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The Role of NGOs in Environmental Conflict
A Case Study of Thailand

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ABSTRACT

Environmental conflicts over natural resources in Thailand have rapidly grown during the past few decades. A number of NGOs have played a major role in these movements, even though they have been criticised for this by the state. This thesis attempts to examine why and how NGOs have become involved in conflict over environmental development projects in Thailand, and the dynamics of the environmental movements.

Two case studies were chosen: the Pak Mun Dam (PMD) and the Keang Sue Ten Dam (KSTD). The PMD project is already operating, and its negative impacts, in particular the loss of fishery, are widely recognised, whilst the KSTD project is still awaiting the decision to go ahead, with the result that its impact upon ways of living is still hypothesised. The thesis shows that NGOs have played a role in both cases as a resource for protest movements and as actors. As a resource, they provide necessary knowledge and information for the movements. As actors, they play a role in shaping the movements, mobilising resources such as elites, and taking part in raising the cases to the level of national issues. The extent to which NGOs perform as actors varies, depending on the needs of the movements. The NGO involved in the PMD case played a role as an actor to a greater extent than the NGO working for the KSTD movement.

NGOs accessed the environmental conflict cases because their ideologies favoured the poor and the presence of political space. In addition, Wildlife Fund Thailand, a professional organisation, assisted the KSTD movement because its activities were consistent with the main aims and objectives of the organisation, focusing on natural resource conservation. Social movement organisations (SMOs) of both movements chose informal and decentralised structures with loose commitment of their members. SMOs emphasised policy change, aiming to secure redress for their grievances. The PMD-SMOs employed more radical strategies than the KSTD-SMOs, because the PMD movement experienced less open political opportunities than the KSTD movement. Resource mobilisation and the movements' strategies were influenced by the following factors: the capacity of state policy implementation; the appearance of allies; the mass media; and repression.

The thesis shows that the Resource Mobilisation Theory and the Political Opportunity Approach can be applied to the cases of environmental movements in Thailand. The role of NGOs can be examined through the concept of SMOs. Resource mobilisation, especially securing contributions from outside the movements, is a major task of the movements of the poor in Thailand. The concept of openness and closedness of the political system can help to explain the cases in Thailand. Due to repression by the state, the villagers were able to gradually develop their capacities in political argument and movement management.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

*The main objective of this research is to examine the role of NGOs in the environmental conflict and the dynamics of environmental movements in Thailand. Two environmental movements have been selected as case studies: that protesting against the Pak Mun Dam and that against the Keang Sue Ten Dam. The central research question of this research is why and how NGOs become involved in the conflict over environmental development projects in Thailand. The principal hypothesis is that Thai NGOs become involved in environmental conflicts in Thailand as resources for, not as actors in, the movements.*

1.1 The Significance of the Research

Over the past two decades environmental conflicts in Thailand have dramatically grown and become a national issue. In many places the exploitation of natural resources led to conflicts between urban, commercial interests, and the affected rural population. Most national conflicts in Thailand are concerned with development projects of the government (Buergin and Kessler, 2000). In 1994, there were 275 protests and demonstrations as a result of conflicts between local people and the state. These protests, about one-third of them in the northeast region, were mainly concerned with conflicts over land, water and forest resources. In 1995, the number of protests grew to 334 (Pintopteang, 1998). The main causes of these conflicts can be summarised as follows: the problems of resources themselves, such as scarcity and allocation; weakening laws and regulations; the lack of management tools; and the non-transparency of the bureaucratic system (Nunman, 2001). Lack of trust in the government is also deeply rooted in Thai society. This mistrust between people and government, people and officials, and government and NGOs has continued for a long period due to corruption and the inappropriate practices of some officials. This situation makes it difficult to create mature negotiations, which may require win-win solutions (The Croft Institute for International Studies and King Prajhadipok’s Institute, 2003).

As a result of the end of Cold War, the end of military dictatorship and the opening of democratic politics, there have been considerable changes in the opportunities for social agitation and political expression (Pongpaichit, 2002; and Vatanasapt, 2003). Also, the success of the protest against the *Nam Chone* Dam in 1988 was crucial for the opening and extension of political space, the emergence of Thai civil society, and the process of democratisation (Baker, 2000; and So and Lee, 1999). The first National Environmental Quality Protection and Enhancement Act was declared in 1975 and revised in 1992. The 1992 National Environmental Act moved from the ‘command and control approach’ to environmental legislation and standards (So and Lee, 1999). Although the 1992 National Environmental Act states clearly that the public has a role in environmental conservation and management, people complain that they are not allowed to be involved at the initial stage, only becoming involved at the end, when the project is implemented. Meanwhile, the government itself lacks sufficient knowledge, experience, tools and mechanisms to tackle the problems. In some situations this leads to confrontation and violence between those who support, and those who oppose the project.

NGOs are recognised as a part of Thai society, and they play a major role in social movements. However, NGOs that involve themselves in environmental conflicts have been criticised by both government and the public. The government often views NGOs as outsiders. This study will contribute to an understanding of the role of NGOs in
environmental conflicts and the dynamics of the environmental movement in Thailand. The study intends to examine: (1) why and how NGOs become involved in the conflict over environmental development projects in Thailand; (2) the dynamics of the environmental movements in two case studies; (3) the existing social movement theories towards an understanding of environmental movements in Thailand. The results of this research could provide information for the Thai government in formulating plans and policy.

1.2 The role of NGOs in environmental conflict, and the hypothesis of the research

The proliferation of NGOs in Thailand occurred in the 1980s, closely related to political and social phenomena. They are not only numerous, but also diverse in their roles, such as public education, lobbying, advocacy, research, improving living conditions for the underprivileged, environmental protection, relief and welfare and some involve specific issues such as children, gender, social justice, and public health. Rural protests in Thailand emerged in the mid-1980s, and NGOs played a major role in raising the issues to the press and public (Dechalert, year unknown; Pintoptang, 1998; and Baker 2000). In many cases, the situation forced NGOs to become involved in rural movements, because they occurred in the areas where they worked, although they did not want to become involved in ‘hot issues’ (Prasartset, 1995). As a result of the studies conducted by Pongpaichit (2000) and Dechalert (year unknown), it has been found that villagers, not NGOs, initiated rural movements and protests. Dechalert (year unknown) points out that the protests were not created by NGOs, but the NGOs themselves became the resource that fed the movements and enabled the poor to continue their struggles. Meanwhile, NGOs raised the conflicts from the periphery to national politics. Dechalert concludes that NGOs became involved in the rural protests mainly as a resource, not as actors.

Dechalert’s study can be clarified by the studies of Prapas Pintopteang and Missingham about the Assembly of the Poor (Assembly of the Poor is the biggest people’s network consisting of 17 protest groups. Most problems that these groups protest about involve dams, water, land and forest. The details of the Assembly will be illustrated in Chapter 7). The results of both studies show that NGOs play the role of supporters and advisors, not leaders or patrons, while villagers hold the power in all decisions. As advisors, NGOs provide assistance in developing the skills of information preparation and negotiation; strengthening people organisations, and sometimes serving as negotiators between villagers and the government (especially the Prime Minister and Ministers), acting as the translator between the style of officialdom and the style of the village. During the protest, NGOs acted as secretariat staff, for example producing press releases, co-ordinating with the press and preparing documents (Pintobtang, 1998; Baker (2000); and Missingham, 2003a). Similarly, the study of the roles of NGOs in eight social movements conducted by Pongpaichit and her team reveals that NGOs have played an important role in all movements, acting as transmitters of information between groups and across movements (Pongpaichit, 2002). Moreover, Pongpaichit (2002) further argues that types of the roles of NGOs depend on the strength of the popular movements that they assist.

Lertchoosakul (2003), who analysed the role of NGOs in the anti-Pak Mun Dam movement (which is one of the case studies) by using information from the press, argues that NGOs become prominent actors in the movement. NGOs mobilised support from other sectors within civil society, rather than leading the movement to enforce structural change and promote a radical movement. Meanwhile, they did not only process the frames based on the demands of the affected people, but also integrated their own background and experience of
the issues, and even the objectives of their organisations. NGOs prioritised their goals, which were different from those of local participants: NGOs emphasised the issues of environment, democracy and injustice, while the latter group aimed to achieve their short-term goals, including compensation and resettlement agreements. However, NGOs failed in gaining support from other sectors in civil society and in creating an understanding about their long-term goals. NGOs were considered separate actors from the affected people, and they were perceived as having their own agendas and interests in mobilising the movement.

In Thailand, it is clear that the poor themselves, not NGOs, have initiated rural movements. NGOs have become involved in the cases to provide support and assistance. There is very little empirical work specifically focused on the role of NGOs in environmental conflicts in Thailand. Some recent NGO research emphasised the role of NGOs in social movements and rural protests, such as the studies conducted by Dechalert, Missingham, Phongpaichit and Pintobteang (as noted above). These studies reveal the similar result that NGOs play their role as transmitters, advisors, and translators, but not as leaders. The role that NGOs play depends on the needs of the local actors who take part in decision-making. NGOs position themselves as supporters. This might imply that they get involved in the environmental movements as resources, rather than actors. Even though Lertchoosakul's analysis shows that NGOs played their role in the Pak Mun Dam movement as actors, her study is based on data and information from the press, which emphasised the role of NGOs in the public forums regarding the movements. The study did not focus on their role in the social movement organisations. The evidence from these researches and from my own observations suggests that NGOs tend to get involved in environmental conflicts as resources. Therefore, my principal hypothesis is that Thai NGOs become involved in environmental conflicts in Thailand as resources for, not as actors in, the movements.

1.3 Structure of thesis

The thesis comprises twelve chapters. The contents of these are:

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework and methodology

Chapter 2 aims to explain how the theoretical framework is constructed, and the methods employed in this research. It firstly states that the NGOs will be studied based on the concept of SMOs. Next, the role of resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity approach employed in this study will be discussed. This study is conducted as a qualitative research by using case studies. According to principles of qualitative research, the methodology of this research will be illustrated under the following topics: criteria of case selection, sources of data collection, and data analysis. Finally, the fieldwork and access to the case studies will be mentioned.

Chapter 3: Society, economy and political change

This Chapter presents the background of society, the economy and politics in Thailand. Thailand has a long history and its own tradition and culture. This chapter reviews the general characteristics of Thai society, including the patronage system and social classes. Then it reviews the effects of the social and economic development of the country since the 1950s, when the First National Economic Development Plan, following the Western concept, began. The final part of this chapter reviews political changes in Thailand since the 1950s.

Chapter 4: Non-governmental organisations

An overview of NGOs, the first part discusses definition of the term ‘NGO’, which is viewed differently by scholars and in different countries. Focusing first on NGOs in
developing countries, various major dimensions will be illustrated, including their emergence and evolution, their relationship with the state and their roles. NGOs in some Asian countries are then reviewed.

Chapter 5: Environmental movements

This begins with a definition of ‘environmental movement’, and then explains why the movement emerged. Next, issues concerning environmental movements in developing countries are presented: characteristics, ideologies and strategies, relationships with state, and successes. Movements in some Asian countries are considered.

Chapter 6: NGOs in Thailand

This describes the evolution of NGOs in Thailand by dividing it into six periods, from before 1960 to present. Then the emphasis moves to environmental NGOs by explaining the focus of NGOs’ works in each region in Thailand. The relationship with government and roles of NGOs is discussed.

Chapter 7: The environmental movement in Thailand

To provide the background of the country, the chapter begins with the state of the environment in Thailand. Then it elaborates on the environmental movement at national level, starting from its emergence and followed by grassroots movements and the forest movement, and the role of Buddhist monks. Lastly, conflicts over development projects of the government are described, focusing on public hearings, and the Assembly of the Poor, which is the biggest network of the environmental movements in Thailand and the umbrella of the case studies.

Chapter 8: Social movement theories

The Chapter focuses on two main theories that will be employed for analysis: the social movement organisation theory and the political opportunity approach. It starts with a discussion about the definition of social movements, discussing social movement organisation theory, social movement organisations (SMOs) and mobilisation processes. The costs and benefits of participation and the ‘free rider’ problem are also discussed. Discussion of the political opportunity approach begins with the debate about the concept of ‘political opportunity’, and then moves on to openness and closedness of political opportunity structures. Lastly, the role of the mass media is discussed.

Chapter 9: Histories of the projects and the movements

This Chapter provides the background of the case studies: Keang Sue Ten Dam and Pak Mun Dam projects. In each case, the explanation begins with how the project was formulated, followed by features of the project, its aims, and its implementation. Next, the chronology of events of the movements is presented in accordance with data and information from coverage and interviews. Then, it moves to views regarding the movements of different parties, including villagers, NGOs and governments.

Chapter 10: Social movement organisations (SMOs)

This Chapter presents an answer as to how the movements have been organised. By employing the resource mobilisation theory, the chapter analyses the SMOs of the case studies, starting from their emergence, structure and form, the roles of the main actors, decision-making, resource mobilisation and strategies. Types and sources of mobilising resources are distinguished following the model proposed by Cress and Snow. Resource mobilisation and strategies is discussed. The similarities and differences of two cases regarding those issues are also discussed.
Chapter 11: NGOs and their role in the movements

The Chapter attempts to examine the role of NGOs in the movement and reasons for their involvement based on the concepts of resource mobilisation theory and political opportunity approach. Firstly, the backgrounds of NGOs involved in both cases are explained, including the aims, structure and form of organisations, their main activities and working styles. Then their role within the SMOs and in the public is discussed. Based on the political opportunity approach, the analysis examines why NGOs become involved in environmental movements and how political opportunities affect resource mobilisation and movement strategies. This will be done by emphasising three variables: the policy implementation capacity of the state, the appearance of allies, and repression. The similarities and differences of two cases regarding those issues are also discussed. The analysis leads to answer the hypothesis of this research at the end of the chapter.

Chapter 12: Conclusion
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This chapter explains how the theoretical framework is constructed, and the method employed in the research. Resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity approach are chosen. The resource mobilisation theory is employed to examine the role of NGOs in social movements while the political opportunity approach is used to explain the reasons that NGOs become involved in the movements. The method of this research and the access to the case studies based on the experience are also explained.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

In this research, the term ‘NGO’ refers to an organisation that seeks to influence public policy and is differentiated from people and grassroots organisations. The organisation is independent from the state and private business, non-profit oriented and professionalised. NGOs are considered in this research as social movement organisations (SMOs). ‘A social movement organisation (SMO) is a complex, or formal, organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals’ (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1218). Some scholars, such as Hirsch (2003:239) and (Warkentin, 2001:21), point out that NGOs can be part of social movements. McCarthy and Zald (1987) also emphasise that some kinds of voluntary organisations can be considered as SMOs. However, Blair (1997) argues that only the NGOs that aim to influence public policy can be defined as civil society organisations. Blair’s model of the relationship of civil society organisations to NGOs and society can be adapted to illustrate the relationship of NGOs to SMOs (see Figure 2.1).

![Figure 2.1: NGOs as SMOs, adapting from Blair’s model.](image)

It is shown that resource mobilisation theory is useful to analyse the role of NGOs in social movements. In this research, the resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories will be employed because, among the range of theories in the toolkit of social movement analysis, they are most relevant to the research questions.
2.2 The role of Resource Mobilisation Theory in this research

Resource mobilisation theory (RMT) has been developed based on the public good theory of Mancur Olson, which focuses on costs and benefits. The main argument of this theory is that social movements are possible when necessary resources are available for them. The concept of ‘social movement organisation’ is central, and plays a significant role in resource mobilisation. RMT considers ‘organisation’ as a means to goal-achievement and a resource for movements. The theory emphasises the questions: how are social movements organised, and how are resources mobilised? RMT is discussed in Chapter 8.

To examine the role of NGOs in social movements, the research attempts to analyse how the social movements have been organised, by employing RMT. As the main concept of RMT focuses on SMOs, the study will analyse the organisational development of the SMOs in the case studies based on four sets of parameters proposed by Kriesi (1996). These parameters are:

1. organisational growth and decline
2. internal organisational structure
3. external organisational structure, and
4. goal orientations and action repertoires.

Therefore, various aspects of SMOs of both case studies will be firstly examined, including emergence of SMOs, structure and form, goals, function and role of members in the organisations, communication in the organisations, resource mobilisation, strategies, and rationality and free riders. Kriesi identifies external structure as having three dimensions: the SMO’s relationship with its constituency, its allies, and the authorities. Therefore, NGOs can be classified as having an external organisational structure. Then the role of NGOs and their interaction with the SMOs in the case studies will be investigated. The structure and form of NGOs and role of NGOs both inside and outside SMOs of the case studies will be analysed.

2.3 The role of the Political Opportunity Approach (POA) in this research

‘Political opportunity refers to signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements’ (Tarrow, 1996:54). Political opportunity theory focuses on the availability of external resources and the political context in which a social movement operates. The POA has been applied to a wide range of empirical phenomena in social movement studies. The main argument is that social movements are shaped by political constraints and opportunities that differ from one political system to another. According to McAdam’s synthesis, the dimensions of POA are:

1. the openness or closedness of the institutionalised political system
2. the stability or instability of a broad set of elite alignments
3. the presence or absence of elite allies, and
4. the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, 1996:27).

Rucht (1996) proposes four variables that affect opportunities:

1. access of the party-system and policy decisions
2. policy implementation capacity
3. alliance, and
4. repression.
Tarrow presents similar variables, but also distinguishes the capacity of state into two variables: political realignment within the polity and splits within elites. The POA is discussed in Chapter 8.

To answer why NGOs become involved in environmental movements, the study will employ the concept of openness and closedness from the political opportunity approach (POA). In this regard, the policies of different governments and their reactions to NGO work are the main factors when analysing the opportunities for NGOs. In addition, as resource mobilisation and strategies are the main tasks of SMOs, the variables affecting political opportunities proposed by Rucht (1996) and Tarrow (1996 and 1998) will be employed to examine how those variables affect the resource mobilisation and the movement strategies of the case studies.

The theoretical framework is presented in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Theoretical framework of the research

Social Movement Theories

Political Opportunity Approach Theory
- Openness or closure of the institutionalised political system
- Stability or instability of elite alignment
- Presence or absence of elite allies
- State's capacity and propensity for repression

Resource Mobilisation Theory
- Availability of resources
- Emphasis on social movement organizations (SMOs)
- Costs and benefits
- Expectation of success

NGOs as SMOs

SMOs in the Case Studies

Why NGOs get involved and how political opportunities influence resource mobilization and movement strategies: POA Framework
- Opportunities for involvement
- Strategies of movement
- Effectiveness of movement

How NGOs get involved: RMT Framework
- How social movement has been organised
- Role of NGOs

- Environmental movements in the context of Thailand
- Thai NGOs in the context of SMOs

The role of Thai NGOs as resources and/or actors

2.4 Methodology

The study is conducted as qualitative research using case studies. Snow and Trom (2002:146) point out that ‘the case study method and the study of social movements are almost one and the same.’ Case study is ‘a research strategy that seeks to generate richly detailed, thick and holistic elaborations and understandings of instances or variances of bounded social phenomena through the triangulation of multiple methods that include but are not limited to qualitative procedures’ (Snow and Trom, 2002: 151-152). The case study may focus upon either a single case or multiple cases.

2.4.1 Criteria of case selection

Two case studies are selected by the following criteria:

(1) They become a national issue, or tend to be a national issue
(2) They concern development projects of Thai government
(3) The stakeholders become polarized.

As a result, two case studies are chosen: Pak Mun Dam Project and Keang Sue Ten Dam Project.

2.4.2 Objectives of the research

(1) To examine why NGOs become involved in environmental movements
(2) To examine the role of NGOs in the conflict over environmental development projects
(3) To analyze the dynamics of the environmental movements of two cases studies
(4) To compare the roles of NGOs and the environmental movements in two case studies.
(5) To examine the existing social movement theories towards an understanding of conflict situations.

2.4.3 The linkage between the research questions and the objectives

2.4.3.1 Why NGOs become involved in environmental movements.
Objective 1: to examine why NGOs become involved in environmental movement;
Objective 5: to examine the existing social movement theories towards an understanding of conflict situations.

2.4.3.2 How environmental movements have been organised.
Objective 3: to analyze the dynamics of the environmental movements of two case studies;
Objective 4: to compare the roles of NGOs and environmental movements in two case studies;
Objective 5: to examine the existing social movement theories towards an understanding of conflict situations.

2.4.3.3 What the roles of NGOs in environmental movement are.
Objective 2: to examine the role of NGOs in the conflict over environmental development projects;
Objective 4: to compare the roles of NGOs and the environmental movements in two case studies;
Objective 5: to examine the existing social movement theories towards an understanding of conflict situations.

2.4.4. Sources of data collection

This research has been conducted based on two main sources of data collection: semi-structured interviews and news clippings. The data on media coverage were collected from various national newspapers published in Thailand in both Thai and English languages. The interview data focuses on social movement organisations and the role of NGOs, while media coverage data provides the history of the movements and reactions of the state and the public. Semi-structured interviews are used for collecting data in the field, relying on an interview guide that includes a set of questions and topics. For villagers, the main questions and topics are as follows: what is their role in SMOs; what is the role of NGOs and how would the movements be organised without NGO assistance; why do they join in the movements; what are their experiences of participating in the movements; how do villagers and SMOs mobilise resources; what are their plans for the future; how do they communicate among participants and do how they make decisions? For NGOs, the questions and topics include: why did they decide to take part in the movements; what are the roles of NGOs; what are their views of villagers and movements; what are their views of government regarding the movements? These questions can be adjusted according to interactions during the interviews. The linkages of research questions and methods are represented in Table 2.1.
## Table 2.1: Research questions and methods (Mason, 2002: 28-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data sources and methods</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Why NGOs become involved in environmental movements</td>
<td>• NGOs staff: semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>• To provide information about why and when NGOs become involved; what their motivation is; who (in the organisation) made the decision to become involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• News clippings, reports and documents in the organisation; and literature review</td>
<td>• To provide information about political change and reactions from government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How environmental movements have been organised</td>
<td>• Specialised group - NGOs’ staff: semi-structured interviews - village leaders: semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>• To provide data about SMOs, such as structure and form, function and role, decision-making processes and strategies. Also provides data on: resource mobilisation both from inside and outside SMOs; rationality and free riders; reaction to repression from the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unspecialised group - villagers as labour (who provide labour): semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>• To provide information about: how they manage their time; how they receive message from SMOs; why they decide to participate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• News clippings and other documents</td>
<td>• To provide data on events of movements in the past; organisational structure and function; activities of SMOs; alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research questions</td>
<td>Data sources and methods</td>
<td>Justification</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. What the roles of NGOs in environmental movements are</td>
<td>• Events such as meetings and demonstrations: observation</td>
<td>• To provide evidence of tactics used by SMOs, and of interaction in movements. The observation data can be also used to crosscheck other data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Specialised group - NGOs’ staff: semi-structured interviews - village leaders: semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>• To provide evidence of: function and role of NGOs in SMOs; role of NGOs in the public (outside SMOs); role of NGOs in resource mobilisation; reaction of NGOs to repression from the state; views of NGOs to villagers; views of villagers to NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local government staff: semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>• To provide evidence of opinions and attitudes of government to the role of NGOs and movements; role of local government to the project implementation and to handle mass movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• News clipping and other documents: literature review</td>
<td>• To provide evidence of the reaction of governments to NGOs and movements; views of the public to movements. Other documents such as minutes of meeting and reports will provide internal data of organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the backgrounds of the projects, project</td>
<td>• News clippings</td>
<td>• To provide the history of the movements and reactions of the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research questions | Data sources and methods | Justification
---|---|---
Implementation and the history of the movements? | • Staff of the Royal Irrigation Department and Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand: semi-structured interviews<br>• Internal documents from those agencies | • To provide: the background to project such as decision-making process, funding, implementation of the projects and studies about the project; how to communicate with affected communities; and responses to movements.

2.4.5. Data analysis

The text or narrative from interviews is categorised into different themes based on research questions. The text from interviews is occasionally mentioned as evidence in the analysis. Moreover, data from news clipping and the interviews is used to support each other.

2.5. Fieldwork and access to the cases

Initially, the chosen case studies were Pak Mun Dam Project in the north and Trans Thai-Malaysia Pipeline Project in the south. A preliminary survey for the latter case was conducted in November 2005. As a result of a meeting with Banjong Nasea, the NGO officer working with Trans Thai-Malaysia Pipeline Project, it was rather difficult for outsiders to access the case. It was also difficult to gain the trust of most villagers, who are Muslims, especially since the movement recently clashed with police, and some villagers were arrested. Some villagers refused to talk or communicate with strangers. In particular, as a government official like myself, it was even more difficult. However, it would be possible to study this case but the researcher might have to spend more time (probably a year) to build up a relationship with villagers. Finally, the case study of the Trans Thai-Malaysia Pipeline Project was cancelled.

2.5.1. Access to the Keang Sue Ten Dam Case

After that, I was suggested the Keang Sue Ten Dam case. When I met Hannarong, a NGO officer working with this case in early December 2005, I was informed that the movement had been run for more than ten years, and the situation in the movement (at that moment) was calm; all villagers are friendly and welcome outsiders. However, the decision to allow outsiders to access the case depended on the villagers. In January 2006, accompanied by Hannarong I travelled to Tambon Sa-iab, Phrea province – about 600 km from Bangkok. After arrival, I was introduced to Kamnan Chum (head of the sub-district and advisor of the movement). He explained that the decision depended on the agreement of the Dam Protest Committee. Therefore, the meeting was called for early morning next day. The meeting was participated by Kamnan Chum, Hannarong, the headmen and the Director of Wat Donchai.
School, the school located at Tambon Sa-iab, and myself. In the meeting, the purpose of the research and what cooperation and assistance needed was explained. Hannarong stressed that ‘the movement has been run for many years and many activities were organised with different objectives and goals. The study will create a channel to tell the outsiders what occurred in our villages and what we did would be a lesson learned for others. The research will be written in English so it would be a greater chance for disseminating our information and our intention to both domestic and foreign academics’. Finally, the meeting agreed to allow me to conduct interviews. The meeting assigned a young man, who had just graduated from a leading university in Bangkok, to accompany me to all of my interviewees. I spent two weeks at Tambon Sa-iab, from January 20-February 4, 2005.

2.5.2. Access to the Pak Mun Dam Case

The Pak Mun Dam movement was used to giving information to many studies so I was not very worried about access to the case. I was introduced to Sompan, a NGO officer working with the Pak Mun Dam case, who was pleased to provide assistance. However, as villagers involved with the movement were busy with a demonstration in Bangkok, the fieldwork could be started in March 2005. Bunmee, a villager volunteer, was asked to accompany me to the interviewees. Bunmee also assisted in making appointments with all interviewees.

In the case of Vanida, an NGO officer working as an advisor of the PMD, I was assisted by Suphavit Piamponsant, who was my ex-boss, and was the Chairman of the Pak Mun Dam Committee. When I met her, she said that ‘in fact, I did not want to spend time with interview because after getting all information needed, all of them who were researcher disappeared. But, in your case, I am very pleased to do so because Suphavit suggested it. Suphavit is really helpful to the movement’.

In June 2007, I conducted interviews with the representatives of two offices that directly handle the project, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand for the Pak Mun Dam Project and the Royal Irrigation Department for the Keang Sue Ten Dam Project. Contact was officially made through the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion, where I work.

2.6. Conclusion

The research relied on the resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity approach as its analytical framework. The study is designed as qualitative research using the case study method. Based on the criteria, two case studies of environmental movements in Thailand are chosen: Pak Mun Dam and Keang Sue Ten Dam movements. The study utilises two main sources of data: interviews and press coverage.

The framework developed in this chapter will inform the analysis of my empirical data in chapters 8 and 9. This analysis leads to consideration of how to employ social movement theories in the Thai context in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 3
Society, Economy and Politics of Thailand

This chapter illustrates the background of the society, economy and politics of Thailand, which provides background information for consideration of the phenomenon of NGOs and environmental movements. The first part of this chapter provides a brief account of the social life and economy of the country. To provide the history of democratisation, the second part focuses on political change, which is divided into seven periods, starting when the country transformed to democracy in 1932. The major national social movements are discussed where they occurred in those periods.

Thailand is one of the leading countries in Southeast Asia, covering 514,000 sq km. About 95 per cent of Thais are Buddhists. Islam accounts for 3.7% of the population, most living in the south. Christianity accounts for 0.6%. Buddhist belief highly influences the way of daily life, socially, economically and politically. Thai society is a loose structured society and deeply relies on the patronage system. Similar to other Asian societies, kinship is significant in Thai society. Thailand has a very long history, and was governed by kings throughout, changing from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy in 1932 as the result of a bloodless coup led by the People's Party, made up of the educated middle class. The first constitution was declared on December 10, 1932. The king is head of state and holds a position of political neutrality. The national assembly of Thailand is a bi-cameral institution consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The administration is divided into seventy-five provinces and the local administration of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration.

This chapter provides the background of the main aspects of Thailand's society, economy and politics, illustrating social and economic development since the first national economic plan in 1961, considered as a turning point in the country's development. Then, by dividing them into seven periods, the major political changes will be highlighted.

3.1 Thai society

According the population census, Thailand had a population of 26.2 million in 1960, and this increased to 60.9 million in 2000. It is projected that the number will increase to 70 million in 2030. The population growth rate is at 1.1 per cent per year, according to the 2000 population census. The literacy rate is 90.6 per cent (National Statistic Office, year known A). Thailand is becoming an increasingly ageing society because the population aged over 60 rose to 10.6 per cent of total population (or 6.5 million). About 60 per cent of those ageing people are in the agricultural sector (National Economic and Social Development Board, 2007).

Poverty is an important problem in Thailand. Thailand measures poverty incidence at household level by comparing per capita household income against the poverty line, which is the income level that is sufficient for an individual to enjoy society's minimum standard of living. The incidence of poverty has gradually declined from 44.9 per cent of the total population (or 23.5 million people) in 1988 to 17 per cent (or 9.8 million people) in 1996. However, the incidence of poverty in 1998 increased to 18.8 per cent with an additional 1.2 million new poor, as a result of the 1997 economy crisis. Then it deepened further to 21.3 per cent in 2000. As various interventions have been undertaken to strengthen the grassroots economy and reduce poverty, it declined to 11.25 per cent in 2004. In 2004, almost ninety
per cent of the poor lived in rural areas, and about a half in the northeast region. This translates into 3.65 million poor living in the northeast, compared to only 3.43 million in the rest of the country (National Economic and Social Development Board, year unknown).

3.1.1 The patronage system

The patronage system is deeply embedded in Thai society, and it obviously affects Thai politics. Rural voters are captives of the local patronage system, and give their votes to a local boss (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002). According to the study on the Measure of Democratic Level and Behaviours in an Election of Member of the House of the Representatives, one of the major factors influencing people in choosing candidates is candidates’ family status and relationship to the community; whether the candidates have brought benefits to the community or not and are able to solve the problems of the community or not; and the reputation of the candidates’ family in bringing benefit to the community (King Prajadhipok Institute, year unknown). Therefore, an election does not politically mean to elect someone to speak for oneself only, but it also economically means to exchange with something existing in the patronage system (Uwanno, 2007). Today, money is the ultimate source of power in Thai politics because it plays its role as a resource in the patron-client relationship, so the politicians can build up their rural political networks (Robertson, 1996). As a result of the patronage culture, Uwanno (2007:4) notes that vote buying does not refer to giving away money and getting votes. Rather, it means that the elected persons should pay back by providing kindness and support to their constituencies. To solve this problem, Phongpaichit and Baker (2002:426 cited Laothamatas, 1995:91-2) emphasise that “we must first destroy patronage relations to release the ‘little people’ of unequal, un-free association with the ‘big people’ or ‘patrons’, so they become ‘individual’ like the people in the city and other modern classes”. However, new social values among the urban middle class in Thai society can be seen, as they view that the superiority and subordination values are no longer seen to be just, reasonable or even economically effective (Girling, 1996). The patronage system in Thai society, and its affects on the role of NGOs will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

3.1.2 Social class

Thai society is stratified by wealth, power, fame, property, and rank. Jacobs (1971) observes that there are some different groups, such as urban and rural, defined by boundaries. In rural society, although landlord and peasant are clearly different, no landlord class exists. He concludes that “there are neither classes nor informally organised occupational groupings in rural Thailand”. Piker (1975) also concludes that there is no distinctive classification among farmers in Thai society. Although some sociologists and anthropologists have argued that a class system does not exist, Jacobs (1971) believes that there is a definite class structure in Thailand based on the patron-client relationship. He therefore proposes the model of the two-class system: leader and follower classes. The leader class consists of educated people who govern, and the follower class of those who serve the governing class.

Due to social and economic development and modern education, the middle class emerged in Thai society and has increased rapidly since the late 1960s. In 1960, the middle class population is only 2.6 million of working population, of which more than 60 percent were in the government. The middle class in Bangkok increased from 310,000 in 1985 to 710,000 in 1994 as a result of the expansion of higher education (Shiraishi, 2004). The urban middle class has been the major driving force of Thailand’s economic development since 1960s. They have had a powerful influence on the development of government institutions and the
state. They played a major role in the May 1995 political incident, and in drafting the 1997 constitution (Phongpaicht and Baker, 2002). The Thai middle class is socially coherent, culturally and intellectually hegemonic and politically ascendant, a heterogeneous group consisting of civil servants, salaried people, academics and professionals, but homogenous in its occupational character in terms of income and security, and differentiated in both their practice and outlook – some are materialistic and power-driven, and some are inspired by civil society (Girling, 1996).

3.2 Economy

Even though Thailand was never colonised by western countries, in practice many western experts and staff were working at high levels, to direct and give advice on the country’s administration, for two or more decades from the beginning of the 1890s. Also, there have been many international programmes to modernise and develop the country. Therefore, Thailand has accepted concepts and ideas from the western world in developing the country (Girling, 1981; and Boesch, 1983). It became one of the fastest growing developing countries. Karel (2001:333) concludes that ‘a dynamic entrepreneurial class together with a supportive state were the key elements in Thailand’s rapid and efficient accumulation of production factors’. Thailand launched the First National Economic Development Plan in 1961, with assistance of the World Bank. The period of Plan 1 to the middle of Plan 3, from the 1960s to 1973, emphasised the infra-structure development of the country, in particular, roads connecting the capital Bangkok to various regions, and irrigation systems such as large dams (Brief of the National Economic and Social Development Plans shown in Appendix VI). Due to rapid development and the encroachment of people, forest resources were destroyed. The agriculture sector was the primary source of growth for this period. Between 1974 to 1985, starting from the mid-Plan 3 to the mid-Plan 5, the country experienced political uncertainty and economic turbulence. The Thai economy was greatly affected by the oil crisis of the world market in early 1980s. The agricultural sector confronted two major difficulties: the decrease of agricultural products in the international market and the rapid decline of areas suitable for agriculture. Therefore, a policy shift from import-substitution to export-promotion was initiated. The 1986 to 1996 was the economic boom decade. The major source of economic growth in this period was the accumulation of capital stocks, which increased at an average of 10.3 per cent per annum (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

Export industry and investment from foreign countries grew rapidly. Thailand launched its policy promoting international trade in the mid-1980s. Its main markets include the United States, Japan, China and Singapore. Thailand is among the top five agriculture exporters in the world; for example, the top rice exporter (27.10% of value share in the world market) and the second exporter of agricultural products in Asia (following China), which in 2004 accounted for over US$ 11.9 billion, almost 13.1 per cent of the total agricultural exports from Asia (Zamroni, 2006).

The economic crisis occurred in 1997 for several reasons: failure of the Thai monetary policy, premature liberalisation of financial institutions; and the external debts of the private sector. The result was a deep recession and social crisis, and destruction of some of the key foundations of the Thai economy from the previous era. Thus, Thailand was forced to request IMF assistance. On 2 July 1997, the baht was floated, and immediately began to slip downwards (Phongpaicht and Baker, 2002). The Thai economy gradually recovered and a huge number of workers returned to their villages in the countryside (Siamwalla, 2000).
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2006 increased by 5.1%, compared to 4.5% in 2005. This growth was driven by the agricultural sector, accounting for 8.9% of total production, and non-agricultural production, accounting for 91.1% of total production. The Thai economy is expected to grow at 4.5-5.5 per cent in 2008. The national inflation rate in 2006 was at 4.7 per cent, decreasing to 2.3 per cent in 2007; but, due to oil price increases and the global food crisis, inflation increased to 5.3 per cent during the first four months of 2008 (National Economic and Social Development Board, 2008).

3.3 Political change

Thailand is basically a bureaucratic society. Throughout her experiences in democracy, Thailand has faced many coups and been governed by the military. There were seventeen military coups between 1973 and 1992 (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; and Aphornsuvan, 2003). When the military came into power they abolished the constitution and declared martial law. They always claimed that, due to national security, it was necessary to launch a new political system. Politics in Thailand can be divided into the following seven periods:

3.3.1 The authoritarian regime (1932-1973)

After the revolution in 1932 Thailand had a very short period of democracy because the military took power and thereafter military dictators ruled the country. The political situation at the beginning period of regime, as it changed to a constitutional monarchy, was very confusing. There were many groups that wanted to take power. Since 1932 Thailand has faced political changes in a cyclical pattern, starting with a coup and followed by an election and a short period of open politics, before a crisis leading to another coup. The common reason for all coups that was given to public was national security. Military leaders always stressed that when all the ‘mess’ had been managed, they would return power to the people (Bunbongkarn, 1987).

For 16 years, from September 1957 to October 1973, Thailand was ruled by a single group of military officers who rose to power in Sarit’s coup: Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat during 1959-1963 and Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (who rose to leadership in Sarit’s regime) during 1963-1973. During Sarit’s regime it was widely accepted that his rule was an absolute dictatorship because democratic institutions and activities were not allowed. Sarit and his group claimed themselves to be the ‘army of the King’ to defend ‘nation, religion, and king’, so anyone who challenged the military state would be seen as ‘communist, illegal and un-Thai’. He believed that what the country needed was the economy, not politics. Therefore, in his period, economic development was emphasised by formulating systematic national economic plans, establishing core national agencies to handle the national economy, developing infrastructure and an education system (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; Phongpaichit and Baker 2002; and Bunbongkarn, 1987). Phongpaichit and Baker (2002:308) summarise Sarit’s development as transforming Thailand’s political economy. After Sarit’s death in 1963, Thanom then held the position of Prime Minister until 1973.

During the authoritarian rule, no interest groups or movements emerged to challenge the military power except the Communist Party of Thailand, which was illegal and was influenced from outside the country, by China in particular (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; and Girling, 1981). Morell and Samudvanich (1982:57) summarise that, ‘since the sources of political organization – a politicised public, a dominant monarchy, an independent civil bureaucracy, effective political parties, politically influential business and
labour communities, a powerful press, a concerned religious institution, or enduringly activist students - have been either nonexistent or weak in Thailand, the military has continued to be the only organised segment of society willing and able to occupy chief positions of authority.

All leaders in the military rule enjoyed their power and built up relationships with businessmen based on patron-client relationships. Therefore, businesses grew rapidly, and the leaders were powerful and rich. After the death of Sarit and the fall of Thanom, they were found to have huge assets: Sarit had 2.8 billion baht while Thanom had approximately 600 million baht, due to their corruption (Phongpaichit, and Baker, 2002).

The student uprising in 1973

In the Thanom regime students could start to organise social activities outside universities, which was different from Sarit’s rule. In 1965, the National Student Centre of Thailand (NSCT) was established, and it later became the centre of student political power. In the early 1970s some radical students in leading universities in Bangkok formed groups to criticize social phenomena such as the Sapha NaDome and Sethatham groups at Thammasart university, Sapha Kafe at Kasetsart university and the SOTUS group at Chulalongkorn university. Numbers in each group were small, but full of radical and active students. They then began to use Marxism to analyse Thai society. November 1972 was a landmark of student activism since the NSCT launched its first public campaign to boycott Japanese goods. This campaign expanded across the country and impacted on Japanese trade and business in Thailand. This campaign became well known amongst the public for the first time. It could be said students were the main actors in political movements during the authoritarian regime.

The most important event led by students was the 1973 uprising. It was the turning point in the political history of Thailand, and led to many changes. The 1973 uprising started on October 6 1973, when a group of students (13 individuals) were arrested by the police whilst distributing leaflets calling for a new constitution. They were accused of being communists, and the public not agree with, or accept this. The student protest occurred rapidly, starting in the Thammasart University, and led by the NSCT, and then moved outside. Their initial request was the release of the arrested students, and was replaced by demands for a new constitution and regime change. The protest gained much support from the public. Hundreds of students and others joined massive demonstrations from 6 to 13 October, and the situation continued after the students had been released. This had never happened before in Thailand. Approximately 400,000 people went onto the streets, marching in protest. Matters became worse on 14 October when demonstrators clashed with the police and the military. As a result over 100 of them were killed, and government buildings and properties were burned and destroyed. Finally, the government resigned, and the Prime Minister Thanmon and his ally Praphat were personally requested by King Phomibhol to leave the country. A new government was appointed with Sanya Thammasak as the Prime Minister (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; Xuto, 1987; Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002; and Girling, 1981).

This uprising is seen as the turning point: it led to a regime change, from a military government to a civil government with public participation. Compared to the ‘bourgeois revolution’ of 1932, which happened without public support and participation, the 1973 incident had huge participation (Xuto, 1987). Morell, and Samudvanich (1982) also noted that ‘the success of the 1973 uprising thus taught the Thai people a very important lesson: the ruling clique was not, after all, omnipotent.’
3.3.2. The democracy period (1973-1976)

The period 1973 to 1976 is remarkable as the 'democracy period'. After the uprising it is considered as a turning point of the political history of Thailand. The most significant result of the incidents was considerable social and political change. Many pressure groups emerged rapidly, which had never happened before in Thailand’s history. The free press provided a channel for ordinary people and the public to express ideas. People enjoyed their rights to express ideas and views after a long period under the military junta (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; and Xuto, 1987). Morell and Samudvanich (1981:97) point out 'this phenomenon of extremism posed a dilemma to Thailand’s political development. How could a political system imbued with an ethic of obedience to traditional authority be transformed into one of effective participation?'

Girling (1981) summarises the impact of the October uprising in four main areas:
(1) The military withdrew from directly intervening in politics
(2) Political parties could participate in the political process again
(3) New forms of economic power emerged
(4) Many pressure groups including labour, farmer peasants, and students emerged for the first time.

From 1973-76 a total of 264 new pressure groups, ranging from labour unions, farmers' associations to the young monks group, were formed and were involved in 390 incidents. These incidents were concerned with various demands, such as labour problems, bureaucratic malpractice and educational administration, and students played their roles as catalysts in almost all of these political activities (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; and Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

The new constitution was promulgated stating that all representatives must be members of parties. It was the first constitution with this statement, and the general election was launched in 1975. Governments after the 1973 revolution emphasised the reform of the political system, which was the first attempt in the country (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982).

3.3.2.1. Student movements after the 1973 uprising

After the uprising students were the main actors in political movements, and the National Student Centre of Thailand (NSCT) was the core organisation. During the 1974-76 period, Marxist and Maoist ideas were very influential among radical students. Many publications on Marxism and Maoism were published, and were very popular amongst students. Xuto (1987) states that the reason why Marxism appealed to activist Thai students is 'because it offered an explanation for the phenomena and conditions which confronted them'. They began to use Marxist idea to analyse Thai society. As a result many student movements and activities during that period followed these ideas. For example, the protest against a continued US military presence in the country, student publications and writings, and the protest against foreign investment in tin mining rights in the Gulf of Thailand, or the TEMCO case (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; Xuto 1987; and Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

3.3.2.2. Right and left wing movements

As movements and protests were often taken part by students, peasants and labour, the government viewed these situations as a threat to the nation. At the same time, the NSCT
(National Students' Council of Thailand) lost its popularity with the public because of internal conflict and negative public views. Public had the negative views to the activities of students involving in protests and political movements after there were protests every day and also the radical ideology that it embraced. The students were seen as leftwing. Many of the students involved in such movements were denounced and suppressed as 'communists'. To stop the movements and protests, right-wing groups were set up in 1974-1975. The Red Gaurs (Krating Daeng) were established by the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) to disrupt the urban demonstrations: in particular, opposition to student movements. This group were mostly recruited from students of vocational schools (who were the allies of students in the university during the October incident). The second right-wing group, called Nawapol (Ninth Force), was set up in 1974, also with the assistance of the Internal Security Operation Command. This group aimed to defend the traditional identity 'Nation, Religion, and King'. It recruited members from all over country, and its main target was local businesses and officials. By late 1975 the group claimed a million members. The third rightwing group was the Village Scouts, which was founded in 1971 by the Border Patrol Police to strengthen rural organisations, to combat insurgency, and communism. Also this movement aimed to show loyalty to nation and king, and it was patronised by the king. By early 1976 the Village Scouts became an urban-based movement. The main purpose of these rightwing organisations was to serve as a counterweight to the peasant and student movements by either peacefulness, or violence in practice.

There were several confrontations between left and right wings. For example, in the anti-U.S. campaign in 1976, while 30,000 student demonstrators led by NSCT were marching to the U.S. embassy, they were blocked and thrown a bomb by the Red Gaurs. This campaign was about requesting the U.S. military base for Vietnam war to withdraw from Thailand, since the radical students viewed the presence of the US military in the region as an attempt to dominate and exploit resources in Southeast Asia (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; Xuto, 1987 and Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

In addition Morell and Samudvanich (1982) observe that military and police leaders used Red Gaurs to harass, attack and disperse student demonstrators several times. However, after the 1976 coup, both Nawapol and the Red Gaurs groups were abolished and Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) withdrew support because they seemed to be uncontrolled. The Village Scout group is still active today.

3.3.2.3 Students' isolation

By early 1975 the popularity of the NSCT was declining precipitously. This stemmed from the fact that hundreds of protests had occurred all over the country. Other reasons can be cited such as their interest in Marxism, Leninism and Maoism; their use of leftist terminology such as the expulsion of the US imperialists; and the alleviation of the difficulties of workers and farmers. At the same time, the press attacked NSCT and its leaders (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982). Morell and Samudvanich (1982:172) noted that 'gradually but inexorably the students were isolated more and more from the mainstream of Thai society.' However, some radical students still play active roles in social and political movements today. Some hold high-ranking posts in government, businesses, government agencies and NGOs.

3.3.2.4 Peasant movements after the 1973 uprising

About 60-70% of the population of Thailand was engaged in agriculture (during that period). Unfortunately, most Thai farmers – 'the backbone of the nation' – face several
difficulties and problems regarding their farming and livelihood, such as low productivity and income, indebtedness, land rights, landlessness, poverty etc. After October 1973, with the support of students, Thai farmers became involved in the political process. The Propagation of Democracy Programme was launched after the 1973 uprising by the interim government. To run this programme over 3,000 students became involved, travelling to rural communities to educate villagers about democracy and popular participation. In fact, except for the CPT (Communist Party Thailand), the students were the first group of political activists in Thailand to reach out to the masses by working in rural camps during summers. The students, therefore, rapidly became good allies of the peasants, and learnt that democracy was not what the farmers needed. Instead they needed help with their livelihood. The students learnt about problems in rural areas, for example high indebtedness, poor infrastructure, overwhelming poverty, low income, the influence of the elite, landlessness and so on. The activist students then concentrated on these problems. Later, they raised this issue to the national scale.

During the period October 1973 to October 1974 many protests and demonstrations occurred. In March 1974, with support from the NSCT, the first large-scale protest was organised demanding higher paddy rice prices. As a result the government promised to allocate 300 million baht to guarantee the price of paddy. However, many problems were raised such as high rents, interest-heavy mortgages and inadequate land. A new national committee was set up to consider and handle farmers’ issues. The first action was to solicit petitions from farmers. By the end of September 1974 the committee was flooded with 53,650 petitions from peasants whose land had been deceived by moneylenders. Unfortunately, only 1,635 cases could be settled. On December 1974 the Land Rent Act was declared. It could be said that this interim government, the Sanya Thammasak government, was the first government of Thailand to seriously consider peasants’ problems.

On December 6, 1974 the Farmers Federation of Thailand (FFT) was established by farmers’ leaders in co-operation with a number of students. The Farmers Federation of Thailand aimed to monitor government action, and to educate and inform farmers about the new law (refer to the Land Rent Act) and its implication. The FFT achieved a level of organisation that had never happened before. Its membership grew rapidly to approximately 1.5 million. Most of them were poor farmers and tenants. Morell and Samudvanich (1982:223) point out that the ‘formation of the FFT was a new phenomenon for rural Thailand, and a significant step in the history of the farmers’ movement.’ The FFT’s activities were criticised for mobilising the masses, and the officials of the Ministry of the Interior considered it an illegal organisation because it was not registered with the government. It therefore was accused of being communist. The situation led to the arrests of many peasants and the murders of many leaders. It was found that at least twenty-one FFT leaders were killed from March 1974 to August 1975. The pattern of killings indicated a co-ordinated policy, and some suspected that the Nawaphon was involved as killers in some of these murders (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002 and Luther 1978). Due to the murders, the FFT’s magazine stated that, ‘the murder of our leaders by capitalists and landlord gangsters teaches us another lesson of our struggle: that in our fight, violence is inevitable’ (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982 cited Chao Na Thai, 1975).

After the 1976 coup some FFT leaders, such as Sithon Yotkantha, the chairman of the FFT northern chapter, joined the CPT in jungle. Also it ended this period of the peasant struggle (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982). Luther (1978 cited AMPO,1977) says, ‘to a large extent, the Thai farmers’ struggle was successful, though a number of their leaders were brutally assassinated by reactionary gangsters’.
3.3.2.5 The 1976 coup and the return of the military

In the late September 1976 a massive demonstration was arranged by NSCT in Thammasart University to protest against the return of the exiled dictator Field Marshal Thanom who re-entered the country as a Buddhist monk. At the same time the rightists – Nawaphon and the Red Gours – showed themselves to be against the leftists by paying their respects to him, and by protecting him while he was staying in the temple to ensure his safety. The NSCT announced a nationwide protest, including a student boycott of classes, demonstrations, and labour strikes until Thanom left the country. The situation became worse when one newspaper publicised a picture of the student who was hanged in a play to dramatise the deaths of two students. These two students were killed in Nakhon Pathom province (50 kilometres from Bangkok) while distributing anti-Thanom posters. It was claimed that the picture looked like the Crown Prince and accused the students of ‘lese-majesty’, a treasonable insult to the monarchy. Its effect was popular outrage. However, later, evidence suggested that the photos were falsified. On 5 October 1976 there were thousands of rightist supporters on the edges of the campus. It was estimated that there were as many as the leftist students within the university. During the night of October 5 until the morning of the next day the military and police accompanied by the rightist supporters carried out an attack on Thammasart University. The incident was extremely brutal. Official government reports listed 46 dead, but other observers believed the toll was much higher. Hundreds were injured, and thousands were arrested. During the following months further arrests were conducted across the country, officially reaching a total of 7,300. However, no rightist or policeman was arrested for their actions (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; and The European Co-ordinating Committee for Solidarity with the Thai People, 1978).

This incident was followed by a coup on the early morning of October 6. The coup was led by the supreme command of the armed forces under the military’s National Reform Council. As is typical in a coup, the constitution, parliament and all political parties were abolished while martial law was declared. The civilian Thanin Kraivichien was appointed as the Prime Minister (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982; Girling, 1981; and Xuto, 1987). Xuto (1987: 161) say ‘thus, in 1976 Thailand witnessed almost a complete reversal of the 1973 situation’.

3.3.3. After the 1976 coup to the 1992 uprising

After October 1976 many students and labour leaders, estimated at around 2,000-3,000, left the city to join the CPT insurgents (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982). Students who joined the CPT after October 1976 came from varied social backgrounds, and not only from lower-class families: both rich and poor, and some middle class. Also they had a wide range of different academic disciplines (Morell and Samudvanich, 1982). Due to the government order allowing authorities to detain ‘elements dangerous to society’, some 8,000 people were arrested. It was a period of political repression: books regarding Marxism, Maoism and politics were banned and burned; journals were closed; publishers harassed and political meetings outlawed; union activities suppressed (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

The collapse of the communist party of Thailand

Due to government policy, combining military and political methods from the early 1970s, the government claimed total victory over the CPT. The idea was called, ‘villages surrounding jungle,’ which contrasted to the, ‘jungle surrounding villages,’ of the CPT. The methods started with constructing roads into the CPT base area, and were followed by military attacks. Finally, campaigns and propaganda were organised in the surrounding
villages. The most important way was the offer of amnesty in return for complete surrender. In late 1980 members of the CPT started coming out of the jungle. They could return to continue their studies and live in the city as ordinary people. In 1987 the army estimated that only 400-500 insurgents remained. By 1990 the government claimed that only three of the CPT politburos were still alive and only one in Thailand (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

In 1978 the constitution was rewritten, and declared again following the 1976 coup. As in previous constitutions, this still allowed military and civilian bureaucrats to occupy the positions of prime minister and other Cabinet posts. The first general election was arranged in April 1979, and from this election until 1991 Thailand had the longest period of undisturbed parliament in its history. For eight years, 1980-1988, Prem Tinsulanonda held the prime ministership, which was seen a compromise between executive power and Parliament. This period was seen as semi-democracy or pre-democracy.

After the Prem era, Chatchai Choonhavan, who held the leadership of the largest party in Parliament in the 1988 election, was prime minister. He announced that Thailand should stop treating Vietnam as an enemy, but should turn battlefields into market places. From 1988 business-based politicians increased their political power through the parliamentary system. Peasant protests emerged for the first time since 1976, such as protests against eucalyptus plantations and protests against dam building. A logging ban was also announced following a serious flood and landslide in the south. This policy is still active. In addition, several new policies on labour and environment were launched.

In February 1991, the Chatchai government was seized by a bloodless coup. However, communism was not mentioned as its justification, but the need to stop corruption was raised instead. The coup group, called the National Peacekeeping Council, agreed to propose Anand Panyarachun as the Prime Minister. The Anand government concentrated on economic development to meet export-orientated business, launching value added tax, reducing both corporate and income taxes (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

In late 1991 the draft of a new constitution was proposed. The draft included four provisional clauses, which could preserve military influence over Parliament for a further four years if implemented. The head of an appointed Senate became the president of Parliament with the duty of recommending a new prime minister to the King. The elective Assembly and appointed Senate voted together on key issues such as the annual budget and no-confidence motions. The prime minister could still be chosen from outside Parliament. As a result, protests occurred immediately, but the constitution was officially passed.

During the national election in March 1992 PollWatch was set up as an independent organisation to monitor vote buying, and to keep the election clean. About 30,000 volunteers participated. After the election, General Suchinda was chosen as the Prime Minister. Choi (2002:20) says 'the return to power of Sichinda after the March election destroyed not only the hope of the poor for an end to their plight, but also infuriated the urban middle classes'. The protest began in April 1992, insisting on the removal of Suchinda and the cancellation of the four provisional clauses. The core group in this movement included the veterans of 1973-76 activists, labour leaders, local community leaders and the Campaign for Popular Democracy. The Democrats and New Aspiration parties provided verbal support, but the Chamlong' Phalang Tham Party played a more active role. Chamlong took the leading role. The demonstrations not only happened in Bangkok but also in many provinces across the country. It was seen as a large-scale middle class movement for the first time. The demonstration continued until May when the incident...
became violent because soldiers fired into the crowd. Although the government completely controlled the national press, the international press, through satellite and cable television, showed the violence and how military troops treated the demonstrators. Mobile phones were used as a tool to distribute messages among demonstrators and to people who did not take part in the event, so it was called the ‘mobile phone mob’ by the press. The situation was ended by the King. The King appeared on national television while Chamlong and Suchinda were sitting in front of him. He ordered Chamlong and Suchinda to join hands to stop the violence. Suchinda resigned on May 24 and Anand Panyarachun was again appointed as head of the interim government. On the next day the Parliament completed the first and second readings of a bill to cancel the provisional clauses (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002; and Choi, 2002).

The crisis of May 1992 resulted in the end of military influence in Thai politics. The constitution requires the prime minister to be an elected representative in parliament. The interim government removed generals from major posts in state enterprises. In 1995 the number of military senators in the appointed Senate was reduced and businessmen were replaced (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002). However, Choi’s (2002:40) view is that, ‘the removal of military domination did not mean the end of exploitation and corruption. As it turned out, business politicians quickly filled the political vacuum left behind by the military. Corruption and vote buying appeared to take a turn for the worse after the Bangkok uprising.’

3.3.4. After the 1992 uprising to 1997 People’s Constitution

After the May 1992 incident, the demand for political reform was raised by academics, NGOs, some politicians and other activist groups because of poor performances in politics such as vote buying, especially in rural areas, and the emergence of money politics. This movement gained great public support. Finally, in December 1996, the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) was established to draft a new constitution, which would be submitted to the National Assembly for approval. The CDA consisted of 99 members, of which 76 members were chosen from 76 provinces, and 23 members were drawn from lawyers, scholars in different areas and NGOs. Local, regional and national public hearings and consultation meetings were arranged throughout the process. This was the first experience of Thai history where all sectors in society participated in the drafting of the constitution, so it is called the ‘people’s constitution’. The constitution was promulgated on October 11, 1997 (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

The 1997 constitution

The 1997 constitution has created significant changes in Thai political system as Albritton and Bureekul (2002) note that the new constitution represents a shift from the movement toward full democracy. The major issues of the constitution can be summarised as follows:

(1) Human rights: For the first time the constitution stipulates that human dignity must be protected. People have the right to vote, to form a political party, and to access government information. Regarding community rights it states that ‘a person so assembling as to be a traditional community shall have the right to conserve or restore their customs, local knowledge, arts or good culture of their community and of the nation and participate in the management, maintenance, preservation and exploitation of natural resources and the environment in a balanced fashion and persistently as provide by law’.

(2) Checks and balances: The supervision and control of the government and its agencies by people is one of the major principles of the constitution. It creates six
new commissions to handle this function, namely: the Election Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, the Constitutional Court, the National Prevention and Counter Corruption Commission, and the National Comptroller Commission.

(3) Separation of powers: The idea of the separation of power is based on the concept of creating a stable government, and protecting individual rights and freedom from the abuse of government power. It therefore separates the executive power from the legislative power. The House of Representatives choose one of its members to be the prime minister. The prime minister then forms the cabinet. The cabinet members cannot be members of the House of Representatives or government officials at the same time.

(4) Election: Voting is compulsory by law. People directly elect the Senate, which has power to recall and investigate politicians. Senators are required to not affiliate with any political party to keep their political roles neutral. MPs come from both direct election and party lists: nominated by political parties to allow certain professionals to be elected into the parliament. In addition elections are overseen by the Election Commission as the independent agency (Aphornsuvan, 2001).

3.3.5. The Thaksin regime (February 9, 2001 to September 19, 2006)

3.3.5.1 The Thaksin government

The Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was in power from 2001 until September 2006. He was the first PM under the People’s Constitution (or the 1997 Constitution). He established the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) in 1999. In the early years of the TRT party, its leadership contained a diverse range of academics and student activists from the 1970s and business leaders. Many MPs from other parties were mobilised to his party with cash inducements, indicating that they would win the election (Simpson, 2006). TRT won the majority of seats in parliament in the 2001 national election. After the 2001 election, few parties merged with TRT, resulting in a larger number of MPs. In February 2005, TRT won a landslide victory in the election, securing a total of 377 seats in parliament, which is so large that opposition MPs do not have the required quorum to call for a censure motion in parliament (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003; and Ganesan, 2006). The Thaksin government was different from all previous governments: firstly, it was led by one of the country’s richest businessmen (owning the largest telecommunication company in Thailand) and supported by big business. The rise of Thaksin is the greatest success of big business in Thai politics. Secondly, TRT fought the election on a popular platform, targeting the rural masses (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003:26).

When he first came to power, Thaksin stated that ‘a country is a company. A company is a country. They are the same’ (Phongpaichit, 2004:2). Phongpaichit (2004:5) expresses that ‘when a country becomes a company, and government becomes management, then people are not so much citizens with rights, liberties, and aspirations, but rather consumers and factors of production’. Thus he offered a new vision of the PM’s role as CEO (chief executive officer) of the Thailand Company (Simpson, 2006:11). Thaksin’s ideas and concepts as the leader of the country and his working style have been criticised as follows:

(1) Nationalism

Thaksin used nationalism as a tool to spur on the Thai economy, and so was identified as a nationalist (Phongpaichit, 2004 and Simpson, 2006:11). ‘The idea of nationalism was not based on an imagined ethnic identity, but that the interests of the people “bundled together”
in Thailand were paramount and that economic sovereignty was the key to their interests’ (Simpson, 2006:14 cited Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004). Therefore, Simpson (2006:15) points out that Thaksin employed nationalism as a rhetorical device to achieve national economic growth, but his nationalism also served TRT’s hidden agenda of self-enrichment and empowerment. ‘Both aims underline Thaksin’s ultimate goal that: unfettered capitalism become the unassailable political discourse in Thailand’ (Simpson, 2006:15).

His nationalism began from the name of his party, Thai Ruk Thai or Thai Love Thai. Secondly, during the election campaign he criticised the previous government for being too passive with the IMF and foreign business; the IMF loan from the financial crisis was repaid two years early, and government offices were ordered to display the Thai national flag at all times and corporations encouraged to display the flag on their buildings and products (Pongpaichit and Baker, 2002: 2; and Simpson, 2006:14).

(2) Populist policy

The major policy of the entire Thaksin regime was populism, which was new to Thai society. Many terms were used to refer to Thaksin’s populist policies, such as populist spending programmes, populist pledges, populist sheen, populist election campaign, and populist brand of government. The major populist policies were in line with the nationalist position of Thaksin’s party (Case, 2001; Pongpaichit and Baker, 2002; and Ganesan, 2006). Based on his idea that incorporating people more firmly into capitalism will increase growth, the populism of the Thaksin government aimed at broadening and deepening the extent of the domestic capitalist economy. The populist schemes mostly focused on increasing access to capital and targeting low-income people. He said ‘capitalism needs capital, without which there is no capitalism. We need to push capital into the rural areas’ (Phongpaichit, 2004:3). Phongpaichit (2004:3) notes that ‘this was the first time in the Thai history; we have moved capital closer to the people’. The major populist schemes are as follows: the One-Tambon-One product (OTOP) scheme, attempting to boost rural entrepreneurship by adopting the the Japanese initiative of ‘one village, one product; ‘People’s Bank’ offering micro-credit loans; thirty baht per visit universal healthcare; the village fund; and the revolving fund. As a result of the populist policies, Thaksin brought changes to Thai politics: firstly, domestic capital has come into the core of Thai politics; secondly, the rural mass has gained some bargaining power through the ballot box (Pongpaichit and Baker, 2002: 12). Thaksin’s government has no policy focusing on labour, land and tax reforms. His main strategy for rural change is to allocate capital funds but he has no strategy to empower farmers, rather he wants to convert them into businessmen (Pongpaichit and Baker, 2002). As a result of his populist policy, it can be said that the Thaksin government became highly popular among the rural poor because no government in the past launched policy directly allocating funds to them. However, as his government did not strengthen rural people, some of them utilised the fund in ways that did not serve its objectives, for example it paid for a motorcycle, mobile phone or other properties, and was not invested in career development. In addition, it has been also obviously shown that his government ignored many national social problems by leaving them in the day-to-day management of bureaucrats.

The emergence of populist policies of Thaksin and the TRT party has been explained by academics in the term ‘Thaksinomics’. ‘Thaksinomics’ means that ‘the government bestows patronage on its affiliated crony capitalist groups on the one hand and garners support from the lower classes by increasing their economic power on the other’ (Aeusirivongse, 2001:1). Aeusirivongse (2001:1) further criticises that the measures do not only strengthen the domestic market but also win the government overwhelming popular
political support. The policies tried to serve both capitalists and the grassroots, or the rich and the poor (Aeusrivongse, 2001; and Pongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

According to the study conducted by the Thailand Development Research Institute, Thaksin’s government policies did not contribute to the country’s bullish economic performance. The government benefited from the economic stability laid down by the previous government of Chuan Leekpai. The populist policies did not affect domestic consumption much because a rise in domestic consumption was the result of a low-interest-rate environment. In addition, debt restructuring for the poor missed its target because about 82 percent of those who did not register were poor (Chaitrong, 2006).

(3) An authoritarian regime

Simpson (2006:3) classifies the Thaksin regime as a ‘competitive authoritarian regime’; ‘his government controlled the media, harassed civil society, and used state violence in ways that recalled Thailand’s past military dictators’ (Simpson, 2006:3). Similarly, the Asian Human Rights Commission views that the Thaksin government was a civilian autocratic because it did not respect human rights and democratic principles. Ganesan (2006:153) points out that during the Thaksin regime, ‘domestic political and social developments reflect a weaker commitment to democratic ideals and its structural and cultural consolidation’. The evidence can be explained as follows.

(3.1) the government attempted to repress the growth of political assertiveness mediated through press, protest, NGOs, academics, public intellectuals, and civil organisations. Thaksin constantly attacked foreign journalist UN agencies, foreign NGOs and foreign sponsors of Thai NGOs. He viewed NGOs and environmental activists as annoying and unnecessary inhibitors of economic growth. He claimed that protests were organised simply to secure foreign funds. He also attempted to link NGOs to organised crime through dubious asset investigations by the Anti-Money Laundering Office, which was later judged unlawful by the Administrative Court (Simpson, 2006; and Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003)

(3.2) to control the media, his family business, Shin Corporation, took over the iTV channel (the only independent news television channel established after the May 1992 incident). A group of journalists on the channel complained that Thaksin had interfered in election reporting. ‘Media issues are high on the list of the ten worst human rights violations in 2005 as listed by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (Thailand)’. According to the World Press Freedom Index, the rank of Thailand dropped from its position 59 in 2004 to 107 (of 167) in 2005 (Simpson, 2006:23)

(3.3) Thaksin’s ‘War on Drugs’, announced in January 2003, one of his major policies, later led to nationwide criticism of the human rights issue. The policy aimed at eradicating drugs, in particular methamphetamine use, in three months. The government issued the Prime Minister’s Order 29/B.E. 2546 (2003), signed on January 28, 2003, calling for the absolute suppression of drug trafficking, by means ranging from soft to harsh, including the most severe charges applicable to the situation (The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2003). Even though the policy was extremely effective in reducing drug consumption, especially in schools, about 2,500 people were killed (mostly by gunmen) during the three-month period. A year after the 2006 coup, the military junta ordered another investigation into the anti-drug campaign. Its results showed that as many as 1,400 of the 2,500 cases had no link to drugs (The Nation, 27 November 2007).
the structural weakening of democracy is Thaksin's co-optation of almost all the independent centres of power and authority in the domestic political process. These included the military, banking, and business establishments (Ganesan, 2006:168). The government instructed the army security services to restart monitoring political activities, including those of NGOs. Thaksin attempted to personalise support in the military and police by promoting his allies, such as classmates and relatives, to take the key posts (Simpson, 2006:19). He skilfully strengthened one-party rule. He persuaded the leaders of the lesser parties to dissolve their parties and function under the TRT banner (Ganesan, 2006; and Maisrikrod, 2007).

The Thaksin government sought to influence the accountability institutions, including the Constitution Court, the Election Commission, and the Senate (Maisrikrod, 2007).

3.3.5.2 The Anti-Thaksin movement

In mid-September 2005, the crisis began with the intra-elite conflict between Thaksin and Sndhi Limthongkul, one of Thaksin’s business allies, who ran the Thailand Weekly talk show on state-owned Channel 9. After his programme was halted because of his criticisms about Thaksin government, Sondhi started an open-air talk show every Friday at Thammasart University, which later moved to Lumpini Park because of the increasing audiences (Pye and Schaffar, 2008; and Simpson, 2006). It became an ‘outlet in Thailand for the urban masses to express political dissent’. The Thai media and academics labelled it as ‘Sondhi fever’, or ‘the Sondhi phenomenon’ (Escobar, 2005).

