



Kent Academic Repository

Pickvance, Katy (1995) *Environmental movements in Eastern Europe: a comparative study of Hungary and Russia*. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent.

Downloaded from

<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/94583/> The University of Kent's Academic Repository KAR

The version of record is available from

This document version

UNSPECIFIED

DOI for this version

Licence for this version

CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives)

Additional information

This thesis has been digitised by EThOS, the British Library digitisation service, for purposes of preservation and dissemination. It was uploaded to KAR on 25 April 2022 in order to hold its content and record within University of Kent systems. It is available Open Access using a Creative Commons Attribution, Non-commercial, No Derivatives (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>) licence so that the thesis and its author, can benefit from opportunities for increased readership and citation. This was done in line with University of Kent policies (<https://www.kent.ac.uk/is/strategy/docs/Kent%20Open%20Access%20policy.pdf>). If you ...

Versions of research works

Versions of Record

If this version is the version of record, it is the same as the published version available on the publisher's web site. Cite as the published version.

Author Accepted Manuscripts

If this document is identified as the Author Accepted Manuscript it is the version after peer review but before type setting, copy editing or publisher branding. Cite as Surname, Initial. (Year) 'Title of article'. To be published in *Title of Journal*, Volume and issue numbers [peer-reviewed accepted version]. Available at: DOI or URL (Accessed: date).

Enquiries

If you have questions about this document contact ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk. Please include the URL of the record in KAR. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our [Take Down policy](https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies) (available from <https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies>).

**ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HUNGARY AND RUSSIA**

by

KATY PICKVANCE

**PhD in Sociology
University of Kent, 1995**



DXN007218

F157152

To Gabi, Balázs, Bence, Chris and Viktor

CONTENTS

Chapter 1	Introduction	1
Chapter 2	Pluralism, opposition and civil society in Soviet type regimes: conceptual debates	5
Chapter 3	Pluralism and opposition in practice in Soviet type regimes	22
Chapter 4	A review of western social movement theories	46
Chapter 5	Hungarian environmental movements	82
Chapter 6	Environmental movements in Russia	125
Chapter 7	Local and national authorities versus environmental movements: the Hungarian case	163
Chapter 8	Local and national authorities versus environmental movements: the Russian case	181
Chapter 9	A comparison of Russian and Hungarian environmental movements	205
Chapter 10	The relevance of western theories in Eastern Europe	232

Conclusion	252
Appendix	258
Bibliography	290

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the collaborators and team members of the project, Dr. Viktória Szirmai, Dr. Lev Perepjolkin, Sveta Klimova and Nick Manning.

I would also like to thank my supervisor, Chris Rootes, for his inspiring help and constructive criticisms.

I would very much like to thank my family for their support.

Finally, and, most importantly, I would like to thank Chris Pickvance in three roles: as a fellow team member, as an intellectual inspiration, and as a supportive partner.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Communist regimes in eastern Europe has been described as a 'revolution'. Political systems which almost all writers considered to be stable and expected to continue for decades rapidly collapsed one after the other. 'Democracy' was expected to replace state socialist regimes which had allowed limited dissent. Likewise journalistic reporting described the probability of rapid transition from a state socialist to a capitalist economy as soon as the appropriate dose of western economic medicine had been taken. In other words the nature of what came after state socialism as 'read off' from a mixture of ideological slogans and desires.

This thesis starts from a different place. As a Hungarian who lived in Hungary until 1986 and a student of Russian and a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union from 1970 I was aware of the gap between western images of state socialism and the reality of the Hungarian and Soviet system. The purpose of the thesis is to go beyond the slogans and to study one aspect of reality of the first four years (1990-94) of post-socialism in Hungary and Russia.

The choice of Hungary and Russia is partly because of my personal experience and interest in these two societies and partly because of the thesis's connection with the ESRC research project. My precise role in the project and the independence of my contribution to the conduct and writing up of the research is detailed in the Appendix.

Hungary and Russia are particularly interesting to study because they had a very different historical development prior to the socialist period and even during it. The recent regime change also took different forms in each case and even occurred in different years. In Hungary the gradual reform process resulted in a peaceful change in 1989 while in Russia there was a stormy regime change in 1991. Thus these two post-socialist societies provide a challenging comparison.

The choice of environmental movements as the subject of the thesis reflects several factors. Environmentalism is one of the most important global currents of thinking today, and the extent of its presence in eastern Europe is of great interest. By definition environmental issues are, in part at least, intrinsically global in character. Hence eastern European reactions are of practical importance to people everywhere as well as being of academic interest. Secondly it is well established that in eastern Europe environmental damage under state socialism was extremely serious. Hence the grounds for environmental activism are abundantly present.

The thesis is concerned with environmental movements in Hungary and Russia in the 1990-94 period. However, since its aim is to offer a proper understanding of differing patterns of environmental movement activity in the two countries it gives considerable attention to political opposition under state socialism, and the historical experience (or absence of) democracy in the pre-socialist period. Only by understanding the long-term trends in the two societies can one understand present patterns.

The thesis has four major aims. First it presents the results of an in-depth study of environmental movements in two eastern European societies and their relations with local and national authorities and their relations. The second main aim is to make a systematic comparison of Russian and Hungarian environmental movements and authorities. Third, to examine the relevance of existing theories of opposition in Soviet-type societies, civil society theory and social movement theories to an understanding of environmental movements and their relations with authorities. The fourth aim is to study the relevance of continuity in the two societies.

The thesis has two major parts. Part one discusses the opposition in Soviet-type societies and the different theoretical approaches including social movement and civil society theories. The second part presents an analysis of the empirical data. This is based on in-depth interviews conducted with social movement activists and leaders and local and national authority members.

Following the introduction (Chapter 1) part one consists of three chapters (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Chapter 2 reviews the state of pluralism and opposition in Soviet-type regimes and the theoretical arguments concerning civil society in order to establish whether present day citizen action has any continuity with the recent past. Chapter 3 demonstrates that there was in fact scope for opposition under socialism and this was true for the Soviet Union as well as Hungary. The nature of this opposition was, however, very different in the two socialist societies due to their different social and political character. Finally Chapter 4 reviews the relevant theories of social movements in order to establish the basis for their application in the eastern European context. This includes theories of collective behaviour, resource mobilization, environmental consciousness, new social movement theories and the political opportunity structure theory. All these theories have been developed exclusively on the basis of 'western' experience (some in North America, others in Western and Southern Europe while the environmental consciousness theory is based on Scandinavian experience). It is therefore both innovative and useful to apply them in the eastern context and establish to what extent they provide 'tools' for the analysis of Hungarian and Russian environmental movements.

In Part II I analyse environmental movement activities and national and local authorities in the two post-socialist societies, based on our empirical research:

Chapter 5 describes a number of environmental movements in Hungary including both those which came into existence in the mid 1980s and are still active, and those which were founded in the early 1990s. The case studies also provide a selection of local and national, Budapest-centred and regional environmental movements, operating outside the capital and examines these movements in order to explore their aims and goals, participants, leaders, leadership styles and internal conflicts, the role of the media and the degree and nature of success they achieved.

Next I turn to Russia. Chapter 6 describes the environmental movements in Russia which came into existence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The case studies provide a selection of national (federal) and local examples, Moscow based and those operating outside the capital and like Chapter 5 for Hungarian movements, systematically examines the individual

Russian cases in order to investigate their aims and goals, participants, leaders, leadership styles and internal conflicts, the role of the media and the degree and nature of success they achieved.

The next two chapters focus on the relation between local and national authorities and environmental movements in Hungary (Chapter 7) and in Russia (Chapter 9). They examine the recent development of democratic institutions in Hungary and Russia both at local and national level. The aim of these chapters is to examine the extent of democratic development in order to establish why movements with many similar features in Hungary and Russia end up achieving such different degrees of success. It is argued that the main reasons for the success of environmental movements in Hungary, and the lack of it in Russia, lie in factors outside the movements themselves, namely the social and political context in which they are embedded. The movements' relation with the national and local authorities is the major focus of these two chapters.

The next chapter presents a comparison of Hungarian and Russian environmental movements which draws together the different aspects of the analysis explored in Chapters 5 to 8 and makes a systematic comparison of the Hungarian and Russian cases. Chapter 10 then examines the relevance of existing 'western' theories in the eastern European context. This includes returning to the civil society theory reviewed in Chapter 2 and the western social movement theories reviewed in Chapter 4 in order to apply them to the concrete cases of Russia and Hungary and examine to what extent they offer arguments applicable in the eastern European context. It is shown that most of the theories examined have some relevance to the cases considered.

In the Conclusion I draw an overall conclusion to the thesis, discussing its achievements in relation to its aims. I also explore the implications of the study for the development of social movement theories, and discuss the likely trends in social movement development and in the development of democratic institutions in the societies studied specifically and in eastern Europe generally.

CHAPTER 2

PLURALISM, OPPOSITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOVIET-TYPE REGIMES: CONCEPTUAL DEBATES

In this chapter I will review theories and debates about the concepts of pluralism, opposition and civil society in societies with Soviet-type regimes, such as the Soviet Union and Hungary. The chapter will concentrate on debates concerning the theoretical aspects of pluralism, opposition and civil society in the one-party system. The next chapter (Chapter 3) will apply the concepts debated here to concrete cases of opposition in Hungary and the Soviet Union prior to 1989.

THE CONCEPT AND DEBATE ON PLURALISM IN THE SOVIET-TYPE REGIME

The debate on pluralism in the Soviet and Eastern European context was a response to the 'totalitarianism literature' which was found one-sided and rigid by the advocates of Soviet-type pluralism.

The totalitarian approach had a narrow, monistic view of Communist regimes. Based on the formal structure of the political system, it argued that, in a regime with only one political party and no free elections, there was no scope to express any opinion other than the prevailing one dictated by the Communist Party. Although the term originally referred to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, after the World War II the Soviet Union was also identified as totalitarian. A large amount of literature concentrated on discussing totalitarianism applying it to the Soviet-type regime (e.g. Huntington, 1964; Friedrich, 1966; Kassof, 1966; Meissner, 1966; Conquest, 1966; Levi, 1966; Brzezinski 1969; Brown, 1984).

Totalitarian rule was identified as "a form of personalised rule by a leader and an elite who seek to dominate both society and the regular, legal structure which is called the 'state'" (Schapiro, 1972, p.102). Others emphasised that it is a regime which makes efforts to remould and transform its citizens in the image of its ideology. The 'essence' of totalitarianism, argued Friedrich, is the regime's total control over the everyday life of its

citizens, of their thoughts, attitudes and activities (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1966).

Totalitarian dictatorships such as the Communist states, it was argued, consist of an ideology, a single party rule, typically led by one man, a terrorist police, a communications monopoly, and a centrally directed economy (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1966). The apparatchiks are part of an extremely centralised and rigidly hierarchical bureaucratic organisation with a high level of institutionalisation. The ruling party maintained unquestioned supremacy over the society, imposing its ideology at will (Brzezinski, 1969). The Communist system, Huntington maintained (1964), combined its high institutionalization with high pseudo-participation of individuals, a system in which people, including the young, became 'dull' conformists. The party monopolised the function of integration by terror in Stalin's time and by means of bureaucratic arbitration in post-Stalinist times.

The really decisive characteristics of the autocratic-totalitarian regime, according to Meissner, are mainly three. The first is the unrestricted autocracy of the party. The second feature is total control from above of all social organisations and institutions and also of all mass media and other sources of public information. Even when the period of all-encompassing terror was over, the control of all functions and thought in every section of society remained totalitarian. The third was total planning, which extended not only to the economic but also to the political and cultural sectors of society. In Meissner's words: "Whatever the means used by the party at any given time, the operative concept is that of control. So long as the party possesses the will and the power to exercise control over autonomous social processes and forms of social spontaneity that it is promoting, the society remains subjected to totalitarian rule - whatever the given relaxation" (1966,p.7).

The argument that totalitarianism did not cease to exist in the Soviet Union with the death of Stalin was echoed by other authors as well. Power within the party became concentrated in the Presidium after Stalin's death, argued Levi (1966), and even more in the hands of Khrushchev, who exercised absolute control over all information and propaganda, and who regularly overruled even party bureaucrats to maintain his own leading position. Even those followers of the totalitarian approach who recognised that after Stalin there was a certain degree of power-sharing among the leadership insisted on describing it in a demeaning way,

from a 'cold war' perspective, in accordance with the anti-Communist rhetoric. "The only significant reality in Russia" - Conquest claimed (1966) - "is the 'Byzantine' structure of top-level politics... As in the Jacobean tradition, a third-rate, faceless, collective leadership holds power in an increasingly nondescript society when their betters had driven each other out" (p.66). The highly organised, strong and experienced bureaucracy, which was built by Stalin but continued to exist in the post-Stalinist Soviet regime, was organizationally highly effective at containing the social, political and economic forces, but not designed to cope flexibly, Conquest argued. A few hundred people wielded as much social 'weight', due to this totalitarian structure, as is usual for whole social classes, and operate with methods comparable only to those used by past despotisms (1966, p.67).

The political changes in the Soviet Union after the Stalinist period, however, opened a wide-ranging debate over the question whether the 'totalitarian model' should be changed in accordance with changing reality in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or the authors should stick to the model, as an 'ideal type' and try to ascertain how far Soviet-type societies have deviated from that model (Brown, 1984). Brown rejects the totalitarian model, not because of the built-in political bias in the concept, but because the totalitarian interpretation of the post-Stalinist period had several shortcomings. Firstly, Brown argues, it exaggerates the success of political socialisation in the Soviet society and implies that a) the CPSU has been monolithically united and b) that the party leadership managed to control all popular beliefs and values, which was not the case. Secondly it does not recognise policy processes and other political changes in the Soviet Union and other Communist states which were initiated from below (Brown, 1984).

Pluralists, however, emphasised a different point. They argued that within the framework of the one-party system there was a range of different views and interests which were expressed in the communist-led regimes (Skilling, 1966; Hough, 1977). It was recognised that pluralism in the Soviet regime was different from pluralism in a multi-party system but if pluralism was defined as interest-representation and group struggle by different sections of society then it was also relevant in the Soviet regime (Hough, 1983).

The concept of 'pluralism', which was rediscovered by Skilling and others in the 1960s to

apply to the Eastern European and Soviet case, was originally used by British and American philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (William James, John Dewey and G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell) (Solomon, 1983). The British philosophers were concerned with the growing role of the state in Britain and argued firstly that the conservative view of the state as legal, moral and political sovereign was false, secondly that non-political groups and associations are prior to the state and hence had legitimate claims upon it and thirdly that the concentration of power in the absolutist state is an impediment to liberty. Liberty - they argued - is best preserved through the dispersion of power to groups and associations (Solomon, 1983). In the American literature pluralism became a frequently discussed term after World War II by writers such as David Truman, Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby and Raymond Wolfinger. But while the British scholars' main anxiety was rooted in an internal problem, the British state, which was steadily increasing its functions and its power, the source of American pluralists' interest was an external matter, the historic shock of two types of totalitarian regime, Hitlerism and Stalinism. Thus American pluralism in the 1950s concentrated on valuing and preserving the American status quo against totalitarianism. American pluralists shared the British view that the nation had to be fundamentally associational in character and groups had an important role to play in the political process, but they felt that the fragmentation of government produced a need for compromise with an emphasis on political participation (Solomon, 1983).

The study of pluralism in Soviet-type societies started off with the earlier works of Gordon Skilling, Jerry Hough and Darrell Hammer. The post-Stalinist period aroused particular interest among scientists studying the Soviet bloc. The new developments under Khrushchev made them recognise elements of pluralistic views developing in the Soviet Union and the satellite states. It was argued that there were major similarities between the American and Soviet-type of system regarding their 'institutional pluralism', with the major difference that the American model of pluralism allowed the formation of independent pressure groups or parties while in the Soviet system those who wished to effect change had to work within existing institutions (Hough, 1977).

However, after the Khrushchev 'thaw', when Brezhnev returned to a more rigid system in the Soviet Union it was recognised and acknowledged that 'bureaucratic domination' had

again become strong (Hough, 1983). Hammer coined the term, 'bureaucratic pluralism' and argued that pluralism even in the United States is restricted by the existing bureaucracy and so this was not unique to the Soviet system (Hammer, 1974) and Skilling noted that the Soviet Union had a 'polyarchical system' meaning that it was 'oligarchical rather than democratic in character' (Skilling, 1966).

The use of the term pluralism in relation to Soviet-type societies was often contested. It was suggested for example that it should be used with qualifiers, like 'limited pluralism' or 'quasi pluralism'. Others considered corporatism to be the most useful concept for understanding Soviet-type regimes or at least some Eastern European societies (Brown, 1984; Solomon, 1983, Schmitter 1982; Hough, 1983). While the pluralist model emphasised conflicts between groups within society, the corporatist model talked about consensus and cooperation via the state. Contesting interest groups were recognised in the Soviet regime by Skilling (1971) who identified three politically active groups with different views. The first group contained officials and bureaucrats, apparatchiks and managers, the police and the military. The second group, like lawyers and economists, had some critical or independent views, but were not antagonistic to the regime and believed in helping by frequent consultations with the first group. Finally the third group included people with independent or critical opinions, such as liberal writers, or opinion groups who were outspoken but often severely condemned. Skilling's definition of political groups was therefore wide, embracing a large spectrum of society including Communist politicians. He concluded that "political groups in the Soviet Union are seldom organised, and if organised, are dominated by functionaries who are usually not elected and not responsive to the wishes of their constituents" (Skilling, 1971, p. 382).

In sum, the most important element in these studies was their treatment of Soviet-type societies as more complex than the totalitarian approach, which characterised Communist regimes in a much narrower way. In comparison with the monistic totalitarian approach the concept of pluralism within the Soviet regime was more useful because it distinguished between the different clusters of actors and interest groups and understood the process of decision-making within a Soviet-type regime in its diversity. The term pluralism, it could be argued, was not the most fortunate one because it could be misleading. Nevertheless there

was an important attempt to discuss the Soviet-type of 'multiplicity' recognising that the system contains different social forces expressed by groups operating within and outside the Communist Party.

THE DEBATE ABOUT OPPOSITION IN SOVIET-TYPE REGIMES

Recognising the complexity of different social forces independent from the party organisation led to a focus on the opposition. First the argument concentrated on the term opposition. It was claimed that it could not be adopted in Communist regimes in the absence of rival political parties (Schapiro, 1972). Instead the term 'dissent' was suggested, because it implied criticism and disagreement with the policy of the government but without any intention of violently overthrowing it. It was not claimed that the Soviet system was democratic, but only that there were strong elements of opposition within the one-party system (Dahl, 1971). The debate concerning the term opposition drew attention to arguments such as Schapiro's claim that it originates in Lenin's concept to designate critics whom he intended to silence. Because these critics did not intend to replace Lenin's administration by one of their own, argued Schapiro, only wanted to criticise certain faults of that administration, their action should be categorised as dissent, not opposition (Schapiro, 1972). Others defined 'a dissident [as] someone who disagrees with the ideological, political, economic or moral foundation of a society but does more than simply disagrees and think differently. He [she] openly proclaims his/her dissent and demonstrates it' putting himself [herself] in danger (Medvedev, 1980). Dahl argued (1966) that oppositional forces were different from each other in the different democratic (multi-party) societies themselves which made it even more difficult to define the term within a one-party system. This inspired a new definition by Skilling: "in non-democratic countries opposition has normally been forced to assume a variety of non-legal or illegal forms and to express itself in other than a formal and institutional manner" (1972, p.73).

Ionescu held the view that one should distinguish between 'opposition', which refers to a conflict of interest and values and incompatibility of opinions, and 'political opposition' which is institutionalised, recognised and legitimate. In Communist states the existence of political opposition as an institution was denied, but opposition existed. Political conflict in

a 'non-opposition' state formed a continuum of sui-generis situations and phases which inevitably led to institutionalised political opposition even if the intermediary situations remained stationary for a longer period, argued Ionescu (1967). He identified four main groups differentiated by their motives. Firstly were those whose political grievances concentrated primarily on the demands for freedom of expression of opinion and of information. Secondly those who had social and professional grievances. These groups of people claimed that the government discriminated against them and obstructed their professional or commercial activities. The third group felt that the state interfered with their religious activities. The fourth motive was the nationalistic one felt by people whose main concern was that their country or region was ruled by a suzerain power or felt oppressed by a central administration as ethnic or regional groups (Ionescu, 1967).

Four other types of opposition were identified by Skilling (1972). Firstly, 'integral opposition' which was based on Dahl's (1966) 'structural opposition' elaborated in his book, the *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. Integral opposition meant overt or covert disloyalty, including underground activities or even revolutionary conspiracy. Secondly 'factional opposition', which involved rivalry within the party or government. It did not therefore involve opposition to the Communist system but included fundamental ideological rifts between politicians. Thirdly 'fundamental opposition' of interest groups outside the circle of politicians. They lobbied the opposition within the 'factional group' seeking to establish alliances and trying to influence them to achieve changes in policies. Fourthly 'specific opposition' which referred to opposition within the system, for example from inside the party opposing specific policies (Skilling, 1972).

Schapiro (1972) found Skilling's categorisation inadequate and proposed instead a five-fold classification. The first form was the complete ('all-out') rejection of the regime with a desire to overthrow it. Examples of the revolt in 1956 in Hungary or in 1967-68 in Czechoslovakia were cited by the author. The second type was the 'power struggle' or 'factional conflicts', when political leaders tried to oust each other. This was a frequent occurrence in regimes where conditions of intrigue and secrecy were present. The third category was "protest against the arbitrary abuse of law, procedure and civil rights by the Soviet authorities; against policies like the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or the oppression of national minorities; against

interference with freedom of speech and writing" (p.6). The fourth category included 'interest group' or 'pressure group' activities. Schapiro distinguished between these two groups arguing that the former brought pressure on the government in order to promote its own interest while the latter sought to promote a policy beyond the group's own particular interest and put pressure with an aim of a more general nature. The last category was the type of 'opposition' described by Schapiro as pragmatic dissent. This included mainly scientists, technicians and experts who won a degree of freedom from party control after Stalin's death. Schapiro's examples were the Hungarian economists and a few Soviet planners and economists, like Liberman.

Schapiro's categorisation was also found inadequate by Bugajski and Pollack (1989) who argued that the groups often overlapped and changes in time were ignored. They also pointed out that although open dissent was restricted to a small number of people, while passivity and apathy characterised the majority, on occasions economic and social crises reached the point where people breached the barrier of their fears and undercurrents of discontent surfaced. Despite the strong party control "numerous sources of discontent persist[ed] among aggrieved social groups within East European societies and mushroom[ed] into open conflict under pertinent conditions" (Bugajski and Pollack, 1989, p.37). This process goes back to the period after Stalin's death and is found in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The intellectuals and students started off the process of discussion acting as spokesmen, arguing for political reforms and criticising official policies. This influenced other social strata and sometimes even penetrated the ruling parties. Categorising the opposition, Bugajski and Pollack differentiated between the national democrats whose main concern laid in gaining independence from Soviet-Communism, the religious oriented Christian Democrats, the liberal democrats pressing for individual liberties, the social democrats stressing the role of state in improving the welfare system, and the socialists who preferred a mixed type of economy with the combination of state ownership and privatisation in certain sectors, emphasising the importance of workers' self-management. Traces of the latter go back to the pre-war and immediate post-war period (Bugajski and Pollack, 1989). This classification, however, could only apply to the last period of the Communist regime.

I argue that the different categorisations of political opposition have one major problem in

common: none of them uses more than one dimension to categorise the different groups. In contrast I identify two different dimensions, one of which has two aspects, along which oppositional groups in a Soviet-type of regime should be categorised. The first dimension (A) which has two aspects (A1 and A2) measures a) the level of resentment against the regime (A1) from high to low, from active opposition via apathy and cynicism to factional conflicts among political leaders and b) the distance from the ideas of the ruling Communist party (A2). The second dimension (B) refers to the type of demands such as 'intellectual type' or 'abstract' and 'working class type' or 'concrete', following Szelenyi's argument described in Chapter 3.

The highest level of A1 was found among the opposition which involved active political action expressing discontent. This was a small hard core of active dissidents who produced samizdat literature and organised demonstrations or strikes. The second level was found among the people who read and circulated illegal samizdat literature and participated in the demonstrations, underground meetings, and illegal strikes. The next level included the so called reformers who did not step outside the limits of legality but were strong opponents of existing policies. The fourth level on the A1 dimension included the large group of open critics who expressed strong disagreement with many aspects of the regime. This opposition became a regular feature of conversations and was more characteristic in Hungary than in the Soviet Union, although in some parts of the Soviet Union. The last category is 'apathy and cynicism' which was very widespread both in the Soviet Union (Yanitsky (1993) and in Hungary (Kulcsár and Dobossy, 1988). This was, however, the 'mildest' expression of resentment against the regime. The majority of people belonged to the two latter categories, but they should be described as a para-opposition, using Schöpflin's expression (1979), meaning that although they did not support the regime, they were politically passive.

The second aspect of the first dimension (A2) distinguishes opposition according to the distance from the ideas the ruling Communist party represented. Firstly those furthest away from the party views were the members of the hard-core opposition. This was a small number of people, as mentioned above, who openly and bitterly rejected the one-party system all Party ideas and expressed their views in writing, published by the strictly illegal samizdat publications. They often lectured at underground meetings, smuggled out writings to the west

and sought any occasion to express their complete opposition to the regime. This small group of people was mostly well known to the authorities, often harassed by the police, lost their jobs and were sometimes sent into exile abroad, and at other times denied passports to travel abroad and in the Soviet case (but not in Hungary) were sent to labour camps, asylums or into internal exile. They became "professional dissidents".

The second group was larger. These were those people who read the samizdat materials (which was an illegal activity) and circulated them with the deliberate intention of reaching as many fellow-thinkers as possible and those who made up the audiences of the underground lectures and who were participants in illegal demonstrations and strikes. They did not suffer too much harassment by the secret police though they were also black-listed and their telephones were often tapped.

The third group of people was the part of the population which was full of discontent against the regime and the government. They did not read the samizdat or go to illegal meetings, and did not do anything actively against the ruling power, but openly expressed their opinion. Their political expression went only as far as complaining and blaming the regime for everything. As this group made up the overwhelming majority of the population this created the basis of the lack of legitimacy which characterised the socialist regimes and contributed to their unexpectedly rapid collapse. The fourth group contained those people whose careers benefitted from the regime and had some sympathy towards it though had some criticisms as well. This was a large minority group. These people firmly believed in the regime and its core ideology but disapproved of certain aspects and practices which they thought needed to be modified. In their opinion the errors were due to the personal misconduct of certain individuals. These people later became labelled as 'reform Communists'.

Finally were the very small group of hardliners, the closest to the party-line, who had privileged positions and firm loyalty towards the regime. They were in opposition only when they contested each other for even higher positions, more privileges and power, like the opposition which toppled Khrushchev. This type of opposition was also recognised by both Skilling (1972) and Schapiro (1989). The opposition of these people was mainly an internal affair amongst those who were closest to the government but it gained much attention among

'Kremlinologists'.

The second dimension (B), as explained, distinguishes between the types of demand. The intellectual opposition had an abstract approach to political grievances. They were mainly concerned with the lack of freedom of expression, press and publication and freedom to organise independent pressure groups, movements and political parties. The working class opposition concentrated on price increases and living standard problems and some of them demanded more workers' participation in management decisions.

In sum, I have identified two dimensions of opposition one of which had two aspects (level of resentment and distance from ideas of the ruling Communist Party) and the other of which referred to the type of demands. This classification will be used in Chapter 3 when I compare opposition in the two societies.

THE DEBATE ON CIVIL SOCIETY

In the previous parts I considered the debates on pluralism and opposition in Soviet-type societies prior 1989. I now turn to the question of civil society a term which became frequently used in the literature on former socialist regimes. The term civil society was used both in the Eastern European and the Western literature, often in different ways. Kumar (1993) pointed out that "using this distinction, East Europeans were mainly concerned with the construction - more or less de novo - of 'political society', for their idea of civil society was fundamentally one of social groups capable of self-organisation independently of the state." (p.2.) The term civil society is not used in the Marxist sense to refer to the private, nonpolitical sphere of the citizens' life, but closer to the Hegelian and Gramscian sense: activities outside the realm of the party and the state as well as the realm of the private life of individuals. The term is associated with political activities of people as citizens, their participation in civil and professional voluntary organisations or pressure groups, which have effects on their political socialisation as well as acting as mediators between the state and the individual.

The term civil society has been the object of extensive debates (Keane, 1988; Cohen and

Arato, 1992; Kumar, 1993; Bryant, 1993; Kumar, 1994). It has a centuries old history and has been applied in many different types of society from eighteenth century North America and Europe to present day Eastern Europe. As a result the concept has undoubtedly acquired a 'catch all' character, as Kumar argued (1993, 1994), especially in the recent Eastern European literature where it not only used in a different way but became overrated and often used without being clearly defined. Hence before making analytical use of the concept it is essential to define it. The definition I use in this thesis and before (K. Pickvance, 1992) is that civil society is the realm of political protest and civil activities, which is extra-parliamentary and which does not seek to gain power but to limit it. Thus civil society, in my definition, refers to those political activities which lie outside institutionalised state activities and party political activities, although the connections between civil society and the latter two types of activities are important, as argued by Tarrow (1983, 1989), Kriesi (1991) and Rootes (1992) and Habermas (1992).

The function of political activities within the domain of civil society is to protest and oppose, to counterbalance and limit power. This can be achieved by means ranging from petitions, demonstrations, campaigns to social movements. It is the task of the representatives of the authorities to organise and regulate society but politicians need control. What is distinctive about civil society is this function of political activities to limit power and not to gain^{it}. This distinguishes civil society from political parties in opposition.

The problem of civil society was first approached by authors of the Scottish Enlightenment, who argued that modern society breeds political despotism, therefore the creation and strengthening of citizens' associations, such as courts of law, citizens' militias and civil society at large, consultation, opposition and civilised persuasion can only bring protection against it (Ferguson, 1767, published in 1966). The most important synthesis of the concept of civil society was developed by Hegel who analyzed it as a system of needs, of isolated individuals confronting each other in terms of antagonistic interests dictated by market relations. For Hegel the realm of the state consisted of civil servants, the police (the authority) and the crown (monarchy), and civil society contained the classes of individuals (Stände), the corporations (associations) and the umbrella organisation of these associations: the estate assembly, and public opinion (Hegel, 1821). Hegel, like Montesquieu earlier and

Tocqueville later, recognised the need for an intermediate level of power between individual and state. The individual is powerless as an atomised subject vis-a-vis the state bureaucracy. The fear of despotism, which motivated Ferguson and Paine, however, was not present in Hegel's approach (Keane, 1988; Arató and Cohen, 1992).

Tocqueville, following Hegel, but basing his views on the American context (*De la démocratie en Amérique*, written in 1835-40 and the examination of the French Revolution: *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*), highlighted the danger of the gradual concentration of power in the hands of a centralised administrative state. The state, argued Tocqueville, which was supposed to regulate the conflicting particular interests of the different groups of civil society was instead becoming a popularly elected despotic power by the very concentration of its power. A pluralistic, self-organising civil society is the foundation of a democratic society, it is the 'indispensable condition' of democracy, he argued. State power without the social safeguards of independent civil associations is a licence for despotism.

Marx viewed civil society as the sphere consisting of unpolitical individuals united only by mutual dependence through the division of labour. Political life was monopolized by the state, Marx argued, which signalled the loss of community and the denial of meaningful citizenship. The individual in the modern society is atomised and depoliticized. "A person's distinct activity and distinct situation in life were reduced to merely individual significance" (Marx, p.166). The member of a modern society, Marx argued, is both an individual and a bourgeois, a participating citizen in communal affairs and a subject of political regulation. The separation of state and society is the cause of political alienation and the formation of voluntary associations are the expressions of particular egoistic interests, determined by the market.

Gramsci, based his concept on civil society on Hegel's ideas, recognising the importance of civil associations such as unions, cultural institutions, churches, clubs, neighbourhood associations and the plurality of political parties, continuing the Hegelian concept of corporations, but unlike Hegel located both family and political culture within civil society (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci, who was a contemporary of the existing Soviet Union and was aware of the totalitarian nature of the regime under Stalin, argued that the centralised state

was becoming the greatest block to a developing free society and civil society. Bobbio, an analyst of Gramsci's works argued, that "civil society in Gramsci does not belong to the structural sphere [to the base] but to the superstructural sphere... a fundamental point, which has not been sufficiently stressed" (Bobbio, 1988 p. 82). Cohen and Arato, however, suggested that Gramsci's concept 'rendered the whole doctrine of base and superstructure irrelevant' because both civil society and state express the same principle and logic - to integrate civil and political society in the state - and that Gramsci argued that this reduction expresses one of two different principles, hegemony and domination (Arato and Cohen, 1992 p.145). Carl Boggs (1984) and Walter Anderson (1976) argue similarly, adding that Gramsci distinguished between state, and in particular parliament, which legitimately encompasses both coercion and consent, *and* civil society, in which legitimate coercion is absent and this differentiation is too rigid and simplified. As Arato and Cohen (1992) stress, Gramsci should have recognised Hegel's concept of mediating institutions between civil society and state. Instead he developed the concept of an independent civil society, independent from both the economy and the state. Gramsci viewed civil society as the outcome and object of class struggle. Consequently the ruling social group, whether or not it is the bourgeoisie, will be the hegemonic one in any particular society in Gramsci's view. Gramsci nevertheless developed Hegel's concept of corporations, modernising it by emphasising the functions of social movements, cultural institutions, civil associations and unions - as long as the working class is in opposition. But he treated many of these associations as pure vehicles for reproducing bourgeois hegemony, which must therefore be destroyed and replaced by forms of association which create a counter-hegemony such as alternative forms of associations, like workers' clubs and the associations of 'organic' intellectuals who do not support the bourgeoisie but the proletariat, and parties of the proletariat itself. He believed, following the orthodox Marxist tradition, in the replacement of capitalism with another form of society via revolution and remained a life long supporter of the Soviet system even if he saw some of its contradictions.

Habermas (1992), in contrast to Kumar (1993), does not dispute the relevance of the term civil society but explains how and why it has developed through history and how it has been transformed in different societies. As civil society in its modern sense emerged when capitalism emerged it will be useful to compare the two situations. In the early period of

capitalism a new class, the bourgeoisie, was emerging, which could not be assimilated with the nobles and courts any more. In this new stratum "the state authorities evoked a resonance leading the *publicum*, the abstract counterpart of public authority, into an awareness of itself, as the latter's opponent, that is, as the public of the now emerging *public sphere of civil society*. For the latter developed to the extent to which the public concern regarding the private sphere of civil society was no longer confined to the authorities but was considered by the subjects as one that was properly theirs." (Habermas, 1992, p.23) Thus civil society for Habermas consists of two realms: the public and private sphere.

Habermas's concept of the 'public sphere', however, unlike my definition of civil society, includes political parties and parliament as well. This is because originally parliament's function was to counterbalance the authority of princes and nobles. However, Habermas himself admits that 'from the very start, indeed, the parliament was rent by the contradiction of being an institution opposing all political authority and yet established as an "authority" itself' (p.233). In the contemporary context, on the other hand, the role of parliament and political parties is different both in Western and Eastern European societies. Habermas also emphasises that, on one hand, private and public spheres in modern societies are indissolubly connected and, on the other, that the private sphere is reduced to family life and leisure activities in contemporary societies. Consequently what we are left with is civil society as the extraparliamentary polity.

John Keane is also one of the contemporary interpreters of the civil society concept. According to Keane (1988) the interest in civil society and its relation with the state in the current Western European context is due to three major factors: the restructuring of capitalist economies, following the post-war prosperity and exhaustion of economic growth potential which leads to a permanent 'mismatch' between the economic and the political spheres; the political controversies following the failures of the Keynesian welfare-state; and the rise of the new social movements. Keane stresses that there is a constant threat to western civil societies from the activities of the state and the private corporations which all try to restrict them in their activities. Keane (1988) uses an ideal-typical approach in his distinction between state and civil society. His approach aims to explain socio-political realities by analyzing particular institutions (their origins, development and transformation), or whole

social systems.

The term civil society was used by the political right as a synonym for "private" life and freedom of market activities as opposed to state intervention. The orthodox marxist left rejected the idea of civil society on the basis that it does not address "fundamental" problems of property, class and class conflict. Some identify it entirely with a Gramscian approach and accept that it could be only used in his original understanding. Others analyze civil society from the point of view of social movement formation (Melucci), the relationship between labour market, welfare state and the household (Claus Offe), or using historical analysis (N. Elias, J. Szűcs, M. Vajda or Habermas). Neo-marxist and neo-Weberian perspectives attempt to incorporate both state and economy centred approaches when analyzing civil society (Skocpol, 1979; Jessop, 1982; Offe, 1982; Giddens, 1985).

Arato (1991) is one of those writers who analyses the case of Soviet Union and Hungary. He defines civil society as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed of associations and publics. He considers it important to link the concept of social movements to that of civil society. Independent collective actions, citizen initiatives and social movements are all present in the transforming new societies argues Arato and should be distinguished from 'political society' (1991). Modern civil society is created through forms of self-constitution and self-mobilization which are institutionalised through laws. But civil society is not all of social life outside the administrative state and economic processes. Arato (1991) argues that it is necessary to distinguish civil society from a political society of parties, political organisations, and parliaments even if they might arise from civil society. This is because they are directly involved with state power which they seek to control and/or obtain. Civil society, on the other hand, is not directly related to the control or conquest of power. It aims to exert influence through democratic associations and unconstrained discussions in the public sphere. "Such a political role is inevitably diffuse and inefficient. Thus the mediating role of political society between civil society and the state is indispensable, but so is the rooting of political society in civil society" (p.198). Concerning the Eastern European and Soviet scene Arato emphasises that a certain degree of economic development, growing consumption and to a certain extent tolerated depoliticization of the private sphere went ahead in the Soviet Union and most Eastern European societies. He

refers to arguments, such as Lewin's (1988) who stresses that modernisation was responsible for the expansion of civil society in the eastern bloc. In Arató's view Lewin overestimates the role of modernisation in the development of civil society. Arató (1991) argues that the existence of social processes and relations independent of the state is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of modern civil society. Stalinism destroyed civil society and prevented it from developing but modernisation contributed to its development. However, the pattern of modernisation in the Soviet Union was in many respects a failed and even pathological one endangering for some time to come the building of a genuinely modern political culture. If modernisation were the only precondition of the emergence of modern political culture or civil society, the level and outlook of democratisation would be much better than the present situation suggests in many countries around the globe (Arató 1991).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the arguments about pluralism, opposition and civil society as they apply to Soviet-type regimes. It was shown firstly that, even though the term pluralism was controversial, the pluralist approach to Soviet-type regimes was more useful than the monolithic, totalitarian one. Secondly, I have explained in this chapter that many writers agree that opposition existed in the one-party system but debate the way to describe the different groups in opposition. Thirdly, it was shown that civil society is a concept which has been used both in the West and in Eastern European context, where it was especially useful during the period of transition. Its relevance has been debated both within Western liberal democracies and in Eastern European societies. I shall return to it in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3

PLURALISM AND OPPOSITION

IN PRACTICE IN SOVIET-TYPE REGIMES

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 reviewed the theoretical debates about the concepts of pluralism, opposition and civil society in Soviet-type regimes. This chapter will now look at the opposition in practice in the Soviet Union and Hungary in the one-party period. It will be shown that, although both societies were categorised as 'Communist' as part of the Soviet bloc, the nature of opposition was very different in them. I shall refer back to my conceptual discussion, elaborated in Chapter 2, in the conclusion of this chapter.

THE SOVIET CASE

Under Stalin the oppression was tight, the country isolated and strictly controlled. Large numbers of people experienced extremely harsh treatment from the regime and became victims of it even without participating in oppositional activities. After the death of Stalin, during the Khrushchev period, a number of people joined vigorous debates on public policy matters. Experts and specialists, especially the cultural, professional and scientific intelligentsia, were invited to participate in decision-making. The intelligentsia thus emerged had a say in policy matters. Under Brezhnev the regime became more bureaucratic and politically less tolerant. The groups in opposition, as well as former advisors, who emerged under Khrushchev, became isolated again. Many of them faced arrest and subsequent trials where they were charged with "subversive" activities or anti-Soviet propaganda (Simmons, 1971). But the process which started off under Khrushchev turned out to be irreversible. Numerous groups were in existence and noted in the literature. Bilocerkowycz (1988) reports about the Ukrainian dissidents, often writers, but political groups as well. One of them was the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, an open and public organization seeking to

defend national and human rights since November 1976. Several other human rights organizations were established in the USSR, one in Moscow formed in May 1976, others in Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia and Latvia. Official harassment of these groups began the very day they were founded (Bilocerkowycz, 1988). Friedgut (1979) provided important evidence of previously little known community self-help groups. These self-help organisations fulfilled the requirements defined by western scholars, like Milbrath and Goel (1965), Verba et al. (1971), and Kornhauser (1960). The self-help groups facilitated the articulation of interests and served to recruit people into politics. Friedgut found examples of numerous community self-help groups which were not only tolerated but supported by the local authorities. This was a widespread and well established phenomenon in the Soviet Union, just like neighbourhood groups in western democracies (Friedgut, 1979).

While the problem of the 1960s was to uncover the complexity of Soviet society and distinguish between several groups to reveal its pluralist nature, by the 1970s it became clear that there were quite a number of people in the Soviet Union who openly expressed considerable unease or even discontent with the regime. This became known in the literature as 'the Soviet-type of opposition', as discussed in Chapter 2. Those distancing themselves from the party propaganda were often educated people, social scientists, writers, artists, social workers. On the other hand, it was the younger generation which felt that the Brezhnevian policy of isolation cut them off from western culture, especially pop culture, and rebelled against it. Clubs, like the 'Independent Song Club' closed by the authorities in 1975, or the 'Student Club' organising double meaning pantomimes, again later banned by the authorities, were examples of activities of the younger generation feeling deprived from accessing western culture and creating their own, which was not in line with the official socialist direction in popular culture (Mandel, 1989).

The Gorbachev period turned out to be the last Soviet period and brought an unprecedented degree of political tolerance to the Soviet Union. Before the Gorbachev period the regular conflict between government and opposition led to direct confrontation, while under Gorbachev a more tolerant attitude started to occur. Civil society was mushrooming and direct confrontation became much less frequent. The process of de-totalitarianism and democratisation had been started by reconstructing the constitution and restructuring political

institutions (Sakwa, 1993) and the establishment of a western type of pluralism was initiated (Tismaneanu, 1990).

I will now examine the development of opposition among people concerned with ecology, women's problems and opposition among workers, and also concern with peace prior to 1991. Environmental movements will only be touched on here since the development of environmental ideas as well as movements will be discussed in Chapter 6 for Russia (and in Chapter 5 for Hungary).

The general political discontent of many people in the Soviet Union was an important phenomenon but many of them saw problems in more concrete terms. Political activities sprang up around those subjects.

The ecological groups were mainly concerned with issues like the Siberian rivers Ob and Irtysh, the drying up of the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan and protest against the nuclear pollution of the Caspian sea. The most influential, and perhaps best known, ecological movement was, however, the long standing protest against the pollution of Lake Baikal. This case will provide us with a good example which will illustrate how 'Soviet-type' opposition operated in practice.

The large Siberian lake was chosen in the 1950s as the 'best' site for industrial 'progress' (Komarov, 1980), to exploit the assets represented by the water, the surrounding forest, and the available local labour force which by background was mainly a poorly educated minority group of Buryats. By the 1960s this had resulted in beginning of a huge construction of two huge paper and pulp combines, the Baikalsk and the Selenginsk.

Although the history of the public protest to save the lake started in 1963, evidence suggests that, in fact, many experts, including biologists, hydrologists, and geographers had opposed the construction of the two combines from as early as 1958 (Komarov, 1980). The scientists' opposition, however, turned out to be far too weak and ineffective compared with such powerful political forces at the time as the Gosplan (State Planning Committee) of the USSR, the 'Committee on Forestry and the Paper and Pulp Industry' and the Ministry of Defence,

and the construction was successfully completed.

In order to 'calm' the first alarming voices the authorities declined any access to the project-documents or the so called 'scientific reports' produced by the authorities, some of which went as far as arguing that "the sewage water will create conditions for the propagation of life... and this will mean an increase in fish reserves!" (Chivilikin, 1965).

Although public pressure grew both among local people and scientists, resulting in the 1960s protest letters signed by a string of prominent academicians and several well known Russian writers, the official Soviet press was never allowed to give a platform to the opposition, and the scientific lobby seemed to be ignored.

The 'Soviet-type' opposition, however, resulted in a number of steps being taken by officials. By as early as 1966 it was announced that an especially powerful and sophisticated purification system had been installed in the paper combines and that a special 'commission' had been set up to monitor the environmental effects. The official report, of course, found the filters to be 'on the whole adequate'. In addition to these an official propaganda campaign was initiated with films produced and articles placed in the official press to reassure the public.

The official propaganda policy, however, could only be effective for a limited period of time. By 1977, only ten years later, several reports were produced by academicians, commissioned by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Clashes between the Soviet authorities and the members of the scientific communities, supported by many of the local population, became increasingly visible and well known.

The new type of 'people power', in the form of organised protest groups, accelerated in the Perestroika period resulting in a number of movements. At the peak of this, in 1990, there were at least five known opposition groups in the region simultaneously campaigning for the lake. These included the Baikal Eco-World, the Baikal National Front, the Society for the Defence of the Baikal, the Centre for the Ecological Defence of the Baikal Region and the Baikal Fund (Stewart, 1992; Wilson, 1993). There were numerous demonstrations in the

streets of Irkutsk and at the site of a controversial construction of a pipe-line which was planned to divert the effluent from the Baikalsk paper mill into the nearby river Irkut (about forty miles away) instead of the lake, thus redirecting pollution to another site which has its own population and is also a popular holiday area.

The activists' successfully organised petitioning campaign (with around 107,000 signatures) and demonstrations were effective in two ways. The pipe-line plan was abandoned and their efforts unified the previously scattered protest groups into a well organised environmental movement, the Baikal Fund (Wilson, 1993).

The Baikal Fund, like all the other protest groups around Lake Baikal, is an environmental movement. It is an organised protest activity which came into existence because of the lack of concern over environmental protection by the industrial growth-oriented Soviet power. The Baikal Fund's success and popularity, however, is not only due to the "newly emerging Russian green movement" or "western scrutiny and international recognition", as Wilson (1993, p.65) argues.

It has a lot to do with a strong nationalist stream, attracting, on the one hand, a number of well known public figures, like the writers, Valentin Rasputin and Sholohov or the economist, Gennadi Filshin. It also mobilises romantic-nationalistic sentiments which can easily lead to a high profile national focus on the plight of Lake Baikal and an emphasis on the preservation of nature. As Dunlop (1983) argued, seeking to safeguard Russian historical monuments and the environment from destruction are tendencies which stem from one root. They both exhibit tendencies in Russian conservative 'patriotic' thinking among both Slavophiles and National Bolsheviks, the philosophies of vozrozhdentsy and the Russian narod.

Evidence also suggests that there is a strong 'nationalistic bias' when weighing the importance of environmental danger within the same region. Stewart pointed out that, beyond the Urals air pollution is all too evident 'with chimneys emitting grey or black smoke producing up to several kilometres long smoke bands, causing serious health problems among

children in Ulan-Ude'¹. Yet there seems to be much less concern about the Buryat childrens' respiratory problems than about the state of this very Russian lake, the Baikal (Stewart, 1992, p.227).

Lake Baikal thus became probably the most famous environmental case in the Soviet Union attracting great attention and mobilising a huge protest force.

In addition to this well known case there were also protests in the Moscow suburb of Kuskovo from 1979 concerning dangerous waste from a nearby chemical factory, which was finally closed in 1987 as a result of this movement!. After the Chernobyl catastrophe there were several protest activities in the Ukraine and elsewhere in the country and a general questioning of the whole Soviet nuclear energy programme (Hosking, 1990).

Ecological groups often had in their leadership well-known writers or scientists whose fame and reputation helped in creating necessary publicity and attention and raising public awareness. Ziegler (1990) pointed out that there were three important underlying elements in the rapidly emerging green movements in the 1980s in the Soviet Union. Firstly, environmental issues mobilized previously politically inactive citizens and they became focal points of voluntary political participation. Secondly, their important but implicit anticommunist message questioned the "growth at any cost" type of Soviet attitude towards the economy, resources and the environment. Thirdly, green movements were against centralisation, rejecting the continuation of Moscow centred policies and giving support to the idea of regional control over resources and environmental consequences (Ziegler, 1990). This notion often coincided with ethnic, separatist and nationalistic feelings (Dunlop, 1983).

Feminism in the Soviet Union was not very widespread. But there were politically active women, who drew attention to the problems between the sexes and the discrimination against women. Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman cosmonaut was active in the Union of Soviet Women and lectured about the fact that many women were still employed in heavy manual jobs in the Soviet Union, that women do the vast majority of queuing^e and other household

¹The capital of Buryatia, seventy five kilometres away from the Lake Baikal.

tasks, that women with equal education occupy the lower prestige jobs and are lower paid. She also drew attention to the high rate of abortion among Soviet women due to the lack of other contraceptive methods and the lack of family planning, and to the appalling and life threatening conditions for abortion in the hospitals, which Soviet women had to resort to (Tereshkova, 1987). Organisations like Women and Russia, which operated in Leningrad from 1979, or the Union of Soviet Women united politically active Soviet women. From 1988 onwards a few, mainly professional, women formed groups such as the international press club of women journalists in Moscow, a women film-makers' union, a women writers' club, an association of women engineers and women scientists and most importantly the League for Society's Liberation from Stereotypes (LOTOS) challenging the traditional sex-role ideology. These women's groups, however, remained fairly isolated and the lack of gender consciousness posed a considerable barrier to the development of the women's movement in the Soviet Union (Nechemias, 1991).

Workers often protested against the conditions they had to work in even under the most severe period of Brezhnev. The strikes in the hydro-electric plant in Vyshchorod near Kiev, in the rubber plant in Sverdlovsk, in the armaments factory in Gorky in 1969 and in Vladimir in 1970, in factories in Dnepropetrovsk, Kopishche, Vitebsk, Tol'yattigrad in the 1970s in a motorcycle factory in Kiev in 1981 are a few examples of the frequent and growing expression of serious discontent among workers concerning their working conditions, the hours of unpaid overtime work due to poor organisation and mismanagement, the poor safety and hygiene conditions, the high level of work accidents, and lack of improvement in living standards. The growing use of moonlighting and black market was just a few of the spontaneous reactions workers turned to as a result of their dissatisfaction with the regime since 1975 (Hosking, 1990). Sedaitis (1991) argues that workers were courted by both the conservative and the reform-oriented politicians during the 1980s. Both sides were claiming to represent the Soviet working class. Workers themselves, however, often turned away from the larger political issues concentrating on more concrete and immediate labour problems, as discussed in Chapter 2. They established unofficial unions and clubs in their factories or group of factories to advance their rights, raise their wages, demanding more involvement in the factory management and call for more decision making power for the workers' collectives. Some demanded the depolitization of workplaces and the abolition of any

prerequisites not related to job performances (Sedaitis, 1991).

The Moscow Group to Establish Trust Between East and West was the most important unofficial peace movement in the Soviet Union. It existed from 1980 and called for genuine detente. Although the 'Trust' group tried to avoid open criticism of the Soviet military build-up it could not be accepted as impartial at the time. Participation in the movement was considered severely subversive and the members of the Trust were arrested, deported or locked up in psychiatric hospitals. But the group survived and by the Gorbachev period groups with similar platforms were mushrooming in the Soviet Union (Tismaneanu, 1990; Kuznetsov, 1990).

Having looked at the opposition which developed in a number of fields, I now turn to the overall pattern of the development of the opposition over time. The sixty years of bureaucratic dictatorship created an overall awareness of social ills, which was of course fragmented into different social milieus, but reflected a general trend (Mandel, 1989). The deepening contradiction in the Soviet Union led to a gradual appearance of a consciousness. "A real public opinion has taken shape in this country" (Mandel, 1989, p.76) which led to the birth of civil society. This was in its embryonic stage in the 1960s but a considerable growth in civil activities occurred in the 1970s, accelerating in the mid 1980s (Hosking, 1990).

The economic and social stagnation of the Brezhnev years led to the degeneration of Soviet society into corruption and sloth while the isolated leadership heralded itself into a cult of glory widening the gap between reality and triumphant empty claims of 'advanced socialism'. The result was massive cynicism and popular rejection of the official ideology, especially amongst the intelligentsia and the youth. Surveys indicated that the governments' extensive agitprop efforts did not result in the desired aims as the majority of the populace ignored the official propaganda (Smith, 1992). The rejection of the Brezhnevian style of regime should not mislead us, however. According to opinion polls (Smith, 1992) Soviet people developed a strong sense of egalitarianism, opposed large income differences and preferred a system in which the state guaranteed the quality of life by providing jobs, housing, health care, education, and pensions for its citizens.

The last period of the Soviet regime, the Gorbachev era, developed a number of forms, even in the sphere of the economy, which encouraged the growth of independence from party control and influence. The appearance of the so called 'cooperative' movement contributed to the development of grassroots movements, too. This started in June 1988 when the Law on Cooperation provided a legal framework. These 'cooperatives' were the first economic units without any direct communist party involvement in their activities, because they were too small to have a party organisation. This made the cooperatives relatively isolated from direct party control. Secondly the cooperatives were obliged to look after their own interests independent of state or party agencies and were answerable only to the members of the association. Later on, over the course of 1988 and 1989 these cooperatives started to join together into national organisations to play a more direct political role and stand up for their own rights. Often they saw benefits in creating specialized associations of cooperatives in scientific research, insurance, health care, construction, agriculture and other sectors. They sought to influence reform economic policies and protect themselves on the national and regional level (Slider, 1991).

A survey of young people conducted in 1987 showed that 65% of young workers and 89% of students of vocational and technical schools considered themselves to be members of illegal, so called 'informal' groups (Tolz, 1990). Yanitsky and others reported about 60 000 groups mushrooming all over the Soviet Union at the turn of the decade (Yanitsky, 1993; Igrunov, 1989; Berezovski, 1990).

On 13 March 1990 Article 6 of the USSR constitution was abolished and the Communist Party lost its 70 year old monopoly on political power. This decision legalised a situation which had already developed in the late 1980s. Different groups and factions were mushrooming in the country demanding legal status. The various democratic and national organisations were in the process of organising themselves into proper political parties gaining strength and support by the day (Smith, 1992). The first embryonic political parties in the transition from the Soviet period to the Russian era were born in 1989.

In sum, the Soviet opposition came into existence with the Khrushchev 'thaw' and, although under Brezhnev the level of political tolerance was much lower, organised political opposition

continued to exist. There were self-support neighbourhood groups strongly encouraged by the officials and a number of types of opposition group concerned with issues ranging from ecology and workers' rights to religious and nationalistic demands. One reason why these groups were not always widely known was that the media and publications were strictly controlled under Brezhnev, hence the circulation of information about them was blocked. In Gorbachev's time this changed, contributing to the rapid growth of grassroots activities. Opposition in the Soviet period did not, however, necessarily mean being anti-socialist. Soviet people developed a strong sense of socialist values which they maintained even when opposing many features of the Brezhnevian period.

THE HUNGARIAN CASE

The case of Hungary is fundamentally different from that of the Soviet Union for several reasons. Firstly, Hungary had a much shorter period of Communist rule, secondly, Hungary experienced the revolution of 1956 and thirdly, not independent from the events of 1956, the political and economic system in Hungary became different from most neighbouring socialist societies. In 1968 the New Economic Mechanism was introduced and from the mid 1960s up to the end of the socialist system the level of political tolerance was greater and more consistent than in the Soviet Union. This resulted in a much greater opportunity to express open opposition to the regime. It was possible to publish the kind of critical articles and books which in the Soviet case was impossible, due to a much greater control of communication there, as mentioned earlier. That is why in Hungary the focus of opposition shifted towards publications instead of organised action.

The theoretical debates concerning the Soviet case mostly applied to the entire Soviet bloc. Meanwhile of course it was always acknowledged that Eastern Europe was different. Research on Eastern Europe prompted the term 'pluralism' in Soviet-type societies in the first place (Skilling, 1966; Gross Solomon, 1983) due to the recognition of the existing plurality of sources of power and later developed to incorporate the Soviet Union itself.

Compared with the USSR, the Eastern European opposition's demands were more centred around the concept of individual rights. This makes an interesting contrast with the west

where demands for social rights increased after the war. In most liberal democracies after World War II the expectation was that the state should intervene using its administrative and judicial power to redistribute income and pursue certain social and economic rights for each citizen. Tökés (1979) argued that this development in liberal democracies was influenced by the historic events in the less developed part of the continent and the world. The rise of social democracy, the trade union movement and later the anti-colonial and national liberation movements were not immune from the leverage of the Russian Revolution and the Eastern European development after World War II which provided strong precedents for the demand for expanded social rights in western liberal democracies. This, however, in turn influenced the more open Central Eastern-European societies, including Hungary, in their political demands (after the short spell of the Stalinist oppression) (Tökés, 1979).

After the Communist takeover in 1948, a one-party hegemony was established in Eastern Europe, led by hard-line Communists who were trained in Stalin's Soviet Union. The Hungarian version of the 'cult of personality' was headed by Mátyás Rákosi, who spent decades in the Soviet Union prior to his return in 1945. Judging by the spectacular defeat of the Communists at the last free election in 1947 (17%) the majority of the population was against the Communist rule. Those groups of people who were going to lose their assets, position and influence were strongly against replacing a wide democratic coalition with Communist rule. They included the aristocrats, the bourgeoisie, those who were educated before the war and occupied managerial positions, and landowners. The churches were also strongly antagonistic to an atheist regime.

The lack of trust was mutual. It was, however, not restricted to these groups mentioned above. According to the slogan of the period - 'the enemy is amongst us' - those who were not 'trustworthy' gradually incorporated the majority of people, just as in the Soviet Union under Stalin, and included ordinary peasants and factory workers. In contrast to the Soviet Union, however, the shorter period under Communism created the situation where previous members of other political parties than Communists remained present in Hungary. They included Christian Democrats, Smallholders, former Social Democrats as well as 'western' Communists, i.e. those who were not educated in Soviet exile but either in western countries or in Hungary. All these people became targets of political harassment. Between 1948 and

1956 political parties other than the Communist Party remained 'dormant' and their former members were subject to strict police control and the special agency, called Állam Védelmi Hatóság (AVO, the Hungarian equivalent of NKDV, predecessor of KGB).

The most important opposition in Hungary occurred in 1956. After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet backing of the hardliners weakened somewhat which resulted in division within the Communist leadership. Imre Nagy, who became prime minister in 1953, became the centre figure of the reform Communists, demanding both political and economical changes. When Rakosi recovered his weakened position for a short while in 1955 he managed to get Imre Nagy expelled from the Party. This act backfired. Imre Nagy became the symbolic figure of change, reforms and political hopes even though he himself was a Communist (though not trained in the Soviet Union). Nagy became prime minister and leader during the revolution, which started on 23 October 1956. His government, which consisted of both Communists and non-Communists, abolished the one-party system on 30 October 1956. Nagy demanded the Soviet troops' removal from Hungarian territories and decided to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact (on 1 November 1956) (Grzybowski, 1991).

After the Kadar regime re-established the one-party system combined with economic reforms and political liberalisation the critical opposition also appeared on the scene. This critical opposition was not, as Schopflin (1979) put it, "a group of individuals, acting in a more or less organised fashion, who have mounted direct or indirect challenges of their governments by seeking to exert pressure on these governments for specific policy objectives" (p.142). The majority of the opposition during the Kadar regime was not trying to act outside the system and bring pressure on it from outside. Apart from two major pillars, namely Hungary's alliance with the Soviet Union and the leading role of the party, which were untouchable subjects, people were allowed to express relatively broad criticism within and outside the party as well. Public debates were frequent and encouraged. Publications, especially those with less circulation and away from central concerns, could carry articles airing highly sensitive points of views. This was the part of the critical current in Hungary which Schopflin (1979) called para-opposition. The para-opposition "does not overtly question the ideological basis of the system, but does accept the leeway for a semi-autonomous political role permitted by that system" (p.142). In the mid 1960s three types of

publication were defined: the supported, the tolerated and the prohibited. This became known as the policy of the three "T"-s from their Hungarian equivalent (támogatott, tűrt, tiltott). These categories were more guidelines than precise definitions and were given a changing interpretation over time. Self-censorship by writers and editors therefore became a complicated and sophisticated system often based on intuition. This system, however, allowed a much wider range of political opinion to appear in Hungary than in most Soviet-type regimes and especially when compared with the Soviet Union.

