Ukraine and the New Frontier of East-West Relations: Dynamics of Regional
and Pan-European Policy Evolution

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, Ruth T. Patterson.

Table of Contents

List of Maps, Tables, and Figures

Page

Maps:

Tables:

Figures:

Acronyms

BSF=	Black Sea Fleet
BSECO=	Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation
CEE=	Central and Eastern Europe
CEFTA=	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI=	Central European Initiative
CIS=	Commonwealth of Independent States
EBRD=	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC=	European Community
EU=	European Union
FSU=	Former Soviet Union
GUUAM=	Sub-regional grouping consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
IBRD =	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IMF=	International Monetary Fund
MOU=	Memorandum of Understanding. A legal document detailing a specific agreement between two parties (in this thesis, MOUs are agreements between NATO countries and Ukraine)
NATO=	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIDC=	NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine
OSCE=	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (formerly called CSCE-Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe)
PfP=	NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme. PfP members are eligible to participate in all PfP operations
ISO PfP=	In the Spirit of Partnership for Peace. A bilateral programme between the US and Ukraine. Other PfP members may be invited to take part as active participants if Ukraine and the US agree. However, some PfP members may only be invited to take part with the status of an observer.
PCA=	Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. A legal document which is the basis for the development of EU-Ukraine co-operation.
SOFA=	Status of Forces Agreement. Deals with the exchange of military troops. Agreement drawn up on a bilateral basis and is a way to avoid having to write a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding). SOFA is a protective document which prevents other countries from harassing each other's troops and subjecting foreign troops to unfair punishment in the host country. Stipulates that legal council is provided and an individual covered under SOFA is subject only to the laws of his/her home country. (i.e. in the case of the death penalty)
Visegrad=	Regional group in Central Europe consisting of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
WEU=	Western European Union
WTO=	World Trade Organisation

EUROPE

UKRAINE (Source: Central Intelligence Agency 1999)

Abstract

This thesis examines Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy orientation and its causes. The dynamics of political evolution in Ukrainian domestic politics are also considered and it is argued that Ukraine's foreign and security policy can be characterised as subjective, pragmatic and evolutionary, but also marked to a large degree by continuity. Moreover, this project investigates the extent to which Ukraine's foreign policy is influenced by its geopolitical position between Russia and the West. It is suggested that a new East-West frontier is emerging between those states which have been invited to join key Western institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and those which have not. This thesis explains that the definition of what constitutes a modern frontier is in the midst of change; it is widening and narrowing, while undergoing erosion with respect to many issues and reinforcement with respect to others. The frontier, as such, resembles a 'third level' of analysis- it is neither the domestic nor the international arena, rather it is a place where crucial political developments unfold and where domestic and foreign politics converge. It is argued that Europe's frontier is differentiated by a lack of mechanisms in a rather structure-less geopolitical space through which authority is exercised. Although some regional structures have begun to emerge and develop a basis for exercising authority in various sectors such as energy and regional trade relations, the frontier is still under-organised. Furthermore, due to the processes of globalisation, transnationalism, and interdependence many regional frontiers in the world are softening and in some cases, even disappearing, as globalisation has tended to reverse the inclination to solidify borders. However, this thesis argues that in Europe the opposite is occurring; the frontier in Europe is not only widening, it also appears to be hardening.

Chapter One: Introduction

Considering that the new security environment of Europe is presently under construction and rapidly changing, there is need for continued analysis of the decisions being implemented and the context and theoretical framework of the issues, not only of Western institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), but also of states in Central and Eastern Europe. Those states that are considered fragile, unstable, or under-developed on an economic, political, and social level are particularly important in this new security arrangement and thus, should be given ample scholarly attention.

This project is, therefore, focused on Ukraine, one such relatively weak and fragile state. This thesis will investigate the extent to which Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy[1] is influenced by the state's geopolitical position between Russia and the West. This project will also consider which domestic factors have the most profound influence on Ukraine's foreign and security policy and why.

Geographically the largest state in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Ukraine has attracted the attention of scholars in recent years because of several factors including, for example: 1) the state's possession of nuclear weapons after the demise of the Soviet Union and its reluctance at the outset to relinquish these weapons for destruction;[2] 2) the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and its aftermath; 3) its reluctance to sign START I, START II, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 4) the economic crises; and 5) Ukraine's diverse ethnic and cultural composition and the potential for instability along nationalist or ethnic lines.

Furthermore, Ukraine has become a focus of scholarly attention due to its geopolitical location between an enlarged NATO and Russia. In Western diplomatic discourse, the association of the terms 'linchpin', 'pivot', and 'keystone in the arch' has become as politically correct as the term 'partnership' with Russia. Ukraine's geopolitical location has often been an added constraint on the government's foreign and security policy decisions *vis-à-vis* the West, Russia, and within the region. The Ukrainian government is facing considerable external pressures and as a result, its foreign and security policy decisions are constantly changing, responding, and adapting to the external environment in a manner which makes even firmly established decisions at the highest political level subject to change.

The Ukrainian government is also facing immense challenges on the domestic level. Real economic reforms have yet to be fully implemented, state- and nation-building is still in the relatively early stages, and corruption at many levels is visible not only to external actors but also to the citizens themselves. Ukraine is constrained by its dependency on Russia for energy supplies and even for trade (45 per cent of Ukrainian trade is with Russia), and Russia has attempted to apply this leverage to draw Ukraine back into the 'Eurasian' sphere, a direction in which the Ukrainian executive has clearly been unwilling to go.

In addition to these constraints on Ukraine, there is also the added factor that the processes of NATO enlargement and EU expansion to a select few states in CEE, as argued in this thesis, is creating a new political, military, economic and cultural frontier in Europe. NATO has been actively seeking to allay fears of this scenario by concluding separate treaties of friendship and co-operation with Russia and Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine has been successful in concluding bilateral treaties with all its neighbours[3] in the hopes of reducing the negative effects that a new East-West division would create. However, the most crucial of those bilateral treaties was with Russia and the May 1997 treaty[4] between Russia and Ukraine was intended to settle old disputes which would effectively lay the

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[1] Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy is defined as integration with the West, co-operation with Russia, and active involvement in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. This policy is attributed to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.

[2] Thus Ukraine was seen as a 'rogue' state by many Western observers.

[3] Russia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, and Slovakia

[4] This treaty was only ratified by the Russian Duma in December 1998 and by the Russian Federal Council in February 1999.

foundation for the beginning of a new era of bilateral relations based on the mutual respect of two sovereign states.

WHY UKRAINE MATTERS

In the introduction to his book *Dilemmas of Independence*[5], Motyl listed the characteristics that make Ukraine an important link in the future of Europe as a whole. First of all, he sought to convey the magnitude of Ukraine's geographical size. Its population of nearly 50 million people is the sixth largest in Europe after Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and France.[6] Further, Ukraine has a total of 232,046 square miles, which is the second largest territory in Europe, after Russia, with France as its closest competitor with 211,207 square miles. Third, Ukraine's industrial sector has enormous growth potential. Four-fifths of the total volume of industrial production belongs to heavy industry including ferrous metals and fuel. Ukraine produced a disproportionately large share of the USSR's metallurgical equipment, as well as heavy electric machines, turbines and motors, and locomotives, freight cars, combines, trucks and tractors.[7]

Fourth, its agricultural sector could be transformed into what it was referred to in the early twentieth century- the 'breadbasket of Europe'. Ukraine accounted for nearly a quarter of the USSR's agricultural output, which included mass production of grain, corn, sugar beets, tobacco, eggs and beef. Furthermore, no less impressive are Ukraine's natural resources especially large deposits of coal and iron ore and a significant amount of potassium, manganese, mercury, titanium, graphite, mineral salts, uranium and natural gas. Finally, there is the quality of human capital, which is nearly fully literate and close to 90 per cent of the employed population possesses higher than a secondary education. Over 150,000 highly qualified specialists graduate annually from the more than 150 colleges or universities. Moreover, Ukrainian scientists have become world-renowned theorists in such fields as mathematics, physics, chemistry, cybernetics and electronics. Thus, Ukraine's size and resources are two key reasons why it should be given considerable attention by Western observers.

In addition to Motyl's reasons as to why Ukraine matters, there are other factors to consider. Given the emergence of a new security environment in Europe, specifically with the enlargement of NATO and eventually the expansion of the EU, it is ever more crucial that the West recognise the political, strategic and economic importance of Ukraine with more than just positive statements of intentions, but with action in the form of policy changes. The break-up of the Former Yugoslavia has all too clearly demonstrated that this region is prone to fundamental shifts often resultant of ethnic and nationalist tensions. Therefore, it is most important to study the nature of the West's response to Ukraine's economic, social and political troubles and to discuss whether the response from the West seems to reflect these geopolitical realities.

At the time of independence in 1991 the US attitude toward Ukraine could be characterised as largely dismissive and sceptical. On the eve of independence in August of that year President Bush delivered a speech in Kyiv that was widely seen as a warning when he stated that, '…freedom is not the same as independence…' (Americans) will not promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred'.[8] This was the implicit characterisation of Ukraine. Certainly nationalist forces were active in Ukrainian independence movements, but they were not the dominant forces in Ukrainian politics.[9] President Bush's portrayal of Ukraine as a land rent by ethnic division encouraged other anxious perceptions of Ukraine as a country inclined to conflict with Russia, and as a nuclear renegade or rogue state so torn by

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[5] Alexander Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993.
[6] The UK, Italy, and France outnumber Ukraine by only a few million.
[7] Also produced in Ukraine were washing machines, refrigerators, cameras, televisions, and a variety of construction materials including cement, ceramics, basic chemicals and synthetic fibers.
[8] Remarks by President Bush in Address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 1 August 1991. Footnoted in Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, *Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment in Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, p. 4.
[9] See Chapter Three.

inner divisions that it would not survive.[10] A 1994 CIA report on Ukraine, whilst not the most notorious was certainly the most authoritative of the expert analyses, strongly suggested that Ukraine was bound to experience a civil war along nationalist lines. Although the report helped to shape this negative stereotype of Ukraine and its people, it turned out to be without foundation.

The appearance of the Ukrainian state on the European continent has inspired anxiety about an unknown future for European security. In light of this anxiety, it is not surprising that the first images of Ukraine and the other post-Soviet states were characterised by apprehension and scepticism. During the first few years of independence as political and economic reforms were in the very early stages, as well as in more recent times, these images continue to influence and shape Western thinking on Ukraine.

Ukraine's economic vulnerabilities in 1993-94 led many Western observers to conclude that its statehood would not endure. Although agreements on nuclear disarmament and the very early stages of economic reform helped to soften this image, many observers still believed that Ukraine must make a strategic choice between Russia and the West. In Europe especially, Ukraine was not (and still is not) seen as a serious candidate for membership in European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. While a new East-West division along political, economic, or military lines is not desirable by either side, many believe that an economically and politically divided Europe is inevitable. One can already see this division beginning to take shape with the first wave of NATO enlargement and as the EU in early 1999 specified those countries which will be part of its 'fast-track' to integration.[11]

Even in the United States where Ukraine's independence and strategic position appears to be more appreciated than in Western Europe, there are limits on the amount of support available to Ukraine. The first hurdle was the elimination of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory. The transfer of those weapons to Russia was of such overwhelming interest to US national security that it brought a high profile to the talks between the US, Ukraine, and Russia. The negotiations proved a success as the last nuclear weapons left Ukrainian soil in June 1996. The second hurdle was American uncertainty as to what would be the future role of the US in a post-Cold War era. Many different options were considered by the US such as: 1) focusing primarily on domestic issues; 2) maintaining the same level of engagement with Europe; and 3) turning away from Europe to focus on the Pacific region. Even those who favoured continuing/deepening US-European ties, the majority favoured concentrating only on Western Europe and perhaps also on Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, or the states likely to become NATO members in the near future. Ukraine and the other 'outs' thus remained far less important to the US following the resolution of the nuclear disarmament issue. This thesis, therefore, argues that the West has yet to fully grasp the importance of those states in CEE to an enlarged NATO and to European security- namely the Baltics, Ukraine, and even Belarus.[12]

These perceptions of Ukraine, which are rooted in history, have very serious potentially negative consequences for the entire European continent. The positive development of Ukrainian-Russian relations is paramount to the creation of a stable security environment. Since independence Ukraine has been fortunate to have been given a 'breathing space' from Russian and Western actors to address the economic and political challenges at home, and to address the conceptualisation and development of a Ukrainian national and state identity which will help it to secure its sovereignty and independence. However, after nearly a decade of independence Russia and the West are now beginning to become more active in the region at the very least in terms of statements of political intentions. The most obvious examples are NATO's military actions in Kosovo, Russia's reference to the 'red line'[13] for NATO enlargement, and the ever-present threat of the union of Russia and Belarus, which is increasingly being discussed as a Russian response to NATO enlargement.[14] As one analyst has noted, Ukraine does not fit easily into the security

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[10] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. 5.

[11] Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta, and at the end of 1999 Turkey was added to this list.

[12] See Chapter Five.

[13] Russia's refusal to accept that any of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine and the Baltics will join NATO in the future, while NATO maintains its 'open-door' policy.

[14] Although clearly there are great difficulties in the path of this 'union's' actualisation.

system of either Russia or NATO, yet its fate is crucial to the shape, costs, and consequences of both.[15]

The importance of Ukraine to a secure and stable Europe in the future, which has been overlooked for some time due to a preoccupation with nuclear disarmament and Kyiv's lagging economic reforms, has yet to be fully realised. What Moscow has known from the start the West is only now beginning to grasp- that is, as Garnett so eloquently put it, Ukraine is the 'keystone in the arch' of the new emerging security environment in Eastern and Central Europe. It is far too large and geopolitically central to be ignored.[16] Further, Russia's own national identity is tied to its historic and present relations with Ukraine. Whether Russia in the near future is able to reconstruct part of the former Soviet empire (if it even desires to do so) depends almost entirely on Ukraine's ability to maintain its sovereignty and independence, on Ukraine's role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and how it responds to Russian and Belarusian pressures to join its pending pan-Slavic union.

MISCONCEPTIONS IN WESTERN DISCOURSE

Brzezinski versus Huntington: Two Schools of Thought on Ukraine

Two rather different schools of thought regarding Ukraine have been advanced by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, two prominent analysts of international relations and European security. It is interesting to compare and contrast these views and the rationale which prompted each to arrive at their respective conclusions. Firstly, Brzezinski is a great supporter of the West's strategic engagement with Ukraine as an independent state. He has argued that 'it cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire'.[17] This mode of thinking falls in line with that of Garnett's 'keystone in the arch' thesis, as discussed above. Moreover, Brzezinski argues that the stability along NATO's new front line which now lies on Poland's eastern border depends largely on the consolidation of Ukraine's nation and statehood, success in economic reforms, and on its ability to balance closer co-operation with NATO and the EU and economic and political relations with Russia.

A different line of thinking on Ukraine has since been advanced by Samuel Huntington. Speaking in Kyiv on 18 October 1999, Huntington stressed that global politics is being configured along cultural and civilisational lines and thus, for the first time in history, global politics is truly multi-civilisational.[18] The relationship between 'the West and the Rest' will be the most important factor in global security because the West will continue to impose its values on other structures. Indeed Huntington argues that the 'clash of civilisations' is alive and well, and the global power structure resembles a *'uni-multipolar system'* having four levels with: 1) the US as the only superpower, 2) Russia and China as the major regional powers, 3) the UK and France as secondary regional powers, and 4) secondary regional states such as Ukraine, Japan, Australia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Pakistan, and India. This 'uni-multipolar system' has encouraged conflicts between Europe and the US as exemplified by Europe's increasing resentment of its dependence on the US, in the introduction of the Euro as a rival to the Dollar, and by the EU's acquisition of a military capability (which is becoming increasingly likely). The implications for Ukraine are even more daunting. The Iron Curtain has been replaced by a new line which is Western Christianity versus Muslim and Orthodox traditions. Huntington cites Kosovo as a classic example of the clash of civilisations. He also argues that a new security order based on civilisations is taking place in Europe where Russia will assume responsibility for stability among the Orthodox countries and states which are 'culturally part of the West' will

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[15] Garnett, p. 7.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Premature Partnership', *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 1994, vol. 72, no. 2, p. 80.
[18] Remarks made by Samuel Huntington at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine, 18 October 1999. The author was present at this conference.

eventually be integrated into European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. Thus, Huntington does not include Ukraine in the latter category, and labels Ukraine as non-Western, culturally divided, and situated on the 'break' between the Christian and Orthodox worlds. Ukraine cannot join NATO or the EU and is unequally situated according to his 'great power divide' to play a central role in the stability and security of Central Eurasia.

After more than two generations of ideologically driven East-West conflict, it is not surprising that some Western analysts have embraced images of an ethnically and culturally divided Ukraine, speculating that this situation would inevitably lead to a spill-over of instability in the region.[19] Although such simplistic images of Ukraine have diminished since 1994, there are still three myths which continue to influence Western thinking on Ukraine.

First, to think of Ukraine as divided between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians ignores two realities. The first of these is the fact that for all the generational and regional differences in Ukraine, there is little evidence to suggest that ethnic Russians hold sharply contrasting political views than ethnic Ukrainians in the same generational, regional, or economic status. The one exception is Crimea. Yet, what distinguishes Crimea from other regions of Ukraine is not the fact that nearly 70 per cent of its inhabitants are ethnic Russians, but that nearly 90 per cent of the population (the Tatars) emigrated from Russia after World War II. Further, irrespective of which language is spoken (Ukrainian, Russian, or *Surzhyk*, which commonly referred to as a combination of both languages)[20], the majority of Ukrainian citizens, whatever their ethnic origin, see no contradiction between animosity towards the Russian state on one hand and affection for the Russian culture and people on the other.[21]

The second myth is that of a 'great regional divide'. [22] The resentments of eastern and southern Ukrainians, which denied former President Kravchuk's re-election, are still seen by Western observers as a potential threat to stability. However, as Bukkvoll has noted local elites in eastern and southern Ukraine believe they have a far greater chance of advancing their personal interests in a smaller independent Ukraine rather than in an overwhelmingly large union with Russia and the CIS.[23]

The final myth is based upon the assumption that the strengthening of the leftists in the *Verkhovna Rada* (parliament) is an automatic threat to Ukrainian independence. During the 1998 Parliamentary elections, the Communist Party received the most seats of any other party (24 per cent). These results may lead one to conclude that a strong vote for the Communist Party was a vote for a return to the past. However, this conclusion overlooks another explanation- that the Ukrainian electorate chose to vote against the status-quo and against the poor socio-economic conditions that had become their daily reality.[24] This belief also overlooks the fact that the non-communist left-wing has been more robust than President Kuchma's centrists in resisting real or imagined Russian encroachments upon Ukraine's independence, and also that the Communist Party has consistently opposed the break-up of Ukraine.[25] But from 1998 the leftists in the *Rada* have become more vocal in favour of closer ties with Russia and the CIS[26] and have also spoken in favour of Ukraine's accession to a pan-Slavic union with Russia and Belarus. However, most of these 'outbursts of emotions' calling for a re-orientation of Ukraine's foreign and security policy (including rhetoric focused on re-acquiring nuclear weapons) do not necessarily reflect the leftists' desire for a loss of independence for Ukraine, but are in fact a response to current events in the geopolitical environment (such as NATO's decision to attack Serbia which Ukrainian parliamentarians across the spectrum strongly opposed).

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[19] See Chapter Three.
[20] 40-50 per cent of Ukrainians speak both Russian and Ukrainian, while 46 per cent speak Russian at home compared to the 30 per cent who speak Ukrainian. See 'Russian language is choice of Ukraine's youth', *The Kyiv Post*, 31 July 1998.
[21] See James Sherr, 'Ukraine in European Security', *Brassey's Defence Yearbook*, December 1997.
[22] See Chapter Three for a discussion of Ukraine's cultural, ethnic, and political divisions.
[23] Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997, pp.31-32.
[24] See Chapter Four.
[25] Bukkvoll, pp. 31-32.
[26] For example, they successfully lobbied for Ukraine's inclusion in the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in March 1999. See Chapter Five.

By dispelling these myths, we run the risk of assuming that Ukraine's sovereignty and independence is guaranteed. However, such a conclusion ignores the reality that these post-communist states are relatively weak as well as economically and politically unstable, and that they are still in the process of trying to consolidate their state- and nation-building. As this thesis suggests the greatest threats to Ukraine come not from Western apathy or misconceptions, but from internal economic challenges and from an expectation that the international community will ultimately be both willing and able to provide the level of assistance necessary to ensure the survival of an independent Ukraine.

BENEFITS OF AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE TO THE WEST

The independence and stability of Ukraine gives four benefits to European security and two increasingly important ones outside Europe.[27] First and foremost, and following the arguments of Brzezinski, a Russia unable to re-absorb or re-subordinate Ukraine stands little to no chance of re-emerging as the dominant influence in the former Warsaw Pact states of CEE. While it is unlikely that Russia will in the near future be in a position to impose direct threats to the region on a military level in response to an issue as politically charged as NATO enlargement, it is possible that a hostile, chaotic, unpredictable Russia could pose less obvious threats to the region in the form of organised crime[28] and increased economic and political pressure.

Second, insofar as the Russian government accepts that the emergence of a sovereign independent Ukraine is a permanent feature of post-Communist Europe, the groundwork will be laid for realistic discussions between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the West. But if Ukraine was unable to 'stand on its own feet', then the basis for realistic discussions would not only diminish, substantiating expectations that Ukraine's independence was a temporary phenomenon, but would also prolong the authoritarian perspectives that encourage such viewpoints.

Third, Ukraine's viability greatly reduces the significance of the 'Russia factor' in the domestic politics of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other states in CEE. A Russia no longer seen as a direct military threat contributes to the perception that change in the region is irreversible. This irreversibility means that any political party can come into power and there would still not be a threat of returning to the past or of a significantly re-oriented foreign and security policy.

Fourth, the stability of a multi-ethnic Ukraine bordering seven different nations would be a positive factor in a region where neighbouring countries face the risk of conflict along ethnic, regional or economic lines. Like Ukraine, these states suffer from the attributes associated with negative sovereignty (see below) such as lacking national self-confidence, effective political and economic institutions, civil traditions, and a basis of trust between government and society. If Ukraine was able to maintain civic tolerance and strengthen its internal cohesion this would not counter the cause advanced by the advocates for tolerance elsewhere in the region. Yet, if Ukraine was to experience serious instability along ethnic lines it is highly probable that this conflict would spill-over into other states in the region particularly in states which have considerable ethnic Ukrainian populations. Such instability would, therefore, expand the inter-state risks associated with minority problems in South-Central Europe.

Two other issues further enhance the importance of an independent Ukraine. The first of these relates to the political importance of energy resources in the CIS- a factor which is as important as the potential of oil and natural gas deposits in and in the vicinity of the Caspian basin has been realised by the CIS countries, Turkey, the EU, and the US, and also Iran, Iraq, and China. The struggle to control oil transportation routes between Asia and Europe is quickly gaining in geopolitical as well as economic significance and is frequently discussed during meetings of heads of states and foreign and defence ministers in the region. The desire to lessen their dependence on Russian energy giants such as *Gazprom* and *Lukoil* has prompted Ukraine and Former Soviet Union (FSU) states to take the initiative in

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[27] Bukkvoll, pp. 31-32.
[28] Which Ukraine itself has no shortage of

attempting to have the new pipelines constructed in their territories.[29] Second, although Turkey has developed its relations with Ukraine cautiously for fear of alienating Russia, the Turkish-Ukrainian relationship adds a vital north-south dimension in European security which also enhances NATO's co-operation with Ukraine. Further, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation (BSECO) provides a regional forum for addressing the issues of energy transportation (Turkey, Ukraine and Russia are among the members).[30]

These six concerns enable the provision of tenuous support from the West for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is little doubt that Western states and institutions are beginning to grasp the importance of an independent and stable Ukraine to the security of Europe. However, these concerns generated equally powerful expectations and pressures upon Ukraine in the process of economic, political, and social transition. Yet, as has been evident with a 'prescriptive' Western approach to solving these problems, such pressures can overburden as much as they can assist. Therefore, it is crucial that Western policy-makers realise the precarious situations facing the Ukrainian government, including both internal and external factors, so that the appropriate steps can be taken to support Ukraine in its efforts at political, economic, and social transition. Only with further detailed analyses of the internal dynamics which influence Ukraine's foreign and security policy will the West be able to comprehend the full range of potential risks and opportunities that lie ahead.

FOCUS OF THESIS AND PRELIMINARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This project will investigate the extent to which Ukraine's international and regional relations are influenced by the state's geopolitical position between Russia and the West, and it will be argued that Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy is the product of geopolitical, historical, and domestic forces. Moreover, Ukrainian foreign policy is intertwined with a domestic political struggle among the state elite, specifically between the Ukrainian left (the Communist, Socialist and Agrarian parties, as well as smaller ethnic Russian and regional parties) and the nationalist right (*Rukh*, Democratic parties). I will be analysing the internal and external factors that influence and essentially determine the orientation of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. *It is the contention of this thesis that in the case of Ukraine and other post-communist states, one must consider both structural and behavioural aspects of international relations to understand how their foreign and security policies are formulated as well as to account for shifts that may occur as a result of Ukraine's tilting between a pro-Europe or pro-Eurasia orientation.*

This thesis will begin with a discussion of international relations theory and Ukrainian foreign policy from two perspectives. The first perspective will review the realist/neo-realist approach and the second will focus on theories of domestic politics. It will be argued that a structural or realist explanation does not fully account for Ukraine's foreign policy behaviour. Moreover, theories of domestic politics are not entirely appropriate either. It will, therefore, be suggested that the current theories on foreign policy-making which incorporates both domestic and international factors have greater explanatory power *vis-à-vis* Ukraine's geopolitical situation. However, because Ukraine's foreign policy orientation is destined to reflect a combination of complex international, domestic, and historical factors, what is needed is a comprehensive model which would incorporate structural factors and domestic issues of state-building, but also takes into account subjective or behavioural factors such as nationalism, national identity, nation-building, party politics, and personalities of leaders.

This thesis has a strong geopolitical component and it is suggested that a new East-West frontier is emerging between those states which have been invited to join key Western institutions (NATO, EU) and those which have not. This new frontier may be developing along the lines suggested by Huntington, but perhaps a modified version of his thesis of the clash of civilisations which takes new factors, both structural and behavioural, into

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[29] However, there is a much stronger force supported by the US which favours the Baku-Ceyhan route, or even the Baku-Supsa route, both of which bypass Ukraine altogether. See Chapter Three for elaboration.
[30] See Chapter Five.

consideration. Moreover, this thesis argues that whereas the processes of globalisation, transnationalism, and interdependence have tended to soften the impact and presence of frontiers and national boundaries around the world, the opposite is to a considerable degree occurring in Europe. As this thesis argues, the frontier in Europe is not only widening, it also appears to be hardening. The frontier, as such, rather resembles a 'third level' of analysis- it is neither the domestic arena nor is it solely the international arena, but rather it is a place where crucial political developments unfold and where domestic and foreign politics come together. Thus, taking these 'frontier dynamics' into consideration is crucial to understanding the realm from within which Ukraine's foreign and security policy is operating.

As regards the politics of the frontier, the following questions are posed: is there evidence which suggests that the East-West frontier has less the character of a linear boundary and more of a broad zone where the influence of NATO and EU member states gradually fades with distance from the frontier? If so, what transpires in this widening geopolitical space that is the frontier? What sorts of individuals are impelled by what motives to engage in what kind of activities in and around the frontier? What issues sustain the politics of the frontier? Have structures emerged that differentiates the frontier from the political space on which it is encroaching as it is widening? Or is the frontier differentiated by a lack of mechanisms in a structure-less geopolitical space through which authority is exercised? Although some regional structures and institutions have begun to emerge and develop a basis for exercising authority in various sectors (such as energy and regional trade relations), this thesis suggests that the frontier in Europe is still, for the most part, a rather - under-organised geopolitical space. The zone of states between Russia and the West continues to be prone to instability along political, economic, social and cultural lines, as Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated. Still, it is not clear whether this instability is caused more by existing ethnic or other divisions in society or by the frontier's lack of superseding political or economic institutions in comparison with the West. Perhaps, as this thesis suggests, it is both at the same time.[31]

Furthermore, the influence of domestic forces on Ukrainian foreign and security policy will be analysed extensively. This thesis suggests that the interaction between domestic institutions plays a key role in the formulation of Ukraine's foreign policy agenda.[32] These institutions, however, do not function for the most part as equivalent institutions in the West. They are highly bureaucratic, disorganised, and operate within the realms of a quasi-state and quasi-nation inherited from the Ukrainian SSR, and as a result, foreign policy in Ukraine is highly subjective.[33] It is further argued in Chapter Two of this thesis that we should consider the *manner* by which Ukraine achieved its sovereignty and independence. There were no key political or economic institutions in place prior to independence (such as in Scotland), no prolonged period of national struggle (such as in Ireland), and no deeply rooted national identity capable of giving impetus to the development of a Ukrainian foreign policy. Indeed there was merely a transfer of authority from the central authority to the peripherals (i.e. Moscow to Kyiv). Thus, it is argued that the mode by which Ukraine became independent is an important factor to consider in an analysis of the factors which influence Ukraine's foreign and security policy.[34]

I will contemplate the viability of Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy, to use Leonid Kuchma's term, after nearly a decade of independence, and will consider how likely it is that Ukraine will be able to continue to follow its chosen foreign policy course.[35] This thesis tends to be critical of Ukraine's multi-directional foreign policy, although it is acknowledged that Ukraine has little choice but to continue with this policy due to both external and domestic realities. However, such an approach to foreign policy does not help to promote or reinforce a state's international prestige and, therefore, does not help Ukraine advance its image as a reliable and credible partner in its international and regional relations.

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[31] See Chapter Six.

[32] See Chapters Four and Six on the interplay between the domestic institutions and the formulation of foreign policy.

[33] As discussed in Chapters Two and Six.

[34] See Chapter Two.

[35] The Kuchma administration's description of Ukraine's foreign policy as 'integration into Europe, co-operation with Russia' while increasing Ukraine's co-operation with regional partners. See Chapters five and six for a more detailed discussion on this topic.

This thesis discusses Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy and its causes within the context of the frontier, and thus posits several questions: what exactly is meant by a 'multi-vector' policy? What are the underlying assumptions, intentions, and implications for a state that chooses to follow such a foreign policy strategy? To what extent is the frontier responsible for this policy, and to what extent does the frontier reinforce or undermine Ukraine's multi-directional foreign policy? To answer these questions, many factors, both structural and behavioural, which drive and shape Ukrainian foreign and security policy should be considered. The roles of the various domestic institutions which have a hand in shaping foreign policy, as well as their ability to work together to achieve common goals will be taken into account. In addition, it will be crucial to consider the nation-building process as a factor in the state's foreign policy orientation.

The scope of this project

I will not be looking in depth at Ukraine-Russia relations beyond those political and economic agreements that have affected Ukraine's overall foreign and security policy. This is, moreover, not an economic thesis; therefore, minimal attention will be given to issues such as economic reform in the various sectors, privatisation, and the development of trade linkages between Ukraine and the West, Russia, and within the region, although I certainly acknowledge the palpable linkages between trade relations and foreign policy. This topic is an important one, but nonetheless, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

I will also not be delving too far into history as this is mostly a contemporary thesis. I have focused my research on events post 1991, the year of Ukraine's independence, paying particular attention to the Kravchuk and Kuchma Presidential administrations (1991-1999). However, I feel compelled at times to discuss the history of Ukraine-Russia and Ukraine-Poland relations in context, as the developments in present day relations can be made clearer with a general understanding of history.

It should be clarified that in this thesis I chose not to discuss extensively Ukraine's relations with individual Western states, not because I feel that these relationships are unimportant, but rather because the scope of this thesis is limited primarily to Ukraine's relations with European and Trans-Atlantic institutions.

New borders, frontiers, and boundaries in Europe

As has already been mentioned, this project has a geopolitical focus and as such, it is appropriate at this stage to briefly introduce some of the terms that will be employed in the analysis as well as to pose some additional research questions. Throughout this thesis, I will seek to determine the extent to which geopolitics influences Ukraine's multi-vector foreign and security policy orientation *vis-à-vis* the West, Russia, and within the region. It is suggested in this chapter that the existence of physical or psychological borders, frontiers, and boundaries is an important factor in shaping Ukraine's foreign and security policy. I will begin by defining these key geopolitical terms and will follow by introducing key questions that will be addressed in greater depth in Chapter Six. These questions include but are not limited to the following: what human purposes do contemporary frontiers serve? Has their existence been justified in both historic and modern times? How have the states and their regional components dealt with the existence of institutional and ideological frontiers? Although I will use several examples of historical/modern frontiers to illustrate my points, I will focus attention specifically on the emergence of a new frontier in CEE and its influence on states in the region. My argument hinges around the assertion that Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy is a reflection of the government's need to manoeuvre amongst both external and internal forces, including the frontier. This policy is also an attempt to find a compromise between the range of foreign policy preferences of Ukrainian policy-makers.[36]

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[36] As discussed in Chapters Four and Six.

The general impact of frontiers is rarely analysed in contemporary social science literature. This thesis attempts to fill a gap by looking at the nature of frontiers and their influence on the foreign and security policies of states in CEE, focusing specifically on the new frontier of European security which, following the first wave of NATO enlargement in 1999, now lies on the border between Poland and Ukraine. The following paragraphs will serve as an introduction to the issues in which I intend to raise throughout this thesis.

Haller has noted several meanings attached to the terms 'borders' and 'limits' in a number of European languages, and has detected a fundamental double meaning.[37] On one hand, borders may be seen as ends or barriers and on the other as passages, filters, or gateways between systems contiguous to each other. This dual meaning is similar to the long-standing distinction which political geographers have made between 'boundaries' (definite lines marking the limits of jurisdiction) and 'frontiers', which in the past have referred to zones which faced an enemy. The term 'border' can be applied to a zone, usually a narrow one, or it can be a line of demarcation (the border between England and Scotland is both). In more contemporary usage, the term 'frontier' can mean the precise line at which jurisdictions meet, usually demarcated and controlled by customs, police, and military personnel. A frontier can also refer to a region, as in the description of Alsace as the frontier region between France and Germany. In this sense it is referred to as the archaic 'march'[38] as in marches between England and Wales. In a broader sense, 'frontier' has been used to refer to the moving zone of settlement in the interior of a continent as in the great American western frontier. Thus, 'boundary' is the narrowest of the four terms as it is always used to refer to a definite line of demarcation or delimitation. For this analysis, I will apply the above slightly modified interpretation of a contemporary 'frontier', which describes a region (not simply a specific line of demarcation) where jurisdictions and spheres of influence converge.

Historically, frontier or border regions have been the site of conflicts over territory and are frequently characterised by different ethnic, religious, linguistic, or national composition than that of their respective nation-states, which is a reminder of the lack of coincidence between national and other socio-economic boundaries. The allocation and demarcation of borders has historically been an elite function that was normally supported by a degree of military force or the threat thereof which has resulted in the forcible inclusion and exclusion of several minority ethnic groups or parts of these groups. [39] According to Hansen, all of the European countries created over the last 150 years have had regional border problems which have arisen from the demands of minorities seeking to realise their 'national values' within the framework of an organised political state.[40] Therefore, the drawing of national borders in Europe has led to the exclusion of some ethnic minorities, many of which are located in frontier regions.

This thesis will contend that the definition of what constitutes a modern frontier is in the midst of change; it is widening and narrowing, while simultaneously undergoing erosion with respect to many issues, and reinforcement with respect to others. Rosenau postulates the following questions which are relevant to this discussion: how do we conceptualise the frontier so that it denotes identities and affiliations (such as religious and ethnic) as well as territorialities? How do those who are active along the frontier mange to absorb, circumvent, or otherwise cope with shifting and porous boundaries? And how long can an increasingly interdependent and transnational world organise its affairs in terms of exclusive boundaries? Rosenau's response is to treat 'the frontier as becoming ever more rugged, and thus, as a widening field of action, as the space in which world affairs unfold, as the arena in which domestic and foreign issues converge, intermesh, or otherwise become indistinguishable within a seamless web'.[41] This, Rosenau asserts, is the new politics of the

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[37] Max Haller, 'The challenge for comparative sociology in the transformation of Europe, *International Sociology*, 1990, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 201.

[38] The term 'march' is defined as a border territory organised on a semi-permanent military system to defend a frontier. See JRV Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 1987, London: Allen and Unwin, p. 48.

[39] Liam O'Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson (eds), *Borders, Nations, and States*, Aldershot: Avebury Publishing Ltd, 1996, p. 7.

[40] N. Hansen, *The Border Economy: Regional Development in the South-West*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981, p. 20. As cited in O'Dowd and Wilson, p. 7.

[41] James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Global Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 4-5.

frontier. Thus, if one concurs with Rosenau's views regarding the importance of developments in the frontier then logically a focus of scholarly attention should be on those states that are geographically situated in this frontier of European security.

Due to the processes of globalisation, many regional frontiers in the world are softening, and in some cases, even disappearing, as globalisation has tended to reverse the inclination to solidify borders. However, this thesis will argue that the opposite is occurring with respect to frontiers in Europe. There is evidence which suggests that a new East-West frontier has been emerging in lieu of NATO enlargement and EU expansion to include a selected few states in CEE. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate, particularly in Chapter Six, how the notion of the East-West frontier has often been internalised in many aspects of Ukrainian politics: from foreign policy, to defence policy, to the economic and energy sectors. The presence of an East-West frontier in Europe which consists of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, states, societies, and cross-border working relationships has created a new dynamic in the region which indeed carries implications for the way in which we view international relations. The frontier has brought about a new level of analysis which, as Rosenau posits, includes the convergence of domestic and international politics in the widened geopolitical space that is the frontier.

CONCEPTS DEFINED

In this section, I will define some of the key concepts that are employed in this thesis, although Chapter Two has several sections in which concepts are defined and applied in context. This section should, therefore, serve only as a brief introduction to some of these terms and their relevance to this project.

Quasi-states and quasi-nations

When the USSR ceased to exist, Ukraine inherited both a quasi-state and a quasi-nation from the Ukrainian SSR. One feature of the present international order is the presence of these quasi-states and quasi-nations. These 'quasi' governments are responsible for exercising power over their inhabitants and over territory, but such governments have not established enduring legal and administrative structures that are capable of outlasting the current regime.[42] Although quasi-states possess judicial statehood, they have not yet been authorised and empowered domestically and, consequently, they lack the institutional features of sovereign states as also defined by international law. Quasi-states are thus far from complete in comparison with 'real' states.[43]

One of the key defining characteristics of a quasi-state is its undertaking of contemporary international relations to promote its development, or at least to compensate for its current condition of under-development, rather like poor citizens in welfare states.[44] By gaining the economic and political support and acceptance of the more powerful actors, quasi-states can seek to promote their foreign and domestic policy agenda on the international and regional scenes.