The turning point, in January 2006, was when Thaksin’s family sold their stake (49%) in the Shin Corporation to Temasek, Singapore’s state-run investment agency, for 73 billion baht (£1.1 billion). It was labelled as ‘the deal of the century’. There was also dissent over the deal avoiding a large tax bill (Simpson, 2006). The deal became seriously criticised in all the media. The first anti-Thaksin mass demonstration was organised on 4 February under the name ‘kan chum num ku chart’ (‘gathering to rescue the nation’). On 11 February, the second mass demonstration was arranged under the name ‘pid ban chi Thaksin’ (‘Closing down Thaksin’) and the People’s Alliance for Democracy was announced.

The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) was formed in February 2006 by five core members: Sondhi, Chamlong SriMeung, a former leader of May 1992 movement; activist Phipop Thaongchai; State enterprise labour leader Somsak Kosaisuk; and University lecturer Somkiat Pongpaibul. Initially, the PAD consisted mostly of middle to upper-class residents of Bangkok, but then quickly expanded to include supporters from all areas of the country. They were heterogeneous groups. The PAD organised anti-Thaksin rallies and demonstrations in Bangkok and major cities across the country. Hundreds of thousands of people took part over a period of two months, from the beginning of February until the end of March 2006. They demanded Thaksin’s resignation. It led to a very tense political situation. Many parties in Thai society, including academics, high-ranking officials and former prime ministers, voiced their views through the media, suggesting peaceful and compromising ways to solve the conflict. The criticisms centred around the personal and national interest conflicts of Thaksin: Thaksin’s use of power for personal profit, his alleged tax evasion, and the sell-off of national assets’ (Pye and Schaffar, 2008).

The pro-Thaksin rally started in March 2006, during the April election campaign, but it was claimed by the anti-Thaksin group that most people were paid to attend (The Nation, March 8, 2006). It has become common to define the anti-Thaksin protests as a middle-class
movement, while support for Thaksin came from the poor in the countryside, mainly from the north and northeast regions. In my view, this stemmed from the fact that most middle-class people, who are educated and live in cities, recognised the corrupt behaviour of Thaksin and his allies through criticisms by the mass media and academics. On the other hand, the poor appreciated his populist policy. Most of the MPs of Thaksin’s Party were based in those two regions, in particular the north, where Thaksin’s hometown is. Regarding corruption, the poor viewed that many former Prime Ministers were also corrupt, not only Thaksin (Pye and Schaffar, 2008:9). However, Pye and Schaffar (2008:2) are true to argue that ‘the anti-Thaksin movement was rooted in the contradictory nature of Thaksin's project itself, which combined populist programmes with a deeper restructuring of Thai capitalism’.

Under increasing pressure, Thaksin dissolved parliament on 24 February 2006 and called a new election on 2 April 2006. All serious opposition boycotted the election after Thaksin reportedly refused to sign a pledge to implement constitutional reforms. During the election campaign, the Democrat Party, the major opposition of the Thai Rak Thai party, suggested electorates for choosing ‘No vote’ option in ballot papers. As a result, TRT won nearly all seats in the parliament: sixty million party-list votes (60 per cent) for TRT nation-wide, as against ten million (37 per cent) of the so called ‘No vote’ (Maisrikrod, 2007).

On 25 April 2006, in a royal audience granted to the newly appointed member of Administrative Court and Supreme Court, King Phumibol instructed the judges of Administrative Court and Supreme Court and the justices of Constitution Court to solve the problem of the nation. The King said ‘as far as I’m concerned, a one party election is not normal. The one candidate situation is undemocratic...the nation cannot survive if the situation runs contrary to the law. Therefore, I ask you to carefully study whether you can make the point on this issue. If not, you had better resign’ (The Nation, April 26, 2006). The Courts then promptly took action. On 8 May 2006, the Constitutional Tribunal annulled the 2 April election, and a new election was ordered for 6 October 2006. The ruling was based on two reasons: ‘first, ordering the new election to take place only 37 days after dissolution of the House, though not in itself of a violation of the constitution, had nevertheless led to political problems serious enough to violate democratic core of the election. Second, by turning the polling booths around in a way the open part would point to the polling station committee and the public, while the voter would turn his backs to both, the constitutionally guaranteed secrecy of the vote had been fundamentally violated’ (Nelson, 2006:13). ‘The court did not so much concern purely legal interpretations, but rather implemented a royally initiated attempt to find a way out of the political ‘mess’ by using the court and the law’ (Nelson 2006:14). After the verdict, the Election Commission came under strong pressure to resign. On 25 July 2006, a criminal court sentenced the remaining three members to an unsuspended four years in prison for malfeasance in office while managing the April 2006 election.

On 19 September, Thaksin was ousted by a bloodless coup launched by the Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy led by Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Martial law was declared nationwide. The People’s constitution was abolished. In the first official announcement, the main reasons for the coup were: disunity and division among Thai people; interference in national independent agencies; and bordering on ‘lese majeste’. It was emphasised that ‘we have no intention to rule but to return the power to the people as soon as possible’ (The Nation, September 19, 2006).
3.3.6. The interim government and the new constitution (October 1, 2006 to January 29, 2008)

After the 19 September coup, the interim civilian government, led by General Surayud Chulanont, was appointed, and the Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy who made the coup transformed to the Council for National Security (CNS). The Surayud government saw Thaksin as a threat to national security and Thaksin’s return would create conflict and violence. The government promoted the King’s Sufficiency Economy concept, in contrast with Thaksin’s growth-oriented approach (Rado, 2008). The national election was planned for December 2007. The post-coup politics attempted to eradicate the Thaksin regime and to prevent the rise of a government similar to that of Thaksin. Thus, the new constitution was drafted to weaken the role of prime minister and political parties (Maisrikrod, 2007; and Phongpaichit, 2007). The new constitution was drafted by the Constitutional Drafting Committee and approved by the National Legislative Assembly, and then submitted to a popular referendum on 19 August 2007. It passed with a slim margin, 57 percent (Public Relations Department, 2007b). Charoensin-o-larn (2007:18) points out that ‘many people voted ‘no’ to the draft because they did not like the military coup and did not want the military to intervene in politics’. However, Charoensin-o-larn (2007:1) argues that the new constitution ‘will intensify rather than reduce current political divide in Thai society’. Thaksin was exiled abroad for more than one year after the coup. The National Security Council and the Surayud government saw Thaksin as a threat to national security and Thaksin’s return would create conflict and violence (Charoensin-o-larn, 2007).

On 30 May 2007, the Constitutional Tribunal officially dissolved the TRT party (together with other three parties), and banned 111 members of TRT’s executive board including Thaksin from taking part in politics for five years. The TRT was charged with illegally hiring smaller parties to contest the April election in order to boost the poll’s credibility and to avoid a legal requirement of winning at least 20 per cent of eligible votes cast in the case of single candidacy. The party also misused the independent Election Commission by paying an official to change the party registration information (Charoensin-o-larn, 2007; and Public Relations Department, 2007a).

The Asset Scrutiny Committee was appointed by the National Security Council to investigate alleged corruption cases involving former Prime Minister Thaksin. The investigated cases include five malfeasance cases and six of abuse of power. In July 2007, the Committee ordered a freeze on most of the family’s money in Thai-based bank accounts – in particular the money from selling his entire stake, which was distributed in many accounts of his family and relatives. Thaksin and his family (wife and two children) and his government members have been potentially threatened by lawsuits as a result of the Committee’s investigation (Charoensin-o-larn, 2007).

3.3.7. The People Power Party (January 29, 2008 to present)

After the TRT was dissolved, members of the former TRT joined the little-known People Power Party (PPP) headed by Samak Sundaravej in July 2007. It was announced that the PPP had a similar ideology to the TRT (The Nation, July 27, 2007). An election under the 2007 constitution was organised in December 2007. The PPP won the majority votes, and with other five coalition parties set up the government, led by Samak Sundaravej. Only the Democrat Party was in opposition. Rado (2008:31) notices that ‘since the PPP-led coalition
government took over in early February 2008, the brand ‘Thaksinomics’ is again becoming acceptable in the public domain’.

In April 2008, a political crisis emerged again when the Samak Government announced plans to amend several articles focusing on seven points of the Constitution, in particular Articles 237 and 309, sparking criticism nationwide in all media and academic forums. It has been criticised that: the amendment of Article 237 serves the government’s self-interest as the article involves the party dissolution; the amendment of Article 309 could overturn the Council for National Security's orders, including the establishment of the Assets Scrutiny Committee. Then Thaksin could gain benefit when his cases are presented to the Court. The government has failed to explain how it will benefit the public. In addition, most people see this as an attempt to negate the investigation into alleged corruption charges against members of PPP and the Thaksin Government (The Nation, April 3, 2008). As a result, mass demonstrations and rallies came onto the streets again. The People’s Alliance for Democracy was re-formed to lead the first demonstration on 28 May 2008 in the centre of Bangkok. During the first few days, they demanded cancellation of the Constitution amendment. Later, the demand was for the government’s resignation. At the same time, pro-Thaksin groups came out to counter the PAD, which sometimes led to confrontation. Mostly middle class people participated in the demonstrations. Meanwhile, the government has tried to maintain negotiation, not using force. The demonstrations focus on the disclosure of corrupt behaviour of the government and its allies. At the same time, the government also confronted with protests by various groups, ranging from farmers to truckers, who are struggling to survive due to the rising cost of living as a result of oil price increases (Bangkok Post, June 12, 2008).

3.4 Conclusion

Thai society is known as a loosely structured society. About 90% of population are Buddhists so its belief highly influences the way of living of Thai people. Poverty is a major problem of the country. The patronage system is also deeply rooted in Thai society, and it affects the economy, politics and social life. Like most developing countries, Thailand has been developed following the model of western modernisation. Today, Thailand highly depends on exports as its main income, especially agricultural products. The country’s democratisation developed through several major steps. The first significant one occurred when it transformed from an absolute monarchy to democracy, in the form of constitutional monarchy. The first turning point of its political history was the student uprising of 1973, which led to a regime change from a military government to a civil government with public participation. Thai people enjoyed a short period of ‘democracy’ after the student uprising, and student activists became the main actors of this period. In addition, with student cooperation, the first farmers’ movement organisation was established. However, political opportunities were closed for most political activists after the 1976 coup, and many of them left cities to join the communist party. Thailand experienced political bloodshed again in May 1992, resulting in demands for political reform from different parties, which led to the establishment of a Constitution Drafting Assembly. The constitution, known as the people’s constitution, was officially announced in 1997, and it is considered to have created the political structural change of the country. Thaksin, who owned the biggest telecommunication company of Thailand, was the first PM under this constitution. His major policy was populism, which was new to Thai society and was criticised by academics in the term of ‘Thaksinomics’. During his regime, NGOs were seriously confronted with repression from the state. In late 2005, anti-Thaksin protests emerged and were participated in by middle class people, and the movement expanded when Thaksin’s families sold their
stake in Shin Corporation Public Company, labelled as ‘the deal of the century’, in January 2006. Thaksin’s regime ended with a bloodless coup on September 19, 2006. After the coup, the country was governed for more than one year by the interim civilian government, led by General Surayud. This government viewed Thaksin as a threat to national security. However, in a new national election in early 2008, the People Power Party, which has been known as Thaksin’s party, won the majority of votes and set up a government led by PM Samak. A political crisis occurred again when the Samak Government announced its intention to amend the constitution. The middle-class protest re-formed, led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy, as they argued that the constitutional amendment would be beneficial to Thaksin and his family.

The background of Thailand’s society, economy and politics presented in this chapter will inform the rest of the chapters, except Chapters 4 and 5. The political change in Thailand will be an important basis for the empirical analysis of the case studies in Chapters 9 to 11.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become a significant part of societies at all levels, ranging from local to global levels. They play their roles in a variety of fields. They also employ a variety of ideologies and strategies in many developing countries where governments lack resources; NGOs provide welfare services to the poor, and upgrade their ways of living. In the environmental field, since the early 1990s, NGOs have influenced government decisions to develop policies to protect natural resources and even how people perceive environmental problems (Betsill and Corell, 2008). The number of NGOs has dramatically grown: in 1993 there were 2,970 NGOs registered in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and about 50,000 national NGOs in developing countries. In fact, hundreds of thousands of indigenous NGOs operate in the South (Silliman and Noble, 1998). In addition, the number of international NGOs increased from about 13,000 in 1981 to over 47,000 by 2001 (Anheier, 2005).

Next, the definition of NGOs is discussed. NGOs in developing countries are illustrated, focusing on their emergence, the role of NGOs, and their relationship with the state. In this regard, situations of NGOs in some developing countries are reviewed.

4.1. What are NGOs?

The term ‘non-governmental organisations (NGOs)’ was first introduced by the United Nations in 1949. Therefore, during the first period the term ‘NGOs’ was mainly applied in reference to the UN context. Since the 1980s, it has become popular for societal actors at local, international and national levels, and has been adopted more broadly by academics and by activists themselves. However, before the term ‘NGO’ became solidified through UN practice, many terms were employed, such as private organisations, international pressure groups, volunteer organisations or volas (Martens, 2002).

There is no consensus among scholars and policymakers about the definition of NGOs. The term NGO has different connotations in different countries (Princen and Finger, 1994; Silliman and Noble, 1998; Martens, 2002). The term NGO has been used to refer to a wide range of organisations, which are often differentiated in terms of geographic scope, substantive issue area, and /or type of activities (Betsill and Corell, 2008:4). In addition, Clarke (1998:37) points out that ‘in the contemporary NGO literature NGOs are distinguished from people organisations, local, non-profit membership-based associations that organise and mobilise their constituents in support of collective welfare goals’. At present, this term is seen as being too broad because it encompasses other actors that are not NGOs, such as multinational companies or national liberation organisations (Martens, 2002). Hirsch (2003: 238) notices that ‘non is an ambiguous term rather than a clear description of the place of NGOs within the structures of state and society in general and in relation to the state and state organisations at the national and international levels in

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particular’. As NGOs receive funding support from government or have funds channelled through government, he further raises some questions: whether NGOs are really organisations of ‘civil society’ rather than state organisations; whether they are part of a government and regulatory complex; and whether they should be identified as parts of the ‘extended state’ (Hirsch, 2003).

According to Clark (1991), the term NGO refers to voluntary organisations. Clark, Simiman and Noble (1998:6) further clarify the term ‘NGO’ to designate ‘any voluntary organisation that is independent of both the government and the private business’. Meanwhile, Hulme and Edwards (1997) and Simiman and Noble (1998) share the same ideas in defining the term NGO as an organisation that seeks to promote development and grassroots organisations. They differentiate NGOs from grassroots organisations: Simiman and Noble describe grassroots organisations as people organisations, and grassroots support organisations as NGOs; Hulme and Edwards (1997: 21) explain that grassroots organisations are formally accountable to their members, but NGOs are not. Alternatively, Gordenker and Weiss (1997:444) consider that NGOs are non-profit organisations, which are private in form but public in purpose. Meanwhile, Anheier uses the narrower concept, as he considers that NGOs are one of a variety of organisational forms in the non-profit sector. He defines NGOs as ‘the organisations engaged in the promotion of economic and social development, typically at the grassroots level’ (Anheier, 2005:39). It can be said that Hulme and Edwards, Simiman and Noble, and Anheier share the same ideas of definition by emphasising the aims of organisations that provide grassroots support, although they use different terms to identify the forms of organisations: voluntary organisations and non-profit organisations.

Martin (2002) also employs a broad concept, as he defines NGOs ‘as societal organisations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level’. However, he refers to a more specific form of organisation: NGOs are formal, professionalised and independent from the state. Similarly, Clarke (1998:36) states that ‘NGOs are private, non-profit, professional organisations, with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals’. Therefore, in the views of Martin and Clarke, they refer to a broader aim of organisations, not only grassroots support.

Hirsch (2003) defines the characteristics of NGOs similarly to Martin and Clarke, but Hirsch focuses on political aims instead of public welfare. He describes an ‘NGO as any formally private organisation, which is active in politics at a national or international level and exhibits the following characteristics: non-profit oriented (charitable status); engaged in advocacy and not representing their own material interests; organisationally and financially independent of the state and commercial enterprises; and professional competence and permanence as an organisation’ (Hirsch, 2003:239). His definition can distinguish between NGOs and other ‘non-state’ organisations which are active in the political arena such as: associations and groups that only represent the particular interests of their members, such as trade union and grassroots initiatives, and many forms of temporary or loosely organised political movements. Then, in Hirsch’s view, ‘NGOs can be part of a social movement, although they are often seen as a product of the disintegration of social movements or even as opposition to a movement’ (Hirsch, 2003:239). Warkentin, who studied eight NGOs at international level, also considers NGOs as ‘transnational social movement organisations that seek to bring a change in the status quo’ (Warkentin, 2001:21). McCarthy and Zald (1987) also emphasise that some kinds of voluntary organisations can be considered as social movement organisations (SMOs).
Blair has an idea to link between NGOs and civil society organisations. Blair (1997) argues that only the NGOs that aim at influencing public policy can be defined as civil society organisations. In his view, all civil society organisations are NGOs, but only some NGOs are civil society organisations. The relationship of civil society organisations to NGOs and society is shown in Figure 4.1.

![Figure 4.1: The relationship of civil society organisations to NGOs and society (Blair, 1997:25).](image)

In this research, as it aims to examine the role of NGOs in social movements, I adopt the ideas of Hirsch, Warkentin, and McCarthy and Zald, who see NGOs as part of social movements and social movement organisations. Then, the term NGO defines as an organisation which is independent from the state and private business, non-profit oriented and professionalised. It aims to influence public policy, so it can be considered as a social movement organisation (SMOs). In this definition, NGOs are distinguished from people and grassroots organisations. By adapting Blair’s model, the relationship of NGOs and SMOs can be illustrated in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2.

### 4.2. Types of NGOs

The diversity of the global NGOs community derives from:

1. Size of their budgets, staff, and offices; many NGOs operate with only a few paid staff and with very limited budgets
2. Organisational duration: the durability of NGOs may depend on targeted issues and their capacities to organise, raise funds and integrate into larger networks and institutions
3. Activities: the scope of activities covers various fields, for example, nature protection, pollution, poverty alleviation, human rights, research and education. Although each NGO has its special area of focus, few can achieve their goals without incorporating a wide range of activities
4. Ideological orientations, for example, the ideas of ‘realists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ of the green movements
5. Cultural backgrounds: in Latin America, many NGOs activities developed from the works of the Catholic Church. In most developing countries, women have been ignored in the development process and, partly as a result, many NGOs exclusively for women have been started
(6) Differences in organisational culture: Northern NGOs are becoming more institutionalised. Southern NGOs are becoming more independent and setting the international agenda. Financial support and technology tend to flow from the North to the South, while the idea of sustainable development, in particular among the poor, is increasingly flowing from South to North.

(7) Legal status and public recognition: in many countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia, NGOs are largely organised and funded by governments. In developed countries, the citizen has legal rights to organise, lobby and protest, but the situations in some developing countries are different (Princen and Finger, 1994: 6-9).

Simiman and Noble (1998:5-6) point out that scholars have different ideas to classify the types of NGO. Korten classifies NGOs into four types: voluntary organisations, public service contractors, people’s organisations and governmental NGOs. Farrington and Beddington distinguish NGOs based on their origins and their staff composition: either advocacy activities or development actions, and either serving their membership or a grassroots clientele. Fisher classifies NGOs into: grassroots organisations, networks of grassroots support organisations, and networks of grassroots support organisations involved in development. In addition, some scholars distinguish NGOs based on the characters of their primary activities: advocacy, research and outreach. (Betsill and Corell, 2008:4).

Clark (1991:40-41) notes that today NGOs can be divided into six schools:

(1) relief and welfare agencies
(2) technical innovation organisations that aim to create new technologies or improve approaches to problems, and which specialise in their fields
(3) public service contractors. NGOs that are mostly funded by northern governments, and which work closely with southern governments, such as CARE
(4) popular development agencies: the cooperation between northern NGOs and their southern counterparts which focuses on self-help, social development and grassroots democracy
(5) grassroots development organisations: locally-based southern NGOs whose members are the poor, and which attempt to shape a popular development process
(6) advocacy groups and networks: organisations which have no field projects but primarily aim to achieve results by means of education and lobbying.

4.3. NGOs in developing countries

NGOs in developing countries are immense in number and diversified in activities as is the case in developed countries. The number of NGOs has rapidly grown since the 1970s. Asian countries probably have the largest number of NGOs in the developing world: India has some 12,000 development NGOs and hundreds of thousand of local groups (Princen and Finger, 1994). There were 58,000 NGOs in the Philippines in 1993 (Silliman and Noble, 1998: 10). It is estimated that 58,000 or more remain unregistered (Constraintino-David, 1998:27). Southern NGOs have successfully challenged social and environmental programmes pursued by their own governments; most NGOs work in the areas of poverty, have a direct relationship with communities of the poor, and have significant experience of tackling environmental problems (Clark, 1991:5). It was estimated that northern NGOs worked with 10,000-20,000 southern NGOs covering some 60 million people in Asia, 25 million in Latin American and 12 million in Africa (Clark, 1991:51).
Next, the phenomenon of NGOs in developing countries will be illustrated by focusing on their emergence, their relationship with states, and roles of NGOs. In this regard, the situation in some Asian countries will be raised, such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Bangladesh.

4.3.1. Views of the term ‘NGO’

The governments in many developing counties often have a negative view of the term ‘NGO’. In China, NGO is often translated as ‘anti-government’ (Martens, 2002:277). The Indonesian government has expressed its unwillingness to use the term NGO as it is used elsewhere. Thus the Indonesian government has introduced the term ‘self-reliant community institutions’ instead. ‘The reason is that the term NGO connotes an alternative power or organisation that might compete with the government in claiming the success of the country development’ (ADB, 1999:21).

In China, the official Chinese term for NGOs is ‘popular organisations’, which are non-profit-making and are comprised of ‘social organisations’ and ‘private non-enterprise units’. Social organisations are membership-based, whereas the private non-enterprise units are not (Lu, 2007). Traditionally, the term ‘social organisation’ has been recognised by Chinese Government that it is distinct from political party. However, this term is referred NGOs in the discussion with foreigners (Howell, 1997:204). Howell (1997:205-207) distinguishes social organisation of China into four types:

1. Mass organisations, which historically connect with the Chinese Communist Party, refer to All-China Federation of Trade Unions and All-China Women’s Federations. These organisations strongly rely on the Party and state
2. Semi-official organisations that find alternative sources of funds but still receive some from the state. The state plays a key role in their foundation, not only encouraging them to set up but often providing them with the necessary starting funds and ongoing support
3. Popular organisations that are more spontaneous, voluntary and autonomous than semi-official organisations. This type corresponds closest to the notion in discourse of ‘membership support organisations’. However, there are a very few grassroots support organisations
4. Illegal or unrecognised organisations that operate outside the state legal and administrative system, such as advocacy groups challenging government policy and alternative interest groups such as the National Autonomous Federation of Students.

HowELL, (1997:207) emphasises that ‘unlike many Asian and Latin American countries, China has few NGOs in the development field which have been initiated from below and are able to control their organisation structures’. According to Chinese researchers, Chinese NGOs divide into: officially organised NGOs, which are created and subsidised by the government, their leadership positions mostly held by government officers; and popular NGOs initiated by private citizens without government subsidies (Lu, 2007).

In India, NGOs are ‘organisations that are generally formed by professional or quasi-professionals from the middle or lower middle class, either to serve or work with the poor, or to channel financial support to community-based or grassroots organisations of the poor. The NGOs are generally non-membership organisations’ (Sen, 1999:329). Grassroots organisations or community-based organisations can be defined as organisations formed by members of low-income communities. They are usually membership-based. These organisations are classified as NGOs because the state’s policy affects them; they are subject to the same laws and regulations as NGOs. Indian NGOs can be divided into three
types: empowerment, modernisation and welfare. It is common for more than one orientation to exist in the same NGO. Many Indians believe in a notion of voluntarism, which does not fit the western term NGO. So many NGOs prefer to be called voluntary agencies, social action groups, or non-party political formation, instead of using the term NGO (Sen, 1999).

Weiss (2003:30) notices that Malaysian NGOs ‘do not fit the theoretical ideal of democratic, grassroots-oriented, politically transformative organisations for building social capital and keeping the government in line. Too few of them are truly independent, self-financing, and racially and linguistically inclusive.’ In contrast to Malaysia, Philippine NGOs consist of a variety forms: individuals, which are referred as non-governmental individuals; membership-based organisations; development, justice, and advocacy NGOs, or development NGOs; traditional NGOs, including charity and welfare organisations; funding agency NGOs; mutant NGOs – established by the government (Constrantino-David, 1998:28-30).

4.3.2. Emergence of NGOs in developing countries

The emergence of the NGO sector is different from one country to another, depending on social, political and economic conditions. During the early period of NGOs’ development, NGOs were charitable in nature with the main objective of assisting the poor. Some scholars argue that the larger contemporary role in development is rooted in and derives from the role of non-governmental religious organisations (Henderson, 2002:102). For example, in the late 1960s, the Philippine Catholic Church, under the Second Vatican Council of 1962-1965, committed itself to both spiritual guidance and action on behalf of justice and transformation. The basic Christian community programme of the Church played a vital role in the development of grassroots organisations by working closely with the poor in rural areas. Later, various social movements that sought to transform economic, political and social conditions also influenced the emergence of NGOs in the Philippines. In particular, the student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s produced the ‘first generation’ of NGO leaders as universities encouraged students to work with labour unions and urban poor communities (Silliman and Noble, 1998:285).

In Malaysia, NGOs have their roots in a range of organisations, including Chinese secret societies, Indian nationalist associations and Malay-Muslim progress organisations. The structure, function, and issue orientation of these early Malaysian organisations varied partly with ethnicity and attendant socio-economic traits, and partly with time, as both political awareness and legal structures evolved through the pre-independence period. Even though modern NGOs have developed in Malaysia since the 1970s, the basic traits of associational life inherited from pre-independence have remained relatively constant. NGOs remain largely racially segregated in membership, and tension persists regarding whether NGOs or only political parties should assume openly political roles (Weiss, 2003).

Political space is a major variable that has affected the emergence of NGOs. In China, NGOs appeared in the post-Mao regime: ‘reforms have not only led to a relaxation of state control over the economy and society, but have also seen the state actively creating and sponsoring NGOs in order to transfer to them certain functions which it used to perform itself under the command system’ (Lu 2007:3). NGOs have grown rapidly in China. By the end of 2006, the number of social organisations had reached 186,000, compared to only about 6,000 before 1978. The number of private non-enterprise units, which occurred after the reform, reached 159,000 (Lu, 2007). Similarly, NGOs in Bangladesh gradually grew after the Liberation War of 1971. In particular, they have had a high profile since the
disastrous floods of 1988, when they played a vital role in relief and rehabilitation. NGOs have gradually grown in size and scope, and many began shifting from a relief to a development focus, working with the landless rural people who were generally ignored by government agencies (Lewis and Sobhan, 1999; and White, 1999).

Clark (1991:34) states that ‘Southern NGOs typically arose out of the independence struggle’. In India, its social background and independence struggle are important factors in NGOs’ emergence. Voluntarism is an integral part of Indian society and dates back to ancient times when it operated in various fields such as education, medicine and cultural promotion. Modern indigenous forms of voluntary organisations have appeared since the colonial period. Voluntary movements were encouraged by Gandhi who emphasised that voluntary action was the only path to India’s development. The ashrams formed by Gandhians became the predecessors of modern NGOs.

Indonesian NGOs’ emergence began in the Dutch colonial period, but the modern NGOs emerged in the 1970s and have grown rapidly since then. Intellectuals, former student activists and others who had been politically aligned with the military in 1965-66 established many NGOs. In 1989, 3,251 NGOs were registered with the government, and in 1999, about 8,000 NGOs worked across the country (Aspinall, 2005; and Asian Development Bank (ADB), 1999).

NGOs in most developing countries have dramatically grown since the 1970s as a result of several factors, such as: (i) availability of funds from developed countries (ii) recognition of the government (iii) failure of political institutions to cope with social and political changes (iv) expansion of political space for citizen, and (v) limitations of people organisations (Clarke, 1998:37; Putzel, 1998; and ADB, 1999).

4.3.3. Roles of NGOs in developing countries

NGOs serve as a third sector between the legitimate rights of the state and citizens’ moral and civic rights (Weiss and Hassan, 2003:3). ‘In the views of some observers, the third world in particular is being swept by a nongovernmental, associational, or ‘quiet’ revolution that at least one analyst believes may prove to be as significant to the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the latter nineteenth century’ (Fisher, 1997:440). Activities of NGOs can be summarised into three categories: (i) project replication based on the success and failure of previous experiences (ii) building grassroots movements, and (iii) influencing policy reform (Clark, 1991). Based on Korten’s classification, Senillosa (1998) categorises NGOs in the South into four generations according to their overall orientation: the first generation began in 1945 with welfarist NGOs; the second generation began in 1960, aiming at promoting local development to meet basic needs by using the model from developed countries; the third generation began in 1973, in partnership with the North based on the concept of self-reliant political process; and the fourth generation began in 1982, focusing on empowerment.

The third generation is a significant step for NGOs getting involved with social movements. This is because, since the early 1970s, developing countries confronted with social and political changes brought the emergence of many new issues, such as human rights, gender, and environmental conservation, but the state failed to cope with this situation. Therefore, NGOs helped to fill that institutional vacuum, focusing on conscientisation and mobilisation leading to direct intervention in political conflicts (Clarke, 1998). Clarke notices that the third generation NGOs act as catalysts, rather than service-providers. ‘They work with
networks of People’s Organisations to replicate and multiply the local successes of ‘second generation’ strategies, and organise NGO-PO coalitions that underpin issue-based social movements’ (Clarke, 1998:42).

NGOs’ achievements in development assistance is a result of: (i) support from Northern NGOs (ii) their ability to reach the poor, in particular, in very remote areas (iii) their capacity for innovation and experimentation (iv) their representativeness, having close links with poor communities (v) their skills of participation, and (vi) their resources that are largely additional. ‘They do not only “fill in the gaps” but serve as response to failure in the public and private sector’ (Clark, 1997:46). Fisher (1997:443) states that ‘the acceptance of NGOs by the development industry has been limited’. The appropriate role of NGOs in development depends on the critics of development, which can be divided into two general camps. The first camp views contemporary development processes as flawed, but basically positive and inevitable. Then NGOs provide a means to mitigate the weaknesses in the development process. The second finds both the dominant development paradigm and its implementation to be fundamentally flawed. For these critics, NGOs become a potential source of alternative development discourses and practices. The critics from each camp may promote NGOs for their abilities in facilitating participation and empowerment (Fisher, 1997).

There are much successful evidence of the cooperation between governments and NGOs, and some have led to policy change. For example, in the Philippines, environmental organisations have successfully arrested the break-neck logging by huge timber concerns in the island of Palawan. As a result, legislation restricting logging operations has been announced (Clark, 1991). In Bangladesh, many NGOs began the shift from relief activities towards longer-term development focused on the structural causes of poverty. The work of NGOs was a direct response to the failure of government to provide basic services and response to essential needs (Lewis and Sobhan, 1999:119). The World Bank estimated in 1996 that NGOs work in 78 per cent of the villages of Bangladesh (White, 1999).

In Indonesia, by the late 1970s, NGOs started to adopt the concept of ‘structural poverty’ following international intellectual trends. ‘Although most NGOs still favoured partnership with government, the NGO movement as a whole cultivated a new kind of discourse that depicted the poor as important actors in their own right in the modernisation process; “people’s participation in development” became a slogan of NGOs from the late 1970s and through the 1980s’ (Aspinall, 2005: 91).

Regarding the role of NGOs in politics, Clarke (1998:50) concludes that ‘the relationship between NGO proliferation and democratisation is ambiguous’. Clarke finds evidence from two fundamental propositions, Tocquevillian and Gramscian. Tocquevillians believe that ‘NGO proliferation strengthens civil society and hence democracy by improving interest articulation and representation’ (Clarke, 1998:50). For example, NGOs play an important role in consolidating democratic reforms in countries such as India, Brazil, Thailand and the Philippines. Gramscians believe that ‘NGO proliferation simply institutionalises existing patterns of political contestation, between civil society and the state and within civil society itself, adding an additional dimension to struggles, which remain fundamentally class-based’ (Clarke, 1998:50). The ability of NGOs to become involved in political struggles depends on the regulatory framework governing NGO activities defined by the state. NGOs’ contribution to the demobilisation of anti-state pressure, such as in the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, can strengthen the state. Therefore, in Thailand and the Philippines, NGOs proliferation correlates with the decline of militant social movements (Clarke, 1998). In India, many organisation leaders realise that it is necessary to join a
radical political party in order to operate radical empowerment and to avoid harassment from the police, the local elites, or from other political parties (Sen, 1999). Even though NGOs are recognised as part of a growing civil society that can engage with the state, few scholars have examined the actual contribution NGOs make either to political change and democratisation, or to political continuity (Fisher, 1977:444).

According to Ulvila and Hossain (2002), who studied political participation of the poor in Bangladesh and Nepal, the development of NGOs played practically no role in the democracy movements of 1990. The absence of development NGOs from democracy movements was because: firstly, democracy was not the agenda of development NGOs at the end of 1980s— they focused on relief and welfare, and issues of democracy played hardly any role (Many NGOs have taken democracy issues into their mission when the third world had already turned toward more democratic polities since early 1990s); secondly, due to their commitments to donors and clientele, major changes including entering the democratic movement would interrupt their programme; thirdly, democracy is not a leading feature of NGOs. Ulvila and Hossain (2002:149) conclude that ‘development NGOs tend to contribute more to elite interests than to the democratic political participation of the poor’.

Most social movement theorists neglect to study institutions, including NGOs, and some are opposed to the institutionalisation of social movements that the proliferation of NGOs heralds (Clarke, 1998:39). Similarly, Fisher (1997) points out that the relationship between NGOs and social movements has often been overlooked. Social movement theorists consider NGOs as primarily social development agencies, and ignore the fact that NGOs often initiate or sustain social movements, or are the institutional vehicles that articulate collective action. NGOs and social movements may either support or oppose states (Fisher, 1997).

4.3.4. The relationship between government and NGOs

The government-NGO relationship depends on political, economic and cultural factors. In a climate such as when martial law is announced, the scope of NGO-government collaboration is limited. In liberal democracies, NGOs may well collaborate with governments. Countries with a strong tertiary educational system are likely to have strong NGO sectors. For example, Kenya and Bangladesh have more diverse NGOs than do Zambia and Nepal. Indigenous NGOs tend to increase and be strong where government is efficiently structured and confident (Clark, 1991). Fisher (1997:452) points out that ‘the relationships between NGOs and governments are so heterogeneous that it is difficult to generalise about the potential impact of NGOs on the state and pattern of governance’. Liberal governments tend to respond to NGO criticism in three ways: they harass and intimidate NGOs; they negate publicly the value of the work done and impugn their credentials; and they co-opt them by providing funds and status but subjecting them to rule (Clark, 1991).

In the case of NGOs as non-profit organisations, and their relationship with the state, based on Yong’s triangular model and using the United Kingdom as an example, the non-profit-government relations are:

1. Supplementary: non-profit organisations providing voluntary services not covered by the welfare state
2. Complementary: contracts and partnerships between government and non-profit agencies are formed in response to new public management and outsourcing
3. Adversarial: non-profit organisations include groups advocating the rights of needy people left unserved and under-served by state (Anheier, 2005).
Anheier (2005) further raises Najam’s Cs model, which offers a more detailed view of organisational goals and means. Then the non-profit-government relations are:

1. Cooperative: if the goals and means are similar, the government and non-profit organisations develop a cooperative relationship.
2. Complementary: if the goals are dissimilar and means are similar, a complementary relationship between government and non-profit organisations emerges.
3. Co-optive: if the goals are dissimilar and means are similar, the government tries to build a co-optive relationship with non-profit organisations.
4. Confrontational: if the goals and means are both dissimilar, then government and the non-profit sector are in a confrontational relationship.

Anheier adds a social movement perspective to the models suggested by Young and Najam (as mentioned above), noting that ‘social movements, as private action to change government policy, have a deliberately conflictual relationship with government’. Therefore, the relationship between government and non-profit organisations can be described as a cycle: ‘private actions are translated into public concerns via formal legal entities, which evolved from the initial social movement; these formal legal entities also influence government policy and government responds either by directly addressing the issue, or a more popular response is to fund nonprofits that in turn address these public concerns. As a consequence, non-profit organisations must adjust their behaviour and programmes to reflect public policy and government priorities’ (Anheier, 2005:286).

4.3.5. NGOs under government control

Government has a significant function for creating regulation and law and allocating resources, which also facilitates the development programmes of NGOs. ‘Government clearly has a tremendous capacity to do harm and to hamper self-help efforts (as indeed does the business sector) but they are part of the reality which NGOs cannot ignore’ (Clark, 1991). Degrees of government control in different countries are varied. Laws and regulations are major tools and mechanisms, from which different methods are chosen. The requirement to register is one of the methods in many countries. Registration is compulsory in some countries, such as Nepal, while it is only an alternative for legal organisations in others, such as the Philippines and Thailand (Silliman and Noble, 1998:10). In Nepal, the Social Service Act requires all domestic and foreign civil social organisations to legally register with appropriate government offices (Kobek and Thapa, 2004). The Nepalese NGOs working for human rights and taking an active part in the protest campaigns cannot be considered as development NGOs, and they are not allowed to receive foreign funding (Ulvila and Hossain, 2002: 153). Chinese government policies do not only strictly require registration, but also control NGOs’ growth (Ho, 2001:903). The government prevents any NGO from growing too large and powerful by developing an extended organisational network. In addition, two organisations are not allowed to establish in the same administrative area (Ho, 2001:903 and Lu, 2007). Many government institutes have formed their own NGOs, which are called government-organised NGOs. ‘Many scholars have criticised that NGOs in China lack a non-governmental character and are not worthy of the name NGO’ (Ho, 2001:904).

In Malaysia, mass demonstrations and rallies organised by NGOs rarely occur because of state control. The main legal instruments that discourage the development of Malaysian NGOs include the Society Act, the Police Act, and a range of laws restricting speech, the press and assembly; any public meeting of more than five people requires police permission in advance. According to the restricted University Colleges, Malaysian tertiary students are
forbidden from engaging in political activities (Weiss, 2003:34). In India, the attempt to exert control over NGOs started in 1980. However, NGOs and the public still had opportunities to oppose the government. This evidence appeared when NGOs, mass media and academics began to criticise the government’s proposal of the establishment of National and State Councils as the organisations that would become government organised-NGOs, which would be a tool of government to control NGOs. Finally, this proposal was withdrawn (Sen, 1999). In Thailand, government control over NGOs’ operation is not strict like Malaysia, Nepal and China. The Thai government has no policy to form government-NGOs. Registration is not compulsory, but non-registered NGOs cannot apply for funding support from the government. However, they can do so under an umbrella of registered NGOs (Chutima, 2004).

4.3.6. Government Organisation (GO) and NGO cooperation

NGOs in many developing countries, such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, work in cooperation with government in formulating policies and plans. Some take part in the national bodies of the government, but only professional and moderate NGOs are likely to be invited (10 Silliman and Noble, 1998:12). In Thailand, most national and local agencies seek ways to work with NGOs in different areas, but only moderate NGOs are likely to be chosen (Chutima, 2004). NGOs consider that working with the government is a way to allow their ideas to be heard (18 Weiss, 2003:37). Nevertheless, Clarke (1991:79) expresses that when liberal governments recruit NGO leaders onto various commissions, it is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it provides forums for NGOs’ ideas. On the other hand, it can ‘dull the sharp edge of NGO criticism and occupy the attention of much of the best NGO talent’ (Clark, 1991:79).

4.3.7. Tension between government and NGOs

In the third world, the worst tension between government and NGOs arises when NGOs launch a development approach different from that of the government; in particular, people’s participation, empowerment and democracy. For example, the Indonesian government perceived that people were the subject of development while NGOs thought that people were the object of development. NGOs might choose to either ignore or oppose the government. Some NGOs were likely to view government as part of problem. Meanwhile, some NGOs began to change their strategies for relating to the state. This became their strength because they could analyse political conditions and discover self-awareness and their motivation. Increased persuasiveness enabled NGOs to convey messages for their political analysis and self-awareness to a broader audience, resulting in many projects and programmes (Clark, 1991).

Translocal and transnational connections create both risks and opportunities for NGOs. The connections may offer southern NGOs increased leverage and autonomy in their struggle with national governments, while they may expose these NGOs to direction or control by others. ‘In India, for example, NGOs with foreign connections have sometimes been regarded as antinationalist agents of capitalism and Western political and cultural values’ (Fisher, 1997:454).
4.4. Conclusion

NGOs in the world today are diverse in various aspects, including size, organisational duration, activities, ideological orientations, cultural backgrounds, organisational culture, legal status, and public recognition. Different countries define the term ‘NGO’ differently. It is commonly accepted in contemporary NGO literature that NGOs are differentiated from people’s organisations. The emergence of NGOs in developing countries differs from country to country, depending on their backgrounds. Philippine NGOs began in the Catholic Church. Malaysian NGOs emerged from ethnic organisations. The emergence of NGOs in many countries has been possible because of the open political space and the independence struggle, as in China, India and Indonesia. Proliferation of NGOs in developing countries has occurred since the 1970s as a consequence of many factors: availability of funds; recognition by governments; and failures of political institutions to cope with social and political changes. NGOs in developing countries provide alternative ways and methods to mitigate weaknesses in the development process.

The relationship between government and NGOs varies and can be classified into four types: cooperation, complement, cooptation, and confrontation. To control NGOs, laws and regulations are major tools for governments. Different countries implement different methods. Registration is one common way, compulsory in some countries such as Nepal, but offered as an alternative for a legal status in others, such as the Philippines and Thailand. An inclusive strategy is common in many countries, for example: providing funding sources; inviting NGOs to join government committees and to take part in policy formulation; and setting up government-NGOs.

The background of NGOs is basic information for the discussion about NGOs in Thailand in Chapter 6. It also is fundamental knowledge for the empirical work in Chapters 9 to 11.
Chapter 5
Environmental Movements

This chapter provides the general ideas of environmental movements, aiming to provide the background information for the discussion of environmental movements in Thailand in Chapter 7. The discussion starts with definitions accepted in the international arena. The second part focuses on environmental movements in developing countries. The cases of some countries in Asia, such as China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, are raised.

Environmental movements are seen as a signal of a new kind of politics because they replace class-based politics with a new post-material and value-oriented politics (Jamison et.al., 1990). It is estimated that tens of thousands of environmental groups have emerged in the Third World during the last quarter of a century. They are mostly located in Asia and Latin America (Haynes, 2002). Environmental movements are organised by a range of organisations, from grassroots at community level to international organisations at global level. They are also diverse in terms of issues, such as, forest, water, air, and so on.

This chapter presents the general background of environmental movements. It begins with a discussion about definition, followed by the emergence of environmental movements. Next, it focuses on environmental movements in developing countries, of which various topics are discussed: characteristics, grassroots movements and ideologies.

5.1 Definition of environmental movement

In the 1970s, the environmental movement was seen as 'a reform movement, seeking to alter the hierarchy or values within the dominant ideological system, rather than aiming at total alteration of production relations or the political system' (Buttel and Flinn, 1976: 478). Later, Jamison et.al. (1990:x) state that 'the environmental movements are the carriers of a new consciousness, but that consciousness also defines the movement differently in different countries'. Therefore, the term 'environmental movement' is defined differently in different countries. The concept of environmental movements in America and Europe is different. The American tradition adopts a catholic, nominalist and empirical approach while the European tradition conceives of 'social movements restrictively as agents of profound structural change or, at least, as extraordinary phenomena of period of dramatic social change' (Rootes, 2004:609). Rootes (1999:2) defines that 'environmental movements are conceived as broad networks of people and organisations engaged in collective action in the pursuit of environmental benefit'. He further explains that the network 'may include, as well as individuals and groups who have no organisational affiliation, organisations of varying degrees of formality' (Rootes, 2004:610). Doherty and Doyle (2006:703) criticise Rootes’s definition on the grounds that it is a broad concept and 'entails a very inclusive definition of the environmental movement able to include groups that never take protest action, and do not challenge the political order ideologically'.

Doyle (2005:3) states that 'environmental movements are types of social movements'. Doherty and Doyle (2006:697) argue that: firstly 'not all forms of environmental movement are social movements; secondly, organisations or groups engaged in environmental action are not necessary defined only as part of a single social movement'.

Different analysts tend to give different weight in applying the characteristics of social movements to empirical cases (Doherty and Doyle, 2006). Based on the idea proposed by Zald and McCarthy, Rucht (1989), in the analysis of environmental movement
organisations in West Germany and France, sees environmental movements as social movement industries. 'Social movement industry is a network of cooperating, competing, and antagonistic of social movement organisations' (Rucht, 1989:62). In Rucht’s study, individuals, groups and organisations within environmental movements can be divided into three categories: conservationism, environmentalism and ecologism. Those organisations may represent one or more than one category, and they may move from one type to another (Rucht, 1989:64). Doherty and Doyle (2006) argue that networks alone are not enough to define the movement, and they give more weight than others to collective identity. They conclude that ‘the observer has to decide not only whether a movement has a collective identity and interacts, but what degree of interaction and evidence of shared ideas is required’ (Doherty and Doyle, 2006:703).

### 5.2. The emergence of environmental movements

Environmental movements emerged in the late 1960s as reform movements (Buttel and Flinn, 1976; Rootes, 2004; and Doyle, 2005). As a result of the interaction of three dimensions: cosmology, technology and democracy (Jamison, et.al., 1990), their emergence was made possible by the new political space opened up by the student revolt and the New Left (Rootes 2004). Apart from the political opportunity, environmental movements emerged as a result of: increasing understanding of environmental impact; the extension of higher education; mass media transmitting information to the public more effectively; increasing awareness of the environmental degradations of economic development, which generated increasing dissatisfaction with the social conservationism and political timidity of established conservation organisations, such as the Sierra Club. Later, dissatisfaction with the philosophical and political shortcomings of reform environmentalism led to the development of various strands of political ecologism in both Europe and North America, with ‘deep ecologists’ choosing direct action in defence of the natural environment rather than building social movement organisations. The environmental justice movement emerged in the late 1980s, with recognition that the social organisations that cause environmental degradation require fundamental social change and the empowerment of local communities. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, perhaps the fastest growing strand of environmentalism in the US – ecotheology – develops themes of the major religions’ traditions as critiques of the degradation of the natural environment (Rootes, 2004).

Environmental movements are very diverse and complex. Their organisational forms range from highly organised and formally institutionalised to the radically informal. Their activities take place at different levels, local, national and global, and are concerned with issues that range from single issues to complex ones (Rootes, 2004). For example, the interests of environmentalist formed differently in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, resulting in distinct environmental movements in each of these countries (Jamison, A. et.al., 1990:198). Based on the diversity of environmentalism, Doherty and Doyle (2006:697) identify three principal kinds of environmental movements: the post-material movements, strongest in the United States and Australia; the post-industrial movements, which are strongest in Europe; and the post-colonial movements of the South. In the United States, there are thousands of environmental movement organisations in which environmental discourses develop. Thus, the discourses of US environmental movements can be identified as follows: manifest destiny, wildlife management, conservation, preservation, reform environmentalism, deep ecology, environmental justice, ecofeminism, and ecotheology (Brulle, 2000).
5.3. Environmental movements in developing countries

5.3.1. Characteristics

In the developing countries, the environmental agenda emerged in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s (Doyle, 2005). The factors that stimulate the growth of environmental groups in the Third World include: the failure of state policy, for example, impacts from development projects; and linkage with transnational organisations, such as Greenpeace (Haynes, 2002). The comparison of environmental movements in western and developing countries is illustrated in Table 5.1 (van der Heijden, 2002; Haynes, 2002; and Lee and So, 1999).
Table 5.1: The comparison of environmental movements in western and developing countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Countries</th>
<th>Developing Countries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The movement has grown from a new social movement into a network of professionalised mass-membership organisations at national level</td>
<td>• The movements are participated in by the wide variety of groups and organisations by building up a loose network. They are mostly rurally-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emphasis has shifted from local issues to global problems, such as, since the 1980s, the focus has moved to the greenhouse effect</td>
<td>• Main issues of movements are different in various regions: forests and trees in Asia; urban pollution and forest in Latin America; and desertification in Africa. The green movement in Asia was started by rural people, unlike in Europe and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• As a result of environmental movements, impacts increasingly achieved political agenda and public support and increasingly access to decision making processes. Environmental laws and departments have been established in many countries.</td>
<td>• Many countries are successful in creating environmental awareness among the public, and many environmental organisations have proliferated. The movements have also led to policy change in many countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Environmental discourse has developed from that of radical social change to ecological modernisation</td>
<td>• The Third World environmental movements do not accept the hegemonic global discourse of capitalism, neo-liberalism, modernism, scientism and anthropocentrism. For example, the Gandhian non-violent ideology is widely accepted in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Western countries raise greenness as a single issue in their environmental movements</td>
<td>• Most groups and organisations in the third world campaign on environmental issues together with developmental issues, such as the promotion of social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Countries</td>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The emergence of a radical counter-current, for example, the anti-roads movement in United Kingdom and environmental justice in the United States</td>
<td>• They aim to mobilise local people in defence of the local environment against outside interests, as they realise that if their local environment is destroyed, it would affect their ways of living. For example, most of the environmental movements in Asia are involved with development projects of the states</td>
</tr>
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</table>

5.3.2 Ideologies and strategies

The notion of third world environmentalism is problematic in at least two main respects: firstly, the differences of the ideas among the countries in the third world such as the differences between countries in East and Southeast Asia; secondly, environmentalist thought and form of actions display great diversity in the third world (Hirsch, 1997: 5). Doyle (2005:65) emphasises that ‘it is critical to understand that Northern and Southern movements are largely ideologically distinct’. The rise of environmental movements in the developed countries has shifted from materialist to post-materialist values (Ho, 2001). So the post-materialist ideology is dominant in the United States, but not in the developing countries, such as the Philippines and India, as they involve themselves in the struggle for social and environmental justice. The issues of environmental movements in India are not just a question of which parts of non-human nature are protected; rather, issues of the mal-distribution and over-consumption of resources dominate green agendas. Therefore, the environmental movement in India is little-related to post-materialist concerns (Doyle, 2005). Doyle (2005:137) concludes that ‘the post-materialist sometimes provides a suitable description of green movements in the minority worlds of the North, but has very little applicability in the South’.

The concept of ecological modernisation is popular in the West. It requires a discourse coalition between business, important sectors of science, reformist progressive politicians and the environmental movement. Milanez and Buhrs (2007) present an encompassing framework of ecological modernisation by considering four main strands: technology, policy, society and economy. Thus they define ecological modernisation ‘as the implementation of preventative innovation in production systems (processes and products) that simultaneously produces environmental and economic benefits’ (Milanez and Buhrs, 2007:17). Milanez and Buhrs see ‘political institutional and society aspects’ as factors conducive to ecological modernisation, rather than as constitutive elements of ecological modernisation. Actors are seen as having ‘a crucial place in the framework, as they collectively determine whether the “idea” of ecological modernisation is put into practice’ (Milanez and Buhrs, 2007:17). In their view, actors can be broadly defined as ‘proponents and opponents of special issues’, comprising four main parties: business, the public, environmental organisations and government.

The impacts of ecological discourse depend on political opportunity structures in each country. In Western Europe: the structures of Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria fulfil...
most of the ecological modernisation requirements, while in countries like France, Italy, Britain and Germany, the political context does not support the emergence of such discourse (van der Heijden, 2002). In the developing world, the idea of sustainable development is more acceptable than the concept of ecological modernisation. The concept of sustainable development depends on the conceptualisations of nature, social values, policy orientation and so on. In political practice, however, many Third World countries are not able to implement the strategy because of their weak state structure (van der Heijden, 2002). In connection with this, the World Conservation Strategy identifies a number of major problems: firstly, the weakness of conservation in national policy-making; secondly, inappropriate land uses in planning; thirdly, inadequate legislation and weak and overlapping natural resource management agencies; fourthly, shortcomings in the training and education of personnel; fifthly, lack of support for conservation policies; and sixthly, lack of conservation-based rural development (Adams, 1990:45).

The Gandhian tradition of non-cooperation and non-violence is the main strategy for environmental movements in India. They have adopted the Gandhian tradition for their movements not only to protect the environment but also for their livelihood and their way of life (Doyle, 2005 and Karen, 1994). The Gandhian tradition highlights the principles of ‘satyagraha’ and ‘ahimsa’, and is based on a mixture of beliefs derived from Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity (Klandermans, 2006). Doyle (2005:18) points out that ‘although sharing some similarities with the North American forest movements and the Australian wilderness movement, in their idea of non-violence, the Indian definition of non-violence is far more than just passive resistance; rather it is a way of life which affects everything from what a person eats through to how they relate to the world around them’. The experiences of non-violence impact on peace and environmental movements across the globe (Doyle, 2005).

Based on studies in five Asian countries, Lee and So (1999) identify three major types of environmental movements in Asia:

1. The path of ecopopulism in Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines: the major concepts of populist environmental movements in Philippine include people’s participation, community empowerment, environmental justice and sustainable development. The main actors are comprised of local people, who are victims and participate in protest, and NGOs, who provide organisational skills, mass media exposure, and strategies. Confrontational tactics are a major tool of movements adopted by populist movements in Asia.

2. Corporatism in Thailand: the main actors are the business sector and the government. The government provides partial environmental funding to support NGOs’ projects. Many business companies have adopted the idea of green business, and provide funds to support environmental activities. Some companies set up NGOs to run environmental activities.

3. Post-materialism in Hong Kong: due to the concept of ‘green life-style’, the environmental movements in Hong Kong have been classified as post-materialist. The main actors are mostly young, new middle-class professionals and ex-radicals from the 1960s. The post-materialist environmental movements adopt a non-confrontational and consensus-building approach.

5.3.3. Grassroots movements

Grassroots movements seem to develop in most developing countries, in particular in all Asian countries, although their patterns are different (Szasz, 1999). Grassroots organisations can form links between groups that are divided along ethnic, gender, and class lines,
resulting in national effects (Basu, 1987; and Karen, 1994). Grassroots environmentalism everywhere is a movement of victims; they realise that if they do not participate in movements, they will become victims (47 Szasz, 1999). In Indonesia, for instance, the People's Organisation was first comprised of people who had been evicted from their lands by large-scale development projects related to forestry, plantations, transmigration, dams or large-scale tourism. They protested against the development projects of the state, and they later expanded to dark green conservation (Peluso et.al. 2008:386). Similarly, the Narmada movement in India began as a struggle for resettlement and rehabilitation of people who were displaced by the Sardar Sarovar Dam. Later, its focus shifted to conserving the environmental and natural ecosystems of the entire valley (Karen, 1994). In addition, the cooperation of different actors, such as elites and NGOs with grassroots organisations, could create the transformative power of Asian populist environmental movements (Lee and So, 1999).

5.3.4. Relationship with the state

The relationship between grassroots movements and the state is ambiguous. According to an analysis of three case studies in India (Chipko movement against deforestation, Fishermen’s movement against large-scale fishing and Shramik Sangathan movement against class and gender), the Indian state legitimised the grassroots movements by making concessions in the form of higher wages, land redistribution, lean season employment, and reforestation schemes. On the other hand, the state had blunted their radical thrust. When grassroots organisations pursue a confrontation strategy, the state may repress them and withdraw funding support (Basu, 1987:668). Basu (1987:669) concludes that 'the consequences of Indian liberal democracy for grassroots movements are two-fold: on the one hand, it creates the space within which movements for direct democracy can arise. On the other hand, government reformism often co-opts these movements'. In the case of agrarian reform in Indonesia, the political opportunities open to the movements have been shaped not only by international and national agendas but also by strong grassroots organisations (Peluso et.al. 2008).

Based on the community approach favoured by NGOs, grassroots activism in developing countries plays a major role in the transition towards a more sustainable society. This approach argues that 'the state is so much involved in the creation of environmental problems'. Meanwhile, NGOs cannot themselves carry out the core function of the state. It is also predicted that as many cities in developing countries could become mega-cities in the twenty-first century, with environmental problems increasingly having a metropolitan character. Therefore, decentralisation of government control is seen as a part of the solution in most developing countries (van der Heijden, 2002:215).

Haynes (2002:223) states that 'the central point is that environmental protection is always highly political'. So the different phases of democratisation can shape the relationship between environmental and democracy movements. During the liberalisation process, environmental and democracy movements in countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and the Philippines were partners as democracy and environmental movements shared the same goals of overthrowing authoritarian regimes and creating a better environment. In South Korea and Taiwan, where democratic consolidation has been achieved, political leaders raised environmental issues in their election campaigns. In contrast, environmental movements in Hong Kong (where democratic consolidation has not been achieved) have become dissociated from the democracy movements, because environmental activists rarely participate in pro-democracy groups (Lee et. al., 1999:250).
5.3.5. Successes

As a result of environmental movements in Asia, many countries are successful in creating environmental awareness among the public, and many environmental organisations have proliferated across the region. The movements have also led to policy change in many countries. In Taiwan, after widespread anti-pollution protests, the government adopted tougher measures on pollution control. A specific Pollution Dispute Resolution Law was passed. In the Philippines, environmental activists have been recruited by the government to participate in local environmental management (Lee and So, 1999). However, Haynes (2002:239) notices that ‘environmental groups in the Third World often do not win their struggle’. They are more likely to achieve their goals under certain conditions, including the democratic environment and strong civil society. Environmental struggles tend to be successful in democratic environments where civil societies are strong. The successes of the Chipko movement and the Narmada anti-dam campaign in India prove that their achievements do not only depend on a high degree of popular organisations and mobilisation, but also the favourable response of the government to such efforts. It is very difficult for environmental groups to meet their goals without external allies. The Indonesian environmental groups achieved their goals in campaigning against deforestation due to two main factors: the abilities of groups to build linkage with wider regional and national alliances, and the democratic environment that then becomes a channel for them to pursue their goals. In contrast, both the Ogoni (Nigeria) and Tahiti (French Polynesia) cases have been successful in gaining foreign support, but are incapable of putting together a domestic coalition of interest groups. In China, the societal and political context has changed considerably since the nation-wide protest against the Three Gorges Dam Project, started in the early 1990s. The state has increasingly focused on environmental degradation, and has put environmental protection on the political agenda. At the same time, green movements have grown in Chinese society. Green social organisations are increasingly courting government approval and influence in policy-making, rather than seeking confrontation with the state (Ho, 2001). Ho (2001:917) concludes that ‘the dilemma of co-optation is not yet as relevant, because there is no true oppositional role for environmentalism’. Ho further notices that environmental actors might become a social force in future, as environmentalism has an opportunity to influence policy-making and to gain experience in participatory actions (Ho, 2001).

5.4. Conclusion

The term ‘environmental movement’ has been defined differently in different circumstances. The trends of environmental movements in developing countries are different from those in the developed countries. In the third world, environmental issues have been raised together with social issues, whereas often the environment is raised only as a single issue in developed countries. The main issues are different in different regions of the developing world, while the focus in the developed world has shifted from local to global issues and from the national to the international arena. Most environmental movements in developing countries are rural-based with political goals, and are supported by NGOs. In addition, environmental discourse in the third world is diverse and different from that in the first world. Post-material ideology is popular in the United States, but not in the third world. The Gandhian strategy is dominant in India. Ecological modernisation is a popular concept in the West, while the sustainable development concept is more acceptable in the third world. The main characteristics of environmental movements in Asia are highly diverse, socially constructed, and culturally indigenised. There three types of environmental movement are identified in five Asian countries: the path of ecopopulism in Taiwan, South
Grassroots movements are developed in most developing countries, and most are involved in conflicts over development policies of states. They begin with protests against development projects, and later expand to environmental issues. The relationship between grassroots movements and the state is varied. For example, the state represses the movements when they employ confrontational methods. On the other hand, the state legitimises the movements in many ways. The different phases of democratisation can also shape the relationship between environmental movements and democracy movements. Environmental movements in developing countries have achieved their goals in many ways: increasing environmental public awareness and participation, many environmental organisations have been established, and these have led to policy change such as pollution control law. The movements also affect civil societies in the third world.

The general ideas of "environmental movement" and its background in developing countries will be fundamental to an argument about the environmental movement in Thailand in Chapter 7.
Chapter 6
Non-Governmental Organisations in Thailand

This chapter aims to illustrate how NGOs in Thailand have developed and become major actors in Thai society. The discussion provides background information for my empirical work. The chapter begins with the history of NGOs' development in Thailand, focusing on the effects of the political changes discussed in the previous chapter. It also discusses their contribution to the social and economic development of the country. It then examines environmental NGOs in Thailand, and their role in environmental movements.

NGOs in Thailand are often referred to as 'ongkon pattana akkachon', or private development organisations reflecting development work. The English term 'NGO' (en chi o) is also often used in both spoken and written Thai. In the Thai context, it is clear that NGOs are different from grassroots and people organisations. Most of them are professionalised in either the formal or informal forms of their organisations. The proliferation of NGOs in Thailand occurred in the 1980s, and most of them typically are small and grassroots-oriented. Most Thai NGOs started working with people in rural areas to upgrade the quality of life, utilising people participation and self-reliance as their main approach. Then they integrated environmental issues into their scope of work, when environmental impacts became obviously visible, so affecting people's way of life.

This chapter illustrates the development of NGOs in Thailand and highlights the development of environmental NGOs. It then goes on to mention the relationship between NGOs and the Thai government, and focuses on the role of NGOs in social movements.

6.1. The development of NGOs in Thailand

The development of NGOs in Thailand can be divided into six periods as follows:

6.1.1. Before 1960 (before the national development plan)

During this period most NGOs were foreign missionary organisations disseminating religion to the public. These organisations concentrated on social work and could be classified as private voluntary organisations. For example the YMCA came to Thailand in 1907 and the Save the Children Federation in 1932 (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996). However, Sapa-u-na-lom-daeng was the first NGO established in Thailand during the reign of King Rama V, later becoming the Thai Red Cross. Gohler (1991: 99) cited Professor Likhit Dhiravegin who observed of the period from 1932 to 1957 – the start of the constitutional monarchy to the regime of Field Marshal Sarit - 'The Thai organisational establishment was clearly seen in two areas: government and religious. The bureaucracy (military and civilian) and the Buddhist order were two institutions which were organised. Among the masses, an institutionalised organised group was absent.'

6.1.2. 1960 to 14 October 1973 (student uprising)

Thailand started its first official national development plan in 1960. Since then Thailand has developed various infra-structures to modernise itself. This led to great social and economic changes. The United Nations announced the 1960s to be the UN Development Decade and subsequently many overseas voluntary services were mobilised to third world countries including Thailand aiming to develop the economy, society and politics in those countries.

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As a result, there were many foreign voluntary groups in Thailand during the 1960s for example, British Voluntary Service Overseas, US Peace Corps, German Volunteer Service and Canadian University Services Overseas. These organisations could also motivate the private voluntary services in country (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996).

In 1967 the first development-oriented NGO, the Thai Rural Reconstruction Movement - TRRM, was established by a group of national leaders led by Dr. Puay Unkphakorn. The main idea of the TRRM was that rural reconstruction is human reconstruction. In the initial stage the centre nominated a core group of staff across the country to be trained on rural reconstruction methods in the Philippines. All participants later became keys to the transfer of knowledge in rural development to new generations. Based on training, the philosophy of work consisting of fourteen principles remains the philosophy of NGOs today: approach people, stay with them, plan with them, work with them, begin from what they know, create from what they have, teach by making them learn from practice, not isolate but integrated, not to please but to help them change, and not to patronise but to empower (Suksawat, 1995: 56).

The Thammasart University’s Graduate Volunteer Service (which later became the Graduate Volunteer Centre) was also founded in 1969 to train graduate students on community and rural development for a year to supply personnel for the voluntary organisations. (This centre continues until today and became the core institution to produce personnel to serve in NGOs.) These movements in this period were a response to the many social problems which became apparent after the government launched the national economic development plans (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996).

During this period, NGOs in Thailand shifted from being ‘social welfare workers’ to ‘social development workers’. During the 1960s, Thai NGOs concentrated on economic assistance for villagers. However, most still worked on a voluntary basis and used the top-down development pattern. However, they were not accepted by the government and officials at that time because participation in development by non-government organisations was considered untenable (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996).

6.1.3 After the student uprising (14 October 1973) to the 6 October 1976 incident

After the fall of the military government following the student uprising in October 1973, Thailand came into a period of liberalism and democratic development (1973-1976) as never seen before. Many students and farmers actively participated in politics and political movements. During this brief democratic period, students from universities travelled to villages and learned how people in rural countryside lived and what they needed. The activist university students and leading academicians were the main catalyst in the evolution of Thai development NGOs from the early stage (Gohlert, 1991; Suthy, 1995 and Missingham, 2003a).

Gohlert (1991: 101) observes that ‘the brief democratic period from 1973 to 1976 proved to be a watershed for NGOs. Political liberalisation made the initial growth of NGOs possible.’ Many organisations began to revise their working styles especially in rural and community development. Then they concluded that they should address people as the subject of development, not the object of development. This idea became the guideline for their development work in the next step (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996).

Another important evolution in this period was the change from single problem solving to holistic problem solving and the concept of integrated rural development began. In
addition, human rights issues were introduced into NGO’s work and the People’s Right and Freedom Association was founded in 1973. Some foreign organisations working in Thailand started to shift their concept from relief and social welfare to community development. For example, the YMCA and the Friedrich Nauman Stiftung began their social work in Chiang Mai province. The Catholic Council in Thailand for Development also began to pay more attention to social problems (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996). Between 1973 and 1976 NGOs working closely with villagers enjoyed great popularity but this declined in late 1976. In the political atmosphere between 1975 and 1976, NGOs were viewed by right wing groups as ‘communist’ (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

6.1.4. After 6 October 1976 to 1979

A bloody coup on 6 October 1976 brought the short period of democracy to an end. Consequently, a large number of intellectuals were forced to go underground. The Thai NGO community was suppressed as Prasartset (1995: 100) points out that: ‘about three years after the military coup of 6 October 1976 activities of most development NGOs almost came to a complete standstill, especially those on civil liberty and human rights.’ The NGOs’ leadership went into the jungle to join the Communist Party of Thailand. Although it was the ‘repressive period’ for the people and NGO movements, the latter began to emphasise non-violence by adopting the concept of Buddhism in social development. Two organisations founded in this period were the Co-ordinating Group for Religion in Society and the Thai Inter-Religious Commission for Development (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996).

In early 1978 the idea of establishing networks and cooperation amongst NGOs gradually emerged. The annual seminar on ‘Exchange Forum on Rural Development’ was held by the Thai Rural Reconstruction Movement to provide opportunities for NGOs to exchange their ideas and experiences. As a result, Suksawat (1995: 63) concludes that ‘Solidarity was created among rural development workers all over the country...Those who had participated in social development in Thailand since 1978, therefore, knew each other all over the country.’ One of the major conclusions was that people empowerment should be a further step in rural development work and rural development should be operated by more professional practice. Although these ideas were not sufficiently implemented, it was considered as the major step in the NGO’s development.

