigenous Special Forces detachments, ranger-type units, paramilitary forces, and other military forces."[383] It further indicates that such units usually include "people from rural areas, ethnic minorities, and other miscellaneous groups such as workmen's militia, youth organizations, and female auxiliaries" and are to be trained in "guerrilla operations" including "hunter-killer", "ambush" (a euphemism for terrorist attacks) with the use of improvised explosive devices, and raid techniques. [384] Special Force manual FM 31-21 (1965) contains an identical description of the detachment's duties but continues to outline how the regular US armed forces should take up the mantle of training "indigenous military and paramilitary forces" as soon as operationally feasible.[385] Where there is no direct link between Special Forces and civilian irregular paramilitary forces there is a clear indication that they should train local "regular" military command structures to mobilize and incorporate para-institutional forces into the overall counterinsurgency effort. Special Forces serve as "advisors to indigenous special forces, provincial authorities, and tribal leaders in the recruitment, organization, equipping training, and operational employment of host country tribal elements or ethnic minority groups."[386]

In order to properly elucidate the rationales for paramilitary forces it is necessary to further analyze a few key components of this counterinsurgency doctrine. Specifically, counterinsurgency was understood by US planners as a protracted politico-military strategy to simultaneously militarily defeat the insurgent movement and gain political legitimacy from the local population for the host nation. The envisioned means of accomplishing this was through a combination of military, population and resource control measures, psychological operations and civic actions. The aim in this quest for legitimacy in counterinsurgency warfare was stabilizing "friendly" government control and insulating it from oppositional subversion and dissent "from below". However, the ultimate objective, as some military manuals describe the desired end state of stability, is "national unity" [387] where no substantial ideological, political, or military challenge to the existing state structures exists.

This distinctly political and ideological focus places civilian activities firmly at the center of counterinsurgent attention. As many scholars have already documented, unarmed oppositional political and social movements are often portrayed in the counterinsurgency doctrine as potentially subversive. Stokes and Raphael show that at the "heart of counterinsurgency doctrine has long been an identification of unarmed elements from within civil society – in clear distinction from armed insurgents – as a threat to desired stability."[388] Similarly, in an analysis of training manuals used to instruct foreign military personnel in

[382] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 10.
[383] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operational Techniques: FM 31-20*, 68.
[384] Ibid., 70 See end of manual for the use of incendiary devices.
[385] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operations: FM 31-21*, 183.
[386] U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Operational Techniques: FM 31-20*, 181. U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 31-16*, 86.
[387] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: FM 31-23*, 1-1.
[388] Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 65.

counterinsurgency warfare at the School of Americas during the 1990s Lisa Haugaard notes that there exists a clear "lack of distinction between civilian movements and armed rebellion."[389] In this manner, unions, political organizations and parties, certain educational systems and other unarmed civilian activities are characterized as potentially "hostile" and "subversive" and thus constitute valid counterinsurgency targets. Michael McClintock has documented similar identifications in his extensive analysis of US military manuals imparted to recipient host government militaries.[390]

Particularly problematic for the counterinsurgent is the insurgent attempts to use democratic processes to institute political change. For example, one 1989 manual used to train Latin American forces claims:

> "The insurgents try to influence the direction, control and authority that is exercised over the nation in general and in the administration of the political system. The insurgents are active in the areas of political nominations, political organizations, political education, and judicial laws. They can resort to subverting the government by means of elections in which the insurgents cause the replacement of an unfriendly government official to one favorable to their cause."[391]

Similarly, a US Army (1972) manual entitled *Stability Operations*, states that an insurgent movement political party "will attempt to create fronts (or coalitions) of the mass civil organizations to serve the party's interest and gain wide-spread support for its drive to destroy the government." Such organizations, the manual informs us, consist of "student groups, unions, youth organizations, political parties, professional associations, and possibly religious groups or women's associations. Many of them will have patriotic or democratic names."[392] Statements such as these, prevalent throughout much of the counterinsurgency doctrine, reveal the extent to which particular political and social activities and identities are considered detrimental to the desired order. It also reveals the politically-charged ideological impetus behind the counterinsurgent effort to gain support for the government. But perhaps most striking is the endorsement of the suppression of legitimate democratic movements in cases where they may yield outcomes at odds with US interests. This highlights an interesting tension between liberal ideational drivers of US policy and the imperatives to create and maintain desirable state forms abroad.

With the civilian population as the central focus, counterinsurgency combines military campaigns as well as psychological operations and civic actions in order to gain control over a given population towards suppressing and ultimately defeating an insurgency and its political components. This often involves stringent control measures in order to extirpate the armed insurgents from the local population that may be supporting it. This process is, borrowing from Maoist revolutionary philosophy, described as analogous to "separate the fish from the sea". Counterinsurgency strategists advise the local military forces to implement programs for the "relocation of those persons of doubtful sympathy" and the

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[389] Lisa Haugaard, "Declassified Army and CIA Manuals used in Latin America: An Analysis of their Content," Latin America Working Group (1997), http://www.totse.com/en/politics/central_intelligence_agency/162408.html (accessed 17 April 2011).

[390] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*; McClintock, *American Doctrine and Counterinsurgent State Terror*

[391] Revolutionary War, Guerrillas and Communist Ideology, 1989. p. 51 as quoted in Haugaard, *Declassified Army and CIA Manuals used in Latin America: An Analysis of their Content*

[392] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: FM 31-23*, 3-6.

resettlement of entire areas.[393] In conjunction with these stringent population control measures, another principal lesson throughout the counterinsurgency doctrine is the need to counteract the armed portion of an insurgency using unconventional means. George Kennan, the mastermind behind the US foreign policy of containment during the early stages of the Cold War advocated the need to "fight fire with fire".[394] As Michael McClintock has extensively documented, employing unconventional warfare methods meant counterinsurgency forces mirrored guerrilla fighting techniques to combat armed insurgents. This often involved "counter-terror" and "counter-organization" to counter the measures the guerrilla forces use as part of an insurgency with similar or mirror-image tactics. Thus counterinsurgency strategies consist of a series of "unconventional" and "irregular" measures that often involve the use of terror tactics and coercion to separate, isolate and "destroy" or "neutralize" the "enemy" and "hostile" forces. Moreover, US counterinsurgency planners envisioned the deployment of "hunter-killer teams" intended to "fix," "eliminate," and "neutralize" the guerrillas and, importantly, given the centrality of the civil population, those "underground elements of an irregular force."[395] These types of counterinsurgency techniques were often considered necessary in order to dissuade populations from supporting an insurgency or engaging in activities considered to be "subversive", as one Cold War-era counterinsurgency manual explains:

> Civilians in the operational area may be supporting their own government or collaborating with an enemy occupation force. An isolation program designed to instill doubt and fear may be carried out, and a positive political action program designed to elicit active support of the guerrillas also may be effected. If these programs fail, it may become necessary to take more aggressive action in the form of harsh treatment or even abductions. The abduction and harsh treatment of key enemy civilians can weaken the collaborators' belief in the strength and power of their military forces.[396]

In identifying such sympathetic elements, some counterinsurgency manuals advocated the creation of black lists of suspected insurgent collaborators and their family members: "The names and locations of families, relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These persons are valuable sources of information and may be used as a lure for trapping guerrillas.... Establishment and maintenance of records concerning black and grey lists should be restricted to those units having the capability to administer them."[397]

This population-centric focus at the heart of counterinsurgency is further exemplified in a few Army and Marine training manuals. One manual, for instance, warns against the potential negative psychological effects that violent conduct against suspected sympathizers of the enemy cause might have:

> troops employed against irregular forces are subjected to morale and psychological pressures different from those normally present in regular

[393] See Haugaard, *Declassified Army and CIA Manuals used in Latin America: An Analysis of their Content*; U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict: FM 7-98*, 2-27.
[394] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 6.
[395] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 31-16*, 12.; U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations Against Irregular Forces: FM 31-15*, 12.
[396] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 10.
[397] U.S. Department of the Navy/Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Operations: FMFM 8-2* (Quantico, Virginia: Department of the Navy/Marine Corps, 1967), para 303 (b) (5). and Counterintelligence manual cited in Haugaard, *Declassified Army and CIA Manuals used in Latin America: An Analysis of their Content*

> combat operations. This is particular true in Cold War situations and results to a large degree from: (1) The ingrained reluctance of the soldier to take repressive measures against women, children, and old men who usually are active in both overt and covert irregular activities or who must be resettled or concentrated for security reasons.[398]

Another US Marine counterinsurgency manual adds that "anxieties resulting from reported or observed guerrilla force atrocities and conversely, the impulse to take vindictive retaliatory measures because of such atrocities."[399]

In direct contradiction to this perceived need to fight "fire with fire", the US Cold War counterinsurgency doctrine also advocated the need to gain the support of the local population (now often popularized by the phrase "winning hearts and minds"). One US Marine manual highlighted this lucidly: "US forces engaged in counter-guerrilla operations function under restrictions not encountered in other types of warfare. These restrictions may appear to hamper efforts to find and destroy the guerrilla. For example, the safety of non-combatants and the preservation of their property is vitally important to winning them over to the government's side."[400] Other Army and Special Force operations manuals highlighted the importance of civil-military affairs and maintaining a positive image for the local host government.[401] This aspect is particularly emphasized in the more recent post-Cold War counterinsurgency manuals. Many US military analysts agreed that the use of terror and violent measures to coerce the local population to support the government (which is acknowledged in the counterinsurgency doctrine as an effective tactic undertaken by the opposing guerrilla forces) can be counterproductive and might decrease the support for and legitimacy of the local government.[402]

In this respect, there is a clear tension between the perceived need to fight "fire with fire", in the elimination of an insurgency and the political objective of "winning hearts and minds" of the local population. This tension opens the political space in which paramilitary forces gain their expected utility in counterinsurgency warfare. While "regular" armed forces are allegedly bound by the rules of engagement and the need for restraint in order to gain the support of the population, "irregular" paramilitary forces can operate outside the established norms, providing the local host government a degree of plausible denial in conducting the "dirty war" tactics deemed necessary to the counterinsurgency strategy. This forms an implicit underlying rationale in counterinsurgency doctrine and ideology for the creation of and support for (covert or overt) paramilitary forces. The plausible deniability afforded by irregular paramilitary groups is one of the primary motivations behind using them.

Given the sensitive nature of their mission parameters – to undermine the popular support base of the insurgency and its underground elements and to eliminate guerrilla members and leaders – paramilitary forces often (not always) operate as death squads.[403] The dirty war tactics to counter the civilian political and ideological movements, in which the

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[398] U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations Against Irregular Forces: FM 31-15*, 47.

[399] U.S. Department of the Navy/Marine Corps, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces FMFM 21*, 77.

[400] U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterguerrilla Operations: MCRP 3-33A* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 3-7 (a).

[401] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 31-16*, 133.

[402] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990,* Chapter 11.

[403] Ibid., p. 241; Bruce Campbell, "Death Squads: Definition, Problems and Historical Context," in *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*, eds. Bruce Campbell and D. Brenner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)

insurgents derive their power and support, are best taken by forces not directly affiliated with the regular armed forces. This is a clear lesson learnt from counterinsurgency specialists. For example, according to French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula, from which the US military has drawn heavily, counterinsurgency operations "cannot fail to have unpleasant aspects" and therefore should be undertaken by "professionals" not directly associated with government forces.[404] As McClintock astutely observes, this "formula might be interpreted as a rationale for covert death squads."[405]

In addition to this potential for plausible denial, the outsourcing of coercion and counter-guerrilla operations under the civilian self-defense force concept is conceived as an effective means to gain their active support of the local government and those civilians living in the immediate area. This final rationale for paramilitarism is both political and psychological in nature. Outsourcing military and security functions to civilians and militia type groups is viewed as a politically expedient way to gain their active support for the government and separate the insurgents and suspected sympathizers from the rest of the local population. This rationale forms an explicit part of the counterinsurgency doctrine. As *Counterguerrilla Operations* (1967) instructs, the paramilitary groups may "be organized primarily to indoctrinate their members to support the government."[406] The effect is further explained on the general local population and the potential for the insurgents to use them as a support base: "The organization and presence of effective local defense units can neutralize the insurgent's efforts to gain support from the people; the insurgent must face the realization that it may now be necessary to fight for support, whereas before, persuasion or threats were sufficient."[407]

According to the doctrine, one way to extirpate and isolate insurgents and oppositional forces from the local populace is to organize and persuade various civilian organizations to fight on its behalf. The mirror image of these unconventional tactics in counterinsurgency reflects the perceived effectiveness of guerrilla tactics and operating outside the perceived "regular" forms and codes of conventional warfare. This rationale for the use of paramilitaries and civilian militias is further explained in a US military article by Paret and Shy:

> The ultimate technique in isolating guerrillas from the people is to persuade the people to defend themselves. Militia-type local defense units help in the military defeat of the guerrillas... But at least as important is their political function: Once a substantial number of members of a community commit violence on behalf of the government, they have gone far toward permanently breaking the tie between that community and the guerrillas.[408]

Robert Trinquier, a classic counterinsurgent theorist, agrees that the most effective way to erode popular support for an insurgency is to mobilize the population in support of the counterinsurgency cause.[409]

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[404] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 124.

[405] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 10.

[406] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 31-16*, 13-16.

[407] U.S. Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces: FM 31-22*, 84.

[408] Paret P. and Shy J.W., "Guerrilla Warfare and U.S. Military Policy: A Study," in *The Guerrilla and how to Fight Him FMFRP 12-25*, ed. U.S. Department of Navy (Washington D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1962 Reprinted 1990), 52.

[409] Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, 105.

However, while this form of paramilitarism is considered an effective political tool, it blurs the distinction between civilians and combatants, and places civilians the state should have a duty to protect into the line of fire. US military strategists are acutely aware of the potential damaging effects a civilian self-defense paramilitary structure in a local village or hamlet might have. FM 31-22 (1963) details provisions that should be made to sufficiently support families and members of the communities that join paramilitary programs as they "run the risk of being listed for reprisal by the insurgents."[410] In effect, this form of "counter-organization" is akin to a divide and rule approach designed specifically to polarize local communities and put them in a situation where neutrality is virtually impossible. Paramilitarism is part of the final counterinsurgency objective of gaining *active* support from the population against "hostile" elements. FM 90-8 states, for instance that "Silence on the part of the populace concerning insurgent activities is considered passive support for the insurgent."[411] Therefore, it outlines, there is a tactical imperative to gain the *active* support of the population in the political and military defeat of the insurgents. One aspect of this "counter-organization" is the mobilization of pliant sections of the civilian population into paramilitary formations.

In sum, the counterinsurgency doctrine the US used to train its own military as well as the armed forces of "friendly" foreign countries identifies a variety of para-institutional agents instrumental in the counterinsurgency objective. Irregular and paramilitary forces and the corresponding "counter-organization" and "self-defense" concepts under which they were to be organized amounted to a privatization of counterinsurgency warfare. More importantly, however, is that by distancing itself from the "dirty" tactics deemed necessary to counter the guerrilla and the coercive techniques they employ, the state can oversee counterinsurgency operations without direct participation, providing a degree of plausible deniability. Ultimately, however, the paramilitarization of counterinsurgency warfare is a form of total internal war, a politico-military struggle for the cohesion of society and state. Counterinsurgency, and paramilitary forces, is about the cohesion and consent of a particular desired "stability".

Counterinsurgency Applied: Training, Assistance and the Paramilitary Nexus

As we have seen, paramilitarism was a central plank of the US counterinsurgency doctrine used to train foreign forces during the Cold War. While the CIA or Special Forces were sometimes directly involved in the creation of paramilitary groups under the aegis of the local government, the US para-state nexus was most often indirect. Lessons for a paramilitary proscription were usually implemented by the local government or military as counterinsurgency lessons were imparted by US advisors. However, US officials were usually quick to denounce paramilitary groups and death squad-style actions to disassociate US policy with such violent tactics taking place in allied counterinsurgent regimes. But as Grandin points out, "in Central America in the 1960s, the bodies piled so high that even State Department embassy officials, often kept out of the loop as to what their counterparts in the CIA and Defense were up to, had to admit the links between US-backed intelligence services and death squads."[412] There is a long historical legacy of paramilitarism in US supported counterinsurgency wars in various parts of the globe, from South and Central America to Asia in the prosecution of a protracted counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam.

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[410] U.S. Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces: FM 31-22*, 84.
[411] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterguerrilla Operations: FM 90-8*, Section 2-2 b.
[412] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 97.

Counterinsurgency experts sent to train foreign militaries implemented and further developed counterinsurgency doctrinal recommendations for paramilitarism. As US Army historian Andrew J Birtle records, the internal conflicts in Greece, the Philippines, Indochina, and Korea offered early chances for the US trainers to get to grips with an advisory role and the prosecution of counterinsurgency wars complete with paramilitary forces in a supporting capacity. He writes, "In every insurgency US advisors...sought to establish defended villages and local self-defense units to free the regular army." However, he continues, the US-local paramilitary relationship was not straight forward as "concern over the reputation of paramilitary groups for lawlessness and brutality... led the Army to move cautiously on creating such entities, lest their excesses undermine the goals of pacification." Moreover, US military planners learnt that the direction of semi-autonomous paramilitary organizations not officially wedded to the state could prove difficult. Birtle concludes that "US advisers had very little control over indigenous governments on this score, especially since many governments organized paramilitary forces without American material aid. Consequently, the best the United States could do was to urge indigenous authorities to impose tighter control and discipline over the paramilitaries."[413] Thus rather than exercise direct control over paramilitary assets, the nexus between the US and paramilitary formations was often mediated through local state and military organizations.

During the 1960s, under the Kennedy-era counterinsurgency push in Central and South America, the export of the US counterinsurgency doctrine set the stage for the intense counterinsurgency para-state military action in the 1980s and 1990s. US advisors from the CIA and Special Forces instructed local military leaders and commanders how to construct semi-official paramilitary networks amongst the civilian population, primarily at this stage, for intelligence gathering. However, these forces often also operated as vigilante death squads in the violent elimination and torture of individuals and groups deemed subversive. In El Salvador, for instance, the *Organización Nacionalista Democratica* (better known by its acronym ORDEN, symbolically meaning "order") was established in accordance with US counterinsurgency doctrinal recommendations as an "organization of a vast network of paramilitary irregulars feeding information into the intelligence apparatus, providing manpower for counter-insurgency's dirty work, and serving as a back-up army of irregular auxiliaries to be activated for large-scale security operations whenever the need arose."[414] According to extensive documentation provided by Michael McClintock, the introduction of US counterinsurgency doctrine had a noticeable effect on the structure and organization of El Salvador's military apparatus. Previous negative experience with armed civilian militias such as the *Liga Roja* during the 1920s, and their potential to spiral out of political control, had inculcated a sense of distrust of loosely organized civilian irregulars. Yet after 1961 and the arrival of American advisors under the Public Safety Program, US military, and MTTs, El Salvadorans were convinced of the utility of paramilitary networks for the insulation of the country's political elites, including its political functions and appeal for "plausible denial".[415] According to Colonel Rodriguez of the Salvadoran military, "anti-guerrilla forces, specially trained, utilizing qualified local men, are much more economical in cost, number and results than large forces using conventional methods."[416]

Consistent with this logic, ORDEN was formed in 1963 with the restructuring of the entire military apparatus under the guidance of US military and CIA advisors even before a

[413] Andrew Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2006), 121.
[414] McClintock, *The American Connection: Volume 1 State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, 204.
[415] Ibid., 209-212
[416] As quoted in Ibid., 212

significant oppositional armed insurgency was mounted. Ten Special Force advisors aided Salvadoran General Jose Alberto Medrano to set up ORDEN.[417] General Medrano, was also a CIA asset that had established ANSESAL (*Agencia Nacional de Seguridad de El Salvador* - the National Security Agency of El Salvador), another semi-official paramilitary agency connected directly to the presidency.[418] ORDEN, as CIA records indicate, was "comprised of tens of thousands of conservative rural peasants as an intelligence gathering organization – identifying and taking direct action against real and suspected enemies of the regime."[419] It depended almost entirely on civilian volunteers in rural areas, but drew on the expertise of ex-military personnel and military reserves. Although officially disbanded in 1979, the paramilitary death squad forces operational during the 1980s drew significantly from the remnants of this network.[420]

Of course, ORDEN, as well as other paramilitary structures in the country, was not a complete American fabrication imposed on the El Salvadoran military system solely for the fulfillment of US security and geo-political objectives. There were a number of domestic dynamics that helped condition and shape its rise. These contextual factors comprise the political and economic tensions that had fractured society towards internal conflict in the first place. For instance, wealthy land owners and elite strata of society in control of the political system who were threatened by peasant movements, the land reforms of the 1950s, and the communist political agenda were already motivated to finance paramilitary organizations to serve as personal security guards, protecting assets and their land, something which US counterinsurgency doctrine often sough to exploit.[421] In conjunction, the refraction of El Salvador's political problems through a Cold War lens was as much a domestic issue as one of international politics. El Salvador's long historical contestation of political space in which the elite and state security forces saw it necessary to suppress peasant uprisings and popular calls for reform had already led to a strong military tradition of social control. As a 1981 CIA official reflected in one report, "The ultra-right in El Salvador has a long history of using violence as a political tool, perhaps marked most vividly by the widespread repression and murder of campesinos following the failed peasant rebellion in 1932."[422] Indeed, El Salvador's history since independence had roughly been characterized by revolution and counter-revolution in which the privileged minority clung to their powerful positions against the poor majority through military repression.[423] In short, the implementation and success of paramilitary networks within this counterinsurgency state was inseparably embedded in domestic political and economic structures. This is important as it highlights the local contingency by which the para-state nexus is constructed and maintained. Rather than a template imposed by American military strategists, the para-state nexus reflected a tailored intersection in accordance with local histories and political dynamics.

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[417] David Kirsch, "Death Squads in El Salvador: A Pattern of US Complicity," *Covert Action Quarterly* (Summer, 1990).; A. Nairn, "Behind the Death Squads," *The Progressive* (May, 1984): 24.
[418] Ibid.
[419] CIA "EL Salvador – the Right Wing" As quoted in Cynthia J. Arnson, "Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death Squads in El Salvador," in *Death Squads in Global Perspecitve*, eds. Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 92.
[420] See for instance Ibid., 93 and Kirsch, *Death Squads in El Salvador: A Pattern of US Complicity*
[421] See Arnson, *Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death Squads in El Salvador*, 92. and McClintock, *The American Connection: Volume 1 State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, 34-35, see esp. p. 36.
[422] CIA report March 18, 1981 as quoted in Arnson, *Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death Squads in El Salvador*, 91.
[423] For further documentation of this see McClintock, *The American Connection: Volume 1 State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*

However, these internal influences do not detract from the impact of US security training and the framing of El Salvador's structural issues as one of a Cold War problematic. Nor do they negate the para-statal frameworks on which US supported counterinsurgency efforts often resided. The para-state nexus in this sense reflects the often complex relationships that impute the overall picture in which para-institutional formations function in the constitution and consolidation of state arrangements conducive to a US driven liberal order. Although US paramilitary connections have been frequently denied, declassified documents demonstrate that the counterinsurgency priority of the containment and elimination of left-wing subversives was higher than that of preventing paramilitary structures from operating as death squads.[424] This in the very least reflects state acquiescence and inability to confront vigilante right wing paramilitary groups that, for all intents and purposes represents a significant component of the state's counterinsurgency campaign. It was, however, much later during the 1980s that what later became referred to as the "Salvador Option" took place.[425]

Meanwhile in Colombia, the initial formulation of a para-state nexus was taking shape. As Doug Stokes, Victoria Sanford, and many others have already argued, paramilitary formations and the outsourcing of Colombia's counterinsurgency campaign have firm historical roots in US counterinsurgency training and doctrine.[426] The arrival of US Special Force advisors and MTTs in the early 1960s, established precedence for military-paramilitary ties in Colombia as various different types of paramilitary organizations have appeared and disappeared over an extended history of a protracted Colombian counterinsurgency campaign against communist-inspired insurgent forces.[427] Much like the experience in El Salvador, this formed the framework and basis for a para-extension of the state's counterinsurgency efforts, under the direction and influence of a US counterinsurgency agenda during the Cold War.

US counterinsurgency policy towards Colombia bestowed particular meanings to the internal unrest that the country was besieged by in the 1950s and 1960s and provided the foundations on which to form a militarized response. US diplomats and military advisors understood the domestic conflict following the period of *La Violencia* from a global Cold War perspective, and policy suggestions revolved around an anti-communist agenda in which counterinsurgency tactics were given priority. The first joint US-Colombian counterinsurgency operation titled "Plan Lazo" from 1962-1965 was implemented under the guidance of US military commanders to destroy "independent republics" held by bandits (*bandoleros*) and reign these areas in under governmental control.[428] This counterinsurgency operation largely disregarded the indigenous historical and political origins of violence manifest in Colombia since around the time of its independence.[429] It was only after "Plan

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[424] See Arnson, *Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death Squads in El Salvador*, 111.

[425] Hirsh and Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination Or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*

[426] Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*; Stokes, *Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia*, 569-585.; Sanford, *Learning to Kill by Proxy: Colombian Paramilitaries and the Legacy of Central American Death Squads, Contras, and Civil Patrols*; M. Lamo, "El Verdadero Origen Del Paramilitarismo En Colombia," *El Tiempo* 2007, http://www.eltiempo.com/participacion/blogs/. (accessed 12 Jan, 2012).

[427] For the best histories see Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia* and HRW, "The History of the Military-Paramilitary Partnership," in *Colombia's Killer Networks* (New York: HRW, 1996)..

[428] See for example Dennis Rempe, "Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counterinsurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959 -1965," *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* 6, no. 3 (1995): 304-327, http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/smallwars.htm (accessed 10 Jan 2012).

[429] Gonzalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens, *Bandits, Peasants, and Politics,* trans. Alan Hynds (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001). and Dennis Rempe, "The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66," *Strategic Studies Institute Monograph* (March, 2002).

Lazo" and an operation titled Operación Marquetalia (1964-1965) in particular that the country's largest and longest lasting armed insurgent movements the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*) and the ELN (*Ejercito de Liberación Nacional*) were created, in 1965.[430] The Colombian military has been internally oriented ever since, geared towards the elimination of subversive elements and the eradication of a protracted guerrilla insurgency, supplemented by a steady stream of US counterinsurgency assistance.[431] This is not to suggest as many authors have pointed out, that US training and aid can be credited as the sole causal mechanism for the creation of paramilitary formations or for the violent and repressive nature of the Colombian military's conduct.[432] It is evident, however, that the US advice and counterinsurgency doctrine has had a significant and perceptible influence on the course of the conflict including the use of paramilitary assets. US counterinsurgency training and military ties in general directed to a large degree the organization of the Colombian military and the state's connection to paramilitary groups.[433]

Consistent with the prevailing counterinsurgency logic and methodologies of the time, US military Special Forces in Colombia recommended the creation of a paramilitary network to achieve a unified and over-arching anti-communist counterinsurgency campaign. In a classified supplement attached to a 1962 report intended to assess the threat of the communist presence in Colombia, a Special Force team led by General Yarborough of the U.S. Special Warfare Centre recommended that a "concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later.... This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States."[434] As some analysts have pointed out, these recommendations and others found in this report formed the basis for the paramilitary groups that continue to operate as deniable counterinsurgency agents connected to the state and the military.[435] Moreover, these early Special Force missions recommended that any special aid provided to Colombia's internal security programs would be covert in nature "in order to shield the interests of both Colombian and US authorities against 'interventionist' charges"[436] According to Dennis Rempe, "Owing to the sensitive nature of Colombian internal security missions, the survey team further advised the use of third country nationals, covertly under US control, but apparently contracted by the host government."[437] US advisors were aware of the potential negative public outcry and propaganda had their involvement been completely uncovered, and those not openly working for the US government were either sheep-dipped or hired as contractors from elsewhere. Obscuring these relationships was part of the policy design entailed in a para-state nexus.

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[430] Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*
[431] Ibid.
[432] Murillo, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization*, 122. and Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, 3, 70.
[433] Michael Lopez, " the U.S. and its Responsibility for Counter-Insurgency Operations in Colombia," *Colombia Bulletin*, no. Summer (1998), http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/lopez.htm.; Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, 58.
[434] Yarborough as quoted in McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 222.
[435] Sanford, *Learning to Kill by Proxy: Colombian Paramilitaries and the Legacy of Central American Death Squads, Contras, and Civil Patrols*; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 223.
[436] Rempe, *Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counterinsurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959 - 1965*, 304-327.
[437] Ibid.

Following on from this initial paramilitary strategy, Colombian officials and military personnel were familiarized with US counterinsurgency strategies through numerous military exercises and training programs such as joint operations with MTTs, training undertaken at the SOA, US Army Special Warfare School, and at the Lancero Military School of Instruction (a training center set up by US Special Forces in Colombia), and via US funding.[438] The introduction of the US counterinsurgency doctrine had a broader influence on the Colombian military strategy and its understanding of the problems of insurgency and how to counter it, including the mobilization of paramilitary forces. For example, one Colombian Army field manual *Operaciones Contra Las Fuerzas Irregulares*, is a translation of the US Army's FM 31-15 with the same title in English.[439] *Reglamento de Combate de Contraguerrillera* references numerous US counterinsurgency manuals as well as classic counterinsurgency texts, such as David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, amongst others, frequently used by US trainers and counterinsurgency educational centers.[440] Other Colombian manuals contain very similar content to US counterinsurgency manuals, with many passages merely extracted from their US equivalents.[441] Thus, the US counterinsurgency doctrine as explored above had a significant impact on the Colombian models of counterinsurgent action.

As Javier Giraldo has shown, the Colombian doctrine directly mirrors US counterinsurgency doctrinal conceptualizations of "counter-organization" and "civilian self-defense forces".[442] Much like the US doctrine, the civilian population is presented as the target of counterinsurgency action, in which many civilian activities are considered potentially "subversive".[443] For instance, one manual stated that soldiers need to understand "the significance of the civil population as one of the principal objectives of irregular war."[444] Another outlined how the "sympathetic civil population...normally organizes itself as a syndicalist movement."[445] In a similar manner reflecting this understanding, Gen. Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva, defense minister from 1978-1982, also has been recorded as saying that protest and collective action was the equivalent of "the unarmed branch of subversion."[446] Within this context, active collaboration of the population is sought as a means to defeat the insurgency, and a passive acceptance of the insurgent ideology and guerrilla presence is deemed sympathetic to the enemy cause. Consequently, one Colombian counterinsurgency handbook from 1963 illustrates, "both sides must force the local population to participate in combat; to a certain extent the inhabitant is converted into a combatant."[447] The principles of "counter- organization" and "self-defense" in some of these manuals outline the requirement for "semi-military" patrols and the mobilization of

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[438] Lopez, *the U.S. and its Responsibility for Counter-Insurgency Operations in Colombia* and Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, 58-59.

[439]Javier Giraldo, "La Doctrina Colombiana y La Poblacion Civil," *Noche Y Niebla* (CINEP, , http://www.arlac.be/paramilitarismo/html/pdf/deuda01.pdf (accessed 10 October 2011).; Javier S. Giraldo, "Genocidio En Colombia: Tipicidad y Estrategia," *Desde Los Margenes* (2004); Giraldo, *Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy*

[440] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 9.

[441] Ibid., Chapter 10 reference 82

[442] See Giraldo, *Genocidio En Colombia: Tipicidad y Estrategia*; Giraldo, *Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy*

[443] Giraldo, *La Doctrina Colombiana y La Poblacion Civil*

[443] Ibid.

[444] Manual de 1979: Instrucciones Generales para Operaciones de Contraguerrillas, impreso por Ayudantía General del Comando del Ejército, 1979. pp. 79-80 as quoted in Ibid.

[445] My translation of EJC-3-10 "Reglamento de Combate de Contraguerrillas" 1987; 115 in Ibid.

[446] Blair as quoted in Human Rights Watch, "Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States," *Human Rights Watch* (1996)

[447] EJC "La Guerra Moderna," 1963; 34 Ibid. Giraldo, *Genocidio En Colombia: Tipicidad y Estrategia*

"sympathetic individuals" to supplement official military operations.[448] Another 1962 manual instructs the reader that "population control permits the obligation of part of the inhabitants to participate in their own defense."[449] Similarly, the Colombian counterinsurgency manual *Reglamento de Combate* advocated the need to "organize the civil population militarily, so that it can protect itself against the actions of the guerrillas and support combat operations."[450] Another still stipulated that "self-defense" systems are planned for the "violent rejection of guerrilla actions in their region."[451] Generally speaking, paramilitary networks are characterized as a "powerful tool to defend the nation."[452]

According to scholar Jasmin Hristov, beyond these counterinsurgency doctrinal logics there were five principal advantages in the creation of such paramilitary frameworks. First, it was a cost effective way of amplifying the Army's counterinsurgency campaign. Second, paramilitaries could extend the state's coercive reach to ungoverned spaces or areas with little governmental control. Third, the state could use questionable methods of irregular war to counter the guerrillas. Fourth, civilians could be monitored and more information could be fed into the central intelligence units in Colombia. Lastly, for plausible denial: "the armed forces could partially reduce its image of a human rights violator in the eyes of the international community since it could distance itself from the atrocities committed in the course of the Dirty War."[453] Much after the Cold War, in 1996-1998, in testimony to state authorities and representatives of the UN, Gilberto Cardenas Gonzales, a former captain of the national police and director of the special investigative branch of the police (SIJIN) in the department of Antioquia, recorded that "the paramilitaries were created by the Colombian government to do its dirty work, in other words, in order to kill all individuals who, according to the state and the police, are guerrillas. But in order to do that, the [the government] had to create illegal groups so that no one would suspect the government of Colombia and its military forces."[454] Statements such as these indicate that there were a number of advantages that drove the creation of and impunity granted to paramilitary groups.

The paramilitary initiative was implemented in accordance with these doctrinal lessons from US advisors alongside certain tactical advantages almost immediately. The civilian self-defense force concept was legislated into law, becoming part of official policy. Decree 3398, announced as a part of a declared "state of siege" during Plan Lazo, laid the legal basis for arming of civilians and their incorporation into the counterinsurgency effort. It granted the army the recourse for "the organization and tasking of all of the residents of the country and its natural resources ... to guarantee National Independence and institutional stability"[455] Subsequently, Law 48 (1968) legalized civilian militias for purposes of "national" and "civil defense" and advocated the utilization of civilians for the "private use of the Armed Forces."[456] Article 183 of resolution 005 of April 9, 1969 also legalized "organizing in military form the civilian population, so that it will protect against the action of guerrillas and will support the carrying out of combat operations."[457] This resolution

[448] EJC "Operaciones Contra Fuerzas Irregulares" 1962; 75-76 as quoted in Ibid.
[449] My translation EJC "La Guerra Moderna,"1963; 70 Ibid.
[450] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 252.
[451] EJC 3-10, 1969 as quoted in Human Rights Watch, *Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States*
[452] Ibid.
[453] Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*, 63.
[454] As quoted in Ibid., 60
[455] HRW, *The History of the Military-Paramilitary Partnership*
[456]Giraldo, *Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy*, 79.
[457] Article 183 of resolution 005, 1969 as quoted in Ibid., 80

oversaw the development of "self-defense boards," defined as "an organization of military type which is made up of civilian personnel selected from the combat zone, which is trained and equipped to develop actions against groups of guerrillas who appear in the area or to operate in coordination with troops in actions of combat."[458]

This legal framework for paramilitarism in Colombia was dismantled in the 1980s due to criticism that such groups were complicit in "death squad" activities and political assassinations, including the virtual elimination of members of the Marxist political party *Union Patriotica* and other liberal political officials such as presidential aspirant Galán.[459] Under the presidential guidance of Barco, Law 48 was revoked and any involvement in the participation, financing, or training of paramilitary groups by civilians and the military was made illegal. In a decree issued by President Barco in 1989, he denounced "the armed groups, misnamed paramilitary groups, that have been formed into death squads, bands of hired assassins, self-defense groups, or groups that carry out their own justice."[460] However, as shall be explored further in the next chapter, paramilitaries continued to be a feature of US supported counterinsurgency efforts in the post-Cold War period after this point, and served as an example of the continuation of a para-state nexus and a foreign policy driven by counterinsurgency concerns.

Both the Colombian state and the military held links with various paramilitary forces throughout the early Cold War period. These military-paramilitary connections, as many declassified documents now demonstrate, were well known to US agencies, strengthening the nexus between the US-supported counterinsurgency initiatives and paramilitary groups. Not surprisingly, some members of the State Department were initially "delighted to hear this declaration for the determination of a number of leaders in Colombian life to halt the spread of communist ideas."[461] In some cases far right-wing groups were silently given the go-ahead by Colombian officials to carry out bombings and assassination. One US embassy document shows that a plan approved by Gen. Jorge Robledo Pulido, Commander of the army, in 1978 was formulated "to create the impression that the American Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA) has established itself in Colombia and is preparing to take violent action against Colombian communists," and that "the bombing of the Colombia Communist party's headquarters ...might be more appropriately characterized as "dirty tricks" rather than as "violations of human rights.""[462] In these instances, the extra-judicial executions of guerrillas and sometimes their sympathizers outside of official military operations were considered an acceptable, although illegal, practice.[463] In another example, according to a report by the Colombian government agency in charge of investigating reports of abuses by government employees, numerous public officials and military personnel were found to have direct links to another paramilitary organization called *Muerte a los Secuestradores* (MAS) or "death to kidnappers" in English, in the late 1980s.[464] The report, written by Prosecutor Carlos Jimenez Gomez in February of 1983, stated that "officials who go overboard when faced with the

[458] As quoted in Ibid., 80

[459] M. Romero, "Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 14, no. 1 (2000): 55, 64-65.

[460] Human Rights Watch, *Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States*, Reference 58.

[461] Memorandum of conversation, December 15, 1960, http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/gerberich15dec1960.htm. (accessed 20 July, 2012)

[462] US Embassy Bogota to Secretary of State, "Memorandum - Human Rights: Estimate of the Current Situation in Colombia," in *The Truth about Triple A*, ed. Michael Evans (The National Security Archive, 1979), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB223/.

[463] Giraldo, *Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy*, 59.

[464] See HRW, *The History of the Military-Paramilitary Partnership*

temptation to multiply their ability to act and take advantage of private agents, whom they begin to use as "guides" and "informants," collaborators and assistants in general, and whom they end up using as a hidden weapon so that, with this plan of hired killers, they can do officiously what they cannot do officially."[465] These cursory examples provide only a limited insight into the numerous military-paramilitary connections, and the ways they have been used as deniable counterinsurgency assets conducting unconventional operations as well as maintaining civilian informant webs for intelligence gathering missions. The totality of this represented a nexus between the Colombian state and a variety of paramilitary groups that continued well into the 2000s.

These examples help to demonstrate the indirect relationships that comprised the para-state nexus in counterinsurgency settings. On one level, para-institutional groups were the intentional creation of counterinsurgency design. The specific political priorities in counterinsurgency in forging societal cohesion and consent for prevailing modes of political and economic organization helped to foment paramilitary organizations through the principles of "counter-organization". In other words, the paramilitarization of the counterinsurgency drive was also a political tool as much as it was seen as a military one. However, local conditions and social stratifications also played a role in the perpetuation of a para-state nexus. As argued above, paramilitary groups often had ties to local elites and large land-owners. This meant that the para-state nexus was not a standardized mechanism externally enforced to expunge unwanted resistance to the status quo. Instead, it is more like a set of tailored military and paramilitary links that are dependent on local conditions. Each manifestation of the broader para-state nexus in its localized contexts took on unique characteristics. Although only two examples from Latin America have been presented here, El Salvador and Colombia, there is ample evidence to suggest that such practices were not confined to the US hemispheric sphere of influence. Rather, such para-statal counterinsurgency connections were also evident in places such as the Philippines,[466] Thailand,[467] and in CIA clandestine paramilitary programs during the war in Korea,[468] as well as other areas in Latin America such as Guatemala,[469] amongst others.[470] It was not until Vietnam, however, that the full extent to which the US was willing to depend on outsourcing became evident. This is the subject of the next section.

Vietnam and the Evolution of the Para-State Nexus

While unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency paramilitary action was taking place in parts of Asia and Latin America, the US was becoming progressively more engaged in a counterinsurgency war in Vietnam. An examination of this and the para-institutional forms it took offers an example of the application of a paramilitary option during a direct US

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[465] As quoted in Ibid.

[466] Kowalewski, *Counterinsurgent Paramilitarism: A Philippine Case Study*, 71-84.; Bello, *Counterinsurgency's Proving Ground: Low-Intensity Warfare in the Philippines*, 158-182.