Geographic size or territory does neither define nor discount quasi-stateness. In accordance with the above definition, a quasi-state can be, for example, a geographically small, newly independent state in Africa; yet, the term could also describe a large post-communist state such as Ukraine. The important element is, therefore, not the size of the territory, but the amount of power and influence that the state in question is able to project in the international system and whether it exhibits negative or positive sovereignty (see below).

A quasi-nation, on the other hand, refers to a nation in the making. Quasi-nations lack clearly defined and set traditions based on a people's shared historical experiences. For Ukraine, building a nation or national identity is problematic because of the state's ethnic

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[42] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, 1984, p. 30.
[43] Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, Independence, and the Third World*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 21.
[44] Ibid, p. 22.

and cultural divisions, and because its identity is closely tied to Russia's national identity (both having origins in Kievan Rus). Ukrainians do not yet have a clear idea of who they are as a people. To define Ukraine as a nation in the strict sense would entail challenging how Russians define themselves. The Ukrainian people need to ask themselves: who are we Ukrainians? What makes our nation distinct from Russia (and Belarus)? To quote Yevhen Marchuk, former Deputy of the *Verkhovna Rada*, and Head of the National Security and Defence Council:

> We are not the Soviet Union, for it does not exist in either political or economic terms. We are not Russia, and we very keenly feel this during each new discussion of our gas debts or the introduction of Russian custom duties…We are not Europe, which we immediately realise whenever we attempt to break through to European markets. Therefore, all we can do is try to consider our country a part of something- nothing more then this… We are fated to have one identity throughout the next decade: We are Ukraine, independent and neutral. Neither external nor internal factors will let us change the status quo. Based on this we should define our strategic interests.[45]

Negative and positive sovereignty

According to Jackson, a defining characteristic of a quasi-state is that of its acquirement of negative sovereignty. Negative sovereignty implies a state's freedom from outside intervention, which is a formal legal condition or entitlement. One can also think of independence and non-intervention as the distinctive and reciprocal rights and duties of an international social contract between states- when it is held, it is held absolutely in the sense that it is not dependent on any conditions, and the only requirement is observance and forbearance.[46] When a state has been recognised by the international community as an independent entity, it is said to have achieved negative sovereignty. Such states tend to be reactive to international developments and are usually in the process of economic, political, and social transition, while at the same time, are attempting to a establish a national and state identity.

Jackson associates this concept of limited or negative sovereignty to former colonies of the Third World, but his analysis is also applicable to Ukraine in many respects. Characteristics of negative sovereignty include 1) a deficient political will and authoritative institutions; 2) a deficient organisation of power to protect human or socio-economic rights; 3) a resemblance to juridical, yet incomplete states; and 4) an absence of empirical statehood.[47]

Positive sovereignty, on the other hand, implies a situation where governments can be more self-directing. Positive sovereignty is the distinctive overall feature of a developed state, and it is not a legal, but a political attribute. A positively sovereign government is one that not only enjoys the rights of non-intervention and other international immunities, but one that is in a position to provide resources to its citizens. Such governments are normally not in the process of major political, economic, and social transition, and they have the ability to declare, implement, and enforce public policy both domestically and internationally. According to Jackson's definition, quasi-states (such as Ukraine) do not have this luxury. They are not yet the masters of their own destiny as they lack such resources and capabilities that would enable them to take advantage of their independence.

Despite possessing only negative sovereignty, former colonial dependencies seek to obtain equal status in international law. They expect to enjoy the same rights as other independent states, yet remain jealous of their sovereignty, independence, and territorial

[45] 'Marchuk views foreign policy priorities', *Kiev Den*, 26 March 1999, pp. 4-5 (in Ukrainian).
[46] G. Schwarzenberger and E.D. Brown, *A Manual of International Law*, 6th edition, London, 1976, p. 54-55.
[47] Taras Kuzio, 'The Domestic Sources of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', Paper delivered at the conference Ukraine and the New World Order 1991-1996, University of Ottawa, 21-22 March 1997, p. 7.

integrity (as Ukraine does). Core aspects of their state- and nation-building, that is their attempt to move from negative to positive sovereignty, are the introduction of legally defined borders, control over their settled populations by acquiring an effective civic government, guarding against internal and external threats to their security, and possessing the means to enforce their will both at home and abroad.

Political capacity: An opposing view?

Organski, Kugler, and Arbetman have advanced the notion of *political capacity*[48], which they acknowledge was inspired by Huntington's contention that the '…most important distinction between nations concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government'.[49] The authors explore how the political capacity of governments affects economic and political performance. Their argument is that capable governments resolve the challenges associated with development and are better able to preserve domestic stability than are less capable governments under similar circumstances. In their book *Political Capacity and Economic Behaviour*, Kugler and Arbetman attempt to show that political capacity plays a critical role in economic, demographic, and social changes that characterise the process of nation-building.

Political capacity is said to capture the ability of political systems to carry out the tasks chosen by the nation's government in the face of domestic and international groups with competing priorities.[50] Kugler and Organski argue that capable political systems need not be free, democratic, stable, orderly, representative, participatory, or endowed with any other attributes which are frequently associated with normative conceptions of political capacity. While one might argue that non-democratic, non-participatory, or non-representative governments cannot be regarded as developed, they can be politically capable (they offer China and Iran as examples).[51] Seen in this context, political capacity is an expression of the political effectiveness of an elite in achieving governmental goals, and does not imply acceptance or support for the means by which such goals are attained.[52]

An aim of Kugler and Arbetman's work is to provide gross comparisons of aggregate political performance similar to those obtained with GDP for economic output. They argue that political capacity is an appropriate tool because it measures the overall performance of the governments across societies over time, regardless of political regimes, ethnic compositions, or cultural differences. Political capacity is closely linked to economics, or more specifically, to the state's GDP. According to Kugler and Arbetman, a politically capable government that is an active economic participant can positively intervene to shape an environment. Although their work is applicable to more economically viable actors, this study is not a very useful tool for this thesis. The GDP of the post-communist countries of the FSU is presently declining from an already unfavourable position. These governments are not strong enough economically to intervene to shape the environment; on the other hand, they are barely surviving economically and thus are heavily reliant on the financial support of the international community.

In light of the above discussion of political capacity, one might question the usefulness of the above discussion on positive and negative sovereignty by asking whether this description of 'two levels of sovereignties' is in fact too simplistic and categorical? It is true that even the concept of sovereignty is problematic in contemporary international relations due to the processes of globalisation, transnationalism, and interdependence which have tended to reduce the significance of national borders. Sovereignty has traditionally been associated with the sovereignty of the state as the primary unit of the international system, but has also been defined as 'final and absolute political authority in the political

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[48] See AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, University of Chicago Press, 1980; J. Kugler and Douglas Lemke (eds), *Parity and War: Extensions and Evaluations of The War Ledger*, University of Michigan Press, 1996; and J. Kugler and Marina Arbetman (eds), *Political Capacity and Economic Behavior*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.

[49] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

[50] Kugler and Arbetman, *Political Capacity and Economic Behavior*, p. 1.

[51] *The War Ledger*, p. 72.

[52] Kugler and Arbetman, p. 1.

community...and no final and absolute exits elsewhere'.[53] However, scholars have recently questioned the conceptual application of sovereignty, arguing that 'though the state will continue to perform important administrative and other functions, the theory of sovereignty will seem strangely out of place in a world characterised by shifting allegiances, new forms of identity, and overlapping tiers of jurisdiction.[54] The appearance of regional organisations such as the EU, where clearly a considerable degree of sovereignty of the state has been transferred (or pooled) from the national government to the regional authority, is an obvious example of state sovereignty erosion. Yet, this partial transfer of sovereignty was done voluntarily by the national governments, which saw it in their interests to join such an organisation. So can we even say that sovereignty still primarily rests with the state? Probably this is true, although certainly to a lesser extent than in the past. Further, is it logical to claim that there are different levels of sovereignty which are obtainable by all states? Again, Jackson's classification of negative and positive sovereignty is being used with the purpose of attempting to analyse and compare the foreign policy activities of Ukraine. Clearly the discussion of negative and positive sovereignty needs to be developed further if these concepts are to be a useful analytical tool in this thesis.[55]

Ukrainian/Russian foreign policy

Relations between Ukraine and Russia are a matter of foreign policy. To Western observers, this should seem like an obvious way to discuss the matter as Russia and Ukraine are now, in accordance with international law, two separate state entities. However, there is a tendency for some to view an independent Ukraine as a peculiarity or a temporary phenomenon, certain to change as Ukraine eventually is bound to rejoin its 'fraternal brothers' in one great Slavic union with Russia and Belarus. Thus, some leftists politicians in Russia have been known to look upon Russian policy toward Ukraine as an internal matter. The Ukrainian government, on the other hand, protective of its sovereignty and independence, views relations with Russia from within the sphere of foreign policy. It is important that the reader be aware of these diverging viewpoints, particularly as the discussion shifts to Ukraine's negative sovereignty, the constraints on Ukrainian foreign and security policy, and the importance of threat perceptions.

Central and Eastern Europe

Garnett defines 'Central and Eastern Europe' as consisting of Belarus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine.[56] This thesis will follow Garnett's interpretation of the states which define 'Central and Eastern Europe'. Breaking down into two separate categories, Central Europe in this thesis consists of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Eastern Europe thus refers to Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine.

Europe and Eurasia

I found during the course of my research that using the terms 'Europe' and 'Eurasia' to describe geographical as well as ideological divisions was highly problematic because there are many conflicting interpretations in the literature and many different variables to consider.[57] To clarify, when I refer to 'Europe' in a comparative sense with Eurasia, I am

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[53] F.H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
[54] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented World*, Brookfield, VT: Elger Press, 1992, p. 256.
[55] See Chapter Two.
[56] Sherman Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. 5, footnote 4.
[57] Although many authors have preferred to use the terms 'Europe' and 'Eurasia' to clarify the 'ins and outs' of the enlargement processes. See for example Taras Kuzio, 'Return to Europe or Eurasia: National Identity, Transformation, and Ukrainian

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referring to those 'European' states which have been included as members or potential members (the so-called fast track) of NATO and/or the EU, adhere to democratic principals, and have a market-oriented economy. 'The West' denotes the aforementioned plus the USA and Canada, and 'Eurasia' denotes Russia, Belarus, the Caucauses, and Central Asia. I acknowledge that other scholars may differ in the manner in which they define these concepts, but this only proves the difficulty in finding a universally acceptable definition. Moreover, the categories which states at any given time are designated as belonging to, or 'Europe', 'Eurasia', and 'the West', are by no means fixed. The classifications will change as states are either invited to join Western structures, or if they choose (or are co-erced) to re-orient their economic and security policies towards 'Eurasia'. Thus, this thesis views the criteria which qualifies a certain state to be a part of 'Europe' or 'Eurasia' to be determined by much more than geographical location.

The following alternative perspective of Borys Tarasyuk, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine indicated five categories by which he groups the states of 'Europe'. As a means to aid Western understanding on the creation of new divisions in Europe, it is thus appropriate to include Tarasyuk's Ukrainian-centred viewpoint.[58]

Group 1:   A traditional Western Europe of developed nations who are members of European economic and security structures. They may serve as a stable foundation to the building of a new Europe.
Group 2:   New democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which are included in the first wave of NATO enlargement and EU expansion.
Group 3:   States such as Slovenia and Estonia which were included in the first wave of EU expansion. These states have already progressed in their political and economic development, but have yet to reach their security aspirations.
Group 4:   Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria, which declared their intention to integrate into the Trans-Atlantic and European structures, have signed Europe agreements with and participate in the economic and security oriented programmes of EU and NATO.
Group 5:   The very special participant of the European integration process- Ukraine.

As is evident in the Foreign Minister's interpretation, the classification for inclusion in 'Europe' is based primarily on membership and potential membership in European and Trans-Atlantic institutions, and not so much on other factors such as shared democratic, economic, religious, or other values. One might also question the exclusion of Russia in Tarasyuk's 'Europe'. It is not difficult to see how new dividing lines can easily be created when the emphasis is on who is and who is not a potential candidate for membership in the West's economic, political, and security institutions. This Ukrainian-centred view highlights the real fear of the Ukrainian government, which is that of a Europe once again divided politically, economically, and socially. This thesis suggests that there is a new frontier of East-West relations emerging following the enlargement of NATO and eventually, the EU, and that the frontier now lies on the border between Poland and Ukraine. Poland is included in the 'European' family of peaceful, stable, and democratic countries while Ukraine, by way of its present exclusion from Western institutions, remains part of a 'grey zone' of European security and prosperity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The following sections will serve as a general overview to the literature on Ukraine's foreign and security policy. I discuss the key arguments made in the most prominent academic works on Ukraine and will identify where gaps in the literature can be found.

Foreign Policy', Paper given at the annual American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Seattle, 20 November 1997. Copy in author's possession; and Sherman Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch,* 1997.

[58] H.E. Boris Tarasyuk, 'Bordercase Europe: Chances and risks of the new neighbourhood', transcript of speech given in Berlin on 4 July 1998 at the International Bertelsmann Forum.

State- and nation-building

Wilson, Arel, Kuzio, Garnett, and Szporluk among others have written widely on the Ukrainian state-[59] and nation-building.[60] These authors have provoked a rather intense debate in the academic literature on this topic. Wilson and Arel have argued that parliamentary factions can be divided into 'Russophone'[61] and 'Ukrainophone'[62] competing contrasts.[63] They tended to view the 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine in terms of a division between a 'Ukrainophone' Kravchuk and a 'Russophone' Kuchma. This picture, according to Kuzio, neglects other issues and thus, gives an oversimplified picture of Ukraine, which neatly fits into the 'nationalist' west versus the 'Russian east'.[64] Garnett and Kuzio argue that language should not be perceived as the key marker of national identity in Ukraine. Moreover, Russian-speaking Ukrainians should not be regarded as disloyal to Ukrainian independence and are not generally supporters of pro-Russian separatism.

Other authors have criticised Arel and Wilson's argument that language is a key determinant of identity and political orientation in Ukraine. First, Nemyria has explained that language and ethnicity are not dominant issues in the Donbass region and that territorial and economic factors play a far greater role. The Russian inhabitants of Donbass associate their identities first and foremost with the territory in question and not with their historic native land (i.e. Russia).[65] Second, Sochor and Kravchuk/Chudowsky concluded that economic factors- not language factors- dominated the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections. They found identity and political culture, especially in the eastern and southern *oblasts,* to be in a state of flux. Ukrainians from this region tended to fall back upon their regional identities with little sense of belonging to a united Ukrainian nation-state.[66]

Garnett has also been critical of those scholars who portray Ukraine as a divided society, particularly of those who have emphasised that language is a determinant of national identity in Ukraine.[67] Garnett states that:

> The weakness of the Ukrainian state and its political
> traditions magnifies the destabilising aspects of those
> factors, but the emphasis on the 'great divide' as a potential

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[59] On early efforts at state-building, see Roman Solchanyk, 'The Politics of State-building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 1994, vol. 46, no. 1. On early efforts to establish ties with the West, see Taras Kuzio, 'Ukrainian Security Policy', *Washington Papers*, Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, no. 167; Peter Van Ham, 'Ukraine, Russia, and European Security', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 13, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, February 1994.

[60] See for example A. Wilson and T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*, London: Macmillian Press, 1994; T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*, New York: Routledge Press, 1998; T. Kuzio (ed), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, New York: M.E. Sharpe Press, 1998; A. Wilson: *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Cambridge University Press, 1997; D. Arel and A. Wilson, 'Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol.3, no.2, August 1994; S. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch,: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment in Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997; and for a historical discussion of the modern Ukrainian nation and state in a wider contact of the formation of the modern nations of Poland and Russia, see R. Szporluk, 'Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State', *Daedalus*, Summer 1997, vol. 126, no. 3.

[61] Defined as ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians who speak Russian as their language of choice.

[62] Defined as ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian as their language of choice.

[63] D. Arel and A. Wilson, 'Ukraine' Back to Eurasia?' op cit.; Arel, 'The Temptation of the Nationalising State', in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russian and the New States of Eurasia*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994; and D. Arel, 'Language Policies in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages', *Nationalities Papers*, vol.23, no.3, September 1995.

[64] Taras Kuzio, 'National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 2, no.4, Winter 1996, p. 587.

[65] Grigory Nemyria, 'A Qualitative Analysis of the Situation in the Donbass', in Klaus Segbers and Stephan De Spiegeleire (eds), *Emerging Geopolitical and Territorial Units: Theories, Methods, and Case Studies. Post Soviet Puzzles*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995, vol.2; and Grigory Nemyria, 'Regionalism: and Underestimated Dimension of State-Building in Ukraine', in Richard Sakwa (ed), *The Experience of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, Chapter 5.

[66] Z. Sochor, 'Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Elections in Ukraine 1994', in Vladimir Tismaneanu, op cit, pp. 208-226; Robert Kravchuk and Victor Chudowsky, 'The Political Geography of Ukraine's 1994 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections', Paper presented to the 1994 Annual Meeting of the New England Slavic Association; and Kuzio, Chapter 2, 'Voters and Issues in the Presidential Elections', in *Ukraine Under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation, and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997.

[67] See Chapter Three.

danger to Ukrainian statehood has led analysts to miss also seeing it and the other divisions within Ukraine as key factors in the stability of the state during its most difficult moments. The most important variables for determining whether the great divide will appear and challenge Ukrainian statehood are exogenous to the regional and ethnic divisions themselves, resting particularly with the fate of the Ukrainian economy and Russia's long-term policy toward Ukraine. The ethno-linguistic divide is more a complicating factor than a motive force.[68]

Also in the scholarly literature on Ukraine's state- and nation-building, much has been written comparing and contrasting the Kravchuk and Kuchma administrations. Kuzio in particular has compared the two administrations and their different approaches to the formulation of Ukraine's foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the West and Russia.[69] During the presidential elections of 1994, many myths were revealed about the two candidates which were later discredited. Kuchma was portrayed by his supporters as being reform-minded, and accused by the opposition as being anti-patriotic, favouring a revival of the USSR, and planning to give away Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet to Russia.[70] Kravchuk was portrayed by his supporters as the 'father of the nation', 'state-builder and national defender', and by the opposition as a 'hardened nationalist' who was anti-reform. Kuzio has categorised Kravchuk as a 'romanticist' and Kuchma as a 'pragmatist'. Kravchuk was seen to be a hard-liner in terms of asserting the Ukrainian state and national identity. His policies reflected anti-Russia and anti-CIS sentiments, particularly against Ukraine signing the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, and favoured integration with Europe. Kuchma, on the other hand, sought a more business-like relationship with Russia, especially in the economic but also in the political spheres. He intended to 'normalise' relations with Russia on a bilateral basis, seeking to avoid the multilateral forum of the CIS.

Kuzio concludes that in terms of policies there were few radical differences between Kravchuk and Kuchma. The differences were only apparent in their style of leadership and their ability to implement policies.[71] This has led to a large measure of continuity in terms of foreign policy. Kuchma's emphasis on ensuring good relations with NATO/EU was always stated in the same breath as the importance of good relations with Russia. He further emphasised that Ukraine's partnership with Russia (based on a shared history and culture) would not be to the detriment of Ukraine's relations with other states. His goal was, therefore, to keep the door to the West open.[72]

Ukraine: The quasi-state and quasi- nation

Kuzio has made a brief mention of the applicability of Jackson's[73] analysis of quasi-states and quasi-nations to Ukraine's precarious economic, political and social situation.[74] Although he does not go into great depth, he does discuss Ukraine's limited or negative sovereignty problem. He asserts that Ukraine inherited a quasi-state and quasi-nation from

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[68] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, pp. 17-18.

[69] See T. Kuzio, *Ukraine Under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation, and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine,* London: Macmillan Press, 1997, especially Chapters 2 and 6; Kuzio, Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994, *Journal of Communist and Transition Politics*, June 1996, vol. 12, no. 2; T. Kuzio, 'Return to Europe or Eurasia? National Identity, Transformation, and Ukrainian Foreign Policy', Paper delivered to the Annual Congress of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Seattle, November 1997; and T. Kuzio, 'The Sultan and the Hetman: Democracy Building in Belarus and Ukraine in a Grey Security Zone', Paper prepared for the research project 'Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transitional Factors', European University Institute, Florence, Italy, April 1998.

[70] T. Kuzio, 'Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994', p. 129.

[71] See Chapters Four and Five.

[72] Reuters, 12 July 1994.

[73] Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World,* op cit.

[74] Taras Kuzio, 'The Domestic Sources of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', Paper delivered at the conference Ukraine and the New World Order 1991-1996, 21-22 March 1997, pp.5-7; and T. Kuzio, 'Return to Europe or Eurasia? National Identity, Transformation, and Ukrainian Foreign Policy'.

the Ukrainian SSR.[75] Applying Jackson's analysis of quasi-states in the Third World, Kuzio concludes that Ukraine is not an unusual case in respect of its inherited quasi-state and quasi-nation. As Jackson points out, 'very few (of these newly independent) states are 'nations' either by long history or common ethnicity or successful constitutional integration'.[76]

Kuzio explains that Ukraine's leaders, therefore, not only have to support democratic and market transitions, but they have understood that state- and nation-building were two other necessary components of their post-Soviet transformations. This four-pronged transition process has greatly shaped the orientation of Ukraine's foreign policy since independence. Two forces are thus at work. State- and nation-building will gradually transform Ukraine into a modern, developed state, while as Morse points out, political and economic reform and the process of modernisation increases the interdependence of those states undertaking such transitions.[77] Ukraine's inherited quasi-status will ensure its continued high levels of interdependence, particularly with Russia and the CIS, which will prevent a radical re-orientation of its foreign and security policies away from its eastern neighbours.[78] The degree to which Ukraine's state- and nation-building policies are successful will determine the extent to which Ukraine will evolve from its inherited quasi-status to become a fully developed state and nation.

Though Ukraine is potentially a medium power, it is currently a weak-state. It does not have the means to oppose or appease its enemies, or entice its friends. Ukraine is still in the making. The consolidation of its statehood, moreover, is taking place on the basis of a history of statelessness, and a great abundance of ethnic and regional diversity. However, according to Garnett, the question is not whether Ukraine will remain a state, but what kind of state will it become? Ukraine is less likely to lose its independence than to experience periods of instability, which could cause a rippling effect throughout the region.[79]

Domestic sources of foreign policy

Although some work has been published on the domestic sources of Russian foreign policy[80], the study of the domestic sources of Ukrainian foreign policy is still limited in both Ukraine and in the West.[81] The following sections survey the existent scholarly work on the influence of nationalism and national identity on Ukraine's foreign policy. In the proceeding section a gap in the literature will be identified in terms of the lack of analyses which focus on domestic sources of Ukraine's foreign policy, particularly on an institutional level.

National identity and nationalism as a factor in Ukraine's foreign policy

Scholars have tended to deal with nationalism and foreign policy as separate phenomena. However, there has been an attempt by Prizel to bridge this gap. In his work on national identity and foreign policy, Prizel discusses rational choice theory in international relations as he focuses on the foreign policy choices of Poland, Russia and Ukraine.[82] He states that while it is certainly true that all states pursue what they perceive as a rational foreign policy,

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[75] Although Kuzio does not define quasi-state or quasi-nation which is a shortcoming of this particular work.
[76] Jackson, p. 41.
[77] E.L. Morse, 'The Transformation of Foreign Policy: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization', *World Politics*, April 1970, vol. XXII, no. 3, pp.371-392. As cited in Kuzio, 'The Domestic Sources of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', p. 6.
[78] Kuzio, p. 6.
[79] Sherman Garnett, 'Reform, Russia, and Europe: The Strategic Context of Ukraine's NATO Policy', in Stephen J. Blank (ed), *From Madrid to Brussels' Perspectives on NATO Enlargement,* Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1997, pp. 74-75.
[80] See for example Celestine A. Wallander (ed), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1996; and Suzanne Crow, *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia Under Yeltsin*, Washington, DC, RFE/RL Research Institute, 1993.
[81] Yaroslaw Bilinsky is one of the few that have investigated the legacy of the Soviet experience on Ukraine. See Y. Bilinsky, 'Basic factors in the foreign policy of Ukraine: The impact of the Soviet experience', in S. Frederick Starr (ed), *The Legacy and History of Russia and the New States of Eurasia*: The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 1, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.
[82] Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

the parameter of what essentially constitutes 'rational' choice is a flexible and elusive concept. In addition to objective factors such as geostrategic position, economic, and other factors that influence a given state's foreign policy formulation, there are also broad subjective criteria that should be considered. Such factors, Prizel argues, are paramount to understanding the foreign and security policy decisions taken by Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. Further, the interaction between national identity and foreign policy is a key element in both established and nascent polities and this interaction is particularly important in newly emerging or re-emerging states as nationalism and national identity are often the main, if not the only forces holding societies together. He explains that these states lack abiding institutions on which to anchor their political personas making them heavily reliant on their collective memories (articulated through historiography and literature) as the basis for their national identities. [83] It is here in the collective memory that national identity originates and any shift in a society's national identity is caused by a shift in the collective memory. Prizel offers us a much more sophisticated and coherent image of foreign relations and shows that the founding nationalist myths of all states shape their conception of national interest, which must be taken into account to predict future behaviour.

Motyl also offers an important contribution to the literature on Ukrainian nationalism and national identity (though several years before Prizel) which furthers our understanding of the connection between these subjective factors and foreign policy. He argues that it was the policy of *perestroika* that pushed the totalitarian state over the edge, thereby precipitating the fall of the empire in Central Europe and the republics, thus provoking the rise of non-Russian nationalism. It is not, as most analysts argue, nationalism that destroyed the system, but the destruction of the system that gave birth to nationalism as a largely reactive force concerned with self-preservation in a collapsing political, economic, and social system.[84] Furthermore, he argues that in terms of the implementation of reforms, 'shock therapy' and radically transformative policies will not prove successful in the realms of the post-totalitarian and post-imperial conditions which are characteristic of all successor states. The only alternative is an evolutionary set of policies that involve the sequencing of political, social, and economic reform within the countries.

Finally, Motyl disputes the assumption that nations are immutable, monolithic, or God-given entities. He observes that scholars, policy-makers, and journalists talk of 'the' Ukrainians and 'the' Russians in Ukraine as if their identities, interests, and loyalties were set in stone, which is not the case. Nations change; they come and go as do classes, states and all other social and political groups. To talk in this manner suggests that national identity is determined either by birth or registration, which overlooks the fact that the malleability of ethnic identity means that ethnic conflict is neither historically inevitable nor immune to policy solutions.[85]

A limited number of additional authors have embarked on projects concerning the influence of nationalism and national identity upon Ukraine's foreign and security policy by questioning the primacy of external constraints in influencing a state's international relations. Futado[86], D'Anieri[87], and Burant[88] are among those authors who have done so. Futado sets out to determine to what extent Ukraine's relationship with the outside world is dictated by a domestic agenda of nationalism. He states that the destabilising impact of nationalism on international security arises only out of certain very specific variants of the national idea. States that exhibit such exclusive ideologies pursue not only internal policies toward national minorities that carry destabilising external consequences, but they are likely to turn their national agenda outwards, justifying expansive definitions of the nation. Futado argues

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[83] Prizel, p. 1.

[84] Alexander Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 17.

[85] Motyl, p. XIV.

[86] C.F. Futado, Jr, 'Nationalism and Foreign Policy in Ukraine', *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1994, vol. 109, no.1.

[87] P. D'Anieri, 'Nationalism and International Politics: Identity and Sovereignty in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict', Paper delivered at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 28-31 1997. Copy in author's possession.

[88] S.R. Burant, 'Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus', *Europe-Asia Studies*, November 1995, vol. 47, no. 7.

that Ukraine's foreign policy is not driven by such an exclusive and expansive ideology of nationalism, and is thus unlikely to provoke international conflict.[89]

D'Anieri focuses on Ukrainian-Russian relations in a theoretical context. He argues that national identity and nationalism are relevant explanatory variables in determining Ukrainian-Russian relations and that in mainstream international relations theory, little attention is given to issues of nationalism and national identity, instead focusing on models of international interaction based on rational action and material-structural factors. D'Anieri's queries whether international politics in the FSU can be analysed in a way that uses the insights of international relations theory without neglecting the context of nationalism and national identity. He argues that social-constructivist theories of international politics provide the necessary bridge between nationalism and international politics. He demonstrates how a constructivist perspective can shed light on the relationship between nationalism and international politics and his case study is Ukrainian-Russian relations. D'Anieri concludes that the Ukrainian-Russian 'conflict' is not driven simply by a conflict of interest, but by a conflict of identity, as both nations see their identities originating from the legacy of Kievan Rus. Thus, Ukraine's determination to be separate from Russia undermines Russia's conception of its own identity.[90]

Interplay between domestic factors and foreign policy

Foreign policy formation is a dynamic process and as such, foreign and domestic sources interact with each other (which is labelled by Rosenau as *linkage*).[91] This linkage can be exemplified where states with a high level of internal antagonism (i.e. ethnic, regional or economic) tend toward internal weakness in a low international threat environment.[92] Conversely, a hostile international situation tends to unite 'fractioned' states which allows for the pursuit of a greater degree of foreign policy cohesion. This, Nordberg argues, has been the case in Ukraine where a revanchiste Russia has helped to lessen internal divisive tendencies that stem from ethnic diversity and regionalism.[93]

Although much has been published on the domestic situation in Ukraine from a political, economic, and societal perspective, nothing substantial and comprehensive has been written on the domestic sources of foreign policy in terms of the interplay between the domestic institutions. This thesis will try to rectify the lacunae. Whereas studies have been conducted on the internal and external influences on Ukraine's security policy which primarily focus on factors which affect the strength of the state, studies on Ukraine's foreign policy have been limited. Moreover, research has tended to focus on the executive branch, specifically on the decisions taken by Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma. Not much has been written on the interplay between the legislative and executive branches of government. Scholars have focused their work on political leaders and their personalities and at first sight, this seems a logical approach, given the highly subjective nature of Ukraine's foreign policy. However, the interplay between the domestic institutions and the subsequent influence on foreign policy decisions is an under-researched area, yet it is absolutely crucial for our understanding of how the post-communist states of the FSU formulate their foreign policy. This gap will be addressed, particularly in Chapters Four and Six. But first, the following sections summarising the works on Ukraine's security policy will serve as a useful starting point.

Ukraine and European Security

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[89] Futado, p. 83.

[90] D'Anieri, pp. 2-3.

[91] James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, London: Pinter, 1980. See also [91] See James A. Kuhlman, 'A framework for viewing domestic and foreign policy patterns', in Charles Gati, *The International Politics of Eastern Europe*, New York: Praeger, 1976. In this work Kuhlman argues that one foreign policy decision will influence another through constant feedback.

[92] Michael C. Desch, 'War and strong states, peace and weak states?', International Organization, vol. 50, no. 2, Spring 1996.

[93] Marc Nordberg, 'Domestic factors influencing Ukrainian foreign policy', *European security*, vol. 7, no. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 64-65.

There are several scholars who write on the importance of Ukraine to European security but each uses a slightly different approach. Some focus on Ukraine's relations with NATO[94], some on Ukraine's geopolitical position between Russia and the West[95], and still others on Ukraine's role in the region, or a regional approach to European security.[96] Still, in other works, scholars have focused their attention on the domestic challenges to Ukraine's stability, and to what extent European security could be affected by an unstable Ukraine[97], and finally on developments in Russian-Ukrainian relations.[98] Surveyed below are some of the more prominent and widely cited works.

In *Keystone in the Arch*, Garnett produced the first comprehensive post-Cold War study of Ukraine's critical role in European security. He sees an independent and stable Ukraine as a crucial factor in the stability and sovereignty of the CEE states. Garnett warns that a NATO-centred view of Ukraine's security role misses this point: it is not whether Ukraine is eventually invited to join NATO, but how the US and other governments can help to ensure that Ukraine becomes the principal stabiliser among the other 'outs' of the enlargement process, and defines itself in a way that does not complicate an already difficult relationship with Russia.[99] He argues that the emergence of an independent Ukraine represents a great departure from the accustomed patterns of political life in CEE. The old patterns of empire may not vanish, and the small and medium sized states may not be guaranteed success, but it is clear that the chances for both propositions will greatly increase if Ukraine remains an independent, sovereign state.[100]

Garnett also makes several important points regarding the future of NATO-Ukraine relations that are worth noting.[101] Ukraine's NATO policy is first of all based on public hopes and private fears. The public hopes are to see a more stable and secure Europe in which NATO enlargement runs in parallel with closer strategic co-operation with those states which are not invited to join NATO. Most Ukrainian officials also understand the value of the NATO alliance and its role in European security and they support NATO as a counterweight to Russian power. NATO enlargement helps to preserve the breathing space that will enable Ukraine to consolidate its independence. The private fears centre on the creation of a new dividing line in Europe. He states that, 'this line should not be either a new Berlin Wall or the sole and defining security feature in the region but it is there and should be acknowledged.[103] The strategic nightmare of the Ukrainian leadership is that NATO

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[94] See Sherman Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch,: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment in Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997; S. Garnett, 'Reform, Russia, and Europe: The Strategic context of Ukraine's NATO Policy', in Stephen J. Blank (ed), *From Madrid to Brussels' Perspectives on NATO Enlargement*, Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1997; S. Garnett, 'Europe's New Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed), *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc, 1998; Tor Bukkvoll, 'Ukraine and NATO: The Politics of Soft Co-operation', *Security Dialogue*, September 1997, vol. 28, no. 3.; Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, June 1998, vol. 21, no. 2; Olga Alexandrova, 'The NATO-Ukraine Charter: Kiev's Euro-Atlantic Integration, *Aussenpolitik*, IV, 1997; and for a Ukrainian outlook on NATO-Ukraine relations, see article by the former Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States, H.E. Yuri Shcherbak, 'A Ukrainian Perspective: Implications for European Security Studies', in Lawrence R. Chalmer and Jonathan W. Pierce, *NATO 1997: Year of Change*, Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1998.

[95] Ian Brzezinski, 'The Geopolitical Dimension', *The National Interest*, Spring 1992, no. 27.; Nikolai A. Kulinich, 'Ukraine in the New Geopolitical Environment: Issues of Regional and Subregional Security' in Karen Dawisha (ed), *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Cambridge University Press, 1994 and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Ukraine's Balancing Act', *Survival*, Summer 1996, vol. 38, no. 2.

[96] See Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine and Regional Co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe', *Security Dialogue*, September 1997, vol. 28, no. 3.; O. Pavliuk, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: A Pillar of Regional Stability?', in Monika Wohlfeld (ed), 'The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', *Chaillot Papers* no. 26, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, June 1997.; and Ian J. Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis', *Survival*, Autumn 1993, vol. 35, no. 3.

[97] Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997; and S. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch;* James Sherr, 'Ukraine's New Time of Troubles', Sandhurst, England: CSRC, October 1998; and John Edwin Mzoz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1996, vol. 75, no.3.

[98] See for example James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapproachement?' The Black Sea Fleet Accords', *Survival*, Autumn, 1997; J. Sherr, 'Ukraine in European Security', *Brassey's Defence Yearbook*, December 1997.

[99] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. vii.

[100] Ibid, p. 5.

[101] Garnett, 'Reform, Russia, and Europe: The Strategic context of Ukraine's NATO Policy', p. 82.

[102] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. 99

[103] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. 99

enlargement will renew tensions and competition between Russia and the West, which will threaten Ukraine's relatively peaceful external environment and exacerbate internal tensions at the precise time when economic and political reforms are working to close them.

Kuzio and Garnett seem to share similar views about NATO-Ukraine relations. Both emphasise that the chances for furthering the development of Ukraine's pro-Europe choice is linked to its successes at state- and nation-building in terms of political and economic reform. Kuzio[104] argues that Ukraine's elites have made a strategic choice in favour of integration into European and Trans-Atlantic structures, and that these elites can be divided into 'romantic' and 'pragmatic' groups. The former supports a Baltic-style demand of immediate membership of NATO, while the latter opts for non-bloc status as a means of achieving eventual membership, or at least closer co-operation with NATO. Kuzio advances three possible foreign policy options for Ukraine:

1) to remain a self-declared non-bloc state;
2) to 'rejoin Europe' through membership of Trans-Atlantic institutions, or
3) to integrate into the Eurasian CIS in the manner of Belarus.

Kuzio argues that the first option is a stepping-stone to the second, while the third option can be ruled out altogether. Neutrality and non-bloc status have been utilised as a means to thwart Russian pressures on Ukraine to join the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty. Ukraine's self-declared neutrality has thus, successfully 'fulfilled its function to find a way out of the sphere of exclusive Russian influence made possible by the development of the Tashkent military bloc into a counterbalance to NATO.[105] In his conclusions, Kuzio claims that Ukraine's future application to join NATO will depend on three interrelated factors: the future evolution of NATO into a pan-European security structure, the success of Ukraine's four-pronged transformation process of democratisation, marketisation, and state- and nation-building, and finally, on developments in Russia. These three factors will determine whether Ukraine will drop its non-bloc status in favour of applying for NATO membership, thereby joining the Baltic States in hopes of becoming part of the second wave of applicants.[106]

In another important contribution on Ukraine's foreign and security policy, Bukkvoll draws attention to three features of independent Ukraine: the evolution of democracy, the potential of ethnic Russian-based anti-independence mobilisation, and the troubled Ukraine-Russia relationship.[107] He makes two main claims. First, although Ukraine is still only a democratising rather than a truly democratic state, developments in Ukraine demonstrate that the country is moving in the direction of a stable democracy. Second, a politically stable Ukraine at peace with its neighbours is fundamental to peace and stability in Europe.

Bukkvoll argues that since most Ukrainian elites see Russia as the main threat to Ukraine's security, the state's desire for closer co-operation with the West should be viewed as a 'balance of threat' policy.[108] According to then Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, 'there is currently no country or group of countries that could dare attack Ukraine militarily.[109]' Ukraine's strategic choice of the West is undoubtedly motivated by a fear that Russian revisionism or hegemonism might increase in the long run, yet Bukkvoll argues that this is only part of the equation. Security concerns are not the only factors that influence the direction of a state's foreign policy. Allying with the West has a much greater value to Ukraine than just being a reaction to the Russian threat. In both economic and political terms, the West is the winner of the Cold War and as Schweller points out states often ally with what they see as the wave of the future.[110] Whether or not to ally depends on the

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[104] Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership', p. 1.
[105] The Centre for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, 'Foreign and Security Policy: Ukrainian Expert Poll, October-December 1997'.
[106] Kuzio, 'Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership', p. 27.
[107] Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security,* op cit.
[108] Balancing being defined as allying with others again the prevailing threat. See Randall L. Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit', in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, London: MIT Press, 1995, p. 257.
[109] Interview with Borys Tarasyuk in *Transition*, 28 July 1995, as cited in Tor Bukkvoll, 'The Politics of Soft Co-operation', p. 367.
[110] Schweller, p. 273.

balance of interests or the costs a state is willing to pay to defend its values relative to the costs it is willing to pay to extend those values.[111]

Some states, Bukkvoll explains, are satisfied with what they have and they will pay a high price to defend it but only a limited amount to extend their values. Other states are unable or unwilling to defend even what they have, to say nothing of extending their values (Belarus would be an example). There are also those states that are willing to risk all that they have for what they could get (Hitler's Germany would be an example here). Then there are states that will pay high costs to secure the values that they have but are also willing to pay even more to extend their values. Bukkvoll argues that the Ukrainian political leadership's change of mindset regarding NATO enlargement as discussed in Chapter Five reflects such reasoning. Ukraine is willing to pay high costs to defend its independence and sovereignty and also appears willing to pay the costs of alienating Russia. This is demonstrated by its change from a policy of balancing between the West and Russia to becoming an associate of the West, even if this relationship has not yet been formalised (i.e. Ukraine's full membership in NATO).[112]

This 'balance of threat' versus balance of interest' scenario is useful in helping to explain why Ukraine has oriented its foreign policy more toward the West than toward Russia and the CIS, particularly when one considers the national identity question. Ukraine can only achieve a national identity that is separate from Russia and part of CEE by re-orienting itself towards Europe and away from Eurasia. Further, the national identity question may be seen as a stepping-stone to achieving two goals which are military and economic security.