When civil war in Kampuchea ended in 1979, refugees flooded into Thailand. Consequently, many international relief organisations entered to work in the refugee camps along the eastern border, for example, the UNHCR, REDD BANA, Save the Children Fund and Canadian University Services Overseas. Some organisations had realised that Thai peasants in the north-east were also in a poor condition so they began to run rural and social development projects. Those organisations included the Catholic Council of Thailand for Development, CARE, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung and Redd Barna (Pongpaichit and Baker, 2002; Goldschmit and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992; Thailand Environment Institute, 1996 and Gohlert, 1991).

6.1.5. Period of 1980s to 1990s

6.1.5.1. NGO proliferation

As many leftist activists joined the Communist Party of Thailand after the 6 October coup, the government introduced a new policy to prevent the victory of the party. This political
climate allowed new NGOs to emerge and work in public (Gohlert, 1991: 103). Goldschmidt, and Boonyarattanasoontorn (1992) considered the 1980s as the period of the mushrooming of small-scaled NGOs because of the period of rapid emergence and consolidation of many small locally oriented NGOs in Thailand. By the mid-1980s some fifty new NGOs had been formed throughout the country (Prasartset, 1995:102). The factors that affected this emergence can be raised as follows: Firstly, in 1979, the government announced Prime Minister Order 66/2523, a counter-insurgency policy, to reduce ideology conflicts. As a result, many students who ‘went to the jungle’ had returned to their normal lives and joined NGOs. Prasarset (1995: 102) concludes that ‘the easing of political conflicts and the state’s policy towards lessening such ideological confrontation was an important facilitating factor behind the relatively rapid growth of NGO activities in Thailand since around 1980.’ Secondly the Fifth National Social and Economic Development Plan (1982-1986) focused on people participation in rural development relating to the trend of international concepts at that time. Thirdly, internal conflicts in larger organisations led a number of development workers to start their own projects.

6.1.5.2. NGO members

NGO members in the 1980s comprised both radical and moderate activists whereas in the 1970s most NGO workers were moderate activists. The radical group consisted of those who returned from the jungles after the collapse of the Communist Party of Thailand and idealistic youths striving for a better society. These radical NGOs had a significant impact on the development of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s. In the early 1980s, as in the 1970s, they concentrated on local issues, such as alternative livelihoods, health and education. However, from the late 1980s when the conflicts over natural resources and environment in rural area had escalated with, for example, the eucalyptus plantation and Nam Chon Dam Project, they turned to mass mobilisation. Pongpaichit and Baker (2002: 402) say ‘they (NGOs) preferred to work more closely with the grassroots movements which had begun to appear in greater numbers’. Therefore, from the late 1980s NGOs divided into two groups; the first, known as the cool group, included those who followed the ‘old’ strategy of NGOs of the 1970s; the second, known as the ‘hot’ group, included NGO workers who engaged in political mobilisation. The relationship between the two groups was not static (Phatharathananunth, year unknown).

6.1.5.3. Approach debate

During the 1980s, particularly among north-eastern NGOs, there was a debate over the strategy of the movement between the ‘community culture’ and the ‘political economy’. The community culture approach argues that development of a country following western precepts destroys the economy of the village community. As the village community has its own culture, economy and way of development and has remained for hundreds of years, villagers are able to solve their problems by relying on their own culture. The political economy approach argues that a self-reliant economy is impractical in real life because the capitalism economy has now inevitably penetrated into rural areas. For political economists, using greater bargaining power is the solution. The bargaining power of farmers relies on their political organisation. However, political economists had different views about political organisation with some proposing the establishment of farmers’ organisations, and others a political party (Phatharathananunth, year unknown). Although the north-east NGO-CORD says ‘no one won’ in the debate between the two sides (Isan NGO-CORD, 1998:18 in Phatharathananunth, year unknown), in the reality the community culture approach was popular and became the main strategy of NGOs during the 1980s. Many scholars conclude that the main strategy of NGOs focused on local wisdom and self-reliance in order to reduce
dependence on outsiders such as merchants and outside suppliers. Thus the major role of NGOs during this period was as catalysts and facilitators (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996; and Phongpaichit and Baker, 2000). Phongpaichit and Baker (2002: 402) point out: ‘they (NGOs) stressed learning from local wisdom, studying local history and culture as a foundation of local self-confidence, and developing practices and technologies which increased self-sufficiency and self-reliance.’ As a result, the philosophy, ‘the answer is in the village’ was very popular among NGOs during the 1980s. This philosophy reflected the idea that villagers have their capacities to solve their own problems (Boonyarattanasoonthorn, 1995). Pongpaichit and Baker (2002: 403) conclude that ‘an NGO movement developed through the 1980s and reached maturity in the 1990s. It began with the aim of humanizing top-down development planning, but shifted over the 1980s to focus on the village community and local wisdom.’

6.1.5.4. Networking

Many NGO workers realised that because the complex problems of villagers such as poverty and debt can no longer be solved at the village level alone, so lobbying, campaigning and close cooperation among NGOs has played a more important role. Several networks were formed with the aim of closer co-ordination and information exchange. These included the Committee on Dissemination and Promotion of Development Works, the Mass Media for Development Group, the Network on Children Development and the Network on Primary Health Care.

In 1985 with the government’s encouragement for better communication and cooperation between public and private development agencies, a NGO Co-ordinating Committee on Rural Development (NGO-CORD), was established and has continued until today. Its main aim is to increase co-ordination among NGOs and to facilitate effective cooperation between NGOs and government. NGO-CORD was also set up to articulate and to propose the people’s visions and plan to the government (Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992; Thailand Environment Institute, 1996; Suksawat, 1995; Prasartset, 1995; Gohlert, 1991).

6.1.5.5. Policy advocacy

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Thai NGO workers realised that based on their experiences, working only at village level could not solve problems in the long term so NGOs should also work at policy level. Some suggested that NGOs should exploit democratic institutions to put more pressure on the government’s policy making. Then, policy advocacy became the major strategy in the late 1980s. The issue of eucalyptus plantation was the first issue where NGOs played their roles in policy advocacy by coordinating with government agencies to arrange seminars and gathering information and opinions. NGOs also contributed to national development by participating in the formulation of the Sixth Five-year National Economic and Social Development Plan 1986-1990 (Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992; Thailand Environment Institute, 1996; Suksawat, 1995; and Prasartset, 1995).

6.1.5.6. International assistance

The Canadian Government funded a grant of 100 million baht to set up the Local Development Assistance Programme (LDAP) to support NGO activities for 5 years, between 1985 and 1989. This fund supported fifty-three projects across the country and greatly affected to Thai NGO development as Gohlert (1990: 121) observed ‘many of the
core Thai NGOs that are functioning increasingly as development catalyst are past or present members of the LDAP family' (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996; Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992; and Gohlert, 1991).

6.1.6. From 1991 to the present

The significant movement in the 1990s was the development of civil society. Many people's organisations emerged in the form of grassroots organisations and civic groups. The main issues in their campaigns were decentralisation, community rights and the people's participation in decision making. During this period, NGOs concentrated on the environment, in particular, legal instruments including three environmental acts: the community forest act, water act and public right to access government information act. The contribution of NGOs as a development partner with the government has become well-recognised in Thai society. They are involved in several national movements, for example, in the campaign to press for reform of the constitution, education, primary health care, legal system and economic planning (Pongpaichit and Baker, 2002; Goldschmit and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992; Thailand Environment Institute, 1996; Suksawat, 1995; Prasartset, 1995; and Gohlert, 1991). However, Thai NGOs are facing many limitations such as having limited staff, a high rate of staff turnover, and a budget shortage because foreign donor agencies which are the main financial source of Thai NGOs are likely to withdraw from Thailand (Boonyarattanasoonthorn, 1995).

6.2. The development of environmental NGOs

Environmental NGOs in Thailand emerged through the recognition of the interrelationship between environmental destruction and the living conditions of rural people. As the impact of environmental problems on people's way of life had been obviously visible, many NGOs working with people in rural communities began to initiate an environmental approach to prevent and tackle the problem. Environmental NGOs focusing on environmental issue emerged in the early 1980s started to develop an 'environmental approach' in the late 1980s. Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn (1992) divided NGOs working for environmental issues into two groups; the first group are those who integrate environmental issues into their mainstream or everyday work as peripheral matters; the second group are the NGOs who aim at the environment or consider the environmental issue as their mainstream interest. According to a study of eight environmental NGOs (categorised in the second group) supported by the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation and the Thai NGO Support Project, it was shown that the main activities of these eight organizations were not homogenous but could be divided into three types based on their spheres of activities: on an international and national level such as the Project for Ecological Recovery (PER) and the Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT); at a regional level such as The Look South Project in the south and the Project for Rural Ecological Development in the north-east and at a local level such as the Dhammanaat Foundation, the Integrated Farming Group and Alternative Pest Control (Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992). According to the study by the Thailand Environment Institute (1996), types of environmental NGOs are presented in Table 1.6, of which people organisations are identified as a type of NGO.
Table 6.1 Types of Thai environmental NGOs (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of environmental NGOs</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmentally-related development NGOs</td>
<td>Working in the field of community or rural development and the environmental issues were later integrated, for example the Rural Development Institute or CARE (Thailand).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment-oriented NGOs consist of:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ecologist-oriented group</td>
<td>• Focusing on nature and ecology, such as the Wildlife Fund Thailand Foundation, the Nature and Bird Conservation and the Association and Elephant Association.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Specialist environment group</td>
<td>• Focusing on environmental management and academic work such as the Air Pollution Prevention Foundation working on air pollution research and campaigns, the Green World Foundation working on environmental education and the Thailand Environment Institute Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Student activist group</td>
<td>• Such as, the Sixteen Educational Institutes' Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation Committee run by students</td>
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<tr>
<td>• NGOs initiated by business</td>
<td>• Being financed by business and works closely with business agencies such as Think Earth initiated by a leading car company, and the Foundation for Environment as part of the Central Department Store. The Magic Eyes concentrates on urban environment and is funded by many businesses but works independently as do NGOs in other groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Types of environmental NGOs</td>
<td>Characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>People's grassroots organisations</td>
<td>Formed in various local areas to solve problems affecting livelihoods. Some organisations emerged because of hot issues, such as <em>Khum Hug Num Mun</em> (Love Mun River Group). Others aimed to manage the natural resources in their areas as part of a way of life, as with the Lumpun Forum in the north and the Small-scale Fishermen in Pattani province in the south.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civic group</td>
<td>This group refers to provincial environmental groups consisting of middle class people in cities who are interested in upgrading the quality of life and solving environmental problems. This appears to be a new phenomenon in Thai society. This group includes the Environmental Conservation Club in Phuket province, and the Environmental Club in Kanchana Buri province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentally-related NGOs</td>
<td>Organisations work in different fields such as human rights, gender, children, slum and public health related to the environment. However, some organisations falling under this category registered with the government as environmental NGOs under the Environmental Act. These include the Duang Pra Thip Foundation working mainly in slums in Bangkok, the Woman Foundation and the Education for Life Foundation.</td>
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### 6.2.1. Concept of work

According to the study conducted by Thailand Environmental Institute (1996), two main concepts are commonly used among environmental NGOs in Thailand: people-oriented concepts and nature-oriented concepts.

People-oriented concepts were developed by NGOs with long experience in rural development. They believe that environmental problems are closely related to livelihood problems and injustice in society. Therefore, this group emphasises the role of the community and uses the strategies as follows: people participation, self-reliance and five-party cooperation. Self-reliance focuses on producing to consume in family as the first priority instead of serving a market and therefore has less reliance on external factors such
as technology. Five-party cooperation refers to cooperation among the five major groups namely the government, scholars, private organisations for public interest, business organisations and the community.

Nature-oriented concepts are popular among NGOs primarily concerned with environmental issues. Most NGOs working with such concepts are accepted as environmental specialists. Most work on specific issues such as the Wildlife Fund Thailand, the Green World Foundation and the World Environment Centre. In the beginning environmental movements in Thailand clearly separated into these two concepts. However, there has been more cooperation and integration between these two groups of NGOs after they exchanged ideas and experiences and worked together.

6.2.2. Strategy

Networking at a regional level among environmental NGOs is the commonest and main strategy. In the north watersheds are used as the main criteria to set up the network. In the northeast networks are built based on hot issues such as dam networks, forest-land networks and the Pong-Chi-Mun network. In the south networks are built based on professions such as the Small-scale Fishermen Assembly and the Alternative Agriculture Network (Thailand Environment Institute, 1996).

6.3. NGOs Registration under the environmental act (Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, B.E. 2535)

To enhance the cooperation between government and NGOs and to promote their role in the environment, the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Act B.E. 2535 (1992) provides a legal basis to these organisations. This Act says ‘non-governmental organisations having the status of a juristic person under Thai or foreign law which are directly engaged in activities concerning environmental protection or conservation of natural resources without any objective to be involved in politics or to make profits from engagement in such activities, shall be entitled to register with the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment as an NGO for the environmental protection and conservation of natural resources’. As a result, environmental NGOs can request support such as grants for environmental projects from the government.

After the governmental re-organisation in 1997, the registration is the responsibility of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. According to this Act, the NGOs Collaboration Sub-division was established under the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (DEQP) to handle the registration under this Act as the implementing agency; this is in order to strengthen and support NGOs’ capacities and to promote cooperation between government and NGOs. At present there are 135 NGOs registered under this environmental act. These registered NGOs are not apparently involved in environmental protests against the development project. They play their roles in research, environmental education, working with villagers to protect the environment and cooperation with government agencies for various activities. As the law allows only NGOs with legal status to register, the number of registered NGOs is very small compared to the overall number in Thailand because there are a large number of NGOs who are not legally registered. The DEQP recognises the role of non-registered NGOs, with some working very effectively and receive public recognition, so the Department also provides support and strengthens them. The NGOs registered with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment can also submit projects, in accordance with the criteria set by the fund’s committee, to request
financial support from the environmental fund at the maximum of 5 million baht or £66,000 per project and a maximum of five years implementation. Up to now, there are at least forty projects across the country supported by the environmental fund. However, from the point of the NGOs there are several difficulties dealing with regulations and the process of approval: for example taking a long time in consideration of the committee; excessive paperwork; some members of the committee lack experience in the rural community and require explanation. As the law agrees only the registered NGOs to request the support, non-registered NGOs have to be under the umbrella of those registered in order to submit the request (Department of Environmental Quality Promotion, 1992; and Department of Environmental Quality Promotion, 2000).

6.4. Relationship between government and NGOs.

NGOs can be registered with the government under the laws summarised in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Types of NGOs and their legal registration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Registrar</th>
<th>Law</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Trade</td>
<td>Director-General of the Association Department of Internal</td>
<td>Commercial Association Trade Act 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Labour Union</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior, Department of Labour</td>
<td>Labour Relations Act 1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To register, the organisation is requested to state the organisation has no political objectives and 'will not be involved in political activity'. These organisations are classified as legal organisations and are requested to submit an annual report to the authority concerned. In general, NGOs working for rural development are registered as foundations or associations while unregistered NGOs have different titles such as project, club or group. However, only a small number of local NGOs are registered with the government because they avoid traditional bureaucratic constraints and they want to be independent and flexible. Moreover, due to the laws, rules and requirements for registration also tend to discourage official
affiliation (Pongsapich, 1995 and Gohlert, 1991). Vichit-Vadakan points out that the major difference between registered and unregistered organisations is that the latter cannot access state monetary support.

During military and dictatorship regimes, especially during the communist period of the 1950s to 1970s, any development work outside the public sector was branded as communist. After the fall of communism in Thailand in 1980, the relationship between the government and NGOs progressively improved. After 1980 many small NGOs emerged and gained popularity amongst peasants because they worked closely with the community in various aspects of development. Therefore, the government recognised the need for NGO involvement in rural development by setting up a government-NGO joint committee on rural development and by supporting to establish the NGO-Coordinating Committee on Rural Development or NGO-CORD. From the early 1980s onwards, the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board as the core agency promoted the role of NGOs in formulating the national economic and social development plans which began from the Sixth Plan (1986-1990). The drafting of the Eighth Plan (1997-2002) took a huge participation from the NGO community. NGOs proposed ideas which diverged from the traditional emphasis on growth alone and the National Economic and Social Development Board agreed. However, in the process of preparing the Ninth Plan, some NGOs thought that their real concerns were omitted through the synthesis process. As a result, instead of participation in drafting the national plan with the government, some of them, especially NGO-CORD and a number of people organisations put forward their own ‘National Agendas for the Free Thais’ to the public by emphasising parallel local or community plans to national plan (Pongsapich, 1995; Thailand Development Research Institute; The Synergos Institute, 2002; and Gohlert, 1991).

The role of NGOs and civil organisations has been emphasised in national policy in particular the national development plan. In practice, NGO representatives are often invited to join or participate in various activities run by government agencies at all levels, national and local, for example, joining in the committees, meetings, and various academic forums. Those representatives often play their key roles as advisor, commentator, partnership or even experts by providing and sharing ideas, comments and suggestions. According to the study on the Process of Formulating Poverty Reduction Strategies in Thailand conducted by the Thailand Development Research Institute, it is concluded that ‘the increasing roles of People Organisations and NGOs make them more significant stakeholders whose roles and voices could no longer be ignored by the government’ (Thailand Development Research Institute: 38).

Some scholars including Pongpaichit (2000) observe that the relationship between NGOs and government in Thailand are varied. The contribution of NGOs to participate in the national plan formulation shows the good relationship with the government while there is still a lot of antagonism between two parties; in particular the relationship between NGOs working for the people movement and involved in protest and government is not smooth.

When Prime Minister Thaksin Chinawathra came to power in 2001, he expressed his negative impression of NGOs to the public and this led to criticism. In a radio address delivered on December 21, a day after police clashed with protesters against the Thai-Malaysian pipeline project, he said on his weekly programme that ‘a group of NGO workers who use violence live well but like making trouble’ and later he referred them as ‘anarchists’. He mentioned that ‘NGO workers who use the language of violence will be blacklisted by the government and face harsh law measures.’ Also, he earlier said that NGOs are funded by foreign organisations which do not want Thailand to develop. Due to
his ideas, the criticism was disseminated among the press, NGOs and scholars (Chang Noi, 2003).

The government began to move against certain NGOs in 2002 by investigating ‘unusual richness’ under the Anti-Money Laundering Law, which included a number of NGO members, although the procedure needed to stop because of public criticism (Janchitfah, 2003). Consequently, Vichit-Vadakan (2003) notes that: ‘A large portion of the public believed that NGOs make things worse by inciting the local people against state authorities.’ Most people view NGOs as not being governmental organisations instead of considering them as non-profit organisations. Meanwhile, some politicians do not really understand who NGOs are and most middle class people also do not realise the role of NGOs. Some questions are raised by the public for example, who are NGOs? Where are the sources of funds for NGOs? (Thungseangprathip, 2003).

6.5. Role of Thai NGOs

NGOs in Thailand are not only large in number but also diverse in their roles. Their general responsibilities are public education, lobbying, advocacy, research, improving living conditions for the underprivileged, environmental protection, relief and welfare, and some are involved in specific issues such as children, gender, social justice, AIDS, and public health. According to the research on Public Interest (Non-profit) Organisations (NGOs) in Thailand conducted by the Social Research Institute of Chulalongkorn University, NGOs can be categorised into ten groups: culture and recreation, study and research, public health, social service, environment, development and housing, law and politic, relief and volunteer, international activity and religion. There are 17,000 organisations registered as foundations or associations under Thai law, and there are approximately 1,000 non-registered organisations. Unfortunately, only 10 percent of these NGOs are still active, and on average there are 14 staff in each organisation (Thungseangprathip, 2003). Nevertheless, the precise number of NGOs in Thailand is unknown, because Thai NGOs comprise both temporary and permanent, mostly small-scale organisations working in specific areas. Thus, new organisations emerge and old ones disappear constantly (Riska, year unknown).

Through Thai NGOs’ experiences in social and community development with villagers for almost four decades, their roles and activities can be summarised as follows:

6.5.1. The search for alternative livelihood

As a result of NGOs’ work during the 1980s, most NGOs concentrate on solving basic livelihood problems of the peasants by using the principle of self-reliance (which is related to the root of Buddhist philosophy), and people-participation as main strategies. Group organisation for different purposes was a common activity, for example rice banks, fertiliser banks, cattle banks, savings groups, revolving funds and handicraft groups. The results of searching for alternative livelihoods are: changing patterns of commercial farming to subsistence farming; integrated farming by using indigenous knowledge; and application of local wisdom or indigenous systems for livelihood improvement.

6.5.2. Networking of NGOs and people organisations

NGOs play a vital role in supporting the establishment of various networks with the main objectives of sharing experiences and information, and to create bargaining power for people. These networks are networks of cattle-raising groups, revolving fund groups, local
intellectuals, and community forest campaigners among others. These networks often join regional networks for campaigns and mobilisation for rallies and protests.

6.5.3. **Policy advocacy**

When people are facing resource conflict with the state, for example conflicts over land and forest, based on rights of local community, NGOs assist them by undertaking active policy advocacy and bringing the issues to public debate. Examples of this are: proposing the people’s development plan, so concentrating on the rights of people and community; and the struggle against the national forest policy and land resettlement scheme (the Khor-jor-kor). In addition, NGOs aim to promote people’s right to manage local natural resources and the right to access information.

6.5.4. **Strategic alliance building**

Apart from networking and strengthening villagers themselves, both NGOs and people’s organisations begin to build alliances with other social groups and even international parties to gain more support. To establish an alliance, there are some recommendations: NGOs should maintain a good relationship with government officials; to run activities, information and technical support from academics in addition to understanding from urban middle class is needed; they need to be aware of creating a public image for their organisations and activities, because the general public, in particular the urban middle class and media, tend to portray NGOs’ as trouble makers (Prasartset, 1995 and Boonyaratnasootthorn, 1995).

Based on his study of the role of Thai NGOs in rural development, Gohlert (1991: 115) concludes that ‘their thinking and underlying philosophy are systematic and holistic in scope’. In addition, the expertise and strength of Thai NGOs is comprised of their problem-oriented work, and establishment of community organisations and networks. However, some NGOs, especially the campaign-oriented ones, are criticised that they lack the political linkages (Kuankachorn, 1995).

6.6. **The patronage system and role of NGOs**

Patron-client relationships (rabop uppatham) permeate Thai society from top to bottom, affecting the economy, polity and social life. The patron-client relationship, or superior-inferior relationship, is the relation between parties of different statuses, one classified as superior or ‘big man’ (phu yai) and one classified as inferior or ‘little man’ (phu noi). It is generally expected that the superior should protect, assist, and provide social connections or even economic benefits for the inferior or client. In turn the inferior or client should respect, obey, serve and be loyal to the superior (Girling, 1981; Vichit-Vadakan, 1989; Pasuk Phongpaichit et.al. 1996; and Girling, 1996). The patronage system, which existed prior to the reign of King Chulalongkorn, was land-based feudalism, under which the peasants and the rich and powerful noblemen respectively exchanged ‘loyalty’ and ‘patronage’. For example, ‘the relationship between landowner and the peasant-tenant is not merely an economic relationship but has implications of support for the tenant’s family and also tenant’s building for his landowner patron’ (Jumbala, 1974:532). King Chulalongkorn changed this system during the mid-19th century (Jumbala, 1974; and Uwanno, 2007). However, the hierarchical relationship is still entrenched firmly in Thai culture. Jumbala (1974:535) argues that the formation of a network of people at various levels of Thai society is a result of the evolution of interpersonal relations of the patron-client relationship. Nowadays, these relationships have changed from a comprehensive system covering all
fields of exchange to a more limited system emphasising specific areas. Thus a person may seek many patrons who can provide assistance in different areas, such as bankers in relation to credit and finance and police in matters concerned with law (Vichit-Vadakan, 1989).

Phongpaichit et al. (1996) point out that ‘this form of relationship is further reinforced by the cultural ideal that is deep in Buddhist doctrine’. For example, the superior should act generously to the inferior, or the superior should protect the inferior. When one receives benefit, one is expected to do something in return. Based on Buddhist principles, this value is called katanyu katawethi, or bun khun, which means ‘to remember and eventually reciprocate favours’. Thais view that persons who lack this value or katanyu should not be associated with. Also, they would be classified as bad persons, according to Buddhist belief (Rabibhadana, 1975; and Vichit-Vadakan, 1989). In modern society, this value is still firmly entrenched in Thai culture. To give something in return to his or her superior, sometimes, someone may act in any way requested, even if that involves illegal actions. These situations can be seen in daily press reports.

Jumbala (1974) explained the dependency relationship as a cone-shaped structure, the same as in some other countries, such as Japan, Italy, East Africa and Latin America. The structure is presented in Figure 6.1

![Figure 6.1 The relationship between a patron superintendent and the coterie client at lower station in a cone-shaped structure (Jumbala, 1974:533).](image)

The cone-shaped structure relationship is a vertical type, of which the individual’s group participation (group B or group C) is regulated by his established relation to a given group member – A. Person ‘A’ is the most powerful; if he or she disappears, it would make the sustaining of the group under his or her patronage extremely difficult. However, in modern society, the case would not become as bad as in the past.

Jumbala (1974) further explains the relationship between the bureaucracy and extrabureaucratic organisations by employing Lomnitz’s model, which is presented in Figure 6.2.
Firstly, in the relationship between bureaucrats and the upper class, such as Ministers and businessmen, the bureaucrat does favours for them by neglecting the use of rational decision-making; for example, recruitment of Minister’s clients and facilitating businessmen in bidding for government projects. In return, the bureaucrat could receive prestige or promotion. Secondly, the relationship between bureaucrats and citizens or ordinary people: this refers to providing favours to relatives, friends and personal clients in exceptional service or recruitment. Jumbala (1974:537) notes that ‘giving favours serve[s] to support the power base of the bureaucrats themselves as individuals and as a group. The doing of favours which are reciprocal and equal are done only among those considered social equals.’

In my point of view, based on this model, relationships among bureaucrats themselves and between bureaucrats and middle class people, including NGOs, can be identified in the third category of giving favours and receiving friendship in return. In Thailand, people in rural areas always rely on the authorities, which could be explained by the Lomnitz’s model presented in Figure 6.2. As a result of NGOs’ work in Thai society to assist the poor, two studies by Dechalert and Pintobteang reveal that the poor become reliant on NGOs instead of the authorities. The local authorities cannot assist them in submitting their petitions to the central government. Therefore, the patron-client relationship in rural society weakens, and the power of the bureaucracy is reduced (Dechalert, year unknown and Pintobteang, 1998). In the larger picture, in the new forms of partnership between grassroots actors and NGOs, other private and public institutions, scholars and researchers, and state and multilateral agencies ‘there is little subordination, condescension or patronage in these engagements’ (Batliwala, 2002:406).
In the field of natural resource management, these relationships were instrumental in the vast deforestation in the Eastern provinces of Thailand some 46 years ago (Vichit-Vadakan, 1989). Vichit-Vadakan (1989) notes that, at present, large-scale deforestation cannot be accomplished without government officials or politicians support, either at local or national levels. However, in the case of villagers, this system cannot help villagers in cases of conflicts with the state over natural resources (Pintopteang, 1998:106).

6.7. Role of NGOs in the environmental and social movement

Rural protest emerged in the mid-1980s. In the late 1980s, during the period when many NGOs appeared in Thailand, rural protests were brought to the attention of the public. Linkages and networks between local movements and local groups were gradually established. In the early 1990s, several new people organisations and networks appeared. The most important were the Assembly of Small-scale Farmers of the North-East, formed in March 1992, and the Northern Farmers’ Network, formed in early 1994. Consequently, networking becomes a significant strategy of Thai NGOs today (Dechalert, year unknown; Pintopteang, 1998; and Baker). Thai NGOs always play a very important role in rural movements because of their close relationships with rural people. Most of them basically expect policy change in favour of the poor, not the political structural change. In the view of Suthy Prasartset, a senior NGO worker, he believes that “they (NGOs) did not intend to lead the struggle into total confrontation with unforeseen consequences for the fate of the participating masses” (Prasartset, 1995: 134). According to Phongpaichit (2002), the role of NGOs in social movements has emerged because of the upsurge of popular movements and the authorities’ attempt to combat these movements by a mixture of constructive neglect or the exercise of traditional power. Missingham (2003a) argues that Third World grassroots organisations’ dependence on the support of NGOs is a weakness because based on result of his study on Assembly of the Poor, the people movement would not exist in the form it does without the assistance of NGOs. The results of studies regarding the role of NGOs in environmental and social movements in Thailand were discussed in Chapter 1.

In terms of the influence of NGOs on villagers, according to Missingham’s observations in several meetings where important decisions were made, some contradictions in NGOs relationship with grassroots were demonstrated. NGOs tended to encourage villagers to make their own decisions through discussion, debate and voting, according to democratic ideology. In the meetings, NGOs set the agendas, chaired the proceedings, and guided the topics and terms of debate. In this regard, I would like to note that this happened in early period of Assembly of the Poor, but today all tasks in leading meetings about villagers’ issues are performed by villagers. Nevertheless, NGOs often guide villagers towards outcomes that they value. In Missingham’s idea, this is because NGOs take the structural position, and have good communication skills and considerable experience (Missingham 2003a). Also, in the study on the limitations of NGOs in the Anti-Pak Mun dam movement (in which the Assembly of the Poor is the main actor) by Lertchoosakul (2003), it was found that NGOs not only process the frames based on the demands of affected people, but also integrate their own background and experience of the issues, and even the objectives of their organisations. Missingham (2003a: 113) concludes that “NGOs activists hold much more power and influence in the Assembly of the Poor than they usually acknowledge”.

In the views of villagers about the role of NGOs, villagers are highly appreciative of them. Missingham, who interviewed villagers in the Assembly of the Poor for his study, realised the recognition of those villagers of the role of NGOs, because most of them regarded NGO workers as people who devote themselves to ‘help the poor’ (Missingham, 2003a: 111). One villager viewed NGOs as ‘a pair of two things that goes together’, although some of
them still questioned where they get their income. However, villagers’ leaders believed that they could run their movements without assistance from NGOs, but when NGOs joined with them, they were provided with information beyond their abilities to find it (Pintobteang, 1998). In addition, Missingham often saw evidence of conflict with one leading villager saying ‘this had taught the villagers not to rely too heavily on the NGOs’ (Missingham, 2003a: 112).

In terms of the success of the political and structural changes, Lertchoosakul (2003) analysed the limitations of NGOs in the anti-Pak Mun Dam movement, and concluded that the movement succeeded in short-term benefits, such as compensation, rather than in long-term goals, such as structural change. NGOs did not succeed in creating an understanding about long-term goals among the public, even among participants of the campaign, particularly the idea of structural change and the need for radical movement. Therefore, the number of participants in demonstrations and campaigns decreased after the immediate goals such as compensation were settled, even though the long-term goals had not been achieved. Without public understanding, NGOs were viewed as outsiders, or the third hand, and were perceived as having their own interests in mobilising the movement. Although NGOs could mobilise many allies from domestic and international networks, they could not promote the long-term goals, as the networks were too loose and broad. Pintobteang (1998) and Missingham (2003a) argue that, although the results of structural and political changes do not appear, the grassroots’ recognition of the impact of development project and the government policy can be seen as the starting point for a political consciousness. Missingham (2003a) further points out that participation in movements provides experiences that transform identity, solidarity and political consciousness. Villagers learn that solidarity is strength as some villagers say ‘we have to join together in great number, join together for a long time. Therefore, they (government/authorities) will listen to us’ (Missingham, 2003a: 219-220). In addition, Pintobteang (1998) and Lertchoosakul (2003) conclude that people’s movements with NGOs’ assistance can affect government policy, but not structural and political change. As Lertchoosakul (2003: 247) observes, ‘today, government may well be much more cautious about the unilateral implementation of large scale development projects as a result of the anti-Pak Mun Dam movement and other struggles.’

Since the late 1980s, NGOs across the country do not work only for or against any policy and implementation at the state level, but they also voice their objections to government policy at the international level. Their concerns focus on the impacts on people, particularly the poor. For example, the demonstrations in objection of some policies of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation.

6.8. Conclusion

During the early period, NGOs in Thailand were involved in social work. They shifted from being ‘social welfare workers’ to ‘social development workers’ in the late 1960s. NGOs dramatically grew during the brief democratic period from 1973-1976, after the 1973 student uprising. Their ideologies emphasised people as the subject of development instead of the object. The concept of integrated rural development and human rights also began at this time. When the country faced the repressive period of 1976-1979, NGOs started to emphasise non-violence by adopting the concept of Buddhism in social development. The number of NGOs proliferated between 1980 and 1990. Most of them work closely with grassroots movements. The radical NGOs group, who engaged in political mobilisation, emerged in the late 1980s. The major debates of NGOs during the 1980s and 1990s were
about community culture and political economy. As a result, the community culture approach was popular and became the main strategy of NGOs. Most NGOs played their roles as catalysts and facilitators. The ideology that 'the answer is in the village' was very popular among NGOs during the 1980s. Meanwhile, they realised that they needed to work more closely with the government to achieve their goals. Then, policy advocacy became the major strategy in the late 1980s.

The contribution of NGOs to the government works has become well recognised since 1990. In the early 1990s many civil groups emerged in Thai society with the main issues including decentralisation, community rights and the people's participation in decision-making. Since the 1990s, the roles of NGOs have become well recognised by the government. NGOs started focusing on environmental issues in the early 1980s. They emphasised two main concepts: people-oriented and nature-oriented.

Like other developing countries, relationships between NGOs and the state are varied. In particular, the relationship between NGOs working for the people movement and involved in protest and government is not smooth.

In general, the roles of NGOs in Thailand can be summarised as follows: (i) the search for alternative livelihood (ii) networking between NGOs and people organisations (iii) policy advocacy (iv) strategic alliance building. As rural protests in Thailand emerged in the mid-1980s, NGOs became involved in the movements because they occurred in their working areas, although they did not want to confront with the state. Based on several studies, NGOs played their role in social and political movement as resources by transmitting information to grassroots, coordinating between people from outside villages and villagers, and suggesting strategies.

The discussion about NGOs in Thailand in this chapter will be background information for analysis of the case studies in Chapter 9 to 11.
Chapter 7
Environmental Movements in Thailand

This Chapter discusses environmental movements in Thailand as significant information for the empirical work in the following chapters. Firstly, it presents a brief on the current state of the environment of the country. Then the major aspects of environmental movements in Thailand are discussed, starting from the history of movements. As both case studies are members of a national people network, the Assembly of the Poor, its major topics will be examined in the final part of the Chapter.

Thailand has changed from a country in which natural resources were abundant to one in which resources are finite, threatened and fragile (Phongpaichit, 2000). As a result of the destruction of natural resources and political space, environmental movements in Thailand have grown rapidly during the past decades. They are mostly based around local struggles by the poor demanding their rights to access to local resources. Like other developing countries, environmental movements in Thailand have not raised environmental issues alone; they are accompanied by other issues, in particular, poverty and social justice. Moreover, villagers are trying to prove the linkage between market-oriented exploitation of forest resources and negative impacts, including ecological damage, rural impoverishment and displacement (Tegbaru, 1998). Environmental movements in Thailand are mostly concerned with essential livelihood and welfare issues, different from those in the West. The debate about development versus environmentalism has appeared among Thailand’s leadership as elsewhere in the world (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989).

This chapter illustrates environmental movements in Thailand. The state of the environment of the country is presented, followed by the emergence of environmental movements in Thailand, grassroots movements, the forest issue, the role of Buddhist monks and environmental movements regarding development projects. Finally, the major issues of the Assembly of the Poor are discussed.

7.1. The state of the environment of Thailand

Thailand’s growth is based upon unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and the environment. Forested lands decreased steadily from 50 percent of the total area of the country in 1961 (when Thailand launched the First National Development Plan) to about only 25 percent in 1998. Deforestation stemmed from many factors: forest concessions, illegal deforestation, population increases, the need for more agricultural land, and development projects such as dam constructions. Although the Thai government has banned logging concessions since 1989, forest areas have still decreased. However, the rate of deforestation has been declining from an average of 1.16 million acres a year (during the period 1960-89, or before the banning policy) to only 0.4 million acres per annum after the logging ban (during the period 1989-98). However, about 1.54 million acres of forest area were encroached upon during 2000-4.

Although Thailand is classified as a country without a water shortage, shortages occur in some parts of the country during the dry season, especially in the northeast. Between November 2002 and June 2003, 62 provinces (of 76 provinces across the country) were reported to have a water shortage, affecting about 5.7 million people and about 132,000 million agricultural acres.
Coastal and fishery resources are threatened by careless and extravagant exploitation by Thai fleets. The harvest rate of marine fishery declined from 298 kilograms per hour in 1961 to a mere 3 kilograms per hour in 1999. In 2000 the total fish landing was 2.77 million tons, exceeding the sustainable yield of 2.5 million tons. The most critical area of marine fishery resources is the inner Gulf of Thailand.

Water quality monitoring of the major 49 rivers and four fresh water reservoirs in Thailand shows that forty percent are classified as having good water quality, 25 percent moderate, and 32 percent deteriorating. However, sharply deteriorating quality has been found in the rivers flowing through densely populated areas: the lower Chao Phraya River, the lower Tha Chin River and the lower Lam Ta Kong River. The main cause of the water pollution problem was contamination by faecal coliform and total coliform bacteria from community wastewater.

Air quality also shows signs of deteriorating. The main problems are high concentration of particulate matter (PM10), Ozone, Nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide. In Bangkok, air pollution along roads with heavy traffic shows high levels of PM10. Some measures have been implemented to resolve the problem. Consequently, the level of PM10 in Bangkok declined from 67.9 micrograms per cubic metre in 2001 to 57.8 micrograms per cubic metre in 2002. Noise pollution has been found along main roads with heavy traffic. The level of noise has exceeded the standard 70-decibels A. However, the noise level is generally within the standard in areas exceeding fifty metres from the main roads. The volume of solid waste from households across the country has been increasing. In 2002, household solid waste totalled 39,225 tons per day, or 14.3 million tons, of which 25 percent was created within Bangkok, thirty percent from municipal areas and the remaining 45 percent from non-municipal areas (Office of Natural Resources and Environment Policy and Planning, 2004).

7.2. The emergence of environmental movements

The emergence of environmental movements in Thailand resulted from several reasons, such as the rise of middle class, visible impacts of environmental problems, open political opportunities, international linkage and the role of mass media (So and Lee, 1999; Hirsch, 1997). Environmental concern in Thailand before the 1970s was restricted to the conservation activities of urban groups, such as the Society for the Conservation of National Treasures and Environment and a bird-watching club. Environmental movements emerged in the 1970s (Forsyth, 2001:39). During the early period of environmental movements in Thailand, the mass media played a very significant role in bringing cases to public attention, and this led to nationwide criticism and debate. However, ‘not all newspaper reports have considered this kind of activism to be democratising or environmental’ (Forsyth, 2007:2127). In early 1973, journalists, in cooperation with student activists, revealed the incident in which military officers and other influential persons used a government helicopter for hunting expeditions into Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary in western Thailand. This scandal led to demands for an official investigation, and to the establishment of the Wildlife Conservation Division under the Royal Forestry Department. At the same time, it increased an interest in conservation among the general public, as the issue had been widely criticised in the media, in particular, newspapers (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989:142).

In 1974-75, the most sustained environmentally-oriented political battle on a national level was the TEMCO movement, demanding that the government should withdraw the mining concession in southern Thailand. The campaign carried on with the cooperation of concerned provincial- and national-level government officials and academics and extensively reported in newspapers. The movement epitomised the use of environmental
issues by students to highlight abuses of power and to build popular support (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989:142-3; So and Lee, 1999).

The most significant event is the Nam Chone Dam protest against a large dam energy generation project at the western border of Thailand. Without expectation from the state, the protest began in 1982 when the authority started logging in the wildlife sanctuary to build a road to the construction site. After a nationwide debate, the government agreed to shelve this project in April 1988. The most important reason for the success of the anti-dam campaign was the growth of mobilisation, including people from local areas and middle class people such as townspeople, domestic and foreign NGOs, academics, and even some government officers. The mass media also played a major role in the movements (Buergin, and Kessler, 2000; Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989:147). The success of the Nam Chone Dam protest was crucial for the opening and extension of political space, the emergence of Thai civil society and the process of démocratisation (Buergin and Kessler, 2000; Forsyth, 2001).

In 1986, the first well-known environmental protest relating to a ‘brown’ issue broke out. That was the protest against the construction of a tantalum processing plant in Phuket. Brown environmental conflicts have become more numerous since then. In 1992, concerns grew at the pollution from the lignite-burning power plant at Mae Moh in the North, and then concerning pollution of the Nam Pong River in the Northeast from the Phoenic pulp and paper plant. In these cases, scientific evidence for resolving the extent and origin of pollution became a source of political conflict, particularly as these were used as the basis for claims for financial compensation (Forsyth, 2001:39).

"Environmentalism in Thailand has been a democratising force, both by forming an arena to criticise the state, and by becoming more diverse and socially inclusive itself" (Forsyth, 2007:2127). The diversity of ideologies of environmental movements in Thailand depends on the range of organisations and their differentiated material bases, in particular as related to the politics of legitimacy in control over resources (Hirsch, 1997). The rhetoric of ‘development versus environmentalism’ has been employed, as elsewhere in the world. The western ideology has been brought to Thailand by elites who were educated in the West since the beginning of the twentieth century (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989; Hirsch, 1997).

7.3. The role of the middle class

Hirsch (1977) emphasises that environmentalism is often seen to be the product of Thailand’s rapidly growing middle class, as a combination of education, increased concern over quality of life issues, and leisure to reflect beyond immediate survival questions. Hirsch (1997:20) further states that ‘on the surface, there is much to support the notion that environmentalism in Thailand is a middle class phenomenon’. According to studies of the middle classes and their social consciousness, Thai middle classes are intermixed among different social origins but with similar educational backgrounds. Based on educational credentials, they have attained an economically distinct status (Funatsu and Kagoya, 2003). More importantly, the generation of people who experienced the student uprising events of October 1973 and October 1976 formed a segment of the new middle class (Banpasirichote, 2004:243). The middle classes in Thai society often engage in environmental debates and rural movements. Alliances with NGOs and other middle class actors are increasingly common for the farmers’ movements. The urban middle classes are increasingly concerned not only about their deteriorating immediate urban environment but also about conservation of the natural resources of the country (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989; Darlington, 2002). However, Banpasirichote (2004) criticises that the middle class in Bangkok mostly ignore the plight of the poor in rural areas.
According to studies of the role of class in social movements in Thailand, the number of middle class people participating in green environmental issues is higher than those participating in brown issues. This imbalance suggests a lack of involvement of the middle class in activism associated with industrial pollution. Even though the topics of pollution in newspapers indicate that there are more references to ‘working’ than ‘middle’ class actors, the working class are generally represented as victims rather than activists (Forsyth, 2001:39). Similarly, According to an analysis of almost 5,000 newspaper reports during 1968-2000 in Thailand, the middle-class has dominated forest activism, but lower-class ‘red-green’ activism has grown for forests and against pollution (Forsyth, 2007:2110). However, in the particular issue of the community forest movement, Forsyth (2001:41) finds that “the proportion of “middle” class versus “working” class actors in relation to community forestry stories are 0.33 to 0.55. The ratio suggests that community forestry is of equal relevance to peasant groups as middle-class activists”.

7.4. Grassroots movements

Grassroots movements have a long history in Thai society. Before the student uprising in 1973, there were only eleven protests in 1948 and twenty-three protests in 1957, but there was no protest during the Sarit dictatorship. The protests during the early period were about local issues (Pintopteang, 1998:33). In the early 1970s, protests in the northern region occurred, focusing on farming issues, including indebtedness, low paddy prices, land loss and tenancy. Student activists helped to bring these local protests on to the national scale and assisted with their organisations (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002:314-5). Therefore, the number of protests grew dramatically during the 1970s. There were 600 protests of labour movements and 153 protests of others groups in 1974-75. However, the social movements were repressed by the state after the 6 October 1975 incident. The movements were broken up again during the Half-democratic period since 1982. Then many new issues were raised in Thai society, such as human rights, labour, environment and social justice. However, the main actors of rural movements remained the farmers of which movements involved the price of agricultural products and materials for production. They adopted strategies to open opportunities in formal parliamentary system by organising as a lobby organisation, and by bargaining with MPs and party leaders (Baker, 2000).

The movements have transformed agricultural issues into conflicts over natural resources since the 1990s. Protests and demonstrations have increased rapidly; for example, there were 170 protests in 1990 and 275 protests in 1994. In 1995, the number of protests grew to 334. About one-third of the movements were in the northeast region in 1994, but the number of protests in this region decreased to about one quarter of the number for the whole country in the following year. Pintopteang further notices that these movements were results of the conflict over natural resources, water, land and forest (Pintopteang, 1998:33-35). Phongpaichit and Baker (2002:386) state about the social movements in the 1990s that a wide range of rural movements exploited the space created by the retreat of dictatorship to defend their access to resources and their “way of life” [...] Debates on “civil society” were supplanted by a vocabulary of social movements and people politics’. Baker (2000) notes that this insecure group adopted strategies that were different from the agricultural group. They employed a loose, flat and networked style of organisations. Meanwhile, they avoided a political co-optation strategy, but depended on a fragile ability to intimidate government without alienating urban public opinion.

Grassroots environmentalism has emerged as a combination of: the impact of the development path on rural livelihoods, especially conflict over forest resources; the
incorporation of the grassroots into mainstream political and economic arenas; and the role of the environment as a legitimising discourse for their claims over resources (Hirsch, 1997). In the view of villagers, the main reason for their protests and demonstrations is that they have no power, and cannot rely on the law and the ordinary channels and processes of bureaucracy (Dechalert, year known; Pintopteang, 1998; and Missingham, 2003a). Vittaya Yoingmeesuk, the villager, in Dechalert’s research, said ‘we found that (protest) is the only way to bring the problem to the government. But if each of us comes, the government will never consider our grievance’. Also, one of the advisors of the Assembly of the Poor declared ‘our country still relies on power. Thus, we have to use “people power” to tell the government of our grievance’ (Dechalert, year unknown: 13-14). Meanwhile, the authorities often think that the grassroots environmental movement is a creation of political interest groups, NGOs, the mass media and foreign researchers, and not something initiated by grassroots actors themselves. Thai government maintains their monopoly of control over natural resources and the environment (Tegbaru, 1998:154).

The struggles of grassroots actors through environmental movements have developed into networks expanding throughout the country, and can be summarised as follows.

(1) The North
Due to water resource conflicts, watershed networks wildly expanded in the main watershed such as, the Committee on Mae Kok Watershed Development and Rehabilitation in Chiangrai province and the Villager Network of Mae Wang Watershed. In addition, the Northern Farmer Network becomes a network for the villagers who have been forced to move out of the national parks.

(2) The Northeast:
Compared to other regions, this region contains the highest number of people movements. The networks are:

   (2.1) The ‘Sa-mach-cha chao-na chao-rai pak e-san’ (Northeast Farmers’ Assembly) was set up aiming to promote a community network and to organise people to tackle problems stemming from government policy on forest and land.

   (2.2) The ‘watershed network’ is another villager network, which was initiated from environmental crises in watershed areas: for example, the Villager Network for Pong River Conservation and Rehabilitation was formed by villagers affected by water pollution caused by wastewater from the Phi Nix Pulp Paper factory.

   (2.3) The ‘Sa-mach-cha pak e-san’ or ‘Northeast assembly’ was a network of communities affected by the ten dam constructions in the Northeast. Its objectives are to provide a forum to exchange information, to object to dam construction and follow up a public petition, and to seek alternatives in the form of water resource management organised by the people.

   (2.4) The ‘Sa-mach-cha kaset korn rai yoi pak e-san’ or ‘Northeast Small Farmers’ Assembly’, covering the whole region, also played a major role in negotiation and managing the problems of members concerning their livelihoods and natural resources.

(3) The South:
Due to the impact of pollution from industrial sites in Songkhla Lake and coastal areas, middle class people living in the cities of both the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand established natural resource and environment clubs. In addition, the ‘Sa-ma-phan pra-mong phuenb ban pak tai’ or Southern Traditional Fishing Association was also set up in order to tackle problems from commercial fishing.

(4) The Central area, Bangkok and the East:
There are no networks related to natural resources in these regions. There were temporary movements focusing on some issues, such as environmental movements concerning the Mum Chon Dam during the period 1986-1987 (Phuraya, 2002).

7.5 The forest issue

The main cause of deforestation is encroachment by agriculturists engaged in cash cropping. Since the 1980s, conflicts over resources, especially forests, have become political and controversial issues. Contradictions have emerged between the rights of local communities, on the one hand, and the state management and control over resources, on the other. These conflicts include: conflict between individual villages who want to protect the forest and water resources and those who want to exploit them; conflict between rice-farming and salt-farming communities; conflict between local communities and the outsiders who invade. Finally, it is the confrontation between the state and local communities that Pongpaichit and Baker (2002:91) state is the most serious (Hirsch, 1997; and Buergin and Kessler, 2000). Tegbaru (1998: 174) notices that the local environmental movement has expanded from specific local forestland issues to more general environmental and socio-economic concerns. In recent years, the villagers have moved from confrontation with the state to a more non-violent approach, such as negotiation. The major environmental movements concerning the forest issue appear in Table 7.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Dates of first and last news reports</th>
<th>Brief summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pa Kham, Buri rum forest evictions</td>
<td>June 89-February 95</td>
<td>Plan to resettle farmers in eucalyptus and pine plantations, northeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forest evictions</td>
<td>February 94-April 94</td>
<td>Plan to resettle farmers in eucalyptus and pine plantations, northeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encroachment into National Parks</td>
<td>May 93-December 99</td>
<td>Ongoing opposition to logging/agriculture/tourism/mining in national parks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community forest</td>
<td>January 96-December 2000</td>
<td>Ongoing debates about laws governing forest access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chome Thong watershed</td>
<td>December 96-December 99</td>
<td>Highland-lowland dispute about alleged damage of upland agriculture in Chiang Mai, the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaween National Park scandal</td>
<td>January 98- May 2000</td>
<td>Illegal logging discovered in national park in Mae Hong Son province, the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to the Beach</td>
<td>October 98-March99</td>
<td>Opposition to government decision to allow filming of a Hollywood movie in two national parks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5.1 Conflict between lowland and upland people

In the upper north of Thailand (areas bordering Myanmar and Laos), there are several ethnic minorities who have been migrating into Thailand for centuries. In the past, these minority groups were classified as non-Thai; the Nationality Act of 1965 changed this. The total population of all ethnic groups was estimated to be 745,000 in 1995, and about sixty percent have Thai citizenship. Most traditionally practise swidden agriculture resulting in forest destruction. As the Thai government has employed all legal means to protect the forested land (based on the concept that forests are state property), in the view of the state, these hill tribe people are considered as violators of state land and destroyers of the environment. In addition, the state does not recognise any kind of ethnic rights over land in the hill areas. During the past decades, many development programmes have introduced various kinds of commercial cash crops, in particular coffee, fruit trees and temperate vegetables, as a means to increase income for these minorities. Such development programmes encourage higher uses of chemical fertilisers, pesticides and water. As a result, they have to compete for land and water resources with lowland communities. The lowland-highland conflict can be seen in a well-known case of conflict between the Hmong of Ban Pa Kuai and lowland Thai farmers in the Chomthong District of Chieng Mai province. ‘The conflicts in the northern Thai highlands are a clear case of the politics of environment in the sense that environment has played a role in lending legitimacy both to the government agencies and ethnic communities in their struggle for the control of forest resources’ (Ganjanapan, 1997:218).

7.5.2 Community forest

Since the 1990s, the different ideas of forest management have become a subject of major debate in Thailand. Based on the question of whether forests can co-exist with people, the controversy has resulted in two main approaches: people-oriented and conservation-oriented. For the people-oriented approach, the light green NGOs and grassroots movement argue that people should be allowed to access forest areas, as local people have been living in co-existence with the forest for hundreds of years. Then they demand their rights in forest management from the state. On the other hand, the dark green NGOs and the state stigmatise people living within the forest as destroyers, so they argue that people’s access to the forests should be minimised, or that people should be moved out (Buergin and Kessler, 2000; Forsyth, 2001; and Darlington, 2002).

The idea of a forest community bill emerged, which became an example of environmental movements in Thailand that relied on the legislative channel. There are at least five versions of the bill proposed by both distinct approaches, people-oriented and conservation-oriented. In July 2000, the people’s draft was scrutinised by parliament after it was presented with the 50,000 signatures required by the 1997 Constitution (Buergin, and Kessler, 2000). The National Legislative Assembly finally approved the forest community bill in November 2007, during the Surayut interim government. However, the approved bill has been strongly criticised by NGOs and civil groups because it is substantially different from the People’s version, which was presented to the parliament in early 2000. ‘Instead of rewarding communities with trust, the law has cut their rights to manage the community forests, on the basis that they are settled outside the protected forest or “conservation zone” [...] this version will definitely make it impossible for the community to fully participate in community forest management’ (Foundation for Ecological Recovery, 2007:14). As a result, this bill still has not been officially declared to date.
7.5.3 Conflict between the state and villagers living in forests

Ganjanapan (1997:214) emphasises a failure in the government’s forest policies, which focus only on individual property rights while ignoring communal property. The Thai government launched its policy to move hill-tribe groups from the forests, resulting in a demonstration of more than 3,000 people of different minority groups in 1999 in Chiang Mai province. They demanded to be acknowledged as Thai nationals and to have recognised their settlement and their rights to live in the protected area where some of them had been living for generations. The policy of excluding social groups in the context of protected area systems may be effective in at least two ways: by isolating these groups, resulting in diminishing their chances to find support in the public debate; by concealing internal conflict and differences, projecting them on the ‘excluded’, resulting in increasing internal cohesion and stabilising structures of power. The Royal Forest Department was strongly supported by dark green or conservation-oriented non-state actors. However, the people-oriented group of non-state actors seemed to accept the exclusion strategy, due to nationalism and ethnicism (Buergin and Kessler, 2000).

The largest protest broke out in 1991-92, when the government launched a plan called Kho Jo Ko to move six million settlers out of 1,253 different designated forests across the country, mostly in the northeast. Assisted by student activists, villagers rallied and petitioned in many provinces. Later, protesters from different Kho Jo Ko assembled in the regional centre and marched to Bangkok. As a result, the government suspended the scheme in 1992 (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002).

From the early 1980s, the government attempted to move villagers out of degraded forest areas to make way for eucalyptus plantations, of which two-thirds (though this was later revised to one-third) were to be planted by commercial firms. To oppose the programme, two reasons were raised: first, a fast growing tree like eucalyptus consumes a great deal of water and nutrients; second, it required lands that were occupied by farmers (Taylor, 1997; Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989; Phongpaichit and Baker, 2002). Pongpaichit and Baker (2002:84) state that ‘the eucalyptus tree became the focus of competition between peasant and agribusiness over the forest fringe’. Local Thai people view the term ‘natural’ (tham-ma-chat) as indigenous forest, and are opposed to plantation forest. They employ the term ‘natural’ to make the contrast between natural forest and the eucalyptus plantation. They argue that the eucalyptus plantation is not natural and not indigenous (Tegbaru, 1998: 152). Therefore, the government suspended the plantation scheme at the end of 1992. Tegbaru (1998:172) explains that this may be because the villagers effectively employed international and national debates about the impact of eucalyptus on the environment.

7.6 The Buddhist environmental movement

Most Thais are Buddhist, although no Thai constitution has ever specified that Buddhism is the state religion. Thai monkhood differs from the political activist monkhood in neighbouring countries, such as Myanmar, where monks have played an active role both in anti-colonialist movements and in postcolonial anti-government protests. In Thailand, the sangha has regularly been enlisted by the state to mobilise Buddhism as a legitimating force for the task of nation building (McCargo, 2004). The growth in numbers of ‘development’ monks paralleled and accompanied the rise of NGOs engaged in alternative development in the 1970s. During the early 1970s, Buddhist monks began conducting rural development projects based on their interpretation of Buddhism. They mostly respond to immediate
needs identified by the people themselves. The projects employ local cultural concepts and beliefs (Darlington, 2002:3).

There are many Buddhist monks taking part in environmental movements. Nevertheless, Darlington (2002:3) considers that environmentalist monks cannot be described as forming a coherent social movement, although it is clear that their actions aim to effect social change. Some Thai activists suggest that ‘a Buddhist environmentalism intermingled with ideas of a new social order based on harmony with nature, popular participation and socio-economic justice could be a hopeful alternative for the future of Thailand. This type of discourse has also reached villages’ (Tegbaru, 1998:155). Buddhist monks employ different methods in pursuing their goals. One of the development monks, Phra Dhammadilok formed his own NGO, the Foundation for Education and Development of Rural Areas, in 1974 (Darlington, 2002:3). Phra Prajak first gained national attention in 1991 by opposing the Kho jo ko scheme, aiming to relocate poor settlers from degraded forest lands. At Dong Yai forest, Prajak tried to raise the consciousness of villagers towards collective action by convincing them of the importance of protecting forest resources for the future well-being of their communities. In contrast to Phra Prajak, Luang Phor Khamkien, who also disagreed with the eucalyptus plantation policy, tried to work alongside state agencies, especially the Royal Forest Department, as much as possible. However, government officers accused both Prajak and Lunag Phor Khamkien of being Russians and communists (Taylor, 1997).

Phra Phothirangsi at Chieng Mai province took a leading role in opposing the cable car project. It was the first time that monks concerned about development incorporated environmental concerns into their actions. It is a debate of environmental conservation versus economic development, which monks framed in terms of concepts of sanctity and the threat to a sacred Buddhist heritage site. Phra Phothirangsi articulated a connection between Buddhism and conserving trees and forests beyond the immediate religious concern for a pilgrimage site. He further argued that Buddhism and the forest could not be separated (Darlington, 2002:3).

Phrakhru Manas of Phayao Province performed the first tree ordinations to raise awareness of the value of the forests. Ordaining large trees in an endangered forest by wrapping monk’s orange robes around them serves several purposes. First, the action draws attention to the threat of deforestation. Second, it can be referred to means of conserving nature. Finally, the monks use the ritual to teach the Dhamma and to stress its relevance in a rapidly changing world (Darlington, 2002:3).

In the early 1990s, to protect the village’s forest, Phra Somkid went bindabat for the forest. Bindabat is the traditional practice of asking for alms, providing lay people with the opportunity to gain merit by giving food to monks. His innovation presented opportunities for villagers to gain merit by donating land to the village temple. As a means of protecting the forest, Phra Somkid began a model integrated agriculture farm on land belonging to his temple. His ideas and practice have been widely accepted and his farm has become a learning centre for integrated agriculture and sustainable development for many interests, even foreigners (Darlington, 2002).

7.7 Development project movements

It is assumed that the government has the right and duty to identify the ‘national interest’ without any consultation with the public. It is suggested that ordinary people should make personal and community sacrifices for the benefit of the nation. Meanwhile, the large-scale development projects often have long-term effects on the livelihoods and future
opportunities of ordinary people. The government fails to confront problems such as: although the idea of environmental impact assessment is accepted, it does not cover all aspects, and the environmental impact is not properly evaluated; although it is agreed that people must be informed and consulted, the process is often carried out without full and sympathetic commitment (Phongpaichit, 2000).

**Public hearings**

Klien (2003:124) defines a public hearing as ‘a process through which the public is heard before a decision has been made and in which citizens have a viable opportunity to influence the decision from the beginning to the end of the process.’ Thailand has relied exclusively on public hearings, although public hearings are only one of many public consultation techniques. The public hearing regulation was first promulgated in 1996. Public hearings are organised after the environmental impact assessment and decision-making of the project has been made, as shown in Figure 7.1 (Siroros, 2003).

![Diagram of typical project planning in Thailand (Siroros, 2003:98).](image-url)
In Thailand, it has been proved that implementation following this process often fails to resolve disputes between local communities and the state, such as the Thai-Malaysian Gas Pipeline Project, the Pak Mun Project, the Keang Sue Ten Dam Project and the Klong Dan Waster Treatment Project (Siroros, 2003). Similarly, Klien (2003) criticises that public consultations for many development projects have been completely unsuccessful due to the fact that no public hearing based on the above concept was ever held. More importantly, public hearings are held only when the government has made the decision, in contrast with the main concept of a public hearing. As far as the general public is concerned, ‘Thai people do not generally understand that a public hearing is a consultation session, not a decision-making session for which the undertaking of a project will be decided’ (Vatanasarp, 2003: 73).

Weaknesses of public hearings in Thailand can be summarised as follows:

1. Public hearings do not affect project decisions because public hearings are launched when decisions have already been made by the state.
2. The proper data and information is not disseminated to all stakeholders, so they lack the information to analyse.
3. Most public hearings do not adequately represent all stakeholders. They sometimes lead to confrontation between supporters and opponents.
4. The government does not provide any alternatives to the public, such as site selection, when launching public hearings, because decisions have already been made (Siroros, 2003; Nunman, 2001 cited People’s Right and Freedom Association, 2001).

As ‘development programmes and projects create both winners and losers’ (Adams, 1990:172), the conflict over development projects in Thailand has significantly increased since the 1990s. The main theme of debate is poverty or human vulnerability to environmental change. The participants are always portrayed as being the victims of development (Forsyth, 2001; 2007). Forsyth (2001:42) states that ‘currently debates within Thailand about “red-green” environmentalism that focus on redefining current orthodoxies in favour of local communities and grassroots development may also remove some of the more repressive elements of environmental policy’. The conflicts over development projects reported in newspapers between 1978 and 2000 are shown in Table 7.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Dates of first and last news reports</th>
<th>Brief summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pak Mun dam</td>
<td>April 89 - December 2000</td>
<td>Dam on Mun river in northeast, and resettlement and compensation of fishing communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai-Malaysian pipeline</td>
<td>January 95 - December 99</td>
<td>Construction of gas pipeline from Myanmar through rainforest in western Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuket tantalum mining</td>
<td>May 86 - June 92</td>
<td>Environmental and economic effects of tantalum mining in Phuket, a tourist province (project was cancelled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mae Moh power plant</td>
<td>October 92 – December 99</td>
<td>Concern about a power plant that uses lignite fuel in the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Pong river pollution</td>
<td>April 93 – August 98</td>
<td>Alleged pollution by Phoenix pulp and paper plant into river in northeast Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamphun industrial poisoning</td>
<td>February 94 – October 96</td>
<td>Public debate about industrial poisoning in an industrial estate in northern Thailand (Lumphun province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayong, Map Ta Phut industrial estate</td>
<td>March 94 – December 99</td>
<td>Concern about pollution and waste treatment at industrial estate on the eastern seaboard of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prachuab Khiri Khan power plant</td>
<td>November 98 – July 2000</td>
<td>Proposed construction of coal-fuelled power plant in fishing with coral reef (finally, the project has been moved to other site)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.8 Assembly of the Poor (AOP)

7.8.1 The Emergence of the AOP

'The Assembly of the Poor was the most striking political event in Thailand in the 1990s' (Baker, 2000:5). In December 1995, during the conference at Thammasat University, Bangkok, representatives of different local communities, who had suffered the consequences of development, established the Assembly of the Poor (samatcha khon jon). It was the first emergence of a national organisation representing grassroots' interests since the formation of the Peasants' Federation of Thailand in the mid-1970s (Missingham, 2003a; 2003b). Baker (2000:8) notes that 'the emergence of the Assembly reflects not only a widening of the space available for peasant politics but also the appearance of a new political economy of the Thai peasantry or post-peasantry'.

The Assembly aims to increase its members' political influence and bargaining power with the state. It can also provide a platform (wethi) for mutual learning and exchange of knowledge about rural problems experienced by the poor and disadvantaged people in Thai society (Missingham, 2003a; 2003b). Pintopteang (1998:109) points out that the AOP has structural change as its long-term aim, not only immediate goal. Groups of villagers still maintain their commitments with the organisation even though they have achieved their immediate goals, such as compensation and project cancellation. Even though some groups (such as Jenco case and Kan Cha Lu Dam case) have withdrawn from the AOP, they still provide resources when needed, such as for mass demonstrations.

Missingham (2003a) emphasises three main aspects to the origins of the AOP. First, the rapid development of the country has created a crisis of social life and environment in rural areas, as natural resources have been widely exploited and destroyed, especially since the early 1980s. The state's policies have sparked widespread rural conflicts over forest, land and water resources – what the AOP identifies as a 'war on natural resources'. Second, Thailand has a long history of rural resistance and collective struggle in the face of state repression. Third, the rise of the middle class in the early 1970s, in particular NGOs, can provide great assistance for villagers. Missingham further emphasises that all of these three aspects converge in the alternative development approach of NGOs in response to poverty and environmental threats. As a result, the early 1990s began a decade of rural organising and grassroots political movement in Thailand.

7.8.2 Organisation

AOP consists of three main groups: local villagers and slum dwellers who are identified as the poor, development-oriented NGOs, and academics and student activists. NGOs play a key role in providing information and support, maintaining and coordinating the network of villagers' organisations in the AOP, and communicating with other organisations. The group of academics and student activists have close relationships with NGOs, and play similar roles (Missingham, 2003a; 2003b). Members of the AOP include people affected by the state policies from localities throughout Thailand. According to the problem areas, they can be divided into seven groups: forest and land, dams, state development projects, slum communities, work and environment-related illnesses, alternative agriculture, and small-scale fishermen. The number of people in each network in 1997 appears in Table 7.3. The networks concerning forest and land and dams constitute the majority of the membership (Missingham, 2003a; 2003b; Pintopteang, 1998).
Figure 7.2: Structure of the Assembly of the Poor (Missingham, 2003a:52).
Table 7.3: Approximate membership numbers of the AOP (Pintopteang, 1998:71).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Group</th>
<th>Number of Grievances</th>
<th>Number of families (approx.)</th>
<th>Number of People (approx.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest and land</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>109,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>55,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State development projects</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slum communities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work and environment-related illness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale fishermen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>36,100</td>
<td>180,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AOP is not itself classified as an NGO, but as a people’s organisation, or umbrella organisation. Within it, power and decision-making are decentralised. As shown in Figure 5.2, the top of its structure are the *pho khrua yai* (head chefs) who act as the collective leadership of the Assembly. Based on the principle of collective decision-making and democratic self-management, each local group chooses one or more delegates to attend the *Pho khrua yai* meetings, depending on their size. Thus, each local community is represented through its delegates. The meetings of *pho khrua yai* are the highest form of authority in the movement to formulate campaign goals and strategies, protest actions and others. *Pho khrua yai* are also responsible for reporting back to their local groups about Assembly decisions.

Advisors are comprised of NGOs workers, academics such as lecturers from universities, and villagers’ leaders with campaign experiences. They act as *phi liang*, coordinating negotiations with the state, communicating with media and allied organisations, administering the preparation of negotiation documents, and summarising issues to explain to the public. For the AOP, the word *phi liang* is often used in reference to NGO workers who are in a superior position with responsibility to care for and guide the villagers (Missingham, 2003b; Pintobteang, 1998).

7.8.4 Strategy

To achieve its goals, the AOP depends on two main ideas: the AOP affirms its political identity as a national movement of the poor who are victims of development; the AOP is based on the concrete grievances that form the foundation of the movement (Missingham, 2003a). The AOP employs the following strategies.
7.8.4.1. Mass demonstration

Based on his research, Pintopteang (1998) concludes that mass demonstration is a way to encourage politicians to realise that villagers are confronted with real difficulties. The AOP has reached the conclusion that at least 20,000 demonstrators have to be mobilised, and the demonstrations should be lasted for at least three months. Thus they can achieve negotiation with the government. In the view of villagers, one of the AOP’s leaders states 'we have no weapon. We have no authority. We have only feet. We must join together in large numbers, for long period of time; then the state would listen to us' (Pintopteang, 1998; Missingham, 2002:1653).