Apart from this para-opposition there was a small but strong core of 'real' opposition in Hungary. These were often individuals or groups of individuals rather than organised movements. The so called New Left or as it became known the 'Budapest School' was the first to gain coverage in the western press (Telos, 1978). A strong public protest was triggered by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, involving Warsaw Pact troops including that of the Hungarian Army. György and Maria Markus, Ágnes Heller, Vilmos Sós and Zádor Tordai were in the vanguard of these protests by signing the so called Korcula letter, but many others joined them, especially university students, and even within the Young Communist Organisation (KISZ) many campaigned in support of the Czechoslovak reforms and against the invasion. As a result of their open protest a group of seven people were denounced by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party in 1973, including András Hegedűs, Mihály Vajda, János Kis, György Bence and those named above. They were dismissed from their jobs and for a long while were banned from publishing in Hungary. All of them were persuaded to go into exile and many of them did. The next person to be persecuted was Miklós Haraszti for his book titled: *Piece-Rate in the 'Red Star' Factory*, which was later published in the west under the title "*The Worker in a Worker's State*" (published in English by Penguin in 1977). His trial aroused widespread support in Hungary. In 1973 there were also large scale petitions against the tightening of the abortion law. In 1974 two people were singled out on the basis of their political attitude based on their academic research and consequent publications, Ivan Szelényi and George Konrád. Szelényi was forced to leave the country and Konrad left for several years (Schöpflin, 1979) and in 1977 support for the Charter 77 movement was expressed in petitions.

In an article, published in 1979, summarising the characteristics of the Eastern European

opposition, Szélenyi argued that the majority of those in opposition were socialists. Their socialist values, argued Szélenyi, did not coincide with those practised by existing state socialist societies which only claimed to be socialist. Being part of the socialist opposition meant being against totalitarianism, police oppression, censorship, restriction of civil rights, freedom of speech, and assembly but still having socialist views. These people were often highly educated intellectuals, but not exclusively so (Szélenyi, 1979).

Szélenyi is right to a certain extent. Many intellectuals started to oppose the existing socialist system because they were dissatisfied with the way it was governed. This part of the opposition wanted to reform socialism and replace existing practices with those original ideas advocated by Marxist theorists. Others, however, argued against the principle of the one-party system. The largest section of the population, on the other hand, opposed the regime on a non-intellectual basis, arguing that it did not deliver living standards as high as those in developed western societies. These people did not have abstract political considerations in mind but only practical interests.

Szélenyi also recognised that there was significant resistance among workers against state socialism, which was expressed in a different way from the intellectual type of opposition. Intellectuals argued mainly through their published (or unpublished) writings and in underground meetings, discussions and legal or illegal lectures. Workers, on the other hand, used methods such as slowing down production, going on strike or simply cheating the regime wherever they could, for example by stealing from 'common' property. They were less articulate and their activities were often more spontaneous; they might have lacked a coherent set of goals, but that is not to deny the strength of their discontent and should not lead us to underestimate the significance of their opposition to the regime.

The question then is, given that these two groups had a lot in common, why was it that they were mostly separated and did not unite? Marc Rakovski's explanation was that intellectual dissidents become marginalised from the working class because the workers did not have appropriate organisations and therefore it was impossible to establish contact with them. Szélenyi disagreed with this and argued that the intellectual 'class' in Hungary (and in Eastern Europe) grew into a dominating position. They pretended to possess the monopoly of

"teleological knowledge" which "legitimated the right of expropriation of surplus" (Szelényi and Konrád, 1979).

The opposition attempted to break with the taboos of official Soviet Marxism and also to warn against the dangers of a technocrat-driven, economic reform-oriented approach. Instead they advocated 'humanistic Marxism'. András Hegedüs, the Lukács disciples, and the Praxis group from a political sociological point of view and János Kornai from a reform economic angle argued against central administrative control and allocation of goods and for increased autonomy for enterprises and commodity exchange. These arguments became very powerful and were highly innovative and oppositional. They were also welcomed by the critics we described earlier as socialist opponents on the basis that they could help to provide more guarantees for the working class to challenge the expropriation of the surplus without changing the legal form of ownership. Economic reforms, it was argued, do not create revolution but challenge the dominant system of expropriation in state socialist economies. The view that by undertaking radical reforms and creating a specifically socialist theory to provide the theoretical basis for the changes, the regime could and should develop into an ideal Eastern European model drawing from the negative experiences of both existing capitalism and state socialism was shared by many in opposition from the early 1960s onwards (Szelényi, 1979).

Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack characterised the Hungarian opposition in the 1970s and 1980s as a group of intellectuals left largely at liberty, experiencing only harassment to make sure they were kept at bay and ensure their activities were strictly isolated from the working masses to prevent any sizeable social movement developing. Hungarian dissidents themselves maintained a relatively cautious approach to avoid provoking Moscow's anxiety resulting in a Czechoslovak type of oppression or the local leadership's willingness to continue the reform process (Bugajski and Pollack, 1989). Konrád (1989) went even further when he argued that the dissent was there to be the opposition on behalf of democracy but at the same time they collaborated in securing for themselves a relatively trauma-free survival.

Describing the working class opposition Bugajski, Pollack and Alex Pravda also pointed out, supporting Szelényi's views, that in general it was motivated by practical everyday concerns:

material issues, like price increases, stagnating or decreasing living standards, rising expectations which could not be satisfied or feelings of powerlessness and under-representation in the management of their enterprise. People in Eastern Europe developed a strong aspiration for steady material improvement, social mobility and effective social services, but these desires remained unfulfilled in most cases (Bugajski and Pollack, 1989; Alex Pravda, 1979). Later, as a result of the growing proportion of better educated skilled workers, an increasing demand for workers' autonomy and participation in decision making developed. It often coincided with the prospect of underemployment and greater wage differentiation on the one hand, more demanding work quotas without material compensation, stricter work disciplines or the prospect of unemployment on the other (Haraszti, 1972).

Although the Communist leadership desperately tried to play down workers' oppositional activities, portraying them as a small minority of decent law-obeying citizens manipulated and misled by a few troublemakers, in fact there were reports even in the legal literature of relatively widespread workers actions (Héthy and Makó, 1978). There were demonstrations, which became widely known, such as the one in 1969 in "Red" Csepel, an industrial area on the outskirts of Budapest. This occurred just after the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism which resulted in radically increased wage differentiation between workers and management, which workers were opposing. The pressure was so great and unexpected that the new bonus system was abolished immediately.

The most important aim of the intellectual opposition, on the other hand, was to force the party leadership to advance reform programs. It was believed that by pushing ahead decentralisation, and expanding market forces within the state economy and outside it, a process of embourgeoisement would occur, creating a middle class which would then counter the dictatorial bureaucracy and develop into a rational bureaucratic elite of professionals. The subject of reform has been widely discussed throughout the last twenty five years of socialism in the Hungarian literature. The process, - which started off with liberalising regulations in the economic field in 1968 and (with some hiccoughs) continued as long as the regime lasted - was of consistent interest and worry. Concern that the reform process was not going ahead and had been halted worried writers all the time. The list of authors whose works appeared in state approved publications is very long: Berend, Fricz, Antal, Szalai, Nyers, Kulcsár,

Giday, Nagy, Ferge, Szelényi, Kopátsy, Gombár, Lengyel, Hankiss to mention just a few. These publications were often highly critical but were published in the politically 'tolerated' category, although often provoking strong criticism from party officials and sacking of editors as a result. Thus even legal publications fell sometimes into the category of opposition.

The Samizdat² was the forum for the illegal opposition. In their regular publications samizdat authors, such as Krassó, Vajda, Demszky, Rajk, Tamás Gáspár published a variety of papers from concerns of the continuing reform process to objections of the political oppression and demands of political rights. The samizdat literature, like Hirmondó, Beszélő, Magyar Füzetek openly questioned taboo subjects, such as the one-party system and the Soviet influence, which were prohibited even in the most daring state publications.

The underlying reason for concern both among those inside and outside the samizdat was that reforms were seen as the only political alternative for a relatively decent society within the Soviet bloc. The Stalinist experience made people try everything politically possible to escape the possibility of a similar experience. The return of the Stalinist methods was seen as a likely threat. The unsuccessful 'breakouts' of 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia and the fate of the Solidarity movement in Poland provided no reason to believe in alternatives other than gradual reform at best. Hungary with its fairly successfully continuing reforms became the only successful example of state socialism "with a human face", using Alexander Dubcek's expression. The other existing alternatives did not make Hungarians optimistic about other available options. Dubcek's attempt in Czechoslovakia failed, the Polish experience did not create a better solution, the Yugoslav model also collapsed. Other neighbouring societies such as the Soviet Union or Romania showed the frightening options existing in the region. The prospects were extremely worrying and concern over the sustainability of reforms was felt very strongly. Samizdat and reform authors constantly kept up the debate providing some advice on how to progress the reform process in order to prevent any U-turn. The constant worry that if the opposition did not put pressure on the

²Samizdat is a Russian word by origin and literally means self-publication, referring to its origin as handwritten, illegally circulated political literature. The word was used for all illegally written and circulated political writings in Eastern Europe, whether handwritten or not.

party leadership the process would halt or even go into reverse was so alarming that it resulted in an enormous volume of publications on the subject both in the tolerated state publications and the illegal samizdat.

Even though Hungary became the "laughing barrack" in the Soviet bloc with its political liberalism this political development remained in the unwritten, informal sphere rather than in the realm of legal changes. As the system of legal and political institutions was not established to secure this political liberalism no-one could guarantee that it would remain the same if either internal or external forces changed. The Hungarian model, one can argue, went as far as a society can in liberalisation within the framework of a socialist system.

This informal political flexibility contributed to the development of a civil society with critical views. It did not, however, create a situation in which 'proper' social movements could develop. The opposition was exhausted by the battle with the authorities to keep the Samizdat going, which was strictly illegal. Any serious attempt to actually organise a movement failed right at the start. This was the point which the authorities were most 'neurotic' about. Social movements dealing with any issue, like the most innocent looking peace, disarmament, or antinuclear movements, were crushed before they could develop. The threat that any potential movement would extend into a revolution like that of 1956 was felt so strongly by the party leadership that it became a number one priority for internal intelligence to monitor and prevent it. An unspoken trade-off was offered to the people: as long as they did not attempt to organise revolution they could fulfil their need for ever increasing living standards and private property and enjoy political liberalism.

There were very few movements which struggled against the odds. One of them, which was the target of constant police harassment was SZETA, the Szegényeket Támogató Alap, a foundation to aid the poor, which in the west would only be considered as a charity organisation. Its aim was to collect second hand clothes and distribute them to the poor (who were often Gypsies, the most deprived section of Hungarian society). Even this was considered a highly political and strictly illegal activity, and its main organiser, Otilia Solt, was subjected to regular harassment and atrocities from the police. Among other punishments she was never allowed to leave the country due to her "subversive" behaviour.

In the period prior to 1988, by which time the regime had started to crack and movements started to mushroom, there were only a few abortive attempts to organise any social movements. There was a case, when a few young people tried to gather support against both the American and Russian armies and put pressure on both governments to speed up disarmament. The hope was to increase opposition to both sides in order to emphasise the strong desire for peace and to reduce the risk of war by expanding or maintaining the arms programs in both the Soviet and American camp. It was hoped that the authorities would allow the creation of a movement with such modest aims since after all official policy also proclaimed its devotion to peace. After the first (and as it turned out, last) peaceful demonstration, organised in a huge park on the Margaret Island, in the middle of Budapest, the police visited the core activists one by one and "explained" to them in a "friendly" threatening manner, that they had to stop the movement. The police argued that the existing official, state-maintained peace organisation, the "Hungarian Peace Council", (notorious for being a dumping place for retired hardliners), was what any Hungarian citizen should join if they felt like "fighting" for peace. That was the end of the Anti-American and Anti-Soviet Independent Peace Movement of 1984.

Another peace movement, called Dialog, which started in 1982-3 and died very shortly afterwards, was the other exception to the rule apart from the Danube Circle. The latter is an environmental movement, which was founded in 1985 and still exists. It is the only existing social movement to have a long history starting well before the regime change as will be discussed in Chapter 5. The rapid failure of the early peace movement, Dialog, was due to a deep internal split amongst the activists at the first stage, from which it has never recovered. "On the way towards becoming an organisation, through the long series of discussions about electing a leadership, direct democratic, anarchist and representative democratic principles came into collision and shortly thereafter the "radical autonomist" and moderate-constructivist" groups turned on each other" (Bozoki, 1988, p.388). They destroyed themselves before the police got to them. In 1982 in Hungary civil society was still underdeveloped compared with its later form by 1988. The lack of experiences around these activists prevented the participants from developing enough maturity in their political behaviour to cope with a situation like this.

The Danube Circle went through very similar experiences. It was luckier though for at least two reasons. It began a few years later. This fact played an important part in terms of the development of civil society on the national scale as well as concretely for the activists of the movement itself. Secondly, the issue around which the Danube Circle was founded was (and is) a concrete one, the construction of a dam on the Danube between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The very concrete object of the movement, namely that the construction should be stopped and the damaged environment rehabilitated, induced the public to support it and the activists not to give up even when there was much conflict among them (Pethő 1989; Waller, 1992). This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

The last example of movement activities before the change of government in 1989 was an anti-nuclear waste site movement in a village (Ófalu) in Southern Hungary, which is located relatively close to the nuclear power station in Paks (Juhász, 1993). It was chosen as the "ideal" place for a nuclear waste dump. The decision about it was made behind closed doors. The first and only nuclear power station itself in Hungary started to operate in December 1981. Long before that, in 1976, a decision had been made to look for a suitable place for dumping nuclear waste, but it was only in 1983 that a location was found and accepted by the ministry, who then turned to the local authorities for formal permission. It was around 1987 when the village was informed by someone who lived in the village and worked at the power station about the plans for the waste cemetery.

The movement of the small village of 500 inhabitants against the giant of the nuclear power station backed by the state shook the public. The socialist government by this time (1988) could not afford to show any sign of anti-democratic decisions. The then opposition party, the freshly established Hungarian Democratic Forum, (between 1990-94 in government) organised a national demonstration with well organised press coverage. Other opposition parties joined them. Many of the leaders of the movement joined the emerging political parties on both sides³ of the emerging political spectrum. In January 1990 the Socialist government made one of its last decisions: the project was cancelled and the movement of the tiny provincial village had won a previously unimaginable battle against a state-supported

³The two major political parties in 1990 were the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) on the central right and their major opposition, the Free Democrats (SzDSz).

giant. The leader of the movement, the chairman of the local council 'won', too. He became a member of Parliament during the following general elections in March 1990 representing the SzDSz.

In summary, social movement activities were the thorn in the flesh for the Communist leadership in Hungary. This led to a situation in which in politically more liberal Hungary there were fewer social movements than in the politically more rigid Soviet Union. Hungary, however, was more tolerant towards publications, which resulted in a wide range of legal writings containing 'constructive' criticism. The focus of this was the nature and future of continuing reforms which was also a central concern of the samizdat. Within the samizdat, however, topics were also discussed which were taboo in state owned publications, such as Soviet domination and the question of the one-party regime. The few Hungarian social movements which appeared before 1988 suffered, on the one hand, from police repression, and, on the other hand, from the activists' lack of experience in organising a social movement and handling ideological conflicts. The only exception was the Danube Circle. In the period from 1988 onwards, before the collapse of the last Socialist government, a new, unimaginable wave of political activities including social movements started in the realm of civil society.

CONCLUSION

Hungary and the Soviet Union shared a similar system of political institutions and a one-party system. The traditional 'totalitarian' approach overlooked, however, that within this system there were a considerable number of people who opposed the regime in different ways. The 'pluralist' literature and the literature on the opposition came closer to reality by recognising these groups and identifying the common characteristics among them in all socialist societies. The individual countries, however, show considerable differences, and Hungary and the Soviet Union provide a good example of contrasting concrete situations. In the Soviet Union there was less tolerance towards published criticism and fewer reforms were introduced before the Gorbachev period. In Hungary, on the other hand, the level of open oppositional debate was much higher in the publications but the number of organised movements was much lower than in the Soviet Union.

I now relate the discussion here to our earlier outline of the concept of civil society and the types of opposition. I defined civil society as those political activities which lie outside institutionalised state activities and party political activities, although the connections between civil society and the latter two types of activities are important. From the discussion above I can see that civil society defined in this way starts to emerge in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death and in Hungary after 1956.

In the Soviet case, under Khrushchev it was encouraged and resulted in a variety of types of activism. Under Brezhnev many of these initiatives were repressed but this did not lead to their complete disappearance as under Stalin. This was firstly because of the accumulated experiences under Khrushchev and secondly because of the lower degree of repression under Brezhnev. In the short spell under Andropov but to a fuller extent under Gorbachev the expansion of civil society accelerated.

In Hungary after the watershed of 1956 a gradual process of opening up encouraged the development of civil society. The Soviet influence was significant in the sense that Khrushchev initiated the destalinization process. However, the Brezhnevian U-turn did not lead to a similar political reversal in Hungary. Gorbachev's new political approach, on the other hand, contributed fundamentally to the further development of civil society in Hungary and to the subsequent regime change.

THEORY AND PRACTICE COMBINED

I now relate our presentation of opposition in Hungary and the Soviet Union to my conceptual discussion of opposition in the previous chapter. I identified two dimensions of opposition one of which had two aspects (level of resentment and distance from ideas of the ruling Communist Party) and the other dimension which referred to the type of demand.

In respect of the level of resentment, opposition in Hungary was at a higher level than in Russia: there was a bigger core of radical opposition, there was more cynicism about the regime, and there was a much more active debate about reform. This was because of the

higher degree of political tolerance during the Kadar regime and more exposure to western ideas than in the Soviet case.

Turning to the distance of opposition from Communist ideas the Hungarian opposition was stronger at every level. The legitimacy of the regime was also more strongly challenged in Hungary than among Soviet people. This is related to two major factors. Firstly that Hungary had a much shorter history of a Communist period and secondly because most Hungarians felt that Communism was imposed on Hungary.

In Hungary the hardest core of the opposition, most critical of the HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) took the form of extensive samizdat publication, underground lectures and a few clandestine social movements whereas in the Soviet Union there were more movements, a small number of well known dissidents, and less samizdat publishing or lecturing.

The majority of the population in both countries, however, while distant from Party officials, were not extreme in their opposition. In Hungary they were more questioning the legitimacy of the socialist regime. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, although discontent was present, there was a much stronger acceptance of the Soviet regime.

Finally I come to the two types of opposition internal to the Party which were distinguished earlier. In Hungary 'reform Communists' were a very important category as they were in a position to be able to publish widely and the political leadership was often willing to discuss their proposals. In Russia, on the other hand, their equivalents were much fewer because reform ideas were less tolerated (except under Khrushchev) and publication was more strongly controlled. There were also frequent debates in both countries among the Communist leadership resulting in opposition between the different factions: usually between one faction and the one in power. In Hungary these debates among the different factions within the top leadership were extensive though they never led to a change of leader. They did, however, modify the course of the reform process in both directions, creating the alteration between more progressive and 'hiccough' periods. In the Soviet Union, however, opposing factions caused the downfall of leaders, such as Khrushchev. It also caused a very radical change of

policy after Brezhnev. The latter was connected to the fact that under Brezhnev even internal Party debates were kept at minimum level.

In terms of the second dimension of opposition (intellectual/ working class types of demands, as discussed in Chapter 2) there were no significant differences between the two countries. Similar methods were used (strikes, go slows versus abstract demands, such as freedom of speech and assembly) and similar contrasts existed: there was a gap between opposition by the two categories. However, nationalist and religious themes were more important in the Soviet 'intellectual' opposition.

The overall result is that while the nature of opposition in the two countries was different (in Russia more social movements and less tolerance of reform publishing, in Hungary the reverse), the challenge to the legitimacy of the regime was much greater in Hungary. Before I return to examine social movements in the two countries after the regime change, I first review the existing western literature on social movements.

CHAPTER 4

A REVIEW OF WESTERN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to review the different theoretical approaches to social movements. Firstly, I will define social movements and then start our review with the collective behaviour perspective, the first major school dealing with problems of collective action. After that I will examine one of the most influential schools within social movement theory, the resource mobilisation approach. In the next part I will explore the diverse group of so called 'new social movement' theories, and then the importance of the political opportunity structure theory. The final part of this chapter will review the newest paradigm, the cognitive approach.

WHAT IS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT?

The concept of social movement has been tackled by almost all theorists of social movements. Instead of listing the different definitions here I will come back to some examples in my detailed analysis. However, the wide variety of definitions leads us to one conclusion: that there is no definition of social movements on which social movement theorists all agree. In a recent account of the diverse approaches Diani (1992) concludes that there are four important aspects which are emphasised in most theoretical approaches: "a) networks of informal interactions; b) shared beliefs and solidarity; c) Collective action on conflictual issues; d) action with displays largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life" (p.7). In addition Diani emphasises the importance of differentiating social movements from, on one hand, political and social organisations (parties, interest groups) and, on the other hand, informal networks of collective action

(campaigns) which are loosely structured protest events.

Another important distinction can be made by identifying collective actions as *political* activities, which would exclude hobby clubs, religious organisations or professional associations. Secondly, a significant aspect is the protest element, and thirdly long term mobilization, which excludes petitions, demonstrations and other forms of short term or ad hoc political protest activities.

Pakulski (1991, p. xiv-xv) describes social movements as partially institutionalised collective activities, emphasising that they are anti-systemic in their value-orientation, form symbolism and that social movements are often vague in their ideology, unlike political parties. They ought to have a degree of permanence and continuity but should not have formal status because the lack of this that distinguishes them from political parties, which are formal organisations. That does not mean that social movements do not have a structure which can be groups, circles, networks with patterns of links between them but formal membership is not a necessary element of movement formation (unlike in political parties); neither is political consensus. Broad participation accompanies openness in terms of ideas as well as recruitment. Instead of discipline it is solidarity and dedication which is expected from movement members. Organisational members and activists, occasional participants and unaffiliated sympathizers make up the core and the wider circles of a social movement (Pakulski, 1991, p. xiv-xv).

My own definition of social movements accepts the above mentioned points and emphasises that the function of social movement activities is to protest and oppose, to counterbalance and limit political power. While it is the task of the state to organise and regulate society the problem of keeping politicians under control is a serious one. Regular elections are just part of the democratic process, and opposition has a very important role in maintaining political control of politicians in power. What is distinctive about social movements is that they are an organised and long term form of opposition political activity and they never seek to gain power but to limit it. This distinguishes social movements both from political parties (in opposition) and short term or spontaneous political actions, such as petitions or one off demonstrations (which can also be used by social movements but only as part of their long

term activities). We now turn to the review of social movement approaches by the different perspectives.

THE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR APPROACH

In the 1920s, when writings first appeared in the field of collective action in the Chicago School by Park and Burgess (1921) mass psychology was very influential. Studies from the turn of century, like Gustave Le Bon from 1896, Scipio Sighele 1895 and Gabriel Tarde from 1891 inspired Park and Burgess. These were the first studies calling attention to the significance of the crowd as a social phenomenon and their theoretical arguments became influential on the Chicago School.

Members of the Chicago School elaborated the symbolic interaction perspective, which was clearly rooted in the mass psychological approach but also took social aspects into consideration. Following Le Bon's arguments they too claimed that collective behaviour was an outcome of social breakdown, disorder or anomie. This could occur as a result of rapid changes in society, or the break-up of established routines which were considered peculiarly characteristic of modern life (Park and Burgess, 1921). Park and Burgess, like their followers later, perceived collective action in a hierarchical order, arguing that one form gradually progresses into another. Social unrest, a vague and general discontent and distress in society was seen as the simplest form of collective behaviour. This could develop into a crowd which initially is violent, confused and disorderly but which develops its leadership and organisation and creates a mass movement by formulating doctrines and dogmas. The movement's evolution concludes in an accepted, established and legalised institution. Park and Burgess (1967) refers to examples of women's suffrage, prohibition, protestantism to illustrate their argument.

Following the symbolic interactionist perspective Blumer (1951) concentrated on social movements as one of the chief areas of collective action, arguing that as a social movement develops it takes on the character of a society. The effects of rapid modernization, industrialization, democratization and cultural change on various social groups were the core

problems of societies in the early 1930s when Blumer was active. In some cases, as Blumer was well aware, these led to a growing tendency to fascism which alarmed him greatly and strengthened his view that collective action was a disruptive, abnormal act, the result of social breakdown and rapid change. Blumer distinguished among three kinds of social movement: the general, the specific and the expressive. General movements were unorganised, had no established leadership or recognised membership and little control. Interestingly enough, among Blumer's examples to illustrate this were the labour movement, the women's movement, the peace movement and the youth movement. The second category was specific movements. Reform movements and revolutionary movements belonged to this group and were described as well organised, with a well defined objective, leadership and a conscious membership. Thirdly were expressive movements which, according to Blumer, did not seek to change the institutions of the social order. Their function was to create profound effects on personalities and the character of social order by releasing some type of expressive behaviour. Religious and fashion movements were included in this category.

There were two innovative aspects of Blumer's perspective. Firstly, his sociological approach to social movements abandoned many of the previously dominant elements of the psychological approach. Secondly, he distinguished between negative and positive aspects in collective behaviour, leading to two kinds of solutions in society, fascism or democracy, unlike his predecessors who only focused on the breakdown element in it.

Blumer's concepts were adapted and developed by two very influential scholars of the collective behaviour school, Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian who not only advanced but systematized studies on collective behaviour and social movements. They recognised that social movements are not only products of social change but also active creators of it. They still paid attention to the crowd as an important part of collective action but communication and public opinion also became the focus of their studies.

A social movement was defined by Killian and Turner as "a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined more by the informal response of the members than

by formal procedures for legitimizing authority" (Killian and Turner, 1972, p.246). They recognised firstly, that anomie is more likely to immobilize individuals and undermine their trust than to promote activism and secondly, that it is not necessarily true that the most deprived people understand the causes of their discontent and unite in social movements. People identify discontents on the basis of conceptions presented to them by others, they argued.

The collective behaviour school was developed in America. The European tradition of viewing social movements as organised collectivities which could change the course of history, based on Karl Marx's interpretation, was not characteristic of the American literature. There were, however, exceptions to this rule. Apart from Killian and Turner it was Rudolf Heberle, an author of European origin, who found it important to distinguish between social movements, political parties and pressure groups.

Heberle (1951) argued that social movements aim to bring about fundamental changes in the social order, especially in the basic institutions of property and labour relationships, though he emphasised that this should not be confused with 'proletarian movements'. Pressure groups, on the other hand, are limited in their goals, Heberle argued, their aim being to pursue a particular, special interest by creating a favourable public opinion and influencing political parties. Political parties have comprehensive political programs considering all important political issues, they have a formal organisation and they compete for political power. This latter point followed Joseph Schumpeter's argument (1942:282) elaborated in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*.

Within the collective behaviour perspective there were two major wings. Firstly, there were those who were inclined towards the symbolic interactionist approach (Blumer) looking for emerging norms, processes of self-regulation, social learning, and the effects of collective behaviour on individual participants, identity formation, and processes of collective will (Killian, Turner). The second group was closer to Parsons's structural-functionalism and focused on the structural context in which collective behaviour took place. The most important follower of this thinking was Neil Smelser. Parsons himself did not deal with the problems of collective behaviour, but in his social system theory he argued that social strain

is manifested by symptoms of disturbance, showing signs of irrationality, organised along axes of wishful thinking and anxiety, and showing abnormal and unrealistic trends (Parsons, 1961:75).

Smelser's (1962) conceptualisation of collective behaviour is one of the most systematic approaches devoted to the subject. He too thought of the emergence of collective behaviour as a spontaneous response to structural strains in society which became a fundamental explanatory category in Smelser's theory. But by paying attention to the general social conditions, the political context, Smelser drew attention to the macro aspects within which collective behaviour occurs: the 'structural conduciveness', as he called it.

Smelser identified six determinants which affect the emergence and development of collective behaviour: (1) structural conduciveness; (2) structural strain; (3) the growth and spread of a generalized belief, which could be hysterical, wish-fulfilment, hostile, norm-oriented, or value-oriented; (4) precipitating factors: a specific event, which triggers protest; (5) mobilisation of participants, the question of leadership and coordination; and (6) the operation of social control, by agencies like the police, the courts, the press, the authorities, and community leaders before during and after the outbreak of collective action (p.383).

Smelser (1962), like Park and Burgess, views the different types of collective behaviour in a hierarchical perspective. He classifies them as ranging from panic through craze and hostile outburst to norm-oriented action which is "mobilization for action in the name of a belief envisioning the reconstitution of the Normative Series and which, unlike panic, craze, or hostile outburst, if successful, leaves a mark in society, whether it is a new norm or a new organization" (p.110). Smelser distances himself from Heberle's definition of social movement, arguing that it does not distinguish between social movements and revolutions. At the peak of Smelser's hierarchy is the value-oriented movement which "involves a basic reconstitution of self and society" (p.120). This includes revolutions and 'messianistic' religious movements. Four basic components of social actions are defined by Smelser (1962). Firstly values (1962:120-130; 313-381) which provide guides to social action. Secondly norms (pp 24-27; 37-38), the regulatory rules governing the pursuit of the goals of social action ranging from formal to informal, sometimes unconscious understandings. Thirdly, the

mobilization of motivation into organized action (pp 24; 27-28; 39-40), the mobilization of energy into action by motivation, and the way it is channelled into organized roles. The final component of social action is situational facilities (pp. 69-71). These include knowledge of the surrounding political environment, opportunities and constraints, and the predictability of the consequences of actions.

Smelser's theory not only followed Parsons but implicitly Merton as well. Merton dealt with the problem of deviant and nonconforming behaviour (Merton, 1957, pp 357-68) linking it to social change and distinguishing between the deviant who does not follow norms in order to gain a personal advantage, from the nonconformist who aims at challenging the legitimacy of the norms of the group and wants to change it with alternative norms. Smelser was criticized for emphasising the nonrational components of collective action and homogenizing the diversity of beliefs, motives, and perceptions in collective behaviour. His value-added scheme, Oberschall argued (1973:22-23), was not useful in dealing with the dynamic element in the analysis of social processes, because it did not account for the likelihood of the listed contingencies occurring. Despite this, Smelser played a very important role in developing social movement theory and he should be acknowledged for his analytical clarity.

Summing up the collective behaviour approach, it should be emphasised that it was innovative in the sense that it called attention to the emergence of new norms in the collective behaviour of people. Among the shortcomings of the school, one clearly stems from the fact that it was one of the earliest theoretical perspectives to approach the problem of collective action: its lumping together of different kinds of collective actions from the unorganised, like panic or hostile outburst, to those needing a lot more organisation, like social movements, and analysing them within the same framework. Another reason why it should be, and often was, criticised is that it was based on an individual-oriented social psychological focus by one group of authors and a structurally oriented functionalism by the other. These led to a failure to perceive collective action as a 'normal' phenomenon in a society and to the functionalist view that only conventional and institutional conduct was accepted as 'normal' social behaviour. The argument was that non-institutionalized activity occurs as a result of the irrationality of participants because rational actions are 'properly' channelled through formal political institutions. Thus, it was argued, the cause of irrational action is social strain due

to changing conditions. Participating in collective action was thus seen as a way of managing the psychological strain created by social tensions, and the experience of alienation and social atomization or anxiety and hostility resulting from normative ambiguity.

The collective behaviour perspective was, however, important because it was innovative. It was widely endorsed in the theory of social movements at the time of its appearance, and even later by many, like the environmental consciousness theorists (see below). The collective behaviour approach both contributed to and inspired the next 'generation' of social movement theorists even if it also provoked many theoretical debates.

THE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

The arguments of the collective behaviour school were challenged both in the United States and in Europe. Collective behaviour theory was rooted in psychology which could not be further from the core of resource mobilization theorists who were close to subjects such as economics, organization theory, and rational choice theory. Students of social movements opposed the image of anomic, irrational and deviant behaviour; movement activities were no longer seen as abnormal, rooted in frustration and strain, as 'breakdown theories' argued (Jenkins, 1977:5). On the contrary, they were perceived as a form of normal and rational response to the challenges of society, and as an important part of the political process (Gamson, 1975:130).

The movements emerging in the sixties mainly in the United States: the civil rights, the women's, the anti-war and black movements were the type of new phenomena which changed the perception of social movements. Resource mobilization theorists did not see the cause of social movement activities as social grievances and did not accept the argument that grievances could trigger social movements because, as Jenkins (1977:77-82) argued, grievances in a society are ubiquitous. Indeed as McCarthy and Zald (1975:18) emphasised, grievances and discontent could be created and manipulated by the movements themselves, by their leaders or/and activists. Thus social movements develop through the activities of actors in the political system. Resource mobilization theorists did not assume that the simple

existence of a social interest automatically leads to organized actions (Gamson, 1975:137). The new emphasis was on the availability of resources which allow social movements to rise. Not only did they argue that social movements were not abnormal phenomena in a society or products of 'strain' but emphasised the potential for conflict that exists in a society and that the actualization of this potential depends upon the usage of resources.

Although the resource mobilization theory encompasses a number of different approaches four key themes can be found in the work of all resource mobilization authors: resources, organization, costs and benefits of participation and success. We will look at these in turn.

RESOURCES

The notion of resources is a key element of the resource mobilization perspective. Resources were understood broadly to include a wide range of components from land, labour, and capital to social status, personal initiative, moral commitment, skills and friendship. Amongst resources McCarthy and Zald (1987a:18) listed money, labour, and costs and rewards, all of which were seen as subject to harsh competition from other kinds of activity such as entertainment, voluntary associations, organized religion and politics. Other types of resource considered by McCarthy, McAdam and Zald (1988:715) were conscientious or integrated members of a movement; communication networks or 'infrastructure' which spread information about the movement (p.723); the micro-mobilization contexts, the organizational 'staging ground' for the movement (p.709) and finally leaders or organizers. Oberschall (1973:28) distinguished between material (jobs, income, savings) and non-material resources (authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry) and the right to material goods and services. He viewed resources as 'commodities' which could be exchanged, borrowed, invested, created, consumed, transferred, assembled or reallocated, in other words Oberschall referred to these processes as 'resource management' (p.28). Freeman (1979:170-176) tried to categorize resources in a more systematic manner and distinguished between tangible and intangible resources. The primary tangible resource was money, which was seen as the most important among all resources because money can buy

other important resources, such as space, and a means of publicizing the movement's ideas, all of which were classified by Freeman as tangible resources. The primary intangible resource of a movement was: people. Although social movements are often low on tangible resources (money) this could be compensated for, argued Freeman (1983:197), to a certain extent by intangible resources. Some of these are specialised, such as expertise of various sorts, access to networks and decision makers while some are unspecialized, such as time and commitment. For Tilly (1978:84-90) labour power, goods, votes, and even weapons were included as necessary resources for a social movement but he did not consider intangible assets, such as loyalty and obligation, to be resources for a social movement but as conditions of mobilization which would deliver resources. Thus resources were defined and categorised differently by the various resource mobilization authors but they all agreed that access to resources is fundamental for the existence of social movements.

ORGANIZATION

The second key aspect of the resource mobilization approach was the question of organization. Organization itself was considered as a major type of resource in the organisation of a social movement (Klandermans, 1991:26) because social movements manifest themselves through organisations (McCarthy and Zald, 1987a:368-374). 1980).

Several organisational levels were identified by Zald, Ash and McCarthy: social movement organizations (SMOs), social movements (SMs), social movement sectors (SMSs) and social movement industry (SMI). SMOs were what is usually understood as social movements: the concrete and formalized structures which identify goals and attempt to implement them, translating individual efforts into collective activities. SMs for the authors were a set of opinions and beliefs directed at effecting changes in society. A social movement can be represented by several social movement organisations and all those SMOs that tried to attain similar preferences constituted the social movement industry. Social movement sectors contained those SMOs which could belong to more than one SMI. According to the authors' analogy, which was borrowed from economics, SMOs were the concrete firms, like a chair factory and SMI is the whole industry producing one particular type of goods, such as the furniture industry. Finally, social movement sectors consisted of 'firms'(SMOs) which could

belong to several SMIs, because they embrace a wide variety of goals (a chair and carpet factory) (McCarthy and Zald, 1987a:20-25). This was a complicated system borrowed from organizational theory.

Movements need organisation because it is fundamental for their survival, it was argued. They are subject to internal and external pressures that affect the movements' structure, processes and their success in attaining goals (Zald and Garner, 1987:123). And it is in the interest of movement participants to develop a bureaucratic structure in order to preserve the organisation (Zald and McCarthy, 1987:162; Zald and Garner, 1987:122; 138).

Even though Zald, McCarthy and Ash emphasised that movement organisations are fundamentally different from bureaucratic organizations, because they do not wish to provide services but aim at changing the society and its members or societal institutions and structures, this still remained a theory resembling the economy more than social processes.

Others argued that movement organisations are closely linked to the movement's success (Gamson, 1975). Gamson emphasised that the most important characteristics without which a movement cannot succeed are: firstly, a kind of constitution or charter, a written document stating the purposes of the organisation and its provisions for operation, secondly, a formal list of members, to distinguish them from supporters and sympathizers, and finally, the movements have to clarify three or more different levels of internal division distinguishing between heads, executives and rank-and-file members.

The concept of loosely structured collective action was used by Oberschall (1979:63-64; 1980:45-88) to characterise relationship among the different social movements. He argued that social movements can have a looser or tighter structure, but this can change over time. Movements can start off as small face-to-face groups, loosely linked, but those which survive have to develop a formal structure. Without this the movement cannot maintain itself, continue to exist, avoid factionalism, create a collective identity, or provide the minimum funding to function.

Certain categories of people share characteristics, argued Tilly (1978:151-166), and a

specific kind of personal bond links people into networks. The combination of the network and these categories creates a 'groupness' comprising both, he argued. The more extensive is the common identity within the network, the more organized a group is. The more 'inclusive' the group is, the more resources - such as time, energy, and social interaction - it absorbs the more organized it becomes. Other measures of the movement's organisation were its efficiency and effectiveness, and structural features, such as the movement's stratification.

For Jenkins (1985:7-9), however, it is inclusiveness which affects the groups' ability to mobilise. The more dense the indigenous organisation the greater is its potential for mobilization. The task is, he argued, to extend and deepen indigenous organisations and harness them to the goals of insurgency, and to link the different groups within a social network together. Granovetter (1978:1433) shared Jenkins's views and added that indigenous organisation is probably the most important single factor for coordinating actions, strengthening collective perceptions of efficacy, and providing communications network for actions.

Thus, there are as many definitions of organisation as the number of participants within the resource mobilization approach. What is shared, however, is the belief that organization is crucial for social movements and without it the movement simply cannot exist. Some even saw a strong correlation between the success of the movement and its degree of organization.

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION

The third most important focus for students of the resource mobilization approach is the problem of costs and benefits, a topic which later provoked extensive debate and criticism. For RM theorists, instead of investigating 'Why people want social change?' the question was 'How people organize, mobilize their resources and use them most effectively?'. The concept of costs and benefits was originally based on Olson's theory, elaborated in his book the *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965). In it Olson argued that a 'group', defined as the aggregate of individuals sharing a common interest, has the potential to mobilize and survive when the

total worth of the collective goods exceeds the total cost of the collective action. But a group will not realise this potential unless its members are provided with selective incentives. The value of the selective incentive must be greater than the individual's share of the cost of the collective action, Olson argued (1965:34). He distinguished between collective and selective incentives in people's relation to participation (pp.62-63). Selective incentives were to stimulate a rational individual to act in a group-oriented way and they are obtained through participation, unlike collective incentives, which are not.

Many RM theorists (Oberschall, 1973:113-135; Zald and McCarthy, 1979:2; 1987:18; 24; 27) believe that people are primarily motivated by their personal self-interest, but since they agree that grievances do not provide sufficient grounds for the development of a social movement, they focus on aspects of costs and benefits. Social movements deliver collective goods therefore individuals do not usually bear the costs of working to obtain these collective goods 'on their own', and costs are carried collectively.

Olson's argument was not shared by all RM theorists. Fireman and Gamson (1979:8-22) debated it by arguing that selective incentives are constraints or inducements that an individual actor (a person or an organisation) may gain or lose depending upon whether the actor contributes to collective action or not, but are not necessary for collective action, as Olson stated. There are a number of factors which may mobilize actors to take part in collective action apart from interest in individual goods or interest in collective goods like, for example, solidarity with others. Klandermans (1991:24-25) went further arguing that selective and collective incentives are not mutually exclusive but are mutually reinforcing or compensating. Which incentive is more attractive depends on the form of action people are asked to participate in and their social background. Middle class groups were found to be more receptive to purposive incentives and lower class groups to selective incentives.

There was also a debate among resource mobilization theorists over whether there is a threshold level below which groups are incapable of mobilizing. Some, such as Fireman and Gamson (1979:36-44), argued that no such level existed. Different cases provided with divert practice and no minimum level was found. Others (Granovetter, 1978:1420), on the other hand, found that such a threshold exist and defined it as the point where net benefit begins

to exceed net costs for a particular actor. Granovetter even suggested a mathematical model which allows an exact calculation of the equilibrium. There was no dispute, however, over the view that calculations are made by participants to decide whether gains and losses obtainable through collective actions exceed those obtainable by individual action. Calculation influences potential group members when deciding whether join a group or not, it was agreed.

No agreement was reached concerning individuals, however. Some looked at them as purely rational human beings (Olson, 1965:34), others emphasised the importance of feelings of solidarity, class identity and ideology (Fireman and Gamson, 1979:21-35). The analogies taken from economics, treating actors in collective actions like actors in the economic system (Zald, McCarthy, Olson) were not acceptable to others (Gamson, Jenkins, Fireman, Tilly, McAdam, Morris). The limited and narrow view of 'economically' oriented calculations of costs and benefits of participation was strongly criticised by authors outside the resource mobilization school as well (Melucci, 1984:819-835), pointing out that people participate in collective actions looking for unmeasurable goods, like self-realization, solidarity, identity.

The question of 'free-riders' was raised as part of the 'cost- and-benefit' debate. Free riders are people who benefit from the achievements of the group action without participating in it. Olson (1965) believed that free-riders impede collective action. People rationally calculating costs and benefits will recognise that they gain from other people's participation without participating themselves. The question of free-riding was approached from the point of view of non-participation by Klandermans (1988:85-86) and it was argued that all people who express a preference for a public good being sought by a social movement organisation, are free-riders. The crucial question for Klandermans (1988:88-89) was, however, whether free-riding jeopardises collective action. Klandermans shares Fireman's and Gamson's (1979:15-18) and Oliver's (1980:1356-75) view that different type of collective actions are vulnerable to a different degree. It all depends on the number of participants and their chances of success. When there is a surplus of resources or the number of participants exceeds the necessary minimum as a result of which the achievement of the collective good is ensured, there is no danger of jeopardy and free-riders can be tolerated to a much larger extent. Free-riders, by definition, are in favour of the collective good in question, which is

a useful asset for the movement. A person's decision whether to remain a free-rider or to become an active contributor to the production of the collective good of the particular collective action depends on the individual's expectation that his or her participation is necessary to the success of the collective action (Klandermans, 1988:89-90). Thus, cost and benefit calculations provoked numerous debates among social movement theorists but it nevertheless remained one of the crucial aspects of the RM approach.

EXPECTATIONS OF SUCCESS

The question of success was addressed in the context of whether the movement has a reasonable chance of attaining its ends. A movement succeeds when its objective is attained and fails when society rejects its goals (Zald and Garner, 1987:129-30). Success itself can, however, lead to the end of the existence of the movement. When the goals of the movement are achieved it can cease to exist unless it can establish new goals. It is the nature of goals which determines whether a movement is likely to survive having achieved its goals. Movements with broad general goals are more likely to survive while those with specific goals are more likely to vanish following success. The more inclusive a movement, the more likely it fades away and the less likely it is to find new goals (Zald and Garner, 1987:132). Thus exclusive movements have bigger chances of success. Three different kinds of successes were distinguished: firstly, policy successes, by altering legislation as a result of movement pressure; secondly, the actual institutional process of decision-making can be altered as a result of collective action, transforming issues and perspectives brought to bear in policy-making; finally, movements can generate distributional successes, redistributing social goods, such as economic resources, social prestige or political power to the previously excluded groups (Jenkins, 1985:20-26). Jenkins saw these three dimensions in a hierarchical order from policy changes to culminating in redistributional gains, though most movements end up with partial measures. The idea that social movement success can be seen in their development from unstructured spontaneity to institutionalisation, as claimed by the collective behaviour approach, is vigorously rejected by Jenkins (1985:xii-xiii). A group can be successfully accepted as a challenger of new ideas and become successful as an accepted and respected representative of those legitimate sets of interest they stand for, argued Gamson (1975:28-37). They could, however, also be successful by making those ideas accepted. Thus

success was defined by Gamson as a set of outcomes a movement can accomplish.

Several theorists of social movements, mainly outside the resource mobilization approach, argued (Goldstone, 1980:1017) that strategic and organisational aspects were irrelevant when the movement's goals were controlled, and that formalised organisations could be counterproductive in certain cases (Piven and Cloward, 1977:4-5) because bureaucratic measures like formal membership diverted energies from movements which derived their gains mostly from mass defiance. Collective behaviourists entered the debate (Turner and Killian, 1987:238) by offering as criteria of success: benefits for members and changes in power relations. Even Jenkins (1983:543), a member of the RM approach argued that Gamson's definition of success was too narrow and limited. By concentrating on the tangible forms of benefits, Gamson ignored such less measurable aspects of success as improved self-images, although clearly they are just as significant as tangible goals. Thus the concept of success was crucial for resource mobilization theorists and this time the theoretical criticism developed not only within the RM approach but from outside as well.

In sum, the four dominant themes: resources, organisation, cost and benefit, and success were the foci of the RM perspective. They were discussed at great length and provoked the sharpest debates within the resource mobilization school and outside it. These debates also demonstrated a large degree of disagreement among the various authors within the same perspective. Two main tendencies within the RM group can, however, be distinguished.

TWO TENDENCIES WITHIN THE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION APPROACH

The initial agreement on rejecting the collective behaviour approach soon developed to a split among RM theorists. Two major groups can clearly be distinguished among them: one, which focuses on the organisational aspects, the so called 'organizational entrepreneurial' group, and the other which started to pay more attention to political processes outside the movement (Mayer, 1991:64-65).

The 'organizational entrepreneurial' group (Herring, Zald, McCarthy, Ash, Olson and Oberschall) focused on the mobilizational and routinizational aspects of the movement. They

saw SMOs as more and more professional in their handling of discontents and demands, cultivating their own constituency and public opinion, consciously using and manipulating the media to achieve their goals. When they noticed that the movements often employed paid staff to fulfil these tasks professionally, they went as far as viewing social movements as managers of resources and social movement behaviour was viewed as part of the free enterprise activities, competing and calculating just like corporations in the market economy.

The other strand of the resource mobilization perspective (Tilly, McAdam, Jenkins, Gamson, Ash-Garner, Piven and Cloward) was sometimes classified as the political process model because they put more emphasis on the political context and process, the indigenous protest mobilization. Thus they paid attention to the macro-structural factors as well. These authors stressed the level of structural 'readiness' within society.

Criticism of the resource mobilization approach came from several directions. Some (MacAdam, 1988:125; Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988:1-3) stressed that it should be extended to incorporate the micromobilization context, mediating between opportunity and action, subjective perceptions and personal networks. Others (Tarrow, 1989:16; Kriesi et al., 1992:229) were outsiders to the RM group and argued that the resource mobilization approach failed to encounter the problems of the wider context. This criticism led to the development of the political opportunity structure approach, which will be discussed below.

To summarise the resource mobilisation approach, we have to emphasise that it is a theory which accommodates diverse ideas expressed by the several authors who are all classified as RM theorists. There are, however, several general points which can be made. Firstly, as Melucci (1984:200) pointed out, the resource mobilization approach focuses on *how* a movement is set up and maintains its structure but does not address the question *why* come into existence and *why* they operate. Secondly, there are several points RM theorists agree on. In dispute with the collective behaviour approach, they all agree that social movements are not abnormal collective actions and that they are not rooted in social frustration or strain. Rather RM theorists argue that social movements are a form of rational response to the challenges of society. This leads to the assumption of rational decision-making which is the second issue resource mobilization theorists agree on. Social movement activities are not

considered to be a mere succession of spontaneous outbursts but they are the results of purposive and continuous monitoring and planning, making use of optimising rationality. It is thus emphasised that social movements are rational groups of social actors who, like market organisations in the economy, calculate costs and benefits, and compete with each other for resources. Joining a movement is based on a rational decision calculating risks and rewards and grievances do not play a role in mobilising collective actions. It is more resourceful people, such as the middle class or the more educated, who lead and are active in social movements because they have better access, skills, positions and ability to successfully compete with the established political institutions. Tilly (1978:55;115;200-204) found that social movements often included people who were excluded from the established routines of decision-making and policy formation and that becoming leaders of social movements compensated for their failures.

Criticism of the RM perspective focused on the emphasis on organisational elements of collective activities: its view of movements as industrial units and its lack of macro-dynamics, the attention to the political environment in which the movement existed (McAdam, 1982:20-36; Jenkins, 1985:7; Tarrow, 1994:13-16). The suggestions that a movement's potential mass base, the politically powerless and deprived, is impotent and incapable of exerting pressure on its own behalf (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977:251) and that movement organisation can only be achieved by elite groups and sources were also criticised (MacAdam, 1982:25). Elite involvement in social protest, Jenkins (1985:227) argued, has the effect of facilitating insurgency, rather than replacing mass basis. The 'European' answer to the RM approach, as well as the collective behaviour approach, was the new social movements theory which we now review.

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Some argue that the new social movement theory is the 'European' rejection of the collective behaviour approach (Diani and Eyerman, 1992:5) but others, such as Scott (1990:19) argue that new social movements are, on one hand, the European answer to the mainly American resource mobilization approach and, on the other hand, a reaction to the 'old' European labour movement traditions.

New social movement theories, again, embrace a wide range of theories which developed on the basis of a new type of social movement from the mid 1960s and 1970s, such as human rights movements, peace movements, feminist movements and environmental movements which have common roots and values. The key characteristics which bring new social movements together and separate them from both the resource mobilization approach and the 'old' labour movements are that new social movements are not concerned with economic goods or direct political actions, as the other two were. They are the products of the late capitalist, post-industrial society (Touraine, 1981:77; Offe, 1985:7; Habermas, 1987:392; Melucci, 1980:207;213) in which symbolic goods have become important. The focus within the new social movement theory shifted to a macro-level in which social dynamics are analysed in relation to the new structural conflicts provoked by the situation which developed from the late 1960s in Western Europe. This is an 'identity-oriented' instead of a 'strategy-oriented' approach in which personal and collective identity and lifestyles, and symbolic meanings became the centre of attention. These are primarily social and only secondarily political aspects, as opposed to workers' movements, which were concerned primarily with political power (Cohen, 1985:663-671).

Representative democracy was dismissed in favour of political participation outside the sphere of political parties, at grass roots level. This was considered to be a new political paradigm (Offe, 1985:831). New social movements consciously locate themselves within the realm of civil society and are not concerned with challenging the state directly or seizing power. Their aim is instead to defend civil society against encroachment from the technocratic state (Touraine, 1981:102; Melucci, 1984:821; Habermas, 1992:23). New social movements focus on values and the mobilization of civil society. Movements are concerned with cultural innovation and challenge to traditional values (Scott, 1990:13-14). To remain part of the domain of civil society rather than the economy or the state, NSMs remain outside the institutionalised framework of government (Melucci, 1980:217-222; Offe, 1985:385) and prefer to influence policy through political pressure. Direct involvement with conventional politics is rejected on the basis that this might force new social movements to compromise on their goals. This is why they prefer to remain highly informal rather than bureaucratic like the political parties they oppose.

New social movements are very 'European' in their nature. Although black civil rights movements, feminist and student movements originate in America when they became important in Europe from the 1960s they were different because both the political scene and the tradition was different in Europe. In America there was a radical liberal tradition which produced left wing populist, civil rights, 'new left' and student movements as well as women's, ecology, and nuclear freeze movements. In Europe powerful and well organised labour movements were more characteristic prior to the new social movements (Rucht, 1990:158). There was also a difference in the theoretical traditions and the research approach. The European theory is based on Marx's and Weber's tradition leading to a macrosocial approach (Neidhardt and Rucht, 1991:437) and pays attention to the causes (Melucci, 1984:819-828) of social movements, while the American resource mobilization school puts emphasis on the mezo level and focuses on the process of mobilisation the new social movements approach.

The new social movements approach's assumption is that societal change produces structural contradictions and collective problems, such as environmental problems, which causes the decay of the quality of life. This has similarities with the argument put forward by the collective behaviour school, as discussed earlier. However, the new argument is that this process is accompanied by a postmaterialist value change. As a result certain social groups, like the new middle class, develop new aspirations and sensitivities (Brand, 1990:26). The role of the middle class becomes central in the new social movements. The members of these movements are mainly relatively young, well educated and often employed in the public sector (Offe, 1985:831-835). This is very different from the tradition of the labour movement which saw its social basis in the working class.

The label 'new social movements' was applied to distinguish new social movements from the 'old' labour movements. New social movements differ from the 'old' ones in many aspects. The 'actors' of social movements not only *come* from a different background they also view themselves differently: not in terms of socioeconomic class, even though their class background is also different; it is not the centre of focus which determines the movement participants' collective identities (Cohen, 1985:663-667) as it was in labour movements. Though the early accounts of new social movements emphasised the roots of the movements

in capitalist class conflicts (Melucci, 1981:174; Habermas, 1981:33-37; Offe, 1984:162) more recent arguments (Dalton et al., 1990:12) criticise traditional class-based explanation. The socio-economic based political cleavages have been replaced by value- and issue-based cleavages.

The movements are motivated by ideological goals and pursuit of collective goods (Muller and Opp, 1986:480-483; Rohrschneider, 1988:349-552). Most prominent among their values are: autonomy, identity and opposition to control and bureaucratization. Issues like economic growth and distribution, military and social security, which were central concerns of the 'old politics', are not important any more. Instead it is the preservation of peace, environment, human rights and unalienated forms of work which became important in the new politics. Consequently the values of the new paradigm have changed too from concentrating on freedom and security of private consumption and material progress to personal autonomy and identity as opposed to centralised control (Offe, 1985:825-832). The dominant goal structure of the western industrial societies has changed. The previous emphasis on wealth and material well-being, has been replaced by greater attention to cultural and quality of life issues and distinct libertarian elements, such as greater opportunities in decision-making. This ideological orientation mobilizes a different type of supporter and needs different political tactics and organizational structure (Dalton et al., 1990:16).

The membership of new social movements is very fluid, with participants joining and then disengaging from the movements. NSMs aim to remain egalitarian and ad hoc. The means used to achieve the movements' goals tend to be unconventional, mobilizing large numbers of protestors to demonstrate strength. The aim is therefore not to form political parties or unions, as in 'old movements', but to focus on grass roots politics. Instead of building a centralised, hierarchical structure which is exclusive and cohesive, and clientelistic associations (like the trade unions and political parties) new social movements concentrate on a fluid, decentralised, open, and democratic structure, with loose horizontal associations. While the 'old' modes of action were large-scale representative associations, formal organisations, competition amongst the different political parties and the achievement of majority rule, the 'new' movements are informal. Spontaneity is an important element and a low degree of horizontal and vertical differentiation characterises them. They are based on

protest politics rather than corporatist interest intermediation as were the 'old' politics (Offe, 1985:825; Klandermans, 1990:122; Kitschelt, 1990:179).

New social movements also realise that the weight of public opinion is very important which leads to the recognition of the power of media. Mass media allow social movements to extend their influence to a much wider circle of people and are consciously used for this purpose. The recognition of the impact of media often encourages social movements to organise their demonstrations in a carefully staged or even theatrical manner, dramatising the issues for which they seek attention and popular support, as recent examples of Greenpeace campaigns demonstrate.

New social movements consciously distinguish themselves from the 'old' left's revolutionary and totalising character. Instead they accept the existence of the formally democratic state embracing democratically structured associations and leading to a plurality of political actors. NSMs also accept the market economy even if their basis is a strong anti-establishment sentiment. Despite many new social movements theorists sympathy with certain aspects of the neo-Marxist approach which stresses the importance of consciousness and solidarity for collective action and ideology, these theorists are also aware of the inadequacies of the Marxist analysis which divides society according to economic classes, and views the middle class, including students and professionals, as subordinated to the needs of the proletariat, and the political institutions and civil society as bourgeois (Cohen, 1985:6630671).

NSMs, both as movements and as a theory, are thus both innovative and specific. The NSM theory differs in a number of ways from any previous social movement approach including resource mobilization and labour movements. It is also very 'European' in the sense that the underlying ideology is strongly based on 'European' theoretical traditions. This theoretical tradition combined with the Western European societal development created the specific problems which inspired new social movements. This is related to the 'saturation' with consumer goods of the 1960s economic boom in Western European societies combined with the experiences provided by the welfare state and the recognition that political regimes are more likely go through reforms than revolutionary changes. Constant opposition is also important vis-a-vis the highly institutionalised and bureaucratised political forces imposed by

the state.

The distinctly (Western) 'European' nature of new social movements, as opposed to the dominantly American resource mobilization approach, created a dilemma which was tackled by a new group of researchers who were increasingly concerned with this dividing line and saw the problems of social movements from a more 'global' point of view, and became known as theorists of the political opportunity structure.

THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE THEORY

The role of social movements is markedly different in the political formation of the two kinds of societies: American and European. American movements are often regional, pragmatic and single issue oriented, often with religious and moral fervour and have largely been incorporated into lobbying for legislative reform. The political structure of the USA is also significantly different from the European. It is federal, and has a two-party system which provide a different tradition of movement organisations, as Klandermans and Tarrow (1988:1-3;23-29) emphasised. European movements, on the other hand, vary from country to country because the political context varies. Thus the contrast between the United States, which is more homogeneous, and Europe, which is extremely diverse, is so great that it cannot be easily overcome. At the same time this diversity highlighted that societal context plays a much more important role in the development of social movements than anticipated before.

Some of the political opportunity structure theorists have links with the resource mobilization theory while others focus on questions raised by the new social movements approach. An emphasis on societal context, the macro-political aspects, such as the degree of openness or closure of the polity, the presence or absence of allies and support groups, the policy making capacity of the government which encourages or discourages social movements, and the divisions within the elite and its tolerance of protest became the key issues of the political opportunity structure theory which is sometimes considered as an 'offspring of the resource mobilization theory' (Diani and Eyerman, 1992:6).

The concept of political opportunity structure goes back to the 1970s. Among the first who established a connection between collective action and politics, protest and opportunity was Eisinger (1973:11) who studied urban protest. He not only introduced the new concept but also operationalised it even though his approach narrowed the concept to the structures of municipal governments, based on his comparison of a number of American cities. Other urban protest theorists (Welch, 1975:741, Castells 1977:1-15, 1980:127-138) also emphasised the importance of urban or national politics when analysing urban movements. Others, like Piven and Cloward (1977:27), whose focus was poor people's movements' success and failure, saw electoral instability as an important source of political opportunity and Jenkins and Perrow (1977:249-268) who first paid attention to the external aspects and political allies when investigating farm workers' movements. The most inspiring contributors, however, were Tilly (1978:Chapter 7), whose work on protest movements in European history emphasised the opportunities to act collectively within a broad political process, McAdam (1982:40) who argued that political opportunities as well as organizational strength are key factors for the articulation of protest, and Gamson (1975:Chapter 1) who also emphasised the link between political processes and movements' strategies. The most important advocate of the political opportunity structure concept became Sidney Tarrow who was the first to systematically develop it. Later but equally important theorists are Kitschelt and Kriesi.

The political opportunity structure might have been an 'offspring' of the resource mobilization approach, but it is certainly not part of it. Theorists of the POS approach are highly critical of several fundamental aspects of the resource mobilization approach: the cost-benefit argument, the 'organization led' approach, and the economic analogy (Tarrow, 1994:14-15; 188). Tarrow argued that social movements are fundamentally different, they are - as new social movement theorists argued - in a permanent process of formation. Within a movement the relationship is far more informal and mediated than within an economic association. The mediation between movement leaders and participants takes place via the so called 'modular repertoire' (using Tarrow's phrase) or the 'repertoire of contention' (as Tilly (1978:151) called it).

The lack of theoretical 'self-sufficiency' is one of the main points of Kitschelt's (1991) critique of the resource mobilization approach. He also argues that resource mobilization

studies use a very vague and broad notion of social movements, and say little about the reasons for the emergence of collective actions. By overestimating and over-simplifying models of rational behaviour and most importantly lacking the analysis of the societal context they cannot achieve a macro-structural approach. The reason why the resource mobilization authors dealt with the dynamics of social movements in a fairly particular way, Kitschelt (1991:332) argues, was because they were referring to one particular society, the United States. Instead of analysing society and the correlation between the different societal contexts and social movements, most resource mobilization authors took society as given and the resource mobilization approach itself became part of the societal process it tries to represent.

This was the starting point from which political opportunity structure theorists developed their own arguments. The term itself became best known as defined by Tarrow (1983, 1991, 1994) as the external dimensions of the political environment which creates the opportunity for social movements. State structures can create opportunities for new movements by providing 'openings' in their power structure. These may be: the opening up of access to power, shifts in ruling alignments, availability of influential allies and cleavages within and among elites which show where elites and authorities are vulnerable which can create potential new allies among them. This is an opportunity which can be taken advantage of by weak or poorly organised challengers with few internal resources. Changing opportunities, provided by the vulnerable power structure, can provide openings for resource-poor social actors. The opportunities offered by the changing political environment lower the costs of collective action which can be well used by the movement. The lack or presence of political opportunity can discourage or encourage people from using collective action (Tarrow, 1994).