Ukraine and regional co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe

A limited number of scholars have written on the development of Ukraine's relations with its neighbours[113], particularly with Poland. Polish-Ukrainian relations has been described as Europe's new strategic axis[114] and a pillar of regional stability.[115] Further, Polish-Ukrainian relations have been viewed by some as a testing ground between future 'ins' and 'outs' of the enlargement process (which makes perfect sense since Poland is now a NATO member and in the near future will join the EU). Both Pavliuk and Brzezinski argue that too little support has been given to the emerging 'strategic' partnership between Poland and Ukraine and this is a downfall of the West's approach to European security. Pavliuk argues that NATO and the EU in particular encourage Ukraine's regional co-operation through the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation (BSECO), and GUUAM.[116] The West should support regional co-operation and not view it as an obstacle to, but rather a supplement and precondition for European and Trans-Atlantic integration. Further, Pavliuk argues that the encouragement of regional ties should be maintained in parallel with the gradual process of enlargement as this would play a positive role in regional security. It should be realised that if Ukraine becomes isolated and unstable, the security of all states of the region is bound to be compromised. On the other hand, a stable Ukraine that is secured in its place in CEE should become a reliable partner of the West and an additional guarantor of regional security. The consolidation of Ukraine's position in the region should also facilitate the improvement of relations with Russia. In this regard, the West should see the benefits to viewing and treating Ukraine as part of CEE rather than as part of the CIS.[117]

The evolving relationship between Ukraine and Russia

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[111] Ibid, p. 276.
[112] Bukkvoll, 'Ukraine and NATO: The Politics of Soft Co-operation', p. 367.
[113] See Chapters Five and Six
[114] Ian J. Brzezinski, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis'.
[115] O. Pavliuk, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations: A Pillar of Regional Stability?"
[116] Sub-regional group consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.
[117] Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine and Regional Co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe', p. 359.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Ukraine and Russia have become the focus of scholarly attention as this relationship is viewed as a crucial factor in European security.[118] Scholars postulate that the interaction of the two states significantly affects the situation in the CIS, CEE, and holds important implications for the European continent as a whole. Lacking any practical experience as regards intra-state relations, Ukraine and Russia have learned much since 1991. However, despite the experience and frequent contacts on many levels, the two states have not yet developed a mutually respectful relationship. As Pavliuk explains, Ukraine and Russia continue to be involved in a complex process of negotiations trying to establish the basic principles and legal norms of bilateral relations.[119]

The Kuchma administration has concluded that relations with Russia should resemble 'equal, mutually beneficial, and respectful relations of two European states based on the norms of international law'.[120] Aside from this rather general approach to relations with Russia, Kyiv finds it difficult to come up with a coherent and enduring strategy towards Russia, which is in part due to the fact that Russia has yet to develop a clear concept of its policy towards Ukraine. Thus, scholars have maintained that after nearly a decade of Ukraine's independence, relations between Ukraine and Russia remain rather uncertain and unpredictable.

The term *rapprochement* has often described the state of Ukraine-Russia relations stemming from the two treaties concluded in May 1997.[121] At a meeting of a group of the top experts on Ukrainian-Russian relations in May 1997, a concept was coined which seems to be an accurate description of the evolving relationship between Ukraine and Russia- *perverse stability*.[122] Garnett noted that the relationship is not one of conflict, although it is conflictual at times. There has been amazing pragmatism when it counted, but there have also been summits where both sides conspired to make 'progress', although they knew that the agreements reached would only last a few weeks. Both countries seem to have understood the need to avoid a breakdown in their relations. Garnett states that the second theme to describe Ukrainian-Russian relations is 'muddling through'. The main obstacle in their relations, according to Garnett, is a 'crisis of expectations'. The Ukrainian side believes in the need to normalise this relationship, to make Russia like any other country. From the Russian perspective, Garnett believes that a 'fraternal Slavic compromise' is what is desired. Russia wants an *intimate* relationship with Ukraine, which is a step above a *normal* relationship.[123] With these conflicting goals, it is clear that a paradox exists in Ukrainian-Russian relations, which is not resolvable without a significant amount of compromise on both sides. As Pavliuk pointed out, in the short run, Ukrainian-Russian relations will remain uncertain and in this sense unstable, corresponding to their defined status of 'perverse stability'. Russia still wants to be a great power and wants to assert its great power status and Ukraine has been perceived as a key in securing this status, thus Russian pressure on Ukraine will continue.'[124]

ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This thesis will provide an original contribution to the existing literature both in terms of its conceptual and empirical content. Conceptually and theoretically, several different but

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[118] See Sherman Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, Chapters 2 and 3; S. Garnett, 'Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands', op cit.; Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, Chapter 4; James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine *Rapprochement*?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', Survival, Autumn 1997, vol. 39, no.3; Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Agenda', in *US Relations with Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe*, Seventeenth Conference, August 24-September 1, 1995, Congressional Program, vol. 10, no. 4, Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 1995.
[119] Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukrainian-Russian Relations: Current Problems and Future Prospects', Paper delivered at the conference 'Ukrainian National Security', Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 8-9 May 1997. Paper in author's possession.
[120] From the interview given by President Kuchma in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 20 February 1997, as cited in Pavliuk, 'Ukrainian-Russian Relations', p. 1.
[121] See Chapter Four of this thesis for the most detailed and comprehensive examination of these Treaties. See also Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine *Rapprochement*?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords', op cit.
[122] See the transcripts for the 'Roundtable discussion: The Future of Ukrainian-Russian Relations', Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 8-9 May 1997. Such experts as Sherman Garnett, Oleksandr Pavliuk, and Ian Brzezinski used this term to describe Ukrainian-Russian relations over the past six years.
[123] Ibid, Garnett's remarks.
[124] Ibid, Pavliuk's remarks.

complementary approaches in international relations literature will be utilised. Chapter Two, which is devoted to international relations theory and Ukraine's foreign policy, will discuss the realist/neo-realist theories and the theories of domestic politics. It is argued that neither theory is wholly appropriate to account for Ukraine's foreign policy behaviour. Thus, it is suggested that the theories on foreign policy-making which incorporate both international and domestic factors have greater explanatory ability *vis-à-vis* Ukraine's multi-vector foreign and security policy. It is suggested that one must look beyond this theoretical literature to an approach which would include both structural and behavioural/subjective factors such as the challenges of nation-building, party and bureaucratic politics, and personalities of leaders for a more accurate account of the forces which direct Ukraine's foreign policy.

As regards the structural approach, the literature which focuses on the emergence and maintenance of political, economic, and cultural frontiers and borders will be consulted, particularly works by Anderson and Bort[125], Rosenau, Prescott, O'Dowd, and Wilson.[126] I will be seeking to determine the extent to which geopolitical factors affect the foreign policy orientation of Ukraine and will suggest that a kind of 'frontier mentality' has emerged among Ukrainian policy-makers.

I will look in depth at one particularly important component of a frontier which is the buffer state[127] and will focus on the issue of sovereignty. Moreover, within this discussion of sovereignty I will also refer to the works of Jackson and his thesis on quasi-states and the Third World.[128] However, it should be clarified that Jackson did not have Ukraine or any of the post-communist states of Europe in mind in his analysis of quasi-states and negative sovereignty. Still, his conclusions on state behaviour and the problem of negative sovereignty in the Third World are in many ways applicable to the situation in the FSU. His analysis provides some very interesting insights into the behaviour of states having achieved limited or negative sovereignty which can be applied to the newly independent states of the FSU, Ukraine in particular, in this time of economic, political, and social transition. In addition, this approach should clarify some of the reasons why the foreign and security policies of Ukraine and other post-communist states are often inconsistent, thus making it difficult to predict their foreign policy in the medium to long term. By drawing on Jackson's study, it is hoped that a more nuanced or multi-directional impression of Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation will be attainable.

I will also discuss the transition processes that are taking place in Ukraine in terms of the government's efforts in consolidating its state- and nation-building. I will highlight the importance of building democratically-accountable institutions as well as the consolidation of the evolving Ukrainian national identity and will pinpoint the obstacles to achieving these goals, beginning with the manner by which Ukraine achieved its independence.[129]

Empirically speaking, most Western work on CEE in the past several years has been skewed towards the Visegrad and Baltic States. Those states which are considered to be front runners for integration into NATO and the EU and those which are have been pinpointed as Europe's most likely hot spots as regards the rise of ethnic and nationalist tensions (the Former Yugoslavia) have attracted the preponderance of scholarly attention. This project is a way of redressing the balance. Furthermore, although much has been published on the domestic situation in Ukraine from a political, economic, and societal level, comprehensive research on the domestic sources of Ukraine's foreign and security policy is still limited. Scholarly work has tended to focus on the foreign policy decisions reached by the Kravchuk and Kuchma's administrations, but has paid little attention to the internal dynamics at the formulation or institutional level. Also, scholarly work to this point has neither considered the influence of the presence of the East-West frontier on Ukraine's

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[125] Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort, *The Frontiers of Europe*, London and Washington: Pinter Publishers, 1998.
[126] See beginning of this chapter for full citations.
[127] John Chay and Thomas E. Ross, *Buffer States in World Politics*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986.
[128] By Third World Jackson refers to Africa, Asia, Latin America. Conceptual work advanced by Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, Independence, and the Third World*, op cit.
[129] See Chapter Two

foreign and security policy orientation, nor has it focused on the influence of the forces of globalisation, transnationalism, and interdependence on the frontier.

The development of Ukraine's relations with Western institutions, particularly with NATO and the EU, is another way that this thesis will make a substantive and analytical contribution to knowledge. I will discuss the *NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership,* Ukraine's response to this agreement, as well as resultant programmes. First, to understand NATO's intentions, it must be clarified whether the Charter was only intended to perpetuate some sort of *distinctiveness* and/or to reward Ukraine for not opposing the NATO enlargement process, or whether it was intended to be a stepping-stone to Ukraine's eventual *integration* into NATO? Second, another equally important issue stems from the domestic political situation in Ukraine. Because Ukrainian politicians on the left and right have different aspirations as far as the state's foreign policy (i.e. favouring the West versus Russia) President Kuchma has been under pressure to make concessions to both sides to the sake of his re-election. In addition, NATO is bound to be preoccupied with the enlargement process and this increased level of involvement with internal restructuring could have a significant affect on the quantity and quality of NATO-Ukraine relations in the coming years.[130]

Although not as dynamic as co-operation with NATO, I will also discuss the successes and challenges of Ukraine-EU relations that is based on the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 which created an overall framework and outlines specific areas of co-operation between the two parties. I also will analyse Ukraine's response to the PCA[131] as well as the EU's Common Strategy on Ukraine.[132] The original contribution to a considerable degree also stems from the many interviews conducted with NATO, EU, Ukrainian, and US officials, and also from the inclusion of various documents and reports (from governments, institutions, academia, and think tanks) that I have obtained and analysed during the course of my research.

Moreover, after the demise of the Soviet Union, there has been a qualitative change in regional relations in the external relations of states in CEE. For example, Russian-Ukrainian political, economic, military and other agreements are viewed through lenses that take into account the larger picture of developments in Europe as a whole, or in this case, Ukraine's relations with Western states and institutions. Conversely, Ukraine ties with Europe and the US must be viewed through the lenses of developments between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, part of the contribution that this project intends to make will be to demonstrate this point by highlighting the complexity of external relations in the region.

It is most important for the West to deepen its understanding of the geopolitical, economic, and foreign policy constraints on the Ukrainian government given the emergence of a new security arrangement in Europe. It suggested that the way to proceed is to focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy, particularly on the interplay between the executive and legislative branches of government. Further, scholarly research should try to establish concrete linkages between these relations and Ukraine's foreign policy agenda, thus paving the way for a more nuanced understanding of how 'quasi', post-communist states formulate their foreign policy. I would emphasise that very little research has been done in this area, yet it is crucial.

Further, when analysing the 'successes and failures' of Ukraine's foreign and security policy, it is necessary to distinguish between the achievements made in foreign/security policy and in diplomacy.[133] Using this approach allows for a more accurate picture of both the activities and policies of the Ukrainian government and also of the external response to those activities and policies. It is not enough to consider foreign policy achievements alone although no doubt they do tell us much about Ukraine. It is also important to take into account the quantity and quality of diplomatic activity of the Ukrainian government in order to understand where their priorities are and the degree of professionalism they demonstrate

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[130] These constraints on the development of the NATO-Ukraine partnership will be analysed in Chapters Five and Six.
[131] See Chapter Five on Kuchma's June 1998 *National Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the EU* which fixed full membership as a long-term goal.
[132] This document was adopted in December 1999 at the Council of Ministers meeting in Finland.
[133] See Chapter Six.

in international relations. This focus will tell us much about the inclusion or exclusion of Ukraine in the international community.

METHODOLOGY

In order to carry out the research for this project, a number of different sources, both primary and secondary, will be utilised.[134] In terms of primary sources, included are various charters and agreements including: *The NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership* (July 1997), Kuchma's decree on a *National Programme of Co-operation Between Ukraine and NATO for the Period up to year 2001* (November 1998), the EU's *Partnership and Co-operation Agreement* (1994) and *Common Strategy on Ukraine* (1999), *The NATO-Russia Founding Act* (May 1997), various agreements between Ukraine and the EU (1994-1999), The Black Sea Fleet Accords and the Friendship Treaty between Russia and Ukraine (May 1997), border agreements between Ukraine and Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Russia, and *The Constitution of Ukraine* (June 1996). Bilateral and multilateral political and economic agreements between Ukraine and its neighbours will also be considered

I have also referred to various speeches and interviews with high-ranking officials in Ukraine (such as Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma, the Foreign and Defence Ministers (Udovenko/Tarasyuk and Kuzmuk, respectively), and the Head of the National Security and Defence Council (Hryshenko/Horbulin/Marchuk) and the Chairman of the *Rada* (Moroz/Tkachenko). I have also considered speeches and interviews with NATO and EU officials and of the leaders of various states in the region[135] when they have discussed relations with Ukraine.

I have utilised the Lexis-Nexis on-line database which has greatly enhanced my ability to receive daily news reports and speeches from Ukraine. Further, I have had access to FBIS translated text in which I have received daily news reports from Ukraine and Russia. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's daily newsline on events in CEE, and *The Jamestown Monitor* have been additional excellent sources in terms of on-line daily information on Ukraine, as are Stratfor Global Intelligence Unit (GIU) reports. I have been able to use this information to track down various documents and speeches that are relevant to my research. Also, *The Ukrainian Weekly, Den,* and *The Kyiv Post* are good primary sources on developments in Ukraine and are available in English. *Keesings Record of World Event* and *Radio Free Europe Research Reports* are other sources that I have consulted. I have also used various OSCE documents concerning their activities in Ukraine, particularly their work in election monitoring. Finally, the Council of Europe's (CE) reports on Ukraine are relevant, specifically as regards Ukraine's progress in bringing the state's domestic legislation in line with CE regulations.

As mentioned previously interviews have been extremely important for this project. I have conducted interviews with Ukrainian, US, NATO, and EU officials during my two field research trips to Kyiv which were in March 1998 and October 1999, to Brussels in April 1998, March 1999, and October 1999, and during conferences on European security held in Ukraine, Greece, Washington, DC, New York, Los Angeles, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and in Cambridge, MA.

During the course of conducting interviews, I have spoken with Oleg Kokoshinski from the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, Grigory Nemirya from the Centre for European Studies at the Institute of International Relations, Kyiv, Ukraine, Natalie Melnyczuk, Director of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, Olexandr Potekhin, Director of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, and Dmitry Koublitsky, President of the Europe Foundation, all of whom are in Kyiv.

As regards interviews with NATO officials, I have twice interviewed Ambassador Robert Hunter, the former US Permanent Representative to NATO (who was involved NATO-Ukraine relations while at NATO) and from NATO's international staff I have spoken with Chris Donnelly, Special Advisor to the Secretary General for Central and Eastern Europe, Susan Pond and George Bachman (NATO's Military Liaison Officers to

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[134] See Thesis bibliography.
[135] Poland and Belarus in particular

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Ukraine), Dr. Marco Carnovale, member of the Political Affairs Division of NATO (who is involved in the development of NATO-Ukraine relations), and John Lough, Information Officer for Central and Eastern Europe. Also at NATO, I have spoken with members of the US Mission including Bill Krug and John Hoag. From the Mission of Ukraine to NATO, I have interviewed Kostiantyn Morozov, Deputy Head of the Mission, and Oksana Petriaieva, Third Secretary Liaison Officer.

From the EU, I have had numerous conversations with Dr. Fraser Cameron and Klaus Schneider of DG1A of the European Commission, Brussels (both of whom have been directly involved in the development of EU-Ukraine relations).

Interviews with officials in the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were conducted with Oleksandr Chalyi, First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Andriy Veselovskiy, Head of Policy Planning and Analysis, Vladyslav Yasniuk, Head of the NATO Division, and Oleksandr Shevchenko and Oleh Ventskovsky, both Ukrainian Liaison Officers to the European Union, Brussels. In the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence I had the opportunity to speak with Colonel Leonid Golopatyuk of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and Sergey Khomchenko, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies.

Finally, as regards bilateral (military) relations between the US and Ukraine, I have spoken extensively with Colonel Robert Hughes, Defence Attaché at the US Embassy in Kyiv, LTC Frank Morgese from the US European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, and Major Joe Knowles who is the Co-ordinator for the State Partnership Programme for Ukraine. Further, I have informally discussed bilateral relations between the US and Ukraine with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5, Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Division) including Joshua Spero and Major Harald Buchholz. Interview partners were carefully selected from various organisations, institutes, and ministries as to ensure that wide-ranging perspectives and viewpoints are included in this project. Interviews were used to confirm or clarify information found in both primary and secondary sources.[136]

Further, I have obtained interesting and informative reports, papers, and other information from various institutes and think tanks in Kyiv including the Centre for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (CPCFPU), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the International Centre for Policy Studies, the Ukraine Centre for Independent Political Research (UCIPR), the Institute for Statehood and Democracy, the East-West Institute, and the Europe Foundation.

CHAPTER BREAKDOWN

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
This chapter sets the conceptual and theoretical framework for the ensuing empirical chapters and focuses on the issue of Ukraine's sovereignty in different contexts. The structural and behavioural aspects of international relations theory are discussed and it is argued that in the case of Ukraine and the other post-communist states of the FSU, scholars must consider both of these aspects to obtain an accurate understanding of how their foreign and security policies are formulated and what issues are able to sustain or change them. The chapter begins with a discussion of international relations theory and foreign policy from two perspectives: the realist/neo-realist approach and the domestic politics school. The first part of the chapter also focuses on the structural aspects of Ukraine's foreign policy and draws on literature on frontiers and buffer states. The second part of the chapter is concentrated on the behavioural aspects of Ukraine's foreign policy such as nationalism, national identity and nation-building, party politics, and personalities of leaders. I also explore the manner by which Ukraine achieved its independence, and argue that because there was a mere transfer of authority from Moscow to Kyiv, the process of state-, institution- and nation-building is very slow. There was neither mature institutionalised

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[136] Secondary sources utilised are enumerated in the literature review section of the thesis introduction.

polities prior to independence, nor was there a prolonged struggle for liberation which engendered a sense of community and nationhood.

Chapter Three: Broad Developments in Ukrainian Domestic Politics: 1991-1999
This chapter discusses the institutional developments and legacies which have influenced the formation of the Ukrainian nation-state and serves as a mechanism to allow the reader to become familiar with the institutional framework and the internal political forces of Ukraine. The chapter surveys legal and political developments in Ukraine post 1991 as well as the political forces and foreign policy perspectives of those forces. The first section surveys the legal and political developments since independence in terms of state-building including the distribution of power of the executive and legislative branches and the foreign policy perspectives of those branches. Also included in this section is a survey of the progress made in economic reforms and the West's response to that progress. The second section focuses on the regional dimension in Ukrainian politics, ranging from ethnic, social, and historical variations. It is argued that despite the presence of forces that seek to undermine the state-building process, there is not much cause for concern. The linguistic and cultural differences in Ukrainian society are not indicative of a clearly divided Ukraine. The third section focuses on challenges and paradoxes associated with the creation of a Ukrainian national identity and argues that the national identity question is also strongly linked to the mode by which Ukraine achieved its independence and the scarcity of myths, traditions, and national heroes with which to identify. Continuing on from points made in the previous chapter, it is argued in this chapter that Ukraine's foreign policy is a balance between structural/systemic and domestic factors. It is the task of this chapter to identify those domestic factors that appear to have the most profound influence on Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation.

Chapter Four: Policy-making and Shifting Political Orientations in Ukraine's Domestic Politics
This chapter focuses on the dynamics of political evolution in Ukraine's domestic politics, specifically on how this evolution affects Ukraine's foreign policy. The issues and outcomes of the parliamentary and presidential elections will be analysed extensively. The analysis will seek to determine what those election results tell us about Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation. The chapter will highlight three features of Ukrainian foreign policy: evolution, pragmatism, and continuity. Also discussed is the leftwards evolution of the national idea in the sense that nearly all of Ukraine's prominent politicians support the notion of independence. Further, the Ukrainian left has tended towards a more moderate approach to foreign policy and this has been exemplified both by the more centrist approach of the left and by the rise of centrist parties. Although this chapter argues that Ukraine's foreign policy has been consistent since independence, it will be shown that foreign policy is highly subjective and as such, has the potential to vary according to the wishes of the individuals wielding power. This is due to the fact that Ukraine does not have clearly defined national interests that have been sustained over time.

Chapter Five: Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy Orientation: 1991-1999
This chapter focuses on Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy and surveys the state's political, economic, and military relations with the West, Russia, and in the region. The success, failures, and trends of Ukraine's relations with key Western political and economic institutions, specifically NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the IMF and World Bank are discussed in the first section of this chapter. Section two examines Ukraine's relations with Russia and the CIS, paying particular attention to the political, economic, and border agreements signed. Section three focuses on Ukraine's regional relations with the Visegrad group, CEFTA, CEI, BSECO and GUUAM. One of the main arguments of this chapter is that regional co-operation in CEE is a very important element of state- and nation-building for the FSU. Regional co-operation is crucial to the successful construction of a new European security system which should not be underestimated or overlooked as NATO enlarges eastwards.

Chapter Six: Re-defining the Frontier of Europe: Frontier Dynamics and Ukraine's Foreign Policy Orientation

This chapter analyses the extent to which the emergence of a new East-West frontier affects Ukraine's multi-vector foreign and security policy and discusses both the internal and external factors in Ukraine that serve as barriers to the development of a predictable, consistent, and clear foreign policy orientation. A thematic approach is used and the various interwoven themes make several assertions. First, Ukraine's foreign policy is highly subjective. Second, Ukraine has followed a 'third way' in its foreign relations, a course which lacks substance, goals, and direction. Third, because Ukraine is geopolitically and domestically constrained, the government has no choice but to continue its multi-vector foreign policy of integration with Europe, co-operation with Russia and the CIS, and participation in regional organisations, even though this policy can be detrimental to a state's international standing and prestige. The chapter is divided into two main sections and the first section defines and examines the frontier concept and seeks to demonstrate how the East-West frontier in Europe affects Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation. Section two is more analytical and places the debate in a wider context by surveying the 'successes' and 'failures' of Ukraine's foreign policy and diplomacy by examining of the influences of the processes of globalisation on frontiers.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

Summary of findings

Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

When attempting to analyse the foreign policy of any given polity, scholars have tended to view the process as pragmatic and rational. It is assumed that the foreign policy decisions reflect geopolitical realities and stem first and foremost from clearly defined national interests. While it is certainly true that most states pursue what they deem as rational foreign policies, the parameters that define what is and what is not rational are flexible and elusive. In addition to objective or structural factors such as geostrategic position and economic conditions which do undoubtedly influence a state's foreign policy orientation, there are also broad subjective or behavioural criteria which guide a state's foreign policy choices and thus, ought to be incorporated into the equation. Even in the West, arbitrary factors such as moral and cultural values and national identity often underlie many aspects of foreign policy. Given the prevalence of the 'rational' model of policy formation, 'irrational' concepts such as nationalism and national identity, as Prizel suggests, are often shunned by modern scholars. On the rare occasion that these concepts are used to explain a given policy, it has tended to be viewed as an outburst of irrationality that will pass once rationality returns. For example, such an explanation has been given for the behaviour of Germany in both World Wars.[1]

There has been a tendency in recent times to avoid discussing nationalism, national identity, and the power of ethnicity because these concepts have been associated with ethnonationalism, violence, and irrationality. However, as Prizel has argued, the interaction between national identity and foreign policy is a key element in both established and nascent polities, and this interaction is particularly important in newly emerging and re-emerging states since nationalism and national identity are often the main, if not the only forces binding societies together.[2]

Still, structural factors such as geopolitics continue to play a decisive role in Ukraine's foreign and security policy. Issues such as the creation of a new division or *frontier*[3] between Russia and the West are of utmost importance to Ukraine, which often feels caught in the middle as either a buffer or a non/semi-aligned state. Thus, this chapter will explore the implications for Ukraine as a buffer state or a country geopolitically situated between two or more regional or global powers with the task of maintaining the peace between them. This discussion will rely on the geopolitical literature on buffer states of the past and present and will investigate the extent to which Ukraine is destined to assume this role between Russia and the West. Ensuing chapters will discuss the subsequent effects on Ukraine's foreign policy orientation (the multi-vector foreign policy) as a result of the state's geopolitical location.

The purpose of this chapter is to set the conceptual and theoretical framework for later empirical chapters by focusing on the issue of Ukraine's precarious sovereignty and independence and on the construction of its national and state identity. It is the contention of this thesis that in the case of Ukraine and other post-communist states one must consider both structural and behavioural aspects of international relations theory for an accurate understanding of how their foreign and security policies are formulated. The structural section will focus on political and geographical considerations, including external and domestic factors, as an explanation of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. The behavioural section will highlight the subjective element of Ukraine's foreign policy and will also discuss nationalism and national identity factors as an explanation for decisions that have appeared to be 'irrational' in Ukraine's foreign and security policy.

Beginning with a general discussion of international relations theory this chapter will consider Ukrainian foreign policy from two perspectives. The first perspective will review the realist/neo-realist approach and the second will focus on domestic politics theory. It will be argued that the structural or realist explanation does not fully account for Ukraine's

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[1] Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, see his introduction and especially pp.1-3.
[2] Ibid, p. 2.
[3] See Chapters One and Six for a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the frontier concept.

foreign policy behaviour. Moreover, the literature from the domestic politics school is not entirely appropriate either. Therefore, it is suggested that the current theories on foreign policy-making which takes into account both domestic and international factors have greater explanatory power *vis-à-vis* Ukraine's geopolitical situation. However, because Ukraine's foreign policy is destined to reflect a combination of international and domestic factors, what is needed is a truly comprehensive theory which incorporates international or structural factors and domestic issues of state-building, but also includes subjective or behavioural factors such as nationalism, national identity, nation-building, party politics, and personalities of leaders.

TWO THEORETICAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Realist/Neo-realist schools

The prevailing theory of what motivates nations to adopt a specific course of action in international relations has historically been that of the Realist school, which asserts that a state's foreign policy is driven by the distribution of power among states in the international system. This short review is not exhaustive but representative and limited to the 'classics' of realist and neo-realist theory and the implications for Ukraine from this viewpoint.

While scholars stress different specific factors, mainstream analyses of the forces shaping international behaviour generally agree that the state is a unitary and 'rational' actor. Kissinger, among others, stresses the balance of power among states as the primary determinant of a state's behaviour in foreign relations.[4] The nation-state is the primary unit of analysis for realists and neo-realists. Just like individuals in Hobbes' state of nature, states aim to survive in a competitive, anarchic and hostile environment where there is no overarching authority to dispense justice or ensure stability. Without such an authority, states must resort to their own resources or capabilities in order to survive and thus survival is ensured primarily by the expansion of the state's military power. States will tend to rely on military threats or force more than diplomacy or co-operation in order to increase their relative power.

Waltz modified the classical realist position by suggesting that states are not always continuously pursuing greater power but merely survival. States are like-units and they perform similar functions. Since all states desire security but have differing degrees of power, much of the character of international relations is determined by the distribution of power among these like-units.[5] States that are extremely powerful will attract allies or force other alliances to form in opposition to balance that power. The anarchic system now assumes a certain structure that is determined by the number of powerful states in the system. The pre-WWI and inter-war years have been characterised by Waltz as an unstable multipolar balance of power and the post-war years as a highly stable bipolar structure. Thus, the two superpowers continuously competed to balance/deter one another and eventually co-operated to thwart potential challengers. Weaker states learned from successful ones to build up their military forces and to seek to ally with the great powers for the sake of their security and ultimately for their survival.

Realists and neo-realists postulate that the distribution of power among states or the structure of the international system is the single most important determinant of a state's behaviour. Issues related to domestic politics, economics, nationalism and national identity are not the crucial issues because all states are basically rational and pursue the same goal which is survival. Chudowsky[6] argues that when discussing Ukraine's security from a realist point of view its domestic problems matter only to the extent to which they interfere with its ability to make rational foreign policy decisions or interfere with capacity for self-help or its ability to build a strong state and army. A greater determinant of Ukraine's geopolitical

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[4] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.
[5] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.
[6] See Victor Chudowsky's dissertation, 'Ukrainian foreign policy in the Kuchma era: Domestic and international determinants', University of Connecticut, 1998 (Introduction).

position is the structure of the international system in which it is operating and, now that the Cold War has ended, this structure is in a state of flux.

It is a matter of debate among realists as to whether the current international structure is seen to be bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar. Waltz argues that the world is in a state of 'altered bipolarity' because Russia is still a nuclear power that no other state can challenge. However, the international positions of Japan, Germany, and China are improving.[7] Mearsheimer suggests that the world or at least Europe is multipolar,[8] while Layne argues that the US is now a single hegemon; however, this situation cannot be sustained because other states will inevitably balance against unipolarity.[9]

The emergence of a new European security structure in Europe is of crucial importance to Ukraine. In realist terms, Ukraine is considered to be a 'secondary state'. Its power does not equal that of Russia, Germany, or the US. As a secondary state interested in its maintaining its survival and security, Ukraine will be forced to ally with the US and/or Germany, perhaps through NATO or alternatively with Russia. Waltz asserts that secondary states will balance against the stronger power.[10] Using this logic, Ukraine should then balance against NATO by joining with Russia because NATO is the stronger of the two. However, the Ukrainian executive has been vehemently opposed to joining a military bloc with Russia and has instead pursued a pro-West policy masked by a non-bloc or neutral foreign policy which is essentially 'multi-vectoral'. Thus, one can conclude that Waltz's logic is not accurate for Ukraine.

Walt disagrees with Waltz's assertion that power distribution alone determines alliances.[11] Instead, states balance against their greatest perceived threat and not against the states with the most power. Therefore, because Russia is Ukraine's greatest perceived threat, Ukraine should balance against Russia by joining NATO. However, there are instances where states 'bandwagon'- that is, they join an alliance with their greatest perceived enemy. Small states bandwagon for several reasons: 1) they may want to share in the spoils of their new ally's military victory; 2) they seek appeasement in the hopes that their new ally will attack other states; 3) they want to ally with states with great power and offensive capabilities; 4) they are within close geographical proximity to the great power; 5) they are weak; and 6) they are unlikely to be able to join any other alliance.[12]

Some of Walt's explanations are true for Ukraine. Firstly, Ukraine geographically borders Russia. Secondly, Ukraine is a weak state unable to join the NATO alliance, although it could join a military alliance with Russia. It is also possible to find evidence of bandwagoning on the part of Ukraine such as a continued Russian military presence in Ukraine's territory in Crimea (the Black Sea Fleet); the formation of joint financial-industrial groups with Russia; and Ukraine's rather strong opposition, along with Russia, to NATO's military action in Kosovo. However, Ukraine has not supported the formation of any military agreements within the framework of the CIS and has continuously opposed a deepening of economic and political ties within the Russia-dominated forum. Clearly, this is an example of realist thinking on the part of the Ukrainian executive. Ukraine is balancing against Russia as this is the direction where the perceived threat is coming from. However, given Ukraine's geographic position, weakness, and size relative to Russia there are pressures upon Ukraine to bandwagon.

In conclusion, we cannot determine from Waltz's or Walt's arguments as to with whom Ukraine should seek to ally. Further, neither theory advances the possibility of a non-bloc or neutral stance as a means for a state to secure its own survival. Also, polities strive to enhance their power, wealth, and prestige in the international system, but there exists no objective definition of 'national interest' on which to agree. Moreover, realist/neo-realist

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[7] Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security,* Vol. 18, no.2, Fall 1993, pp. 44-79.

[8] John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (eds), *Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security,* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, pp. 78-130.

[9] Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (eds), *Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security,* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, pp. 130-178.

[10] Waltz, pp. 126-7.

[11] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances,* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987, p. 5.

[12] See also dissertation by Victor Chudowsky, introductory chapter.

theories overlook the psychological aspect of foreign policy. As Weber observes, some polities have been willing to sacrifice a great deal of wealth for an undertaking that may not enhance the state's economy or security but will satisfy psychological needs. He states that:

> Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the world images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interests.[13]

Furthermore, neo-realist theory fails to answer several crucial questions: should Ukraine balance against the stronger alliance or power? Should it side with Russia against NATO? Should Ukraine balance against the greater threat to its security (with NATO and against Russia)? But what if Ukraine opts to balance against the greater threat but is not accepted into the NATO alliance and is not even given the credible prospect of joining in the future? Moreover, should Ukraine seek to bandwagon with Russia? Its geographic proximity and relative weakness in power suggests that it should. However, Ukraine has done everything possible to ensure that the CIS is a relatively loose coalition or a glorified talking shop with no real power (see Chapter Five), which is exemplified through its refusal to sign both the CIS Charter and the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty. Neo-realist theory, while presenting a clear set of foreign and security policy options, does not fully explain the foreign policy choices Ukraine has clearly made - the implementation of a multi-vector foreign policy which pursues integration with the West even at the risk of exacerbating tensions with Russia.

Finally, the realist and neo-realist perspective is problematic because it does not recognise the domestic political situation of a given state as a key factor in determining that state's foreign policy orientation. It is argued in this thesis that domestic factors, in addition to the external environment, must be taken into account and closely monitored just as the external environment is for a clear and accurate understanding of the range of factors which influence Ukraine's foreign and security policy.

Domestic politics school

While realism and neo-realism have reflected the core approaches to the study of international relations, the domestic politics school is generally presented as a deviation from the realist theory. The domestic politics school suggests that political phenomena within countries determines a state's foreign policy contrary to the realist view that the external international system ultimately determines a state's foreign policy. Thus, factors such as domestic groups, social ideas, the character of constitutions, economic constraints, and historical and social tendencies are worth studying because they help to determine a state's behaviour and its reaction to events external to it.[14]

Rosecrance and Stein have discussed the compatibility and applicability of the realist and domestic schools to present day international relations and have pointed out the realist view that domestic factors or pressures are generally seen to be frictional forces that impede the operation of systemic and realist determinants. A country that allows its domestic political imperatives to chart what they term its 'grand strategy' will soon find its international position undermined (as Ukraine's position on Kosovo has demonstrated- See Chapters Five and Six). If a state chooses to pursue 'moral causes' in its international relations it will waste its national substance. Moreover, if a state spends its limited resources on domestic welfare, thereby neglecting a fundamental external challenge to its international position it will not endure for long.[15] They argue that the study of grand strategy that deals with what influences and determines national policy choices for war and peace is an ideal

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[13] Quoted in Prizel, p. 15.
[14] See Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, (eds)., *Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy,* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993, p. 5.
[15] Ibid, p. 8.

arena in which to examine realist approaches. Rosecrance and Stein agree with Keohane and Nye[16] that domestic factors have been somewhat neglected as determinants of grand strategy and they suggest that ideas, institutions, and interdependence continue to play an important role in shaping national policy. Without confuting traditional theory, they suggest that developments in past and present national decisions are compatible with a different approach which is that of the domestic politics school. Finally, it appears that nations in ordinary situations have often behaved more co-operatively than the theory of structural realism dictates and most of the time without suffering as a result.[17] For example, Ukraine has actively sought to improve its relations in the region through its ties to and membership in several regional organisations including CEI, CEFTA, BSECO, GUUAM[18], as well as through its 'strategic partnership' with Poland, even though there is no direct military threat from Russia (though there may be an indirect one).

Foreign policy, nationalism, and the domestic politics school

With regard to Ukraine, most scholarly work on the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy has focused on nationalism, national identity, and nation-building, which this chapter argues is not an accurate approach for the study of Ukraine's foreign policy. Scholars have relied on some of the following definitions of nationalism and national identity in their analyses.

According to Snyder, nationalism is an internally generated force that can grow or be dampened through a state's interaction with the outside environment. Thus, both international and domestic politics affect nationalism and nationalism affects both international and domestic politics.[19] Connor in a rather simple way defines *nation* as a group of people who believe that they are related by ancestry. It is the largest group that shares that belief'.[20] Connor also explains that a nation exists when a significant number of people form a community and consider themselves to be a nation and behaving as if they were one.[21] Renan is more detailed in his conception of a nation which he defines as:

> A grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of
> sacrifices which have been made in the past and those
> that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past,
> renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed,
> the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue their
> communal life.[22]

Other scholars are more specific as to the attributes necessary for nationhood. Smith ascribes that nations also include a mass public culture, legal rights, and duties for all citizens.[23] Moreover, other scholars stress the importance of homogeneity (or unity) and national will.[24]

Nationalism, in a more negative tone, has been defined as both a collective and individual paranoia. As a collective paranoia, manifested nationalism results from fear and most of all from the loss of individual consciousness. Thus, collective paranoia is simply an

[16] See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Boston: Little, Brown, Inc., 1977 and Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

[17] Rosecrance and Stein, pp. 12-13.

[18] Central European Initiative (CEI), Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation (BSECO), and Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUUAM).

[19] Jack Snyder, 'The New Nationalism: Realist Interpretations and Beyond, in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, (eds), *Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy,* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993. As cited in Victor Chudowsky's dissertation, 'Ukrainian foreign policy in the Kuchma era: Domestic and international determinants', University of Connecticut, 1998.