The AOP organised many mass demonstrations with different goals: to put pressure on the government in different ways, such as marching and having a large numbers of demonstrators; as a process to motivate villagers that they have power; using prolonged demonstration as a way to disclose all of the difficulties and grievances of the poor to the public.

The AOP divides its demonstrations into four kinds.
(1) National large-scale demonstrations aiming at opening negotiations with the central government. The demonstration is organised until negotiations have been completed and a cabinet resolution declared. This kind of demonstration might occur when the government changes to new power-holders, such as in the Banharn and Chavalit governments. The negotiations could lead to resolutions for all grievances.
(2) Demonstrations aiming at encouraging the government to take action. This kind of demonstration occurs when villagers realise that the results of negotiations with the state are not implemented.
(3) Demonstrations aiming at opening new negotiations because the government has not followed the resolutions.
(4) Local demonstrations (organised by grievance cases in local areas, not in Bangkok) aiming to create forums to train villagers in political movements, such as public speaking skills and negotiating skills. This kind of demonstration does not usually focus on opening negotiation (Pintoptaeng, 1998).

7.8.4.2 Dao kraiai or scattered stars

In 1998 and 1999, the AOP created a new strategy labelled 'dao kraiai or scattered stars'. Missingham (2003b:321) notes that dao kraiai is 'coordinated but geographically scattered protests at strategic sites of conflict throughout the country'. This strategy was created because the AOP judged that a large centralised demonstration was likely to fail under the Chuan Government. It also found it was difficult to sustain continuous large-scale protest, in terms of resource mobilisation, motivation, and enthusiasm of participants. Thus, from March 1999, rallies began at the Pak Mun Dam in Ubon, Resi Salai Dam in Srisaket, Pong Khun Patch Dam in Chaiphum, and a few other provinces, demanding that the Chuan Government honour the previous government’s agreements with the AOP. The AOP identified the demonstration sites as the symbols of the campaigns. Based on this strategy, the presence of a large number of people was not necessary at all times, so villagers could carry out day-to-day work in their fields (Missingham, 2003a; 2003b).
7.8.4.3 Village of the poor in the city

In the national demonstrations in Bangkok, the protesters transformed the streets in front of the Government House into a makeshift camp and created a 'village of the poor' in the heart of Bangkok. Missingham (2002) notes that this symbol acts as a domain of popular and democratic politics. The village of the poor serves three purposes: first, to create a common ground for a political identity for the diverse groups of the AOP; second, by representing the AOP as a peaceful, orderly and healthy community to suggest social order rather than an unruly crowd or mob; third, to symbolise a community in crisis. Missingham emphasises that the geography of the protest is crucial to its political impact, as the location that the AOP chose to demonstrate is in front of Government House, a key centre of state power and authority.

7.8.5 Response from governments to the AOP

Until 2008, the AOP has experienced eight governments since it was established in 1995. The responses of different governments to AOP are varied. As shown in Table 7.4, the AOP faced more difficult challenges during the Chuan Government, which was considered a strong government. The Chuan Government considered that villagers were not victims, and so the AOP movement could not reach its goals. In contrast, a series of negotiations between the AOP and government were arranged in the Banharn and Chavalit Governments. Pintobteang (1998) explains the success of the AOP in terms of three main elements: opening political space, adopting a loose network organisation model, and building of alliances, especially with the middle-class.
Table 7.4: Comparison of the responses of different governments to the Assembly of the Poor (Pintoteang, 1998:125).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Views about demonstrations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not following democratic principles</td>
<td>• Some ministers thought that demonstrations had hidden intentions</td>
<td>• Asking the government members not to give interviews that demonstrators had hidden attention</td>
<td>• Same as Chuan’s first term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Claiming that demonstrations were organised with hidden attention</td>
<td>• Following the views of public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employing violent methods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dispersing with force</td>
<td>• Dispersing with force</td>
<td>• Threatened by local officers</td>
<td>• Same as Chuan’s first term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response to demands of AOP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transfer to bureaucracy</td>
<td>• Opening for negotiation between government and AOP and chaired by the PM</td>
<td>• Opening for Negotiation between government and AOP and chaired by the PM</td>
<td>• Same as Chuan’s first term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Never met demonstrators as requested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-making at policy level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Did not accept that development projects affected way of living</td>
<td>• Accepted that villagers had been affected by development projects and should be paid compensation</td>
<td>• Accepted that villagers had been affected by development projects and compensation should be paid compensation</td>
<td>• Cancelled the cabinet resolution of previous government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No grievances were settled</td>
<td>• No further action for compensation was made.</td>
<td>• Compensation was paid</td>
<td>• Transfer to bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92
7.9 Conclusion

During recent decades, Thailand has been experiencing the depletion of natural resources, degradation of the environment and their impacts on people’s way of life. The forest area has dramatically decreased, while fresh water in natural sources such as major rivers and streams has been contaminated from both domestic and industrial waste. Environmental movements in Thailand emerged as a result of the presence of political opportunities, the growth of the middle classes and destruction of natural resources. The Num Chone Dam protest in the early 1980s is the most significant event that was able to mobilise actors from various parties, in particular the middle class, to participate. It stimulated a national debate regarding environmental conservation versus development. The success of the Nam Chone Dam protest is a major step for democratisation and the opening of political space. As in other developing countries, environmental issues have been raised together with poverty and social justice to argue with the state. Environmental movements in Thailand are diverse both in terms of ideologies and strategies. The middle classes have grown since 1970s, and they have played very important roles in environmental movements, but they participate in green environmentalism more than in brown movements.

Grassroots movement rapidly grew during the 1970s. Most of the movements were involved with agricultural issues. However, since the 1990s, the issues have been transformed, agricultural issues being superseded by conflicts over natural resources, especially, forests and water. The grassroots movements emerged because of the impacts of development on people’s livelihood. They also consider that protest is their last resort. Nevertheless, authorities often think that grassroots movements are the creation of political interest groups. The forest issue has been a matter of major national debate for several decades. The development policies of governments often create conflicts between local communities and the state over resource uses; for example, large dam construction and commercial reforestation, which required a massive number of settlers to be removed. In addition, conflicts among villagers themselves also occur, such as the conflict over water uses between lowland and highland villages. The debates are based on two different approaches: a people-oriented belief that people are able to co-exist with the forest; and, in contrast with this, a conservation-oriented approach in which people are considered as destroyers who should be removed from the forest. Starting from these different approaches, the movement developed a proposed community forest bill, which mainly relied on the legislative channel. As most Thais are Buddhist, many Buddhist monks participate in environmental conservation and movements.

Since the 1990s, conflicts over development projects have significantly increased. The actors always raise environmental issues together with poverty as their main debates with the state. They portray themselves as victims of national development. The conflicts over development projects stem from conditions that: people have little participation in decision-making; public hearings are controversial because they are always arranged after the decision has been made. The Assembly of the Poor is the biggest national network of different local communities who have suffered from the consequences of development. It was established in 1995, aiming to increase its members’ political influence and bargaining power with the state. The success of the AOP depends on political space, loose network organisation and alliances.

Evidence presented in this chapter provides the background for the empirical analysis in Chapters 9 to 11. As the case studies involve the development dam projects of the state, the campaigners raise several issues to argue with the state, such as forest, poverty and social justice.
Chapter 8
Social Movement Theories

As the resource mobilisation theory (RMT) and the political opportunity approach (POA) are employed in the empirical analysis, they are discussed in this chapter. These theories have been widely argued and criticised by many theorists and scholars, but only major arguments and concepts related to the research question and analysis have been chosen. The presentation starts with the definition of social movements. Then it moves to the main concept of RMT. The discussion emphasises the different aspects of social movement organisations (SMOs) and their resource mobilisation. Next, various dimensions and factors of the POA are discussed, focusing on political structure, factors affecting political openness and closedness and mass media.

8.1 Definition of Social Movement

Scott (1990:6) defines a social movement as ‘a collective actor constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common interests and, for at least some significant part of their social existence, a common identity.’ Scott distinguishes social movements from other collective actors such as political parties and pressure groups, as social movements rely on mass mobilisation, and voluntary associations or clubs, as social movements are concerned with defending or changing society, or the relative position of the group in society. As forms of cognitive praxis, ‘social movements are the result of an interactional process which centres around the articulation of a collective identity and which occurs within the boundaries of a particular society’ (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:4).

Della Porta and Diani (2002) identify the common characteristics of social movements from varying theoretical and territorial backgrounds as follows.

(1) Informal interaction networks that contribute to creating the preconditions for mobilisation and for providing the proper setting for specific world views and lifestyles;
(2) Shared beliefs and solidarity, which is considered as shared values of a collective actor;
(3) Collective action focusing on conflict aimed at social change at either the systemic or non-systemic level;
(4) Use of protest. Thus, Della Porta and Diani (2002:16) consider social movements as ‘informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest’.

In sum, the definition of a ‘social movement’ centres on the following key words: shared beliefs and solidarity; aim for social changes; mass mobilisation; collective action or collective actors. Then, social movement can be defined as collective action handled by people that share beliefs and solidarities. It has political aims for social change and uses mass mobilisation as its means.

Social movement studies have developed in many directions. Pakulski (1991:3) points out that ‘they (social movements) grow in scope and gradually enter the mainstream of social research and social theory’. Resource mobilisation and political opportunity approaches are highlighted, as these theories are employed to analyse the empirical work in following chapters.
8.2 Resource Mobilisation Theory

Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), which emerged in the late 1960s (Zald, 1992), offered an alternative to the previous traditions: collective behaviour, mass society, relative deprivation and political sociology (Mueller, 1992). The theory accepts the application of economist Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action published in 1965 (Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Scott, 1990; Mueller, 1992). Olson’s statement emphasises that ‘(i) social phenomena are to be explained with reference to the preferences and choices of individuals; (ii) individuals act rationally to maximise their interests and minimise their costs’ (Scott, 1990:110). Thus, RMT was developed ‘based on the public good theory of Olson, which focuses on costs and benefits rather than deprivation and grievances’ (Mueller, 1992:3). RMT emphasises the questions: where are the resources available for the movement; how resources are mobilised; how are social movements organised; how does the state facilitate or impede mobilisation; what are the outcomes; why are some more successful than others (Mueller, 1992:3; Klandermans, 1991; Fireman and Gamson, 1979).

The centre of RMT shifted from ‘why individuals join in social movements or why the movements form’ to the effectiveness of social movements (Fireman and Gamson, 1979). This is because the traditional approaches and RMT have different conceptions of social movements; traditionally, social movements are seen as ‘extension of more elementary forms of collective behaviour and as encompassing both movements of personal change and those focused on institutional changes’. In contrast, resource mobilisation theorists have seen social movements as an ‘extension of institutionalised actions’ (Jenkins, 1983: 529). The traditional approaches assume that ‘resources come from the direct beneficiaries of the social changes pursued’, while RMT emphasises the significance of outside contributions and the cooptation of institutional resources (Jenkins, 1983: 533).

The resource mobilisation perspective has developed based on the following assumptions.

(1) Behaviour entails costs.
(2) Mobilisation of resources does not come only from the aggrieved group but also from many other sources.
(3) Organising activities play a vital role in mobilising resources.
(4) The costs of participation may be raised or lowered by state and societal support or repression.
(5) There is no direct interaction between amount of mobilisation and movement success (Zald, 1992).

The main idea of RMT is that social movements are possible when sufficient resources such as money, people, place and materials are available. Costain (1992:xiv in Foweraker, 1995:16) states that ‘successful movements acquire resources and create advantageous exchange relationships with other groups as they succeed in fulfilling their goals.’ This theory emphasises three major elements: costs and benefits of participation, organisations and expectations of success (Klandermans, 1991).

(1) Costs and benefit of participation.
This theory depends more upon political, sociological and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behaviour (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The costs and benefits play an important role in the analysis of mobilisation processes. Actors of social movements are rational and participate in the movements based on costs and benefits (Pakulski, 1991). The idea of cost and benefits participation stems
from Olson's logic of collective action. Olson's theory states that rational individuals will not participate in collective action unless selective incentives encourage them to do so (Fireman and Gamson, 1979). However, Klandermans (1991:4) points out that 'this statement is no longer taken seriously; instead, recent studies suggest that the two types of incentives (collective and selective incentives) can reinforce or compensate for one another'.

2. Organisation.
RMT considers 'organisation' as a means of goal-achievement and a resource of movements. Organisation plays a major role in mobilising all necessary resources, such as labour, money, and technology, and it also increases the possibilities of success (Klandermans, 1991). McCarthy and Zald (1977:1215) point out that 'organisation did not develop directly from grievance but very indirectly through the moves of actors in the political system'. Like other organisations in economic markets, social movement organisations are able to change, develop or decline.

3. Expectations of success.
These play a role as an important determinant of the perceived collective incentives of participation. They can be divided into three particular types: 'expectations about (i) the effectiveness of collective action; (ii) the effectiveness of the individual's contribution and; (iii) the behaviour of other individuals' (Klandermans, 1992:76). The success of a movement is related to several factors such as, political opportunity structure, the influence of sympathetic third parties, influential allies, and strategy and tactic employed by movement (Klandermans, 1991; Jenkins, 1983).

Foweraker (1995:17) criticises that in the resource mobilisation approach, the actors are presumed to employ only costs and benefits calculation without reference to their social context. Similarly, Scott (1990) points out that the theory of resource mobilisation places too much emphasis on the economic model of organisations, and it says little about the content and the socio-political aspect of collective action. However, Melucci (1988:343 in Foweraker, 1995:17) argues that 'collective action is never solely on cost-benefit calculation, and a collective identity is never entirely negotiable'. Thus, social movement studies must include the cultural and the purposive aspects of their activities (Scott, 1990; Foweraker, 1995).

Buechler (1993:219) notices that after more than a decade of development of the resource mobilisation approach, its framework is under increasing challenge in the form of new issues and questions, which cannot be resolved within this framework. This is because the theory ignores the aspects of collective identity, movement diversity and cultural construction.

The resource mobilisation theorists ignore the role of grievances. They argue that 'grievances are secondary' (Jenkins, 1983:530). However, it has been suggested that both grievances and structures must be included in any analysis of contemporary social movements because both factors are important for successful movements (Kim and Walsh, 1983:135).

Next, some aspects of the resource mobilisation theory are illustrated, in particular, social movement organisation, resource mobilisation, costs and benefits participation, and the free rider problem.

8.2.1 Social Movement Organisations (SMOs)

A social movement organisation (SMO) is a complex, or formal, organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and
attempts to implement those goals’ (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1218). Similarly, Della Porta and Diani (2002:139) define an SMO as ‘a rational organisation capable of gathering resources from their surrounding environment and allocating them with the aim of bringing about political transformation’. Based on these definitions, SMOs have political goals and mobilise all potential resources to achieve their goals. Like other organisations, SMOs attain an economic and social base in society (Zald and Ash, 1966:327). SMOs are comprised of social structures, participants, goals and technologies (Della Porta and Diani, 2002). SMOs have at least two primary goals: to increase their membership and to implement within society the reforms they advocate (Sterm, 1999: 92). Therefore, there are two reasons why SMOs differ from other formal organisations: SMOs aim at changing society and their members; SMOs are characterised by an incentive structure in which purposive incentives predominate (Zald and Ash, 1966: 329). Similarly, Kriesi (1996:152) distinguishes the differences of SMOs from the other types of formal organizations by two main criteria: SMOs mobilise their constituency for collective action; they aim to obtain some collective good from authorities.

SMOs emerge in a lifecycle of social movement which consists of four stages: first, the social ferment stage, which is characterised by unorganised and unfocused movements; second, the popular excitement stage, in which the major causes of discontent and the objectives of actions are more clearly defined; third, the formalisation phase, during which a formal organisation is created; fourth, the institutionalisation stage, in which the movements become an organic part of society and develop into a professional structure. However, institutionalisation rarely occurs. Some organisations dissolve once their goals have been achieved (Della Porta and Diani, 2002). McCarthy and Zald (1977:1215) note that ‘the organisation did not develop directly from grievance but very indirectly through the moves of actors in the political system’. However, the terms social movement and social movement organisation are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature; especially a specific SMO is often referred to as a social movement (Lofland, 1996). As many leading scholars use the term ‘social movement’ referring to both networks of interaction and specific organisations, Diani (1992:14) criticises that ‘this overlap is a source of analytical confusion’.

8.2.2 SMOs’ structure

SMOs tend to adapt their structure to the aims of movements, resource mobilisation problems and the characteristics of the social groups they seek to mobilise (Della Porta and Diani, 2002; Zald, 1992). Most political organisations are shaped by two basic fundamental requirements: resource mobilisation and political efficacy (Diani and Donati (1999:15). Zald (1992:336) points out that ‘movements aimed at changing laws in individual states must develop a different structure and tactics than movements aimed at national-level targets. Movements aimed at consciousness change must have different structures and tactics from movements aimed at overthrowing governments’. Meanwhile, SMOs often adjust their goals in order to better fit their environment and survive (Campbell, 2005).

The major debate over the organisation of movements is between a centralised bureaucratic model and a decentralised informal model (Jenkins, 1983). The centralised structure appears to be best for attaining short-range goals in which organisational survival is not the main concern. The decentralised model, on the contrary, appears to be best for attaining personal change in which organisational survival is the main concern. Decentralised structures can also evolve from ecological constraints and inherited models (Freeman, 1979; Jenkins, 1983). The student movement adopted a decentralised ‘leaderless’ model of democratic structure in order to maximise the value of direct participation and communal involvement (Jenkins,
Also, due to the rapid turnover of student generation, students cannot continuously pursue their political activities in a long period. Thus the leaderless model would be fit to their conditions (Rootes, 2006:4). The older branches of the women’s movement adopted bureaucratic structures because these were familiar means, which had been used by the labour and civil rights movements (Jenkins, 1983:541).

Based on studies conducted by many scholars and researchers, social movement organisations have shifted from decentralised, informally structured communal movements to formally structured SMOs (Jenkins, 1983). However, Jenkins (1983) notes that most SMOs take advantage of both decentralised and bureaucratic models, so their structures fall somewhere between the bureaucratic and decentralised models. According to the civil rights experience, informal coordination between various SMOs based on shared ideology and goals might afford the advantages of decentralisation while simultaneously allowing sufficient centralised thrust to reap the advantages of bureaucratisation (Jenkins, 1983:542). In addition, Campbell (2005:41) points out that SMOs tend toward bureaucratisation, professionalisation, and conglomeration.

Lofland (1996) concludes three types of SMOs structure as follows. 

1. The collectivist-democratic structure proposed by Rothschild and Whitt who studied several alternative or counter-cultural organisations. The characteristics of this type are
   (1.1) authority resides in the collectivity as a whole
   (1.2) minimal stipulated rules, primary of ad hoc and individual decisions
   (1.3) social control is primarily based on personalistic or moralistic appeals and the selection of homogeneous personnel
   (1.4) ideal of community
   (1.5) employment based on friends, social-political values and informally assessed knowledge and skills; no hierarchy of positions
   (1.6) normative and solidarity incentives; material incentives are secondary
   (1.7) egalitarian: reward differential, if any, are strictly limited by the collectivity
   (1.8) minimal division of labour
   (1.9) generalisation of job functions

2. Professional SMOs, delineated by McCarthy and Zald.

3. Marketed SMOs, formulated by Hank Johnston

Nevertheless, Gerlach (2001) states that the most common form of SMO is neither centralised and bureaucratic, nor amorphous, but one that is a segmentary, polycentric and integrated network, which Gerlach calls SPIN. A segmentary SMO is composed of many diverse groups that change through fission, fusion and new creation. Polycentric refers to SMOs having many leaders or centres of leadership, which are not organised in a hierarchy; they are ‘heterarchic’. They are often temporary, and sometimes have competing leaders or centres of influence. Finally, SMOs form a loose, reticulated and integrated network with multiple linkages through overlapping membership, joint activities and shared ideals and opponents.

Like other organisations, SMOs experience organisational changes over time. There are at least three social conditions that affect the growth and transformation of SMOs: first, changing conditions in society influence the number of potential supporters of an SMO; second, the society may change in the direction of organisational goals; third, SMOs may emerge in an environment populated with other organisations aiming at rather similar goals. Similarity of goals may produce an uneasy alliance, but also creates the conditions for inter-
organisational competition (Zald and Ash, 1966: 330). Kriesi (1996) proposes four sets of parameters, or organisational development analysis. They are: parameters capturing organizational growth and decline; internal organizational structure; external organizational structure; goal orientations and action repertoires.

(1) Organisational growth and decline refers to the changing size of the Social Movement Industry (SMI) – the number of SMOs in the SMI and the amount of resources available to the various SMOs. In the early phase of movements’ development, the only resources available tend to be the active commitment, courage and imagination of the movement’s activists and adherents. Then, organisations tend to be weak and informally constructed. SMOs have to attract public attention in order to mobilise resources into movements.

(2) The internal structure of SMOs refers to processes of formalisation, professionalisation, internal differentiation and integration. Formalisation means the development of formal membership criteria, the introduction of formal statutes and established procedures, and the creation of a formal leadership and office structure. Professionalisation means management by paid staff members who make careers out of working for a movement. Internal differentiation refers to the functional division of labour (task-structure) and territorial decentralisation (territorial subunits). The integration of the differentiated functional and territorial subunits is achieved by horizontal coordinating mechanisms, and by centralisation of decision.

(3) External structure refers to the integration of an SMO in its organisational environment. There are three dimensions to be taken into consideration: the SMO’s relationships with its constituencies, its allies, and the authorities.

(4) There are the SMO’s goal orientations and action repertoires. The primary activities of SMOs include the maintenance of membership, funds, and other requirements of organisational existence. In the process, the action repertoire of the SMO is expected to become more moderate, more conventional and more institutionalised.

Meanwhile, Zald and Ash (1966:335) distinguish interaction of SMOs into three types: cooperation, coalition and merger. Cooperation among SMOs is limited. The creation of coalitions and mergers could lead to new organisational identities, changes in membership bases and changes in goals.

8.2.3 Organisational form

It is recognised that forms of SMOs are diverse, even though an SMO’s life expectancy is short and its aims limited. Della Porta and Diani (2002: 140-144) identify three factors influencing SMOs’ classification: the degree of organisation, the distribution of power within an organisation, and the level of participation or degree of commitment from participants. An increase in diversity of goals and tactics has a positive effect on movement vitality and movement outcomes (Olzak and Ryo, 2007).

Della Porta and Diani (2002:159) emphasise that ‘choice of organisational form is linked to the organisational repertoires typical of the social groups which a movement is seeking to mobilise.’ Both their external and internal environments determine the organisational characteristics of SMOs. The internal environment includes leadership functions and decision-making processes, which regulate the input and output of resources. The external factors refer to allies and opponents who determine the political opportunity structure (Klandermans, 1991:7).
Analysis of organisational changes among environmental groups in Western Europe has found that a more diversified range of organisational models has emerged since the 1980s. Because environmental groups in Western Europe often now enjoy relatively favourable opportunities to influence the formal policy of the states so 'institution-building appears gradually to be replacing confrontational politics' (Diani and Donati, 1999:18). In Italy, for example, two organisations, namely Legambiente and Friends of the Earth, have shifted from being movements to being institutions by combining traits of both the public interest lobby and the participatory group (Diani and Donati, 1999:25).

Diani and Donati (1999:16) emphasise that 'SMOs face at least two elementary dilemmas: having to choose between professional vs. participatory organisational models, and disruptive vs. conventional forms of pressure'. Therefore, they propose four ideal, typical resolutions by employing these two dimensions. This leads to the combination model of these alternatives, which includes four organisational types: public interest lobbies, participatory pressure groups, professional protest organisations, and participatory protest organisations.

Kriesi mentions three other types of formal organisation that are different from SMOs: supportive organisations, movement associations, and parties and interest groups. Supportive organisations are service organisations such as media, churches, or educational institutes, which contribute to the movements but do not take part directly in mobilisation for collective action. Movement associations are voluntary associations or clubs created by the movement itself in order to provide some daily needs for its members. Last, parties and interest groups do not have to mobilise resources through collective action because they have sufficient amounts of resources. They do not usually rely on the direct participation of their constituents for attaining their goals. However, SMOs possibly transform into these types of organisation. Kriesi (1996:156) says that 'an SMO can become more like a party or an interest group; it can take on characteristics of a supportive service organisation; it can develop in the direction of a self-help group, a voluntary association or a club; or it can radicalise; that is, become an ever more exclusive organisation for the mobilisation for collective action'.

The organisations do not always develop in the same direction. Research has revealed a pattern of multiple organisations with simultaneous participation that has led to the idea of the 'social movement family'. The social movement family refers to 'a cluster of the movements, which have different specific objectives but share a similar world view' (Della Porta and Diani, 2002:148). The various forms of the SMOs are as follows:

8.2.3.1 Inclusive and exclusive organisations

Zald and Ash distinguish SMOs (which they call MOs in their paper) into two forms: inclusive and exclusive organisations. These two organisational forms require different levels of participation. The exclusive organisation not only demands a greater amount of commitment (such as time and energy), but it more extensively permeates all sections of the members' lives, including activities with non-members. On the other hand, members of the inclusive SMO are not required by their organisational goals, policies and tactics as permeated. The membership of an inclusive SMO declines and rises faster than that of an exclusive one. In addition, any single SMO may have attributes of both the inclusive and exclusive organisation (Zald and Ash, 1966: 330-331).
8.2.3.2 Social movement industry (SMI)

McCarthy and Zald present the concept of an SMI, saying that ‘all SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement constitute a social movement industry (SMI) – the organisational analogue of a social movement’. They consider an SMI as a common industry in economics. The main task is how to group SMOs into SMIs. They conclude that ‘the social movement sector (SMS) consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which social movement they are attached’ (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1219-1220).

8.2.3.3 Professional SMOs

Social movements in the 1960s and 1970s shifted from classical SMOs (with indigenous leadership, volunteer staff, extensive membership, resources from direct beneficiaries and actions based on mass participation) towards professional SMOs. This type of SMO refers to the organisations with outside leadership, full-time paid staff, small or non-existent membership, resources from conscience constituencies and actions that ‘speak for’, rather than involve, an aggrieved group (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy, 2005). Jenkins (1989:535) accepts that ‘McCarthy and Zald are correct that professional SMOs and the cooptation of institutional resources increased in the 1960s’ but he argues that ‘these features hardly explain the mobilisation of the generalised political turmoil in that period’. Jenkins (1989:535) further points out that ‘most of the movements were not professional. SMOs did not rely on external resources for their crucial victories’.

McCarthy (2005) distinguishes a variety of forms of professional SMOs, such as,
• national professional federations,
• state professional federations,
• centralized national professional federations,
• national professional federations without locals,
• national professional SMOs,
• state professional SMOs, and
• local professional SMOs.

8.2.3.4 Moderate SMOs and radical SMOs (RSMOs)

As radical SMOs tend to focus on structural change rather than incorporating into the system, Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000) propose an alternative theoretical model for radical SMOs. They compare moderate SMOs to radical SMOs (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1: Ideal characteristics of Moderate and Radical SMOs (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000: 578).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moderate SMOs</th>
<th>Radical SMOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal structure</td>
<td>Hierarchical leadership; formal bureaucratic organisation; development of large membership</td>
<td>Non-hierarchical leadership; participatory democratic organisation; membership based upon involvement; support indigenous leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Reform agenda; emphasis on being a contender in the existing political system; national focus; support government military involvement</td>
<td>Radical agenda; emphasis on structural change; flexible ideology; radical network; global connections; anti-militaristic stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Non-violent legal action</td>
<td>Non-violent direct action; mass actions; innovative tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Able to rely on mainstream forms of communication</td>
<td>Ignored/misrepresented by media; reliance on alternative forms of communication (music, street theatre, newsletters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of success</td>
<td>Potential for plentiful resources; manipulate resources for the self-interest of organisations; formal rationality; success measured in terms of reform of existing political and economic system</td>
<td>Limited resources; may be purposefully short-lived; substantive rationality; contribute to larger radical agenda; subject to intense opposition and government surveillance</td>
</tr>
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</table>
McCarthy and Zald (1977) present the idea of federated and isolated structures. Federation serves to organise constituents, who give time or money, into small local units or chapters. SMOs in federations deal with constituents directly and through chapters. However, many SMOs do not develop chapters, so they contact their constituents directly through mail outs or field staff. These SMOs are called isolated or non-federated SMOs. McCarthy and Zald (1977:1228) emphasise that ‘the important point is that constituents in non-federated SMOs do not normally meet in face-to-face interaction with other constituents and hence cannot be bound to the SMOs through solidarity selective incentives’.

SMOs, in particular federated SMOs, are generally highly unstable organisational forms. McCarthy (2005:206) emphasises that ‘this instability is importantly the result of: relatively weak state regulation of the sector, the multiple origins of federation constituents, and ongoing conflicts between central structures and constituent federated units’. McCarthy divides the federated forms of SMOs in the US into: classic national federation, state/regional federation, centralised national federation, national federation without locals, national direct membership, state/regional membership and freestanding locals (locally-based SMOs without formal affiliation to other organisations).

8.2.4 Decision-making processes of SMOs

Freeman (1979) proposes a strategic decision-making model. He believes that a leader, or even a small committee of strategic experts, do not always make decisions about how a movement will act, because many movements are not hierarchically controlled. Decisions will be made in response to circumstances or be made and executed by a significant group of participants. Therefore, Freeman proposed the model of strategic decision making by social movement organisations (SMOs) consisting of four major elements: mobilising resources; constraints on these resources; SMO structure and internal environment; and expectation about potential targets. Freeman (1979:189) points out that ‘this model could help SMO leaders to analyse their strategic options and help outside observers to explain why certain actions are chosen.’

8.2.4.1 Resources

The resources available to organisations comprise tangible and intangible resources. Intangible resources include money, space and means of communication which are sometimes interchangeable. For example, money can buy space or be used to publicise movements. People are the primary intangible source. People provide different contributions to a movement which can be divided into specialised and unspecialised groups. The specialised group refers to expertise of various sorts; decision makers, whether within the movement’s constituencies or within the polity the movement is trying to influence. The unspecialised group provides labour, time and commitment.

The major sources of mobilising resources are divided into three categories: the beneficiary constituency, conscience constituencies and non-constituency institutions. The beneficiary constituency refers to political beneficiaries of the movement. Conscience constituencies are sympathisers who supply movements with resources but are part of the beneficiary base. Non-constituency institutions are those available independently of the movement’s existence that can potentially be co-opted by it.
8.2.4.2 Constraints

In practice, all resources have constraints on their uses. Constraints act as filters between resources and SMOs. Freeman (1979:176) states that 'these filters are so important that they can totally redirect the resources of a movement'. He further identifies five different categories of constraints: values, past experiences, reference groups, expectations, and relationships with target groups.

8.2.4.3 SMO structure

SMO structure can be either centralised and hierarchical or may take the form of a decentralised, segmented, reticulate movement with no real centre. The centralised movement focuses on goal attainment while the decentralised one devotes major resources to group maintenance.

8.2.4.4 Expectations about potential targets

Effective actions of SMOs depend on three factors of potential targets and external environment.

(1) It is the structure of available opportunities for action. Generally, social movements lack the usual, conventional opportunities for action. However, when there are no feasible opportunities for action by conventional means, they may take forms other than political action.

(2) There are the social control measures that might be taken. The action of movements generally experiences social control measures such as counter-movement and law. Effective implementation of social control measures can stop movements.

(3) It is the effect on bystander publics. Freeman (1979:187) states 'bystander publics are not direct targets of a movement's action, but they can affect the outcome of these actions.' Movements try to turn bystander publics into conscience constituencies who supply resources to the movement. Meanwhile, movements try to prevent them from becoming opponents.

Freeman (1979:189) points out that his model is not a dynamic one, but 'it enables one to look at an SMO at one point in time to determine the resources available for mobilisation and the potential ways in which these resources can be deployed.'

8.2.5 The Mobilisation Process

'Mobilisation is the process by which a group secures collection control over the resources needed for collective action' (Jenkins, 1983:532). Similarly, Klandermans (1984:586) states that 'mobilisation attempts have the aim of winning participants by persuading people to support the movement organisation by material and non-material means'. The major issues of resource mobilisation consist of: 'the resources controlled by the group prior to mobilisation efforts; the processes by which the group pool resources and directs these towards social change; and the extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources' (Jenkins, 1983:532).

8.2.6 Type and source of resource

As most resources have multiple uses, there is no consensus among the resource mobilisation theorists about the types of resources that should be mobilised. However, many theorists
propose different ways to distinguish the resources. Freeman (1979) divides mobilising resources into tangible and intangible resources, which is a useful scheme (Jenkins, 1983). Tangible resources are money, space and means for disseminating movements' ideas. These resources are exchangeable, in particular money, because it can be used to buy various necessities. As the primary resources, people or human assets are intangible ones. Freeman further distinguishes people into three categories: specialised groups, unspecialised groups and conscience constituencies. Specialised groups include ones that have expertise and can access decision-makers of the movements. They are whether within the movement’s constituencies or within the polity the movement is trying to influence. Uns specialised groups mainly provide time and commitment. Conscience constituencies are ones that support movements’ specialised needs when movements have little access to specialised resources (Freeman, 1979:173).

Della Porta and Diani (2002) divide resources into material resources, such as money, concrete benefits and service, and non-material resources, such as authority, moral engagement, faith and friendship. Della Porta and Diani further emphasise that mobilising capacity depends on those resources available to movements.

Considering movements of the poor in the US, Cress and Snow (1996) distinguish the mobilising resources for the poor into four categories.

(1) Moral resources refers to external organisations or institutions that provide sympathetic and solidaristic support relevant to the aims of movements. Sympathetic support refers to statements by external organisations that are supportive of the aims and actions of SMOs. Solidaristic support refers to participation by an external organisation in the collective action of SMO.

(2) Material resources include tangible resources such as supplies, meeting space, office space, transportation, money and employment.

(3) Information or knowledge resources, which are necessary for SMOs’ maintenance and mobilisation, are distinguished into three categories:
   (3.1) strategic support: knowledge that facilitates goal-attainment collective action
   (3.2) technical support: knowledge that facilitates organisational development and maintenance (e.g. how to run meetings)
   (3.3) Referral: provision of connections to potential external organisation for resources. This consists of strategic support, technical support and referrals.

(4) Human resources, who donate resources, time and energy to SMOs, have status as captive audiences (constituency and bystander populations assembles for recruitment and resource appeals), leaders and cadre.

Moreover, ‘the power resources provide means for controlling the action of the targets from mobilising resources such as facilities that provide for mobilising power resources’ (Jenkins cited Jenkins, 1982). Pichardo (1988) emphasises that the primary resources include money, manpower, skills and leadership. Cress and Snow (1996:1090) conclude that resources refer to ‘anything that SMOs need to mobilise and deploy in pursuit of their goals’.

Mobilising resources come from both external and internal sources. The external sources include: conscience constituencies who support movements without benefiting from their objectives (Freeman, 1979; McCarthy and Zald, 1977); non-constituency institutions, which are available independently and can potentially support movements (Freeman, 1979). The internal sources include beneficiary constituencies, which is referred to ‘political beneficiary who also supply it with resources’ (Freeman, 1979:174).
8.2.7 Mobilisation strategy

Klandermans (1984:586) notes that mobilisation comprises of two components: consensus mobilisation and action mobilisation. Consensus mobilisation is 'a process through which a social movement tries to obtain support for its viewpoint'. Action mobilisation is the process by which a social movement organisation motivates people to participate. It appeals to people who already belong to the constituency of a movement (Klandermans, 1991). Consensus mobilisation involves: a collective good; a movement strategy; confrontation with the opponent; results achieved. One key feature of the successful consensus mobilisation is the credibility of the SMO, which depends on several factors such as expertise of leaders, sacrifices made by movement members for the cause of the movement organisation, and perceived similarities between source and target (Klandermans, 1984 and 1991).

It is accepted that resource mobilisation is mainly managed by SMOs. Traditionally, SMOs mobilised most of their resources from within by focusing on their direct beneficiaries. Later, their focus shifted to resources from outside SMOs, such as conscience constituencies, educational institutions, the mass media and business corporations (Jenkins, 1983). SMOs may face the choice between mobilising the greatest possible support from the general public and resources, or mobilising smaller, but more carefully selected, groups of committed activists (Diani and Donati, 1999:15).

As social movements heavily rely on human resources, the main tasks of mobilising resources may emphasise adherents who are potential beneficiaries and attempt to convert bystander publics into adherents. (McCarthy and Zald use the term ‘adhocrats’, which refers to those individuals and organizations that believe in the goals of the movement.) At the same time, SMOs try to prevent members of the bystander public from becoming opponents. SMOs may adjust target goals in order to enlarge their potential beneficiary groups. Also, SMOs may attempt to mobilise those who are not potential beneficiaries into adherents (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; and Freeman, 1979). However, McCarthy and Zald (1977:1223) observe that ‘since SMO resources are normally quite limited, decisions must be made concerning the allocation of these resources, and converting bystander publics may not aid in the development of additional resources.’

McCarthy and Zald (1977:1232), who present the concepts of SMS (Social Movement Sector) and SMI (Social Movement Industry), note that ‘conscience constituents are more likely to control larger resource pools. Individuals with more resources exhibit concerns less directly connected with their own material interests. Consequently, conscience constituents are more likely to be adherents to more than one SMO and more than one SMI’. Similarly, ‘one movement’s conscience constituency can become the next movement’s beneficiary constituency’ (Freeman, 1979:176). McCarthy and Zald (1997) propose the resource mobilisation model, which emphasises the interaction between resource availability, the pre-existing organisation of preference resources, and entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demand. Based on the concepts of SMS and SMI, McCarthy and Zald develop a number of hypotheses concerning important variables: the interaction of authorities, SMOs, and bystander publics; the dynamics of media involvement; the relationship between SMO workers and authorities; the impact of industry structure and; the dilemmas of tactics.

Jenkins (1983:538) presents the idea of groups, stating that ‘groups sharing strong distinctive identities and dense interpersonal network exclusive to group members are highly organised and hence readily mobilised’. In contrast, groups with weak identities having few intra-group
networks and few strong ties to outsiders are less likely to mobilise. Group size is also significant, with smaller groups contributing at higher rates.

Cress and Snow (1996) conclude that effective movements of the poor need strong organisations with high capabilities in resource mobilisation. They also require support from non-constituency-based facilitative organisations. According to Piven and Cloward (1977:284), ‘political influence by the poor is mobilised, not organised’. Therefore, a disruptive strategy requires masses of people to be mobilised instead of regularly participating in an organisation. In the case of the welfare rights movement in the US, the idea of the establishment of the organisation of organisers (composed of students, churchmen and activists) was not acceptable because it would be a manipulative approach to the poor. A ‘national union of welfare recipients’ should be formed, instead, as it would be able to wield sufficient influence to oblige a national income concession from the Congress. Then, the campaigns for existing recipients became a main strategy for the establishment of the National Welfare Rights Organisation. For a few years, campaigns to obtain special grants spread throughout the country; hundreds of groups formed, and many hundreds of millions of dollars in benefits were obtained from local welfare departments. Finally, the National Welfare Rights Organisation was officially formed in 1997. However, the most difficult task was developing support and resources, in particular, money. However, the industrial workers’ movement in the US utilised another tactic. The movement was successful because a large number of voters could be organised through workers’ unions for political influence. Thus, it becomes a case to test beliefs about the effectiveness of mass-based organisation in electoral spheres (Piven and Cloward, 1977).

In general, decisions of SMOs concerning resource mobilisation are constrained by a number of factors including the pre-existing organisations of various segments of the social movements. SMOs compete with one another for the resources of isolated adherents. This is because support from isolated adherents depends on organisational advertising. Thus, effective advertising campaigns may convince isolated adherents to support SMOs’ activities, and at the same time social movements may be competing for the same resources because they would have overlapping adherents (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

8.2.8 Constraints of resource mobilisation

All resources have constraints on their uses. Freeman (1979) identifies five categories of constraint: value, past experiences, reference groups, expectations and relationships with target groups. Also, those tasks with resource mobilisation may also experience the effects of authorities and agents of social control, such as police, because their action affects the readiness of bystanders, adherents and constituents to alter their own status and commitment (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Regarding the tactics intended to damage social movements, Marx (1979) identifies these as follows.

8.2.8.1 Creation of unfavourable public image.
Information may be given to friendly journalists or supplied anonymously. The information may concern arrest records, associations, and life-styles that are thought likely to hurt the movement

8.2.8.2 Information-gathering.
This technique was originally developed for criminal investigation, but it also has been applied to social movements.
8.2.8.3 Inhibiting the supply of resources and facilities
As social movements need various resources, such as money, people and communication services, government action may be taken to deny or restrict a movement’s access to such resources.

8.2.8.4 Destroying leaders
Leaders are considered as the centre of movements so movement-damaging activities often focus on weakening them.

8.2.8.5 Internal conflict
It could be created by encouraging factionalism, jealousy, and suspicion among activists.

8.2.8.6 Encouraging external conflict
The conflict between the movement and groups in its environment may be encouraged, aimed at damaging it or inverting from the adherents. Conflict may also be encouraged between social movements with different ideologies.

8.2.8.7 Sabotaging particular action
When social movements take public action, such as mass demonstrations, the movements may face tactics aiming to damage them; for example, misinformation used to notify members falsely that events are cancelled; counter-demonstrators who are paid and encouraged by the government. An example of the use of such tactics is provided by the experience of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the principal organisation of the US New Left, which was attacked by the US government in 1965 when the issue of opposition to the Vietnam War had been raised. In October 1965, Attorney General Nicholas B. Katzenbach told a news conference that ‘there are some Communists in it. We may very well have some prosecutions’; Senator Stennis denounced an SDS ‘conspiracy’ (Gitlin, 2003:96, 82).

8.2.9 Costs and benefits of participation and free riders
The resource mobilisation perspective has been developed based on the idea that ‘behaviour entails costs’ (Zald, 1992:332). This idea is presented by the collective good theory of Olson. A collective good is ‘any good or service or state of affairs that any given group can benefit from, regardless of whether they help to pay the costs of providing it’ (Fireman and Gamson, 1979:11). Therefore, some people prefer to get a free ride by letting others do it. Olson says:

But it is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested behaviour. It does not follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieve their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested. Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in common interests, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests (Olson, 1971:2).

Costs and benefits imply choice and rationality. ‘Olson argues that people act collectively only when there are selective incentives for them to do so. Olson concludes that common interest in collective goods is not sufficient to bring a large group of actors together for collective action and that the provision of selective incentives is necessary’ (Fireman and Gamson,
The free rider problem can be solved only by offering selective incentives (Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Jenkins, 1983; Fireman and Gamson, 1979). Olson offers ‘selective incentives’ as special devices, or as separate incentives.

Only a separate and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way. In such circumstances group action can be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately, like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather ‘selectively’ toward the individuals in the group. The incentive must be ‘selective’ so that those who do not join the organization working for the group’s interest, can be treated differently from those who do’. Olson further defines a ‘selective incentive’ as something that ‘can be either negative or positive, in that they can either coerce by punishing those who fail to bear an allocated share of the costs of the group action, or there can be positive inducements offered to those who act in the group interest (Olson, 1971:51).

Fireman and Gamson (1979:10) interpret Olson’s definition as meaning that ‘selective incentives are constraints or inducements that an individual actor may gain or lose contingent upon whether the actor contributes to collective action’. The selective incentives can be divided into external and internal ones. The external selective incentives are expectations that individuals have in relation to the groups. In turn, the groups can use those expectations to solve the free riding problem. The internal selective incentives are the internal mechanisms of movements that motivate individuals to participate (Della Porta and Diani, 2002).

‘Free riding is simply a synonym for non-participation’ (Jordan and Maloney, 2006:119). Free riding is considered a problem for collective action from the resource mobilisation perspective. Oegema and Klandermans (1994: 424) point out that ‘Olson argues that it is logically inconsistent for large numbers of people to act together to obtain a collective good, even when each member recognises that she/he will be better off if the collective good is provided. This is the free rider problem’. Meanwhile, Fireman and Gamson (1979:15) also say that ‘at the heart of the utilitarian approach to collective action is the “free rider” problem. However, Jordan and Maloney point out that ‘Olson saw non-participation as “natural”, not pathological (Jordan and Maloney, 2006:115).

Olson (1971:166) states that ‘the rational individual in the economic system does not curtail his spending to prevent inflation (or increase it to prevent depression) because he knows, first, that his own efforts would not have a noticeable effect, and second, that he would get the benefits of any price stability that others achieved in any case’. In the case of a large society, Fireman and Gamson (1979) agree, saying that ‘it is reasonable for the individual to expect that the actors who share his interest will not mobilise effectively when they lack the organisation to communicate and coordinate commitments’ (Fireman and Gamson, 1979:16).

The Olson theory is widely criticised by social movement scholars and theorists. Some of them, such as Fireman and Gamson (1979) and Ferree (1992), point out that the approach emphasises only self-interest and ignores other factors. It is accepted that many people participate in collective action without selective incentives. A series of experiments conducted by Marwell and Ames (1979 and 1980 in Jenkins 1983) show that over half of all participants contribute to the collective good without selective incentives. The result of the study (whether non-participation is a self-interest strategy, as Olson suggests, or reflects broader differences in resources and orientations to political action) shows that ‘non-joiners are not making Olson’s self-interested calculations. They are declining to participate not
because they want others to do it for them, but because they are sceptical of the effects of political action' (Jordan and Maloney, 2006:135-336). In their study, free riders are considered as a specific type of conscious non-members. They identify free riders as ones who are: concerned (i.e. they value the group goal); aware of the groups; believe group activities will produce desirable outcomes; consider the groups to be efficient and still choose not to join. They reject the loose definition of free riding, which refers to adherents, sympathizers or supporters.

Fireman and Gamson (1979) state that resourceful actors (which may include politicians, prophets, business firms, or voluntary association) facilitate mobilisation without promising or providing incentives. However, some cases, such as the case of the National Welfare Rights Organisation, support the Olson theory. This organisation offered a cash benefit, as a selective incentive, to its members. When this incentive was abolished, this organisation virtually collapsed (Jenkins, 1983). In addition, individuals as members of communities must make decisions based on their self-interest if communities lack tight internal-control structure (Fireman and Gamson, 1979).

According to the results of researches on individual participation, values and solidarities of the groups become the main factors of participatory motivations (Della Porta and Diani, 2002). It is accepted among resource mobilisation scholars that solidarity and purposive incentives are as important as selective ones, and the structural location of individuals is also critical to their choice (Foweraker, 1995). Ferree (1992:44) proposes that 'the postulate that individuals are self-interested can be re-examined in the form of testable hypotheses about the structural conditions under which material self-interest will emerge as a characteristic or dominant value'. Such structures may be the societal context in which the movement as a whole operates, or they may reflect the internal group processes of specific movement organisations.

As Olson’s model only focuses on incentive and self-interest, it imposes limitations on resource mobilisation studies as follows: it offers only a one-dimensional view of rationality; it insists on the theoretical significance of free riding; it presents a de-contextualised view of individuals (Ferree, 1992:32). Fireman and Gamson (1979) agree that much of Olson’s statement is not relevant to the resource mobilisation approach. They argue that ‘Olson’s reasons become relevant only if the individual is faced with collective action that stands a chance of success’ (Fireman and Gamson, 1979:16). Thus the mobilisation theorists have attempted to propose other variables such as solidarity and collective identity instead of self-interest (Ferree, 1992:39). In addition, Klandermans (1984:597) argues that the free riding problem ‘can be solved on a psychological level. As people have expectations about others’ behaviour, they can formulate their own production functions’. Klandermans proposes the statement to counter Olson’s argument that ‘a collective good can motivate persons to participate in a social movement if they expect that others will also participate’.

However, Jenkins (1983: 537) emphasises that ‘the Olson theory correctly identifies a major problem but fails to offer an adequate solution. Olson is correct that movements cannot be mobilized around collective material benefits and that free riding is potentially a major problem’. Then Jenkins proposes that ‘the major task in mobilisation is to generate solidarity and moral commitment to the broad collectivities in whose name movement act’.
8.3 The Political Opportunity Approach

Peter Eisinger first introduced the concept of political opportunity in the early 1970s in his comparative study of urban politics in US cities. Since then, in the US, it has been used in the ‘political process theory’ which links institutionalised politics with social movements. American scholars mainly analysed the emergence, development and outcomes of a particular movement on the basis of changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a national political system. Meanwhile, the new social movement scholars in Europe developed this concept in the study of ‘political opportunity structures’. European scholars have focused on cross-national differences in the structure, extent and success of movements (McAdam et al., 1996:2-3). The main assumption of the European group is that social movements in different countries have developed in different ways as a result of the political conditions in their respective countries (van der Heijden, 1997). However, both American and European versions are based on the same belief that social movements are shaped by a broader set of political constraints and opportunities, which are different from one political system to another (McAdam et al., 1996).

There is no consensus among scholars about the definition of the term ‘political opportunity’ applied to social movement studies. McAdam (1996) points out that scholars have defined the term ‘political opportunity’ differently depending upon which research question they were addressing. It is applied to a variety of empirical phenomena and is used to explain a wide range of questions in the study of social movements. This approach has been used to study the emergence of a social movement; to analyse success and failure; and to compare the development of similar movements in different nations, states, or cities. Its various definitions given by leading scholars are considered below.

In his study of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies, Kitschelt (1986: 58-59) notes that ‘political opportunity structures functioned as "filters" between the mobilisation of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment. The political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configuration of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilisation, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others’.

In their study of new social movements in Western Europe, Kriesi et al. employ the concept of political opportunity structure by identifying four components, which are more or less systematically linked to each other: national cleavage structure, institutional structures, prevailing strategies, and alliance structures (Kriesi et al. 1995).

For Tarrow (1996:54), ‘political opportunity refers to signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements’. This concept emphasises not only formal structures like state institutions, but also the conflict and alliance structures, which provide resources and oppose constraints to the group. By using this concept, scholars can understand how mobilisation transfers from people with deep grievances and strong resources to those with lower levels of grievance and fewer resources (Tarrow, 1998).

Some scholars, such as Della Porta and Diani (2002) and Gamson and Meyer (1996), view this issue as problematic. Gamson and Meyer (1996:275) say that ‘the concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment – political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy shifts’. Kriesi et al. (1995) criticise that the
political opportunity structure fails to explain how political structures influence movement mobilisation. As a result, the explanations are often very simplistic and sometimes wrong. Rootes (1999) raises the problem that leads to misunderstanding the term ‘structure’ as the difference in interpretations of the term ‘structure’ between political scientists and sociologists. In political science, the term structure refers to formal political, especially government, institutions, while this term refers to less formal structures in sociology. However, Rootes (1999: 79) points out that ‘the slippage between the traditional political scientific and the sociological uses of the term ‘structure’ is understandable’.

McAdam (1996: 27) synthesises dimensions of political opportunity from concepts of four scholars as follows:

1. The relative openness or closedness of the institutionalised political system.
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity.
3. The presence or absence of elite allies.
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.

In this regard, he further clarifies that the first dimension emphasises the formal legal and institutional structure of the polity, while items two and three refer to the informal structure of power relations characteristic of a system.

The concept of political opportunity has been used in the study of social movements as both dependent and independent variables. As an independent variable, it has been used to understand the emergence of movements and the outcome of movements’ activities. When a movement can create political opportunity, political opportunity is used as a dependent variable (McAdam, 1996; Gamson and Mayer, 1996).

Goodwin and Jasper (1999) note that social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities. Tarrow widened that by suggesting that social movements can also create political opportunity by employing a repertoire of collective action (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Tarrow, 1998). Political opportunities are available for all parties in society such as the left and right wings, political parties, states and challengers. Political opportunities are sometimes presented to only some groups and may not be apparent all at once to all potential actors (Tarrow, 1998). However, opportunities are not the only factor that stimulates actors to act. It also depends on several factors such as perception of actors (whether and how actors perceive opportunities to be open or closed), and beliefs and values of actors. Beliefs and values may constrain them from seizing the opportunities that are open to them; beliefs and values may also motivate them to create new opportunities (Rootes, 1999).

Tarrow (1996) points out that when social movements are formed, they create opportunities for: their own groups, others, opponents, and elites.

1. Expanding the group’s opportunities by expanding the repertoire of collective action into new forms
2. Expanding opportunities for others by presenting issues and demonstrating the utility of their actions, which may attract others. For example, the American civil rights movement in the early 1960s placed new frames of meaning, particularly the extension of the traditional notion of rights. Then other groups could reshape around their own grievance
3. Creating opportunities for opponents; for example, movements employing violent action, which allow repression from the state to be taken against them. Movements
that take extreme forms of demand upon the polity can be outmanoeuvred by groups that pose the same claim in more acceptable forms

(4) Making opportunities for allies in both a negative sense (when collective actions provide the grounds for repression) and a positive sense (when elites seize the opportunities created by challengers to proclaim themselves as tribunes of the people).

Tarrow (1996 and 1998) identifies the dimension of opportunities into five elements:

(1) Opening of access to participation for new actors: opportunity is created when access for participation is increased, such as through an election, mass media, and repression. Rucht (1996) focuses on the accessibility of the party-system and policy decisions to both the formal and informal channels in order to influence political decision. If opportunities are open continuously to challengers to access decision-making, in the long term, this could encourage the formation of centralised and professional interest groups within movements.

(2) Evidence of political realignment within the polity: movements’ opportunities increase when political alignments become unstable, especially when they are based on new coalitions.

(3) Emerging splits within elites: conflicts within and among elites encourage groups to engage movements. ‘Divisions among elites not only provide incentives to resource-poor groups to take the risks of collective action; they encourage portions of the elite that are out of power to seize the role of tribunes of the people’ (Tarrow, 1998:79).

(4) The appearance of influential allies: they come in a variety of forms, for example, mass media, public agencies and religious organisations. The presence of powerful allies is generally a factor facilitating social movement success (della Porta and Diani, 2002). In non-democratic systems, political actors are encouraged to act when they have allies who can act as a friend at court or as a negotiator on their behalf (Tarrow, 1996).

(5) Repression: There are at least three ways in which strong repression may stimulate movements: first, repression could strengthen the identity of counter-cultural movements; second, repression may itself become an issue for the actors; third, it may bring the issue to the attention of the mass media, which may result in increasing support from outsiders (Kriesi et al., 1992). Successful repression and violent counter-movements can encourage more radical repertoires of actions (Tarrow, 1998; and della Porta and Diani, 2002). Moreover, the presence of non-violent counter-movements affects the chances of movements’ success. For example, the radicalisation among social movements in Italy in the 1970s occurred following a period of harsher repression, the police killings of a number of demonstrators during public marches. Moreover, aims and focuses of movements may shift from a single issue to the meta-issue due to repression (or police intervention). For example, the issue of repression and police tactics became an issue that the Chicano movement in Los Angeles raised to increase grassroots participation in movement activities (della Porta and Diani, 2002).

Similarly, Rucht (1996) identifies four variables that affect political opportunities:

(1) Access of the party-system and policy decisions
(2) Policy implementation capacity
(3) Alliance structure and
(4) Conflict structure.
By comparing these to Tarrow's classification, Rucht focuses on the accessibility of the party-system for the category of access to opportunities. Meanwhile, Rucht raises the capacity of the state in policy implementation as one of the variables that is different from those of Tarrow, who categorises the state's capacity into political realignment and splits within the elites. Rucht (1996:192) explains that 'a weak policy implementation capacity of administrative bodies invites a continuous engagement at institutional leverage points via more formal movement organisation. By contrast, strong executive power structure tends to introduce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic and hierarchical political forms; which is then reflected in the movements' emphasis on informal and decentralised structure'.

8.3.1 Political opportunity structure

Firstly, the political opportunity structure is divided into 'open' and 'closed' structures. Open structures allow for easy access to the political system, while a closed structure makes access more difficult. Kitschelt (1986) considers that the focus upon openness or closedness emphasises only the input processes of the political decision cycle. Meanwhile, it ignores the capacity of political systems in developing public policy. The output of policy cycles shapes social movements, and offers them the possibility of access to, and inclusion in, policy-making. Therefore, Kitschelt introduces the distinction between 'political input structures' and 'political output structures'. The political input structures are divided into openness and closedness of states to societal demands. The political output structures (or state capacities to implement policy) are divided into strengths and weaknesses of states. In his study on Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Countries, by combination of political input and output structures, Kitschelt classifies the national political opportunity structures into four types: open and strong states, such as Sweden; open and weak states, such as the US; closed and strong states, such as France; closed and weak states, such as Germany. These political opportunity structures affect movement strategies. For example, when political systems are open and weak, they invite assimilative strategies, and there are many established institutions through which movements can achieve access. When political systems are closed, movements are likely to adopt confrontational strategies.

However, Kitschelt's approach is criticised by Rootes (1999) for selecting evidence from his cases to make them fit the relevant boxes. This is most apparent in his discussion of the German case. Kitschelt's account of the anti-nuclear movement in Germany is sharply different from that of Nelkin and Pollak, who contrast the relatively open German political system with the closed French one. Rootes argues that in categorising Germany as 'closed' to political inputs, Kitschelt fails to distinguish between the structural and the contingent; the German system has been closed to one set of protesters at various times, but 'those instances of closure were essentially contingent upon the political strategies and tactics of other political actors rather than effects of structures'. He further states that 'this has been a pervasive problem with political opportunity structure' (Rootes, 1999:78). On the other hand, he states that Kitschelt's approach highlights the importance of states to social movement studies.

Kriesi et al. (1995:27) argue that it is impossible to clearly separate these two types of structures as strictly as Kitschelt does in his classification. This is because 'open states tend at the same time to have only a limited capacity to act, whereas closed states tend to lack such a capacity'. By emphasising the importance of formal institutional structure, Kriesi et.al. propose the distinction between 'strong states' and 'weak states'. They define that 'strong states are at the same time autonomous with respect to their environment and capable of getting things done, whereas weak states not only lack autonomy but also the capacity to act'.

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They recognise that even though the distinction between weak and strong states is rather crude and overly schematic, it is useful because the strength and weakness of states are apparently relevant to movement mobilization. Variables employed to determine the strength of the state have been distinguished into three political arenas: the parliamentary, the administrative, and the direct-democratic. Apart from the distinction the strength of the states, which is a formal institutional structure, Kriesi et al. also employ the prevailing strategies (informal strategies), which refer to ‘the procedures that members of the political system employ when they are dealing with challengers’ (Kriesi et al., 1995:33). The informal procedures and prevailing strategies are either exclusive (repressive, confrontational, polarising), or integrative (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative). In the study of New Social Movements in Western Europe, they combine the strength of states (including an intermediate category) with the distinction between exclusive and integrative dominant strategies. As a result, there are six categories as follows:

1. A strong state with an exclusive dominant strategy is represented by France
2. A weak state with an exclusive strategy is Italy
3. Switzerland is a weak state with an inclusive dominant strategy
4. Germany is an intermediate case with an exclusive dominant strategy
5. The Netherlands is intermediate case with an ‘informal inclusion’ which may also apply to United Kingdom and to the Scandinavian countries (Kriesi et al., 1995).

In an attempt to answer questions concerning the relationship between states and social movements, Dryzek et al. (2003) employ two dimensions to identify state structures, which is different from Kriesi’s classification. The first dimension is that states can be either exclusive or inclusive in their structures when it comes to interest representation. An exclusive state restricts effective representation to a small number of political actors while an inclusive state is more open to a variety of different interests. The second dimension is that states can be either passive or active in the kinds of interest representation they allow or seek. Combining these two dimensions creates four types of state:

1. Passively inclusive – which accepts and accommodates a variety of interest groups: the most prevalent kind of passively inclusive state structure is pluralism, such as in the US;
2. Actively inclusive – such as Norway, which can be identified as a corporatist society: the state usually provides support in various forms, for example, funding and guaranteeing privileged policy access to women’s groups and environmentalists;
3. Actively exclusive – such as the United Kingdom in the Thatcher era (1979-90) and beyond: this type tries to undermine the conditions under which oppositional social movements are likely to form, and it associates with market liberalism;
4. Passively exclusive – which provides the challengers with few real channels of political influence, such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria.

Dryzek et al. further note that, in reality, some states combine two or more of these categories, and may shift over time. The study shows that ‘the environmental movement and its relation to the state can take strikingly different forms. This form is also subject to change over time’ (Dryzek et al., 2003:55).

The formal institutional structure of the state consists of four elements:

1. The degree of vertical territorial decentralisation;
2. The horizontal concentration of state power;
3. The nature of the electoral system;
4. The availability of direct-democratic procedures (Heijden, 1997).
The strength or weakness of the state relies on two structural parameters: the degree of the state’s (territorial) centralisation and the degree of the (functional) separation of state power (Kriesi et al., 1995). Kriesi et al. emphasise that strong states may turn into weak ones, and that states that are weak under normal circumstances may momentarily gain in strength under exceptional circumstances. However, ‘while a weak executive may ease access to decision-making; it will have little hope of implementing policies to meet social movement demands’ (Della Porta and Diani, 2002: 197). However, strong states also have greater capacity to implement the policies they choose to support, including by the use of violence or confrontation (Tarrow, 1998).

Institutional variables also influence the evolution of social movements. Della Porta and Diani (2002) mention that these variables cover three main areas: territorial decentralisation, functional dispersal of power, and the extent of power in the hands of the state. The idea of decentralisation is that the greater the degree of decentralisation, the wider the degree of formal access, and the smaller the capacity of any part of the state to act. Decentralisation implies a multiplication of state actors, points of access and decision-making in each parliamentary, administrative and direct-democratic arena (Kriesi et al., 1995). Thus, federal states are more open than centralised states. However, in a decentralised system, dispersal of power not only increases the chances for social movements but for all political actors, including counter-movements. Regarding the arena of government, Della Porta and Diani emphasise that the elites’ attitudes to actors will depend on whether the government is homogeneous or a coalition. The more fragmented the government, the easier it will be to find allies. However, a coalition government has less chance of implementing policy (della Porta and Diani, 2002).

Swain and Chee (year unknown: 95) argue that ‘different political structures use different conflict management mechanisms to manage opposition to large hydro projects’. By comparing the political movements of two dam project in two countries – the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand and the Bakun Dam in Malaysia – they find that Thailand, as a liberal democracy, provides possibilities to counter the non-consultative policy of the state. In contrast, Malaysia, as a semi-authoritarian state, reacts with a more oppressive approach to prevent escalation of the protest against the project. Thus, Malaysia is more effective in the implementation of policy decisions to build large dam through its suppressive methods (Swain and Chee, year unknown).

8.3.2 Resources and opportunities

Carmin (2003) proposes the hypothesised relationships between community resources, opportunities and political behaviour by combining the resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories. She explains that this idea is based on the main theses of both theories: resource mobilisation theorists say that sufficient levels of resources are necessary for action to be initiated and sustained over time; the political opportunity thesis suggests that ‘high levels of access (open) invite institutional participation, highly restrictive access (closed) suppresses public expression, and partial access (ajar) establishes conditions favourable to collective action’ (Carmim, 2003:49). When resources are low and political opportunities are presented to actors, they are likely to employ personal contact and private interactions with officials as their strategies. When resources are high and opportunities are open, institutionalised participation in government-sponsored forums is used. However, when resources are low and political opportunities are almost closed (ajar) to actors, this is likely to lead to non-participation. Finally, collective action, protest and other forms of expressive
action are used if resources are high and opportunities are ajar to them. This is shown in Figure 8.1.

### Community Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal contact and private interactions with officials</td>
<td>Participation in government-sponsored forums</td>
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<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inaction</td>
<td>Collective</td>
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<td>Non-participation</td>
<td>Protest and other forms of expressive action</td>
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Figure 8.1 Hypothesised behaviours associated with different combinations of community resources and political opportunities (Carmin, 2003:49).

Rootes (1997:21) explains that political actors' strategies are influenced by the availability of resources. In the case of student movements, due to lack of resources for conventional political participation, their mobilisations aim to ‘maximise the benefit of the resources of numbers and short-term availability while minimising dependence on resources such as money and access to elites which are in short supply’. Moreover, the forms of political actions also depend on the political values of the actors; preference for direct action generally stems from the values actors place upon mass participation, and the belief that such tactics might effect social and political transformation.

8.3.3 The mass media

The mass media is another component of political opportunity structure (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Social movements have become more sensitive to the impact of the media on their messages and identities since the 1960s (Gitlin, 2003:284). The mass media contributes to a movement’s aims while at the same time working on the open market (Della and Diani, 2002). However, the relationship between the mass media and movements is both symbiotic and antagonistic (Gitlin, 2003:22). Gitlin summarises the evolution of the media and movement relationship as follows: at first, the media does not get involved with movements; after the media discovers movements, the movements cooperate with the media; then the media presents the movements in patterned ways; later, the quality and slant of these patterns changes, and different parts of the movements respond to them in different ways; last, the state intervenes to shape the coverage. Gitlin further emphasises that the involvement of the state in coverage can create an interaction between three parties, including media institutions, movement actors and the state.

One outcome of mass media coverage is public perception, which shapes the movement and the response of authority to it (Zald, 1992:338). Movements’ actions are likely to change public support only at the margins, because the public’s attitude is tied to individuals’ social
identities and positions. However, collective actions affect the social context in such a way that media message are presented (Zald, 1992 Smith et al., 2001).

The mass media is instrumental in social movements in at least three different ways: as an important means of reaching the general public, in particular, to mobilise potential participants; as a means of linking movements with other political and social actors; as a way of providing psychological support for members (Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996). In addition, Gamson and Mayer (1996) emphasise that the media can become part of a shared movement culture.

In some cases, such as the case of the new left in the US, the relationship between the media and movements developed through several stages over a long period. In the case of the US New Left, the development of media involvement in the movement can be classified into five phases:

1. From 1960 to the late winter of 1965, SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) was not covered by major news media
2. The media discovered SDS in the late winter of 1965
3. As the SDS participated in the antiwar protest in April 1965, reporters began to seek out leaders and to cover protest events
4. As the media actively engaged the movement, an adversary symbiosis developed
5. The media entered into the movement. The media helped recruit new members and backers into SDS, who expected to find what they saw on television or read in the papers (Gitlin, 2003).

The mass media play an important role in defining political opportunity for movements. Gamson and Mayer (1996:285) suggest that ‘opening and closing of media access and attention is a crucial element in defining political opportunity for movements’. They further state that ‘on one hand, the media play a central role in the construction of meaning and the reproduction of culture [...] On the other hand, the media are also a site or arena in which symbolic contests are carried out among competing sponsors of meaning, including movements’ (Gamson and Mayer, 1996:287).

The media, in particular the mainstream media, has to define an issue as a controversial one. Creating controversy is a way to increase opportunity by opening media access to movement spokespersons (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). However, when movements fail to offer a formal spokesperson, the media typically appoint a leader. They often seek out someone who has a colourful character but who is not necessarily responsible for movement organisation. Meanwhile, the structures of social movement organisations affect their messages. Professionalised movement organisations with centralised structures typically have an advantage in dealing with media organisations because they can control their leaders and message. In contrast, decentralised organisations with ideological objections to centralised leadership often have difficulty in formulating effective media strategies, and leaders who develop message frames may be repudiated by other participants (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004).