[467] Daniel Fineman, *A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand 1947-1958* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 182-184.; International Crisis Group, *Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries* (Asia Report 140, 2007).; Arne Kislenko, "A Not so Silent Partner: Thailand's Role in Covert Operations, Counter-Insurgency, and the Wars in Indochina," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 24, no. 1 (2004).

[468] See Church Committee Reports, *United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, "Foreign and Military Intelligence" p. 23-28.

[469] McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala*; S. Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and US Power* (Westview Press, 1991).; Parry, *History of Guatemala's Death Squads*

[470] For a longer list of similar counterinsurgency support with military-paramilitary connections see William Blum, *Rogue State: A Guide to the world's Only Superpower*, Second ed. (London: Zed Books, 2003), 122-167.

counterinsurgency engagement. In Vietnam, the delegation of coercion to para-institutional groups grew as part of overt US strategies. Rather than purely a covert affair, outsourcing occurred through various channels and agencies. Moreover, not only were many combat functions delegated to private entities and armed militias, but it was during Vietnam that logistical requirements for supporting the US military became a significant undertaking by the private sector, forming the basis of much of the privatized military apparatus today. PMCs were also increasingly often sent abroad to train foreign armed forces in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in place of US military assistance programs.[471] Finally, not only did operating through surrogate forces become a much more unconcealed facet of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, but the domestic US political reverberations after the war helped to further entrench the para-state nexus as an instrument of US foreign policy.

Rather than provide a comprehensive history of paramilitary action in the Vietnam War, which has already been well documented,[472] this section attempts to convey the extent to which outsourcing became an accepted facet of US counterinsurgency strategy during this time. It also serves to elaborate on three key themes threaded throughout this analysis. First, the para-state nexus during this period and beyond is consistent with established policy priorities to "remain in the background" as Kennedy's 1962 counterinsurgency blueprint outlined.[473] Another important aspect about US involvement in Vietnam was the sheer scale of US military and paramilitary assistance to South Vietnam as part of Washington's policy of stabilizing allies against internal subversion. South Vietnam was the recipient of hundreds of millions of dollars in counterinsurgency aid (1953-1963) before the US was formally and directly involved itself, through which the paramilitary option and the use of contractors became a fundamental tool. Second, towards the end of the war, mounting domestic and international pressures against overt intervention help to fortify the para-state nexus. Overstretched resources and large contingencies of US troops abroad meant that relying on a plethora of relations to parallel non-state armed groups and contractors would ease the political and material burden of the war. Third, outsourcing beyond this period represented a way for different US agencies to evade oversight, including specific Congressional restrictions on military activities and assistance. This served as an important constitutional factor, in the perpetuation and entrenchment of the para-state nexus.

From 1955-1961, rather than deploy significant numbers of troops to Vietnam, the US relied on security assistance to the allied South Vietnamese government (led by Ngo Dinh Diem) and training and support to the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). But instead of relying completely on these official military structures, the US gradually began to take the reins from the background instituting both covert and overt paramilitary programs to battle the National Liberation Front (NLF), otherwise known as the Viet Cong (VC).[474] In the late 1950s, as Rosenau states, "In the judgment of Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, it was essential to avoid committing US troops to costly and unwinnable ground conflicts like the one the United States had endured recently in Korea."[475] This sentiment carried over to the

[471] Vinnel became the first company sent abroad to train the Saudi Arabian SANG William Hartung, "Saudi Arabia: Mercenaries, Inc." *The Progressive* (1996), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=7855 (accessed 4 September, 2011)
[472] See for example Rosenau, *US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order*
[473] U.S Office of the President, *United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy*
[474] See Rosenau, *US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order* also Mike Gravel, *The Pentagon Papers*, Vol. 2 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 128-159, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent4.htm. (accessed 4 Oct, 2011)
[475] Rosenau, *US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order*, 10.

Kennedy administration. Although upon his inauguration Kennedy saw Vietnam as a peripheral problem (especially in light of the failed Bay of Pigs operation), it was understood that a counterinsurgency blueprint was needed to strengthen the resistance to the rise and influence of communist forces. A plan was drafted in early 1961 to supplement Southern Vietnamese combat efforts with helicopter companies and counterinsurgency and paramilitary training centers.[476] Indeed, in the early 1960s, Kennedy repeatedly rejected requests to send in US troops to support the South Vietnamese government against a growing insurgency and their Northern neighbors. Instead, further CIA and Special Forces paramilitary training and covert actions were authorized as part of the growing US proxy intervention to shore up the South Vietnamese government. In the words of Douglas Valentine, "political and psychological warfare experts moved to the forefront of the counterinsurgency in the early 1960s, fighting, under cover of Civic Action, a plausible denial war against enemy agents and soldiers, using black propaganda, defectors, criminals (the entire Fifty-second Ranger Battalion was recruited from Saigon prisons), selective terror, [and] forcible relocations."[477] The paramilitarization of the South Vietnamese counterinsurgency initiative had begun.

In accordance with the counterinsurgency doctrine of the time, civilian irregular paramilitary cadres were created to bolster local counterinsurgency campaigns and to galvanize support for the local government under the principle of "counter-organization".[478] According to a post-Vietnam US Army study, the Special Forces were deployed "in late 1961 to broaden the counterinsurgency effort by developing the paramilitary potential of certain of these minority groups."[479] Another US Army report recorded that these forces would be organized around "guerrilla-style" tactics, trained specifically in "ambushing, raiding, sabotaging and committing acts of terrorism against known VC (Viet Cong) personnel."[480] There was a rapid build-up of paramilitary forces in South Vietnam as they became an integral part of the US supported war effort. US military estimates report that by 1963 "approximately 11,000 strike force and 40,000 hamlet militia from over 800 villages had undergone training that averaged about six weeks for strike force troops and two weeks for hamlet militia."[481] According to another figure, in 1964 regional forces comprised of 196,000 armed civilians nearly equaling South Vietnam's regular army of 250,000 personnel.[482] These loosely related paramilitary initiatives collectively became known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), one of the largest US paramilitary programs.

The CIDG program saw the Special Forces (in coordination with the CIA) hire tens of thousands of Vietnamese minorities, primarily a tribal group called the Montagnards, as well as ethnic Cambodians and Chinese, many of which were paid and trained as hamlet militias and mobile strike (also known as "hunter killer") teams. The application of the US Army counterinsurgency doctrine meant organizing, training, and arming civilians in a self-defense

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[476] See Gravel, *The Pentagon Papers*, -39.
[477] Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, 49.
[478] U.S. Department of the Army, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations FM 31-21*
[479] Colonel Francis Kelly, *Vietnam Studies: US Army Special Forces 1961-1971* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1985), 6, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll11/id/938. (accessed 7 April 2012)
[480] Department of the Army, Army Concept Team, Vietnam. "Employment of a special Forces Group" 20 April 1966 as quoted in McClintock, *The American Connection: Volume 1 State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, 24.
[481] Kelly, *Vietnam Studies: US Army Special Forces 1961-1971*
[482] See Shultz, Richard. "the Vietnamization-Pacification strategy of 1969-1972: A quantitative and Qualitative Reassessment page 56 in Richard Hunt and R. Shultz, *Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).

capacity was not only an expedient way to free up regular troops (in this case the ARVN) for counter-guerrilla warfare, but also represented a politico-military strategy to gain the allegiance of a group of people by making them targets of the enemy, and thereby forcing the self-defense members to fight back on the government's behalf. Another appeal of delegating counterinsurgency operations to Montagnard assets was that they were cheap. According to a US government estimate, it was up to ten times less expensive to hire a Montagnard warrior than pay a US soldier; a difference well celebrated by US planners.[483] Moreover, Montagnards and other local assets were expendable; a death of a local tribesman was not as politically sensitive for US policy makers as the death of a US soldier. Such a paramilitary strategy was initially hailed a success and Kennedy's NSAM 162 (1962), a proposal for strengthening of the counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam which called for, amongst other means, the further "exploitation of minorities" stating that "On a selective basis, CIA and the Department of Defense will make studies of specific groups where there is reason to believe there exists an exploitable minority paramilitary capability."[484]

The CIDG, however, was more than just a "self-defense" program. It became a full-fledged outsourced parallel military force hired to conduct numerous offensive maneuvers and counterinsurgency terror against the VC and its civilian infrastructure. The CIDG program was initially a Special Force and CIA operation, but responsibility was later handed to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in 1963 (i.e. overt agencies) as part of Operation Switchback and then much later (somewhat unsuccessful) attempts were made to incorporate these forces into the South Vietnamese Army when the program was shut down during the "Vietnamization" of the war in 1970.[485] Under the direction of the MACV, the CIDG became further offensive in nature, often with US advisors fighting alongside these for-hire militia armies.[486] According to Douglas Blaufarb, a former CIA officer, "the armed tribal irregulars [the CIDG], were no longer a hamlet militia.... They were used for attack and defense against enemy units," and in this role were "close to being mercenaries."[487] Using "selective terror", these hunter killer teams served as counter-terror operatives, mirroring VC tactics to ensure local support for the South Vietnamese government.[488] This meant the use of terror tactics on a selective basis in order to coerce and scare local inhabitants from supporting the VC and joining the incumbent government cause. It was a bid to terrorize the local populations into submission. Much like many other paramilitary operations in Laos, Cambodia, Tibet, and elsewhere, these forces were supported by Air America (and sometimes the US Air Force) under contracts with the CIA to run supplies and ferry the Montagnard fighters from one village to the next, identifying and "neutralizing" or capturing suspected VC and their sympathizers.[489] By 1967 one estimate put the numbers at 2,726 US Special Force advisors in liaison with 34,300 CIDG 18,200 regional mercenary forces and about 5,700 mobile strike teams (hunter killers).[490] Similar paramilitary programs

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[483] Dunigan and Nofi, *Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War*, 181.

[484] White House, *NSAM 162: Development of U.S. and Indigenous Police. Paramilitary and Military Resources*, 1962), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam162.htm. (accessed 7 August, 2011)

[485] See Kelly, *Vietnam Studies: US Army Special Forces 1961-1971*, 40.; Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 245, 256.

[486] See Ives, *US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam*, 24.

[487] Blaufab, Douglas *Counterinsurgency Era* as quoted in Ibid., 103

[488] Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, 46.

[489] See Robbins, *Air America*, 132. and Leeker, *The History of Air America (Ebook)*, Chapter Air America in South Vietnam I, p. 14 and 37.

[490] See graph on Dunigan and Nofi, *Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War*, 182.

were initiated with various other tribal groups such as the Sedang, Hre, and Bahnar, amongst others.[491] These paramilitary networks played a significant role in the Vietnam conflict.

Kennedy had made plans to transfer these paramilitary capabilities from clandestine agencies to the more overt military command structures. National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM) 55, 56, and 57 were key national security documents that outlined the take-over of many of the CIA and Special Force paramilitary operations. This signified that paramilitary operations and outsourcing to such groups was becoming more of an overt part of US policy planning. NSAM 56 (1961), written by McGeorge Bundy, the then United States National Security Advisor to Kennedy stated that "It is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we should act in this field"[492] This underscored the future plans for paramilitary capabilities that would expand significantly in Vietnam. Crucially, NSAM 57 titled "Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations" assigned responsibility for such paramilitary operations to the US Armed Forces, rather than its more covert intelligence counterparts. It stated that

> Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of military trained personnel, amounts to military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed services is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role.[493]

This move to overt agencies and the use of paramilitary capabilities was consistent with the broader re-orientation of the military towards counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare during the Kennedy administration.[494]

A related and more controversial program was the infamous Phoenix operation designed to extirpate the VC from South Vietnam and destroy its political infrastructure. Phoenix depended heavily on various levels of unofficial paramilitary forces fighting alongside an official South Vietnamese shadow program (Phung Hoang) and US troops. Vietnamese nationalists were organized into Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), functioning essentially as CIA contract assets, trained to locate and "neutralize" suspected VC.[495] Often, the PRU consisted of VC deserters, common criminals, and were almost always native to the area in which they operated in.[496] To facilitate this pacification program

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[491] Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 252.; Ives, *US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam*, 23. and CIA, *Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) Political Action Program* (CIA, 1965), http://library.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=view&id=565 (accessed August 4, 2011).

[492] White House, *NSAM 56: Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements* (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1961), http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/USO/appE.html#NSAM56. (accessed 4 June 2011)

[493] U.S. Department of State, *National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 57, Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations* (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1961), http://www.jfklancer.com/NSAM57.html. (accessed 4 June 2011)

[494] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 6.

[495] Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, 162-163, 166-167.

[496] Ibid., 167, 170

and its intelligence requirements the CIA and the US Army hired Pacific Architects and Engineers in 1964 to construct interrogation facilities across South Vietnam.[497]

Much like the CIDG, the Phoenix program and its PRU component, reaching a level of success in eliminating VC and its sympathizers, made arrangements for management of the program to be handed over to the MACV in 1968-1969.[498] At this point it also became increasingly militarized, with more than double the number of VC and its cadre killed, or "neutralised" as the popular euphemism held, from 1968 (2,229) to 1969 (4,832).[499] The Phoenix program was often referred to as an assassination program in the press and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on US pacification programs in Vietnam in 1970 in order to unveil the level of atrocities.[500] One reporter, in an article titled "The CIAs Hired Killers," wrote that the PRU were "the best killers in Vietnam," stating that they were not much different from the terrorists the US was seeking to defeat, except that rather than ideology, they terrorized for money.[501] According to the CIA website, the PRUs "went to the villages and hamlets and attempted to identify the named individuals and "neutralize" them. Those on a list were arrested or captured for interrogation, or if they resisted, they were killed."[502] Extreme forms of violence against civilians perpetrated by paramilitary assets, according to Valentine, constituted part of a policy of "counter-terror". Selective assassinations and various forms of harsh treatment such as torture was an intended means of "terrorizing the neighboring population into a state of submission." [503] As Blakeley argues, drawing on these accounts, these features of the Phoenix program were designed not only for "destroying the VCI, but also of instilling terror among Vietnamese civilians" and constituted a clear case of state terror.[504] In using such terror tactics to induce a sense of fear, the CIDG and PRUs constituted outsourced mechanisms through which US agencies could conduct a counterinsurgency war for the "stabilization" of the desired political framework in Vietnam. Yet the extent of outsourcing during Vietnam went beyond these paramilitary structures and included various mercenary forces and private for-profit US contractors.

In order to further augment the war capability, decrease the burden on US troops, and mitigate the political consequences associated with large deployments and casualties of US forces, Kennedy's NSAM 162 (1962), called for the increased use of "third country personnel" alongside paramilitary capabilities for an integrated foreign internal defense strategy. According to the memorandum, "Such forces would be composed of foreign volunteers supported and controlled by the US."[505] This recommendation was later implemented. For example, as part of the Phoenix Operation, President Lyndon B. Johnson contracted a "Filipino Civic Action Team" for 39 million dollars to combat the VC and their political following in Tay Ninh province.[506] Similarly, in 1964 President Johnson began the "More Flags" program in which a variety of third-country troops were hired.[507] The program

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[497] Leeker, *The History of Air America (Ebook)*, Chapter AA in S. Vietnam I, p. 35.
[498] Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, 277.
[499] Ibid., 289
[500] Ibid., 315
[501] Geyer, Georgie Ann,, "The CIA's Hired Killers," *True* Feb., 1970 as quoted in Ibid., 314
[502] Andrew Colonel Finlayson, "A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations," CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/a-retrospective-on-counterinsurgency-operations.html (accessed 2 August, 2011).
[503] Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, 13.
[504] Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*, 50.
[505] White House, *NSAM 162: Development of U.S. and Indigenous Police. Paramilitary and Military Resources*, 3-4.
[506] Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*, 160.
[507] Robert M. Blackburn, *Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags": The Hiring of Korean, Filipino and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1994).

was initiated under the original objective of providing coalition (i.e. "more flags") non-combat assistance to South Vietnam but soon expanded to delegate military operations. The Australian and New Zealand forces were sent on a voluntary basis, but the Korean (providing around 50,000 soldiers), Philippine, and Thai contingents were paid for, including deployment costs, a per diem payment, overseas allowance and death benefits, costing the US tens of millions of dollars. The Johnson and Nixon administrations went to great lengths to keep the payments to these third countries secret.[508] Around 5,000-6,000 of these foreign national mercenaries died in Vietnam. Congress attempted to restrict the use of the More Flags mercenaries, and in 1970 placed an "anti-mercenary" provision in the Cooper-Church Amendment, which sought also to restrict US troops and advisors from operating in Laos and Cambodia. The special provision, however, did not pass and the Amendment went through without the strict "anti-mercenary" language.[509]

PMCs: Logistics, Training, and Combat

PMCs represented a crucial component of the Vietnam effort so much so that *Business Week* described it as a "war by contract."[510] An estimated 80,000 contractors contributed to US operations throughout the entire US presence in Vietnam.[511] A considerable portion of this PMC activity during this period was logistical in nature, providing essential technical and support services. But they were also often contracted as mercenaries and private trainers. For instance, a US-based PMC named Vinnell was contracted to run "black" operations with one Pentagon official interviewed by the *Village Voice* describing them as "our own little mercenary army in Vietnam...we used them to do things we either didn't have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of legal problems."[512] This same company was also instrumental in aiding the US troop withdrawal during the 1970s, supplementing official forces to "clean up" US military bases and areas overrun by the VC.

There was also a significant presence of PMCs in a logistical capacity. Many support services normally provided by the US military itself were contracted to private companies, such as utilities, repair services, base construction, procurement and distribution of resources, and many others. For instance, Vinnell won contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars for logistical and technical services rendered to support the US military, with around 5,000 contractors on the ground at the height of its involvement.[513] All of the US armed forces relied heavily on Pacific Architects and Engineers, Brown and Root, and other contractors for construction of bases and engineering works.[514] Such increased levels of contracting during the Vietnam War set a precedent for future public-private partnerships in a supporting role, a capacity that essentially greased the wheels of the US military machine and served as a force multiplier freeing up regular troops from mundane tasks. As Carafano suggests, the US has been dependent on contractors since the Vietnam War, and not as a result of military

[508] Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 28.
[509] Ibid., 29
[510] "Vietnam: How Business Fights the 'War by Contract,'" *Business Week*, 5 March 1965, 58-62, cited in Stephen J. Zamparelli, "Contractors in the Battlefield: What have we Signed Up for?"," *Air Force Journal of Logistics* 23 (Fall, 1999): 10.
[511] As cited in Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 84.
[512] Hartung, *Saudi Arabia: Mercenaries, Inc.*, 2010.
[513] Ibid.
[514] Lieutenant Col Carroll Dunn, *Base Development in South Vietnam 1965-1970* (Washington D.C.: US Department of the Army, 1991 [1972]), 90-96, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/basedev/index.htm#contents. (accessed 20 July 2011) For Brown and Root see Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army*, 25-28.

downsizing in the post-Cold War period: "The Pentagon had actually considered contracting in combat during Vietnam a big success... That allowed the Pentagon to maximize the number of combat troops deployed to the theatre."[515] The efficiency in outsourcing logistics and other support roles was one of the principal lessons taken from the Vietnam War.

Several factors played a role in this increased reliance on contractors to support US military deployments. According to a US Army post-Vietnam War study by Lieutenant General Joseph Heiser, limitations on the amount of US troops that could be deployed (troop caps) imposed by Congress was one of the principal factors in the greater use of contractors. The number of US troops to be deployed to Vietnam after escalation of war in 1964 was always less than what was requested by the MACV, which led to an inadequate logistical support base. Thus, the required services and support functions were beyond the capacities of the US military.[516] Furthermore, the exigencies of Vietnam surpassed that of previous engagements: "Never before had the Army's logistic system been tasked with the mission of supporting large numbers of ground combat troops operating in a counter-guerrilla role."[517] Thus contractors became instrumental in increasing US military capability while avoiding surpassing troop caps, freeing up regular solders for training, combat, and other roles.

To manage and coordinate outsourced support and procurement procedures, the Army created an ad-hoc administrative body, the United States Army Procurement Agency Vietnam, spending around 500 million dollars on contracts at the peak of the Vietnam War in 1968, hiring over 50,000 contractors.[518] This was an important precursor to the creation of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in 1985, an administrative body created to manage privatized support roles.[519] Although outsourcing of support and logistical functions was by no means new,[520] contracting during the Vietnam War underscored the benefits and flexibility of such public-private partnerships to facilitate and improve the deployment of US troops. According to Dickinson, "Official military reports after the war make the case for continued and increased use of contractors to provide logistical support on the battlefield."[521] Heiser's report, for instance, concluded that "The successful techniques and procedures developed by U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam in providing these procurement services, in the combat zone, will be the basis for contract logistical support in future conflicts."[522] Contracting during the Vietnam War served as a basis upon which much of the privatization of logistics and support roles were administered during the 1980s, establishing many of the mechanisms for such outsourcing that are currently used.

Beyond CIA contracts with AA to facilitate its paramilitary pacification programs (primarily a combat role), private airline companies were hired by the CIA, US Air Force, US Army, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and State Department, amongst other US government agencies, to provide transportation for US and South Vietnamese government personnel and armed forces as well as evacuation, airlift and supply

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[515] James Jay Carafano, *Private Sector, Public War* (Westport: Praeger, 2008), 43.
[516] Heiser Jr., Lieutenant General Joseph, *Logistic Support* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), 13, 84, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/logistic/index.htm#contents. (accessed 4 Aug 2011)
[517] Ibid., 4
[518] Ibid., 88
[519] See Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army*, 51-54.
[520] The US military has used private companies in and outside of the combat zones to facilitate the war effort, particularly in construction of bases well before the post-war era. See Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*
[521] Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 29.
[522] Heiser Jr., Lieutenant General Joseph, *Logistic Support*, 91.

missions and other supporting roles.[523] For example, in US early involvement in Vietnam, CAT was used to supply weapons and "sabotage" materials, or explosives, to stay-behind paramilitary forces in North Vietnam after the Geneva agreements in 1954, as well as evacuations of nationalist supporters of the Southern government remaining in Hanoi.[524] After 1965, with the US troop build-up, AA received a wide assortment of contracts. The majority of such logistical contracts were set by USAID to transport many of the materials required for the development and civic action portion of the counterinsurgency campaign. Shipments varied from case to case with cargo consisting of myriad of items such as gasoline, cement, food, to chickens, and even donkeys. The Logistical Support Group also contracted AA for various transport and rescue missions. The DoD hired AA to facilitate research on defoliants and communication infrastructure.[525] Moreover, AA was involved in the transportation of North Vietnamese prisoners to interrogation centers as part of the Phoenix program including to Con Son, an island prison notorious for large numbers of prisoners kept in small prison cells known as "tiger cages".[526] In sum, AA's presence was much more conspicuous than in covert paramilitary operations in other parts of South East Asia, and even Miss America was flown around Vietnam on a publicity tour campaign in an AA plane.[527]

AA also played a special role in the US gradual withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. As US forces were phased out of Vietnam in accordance with Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" (1969-1973), AA began to take on new roles, often replacing US agencies altogether. "Vietnamization" was a policy to hand over responsibility and direction of the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam to the South Vietnamese partly in response to mounting anti-war domestic pressures in the US and the political and economic costs associated with war. Indeed, according to Chalmers Johnson, the IMET program was created in 1976 in accordance with Nixon's famous principle that "Asian boys should fight Asian wars."[528] Yet, it was AA that picked up much of the slack left in the vacuum of the US retreat. This was not part of a set of plausibly deniable covert operations, but nonetheless the reliance on contractors limited the implication of the US in continued operations, providing a public image of non-involvement, and by extension, a commitment to the withdrawal process. While some contracts, such as with USAID to supply materials for the CORDS program (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Developmental Support) and development initiatives continued, AA became increasingly involved as an evacuation service[529]and in the transportation of refugees.[530] AA was also commissioned to train Vietnamese pilots.[531] In other words, while there was an official declaration of US withdrawal, AA and other private companies filled the void. The withdrawal process depended on strengthening the South Vietnamese military and government, but also to a large degree on a collection of private companies and paid paramilitary assets that fought at the forefront of the war. In fact, during the withdrawal process, AA took on an increasingly important role. Robbins describes this as follows: "As the US formally began to withdraw from Indochina, and the war apparatus was phased out, AA was hiring more pilots. With the majority of the US military forces out of the picture, the role of maintaining significant American influence reverted largely to the CIA

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[523] For a complete description of these contractual obligations complete with digital copies of original contracts and US government communications on the subject, see Leeker, *The History of Air America (Ebook)*
[524] Ibid., "Chapter AA in S. Vietnam I", p. 2
[525] Ibid., "Chapter AA in S. Vietnam I" p. 35
[526] Ibid., "AA in S. Vietnam I" p. 14 Robbins, *Air America*, 144.
[527] Leeker, *The History of Air America* (Ebook), "AA in S. Vietnam part II" p. 13.
[528] Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*, 135.
[529] Leeker, *The History of Air America* (Ebook), "AA in S. Vietnam III".
[530] Ibid., "AA in S. Vietnam II" p. 24-25
[531] Ibid., "AA in S. Vietnam II"

and subsequently the services of AA were more in demand."[532] The DoD increasingly depended on public-private partnerships to extend US influence throughout the US troop withdrawal process, with contracts with AA climbing from $17.2 million in 1972 to $41.4 million in 1973.[533]

The nexus between the US and various para-institutional forces and private companies during Vietnam and beyond was also partly inspired by the distance between the actions that these forces could take and US responsibility for them. As Dickinson asserts "the mere fact that these foreign fighting forces were not literally US troops helped the US government distance itself from their actions, rendering abuses more likely, and legal and democratic checks less so. This is a pattern that has continued to the present."[534] Thus the plausible denial of an operation extended beyond the mere denial of its orchestration, but also formed an acknowledged responsibility buffer between the parallel groups and the United States. While US direction and support of forces such as the PRUs, for example, was public knowledge, US forces were not held directly responsible for their actions. As the US became increasingly involved in Vietnam the pressures on the government to withdraw intensified. Outsourcing represented a way to alleviate, and in some cases evade the political costs of waging war. While the deaths of US troops would not be tolerated at home, those of local agents, mercenary forces, and private contractors largely went unnoticed. Finally, the privatization of logistics and other supporting roles while peripheral to the delegation of violence to para-institutional groups, often served similar purposes, and augmented military capacity as force multipliers.

In summary, the Vietnam case marks an important historical point in the evolution of the para-state nexus. Primarily, rather than the preserve of covert warriors, PMCs and the use of paramilitary assets were hired by various overt US agencies beyond the Special Forces and the CIA. This overt turn helped to cement these practices into US foreign policy, particularly in the cases of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, as we shall see in the next section. Several intermingling factors helped to further entrench these para-statal connections during the Vietnam War. US military resources were stretched almost beyond a point of sustainability, with an obligatory draft at home, outsourcing, particularly during the withdrawal process, offered an alternative means to extend US coercive reach without overstretching US forces. This was compounded by Congressionally-imposed troop caps towards the end of the war which meant hiring private military services, third country mercenaries ("More Flags" program), and paramilitary assets was a viable option to circumvent such restrictions. Furthermore, although US complicity was not deniable, a certain level of distance was afforded by operating through such surrogate means. The next section continues to trace further evolution in the para-state nexus and the lingering effects of the Vietnam War in the "Low Intensity Conflicts" of the 1980s.

The Reagan Years: Low Intensity Warfare and the Intensification of the Para-State Nexus

> "We must find a way to incorporate into a grand strategy the total resources of our society, so as to address those needs essential to our security beyond the limitations of our current defense structure."[535]

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[532] Robbins, *Air America*, 145.
[533] Ibid., 145 also Leeker, *The History of Air America* (Ebook), "AA in South Vietnam II" p. 35.
[534] Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 30.
[535] US Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh quoted in John H. Marsh, "Keynote Address by the Honorable John O. Marsh Jr." in *Special Operations in US Strategy*, eds. Frank Barnett, Hugh Tovar and Richard Shultz (New York: National Defense University Press, 1984), 24.

- US Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, 1984

Upon his inauguration as President in 1981, Reagan reinvigorated the anti-communist rationale that underpinned much of US Cold War policy towards the global South.[536] With this, the para-state nexus became further entrenched in US foreign policy, as outsourcing and contracting became a primary extended coercive means of influence over the direction of political events in certain areas of the South. Several factors can help explain this intensification of the para-state nexus which will be the subject of this section. Firstly, while the Open Door grand strategy remained firmly rooted, mounting limitations on military and covert action often pressured the release of intervention through "private" para-institutional means. Secondly, outsourcing, broadly speaking, was consistent with the privatization ideology of the efficiency of market mechanisms promoted during the 1980s.[537] Finally, by this time, a parallel infrastructure, consisting of ex-military officials working for the "private" sector and other organizations, had largely been consolidated from the aftermath of Vietnam. This infrastructure helped pave the road for the expansion of a private military industry after the Cold War.

The Reagan administration renewed US efforts to counter challenges to the prevailing order, justified under the pretense of stemming Soviet influence. Yet, much like earlier Cold War interventionism, the twin policies of containment and rollback involved the "overthrow of governments that seek full independence from the economic, political or military influence of the United States," with the ultimate vision for the "overthrow of the entire socialist world, including the Soviet Union and its replacement with capitalist nations."[538] Rather than a strict anti-communist stance, the US was committed to advancing an Open Door policy which involved securing and protecting favorable political and economic arrangements in strategically important countries across the global South. Moreover, if and where perceived necessary military strategies were implemented to counter threats to the desired form of "stability". In an article in *Military Review,* US Colonel James, for instance, argues in favor of broad stratagem to "better influence politico-military outcomes in the resource-rich and strategically located Third World Area."[539]

Towards these ends, Washington continued to employ counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare towards the South under a revised umbrella title of "Low Intensity Conflict" (LIC). Devised and articulated through a series of conferences and military committees on the subject, LIC was promoted as the new politico-military strategy to reverse challenges put forward by counter-hegemonic forces.[540] A "synergistic application of comprehensive political, social, economic and psychological efforts," LIC constituted a form of total war, a coordinated campaign to alter conditions in the South favorable to US objectives.[541] However, according to many analysts, instead of offering a profoundly altered understanding of the problems of insurgency, subversion and terrorism, as well as responses

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[536] See Peter Kornbluh, "Nicaragua: US Proinsurgency Warfare against the Sandinistas," in *Low Intensity Warfare*, eds. Michael T. Klare and P. Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 137.
[537] See Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 35.; Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 96.; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 120-122.
[538] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*
[539] Motley, James B "A perspective on Low-Intensity Conflict" *Military Review*, January 1985: As cited in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, "The New Interventionism," in *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Anti-Terrorism in the Eighties*, eds. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 5.
[540] Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project: Final Report. Vol I. Analytical Review of Low Intensity Conflict and VOl II. Low Intensity Conflict, issues and Recommendations, August 1 1986 see Ibid., 5
[541] See Kornbluh, *Nicaragua: US Proinsurgency Warfare Against the Sandinistas*, 137.

to them, LIC represented a continuation of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.[542] The concepts that underpinned LIC remained consistent with counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare principles and many sections of training manuals were extrapolated from earlier 1960s manuals. Beyond an incorporation of terminology of "peace operations" amongst other scenarios within its mandate (which had its own separate mandate anyway), LIC offered very little alteration from previous doctrinal recommendations. According to US counterinsurgency expert Michael McClintock, the term "Low-Intensity Conflict" was merely a code word for counterinsurgency.[543] The primary focus of LIC remained on curbing the tide of revolutionary movements around the world.

In this manner, LIC was consistent with US grand strategy. Beyond containing communism, LIC was an instrument used to combat political movements aimed at steering their countries on an alternative developmental course away from the US sphere of influence and by extension help stabilize capitalist state forms in the South. Along with political considerations, economic and geo-strategic imperatives were integral to the grand vision or framework that guided LIC policy. Such intentions are reflected in official statements and documents. According to Reagan's 1987 National Security Strategy, for instance, the architects of the LIC strategy were fully cognizant that losing LIC conflicts can lead to the "Interruption of Western access to vital resources... Gradual loss of U.S. military basing and access rights... Expanded threats to key sea lines of communication... Gradual shifting of allies and trading partners away from the United States into positions of accommodation with hostile interests." Therefore, the document points out, "If we can protect our own security, and maintain an environment of reasonable stability and open trade and communication throughout the Third World, political, economic, and social forces will eventually work to our advantage."[544] Crucially, it is argued in this document, this can be accomplished through "indirect rather than direct applications of military power," coupled with political and economic inducements designed to "reduce the underlying causes of instability of the Third World, help undermine the attractiveness of totalitarian regimes, and eventually lead to conditions favorable to US and Western interests."[545]

Consistent with political pressures within the US such as the "Vietnam syndrome," the *raison d'etre* of LIC was to avoid direct US intervention and the use of US personnel in combat roles.[546] This indirect approach also made it possible to sustain military campaigns in multiple theatres in various locations without the need for public support or approval and sometimes, in exceptional cases, without the expressed consent of Congress. LIC, in other words, was designed specifically to avoid direct military intervention, yet could be conducted so as to achieve the desired political and economic objectives abroad. LIC helped to etch into the US foreign policy making apparatus the extended means by which Washington could conduct interventions in the South. The LIC strategy contributed to the advancement of the nexus between the US and various para-institutional groups.

Strengthening the Special Forces and CIA was a principal ingredient in maximizing the use of foreign paramilitary forces, mercenaries, and private companies to spearhead US LIC campaigns. The 1980's saw a consistent build-up of the Special Forces and concerted

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[542] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 337-339.; and Hippler, *Counterinsurgency and Political Control*

[543] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 337-338.

[544] President Ronald Reagan, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1987), 34, http://edocs.nps.edu/govpubs/wh/1987/nss1987.pdf (accessed 10 April 2011).

[545] Ibid., 33

[546] Klare and Kornbluh, *The New Interventionism*, 3-20.

efforts to strengthen the CIA's paramilitary capabilities. The number of Special Forces personnel surpassed previous figures, from a peak of 13,000 active duty officers in 1969, this surged from 11,600 in 1981, to 14,900 in 1985, reaching around 20,900 by 1990. Concurrently, the DoD budget allocations for SOF increased from around $500 million in 1981 to around $1.2 billion in 1987.[547] In 1988, projected spending for the next five years on SOF was set at $7.6 billion.[548] CIA covert operations, including paramilitary campaigns increased by five times during Reagan's first term.[549] The Special Forces and CIA were the first point of contact with paramilitary groups, militias, and private companies operating on the ground. As Secretary of Defense Weinberger argued, the build-up of Special Forces was necessary "to project United States power where the use of conventional forces would be premature, inappropriate, or infeasible."[550] In addition to this, in the words of Special Operations Chief Colonel Roger Pezzelle, MTTs were dispatched to liaise and train with, "host country regular units, militia, reserve forces and security units."[551] Thus ensuring as McClintock points out, the "burden of low-intensity conflict would fall on allied foreign forces, proxies, or mercenaries."[552] This meant a continuation of a nexus between the US state and para-institutional agents in the projection of American military power.

Although the Reagan era marked continuity in the para-state nexus in this regard, during this period US power projection through non-state military forces developed significantly. While previous engagements involving outsourced military means were primarily the remit of covert operations, contracting and outsourcing to both private companies and paramilitary outfits became a more uninhibited and overt facet of US policy. This had two implications for the use of PMCs. First, rather than using PMCs primarily to conceal US complicity, such practices were by this time an integral part of US statecraft. Secondly, this helped further forge an infrastructure out of which the contemporary private military industry as well as future paramilitary practices grew. There was an entrenchment of the para-state nexus, which paved the way for its further development in the post-Cold War period.

In contrast to the Bay of Pigs invasion twenty years prior, as just one example, which was a wholly covert affair, support for paramilitary fighters in Central America and beyond in the 1980s was conducted, for the most part, in the open. In accordance with this Special Forces and CIA build up, shortly after assuming the presidency, Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive 17 to fund an initial 500 commando Contra team force with $19 million to conduct an unconventional war against the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. In addition, he appealed for the repeal of the 1976 Clark Amendment that prohibited military training to the insurgency in Angola, which the CIA had reportedly violated anyway.[553] Furthermore, Reagan famously announced to the nation, in his seventh State of the Union

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[547] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 349.
[548] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*, 102.
[549] William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua* (London: Zed Books, 1987), 35.
[550] Wienberger as quoted in Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era*, 189.
[551] As cited in McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 351.
[552] Ibid., 335
[553] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*, 83. for violation see Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Possible Violation Or Circumvention of the Clark Amendment* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1987), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000013683399;page=root;view=image;size=100;seq=1 (accessed 12 March 2011).

Address that he would be seeking to extend further support to the Contra "freedom fighters".[554] "So, too, in Afghanistan," he stated, "the freedom fighters are the key to peace." This was likened to "a swelling freedom tide across the world" connecting US support for these groups and others in Cambodia and Angola. At one point he went as far as to compare the Contra "freedom fighters" to the founding fathers of the United States. Such official statements and policies reflected a much more open approach to the financing and support of paramilitary forces abroad.

Despite this more overt turn, and perhaps contradictorily, this manifestation of the para-state nexus carried with it the intended deniability for specific activities and mitigating restrictions from Congressional control. With the use of irregular forces, PMCs, and mercenary paramilitary groups, US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations (but not the fact that these forces were receiving US support) would fall out of the purview of the Congressional and public eye. Moreover, Special Forces' responsibility for paramilitary operations held the advantage over CIA covert missions in that Special Forces was not required by law to report their missions to Congress, thus allowing for greater levels of procedural secrecy.[555] This was an explicit motivation of LIC and outsourcing covert wars to such para-statal groups. "Since the Vietnam War," a Reagan NSC staff member expressed to a reporter, "we have had this growing involvement by the legislative branch in the details of foreign policy that - you can make a constitutional argument - are properly left to the president. When you do that, you drive him in the direction of using other techniques to achieve objectives."[556] The case of the Contra war against Nicaragua revealed how far the Washington was prepared to go to continue its global counter-revolution. As Grandin notes, "It was in Central America that unconventional warriors learned to bypass Congressional oversight by creating a semiprivate, international network to carry out a clandestine foreign policy and to undermine post-Vietnam efforts to limit the use of military power for other than clearly defined, limited objectives."[557] Similarly, John Prados noted that Reagan had let "the hand of the White House and the NSC [National Security Council] become visible, standing the very definition of covert action on its head." As such, Prados continues, "Reagan's secret wars have revealed new problems of accountability, and led to an unprecedented confrontation between Congress and the Executive over a specific covert action."[558] In short, the culmination of pressures emanating from Congress and the public encapsulated in the "Vietnam syndrome" to disentangle the US from protracted conflicts helped pave the way for the LIC way of war and the continuation and consolidation of the para-state nexus.

Implementing the suggestions put forward by right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Santa Fe Committee, by 1986 the US was financing "freedom fighters" in four countries with a budget of over $600 million. This included support for an estimated 150,000 irregular fighters in Afghanistan, 25,000 in Angola, 20,000 in Kampuchea, and 15,000 in Nicaragua.[559] Much like previous para-statal engagements private companies were often contracted to provide logistical and training support to these paramilitary armies. Such a para-institutional extension of US policy was applied in El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries. Paramilitary operations and support for "freedom fighters" were consolidated to defend US interests abroad, and PMCs slowly emerged as an accepted para-institutional

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[554] Ronald Reagan, *Seventh State of the Union Address*, (1988).
[555] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*, 103.
[556] NSC staff member as cited in Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era*, 8.
[557] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 119.
[558] Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 357.
[559] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 337.

appendage to the US military. As Schraeder comments, despite considerable paramilitary operations, in terms of size and scope, during the 1950s-1970s, "it was not until the 1980s that paramilitary intervention became a comprehensive and coherent instrument of US intervention in the Third World."[560]

Much like previous para-statal engagements, private companies were often contracted to provide logistical and training support to these paramilitary armies. Moreover, and importantly, it was also this period that helped lay the foundations for an expansion in the PMC industry. The remnants of private ventures in Indochina and the privatization of CIA proprietaries, helped establish an infrastructure that would pave the way for the later development of the PMC industry. Fletcher Prouty, a retired Air Force Colonel observed in 1987 that "The agency uses fewer wholly subsidiaries and more private contractors, but the range of activities is little changed, and the volume of business could be 10 times higher than in our day."[561] These contractors often consisted of former government officials operating under Washington's direction in a private capacity.