[20] Walker Connor, 'From tribe to nation', *History of European Ideas*, 1991, vol. 13, no. 1-2, p. 6.

[21] See Walker Connor, 'When is a nation?' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1, January 1990; and W. Connor, 'A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a ...*'Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 1, no. 4, October 1978.

[22] Ernest Renan, 'Que'est-ce qu'une nation?' reproduced in *The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in its Meanings and Developments*, Louis L. Snyder (ed), Princeton: D. Van Norstand, 1964, pp. 9-10, as cited in Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, p. 12.

[23] A.D. Smith, *National Identity*, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 14.

[24] Jack S. Plano and Roy Oltan, *The International Relations Dictionary*, New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1969, p. 119.

accumulation of individual paranoias.[25] Kohn sees nationalism as a substitute for the decline of religion[26], while Gellner, considers cultural bonds and linguistic links in a highly literate modern society as the key to its national assertiveness.[27]

Perhaps the simplest, broadest definition of national identity was advanced by Moore as 'membership in a group that can save an individual from the anxieties of carving out his own meaningful place in the world, especially when the realistic chances for doing so are tiny'.[28] A polity's national identity is a result of how it interprets its history which he defines as the beliefs and perceptions that accumulate over time and constitute a society's collective memory. National identities vary in terms of both intensity and origin. Nations may derive their identity from a shared language, religion, geographic location, cultural practices, collective memory, or myth of common ancestry. Since the memories of individuals are selective and inconsistent, the national identity is subject to which layer at any given time has the custodianship over the collective memory. Prizel argues that a transfer of custodianship of a polity's collective memory will often lead to a fundamental re-definition of the 'national idea', and with it the parameters of a polity's national interests.[29]

The development of a Ukrainian national identity since its independence has been a significant challenge. In Marxist-Leninist philosophy and in social studies in the USSR there was no place for research into questions of national identity, national characteristics and national ways to run the economy. Marx stated that 'workers have no fatherland' and after the proletarian world revolution, with its aim of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat and destroying the bourgeoisie and private property, all nationalities would eventually 'merge' into one. From a theoretical viewpoint, Marxism was a kind of reductionism that reduced the great diversity of history, politics, and rights to a dialectic of a few category pairs: bourgeoisie-proletariat, private-public ownership, and so on.[30] Thus, questions of national identity are awkward for Marxist theory and practice and the absence of a theoretical description of nationality, national originality, and national psychology has meant that there is no basis for such issues to be dealt with or resolved.

In the early 1990s, scholarly analysis of nationalism and national identity focused a great deal of attention on the domestic situation in Ukraine which led to much speculation as to whether the Ukrainian state and nation would survive since nationalism was seen as *the* driving force in the development of Ukraine's foreign policy. Bleak pictures were painted by Western observers such as Morrison as regards the 'Pereyaslav complex' and conflicting interpretations of history[31] and in Rumer's assessment of Ukraine's security situation which was based on his study of Ukraine's domestic politics.[32] The negative depiction of Ukraine's internal situation can be accounted for by examining the policies of the nation's highly nationalist elite, virtually all of whom are former Communist Party officials which have allied with a small group of nationalist intellectuals from western Ukraine. Using a 'diversionary tactics of war' argument, Rumer asserted that this same group of elites used the perceived Russian threat as a convenient scapegoat for the nation's severe economic and political problems.[33]

The above analyses are problematic for many reasons not least because there is not one single type of nationalism; but many different *nationalisms* that must be considered in order to assess which ones are more likely to bring about conflict. Van Evera looks at these different types of nationalisms and concludes the most dangerous are those which seek the recovery of diasporas and oppress minorities within their states.[34] Furtado argues that because of Ukraine's promotion of nationalism along civic rather than ethnic lines, nationalism is not very strong and is thus not a driving force which will lead to the collapse

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[25] Danilo Kis, 'On nationalism', in Mark Thompson (ed), *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1992, p. 337.

[26] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*, New York: Macmillan, 1945m pp. 188-9.

[27] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983.

[28] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1978, p. 488.

[29] Prizel, pp. 14-15.

[30] Volodymyr Zviglyanich, 'Ukrainian identity and challenges of modernity', *The Jamestown Monitor*, 3 March 1999, no. 5, part 3.

[31] John Morrison, 'Pereyaslav and After: The Russian-Ukrainian Relationship' *International Affairs, 1993*, vol. 69.

[32] Eugene Rumer, 'Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?', *Foreign Policy, 1994*, vol. 96.

[33] As argued in Victor Chudowsky's dissertation, introductory chapter.

[34] Steven Van Evera, 'Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,' *International Security, 1994, v*ol. 18, no. 4.

of the Ukrainian state (see Chapter One). However, as Furtado and Prizel explain, what has caused problems for the state is nationalism for the sake of adherence to the legitimacy of the state instead of an ethnic group.[35] In this case, the state institutions are the focus of national identity and loyalty and while 'official' nationalism can be seen on a global level it is particularly evident in a young state going through the processes of state- and nation-building. Official nationalism can thus be exemplified by introducing a Ukrainian currency, declaring the Ukrainian language as the official state language, requiring governmental and military personnel to take an oath of allegiance to the state, and obstructing the integration process in the CIS. Therefore, as argued by Chudowsky and others, it is civic nationalism which has caused the Ukrainian executive to take a defensive line on sovereignty and this defensiveness has caused problems with Russia and the West, particularly when it has led to a series of crises around the issue of nuclear weapons. It is Ukrainian state-building and the search for security and not nationalism *per se* which is causing instability in Ukraine. It is also important to recognise that as regards state-building, Ukraine achieved its independence by a mere transfer of authority from the central authorities (Moscow) to the periphery (Kyiv). Ukraine did not have in place the necessary state institutions which had both the experience and resources to govern effectively in both domestic and foreign policy. This topic is discussed more extensively in the second half of this chapter.

An important question to consider as regards the domestic politics school is does the perspective only account for issues of nationalism and national identity as driving forces in foreign policy making? What about additional behavioural factors such as party politics, personalities of leaders, and other internal dynamics within the government itself? Chudowsky takes some of these questions into consideration. He argues that in Ukraine as well as in other post-communist states, foreign policy is directed and dictated by the interests of the state elite. Ukraine's foreign policy is the product of domestic as well as geopolitical forces and is intertwined with a domestic political struggle between the state elite and the Ukrainian left and nationalist right. But Chudowsky tends to downplay the importance of domestic factors in comparison with circumstances external to the state and he argues that domestic factors are at best a latent force in Ukrainian politics which prevents the state leadership from joining an alliance with Russia. However, this thesis argues that perhaps it is not only international political developments which drives Ukrainian foreign policy, but rather it is the conscious fear of ending up in a permanent grey zone of security in Europe or on the wrong side of a new East-West division or frontier. From this perspective, it is not difficult to see why the development of relations with Western states and institutions has been a top priority of the Ukrainian executive since its independence and why Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy became the official foreign policy stance.

Subtelny goes a step further than Chudowsky as he discounts nationalism almost completely as a factor in Ukrainian politics and foreign policy.[36] As he correctly points out, the new state arose as a result of the collapse of the USSR during the August 1991 coup and not out of a heroic national liberation struggle. Consequently, there is an absence of nationalist heroes and martyrs with which society could identify. Following independence, former President Kravchuk failed in his attempts to construct a 'father of the people' cult of personality around himself because the nationalists were divided and corrupted over their ties to the party elite. The Ukrainian state cannot overtly define Russia as an enemy or as a threat because of the large minority of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine and also because of historical and cultural ties.

Subtelny, Prizel, Furtado and others who have focused their work on civic or official nationalism in Ukraine have been more accurately able to explain why such nationalism has caused conflict with Russia. It is primarily because Ukraine is *separating* from Russia and is forming a new state. Because a large minority of the population are ethnic Russians, the Ukrainian state elite cannot seek legitimacy on ethnic grounds, but instead must focus on gaining legitimacy on civic grounds. Ethnic nationalism and inter-ethnic hatred is a poor explanation because as Chudowsky has argued, much of the Ukrainian elite and a great

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[35] See Charles Furtado, and Ilya Prizel, 'Ukraine's Foreign Policy as an Instrument of State-Building', in John Blaney (ed), *The Successor States to the USSR* , Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995.

[36] Orest Subtelny, 'Imperial Disintegration and Nation-State Formation: The Case of Ukraine, in John Blaney, (ed), *The Successor States to the USSR,*, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995, pp. 188-189.

majority of the population want a close relationship with Russia. However, the executive under Kuchma has sought to establish this relationship on the basis of two equally sovereign states.[37] Thus, the work that has focused on the nationalist influence on Ukrainian foreign policy is not adequate and assumes that the Ukrainian leadership is highly nationalist. There is little evidence to back such a claim. Within the domestic politics school, it is more appropriate to take into account the subjective factors such as personalities of leaders, party politics, the state structure and bureaucracy, as well as traditional focal points such as the impact of the international environment on the domestic political agenda. As has been discussed in this section, neither realism nor theories on nationalism and foreign policy within the domestics politics school is appropriate for Ukraine. One must, therefore, look to other models that have sought to bring together these two schools in terms of incorporating both structural and behavioural factors.

A Model for Ukraine

Due to the wide range of both international and domestic factors that influence Ukraine's foreign policy orientation, a 'new' theoretical approach is necessary. As stated previously, such an approach must incorporate external factors as well as domestic issues of state-building, but also take into account broad subjective factors.

Scholars studying international relations theory have considered ways to incorporate the realist approach which asserts that state behaviour is determined by both the distribution of power and the structure of the international system and the domestic politics school which suggests that internal factors are the primary determinants of state behaviour. International developments dictate the way states ideally should respond as neo-realist theory tells us. However, whether or not a state is able to adequately respond to these challenges is a matter left to the study of domestic politics. Thus, we can conclude that international and domestic circumstances are interrelated.

Some scholars[38] have subscribed to the work advanced by David and his theory of 'omni-balancing', which suggests that the alliance choices of Third World states can be attributed to the domestic political situation.[39] Omni-balancing incorporates both the need to appease secondary adversaries and the desire of leaders to balance against the internal and external threats in order to survive in power. It is, moreover, conditional on regimes being rather weak and illegitimate and on the stakes for domestic politics being high.[40] David criticises international relations theory, which distinguishes between internal and external factors, and he argues that in the Third World the central authorities often lack the ability to resolve disputes that arise within the state borders. Also, there is no strong consensus or integrated civil society capable of inhibiting conflict in these states and therefore, these countries reinforce the anarchy of the international system. Thus, it is more accurate to consider Third World domestic politics as a 'microcosm of international politics'. It is just as important to balance on a domestic level to ensure the survival of political groups as it is to balance in international relations. Moreover, David argues that elites tend to choose allies in order to wage both domestic and international battles. This is accomplished by obtaining economic and/or political support from an outside source to engage in a power struggle with an internal 'enemy' which has the potential to threaten the legitimacy of the presently governing elite. However, for omni-balancing to be applicable neither external threats nor ideological beliefs can determine alignment behaviour. Instead, the leadership should seek to balance against the principal threats it faces, but this decision will also include the consideration of internal threats. The key determinant of alliance choices would be the intensity of threat to the leadership and not whether the threat was internal or external.[41]

David's theory of omni-balancing applies somewhat to the Ukrainian case, particularly as regards the replication of international issues in the domestic political arena.

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[37] Chudowsky, introductory chapter.
[38] See dissertation by Victor Chudowsky, introductory chapter.
[39] Steven R. David, *Choosing Sides*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
[40] Ibid, p. 7.
[41] Ibid.

What is also relevant is David's discussion of the political situation of Third World countries. It is true that like some Third World countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Ukraine lacks a unifying national idea as well as a strong political consensus that originates more or less from society. Moreover, one can easily point to instances where tensions between East and West or between NATO and Russia have been replicated in Ukrainian domestic politics (such as NATO enlargement and the Kosovo conflict- see Chapters Four, Five and Six). The pro-West versus pro-Russia sentiment has become a factor in Ukrainian politics to the point dividing the political elite (nationalists versus leftists) and to a lesser extent has become a regional issue (i.e. western *oblasts* versus eastern/southern *oblasts*).[42] Ukraine's dual balancing act is also reflective of Huntington's thesis, as discussed in Chapter One, which views Ukraine as straddling the divide between the Catholic and Orthodox traditions, and is thus in danger of constantly being pulled into two different directions by the opposing forces.[43]

Other scholars have advanced similar comparisons of Ukraine to the Third World. Goldgeier and McFaul made a convincing argument that the FSU constitutes a new 'periphery' similar to the Third World both in their domestic politics and in the anarchic international system within which they struggle to survive.[44] While the domestic political battle in Ukraine is not a violent one, the government does seem to have a problem with legitimacy. For example, there are some parliamentary groups who view the present regime as illegitimate. In addition, the state elite has been involved in a political battle with the leftist forces and other pro-Russia factions over the very *idea* of Ukraine's independence, though the number of *Rada* deputies who view the Ukrainian state as illegitimate has greatly decreased in the mid to late 1990s.[45] The Ukrainian executive has sought to counter such forces by seeking a strong alliance with the West including its political, military, and economic structures as well as key individual states such as the US, UK and Germany. Thus, as Chudowsky argues, foreign policy is not only a matter of state-building, but of the preservation of power for the existing policy-makers. Further, foreign policy is a struggle on both a systemic and domestic level. It is a battle on two fronts simultaneously. Both the domestic political struggle and geopolitical developments are key factors in Ukraine's decision whether to bandwagon with Russia or balance against it, which ultimately will determine Ukraine's present and future foreign and security policy course.

Yet, there remains some open questions in international relations theory that are not completely resolved by either Synder or David such as which factors are the most important in determining a state's foreign policy orientation- domestic or international factors? Perhaps this question is not resolved because these scholars have recognised that the application of broad objective criteria is not very helpful in the overall political analysis. States and their respective governments should be examined on an individual basis with regard to both internal and external factors that seek to shape foreign policy decisions. A range of factors should be considered such as a state's economic and political situation, international status, and its overall ability to influence international and regional relations. Such reasoning highlights the importance of the study of domestic politics on a continuing and comprehensive basis.

This thesis thus far has explained that Ukraine's primary goals since independence have been to secure its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The following section will take a closer look at Ukraine's precarious sovereignty and at the possible threats to the state's independence. Two 'levels' of sovereignty will be discussed and it is argued that Ukraine has achieved only negative sovereignty after nearly a decade of independence. Reference will be made to Jackson's analyses of quasi-states in the Third World and this section will consider the applicability of his argument to the FSU and particularly to Ukraine. Jackson argues that in quasi or relatively weak states foreign policy choices cannot

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[42] Although as discussed in Chapter One, loyalties tend to be associated with the region where one lives rather than to 'West' or to 'Russia'

[43] See Chapter One. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Touchstone, 1996.

[44] James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'Core and periphery in the post-Cold War era', *International Organisation*, 1992, vol. 46.

[45] See Chapter Four.

be seen as solidified because the current policies are incapable of outlasting the individuals currently wielding power.

This section will begin by defining several key concepts employed in the analysis, taking care not to repeat the conceptual definitions found in Chapter One, but rather to supplement these definitions and to demonstrate the applicability of the concepts to this analysis. Focusing on more structural aspects of the international system, the discussion begins by considering the issue of sovereignty (negative and positive) and quasi-states and will then shift to a detailed description and analysis of buffer states in the international system using Ukraine as a case study. The discussion will make reference to the buffer as a geopolitical component of the *frontier* so as to keep with the focus of the thesis. Moreover, this section will demonstrate how the concepts and analyses of quasi and buffer states can be useful in studying the countries of the FSU, Ukraine in particular, in terms of formulating and executing its foreign policy objectives.

CONCEPTUALISATON: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

Sovereign statehood

It is important to discuss the concept of sovereignty in this thesis because for Ukraine maintaining its sovereignty, along with securing its territorial integrity and establishing the legitimacy of the regime have been the key goals of the government under Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma. This thesis acknowledges different 'levels' of sovereignty and seeks to distinguish between the *legal* and *political* aspects of sovereign statehood.

Sovereignty in international relations signifies constitutional independence of states. According to James, sovereignty is a legal, absolute, and unitary condition.[46] Sovereign statehood is only one of several kinds of international statuses that have existed historically, but today it is virtually the only kind. Before the appearance of quasi-states, various other forms existed which were associated with European colonialism: dominions (Australia, Canada), colonies (India), protectorates, and mandates. Although each of these statuses differs, they all share the condition of legal insubordination to a foreign power; therefore, this was a denial of absolute sovereignty. To say that sovereignty is an absolute condition is the same as saying, for example, that marriage or any other formal relationship is absolute: one either is or is not a married person, a US citizen, or a member of the Catholic Church. As Jackson, points out, legal language differs from sociological language- like marriage from intimate relations, citizenship from residency, and an active to a passive member of a church. The first category invokes a status and the second is descriptive. The same can be said of sovereign statehood. Constitutional independence differs categorically from physical separation and colonial status is not the same as economic dependency. Sovereign states are legally but not necessarily physically insular and today most are economically dependent or interdependent.[47]

Quasi-states

As discussed briefly in Chapter One a basic feature of the present international order is that much of the world is under the sway of states that are not states in the strict sense but only as a matter of 'courtesy'. They are governments or regimes that exercise power over persons and over territory but do not possess authority, as distinct from mere power.[48] These quasi-states, furthermore, do not possess enduring legal and administrative structures that are capable of outlasting the individuals who wield power at any one time as the state, by and

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[46] Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood*, London, 1986, p. 25.

[47] Jackson, p. 33.

[48] It should be clarified at the outset that the defining characteristics of a quasi-state do not refer to geographic size or territory, as mentioned in Chapter One. The important factor is therefore not the size of the territory, but the amount of power and influence that the state in question is able to project in the international system, and whether it exhibits elements of negative or positive sovereignty.

large, remains to be built. Still, such governments tend to exhibit respect for constitutions and acceptance of the rule of law. Ukraine and the other states of the FSU share some of the characteristics that led European statesmen in the previous century to conclude that Africa, Asia, and Latin America could not be brought into international society because they were not capable of entering into the kinds of relationships that European states had with one another. As argued by Bull and Watson, 'the presence of these pseudo or quasi-states within international society, whether we regard it as good or bad, inevitable or avoidable, makes for a weakening of cohesion'.[49]

Quasi-states possess the same external rights and responsibilities of all other sovereign states which is *juridical statehood*. But at the same time they lack many features of sovereign statehood and exhibit limited *empirical statehood*. This Jackson defines as negative sovereignty, a condition where a state is recognised in international law but still fails to exhibit many of the attributes associated with a modern Weberian state (see below). Quasi-states have not yet been authorised and empowered domestically and consequently, lack the institutional feature of sovereign states as also defined by international law. Their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with sovereign statehood and often their governments are deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organised power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic welfare to citizens. The concrete benefits that have historically justified the burdens of sovereign statehood are often limited to a narrow group of elites and are not extended to the citizens at large, whose lives may not have improved since independence or may have even been adversely affected.[50] Quasi-states are primarily juridical and far from complete, so to speak, in comparison with more developed states in the international system.[51].

Others have noted the differences between 'real' states and quasi-states. Colonies have been granted 'independence' without necessarily possessing 'freedom'.[52] Plamenatz makes this distinction:

> The colonies now claiming independence are not societies
> of the same kind as the thirteen colonies which signed the
> Declaration of Independence in 1776…If capacity for freedom
> is our test, the thirteen revolted colonies were fit for self
> government; or at least not less fit than the country they
> rebelled against. It is by no means clear that the colonies
> (of the present day) now clamouring for independence
> are fit for self-government in the same way.[53]

In more recent times as regards the emergence of numerous states it is clear that many still do not disclose substantial and credible empirical statehood thus, bringing into question their 'fitness for self-government' as Plamenatz suggests. However, this lack of 'freedom' which quasi-states experience has not been a barrier to their independence. Quasi-states enjoy equal sovereignty with other states in the international system but lack credible, established, and enduring institutions as state-building and civic institution building is still underway.

One of the key defining characteristics of quasi-states is the undertaking of contemporary international relations to promote their economic development, or at least to compensate for their current condition of under-development, rather like poor citizens in welfare states.[54] This is a relatively new departure in international relations as prior to the twentieth century there were no special international financial organisations such as the IMF or World Bank, which could provide such assistance.

Ex-colonial self-determination has led to a new kind of territorial legitimacy. The rules of sovereign statehood have changed in the direction of far greater international toleration and accommodation of these marginal states. Whereas in the past such entities

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[49] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford, 1984, p. 30.
[50] Which is certainly true of Ukrainian elites and the high-level of corruption in government.
[51] Jackson, p. 21.
[52] As Jackson equates with 'positive sovereignty'.
[53] John Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government*, London, 1960, p. 28.
[54] Jackson, p. 22.

were usually dominated by other more powerful states and often demoted to an inferior international status or barred from participation in international institutions, today they are admitted as 'equal' members. As Jackson argues, this factor has changed the sovereignty game fundamentally and irrevocably and quasi-states and their external support structures reflect a novel doctrine of negative sovereignty, which was fashioned solely for colonial independence.[55] By gaining the economic and political support and acceptance of the major actors and institutions, quasi-states can seek to promote their foreign and domestic policy agenda on the international and regional scenes.

Jackson's in-depth analysis of post-colonial quasi-states in the Third World does indeed provide some interesting and relevant insights of state behaviour that can be applied to the post-communist states of the FSU. He pays particular attention to issues of state-building and reflects upon the fact that one of the defining characteristics of a quasi-state is an absence of enduring legal and administrative institutions with clearly defined duties and responsibilities. One can argue that this is true of Ukraine as there have been many instances of a power struggle and even confusion between the executive and legislative branches of government over, for example, who is responsible for Ukraine's foreign policy (i.e. the executive or legislative branches). Jackson also highlights the fact that post-colonial quasi-states will actively seek international economic and political support as they undertake state-building. This is also true of Ukraine and can be exemplified with the government's preoccupation with obtaining assistance from international financial institutions well as concluding agreements with other influential international and regional bodies (NATO, EU). Reflecting upon Jackson's analyses, this chapter aims to ameliorate Western understanding of how post-communist states such as Ukraine formulate their foreign and security policies by focusing on the issue of state sovereignty. Understanding the importance of the sovereignty issue to the Ukrainian elite can help to shed some light on why Kuchma has pursued a pragmatic multi-directional foreign policy course.

Negative liberty and negative sovereignty

Jackson links his discussion of the defining features of quasi-states to the concepts of negative and positive sovereignty as derived from the cognate ideas of negative and positive liberty. According to Berlin, individuals possess liberty, whereas sovereignty is a property of states.[56] Negative liberty is defined as 'the idea within which a man can act unobstructed by others'.[57] It affords individuals 'freedom from' interference from outsiders and, therefore, presupposes individual self-determination. Under the conditions of negative freedom one has immunities from others and is 'at liberty'; there is a sphere of action that is one's own. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. Interference with an individual's negative liberty is only justifiable if he harms or threatens to harm another. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient to warrant or justify outside interference. This presupposes that individuals are rational agents who can be held accountable for their actions unless there are valid grounds (such as insanity) which can override the principle.[58]

As discussed in Chapter One, negative sovereignty is defined as freedom from outside intervention which is a formal legal condition or entitlement and, therefore, something which the international community is capable of conferring.[59] Once the state in question has been recognised by the international community as independent, negative sovereignty is bestowed upon that entity. Negative sovereignty is the legal foundation upon which a society of independent and formally equal states rests.

Negative sovereignty differs from negative liberty in many respects. The former cannot presuppose the same satisfactions as the latter because of fundamental differences between states and individuals. First, individuals are equipped to enjoy immunities simply

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[55] Jackson, p. 25.
[56] See Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford, 1969, Chapter 3.
[57] Ibid, p.122.
[58] Jackson, p. 27.
[59] See G. Schwarzenberger and E.D. Brown, *A Manual of International Law*, 6th edition, London, 1976, pp. 54-55.

by being; the sovereign individual is intrinsically and demonstrably *valuable*. Second, individuals are sole agents whereas states in the Western philosophical tradition are complex organisations consisting of many agents, both rulers and ruled, which creates problems of mutual capability and of responsibility. Moreover, a sovereign government is unlike a free individual because a government simultaneously faces both outward at other states and inward at its population. The responsibility of a sovereign government is both external to other sovereigns and internal to its citizens; this is not the case which individuals, whose responsibility is 'owed' to others only. Also, a sovereign can commit many more crimes than an individual because there is no definitive higher authority to arrest him, bring him to trial, and if guilty, punish him.[60] In short, there is consequently a dilemma in negative sovereignty which is not found in negative liberty as there can be quasi-states whereas there are no quasi-persons.

Positive liberty and positive sovereignty

Positive liberty, according to Berlin, is a condition that allows one to be active and self-directing, and to choose, pursue, and realise goals. It also points towards the acquisition and enjoyment of capacities and not just immunities because it presupposes agents and conditions that are enabling. Positive sovereignty assumes the presence of capabilities that enable governments to be their own masters and is a substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively sovereign government is one that not only enjoys the rights of non-intervention and other international immunities, but one that is in the position to provide political goods to its citizens. Further, such a government can collaborate with other governments in defence alliances and similar international and regional arrangements and reciprocate in international commerce and finance. According to Jackson, positive sovereignty is the means that enable states to take advantage of their independence and is usually indicated by able and responsible rulers and productive and allegiant citizens.[61] The achievement of positive sovereignty may come as a direct result of state- and nation-building thus empowering these states with effective institutions, ruling elites, and other attributes found in modern states.[62] Yet, since states are never at rest due to, for example, technological innovation, cultural transformation, and the passage of time, positive sovereignty is a relative condition for most states which is unlike negative sovereignty.[63]

The growth of positive sovereignty through state- and nation-building is often conducted in the early years of a state's independence by maximising the distance between itself and the former imperial centre. In Emerson's post-colonial study it was found that the former ruling centre is defined as a negative 'Other' upon which a new national identity is forged.[64] This initial maximisation of independence and sovereignty *vis-à-vis* the former colonial empire is clearly exemplified in the Ukrainian case. Especially in the early years of independence, the Ukrainian government under Kravchuk sought to vigorously distance itself from Russian and CIS economic, political, and military structures for fear of a renewed Russian hegemonic dominance over Ukraine. It should be clarified, however, that Emerson's model reflects only one strategy. If one takes the British Commonwealth as an example, its states (i.e. Australia and Canada) did not follow Emerson's model and are clearly independent entities whose sovereignty is unquestioned. The maximal distance strategy can also be counter-productive for the post-colonial state. During the first three years of independence Ukraine was considered by the West to be a *rogue state* because of its aggressive distancing strategy from Russia, its reluctance to give up its stockpile of nuclear weapons, and its refusal to sign several international treaties dealing with non-proliferation. Ukraine thus perplexed the international community for several years as it was attempting to project a new national identity separate to Russia.

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[60] Of course, this is why attempts have been made to establish an international law of human rights which would overrule sovereigns in certain cases, and indeed, the establishment of the International Criminal Court.
[61] Jackson, p. 29.
[62] Taras Kuzio, 'The domestic sources of Ukrainian security policy', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1998.
[63] Jackson, p. 52.
[64] R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 152, as cited in T. Kuzio, 'The domestic sources of Ukrainian security policy' op cit.

What can be concluded from the above discussion is that legally speaking, all sovereign states in the international system are equal in the sense that no one state has the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of any other state. All states possess at least negative sovereignty; however, some states are positively sovereign which allows for proactive policy-making in the international system. Such states have the ability to declare, implement, and enforce public policy both domestically and internationally. Quasi-states generally tend to only have the ability to react to events in international relations and are usually in the process of economic, political, or social transition. They are not the masters of their own destiny as they lack such resources and capabilities to fully take advantage of their sovereignty and independence.

The Transition: Negative to Positive Sovereignty

Ukraine has tended to follow the following steps in its transition from negative to positive sovereignty although admittedly it is difficult to trace the steps in this sovereignty transition. Moreover, it is equally difficult to create a model that would help to explain this process as each newly independent state has different economic, political, social, and other characteristics. Further, each has distinct geopolitical realities as well as different histories, all of which have definitive influence on a state's success in this transition. Since a theoretical model using deductive reasoning is not feasible, inductive reasoning will be applied by looking specifically to the Ukrainian case while attempting to provide some background context for Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy.

Stage One: Radical distancing strategy
This first stage includes radical or 'romantic' policies characteristic of so-called rogue states. This stage coincides with Emerson's model in which the former imperial centre is seen as a negative Other, thus the newly independent state will seek to distance itself from that centre. Further, a national identity may start to emerge which is based on the population defining itself as something distinct from the former ruling imperial. This stage occurred in Ukraine from 1990-1994 when the government led by Kravchuk was apprehensive toward Russia and sought to establish integral ties with the West while adamantly renouncing the Russian-dominated CIS economic and security structures. As a result Ukrainian-Russian relations were precarious and unpredictable. Ukraine was in the early stages of trying to determine its foreign policy priorities while at the same time staunchly defending its right to sovereignty and independence which included establishing control over Crimea. The building of state institutions was taking place in the very early stages. Political parties and ideologies were also beginning to form.

Stage Two: Pragmatic strategy
In this stage which began with the election of Kuchma in 1994 there was a shift to a more pragmatic or business-like approach to international relations. Ukraine was beginning to gain experience in foreign relations and was in the early stages of defining its foreign and security policy priorities. Kuchma stressed the importance of developing bilateral ties with Russia, which would be based on the equality of two independent and sovereign states. The functioning of state-institutions has not improved dramatically and there is no 'civic society'. The necessity for favourable economic and energy relations with Russia and the CIS dictated that the Ukrainian executive should shift its foreign policy eastwards toward 'Eurasia'.

Stage Three: Internationally active, domestically lagging
The Ukrainian government has become more outspoken in foreign policy and the state's diplomats are actively seeking to conclude international agreements which will help to solidify its territorial integrity, improve its economic situation, and confirm its place in the international system of sovereign states. However, the domestic situation has not advanced to match the enthusiasm of its foreign policy. As nation- and state-building are still in the relatively early stages the internal situation is unstable due to socio-economic realities. Political parties and prominent politicians have sought to influence foreign policy decisions

and thus, it was necessary for the executive to seek compromises. As a result the state has had difficulty in projecting a convincing and stable foreign policy in international relations. This stage began roughly in mid 1995 and Ukraine is in this stage at present. Ukraine has concluded border treaties with Russia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Moldova and Slovakia, has worked vigorously at attracting international financial support, and has also managed to develop extensive ties with NATO and the EU (though to a lesser extent.) However, socio-economic conditions are starting to have a more profound affect on the direction of the state's foreign policy.

[It is possible in this transition from negative to positive sovereignty not to progress beyond Stage Three if after several years the state has not acquired economic and political stability. If the quasi-state has not been able to attain favourable trade conditions for its products in the global and regional markets or is lagging in terms of democratic reforms, Stage Three may be the end point in the transition to positive sovereignty. The state will then back step and would, therefore, be vulnerable to outside encroachments on its sovereignty or may even decide to give up statehood by joining some type of larger economic, political or military union.]

Stage Four: Reforms lead to confidence, clearly defined national interests
In this stage which Ukraine has not yet reached progress made in political and economic reforms will allow for a general consensus among the legislative and executive branches as regards its foreign and security policy priorities as well as clearly defining the state's national interests. Nation- and state-building efforts will begin to show signs of real progress as the political, economic, and social problems will start to stabilise. Ukraine's state institutions should be functioning in a less bureaucratic and restrictive manner, and as a result, the legislative and executive branches will no longer be at constant loggerheads (as in the previous stages) over tactics for economic reform and foreign policy. These factors have allowed the state's foreign policy and national interests to become more solidified as the improved domestic situation has accorded the government greater latitude and flexibility in conducting international relations.

Stage Five: Positive sovereignty is achieved
The quasi-state can be said to have achieved the relative condition of positive sovereignty. Characteristics might include membership in influential international or regional organisations such as the WTO, IMF, NATO, and the EU. In this final stage, the quasi-state will not have to rely on international institutions for improvement or survival as it has the ability to provide for its citizens on a socio-economic level through domestic production and favourable trade conditions. Moreover, Ukraine's state institutions will be fully functional and civic society will be present. Ukraine as a positively sovereign state will not feel the need to jealously guard its sovereignty because there will be no question of the state's continued independence. There is also no overwhelming economic, military, or other internal or external threat that could infringe upon the state's sovereignty.

Is sovereignty intrinsic to all states?

A controversy exists in international relations as to whether or not sovereignty is intrinsic to all states. In other words, is this a fact or simply a status acknowledged by other statesmen? Jackson poses the following questions: does the world today consist of distinct and separately organised political realities called states? Is sovereignty constituted by that reality? Or is the world a framework of jurisdictions defined according to common principles of international law? Is sovereignty a rule or rather a set of rules of an international society and, therefore, extrinsic to states? In short, are sovereign states self-standing realities and rugged individualists or are they constituents of an international community and responsible citizens or are they somehow both at the same time?[65]

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[65] See Jackson, Chapter 3.

International law presupposes empirical statehood. The following statement by Schwarzenberger and Brown is a description of empirical statehood in international law:

> Before recognising an entity as an independent state, the subjects of international law usually require a minimum of three (essential) conditions to be fulfilled. The state in quest of recognition must have a stable government which does not recognise any outside superior authority; it must rule supreme within a territory with more or less settled frontiers and; it must exercise control over a certain number of people...[66]

As Brierly has explained, 'whether or not a new state has actually begun to exist is a pure question of fact'.[67] Thus, classical international law is the child and not the parent of states.[68] The answer to the questions posed above is that sovereign states have a dual dimension: they face inward and outward simultaneously and have an empirical and a normative aspect. Sovereign states declare their normative supremacy over all domestic authorities and moral and legal obligation to all other states.[69] In a legal sense states are deemed to be substantial and capable. Historically, this has been a reasonable working assumption; however, according to Bull, 'an independent political community which merely claims a right to sovereignty (or is judged by others to have such a right) but cannot assert this right in practice is not a state properly so-called.[70] Yet, if the existence of these new states were a matter exclusively of power rather then birthright many states would not have been born. The international legal order does not provide foundations for the state; it presupposes the state's existence. Under the conditions of the contemporary collaborative states system, such states that cannot assert their sovereignty in practice are considered to be sovereign entities nonetheless. They are, for all practical purposes, negatively sovereign or quasi-states.

Conceptual application

Much of the discussion on quasi-states up to this point has been concentrated on several authors[71] who have used the term quasi-state in reference to decolonisation, Africa, and the Third World or in reference to a legal discussion on state sovereignty. Jackson's study is an attempt, following the lead of others, to think through the new sovereignty regime and to draw some conclusions. His study discloses an image of Third World states as consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic foundations, but of territorial jurisdictions supported from above by international law and material aid which he describes as a kind of international safety net.[72] In short, they often appear to be juridical more than empirical entities, hence quasi-states.

To be clear it has not been a goal of this chapter to continue what has already been researched and written on extensively by Jackson, but merely to borrow the concepts in his work on quasi-states and apply them to this analysis of foreign policy-making in the FSU, particularly to Ukraine. Unfortunately, there is no grand theory of quasi-states found in international relations literature in which to employ for this analysis. However, one can see a degree of usefulness in Jackson's discussion and conclusions about the experience of post-colonial states and what we can expect from them in terms of foreign policy choices, which stems firstly from the manner by which they achieved their independence.

As this thesis contends that both domestic and international factors play a crucial role in the shaping of Ukraine's foreign and security policy, it is important that the

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[66] Schwarzenberger and Brown, p. 44.
[67] J.L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations*, 2nd edition, London, 1936, pp. 102-103.
[68] Jackson, p. 53.
[69] Known as juridical statehood
[70] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, London, 1977, pp. 8-9.
[71] Jackson, Bull, Schwarzenberger and Brown
[72] Jackson, p. 5.

theoretical discussion move beyond internal factors, and thus consider the external environment in which Ukraine is operating, specifically its position as a buffer state between Russia and the West. Although some scholars might object to referring to Ukraine as a buffer, one could argue that international relations literature that focuses on buffer states provides a useful context by which to analyse Ukraine's multi-vectoral foreign and security policy given its geopolitical position between Russia and the West.

The following section defines the buffer concepts and analyses the theoretical literature on buffer states in a geopolitical context. This section is proceeded by an in-depth discussion of buffer states in international and regional relations. It will be argued that it is necessary to broaden the context under which buffer states and buffer systems emerge and are maintained in the international system to include a re-definition of what constitutes an opposing power in a post-Cold War world. Because the buffer state is an integral component of a frontier[73] an in-depth look at the role of contemporary buffer states is necessary.

Buffer concepts defined

In the social science academic literature there are many concepts that can be referred to as 'essentially contested'. It was explained by Gallie that people who are committed to partly discrepant assumptions and ideas are likely to construe shared concepts in rather different ways', thus they are essentially contested concepts. Such terms often involve endless disputes about the proper uses of the terms.[74] Although on many occasions scholars define these concepts in a relatively similar fashion, there is no one grand definition that is universally acceptable. Buffer states can be included in this category. Geographers, political scientists, and sociologists attach different variables in their definitions of these concepts and there are also differences of opinion within the disciplines themselves.[75]

The difficulties associated with applying the buffer concepts are in part due to the fact that there is no 'grand theory' of buffer states to refer to. Buffer states have traditionally been analysed in reference to individual case studies. This approach appears to have left many unanswered questions relating to the general nature and patterns of behaviour of buffer states.

Buffer zone and buffer state

According to Wight, a *buffer zone* is a region occupied by one or more weaker powers between two or more stronger powers and is also described as a 'power vacuum'. The stronger powers have an interest in preventing the opposing side from controlling the buffer zone and will pursue this interest in one of two ways dependant upon their political and economic strength. They will either seek to maintain the buffer zone as neutral and independent or will attempt to establish control over the zone, which may lead to the annexing of the buffer zone and converting it into a frontier province.[76]

The term *buffer* was first applied to a political entity in 1876 and *buffer state* was first used in 1883.[77] Its roots extend back about 3500 years to the fifteenth century BC when the Kingdom of Kadesh was established on the Orontes River of Syria by the King of Mitanni to keep the Egyptians away from his territory in the Euphrates River region. Fifteen

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[73] See Chapters One and Six.

[74] W.B. Gallie, 'Essentially contested concepts', in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, London, 1955-56, vol. 56. Reprinted in Max Black, *The Importance of Language*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1962, p. 142. As cited in William Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 2nd Ed, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 10. Other examples of essentially contested concepts are democracy, security, culture, and ethnicity.

[75] John Chay and Thomas Ross, *Buffer States in World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, see introduction.

[76] Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, London, 1979, pp. 160-1.