In reality, movements always face difficulties in accessing the media; as Molotch (1979:77) says, ‘what is “interesting” to the movements is not necessarily “interesting” to the media’. Therefore, the movement necessarily attempts to shape its behaviour in such a way that it can attract the media while serving its own interests. Nevertheless, many social actors consider the mass media when they formulate their strategies, even if they are unable to execute a deliberate media strategy (McCarthy et al., 1996). The mass media may pay less attention to a
movement because of the low status of movement participants. Therefore, movement leaders can change their strategy by recruiting the members of privileged groups or by implementing dramatic actions. However, such innovations may not only attract media coverage, but also create problems. In particular, movements may escalate their tactics and engage in violence, as they are in the cycle of needing more and more flamboyant tactics to attract coverage (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004).

Meanwhile, when events receive media attention, the media selects and interprets information according to principles that define news value. As a result, media coverage is a production of a transformed reality that diverges from reality as a political actor defines it. Activists often accuse that the media fails to portray their causes as they want (Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996; Smith et al., 2001). Klandermans and Goslinga (1996:320) emphasise that the ‘mass media do not transmit information without transforming it’. An example is the case of criticising the new left as communists. Gitlin (2003) notices that the Times elevated the Communist issue to major proportions, which was different from the tenor of Katzenbach’s actual statement. It may be reporters, not Katzenbach, who first brought up the Communist issue. What is interesting in this case is that newspapers were framing the SDS-draft story from the right.

Moreover, forms of action also affect the amount and kind of media attention. In the view of the mass media, conventional actions, actions using legal mechanisms to foster change, are less newsworthy than unconventional actions, such as riot, demonstration, blockade, street theatre, and defacing property. As a result, conventional actions tend to be under-reported (Carmin, 1999). According to a comparison of the frequencies of environmental protest events reported in national and local newspapers in Germany, Sweden, Italy and Spain, the confrontational and violent forms were always more frequently reported in national editions. In Germany and Spain, the number of participants increased the chances of an event being reported in national newspapers (Fillieule and Jimenez, 2003).

Klandermans and Goslinga (1996:318) point out that ‘media are not neutral’. Smith et al. (2001) identify bias in the media’s recording of protest events in two forms: selection bias and description bias. Selection bias involves media gatekeepers, such as editors’ choices of a very small number of protest events to report from a much larger pool of events. In the case of the New Left, during the first two weeks of October 1965, the New York Times reported seven pieces on student anti-war action, but four of them consisted entirely of antagonistic statements by authorities, including two universities presidents, the police chief and the attorney general of the US (Gitlin, 2003). However, this kind of selection is part of the media’s agenda-setting role. Description bias describes how a selected protest event is portrayed in a media story. The results of the study of newspaper and television news stories on Washington, D.C. protests held during 1982 and 1991 showed that ‘results support much of the surmising among media scholar, that even when movements succeed at obtaining the attention of mass media outlets, media reports portray protests in ways that may undermine social movement agendas. Despite this obstacle to communicating protest messages through demonstrations, movements engage in other forms of communication that can affect public interpretations of mass media frames’ (Smith et al., 2001:1397).

Reviewing the social movement theories is a difficult task, but it is useful because it provides the ideas with which to develop an analysis of the empirical work of this thesis. The concept of SMOs is used to analyse the role of NGOs. First, various aspects of the SMOs in both case studies are examined (in Chapter 10) in order to answer how these social movements are organised. The discussion on SMOs in this Chapter helps to investigate: what forms and
structures of SMOs were chosen and why; how they mobilise resources and what their constraints are; how decisions are made; what the interaction between SMOs and NGOs are; and what strategies are utilised. The comparison of two case studies regarding those topics is also analysed. The concept of rationality and free riders provides answers as to why some people participate in movements while some do not. Based on the fieldwork data, all villagers in the four villages of the KSTD case participated in the movement, but not all of the villagers in the Pak Mun Dam area joined the PMD movement. In Chapter 11, the role of NGOs is investigated through the interactions between SMOs and NGOs as SMOs. The role of NGOs outside the movements is also examined, based on the idea of RMT.

In Chapter 11, the concept of POA helps to analyse why NGOs became involved in the movements outlined in the case studies; and how POA influences the resource mobilisation, the movement strategies and the role of NGOs. The answers to these questions are based on the concept of openness and closedness of political opportunities. In addition, the variables of political opportunities proposed by Tarrow (1996 and 1998) and Rucht (1996) are analysed to discover how they affect the movements. The empirical analysis addresses the principal hypothesis of this thesis in the final part of Chapter 11. Finally, conclusions are drawn as to how RMT and POA can be applied in the case of Thailand.

8.4 Conclusion

8.4.1 Resource Mobilisation Theory

RMT is based on Olson's public good theory, stating that the actors calculate costs and benefits when participating in social movements. The main concept of this theory is that social movements are possible when sufficient resources are available to them. This theory emphasises three major elements including costs and benefits of participation, organisations and expectations of success. The approach emphasises the importance and role of organisations in the form of social movement organisations (SMOs). SMOs' structure depends on variables such as movement objectives, resources mobilisation problems, and the characteristics of the social groups they seek to mobilise. It has been found that most SMOs take advantage of both decentralised and bureaucratic models. Currently, the most common form of SMO is a segmentary, polycentric and integrated network, which Gerlach (2001) calls SPIN. Over time, SMOs experience organisational changes, as do other forms of organisations. The forms of SMO are diverse, and are influenced by the degree of organisation, the distribution of power within an organisation, and the level of participation or degree of commitment from participants. Scholars propose different forms of SMO as follows: (1) inclusive and exclusive organisations (Zald and Ash, 1966); (2) social movement industries (SMI) (McCarthy and Zald, 1977); (3) professional SMOs (Jenkins, 1983); (4) moderate SMOs and radical SMOs (RSMOs) (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000); (5) federated and isolated SMOs (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

Decision-making is a major task for SMOs. Freeman (1979) presents a strategic decision-making model, based on the assumption that decisions are made in response to circumstances. The model proposes four major factors, which affect the decision making of SMOs: (1) mobilising resources, comprising of tangible and intangible resources; (2) constraints on these resources which act as filters between resources and SMOs; (3) SMO structure and internal environment; (4) and expectation about potential targets.

Resources are the main concern of this approach. Resources may include anything necessary for SMOs to pursue their goals. Freeman (1979) divides resources into tangible and
intangible, while Della Porta and Diani (2002) divide resources into material and non-material. Regarding the resources of the poor, Cress and Snow (1996) distinguish four categories of resource: moral, material, information or knowledge, and human, referring to people who donate resources, time and energy to SMOs. Resources may come from both internal sources, such as beneficiary constituencies, and external sources, such as conscience constituencies and non-constituency institutions. To mobilise human resources, SMOs may decide between mobilising the largest possible support from the general public, and mobilising smaller but carefully selected and strongly committed groups. SMOs generally attempt to convert bystander publics into adherents, so preventing them from becoming opponents. In reality, all resources have constraints on their uses. The resource mobilisation may experience various measures of social control and repression from states and authorities.

Free riding is considered a problem in collective action from the resource mobilisation perspective. According to Olson, as a collective good is provided to all members in the given group whether they help to pay the cost of providing it or not, some people prefer to get a free ride by letting others do it. Olson proposes that offering selective incentives as special devices or as separate incentives is the only way to solve the free rider problem. This theory is widely criticised by social movement scholars and theorists. Some of them note that Olson focuses only on self-interest, and ignores other factors. Results of many studies show that many people participate in collective action without selective incentives. Instead, participatory motivations include values and solidarities of the group. Therefore, mobilisation theorists propose other variables, such as solidarity and collective identity, instead of self-interest. According to Jenkins (1983), generating solidarity and moral commitment in collective actions is a major task in mobilisation.

8.4.2 Political opportunity Approach (POA)

Since the concept of political opportunities was introduced in the 1970s, it has developed in both the US (as the political process theory) and Europe (as the theory of political opportunity structures). Both versions are based on the belief that social movements are shaped by a broader set of political constraints and opportunities, which are different from one political system to another (McAdam et al., 1996:3). There is no consensus among scholars on the definition of the term ‘political opportunity’. Some scholars view this as problematic, because the term ‘political opportunity’ is differently identified and applied in a variety of empirical phenomena. McAdam (1996) synthesises dimensions of political opportunity from concepts of scholars as follows: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically under-gird a polity (3) the presence or absence of elite allies, and (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.

The main idea of the political opportunities approach is that social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities. Also, social movements can create opportunities. Opportunities are available for all parties in society, not only challengers. However, opportunities are not the only variable that stimulates challengers to act; others include perception of actors about opportunities, and their values and beliefs. When social movements are formed, they create opportunities for: their own groups, others, opponents, and elites. Opportunities depend on five variables: (1) the opening of access to participation for new actors (2) evidence of political realignment within the polity (3) emerging splits within elites (4) influential allies (5) repression.
Political opportunity structure is divided into ‘open’ and ‘closed’ structures. Open opportunities allow actors to access political systems more easily than closed ones. Kitschelt (1986) presents the distinction between ‘political input structures’ (divided into openness and closeness of states to societal demands) and ‘political output structures’ (divided into strength and weakness of states), because focus upon openness or closedness emphasises only the input processes of the political decision cycle, and ignores the output of policy cycles. When political systems are open and weak, they invite assimilative strategies. When political systems are closed, movements are likely to adopt confrontational strategies. As Kriesi et al. consider that, in reality, states are not either completely closed or open, it is impossible to clearly separate these two types of structures as strictly as Kitschelt does in his classification. Therefore, they propose the combination of formal institutional structures (either weak or strong states) and informal strategies, or prevailing strategies (either exclusive or integrative strategies).

Dryzek et al. (2003) propose the application of two dimensions to identify state structures: exclusive or inclusive states; passive or active in the kinds of interest representation they allow or seek. Combining these two dimensions creates four types of states: (1) passively inclusive (2) actively inclusive (3) actively exclusive (4) passively exclusive. Carmin (2003) proposes the combination of the resource mobilisation and political opportunity approaches. Both resources and opportunities affect the strategies chosen by actors. However, forms and strategies of political actions do not depend only on availability of resources and opportunities, but also on the political values of actors.

The mass media is seen as another component of political opportunity structure. The relationship between the mass media and movements is both symbiotic and antagonistic. The mass media is instrumental in social movements as a means of reaching the general public, linkage between movements and other political and social actors, and providing psychological support for members. In some cases, the media can become part of a shared movement culture. However, movements always face difficulties in accessing the mass media. Therefore, political actors necessarily attempt to shape their behaviours and strategies in such a way that they can attract the media’s attention while serving their own interests. Even when movements do reach media attention, the message is been selected and transformed by the media. Forms of action also affect the amount and kind of media attention. Confrontational and violent actions are more frequently reported than conventional ones. A large number of participants increase the chances of an event being reported.

Both of these approaches are employed to analyse the two cases studied in Thailand. RMT is used to answer how social movements are organised. Then the SMOs are examined as follows: (1) structures and forms (2) decision making processes (3) roles of villagers and NGOs in SMOs (4) resource mobilisation and strategies (5) rationality and the free riding problem. On the other hand, the political opportunities approach is employed to examine why NGOs became involved in the two case studies; and how they influence the resource mobilisation and the movement strategies. The concept of openness and closedness is helpful in analysing the variables of policy implementation capacity, the appearance of allies, such as elites and mass media, and repression.
Chapter 9
Histories of the Projects and the Movements

This chapter aims to provide the background of the case studies, the Keang Sue Ten Dam and Pak Mun Dam Movements, which are analysed in the next chapters. Their backgrounds are explained, including project features, aims of the projects and project implementation. Then the histories of movements are presented based on information from news coverage. As the disputes in both case studies have run for almost twenty years, the histories of movements are presented in chronological order. The reactions of different governments and views of different villagers and NGOs regarding the movements are also presented.

9.1 Keang Sue Ten Dam (KSTD) project

9.1.1 Background of the KSTD project

The Keang Sue Ten dam (KSTD) is an irrigation project for the agricultural sector. It is situated in the Mae Yom National Park, 50 km north of Phrae. Its capacity could provide water for agriculture in the upper Chao Phra Ya River, including Phare, Sukhothai and Pichit provinces. Initially, the dam was designed for both agriculture and power generation purposes, under the responsibility of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). The project was initiated in 1980 under the Ing-Yom-Nan Project. After EGAT revised its feasibility, the project was transferred to the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) in 1985, because it was decided that the project should mainly focus on agricultural purposes. In 1989, the project was submitted to the Chavalit government. In 1994, an environmental impact study was submitted to the National Environmental Board for consideration. In 1996, various institutes conducted four additional studies on controversial issues including the ecological impact, geology and earthquake studies, and public health and resettlement. In November 1996, the cabinet agreed with the RID to take a further step regarding the project's design, and in 1997 the cabinet resolution agreed to public participation in the project. The government approved a budget for the RID, for the revised study and survey, in 1998. However, the National Environmental Board has not approved the environmental impact study to date.

The dam is designed as a concrete-faced, rock-fill dam, 70 metres height and 540 metres long. Its reservoir capacity is 1,175 million cubic metres, and its impounded water surface is 66.8 square kilometres (16,700 acres). The benefit cost ratio is 1.6, and the economic internal rate of return (IERR) is 18.41%. Its construction period would be five to seven years. The current (2006) project cost is 11,000 million baht, of which the construction cost is 9,930 million baht and the compensation and relocation costs are 1,070 million baht. At present, the dam tender drawing has been done, and the RID has engineering capacity for its implementation.

The project could provide water in the dry season for an agricultural area of 167,906 acres, increasing the existing area about threefold. As the ground survey could not be conducted due to the protest, aerial photography taken in 2002 has been used to examine the area. It shows that the project would affect 1,000 households in Tambon Sa-iab, Phrae province and Tambon Chieng Muan, Pa-yao province. The government would offer two options to the evicted people for relocation, either in the relocation area provided by the project, or financial compensation. The relocation area is in Pa Huay Pom (Huay Pom forest), which covers an area of 12,000 acres. However, at present this potential area is occupied by a large number of
people. The RID is unable to move forward to project implementation because the Chavalit cabinet suspended the project on April 29, 1997, together with other three dams (RID, year unknown).

It is claimed that a large dam is not necessary because there is a weir in Mae Yom catchments, which was built in 1947. Niwat, a senior expert of the RID, explained that 'the concept of building a weir was appropriate to our country thirty years ago when the natural resources were not deteriorated like today. A weir usually blocks water for the dry season and serves only a small area where is not very far from its reservoir. In the past, the streams and rivers were full of water all year round, but today, our environment has been deteriorated and our country has been facing water shortages in dry season almost everywhere. Therefore, we need a huge reservoir to provide water in a very large area' (Niwat interview). In addition, the project was proposed to prevent flooding. He emphasised that ‘throughout my long experience, I could say that flood prevention is not the main purpose of the project so we cannot exactly expect that the KSTD can serve this function. However, this issue was raised by both local and national politicians because of the political culture; the politicians always try to maintain their popularities by supporting the projects which are beneficial to those people in their areas’. Niwat insisted that no government in the past has seriously pushed the project. The Prime Ministers or Ministers have given interviews, or have expressed to the mass media that the project should be built, but they have not requested the Department to take action. Meanwhile, the RID cannot move forward because of the Cabinet resolution on April 29, 1997 (Niwat interview).

9.1.2 History of the KSTD movement

The first demonstration against the KSTD occurred in May 1989 when the project was submitted to the Chartchai Government for consideration, but the project was shelved (Bangkok Post, 10 June 1994). The conflicts against the KSTD project exploded twice every year during the drought and flood periods. There were both supporters and opponents (Weekly Matichon, October 3, 1995). Supporters were mostly farmers from Phare, Phitsanulok, Sukhothai, Phichit and Nakhon Sawan provinces who believed that the project would benefit the lower north by providing water in the dry season and preventing flooding. Meanwhile, as their area would be submerged, the opponents included people in Tambon Sa-iab (or Sa-iab sub-district) in Phare province and Chieng Muan district in Chieng Rai province. However, the dam-protest activities of the people in Tambon Sa-iab are still active today. Meanwhile, the government officers, at central and local levels, expressed their views in the way that they fully supported the project. The main issue raised by the government and supporters was that the dam would prevent floods in the lower north, in particular Phare, Sukhothai and Phichit, but many academics and conservationists claimed that this lacked technical evidence to support it.

The conflict is a national issue, which has been widely criticised throughout the mass media. The press pointed out that, in principle, there were two main problems with the KSTD project: a lack of necessary information to make a decision with the result that both politicians and conservationists expressed their own views based on their thoughts instead of technical information, and a lack of appropriate procedures to make decision-making transparent (The Nation December 27, 1995; and Sapda Vijan, April 10, 1998). The conflict led to the appointment of a sub-committee in 1997 to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIA) of the project. In the initial phase, studies by government consultants, including Chiang Mai University, recommended that the project should proceed. At a later stage, a study commissioned by the World Bank and a draft study by Chulalongkorn
University, commissioned by the Minister of Science, Technology and Environment shows that the project area contains valuable plant and animal diversity, particularly wildfowl and teak. The new dam will be detrimental to such an ecosystem. From the geological perspective, it has been found that landslides, sedimentation and foundation are not major problems for dam construction, and can be overcome by technological innovations. A study conducted by the Thailand Development and Research Institute (TDRI), which updated the FAO 1991 cost and benefit analysis, indicates that the loss of forest area resulting from dam construction will result in a 900 million baht economic loss. This is partly due to the fact that the crops benefiting from the reservoir are not economic crops. Despite the latter factor, and after including ecological damage in the calculations, the KSTD will result in an economic loss in terms of net present value of 1,132 million baht (Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, year unknown).

The World Bank withdrew its support for the KSTD in 1994, claiming that the project had too many problems concerning the environment and resettlement. However, it was noticed that the decision was made after protesting villagers attacked the bank’s consultants in June 1993 (The Nation, December 15, 1994). The conflict seemed to have ended when Prime Minister Thaksin confirmed in December 2005 that the KSTD would not be constructed. Instead of building the large dam, small-scale reservoirs should be considered (Manager, December 19, 2005). However, this idea did not come from the RID (Niwat interview).

Prime Minister Surayut mentioned the KSTD project when the flood occurred in the north, but the Department did not respond to his idea because the 1997 Cabinet resolution agreed to suspend the project (Niwat interview). However, the House Sub-committee requested the RID to collect all studies regarding the project and current progress for further consideration. The problems identified by the House Sub-Committee on KSTD monitoring, held on March 27, 2007, are as follows: first, the affected people are concerned that they would be treated by the government like those affected by the Sirikit dam, which was built more than forty years ago; second, information has been disseminated only to community leaders, and information transmitted to ordinary villagers was distorted; third, there are big golden teak trees in the area, but not in large numbers (House Sub-committee on Monitoring Agricultural Policy, 2007).

In future, other organisations must cooperate with the RID to publicise the project; the RID cannot work alone. The most important task is to publicise valid information intensively to the public and the affected people. Niwat emphasised that ‘our main mission is to build infrastructure for irrigation system (engineering work) so we are not very specialised on public communication’ (Niwat interview).

9.1.3 Views of KSTD villagers on the government

The KSTD movement has experienced several governments in almost twenty years. In the view of villagers, the Chuan Government (September 23, 1992 – July 13, 1995 and November 9, 1997 – February 9, 2001) was the most difficult for villagers to deal with. The Thaksin government was more open than others as it listened to the villagers’ voices (U-dom, Mae Ten Headman and Kamnan Chum interviews). Traditionally, ordinary people such as villagers in rural areas are always respectful and afraid of state power. By participating in the dam-protest, villagers could realise that they had rights to argue with the government (Kamnan Chum, Mae Ten Headman and Sagnuan interviews).
Local authorities and local politicians act as the representatives of the central government in Bangkok. They have to serve the policy of the central government. Therefore, they supported the project. Later, most local officials, such as head of Song district and Phrae’s governor, presented themselves in neutral ways, neither supporting nor objecting to the project. Sagnuan said ‘in 1992-1994, Song district’s officials requested villagers to sacrifice themselves for the majority. Today, officials stop saying that sentence and most of them present themselves in neutral’. All heads of Song district realise that people have rights to oppose the government projects. They suggest villagers to conduct protests according to the law (Mae Ten Headman interview).

Local government agencies, such as Tambon Councils and schools, have been invited to join the activities arranged by villagers, such as conservation activities. The police stand guard when villagers arrange their activities including rallies and demonstrations. When U-dom, as Chairman of the dam protest committee, had his life threatened (by a letter sent to him at home), he did not report the case to police. He reported to the committee and Kamnan instead.

There are two primary schools located in Tambon Sa-iab. Traditionally, teachers have a very good relationship with villagers. In the past, when protests began, teachers were asked for assistance in writing official letters, such as petitions. However, they seemed unwilling to do so, as they were worried about getting involved in the protest against the government’s project (Villagers are farmers and have less skill in writing). Also, teachers did not allow students to join in campaigning and training activities arranged by villagers, so students, who were mostly children of villagers, joined activities during weekends and holidays. Seng said Kamnan played an important role in this issue by confirming that the teacher could not prohibit our children to join activities. Bringing them to participate in our activities was our responsibility. If any teacher got into any trouble with their authorities, they could inform us and Kamnan could explain to the authorities (Seng interview).

Kamnan is a head of sub-district or Tambon, a post that is elected by villagers, and can be retained until the age of sixty. Chum is Kamnan of Tambon Sa-iab and one of leaders of the dam protest. Kamnan Chum acts as advisor to the dam protest committee. Kamnan Chum said ‘the movements are managed by the committee and participated by the villagers; I get involved with the protest when conflicts between villagers and local authorities occur’. Kamnan is an advisor, and he has never joined rallies and demonstrations or presented himself in public as leader. Before the meeting of dam protest committee is organised, its chairman consults with Kamnan regarding issues of meeting (U-dom interview and Hannarong interviews).

As a government officer, Kamnan Chum coordinates at both district and province levels. However, if he and his villagers dis not agree with the policy of the local government, he would then discuss this with the governor. He would explain why villagers had protested against the dam. He insisted that ‘it is my responsibility to compromise with local authorities’. Kamnan said the governor always requested that he should motivate villagers to agree with the project when the governor firstly moved into Phrae province. He said ‘I asked whether the governor could accept it if he were facing the same situation. Then, all the governors could understand our condition’. At district level, heads of district that are young are not difficult to deal with because they understand the reasons of the villagers’ (Kamnan Chum interview). Therefore, Kamnan Chum acts as a middleman between villagers and the local government.
9.1.4 Views of NGOs on the KSTD villagers

As allies of villagers and protesters, NGOs provide a voice for villagers. In 1994, NGOs confirmed their intention to fight alongside the villagers protesting against the KSTD project. Meanwhile, an officer for WFT, Hannarong Yaowalerd, requested the government to take responsibility for the lives of the local people protesting against the dam (Bangkok Post, August 8, 1994). Regarding the project research and study, Chainrong Setthachau of WFT, criticised that the social aspect, in particular people's livelihoods, was a weakness in the project study, so it could affect the calculation of financial compensation to affected families (Bangkok Post, June 10, 1994). When Sa-iab's villagers attacked the World Bank's consultancy team, Chainarong Setthachua from the WFT emphasised that the incident was the result of continual pressure from governmental authorities towards the villagers. The protesting villagers were often threatened by local politicians, government officials and local businessmen (Bangkok Post, July 15, 1994). In addition, NGOs sometimes conveyed views and ideas of villagers to the public. For example: regarding the project research, Wildlife Fund Thailand's staff said to news reporters that 'villagers felt that their voice was being excluded from the study process. They did not trust the study team because its members were appointed by the government with no local participation' (The Nation August 9, 1996).

9.1.5 Views of government on the KSTD project

9.1.5.1 Views of officials

In 1992, a specialist of the RID (which is responsible for this project) expressed that 'I am confident that the villagers do not have ideas to oppose the project by themselves but they have been encouraged by outsiders' (Neaw Na December 27, 1992). In 1994, Phrae Governor Sak Techatarn suggested that people in Tambon Sa-iab, as a minority, should make a sacrifice because the dam would benefit a large number of people (Neaw Na, June 20, 1994). Meanwhile, Sa-iab’s villagers have been criticised as making a living through illegal logging. As Metha, MP of Phrae, said 'Don Chai, Don Kaew and Mae Ten villages have earned a notorious reputation of being the centre for illegal logging in Phare' (Bangkok Post, 4 August 1994). In 1995, The Governor Songvut Gnammeesri said 'villagers in Sa-iab are not all protesters but some of them wish to be well informed about relocation' (Krungthep Thurakit, October 10, 1995). In 1996, the view of provincial officers seemed to be more positive as Chuta Thapanawong, Phrae Deputy Governor, said 'we will try to come to an understanding with villagers in the Sa-iab area' (The Nation August 15, 1996).

9.1.5.2 Views of government leaders

The government always emphasised the benefit of the dam for flood prevention. The Agriculture and Cooperatives Minister, Montri Pongpanich, strongly expressed at a press conference, 'I will fight to have the dam built for the sake of more than 30 million people who have been affected by floods and drought over the years' (Bangkok Post, 19 September 1995). Also, the Prime Minister, Banharn, said KSTD would help save several provinces in the north and Bangkok from being flooded (The Sunday Post, September 24, 1995). However, the flood prevention issue has been criticised by NGOs, academics and opponents because no technically valid evidence supported the claim. Later, Rung Rueng Julachat, Director General of the RID confirmed that 'the belief that the KSTD can help prevent floods in Bangkok is false. The main objective of the multi-purpose dam was to provide water for agricultural purposes; flood prevention and electricity generation were by-products' (Bangkok Post October 21, 1995).
The Minister Yingphan, who handled EIA considerations, argued that construction of the dam would not cause deforestation because a large quantity of trees is being cut down every day. He said ‘the later we start, the more time we waste’ (Bangkok Post September 27, 1995). He further said KSTD project should be continued, as it would benefit the majority of the people living below the proposed site. He pointed out that ‘the only people to be (adversely) affected would be 500-600 families which are the minority compared with hundreds of thousands who would gain from the project’ (The Nation October 17, 1995 and Siam Post, October 16, 1995). During the Banharn government, Deputy Prime Minister Thaksin declared that the decision on the KSTD project should be made based on the information available rather than yielding to pressure from various groups (Thailand Times, September 26, 1995).

In 1995, after the government was seriously criticised, as the Agriculture Minister planned to submit the KSTD project to the Cabinet for approval without the agreement of an environmental impact assessment expert panel, government leaders such as Prime Minister Banharn and Agriculture Minister Montri softened their stance on the project. The Prime Minister said, ‘in my personal opinion, I think the dam should be built. However, if the project’s opponents have better information, I will accept it. I won’t be stubborn’ (The Nation September 26, 1995).

Some political leaders and officials suggested that the government should offer high compensation to people who would be affected in order to reduce opposition against the project. In 1992, when Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai first came to power, he said affected people could be generously compensated (Matichon December 10, 1992). In 1994, Niphon Promphan, Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, said protesters might not trust the government’s ability to provide compensation that could meet their demands (Neaw Na, June 20,1994). The Director General of the RID confidently expressed that the affected people could accept if the government offered to buy their lands at a higher price than the officially evaluated price (Krungthep Durakit, August 26, 1995). In 1996, (during the Banharn government) Banjong Phattana phibun, an MP, suggested that villagers wanted lump sum cash compensation (Siam Post, September 9, 1996), but villagers argued that they did not want compensation; they wanted to carry on living on their land.

9.1.5.3 Views of local officials on villagers

The Song District Office plays a major role as the governmental agency responsible for Tambon Sa-iab. The Assistance of the head of Song District clarified that ‘the district office acts as transmitter between government and local people such as: what people need; how people feel and what the government’s policy is. The office has to control the movements to be conducted according to the law and with non-violence’. In the case of the dam-protest, he expressed ‘I understand that Sa-iab’s people protest against the dam because the dam directly affects their lives. They would love to remain at Sa-iab because they can rely on the forest; although they are not rich, they can well survive because of their low cost of living. Also, the project implementation of the government in the past was not transparent. I put myself in a neutral position; I do not favour any side’. He further said ‘in the past, the government officers could direct people but at present we cannot tell people to do what we want. The office has to listen to people what they want. Today we are more open. We coordinate together. During the Banharn administration, government officers were barred from entering Sa-iab by the villagers. Today, the community does not use this method. The government offices have to be sincere’ (Assistance of Head of Song District interview).
9.1.6 Views of the government on the role of NGOs in the KSTD movement

Views of the government about NGOs are always negative. NGOs have been often criticised for: blocking development of the country, receiving foreign money and protesting against all government projects. As politicians claimed that the KSTD could prevent flooding, NGOs were criticised on the grounds that they opposed the project without considering the difficulties of people affected by flooding. In 1994, Nevin Chidchob, MP, said ‘NGOs who opposed this project were unreasonable and they opposed it without considering the difficulties of people and the water shortage problem’ (The Nation, 6 August 1994). Meanwhile, the secretary to the interior minister said the activists and environmentalists were protesting because it was fashionable, without considering the hardship of the people whose houses had been flooded in rainy season (The Nation September 29, 1995). The Director General of RID, Rungreung Chulachart, said ‘I do not understand conservationists who protest against the dam. They think about only teak but no one thinks about victims of floods. No one talks about the economy of the country which has been destroyed by flooding’ (Kaosod, October 1, 1995).

Politicians such as Nevin Chidchob, MP, lambasted NGOs in the seminar on the KSTD project by saying that ‘NGOs who opposed the dam do not dare to show up. They have to protest against every development project. They are not sincere in helping villagers because they are subsidised by foreign organisations’ (The Nation, August 6, 1994 and Bangkok Post, August 8, 1994). Also, Secretary to Interior Minister, Veerakorn Khamprarob, said NGOs should stop creating problems for society. NGOs have been financially supported and they have become hugely rich (Thailand Times September 29, 1995). However, Minister of Science, Technology and Environment, Yingphan Manasikarn, (who handled the EIA) seemed to soften as he expressed that ‘the government understands the views of the environmentalists but it needs to do what it can satisfy all concerns and protect the interests of the majority’ (Bangkok Post September 30, 1995). He also said ‘there are NGOs who agree and disagree with the project. However, both sides should be aware of the public interest’ (Daily Manager, April 25, 1996).

Views of local government officers on NGOs

There are three government agencies located either in or near Tambon Sa-iab: Wat Don Chai Primary School, Sa-iab Public Health Centre and Song District Office. Due to their missions, these organisations work closely with villagers. According to interviews, it is found that heads of these government agencies view NGOs positively, in contrast with the views of national politicians and central government officials. They consider that NGOs play a very important role in the dam-protest. As the Director of Wat Don Chai Primary School pointed out, ‘NGOs can shape the movements to be conducted under the law’ (Director of Wat Don Chai Primary School interview). The Head’s Assistance of Song District expressed that ‘if no NGO support, villagers in Sa-iab are unable to manage the dam-protest as it is today. With NGOs’ support, the villagers have been strengthened, in particular with their capacities in negotiating with the state’ (Head’s Assistance of Song District interview). In addition, the Head of Sa-iab Public Health Centre said ‘if I did not live in Sa-iab, I would not realise how villagers gain benefits from NGOs’ support. NGOs give suggestions to villagers and villagers decide by themselves whether they agree with them or not. NGOs act as another source of information while the mass media give them the information from the government’ (Head of Sa-iab Public Health Centre interview).
The Head’s Assistance of Song District further pointed out that ‘voices of villagers affect the government because the government becomes aware of public opinion. Today people have rights according to the Constitution so the government should listen to people affected by its projects. In future, the government should listen to NGOs and allow them to have more participation’ (Head’s Assistance of Song District interview).

9.2 Pak Mun Dam (PMD) Project

9.2.1 The background of the PMD project

The Mun is the main river of the northeastern region of Thailand. Its basin covers 117,000 square kilometres, about 23 per cent of the entire country area. An average flow rate of the river is 24,000 million cubic metres per year, or 740 cubic metres per second. Prior to the existence of the Pak Mun Dam (PMD), the most of its water resources flowed to its confluence with the Mekhong River at Khong Chiam district of the Ubon Rachathani province. During the 1990s, the power requirement in the northeast grew by about 7.17% per annum, and was forecasted to rise by 6.69% annually between 2002 and 2006.

The PMD project was selected as the lowest cost option for peak power generation in the northeast. The PMD is located on the Mun River, 5.5 kilometres upstream from the Mekong River. The dam is an innovative run-of-the-river design, and is created for multi-purpose power generation and agriculture. The dam aimed to generate an average annual energy output of not less than 280 GWh. However, it was found that the dam could generate an average annual energy of up to 300 GWh, which was higher than expected. Apart from power generation, it is capable of serving an agriculture area of 64,000 acres.

The National Energy Office initiated the PMD project under the Chi-Mun Watershed development programme in the late 1960s. Its feasibility study was finalised in 1970 in cooperation with the French Government. Then, the project was transferred to the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) in 1979 and its environmental impact study was conducted in 1982. As the project was revised in 1985 to minimise its impact, the dam was relocated 1.5 kilometres further upstream. The dam was built with the operation water level of 108 metres above mean sea level (m.MSL), which was a four-metre decrease from the original design. This new design could save the famous rapids tourist attractions in the Mun River, and only 241 households would be relocated instead of 4,000 households (Electricity generating Authority of Thailand, 1996).

The dam was designed as a run-of-the-river model because it did not create a large reservoir and it had minimal impact to communities. The PMD is the first run-of-the-river dam in the Southeast Asia Region. It is 17 metres high, rising about 5 metres above the riverbanks. The dam will submerge an area of 60 square kilometres, most of which would normally have been submerged during the annual wet season floods. The dam has a peak holding capacity of 225 million cubic metres (The External Affairs Office of the WB’s East Asia and Pacific Region, 1993).

According to Pramote, a senior engineer of EGAT, the Thai Government took part in all decisions about the project without influence from international organisations, in particular, the World Bank who supported loan to the project. Pramote said ‘as I got involved with the project at the early stage, the World Bank considered and managed the project according to its criteria and regulation. The WB sometimes submitted suggestions to us, but we, as the
Thai Government, independently considered ways to manage the project’ (Pramote interview).

The Chartchai government approved the project in 1989. Construction began in June 1990, and was completed in November 1994 at a cost of 6,600 million baht, excluding the compensation paid to affected villagers. The cost of compensation was much greater than expected. A total of 499,932,111.80 baht was paid for loss of properties, public utilities improvements and occupational training. From 1995-2002, 6,176 households received compensation for fishery losses at a total of 489,540,000 baht. The final cost, including both construction and compensation, was 7,589.5 million baht (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, 1996).

The resettlement and compensation policy was progressively changed to accommodate the demands of the people. Samart, who handles the People Participation Unit of EGAT, and has been involved with the PMD case since the project started, explained that ‘the PMD was the first dam which offered options to affected villagers. The tri-partite committee consisting of EGAT staff, government officials and villagers was set up to consider the options. The compensation of this project was paid to people in a very short period, which was the fastest arrangement compared to the previous dam projects of EGAT. In addition, the compensation rate for land was higher than its market rate. For example, we paid 35,000 baht per rai while the market price was about 5,000-7,000 baht per rai’ (Samart interview). According to the mid-term review of the World Bank, the Thai Government has fully complied with World Bank standards for resettlement and compensation. The Thai Government moved quickly to take corrective action where implementation problems were identified (The External Affairs Office of the WB’s East Asia and Pacific Region, 1993).

The PMD project was selected by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) as one of the case studies representing the Southeast Asian Region. The WCD was an independent body with a two-year mandate, established in 1998 by the World Bank in cooperation with NGOs. Its main mission was to review the effectiveness of large dams in the world. WED conducted a number of studies on dam projects in both developed and developing countries. The results of these studies led to conclusions on the lesson-learned from past experience, and provided recommendations for large dam decision-making in future. The Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) was commissioned to lead the case study, especially to re-examine the premises of the underlying economics of the project, and to review the project’s economic justification. The study concluded that ‘it is evident that EGAT over-stated the case of project benefits and did no justice to the method of benefit-cost analysis in exaggerating the value of net gains in power production and in claiming irrigation benefits of invalid grounds’ (Thailand Development Research Institute, year unknown). The report of the WCD’s study emphasised that ‘if all the benefits and costs were adequately assessed, the study team believe it is unlikely that the project would have been built in the current context’ (World Commission on Dams, 2000:15).

Although EGAT facilitated the WCD team in conducting the study, EGAT criticised that WCD had bias in its studies, because most of its staff had dam protest backgrounds. The study avoided mentioning the positive aspect of the project. The data collection method was unreliable because most data came from protesters (EGAT, year known). However, the WCD’s study has been widely cited by NGOs, academics and protesters to argue with the government.
The government lacked baseline data about fish in the river before the dam’s construction, so it was difficult to analyse the problem of fishery impact. The idea of zoning the area for fishery loss compensation was wrong; it was not related to the real situation. The idea was very technical, which was difficult to communicate to villagers, so the villagers opposed it. EGAT did not object to the idea because EGAT is not specialised in fishery. ‘Setting up an agriculture cooperative was a good idea in the views of leading NGOs and the government, but it was not based on villagers’ agreement. This was a failure’ (Samart interview).

According to the WCD Report, the impact on fisheries was overlooked during the planning stage, because the PMD was a run-of-river type dam without a reservoir. No study ever predicted that fishery issues would become problematic. The report pointed out that ‘it has been realised by almost all of the stakeholders that planning, decision-making, implementation and mitigation were done with inadequate base-line information, especially on fisheries, the most serious and most controversial of the issues’ (World Commission on Dams, 2000:10). However, many academics and villagers had warned the government to carefully consider the environmental impact, in particular as regards fish. Fish experts and villagers living along both sides of the Mun River emphasised that many types of fish would die, because the dam would block migration of fish species from the Mekong into the Mun during the spawning season (The Nation, June 10, 1989; The Nation, December 12, 1991). Moreover, many rapids in the river were dynamited, which also affected the fish. According to Banthoen Temdee, a villager, the abundance of rapids in the Mun acts as ‘fish habitat’ because the rapid beds create thousands of holes for fish to live in’ (The Nation, March 20, 1992; The Nation, December 12, 1991). Walt Rainboth, a biology professor at the University of California, who has studied fish biodiversity in the Mekong River since the mid-1970s, recommended that the World Bank should suspend the project (The Nation, December 10, 1991). Apart from its impact on fish, experts also voiced their concerns about the risk of schistosomiasis, or blood fluke disease, after the dam’s construction (Bangkok Post, September 23, 1991; The Nation, December 10, 1991). To respond to public concern, a fish ladder was introduced, although experts warned that the ladder would not be effective for the hundreds of fish species involved (The Nation, December 12, 1991). According to the WCD report, ‘provision of a fish ladder was based on very little knowledge and experience’ (World Commission on Dam, 2000:110).

9.2.2 The history of the PMD movement

The PMD movement started in 1989 when the project was first approved. During the first period of protest, in 1989-93, protesters strongly demanded the project’s cancellation. Meanwhile, those in support of the project formed a coalition comprised of local politicians, businessmen, and government officers. In early 1989, groups of protesters were townspeople such as the Ubon Rachathani Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation Group, the Keang Sapue Protection Group, the Mun Watershed Youth Group, the Keang Sapue Seller Group, and the Ubon Student Club (Daily Matichon, April 29, 1989). Their main concerns were the destruction of tourist attractions, in particular, the famous Keang Sapue and Keang Ta Na rapids. As the mass demonstration voiced their concerns and demanded the project’s cancellation, the government revised the project. Then the project was redesigned to ensure that the water level would not rise above 106 m MSL (Mean Sea Level) during the dry season, from January to May and would retain a maximum level of 108m MSL for the rest of the year. This would reduce the number of those affected to only 300 families instead of 4,000 families and the famous Keang Sapue would be saved (Daily Matichon, April 23, 1989; The Nation, June 10, 1989; The Nation, June 29, 1989).
When a military coup took place, overthrowing the Chartchai’s civilian government in February 1991, EGAT took the opportunity to advance its project by starting its construction. Therefore, a group of villagers started protesting, and the national environmentalists and NGOs began to join. They demanded that the government temporarily suspend the dam’s construction. However, there was no response from the new government under the military regime. EGAT began to blast the rapids in Kaeng Tana National Park, and explained that the destruction of the rapids’ rock beds was essential to make way for an approximately eight-metre deep to sixty-metre wide outflow channel downstream from the dam (The Nation, March 20, 1992). Meanwhile, NGOs complained that EGAT had never informed the public about its plan that twelve rapids would be destroyed for dam construction (The Nation, February 24, 1992). EGAT announced the plan to build a fish ladder to solve the fishery problem.

After the May 1992 uprising, the elected government of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai took power. The PMD movement moved its focus to the fair compensation and resettlement issues. Fish became the controversial issue after the impact on fishery became evident when the dam started operation in 1994 (The Nation, May 23, 1994). Villagers in several districts said their income from fishing had decreased dramatically, from 100,000 Baht to 8,000-10,000 Baht a year since 1992 when the dam construction started (The Nation, July 18, 1994). According to the WCD, the fish catch directly upstream of the dam declined by 60-80% after the completion of the project. Its study found that ‘migratory and rapid dependent species were affected seriously as their migration route is blocked in the beginning of the rainy season, the head pond has inundated their spawning ground and the fish pass is not performing’ (World Commission on Dam, 2000:110).

In April 1994, about 300 villagers started a prolonged demonstration in front of Government House, requesting 35,000 Baht annually for three years in compensation for fishery loss. This amount was calculated from the lowest estimation of fishing income, 100 Baht a day, and the duration of three years referred to the period of dam construction. They also requested 10 rai plot of farmland for each family that had traditionally lived by fishing (Bangkok Post, April 26, 1994; Krungthep Dhurakit, April 25, 1994; Kaosod, April 25, 1994 and Kaosod November 2, 1994). Minister Savit, who oversaw EGAT, voiced his concern that ‘Pak Mun would create a new criterion for compensation for other development projects’ (The Nation, December 6, 1994).

In June 1994, the government announced that compensation would vary in accordance with the degree of impact. The area was divided into five zones ranging from that closest to the dam site, which was most affected. Thus, Ban Hua Heaw residents were entitled to the highest payment. The compensation ranged from 90,000 baht at Ban Hua Heaw to 8 baht at Kaeng Sapue. Villagers disagreed with the idea, as one of them expressed that ‘we want to get paid at the same rate as the villagers at Ban Hua Heaw. This is because the dam construction affected fish in the whole system, not only at Ban Hua Heaw’. Also, villagers always travel up and down the river in order to search for good spots (Bangkok Post, June 10, 1994; The Nation, June 30, 1994). To respond to villagers’ demands, EGAT stated that the fishing practices of villagers were different in type and quantity of fishing gears, and the distance from the dam. Therefore, it would not be fair if everyone received the same amount of compensation (Kaosod, October 24, 1994). In contrast, the chairman of the sub-committee on fishing loss compensation said that the argument that villagers did not agree with zoning was reasonable (The Nation, July 18, 1994). In the seminar organised by the Seub Nakasathien Foundation, both the chairman of EGAT and the study team admitted that, due to time constraints, research on fish impact was too unreliable to set a standard to determine
the rate of compensation (Siam Post, November 17, 1994; The Nation, November 25, 1994). Thongchareon illustrated how a survey on fishing was conducted that ‘they asked the villagers living along the river from the Keang Tana to the Keang Sapue to answer questions. More than 2,000 villagers did. Mostly, we were asked about fishing equipment. We were told that the information would be used to classify that we are considered as fishermen and either part-time or full-time fishermen and to determine the appropriate compensation. However, I question what standard they used to classify that’ (The Nation, May 23, 1994).

The result of negotiations announced in October 1994 was that 1,765 families would receive compensation of 10,000 Baht per family per year for three years and 377 families would receive in the range from 10,000 to 97,000 baht. However, the demonstrators did not accept the resolution because they insisted on a flat rate of compensation. They announced that they would continue their demonstration (Daily News, October 26, 1994). The issue whether villagers on a list were authentic fishermen was also controversial. Negotiations in November 1994 agreed to examine the number of 2,390 villagers on the list. Based on Vanida’s idea, the government allowed villagers to vouch for each other and for this to be confirmed with the signature of either Kamnan or the headman. If they could not get the confirmation from Kamnan or headman, ten villagers would be requested to confirm their status, and then the head of district would validate this (Kaosod, November 4, 1994). The compensation dispute was settled in February 1994 after a five-month demonstration and a series of meetings. Firstly, the total number of affected families from the dam was set at 3,227 people who would be paid after it had been proven by a committee whether they were authentic fishermen; secondly, the villagers would be paid 90,000 baht a family, of which 30,000 baht a family would be paid in cash at one time and 60,000 baht would be given at 20,000 baht a year for three years to agricultural cooperatives. The total amount of the fund to set up the cooperatives was 200 million Baht (The Nation, February 24, 1995; Matichon, March 19, 1995). It was the first time in Thailand that the government paid compensation for social loss to the affected people.

Since the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) was formed in the late 1995, the PMD movement has been run under the AOP. The first AOP demonstration occurred in the Banharn government, from 26 March to 22 April 1996. As a result, the cabinet resolution was declared to address the 47 grievances of the AOP. With no obvious implementation following the cabinet resolution, a 99-day demonstration organised by the AOP was staged in front of Government House, resulting in an agreement to provide land for 3,084 families affected by the PMD project. This agreement was cancelled by the following Chuan government based on the idea that compensation would not be issued for any completed projects. As a result, in March 1999, a prolonged demonstration by the AOP started again at the dam site. Demonstrators established a temporary village named Mae Mun Man Yeun, waiting for a response from the government. (Daily Manager, March 24, 1999; Krungthep Dhurakit, March 29, 1999)

In April 2000, the idea of opening the dam sluice gates was introduced (Kaosod, April 22, 2000). The World Commission on Dam’s report supported this demand. The Officers of EGAT responded that opening all of the dam’s water gates would cause flash flooding downriver, and would result in power shortages or even blackouts in a number of Northern provinces’ (The Nation, May 19, 2000; The Nation, May 16, 2000). However, the national committee charged with solving the PMD crisis argued that opening the dam’s spillways would not have an adverse impact on either fisheries or electricity generation in the northeast as claimed by EGAT. Therefore, the committee suggested opening the dam gates for four months, from May until end of August, to allow fish from the Khong River to spawn in the Mun River (Daily Manager, June 14, 2000; Bangkok Post, June 14, 2000). Instead of
following the committee suggestion, Interior Minister Banyat established another committee to conduct a study on the opening of spillways. A committee member thought that it seemed the government wanted to buy time (Bangkok Post, June 15, 2000).

When the newly appointed Thaksin Government came to power, the movement realised that this government needed their political support because the majority of MPs had a rural-based background. Then about 1,000 of affected villagers renewed a rally. As a result, on 17 April 2001, The Thaksin Shinawatra Cabinet ordered the EGAT to open all gates of PMD for a period of four months to study its effect on fish in the Mun River (Bangkok Post, June 17, 2001). After the opening of the dam gates ended in early October, 70 villagers led by the AOP marched from Ubon Rachathani province to Government House in Bangkok (about 560 km) to demand that the PMD sluice gates be kept open permanently (Bangkok Post, October 8, 2001). Somparn Khuneede, a NGO staff member, said the march aimed to disseminate the information about the hardship of people living above the PMD, whose livelihoods had been affected by the closing of the dam gates. Moreover, people affected by other dams including the Sirithorn, Fai Huana and Lam Khunchalu dams joined this activity (Bangkok Post, October 10, 2001).

On 11 December 2001, the Cabinet agreed to the proposal of increasing the period that the PMD sluice gates remained open to one year. This would enable the government’s working group to complete the research (The Nation, December 12, 2001). Two parallel research projects were conducted between June 2001 and July 2002 by a Ubon Rachathani University team, and by villagers with the support of the Chiang Mai-based NGOs and the Southeast Asia River Network (SEARIN). The research conducted by Ubon Rachathani University found that the opening of the sluice gates from June 2001 witnessed the return of 184 species of fish. The average household income increased from 3,045 baht per year in 2000 to 10,025 baht in 2001. However, this was much less than the income prior to the dam construction (in 1990), which was 25,742 baht per year (Bangkok Post, November 1, 2002). According to the results, Ubon Ratchathani University proposed three options: permanently closing the gates, periodically opening them for five or eight months, or permanently opening them. The research concluded clearly that opening the gates all year round would enhance and restore a healthy ecology and the livelihood of villagers. The Thaksin Cabinet agreed to open the dam gates for four months a year, from July to October. Then, more than 200 members of the AOP gathered outside Government House to renew their push for the permanent opening of the dam spillways (Bangkok Post, October 30, 2002). In June 2004, the Thaksin Cabinet agreed to re-schedule the period for opening the dam sluice gates from 1st July-31st October to 1st May-31st August. This agreement followed the result of a meeting of academics, villagers and government agencies concerned, showing that the migration of fish from Mekong River starts from May and fish migrate back to Mekong in August. Therefore, the period of opening should be changed in accordance with nature (Kaosod, June 9, 2004).

The final demonstration was staged in February 2006, and a new demand was submitted for 500 Baht daily per family during the period of the dam gates’ closure. Since the September 2006 coup, no mass demonstration has been held. This is because villagers considered that the Surayut government was an interim government after the September 2006 coup.

On June 12, 2007, the Surayut Cabinet declared the resolution to open the PMD’s gates according to the level of water, maintaining the water level at 106-108 msl. This means that the gates are closed almost permanently. This again led to criticism among academics and villagers. An academic, Kanokwan, a lecturer of Ubon University, expressed that 'it seemed that the government chose between the benefit for irrigation and fishery and finally they went
for irrigation. Unfortunately, this decision was not based on valid information and it was made without a study to support the decision (Daily Manager, July 19, 2007). The representatives of the PMD movement under the AOP submitted a petition to the government to revise the resolution. As a result, on July 17, 2007, the Surayut government agreed to set up a provincial committee, chaired by the Ubon Rachathani's governor, to consider the issue of opening the dam's gates, which should be based on the nature and facts of the area. Due to this resolution, the decision on the dam’s gate opening depends with this provincial committee (Khao Sod, July 18, 2007). The PMD movement under the AOP declared the statement condemning the Surayut government for forcing the affected villagers into more difficulties. Its decision has destroyed their livelihoods (The Nation, July 11, 2007).

9.2.3 Villager perspectives

9.2.3.1 Views of villagers on the government

The villagers considered that they had not been well informed about the project since it began. The villagers claimed that they had never been informed about the issues of the PMD project by the provincial authority, but they received news from the media instead (Bangkok Post, May 12, 1994). Sometimes, the information given to people was unclear. For example, a villagers’ leader, Thongchareon Sihatham, asked EGAT how they managed if the water level of the dam reservoir was higher than 108 metres. Then, EGAT answered that ‘it is a natural issue so we are not responsible for it' (Thai Rath, March 16, 1993).

As several counter-movements occurred and some led to violence, the villagers accused that those movements were managed by the government. However, the government denied that. For example, after a group of men raided and demolished more than 250 shelters of PMD opponents, The AOP accused EGAT of masterminding the demolition (Bangkok Post, December 17, 2002). Villagers used their experience, learned from nature, to argue with the government. Banthoen Temdee, a villager, explained that ‘there are thousands of holes in the rapids beds which become a fish habitat' (The Nation, March 20, 1992). As the government planned to provide compensation for loss of fishing by the zoning system, resulting in very different amounts of compensation, from 8 baht to 90,000 baht, the villagers argued that they should be provided with the same rate because the dam affected fish in the whole system (The Nation, June 30, 1994). Meanwhile, a villager, Noo, said ‘the compensation cannot substitute for what I have lost' (The Nation, November 2, 1994).

9.2.3.2 Views of villagers on NGOs

NGOs accessed the PMD case after its movement had been established. They have played a very important role in the movement. The villagers were very appreciative of their role. Most villagers accepted that they could not run the movement the same as today's form if they had received no NGOs’ assistance. Lek, a Kaosod newspaper reporter, expressed that ‘only NGOs assisted the villagers and they could strengthen the PMD movement. NGO assistance is the main factor that helps the movement be successful. If there were no NGO, villagers could not run the movement until today. The PMD movement becomes a case study for villagers who protest against the development project for example, the Sirinthorn dam case’ (Lek interview). The villagers’ leaders, such as Saweang, Sanit, Pha and Bunsu, expressed that ‘without NGO support, villagers could not organise the movements in the form of today’s movements’ (Saweang, Sanit, Bunsu, Jan and Pha interviews). However, Sudjai pointed out that, based on her experience, some NGOs were not sincere, because they distorted information which was provided by villagers (Sudjai interview).
9.2.4 NGOs’ perspective

9.2.4.1 Views of NGOs on villagers

NGOs realised that the impact on livelihoods was the main reason for protesting against the PMD project. Vanida, an NGO staff, clarified that ‘9,000 fishermen families could earn around 100,000 baht per year from fishery but nowadays they are unable to do as before. Although villagers have voiced their concerns since the project started, no one listened to them’ (Vanida interview). Also, NGOs realised the effects of the project on the way of life of local people: young people had to leave home to work in towns and cities, whereas they preferred to fish because they could live with their families. Vanida said this was the reason why villagers wanted the dam’s gates to be open. Meanwhile, the villagers realised that if they did not fight, they could not achieve their goal (Vanida interview).

Vanida thought that ‘mega projects are created by politicians, technologists and planners, not villagers. They do not think about villagers in the area where the projects are located because they think they do it for the majority. Therefore, people in the affected area have to sacrifice. This is why people stand up to fight. After a long period in the movement, outsiders thought the villagers have never enough demands but in fact, they have never received fairness’ (Vanida interview). In terms of human rights, NGOs viewed that villagers had rights to be concerned about their future (Bangkok Post, December 27, 1993). Villagers had their own wisdom, but they did not know how to use it. Thus, with NGO’s support, they could manage the movement (Air interview). For the future, Vanida expressed that ‘the villagers continue fighting but the number of villagers may not be very high’ (Vanida interview).

9.2.4.2 Views of NGOs on the government

The project started construction under a non-elected government after the coup. Vanida expressed that at that time, middle class people were more interested in politics than the dam protest. Therefore, the voices of villagers could not be heard. When the project started in 1989, only positive information was given to the villagers; for example, the project could provide jobs to local people and more water to the farming system. Moreover, when the villagers experienced the decrease in fish in the Mun River, the government said it was because of over-fishing, which was not true (Vanida interview).

Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai confirmed his government would not review the half-completed PMD project when he first came to power. Professor Saneh Jamarik, director of the Local Development Institute criticised that ‘the elected Government is obliged to re-examine the process of construction to see if it is correct’ (Bangkok Post, March 5, 1993 and The Sunday Post, March 7, 1993). After violence occurred, NGOs requested the government to end the PMD conflict. Somchai Homla-or of the Campaign for Popular Democracy mentioned his organisation joined with other NGOs because the villagers’ rights and freedom were violated. He viewed that the elected government should respond in a different way to a non-elected government (The Sunday Post, March 7, 1993). Chatchawan Thongdeelert, the chairman of the Coordinating Committee of NGOs for Rural Development in the North, said the violence reflected the Government’s insincerity in solving problems resulting from the dam project (Bangkok Post, December 24, 1993). Moreover, Suriyasai Katasila, secretary-general of the Campaign for Popular Democracy, blamed the Chuan government for using the media to smear the demonstrators by claiming that they had destroyed state property (The Nation, May 20, 2000).
As some villagers found that their houses were surrounded by water after the dam started operating, they asked EGAT to relocate them and pay compensation. They claimed that they could not live under such circumstances, and they could not bring their cattle to graze. Bamrung Khayotha from the Congress of Northeastern Farmers said ‘the government should change its thinking that these villagers are not affected because their houses were not flooded. We believe the government is simply buying time; the government should show sincerity and tackle the problems’ (Bangkok Post, December 27, 1993).

After the villagers and NGOs gained long experience in the movement, they learned that, although the Cabinet resolution regarding their requests was announced, it would be cancelled by the following government; when Chuan first came to power, his government agreed to cancel the Chavalit Cabinet resolution, so the villagers decided to stage a mass demonstration. Also, the Thaksin government did not follow the cabinet resolution of the previous government, although he announced that he would do so (Vanida interview). After PM Thaksin announced that he wished to talk to the villagers directly without the NGO’s support, Bamrung Kayotha, core leader of the northeastern farmers criticised PM Thaksin for attempting to ‘divide and rule’. The government believed that if no NGO assistance, it would be easier to lead farmers (Bangkok Post, December 26, 2000).

9.2.5 Views of government

9.2.5.1 Views of the central government on the PMD project

The leaders of the governments showed their stance in supporting the project. In the forum held in Ubon and aimed to provide information to the local people, the Interior Minister Chalerm strongly expressed that ‘the PMD will definitely be built and is expected to be completed in 1993.’ Minister Chalerm pointed out the most important reason for the construction was the pressing need for electricity in the country (Siamrath, June 20, 1989; The Nation, June 22, 1989). Due to the coup in early 1990, martial law was declared so political meetings of more than five people became illegal (The Nation, May 17, 1990). Prime Minister Anand, who came to power after the coup, said a study showed that the dam would not have much impact on the environment (Bangkok Post, September 11, 1991).

In 1992, when the elected government came to power, Prime Minister General Suchinda Kraprayoon confirmed that his government would maintain a policy of building the dam for the benefit of the agriculture sector. He said ‘what will you choose between keeping the environment untouched and leaving some people to starve? As the Prime Minister, people’s well-being must come first’ (The Nation, May 2, 1992).

In 1993, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai confirmed the government would not review the half-completed PMD. He said ‘speaking in terms of policy, nothing needs to be reviewed’ (The Sunday Post, March 7, 1993). For the PM’s Office Minister, Savit Bhodivihok, who was in charge of EGAT, said ‘the protests are acceptable in a democratic society as long as those who are protesting do not violate the law’ (Bangkok Post, March 4, 1993).

To respond to the protesters, Prime Minister Chuan said ‘we will make a decision based on principles, not threats from protesters’. In addition, Deputy Prime Minister Banyat said ‘do not use children and old people to put pressure on the government. It will change nothing in our eyes’ (The Nation, July 25, 2000). The Prime Minister Chuan insisted that the
government had to act according to the law. Police had to guard the demonstrators. Then many parties condemned the reaction of the government (Daily News, July 18, 2000).

As opponents demanded that the government give a public guarantee that the dam would not cause extensive flooding, depletion of fish species and the outbreak of a fluke worm disease, Abhisit Vejjajiva, a MP and government speaker, informed a press conference at the Government House that ‘the public guarantee is unnecessary but if some problems occur, the government will take responsibility’ (The Nation, March 10, 1993).

9.2.5.2 Views of central government on protester demands

Prime Minister Chuan emphasised that ‘the government did not follow demands which did not benefit the public’ (The Nation, March 9, 1993 and Bangkok Post, March 12, 1993). Also, he further said ‘officials should not be afraid of villagers’ demands, and should proceed with the case according to proper principles’ (The Nation, May 10, 1994). In response to the protesters’ demand to open the dam’s sluice gates, Prime Minister Chuan said whether the gates would be opened depended on decision of EGAT, while officers of EGAT explained that opening all of the dam’s water gates would cause flash flooding downriver, and it would result in power shortages or even blackouts in a number of north-eastern provinces’ (The Nation, May 19, 2000 and The Nation, May 16, 2000). However, the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD) argued that shutting down the power plant would not affect electricity consumption, because output in the North and elsewhere had already been minimal (Bangkok Post, May 20, 2000). Interior Minister Banyat said ‘the government needs to seek the opinion of concerned agencies. It may not be all right to respond to all of the committee’s recommendations. The government has to exercise caution in dealing with the problem’ (Bangkok Post, July 14, 2000). Moreover, Minister Savit, who oversaw EGAT, said villagers were proposing the new demand, the fisheries loss, which had never occurred before. He voiced his concern that that PMD project would create a new criterion for compensation for other development projects’ (Matichon, November 29, 1994 and The Nation, December 6, 1994).

9.2.5.3 Views of central government about villagers

Prime Minister Chuan said people had their rights to protest, but they must avoid causing damage such as blocking roads and destroying public property (The Nation, May 10, 1994). Meanwhile, Savit Bhodivihok, the Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office who was in charge of EGAT, viewed that only people living in the area had rights to express their concern (Bangkok Post, March 4, 1993). Prime Minister Chuan said to the representatives of students that ‘it is a pity that senior officers at EGAT have not given enough attention to this issue. I have told the Minister Savit several times to tell EGAT board members to take a closer look at the people affected’ (The Nation, October 23, 1994). A senator viewed that the problem of PMD movement was a national issue and should have been closely considered by the central government, not only managed at provincial authorities (Kaosod, May 23, 2000).

In 1993, although the protesting villager leaders and EGAT agreed to set up a tripartite committee, Prime Minister’s Office Minister, Savit Bhodivihok, refused to recognise the leaders of the protesters as villagers’ representatives. He insisted the representatives must be Kamnan or headmen (Bangkok Post, May 20, 1993). Tassanai Suwansil, head of the EGAT officers’ association, thought that the protesters had never had their demands met, which the government could not accept (Kruangthep Dhurakit, April 29, 1994).
Samart, a senior officer of EGAT, said ‘the PMD project has been strongly protested because: firstly, at that time there was no other large project; secondly, many governments came to power; the project experienced seven Prime Ministers until the construction ended; and thirdly, most of the young in communities left to go to the cities, and only the elderly lived in villages; they could spend time in long demonstrations’ (Samart interview). The PMD movements became a political issue. Both local and national politicians wanted to maintain their popularity in rural areas, so they possibly made decision favouring to villagers. For example, in case of the 6,000 families who received the fishery loss compensation, if politicians could maintain their popularity, it did not refer to only those 6,000 families but also their friends and relatives (Samart interview).

9.2.5.4 Views of central government on NGOs

The government expressed negative views about NGOs to the public. EGAT accused NGOs involved in the protest of manipulating villagers for their own ends. Tasnai Suwansilp, public relations chief for the PMD project, viewed that ‘in fact, the villagers did not want a dispute with EGAT, but they were encouraged by some people to view EGAT as a wicked organisation’. He named NGOs as AGOs, Anti-government organisations (The Nation, November 2, 1994). In addition, the government accused both villagers and NGOs as its way to discredit NGOs and way for counter-movement. In 1994 the press reported that ‘nearly a hundred rallies, large and small, had been staged by villagers over the past four years. The villagers’ persistence had prompted an effective smear campaign, in which villager leaders are portrayed as remnants of communism and environmental NGOs as “traitors” who receive funding from overseas to stop Thailand’s development’ (Bangkok Post, November 11, 1994). During the period of a prolonged demonstration at the dam site, establishing the Mae Mun Man Yeun village, demonstrators donated one baht a day to pay for water and electricity consumption. In this regard, Amnart, EGAT’s public relations director, alleged the demonstrators had to pay the demonstration’s organisers so that the money was given to the NGOs involved, netting them 30,000 baht a month (Bangkok Post, June 4, 2000). Some members in the government positively expressed their views about NGO assistance. For example, the Government Speaker, Abhisit Wajchasheva, pointed out that NGOs’ role could be more acceptable to the public and they could take part in policy decisions (Matichon, March 13, 1993).

In 2002, one year after Prime Minister Thaksin came to power, he apparently showed his stance by meeting opposing villagers without NGOs’ assistance to end the dispute. The prime minister said he wanted to talk to ‘real’ villagers suffering from the dam project, not their ‘brokers’ (Bangkok Post, December 10, 2002). His idea was strongly criticised by NGOs, academics and senators, saying that the government was attempting to use divide-and-rule tactics. The senators called on the government to be open-minded when reviewing the protesting villagers’ demands (The Nation, December 19, 2000). Suriyasai Takasila, of the Campaign for Popular Democracy, pointed out that Prime Minister Thaksin was trying to undermine the NGOs’ legitimacy by dividing them from villagers. He said ‘probably he thinks the villagers would be easy to handle without NGOs around. But that is a mistake’ (Bangkok Post, December 10, 2002). However, Prime Minister Thaksin insisted his intention and attacked NGOs by saying that ‘the NGOs working with the dam opponents are the same old faces. I know who supports them and I want to tell foreign countries that support them to shift their support to NGOs who work more creatively and efficiently’ (The Nation, December 17, 2002).
9.2.5.5 Views of local officials on villagers

The 72 villages involved in the PMD protest are located in three districts: Pibun Mungsaharn, Khong Chiam and Sirinthorn. The district offices are operational agencies working closely with villagers. As interviewees, all of three district offices’ representatives declared themselves neutral.

The districts’ representatives conceived that the opposing villagers were motivated by someone and by the advantages they could gain. The district assistant head of the Phibun Mungsaharn district said ‘if they can gain advantage, they will give support. If they lose, they will oppose’; the head district assistance of the Sirinthorn district said ‘the villagers were encouraged by someone and they received only one side of information. I was told by headmen that they protested because of advantage which they could gain if the government agreed with the request’. Like the view of the central government, the districts thought that the demands of the villagers had never been met. The assistant head of the Phibun Mungsaharn district expressed that ‘this group could gain much more than others. The government provided them 50,000 baht for compensation, which was very much for them. They claimed they could not continue their fishing profession, so the government offered them an alternative. In fact, we considered they were not authentic fishermen because they did fisheries only for a part-time job’. The head of the Khong Chiam district said ‘the villagers were hired to join the protest, for example, one reported to me that he received 500 baht a day’ (Head of Khong Chiam district; head assistance of Phibun Mungsaharn district and head assistance of Sirinthorn district interviews).

On the matter of the relationships between villages, the head of the Khong Chiam district said ‘people in the opposing villages in my district were divided into three groups: firstly, the AOP group; secondly, the group stays against the AOP; and thirdly, the neutral who considered what the district said, what the AOP group said and what the second group said. Then if the AOP did not apparently show their stance, the third group did not take any side’ (Head of the Khong Chiam district interview).

The assistant head of Sirinthorn district and the head of Khong Chiam district pointed out that the government did not solve the problem at the initial stage and did not give valid information to the public. Therefore, people did not know the benefits of the dam. Head of the Khong Chiam district said ‘today, this case became a political issue’ (head assistance of Sirinthorn district and head of Khong Chiam district interviews).

Some officials thought that the dam provided many benefits to people. For example, the assistant head of Phibun district said ‘the villagers can do fish farming as an alternative. Today, the villagers living along the Mun River have more income because there are more resources in the river such as fish and big prawn. The fishery department released millions of fry into the river. Also, people in Phibun can grow rice for two crops a year because the dam provides water during the dry season. They do not know this information’ (head assistance of Phibun Mungsaharn district interview).

On the matter of opening the dam’s gates, the head of the Khong Chiam district expressed that ‘as the government agreed to open the dam’s gates for four months a year from May to August, the district and most villagers thought that this should be changed. This is because it should depend on the situation of the water level and should be decided by a specialist’ (head of Khong Chiam district interview).
9.3 Conclusion

Both the KSTD and the PMD projects were initiated by the state with little public participation. The projects have different purposes: the PMD serves the needs of power demand in the northeast, and the KSTD is mainly an irrigation system. The PMD has been constructed, while the KSTD project is still undergoing the decision-making process today. Therefore, the impact of the PMD project is evident, while the impact of the KSTD project is hypothesised. Governments raised the KSTD project when the northern area faced floods in the rainy season and drought problems in the dry season; they said that the dam would solve these problems. The protests against these projects began in 1989. For the KSTD movement, the main arguments raised by protesters included the forest issue and the number of people affected. Also, academics and NGOs criticised the idea of the government and its supporters claiming that the dam could prevent flooding in the upper north. For the PMD movement, the affected villagers raised the fishery loss to argue with the government, and requested that the dam’s gates be opened. The PMD movement relied on radical collective actions, while the KSTD movement did not. The PMD ran several mass demonstrations and rallies in the Ubon Rachathani province and Bangkok. By joining the Assembly of the Poor, they could mobilise a large number of participants and could run prolonged demonstrations. Therefore, the PMD actors seriously experienced repression from the state, which sometimes led to confrontation and clashes with police. In contrast, the KSTD movement has never had that experience. The villagers in both cases were appreciative of NGO assistance, while the governments always viewed NGOs negatively. NGOs were accused that they were supported by foreign funds to destroy the country. The KSTD movement received positive views from local and provincial government officers, but the PMD movement did not.