Alongside this para-state nexus, a range of "private" organizations and groups such as the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) helped formulate and sometimes implement US foreign policy. Groups such as the WACL held various connections in and out of government (for instance, former CIA agent John Singlaub) and collectively represented an intricate shadow network of para-institutional formations.[562] Many scholars have already uncovered and traced these shadow networks working in conjunction with the US state. Marshall, Scott, and Hunter, for example, document the secret teams associated with the Iran Contra affair, revealing a wider network of private institutions working in tandem with the US state.[563] Some US foreign policy decisions and their execution were totally "privatized", with private entities conducting their own policies, yet within the guidance of the US government. Bodenheimer and Gould argue that during this period there emerged a "global rollback network in which it is difficult to distinguish what is governmental activity, what is private, and what is public-private meld."[564] The rollback network they describe has the essential features of the para-state nexus comprised of various private organizations, selection of paramilitary assets and private companies, all involved in some level in the projection of military force. It also expands beyond and above it, to include various right-wing lobby groups and other US political entities. Bodenheimer and Gould's rollback network is a collection of domestic and international right-wing movements and organizations in the 1980s which collectively organized to promote and carry out the Reagan administration's policies of containment and rollback. The prevalence of supportive organizations was tantamount to a para-institutional movement which the Reagan administration eagerly used in order to orchestrate a global counter-revolutionary push. US support for the Contras in Nicaragua serves as an example of these developments.

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[560] Schraeder, *Paramilitary Intervention*, 131.

[561] Prouty as cited Clyde Farnsworth, ""the Company" as Big Business," *New York Times*, sec. 3, 4 January, 1987.

[562] For a further expose of these shadow networks see Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era.*; For further information on the WACL see Right Web, "World-Anti Communist League," Right Web, http://rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/World_Anti-Communist_League#P10671_2152317 (accessed Nov/29, 2011).

[563] Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era*

[564] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*, 54.

The Para-Statal War on Nicaragua

Washington's war against the Nicaraguan Sandinista government is an excellent example of the para-state nexus. From the beginning of this LIC war of attrition, the US state, mainly through the CIA, presided over a vast intricate network and multiple levels of "private" and para-institutional forces coordinated for the destabilization of the Sandinista regime. Alongside various factions of US-trained Contra "freedom fighters", as they were called, mercenary outfits and private military companies were called upon to conduct military actions in Nicaragua. In addition, private military airline companies were summoned to conduct bombing raids on Nicaraguan military and civilian targets, and employed to re-supply the Contra fighters. As Marshall, Scott, and Hunter described it, "President Reagan's secret weapon is "contracting out" such normal government functions as funding and executing policy to the "private" sector while keeping policy making itself in the hands of the state."[565] The Contra-war against Nicaragua is a prime example of public goals via private or outsourced means. This in turn, once the Iran-contra scandal broke out, makes this Contra war an example of circumvention of Congressional accountability and control as well as the effective use of plausible denial with many of the top politicians evading serious punishment.[566]

Washington's war by proxy was coordinated at the top levels to coincide with and reinforce parallel political and economic pressures against Nicaragua to reverse the tide of revolution and reinstate leaders willing to re-direct Nicaragua along a political path under the aegis of US leadership and of capitalist design.[567] Following the overthrow of the US-supported Somoza regime in 1979, Sandinista revolutionary reforms guided by the "logic of the majority" promised to tackle poverty and exploitation, creating a system of political and economic pluralism, much to the consternation of the country's elites who saw such maneuvers as a "betrayal."[568] Based on a platform of non-alignment, the political and economic transformation of Nicaragua threatened to lead Nicaragua away from US sphere of influence. As Kolko states,

> Nicaragua, like Cuba before it, was of profound significance in the United States' relationship to the hemisphere, and both confirmed that it had irrevocably lost its ability to control the main political developments that grew irresistibly out of the economic policies and social forces it supported. Nor could it stem the political consequences of United States endorsed structural changes or define alternatives to them, for these impinged on its own basic economic needs and interests as well as those of the classes with which it was aligned.[569]

Moreover, the appeal of the Sandinista revolutionary platform, in the eyes of US policy makers, threatened to spill over and spread to other areas. Refracted through the lens of the Cold War logic, this signaled increased Soviet influence in the region and the potential for a spread or contagion of revolutionary social change. However, while Carter sought to avoid

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[565] Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era*, 7.
[566] See the various documents compiled at The National Security Archive, *The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years on* The National Security Archive, (2006), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/index.htm. (accessed 17 July 2011)
[567] See Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 82-83.
[568] Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 37.
[569] Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980*, 288.

the mistakes of previous US policies towards the revolution in Cuba,[570]Reagan gave way to attempts to topple the Sandinista government.

This unconventional warfare episode resembles earlier engagements with irregular forces such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and or the use of tribes and other irregular fighters as surrogates in Laos. However, one or two important developments stand out in the evolution and entrenchment of the para-state nexus. First, human rights legislation and arms control laws such as end-user agreements on weapons sales had emerged and strengthened during the 1970s.[571] Moreover, the Boland Amendments (1982-1984) were enacted after concerns for overt support surfaced in Congress, prohibiting direct military support to the Contras. This meant devising new ways to circumvent and overcome these restrictions if aiding the Contras was to continue. Subsequent to the enactment of this amendment to US military assistance, much of the operations against Nicaragua were of a covert nature, culminating eventually in the Iran –Contra scandal. Secondly, and beyond the disregard for US laws, it is here that discernible patterns emerge leading to the eventual growth of a PMC industry in the US in the early 1990s. Not only are private companies more prevalently used, but it is the specific way in which retired US personnel move on to forge public-private partnerships in the execution of combat missions that paved the way for the more officialized PMC activity of the future. Even though PMCs were put to use previously, it was during the Contra war that it took its present form. In particular, retired servicemen created their own companies and/or were hired by various branches of the US state for their expertise and experience.

Although initiated covertly by providing support to right-wing political parties, trade unions, and favorable media outlets during the Carter administration around 1978-1980, destabilization measures against Nicaragua were spearheaded by the Reagan administration. The orchestration of an unconventional insurgent war using a collection of counter-revolutionary paramilitary groups began with the implementation of the National Security Decision Directive on 23 of November 1981 allowing the CIA to conduct paramilitary operations against Nicaragua. Ex-Nicaraguan National Guardsmen and Somocistas were trained and directed by the CIA in insurgency, sabotage techniques, demolition and explosives, and so on in various covert locations including Argentina, Honduras, and the US.[572] According to both secondary sources and US government documents, the Contras grew from 500 members in 1981 to around 15,000 in 1984,[573] many receiving salaries from the CIA.[574] Reagan authorized an initial $19.5 million towards those ends and another $50 million to Argentina to train some of the Contra fighters.[575] The total sums of military aid throughout the conflict to the Contras including funds presented as "humanitarian aid", other portions allocated through contingency appropriations, those financed clandestinely, and contributed through private sources cannot be attained, but estimates place it in the tens of millions annually.[576] Contra fighters conducted raids, attacks and sabotage operations in Nicaragua from bases in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica procured by the CIA. Such

[570] Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 39.

[571] See Clair Apodaca, *Understanding US Human Rights Policy* (London: Routledge, 2006).; Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

[572] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 46.

[573] Grace Livingstone, *America's Backyards* (London: Zed Books, 2009), 77.

[574] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 46. Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (Washington DC: US house of Representatives and US Senate, 1987).

[575] Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 100.

[576] See Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 87. See the enterprise expenditures from 1984-1986 Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 339.

sabotage attacks included bombings in Managua, the Nicaraguan capital and the main international airport.[577] The CIA manual *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare* used to train the Contras advocated "armed propaganda", killing of judges and other civilian officials, amongst other terrorist activity aimed at fostering a popular insurgency against the Sandinista government.[578] Following this training, by the end of 1985 the Contras had reportedly killed 3,652 civilians and kidnapped 5,232[579] gaining a reputation for their brutality, mutilating many of their victims.[580]

The Boland Amendment (final legislation: 1984[581]), prohibiting US military assistance to the Contras culminated in its circumvention through various "privatized" means, which leant itself further to shadow parallel networks and outsourced military operations. For example, in lieu of absence of legitimate assistance, funding for the Contras was secured through various private sources, with estimates of totals raised running up to $100 million between 1983 and 1985. Such initiatives saw campaigns for "Christmas bags" to be donated to Contra guerrillas along with food, clothing and medical supplies.[582] Funds and military equipment were often channeled through the CIA from private donors or companies. For instance, a disused fleet of twenty Cessna counterinsurgency aircraft were procured from the New York National Guard and channeled via Summit Aviation, Inc. (a CIA owned company) to the Contras.[583] In addition, and most importantly, CIA staff Oliver North and William Casey established what they called the "Enterprise" – a network of private organizations, off-shore bank accounts, and mercenary connections to finance and directly support the Contra efforts. The Enterprise was created explicitly to by-pass Congressional scrutiny and to provide the US with the plausible deniability it needed in order to be able to sustain its paramilitary war. According to the Iran-Contra inquest records, North describes the Enterprise as "the starting point for the creation of an organization that would conduct activities similar to those of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including counter-terrorism."[584] The Enterprise remained the principal channel through which the US state financed and coordinated the Contra forces until in 1987 Congressionally-approved aid resumed, approving $100 million to the Contras. Such arrangements continued until the Iran-Contra scandal surfaced and only "non-lethal" aid was authorized until 1990.

The delegation of force to non-state and/or private actors, however, extended much further beyond the irregular Contra fighters. While the Contras waged their deadly insurgency, in 1983 and early 1984 the CIA directly employed the use of "Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets," (UCLAs) trained mercenary commando teams hired by the CIA to conduct bombing raids and sabotage operations against key installations and areas of strategic and economic importance. For instance, the UCLAs, operating from CIA boats, were responsible for exploding an oil facility in the port of Corinto (injuring 100 and temporarily displacing 25,000). Additionally, authorized directly by President Reagan as part of the sabotage package, the UCLAs mined Nicaragua's main commercial harbor, with the ultimate

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[577] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 49.
[578] CIA, *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*,
http://www.whale.to/b/CIA%27s%20Psychological%20Operations%20in%20Guerrilla%20Warefare.pdf. (accessed 21 June 2011)
[579] Livingstone, *America's Backyards*, 77.
[580] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 90.
[581] The Boland Amendment is the title given to a series of three legislations prohibiting military or "lethal" aid to the Contras in the explicit quest to overthrow the Sandinista government.
[582] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 89.
[583] Ibid., 88
[584] Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 327.

aim of crippling the Nicaraguan economy.[585] Nicaragua later filed suit against the US in an international court for the mining of its waters. The UCLA members hailed from Honduras, Guatemala and other Latin American countries previously in reception of US military training and aid, and were employed to disrupt trade, terrorize the Nicaraguan people and support the Contra attacks.[586] One Honduran UCLA later remarked that their mission was "to sabotage ports, refineries, boats and bridges and make it appear that the Contras had done it," in order to create the impression the Contras were significantly stronger than they were.[587] The UCLAs were an additional paramilitary asset at CIA disposal to further debilitate the Sandinista regime while simultaneously preserving a perception of US restraint.

In addition to this, Congressional reports subsequent to this conflict demonstrate how paramilitary mercenary-type organizations from the US not only provided training and assistance to Contra groups, but also conducted their own paramilitary operations.[588] The American group called Civilian Military Assistance (CMA), for instance, comprised numerous Vietnam veterans and was established in 1983 to aid the counter-revolutionary agenda. Their participation in the Nicaraguan war became known when three former US military personnel were killed after their helicopter was shot down after conducting an attack on the Nicaraguan town of Santa Clara in 1984.[589] In addition, according to Grandin, a Washington-based group called GeoMilTech, a small military consulting firm shipped $5 million worth of arms to the Contras.[590] GeoMilTech's executive board at the time comprised of numerous influential former policy makers from Washington, including General John Singlaub (also head of the WACL), John Carbaugh, and Robert Schweitzer (a former US Army general).[591] Similarly, in 1985, five mercenaries (from US, Britain and France) were arrested in a Contra training camp in Costa Rica.[592] These parallel military organizations hailing from the US such as CMA, Soldier of Fortune, and Air Commando Association were mobilizing veterans and ex-US military personnel for various missions from military engagements, piloting planes and helicopters, to training and running supplies to the Contras, as well as fundraising. Much like the later explosion of PMCs during the 1990s, these groups were using expertise of former US military personnel and forging public-private partnerships under the auspices of officials in the Reagan Administration and the CIA.

An additional layer of para-institutional fighters was added by PMCs, which much like the UCLAs and paramilitary organizations, were employed to conduct special operations and training exercises. In 1984, the Enterprise approached David Walker, a former British SAS (Special Air Service) commander, to contract military operations out to his PMC Keenie Meenie Services (KMS). According to later testimony given by North to the Congressional Committees investigating the Iran-Contra affair, Walker offered to conduct "sabotage operations for the resistance," inside the capital Managua and elsewhere, including a $50,000 contract to destroy Nicaraguan army ammunition depots and plans to demobilize helicopters at Managua's main airport.[593] Walker and his KMS were authorized to conduct other military

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[585] Kornbluh, *Nicaragua: US Proinsurgency Warfare against the Sandinistas*, 142-143. also see *Wall Street Journal* of March 6, 1985

[586] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 116.

[587] Kornbluh, *Nicaragua: US Proinsurgency Warfare against the Sandinistas*, 142.

[588] See Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 648.

[589] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 88.

[590] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 143.

[591] Ken Silverstein, *Private Warriors* (London: Verso, 2000), 88.

[592] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 185.

[593] Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 124. and Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 276.

and sabotage operations in Nicaragua, which according to North in later testimony were intended to foster the "perception that the Nicaraguan resistance could operate anywhere that it so desired."[594] Another un-named PMC was allegedly hired to conduct "so-called policies of intimidation."[595] In addition, the Enterprise planned for Walker's introduction to Calero (a Contra group leader) in order to arrange special operations and insurgency training programs for Contra troops. While Calero was to contract KMS directly (thereby not directly implicating the CIA) efforts were made to "defray the cost of Walker's operations from other than Calero's limited assets."[596]

Enterprise coordinators North and Secord arranged for retired Air Force Lt. Col Richard Gadd to coordinate Contra resupply efforts using a network of private companies. Gadd contracted Southern Air Transport which he interlinked with his own set up of private airlines such as Eagle Aviation Services and Technology (EAST), American National Management Corporation (ANMC), procuring airplanes for the delivery of "lethal" assistance in contravention of Congressional bans.[597] All these private companies also secured contracts with the US government for other operations such as logistical flights for the Grenada invasion and for Special Force transportation for "low visibility operations" and training exercises in the Caribbean.[598] The transfer of materials and weapons to the Contras was conducted by private airline companies, SAT (receiving around $2 million), Corporate Air Services ($437,000), and EAST (just over $600,000) with much of the money towards the resupply operations laundered through private companies with connections to Gadd. SAT had previously covertly supported wars in Vietnam, Indonesia, China, to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Dominican Republic, it was a CIA propriety since 1960-1973, and was now the "airline of choice" for the exchange of weapons to Iran that once unveiled led to the Iran-Contra scandal.[599]

In a similar fashion as the paramilitary organizations and PMCs, pilots hired to fly resupply missions and other combat roles in private airlines in Nicaragua were either retired Air Force personnel or were "sheep-dipped" and employed as a civilian.[600] But later at North's request, the Enterprise paid David Walker (of KMS) $110,000 for two pilots to fly supply missions to the Contras in order to evade using US military personnel.[601] The issue, according to Secord in later testimony, was an "appearance problem. If we were to have one or more of these people captured, as it ultimately occurred, it becomes a real problem when it's American citizens."[602] Here, Secord makes reference to the capture of former US marine Eugene Hasenfus in 1986 by the Nicaraguan authorities after his plane was shot down. The other crew members, who were in possession of SAT identification cards died, while Hasenfus' capture went on to expose the Iran-Contra scandal.[603] It was later revealed,

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[594] North as quoted in Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 338.
[595] As quoted in Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 276.
[596] Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 124.
[597] Ibid.
[598] Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 258.
[599] Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era* also see Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 217, 341.
[600] See Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 258.
[601] Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 67, 338.
[602] Secord as quoted from Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 276.
[603] Select Committees US House of Representatives and Senate, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, 77.

although the State Department issued a statement denying US involvement, that knowledge of the event and attempts to scramble a rescue operation went up to the highest echelons of government.[604] The Enterprise had also hired Col. Robert Dutton, retired Air Force officer, to replace Gadd to coordinate resupply efforts on the Southern Front.[605]

Instead of a wholesale privatization of US foreign policy, in which the formulation and implementation of policy is conducted by private organizations independent of state direction or control, these public-private partnerships remained a coordinated instrument of US policy. The power and expertise of hundreds of war veterans and counterinsurgency experts as well as right-wing enthusiasts was harnessed to contribute to the cause of counter-revolution through a secret 1984 White House plan to coordinate their efforts.[606] The CIA and the NSC, under the direction of Col. North, were the principal agencies through which the nexus between government initiative and such private organizations was channeled. A para-statal model of US foreign policy becomes clear through analysis of this paramilitary endeavor to alter and control the political course of Nicaragua. This effort was principally of US state design and direction, but one spearheaded by a collection of para-institutional organizations.

In conclusion, while the Contra war against Nicaragua was just one part in the continuation of US grand strategy towards the South, it serves as an example of the development of the para-state nexus. LIC during the Reagan administration represented a continuity of a coercive strategy towards the stabilization of pro-US state formations. Much like the counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies of the 1950s and 1960s, these forms of conflict relied on networks of civilians, paramilitary assets, and private companies for their execution. What was new at this juncture, however, was the way in which PMCs were increasingly involved in various aspects of US unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency practices, at the forefront of battle and for paramilitary logistical requirements. unconventional warfare involving Special Force and CIA paramilitary divestment of coercion to irregular paramilitary groups (in this case the Contras) was slowly built upon and facilitated by an intricate network of "private" organizations that soared to unprecedented levels. This was in large part the result of a strong determination to continue LIC rollback efforts in the face of layers of restrictions on action and assistance. The outsourcing of US coercive apparatus in this case demonstrates the fluidity by which ex-officials could continue to use their influence, knowledge and training for personal gain, while serving as a "private" extension to public objectives. This not only occurred through their hiring as independent contractors, but represented part of a larger shift in which there was a fluid osmosis between the public and private realms. One of the most influential personalities in this regard was retired Gen. John Singlaub, a CIA veteran of paramilitary operations and counterinsurgency expert who not only served as an independent Pentagon advisor but also headed the WACL during much of the 1980s, another organization which helped to rally domestic support for Reagan's proxy wars. He is also affiliated to groups such as the National Defense Council and Air Commandos Association, which collectively coordinated their actions towards Nicaragua through the NSC and the Enterprise system.[607]

As Marshall, Scott, and Hunter explain, this amounted to a specific approach to outsourcing, tapping into the reservoirs of expertise of ex-servicemen. "Unlike typical commercial examples of the practice," they argue, this "administration has contracted to

[604] Ibid.
[605] Ibid.
[606] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 92.
[607] Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era*

agents who are themselves total creatures of government-in particular, of government intelligence agencies. In their "private" capacities, however, these agents nonetheless fall largely outside Congressional purview."[608] Similarly, the presence of private paramilitary organizations such as CMA were part of a larger swath of private entities that helped implement US policy on the ground, often with the expertise of retired generals and military servicemen. In these ways it helped forge new patterns of public-private partnerships that became more prevalent in the years to come. In this manner you find the precursors to the growth of the PMC industry in the early 1990s, whereupon ex-servicemen can sell their knowledge and skills as part of an official business. While during the entire Cold War period there were many instances of contracting to PMCs, in particular to support paramilitary incursions and facilitate their resupply efforts, the post-Cold War era signaled a new level of their "officialization" as PMCs grew slowly into an accepted part of the military industry.

In short, the nature and extent of the outsourcing of the Contra war indicates an increasing reliance of the US state on parallel military groups to execute coercive interventions. This is part of larger set of conditions and developments. Robinson and Norsworthy write, "Behind privatization [of the Contra war in Nicaragua] is the growing fusion of the right wing in and out of government, a process closely tied up with the reconfiguration of US society and the imperial state to wage low-intensity warfare."[609] However, rather than a distinct emergence of such para-institutional phenomena, this forms part of a long-term pattern in which the US has been unable and/or unwilling to intervene directly to assert its interests and influence. Ambitious plans for the "horizontal escalation" of LIC across the South, or as one military expert put it, the "strategy of worldwide war" required leveraging support from other sources to meet the desires of the Reagan administration.[610] Outsourcing was part of a deeper process that involved a nexus between para-institutional forces and state officials, a series of public-private partnerships, and the application of unconventional warfare principles. These overlapping parallel-military formations are conditioned and molded to the particular structural dynamics which made intervention in this manner intelligible. In the case of Nicaragua during the 1980s, this not only involved the social and political currents in Nicaragua but also the limitations and potency of US power. The Reagan Doctrine and the ancillary LIC strategy, ultimately giving way to an outsourced military project, were part and parcel of US grand strategy.

Conclusions

This chapter has sought to describe the gradual escalation of a nexus between the US and a variety of parallel non-state military forces. In so doing it has examined the doctrinal and tactical logics behind the use of paramilitary assets and the ways in which such practices have been embedded in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations. It traced the evolution of PMCs in US foreign policy, as they emerged as an instrument of covert operations in the early 1950s to a broader logistical and combat function in Vietnam and beyond, by analyzing important historical moments in their build-up. In such a limited space it has been impossible to describe and analyze in-depth the intricacies of operating through "surrogates" and private-public partnerships. Instead, this chapter has attempted to describe the ways in which para-institutional phenomena have been an increasingly important facet of US Cold War coercive strategies to create and/or sustain specific forms of "stability" conducive to the broader US foreign policy objectives.

[608] Ibid., 7

[609] Robinson and Norsworthy, *David and Goliath: Washington's War Against Nicaragua*, 89.

[610] Bodenheimer and Gould, *Rollback: Right Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*, 110.

This nexus has developed through the interaction or confluence of three overlapping and related levels of causal factors. First, these dynamics are inextricably linked to US coercive strategy towards the South more broadly. The para-state nexus is a phenomenon inseparable from the managerial role the US has played in the international system in the post-war period. The quest to forge a semblance of a global order under the hegemonic tutelage of the US has very often required the use of parallel military formations. In simplistic terms, it would be infeasible to deploy US troops in every instance where US interests were threatened. This may be viewed as a part of what some have called an "imperial overstretch".[611] The para-state nexus, then, is a fundamental feature of US hegemony as a "force multiplier". With counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare staples of US statecraft, the para-state nexus has helped to underpin US hegemony.

Secondly, as I have shown through an examination of US unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency doctrines, there are a number of strategic logics behind the use of and reliance on paramilitary assets. In unconventional warfare, for instance, local assets were viewed as the core components of US supported guerrilla warfare operations primarily because as local assets, they knew the area, terrain, language, and cultures and could more effectively wage an insurgency or covert operations on their benefactor's behalf. Moreover, as further described in this doctrine as well as in declassified statements from US planners such as in the Bay of Pigs operations, the use of parallel forces unaffiliated with US government or armed forces provided a level of plausible denial that was viewed as a necessary aspect of Cold War dynamics to avoid a war with the Soviet Union. Similar logics underpinned the promotion of paramilitary assets in US counterinsurgency training and doctrine. While on the one hand paramilitary forces were viewed as an effective way to avoid the complicity of the state in human rights violations against its own population, "self-defense forces" were mobilized under the concept of "counter-organization" in a bid to galvanize active support for the local government. Either way, paramilitary formations of various kinds were central to the US planners' Cold War unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency strategies.

The classic covert practices of supporting local militias, paramilitary groups or insurgents complete with the help of propriety airlines and PMCs for their resupply and military support slowly gained prominence as an acceptable alternative means of extending US coercive reach whilst preserving an image of US restraint. Such an indirect method of proxy war became further entrenched as an effective means to implement policy while maintaining a modicum of plausible deniability. Moreover, the US public and Congress have often expressed their disinterest in US involvement in internal conflicts in far-away lands, and in the aftermath of US involvement in Vietnam in particular. The Iran-Contra affair, for instance, revealed the lengths that the Executive and the CIA went to wage an unconventional war against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua circumventing public and Congressional pressures to hinder US entanglement in internal conflicts abroad. Thus the Reagan strategy of LIC had its roots in the early CIA and Special Force paramilitary operations, such as the failed Bay of Pigs operation, which involved the mobilization, arming, and training of para-institutional forces to either overthrow unwanted governments or bolster counter-efforts to strengthen "friendly" countries from radical opposition from within. In addition, as I have shown, the delegation of force to private individuals, groups or companies was initially and almost exclusively a part of US covert operations. This para-extension of US foreign policy has become increasingly overt, whilst still, perhaps ironically or contradictorily, preserving the appeal to deniability. Thus, for example, Reagan made explicit and very public his policy

[611] Roger Burbach, *Imperial Overstretch* (New York: Zed Books, 2004).

stance towards Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan, unlike Kennedy's attempts to conceal, at all costs, the Bay of Pigs invasion. Yet at the same time these outsourced techniques were used to deny a direct connection when political situations demanded it.

This para-state nexus formed the basis of the post-Cold War expansion of the PMC industry and the entrenchment of a paramilitary option. Towards the end of the Cold War, US planners predicted that internal conflicts in the global South would continue to be the principal threats to US national interests and security. Yet rather than a continuation of a geopolitical battle with an arch super-power, they were cognizant of the detrimental effects of destabilizing forces within strategically important countries. For example, the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy predicted in 1988 that insurgencies and other Third World conflicts would continue to "have an adverse cumulative effect on US access to critical regions, on American credibility among allies and friends, and on American self-confidence. If this cumulative effect cannot be checked or reversed in the future, it will gradually undermine America's ability to defend its interests in the most vital regions . . ."[612] As we shall see, the practices outlined above informed the expansion of US paramilitary capabilities well into the "war on terror" as US planners continued to consider operating through "surrogates" and private businesses necessary.[613] As historian Greg Grandin argues in his *Empires Workshop*, Latin America during the Cold War was an experimental staging ground for many of the coercive practices later put into effect in Iraq after the initial invasion of 2003.[614] Yet, the para-state nexus and the delegation of coercion to para-institutional phenomena was part of US policy procedure towards the much of the global South more generally, and as will be shown, this connection has become increasingly strong in the "war on terror."

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[612] Steven Metz, "Rethinking Insurgency," *Strategic Studies Institute* (June, 2007): 5.
[613] See for example the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,* (6 February, 2006): , http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf (accessed 11 May 2011).
[614] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 88.

Chapter 4

Continuity After the Cold War and the Evolution of a Para-State Nexus

Introduction

This chapter argues that the end of the Cold War entailed the further entrenchment of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy. It focuses primarily on the increased use and acceptance of PMCs in the context of a continuation of the Open Door grand strategy. While the US-paramilitary nexus in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare remained relatively intact, primarily in the context of lingering Cold War conflicts, it was the PMC industry which underwent significant development during this time. Thus the end of the Cold War marked an important historical moment in the evolution of a para-state nexus as PMCs became institutionalized in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare modes of statecraft. Moreover, PMCs began to take on central roles in the projection of US military power in training foreign forces, serving as conduits through which US assistance was furnished, and facilitating military missions. This chapter makes the case that while a myriad of factors played a role in the rise of the PMC industry in US foreign policy, it was primarily a consolidation of past practices in combination with a continuity of US global commitments as an extra-regional hegemonic stabilizer that best explains their increased use. PMCs took on an array of activities as "force multipliers" in US-supported counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare campaigns as a means to avoid overstretch of US resources in meeting its global managerial commitments.

To make this argument, the chapter first briefly analyzes the continuity of the US Open Door grand strategy and counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. It then, secondly, examines the rise of the PMC industry in relation to the extant literature on the subject. It argues that while existing studies have captured the myriad factors that computed into a rise of the industry as a whole, they are insufficiently attentive to the ways in which US-based PMC activities were tied to US foreign policy. It then provides a variety of examples of the increased prevalence of PMCs in US foreign policy and the ways in which they have helped bolster US power projection and, in turn, US hegemony. Thirdly, it takes the case of US-supported counterinsurgency campaign in Colombia as an example of these trends. Colombia was one of the largest recipients of US counterinsurgency assistance during the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly with the passage of Plan Colombia in 2000 and subsequent military aid packages and therefore represents a likely case in which these post-Cold War dynamics would unfold. With an extended counterinsurgency relationship with the US, the example of Colombia also underscores the broader continuities in US foreign policy while capturing the specific post-Cold War trends that led to increased PMC involvement in these processes. Moreover, despite this single case limitation, the Colombian example has larger implications for broader dynamics taking place. It is offered only as a focused example of the types of processes unfolding in US foreign policy more generally. As a result, finally, this chapter also briefly provides illustrative examples of the para-state nexus within the remit of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare and its developmental course in the post-Cold War period, with particular focus on paramilitary formations in post-Cold War counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.

"Stability" and the Para State Nexus in the Post-Cold War: A New World Order?

Despite significant changes in the global geopolitical environment at the end of the Cold War, the under-riding logics driving much of US foreign policy towards the South remained intact. As many have already argued, US statecraft continued throughout the post-Cold War period to be concerned primarily with creating and maintaining conditions abroad favorable to mutually reinforcing political and economic interests.[615] This meant that although communism had largely dissipated as a "destabilizing" force, the response to threats within countries in the global South was often expressed by US military planners in terms of promoting "stability". This is not to suggest that "stability" was the only preoccupation of US planners. The trafficking of illicit drugs, humanitarian concerns, amongst other national security threats and/or interests gained prominence in US strategic thinking. However, where direct contestation of the prevailing order emerged within countries in the South, US planners continued to rely on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare to conserve favorable state arrangements.[616]

Statements contained in numerous national security documents help to point to the continuity of the US Open Door strategy and with it the use of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. The then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney predicted in his *Annual Report to the President and Congress* in 1990 that "low-intensity conflict will remain, as it has since 1945, the most likely form of violence threatening US interests."[617] Internal conflict, he further suggests which "largely result from instability in the Third World, poses a real and immediate danger to democracies, and threatens relationships and alliances that are vital to the coalition defense and open economies of the United States and its allies and friends."[618] In defending these interests, Cheney advocated a politico-military response which hinged on "winning popular support" in host countries "rather than merely capturing and controlling territory." Therefore Cheney viewed it vital to continue to employ strategies "that rely more heavily on mobile, highly ready, well-equipped forces and solid-power projection capabilities."[619] Special Forces, he noted, were best positioned to work with, through, or by local forces coupled with military assistance to strengthen recipient countries' defenses against internal centrifugal forces. Similarly, General A.M. Gray wrote in a 1990 policy report, "If we are to have stability in these regions, maintain access to their resources, protect our citizens abroad, defend our vital installations, and deter conflict, we must maintain within our active force structure a credible military power projection capability with the flexibility to respond to conflict across the spectrum of violence throughout the globe."[620]

US military reports throughout the 1990s, further identify "instability" as one of the primary threats to US national interests and strategic objectives. According to Michael T. Klare, "instability itself" began to be recognized as a major threat to the "new world order"

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[615] See Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*; Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 11.; Bacevich, *American Empire*

[616] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, xix.

[617] Dick Cheney, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and to the Congress* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1990), http://osdhistory.defense.gov/docs/1990%20DoD%20Annual%20Report%20-%20Cheney.pdf (accessed 6 March 2012).

[618] Ibid.

[619] Ibid.

[620] Gray, General A.M. Gray "Defense Policy for the 1990s" *Marine Corps Gazette* May 1990 page 18. As quoted in John Quigley, *The Ruses for War* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2007), 403.

articulated by President Bush.[621] Consistent with the Open Door strategy, this "new world order" was not only a vision for a liberalized global international system but also for a privileged US position at its apex.[622] The 1991 *National Security Strategy,* states that in this bid "to build a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemy we face is less an expansionist communism *than it is instability itself*."[623] In this way, US planners understood that "National security and economic strength are indivisible" whereupon the US defense policies seek primarily "to promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy; ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space; promote an open and expanding international economic system." [624] Such iterations of the need for the promotion of "stability" are found in national security statements throughout the 1990s.[625] In this context, efforts to preserve "stability" in the global South, and beyond, is a continuation of a broader US Open Door grand strategy.

Military planners continued to view counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, often euphemistically referred to as LIC or "Military Operations Other Than War", as important tools in the pursuit of US foreign objectives.[626] According to Grosscup, US military planners in the early 1990s envisioned that the use of terrorism arising from nationalism, irredentism, and religion (rather than ideology) would make "low intensity conflicts of the 1990s even more threatening than those of the Cold War."[627] As such, security assistance to the global South in the form of military to military ties, counterinsurgency training, and unconventional warfare operations, were sustained as the principal instruments of statecraft in the forging of the desired stability. Consistent with these US policy objectives, one Special Force training manual notes how "the objectives of security assistance are to support U.S. national security interests and strengthen the military capability of selected friendly and allied countries."[628] This, it is envisioned, will:

> Foster favorable attitudes toward the United States and its policies; Encourage friends and allies to pursue national objectives compatible with U.S. foreign policy and military strategy; Assist in obtaining and maintaining the necessary base rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements at key locations for U.S. and allied forces; Develop defensive self-reliance of other nations, thus reducing the need to commit U.S. forces in local crisis situations.[629]

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[621] See Michael Klare T., "The Interventionist Impulse," in *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Anti-Terrorism in the Eighties*, eds. Michael Klare T. and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 51.
[622] See for instance, George Bush, *President George H. W. Bush Address to the Congress 6 March 1991* (Washington D.C.: http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/america7/content/multimedia/ch36/research_01d.htm. (accessed 15 November 2011)
[623] Emphasis mine George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States August 1991* (Washington D.C.: , http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm (accessed 2 March 2012).
[624] Ibid.
[625] See John Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, 1995).
[626] See Hippler, *Counterinsurgency and Political Control*
[627] Grosscup, *The American Doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict in the New World Order*, 57.
[628] U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces FM 31-20-3* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994), G-1.
[629] Ibid., G-1

Although there were slight variations and minor developments in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, the core objectives and means behind such forms of statecraft remained unchanged.[630]

Crucially, the para-institutional strategies that US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare manuals endorse changed very little from their predecessors. One 1994 manual read: "Commanders must influence (rather than dominate) their operational environment to create favorable politico-military conditions for achieving specific national security objectives." In order to do this, it states, they must "apply military power indirectly through the military and paramilitary forces of a foreign government or other political group."[631] The Special Forces remained one of the primary intermediaries of this nexus. The 1997 Secretary of Defense annual report to the President details how Special Forces serve as "force multipliers" establishing "rapport with foreign military and paramilitary forces."[632] One US military manual advises that the Special Forces are designed specifically "to advise, train, and assist indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-US forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of US national security objectives with minimum US visibility, risk, and cost."[633] Other manuals detail how Special Forces "advise and assist irregular HN [Host Nation] forces operating in a manner similar to the insurgents themselves, but with access to superior... resources."[634] These paramilitary operatives may also be trained as "stay-behind cadres" according to one manual, in case of a hostile government takeover whereupon they can serve as insurgents.[635] These entries and similar statements peppered throughout the US counterinsurgency doctrine, underscore the unconventional nature counterinsurgency operations are meant to exhibit, with support to local "irregular" forces and paramilitary outfits at the heart of the counterinsurgency effort in order to bolster "regular" military capabilities of allied states.

Particularly instructive of the politico-military logics that underpinned the paramilitary proscription was the description of "civilian irregular defense forces" (CSDF) contained in Appendix D of FM 31-20-3 (1994). This manual highlights how the self-defense forces paramilitary concept, similar to that applied in Vietnam, was supposed to divide and polarize societies to gain the active participation of members of the public by divesting responsibility for certain activities to private groups. It states that when the strategy is implemented "the insurgents have no choice; they have to attack the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages considering CSDF." Yet the insurgents' response with terror has utility: "the psychological effectiveness of the CSDF concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be liberating."[636] There is an explicit acknowledgement of the counter-productivity of insurgent

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[630] See Hippler, *Counterinsurgency and Political Control* see also McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990.*; Klare, *The Interventionist Impulse*, 51-53.

[631] U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces FM 31-20-3*, 1-6.

[632] William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr97/index.html (accessed 13 March 2012).

[633] U.S. Department of the Army, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations FM 31-20* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-11, 1-12.

[634] U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict: FM 7-98*, 10-5. U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces FM 31-20-3*, 1-19.

[635] U.S. Department of the Army, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations FM 31-20*, 8-5.

[636] U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces FM 31-20-3*, D-1.

terror against civilians in areas adopting the CIDG program. By denouncing insurgent violence and forming a link with anti-insurgent members of the public it is hoped that the insurgents lose the battle for legitimacy for themselves by attacking civilians organized against them. Volunteers for this program it continues can include "older persons, disabled veterans, women, and youths under 16." [637] Such a tactic is consistent with the logic of "counter-organization" envisaged in the Cold War-era military instructional handbooks. Paramilitarism, and the subcontracting of local defense and combat capabilities to private groups or citizens, in this case is part of a broader political imperative to win the allegiance of the civil population. One way to do this is to mobilize them on your behalf. According to the logic in this particular manual, deaths and/or injuries amongst the civilian population when they come under attack from the opposing insurgents will only make the civilian population more diligent counterinsurgency forces.

Alongside these propensities to advocate the subcontracting of violence "downwards" to private armies, one US counterinsurgency manual of the post-Cold War advises the further outsourcing "outwards" of the total US support role to private companies and/or other third-country nations. FM 31-20, for example, instructs the reader that the US Special Forces operational in a counterinsurgency setting "may also contract with the HN [Host Nation] or another (third country or commercial) source for a dedicated security force."[638] This is one of the first references in counterinsurgency manuals to commercial sources of security contracting.

Unconventional warfare was also imagined in manuals dating from 1990 and 1994 as "a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source."[639] Another manual details how support is proffered by US forces "for insurgents in a third-world country."[640] Thus the para-extension of US capability to undermine or destabilize hostile regimes depended primarily on indigenous irregular warriors to who combat and other military operations were sub-contracted. Moreover, this form of warfare continued to be characterized by "guerrilla warfare, E & E [Escape and Evasion], subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature."[641]

Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, it must be pointed out here that in the post-Cold War environment some "stability" operations were conducted on "humanitarian" or "peacekeeping" grounds, and involved an entirely distinct mode of operation. US and multinational interventions (as part of NATO or the United Nations) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and in Somalia are examples of missions that are often referred to as "stability" operations and did not involve significant elements of counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare.[642] Rather, these missions represent a response to a specific kind of destabilizing threat, that of on-going ethnic civil wars and lawlessness and other complex crises, that did not include an immediate direct contestation of the US-led order. Hence, falling outside of the

[637] Ibid., D-3
[638] U.S. Department of the Army, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations FM 31-20*, 6-14.
[639] U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces FM 31-20-3*, 3-1.
[640] U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict: FM 7-98*, 5-12.
[641] Ibid., 5-12
[642] For a discussion on terminology of "stability" operations see Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement* (CRS Report for Congress, 2006).; Keith Gerbick, ed., *Peacekeeping and Stability Issues* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007).

counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare purview, these involvements that are nonetheless closely related to other forms of "stability" operations will not be touched upon.

PMCs: From the Cold War and Beyond

Many scholars, journalists, and military analysts alike have already recorded the significant growth of the PMC industry in the post-Cold War era. This section, rather than recapitulate what has already been described elsewhere, builds on the previous chapter to argue that the conditions for this expansion within US foreign policy specifically (instead of a global expansion) were embedded in US strategies towards the global South. Thus, the precipitous rise in PMC activity in US foreign policy and the spread of services they offered added further layers to a para-state nexus. As highlighted in the literature review, the majority of existing studies assert that the reasons for the rapid growth of PMCs in the post-Cold War period are due to some combination of the following factors:

- Reduction in active troop personnel – global military downsizing.[643]
- Concomitant rise in demand in military services from countries in South resulting in a "market for force"[644]
- Significant changes in the post-Cold War international environment and changes in dynamics of war.[645]
- Consistent with and part of a general push for privatization – this includes their cost effectiveness and flexibility of deployment.[646]
- Reliance on contractors for increasingly sophisticated weaponry (RMA)[647]
- Circumvention of troop caps[648]
- Circumvention of other restrictions and plausible denial[649]

While I do not contest that these factors have played an important role in the rise of the PMC industry, it paints an incomplete picture of the continuity in the use of PMCs in US foreign policy. In particular, many existing analyses posit that the exponential rise in PMCs is

[643] Ballard, *The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry*, 44.
[644] For a much more detailed and nuanced account of the rise of the PMC industry please see Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 30-34.; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 49.; Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 1.; Ballard, *The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry*, 69. Chesterman and Lehnardt, *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*, 96.; Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 235.; Mandel, *Armies without States*, 56.; Silverstein, *Privatizing War*, 12.; For specifically the US see Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 85.
[645] Adams, *Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century*, 54-67.; Mandel, *Armies without States*, 40.; Zarate, *The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies and the New World Disorder*, 81.; Smith, *The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications*, 104.
[646] Krahmann, *States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security*, 10-19.; Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 35.; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 120.
[647] See for example Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 93.; Cohen, *Defending America in the Twenty-First Century*, 40-56.
[648] Zamparelli, *Contractors in the Battlefield: What have we Signed Up for?"*, 8.
[649] Jamieson and McEvoy, *State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering*, 504-527.; Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*.; Chesterman and Lehnardt, *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*; Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications*, 186-220.

extraneous to US foreign policy, and largely ignores how conditions for the use of PMCs were rooted in US post-war Open Door strategy. In other words, while these above mentioned dynamics are important in the *growth of the industry as a whole*, the extant literature is not sufficiently attentive to the underlying logics at play in US foreign policy that channeled US military power through privatized means. Indeed, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the use of PMCs has a longer history as a mechanism in the prosecution of stability operations. Thus this thesis is in agreement with Zarate's statement that "the emergence of security companies in not a revolutionary development in military and geopolitical strategy but a permutation of past forms of mercenarism adapted to the demands of the post-Cold War world."[650] There was a longer historical context of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations in which the acceptance of PMCs as a tool of US military capabilities in the post-Cold War environment is rooted.