[77] J. Murray et al (eds), *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, vol. 1, 1993, p. 127 and p. 1158.

hundred years later and in an attempt to establish a neutral zone between Rome and Persia, Pompey used Syria as a buffer.[78]

Although widely employed in the academic literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the term has received little scholarly attention. A buffer state can be defined as a weak power between two or more stronger powers, which is maintained and even sometimes created with the purpose of reducing the likelihood of conflict between the greater powers. Another definition refers to a buffer state as a weak political or administrative unit geographically situated between and separating two larger militarily or ideologically conflicting powers.[79]

Buffer states include trimmers, neutrals, and satellites. Trimmers are states which subscribe to the policy of playing their powerful neighbours against one another (such as Ukraine has done in some instances- see below).[80] Neutrals are states that lack an active foreign policy, possibly in the hopes of escaping the notice of the powers (such as Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and Austria). A satellite is a state whose foreign policy is controlled by another power (as all of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and arguably Belarus in the late 1990s). The gradation of a trimmer to a neutral, a neutral to a satellite, and a satellite to an ally is quite an unpredictable and obscure process. Because power between the opposing states fluctuates the buffer zone is unstable and often volatile. For example, if one power adopts a policy aimed at preserving the neutrality of a buffer state this action may be seen by the opposition as an attempt to reduce the state to a satellite.

Furthermore, the buffer state in question may be regarded in the future in different circumstances as either a defence bulwark or a springboard to future expansion. Still, differences in each of the larger state's political traditions will allow for different degrees of respect for the independence of small states that are situated between them. However limited in choice, buffer states are not necessarily paralysed by their geopolitical location. A small power with a strong and resolute government can often take advantage of its stronger neighbour's eagerness to protect it and conversely, may be able to further its own foreign policy goals because the opposing powers are preoccupied with one another. If the buffer state is able to convince the powers that it will remain neutral and independent it may go unnoticed.[81]

Scholars and policy-makers (and even former President Kravchuk) have often referred to Ukraine as a buffer state. Ukraine has successfully negotiated the furthering of its domestic and foreign policy agenda in many instances by playing both sides off the other (during the Kosovo conflict, for example). It has done so by attempting to convince the outside forces (Russia in particular) that it will not seek to enter into an alliance with NATO, but instead will seek to co-operate both with NATO and with Russia. Although President Kuchma has stated that Ukraine does not intend to join NATO, he has vigorously sought to deepen Ukraine's ties to the Alliance, viewing NATO as its 'insurance policy'[82] if Russia were to take a more hard-lined and aggressive approach to Ukraine. Still, Ukraine has overall pursued a multi-vector foreign policy while seeking to improve relations with individual countries, including Russia, as a means of promoting its security and well being.[83] Clearly, this is an example of Ukraine asserting its position as a state outside of any bloc, yet not necessarily neutral in the strict sense.

Buffer system and buffer effect

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[78] Nicholas John Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, 'Geographic objectives in foreign policy', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 33, 1939, p. 410. As cited in Chay and Ross, *Buffer States in World Politics*, p. 16.

[79] As with Quasi-states, the size of the geographic territory is not used to classify or disqualify the state in question as a buffer state.

[80] Ukraine often behaves as a trimmer as it has attempted to play Russia and NATO/US against one other for its own Ukraine's benefit. This tactic is sometimes used in when negotiating international financial support from the West.

[81] Wight, p. 161.

[82] The term 'insurance policy' in reference to how Ukrainian elites view their relations with NATO was discussed informally by the author and Dr. Taras Kuzio on several occasions.

[83] See Paul Goble, 'A State Outside a Bloc', *RFE/RL Daily Newsline*, vol.1, no.108, Part I, 2 September 1997.

The complete collection of the larger opposing and roughly equal powers and the adjacent buffer states is the *buffer system*. The relationship among the three elements of the buffer system determines the strength of the *buffer effect,* or the degree to which the buffer state is resistant to outside encroachments. One characteristic of a buffer system involves the geographic location of the two powers as well as the buffer state(s). Ross emphasises the importance of location with respect to the neighbouring powers. He explains that location may not be contiguous, but the buffer state's existence is owed to its proximity to the more powerful and conflicting actors.[84]

As regards the opposing powers certain characteristics are implied. First, the powers must have a considerable advantage over the buffer state both in economic and military strength. Second, the two larger powers must be significantly more powerful in comparison in order to impose their will on the buffer. Furthermore, the greater the disparity of economic and military power between the larger states and the buffer and the greater the degree of power parity between the two larger powers, the stronger the buffer effect and thus the chance for stability in the buffer system. The key to stability in the region is the continuous pressure on the buffer from both sides. The two larger powers should be in discord with one another and also must be committed to the maintenance of the buffer system.[85]

According to Ingalls the characteristics of a buffer system include the following attributes:

1)   Size- measured in military, political, or economic strength which is often determined by the degree of power disparity relative to the larger power;

2)   Location- measured in terms of strategic position, physical or environmental features, strategic transportation routes or geopolitical position; and

3)   Sovereignty[86]- measured in terms of the degree of autonomy the buffer state possesses and the commitment of the larger powers to preserving the independence of the buffer[87].

Size is a key determinant of a buffer state but only insofar as the buffer must be disproportionately smaller than the opposing powers. Furthermore, there must be a degree of balance in the buffer system to maintain the status of the buffer state and this is the point where the issue of sovereignty is paramount: *A buffer state must maintain a certain degree of autonomy and independence or its very existence as a state will be at risk.*

Buffer states will often seek to maintain a policy of neutrality or non-bloc status (as Ukraine has done). Knudsen points out that the leadership of the buffer state is crucial insofar as the goal of fostering independence and autonomy is pursued.[88] The success of the buffer system depends largely on the balance of power between the opposing sides, the continued acceptance of the buffer state, and their commitment to the buffer's autonomy and independence.[89].

Internal characteristics such as physical features (difficult terrain or topography) are also important factors to consider. Although a buffer state can physically separate two opposing powers especially in the case of topographical barriers, some analysts have argued that technology and globalisation have played a role in reducing the importance of the buffer state. But Ingalls argues that even though technological advances have eliminated the effectiveness of many physical barriers, the role of buffer states has not been reduced. Instead, the way in which we view buffer states must be modified to fit the new political, economic, and military circumstances. Space-shortening technologies, ideological struggles, and the actions of liberation and revolutionary movements against national governments may produce buffer systems in which physical location and vicinity are not necessarily the

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[84] Gerald Ingalls, 'Buffer states: Outlining and expanding existing theory', in *Buffer States in World Politics*, Chay and Ross, pp. 233-234.

[85] Ingalls, p. 234.

[86] Referring to negative, as opposed to positive sovereignty

[87] Ingalls, p. 235.

[88] Olav Fagelund Knudsen, 'Eastern Europe: The buffer effect of a cordon sanitaire' in John Chay and Thomas Ross, *Buffer States in World Politics*, Boulder: Westview, 1986.

[89] Ingalls, p. 236.

crucial elements in understanding the functioning of the buffer system. One needs only to look to recent ideological or revolutionary conflicts in Eastern Europe on which to support Ingalls's argument.

The definitions provided in this section are not to be taken as unchallengeable. Particularly problematic is the definition of what constitutes an opposing power[90], the relationship among the elements of the buffer system, and locational characteristics of the buffer state and the buffer system. Historically, the justification for a buffer state's existence was to separate the conflicting national interests of two opposing and relatively equal powers. But in more recent times one must query whether buffer systems exist solely to insulate and isolate and to protect against military confrontation? It is certainly conceivable that buffer states serve other purposes. For example, buffers have existed to separate conflicting ideological aims (Albania), cultural, ethnic or racial groups (South Africa), and have served as defensive zones (Lebanon), and even acted as economic (Uruguay) and political bridges between nations, states, or culturally divided societies.

In the mid 1990s President Kuchma expressed his desire to portray Ukraine as an economic and political bridge[91] between Russia and the West. This description counters the portrayal of Ukraine as an East-West bulwark, defensive zone, or buffer state in the traditional sense. On one hand, there may be truth to the statement that Ukraine is transforming into an East-West economic and political bridge. In economic terms, Ukraine's desire for associate status of the EU as well as its desire to join CEFTA coupled with the state's extensive trade linkages to Russia and the CIS is certainly an example of how Ukraine 'looks both ways' in terms of trade relations.

But on the other hand, it is difficult to imagine how a negatively sovereign state such as Ukraine which is in the process of state- and nation-building could perform such a role as bridge. Recalling Jackson's defining characteristics of a quasi-state which above all includes the lack of a self-standing structure and solid domestic foundation, it is difficult to conceive of Ukraine playing the role of East-West bridge. Kuchma's analogy was strongly criticised for this reason. According to one official, being a bridge between conflicting ideologies, political, or economic practices is not a normal function of a state. This would require Ukraine to be the East-West negotiator or mediator, a role that Ukraine is not able to take on at this time. One need only recall Ukraine's failed efforts to mediate in the Kosovo conflict to exemplify this point.[92] Ukraine must first of all begin to consolidate its economic reforms before it can attempt more ambitious, proactive roles in the region. Moreover, because ties between the West and Russia are already formalised (i.e. in the NATO-Russia Permanent Council) it is difficult to see how Ukraine's efforts could be warranted.

It may also be necessary to broaden the context under which buffer systems emerge and are maintained in light of the potential new roles that buffer states are playing in the international system. Location, first of all, can no longer be confined to physical or environmental characteristics. It must be broadened to include an economic, geopolitical, and ideological dimension. Furthermore, for the buffer concepts to remain useful in modern analyses, account must be taken of the alternative methods to solve international conflicts. Some of these conflicts can be considered non-conventional but are nonetheless crucial elements of the international system, such as wars of liberation, revolution, independence, as well as efforts to establish cultural, racial, or ethnic autonomy or identity. Ingalls, therefore, concludes that continued research is necessary to gauge the components of such non-conventional buffer systems and to effectively meld these to classic concepts of the buffer state.[93]

Buffer states: the geographer's perspective

To understand the internal and external dynamics of buffer states, it is necessary to include different perspectives including the perspective of a geographer, which generally differs

[90] For example, defining Russia an opposing power in relation to Ukraine can be problematic.

[91] As opposed to the description of Ukraine as a buffer state advocated by President Kravchuk.

[92] Interview with the Vice President of the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, Oleg Kokoshinski, Kyiv, 24 March 1998.

[93] Ingalls, pp. 237-240.

from that of a political scientist. The discussion of buffer states has usually been presented within a larger debate such as boundary or frontier studies (as it is in this thesis). Geographers are concerned with the state as a whole, with the physical and cultural characteristics, and with those characteristics that make that particular state different from others. They are interested in the geographical location of the state and how its location affects its relations with other states.

Geographers agree that all states must have a territory which Gottmann defines as a spatial notion establishing links between politics, people and the natural setting. He perceived territory as 'the unit in the political organisation of states that defines, at least for a time, the relationship between the community and its habitat on one hand, and the community and its neighbours on the other'.[94] Therefore, the state is comprised of a territory and a human society that has organised governmental control to occupy and exercise power and sovereignty over its territory. For the state to survive it is crucial that the population believe that the state has the right to exist. Also important is the fact that the citizens of the state must possess or accept a common body of political attitudes or an ideology that surpasses the differences in language or ethnic background. Furthermore, a state must have considerable political, economic, and/or military resources.[95] Finally, a state must be capable of operating as a single political unit in its international relations or will otherwise risk being challenged by an external actor.

Ukraine has been struggling since independence to consolidate its state- and nation-building. Referring to the above criteria for statehood, the population must overwhelmingly believe that the state has the right to exist. However, it is questionable whether Ukraine as a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse state has a common body of political attitudes or an ideology that surpasses the societal differences. Still, Ukraine's society has been supportive of independence and of an identity separate from Russia. But it can be argued that the Ukrainian government does not possess adequate economic, political, or military resources that would enable the state to protect itself from outside encroachment.

In this study of buffer states it is imperative to stress the importance of geographical location. Ross mentions three methods of expressing the geographical location which is in terms of: 1) the degree of latitude and longitude; 2) its relation to water bodies and land masses; and 3) its position with reference to its immediate neighbours or its *vicinal location.* In this chapter buffer states have been discussed in the context of its vicinal location. The discussion has also centred on the primary purposes that buffer states serve which is that of physically separating two conflicting and relatively equal powers. However, in another context, buffer states have been created in association with secondary factors which include: 1) hostile physical environments such as deserts or rugged terrain; 2) the presence within the territory of strategic transportation routes, and 3) the existence of zones where cultural transitions are taking place.[96] In the first case it is possible that a state may become a buffer if the larger powers have come to view the territory in question as unattractive, possibly due to harsh environmental conditions. The surrounding states may choose not to incorporate the undesirable area into its political territory or in other words, it becomes a sort of 'no man's land'. In the second case a state could become a buffer if strategic transportation routes pass through the territory (such as oil pipelines) and neighbouring states feel they are unable to lay sole claim to these important routes. In the third case a state may become a buffer if it lies between two culturally conflicting spheres of influence. The buffer may possess a conglomeration of the two linguistic, ethnic, and religious characteristics of both cultures and, therefore, serves as an area of transition between the two. In this case neither side wishes to become involved with the buffer as any form of cultural conflict within the buffer may spill over into the neighbouring states.

Aside from these secondary factors geographers are concerned with the vicinal location of the buffer itself. They agree that buffer states are countries located between two conflicting powers or spheres of influence and their existence is reliant upon the power's acceptance of them as autonomous entities. According to Spykman, when the opposing

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[94] Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory*, Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1973, p. ix.

[95] Although the amount of resources and the ability of the state in question to project its political, military, or economic power defines whether that state is positively or negatively sovereign, or a 'real' or quasi-state.

[96] Ross, p. 14.

powers are relatively equal and the frontier boundaries are in question, a buffer state provides a certain degree of security for both sides by acting as a neutral zone and functions as a keeper of peace by providing for the physical separation of the potential combatants.[97] However, peace is not always achieved by the existence of buffer states. For example, Poland has been made a historical zone of conflict between the powers situated on both sides.

Spykman's description seems to relate to the security situation of Ukraine. As a buffer state in either the historical or modern sense (i.e. bulwark or perhaps bridge) Ukraine's non-bloc status demonstrably provides some comfort to both Russia and the West and to Central Europe, Poland in particular. Territorial claims are not essentially the problem[98] but frontier boundaries are, as illustrated by Spykman. This is due mostly to the enlargement of NATO eastwards in 1997 when Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join. However, although NATO has maintained an open-door policy, it has not specified where the line will be drawn. As a result, frontier boundaries remain a contentious question particularly for those states left outside of the enlargement process.

It is also possible for a buffer state to 'graduate' from this status[99] and remain independent because of the will of the people to retain autonomy of their government. Finland is a good example of an erstwhile buffer state that has remained autonomous largely due to its intensely independent-minded citizens. It must be reiterated that buffer states are not puppet states of either powerful neighbour. A buffer cannot exist without having a certain degree of independence and autonomy. Buffer states can be defined as zones of cultural transition, as discussed above and as such, they can partake of the cultural and ideological patterns on either side (as Ukraine does).[100] Buffer states are shock absorbers in terms of cultural, political, economical, and military discrepancies.

Buffer states and sovereignty

In addition to the contestability of the buffer concepts there has been no agreement on how to develop a general theory of the buffer state and what such a theory would entail. An examination of the issue of sovereignty is one way to develop a general theory of the buffer state but clearly one must go beyond this discussion. However, it is a useful starting point.

Sovereignty, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, is generally understood as the right of the state to exercise power over its territory and population, but also refers to the right of the state to act without being subordinated to the authority of another state. Thus, territory and autonomy are two crucial elements of sovereignty. A buffer state's sovereignty is generally fragile because of its proximity to more powerful states.[101]

As regards territory the buffer is often the target of paradoxical border claims by its neighbours. For instance, both Poland and Uruguay have historically been disputed territories. Prussia, Austria, and Russia (e.g. 1791 and 1793) have annexed sections of Poland. Argentina and Brazil have both considered Uruguay as part of their territory.[102] Furthermore, the territories of buffer states can be overtaken by the powers that seek to extend their territory or sphere of influence. Poland again proves a useful example as its territory was divided in 1771 and in the aftermath of World War II, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam were all partitioned in accordance with the wishes of the powers.

At the regional level the buffer state may also be subjected to pressures from the powerful neighbours to establish alliances. The buffer may choose to remain neutral or it may join a military alliance. In the first case, the buffer state gives up the right to establish a

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[97] Nicholas John Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, 'Geographic objectives in foreign policy', *The American Political Science Review*, 33, 1939, p. 410.

[98] Ukraine has only recently concluded in May 1997 border agreements with Russia and Romania, the final two states with which Ukraine has had contested borders.

[99] But after changes have occurred in the system that allow for this to happen.

[100] Samuel Van Valkenburg and Carl L. Stotz, *Elements of Political Geography*, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1954, p. 51.

[101] Joseph Maila, 'Buffer states: The issue of sovereignty', in John Chay and Thomas Ross, *Buffer States in World Politics*, Boulder: Westview, 1986, p. 31.

[102] Uruguay has been referred to as the Banda Oriental by Argentina, and the Cisplatine by Brazil.

foreign policy (except for neutrality) and in the second, the buffer is reliant upon the will of other states for its existence as an independent entity. Whichever the case, it is clear that the sovereignty of the buffer state will be significantly affected. As Maila shows, territorial integrity and military alliances can be used as meaningful variables to aid in the explanation of the behaviour of the buffer state. Whether or not a buffer has a unified territory or is part of a military alliance, it is useful as an indicator of the foreign policy and behavioural patterns of the state in question.[103] A matrix combining these two variables is shown below:

Territorial integrity	Yes	YES	NO	NO
Military Alliance	NO	YES	YES	NO
Case	1	2	2	3

If a buffer chooses to guard its territorial integrity it is in a position of *neutralised sovereignty* as in Case 1. Moreover, when a buffer has become engaged in a military alliance, with or without having negotiated territorial integrity, the state is adhering to a policy of *controlled sovereignty* as in Case 2. Finally, if a buffer state is not part of a military alliance and is without territorial integrity, the state is in the position of *challenged sovereignty* as indicated in Case 3.

The Ukrainian government has opposed joining a military alliance with Russia and the CIS. This was illustrated by the rejection of the CIS collective security agreement and also by the fact that Ukraine is only *de facto* a member of the CIS. Further, Ukraine has sought to co-operate with Western security organisations, specifically NATO. Recognising that it is not considered to be a front-runner for NATO membership, Ukraine has chosen to co-operate with NATO without applying for membership, thus reaffirming its multi-vectoral foreign policy stance which is pragmatically pro-West perhaps masked as non-alignment or neutrality. Having secured its territorial borders with its neighbours and not being a member of any military or security organisation, Ukraine can be placed in the category of Case 1.

According to Maila, the above mentioned forms of sovereignty are of utmost importance for buffer states. They are the source of foreign policy and not just the outcome of it. For example, the 'degree' of sovereignty will determine what the buffer state will transmit and receive from the external environment. Both the foreign policy-making mechanisms and the solving of foreign policy problems tend to be weakened by the sovereignty dilemma. Also, the leadership role of buffers tends to be weakened as they are constrained in their foreign policy options.[104] Therefore, the issue of sovereignty is paramount in any attempt to analyse the role of buffer states from a systemic perspective.

As mentioned previously, in order to avoid being brought into a conflict between the neighbouring powers and to preserve their territorial integrity, buffer states normally strive to remain neutral. By pursuing a policy of neutrality, a state voluntarily commits itself to non-involvement in the disputes of other states and also does not allow its territory to be used for another state's military exercises.[105] Although a policy of neutrality receives its legal status from an international treaty or from a binding unilateral decision that is made by the state, it is only effective insofar as other states recognise and accept the policy. The degree of neutrality differs from one state to another. For example, Austria has opted for active neutrality and Switzerland has become an advocate of integral neutrality. The difference is that Austria has chosen to take part in international conflict mediation and is member of the United Nations and the EU, for example, whereas Switzerland is not. Moreover, Ireland, opting for a position of neutrality (though not officially written into the Irish Constitution), is a member of the UN, the EU, and has observer status in defence organisations such as NATO and the WEU. Ireland, therefore, does not view participation in the UN's peacekeeping activities as a challenge to its pragmatic neutrality policy.

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[103] Maila, p. 32.

[104] Maila, p. 33.

[105] Which is not the case of Ukraine as Chapter XV, Article 14 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides for the use of existing military bases on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stationing of foreign military operations. As example would be the Yaroviv training facility near Lviv which is used by NATO.

But a distinction has to be made between neutrality and non-alignment. The former is legally recognised as a binding status while the latter refers to a political stance having no legal obligations. In fact, many countries claiming to be non-aligned do not necessarily adhere to this policy. For example, during the Cold War period many Third World states sought to be players, not witnesses of world affairs, and have claimed to follow a policy of non-alignment while actually leaning toward one of the superpowers. Further, Ukraine's non-alignment in theory allows the Ukrainian government greater flexibility in its political and economic relations with all of its neighbours. Moreover, it is not uncommon for buffer states to tilt to one side or the other (as Ukraine does toward the West), therefore encouraging confrontation and/or domination of the buffer by one of the powers.

In the case of controlled sovereignty[106] where the buffer has been unable to dissociate itself from the pressures exerted on it from the larger powers, it is then forced to enter into a political or military alliance. The result is that the buffer now is reliant upon one of the larger external or neighbouring powers who claims responsibility for its defence and foreign relations. Two scenarios could result from this action. First, while still enjoying territorial integrity and after having entered into a military alliance, the buffer may have to accept the presence of foreign troops on its territory. This was the case with Belgium in 1920. Second, the buffer may find itself in an unequal framework of broader multilateral alliances. An example would be Czechoslovakia, which was under controlled sovereignty after the Warsaw Pact was formed following the invasion of communist troops in August 1968.[107]

In this focus on sovereignty Maila explains that there is another important point to consider which is the issue of asymmetric perceptions of buffer states and their surrounding neighbours. Buffers will normally strive to be neutral and will focus on freedom, sovereignty, independence and the right to exist. If the buffer is threatened externally it will normally attempt to disentangle itself from the environment from which it is threatened, thus returning to its neutral position. But in many cases the perception that the buffer has of itself is not necessarily the perception that others have of it. The territory of the buffer may be used as a springboard of attack against them or a power might strive to coerce the buffer into choosing sides. This can be illustrated by considering Russia's fear of NATO enlargement to CEE and its attempts to coerce Ukraine into becoming more closely integrated into the CIS economic, political, and military structures and into a pan-Slavic union with itself and Belarus.

Historically, the sovereignty of buffers has been sacrificed to the greater powers, particularly during a period of conflict and confrontation. In this case the buffer would be wise to strive to play the role of mediator, (again as Ukraine attempted to do in Kosovo) thus, attempting to change the attitudes of the actors involved by encouraging them to adopt a more constructive approach to the settlement of the conflict. Buffer states must strive to develop a peaceful approach to resolving conflict and exercise diplomacy over military strategies; they must shape their policies more on integrated regional development than on confrontation or isolation. For a buffer to be neutral is not to be isolationist; rather it is to neutralise war and to stress non-military approaches to the settlement of disputes.[108]

The buffer system: a closer examination

It would be useful at this stage to move beyond the discussion on sovereignty and buffer states and to examine the complete collection of great and small powers or the *buffer system*. Although the term buffer state is the more commonly used one, it is more appropriate to speak of a buffer system because buffer states exist only as part of a larger system.[109] The larger powers in the buffer zone are 'subsystem dominant', whereas buffer states are at best

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[106] Which is when a buffer has concluded a military alliance and enjoys territorial integrity or has concluded a military alliance without territorial integrity.
[107] Known as the Brezhnev theory of limited sovereignty.

[108] Maila, p. 39.
[109] Michael G. Partem, 'The buffer system in international relations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27, 1983, p. 3.

'subsystem influencing'. It is, therefore, impossible to study the dynamics of the buffer state without considering the buffer system as a whole. The logic of the buffer system is such that neither power can dominate the system, and thus neither power should encroach on the sovereignty of the state(s) separating them because they act as a deterrence mechanism. Although a likely side-effect is that conflict between the powers is repressed, it is possible as in other deterrence relationships that the system may become unstable for political, social, or economic reasons and as such the relationship between the powers and buffers could change dramatically. In order to maintain stability in the buffer system both powers must agree on the strategic importance of the buffer zone and also must continue to support its independence and autonomy.

The overall buffer effect[110] will vary in accordance with individual cases and over time but the variables that tend to influence the strength of the buffer effect are the following:[111]

- the degree of power parity between the great powers
- the degree of equality of salience of the buffer area to the great powers which is also linked to the degree of the attractiveness (to the powers)
- the probability that each power would resist an attempt to attack or intervene in the system's small state
- the political and economic costs to each power of subduing the smaller state
- the degree of power disparity between the great and small powers
- the commitment to continued independence on the part of the buffer state's leadership, especially in the desire for freedom from the power's intervention into the domestic affairs of the buffer, which is evidenced in public statements by political elites.

The way in which these variables interact serves to maintain the buffer system while keeping the small state from becoming too weak (thereby collapsing the system altogether) or too strong where the buffer would then be more attractive to the powers as a potential ally.

The emergence of a *cordon sanitaire*

Using the above variables, it may be useful to present examples in which one or more of these factors are only vaguely present or not at all. One possibility is the emergence of a *cordon sanitaire* which was first used to signify the containment policy towards the new Bolshevik state after World War II. In more recent times a *cordon sanitaire* has described a situation in which a string of small states on the periphery of a powerful state are made by a rival power to serve as a barrier, or when the small states themselves wish to form a barrier to both isolate and insulate the rival power from the rest of the world. Having strong defence implications, a *cordon sanitaire* may be a way for a power to turn internally or it could be a means for a rival power to contain another's influence.

Taking the form of an asymmetric pattern of alliance or association, a *cordon sanitaire* has two main functions. The first is to separate a great power from another rival power or group of powers. The second function is to mobilise the support of political elites that are present in the *cordon sanitaire* or if that is not possible, to co-ordinate their foreign policies so as to counter the interests of the opposing power. In theory the presence of a *cordon sanitaire* would improve stability in the region while separating the conflicting ideological perspectives, therefore reducing the chance for military confrontation. The *cordon sanitaire* could also serve as a political, economic and social barrier from the undesirable state or region. For example, Moscow perceives NATO enlargement to the area it views as its natural sphere of influence as implicitly directed against Russia. Even though this scenario does not coincide with stated NATO intentions, the changing geopolitical dynamics of CEE bring uncertainty for Russia as NATO has not officially drawn the line of where its enlargement eastwards will end.

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[110] Referring to the degree of resistance of a buffer area to outside encroachments, superficially observable as the persistence over time of the small states of the buffer system as independent political units.
[111] Knudsen, p. 91.

If one were to combine various aspects from both the *cordon sanitaire* and buffer system situations, it might be possible to imagine a system that is partially controlled by one power, partially controlled by the other, and partially by neither. The centre of the cordon would be the uncontrollable area consisting of one or several non-aligned states. Moving further from the core to the periphery those states would be under the influence or directly controlled by the powers. This type of system is referred to as a *buffer complex*. Some states lean to one side, some to the other, while the core is largely non-aligned. In this scenario the difference is the greater the distance from the core, the more susceptible the weaker states are to encroachments on their sovereignty.

Pressures on a buffer state to lean to one side may intensify in the following three situations. First, this shift occurs when there is an intensified rivalry between the larger powers; second, when the level of capability shifts dramatically to the advantage of one of the larger powers over the other; and third, when internal dissension threatens domestic upheaval and one group seeks external support. But neither neutrality nor leaning to one side is always a satisfactory solution to the buffer state's problems. Neutrality is often made unattainable by political or economic pressures from the larger powers, and a policy of leaning is fraught with the danger of the buffer losing its independence and autonomy. There is another option that the buffer state may have which is the 'third power option'. This is when a third power outside of the buffer system becomes involved as it may have an interest in helping to preserve the buffer's independence or keeping the larger powers from expanding their influence.

Conversely, instead of seeking support from external actors the smaller states possibly derive protection by banding together and using their combined aggregate strength to withstand a challenge from a peripheral power. In this case they behave like a pluralistic community, not necessarily in the military sense, but in the sense that they are committed to the independence and autonomy of each other. Theoretically speaking, if one falls subject to one of the powers, the effects of instability will be felt within entire buffer region.[112] The stability of the buffer complex hinges on the ability of the small states to resist encroachment or outright control by the larger powers. An example of this could be the forming of the GUUAM[113] alliance. As discussed in Chapter Five this sub-regional organisation represents those states that have sought to maintain Russia at a distance and opposed CIS supra-national structures. GUUAM's members share common ideologies regarding their desire to integrate with Europe as well as the need to find alternative energy suppliers to lessen their dependence on Russia.

On the other hand, if a smaller state in the buffer zone would seek closer military or economic co-operation with one of the larger powers, there is a danger that the rival power would seek compensation, possibly by exerting influence over another small state in the region. If there is disagreement and a lack of co-operation among some or all of the smaller states, the likelihood of fending off encroachments from the larger powers will be significantly reduced. Infighting among the small states is a reason why a buffer complex might collapse. Moreover, if the core were to come under the control of one or both of the powers, the buffer effect would disappear because it is contingent upon some minimum level of resistance to the great powers. If the core were to fall to a power, the situation would be that of a head to head confrontation between the rivals, and thus the buffer zone would no longer be useful for preserving regional stability.

This ponderous section which analyses buffer states, systems, and the issue of sovereignty and the buffer state has attempted to provide a theoretical framework based on structural arguments for explaining the multi-vector foreign and security policy of Ukraine, given its unique geopolitical position as a buffer state in CEE. Further, the dominating theme has focused on the importance of state sovereignty and has distinguished between positive and negative sovereignty with the latter being characteristic of buffer (and quasi) states. In the following section the discussion will continue on the topic of sovereignty and will add the element of state- and nation-building to the equation. This section will attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of the conceptual work and theories associated with buffer and

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[112] On a larger scale this would resemble a collective defence organisation such as NATO.
[113] Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova

quasi-states in studying Ukraine, specifically in terms of Kuchma's multi-vectoral foreign policy.

Quasi and buffer states compared and contrasted

Before addressing some of the commonalties shared by quasi and buffer states, it is important to note that these two concepts are rather different creatures. A quasi-state is the product of an accommodating doctrine of international law based on self-determination and sovereignty for all ex-colonies. Quasi-states exist by international right. Buffer states, on the contrary, are not the result of a legal but a political situation. Buffer states do not exist as a matter of right, but rather are the product of geopolitical dynamics in a particular region. Further, the theory of quasi-states is rationalist theory, whereas the theory of buffer states is realist theory. But even given these fundamental differences, one can compare the actions of governments that are considered quasi or buffer states or even both (as this thesis considers Ukraine) and use these concepts in a framework that helps to explain their foreign policy decisions. Both statuses presuppose foreign policy constraints and both are helpful in explaining Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation.

Throughout this chapter, the discussion has centred on the implications for the development of the foreign and security polices of a state that is perceived by the external environment as negatively sovereign. Both quasi and buffer states are rather limited in terms of political freedom as they are both highly dependent on the perceptions and actions of external actors. Their sovereignty and legitimacy are often questioned and at times even challenged by more capable states. Quasi and buffer states traditionally have had to accept a reactive rather than a proactive role in international and regional relations. Both quasi and buffer states are negatively sovereign and as such, they are unlikely to be in a position to provide their citizens with socio-economic welfare.

During this period of economic, political and social transition, quasi-states are inclined to consider state- and nation-building as their primary concern as otherwise sovereignty and independence will remain questionable and challengeable rather than accepted and solidified. They will also be wary of entering into economic or political agreements with other actors where their sovereignty could be compromised. Quasi-states are vulnerable to outside encroachments on their domestic affairs as they possess weak state institutions and traditions.

Similarly, buffer states, because of their geopolitical position, are vulnerable to encroachments from external actors. But buffers may be seen in some cases as having a 'sovereignty advantage' in the sense that it is normally in the interests of the larger powers to have a viable, independent entity which serves to physically separate the conflicting ideological, political, or military interests of the two powers.

General implications for international relations theory

It would be useful to briefly discuss several paradigms in mainstream international relations theory and to pose the following questions: can the traditional theories of international relations account for the practices and institutions of negatively sovereign quasi-states? Are the assumptions concerning the nature of states valid in the case of quasi-states? Or are amendments to them or possibly even new theories called for?

This section will classify international relations theory, at the risk of oversimplification, according to Wight's three classical paradigms which have existed almost as long as sovereign states- realism, rationalism, and revolutionism.[114] These paradigms reflect categorically different modes of thought and as such have their own logic and rhetoric.

Classical international relations theory is first and foremost a theory of survival.[115] Sovereign states exist in a condition of anarchy and can ultimately depend only on

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[114] Martin Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', *Review of International Studies*, 1987, vol. 13, pp. 221-7.
[115] Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, pp. 160-1.

themselves for survival. Realism conceives of international relations predominantly by *raison d'etat* in which political right is the good of the state and sovereignty is the final word on such matters.[116] Although states are at liberty, they exist in close quarters and therefore cannot avoid interaction with one another. They are bound by fate although not by society. The international system is viewed as an arena where states pursue their national interests and periodically come into conflict with one other. The fundamental problem in international relations is how to prevent the unavoidable conflicts from getting out of hand.

Realism was founded on a conception of sovereign statehood which asserts that the state must protect its subjects from foreign threats otherwise the enemy will invade, the covenant will be dissolved, and domestic civil society reverts to the state of nature which is a war for all.[117] Hobbes conceives of the sovereign state as an organised protectorate of its subjects and sovereignty is derived from within. In the case of quasi-states they normally possess arms, but these arms often point inward at the subjects. This seems to indicate that there is no external enemy or rather that the internal one is more significant. But unlike Hobbes' version of realism, the quasi-state cannot logically collapse into a state of nature because its sovereignty is not derived from internal conditions but externally from the states-system. Quasi-states are upheld by an external covenant which in itself turns Hobbes' realism upside down because the state of nature is domestic and civil society is international.[118] Quasi-states are by definition deficient and defective as apparatuses of power as they as not positively sovereign or naturally free. Further, their independence is granted by the international community as a matter of courtesy and they are only constitutionally independent in the legal sense. Quasi-states are tolerated by 'real' states only because nothing vital is at stake and they survive by virtue of the East-West balance of power. Moreover, giving these quasi-states a place in the United Nations, for example, is easier than not giving them one, and may even serve to promote the national interests of the more powerful states. But realism in the classical sense underestimates the political significance of both quasi and buffer states in international relations in that they should not be considered to be purely reactory bodies and they can affect international relations simply by being.

According to rationalist theories it would be a political distortion to claim that international relations are determined only by the behaviour of positively sovereign states. Thus, rationalism seems to account for the existence of quasi-states in the system. Rationalism is a conception of international relations as a society shaped by a conversation between states and the rule of law and the root of society is the sociability of man. The fact that international relations are anarchical does not rule out the obligations of states bound by international agreements. The idea is constitutionalism or the observation of rules that apply equally to oneself as to others.[119] This approach highlights the behaviour of diplomats in general as they conduct international relations with civility and forbearance, observe norms of society, avoid interfering in the domestic affairs of other states, and do not engage in warfare. Rationalism is a notion of consenting adults freely entering into international society by formally concluding agreements and treaties, observing common customs, attending conferences, founding organisations, and engaging in bilateral and multilateral negotiations which are aimed at improving the economic, political, and social conditions of the parties involved.

Diplomats from quasi-states are not exceptions to this code of conduct. They are supporters of the law of nations and seek an expansion and enhancement of international obligations which in turn facilitates the transition to positive sovereignty.[120] These statesmen also expect and even demand forbearance from other states because their survival depends fundamentally on non-intervention and thus, their positive outlook on international society reflects a necessary course of action rather than virtue. Perhaps they cannot follow the same rules and norms on a domestic level because they are unable to trust their domestic rivals. Although quasi-statesmen are generally good citizens internationally, many

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[116] Jackson, p. 164.

[117] T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford, 1946.

[118] Jackson, p. 169.

[119] Jackson, p. 165.

[120] Refer to the stages to positive sovereignty at the beginning of this chapter.

nevertheless operate contrary to the rules on a domestic level (excessive corruption in the Ukrainian government is a vivid example). As discussed in Chapter Six, Ukraine's diplomatic tactics reflect such rationalist theories of international relations. These diplomats tend to respect international norms, are professional and courteous in international forums, and seek to be integrated into the international community as equal partners. Ukraine's enthusiasm in its relations with international actors and organisations reflects its need to obtain financial and political support to ensure the state's survival, which as mentioned above, is more an act of necessity rather than of virtue.

The third paradigm, revolutionism[121], rejects the existing sovereignty system and views it as an obstacle to the ultimate values of humankind.[122] Thus, revolutionism does not really account for the existence of quasi-states as one of the primary characteristics of quasi-states is the undertaking of contemporary international relations. In other words, they *want* to be part of the 'club' and they do not reject the existing sovereignty system. For Kant sovereignty is the barrier in the path to enlightenment. People always take priority over institutions and consequently, the sovereign state must be subject to a higher authority of some kind.[123] A different image of revolutionism is associated with Marx (and more recent theories of international political economy) who believed that a global divide into socio-economic classes was more fundamental than divisions between states. Marx described a wealthy and industrial centre and an impoverished, agrarian periphery with highly unequal and imperial relations between the two.[124] This model is revolutionary not only because sovereign states are less significant than classes, but because the sought after goal is a world free of class divisions and of the capitalist states which perpetuate such divisions.

As stated previously, quasi-states are not yet capable of providing their populations with the resources associated with developed statehood. They ask for international financial and political support to assist in the processes of state- and nation-building and this support is normally difficult to attain. A logical question to ask along these lines is does this type of 'paternalism' have any place in international relations today? If by paternalism is meant relations in which some states assume a positive regard for others and provide them with assistance, this is certainly common behaviour. However, if this type of support is meant the moral and legal responsibility of one agent over another, then international paternity is uncommon today. The reasoning that justifies the relationship between 'real' and quasi-states rests on the assumption that the survival of quasi-states is important because over time and with substantial assistance, these states will develop into viable, prosperous states.

But what then will be the fate of these states in terms of negative sovereignty and is this division bound to continue? One important factor hinges on whether or not these states enhance their prosperity to the point of no longer depending on external support. Also important is whether there is a continued East-West divide. Jackson believes this division is bound to continue because 'statesmen prefer predictability in international relations...One can see negative sovereignty more or less as an institution which accommodates the instrumental requirements of diplomacy in what today is a far flung society of states with exceedingly diverse characteristics'.[125] Moreover, diplomats do not confront each other from within the narrow perspective of their own national interests; they engage in dialogue from an equal legal status. Statesmen are under the obligation to respect the sovereignty and independence of other actors by using consideration, courtesy, decorum, and honour despite enormous inequalities of power and wealth. International relations, moreover, has the character of a club as members are honorary fellows and with membership comes privileges. Provided members conform to the rules of the club, their private lives are their own. Governments who break the rules cannot usually be deprived of sovereignty; therefore, punishment comes in the form of being condemned or ostracised by other members (such as economic or diplomatic sanctions).

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[121] Reflected in the Protestant Reformation, the French, Communist, Islamic, and Green Revolutions.