The data and information in this chapter is employed for the analysis in the next two chapters, based on the resource mobilisation and the political opportunity approaches. The views of different parties are used to analyse the political opportunities of the movements.
Chapter 10

Social Movement Organisations

This chapter attempts to answer how the movements have been organised. The analysis mainly employs the resource mobilisation theory. In the first part of this chapter, the social movement organisations (SMOs) of both case studies will be investigated with the emphasis on structure, form, and aim of organisations. Then the analysis moves to focus on resource mobilisation of the organisations and their strategies.

The backgrounds of the KSTD and the PMD are different; the KSTD is located in the mountainous area in the north, and the PMD is located in the Mun watershed in the northeast. People in the PMD case are fishermen and farmers but the KSTD’s people are farmers. In the past, people living in the KSTD area relied on logging. The PMD case covers the area of seventy-two villages in three districts while the KSTD movement has been involved with people in only four villages in one sub-district, Tambon Sa-iab. This is because the PMD has actually been built, and its impact on fishery has affected a large number of people, although it was predicted that only a small number of families would be affected due to displacement; the KSTD is still in the decision making process, and it is projected that the four villages in the Sa-iab sub-district will be submerged. The villagers in the four villages have a consensus to protest against the project, so all of them have joined in the KSTD movement. For the PMD case, not every villager has joined the movement. Both the KSTD and the PMD movements emerged at the same time, in 1989, and they have continued up to the present day. Nowadays there are 72 villages involved in the PMD movements. Those villages are under three districts: Phibun Mungsahn, Khong Chiam and Sirinthorn. In each village, not every villager joins the movements. Therefore, villagers mentioned in the PMD case refer only to people opposing the PMD project, of which the total is about 3,000-4,000 (Bunmee interview).

The social movement organisations (SMOs) of the KSTD and the PMD cases are analysed next, starting from their emergence, structure and form of organisations. Resource mobilisation of organisations and their strategies are then analysed.

10.1 Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) of KSTD and PMD movements

10.1.1 The emergence of SMOs

It has been found that villagers who have been affected, not NGOs, created the movements of both case studies. This finding is the same as previous studies about social movements in Thailand. The actors established their organisations in the form of ‘committees’. The SMO of the KSTD was organised from the first stage because it was suggested by NGOs, and the leaders of villages participated; it was well-organised from the start. By contrast, the PMD campaign was started by a group of villagers who disagreed with the project, not by the community leaders, and without NGO support. Later, when the impact of the PMD project on the environment became apparent and was shown to affect their livelihood, more people joined the protest. The opposing group then gradually organised and developed. After these actors were supported by NGOs, they set up the organiser group in the form of a committee. Therefore, the PMD movement developed through stages distinguished by Della Porta and Diani (2002). The PMD-SMO emerged after the movement developed through the unorganised stage and the popular excitement stage, in which the aims of actions were clearly
defined. However, today the SMO of PMD has developed to the formalisation stage, but it has not developed to the institutionalisation stage. Regarding the KSTD case, its SMO developed shortly after the movement emerged. The movements of KSTD and PMD experienced differences in development because they acted under different conditions. First, the projects are at different stages: the KSTD project is still in the decision-making process, but the decision of the PMD project was made and has been implemented. Second, the KSTD movement has been supported by NGOs from the first stage, but the NGOs accessed the PMD case only after the movement started. Third, the leaders of the community, including Kamnan and Headmen who work for the government, initiated the KSTD movement. No Kamnan and Headman took part in the PMD movement during its first stage because they supported the PMD project.

The SMOs emphasised the redress of their grievances as their first priority. Even though actors created the idea of natural resource conservation, it was employed as their means, not as the end of the movements. Therefore, the aims of both cases are concerned with immediate goal and policy change, not structural change.

10.1.2 Structure of the SMOs of the KSTD and PMD movements (Figures 10.1 and 10.2)

The SMOs of both cases have the same structure, which can be distinguished into two main levels.

10.1.2.1 The village-level

Each village has its own SMO comprising of the head of the SMO and its members selected by villagers opposing the dam. Each Village-SMO of the PMD movement consists of five members selected by villagers opposing the dam in each village, while each Village-SMO of the KSTD movement relies on the Village Committee formed under the regulation of the village administration of the government. There are seventy-two Village-SMOs in the PMD movement and four Village-SMOs in the KSTD movement. Each of Village-SMOs has its own authorised decision-making. Each Village-SMO is responsible for: making decisions in its own village, participated in by members in that village; coordinating with other village-SMOs and the PMD-SMO or KSTD-SMO; mobilising resources in its own village.
Figure 10.1: Structure of KSTD-SMO.
Alliances and Elites

Vanida (Bangkok-Based)

Assembly of the Poor (AOP)

Sompan (Senior Pee Liang) and Volunteers (Pee Liang)

PMD Committee (PMD-SMO)

Village Committee 1 (V-SMO1)

Village Committee 2 (V-SMO2)

Village Committee …. (V-SMO…)

Village Committee 72 (V-SMO72)

Opposing Villagers in Village 1

Opposing Villagers in Village 2

Opposing Villagers in Village …

Opposing Villagers in Village 72

*Figure 10.2: Structure of PMD-SMO.*
Representatives of each village-SMO sit in the upper-village level called the PMD-SMO and KSTD-SMO. These SMOs are responsible for: coordinating with NGOs, heads of village-SMOs and outsiders; creating movement strategies; and making initial decisions (and then transferring them to Village-SMOs for consideration) and final decisions (after decisions from all Village-SMOs have been made).

(1) KSTD-SMO

The KSTD-SMO, known as the KSTD Protest Committee, comprises 105 members from the four villages. It is chaired by U-dom Srikampa. The leaders of the committee, including the chairman and vice-chairman, have been carefully selected from people who have not held any government posts, such as headman and Kamnan. Apart from their abilities, leaders in movements have been selected according to family situation. (In the case of U-dom, it was considered that he was relieved of family responsibilities because his children had grown up.)

(2) PMD-SMO

The PMD-SMO is comprised of heads of Village-SMOs, who are called 'Pho Khrua Yai', which means 'big chef'. To select the committee, villagers considered people who could be a voice for them; people who were loyal and altruistic. Kammai, a leader, said 'we selected ones who could be trusted; ones who were able to discuss with others and to convey issues and messages to villagers' (Kammai and Bunnim interviews).

(3) Participants

Only people who have been directly affected by the projects get involved with SMOs. Outsiders participate in the movements only as supporters or allies. Roles of NGOs and villagers are clearly identified. NGOs act as advisors to SMOs. For the PMD, NGOs play their roles as Pee Laing and advisor. For villagers, Pee Liang refers to advisors working in the area. There are five Pee Laings: Somparn, Bunnim, Air, Oon, and Job. Somparn is a senior Pee Laing who sometimes works with other networks in the region. Advisor refers to Vanida who is based in Bangkok. Mainly, she works closely with Pee Laing in the area; she also cooperates with other organisations and networks in Bangkok. For the KSTD, Kamnan Chum and NGO staff act as advisors. In practice, advisors do not join in the KSTD-SMO's meetings. However, the chairman consults with them regularly, in particular before a meeting is held (U-dom interview).

Moreover, both PMD-SMO and KSTD-SMO are members of the Assembly of the Poor (AOP), in order to increase their capacity to negotiate with the state and to mobilise resources. Occasionally, representatives of the PMD and KSTD SMOs join the AOP meetings.

It could be said that the structure of both SMOs is informal, decentralised and takes the form of loose commitment. Even though they are informal organisations, they are well constructed with clearly identified roles and functions. People participating in the movements are loosely committed, varying from high to low commitment. They can either enter or withdraw from the movements at anytime. It has been found that the degree of commitment from participants who play their role as leaders are higher than those who are not leaders.
The reasons why they chose this form of SMOs are possibly as follows.

(1) The campaigners wanted to organise in the form of collective leadership, not single leadership, as in the past many leaders in political movements were attacked in various ways: some were threatened and some of them were assassinated. Therefore, all leaders always referred to autonomous agreements of the SMOs, not any specific ones.

(2) They did not adopt the formal form of organisation because they did not want to be concerned with the legal commitment with the regulations of the state. Formal organisations are part of the institutional realm of the state; for example, in Thailand private formal organisations have to be registered with the authorities in the name of ‘foundation’ or ‘association’. They have to annually submit their activities and financial reports to that authority. According to Vanida, an advisor of PMD and the Assembly of the Poor (AOP), she emphasised that if the AOP becomes a formal organisation, it needs more administrative work, such as official reports and financial accounts, which villagers are unable to manage (Vanida interview).

(3) The acceptance of this organisational form stemmed from the fact that Thai society is a hierarchical society.

10.1.3 The decision-making process

The decision-making processes of both KSTD and PMD SMOs rely on villagers. NGOs do not take part in decision-making. Meetings of the KSTD-SMO mainly consider ways to respond to the government movement about the KSTD project. For example, during national election campaigns, such as the national election in 1999, villagers realised that local politicians who fully supported the KSTD project would raise the project. The committee discussed plans, strategies and methods to react to the situation (Kamnan Chum interview). All decisions were made based on democratic principles. All issues regarding the movements were seriously discussed in the SMOs’ meetings, and their agreements were brought to consultations with villagers opposing the dam; in particular, the decisions on mass demonstrations and rallies. Voting by raising a hand was commonly used for a final decision. Even though NGOs did not take part in decision-making, their suggestions and information fed to the SMOs had a strong influence on its decisions. The initial decision would be made by the PMD-SMO or KSTD-SMO. Then it was considered by each Village-SMOs, whether the village’s members agreed or not. Then the results would be brought back to the PMD and KSTD SMOs for further actions. Saweang, a member of a Village-SMO explained ‘we discussed how we could solve the problem and then we brought our proposed solution to discuss it with other villages. If a common agreement of villagers in a village was needed, a villager meeting would be called’.

For the PMD movement, if agreement of all villagers was needed, for example, about the demands to be submitted to the government, a meeting of the 72 villages would be called. This meeting is called a ‘big meeting of Pak Mun’. In this regard, each village arranged its own meeting and its result was presented in the ‘big meeting’ (Bunmee interview).

10.1.4 Assembly of the Poor (AOP)

Both cases are members of the AOP. The PMD movement is a major case of the AOP, under which the PMD movement has conducted its activities since December 1995, when the AOP was formed. Vanida, an advisor of the AOP, emphasised that ‘today, not only the Pak Mun villagers fight for their grievance but also for the AOP’ (Vanida interview). The heads of
grievance cases (*Pho Krua Yai*) meet occasionally. Only ten representatives selected from heads of 72 Village-SMOs attended the AOP national meeting in 2005 (Bunmee interview).

10.1.5 Communication within SMOs

Ways of communication between SMOs and actors are clearly identified, as shown in Figures 10.1 and 10.2: NGOs contact the upper-village level, PMD-SMO and KSTD-SMO, then these SMOs communicate with the Village-SMOs and the Village-SMOs transfer the information to villagers opposing the dam in their own villages. Sudjai, a member of the PMD, pointed out that person-to-person communication, especially in the community, is important. She said ‘we always have informal talks among villagers in my village. After I attended meetings and demonstrations in Bangkok, I talked to the villagers about their results’ (Sudjai interview).

10.1.6 Role of the broadcasting tower in the KSTD case

Like most communities in rural areas of Thailand, Sa-iab sub-district or Tambon Sa-iab has a broadcasting tower (*ho kra jai khao*) providing news and information to people living in the community. The facilities include amplifiers, which are installed on high towers. Mostly, community broadcast towers are located in temples or headmen’s houses. Tambon Sa-iab’s broadcast tower is located in the temple, Wat Don Chai, which is the centre of the community. The KSTD protesters could utilise the broadcasting tower for their movements. In contrast, the PMD movement did not receive that opportunity because their communities comprised of those who support and those who oppose the project. Therefore Sa-iab’s broadcast tower plays a very important role in the dam protest, as it is a way to communicate with all villagers and leaders, including announcements for gatherings and meetings, reporting the situation of the dam protest, and disseminating information and news. Speakers are leaders in the community such as headmen and the head of temple (a Buddhist monk), depending on availability. A Buddhist monk, who is a Head of Wat Don Chai, said about his contribution to the community, ‘I announce the call for a gathering of villagers. I also encourage people to join together, sometimes both morning and evening’ (Head of Wat Don Chai interview).

In the case of the PMD movement, some villages could not use broadcasts because the headmen did not allow it. Therefore the village committees and Pee Liang contacted them in person, family by family (Bunmee, Air, Saweang, Sanit and Bunsu interviews). Jan explained ‘when we planned to act, I was informed by Pee Laing. Then I discussed with committee members and disseminated this information to opposing villagers in my village. We asked each family whether they could join or not’ (Jan interview).

10.1.7 The role of community radio in the PMD case

The PMD movement operates a community radio station, which covers the opposing 72 villages. The station is based at the Pak Mun Cooperative Centre and it broadcasts three days a week, Friday, Saturday and Sunday, without commercial advertisements. The community radio was initiated by the villagers aiming to provide knowledge and information to communities. It is an important channel to communicate with the protesters by broadcasting news and information about the movement including meeting invitations and the progress of the movement. For instance, the demonstration schedules were announced through the radio, such as the demonstration in Bangkok arranged in February 2006. Its main programmes, presented by villagers and Pee Liang, are as follows: the way of life in the community,
music, Buddhist religion and law for villagers. Also a programme is presented by the Tambon
Council to publicise the government policy. Bunmee said 'the villagers always listen to the
radio because they sometimes do not meet Pee Liang. Therefore it becomes a major channel
to communicate with villagers' (Bunmee and Air interviews).

10.2 Resource mobilisation

10.2.1 Types and sources of resources

Resource mobilisation is a major task of SMOs, according to the resource mobilisation
theory. Even though scholars have different ideas to distinguish types of resources, they
include human, money, knowledge, service means and strategies. To distinguish types of
resources of both case studies, the model proposed by Cress and Snow (1996), who studied
the resource mobilisation of the poor in the United States, appears to fit to the case studies.
They distinguish the mobilising resources for the poor into four categories: moral resources,
material, information and human, which are shown in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1 Types and sources of mobilising resources of the PMD and the KSTD movements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Resources</th>
<th>Sources of Resources PMD movement</th>
<th>Sources of Resources KSTD movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Moral resource provided by external organisations or institutes relevant to the aims of movements;</td>
<td>• NGOs, both domestic and foreign • NGO led by Vanida • Academics from educational institutes • Student activist organisations</td>
<td>• NGOs, both domestic and foreign • WFT (NGO) • Academics from educational institutes • Primary School located in Sa-ib • Student activist organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Material, includes tangible resources</td>
<td>• Office space – Pak Mun Agricultural Cooperative Office, houses of members • Meeting space - Pak Mun Agricultural Cooperative Office and houses of members • Money – within SMOs, • Community radio run by SMOs • Broadcast towers in some villages • Transport – trains /bus, using their own money • Food for prolonged demonstrations – within SMOs and some donations</td>
<td>• Office space and meeting space – the office of Tambon Sa-ib cooperation, houses of members and temple • Broadcast towers located in the Sa-ib Temple • Money – within SMOs by setting up funds • Transport – within SMOs and trains and bus • Food for prolonged demonstrations – within SMOs and neighbour donations • Sa-ib Temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Information or knowledge</td>
<td>• Strategic support – study tours, academics, NGOs, research • Technical support – academics, NGOs, participants’ experiences • Referral – NGOs</td>
<td>• Strategic support – study tours, academics, NGOs, research • Technical support – academics, NGOs, participants’ experiences • Referral – NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.2.1.1 Moral resources

In terms of sympathetic support, both cases have received massive support from various organisations during almost twenty years. Many organisations, including domestic and foreign NGOs, universities and student activists’ organisations voiced their concerns through the mass media on various aspects of the projects; they submitted statements and requests to the governments; they also voiced their concerns on behalf of affected villagers; they organised press conferences to provide information and concerns about the negative impacts of projects; they criticised the government policy regarding the projects. By contrast, the PMD and KSTD movements received little solidaristic support; no organisation apparently participated in collective action of both movements. Apparently, only student activists and some domestic NGOs participated in collective action. However, when the collective actions — in particular, mass demonstrations — were organised, those supporting NGOs assisted the movements by coordinating with people in the government, resulting in negotiations between movements’ representatives and the government. This role of NGOs was not shown to the public.

The KSTD case received moral support from organisations located in the area, such as the government primary school, the temple, the Sa-iab sub-district public health and the District Office, because the officials have a positive attitude to the KSTD movement. By contrast, the PMD movement did not receive moral support from any organisation in the area because government officials have negative attitudes to the PMD protesters.

10.2.1.2 Material

As shown in table 10.1, most material could be mobilised from facilities in the area. Due to repression from the state, money has been mainly mobilised from local SMOs.
10.2.1.3 Knowledge and information

(1) Strategic support

Study tours (to discuss with people affected by previous dam projects) were arranged as a major strategy of the KSTD movement, aimed at gaining information about the dams' impact on people's livelihood. Unfortunately, the KSTD villagers learned only about negative impacts upon the livelihood of people affected by the dam constructions. The representatives from both cases were sometimes invited to attend workshops and seminars arranged by NGOs, universities and even international organisations. Based on the knowledge they gained, they could explain their rationale as to why they opposed the projects, and they could argue with the government. In addition, their political idea also gradually developed.

Research conducted by experts became the information that supports SMOs' goals in both movements. The results of research on non-timber products in Mae Yom National Park, the location of the KSTD project, show the economic value of ecological systems in the forest, and support the argument of the movement that the forest should be preserved. Meanwhile, researches regarding the PMD project conducted by the World Commission on Dams and Ubon Rachathani University could support the movement, such as the impact on fishery and the opening of the dam's gates. (The World Commission on Dams studied the effectiveness of large dams in the world, and the PMD project was one of its case studies. Due to the Thaksin Government agreement, the Ubon Rachathani University studied the effects of the opening of the dam's gates.) Moreover, the villagers of both movements conducted their own research concerning the biodiversity in their areas: diversity of fish in the PMD area, and the diversity of plants and animals in the KSTD area.

(2) Technical support

By participating in the movements for a number of years, the affected villagers could develop their capacities in various aspects including: understanding about law and civil rights; skills in conducting meetings and public speaking; and skills of negotiation and problem analysis. Moreover, as governments had a negative view of NGOs' involvement, villagers needed to develop their capacities to cover the tasks of organisation. NGOs had to play their role only as supporters to the public and let villagers run movements.

Not all villagers in the PMD area have opposed and joined the movement, while all villagers in the four villages of the KSTD area have supported the movement. Therefore, the leaders of PMD-SMOs had to learn the skills of presenting arguments to opponents and sceptics in their own villages, whereas campaigners against the KSTD did not. As a result, campaigners against the PMD may become more generally politically skilful than KSTD leaders.

(3) Referral

NGOs play very significant roles in both cases in mobilising resources from outside the movements. (The role of NGOs is illustrated in the next chapter.)

(4) Human

Human resources are the main concern of both the PMD and KSTD movements, especially, the number of people joining the mass demonstrations. The movements considered human resources in their SMOs as their first priority. They did not emphasise motivating bystander
publics to take part in the movements. Apart from their SMOs, the movements could mobilise people from among other AOP members and student activists to join their activities.

10.2.2 Resource mobilisation and its constraints

10.2.2.1 Human resources

Human resource mobilisation is a major task of Village-SMOs. In principle, people join dam-protest activities on a voluntary basis. Every village-SMO aimed to mobilise people in its own village to take part in the activities because of the view from the state, emphasising that only the affected people should participate in the protest. Both the KSTD and PMD movements were concerned with the number of people who joined the mass demonstrations and rallies. Mostly, they could not mobilise as many people as expected.

The KSTD case experienced less difficulty in mobilising people than the PMD. The KSTD campaigners could make announcements through *Ho Kra Jai Kao*, or broadcasting tower, and could mobilise people from their neighbouring villages through the cooperation of headmen. U-dom clarified that ‘if we go to district or province, we ask headmen to recruit people to join us because we want a large number of people. People in the town of Phrae have never joined with us and we have never asked them to join. We do not ask for food or money as we can manage ourselves’. However, in case of joining activities in Bangkok, only people in four villages were mobilised.

The KSTD movement also well organised people to participate in mass demonstrations. Villagers were assigned to handle various responsibilities needed; for example, guards, transportation and producing campaign banners. Heads of villages collected names of people willing to join in, and assigned them their responsibilities. In case of participating in prolonged demonstrations in Bangkok, people were organised in groups to take turns (Pisanu, Oun and Headman assistance, Ban Don Kaew interviews). In addition, the area of the KSTD movement was divided into different zones, and the head of each zone handled people management. In demonstrations, Sagnuan said ‘myself, as head of zone, I have to control our group: I have the list of names of our group; what task we have to do; keep our members under control; and transfer any one who is sick to hospital or going home’ (Sagnaun interview).

To attend activities in Bangkok for a long period, villagers had to manage their families; for example, husband and wife took turns, and they managed their farms before leaving. Each Village-SMO in the PMD movement independently managed ways to recruit people to join collective actions such as demonstrations. Villagers in some villages were arranged in groups to take turns; for example, 15-20 people in each group took turns every ten days, while in villages with a low number of opposing villagers, all of them participated throughout the demonstration.

The PMD case has experienced difficulties in mobilising people since the initial period of the movement. At the initial stage, as people realised the impact of the dam upon their livelihoods, they started discussing the dam issue with their neighbours in the same village and then expanded to other affected villages. For example, Reon started discussing the dam in her village by raising the Sirinthorn dam as a case study. Later, she discussed it with people in the Phibun Muangsahan district. She recruited two to three representatives from each of the 13 villages to deliver a petition to Bangkok with the assistance of a MP. In Bangkok, she talked with lecturers at Thammasart University. Later, students visited the area.
(1) Number of participants

The number of people taking part in activities is one of the main concerns of SMOs. The AOP played a major role in pooling human resource. By joining the AOP, SMOs of both cases could mobilise more people to join in movement activities, especially mass demonstrations, because the AOP consists of various groups of people who have been affected by different development projects and policies of the state. In making their commitment to the AOP, all of its members have to mobilise people to join in mass demonstrations. The AOP identified the number of people from each movement to participate in a mass demonstration but mostly the movement could not reach the target. For example, for the demonstration in February 2006, the PMD case was expected to recruit 1,000 people, but they could mobilise only 300 people. Sanit and Bunsu, leaders of the PMD-SMO expressed their concern that ‘we discussed how we could mobilise people from each village. However, as we relied on participation on a voluntary basis, we could not reach the targeting number. There are about 8,000 people in the list of the PMD case but only a small number participates in the movement. The AOP meeting expressed its concern how we could reach our goal under these circumstances. The villagers could not afford it, but we have tried to encourage them to join’ (Sanit and Bunsu interviews).

The movements themselves created various ways to manage the number of participants. For the PMD case, NGO staff played a major role in assisting SMOs to mobilise people by firstly discussing with committees and villagers; later the conclusions were brought to Pee Laing and NGO staff to discuss how to encourage people to participate, such as by organising forums in villages, or talking in person. Somparn, an NGO staff member, explained that ‘if we agree to organise forum in villages, we have to evaluate the current situation in each village such as feeling of people’ (Somparn interview). If activities lasted a long time, they would arrange for people to take turns; for example, ten to twenty people in one group took turns every ten to fifteen days; also the wife and husband in some families took turns. In addition, if possible, collective action, especially mass demonstrations, would be arranged in summer, when demonstrators are free from farming.

(2) Constraints on mobilising human resources

It could be said that repression from the state was the main constraint for human mobilisation because both the KSTD and PMD movements were confronted with various methods of repression. During the first period of the movements, they were commonly accused of being communists. Reon, a former leader of the PMD movement, explained that ‘I was threatened by government officers including the police, claiming that I was a communist and that I incited people. At that time, the area was under martial law so gatherings of more than five people were prohibited. We met the police at every house where meetings were planned because Kamnan and headmen kept informing them. After that, we planned to hold meetings in the rice-fields’ (Reon interview). Apart from being accused of being communists, the protesters faced counter-demonstrations and distorted information. They were blocked and delayed from joining activities at police at checkpoints. However, the PMD movement experienced the counter-movement more seriously than in the KSTD case. It sometimes led to confrontation and violent incidents, while the KSTD movement has never been faced with violence. In addition, the villagers opposing the PMD project claimed that the Kamnan and headmen played a key role in the counter-movement. By contrast, the Kamnan and headmen of the KSTD area joined the movement as its leaders. The free riding problem also emerged in the PMD area, but it did not appear in the KSTD area. Moreover, the relationships between
villagers in some of the seventy-two villages of the PMD were divided into different sides, while no such split of relationships obviously appeared in the KSTD villages.

All methods of repression strongly influenced resource mobilisation of both cases as follows.
(1) As the state claimed that only directly affected people should participate in protests against development projects, especially in collective action, the SMOs of both movements did not aim to mobilise bystander publics such as townspeople to take part in such activities, but focused only upon members of their SMOs.
(2) The politicians and government officials claimed through the mass media that protesters were hired to participate in sit-in demonstrations. Therefore, the SMOs agreed to ask participants to cover all their own expenses, resulting in lower numbers of people participating because they could not afford to do so.

Moreover, the PMD case experienced more difficulties in mobilising resources than in the KSTD case, due to the following reasons.
(1) The PMD covers the area of seventy-two villages in three districts, but the KSTD covers only four villages. The KSTD campaigners found it easier to communicate with members than the PMD campaigners do.
(2) Some PMD protesters felt disillusioned after they had struggled against the project for many years but could not reach their goal. As a result, some gave up their participation. Vanida pointed out that as the PMD movement has been running since 1989, most of the first generation taking part in the movement withdrew because of illness or death. Nowadays, the younger generations are joining but most of these people are middle aged or late forties. Most of the people, who are about 20-30 years old, have left the villages to work or to study in cities (Vanida interview). Banyat, a leader, said ‘many protesters gave up because they became disillusioned after involving over the long period. However, they still disagree with the project. Today, the number of protesters is lower than in the past’ (Sanit and Bunsu interviews).
(3) As villagers in the PMD no longer rely on fishing for their main income, young people have to move to towns and cities to work. Therefore, SMOs face more difficulties in mobilising the younger generations to participate in the movement.
(4) The relationships in the PMD communities are split into different sides: mainly those supporting the dam (or the government side – principally the Kamnan and headmen) and those opposing the dam. This division affects the mobilisation of people to participate in activities, in particular the mass demonstrations, because supporters of the dam, Kamnan and headmen, might threaten the villagers. Some protesters have been threatened by members of their own communities. Sometimes, they were threatened by leaflets whose sources were unknown, which were distributed in communities discouraging villagers from participating in the movement activities. Moreover, the PMD movement faced the free-riding problem created by the government. Therefore, NGO and SMO leaders have to put more effort into encouraging villagers to participate.
(5) The government officers in the KSTD area have positive attitudes to the protesters, while the government officers in the PMD area have negative attitudes. The KSTD movement could ask them for cooperation in such ways as asking for assistance to prepare official letters and organising activities for children in the villages.
The protesters of both cases came to rely on their own resources for all expenses because the villagers were previously accused of being hired when they accepted financial donations from outsiders. This created more difficulties for them in terms of financial mobilisation. People in the KSTD area collected money to set up a fund for the movement to cover all the expenses of their activities, such as travel costs for mass demonstrations. On the other hand, SMOs in the PMD case had no funding, so the villagers had to cover all expenses by themselves whenever they joined activities. They sometimes could not afford to do so, resulting in a lower number of people taking part in the mass demonstrations. It is usually difficult to engage protesters in financial mobilisation but, due to repression from the state, this is made even more difficult. Occasionally, NGOs assisted them to ask for financial donations if they needed. For example, Hannarong as advisor for KSTD-SMO assisted them by asking for donations from NGOs. Hannarong explained ‘firstly I asked them if they had enough money. If not, I asked some NGOs for voluntary donations, for example this NGO gave 2,000 baht and another gave 3,000 baht. The names of donors were not disclosed’ (Hannarong interview).

However, apart from mobilising resources available in their communities, the KSTD villagers could ask for donations, such as food and even money from their neighbouring villages and the temple located in the communities (Head of temple Wat Don Chai, Seng, Pisau and Udom interviews). Meanwhile, for the PMD, income from accommodation and meals served to visitors to the Pak Mun Cooperative Centre was used to support the representatives’ expenses, but not mass demonstrations (Somporn interview). In addition, during prolonged demonstrations either in Bangkok or Ubon province, the protesters raised funds to support their activities. For example, they made handicrafts such as fishing nets, bamboo containers, and so on, and sold them in villages and towns to support the demonstration at the dam site (Matichon, December 14, 1994).

**Funds of the KSTD case**

To set up a fund, one hundred baht (approximately £1.5) is collected from each house in the four villages of the KSTD movement. This fund is managed by the KSTD-SMO. The fund is used for all activities concerning the movement, such as travel costs, food and annual activities – Seub Cha Ta Mae Mun and Buach Pa or tree ordination (Chaleaw, Wad, Udom and Seng, Kamnan Chum and Hannarong interviews). Seng added that ‘we also use it for other activities of our four villages such as for proving meals to a study group visiting our area. It becomes money used for all of our activities in these four villages’. The money is sometimes collected two to three times a year if many activities are organised.

**10.2.2.3 Alliances**

As both case studies are the AOP’s members, they have many allies such as, people from other cases, academics and NGOs, who mostly work for environmental issues and human rights. The alliances organised forums, seminars and meetings for villagers, which became channels to disseminate information about the PMD movement to the public. In addition, they delivered petitions and declared statements to support the movements. Even though they tried to mobilise outsiders to participate in the movements, it was not successful; according to Somporn, an NGO staff member working for the PMD, ‘only a small number of middle class people joined; even academics, only a small number of them joined with us; for example, they helped us to petition and some gave speeches on stage’ (Somporn interview). In
addition, both cases could build relationships with government officials and politicians, mainly through NGO assistance. Some of them, especially officers at the provincial level, became sources of information (Vanida interview).

(1) Students

Students played their role in the movement when it first started, although their role has declined in the past few years. They came from universities in Bangkok and other provinces. They joined the movement through their clubs, groups and the Committee on Natural Resources and Environment Conservation of 16 Institutes, which was a national committee of students in universities. They viewed that affected people were treated unfairly and they could not rely on help from the authorities (The Nation, November 2, 1994; Bangkok Post, May 23, 1991; and The Nation, May 27, 1991). Students participated in activities including demonstrations, rallies, hunger strike and petition. Narong Jangkramon, coordinator of the Committee for Natural Resources and Environment of 16 Institutes, explained that the students act as coordinators while all decisions are made by villagers (Thai Rath, March 16, 1993). For example, they acted as resources in the mass demonstration at the PMD site in 1994 (The Nation, November 28, 1994; Bangkok Post, November 28, 1994). Students also play their role in disseminating information to the public. For example, in Bangkok, they organised an exhibition on rapids destruction in the Mun River. The exhibition and public speeches drew much attention from the audiences and passers-by, who also affixed their signatures to a petition in support of the students’ movement to condemn EGAT’s operations (The Nation, March 16, 1992).

(2) International support

According to information from the press coverage, it has been shown that the PMD movement gained more international support in than the KSTD case. For example, in 1991, international NGOs urged the World Bank not to release funds for the PMD (The Nation, March 16, 1991). The South-East Asia Campaigner, Aviva Imhof, from the International River Network sent an open letter to the Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, expressing support for the PMD demonstrators in Mae Mun Man Yeun (The Nation, November 4, 1999). A group representing 74 environmental organisations from 21 countries announced in Washington, DC, that their members would stage a hunger strike in the US capital. In Japan, representatives of ten environmental groups sent an open letter to the Thai Embassy in Tokyo calling on the Thai government to address the protesters’ grievances (The Nation, July 25, 2000).

10.3 Strategies

10.3.1 Demands submitted to the state

The KSTD and PMD projects are in different stages: the KSTD is in the decision-making process, but the PMD is already in operation. The KSTD protesters have submitted the only demand for the project’s cancellation, but the PMD protesters submitted several demands, which varied according to the situations. During the first period of the movement, they demanded the project’s cancellation and displacement compensation until dam construction was completed. In 1994 when the impact on fisheries became apparent, they turned to the issue of compensation for loss of fisheries. They presented the argument that loss of fish in the Mun River has affected their traditional livelihood. This was the first time that the movement reframed their demands by turning to social loss instead of destruction of personal
property. Finally the government agreed to provide 90,000 baht per family for the loss of fisheries, which was the first time in Thai history that the government had paid compensation for a social impact caused by a government project. Later, the request for the opening of the dam’s gates was introduced in April 2000 during the prolonged demonstration at the dam site. To respond to the villagers’ demands, the government set up a committee to study the impact of the opening of the dam’s gates and to study its possibilities. In 2002, the protesters insisted on permanently opening the dam gates. As a result, the Thaksin government decided to open the dam gates for four months a year, from July to October, following the results of the research. Later the period of opening the dam sluice gates was re-scheduled from July to October to May to August. At present, the request for permanently opening the dam gates remains. In the view of NGOs, all demands should be created by participants of the movements because they became a motivation for villagers to act. Somparn emphasised that ‘NGOs should not think for them’ (Somparn interview). For example, in the case of opening the dam’s gates, the government agreed to open them four months a year while villagers have requested twelve months. Therefore, the villagers started thinking about their losses during the closing period. They could not earn from fishing so the government should cover the losses. As a result, villagers agreed to demand 500 Baht a day in compensation for each family during the closing period. The amount was calculated from the average expenses for a family. However, to date, there has been no response from the government regarding this demand.

10.3.2 Identity construction

The KSTD movement employs the idea of forest conservation as its major strategy. It is as a means, not an end. It is a way to re-construct its identity. This idea emerged because the KSTD area was notorious for forest destruction. Before the logging ban was announced in late 1989, villagers in the Sa-iab district cut trees on a large scale, and some relied on logging as their main source of income. Some villagers were hired by a contracted company to cut trees. Even after the logging ban was announced, villagers still continued cutting trees because they could earn a good income. Nikom Putha, from WFT, the first NGO staff member who worked with this community played a major role in encouraging the villagers to realise the importance of natural resources, especially forests. He told them that ‘if you continue cutting trees, all of you will be relocated’ (Hannarong interview). In 1989, the People Love Forest Group (Klum Rasadon Rak Pa) was established to handle forest conservation, and it later moved on to address the dam issue. Based on the lessons learned from the anti-Nam Chone Dam protest, the Group agreed to raise forest as the main issue for the KSTD protest. Then it was suggested that the villagers should grow sweet tamarind for their income instead of logging. To stop logging, the Group also announced the regulations for Tambon Sa-iab:

1. Do not log
2. Do not bring or persuade capitalists and merchants to villages
3. Do not do shifting cultivation
4. Do not sell wood to merchants
5. Do not sell used (old) houses
6. Do not transport wood from villages.

In case any members wanted wood to build new houses or to repair their houses, the committee would consider what wood was needed (Seng interview). Because of the strong policy in favour of stopping logging, Tambon Sa-iab could achieve its goal and people came to realise the importance of natural resources. Several rules were set up aimed at preventing the removal of old houses or used wood from villages. For example, people from outside
villages must settle in villages more than two years if they want wood from villages. Before moving, their wooden furniture will be examined by village representatives. With these regulations, the removal of all wood from villages is prohibited. However, their identities as forest protectors are not obviously recognised by outsiders, because some politicians who strongly support the project still view them as forest destroyers.

On the other hand, even though the PMD protesters did not organise activities for natural resource conservation, they always raised the fishery issue in their arguments with the state. This is because fishing was their traditional way of living. During the construction period, during which many rapids in the Mun River were destroyed, the villagers expressed their concern that it would affect a number of fish species and the dam would block the seasonal migration of fish between the Mun and the Makong Rivers. After the dam started operating, the villagers experienced an extreme decrease in the number of fish so they argued that it affected their way of living because they could not practice traditional fishery. The fish issue was raised, as it was important to a traditional way of life and culture.

10.3.3 Non-cooperation by declining to provide information

As a result of the learning process, the KSTD participants learned that the data and information in the location of the project was needed in the planning stage and for an environmental impact study. They then declined to provide their social and economic data to officials. Kamnan Chum, an advisor of the KSTD-SMO, said villagers would not allow researchers access to their land until the government presented a clear plan for resettlement at a site that was acceptable (The Nation August 15, 1996). They also refused to give their signatures to the government because they learned that the government might use their signatures to confirm that local villagers had agreed with the project. U-dom emphasised that 'it is found that this way is very common in many previous cases' (U-dom interview). They also guarded the area, which would be a construction site of the project, to prevent officers from collecting essential data and information. As a result, the environmental impact study could not be completed.

10.3.4 The mass demonstration strategy

The PMD movement relied on mass demonstrations as its main strategy. In contrast, the KSTD movement did not conduct prolonged demonstrations. The KSTD movement has never staged a mass demonstration in Bangkok. Alternatively, it conducted demonstrations and rallies in its own district over short periods, such as only a half-day or one day. However, all conventional means, including petitions through authorised agencies, were used before the tactic of mass demonstrations was used.

During the first period of the PMD movement, from 1989-1993, mass demonstrations were conducted in Ubon Rachathani province. In 1989, at least five mass demonstrations were arranged, demanding the project’s cancellation. The mass demonstration at the dam site also continued throughout the construction period, requesting compensation for the displacement and the termination of the construction. In 1994, the pressure shifted from the provincial authorities to the central government when the request for compensation for fishery loss was introduced. The first prolonged demonstration of the PMD case was staged in front of the Government House in April 1994.

After joining with the AOP in 1995, both the PMD and KSTD ran their activities, in particular mass demonstrations, under the AOP. This allowed them to mobilise more
resources to strengthen their capacity in negotiating with the state. Based on experience, the protesters learned that although they could negotiate with the government and reach a common agreement, they had to continue their action until a cabinet resolution was announced. Later, they realised that the following government could cancel that resolution. The AOP ran its first mass demonstration during the period of the Banharn Government, from 26 March 1996 to 22 April 1996, resulting in the cabinet resolution to resolve the forty-seven grievances of AOP members. However, when no progress had been made, so the second demonstration began under the Chavalit government, from 25 January 1997 to 2 May 1997, 99 days. As a result, the Cabinet agreed to provide land for the people affected (3,084 families) by the PMD project. Unfortunately, the Chuan Government later cancelled this resolution. Therefore, the PMD movement, under the umbrella of the AOP, conducted the longest demonstration in Thai history, which lasted for almost two years, starting in March 1999. The demonstration established a temporary community that was named ‘Mae Mun Man Yeun Village’. Meanwhile, the movement mobilised allies from other dam projects. Those allies staged their demonstrations by establishing Mae Mun Man Yeun villages in different areas. After a yearlong demonstration at the dam site, the request to open the dam sluice gates was introduced in April 2000. The movement decided to launch more radical activities after the demonstration had continued for more than one year. Another group of protesters invaded the Government House in May 2000. Vanida, an NGO advisor, explained that ‘we do not want to pressure the EGAT and the provincial authorities any more. Then, we have put the pressure on the government directly. This way would lessen tension between our group and the provincial authorities’ (Bangkok Post, May 29, 2000 and The Nation, May 29, 2000). Meanwhile, the demonstrators at the dam site seized the dam and its hydroelectric power plant. The atmosphere became increasingly tense when the PMD’s electricity generators were shut down on May 31. The second invasion into the Government House occurred in July 2000, and that time protesters clashed with the police.

As a result of collective actions, villagers strengthened in many ways, including negotiating with the state, expressing political views to the public and running the movement. Vanida pointed out that ‘the villagers realise they are more powerful because government officers have to listen to them; they can discuss with the governor’ (Vanida interview). However, they could not reach their goal, although they tried every way they could, such as long marches, hunger strikes, prolonged demonstrations and invasions of the Government House. Therefore, some of them felt disillusioned (Somparn, Sudjai and Lek interviews).

10.3.5 Diffusing ideas

Diffusing ideas is another strategy aiming to mobilise people to join the movements, in particular, mass demonstrations. This strategy was obviously employed in 1999, after the PMD movement staged a prolonged demonstration at the dam location by establishing a temporary community called ‘Mae Mun Man Yeun Village’. To mobilise resources and alliances, the campaigners and leaders diffused their ideas to groups of people who were also affected by dam projects in the northeastern region (the same region as PMD). As a result, those alliances staged their demonstrations by establishing Mae Mun Man Yeun villages in seven locations in the northeast.

10.3.6 Public understanding

The public’s understanding was another concern of the movement, so some activities were created to serve this purpose. They sometimes created an activity that could attract both the media and the public, for example a long march. In 1994, after one month of mass
demonstrations at the City Hall of Ubon Rachathani province, the PMD movement decided to
march to the dam site in the Khong Chiam district, which took them more than a week. In
2001, seventy villagers, led by the AOP, marched from Ubon Rachathani province to
Government House in Bangkok (about 560 km) to demand that the PMD sluice gates be kept
open permanently. These activities were designed to campaign for an understanding among
the public about the hardships of affected people (Daily News, November 14, 1994; The
Nation, November 22, 1994; Bangkok Post, October 8, 2001; and Bangkok Post, October 10,
2001).

10.3.7 Learning process

Learning is one of the major strategies of both the PMD and KSTD movements, because
political ideas of participants can be developed and any information obtained used to argue
with the government. Both movements rely on different methods. When the movement
began, due to lack of experience in protesting against the development project, the SMO-
KSTD leaders and its participants made, as their first priority, a common agreement to learn
about dam construction and its impact. They mainly organised study trips to various
resettlement sites for people evicted from the sites of dams to learn how dam development
affected their way of living. After visiting, information was disseminated to villagers in the
four villages who could not attend the trips. From this, villagers learned that most people who
were evicted faced many problems and difficulties; for example, infertile soil, unfair
compensation, corruption, poor infrastructure etc. The government also organised study trips
for them, but villagers claimed that the government provided them with only positive images,
and viewed those trips as a propaganda campaign (Han narong and Seng interviews).

The participants of the PMD movement gained knowledge about politics, natural resources
and problems from other development projects by participating in activities, such as
prolonged demonstrations, seminars and group discussions. While joining prolonged
demonstrations, many discussion groups were organised for demonstrators so they could
exchange views, ideas and experiences. Moreover, villagers were invited by universities,
NGOs and government agencies to attend seminars and meetings. One participant, Kammai
said, ‘I learned not only my problems but also other problems. It opened a world view for
me’ (Kammai interview).

10.4 Rationality and the free-riding problem

People claimed that they participated in both the PMD and KSTD movements because they
were affected by the projects. People in four villages in Tambon Sa-iab, predicted to be
submerged if the KSTD is constructed, would be displaced. They do not want to be relocated
because they live in the area whose environment is in very good condition; the new location
offered by the government is very infertile and is already occupied by a number of people.
Seng, a KSTD village leader, pointed out that ‘we were proposed 2,000,000 baht for our
properties and then we had to use it to buy our new properties so we rejected that. We told
them [government] that we always rely on nature such as forest and water. They
[government] do not know how we spend our lives. If we have 100 baht, we sometimes can
survive for several days; or sometimes we need not use it. We are farmers so land is our vital
element. Even if we have one million baht but we have no land, then we cannot survive. We
explained that to them’ (Seng interview). Similarly, some villagers insisted ‘I prefer to settle
here, where we can survive with our environment, no need money. We can find vegetables
around our houses for consuming’ (Chaleaw and Pisanu interviews).
The villagers in the PMD area could not rely on their fishing because the numbers of fish in the Mun River dramatically decreased after the dam began operating. Pha, one of the PMD leaders who joined the movement in 1997, said 'I took part in the protest when I realised its impact when the numbers of fish in the Mun River dramatically decreased. My children had to work in the city because they could not rely on fishing' (Pha interview). Some of the PMD villagers individually rationalised that they joined the movement because the government gave them untrue information. Kammai said 'the government including Kamnan and headmen gave invalid information to villagers by saying that fish would not be affected by the dam because fish ladders would be installed. Many villagers, including me, believed them. Later, we realised that it was impossible. We could earn about 1,000-2,000 baht a day before the dam construction' (Kammai interview). Others, such as Kan, explained that 'the villagers were told that they would receive eighteen rai of farmland and houses. We thought that if we could not fish, we would have farmland instead' (Kan interview). Air, Pee Liang and a young villager at Ban Hua Heaw who was displaced, pointed out that in the past, villagers were afraid of state power and they always listened to the community leaders. However, the situation forced them to protest when flying stones from the blasting destroyed their houses and properties. The villagers started asking for their rights. Initially, there were only 50-60 people who protested; later more villagers joined in. They realised that they had rights (Air interview). In addition, when the movements emerged, the protesters in both cases learned from the cases of the other dams such as Sirinthorn, Sirikit and Pa Sak dams. In particular, the PMD villagers who live in the same area with the Sirinthorn Dam saw how the affected people from that dam struggled. They learned how the dams had negatively impacted on people's ways of life. Then the information was used to argue with the government. As mentioned above, it is true in both cases that people participating in social movements are rational, according to Mancur Olson's argument. They participated because the projects had adverse effects on their livelihood. The actors in both cases related their reasons to other issues, such as human rights, the right to know, poverty, and the traditional way of living.

In principle, people voluntarily take part in the movements. All affected villagers from the four villages in the KSTD area joined the movement, but not every one in the seventy-two villages in the PMD area joined its movement. The number of people participating in the PMD movement has changed throughout almost twenty years; some, who were not at first involved, decided to join, while some withdrew from the movement. However, everyone living in the area could receive the same benefits, such as compensation, whether he or she took part in the movements or not. Therefore, a free-riding problem occurred in the PMD movement. The free-riding issue was created by the government to prevent people from participating in the protest, and at the same time, to prevent supporters of the dam from turning into opponents. In announcing that the benefits would be given to all people, whether they joined in the movement or not, the government initiated the free-riding problem as a tool for repression. It did not arise naturally as a result of people's calculation of costs and benefits, according to the Olson statement, but they were motivated (by the government) to calculate costs and benefits. Nevertheless, not all free riders wanted others to ride for them. It has been found that villagers did not participate in the activities of the PMD movement for various reasons; for example, some could not cover the expenses of participation, some had health problems, some felt disillusioned and some were threatened. According to Bunmee, those people could be divided into two groups: the first group could not really afford to do so because they had to pay for themselves; the second group could afford it but they were threatened; for example, they might be killed or arrested if they joined the protest (Bunmee interview). However, as the free-riding problem occurred in the PMD movement, the villagers developed their political ideas more than those in the KSTD movement, because the PMD participants had to argue with ones who did not join the movement. To solve the free-
riding problem, the selective incentive that people who joined would receive compensation as first priority was offered by the movement. However, this did not motivate free riders to participate. Possibly, free riders had various reasons, not only that they wanted a free ride. The announcement (that benefits would be given to all people whether they joined in the movement or not) made by the government was more powerful than the selective incentive proposed by the protesters.

In the case of the KSTD, all villagers reached a consensus agreement to protest against the dam. Kamnan Chum, an advisor of KSTD-SMO, explained that 'we never forced them. All villagers agreed to fight against the dam construction. Whether right or wrong, we are all together' (Kamnan Chum interview). Therefore, people joined the KSTD movement without any selective incentives, which does not support Olson’s statement that only a separate and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual to act collectively (Olson, 1971:51). On the other hand, this is relevant to the result of research conducted by Marwell and Ames (1979 and 1980, in Jenkins 1983), which shows that most participants contribute to the collective good without selective incentives. In addition, people participated in both movements because of the solidarity of each group. The actors of both the PMD and KSTD movements have shared ideas, experiences and aims which could be factors motivating participation. This supports many findings presented by social movement scholars such as Della Porta and Diani (2002) and Foweraker (1995).

10.3 Conclusion

Even though the PMD and KSTD projects are at different stages and have different backgrounds, their SMOs have the same structure and form: the informal decentralised structure and the form of loose commitment. The SMOs can be distinguished into two levels: the Village-SMOs and Upper-village SMOs. Each Village-SMO has its own authorised decision-making process. The role of each level is clearly identified: the Village-SMO is mainly involved with resource mobilisation in its own village, while the Upper-village level SMOs create strategies and coordinate with outsiders, especially NGOs. The SMOs mainly aimed to achieve redress of their grievances. The KSTD-SMO movement could be organised shortly after the movement emerged because they were advised by an NGO. However, the PMD-SMO gradually developed from the unorganised stage to the popular excitement stage, and then the formalisation stage. In response to repression, the movements mainly mobilised resources from within SMOs, and relied on themselves as much as they could. The main concern of SMOs in resource mobilisation included human resources and money. Both the PMD and KSTD movements have not mobilised as many participants as they expected. As a result of being accused by the state that protesters were hired to participate, both movements denied accepting donations from outsiders. The KSTD case set up a fund for its movements but the PMD case did not. Therefore, demonstrators had to cover all their own expenses, which some could not afford, resulting in a lower number of participants. Resource mobilisation of the PMD was much more difficult than that of the KSTD, because the size of the PMD area is larger, the number of villages involved is much greater, and the PMD seriously faced various methods of repression. Their main strategies include: demands submitted to the state in accordance with the situation, identity construction, non-cooperation, mass demonstrations, diffusing ideas and encouraging public understanding. However, the PMD movement relied on more radical strategies than the KSTD case.

It has been found that people are rational to participate in the KSTD and PMD movements in view of the actual or potential effects upon their well-being. The free riding problem occurred in only the PMD case because their people were encouraged by the government to believe
that they would receive compensation whether they participated in the protest or not. Then the selective incentive was offered by the PMD movement, but it was not effective, possibly because free riders had various reasons, not only that they wanted a free ride.

The discussion in this chapter is further used for the analysis of the role of NGOs in the next Chapter, which will consider their role within and outside SMOs.
Chapter 11
NGOs and Their Role in the Movements

This chapter discusses the role of NGOs and the reasons why they got involved in the case studies. The background of two NGOs, including Wildlife Fund Thailand and a group of people led by Vanida, are presented first. Then the role of NGOs in SMOs and in the public are analysed based on the discussion in Chapter 10 and interview data. Next, the concept of the political opportunity approach is employed to analyse reasons why NGOs became involved in the case studies, and how political opportunities influence resource mobilisation and strategies. These results lead on to address the principle hypothesis in the last part of this chapter.

11.1 NGOs that became involved with the KSTD movement: Wildlife Fund Thailand under the Royal Patronage of H.M. The Queen Sirikit

11.1.1 History

The Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT) is the only NGO that has become involved with the KSTD movement. WFT is a national NGO whose headquarters is located in Bangkok. Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT) was established on October 13, 1983, as a private, non-profit organisation, under The Royal Patronage of H.M. the Queen of Thailand. Its main objectives are to raise environmental public awareness, to encourage people’s participation in natural resource management and to conduct research on natural resources by using a participatory process.

The WFT was founded by Medical Doctor Boonsong Lekagul who was a pioneer conservationist of Thailand. Pisit Na Pattalung, who later became the first Secretary General of WFT, said ‘in 1982, Dr Boonsong asked me to assist him in managing the very important event when H.R.H. Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, visited Thailand and wished to know about wildlife conservation. At that time, he was the President of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF, later World Wide Fund for Nature). We thought that this occasion was a very important opportunity for our country to encourage environmental awareness to the public in particular natural resource conservation; at that time, environment and conservation ideas were rather new issues for Thai people because our environment had not deteriorated like today. We organised a gala dinner to raise funds for natural resource conservation, which H.R.H. Queen Sirikit and Prince Philip joined. Also, we arranged an exhibition and study trip for Prince Philip. I could say that this event was very successful in terms of creating public attention about conservation because it was presented through all media’ (Pisit interview).

After visiting, Prince Philip raised funds to support wildlife conservation in Thailand. Therefore, the WFT was officially established in 1983, in the form of a foundation, and it was a partnership with the WWF. Queen Sirikit kindly supports the foundation, so WFT is under the patronage of the Queen. Pisit became the first Secretary General of WFT. Pisit attended a study trip organised and sponsored by WWF. He said ‘I represented Thailand and there were several people from other countries who worked in WWF’s branches. We learned about WWF’s implementation in Europe. It was very good start for me; I entered into this field of work because of my personal interest. I worked in Olympia Company and I resigned to work at this foundation’ (Pisit interview).
During the first period, projects and activities of WFT were mainly sponsored by WWF. However, Pisit emphasised that WFT worked independently under WWF support. Pisit said that ‘staff from WWF worked with us as co-workers in some projects. Our staff could learn from WWF’s staff. At the same time, WWF’s staff could learn from us too’ (Pisit interview). WFT set up the Conservation Mobile Unit, aiming to create conservation awareness in people living in remote areas, such as the borderline between Thailand and Myanmar and minority groups living in mountainous areas. Pisit explained that ‘the unit arranged an open-air cinema for people in communities and our staff talked with them about natural resources conservation during breaks. Sometimes, we spent a few days in communities and talked with community leaders and villagers so we could collect information about the situations of natural resources in the areas’ (Pisit interview). WFT also joined in the Num Jone Dam protest during 1984-1985 by providing information about the wildlife and forest.

During the early period, Pisit had to adjust what he had learned from the international organisation, WWF, to the situations in Thailand. He realised that Thai culture is different from western culture. For example, WWF staff suggested raising funds from Thai people because they considered that Thailand is not a very poor country. Pisit explained that ‘Thai people prefer to donate money for religion based on their belief in Buddhism rather than donating to NGOs’ (Pisit interview). This is different from the west. In particular, the conservation work and activities in Thailand at that time, more than twenty years ago, was in the beginning period. The public did not realise about quality of environment like today’ (Pisit interview). Pisit further said ‘WWF also suggested me to hire a professional manager. I explained the situation that it was impossible for our country because those people had to be paid with high salary, which WFT could not afford. Those people also did not want to work in the conservation field. In Thailand, people working with non-profit organisations had to work with spirits and minds because of insecurity and poor welfare as compared to government or commercial company. The situation was quite different from WWF because WWF had a long list of applicants who wished to work with it’ (Pisit interview).

In the early 1990s, the WWF asked WFT if it would like to be a branch of the WWF, because they had a policy to establish a branch in the Southeast Asian region. WFT rejected the offer. Pisit said ‘we considered that we wanted to work independently with our aim’ (Pisit interview). Although WWF withdrew its support, both organisations still maintain a relationship as partners, and sometimes they run joint projects. The WWF opened its own project office in 1995, and later became a WWF Thailand Programme Office in July 1999 (www.panda.org, access July 7, 2007).

In 1999, Pisit resigned from WFT to work as the director of the Zoological Park Organisation of Thailand, and Suralpol Duangkhea was appointed as replacement. At present, Pisit is the President of WFT. The Secretary General, as head of the office, runs administrative work on day-to-day basis. The advisory board oversees policy and provides assistance requested by the WFT’s office such as raising funds. Its sources of funds mainly come from international donors, Thai government and people donations. Also, WFT organised events to raise fund.

Nowadays, after almost thirty years working in the environment field, WFT is widely recognised by the public, the NGO community and governmental agencies. WFT’s representatives have been invited by many government agencies to sit on national committees and to participate in meetings and conferences regarding environmental issues.
11.1.2 Current Projects

WFT relies on participatory and community-based process to implement its projects and activities. Mainly, the projects and activities aim at raising environmental public awareness and participation in natural resource protection. The major projects are as follows:

11.1.2.1 The Upper Mae Ping River Basin’s Forest Rehabilitation Project

The project has been implemented since 1997 in the Chiangdao National Conserved Forest in the northern region of Thailand, aimed at strengthening the capacity of local community organisations to participate in natural resource management. The project emphasises the participatory process by creating community networks in the targeted area. All activities are agreed by communities and related to their way of life. Three networks were established: the Mae Ping Community Forest Network comprising of fifty-four villages in the area of 152,000 acres; the Mae Ping Rehabilitation and Conservation Network consisting of twenty-eight villages along the Mae Ping river bank; the Water Resource Network comprising of seventy-two villages who manage water resources in the form of check dams. Supported by the project, these community networks analyse the natural resource conditions in their areas and formulate plans to solve the problems.

11.1.2.2 The Reforestation Project

WFT runs the Reforestation Project at Khao Paeng Ma in the northern region of Thailand, covering an area of 2,000 acres. Khao Paeng Ma was an abundant tropical forest, but it was destroyed by development and encroachment. The area is the origin of various streams in the region. The project has been running since 1994 in commemoration of H.M. the King’s 50th Anniversary on the Throne. Mature saplings were planted. WFT worked closely with local villagers who were encouraged to guard against fires and to stop cutting down trees. At present, Khao Paeng Ma gradually turned from barren mountains into a lush area. A significant phenomenon was the return of a herd of 4-10 gaurs in the rainy season in 1995, which WFT closely studied. Nowadays, it is speculated that there are about fifty gaurs at Khao Paeng Ma.

11.1.2.3 The Wild Asian Elephant Conservation Project

It is estimated that less than 2,000 wild elephants are living in natural forest in Thailand, mostly in the protected area. Wild elephants have been facing many major threats, resulting in habitat destruction, such as deforestation for different purposes, over harvesting of forest non-products by poor people and wildlife poaching for trading. Moreover, conflicts between elephants and local villagers often occurred because they invaded plantations for foods. According to a survey conducted by WFT, the serious conflict occurred in at least of ten major protected areas. WFT has implemented the Wild Asian Elephant Conservation Project since 1992. Its activities have included: surveying wild population in three protected areas; cooperating with biologists and ex-poachers to survey plants and water sources for wild elephants; studying their behaviour and sharing information with local villagers to avoid conflict situations; submitting information to the policy-making level. In 2004, WFT emphasised the conflict situation between elephants and people as a case study. Nowadays, villagers living along national park’s edges work closely with WFT to develop appropriate ways to prevent elephants from invading their plantation areas.
11.1.2.4 The Bumble Bee Bat Project

The Bumble Bee Bat (Craseonycteris thonglongyai) is the smallest mammal in the world. WFT implemented the project to study its behaviour and to formulate a plan to conserve it.

11.1.2.4 Urgent Assistance to Local Fishermen Affected by Tsunami Project

The project was funded by FAO and UNDP, aiming to provide fishing boat machines and fishing gear to the local fisherman organisations in six provinces affected by the tsunami. This project ran from September 2005-June 2006.

11.1.2.5 The Wildlife Rescue Project

WFT allows the public to give information about wildlife needing to be rescued (Wildlife Fund Thailand, year unknown).

In July 2007, the public and WFT’s supporters and staff were very surprised by the announcement to halt its operations and lay off all 37 employees. Pisit, the President of WFT, said due to financial constraints, the advisory board decided to suspend operations and terminate all staff from 1 August 2007. Although WFT intended to resume operations once its problems were resolved, no timeframe was given. The conflict between Pisit and staff members started in May 2007 when Secretary-General Surapol and his deputy Hannarong were transferred to inactive posts. Pisit claimed that this was because the Secretary-General failed to improve the organisation’s financial status. However, staff members and those in some leading environmental NGOs believed they were removed because they criticised the President for having a conflict of interest. Pisit was accused of being involved in wildlife trading, which was incompatible with his official capacity in this well-known environmental organisation. Also, staff launched a petition calling on Pisit to step down. However, Pisit declined to respond to and clarify the allegations against him (Bangkok Post, July 21, 2007; The Nation, July 25, 2007; Bangkok Post, July 27, 2007).

According to Hannarong, WFT’s closure negatively affected the country’s conservation movement and also obstruct the work of state-appointed committees of which WFT’s environmental experts were members, such as the national committee on wildlife protection and National Environment Board’s biodiversity panel. The press pointed out that it was the first time in Thailand that a leading well-recognised NGO had been closed without an acceptable explanation. Therefore, questions about transparency and accountability in the organisation were raised. (The Nation, July 25, 2007; Bangkok Post, July 27, 2007).

11.1.3 Working with the KSTD movement

Staffs working with the KSTD case were carefully selected. According to Surapol, to recruit WFT staff for working in the field, only those who were qualified and committed to work in rural area were selected. Their personal interest in the case became a major criterion. Fortunately, in the case of KSTD, Nikom, Chainarong and Hannarong are interested in dams and forests, otherwise WFT would decide to assign only non-residential coordinators.

When WFT’s staff worked in Tambon Sa-aib with villagers, they discussed with villagers’ leaders on questions such as what the problems were, how they could find resolutions and how they could negotiate. If they needed more information or they were not confident about their decisions or their ideas, all of these would be brought to the head office for further
discussion with colleagues. The major guideline of WFT in working with the KSTD movement included no attack on government organisations and no violation of law. All decisions, such as delivering petitions, rallies and demonstrations, were made in the area of Sa-iab, not in Bangkok. Mainly, the office in Bangkok assisted in finding information and coordinating with allies and government officials and staff. For example, they knew that the project would be submitted to a cabinet meeting. Then, WFT contacted the government officials and the media reporters to follow the movement of the government. The information was transferred to the staff and then to villagers. Villagers evaluated the situation by themselves. Surapol concluded that Sa-iab villagers run the KSTD movement in three levels as follows: by area – organising activities in Sa-aib, organising demonstration at Song District Office; at provincial level – delivering petitions to the governors; at ministerial level – delivering petitions to the ministers. He further emphasised that ‘WFT has never joined either rally or demonstration on the street. The organisation plays a role in an academic aspect by providing and finding information needed by the movements’ (Surapol interview).

11.1.4 Role of the head office of WFT in supporting the KSTD case

Head office of WFT located in Bangkok focused on academic issues regarding the dam development in Thailand. WFT studied how the RID manages dams. It was found that the department has been only specialising in dam construction. Surapol illustrated that ‘we tried to search on dam management and engineering information such as how they manage the Bhumipol and the Sirikit dams. We found that the RID has no system to manage these two dams. Then we informed our alliance that it is problematic because the RID know only how to build dams but they do not know how to manage them’ (Surapol interview).

WFT studied the reason mentioned by the government. In the case of the KSTD, the RID said ‘the government proposes KSTD project because there is no dam on Yom River’ (Surapol interview). Then WFT studied information from the Land Development Department and the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board. WFT studied what kinds of activities and plants were suitable for types of land and soil in Yom Watershed. Finally, Surapol said ‘we put the questions to the RID what kinds of plantation would be provided by the irrigation system of KSTD. The department said either rice or other crops, then we asked how would you ensure that these crops could get good prices in the market, but they could not answer’ (Surapol interview). (Note: This is because the department handles only irrigation systems, but plantation promotion or other aspects regarding agriculture are handled by other departments. However, all of these departments are under the Agriculture Ministry.) This could show that there is no systematic planning from the initial stage of dam creation.

WFT studied the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report of the KSTD project and found that the EIA report had several weaknesses. WFT raised this issue publicly, and requested the government to revise this report. Also, WFT studied the benefit of the dam, claimed by the government, that ‘the dam can prevent flooding’. WFT studied whether the dam could prevent flooding, and it found that the information of RID could not be proven. This was raised publicly. ‘In the past, we only said we did not want the dam. At present, we study the concept and working process of dam management. We found that engineers only take part in dam design and they do not understand what we lose and what we gain from dam construction. We analysed all of these issues and came to the question of how they manage and administer dams and benefits from them but they (RID) could not answer’ (Surapol interview).
11.2 NGOs that became involved with the PMD: Vanida and her team

NGO workers led by Vanida supported the PMD case. Vanida was born in Bangkok in a Chinese family. She participated in the Student Revolution in October 1973 while at secondary school. She studied Political Science at Thammasart University. After the bloodshed of October 1976, she joined the Communist Party in the forest. Then she returned to continue her studies in 1981 (Tantiwittapitak, 2008). She started working on environmental issues in 1990 with The Project for Ecological Recovery, a national NGO. She worked for the Kreang Krung dam, the Keang Sue Ten dam and then the PMD movements respectively. She illustrated that ‘when I first came to the PMD movement, the villager group had been set up. I came with one staff member. I worked for the water management project, which was a small-scale project under the Project for Ecological Recovery (PER). Its main aim did not involve the villagers’ protest. Then PER withdrew from the case because PER thought that they could not fight for villagers. However, I thought it was not the issue whether we could fight or not; the issue was that the question of the dam impact raised by villagers should be proven. Meanwhile, the villagers still continued running the movement. I decided to leave PER and I proposed a project for funding which covered only the salary for me, 4,000-5,000 baht a month and travel costs’. Vanida further expressed ‘I did not agree with ways that the government had proceeded without the understanding of villagers’ (Vanida interview).

Somparn, Vanida’s co-worker and the only full-time staff member, originally comes from the northeastern region, Yasothorn province. She joined the PMD movement as a student activist when she was studying at university. She said ‘I accompanied senior students in the university and worked with villagers. I am familiar with people and the PMD case since I studied. Therefore I continued working after graduation. I think I should do something for villagers because I realise that they are sincere and they tell the truth. Also I have grown up in a rural community and I do not like the city’. She worked in the area that opposed the state’s power so her family did not support her work in the movement (Somparn interview).

Bunmee and Air are people affected by the project. They used to join the demonstrations on behalf of their families who opposed the PMD project. They work as volunteers and on a part-time basis. They are from the younger generation and live in a village, so they have close relationships with the villagers. They can understand villagers better than outsiders (Bunmee, Air and Somparn interviews).

11.2.1 Structure of the NGO working with the PMD

The NGO working with the PMD case was led by Vanida. Although Vanida and her colleagues involved in the PMD movement did not mention the organisation they work with, their working style seemed not to be different from that of WFT. Vanida, who was based in Bangkok, acted as an advisor to the staff working in the field, and coordinated with organisations and people in Bangkok. Meanwhile, other staff working in the area coordinated with villagers. Among all of the field staff, Somparn seemed to be the head of the team because of her seniority, and she also coordinated with other networks and organisations in the northeastern region.
As shown in Figure 11.1, the group of people working in the PMD movement consists of nine people: Vanida, Somparn, Bunmee, Air, On, Job, Po, Kampeang and Nuay. Vanida is an advisor to the AOP, who is based in Bangkok. She coordinates with people in the government, NGOs and academics in Bangkok, and with other networks under the AOP. She handles overall strategies for the movement and provides consultation to Pee Liang and villagers’ leaders (NGO staff members working in the area are called Pee Liang by villagers). Vanida illustrated her experience when she began working: ‘I started learning together with villagers because the dam was the first dam in the country that was designed as run-off the-river-dam. I discussed with the villagers and we worked together. We tried every way we could do, such as how to arrange demonstrations and rallies and how to disseminate our requests to the public’ (Vanida interview).

All staff work as a team. Practically, Vanida works at national level while Somparn works at regional level, and other volunteers work at village level. Vanida is based in Bangkok while the rest of the staff is based in Ubon Rachathani province. The focal point is located in the Pak Mun Cooperative Centre, where all staff members meet for discussion and cooperation. A large meeting hall is also located in the Centre where all villagers can meet. They mainly communicate through mobile phones.

Somparn works as a senior volunteer, or Pee Liang, who is responsible for: coordinating with networks under the AOP, NGOs and other alliances, mainly in the north-east, for example
attending meetings, seminars and informal discussions; coordinating and discussing with Pee Liang working in villages; sometimes working directly with the villagers. Somparn explained that ‘sometimes, I work directly with villagers. For a mass demonstration preparation, I stay in villages and discuss with villagers by organising group discussions’ (Somparn interview).