Developing Jenkins's and Perrow's (1977:249-268) ideas Tarrow identified first three (1983) and later a fourth component (1989:14-25), as most important aspects of opportunity for a social movement. These were the degree of openness or closure of the polity, which he later (1994:85-99) called the opening up of access to participation; the stability or instability of political alignments; the presence or absence of influential allies and support groups, and the divisions within the elite or its tolerance or intolerance of protest.

Tarrow (1994:62-78) argues that historically it was the appearance of the nation-state which

created a new situation in which the social or institutional structure became less important for developing protest activities than the changing configurations of political opportunities. Today it is the political opportunity which provides the major resources for transforming mobilization potentials into actions. The opening of opportunities produces external resources which can easily shift from the initial challengers to their allies or opponents or even to the elites or authorities.

There are three basic types of collective action in the modern movement repertoire, argues Tarrow (1994:31-47): violence, disruption and contention. Violence is easy to initiate but usually only a limited group of people are willing to join it. Contention is capable of building on routines which is useful for both 'sides': the activists who can build on it, and the elites who can accept or facilitate it. Disruption is close to violence in the sense that it breaks with routines, but it is also unstable and disorientates elites. Some, originally disruptive forms of action, like strikes or demonstration, however, became conventional over time.

Another important aspect of Tarrow's argument is the concept of protest cycles: collective actions appear in waves which are described by Tarrow (1994:153-170) as a parabola: the cycle starts off with an institutional conflict, turns into an enthusiastic peak and ends with an ultimate collapse. However, different groups within the several movements are in dissimilar positions which places them differently within the cycle: some are 'early risers', others 'latecomers'. Cycles of protest also have recurrent paths of diffusion from centre to periphery. The shift of political opportunities from challengers to their allies and then to elites can also send the cycles off in divergent directions. The outcomes of protest cycles differ depending on the nature of the political struggle and the strategies of the actors in each country. These determine the outcome of the cycle.

The concept of political opportunity structure has been endorsed and also challenged by several authors. A 'member', and at the same time a challenger of POS school, Kitschelt (1986:58) agrees with Tarrow that the development of protest movements is facilitated or constrained by a specific configuration of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents: in other words by the political opportunity structure. However, Kitschelt argues that these do not determine the course of social movements but influence the choice of protest

strategies which in turn also make an impact on their environments as was pointed out later by Kriesi (1991:2-5) as well, and earlier by Gamson (1975:72), Marx and Wood (1975:384; 394), Gurr (1980). POS can encourage or restrain protest capacity in three ways, argues Kitschelt (1986:238-255). Firstly, by a political environment which can provide coercive, normative, remunerative and informational sources which the incipient movement can extract and employ in its protest. Secondly, by access to the public sphere and political decision-making, and thirdly in context with other social movements. Kitschelt challenges both Eisinger's and Tarrow's concept of 'open' and 'closed' political opportunity structures arguing that it is a one-sided concept. It considers only the 'input' processes of political decisions. The capacity of political systems to convert demands into public policy is what Kitschelt calls the 'output' phase of policy making which also shapes social movements. This is, again, the aspect of the argument which refers to the interaction between movements and polity.

Kitschelt, like Kriesi (1991:5), emphasises the determining role of national 'policy styles'. Kitschelt identifies four factors which determine the openness of a political regime to new demands on the 'input' side: a) the plurality of political parties, factions, and groups which articulate electoral choice. The larger the choice the more open a society is; b) independent (of the executive) legislature; c) intermediation between movements and executives. The more 'pluralist' and fluid the links are the more access is facilitated to the centres of political decision-makers; and finally d) the processes of forming policy compromises and consensus. Openness is not only the question of opportunities for the articulation of new demands but finding ways of forming policy changes, argues Kitschelt (1986:63).

The capacity for policy implementation is characterised by Kitschelt in three operational dimensions. Firstly, a more centralised state apparatus can implement national policies more effectively. Secondly, government control over market participants can be a key issue when implementing economic and social policies, and thirdly by the relative independence and authority of the judiciary in resolving political conflicts. However, as Kitschelt rightly emphasises, the above dimensions are in fact 'continuous rather than discrete variables', in other words the differences in the openness of political regimes are not black and white. For the sake of comparison analytical dichotomies can, however, be drawn. Kitschelt (1986:66-

67) drew up a hypothesis in his comparison of four societies (France, Germany, USA and Sweden). When political systems are open, he argues, they invite non-confrontational, assimilative strategies because established institutions in an open political system offer multiple points of access. In contrast movements are likely to adopt confrontational strategies when the political opportunity structure is closed and ward off threats to the implementation of policies.

Finally Kitschelt (1986:72-85) distinguishes among three types of movement impacts which political opportunity structures facilitate or impede: procedural, which open new channels for protest participation, recognising protest actors as legitimate representatives; substantive gains, when policies are changed in response to protest; and structural impacts, when the political opportunity structure itself is transformed as a consequence of social movement activity.

Kriesi (1991:6) disputed certain aspects of Kitschelt's 'political input structure' and 'political output structure' distinction, arguing that it is used as a 'summary term' applying both to the institutional structure as well as to the actual power configuration. Kriesi, however, adopted Kitschelt's conceptual distinction and differentiated between open and closed states. This is based on four aspects drawn up by Kriesi: first, the degree of the centralization of the state, a similar point to Kitschelt's; second, the degree of formal access, depending on the degree of independence between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, again a slightly modified version of Kitschelt's concept; thirdly, the coherence and professionalism of public administration; and finally, formal access to direct democratic procedures, such as referenda.

The distinction between open and closed states allowed Kriesi (1992) to conclude that strong states are centralised, concentrated and coherent and at the same time autonomous with respect to their environment and capable of getting things done. Weak states, on the other hand, lack the capacity to act but are more favourable settings for collective action. Kriesi also criticizes Kitschelt's 'structural impact' concept arguing that the political opportunity structure is too stable over time to consider any structural impact. Kriesi's different argument is interesting because two of the societies he studied coincide with those of Kitschelt's investigations (France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland).

Kriesi (1991:9) also argued that actors, when they engage in collective action, cannot anticipate changes over time, and so we have to take the political opportunity structure as a given, while in fact it is not constant. He distinguished three sets of properties of a political system: a) its formal institutional structure, b) its formal procedures and prevailing strategies regarding movement actors, and c) the configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with the movements. These specify the strategies of the authorities and define the extent to which challenging collective actions will be facilitated or repressed and also the chances of success. Kriesi recognises that this in fact is a process in which both 'partners' are mutually interdependent, and it is more useful to talk about the 'interaction context' but does not elaborate this concept.

Kriesi discusses the impact of political opportunity structure on the mobilization of new social movements. He concludes that, unlike NSM theorists, for whom changes in politics mean changes in social and cultural aspects and the aim of new social movements is to influence the social and cultural context, these changes only become relevant to the extent that they are mediated by politics. The relevance of social and cultural changes for the mobilization of social movements is the focus of new social movement theories and is only secondary for Kriesi.

He also argues that collective actions, in an organised, sustained and self-conscious manner, challenge the existing authorities as formal political institutions. Consequently this is, at the moment, most relevant at a national level, as long as nation-states remain the main determinants of conventional politics.

Kriesi also emphasises an important point, not mentioned earlier by political opportunity structure theorists. This refers to the way authorities relate to 'challengers' (social movement activists), using Kriesi's expression, following Tilly (1978:53,65 and Gamson, 1975:28). Kriesi draws attention to the fact that a) authorities use formal and informal procedures and strategies with regard to challengers and b) that the 'exclusive' (repressive, confrontive) and 'integrative' (facilitative, cooperative) procedures undertaken by the authorities (formally or informally) have a long tradition in a given country. This historic strategy created marked differences among the so called long-term democracies, such as France, Britain, Germany

as well as the Southern European societies which result, even at present, in a different setting for social movements in these societies. This a point well worth considering in the Eastern European cases as well.

Combining his distinction between weak and strong states with the distinction between exclusive and integrative dominant strategies Kriesi arrives at four distinct general settings for dealing with 'challengers'. The combination of a strong state with an exclusive dominant strategy is labelled as 'full exclusion' and the combination of weak state with an inclusive dominant strategy is the case of 'full procedural integration'. The two intermediate cases are the 'formalistic inclusion', when the state is weak but the dominant strategy is exclusive, and the case of 'informal cooptation', when the state is strong but the dominant strategy is inclusive. The first and last cases (full exclusion and informal cooptation) invite disruptive strategies from 'challengers'. By contrast, the second and fourth cases (formalistic inclusion and full procedural integration) invite, as expected, moderate, conventional strategies on the part of 'challengers'. In other words, those movements which operate in a strong state become disruptive and uncooperative, while those in weak states become moderate and cooperative in their 'challenges'.

To sum up the importance of political opportunity structure, I would argue that it represents a major advance over all existing social movements' theories. The most important feature of POS is that it draws attention to what is indeed the determining factor for a movement: the societal context. The political opportunity structure theory consciously tried to bridge the gap between the American and European traditions of social movement theory which I do not think they have achieved. But it became 'global' by not being particularistic, as all previous theories have been. This certainly made POS extremely useful when applying it to a context its authors could not have had in mind when originally constructing it, i.e. Eastern Europe. We will come back to the application of political opportunity structure theory in Chapter 10. In the remaining part of this chapter we discuss a very recent theory which we also kept in mind when analysing Eastern European environmental movements.

THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Unlike any other theory, the specificity of the cognitive approach or environmental consciousness approach, as it is also known, is that it has been developed studying one particular type of movement. This does not necessarily mean that the theory cannot be applied to other type of movements but it certainly made it an approach especially worth investigating in our cases.

The arguments of the political opportunity structure theory are fully endorsed by Eyerman and Jamison (1991:35) who agree that no social movement can emerge until there is a political opportunity available, even though they not only understand this in political or social terms but as opportunity for communication and knowledge dissemination. Eyerman and Jamison, however, strongly criticised other currently dominant analyses of social movements, among them the resource mobilization theory's operational approach to social movements for treating the movements as particular mechanisms of mobilization and recruitment, as challengers of the power-holders who lack established political position. American sociologists generally are criticised, except for the collective behaviour school, for their over-empirical approach in which knowledge and identity are seen as non-empirical objects and are left out or marginalised. They also criticised all currently dominant paradigms of social movement analysis which focus on the tactical, strategic, organizational and interactive praxis of movements instead of the cognitive praxis. In the European approach they criticised the domination of the political meaning of the movement and the sociohistorical aspects, drawn from theories of social change and philosophies rather than the movement's cognitive identity, with the exception of Melucci's challenge of the new social movements in primarily symbolic terms. They also conceptualise social movements in symbolic and expressive terms when focusing on them as cognitive praxes. Eyerman and Jamison, however, shift their locus from the aspect of challenge to established power to considering cognitive praxis as a socially constructive force.

Their concept of knowledge is based on Berger and Luckmann's (1967:13) approach of the social construction of reality and Habermas's (1987) and Giddens's (1985:Ch. 1 and 2) social theories. Eyerman's and Jamison's aim was to provide a social theory which focuses on the

interactions among individual, collective and macrosocietal practices. Knowledge is identified as the broader cognitive praxis that informs all social activity. Knowledge creation is understood as a collective process, the product of a series of social encounters. Cognitive praxis is defined as the interaction among the individual, the collective and the macrosocietal levels. Social movement is its cognitive praxis. This is what gives a social movement its significance for broader social processes, it is argued. The fragmentation which exists in all social movements' theories will be resolved and the polarisation between 'grand' theories and particular studies will also be avoided by directing attention to the role of social movements as cognitive actors, they argued. Social movements are thus seen as producers of knowledge, not as rational operators. Their most important function is that they create, articulate and formulate new thoughts and ideas. There is also an emphasis on the fact that social movements, unlike single issue actions, interact and develop a cognitive territory within society. Cognitive praxis also has a cycle, following Tarrow's arguments, moving from discovery and articulation through application and specification to diffusion and institutionalisation. Thus social movements are in processes of constant formation, they are impermanent, transient, in motion, as NSMs theorists also pointed out.

The focus of Eyerman's and Jamison's attention is not to explain why social movements happen or why particular individuals choose to participate in them but what a social movement represents for the development of human knowledge. Movements come into existence and later wither away but by creating a new cognitive space with new kinds of ideas, which at the time might be adopted by their opponents or discarded, they have achieved something, it is argued. So the focus of interest is which new ideas have been produced by the movement, what has the movement contributed to social processes of knowledge production, and what common processes of cognitive praxis can be identified in social movements from different historical periods and different societies.

The concept of movement success is different from its understanding in previous theories, which measure the ability of the movement to mobilise resources and utilise the opportunity structure of the political context to achieve strategic aims. Jamison and Eyerman measure success in a broader sense by the movements' effectiveness in diffusing the knowledge they produce. This will be a very important point to consider when analysing Eastern European

environmental movements.

Traditional analysis of social movements examines participants from two points of view, their position within the movement (leader, core member, sympathiser) and their position within society (middle class/working class, educated). Jamison and Eyerman employed the term *movement intellectual* (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:94) for their description of movement activists. Just like 'established intellectuals', who are professionally engaged in the production of ideas, movement intellectuals create the meaning and identity of movements which, it is argued, are the core of movement activity. Thus movement intellectuals are those individuals who through their activities articulate the knowledge interests and cognitive identity of the movement. At the same time they also create their own individual identity because this is an interactive process. It is not denied that 'established' intellectuals are often in the vanguard of the formation of emerging movements because they are 'established' social critics but later often chose to remain outside the movement and let the 'movement intellectuals' continue the work. Conversely many movement intellectuals have a good chance to develop into professional intellectuals by having 'practised' in social movements, finding a new identity and establishing themselves within society as intellectuals by pursuing professional careers.

Eyerman and Jamison studied environmental and peace movements in three European societies and in the United States respectively, and found that concentrating on resources and organisation is futile when analyzing social movements. They are not competing with each other, as companies do, and a political economy approach only misleads the researcher in studying social movements. They also found that the surrounding political context, the opportunity structure, plays a crucial role in the development of environmental movements. Hence the comparison of three societies, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark provided an excellent example of diversity due to their different political configurations and historical traditions. However, they argued that the most important aspect of these movements is their cognitive praxis, the knowledge they produce and disseminate within society and beyond the individual nation states. It is argued that environmental movements share a common set of knowledge interests. Firstly, they found a shared world view - ecology - with a common framework of reference, a shared cosmology. Secondly, there was a rejection of technology

which was country specific, depending on what sort of technology was used to damage the environment in each society. This forced environmentalists towards professionalism in order to combat technocrats in their disputes. This was specific to each national case. Thirdly, there was a diversion among environmental movements concerning their way of articulating knowledge interests. This meant that, depending on the national political context, different groups concentrated on different methods.

Two examples were particularly interesting for us. In the Netherlands a combination of a pillarised party structure and pragmatic tradition of accepting differences of opinion developed. Environmental groups were formed with disparate orientations in which a more coherent sense of collective purpose developed and individual environmental groups coordinated their actions to a large extent even though some prioritised to educate the general public and others preferred to influence power-holding elites. Later the various environmental organisations professionalised and provided experts and expert knowledge to the establishment. Greens did not form powerful political parties and environmentalists remained extraparliamentary and professional at the same time.

Sweden has a long term tradition of nature conservation. Pragmatism and utilitarianism were combined with the well-organised welfare system which swiftly absorbed both the international and the local grassroots demands and formalised environmental issues through the state bureaucracy in a top-down, centralised manner. Radical environmentalism found little fertile ground, the political hegemony of managerial corporatism was the determining factor and filtered green issues through using a selective openness. Some issues were accommodated but others excluded, according to the Swedish Social Democratic party bureaucratic interest which basically believes in the ability of science and technology, and the rationality of state intervention in solving social problems. Thus knowledge has been controlled and filtered through the government bureaucracy and environmentalism became a state matter. We felt that the Dutch scenario was interesting when investigating the Hungarian case and the Swedish example is important for us because of the resemblance with the Russian case. We will come back to this later, in Chapter 10.

To sum up the cognitive consciousness theory, we certainly felt that it had to be incorporated

when analysing our own cases of environmental movements because it offered innovative views for us. Although the concept can be and has been applied to other types of movement rather than only environmental ones (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:Ch.5), the example of environmental movements when studying cognitive praxis is fortunate in that they have a country and a global identity at the same time. Environmental movements have also emerged in every developed industrial society even if their strength and frequency have been diverse among different societies. This includes Eastern Europe as well. We will therefore incorporate the environmental consciousness theory's arguments in our analysis and evaluate its relevance in the Hungarian and Russian contexts.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have reviewed the relevant social movement theories. This was an important and useful exercise. The main focus of my review was not only to provide a systematic picture of existing theories, but to provide a basis for our own investigations. A detailed discussion of the different approaches was necessary for us in order to apply them to the social movements which we were going to scrutinise. Considering that at the time, in 1990, none of the western social movement theorists paid any attention to Eastern Europe, this may have seemed an odd exercise. To choose a number of theories which had nothing in common with the Eastern European reality was somewhat unusual. The diverse social movement theories, as I have shown, had usually been applied in North America or Western Europe and there were difficulties in applying them even outside the part of the world they have been developed, i.e. North America or (Western) Europe. In this ongoing debate over the incompatibility of American and (Western) European cases the question of relevance to any other part of the world was simply ignored. Thus the majority of the existing societies were simply and systematically excluded from these debates (with the only exception of Tarrow who has been concerned with the question of 'globality'). Our idea that these theories might be applied in a different part of the world with a completely different history might therefore be seen as over-ambitious.

By studying these theories before I started *my* investigations I gained several advantages. Firstly, it helped me to become familiar with cases outside our region, which was useful in

itself. Secondly, I could approach my own field in a systematic way, keeping in mind existing theoretical arguments. And finally I could embark on a very new and exciting investigation when evaluating the relevance of all these western-born theories in a completely different context from that in they were originally conceived.

My own 'empirical' chapters will consistently refer back to the different arguments of the above discussed theories when carrying out our own analysis of environmental movements and authorities in Russia and Hungary and Chapter 10 will be solely devoted to the evaluation of the relevance of the theories reviewed above, in the Eastern European context.

CHAPTER 5

HUNGARIAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

In the first half of the thesis I have examined different theoretical approaches, such as western theories of social movements and pluralism and opposition in Soviet type regimes, which are relevant to our investigation. The second half of the thesis will focus firstly on the analysis of environmental movements and the authorities, based on empirical studies¹ in Hungary and Russia, conducted between 1990 and 1994. After a comparative analysis of the Russian and Hungarian case I will examine the relevance of western social movement theories in the Eastern European context before concluding the thesis.

The empirical part starts off with separate analysis of the Hungarian and Russian cases (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) which are drawn on my original research conducted in Hungary and Russia between 1990 and 1995.

The basis of the empirical part is the 129 interviews conducted firstly, with environmental movement activists, including leaders of the groups and rank and file members, and secondly, with local authority members, including elected representatives and officials. The comparative analysis will build upon these four chapters.

Chapters 5 and 6 will introduce several cases of Hungarian and Russian environmental movements describing their origins, aims and goals, participants, leadership, internal conflicts and conflicts outside the movement, their degree of success and the role of the media and will analyse the findings. In Chapters 7 and 8 I will examine the movements' relations with the local and national authorities (Hungary and Russia separately) and these will be followed by Chapter 9, the comparative analysis of Hungarian and Russian environmental movements focusing on the similarities and differences between them.

¹See details on methodology in Appendix.

In the first part of this chapter I will examine the causes of environmental problems in Hungary and the growing awareness concerning the environment. Secondly, I will introduce several Hungarian environmental groups. In the third part of this chapter I will analyse the movements mentioned above in order to evaluate the Hungarian environmental movement situation.

INTRODUCTION

In the one-party system interest and self-support groups existed but were only tolerated. They were kept under close observation by the authorities with the help of extensive networks of informers. The groups were judged individually and acquired a certain reputation in terms of their political radicalism which defined the authorities' tolerance level towards them. None of the groups could feel completely safe in the one-party regime as they had no legal protection. This constant potential threat obviously limited the number of groups as well as the number of participants, but did not succeed in eradicating peoples' willingness to organise themselves completely.

Social movements cannot be created by a favourable legal framework but, as 'Political Opportunity Structure' theorists would point out, it certainly encourages their existence. Consequently we should not be surprised to see the mushrooming of collective activities which started as the existing legal constraints were relaxed just prior to the rapid political changes from state socialism to a liberal democratic system. In the second half of the 1980s thousands of groups appeared almost simultaneously (Igrunov, 1989:2; Berezovski, 1990:12; Bozoki, 1988:25; Juhasz, 1993:227; Yanitsky, 1993b:120; Shomina, 1996:3; Szirmai, 1996:3; Perepjolkin, 1996:2).

INDUSTRIALISATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

After the Communist Party established its power in Hungary in 1948, industrialisation, and especially heavy industry was given absolute priority. There were two major reasons for this. Firstly it was related to Marxist ideas which saw industrialisation as the path for the development of the society. This was similar to policies pursued in other socialist societies

whether it suited their economic situation or not.

The other reason for pursuing industrialisation was a much more practical one. The cold war period shifted the interests of the government in the Soviet bloc (as well as in NATO countries at the same time) towards developing the economy to serve military aims. Hungary, like all socialist societies, as well as western democracies, became part of this process which again resulted in giving industry and especially certain sectors of industry, absolute priority in expenditure (Pető and Szakács, 1985:ch.3.1 and 2). This industrialisation policy, combined with the increased use of chemicals in the agriculture, created a severe environmental situation in Eastern Europe, including Hungary, just as it did all over the developed world.

GREEN IDEAS IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD

The recognition of the damage caused by industrialisation and the excessive use of chemicals in agriculture started even in the most developed societies only in the 1970s. The first Green Party was established in New Zealand in 1972 and the first Green member of a national parliament was elected in Switzerland in 1979. Apart from pioneering exceptions the upsurge of green ideas did not appear before the late 1960s and early 1970s even in the most developed societies, where the success in raising living standards silenced any criticism against industrialisation. The first attempt to attack prevailing views appeared in *The Costs of Economic Growth* by E. J. Mishan in 1967 followed by the establishment of the Club of Rome in 1968. Its report, *The Limits of Growth*, published in 1972, questioned the ability of the planet's resources to meet contemporary rates of consumption. This was followed by *A Blueprint of Survival*, published by The Ecologist also in 1972, in which a need for national and international movements and a new philosophy of life was voiced (Richardson, 1995:5).

GREEN IDEAS IN THE EASTERN BLOC

Unlike the West, the Eastern bloc did not suffer from consumption 'fatigue' which could have led to the development of 'postmaterialist' values. Although living standards had been improving dramatically in every socialist society relative to their own past standards and although the prevailing political regime emphasised this factor, the majority of people

compared themselves with the 'western' countries. As a result anti-consumption ideas did not develop in Eastern Europe, even in Hungary where the relative living standard in the socialist bloc was among the highest.

At the same time neither Hungary nor any of the other socialist countries were immune to ideological influences arriving from western Europe. When the above mentioned literature was published and news of the growing environmental awareness reached the most educated section of these societies green ideas started to grow. By the late 1970s and early 1980s environmentalist ideas had started to develop in Hungary. A survey conducted by Kulcsar and Dobossy in 1985 found that 80% of the population were aware of environmental problems and were concerned about them a great deal (Kulcsár and Dobossy, 1988:32). People were worried about air and water pollution, industrial and nuclear waste and the shrinking extent and quality of forests. They also complained about the level of traffic noise and the decreasing proportion of green areas especially in cities. There was also an awareness of the growing health hazards as a consequence of environmental problems.

WHY WERE THERE NO ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE MID 1980S IN HUNGARY?

The development of environmental movements encountered serious obstacles. There were only three countries in Eastern Europe where the organised opposition against the Communist Party became significant: Poland, with the Solidarity movement, Czechoslovakia with Charter 77, and the GDR with the pacifist movements organised by the Lutheran Churches (Dawisha, 1988:127; Waller, 1988; Bozóki, 1988:15; Bugajski-Pollack, 1989:67-108; Tismaneanu, 1990:135-180; Waller and Millard, 1992). In other societies, such as Romania, Albania and Bulgaria party control was overwhelming and prevented opposition to the regime from developing.

Although in Hungary there was a one party system, there was a lack of total party control. This allowed the development of a type of resistance which was not organised political resistance. Apart from a tiny group of dissidents and the occasional strikes among workers, the most developed form of 'resistance' was very passive: a turning away from political

questions and concentrating on individual matters, personal careers, raising individual living standards, and an interest in family life. The Kádár regime encouraged this individualistic response. The fear of '1956' being repeated made the political leadership feel safe as long as the population did not engage in independent civil initiatives. Organised opposition was a thorn in the flesh of the party leadership therefore and it suppressed it even when, as from the late 1960s, political liberalism already tolerated individually expressed 'constructive' criticism.

Those few who preferred a less self-centred form of political resistance had to fight on two fronts: against party control, and against the political apathy and individualism which became widespread and characteristic in Hungary. In the above mentioned survey on environmentalism conducted in 1985 the respondents saw the solution to environmental problems either by state action (tougher legislation, stricter control of polluting companies) or via individual action, like paying more for better services to clean up the environment. The idea of organised action was scarcely mentioned by the people surveyed in 1985. It is not surprising therefore that the very few environmental movements which existed at this time were isolated and little known to the public, although environmental concern was present.

THE APPEARANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

The first environmental movements appeared from 1984. The earliest movements emerged simultaneously in large cities and small villages. Some were triggered by concrete events, as in the case of the Danube Circle and the movement against the nuclear dump in Ofalu, Baranya county, and others were reactions to a generally growing concern combined with the lack of any activity from the state bureaucracy (Reflex Movement). The sudden change in the willingness to form social movements is due to the surrounding political context.

Thus political opposition was sporadic in Hungary prior to the mid 1980s partly because of direct police repression and partly as a result of the prevailing and successful 'party line' in Hungary which encouraged people to seek individual solutions to their problems rather than organised ones.

When in 1987 more progressive Communist leaders, like Németh and Pozsgay, replaced the older guard (Grósz), reports about changing political circumstances were published. Many, previously 'forbidden', names emerged in state approved periodicals (Szelényi, Konrád, Kis, Hegedűs). In 1988 an interview with a leading dissident, János Kis, who had formerly never been published in anything other than illegal samizdat publications, appeared in *Valóság*, a state-approved social science journal. In the interview he referred to the 'democratic opposition', a term never before used outside the samizdat, and argued that the official authorities from about 1987 had started to remove the constraints step by step allowing the dissidents to gain wider publicity and acceptance. In fact party officials had even started to communicate with the 'democratic opposition' in order to negotiate with them, and especially with those involved in publishing Samizdat literature. At the time of the interview, in 1988, János Kis could not predict how long the process would take but he identified the starting year of the erosion of the existing socialist regime as 1987. The persecuted political dissident could sense the changing atmosphere in the first place but the changing political circumstances were widely felt by the rest of the population soon because of the gradual opening up of state publications. These generally perceived changes by the public led to the appearance of organised political actions.

In fact the easing of political control led to a certain euphoria and resulted in the mushrooming of oppositional initiatives from 1988. The so called 'Round Table' negotiations started including the future political parties, as well as grassroots organisations of independent trade unions (TDDSz, Democratic League of Trade Unions, Workers' Solidarity, Union of Workers' Councils) and independent organisations of professionals (VOSz, the union of entrepreneurs, The Independent Forum of Lawyers, etc). Simultaneously many social movements were formed as well, like the Tenants Organisation, Homeless Movement, and most of the environmental movements, like Green Future, Air Working Group, Fadrusz Street Movement, etc.

Strictly speaking all these oppositional organisations were illegal at the time as the Bill legalising free associations in Hungary was only passed a year later, in 1989. The political and legal changes were brought about, on the one hand, by the progressive wing of the Communist leaders who were ready to share power and dismantle the one-party rule of the

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and on the other by the pressure from, the multiplying grassroots organisations 'below' (Stumpf, 1990:5; Arató, 1992:201). In this period of regime change, for the first time since 1956, many people had an felt overwhelming sensation of political freedom and hope. As one activist put it: "The first activity I participated in was a demonstration in May 1988. Around 2-3000 people participated in this demonstration. It was very moving and exciting to me. I had never been involved in any political demonstrations or activities before." (Kántor Judit, p.34)

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN HUNGARY: CASE STUDIES

In the early 1990s there were several hundred registered environmental groups in Hungary (Szirmai, 1996:3). They differed in size, locality and in their concerns which ranged from local issues to national or even global ones. It is not our aim to describe all these environmental groups in this thesis. We will instead describe a few in detail, illustrating different kinds of environmental groups in Hungary: a local movement which became well known all over Hungary, called Green Future; two different types of national movements, one of which became well known abroad, called the Danube Circle, and another one which became very successful at the time when many thought environmental groups were on the decline; and finally an example of environmental movements outside the capital.

A LOCAL MOVEMENT WITH A NATIONAL REPUTATION, THE CASE OF GREEN FUTURE

Some environmental movements concentrate only or primarily on local issues. The locality can be a provincial town or village or a particular district of the capital, as is the case with Green Future which is located in the outskirts of Budapest, in an industrial area. However, as the example of Green Future will prove local movements can gain a reputation far beyond their localities.

Green Future started in the Summer of 1989. The future activists of the movement became interested in green issues together with many other Hungarians who from the mid to late

1980s showed a growing interest in environmental issues as a result of the upsurge in interest in Germany and Austria which trickled over the border (Szabó, 1993:96).

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

Just before the birth of Green Future a local organiser of the community centre in Nagytétény organised a series of lectures on environmentalism and invited several speakers on the subject.

'I was very naive and had little knowledge about environmentalism generally when I started to work here in 1987. I started to invite experts to give lectures for the public and the children: doctors, teachers, environmentalists came to speak to us. We all benefitted from these enlightening talks. People became more aware of what was happening around us and started to be more and more irritated about the pollution in the district. ' (From the interview with one of the co-founder's of Green Future, Hársfalvi Ágnes, p.1)

The lectures 'opened people's eyes'. They started to 'see' the dark, black smog coming out of the local factory chimneys, argued Ágnes Hársfalvi (p.2). The lecturers pointed out also that these polluting state companies only paid negligible fines which of course did not persuade them to alter their polluting behaviour.

Local GPs in their lectures at the community centre spoke about their own observations, suggesting that local children suffered medically from the polluted air, soil and water in the district and that the level of tumour-related cases was higher in the district than the national average (Interview with Kékessy Olga, a local GP, p.6). They suspected neighbouring factories, such as Chinoin Pharmaceutical and Metallochemia as well as large pig farms polluting the river by discharging their waste into the Danube. The river was used for irrigation in the neighbouring gardens and allotments where vegetable and fruit were produced for home consumption. The local GPs drew up their own statistics based on their observations going back as far as 1977. These only became known locally via the lectures organised in the district community centre by a future movement activist in 1989 (Utassy

Éva, p.8).

There were other important local issues which mobilised people. One of them was the emerging plan for a ring road 'around' Budapest. This road was, however, planned to be built right through a highly populated housing estate in the district. This plan had never been discussed in public meetings and was not known to the public until the construction almost reached their doorsteps. The main reason for building the ring road through highly populated areas rather than a little further out of the city to avoid housing estates, was that a Soviet military base lay directly in the way of the ring road and, given the choice of disturbing the Soviet base or building a motorway through a highly populated area, it was obvious for the prevailing political regime what to choose. But, for very good reasons, they kept the plans very quiet. "The construction work and some documents were leaked out only in the Autumn of 1989" (Sárosy Béla, p.14.).

Finally it was very important that all these events occurred in the late 1980s, at the time when the 'party-state regime' - as Hársfalvi Ágnes put it (Hársfalvi, p.18) - had its last period of existence when the old political structure started to be dismantled.

REASONS FOR JOINING

The hard core activists of the movement came together in the community centre around the lecture organiser.

"We were the first people who met in the lectures. These were Kékessy Olga, one of our local GPs in the district, Sárosy Béla who was active in the M0 protest, Kovacs Judit who worked as an information officer in one of the local polluting companies, Bartók János, a graduate, Hollán Józsa, a former bus driver, later unemployed, who became very active politically, and the future local MP, Marton Károly" (Utassy Éva, p.5).

The triggering event for forming the movement was that the local council had discussed the alarming environmental situation in the district in a meeting but behind closed doors. (This

was still the period of the previous regime.) The community organiser bravely decided to call a public meeting inviting the local representatives of the just-forming 'embryonic' parties in opposition. "I wanted the opposition to help us to put pressure on the authorities. These were the last days of the party-state power" - she said (Hársfalvi Ágnes, p.3).

The future core of the leadership did not know each other very well and were occasionally hostile to each other at the beginning. Not even the brave community organiser escaped this initial attitude. "Many people were hostile to me at the beginning. They just could not believe that someone employed by the local authorities could be trustworthy. But I proved to them that I was²" (Hársfalvi Ágnes, p.4).

Three members of the future leadership called another public meeting a few months later, in September 1989, with the specific aim of going public and recruiting activists for the 'District Environmental Council' as they called themselves then. We wanted to

"emphasise that we want to represent the interest of the whole population [in the district] and attract anyone interested to join" (Sárosy Béla, p.12.)

Forty people joined the movement at this public meeting.

THE MOVEMENT PARTICIPANTS

At the time of my investigations, apart from the core 8 - 10 members most of whom were the leaders, there were 60 - 100 activists "available whatever we asked them to do" (Kékessy Olga, p.9) and a further 400 people regularly turning up at public meetings, demonstrations, and signing petitions. The activists considered 60 an ideal number in terms of organisation and did not wish to increase this number. The circle of sympathizers was wider still but the precise number was unknown to the movement activists as they have never had the means of conducting a survey about it. They claimed it was huge, which was demonstrated during election campaigns when the most important local issue was environmentalism. They felt well supported by the local population during the campaign.

The 60 plus activists (who regularly paid their membership fees) had mainly medium level

²Community Centres were run by local councils.

education [A-level equivalent] but many had less.

"We are popular right across the board in terms of social and educational background. There is not much conflict regarding educational differences" (Hársfalvi Ágnes, p.8.).

The majority of the activists were middle aged or above and women, often mothers with children. Women - the local activists believed - were more sensitive to environmental issues and more willing to do something about it. Often the whole family joined.

THE LEADERSHIP

The leadership itself was 90% made up of professionals except for, Hollán József, the unemployed bus driver. They were biologists, medical doctors, engineers and scientists. The only profession they felt short of was lawyers, to help the movement to deal with bureaucratic issues, legal requirements and illegal acts by the authorities. Green Future's leadership was a fairly rare type. It was fully democratic in every sense. They did not maintain a strict hierarchy even if there was a president. His role was only formal. He was the local MP and busy in his Parliamentary job anyway. The rest of the 7 - 9 people shared the different kinds of task. This, however, did not mean that they did not experience conflicts and serious debates in the course of their activities.

CONFLICTS

Disagreements grew over a fairly lengthy period. One source of the disagreements stemmed from the diverse party political affiliations which developed following the phase when opposition parties established themselves before the national elections of March 1990 and six months later during the local election campaign. Some felt closer to the MDF advocating nationalist-Christian values and others to the more cosmopolitan, liberal oriented Free Democrats or the young democrats, the FIDESZ. At this time there was no significant

sympathy towards the Socialist Party³.

Another related source of conflict was that while the district voted for an MDF MP in March 1990, half a year later, by the time of the local elections, a Free Democrat local government was voted in. This was similar to the national trend. The movement leadership became divided over the question of cooperation versus confrontation with the local as well as national government. These divisions were strongly influenced by their individual political affiliation with the different political parties holding power at various levels of authority.

Finally the movement activists ran into conflicts over finances. This conflict was a product of their increasing success: the more funds they managed to attract the more money there was to row about. They started to accuse each other of mishandling finances and accounting and creating full time jobs for themselves.

"Money caused more problems among us than the lack of it. When I was in charge of the accounting Eva started hostile rumours in the group that I was misshandling the money. It hurt me because it was unfair. I have never done anything like that" (Hársfalvi Ágnes, p.14.).

THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

Green Future is an example of a social movement which was originally organised with very concrete aims. They were twofold. The first aim was to fight the planned road project and to try to divert the route from the highly populated estate. The second concrete issue was the neighbourhood's largest polluting factory, Metallochemia. The activists and supporters strongly suspected that the main source of the diseases in the district was the negligence of the large chemical company which consistently mishandled chemical waste, dumping it on the company site, which was in the middle of a densely populated residential area. The movement's aim was to press for a government enquiry which would then prove the dangerous situation and lead to a) the closure of the company b) legal compensation and c) the cleansing up of the site.

³By May 1994 the Socialists became the most popular political party in Hungary and won the national elections with a landslide victory.

But at a later stage, after their first successes, the movement developed plans of a more continuous nature. They decided to monitor and continuously measure the level and detailed content of the air, soil and water pollution in the district as well as collecting systematic statistics of the deceases and general health status of the population of the district. They knew that these were tasks of state organisations, such as public health authorities, but they had no trust in them. The movement decided to take on the role of 'representing' the district's interest in all environmentally related questions. One reason for this was that the movement activists felt they had developed a certain expertise in the field of environmentalism during the initial period of concrete fights. This would have been wasted unless turned into a more systematic and ongoing activity. They also felt that, on the one hand, they had become better equipped to fight with the local and national government but, on the other hand, the new regime had only changed in legal terms. It had become democratic tolerating social movements and different political parties but it was felt that the regime remained as resistant to public pressure as before. The new national and local governments did not gain more reputation in terms of introducing radical changes to solve the burning environmental problems. The need for ongoing pressure was felt very strongly and not only from the activists side. The population of the district started to turn to the movement with countless requests, partly acknowledging their success and experiences as well as growing expertise in handling and evaluating cases, and partly in the hope that they could or were more likely to be able to get results than private, individual actions.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the movement developed among its goals the 'education' of the population in a very wide sense. They restarted organising lectures, pursued recycling, and paid special attention to educating the children by organising special environmentalist summer camps for them.

"We wanted to achieve more than just concrete goals. We wanted to educate people and to try to achieve preventative measures concerning the environment, not only cleaning up the damage afterwards. For example, we went out to the neighbouring forest in Haros and listed the zoological and botanical importance of that ancient forest in order to have official recognition of its importance in the future. We also organised camps there for young

people and lectures for adults in order to educate them." (Interview with Salgó Lajos, p.5).

SUCCESS

Success can be measured in two ways. Firstly tangible success and secondly long-term intangible ones. Examining firstly the tangible type of success Green Future became successful in one major concrete area. They managed to have Metallochemia, a large company of national importance, closed down. The government inquiry concluded that their strong suspicion was justified and had to act upon it without delay. Plans for cleaning up the site were drawn up and talks about compensation started. The government even allocated a special environmental fund for the district to improve its pollution overall.

The question of the ring road, however, had not been resolved by the time of writing this analysis. The construction of the part outside the district developed to the point where the diversion of routes would be a lot more difficult. But the movement activists have not given up their fight and hopes.

When asked about their success the movement members considered people's changed perceptions, the second type of success, to be their most important achievement. First the population in the district, they argued, look at nature, environment and waste differently from the period prior to their activities. The second most important intangible success was that people in the district had learned to represent their own interest. They cannot, as in the past, be excluded from information and decision-making. A road project for example could never now get to the complicated, entangled stage before protest or consultation could start. And finally the movement achieved not only a cognitive acknowledgement of environmentalism but a political one as well. "No political party can even imagine being elected in this district without being interested in environmental questions" - they argued (Kovács Judit, p.16).

MEDIA

Part of Green Future's success is due to the media both locally and nationally. The formation

of the movement coincided with the newly found 'free' period of the press, when the traditional state control had disappeared. Although between 1990 and 1994, under the conservative right wing MDF government, some degree of 'censorship' had been re-established, this did not concern environmental matters but 'only' political issues. Similarly this was the period of environmental 'awakening' nationally (as well as locally) and so information about a well organised environmental movement was welcomed by editors.

"The media is very important. Sometimes they misinterpret what we say, so I cannot say I trust journalists, but we badly need publicity. We are very often mentioned by the media, in papers, by the radio, TV. Apart from that I frequently appear on the local cable channel. Last time, for example, I talked about my new refuse collection plan." (Interview with Hollán József, p.7)

Green Future became one among the environmental movements which became well known. It formed during the regime change and was consequently lucky enough to get all the publicity it needed in the national press. Its fairly quick and relatively spectacular success earned it yet more publicity and national acknowledgement. It could also be argued that this national fame contributed to its success as well. The surrounding publicity increased the pressure on the government to act and the case of Metallochemia was felt to be sufficiently serious for the government to feel it had to do something about it to avoid further embarrassment. The unexpected financial 'windfall', the government's special fund to aid the district's environmental development, strongly supports this argument.

Summarising the case of Green Future, it is a good example of a generally fairly successful local environmental movement which achieved national fame. It has expanded its original goals which were concrete and well defined. The newly developed long term aims concerning 'public education' both in environmentalism and political actions were similarly clear and were based on their own enlarged capacity to tackle environmental problems to handle the press and the national and local authorities and to achieve their goals. In turn both the publicity and their success contributed to their national reputation. More importantly they have earned the respect and trust of the local population, a factor which strongly contributes to their survival.

NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

I will now examine two national movements which represent two contrasting cases. One - the Danube Circle - is an example of a movement which has been around for a long time now. It was very popular at a certain stage after which its popularity has plummeted, though the movement itself has survived and still exists. The other example is the Air Group, an originally relatively small movement which has 'catapulted' to national fame and made it a lot more important than it had ever planned to become.

THE DANUBE CIRCLE

The Danube Circle is probably the only Hungarian environmental movement which has achieved international publicity (Waller, 1992:121; Fleischer, 1993:429).

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

The idea of a dam jointly built by Hungary and Czechoslovakia at Bős-Nagymaros was first raised in the 1950s. The power station was supposed to supply energy, help navigation and control floods. The agreement was signed by the two countries much later, in September 1977. The plan was to build two power stations, (one at Bős/Gabčíkovo and another at Nagymaros) and a twenty kilometre long reservoir. The dam was supposed to ensure a 4-5 meter flow wave passing several times a day. The monstrous plan has all the fingerprints of the engineering ideas of the 1950s and 1960s when such constructions were built all over the world, and especially in the less developed part of the world, often with first world 'aid'. The argument was always that they would provide low cost energy. Apart from the obvious environmental damage in most of these cases, even the 'low cost' argument ceased to apply by the 1970s. In the Bős-Nagymaros case, for example, the very expensive investment would only produce an insignificant amount of energy, about 2-3% of the required amount in both countries, and the problems of navigation and flood control could have been solved by other,

cheaper means. The most important criticism against this giant plan, however, concerned its environmental effects. The dam and reservoir system threatened the drinking and underground water supply and the livelihood of the neighbouring natural habitat and the river itself stretching from the Austrian border to the middle of Hungary. Similar plans for a dam were floated in Austria at around the same time as the one on the border of the two socialist countries, but a national referendum swiftly rejected them. No referenda or public discussions were undertaken in either Czechoslovakia or Hungary (Szirmai, 1996:76).

In fact what happened was exactly the opposite. The plans were kept secret for a long time. The first limited public debates occurred only as late as May 1980 at a Conference of engineers, which soon led to further debates, even if still mainly among people connected with the subject professionally. The 400 engineers who participated in the meeting in the House of Technology voted against the project as soon as they heard about it.

Public debates, however, started only later, with the intervention of a 'non-professional', Janos Varga, who later became the well known leader of the Danube Circle. He was a biologist by profession, a journalist at the time of a biological-environmental oriented magazine, when he stumbled into the subject. Parallel to this, several local authority committees of the region questioned the viability and feasibility of the project or some technical aspects of it. Several national institutes such as the Hungarian Association of Hydrologists, the Union of Engineers and Natural Scientists, the National Office of the Protection of Nature and Environment, etc. joined the debate. Finally the Academy of Sciences, as the most prestigious scientific institution, was asked to comment on the case. The special committee of the Academy recommended the abandonment of the project or at least, if this was politically too sensitive, the alteration or delay of the existing contract with Czechoslovakia, to allow further investigations (Fleischer, 1993:432).

The clear message from many sections of the profession did not lead to the logical reaction. Instead the political leadership classified all the documents on the subject as confidential and secretly gave the go ahead to the project. The wider public was still unaware of the storm in professional circles, the media was not allowed to report about it. Not until 1984 did it become known to anyone outside the profession when a small circle of dissidents attended

a meeting where Janos Varga explained the case. Many of the professionals who had been at the meeting in the House of Technology were also present. The 'dissident' meeting turned into a movement. Those present voted for a resolution to organise a movement to raise public awareness and gain public support to put political pressure on the government and try to stop the construction.

REASONS FOR JOINING

Many professionals joined the movement in desperation. They included people who were aware of the ongoing debate and felt let down when their strong recommendation against it was ignored by the political leadership. But not only professionals were present at the meeting or joined the Danube Circle later. Some people joined because they had strong feelings towards nature generally and the Danube in particular. "In 1979-80 I heard about the dam plans and was outraged, this is why I joined the Danube Circle.." (Kemény Kálmán, p.2)

Others supported the cause following their awakening interest in environmentalism. Most importantly, however, the Danube Circle became the first national movement with wide public support, the strongest public opposition against the government's ways of conducting important decisions. It became the only social movement well before the government change of 1990 and attracted millions of sympathizers, signatures on petitions, and tens of thousands of demonstrators in front of the Parliament building. It actually reached its peak of popularity before the new regime had been established unlike any other social movement in Hungary.

"I have been an activist of the Danube Circle since the beginning of 1980s. I used to help to collect signatures for petitions and joined demonstrations. There was a major demonstration in 1987 in front of the Ministry of Environment including Austrian Green participants. The Police brutally beat up people, Hungarians and Austrians alike. After that there were demonstrations at Nagymaros and in front of the Parliament building. Finally the Nemeth government stopped the construction. Our movement was strong and influential before the regime changed." (Szalai Irén, pp.1-2.)

THE MOVEMENT PARTICIPANTS

At the original stage, in the mid 1980s, the movement participants were mostly people who were part of the so called dissident circle. They were often people with excellent academic records who had politically distanced themselves from the establishment and who were not prepared to embark on a career within it. An alternative route was to become part of the growing group of so called dissidents. The circle of dissidents was amorphous and undefined. Apart from the hard core members who were engaged in writing, editing and publishing samizdat literature, anybody could be labelled as dissident or feel a dissident if they belonged to a certain group of people who discussed political subjects on a regular, organised, club type basis and/or refused to advance their career by joining the establishment. Most of those people, who joined the original Danube Circle were dissidents in these terms.

Later, in the late 1980s, the situation changed. Many former dissidents became leading politicians. However, Danube Circle still attracted mainly well educated people as core members. Of course the demonstrations or petitions, which at their peak mobilised 40,000 people attracted a wide spectrum of the population.

THE LEADERSHIP

The leadership, just like the core members, consisted of educated people, biologists, economists, engineers, often with experience in academic work or publishing. The leadership, unlike Green Future's, was highly structured and strictly hierarchical. Of the top three, the main leader of the movement was Janos Varga. He was undoubtedly the most important and dominant character within the Danube Circle. He provoked strong emotional reaction among all participants either in positive or in negative terms. He was obviously a good example of a charismatic leader, with enormous intellectual appeal to most, but with a fairly low tolerance level towards those who engaged in disputes with him. Several crisis situations occurred during the history of the movement, always concentrating on Varga's personality and ending up with people or groups of people walking out of the movement as a result of clashes and heated debates. However, those who stuck with him and accepted his leadership style felt equally strongly and positively when talking about him. These people

were attracted to his intellectual ability, innovative views and capacity to be extremely charming (unless provoked). These movement members found him irreplaceable and were fearful of losing him whenever a crisis occurred and he threatened to resign.

CONFLICTS

Most of the conflicts in the Danube Circle occurred as a result of the above mentioned personality clashes between Varga and one or more members of the movement. As Varga was the founder of Danube Circle and had a fairly large group of supporters who remained loyal to him the conflicts always ended with the other person or persons leaving the group.

"Varga János is a very special person. He is the core and the soul of this movement. I wish there were many others like him, but at least we have got one like him. He is a very rare person. A person of his principles. He cannot be corrupted and he has a sense of political problems. He is very good at sensing the problems and acting upon them. But there was a time when he was not appreciated and wanted to leave the movement. He actually left with huge publicity and I remained the only contact person between Varga and the Danube Kör. But luckily we solved all these. He returned to the movement and is with us. It was just a short spell. It is over. I am very happy this way. I would not want to imagine this work, this movement without him." (Fejtő Julia, p.4)

As Varga has developed an enormous reputation outside the movement as well, he was courted by politicians to join or openly support them, invitations which he consistently turned down. He maintained political 'neutrality' as far as political parties went even if he was viewed as a sympathiser of the Free Democrats. He also developed an international reputation, which led to the award to him and the Danube Circle of the so called 'Alternative Nobel Prize' and a membership in countless international organisations accompanied by the interest of the western press and very generous western funding.



THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

The original aim of the Danube Circle was obvious: to stop the construction of the dam at Bos-Nagymaros. But like many other environmental movements, it too has expanded its concerns and become an environmentalist centre point. Whether it has achieved success or not is more difficult to assess. It secured a decision by the Hungarian government to halt construction for a while. As a result the two governments conducted new negotiations and searched for new alternatives. A so called C-variant of the dam, however, has been completed by the Slovak side. It also attracted directly and indirectly a strong western interest in the question leading to decisions made by the European Court in the Hague and led to conflicts strong political disagreement between the two countries.

The Danube Circle became a political force with considerable impact on both the Hungarian government's decision and on public opinion. However, it became somewhat the victim of its own success. It became such a well known movement with such an enormous circle of sympathisers that it could obviously not maintain this level of 'revolutionary' popularity over a long term. The movement members discussed the possibility of becoming a permanent political party but this was rejected. Consequently when the political turmoil settled within the country, demonstrations as vehicles of political pressure transformed into different forms of political activity, most people started to perceive the Danube Circle as a movement which had reached its peak and was on the decline.

In sum, the Danube Circle undoubtedly became Hungary's best supported environmental movement at its peak time. But a) many people demonstrated with it at the time when demonstrations were a highly popular form of political expression, b) it fought for a concrete goal of national importance which was easily identifiable for a large section of the population whether or not they had any environmental interest; and c) at the time the Danube Circle inevitably took on another role as well, which can be described as *the* opposition. Any independent movement could become a symbolic vehicle of opposition feelings towards the prevailing regime. The Danube Circle certainly performed this function very clearly at the time of its formation and through the turbulent historic period.

In view of the above conclusions what is surprising is that the Danube Circle still exists. The main reason for its continued existence is that it has transformed into a green movement with a wide range of environmental concerns. The other reason, as in the case of Green Future, lay in the 'human factor'. The activists of the Danube Circle gained a lot of experience, developed a strong interest well beyond the problems of the river, and the environment became the focus of their attention. The problem of the Danube itself has not been solved either, the 'C-variant' has been completed, damaging the environment, and continues to cause concern to both the population and the movement activists.

THE AIR GROUP

The second example of a national movement is the Air Group. It certainly differs from the case of Danube Circle in that it was not around as early as the Danube Circle and did not have the chance to become a 'dissident movement' in the same way as the Danube Circle. The Air Group achieved its biggest success at the time when many students of social movements studying Eastern Europe were already talking about the disappearance of environmental movements in Eastern Europe.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

The Air Group also came into existence during the turbulent years of 1988-90. Prior to its formation there were three clubs, two of which were university clubs, (the Green Club of the Technical University and the Environmental Club of the Eötvös Loránd University plus the Environmental Club of the Esperanto Union) which can be viewed as the predecessors of the present movement. The Air Group's founders were all members of these clubs, came together as activists in them and decided to found the Air Group.

REASONS FOR JOINING

The people who joined the Air Group felt sympathetic to the concern of the founding members about the high concentration of pollutants in the air, especially in major cities, and generally in the country. The movement participants were, again, mostly highly educated people. This was partly because its predecessors were university clubs but partly because this

movement too was happier to attract people who were specialists in the analysis of air pollution or health-related problems. But as the movement grew so did the range of its participants and it started to accommodate a wide section of the population regardless of their education level. The core, though remained well educated.

"I am a founding member of the Air Group. First we had mainly students among us. Our love towards nature was the basis of our commitment to the group. Then we turned our attention to the problems of air pollution in the cities. First we did measurements in the university labs as a kind of practical. Later we decided to organise ourselves as a social movement. We became more political: started to lobby and petition the government. This was from 1988" (Nagy Andrea, pp.2-3).

THE LEADERSHIP

The leader of the Air Group is a geophysicist. He could not be more dissimilar in character from Janos Varga. He, too, was a charismatic leader but has a much more peaceful character and a much calmer style of leadership. He is well respected by the group members.

THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

The Air Group came into existence, unlike the two movements described earlier, with two aims right from the beginning. It had both a concrete goal and a wider agenda. The concrete goal was to achieve cleaner air by reducing private traffic, improving the quality of public buses and providing proper facilities for cycling. The wider aim was to combine environmental forces by attracting existing members of environmental groups scattered around the country and the city who were acting fairly independently from each other. These aims were taken right from the very beginning as conscious objectives, unlike the case of the other two movements where the idea of widening the movement's concern from a concrete goal to a more embracing general environmentalist approach developed at a later stage, almost as a survival tactic. (See about this argument in detail in Chapter 6.)

SUCCESS

The most important reason choosing to focus on the Air Group lies in the nature of its success. It achieved an unprecedented popularity way beyond its circle of sympathisers at a time when most environmental movements had already achieved their concrete, short-term goals and had arrived at their second stage, transforming into a movement concerned with more general environmental interests. The Air Group managed to gain popularity at a time when the political excitement of the very first years had calmed down. Its popularity is surprising considering that neither of its aims suggest any spectacular attraction beyond the small circle of the environmentally active section of the population. But the Air Group managed to become the best known and the most popular environmental movement in recent times. It came into the centre of interest well after the decline of the Danube Circle. The reasons for its popularity differ fundamentally from those of the Danube Circle. It is not engaged in 'oppositional' roles on the political platform, nor does it pursue particular national interests. The reason for its popularity lies in the fact that it has struck a chord with the growing environmental awareness in the population. The many environmental groups which paved the way for Air Group have educated people and consequently have achieved one of their most ambitious aims: to raise environmental awareness among the population. When Air Group started to publicise their demands they were talking to a public which was already much more open to the subject than their predecessors' 'audience'. The Air Group made people suddenly feel that they were indeed suffocating in the highly polluted cities and joined the Group monitoring the air in urban areas. When this was achieved and the measurements were made public, people's opinion became very supportive helping the Air Group to pursue its aims. It managed to achieve an unprecedented governmental decision, according to which a special environmental tax was introduced, on top of the normal state tax, on every litre of petrol exclusively to finance environmental projects. The Air Group's aim was to a) penalise road users for not choosing alternative means of transport, b) to reduce car-traffic by raising petrol prices and hence ease one of the main sources of air pollution in urban areas and c) to create a special fund for environmental purposes. This tax was introduced with wide public support instead of resentment as is usual for new taxes. Further taxes were pressed for by the Air Group to penalise other road users, such as trucks, but the petrol tax hit the population directly and yet was accepted as a result of the Air Group's popularity.

"I consider the biggest of our successes that people started to think differently about the environment and the issues of pollution. Secondly, that we achieved changes in the legislation. The environmental tax is a tremendous success but there is a lot more to do. We regard every step as a success and see our task as a continuous long term duty." (Mizsei Jozsef, p.19)

MEDIA

Publicity played a vital role in the movement's rapidly growing popularity. The Air Group activists were clever enough to turn to companies whose interest coincided with their efforts, such as, for example the biggest public transport company running Budapest's transport services. These companies agreed to finance leaflets and flyers and place them on their own boards inside and outside the buses, trams, etc. publicising the Air Group's recommendation that people should use more public transport facilities and leave their cars at home. The publicity campaign made the Group known everywhere and their innovative ideas gained the media's support as well. They also publish their own magazine called 'Breath'. As their publicity grew so did the numbers of sponsors and the strength of these made them more influential in their parliamentary lobbying.

To sum up, the Air Group's successful existence in a 'second' stage of development of social movements in Hungary, after the first period of the historic changes, is clearly the result of its innovative way of adapting to new circumstances. They found a new approach for an Eastern European movement, persuading a company to advertise their messages, thus environmental interest was combined with business interest, namely to achieve fresher air in a suffocating city by using public transport instead of private cars. They also recognised right from the beginning that short and long term aims can and should be combined for an environmental movement. Finally they became popular at a time when Hungarians were becoming more aware of environmental problems, and becoming more responsive to social movements' persuasion.

MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL: REFLEX

Finally we consider an environmental movement outside Budapest. With its 2 million inhabitants the Hungarian capital is disproportionate in size to the total population of ten million, and like many capitals, plays a decisive role in the life of the country. It is also the capital of a society which was overcentralised in its socialist period. The result is that many national organisations end up being located in Budapest and develop a Budapest-centred view. But 80% of the population lives outside the capital and one cannot simply ignore this. According to the literature numerous environmental groups exist in the provinces (Juhász, 1993) as well. To pay attention to environmental movements outside Budapest is therefore relevant.

Reflex is a movement which is located in Győr, one of the five largest cities in the country, in the north western part of Hungary. It is a city with a strong tradition of theatre and ballet as well as being an important industrial centre. It is a city which is, geographically speaking, closer to the Austrian border than to Budapest.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

Reflex is actually almost as old as the Danube Circle, as it started its activities in 1985. But it differs from it in that it was not organised around any concrete objective at the time of its foundation. It came into existence by the decision of 11 people, who knew each other previously and shared a strong environmental concern. Many of the founding members were working in the Environmental Office of the local authority at the time and felt frustrated by the lack of possible action within the frame of an 'overbureaucratised' state office, as they put it, where no actual work was demanded from them. Most of them were in their early 30s and were educated as biologists, environmental engineers, chemists and hydrologists.

THE MOVEMENT PARTICIPANTS

There were 400-500 members who formally registered with the movement and regularly paid their membership fees. Forty to fifty of them were activists who participated in the movement on a regular basis. The circle of sympathizers, who regularly signed petitions for them, was large, around 10,000 people. Considering that the whole town only has a population of 300,000 this is a proportionately large circle.

Half of the movement participants were young, below 25, and both sexes were equally represented among them. But the leadership was predominantly male. Only one female leader was among them. Reflex paid a lot of attention to activities outside the city, in the rural areas and small villages, where environmentalism was far less developed than in urban middle class areas and the population was usually older. They gained a considerable reputation in the region and were regularly invited to village meetings to participate in debates regarding local interests and highlight environmental aspects. Some issues occasionally created difficult dilemmas between them and the locals, as when they advised the locals against a new road being built between two villages through a nature reserve, while the locals preferred, perhaps understandably, to concentrate on the advantages of a new road. On the whole though, they were successful in recruiting people or winning their sympathy.

THE LEADERSHIP

The leadership consisted of seven members, one of whom was elected as president. They were mainly the original core members, though some have left to pursue political careers. The president has been the same person since 1987, except for one year, when someone else was elected for the job. Elections took place yearly. The leadership was remarkably friendly with each other. They have been working together for a number of years now, surviving crucial regime changes, and yet they have only experienced a few internal conflicts.

CONFLICTS

But the peaceful and constructive reputation concerning within the movement did not mean that it had no enemies. The local government has had only one consistent characteristic through the crucial regime change: to remain consistently antagonistic and hostile towards the Reflex movement. They viewed them as potential enemies on many questions and developed a competitive attitude towards them. This is not typical in the Hungarian context where local authorities are usually responsive and offer some sort of co-operation with the environmental movements. (See Chapter 7 discussing the function and behaviour of local and national authorities towards social movements.) The local authority, like the national government, of course went through radical political changes during this period. But its antagonistic attitude remained unchanged.

However, not all 'official' bodies were or are antagonistic towards the movement. In the Communist period as well as since there were organisations which offered cooperation with them. In the 1980s it was the Young Communist League (KISZ) and the Hazafias Nepfront (National Popular Front) which expressed their readiness to embrace them and in the 1990s the newly born political parties wished to be associated with Reflex, because of its good reputation in the region. But all these approaches were turned down and there was a conscious effort to maintain political independence and a global environmental interest. Among those turned down was the Green Party itself. This is because the movement maintained strong 'anti-party' views, and wanted to keep the movement outside the party political framework rather than affiliate with any political party including the Greens. Individual members of the movement did of course have individual preferences towards one or other main political party. They even advocated accepting anybody's membership independent of their personal political views. The idea of political 'independence' only referred to the movement as a whole.

THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

Reflex's primary focus is global environmental education.