There are two points that help elucidate this evolution. First, the use of PMCs gained acceptance in the 1980s, building on their use in Vietnam as well as in covert operations of the Reagan administration. It was also during the 1980s when some of the companies that are currently still in operation were formed. Second, most PMCs hail from the US (with Britain in close second) and remain an instrument of US power. Rather than emerging solely out of a global market for force in which the logics of supply and demand shape the locations and use of such companies, PMCs in US foreign policy have their origin in and remain wedded to US policy commitments. These two points help to construct a broader understanding of the use of PMCs within the context of US Open Door strategies. They also help to elucidate more of a gradual transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period, rather than a rupture as outlined in the literature on the subject.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, a precedent for public-private partnerships had been firmly ingrained in covert operations and counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare during much of the Cold War. The practice of using former or "sheep-dipped" military personnel in private capacities was entrenched by the time the Reagan administration kick-started its covert "rollback" wars of the 1980s.[651] In addition, rather than being formed in the post-Cold War period with the rise of the PMC industry as prevailing analyses would suggest, many of the major PMCs in the US had already been created in the 1980s. Public-private melds in which ex-military members stayed in business cahoots with their former governmental employers preceded the end of the Cold War privatization boom. The history of DynCorp (still an active and lucrative business), for instance, is indicative. The company has its origins as a private airline contractor (not unlike CAT or AA) in 1946 (then under the titles Land-Air Inc. and California Eastern Airways [CEA]). After serving as an airlift capability in the Korean war, CEA was awarded the first Contract Field Team (a US Air Force program to solicit private support for technical aviation services) contract in 1951 for "depot-level repair to U.S. military aircraft and weapons systems worldwide," and has been awarded similar logistical contracts ever since.[652] In 1951, revenue from such contracts hovered around $6 billion, an amazingly high figure for this time.[653] The company, diversifying beyond the defense industry, became DynCorp in 1987 and has subsequently

[650] Zarate, *The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies and the New World Disorder*, 81-82. As quoted in Mandel, *Armies Without States*, 33-34.
[651] See for example Marshall, Scott and Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in Reagan Era*
[652] DynCorp, "A Brief History of DynCorp International," http://www.dyn-intl.com/about-us/history.aspx (accessed March 15, 2012).also see Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 2.
[653] "DynCorp," Funding Universe, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/DynCorp-company-History.html (accessed 15 March, 2012).

been contracted for a variety of military missions.[654] For instance, by the late 1990s DynCorp had an intimate role in providing military assistance to Colombia and also trained forces in El Salvador and Haiti.[655]

The history of MPRI is similar. It was founded in 1987 by "eight highly skilled and experienced military leaders," before the 1990s military downsizing.[656] Company operations however, expanded significantly after the end of the Cold War and have been involved in training numerous foreign militaries.[657] Airscan, a company which became integral to US drug-crop eradication programs in Colombia was founded in 1989.[658] Betac, has also been a key player since the early 1980s.[659] According to Shorrock, the Betac Corporation is "a consulting firm composed of former intelligence and communications specialists from the Pentagon." It "was one of the largest government contractors of its day and, with TRW and Lockheed itself, dominated the intelligence contracting industry from the mid-1980s until the late 1990s."[660] There are many other examples of companies that were formed during the 1980s well in advance of either post-Cold War military downsizing or changes in the international arena took place.

It was, however, around the late 1980s and early 1990s in which many of the administrative mechanisms were established to systematize outsourcing of military logistics and other roles. This highlights a gradual shift in the way in which PMCs were incorporated into the military fold. For instance, the creation of LOGCAP in 1985 was an important step in the formalization of outlets for privatization both in the sense of streamlining outsourcing within the US government, but also in terms of creating the receptivity to PMCs towards their use in US foreign military endeavors.[661] As noted in the previous chapter, some of these precedents in US foreign policy were well under way during and after Vietnam. It was, however, after the Cold War when further procedural standards and regulations were formulated in the evolution of the PMC industry as a tool of US foreign policy. A 1995 Defense Science Board report, for instance, argued that contracting military support and logistics to private firms could potentially save the Pentagon around $12 billion in a span of around 8 years.[662] This report and others by KBR were advocated in accordance with the

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[654] See Greg Guma, "The CIA, DynCorp, and the Shoot Down in Peru," *Zmag Online,* Dec, 2009, , http://www.zcommunications.org/the-cia-dyncorp-and-the-shoot-down-in-peru-by-greg-guma. Alvear Restrepo, "Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia: Case Study Plan Colombia," *Corporacion Colectivo De Abogados* (February, 2008).

[655] Jeremy Bigwood, *DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War* Corpwatch, 2001), http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=672 (accessed 16 March 2012).

[656] L3 MPRI, "Our History and Fast Facts," http://www.mpri.com/web/index.php/content/our_company/our_history/ (accessed 16 March, 2012). see David Isenberg, *Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms* (Washington D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 1997), http://www.aloha.net/~stroble/mercs.html (accessed 16 March 2012).

[657] "MPRI, Inc." Sourcewatch, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Military_Professional_Resources_Inc. (accessed 16 March, 2012).

[658] Juan Tamayo, "Colombia: Private Firms Take on US Military Role in Drug War," *Miami Herald* 22 May, 2001, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11094 (accessed 05 September 2010).

[659] Tom Burghardt, "'Managing' Data and Dissent," *Pacific Free Press* 4 April, 2010.

[660] Shorrock as quoted in Ibid. also see Steven Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," *U.S. News and World Report* 7 Aug, 1989.
TRW has a long history as a US defense contractor see R. Vartebedian and B. Sing, "TRW may have Overcharged Defense Dept." *LA Times* 20 June, 1986, http://articles.latimes.com/1986-06-20/business/fi-11499_1_trw-defense-contract. (accessed 12 June 2011)

[661] See Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army*, 52-65.

[662] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 2. see also Chatterjee, *Halliburton's Army*

larger privatization push.[663] Much privatization in the military sector was pushed based on the logic of the efficiency of the private sector beginning in the 1980s. Further standardized operating procedures for privatization of military affairs such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A-76, which required competition from the private sector for non-core governmental services, were born in the later 1990s.[664] These procedural mechanisms for the integration underscore the extent to which PMCs were being integrated into the US military machine. Rather than ad-hoc contracts to obscure US complicity in covert operations, they reflect a stabilized set of relations between the US state and various private for-profit military enterprises. Beyond these contracting mechanisms, military officials began to introduce protocol for interfacing with public-private partnerships in attempts to familiarize troops and others with the presence of PMCs. For instance, the 1999 *Contractors Accompanying the Force* was a military training manual for US military personnel for the purposes of organizing and liaising with PMCs to attain a unity of effort.[665] This is further anecdotal evidence of an increased receptivity on the part of the US military towards the integration of PMCs.

The concretization of PMCs as a central feature of the US military apparatus is consistent with certain changes with PMCs themselves occurring in the 1980s. Primarily, rather than the covert nature of previous US-based PMCs and aviation companies of the Cold War, often partly owned by the CIA, PMCs became the overt corporate entities they are today.[666] Part of this transition occurred after Vietnam when the CIA shed its shares of its private aero-companies in order to avoid long-term overhead costs, thereby effectively totally privatizing these companies.[667] According to Robbins, while some companies were liquidated, others went on to lucrative defense deals with US government agencies throughout the 1980s.[668] The overall evolution of PMCs was captured by Isenberg who claimed that, "The modern twist, however, is that rather than being ragtag bands of adventurers, paramilitary forces, or individuals recruited clandestinely by governments to work in specific covert operations, the modern firm is solidly corporate. Instead of organizing clandestinely, such firms now operate out of office suites, have public affairs staffs and Web sites, and offer marketing literature."[669] Although the use of PMCs is nothing new, they gained an explicitly corporate identity in the post-Cold War that is a further indication of their acceptance as for-profit businesses rather than clandestine firms of ex-military personnel working in a private capacity. There is evidence to suggest that this model has been taken and adapted from British PMCs such as Sandline and other companies operating in counterinsurgency roles across parts of the Middle East and Africa during the 1980s, and in the Iran-Contra affair.[670]

This integration of PMCs and the acceptance of privatization of defense services seem to corroborate Naomi Klein's proposition that there has been a gradual transmission,

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[663] Ibid.

[664] Valerie B. Grasso, *Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy* (Washington D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 2005).

[665] See US Department of the Army, *Contractors Accompanying the Force* (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1999).

[666] For a more nuanced discussion of the difference between mercenaries and PMCs see Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 40-48. Geraghty, *Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare*

[667] Robbins, *Air America*, 283-285.

[668] Ibid., 288-289, 304-305

[669] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 4.

[670] Kevin O'Brien, "PMCs, Myths, and Mercenaries," *RUSI Journal* 145 (2000): 59-64. Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies* Geraghty, *Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare*

"removing the revolving door, [and] putting in an archway" between the public and private realms.[671] She argues that not only has US foreign policy protected and serviced those interests of US-based corporations, but that public service employers often have their own links to corporations that benefit from US contracts. In other words, there is an increasing symbiosis of the public and private realms in which former public employees go on to work in a private capacity for public goals. This was another development in the PMC industry consolidated in the post-Cold War period. As briefly explained in the previous chapter, during the Cold War US military personnel were sometimes "sheep-dipped" to work in a private capacity for public goals. These relations have shifted, but not dramatically. PMCs are usually owned and operated by ex-military personnel, and often hire ex-soldiers.[672] It is important to note, for instance, that the majority of the emerging military contractors in the 1990s such as MPRI or DynCorp were run and staffed by former US army personnel. MPRI once proudly claimed, for instance, that it had "more generals per square foot than the Pentagon,"[673] and maintains intimate connections to the US military and government. This is crucial as it points to the strong relationship that most of these high-profile firms have with the US government as they remain an instrument of US power rather than companies operating in an open market contracting with the highest bidder. Essentially, US-based PMCs represent an appendage of the US military establishment whereby government goals or objectives can be conducted privately.

The second and related point revolves around the fact that the US forms a center (with Britain in close second) of the PMC market. Most large PMCs hail from the US (whereas the UK and South African companies tend to be smaller in size), and more PMCs come from the US than any other country.[674] Moreover, the US spent more on private companies than any other country during the 1990s and beyond. According to Mandel, by 1999, US expenditures on PMCs (contracts of all types) approached $50 billion, which is more than the entire defense budgets of all the other NATO members combined.[675] A 2004 report compiled by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists stated that "since 1994, the US Defense Department has entered into 3,061 contracts with 12 of the 24 US based PMCs."[676] While it must be remembered that these figures include a variety of services rendered including weapons construction, research and development, and other non-core activities, the centrality of US-based PMCs as one of the primary drivers of the PMC market is indicative of the extent to which PMCs and their growth is a product of US foreign policy decisions and dynamics.[677]

To further this point, despite the significant growth in the PMC market on an international scale during the post-Cold War period, US-based PMCs remained an instrument of US foreign policy through licensing requirements, much as they were in the hey-day of privatized covert operations during the Cold War. In 1997, Ken Silverstein recorded that

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[671] Naomi Klein, *Shock Doctrine* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 308-325.
[672] For further discussion on the typical make-up of many PMCs Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army*
[673] Nicolas Von Hoffman, "Contract Killers: How Privatizing the US Military Subverts Public Oversight," *Harper's Magazine* (June, 2004): 80.
[674] Allison Stanger and Mark Williams, "Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* (Fall/Winter, 2006): 14. Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 1. Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 80.; Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 8-9, See table 1.
[675] Mandel, *Armies Without States*, 8.
[676] International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, *Making a Killing: The Business of War* (Washington D.C.: Center for Public Integrity, 2003), 2.
[677] For a further argument about how US firms constitute "market drivers" in Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 80.

companies such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), run by former members of the Special Forces offer "military training and related assistance to foreign governments at the bidding of the United States."[678] Similarly, a former high-ranking DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) officer observed that, "The [privately run] programs are designed to further our foreign policy objectives... If the government doesn't sanction it, the companies don't do it."[679] The US government thus exerts control and/or direction of contracts bought between a third country and a US-based PMC. US-based PMCs require a license from the US government before they can carry out any operations, usually issued by the State Department.[680] This ensures that the parameters or objectives of the contract conform to US interests and foreign policy agenda. This also serves to strengthen the connections between the US government, these private corporations, and the operations they carry out as part of their contract. In other words, the arrangements serve US policy goals, but through private means, even though the PMCs may be hired by a foreign country. MPRI, for example, is noted for its "loyalty to US foreign policy objectives", and the firm's headquarters are located a few miles from the Pentagon.[681] As such, as scholar Michael Likosky puts it, "Even if we retain the term 'privatization', we should see privatization itself as created by public-private partnerships, rather than a move of activities from the 'public' and into the 'private' domain."[682] PMCs continued to represent a para-extensional means by which to fulfill specified foreign policy objectives.

Moreover, although not classified as covert operations, the terms of these contracts between US-based PMCs and a foreign government are often completely hidden from Congressional view and scrutiny. According to Lumpe and Amnesty International, US law stipulates that the State Department is only required to notify Congress about contracts that are valued at $50 million or more, "a threshold so high that very few, if any, training operations are likely to be reported."[683] Contracts that exceed that amount can be broken up or separated so as to avoid reporting them. In this way the US can finance and coordinate the terms of a contract, but allow a country to officially purchase it. Funds can be provided or cleared by the US to a foreign country to finance PMC contracts through that country's budget. This practice guarantees that PMC operations fall in line with broader US national security and foreign policy objectives while circumventing Congressional policy restrictions. Moreover, extolling the virtues of outsourcing to PMCs, Colonel Bruce Grant writes "since contracting shifts the cost to the recipient, the US can help an ally and improve stability without committing forces or directly spending US dollars."[684] This point is crucial as some of the dynamics of outsourcing, such as the preservation of an image of limited engagement, remained intact.

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[678] Silverstein, *Privatizing War*

[679] As quoted in Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War," *The Nation* (28 July, 1997), http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/silver.htm (accessed 7 May 2011).

[680] These regulations are directed by the Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) under the Arms Export Control Act (AECT) , the State department's Office of Defense Transitions Assistance and the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). For more details on licensing procedures see Grant, *US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy* also see Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 213.

[681] Ibid., 120

[682] Michael Likosky, "The Privatization of Violence," in *Private Security, Public Order*, eds. S. Chesterman and A. Fisher (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 18.

[683] Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*, 13. Amnesty International, "Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles: The Human Rights Dimensions of US Training Foreign Military and Police Forces," (2002): 22, http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/msp.pdf.

[684] Grant, *US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy*, 14.

These points help elucidate the ways PMCs were wielded as an instrument of US power rather than simply a result of an expanding "market for force". An alternative explanation for this rise of PMCs implicit in the following analysis revolves around the continued commitment to US hegemonic role and the Open Door grand strategy that underpinned it. According to Colonel Steven Zamparelli of the US Air Force, for instance, the increased US reliance on contractors in the 1990s was the result of a reduction in active duty forces alongside a consistent, or even an increased commitment of US military engagements abroad. He states that all of the branches of US armed forces "have experienced a significant increase in operating tempos over the last 10 years while operating with about one-third fewer forces." Contractors, he asserts, were therefore instrumental in "filling the gaps" as "force multipliers".[685] In part, this captures the way in which contracting was rooted in continuities in US foreign policy rather than something extraneous to it. In the post-Cold War period in which the US sought to maintain a dominant, uni-polar position, as well as continue to underwrite the internal stability of countries in the global South through military assistance was limited by military resources and a concomitant decline in US military personnel. PMCs were able to "fill in" key areas such as foreign military training and undertaking non-core military tasks such as logistics to sustain US global military power projection. In this sense, this dissertation is an agreement with the notion that PMCs offered one way, amongst others to overcome Paul Kennedy's famous assertion that US officials "must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously."[686] Similarly as Jamieson and McEvroy assert, "The United States has downsized its active-duty troops by 32 percent since 1991." And in this context, "The political benefits of buying [PMC] personnel to casualty-averse and military overstretched states like the United States are fairly obvious."[687] This is also captured by Colonel Bruce Grant who stated in 1998 that "as the US defense budget shrinks, the use of privatized military training abroad is quickly gaining acceptance as another means of conducting foreign policy while avoiding the direct use of American forces."[688] Part of the logic of the employment of PMCs in an increasing variety of capabilities in the post-Cold War environment, and as we shall see later in the "war on terror", was to overcome issues of so-called "imperial overstretch."[689]

Thus, as these dynamics in the post-Cold War environment took root, PMCs became an increasingly important element in the repertoire of US military power projection in order to sustain global military presence. For instance, military training programs have expanded significantly in the post-Cold War US strategy, with the most popular avenue of foreign military training, IMET, growing four-fold between 1994 and 2002.[690] Many of these training exercises, in turn, were increasingly delegated to PMCs.[691] Indeed, a variety of PMCs during the 1990s offered their military expertise to foreign countries around the globe, such as MPRI, SAIC, BDM International, Booz-Allen, and Vinnell, which had been operational in small scale training in technologies were now sometimes hired to train entire militaries.[692]

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[685] Zamparelli, *Contractors in the Battlefield: What have we Signed Up for?"*, 13.
[686] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (Vintage Books, 1989).
[687] Jamieson and McEvoy, *State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering*, 514, footnote.
[688] Grant, *US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy*
[689] See for example Anthony Cordesman, *Salvaging American Defense: The Challenge of Strategic Overstretch* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007).; Burbach, *Imperial Overstretch*
[690] See Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*
[691] See Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 120-126.; Avant, *Privatizing Military Training*; Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*
[692] Grant, *US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy*, 6-7.

For example, Vinnell continued to have an intimate role in training the Saudi National Guard in counterinsurgent techniques and intelligence gathering to protect vital oil infrastructure and the Saudi Royal family from internal opposition.[693] The Saudi Marine Corp was also trained in such techniques and other standard military training by Booz-Allen and Hamilton. The same company also ran a "very sizeable contract" consulting the Saudi Armed Forces Staff College, teaching "senior-level military skills."[694] Companies named O'Gara's and SAIC were also reportedly involved in training Saudi private guards and the Navy. Many similar contracts were issued across the globe to fortify and professionalize the militaries of various allied countries, primarily for internal pacification and control. For example, after Angola shed its contract with the British Executive Outcomes under pressure from US president Clinton to do so, MPRI was hired to train Angolan forces to quell a growing insurgency and protect lucrative mining businesses, but the contract was reportedly never fully implemented.[695] The contract, according to Silverstein, was meant to include "full-scale" training of the army and police and the notorious Rapid Intervention Police which had a record of human rights abuses in attempts to deter the UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) rebels.[696] Similar contracts were issued to help improve the Nigerian military control areas of oil extraction, in conjunction with numerous multi-national oil companies, and these para-statal arrangements for the internal stabilization of the Nigerian Delta have grown steadily since the 1990s.[697] Although ostensibly for "humanitarian" purposes rather than a strictly counterinsurgency role, the US government also hired MPRI and a slew of other contractors to help train a number of African Armed Forces as part of the Africa Crisis Response Initiative.[698] Similar types of contracts were awarded to train and help professionalize numerous countries' armed forces in the Balkans following the break-up of Yugoslavia, including a controversial appointment to Croatia.[699] As we shall see, PMCs have also been increasingly used to train Latin American militaries in internal "stability" operations. There are many other examples that elucidate the way PMCs during the 1990s were increasingly employed to extend the training capacities of the US military globally, primarily in order to professionalize and enhance foreign militaries' capacity for improving internal "stability".

In some cases, PMCs have been hired for more direct participation in counterinsurgency measures and unconventional warfare operations. According to Silverstein, Betac, a company that was previously involved with covert operations in the 1980s, was enlisted by United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to "assist US clients with internal security."[700] In addition to this, PMCs were increasingly commissioned by the US (either hired by the recipient country or agencies of the US itself) to help host nation security forces protect oil installations and other areas of economic interest, as part of a broader stabilization agenda.[701] In this way, such companies during the 1990s increasingly

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[693] Hartung, *Saudi Arabia: Mercenaries, Inc.*, 2010. also see Silverstein, *Privatizing War*

[694] Ibid.

[695] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 131. John E. Peck, *Remilitarizing Africa for Corporate Profit* Z Magazine, 2000).

[696] Silverstein, *Privatizing War*

[697] Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 126-138.

[698] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 131.; Daniel Burton-Rose and Wayne Madsen, "Corporate Soldiers: The US Government Privatizes the use of Force," *The Multinational Monitor* 20, no. 3 (March, 1999).

[699] Smith, *The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications*; Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*, 153.

[700] Silverstein, *Private Warriors*, 182.

[701] Kevin O'Brien, "Private Military Companies and African Security 1990-1998," in *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*, eds. A. Musah and J. Fayemi (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 43-75.; Thomas Adams, "The

took on roles as "investment enablers" alongside counterinsurgency and other stabilization measures. For example, oil companies and other lucrative resource extraction businesses work with PMCs and local armed forces in Nigeria to protect their business assets and operations.[702] Airscan was also hired in Angola in 1997 to provide aerial surveillance against rebel attacks on oil pipelines.[703] Similar PMC operations were designed in Latin American countries, and as we shall see, in Colombia in particular. PMCs were also incorporated to a larger degree than ever before in logistical fashion in support of US direct deployments of troops, such as in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Southwest Asia.[704]

Rather than detail all of these US PMC engagements, what is significant here is that while PMCs were used previously towards promoting US objectives and increasing its coercive reach, they became a routine feature of US strategy towards the global South in an increasing variety of capacities in the post-Cold War period. There was a global proliferation of PMCs with their incorporation into the US military edifice. Outsourcing to military companies became institutionalized as regular practice in US strategic calculations and an important component of a para-state nexus. By extension they have become central to the lubrication of the global flows of capital, resources, foreign direct investment, conducive to the wider liberalized global order.

In sum, this section has argued that rather than purely the consequence of changes in the international arena, the growth of the PMC industry in the conduct of US stability operations towards the global South in the post-Cold War period is best understood as emerging from continuities in US grand strategy. Specifically, PMCs were concretized as an instrument of US power rather than a development extraneous to US policy that policy makers simply "bought into". Building on evidence provided in the last chapter, there is a longer historical evolution of the propensity to use PMCs than is commonly suggested. This is important as it reflects an alternative account of the changes in the scope of PMCs as a tool of US power and their move to the forefront of US Open Door policies. The next section serves to further highlight these continuities and how contractors and para-institutional agents were instrumental in US counterinsurgency assistance to stabilize liberalized political and economic arrangements by considering the example of US policy towards Colombia.

Colombia, Counterinsurgency, and the Para-State Nexus

The example of Colombia highlights the entrenchment of the para-state nexus in US counterinsurgency operations. The long-term counterinsurgency relationship forged from the 1960s and then subsequently re-invigorated in the late 1990s elucidates the changes to the ways US military assistance has been allocated through PMCs and the extent of a broader US-paramilitary nexus mediated through the Colombian government and Armed Forces. This section briefly analyzes the multiple layers of para-institutional formations through which US-supported counterinsurgency policies have been operationalized. However, while it focuses primarily on the immediate post-Cold War environment, history is not neatly compartmentalized into distinct sections, and much of this analysis will cover aspects of US foreign policy well into the "war on terror", which is the subject of the next chapter.

New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict," *Parameters* 29, no. 2 (1999).; Adams, *Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century*, 54-67.

[702] Abrahamsen and Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics*, 126-135.

[703] See for instance, Silverstein, *Private Warriors*, 176.; Adams, *The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict*, 3.

[704] Deborah Kidwell, *Public War, Private Fight? the United States and Private Military Companies* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012).

While the US-Colombian counterinsurgency relationship was forged in the early 1960s, with Plan Lazo and other operations designed to root out leftist insurgencies, US assistance to Colombia increased with the implementation of Plan Colombia in 2000 which has now exceeded $7 billion of aid, the majority of which has been allocated to the Colombian military. Such assistance including military training has also increased in light of the "war on terror".[705] Much of this aid, although ostensibly allocated for purposes of combating the illicit drug trade and then later terrorism, has consistently had a counterinsurgent orientation for the purposes of insulating the Colombian government against leftist insurgencies, namely the FARC and the ELN.[706] According to Stokes, these "massive levels of post-Cold War US funding of the Colombian military serves to underline the continued relevance of counter-insurgency for destroying movements that may threaten a stability geared towards US interests."[707]

This counterinsurgency orientation has increasingly taken on outsourced forms in the entrenchment of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy. As the next two sub-sections demonstrate, US-supported counterinsurgency initiatives have increasingly been delegated to para-institutional armed actors. For purposes of clarity I have separated the two principal types of actors, paramilitary forces and PMCs, into distinct sub-sections. However, although these two para-institutional layers to US-led counterinsurgency policies have disparate origins and roles, they should be viewed as part of similar processes and objectives in US foreign policy. They are both part of the broader phenomenon of a para-state nexus.

The Counterinsurgent Paramilitarization of Colombia

Much work already exists documenting the nexus between various right-wing paramilitary organizations and the Colombian state and by extension their connection to US-supported counterinsurgency strategies.[708] As Hristov argues, and touched upon in the previous chapter, paramilitary forces developed from an intersection of local dynamics and processes alongside the Cold War interpretations of on-going conflicts by US military advisors. They are part and parcel of conditions of inequality, elite domination of instruments of power, and foreign capital penetration. [709] While the initial legal frameworks for paramilitarism were established by the Colombian state in consultation with US counterinsurgency planners, paramilitary groups have also been often supported by the country's elite and multinational corporations. Thus the formation of paramilitary groups has domestic and international systemic roots as much as they are an intentional fabrication of counterinsurgent design. This point underlines two important notions. First, paramilitarism has been a constantly evolving structure in Colombia tied to the Colombian states' counterinsurgency campaign, conditioned by changing local environments. Therefore, secondly, the para-state nexus which they partly constitute is not exclusively a top-down

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[705] Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia.*; Murillo, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization*

[706] Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*

[707] Stokes, *Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia*, 584.

[708] See Human Rights Watch, *Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States*; HRW, *The History of the Military-Paramilitary Partnership*; HRW, "The "Sixth Division": Military- Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia," *Human Rights Watch* (2001); Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*; Sam Raphael, "Paramilitarism and State Terror in Colombia," in *Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice*, eds. Richard Jackson and S. Poynting (London: Routledge, 2010).; A. Weiss, "Colombia's Paramilitary: Profile of an Entrenched Terror Network," *Zmag Online* (2001), www.zmag.org/content/Colombia/weiss_paramilitaries.cfm

[709] For the best analysis of these dynamics see Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*, 76-78.; Mazzei, *Death Squads Or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Threaten Democracy in Latin America.*

product of counterinsurgency design, but is instead also molded by an amalgamation of processes within political and economic structures in Colombia.

Nevertheless, paramilitary forces have been instrumental as a "para-extension to the Colombian state's coercive apparatus" in the conduct of a dirty war against the two main insurgent groups, the FARC and the ELN, as well as elements of civil society deemed subversive to the desired liberalized order.[710] As many scholars have demonstrated, paramilitary forces, particularly during the 1990s, played an increasingly important role in terrorizing labor unions, workers organizations, and social movements that were deemed inimical or obstructive to the construction and maintenance of a functional capitalist state design. Stokes has argued, for instance, that paramilitary-state terror has played a central role in Colombia's counterinsurgency campaign towards "the maintenance of a stability geared towards the preservation of capitalist socio-economic relations and the continued and unhindered access to Latin American markets by US transnationals."[711] Similarly, Hristov shows that paramilitary forces wedded to the counterinsurgency state serve explicitly to "protect the interests, privileges and power of the oligarchy and foreign enterprises by attacking any social forces that might block or challenge them."[712] Moreover, paramilitary forces have been the primary perpetrators of forced displacement in areas of economic importance, strengthening an already existing bond between violence and capital accumulation.[713] Carlos Castaño, the former leader of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia - *Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC), the primary right wing paramilitary umbrella group operational during the 1990s and early 2000s, himself proudly stated that his paramilitary organizations "have always proclaimed that we are the defenders of business freedom and of the national and international industrial sectors"[714] In simple terms, paramilitaries have generally served as the tip of the spear in armoring processes of globalization against various forms of opposition from "below" as a central component to US-supported counterinsurgency efforts.

What is important to note in this light is that the US connection to Colombian paramilitaries is indirect. Successive US administrations have even sought to limit and/or halt US military assistance to Colombia due to on-going Colombian military-paramilitary links. Policy makers in Washington and Congress were also firm supporters of the AUC demobilization in 2003.[715] Thus as scholars Villar and Cottle state: "The AUC may not be a proxy army for the United States, but it functions as a vanguard force of the counterinsurgency strategy in the Colombian countryside."[716] However, recent media reports claim to have uncovered documents detailing CIA support for paramilitaries in Colombia in the 1990s leading up to the formation of the AUC.[717] The bottom line is that paramilitary fighters have played a key role as a counterinsurgent force against insurgents and radical elements of civil society jockeying for political and social change. They have served as a

[710] Best articulated by Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia* and Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*; Stokes, *Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia*, 569-585.

[711] Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, 123.

[712] Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*, 77.

[713] Ibid. David Maher and Andrew Thomson, "The Terror that Underpins the "Peace": The Political Economy of Colombia's Paramilitary Demobilization Process," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4, no. 1 (2011): 95-113.

[714] As cited in Stokes, *Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The US War of Terror in Colombia*, 584.

[715] Maher and Thomson, *The Terror that Underpins the "Peace": The Political Economy of Colombia's Paramilitary Demobilization Process*, 95-113.

[716] Oliver Villar and Drew Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Colombia* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011), 125.

[717] Brandon Barrett, "Paramilitary Emails Allege CIA Worked with AUC," *Colombia Reports*6 June, 2012.

plausible deniable para-institutional mechanism through which US-supported counterinsurgency efforts have been prosecuted by the Colombian state and Armed Forces. Indeed, during the mid to late 1990s, paramilitary violence constituted a majority of the country's human rights violations against counter-hegemonic forces and suspected insurgents.[718] Thus, although there is limited information to suggest a direct link between US policy and paramilitary formations,[719] paramilitary groups and the AUC in particular were emblematic of the para-state nexus in which these armed para-institutional agents worked in concert with Colombian forces towards common counterinsurgent goals.

PMCs in Colombia: The Expanding Para-State Networks

Since the early 1990's PMCs have taken on an increasingly central role in US counterinsurgency assistance to Colombia, constituting a distinct layer of the para-state nexus. Unlike the paramilitarization of the Colombian military's counterinsurgency campaign, contracting represents a direct outsourced application of US policies. Private companies have gradually taken on roles traditionally undertaken by US advisors and military personnel. The culmination of which is a matrix of private-public partnerships that strengthens the pursuit of US interests in the area. PMCs facilitate US military assistance programs to Colombia, serving as a platform of operational support on which Colombian official military forces conduct a counterinsurgency war (with connections to paramilitary forces) against the FARC, the ELN, and, often, repression against social movements.[720] Additionally, in some cases US PMC contracts are linked to the interests of multinational corporations, contributing further to the overall stabilization agenda.[721]

According to Singer, the full extent of PMC activity in Colombia is not known as the terms and conditions of these contracts as well as their operations are deemed private (as they are elsewhere).[722] It is clear, though, that this private infrastructure was gradually installed throughout the 1990s and early 2000s in order to both replace and support the US military in its provision of military assistance to its Colombian partners. According to Colombian government records the private security sector in Colombia, including those contracts under US military assistance has grown by 360% between 1994 and 2007.[723] From 2002 to 2006, the value of US PMC contracts doubled, and roughly half of US military assistance since 2006 has been implemented through PMCs (in 2006 this was \$309.6 million out of \$632 million).[724] By 2006, around 25 US PMCs were contracted by the State Department and DoD for a variety of tasks.[725] These figures only represent the amounts spent by the US

[718] See Human Rights Watch reports cited above

[719] The CIA did have connections to los Pepes the leader of which, Carlos Castano, later became the head of the AUC. Michael Evans, "Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: "Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web": Documents Detail Narco-Paramilitary Connection to U.S.-Colombia Anti-Escobar Task Force," The National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 243, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB243/index.htm (accessed December/01, 2011).

[720] Again see Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*; Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*

[721] See Hernando Calvo, "Colombia's Privatized Conflict," *Znet Online*30 December, 2004, http://www.privateforces.com (accessed 21 December 2009).

[722] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 207.

[723] "Superintendencia De Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada," Government of Colombia, http://www.supervigilancia.gov.co/? (accessed April 14, 2012). and Restrepo, *Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia: Case Study Plan Colombia*

[724] CIP, "Report: Half of US Military Aid Goes through Private Contractors," CIP Online, http://www.cipcol.org/?p=416 (accessed 12/4, 2010).

[725] See Irene Cabrera and Antoine Perret, "Colombia: Regulating Private Military and Security Companies in a 'Territorial State'," *PRIV-WAR Report* 19, no. 9 (15 November, 2009): 13.

government on PMC military aid, and do not include contracts bought, in coordination with the US, by the Colombian government. Although the full extent of these types of contracts is unknown, Alvear Restrepo reports that the Colombian government has signed multiple multi-million dollar contracts independently with US PMCs, with full US government cooperation.[726] According to Singer one contract between Colombia and US military firm MPRI was paid for by US foreign aid funds, which had been redirected or filtered through Colombia's budget.[727]

PMCs have become increasingly involved in almost every type of activity in the Colombian conflict, from logistical and mechanical support, to in-combat intelligence and surveillance, to military training.[728] One example includes the presence of DynCorp which has been operational in Colombia since 1993 (some reports suggest that this may be as early as 1991).[729] According to its contract, DynCorp and its subcontractors (including EAST – a company involved in the Iran-Contra scandal)[730] have been commissioned to conduct "eradication missions, training, and drug interdiction, but also participates in air transport, reconnaissance, search and rescue, airborne medical evacuation, ferrying equipment and personnel from one country to another, as well as aircraft maintenance."[731] A US Government Accounting Office (GAO) report indicates that the company has provided airplane and helicopter pilots and mechanics across the Andean region and in parts of Central America earning at least $270 million between 1991 and 2001, with around 80 pilots and mechanics, costing around $30-$40 million a year.[732] Under a $79 million contract, DynCorp flies Black Hawks and Huey II helicopters granted to the Colombian military though US assistance programs in support of the Colombian Armed Forces. As part of this same contract, DynCorp also trains Colombian pilots and maintains these aircraft.[733] However, DynCorp pilots have reportedly surpassed their contractual limitations and have engaged in direct combat with the FARC, earning a local reputation for a willingness to "get wet".[734] Indeed, in similar ways to Air America and other aero-military contractors during Cold War-era paramilitary operations, DynCorp personnel have been involved in direct engagements with Colombian guerrillas in efforts to extricate downed pilots in "search and rescue" operations.[735] In addition, DynCorp bases and refueling stations became primary targets for the FARC and other guerrilla groups, as acknowledged in a July 1998 publication of *Soldier of Fortune* magazine.[736]

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[726] Restrepo, *Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia: Case Study Plan Colombia*, 4.
[727] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 133.
[728] See for instance graph on Restrepo, *Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia: Case Study Plan Colombia*, 8. and Peter W. Singer, "The Contractors in Colombia," (2003), www.privateforces.com (accessed 11 April 2012).
[729] Calvo, *Colombia's Privatized Conflict*.; Stanger and Williams, *Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security*, 9.
[730] See Calvo, *Colombia's Privatized Conflict*
[731] As quoted in Bigwood, *DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War*
[732] Tamayo, *Colombia: Private Firms Take on US Military Role in Drug War* see also Bigwood, *DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War*
[733] Singer, *The Contractors in Colombia*
[734] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 208. For another example, see Tom Burghardt, "Did US Mercenaries Bomb the FARC Encampment in Ecuador?" *Global Research*23 March, 2008, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8423. and Stephan Fidler and Thomas Catn, "Colombia: Private Companies on the Frontline," *Financial Times*12 August, 2003, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=8028.
[735] Bigwood, *DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War*
[736] See Ignacio Gomez, "US Mercenaries in Colombia," *Colombia Journal* (16 July, 2000), http://colombiajournal.org/colombia19.htm (accessed 11 April 2012). This publication is entitled "Pray and

Other PMC activities range from logistics to surveillance and military training. Lockheed Martin, for example, provides "logistics advisory, management, and professional services" to the US and Colombian militaries, "in support of counternarcotic and counterterrorism efforts."[737] The lesser-known PAE Government Service conduct a plethora of logistical support activities to the US and Colombian militaries.[738] PMCs have also been contracted out by the US government to conduct training exercises with the Colombian military. In 2000, MPRI was contracted for a training mission designed to aid the Colombian government to professionalize and develop its counter-narcotics/counterinsurgency capacity, part of a previously devised "three-phase action plan" to reform the Colombian armed forces involved "planning, operations (including psychological operations), military training, logistics, intelligence, and personnel management".[739] In a more intimate role closer to the facilitation of battle itself, Airscan operated surveillance aircraft and machinery to locate guerrillas near the Caño-Limon pipeline, which came under frequent intense attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s.[740] Up until 2003, US contractors with a company called Northrup Grumman piloted reconnaissance aircraft equipped with infra-red cameras to monitor guerrilla movements and drug related activities.[741] A series of plane crashes and clashes with guerrilla forces resulted in the death of at least five contractors and the capture of three others by the FARC. These hostages were rescued in the controversial *Operación Jaque* mounted by the Colombian military in 2008.[742] Another company called Mantech International provided "complete technical support" which includes, providing real time intelligence and imagery transfers on guerrilla and drug trafficker locations.[743] In 2001, a light aircraft carrying around 4 civilians was shot down by the Peruvian military after information was passed on from a PMC operating under US contracts that the plane was carrying drug traffickers or materials in support of guerrilla groups.[744] As such, PMC operations of this kind, and intelligence gathering and operation of surveillance aircraft and battle helicopters in particular, point to a level of US involvement in the Colombian conflict that far surpasses what Congress had intended.[745] In sum, PMCs have been contracted to undertake a variety of tasks across the spectrum of activities involved in US counter-narcotics/counterinsurgent policies towards Colombia.[746]

Spray: Colombia's Coke Bustin' Broncos" available on ebay at http://www.ebay.com/itm/Soldier-Fortune-Magazine-July-1998-Pray-Spray-Columbias-Coke-Bustin-Bronc-/260917023541

[737] Restrepo, *Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia: Case Study Plan Colombia*

[738] Ibid.

[739] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 133.

[740] Tamayo, *Colombia: Private Firms Take on US Military Role in Drug War*

[741] Juan Forero, "Private US Operatives on Risky Missions in Colombia," *New York Times*14 February 2004, , http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=7830 (accessed 12 October 2010).

[742] Northrup Grumman, "Northrop Grumman Statement to News Media regarding the Release of Ours Employees in Colombia," Northrup Grumman, http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=145805 (2010). (accessed 12 July 2011)

[743] Restrepo, *Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia: Case Study Plan Colombia*

[744] J. Borger and M. Hodgson, "A Plane is Shot Down and the US Proxy War on Drug Barons Unravels," *The Guardian*1 June, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jun/02/julianborger.martinhodgson (accessed 10 April, 2012).; Guma, *The CIA, DynCorp, and the Shoot Down in Peru*

[745] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 208.