As the PMD movement covers a large area of 72 villages located in three districts, they were divided into different zones, covering 10-20 villages in each zone, when meetings with all villages were planned. Each Pee Liang was assigned to handle each zone, and they had to manage their own work. Pee Liang met regularly to discuss the results of villagers’ meetings and progress of the work (Somparn, Bunmee and Air interviews). Air explained that ‘the Pee Liang met to evaluate and discuss what they had obtained from villagers. For example, the number of people from each village that could join the demonstration; what the conditions, especially the counter-movement in villages were; how we could monitor the situation; what help the villagers needed; and what the results of villagers’ meetings were’ (Air interview).

It can be said that WFT, working with the KSTD case, and Vanida together with her team working with the PMD case, took on different forms of organisation: WFT was formal while the other was informal. But both were professionalised because they involved paid staff.

11.3 Relationships between NGOs and villagers

The findings from this study show that relationships between NGOs and villagers cannot be classified as a patronage relationship or patron-client relationship in the manner usual in Thai culture. Their performances make no distinctions of status: they worked as partners and co-workers. In addition, villagers did not see the NGO assistance in the term ‘bun khun’ or gratitude, and they had no ideas to give something in return to NGOs as their patrons, although they were highly appreciative of NGO assistance. At the same time, NGOs also did not have any ideas to protect villagers as clients. This finding supports the statements of Missingham and Batliwala who also find that the relationship between NGOs and villagers is not a patronage relationship. It can be classified as the third type of Lomnitz’s model, giving favours and receiving friendship in return.

11.4 Role of NGOs in the movements

11.4.1 Role of NGOs in SMOs

11.4.1.1 Role in shaping the movements

It has been found from this study that NGOs involved in both cases shaped the movements in many ways. In principle, NGOs suggested that the campaigners should manage their movements in accordance with the law. The villagers in both cases report that if there had been no NGOs’ assistance, violence and confrontation would have occurred. They also accepted that they did not know about the law and how to manage the movement under the law. The head monks of Wad Don Chai, located in the KSTD area, explained that ‘at that moment, villagers could only demonstrate their power and they do not know about the law. NGOs told us what we should do properly’ (Head of monk of Wad Don Chai interview). NGOs suggested villagers to set up their SMOs (in form of committee) to run the movements. NGOs also supported ideas of villagers to formulate the demands submitted to the state; for example, the idea of requesting compensation for fishery loss. For the KSTD case, it is accepted by villagers that the idea of conservation was inspired by NGOs. Nikom, who was the first NGO staff member of Wildlife Fund Thailand dealing with the case, expressed that ‘it is impossible that we
protest against the dam while we are destroying the forest’ (Hannarong interview). Later, this idea developed into one of the main strategies of the KSTD movement: identity reconstruction.

As a result of these roles of NGOs, the villagers came to realise that they had legal rights to oppose the development projects of the state. Due to the ideas and suggestions of NGOs, villagers accepted that they could act confidently. One of the members of the KSTD-SMO, Pisanu, pointed out that ‘information, ideas and suggestions provided by NGOs like Hannarong gave us confidence; we are more confident about expressing our ideas, negotiation with government, and making decisions’ (Pisanu interview). The villagers accept that they could not manage the movement in its present form without NGOs’ support.

11.4.1.2 Role as transmitters and coordinators

NGOs in both cases acted as transmitters by providing essential messages and information and knowledge to villagers. Many villagers thought that NGOs brought news of the outside world to them. All of these were applied to run movements and strengthen villagers’ capacities. NGOs invited academics, reporters, and many activists to visit the area and discuss with villagers. They also supported villagers in arranging study trips and building networks with other movements.

The KSTD’s villagers accepted that, initially, they did not have ideas of what the benefits of the dam to villagers were; some villagers thought they could move to more developed areas if the dam was constructed. However, due to information given by NGOs, they could understand about the dam development and its effects on their way of life. In addition, villagers in both cases report that NGOs provide them information regarding movements of the government, which they could not get by themselves. This was because NGOs have connections with many people in the government.

11.4.1.3 Role in human mobilisation

NGOs working in the PMD case played a role in mobilising people to participate in movement activities, but NGOs working with the KSTD movement did not. Bunmee and Air, Pee Liangs working for the PMD movement, explained that ‘we discussed the objective of the demonstration and Pee Liang recorded the opinion of villagers in each village, compiling a list of people who could join the demonstration’ (Bunmee and Air interviews). In contrast, the human mobilisation in the KSTD case, in particular to participate in mass rallies and demonstrations, was mainly handled by the KSTD-SMO, not the NGO.

After almost twenty years of struggle, the PMD villagers felt disillusioned, and some gave up their participation. Therefore, the NGOs had to find ways to encourage and support them. The NGO staff agreed that it was necessary to encourage villagers to analyse and to discuss various issues concerning them. Pee Liang acted as catalysts, for example, encouraging villagers to analyse why the dam’s gates should be opened longer than four months a year and how they could achieve it. Somparn, an NGO staff member, explained that ‘if we did not encourage the villagers to think about it, they might feel that they were unable to achieve their demands because they have struggled for a very long period’ (Somparn interview). NGO workers involved in the PMD also visited all villagers opposing the dam in 72 villages. They organised group discussions and meetings in each village. Particularly, when NGO workers were reported about repression in villages, such as villagers opposing the dam being threatened, those workers met them and encouraged them to join the activity. Where it was
found that no representative from a village attended the meeting or demonstration, Pee Liang visited those villages to find out the reason. Bunmee said ‘I met leaders in villages. Mostly, I found that they were busy, they did not know the schedule of the meeting and they could not afford to attend’ (Bunmee interview). When a mass demonstration was planned, NGOs would visit them in all villages to discuss the various issues and encourage them to join the activity. So, in the PMD case, NGOs acted not only as supporters but also as a catalyst.

In contrast, no repression occurred in the four villages of the KSTD case, and everyone in those villages supported the movement. As a result, NGOs working with the PMD-SMO played their role more intensively in human mobilisation than NGOs working with the KSTD-SMO.

11.4.1.4 Role in money mobilisation

NGOs in both cases also occasionally mobilised money for SMOs by asking for donations from friends, other NGOs and academics. NGOs generally avoid involving themselves with the use of money in SMOs, only becoming involved when needed.

11.4.2 Role of NGOs outside SMOs

11.4.2.1 Resource mobilisation

NGOs mobilised elites from outside SMOs to support movements. NGOs personally contacted government officials, academics and media reporters. NGOs invited academics, researchers and reporters to visit the area and discuss with the villagers. As a result, outsiders realised and understood why villagers protested against the projects, and what the projects’ impacts upon the environment and people’s livelihood were. Then the information was disseminated to the public through the mass media and academic forums, including conferences, workshops and seminars.

NGOs created connections with people in governments, and so they facilitated the movements in various aspects, such as ways to negotiate and providing information about movements of the government toward project approval and implementation. Sudjai, a leader of the PMD movement expressed that ‘before NGOs got involved, we had to follow the bureaucratic system, starting from district to province and then to the Department and Ministry in Bangkok. NGOs helped us to go through a fast track’ (Sudjai interview). According to Surapol, head of WFT, NGO workers contacted their friends and met government staff on many occasions, such as seminars, conferences and meetings. They had informal talks and discussions with those officers. Surapol further said ‘since WFT has involved in the environmental movements, we got more information from government officers: some sent us letters and some gave us clues. Although they could not give us the document or evidence, all information could guide us. They seemed to be a source of our information’ (Surapol interview). When the movements planned to stage a mass demonstration or to petition, NGOs could ask people in the government to facilitate them; for example, the venue for a mass demonstration. Surapol clarified that ‘for example, if villagers decided to deliver a petition to the ministers, we had to find out whom that minister would respect and listen to and whether that person was the one we could talk to or not. Then we contacted that person, if possible’ (Surapol interview). NGOs could thereby open political opportunities for the movements.
11.4.2.2 Role in the public forums and mass media

It has been found that not only NGOs directly involved with the cases but also other NGOs, both domestic and foreign, played their role in public forums and with the mass media. They showed a stance in favour of the villagers as the poor. They cooperated with academics to arrange press conferences and seminars regarding the projects, aiming to put pressure on the government and to present their concerns and arguments to them. They criticised government policy concerning the projects, for example: the environmental impact assessment of the PMD project, which was not disclosed to the public; repression, which sometimes led to confrontation; public hearing arrangements about the KSTD project, which NGOs thought were improper and invalid; disagreement with cabinet resolutions; policies of the state regarding compensation to people affected by the PMD. Meanwhile, major academic issues were raised, for example: the environmental impact assessment, the number of affected people and households, the impacts of the KSTD upon the forest, fish and livelihood, in the case of the PMD. Due to these actions of NGOs through the mass media, it could be said that they partly played their role in raising the controversial issue to the status of a national issue.

(1) Wildlife Fund of Thailand

It has been found that WFT apparently focused on the academic issues by raising various issue to the public, which was relevant to the background of the organisation. As WFT was a leading organisation focusing on natural resources, WFT suggested raising issues related to dam with the public. Surapol, head of WFT, explained that ‘we agreed that we should not only say “we do not want dam” but also we should mention our reasons and solutions. Then we opened a new issue to the public, the Issue of water resources management. We raised this issue in several academic forums’ (Surapol interview). The major issues regarding the KSTD were raised by NGOs are as follows:

(1.1) Public hearing
A public hearing on KSTD project held by the government was heavily criticised by many NGOs, saying that it was improper and invalid. After the schedule of the public hearing was announced, thirteen domestic NGOs expressed publicly that they unanimously disagreed with this plan by claiming that it did not follow the principles of a public hearing and would be another gathering of dam supporters (Manager, July 11, 1994; Bangkok Post, August 8, 1994; and Manager, July 11, 1994). In addition, on July 30 – two days before the public hearing was held – many NGOs held a joint press conference to confirm their disagreement with the public hearing. They insisted that it was improper and invalid (The Nation, July 31, 1994; Kao Sod, July 31, 1994; and Bangkok Post, August 8, 1994). The Director General of WFT, Surapol Duangkhae, suggested that ‘the public hearing should be held after the RID clarifies the 36 points of recommendation and criticism raised by the Office of National Resources and Environment Policy and Planning’. He further confirmed that ‘WFT rejected the RID’s Environmental Impact Assessment of the project’ (Bangkok Post, July 31, 1994).

(1.2) The number of submerged households
The issue of the number of households projected to be submerged due to dam construction was raised by NGOs, because the number estimated by the government was very different from that estimated by NGOs. According to WFT, about 10,000 villagers comprising 2,000 families will be evicted from their land if KSTD is constructed (Bangkok Post, September 17, 1994; and Bangkok Post, September 18, 1994). Chainarong Sreththachuea, a researcher of WFT, pointed out that this finding was greatly different from an initial report of the RID,
which said only about 3,500 villagers from 620 families would be relocated (Bangkok Post, September 18, 1994).

(1.3) Opposing cabinet approval
As cabinet approval is a significant step for project implementation, NGOs closely watched its movement. The Agriculture and Cooperatives Minister (Montri Pongpanich in Banharn Government) planned to submit the project for the cabinet approval when the Environmental Impact Assessment panel of experts had not yet agreed the project. This issue was criticised by NGOs, academics and students on the grounds that it did not follow the step identified by environmental law (Bangkok Post, September 20, 1995; The Nation, September 22, 1995). Meanwhile, at Chiang Mai University, a group consisting of academics, students, northern farmers and NGOs, who called themselves the ‘For Democracy and Environment Group’ made a joint statement to accuse the Prime Minister Banharn and his government of being opportunists for taking advantage of the flood crisis to build the controversial KSTD (The Nation, September 25, 1995). In July 1997, after the government announced its intention to submit the KSTD project to a cabinet meeting, ten NGOs held a press conference proposing three issues to the government: ‘the KSTD project should not be submitted to the mobile cabinet meeting on July 29; the government should disclose information about the dam to the public; a public hearing should be arranged’ (Daily Manager, July 25, 1997).

(1.4) The forest issue
Similar to other dam development projects, NGOs and academics raised the forests as a major issue of the KSTD project to argue with the state. They criticised that the project would result in the loss of forest areas, especially the last golden teak forest in the country (Bangkok Post, August 5, 1994 and Bangkok Post September 27, 1995). Meanwhile, the RID Director General, Mr. Sawat, admitted that 15,000 rai of teak forest and 35,000 rai of other tree varieties would be submerged, but the RID planned to afforest with 50,000 rai of compensation. In contrast to the view of NGOs, he further expressed that strict conservation of the environment sometimes forced people into constant poverty (Bangkok Post, August 5, 1994).

(2) Vanida and her team
The major issues regarding the PMD case raised by NGOs are as follows:

(2.1) Counter-movement
The PMD protest experienced many violent attacks. Apart from academics, lawyers and human right officers, NGOs played a major role in criticising the violent incidents. In 1993, after the anti-dam protesters confronted the dam supporters, with the result that the week-long protest was ended, Narong, a NGO staff member, claimed that EGAT treated the protesters as its enemy (The Nation, March 10, 1993). Later, representatives of ten NGOs met Prime Minister Chuan to seek his assurance that the authorities would not use force against the protesters (The Nation, March 5, 1993). In addition, public health NGOs delivered a letter to PM Chuan requesting that the government should consider the violent incident where the government used force to disperse anti-dam protesters (Daily Manager, March 11, 1993; Daily News, March 11, 1993). Chatchawan Thongdeelert, the chairman of the Coordinating Committee of NGOs for Rural Development in the North, declared that the violence reflected the Government’s insincerity in solving the problems resulting from the dam project (Bangkok Post, December 24, 1993).
NGOs requested the government to disclose the environmental impact of the PMD to the public. The committee on natural resources and environment conservation of 16 institutes and Project for Ecology Recovery arranged a press conference to disclose the facts about the PMD project. Two main issues were mentioned: the environmental impact had not been carefully considered, and the authority did not disclose clear information about the area that would be submerged (Saim Rath, May 24, 1991). In response to the view of Prime Minister Anand, saying a study showed that the dam would not have much impact on the environment, Siam Environmental Club chairman Surapol Sudara said that the study had not yet been completed, and the sub-committee members had still not determined the actual flood levels caused by the dam. Moreover, WFT President Phisit Na Phattalung said the government should not consider only the economic aspect of the dam (Bangkok Post, September 11, 1991 and Bangkok Post, September 15, 1991).

The PMD project was partly financed by the World Bank (WB) so the PMD movement used several ways to motivate the WB to withdraw its loan from the project. Even though the WB approved a loan to Thailand, the movement could delay its decision. Both Thai domestic and international NGOs publicly requested the WB to withdraw its support. For example, in 1991, several international NGOs urged the Bank not to release funds for the PMD (The Nation, March 16, 1991). Later, on September 9, the WB announced postponement of a decision on a loan for the project because it needed to review additional details of a physical nature (Bangkok Post, September 12, 1991; Bangkok Post, September 20, 1991). However, the WB Board of Directors approved funding for the PMD project, but the decision was not unanimous. Its decision was strongly criticised by environmental groups. Vitoon Pernpongsacharoen, Director of the Project for Ecological Recovery, pointed out that the World Bank decision was based on improperly obtained facts and information. He said ‘villagers explained their difficulties directly to the Executive of the World Bank but they seemed to have ignored them’. Also, Chainarong Setthachuea, a NGO worker, said the Bank ignored the voice of the affected people. The environmental group insisted that the WB decision was unacceptable (Bangkok Post, December 12, 1991 and The Nation, December 12, 1991).

11.5 The Political Opportunity Approach

The main argument of the political opportunity approach is that social movements are possible when political opportunities are available to them. Also, social movements are shaped by a broader set of political constraints. Next, the concept of openness and closedness is employed to examine why NGOs became involved in the two cases, and how political opportunity influences the resource mobilisation and the movement strategies. The analysis focuses on the following variables: capacity of state policy implementation; appearance of allies, such as elites and mass media; repression.

11.5.1 Why did NGOs get involved?

NGOs initially accessed both cases at different stages: Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT) started working with the KSTD case before its movement obviously appeared, whilst the PMD movement had already started, and the group of leaders was set up when Vanida first accessed the case. Wildlife Fund Thailand is a national environmental NGO focusing on the field of wildlife and forest conservation. It could be classified as a professional organisation, according to the criteria proposed by McCarthy and Zald. Surapol, head of WFT, mentioned
that accessing the KSTD case was initiated by the personal interest of the WFT’s staff. However, later the WFT decided to work with the case because the issue was related to the mainstream issue of the WFT, natural resources, especially forest and wildlife.

The NGO involved with the PMD movement is a group of people, led by Vanida. She decided to work with the PMD case because of her personal interest. She is interested in politics, and she has been an activist since she was a student and she joined the Communist Party Thailand after the 1976 bloodshed incident. Vanida related the movement to poverty. In her view, poverty is not a natural phenomenon, but it stems from unfairness in society and from the unfair distribution of resources. The poor are the majority in Thai society, but they are the weakest part of society. The poor people living in rural areas have to give their lands for the country’s development, but they cannot themselves gain access to the benefits of those developments. For example, the dam development aims to generate power for people in cities like Bangkok, not for the poor people in rural areas. In turn, the rural poor have to leave an abundant environment with fertile soil and move to arid areas with infertile soil. As a result, they struggle for a living and remain in a cycle of poverty. Vanida expressed her view about the PMD: ‘after I got involved with the PMD movement, I realised how nature is important to them. The government decided to convert the Mun River, which contains varieties of fish, into a dam to serve the needs of cities. I felt disappointed with this decision. The decision was made by the state without the participation of the people. People in the PMD area were never informed until the decision had been made. Taking part in the movement, I would like to prove to the public that man can live with nature. Assisting the poor is also my way to give something in return to ones who produce rice for us’ (Tantiwittaypitak, 2008).

Sompan, who is a senior field staff and works on a full-time basis, has been involved with the case since she studied at university. She decided to work for the PMD movement after her graduation, although her family disagreed with her decision. Her background is different from that of Vanida; she comes from a farming family in the northeast, while Vanida comes from a Chinese family in Bangkok. As Sompan has long experience of dealing with the PMD movement, she feels sympathy and shares value with PMD protesters. Both staff consider that the villagers were unfairly treated by the state. They think that the voices of villagers were not heard by the state. In sum, it could be said that these people decided to work with the movement because of their ideologies.

However, values and ideology alone are not enough to motivate them to support the movements; political opportunities should also be presented to them. For several decades, NGOs played a significant role in rural development by working with the poor in remote areas of the country that the government agencies could not access. Some rural people recognised them as the ones who devoted themselves to improving the lives of the poor. Relationships between government and NGOs are varied. The contributions of NGOs to support the government in various aspects are evidence of good relationships. However, NGOs involved in social movements against development projects are seen as anti-government. The government has a negative view of such NGOs, which are seen as ‘third hand’, interfering outsiders, and receiving foreign funds to destroy the country. Meanwhile, NGOs do not respond to such negative views on the part of the government because they might consider that it is a usual phenomenon in Thai society.

The policy of the government regarding NGOs has varied from one government to another. The Anund Panyarachun government, which came to power in 1992 after a people’s uprising, declared its intention to change policy on NGOs from ‘control’ to ‘promote and support’. It was the first time that the government had made an official announcement regarding policy
on NGOs (Chutima, 2004). However, the responses of the Thaksin Government seemed worse. Under the Thaksin Government, the Anti-Money Laundering Office confidentially ordered financial institutions to provide information related to the financial transactions and assets of twenty people including journalists, NGOs, advisors of the AOP including Vanida. This action was leaked to some of them and to the mass media. It was criticised that the request was initiated by the government, and a legal case was brought against the Anti-Money Laundering Office and its key staff on the grounds that they had violated their authority under the Prevention and Suppression of Money-Laundering Act 1999 (BE 2542). Finally, in February 2005, a majority of judges of the Administrative Court found that the respondents had used their authority without reasonable cause and had wrongfully used their discretionary powers, as well as violating the complainants’ right to privacy (Editorial Board, 2007).

It could be seen that political opportunities have gradually opened for NGOs throughout the long period of their development. Even though NGOs working with movements do not receive support from the state, they have never been obstructed by the government, which is possibly because of the following reasons:

(4) Even though governments have negative attitudes toward movement NGOs in public, there are many NGOs working with them, both as full-time staff and allies
(2) Some populist policies of the Thaksin Government were created by NGOs, especially the generations of 1976 student uprising
(3) The democratisation of Thailand has developed through several major steps during the past three to four decades. Therefore, civil society and public recognition of human rights have developed. In particular, the mass media plays a significant role in political criticism
(4) Most NGOs work with the rural poor who are the majority population of the country. Therefore, if governments obstruct NGOs, they may lose popularity among the poor. Thus, the opportunities are not entirely closed for NGOs.

11.5.2 Effects of political opportunities on resource mobilisation and movement strategies

Next, how political opportunities affect resource mobilisation and movement strategies will be examined by emphasising the following variables:

11.5.2.1 The policy implementation capacity of the state

Throughout almost twenty years, from 1989 until today, both case studies have experienced twelve governments. The government initiated the projects, and they have been the subjects of top-down decisions with little information disseminated to the public and without public consultation in the decision-making process. The PMD project decision was made in the Chartchai Government in 1989, while a decision on the KSTD project remains pending until today. The PMD project started construction under a non-elected government after the coup.

The KSTD case is still in the decision-making process. Initially, the World Bank considered supporting the project, but later decided to withdraw its support. The withdrawal of the WB was one factor obliging the government to delay its decision. In addition, no action was seriously taken by previous governments. Even though politicians and governments had raised the project was when the northern region faced either flooding or drought problems, no serious action was taken. They only made statements through the mass media, but no order
was passed to the implementing agency, RID, for further action. This situation would become the political openness for the KSTD movement to achieve its goal.

During the period of community preparation before the construction of the PMD, EGAT (the implementing agency) worked with community leaders such as, government officers, headmen and Kamnan (head of sub-district). EGAT was successful in mobilising those officers to support the project. They worked closely with EGAT staff. Unfortunately, the information about the project was not effectively disseminated to all villagers. Some information was distorted because of the way in which it was communicated, because most rural villagers have low abilities in reading and writing; therefore, group meetings and person-to-person communication became the ways to communicate and through which information could be distorted, either due to individual perceptions or misunderstandings; in addition some technical words are too difficult for villagers to understand. When the project started, in 1989, only positive information was given to the villagers for example: the project would provide jobs to local people and more water to the farming system. As regards the controversial impact of the PMD upon fishery, the government failed to deal with this issue at the initial stage. Vanida explained that when the villagers experienced the decrease of fish in the Mun River, the government said it was because of over-fishing, which was not true (Vanida interview). According to the World Commission on Dams Report, this issue was overlooked during the planning stage, because no study predicted that it would become problematic. The ideas to resolve this problem led to other controversial issues, such as: building a fish-ladder, which was not effective; zoning the area for compensation for fishery loss, which relied on only academic knowledge, but was not accepted by the affected people; the idea to set up an agricultural cooperative as part of the compensation, which was decided without villager participation.

As the administrative practice of the Thai polity is based on Cabinet resolutions, which are not law, the Cabinet can reconsider decisions at any time, depending on the policy of the government. This practice can constitute opportunities for both government and people; a new government can easily change the Cabinet resolutions of the previous one, and people can request the government to reconsider resolutions. For the KSTD movement, the resolution of the Cabinet is the first step towards project approval, so the movement has to keep watching the movements of each government closely, in particular when the power of the state transfers to a new government. For example, the Chavalit Government agreed to provide land for families affected by the PMD project, but the Chuan Government later cancelled this agreement.

Nevertheless, the campaigners in both cases achieved successes under the Thaksin Government, which was the strong one-party government. Thaksin considered the PMD protest when he first came to power by visiting the AOP protest camp near Government House, and he promised to seriously consider the AOP’s cases. Later, the Thaksin Government decided to open the PMD’s gates for four months a year, and announced that the Government would not take any further steps toward the KSTD project. It is well recognised that this government implemented policies favouring the poor. Thaksin’s party, Thai Rak Thai, received popularity in both the north (where the KSTD is located) and the northeast (where the PMD is located). Due to these decisions on both projects by the Thaksin Government, the Thai Rak Thai party could maintain popularity among the poor in those regions.

During the interim government led by the caretaker Sorayut (September 2006 – January 2008) after the 19 September coup and during the movement against the Thaksin government.
before the coup, no mass demonstration was launched, as the campaigners considered that the interim government would be in power for only a short period. Moreover, the AOP, including the PMD and KSTD movements, did not join the movement against the Thaksin Government, although they were invited to do so, because they thought that it was not consistent with their aims.

In addition, Thai people have enjoyed greater political rights and access to a broader social movement since the new Constitution was officially declared in 1997. The 1997 Thai Constitution explicitly recognised people's rights. It stipulates that human dignity, not only the rights and liberties of an individual, must be protected. These rights include individual rights, community rights, and the rights of children, the elderly, the disabled and equality of the sexes. In total, there are forty rights mentioned, as compared to only nine rights in the first Constitution, declared in 1932. For the first time, the 1997 Constitution grants people 'the right to resist peacefully' and 'the rights to access government information'. People are granted rights to sue the government and public agencies, and to lodge complaints with the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman. After the 1997 Constitution was declared, Thai people became more understanding of their rights.

11.5.2.2 Appearance of allies

(1) Elites

The background of the KSTD community is different from that of the PMD. The Sa-ibab sub-district had been involved in the logging business for a very long period, so people, in particular leaders of the community, had created relationships with high ranking local officials, both at district and province levels, and with local and national politicians. The PMD community has only a farming background (the same as most rural communities in Thailand), so they could not create relationships as same as the KSTD's villagers could. Therefore, the KSTD community leader, Kamnan Chum, who became one of the KSTD-SMO advisors, played his role as a lobbyist by personally discussing with people such as governors, heads of district and politicians. He acted as a middleman between the movement and local government. He explained why villagers were protesting against the project and he became involved in resolving conflicts between authorities and the KSTD movement. For example, when the vehicle transporting the World Bank team was attacked by villagers, the case was settled by his efforts, although the governor announced that 'a lawsuit against the villagers will be filed' (Bangkok Post, July 15, 1994). He personally discussed the case with authorities including the police, the head of district and the governor. Finally, no one was arrested and someone outside the movement paid the compensation for the vehicle damage. In addition, as some provincial officials viewed that NGOs hired villagers to join demonstrations, Kamnan Chum responded that 'NGOs working in my area have never operated as you thought. They acted as advisors providing us with information and knowledge. They have never guided us to violate the law' (Kamnan Chum interview). Then, local officials working in the area gained a positive attitude toward the role of NGOs and opposing villagers.

Moreover, both movements have been supported by NGOs. With NGO assistance, both cases have enjoyed enhanced opportunities to challenge the power of the state. NGOs create connections with elites in the governments and the mass media. Therefore, the movements received information about the government actions, and they could plan to respond effectively. When mass demonstrations were planned, they informed elites in the government, and then venues, facilities and permits were arranged for them. Even when the
use of force was planned, NGOs were informed in advance by elites in the government. The reason why Thai NGOs can mobilise elites for the movements is that: most NGO workers are middle class and have graduated from universities, through which they have connections with classmates and relatives working with the state. As the patronage system is deeply rooted in Thai society, those connections could benefit NGOs' work; thus NGOs might get support from their connections in terms of inside information. For example, many of the generation of 1976 student activists, known as ‘Octoberists’, who work in politics support NGOs. The patronage system may not help with conflict with the state or in policy change, but it can be useful in terms of transmitting information from the government side.

(2) The Assembly of the Poor (AOP)

Under the umbrella of the AOP, the movements could mobilise more allies, including affected people, from its members across the country, domestic and international NGOs, academics and student activists. The AOP establishment became a tool for creating political opportunities for the poor. They could mobilise more demonstrators and could develop movement strategies. As a result, the AOP was able to run the longest and largest mass demonstration, which led to series of negotiations between the AOP and the government. Moreover, it could motivate the public to recognise the poverty problem.

(3) The mass media

The mass media plays a very significant role in both cases, in particular, raising awareness, so that it becomes a national issue. This study finds that the mass media could either open or close opportunities for the movements in different ways.

According to the press coverage of the case studies, the mass media could close opportunity for the movements. The authorities, including high-ranking officials, local and national politicians, made accusations against the movements by being interviewed by the mass media, particularly while mass demonstrations were being arranged. For example, villagers were accused of being communists; it was alleged that villagers were hired to take part in demonstrations. A specialist of RID said ‘I am confident that the villagers do not have ideas to oppose the project by themselves but they have been encouraged by someone’ (Neaw Na December 27, 1992). As a result, those messages could prevent the development of sympathy for the protesters among the public, and could prevent the development of public support and understanding. This can be seen in the press, which reported that ‘many middle class people in Bangkok believed that the demonstrators were hired and their action caused the traffic problem’ (Kaosod, October 17, 2000). Meanwhile, it influenced the movements’ mobilisation strategy with the result that they declined to accept any donations and tried to rely on their own capacities as much as they could. This finding supports the statement of Zald (1992), saying that public perception is the outcome of media coverage, which can shape the movement.

When confrontations or violent incidents occurred, they became the subject of headlines in the mainstream media, including newspapers, television and radio. Meanwhile, this could open opportunities for the movements. The incidents were criticised by many parties such as academics, NGOs and lawyers. For example, after the PMD demonstrators clashed with police while invading the Government House, the chairman of the Union for Civil Liberty Charan Dhitaphichai said ‘while the government claims the sight of a mob ruins Thailand’s reputation for tourism, its ill treatment of the group is even worse’ (Daily News, July 18, 2000 and Bangkok Post, July 23, 2000). In the criticism, other relevant issues such as human
rights, poverty and the policy of the government toward the poor people were raised. The movements’ backgrounds and rationales were criticised before the public. The participants in both cases thus were given opportunities to explain their reasons and express their views to the public. In addition, various photos presented by mass media influenced the emotional reactions of the public; for example, photos of women demonstrators (most of them elderly) being aggressively treated by police; photos of women with their babies and children being arrested. As a result, public sympathy toward, and understanding of the movements rose, although it occurred in a short period.

Both case studies also created opportunities by using the mass media. The PMD movement attempted to attract the mass media by using mass demonstrations and novel methods. Those activities were not only designed to put pressure on the government but also to attract coverage. The activities included marathon demonstrations in Bangkok and at the dam site in Ubon Rachathani by establishing camps called ‘village for the poor’ and ‘Mae Mun Man Yeun Village’; marching from Ubon Rachathani to Bangkok; invasion into the Government House. These activities were designed to attract the mass media, and were successful in doing so. In addition, the opponents of the PMD ran a community radio station, while the KSTD did not. For the PMD movement, having its own form of media proved to be useful for communication with people both inside and outside the movement.

The movements of the poor in Thailand, like other countries, face difficulties in accessing the media. However, with NGO assistance, they can reach the media’s attention. The forms and actions of the movements also affect whether the media is attracted to report them, which supports the statements of some scholars such as Carmin. Therefore, the unconventional actions, including invasion of government buildings, mass demonstrations and rallies, were always reported by all kinds of mass media. The campaigners had to create activities that could motivate the media’s attention, such as a long-distance marching. As mentioned above, the mass media could either close or open political opportunities for movements. Meanwhile, the movements themselves could create opportunities. These findings support the statements of scholars such as Gamson and Mayer, who say that the mass media plays an important role in defining political opportunities for movements.

(4) Repression

The movements faced repression from the government from the moment they emerged, but the PMD movement experienced it more heavily than the KSTD, as it conducted more radical forms of collective action. The common repression methods included: that protesters were accused as communists and that protesters were hired by someone.

Various methods of repression faced by the PMD actors can be summarised as follows.

(4.1) Threats in many forms
For example, in early 1990, as a big rally was planned, police and soldiers came to various villages to threaten villagers not to join the rally. The headmen also received threats that they would be deposed if people in their villages joined the rally (Matichon, February 8, 1990). Students activists were warned to refrain from becoming involved in the PMD protest, saying that ‘it might not be safe’ (Bangkok Post, April 25, 1990). NGO workers, such as Vanida, Somparn, and Bumnee, reported that they were threatened for their lives by letters. Unsigned leaflets were distributed warning that if the protest leaders did not give up and students guarding the villagers did not leave, force would be used, and their safety was not guaranteed (The Nation, December 10, 1994; Siam Post, December 10, 1994).
(4.2) Counter-demonstration
As the PMD movement staged many short and long demonstrations and rallies, many
counter-demonstrations to support the project were organised. In the PMD case, it has been
found that headmen and Kannans led most counter-demonstrations. For example, in
November 1994, about 15,000-20,000 people, led by Kamnan and headmen, rallied to
support the dam. The rally was held on the opposite side of the road from Ubon’s city hall,
where about 500 villagers were protesting against the dam (Bangkok Post, November 1,
1994; The Nation, November 1, 1994). In the views of opposing villagers, Kamnan and
headmen, with EGAT’s support, played a key role in mobilising people for the counter-
movement. NGOs and villager leaders said people joining the counter-movement were paid
200-500 baht each (Air, Bunmee, Kan, Reon and Jan interviews). Air illustrated that ‘at Ban
Hua Heaw, the community was apparently divided into two sides, those of the AOP and the
EGAT; some villagers took both sides. Bunmee pointed out that ‘some headmen supported
villagers to join the anti-dam activities because they realised that if the protesters achieved
the goal, in particular, in term of compensation, they could also gain the same benefit (Jan
interview). However, according to Bunmee, some Kamnan and headmen participated in
meetings and discussions with opposing villagers, but they could not show their roles in
public. In addition, not only Kamnan and headmen participated, but also Tambon Council
members (Bunmee interview).

(4.3) Blockade
When anti-dam demonstrations and rallies occurred, especially in Ubon province, the
provincial authorities, such as the police, set up checkpoints to prevent people from joining
the activities and to block food supplies. Sometimes, violence occurred; for example, while
the Sirinthorn dam protesters were travelling to join the PMD protest in December 1994, they
clashed violently with the police. PMD demonstrators believed the action was designed to
pressure them into giving up the protest (The Nation, December 6, 1994). The positive way
was also conducted by offering temporary jobs to the PMD villagers when the mass
demonstration was announced (Air interview).

(4.4) Using force and disperse
Force was used to disperse the PMD protest, resulting in injuries. In December 2002, a group
of unidentified men raided and vandalised the AOP’s campsite near Government House.
However, it failed to discourage the protesters from giving up their campaign to get PMD’s
sluice gates opened permanently because they announced their intention to return to Bangkok to
reinforce their protest (Bangkok Post, December 7, 2002). The violence was widely criticised
by NGOs, academics and some politicians, who requested that government should investigate
the case.

(4.5) Distorting information and spreading rumours
The villagers’ leaders were commonly portrayed as remnants of communism, while NGOs
were portrayed as ‘traitors’ who received funding from overseas. The accusations and
distorted information were distributed while demonstration and rallies were being arranged,
sometimes when plans for protesting activities were announced to the public. Rumours of
dispersing demonstrations were often released. In February 1990, during the Chartchaei
Government, more than 5,000 people rallied to protest against the PMD project. They
distributed leaflets informing the public about the dam’s environmental impact, while an
unidentified group distributed many leaflets in the town accusing the protesters of receiving
financial support from communists (Bangkok Post, February 12 1990; The Nation, February
13, 1990; Bangkok Post, February 14, 1990; The Nation, February 14, 1990). In March 1993,
General Chamlong, City Police Commander, said ‘the PMD demonstration had no support from any political party but the movements have been run by NGOs aiming to receive foreign funds’ (Thai Rath, March 11, 1993 and Matichon, March 11, 1993). In 2000, during the prolonged demonstration in front of the Government House, many middle class people in Bangkok believed that the demonstrators were hired and their action caused the traffic problem (Kaosod, October 17, 2000). In this regard, Kan, a leader, said ‘it was untrue because we did not receive money from anyone and we joined with our own support’ (Kan interview).

Various methods of repression influenced resource mobilisation, in particular, human and money. As a result, the movements decided to mainly rely on themselves as much as they could and attempted to mobilise resources within their SMOs. Also, repression highly affected the attitudes of the public. Politicians and high-ranking officers announced that only the people directly affected should participate in protests against the development project. Other parties were seen as outsiders. Even though the public felt sympathy for demonstrators when the violent incidents were presented by the mass media, it was not so strong as to turn sympathy into support for those political actors. Therefore, the movements did not attempt to convert bystander publics into constituencies. They aimed to mobilise only people within their SMOs.

The government have a negative attitude to the NGOs, in particular, NGOs working with social and political movements. NGOs had to keep their role only as a resource for villagers; they tried not to show their active role to the public. Meanwhile, the villagers had to develop their capacities to carry out tasks for their movements. As a result, this combination of adverse circumstances became opportunities for villagers to strengthen their own mobilisation as social movements. With NGO support, the villagers thus become more capable in politics. Therefore, the repression by the state can affect the movement strategies in both positive and negative ways.

NGOs became involved with the movements at various stages of their development: WFT entered the KSTD area before the movement started, but after the policy on the dam project had been announced; Vanida entered the PMD area after the movement had developed to the organised stage, by which time the movement had set up its organisations and had clear aims.

11.6 Hypothesis: NGOs become involved in environmental conflict cases in Thailand as resources for, not as actors in, the movements.

According to the role of NGOs mentioned above, NGOs got involved with both the PMD and KSTD movements as both resources and actors. As resources, NGOs assisted SMOs by providing information and knowledge necessary for the movements. As actors, NGOs have played a role in mobilising resources, in particular human resources; raising the issue to the national level; and opening political opportunities for movements.

Even though NGOs played their role as resources and actors, degrees of participation in both cases were different, varying according to the needs of the movements. As villagers created the movements, NGOs wanted to support the poor because they considered that the poor had been treated unfairly. Initially, NGOs did not intend to be actors in the movements, but they focused instead on assisting villagers to achieve their goals. Meanwhile, due to repression from the state, only affected people have rights to participate in the movements; others are viewed by the state as outsiders. Then, to reduce repression from the state, NGOs tried not to appear as actors to the public. As a result, NGOs played their role where villagers could not
do it (or where it was beyond the capacities of villagers). The different degrees of being actors of NGOs can be seen in those two cases. WFT did not get involved in the internal mobilisation of KSTD-SMO, as villagers could do it by themselves. In contrast, Vanida and her team who were involved in the PMD movement had to mobilise human resources in its SMOs. This was because of the following reasons: the PMD case covered a large area; the free-rider problem emerged; and the participants had faced many methods of repression from the state. The role of NGOs outside SMOs depended on the backgrounds of NGOs. According to the results of this study, WFT, a leading national NGO focusing on academic aspects of natural resource conservation, played its role in focusing on academic aspects related to its specialised area. In contrast, Vanida and her team did not focus on academic aspect.

This study emphasises the role of NGOs inside SMOs, which previous studies have neglected. Therefore, the role as actors of NGOs was not apparent in those previous studies.

11.7 Conclusion

There are two NGOs involved in the case studies: Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT) and a group of people led by Vanida. The NGO involved in the KSTD movement is Wildlife Fund Thailand, which is a national NGO. WFT can be classified as a professional organisation whose headquarters is located in Bangkok. In contrast, the NGO involved in the PMD case is a group of people led by Vanida. Vanida worked at a national level based in Bangkok, while Sompan worked as a team leader in the PMD area, coordinating with villagers in the area and with other networks in the northeast. However, both NGOs played similar roles in the movements, including shaping the movements, human resource mobilisation, acting as transmitters and raising various issues to the public and mass media. However, Vanida and her team had to work harder than the WFT in human mobilisation because the PMD movement was confronted with repression from the state, more so than the KSTD movement. It has been found that NGOs participated in the movements because of their ideologies favouring the poor, and because political opportunities opened for them. Opportunities have gradually opened for NGOs throughout the long period of their development. Even though NGOs involved in the social movements do not gain support from the state, the political opportunities are not entirely closed to them. Meanwhile, political opportunity influences resource mobilisation and movement strategies because of three variables: (1) the policy implementation capacity of the state; (2) the appearance of allies, such as elites, who were mainly mobilised by NGOs, the AOP and the mass media; (3) repression. Therefore, it has been found that NGOs played their roles as both resources and actors in the movements. The degrees of being actors in the movements are different, depending on the needs of those movements.

The results discussed chapters 9-11 lead to the conclusion in the next chapter.
Chapter 12
Conclusion

This final chapter offers a summary of what has been discussed in the previous chapters. The summary focuses on answers to the research questions set at the beginning of this thesis: why and how NGOs become involved in the conflict over environmental development projects in Thailand; how environmental movements have developed. Then conclusions are drawn as to how the social movement theories can be applied to the cases of Thailand.

12.1 The role of NGOs

Thai NGOs became involved in environmental conflicts as both resources and actors. As resources, NGOs provided necessary knowledge and information for the movements, for example: movements of the government regarding the projects’ implementation; academic and technical information; ideas and views to the SMOs’ meetings. As actors, NGOs played several roles including: shaping the movements, mobilising human resources, raising various controversial issues to the public, raising the case to the level of a national issue, and criticising policies and actions of the governments through the mass media and academic forums. Even though the study shows that NGOs played their role in the movement as resources and actors, NGOs did not intend to be actors when they first accessed these cases. NGOs aimed to provide assistance to villagers to achieve their goals because villagers, not NGOs, had created the movements. However, due to the needs of the movements being beyond the capacities of villagers, NGOs had to play their role as actors. It could be seen that degrees of being actors in both movements are different: the NGO involved in the PMD case had to put more effort into mobilising human resources to participate in the activities than the NGO working for the KSTD case. Meanwhile, NGOs tended not to show themselves as actors to the public because of repression from the state. Therefore, the role of NGOs in the movements as actors might not been seen in the studies which is not deeply emphasise the relationship of NGOs and SMOs.

12.2 Why NGOs became involved

Even though access to the KSTD case was motivated by the personal interest of a member of staff of Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT), later WFT decided to support the case because of its relevance to the main aim of the organisation, which focuses on natural resources. WFT can be classified as a professional SMO. On the other hand, NGO involvement in the PMD case consists of a group of people led by Vanida. Vanida and Sompan, her colleague, decided to support the PMD movement because of their ideologies favouring the poor. Even though they did not mention the name or character of their organisation, they had structure for their work: Vanida mainly worked at national level and was based in Bangkok; Sompan worked at regional level and coordinated networks and organisations in the northeast. However, values and ideology are not the only factors that encouraged NGOs to get involved with both cases; also important are the political opportunities presented to them as a result of a long period of their development in Thai society. NGOs working for social and political movements have never been obstructed, although they do not gain support from the state. This might be because of the development of democratisation and their contribution to the poor, which is the majority population of the country.
12.3 How the movements were organised.

All activities of the movements were run by SMOs. SMOs of the KSTD and PMD movements are informal and have a decentralised structure with forms of loose commitment. SMOs aimed for policy change, relieving their grievances as their first priority. No outsiders sit as members of SMOs, but they were involved as supporters and members of alliances. NGOs were viewed as outsiders by SMOs. Roles of NGOs and SMOs have been clearly identified: NGOs mainly mobilised resources from outside SMOs, while SMOs mobilised resources from inside SMOs. Villagers carry out all decision-making, not NGOs. It has been found that the model of types and sources of mobilising resources of the poor in the US, proposed by Cress and Snow, fits with the movement of the poor in Thailand. The ways of mobilising the resources of the poor are distinguished into four categories: moral; material; knowledge and information; and human. With respect to moral resources, in both cases campaigners received massive sympathetic support from various organisations, but they received little solidaristic support because only student activists and some domestic NGOs apparently participated in their collective actions. Most material resources were mobilised from facilities within SMOs. The movements utilised knowledge and information from many sources; for example, study tours, researches, experiences and NGOs. Repression from the state has highly affected resource mobilisation since the movements emerged. Due to the allegations that demonstrators were hired, SMOs decided to decline to accept donations from outsiders and instead requested all actors to cover all their own expenses. As a result, some could not participate because they could not afford to. Campaigners in the PMD case experienced repression more seriously than did protesters against the KSTD. The movements did not aim to mobilise bystander publics to join their activities because the state claimed that only the people affected should participate in the protests. The free riding problem emerged in the PMD case, as it became a tool for repression by the state.

The strategies used by the PMD movement were more radical than those of the KSTD, as the PMD mainly relied on mass demonstrations. Identity reconstruction became a main strategy of the KSTD movement. As KSTD villagers had been notorious as forest destroyers because of their past involvement in the logging business, they attempted to reconstruct their identities by turning themselves into forest conservationists. Meanwhile, PMD protesters raised the fish issue, as a concrete demonstration of the importance of their traditional way of living, to argue with the state. The participants of both case studies also related to other issues such as human rights and poverty. The study also shows that factors of openness and closedness of political opportunities influenced resource mobilisation and the movements' strategies. Those factors include:

1. Capacity of state policy implementation

The government failed from the planning stage to deal with the controversial impact of the PMD project upon fishery. As a Cabinet resolution is the first step towards project approval, the KSTD movement has to closely follow the movements of each government; in particular, when power transfers to a new government. The PMD movement put pressure on the government until a Cabinet resolution regarding the demand was announced. When Thaksin came to power, opportunities were open for protesters because his Government ran a policy favouring the poor. Also, Thaksin’s party, Thai Rak Thai, hoped to be able to maintain its popularity in the north and northeast regions.
(2) Appearance of allies

as KSTD villagers used to be involved with the logging business, some villagers, especially community leaders, had opportunities to develop their relationships with high-ranking officers and politicians. As a result, government officers in the KSTD area have a positive attitude to the movement. However, the PMD villagers did not have this opportunity. NGOs played a major role in mobilising elites in the government and mass media in favour of the movements.

(3) The mass media

The negative attitude of government officers and politicians expressed through the media prevented sympathy of and support from the public. In contrast, media reports of violent confrontation encouraged sympathy from the public, led to widespread criticism and raised other relevant issues, such as poverty and national policy with respect to it. Some activities were designed to attract media attention in order to create opportunities for the movements.

(4) Repression

Due to the negative views of the government with respect to NGO support, NGOs had to keep their role only as a resource in public; then villagers' campaigners needed to be strengthened to cover movement tasks. As a result, villagers become more skilful and more capable in politics.

12.4 Applying the resource mobilisation theory to the case of Thailand

Resource mobilisation theory developed based on Olson's public good theory, which focuses on costs and benefits. The proponents of the theory believe that humans are rational and view social movements as goal-oriented activities. Resource mobilisation theorists believe that social movements are effective when sufficient resources are available to them. The resource mobilisation approach focuses on three elements: costs and benefits of participation, organisation, and expectation of success. A social movement organisation (SMO) is an instrument for organising movements to achieve their goals. The approach sees SMOs as similar to other organisations in a market. Therefore, SMOs can develop and decline and have many types of structure and form. According to Olson, actors are assumed to calculate costs and benefits when participating in collective action. Some people prefer to get a free ride by letting others act. Olson argues that people participate in collective action only when there are incentives offered to them. The resource mobilisation approach sees free riding as a problem in collective action. However, many scholars criticise this view on the grounds that people take part in collective action not only because of selective incentives but also for other reasons.

Resource mobilisation theory helps us to explain how movements have been organised. The theory argues that organisation is a tool for goal achievement. This proposition is borne out in both our cases. This research has found that all movement activities in both cases had been run by their own SMOs. The SMOs in both cases were structured with the roles and functions of the main actors were clearly identified. Communication among participants, leaders and advisors in SMOs was also identified.

In addition, the role of NGOs can be examined through the activities of SMOs, although NGOs are not classified as members of the SMOs of the case studies. On the other hand,
NGOs working with the villagers in these cases can also be classified as SMOs, which take different forms in each case. The WFT (which provides assistance to the KSTD movement) is a professional organisation, while the NGO working with the PMD is a group of people in the form of an informal organisation. However, those NGOs must share ideas, goals and political values with the SMOs in each case so that the movements will accept the NGOs. Even though both NGOs chose different forms of their organisations, they have the same ideologies and the same structures for their works. The concept of SMOs in resource mobilisation theory is useful to help us examine the interaction between NGOs and SMOs. Mainly, NGOs assisted the movements in resource mobilisation from outside the SMOs.

The theory emphasises the significance of outside contributions and the cooptation of institutional resources. This, too, is borne out in the case of the movement of the poor of Thailand. As resources from outside SMOs, NGOs played a very significant role in supporting social movements. It is true in the case of Thailand, in particular the movement of the poor, that the major concern of SMOs is resource mobilisation. The mobilisation of the resources of the poor of Thailand corresponds to the model proposed by Cress and Snow who studied the resource mobilisation of the poor in the US. Knowledge and information became an important resource for the movement of the poor in Thailand. Both the KSTD and PMD cases started with mobilising knowledge to support the movements. The knowledge and information included basic human rights, law and regulations and project information. Later, they mobilised technical knowledge in order to strengthen the capacities of participants of the movements.

In the development of SMOs, the KSTD-SMO was established at the initial stage of the development of the movement because it was suggested by an NGO; that is, by an outside resource. However, the PMD-SMO emerged through the stages of social movement development in accordance with the sequence outlined by resource mobilisation theorists. Thus, with assistance from outsiders such as NGOs, the KSTD movement could develop their SMOs to the stage of formalised organisation from the moment the movement started; they did not move through the lifecycle of social movement development envisaged by the resource mobilisation theorists.

People participating in the PMD and KSTD movements were rational. They participated in the movements because the projects had adverse effects on their livelihoods. In the KSTD case, people participated without selective incentives and without apparently making any calculation of costs and benefits. Even though the free riding problem occurred in the PMD case, it did not naturally arise as Olson theorised. Instead, the free riding concept became a tool of state repression. However, people did not participate in the PMD movements for a number of reasons, and not only because they wanted a free ride. This finding does not support the idea of the calculation of costs and benefits as the basis of participation, as the theory proposes.

Resource mobilisation theorists emphasise costs and benefits and ignore the role of grievances. However, in the case of Thailand, grievances became a main factor encouraging people to participate in social movements.
The PMD case supported Jenkins's argument that generating solidarity and moral commitment to collective actions is a major task in mobilisation. As non-participation occurred for several reasons, not only because of free riders, the campaigners of the PMD had to put more efforts into generating solidarity and commitment. Meanwhile, the KSTD's campaigners did not attempt to generate commitment among participants.

12.5 Applying the Political Opportunity Approach to the case of Thailand

The main argument of the political opportunities approach is that social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities. In addition, actors can also create opportunities for themselves. The political opportunities approach distinguishes between the openness and closedness of political systems and situations. The degree of openness or closedness of political opportunities depends on variables such as: splits within elites, political realignment within the polity, repression and appearance of allies. Different scholars define the concept of political opportunity structure differently. Kitschelt introduces the concept of 'political input structures' and 'political output structures'. Kriesi et al. employ two sets of variables: a formal institutional structure, in which they distinguish between strong states and weak states; and informal strategies, which are either exclusive or integrative. Moreover, Dryzek et al. employ two dimensions to identify state structures: states can be either exclusive or inclusive in their structures; and political opportunities in Thailand: why NGOs get involved in the two cases; and how they influence resource mobilisation and movement strategies. Nevertheless, this research does not demonstrate the effects of other variables suggested by Tarrow: accessibility of the party-system and policy decisions; political realignment and splits within the elites.

The concept of openness and closedness is useful in the case of Thailand. Variables including the policy implementation capacity of the state, the appearance of allies, and repression help us explain the situations of social movements in Thailand: why NGOs get involved in the two cases; and how they influence resource mobilisation and movement strategies. Nevertheless, this research does not demonstrate the effects of other variables suggested by Tarrow: accessibility of the party-system and policy decisions; political realignment and splits within the elites.

The political opportunity approach is correct in saying that open opportunities invite non-confrontational strategies. It is relevant to the KSTD case: political opportunities were opened to KSTD campaigners. Most authorities in the area had positive attitudes to the protesters and NGOs. The capacity for policy implementation of the state was also weak. As a result, the KSTD employed conventional strategies such as lobbying and petitioning, not large-scale demonstrations. On the other hand, the PMD experienced less openness than the KSTD because of the different conditions. They relied on radical methods such as large-scale demonstrations.

Carmin (2003) is right to introduce the idea that when resources are high and opportunities are almost closed or ajar, actors are likely to use collective action, protest and other methods. This is relevant to the PMD case. After the Assembly of the Poor was established in late 1995, the PMD could mobilise more human resources and elites, and could run more radical activities including large-scale demonstrations. Social movements in the cases we have considered in Thailand are successful because of open political opportunities rather than the effectiveness of collective action and resource mobilisation. The KSTD campaigners achieved their goal insofar as the project still remains at the decision-making stage because of the weakness of government in implementing its policy. Campaigners in both the KSTD and PMD cases achieved their goals under the Thaksin government because the government implemented its policy favouring the poor. Even though the PMD movement entered many
series of negotiations with the state and many joint committees were formed, it could not reach resolution; it became the tactic of the government to relieve tension between the movement and the state, while the movement considered that this was the government's way to buy time.

In the Thai cases, the mass media played a significant role in helping the social movements to create opportunities. The media raised the level of the movements to the status of national issues. The PMD organised several activities aimed at attracting the attention of the mass media; for example, long marches, marathon demonstrations, invasion of Government House and running its community radio.

State repression not only negatively affected the movements but also provided positive effects for the movements. Because the negative views of the state toward NGOs inhibited them from becoming very prominently involved, opportunities were created for protesters to strengthen their own mobilisation and, as a result, they then became more capable in politics. Moreover, when the news of violent confrontation was presented in the mass media, it created opportunities for the movements because public sympathy for, and understanding of, the movements rose.

It is difficult to explain how political opportunities have affected the movement strategies in the two cases studied in terms of the institutional structure of the state. In this aspect, the cases have experienced the same political opportunity structure and the same society, but they organised their activities in different ways: the KSTD movement ran non-confrontational methods but the PMD case mainly depended on radical activities. The institutional structure of the state cannot explain why movements in the two cases employed different methods. However, it can be seen that since the 1997 Constitution was officially announced, the political structure of Thailand has dramatically changed. As a result, Thai people have a better understanding of their political rights. In the KSTD case, greater opportunities have been presented to the movement, as the local authorities have positive attitudes and repression from the state has been reduced.

12.6 Conclusion

This study shows that it was the poor, not NGOs who created the movements. NGOs play their role in environmental movements in Thailand as resources and actors. NGOs became involved in both case studies because they wanted to assist villagers with whom they empathised as the poor, and because political opportunities were presented to them. SMOs became a significant means to manage the movements. Functions and roles of SMOs and NGOs have been clearly identified. It has been proven that resource mobilisation theory and the political opportunity approach help us to examine the environmental movements in Thailand. People rationally participated in the movements, according to Olson's theory. Nevertheless those who did not take part in the movements failed to do so for a number of reasons, not only because they wanted a free ride, which does not support Olson's theory. The role of NGOs and their interaction with SMOs of the movements can be investigated through the concept of SMOs proposed by the resource mobilisation theory. The cases of the social movements of the poor of Thailand demonstrate that resource mobilisation is a major concern of SMOs. The concept of openness and closedness of political opportunities can help to explain the incidence of the phenomenon of social movements in Thailand, but the concept of political opportunity structure does not shed much light on cases within the same political environment. Studies of NGOs and environmental movements in Thailand are still in their infancy. The topics on which there is a need for further studies include: the contribution of
NGOs to other local and national environmental conflict cases; the free riding issue; improvement of environmental impact assessment; and public participation in decision making in development projects in ways suitable to the Thai context.
Appendices
Appendix I
Project Location
## Appendix II

### List of Interviewees

**Keang Sue Ten Dam Project:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Interview date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surapol (WFT)</td>
<td>9 February 2006 (Bangkok)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannarong (WFT)</td>
<td>30 November 2006 (Bangkok)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noi (NGO)</td>
<td>4 February 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Wat Don Chai</td>
<td>25 January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisanu</td>
<td>25 January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaleaw</td>
<td>26 January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanmun</td>
<td>26 January 2006</td>
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<td>Wad</td>
<td>26 January 2006</td>
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<td>Chuan</td>
<td>27 January 2006</td>
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<td>Lek</td>
<td>27 January 2006</td>
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<td>Seng</td>
<td>27 January 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamnan Chum</td>
<td>27 January 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>U-dom</td>
<td>29 January 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sagnuan Kantawong</td>
<td>29 January 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head Assistance Officer of Song District Office</td>
<td>31 January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To, Kan, Aew (Members of Ta Kon Yom Youth group)</td>
<td>29 January 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of Khong Jiam district office</td>
<td>9 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kao Sod news reporter</td>
<td>12 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of Public Health Station</td>
<td>2 February 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director of Wat Don Chai School</td>
<td>2 February 2006</td>
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**Pak Mun Dam Project**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanida (NGO)</td>
<td>20 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunmee (NGO)</td>
<td>7 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sompan (NGO)</td>
<td>10 March 2006</td>
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<td>Air (NGO)</td>
<td>7 March 2006</td>
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<td>Kan</td>
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<td>Reon</td>
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<td>Pha</td>
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<td>Saweang</td>
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<td>Jun</td>
<td>8 March 2006</td>
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<td>Kammai</td>
<td>8 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior District Officer (Phibun MungsaHarn)</td>
<td>8 March 2006</td>
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<td>Banyat</td>
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<td>Snit</td>
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<td>Bunsu</td>
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<td>Sing</td>
<td>9 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudjai</td>
<td>10 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of Khong Jiam district office</td>
<td>9 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Sod news reporter</td>
<td>12 March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirinthorn District</td>
<td>13 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan (Ban Pan Chart)</td>
<td>13 March 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wannee (Ban Pan Chart)</td>
<td>13 March 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EGAT senior staff

Royal Irrigation Department (RID)
Niwat Charnkul, Senior Expert Officer

EGAT
Pramote Chamamathana
Director of Water Power Construction Division
Samart Pupaibun
Director Assistance of Community Relations Division

14 March 2006
12 June 2007

12 June 2007
12 June 2007
Appendix III
Thai Government Structure

House of Senate

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House of Representatives

Prime Minister
And Cabinet

Office of Prime Minister
Ministry of Interior
Other Ministries

Provincial Governor

District Officer

Head of Tambon (Kamnan)

Head of Village (headman)

Bangkok Administration
City of Pattaya
Municipality

Provincial Administrative Council
Tambon Administrative Council
Sukhapiban Committee (Mini Council)

Local Administration

Central Administration

Provincial Administration
## Appendix IV: Brief of the National Economic and Social Development Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Plan</th>
<th>Main aim and concept</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan 1</td>
<td>Economic growth based on the idea that development is economic development.</td>
<td>• Infrastructure development, such as transportation systems, dams both for irrigation and power generation purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1961-1966)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan 2</td>
<td>Economic growth, following plan 1</td>
<td>• Infrastructure development, focusing on remote areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1967-1971)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• mentioning the importance of regional development, specially in the Northeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• promoting free market economy and suggesting an import-substitution strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan 3</td>
<td>Economic growth and social development</td>
<td>• focused on financial stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1972-1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• formulating the population policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan 4</td>
<td>Economic recovery and rehabilitating natural resources</td>
<td>• increasing agricultural production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1977-1981)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• improving the industrial structure for export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• formulating policies on natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• supporting small-scale industry; in particular, in rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Plan</td>
<td>Main aim and concept</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Changing from project planning to programme development. | • developing the eastern seaport development programme  
• poverty eradication, targeting 286 districts  
• initiating an environmental policy  
(During this period, the country experienced the oil crisis and the increasing costs of foreign debts in the early 1980s.) |
| Plan 6 (1987-1991) | To cope with the severe macro-economic imbalances in the mid-1980s  
(Emphasis on bottom-up planning and administrative improvement) | • changing the role of government from the state-as- controller to the role of state-as- supporter of the private sector;  
• promoting the role of people organisations in natural resources and environment conservation;  
• adjustment of the structure of country's production and marketing;  
• expanding the targets of rural development areas throughout the country. |
| Plan 7 (1992-1996) | Focusing on maintaining the balances of economic development, income distribution and development of human resource and quality of life and environment, based on the sustainable development concept | • development of human resource and environment;  
• development of law, state enterprise and bureaucratic system;  
• income distribution and rural and regional development;  
• stability of economic development rate. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Plan</th>
<th>Main aim and concept</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan 8 (1997-2001)</td>
<td>Shifted from economic concept to people-centred development concept.</td>
<td>• strengthening natural resources and environment management; • developing the good governance in government sector; • emphasis on empowerment of local community through decentralisation of government, public participation in decision making process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attempt to balance the development of society, economy, natural resources and environment.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Plan 9 (2002-2006)</td>
<td>Adopting the King’s principle ‘sufficient economy’.</td>
<td>• emphasising conservation, revival and sustainable utilization of natural resources; • strengthening economic stability and economic growth that benefits the majority of population; • focusing on the consumption that is save to environment; • enhancing participation of people from all in the development of natural resources and environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance is given to the balanced state of people, society, economy and environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Plan</td>
<td>Main aim and concept</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
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</table>
| Plan 10       | Aiming to make Thailand a ‘Green and Happiness Society’  
Adopting the principle of sufficient economy as guidelines for both conceptual framework and action plans | - human and society development strategy: to become a knowledge and learning-based society;  
- community and society strengthening strategy: communities are encouraged to unite and join forces in learning and turning knowledge into practice;  
- economic structure modification strategy;  
- bio-diversity, resource bases and environment development strategy  
- good governance reinforcement strategy for the country’s administration. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Important Political</th>
<th>Dynamic of civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>• Change from absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy</td>
<td>• State-interest groups e.g. trade unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948s</td>
<td>• Founding of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)</td>
<td>• Underground movements and armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1973</td>
<td>• Authoritarian government</td>
<td>• State-initiated groups, e.g. trade unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Centralised planning</td>
<td>• Continuing armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strong bureaucratic polity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Oct. 1973-</td>
<td>• First student uprising against authoritarian regime</td>
<td>• Student movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before 6 Oct. 1976</td>
<td>• Democracy flourishes</td>
<td>• Federation of farmers associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Oct. 1976</td>
<td>• Army massacre of students, and return of authoritarianism</td>
<td>• Right and left wing civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Right and left ideology conflict</td>
<td>• Student joins CPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End 1970-early 1980s</td>
<td>• Half-democracy</td>
<td>• Emergence of extra-bureaucratic polity, business in politics, state corporatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More political liberalised policy</td>
<td>• Proliferation of NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• End of armed conflict with CPT and amnesty policy</td>
<td>• Decline of communist movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1980s</td>
<td>• Money politics and bubble economy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Chartchai Gov.)</td>
<td>• Return of military coup and formation of National Peace Keeping Council, 1991</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1992</td>
<td>• Bloody May incident</td>
<td>• Expansion of business in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Redemocratisation and political reform</td>
<td>• Presence of NGOs in environmental movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 (Banharn Gov)</td>
<td>• Constitutional reform process</td>
<td>• Politicisation of environmental issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Competing elitist and populist version of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Manifestation of new middle class in politics</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Nation-wide people’s participation in drafting constitution</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Consolidation of grassroots</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Important Political</td>
<td>Dynamic of civil society</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997 (Chavalit Gov)</td>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>and radical democracy, e.g. AOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic crisis</td>
<td>• Good governance and civil society as national strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promulgation of constitution</td>
<td>• Sustaining grassroots movements against ‘national development’ scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Decentralisation in progress</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>• New political institutions</td>
<td>• State-mobilised civic groups in national development planning exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• New elected senates</td>
<td>• NGOs and grassroots movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political atmosphere of distrust</td>
<td>• Economic nationalism in civil society</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Public sector reform</td>
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Appendix VI
News reports in newspapers on Keang Sue Ten Dam

May 1989
• In May 1989 during the Charitchai government, a mobile cabinet meeting was arranged in Chiangrai province, and the KSTD project was submitted to the meeting for consideration. The first demonstration occurred then. ‘Around 6,000 to 7,000 villagers from Phrae and Phayao provinces demonstrated at Chieng Muan district office to protest against KSTD construction that will flood their land’ (Bangkok Post, May 8, 1998).

November 1992
• Around 5,000 supporters, led by the representatives of Phrae, Kamnan and heads of villages demonstrated to support the KSTD project at Muang district, Phrae province. They also protested against the student activists who opposed the project (Matichon November 30, 1992).

December 1992
• Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai said dam construction could create flooding, but this could be paid by high financial compensation. On December 9 1992, the Phrae governor and his staff gathered information and villagers’ opinion in the Sa-iat sub-district. The villagers informed them that they did not want to migrate anywhere, and suggested that the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) should solve the problems of the previous dams, and then they could manage the KSTD project (Matichon December 10, 1992).
• Pramote Maiklad, specialist of the RID, said ‘I am confident that the villagers do not have ideas to oppose the project by themselves but they have been encouraged by someone’. Conservationists should not be against the RID’s work, but they should react against groups who destroy forest (Neaw Na December 27, 1992).

February 1993
• Deputy Director General of the RID, Jamroon Chindasagnuan, said dam construction would cover land amounting to not more than five percent of the total land of Thailand, so questioned why there should be protests against the dam; he suggested that protestors should pay attention to protecting the other 95 percent instead (Neaw Na, February 16, 1993).

March 1993
• A new panel was set up to study the impact of the KSTD project on the environment, in particular the earthquakes issue (Bangkok Post, March 1993).

September 1993
• Prime Minister Chuan said ‘for the case of KSTD, there are both supporters and protesters. The government would choose the highest benefit to public’ (Siampost, September 25, 1993).
• Villagers, led by Kamnan Chum Sa-iat Kong, submitted a protest letter complaining that the RID has informed the public only of the benefits of the dam (Siampost, September 25, 1993).
February 1994
• The public hearing on the controversial dam was organised at Phrae province and attended by about 30,000 people from eight provinces in the north. Questionnaires were used to examine the opinions of attendees. The results showed that almost of them supported the dam, while only 43 opposed it. ‘However, some people attending the forum still did not understand what the public hearing was for, saying that they were told to come by district officers’ (Bangkok Post, February 8 1994).
• Niphon Promphan, the Minister of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, said ‘with Government’s approval for the dam, people living along the Yom River Basin will no longer live in poverty because the dam will store about 1,200 million cubic metres of water, which will be enough for use throughout the year’.
‘Buriram MP Newin Chidchob of the Chart Thai Party told the gathering that ‘NGOs who opposed the dam did not dare to show up. He said without the dam plan, forests already had been destroyed on a wide scale’ (Bangkok Post, February 8, 1994).