"Our actions are mainly to draw people's attention to certain things. To make people aware of the environmental dangers. We organised a day of the 'Earth and People' and other similar events. We tried to explain people where the economy and political bias lead us in terms of the environment. I value the most in our work educating young people. We have done that ever since we started to be together. We put a lot of emphasis on educating people. We use posters, organise children's clubs, street demonstrations and many other ways." (Balint Csaba, p.4)

They have many young participants because they concentrate on educating people through schools, lectures and the production of publications. Students and secondary school pupils started to develop an environmental interest after coming across Reflex's lectures and developing the relationship into activism through these channels. The fact that the leaders

themselves were fairly young helped them appeal to the younger generation. Another important factor was that many of them were either former teachers themselves or had a diploma in education. Interestingly enough, however, Reflex also developed concrete demands at a later stage. Unlike other movements, Reflex had started off with strong abstract views and developed concrete objectives later.

SUCCESS

One of these concrete aims has been achieved. Reflex suggested a ban on all cars in the central shopping area of Győr city and achieved it. The other successful outcome related to a road traffic diversion. A new, major motorway construction was taking place outside the city for which all road traffic, including construction traffic went through the city. They managed to impose a ban on trucks 3 tonnes and larger driving through the city. They were also successful in persuading the city to improve recycling and at the same time educating the population to use the facility.

Where of course neither they nor other movements achieved full success was the Danube dam question. As the dam is actually located in their region, they obviously took sides in the matter, strongly supporting the Danube Circle. It is interesting to point out here that a) Reflex was not founded because of the Danube dam project. At the time when Reflex was founded in 1985-86 they hardly knew about it given the lack of information available to the larger public outside the profession and the 'dissident circles', b) they had never 'claimed' any special rights over the Dam issue, even though it was geographically very close to them and damaging their region, and c) they had never felt any competitive or antagonistic feelings towards the Danube Circle, which gained all the national publicity and fame over the matter at that time⁴. And Reflex not only did not get fame but even jeopardised itself locally by provoking the local government which disliked Reflex's open and unconditional support for the Danube Circle and that it went to demonstrate with them side by side.

MEDIA

⁴Interestingly enough Reflex is still a stronger and more popular environmental movement than ever while the Danube Circle has declined.

The local authority even mobilised a part of the local press which they could influence against Reflex. This, the largest local paper, *Kisalföld*⁵, ran a series openly attacking Reflex's attitude on the Danube question, supporting the local council's view which favoured the construction. But this paper was not the only local medium and national papers were also very favourable towards the movement as well as the part of the local media which was not influenced by the local authority. The Reflex group frequently appeared in the most important national papers as well as television (local and national) and radio.

"The contact with the media is extremely important because the role of the media is to inform the wider population. And the media is the best tool for us to reach the widest circle of people... We have never had any trouble contacting the press, the radio or TV. More and more frequently the journalists themselves seek to get information from us in order to report about us. Thus most of the time our relationship with them is very positive." (Szűcs Gábor, p.10).

In fact their fame went even further than the country's boundaries. Reflex developed fruitful contacts with several international organisations, from Austria and the Czech Republic to Denmark and had frequent contacts, cooperation and substantial funding from internationally financed projects. This improved their arsenal of laboratory equipment as well as helping finance their activities.

In sum, one striking feature of Reflex is the remarkable continuity in its long term activity. Half of its 'career' was spent at a time when very few environmental groups operated in Hungary, and it maintained their activities, virtually unchanged, in the new political circumstances. The other important point is that Reflex put the problem of global environmentalism before any concrete issues when it was established: 'at the time we felt we should concentrate on long term plans. Environmental changes take a long period to bring about.' (Szűcs Gábor, p.2) and concentrated their efforts on educating people, especially the younger generation which did not of course prevent them later from embarking on concrete

⁵ The name of the region.

actions.

And finally it is important to draw attention to activities of social movements outside the dominating capital. This proves that social movements are not confined to the centre. More than this, Reflex actually seemed to develop a particularly international profile in two respects. Its concrete contacts with Danish, Czech and Austrian colleagues turned out to be very fruitful for the movement. But secondly Reflex actually shows a more 'developed', German-like approach to environmentalism. They seemed to be more informed and influenced by the more abstract environmentalist ideas which developed mainly in German speaking territories, than any other movement. They did not come together as a result of a concrete urge but on an unusually wide, long term and abstract basis, which is not typical in the Hungarian context.

To conclude the case studies, we have described four different environmental movements, all of which existed in Hungary in the early 1990s. Some had a history going back to the 1980s (the Danube Circle, Reflex) another came into existence with the 'tide' of rapid political changes during the change of the regime itself (Air Group). The fourth movement in question became the best known in Hungary at the time when others, such as the Danube Circle were already on the decline. Some of these movements are local (Green Future, Reflex), representing a particular district or region of the country and others are national (Danube Circle, Air Group).

There are a number of environmental movements apart from the ones we have chosen to describe in detail, which would be equally interesting to analyse and perhaps should be at least mentioned at this stage. In the next part of this chapter, analysing Hungarian environmental movements, we will build on the description of the movements above but we will also use some of the information which we learned from the experiences of other movements. Among them a local environmental movement, in a village, called Ófalu, in South-Western Hungary, which successfully fought against a national government plan to building a nuclear waste storage site just outside the tiny village, which has been documented by Juhász et al. (1993:227-248). Another local movement, in Buda, called the Fadrusz street movement, is still fighting. It wants to stop the government's plan to build a new bridge in

the South of Budapest which would channel more heavy traffic in to the area. Thirdly, we did not choose to analyse the only social movement in Hungary which is attached to a political party. This is the movement of Socialist Greens. It is so peculiar in its attachment to a political party that it is atypical of the overwhelming majority of social movements which specifically avoid being associated with political parties. Hence we did not feel it appropriate to chose it. The information, however, deriving from our fairly detailed knowledge of these movements, as well as those detailed in the main part of this chapter, will be used in the next chapter which will analyse the major characteristics of Hungarian environmental movements.

The environmental movements we presented therefore were carefully chosen to represent different types of movements which are typical for Hungary. Here we have only introduced them by describing the different characteristics of the movements from their origin through their participants and leaders, the different conflicts which occurred among them and the role of the media in connection with the movement. We now turn to the analysis of the environmental movements in Hungary.

AN ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN HUNGARY

The emergence of the current environmental movements can be traced back to the 'euphoric' period of 1988 except for the above mentioned pioneering exceptions which came into existence a few years earlier (Danube Circle, Reflex).

THE PARTICIPANTS

The participants in the environmental movements, whether they were local or national, came from a particular group of society. They are mostly educated people, often with degrees in natural science. The core of educated people is often joined by housewives and retired people, and many environmental movements pay special attention to the younger generation, including those of school age. The age range therefore runs from students, or even secondary school pupils to the retired, but the most active members are often middle aged. The

proportion of women in environmental movements is very high, in fact they often constitute the majority of participants.

When asked specifically, most activists described their movements as "mixed, containing a wide variety of people" from the unskilled worker to the retired manager, but in fact well educated people are generally more valued by the movements as they are looked upon as potential experts who can contribute to tackling difficult and special matters, such as legal, scientific, etc.

Those who joined environmental movements right at the start could have two reasons for seeking participation a) political reasons and b) environmental reasons. A number of activists attached themselves to environmental movements as forums of political activity but as soon as political parties became legal and active they left the movements seeking political careers in political parties and sometimes consequently in the government or in the civil service. "We as a social movement were acting politically speaking as catalysts. Many people joined us at the beginning because it was a political action, a form of opposition" - argued an activist (Bihari Katalin, p.6). The majority of movement participants, on the other hand, saw themselves as environmentalists whose role was to support a non-party, non-governmental organisation: "We, those people who are involved in environmental movements, believe that social movements belong to the domain of civil society and should not be confused with party politics. They are two different things" (Varjú Margit, p.4.). This type of participant stayed on in the movements as loyal activists.

Movement participants consist of three circles. Firstly there is a core of the most active members, typically around a dozen people, who devote most of their time and energy outside work to the movement. If the movement's financial situation allows, some of these core members become full or part-time paid staff members.

The second circle is the group of activists who cooperate on a regular basis and are often registered members of the movement. They often pay a symbolic membership fee as well. This circle can number from around 50 up to 300 people. The third circle is a larger group of people who are ready to participate in demonstrations to express their support for the

movement, numbering often a few thousand people. Beyond these circles are the sympathizers. The movements usually find it difficult to estimate their numbers, it is only at election periods or other major events when it becomes clear how many people sympathise with the movement among the otherwise passive section of the population. This number could run up to tens of thousands of people.

THE MOVEMENT LEADERS

The movement leaders are a frequently discussed question in the theoretical literature. The resource mobilisation theory argues that they are mostly well educated and higher positioned individuals with a strong motivation towards upward social mobility which many seemed to achieve by simply becoming movement leaders (Oberschall, 1973:146-177; Zald and Garner 1987:135-139). The Collective Behaviour school emphasised that socio-economic position on its own is not enough to lead a group of people; personal attributes of leaders, such as personal charisma are necessary too. Leaders who were well accepted, liked and respected for their expertise maintained the movement successfully (Smelser, 1962:253; 297-298; Killian and Turner, 1972:349-350; 388-397). Both schools assume a hierarchical type of leadership with one particular person as the main leader. New Social Movement theorists, on the other hand, emphasise group leadership with carefully divided responsibilities which are discussed and decided by the collective leadership on a regular basis. The tasks are delegated to the right person in the light of the different skills and personal characteristics of the different members within the collective leadership. In this kind of leadership it is the duty of the entire leadership to maintain a good relationship with the wider circle of activists to achieve solidarity. New Social Movement writers also emphasise the special role of middle class, well educated people in new social movements such as environmental ones (Offe, 1985:831-835; Brand, 1990:26).

In the Hungarian case we see examples supporting all three arguments in different cases. The leaders of movements are overwhelmingly well educated people in every case. Even if the movement itself attracts a fairly wide range of people in socio-economic terms, the leaders themselves are selected from those with the most expertise in some subject. There was no exception to this tendency. The leaders also see their position as an achievement in social

mobility terms.

A wide spectrum of different age groups were represented among the activists but the leaders were usually middle aged. As mentioned above, women's participation in environmental movements is very high, but when it comes to leadership the different groups have shown different patterns. The Danube Circle, the Air Group and the Reflex group had a male dominated leadership, but the Green Future and other groups such as the Fadrusz Street movement and the Green Socialists had women leaders. Women therefore, though as well represented in the leadership as their proportion in the membership would suggest, and in at least half of the movements are significantly left out, are chosen as leaders in a number of cases. Women's participation in the public sphere and political parties all over East Central Europe has decreased radically and the level of female political representation has fallen drastically as Barbara Einhorn (1993:35) and Olga Voronina (1994:32) point out. The trends in women's participation in environmental movements in Hungary both support and contradict this picture as women participate at a high level but are not proportionally represented among the leaders.

Among the movements with hierarchical leadership the leaders' personal characteristics were looked upon as fundamental elements, charisma and expertise were the two most important ones (Danube Circle, Air Group). In groups where the leadership was collective (Green Future) New Social Movements' findings could be applied, the right person carried out the right task and movement solidarity was achieved by the entire leadership.

The role of leaders was essential in any case in the survival of the movement. They had to be resourceful, full of initiatives, good organisers, respected persons, good negotiators vis-a-vis the authorities, and good at relations with movement members and with the public. Whether this was achieved on a hierarchical basis or collectively it did not make much difference from the point of view of survival. Social movements do not reward activists in materialistic terms. One of the rewards they can offer in return for many hours of voluntary activities is personal relationships, a certain feeling of 'belonging'. Social movement leaders had to be skilful in handling and managing people well by creating an atmosphere which was attractive enough to keep the participants together. Most surviving environmental movement

leaders showed a remarkable talent in achieving this.

THE MOVEMENTS' GOALS

Hungarian environmental movements mostly came into existence because of a particular, concrete goal they wanted to accomplish: to stop a major project on the Danube (Danube Circle), clean the badly polluted air (Air Group), divert traffic and stop bridge construction (Fadrusz Street), prevent a nuclear waste dump (Ofalu, Baranya), close down a polluting factory and divert a motorway route (Green Future). Even movements which originally had no concrete objective developed one in the course of their actions (pedestrianisation in the town centre, traffic diversion, protest against the Danube dam (Reflex)). Whether these goals were achieved fully, partially or not at all, most movements came to the conclusion that their concrete objectives, which often were 'not in my backyard' type claims, were fairly narrow and not political enough in a wider sense. Though movement members have diverse political views in terms of party political affiliation, there was a consensus among most environmental movements that becoming more ecological in general terms and simultaneously more political was the right way ahead for the movement's development. Those movements which originally had only concrete goals widened their horizons and became environmentally interested green movements (Green Future, Fadrusz Street, Danube Circle) while other groups adopted a wider, green agenda from the start (Air Group, Reflex). As a result all surviving environmental groups became more political pursuing a strong environmentalist agenda, even if it meant a change in the course of their development from simple protest group to a strong political movement. Conversely, those 'not in my backyard' type protest groups which did not become interested in converting into environmental movements with a wide range of green interest died out, out even if they achieved their concrete goal (Ofalu, Baranya).

The question is whether surviving movements followed the route of institutionalisation and professionalisation in the course of their changing character, as is often observed in western examples? In the case of environmental movements in Hungary there is no evidence of this. It is true that professionals are especially sought in movements but any person with the right personal qualities is welcome. The fact that movements were on occasions funded from

government funds did not necessarily led to 'institutionalisation'. It only allowed them to employ a few activists for moderate fees, based on short-term contracts and on a very insecure financial basis. No political strings were, however, attached to these governments funds which were allocated by all-party based parliamentary committees. Two other reasons why institutionalisation did not take place were that movements maintained a strong principle of independence even from political groups, let alone bureaucratic organisations, and the authorities did not attempt to incorporate them either. (The question of the authorities' relations with the movements, including conflicts with them, will be discussed in Chapter 7.)

CONFLICTS

Conflicts are essential parts of social movements as they always challenge something in the existing system. Conflicts can be internal as well as external. The two types of conflicts can also relate to each other. The very origin of a movement is usually based on external conflicts which can pull movement participants together in the first place. They can add to the group's cohesion by strengthening it but can also tear the movement apart. In our description of the different cases of Hungarian environmental movements in the earlier part of this chapter we have shown examples of both cases, sometimes within the same movement. In this chapter we will concentrate on internal conflicts and Chapter 7 will deal with the movements' conflicts with outside bodies, such as authorities.

Examples of internal conflicts were given earlier in this chapter when we described for example one of the local movements in the outskirts of Budapest, the Green Future group. Having achieved the closure of a huge chemical plant Green Future first experienced a sort of euphoria which had a strong cohesive effect on the movement but did not prevent conflicts from developing among the activists a little later:

"We were united with some kind of 'fanaticism' when we heard about the closure of the chemical plant. But unfortunately later there were conflicts among us. Personal antipathy, which was concealed by the group's success, led to some internal conflicts. A financial windfall also caused conflicts and led to accusations among us about whether any of us had mishandled the

money." (Hársfalvi Ágnes, p.12)

There were frequent rivalries and personal conflicts within the Danube Circle as well. Again, both success and failure contributed to them or triggered them. Personal conflicts developed among the leaders after they were awarded the 'Alternative Nobel-Prize' and again when the movement was at its zenith of popularity. Similarly, the loss of hope of achieving the total abandonment of the construction of the dam provoked conflicts, too. Most of the movements, however, learned to deal with conflicts and absorbed them. In some cases this even united them (Ófalu). Personal conflicts were either avoided or kept at bay in most movements (Reflex, Air, Fadrusz street).

One major potential source of antipathy was political. At the time when most movements came into existence political parties were still in an embryonic state. The common feeling of opposition towards the regime was the most characteristic element both in the movements and the new political parties. But as the political parties developed so did movement members' affiliation with them, which became very diverse. This, however, did not lead to direct conflicts among them. All movements emphasised and practised great tolerance regarding members' political views, although it should perhaps be mentioned that no movements faced far right political views among their members as was the case in Russia (see Chapter 6). Political diversity did not constitute a problem in any of the Hungarian cases.

SUCCESS

When political parties think of success it is always related to their popularity in opinion polls and ultimately electoral success. As social movements do not aim to win elections they think of success in different terms which are more difficult to define or measure. Social movements aim to achieve goals, which could be short or long term, or both. The most tangible success of course is when a movement manages to close a factory, stop a road being built, divert traffic, increase petrol tax, change a major project or stop a nuclear waste dump being opened near them. These have been achieved by many movements (Green Future, Reflex, Air Group, Danube Circle, Ófalu movement) in Hungary. However, movements with broad

general goals are more likely to survive, it was argued, than those with specific goals which could vanish following success (Zald and Garner, 1987:129-132). Environmental movements in Hungary confirm this argument in two respects. Firstly, it is true that the only movements which survived for a longer period were those which broadened their goals and became environmental movements with a wide ranging green agenda. Those which achieved quick success but did not 'mutate' stopped existing right after they achieved success (Ofalu movement). Secondly, this connection has been recognised by the movements themselves. Having become aware of the potential constraints of having a too narrowly defined goal, as when movements were set up around a concrete grievance, many of the movements widened their interest to secure their own survival, as discussed earlier, in order to not to become victims of their own short term successes (Green Future, Danube Circle). Some movements came into existence with both a broad and a concrete aim from the start and when they achieved success it was not perceived as a reason to disband but as one of the many aims to be achieved over a long term (Air, Reflex).

A recent paradigm, the cognitive approach, has been applied specifically to environmental movements and sees success in terms of the movement's capacity to spread environmental consciousness (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:ch.2 and 3). The movements which transformed themselves into long term, more general green movements, which form the majority of movements in Hungary, viewed success in the terms identified by writers using the cognitive approach. Environmental awareness, educating people generally and young people especially, was or became a central focus of environmental movements (Green Future, Reflex, Air, Danube Circle, Fadrusz street, Green Socialists). Changing attitudes towards environmentalism as a whole was perceived as success. "The most important success in my eyes is the fact that people's perception has changed tremendously. People look at nature, environment, environmental questions, waste, etc. differently" (Utassy Éva, p.15).

Another aspect of changing attitudes as part of success is the fact that ordinary people are able to stand up for themselves and represent their own views, which was emphasised by Hungarian movement activists. It was also important for them that the movements established a strong reputation and are respected by major political parties, the government, local authorities and the public. No political party could ignore successful environmental

movements even if environmentalism was not part of their agenda. Environmental movements became very successful in influencing public opinion. It became politically wiser to deal with them by consulting them and taking their ideas into account. Even if environmental movements do not participate in elections directly their presence is important in indirect terms. If a local environmental movement chooses to support a candidate within a constituency during local or national elections this has an effect on the outcome of the election. The MP elected in the district where Green Future operates was voted for on the basis of his strong environmentalist views, and Reflex sent a green representative to the county assembly in the most recent local elections (December 1994).

But most importantly environmental movements became centres which the local population could turn to if they came across any kind of environmental grievances. People learned to organise themselves and collectively pursue environmental issues, which was not the case in the mid 1980s, when as explained earlier, people saw the solution to environmental problems as either lying with the 'almighty' state or to be approached individually.

Movements often see their role as to change legislation or the institutional process of decision-making (Jenkins, 1985:xii-xiii and p. 543). Only popular and nationally acknowledged movements can achieve changes in legislation (Air Group) or government decision (Danube Circle), but local movements can also achieve success when taking on the government (Green Future, Ófalu movement).

Thus success can be seen in several different forms ranging from concrete, tangible achievements to more long term success. Hungarian environmental activists considered long term success, such as educating the population to think 'green' or to stand up for themselves collectively, as often more important than any concrete victory, which could even mean the end of the movement.

MEDIA

It is clearly recognised by the movements that being reported on in the local and national media is beneficial. It helps them to achieve the fame and popularity they need to

successfully put pressure on the authorities. The media provides the widest communication channel for the movements. However, the media is influenced by its own interests which can cause harm as well as help. Journalists appear when they wish to report about a subject and present movements in the light of their own agenda which can be misleading. Also the media often sensationalises cases or portrays the scandalous aspect of cases.

Nevertheless all environmental movements emphasised that having been reported on by the media is on balance more beneficial than remaining unknown to the public. Local movements can be especially grateful for achieving national fame via the national media which equips them with a lot more power than if they were only featured in local papers. Communication with their 'constituency' is more useful, on the other hand, by appearing in local cable television as well as local papers (Reflex, Green Future). Publicity by advertising on public transport vehicles was the basis of the fame of Air Group. This was a new approach in two ways: by utilising business interest (the public transport company in Budapest) and by using publicity. These were well recognised by this environmental movement and achieved the desired effect.

Appearing in the media on a regular basis replaced the 'old fashioned' method of demonstrations, which were so popular and powerful in 1989-90. Social movements were finding it increasingly difficult to mobilise masses for demonstrations in order to put pressure on local or national governments. Since the heroic times it is the media which can achieve the same effect. The media can of course be openly antagonistic to the environmental movement and support the views of the authorities. This happened in the case of Reflex, when the local paper supported the local council against the movement. This, however, was a fairly isolated case in Hungary. Generally speaking the Hungarian media is a) interested in environmental matters and b) supports environmental movements in their efforts. Most activists felt that they had a very good relationship with the journalists who regularly came to report about them and did not have to make much effort to be reported on by the national or local press, television or radio stations. In addition most of the movements wrote and distributed their own publications in order to gain publicity, on their activities and aims and to encourage people to join or sympathize with them.

CONCLUSION

Environmental movements in Hungary developed at a fairly late stage. Considering the fairly liberal political situation in the country which developed from 1968 and gradually led to major reforms in the economy as well as tolerating more 'constructive' criticism than in any other socialist society it is surprising that civil initiatives were so scarce. The reason lies in the prevailing ideology which did not allow the organisation of social movements and diverted people's interests towards individual materialistic achievements. This unusual policy, as mentioned earlier, was deeply rooted in fear of a repetition of the 1956 events. As a result Hungary became the society in the eastern bloc with the highest level of private wealth and living standards but with a very low level of opposition movements. Thus the more liberal political atmosphere only translated into individualistic actions as far as the overwhelming majority of the population was concerned, and organised movements, including environmental ones, became widespread only in the late 1980s. Even though environmental awareness developed fairly early, from the late 1970s, due to Hungary's limited isolation from the 'west', the public only relied on either solutions organised from the top or solving problems individually. The idea of non-governmental organisations as an option for expressing public awareness and pressing for solution was absent.

At the time when the one-party system started to dissolve and the opposition parties appeared on the scene in an embryonic form and the so called 'Round table' negotiations were initiated social movements also appeared in the scene mushrooming in their thousands within a very short period (1988-89). Many of those which came into existence then still exist. Originally most of them were organised around concrete goals. In order to survive, however, the short-term goals had to be widened. The broadened horizon of the movements took on board wider aims than 'not in my backyard' objectives.

Consequently both educating the population to raise environmental consciousness and to strengthen politically became important aims of the movements. Concrete goals were not abandoned but became part of the objectives. Once they were achieved new goals were adopted. Environmental movements in Hungary also achieved political respect. The absence of successful green political parties also contributed to the movements' political strength.

They have direct or indirect influence on the major (non-green) political parties in the sense that where there is an environmental movement the local political representatives have to express a clear view on environmental issues and rarely win without supporting green issues. Most of the major political parties, however, do not consider environmentalism as their most important problem, not even the party which itself has an affiliated green movement (Green Socialists) and being in power since 1994 could have done a lot more to enhance green matters in Hungary. Nevertheless environmental movements do a valuable job in changing the Hungarian population's attitudes towards green matters by drawing attention to them and keeping them on the agenda as well as achieving concrete aims. We now turn to the Russian environmental movements.

CHAPTER 6

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN RUSSIA

The previous chapter analysed Hungarian environmental movements, firstly describing them and then evaluating them. This chapter will describe and evaluate Russian environmental movements. The chapter falls into several parts. Firstly, I shall examine the causes of environmental problems and whether there is a growing awareness concerning environmental issues in Russia. Then I will look at the origin of environmentalism in Russia, the different ecological concepts prior to the Soviet period and under socialism. The third part of the chapter will describe several existing movements which all came into existence in the late 1980s. Finally, I will analyse the situation of Russian environmental movements in order to evaluate them.

INTRODUCTION

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IDEAS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Industrialisation in the Soviet Union was pursued on an even larger scale and for a longer period than in Hungary or any other Eastern European socialist country. The basis of the ideology was similar to that in Hungary, and had its origin in the Soviet Union. Both the Marxist approach and the cold war constraints were primarily Soviet ideas and have been executed to a large extent. The Soviet Union being a country of enormous physical size had a much larger land area with forests and other uncultivated areas than other Eastern European countries. This vast natural site and the cultural value attached to it led to a romantic attitude towards the natural environment, which was not the case in Hungary. A good example of this is popular literature which expresses great distress at the deforestation and the shrinking area of natural beauty in Soviet Russia.

Environmental ideas, which developed in the western industrialised world, did not reach the Soviet Union to the extent they influenced Central-Eastern European societies because the Soviet Union was a lot more isolated from the west. The upsurge of environmental concern

in the 1970s in the developed world was virtually unknown in Russia. The political and economic situation was also different from the Hungarian case. The reform 'winds' of the short-lived Khrushchevian period were reversed under Brezhnev and living standards remained much lower than in Hungary. The accumulation of private wealth was not encouraged at all, the second economy was not legalised, and ideology gave priority to communal as opposed to individual thinking. At the time when 'subbotniki' in Hungary were long forgotten, in Brezhnev's Soviet Union they were still being widely pursued as ways of encouraging people to do more 'voluntary' work for their community in their spare time. The official collectivism implemented through the strong grip of the local party apparatus did not, however, succeed in achieving its aim and by the first half of the 1980s there was evidence suggesting that the ideology did not work. A study investigating work and leisure activities in 1984 concluded that the majority of the urban population were tired and apathetic, and they felt they had exhausted their moral and physical resources (Abankina, 1986 quoted in Yanitsky, 1993b:132) seventy five per cent of the respondents were very pessimistic, and felt they could not hope for any changes in their lifetime. The respondents felt they had no strength to implement changes individually and there was also a decline in interest in work. Instead various forms of escape were on the increase (retreat into private life, migration in search of higher wages, alcoholism, drug abuse, etc.). Faith in the values of socialist ideology was disappearing leading to an ideological vacuum and psychological tension (Yanitsky, 1993b:132).

Environmental consciousness developed only very slowly, even though the Soviet Union experienced the biggest man-made environmental catastrophe in Chernobyl in 1986. A survey conducted in 1989 (Doktorov et al., 1993:252) found that low income, inflation, shortage of food and consumer goods, and housing problems worried people more than environmental issues, and that environmental problems came only fifth in the list of the most acute problems which aroused people's concern. Environmental problems preceded in people's opinion concern over other burning social problems such as bureaucracy, corruption, low standards of medical service, ethnic conflicts, degradation of public morality, etc. Even though environmental issues were not the most important concern for the population they were mentioned, according to Doktorov's 1989 survey, among the first five alarming social issues. It is not surprising therefore that the survey also found that 85 to 90 % of the population

were concerned and worried about the ecological situation of the country (Doctorov, 1993:252). In other words the overwhelming majority of the population was concerned but they did not find environmental problems the most important problems in their life.

ENVIRONMENTALISM IN RUSSIA

Environmentalism in Russia goes back to the pre-Soviet period. By the time of the revolution in 1917 a modest conservation movement was already established. The need for nature protection was recognised by journals, societies, a quasi-governmental commission and an informal network of professionals. Weiner (1988:Ch.2) identified three basic positions among conservationists: pastoralist, ecological and utilitarian.

The pastoralist view was antimodernist and repelled by modern industrialism. It sought to return to an idealised agrarian golden age. Humans were viewed as 'children of nature' and it was argued that the 'industrial human' had become denatured. They saw contemporary humankind as a pathological element which disrupts the preexisting harmony of nature. The Russian pastoralist view was deeply influenced by German neo-romanticism. The strong German patriotic accent was also influential on the Russian pastoralists.

The second early position was the ecological view, which was strongly materialistic in contrast to the pastoralist one. Followers of the ecological view were also deeply worried about the consequences for civilisation, the breakdown of the natural eco-system, but on an anthropocentric basis. They argued for strong policies in economic matters and resource use. The group consisted of natural scientists almost exclusively. In the early Bolshevik period enlightened leaders, such as A.V. Lunacharskiy, supported the ecologists but later the Stalinist technocrats turned against them. The early ecologists were politically progressive in their views but rooted in their philosophy was a strong element of protest against the emerging new order in which in the name of collectivization intellectual autonomy could be lost. Nevertheless the early Bolshevik period encouraged and accommodated these groups because they were enlightened, materialistic and scientific. Lunacharsky, who was committed to humanistic education, cultural pluralism and intellectual autonomy and promoted values on this basis warmly welcomed the ecologists who sought to provide scientific explanation

for complex natural phenomena.

The third position, utilitarianism, was also rooted in the pre-Soviet period, but was especially favoured under Stalin. Utilitarians defined resources narrowly, based on the limiting criteria of economic utility. They favoured the idea of growth and did not reject technocratic priorities. They excluded recreational and aesthetic amenities and all things (living or non-living) which had no economic values. Utilitarianism triumphed from the late 1920s, when Stalinism became the dominating power (Weiner, 1988:Ch.2).

At the time when civil initiatives went through hard times during the Stalinist period ecologists were also rejected. It was the Khrushchev era which allowed civil initiatives to surface again, among them environmental activities. The Nature Protection Squad of the Moscow State University was the pioneering organisation founded in 1960. It started as an organisation of students and lecturers of the Faculty of Biology but grew to become a national movement surviving difficult periods after the Khrushchev 'thaw'. The Squad trained brigades of people who then became active all over the country (Perepjolkin, 1996:132; Yanitsky, 1993a:32).

In more recent times it was the final years of the Brezhnev period, when the symptoms of the decay of Soviet Communism reached the point when activities outside the control of state increased. Sharp criticism within the party as well as outside was voiced from the mid 1970s, including environmentalist criticism but only in the period of Perestroika were there civil initiatives in such numbers. The series of ecological disasters which became public for the first time, among them the Chernobyl catastrophe, speeded up the growth of interest in ecological safety. From the late 1980s many ecological movements were organised as a result. Some had strong concerns about local problems and others pursued national objectives.

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS PRIOR TO THE PERESTROIKA PERIOD

Environmental movements prior to the Perestroika period existed in the Soviet Union in the

form of local initiatives, neighbourhood groups, and clubs and the ones being concerned with great natural beauties, such as Lake Baikal, as discussed in Chapter 3, and the Aral Sea. Voluntary patrols for protecting the environment had been active for decades. Environmental catastrophe, such as Chernobyl, however, did not give birth to organised anti-nuclear protest (Yanitsky, 1993a), even if people's opinion did turn against nuclear power stations as testified by opinion polls. According to a survey, conducted in August 1990 (Doctorov, 1993:252), 13% of the Soviet population supported the use of nuclear power and 54% rejected it and environmental protection was more a continuation of the romantic cultural notion of preserving the once unspoiled Russian countryside. Nevertheless ecological groups which were around at the time provided experience in organising environmentally related group activities which was to be useful later on, and this was as much as could be achieved given the political circumstances.

Political repression did not allow a very large scope for oppositional civil initiatives under Brezhnev although the regime could never fully succeed in silencing it. The case of Lake Baikal, analysed in detail in Chapter 3, well illustrates this. Soviet-type opposition, in a regime which did not tolerate civil initiatives to operate freely, turned to different methods. Firstly, experts, such as biologists, hydrologists and geographers drew attention to the alarming prospects for the lake and its environment when the plan of the paper-mill construction emerged. Secondly, well known writers and academicians joined the growing opposition. Finally local people organised protest groups, demonstrations and successful petitioning. The latter, however, did not occur in the case of Lake Baikal prior to the Gorbachev period (Wilson, 1993).

One result of Brezhnev's policy by forcing an ideology 'down the throat' of an unwilling population was that individualism and political apathy became a political escape route for Russians just as for Hungarians. When, however, a new style of policy, Glasnost, was introduced by Gorbachev which undoubtedly woke and shook the Soviet Union to an unprecedented extent (Sakwa, 1990:1-9), political apathy vanished.

Gorbachev's policy was most successful in highlighting and bringing into the open certain facts which were well known to all within the Soviet bloc from personal experience: the

enormous degree of corruption within the state and party bureaucracy, the lack of professional conduct, the deficiency in the coordination of the economy to increase production and reduce waste, and to improve services, etc. All these existed in the country in contradiction with the official Brezhnevian propaganda and were admitted by Gorbachev for the first time. As a result political apathy was suddenly transformed into a political upheaval with countless (according to some calculations in 1988 60 000, Yanitsky, 1993a) civil initiatives appearing on the scene simultaneously.

THE APPEARANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

Part of this upsurge was the rapid appearance of numerous environmental movements. They were tolerated under Gorbachev, but not legalised for a few years, just as in Hungary in the last period prior to 1989, but that did not prevent them from mushrooming all over the country. The environmental movements of the 'transitional period' of 1985 - 1991, i.e. during Gorbachev's perestroika, played a very important political role. Unlike in Hungary, political parties in the Soviet Union did not develop parallel to civil initiatives due to Gorbachev's reluctance to give up the primacy of the Soviet Communist Party till the very end of his presidency. This hindered the development of political parties and the introduction of a radically new political regime in the Soviet Union. The Gorbachev 'revolution' therefore managed to shake up the regime and introduce a lot of improvements to achieve democratisation but did not let it develop to the full. Within the Soviet Union Gorbachev was both radical and too conservative in political terms. His innovative efforts aimed at radical democratisation but turned into damaging conservatism by keeping the Communist party's role and preventing Russia from becoming a multi-party system. This unnecessary delay caused a limbo situation within the economy as well leading to a substantial decline in living standards and an economic despair in Russia. Gorbachev's political ambiguity led to general discontent provoking the coup of August 1991 but his innovative ideas in pursuit of democratisation were very important.

Environmental movements under Gorbachev became a focus of 'safe' oppositional forces. Some of this phenomenon occurred in Hungary as well at the very beginning of the transitional period, until people realised that there was no danger in openly participating in

anti-communist parties. Feeling confident that there will not be political retaliation occurred at a much later stage in the Russian case because of the harsher political atmosphere there in the past, and environmental movements remained the vehicles of general oppositional forces for a lengthier period, till well after August 1991.

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN RUSSIA: CASE STUDIES

In this part of the chapter I will describe representative examples of Russian environmental movements. This will include the Socio-Ecological Union and the Moscow Ecological Federation which both are umbrella organisations representing a number of local environmental groups both in Russia and in Moscow. I then will introduce the Russian version of Greenpeace International, which was set up with their help and is called Greenpeace Russia. Local environmental movements will be represented by a movement called Bitsa, a neighbourhood protest group, a local movement against the Northern thermal electric station and a movement called Ecopolis.

Among Russian social movements there is a strong tendency generally, not only in the case of environmental ones, to form umbrella organisations and can be more effective in dealing with higher levels of bureaucracy more. First I look at one such federation.

THE SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL UNION

The Socio-Ecological Union (SEU) is a national organisation with members all over Russia. It also has active contacts with members of environmental movements in the former Soviet Union who were previously members of SEU.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

The origin of the movement goes back to the already mentioned Nature Protection Squad which was very influential on the SEU both ideologically as well as in its organisational principles. Several members of the Union started off in the Squad. The contemporary

movement, on the other hand, is different from its predecessor in its philosophy. It is an 'anthropo-centred movement' as argued by Weiner (1988) which means a strong concern with the protection of the health and life-conditions of people, unlike the Squad, which was a more romantically inclined nature preservation organisation fighting against poachers and other individuals harming the Russian countryside.

The Union sprang up after 1986-87, when protests against a major project to divert the flow of northern Siberian rivers south, to provide water for the irrigation of the cotton fields in Central Asia, became strong and finally successful. Many of the present movement members experienced environmental protest against the government for the first time during this action which was initiated by well known writers and scientists.

But there were three other important phenomena contributing to the foundation of the movement. One was the opening up of information on environmentalism. Glasnost gave more opportunity for the press to report about protest actions and a degree of possible success. That encouraged existing environmentalists and mobilised new ones. The other was the Chernobyl disaster in the first place and other man-made catastrophes which were reported for the first time. These made it clear to many people in Russia, far beyond the existing small circle of environmentally inclined people, that life threatening events were very common in Russia and that something had to be done about this. Thirdly the fact that Russia, which before Perestroika was fairly closed off from contacts with western societies, opened up and international contacts started to be built on a fairly rapid scale. That led, in the case of the Socio-Ecological Union to 'exchanging notes' and developing long term relationships.

THE PARTICIPANTS

The participants in the SEU were in part former activists of the Nature Protection Squads who had been students of major cities like Moscow, Gorky, Novosibirsk. The Union maintained the organisational principles of the Squad in the sense that it brought together groups of movement members in different points of Russia, mainly in urban areas. In 1989 they had 1000 member groups. The most active participants were reported to number 300 but an action would attract 3000 people. One of the co-chairmen of SEU claimed that overall

"counting signatures, participants in meetings, discussions and demonstrations there were around a million people involved' in the movement." This could be a slightly exaggerated claim even if it is true that at the height of the period when demonstrations were the most important forums of protests a sizeable mass of people was active in environmental demonstrations on a regular basis. Later all movements changed their main forms of actions.

THE LEADERSHIP

Russian social movements often develop a strong resentment towards hierarchical structures which are so typical of the Russian and Soviet bureaucracy. These feelings were very strong in the SEU and led to the decision to develop a horizontal rather than a vertical structure within the organisation. SEU built up a network of horizontal links with all the groups involved in it emphasising that each member group has equal rights. This somewhat romantic, 'egalite, fraternite, liberte' principle runs through many movement organisation as a response to past experiences. The leading role is in the hands of several coordinators, who are in charge of various programs and activities as well as information within the movement. They have tried to set up a council of elected representatives, but it has only a symbolic function, and in practice does not operate. Recently there has been an increase in the numbers of paid staff funded by foreign environmental movements. Most of these staff work in the Moscow centre. There is no membership fee or formal registration for the individual members of the SEU. Again the aim is to avoid being seen too bureaucratic. SEU is, however, legally registered with the authorities but this is considered to be a pure formality.

THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

The goals of SEU are varied which comes from the fact that it is a national organisation with many local groups which individually formulate their own concrete aims. One of them is to make sure existing environmental legislation is observed in Russia, a role resembling the one the Squad pursued during its activities, though the Squad only ever blamed individuals while SEU sees environmental problems as structural ones. Now they talk about 'unbearable conditions as a result of industrialisation, collectivization, Chernobilization. "Previously we

only talked about saving nature, now the talk is about saving human lives" - argued an activist (Cherkasova, p.2). SEU does not want to maintain close relationships with any political party; they feel that ecology is apolitical in party political terms though recognising that everything they do is political in a wider sense.

SUCCESS

Just like goals success is mainly perceived in abstract terms by SEU: "the main success of the movement is that it is a fully developed part of the civil society, its active institution is in the making and it has been recognised by the authorities. The authorities show it respect and consider its opinions" - stated one of the leading members (Zabelin, p.9). Another achievement considered by them is that they became 'part of the international arena'.

MEDIA

The media played a very important role in the formation of the SEU both by providing information about other movements and by reporting about their activities. In 1987-89 the national press as well as the major television news program 'Vremia' reported about SEU's involvement in the protest connected with a power station on the River Katun, in Siberia. Lately the foreign press has shown more interest in their activities than has the national press. But this is not a 'personal' conflict between the Socio-Ecological Union and the Russian press. This is a general tendency in the Russia media which shows much less interest in environmental problems generally. On the other hand, SEU activists are very active in publishing their own local newspapers all over Russia, - there are 30-40 papers edited by their member organisations.

To summarise, the Socio-Ecological Union is specific in the sense that it is an umbrella organisation, spreading all over Russia with many member groups located in different, mainly urban areas. It is built on the experience of a very successful conservationist society with a history going back to the 1960s. It has accommodated not only previous members of the Squad but its network form as well. It has become well known beyond the boundaries of Russia, which contributes greatly to its financial success. The activities of the Union are wide-ranging, at the centre they tend to concentrate on abstract goals such as standing up as

strong representatives of their member groups vis-a-vis the national authorities and coordinating information flow among the member groups. The concept of success is also abstract in the SEU activists' definition; concrete success, they argue, should be achieved at regional and district levels by their local groups.

The other umbrella organisation representing local movements is the Moscow Ecological Federation.

THE MOSCOW ECOLOGICAL FEDERATION

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

The origin of the Moscow Ecological federation (MFE) goes back to the late 1980s when many local environmental groups were mushrooming in Moscow. Some of those who acted as contact persons among these local movements felt that they would become more effective if they were united in a Moscow-level federation. It was also felt that there were ecological problems on the city level which could not be solved by neighbourhood groups. In the winter of 1987-88 many of the leaders of local groups met and by the second half of 1988 they came to the conclusion that they should set up a federation. This was finally founded in April 1989. The Moscow Ecological Federation was officially registered as part of the All-Russian Nature Protection Society, which was a pure formality, but it provided the activists with meeting places.

THE LEADERSHIP

The leadership is practically one person, though theoretically there are three co-chairmen. The only active leader is a woman who worked as an electronic engineer for more than 20 years. Then she joined a neighbourhood environmental action group and later became elected one of the co-chairmen of the MEF. She was also involved in the all-union 'Green Movement' for two years and after that she became the deputy head of the of the Centre for Coordination and Information of the Social-Ecological Union where she works parallel to her MEF activities where she is unpaid. The structure of the MEF is that it is a confederation of the local movements with a coordinating board which consists of local movement

representatives. They hold annual conferences, with around 100 member representatives and coordinating board meetings with 30 people sometimes once a week, sometimes once a month, depending on how many problems there are to discuss. Several dozen experts help them in their work and there are 60 activists associated with the centre. They claim that through the local group members they have 7 to 10 000 participants. But as Lubov Rubenchik, the leader put it: "I am not happy with the size of the Board because in reality I am the only person who has to do all the co-ordinating work. We have two co-chairmen beside me, but they don't do this work. One of them became a city councillor, the other one is no longer involved [in the movement]." (p. 5).

Most of the activists are middle-aged people or older, and most are well educated. Their political affiliations are very diverse. As far as the recruitment 'policy' is concerned, it is believed by the activists that a movement needs experts rather than masses: "mass enthusiasm can discredit the movement if it is not based on scientific expertise. Experts," - it was argued by movement members - "can be employed by governmental institutions or independent bodies. Each demands full loyalty. Therefore independent experts are needed to tackle governmental claims, people who are experts in their fields and are active citizens in grassroots non-governmental organisations are of the most use for movements" (Rubinchik, p.3).

THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

The goals of MEF are threefold. Firstly they try to take on board all Moscow-related problems. The Federation wants to secure the right to participate in the decision-making at the city level both in concrete plans and over long-term planning. They also wish to ensure that the authorities act in line with the existing environmental legislation, because, they argue, it is often ignored. Secondly MEF gives all the support it can by backing local movements in their struggle. Thirdly they try to coordinate the activities of local movements so that a flow of information exists among them.

On a more concrete level the MEF was very active in opposing any new houses being built in Moscow. They argue that Moscow is overpopulated as it is and does not need any new

houses, and that enterprises should be moved out of the capital which would attract the population to other parts of the country. At present construction of new houses and enterprises is attracting yet more Russians into the capital. The city cannot cope with any more migrants or even with its existing population, argue MEF activists.

MEF is also trying to set up a data base and information centre, which would allow them to advise firms how to change to environmentally friendly technology to avoid being fined. They hope that this part of their activities can grow into a commercial one, advising companies for fee.

SUCCESS

It is difficult to achieve success in a movement which identifies its goals in such wide terms. The MEF cannot therefore claim any concrete successes: "when the government stops violating environmental laws that will be success. When courts will investigate cases, that will be success. When industrial plants will use filters, that will be success." (Vorobiev, p.9.) They consider an achievement that they could participate in the evaluation of general plan of the development of Moscow. They are still struggling to influence the city council in its final decisions on concrete plans.

THE MEDIA

The media interest in MEF issues is sporadic. Occasionally national newspapers seek to interview them but this is not regular, and often MEF activists feel they were misinterpreted. Green newspapers, however, frequently seek their help both by asking MEF members to contribute articles, and to distribute green magazines because they have difficulties in selling copies. One of the council members gives regular talks on Radio Russia on environmental issues. This sporadic 'publicity' in the national media, however, does not contribute to strengthening MEF's position among the public outside the movement 'circles'.

To sum up the Moscow Ecological Federation, it was obviously a good idea to create an organisation uniting local efforts and representing them on the city level. But since MEF has inadequate financial resources, which are coming mainly from western sources, they cannot

afford to employ any paid staff. This leaves the bulk of the coordination by enthusiastic volunteers, which in the MEF case is reduced to one person, and she finds it very difficult to cope. Thus MEF is not very strong at fulfilling its two major aims, coordinating local movements and representing them at the city level. Nevertheless MEF activists try very hard to provide as much support to local environmental movements in Moscow as they can and to influence the city's long term plans.

Now we turn to the third Russian environmental movement which has national aspirations as an umbrella organisation, but of a different kind. It is a 'local branch' of a well known international organisation, Greenpeace International, which covers most western European countries, and now has a group set up in Russia as well.

GREENPEACE OF RUSSIA

Greenpeace of Russia is not the only organisation which has international contacts. As we saw above, the Socio-Ecological Union is also helped by foreign funds. The fame, the skills and the organisational principles of Greenpeace International, however, provide an interesting specificity for Greenpeace Russia.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

This is a fairly new movement. It was not organised as a spontaneous collective action in the late 1980s like most Russian environmental movements and it is not a grassroots movement by any means. It is a highly institutionalised operation initiated by Greenpeace International which wanted to expand into the former socialist world, and chose Russia as a target because of its international importance. The office was opened in 1990. Greenpeace International provided the equipment for the Russian Centre, but surprisingly their main source of income comes from local members. Greenpeace International set up an office with a director and campaign managers who are in charge of different subjects areas, such as nuclear power, disarmament, forests, toxic waste and the state of the ocean with special attention to the consequences of fishing.

Not only they are not financed from abroad but Greenpeace International even targeted Russian people with publications and other products, like records, even before the office was set up in Moscow and attached to them leaflets encouraging Russians to contact Greenpeace International and send substantial donations (by Russian standards) in American dollars!¹

PARTICIPANTS

Greenpeace Russia has 10 paid staff members, 8 of whom are involved in the campaign work. Apart from that around twenty volunteers contribute to their activities in the Moscow office and 10 to 15,000 members contribute regular membership fees. Most of the paid staff are in their 20s and 30s, well educated: have university degrees in geography, geology, sociology. Some of them are Ph.D. students. As work is flexible in the sense that they often work 10-12 hours a day and most weekends as well, it is an advantage to be young and single: "we have young people because we have got a lot of hard work to do, for married people it would be difficult" (One of the campaign co-ordinators).

THE LEADER

The leader of the centre is the director who lived in Russia till the age of 12 when the family was forced to leave the country. He is not actually a Russian citizen but was sent to Russia because of his personal roots and his experiences in western locations. Part of his job is to pass on his skills to the local activists. He is highly respected by the staff for his knowledge and experience in the field. There is good co-operation among the different staff members as well, although their work is clearly separated by subject areas. As a result of this 'parachuting' method Greenpeace has achieved a Russian environmental movement which in organisational skills is far superior to any other movement in Russia. It, however, is not based on organic development, which raises the question of to what extent it is an institutionalised organisation and whether it is a 'collective' action at all as were all the other movements we studied.

¹Considering that Greenpeace International is not in a desperate financial situation such a desperate method seems a little surprising. But perhaps this was only a badly marketed attempt to gain local contacts before the local branch was set up.

THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

The goals of the movement derive from two factors. The first is the fact that it has been initiated by Greenpeace International, which had already developed certain areas of activity and a style action. Greenpeace Russia therefore became a highly organised movement right from the start with well defined goals and well equipped offices in strong contrast to all other environmental movements in Russia. This, however, also meant that Greenpeace Russia became fairly institutionalised from the beginning.

The second factor of goals derives from the Russian context. Greenpeace Russia campaigns against nuclear power and for disarmament, as in any other country and to protect forests in regions like Karelia, the Northwest, and Central Siberia (Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk region) where the timber trade is concentrated often involving joint companies (Finnish, Korean) with excessive tree felling and against trade of toxic substances and acid waste aimed at poorer countries like Russia. It tries to prevent environmentally harmful technologies from being imported to the country. The fishing campaign concentrates on the problem of overfishing of Russian waters, often by joint ventures. Fishing companies in which 31% of the shares are owned by foreign companies can sell fish abroad without a licence, which they do in desperation for hard currency.

Greenpeace Russia concentrates its efforts on large issues, which also attract attention to in many other countries where Greenpeace International is involved. But it concentrates on their Russian aspects and especially on international projects and joint ventures. As one of the campaigners put it: "Greenpeace is an international organisation. That is a specific thing about it... e.g. my campaign against the trade in toxic substances tries to prevent environmentally harmful technologies and acid waste from entering the country. The nuclear power campaign also deals with international problems. Fishing and ocean problems are international too. The forest campaign keeps watch on the problems of foreign capital participating in the production and trade of timber. That's specific to Greenpeace." (Interview with Strigulian, p.2.)

SUCCESS

Success has been achieved in a campaign organised against the South-Korean company 'Heido', which was involved in logging in the far east of Russia and violated several legal regulations but escaped prosecution. Greenpeace Russia launched a campaign against the firm which roused the public and as a result the firm lost its licence. In other cases Greenpeace Russia draws attention to environmentally dangerous activities, like dumping nuclear waste in the Baltic Sea, or to the overfishing of the Okhotsk Sea and the cheap selling off of fish which are viewed by them as achievements. They also lobby very hard to influence legislation.

Greenpeace campaigners also emphasised their role in changing the general attitude of people in Russia towards the environment. Given that economic problems are more important for people than ecological ones at the moment, changing people's consciousness and making them understand the ecological threat would be their biggest success, they felt.

THE MEDIA

The media is involved in publicising their activities. However, it is not the Russian media. Gathering information and passing it to the press occupies 50% of his time, claimed one campaigner, but the Russian press does not pay much attention to their activities. It is often the more specialised magazines which use the information they provide rather than popular national papers. On the other hand, the international media is in contact with them all the time. Apart from this Greenpeace International itself finances special publicity projects, such as a film on Russian forests: "The image of Greenpeace will attract the audience, the trade label will attract the public's attention to the film" (Interview with Tsyplenkov, p.12) - a campaigner hoped. This seems to work as a trade off, in which both Greenpeace International and its Russian branch benefit.

Greenpeace Russia thus obviously differs from other environmental movements primarily in that it has never been a Russian grassroots organisation growing to achieve international fame, but was set up as a highly institutionalised, and by local standards, well equipped organisation, a local branch of a successful international movement. Despite, or perhaps because of that, it is popular in Russia with a number of supporters and is fairly successful

considering how short its history is. Its survival does not entirely depend on local efforts but the full-time paid participants, as well as the group of unpaid helpers, show a strong enthusiasm which could help give it a long-term future. The young people working for Greenpeace Russia find their work extremely rewarding and the number of sympathizers is surprisingly large.

LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

Apart from the movements which are concerned with national or all Moscow interests there are many grassroots initiatives which operate within one locality.

THE MOVEMENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF BITSA FOREST

In contrast to the above described movements, the Bitsa movement is an example of a local protest with a very concrete goal. It has nevertheless become well known all over Moscow.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT

The origin of the movement goes back to 1987, like many of the environmental movements. The movement emerged as a reaction against a concrete project, the plans to construct a zoo in Bitsa forest. The forest is located within Moscow, next to the usual modern housing estates, and is the only green recreational area in proximity. The forest, argued the locals, is important in absorbing some of Moscow's heavy smog. Even if it became known all over Moscow, it nevertheless remained a local movement.

PARTICIPANTS

The movement participants are people living in the neighbouring houses who are very attached to the forest. A lot of houses in the neighbourhood were built by enterprises where the working conditions were bad and employees developed occupational diseases. Most of them are older people, often retired and with a low income, who do not have any chance of a dacha or seaside holidays. The forest is the only leisure opportunity for most of the

participants. This explains why most of the movement participants are older people. Young people under the age of 30 are extremely rare among them. The activists did not know each other prior to the movement organisation but became highly motivated and enthusiastic. Some of them are lonely people, for whom movement activities mean a way of socialising as well as feeling good about doing something for the community. Some of the movement participants are professional ecologists, but only a few.

The movement accommodates people with diverse political views. Some of them are strongly opposed to the new regime and maintain their Communist beliefs, while others are closer to the Democratic Russian political views. This, however, does not create conflict among them. They do not have any contacts with political parties though some of the existing or former activists stood for elections on different levels from local councillor to MP.

THE LEADERSHIP

The leadership is formal and well structured with the tasks well-defined and shared. Bitsa movement does not share the Socio-Ecological Union's and the Moscow Ecological Federation's reservations towards hierarchical leadership. There is a leader and two deputies who are all described as charismatic persons and good organisers. They are also very good at communicating with the authorities which in the members' view is a crucial leadership skill. Major decisions are taken collectively by the so called governing body, the core of activists of about 15 people. None of them are paid for their activities or even reimbursed for their expenses. They had 800 active members when the fight against the zoo was on, now the activity is reduced to the core activists on a regular basis but they claim that the movement can still count on the support of some five thousand people, more or less the whole neighbourhood. That was the number of people who attended rallies.

CONFLICTS

Recent conflicts, on the other hand, divided the population in their support. Many of the locals wish to use the forest for building (illegal) garages for their cars. As the crime rate

has grown considerably in Russia, and shortages of car parts have increased, one of the 'ways' of replacing a part is by stealing it from a parked car. The thieves take every possible part from cars standing in the streets and sell them to desperate car owners. This situation has increased the demand for garages to keep private cars safer. This, in turn, 'divides' the population between car owners, and non-owners who do not wish to sacrifice every plot of land in the city to build garages, e.g. in the forest or on river banks. In this neighbourhood approximately half of the population is 'pro-garage' and the other half wants a 'garage free' forest.

Another source of conflict was the local authority. It was originally hostile and antagonistic towards the movement. But in the late 1980s, in the last period of perestroika, when the 'democratic atmosphere' changed even local authority bureaucrats somewhat, the movement's growing popularity persuaded them to change their attitudes. They started by accepting the activists' arguments, and later even supported the movement by providing some funding. This limited financial support was the only support Bitsa achieved during its whole existence. The movement has no contacts with organisations outside Russia, or even Moscow, but is a member of the Moscow Ecological Federation.

THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT

The goals of the movement are very clear and well defined: the protection of the Bitsa forest. Firstly they struggled against the zoo. When it first became known that the authorities wished to construct a zoo in the forest, the consensus of local opinion was against it and the freshly organised movement gained a lot of support. After that the movement opposed plans to build houses and roads through the forest. At present their task is to make sure the decisions of the authorities concerning the forest are actually carried out. The latest fight is over the garage question and they pay attention to maintaining the forest as a clean and green park.

SUCCESS

The Bitsa movement has achieved many of its concrete goals. The zoo project has been cancelled and the house building plans were abandoned, too. In fact the forest was given the

official title of a 'Natural Reserve Park' on 17 October 1991 by the city council as a result of the movement-generated public pressure. This means that no construction is permitted in it. The 'only' task remains to monitor whether the decision is carried out and to make sure that no construction without permission takes place in the forest.

MEDIA

The national media only reported on the movement at its peak activity period. Since then, just as in other cases, there is little reporting on their continuing activities, except for the local paper which runs articles about them on a regular basis keeping the local population informed, but this does not secure knowledge about their activities outside the neighbourhood. The movement itself does not have financial resources for their own publications or even photocopying, as their only income over the years was the local authorities small fund and personal donations from low income population which in total was not very large.

In sum the Bitsa movement is a good example of the numerous local movements which came into existence in the late 1980s. It is undoubtedly a fairly successful movement, which is rare in the Russian context. It achieved all its objectives, which were clearly defined and well supported by a large proportion of the local population. Bitsa movement used the means most frequently used by Russian movements in the late 1980s to put their views forward to the authorities in charge of the forest: mass demonstrations and rallies. Their popularity changed the local authorities' attitude towards them for a limited period around the peak of their popularity and from being opposed to them the local officials became the movement's funders for a short time. Nevertheless Bitsa remained a poorly resourced organisation, relying mostly on participants' activities, contributions and enthusiasm. The movement continued to stay together even after it had achieved many of its primary targets. But rather than developing an abstract or global environmental philosophy to justify its existence, as was the case in other environmental movements, it remained a basically conservation oriented local group with strong local support. This can be rooted in the fact that movement participants are mostly retired people, older in age. Though the movement became known outside its locality, but mainly within Moscow. It had no ambition to make contacts with Russian or international

partners. Although individually many of the activists became interested in political careers, the movement itself remained neutral in party political terms accommodating a wide range of political beliefs from communists to democrats.

OTHER LOCAL MOVEMENTS

There are a number of other local environmental movements in Moscow, apart from Bitsa, some with concrete goals and others with more general aims. Few of them are successful in their efforts.

One neighbourhood group protested against plans to build a bakery on a site formerly used for nuclear waste. They were convinced that the bread baked in the new factory would be contaminated. The fight went on from 1983 but the construction of the bakery started in 1991. The movement's only achievement was that it raised public awareness.

Another environmental group was organised against the Northern thermal electric power station. This was part of a larger project to create an industrial zone in the northern part of Moscow with many new enterprises. The movement organisers collected 300 000 signatures and held demonstrations (in 1989) with several thousand participants. But the construction went ahead. In fact, if anything, they felt that the protest speeded up the completion of the project. The media coverage strongly supported the building of the power station and portrayed the movement participants as 'not in my backyard' protestors. They claim that they are a neighbourhood environmental group with several local concerns, like the local river, called Yauza, which was used for dumping dirty snow collected from Moscow's streets during the winter period, or trying to find solutions to the problem of garages being built all over the neighbourhood to accommodate the growing number of car owners and to combat the equally growing crime incidents.

Interestingly enough many local groups have general environmental aims rather than concrete goals. One of them is located in Kosino, a new district on the outskirts of Moscow which used to be a quiet nature reserve area just outside the capital before 1985. The reason for joining it to Moscow was to find land for new high-rise blocks of flats. The local protest

group of 200 people joined forces to prevent this. They also wanted also to save two local lakes, which would have dried out if the construction had gone ahead as planned. The movement is called 'Ecopolis Kosino' following the teachings of a Russian ecologist, Kavtaradze, who talks about ecopolises, ecologically sound places as opposed to megalopolises, large cities with a deteriorating environment. The leader of the movement is a strong believer in Kavtaradze's teachings.

The utopian ideas of an ecopolis and the concrete goals of protecting the neighbourhood from becoming a victim of the evergrowing Moscow estates are combined in the main aims of the movement. They do not organise mass demonstrations, but prefer lobbying individuals in charge of decision-making up to the level of Yeltsin and are very proud that foreign journalists or ecologists frequently visit them and report about them. They have achieved some of their aims: the plans were revised and fewer blocs were built than first planned. The idea of letting a small area of Moscow remain an 'ecopolis' was accepted by some of those in charge within the authorities.

There are several local environmental movements in Moscow which are concerned with general environmental problems in the neighbourhood rather than one particular objective. The Neighbourhood Grassroots Environmental Movement in Leningradski District, the environmental group in the neighbourhood of Fili, the one in Strogino and the group in Lyublinski district of Moscow are good examples of this. Their aim is to prevent diseases occurring as a result of contamination, to obtain proper information about the situation and its possible consequences, to persuade firms to use better filtering and purification methods and to introduce environmentally safer technologies. They intend to put pressure on the authorities to introduce and implement proper legislation. These districts are not necessarily the worst in environmental terms. As one of the activists argued: "movements do not necessarily appear in polluted districts. Interestingly enough, ecological movements are developed best of all in those districts where some green areas have been preserved. Movements do not always appear as a reaction to pollution, people react sometimes to relative changes." (Zaikonova, p.2)

At the demonstrations, which were frequent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but have since

become rare, they used to have hundreds or even thousands of people protesting. Today the movements can count on no more than 50 participants in any action. The core activists usually number around 10. The most interesting characteristic of these local movements is that they are mostly middle aged or older people, rather than members of the younger generation. Often it is a cross-section of the population in terms of occupation, retired people or housewives, though the leaders are mostly well educated with degrees in geology, geophysics, physics or biochemistry, etc. The majority of the leaders are women. Most of the local movements belong to the Moscow Federation and recount active support from the MEF, which is very much appreciated by the local movements. Most of them have very few resources other than their own enthusiasm and mobilise all the work-related help they can, such as photocopying to save on expenses. As local phone calls are still free in Moscow, it is a matter of time rather than money to maintain contact via the phone, which is why telephones are 'manned' by pensioners most of the time. All the local movements we contacted put special emphasis on educating the Russian people, changing their priorities from the economy to more long term and global problems such as environmentalism.

Often movements developed from a previous Russian custom of letter-writing to communist party committees complaining about different things they were upset about in the neighbourhood. When the glasnost period allowed them to unite and organise themselves without police repression they met up on a regular basis. The political atmosphere has changed but the authorities have not. And environmental issues were politically safe to unite people of diverse political affiliations. "From the beginning our motives were political, but to attract the public and create a social base we decided to use an environmental movement." - argued an activist (Shalimov, p.3.).