[746] For more information on specific contracts and numbers see Kristen McCallion, "War for Sale! Battelfield Contractors in Latin America & the 'Corporatization' of America's War on Drugs," *U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev.* 36 (Spring, 2005): 317-353.; Fidler and Catn, *Colombia: Private Companies on the Frontline*; Douglas Porch and Christopher Muller, "Imperial Grunts Revisited: The US Advisory Mission in Colombia," in *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007*, ed. Donald Stoker (New York: Routledge, 2010).; Cabrera and Perret, *Colombia: Regulating Private Military and Security Companies in a 'Territorial State'*

The reasons for employing a para-extension of US policy in Colombia help to confirm existing analyses.[747] Specifically, outsourcing confers numerous benefits in the eyes of policy makers in Washington. Firstly, with multiple commitments across Latin America, and an increasing American engagement in the stabilization of Mexico in the late 2000s, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the section of the US military responsible for Central and South America, does not have sufficient capabilities to sustain significant US military presence in Colombia. As such, according to Stanger and Williams, "employing PMCs enabled Washington to implement its Andean policy without undermining America's own military readiness."[748] In other words, PMC have served as "force multipliers" that avoid over-commitment of US regular armed forces.

Secondly, these partnerships are a convenient way to obscure US involvement from Congress and the public. US policy makers have used these private forces to by-pass the varied policy restrictions Congress has imposed on military assistance to the country, including human rights conditions and troop caps.[749] For example, there are no legal mechanisms to guarantee that the content of military training provided by contractors conform to US human rights policies. Indeed, Patrick Leahy, the author of the Leahy Laws (the most stringent human rights legislation imposed on training of foreign military training), commented that "we have no way of knowing if the contractors are training these Colombian soldiers in ways that are fully consistent with U.S. policy, laws and procedures."[750] Contractors hired by the CIA fall outside of all contract licensing controls.[751] PMCs, also provide an avenue to circumnavigate potential political costs of US intervention. For instance, the State Department has declared that approximately 14 US citizens employed in Colombia as contractors have been killed since 1997, five of them in 2003.[752] General Nestor Ramirez, former Colombian Army commander and an ex-attaché to Washington rightly commented, "Imagine if 20 American troops got killed here. Plan Colombia would be over."[753] Similarly, former US ambassador to Colombia, Myles Frechette highlighted this potential for a level of plausible denial: "It's very handy to have an outfit not part of the U.S. armed forces, obviously. If somebody gets killed or whatever, you can say it's not a member of the armed forces."[754] In this case, rather than deny US complicity in these affairs, PMCs serve to create a distance between the US and actions taken on its behalf.[755] Thirdly and finally, PMCs provide the flexibility, cost-efficiency, and expertise US policy-makers desire. Consistent with the advantages put forward by its advocates, US policy makers have claimed

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[747] See for instance Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 49-73. Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 90-97.; Stanger and Williams, *Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security*

[748] Ibid.: 10

[749] For troop cap circumvention see McCallion, *War for Sale! Battelfield Contractors in Latin America & the 'Corporatization' of America's War on Drugs*, 317-353. See also Grant, *US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy*

[750] Senator Leahy (D-VT) as quoted in de la P. Garza and Adams, "Military Aid... from the Private Sector," *St. Petersburg Times* 3 December, 2000, http://www.ratical.com/ratville/Columbia/PentagonWM.html (accessed 10 February 2010).

[751] Stanger and Williams, *Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security*, 11.

[752] Fidler and Catn, *Colombia: Private Companies on the Frontline*

[753] Ibid.

[754] Frechette, Myles as quoted in Bigwood, *DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War*

[755] This is different from a conventional understanding of "Plausible Denial" see McCallion, *War for Sale! Battelfield Contractors in Latin America & the 'Corporatization' of America's War on Drugs*, 317-353.; Jamieson and McEvoy, *State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering*, 504-527. See Stokes, *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, 99.

that outsourcing is an expedient form allowing market forces to fulfill needed roles in an efficient manner.[756]

While these reasons lend further support for the surface sources of such privatization, the ways in which PMCs are embedded in broader processes of stabilization helps to elucidate the nature of the para-state nexus and how it has become increasingly entrenched as a feature of US hegemony. PMCs play a direct facilitative role in US-supported counterinsurgency operations in Colombia hired by US or Colombian authorities, but they are also nestled in wider stabilization imperatives whereupon PMCs serve as "investment enablers".[757] In order to protect businesses from insurgent attacks, large transnationals in Colombia began to hire PMCs in the 1990s. Colombian government sources counted 573 companies mainly in the petroleum sector and other natural resource exploitation industries that have their own security department.[758] While this includes private security guards and basic installation protection, many have been military in nature, often collaborating with US and Colombian military forces as part of the overall counterinsurgency effort. For instance, a number of PMCs have provided operational and intelligence support to the Colombian military in protecting key oil facilities. US and Colombian court records demonstrate that in early 1998, Airscan, a US company hired by Occidental Petroleum to monitor insurgent activity to protect the Caño-Limon oil pipeline, was intimately involved in furnishing information that led to an air strike against a village called Santo Domingo.[759] Airscan shared information with the Colombian Air Force during meetings held at Occidental facilities, in order to coordinate attacks against suspected insurgents who were allegedly in the area. However, the attack resulted in the deaths of 17 civilians, from which numerous court cases have arisen. Similarly, British Petroleum and a slew of other affiliated oil companies were claimed to have operated alongside Colombian forces and were complicit in the creation of an informant network of former Colombian soldiers to actively seek out insurgents in communities around the length of the Ocensa oil pipeline.[760] These allegations amount to the connections between the PMC activities gathering intelligence on local "subversives" alongside support to a parallel paramilitary formation to neutralize such civilian threat.

In this way there is a symbiotic relationship between PMCs, the US-supported Colombian military-paramilitary nexus, and the business interests that they benefit. Para-statal mechanisms support the overall stabilization efforts of the liberalization of Colombia's political economy. Links between PMCs, the Colombian military and their paramilitary allies have been found in relation to Occidental Petroleum's monetary assistance to the Colombian Army's 18th Brigade, well known to have connections to paramilitary groups. Court proceedings against Occidental Petroleum alleged that money was funneled to the Colombian Armed Forces to protect the Caño-Limon oil pipeline whereupon Colombian forces, according to one of the claimants, "directly or indirectly (by supporting right-wing paramilitary groups), participated in numerous massacres of civilians and the disappearances,

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[756] Bigwood, *DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War*

[757] Mandel, *Armies without States*, 20.; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 81.

[758] Restrepo, *Private Security Transnational Enterprises in Colombia: Case Study Plan Colombia* see also *Superintendencia De Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada*

[759] Christian T. Miller, "A Colombian Town Caught in a Cross-Fire; the Bombing of Santo Domingo shows how Messy U.S. Involvement in the Latin American Drug War can be," *LA Times* 17 March, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0317-01.htm (accessed 15 October, 2009).

[760] Michael Gillard, Ignacio Gomez and Melissa Jones, "BP Hands Tarred in Pipeline Dirty War," *The Guardian*17 October, 1998. also see the following primary documents Various, "Airscan International Inc." U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/m/a/ips/c42178.htm (accessed 6/7, 2012).

extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and beatings of social protestors."[761] In this way, paramilitary forces are often given the unofficial go-ahead to attack suspected insurgents in efforts to exert further control and protection of oil installations and pipelines, acting on information garnered by PMCs provided to Colombian military sources. There have been further accusations of PMC-paramilitary links mediated through the US and Colombian counter-narcotics/counterinsurgency programs. According to a human rights organizer in Colombia, paramilitary forces "clear the ground" to prevent aero-contractors spraying herbicides from being shot at by farmers or insurgents.[762]

There have also been cases of more direct PMC-paramilitary connections. For instance, in 1987, paramilitary groups and large landholders received training in counterinsurgency and "anti-subversive techniques" including lessons on how to "clean out" suspected members of guerrilla organizations from areas involved in oil and banana production from an Israeli military company called *Hod He'hanitin* (Spearhead Ltd.). The training allegedly took place on land owned by Texas Petroleum Co. [763] The Spearhead company's leader Yair Klein was later detained, but according to media reports claims that such training to paramilitary forces was provided with the consent of the Colombian authorities.[764] Similar charges emerged that British mercenaries have helped to train paramilitary groups.[765] While this is somewhat peripheral occurring independently of US foreign policy, it is further indicative of the possible fluid connections between non-state groups which are embedded in a larger para-state nexus. Such an organic nexus was built within the framework and pressures of a counterinsurgency agenda, geared towards thwarting opposition to the liberalization of Colombia.

These intersections of private operatives in relation to the overall stabilization agenda are an important facet of the unfolding of a para-state nexus in Colombia. These examples help to elucidate the complex localized relations between state forces and parallel non-state military actors, as well as the sub-stratum of relations between the latter. The nexus between state forces (the US-Colombian counterinsurgency assistance relationship) and para-institutional actors has been generated and molded by the particularities of the Colombian context, the conflict, local elite structures, and the interests and actions of multinationals. There is an organic fashion, dependent on the contours of the Colombian setting, by which this para-state nexus is manifested. Yet, it is within a US-supported counterinsurgency framework geared towards the liberalization of Colombia in which this occurs. Both paramilitary and PMC actors play a key role in facilitating US counterinsurgency strategies, helping to support mutually reinforcing political and economic objectives. Maintaining the fluid functioning of political and economic arrangements conducive to US interests and those of the wider global capitalist system by destroying oppositional movements from below has been a fundamental feature of US policy towards Colombia.

In summary, the prosecution of a counterinsurgent war in Colombia during the 1990s and beyond, which was transposed on an anti-narcotics element, was increasingly delegated to para-institutional forces. While many core support and training activities were subcontracted "outwards" in public private partnerships, much of the brute force of counterinsurgent violence was delegated "downwards" to paramilitary forces with disparate

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[761] Matthew Reynolds, "Occidental Accused of Funding War Crimes," *Courthouse News Service*1 Nov., 2011. Christian T. Miller, "Blood Spills to Keep Oil Wealth Flowing," *LA Times*15 Sept., 2002.
[762] Bigwood, *DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War*
[763] Calvo, *Colombia's Privatized Conflict*
[764] Brandon Barrett, "Israeli Mercenary Yair Klein Trained Paramilitary with the Approval of the Colombian Authorities," *Colombia Reports* 26 March, 2012, http://www.colombiareports.com/ (accessed 12 April, 2012).
[765] Richard Norton-Taylor, "Drug Barons Army Trained by Britons," *The Guardian* 6 December, 1990.

connections to the military, Colombian state, elite landowners, and multinational corporations. This precursory and descriptive analysis of these para-institutional mechanisms operating in tandem, and sometimes directly with one another, points to the need to avoid overly state-centric conceptions of the Colombian conflict. Instead, as this section suggests, the para-state nexus as a concept incorporates a broader network of para-institutional mechanisms that have been central to the counterinsurgent effort in Colombia. This is important in relation to the wider understanding of US hegemony and the "Open-Door" grand strategies that underpin it. US coercive interventions have helped to provide the conditions for the locally contingent para-statal relations. Thus US counterinsurgency assistance in Colombia, and indeed across many areas of the South, have a constitutive influence on para-statal arrangements in efforts to stabilize favorable political and economic state structures conducive to a US-led global liberal order.

Para-State "(In)Stability" Beyond Colombia

While the example of US involvement in Colombia during the 1990s and beyond highlights the entrenchment of a para-state nexus in the post-Cold War period, similar processes of the delegation of force to non-state military actors, primarily to paramilitary groups, also unfolded elsewhere during this time. While the examples below detail further paramilitary connections, these networks occurred in conjunction with the expansion of the use of PMCs as part of US hegemonic role as outlined above. Para-statal relations in response to complex internal crises occurred within the remit of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in various countries with a crucial historical US role in supporting para-institutional dynamics through counterinsurgency aid. In most cases, however, this was limited to a continuation of Cold War-style conflicts that lingered on much after the end of the Cold War. US support for such counterinsurgency conflicts in some cases help to further highlight how a para-state nexus continued to form a principal means to deter threats, where they existed, to the prevailing liberalized order in the post-Cold War environment. Much like in Colombia, these para-statal connections were indirect. Yet paramilitary forces and other non-state armed groups were integral to protracted local state counterinsurgency campaigns. In addition, limited unconventional warfare operations occurred during the 1990s against states and forces oppositional to US interests.

One example of a counterinsurgency para-state nexus included the prolonged counterinsurgency war in Guatemala, in which Guatemalan military forces continued to rely on paramilitary structures up until the cessation of the conflict in 1996. As many authors have already documented, after the 1954 US-led coup against Arbenz in Guatemala, substantial US military assistance (in the form of foreign military financing and training) helped fortify and internally orient Guatemala's military for a deadly counterinsurgency campaign against communist forces, unarmed political organizations (including unions), and their sympathizers.[766] Counterinsurgency strategies, as numerous declassified US documents attest to, involved methods of terrorizing the civilian populations into submission, often delegating extreme violence to non-state death squad actors.[767] In one declassified 1968 US diplomatic cable, for instance, Viron Vaky deplored the "indiscriminate counter-terror" being perpetrated the Guatemalan Army and the paramilitary death squads the Guatemalan Army supported.[768] He conceded, though, that the US has "condoned counter-terror," and that

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[766] McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala*; Susanne Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U. S. Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 288.
[767] See Kate Doyle and Carlos Osorio, *US Policy in Guatemala, 1966-1996*National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 11.; National Security Archive, *The Guatemalan Military: What the US Files Reveal* Douglas Farah, "Papers show U.S. Role in Guatemalan Abuses," *Washington Post Foreign* 11 March, 1999.
[768] Document 5 Doyle and Osorio, *US Policy in Guatemala, 1966-1996*

"Murder, torture, and mutilation are alright if our side is doing it and the victims are communists."[769] The problem with this, he argued, was not only a "practical political" one due to the public image of US intimate involvement in these forms of state terror, but also a "moral" issue that could ultimately have threatened the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency drive. Despite this, it was during the 1980s when para-institutional structures were further built-up according to US counterinsurgency doctrinal recommendations as the US-supported counterinsurgency intensified significantly.[770] Alongside other parallel non-state military formations, Guatemala adopted a civilian self-defense approach to counterinsurgency by organizing and mobilizing civilians into "civilian self-defense patrols" (PACs) as part of a local irregular forces initiative to stem communist influence.[771] Although participation in these pro-government militias was meant to be voluntary, coercion of local populations was often used to force them to serve the counterinsurgency cause and violently attack their neighbors and areas suspected of communist infiltration.[772] By 1984, according to some estimates, the PACs had recruited a staggering 900,000 civilians, primarily indigenous men, to actively participate in both defensive and offensive counterinsurgency measures.[773] Numerous studies, such as the Guatemalan truth commission report *Memory of Silence*, show how such para-institutional forces particularly in the early 1980s were responsible for terrorizing local populations suspected of being communist or sympathizing with the communist cause.[774]

At the end of the Cold War, and after the intimate US role in the spike in counterinsurgency violence during the 1980s, US military assistance to Guatemala was officially cancelled on human rights grounds in 1990.[775] Despite this ban on military assistance, however, according to media reports, the CIA was ordered to covertly support the Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaign to the tune of $5 million to $7 million annually throughout the early 1990s.[776] Meanwhile, as a number of US human rights organizations documented, the Guatemalan Armed Forces and their paramilitary PACs continued a violent protracted counterinsurgency war against internal dissidents.[777] One State Department human rights report, for instance, recorded that an "estimated 340,000 men serve in rural civil self-defense committees called Civil Defense Patrols (PAC's), some of which conduct counterinsurgency patrols... committed numerous serious human rights violations and

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[769] Document 5 Ibid.

[770] For an excellent discussion on US human rights policies in the 1980s in relation to military assistance see Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America*, 155-165. see also Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U. S. Power* , 288. and Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), *Guatemala: Memory of Silence* American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1997.

[771] For more on PACs see Fumerton and Remijnse, *Civil Defense Forces: Peru's CAC and Guatemala's PAC in Comparative Perspective*, 52-72.; Simone Remijnse, "Remembering Civil Patrols in Joyabaj, Guatemala," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20, no. 4 (2001): 454-469.

[772] For the issue of being forced see Patrick Ball, Paul Kobrak and Herbert Spirer, *State Violence in Guatemala 1960-1996* American Association for the Advancement of Science. and see Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*

[773] Fumerton and Remijnse, *Civil Defense Forces: Peru's CAC and Guatemala's PAC in Comparative Perspective*, 55.

[774] Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*

[775] US cancelled military aid, $36,000 in military aid in 1994, then $0 for 1995 and 1996, then going back up to a minimal $205,000 in 1997. "US Foreign Military Aid by Region and Selected Countries," http://www.allcountries.org/uscensus/1320_u_s_foreign_military_aid_by.html 8 Aug (2012).

[776] Tim Weiner, "Tale of Evasion of Ban on Aid for Guatemala," *The New York Times* 30 March, 1995.

[777] U.S. Department of State, *Guatemala Human Rights Practices, 1994*, (1995).; U.S. Department of State, *Guatemala Human Rights Practices, 1995*, (1996).

generally enjoyed impunity from the law."[778] These para-institutional structures were finally dismantled only in 1996 with the signing of the Peace Accords, but continued to have an effect on Guatemalan civil society.[779]

Similar para-institutional mechanisms were used in Peru during the 1990s to help in the stabilization of the liberalization of the Pervuian economy. The Peruvian military, with long-standing historical military ties with US counterinsurgency planners[780] supported various pro-government civilian militias towards the military defeat of the Sendero Luminoso, the country's longest-lasting insurgency, up from the 1980s, well through up to the late 1990s.[781] In 1991, after his election, Fujimori legalized the use of so-called *Comités de Auto-Defensa* (CADs) and provided means to arm peasant communities that were part of the civilian "self-defense" counterinsurgency program.[782] Much like paramilitary initiatives elsewhere, despite the fact that they had diverse localized origins, as Fumerton demonstrates, "Counter-insurgency is the fundamental rationale behind [their] creation."[783] As Cynthia McClintock argues, amidst strengthening economic ties between the US and Peru and the increasing liberalization of the Peruvian economy, the continual support for paramilitary forces and human rights abuses committed by them and the Peruvian Armed Forces as part of a concerted counterinsurgency effort to defeat the Senderos created tensions for the two countries' relations due to human rights concerns and issues over proper democratic procedures.[784] Despite this tension, much like in Colombia, US military assistance has continued (although not continuously)[785] ostensibly for counter-narcotics purposes throughout the post-Cold War period up until the present.[786] PMCs have also aided in stabilization efforts through direct participation in aerial surveillance as well as served in the protection of mines, oil fields, and other industries of international economic importance.[787]

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778 Ibid.

779 Remijnse, *Remembering Civil Patrols in Joyabaj, Guatemala*, 454-469.

780 See Gerardo Renique, ""People's War," "Dirty War,": Cold War Legacy and the End of History in Postwar Peru," in *A Century of Revolution*, eds. Greg Grandin and Joseph Gilbert (Durham: Duke University press, 2010), 309-337.

781 Fumerton and Remijnse, *Civil Defense Forces: Peru's CAC and Guatemala's PAC in Comparative Perspective*, 52-72.; Mario Fumerton, "Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant Self-Defence Organizations in Ayacucho," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20, no. 4 (2001): 470-497.

782 Ibid.: 488 Mario Fumerton, *From Victims to Heroes; Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980-2000* (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, 2002), 200.

783 Fumerton and Remijnse, *Civil Defense Forces: Peru's CAC and Guatemala's PAC in Comparative Perspective*, 53. Also see Cynthia McClintock, "The Decimation of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," in *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1999), 235-237.

784 Ibid. Cynthia McClintock, "The United States and Peru in the 1990s," *George Washington University Working Papers* (2000). Also see Peru U.S. Embassy Lima, *1994 US State Department Report on Death Squad Operations in Peru.*; Tamara Feinstein, ed., *Peru in the Eye of the Storm: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 64*The National Security Archive, 2002).

785 US military aid was stopped twice in the 1990s, once in efforts to persuade Peru to undertake further democratic reforms and once when Peru refused counter-narcotics assistance. See Barbara Crossette, "US, Condemning Fujimori, Cuts Aid to Peru," *The New York Times* 7 April, 1992.; Author Unknown "Peru's Refusal of Military Aid Stalls US Drug Policy," *Deseret News* 16 Sept, 1990.

786 Clifford Krauss, "US Military Team to Advise Peru in War Against Drugs and Rebels," *The New York Times* 7 August, 1991.; Just the Facts, "U.S. Aid to Peru, all Programs, 1996-2001," http://justf.org/Country?country=Peru&year1=1996&year2=2001&funding=All+Programs&x=81&y=11 Anthony Faiola, "US Allies in Drug War Disgrace," *The Washington Post*10 May, 2001.

787 See Guma, *The CIA, DynCorp, and the Shoot Down in Peru* also see DynCorp International, *US: DynCorp International again Wins Contract for Narcotics Eradication* Business Wire, 2005). For PMCs and Investment enabling see Charis Kamphuis, "Foreign Investment and the Privatization of Coercion: A Case Study of the Forza Security Company in Peru," *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 37, no. 1 (2011).; Angela Paez, "Peru: UN Mission Probes Private Security Groups," *Inter Press News Service* 7 Feb, 2007.

They have also been hired for counter-narcotics purposes in the Andean region, with the Peruvian military working directly with companies such as DynCorp under the auspices of US agencies.[788]

Comparable para-institutional relations also continued, albeit less than during the Cold War, in the Philippines throughout the 1990s and, later expanded again as part of the "war on terror". As a former US colony the Philippines had long and strong military ties with the US ever since its independence in 1946, which primarily revolved around the fortification of military and police structures for internal policing and the eradication of communist-inspired forces.[789] Much like similar conflicts in Latin America and elsewhere, the Philippine authorities supported both officially sanctioned and illegal armed non-state military forces as a central component of the counterinsurgency campaign.[790] This was silently condoned by US military tacticians and military trainers, who held significant influence on the conduct of the Filipino counterinsurgency measures.[791] These para-statal relations reached their peak in the LIC environment of the 1980s in which the US-supported counterinsurgency war oversaw networks of civilian militias and other vigilantes often generally referred to as "Civilian Volunteer Organizations" that spearheaded much of the state's counterinsurgency drive, accused by numerous human rights organizations for serious abuses and terrorizing local populations.[792]

In the post-Cold War period, the US withdrew its military presence as it dismantled its military bases alongside its military assistance packages (ending 1992) as the communist insurrection in the Philippines slightly waned. During this time, though, the Ramos administration (1992-1998) continued to rely to a on a state-sanctioned and administered paramilitary militia called the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU), as well as other smaller illegal armed groups for counterinsurgency efforts against remaining pockets of communist forces. Amnesty International claimed that

> The official militia, the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU), engaged in counter-insurgency operations and continued to recruit members from unofficial vigilante groups. CAFGU members were implicated in numerous reports of extrajudicial killing and other human rights violations. Despite mounting national and international pressure for the CAFGU to be dismantled, President Fidel Ramos said in June that the CAFGU was still needed in 'critical areas' where the NPA [New People's Army – an armed communist insurgent group] remained active.[793]

One Human Rights Watch report recorded that since this time, "Successive Philippine administrations have publicly committed to disbanding CAFGUs, vigilante groups, and so-

[788] Silverstein, *Privatizing War*; Guma, *The CIA, DynCorp, and the Shoot Down in Peru*

[789] See San Juan, *US Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines*; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*

[790] See Ibid., 433-443 Erineo Espino, *Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries* (Storming Media, 2004). James Ross D., "Militia Abuses in the Philippines," *Third World Legal Studies* 9, no. 1/7 (1990).; Kowalewski, *Counterinsurgent Paramilitarism: A Philippine Case Study*, 71-84.

[791] See McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, Chapter 4.; Clark, *Right-Wing Vigilantes and US Involvement : Report of a U.S.-Philippine Fact-Finding Mission to the Philippines*

[792] See McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*, 436-441.; Seth Mydans, "Right-Wing Vigilantes Spreading in Philippines," *The New York Times* 4 April, 1987.

[793] Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1994 - Philippines* Amnesty International, (1994).

called private armies from time to time, but efforts have been cursory."[794] Numerous human rights reports compiled by the State Department also document continual abuses by the CAFGUs throughout the 1990s.[795] One 1997 US State Department report, for example, saw that "Civilian militia units or Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's) also committed extrajudicial killings. Organized by the police and the [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to secure areas cleared of insurgents, these nonprofessional units have inadequate training, poor supervision, and a propensity for violent behavior."[796] It reports that other "vigilante groups or employees of contract security firms working with the authorities were also responsible for extrajudicial killings."[797] In 2000, the CAFGU still comprised of around 30,000 active participants.[798]

Crucially, with the onset of the "war on terror" these para-statal relations were re-vamped alongside skyrocketing US military assistance and training in order to quell a resurgent communist insurgency, located primarily in Mindanao, as well as numerous Islamic insurrectionary forces such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf, as part of a commitment to "stability" operations and counter-terrorist objectives.[799] Consistent with para-statal arrangements elsewhere this has involved not only a fortification of the Philippine Armed Forces and its paramilitary appendages towards counterinsurgency and counter-terror operations, but has also relied on contracts with PMC to support it.[800] DynCorp, for example, was awarded a total of $164 million up until 2008 in multiple contracts to help train and support the Joint Special Operations Task Force in the Republic of the Philippines.[801] The Philippines has also created a number of its own PMCs for foreign investment protection, such as guarding oil infrastructure and other areas of economic importance.[802]

Counterinsurgent "stabilization" efforts in Mexico provide another example of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy. Counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico had significant parallel military structures, albeit to a less degree than Colombia, throughout much of the 1990s. Although US and Mexico have long shared military-to-military ties, in

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[794] HRW, *They Own the People: The Ampatuans, State-Backed Militias, and Killings in the South Philippines* HRW, 2010).

[795] See U.S. Department of State, *Philippines Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*, (1997).; U.S. Department of State, *The Philippines Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997*, (1998).; U.S. Department of State, *1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines* , (2000). Human Rights Solidarity, *Philippines: The Ramos Presidency and Human Rights the Human Rights Record of the Ramos Administration from July 1992 to June 1997*, 1998).

[796] U.S. Department of State, *The Philippines Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997*

[797] Ibid.

[798] HRW, *They Own the People: The Ampatuans, State-Backed Militias, and Killings in the South Philippines*, 22.

[799] Ibid. For figures on US military assistance see McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*, 511. San Juan, *US Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines*, 169 and 178 and 210-211.

[800] See for example James Mann, "'Privatizing' of U.S. Bases in Philippines being Studied: Military: Turning Work Over to Contractors might Save Money, but would it be Feasible for the Pentagon?" *LA Times* 13 April, 1990.; Katherine Hernandez, *Pirates in the Sea: Private Military and Security Company Activities in Southeast Asia and the Philippines* (Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010).; David Pugliese, "World: Soldiers of Fortune," *CorpWatch* 12 November, 2005.

[801] DynCorp International, "DynCorp International Awarded Support Services Contract for Philippines Operations Support," http://www.dyn-intl.com/news-events/news-archives/news-2008/news030408-di-awarded-support-services-contract-for-philippines-operations-support.aspx (accessed 8 Aug, 2012).

[802] See Laura Peterson, *Making a Killing: Privatizing Combat, the New World Order* (Center for Public Integrity, 2002).

which numerous Mexican military personnel were trained for internal policing,[803] it was the rise of the Zapatista (EZLN) insurgency in 1994-1995, and an overlapping increasing drug trafficking problem, which prompted a closer military relationship between the two countries based on counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics.[804] The Mexican Armed Forces created a military development plan which was predicated on significant US military assistance, training, and equipment.[805] This was primarily in response to the Zapatista insurgency in the Chiapas region which arose in opposition to neo-liberal reforms and Mexico's integration into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).[806] As part of these counterinsurgency efforts, around nine non-state paramilitary organizations emerged throughout Chiapas.[807]

Although Mexican paramilitary forces had local origins with connections to the ruling political party, the PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*), and elite land owners in the area, as Mazzei shows they had significant links with the Mexican military. She notes specifically how Mexican military manuals and directives, which were "an almost literal translation of the U.S. Defense Department's *Field Manual Psychological Operations*," described a paramilitary option.[808] Much like other US-informed Central and South American counterinsurgency manuals of the Cold War, the Mexican *El Plan de Campaña* secretly issued to military commanders in Chiapas to counter the growing insurgency there, among other paramilitary recommendations instructed "secretly organizing certain sectors of the civilian population, small property owners and individuals with strong patriotism, who will be employed in the support of [these] operations."[809] The aims of paramilitarism were made pretty clear: "the command and coordination of local public security troops and local ranchers "in the elimination" of the subversives and "the disintegration or control of social organizations"[810] Although Mexican authorities and military leaders denied the existence of paramilitary organizations altogether, let alone their connection to them,[811] declassified US diplomatic communications point to the direct support provided to non-state paramilitary groups operating against EZLN-sympathetic communities by Mexican authorities.[812] Media reports have also noted the explicit paramilitary-military connection in the promulgation of a counterinsurgency war against local movements (both armed and unarmed) opposed to the prevailing economic and political modes of development.[813]

Consistent with the Mexican military's counterinsurgency drive, according to Mazzei, paramilitary groups targeted "EZLN activists and sympathizers, PRD [*Partido de la Revolución Democratica*] members, and officials or communities thought to be PRD or

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[803] Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict, 2nd ed.* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 39-52. Graham H. Turbiville, *U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging Future* (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2010), 14-15.

[804] Ibid., 15-17

[805] Ibid.

[806] See for example Tom Hayden, ed., *The Zapatista Reader* (New York: Nation Books, 2002).

[807] Mazzei, *Death Squads Or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Threaten Democracy in Latin America.*

[808] Ibid., 59

[809] As quoted in Ibid., 58

[810] As quoted in Ibid., 58

[811] Ibid.

[812] See Document 2 of Kate Doyle, ed., *Breaking the Silence: The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre* National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 283 (The National Security Archive, 2009).

[813] See for instance Diego Cevallos, "Paramilitaries Attack Rebel Sympathizers," *Inter Press Service* 5 August, 2000.; Diego Cevallos, "Shadow of Paramilitaries Still Hangs Over Chiapas," *Inter Press Service* 30 Sept, 2001. Diego Cevallos, "Report Links Paramilitaries with Ruling Party," *Inter Press Service* 30 Apr, 1999.

EZLN strongholds. Attacks have also been orchestrated against human rights workers and advocacy groups, as well as civic and religious leaders suspected of being sympathetic to the "leftist" cause."[814] Entire communities with declared links to the EZLN have been targeted, as well as unarmed movements across the region. In one instance, for example, in 1997 paramilitary groups initiated a prolonged terror campaign in towns throughout Chiapas, culminating in the Acteal Massacre on December 22 in which 45 people were killed by paramilitary gunmen.[815] According to Moksnes, up to this point there had been escalating violence and an increase of paramilitaries throughout the region during the 1990s.[816] Similar paramilitary forces have been used in other areas of Mexico, such as in the state of Oaxaca and Guerrero, in order to contain incipient insurgent movements and deter other forms of "subversion" throughout the 1990s and beyond.[817]

The para-state nexus also comprised of unconventional warfare operations, but to a limited extent, in which US agencies covertly supported non-state military forces for a variety of smaller "irregular" operations and insurgency. Although much more limited in number and in scope compared to those of the previous decade (1980s) the US continued to support guerrilla and insurgent oppositional forces to destabilize regimes considered hostile to US interests. For example, US Special Forces and the CIA were active in supporting and training insurgent and resistance forces in parts of the Middle East during the 1990s, such as the Kuwaiti resistance and Kurdish rebel forces in Iraq as part of de-stabilization programs against Saddam Hussein. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as part of Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the CIA and US Special Forces supported a Kuwaiti resistance guerrilla army, in attempts to expel and hold back Iraqi forces.[818] These Kuwaiti resistance fighters mounted "sabotage" operations and other military efforts and provided US and Coalition forces intelligence on the Iraqi army before the direct US military involvement.[819] Then within Iraq, according to a *New York Times* interview with ex-CIA officials, the CIA supported a group of Iraqi exiles in the early 1990s "to plant bombs and sabotage government facilities" as part of a regime change agenda.[820] Alongside this, US covertly supported other oppositional armed groups, such as Kurdish militias to run campaigns against Saddam's rule, with Congress approving a $40 million budget for these efforts in 1993.[821]

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[814] Mazzei, *Death Squads Or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Threaten Democracy in Latin America.*, 47.

[815] "Acteal Massacre 1997," http://acteal97.com/?page_id=65 (accessed 7 Aug, 2012).; Andrew Kennis, "Ten Years Later, it's Time to Recognize the US Government's Responsibility for Acteal," *The Narco News Bulletin* 30 Dec, 2007.

[816] Heidi Moksnes, "Factionalism and Counterinsurgency in Chiapas: Contextualising the Acteal Massacre," *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 76 (April, 2004): 109-117.

[817] Kristin Norget, "Caught in the Crossfire: Militairzation, Paramilitarization, and State Violence in Oaxaca, Mexico," in *When States Kill: Latin America, the US, and Technologies of Terror,* eds. Cecilia Menjivar and Nestor Rodriguez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 115-142. also see PBI, *Human Rights Defenders in the State of Guerrero* (Peace Brigades International, 2007).

[818] John Levins, "The Kuwaiti Resistance," *Middle East Quarterly* (March, 1995), http://www.meforum.org/238/the-kuwaiti-resistance (accessed 12 April, 2012).; Frank Greve, "CIA, Army Said to be Supporting Kuwaiti Resistance," *Inquirer Washington Bureau* 31 August, 1990, http://articles.philly.com/1990-08-31/news/25930475_1_kuwaitis-kuwait-resistance-kuwait-city. Michael Wines, "Confrontation in the Gulf: US is Said to Quietly Encourage a Kuwaiti Resistance Movement," *The New York Times* 1 Sept, 1990.

[819] Eric Schmitt, "After the War: Tensions Bedevil Allies all the Way to Kuwait," *The New York Times* 24 March, 1991.

[820] Joel Brinkley, "The Reach of War: New Premier, Ex-CIA Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks," *The New York Times* 9 June, 2004.

[821] Kenneth Katzman, Iraq's Opposition Movements (CRS Report, 1998).; Major Paul Ott, *Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special Forces* (Fort Leavenworth:

Conclusion: PMCs and the Entrenchment of a Para-State Nexus

This chapter has demonstrated that after the Cold War a para-state nexus was further etched into US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare designs. Specifically, there occurred a formalization of PMCs and their official integration into US military power projection, taking on an increased variety of activities. This represented a significant development in this para-state nexus in the midst of broader continuities, namely the Open Door grand strategy and counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Thus rather than a drastic shift in policy solutions towards "destabilizing" internal forces in areas in the South, there was a continuation of para-statal relations in the conduct of US statecraft abroad, albeit with some modifications in its evolution over the course of the 1980s – 2000s. One implication that this has, in conjunction with the analysis in the previous chapter, is that PMCs have longer historical roots in US foreign policy than is commonly portrayed in the literature on this subject.

In order to better elucidate these dynamics and the locally contingent nature of the para-state nexus as it functions within the framework of US-led statecraft, this chapter briefly analyzed the composite relations between state and non-state military forces in Colombia, and the ways in which these parallel outlets of force form part of a broader stabilization agenda. The example of Colombia is indicative of a broader entrenchment of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy, in which para-extensional means of extending US coercive reach were increasingly employed. This example also serves to underscore the continuation of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies in the post-war era and with it US objectives and interests that inform them, as well as highlight the evolution of this para-state nexus as part of it. Most importantly, however, the Colombian case served to elucidate the escalation of the use of PMCs in US counterinsurgency "stability" operations. This increased use of PMCs, as indicated above, is prevalent throughout different aspects of the US Open Door strategy with various roles in different places. Similarly, in many scenarios, paramilitary formations continued as a fundamental facet of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy contributing to US hegemonic role in the international system. The almost global reach of US counterinsurgency assistance programs and unconventional warfare operations have a constitutive effect on para-statal relations in conjunction with local dynamics and histories within numerous countries in the South. Moreover, the para-state nexus and its further development constituted a fundamental feature of the managerial role the US continued to play in the international system after the Cold War. As will be the topic of the next chapter, this para-state nexus in US hegemony continued to evolve and became further entrenched in the "war on terror".

School of Advanced Military Studies, 2001).; Marianna Charountaki, *The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International Relations in the Middle East Since 1945* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

Chapter 5

The "War on Terror" and the Consolidation of a Para-State Nexus

Introduction

This chapter argues that the para-state nexus has become further entrenched in US foreign policy during the "war on terror". With increased global commitments, para-institutional means of extending US coercive reach are now central to its Open Door grand strategy. Not only have PMCs flooded into Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond, but they are hired for a wider variety of activities globally, including substituting US personnel in military training missions, surveillance and intelligence gathering, transportation in the global rendition network, amongst others. Similarly, US military alliances with militias, warlords, and other paramilitary organizations continue to be a central component of US coercive statecraft in many countries in the global South. Non-state military actors are now a fundamental part of the US military edifice straddling the globe. Yet this evolution of a para-state nexus, rather than emerging from a rupture with past experiences, represents the latest stage in an on-going process of the paramilitarization of US military practices. Thus, a central argument of this chapter and this dissertation is that the para-statal mechanisms used to conduct counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare campaigns as part of the "war on terror", such as the so-called "Salvador option"[822] in Iraq and an "indirect approach",[823] as well as the facilitative roles of PMCs, have a long historical genealogy in US foreign policy. Moreover, such para-statal configurations, rather than a strictly "top-down" application of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrines, emerge within and are adapted to local conflicts. This para-state nexus emerges within and is tailored to the contexts to which it is applied, through the creation of a series of separate relations, alliances, and networks between the US and various non-state actors. This further entrenchment of a para-state nexus is important because it has helped shape the way US power is projected abroad. Rather than just the deployment of US Armed Forces, and ties with allied state militaries, US power configurations are also comprised of para-statal relations serving to extend US coercive reach. In turn, this highlights additional alternative processes in the maintenance of a liberalized global order and US hegemony within it.

This chapter describes this further entrenchment of a para-state nexus first by examining the centrality of paramilitary forces and PMCs in US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrines and stated foreign policy announcements and strategies in the "war on terror". Then, secondly, to shed light on the manner a para-state nexus is manifested within localized contexts, it investigates the myriad para-statal relations in Iraq aimed at pacifying the protracted insurgency after the 2003 US invasion. It then turns to Afghanistan as another example of these dynamics in US foreign policy. The similarities and contrasts between these two examples contribute to an understanding of a para-state nexus as a bespoke instrument of statecraft that both emerges within local contexts and tailored to the contours of the conflict at hand. While the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan highlight these processes and the indigenous dynamics that contribute to the construction of a para-state nexus, similar processes continue to occur in areas of US-led stabilization programs such as

[822] Hirsh and Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination Or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*; Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality*
[823] See for example Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*; Gant, *One Tribe at a Time*

in Colombia, Mexico, Yemen, and in other countries threatened by internal instabilities. Both Iraq and Afghanistan, in other words, are indicative of broader trends occurring in US foreign policy on both local and international levels.

The "War on Terror" and the Continuity of the Open Door

The "war on terror" is commonly used shorthand for a multitude of complex problems the US faced in the aftermath of 9/11. While Iraq and Afghanistan are often seen as the front lines of the "war on terror", US policy makers often refer to "ungoverned spaces" and "state weakness" in the collage of issues linked to global terrorism faced in many areas of the global South.[824] Similarly, drug trafficking by anti-state forces has led to terms such as "narco-terrorism". Although the threat of terrorist actions on US soil has been demonstrated in the 11 September attacks, the totality of US military engagements around the world cannot be explained simply by counter-terrorism. As indicated in chapter two, many analysts have already argued that US policy in the "war on terror" does not represent a significant departure from previous blueprints for global order.[825] The scope of US global military presence as part of the "war on terror" did not instantaneously appear after 2001, but forms part of a longer history of military relationships and hegemonic objectives. The "war on terror", crudely speaking, has served largely as a pretext for continued application of US military power in the maintenance of a global liberalized order.[826] Thus, at its core, the "war on terror" is not only a commitment to root out international terrorist organizations, but a continuation of long-standing strategies to promote specific forms of "stability" conducive to a global liberalized political economy, particularly in countries in the global South.[827]

Consistent with this perspective, US strategic military reports articulate that the "war on terror" not only involves thwarting international terrorism, but also efforts to mitigate internal "instabilities" that threaten mutually supportive political, economic, and security interests in foreign countries. For instance, the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* states that "Since World War II, the United States has acted as the primary force to maintain international security and stability.... Driving these efforts has been a set of enduring national interests and a vision of opportunity and prosperity for the future. U.S. interests include protecting the nation and our allies from attack or coercion, promoting international security to reduce conflict and foster economic growth, and securing the global commons and with them access to world markets and resources."[828] Therefore, it posits, alongside defeating transnational terrorist networks, the preservation of specific forms of "stability" in the pursuit of US interests has taken center stage in US defense strategies throughout the post-war era, but also specifically in the contemporary "war on terror". Many other national security and

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[824] United States Office of the President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2002).; Alternatively see Marcia Wong, *Conflict Transformation: The Nexus Between State Weakness and the Global War on Terror* (Crystal City, VA: Remarks at the 17th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium, 2006).; For academic treatment of the subject see Patrick Stewart, *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).; William I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* (July/Aug, 2002).