[122] Wight, *Power Politics*, pp. 221-7.

[123] Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch' in Hans Riess (ed), *Kant's Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 107-8, and A. Linklater, 'Men and citizens of international relations', *Review of International Studies*, 1981, vol. 7, pp. 23-37.

[124] See R. Pettman, 'Competing paradigms in international politics', *Review of International Studies*, 1981, vol. 7, pp. 39-49.

[125] Ibid, p. 195.

For the majority of this chapter the literature associated with quasi and buffer states and its usefulness in analysing the foreign policies of post-communist governments such as Ukraine has been presented. The discussion has followed from assumptions found in the structural model of mainstream international relations theory. However, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, in addition to objective factors such as geopolitics and economics, subjective and behavioural criteria must also be included in the equation.[126] Particularly given that Ukraine is in the process of state- and nation-building, subjective factors such as the lack of a national identity can have a crucial impact on the formulation of clearly defined national interests, which in turn reflects in the government's changeable and somewhat unpredictable foreign policy. The following section will examine the two contradictory forces of post-imperialism and post-totalitarianism as well as the effects of such legacies on Ukraine's efforts at state- and nation-building. The discussion will then shift to Ukraine's quasi-state and quasi-nation inheritance, focusing on four means by which states have historically achieved their independence. It will be argued that the process and success of state- and nation-building in the newly independent states of the FSU is strongly linked to the nature of the state's colonial experience of subjugation and the mode by which it became independent. Further, this section will consider the implications for Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy given this historic legacy.

CONCEPTUALISATION: A BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH

The End of Empire and the End of Totalitarianism

As explained by Motyl[127] there are two contradictory forces buffeting all of the FSU successor states- post-imperialism and post-totalitarianism. The collapse of empire has encouraged rapid and fundamental change while the shock of collapse has made populations cognitively and emotionally more receptive to change. The socio-economic disruption associated with this collapse undermines the existing power structures and creates a dissatisfied population. The attempts of post-Soviet elites to appeal to the potential constituencies encourage them to adopt policies of radical change. Also, the emergence of new states in some cases has encouraged nationalist sentiments based on assertiveness, regeneration, and a new beginning.[128]

On the other hand, the end of totalitarianism undermines the ability of post-Soviet elites to adopt radical policies and also of society to withstand them. Where the state is totalitarian and controls society in depth, there can be no democracy, no market, no rule of law, and no civil society. The result is that post-totalitarian elites lack the political, social, and economic institutions and resources necessary to govern an independent state, while the post-totalitarian society lacks the basis which would permit the state to survive the necessary radical transitions without experiencing extreme economic hardship as well as social disruption. Most importantly, post-totalitarian societies are so atomised that the challenge before them is not the *transformation* of the political, economic, and social institutions, but rather of the *creation* of these institutions. The post-imperial tendency is to take advantage of the collapse of imperialism and to transform their society as quickly as possible while the post-totalitarian tendency is for elites to recognise that they have virtually nothing to work with. Although transforming these institutions into something viable may be possible, creating these state institutions simultaneously is not possible. Logic dictates that the post-totalitarian reasoning will assert itself over post-imperialism, thus once governmental elites recognise that constructive change is possible over time, they should in theory abandon their post-imperial tendencies.[129]

After more then 300 years of Russian imperialism and 70 years of Soviet totalitarianism Ukraine has achieved independence and has joined the international

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[126] See also Chapter Six for a discussion of the subjective element of Ukraine's foreign policy.

[127] Alexander Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. See Chapter Two in particular.

[128] Ibid, p. 51.

[129] Ibid.

community of sovereign states. But this is just the first step towards true and lasting statehood. Ukraine has at best questionable democratic institutions, no rule of law, no civil society for the most part, and lacks a market. Indeed Ukraine lacks a bona fide state by Western standards, and legitimate economic and political institutions that engage in effective taxation, administration, and policing of territory.[130] Many of the post-Soviet states are unlikely to succeed in the short term. Institutionally speaking, although something can be created on the basis of nothing, it is difficult to imagine how nothing can be immediately transformed into everything without considerable economic, political, and social upheaval.

Gennep's Rites of Passage Model: The Three-Stage Transition to Nationhood

After World War II Ukraine followed the psychological paradigm described by Gennep.[131] In his model, unifying peoples experience a three-stage transition in attempting to establish a national identity. In the first stage, *separation*, a community realises that it is disconnected with the original identity, yet has not envisioned a clear alternative. In this stage, the group is identified by comparing itself to the Other while emphasising the differences. The second stage, *liminality*, is a transitional stage in which the group has not abandoned the old identity entirely but has begun to show signs of developing a new national identity. Thus, the group may identify itself as part of both its traditional identity and its new identity or as a distinct subsection of the original group. The final stage, *aggregation*, occurs when a group has fully embraced a new identity by incorporating the new values and symbols and thus, has completely disregarded the original identity.

Post-World War II Ukraine seems to follow this model in its nation-building process. However, due to the vast differences which have arisen from historical experiences and collective memories of the regions, Ukraine's Rite of Passage has been a relatively uneven process. The result has been an incoherent and at times conflicting development of Ukraine's national identity, and with it an unpredictable, changeable foreign policy which as yet has undefined national interests.[132]

Because of the peaceful and almost uneventful transition to independence Ukraine was deprived of several crucial building blocks of nation-building. Ukraine lacked a unifying national mythology and heroes with which to associate its new independence. Although some nationalists did call for the establishment of a distinct culture and policy, most Ukrainians found this agenda unappealing. Further, Ukrainians could neither look to a common national historic experience to bring about unity nor could it look to the church as a unifying force as religious practices are split between Orthodoxy (eastern/southern Ukraine) and Catholicism (western Ukraine). Given the historic, cultural, religious and psychological divergences across Ukraine, the use of nationalist rhetoric has tended to divide rather than consolidate the population. For these reasons, Ukraine became a state without a clear sense of national identity and legitimacy and remains plagued by these deficiencies to the present day.[133]

Ukraine's 'Rite of Passage' is, moreover, by no means complete. The dynamics of Ukrainian nationalism are not synchronised which in turn fosters differing national agendas as advocated by the various regions. Although after nearly a decade of independence the Ukrainian state has been accepted by the international community as legitimate, there is little cohesion or general agreement as to the purpose of statehood. Fundamental questions need to be addressed at this stage: will Ukraine become a culturally unitary state? Is Ukraine a part of the 'European' or 'Eurasian' civilisations or perhaps both? Until such basic issues of national identity are resolved, Ukraine's posture both at home and abroad will remain uncertain and variable and its foreign policy will remain multi-vectoral.[134]

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[130] Ibid, p. 54.
[131] Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, as cited in Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, Chapter 9.
[132] Prizel, pp. 339-340.
[133] See Chapter Three for a discussion of ethnic, cultural, and political divisions.
[134] Prizel, p. 371.

Modalities of Independence and the case of Ukraine

Ukraine is by no means unique in that its independence was achieved after long periods of external domination. Indeed, most modern states fit into this category. However, the chronological length of external domination does not help to explain the nature of state behaviour once independence is achieved. It is important to realise that the process and success of state- and nation-building in newly independent states is strongly linked to the nature of the respective state's colonial experience and the mode by which it became independent. The success in state-building also depends to a large degree on what institutions existed during the colonial era and the viability of those institutions just after independence. In the following section four categories by which states have historically achieved their independence will be discussed, showing the link between the mode of independence/presence of national institutions and successes in state- and nation-building.[135]

Mature institutions prior to independence

The construction of national institutions is a slow and arduous process in any newly independent society and to a large degree, depends both on the structure of the former empire and on the manner by which independence was achieved. Some empires allowed their subjects to retain and even to develop their national institutions, inviting a sense of national identity during the time of domination. Examples would include Scotland in the United Kingdom, Iceland under Danish control, Norway under Swedish domination, Finland in the Romanov Empire, and Ukrainians in Galicia. Because these subjects were able to preserve and to develop their national institutions the transformation to independence was not as problematic. In the case of Scotland where independence has not yet been achieved, institutions are already in place which have enabled the Scottish elite to gain valuable experience in decision-making. Thus, having decided by referendum to establish a Scottish parliament, independent of Westminster, Scotland will retain control over its domestic affairs to a limited extent. On one hand, when a subject is at liberty to assume partial responsibility and control over its own affairs, valuable experience and knowledge gained during the time of subjugation becomes integral to the survival of the state once independence is achieved or granted. On the other hand, this experience could possibly work against the independent state if the elites are stuck in the old mentality and continue to adopt the same type of policies that brought about the downfall of the colonial power. To a large extent this is the situation in Ukraine with its post-Soviet style bureaucracy and mentality.

National Struggle to achieve independence

The second category refers to a condition where, although the empire may have destroyed the nation's institutions, a prolonged struggle for liberation has engendered a strong sense of national consciousness. Ireland would be an example of this case. English hegemony towards Ireland triggered centuries of struggle which led to mass mobilisation and the creation of a host of national institutions, including political parties, and educational institutions. The emergence of national institutions in Ireland as a result of this prolonged struggle for independence helped to make the transition to an institutionalised state relatively easy. Other polities fall under this category, including Israel, where the struggle for independence resulted in the rise of political parties, India where the political parties preceded independence by decades, and South Africa where a long period of struggle against apartheid led to mass political mobilisation among the population.

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[135] See Ilya Prizel, 'Ukraine's Lagging Efforts in Building National Institutions and the Potential Impact on National Security', *The Harriman Review*, vol. 10, no. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 29-31.

Instant independent states

A third category of newly independent states refers to one with a very weak national and state identity. In this case, independence was thrust upon the subjects by a collapsing empire, rather than due to a movement within the population. Examples include much of Francophone sub-Saharan Africa and Belarus. In the case of Belarus the old ideology remains relatively intact. While the 'independent' state does exercise the formalities of statehood by appointing governments and engaging in international relations, the empire or the remains of it, continues to retain *de facto* control over its foreign relations, finances, and defence without objection from the quasi-government. It is thus not by modern definitions a truly independent state.

The Ukrainian case: The transfer of authority

Ukraine's path to independence falls into a fourth category that is similar in some ways to Brazil, Italy, and parts of Latin America. In each of these cases, there was a history of resistance to colonial rule usually led by intellectuals. But ultimately independence was not achieved by a societal struggle, but by an empire which was reacting to shifts in the international system to protect (and in some cases to expand) its own power and prestige. A mere transfer of authority from the 'mother country' to the subjects achieved independence. Under these circumstances the processes of state- and nation-building are very slow. Such newly independent states must begin almost from scratch to learn from trial and error as to how to establish credible economic and political institutions and how to conduct diplomacy.

Ukraine's drive to independence was conducted by those who saw the implosion of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to preserve, transfer, or possibly to expand the political and economic power created by the Soviet Union. However, the peaceful and swift collapse of the Soviet Union denied Ukrainian elites the opportunity to create replacement institutions that would fill the vacuum left by the receding empire. The historic experience of Ukraine destroyed most of the indigenous political and economic institutions while the manner in which independence was achieved did not lead to the mass mobilisation of the population, hence failing to establish new political institutions that would link the state to the society.[136] The survival of the Ukrainian state which binds the state and society is dependent upon the government's ability to create institutions which transform the population from 'subjects' into citizens.

The fact that Ukrainian independence came so abruptly and unexpectedly has enormous consequences for the future of the country. As Motyl explains, virtually no one in or out of the government was prepared for independence or its aftermath. Largely inexperienced and untrained, Ukraine's elites must now cope with the task of transforming a colony into an independent state and creating everything that totalitarianism had either destroyed or stifled: a civic society, a market, the rule of law, democracy and the machinery necessary to run a state. In many respects, the challenges confronting Ukraine are more significant than those of former British or French colonies, for example. All had to overcome the legacy of empire but by contrast, Ukraine and the other post-Soviet republics also have to overcome the legacy of totalitarianism.[137]

As also discussed in Chapter Three Ukraine's historic legacy of external domination, lack of a tradition of national institutions and national identity, and ultimately the manner in which Ukraine became an independent state contributed to its present situation of quasi-stateness, its negative sovereignty problem, and is indirectly related to the necessity to maintain a multi-directional foreign policy, at least for the time being. From this discussion it can be concluded that the difficulties associated with Ukrainian state- and nation-building is strongly linked to the mode by which independence was achieved. By returning to the definition of *nation* found in the beginning of this chapter it should become clear that a sentiment of sacrifices which have been made in the past is an important attribute and one which makes the creation of a national identity an easier task. Without either a history of

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[136] Ibid, p. 31.
[137] Motyl, p. 51.

struggle or national symbols or heroes with which to identify, it becomes an arduous task to move beyond the statuses of quasi-state and quasi-nation.

In any case, it is difficult to create a national consciousness from the top down (i.e. government to society). A single national identity cannot be easily forged within the existing divisions that remain in Ukraine. The movement should ideally originate within the society and should be based on values that can be embraced universally. Ukrainians must be able to interact within democratic institutions using a free press and the rule of law. They also need to possess the ability to create economic wealth. If those values become the foundation of the Ukrainian identity then old divisions would likely disappear. Once these fundamental requirements have been met, Ukrainians would then have a convincing reason to support the state's independence.[138]

CONCLUSIONS

It should be clear from this chapter that both structural and behavioural models of international relations theory should be utilised for a clear understanding of how Ukraine and other post-communist states formulate their foreign policy agendas. It is indeed crucial to take into account Ukraine's geopolitical realities as a negatively sovereign state situated between Russia and the West. It is equally important to consider the domestic and subjective factors such economic constraints, the character of constitutions, historical and social tendencies, party politics, personalities of leaders, the spread of nationalism and the creation of a national identity.

In this chapter quasi and buffer states are discussed in the context of the enhancement of state sovereignty and international status. Although fundamentally different creatures both types of states possess negative sovereignty which this chapter argues is a limiting factor in a state's international and regional relations. In order to improve their international statuses such states strive to alter their political situation from being negatively to positively sovereign through state- and nation-building. Quasi-states such as Ukraine do not have domestic political institutions that are capable of outlasting the individuals that presently sanction them. Therefore, decisions reached in foreign relations are often less than certifiable and more than likely will not stand the test of time in the event of unfavourable developments in the internal or external environment.

When the USSR ceased to exist and Ukraine became an independent state, it did so with many qualifications. Chief among these factors was Ukraine's inheritance of its quasi-state and quasi-nation from the Ukrainian SSR. Ukraine's inheritance will ensure its continued high level of dependence particularly with regard to Russia and the CIS and thus, will prevent a radical re-orientation of its foreign and security policies away from its eastern neighbours. Moreover, the dependency factor will also prevent Ukraine from altering its multi-vector foreign policy too radically toward the West. The degree to which Ukraine's state- and nation-building policies are successful will determine the extent to which Ukraine will evolve from its inherited quasi-status to become a fully developed state and nation.[139]

Though Ukraine is potentially a medium power it is a relatively weak state, particularly as regards the stagnant economic situation. The government does not have the means to oppose or appease its enemies, or entice its friends. Ukraine is still a state and nation in the making. The consolidation of its statehood is, moreover, taking place in the context of a history of statelessness and an abundance of ethnic and regional diversity. However, the crucial question is not whether Ukraine will remain an independent state but rather what kind of state will it become? Will it be able to improve the efficiency and accountability of its institutions, consolidate political and economic reforms, create a strong national and state identity among the population, and ultimately, achieve positive sovereignty?

Stepping out onto the world stage for the first time, Ukraine has a relatively low international profile. Far more than neighbouring Poland or Russia Ukraine will have to rely

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[138] Bohdan Skrobach, 'Ukraine still lacks its own identity', *The Kyiv Post*, 29 December 1998.
[139] Taras Kuzio, "The Domestic Sources of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', Paper delivered at the conference Ukraine and the New World Order 1991-1996, University of Ottawa, 21-22 March 1997, p. 6.

on foreign policy as a means to establish its presence within the international system. At the same time Ukraine will have to determine its national interests for the first time in history after centuries of foreign domination by Lithuania and Poland and later by Austria and Russia as discussed in Chapter Three. Given the varying experiences in Ukraine's regions, the segments of the population will have different ideas as to what constitutes Ukraine's 'Other' thus making it extremely difficult to forge a national identity. The result has been an incoherent and at times conflicting development of Ukraine's national identity, accompanied by an inconsistent foreign policy agenda to defend its inadequately defined national interests. Unlike neighbouring Poland Ukraine has to contemplate external tensions as well as far more profound internal problems. Given its economic, geopolitical and security realities, a prolonged period of tension with its neighbours seems almost inevitable as Ukraine shapes its national and state identity and seeks to determine its national interests.[140]

The purpose of this chapter was to lay the theoretical and conceptual foundation for later empirical chapters by highlighting the importance of considering both structural and behavioural factors in an analysis of Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy orientation. It was also intended to show how the success and failure of nation-and state-building depends largely on the political and economic institutions, how long these institutions have been in existence, and on the manner by which independence was achieved. In the following chapter the dynamics of Ukrainian independence and the resultant political system that has emerged under the leadership of Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma will be discussed in detail. As this chapter has focused more on nation-building, Chapter Three will address the issue of state-building paying particular attention to the Ukrainian Constitution, the institutions, the historic legacies, as well as the forces which threaten to undermine the construction of the Ukrainian state.

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[140] Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy,* p. 10.

Chapter Three: Broad Developments in Ukrainian Domestic Politics: 1991-1999

Ukraine is currently in the process of confronting and attempting to minimise a host of wide-ranging domestic problems associated with state- and nation-building. Since independence and as discussed n the previous chapter, Ukrainian policy-makers have had to deal with the remnants of totalitarianism and have been working to install democratic regimes, to transform the economy into a market economy, and to establish a foreign and security policy agenda capable of capturing positive attention from the international community. As regards state-building, Ukraine's political and economic institutions are lagging in efficiency and capability compared to the institutions of other states in CEE. As regards nation-building, the task of establishing a Ukrainian national identity will not be an easy one. Ukraine's many ethnic and cultural divisions have resulted in differences of opinion as to with whom Ukraine should develop its international and regional relations.

This chapter will discuss the institutional developments and legacies that have plagued Ukraine since its independence beginning with a brief description of the legacy of the Tsarist and Soviet inheritance. However, the actual impact of these institutional developments and legacies on policy will be dealt with in the following chapter. The first section will survey the legal and political developments post 1991 in terms of state- and institution-building including the distribution of power of the executive and legislative branches of government and the foreign policy perspectives of those forces (political parties-right, centre, and left). Also included in this section is a survey of the progress made in economic reforms including economic decrees issued by the executive, privatisation, and the West's response. The second section focuses on the regional dimension and Ukraine's many divisions ranging from ethnic, social, and historical differences of the *oblasts* (provinces). Attention will also be given to those forces that have threatened to undermine the state-building process in Ukraine, although it should be noted that the influence of those forces has been minimal. Moreover, I argue that linguistic and cultural differences in Ukrainian society are not causes for widespread concern because the majority of those which affiliate themselves historically, ethnically, and linguistically with Eurasia (USSR/Russia/CIS) do not wish to reintegrate politically or economically with Russia. The third section focuses on the challenges and paradoxes associated with the creation of a Ukrainian national identity, and argues that the formation of this identity is further complicated by ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. Further, the national identity question is also strongly linked to the mode by which Ukraine achieved its independence (see Chapter Two) and the scarcity of myths, traditions, and national heroes with which to identify.

Continuing on from points made in the previous theoretical chapter, this chapter will advance the argument that Ukraine's foreign policy is a balance between structural/systemic and domestic factors. It is the task of this chapter to identify those domestic factors that appear to have the most profound influence on Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation and to discuss why.

THE TSARIST AND SOVIET INHERITANCE

In the Tsarist era Ukrainians were not recognised as a separate ethnic group but merely as a regional variation of Russians (*Russkie*). In contrast, the Soviet era did recognise Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group having the right to establish their own republic until modernisation and urbanisation which led to the 'Ukrainisation' of towns became a threat to Soviet rule in Ukraine. Thus, repression and 'little Russianisation' from 1933-34 with the rise of Stalinism replaced this policy.[1]

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[1] Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine: Coming to terms with the Soviet legacy', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol. 14, no. 4, December 1998, p. 2.

In 1917 ethnic Ukrainians were divided between two empires (Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary) and one state (Romania). The bulk of Ukrainian territories had not been united since the seventeenth century when an independent Ukrainian state was established for a brief period of time. The most favourable treatment towards Ukrainians came from Austria. Until the late nineteenth century, Ukrainians defined themselves as *Ruthenians (Rus'yny)*, but the Austrians had encouraged the development of a Ukrainian identity for two reasons: first, to counter tendencies toward a Russian identity at a time when Austria and Russia were enemies and second, to divide and rule by promoting a counterweight to the Poles. The Austrian policies on nationality were implemented with a more liberal approach than were the prevailing Tsarist policies and such policies were coupled with the ongoing and often violent conflict between the Ukrainians and the Poles until the 1940s. These factors helped to transform by the turn of the century the former *Ruthenian ethnos* of western Ukraine into a people who identified themselves as members of a larger Ukrainian nation. However, such developments did not take place in Tsarist Russia as they worked to prevent a Ukrainian identity from surfacing. The Tsarist regime never prohibited the use of the Polish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Hebrew or Tatar languages, but did prohibit the use of Ukrainian, particularly in primary education. [2] According to one study some of the reasons why are as follows:[3]

(1) to prevent Ukrainians from developing a sense of their ethnic identity;
(2) to prevent Ukrainian intellectuals from transferring the national idea to the masses;
(3) because of concern over the long-term cultural orientation of Ukrainians as an identity separate from Russian might eventually emerge;
(4) because 'Little Russians' (Ukrainians) had only two options- to identify with either the Poles or the Russians. The Tsarist authorities wanted to prevent a third option from arising (Ukrainian) and the severity of their edict forbidding Ukrainian-language publishing reflected this concern.[4]

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as state- and nation-building was progressing in Western Europe, Russian officials looked to France as a model of a traditional nation-state by which they would try to emulate. The core of the Russian nation would consist of three eastern Slavic branches of the *Russkie* (Russian) peoples. This nation would be defined in terms of language, ethnicity, and religion (Orthodoxy). Thus, Ukrainians and Belarusians were described as mere regional offshoots of Russians. Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of the Tsarist nationality policies the attempt to create on independent state between 1917 and 1920 ultimately failed. Nevertheless, the strength of nationalist sentiments in Ukraine had the unexpected result of forcing the Soviet Russian state to allow for the creation of the Ukrainian SSR.

As discussed throughout this thesis, the Tsarist and Soviet inheritance has indeed had a profound influence on the development of the Ukrainian nation-state and is also reflected in Kuchma's multi-vector or 'torn' foreign policy orientation. Ukraine has a history of identifying with various cultures and traditions which were very different, while the nation's own distinct identity has been suppressed for most of its history. It should not, therefore, be surprising that depending on the region in which they live (west, east, south) Ukrainians differ in their preference for closer ties with Europe or with Eurasia.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER INDEPENDENCE

During the period from 1990-94, Ukraine was ruled by representatives of the *nomenklatura-* national democratic alliance (which was far from homogeneous) as well as the Communist

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[2] Ibid, p. 3.
[3] See David Saunders, 'What makes a nation a nation? Ukrainians since 1600', *Ethnic Groups*, vol. 10, 1993, p. 109; D. Saunders, 'Russia's demographic policy (1847-1905): A demographic approach, *European History Quarterly,* vol. 25, no. 2, April 1995, p. 188; as cited in T. Kuzio, 'Ukraine: Coming to terms with the Soviet legacy', p. 3.
[4] David Saunders, 'Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863', *International History Review*, vol. 17, no. 1, February 1995, p. 28.

Party which had turned nationalist. This government ruled in conjunction with western and central Ukrainian moderate nationalists from the former opposition. After the 1990 elections, the majority of seats in the Ukrainian parliament were held by the Communist Party (239 of the 450 seats), followed by the opposition which had about 130; the rest were allocated to independent representatives.[5] At this time, the opposition and the independents were united under the umbrella of the moderately nationalist *Rukh* movement (discussed below). Thus, when Ukraine gained its independence in 1991 the Communists were in the majority.

Given the small numerical bloc of those calling themselves democrats, it might be concluded that the bloc itself was not very significant. However, this is a false conclusion. The representatives of the non-communist bloc were elected on a non-communist political platform which focused on independent state-building. Their ideology was a combination of Ukrainian nationalism and an emphasis on human rights. When Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, the Communists had no immediate plans for the creation of Ukrainian foreign, ethnic, or nation-building policies, since all of their political activity thus far had taken place within the framework of a different regime and a different country. The choice facing the Communist Party was whether to accept and adopt the policies presented by the opposition, whether to develop their own new concepts and ideas, or whether to cling to the nostalgia of the old system. The result was that the concepts of the nationalist opposition were adopted to varying degrees by President Leonid Kravchuk in December 1991 and a substantial proportion of the former Communists. They also attracted some of the more prominent opposition members who came to power under Kravchuk. Included were several national democrats from the *Rukh* movement and the Ukrainian Republican Party, most of them from western Ukraine.

It would be useful here to briefly discuss the reasons why the Communists, by and large, adopted the nationalist discourse over their traditional political agenda.[6] The gap between discourses had been bridged by their shared basic assumptions. First, both discourses emphasised the need for a strong state. It had been stressed in the 'Complex Programme for Social-Economic Reform' published in the national-democratic political theoretical journal *Rozbudova Derzhavy* that 'it is a dangerous illusion to think that authentic democracy is connected with weak state structures.'[7] Since the former Communists had worked most of their political lives within a discourse where the state was seen to be everything, the democrats' stance along these lines was fairly compatible. Second, there was a tendency in both discourses to seek 'final solutions' as opposed to 'process solutions' that have no certain end. For example, as in communist ideology, national-democratic discourse believes in the ability to solve the national problem and to achieve a permanent harmony in the relationship between nationalities. They seem to forget that national antagonisms are an inevitable and eternal companion of a multi-national state.[8]

Also, in both discourses there was an inclination to put political priorities before economic priorities. For example, Ukrainians have had to endure the economic difficulties resulting from the break-up of the USSR. In the USSR propaganda urged the population to make sacrifices for the sake of a bright communist future. The fourth similarity can be exemplified by the fact that there was a disposition towards 'politics by proclamation' and 'illusionism' or in other words, 'an appreciation of grand words and projects as opposed to politics understood as a process of incremental solutions sought through immediate and not always glorious tasks'.[9] This paradigm, 'political idealism', which developed under the old Soviet regime is essential for understanding the politics of the FSU. Idealistic thinking has been criticised for its lack of connection with reality and for its ever-growing illusion that numerous declarations, conferences, resolutions, and high-level meetings will eventually lead to a change. This mode of thinking can best be exemplified by President Kravchuk's Western-oriented policies. Kravchuk reasoned that (although) 'the West is unwilling to open

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[5] Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, Chatham House Papers, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 1997), p. 4.

[6] It should also be mentioned that the CPU split between 1990 and 1991 into imperial and national/sovereign communists. The former had their base in the party, which was banned in August 1991, and the latter in the parliament and presidency.

[7] Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, p. 5.

[8] Oleskandr Mayboroad, 'Debyutuye ennopoliyka, *Viche*, no.5, August 1992.

[9] Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, p. 6.

its doors to us, it doesn't matter. We will just keep on knocking and knocking and in the end they will open their doors.[10] Kravchuk thus assumed this tactic would lead Ukraine to towards Europe as opposed to pursuing economic reform as a means to join the West.

Finally, in both discourses there was a strong drive for societal unity. For example, in the Soviet communist discourse it was repeatedly stated that collective interests are superior to individual interests. Furthermore, the influential democratic ideologist Skorik urged the need to 'renounce personal ambitions, rise above one's own sentiments and the interests of parties and groups in the understanding that state-building is only accomplished by the strong and tightly organised'.[11] So essentially the Ukrainian *nomenklatura* was forced by the chain of events following independence to find an ideological basis and the moderate nationalist discourse was found to be the most suitable for explaining Ukrainian independence and was also not difficult for the communists to accept.

The *nomenklatura* remained in power following the parliamentary election in March 1994, as the majority remained left-wing (see Chapter Four). These parties did especially well in southern and eastern Ukraine. However, major shifts to more moderate parliamentary factions began to occur after the election and by 1996, the Ukrainian parliament consisted of four major groupings which were the left, the national democrats and nationalists, pro-reform centrists, and the *bolota* (the 'swamp') group.[12] During the July 1994 presidential elections, the national democrats and the pro-reform centrists were the main supporters of Leonid Kuchma, also from *nomenklatura*. Yet, in order to achieve a majority in parliament for his policy proposals, he needed to attract support from the left and to a considerable extent he succeeded in doing so.

The distribution of power

While many factors influence Ukraine's foreign policy orientation, it is crucial to take account of who has the power, influence, and resources to decide and implement policy. Therefore, the structure of the government, its division of powers as embodied in the Constitution, and how it works in practice should be given ample consideration. Other factors to consider include how power is divided within a given polity, what individuals or groups attract the leader's attention, and who can exert power from within the group. Also important is whether a single person makes the decision or whether power rests with a small group of elites and if there is competition among the groups which support differing foreign policy agendas.

For the first five years of Ukraine's independence the government was operating under a modified version of the 1978 Soviet Constitution, which was designed for a subordinate public and as such, had little practical operability for Ukraine as an independent state. This document outlined no clear division of powers in domestic or foreign policy. Thus, when Kravchuk was elected President in 1991 a non-presidential constitution was clearly outdated. The delineation of power following independence was regulated by amendments to the existing constitution, allowing for more rapid shifts in policy-making that would not have been possible under the old system. One such constitutional change that Kravchuk (and later Kuchma) strongly supported was an increase in the powers of the executive branch of government.

Kravchuk argued that a strong executive was necessary to secure independence. This opinion was supported in parliament and in February 1992, Kravchuk was granted the right to issue decrees having the force of law and to appoint ministers directly in each district in Ukraine. Further, the local representatives' decisions were to be binding on the local governments. In February 1992, without any constitutional foundation, Kravchuk established the State Council, whose decisions had to be formally debated in different political gatherings at the executive level. All of these actions clearly meant the

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[10] Moskovskei novosti, 6 January 1993.
[11] Larisa Skorik, 'Protreba sinchronnysch zusil',Viche, no. 9, December 1992.
[12] Representatives who support both the national democrats and the pro-reform centrists at different times.

concentration of power in the hands of the executive. Kravchuk's decisions, for the most part, were not even contested by parliament.[13]

In May 1993 these events took a more radical turn when President Kravchuk unexpectedly asked parliament to dissolve the post of Prime Minister and to make him the sole head of government. Again, this request was justified by the need to have a strong executive for the sake of a consolidated independence in Ukraine. Leonid Kuchma, then Prime Minister, was also courting parliament for an increase in executive powers. Kuchma threatened to resign if the special rights he had previously received in economic decision-making were not reviewed and extended. The parliament's reaction was three fold: to reject Kravchuk's request to abolish the post of Prime Minister, to deprive Kuchma of his special economic powers, and to refuse to accept his resignation.

The Constitution of Ukraine

A very significant institutional development for Ukraine was the adoption of the Constitution, which was the key act of Ukrainian statehood.[14] The contents of a new Ukrainian constitution began to be discussed in the *Rada* in the early part of 1991, but the *coup d'etat* in August and the declaration of independence prevented its adoption. Originally some of the areas of agreement were that the constitution should be based on the declaration of sovereignty, that there should be a clear division of powers between the executive and legislative branches, and that the majority were opposed to the creation of a federation. However, there were also many areas of disagreement in parliament which included the name of the new state ('Ukrainian Republic', 'Ukrainian SSR', 'Ukrainian People's Republic', or 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic'), whether to have a bicameral parliament made up of a House of Peoples and a House of Representatives (three-four year term) or a Senate (six year term) representing the regions, as well as disagreements over the right to private property.

During Kravchuk's presidency, the main stumbling block was the parliamentary left which had remained opposed to a bicameral parliament, the destruction of the system of local Soviets, de-ideologisation of the constitution, and the removal of socio-economic safeguards. Further, the democrats and the centre-right deputies complained of a lack of outlined rights for the Ukrainian people, that there was no regulation of the state language, no clear description of the state's national symbols, and the fact that political parties were placed on the same level as civic groups. Another concern was that the new constitution would not be modelled on the American or German ones and that Ukraine's historic experiences should be taken into consideration.[15]

In 1992 and 1993 draft constitutions were proposed in the *Rada* but were not successfully adopted before the 1994 elections. Criticisms of the 1992 draft constitution were that it was too long (258 articles), excessive in detail, contained too many provisions that were not properly analysed (especially the guarantees of socio-economic rights), weak on local democracy (because local authorities were to be controlled by executives in Kyiv), and gave considerable power to the executive with no independent judiciary. The 1993 draft was also criticised sharply by Kravchuk because it failed to clearly define the new social, ideological and moral foundation of society. The most heated debates centred on the division of powers between the president and the parliament over the territorial system to be adopted. Further, international advisers proposed several recommendations for revision which included shortening the text, limiting its aspirations, strengthening the section on judicial review and guaranteeing an independent judiciary, defining the sphere of activities of the separated powers, and protecting the rights of individuals.

Under President Kuchma, a Constitutional Commission was created which was composed of new members of the *Rada* and presidency elected in 1994. The Commission

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[13] See Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine: The Unfinished Revolution', London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1992.
[14] See Kataryna Wolczuk, 'Politics of state-building: The Constitutional process in Ukraine, 1990-1996', PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2000.
[15] Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine Under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation, and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 112.

received many draft proposals in December 1994 by different political parties. Kuchma supported a bicameral parliament because it would give the regions economic decentralisation and unite Ukraine's different regions within the overall national process of state-building. However, Oleskandr Moroz, Chairman of the Parliament, argued against the new draft on the grounds that the bicameral parliament was copied from Russia, there was no section on civil society, presidential decrees should not have the force of law, a strengthened judiciary was necessary, and individual rights should be expanded. Further, the draft constitution still failed to resolve the division of powers, deprived parliament of any control functions, and was based on abstract ideas that did not reflect the country's social development and public standards.

President Kuchma would not remain as patient as his predecessor in terms of adopting a new constitution.[16] Throughout 1995 draft constitutions continued to be presented and debated, but in February 1996 following a three-day conference held in Ukraine which was attended by a variety of foreign and domestic experts, a new draft was submitted. During the spring of 1996, the constitutional process was the main focus of politics in Ukraine. Commissions were set up to seek compromises and to find a new common platform. Among the main discrepancies was the delineation of respective powers of the president and parliament, the degree of local self government, especially in Crimea, the state symbols- flag, coat of arms, anthem, and official state language (Ukrainian or both Russian and Ukrainian), and the idea of private property. Those supporting Kuchma's stances were in the majority, but they still had to win the support of leftist deputies to secure the 300 votes necessary to adopt each article of the new constitution. After lengthy debates, the new Constitution of Ukraine was signed on 28 June 1996 after a vote of 315 in favour and 36 against. The outcome was that the status of private property was secured, Crimea would retain its right to an autonomous status above that of *oblast*, Russian did not become a second state language, the blue and yellow flag and the trident remained the Ukrainian state symbols, and the president retained the right to appoint the government, following parliament's approval.[17]

The main reason why the constitution was adopted so quickly was because Kuchma threatened to have it adopted by referendum if agreement could not be reached. This action would be most threatening to anti-Kuchma forces in government as a constitution that would be decided by referendum would be drafted by those experts loyal to the President. Thus, if Kuchma had won in a referendum, the anti-Kuchma forces would have lost their chance at negotiating a better deal by deciding the matter in parliament. In June 1996 the National Security Council and the Council of Regions called for a referendum on the grounds that the continued absence of an updated constitution posed a threat to the political stability of Ukraine. This action significantly increased pressure on parliament to come to an agreement. The parliamentary political parties showed themselves more willing to compromise and finally, a new constitution was agreed upon.

This following section will discuss the executive and legislative branches of government with regard to foreign policy responsibilities according to the Constitution of Ukraine. In the following chapter, the focus will shift to how this division of power works in practice.

The Constitution and Ukraine's foreign policy

The newly adopted Constitution outlined the division of powers and basic goals of Ukraine's foreign policy. Foreign policy decision-making was to be divided between the President and the *Rada*, with the majority of power going to the executive branch. Under Chapter IV of the Constitution of Ukraine, which is dedicated to the duties, rights, and responsibilities of the *Rada*, there are only a few references to Ukraine's foreign policy. The *Rada* is responsible for determining the principles of domestic and foreign policy and should hear

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[16] Kuchma was under pressure from the Council of Europe (CE) to adopt a constitution by 9 November 1996, the CE's deadline, which was one year after Ukraine joined the organisation. This was seen as a precondition for Ukraine's continued membership in the CE.

[17] Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security,* p. 9.

the annual and special messages of the President on the domestic and foreign situation of Ukraine.[18] Further, the *Rada* is entitled to confirm decisions on granting loans and economic aid by Ukraine to foreign states and international organisations and also decisions on Ukraine's receiving of loans not envisaged by the State Budget from foreign states, banks, and international financial institutions exercising control over their use.[19]

In contrast, under Chapter V Article 106 of the Constitution, the President is responsible for representing the state in international relations, administering the foreign political activity of the State, conducting negotiations and concluding international treaties. The President also adopts decisions on the recognition of foreign states and appoints and dismisses heads of diplomatic missions of Ukraine to other states and international organisations.

The President is the Chairman of the Council of National Security and Defence (NSDC) of Ukraine, the body that co-ordinates and controls the activity of bodies of executive power in the sphere of national security and defence. The President is responsible for forming the personal composition of the NSDC. In accordance with the Constitution, the President, Prime Minister, Head of the Security Service, Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are *ex officio* members of the NSDC. Moreover, the Chairman of the *Rada* may take part in the meetings of the NSDC.[20]

Headed by Yevhen Marchuk, who replaced Volodymyr Horbulin[21] in November 1999, the NSDC consists of a presidium of the President, Prime Minister, as well as ministers of defence, interior, intelligence, foreign affairs, finance, justice, and environment, plus other individuals who are appointed by the president. A decree issued by Kuchma in August 1994 transformed the NSDC from an advisory body (as under a 1992 decree by Kravchuk) to a governing one as the decree states that 'decisions taken by the Council and its Presidium are compulsory for the fulfilment by all state executive bodies', which in effect changed the NSDC to an executive body. Further, the National Institute of Strategic Studies (NISS), a governmental think tank, has been made subordinate to the NSDC, thus effectively acquiring a staff of scholars and researchers with which to consult, if desired.[22] Kuchma's decree had the effect of uniting foreign policy-making in one body, with each NSDC member answerable to the president in an effort to promote co-ordination among ministries dealing with foreign affairs.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also plays an influential role in foreign policy as it is responsible for implementing the decisions of the president. During the Soviet era, Ukraine had its own foreign ministry, which gave the new state some experience in international affairs (Ukraine also had its own seat in the UN). However, the most important decisions were made in Moscow. Hence, Russia inherited the most talented and experienced staff and Ukraine was left with an understaffed Ministry of approximately 20 individuals. However, since 1991 the MFA has expanded and gained much experience in international relations and diplomacy.[23]

Another body of executive power which has the ability to influence Ukraine's foreign and security policy is the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine which is subordinate to the President but is also under the control of and is accountable to the *Rada*. The Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for ensuring the implementation of domestic and foreign policy including the foreign economic activity of the State and takes measures to ensure the defence capability and national security of Ukraine.[24]

It seems quite clear that the majority of power as regards Ukraine's foreign and security policy lies with the executive branch of government. The *Rada* is essentially

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[18] The Constitution of Ukraine, Numbers Five and Eight, Article 85 under Chapter IV.