Thus the movements do not achieve much in concrete terms. Occasionally they might stop a previously green area from being turned into a waste dump but generally their main concern is the lack of legal protection against industrial pollution, lack of information openly provided for them about the level of pollution. Often they repeat hair-raising anecdotes about nuclear contamination which killed one of their neighbours, or sudden 25% rises in child mortality rates as a result of the mercury level, as well as the alleged murders of green sympathizers who refused to sign documents allowing more industrial plants be built in

Moscow, etc. These anecdotes are difficult to verify but have strong psychological effects among those who feel they have got to act upon them. The authorities usually deny these allegations, but when they are in dispute over concrete plans, the argument often ends in agreeing to disagree over priorities. The argument often turns on whether it should be the economy and people's every day needs which should be given priority, or environmental aspects. Those in the movements on local or national level are very much in a minority but they certainly side with those who support green priorities.

Concluding this part of the chapter, we have introduced several Russian environmental movements. They, again, as in the Hungarian case, were chosen in order to represent a selection of the most typical examples of environmental movements which exist in Russia. Thus there are federal organizations being described here as well as different kinds of local movements. The movements were all described by their origins, participants, leaders, goals and successes. The role of media was also always considered in relation to the individual movements. We now turn to the evaluation of Russian environmental movements.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN RUSSIA

Generally speaking the environmental movements in Russia which were born in the late 1980s and exist today went through two major periods. The late 1980s and very early 1990s witnessed a newly-found freedom which allowed people to express their discontent and demands by demonstrating. This was not unknown in other former socialist countries in the early period of their democracy either but in Russia, on the one hand, negative feelings towards 'deviant behaviour' and 'hooliganism' was stronger than in Eastern Europe and, on the other hand, participation in (state organised) mass demonstrations, such as 7 November celebrations, were more customary and appreciated till the end of the soviet regime. Attending demonstrations was therefore both a well known practice for expressing collective feelings and a new and welcome experience, because this time it was not state organised. Even if individualism had grown by the late 1980s relative to earlier periods, the idea of collectivism among soviet people remained much more important than in European socialist societies which had a shorter communist past and felt that it was imposed on them from

outside. Russians emphasise that collectivism had been a cultural imperative historically. Hence collectivism is not regarded as a foreign culture which was imposed on them, as Hungarians and other Central-Eastern Europeans did. The numerous and well attended demonstrations and strikes of the late 1980s and early 1990s, frequently used by environmental movements as well, were not, however, welcomed by the newly forming Yeltsin regime and the ideological propaganda turned against them. The tragic events during the two coups, resulting in unnecessary bloodshed, further strengthened the official political view that demonstrations are dangerous and irresponsible political actions and should not be used by civil initiatives to protest. This message was well accepted by most environmental movements and in their second stage of 'development' all of them started to denounce demonstrations as a method of political action and abandoned them.

The other important characteristic of Russian social, including environmental, movements is not entirely independent from the above described attachment to collectivism. Social movements in Russia, as soon as organised at grassroots level, felt a strong need to combine forces. City and federal level umbrella organisations appeared soon after local movements were organised. This umbrella system always has a hierarchical structure: the federal, national or city level incorporates and claims to represent member organisations at local levels. In the case of environmental movements both the Socio-Ecological Union and the Moscow Ecological Federation represent this tendency. Local movements, on the other hand, confine their activities to the locality which gave birth to them and rarely gain national reputation. This, as we demonstrated, was very different in Hungary where local movements did become nationally known. In Russia local movements feel weak and the umbrella organisation provides them with the necessary backing in confrontations with the authorities therefore federations are very much welcomed by local movements. Almost all environmental movements came into existence during the late Gorbachev period, along with all the other civil initiatives of the time. The exception was Greenpeace of Russia which was not a grassroots movement.

THE PARTICIPANTS

As in Hungary, the participants in Russian environmental movements are often people with

a high level of education, mostly with degrees in natural sciences. Local movements, however, usually only core members are educated and a wide variety of 'foot soldiers' participate in the movements from ex-army officers to factory workers. People with higher education are particularly welcomed not only because of the special knowledge they can contribute to the movements' activities. The intelligentsia in Russia have always played a special role in society. Back in the pre-revolution period they were the most progressive independent thinkers in a generally very conservative environment as far as social change was concerned. More recently the lack of a western type middle class provided them with a special role in society within which the distinction is between working class people, peasants (farm workers) and the intelligentsia, usually defined as people with a degree. Education has generally played an important role in the Soviet Union and the majority of the population benefitted from this. Education was the most important channel of personal improvement and career advancement, and was a popular route to follow. Those with university degrees have a high reputation and prestige even if it does not necessarily lead to very different living standards from the rest of the society. It is not surprising therefore to see that the so called intelligentsia is well appreciated by most Russian environmental movements.

The most important distinction between local and national movements is, however, in their age balance. Many of the participants in local movements are retired people, people on long term sick benefit and housewives. The specificity of the Russian local environmental movements therefore is that they attract an overwhelming majority of the older generation. Young people rarely participate. National movements, on the other hand, have more younger people, many of them in their thirties. Greenpeace is the exception with a majority of 30s among the core members. This could be connected with the fact that Greenpeace Russia was set up by Greenpeace International which itself operates with a younger generation and 'imported' its idea concerning age groups into Russia. The Socio-Ecological Union, which traditionally recruited members in the natural science faculties of universities from the period when it used to be the Nature Protection Squad, also used to have lots of young participants. But now the Union has widened its scope and now attracts a mixture of students and middle aged former students.

Environmental movements, as mentioned above, were regarded in the 'transitional' period

as oppositional political groups thus participants of the movement were environmentalists and oppositional political activists at the same time. Unlike in Hungary where this phenomenon also occurred but these two groups of people, 'the oppositional' and 'true environmentalists', separated after a short period of time, in Russia they stayed together longer. Political parties remained fuzzier than in Hungary and it was more difficult to distinguish among them up to 1993, but elections became a regular feature of Russian political life, many activists from the environmental movements became political candidates. Environmental issues at the 1990 elections were also a popular subject which attracted many voters therefore political parties often courted environmental movements for their support. Most candidates declared their interest in environmental issues in the run up to the elections, but did not always fulfil their promises once elected. Russian participants in social movements do not distinguish as strictly between their roles as movement activists and political candidates in local or national elections as did their Hungarian counterparts. Political parties in opposition are not separated in the activists view the way they are in Hungary. In fact most of the core movement members wished to be elected at some level of authority. They, and the rest of the movement participants, believed that a movement activist who becomes an elected member of the authority would give the movement power and influence. Once elected as councillors or deput^{ie}~~as~~, however, many of them started to look at problems from a different angle to the great disappointment of their colleagues in the movements who felt let down. Activists frequently accused these politician-become former movement members of using the movement as a political springboard to gain popularity in the neighbourhood and be elected. Perhaps it is worth noting that unlike in most other countries elected representatives at any level are paid a salary in Russia. This led to the suspicion that being elected was also a job seeking exercise in some cases. But not all movement participants saw their activities as potential political careers. Most of them remained devoted environmentalists pursuing a matter which was not easy. When demonstrations ceased to be the most important way of protesting, their task became especially difficult and tiresome. Most movements are very poorly funded, if at all, which means that personal sacrifices were often needed to achieve their goals. Very few movements became well funded enough to pay any staff. In fact, only Greenpeace Russia and the Socio-Ecological Union were able to do so.

The structure of the movements is generally very similar to the that described in Hungary.

The core members can rely on a group of regular activists. The third circle was made up of people who appeared in demonstrations but later were more likely to sign petitions. The widest circle is the group of sympathizers who support the group's activity in principle. Many of the latter regularly contribute to the movements financially, if this activity is properly organised by the movement itself, as in the case of Greenpeace. Women's participation is very high among Russian environmentalists both among the core members and the regular activists.

THE LEADERSHIP

The movement leaders are overwhelmingly people with higher education, as expected. As it is difficult to compare the western type of middle class with the Russian social structure the reasoning of the western theoretical literature which argues that middle class, public sphere employees are more likely to participate in social movements cannot be applied in those terms. But I would suggest that the so called intelligentsia in Russia fulfils a role similar to the middle class in the west in many ways, and especially as participants in social movements where they are in the vanguard. If we accept this argument, then it can be suggested that in the Russian circumstances the term middle class can be replaced with the equally disputable term intelligentsia. In which case we can and should argue that environmental leadership is most certainly attracted by the most advanced group of the society in intellectual terms, just as in western societies.

The leadership of environmental movements in Russia was hierarchical in its practice in every case. This is not surprising. The Russian tradition concerning a hierarchical way of organisation is very forceful historically. Although there were strong signs of dislikes of hierarchical structures in principle, in practice these only led to the concealing of the hierarchical structure. For example, instead of naming certain functions 'leaders', they called them 'coordinators'. This did not solve the problem, because in practice the so called coordinators were clearly leaders of the movement. In line with the popular democratic ideas the movements also tried to introduce 'proper' representation within the umbrella organisations, which also turned out to be futile. Wherever such councils or assemblies were set up they failed to function. Member organisations did not wait for formal (ir)regular

meetings to express their views. Indirect contacts with the umbrella organisations' leaders turned out to be more useful and workable than formal representation.

Bureaucracy is the other traditionally (historically) well developed form of organisation in Russia. Bureaucracy was also rejected by movement participants, just like hierarchical structure, but this time not only in principle. Bureaucracy was looked upon as an 'evil' of society suffocating it. As a result many environmental movements refused to introduce 'bureaucracy' by not documenting their activities. This clearly hindered them in their activities which was recognised occasionally but no solution was found.

THE MOVEMENTS' GOALS

In terms of their goals, there were three types of environmental movements in Russia. Some came into existence because they wanted to achieve a concrete goal. These were in the minority. The movement for the protection of Bitsa forest for example was one, which had a very concrete aim in 1987, to stop the project to build a zoo. Having achieved this, they became concerned with the whole forest and became a movement with this relatively narrow aspiration.

Secondly, a number of environmental movements, both on the national and local level, in Russia were triggered by a concrete event and later adopted general environmentalist goals. The original concrete aims included wanting to stop river diversions (SEU), stopping the construction of building projects (Ecopolis) and thermal electric power stations (environmental group North) or a bakery on a former nuclear waste site (Khoroshevsky district movement). Such movements converted themselves in their second stage to becoming general environmental movements with wide concerns.

The third category of Russian environmental movement was organised without any concrete goal or triggering event other than the general political context. These movements, which were again both local and national, have a very general environmentalist agenda from the very beginning of their existence. They were concerned with general health hazards in the neighbourhood, industrialisation, growing construction works in an overcrowded city, cutting

down trees, polluted rivers, lakes and air, the growth of garage building, noise from motorways, etc. (neighbourhood movement Strogino, environmental group Fili, environmental movement Leningradskij district, environmental group Lyubinskij and the Moscow Ecological Federation and Greenpeace Russia).

Whether the environmental movement came into existence as a result of a concrete goal or based on a general purpose concerning their environment did not make any difference to their survival, unlike in Hungary. Concrete goals did not have to be widened to 'global' environmental concerns or even into general ones to secure the durability for a movement, as we can see in the example of Bitsa. It was sufficient for them to 'broaden' their interest from the zoo to the whole forest to remain a movement, once the zoo problem itself had been solved. Those many movements which originally had a concrete aim and then became environmentalist in a broader sense did not do so with a conscious aim to survive, unlike in Hungary. Their new interest grew as a natural process from the first stage to the second one. Groups which had general aims in mind from the start also failed to think about survival strategies and acted more instinctively. As mentioned earlier, in the case of local movements the average age is fairly high, (mainly retired people) which might explain why these movement participants do not think in terms of long-term and sophisticated survival strategies. Thus the empirical evidence of the Russian social movements clearly shows that the resource mobilization approach's argument claiming that rationality plays an important role in movement organization should be disputed.

CONFLICTS

Russian movements are not immune from internal conflicts. Six types of conflicts can be distinguished. Firstly, internal conflicts which are based on personality clashes. Strong core members become involved in conflict with each other which can lead to some members leaving the movement altogether: "Conflicts do take place. The reason is firstly my awful character and in other cases people who want us to carry out their ideas... intellectuals think that they are the only ideologists and the rest of the people are idiots. I am an academic myself and have plenty of ideas, but they do not have to be imposed on each other. This sort of conflict makes people leave the movement." (Ecopolis, p.9.)

Secondly, conflicts are based on changing priorities. For example, the problem of garage building seems to be a source of conflict among movement members as well as between the movements and the population. Some people who previously supported environmentalist ideas have changed their minds and left the movement when it turned against garage building projects. The population at large is clearly divided between car owners demanding garages and those who are against it. Those in favour of car protection turned against environmentalists with whom they might have sympathised in the past. This seem to be a unique but in a bizarre way central source of conflict among Russians appearing in several local movements (Bitsa, North, Strogino).

The third type of conflict which divides people according to their personal status is over whether they are Moscow residents with satisfactory housing conditions or not. Although in the country and especially in the cities many people feel unsatisfied with their accommodation some environmental movements strongly oppose any further housing construction (Ecopolis, Moscow Federation). This of course again divides opinions among those who are in need of new housing and those who do not want the city to grow any further.

Fourthly conflicts developed with industrial enterprises. Some movements are against them generally while others concretely oppose specific cases. Many of the movements believe that moving industry out of major cities is the solution to Russia's environmental problems. Whether these movements think on a general urban scale or on a more concrete level they still fall, in my opinion, into the 'not in my backyard' type of movement (Moscow Federation, North, Bitsa, Ecopolis, Anti-bakery movement). Moving heavily polluting industry from one part of the country to another is not the solution to the problem. To be fair, however, I should add that in many cases this is only part of what the movement stands for. Nevertheless it puts a question mark over their interpretation of the frequently repeated slogan: 'think globally, act locally' since only the second half of it appears to be kept in mind. There were, however, quite a number of environmental movements which did not confine their thinking to a 'not-in-my backyard' solution (Socio-economic Union, Greenpeace, Lyublinski, Leningrdaski, Strogino, Fili).

The fifth type of conflict is related to political affiliations. In terms of political sympathy it

was always easy to distinguish between pro-communist and pro-democratic tendencies which clearly separated different views from the first election period under Gorbachev when political parties had not yet been formed. Consequently people could develop distinctive political priorities which could lead to unsolvable political disputes and disagreement within a movement. These two kinds of political debate, the pro-communist versus pro-democratic axis separated people in terms of their political views but did not separate them within the environmental movements. Some of the activists were communists and were strong supporters of the soviet regime. They had strong nostalgic feelings towards 'the good old days' which disappeared in Russia. The present political and economic disorder disturbed and disappointed them. But that did not prevent them from co-operating within the same movement with people whose views were very much on the opposite side and were supporting the so called democratic line in political terms.

A more recent development in the Russian political scene is the fairly high proportion of followers of fascist views. This clearly appeared in the debate among Russian environmentalists as well. According to the movement activists there are strong tendencies among some environmental groups to identify 'cleansing' the environment with social cleansing, openly advocating racist views. The St. Petersburg branch of environmentalists and Chelyabinsk (a regional centre in the Urals) were identified as eco-fascists, and even formed a party, called the Green Party of Russia. This was a break away party from the League of Green Party which is an 'eco-anarchist and eco-socialist' party, according to Vladimir Damie, a leading figure of the group. The League itself originates from the Green Party and was founded in May 1991. The League labels itself as 'eco-anarchist and eco-socialist' because they were against the social and economic policy of the government which they argued was bureaucratic and were dissatisfied with the system of presidential democracy in Russia. The eco-fascist Green Party of Russia attracted the majority of the board of coordinator members of the left wing League of Green Party when they run into serious disputes and separated.

Political diversity, although different in Hungary, was similar in the sense that it was both a principle and a practice in the environmental movements without exception. Views of eco-fascists, however, were completely unacceptable to all the environmental movements we

studied. We did not choose our movements deliberately on this basis but all the movements we interviewed turned out to be strongly and categorically against eco-fascists. Only one of the movements, the Socio-Ecological Union, reported that they did have contacts with those supporting the Pamiat movement, which is also a racist, right wing political organisation. Apart from this the environmental movements we come across expressly closed their ranks against eco-fascism.

The final conflict which should be mentioned is related to the lack of a proper legal system in Russia. Soviet law basically identified anyone who did not follow it as criminal cases. The concept of civil law did not develop in Russia in the soviet period and has not been established even now. Lawyers and judges have never been trained to deal with such cases or even to look at them from a 'non-criminal' point of view. Neither are they trained as environmental lawyers. The idea of politically independent judiciary is also missing in Russia. Courts, judges and prosecutors are strongly controlled by the state. This is fundamentally different from Hungary. Advocates of the political opportunity structure approach (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1991) and civil society theorists (Habermas, 1992; Keane, 1988) put a special emphasis on the question of an independent judiciary arguing that this provides a very important basis of a democratic regime.

Social movements, including environmental groups, in Russia also recognise a very strong need to turn to litigation within the framework of civil law, to be able to sue those companies which breach existing regulations, but there is no possibility to do that at present. Within the framework of criminal law the state could do something but does not. This makes environmental movements feel very weak in disputes with enterprises which are in a strong position anyway. In addition to this even the existing law is badly defined, and is full of loopholes, unclarities. Decrees are issued on a frequent basis, often by the president, which are ignored mostly because they contradict existing ones. The highly unsatisfactory state of legislation and lack of a proper legal framework makes environmental movements feel helpless in many ways, a problem which often was raised by them and was raised by the authorities as well (see Chapter 8).

SUCCESS

Success is not a very frequent phenomenon among the Russian environmental movements. Among those with concrete goals only Bitsa achieved fully its objective, when it managed to have the proposed Zoo project abandoned and the forest declared a national heritage park. Apart from this a few movements achieved partial successes. Greenpeace was successful in fighting against a foreign company's deforestation in the far eastern part of Russia. Activists who later became founders of the Socio-Ecological Union succeeded in their protest against the plan to divert Siberian rivers which were to be diverted to feed southern cotton production. All these achievements, however, happened in the late 1980s except for that of Greenpeace's in 1991. Since then most movements faced disappointments in their efforts.

Some of the victories were more likely the results of economic led decisions rather than due to the environmentalists' protest. The cancellation of the plan to build a new power station in Moscow's northern district to provide electricity for new industrial development is an example of such a case. The protest against the power station coincided with changing plans due to the economic constraints which was most probably the real reason behind a favourable decision against power station construction in the Northern district.

The weakness of the efforts of environmentalists fighting against economic priorities, such as new enterprise construction is well illustrated in the case of the protest against a bakery. A lengthy battle by the protesting locals, who were aware that the site had previously been used for dumping nuclear waste, ended in complete defeat. The bakery has been completed and produces bread against the strong wishes of environmental protestors even if the fact that the site was used for nuclear waste has never been disputed by anyone. Economic aspects simply became dominant over worries about environmental issues.

This situation might explain why Russian environmental movements often developed a broad rather than a concrete approach. Raising general awareness concerning health hazards seemed to offer more 'success' than winning concrete disputes. Talking about the condition of the air, the rivers and the lakes earns many people's sympathy. A fight against a concrete factory turns out to be too futile in too many cases to encourage followers. This is why ideas, argued by the cognitive approach (Jamison and Eyerman, 1991), relating to the desire of environmental groups to spread green views, was strongly present. Success this kind can be

achieved by the movements in very broad terms, by raising environmental consciousness. However, priority of problems within the economy and lowering living standards are still emphasised not only by those who are in power to make decisions on the matter but by ordinary people as well. Nevertheless conscious recognition of problems not acknowledged earlier by many is undoubtedly on the rise and the efforts of environmental movements certainly contribute to this process.

Another important aspect of the movement's achievements, as in the case of Hungary, is the fact that people are ready to stand up for their views in an organised form when they disagree with authorities or enterprises. Whether they end up winning the fight or not, they have accomplished a new political experience which on its own is a success.

Finally it should be pointed out that movement activists, by participating in the group, gained socially as well. They became a strong circle of people with a lot in common which brought them very close to each other in many cases. Whether they were old aged pensioners or young intellectuals they all did something which meant a lot to them and formed a basis of friendship and care for each other. They were doing something morally very desirable which gave them an enormous satisfaction. This most definitely was one of the successes no one could deny any of them.

THE MEDIA

The media does not play a very positive role in helping environmental movements in their efforts in Russia. During the upsurge of social movements in the glasnost period the media showed a tremendous interest in reporting about environmental movements, supporting them in their protest, and thus contributed to their growing popularity and consequently to the pressure they could exert to achieve success. After glasnost the routine of media control, well exercised in Brezhnevian times, came back into the political arsenal and reports on protests became scarce. Current environmental movements in Russia find it very difficult to be reported in the press, the television or radio on national level. Local papers sometimes show more interest in local matters, but their ability in gaining publicity is so much less that it cannot be compared with national media. Many movements pointed out that the international

media reports about their activities more often than the Russian. This shows that there is enough to report about, and that it is the system of self-censorship within the media concerning protest activities, which prevents the Russian press from informing the public about environmental protests.

Because movements lose out on publicity, they do not become as well known as they would otherwise. The loss of the numbers of sympathizers as well as the declining success rate strongly correlates with the attitude of the media. In the long term even public consciousness will suffer. The fairly recently started process of raising people's awareness concerning environmental issues and all the efforts of changing people's attitudes and priorities so that economic decisions would not contradict environmentally sane objectives will never be achieved by the efforts of any number of environmental movements alone. Without the active participation of the media this will be a lost battle in the long run, as new social movement theorists rightly emphasised. Unless the situation changes, Russian environmentalists have an immense task on their hands.

CONCLUSION

Summarising environmental movements in Russia it should be noted that although love of nature goes back a long way it was based on a romantic patriotic notion which only recently changed. At present one has to recognise the enormous difficulties the movements face. Public opinion supported both environmentalism and protest activities in the late Gorbachev period when many movements were born as modern protest groups. At this time frequent and well attended demonstrations, and media support ensured that Russian environmental movements were acknowledged as a political power. At this stage political opposition was combined with environmentalist goals. Later, movement tactics had to change by abandoning mass demonstrations as irresponsible political activities, and by the neglect by the media also worked against them. As a result not many environmental movements managed to achieve successes to boost moral and reactivate participation. The lack of funding also hinders their survival. Many movements are engaged in wider issues rather than being bogged down in concrete battles which, according to previous examples were intensely difficult to win.

Russian environmental movements, unlike those in Hungary, form federations in a hierarchical system. These umbrella organisations give them full support, information, experience and advice thus seems to be a useful tactic in difficult circumstances. These federations concentrate the best educated and experienced leaders and activists who are usually much younger than most local group participants. However, there is a high proportion of women among all movements, local or federal, and women generally play an important role in Russian environmental movements at every level including in leadership positions. Some local movements were organised originally to achieve concrete goals but many of them aim at general environmental issues pointing out problems in broader terms. The lack of success undoubtedly hinders environmental movements in attracting mass sympathy or even to survive. The lack of proper legal facilities is also a very serious obstruction. Thus Russian environmental movements put up a tremendous fight in very difficult circumstances. After the initial period when they were well accepted and appreciated the political situation has changed and this turned against them. In Chapter 8 we shall look at the way local and national authorities developed in Russia and examine the relationship between environmental movements and these authorities. But first we now turn to the Hungarian authorities.

CHAPTER 7

LOCAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS: THE HUNGARIAN CASE

INTRODUCTION

In the previous two chapters (5 and 6) I described and then analysed Hungarian and Russian environmental movements and, with the exception of the media, the 'units of my investigation' were the movements. However, limiting an analysis to the movements, the 'challengers' as Tilly (1978) called them, without examining those whom they 'challenge' i.e. the national and local governments would be one-sided and unsatisfactory. Social movements are embedded within society therefore I find it crucial to look 'beyond' the movement in order to understand why do they do what they do. Most theoretical approaches were fully aware of the importance of the societal context except for the organisational entrepreneurial group of resource mobilization authors who treated social movements as if they existed in a social 'vacuum'. I argue, as the majority of students of social movement, that this is a social phenomenon and has to be seen in the social context, not in isolation. In the case of social movements it is the local and national governments which provide an important context which should be looked at in relation to social movement activities. This will be the aim of Chapters 7 and 8.

In these two chapters I will analyse Hungarian and Russian authorities initially one by one and then compared (Chapter 9). The focus of the analysis will be the development of local and national authorities in the two countries since the 'democratic' regime was introduced in order to establish their attitude towards environmental movements which will be the discussed in the second part of these two chapters.

Thus in this chapter first I will discuss the different levels of authorities in Hungary, with special attention to those which deal with environmental problems including elected and non-elected members of both national and local authorities. Then I will analyse the environmental

movements' perception of the authorities and their relationship to them. Chapter 8 will follow the same pattern of analysis in the Russian context. The chapter following that (Chapter 9) will undertake the comparative analysis of the Hungarian and Russian cases.

The modern state is characterised by power and its legitimate use with the help of an administrative organisation through which it maintains its day-to-day existence. This administrative organisation plays a very important role in the life of a society, including social movements. Governments create the political direction of the country and authorities implement it. Consequently the relationships between government, administrative bodies and social movements are crucial. It is the government and the administrative authorities which movements face when trying to achieve their objectives. The central administration is capable of initiating changes in the legislation, modifying regulations and enforcing them. Therefore even when the target of an environmental movement is an enterprise, for example, it is the authority (central or local) which is the originator of the legislation or regulation that the enterprise has to compile with. It is the (local or national) authority which is in charge of decision-making in a dispute (the legal system is part the 'national authority' in this sense), and this is the case in most Eastern European societies no less than in the West.

The relation between a social movement and the authorities (at different levels) therefore is crucial. Whether an environmental (or any other) movement achieves its goals depends a lot on the situation dictated or influenced by the national and/or local authorities' initial attitude towards grassroots initiatives in general and the environmental movements in our case. Governments and other central or local authorities can be supportive politically or even financially, by providing funds for the movements, or be seriously obstructive. In these two chapters I will examine the existence or lack of existence of such roles of authorities in Hungary and Russia, the development of the so-called democratic institutions, such as government, the national and local authorities, the role of elected representatives and non-elected officials, being very different in the two countries.

GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES

i) National level

The Government in Hungary is set up as a result of national elections held every four years. The first free national elections were held in March 1990 and the last one to date in May 1994. There is a tradition of coalitions being formed, much as in Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, etc. and viewed as a more successful way of government than a single-party led system.

In 1990 the election results did not produce an overall majority for any one party, so it was unavoidable that a coalition would be formed after the elections. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Forum, MDF) became the largest party in parliament, but lacking an overall majority, needed the coalition of two other minor right-wing parties, the Smallholders and Christian Democrats.

In 1994, on the other hand, the same electoral system resulted in a landslide victory for the Socialist Party. Consequently it did not need to join in coalition to form a government but, for political reasons, decided to share responsibility and joined with the Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SzDSz) in forming a coalition government. The SzDSz was one of the important parties in opposition between 1990-94 and was willing to ally with the Socialists. The government since 1994 thus became 'socio-liberal'. The Prime Minister is Socialist and only three ministers are Free Democrats, including the minister of Internal Affairs. So is the President of Hungary. The reason for that, however, is different.

The role of the Hungarian president is so different from the Russian one we have to explain it in order to understand the contrast between them. The Hungarian president, Arpad Goncz, became over the years the most (consistently) popular politician in Hungary (according to regular opinion polls conducted by the Median agency). The president is elected in an independent process outside the national and local elections. The reason Arpad Goncz became president goes back to 1990.

During the first Hungarian national elections since the regime change there were two major competing parties running neck and neck: the HDF and the Free Democrats. When the HDF won the national elections with a very small majority over the SzDSz, it was felt fair to allow the president to be chosen from the most important opposition party as the Prime Minister of course is always a member of the winning party. Hence the president became a Free Democrat and the SzDSz nominated Arpad Goncz for the post.

The process of presidential elections, however, is now under consideration in Hungary. This is because the present president became so popular over the years, no-one wishes to suggest any process which would replace him automatically. Public opinion would not allow that. The president's re-election is long overdue, but no solution has been found as yet to cut this 'Gordian knot': how to let him be re-elected and at the same time create a democratic and fair process of presidential elections. Thus Goncz remains the most popular politician and the (not re-elected) president (strictly speaking) at the same time. The reason he became so popular among the electorate is that, in a way similarly to that of the speaker of the House of Commons in Britain, he plays a politically impartial, arbitrator role. His role is to intervene when it is absolutely necessary and not from a party political point of view, but staying above it. Arpad Goncz only intervened in cases, like the persecution of the presidents of the HTV (Hungarian Television) and the HR (Hungarian Radio), which both provoked enormous outcry nationally. They were both well known, critical sociologists prior to the regime change and accused of being 'liberal-bolsheviks' by the MDF prime minister, Antall. He meant that the two media-presidents were not 'efficient enough' in (re)introducing political censorship against the growing criticism, in the different radio and television programs, of the right wing government of 1990-94. When the Hungarian president refused to sack them (formally it was his role following the 'suggestions' by the PM, analogous to that of the monarch in Britain) Goncz became without doubt the bravest and most decent politician in the land and his popularity has not changed since. He shaped his own job from being a formal and ceremonial figure into a decent and brave arbitrator who is above partisan aspects.

The highest legal body of the land is Parliament, where both formally and in substance (unlike in Russia) all legislative decisions are made, based on extensive political debates (a

frequent phenomenon in the Russian Parliament as well). Apart from that there are subject Parliamentary committees, drawn from all parties of MPs in Hungary, similarly to Britain. These committees have an important role in discussing different subject matters, including the allocation of some of the government funds within the Environmental Committee among contesting environmental groups.

The administrative authority at national level is the Ministry of Environment, as mentioned earlier. One of its major tasks is supposed to be to create new legislation to protect the environment. The first and only (legally speaking still relevant but from a political point of view completely out of date), relatively comprehensive legislation, called the Law on Environmental Protection, was introduced in 1976, under the socialist period. It was (and still is) a highly unsatisfactory law not designed to be tough or efficient but more a matter of form. In a way naturally, the state (of the time) had no interest in enforcing tough measure and fines against the overwhelmingly state-owned companies. The situation has changed rather radically, but the question of environmental protection has not improved much. The need for new legislation, as the very first step in the process, is incredibly important, and urgent, well recognised by all but has been constantly delayed.

ii) Local level

The new government in 1991 set up 12 Regional Environmental Units which are in charge of all environmental issues in their region. Their task is to monitor the level of pollution continuously, to carry out measurements in their own laboratories and investigate when the level of pollution exceeds the regulated level. They are also in charge of rivers, soil, air, dismantled plants, and military barracks, such as the abandoned Soviet barracks which are environmentally in very bad shape.

Local authorities in Hungary have also been reorganised as soon as the regime changed. Their names have been changed from council to 'self-government', which was obviously a cosmetic change but substantial changes have also been introduced. Firstly that local authorities are led by an elected mayor who is the leader of the council as a well paid employee in an executive role. He/she combines three functions: the leader of the elected

bodies, the chair of the executive part of the council and fulfils various formal functions as well.

The local government consists of two major parts, the elected councillors and the non-elected officers. The councillors work in subject committees, where policies are discussed, which are then ratified by the major council assembly of all elected councillors. The mayor is supposed to create the bridge between these two parts of the local government which were allocated considerable powers as a result of the decentralisation program introduced by the new regime in 1990.

In environmental terms, however, this did not have much relevance at the time of our research since the 1976 law had not then been changed. Thus local authorities, which could only issue regulations and could only act against enterprises in their own territory, had only a small scope for manoeuvre without a nationally binding law. Since, however, local authorities allocate finances for services and it is of course the local authority which is responsible for creating local environmental policies from waste collection to improving their local environmental problems, including restrictions in issuing building permits for potentially environmentally dangerous constructions, road-development plans or preventing further water pollution, local self-governments have a lot of power since the 1990 decentralisation. Consequently for local environmental groups close contacts with local authorities is unavoidable.

In Hungary (unlike in Russia) council officers are obliged to implement policies suggested by the subject committee after they have been ratified by the council assembly of elected representatives. The most important point here is that in Hungary in all authorities it is the elected representatives, whether MPs or councillors, who are in charge of policy-making and executives have to obey their decisions.

Elections of local authority representatives are also held every four years, usually 6 months after the national elections. They are held at the same time throughout the whole country. As mentioned before, soon after the first national elections of 1990 the majority of the population turned against the MDF-led government which was well represented in the votes

during the local elections all over Hungary. As a result the first local elections in December 1990 brought in a large number of Free Democrats-led local authorities, often in coalition with the FIDESZ, especially in urban areas, particularly in Budapest. In smaller places, especially villages, it was the so called independents who were voted in. These were mostly people who were previously council leaders and were in fact close to the old regime politically, but at that time it was not 'wise' to openly stand as Socialists. Four years later, however, the political atmosphere has changed fundamentally in Hungary and many of these independent stood as Socialists in the local elections (1994) and were re-elected.

Even though this was after the Socialists became the governing party nationally , 'history' did not repeat itself in the sense that six months after the national elections of 1994 people were not disappointed with the fairly recently elected government to the same extent as in 1990 when turned against the MDF-coalition. Instead the Socialists won the majority of seats in local authorities as well, just like in rural areas in 1990 (as so called 'independents') and nationally May 1994.

The situation with the Free Democrats was different. They were successful in the 1990 local elections in urban areas (especially Budapest) but lost many seats in the same places in the 1994 local elections, especially in Budapest! This reflected the local populations' disappointment with the way many local authorities had been run by the SzDSz and also the many bickerings within the party itself, especially at local level.

Budapest's mayor, on the other hand, remained a Free Democrat, (Gabor Demszky) who was re-elected but this was more a personal victory than a political one. He was the second most popular politician according to opinion polls (Median). Budapest council as a whole, however, has much reduced power as a result of the decentralisation process. It was the 22 local district councils which were allocated power and responsibility in the course of the local government decentralisation in 1990 within the capital and above 3,100 local authorities are in charge nationally.

THE AUTHORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

In my analysis concerning the national and local authorities the key issue is what is their relation to environmental movements. The activity and relation of the different authorities beyond their legal obligations is in question here. During the shaping of a movement external hindering or support from the authority greatly influenced the outcome of the movement's development. The in-depth interviews (see Appendix) sought to identify factors underlying the authorities' responses to the movements and their choice of strategies towards the movements. The task was to uncover whether they supported citizen actions in theory and this was that translated into practice, e.g. how they reacted when the movement entered in conflict with them and put pressure on them. Did they distinguish among different movements or did they develop a general attitude to all of them? What strategies did they develop dealing with environmental movements in particular? Were they cooperative or repressive? Were the authorities under pressure from their own superiors when dealing with environmental movements? Did they have a conflict of interest as individuals and as members of authorities? Authorities of different levels, as described above, were approached in the search for an answer to these questions as well as the movements themselves.

i) National level

The governments in Hungary, whether it is the Right-wing coalition led by the MDF or the Socialist-Liberal, pays very little attention to the question of environmentalism. The last time political parties showed any interest in the subject was before the 1990 elections. Since then the economic problems and the shrinking range of social service provision have topped the political agenda. As the general politicians' perception, rightly or wrongly, is that environmentalism is not among the priorities of the population, parties and governments do not feel obliged to even promise radical changes in the field. When directly asked, every politician acknowledges that environmental problems exist and that something should be done about them, but this is as far political willingness goes.

As established earlier, those in charge of the nation's environment at the highest political level are the ministers of environment. There were two ministers in the job, following each

other, during the period of our investigation. They were both very concerned about the attitude towards the environment within the government. They both had a very similar attitude towards environmental movements which was positive and supportive for two main reasons. Firstly the Ministry of Environment was supposed to coordinate the activities of other ministries, including such ministries as Industry, Agriculture and Energy which obviously have a lot of environmentally important aspects when defining policies in their own fields. The minister of environment, however, has never been consulted by any of these ministers to comment on different issues. The only way of expressing concerns was in cabinet meetings and even then the environment ministers were largely ignored. Equally weak was the position of environmentalism in the distribution of the national budget among the different ministries.

As a result both ministers ended up feeling very much let down by their own political parties which, like most other political parties while contesting elections in 1990, declared a 'strong interest' in their manifesto during the campaign period. But when it came to putting political slogans into practice, it found other issues had priority. This disappointment in recognising that their scope of influence was extremely limited within their own government led the ministers to believe that social movements could be a useful political force to enhance their own political influence within the government. They felt a huge political need to put pressure on their own government and gain more support for their much neglected subject. Their attitude towards social movements was therefore very positive. They wished environmental movements were a lot more active, mobilising large masses which would reinforce the ministers' aims. They were disappointed that the movements did not manage to organise demonstrations in front of the parliament building with tens of thousands of people demanding more attention to environmental issues. The ministers also wanted the movements to unite in umbrella organisations to strengthen their own political influence which in turn would improve the ministry's position within the government.

Secondly the ministers' very positive attitude towards environmental movements was based on their political convictions. Both ministers were politicians who firmly believed in political pluralism in the sense of a multi-party system as well as in the plurality of organisations, including the rights of collective action or grassroots movements, to operate outside the

state/party institutions. Both of them had also participated in environmental movements themselves before embarking on a party-political career. They were examples of those former movement activists who, as discussed earlier, became activists in environmental groups at the movements' earlier phase and later detached themselves from the movements because as political parties developed in Hungary they preferred party politics to social movement participation as a form of political activity for themselves. As they had also remained faithful to their interest in environmental issues, they ended up in the political job which gave the highest political position to achieve something. Having occupied the job, however, they recognised the serious limitations of what they could achieve. Their loyalty to environmental issues combined with their disappointment in their party's changed priorities, led them into an alliance with social movements as a potentially useful political force.

Other Members of Parliament such as those who were back-bench politicians, but members of the Parliamentary Environmental Committee, felt very similarly. They too came to the conclusion that the environment is a much neglected subject compared with the economy. They complained about the lack of cooperation among the different Parliamentary Committees to improve the environment as well as the lack of available finance. These MPs felt also that the committee was in a very weak position in debates with the government, which only accepted suggestions if they did not have financial consequences:

" When the government suggests a new bill and it ignores the environmental aspects it is our job to make sure it is there and is not ignored. But we can in fact only 'smuggle' environmental points in if they have no financial consequences." (Interview with a member of the Parliamentary Environmental Committee)

Originally the Parliament did not even want to set up this committee as all the political parties had lost interest in green matters once in Parliament. Only strong pressure from several MPs resulted in its existence. In the committee there is a strong feeling that the reason why the outdated environmental law has not been replaced is because of fears that a stronger law would slow down economic growth which is politically undesirable for the government.

Like the ministers, the committee members also feel very positively towards the environmental movements: they are seen as potential political allies which should be cherished. They too felt that a more united environmental movement, under a strong umbrella organisation would be more effective in two ways. Firstly, it could mobilise larger numbers of people which would be more effective in putting the message across to the government and secondly, it could lobby more effectively. This would be of more use for the committee in its work. The chair of the committee also emphasised that the committee's work benefits from the movements' 'healthier' outlook, the fact that they are outside the realm of political institutions. The movements are in touch with the grassroots feelings, he argued, which is a valuable source of information for a politician. Even their criticisms were welcomed, and it was felt that the movements did not utilise the opportunities available to them well enough, meaning that the Parliamentary Environmental Committee would have welcomed a lot more communications and advice from the movements. Political forces in a society which are outside the realm of party politics are invaluable in a democracy, it was emphasised by the committee members.

Committee members were also favourable to supporting environmental movements and initiatives financially as they are directly involved in pressing the Minister of Finances to allocate money for such purposes. Finally committee members are involved in allocating funds to the movements themselves. This way they are actively involved in supporting them. As money is scarce the competition for funds is harsh and there are inevitably losers as well. Still there is a fund supporting many environmental movements unlike in Russia, as will be discussed later.

Another question is whether the funds discriminate among the environmental movements when financially helping them. Discrimination can be on several different bases. On political criteria there is no evidence of any discrimination. The committee consists of MPs from different parties to ensure political fairness. Apart from that, none of the committee members were partisan-oriented when evaluating environmental groups. The allocation of funds, however, favoured better known movements. Those groups which were lesser known had less chance of being awarded financial support. It is as if they had to prove themselves to be strong and durable organisations before the government gave them funds. Better established

movements were therefore more likely to be rewarded as far as government funding was concerned.

This, however, suggests that the government does not fear well established social movements and is not afraid to further strengthen their existence. Politicians in Hungary who are in position to help social movements are ready to do so, either because of their political beliefs or because it is in their own interest to utilise the movements' political support and to lobby together on environmental questions.

Civil servants in Hungary are supposed to be politically neutral since 1990. During the socialist period civil servants were of course expected to be loyal to the HSWP. When the new regime was established, the new slogan was to change this system and separate civil service from the government of the day. This did not, however, become the practice. The new ministers got rid of the old guard very soon but replaced them by people whom they trusted, namely those who were politically loyal to the new government. The cleansing did not stop at the old nomenklatura, but extended to those who were supporting any of the opposition parties. Governments are attacked for the insistence on political loyalty which is an obvious political 'routine' learnt in the socialist period. Civil servants therefore became overwhelmingly MDF supporters between 1990 and 1994 and a new change of guard occurred in 1994 at least at senior levels.

The civil servants' opinion we are going to describe is that of the period of 1990-94 when our investigation was going on. Unlike ministers, civil servants had a more complex view of environmental movements. The official instruction from the Ministry of Environment was that the civil servants have to take the movements very seriously because they are part of the environmental question and the environment is an important political question which should not be ignored any longer. In reality, however, the civil servants fall into two major categories in their attitudes to the movements. The first group does not really know how to convert theory into practice and how to maintain ongoing communication and cooperation with the environmental movements as instructed by the minister. They cannot see the advantages of turning to an environmental movement activist instead of commissioning an environmental expert who could advise them when working on reports or briefings for the

minister. The compulsory meetings with the movement activists, set up as a result of the minister's directives, turned out to be futile and ended in fiasco. The movement activists and leaders complained, but the formal meetings did not lead to meaningful cooperation. The minister also directed that financial support for the movements should be increased substantially. A ten times larger fund was allocated from 1991 than in 1990. But the allocation of the fund also ran into difficulties due to lack of coordination.

The other group of civil servants held conservative views. They were openly hostile to the movements and viewed them as politically dangerous forces, as a bunch of people who do not understand what law and order is. They felt that environmental movements just provoked controversy and actually hindered the ministry in obtaining political attention, finance and winning arguments within the government. They often blamed the political leadership of the ministry for being too weak when it came to decisions, for dithering and hesitating and for listening to too many sources, such as the movements. They felt that the ministry did not even have a political concept which should or could have been implemented. Their feeling was that there was no direction within the question of environmental policy in the ministry and it was argued that no one had any clear concepts of how the environment should be improved. As this group of civil servants rejected contacts with environmental movements they could not be guided by their suggestions.

ii) At local level

Within the local level two organisations exist, as mentioned above, the Regional Environmental Units, which are government agencies and have only non-elected officers and the local councils, including county, city, district levels which have both elected and non-elected members. The officers' relation to social movements will be examined separately from that of the elected members.

The officers who either work for the regional government agencies or the councils are mostly experts in the field, with degrees in natural science and well informed about the regulations as well as the scientific aspects of environmental issues. They emphasised that politically they

are not involved in forming an opinion, their main concern was more 'expertise-oriented'. Most of them were hostile or even openly antagonistic to environmental movements. The basis of these feelings was mainly that they regarded the movement activists as amateurs. They felt the activists were more interested in the political side of questions, and were basically there to question and irritate. This, it was felt by the 'experts', did not lead anywhere. They felt that the movements' function should only be the education of people and not intervention in experts' activities, especially not to question or criticise them. These feelings were generally shared by officers but was stronger in the provinces, outside Budapest.

Even though feelings were hostile to movements, that does not mean that officers excluded them from cooperation all together. Many felt obliged to communicate with movements and most importantly to provide them with all the information they had concerning environmental plans or problems. This is very different in the Russian case, as we will see later. The instruction to provide information for the movements always came from the political bodies (the minister or the mayor) and was fulfilled by the officers. Political openness in this respect was complete between environmental movements and the apparatchiks.

The elected councillors are politicians, just like their national counterparts. It is not surprising therefore to find a much more positive attitude on their part towards environmental movements than that of the officers. Those who were members of the councils' environmental committees always had contacts with the environmental movements and felt that this was beneficial for their work for several reasons. Firstly environmental movements are in contact with the electorate at the grassroots level. This provides them with useful information regarding the problems people are concerned about. Social movements became centres of information and complaints. Ordinary people often have negative experiences of the councils' response to individual complaints. Organised movements, it was felt by the councillors, can channel public concern with greater success. This is why information or even complaints could get to the councillor via a movement. Recognising this the councillors appreciated the 'channelling' function of environmental movements. Secondly, unlike officers, elected councillors have no expertise on environmental issues. Just as most environmental movements have a concentration of activists with a degree in natural science

and spend a considerable time investigating cases and writing reports, this was appreciated by councillors as useful professional information. Many argued that the documents, written by movement activists were very useful sources of knowledge regarding concrete cases. Thirdly, the movements provided political support in their own lobbying activities for environmental issues as a whole or in concrete cases. Environmental committees within the council are just as weak as at national level. Any support they could get, any pressure demonstrated by the population, organised by the movements, was handy for the councillors. And finally, elected members of councils have to stand for elections every four years. It is important therefore for them to maintain a friendly, listening image with the population at large and with the organised part of the population especially. Since movements express their views for or against local and national politicians at election time, cooperation with them is vital if councillors wanted to be reelected.

Politically speaking environmental committees were rarely divided according to party political interest. They rather offered temporary alliance with any party bloc which was willing to help in order to achieve majority votes in the assembly. Environmental issues do not divide councillors along party lines. Rather they unite in desperation seeing the large degree of political neglect regarding environmental issues.

The mayors are special cases, as mentioned above. They are both elected members and the executive chairs of the council. On the other hand, naturally, the mayor is responsible and accountable for many issues not only the environment. These explain why mayors are more likely to develop an ambiguous relationship with social movements. On the one hand, the movements' critical role irritates them, but as politicians they cannot be antagonistic towards them. Mayors often end up offering support to 'cooperative' movements or activists while resenting militant or very critical ones. The pressure put on the mayor by 'cooperative' environmental movements often persuades them start sorting some environmental issue, which later, during election time, can be presented to the electorate. Becoming 'cooperative' with the movements, especially when they can combine forces vis-a-vis the central government, is what mayors are very willing to do. Cooperation with local pressure groups often is part of their political willingness. Mayors, on the other hand, have more than one interest to keep in mind. They obviously have to consider the interests of local businesses as

well and cooperate with them too. This could create conflicts with environmental movements. Mayors are, in the first place, politicians who are concerned to be re-elected. When it is the environmental movement which is influential in the constituency, then mayors are becoming very willing to create a 'cooperative relationship' with the movements.

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS VERSUS AUTHORITIES

Before the first elections most environmental movements were hostile towards authorities at any level. At this time authorities were not accountable. Since then the situation has changed. There is a lot of contact and communication between environmental movements and authorities at every level. As described above, politicians are especially eager to keep contacts with the movements. As politicians dictate policies in Hungary there is communication with non-elected apparatchiks as well both at national and local level. This has changed the movements' attitude towards the authorities considerably. The original hostility has changed for the better in most cases. The movements often find willing authority members who are ready to cooperate with them for one reason or another. Also their interests often coincide in concrete matters. Many environmental movements even receive financial support from the authorities at different level in forms of funds or payments for occasional reports or consultancy. Their common goals leads to a willingness to cooperate on the side of the movements as well. This cooperation can be ad hoc or continuous, depending on the situation, but has become the most characteristic attitude of movements in general. It is as if both sides had come to the conclusion that cooperation achieves more than confrontation. This does not mean, however, that the movements are less critical in their attitude, but only that they seek and find contact with authorities, discuss matters, express views. Listening to each others' arguments often leads to compromises (but not always). The movements underlying feeling is that it is better to achieve something than nothing. There are of course cases where compromise cannot be achieved, and the conflict cannot be resolved but there is most of the time a willingness to communicate, to talk things over from both sides. This is a very different attitude compared with the movements' members past feelings towards authorities. And even more importantly from our point of view this will be different from the Russian case.

CONCLUSION

To sum up the relation between the environmental movements and the local and national authorities in Hungary, firstly it is important to emphasise that the most important division is between the elected and non-elected members of the different authorities. Elected members at every level are much more favourable to the movements because they see them as potential political allies in support of environmental issues. Even those elected members of local governments who might see them as trouble makers at first, such as mayors, are ready to compromise and try to act upon the movements' pressure because they have to think of the movements' political potential at election times.

The non-elected civil servants and officials are more anti-movement in their personal feelings and see them as political activists who antagonise and are less knowledgeable than themselves, the experts. These apparatchiks, however, have no political power and have to obey the elected politicians' decisions.

This brings me to the most important question to be investigated here. Social movements operate in a political environment in which different political actors participate. Governments, national and local authorities can develop a democratic system in which accountable, regularly elected members are in charge of decision making. There can of course be another scenario in which elections are not held regularly and elected politicians have little power and accountability is not in the centre of political thinking. Hungary used to be such a society prior to 1989. Since then, however, every effort has been made by every existing political party to strengthen a democratic development and arrive at the first scenario. As a result, Hungarian environmental movements operate in 'civilised' circumstances in which negotiations, communication and cooperation characterise the relationship between authorities and movements. They often want to achieve the same and ally. Other times it is shrewd political thinking which brings them together. Whichever is the main motive, the outcome is acceptable. It also helped to develop to resolve the initial lack of trust among the movement members. This cooperative and communicative character between environmental movements and authorities in Hungary is the direct consequence of the democratic development in the political system. In contrast, however, as will be

demonstrated in the next chapter, the situation is very different in present day Russia.

CHAPTER 8

LOCAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS: THE RUSSIAN CASE

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will look at the latest development of national and local authorities in the light of the last elections in Russia, and investigate whether the frequent reorganisation of local and national governments has led to more democracy within the authority or not. In the first part of the chapter I will look at elected and non-elected members of authorities. The second part will analyse their relationship with environmental movements. Finally I will discuss how environmental movements perceive local and national authorities' attitude towards them.

CENTRAL AUTHORITIES

The central level of administration and elected bodies in Russia were reorganised after the last elections of 12 December 1993. This was the first election since the Soviet Union collapsed after the coup of August 1991 and the first in the newly established Russia with several competing political parties.

Previously there were only elections with competing views but not political parties. The first elections which allowed any competition were held still in the Soviet period under Gorbachev, in March 1989, for the new Soviet Congress. These were multi-candidate elections within the one-party system which was finally abolished only a year later in March 1990. These elections of the Congress of Peoples' Deputy's only resulted 400 pro-democrat representatives out of a total of 2,250 (one of whom was Boris Yeltsin) (Sakwa, 1993). The Soviet Union still existed when the next elections occurred in March 1990 in Russia. There were still no political parties but an electoral bloc, Democratic Russia, which was established in January 1990 with branches in all the major Russian towns. Thus these elections could only offer 'pro-democrats' (candidates of Democratic Russia) competing against 'pro-communist' (CPSU) candidates and played a more important role at local level which will

be discussed later.

In December 1993 53% of the 105 million eligible electors (Sakwa, 1994) voted not only for political parties, but for a new constitution as well, which granted a special role to the president. Sixty per cent of the electorate supported Yeltsin in his wish to become a very strong president by voting for the new constitution.

Thirteen parties contested the elections to send representatives to both houses of the National Assembly: the Federal Council (upper house, previously Supreme Soviet) and the Duma (lower house, previously Congress of People's Deputies). In the Federal Council every unit is represented by two members, there are 89 such units, with 178 potential delegates. It is made up of representatives of 21 republics (mostly former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics), 55 regions (oblasti and kraya), two special cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg with the status of regions); 1 autonomous territory and 10 autonomous districts. All the above mentioned units have equal rights within the upper house. In terms of their political party preference there are 12 members representing the Communist Party (led by G. Zyuganov), six members belong to Gaydar's party and 145 members do not represent any political parties.

The Duma has 450 MPs half of whom are elected as constituency representatives on an individual basis and half on the basis of their party list. The threshold for any party is a minimum 5% of the votes. The party political elections gave the most support to the fascist Zhirinovskiy's party, the 'Liberal Democratic Party of Russia' (24%). The second became Igor Gaydar's pro-reform party, 'Choice of Russia' (15%). At the time of the elections Gaydar was Yeltsin's favourite Deputy Prime Minister, but he has resigned soon after the elections and his party has practically become an opposition party. The Russian Communists received 11% of the votes, the Party of 'Russian Women' (leader Ye. Lachova) 9%, the Russian Agrarian Party 8% (leader M. Lapshin), the so called Yabloko Party, a liberal-oriented party led by the economist, Yavlinskiy 7%; the Russian Unity Party (led by Sachray, another deputy PM) which stood for moderate reforms gained 6% and the Democratic Party, led by Travkin 5% (Duka, 1993; Heti Világgazdaság, 1994a).

As a result of the electoral system, however, the large majority of the Zhirinovskij party has not resulted in their obtaining a majority in the Duma. This is because of the separate party and individual list system and in fact that in Zhirinovskij's case it was only the party which gained such a high percentage in the elections; the individual candidates were little known and were not elected. As a result the number of MPs ending up in the Duma do not closely correspond to the election results of the political parties. Zhirinovskij's party ended up with 63 MPs of whom only four were elected as individuals and the rest on the party list. Gaydar's party, on the other hand, could send 76 MPs to the Parliament, providing the majority there because 36 of them were elected as individuals. The Communists have 55, the Agrarian Party 45 MPs and the Russian Women 23 deputies. Almost one third (131) of the MPs do not represent any political party.

The Russian government is selected partly by the Prime Minister of the country and partly by the president. The three most important posts, the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs and defence, are selected by the president. There are, however, two other, non-elected bodies, which exercise power in the Russian administration, the president's so-called advisory body and the National Security Council, or 'new Politburo', as it has been nicknamed by Russians.

The president's advisory body is the government's 'rival' body, according to Russian politologists (Heti Világgazdaság, 1994a) who claim that this is the most influential political body in the country in major decision making. This is a non-elected body, hand picked by the president, and un-accountable to anyone but him. At the moment it consists of seven people, but its number is not fixed. Only one of them is a minister, Pavel Grachov, the Defence minister. The rest of them are in their posts without being elected, like the head of the new 'KGB', two military officers, the leader of the presidential administration, and the president's personal secretary (Heti Világgazdaság, 1994b).

The excuse of the Chechen-war created a good opportunity for the president to create a second non-elected body, the so called National Security Council, which in practice took over leadership from the government. The constitution hardly mentions such a body, and its function is not clearly defined. There are 13 members in this council at the moment. It is

headed by Oleg Lobov, who is a member of the president's advisory body as well. The council consists of the prime minister, the leaders of the lower and upper houses and the minister of finances. These are the so called voting members of the council. Among the non-voting members are the minister of defence and internal affairs (Home Office), the Russian nominated governor of Chechnya, the head of intelligence and counter-espionage, the deputy PM in charge of ethnic problems, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of civil defence (Vida, 1995).

Thus in Russia the overwhelming majority of the Federal Council and one third of the Duma consist of elected members who do not represent any political party. The electoral system is also devised not to ensure that party political representation reflects people's voting within the two houses. The president has enormous personal power, and added to that he relies on unelected bodies when forming his policies.

THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

There were frequent reorganisations of the local government system in the last 5 years. Political reforms transferring political power from the Communist Party to the state system were initiated in 1988 under Gorbachev. The local elections of 1990 were held to fulfil this reform ideas by electing new representatives to the councils but did not introduce structural changes.

In the elections of local authorities in March 1990, similarly to the general elections of Russia, the main distinction between the political preferences of candidates was based on those who supported reforms standing for Democratic Russia and those who did not. But even this fuzzy distinction only became significant in major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, where democrats were elected to form majority on local councils. In most councils outside these two cities, especially in rural areas, the old guard, local party leaders, factory and farm managers entered and won the elections, people who were previously closely associated with or part of the nomenklatura. In Russia there was a tradition of nomination of candidates by labour collectives, rather than residential meetings. A further obstacle to nomination via residential meetings which discriminated against candidates was

that they had to produce a quorum (150 in Moscow) while no lower size limit was stipulated for labour collectives. The same law obviously disadvantaged the 'neformaly', the embryonic movements and future political parties, which had not been formally registered and did not therefore count as public organisations (Boyce, 1993).

The main reason for reformers not performing well in the local elections, it was argued, was not because outside big cities people had a different opinion about the old nomenklatura, but because the democrats were largely inexperienced in organising effective election campaigns, while the old guard were more experienced organisers and successfully mobilized techniques for surviving electoral challenges (Hanson, 1993). In Moscow, however, which was the vanguard of perestroika, and where the CPSU's campaign was disorganised and half-hearted, a democratic victory was achieved and 60% of the seats were won in the city soviet in 1990. Apart from that there were 33 district councils in Moscow at the time.

Structural changes came a year later, in Autumn 1991, after Popov, Moscow's mayor at the time, was given the right by Yeltsin (then the president of the Russian Federation) to determine the city's administrative structure. 10 large prefectures and 120 municipal districts were established within Moscow. This structure, however, was again short-lived, since it was abolished by a presidential decree in October 1993. The city council was also renamed Duma, bringing back pre-1917 names both in local and national government after the December 1993 elections.

THE RELATION BETWEEN LEGISLATURE AND THE UNELECTED EXECUTIVE BODIES

Gorbachev started a process of guaranteeing independence to the elected bodies of authorities and to ensure that elected bodies had the power to formulate policy against the executive. This has since failed because Yeltsin does not believe in democratisation as the solution of Russia's political problems. He believes in a strong leadership and a centralised political system hence the extensive restructuring at both national and local levels.

Another problem is that apparatchiks at every level remained more or less the same people.

Ministries as well as local authorities are filled with the old guard, who firstly did not wish to give up power they had gained and accustomed to during the Soviet period and secondly, did not change their old routines of treating clients with a surly manner. Apparatchiks were and remained badly informed even in their own fields and maintained a system which was disorganised and inefficient. They did not develop cooperation between different departments and different hierarchical levels. They continued to be part of an overstaffed and ineffective bureaucracy failing to cope with the ever increasing flow of decrees and were not backed up with adequate infrastructure such as computerisation. The idea of not replacing 'experienced' apparatchiks who supposedly alone possessed the 'necessary professional qualifications' in fact led to the maintenance of the old system. Executives held power, government departments and central ministries as well as local authority officials dictated and kept control and elected bodies remained impotent and powerless.

The situation was not helped by the fact that many newly elected representatives were inexperienced in legislative procedures, spent too much time discussing unimportant matters, and were not clear how to discuss issues efficiently and reach decisions. The frequent reorganisation of both national and local levels of authorities in both the elected and executive part did not contribute to a successful development of a working system either. The strong hierarchy did not disappear, the lack of clarity about who was entitled to do what both within a given level of state administration and between different levels remained the same as before. Both at national and local level, the leaders, such as the mayor at local authority level and the president at national level were granted concentrated power, which did not help elected assemblies to develop authority and independence. Leaders either kept changing the law by the power granted for them or simply ignored the law (Boyce, 1993). (The problems of the environmental law and the lack of clear regulations and implementation will be discussed later in this chapter.)

Thus 'democratic' Russia remained a society where administrative power was concentrated, elected bodies were powerless, the system of hierarchy was maintained, bureaucracy was enormous and inefficient, the legal system did not serve the citizen and corruption flourished. How this translates in the field of environmental issues is the subject of the rest of the chapter.

THE AUTHORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

Our aim in looking at the authorities of national and local level will be, as in the Hungarian case, to investigate the relationship between them and the environmental movements in Russia. Based on the evidence of our interviews¹ we will focus on questions whether elected members of the local and national government and the apparatchiks supported the idea of citizen action or resented it both in theory and in their practice, and whether authorities developed an autonomous policy towards environmental movements and what it was like. We also studied whether the authority had any other means of knowing public opinion, or any relationship with the public at large. We investigated how they reacted to pressure from environmental movements, e.g. whether it affected them, and influenced their policy-making. It was important to find out what strategies they developed towards the movements and how these worked. It will be shown whether the personal opinion and attitudes of both employed and elected members of authorities differed from those of their own authority or whether they fully identified with the authority's attitude towards environmental movements. Finally we will discuss the relationship between environmental movements and authorities.

THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Political interest in environmentalism in Russia is just as weak as in many other countries, including Hungary. At the period when environmental movements were strong there was some increase in political interest but the growing problems in the economy and decreasing living standards swiftly pushed it aside. Formal bodies in charge of ecology have been set up at all levels, but these turned out to be more formal than substantial steps. The Russian Parliament has formed a Committee for Ecology in which MPs were supposed to deal with environmental problems and formulate new national laws and regulations. According to a leading member of the ministry, however, members of the committee have been chosen "according to the 'residual' principle [meaning MPs with the lowest prestige, not good enough for 'more important' committees].

¹ Methodological details will be discussed in the Appendix.