[825] See Wood, *Empire of Capital;* Bromley, *The Logic of American Power in the International Capitalist Order*, 44-64.; Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 25.

[826] For further discussion on pretexts see Gibbs, *Pretexts and US Foreign Policy: The War on Terrorism in Historical Perspective,* 25-54.

[827] See Gordon Lafer, "Neo-Liberalism by Other Means: The "War on Terror" at Home and Abroad," in *The Politics of Empire: War, Terror, and Hegemony*, ed. Joseph Preschek (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). Various entries in Alejandro Colas and Richard Saull, eds., *The War on Terrorism and the American Empire After the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2006).

[828] U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Department of Defense, 2008) http://www.hsdl.org/ (accessed 24 April, 2012).

military documents contain similar statements regarding these US strategic priorities.[829] With this enduring commitment to preserving "stability" in areas of interest and geopolitical importance as part of the "war on terror", irregular warfare emerged as an ostensibly new US military paradigm. However, as the next section argues, rather than a novel form of warfare and military doctrine, irregular warfare is a continuation of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies towards safeguarding mutually reinforcing political and economic objectives abroad.

Irregular Warfare: Old Wine in New Bottles

Military analysts in the Bush administration were quick to conceptualize the operational reality of the "war on terror" as a series of localized counterinsurgency campaigns and unconventional warfare operations in various parts of the world threatened by destabilizing internal forces.[830] For example, the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* stated that "The enemies in this war are not traditional conventional military forces but rather dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political aims." Subsequently, the report asserted, the "war on terror" "requires the U.S. military to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches" to mitigate this threat.[831] Following this, in 2008, the DoD proclaimed "irregular warfare" is "as strategically important as traditional warfare."[832] It further emphasized this priority by stating that "Future warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat."[833] This was accompanied by a deluge of military doctrine and military-academic examination of this ostensibly new paradigm for the US military.[834] This drive to strengthen irregular warfare capabilities placed the projection of US military power through paramilitary groups firmly at the forefront of US military tactics in the "war on terror", rather than just the preserve of (covert) Special Force and CIA operations.[835]

Irregular warfare is a loose umbrella term that encompasses a wealth of coercive strategies designed to promote "stability" and counter those forces deemed to threaten US interests and security abroad.[836] Despite often being touted as a new form of war, in response to developments in the contemporary security environment, irregular warfare is a largely a

[829] See U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011), 1-3.; United States Office of the President, *National Security Strategy*; United States Office of the President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*; Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*

[830] See for instance David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August, 2005): 597-617.

[831] Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 1.

[832] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07*, 2. There is a burgeoning literature on this subject within military-academic circles which posits that the US Army (as distinct from the Special Forces, Marines and other branches) was unprepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations, and argues for its re-orientation towards counterinsurgency. See for instance Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars*

[833] Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*

[834] For an overview and critique of this see Vacca and Davidson, *The Regularity of Irregular Warfare*, 18-28.for iterations of this being a new paradigm see Jeffrey B. White, "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare: A Different Kind of Threat," *CIA*, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/iregular.htm (accessed Feb. 16, 2011).; USJFCOM, *Irregular Warfare Special Study*.; Newton, *The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare*, 1-19.; Peltier, *Surrogate Warfare: The Role of US Army SF*, 55-85.

[835] For further information on the wider adoption of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in conventional military structures, see *Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars*.; Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror*

[836] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07*, 2.

continuation of US Cold War forms of statecraft and of those "Low Intensity Conflicts" prevalent during the 1980s.[837] Counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare are identified as the two core components of irregular warfare.[838] Other doctrines with long histories, including psychological operations, counterintelligence activities, and counter-terrorism amongst others are also important sub-activities within the general irregular warfare umbrella concept.[839] Irregular warfare is defined as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations," which "favors indirect and asymmetric approaches."[840] Irregular warfare is therefore a protracted politico-military struggle "for control or influence over and the support of a relevant population. The foundation for irregular warfare is the centrality of the relevant populations to the nature of the conflict."[841] Such operations, according to one report, "can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership and/or populations to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives."[842]

As one DoD directive outlines, a central feature of this commitment to irregular warfare involves "operating with and through indigenous foreign forces" in order to "extend U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments."[843] Another DoD report states that "By 'irregular,' this concept means any activity, operation, organization, capability, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country."[844] It further adds that conducting irregular warfare can present certain risks as irregular warfare activities "frequently involve the irregular forces of non-state armed groups with questionable personalities and motives."[845] This paramilitarization of US intervention is further outlined in contemporary counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare sub-category doctrines.

US counterinsurgency training manuals in the "war on terror" contain similar understandings of insurgency and the methods used to counter them as their predecessors, and the paramilitary proscription still stands out as an option advocated throughout. For instance, a 2004 joint US military doctrine on "Foreign Internal Defense" describes paramilitary forces as playing a fundamental role in counterinsurgency military operations, intelligence gathering, and psychological operations.[846] Another manual advises that paramilitary formations should be constructed to augment state counterinsurgency forces: "if the HN [Host Nation] security forces are inadequate, units should consider hiring a paramilitary force to secure the village or neighborhood."[847] There is a general understanding reflected throughout US irregular warfare doctrines that local military forces usually consist

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[837] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*, 9.
[838] See for instance Ibid.; USJFCOM, *Irregular Warfare Special Study,* II-5.; U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07*, 2.
[839] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare: FM 3-05.130* , p. 1-5, p. 3-19.
[840] Ibid., Glossary p. 11
[841] Ibid., p. 3-17
[842] Armed Forces of the United States, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations: Joint Publication 3-05* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003), Section I-4.
[843] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07*, 2.; Also see Gross, *Different Worlds: Unacknowledged Special Operations and Covert Action*, 14.
[844] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept,* 9.
[845] Ibid., 32
[846] Armed Forces of the United States, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defence: Joint Publication 3-07.1*, glossary p. 8.
[847] U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24.2* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2009), 3-22.

of "government militias, and other paramilitary organizations" that can be effectively leveraged towards the counterinsurgency cause.[848] Moreover, much like Cold War-era conceptualizations of "counter-organization", paramilitarism is viewed as a political tool to garner active participation from local citizens in the counterinsurgency effort. For example, one 2004 Special Force manual released by Wikileaks contains a section on mobilizing civilians into self-defense forces in order to garner support for the local government and deny civilian safe havens for insurgents. It explains that because the "average peasant is not normally willing to fight to his death for his national government... The CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a fight for some far away irrelevant government."[849] Similar instructions are provided in other manuals: "Success in a counterinsurgency depends on isolating the insurgent from the population. Insurgents intimidate the population into passive support and prevent the population from providing information to counterinsurgent units. A technique to combat this is to establish a paramilitary organization. Paramilitary forces are designed to support the rule of law and stabilize the operating environment."[850]

Unconventional warfare is also relatively unaltered with regards to the use of paramilitaries and other non-state military means of exerting influence. In 2008, unconventional warfare was defined by the DoD as a "broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery."[851] Another report further outlines that "In unconventional warfare, U.S. forces foster and/or support insurgencies against an established government. These operations are characterized by their low visibility, covert, and clandestine nature."[852] The unconventional warfare military doctrine describes as "irregular forces" as non-state military forces including "paramilitary forces, contractors, individuals, businesses, foreign political organizations, resistance or insurgent organizations, expatriates, transnational terrorism adversaries, disillusioned transnational terrorism members, black marketers, and other social or political "undesirables."[853] The expected functional utility of working "through, with, or by" irregular forces is multiplying US power[854] without direct participation or commitment of US forces, thus providing a "perception of USG [US government] restraint".[855] "Irregular forces" are thus explicitly delineated as "force multipliers" which simultaneously preserve an image of US non-intervention.[856]

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[848] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: FM 3-07* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2008). Also see U.S. Department of the Army, *Threat Force Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics: TC 31-93.3* , 1-38.
[849] See previous chapter on the civilian self-defense force (CSDF) concept. This manual was reproduced as U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces: FM 31-20-3* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2004).
[850] U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24.2*, 8-12.
[851] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Directive 3000.07*, 11.
[852] U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces: FM 31-20-3*, 1-24.
[853] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare: FM 3-05.130* , 1-3.
[854] Ibid., 2-11
[855] Ibid., 3-11
[856]See for instance, USJFCOM, *Irregular Warfare Special Study.*; Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*; Peltier, *Surrogate Warfare: The Role of US Army SF*, 55-85.

While much of this drive to strengthen irregular warfare capabilities globally involved the provision of counterinsurgency training and assistance it also entailed direct support for paramilitary forces.[857] Special Forces are designated specifically to "select, organize, and train paramilitary and irregular forces."[858] According to another Special Force manual, "The supported non-U.S. forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost."[859] This direct application of paramilitary action is also part of the CIA mandate.[860] At the onset of the "war on terror" Donald Rumsfeld significantly expanded the US Special Forces as well as augmented DoD "special operations" capabilities by granting the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) the authority to conduct paramilitary operations.[861] US SOCOM budget has subsequently increased from $2.3 billion for FY 2001, to a peak of $12.1 billion in FY 2011, and a projected $10.4 billion in 2013 as well as increased in personnel and number of missions.[862] Congress also approved DoD paramilitary operations through Section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 2005 which grants the DoD around $25 million annually in order to provide "support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating on-going military operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism."[863] Effectively, this authorized the DoD to conduct covert paramilitary operations.[864]

In addition to this, US military specialists have published a deluge of material extolling the virtues of US conventional Armed Forces exercising power through para-institutional agents. For instance, Colonel James contends that the US military should reignite and embrace its "culture of Irregular Warfare – advising, liaison, training, leading and operating closely with local tribal levies, militias and other non-state forces."[865] US military ideologues have further argued for an "indirect approach", or dependence on surrogate paramilitary or militia forces to conduct counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare particularly after their use in Iraq and Afghanistan.[866] In summary, during the "war on terror" paramilitary forces became a central feature of US military strategies as a para-extensional means of projecting power both through covert agencies, such as the CIA and Special Forces, and through conventional military channels.

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[857] Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*; James S. Corum, "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies" *Strategic Studies Institute* (March 2006).; Campbell, *Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare*

[858] U.S. Department of the Army, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces: FM 31-20-3,* Section 1-10 and p. 1-19.; U.S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations: FM 3-05.202*

[859] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Special Operations Forces: FM 3-05* (Washington D.C,: Department of the Army, 2006).

[860] Richard A. Jr Best and Andrew Feickert, *Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress* (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2009).

[861] Jennifer Kibbe, "The Rise of the Shadow Warriors," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2004): 102-115. and Best and Feickart, *Special Operations Forces and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress* and Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2012).

[862] USSOCOM, *FY2013 Budget Highlights United States Special Operations Command* see also Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):Background and Issues for Congress*

[863] Section 1208 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 P.L. 108–375, 2004. Available at http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/PL108-375.pdf (accessed 10 Nov. 2011)

[864] Kibbe, *The Rise of the Shadow Warriors*, 103.

[865] Campbell, *Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare*, 5.

[866] See for example Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*

The Global Proliferation of PMCs as Agents of "Stability"

In a similar manner to paramilitary operations in irregular warfare, the use of PMCs has become a central component in US coercive foreign policy during the "war on terror". They have served to significantly strengthen and extend US coercive strategies by supplementing and often replacing US personnel in an increasing variety of roles globally. Although this increase in PMC activity in the "war on terror" has already been extensively documented,[867] it is important to highlight this expansion in terms of US global military reach and the ways in which they have complimented US power.

Military planners in Washington have increasingly viewed PMCs as a necessary facet of US military strategies. One driver of this has been an overall privatization push consistent with the ideology of the efficiency of the market.[868] Secretary Rumsfeld's crusade to transform the DoD by outsourcing a multitude of tasks to streamline its operations is just one example of this trend in the recent past.[869] Towards the privatization of defense, Rumsfeld outlined in his 2002 annual report how "wars in the 21st century will increasingly require use of all elements of national power," and further details the strategic thinking behind eliminating inefficiency through privatizing essential services.[870] By the mid-2000's, PMCs were acknowledged as fully integrated parts of the overall military force structure. For example, unlike previous versions of the report, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review listed the DoD's "Total Force" as including "its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors"[871] Similarly, a slew of DoD reports on the benefits of and ways to manage contracting services have appeared as another step in integrating PMCs into its "total force".[872] Military training manuals have also increasingly incorporated consideration of PMCs in the battlefield to reflect the reality of the contemporary counterinsurgency engagements. For example, AR 715-9 *Contractors in the Battlefield* details policies on the management of PMCs in the "area of operation".[873] Outsourcing essential services beyond logistical requirements was gradually incorporated as a standardized procedure in US military power projection.

As a further indication of this incorporation of PMCs in US foreign military policies, contracting of defense activities has increased dramatically since the onset of the "war on terror" both in terms of numbers and the variety of services PMCs provide.[874] As Alison Stanger documents, for instance, contracting to PMCs from all US agencies has increased significantly since 2000, and DoD contracts have risen by 123% with expenditures from around $140 billion in 2000 to $300 billion in 2006.[875] One recent study found that the DoD

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[867] See for example Carafano, *Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan Iraq and Future Conflicts*; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*; Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*

[868] See Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 30-33.; Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 26.

[869] See Ibid., 23-26, 86-87.; Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army,* 50.

[870] Donald Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002), http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/us-defense-report/2002/toc.htm. (accessed 4 April 2012)

[871] Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*

[872] See for instance U.S. Department of Defense, *Instruction: Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany* (The U.S. Armed Forces Department of Defense, 2005), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i3020_41.pdf (accessed 23 April 2012).

[873] See for instance U.S. Department of the Army, *Operational Contract Support Planning and Management: Army Regulation 715–9* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2011).

[874] Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatising Security*, 122.

[875] Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy,* Chapter 5 and p. 29-31, and 88. For figures on the State Department see Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 32.

had spent half of its budget on private contractors between 1998 and 2003.[876] Many analysts and government reports have also cited the increased ratio of PMCs to US troops in the history of US military deployments as further evidence of the more inclusive and expanded role accorded to private military firms. For instance, US government reports demonstrate that while this ratio was around five contractors per fifty troops during the first Gulf War, an estimated 190,000 contractors were operational in Iraq in the "war on terror", with a ratio that exceeded one to one.[877] According to DoD data, since 2009, DoD contractors have outnumbered US military personnel in Iraq, and in recent years (2008-2012) the amount of (US-hired) contractors on the ground has fluctuated around the same amount of US troops (around 90,000).[878] Although these last two figures indicate a growth over time of the involvement of PMCs in US military expeditions, it only captures part of the picture. It includes PMCs that have been employed in logistical capacities alongside US troop deployments, and misses out on the ways in which they have been hired in an increasing range of situations.

The wider variety of services provided by PMCs further highlights the extent to which US strategy has been outsourced "outwards" to PMCs. While most PMCs are hired by the DoD and other departments for logistical roles to support the deployment of US troops in non-combat or mundane roles (such as laundry, cleaning, and cooking services), there has been a proliferation of the roles undertaken by PMCs.[879] For instance, PMCs have been operational in Iraq in training capacities, protecting oil facilities[880], and security services (such as protection services for Paul Bremer, head of Coalition Provisional Authority, in 2006).[881] They have also been hired in intelligence gathering missions and interrogations.[882] This is crucial as it highlights the ways the US military has also worked "through, with, or by" civilian contractors in roles usually undertaken by military specialists, constituting a nexus between US foreign policy and parallel-military forces.

US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare commitments in much of the global South (as well as other areas of military activity[883]) have increasingly taken on outsourced forms. According to Lumpe and others the US has increasingly relied on PMCs to train foreign militaries for internal policing as part of its military assistance programs.[884]

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[876] Kidwell, *Public War, Private Fight? the United States and Private Military Companies,* 29.

[877] See for instance Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 4.; Thomas Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 115.

[878] Schwartz and Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis*

[879] For reports on specific proportions of contract service types hired by DoD see Kidwell, *Public War, Private Fight? the United States and Private Military Companies*, 30. and Schwartz and Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis,* 16.

[880] See Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatising Security*, 122. for official figures see Commission on Wartime Contracting, *At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations* (Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011)

[881] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 76.

[882] Antonio Taguba, *The "Taguba Report" on Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq: Article 15-6* Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (U.S. Department of the Army, 2004).; S. Chesterman, "We can't Spy... if we can't Buy!': The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing 'Inherently Governmental Functions," *European Journal of International Law* 19, no. 5 (2008): 1055.; Josh Meyer, "CIA Contractors Will be a Focus of Interrogation Investigation," *LA Times* 27 Aug, 2009.; Renae Merle and Ellen McCarthy, "6 Employees from CACI International, Titan Referred for Prosecution," *The Washington Post* 26 Aug, 2004.

[883] I acknowledge that PMCs have a wider utility in US military operations, such as in training US troops, serving as security forces within the US as in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina, amongst other examples.

[884] Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*, 12.; Singer, *War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law*, 95.; Avant, *Privatizing*

PMCs have trained foreign forces in countries such as Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan and many others.[885] Vinnell, for instance, has continued to secure contracts training the Saudi National Guard (SANG) in maintaining the Saudi Royal family's grip on power in the country and to protect oil pipelines and infrastructure. The same company was hired to train the Iraqi Army, aided by a plethora of sub-contractors.[886] Similarly, PMCs are often hired for intelligence gathering and other activities closer to combat roles.[887] Such activities are important "force multipliers," specialized tasks that extend US coercive reach. For instance, Vinnell Corp and Airscan operate aerial surveillance and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence gathering missions in countries such as Iraq, Colombia and Angola.[888] These operate as an "eye in the sky" passing on real-time information on suspected insurgent movements and locations either to US forces or local state militaries. In addition, some unconventional warfare tasks have been delegated to private companies. For example, the *New York Times* reported that the CIA hired Blackwater to locate and kill Al-Qaeda leaders as part of a clandestine assassination program.[889] According to emails released by Wikileaks, US PMCs were also linked to training and aiding Syrian oppositional forces against the Assad government in efforts to promote regime change in the country.[890] These examples point to the ways PMCs have been instrumental to US irregular warfare, serving as a parallel means to extend US influence and military reach.

In a similar manner to many covert unconventional warfare operations during the Cold War era, the global system of rendition is also dependent on private companies. The system of rendition is a clandestine network of flight routes, airports, and detention centers in which suspected terrorists are secretly taken to hidden "black sites" where many detainees have reportedly been tortured.[891] In a fashion reminiscent of the private airliners of Cold War covert operations, such as those conducted by Air America and Civil Air Transport, some US airline companies are intimately involved in the rendition program, hired to transport CIA agents and detainees to various secret locations across the world. This public-private partnership has helped to obscure the US involvement in allegations of torture in foreign detention sites through a series of intricate sub-contracting and plane loaning processes. While many of these companies are associated with large PMCs such as DynCorp, others are linked to smaller non-military corporations. This constitutes part of the broader para-state nexus in which parallel non-state actors operate in concert with US agencies to conduct a war against counter-hegemonic and destabilizing forces.

Military Training see also Grant, *US Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consultants as a Tool for Foreign Policy*

[885] Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*; Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007*

[886] Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatising Security*, 122.

[887] Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 100.; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 16.

[888] Ballard, *The Privatization of Military Affairs: A Historical Look into the Evolution of the Private Military Industry*, 51.; Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 16.

[889] Mark Mazzetti, "C.I.A. Sought Blackwater's Help to Kill Jihadists," *New York Times* 19 Aug, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/us/20intel.html (accessed 15 March 2012).; Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, "C.I.A. had Plan to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders " *New York Times* 13 July, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/14intel.html (accessed 12 March 2012).

[890] "The Global Intelligence Files," Wikileaks, http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2012-03-19 (accessed 4 May, 2012).; RT, *WikiLeaked: Ex-Blackwater 'Helps Regime Change' in Syria*

[891] Ian Cobain and Ben Quinn, "How US Firms Profited from Torture Flights," *The Guardian* 31 August, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/31/us-firms-torture-flights-rendition (accessed 12 April 2012).; Grey, *Ghost Plane: The Inside Story of the CIAs Secret Rendition Program*.; "The Rendition Project," http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/index.html (accessed 20 August 2012)

Although the full extent of PMC involvement in US military missions, training exercises, and other forms of irregular warfare is unknown, it is clear that their use in extending US military force has reached unprecedented levels. PMCs are now a common feature of US military deployments and assistance programs, including training, technical support, and intelligence on a global scale.[892] The sheer breadth and scope of their activities in service of US foreign policy objectives and particularly within the remit of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare modes of statecraft is important. It underscores the extent to which the US is militarily engaged with various parts of the world, primarily in the global South, operating through private non-state military forces. The continual development of PMCs as a para-extensional form of US power projection is fundamental to the consolidation and entrenchment of a para-state nexus. Perhaps nowhere else is this more evident than in US intervention in Iraq.

Iraq and the US Para-State Nexus

The projection of American power in Iraq during and after the 2003 invasion relied on parallel military structures to an unprecedented degree. Indigenous paramilitary forces and the facilitating assistance of PMCs were at the front line of US "stabilization" efforts. While most studies tend to focus on the explicit role of the US military and the difficulties encountered in undermining a growing anti-occupational insurgency,[893] parallel non-state and semi-official armed actors represented the main driving force at the forefront of US counterinsurgency tactics. The US presided over a vast network of para-institutional agents to augment its influence and achieve its politico-military objectives. The increased scope of the para-state nexus as it has been manifest in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan, has surpassed any previous engagement.

Yet sub-contracting in US-directed counterinsurgency is consistent with a wider pattern of coercive practices from the Cold War period. The delegation of force to parallel military structures fits clearly into longstanding counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrines and practices, particularly of those implemented in Latin America. Moreover, as in previous similar interventions of this kind, the underlying objective of this form of intervention was to aid in stabilizing the transnationalization of Iraq. The logic driving US intervention and the specific counterinsurgent forms it has taken upon occupation not only pivoted on the removal of a despot leader perceived to be an immediate threat to US national security (Saddam Hussein), but also centered on the transnationalization of the Iraqi economy and its integration into the global capitalist system more broadly, with the careful protection of the continual flow of oil into international markets a top priority.[894] As Herring and Rangwala argued, US economic policies in Iraq as well its counterinsurgency initiatives against resistance, have worked to "open up the Iraqi economy," in accordance with a "US version of the neoliberal model" towards the integration of a liberalized Iraq into the global economic order.[895] The stabilization of political and economic arrangements conducive to US interests and beneficial to circuits of global capital is in accordance with its post-war Open Door strategy.

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[892] See various entries in Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007*

[893] For a cursory example see Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General Patraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (New York: Penguin, 2009).; Ahmed Hashim, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006).

[894] Michael Schwartz, *War Without End: The Iraq War in Context*.; Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 96-97.; William I. Robinson, *What to Expect from US 'Democracy Promotion' in Iraq* (Focus on the Global South, 2004), www.globalpolicy.org. (accessed 12 July 2012)

[895] Herring and Rangwala, *Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy*, 222, 222-250.

This section examines the multiple ways parallel military agents and structures have been central to US counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. US intervention into Iraq provides an example of a large-scale deployment of US troops and a direct application of counterinsurgency measures not seen since American involvement in Vietnam. It also represents a primary theatre of US counterinsurgency, in which the "war on terror" has been staged. US intervention in Iraq is therefore the most likely case, along with Afghanistan, in which the para-state nexus has emerged, given the large deployments of US troops there and the massive overhaul of the entire Iraqi society and state towards arrangements conducive to US interests. Analysis of this highlights the scale to which both paramilitary agents and PMCs have become integrated into US military practices. Moreover, as an instance of direct US participation in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign, the case of Iraq provides opportunity to compare and contrast with previous similar entanglements such as Vietnam in order to highlight the different levels of para-statal involvement. Lastly, information on Iraq and the activities of paramilitaries, PMCs and others are more readily available through media accounts of US and coalition activities and information released through organizations such as Wikileaks. For purposes of clarity I have separated consideration of paramilitary forces and PMCs into separate sections. However, they should both be viewed and conceptualized as part of a larger phenomenon of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy.

Iraq and the "Paramilitary Option"

The prevalence of paramilitary and counterinsurgency militia groups in Iraq, some trained and supported by the CIA and Special Forces and loosely connected to the Iraqi Interior Ministry, forms an important part of the development of the para-state nexus in the "war on terror". The use of local parallel non-state military groups is consistent with the historical legacy of US-supported counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare elsewhere. There is a clear continuity of the application of the counterinsurgency doctrine in fighting "fire with fire" and lessons for "counter-organization". One US advisor to the civilian Iraqi authority described this parallel military strategy to reporters candidly: "The only way we can win is to go unconventional. We're going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We've got to scare the Iraqis into submission."[896] Yet, such a "paramilitary option" is informed by local dynamics. Rather than a blind application of a counterinsurgency template, the para-state nexus emerges within and is tailored in a bespoke fashion according to the local context of the Iraqi conflict. This is also important as it reflects the fluid construction of a para-state nexus within a given environment and emphasizes the agency and relative independence of such non-state military forces in their intersection with US military objectives. Rather than a rigid structure, the para-state nexus is a malleable feature of US hegemony in its manifestation in local contexts.

Before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, irregular paramilitary forces were mobilized to support regime change in Iraq and help pave the way for the US invasion. In accordance with US unconventional warfare practices, the CIA and US Special Forces were covertly directing irregular forces in a program to topple Saddam through a US funded insurgency.[897] The CIA spent millions of dollars in training and supplying a clandestine irregular force known as the Scorpions. The squad was mobilized to "foment rebellion, conduct sabotage, and help CIA paramilitaries who entered Baghdad and other cities target buildings and individuals,

[896] Seymour Hersh, "Moving Targets," *The New Yorker* Dec, 2003.
[897] Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Chapter 10.

according to three current and former intelligence officials with knowledge of the unit."[898] The Scorpions were also covertly trained and supported to conduct sabotage operations, such as blowing up train lines.[899] A US intelligence official told reporters at the *Washington Post* the group would occasionally serve to conduct "the dirty work" of irregular tactics leading up to the invasion and subsequent to it.[900] However, the US relied to a much greater extent on a larger irregular force of Kurdish Peshmerga paramilitary fighters to prepare the ground for US troop arrivals and conduct raids, ambushes and similar "sabotage" missions. The Kurdish minority in the Northern provinces of Iraq had had a long history of rebellion against the Baathist regime, and also enjoyed CIA paramilitary support in the 1990s.[901] It was partly the tumultuous history of the Iraqi Kurds that led to their renewed alliance with US forces. In February 2002, CIA teams labeled Northern Iraq Liaison Elements organized Kurdish Peshmerga into guerrilla insurgent forces to undermine the Saddam regime.[902] The Kurdish insurgents performed guerrilla attacks on the Iraqi government including bombing of infrastructure. This also included psychological operations to gain support for an insurgent movement against Saddam.[903] These Kurdish irregular fighters were instrumental in the US invasion of Iraq, operating alongside US Special Forces to push Saddam's army to the south. The Peshmerga were so effective that subsequent to the occupation, US planners considered using them as a counterinsurgent force throughout Iraq.[904] Instead, they remained a paramilitary security group confined to the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq.

Early on in the US battle to pacify the growing Iraqi insurgency and root out remaining suspected Baathist elements, US strategists devised and implemented a paramilitary plan to supplement US and Iraqi regular armed forces. According to reporter Robert Dreyfuss, in November 2003 the US approved a covert budget of $3 billion towards the "creation of a paramilitary unit manned by militiamen associated with former Iraqi exile groups."[905] The funds for such a plan were to be channeled through the CIA to create paramilitary units and entice tribal Sunni leaders, exiled members of the Iraqi elite, and various militias to join the counterinsurgency effort. This use of local paramilitary forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations, including infiltrating suspected sympathizers and hostile communities is consistent with the US counterinsurgency doctrine and strategies applied in previous counterinsurgency engagements.[906] The covert plan has been compared to Operation Phoenix implemented during the Vietnam War in which the CIA and US Special Forces oversaw the assassination and torture of suspected insurgents in order to liquidate the guerrilla movement.[907] During a Congressional hearing regarding Special Force operations in the "war on terror" US Army Lt. Gen. William Boykin commented: "I think we're running

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[898] Dana Priest and Josh White, "Before the War, the CIA Reportedly Trained a Team of Iraqis to Aid US," *Washington Post* 3 August, 2005, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9660.htm (accessed 5 November 2010).

[899] Mike Tucker and Charles Faddis, *Operation Hotel California* (Guilford: The Globe Pequat Press, 2009), 33-38.

[900] Priest and White, *Before the War, the CIA Reportedly Trained a Team of Iraqis to Aid US*

[901] Steven Hurst, *The United States and Iraq since 1979: Hegemony, Oil, and War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 129-131.

[902] Woodward, *Plan of Attack*

[903] Ibid.

[904] Hirsh and Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination Or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*

[905] Robert Dreyfuss, "Phoenix Rising," *The American Prospect* 1 Jan, 2004, http://prospect.org/article/phoenix-rising. (accessed 24 March 2012)

[906] Schwartz, *War Without End: The Iraq War in Context*, 107.

[907] Valentine, *The Phoenix Program*; Douglas Valentine, "The Pentagons Local Defense Initiatives in Afghanistan: Making Everyone 'Feel Safer'," *Global Research* 7 May, 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19031 (accessed 24 September 2010).

that kind of program. We're going after these people. Killing or capturing these people is a legitimate mission for the department. I think we're doing what the Phoenix program was designed to do, without all of the secrecy."[908]

Then in 2005, discussions amongst US military planners proposing the implementation of the so-called "Salvador option" drew new parallels to previous US-backed counterinsurgency campaigns. This option memorializes the provision of counterinsurgency support to El Salvador's military with death squad connections in order to crush the insurgency there and their civilian support base during the 1980s. The reliance on indigenous and local paramilitary forces with an advisory role for the US Special Forces is consistent with the US counterinsurgency doctrine, training and strategy imparted to Latin American militaries throughout the Cold War period and beyond.[909] The application of this option in Iraq, according to *Newsweek,* meant that the US would send "Special Forces teams to advise, support and possibly train Iraqi squads, most likely hand-picked Peshmerga fighters and Shiite militiamen, to target Sunni insurgents and their sympathizers."[910] During preparations to delegate counterinsurgency actions to such parallel armed groups, commentators pointed to the similarities between these tactics and those employed in El Salvador and Vietnam. Moreover, they pointed to the recycling of US military personnel that had previous experience in promoting the paramilitary proscription in counterinsurgent wars in Latin America during the Cold War.[911]

The formulation of paramilitary forces, often with informal ties to the Iraqi Interior Ministry, was overseen by US military specialists with previous experience in creating similar counterinsurgency structures in Central and South America.[912] These elite paramilitary counterinsurgency forces played an indispensable role in the US-backed counterinsurgency drive to insulate the newly formed Iraqi state from dissent and subversion and are implicated in the death squad activities against Iraqi civilians, including disappearances, assassinations, torture and unlawful detentions.[913] More importantly, perhaps, is the way they formed out of tensions between the Sunni and Shiite sects within the context of the insurgency. In some cases, parliamentary members were allegedly using death squad agents to amass personal power, in moves said to exacerbate local sectarian divides. For example, Iraq's former (Sunni) vice president, Tariq Al-Hashimi has been on the run after accusations that he led death squad campaigns against Shiite political opponents.[914] One

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[908] Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army*, 377.

[909] Hirsh and Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination Or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*.; Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism,* 87.

[910] Hirsh and Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination Or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*

[911] See for instance Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism.*; Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army*, 349. see also "The Salvador Option Exposed," *Brussels Tribunal*, http://www.brusselstribunal.org/BritishBombers.htm (accessed 17 April 2012)

[912] See Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army* and Peter Maass, "The Way of the Commandos," *New York Times Magazine* 1 May, 2005.

[913] See for instance Ibid., Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality*; Monitoring of Human Rights in Iraq (MHRI), "Death Squads in Iraq: Evolution, Objectives, Results," Baghdad: MHRI, December 2006. Available at http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/deathSquadsMHRI.PDF (Accessed 12 September 2012). S. Bauer, "Iraq's New Death Squad," *The Nation* 6 (June, 2009), http://www.thenation.com/article/iraqs-new-death-squad (accessed 12 September 2010).

[914] Schmidt, Michael, and Tim Arango, "Vice President of Iraq Voices Sunni's Anger as He Denies Ordering Killings" *The New York Times* 20 December, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/world/middleeast/sunni-leader-in-iraq-denies-ordering-assassinations.html?_r=1&ref=global-home (accessed 20 August, 2012)

paramilitary force called the Special Police Commandos, led by General Adnan Thabit, drew from state intelligence and reported directly to the Interior Ministry. The Commandos also received US support and were supervised by US military specialist James Steele who had headed the Military Advisory Group in El Salvador during the early 1980s.[915] The Special Police Commandos, were associated with numerous instances of extra-judicial killings and massacres, and heavily implicated in torture and maltreatment of detainees. According to journalist accounts, there are consistent patterns of mass killings of suspected insurgents, in areas of Commando operation.[916] Moreover, this unit aired some its counterinsurgency operations on a television show titled "Terrorism in the Grip of Justice" on U.S. funded national TV station *Al-Iraqiya*.[917] With civilians bearing marks of torture confessing to various crimes including providing support for the insurgent movement, the program is an example of counterinsurgency propaganda (psychological operations) designed to instill fear in the local population from aiding and abetting the insurgents.

Much like the Special Police Commandos, the Wolf Brigade was supported by the US command and operates as another elite counterinsurgency force un-officially affiliated with the Iraqi Interior Ministry.[918] Despite some media accounts depicting this group as an autonomous unit with few links to the Interior Ministry, the US ran joint operations with this group, and has conducted counterinsurgency raids under the direct mandate of the Iraqi government and US advisors.[919] Furthermore, the Wolf Brigade also appeared on the TV program "Terrorism in the Grip of Justice".[920] A predominantly Shiite counterinsurgency force, the Wolf Brigade is also complicit in systematic abuses against civilians, including torture and arbitrary detentions but specifically against the Sunni population. Indeed, this paramilitary group has been accused of instigating sectarian tensions by persecuting Sunnis in the counterinsurgency imperative to locate and defeat insurgents.[921] Semi-official units such as these established under the Iraqi Interior Ministry were designed, according to one academic observer, "as an extrajudicial method of capturing and killing suspected Sunni insurgents."[922] Consistent with this assertion, a military source told reporters that "The Sunni population is paying no price for the support it is giving to the terrorists... From their point of view, it is cost-free. We have to change that equation."[923]

The rise of these paramilitary counterinsurgency forces is strongly associated with the systematic targeting of civilians allegedly supportive of the insurgency and those social and political forces deemed subversive to US and coalition political and economic program.[924]

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[915] Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality* and Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army*, 352.
[916] Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality*
[917] Ibid.
[918] BBC News, "Profile: Iraq's Wolf Brigade," *BBC News* 11 June, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4083326.stm (accessed 16 June 2010).
[919] Max Fuller, "Crying Wolf: Media Disinformation and Death Squads in Occupied Iraq," *Global Research* 10 November, 2005, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=FUL20051110&articleId=1230. (accessed 12 July 2011).; and G. Porter, "US Military Still Runs with Dreaded Wolf Brigade," *IPS News* 2 Jan, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31639. (accessed 12 December 2012)
[920] L. Beehner, *Iraq: Militia Groups* (CFR, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/publication/8175/iraq.html. (accessed 1 July 2011)
[921] Fuller, *Crying Wolf: Media Disinformation and Death Squads in Occupied Iraq*
[922] Schwartz, *War Without End: The Iraq War in Context*, 211.
[923] Hirsh and Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination Or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*
[924] Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality* for a broader study on the intersection on the perpetuation of state terror and neoliberalism promotion in the South see Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*

Similar to the paramilitary units that operated under US direction or acquiescence throughout Central America during the 1980s, these Iraqi paramilitaries, under the mandate of the US backed Iraqi government, conducted extrajudicial killings of suspected terrorists and insurgents.[925] Victims recovered from mass graves showed signs of torture, having been blindfolded, handcuffed and executed with gunshots to the back of the head. Former UN Human Rights Chief in Iraq, John Pace, comparing these activities to those of death squads elsewhere including El Salvador, confirmed that numerous civilians have been found with evidence of torture and summarily executed.[926] The media reported a flurry of dead bodies disposed of in rivers, abandoned buildings and other public places, often with marks of torture.[927] Human Rights Watch commented that "Every month, hundreds of people are abducted, tortured and killed by what many believe are death squads that include security forces. To terrorize the population, the killers often dump the mutilated corpses in public areas."[928] In this way, such practices conform to patterns of terror perpetrated by parallel agents of the state.[929]

Moreover, other victims of Iraqi paramilitary violence consist of various but specific political and social forces, including those in opposition to economic policies favoring privatization and neoliberal structural reforms. For instance, Max Fuller reports that trade unionists and worker's organizations appealing against the privatization of key industries have been met with force and intimidation coupled with state policies in favor of privatization and minimal union activity.[930] Similar counter-resistance has been launched against members of the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions opposing the privatization of the Iraqi oil infrastructure, with the Iraqi government issuing arrest warrants for union leaders.[931] According to a 2010 Amnesty International report titled *Civilians Under Fire*, political activists opposing occupation and critical of the Iraqi government have been the subject of reprisals from paramilitary militia groups with connections to various political parties in the Iraqi Interior Ministry. In addition, the report details, human rights defenders and other political organizations have been attacked from both state and state-sponsored armed groups, as well as insurgent groups and Al-Qaeda.[932] Journalists working to report on and uncover abuses connected to the occupation forces and Iraq's Interior Ministry have been assassinated. In conjunction, many of the attempts to silence the media in this way have not been fully investigated, largely sending message of impunity to the groups responsible.[933] Lastly, Iraqi academics and scientists have been selectively assassinated and intimidated slowly emptying the country of its educated elite. Suspicions have arisen in the media that the assassinations have been conducted by paramilitary forces, Israeli Mossad and insurgents bent on destroying

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[925] Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality*

[926] Amy Goodman, "Exclusive: Former UN Human Rights Chief in Iraq Says US Violating Geneva Conventions, Jailing Innocent Detainees," *Democracy Now* 28 Feb, 2006, http://www.democracynow.org/2006/2/28/exclusive_former_un_human_rights_chief.

[927] S. Harris, "Who's Behind the Active Death Squads Running Iraq?" *Al Jazeera* 20 July, 2006.

[928] HRW, *Iraq: End Interior Ministry Death Squads* (Human Rights Watch, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/10/28/iraq-end-interior-ministry-death-squads (accessed 4 May 2011).

[929] For an in-depth study of state terrorism see Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*; Blakeley, *Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies*, 228-235.; Stohl and Lopez, *Terrible Beyond Endurance? the Foreign Policy of State Terrorism*

[930] Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality*

[931] Stokes and Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, 103.

[932] AI, *Iraq: Civilians Under Fire* (Amnesty International, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org (accessed 4 April 2011).