[19] Ibid, Number 14.

[20] The Constitution of Ukraine, Chapter V, Article 107.

[21] Volodymyr Horbulin, long time friend and ally of Kuchma, was the Head of the NSDC from October 1994 to November 1999 and was replaced by Kuchma with Marchuk in between the first and second rounds of the presidential election in an effort to increase the incumbent's vote from the right.

[22] However, as this thesis and particularly Chapter Six discusses, independent scholars and advisors whose opinions do not coincide with that of the executive administration are not given consideration, which only serves to highlight the subjective nature of Ukraine's foreign policy.

[23] As explained to this author in an interview with Oleksandr Chalyi, First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, 7 September 1998, Halki, Greece.

[24] The Constitution of Ukraine, Chapter VI, Article 116.

limited to drafting general principles of foreign policy, while the executive has the right of implementation. However, the power to draft general principles means that the parliament has an important role in creating standard operating procedures that the Foreign Ministry must follow. Within this heavily bureaucratic governmental structure, these principles provide general guidelines for behaviour in policy implementation.

Further serving as a guidance mechanism, *The New Concept of National Security of Ukraine* was adopted by the *Rada* in January 1997. Moroz, then Chairman of the *Rada*, described the document as an important set of recommendations to the president and the Cabinet of Ministers which serves to guide foreign policy formulating.[25] According to the document, Ukraine's national security must be achieved through a balanced state policy based on the adopted doctrines, strategic trends, and programmes in all spheres of the state's activities including the political, economical, social, military, scientifical, technical, ecological, and other spheres.[26]

However, in practice actual foreign policy is usually set by a narrow group of elites within the executive branch, specifically the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), as discussed above. It should be noted that by law the Foreign Minister is subordinate to the National Security Advisor. While the NSDC's main tasks are security and defence, the concept of security has been expanded to include national, economical, informational, and environmental facets, which gives the NSDC a very broad jurisdiction. Although the president has the final say in foreign policy the influence of the NSDC should not be overlooked.

Political forces in Ukraine

It would be useful at this stage to discuss the four main political tendencies in Ukraine that have developed since independence. The following survey is non-exhaustive as it deals only with the most influential political parties within each strand of the national democrats, the centrists, the leftist parties, and the radical nationalists. It is important to note that over half of Ukraine's 238 parliamentary members are independents and of Ukraine's 41 political parties, only 14 are represented in parliament. This vast amount of independents and the proliferation of parties show the weakness of the party system in Ukraine. In an attempt to alleviate this, parliament has been divided into 12 factions, but there still remains little factional unity in voting.

The National Democrats

Within the national democrats, the three major parties are the Popular *Rukh,* the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), and the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU). First, *Rukh* was founded in September 1989 and, until the spring of 1992, it was the main opposition force in Ukraine. From the outset it was not a political party as such but rather a broad-based 'umbrella organisation' of political parties and cultural organisations, all of which were united against the Communist forces and in favour of Ukrainian independence. At its third Congress in March 1992 a major split occurred between those who preferred to remain in opposition to President Kravchuk, led by Vyacheslav Chornovil, and those who took the view that in this critical period of establishing independence, it was necessary to support the President in his policy-making efforts. This effort was led by Myhailo Horyn and Ivan Drach. A compromise was finally forced through by a representative of the Ukrainian diaspora in the West whereby all three were elected as *Rukh*'s joint leaders. The compromise, however, was unsuccessful as Drach pulled out, Horyn became leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party, and at *Rukh*'s Fourth Congress in December 1992, Chornovil was elected sole leader of the party.[27] Chornovil remained chairman of *Rukh* until February

[25] 'Kontseptsiia (osnovy derzhavnoi polityky) natsional' noi bezpeky Ukrainy', *Holos Ukrainy*, 4 February 1997, pp. 5-6.
[26] See text of the New Concept of National Security of Ukraine, adopted by the Supreme *Rada* of Ukraine on 16 January 1997.
[27] Bukkvoll, p. 10.

1999 when a split in support of the party's leadership took place and during an extraordinary congress, Yuriy Kostenko replaced Chornovil as chairman.[28]

Rukh can be politically characterised as a centre-right party as it advocates Western-style democracy and a market-oriented economy. The party also places special importance on the questions of Ukrainian rebirth, which includes consolidating independence and strengthening the position of the Ukrainian language and culture. *Rukh* also supports the immediate withdrawal of Ukraine from its association from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the 1994 parliamentary elections, *Rukh* fared badly winning only 27 seats (see Chapter Four).[29]

Famous Ukrainian dissident Levko Lukyanenko established the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) in April 1990. The party was able to take only nine seats in the 1994 elections. Second, the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU), was established in December 1990 and has been viewed as the party of intellectuals (led by Volodymyr Yavorivsky). The DPU took only six seats in the 1994 elections. Ideologically, both the URP and the DPU are similar to *Rukh* on most major issues.

Overall, democratic forces in Ukraine are not very homogeneous. However, three political spectrums of democratic forces can be determined: ordinary democrats (national democrats, liberals, and social democrats), Ukrainian national democrats (*Rukh* members, members of the Congress of Ukrainian nationalists, and other republican groups), and the 'Balashov-type' democrats. National democrats dream of a 'Ukrainian Ukraine', of a state for the Ukrainian people and not of the people of Ukraine. Ordinary democrats do not oppose a 'Ukrainian Ukraine', but they are not very anxious for it. The primary issue for them is that the Ukrainian people will be fed. What is important according to the 'Balashov' concept is the positive lives of the Ukrainian people- it does not matter whether Ukraine is an independent state or another Russian state.[30]

The Centrists

The centrists in Ukrainian politics include the New Ukraine bloc (centre-left) and the Liberal Party of Ukraine (centre-right). New Ukraine was formed in June 1992 as initiated by the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (PDRU). The PDRU was established in December 1990 on the basis of the so-called Democratic Platform, which broke away from the Communist Party of Ukraine.[31] Along with the social-democratic parties, the Green Party and many other groupings, the PDRU tried to make New Ukraine the main force in promoting economic reform in the 1990-94 parliament. The social democrats later left New Ukraine and after 1993 the block gradually lost its dominant position among the centrists to the Liberal Party of Ukraine (see below). But in July 1995, there were attempts to revive New Ukraine and several leading Ukrainian politicians including the deputy speaker of parliament Oleg Demin and the former presidential adviser Valeriy Pustovoytenko contributed to the effort. In February 1996 the forces behind New Ukraine, PDRU, and the Ukrainian Labour Congress decided to create a new political party which was the People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (PDPU).[32]

Established by local businessman Ihor Markulov in Donetsk in 1991, the Liberal Party of Ukraine had a social base that was at the outset limited to eastern Ukrainians. But by the summer of 1995, the party had developed an all-Ukrainian profile. The Liberal Party received increasing support from business circles, thus securing their party finances, and several prominent Ukrainian politicians including former President Kravchuk. Although the Liberals did not muster a single seat in the 1994 parliamentary elections, they nevertheless managed to organise twelve deputies to form the Social Market Choice parliamentary group.[33] During the spring of 1996, there were rumours of a possible merger between the

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[28] Chornovil was killed in a car accident in the spring of 1999.
[29] Wolczuk, 'Presidentialism in Ukraine', p. 163.
[30] Yuriy Hnatkevich, 'Right, left-wing election prospects', *Vechirniy Kyiv* (in Ukrainian) 2 March 1999, pp. 1-5.
[31] As discussed at the beginning of this Chapter.
[32] Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, p. 11.
[33] This group could not be referred to as a faction, as 25 members are needed to be registered to achieve this status.

Liberal Party and two other centre-right parties: the Interregional Block for Reforms and the Party of Economic Recovery.[34] In terms of economic policy, New Ukraine has a social-democratic orientation whereas the Liberal Party has a liberal tendency. Both have moved closer to the national democrats on questions of Ukrainian independence and statehood.[35] For example, at its Fourth Congress in July 1995, New Ukraine favoured a unitarian as opposed to a federal state structure and also supported Ukrainian as the state's only official language.

The Leftists

Although the leftist parties have different names and tactical positions, they are the followers of the communist ideology to some degree. They generally adhere to the following philosophies: 1) a negative attitude toward denationalisation and privatisation; 2) an ardent dream to set up a new union with Russia and an opposition to the 'European course' and contacts with NATO; and 3) a passionate desire to make Russian the official state language of Ukraine. The leftist parties include the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), and the Peasant (or Agrarian) Party of Ukraine.

The Socialist Party was established in October 1991 following the prohibition of the Communist Party because it allegedly supported the coup plotters. Originally SPU's political programme favoured a return to the past, to a planned economy for the whole of the state, to the abolition of a multi-party system, and to a renewed federation with the republics of the FSU. Since moderating its position on several of these issues, the party now advocates a mixed economy with strong social guarantees and an independent Ukraine that closely co-operates with the other republics. In the 1994 election the SPU took 25 seats[36] and was led by Parliamentary Chairman, Moroz. At the SPU's third conference in February 1996, a small group of Marxists led by Natalia Vitrenko and Volodynyr Marchenko left the party complaining that the SPU had adopted social-liberal positions. They then formed the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU).

The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) re-emerged on the political scene in October 1993 and soon became extremely popular. In the 1994 elections the CPU gained 87 seats which was the largest number of seats of any party. Further, organisational structures have been re-established and the CPU now has local branches in all *oblasts* and in most large and medium-sized towns. However, a major weakness of the party is that most of its support is among the older generation. In terms of an ideological political profile, the CPU advocates closer co-operation with the other FSU republics and also within the CIS structures. It accepts all forms of property but clearly favours collectively owned property. However, in questions concerning Ukrainian statehood and independence, the CPU has been forced to take account of the views of western and central Ukrainian communists. The party has since split over the question of the Russian language as the state's second official language as well as over questions of economic reform.

The Peasant Party of Ukraine established in January 1992 was the equivalent of the Socialist Party in the Ukrainian countryside and was intended to counter the radical nationalist Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the Agrarian Party fared well gaining 35 seats. But in June 1995 their parliamentary faction split when twenty deputies, unhappy with the faction's anti-reform policy, established a new parliamentary faction known as 'Agrarians For Reform'.

The Radical Nationalists

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[34] It is worth noting that the latter was earlier called the party for the Economic Recovery of Crimea, and was a regional Crimean party. However in March 1996, it officially became an all-Ukrainian party, and thus changed its name to reflect that fact.
[35] Clearly this is one example of a shift from the left to the centre as discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.
[36] See Wolczuk, 'Presidentialism in Ukraine', p. 163.

The radical nationalists, the most politically extreme of the parties in Ukraine, is the final category to be discussed. Since independence, incidents of political extremism have remained marginal, yet the party is still worth mentioning in some detail as it is still a rather influential force in Ukrainian politics. The radical right in the Ukrainian political spectrum is dominated by three movements: the Nationalist Union Ukrainian State Independence (DSU), the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN). The UNA is dominated by the highly secretive Ukrainian Nationalist Union (UNS) which had its origin in the nationalist wing of the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM).[37]

Nationalist groups in Ukraine have not united into one large bloc, but the main ideological tenets of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism are shared by these three radical groups. These include: 1) a cult of strength; 2) hostility to the groups of political activists known as 'fifth columnists'[38]; 3) contempt for 'weak democrats'; 4) demands for revision of Ukraine's current borders to incorporate her ethnographic territories; 5) a cult of violence and xenophobia towards the outside world including a domination by conspiracy theories or 'Russophobia'.[39] First, Ukrainian nationalists disseminate a cult of strength because weakness is seen as the road to ruin, anarchy, and chaos. In the radical way of thinking, there exists a hierarchy of both 'strong' and 'weak' nations. Nationalist Oles Babiy believed that 'the formulation of an idea to carry along the nation is only possible by the strong, by those who stand tall above average people because only they can realise the ideal.[40] Second, as regards 'fifth columnists', most nationalists agree that there needs to be paramilitary formations such as the Ukrainian People's Self Defence Forces (UNSO) to change the character of Ukrainian politics and to stifle those who aim to destroy the Ukrainian state.[41] Third, the contempt for the social-democratic leaders has to do with the nationalist belief that Ukrainian democrats do not know what to do when there is a growth of anarchy, rising unemployment, or an increase in sabotage or separatist movements in the republic. They believe that only nationalists can bring order, peace, and work to Ukraine.

A further preoccupation of all three radical nationalist political groups has to do with the demands for the return of ethnographic territories where Ukrainians live outside the state. The UNS went so far as to contact Russian President Yeltsin directly in August 1991 after his press secretary, Pavel Voshchanov, had made territorial claims upon Ukraine in the aftermath of the declaration of independence in August. This action was a demonstration of Russophobia and also the paranoia that stems from the presence of the fifth columnists which advocate separatism in the Ukrainian state.

The extreme group UNA and its paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian National Self-Defence (UNSO)[42], merit considerable attention in the context of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism. UNA-UNSO originally advocated Ukrainian chauvinism but in the autumn of 1994, it changed its ideology to Ukrainian imperialism and downplayed the ethnic factor. Their political goals post-1994 are as follows:

- A new pan-Slavic empire led by Ukraine with its capital in Kyiv.
- An authoritarian, non-democratic state. One of their slogans is 'Vote UNA and be spared from going to the elections again.'
- A state-controlled market economy or 'a strong state that honours work, thrift, activity, and enterprise.'

Moreover, UNA's strategies can be summarised as three main political goals:

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[37] Kuzio, 'Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine Before and After Independence: The Right and its Politics, 1989-1994', in *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1997, p. 211.

[38] Those activists fomenting separatism and working through the Supreme Council and local councils who are seen to be sabotaging the re-building of the state.

[39] Kuzio, 'Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine', p. 214.

[40] *Neskorena Natsiya,* no. 4, November 1991.

[41] See article by Anatol Bedriy, 'The enemies of Ukraine are also in Ukraine!' in the *Nationalist*, no.2, 1992.

[42] See Taras Kuzio 'Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine, and Bohdan Nahaylo, 'Ukraine', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 22 April 1994 for detailed discussions of the radical and ultra right political and paramilitary groups.

- Gradually weakening Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet environment by fighting Russia everywhere except on Ukrainian soil. A UNA-UNSO activist told the Ukrainian daily *Nezavisimost* in August 1993 that, 'our next step will be to create hot spots in Russia herself.'
- Gaining political dividends by exploiting the growing social grievances in Ukraine.
- Creating small fighting cells all over Ukraine ready to assume powers when called upon to do so.[43]

There are at least five conditions[44] that have helped UNA-UNSO to become more well known in Ukrainian politics. First, an increase in social and economic misery is boosting popular support from among the most disadvantaged in society. In the 1994 elections UNA did surprisingly well in Kyiv, particularly in those districts such as Obolon, which are among the poorest in the capital. Further, moving in where the state fails (i.e. providing food rations and standing up to individuals who have been treated badly by local authorities) appears to be a new UNA-UNSO strategy. Second, the change in politics from ethnic Ukrainian nationalism to a more inclusive imperial ideology with emphasis on economic stability and law and order may broaden the party's support beyond nationally conscious Ukrainians. UNA-UNSO leaders have supported the idea of uniting the Ukrainian people independent of religious confession, ethnicity, nationality, or language.

The third way UNA-UNSO is gaining political attention is by targeting trade unions as potential partners. The two kinds of trade unions in Ukraine are the successors of the Soviet trade unions grouped together as the Federation of Independent Ukrainian Trade Unions (FNPU) and the new independent trade union, mostly organised within the Union of Free Trade Unions (OVPU). The FNPU represents by far the largest part of the workforce. However, the independent trade unions are gaining support and membership in key sectors such as coal, the metal industry, and transport.[45]

Fourth, it seems probable that the ideological gap between UNA-UNSO and the national democrats is narrowing. Previously, the national democrats had condemned the actions of UNA-UNSO thus decreasing the amount of new members. Yet, the common goal of Ukrainian independence has helped to bring about a greater consensus between the two parties. Finally, UNA-UNSO has attempted to advance its image as the guardian of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriachate.

UNA-UNSO has sought to increase its influence on Ukrainian politics on three levels. First, it has working to win support from the economically and socially deprived; second, UNA-UNSO is establishing links with politically influential organisations such as trade unions, the national democrats, and the church; and third, with the use of paramilitary power the organisation is conspiring to frighten politicians and the public through the use of violence. Although it has had limited success, its political influence remains marginal. It is viewed more as a nuisance rather than a real threat to stability in Ukraine, and is likely to remain just a political discomfort.

The next section will continue with the discussion of the institutional factors that have shaped Ukrainian foreign policy, but will focus specifically on the economy. It is argued that the rather dubious state of the Ukrainian economy has influenced Ukraine's relations with its neighbours and particularly with the West (see also Chapter Five). This section will discuss the state of the Ukrainian economy as a crucial element of the state-building process.

THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY

Probably the most critical threat to the internal stability of Ukraine that merits considerable attention concerns the state of the economy. The Ukrainian government's attempts to create a viable economy have certainly attracted much attention from the Western states and

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[43] Kuzio, 'Radical Nationalist Parties', pp. 213-216.
[44] See Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, pp.15-17 for a discussion on these five conditions.
[45] UNA-UNSO has had little success with FNPU, but appears to have had some success in the OVPU.

financial institutions (see Chapter Five). Although the long-term prospects of Ukraine's recovery depend largely on its economic vitality, Western observers have tended to treat the problem of economic reform in isolation from the many other challenges confronting Ukraine. Creating a market economy is a difficult enough challenge, but creating one under post-Soviet conditions compels policy-makers to consider a wide range of issues that are not simply economic. In other words, policy-makers have had to choose between equally pressing and equally valid economic and social ends. Thus, Ukrainian elites have been faced with a predicament: they could either instigate rapid economic reform which would more than likely lead to massive social and political problems or they could pay greater attention to the social and political instability at the expense of furthering economic reforms. Ukraine has chosen the second option and Russia the first.

Economic ties to Russia

Since the mid-nineteenth century, Ukraine's economy has been tied to Russia with varying intensities. This has resulted in the creation of a dependency situation in which economic development in Ukraine was subordinated politically to the economic priorities set first by the Tsarist ministers and later by the State Planning Committee in Moscow. It has also meant that Ukraine's economic relations (trade, capital and labour flows), as well as communications and transport has been overwhelmingly with Russia. Western Ukraine was the exception until its integration with the USSR in 1945.[46]

Yet, without much warning, this dependency relationship changed dramatically under Gorbachev's *perestroika*, which brought the Russian economy to near-collapse, producing massive inflation, disrupting production, and lowering living standards. As production and trade relations between Russia and Ukraine declined, Ukraine and the other republics were forced to defend themselves against a post-colonial economy. Co-operation should have been the priority, but the republics found it difficult to do so when decreased production had reduced the overall supply of needed inputs and the republics were forced into practising 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policies. For example, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan demanded world prices for their energy supplies from their indigent neighbours and Ukraine had no choice but the take control of its own economy and devise new policies in an environment of economic disarray.[47]

During the Tsarist period, Ukraine served largely as an agricultural producer of raw materials and metals and was referred to as the 'breadbasket of Europe'. Ukraine accounted for 98 per cent of the Russian Empire's world wheat trade in the early twentieth century. Further, the Donbass-Kryvy Rih industrial region produced 67 per cent of the empire's coal, 87 per cent of its iron-ore, 67 per cent of its pig iron, 58 per cent of its steel, and nearly 100 per cent of its machines.[48] Throughout the Soviet period, Ukraine's economy was highly dependent on the USSR and particularly on Russia. In 1992 Ukraine was producing between 20 to 50 per cent of the FSU's coal, steel, rolled ferrous metal, steel pipes, iron ore, bricks, agricultural machinery, chemical industrial equipment, rail cargo cars, and many other goods. However, Ukraine still relies on Russia for trucks, tractors, and most of its oil and natural gas.[49] As a result of such interdependence, the decline in energy production and supplies, coupled with the near-collapse of the Soviet economy has produced similar negative economic results in Ukraine.

In 1993 Ukraine was on the verge of economic collapse. Inflation was over 10,000 per cent, and production had fallen according to some estimates by as much as 50 per cent since 1990. The budget deficit stood at 20 per cent of GDP and the balance-of-payments deficit was over $3 billion.[50] Aside from those countries affected by civil war or regional conflict, Ukraine's economy was in the worst shape of any of the FSU republics. The strikes

[46] The economy was geared toward Austria until 1918, and then toward Poland in the inter-war period.

[47] Alexander Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993.

[48] *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, vol.2, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971, pp. 754-756.

[49] Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, 'Ukraine: Europe's New Nation', in *The World and I*, March 1992, p. 97.

[50] See M.Meeker and S.Garnett, 'Ukraine, Rising from the Ashes' in *Strategic Survey 1994-95,* London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1995.

that had broken out in eastern Ukraine forced the government to grant large subsidies to the miners and other industrial interests. Ukraine remained dependent on Russia for 90 per cent of its oil supplies and on both Russia and Turkmenistan for 100 per cent of its natural gas. The Ukrainian government was piling up massive debts as it continued to use these energy supplies without paying for them. This situation has contributed significantly to Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia and thus has influenced Ukraine's foreign policy orientation.

The major economic dilemmas facing Ukraine today appear even more pressing in light of the energy factor. Ten nuclear power stations are currently meeting 22 per cent of its needs, most of which are fairly reliable (unlike Chernobyl). Although closing down some stations might be environmentally imperative, as most are unsafe by Western standards, this is unthinkable for Ukraine, which has few other untapped resources.[51] Also, Moscow has required that petroleum be paid at world prices thus placing even more pressure on the Ukrainian government. Ukraine produces only 58 per cent of its primary fuel[52] and as such, has been actively seeking external solutions to this problem. Ukraine has sought to conclude agreements with oil rich nations such as Iran and Libya based on the trade of Ukrainian metals, petrochemicals, and perhaps military arms. This is another example of how Ukraine's economic and energy situation has influenced the state's foreign policy. Ukraine has had few alternatives but to seek out new trade partners in the Middle East, many of which are unfriendly to the West and particularly to the US, to ensure its survival.

Ukraine has also been involved in the negotiations for two oil transportation routes which would bypass Russia, thereby reducing the state's dependency on Russia for most of its energy needs. Talks on the proposed oil pipeline occurred on 20 June 1997 in Ankara and Alma-Ata (which have since ceased), the capitals of Turkey and Kazakhstan, respectively. After nearly three years of talks, AGU (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine)[53] and Turkey signed several agreements on the building of an oil pipeline that would connect the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts of Asia Minor. The pipeline would be 564 kilometres long extending from the oil-refining complex at Ceylan, Turkey on the Mediterranean Sea to the port of Samsun, Turkey on the Black Sea. The main artery of the pipeline would be used to transport oil from Africa and the Middle East to Western Europe and would be delivered to Ukraine's Black Sea terminals by tanker. During the first phase, the capacity of the new pipeline would be 40 million (metric) tons per year and the second phase would increase this amount by 30 million tons. With the support of the US State Department (for the main reason that this route bypasses Russia), the pipeline would be built by jointly by Turkey's state-owned Botash firm and by Ukraine's *Ukzarubezhneftegazstrio* firm. The cost of the project in the first phase will be $650 million and when a parallel pipeline in added, the cost will increase to over $1 billion. It is anticipated that this project will enable Ukraine to meet all of its needs for liquid fuel as the country currently obtains 90 per cent of its oil from Russia.[54]

Also in June 1997 the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Kazaskstan (Geidar Aliyev and Nursultan Nazarbayev respectively) signed a declaration in Alma-Ata in which a portion of this document was devoted to co-operating in terms of petroleum transportation to world markets. Reflecting the desire to reduce energy dependence on Russia, the Alma-Ata agreement plans for shipping Kazakh oil by tanker across the Caspian Sea to Baku and from there by pipeline along the 'Western' route to Turkey's Black Sea ports. It should also be noted that that the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) oil consortium, which is currently developing the Caspian shelf, signed an agreement with several firms on initiating the modernisation of the Azerbaijani section of the 'Western' route. This endeavour will cost $20 million and should take about one year to complete.[55] These two oil projects are signs of hope for Ukraine that it will eventually reduce its dependency on Russia for its oil supplies.

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[51] Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence*, p. 132.

[52] Though as stated previously Ukraine is highly dependent on Russia for its oil.

[53] Now called GUUAM with the addition of Uzbekistan and Moldova See Chapter Five for a more detailed discussion..

[54]'New oil arteries increasingly bypass Russian territory', *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, 23 July 1997, no. 25, p. 27.

[55] Ibid.

Attempts at economic reform

The economic problems in Ukraine are indeed substantial, notwithstanding the added burden of transformation to a market economy. Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma both attempted to reform the Ukrainian economy, neither with much success. It would be useful here to discuss the extent to which each political leader was able to implement both proactive and reactive economic programmes designed to foster economic reform.

Kravchuk's introduction of the currency coupons in mid January 1992 can be seen as an example of reactive economic policy-making. The Yeltsin government had announced in the autumn of 1991 that it was planning to adopt a radical economic programme aimed at price liberalisation. Proceeding the December 1991 signing of the Commonwealth agreement, the Russian government was prepared to initiate this reform programme. Following requests from Ukraine and Belarus, Russia agreed to delay the economic reforms for two weeks. Thus, in January 1992 Ukraine had the added burden of dealing with the significant price increases and Russia did not help matters by failing to supply Ukraine with the appropriate amount of rubles needed to absorb the shock of the price increase. Ukraine also was obliged to raise its own prices while introducing currency coupons to both alleviate the cash shortage and to protect the Ukrainian market from Russian consumers, as prices of agricultural products in particular were generally lower than in Russia.[56]

The coupon developed into a second currency squeezing out the ruble which the Ukrainian government dumped on the Russian and Moldovan markets.[57] The ruble continued to exist in Ukraine, albeit at a lower level. The coupon was meant to function as a cash supplement only. As the Ukrainian government continued to print coupons to cover debts, the coupon eventually lost its value against the ruble, resulting in the break-down of its protective function as well as hyperinflation. But even if a Ukrainian currency was not desirable before the introduction of the coupons, it became so afterwards. The Ukrainian executive argued that the only way to restore consumer confidence would be to introduce a single monetary unit of currency. Ukraine had learned from the Russian example that an uncontrolled printing of a currency together with easy credit, deficit spending, and unbalanced budgets will lead to hyperinflation which could destroy the economy as well as discredit the currency. In late 1992 when Ukraine left the ruble zone, Kyiv decided not to introduce the *hryvnia* (the new Ukrainian currency) and instead chose to retain the coupon, renamed the *karbovanets*, as a temporary currency.

Along with the creation of the *hryvnia*, other such economic reforms under Kravchuk involved the agricultural and industrial sectors. Ukrainian policy-makers felt that decollectivising farms, privatising small enterprises, shops and restaurants, and encouraging entrepreneurship in the trade and service sectors would bring the most bring immediate benefits to Ukrainian consumers. However, reforming the agricultural sector proved to be a more difficult endeavour because capital, fuel, seed, and machinery was still allocated by state-run distribution systems that favoured collective and state farms over private ones. Also, the collective farmers had powerful incentives to sabotage attempts at wholesale decollectivisation. However, increasing the size of private plots which already produce substantial amounts of eggs, vegetables and other food products would have a positive influence on food production.[58]

Industrial reforms also proved difficult. Although closing down unproductive plants would have been economically viable, it would also have been socially disruptive and would have encouraged striking. Further, it was difficult for the government to sell industry as the economic difficulties involved in investing in Ukraine were and still are too substantial to attract the larger foreign firms (such as Johnson & Johnson, AT&T, and RJ Reynolds). But it has been nearly impossible to modernise industry without considerable foreign investment. The reality is that in order to create a market economy a large proportion of Ukrainian industry will have to be closed which will result in roughly 40 per cent unemployment.

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[56] Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence*, pp. 138-139.
[57] Thus contributing to inflation in these two republics
[58] Motyl, p. 140.

However, public works projects, the growth of the private sector and emigration to the West and to the countryside will help to lessen the negative effects, but widespread public dissatisfaction and suffering is inevitable.[59]

However, there may be some positive news regarding entrepreneurship. In a development known as '*nomenklatura* privatisation', plant managers in all the former republics are expropriating their factories and re-establishing ties with suppliers and sellers, while at the same time, are attempting to modernise their equipment and production processes. This business may be legally questionable, but is nevertheless having the effect of promoting a sort of grass roots economic reform. Legitimate entrepreneurs (as opposed to those who engage in black-marketeering) are also taking the initiative to provide many of the services that the Ukrainian economy desperately needs: restaurants and cafes, auto service stations, commodity exchanges, stock markets, and advertising firms are among these. Furthermore, Kyiv's Biznex firm offers consulting advice to Western companies and Ukrainian policy-makers. Despite a less than enthusiastic reception from the Ukrainian government, these entrepreneurs are bound to assume an important role in Ukraine's transformation to a market economy.

Overall, the inability of the Ukrainian authorities to adopt effective economic reform policies has led the district or regional authorities to develop their own strategies to stay economically afloat. For example, the Lviv provincial government has managed to develop *ad-hoc* responses to particular economic needs. In 1991, some revenue was raised by imposing customs duties on the flow of products between Poland and Ukraine. Lviv, furthermore, has begun to develop elaborate privatisation schemes and is a leading creator of private farms. Other *oblasts* are responding similarly: Odessa and the Donbass have sought to develop trade ties with some of Russia's eastern regions and Transcarpathia is actively developing closer ties with Hungary and Slovakia.

Obviously, if Ukraine's regional authorities are pursuing their own means of facilitating economic reform, either the central authorities are not doing enough or not doing what they should. Under Kravchuk it seems as if the only major accomplishment was the subsidising coupon that was intended to aid with the introduction of the Ukrainian currency (which it has since done). The Ukrainian socio-economic crisis was also partly attributable to the unwillingness to accept that an economic strategy was needed which would place Ukraine on the road to a market economy. Kravchuk's government possessed no economic strategy and lacked a long-term economic vision. Throughout the Kravchuk era there was no indication that the government accepted the inevitability of the transition to a market economy. Indeed at the end of Kravchuk's term, there were indications that the executive was considering the reintroduction of some elements of state planning.[60] However, more significant economic reforms have been proposed since 1994 under President Kuchma.

Kuchma inherited a troubled economy, to say the least. High inflation, low production, and a massive balance of payments deficit were just some of the major economic dilemmas. Ukraine remained dependent on external sources for energy supplies and continued to accumulate enormous debts as it was using imported energy sources without paying for it. Yet, even during these dismal conditions Ukraine's society, for the most part, was remarkably patient despite the growing hardship. The most extreme social protests were in the form of strikes; however, they did not involve mass social participation and the government usually responded by acceding to their demands as well as providing additional subsidies. This strategy made for deficient economic decisions, but nonetheless was sufficient to keep the social peace.

Corruption at many levels of government and society has also been a major contributing factor to Ukraine's slow progress in economic reform. Many Ukrainian workers have supplemented their state work with activities in the largely unofficial economy. These forces are of mixed origin. Some are parts of the old system (subsidies, housing benefits, and access to special goods); some are rooted in the old ways of dealing with economic hardship (black market); and still others are derive from commercial activity, both legal and quasi-legal, that remain outside government control. According to some

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[59] Ibid, p. 142.
[60] Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine: Back from the Brink', The Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, London, 1995, pp. 24-25.

estimates, at least half of Ukraine's $6.5 billion in exports in 1993 went unreported to the government. The state's domination of the official economy forced many to move into the unofficial economy in which market conditions were already at work, although often it was shaped by criminal gangs rather than market forces. This unofficial economy was waiting to be tapped by economic reform.[61]

Moreover, corruption is highly visible in Ukrainian society- from the selling of pirated videos, CDs, and computer software to corruption at the highest level of government (former Prime Minister Lazarenko, for example). Kuchma's first programme of real economic reform was viewed by the administration as a way to ensure Ukraine's economic survival, though it did not address corruption. In October 1994 Kuchma presented his comprehensive reform plan to parliament which passed by a vote of 231 to 54. The plan contained three basic elements:[62]

- Financial stabilisation through deep cuts in subsidies, budgetary restraint, the introduction of a national currency, the rationalisation of the tax regime with the aim of increasing revenues, and eliminating stringent controls on exports to facilitate the flow of international trade.
- Privatisation of state-owned enterprises in all sectors except those which contain natural monopolies; privatisation of agricultural land and distribution networks as well as housing to proceed at a much lower rate.
- Price liberalisation on all goods with gradual increases in prices on such vital commodities as housing and energy.

Kuchma's plan was logical, particularly in the area of price liberalisation, and reflected the first steps toward real economic reform in Ukraine. He had begun to implement this plan though a series of presidential decrees that freed prices and initiated a privatisation programme for approximately eight to nine thousand medium- and large-sized industries. The special price support for energy was eliminated and with international help, Ukraine began to pay off its energy debt. The Ukrainian government concluded a $1.5 billion standby agreement with the IMF in March 1995.[63] Further, the government set low targets for the budget deficit and the Central Bank stopped issuing credits. The result was a dramatic reduction of inflation- from 72 per cent a month in November 1994 to five per cent per month in May 1995.[64]

But Kuchma's plan of economic reform experienced some setbacks in the second half of 1995. The government began to issue credit to large industrial enterprises and privatisation was beginning to take place. These developments were cause for IMF intervention and the response was to issue a standby loan in January 1996. However, in April the IMF cancelled the loan because Ukraine spent well over the target amount for the first quarter of the year. In May 1996 a new loan of $867 million (to be released over nine months) was granted to the Ukrainian government.

Still, in early 1997 there were no signs of real economic growth, yet the rates of decline in GDP and in industrial production were slowing. Ukraine's GDP declined by 11.8 per cent in 1995, compared to a decline of 24.3 per cent in 1994. The fall in industrial production also slowed from 28 per cent in 1994 to 11.45 per cent in 1995. Real incomes rose by 28 per cent in 1995, the first such increase since independence. One of the most important results of the reform package was the dramatic reduction of inflation from over 10,000 per cent in 1993 to 180 per cent in 1995. At the end of 1996 inflation was 39.7 per cent and was expected to decrease to 30 per cent at the end of 1997.[65] Finally in September 1996 a new currency, the *hryvnia*, was introduced, proving that the reforms introduced were starting to pay off.

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[61]Meeker and Garnett, 'Ukraine-Rising from the Ashes', p. 90.

[62] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, pp. 33-34

[63] See Chapter Five

[64] Garnett, p. 34.

[65] See 'Ukraine: Outlook for 1997-98', *Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports*, Lexis-Nexis online database, 28 January 1997

Privatisation

As regards privatisation, the pace under former President Kravchuk was slow, primarily due to the lack of political support from the Ukrainian executive for economic reform and also because of ineffective legislation such as the 1992 laws on privatisation. Under Kuchma, privatisation started to gain momentum. The Ukrainian government reported that 7,967 enterprises were privatised in 1994. This figure can be compared to 3,555 in 1993 and to only 30 in 1992.[66] During the first quarter of 1995, 8,200 large enterprises were privatised and an additional 5,104 small and 941 medium-sized businesses at the beginning of 1996. Perhaps surprisingly, the areas with the highest degree of privatisation were not in western Ukraine, but in the traditionally industrialised *oblasts* of eastern Ukraine where President Kuchma received the highest backing in the 1994 elections (see Chapter Four). However, there are still several problems with this part of Kuchma's reform programme. First, the state is still the majority shareholder in most cases and foreign investment remains at a minimum. Also, voucher privatisation has reached only slightly more than half of the Ukrainian population and only 15 of the 28 million recipients used their vouchers to acquire shares. Opposition to privatisation efforts is especially evident in the eastern part of the country where communist and socialist dominated strongholds are located.[67]

The most significant step in price liberalisation came with a broad price deregulation in November 1994. Although prices for rent, household energy, public transportation, and other key public sectors had risen, they had done so more gradually. The state continues to play a significant role in the economy and at the federal and regional levels, the state maintains a host of anti-market regulations, tariffs and controls that help to fuel crime and corruption. The problems are not so much with those who make their living in the shadow economy, but with those government officials who continue to exploit the loopholes and 'back-doors' in the current system. As discussed previously, such opportunities for corruption remain a very real and visible part of Ukrainian political life.

Without substantial economic relief in sight, Ukrainian policy-makers have attempted to lessen the pain of the transition to a market economy; however, remaining at the centre of Ukrainian politics is a battle over control and ownership of state resources. The old *nomenklatura* will continue to exercise its power over the privatisation of enterprises, energy policy, and foreign trade. One important task is to control the level of profiteering and corruption that occurs within the government itself as this factor has and will continue to deter the foreign investment that Ukraine desperately needs. Also, as Kuchma has taken some preliminary steps toward economic reform, such efforts should be unequivocally supported by Western financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank as well as by regional organisations such as the EU. Only with the substantial support and encouragement from the West can Ukraine succeed in its efforts to bring about a market economy that can compete on a regional and global level.

Kuchma's economic decrees

In an effort to avert a financial crisis and to convince Western financial institutions to award Ukraine more substantial economic support, President Kuchma announced in June 1998 that he would introduce an edict that will impose strict limits on budget expenditures and other state outputs. The edict prohibits the Cabinet of Ministers from granting tax exemptions or postponing budget payments to any ministries, social organisations, local authority bodies, or enterprises. Kuchma's decrees were expected to lower the current 20 per cent value-added tax, simplify tax procedures for small businesses, and introduce a fixed tax rate on agricultural products.[68] Later in June, Kuchma raised the monthly minimum wage by 10 hryvni ($5) to 55 hryvni ($27). He also issued several 'emergency' economic decrees easing taxes and other payments to the state. For example, employers' obligatory payment to a state

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[66] Kuzio, 'Ukraine: Back from the Brink', pp. 27-28.

[67] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. 35.

[68]*RFE/RL Daily Newsline*, 10 and 18 June 1998.

fund for the consequences of the Chernobyl accident has been reduced from 10 to five per cent of the wage fund and 1.25 billion ($620 million) hryvni has been allocated to help pay back wages, pensions, and social benefits. Ukraine must cut the budget deficit before the IMF would approve the $2 billion credit.

The IMF Loan

Although the IMF loan is also dealt with in Chapter Five in the form of a timetable on Western financial assistance, a brief overview is warranted in this discussion of Ukraine's economic challenges.