"Many of the MPs in the committee did not even know the meaning of the word ecology. People, who were supposed to draft environmental legislation, were illiterate in terms of ecology." (Interview with Grakovich, p.3)

The political ignorance is coupled with administrative anarchy. The Ministry of Ecology of Russia is supposed to be in charge of the 89 Regional Divisions covering the country, similarly to the Hungarian structure, but whilst originally the Regional Divisions were part of the ministry's responsibility they have now become independent organisations and only have to co-operate with the ministry if they wish to do so. They are of course non-elected authorities. The 1500 employees of the ministry are therefore not responsible for the regional level any more. The ministry was also supposed to coordinate the work of several related committees, such as the Committees of Forests, Hydrometeorology, Geology, but these committees started to work autonomously and finally set up their own ministries. In terms of general policy, which could have guided the ministry employees in their work with the remaining committees and other related organs, no-one is clear what to do and how to do it given the absence of any kind of ecological conception which is necessary to consolidate their work. This deepens the problems of the ministry caused by its very limited financial resources most of which are spent on staff.

The minister of environment has a similar position within the government to that of his Hungarian counterpart: the department is in a weak political position. But this similar situation did not lead the minister to react similarly to his colleagues in Hungary. The Russian minister does not see the environmental movements as potential political allies who can channel peoples' wish to put environmentalism higher in the political agenda of the government, and who could support him in his lobbying and make the issue more prominent politically. The minister instead looks at environmental movements as a threat to him and the entire ministry. Environmental activists annoy him, because he sees them as people who demand information, want to know the law and call on him to implement the law which is not something the environmental minister of Russia wishes to endorse. He does not recognise any advantages in the existence of environmental movements but sees them as wholly negative and is irritated by them. Thus the idea of any cooperation is not on his agenda, but calming them is. The ministry set up a department which was given the task not to cooperate

with the movements but act as a buffer. It is, however, a pure formality since the head of department, whose job is to provide information to the movements, commercial organisations and the public at large admits he cannot fulfil this role:

"Theoretically speaking anyone can come to me and ask for information on this or that legislation but I can't give them this information because I am poorly informed myself. I am the head of a department, responsible for information, and I can't provide the population with information, because I don't have it myself." (Grakovich, p.5.)

Civil servants in the Soviet Union were obliged to be loyal to the regime. Most apparatchiks were party members and all of them had to be faithful to the party political line. The majority of existing civil servants are the same people as before since apparatchiks have not been replaced. Their political views may have altered even if their routines have not and they could be strongly committed to any kind of political interest. Whether they are politically neutral or strongly support any of the political parties today is not discussed. There are no attempts to create a politically neutral civil service and the problem is simply left unsolved.

The majority of civil servants are not very sympathetic towards environmental movements. Some are straightforwardly against them. This is the case even among those who themselves were once members of environmental movements. Civil servants perceive environmental movements either as groups with slender interests or as groups pursuing wild philosophical views. The groups aiming at solving concrete local problems are often looked upon as environmental movements with a narrow, selfish interest with a 'speculative character', only aiming at securing the payment of compensation to activists or local residents.

"All political actions of the Greens are but 'democratic schizophrenia'. If we look at them carefully we will find that the majority of them are not normal people." - argued a senior civil servant, an advisor of the minister on radiation (Kuranov, p.4).

Civil servants' attitudes towards environmental movement activists is very disrespectful. The

movements' leaders are accused either of only aiming at political careers, to gain personal privileges or of wanting to receive bribes. Once elected, it was alleged, they forget about their previous environmental demands. Other movement leaders were perceived as people who only want to achieve small individual advantages, like a foreign trip. The relationship between authorities and movement leaders and their 'treatment' is well illustrated in the following quotation. When asked what strategies of interaction with environmental movements the interviewee, a senior civil servant, adopts the response was:

"Demagogy. I have to resort to demagogic methods. When the Greens raise environmental problems they don't aim at constructive co-operation and mutual understanding. Their approach is simple: this is a sore - cut it out. With such negative approach only demagogy is a right strategy. For example, the Greens in Tomsk were protesting against a contract with the French for enrichment of uranium. How can I have a serious dialogue with people who make a fuss about a small problem but disregard a much bigger one? [the danger of uranium enrichment over gaining some hard currency, he means.] I may try to convince them like children that they are wrong but I won't take them seriously. Any explanations are useless with them. The cheapest method to resolve a conflict is to deprive a movement of its leaders, e.g. by bribing them or offering them a trip abroad. It works perfectly. Particularly because this is what many of them want to achieve anyway." (Strigulian, p.10-11)

The public's opinion regarding environmental issues is perceived by civil servants either as something which most people do not worry about too much or as something which has a low priority. Some civil servants felt that they were not supposed to have any knowledge of public opinion and should not have any relations with the public. The public is often looked upon by them as an underdeveloped crowd and even the more tolerant civil servants mainly saw their role as to provide them with more information rather than listening to the public's wishes.

Their main source of information about environmental problems is admittedly the media. But as we showed earlier the media devotes very little attention to environmental questions and

they are censored. The reports are often distorted and portray one or another side's point of view depending on the journalists' own perception or interest. The media also deals only with 'news-worthy' items. Using it as the main source of information regarding people's views in a central administrative organisation is hardly a satisfactory solution. Some civil servants do recognise this, while others refuse to admit it.

Not all civil servants, however, are completely negative regarding environmental movements. Some see them as useful ways to educate people to improve their environmental consciousness. The movements are also useful critics, some argued, 'like a wolf is necessary for a herd of sheep'. But even the most positive supporters of movements among civil servants emphasised that when the greens were strong and popular, frequently demonstrating attracting masses of supporters, they only saw them as 'a destructive force'. And even supportive apparatchiks looked upon activists as 'mentally unbalanced' people who only put pressure on the ministry to impede their work. But the ministry is 'equipped' to deal with such impertinence and destruction, they said. It uses the well-tried Russian method to deal with complaining clients:

"the traditional method: to send them around the corridors, which is enough to make them feel confused and irritated" (Grakovich, p.11).

The reason for trying to get rid of environmental movements or at least completely ignore them rather than co-operate with them is based on the underlying attitude of many civil servants which is well summarised by one of them: 'Co-operation with them [the environmental movements] can be only compared with a dog which tries to bite your leg.' Organising any dialogue between the environmentalists and civil servants was considered completely futile because, it was argued, the activists' and civil servants' 'levels' (sic!) and views are completely incompatible. Many civil servants do not see the role of activists outside the governmental system. A group of experts is more than enough, it was argued, even though the adequacy of their information regarding environmental problems is very questionable. This aspect, however, is not brought into the equation when thinking of any functions environmental movements could fulfil. Some even honestly admitted, that although they did not like the regime before the political changes, they preferred the times when the

CPSU and the KGB had a strong grip on the population and prevented social movements from existing. This worked with 97% of the population, he said, and the remaining 3% was successfully dealt with by repressive methods. Those were the adequate ways of relating to civil society, it was argued.

LOCAL LEVEL

The Regional Committees on the Use and Protection of Natural Resources were set up recently. They are supposed to take over the functions previously held by the All-Union Nature Protection Society, and some of the functions of the State Hydro-Meteorological Committee and the Ministry of Water Supply. Officially they belong to the Ministry of Ecology of Russia as well as the Regional Local Authority, which makes their position very difficult as the two bodies fight over them. The idea is that they will be independent of the local council and fully belong to the ministry. (They are already financed by the ministry.) The Regional Committees on the Use and Protection of Natural Resources are supposed to control the use of newly privatised land and protect it by placing restrictions on the new owners. This power derives from the government. They are also supposed to give 'expert' opinion on issues which the existing laws and regulations do not provide for and keep watch on air pollution, surface water, waste and dumps. Specially protected environmental zones and nature reserves are also their responsibility. They have branches in every district. It is not clear for them, however, whether their function is to be an inspectorate or an agency of the (local or central) administration. The local (regional) administration sometimes sets up a rival internal department for the protection of the environment, which only increases bureaucracy and hinders cooperation. They end up not knowing who is in charge of what. The administrative chaos is well illustrated in one of the employee's testament:

"Ideally the new department [of the regional authority] should be responsible for the use of natural resources, while our [the regional committee's] task would be to keep their activity within environmentally acceptable limits. But this does not happen. It seems that our status is undermined because the Ministry's status is not properly defined. The same is true for other committees, like the Sanitation and Hygiene Committee in the president's

administration. As long as it had this status, it was working very efficiently, e.g. it could close down any industrial enterprise which violated sanitation norms. But after it had been made a part of the Health Care Ministry, it lost all its power (Kreidlin, p.6).

The Regional Environmental Committees are also very badly equipped and lack adequate equipment. 'All departments have radioactivity meters and little else'- we were told. They are also understaffed. Furthermore one has serious doubts about the expertise of the staff. More than half of them are former party functionaries. Whole departments were transferred to the committees when local party administrations started to dissolve. These people are not experts in the field at all. But even those who were not Communist party functionaries are poorly equipped for the job, these 'experts' sometimes have only secondary school education. And this in a country where there is no shortage of highly educated scientists. These committees therefore look more like places which were invented to create jobs for former party functionaries than regional bodies in charge of environmental problems.

But staffing is not the only problem these committees face. The laws and regulations which they are supposed to follow and implement cover only 5% of the problems. A major environmental law, the so called Russian Federal Environmental Protection Law, which was issued in 1992 and was supposed to be interpreted for implementation by the Ministry of Environment, has not been completed and has not been used for years in practice. Old laws are frequently replaced by new ones, but not even the older ones were implemented. The newly issued ones also often contradict existing ones. This leads to a very 'open' interpretation by any body concerned. For example, the law concerning fines for environmentally damaging enterprises or individuals does not work because it is too complicated and there are disputes over the meaning of passages, we were told. Or, in other cases, the court needs calculations for the size of damages, but no-one knows how to do this, so the courts do not accept the committee's application for legal action. In fact even the prosecution's level of competence is questionable, because as one civil servant put it:

"Their competence can be illustrated by the fact that they phone us asking what laws apply to a particular problem." (Kriedlin, p.3)

Local authorities also 'misinterpret' the law if that is in their interest, contradicting the committee's interpretation. The lack of clear guidelines which should have been coming from the central level allows that.

But the civil servants working for the committee did not develop the same antagonistic stance towards environmental movements as their colleagues at the national level. They do not look at them with a very negative attitude which characterises civil servants working for the central administration. They are also aware that environmental movements were generally a lot more active and powerful in the past and their influence has since weakened. The committee, being a fairly new organisation (and one which does not seem to be very effective), has not been often approached by movement activists. Local movements do not turn to them because they are neither local representatives nor local executives. The national movements also bypass them and turn to the central level of administration because they are a regional body with no clear responsibilities. Since movements have not provoked or challenged them, the civil servants of the committee look at the activists more with the attitude of officials of an environmental organisation rather than confronted apparatchiks, like those in the ministries. Committee employees do not think environmental movements are very effective or professional enough but do not see them as irritating enemies. Rather they perceive them as useful independent groups which should pool their resources and use them to highlight concrete environmental problems. If movements contacted them and provided them with information about ecological damage in the region this is accepted as valuable information, they said. In fact they would be grateful if the movements were looking for issues they presently ignore, such as the piling up of rubbish or dangerous waste lands which are not dealt with, which would encourage the committee itself to pay attention to. Not only are they not antagonistic towards the movements but some even co-operate with them. 20 - 30 students of the nature protection brigade of the Moscow State University help the Moscow Regional Committee on a regular basis. One of them who had been a member of the brigade since 1985 became an employee of the committee in 1991 and mobilised his comrades to help on a voluntary basis which was well appreciated by the committee's other employees, including senior officials.

The committee has contacts with the public mainly via their complaints. When a member of the public or groups of people send a letter of complaint to the Ministry of Environment it passes the letter down to the regional committee which is supposed to investigate the case and reply. Most of the complaints, however, are treated with scepticism and looked upon as 'overdramatised' demands, which slightly contradicts their verbal testimonies regarding the movements. Little is done to carry out serious investigation and even less towards solving problems. The letters are replied to as a formality. This seems to be the main occupation of the staff within the committee. Even the committee's own employees are ignored and their concerns are mostly disregarded. As one of them put it:

"During my working day I have to sit in my office, because the boss does not like us to go out even to the nature reserve, which is part of our responsibility. So, I have to do it on weekends and then write a report which no-one seems to need here. It happens that I send a letter of complaint myself to the ministry and it is sent back to the committee. " (p.8)

Overall civil servants at the regional level are somewhat more positive towards environmental movements than civil servants at the central level but that does not mean that they are fully supportive. Interestingly even those who themselves participate in movements or who make good use of them as supportive voluntary helpers are only ready to accept the movements they are in direct contact with and reject others. Thus, when asked, environmental movements in general are either strongly criticised as being too global or too local, or too demanding or not looking for the right things in the eyes of the official or looked upon as people who are amateurs and should be ignored. But these civil servants at least support people with ecological thinking and are not against the idea of independent environmental movements on the whole. They are ready to co-exist with some and support the ideal movement which they wished existed in a shape and form they envisage it. They are thus a lot more positive than civil servants at the central level in their dealings with environmental movements.

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Local authorities have elected and non-elected members but a peculiarity of the Russian situation is that local councillors, like MPs, are actually paid a full salary for their services and in practice being an elected local representative is a full time job, with offices in the council building itself. This means that both officials and councillors are in practice employees of the local government. Nevertheless they have very different positions and outlooks within the administrative system and we must look at their relation to environmental movements separately.

THE NON-ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The non-elected members of local Dumas have a very similar stance to civil servants of the regional committees concerning environmental movements. They too have surprisingly little direct contact with local environmental movements, and see them as harmless forces as long as they are ready to compromise and eliminate extremist ideas and individuals among them. Environmental movements are perceived as groups which accommodate too many people who joined the movements because they are 'odd', 'antisocial' and have extremist views. The activists, Duma officials argue, have a very one-sided approach when they see environmentalism as the most important problem. These apparatchiks believe that it is the economy which does and should have priority when it comes to allocating resources or deciding in a concrete conflict. Environmentalists therefore are often perceived as people who represent very narrow interests, opposing everything the rest of the society stands for. A power station should be built if the economy needs it and no environmental consideration can alter that, to use a concrete example, as argued in the interviews. The solution of problems is often looked at from a financial point of view. People who complain should be paid compensation, polluting firms should be fined and that is the most that can be done for them.

Local authorities, as executive bodies, do not seem to be too concerned with environmental issues. They do not allocate resources to solve environmental problems and do not even have officials dealing with these issues. There was not a single official, for example, in the entire Moscow city council, whose job was to deal with environmental problems. Consequently there is no-one to investigate problems signalled by the many letters individuals or groups

write to the Duma concerning environmental complaints thus ecologists' demands are simply ignored. And this is the best they can do, officials argued, because social movements are a kind of 'pest' anyway. If not ignored then they would be fought on a political basis and ridiculed. The fact that the authorities do not use dirty campaigns against the movements is considered by them to be a generous gesture, a sign of huge political tolerance! 'Luckily' the authority is very busy with other problems. It has a more important task on its hand which is maintaining its power vis-a-vis the elected members of the council.

"This is a large well-organised [?], highly intellectual organisation which would like to preserve its power...it is a natural inclination of people who were previously in power to keep this power" - revealed an apparatchik from Moscow city council (Makagonov,p.5).

And this power can and is turned into marketable commodities, such as property and privatization vouchers. The previous elite is working very hard on maintaining their positions using new and old methods. Environmentalism is way down the line among the worries they are concerned with.

THE ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL DUMAS

The elected members of the council are in a very difficult position. Since 1990 many councillors have been elected as new members without much experience of local government. The 'old' councillors, however, also faced difficulties due to the changing division of labour between the elected and the executive body. Theoretically the councillors' work is a) to monitor whether the law is observed, b) prepare regulations if needed and c) to approve the budget and monitor expenditure. The idea that councillors are supposed to make policies and decisions is, however, not clear for Russian councillors. They do initiate policy related ideas occasionally but more often pet projects rather than systematically looking at different issues. But even on those few occasions when they draw up drafts, discuss them with the relevant committees, and pass them to the executive body they are completely ignored most of the time.

Thus even concerning fundamental issues, such as the budgeting, the entire elected body is completely ignored. Councils keep on operating without approved budgets, via personal negotiations between the Mayor and the presidential office. This way no-one has to, even formally, approve or know about the budget allocation outside the Mayor's office within the council. Moscow city's 1992 budget, for example, had not even been discussed by September 1992! This, according to councillors, became a practice to avoid the uncomfortable discussions which happened over the budget allocation in 1991 when cuts were introduced from the already very low allocation of 1% for environmental projects to 0.7%. For 1992, Moscow city did not wish to allocate any money at all. By not making the 1992 budget public, they avoided 'unnecessary' debates with the councillors. Thus the elected body not only does not have the right to be in charge of the budget but is not even informed about any decision concerning major issues. Clearly the Mayor and his department keep control of all decision-making, if necessary unlawfully, and the elected members of the local authorities are mere formalities, reduced to performing fewer than their legal obligations. This means that in practice the full and part-time councillors' main work is often to reply to the public's complaints. The council is bombarded by letters from the public - from individuals as well as groups. Some are kept within the executive part of the council and replied to from there, but the majority of these letters are passed on to the councillors. They can look at the problem before replying if they wish to do so, but are not obliged to do so. Their main task is to try to reply to as many letters as possible.

Party politics also play very little role in the elected section of the council. Councillors might belong to one party or another but many of them stand for their own individual views and are elected on that basis. Party politics do change rapidly, as parties have been forming over the years but at local level they seem to have even less importance than at national level. At the 1990 local elections for example, even if political parties were in an embryonic shape, it was clear that the majority of the newly elected city councillors in Moscow were anti-hard line, pro-democracy members. This, however, was completely ignored when it came to appointing a chair of the elected body, Mr. Gonchar, a former district party committee secretary. He was a useful choice for the Mayor, however, as Mr. Gonchar agreed with his policies and contributed to the maintenance of the old status quo. The executive body's position in the power struggle is carefully strengthened at every point. The argument is that

'old' experience cannot be beaten by new ideologies.

Elected councillors do support environmental movements as long as they are moderate and do not voice too radical demands. Many of them either stood with environmental issues at the centre of their political manifestos or at least supported the subject very strongly. Even the Mayor of Moscow, Popov, promised special attention to environmentalism when he was a candidate. Many of these people, from the mayor to the councillors, however, found 'more important problems' to deal with once elected.

Not being negative about organised civil actions is, however, one thing, but supporting them in concrete cases is another. Some councillors even in the ecological committee, often environmental movement activists themselves, might take a conservative view, having looked at concrete complaints regarding green aspects. For example, when a neighbourhood complained against the heavy pollution caused by a tyre factory, and in another case by a brickworks he commented:

"After I studied the documents I realised that they did not do any harm to the environment and did not pollute the atmosphere. I recommended that the application was turned down. This was not based on my opinion but on my professional knowledge." (Vorobiev, p.10) And when he was confronted with the fact that thick soot and dust pollute people's houses in the neighbouring blocks of flats and that heavy industry should not be located in the middle of highly populated housing estates he regarding himself as a 'highly respected professional' argued this way: "As for advanced technology, well, we will pollute space. I can't tell exactly what problems arise, but I know that this is an objective law of any growing system. One can observe this happening in the world of crystals, my academic subject. Growing crystals begin to 'pollute' the surrounding environment thereby slowing down their growth because they consume the components essential for it." (p.11)

The philosophy, which is very strong among most Russians, and shared even by environmentalist councillors, is clear: the materialistic needs of Russia require growth, which

in turn needs sacrifices. Nature and environment is just one of those things which inevitably fall victim to this process. The philosophy echoes ideas repeated when the aim was building communism. Human and natural sacrifices are still viewed as an inherent part of development for many people brought up on Soviet philosophy and persist among environmentalist councillors as well.

There were quite a number of environmental groups in the early 1990s, in Moscow alone there were around 160 known by the city council in September 1992. Some were more active in creating relationships with councillors than others. There is always a number of councillors ready to listen to those movements which approach them and offer some help. They would first of all make documents available for the movements, as long as these are available to the councillors themselves, which often constitutes a problem. Secondly these sympathetic councillors would look at their complaints and advise them about the circumstances. Some have supported a few movements with funds, even though this has been rare and the funds were not very large either. This is partly due to the general financial situation of environmental issues within the council.

Some councillors complained about the lack of any strong organised national or city level organisations and even offered to organise some themselves, which seems like a confusion of roles. The chair of the Environmental Committee of Moscow City Council, for example, expressed a strong wish to organise another Moscow Federation of Environmental Movements, because he was not satisfied with the strength of the existing one. He also organised a body of environmentalist councillors. This strong belief that small groups have to be organised into national or federal forces was thus not only present among the movement activists, but was very characteristic of those who strongly support environmental movements among the councillors. The lack of political strength of environmental movements was blamed on organisational matters by these Moscow city councillors who themselves were very weak politically within the city government. Their way of thinking was similar to Hungarian politicians who sought to be backed up by demonstrating masses organised by environmental movements in order to strengthen their own political power within the government.

Elected members of the council also saw the advantage of environmental movements in providing information about the state of the environment within the community. Their source of information was not confined to monitoring the press, like civil servants did. Many of the councillors paid careful attention to opinion polls and felt very concerned that the media did not supply enough coverage to enable people to be properly informed and form opinion. However, councillors themselves found it difficult to do much about this. The press, they also felt, was censored: many subjects were not discussed at all, others not adequately presented to alert ordinary people. The chair of the Environmental Committee himself was banned from broadcasting because of his known political views.

Councillors believe that environmental movements in Russia should consider themselves lucky not to be harassed by the executives of the authority. This is only because environmental movements are perceived as powerless organisations not worth worrying about. At the time when the movements were viewed as a stronger political force, attracting considerable public support, the authorities were not in the same position as they are now. In the late 1980s and very early 1990s the authorities reacted to pressure from organised grassroots action. Since then the situation has changed. The apparatchiks regained power and do not seem to fear social movements any more. Social movements for their part have also calmed down; they are not capable of exerting strong pressure on the authorities. Interestingly, however, it was felt by many councillors that a potential threat could even be dangerous, it could bring about an unfriendly retort towards the movements.

ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS VERSUS AUTHORITIES

Environmental movements are fully aware of the lack of support they receive from the authorities. They feel that their opinions and protests are ignored. Some support of councillors is only experienced by those few activists who contacted them. Most, however, felt that the authority was antagonistic whenever it could be. For example, many movements tried to legalise their position by registering at the local council. In most cases this procedure became a very unpleasant experience. Instead of providing help and advice on how to write up the statute, council officers delayed looking at it and after a while would find some problem with it which, the movement activists felt, was a mere excuse to avoid registering

them. This often led to a lengthy process before they could finally register, and in some cases they were delayed indefinitely.

When it came to obtaining information on concrete issues and discussing them with the relevant authority, lack of support was again the most common experience. Information was not made available to movement activists, relevant data is withheld from them, and discussions seemed to be completely futile. No signs of cooperation were offered by the authorities. In case of concrete struggles the authority most of the time ignored the environmentalists' arguments and took the side of the other partner in the debate, e.g. the enterprise. In other cases the movement was simply ignored altogether. Those few councillors who remained faithful to them and actively supported (moderate) environmentalists were hardly visible to the activists, as they were outnumbered by the many hostile and antagonistic members of authorities.

CONCLUSION

Central and local authorities in Russia show strong signs of developing in the direction of re-centralisation and rebuilding non-democratic forces. This is done both by the frequent reorganisation of the authorities as well as informally, by not letting elected bodies carry out their duties. The events of the two last coups, as well as the war against Chechnya, provide constant and well exploited excuses for President Yeltsin to set up bodies which contradict all the efforts of the late Gorbachev period to change the authority system into a more democratic one. The tentative alterations have since been overruled by many new ones since Yeltsin has become president, including at the level of local authorities.

Political parties did develop in Russia slowly over the years, but elected representatives often do not stand for parties when they contest elections. The overwhelming majority of the upper house is made up of so called 'independents' and one third of the lower house MPs as well. At the local level political parties play even less role when electing councillors. As a result of the electoral system, however, political party representation would not result in corresponding representation in the elected bodies either at local or national level anyway, for the reasons given earlier.

In this situation the non-elected part of authorities, both at national and local level, play a disproportionately powerful role. They have successfully maintained their power to form policies and allocate budgets, to issue decrees and regulations at all levels. Elected representatives play a mainly secondary role and feel unarmed in this struggle for power. The lack of a systematic legal system also contributes to the difficulties.

Non-elected authority members are mostly not very supportive towards environmental movements, but even some elected representatives are antagonistic towards them. The minister in charge of the Environmental Ministry is just as hostile towards them as the top civil servants who do not see much function for independent, non-governmental organisations and do not wish to listen to them or co-operate with them. Civil servants at the regional level have a more mixed view of environmental movements. They can see their use as unpaid volunteers, as long as the activists restrict themselves to fulfilling certain useful tasks for the authority. Radical views are strongly opposed by civil servants at all levels and many movements' complaints are viewed as a nuisance.

Local authorities have two parallel bodies in full-time jobs, the elected councillors and the executives. Of the two the executives possess real decision-making power while councillors can only advise and are mostly ignored. The council apparatchiks do not have a positive attitude towards environmental movements, and generally ignore environmental problems altogether. This is demonstrated by the fact that no money was allocated to environmental issues by 1992 and that no department is in charge of environmental problems within the executive part of local Duma. The elected body of the council has an environmental committee but it is very weak in Moscow and its activity is largely reduced to replying to letters of complaints from the public. It cannot fulfil its role in influencing financial decisions or policy making or in monitoring whether the law is observed by the council and enterprises in the constituency. Some of the councillors are supportive towards environmental movements but the majority lost interest in the subject once elected. Some maintain the view that Russia needs sacrifices while having economic problems and the environment cannot escape its share even if it becomes the victim of this development. Other councillors, however, try to give as much support to environmental groups as they can. They are, however, the minority of councillors. Consequently environmental movements in Russia find themselves in very

difficult circumstances. They face an overwhelmingly unsupportive authority both at local and national level. They are deprived of information, documents and data which could help in their arguments and are faced with a lot of hostility. Their declining public support helps them to avoid harassment from the authorities, which choose simply to ignore them due to their political weakness. When it comes to battling with each other, environmental movements in Russia almost always become the losers in this one sided struggle.

CHAPTER 9

A COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN AND HUNGARIAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will identify the major similarities and differences between environmental movements in Russia and Hungary. The comparison will emphasise the extent of diversity within the former Soviet bloc. I will discuss the differences deriving from the political context as well as the situation characterising the movements. Russian and Hungarian environmental movements will be systematically compared in terms of their structure and goals, the characteristics of the participants and leaders, the extent of internal conflicts of the movements, their survival tactics and achievements and the role of the media. Finally I will examine how the different development of local and national authorities influences the features of environmental movements in the two cases.

The chapter thus has two major aims: as well as comparing Russian and Hungarian environmental movements I shall also discuss the extent of development of democracy because of its influence on the chances of grassroots organisations, like environmental movements, to succeed.

A COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

I) Before the regime change

Descriptions of the political context in Russia and Hungary often emphasise the similarities between them. In my view, however, the differences outnumber the similarities. It is not disputed that there was a period when the two countries' political development coincided in many ways which was an intentional outcome of the leaderships' aims. The resemblance was strongest at the time when Stalin was in power in the Soviet Union and Matyas Rakosi in Hungary. Between 1948 and the mid 1950s Hungary was shaped according to the Soviet pattern, as were most other socialist societies. 1956, however, put a halt to this process and

Hungary started to diverge from the 'Soviet model' as far as circumstances allowed, as analysed earlier. This allowed Hungary to follow its reform efforts which were initiated much earlier, from 1953 onwards but were only taken seriously in the early and mid 1960s with the official introduction in 1968 of the so called 'New Economic Mechanism' (NEM). Unfortunately the Soviet Union itself (after Khrushchev's removal from the political scene) did not manage to maintain the liberalisation process and turned backwards politically speaking, especially in her domestic politics, while in Hungary - with some hiccoughs - the reform tendency remained unaffected on the whole and continued till the end of the regime.

Major political changes re-started in the Soviet Union only after the death of Brezhnev, although some relaxation in political terms had been occurring in the period before his death. These changes stemmed from the recognition that the country's economy was stagnating and living standards were not increasing. Examples of other socialist societies, such as Hungary, where the primacy of the Communist party was not questioned and the basic structure of the regime was untouched but where the economic reforms and political relaxation had resulted in a better economic situation, higher living standards and less discontent than in the Soviet Union, encouraged the new party leader, Gorbachev, to follow these examples. He initiated radical changes which led to a political upheaval, resulting in the so-called glasnost and later perestroika. The restructuring within the Soviet Parliament and local government aimed at increasing democratisation within the Soviet Union under Gorbachev.

Gorbachev was too radical and too conservative at the same time. This provoked forces both on the right and the left. His conservatism was demonstrated in the fact that he dithered for too long over the introduction of a multi-party system in Russia. By the time he gained power, political demands were far more radical all over the socialist world and radical changes could not be reduced to reforms within the old regime. Failing to recognise this and insisting on keeping the leading and exclusive role of the CPSU till the very end of his leadership, Gorbachev provoked the pro-democracy supporters, who as a result of the very glasnost initiated by Gorbachev, developed the recognition that multi-party system is a necessary basis of democratic development.

Gorbachev's radical reforms, on the other hand, also alarmed the hard-liners who wanted to

return to the political system as it was in Brezhnev's time. This led to the coup of 1991 followed by Gorbachev's lost popularity among the masses which brought his opponent, Boris Yeltsin, into power.

The Hungarian development is very different in many respects and as a result Hungary did not go through such a stormy process as Russia. The reforms within the economy were followed by liberalisation in the political sphere from the late 1960s onwards. The crises in the early and mid 1980s, when many reform supporters expressed worries that a) the reform process was starting to slow down, and b) that after Kadar's succession it could even be reversed, just as in the Soviet Union after Khrushchev, were at the centre of discussion in many social science publications. The development in the Soviet Union, the Andropov-Gorbachev political line, however, gave some hope to supporters of reforms in Hungary. Even when Kadar was replaced by Karoly Grosz, who had the reputation of being a hardliner, the wider political circumstances could not keep him in power for long and he was swiftly replaced by a reform communist, Miklos Nemeth. This reform leadership within the party and the government peacefully led the country out of a one-party system.

In Hungary private property, including land ownership, had never been completely abolished and private business had gradually been encouraged since the 1960s with increased encouragement from the very early 1980s. State companies were also run by more competent management due to the New Economic Mechanism (Hare, 1977; Radice, 1981; Galasi and Sziráczi, 1985) and profitmaking by individual state enterprises became increasingly important (Soós, 1986). Hence the economic changes towards a market economy were much smoother than in Russia. In the political sphere the changes were also more gradual. Political parties started to develop at a very early stage of the transition (Bozoki, 1990), with rapidly established clear political complexions, unlike in Russia. The differences among the major political parties allowed the electorate to choose with a fairly clear conviction by the March 1990 general elections.

In Russia, however, both economic and political changes show a different pattern. The lack of gradual development towards a market economy combined with the political turmoil during the Gorbachev period resulted in a serious economic slip back. Living standards,

which were already lower than in neighbouring European socialist societies, were falling and new phenomena appeared in the life of Russian people, who had never before experienced them: high inflation, unemployment and privatisation, features which had been known in socialist Hungary for decades.

II) After the regime change

After the elections of 1990 Hungary embarked on a major reconstruction of the political system. The multi-party elections were successful in the sense that they brought in a government for four years with fairly clear political goals. The government was a coalition of three parties of the centre right with nationalistic emphasis and a moderate style. The opposition parties were also well organised and not much behind the victorious ones in popularity, as expressed in election results and reflected in their representation in parliament. Radical changes were introduced in the central administration as well as in local government. The first and most important intention, based on an all-party consensus, was to give the elected political bodies the leading role in national and local policy-making. Representatives were made accountable to their electorates. National and local elections were set for every four years to ensure a cyclical system of democratic elections both nationally and at local government level. Parliament became the most important body of political decision-making at the national level and the system of local administration was also radically reorganised. It was decentralised, delegating power to the lowest level of local government, doubling the number of local councils in the process of reorganisation, decentralising every unit (regional councils) which were during the socialist period artificially united against the wishes of the local population. Very importantly local authorities gained responsibility for their budgets, as well as policies, independent from each other both hierarchically and vertically.

The legal system became politically independent, based on the existing criminal and civil system. Solicitors had been acting on a private basis even prior to the democratic changes, but were not completely free politically. Judges and prosecutors were politically dependent, a system which changed from 1990. Parliament embarked on a continuous process of replacing the outdated socialist law by new legislation. This process will need considerable time to complete, especially as certain issues, such as social policy (pensions, health service,

etc.) and the economy are more frequently discussed (and changed) than others, such as the environment, which has no priority for any government in Hungary or major party. It is only Parliament, however, which can issue new laws in Hungary and only elected bodies, such as local authorities, can issue legally binding regulations.

Overall every attempt has been made to create a society where political structures and processes follow those developed in 'older' democracies. These processes did not of course take place without major errors. The newly elected government in many ways echoed the communist practice. Former loyal communist civil servants, for example, were replaced by new ones, but in many senior cases by those who were 'politically loyal' to the new government. Similar changes occurred in the leadership of important institutions, like national banks. The most damaging attempt to establish political loyalty occurred in the media. The state television and radio presidents and a large number of journalists, known critics of the new government, were sacked. However, these measures backfired in two ways. Firstly they drew attention to defects in the process of nominations for such positions and secondly they added to the rapidly growing unpopularity of the MDF-led government which contributed to their spectacular defeat in 1994. The problems of party-neutral civil servants and managers of nationally important institutions, media leaders and journalists still exist and are high on the agenda of political and parliamentary debates. The MDF-led government lost popularity only six months after the national election in March 1990 to such an extent that it brought about an overwhelming victory for the opposition parties in many local governments in December 1990 which created a very interesting situation politically speaking at local versus national level.

In Russia, on the other hand, it was only the last years of the Gorbachev period which addressed and, to an extent, implemented changes which led to a more developed democratic system. Since Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev as president of Russia, however, no attempts have been made to continue the process of democratisation, initiated by Gorbachev by reorganising the parliament, the constitution and the system of local government. Apart from allowing political parties to compete during elections (but not to compete on equal terms, i.e. allocating them equal shares of television time or a fair amount of financial resources) several direct attempts have been made to centralise power in the hands of the president and non-

elected leaders and no attempts have been made to place political power in the hands of elected bodies (Heti Vilaggazdasag, 1994a; 1994b). The electoral system does not lead to a proportionate representation of the elected parties in Parliament and Parliament is not the only body which issues law. It is the president and mayors, who are sometimes not even elected but put into their position by Yeltsin (for example Moscow city council's [now called Duma] mayor, Luzhkov), who issue decree after decree (Tolz, 1994; Vida, 1995).

At local level it is not elected bodies which make policies, or are in charge of the budget allocation and issue regulations but the unelected executive part of the authorities. There were no attempts either to replace civil servants and local government officials 'inherited' from the Soviet period. Hence the majority of the Russian apparatchiks follow routines acquired in the old regime. As they are 'in charge', in both political and executive terms, of the old 'apparatchik' system, originally developed in Tsarist Russia, continues more or less untouched.

The legal system in Russia is not independent either and it remains (as was before) completely inadequate to fulfil its tasks. The lack of civil law (never developed in the Soviet period and not established since), the unclarified legislative system, including contradictory laws frequently issued (often by the president) without systematically replacing outdated ones, are just examples characterising the situation (see about this more in Perepjolkin, 1996).

The decentralisation process of the local administration, introduced under Gorbachev in 1990, has since been reversed (Boyce, 1993; Hanson, 1993). The frequent reorganisation of both local and national administrations shows two clear tendencies: firstly a re-centralisation, a shift of power back to the top level within the hierarchy and secondly a shift back towards the hands of non-elected bodies. The media, which under Gorbachev experienced a refreshing openness, has become closely controlled and censored again. This is also true of the so called independent papers, and there is no sign of any relaxation in this field.

To sum up, Hungary has been through a gradual process of reform concluding in a peaceful and fairly smooth transition into a multi-party system with a market economy. Political parties developed at an early stage during the regime change and the all-party consensus led

to a gradual and steady development of a democratic structure. Hungarians have been more accustomed to 'capitalist' phenomena, such as price rises and private property, which became familiar features over the decades since the New Economic Mechanism was introduced, but are very new for Russians.

By contrast, political and economic changes took Russia by storm. The openings and democratization attempts under Gorbachev have largely been reversed. Many Russians, including political leaders, see the solution to the evolving difficulties, both in the economy and in the political sphere, in strong concentrated power. A multi-party system has been introduced and different political parties could compete by the December 1993 general elections, but the electoral system does not ensure proper representation. Elected bodies on the whole do not play the leading role; instead it is the non-elected executives who govern the country at all levels of administration and they are often members of the 'old' apparatus. Neither democracy nor a market system has been established in Russia while social policy achievements established in the Soviet period are rapidly eroding. While most people's living standards have been decreasing social polarisation increased greatly. This is the subject of deep dissatisfaction among most Russians who still maintain a strong feeling of social justice developed in the Soviet period. No serious attempts have been made to extend the process of democratisation and in fact all the evidence suggests that the most important trend is just the opposite in Russia today. A concentration of power and a process of re-centralisation is occurring under Yeltsin, a process which was re-enforced by his increased presidential power, voted for overwhelmingly by the 52% of the population who did vote in the December 1993 elections (Sakwa, 1994).

A COMPARISON OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

The upsurge in concern over environmental problems which was emerging in the developed world in the early 1970s reached Hungary fairly soon after it occurred in the west. It, however, avoided the Soviet Union which was more isolated than Hungary. Concern over the environment developed in Russia prior to the revolution as a result of 19th century German influence (Weiner, 1988) and this continued in the Soviet period independent from

the western influence. This romantic notion regarding Russian nature characterised the development of environmentalism up to the late 1980s when it started to combine with ideas arriving from the west.

I. Before the regime change

Social movements existed in both societies before the political change but in Hungary they were scarce, even if political liberalism was more advanced than in the Soviet Union. In Hungary the very few social movements concentrated on peace and environment related issues. It is interesting that organised movements were not allowed to develop by the ruling communist leadership considering that political liberalism was the greatest in the entire Soviet bloc. Critical voices were strong, and opposition existed among intellectuals and workers as well and dissidents experienced much less repression than their counterparts in the Soviet Union, but independent grassroots organisations were repressed.

In the Soviet Union interestingly enough political repression was greater but movement activities became stronger than in Hungary. Political opposition existed in both countries but they were different. While the Hungarian opposition was more focused on political issues, i.e. the lack of freedom in the press and publications and the prohibition of free assembly were the main issues among intellectuals, and pay and not enough say in management decisions was the main concern among workers' opposition, in the Soviet Union opposition mainly concentrated on nationalism and religious issues or else it focused on collective issues, not catered for by the 'all embracing' state system (i.e. neighbourhood movements, self-interest groups). There were other groups which were turned into opposition groups by the political leadership, including pop-groups, art groups, environmental protection groups (to save Lake Baikal, Siberian rivers, Lake Aral, the forests in the North, etc.) led by famous writers concerned with the deterioration of the Russian environment.

II. After the regime change

Environmental movements started to mushroom in the two countries at the same period as a result of the parallel political changes. Gorbachev's glasnost and the relaxation of the last

communist leadership in Hungary were closely connected and resulted in an upsurge of social movements in both societies simultaneously. Environmental movements were in the vanguard of social movements in both societies, combining oppositional political sentiments with concerns over environmental problems. Many activists of this early period catapulted into political fame and later became leading politicians (in different parties of the right and of the left) having participated in environmental movements first.

In Hungary the process of differentiation between greens and politicians occurred at an early stage. A strict distinction between party politics and non-party political activities very soon followed the short period of transition. The sphere outside party politics, i.e. social movement participation, is therefore sharply distinguished by Hungarian movement activists, who consider themselves to be political activists of a non-partisan civil society.

In Russia this separation between political party activities and social movement activities has not developed to the same extent as in Hungary. The concept of civil society has not been discussed or emphasised either, in the same way as it has in Hungary. Hence in Russia party political activities are not looked upon as a completely different type of engagement in political activities, from participating in civil society actions, as emphasised in Hungary. Russian movement activists find it easy to reconcile being part of party politics (especially in opposition) at the same time as being active in social movements. This can be related to the fact that political parties in Russia are a lot more unstable than in Hungary and most of the opposition political parties are much weaker. This led to a situation in which different political forces, (i. e. political parties and social movements), all in opposition, wish to combine efforts rather than divide, as in Hungary.

Both Russian and Hungarian environmental movements, however, went through a stage when mass demonstrations and meetings were a frequently used method in expressing views and putting pressure on relevant authorities. This has changed in both countries for different reasons.

In Russia ~~they~~ not only disappeared from the arsenal of political weapons but has become a condemned method by everybody: the public, the movements and the authorities. In Hungary

however, demonstrations have not been rejected by any means but a certain 'demonstration-fatigue' occurred after a while which led to growing difficulties in mobilising the masses. This was, however, looked upon as a lamentable outcome by all concerned, especially by Hungarian senior politicians in charge of the environment who even blamed the movements for not trying harder to mobilise spectacular masses demonstrating!

In Russia there is a much stronger desire for collectivism than in Hungary. This is expressed in the case of environmental movements in the strong wish to unite in federal organisations. Russian environmental movement activists devote a lot of time and energy building and maintaining federal organisations, which do not exist in Hungary. These federations help the individual movements to exchange information and provide support for each other. This desire to unite is, however, a strong sign of political weakness as well. Individual movements in Russia do not feel forceful enough to face authorities or enterprises in their fight and hope that united forces will provide stronger support.

In Hungary, on the other hand, no umbrella organisation exists for environmental movements and no individual movement expressed the view that there was a need for it. There had been tentative attempts to organise such bodies but they had all failed almost at birth. I would argue that in Hungary a different culture developed historically from that in Russia. This is connected both to the more recent pre-socialist period compared with the Soviet case and to the pre-socialist period. Since the mid-1960s under Kadar there was a special approach to 'socialist values' as discussed above, which prevented another 1956 reoccurring in Hungary. This led to a culture in Hungary which is much more 'individualistic'. It also created a situation in which hierarchically built organisations are not desired, unlike in Russia. There is a good information flow and frequent contacts among the different Hungarian environmental movements horizontally, and they also meet at yearly conferences, but the idea of a hierarchical structure is strongly rejected by the individual environmental movements in Hungary. Hierarchy is not favoured either as a principle or as a practice.

THE MOVEMENT PARTICIPANTS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The participants in environmental movements in both countries are very similar. The

movements attract many highly educated people, frequently with a degree in natural science. At the same time environmental movements accommodate a large number of activists from all segments of society with all levels of education in both cases. The difference, however, is that in Russia the movements at a higher level within the hierarchical system of environmental movements (i.e. federal organisations or any other umbrella organisations) concentrate the most highly educated members. Local movements are more likely to have a few well educated members and for the rest of the activists to have lower educational background. In Hungary, on the other hand, where the hierarchical system does not exist, the distribution of well educated people and lesser educated activists is fairly even among movements.

There is an important difference in the age distribution of activists between Hungarian and Russian environmental movements. In Hungary most core members are middle aged and there is a large proportion of young people participating in the movements because Hungarian environmental movements pay special attention to attracting young people. In Russia, however, there is no such conscious attempt. Consequently young people are not represented in large proportions within environmental movements as a whole. The age division between national and local movements is influenced, again, by the hierarchical structure of Russian movements. Local environmental movements often attract the older generations, (retired people), while national organisations are more likely to have middle aged activists with one exception where the average age is much younger (Greenpeace Russia).

In both countries there was a high proportion of female participation in environmental movements at every level. It is Russia where women were more likely to become leaders in both national and local movements. In Hungary, however, the proportion of women among leaders was not always proportional to their ratio as activists within the movement where they are the majority of participants.

According to recent literature there is growing concern among social scientists about the rapid decrease of womens' participation in political parties and governments in Eastern Europe (Einhorn, 1993). The disappearance of the quota system, which existed during the socialist period, has radically decreased women's previous ratio (around 25 %) in Central and

Eastern European parliaments. Environmental movements, however, provide good evidence that women have not given up political activism in Eastern Europe altogether though their exclusion from political parties remains an alarming trend even if women became active at grassroots level.

The structure of each movement in both countries follows the same pattern. Firstly the core of very active members. In Hungary a lot more of them have a chance to be paid for their activities after a period of voluntary work than in Russia where only very few movements had the resources to afford that. The second circle is the group of activists who take part on an intermittent basis and do not have regular responsibilities. The third group of people in both countries is the circle of sympathisers. The widest circle is the non-active sympathisers. In Russia in the national and local elections in 1990 for example a lot of candidates stood for elections delegated by environmental movements and many of them were elected which is a strong proof of the many sympathisers. In Hungary it is also true that environmental movements express their priority towards individual candidates at local and national elections and their political support plays an important part in voting patterns within a locality.

THE MOVEMENT LEADERS COMPARED

The movement leaders are always (in both societies) chosen from the core members which is understandable: they become leaders because they are very active and willing to devote the necessary time and energy and are charismatic enough to be accepted for leadership. Leaders of environmental movements are always highly educated people without exception, irrespective of whether the movement was national or local, in both countries. This is because expertise is always regarded as essential to leading an environmental movement in its struggle.

However, leaders differed in terms of age in the two countries. In Hungary they were always middle aged people, while in Russia in some cases they came from the older generation. This is a consequence of the age characteristics of many Russian local environmental movements.

HIERARCHY AND BUREAUCRACY IN CONNECTION WITH ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS COMPARED

There were two important respects in which Hungarian and Russian environmental movements differed substantially. These are the questions of hierarchy and bureaucracy. Even though Russian environmentalists frequently emphasised their dislike of any hierarchical system as a principle, referring to their movements, paradoxically the leadership structure of the individual groups was very hierarchical, as is the whole system of movement organisation in Russia.

In Hungary there were instances of collective leadership where responsibilities were divided and shared and decisions were made collectively. In Russia the idea of collective leadership was raised on a theoretical basis only but has not developed in practice. There were attempts to avoid a hierarchical structure, but this simply meant renaming different functions euphemistically. Collective leadership with shared responsibilities has not been successfully implemented in the Russian environmental movements' practice.

Bureaucracy was also looked upon as a negative phenomenon in Russia. This was often 'translated' into not keeping proper records about movement activities. This resentment was not present in Hungary and record keeping was part of their everyday practice. Correspondence with the authorities as well as records of activists were kept most of the time on computer files. In Russia the lack of elementary infrastructure, such as computers, offices also prevented the activists from keeping proper files. The only exception was Greenpeace Russia, which was better equipped.

THE MOVEMENTS' OBJECTIVES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Hungarian and Russian movements often differ in the way they came into existence. Most Hungarian environmental movements were started because of a particular objective they wanted to achieve, i.e. people became united because they wanted to stop a bridge from being constructed near their area which would increase traffic or to stop nuclear waste being stored near their village. Russian environmental movements more often lacked a concrete

short term aim (or else the concrete goal was only a triggering event for people with a common interest).

In Russia many environmental movements started off with a general concern regarding the environment rather than a concrete objective. The general state of the environment, either in the neighbourhood or at national level, was the most important initial reason for many activists to unite at grassroots level in several Russian cases. All these movements started in the late 1980s. Unfortunately the tradition of general public concern over green matters did not persist and the few remaining environmental movements did not manage to maintain public interest either. Today in Russia the general interest in environmental problems is diminishing.

DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOVEMENTS IN THE TWO SOCIETIES

Firstly Hungarian environmental movements often changed over time while Russians mostly remained more static. Many Hungarian movements were mobilising forces initially against a concrete environmentally harmful obstacle, and then started to widen their horizons unlike Russian movements which, with one notable exception (Bitsa), have not altered over time in this respect.

Secondly Hungarian environmental movements often took up problems at a later phase, which lay outside their original scope, but became important in the course of their concrete struggle. This, after a while, became a conscious survival strategy for many of them. It helped the activists to maintain and continue with the movement even when they had attained their immediate task which would have meant the end of the movement or failed.

Thirdly the 'Hungarian pattern' of change over time did not occur in the Russian cases. Instead those Russian movements which were general environmentalists from the beginning continued to be so and those Russian movements which started off with concrete aims did not transform into general green movements. As the process of openness was gradually reversed in Russia the movements' situation also became more difficult and achieving their

objectives (whether concrete or general) became much bleaker. 'Russian' survival techniques therefore had to be less subtle and were frequently unsuccessful.

Thirdly there was another important Hungarian specificity. This was the special attention devoted to educating (and hopefully recruiting) the population at large but especially young people. (This again is a phenomenon stressed by Eyerman and Jamison based on their Scandinavian experiences, to be discussed later.) This, however, also needed a changing focus for the environmental movements in Hungary with two important aspects: a more general approach to environmentalism, and a continuous stable existence and did not occur in Russia.

Fourthly, the process of qualitative change from one stage into another was also different in the two societies. The most important change was the denunciation of demonstrations as a method by Russian environmentalists, as discussed earlier, which did not happen in Hungary.

Finally it is worth pointing out in both countries that environmental movements also became important as a way of activity for many activists participating, a sort of social club.

THE MOVEMENTS' INTERNAL CONFLICTS COMPARED

There are conflicts within and beyond the movements in both countries. Internal conflicts were mostly based on personality clashes. Movement leaders are often people with a strong character and determined views which often leads to strong debates. Whether compromises were achieved or not depended on the leaders' personalities as well as the members' willingness to conform or compromise. There was no difference between Russian and Hungarian characteristics in this respect. There were examples of charismatic and patient leaders in full agreement with the members and instances of irreversible conflicts leading to splits in both countries. Environmental movements which survived could lose participants for all sorts of reasons, not only because of internal conflicts.

One source of internal conflict could have been the question over party politics among the activists. As discussed earlier, political parties formed parallel to the movements which could

have resulted in serious internal divisions. Most activists within the environmental movements did form their political views during the course of the party political development and views and they have become diverse.

In a western context environmentalists are often associated with people who are more likely to have left wing political views. Russia and Hungary differ from the western situation, but not from each other, in this respect. Both moderate right and left wing views are present in both countries within one environmental movement. This in Russia mostly means people who either support reforms or the old regime.

In Hungary people are divided politically according to whether they favour the right wing coalition which governed between 1990-94, the liberal opposition or the socialists (the present government in coalition since 1994). Environmental movement members have developed their political preferences over recent years and differ from each other. This, however, has not led to conflicts or splits within the movement itself. Movement activists in both countries coexist with activists with diverse political views, supporting different moderate political parties. This was a principle which they all emphasised and a practice which was followed.

The only exception was towards polarised political views. And this is the point where the two countries inevitably differed. The political context was different. In Hungary polarised political views are scarce since a small minority of the population voted for the extreme right (or the extreme left). Among the environmentalists it did not even appear as a problem due to the absence of such views among people associated with environmental movements. There are two, very weak and unpopular green parties which are accused of being eco-communists and eco-fascist and these absorb the minority who have such views (and gain extremely little attention or popularity among the public, to judge by their very meagre election results).

In Russia, however, fascist political tendencies are more popular than in Hungary. The widespread popularity of Zhirinovskiy's party in the 1993 general elections is strong evidence to support this view. Environmentalists also faced the problem when, as a result of the rapid growth of eco-fascist ideas, the existing greens split especially when the eco-fascists formed a united party and were rapidly gaining popularity in several regions, such as St. Petersburg

and Chelyabinsk. Experiencing the speedy growth of eco-fascist ideas, Russian environmental movements faced the question whether they wish to accommodate such views. All the movements we came across strongly resented eco-fascist ideas and individuals and expressed their wish not to co-operate with them. In in this respect there was no difference between the two countries. There was, however, an enormous difference in the rate of success between Hungarian and Russian environmental movements.

THE RATE OF SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS COMPARED

Success and survival can be related. There are exceptions but generally movements are more likely to survive if they are successful. However, a comparison of the two cases here can provide a very interesting contrast.

Environmental movements in Hungary are fairly successful if we measure success by winning concrete fights and even more successful if it is measured by their growing fame and success in raising environmental consciousness. Hungarian environmental movements are also often successful in the sense that they have political influence locally, as discussed earlier.

In Russia, however, the situation is very different. The very low rate of success the movements manage to achieve is due to a combination of circumstances, mostly outside the actual movement. Facing serious problems in the economy was a good excuse for the 'official' propaganda pursuing a strong (and penetrating) argument that environmentalism cannot be the major problem for the time being. This led to a situation where green issues are increasingly viewed as less important matters. The small spell in the late 1980s when this was different seems to be over in Russia today. Environmentalism has become a very secondary problem compared with others in the public's mind in Russia. As a result economic lobbies have become very strong again. And as authorities are dominated by non-elected bodies consequently they do not react to organised pressure groups and their priority is also old-fashioned: the apparatchiks always strongly supported the economy lobby, as will be discussed below.

It is not surprising therefore to find a very low success rate among environmental movements

in Russia. After the above mentioned short period when the public became more sensitive on green issues and also wished to and could put pressure on the local and national authorities and their efforts resulted in some concrete achievements, the movements experienced a rapid decline in success. This lack of achievements, both in concrete and indirect terms (meaning popularity), became the most important trend among Russian environmental movements for no fault of their own.

I cannot argue that Hungarians were any more experienced in their methods, or that they chose more easily obtainable aims. Nor are Russian demands any less rational than Hungarian ones. The only difference leading to such a low rate of success in Russia is in the political context. In fact Russian environmentalists work under so much more difficult circumstances and are facing so many elementary problems, including the lack of resources, their heroic efforts deserve much better results. But instead, unfortunately, they face growing hostility and isolation by the media and consequently from the public. The tendency with little hope of success also led environmental movements to become less popular: they are looked upon as 'Don Quixote' characters, with noble but utopian ideas at best. The media also contributes to this in a negative sense.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The support of the media or the lack of it is crucial in the development of public opinion which includes environmentalism. The situation in the two countries could not be more different. In Hungary the media - although it went through a period when part of it was under strong governmental influence (1990 -1994) - was not completely controlled or censored even then. Environmentalism was in any case one of those 'lucky' subjects which did not irritate the government of the time and which therefore has not been the subject of censorship since a multi-party system came into existence in Hungary. Environmentalism is, in fact, a very frequent subject in the Hungarian press, television and radio. Even though none of the political parties pursue green issues, equally none are against them, hence no political pressure prevents journalists from writing about the subject. In fact environmentalism has become one of those 'politically safe' subjects which could fill up air-time or newspaper columns without any risk. Consequently it appears in the media on a very

regular and frequent basis (and has when the media was under political fire from the MDF).

The media, on the other hand, is consciously and systematically used by the Hungarian environmental movements themselves to build their own reputation and to gain publicity. This in turn results in most movements becoming known all over the country irrespective of how narrow or widespread their objectives are. Even environmental movements organised in a previously little known, tiny village become sometimes widely reported about and gain publicity just as major national movements (for example the case of Ofalu, Juhasz et al., 1993) The reports mostly portray the movements' efforts sympathetically which always contribute to their reputation and in turn to their success. The contact with journalists is continuous: the movements' activists always felt that the journalists were easily approachable and ready to report about them. Because environmentalism as a subject is favoured in the media it is easy for the movements to initiate for the journalists to put an issue, important for the activists, on the agenda. Conflicts between the media and the movements only occasionally occurred.

The Russian case is fundamentally different. In Russia today the biggest damage is caused by 'omission': by the lack of reporting about the activities of environmental subjects generally and the movements in particular. This is the result of strong political pressure.

At the height of glasnost the media in Russia experienced an unprecedented chance to report anything of a journalistic interest. The political taboos, developed in the Soviet era, broke down and there was a refreshing upsurge of interesting, informative and uncensored articles in the Russian press. As a result of the lack of political control, environmentalism has become a frequently approached subject resulting in ever growing public interest in the state of the environment. Environmental movements also felt well appreciated by the press's attention to their activities and were satisfied with the reports about them. The public became better informed about the movements hence more and more people joined them. As a result the public pressure grew and some modest successes were achieved. It was a good start.

After Yeltsin came into power the 'honeymoon' for the media was over. This happened on several 'fronts'. Political freedom has been gradually eroded and this was combined with the

introduction of commercial aspects in the press. Previously subsidised papers ceased to be supported financially and many of them turned out to be unviable in the new market conditions. Cheap tabloids took their place. Other, more serious, papers were financed by state-owned bodies which in turn re-introduced political control. This was also the case with major state owned television and radio stations. In the renewed antidemocratic media situation opposition voices, such as those of the environmental movements, were not welcomed. Reporting about them also became risky and journalists avoided the subject.

Because local papers were considered less dangerous by the authorities they are the only media forums which are likely to report about (local) environmental events and movement activities. Their circulation, however, is small and only reaches those living in the neighbourhood. Local papers cannot have the same mobilising effect as the national media (hence the authorities' 'tolerance' towards them). Public opinion on the whole has not been altered by local news which can only deal with isolated cases. This is precisely why local papers are not considered a political danger and are not blocked from reporting about the movements. This is a good example of how 'democracy' and 'freedom of speech' operate in Russia since Yeltsin came into power in December 1993.

This overall process, however, contributed greatly to the decreasing public interest in environmental movements in Russia, as well as the lack of increase in environmental consciousness. Movement members themselves often felt less inclined to stay in the movements as public opinion changed. Their declining respect and prestige, the 'Don Quixote' effect, resulted in a rapid decrease in the number of movement participants and sympathizers. As prestige, the number of activists and supporters decreased so did the potential power of public pressure: it became very weak. Hence the ever declining rate of achievements, discussed above. The only reason environmental movements and activists are not targeted by the authorities actively as 'public enemies' is because they are considered too weak to worry about as oppositional forces. The 'media-vacuum' around the movements and activists creates the desired effect as far the authorities are concerned.

Had they been in a stronger position, in the antidemocratic political atmosphere which is increasingly developing in Russia today, they would most likely be attacked more actively

and openly by the local and national authorities using their power via the media (smear campaigns) and even the police. The non-elected apparatchiks, according to their open testimonies in the interviews, are ready to start ridiculing environmentalists any time if they sense any potential political danger in them and would conduct dirty tricks campaigns or resort to even stronger measures. As it stands at present, environmental movements are too weak to be considered as potential political rivals, they are left 'alone' and the media is 'just' instructed to simply neglect them.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN THE TWO SOCIETIES COMPARED

I. The attitude of elected politicians

First I look at the attitudes of elected representatives in Hungary and Russia. Environmentalism is a fairly neglected question by both governments. This is because no major political parties take the subject of environmentalism seriously enough to keep it high on the political agenda in either country. It does not appear as a central issue in any of the party manifestos any more either in Russia or in Hungary.

Green parties are not strong enough to send a single representative into Parliament again in either country. They are also divided politically into 'red greens' or 'water melon greens' (as the saying goes i.e. outside green, inside red) and eco-fascists. Environmental movements follow a more moderate political route than green parties in either country. In Russia, however, the contacts between the movements and the left-wing oriented green party is stronger. In Hungary there is no connection between the green parties and environmental movements.

In Hungary there is a major difference between the attitude of elected politicians and that of the executives both nationally and locally. Hungarian elected representatives are accountable to their constituencies and pay a lot of attention to their re-electability. They are also in charge of policy-making and budgeting. Hungarian politicians see environmental movements

as the best potential allies in gaining support and attention for the cause of environmentalism. By feeling the weakness of the issue within the political spectrum and needing public support Hungarian politicians see a potential in the environmental movements who can mobilise political sympathy and change public opinion. This is why Hungarian politicians expressed such a strong wish to co-operate with the movements and are also willing to support them financially. The hope that the movements would provide support in return for lobbying together (or at least for the same subject) pulls politicians and movement activists together.

Hungarian movement activists, however, look at the problem from a different point of view. They are sometimes hostile towards politicians and see them as party political people first and environmentalists second. But it is also recognised by movement activists that cooperation is more worthwhile than antagonism and therefore they are often ready to compromise.

Meanwhile Hungarian politicians are disappointed that the movements generally do not attract the kind of public support, manifested in mass demonstrations, they had before (at the turn of the decade) and that Hungarian environmental movements do not form national umbrella organisations (like Russians) which could be presented to the government as a stronger evidence of public support. Nevertheless politicians try to cooperate with the best known movements as best they can. Thus both movements and politicians in Hungary provide each other with information, and are ready to exchange ideas and collaborate.

In Russia, on the other hand, politicians are a lot more divided on this question. At the national level there is not much positive interest in environmental movements. In fact the relationship should be described as hostile and antagonistic.

At local level, however, there is a clear recognition on the side of some elected representatives of a possible role for environmental movements if properly supported. Some councillors try to help them as best they can in their own meagre circumstances. However, as local representatives themselves do not have much power their support does not lead environmental movements very far. These councillors are ready to share the limited

information they can get hold of and express support on the whole.

There are exceptions, however. Some councillors, elected because of the environmental priorities they had expressed during the election campaign, changed their priorities once elected. On some occasions they accepted ideas propagated by the economic lobby. When they were in charge of analysing concrete cases put to them by an environmental movement and these councillors were asked to prepare recommendations for the apparatchiks (as ironically is the reverse way of decision-making process in Russia), the economic priorities overtook some councillors' views in the environmental committees. They did not accept the environmentalists' demand that industrial enterprises should not be located in highly populated areas and forwarded to the apparatchiks their recommendations of rejection. This kind of 'change of heart' was frequently mentioned by environmental movements as well: the environmentalists also explained that this is a recurrent event which often happened to former environmentalists, who had become councillors or MPs.