[933] Harris, *Who's Behind the Active Death Squads Running Iraq?* and J. Cogan, "Journalist Killed After Investigating US- Backed Death Squads in Iraq," *World Socialist Web Site* 1 July, 2005, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jul2005/iraq-j01.shtml. (accessed 6 May 2012)

the country.[934] Although there is speculation as to the perpetrators of such murders, it is clear that, in the words of reporter Andrew Rubin, "Without the intelligentsia, the US and its allies will continue arrogating to themselves the right to determine the form that Iraq's universities and knowledge should assume."[935]

Adding to the counterinsurgency paramilitary networks to pacify the insurgency and to counter the presence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, US planners exploited groups (primarily Sunni tribes) that had defected from the insurgency in 2005-2006 and incorporated them into the US counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy is consistent with the counterinsurgency logic of using and/or forming civil defense groups as paramilitary operatives in order to mobilize active support from the local population. Known as the Anbar Awakening or *Sahwa* in Arabic, the shifting of allegiances of various Sunni insurgent forces to seek an alliance with the US military arose out of complex divisions and dynamics between anti-occupation forces and rising tensions between Sunni and Shia populations.[936] Disgruntled with the resistance and the power attained by foreign members of the insurgency, Sunni tribal leaders in the Al-Anbar province began defecting from the insurgency and joining the US counterinsurgency campaign. US forces had up to that point considered the Anbar province "lost" to the insurgents[937] and the official US reception of the "Awakening" has been described as unexpected and a "watershed" moment in the counterinsurgency effort by US military specialists.[938] Indeed, the subsequent civilian self-defense scheme formed a central component of US counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, in which the US authorized, organized, trained, and financed Sunni tribal militias to contribute to US counterinsurgency operations, providing intelligence and conducting counterinsurgency security operations against suspected insurgents and members of al-Qaeda.[939]

The official program initiated by the US military to use these turned Sunni tribes was titled "Concerned Local Citizens" and later given the name "Sons of Iraq". However, as Schwartz points out, this label obscures the reality that many of these groups were recently anti-US insurgents that previously would have been labeled "terrorist", and were now handed a "special mandate to suppress, arrest, or kill local jihadist cadre."[940] Initially concentrated primarily in the Anbar, Salah-ad-Din, Diyala and Baghdad districts, the program rapidly expanded and counted on over 100,000 paid paramilitary fighters at its peak in 2007-2008 in more than two thirds of Iraqi provinces. These groups functioned as paramilitary security contractors for the US military, each "Son" receiving $300 monthly salary for their services,

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[934] The Brussels Tribunal, "Stop the Assassination of Iraqi Academics," *The Brussels Tribunal*, http://www.brusselstribunal.org/Academics.htm (accessed 5 May, 2012).
[935] A. Rubin, "The Slaughter of Iraq's Intellectuals," *New Statesmen* 6 Sept, 2004, http://www.newstatesman.com/200409060018 (accessed 4 may 2012).
[936] Schwartz, *War Without End: The Iraq War in Context*, 241. Also see John A. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives," *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (Jan., 2009): 43-59.
[937] John Hendren, "Anbar Province is Lost to US Military," *NPR* 11 September, 2006.; Jonathan. Steele, "Military Admits Problems in Anbar After Leaked Report," *Guardian* 14 September, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/14/iraq.jonathansteele (accessed 13 March 2012).
[938] Colonel M. Stanton, "Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable: Transcript," *Federal News Service* 2 November, 2007, http://www.defense.gov/dodcmsshare/BloggerAssets/2007-11/1102071717471102_stanton_Transcript.pdf (accessed Dec 2010).and Greg Bruno, "The Role of the "Sons of Iraq" in Improving Security," *Washington Post* 28 April, 2008.
[939] Federico. Manfredi, "Iraq's Crooked Politicians: Talking with Sheik Ali Hatem, Leader of the Sunni Awakening Councils," *Huffington Post* 16 August, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/federico-manfredi/iraqs-crooked-politicians_b_683537.html (accessed Dec 2010).
[940] Schwartz, *War Without End: The Iraq War in Context*, 246-247. SIGIR, "Sons of Iraq Program: Results are Uncertain and Financial Controls are Weak," Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) (28 January, 2011).

the US allocating around $16 million a month for those payments in 2008.[941] US military leaders found the outsourcing of security and counterinsurgency functions to such paramilitary militias extremely advantageous as they "realized that buying the loyalty of these tribes was cheaper and more effective than fighting them."[942] Moreover, they were significantly cheaper than hiring PMCs and politically more acceptable by reducing US military casualties.[943] Hence, these paramilitary forces were beneficial to the US in a number of ways.

It is clear, however, that while the US backed paramilitary forces played an important role in the US's counterinsurgent "surge" in 2007, there were concerns amongst US military commanders and the Iraqi government of the long-term consequences of supporting such a large paramilitary infrastructure. For its part, the Iraqi government had issues with the employment of former insurgents whose allegiance and agendas might be questionable as well as incompatible with government objectives. As General Petraeus, US counterinsurgency military expert and leader in Iraq, stated, "There are understandable concerns on the part of a government that is majority Shiite that, what they [would be] doing was hiring former Sunni insurgents, giving them a new lease on life, and that when this is all said and done they may turn against the government or the Shiite population."[944] The Iraqi government was thus concerned that the empowerment of a network of Sunni paramilitary forces could lead to sectarian violence and instability for the current Iraqi government in the long-run. [945] Other concerns about the viability of controlling such a large contingent of paramilitary militia forces have been expressed by US commanders. Major General Allen, for example, commented that "It's the case with any franchise organization. Sooner or later you lose control of the standards."[946] In late 2008 the US transferred responsibility for these paramilitary forces to the Iraqi army, which eventually terminated its financial aid for the program.[947] Attempts to integrate the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi military largely failed for various reasons, and splintered and factional groups became targets of the US military as well as Al-Qaeda.[948] According to a *New York Times* article, many Sons of Iraq leaders have also been arrested by the Iraqi government for their previous role in the insurgency.[949] Subsequently, by September 2010 many of the Sons of Iraq had reportedly abdicated their paramilitary role and re-joined the insurgency in anticipation of US troop exit.[950] Others were hunted down by both insurgent forces and by the US and Iraqi militaries alike. Sheik Al-Rishawi, the founder of the Anbar Salvation Council was himself killed in a targeted explosion in 2007.

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[941] Bruno, *The Role of the "Sons of Iraq" in Improving Security*
[942] Ahram, *Proxy Warriors*, 90.
[943] Bruno, *The Role of the "Sons of Iraq" in Improving Security*
[944] Walter Pincus, "U.S. Seeks Contractors to Train Iraqi Military," *The Washington Post* 4 May, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/03/AR2008050301678.html (accessed 2 May 2012). Also see U.S. Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability in Iraq* (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/master%20%20mar08%20-%20final%20signed.pdf (accessed Sept 2010).
[945] Alissa. Rubin and Damien Cave, "In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict," *The New York Times* 23 Dec, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/world/middleeast/23awakening.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (accessed Sept 2010).
[946] Richard. Oppel, "Iraq Takes Aim at US-Tied Sunni Groups' Leaders," *The New York Times* 21 Aug, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/world/middleeast/22sunni.html. (accessed 6 Sept 2010)
[947] Ned. Parker and Tina. Susman, "A Delicate Hand-Over in Iraq," *LA Times* 11 Nov., 2008.; Eduardo. Londono, "US Aircraft Opens Fire on Sons of Iraq Members," *Washington Post Foreign Service* 3 April, 2009.
[948] Ibid.
[949] Oppel, *Iraq Takes Aim at US-Tied Sunni Groups' Leaders*
[950] Michael. Chulov, "Fears of Al-Qaida Return in Iraq as US-Backed Fighters Defect," *The Guardian* 10 Aug, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/al-qaida-sons-of-iraq (accessed Sept 2010).; Dan Morse, "Former Sons of Iraq Targeted by Insurgents After US Pullout," *Washington Post* 28 Jan, 2012.

The Obama administration has yet to reverse paramilitarism in Iraq and the support the US and Iraqi governments provides to paramilitary groups. The Sons of Iraq, for instance, despite questions as to their legitimacy and cohesion under the Iraqi government, continued to operate in the facilitation of US withdrawal from Iraq and handling the mantle of counterinsurgency and security to Iraqi forces. Furthermore, according to Shane Bauer, US-trained and special force paramilitary units continued to conduct death squad tactics through 2009, committing extra-judicial executions, arbitrary detentions and intimidation of suspected members of the insurgency and political and ideological dissidents.[951] The Iraq Special Operations Forces (ISOF), an elite counter-terror and counterinsurgency contingency trained by US Special Forces since 2003 functions outside regular military command structures, with little to no oversight and accountability for their operations. Under US supervision, the Iraqi government created an independent chain of command in order to free this elite counterinsurgency force from the accountability mechanisms established in the Iraqi bureaucracy. Instead of reporting to conventional military structures, the ISOF is part of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, making it a covert organization, hidden from Iraq's congress and public scrutiny.[952] In Sadre City, according to reporter Shane Bauer, the ISOF often targets civilians and unarmed movements as part of a form of "collective punishment".[953] According to Hassan al-Rubaji, a member of the Security and Defense Committee in Sadre City, the ISOF "terrorize entire neighborhoods just to arrest one person they think is a terrorist."[954] These US trained forces, labeled "death squads" by the media is not an aberration from the norm of US supported counterinsurgent efforts. Rather, it is representative of its very core features with paramilitarism as a central plank of US policy in Iraq. As we shall see, such policies, as part of a counterinsurgency template, have also been applied extensively in Afghanistan, yet in its own ways unique to the Afghan context.[955]

PMCs in Iraq: The Occupation's Senior Partner

The scale of this para-state nexus in US bids to stabilize Iraq is further exemplified by the scope of PMC activity. PMCs accompanied US troops into Iraq in a vast array of roles. They have been instrumental in US counterinsurgency efforts as tools of US statecraft to further US objectives in the region. According to government data, the DoD spent a staggering $112.1 billion in contracts in Iraq between 2005-2010, with around $15.4 billion in 2010 alone.[956] Moreover, by 2007, there were more PMC personnel in Iraq (180,000) under contracts paid for by the US government than there were soldiers (160,000).[957] According to data released by the DoD, contractors continued to make up over 50% of the DoD's workforce in Iraq with 64,253 DoD contractors compared to 45,660 US military personnel in March 2011, in the lead up to US withdrawal.[958] As Isenberg points out, "This meant the U.S. military had actually become the junior partner in the coalition that occupies

[951] Shane Bauer, "Iraq's New Death Squad," *The Nation* 6 (June, 2009), http://www.thenation.com/article/iraqs-new-death-squad (accessed 12 September 2010).
[952] Ibid.
[953] Ibid.
[954] Ibid.
[955] Paramilitary teams Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3* Bradford Burris, "Applying Iraq to Afghanistan," *Small Wars Journal* (2010), www.smallwarsjournal.com.; Valentine, *The Pentagons Local Defense Initiatives in Afghanistan: Making Everyone 'Feel Safer'* Alongside these, the CIA also paid a 3,000 men armed mercenary force of Afghanis called the Counterterrorism Pursuit Units see Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2010).
[956] Schwartz and Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis*
[957] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 46.
[958] Schwartz and Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis*

Iraq."[959] Although the vast majority of these contractors were present as "force multipliers" in mundane logistical roles such as cooking, cleaning and construction,[960] it does not detract from the multiple forms in which PMCs were essential to the overall stabilization efforts.

One interesting component of this para-state nexus as it unfolded in Iraq was the way the US military attempted to coordinate PMC activity. After the Fallujah incident where four Blackwater employees were ambushed and killed, their burnt bodies hung from a bridge across the Euphrates river, the Pentagon decided to establish a mechanism to coordinate the activities of the various PMCs operational in Iraq and the US military. "Project Matrix", as it is known was contracted out to Aegis Defense Services, a British PMC founded by former Sandline.[961] The central aim of the $293 million dollar contract signed in 2004 was to facilitate counterinsurgency efforts by overseeing and providing communication between all the PMCs operational in the country and US armed forces. Under the Reconstruction Operations Center, "Project Matrix" tracks and coordinates PMC movements and activities. Transponders were issued to each contractor in order to liaise more effectively between them and the military reporting back to central command any emergencies and insurgent activity. In this way, "Project Matrix" also had an intelligence gathering function. Armed contractors visit reconstruction sights gathering information on insurgent activity. According to Kristi Clemens, Aegis' executive vice-president, "Their mission is to provide 'ground truth' to the Army Corps."[962]

The provision of military and police training to Iraqi forces for internal policing was also often delegated to private companies. After the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrated by Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi army as part of the process of de-Baathification, Vinnell, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Corporation, was awarded a $48 million contract to train the first 9 battalions of the new Iraqi Army.[963] Subsequent training has been undertaken by different countries in the multi-national Coalition and by NATO as well as US forces, and PMCs have often been hired by US agencies to aid in this process.[964] The majority of Iraqi police forces have also been trained by DynCorp with around $2.5 billion in contracts since 2004-2011.[965] Perhaps most significant, however, has been the passing of training of militias, commando squads, and other para-institutional forces to PMCs. In moves that distance the training of similar units further away from the US government, the media also reports on another "third force" program, in which a US PMC trained "Emergency Response Units" (ERU) as elite commando units designated under the Iraqi Interior Ministry. US Investigations Services won the $64.5 million contract in 2004 to train and lead a variety of sectarian forces to bolster the local security and counterinsurgency

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[959] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 46.

[960] Schwartz and Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis,* 16.

[961] Stephen Armstrong, *War PLC: Rise of the New Corporate Mercenary* (Chatham: Faber and Faber, 2008), 39.

[962] Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein, "In Iraq, A Private Ream of Intelligence Gathering," *Washington Post* 1 July, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063001075.html. (accessed 12 January 2012)

[963] Northrup Grumman, *Northrop Grumman Statement to News Media regarding the Release of Ours Employees in Colombia*

[964] David Brunnstrom, "NATO to Stop Training Iraq Army when U.S. Troops Leave," *Reuters* 12 Dec., 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/12/us-nato-iraq-idUSTRE7BB17O20111212 (accessed 4 May 2012).; Pincus, *U.S. Seeks Contractors to Train Iraqi Military*

[965] David Isenberg, "DynCorp in Iraq," *Huffington Post* 24 January, 2010, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dyncorp-iraq (accessed 1 May 2012).; August Cole, "DynCorp's Iraq Contracts with U.S. are Scrutinized," *The Wall Street Journal* 25 January, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703415804575023293904363732.html (accessed 24 April, 2012).

capability, putting a "local face" on the US-led strategy to defeat the insurgency. The initial training phase of some parts of the ERUs has been accused of being fraught with human rights violations as training exercises have spilt over into live combat missions. Training for some of the militia forces mobilized and organized under the Sons of Iraq umbrella paramilitary force was also provided under this initiative.[966]

PMCs have also played an important role in intelligence functions in the counterinsurgency policing of Iraqi society. Multiple companies have been contracted for aerial surveillance and the provision of real-time intelligence to US and Iraqi forces.[967] Airscan, for example, was handed a $50 million dollar contract from the US military in March 2011-December 2011 to provide "real-time over-target full-motion video from commercial manned airborne surveillance platforms for Iraq-wide air surveillance support."[968] Similarly, according to one joint Corpwatch/Amnesty International report, "L-3 and Titan play a key role in staffing and maintaining what was once considered an *inherently governmental* function: the acquisition and analysis of human intelligence during war."[969] Such governmental functions, the report outlines, included contracting interrogators, such as L-3 interrogators in various facilities in Iraq, and CACI which claims to have 28 interrogators in Iraq at any given point in time, as well as having the distinction of being the first contractor to supply interrogators.[970] As Khalili has argued, these "para-statal complexes" of coercion in places such as Abu Ghraib are not an aberration from the norm in the way public and public forces intermesh in "neo-liberal forms of rule and coercion."[971]

Private security firms in the protection of important infrastructure have also served as investment enablers in Iraq.[972] PMCs have often been hired to protect vital infrastructure and trade routes from insurgent and Al-Qaeda attack as an integral component of US economic and political designs for the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. For example, according to its own website, Erinys International "created and deployed over a period of 18 months a guard force of over 16,000 Iraqi national security guards (both fixed site and mobile) protecting 282 key oil infrastructure sites, including strategically significant oil and gas pipelines."[973] A night time aerial surveillance function was sub-contracted to Airscan to monitor the pipelines at night. This constitutes only a small part of a larger "Facilities Protection Services" program established by Bremer's CPA in 2003 to protect Iraqi

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[966] Pratap Chatterjee, "The Boys from Baghdad: Iraqi Commandos Trained by US Contractor," *CorpWatch.Com* 20 September, 2007, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14700.
[967] "MARSS & More: Quasi-Civilian Spy Plane Services on the Front Lines," *Defense Industry Daily* 31 March, 2011, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Telfords-Dash-7s-to-Supplement-Military-Surveillance-04947/ (accessed 29 April 2012).
[968] U.S. Department of Defense, "Contracts," U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4501 (accessed 12 April, 2012).; Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq,* 74.
[969] Pratap Chatterjee, *Outsourcing Intelligence in Iraq: A CorpWatch Report on L-3/Titan* (Amnesty International, 2008)
[970] Ibid. also see Chesterman, *We can't Spy... if we can't Buy!': The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing 'Inherently Governmental Functions,* 1055.
[971] Laleh Khalili, "Tangled Webs of Coercion: Parastatal Production of Violence in Abu Ghraib," in *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East: Formations of Coercion*, eds. Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler (London: Hurst, 2010).
[972] Term taken from Mandel, *Armies Without States,* 20.
[973] Erinys, "The Erinys Oil Protection Force," *Erinys International*, http://www.erinys.net/#/case6-opf-iraq/4532961711 (accessed 16 April 2012, 2012).; Jim Vallette and Pratap Chatterjee, "Guarding the Oil Underworld in Iraq," *CorpWatch* 2003, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=8328 (accessed 20 April 2012).

government buildings, public facilities, and critical infrastructure.[974] However, it also forms part of an increasing trend in which private companies are designated in various areas around the globe often (but not necessarily always) connected to US and local counterinsurgency campaigns to insulate lucrative resource extractive business from the damaging effects of conflict and deliberate attempts by rebels to disrupt their operation.[975] Erinys, for instance, has previous experience in protecting the Ahanti gold mine in Ghana[976] and MPRI's agreement to professionalize and enhance Equatorial Guinea's military capability to protect key oil facilities is another good example of this trend.[977] Moreover, many of the operatives in this program in Iraq have involved PMCs and trained local forces to protect "vital" infrastructure, often spilling over into counterinsurgency operations against suspected insurgents.[978] Thus PMCs and sometimes militia groups have buttressed and served as a crucial component of a security infrastructure to protect areas of economic importance from insurgent attack, constituting a smaller cog in the overall outsourced machinery of US-led counterinsurgency in Iraq.

These examples outlining the scope of a US para-state nexus in the prosecution of stability operations in Iraq underscores the extent to which US military power relies on such para-institutional mechanisms in localized settings. It also highlights the fluid functioning of a para-state nexus as conforming to the contours of the immediate context. It is not a static infrastructure designed by military planners, but instead arises and evolves through a series of different contracts and relationships with various agencies, groups and individuals. It is a synergistic intersection of forces working towards US counterinsurgency objectives. However, the counterinsurgency engagement in Iraq is only part of the wider geo-political jigsaw in which parallel military agents and structures have become indispensable during the "war on terror". Paramilitary forces have taken on significant counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare duties, hunting down "terrorists" and other internal dissidents and "subversives". Similarly, PMCs are now an essential part of the military machine as force multipliers. Both these types of forces are integral to US global military presence and in the maintenance of its hegemonic role in the international system.

The Para-State Nexus in Afghanistan: The "Indirect Approach" Applied

US intervention in Afghanistan (2001-present) provides another example of this para-state nexus and the ways it has been central to US efforts to stabilize a pro-US post-Taliban order. This nexus, in the application of an "indirect approach"[979] has been shaped significantly by domestic Afghan political dynamics between the consolidation of state power and local warlords, militias, and other tribal factions, which often jockey for their own domains of control. Thus the example of Afghanistan is demonstrative of the intersection of US para-institutional stabilization strategies and local political power structures in shaping the contours of a US para-state nexus. This section, though, rather than provide an in-depth analysis of Afghan tribal politics and their role in state formation, will analyze the use of non-state armed groups, including PMCs, in US stabilization efforts in order to further

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[974] For more on the FPS see GlobalSecurity.Org, "Facility Protection Service," http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/fps.htm (accessed July/7, 2012).

[975] Vallette and Chatterjee, *Guarding the Oil Underworld in Iraq*

[976] See Pratap Chatterjee, *Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), 119.

[977] Human Rights Watch, *Well Oiled Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 83.

[978] Sarah Meyer, "Iraq: Security Companies and Training Camps," *Global Research* (18 May, 2006), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2461# (accessed 3 May 2012).; "Facility Protection Service," *Global Security*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/fps.htm (accessed 3 May, 2012).

[979] See Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*

demonstrate the entrenchment of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy, and the localized forms that it takes. It examines how, in similar ways as in Iraq, leveraging tribal groups and militias for the counterinsurgency campaign and the integration of PMCs as force multipliers have been central to US attempts to stabilize Afghanistan and strengthen the Afghan internal security apparatus. This section also briefly argues that this strategy, however, has sometimes led to unintended consequences, as the empowerment of warlords and militias has often been detrimental to the consolidation of Afghan state power and the desired end-state of "stability".

Unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Warlords, Militias, and Paramilitaries

In Afghanistan, warlords and militias have historically occupied complex and influential roles in local power structures and in processes of state formation.[980] However, despite the diverse origins of these non-state actors, the nexus between the US and para-institutional armed forces in the application of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare doctrines in 2001 and after has been remarkably consistent with similar engagements. For example, in a comparable manner to the invasion of Iraq, during the build-up and initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan the US launched an unconventional war to overthrow the Taliban government that existed at the time. CIA and Special Force officers were deployed in late September 2001 to mobilize indigenous anti-Taliban guerrilla forces, primarily the Northern Alliance in the north of the country and various Pashtun tribes in the south. The code-named Operation Jawbreaker saw the dispatch of a Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team to connect with Northern Alliance fighters and other paramilitary groups.[981] US unconventional tactics depended on networks of irregular allies-for-hire for intelligence gathering, conducting "sabotage" operations, and marking targets for US aerial attacks. These private armies, receiving cash hand-outs from the CIA and Special Forces for their collaboration (sometimes receiving cash payments of upwards to $1 million) were the principal guerrilla force in destabilizing the Taliban regime in preparation for the eventual arrival of US forces as well as leading counter-terror operations in search of Al-Qaeda operatives and Osama Bin Laden.[982] This included the delivery of "767 tons of supplies and $70 million, sufficient to equip and fund an estimated 50,000 militiamen."[983] The policy rationales of employing proxy paramilitaries were straightforward. The operation was mounted much faster, easier, and cheaper than the direct deployment of US troops. According to reporter Bob Woodward, "In all, the U.S. commitment to overthrow the Taliban had been about 110 CIA officers and 316 Special Forces personnel, plus massive air power."[984] Moreover, according to Henriksen, contracting the Northern Alliance and other tribal as surrogate forces for US power was a relatively cheap option: "By spring 2002, 6 months after the assault, the United States spent only $12 billion and lost about a dozen American lives."[985] Finally, while these forces were instrumental in undermining the Taliban regime, they would also later become useful military allies against a growing insurgency.

[980] Antonio Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). see also Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica: RAND Publications, 2008), 33-35.
[981] Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 141-146.; For personal account of these events see *Gary Bernstein and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander* (Crown Publishing Group, 2006).
[982] Bob Woodward, "CIA Led Way with Cash Handouts," *The Washington Post* 18 Nov, 2002.
[983] Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan*, 89.
[984] Woodward, *CIA Led Way with Cash Handouts*
[985] Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*, 39.

Shortly after the arrival of US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, a US-led counterinsurgency mission ensued to pacify a growing insurgency composed of the remnants of the Taliban, a collection of Haqqani tribal networks, and elements of Al-Qaeda.[986] Much like in Iraq, this pacification strategy depended on numerous allied militia forces. Militias and local strongmen were often paid on a sporadic or *ad-hoc* basis by US command to participate in military operations against insurgent groups.[987] The loyalty of many warlord militias was literally bought. According to some estimates, the Coalition may have been paying up to $10,000 a month in salaries to select local militiamen leaders.[988] Media reports also highlighted hidden links between US agencies and the Afghan security services to counterinsurgency paramilitaries conducting night raids and extra-judicial killings against civilians suspected of supporting the insurgency.[989] Professor Philip Alston, the special rapporteur on illegal killings for the UN, stated that "There have been a large number of raids for which no state or military appears to take responsibility."[990] Furthermore, he stated that Afghan militias (one named the Shaheen unit) with no overt ties to any military command, conducted night raids and other counterinsurgency functions with impunity.[991]

Although used in accordance with US counterinsurgency doctrines, these para-statal arrangements were also partly a product of the resurgence of localized nascent warlord political power structures that had been suppressed under the Taliban regime.[992] In attempts to consolidate state institutions the US and Coalition forces and the newly established Afghan government (headed by Karzai) conceded to and supported regional warlord power brokers, which in some cases actually served as an impediment to the development of centralized bureaucratic institutions and a strong security apparatus.[993] In the face of growing skepticism about the viability of stable state construction in light of networks of local warlords and militias with their own political agendas, a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program (2003-2005), as part of the 2001 Bonn agreements, was initialized in attempts to consolidate and centralize the state's monopoly of force.[994] However, according to critics, the DDR "was more of a façade than a substantial disarmament process."[995] This was partly due to a continued reliance on militias and warlord factions for local security and

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[986] Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 38.

[987] See Ibid., 76 Antonio Giustozzi, "The Privatizing of War and Security in Afghanistan: Future Or Dead End?" *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 2, no. 1 (2007): 30.

[988] Mark Sedra, "Small Arms and Security Sector Reform," in *Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament and Security in a Post-War Society,* eds. Michael Bhaktia and Mark Sedra (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 176.

[989] See for instance Jerome Starkey, "Afghan Death Squads Acting on Foreign Orders," *The Independent* 16 May, 2008.

[990] Ibid. and Alston, Phillip. "Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions" *Press Statement* Kabul, 15 May 2008. Available online http://www.extrajudicialexecutions.org/application/media/Statement,%2015%20May%202008,%20Kabul,%20Afghanistan%20%5BEnglish%5D.pdf (accessed 15 June 2012)

[991] Ibid

[992] Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan,* 88-91. Peter Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan* (Philadelphia: Public Affairs, 2011), 643-648.; HRW, *Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords* (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

[993] Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan,* 88-91.; Peter Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan* (Philadelphia: Public Affairs, 2011), 643-648.; HRW, *Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords* (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

[994] Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (CRS Report For Congress, 2012).

[995] Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan*, 92.

counterinsurgency measures, but was also a dynamic of existing local Afghan warlord politics.[996]

A counterinsurgency para-state nexus was further entrenched in early 2009 with the implementation of the US civilian self-defense force template of "counter-organization", as US military forces sought to replicate the "Sons of Iraq" model alongside an ancillary US troop "surge" strategy in Afghanistan.[997] Counterinsurgency experts converged on the idea of harnessing the military power of tribal factions, producing a torrent of articles and workshops extolling the virtues of incorporating the various tribes and warlords into the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.[998] US Special Forces Major Jim Gant, for example, advocated a local level approach that would "advise, assist, train and lead tribal security forces (*Arbakais*) [traditional private militias]" in counterinsurgency warfare.[999] In a similar spirit, according to journalist Spencer Ackerman, a "former CIA counterterror operative" leaked a memo presented to the highest echelons of US military command describing the utility of what he labeled a "Tribe-Centric Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense."[1000] In accordance with these recommendations, the Obama administration increased its funding for tribal and warlord militias with the passage of the 2009 Defense Appropriation Bill allocating $1.3 billion dollars towards financing the "reintegration" of Afghan warlords into a counterinsurgency paramilitary force.[1001] Under a so-called Community Defense Initiative, US and Afghan agencies began to co-opt tribal forces, integrating them into the counterinsurgency strategy.[1002] According to one media account, CIA operatives were sent to persuade warlords and tribal leaders to join the fight against the Taliban and other insurgent movements, dolling out cash incentives and reportedly even Viagra as payment for their loyalty.[1003] Like in Iraq, the plan formed part of the indirect approach to counterinsurgency which relied on a web of non-state agents to conduct military operations against the Taliban and oppositional forces.[1004] Moreover, in many cases, US Special Force trained Afghan militias were reportedly sent over the border to Pakistan in search of Taliban leaders and members of Al-Qaeda.[1005]

While the foundation of US counterinsurgency strategy has been to develop Afghan government and security forces (the Afghan National Army - ANA and Afghan National Police - ANP) these "self-defense" measures have also led to the creation of various community-based paramilitary police forces.[1006] For example, the Afghan National Auxiliary

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[996] Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 79-80.; HRW, *Just Don't Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the "Afghan Local Police"*, 15-18.
[997] Burris, *Applying Iraq to Afghanistan*.; Yochi Dreazen, *"US to Fund Afghan Militias, Applying Iraq Tactic," The Wall Street Journal* 23 Dec, 2008.; Jon Boone, "US Keeps Secret Anti-Taliban Militia on a Bright Leash," *The Guardian* 8 March, 2010.
[998] See for instance "Tribal Engagement Workshop" *Small Wars Journal.*; Seth G. Jones, *The Strategic Logic of Militia* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012),. Litchfield, *Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas*
[999] Gant, *One Tribe at a Time*, 11.
[1000] Spencer Ackerman, "A CIA COINdinista's Misgivings on Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," *The Washington Independent* 13 May, 2010.
[1001] UPI, "US Funds Sons of Iraq," *UPI* 29 Oct, 2009.
[1002] Seth Jones and Arturo Munoz, *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010).; Jon Boone, "US Pours Millions into Anti-Taliban Militias in Afghanistan," *The Guardian* 22 November, 2009.
[1003] Greg Miller, "CIA Expanding Presence in Afghanistan," *LA Times* 20 Sept, 2009.
[1004] Henriksen, Afghanistan, *Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*
[1005] Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, "US Military Seeks to Expand Raids in Pakistan," *New York Times* 20 Dec, 2010.
[1006] Jones and Munoz, *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces* also see Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*

Police (ANAP) was created in 2006 as a conventional "top-down" paramilitary police force to supplement the ANP. However, according to numerous observers, the program was "used to absorb pre-existing jihadi militias or armed groups," thereby "officializing" existing militias.[1007] Recruits for the ANAP were appointed by tribal leaders and many worked for local warlords.[1008] In this sense, rather than a "regular" state institution, the ANAP incorporated existing "irregular" militia forces in order to enhance the overall counterinsurgency capability.[1009] However, after realizing that many ANAP personnel were closely affiliated with warlords the program was terminated in 2008. Many other similar paramilitary initiatives have also sprung from this self-defense strategy, many of which have been cited by Human Rights Watch for serious violations of human rights against civilians both as part of the counterinsurgency campaign and in criminal activities.[1010] The Afghan Local Police (ALP), for instance, the most recent militia-led police force was created in 2010, with approval from the Karzai government to "secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of insurgent groups."[1011] It relies on civilian recruits vetted by local police and trained by the US Special Operations Forces. By March 2012, the ALP counted 12,600 personnel with plans to expand the counterinsurgency paramilitary force to over 30,000 members.[1012] Initially, the Afghan government was reluctant to mobilize these paramilitary militia forces, for fear of empowering local warlords and undermining state consolidation of power.[1013] But they were incorporated into a government-sanctioned program and have reportedly committed wide-scale human rights abuses in search of suspected insurgents, despite an ostensible defensive capacity.[1014] Support for these forces continues regardless of US military investigations confirming allegations of serious human rights abuses, including extra-judicial executions, torture, rape and theft.[1015]

The logic behind using civilians in such forms of warfare conforms to principles in the US counterinsurgency doctrine. While mobilizing militias is used as a force multiplier to supplement US and Afghan armed forces as well as an intelligence gathering function on the insurgents, it is also meant as a political tool to gain the active support of the local populations. For example, as Seth Jones records, "Gaining the support of the population — especially mobilizing locals to fight insurgents, providing information on their locations and movements, and denying insurgent sanctuary in their areas—is the *sine qua non* of victory in counterinsurgency warfare."[1016] Moreover, a US counterinsurgency manual, released in 2006 summarizing the lessons learnt in the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan up to that point bears the hallmarks of the Cold-War era US doctrines. It cites the importance of constructing local "self-defense units" and "paramilitary forces" as well as mobilizing "friendly guerrilla" armies, in order to extirpate the insurgents from their "underground elements" and civilian

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[1007] HRW, *Just Don't Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the "Afghan Local Police"*, 18-19.; Andrew Wilder, *Cops Or Robbers? the Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police* (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007).

[1008] Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 76.

[1009] Wilder, *Cops Or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police,* 13-14.

[1010] See HRW, *Just Don't Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the "Afghan Local Police",* 22, 22-53.

[1011] President Karzai as cited in Ibid., 53

[1012] Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 37.

[1013] See for instance Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "US Training Afghan Villagers to Fight the Taliban," *The Washington Post* 27 April, 2010.

[1014] HRW, *Just Don't Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the "Afghan Local Police"*

[1015] Ernesto Londono, "U.S. Cites Local Afghan Police Abuses," *Washington Post* 16 Dec, 2011.; Yaroslav Trofimov, "Afghan Militia Wins Uneasy Peace," *The Wall Street Journal* 29 May, 2012.; Dan De Luce, "Pentagon Defends Afghan Local Police Program," *AFP* 14 May, 2012.

[1016] Jones and Munoz, *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces*

support base.[1017] In addition, following the tradition of US counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics, civilians and communities sympathizing with the insurgent cause were the focus of military attention. US commanders, the handbook advises, are meant to pay attention, amongst other factors, to the "adherents to the political philosophy of the insurgent force or to similar philosophies."[1018] In this way the self-defense apparatus is a politico-military tactic to garner support for the incumbent Afghan government and to dissolve the Taliban and other insurgent elements' popular support base. As Douglas Valentine argues, this constitutes an "instrument of unstated statecraft" used ultimately to eradicate the ideological and political movements that threaten US interests.[1019] Plans for the "reintegration" of Afghan warlords and militias into state structures and linking them to the Afghan internal security apparatus represents a deeply political move to consolidate state institutions built around repressing political and social forces considered to threaten the desired stability of a US crafted allied government. Paramilitary forces were also used for other practical purposes as well. One US military report found that militia forces were extremely useful and "led every mounted patrol and most major operations," as "they knew the ground better and could more easily spot something that was out of place or suspicious," making US forces much more effective in their counterinsurgency duties.[1020]

PMCs in Afghanistan: Force Multipliers and Sub-Contracting

Similar to Iraq, PMCs represent an increasingly significant part of a US para-state nexus in Afghanistan. According to statistics compiled for Congress, between 2005 and 2010 the DoD (this does not include contracts by other agencies such as the State Department) spent approximately $33.9 billion on PMC contracts in Afghanistan.[1021] Moreover, between December 2008 and March 2011, the time of the US troop "surge", the number of PMC contractors in Afghanistan increased at a rate of 414%, compared to the 207% increase in US troops. [1022] This put the PMC ratio to US troops around 1 to 1 during the height of US involvement with 99,000 personnel.[1023] It meant also that the US "surge" tactic was predicated primarily on an increase of para-institutional forces, both PMCs and paramilitary groups such as the ALP. By mid-2012 reports emerged that casualties amongst US contractors were higher than that of US troops, another indicator of the extent of PMC presence in Afghanistan relative to "conventional" military structures.[1024]

Although the majority of these contracts went to logistical base support, construction, and security work as part of the overall stabilization agenda, PMCs have also taken on central counterinsurgency roles. In particular, PMCs have been instrumental in training and building up Afghanistan's security forces by advising and mentoring the Ministry of Defense, the ANA, and ANP.[1025] The CIA has also reportedly hired Blackwater and other PMCs for covert operations and central combat roles in counter-terror and counterinsurgency in the early

[1017] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Southern Afghanistan COIN Operations no. 07-6* (Washington D.C.: US Department of the Army, 2006), 29.
[1018] Ibid., 13
[1019] Valentine, *The Pentagons Local Defense Initiatives in Afghanistan: Making Everyone 'Feel Safer'*
[1020] As quoted in Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 77.
[1021] Schwartz and Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis*, Summary and p. 9.
[1022] Ibid.
[1023] Ibid.
[1024] Rod Nordland, "Risks of Afghan War Shift from Soldiers to Contractors," *The New York Times* 11 Feb, 2012.
[1025] See for instance DynCorp International, "DynCorp International Awarded Mentoring and Training Contract in Afghanistan," http://www.dyn-intl.com (accessed 7 July 2012).; Christine Spolar, "DynCorp Wins Contract Dispute Over Afghan Police Training," *Huffington Post* 25 May, 2011.

phases of US intervention.[1026] Although little is known about most of these contracts, several contractors have been found dead including in 2003 two CIA civilian contractors were killed in an ambush whilst tracking Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives.[1027] PMCs also aid in the deployment of drone and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which have become central to US approaches to counterinsurgency and counter-terror in Afghanistan and neighboring areas of Pakistan. For example, the first deployment of the Global Hawk drone system consisted of 56 contract operators out of a team of 82.[1028] Moreover, according to a US Air Force report, the involvement of PMCs in flying drones has "evolved over the years, with contractors now conducting combat-type operations."[1029] Indeed, an investigation of US military documents revealed that "America's growing drone operations rely on hundreds of civilian contractors, including some — such as the SAIC employee — who work in the so-called kill chain before Hellfire missiles are launched," and some contractors have been involved in incidents of civilian deaths from UAV strikes.[1030] Contractors are also often hired to analyze information collected from drones and satellites over Afghanistan, with SAIC winning a $49 million contract for this purpose.[1031] Finally, PMCs have also taken on central roles as body guards for Afghan President Karzai, conduct counter-drug operations, and guard vital roads and other infrastructure.[1032]

The proliferation of PMCs in Afghanistan has also contributed to other complex para-state connections between PMCs and paramilitary militias and warlords. For example, US Senator Carl Levin released an Armed Services Committee report on the role of DoD's contracts in Afghanistan which found that many companies between 2007 and 2009 were sub-contracting to warlords and militia forces.[1033] A US House of Representatives investigation into the DoD's Host Nation Trucking multi-million dollar contract, outsourcing the transportation of a majority of the US military supply lines and the protection of key roads, contained similar findings.[1034] PMC payments to local militias, the reports alleged, helped to strengthen warlords and militia factions and further entrench systems of patronage. In some cases, furthermore, PMCs were paying militias affiliated with the insurgency. The House of Representatives report concluded that "The principal private security subcontractors on the HNT [Host Nation Trucking] contract are warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the Afghan central government for power and authority. Providing "protection" services for the U.S. supply chain empowers these warlords with money, legitimacy, and a *raison d'etre* for their private armies."[1035] As a result of these reports and multiple killings of Afghan civilians by PMCs, president Karzai attempted to ban PMCs from Afghanistan altogether.[1036] However, PMCs have proved to be too integrated into

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[1026] Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army*, 110.; Jeremy Scahill, "Blackwater: CIA Assassins?" *The Nation* 20 Aug, 2009.

[1027] Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 24.

[1028] Michael Guidry and Guy J. Wills, "Future UAV Pilots: Are Contractors the Solution?" *Air Force Journal of Logistics* 28, no. 4 (2004).

[1029] Ibid.

[1030] David Cloud, "Civilian Contractors Playing Key Roles in US Drone Operations," *LA Times* 29 Dec, 2011.

[1031] Ibid.

[1032] Giustozzi, *The Privatizing of War and Security in Afghanistan: Future Or Dead End?*.; Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 23.

[1033] Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, *Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan* (US Senate, 2010).

[1034] Representative John Terney, *Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan* (Washington D.C.: Committee on Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives, 2010).

[1035] Ibid.

[1036] Dexter Filkins and Scott Shane, "Afghan Leader Sees Plan to Ban Private Guards," *The New York Times* 16 Aug, 2010.; Al Jazeera, "Karzai Bans Private Security Firms," *Al Jazeera* 16 Aug, 2010.

US military force projection and capability, and PMCs continue to operate in Afghanistan as do militias and other paramilitary forces as part of the US-led counterinsurgency strategy.

In summary, para-institutional forces have been central to US approaches to counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in Afghanistan. In the application of an "indirect approach" US military engagement has, alongside developing the Afghan internal security apparatus, depended on networks of PMCs and paramilitary militia forces in attempts to eradicate insurgent forces and stabilize the post-Taliban regime. In a similar manner as in Iraq, these parallel forces represent a significant component of a broader para-state nexus in the global projection of US military power. Yet the interaction of US statecraft and the Afghan context has shaped the particular ways in which para-statal mechanisms have been employed. In this case, while warlords and militias were often supported to spearhead campaigns against the insurgency and elements of Al-Qaeda, tribal factions have been incorporated into various "self-defense" initiatives in attempts to replicate the "Sons of Iraq" model. Moreover, US and Afghan planners have had to strike a balance between building a para-state nexus and the empowerment of local power brokers threatening to undermine processes of stabilizing the Afghan state.