June 1994
• A World Bank team visited Sa-iab sub-district to gather information about the social impact of the dam proposal. About 1,500 villagers affected by the KSTD project asked a World Bank team to withdraw from the project.
• Protesters circulated letters to the public saying that: villagers did not want dam; the meeting between villagers and the WB team did not mean that villagers agreed to the project; as regards the RID, villagers announced that they would not allow anyone visiting the villages to study or collect information for the dam project; villagers requested the team to submit this letter to the executive level of WB and requested WB to withdraw their support for this project. This letter was signed by Chum Sa-iabkong and villagers’ representatives (Neaw Na, June 20,1994).
• A protester leader, Udom Srikhampha, said that ‘from now on we will not let anyone come here to gather information. We will not be responsible for the safety of people, we will neither let them step into the forest, nor give any information to any agencies, including the World Bank, which want to push forward the project’ (Bangkok Post, 10 June 1994).
• Later, the villagers attacked the World Bank team when the team came back to villages again.
• Villagers explained why they opposed the project through the press. The village leader, Kamnan Choom Sa-ibkong, said the villages opposed the project because they learned from the suffering of fellow villagers in Uttaradit who had been evicted from the site of the Sirikit dam. ‘The compensation process is very slow and the new land provided by the government is much less fertile. It’s not good for farming’. ‘Ban Paen is rather rocky while most of the land in Huay Pom is occupied’.
• Niphon Promphan, the minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, said the protesters might not trust the government that could provide them with compensation, whether they could reach a mutual agreement or not.
• NGOs and academics provide information to the public and villagers in the form of academic information and knowledge. Chainrong Setthachau of Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT) said ‘the information about the social impact, including that on people’s livelihoods, is weak in the study. This makes it impossible for the Royal Irrigation Department to calculate the compensation to each family affected’ (Bangkok Post, June 10, 1994). He claimed that ‘Agrisystem’s study (Agrisystem is the WB’s team) did not take into account the hardship facing villagers, or their views’ (Bangkok Post, June 24, 1994).
Villagers were asking why they had to make sacrifices and plunge deeper into poverty. Seng, a villagers’ leader said ‘to move out of our homeland means we will lose touch with our culture and our livelihood. Nothing can compensate us for the loss of them’ (Bangkok Post, June 24, 1994).

July 1994

- According to Somming Muangrong, a villager from Sa-iab, the villagers had no intention to use violence against the officials of Agrisystem Consultants. He said the incident took place because the officials tried to push Government policy in the project and because the people were set up by distorted news reports in local papers (Bangkok Post, July 7, 1994).
- On the contrary, officials such as Phrae’s MP, Metha Eua-apinyakul, viewed the incident as having destroyed the country’s good image, and viewed that the villagers had disturbed the public order. Meanwhile, Phrae Governor Sak Taychaicharn demanded that a lawsuit be filed against the villagers (Bangkok Post, July 15, 1994).
- On July 9, the first northern people’s forum was organised and attended by thirteen NGOs and Sa-iab’s villagers. The meeting discussed the public hearing to be held on July 29. Finally, they agreed that they would not cooperate with this hearing because only government agencies and the project owner would be attending it only. In particular, thirteen NGOs did not agree with this public hearing because it seemed that it would be biased and unfair. The representative of Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT) said that ‘the forum to be held on July 29 would be the forum for gathering people who support the dam’ (Manager 11 July 11, 1994).
- Somming, a villager from Sa-iab, said ‘one problem with the project was that the villagers were never truthfully informed about all the possible ramifications of the dam, although they are the ones who would be most affected by it. The only source of information they have has been from the media, which has occasionally given distorted information’ (Bangkok Post, July 15, 1994).
- Prasan Tahngsigabutra, a sociologist from Chieng Mai U, said the KSTD project was a case of the state and the people scrambling for natural resources. ‘The state policy on natural resources management doesn’t pay enough attention to people in rural communities. Emphasis is placed more in the use of power to tame opposition movements’ (Bangkok Post, July 15, 1994).
- The government announced that it would organise a public hearing (which was called a ‘seminar’) in August. Then, criticism from various parties occurred. It was claimed (by leading NGOs, academics and villagers) that it was not a proper public hearing based on international concepts because only parties that supported the dam were invited. Rataya Chanpien, Chairman of the Suab Nakasathien Foundation, said that the hearing in Phrae province would present only a one-sided view. Most politicians and government officials at the event would favour the project and were not likely to tell the whole truth to the public. As a result, people in Sa-iab sub-district, who would be directly affected, boycotted this hearing because they were afraid that their attendance might be misconstrued as acceptance of the project. ‘It is clear that this seminar will try to sway public opinion with one-sided information to promote construction of the dam’, said Surapon Duangkhae, director of WFT (Bangkok Post, July 31, 1994).
- The Royal Irrigation Department (RID) denied that the seminar was a public hearing (The Nation, July 31 1994).
- NGOs, including the WFT, the Committee of Natural Resource Conservation and Environmental Conservation from 16 Institutes (CNEC’16), the Project for Ecological
Recovery, the Siam Environmental Club and the Seub Nakasatien Foundation, insisted that the public hearing was improper and invalid because there was no committee to collect ideas and views. The organiser set up two committees that were apparently favourable to the dam. They said the House committee was attempting to fool the public into believing that the seminar would fulfil the full and open procedures characteristics of a proper public hearing (The Nation, July 31, 1994 and Kao Sod, July, 31, 1994).

August 1994

- A public hearing on the KSTD was organised on August 1 in Phrae province. People from eight provinces in the north attended the event, and some people said that all district chiefs in those provinces had been told to recruit people in their districts to attend the hearing. However, the committee chairman, Songsak Pakkasem, denied the accusation. Apparently, most of them were mobilised by their village headmen. Some provincial councillors told villagers that if they wanted water during the dry season, they should come to support the dam’s construction (Bangkok Post, August 1, 1994).

- The seminar was criticised by many as one-sided because organisers failed to invite the villagers who would really be affected by the dam project. The villagers filled out questionnaires that were worded in a way to ensure support for the project (The Nation, August 12, 1994).

- About 30,000 Questionnaires were distributed to attendees. As a result, the project received overwhelming support, although most of the people who completed questionnaires were totally unaware of the full and long-term implications of a dam on the environment (The Nation, 6 August 1994).

- In fact, some of the villagers, who were illiterate, could not understand the questions, so their companion told them to select the answer on the upper line for all the questions. All the pro-dam answers appeared on the upper line (The Nation, 6 August 1994).

- Professor Surapol Sudara from Chulalongkorn University disagreed with the plebiscite. He claimed the questionnaire, on which the ‘vote’ was based, was biased and misleading. Therefore, the true voice of the public was not heard. ‘It is more a public deception that a public hearing’, he said’. ‘What I cannot accept is that the forum broke the unity of villagers,’ he said (Bangkok Post, August 8, 1994).

- Initially, Sa-iaab villagers decided not to join the forum, but when they saw the live telecast on Channel 9 and found out that information presented was one-sided, five representatives held a press conference at the Nakhon Phrae Tower Hotel. ‘We will not accept such a plebiscite because it was not held through democratic means’ Seng Kwanyeun said (Bangkok Post, August 8, 1994).

- Songsuk Pakkasem (Chart Thai party-Chieng Mai), the Chairman of The House Monitoring Committee said ‘I don’t care. I insisted on going ahead because it is an MP’s duty to relieve the people’s drought problem’. He further explained ‘We tried to coordinate with all the state and private agencies to come up with a final decision for solving the drought in the Yom basin and we will take it to the Cabinet’ (The Nation, 6 August 1994).

- Prime Minister Chuan said ‘opposition is concerned with different views and thoughts. I believe we could achieve a resolution when the dam has to be built’ (Siam Post, August 29, 1994).

- Provincial officials say many residents of Sa-iaab district opposing the KSTD still make a living through illegal logging, Chart Thai MP Metha Uahapinyakul said.
Don Chai, Don Kaew and Mae Ten villages have earned a notorious reputation for being the centre for illegal logging in Mhare, Metha said.

But a village headman said villagers had stopped logging, instead turning to picking teak seeds and bamboo shoots to sell at the market (Bangkok Post, 4 August 1994).

NGOs have criticised the project by saying it will result in the loss of forest areas. The Royal Irrigation Department Director General, Mr. Sawat, admitted 15,000 rai of teak forest and 35,000 rai of other tree varieties would be submerged, but the Royal Irrigation Department planned to re-afforest 50,000 rai in compensation. He said that conservationists must realise that villagers living in the Nam Yom River basin have suffered both droughts and flooding because there is no dam in the area. Strict conservation of the environment sometimes forces people into constant poverty (Bangkok Post, 5 August, 1994).

During the seminar (public hearing), as speaker, Buri Ram MP Newin Chidchob gave a speech strongly attacking opponents of the dam. ‘NGOs opposing the dam are mere devils who are always up in arms against anything’ (Bangkok Post, August 8, 1994). He said he came here to push the project. He said NGOs who opposed this project were unreasonable and they opposed it without considering the difficulties of people and the water shortage problem. He spoke out strongly against the dam opponents ‘NGOs are now this country’s social demons’, he said. ‘They have to protest against every development project. I wonder if they are afraid the people will have a better life. They are not sincere in helping villagers because they are subsidised by foreign organisations’ (The Nation, 6 August 1994).

Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai expressed support for the controversial KSTD while visiting thousands of villagers during an inspection of flooding in Phitsnulok and Phichit provinces. Meanwhile, Royal Irrigation Department director-general Sawat Watthanayakorn called on conservationists to base their moves against the dam on reasons, not emotion (Bangkok post, September 12, 1994).

The issue of the number of households projected to be submerged due to dam construction was raised by NGOs. According to WFT about 10,000 villagers, comprising 2,000 families, would be evicted from their land if the KSTD were constructed (Bangkok Post, September 17, 1994 Bangkok Post, September 18, 1994). Therefore, the Royal Thai Survey department planned a more comprehensive contour study, which would prove whether more villagers would be affected by the dam, according to Chainarong (Bangkok Post, September 17, 1994). Surapol Sudara, who sits on the Environmental Policy and Planning Office’s panel, said ‘the government must show us the data and explain why it greatly differs from the one made by NGOs’ (Bangkok Post, September 17, 1994).

Supported by some NGOs, children in the Saiab sub-district set up a conservation group called Ta Kon Yom – ‘sediment of the Yom River’ – to mobilise support for their fight against a controversial dam project which would destroy their homes and forests. Its objective was to sensitize children in villages who may still have been unaware of the dam’s threat (negative impact). Children faced difficulties in gaining support to organise activities. A teacher told a student he could not support the group openly because teachers had been ordered by high-ranking officials not to become involved in dam opposition movements. However, some teachers supported this group secretly by providing information about the dam for exhibitions and sometimes giving them money. Like their parents, the child campaigners were fraught with problems. According to Ampika, ‘we have to study under pressure. Some students are distracted by their problems. Our academic performance has also dropped. Nongrak, another
member of the Takon Yom group, said her own friends and teachers whose homes will not be affected by the dam have often told her to accept the dam project. ‘They often belittle our cause. They say the dam is useful and we are being selfish,’ she said (Bangkok Post, September 24, 1994).

- Sa-iab sub-district was notorious for forest destruction. When they became involved in anti-dam movements, local people turned themselves into forest protectors. In 1992, Sa-iab villagers unanimously agreed to stop logging and handed their tree-cutting tools over to the The Army’s commanding general for the area. Then, they turned to planting tamarind and teak seedlings as their primary source of income. WFT provided financial support for them. At the same time, the Golden Teak Seedling Plantation Group was set up to provide villagers with funds for, and information on, teak cultivation. They established a group called ‘People Love Forest’ to protect the forest in their vicinity. New regulations were launched such as ‘If they want to build a new house, they have to ask the village committee’s permission to cut down the necessary trees. Also, they have to plant at least five new trees for each one they are allowed to cut’ (Bangkok Post, October 15, 1994). Kamnan Chum said ‘We have committees to look after the forest in their areas. If anyone is caught breaking the rules, they will be warned, fined or sent to the police depending on how much damage they have done’ (Bangkok Post, October 15, 1994).

December 1994
- The World Bank cancelled its support for KSTD project because the KSTD had too many problems concerning environment and resettlement. The decision was made after the bank’s consultants were attacked by protesting villagers in June 1993 (The Nation, December 15, 1994).

February 1995
- A senior environmental official expressed concern that construction of the KSTD would destroy a major habitat of one of Thailand’s most beautiful and endangered species: the green pea-fowl. Moreover, local villagers collect non-wood products such as mushroom, bamboo shoots, and honey.
- Currently, the OEPP is waiting for the RID to submit a revision of its EIA (The Nation February, 1995).

August 1995
- The northern area was flooded. Then, the issue of KSTD construction was raised. About five hundred people who were facing flood in Phrae handed a letter to Head of District and Mayor requesting that the dam construction be speeded up to prevent flooding. The Municipality of Phrae supported the people’s request for the dam (Siam Post August 15, 1995). Also, Phrae’s Assembly of Commerce pushed the government to make a decision on this dam. ‘If the government wants to reduce opposition against the dam, the government should provide new land with complete infra-structure to affected people’, the chairman of Assembly of Commerce said (Krunghthep Durakit, August 15, 1995). At national level, The Royal Irrigation Department tried to push the construction of KSTD to deal with the water shortage in Phrae province. The Director General pointed out that ‘there are only 730 families which would be evicted (Krunghthep Durakit, August 26, 1995).

September 1995
- The Agriculture and Cooperatives Minister (Montri Pongpanich) planned to submit the project for cabinet approval when the EIA panel expert had not agreed the project.
He said at a press conference: ‘I will fight to have the dam built for the sake of more than 30 million people who have been affected by floods and drought over the years’ (Bangkok Post, 19 September 1995). This issue was criticised by NGOs, academics and students. An environmentalist warned that Agriculture and Cooperatives and MOSTE Ministries should not try to influence experts who were reviewing the EIA of the controversial KSTD. The Wildlife Fund Thailand coordinator of conservation policy, Harun Narong Yaowalert, also argued that consideration of the EIA by OEPP experts should not be interfered with (Bangkok Post, 20 September 1995). However, Montri denied an allegation that he planned to lobby the panel of experts to give the project the green light. He said that the experts should consider the severe hardship people are faced with during floods and seasons of drought (Bangkok Post, 19 September 1995).

• Experts pointed out that the rush to approve the KSTD disregarded statutory environmental safeguards. Montri appeared confident the Cabinet would approve the project, and the NEB would likely follow suit. (Bangkok Post, September 22, 1995).
• The Prime Minister, Banharn, said the KSTD would help save several provinces in the north and Bangkok from being flooded (The Sunday Post, September 24, 1995). Regarding the flood prevention issue, Harun Narong Yaowalert from WFT said pro-dam groups tried to justify the construction of dams by saying that the dams could prevent floods, but provided little proof to back up their reasoning (The Nation, September 22, 1995).
• In a meeting at Chiang Mai University, a group consisting of academics, students, northern farmers and NGOs, who called themselves the ‘For Democracy and Environment Group’, made a joint statement to counter the Cabinet meeting, at which approval for the Royal Irrigation Department’s KSTD project was being considered. They accused Prime Minister Banharn and his government of being opportunists for taking advantage of the flood crisis to give the go-ahead to build the controversial KSTD. The northern farmers also demanded that the government respect democratic principles and the rights of villagers in the Sa-iab sub-district who would be directly affected by the project (The Nation, September 25, 1995).
• The committee of natural resources and environment conservation 16 institutes announced a statement saying that they did not agree with the idea of submitting the KSTD project to a cabinet meeting to be held on 26 September (Financial day September 26, 1995).
• The director general of the RID, Sawad Wattanayakorn, said ‘if we follow the legal process according to the Environmental Act, the KSTD would not be built’ (Manager, September 25, 1995).
• The deputy Prime Minister, Thaksin, declared that the decision on the KSTD should be made based on the information available rather than yielding to pressure from various groups. He said, ‘If pressure groups influenced everything, the government would be controlled by such forces’. (Thailand Times, September 26, 1995).
• Government leaders, such as Prime Minister Banharn and Agriculture Minister Montri, softened their stance on the controversial KSTD, pledging to listen to the public and the opposition, as well as endorsing public hearings on the viability of its construction. Also, Montri said ‘in my personal opinion, I think the dam should be built. But if the project opponents have better information, I will accept it. I won’t be stubborn’ (The Nation September 26, 1995).
• Prime Minister Banharn confirmed that the environmental impact from the KSTD had to be carefully considered before the final decision would be made (The Nation September 26, 1995).
• MOSTE Minister Yingphan argued that construction of the dam would not cause deforestation, since ‘a large quantity of trees is being cut down every day’. He said ‘the later we start, the more time we waste’ (Bangkok Post September 27, 1995).

• Seven villagers representing those affected by the construction in the Sa-iab sub-district held a press conference at Thammasart University. They said the department (Irrigation) was also accused of misrepresenting the number of households to be affected. It would be more than 700, and not 614 as estimated. Other villagers already occupied the land to which they were to be moved. They said they did not want to suffer the fate of those villagers affected by construction of the Bhumibol and Sirikit dams (Bangkok Post September 27, 1995).

• The teak forest issue was raised by academics. ‘The last golden teak forest in the country is home to a rare species of bird, the Thai peafowl, according to an environmental expert (Bangkok Post September 27, 1995). Meanwhile, Sa-iab’s villagers expressed concern about the effect of the dam on teak forest and wildlife, which they said supplied them with food and medicine (Bangkok Post September 27, 1995). Wanchai Tantivittayapitak, Secretary General of the Seub Nakasathien foundation asked the politicians to visit the teak forest in KSTD area because it still be in very good condition (Kao Sod, September 28, 1995).

• Views of government toward NGOs: Interior Ministry Secretary Veerakorn Khamprarob strongly criticised NGOs who protested against dam. He said NGOs should stop creating problems in society. ‘The NGOs movements have been financially supported and as such they have dramatically become rich. I want them to be investigated so as to ensure that they haven’t abused the money. I’m ready to fight them’ he said. He suggested that the students involving in the anti-dam movements should seriously study both the advantages and disadvantages of the dam project before taking part in demonstrations with NGOs. In addition, Agriculture and Cooperatives Minister Montri Pongpanich said ‘How dare those protesters oppose the people’s need’ (Thailand Times September 29, 1995).

• Veerakorn, MP, also alleged that some academics from NGOs had been paid by foreign countries to delay development projects to Thailand would not be able to compete economically. ‘The NGOs are happy to see disasters, aren’t they? Student activists should also consider the pros and cons carefully before joining protests, instead of allowing themselves to be dragged in easily’ (The Nation September 29, 1995).

• The 16 environmental groups viewed that the KSTD project should first go through a public hearing to listen to people’s opinions before submitting to the National Environment Board for consideration. Nucharee Chahteng, the coordinator of the 16 environmental groups, said the group did not trust the government because in the past, the public hearings set up by the government were barely disclosed and lacked real cooperation from the people. (Thailand Times September 29, 1995).

• About 5,000-6,000 people, including students, local politicians and businessmen, gathered in front of the Phrae provincial hall, calling for construction of the KSTD. ‘We will continue our protest until the government agrees to build the dam. We will absolutely not allow the dam opponents, who are outsiders and not Phrae natives, to protest against the KSTD project’, said Vorrawat, mayor of Phrae. The anti-dam groups are not the ones who suffer from flooding, as Phrae’s people do. They do not understand hardship’, said Vichai Supan, member of Phrae Municipality. About 400 students of the Piriyalai Secondary School in Muang district also joined the rally (Bangkok Post September 30, 1995; The Nation September 30, 1995; Kao Sod, September 30, 1995).
A group of 10 student activists handed in an open letter at Government House, asking the NEB to delay consideration until a public inquiry into the project had been held.

A group of seven people, claiming to represent the Phrae people and led by Phrae Governor Songwut, visited the Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister to express their stances on supporting the KSTD project. Governor Songwut said the group wanted to publicise the fact that the province had been devastated by tropical storms. Some 63,000 households in 397 villages had been affected, representing 52 per cent of flooded areas nationwide. Mayor Worawat Uawinyakun, as the group leader, said local people wanted the dam because they suffered from floods. ‘We are ready to explain our stand to the opponent face-to-face’, he said (Post September 30, 1995).

On September 30, 1995, the meeting of the National Environment Board chaired by Prime Minister Banharn decided to set up a committee to investigate the impact of the KSTD’s construction and to give the final result – whether or not the project was sound – in 90 days (The Nation September 30, 1995).

MOSTE Minister Yingphan said ‘The Government understands the views of the environmentalists, but it needs to do what it can to satisfy all concerns and protect the interests of the majority’ (Bangkok Post September 30, 1995).

Villagers of Sa-iab sub-district urged the government and politicians to stop using the current flood crisis as an excuse to build the dam (The Nation September 30, 1995).

October 1995

The government was criticised that they bought time by setting up the new committee to study the impact of the dam and submit it to the government within 90 days (Kaosod, 1 October 1995).

The Director General of RID, Rungreung Chulachart, said ‘I do not understand conservationists who protest against the dam. They think about only teak but no one thinks about victims of floods. No one says about economy of the country which has been destroyed due to flooding’ (Kaosod, 1 October 1995). ‘Police in the northern provinces were instructed yesterday to be prepared to cope with likely demonstrations by 10,000 villagers in support of the government’s KSTD construction project’ (Thailand Times October 2, 1995).

The Kamnan and Headmen village club of Phrae province agreed to recruit villagers from 5 provinces including Phrae, Nakorn Sawan, Sokho Thai, Pichit and Pisanulok to join a demonstration to support the dam. ‘Anyone who does not join in the demonstration cannot be considered a Phrae resident’ said the pro-government head of Phrae’s Don Moon Tambon, Phanarong Porchit. As a result, thousands of supporters gathered in front of the Phrae provincial hall, calling for construction of the KSTD (The Nation October 1, 1995; The Nation 2, 1995; Bangkok Post 3, 1995). ‘Thousands of people rallied in Phrae on Monday in what was seen as a [show of force] to press for the construction of the KSTD. Apparently, the peaceful demonstration was organised by kamnan and village headmen who had the tacit blessing of the local politicians and administrators’ (Bangkok Post, October 4, 1995).

Yongyut Sunsuwong, member of Phrae provincial council, as demonstration leader, said ‘the protesters do not know the fact in particular teak forest because today there is any teak forest for conservation’ (The Nation, October 3, 1995).

Conservation of Natural resources and Environment committee Coordinator, Nucharee Chaikeng, said the villager groups who supported the dam’s construction did not know the real impact the project would have. They received only biased data from the government’s side, and alleged that the move by villagers to show their support for the reservoir construction had been backed by politicians or businessmen.
who have ulterior motives for supporting the project (Thailand Times, October 2, 1995).

- The conflicts over the KSTD’s construction exploded twice every year, during the drought and flood periods, but during this period, it seemed very serious because both supporters and opponents requested the government to make a decision (Weekly Matichon, 3 October 1995).

- On October 3, 1995, the Assembly of Northern Students released a statement requesting that the ad-hoc committee should study three aspects – ecology, impact of resettlement and geology (Daily Matichon, October 4, 1995).

- Peang In-tha, Sarawat Kamnan of Sa-iab, said ‘I would like to invite the committee set up by the government to come to the area to see the teak forest. However, if they decide to come, firstly they have to inform us. If they come without any notice in advance, we do not guarantee their safety. Regarding land selling issue, we accept that it is true because villagers need money for their survivals. However, we realise that people who offer to buy land expect benefit from compensation in case that the dam is constructed. Therefore, we announce to all villagers to be aware on this issue’ (Daily Matichon, October 4, 1995).

- Suriyasai Katasila, Secretary General of So No No Tho made a statement requesting the government to declare the public hearing regulation according to academic principle. The statement also expressed against the idea of support demonstrators complaining that anti-dam protester are ones who obstructed the development of the country and received foreign money (Manager, October 4, 1995).

- Lectures of Khon Khean University submitted five requests regarding the dam protest to the Prime Minister. They requested that the Royal Irrigation Department should disclose the valid information.

- Ko O Tho So disclosed a statement questioning the neutrality of the committee that was charged with studying the impact of the KSTD’s construction, as the committee members were mostly bureaucrats who supported the construction of the dam (Manager, October 5, 1995 and The Nation October 6, 1995).

- MOSTE Minister Yingphan said that students protesting against the KSTD project had not received enough information about it. “One day when they grow up they will realise the usefulness of the dam”, he said (Bangkok Post, October 6, 1995; Thai Financial Business October 6, 1995 and The Nation October 6, 1995).

- A debate about the KSTD project was arranged between pro-dam politicians and environmentalists in a TV news talk programme (The Nation, October 5, 1995).

- ‘Many ministers are now defending their support of the dam by claiming that environmentalists, students, and academics are using emotion, not reason to oppose the project’ (The Nation, October 5, 1995).

- While visiting the northern province of Phichit, Yingphan asked villagers who were in favour of dam to raise their hands; most villagers did. Then, the minister added ‘this is a small public hearing session. I’ll report to the environment sub-committee’ (Kaosod, October 8, 1995; Daily Matichon, October 8, 1995; The Nation, October 8, 1995; The Sunday Post October 8, 1995). Nucharee Jaikeang, the coordinator of the natural resources and environment conservation committee 16 institutes, criticised that this event could lead to higher degree of conflict among people. (Daily Matichon, October 9, 1995). Also, Deputy Prime Minister Samk Sundaravej argued that it did not represent a public inquiry (Bangkok Post October 10, 1995). The press viewed that ‘if a number of hands raised during a public hearing are to be taken as an expression of approval for the construction of the controversial KSTD, then it means Thai democracy has obviously taken a step backward’ (The Nation October 18, 1995).
• Srimun Khanthabut at Sa-iab reported that the number of investors buying land had increased. These people contacted villagers directly without acknowledgement of the committee. Most of them were relatives of both local and national politicians (Daily Matichon, October 9, 1995).

• The Mae Yom National Park announced that reporters would be prohibited from visiting the area of dam construction in the national park, except with permission from the Director General of the Royal Forest Department (Kaosod, October 10, 1995).

• The Governor, Songvut Gnammeesri, said ‘villagers at Sa-iab are not all protesters but some of them wish to be well informed about relocation. Regarding the public opinion which was organised on August 1, I think that we get the same result if we do it again’ (Krungthep Tharakit, October 10, 1995).

• ‘Royal Irrigation Department said that 620 families in the area will be moved but now the number has increase to more than 700 families’. ‘The lower number was taken from data recorded five years ago. The RID does not update the number of families in the area’ (The Nation, October 11, 1995).

• Public hearing: Several academics have suggested a public hearing be held to avoid conflicts (Siam Post October 13, 1995; The Nation October 14, 1995). Meanwhile, MOSTE Minister Yingphan said that the committee had to consider the issue of whether the public hearing would be held or not. (Pimthai, October 12, 1995). However, environmentalists were worried that the politicians’ idea of a public hearing was not compatible with that proposed by the academics (Siam Post October 13, 1995).

• Local government: Due to severe damage by flooding in Phichit province, the government and provincial council of Phichit agreed to support the KSTD dam which should be constructed as soon as possible (Saim Post, October 16, 1995).

• Central government: MOSTE Minister Yingphan said the KSTD should be continued, as it would benefit the majority of the people living below the proposed site. ‘…only people to be (adversely), affected would be 500-600 families which are the minority compared with hundreds of thousands to gain an advantage’, he said (The Nation October 17, 1995 and Siam Post, October 16, 1995).

• Alliances: Saroj Supsiri, a member of the dam construction (pro-dam). campaign and a local politician, requested the government to approve the construction by January 2, 1996 as proposed by the demonstrators in October, 1995. ‘If not, the villagers will demonstrate again in front of the Government House, Bangkok’, he said (Manager, October 18, 1995).

• ‘The voices of the villagers residing in Sa-iab, including 2,650 families who face resettlement as a result of the dam’s construction, have never heard. In fact, they might not even be allowed to air their views on it at all’.

• ‘The television aired only the first part of the series, which focused solely on the proposed dam site. Sadly, this only served to emphasise that freedom of expression is unheard of in Thai society’.

• ‘There is one question that needed to be asked: would the construction of KSTD stop flooding? A series of pro-dam demonstrations in Phrae were due in part to the efforts of influential locals and propaganda by politicians, which implied that the dam’s construction would solve the problem’.

• ‘The KSTD controversy will eventually reveal the truth that the Banharn government is apparently surrounded by pro-dam ministers. It is high time that the government allowed the holding of a public hearing on the project’ (The Nation, October 18, 1995).
• Central government: ‘I’m not sure of the purpose of the opposition movement, whether it’s to protect the teak forest or the villagers, who are forest destroyers living at the proposed dam site’, said Sawat Wattaniyakorn, Director General of the Royal Irrigation Department (The Nation, October 20, 1995).

• Supporters: MOSTE Minister Yingphan told 7,000 supporters of the project the KSTD would be built. Supporters were mostly farmers from Phare, Phitsanulok, Sukhothai, Phichit and Nakhon Sawan. They believed that the project would benefit the lower north by providing water in the dry season, preventing flooding and generating electricity.

• In Sa-iab sub-district, the committee agreed that Sa-iab’s villagers would stay in the area and would not rally outside the district. In addition, they agreed to consult with people in Chiang Muan district (which would be affected by the dam) about anti-dam movements (Manager, October 20, 1995). In Sa-iab, Kamnan Chum said villagers would not protest because they had faith in the April 22 cabinet resolution to delay construction (Bangkok Post, October 25, 1995).

• The environmental impact study of the KSTD project needed to be extended to six months instead of three months. Kasem Anidvongs, permanent secretary of MOSTE claimed that ‘It is not because it wants to delay the project but because it is necessary to review all sides’ (Bangkok Post October 20, 1995; The Nation October 20, 1995; Manager, October 20, 1995).

• Central government: MOSTE Minister Yingphan insisted that its main aim was to provide irrigation to farmers although previously, he said its main purpose was to prevent flooding (The Nation October 20, 1995).

• NGOs: Chainarong Sretthachua of WFT called on the RID to release the project’s feasibility study to the public: ‘Even today, the RID director general cannot say what the exact level of flooding will be’ (The Nation October 21, 1995).

• ‘In a seminar on the dam’s environmental impact assessment organised by the Reporters’ Association of Thailand, Rung rueng Julachat, Director General of the Royal Irrigation Department, confirmed that ‘the belief that the KSTD can help prevent floods in Bangkok is false. The main objective of the multi-purpose dam was to provide water for agricultural purposes; flood prevention and electricity generation were by-products’. Surprisingly, his remark contrasted with the views of many politicians, including Deputy Prime Minister Samak and Agriculture minister Montri who argued that the dam would help prevent flooding in the capital and the central region. Chainarong Sethacue-WFT appeared satisfied by Rungrueng comments yesterday, saying it would help remove public confusion’ (Bangkok Post October 21, 1995).

• Two technical issues were raised: first, according to a geologist of the Department of Mineral Resources, the Mae Yom fault zone at the site of the proposed dam appears to be inactive but the pressure of a large water reservoir sitting on top of it could activate it; second, its construction would seriously damage Thailand’s teak gene pool because natural teak forests are important as genetic resources, according to an expert at Chulalongkorn University (The Nation October 30, 1995).

• NGOs: The Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (DEQP). hosted a meeting to discuss the controversial KSTD project; it was attended by about 40 environmental registered NGOs. The NGOs requested that all the information about the dam’s impact should be released to the public before a cabinet decision was made on the project. (The Nation, October 31, 1995).
November 1995
- Pramote Maiklad, an expert of the RID, questioned whether academics who raised the issue of a fault zone had proper information (The Nation November 23, 1995).

December 1995
- On Dec 14, villagers physically blocked a team of officials from entering the area for an inspection (The Nation, December 26, 1995).
- The press pointed out that, in principle, there were two main problems with the KSTD project: a lack of necessary information to make a decision, and a lack of appropriate procedures to make decision-making transparent. (The Nation December 27, 1995).
- MOSTE Minister Yingphan said during the press conference ‘Villagers in Sa-ib will not create any problems for the construction of the dam unless provoked by outsiders’ (The Nation December 28, 1995).

January, 1996
- Dr. Suthawan Sathirathai, an economics professor at CU, said environmental costs were missing in studies on the dam project. ‘The EIA, for example, has taken the values of fallen timber as the whole value of the forest which is not true and we need a more thorough study on the issue’
- Suntiad Somchevita, Secretary-General of OEPP said ‘We’ve been debating the issue without knowing exactly what it was we are arguing about’ He accepted the government had no necessary data and information (Bangkok Post January 18, 1996).
- Protesters: the Villagers Conservation Group in Sa-ib sub-district raised funds to save the peafowl as well as the golden teak forest in Mae Yom National Park. Villagers held a ceremony for the old teak trees in the Mae Yom National Park to protest against the decision to cut them down to pave the way for the KSTD (The Nation, January 22, 1996).
- Protesters: Kamnan Chum, leader of the Sa-ib sub-district, insisted to continue anti-dam movements. He also announced that all officials concerned were strictly prohibited to visit the project site (Manager, January 20-21, 1996).
- Sagnuan Kantawong, one villager of Sa-ib, said ‘we accept that we did logging in the past but right now we stop completely’. Villagers told the press that ‘since 1957 villagers had been hired by capitalists for logging. Recently, we realised to conserve the environment and we turned to do farming such as sweet thammarine plantation. In 1992, we set up ‘Forest Conservation Group’.
- On January 20, the ceremony of Seub Cha Ta Mae Num was arranged by Sa-aib villagers and attended by NGOs, students and academics and villagers from other villages (Kaosod January 22, 1996).
- ‘Not only Sa-ib people opposed KSTD but also conservationists across the country’, Kamnan Chum said (Saim Post, March 14, 1996).
- Central government: MOSTE Minister Yingphan pointed out that ‘there are NGOs who agree and disagree with the project. However, both sides should be aware of the public interests’.
- Supporters: the Phrae Provincial Council set up the Sub-committee on Dam Construction Support Campaign, and it planned to coordinate with Mae Yom’s Farmer Group. It was expected that they could recruit 1,000 people from Phrae and other provinces nearby to join a demonstration to be held on 7-8 May (Manager, April 25, 1996).
• Supporters: On May 7, about 5,000-10,000 people from six northern provinces including Phrae, Utradit, Phichit, Sukhothai, Pisanulok and Nakorn Sawan rallied outside the provincial hall to support the construction of Keang Sue Ten dam. They claimed the dam would help prevent floods, so they requested the government to make a final decision on the dam’s construction. Meanwhile, protesters in Sa-iab insisted that they would not respond to the demonstration because they relied on the April 22 cabinet resolution, which had agreed to suspend the project (Siam Post, May 7, 1996; Manager May 8, 1996; The Nation May 8, 1996).

• As a representative of the government, MOSTE Minister Yingphan met the supporting demonstrators and they achieved the resolution. Then, he and Phrae’s governor signed a memorandum saying that the government would consider making a final decision on the dam by 30 May and that the 22 April cabinet resolution would be reviewed (Kaosod, May 9, 1999; Manager May 9, 1996). Yingphan also said to demonstrators that ‘the government welcome proposals from all parties’.

June 1996
• Villagers in Sa-iab sub-district (Tambon Sa-iab), confirmed that staff of any agencies had been prohibited from visiting the district (SiamRath, June 21, 1996).

July 1996
• About 200 villagers obstructed the geology surveyors who were accessing the project site to collect data regarding dam construction. Although the head of Song district met those villagers and explained, the villagers still insisted that they did not allow any outsiders entering the area. Finally, all surveyors had to withdraw. Head of Song district did not agree to set up the security guards to protect the surveyor group because it would have a negative effect to images of villagers. He also pointed out that if the government did not obviously provide them information about compensation and re-location site, the protest would continue (Siam Rath, July 22, 1996).

August 1996
• The researchers were unable to complete the environmental assessment study of KSTD project, claiming that local villagers had denied them access to the study area. A researcher said ‘without local co-operation, they said that they were unable to present a complete report’.

• NGO: Regarding the research, WFT staff said to a news reporter that ‘villagers felt that their voice was being excluded from the study process. They did not trust the study team because its members were appointed by the government with no local participation’ (The Nation August 9, 1996).

• Villagers: Head of sub-district Chum Sa-iabkong said villagers would not allow researchers access to their land until the government presented a clear plan for resettlement at a site that was acceptable. ‘As of now, we have no confidence in the management of the dam project. The dam will result in massive changes to our lives, so everything must be made clear to us’ (The Nation August 15, 1996).

• The government proposed three resettlement areas for villagers, but villagers rejected them. The villagers claimed that ‘One site is already occupied and the other two are not suitable for farming’. Villagers also rejected an offer to inspect the proposed sites, as they knew the areas and were dissatisfied with the offer, according to Head of sub-district Chum Sa-iabkong (The Nation August 15, 1996).
• Chuta Thapanawong, Phrae Deputy Governor, said ‘we will try to come to an understanding with villagers in the Sa-iab area, who are the strongest opponents of the dam’ (The Nation August 15, 1996).

• Phrae deputy governor Jutha said ‘the villagers will only allow the study teams to enter the area after they are satisfied with the relocation plan. So the ad-hoc sub-committee plans to allow these villagers to select the most appropriate site for their resettlement by themselves’ (Bangkok Post August 17, 1996).

• According to MOSTE Minister Yingphan, the main obstacle was the lack of cooperation of local villagers (The Nation August 15, 1996).

September 1996

• Banjong Phattana phibun pointed out that villagers did not trust the government in regarding financial compensation, and they wanted its lump sum (Siam Post, September 9, 1996).

May 1997

• The press reported the youth activities in Sa-iab. A youth group was set up and called Ta kon yom group (klum ta kon yom)., aiming to raise environmental awareness in the young generation. Its activities were supported by several NGOs such as WFT, Duangprsthip foundation, Seub foundation and klum kra jok gnoa (Krungthep Thurakrit, 10 May 1997).

June 1997

• Results of environmental studies were disclosed.

July 1997

• At the Centre of the Northern Coordination Student Committee for Natural Resources and Environment Conservation, students from northern educational institutes met to consider their strategies to oppose the idea of government, which planed to submit the KSTD construction to the cabinet meeting (Daily News, July 22, 1997).

• Villagers in Sa-iab sub-district agreed to mobilise people to Chieng Rai province if the KSTD issue was submitted to the cabinet meeting. However, Teang In-tha, a leader, confirmed that ‘villagers are confident that the government will not submit the project to the cabinet meeting because the government has already given promise to the Assembly of the Poor’ (Siam Post, July 28, 1997).

• Ten NGOs held a press conference proposing three issues to the government as follows: ‘the government will not submit KSTD project to the mobile cabinet meeting on July 29; the government should disclose information about impact of the KSTD project to public; and public hearing should be arranged’ (Manager, July 25, 1997).

• MOSTE Minister Yingphan said the Assembly of the Poor and NGOs had a right to protest about the project, and the government had to treat all parties fairly. (Thairath, July 25, 1997).

• The Cabinet Secretary confirmed that the project would not be considered for approval by the cabinet meeting to be held on July 30 (Daily Matichon, July 29, 1997; Siam Rath, July 29, 1997; Siam Post, July 29, 1997).

• About 100 supporters, led by the Chairman of Pisanulok Provincial Council handed a letter to MOSTE Minister Yingphan expressing support for the KSTD. Meanwhile, there were protesters gathering at the Cabinet meeting venue in Chieng Rai. The Prime Minster Chavalit met the representatives of both protesters and supporters and confirmed that the meeting would not consider project approval, but only be informed
about the progress of the environmental impact study report. Yingphan criticised that
protesters were not local people while all supporters were local (Manager, July 30,
1997; Siam Post July 31, 1997).
• The Wildlife Fund Thailand suggested that the confrontation between supporters and
protesters about the KSTD project could be terminated or resolved by facts. WFT
disagreed with the project because the obvious information had not been presented to
public (Siam Rath, July 29, 1997).
• Also, academics and NGOs put pressure on the government to withdraw the KSTD
agenda from the cabinet meeting at Chieng Rai (Manager, July 28, 1997).

August 1997
• Parinya Nutalai, a specialist in geology, pointed out that the study team did not
completely study all aspects according to the terms of reference, although the main
objective of the Office of National Environment Plan and Policy is to study valid and
accurate data in order to solve conflicts (Matichon, August 3, 1997).

September 1997
• Wildlife Fund Thailand reported that they had studied the flood problem in Sukhothai
and Pisanulok to be presented to the committee on people participation for four
pending dam cases (Daily Manger, September 23, 1997).

October 1997
• The committee on monitoring and solving the KSTD problem, led by Phasuk
Phongpaichit, Chulalongkorn University, studied the way of life of people in the
Chieng Muan district. People in the Chieng Muan District said they did not agree with
dam construction because they learned from previous dams that most of the affected
people had faced difficulties and received unfair compensation (Thai Post, October
15, 1997).
• Assembly of the Poor’s members met at Sa-ib sub-district to consult on the dam
protest (Siam Rath, October, 17 1997).

February 1998
• During the seminar at Kasetsart University, the Deputy Director General of the RID
said that the project site of the KSTD covered destroyed forest area, so he requested
conservationists to inform local people about this fact (Manager, February 5, 1998).

March 1998
• The committee for natural resources and environment conservation condemned the
government (Chuan Government). for the cabinet resolution on March 24, 1998,
which approved a budget for detailed designs for the KSTD project, although the
study on it had not been finalised.
• The Thailand Student Assembly criticised the government for the cabinet resolution
that approved the budget for the controversial KSTD project while its environmental
impact study was not finalised (Daily Matichom, March 27, 1998; Krung Thep
Duragit, March 27, 1998).
• Due to the cabinet resolution on March 24 that approved a budget of 95 million baht
for detailed designs for the KSTD project, the Assembly of the Poor released a
statement saying that this resolution broke the agreement between the government and
the Assembly of the Poor and there was no obvious technical information to prove
that this dam could prevent flood and drought (Kaosod, March 27, 1998).
• Chum Sa-iabkong, Sa-iab leader, said due to the approval for a budget of 95 million baht (as mentioned above) villagers felt really disappointed with the Chuan Government, and the voice of villagers seemed useless (Kaosod, March 31, 1998).
• The TDRI report showed that ‘the economic benefit of the KSTD project is low (Manager, 28 March 1998, Krung Thep Duragit, June 24, 1998).

April 1998
• After the government agreed to continue the KSTD project by approving budget for the design on March 24, six villagers’ volunteers from Sa-iab entered near the planned construction site (located in the national park) in protest. Villagers intended to fight to the end to stop construction (Bangkok Post April 3, 1998).
• About 1,000 villagers protested against dam construction at Wat Donchai, Sa-iab and they agreed to select their representatives joining with the Assembly of the Poor to meet the Prime Minister Chuan on April 8 (Daily Matichon, April 7, 1998). The villagers said their group would not allow any engineering survey team to enter the proposed project site in the teak forest in the heart of the Mae Yom National Park. The villagers viewed the budget approval as a green light for the project against public will (The Nation April 8 1998).
• On April 8, the meeting between the government and the Assembly of the Poor was held and chaired by Phichit Rattakun, The Deputy Prime Minister. The meeting agreed that the RID would stop dam implementation until the end of May, awaiting the result of the public hearing (Thai Post, April 9, 1998).
• Sa-iab’s committee agreed to set up security guards to protect the project site. The guards were voluntary young men from the villages, and they were on duty from morning to evening every day (Kaosod, April 2, 1998).

December 1998
• The Assembly of the Poor condemned the resolution of Parliament that agreed to construct the dam, and requested that Parliament should review this issue. In addition, Harnarong Yaovalert, WFT, criticised that the House Committee considering this issue consisted of people who supported dam construction (Kaosod, December 19, 1998).
• Sa-iab villagers met to find out the way to protest against the KSTD project. As a result, they would rely on human rights and environmental impact. Sa-iab’s villagers agreed to collect money from all households for their protest activities (Daily Matichon, December 22, 1998).
• The Assembly of the Poor, led by U-dom Srikampa from Sa-iab and Vanida, AOP’s advisor, handed a letter to the Chairman of Parliament requesting a review of the agreement of dam construction. Also, they requested the government to strictly react to the main three cabinet resolutions on April 22, 1996 (Banham government), April 29, 1997 (Chavalit government) and December 30, 1997 (Chuan Government). (Kaosod, December 25, 1998, Thai Rath, December 25, 1998).

May 2001
• Due to flooding in the north, the idea of KSTD dam construction was raised by officials and proposed to the Interior Minister Purachai together with the flooding situation report. However, Purachai declined to respond to this issue, while Prime Minister Thaksin said the project had not been raised. The Mae Yom Conservation Network informed the public that this action had been taken without considering the facts (Thai Post, May 9, 2001; Kaosod, May 12, 2001).
• The Committee for Natural Resources and Environment Conservation in 16 Educational in Institutes complained the government about its policy on raising KSTD project (Krung Thep Durakit, May 10, 2001).
• Interior Minister Purachai pointed out that the KSTD project was a mega project, so it needed to be considered carefully (Kaosod, May 11, 2001).

December 2005
• Prime Minister Thaksin confirmed that the KSTD would not be constructed. Instead of building the large dam, a small-scale reservoir would be considered (Manager online, December 19, 2005).
Appendix VII
News reports in newspapers on Pak Mun Dam

June 1989
• The protesters staged a mass demonstration at the Khong Chiam district where the dam is located, requesting project cancellation. The representatives of NGOs and villagers submitted a letter to the PM Anand Panyarachun through the governor (Siamrath, June 18, 1989).

August 1989
• About 1,000 villagers and student activists rallied in the Pibun Mungsaharn district. They collected donations of money for future campaigns and signatures of townspeople who opposed the project to submit to the government (Bangkok Post, August 26, 1989).

September 1989
• A group of students from Ramkhamhaeng University submitted a petition to PM Chatchai calling for project cancellation. They also asked the government to order EGAT officials to withdraw from the project site. They claimed that EGAT provided invalid information to the public. In the petition, many concerns were raised, such as the life span of the dam, the possibility of the flooding of several rapids in the Mun River, which were tourist attractions, and the blocking of the natural route of fish from the Mekong River to hatch and breed in the Mun River (The Nation, September 6, 1989; Bangkok Post, September 6, 1989).

October 1989
• The official opening ceremony for the PMD's construction was launched on 21 October 1989 (Daily Matichon, October 23, 1989).

February 1990
• On February 11, 1990, more than 5,000 villagers rallied, led by Paitoon Chob-saing — the Chairman of Committee of Opponents to the PMD Construction to protest against the PMD project, and demanded that PM Chartchai Choonhavan give them a clear answer that he would scrap the project (Bangkok Post, February 12, 1990).

• On the third day, the protesters, supported by students, distributed leaflets informing the public about the dam's environmental impact, while several leaflets were also distributed in the town by an unidentified group accusing the protesters of receiving financial support from communists (Bangkok Post, February 14, 1990; The Nation, February 14, 1990).

• The protesters gave up on the fourth day of the rally after they were informed by MP Prasom that the government had ordered the PM’s Office Minister, A-nuwat, who was in charged of EGAT, to suspend the dam’s construction. Later, Minister A-nuwat said this information was distorted (Siam Rath, February 15, 1990).

March 1990
• About 2,000 people rallied in front of the Ubon Rachathani Provincial Hall to support the PMD project. The rally was reportedly organised by district officers, kamnans and headmen. Meanwhile, about forty people including MPs and people from Ubon met PM Chartchai at Government House, and asked him to support the PMD project (Bangkok Post, March 28, 1990).
April 1990

- EGAT announced its readiness to assist the people who would be affected, which was estimated at 300 families. The EGAT public relations director pointed out that the PMD project was different from previous dams, as it would not need a large reservoir and would not destroy the environment, in particular forest. However, the opponents argued that the area covered the forest reserve and the Keang Tana National Park (Bangkok Post, April 3, 1990).

- For the first time, after months of confrontation, the opponents of the PMD project, including Ubon’s villagers and student activists, and EGAT executives discussed the dispute over the project. The main issues proposed by the opponents included the number of affected families, which the EGAT had projected that only 39 families would be submerged, but the opponents’ figure was up to four hundred (The Nation, April 24, 1990).

- About 400 villagers from Ubon, led by Kamnan, headmen and members’ provincial council, rallied at the Government House to support the PMD project. (The Nation, April 25, 1990 and Siam Rath, April 25, 1990).

May 1990

- Due to the coup, martial law was declared, so political meetings of more than five people were illegal (The Nation, May 17, 1990).

March 1991

- The number of evicted people figure became one of the controversial issues. In 1982, EGAT reported that 4,000 families would be relocated, but this figure dropped to only 400 families, according to its revision in 1990. The final number declared by the Cabinet on May 15, 1990, when the project was approved in principle, was 262 families. However, the Ubon Committee of Opposing the PMD estimated that the number of households living inside the flood zone was more than 3,400, or about 20,000 people (The Nation, March 15, 1991).

- The international NGOs argued with the World Bank not to release funds for the PMD hydroelectric dam project. These international NGOs included Environmental Defence Fund, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, National Resources Defence Council and the International Rivers Network. The letter sent to the WB stated that ‘these circumstances indicate a state that sectoral lending operations must take into account the need for sound resettlement policies and the country’s willingness and capability to handle involuntary resettlement adequately’ (The Nation, March 16, 1991).

- Five Ubon Rachathani villagers met the World Bank officials in Bangkok, attempting to dissuade the financial institution from disbursing funds for the PMD project. They also handed over the 12,000 signatures of Ubon villagers and townspeople who opposed the project (The Nation, March 17, 1991).

May 1991

- About 300 Villagers from Phibun Mongsaharn and Khong Chiam rallied at Ban Huay Tung Lung, nine kilometres away from the PMD construction site. They rebuilt the new shrine and named it the ‘Mun River Protection Shrine’. The villagers explained that they did not want to move to the new location because it was arid and very unfertile. The village also complained that the government started construction and expected that villagers would move when the water level was rising. They demanded that the PMD’s construction be immediately stopped (Siam Rath, May 22, 1991; Bangkok Post, May 23, 1991).
• On the fourth day of the protest, villagers submitted a petition to the PM A-nant, requesting the project's suspension and a new study of its environmental impact (Bangkok Post, May 25, 1991; The Nation, May 27, 1991).

• Police set up checkpoints to block foodstuff and petrol entering the protest area. Also, police motivated villager not to join the protest and blamed the students. Thieng Bantao, a villagers’ leader, said ‘we propose to conduct the environmental impact study which will be participated by representatives of villagers and environmental academics’ (Saim Rath, May 24, 1991).

• The committee on natural resources and environment conservation of 16 institutes and PER (Project for Ecology Recovery) arranged a press conference to disclose facts about the PMD protest. Two main issues were mentioned: the environmental impact had not been carefully considered and the effect on people, about which the authority did not disclose clear information about how many areas of land would be submerged. The problem became more tense when EGAT demolished the shrine (Saim Rath, May 24, 1991).

February 1992

• As the dam started construction by exploding rapids in the Mun River, people demonstrated and requested this to stop. Chainarong Setthachua of the Ecological Concern Organisation said EGAT had never informed the public about its plan that rapids would be destroyed for dam construction (The Nation, February 24, 1992).

April, May 1992

• Violence erupted when anti-dam demonstrators, mostly the elderly and women, were in confrontation with a group of dam supporters. Later, officials used force to stop the anti-dam group as they tried to gain access closer to the dam site (The Nation, April 29, 1992; The Nation, April 30, 1992; The Nation, May 2, 1992).

March 1993

• EGAT publicised the facts about the controversial issues of the PMD project. The major issues included rapids’ explosion, fish species decrease and the spread of snails possibly causing disease. For example, EGAT said ‘the claim that the dam has considerably caused lower fish yield is not true. People in the project areas earn their living on farming, not on fishing. Beside, the dam construction, which occupied only a small area, does not change the flowing pattern of the Mun River, thus, causing no impacts to the aquatic system’ (Bangkok Post, March 10, 1993). The press argued that the concern of the villagers was not whether EGAT had received permission from authority agencies, as EGAT alleged in the fact sheet. The villagers realised that rapids’ destruction would affect their fishing grounds and would prevent the seasonal migrations of fish between the Mun and Makong Rivers (The Nation, March 12, 1993).

April 1994

• About 300 villagers started a prolonged demonstration in front of Government House. Then, the villagers agreed with the requests: first, relocating families whose houses were surrounded by water; second, resolving the unfair offer of compensation; third, paying 35,000 Baht annually for three years (during the construction period) per family, which was calculated from the lowest estimation of fishing income, 100 Baht a day; and fourth, providing 10 rai per plot of farmland for each family who had traditionally lived by fishing and not farming (Bangkok Post, April 26, 1994; Krungthep Dhurakit, April 25, 1994; Kaosod, April 25, 1994).
May 1994
- Thongchareon illustrated how a survey on fishing was conducted: ‘they asked the villagers living along the river from the Keang Tana to the Keang Sapue to answer questions. More than 2,000 villagers did. Mostly, we were asked about fishing equipment. We were told that the information would be used to classify whether we are considered as fishermen and either part-time or full-time fishermen and to determine the appropriate compensation. However, I question what standard they used to classify that’ (The Nation, May 23, 1994).

June 1994
- The government announced that the compensation would be varied in accordance with the degree of impact. The area was divided into five zones, ranging from the closest zone to the dam site, which was the most affected (Bangkok Post, June 10, 1994).

October 1994
- About 1,000 villagers started a prolonged demonstration in front of the Ubon City Hall. They insisted on flat rate compensation, 35,000 Baht a family per year for three years (The Nation, October 21, 1994).
- Apart from the compensation for fishing loss, villagers requested a new committee, in which villagers comprised at least a half of the members, to conduct a survey on the dam’s impact on fishing and to calculate a fair compensation scheme (Bangkok Post, October 15, 1994 and The Nation, October 16, 1994).
- One of the controversial issues was the number of people who were affected by fisheries loss and could get financial compensation. EGAT listed 2,142 while the protesters submitted a list of 2,233. Meanwhile, the complaints to the provincial administration listed 3,985 people. Therefore, the governor asked the ad-hoc committee to check the list of affected people. Thus, Thongchareon criticised ‘the governor’s move to have the list re-checked was an old trick to break up the rally. The demonstrators grew to over 2,000 on 17 October although police set up check points on the main roads from the Pubun Muagsaharn and Khong Chiam districts to obstruct people joining the demonstration at the Ubon City Hall, (Kaosod, October 17, 1994 and Bangkok Post, October 18, 1994).
- Vacharee Paonthongleaung, Project for Ecological Recovery, pointed out that the main problem of the compensation was that EGAT and the villagers relied on different ideas. The sub-committee for fishing impact concluded that the decrease of fish species in the Mun River stemmed from the cumulative impact of many developments in the watershed so the dam was the one of the factors. Therefore, EGAT calculated compensation based on this concept. On the other hand, villagers viewed that the problem stemmed from only the dam. (Kaosod, October 20, 1994).

November 1994
- About 15,000-20,000 people, led by Kamnan and headmen, rallied to support the dam. The rally was held on the opposite side of the road from the city hall, where about 500 villagers were protesting against the dam (Bangkok Post, November 1, 1994 and The Nation, November 1, 1994).
- The villagers and government agreed to examine the number of 2,390 villagers in the list whether they were fishermen. The government agreed with the idea proposed by Vanida, a NGO. According to her proposal, the government should allow villagers examining each other and confirmed with signature of either Kamnan or headman. If they could not get the confirmation from Kamnan or headman, ten villagers were requested for confirmation and then head of district re-confirmed. However, a resolution could not be reached on the issue of the amount of 35,000 Baht a year (Kaosod, November 4, 1994).

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• After one month of demonstrating, villagers decided to march to the dam site in the Khong Chiam district, which took them more than a week. While marching, the demonstrators campaigned to create an understanding in the general public about their activities (Daily News, November 14, 1994 and The Nation, November 22, 1994).

• After a fifteen-day walk from the Ubon’s city hall, about 2,000 PMD protesters broke through police barriers and continued their rally at the construction site. They insisted on remaining there until their demands were met. A large number of police were mobilized to guard the protesting area (The Nation, November 28, 1994 and Bangkok Post, November 28, 1994).

December 1994

• The protesters of the Sirindhorn Dam, which began operating in 1971, moved to join the PMD protest, but they clashed violently with the police. As a result, fourteen protesters were arrested and several others were injured. The violence shocked the PMD villagers. They believed the action was designed to pressure them into giving up the PMD protest (The Nation, December 6, 1994). Later, the Interior Permanent Secretary, A-ree Wong-araya, admitted he ordered police to disperse the Sirindhorn protest, but not in a violent way (Kaosod, December 8, 1994). The violent incident was wildly criticised by many parties such as academics, lawyers, NGOs and human right officers. Later, the Police Department set up a committee to investigate the case (Siam Post, December 12, 1994). Leaflets from an unidentified source were distributed warning that if the protest leaders did not give up and students guarding the villagers did not leave, force would be used (Siam Post, December 10, 1994 and The Nation, December 10, 1994).

• The demonstrators made handicrafts such as fishing nets, bamboo containers and so on, and sold them in villages and towns to raise funds for their activities (Matichon, December 14, 1994).

• Based on the information on fishing equipment gathered by sub-committee, it found many of the villagers’ claims to be incredible. Apparently, some villagers submitted false reports in hope of getting more than they were entitled to from the compensation schemes. A committee member said ‘there seem to be many large-scale fishing villages here. The family fishing industry in each of the 30 villages is indeed bigger than those in the fishing villages in the East and South’ (Bangkok Post, December 20, 1994).

February 1995

• A committee chaired by the Fishery Department Director General and comprising of representatives of villagers and NGOs was established to conclude who the authentic fishermen were and what their income was (The Nation, February 16, 1995).

• After a long demonstration and series of meetings, both government and villagers could reach a resolution as follows: first, the total number of affected families from the dam was set at 3,227 people; second, husbands and wives who were on the list would be compensated as one family. Married sons who still live with their parents would be paid as part of one family. Those who moved out before the dam was constructed would not be allowed to receive compensation; third, the villagers on the list would be paid after they had been proven by a committee whether they were authentic fishermen; fourth, the villagers would be paid 90,000 Baht a family, of which 30,000 Baht a family would be paid in cash at one time and 60,000 Baht would be given at 20,000 Baht a year for three years to agricultural Cooperatives. The total amount of fund to set up the cooperatives was 200 million Baht (The Nation, February 24, 1995).
March 1995
- The demonstration officially ended on 22 March 1995 after the longest demonstration, which lasted five months (Matichon, March 19, 1995).

July 1995
- A rally led by Kamnan and headmen requested the government to provide them with compensation the same as the villagers who joined in the prolonged demonstration (Bangkok Post, July 19, 1995).

December 1995
- The Assembly of the Poor was established.

March to April 1996
- The first demonstration under an umbrella of the Assembly of the Poor aiming to remind the government about its commitment started in the Banharn Government, from 26 March 1996 to 22 April 1996, resulting in the cabinet resolution to solving the forty-seven grievances.

January 1997-May 1997
- No progress had been made by this time, so the second demonstration began from 25 January 1997 to 2 May 1997, 99 days (in the Chavalit government). As a result, the Cabinet agreed to provide land for the people affected by the PMD project (3,084 families).

March 1999
- The Chuan government agreed to cancel the Chavalit government’s resolution. Then, in March 1999, the PMD movements, under the umbrella of the Assembly of the Poor (AOP), staged a prolonged demonstration at the PMD site. The demonstrators condemned that the Chuan government (second term) was not interested in the problems of the poor (Manager, March 24, 1999). They established a temporary community named ‘Moo Ban Khon Chon’ or ‘the Poor Village’, which later was changed to ‘Mae Mun Man Yeun Village’. The community consisted of huts for accommodation and simple shops. They insisted on demonstrating until their demands were met (Krungthep Dhurakit, March 29, 1999).

April 2000
- The demonstrators in cooperation with academics and NGOs organised a seminar on ‘Poverty and Solution in Thai Society’ at Mae Mun Man Yeun village one. The seminar was participated in by many leading academics including the former PM A-nand, and some parts of the seminar were televised in popular programmes. The story of the movement was widely publicised to the public. The participants supported the idea of opening the PMD sluice gates (Kaosod, April 22, 2000).

May 2000
- About 1,000 demonstrators led by the AOP seized the dam and its hydroelectric power plant. They continued to refuse to let EGAT’s staff maintain generators inside the occupied power plant. Two power generators shut down due to a lack of routine maintenance. One member of EGAT staff said that if EGAT staff were not allowed to resume operations soon, the Mun River could over-flow its banks and flood areas upstream of the dam (The Nation, May 30, 2000).
• Early morning on 28 May 2000, a group of PMD protesters invaded Government House, and twenty raiders managed to get as far as the Thai Ku Fha building, where the PM’s office is located. Vanida, advisor to the AOP, said the raid was designed to pressurise the government into promptly responding to the villagers’ demands. She said ‘we knew the Chuan government would drag its feet and we do not want to pressurise the EGAT and the provincial authorities any more. Then, we have put the pressure on the government directly. This way would lessen tension between our group and the provincial authorities’. Later, the incident ended peacefully after the Interior Minister promised the government would pay serious attention to their grievances. He said that he would advise the PM to set up a high-level committee to handle the problem (Bangkok Post, May 29, 2000; The Nation, May 29, 2000).

June 2000
• Protesters at the PMD site insisted that they would not allow officials to enter the power generation plant until a concrete plan had been drawn up to address their grievances. The atmosphere became increasingly tense when the PMD’s electricity generators were shut down on May 31. EGAT claimed that this was because the protesters prevented its workers accessing the plant (Bangkok Post, June 4, 2000).
• About 1,000 demonstrators who remained at the dam issued a statement in response to the authority’s warning. They stated that EGAT’s warning was aimed at discrediting the demonstrators and pitching them against other groups of people (The Nation, June 11, 2000).

July 2000
• 12 July 2000, villagers (led by the AOP) staged their demonstration again in front of Government House, as the government had not followed the suggestion of the committee to open the dam’s gates. About 100 makeshift shelters near Government House were built to protect demonstrators, particularly the elderly, from illness caused by the rains (Bangkok Post, July 14, 2000).
• On 16 July at 8 pm, the demonstrators invaded into the Government House and clashed with police. As a result, many demonstrators were arrested and some sustained minor injuries. PM Chuan insisted that the government had to act according to the law. Therefore, many parties condemned the reaction of the government. For example, Chairman of the Union for Civil Liberty Charan Dhitaphichai called on PM Chuan to reduce the number of police deployed at Government House. He said ‘while the government claims the sight of a mob ruins Thailand’s reputation for tourism, its ill treatment of the group is even worse’ (Daily News, July 18, 2000 and Bangkok Post, July 23, 2000).
• On 24 July, the number of protesters in Bangkok increased to about 3,000 after 500 more villagers arrived from the north. About 300 slum residents in Bangkok also joined the protest. Bangkok’s middle class also backed the villagers, with the Club of Businessmen for Society donating 100,000 Baht and large amounts of food to the protesters (The Nation, July 25, 2000).
• Almost 500 demonstrators volunteered for a hunger strike (Bangkok Post, August 7, 2000).

November 2000
• On 19 November 2000, after the villagers had occupied the PMD site area and established Mea Mun Man Yeun Village to protest against the dam for almost two years, they were attacked and their makeshift wooden shelters were set on fire. About thirty villagers were injured and at least two of them were seriously injured. One of AOP’s activists said
obviously they were hired by EGAT. This is not the first time they have tried to force the villagers out’. However, there was no official response from EGAT (The Nation, November 20, 2000).

April 2001
- On 17 April 2001, PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s cabinet ordered the EGAT to open all gates of the PMD for a period of four months, from 15 May to 15 August. The Ubon Rachathani University was assigned to conduct a study on the effect of the dam gates’ opening to fish in the Mun River. Unfortunately, all eight gates were opened on 14 June, after a month’s delay, as there was another group of villagers protesting against the opening (Bangkok Post, June 17, 2001).

October 2001
- After the four-month opening of the dam gates ended in early October, seventy villagers led by the AOP marched from Ubon Rachathani province to Government House in Bangkok (about 560 km), to demand that the PMD sluice gates be kept open permanently (Bangkok Post, October 8, 2001). Somparn Khuendee, an NGO staff member, said the march aimed to disseminate the information about the hardships of people living above the PMD whose livelihoods had been affected by the closing of the dam gates. Moreover, people affected by other dams, including the Sirithorn, Fai Huana and Lam Khunchalu dams, also joined this activity (Bangkok Post, October 10, 2001).

December 2001
- On 11 December 2001, the cabinet agreed to the proposal of increasing the period that the PMD sluice gates remained open to one year. This would enable the government’s working group to complete the research (The Nation, December 12, 2001).

September 2002
- On 16 September 2002, about 300 AOP members and villagers affected by the PMD started their rally outside the Ubon’s provincial hall, requesting the permanent opening of the dam’s spillways. They referred to research conducted by Ubon Rachathani University showing that the opening of the spillways helped revitalise the environment and the ecological system of the Mun River basin, which had been affected by the dam project (Bangkok Post, September 17, 2002).

October 2002
- The Ubon Ratchathani University paper proposed three options: permanently closing the gates, periodically opening them for five or eight months or permanently opening them.
- The Thaksin Cabinet agreed to open the dam gates for four months a year. Therefore, more than 200 members of the Assembly of the Poor gathered outside Government House to renew their push for the permanent opening of the dam spillways. They threatened to move their rally to Prime Minister Charansanitwong’s residence if he refused to meet them (Bangkok Post, October 30, 2002).

December 2002
- Early on 5 December 2002, a group of unidentified men raided and vandalised the Assembly of the Poor’s campsite near Government House. The protesters believed that state officials carried out the raid, although the government denied it. However, thousands of PMD opponents announced that they would return to Bangkok to reinforce their protest (Bangkok Post, December 7, 2002).
• On 8 December, PM Thaksin visited the demonstrators at the demonstration site in front of Government House after the raid. He promised a review of their problems, but many protesters said they would go ahead with a protest against the cabinet's decision on opening the dam gates only four months a year (Bangkok Post, December 9, 2002).

• PM Thaksin announced an invitation to the villagers to meet him without NGO representatives, claiming that he wanted to talk to ‘real’ villagers, not their ‘brokers’. Suriyasai Takasila, of the Campaign for Popular Democracy, pointed out that MP Thaksin was trying to undermine NGOs’ legitimacy by dividing them from villagers (Bangkok Post, December 10, 2002).

June 2004

• The Thaksin cabinet agreed to re-schedule the period for opening the dam sluice gates from 1 July-31 October to 1 May-31 August. This agreement followed the result of a meeting of academics, villagers and government agencies concerned, showing that the migration of fish from Mekong River starts from May and fish migrate back to Mekong in August. Therefore, the period of opening should be changed in accordance with nature (Kaosod, June 9, 2004).

February 2006

• A demonstration under the Assembly of the Poor was staged in Bangkok requesting the Thaksin government to solve the villagers’ problems.

May 2007

• A group of villagers submitted a petition to the Surayuth government requesting for annual opening of the dam’s gates according to the cabinet resolution.

June–July 2007

• On May 29, the Cabinet had maintained a resolution by the previous administration to open the dam gates for four months a year during the rainy season for fish migration and breeding. However, on June 12, two weeks later, the Cabinet made an about-face, reportedly under the influence of the military.

• The Sorayut interim government agreed to Cabinet resolution on June 12, 2007 to permanently close the gates. The resolution instructed the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), to maintain the reservoir water level at 106-108 meters above mean sea level. The 108-meter level is the normal retention level of the Pak Mun dam, and after the dam releases the water for electricity generation, the level will come down to the 106-meter level. In effect, the dam's sluice gates would never be opened to allow migration of fish from the Mekong into the Mun River. Fishing communities along the river would inevitably suffer, they said.

• The Assembly of the Poor said that the change of mind resulted from pressure by the CNS (Council for National Security), which had assigned an Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) officer, Gen Surin Pikuntong, to collect villagers' signatures to claim the majority opinion, despite the dam's failures in economic, social, and environmental aspects, as concluded in an academic study. They said the CNS employed the same tactic used by former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who instructed the National Statistics Office to conduct a poll, and turned the result against them. At least Thaksin agreed to open the gates for four months in a year, but the CNS gave villagers no choice. They vowed to fight till the end.

• On July 10, about 70 villagers from the northeastern province, Ubon Ratchathani, gathered in front of the Government House, anticipating their case to be reconsidered in
the Cabinet meeting. Unfortunately, they were not successful. (Prachatai, June 19, 2007 and Prachatai, July 11, 2007).
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