Thus the two countries show a very different pattern in relation to the elected representatives and environmental movements which has its origin in the different procedure and role of elected representatives in the overall political system.

II. The attitude of non-elected officials or apparatchiks

Now I turn to the comparison of the non-elected officials or as the Russian phrase goes, apparatchiks. Non-elected officials in both countries have a more negative attitude towards the movements. The most important difference here, however, is that in Hungary they have a lot less power than elected ones. While in Russia officials (apparatchiks) play by far the dominating role, and increasingly so (again).

In Hungary an official can have a highly negative personal view of an environmental movement, but that cannot stop him/her from having to fulfil the politicians' demand to cooperate with those movements. Some ministerial civil servants can and do, for example, dislike or dismiss environmental movements and did not hide this in the interviews. They are also clear, however, that they are obliged to heed the wishes of the Minister of the

Environment. This is similar at local level where the district environmental committee leaders or even the mayor, who is also elected as head of the local authority, is in charge of policy-making.

Often, however, there was a good relationship between the movements and the executive part of the local authority anyway (in Budapest City Council, for example). It is perhaps the civil servants at the regional level who are the least likely to be keen on the movements' activities and some provincial city council officials. Some of them are professionals who see the environmentalists as amateurs, people with less knowledge in the subject. Being in the regional or provincial offices, a little further away from direct political instructions than civil servants in ministries or local councillors, these officials tend to follow political guidelines only as much as they have to and at the same time they look at environmental activists as 'impossible busy-bodies'.

In Russia as established, non-executives keep all the power in their hands, (and this is increasingly so at every level). As they are not elected people they have no interest in keeping up a good image and consequently they do not keep good contacts with environmental movements and have a very low opinion of them. No potential cooperation could be envisaged as the officials, according to their testimonies, do not see any point in working together with the social movements. In fact not only social movement activists but even elected representatives and political party activists are all seen as one category in the eyes of Russian apparatchiks: they are all eyesores, they are all viewed as part of the very uncomfortable outcome of the new system caused by some very uncomfortable upheaval. This new 'democracy', argue the apparatchiks, only forces them to live with this group of 'trouble-makers', who have a different shape and form but are basically all the same: they are all in opposition (a very dirty word in the apparatchiks vocabulary). These 'trouble-makers', including elected ones, only prevent Russian officials from creating 'order'. These people should be avoided and excluded from power at any price - goes the apparatchik's view on the matter. These are at best nothing but misguided political intruders. They think that in 'democratic' Russia the system would or should be different then before (at any time in history). These troublemakers should be and are dealt with one by one (and sadly fairly successfully) by the Russian apparatus at all levels very consistently. Giving up power and

position, getting into complicated debates over priorities or offering any sort of cooperation or political compromise is not what the apparatchiks are used to in Russia during or prior to the Soviet period. Consequently the apparatchiks do not intend to show any sign of change. They are convinced that 'order' will only be re-established in Russia if it is again dictated by the apparatus as in the Soviet time. The so called 'democratic' system since Yeltsin came to power re-inforced the 'old guard' of apparatchiks in their position to stay on unopposed, unelected and untouched. As a result they pursue their functions in a continuous manner.

As there is no attempt to create a politically neutral civil service whose job is to implement policies devised by elected and accountable politicians in Russia, and independent political forces such as pressure groups, opposition party activists and elected representatives will never be able to put pressure on unelected officials the development of any 'proper' democratic process does not look very likely in the Russian case at present.

The way apparatchiks relate to opposition, which includes environmental movements, is not new. They are only following all the old routines they used to pursue before. As there is no pressure to radically and fundamentally reform this system, (as is happening gradually but much more forcefully, hence successfully, in Hungary), nothing about it will change in Russia in the foreseeable future.

Thus the key to the problems of Russian environmental movements paradoxically lies outside the environmentalist movements. The lack of proper democratic institutions inevitably creates a situation in which independent pressure groups in opposition are doomed to fail. This is the case of Russian environmental movements.

CONCLUSION

To sum up this chapter, I would argue that the fact that Russian environmental activists feel very pessimistic and disillusioned in many ways should not be of any surprise to us. The complete lack of support or even willingness to communicate by the authorities naturally leads to those negative feelings on the side of activists. By withholding public documents, not allowing the movements to obtain the information necessary to prepare a fair argument,

the lack of help in funding, negative attitudes and a hostile atmosphere leading to the series of failures or even open fights, make environmental movements work in very difficult circumstances.

Even though, as explained above, Hungarian officials are often fairly unfriendly themselves, Hungarian environmental movements are a lot more positive when describing their chances vis-a-vis the authorities. There is, again, very good reason for that. The apparently famous Hungarian pessimism does not apply here, there is no ground for it. The regular exchange of information, the funding and cooperation combined with a fairly friendly atmosphere with the politicians and a lot of support even from some officials make Hungarian environmentalists feel wanted and needed, and their efforts worthwhile. Added to this they have achieved numerous successes which makes them feel the potential and will for further battles. The public, thanks to media support, is behind them, and their activities and achievements are widely publicised. Hence many of them widened their range of interest and took upon tasks previously not thought of, such as education in a wider sense. It is clear to most environmentalists that they had to compromise with the authorities to be able to cooperate with them, but it is seen as the right way to pursue matters. Politicians are viewed with a certain degree of suspicion, as people who are often nothing more than careerists, but that does not exclude a willingness to collaborate with them for the sake of the movement's aims.

Finally I return to our opening statement. I have argued at the beginning of this chapter that it is the political context which is the most important basis within a society. The two cases of the former Soviet bloc gave us two very different examples of democratic development in the first half of this decade. The Hungarian case can encourage optimism about the future but the Russian case is at present situation rather gloomy. Tolerating political opposition is the basis of democracy. In Hungary the system has been established and is working. This allows not only opposition political parties to operate but non-party political opposition as well. The case of Hungarian environmental movements provides a good example of successful opposition. In Russia, however, democratic institutions have not been established. The period since Yeltsin came to power shows a process of recentralisation and even less development in democratic processes than in Gorbachev's time. Not only the opposition but

even elected representatives are politically ignored in Russia and are powerless. Not surprisingly, non-party political opposition also is having a difficult time as the case of Russian environmental movements showed. I now turn to my penultimate chapter in which I return to the theoretical arguments discussed earlier (Chapters 2 and 4) and used in my analysis of the empirical data.

Hungary.

The other four theories were all very relevant in our investigations. But again, some more so than others. New social movement theory brought out a lot of similarities, partly stemming from the fact that they are also 'European'. The cognitive approach was useful both in its arguments and in comparative terms. The two most useful theories, however, turned out to be civil society and political opportunity structure theory. This is because I came to the conclusion that it is the political context, the degree of development of democratic institutions, which is the single most important key to understanding the differing evolution and success of environmental movements in Hungary and Russia. The differences in political context in the two countries also have an effect on the level of resource availability and the degree of media support which we also showed to have a significant influence on environmental movements. Thus the relevance of civil society theories and the political opportunity structure is greatest because they focus on the crucial and fundamental aspects of the analysis of social movements showing their embeddedness within society.

Finally the fact that existing theories are relevant implies that Hungary and Russia are part of the same 'analytical universe' as those societies in the 'west' which inspired them. They differ from each other but so do 'western' societies. 'Universal' concepts such as those dealing with problems of democracy, citizenship, social movements, etc. can be applied to analyse social and political processes in any society.

CHAPTER 10

THE RELEVANCE OF WESTERN THEORIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

In this last chapter before my conclusion I will confront the theoretical approaches identified earlier with my empirical findings. I shall argue that the theoretical works based on American and Western European experiences inevitably leave unanswered questions when measured against Eastern European cases but their usefulness far outweighs their shortcomings. Civil society theory is the only body of writing to have been based on Eastern European experience as well as on western and it will be argued that it too has some value in understanding the contextual conditions under which social movements develop.

THE RELEVANCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY AND THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SPHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Let me deal with civil society theory first. The concept, as discussed in Chapter 2, has a centuries old history and has been applied in many different types of society from eighteenth century North America and Europe to present day Eastern Europe.

There is a strong analogy between the period when civil society became a relevant concept in Western democracies, at the time when financial and commercial capitalism emerged and the elements of a new social order were taking shape in Western and Southern Europe, and Eastern European societies in transition today. Then, just as now in Eastern Europe, two parallel processes occurred at the same time: the development of capitalism in the economic sphere and the restructuring of the political sphere. There are several similarities here: firstly, the changing character of the ruling authorities providing greater freedom for the individual. Secondly, that the public could challenge the state administration, and thirdly, that radical social changes accompanied this development.

However, we also have to be aware of the fact that state socialist societies were not

feudalistic ones. At the time when Eastern European societies became socialist there were still strong elements of feudalism in all of them, as discussed earlier, but the socialist regime undoubtedly brought about a tremendous amount of modernization as a consequence of which contemporary state socialist societies developed a curious mixture of a modern European state and an overcentralised, overcontrolled society. And, as we argued previously, civil society (in my sense) was also present in state socialist societies, even if it existed within constraints. Freedom of assembly, association of any kind of organisation and the press were certainly not guaranteed. However, there were parliaments, a legal system and political parties, media and public opinion even if all of them were under a large degree of political control.

The realm of free and independent political protest was curtailed but it existed under socialism. There were many associations which existed legally but some of them became opposition. Other groups existed illegally. The press, which played such an important role in the development of western civil societies, was censored but censorship cannot be perfect. Both in the Soviet Union and in Hungary articles appeared which later caused serious headaches for the editors. The process of self-imposed censorship was much more successful in the Soviet Union than in liberal Hungary but no-one can deny the appearance of protest literature within the Soviet press, including the works of Solzhenitsin and many others. Political criticism also existed, again more openly in Hungary than in the Soviet case. Apart from that of course there existed an illegal samizdat literature which not only reached those in opposition but even the inner circles of the political leadership, which was its main target. Hence, as an opposition force, it certainly fulfilled an important political function within the limited sphere of civil society under socialism.

The question of freedom of association is difficult in the sense that, as I mentioned many groups existed legally and shifted into opposition, or became perceived as part of the opposition. This was especially true for the Soviet Union precisely because the political tolerance level was much lower than in Hungary. Groups or associations which would have been perceived as apolitical in a western democracy, or even Hungary, such as pop-groups or art groups, were treated as subversive in the Soviet political context. In contrast organisations which were perceived as 'bastions' of the regime, such as the Young Communists' League (KISz) in Hungary produced publications containing articles with strong

criticism of the regime (Medvetánc¹). As the line was fairly blurred one can only safely state that civil society, outside the realm of the similarly blurred state control, existed in both societies, as everywhere else in state socialist countries. Most of civil society activities were informally finding their ways within the unclearly drawn and constantly changing lines of political tolerance threshold.

Even before the regime changed, the level of political tolerance was rapidly expanding, and people were ready and eager to take part in political protest activities. Civil society grew to an unprecedented extent under Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, with the formation of 60,000 'neformaly' (informal groups, as they were named in Russian) (Berezovsky, 1990; Yanitsky, 1993b). These groups did not arise from nowhere, they had their roots in the pre-Gorbachev period, and their sudden upsurge was only due to the changing political atmosphere, which did not constrain them any more. Similarly the gradually growing freedom within the press had its roots in the Khrushchevian past waiting for the new impulse to reappear. In Hungary there was a more gradual development of reforms but in the late eighties there was a sudden upsurge of political interest resulting in the mushrooming of social movements including environmental movements.

However, it needed a complete regime change to fulfil Habermas's definition. In guaranteeing the effectiveness of a public sphere in the political realm there are two important aspects to be fulfilled. Firstly, basic rights, such as free press, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of speech and opinion have to be guaranteed by the state (Habermas, 1992). And secondly the state has to oblige organizations to fulfil their task and to structure their internal order accordingly to guarantee these basic rights. Thus the public sphere, which is part of civil society in Habermas's definition, can only be achieved by state guarantees. The question for us will be whether this has been achieved in Russia and Hungary.

After 1989 in Hungary the party political system stabilised and the institutions to ensure democratic development were established, as we demonstrated in previous chapters. Civil

¹ Medvetánc was a periodical, published by the KISz organisation of one of Budapest's main Universities, the Eötvös Loránd University.

society also continued to develop. The period of transition from state socialism to liberal democracy encouraged civil society to spring up, as it did throughout the region. Civil society, just like the whole system of democratic institutions, also found its function within the new regime. It carved out its role very clearly, separating itself from party politics, and embarked on an important protest role, while maintaining continuous interaction with both political parties and administrative authorities. Environmental movements became an important part of this process. They attracted movement members and a large number of sympathizers. They took on every level of the state apparatus and utilised the media successfully. The result is shown in their concrete achievements and in their good reputation among the public and the politicians, as has been demonstrated in this thesis. Habermas's criteria have been almost completely fulfilled in Hungary. The state does guarantee citizen participation in the public sphere: freedom of assembly and association exist, and freedom of speech and opinion is present. With some initial hiccoughs the media has also become free. Most importantly, state organizations are obliged to fulfil their task and to structure themselves internally to guarantee these basic rights.

The Russian case is different. Soon after the revolutionary period of Gorbachev when a gradual process of democratization started in Russia, as our evidence demonstrates, a recentralization process occurred. The process of democratization was reversed. At present in Russia political institutions do not fulfil the requirements of a democratic regime and no attempts are being made to change this. There is a backward process in Russia today compared with the glasnost period. The environmental movements analyzed here show well how impossible it is to achieve any success in an undemocratic regime. The lack of development of democratic institutions seriously hinders civil society: it can exist but it cannot be effective. The state does not guarantee citizen participation in the public sphere: the media is not completely free. Freedom of assembly and association exist, as does freedom of speech and opinion, and in this sense the changes are fundamental, but state organizations do not fulfil their obligations in guaranteeing that these basic rights work effectively. Russian democracy fails on Habermas's criteria.

My first conclusion is therefore that civil society has to be defined clearly, in my understanding in separation from state and political parties. It is fundamental, however, not

to treat civil society in *isolation* from state and civil society since it is the *interaction* between them that shapes civil society. I therefore consider that those writers of civil society who regard it as the exclusive key to understanding social movements and/or the state of democratic development in Eastern Europe, or anywhere else, are mistaken. This leads to my second conclusion, that civil society can fully develop only in a democratic regime. This is in accordance with Habermas's emphasis on the primary role of the state on the public sphere. However, I find it useful, for analytical purposes, in modern society to separate the state and political parties from the sphere of extraparliamentary political civil action. Finally, the concept of civil society should not be treated ahistorically: as Habermas also demonstrated in his account of the transformation of civil society and the public sphere in several Western democracies (1992) it is also important to realise that the different experiences in Eastern European societies, as elaborated in the first two chapters, are the basis of the diverging realities of democratic development in general and civil societies, including environmental movement patterns, in particular.

As civil society is concerned with the context-setting and power-challenging aspects of citizen action, democracy, state and polity and the interaction between them, once clearly defined, the civil society concept is useful in demarcating a category of power-challenging phenomena and the conditions under which they arise. It does not, however, seek to answer how and why collective actions occur and function. This is the central concern of social movement theories.

THE RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES

I now turn to the social movement theories - from the collective behaviour approach, resource mobilization theory, new social movement school, political opportunity structure theory to the cognitive approach, discussed in Chapter 4. Although social movement theories started a lot more recently than civil society theory, and consequently do not have to bridge a gap in time, since none of them have dealt with Eastern Europe, their application in this context is innovative.

THE RELEVANCE OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR APPROACH

The most important feature of the collective behaviour approach was analysing social movements firstly, as part of the very wide category of collective action and secondly, as social action. Both these aspects are relevant and important in any society today, as there is little agreement among the different authors what should constitute a social movement and it is important to realise that collective action is embedded in society. But by lumping together all sorts of collective actions from crowd through panic to revolution embracing several forms of social action which have little in common in our view, this theory does not bring us closer to an understanding of social movements either in Eastern Europe or in any other society (Smelser, 1962:306-388; Killian and Turner, 1972: 79-178; 245-388).

The collective behaviour approach also looks at the different forms of collective action as a hierarchy in which crowd gatherings can develop into social movements (Smelser, 1962:395-398). This is an unacceptable interpretation for us. We do not see the early demonstrations, petitions and crowd gatherings in Eastern Europe at the time of the regime change as predecessors of later social movements. In fact social movements developed either earlier or simultaneously with the peak of mass movements on the streets of Hungary and Russia and most demonstrations were organised by these social movements. Demonstrations, petitions and other forms of protest action are the tools of social movements rather than their embryonic forms, as collective behaviour theory argues. On the other hand, the collective behaviour approach's view of social processes resulting from value transformation, as argued by Smelser (1962:14-53), is useful in understanding what is happening in Eastern Europe today and why social movements occur. But the theory's functionalist approach to collective behaviour as abnormal, as a reaction to social breakdown caused by rapid social changes, is inappropriate in my opinion in explaining events in Eastern Europe (or any society). Social movements did not occur because of social breakdown. They occurred because of a major opening in society, viz. the ending of the political control which kept collective action at bay in the state socialist system. Collective action is not the result of anomie (Killian and Turner, 1972:57-78) but the result of the creation of democratic institutions which allow people to form political groups if they wish to express their protest against existing political routines. At the time when some representatives of the collective action were concerned with the

analysis of the growing fascism in some European societies the conclusion of social breakdown was understandable. The situation in the United States where it was later applied and in Eastern Europe today is, however, different.

To sum up the relevance of the collective behaviour approach for our cases, we would argue that generally speaking it is not helpful in understanding social trends which in fact are moving in the direction away from a dictatorship. In Eastern Europe where, despite the Russian problems, the underlying trend is a move from an overcontrolled political system towards a more democratic one the 'breakdown' theory of the collective behaviour approach does not apply (Killian and Turner, 1972:57-70). In addition to that, neither the psychological nor the functionalist approach helped us to understand why social movements occur and how they operate. The attention to value changes (Smelser, 1962:120-130), leadership styles (Killian and Turner, 1972:388-406) and success (256-57), however, as discussed in the empirical chapters, turned out to be useful tools in our investigation and most importantly the fact that social movement activities are viewed within their social context. We now consider the relevance of the resource mobilization theory.

THE RELEVANCE OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION APPROACH

The resource mobilization approach arose as a challenge to the collective behaviour theory. The starting point of this new approach was therefore not the individual but the organization. The most important aspect of this perspective is how effective participants are and what resources they need to achieve their goals with the movement. The corner stone of the resource mobilization approach is seeing the rationality of human actors who are assumed to calculate costs and benefits when participating in social actions and are accompanied by the 'free-riders' who let others take a risk and only hope to reap benefit from the movements' achievements. Thus the focus is on the instrumentality of movement strategy formation by trying to explain how movement organizations went about trying to achieve their goals. It is concerned with the collective-organizational level of analysis of movement organizations and organizational strategies by looking at mechanisms and incentives and tries to uncover the underlying rationality through a mezzo-level operability.

However, the resource mobilization approach's argument that collective action is not abnormal was useful in our approach. We also see social movements as normal responses to the challenges of society in Eastern Europe and it is not 'strain' which led people to join social movements. However, we find it difficult to agree that it is rationality, based on cost-benefit analysis, which leads people to take part in collective action or calculate whether to become free-riders. It was true in the cases of the 'not in my backyard' type of movements, that participation was initially strongly motivated by self-interest but movements of these kinds were in the minority in both countries. And more importantly, many of the movements which started off as 'not in my backyard' groups often changed their character and became environmental movements supporting a wide range of long-term green issues; thus rational calculative behaviour was not characteristic. When it comes to costing the benefits, in fact, there were a lot more losers among them than gainers. Many core activists in Hungary and Russia lost their jobs for their political views or by spending too much time and energy on the movement. Some in Hungary later managed to gain some financial support from the movement but it never came near to their previous income. The one very common motive among activists in fact was a utopian desire to achieve a better environment for all, a highly 'irrational' and very long term way of thinking. Resource mobilization theory therefore was not proven relevant in this respect.

Another argument of the RM theory is that organization benefits movements in achieving their goals. As was shown, Russian environmental movements are a lot more structured, much better organised than Hungarian movements where there is no hierarchical organisation at all. Yet, Hungarian movements are a lot more successful than Russian ones.

The question of success was also crucial within RM theory. However, our understanding of success is slightly different from resource mobilization theorists'. We too incorporated among the many aspects of success achieving concrete goals and aspects such as changes in policies, maintaining the group itself, as originally argued by RM theorists.

However, our interpretation of success also emphasised the distribution of knowledge in the wider community which has never been thought of by RM theorists. Success nevertheless was a central issue of our investigation, as well as that of the RM approach, and we found

very useful the initial impetus of their analysis drawing attention to it. They, however, failed to provide us with the right answer why success has been achieved in one society on a much larger scale than in another. None of the reasons the RM approach has offered helped us to get closer to the answer to this most crucial question. This is because in fact the answer did not lie in the difference between the amount of resources used by Hungarian and Russian activists, especially not when we consider that their intellectual resources were in fact very similar. The differences in financial resources are in fact the consequences of the lack of support, not the explanatory reasons in explaining the differences between Hungary and Russia. Thus material resources are of secondary importance compared with the fact that the entire societal context in which these movements operate is different.

The answer therefore cannot be found in a theory which views social movements in isolation, operating as rational organizations and which explains everything in terms of features of the movement itself. Some aspects of the resource mobilization approach were useful when analysing the different movements but the mezzo-level of interpretation did not bring us closer to the real explanation which lies in the differences between the two societies. The theory which looks at movements not as rational mobilizers of resources to achieve certain end but as transforming agents of political life offered for us a more useful the analysis. This was the new social movement theory.

THE RELEVANCE OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

The social movements perspectives we have looked at so far have been developed in America. The new social movement theory was conceived in Europe, even if this 'Europe' was in fact half of Europe, and it is the product of many trends in recent decades some of which are similar to tendencies in Eastern Europe. There are eight respects in which new social movement theory was useful in our investigation These are the European theoretical tradition, the mediating role of social movements between the abstract world of academia and politics, the role of the 'old' labour movement, the question of extraparliamentary political activities, NSM demands concerning main attitudes characterising them, the role of environmental movements, social movements and the media and the composition of NSM participants. We will look at these in turn.

Firstly, on the theoretical level, an important characteristic of NSM theory is its European theoretical tradition, based on Marx's and Weber's writings. This is very similar to the Eastern European social scientific tradition which is also based on the philosophical, political and historicist approach as is the western European tradition, including Marxism which was influential in the Soviet Union and both Marxism and a Weberian approach which were influential on Hungarian sociology.

Secondly, the mediating role between the abstract world of academia and the practical world of politics, which became a significant feature of NSMs and similarly of movement activities in eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the 1990s, just as in the case of western European new social movements. Social movement activists were often scientists who became very active politically and played an important role in social movements, including environmental movements in which natural scientists played a particularly important role.

Thirdly, the role of the 'old' labour movement was similar in the sense that it has been rejected in western Europe and it also has been rejected in eastern Europe for its old-fashioned approach and replaced by demands for new politics. There were obvious differences as well, mainly that this 'old' labour movement was in power in eastern Europe. However, the dislike of eastern European people towards these socialist parties was hugely exaggerated in the western press which their recent election victories in many Eastern European societies proved to be incorrect. The 'renewed' old labour movement in the form of a modernised socialist party is popular all over eastern Europe. However, parallel to this, there also is a general disillusion with political parties and a growing interest in 'new' political actions, which is similar to what is argued by NSM theorists.

This leads to our fourth point, the question of extraparliamentary political activity. As discussed earlier, in the civil society section of this chapter and in previous chapters, in Hungary social movement activists are very conscious of their political role as lying outside the sphere of political parties, just as in western new social movements. Here, however, we have to distinguish between the two countries because this is not the case in Russia where there is a lack of clarity of the unfolding situation in the sphere of the polity. This is due to the fact that political parties come and go with a great frequency and political parties do not

fulfil their accustomed role in democracies. This leads to an unclarity between the opposition role within a party or a social movement, the emphasis being on opposition rather than on social movement versus political party.

Fifthly, new social movements in western European democracies embody three main sets of attitudes: 1) anti-consumptionism and postmaterialism which originated in the 1950s and 1960s period of economic boom, 2) demands for autonomy and identity, and 3) against centralisation, opposition to control and bureaucratization. Whereas anti-consumptionist and postmaterialist attitudes are mostly absent in eastern Europe, due to the lower level of economic development compared with western Europe, the pro-autonomy, anti-bureaucracy, anti-centralisation and control attitudes are strongly present both in Hungarian and Russian societies and environmental movements. Thus emphases advocated by new social movement theorists, such as Offe (1985) and Habermas (1981; 1992) in particular, are of specific use for researchers in the eastern European region.

The sixth point refers to the fact that both in Russia and Hungary environmental movements became one of the most popular types of social movements which is connected to western European new social movements. The recognition of the state of environment as a major problem is a direct result of influence from the west in both cases. Although this direct inspiration arrived in Hungary a lot earlier than in Russia, where it only reached social thinking in the glasnost period, today western environmentalist ideas are equally influential in both countries.

The seventh aspect where new social movement theories have been proven relevant concerns the movements' relation to the media. The weight of public opinion and the role of mass media in influencing it is well recognised by both western NSMs and eastern European social movements. The media's ability to extend the movements' domain to a very wide circle of people is well understood everywhere. This recognition is similar in both countries but there is a difference between the way social movements can 'use' the media to help their own cause. Again, it is Hungary, where the media is independent enough to be 'used' by the movements in a similar manner to the western cases, by securing media presence at demonstrations and contacting journalists to 'advertise' movement activities. In Russia,

however, the overall political control and lack of democracy prevents the media from acting similarly to the Hungarian or the western cases, as discussed earlier. However, the international media outside Russia do play a role to a limited degree which facilitates some recognition of the movements even though this can only create a small and indirect influence on public opinion within Russia and, thus achieves very little of its original intention.

Finally concerning the composition of social movement participants, new social movement theorists' recognition that most participants in new social movements come from the most educated part of society was borne out in Eastern Europe. Although the distinction between private and public sector employment was irrelevant at the time when environmental movements emerged in Russia and Hungary and seem to be irrelevant even now when the proportions are changing to some extent, the educational level of the activists is very important in both societies. Most core movement members and leaders come from educated groups and are often middle class by origin (if we can use this term in Eastern Europe at all). They are mostly natural scientists by origin in the case of environmentalists rather than social scientists as in other types of movement. There is, however, a wider mixture of the different 'classes' in Eastern Europe than in similar Western movements. This is related to two important factors. Firstly, that labour movements, or 'old' movements, against which new social movements originally emerged, play a somewhat different role in Eastern Europe from the point of view of their class construction. These were highly institutionalised ruling movements which did not have a majority of working class people members, but were made up of party apparatchiks, whose fathers might have been working class, and were more likely to be careerists themselves than devoted revolutionaries. Secondly that, although state socialist countries did not become classless societies by any means, the kind of rigid class division which characterised Eastern Europe at the time of the emergence of new social movements was certainly not similar to the Western European situation. This in fact makes class comparison so difficult, that it is safer to talk about the level of education when comparing eastern and western cases, in which case Russia and Hungary are fairly similar to the Western cases. It is, however, important to notice that in terms of the age of movement activists, the two countries differ from each other. In Hungary the age group of environmental movement participants is again similar to that of the Western European pattern: it is dominated by the middle aged and the student-aged, while in Russia many older

people of retirement age participate alongside the middle aged.

Summarising the relevance of new social movement theories in eastern Europe, we found that there are many elements of the new social movement theory which stand up when measured against an eastern European context. Thus the theory which deals with European matters unwittingly applies to the eastern part of Europe as well. There are significant differences, however, between Russia and Hungary, the latter being a society which has been exposed to western influence a lot earlier than Russia. Thus the new social movement theory's European and macro-sociological approach proved to be a lot more relevant than any of the any earlier discussed theories in explaining our cases. As we have demonstrated, NSMs had an important impact especially in Hungary but later in Russia as well. The numerous similarities between the two parts of Europe made this fundamentally European concept very relevant in the eastern European context as well.

The NSM theory emphasises the importance of political challenge in the social and cultural changes. This is where it substantially differs from the political opportunity structure perspective which focuses on the political context instead.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE THEORY

As we have argued earlier the political opportunity theory developed following the arguments of the more macro-oriented group of theorists many of whom originally were labelled as RM theorists. The need for macro aspects when analysing social movements thus arose in America and has been the corner stone of the European investigations. The gap between the two approaches was recognised by Klandermans and Tarrow (1988) who expressed a strong wish to bridge it, suggesting that both RM and the European approach had a lot to offer and should be synthesised. This desired synthesis, however, turned out to be difficult to achieve due to the incompatibility of the different approaches which derive from different political cultures.

The political opportunity structure theory, although it does not synthesise two existing theories, managed to bridge the gap by providing a sufficiently general framework to be

successfully used in any existing society. It abandoned the particularity of all the previous theories and is neither 'American' nor 'European', but 'universal'. Thus we should not be surprised that this theory was found useful for our cases. Accepting the theory's fundamental argument that it is the political opportunity structure which is responsible for the emergence and effect of social movements in different societies, we can explain the diversity within Eastern Europe as well. In this sense Eastern Europe is truly part of the European tradition: the different countries provide varying political scenarios and those in turn lead to specific patterns of social movement development.

This is very much the case of the present situation but was in fact true even in the socialist period. Under the 'uniform' political structure there was in fact a range of cases because there were important differences in each individual society within the so-called Soviet bloc. There were two countries where the church became an important centre of the opposition: Poland (the Catholic church) and East Germany (the Lutheran church). A strong, nationwide social movement (Solidarity) developed in Poland, while no movements could emerge in Romania and Albania due to the most repressive party politics and extensive informant system. There was some clandestine movement formation in Bulgaria and a mainly intellectual movement (Charter 77) in Czechoslovakia. There was a high degree of political repression in the Soviet Union but opposition emerged in different shapes and forms from religious and nationalistic to workers' resistance or even 'pop-groups'. And finally there was a large degree of political tolerance in Hungary but social movements were not a frequent phenomenon in the socialist period. Thus in each society a different political opportunity structure was combined with a distinct national historical 'inheritance' leading to different chances for social movement activities in various cases.

In a comparative study, the political opportunity structure theory is doubly useful. It helps us to understand why social movements could develop more successfully in one society compared with another, and to explain why the two cases follow such different paths. As we argued earlier, by analyzing the available intellectual resources of Russian and Hungarian environmental movements we found so many similarities that the fundamentally different outcomes of these movements remained unexplained and even run into contradictions. We have found, for example, that Russian movement activists are often almost fanatical

concerning their 'missions' and devote a lot more time and energy to the movement than their more practical Hungarian counterparts. Russian movements are also a lot more structured than Hungarian ones whether we look at individual movements or city or national federations. Following the RM arguments, a well structured movement organization is certainly the basis of a successful social movement. Yet success eludes Russian social movements and is very much part of the Hungarian outcome of movement achievements. Loosely structured Hungarian movements make more progress in every sense than well structured Russian ones. What is behind this fundamental contradiction? Why can't the resource mobilization theory offer an explanation? The answer is that the cause of the different patterns of social movement development lies outside the 'movement-organization'. It depends on the different political context of the two societies in which these movements have to operate. Thus it is the political opportunity structure theory which offers the explanation which could help us find the answer to this crucial question.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the political opportunity structure theory draws attention to several important aspects of social movement development in each society. These include the degree of openness/closure of formal political access, the degree of stability/instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners and the political conflict within and among the elite. All these aspects concern relations between social movements and the polity. Thus we turned our attention to the analysis of the social movements' relationship with the authorities, the link between movements and polity. Having analysed step by step the state of the polity and the authorities' relationship with the movements at different level we concluded that there is a very limited openness of formal political access in the Russian case in great contrast with the much more open and cooperative system in Hungary. We found that there is a high degree of stability of political alignments in Hungary and a largely unstable political party formation in Russia and that potential alliance partners are available for social movements in Hungary up to the highest level of politicians. This again is in contrast with the Russian case where there is very little availability of potential allies and even this exists only with the weakest 'link' in the fragile political system, the mainly powerless local councillors. However, we also found that there are frequent political conflicts within the elite and between elites in both countries.

The political opportunity structure also draws attention to the configuration of power and informal procedures and dominant strategies, including aspects of the strategies of the authorities. These were very different in Russia and Hungary. In the Russian case power is held in the hands of unelected officials in authorities and both formal and informal procedures lack of helpful provision because the authorities are obstructive towards social movements. Russian movements are not even in a position to be proactive in building relationships with authorities. The situation in Hungary is just the opposite. There is a cooperative relationship between authorities and movements with mutual respect. In Hungary many of the social movement demands are facilitated by the authorities because the movements are respected as political actors with influence on local public opinion hence their chances of success are high. In Russia social movements suffer a high level of repression and their demands are not facilitated by the authorities who do not even negotiate with them. Consequently they are isolated and their chances of future success are remote and diminishing. Hence the strategic options of 'challengers' are very limited.

Thus the context for environmental movements is becoming very different in the two societies. While in the late 1980s and early 1990s the political situation, as described earlier, was similar in many ways it is diverting as time goes on. Hungarian movements have established themselves and survive enjoying the support and cooperation of authorities, and are achieving substantial results on all fronts. Russian movements, on the other hand, are becoming isolated and disillusioned which persuades many of them to give up their activities.

The gap between the two societies is also growing. In Russia we found a closed political system which is confrontational towards challengers, and is not ready to listen and compromise, or to allow access to policy-making or be influenced by outside opinion. There is no mediation between authorities and environmental movements. Even basic requirements are missing, such as an independent legislative system to allow social movements to seek justice. However, in contrast to Kitschelt's suggestion (1986), this closed and hostile political system did not push social movements into a confrontational mode, they did not become more aggressive. Instead it led to their weakening and steady disappearance from the political scene. This is because Kitschelt's model fails to distinguish between the structural and the contingent features of political systems, such as political strategies and tactics of other

political actors, including the absence of effective opposition, as argued by Rootes (1992). The lack of belief in Russia's ability to create a democratic society is the saddest outcome of this situation.

Kitschelt was, however, right to argue that open political systems invite non-confrontational, assimilative strategies towards social movements, which is exactly what happened in Hungary. The many access points within the public sphere, including the authorities and social movements, created a healthy pluralistic political structure in which the mediation between social movements and executives is an ongoing process. There is an independent legislative system which provides a fair potential for social movements when needed (and in one case it was the government itself which provided the finances for the movement to be able to sue a highly polluting former state company!). The openness of the polity leads to compromises in many cases which means that the environmental movements not only achieve concrete policy changes but more importantly increase their reputation and respect among both the authorities and the public. This has created a political consensus in which most sides do their bit forwards maintaining a democratic system in Hungary.

In sum, the political opportunity structure theory was found exceptionally useful in our analysis. The state of the environmental movements could not be explained by an analysis of the movements themselves. It was necessary to take into consideration the political context and the interaction between the polity and movements. Thus societal context was the most important explanatory variable when understanding the behaviour of environmental movement activists. The analysis of resources and organizational aspects did not lead to satisfactory explanations. Thus POS provided the most useful concept in interpreting what is happening in Eastern Europe, as it has where ever it has been applied. Finally we will turn to the most recent theory which we looked at when analyzing environmental movements in Russia and Hungary.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE COGNITIVE APPROACH

The main argument of the cognitive approach is that the function of social movements is not only to achieve concrete goals but to disseminate a certain set of knowledge within the `social

space', the society or/and in global terms.

The concept of environmental consciousness was important in our investigation for three reasons. Firstly, because, like Eyerman and Jamison, we found that Russian and Hungarian environmentalists perceived environmentalism as a subject which has long term consequences and spreads far beyond their locality. Subjects such as the resolutions of the Rio conference were often brought up and were taken very seriously. Thus the global nature of green matters was central to their thinking. Secondly, both Russian and Hungarian environmentalists considered it important to disseminate green views to a wider circle, outside their own group. In Hungary, however, this wish not only has been articulated but also converted into action and most movements actively disseminate environmental knowledge in a wider circle and especially among the younger generation. Russians, on the other hand, only mentioned the idea of dissemination of environmental views as a desirable aim that they should think about and try to do something about it. Russian environmental activists frequently mentioned that they saw the lack of environmental consciousness among their fellow citizens as a major problem and environmental issues should be thought of globally while acting locally, but had done nothing to change the situation. None of the groups or even individuals had approached people, for example younger ones, to 'plant' environmental concerns in the thinking of the new generation. Not even during the peak period of the late 1980s, when so many Russians became concerned with environmental problems, was there an attempt to spread environmental consciousness among the young. The wish, however, remained there even at the time when green movements were in a decline.

Thirdly, the cognitive consciousness theory argued that a movement's success cannot only be measured by its concrete achievements. Rather the way they manage to carve out new knowledge, new understanding of, in our example environmental issues, within the society they act in is also important. We have to emphasise at this stage that the movements themselves also articulated such views. The movements measured their own success by the extent to which they could change public opinion, locally or nationally, concerning the issues of particular concern to them and about environmental matters generally. We also incorporated this aspect in our judgement of success or failure and concluded that Russian environmental movements were very unsuccessful and Hungarians were successful in this

respect. The examples of the Swedish and Dutch 'models' were also useful from a comparative perspective. The Swedish centralised, top-down model, in which political openness is limited selectively and radical environmentalism is not successful but the traditional nature-loving conservationalism combined with a strong desire and belief in technical development, has a lot in common with the Russian case. Even though the Swedish scenario is based on an economically sound and well organised society both of which are not characteristics of Russia at present, future economic development could lead in the future to a Swedish-type of development, as far as environmentalism is concerned.

The Hungarian case is similar to the Dutch 'model' in the sense that both political parties and grassroots groups play an important role in the political context. Green parties, however, are politically weak and extraparliamentary, professionalised environmentalist groups have become the leading actors in environmental issues and both population-education and lobbying are present among the tactics used by the movements.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have evaluated all the theories reviewed earlier (in Chapter 2 and 6), including the theory of civil society, collective behaviour, resource mobilization, new social movement, the opportunity structure theory and the cognitive approach. My aim was to establish whether these theories, all of which were developed in a western context, had any relevance in our Eastern European cases. As I have demonstrated in this chapter the different theories were of varying relevance in our cases. The two American approaches, the collective behaviour and resource mobilization approaches, both of which had been developed decades earlier, were found least useful in our investigations. But the main problem with these two theories was not their country or time of origin. Rather it was that their arguments were found less useful than those of other theories. Nevertheless even these two theories were relevant to a certain degree even though they could not help us in answering the most important questions we posed: why Russian movements were developing so differently from Hungarian ones and why they were a lot less successful than environmental movements in

CONCLUSION

The focus of this thesis was the development of environmental movements in two former 'Soviet bloc' societies. In this concluding chapter we shall attempt to bring together some of the disparate threads of this study. The chapter is divided into five parts. In the first section I outline the main aims and achievements of the thesis. I then summarise its contribution to the theory of social movements. The third part will outline an understanding of political change in eastern Europe including a number of questions for future research and in the fourth section we discuss the likely future development of environmental movements and democratization in eastern Europe.

MAIN AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE THESIS

In the introduction I set out four major aims. These were: to carry out an in-depth study of environmental movements and authorities in two eastern European societies using an over time research design; to carry out a systematic comparison of the two societies; to examine the relevance of existing theories of opposition in Soviet-type societies, civil society theories and social movement theories and to study the relevance of historical continuity in these two societies.

At the end of my study how far have these aims been achieved? In relation to the first aim I studied environmental movements and their interaction with authorities in Russia and Hungary over a four year period (1990-1994). This is an advance on the many previous studies of social movements which have not carried out empirical research on authorities in relation to social movements. In my view it is crucial to study empirically both parties to the relationship between social movements and authorities in order to understand the interaction.

Secondly, I carried out a systematic comparison of the two societies and their environmental movements. Previous writers on eastern Europe have mostly done empirical studies in one country and have not made systematic comparisons. In my opinion a comparative analysis

is essential to bring out empirical similarities and differences, and to help in developing theories about them.

Thirdly, we have given considerable attention to examining the relevance of existing theories. I have considered theories relating to opposition in soviet-type societies, civil society theories and social movement theories. The theories of opposition helped me understand the very different experiences of regime opponents in these two societies and also the subsequent development of democratic opposition once this was possible. Civil society theories were useful in demarcating the sphere of political activities outside the state and political parties, and social movement theories have addressed the pattern of emergence and success of movements which were the focus of our study.

CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY

The thesis contributes to theory in three fields: theories of opposition in Soviet-type societies, theory of civil society and social movement theories. Previous writers on opposition in Soviet-type regimes have classified it in various ways but usually in terms of a single dimension. My own contribution is to introduce two dimensions of opposition. The first of these refers to the level of resentment against the regime and the distance from the ideas of the ruling Communist Party. The second dimension referred to abstract and concrete types of demand.

In relation to theories of civil society, I agree with those writers who regard it as an over-used and often poorly defined term. Once clearly defined, however, it is a useful concept to separate grassroots activities from political parties and other parts of the formal political structure, though the connection between them is obvious and important. But the aim of the concept of civil society is not to explain why and how social movements develop. This is the task of social movement theories.

In the previous chapter I showed that, despite their western origin, the concepts in a number of existing theories of social movements were useful in understanding Eastern European

experience, though to varying degrees. This shows that they have explanatory power in a greater range of situations than their authors envisaged. It also shows that eastern Europe is not an isolated entity which requires a totally unique conceptual approach. At the broadest level, the political opportunity structure theory proved most useful. This justifies our decision to study authorities empirically. However, the other theories were all valuable for understanding specific aspects of social movements. Although my conclusions are based on the study of one type of movement, in the light of other research (including my own on housing movements), I believe that they are not limited to environmental movements.

CONTRIBUTION TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF EASTERN EUROPE

A major conclusion of my analysis has been to emphasise the contrast between Hungary and Russia. I first showed this in my discussion of the development of the two societies. This discussion emphasised the distinctiveness of the pre-socialist and socialist periods, and showed that these periods had a major impact on the process of democratization and the emergence of political opposition. I see the very different levels of democratization as the key to the contrasting social movement experience in the two societies.

I also showed that Hungarian environmental movements were strongly influenced by the German and Austrian models whereas in Russia western influence is combined with the more romantic tradition of national nature protection. The recent evolution of environmental movements in Hungary and Russia since the regime change has also been very different. At the 'peak' of the transition there was an upsurge of social movements in both countries and a sudden growth of interest in environmental issues. This resulted in a sharp increase in environmental movements. While this was very similar in both countries the subsequent decline was different.

In Hungary, as in other non-eastern European societies in transition, such as Spain and Portugal, a certain decline of movement activities was due to political stabilization with the establishment of well functioning political parties and the successful restructuring of authorities. However, a fairly steady level of environmental movement activity continues to exist till today. Thus in Hungary the more favourable environment and achievement of

considerable success has led to a stabilization of environmental movements at a higher level. In Russia, however, neither of these conditions was present: no system of functioning political parties developed and the frequent reorganisation of authorities did not result in a more democratic system. This different societal context is responsible for the difference in environmental movements. Failure to achieve their aims and the repressive political environment led to a sharp decline in environmental movements.

Finally, I need to ask whether my conclusions about the development of democratization in Hungary and Russia are influenced by the choice of environmental movements as the focus of our research. In both societies environmental activism did develop in the final years of state socialism and undoubtedly to some extent even contributed to the development of political pluralism. This was because at the end of the socialist period environmental movements played a double role in both societies. They were tolerated by the outgoing regime and therefore became the focus of opposition. Many politically active people joined environmental movements in order to express their cautious discontent with the regime. Later, when opposition was legalised, these primarily politically oriented people left environmental movements and joined political parties. Environmental movements were thus the first organised political activity in which these people gained experience as political activists. However, with the change of regime, environmental activity lost its privileged character as a much wider range of types of political participation became possible and environmental movements became only one type of social movement. The implication of this is that since the change of regime (but not before), environmental movements can be considered typical of social movements of all kinds.

Despite the achievements of this study I do not consider that it has at all exhausted its field. There is clearly scope for similar studies in former state socialist societies other than Hungary and Russia, and also for a comparison between former state socialist societies and Mediterranean and Latin American societies that have undergone transitions from an authoritarian rule. The role of enterprises and their influence (or the lack of it) on the emergence of environmental awareness also deserves explicit attention. There is also a need for systematic national studies (including developed western societies) and data archives which would be a great value to those undertaking in-depth studies of a limited number of

movements.

THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

In order to discuss the future of environmental movements I need to consider the forces that favour their development. Firstly, the 'objective' level of environmental ills is relevant. Though I know that industrialisation in the past and the more recent lack of attention to environmental problems has led to serious environmental damage, the first question is whether this damage is recognised and secondly to what extent grievances are translated into action.

As a result of the upsurge of interest in environmental problems at the time of the regime change, one would expect a wide spread recognition of their existence in both societies today. In Hungary this recognition does exist among ordinary people and there is continuing interest in environmental issues. In Russia, however, where the 'objective' situation is worse than in Hungary due to the fact that industrialisation was more developed, the earlier recognition has given way to the 'official' ideology that the first priority is to get the economy working properly, and that the expenditure of energy and resources on green matters is a 'luxury'. However, at the central governmental level there is strong evidence that environmental policy is given a low priority in both countries (with the exception of the mayor of Budapest who pursues the matter).

It could be suggested that in Russia there will be a greater increase of activism based on the objective situation and failure of by the political leadership to respond to demands. But, as the theoretical literature on social movements suggests, grievances are much less important than the political context and the level of consciousness in determining activism. It is these social forces which are more likely to shape the future pattern of environmental movements. In Russia there is a 'closed' polity, central and local government are not open to outside suggestions, pressure or any kind of opposition, and this is likely to lead to the continuing decline of grassroots political activities including environmental movements. The lack of

success of current environmental movements and the hostile attitude of the authorities will continue to discourage people from spending time and energy on such futile activities as social movements, including environmental movements. I also think that environmental policy will continue to be given a very low priority by the government.

The divergence between the two societies is likely to continue. In Hungary, where central and local government are a lot more open to outside influence, civil society will survive and social movements will continue to have a say in politics. Environmental movements will maintain a steady level of activity. Many 'old' movements will continue to exist and new ones will come into existence all over the country. The relative success of present day environmental movements will provide a good example for the new ones as to how to cooperate and compromise in order to survive. Thus environmental issues will remain fairly important in people's minds and in the media. Whether environmental policy will be given a higher priority by the government remains to be seen.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Appendix A describes the sources of data, the method of collecting them and the distinction between this thesis and the ESRC^{*} project. Appendix B contains the two interview schedules used in my in-depth interviews: one with social movement activists and the other with authority members.

APPENDIX A

The research for the thesis was conducted between 1990 and 1994. After some preparation it was at the time of the March 1990 general elections that I first visited Hungary in order to observe the first free elections, including the campaign. I visited party headquarters, collected election leaflets and manifestos, talked to people, and followed the election campaign methods on television. At the same time I also started my interviewing of representatives of environmental movements. This was before the ESRC project. I visited and interviewed present and former activists and leaders of several environmental movements including the Danube Circle, Green Future, the Free Democrats Green Group, the Eotvos Lorand University's green group (which later became one of the founders of the Air Group). Apart from interviewing activists individually, I also participated in several meetings and conducted participant observation in order to establish the basis for subsequent over time interviewing.

I prepared two separate structured interview schedules (see Appendix B): one for social movement participants and another for authority members. These were carefully piloted by the local collaborators in both countries. Having analysed the pilot interviews (both in Russian and Hungarian) I had a training session with them in order to get the maximum results and consistency. The interviews using the provided schedules were conducted by two collaborators (Dr. Viktoria Szirmai and Dr. Lev Perepjolkin) in Russia and Hungary between 1991 and 1994. The collaborators sent over the interviews on a continuous basis and I monitored them very carefully in order to maintain consistency.

I also went to Hungary and Russia to conduct further interviews with local and national

* See page 289

authority members, movement leaders and activists as well as to participate in meetings, monitor the media and learn about the political development in both societies on a regular basis.

I have conducted 23 intensive interviews with environmental movement activists (both leaders and rank and file members) and local and national authorities which included elected representatives, and local and national government officials and my two local collaborators conducted a further 106 interviews closely following the interview schedules which I provided them. (The ESRC project had another 187 interviews conducted by the local collaborators which have not been used in my analysis for this thesis).

The movements selected were representative of the types of movements which existed in each country. Thus in Hungary where there are no federal organisations, the movements which I call 'national' are of national importance, because of their subjects. These always have their headquarters in Budapest, representing the dominance of the capital in Hungary. There are however important local movements inside and outside the capital which were also represented in my choice.

In Russia, on the other hand, the importance of federal organisations made me decide to include them. Russian local movements do not usually become as important as national ones, nevertheless it was important to include them in order to represent the variety present in Russia. Here too Moscow plays a central role in political life but of course federal organisations stretch beyond Moscow.

In order to conduct a systematic comparison of Russia and Hungary I used the same detailed interview schedules in both countries. This, combined with my own interviews which did not use the schedule, worked very well. The topics covered in the interviews with movement participants were: the history of the movement, grievances, change in the political situation, institutional support, the goals of the movement, participants, organisational aspects, structure, size, motivation of participation, leadership, funding and other resources, contacts with political parties and other movements, conflicts, relation with the media, attitude of population with the movement, success, dynamics.

Topics covered in the interviews with the authorities covered: clarification of the authorities' functions, role of representatives and officials, relations with other authorities, each other and the movement, how they obtained information and formed their views, what official relationships and personal feelings the authority members developed towards the movement.

Finally let me explain the connection with the ESRC project.

In 1989, when exciting political changes occurred in eastern Europe I decided to turn my academic interest back to Hungary and the Soviet Union and visited the region, as mentioned above, in order to explore the situation. My interest in environmental issues was also very strong even prior to this time which is why I decided to focus on green issues.

Later, when the ESRC launched the so called 'East-West' initiative in order to promote research in the area, three of us (Nick Manning, Chris Pickvance and myself) decided to apply for a grant which we were awarded in 1991.

The aim of the ESRC project, as opposed to my agenda, was to conduct research in two republics of the Soviet Union (Estonia and Russia) and in Hungary in order to investigate housing and environmental movements in three locations during a three year period (1991-1994). In addition to the interviews with environmental movement activists, referred to above, within the project we conducted in-depth interviews with housing movement activists and, in relation with housing movements, with authority members. Within the ESRC project we also conducted three large scale surveys in three locations: Estonia, Hungary and Russia (a sample of 2,000 people in total) in order to gauge ordinary people's attitudes concerning their housing problems, environmental and general political issues and to establish to what extent they were willing to participate in political action or keep away from them.

During my employment in the ESRC project (which was only between 1992-1994, because from 1989 to 1992 I was employed in a different project studying British housing) I was in charge of two major tasks. Firstly, I had to prepare, write and analyse the survey questionnaires and data in three different countries (as they were by then) and in three different languages in order to ensure their full compatibility. This needed a lot of careful

preparation in the field in all three countries because we had to use local (fairly inexperienced) firms for our sampling, conducting the face-to-face interviews and the recording of the data. I then had to spend considerable time cleaning and checking the Hungarian, Russian and Estonian data and prepare it for analysis.

It was also my task to analyse the data which I presented at several conferences. I have written up a number of papers, based on the data analysis, many of which have been published. The data analysis also provides the basis of my part in a book, currently under preparation, co-authored with Nick Manning and Chris Pickvance.

The second major part of my tasks was connected to the fact that two members of our project-team do not speak the languages of these countries. Thus my job was to translate every (around 190) lengthy in-depth interviews into English from Hungarian and some from Russian. I also translated, both from Russian and Hungarian, all important documents for the project.

Apart from these two major tasks, I was also in charge of communicating and corresponding with all our collaborators in three countries and organising several workshops during the project.

Our ESRC team has produced a considerable number of papers presented at conferences. None of these papers are co-authored. All of us focused on different aspects within the project: Chris Pickvance's main interest was: urban issues, the role of local authorities and housing movements, and the question of transition; Nick Manning mainly focused on the question of citizenship, citizen action and social policy related aspects; I focused on environmental issues, civil society and social movements theories, opposition and protest politics, the development of democracy in eastern Europe and the question of non-participation in political activities (based on the survey data) which led to a successful avoidance of any overlap within the papers or publications.

Finally, none of my collaborators in the ESRC project had the chance to be involved in the shaping or writing up of my thesis or my analysis of the interviews, because - in order to

separate the project from the thesis - I never discussed any aspect of the thesis with any of them, or allowed them to read any part of the thesis until I had finally completed it in the Summer of 1995.

There were only two people who had access to my previous chapters. One was my supervisor, Chris Rootes, who was closely involved in advising me concerning the thesis from the very start to the very end on a regular basis. The other person was Dr. Howard Davis whose task was to see two of my chapters in order to decide on my upgrading from MPhil to PhD and who also has regularly seen and commented on several of my conference papers.

In sum, in order to separate my analysis concerning the ESRC project and the thesis, firstly, I opted to compare only two countries, instead of all three. Secondly, I decided to focus on environmental issues in the thesis and leave out several other comparative issues, such as the housing movements and non-participation in political actions. And thirdly, I opted not to use the survey data, which I generated for the ESRC project.

In my ESRC project work, however, I compare three countries, including Estonia; I examine and contrast housing and environmental problems (but not social movements) and also wider political attitude aspects, such as trust in local and national politics, and inactivity in political issues; and use the survey data in my analysis but not the in-depth interview material.

APPENDIX B.

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

General Instruction:

1. The study of the dynamics of the movements is one of our principal aims. Therefore the interviewing will continue over a longer time than usual. We would like the interviews to start in early November 1991 and continue till May 1993, i.e. a period of 18 months.

We do not want to impose a fixed set of dates for interviews with given movements. The timing of the interviews should follow the logic of development of the movement. In the case of short-lived movements it may be sensible to carry out several interviews in a short period. Similarly, if a movement is highly active, that may justify more interviews in a short space of time. On the other hand, movements which are relatively inactive can have interviews spread out at longer intervals.

2. The interview guide is drawn up in the form of open questions to the interviewee. The analytical topics precede the questions and are printed in CAPITAL letters. We have also separated questions from information which needs to be found out. Please ask the open questions first, before asking the 'find out' items, since we want to give people a chance to give responses different from those we expect.

Since there is a lot of interconnection between different sections of the guide we do not mind if sometimes the order of the schedule is not observed as long as all the questions are answered.

3. Note that when you are interviewing the same person again some of the questions do not need to be asked: Q2 (History of the movement) and Q9 (Reasons for the emergence of the movement). While asking the questions concentrate on changes which have occurred since the previous interview was taken.

However, if you change interviewees each time you visit the movement it is important not to omit Q2 and Q9, and in the other questions ask both about the initial stage of the movement and its current state (the changes which have occurred in between).

1. INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE:

Ask about the interviewee's:

- age, educational and occupational background;
- whether he/she is active in any political parties (and if so, which);
- whether he/she is active in any other social movements (and if so, which);
- position in the movement (leader or activist, volunteer or professional);
- how long he/she has been in the movement.

2. THE HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT:

- (a) When and how did the movement start?

[Note for the interviewer: from here onwards the questions refer to the movement named on page 2]

- (b) Who were the founding members of the movement (by age, educational and occupational background)?

3. THE GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT:

- 3.1. What were the goals of the movement at the moment of its formation?

Have they changed since then? If yes:

- which way;
- and why?

Find out: whether they were at the start and are now:

- wide-scope/narrow-scope;
- multiple/single;

- long-term/short-term;
- policy-concerned, or instrumental/value-concerned, or expressive;
- radical/moderate;

3.2. What actions does the movement undertake to achieve these goals (e.g. campaigns, demonstrations, petitions, dissemination of knowledge, any other kind of action)?

4. THE SIZE OF THE MOVEMENT:

4.1. What was the size of the movement at the start?

Find out one by one:

what was the number and proportion of:

- (a) activists;
- (b) participants;
- (c) sympathizers.

4.2. Have there been any changes in the size of the movement since that time?

If yes,

- of what kind;
- in which group [see 4.1: (a), (b), (c)]?

4.3. Are you happy with the number and proportion of:

- activists;
- participants;
- sympathizers?

If not - why?

Does the movement undertake any particular actions to change (increase or decrease) the size of the movement? What are these actions? Why are they important?

5. SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE MOVEMENT

5.1 What is the social composition of:

- the leadership;
- participants;
- the support base of the movement; (age, gender, education, social class, ethnic group)?

Has that changed since the movement was formed?

5.2 Are there intellectuals in the movement?

If there are intellectuals, ask:

Do you think they play any specific role in the movement? What is it?

What do you think about the proportion of intellectuals in the movement? Are you happy about it?

If there are no intellectuals, ask:

Why do you think there are no intellectuals in the movement?

Do you think it is useful to have more intellectuals, or would you rather stay as you are?

6.THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE INTEREST IN THE MOVEMENT:

6.1 Would you say that the movement is promoting a new idea?

If so, what is it?

6.2 Where does this idea come from?

Who articulates this idea?

6.3 How important is it for the movement?

Do you think this idea influences society outside the movement?

7.SCALE OF OPERATION OF THE MOVEMENT:

Find out:

what levels the movement operates at:

- neighbourhood;
- local;
- regional;
- national.

[Note for the interviewer: If there is some sort of combination of different levels make sure it is clearly explained]

8.REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT:

8.1. What was the role of the objective conditions (the environmental grievances) in generating the movement?

Would you say that the objective situation became worse shortly before the movement was organized (sudden increases in grievance)?

If the problems existed before the movement started, were people's grievances expressed in any other way (e.g. individual behaviour)?

8.2. What was the role of the political context in generating the movement?

Find out:

whether the movement emerged because:

- there was a general increase in political activism;
- the chances of achieving success were higher than before (if yes, then explain in what way);
- authorities of different levels had become more responsive to claims from the public (if yes, then what were the reasons for the increased responsiveness?);
- there were more legal opportunities than before to (a) organize the movements and (b) acquire resources necessary for that.

9. RESOURCES OF THE MOVEMENT:

9.1. What kind of resources did the movement have at the beginning:

Find out one by one about:

- financial resources;
- offices;

- transport;
- publishing and photocopying facilities;
- telephone, fax;
- monitoring equipment (e.g. for environmental movements);
- any other type of material resources;
- non-material resources (such as contacts, influence).

9.2. Where did the resources come from originally?

Find out whether they come from:

- established organizations;
- authorities;
- other movements;
- powerful and resourceful individuals;
- any other sources.

9.3. What resources does the movement possess at the moment and where do they come from? (See options as in Q.9.1 and Q.9.2)

How has the situation changed over time?

10. SOCIAL NETWORKS (PRE-EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS):

10.1 Did the founding members of the movement know each other before they organized the movement (e.g. were they friends, colleagues, or members of the same organization, etc.)?

Q. If yes, then how did they come to organize a movement?

10.2 Would you say that now there are strong or weak informal links between members, or only within the core of activists?

11. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MOVEMENT:

11.1 Is the movement registered with the authorities? What advantages does it gain from this? Are there any disadvantages of registration?

11.2 Does the movement possess a written document that states both the purpose of the organisation and its provisions for operation? Is any other sort of documentation available?

11.3 Is the membership loose or formal (membership fees, a formal list of members, etc.)?

11.4 What information does the movement have about its membership?

11.5 Does the movement have a hierarchical structure, or is it loosely organised (like a network)?

11.6 Does the movement employ paid officials or is the work done entirely on voluntary basis?

11.7 Does the movement experience internal conflicts and splits?

12. PARTICIPANT MOTIVATION:

12.1 What makes you participate in the movement?

Find out whether:

- respondents expect individual benefits (e.g. obtaining making a political career, etc.);

- participation brings social-psychological gratifications to respondents (e.g. sociability, spending spare leisure time, sense of solidarity and group affiliation, etc.);
- respondents have ideological affiliation with movements (e.g., express their value commitments);
- other reasons.

12.2 And why do you think other people participate in this movement?

12.3 Would you say that your participation in the movement is motivated by (or related to):

- your work;
- your family (can be the family he/she was brought up in);
- your involvement in the life of the community (neighbourhood);
- your religious beliefs;
- your personality;
- your participation in other movements (if yes, which; and how do they relate to this movement?);
- your affiliation with any political parties;
- your ethnic origin?

If yes, then explain how.

12.4 Would you say that those who participate in the movement are also those who have enough time to be involved in movement activities (e.g. have no children, are unmarried or retired, have flexible working hours, etc.)?

Is this true in your case?

12.5 Would you say about yourself that you are successful in organising

your private life (meaning job, living standards, leisure time, etc.)? In what way (describe it, please)?

13. LEADERSHIP:

[Note for the interviewer: Question 13.1. do not ask from leaders].

13.1 Who is the leader (leaders) in the movement? Is there one particular person whom you consider to be a leader in the movement, or are there several leaders?

Find out the basic facts about the leader (leaders):

- age,
- gender,
- educational and occupational background,
- ethnic origin,
- whether he/she (they) is (are) active in any political party, or/and other movements.