Conclusion: The Admission of Essence

This brief analysis has detailed a few examples of a para-state nexus in the "war on terror" towards outlining its evolution as a central facet of US hegemony. The examples of a build-up of a private parallel army of PMCs and paramilitary agents in Iraq elucidate the unprecedented levels of a para-state nexus in US statecraft. While many of the covert paramilitary wars of the Cold War such as unconventional warfare operations in Laos and the counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam were national in scale, the multi-tiered para-institutional system installed in Iraq and Afghanistan, points to a delegation of force unsurpassed previously in the history of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations. Moreover, while these processes are manifest to such a degree within the context of US counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have similarly become central to US military engagements globally. PMCs, for example, have taken on an increasing variety of fundamental military roles in US global military power projection. In order to sustain and preserve the myriad and extended US military relations and engagements across the globe, the US has had to rely on parallel military structures. PMCs and local irregular and paramilitary units are force multipliers, filling in the gaps where required and sometimes undertaking the unconventional sensitive roles the "regular" army is not willing or able to do.

Another related argument of this chapter, and indeed this entire thesis, has been that these para-institutional networks in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare are not new features of US hegemony. They share a longer historical development and evolved over decades of such politico-military engagements. Thus, these twin forms of outsourcing as Greg Grandin suggests were not only a feature of the anti-communist "world historical paramilitary movement" the US helped to foment in Latin America and elsewhere during the Cold War era, but were also applied in the counterinsurgent campaigns much later in Iraq.[1037] "Talk of the "Salvador Option," Grandin says, "is not an indication of the failure of Washington's imperial policy but an admission of its essence."[1038]

[1037] Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, 111.
[1038] Ibid., 235

Chapter 6

Conclusions on the Para-State Nexus: A Systematic Summary and Analysis

Introduction

This thesis has traced the evolution of what I have termed the "para-state nexus". The para-state nexus refers to the variegated ways in which para-institutional forces have bolstered US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare interventions in the global South. Throughout the post-war period, US strategists have delegated coercion and other activities to various parallel military actors, such as militias, semi-official paramilitaries, and private security firms or PMCs. The para-state nexus conceptualizes the multifaceted connections to para-institutional agents and structures augmenting US influence and the prosecution of coercive statecraft abroad. Crucially, the para-state nexus does not describe a standard package or set of practices. It is a pattern of outsourcing and co-optation that emerges within and is applied to local structural, economic and political conditions. It is also dependent on US domestic and international policy contexts. The examples elaborated on throughout the core three chapters on the historical evolution of this para-state nexus have helped to clarify this concept and highlight the extent to which US hegemony has been constituted by parallel military actors outside the conventional military chains of command. The driving force behind much of this analysis has been the continuity of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in US foreign policy towards the South. The overlapping connections between public/state and private/non-state forces and their combination in the execution of politico-military strategies has been a central feature of US Open Door grand strategy throughout the post-war period towards much of the global South in countries threatened by internal "subversion" and instabilities.

Yet, this broader continuity has by no means been immune from change. Para-extensional means of projecting US military power have been increasingly integrated into US military practices. For instance, the failed Bay of Pigs operation mobilized a cohort of Cuban paramilitary actors and leveraged private companies affiliated with the CIA to mount an invasion of Cuba with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the Castro regime in a manner intended to completely obscure US complicity. The interventionist US hand had been hidden from view until all appeals to deniability had been rendered implausible following the failure of the operation.[1039] Similar covert operations which depended entirely on para-institutional linkages were conducted in Guatemala, Tibet, Laos, amongst other places. In contrast, PMCs operated at almost every level of counterinsurgency efforts in logistical roles as well as training, flying helicopters, interrogations, infrastructure security, and sometimes combat operations in US engagements in Iraq (2003-present) and Afghanistan (2001-present).[1040] Moreover, counterinsurgency efforts have been amplified by paramilitary assets and militia forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan and US military strategists openly refer to surrogate warfare, "indirect" methods, and contemplate duplicating a "Salvador option."[1041] This is not

[1039] Jones, *The Bay of Pigs.*; Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Bay of Pigs* Cullather, *Secret History : The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*
[1040] See Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*
[1041] See for instance Newton, *The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare*, 1-19.; Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach Report 10-3*; Hirsh and Barry, *"The Salvador Option": The Pentagon may Put Special Forces-Led Assassination or Kidnapping Teams in Iraq*

to suggest, however, that covert operations no longer rely on clandestine public-private partnerships. They do. It is rather to show how this para-state nexus in general has moved to the forefront of the conduct of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies. While this para-state nexus has been a continuous feature of US hegemony through its counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare promotions of "stability", it has evolved and developed from its Cold War manifestations. Rather than simply a tool of covert action, it has become integral to US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare global projection of military power.

Consistent with the expansion of this nexus, there has been a gradual increase in the scope to which the US has leveraged such para-extensional forces. A systematic quantitative analysis is hampered by the secretive nature of contracts and the ways in which paramilitary assets are mobilized. Yet, anecdotal evidence points to this amplification. At the height of US intervention in Vietnam, for example, US troop numbers on the ground reached an estimated 536,000 in 1968.[1042] At this same time, estimates put the number of civilian contractors that accompanied US troops between 9,000 and 50,000.[1043] The US was also supporting an estimated 34,300 CIDG, 18,200 regional mercenary forces, and about 5,700 mobile strike teams (hunter killers) in 1968.[1044] However, in Iraq, estimates of the number of troops at the peak of US involvement revolve around 140,000 in 2008.[1045] This has included, though, a slightly higher number of PMC personnel under contract with US government agencies,[1046] over 100,000 paid Sons of Iraq militia,[1047] and thousands of other counterinsurgency or pro-US paramilitaries.[1048] Similarly, while in 1975 Vinnell won the first contract to train a foreign nation's military, outsourcing training programs including those in counterinsurgency and related arts of foreign internal defense to foreign countries is now a common feature of US military assistance.[1049] Although such crude comparisons can be problematic owing to the marked differences in the cases and their context, they serve as an indication of the increased use of para-institutional mechanisms in general.

In this regard, this thesis has described a para-statal model of US hegemony. In so doing, it has made the case for a conceptualization of a nexus between US counterinsurgency strategies and various parainstitutional actors. Rather than solely analyzing the multiple direct linkages between the US state and para-statal groups, it has provided a structural account of the emergence and incorporation of these agents as part of US irregular warfare activities. First, the US managerial role in the international system has conditioned its increasing reliance on such forces. The US has continued to rely on coercive methods to deter internal

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[1042] "Vietnam War: Allied Troop Levels 1960-73," http://www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwatl.htm (accessed 25 June, 2012).; "Vietnam War Statistics and Exclusive Photos," *Veteran's Hour*, http://www.veteranshour.com/vietnam_war_statistics.htm (accessed 25 June, 2012).

[1043] Dickinson asserts that US documents count around 9000 contractors Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 24. Whereas a US military report by Heister puts this figure at 50,000 including all contracts for logistics and construction. Heister Jr., *Lieutenant General Joseph, Logistic Support*, 88.

[1044] See graph on Dunigan and Nofi, *Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War*, 182.

[1045] Amy Belasco, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues* (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf. (accessed 12 July 2012)

[1046] Schwartz and Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis* also see Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*

[1047] SIGIR, *Sons of Iraq Program: Results are Uncertain and Financial Controls are Weak*

[1048] See Peter Mass, "The Salvadorization of Iraq?" *The New York Times Magazine* (May, 2005), http://www.petermaass.com/articles/the_salvadorization_of_iraq/ (accessed 12 October 2010).; Chatterjee, *The Boys from Baghdad: Iraqi Commandos Trained by US Contractor*; Fuller, *For Iraq, "The Salvador Option" Becomes a Reality*

[1049] See Lumpe, *US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*.; Stoker, *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007*

opposition to the required state arrangements and parameters for capitalist development and the free-flow of resources and goods as part of a larger Open Door grad strategy. But it is precisely this global hegemonic role in which the US is the ultimate guarantor underwriting the functioning of this global capitalist system that has given rise to such para-statal connections, as US planners and military strategists seek to find ways to limit US direct involvement in bloody, costly and protracted wars abroad. Second, I have argued that local contexts have shaped the specific ways in which these para-statal connections emerge and evolve. Rather than solely international dynamics, domestic contexts in the countries in the global South, such as colonial legacies, socio-economic inequalities and class hierarchies, amongst others have moulded these para-statal relations between local agents and counterinsurgent politics. These interconnected dimensions constitute the basis for this para-statal model of US hegemony. Para-institutional agents intermingle in a patchwork of links with state agencies in the maintenance of US hegemony. The US hegemonic role in the international system by underwriting the stability of "friendly" regimes and integrating them into a liberalized global order (counterinsurgency) or eroding the power of "unfriendly" governments (unconventional warfare) has been forged and supported by a myriad of para-institutional agents and assets. This functions as a para-extensional mechanism of US hegemonic relations with partner states and their "official" armed forces. The coercive component of US hegemony is often (but not always) dependent on collaborations with "irregular" military actors that parallel and or mirror their "regular" counterparts.

For example, as analyzed in chapters three and four, the Colombian state, with the aid of military assistance and training from the US, has become increasingly paramilitiarized with the escalation of its internal conflict against leftist insurgencies. In this regard, Jasmin Hristov describes a "para-statal model" of the Colombian state in which paramilitary forces have become an important and instrumental component of the Colombian state's counterinsurgency drive. Hristov details how on the one hand paramilitarism in Colombia is a direct consequence of state policy, both through the direct support and paramilitary infrastructure it has provided alongside the impunity they have been granted. On the other hand, the paramilitarization of Colombia, Hristov argues, can be "conceptualized as a socialization of the networks of terror, as more and more civilians are drawn into it."[1050] Principally, in this case, paramilitary networks are not a force entirely and artificially created by the Colombian state, or through US counterinsurgency support, but rather are the result of intersecting and complex political and economic dynamics of the integration of Colombian society into the global capitalist system. Paramilitary violence in Colombia is essentially an articulation of class warfare, which is then buttressed or supported by the state and its US military benefactors, for the purposes of protecting and further constructing a capitalist stability. This is similar to the US para-state nexus in that while the US has directly used and benefited from various para-institutional phenomena in support of its counterinsurgency and regime change policies, the emergence of these phenomena themselves and the ways in which they have been used to effect, are part and parcel of the managerial role the US plays in destroying forces that threaten the stability of capitalist structures in allied periphery states. While Hristov's para-statal model of the Colombian coercive apparatus is internally oriented, the para-state nexus is a facet of US foreign policy. These practices as embodied in the US para-state nexus have been a product for export.

This para-statal model of US hegemony provides an alternative and more inclusive conception of US statecraft, as it functions within the remit of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. First, it allows for a more expansive understanding of the way US

[1050] Hristov, *Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia*, 202.

hegemonic power is articulated militarily across various parts of the globe. It accounts for the multifarious para-state connections that arise in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare arrangements, rather than simply the relations between states. It also, in this manner, provides a conception of the sources of outsourcing in US foreign policy as inextricably bound to the structural imperatives to guarantee the fluid functioning of political and economic arrangements conducive to US interests and those of the wider global capitalist system. In this case, it has argued for an alternative explanation of the rise of outsourcing based on dynamics in US policy rather than those arising through processes extraneous to it. In so doing, secondly, it also presents a longer historical account of the use of PMCs, paramilitaries, and militias in US foreign policy than is commonly depicted in the existing literature on these subjects. Rather than a feature of the post-Cold War period, the US has long had a propensity towards creating para-statal connections and/or public-private partnerships in the conduct of its hegemonic Open Door strategies in the global South. Moreover, while covert activity has been an important facet of these privatized arrangements, it is not the only source from which outsourcing has grown. Finally, it provides a more inclusive conception of outsourcing. Rather than just an examination of PMCs, this thesis has argued that the delegation of force to paramilitary groups, militias, mercenaries, and other "irregular" fighters is also an important element of sub-contracting practices, and that these diverse actors share similar historical origins in US foreign policy.

Why the Para-State Nexus and its Consolidation in US Foreign Policy?

Threaded throughout this analysis, this thesis has also identified a variety of reasons *why* this para-state nexus has formed a central plank in US foreign policy towards the global South. Indeed, this has been the central focus of this dissertation and the research question that animated it. This is a pertinent question given the relative military strength of the US vis-à-vis its closest allies and rivals, particularly in the post-Cold War period. Why has this para-state nexus been a central feature of US power projection when it has the world's most sophisticated and powerful military? What dynamics, both domestic and international, have helped to shape these para-institutional phenomena as a component of the US coercive apparatus? This section reiterates these conclusions in a systematic manner. It identifies three levels of analysis that when taken together can better explain this para-state nexus and the propensity towards in US foreign policy to outsource military activities.

US Foreign Policy and the Sources of the Para-State Nexus

The specific conceptualization of US foreign policy and the role that counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare play in it as articulated in chapter two, serves not only as a lens through which to understand US foreign policy but it also provides a macro-level explanation for the para-state nexus. This background understanding of US post-war Open Door strategy situates the para-state nexus within the context of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare and the purposes of and underlying objectives behind these forms of statecraft. Crucially, this conceptualization of US foreign policy also helps to explain the continuity of the para-state nexus as a central feature of US grand strategy throughout the post-war era.

Furthermore, the entrenchment of a para-state nexus can be partially explained in relation to these continuities in US foreign policy and its uni-polar power position after the Cold War. As demonstrated in the literature on the causes of the rise of the global PMC industry, the decrease in the number of US troops in the immediate post-Cold War period was coupled with an increase in various other destabilizing forces in much of the global South and demand for military services and training. This only served to exacerbate already existing

problems of overstretch of US military resources. This has been a particularly acute problem in the "war on terror" with US military involvement in two simultaneous wars and a vast array of military relations with other countries of the world. Thus there is a growing tension between the US capability and willingness, as the primary guarantor of the flourishing of a global capitalist system, to apply or use US military power directly for the stabilization of countries facing internal unrest. Due to a combination of domestic and international factors which are elaborated on further below, the US is unable and unwilling to engage in extensive and protracted militarized interventions and instead is able to call upon or rely on parallel or para-institutional forces. The para-state nexus and the use of proxy parallel armed groups such as PMCs and paramilitaries help to serve as force-multipliers and "fill in the gaps". Simply put, the US is unable to police the "free world" and the international system alone. It has had to rely on para-statal arrangements in order to pursue its global interests and commitments whilst preserving its prominent military position and hegemony underpinning the current global liberal economic order. Without these para-institutional connections and public-private partnerships, the US would be unable to sustain its global military presence. This is significant and points to broader configurations of global governance mirroring those of previous imperial powers in which indigenous forces bore the brunt of imperial policing.[1051]

The entrenchment of the para-state nexus is therefore also part of broader dynamics in US foreign policy. It runs parallel to other developments in the projection of US military power designed to distance the US from its interventionist strategies. While US planners and policymakers have continually asserted their commitment to upholding a dominant managerial role in the international system, there are limitations to military intervention, operations, and assistance. According to Martin Shaw, for example, Western countries have been increasingly sensitive to restraints imposed on their ability to wage war. Lack of domestic political support for intervention, media exposure, and norms of international conduct, amongst other factors have produced a way of war predicated on avoiding the risks associated with its conduct, such as domestic political backlash against troop casualties (body bag syndrome). This risk-averse way of war, he argues, includes the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) and the use of drones and other advanced machinery, massive airpower, and in many situations, forging local alliances.[1052] Thus the para-state must not be seen in isolation from other trends in US foreign policy, but rather one result of a horizontal escalation of hegemonic commitments.

Paramilitaries and the Logic of Violence in Irregular War

Another component of this analysis, explained in chapter three, included how the nature of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare as coercive politico-military strategies with political objectives at their core can, in part, dictate the development of para-statal arrangements. Given the political objectives that underpin counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies, local agents play an indispensable role. Paramilitary forces and irregular armed actors not only provide local knowledge, help solve the "identification problem", and potentially afford the US and the host government plausible denial, but they also are central to the creation of consent and active collaboration with the host government. In other words, they not only often have strategic advantages over official armed forces, but

[1051] See for instance Tarak Barkawi, "State and Armed Force in International Context," in *Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires*, eds. A. Colas and B. Mabee (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), 33-54.
[1052] Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer and its Crisis in Iraq* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 71, 81.

they have a specific political utility.[1053] This is particularly the case with paramilitary or militia forces in counterinsurgent settings. Kalyvas has identified this political facet of paramilitarism or the use of militias and its possible impact on the course of internal political dynamics and support for the host government. He notes how "militias are primarily a political rather than a military institution" that not only help in the counterinsurgent effort by providing intelligence, amongst other tasks, but are "part of local rule and state building."[1054] Similarly, arming and mobilizing civilians to support the counterinsurgent cause has long been identified in US counterinsurgent training manuals as a way to manipulate the political preferences of the local populations. By creating paramilitary structures out of civilian populations, it polarizes local political positions and viewpoints, and if successful, removes the support base of oppositional social and political movements. Paramilitarism is a tactic consistent with the logic of "counter-organization" envisaged in US Cold War-era counterinsurgent instructional handbooks as a way to politically and militarily organize the general population against the insurgents and their political agenda and ideology.[1055] Paramilitarism is more than just a tactic or strategy as part of the military defeat of guerrilla forces, but has to do with the political nature of the objectives that lie at the heart of counterinsurgency.

The application of the Sons of Iraq paramilitary program serves as an example of this aspect of paramilitarism. As highlighted in chapter five, the Sons of Iraq constituted an attempt to harness the political and military power of local Sunni tribal groups that had defected from the insurgency. However, as US Army personnel Smith and Macfarland describe, US efforts to mobilize the Sons of Iraq paramilitaries and garner support for the counterinsurgent cause was lubricated by folding the insurgency in on itself by polarizing support into binomial oppositions, helping to fabricate support for the counterinsurgent cause. They detail how at the early stages of the "awakening" in the Anbar province, tribal leaders were "either openly supporting the Awakening or withdrawing their support from [the insurgency]," and many Sunni tribes began a "campaign of eradication and retaliation against [insurgent] members living among them."[1056] Interviews of Sunni civilians, tribal leaders, and Iraqi military and government personnel involved in the Sunni awakening and the ancillary Sons of Iraq program retell how the political and/or ideological sympathies of local residents could determine their fate as an insurgent or as a counterinsurgent.[1057] In other words, the way this paramilitary program was able to forge political loyalties and help turn certain members of the insurgency against remaining insurgents (against each other) is indicative of the underlying political nature of irregular war and how paramilitary forces can play a constituting role in the creation of legitimacy and consent for the counterinsurgent cause.

Historical Factors in the Evolution and Entrenchment of the Para-State Nexus

This thesis has highlighted a number of key moments and trends that have influenced the evolution of a para-state nexus within the Open Door strategy as set out above. It might be said that although PMCs, paramilitaries, and other irregular forces share a shared history

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[1053] See Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 reprinted 2009), 106-110.

[1054] Ibid., 107

[1055] McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 -1990*, 217-218, 253-257.

[1056] Neil Smith and Sean Macfarland, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," *Military Review* (March-April, 2008).

[1057] See Colonel Gary Montgomery and T. CWT McWilliams, eds., *Al Anbar Awakening: Iraqi Perspectives*, Vol. II (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 51, 139, 197, 199, 206, 215, http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/Documents/historical/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolII.pdf.

in US foreign policy, different elements of the para-state nexus have separate strands of historical development. Moreover, these constitutional factors in the para-state nexus represent overlapping dynamics in US foreign policy that have waxed and waned in importance over time and within certain contexts. So for instance, while the pressures associated with the "Vietnam syndrome" might have played a role in the instrumentalization of PMCs in Colombia during the 1990s and 2000s, they may have been less important in determining the role of PMCs elsewhere, depending on the circumstantial exigencies of particular issues of internal defense. These historical trends and key moments have molded and shaped the propensity to sub-contract force, but may not have directly determined the course or scope of outsourcing within a particular situation.

Early Cold War imperatives to contain communism in "friendly" countries without engaging the USSR in major war has long been acknowledged as a source of proxy warfare and ancillary forms of limited intervention during this time.[1058] In particular, as seen with the case of the Bay of Pigs example, as well as the history of the formation of semi-private military aero-operators such as CAT, covert operators in the form of parallel armed actors were indispensable in early Cold War engagements which strived to conceal US complicity. In this case, as highlighted in chapter three, the Kennedy administration even had direct contact with Soviet diplomats in attempts to divert a major war once US sponsorship was revealed. The use of covert proxy forms of war, especially in the early stages of the Cold War, represented a means by which US policymakers could avoid major conflict with the USSR. Similarly, Kennedy's 1961 *Overseas Internal Defense Policy*, underscored the importance of indirect assistance and paramilitary action to not only avoid complications with its super-power rival, but to mitigate charges of colonial intervention that would run contrary to liberal American values.[1059]

The Vietnam War represented a turning point in the evolution of the para-state nexus. As demonstrated in chapter three, US agencies sub-contracted out a significant portion of US counterinsurgency efforts to both paramilitary and mercenary style forces as well as private companies during the war. These experiences in Vietnam led to the creation of institutionalized mechanisms for privatization of military activities to PMCs, such as LOGCAP in 1985, as US commanders considered it an effective way to multiply US power. However, it was the subsequent impact of the Vietnam War, derived from substantial domestic and international opposition to it that held significant influence on the continuation and entrenchment of a para-state nexus. The "Vietnam syndrome" was a major constitutional factor in seeking alternative forms of conducting unconventional war.[1060] Despite George Bush declaring triumphantly in 1991 after the US withdrawal from Iraq and Kuwait "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome," the reluctance of the American public to support protracted and possibly unwinnable wars continues to impact policy makers in Washington.[1061] This, and an ancillary "body-bag syndrome", has helped form the outsourced ways through which the US has projected its military power abroad in the remit of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.

[1058] See Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*, 26.
[1059] U.S Office of the President, *United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy*
[1060] Ian Roxborough, "The Ghost of Vietnam: America Confronts the New World Disorder," in *Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation*, eds. Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[1061] Marvin Kalb and Deborah Kalb, *Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011). This is also quite evident in descriptions of US military decisions in Woodward, *Obama's Wars*

Moreover, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress enacted legislation curbing Executive power and increasing Congressional oversight, including human rights conditions on military assistance. Some of these restrictions, conditions, and mechanisms of oversight have been established as permanent features of US military assistance and conduct abroad, such as the Hughs-Ryan act or Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, and then much later the enactment of the Leahy Laws on US military training.[1062] Others have been imposed in case by case basis, curtailing the use of official US force or creating conditions in specific circumstances, such as the numerous conditions placed on military assistance to Colombia.[1063] Delegating military tasks to "private" entities and forces not officially affiliated with US agencies offered a way to circumvent these "limitations". According to Hughes, this was an explicit motivation in outsourcing covert wars to para-statal groups such as the Contras in the 1980s.[1064] The imposition of the Boland Amendment of December 1982 (passed 1984) obstructing direct sponsorship of the Contras, for instance, was a factor that drove the increasing privatized nature of US support. Moreover, after the Iran-Contra scandal, Congress imposed further limitations on covert warfare in the form of the Intelligence Authorization Act in 1990, which required a presidential statement justifying covert operations. This has been a further influence in reinforcing outsourced mechanisms to conduct such missions, outside of legislative obstruction.[1065] Other examples of the private alternative avenue for avoiding restrictive legislation and oversight included privatizing training to Colombian forces and those of Equatorial Guinea.[1066] Direct US assistance to Equatorial Guinea in 2005-2006 would have attracted substantial criticism, not to mention the human rights restrictions, such as the Leahy Laws, that would have most likely prevented or limited assistance to this country. These private arrangements, coordinated with the US, not only circumvented Congressional checks and oversight, including the application of the Leahy Laws, but also avoided the political costs of supporting a regime with poor human rights records. However, this does not necessarily need to involve direct and intentional circumvention of particular laws, but rather a trend through which to avoid red-tape entanglements and breaking free of bureaucratic restraints in general. For example, according to one report compiled by a conglomeration of human rights organizations, due to the "impractical" and "burdensome" restrictions and reporting requirements that Congress had compiled on security assistance through the Foreign Assistance Act, the US Executive has increasingly sought to administer and fund military assistance through the Department of Defense and private companies, thereby avoiding the traditional avenues of military assistance.[1067]

Another key trend in the evolution of the para-state nexus identified in this thesis is the ideology of the efficiency of the market which became particularly strong during the 1980s and Reagan's presidency. As described elsewhere in the literature on PMCs, neo-liberal ideals about the efficiency of the privatization of government functions went hand in

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[1062] Apodaca, *Understanding US Human Rights Policy*.; David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal," *American Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 4 (November, 1987): 1002-1018.; Stephen Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices," *The American Journal of International Law* 76, no. 2 (April, 1982).; Julie Mertus, *Bait and Switch: Human Rights and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2004).
[1063] Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America*.; Cohen, *Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices*
[1064] Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics*, 22-23.
[1065] Ibid., 23
[1066] Human Rights Watch, *Well Oiled Oil and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea*, 83.
[1067] George Withers and others, *Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy*, (2008).

hand with the increase of a PMC market.[1068] In this case, the growth of the PMC industry has been consistent with broader trends towards the privatization of government services. A series of developments consistent with the privatization trend continued much after the end of the Cold War to contribute to the rise of the PMC industry and the propensity of various agencies of the US government to privatize many of their military tasks. As covered in chapter five, Rumsfled's efforts to streamline the DoD not only included outsourcing functions within it, but also components of military engagements abroad as well.[1069]

Strategic Rationales

A number of strategic and policy rationales have also been identified in this thesis in explaining this para-state nexus. However, while the following factors play a role in the making of decisions within the immediate counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare setting, they are in this sense insufficient by themselves in explaining the para-state nexus or its continuity. These policy rationales do not occur outside of the enabling structures and broader historical processes which were described throughout this thesis. Anecdotal evidence in US reports suggest that policy makers understand that hiring paramilitary forces or mobilizing guerrilla armies to work towards their cause is much cheaper than using large contingencies of US troops.[1070] Similarly, PMCs are commonly understood to offer cheaper services than the military itself is able to by saving in long-term overhead costs. Whether or not this is actually the case is contentious and a source of controversy amongst specialists on the subject.[1071] Regardless, this is a belief prevalent amongst military strategists. According to US officials, for example, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would not have been possible without contractors due to the prohibitive cost and strain on resources of sending US troops.[1072] Other similar explanations of the efficiency of PMCs, paramilitaries and other third non-state agents, include that they are faster to deploy, they are flexible and have the desired expertise. Paramilitary groups, for instance, are often already trained (or do not require much training as an unofficial force) and reside within or near the area of operation and hence are much faster to deploy than using US military personnel. Moreover, familiarity of the terrain, culture, language, and local inhabitants is proffered as an explicit reason in US training manuals for creating paramilitary groups as force multipliers and intelligence gatherers in both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare missions. Lastly, as is argued elsewhere and demonstrated throughout this thesis, para-extensional forms of engagement often provide the plausible deniability policy makers desire and aid in distancing the US from interventionist charges.[1073] Thus there exists a variety of strategic rationales behind the delegation of force to para-institutional agents.[1074]

[1068] See for instance Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security,* 35.; See also Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies,* 96. Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security,* 120-122.
[1069] See Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy*, 23-26, 86-87. See also Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds most Powerful Mercenary Army*, 50. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress,* 30.; Dickinson, *Outsourcing War and Peace*, 32.
[1070] See for instance Best and Feickert, *Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress.*; Helms as cited in Leary, *CIA Air Operations in Laos 1955-1974*
[1071] See Isenberg, *Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq*, 22.
[1072] Schwartz, *The Department of Defense's use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress*, 5.
[1073] See for example, Jamieson and McEvoy, *State Crime by Proxy and Judicial Othering,* 514.; McCallion, *War for Sale! Battelfield Contractors in Latin America & the 'Corporatization' of America's War on Drugs*, 341.; Gross, *Different Worlds: Unacknowledged Special Operations and Covert Action*
[1074] For more on the possible rationales and consequences of proxy warfare see Hughes, *My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics,* 38-61.

Concluding Remarks

The concept of the para-state nexus entails the intersection of disparate but related processes occurring in US foreign policy and within many countries in the global South. By framing the para-state nexus in relation to the interaction between US Open Door counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies and dimensions of capitalist globalization in the South, this analysis has weaved together the historical development of a variety of separate para-institutional forces in different contexts as instruments of US policy. Ultimately, it has only touched on the diverse political, economic, and social dynamics as the enabling global and localized structures that have conditioned the rise of such actors.[1075] However, the para-state nexus, as a feature of US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare modes of statecraft towards the South, must be understood in relation to creating and preserving liberalized state formations conducive to the interests of the US and other core capitalist powers. This forms part of a larger context of elite hierarchies of power and inequalities of wealth within countries in the South as well as between the core and periphery. In this way, the para-state nexus is embedded in structural relations of the current global order and inextricably linked to processes of globalization. It forms part of a set of politico-military strategies connected to elite power centers in the South with the US at its apex designed to stabilize particular liberalized state arrangements against calls for inimical political and economic change from "below".

This has had a significant impact on the course of development in the global South. At the core of the US Open Door strategy has been an enduring commitment to containing the political and social forces that represent a challenge to the liberalized global order. US counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare modes of statecraft and the para-state networks that have accompanied them have been geared primarily towards deterring social and political movements, both armed and unarmed, within countries in the global South that threaten to bring them out of US orbit and close their markets and resources to the global economy. In effect, the para-state nexus has been paramount in the politics of alternative futures in which these coercive partnerships have aided in the silencing of other possible developmental pathways deemed to threaten US interests. In this manner, a para-state nexus has been instrumental in shaping specific state arrangements and consolidating class configurations in countries in the global South threatened by internal "destabilizing" forces. As examined in several parts of this dissertation, these processes have often culminated in the propagation of state terror, insulating pro-US elites from internal opposition and deterring political and social movements deemed inimical to the desired developmental pathways. The use of coercion, facilitated by US counterinsurgency assistance and support and the creation of military relations embodied in the para-state nexus have played an important role in the politics and development of many countries in the global South. By extension, the para-state nexus has been central to hardwiring the political economies in the South to the circuitry of global capital. By forming as a coercive bedrock under which perceived threats to the interests of the US and global capital are countered, the para-state nexus has aided in the creation of stable investment climates in the South and underpinned the fluid functioning of the global economy.

This is not to argue that the US has been the only driver behind these processes or that localized dynamics have not influenced the way these dynamics have unfolded. Indeed, a theme elaborated on throughout this dissertation has been how local forces such as elite power centers, local tribal groups, or warlords and strongmen have very often shaped a nexus

[1075] See for example Barkawi, *State and Armed Force in International Context*, 53. For similar dynamics in civil war to emphasize the similarities between civil wars and these forms of proxy engagement see Christopher Cramer, *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 202-219.

between the US and para-institutional actors. In this way, the para-state nexus functions like a bespoke set of relations emerging within and applied to local contexts in the conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter two, while the US has held a dominant position in the international system, it is not the only player in these core-periphery relations. Other countries, such as the UK, have held similar influence over the course of the global politics in the post-war period, albeit to a lesser extent. There are also signs that China, in its rapid industrialization and development, is increasingly becoming a player in these global games of access to markets and resources.[1076] Lastly, although US military presence and its assistance programs to allied states reach around the world, US power is not omnipotent. There are significant limitations to US power, and coercive interventions are not always successful (such as in Bay of Pigs, as just one example). In relation to this, the mobilization of such para-institutional forces can also backfire. First, the US does not necessarily have control over local paramilitary forces, warlords, and tribal forces, which are often operating for their own benefit. For example, as Dan Cooley and others have argued, US support for Mujahedeen and other anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan has caused significant blowback, serving as the background for the emergence of radical Islamist terrorist groups.[1077] Similarly, as alluded to in chapter five, local alliances with Sunni tribal forces in Iraq crumbled and many tribal militia members reverted back to the insurgency. In Afghanistan, the paramilitary option has often resulted in the empowerment of warlords and strongmen, fragmenting state power in unintentional ways. Moreover, the state terror and other forms of violent repression that intense counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare campaigns can often result in generate negative publicity for the US as a liberal democratic state officially committed to internationally recognized norms and human rights conventions. As such, the practice of delegating force and other military responsibilities to para-institutional actors is not necessarily always a successful strategy. Yet, despite these offsets and limitations, para-statal networks in US statecraft have been central to processes of state formation in many countries in the South and by extension to sustaining a US-led global order.

It is hoped that this cursory analysis of a para-state nexus can serve as modest platform from which to conduct further research into the intersection of public/state and private/non-state forces on both local and international levels in US foreign policy. First, there is substantial scope for detailed single-case studies of para-statal networks in US interventions and counterinsurgency support. This analysis has favored a broad historical overview of para-statal networks in a variety of locations across time. While this has provided insight into a para-state nexus and its evolution, detailed studies of such relationships would provide a more in-depth understanding of these practices in US foreign policy and the enabling internal and international dynamics that condition the possibilities for a para-state nexus. For example, this analysis has built on the many existing studies that examine the interaction between para-institutional forces in various countries, such as Colombia, Guatemala, Vietnam and the Philippines, to name a few, and US foreign policy. Much less has been done up to this point, however, on the importance of para-statal networks in Iraq during and after the 2003 invasion in order to better contextualize the para-state nexus within local and international political economic dynamics.

Second, in analyzing political economic relations between core and periphery, this thesis has highlighted the ways the para-state nexus affords the US a greater ability to project its power and preserve a hegemonic role in the international system. Much more might be

[1076] See for example Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Baltimore: Brookings Institutional Press, 2008).
[1077] Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism.*; Coll, *Ghost Wars*

said, however, about how these dynamics have impacted domestic US political military arrangements. The use of alternate means to extend US coercive capabilities, through PMCs and indigenous armies, has helped to make US hegemony possible by reducing the demands made on domestic populations and the requirement for public approval for coercive intervention. For instance, US intervention into Vietnam drew heavily on US civil populations, most notably in the form of a draft, which was ultimately rejected by mass-protest and resistance, and led to the abandonment of conscription. The interventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq in contrast, avoided such civil-military tensions by relying to a greater extent on parallel military forces. In other words, a possible research focus opens in examining how a para-state nexus might have aided in enabling the possibilities for a continuing militarized Open Door strategy without, necessarily, the need for domestic approval. This might have implications for the democratic application of military power abroad. Rather than just having a powerful constitutive presence on processes of stabilizing certain state arrangements in the South, there is a possibility to examine the domestic political military dimensions of a para-state nexus in the US.

Another research agenda emerges in analyzing the increasingly privatized nature through which these same processes of globalization might be occurring relatively independent from state power. The analysis in this dissertation points to broader dynamics taking place in global governance, and the concept of the para-state nexus has a number of possible implications for academics studying such diffusions of power. This dissertation has examined different para-statal networks which reside in the realm of state relations with non-state military actors as well as in the context of the US as one of the primary drivers of a liberal global order. However, many of these processes within unstable areas seem to be taking an increasingly autonomous nature. For example, some authors have already considered the ways MNCs themselves can operate as agents of counterinsurgency in internal conflicts in a variety of different ways.[1078] This has the effect of broadening systems of governance in which MNCs, operating independently of the state, can participate in the stabilization of certain areas, and in preserving specific socio-economic relations. Similarly, many researchers have already noted the ways MNCs operating within zones of intense political contestation and unstable internal conflict environments have opted to rely on PMCs and indigenous militias and security details rather than the military and security forces of the countries they operate in.[1079] In this capacity PMCs have been labeled "investment enablers" in protecting the assets and operations of MNCs, aiding in the creation of pockets of stability in which business and resource extraction can continue unhindered by local political volatilities. This might be viewed in relation to larger networks of global governance and the nexus between security and development.[1080] There is scope in this case to further analyze such para-statal networks as enabled by and in the production of processes of globalization more generally.

Finally, these developments also have implications for scholars studying "private" applications of violence in the context of foreign policy objectives. The diffusion between "public" and "private" inherent in the processes described in this analysis of the para-state

[1078] William Rosenau and others, *Corporations and Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009).
[1079] Abrahamsen and Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics*; Madelaine Drohan, *Making a Killing: How and Why Corporations use Armed Force to do Business* (Guilford, CT: First Lyons Press, 2004).; David Frances, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Secuirty of International Exploitation?" *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (1999).
[1080] See for instance Abrahamsen and Williams, *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International* Politics; Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

nexus has led leading commentators such as P.W. Singer to acknowledge that the "public-private dichotomy in the art of war, which was once solidly fixed, is now under siege."[1081] Indeed, the evolution and recent intensification of a para-state nexus in US foreign policy points to an increasingly blurry distinction between "public" and "private" in the conduct of US statecraft towards the global South. The pseudo-"private" aero-companies of the Cold War, for example, were precursors to the privatized military industry that the US military depends on today, in an increasing fluid relationship between the organs of the US and a myriad of actors in the "private" sphere. In this respect, ultimately, the para-state nexus does not signify an erosion of the US state's ability to project its influence abroad, but rather its intensification within a gradual transformation of the location and organization of force globally.

In this way, there may be a need to re-conceptualize the shifting spheres between "public" and "private" in International Relations more broadly. As Patricia Owens observes, most analysts in International Relations start from the Eurocentric assumption of the state as conforming to the Weberian principles of having a monopoly over violence, and thus a sharp distinction between the "public" and "private".[1082] Yet Owens and others have questioned these analytical and ideological distinctions in relation to the use of force.[1083] In this regard, this dissertation makes a modest contribution towards capturing the "emergence of transnational 'public-private partnerships', a hybrid form of global governance," in which the mobilization of foreign populations and the employment of PMCs against insurgencies and other movements that the US sees as detrimental to its political and economic interests is crucial to its ability to serve as a global hegemon.[1084] Although it has been asserted that "private" forces serve as a para-extension of the US military (thus largely working under the foundational assumptions of a "public" -"private" distinction), this analysis of the para-state nexus points to a need to better conceptualize the myriad and complex relations that help constitute the contemporary global order. As Barkawi argues, "These political-military and security relations fall outside of the kinds of approaches and questions found in security studies and IR. The model of the sovereign nation-state turns out to be a poor guide to the organization of military power for much of world politics." [1085] In this sense, the para-state nexus should be viewed in the context of shifting patterns in relations of power between the "public" and "private" within processes of capitalist globalization.

In conclusion, the nexus between the US and various para-institutional forces is not set to dissipate in the immediate future. According to US military forecasts on the impending importance of "surrogate warfare" in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations, "The future will demand perhaps unprecedented U.S. reliance on the participation of indigenous forces in their military operations."[1086] Similarly, analysts tend to agree that PMCs will continue to play an increasingly crucial role in the projection of US military

[1081] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 8.
[1082] Patricia Owens, "Distinctions, Distinctions: 'Pubic' and 'Private' Force?" in *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Bandits,* eds. Alejandro Colas and Bryan Mabee (London: Hurst and Co., 2010).
[1083] Ibid.; Barkawi, *State and Armed Force in International Context*, 33-54.; Jose Gomez Del Prado, "The Elusive Distinction between Public/Private Security," in *Mercenarios y Companias Militares y De Seguridad Privadas: Dinamicas y Retos Para America Latina*, ed. Antoine Perret (Bogota: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2010), 47-101.; Anna Leander, "Risk and the Fabrication of Apolitical, Unaccountable Military Markets: The Case of the CIA 'Killing Program'," *Review of International Studies* 37 (2011): 2253-2268.
[1084] Owens, *Distinctions, Distinctions: 'Pubic' and 'Private' Force?*, 24.
[1085] Barkawi, *State and Armed Force in International Context*, 52.
[1086] Smith, *Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century*, 36.

power abroad.[1087] While many scholars argue that the US cannot sustain its global commitments and is entering into a period of hegemonic decline, there is no evidence to suggest that it will abandon its Open Door strategy and its dominant managerial role in the international system. As long as the US continues to have an interest in maintaining particular forms of "stability" abroad for unfettered access to valuable resources and markets, as well as for the fluid functioning of the global economy, it will likely depend on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare modes of statecraft to deter significant threats to the prevailing order. Far from dismantling a para-state nexus, para-institutional forces will most likely continue to be central to US coercive statecraft and networks of global governance. In helping to underwrite the "stability" of geopolitically important countries in the South, it would not be surprising if this, in turn, would continue to have effects on human rights and democracy in the global South. Meanwhile, Obama's recent 2010 *National Security Strategy* report stated that in attempts to strengthen "military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, [and] stability operations… The most valuable component of our national defense is the men and women who make up America's all-volunteer force."[1088] The analysis contained in this thesis points to a different picture in which a collection of PMCs, mercenaries, paramilitary forces, and militias mobilized to defend national interests abroad will represent the most valuable component of US hegemony in the foreseeable future.

[1087] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 230; Ortiz, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, 155-156.; Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*, 151, 158.
[1088] United States Office of the President, *National Security Strategy 2010*

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