[Note for the interviewer: the following questions in this section should be adjusted accordingly]

13.2 How long have (you, he/she, they) been the leader in the movement?

13.3 What were the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the leaders? How did (you, he/she, they) come to be leaders?

13.4 Did (you, he/she, they) have any experience of leadership before (you, he/she, they) became leaders in the movement?

13.5 Do (you, he/she, they) possess relevant skills? Where did (you, he/she, they) acquire them?

13.6 What motivates (you, the leaders) to take on the leader's role?

13.7 What is the main basis of the leader's authority:

Find out whether it is:

- charisma,
- skill in bargaining,
- organizational skills,
- expertise in any field (e.g. biologist, lawyer)
- leadership in some other organization (e.g. leadership-skills converted from previous leadership experiences);
- other bases;
- combination of different bases.

13.8 What are the relations between (you, the leaders) and the activists?

13.9 How much autonomy is allowed to (you, the leaders)?

Is there some form of participatory democracy which restricts the leader's freedom?

Or is there too much autonomy in the hands of the leaders?

14. THE MOVEMENT'S RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:

14.1 Does the movement act independently or in alliance with any political party?

Does it seek any alliance with political parties (close/loose; in what way and for what purpose)?

Does it have any ambition to develop into a party or be incorporated by a party?

Have parties tried to incorporate the movement?

14.2 What type of relations, if any, does the movement have with other social movements, including:

- movements having similar aims,
- movements having counter aims?

15. THE MOVEMENT'S RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA:

15.1 Does the movement consider its relations with the media important? If yes, then why?

15.2 Does the movement have access to central or local press, radio, TV?

Find out:

- how often;
- regularly/occasionally.

15.3 Does the movement have any type of publication? If yes, what is its circulation?

15.4 How is the movement covered by the media?

Find out:

- how frequently;

- negatively or positively;
- how happy they are with the media coverage.

16. THE ATTITUDE OF THE PUBLIC TO THE MOVEMENT:

16.1 How much knowledge does the movement have about the attitude of the public to the movement?

- Where does this knowledge come from?
- Has the movement itself ever conducted any sort of surveys about its perception by the public?

[Note for the interviewer: If yes, we would like to borrow it!]

16.2 Is the attitude of the public:

- supportive;
- indifferent;
- hostile;
- contradictory (mixed)

(Always ask and have them explain why?)

16.3 Are you happy about the attitude of the public toward the movement? How important for the movement do you consider this to be?

17. THE MOVEMENT'S INTERACTIONS WITH THE AUTHORITIES:

17.1 What relations does the movement have with authorities of different levels?

- What particular authorities (and people within the authority) do you go to with your problems?

Find out: their names and precise positions within the authority so that they could be contacted later.

17.2 What means does the movement choose to influence authorities?

Find out: whether the movement makes use of:

- participation in election campaigns (local/national; promoting/supporting a candidate);
- lobbying: petitions, demonstrations, etc.;
- information exchange;
- other means.

Why are these means chosen?

17.3 Is the movement willing to compromise? How and to what extent, and what way?

17.4 Does the movement undertake actions which are not intended to exert pressure on authorities? Please make them explain, why.

Find out: whether the movement uses:

- self-help actions;
- disseminating knowledge (lectures, discussions, etc.);
- collecting information (surveys, expertise, etc.);
- other.

18. RESPONSES FROM THE AUTHORITIES TO THE MOVEMENT:

18.1 What response did the movement receive from the authorities at the beginning?

Has there been any change in the authorities' response to the movement since that time?

18.2 Does it receive any attention from the authorities or is it ignored by the authorities?

18.3 Do the authorities seek cooperation with the movement?

18.4 Do the authorities attempt to incorporate the movement?

18.5 Are there any attempts on the part of the authorities to weaken the movement, i.e.:

- by offering jobs to the leaders of the movement;
- by setting up a rival organization with aims similar to those of the movement?

18.6 Do the authorities resort to repression tactics?

19. THE MOVEMENT'S ACHIEVEMENTS:

19.1 How successful has the movement been so far: what has it achieved?

How did this happen?

What conclusions have been drawn from the experience?

19.2 What aims has it failed to achieve?

How did this happen?

What conclusion and experience has the movement drawn from it?

19.3 What do you consider to be a success?

Find out: whether it is:

- mere survival;
- acceptance by the authorities;
- raising consciousness of members and general public;
- placing issues on the political agenda;
- other.

20. TRANSFORMATION OF THE MOVEMENT:

[Note for the interviewer: This question should be asked only when you revisit the movement]

What changes, in your estimation, has the movement undergone since the previous interview?

What were the changes caused by?

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS OF THE INTERVIEWER:

**INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR AUTHORITIES'
REPRESENTATIVES**

General Instruction:

1. Activity of authorities is crucial in shaping the actual experience of environmental and housing movements at each stage of their development, i.e. in provoking movement

formation, encouraging or discouraging mobilization, moulding movements' goals and courses of action, and furthering final success or failure of the movements.

Through interviewing authorities' representatives we mean to identify factors underlying authorities' responses to the movements, and the choice of particular strategies for interaction with the movements.

2. Interviews should be conducted with the a variety of types of authorities' representatives, ranging from:

- the 'apologist', who identifies with and defends completely the authority's policies; to
- the so called 'whistle-blower', who is willing to reveal behind-the-scenes information.

3. We want you to ask the movement people and seek advice from them about which representatives they would contact before you decide on who to interview within the authority. Try to interview the representatives they suggest (see section 17.1. in the other interview guide).

4. If there has been a considerable change in relations between authorities and movements (e.g. pressure from movements on authorities has mounted substantially, or/and a shift in authorities' policy towards movements has occurred) since completing this interview, we recommend you to go back to the authority and reinterview the same (or another) person concentrating on changes which took place.

1. POSITION OF THE INTERVIEWEE:

Ask about:

- the interviewee's position within the authority;
- his/her relation to a particular party;

- the interviewee's background (occupation, qualifications, career in the authority);
- the interviewee's responsibilities in the environmental area;
- whether the interviewee is a member of any social movement him/herself.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORITY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD:

[Note for the interviewer:

1. Make sure the interviewee answers about the current situation and not about plans.
2. In case the authority you are interviewing is undergoing reorganisation so that the respondent cannot give answers to the questions, let him/her spell out the details of reorganisations.

2.1. What do these responsibilities comprise?

Are they new /old?

Have there been any recent changes (e.g. acquisition of new functions)? What were they?

2.2. What are the main issues the authority faces in the environmental/housing field ?

Have they changed over time?

What priorities has it established among its policies?

How is the authority organised in the environmental field?

Find out:

- if there are separate departments for each field;
- what numbers of staff are involved in each field;
- what the staff's responsibilities in each field are;
- if any officials work in decentralised (e.g. neighbourhood) offices.

Have there been any recent changes in organization? What are they?

2.4. Does the authority have enough resources (i.e. budget, personnel, legislation) to carry out its responsibilities?

If not, how does this affect the actual policymaking?

How does the authority cope with the problem ?

2.5. How much autonomy (e.g. from higher-level authorities, local party committees) does the authority have in the carrying out of its responsibilities?

Explain recent changes, if there have been any.

3. THE AUTHORITY'S POLITICAL MANAGEMENT:

3.1. What is the balance between different parties among elected representatives:

- now;
- and in the past?

Is there a ruling party or coalition?

Has this changed recently?

3.2. What are the formal stages by which decisions are made?

3.3. What are the real centres of decision-making?

How much power do officials have compared with elected representatives?

3.4. How open is policy-making to outside interests (e.g. pressure from interest groups, industrial and other enterprises, higher level authorities, local people) ?

4. THE AUTHORITY'S RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC:

4.1. How much does the authority know about the needs of the public in the environmental area?

How does the authority prioritise the needs of the public?

4.3. How does the authority collect information about public needs?

Find out whether the authority:

- relies on experts;
- conducts surveys, expertise, consultation;
- employs special staff.

How important is this activity for the authority?

4.4. To what extent is this information utilised?

How is it utilized - do systematic procedures exist by which this information enters the elaboration of policies? (ask for examples)

4.2. How does the authority respond to the needs of the public?

Do the policies of the authority meet the needs of the public in the environmental area?

Do the policies have public support?

What are the main sources of discontent of the public with the authority's policies in the environmental area?

4.5. What means does the authority use to influence public opinion (directly or/and indirectly) in both environmental areas? (ask for examples)

Does the authority use the media for this purpose? (Find out: If yes, how? If not, why?)

How does the authority present itself towards the public?

How much does it care about its image?

5. THE AUTHORITY'S SUPPORT FOR CITIZEN ACTION:

Does the authority support citizen action in the carrying out of its functions (e.g. creation of tenants organizations to manage housing, stimulation of volunteer action in the environmental sphere)? (ask for examples)

What kind of support does the authority provide (e.g. funds for local citizen groups who perform community tasks, 'verbal' support, other kinds of support)?

How significant is this support?

How selective is it, i.e. does it cover all such groups or certain groups? If the latter,

how can it be explained?

Has there been any change in policy towards this kind of support in recent years?

6. THE AUTHORITY'S ENCOUNTERS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS:

6.1 Has the authority come under pressure from environmental movements?

How widespread and active have these movements been?

Do they exert more pressure today than in the past?

[Note for the interviewer: Let the interviewee say as much as he/she knows about the history of the authority's encounters with environmental movements. Ask the names of the movements and the time they were active].

Find out:

- how much the respondent knows about the particular environmental movements we have chosen for interviewing;
- whether the authority has any experience of dealing with these particular movements.

6.2. Judging from your experience,

How do the movements affect policy-making by the authority?

Do they in general facilitate or impede policy-making?

Are the activities of the movement threatening to the authority (to the exercising of its duties)?

- 6.3. Would you say that the existence of movements is a positive thing for society, or is it mainly a negative thing (something that should be avoided)? (Ask for explanation)

How much does your personal view on movements differ from the general attitude within the authority?

7. THE AUTHORITY'S STRATEGIES TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS:

[Note for the interviewer:

If the authority has a considerable experience of interaction with the particular environmental movements we are studying, we would like you to concentrate on the authority's response to these particular movements.

In case of no such experience, ask the respondent about the concrete examples of the authority's responses to environmental movements. Please, do not forget to ask the names of the movements and the time they came to interact with the authority.]

- 7.1. Would you say that the authority has a selective policy towards certain movements (i.e. favouring some, opposing others) or does it have the same general pattern of response to all the movements?
- (a) Is there any marked difference in the response given by the authority to environmental as opposed to other movements? If yes, then explain why.
- (b) Is the authority itself homogeneous in its reaction towards social movements?

Are there any conflicts within the authority regarding attitudes towards movements?

Are there movement-linked or movement- sympathetic officials within the

authority?

- 7.2. How autonomous is the authority in choosing its line of action towards movements?

Find out: whether there is any sort of pressure from:

- higher level of authorities;
- enterprises;
- interest groups and parties;
- the media;
- the public opinion.

How strong is the pressure from the public?

Is the authority under more pressure from the population than in the past?

Is this a good thing or a bad thing, why?

- 7.3. Could you think of any examples of the authority choosing a cooperation strategy toward environmental movements?

(a) How often does the authority use this tactic?

(b) What did the cooperation strategy involve?

Find out whether it involved:

- allowing access to information;
- including activists in advisory bodies;
- recruiting them as personnel;
- setting up new agencies to deal with problems raised by movements;

- providing movements with different types of resources;
- other.

(c) Why did the authority prefer to cooperate with environmental movements?

Find out whether:

- movements had a large support base;
- movements showed willingness to cooperate and compromise;
- the cooperation strategy proved to be effective based on prior experience;
- movements were not threatening to the authority;
- movements' claims were easy to handle;
- there was strong pressure from actors other than movements, such as public opinion, political parties, etc.;
- other reasons.

(d) Do you think the cooperation strategy was successful (effective)? In what way?

(e) In general, how do you define success (or effectiveness)?

7.4. Have there been attempts by the authority to coopt leaders and activists, i.e. to allow movements to remain but persuade them to adopt goals of the authority?

How often did the authority use this tactic towards environmental movements?

Why did the authority choose this strategy?

Were these attempts successful?

Are there cases when environmental movements were ignored by the authority?

How frequent were they?

What made the authority choose this strategy?

Was this strategy successful?

7.6. Has the authority ever tried to weaken environmental movements?

Find out whether the authority:

- offered jobs to movements' leaders;
- set up a rival organization which would undermine the legitimacy of movements' claims.

How often did it happen?

Why was this strategy chosen?

Has the authority succeeded in that?

7.7. Could you think of examples when the authority resorted to repression?

- (a) Is the use of repression a common or uncommon practice with the authority?
- (b) What particular sanctions did the authority use against movements?

Did the authority make alliances with other agencies against movements (e.g. local media)?

- (c) Why do you think the repression strategy was chosen?

Find out whether:

- movements had radical goals and/or were unwilling to cooperate;

- movements were threatening for the authority;
- the authority relied on prior experience in choosing this strategy;
- other reasons.

(d) Was the repression strategy successful? In what sense?

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS OF THE INTERVIEWER:

* Note :

¹ The study is based on a research project carried out at the University of Kent, Canterbury funded by the ESRC East-West initiative, project Y309253009. I would like to acknowledge the work of the other members of the UK team Nick Manning, Sveta Klimova and Chris Pickvance, and the work of our collaborators in Hungary and Russia: Dr. Viktoria Szirmai, Dr. Peter Gyori, Eva Matern, Dr. Lev Perepjolkin and Dr. Yelena Shomina.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acton E. 1992: *Rethinking the Russian Revolution*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Alexander J. T. 1989: *Catherine the Great*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Almond G. A. and Verba S. (eds.) 1989: *The Civic Culture Revisited*. London: Sage Publications.
- Anderson M. S. 1969: *Peter the Great*. London: Themes and Hudson.
- Andreyev N. 1976: Appanage and Muscovite Russia, in: Auty R., Obolensky D. and Kingsford A.: *An Introduction to Russian History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anonymous, 1974: *The Bolsheviks and the October Revolution: Central Committee Minutes of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), August 1917 - February 1918*. (Translated from the Russian by Ann Bone), London: Pluto Press.
- Arató A. 1991: Social Movements and Civil Society in the Soviet Union, in: Sedaitis J.B. and Butterfield J. (eds.) *Perestroika from Below: Social Movements in the Soviet Union*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Arató A. and Cohen J. L. 1992: *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Arendt H. 1973: *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Brighton: Harvest Publishers.
- Armstrong J.A. 1961: *The Politics of Totalitarianism*. Random House.
- Aron R. 1978: *Politics and History: selected essays*. London: Collier-Macmillan.
- Bak J. 1990: The Late mediaval Period, 1382-1526, in: Sugar (ed.) *A History of Hungary*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
- Balogh E.S. 1971: Nationality Problems of the Hungarian Soviet republic, in: Volgyesi (ed.) *Hungary in Revolution, 1918-19*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Barány G. 1984: Two revolutions in 1848: Vienna and Pest, in: Ranki G. (ed.) *Hungarian History - World History*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Barány G. 1990: The Age of Royal Absolutism, 1790-1848, in: Sugar F. P. (ed.) op.cit.
- Barta I. 1975: Toward Bourgeois Transformation, Revolution and War of Independence (1790-1849), in: Pamlényi E. (ed.) op. cit.
- Bartha A. 1975: *The Hungarian Society in the 9th and 10th Centuries*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

- Bater J. H. 1987: St. Petersburg and Moscow on the eve of the revolution, in: Kaiser D. H. (ed.) *The Workers' Revolution in Russia, 1917: the view from below*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Batkay W. M. 1982: *Authoritarian Politics in a Transitional State, 1919-1926*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Berend T.I. 1990: Contemporary Hungary, 1956-1984, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.
- Berend I. and Ranki G. 1975: The Horthy Regime, 1919-1944, in: Pamlenyi (ed.) *A History of Hungary*. London: Collet's.
- Berend I. and Ránki Gy. 1976: *Közép-Kelet-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19.-20. században*. (The economic development of Central Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries) Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.
- Berend I. and Ránki Gy. 1987: *Európa Gazdasága a 19. században, 1780-1914*. (The Economy of Europe in the 19th century, 1780-1914) Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó.
- Berezovski V. N. 1990: *Neformalnaja Rossija*. (Informal Russia) Moscow: Molodaja Gvardija.
- Berger P. and Luckman T. 1967: *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Doubleday.
- Bibó I. 1979: *Selected Essays*. (edited by Kende P.) Paris: Dialogues Europeens.
- Bilocerkojcz J. 1988: *Soviet Ukranian Dissent: a study of political alienation*. Boulder: Westview.
- Blumer, H. 1951: "Collective Behavior" in Lee, A.M. (ed.) *Principles of Sociology*. New York: Barnes and Noble.
- Bogoslovskij M.M. 1963: Peter's program of Political reform, in: Raeff M. (ed.) *Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary?* Boston: Heath.
- Bottomore T. 1979: *Political Sociology*. London: Hutchinson.
- Boyce J.H. 1993: Local Government reform and the New Moscow City Council, *The Journal of Communist Studies* 9(3): 245-271.
- Bozóki A. 1988: Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary, *Südosteuropa*, 7-8.
- Bozóki A: 1990: Politikai Irányzatok Magyarországon. (Political trends in Hungary)in: Kurtán S. (ed.) *Political Almanach of Hungary*. Budapest: AULA-OMIHK.
- Bozóki A., Körösenyi A. and Schöpflin G. (eds.) 1992: *Post-Communist Transition: the emerging pluralism in Hungary*. London: Pinter.

Bugajski J. and Pollack M. 1989: *East European Fault Lines: Dissent, Opposition and Social Activism*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Burnham 1941: *The Managerial Revolution*. London: Putnam.

Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J. B. 1991: The Emergence of Social Movements in the Soviet Union, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J.B. (eds.) op.cit.

Butterfield J. and Weigle M. 1991: Unofficial Social Groups and Regime Response in the Soviet Union, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J.B. (eds.) op. cit.

Button J.W. 1978: *Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Brand K.W. 1990: Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements: Waves of Cultural Criticism and Mobilization Cycles of New Middle-class Radicalism in: Dalton R.J. and Kuechler M. (eds.) *Challenging the Political Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Breslauer G. W. 1980: Khrushchev reconsidered, in: Cohen, Rbonowittch and Sharlet (eds.) *The Soviet Union since Stalin*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Brown A. 1984: Political Power and the Soviet State, in: Harding N. (ed.) *The State in Socialist Society*. London: Macmillan/St. Anthony's College Oxford.

Bryant, C. G. A. 1993: Social Self-Organization, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on Kumar's "Civil Society", *British Journal of Sociology*, 44(3):397-401.

Brzezinski Z. 1966: *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Praeger.

Brzezinski Z. 1969: The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration? in: Brzezinski (ed.) *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Campeanu P. 1988: *The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order*. London: M.E. Sharpe.

Carr E.H. 1979: *The Russian revolution from Lenin to Stalin 1917-1929*. London: Macmillan.

Castells M. 1977: *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*. Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press.

Castells M. 1980: Multinational Capital, National States and Local Communities, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley working paper No.334.

Channon J. 1992: The peasantry in the Revolutions of 1917, in: Frankel E. R., J, and Baruch Knei Paz (eds.) *Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Charques R. 1974: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen G. B. 1989: The Social Structure of Prague, Vienna and Budapest in the late Nineteenth Century, in: Ranki G. (ed.) *Hungary and the European Civilization*. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado.
- Cohen J.L. 1985: Strategy and Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements, *Social Research* 52: 663-716.
- Cohen J. L. 1986: *Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen S. F. 1985a: *Rethinking the Soviet Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Conquest R. 1966: Immobilism and Decay, in: Brzezinski (ed.) op. cit.
- Cracraft J. 1988: Opposition to Peter the Great, in: Mendelsohn M. and Shatz S. (eds.) *Imperial Russia*. Northern Illinois University Press.
- Crankshaw E. 1978: *The Shadow of the Winter Palace: The drift to revolution 1825-1917*. London: Penguin Books.
- Dahl R. 1956: *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Dahl R. 1966: *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl R. 1971: *Polyarchy: Particiaption and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl R. 1982: *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy versus Control*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl R. 1989: *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dalton R.J. and Kuechler M. (eds.) 1990: *Challenging the Political Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Dalton R.J., Kuechler M. and Burklin W. 1990: The Challenge of New Movements in: Dalton R.J. and Kuechler M. (eds.) *Challenging the Political Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Daniels R.V. 1962: *The Nature of Communism*. Random House.
- Davis H. 1987: Class and the Media, in: Seaton J. and Pimlott B. (eds.) *The Media in British Politics*. Aldershot: Gower.
- Davis H. 1989: Crisis and conflict in East European state socialism, in: *Industrial Societies: crisis and division in western capitalism and state socialism*. London: Unwin Hyman.

- Davis H. 1992: Social Stratification in Europe, in: Bailey J. (ed.) *Social Europe*. London: Longman.
- Davis H. and Walton P. 1983: "Death of a Premier: consensus and closure in international news" in Davis H. and Walton P. (eds.) *Language Image, Media*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Davis H. and Scase R. 1985: *Western Capitalism and State Socialism: an Introduction*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Dawisha K. 1988: *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: the great challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Madariaga I. 1990: *Catherine the Great*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Deak I. 1971: The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918, in: Volgyes I. (ed.) op. cit.
- Deak I. 1990: The Revolution and the War of Independence, 1848-1849, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.
- Deme L. 1976: The Radical Left in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. *East European Quarterly*.
- Deme L. 1984: Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy, in: Ranki G. (ed.) op. cit.
- D'Encaussee H. C. 1981: *Stalin*. London: Longman.
- Diani M. 1992: The concept of social movement, *The Sociological Review*, 1-25.
- Diani M. and Eyerman R. (eds.) 1992: *Studying Collective Action*. London: Sage Publications.
- Djilas M. 1957: *The New Class*. London: Themes and Hudson.
- Doktorov B. Z., Firsov B. M. and Safronov V.V. 1993: Ecological Consciousness in the USSR: entering the 1990s, in: Vari A. and Tamas P. (eds.) *Environment and Democratic Transition: Policy and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Duka A. 1993: Elections 1993, unpublished manuscript. Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of Russia, St. Petersburg branch.
- Dukes P. 1990: *The Making of the Russian Absolutism*. London: Longman.
- Dunlop J. B. 1983: *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Eckelt F. 1971: The Internal Policies of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, in: Volgyes (ed.)

op. cit.

Eckhart F. 1931: *A Short History of the Hungarian People*. Grant Richards.

Einhorn B. 1993: *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe*. London: Verso.

Einhorn, B. 1995: Ironies of History: Citizenship Issues in the New Market Economis of East-Central Europe, in: Einhron,B. and Eileen Yeo (eds.) *Women and Market Societies East and West*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Eisinger K. 1973: The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities, *American Political Science Review*, 67:11-28.

Emmons T. 1983: *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Engel P. 1990: The Age of the Angevines, 1301-1382, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.

Erdei F. (1943) 1978: A magyar társadalom a két háború között (The Hungarian society between the wars), in: *Szöveggyűjtemény a Szociológia szakosító hallgatói részére*. (Reader for Sociology Students) Budapest: MSzMP Budapesti Igazgatósága Szociológia Tanszék.

Eyerman R. and Jamison A. 1991: *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fainsod M. 1979: *How the Soviet Union is Governed?* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Ferro M. 1985: *The Bolshevik Revolution*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Field D. 1976: *The End of Serfdom*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Field D. 1989: *Rebels in the Name of the Tsar*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Fireman B. and Gamson W. A. 1979: Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective in: Zald M.N. and McCarthy J.D. (eds.) 1979: *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control, and Tactics*. Cambridge, Ma: Winthrop Publishers

Fischer G. 1970: The Intelligentsia and Russia, in: Black C. B. (ed.) *The Transformation of Russian Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Fitzpatrick S. 1979: *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fitzpatrick S. 1982: *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fleischer T. 1993: Jaws on the Danube: Water Management, regime Change and the Movement against the Middle Danube Hydroelectric Dam, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 17:429-443.

Freeborn R. 1966: *A Short History of Modern Russia*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Freeman J. 1979: Resource Mobilization and Strategy: A Model for Analyzing Social Movement Organization Actions, in: Zald and McCarthy (eds.) *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, Cambridge, Ma: Winthrop Publishers.

Freeman J. 1983: A Model for Analyzing the Strategic Options of Social Movement Organizations in: Freeman J. (ed.) *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies*. London: Longman.

Friedgut T. 1979: *Political Participation in the USSR*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Friedrich C. J. and Brzezinski Z. (eds.) 1966: *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. London: Praeger.

Frank T. 1990: Hungary and the Dual Monarchy, 1867-1890, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.

Frankel J. 1992: 1917, The Problem of Alternatives, in: Frankel et al. (eds.) op.cit.

Fuhrmann J.T. 1972: *The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Chicago University Press.

Galasi P. and Sziráczi G. 1985: State regulation, enterprise behaviour and the labour market in HUNGARY, 1968 - 83. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 9:203-219.

Gamson W. A., 1975: *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Press.

Garner R.A. and Zald M.N. 1987: The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors in: Zald M.N. and McCarthy J.D. (eds.) *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays*. New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books.

Gati C. 1990: From Liberation to Revolution, 1945-1956, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.

Geyer A. R. 1987: *The Russian Revolution*. Hamburg: Berg Publishers.

Giddens A. 1985: *The Constitution of Society*. London: Macmillan.

Gleason A. 1983: *Young Russia: the genesis of Russian radicalism in the 1860s*. Gleason: University of Chicago Press.

Goble P.A. 1991: Nationalism, Movement Groups and Party Formation, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J.B. (eds.) op. cit.

- Goldman M. I. 1972: *The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, Ma: The MIT Press.
- Goldstone J.A. 1980: The weakness of Organization: A new look at Gamson's *The Strategy of Social Protest*, *American Journal of Sociology* 1985(5):1017-1042.
- Grzybowski M. 1991: The Transition from One-Party Hegemony to Competitive Pluralism: The Case of Hungary, in: Berglund S. and Dellenbrant J.A. (eds.) *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe: Party Systems and Political Cleavages*. London: Edward Elgar.
- Guardian* 1991: 27 August.
- Gurr T.R. 1980: *Handbook of Political Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Gurian 1932: *Bolshevism*. London: Sheed & Ward.
- Gramsci A. 1971: *Prison Notebooks*. (eds. and translated by Hoare Q. and Nowell-Smith G.) London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Granovetter M. 1978: Threshold Models of Collective Behavior *American Journal of Sociology* 83(6):1420-1443.
- Habermas J. 1981: New Social Movements, *Telos*, 49:33-37.
- Habermas J. 1987: *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Habermas J. 1992: *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Haimson L. 1964: The problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917, *Slavic Review* 23(1964):619-642; 24(1965):1-22.
- Haimson L. H. 1970: The parties and the state, in: Black C. E. (ed.) op. cit.
- Hajdu T. and Nagy Z. L. 1990: Revolution, Counterrevolution, Consolidation, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.
- Hammer D. P. 1974: *The Politics of Oligarchy*. London: Praeger.
- Hanak P. 1984: Hungary's Contribution to the Monarchy, in: Ranki G. (ed.) op. cit.
- Hanson P. 1993: Local Power and Market reform in Russia, *Communist Economies and Economic Transformation* 5(1):45-60.
- Haraszti M. 1990: The Beginnings of Civils Society: the independent peace movement and the Danube movement, In: Tismaneanu V. (ed.) *In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc*. London: Routledge.

- Harding, N. (ed.) 1984: *The State in Socialist Society*. London: Macmillan/St. Antony's College, Oxford.
- Hare P. G. 1977: Economic reform in Hungary: problems and prospects. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*. 1: 317-333.
- Haselsteiner H. 1984: Enlightened Absolutism and Estates Politics in Hungary at the time of Joseph II. in Ranki G. (ed.) op. cit.
- Haselsteiner H. 1990: Cooperation and Confrontation between Rulers and the Noble Estates, 1711-1790, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.
- Heberle, R. 1951: *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Hegel F. 1821 (1942): *Philosophy of Right*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Held J. 1971: The Heritage of the Past: Hungary before World War I, in: Völgyes I. (ed.) op.cit.
- Held J. 1984: The Defence of Nandorfehérvár (Belgrade) in 1456: A Discussion of Controversial Issues. in: Ranki Gy. (ed.) op. cit.
- Héthy L. 1988: *Organizational Conflict and Cooperation: A theoretical approach illustrated by a case study from the Hungarian construction industry*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Héthy L. and Makó Cs. 1978: *Munkások, Érdekek, Érdekegyeztetés* (Workers, Interests, Interests conciliation) Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó.
- Heti Világgazdaság* 1994a: Új Orosz Kormány: Hátra arc! (New Russian Government: Around Turn!) 16(4)(766), 29 January p. 21.
- Heti Világgazdaság* 1994b: Kiválasztottak (Selected Ones) 16(4)(766) 29 January, p.21.
- Heti Világgazdaság* 1995: Heten Vannak (They are seven), 17(3) (817) 21 January p.24.
- Hingley R. 1967: *Nihilists, Russian radicals and Revolutionaries*. New York: Delacorte Press.
- Hobsbawm E. 1959: *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Hobsbawm E. 1973: *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789 - 1848*. Cardinal.
- Hoensch J.K. 1988: *A History of modern Hungary, 1867- 1986*. translated by Trayner K. Harlow: Longman.
- Hollós L. and Lajtai V. 1974: *Köztársaság tér, 1956*. (Republic Square, 1956) Budapest:

Kossuth Kiadó.

Holmes L. 1986: *Politics in the Communist World*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hosking G. 1990: *The Awakening of the Soviet Union*. London: Heinemann.

Hough J. F. 1977: *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hough J. F. 1983: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Soviet Union, in: Solomon (ed.) op. cit.

Huntington S. P. and Brzezinski Z. 1964: *Political Power: USA/USSR*. New York: Viking Press.

Igrunov V. V. 1989: Public Movement: from protest to political self-consciousness, Paper to ISA Conference, Moscow, October.

Ionescu G. 1967: *The Politics of the European Communist States*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Jamison A., Eyerman R. and Cramer J. (with Laessoe J.) 1990: *The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness: A Comparative Study Of The Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

János A. C. 1982: *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary 1825-1945*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Jaszi O. 1923: *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*. London: King & Son.

Jenkins J.C. 1983: Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements *American Review of Sociology*, 9:527-553.

Jenkins, J.C., 1985: *The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jenkins, J. C. and Perrow, C., 1977: "Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm workers movements (1946-1972)", *American Sociological Review*, 42: 249-268

Jeszenszky G. 1990: Hungary Through World War I and the End of the Dual Monarchy, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.

Jones R. E. 1973a: Urban Planning and the Development of Provincial Towns in Russia during the Reign of Catherine II. in: Garrard J. G. (ed.) *The Eighteenth Century in Russia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jones R. E. 1973b: *The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Juhász J., Vári A. and Tölgyesi J. 1993: Environmental Conflict and Political Change: Public Perception on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in Hungary, in: Vári A. and Tamás P. (eds.) *Environment and Democratic Transition: Policy and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers.

Karády V. 1989: Assimilation and Schooling: National and Denominational Minorities in the Universities of Budapest around 1900, in: Ranki (ed.) op. cit.

Karamzin N.M. 1959: *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kareev N. 1910: *V kakom smysle mozžno govorit' o sushestvovaniy feodalizma v Rossi?* (In what way can we talk about the existence of feudalism in Russia?) St. Peterburg.

Károlyi M. 1956: *Faith Without Illusions: Memoirs*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Kassof, A. 1968: *prospects for Soviet Society*. London: Pall Mall Press.

Kastner J.C. 1853: *Sketches in Remembrance of the Hungarian Struggle for Independence and National Freedom in the Years 1848-1851*. London: J. C. Kastner.

Katkov G. 1967: *Russia, 1917: The February Revolution*. London: Collins.

Kean J. (ed.) 1988: *Civil Society and the State*. London: Verso.

Kemény I. 1983: *Magyar Füzetek* No. 12. (Hungarian Booklet) Paris: Dialogues Europeens.

Kemény I. 1988: *Közelről s távolból* (Close-up from a distance) Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó.

Keep J. 1976: Imperial Russia, in: Auty R. (ed.) *Russian History*. Cambridge University Press.

Killian L. M. and Turner R.H. 1972: *Collective Behavior*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Király B. K. (ed.) 1986: *War and Society in East Central Europe: Vol.4. : East Central European society and war in the era of revolutions, 1775-1856*. Brooklyn College Press.

Kis J. 1988: A Filozofiai Intezettől a Beszélő szerkesztőségéig. (From the Institute of Philosophy to the Editorial Board of the Beszelo) (Int. with Csizmadia E.) *Valóság* 12:86-108.

Kitch J. M. 1970: Eastern Europe 1918-44, in: Schopflin G. (ed.) *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: a handbook*. London: Blond.

Kitschelt H. 1985: New Social Movements in West Germany and the United States, *Political Power and Social Theory*, 5:273-324.

Kitschelt H. 1986: Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-nuclear

- Movements in Four Democracies, *British Journal of Political Science*, 16: 57-85.
- Kitschelt H. 1990: New Social Movements and the Decline of Party Organization in: Dalton and Kuechler (eds.) op.cit.
- Kitschelt H. 1991: Resource Mobilization Theory: A Critique in: Rucht D. (ed.) op.cit..
- Kitschelt H. 1992: The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe, *Politics and Society*, 20:7-50.
- Klandermans P.G. 1984: Mobilization and Participation: Social Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory, *American Sociological Review*, 49:583-600.
- Klandermans P.G. 1988: The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus in: Klandermans P.G., Kriesi H. and Tarrow S. (eds.) *International Social Movement Research*, Vol.1. *From Structure to Action: Comparing Movement Participation Across Cultures*. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
- Klandermans P.G., Kriesi H. and Tarrow S. (eds.) 1988: *International Social Movement Research*, Vol.1. *From Structure to Action: Comparing Movement Participation Across Cultures*. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
- Klandermans P.G. 1990: Linking the "Old" and "New": Movement Networks in the Netherlands in: Dalton and Kuechler (eds.) op.cit.
- Klandermans P.G. 1991: New Social Movements and Resource Mobilization: The European and the American Approach Revisited in: Rucht D. (ed.) *Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag/Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Klyuchevsky V.O. 1968: *A Course on Russian History*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Koenker D. P. 1981: *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Koenker D. P. 1987: Moscow in 1917: the view from below, in: Kaiser (ed.) op.cit.
- Kolakowsky 1977: Marxist Roots of Stalinism, in: Tucker (ed.) *Stalinism*. New York: Norton.
- Komarov B. 1980: *The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Konrad G. 1989: *Antipolitika: Az Autonomia kiserterese*. Budapest: Codex Rt. (English publication: 1984: *Antipolitics: an Essay*. Translated by Allen R. E. London: Quater).
- Kornhauser W. 1960: *The Politics of Mass Society*. London: Routledge.
- Kosáry D. 1987: *A Történelem Veszedelemi: Írások Európáról és Magyarországról*. (The

Perils of History: Essays on Europe and Hungary) Budapest: Magveto.

Kossuth L. 1880: *Memories of My Exile*. New York: Cassell.

Kulcsár L. and Dobossy I. 1988: Az ökológiai tudat és viselkedés társadalmi tényezői. Zárótanulmány. (The social factors of ecological knowledge and behaviour. Report.) Budapest: Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont.

Kumar K. (ed.) 1971: *Revolution*. London: Widenfeld and Nicolson.

Kumar K. 1991: The Revolutions of 1989: Socialism, Capitalism and Democracy. Paper.

Kumar K. 1992: The 1989 Revolutions and the Idea of Europe, *Political Studies*, XL:439-461.

Kumar K. 1993: Civil Society: an inquiry into the usefulness of an historical term, *British Journal of Sociology*, 44(3):375-395.

Kumar K. 1994: Civil Society again: a reply to Cristopher Bryant's 'Social self-organization, civility and sociology', *British Journal of Sociology*, 45(1):127-131.

Kuznetsov E. 1990: The Independent Peace Movements in the USSR, in: Tismaneanu V. (ed.) op.cit.

Krieši H. 1991: *The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on Their Mobilization*. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung.

Kriesi H., Ruud K., Duyvendak J.W. and Giugni M.G. 1992: New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe, *European Journal of Political Research*, 22: 219-244.

Le Bon G. 1960: *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. New York: The Viking Press; (originally London: Ernest Benn, 1896).

Lenin V. I. 1969: 'Speech to the Moscow Party Workers' Report on the Attitude of the Proletariat to the Bourgeois Democrats, in: *Collected Works, Vol.28*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Lentin A. 1973: *Russia in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Heinemann.

Levi A. 1966: The Evolution of the Soviet System, in: Brzezinski (ed.) op. cit.

Lewin M. 1968: *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power*. Evanston : University of Northren Illinois.

Lewin M. 1985: *The Making of the Soviet System*, London: Methuen.

Lewin M. 1988: *The Gorbachev phenomenon: a historical interpretation*. Berkeley:

University of California Press.

Liebman M. 1970: *The Russian Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books.

Lincoln W. B. 1989: *Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Lincoln W. B. 1990: *The Great reforms, Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia*. Northern Illinois University Press.

Lippay Z. 1919: *The Hungarian Landed Middle Class and the Public Life*. Budapest: Franklin.

Littlejohn G. 1984: *A Sociology of the Soviet Union*. London: Macmillan.

Lomax B. 1976: *Hungary 1956*. London: Allison & Busby.

Makkai L. 1975: The Independent Hungarian Feudal Monarchy to the Battle of Mohacs, in: Pamlenyi E. (ed.) *A History of Hungary*. London: Collet's.

Makkai L. 1990: The Foundation of the Hungarian Christian State, 950-1196. in: Sugar F.P. (ed.) op. cit.

Mandel D. 1983: *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime: from the February revolution to the July days, 1917*. London: Macmillan.

Mandel E. 1989: *Beyond Perestroika: the Future of Gorbachev's USSR*. translated by Fagan G. London, Verso.

Manicas P.T. 1989: *War and Democracy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Manning R. T. 1982: *The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia*. Princeton University Press.

Marx G.T. and Wood J.L. 1975: Strands of Theory and Research in Collective Behavior, in: Inkeles A. et al.(eds.) *Annual Review of Sociology* 1: 363-428.

Marx K. and Engels F. 1975: *Collected Works* 3. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Marples D. R. 1991: The Greening of Ukraine: Ecology and the Emergence of Zelenyi Svit, 1986-1990, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J.B. (eds.) op. cit.

Massie R.K. 1981: *Peter the Great*. London: Gollancz.

Mawdsley E. 1987: *The Russian Civil War*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Mayer M. 1991: Social Movement research and Social Movement Practice: The U.S. Pattern in: Rucht D. (ed.) *Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag/ Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press.

McAdam D. 1982: *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam D. 1988: Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism in: *International Social Movement Research*, 1: 125-154.

McAuley M. 1992: *Soviet Politics, 1917-1991*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McAuley M. and Waldron P. 1988: *The Emergence of the Modern Russian State, 1855-81*. London: Macmillan.

McCarthy J.D. and Zald M.N. 1977: Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6): 1212-1241.

McCarthy J. D. and Zald M.N. 1987: *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*. Morristown, N.J.:General Learning Press.

McCarthy J. D. and Zald M.N. 1987a: Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory in: Zald and McCarthy (eds.) op.cit.

McCarthy J.D., McAdam D. and Zald M.N. 1988: Social Movements in: Smelser N.J. (ed.) *Handbook of Sociology*, Newbury Park: Sage

McCauley M. 1984: *Oktobrists to Bolsheviks*. London: Edward Arnold.

McNeal 1975: *The Bolshevik Tradition*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Medvedev R. A. 1980: *On Soviet Dissent*. (Interviews with Ostelino P.) edited by Saunders G., New York: Columbia University Press.

Meissner B. 1966: Totalitarian Rule and Social Change, in: Brzezinski (ed). op. cit.

Melucci A. 1980: The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach, *Social Science Information*, 19 (2): 199-226.

Melucci A. 1981: Ten Hypotheses for the Analysis of New Movements, in: Pinto D. (ed.) *Contemporary Italian Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Melucci A. 1984: An End to Social Movements? Introductory Paper to the Sessions on New Social Movements and Change in Organizational Forms, *Social Science Information*, 23 (5):819-835.

Melucci A. 1989: *Nomads of the Present. Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. London: Century Hutchinson Ltd.

Mende T. 1944: *Hungary*. London: MacDonald.

- Merton R. 1957: *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Milbrath L. W. and Goel M. L. 1965: *Political Participation*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Milbrath L. W. and Goel M. L. 1977: *Political Participation: How and why do people get involved in politics?* Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co.
- Mishan E. J. 1967: *The Costs of Economic Growth*. Harmondsworth: Pelican.
- Mitchell R. 1979: National Environmental Lobbies and the Apperant Illogic of Collective Action, in: Russell C. (ed.) *Collective Decision Making*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Molotch H. 1979: Media and Movements in: Zald and McCarthy (eds.) op.cit.
- Moorehead A. 1967: *The Russian Revolution*. London: Panther.
- Morris A. 1984: *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: McMillan Inc.
- Morris L. P. 1984: *Eastern Europe since 1945*. London: Heinemann.
- Muller E. and Opp K.D. 1986: Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action. *American Political Science Review*, 80:471-488.
- Nagy Z. L. 1975: Revolution in Hungary, 1918-1919, in: Pamlényi (ed.) op. cit.
- Nechemias C. 1991: The Prospects for a Soviet Women's Movement: Opportunities and Obstacles, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J.B. (eds.) op.cit.
- Nechkina M. V. 1970: The reform as a by-product of the revolutionary struggle, in: Emmons (ed.) *Emancipation of the Russian Serfs*. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston.
- Neidhardt F. and Rucht D. 1991: The Analysis of Social Movements: The State of the Art and Some Perspectives for Further Research. in: Rucht D. (ed.) op.cit..
- Nove A. 1984: *Stalinism and After*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Oberschall, 1973: *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Oberschall, A. 1979: Protracted Conflict in: Zald and McCarthy (eds.) op.cit.
- Oberschall A. 1980: Loosely Structured Collective Conflicts: A theory and an Application *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 3:45-88.
- Oberschall A. 1993: *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities*. New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers.

- Offe C. 1984: *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.
- Offe C. 1985: New Social Movements: Changing Boundaries of the Political, *Social Research*, 52: 817-868.
- Offord D. 1986: *The Russian Revolutionary Movement in the 1880s*. Cambridge University Press.
- Oliva J. L. 1969: *Russia in the Era of Peter the Great*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Oliver P. 1980: Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84:1356-1375.
- Olson M. 1965: *Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Ormos M. 1990: The Early Interwar Years, 1921-1938, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.
- Pakulski, J. 1991: *Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Pares B. 1907: *Russia and Reform*. London: Constable
- Park, E.R. and Burgess, E.W. 1921: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
- Park R. E. and Burgess E. W. 1967: *The City* (reprint of 1925 edition). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Parsons T. 1961: *Theories of Society: foundations of modern social theory*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Pavlov-Silvansky N. 1907: *Feodalism v drevnei Rusi*. (Feudalism in ancient Russia) St. Peterburg.
- Peter K. 1990: The Later Ottoman Period and Royal Hungary, 1606-1711, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.
- Peter L. and Pynsent R.B. 1988: *Intellectuals and the Future in the Habsburg Monarchy*. London: Macmillan.
- Petho A. 1989: An Interview with an Environmentalist, in: *Heti Vilaggazdasag*.
- Pető I. and Szakács S. 1985: *A Hazai Gazdaság Négy Évtizedének Története 1945-1985: I. Az újjáépítés és a tervutasításos irányítás időszaka 1945-1968*. (The history of the four decades of the Hungarian economy 1945-85: I. The period of the reconstruction and the planning command 1945-1968). Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.

- Pearson T. 1989: *Russian Officialdom in Crisis: autocracy and self-government, 1861-1900*. Cambridge University Press.
- Perepjolkin, L. 1996: Environmental Movements in Russia, in: Lang-Pickvance K., Manning N. and Pickvance C. (eds.) *Environmental and Housing Movements in Hungary, Estonia and Russia: research reports*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Pinchuk B. C. 1974: *The Oktobrists in the Third Duma, 1907-1912*. University of Washington Press.
- Piven F.F. and Cloward R.A. 1977: *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Pantheon.
- Pokrovsky M.N. 1970: Gentry Capitalism, in: Emmons (ed.) op.cit.
- Pokrovsky M.N. 1931: *A Brief History of Russia*. London: Lawrence.
- Poggi G. 1990: *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Pogodin M.P. 1965: *Issledovaniia, zamechaniia i lektsii o russkoi istorii*. (Research, comments and lectures on Russian History) Moscow: Nauka.
- Pomper P. 1970: *The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia*. Harlan Davidson.
- Pravda A. 1979: Industrial Workers: patterns of Dissent, opposition and Accomodation, in: Tokes R. (ed.) op.cit.
- Pridham G. 1994: Democratic Transitions in theory and practice: Southern European Lessons for Eastern Europe, in: Pridham G. and Vanhanen T. (eds.) *Democratization in Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Pushkarev S. 1963: *The Emergence of Modern Russia, 1801-1917*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Rabinowitch A. 1976: *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*. New York: Norton and Co.
- Radice H. 1981: The State Enterprise in Hungary: Economic Reform and Socialist Entrepreneurship, in: Jeffries I. (ed.) *The Industrial Enterprise in Eastern Europe*. Eastbourne: Praeger.
- Raeff M. 1973: The Enlightenment in Russia, in: Garrard J.G. (ed.) op. cit.
- Ránci Gy. 1989: The Role of Budapest in Hungary's Economic Development, in: Ránci Gy. (ed.) *Hungary and European Civilization*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Ránci Gy. 1990: The Hungarian Economy in the Interwar Years, in: Sugár (ed.) op. cit.
- Riasanovsky N. V. 1984: *A History of Russia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Riasanovsky N. V. 1985: *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richardson D. 1995: The Green Challenge: Philosophical, programmatic and electoral considerations, in: Richardson D. and Rootes C. (eds.) *The Green Challenge: The development of Green parties in Europe*. London: Routledge.

Robinson G. T. 1970: The peasants in the last decades of serfdom, in: Emmons T. (ed.) op. cit.

Rohrschneider R. 1988: Citizen Attitudes Towards Environmental Issues: Selfish or Selfless? *Comparative Political Studies*, 21: 347-367.

Rootes C. 1982: Student Radicalism in France: 1968 and after. in: Cerny P. (ed.) *Social Movements and Protest in France*, London: Frances Pinter.

Rootes C. 1991: The New Politics and the New Social Movements in Britain, Paper for the Political Studies Association Annual Conference.

Rootes C. 1992: Political Opportunity Structures, Political Competition, and the Development of Social Movements, paper presented at the First European Conference on Social Movements, Berlin.

Rootes C. 1995: Environmental consciousness, institutional structures and political competition in the formation and development of Green parties, in: Richardson R. and Rootes C. (eds.) op. cit.

Rootes C. and Davis H. (eds.) 1994: *Social Change and Political Transformation*. London: UCL Press.

Rosenberg W. G. 1974: *Liberals in the Russian Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rosenberg W. G. 1987: Russian labour and Bolshevik power: social dimensions of protest in Petrograd after October, in: Kaiser (ed.) op.cit.

Rothschild J. 1988: *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*. University of Washington Press.

Rozhdenstvenskii S. V. 1963: Educational Reforms, in: Raeff M. (ed.) op.cit.

Rucht D. 1990: The Strategies and Action Repertoire of New Movements in: Dalton R.J. and Kuechler M. (eds.) op.cit.

Sablinsky W. 1976: *The Road to Bloody Sunday*. Princeton University Press.

Sacharow A. 1988: Speech. *New York Times*. 22 December 1988.

- Sakwa R. 1990: *Gorbachev and his Reforms, 1985-1990*. London: Philip Alan.
- Sakwa R. 1993: *Russian Politics and Society*. London: Routledge.
- Sakwa R. 1994: The Russian Elections of December 1993, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47:195-228.
- Sakwa R. 1995: The Russian Crisis and Russian Political Development, Breifing Paper No. 18, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Schapiro L. 1972: *Totalitarianism*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Schapiro L. 1984: *1917 The Russian Revolutions*. Peguin Books.
- Schmitter P.C. 1982: *Pattrens of Corporatist Policy Making*. London: Sage Publications.
- Schopflin G. 1979: Opposition and Para-Opposition: Critical Currents in Hungary, 1968-78, in: Tokes R. (ed) *Opposition in Eastern Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Schopflin G. 1993: *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Schumpeter J. 1942 (1961): *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Skocpol T. 1979: *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott A. 1990: *Ideology and the New Social Movements* London: Unwin Hyman.
- Sedaitis J. B. 1991: Worker Activism: POLitics at the Grass Roots, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J. B. (eds.) op.cit.
- Segal L. 1944: *Russia*. London: Allen & Co.
- Serge V. 1972: *Year One of the Russian Revolution*. Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press.
- Seton-Watson H. 1945: *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1942*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Seton-Watson H. 1967: *The Russian Empire 1801-1917*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shanin T. 1989: *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Shmorlo E. F. 1963: The Opposition of the Traditionalists, in: Raeff M. (ed.) op.cit.
- Shomina Y. 1996: Housing Movements in Russia, in: Lang-Pickvance K. et al. (eds.) op.cit.
- Sighele S. 1895 quoted in Park R. E. and Burgess E.W. 1967: *The City* (reprint of 1925

edition) Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Simmons E. J. (ed.) 1955: *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Singleton F. (ed.) 1987: *Environmental Problems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Sinor D. 1959: *The History of Hungary*. Ruskin House.

Skilling H. G. 1966: Communism and Czechoslovak Tradition, *Journal of International Affairs*, 20(1):118-137.

Skilling H. G. 1971: Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses, in: Skilling H. G. and Franklin F. (eds.) op. cit.

Skilling H. G. and Franklin F. (eds.) 1971: *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Slider D. 1991: The First Independent Soviet Interest Groups: Unions and Associations of Cooperatives, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J.B. (eds.) op. cit.

Smelser N. 1962: *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: The Free Press.

Smith G. B. 1992: *Soviet Politics: struggling with change*. London: Macmillan.

Smith H. 1990: *The New Russians*. London: Hutchinson.

Smith S. A. 1987: Petrograd in 1917: the view from below, in: Kaisner (ed.) op.cit.

Solomon S. (ed.) 1983: *Pluralism in the Soviet Union: Essays in Honour of H.G. Skilling*. London: Macmillan.

Solomon S. 1983: 'Pluralism' in Political Science: The Odyssey of a Concept, in: Solomon (ed.) op. cit.

Solovev S. M. 1965: *Istoriia Rossii s drevneshkikh vremen*. (Russia's history from the ancient times) Moscow: Nauka.

Soloveytschik G. 1945: *Russia in Perspective*. London: Macdonald.

Somogyi E. 1990: The Age of Neoabsolutism, 1849-1967, in Sugár: (ed.) op. cit.

Soos K. A. 1986: *Terv, kampany, penz: Szabalyozas es Konjunkturaciklusok Magyarorszagon es Jugoszlaviaban*. (Plan, campaign and money: Regulations and cyclical changes in Hungary and Yugoslavia) Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado-Kossuth Kiado.

Sugár F.P. 1990: The Principality of Transylvania, in: Sugár (ed.) op.cit.

- Sumner B.M. 1943: *A Short History of Russia*. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock.
- Suny R. G. 1987: Revising the Old Story: the 1917 revolution in the light of new sources, in: Kaiser D. H. (ed.) op.cit.
- Suny R. G. 1992: Nationalism and Class, in: Frankel et al. (eds.) op.cit.
- Spector I. 1965: *An Introduction to Russian History and Culture*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Stewart J. M. 1992: Air and water problems beyond the Urals, in: Stewart J. M. (ed.) *The Soviet environment: problems, policies and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stokes A. D. 1976: Kievan Russia, in: Auty R. and Obolonsky D. (eds.) op.cit.
- Szabó M. 1993: *Alternatív mozgalmak Magyarországon*. (Alternative Movements in Hungary) Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó.
- Szabó M. 1994: Alternatív társadalmi mozgalmak Németországban és Magyarországon, (Alternative Social Movements in Germany and Hungary), *Politikatudományi Szemle*, 1:96-103.
- Szamizdat '81-89: Válogatás a Hirmondó című folyóiratból*. (Samizdat' 81-89, Selected Articles from the Journal Hirmondo) Budapest: AB-Beszélő Kft.
- Szakály F. 1990: The Early Ottoman Period and Royal Hungary, 1526-1606, in: Sugár (ed.) op. cit.
- Szeftel M. 1956: Aspects of Feudalism in Russian History, in: Coulborn R. (ed.) *Feudalism in History*. Princeton University Press.
- Szekely A. 1973: *A Brief History of Hungary*. Budapest: Corvina.
- Szelényi I. 1979: Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe: Dilemmas and Prospects, in: Tókes R. (ed.) op.cit.
- Szelényi I. and Konrád G. 1979: *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. Brighton: Harvester Press.
- Szirmai V. 1996: Protection of the Environment and the position of Green Movements in Hungary. in: Láng-Pickvance K. et al. op.cit.
- Swain G. 1983: *Russian Social Democracy and the Legal Labour Movement*. London: Macmillan.
- Tarde G. 1891 (1969): *On Communication and Social Influence*. (edited by Clark T.N.) Chicago: Chicago University Press.

- Tarrow S. 1983: *Struggling to Reform. Social Movements and Policy Change during Cycles of Protest*. Cornell University, Western Societies Paper. No.15.
- Tarrow S. 1989: *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tarrow S. 1991: *Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest*. Western Societies Program Occasional Paper No.21. Center for International Studies, Cornell University.
- Tarrow S. 1994: *Power in Movement: Social movements, collective action and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tereshkova V. 1987: Speech on 30 January 1987, reported by the *Liberation* 3 February.
- Thaden E. 1971: *Russia since 1801*. London: John Wiley.
- Thompson 1990: *Russia and the Soviet Union*. Boulder: Westview.
- Tilkovszky L. 1990: The Late Interwar Years and the World War II, in: Sugar (ed.) op. cit.
- Tilly C. 1973: Does Modernization Breed Revolution? *Comparative Politics* 5(3): 423-447
- Tilly C. 1978: *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: Random House
- Tilly C. 1979: Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750 - 1830 in: Zald and McCarthy (eds.) op.cit.
- Tilly L.A. and Tilly C. (eds.) 1981: *Class Conflict and Collective Action*. London: Sage Publications
- Tismaneanu V. 1988: *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The poverty of utopia*. London: Routledge.
- Tismaneanu V. (ed.) 1990: *In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc*. London: Routledge.
- Tolz V. 1990: *The USSR's Emerging Multi-party System*. London: Praeger.
- Tolz V. 1994: Problems in Building Democratic Institutions in Russia. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 3(9):1-7.
- Touraine A. 1981: *The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tocqueville A. C. 1862 (1946): *Democracy in America*. (Translated by Reeve H.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Tocqueville A.C. 1966: *The Ancient Regime and the French Revolution*. London: Collins-Fontana.
- Tókes R. 1967: *Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic*. London: Praeger.
- Tókes R. (ed) 1979: *Opposition in Eastern Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Turner R. and Killian L. 1987: *Collective Behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall.
- Turnbull M. 1991: *Soviet Environmental Policies and Practices: The Most Critical Investment*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Treadgold (ed.) 1964: *The Development of the USSR*. Washington University Press.
- Troyat H. 1961: *Daily Life in Russia under the last Tsar*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Tsagalov N. 1970: Systematic Contradiction, in: Emmons (ed.) op. cit.
- Tucker R. C. 1971: *The Soviet Political Mind*. New York: Norton.
- Turner R.H. 1981: Collective Behavior and Resource Mobilization As Approaches to Social Movements: Issues and Continuities, *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 4:1-24.
- Vámbéry A. 1886: *Hungary in Ancient, Medieval and Modern Times*. London: Fischer Unwin.
- Venturi F. 1960: *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*. New York: Grosset and Dunlop.
- Venturi F. 1982: *Studies in Free Russia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Verba S., Nie N. H. and Kim J. 1971: *The Modes of Democratic Participation*. London: Sage Publications.
- Verba S. and Nie N.H. 1972: *Participation in America*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Vermes G. 1971: The October Revolution in Hungary: from Karolyi to Kun, in: Volgyes I. (ed.) op. cit.
- Vernadsky G. 1973: *Kievan Russia*. Cambridge. Mass.: Yale University Press.
- Vida L. 1995: Moszkvai hatalmi struktúra: Ostromallapot, (Moscow's power structure: A state of siege), *Heti Világazdaság*, 12(3)(817):23-27.
- Völgyes I. 1982: *A Nation of Contradictions*. Boulder: Westview Press.

- Völgyes I. and Toma P. 1977: *Politics in Hungary*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- Voronina O. 1994: The Mythology of Women's Emancipation in the USSR as the Foundation for a Policy of Discrimination, in: Posadskaya A. (ed.) *Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism*. London: Verso.
- Walicki A. 1975: *The The Slaphofile Controversy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Walicki A. 1988: *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Waller M. 1981: *Democratic Centralism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Waller M. 1989: The Ecology Issue in Eastern Europe: Protest and Movements. *The Journal of Communist Studies*, 5(3) 303-328.
- Waller M. 1992: The Dams on the Danube, *Environmental Politics*, 1:121-143.
- Waller M. 1993: *The End of the Communist Power Monopoly*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Waller M. and Millard F. 1992: Environmental Politics in Eastern Europe, *Environmental Politics*, 1:159-185.
- Waller M. and Myant M. (eds.) 1994: *Parties, Trade Unions and Societies in East-Central Europe*. London: Frank Cass.
- Waller M., Coppieters B. and Deschauer K. (eds.) 1994: *Social Democracy in a Post-Communist Europe*. London: Frank Cass.
- Walsh W. B. 1963: *Readings in Russian History*. Volume I. Syracuse University Press.
- Wilson L. 1993: The Baikal Fund as an Environmental Pressure Group. Research Note. *Environmental Politics*, Vol. 2, No.1, Spring, pp. 63-80.
- Wolfson Z. 1994: *The Geography of Survival: Ecology in the Post-Soviet Era*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Weiner D. R. 1988: *Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Welch S. 1975: The Impact of Urban Riots on Urban Expenditures, *American Journal of Political Science* 19: 741-760.
- Williams B. 1987: *The Russian Revolution 1917-1921*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wood A. 1979: *The Russian Revolution*. London: Longman.

- Wortman R. 1967: *The Crisis of Russian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yaney G. L. 1973: *The Sytematization of Russian Government*. University of Illinois Press.
- Yanitsky O. 1993a: *Russian Environmentalism: Leading Figures, Facts, Opinions*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodyje Otnoshenija Publishing House.
- Yanitsky O. 1993b: Environmental Initiatives in Russia: East-West Comparisons, in: Vari A. Tamas P. (eds.) op. cit.
- Yanitsky O. and Khaly I. A. 1993: *Invajronmental'noje Dvizhenie i Invajromental'naja Politika v Rossii*. (Environmental movement and environmental politics in Russia) Milieukunde, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
- Yarmolinsky A. 1959: *The Road to Revolution*. New York: Cassell.
- Zald M.N. and Ash R. 1966: Social Movement Organisations: Growth, Decay and Change *Social Forces*, 44:327-341.
- Zald M.N. and Garner R. A. 1987: Social Movement Organizationa: Growth, Decay and Change, in: Zald and McCarthy (eds.) op.cit.
- Zald M.N. and McCarthy J.D. (eds.) 1979: *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control, and Tactics*. Cambridge, Ma: Winthrop Publishers
- Zald M.N. and McCarthy J.D. 1980: Social Movement Industries: Competition and Cooperation among Movement Organizations *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 3:1-20.
- Zald M.N. and McCarthy J.D. (eds.) 1987: *Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Eassays*. New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books.
- Zald M.N. and McCarthy J.D. 1987: Social Movement Industries: Competition and Conflict among SMOs in: Zald and McCarthy (eds.) op.cit.
- Ziegler C. E. 1987: *Environmental Policy in the USSR*. London: Pinter Publishers.
- Ziegler C. E. 1991: Environmental Politics and Policy under Perestroika, in: Butterfield J. and Sedaitis J.B. (eds.) op.cit.
- Zimányi V. 1987: *Economy and Society in 16th and 17th Century Hungary*. Budapest: Akademiai Kiadó.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS QUOTED IN THE STUDY (these are fictious names in order

to protect the real identity of the informers)

Bálint Csaba

Bihari Katalin

Cherkasova, Elena

Ecopolis

Fejtő Júlia

Grakovich, Nikolay

Hársfalvi Ágnes

Hollán József

Kantor Judit

Kékessy Olga

Kemény Kalman

Kovács Judit

Kuranov, Mihail

Kreidlin, Anton

Makagonov, Ivan

Mizsei József

Nagy Andrea

Ira Rubinchik

Salgó Lajos

Sárosy Béla

Shalimov, Ovsey

Strigulian, Sergey

Szalai Iren

Szücs Gábor

Tsyplenkov, Andrey

Utassy Éva

Varjú Margit

Vorobiev, Ivan

Zabelin, Igor

Zaykonova, Natasha