At the beginning of August 1998 the Ukrainian government was informed by the IMF mission in Kyiv that they would recommend the approval of a $2.2 billion low-interest loan to Ukraine. The IMF's decision had an immediate effect on Ukraine's financial markets with stocks rebounding and insiders predicting that Ukraine would be able to place an international bond issue within a week. An initial tranche of $153 million was released in March 1999. The IMF's aid programme aims to promote economic growth and consolidate the recent gains in tax stabilisation, while encouraging progress in rationalising the tax structure and reducing the tax burden over time. It also hopes to strengthen fiscal and monetary institutions, launch efforts aimed at administrative reform, rationalise the size of budgetary organisations, adopt transparent privatisation procedures to further deregulate the economy, reduce government intervention in economic activity, and reform the energy and agricultural sectors. The IMF programme also envisioned annual GDP growth of five per cent and an inflation rate of 10 per cent in 1998, and eight per cent through 2001- figures most observing economists referred to as very optimistic.[69]

The continued supply of credits will depend on Ukraine living up to the terms of the agreement. But Ukraine has repeatedly fallen out of line with IMF conditions in the past such as in March 1998 when the IMF suspended a $542 million standby loan. Further, in 1997 negotiations had collapsed due to the resistance from the *Rada* to implement IMF conditions.

During the time of the negotiations with the IMF, surveys were conducted in which Kyiv residents were asked whether Ukraine should be given the money at all and whether they trusted their government to use it wisely. Most thought that the country needed the money badly and should take it if offered, but still the population overwhelmingly believed that the money would not go where it was needed or was intended to go. This poll seems to indicate that the majority of those surveyed are distrustful of their government and as such corruption is a prime concern. Further, analysts have stated that the growth of Ukraine's shadow economy poses a great threat to the country's economic security. Kuchma estimated that $15-20 billion in capital has left Ukraine since independence in 1991, which far exceeds the country's $10 billion foreign debt. No one really knows the size of the shadow economy, but Ukrainian officials have estimated it at roughly 45 to 60 per cent of Ukraine's GDP.[70] Kuchma blamed Ukraine's under-developed market economy, imperfect legislation, high taxes and corruption saying that law enforcement authorities were not prepared or willing to fight against these problems.

This chapter has thus far examined the institutional factors that have affected Ukraine's foreign policy orientation since 1991. The next logical step would be to examine the historical, ethnic, cultural, and other legacies that inevitably help to drive and shape Ukrainian foreign policy. It is crucial to understand the dynamics that influence the regional forces in Ukraine as they have the potential to affect the orientation of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. Although this chapter has touched on regional attitudes toward foreign policy, an explanation of Ukraine's many divisions has not yet been presented. Thus, the starting point will be an analysis of the regional dimension of Ukrainian state- and nation-building in which it will be argued that despite evident political, economic, social, cultural,

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[69] Ibid.
[70] Vox Populi, 'Spend the money wisely', *The Kyiv Post*, 24 July 1998. See remarks given by Ukraine's tax chief, Mykola Azarov.

and ethnic divergences in Ukrainian society, the transition to independent statehood has been remarkably peaceful.

THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

Ukraine's many divisions

Ukraine is an ethnically, culturally, and economically diverse state. Although there is only one official state language (Ukrainian), there are two working languages (Ukrainian and Russian). Yet, it would be incorrect to assume that the state is linguistically divided between a Russophone east and a Ukrainophone west.[71] One must not overlook the fact that Ukraine has a large Russian minority that resides mostly in the eastern *oblasts*. It would, however, be more appropriate to speak of the divisions in Ukraine on a regional basis as the regions have taken shape under very different political circumstances, democratic pressures, and religious affiliations. They all have distinct histories so it should be of no surprise that the inhabitants have different attitudes and interests as regards foreign policy. The Ukrainian government has had a relatively short period of time in which to try and unite the provinces under common political, social, and economic principles and as such, regional differences are likely to remain a core part of Ukrainian politics for decades to come. The regions affect nearly every political decision, but the key question is do they pose a danger to the consolidation of Ukraine's independence? Further, does this cultural 'great divide' between the ethnically Russian east and the ethnically Ukrainian west threaten the state?[72] These questions will be addressed below, but first this section will commence with a discussion of regionalism as a dimension of state-building and will consider the extent to which regionalism can be a source of strength for Ukraine.

Regionalism and state-building

Ukraine is a conglomeration of various regions, which are different in their ethno-graphic, economic, social, geopolitical, and cultural characteristics, and the central authorities take these differences into account. Ukraine is often considered, as Nemyria argues, to be a country having two poles: an eastern one (with the centre of Donetsk) and a western one (with the centre of Lviv). These two peripheries differ in ethno-linguistic characteristics, with the domination of ethnic Russians and Russophones in the east and the domination of ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainophones in the west. Other differences are religious (Orthodoxy versus Catholicism), social and cultural (collectivism and state paternalism traditions versus individualism), economic orientation (state property versus private property), geopolitical and foreign policy preferences (Eurasian versus European), and nostalgia for the past (revival of Soviet Union to some degree versus Ukrainian nationalism). Kyiv, the bureaucratic centre of power, is the target of continued competition between the two poles and often acts as the mediator of conflicts while attempting to preserve stability in the state. .[73] Obviously this scheme is oversimplified and cannot suffice for an in-depth analysis of regionalism in Ukraine, but still it provides a general overview of Ukraine's many regional divisions by which to expand upon.

Nemyria posits that regional diversity is ultimately a source of Ukraine's strength as it carries the necessity for the central government to be flexible, thus permitting its better adaptation to the general tendencies of global regionalism and to the formation of the new Europe. He offers convincing reasoning for this assertion as summarised below. But first, it

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[71] Although the data of the most recent Presidential election of 1999 did seem to reveal an East-West division in Ukraine. This will be discussed in Chapter Four.
[72] Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine and the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997.
[73] Grigory Nemyria, 'Regionalism: An underestimated dimension of state building in Ukraine', in R. Sakwa (ed.), *The Experience of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 72-90.

is necessary to briefly elaborate on the geopolitical, economic, and ethnic elements of regionalism to better understand Nemyria's assertion.

According to the geopolitical administrative and territorial divisions, Ukraine consists of 24 *oblasts*, two cities which are subordinate to the centre (Kyiv and Sevastopol) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Despite the fact that the terms 'region' and '*oblast*' are often used interchangeably, 'region' refers to a group of several *oblasts*. The use of names having historical and geographical meaning is also common (i.e. Galicia, Volyn, Bukovina, Donbass). There are 11 generally agreed upon regions according to geopolitical criterion which are as follows:[74]

1) Kyiv
2) Northern (Zhytomirska, Chernihivska, Kyivska)
3) Central (Vinnytska, Kirovohradska, Poltavska, Cherkaska, Khmelnytska
4) North-Eastern (Sumska, Kharkivska)
5) North-Western (Volynska, Rivenska)
6) Dnieprovsky (Dniepropetrovska, Zaporishska)
7) Western (Ivan-Frankivska, Lvivska, Ternopilska)
8) South-Western (Zakarpatska, Chernivetska)
9) Southern (Mykolayivska, Odesska, Khersonska)
10) Crimea
11) Donetsky (Donetska, Luhanska)

Ukraine
Administrative Divisions

——— International boundary
— · — Republic or oblast boundary
★ National capital
● Republic or oblast center

Administrative units are oblasts except Respublika Krym, Kiev and Sevastopol' are municipalities with oblast status. Kiev is also the capital of Kyyivs'ka Oblast'.

It should be pointed out that not all of the political parties accept this model for Ukraine's geopolitical breakdown. One variation is to divide Ukraine into larger geopolitical territories (unitary, unitary-decentralised, and federal). The fact that the future of administrative and territorial reform is put on the agenda of state-building influences the political behaviour of Ukraine's regional leaders.

Second, as regards economic elements of regionalism, great territorial differentiation in the economic life of the regions is evident. Roughly 60 per cent of the national income and over 60 per cent of Ukraine's principal production lies in seven *oblasts:* Donetska, Dnipropetrovska, Luhanska, Kyivska, Zaporizhska, Odesska, and Kharkivska. But the difference of national income per capita among the western and south-eastern *oblasts* reaches as high as 45 per cent. For example, in Donbass, whose economic potential is determined by industry[75], most of the return goes to Kyiv (80 per cent). On average, a resident of Donbass earns three times less than a resident of Galicia.[76] This income indicator alone creates an incentive for an increase in social tensions and regional cleavages, and naturally influenced foreign policy preferences (i.e. pro-Europe or pro-Eurasia) depending on the region in which one is living.

Third, there exists an ethnic dimension of regionalism and which has the potential to divide Ukrainian society. It can be argued that the ethnic Russians who mostly reside in the east and south (see Table 1) are of a 'mixed identity' as most of them have lived side by side with ethnic Ukrainians (and have inter-married) long enough to bind their identity with their region or *oblast,* rather than with the historic 'motherland' (i.e. Russia). Thus, regional identities tend to supersede one's identification with either Ukraine or Russia at the national level.

Nemyria argues that the ethnic element is not a decisive one in the self-determination of Russians in eastern Ukraine; geopolitical and economic factors, on the other hand, are more pertinent. Moreover, hopes of an improvement in their economic well being together with a strong feeling of belonging to an 'important' region were the main motives for voting 'yes' to independence in the December 1991 referendum.

An example of regional identity in north-eastern Ukraine is a growing number of collective agreements between the border regions of Russia and Ukraine including cross-border trade and industrial co-operation. Similar forms of 'regional diplomacy' are evident in western Ukraine in relation to Poland's border regions. In January 1995 a governmental agreement on co-operation between Russian and Ukrainian border regions was signed in Kharkiv which to a certain degree formalised co-operation between the borderlands.

Is Ukraine a divided state?

The ethnic population of Ukraine is largely Ukrainian. According to the 1989 Soviet census, ethnic Ukrainian's comprised nearly 73 per cent of the population, while ethnic Russians made up roughly 22 per cent or 11.4 million people.[77] Garnett shows the distribution of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in the following table.

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[75] Industry is mostly south-east based and accounts for two-thirds of Ukraine's national income and Donbass alone is responsible for 82 per cent.

[76] Nemyria, op cit.

[77] See summary table based in the 1989 census in T. Kuzio, A. Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*, 1994, p. 30.

Table 1: Distribution of Ethnic Ukrainians and Ethnic Russians by *Oblast*

Oblast	Ethnic Ukrainians (per cent)	Ethnic Russians (per cent)
Volyn	95	5
Lviv	90	8
Zakarpatia	78	4
Ivano-Frankyvsk	95	4
Ternopil	97	2
Rivine	93	5
Chernivtsi	71	7
Khmelnytskyy	90	6
Zhytomyr	85	8
Vinnytsa	92	6
Kyiv	89	9
Chernihiy	92	7
Cherkasy	91	8
Sumy	86	13
Poltava	88	10
Kirovohrad	85	12
Odessa	55	27
Mykolayiv	76	19
Kharkiv	63	33
Dnipropetrovsk	72	24
Kherson	76	20
Luhansk	52	45
Donetsk	51	44
Zaporizhzhya	63	32
Crimea	26	67

Sherman Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. 14.

It is only in Crimea that the majority of the population is ethnically Russian. In addition, ethnic Russians account for over 30 per cent of the population in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya and for over 20 per cent of the population in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Odessa.[78] These regions have been particularly affected by the cultural and political influence of Russia. Furthermore, Moscow has affected these regions in terms of economic development and settlement patterns firstly under the Romanovs, and later under the Soviets. But the key question is have these policies produced two separate and distinct Ukraines and if so, what implications does this have for foreign policy?

Garnett argues that when one examines the divisions in Ukraine on the basis of language preference rather than ethnicity, the Russophone population is relatively equal to the Ukrainophone population.[79] Thus, the 'divide' in Ukraine appears to be much greater than suggested by current census reports. Further, surveys conducted in 1994-95 have shown a strong correlation between language spoken and stances on key political issues.[80] Some of these issues include relations with Russia and the internal structure of the Ukrainian state. There are also notable differences of opinion on fundamental social issues such as private property and market reform, the preservation of the Russian language, and the need for integration with Russia.

As for the scenario that would translate this division into a threat to the Ukrainian state, two key factors should be considered: the Russian minority and the Ukrainian state itself. The first scenario sees the Russian minority as a permanent one which would increase in size and increasingly separate from the Ukrainian state over time. The community itself is a source of internal instability that Russia could potentially use to intervene in the domestic affairs of Ukraine. In the second scenario the danger comes from a Ukrainian state

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[78] Kuzio and Wilson, p. 30.

[79] Yet it should be stated that the majority of the population of Ukraine regards itself as bilingual.

[80] See Dominique Arel, 'Ukraine: The temptation of the nationalizing state' in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu, New York: ME Sharpe, 1995.

that finds itself unable to create a genuine political community from the two halves and thus, the government may be forced to adopt a more openly ethnic orientation in its state-building. In other words, the government may choose to divide the country to save the Ukrainian state.

Since independence, Ukrainian leaders have been especially preoccupied about the idea of this 'great divide'. President Kravchuk justified key foreign and economic security policies as a way of avoiding the emergence of two separate Ukraines. For example, on the topic of the CIS charter on economic union, Kravchuk spoke on the danger of creating a situation in which Ukrainian society is divided into two defined groups.[81] Further, in his 1994 inaugural address, President Kuchma spoke of the potential dangers arising from Ukraine's multi-cultural composition: 'we must understand that Ukraine is a multiethnic state. Any attempts to ignore that fact threaten a deep schism and the collapse of the idea of Ukrainian statehood'.[82]

It is easy to demonstrate how ethnic politics and regional divisions can play an important role in Ukrainian politics. However, it is another task entirely to prove that these factors threaten the consolidation of the Ukrainian state. Ethnic politics and regional divisions are very often part of stable societies (i.e. Belgium). The weakness of the Ukrainian state and its political traditions seems to magnify these other internal challenges, yet the emphasis on the 'great divide' as the most potential threat to Ukrainian statehood has sometimes led analysts to assume that these divisions cannot serve as stabilisers or to overlook the fact that Ukraine's divisions can be a source of its strength. The real challenge to the consolidation of Ukrainian independence is the state of the economy as well as Russia's long-term policy toward Ukraine. The ethnic and ethno-linguistic divide is thus more of a complicating factor than it is a primary source of internal strife. In the following discussion four constraints will be given as to why the 'great divide' is not the main threat to Ukrainian stability.

The first factor to consider is that Ukraine is comprised of several regional, economic, and cultural divisions that cut across the so-called East-West state divide. Ukrainians are, therefore, not necessarily divided on key foreign policy and other issues between Russophones and Ukrainophones. In terms of political attitudes, there are at least five key regional divisions that can be made: western[83], central[84], southern[85], eastern[86], and Crimea.[87]

The purpose here is not to show how many ways Ukraine can be divided. For that matter, one could further break down the regions into sub-regions and perhaps even make Kyiv a separate region. The goal is to demonstrate that there are more than two divisions which in itself is grounds for questioning the 'great divide' scenario. The sharp political differences between east and west Ukraine seems to capture most of the attention; however, Ukrainian politics cannot be simplified in this manner. In the 1994 presidential elections,[88] the voting patterns are worth mentioning as they demonstrated remarkable geographic divisions. The eastern regions gave Kuchma more than 74 per cent of the vote, while in the west Kravchuk received over 84 per cent of the vote. However, there was also a central belt of eight *oblasts* in which neither Kravchuk nor Kuchma received more than 60 per cent. Analysts have described this outcome as 'a space of peculiar political ambivalence'.[89] It is here that Kuchma won the election. Though the central region's votes in his favour were high by Western standards, they were far below the levels that appeared in either the eastern or western regions. Furthermore, the results do not fit easily into the stereotypical view of either 'half' of the country.

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[81] *FBIS Daily Report*: Central Eurasia, 22 September 1993, pp. 26-27.

[82] See 'Leonid Kuchma takes oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people' in *Golos Ukrainy*, 21 July 1994.

[83] The west includes the most ethnically conscious Ukrainian regions of Galicia-Volyn (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankyvsk, Volyn, and Rivne), and Zakarpatia and Bukovyna.

[84] Central Ukraine is comprised of several highly diverse *oblasts* including Kharkiv in the east and Khmelnytskyy in the west.

[85] Southern Ukraine includes the *oblasts* Odessa, Kherson, and Mykolayiv.

[86] The east is made up of four *oblasts* that are Russian speaking and are also highly industrialised, which are Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya.

[87] Crimea is a separate region altogether, having the status of an 'autonomous republic'.

[88] See Chapter Four for a detailed analysis of the 1994 and 1999 Presidential elections.

[89] Svitlana Oksamytna and Serhiy Makeev, 'Sociological aspects of political geography in Ukraine', *A Political Portrait of Ukraine*, vol. 5, 1995, p. 2.

When analysing the results of the 1994 election, it becomes clear that the campaign itself exacerbated regional divisions. For example, Kravchuk would not have been able to run on the record of the economy so instead he chose to run as the defender of Ukrainian statehood, and thus cast Kuchma as the 'dupe of Russia'. Kuchma, in turn, countered by appealing to the regions in the east by pushing for establishment of Russian as the state's second official language and for pursuing a more business-like relationship with Moscow. However, these issues did not split the country as one might have expected. The campaign quickly turned back to the issues that most closely affect Ukrainian life which were the economy and social issues.

Not one great divide, but many divisions

Upon examining the regional, ethnic, and cultural divisions, it should be clear that it is erroneous to describe Ukraine as a society overshadowed by a 'great divide'. Geographical, cultural, and economical divisions tend to supplement the 'great divide' and often times serve as the reason for political moderation in election campaigns in particular. Extremist political visions are not saleable across the whole of Ukraine and its diverse communities. During this time of weak central institutions and state-building, decision-makers remain under a system of checks and balances and no politicians with extreme views, whether democratic-nationalist or communist-integrationalist will be successful without some moderation (this was clearly evident in the 1999 Presidential election as discussed in the following chapter). The culturally, ethnically, and politically diverse regions in Ukraine continue to force the state elite to compromise in their domestic and foreign policy-making.

A second constraint on the 'great divide' is intra-regional competition that includes a set of internal obstacles. These obstacles are a threat to the emergence and survival of large regional or ethnic blocs. For example, eastern regions share concerns about economic, cultural, and political questions that are at the heart of state-building, yet they are forced to compete with one another for scarce political capital. The eastern regions are economic competitors for governmental support as well as for international aid and investment. Not even the old system of mines and heavy industries can continue without heavy government subsidies. As the Ukrainian government cannot afford to finance all of these industries, inefficient mines and other industry should be closed down for the sake of state-wide economic reform efforts; however, Kyiv is finding it difficult to finance the closing of these industries. This is a trend that is likely to intensify intra-regional competition. The Ukrainian government must regularly deal with pressures from key interest groups such as the collective farmers or the miners. The process of economic reform as well as outside pressures from international financial institutions, specifically the IMF, and key Western governments have basically thwarted the prospect of expanding subsidies.[90]

Moreover, as regards foreign policy, the eastern regions are often unpredictable in terms of which parliamentary group will receive the greatest support. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the east supported a large number of Socialists, Communists, and Peasant Party candidates, many of whom expressed a desire for integration with Russia.[91] However, the east has also been the major supporter of Russian-language parties that favour economic reforms which included Kuchma's bloc. Unlike in Crimea, large-scale movements toward secession do not exist and there are no region-wide patterns of strikes or opposition to the government. The strikes or ballot initiatives on the Russian language have been local and not region-wide.

A third constraint on the idea of a 'great divide' is the lack of significant support on the part of Moscow for ethnic and regional political movements within Ukraine.[92] Although it should be pointed out that the Ukrainian elite *perceives* that there is the potential for Russia to become more proactive in Ukraine's eastern and southern *oblasts*. This can be exemplified through the increase of Russian language media in Ukraine. In public opinion

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[90] Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch*, p. 20.

[91] See Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, 'The Ukrainian parliamentary elections' *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 26, 1 July 1994.

[92] Yet forces in Russia, not the government directly, certainly backed Meshkov's drive to separatism.

polls, eastern Ukraine captures a great deal of Russian sympathy; however, Moscow is currently in no position to undertake the scale of support necessary to significantly affect Ukrainian domestic politics. Experience has also shown that Ukraine's Russia-oriented politicians can gain more economic support by playing the 'regional card' in Kyiv rather than joining the long queue for Russian subsidies.

Kyiv has thus managed to attract the attention and ambition of the eastern regions. The fact that Russia has not interfered in the affairs of the eastern *oblasts* and the absence of a Russian policy of support and intervention demonstrates that Kyiv remains the central authority on crucial socio-economic decisions such as resource allocation, jobs and benefits. The high turnout for the 1994 elections demonstrates the population's continued orientation toward Kyiv. This orientation helps to turn internal divisions from a state-destroying to a state-creating way of political life. It will always be difficult to balance interest in the midst of an ethnically, regionally, religiously and economically diverse state, but these factors are the defining characteristics of Ukrainian politics. The regional tugs and struggles to gain economic support as well as political influence can be seen as a sign that the state is starting to mature, not break-up.

The fourth constraint on the development of the 'great divide' concerns the extent to which the Ukrainian state has successfully addressed and continues to work on the challenges that confront it. For example, the laws and policies of the Ukrainian government have secured the rights of minorities. Further, the provisions for citizenship have been defined in political, not ethnic terms. Ukrainians have never had a strong state bearing tradition within anything like its current borders.[93] Ukrainian history is one of a 'stateless nation' and as such, one should not be surprised if at first the internal divisions and other forces from the Soviet era are stronger than the forces that are trying to mould a new state. As previously explained Ukraine's regions all have distinct histories. Especially those in the eastern, northern, and southern regions of present-day Ukraine have been under Russian political control for centuries. In contrast, the western regions, specifically Galicia, Volyn, and Bukovyna were part of other political systems which included the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland, and Romania. It was not until World War II that the Soviet Union absorbed these territories and only in 1954 did Crimea become part of the Ukrainian SSR.

Because of the diverse history of the regions in Ukraine, the government is limited as to how much power can be concentrated in the centre. It is thus relatively ensured that the regions will continue to be consulted on issues directly affecting them which will in turn make them major players in Ukrainian politics and in foreign policy. Processes already at work in Ukraine are slowly creating a political community that is more than the sum of its parts. Instead of looking for the citizen's expressions of loyalty to Kyiv, observers should understand the multiple and even contradictory sources of attachment to the Ukrainian state beyond ethnic and cultural cleavages. Opinion polls in 1994 have shown that the number of people favouring independence has continued to rise, yet there are still large segments of the population that favour integration with Russia.[94] The test will be whether the Ukrainian state can build on these contradictory sources of identification which would result in a unifying allegiance to, and a tolerance of, the Ukrainian state. To date, the government has not pursued policies that would bring potential conflicts between those identifications. The 'great divide' thus remains a decisive factor in shaping Ukrainian politics but does not threaten its demise.

In a poll taken in July 1998 by Ukrainian Surveys and Market Research, Ukrainians were asked about their preference for Ukrainian or Russian as the official state language (see Figure 1 and Table 2). It was determined that the majority of those surveyed favoured a legal status for both languages. Although naturally it was confirmed that respondents from the west were more likely to favour the Ukrainian language while those from the east and south were more likely to favour Russian, the poll brought about some surprises. Most notably, the poll showed that the younger population is more likely to favour the Russian language, regardless of where they are living in Ukraine. The results suggest that the

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[93] Although in Ukrainian historiography the state of the Kyiv Rus, the Galician-Volhynian the Cossack Hetmanate are all examples of past Ukrainian states.
[94] See *OMRI Digest*, 10 January 1995.

government's policy of conducting all public education in the Ukrainian language has failed to halt a long-term trend toward linguistic Russification in Ukraine.[95]

Figure 1: Ukrainians divided on language issue

Source: Ukrainian surveys and market research

1- Ukrainian should be the state language, but both Russian and Ukrainian should be officially recognised for legal business documents
2- Ukrainian should be used in all official communication, while Russian should be used in unofficial communication among the Russian-speaking population
3- Russian language should be banned from Ukraine
4- Russian should be the only state language of Ukraine
5- Russian and Ukrainian should both be state languages

Table 2: Preferred Status of the Russian Language by Region (per cent)

	Ukraine	Kyiv	North	West	Centre	South	East
Russian sole language	4.6	1.7	1.1	3.9	1.1	8.0	5.0
Russian 2nd language	36.1	11.0	21.5	6.3	24.9	58.5	56.5
Russian legal for contracts	30.3	48.4	49.1	16.6	46.0	25.7	26.5
Russian unofficial only	24.2	37.1	24.7	54.7	24.9	6.2	11.1
Russian banned from Ukraine	4.1	1.7	3.5	16.1	.7	.5	.2

Source: Ukrainian Surveys and Market Research, 1998, in *The Kyiv Post*, 31 July 1998

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[95] Stefan Korshak and Vitaly Sych, 'Ukrainians want legal status for Russian', *The Kyiv Post*, 31 July 1998.

As a result of the 1996 Constitution, all government documents, public education, and commercial contracts must be in Ukrainian, although such regulations are less likely to be enforced in Russian-speaking regions. Out of nearly 1,000 people polled throughout the country, over 70 per cent said they favoured giving the Russian language some official status, but almost 60 per cent were against making Russian a state language.

Political scientists have long predicted growing ethnic tensions between Ukrainian nationalists in the west and ethnic Russians in the east and Crimea. More pessimistic observers have even foreseen a second Yugoslavia in Ukraine, but this has not happened. Unlike, for example, the Baltic States where workers have been forced to learn the national language or lose their jobs, Ukrainians appear to be comfortable with not one but two functional languages.

In conclusion on this topic of whether the 'great divide' is a threat to Ukrainian stability, Garnett points out that these divisions- cultural, linguistic, and ethnic- are not eternal. The distribution of the Russophone and Ukrainophone populations was the result of the ruling authorities who decided where and how people made their living. The historical circumstances that created such divisions have been profoundly disrupted and are unlikely to be re-established. Every year the number of Ukrainians who can recall little or nothing about the Soviet past increases. Most have grown up under Gorbachev's policies of loosening the Soviet system. Those under thirty years old remember no other and those under forty are familiar with Leonid Brezhnev, but have now spent most of their adult lives under Gorbachev's Soviet Union and an independent Ukraine. State-building is one of the driving forces that is shaping Ukrainian politics and it is the task of present day Ukrainian statesmen to create a state and society that is no longer bound by its most serious divisions.[96]

Crimea

The only exception to the above argument that its divisions do not plague Ukraine would be Crimea. The clearest division in Ukrainian society is not between east and west, but between Crimea and the rest of the state.[97] It is worthwhile to present a brief background and present day situation in Crimea because in terms of Ukrainian security and political stability, Crimea has exemplified one of the most serious challenges. Moreover, in terms of Ukraine's foreign policy orientation, the people of Crimea have been the most supportive of a re-orientation towards Russia, Belarus, and the CIS. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, Crimea has been considered to be potentially the most significant trouble spot in the country. There are two main conflict roots in Crimea: the first is between the Russian majority and the Ukrainian central authorities and the second is between the Crimeans and the Crimean Tatars.[98]

The stages of Kyiv-Crimea relations

The status of Crimea as either part of the Ukrainian state or even altogether separate from Ukraine has resulted in a constant tug-of-war between Kyiv and the Crimean capital of Simferopol. Crimea's relations with the Ukrainian government has gone through four stages since 1991:

I.   A period of demand and compromise from 1991 to February 1994
II.   Growing support for separatism from February 1994 to March 1995
III.   The subjugation of the separatists and their defeat from March-July 1995

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[96] Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, p. 26.
[97] For on overview on this topic see Maria Drohobycky (ed), *Crimea: Challenges, Changes, and Prospects* Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield, 1995.
[98] The discrepancies lie in the system of representation of the different ethnic groups in the official political organs of Crimea, the status of the Tatar language, and the distribution of land. The nature of the conflict is thus cultural, economic, and political, and territorial.

IV.   A renewed struggle for autonomy from July 1995 to the present.

In the first stage following the Ukrainian declaration of independence on 24 August 1991, demands for a separate status were expressed. The Republican Movement of Crimea (RMC) was then formed which had the task of promoting full Crimean secession from Ukraine. It proposed that following secession the inhabitants of Crimea should be allowed to decide in a referendum whether they would remain independent or integrate with Russia. On 4 September 1991 the Crimean legislature, the Crimean Supreme Soviet, declared the state sovereignty of Crimea as a constituent part of Ukraine. Days later the RMC started a campaign for a referendum on the question of Crimean independence. By November the RMC had gathered close to 250,000 signatures in favour of holding this referendum.[99]

The *Rada* recognised the autonomous status of Crimea in February 1992 following the Crimean referendum in January, which had shown that 93 per cent of the Crimean population was in favour of autonomy. Kyiv's response to the referendum was to start negotiations with the Crimean leadership, yet it was still unclear what powers would be bestowed upon Crimea. The negotiations led to the drafting of a document on the delineation of power between Ukraine and Crimea. After various amendments, the *Rada* approved the document on 30 June 1992.

Since 1991 Crimean politics has been dominated by the Russophones, the communists, and business interest parties. The Russophone parties compromise a small bloc of parties which advocate some form of union with Russia, as well as the dominant Crimean Republican Party, which supports independence for Crimea. The Communist Party, established in 1992, was initially opposed to reform and in favour of the restoration of the Soviet Union, but eventually dropped its pro-USSR position and was simply anti-reform. The Communists still advocated close co-operation with Russia and the CIS, but as party leader Leonid Grach stated in May 1995, 'we cannot go back to the old Soviet Union. People would not put up with it.[100]

The second stage in Crimean politics was characterised as growing separation. Candidates of the Rossiya political coalition won both the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections in 1994, acquiring 51 of 94 seats, which created a solidified movement towards independence. President Meshkov proclaimed that Crimeans should serve their military time only in Crimea, demanded that all Ukrainian troops and military arsenals be removed from Crimea, and re-activated the strongly pro-independence 1992 Crimean constitution. In September 1992, the parliament even discussed the following wording for the independence question in the upcoming referendum: 'are you in favour of the Independent Republic of Crimea, in a union with other states?'[101] Kyiv reacted to these and other actions with no more than verbal condemnation and a war of decrees made it nearly impossible to have any meaningful negotiations with Crimea. The Crimean parliamentary Speaker, Sergey Tsekov stated that, 'we are not ignoring Kyiv and we are not threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity; we are only realising the programme of Crimean and Russian reunion'.[102]

The third stage was one of subjugation and local defeat as the heroes of Crimean independence suffered three serious setbacks during the spring and summer of 1995. The central authorities in Kyiv issued several decrees that severely limited Crimean autonomy. The first major blow to Crimean autonomy occurred in March 1995 when the Ukrainian parliament declared the Crimean Constitution null and void. Two weeks later, President Kuchma issued a decree placing the Crimean government under direct Ukrainian control. These decrees were a major alteration from previous cautious policies; Kyiv had now taken on Crimean separation.

Three key factors triggered the change in policy: 1) the improbability of Russian involvement because of the Chechen war; 2) the presence of pro-Ukrainian allies in Crimea; and 3) the internal divisions that were becoming apparent within the separatist Crimean movement. Moscow, first of all, made few attempts to interfere in Ukrainian-Crimean

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[99] Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, p. 46.
[100]See *FBIS-SOV*-95-100, 17 May 1995.
[101] *Nazavisimaya gazeta*, 5 November 1994.
[102] *Moskovskie novosti*, no.21, 21-29 May 1994.

relations, despite the fact the over 70 per cent of the Crimean population was ethnically Russian and Crimea is the base of the Black Sea Fleet. President Yeltsin and other political leaders in Russia had also declared their intention to adhere to a 'hands off' policy for Crimea, and engagement with the province would be viewed as interference in the domestic affairs of Ukraine. However, there are still strong pro-Crimea sentiments in the Russian political elite and in the Russian population, and it would be hard to imagine Moscow turning its back entirely on Crimea and its people. Because Kyiv cannot be sure of the possibility of future Russian involvement in Crimea, it was important for Kuchma to act when the chances were low, and the Chechen conflict provided a good opportunity. How could Moscow possibly condemn Kyiv for solving its problems with a separatist province by juridical means while they were bombing Chechen separatists in their own backyard? Yevhen Zherebetsky, member of the parliamentary commission on Foreign and CIS affairs, asserted that such reasoning was a major factor in Kyiv's firmer attitude towards Crimea.[103]

Second, by March 1995, Kyiv could rely on two allies in Crimea: a considerable number of the former *nomenklatura*, and the Crimean law enforcement authorities.[104] Reaching an agreement with the Crimean *nomenklatura* was one of Kyiv's strategies in attempting to bring an end to the conflict with Crimea. Although the *nomenklatura* was virtually deprived of all political power, Kyiv continued to pay close attention to relations with the party throughout 1994. Further, Kyiv had solid ties to the law enforcement in Crimea and most of these authorities aligned with Kyiv's position.[105] Crucially important in this effort was Nikolay Bagrov, the former Crimean Speaker of parliament and ally of Kyiv authorities. However, the landslide victory of Yuriy Meshkov, who received 73 per cent of the vote, was a drawback.

A third reason for the change in Ukrainian policy towards Crimea was due to the split in the Crimean separatist movement. By October 1994 Meshkov, the Speaker of the Crimean Parliament, and others in the Rossiya parliamentary block had fallen out to the extent that Meshkov attempted, unsuccessfully, to dissolve the Rossiya-dominated parliament. The disunity in the separatist movement certainly worked in Kyiv's favour and served as an opportunity to increase its control over the region.

The third stage of Ukraine-Crimea relations began in March 1995. Although Crimean leaders protested the decisions handed down from Kyiv in March 1995, by early June they appeared to be retreating from further conflict. For example, the proposed referendum set for June 1995 was postponed and the Crimean parliament also passed the text for the new Crimean constitution in which most of the wording concerning separatist movements was removed. There are at least three factors that slowed the separatist movement in Crimea. First, parliament was ready to concede the separatist movement in exchange for getting the government back under their control. Second, despite many missions to Russia by Crimean parliamentarians, Russia refused to give Crimea the tangible economic and political support needed for the referendum. Third, the Crimean government had high hopes of securing financial support from the OSCE at the conference on Crimean problems in June 1995 in Locarno. Though the OSCE did issue a warning to Kyiv against disbanding the Crimean parliament, they did not have much sympathy for the people of Crimea and their claim to have the right to determine the future status of the peninsula.

While the Crimean parliament did get its government back, serious limitations were applied. First of all, all future candidates for the post of Prime Minister of Crimea have to be approved by the Ukrainian president, thus in reality no candidate that was not pro-Ukrainian statehood would be accepted. Also, Kuchma further strengthened Kyiv's control by placing Crimean local administrative authorities under the control of the Ukrainian government. The President also merged the Crimean privatisation bureau with the local branch of the Ukrainian privatisation bureau. Finally, the factional structure of the Crimean parliament also experienced major changes. The Rossiya faction that was formerly in the majority was left with only ten deputies, whereas the new faction, 'Creation', which supported the new Prime Minister, Suprunyuk, emerged as the majority party with 23 deputies.

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[103]See Taras Kuzio, 'The Ukrainian armed forces in conflict', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 7, no. 7, 1995.

[104] But these were not linked to the national democrats in the Crimea.

[105] Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, pp. 49-50.

The fourth stage of Ukrainian-Crimean relations began in the autumn of 1995 and continues at the time of writing. Following the period of subordination, a new era of tensions arose. After a revamping of the Crimean parliament in June 1995, its deputies began to work on a state constitution which would ensure that Crimea regained control over economic policy as well as privatisation efforts. The document was adopted by the parliament in November 1995 and sent to the Ukrainian parliament for approval. However, the *Rada* was in no hurry to endorse the draft, particularly since Ukraine had not yet approved its own new constitution. The first reading of Crimea's proposal was in March 1996 and the Ukrainian parliament proposed many changes. For example, the *Rada* insisted on several word changes in the draft constitution such as the 'citizens of Crimea', to 'a citizen of Ukraine living in Crimea'; the 'Crimean people' to 'the population of Crimea'; and 'the Republic of Crimea' to 'the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.' Further, Ukrainian and Tatar had to be named as the official languages alongside Russian, and Crimea was to have no separate anthem, flag, or coat of arms.

Overall, relations between Kyiv and Crimea have changed dramatically since Ukraine's independence- from making demands for separation, to resorting to violence, to making concessions to Kyiv, to repeating the cycle. After Crimean separatism became a threat to Ukrainian territorial integrity in 1994, Kyiv changed its policy from verbal condemnation to a more active effort to reign in Crimea. There were three circumstances that were crucial to the turn of events: Russian non-interference in Crimea, the Crimean politicians' preoccupation with securing control over privatisation, and the fact that Crimea remains financially dependent on Ukraine. However, these factors must by no means be viewed as permanent. Russia could decide to take a more active role in the region (although this is highly unlikely, as Russia has neither the desire nor the economic means to do this). Also, the separatists in Crimea could sort out their differences and appoint new leaders. Moreover, once Crimea's economic situation improves, the region's dependence on Kyiv could be significantly reduced.[106]

The separatist movements in Crimea have had the potential to draw Russia into the conflict and thus into the domestic affairs of Ukraine. If this had happened, Moscow's involvement in Crimea could have seriously affected its bilateral relations with Kyiv as well as its international standing with the West and in the region. However, Russia has not supported the Crimean separatists, which is testimony to both its preoccupation with domestic crises at home as well as its resolve not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Ukraine.

As this section has discussed Ukraine's many ethnic, cultural, and social divisions it seems logical that the next step would probe deeper into one specific challenge which is that of consolidating the Ukrainian nation. The following section will thus focus specifically on the challenge of developing a Ukrainian national identity and how this identity, or lack thereof, affects foreign policy.

The Challenge of Creating a Ukrainian National Identity

The rejection of the communist ideology and the break-up of the Soviet Union have caused a profound crisis of identity among the citizens of the newly independent states. Their confusion about belonging to a specific socio-cultural tradition is combined with the desire to reside in a stable political and economic system. Consequently, according to Kulyk, the political elites have been faced with the task of 'producing new identifying models which will not only enable citizens to overcome their sense of disorientation and fear of choices and to strengthen their loyalty to the new states, but will also determine the essential parameters of state-creating strategies and promote the readiness of the societies to implement those strategies'.[107]

Much has been written recently in the academic literature regarding Ukraine's national identity crisis. This situation stems, among other things, from the fact the Ukraine

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[106] See Taras Kuzio, 'The Crimea and European Security', *European Security*, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1994.

[107] Volodymyr Kulyk, 'The search for post-Soviet identity in Ukraine and Russia and its influence on the relations between the two states', *The Harriman Review*, March-May 1996.

became an independent state before it was ever a nation. The people living in the territory of Ukraine had neither a fully developed and unilaterally recognised shared culture in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion, nor a common set of historical experiences that would help society to unify. Therefore, when Ukraine became independent, the government was taking on many challenges. Not only did the new administration have to contend with extreme economic and social problems it had to encourage the development of a Ukrainian national identity in an ethnically and culturally diverse state. Speaking on the fifth anniversary of the declaration of independence, President Kuchma spoke emotionally: 'it was an event of huge importance (referring to the declaration of independence), one of those few historic dates which unites people not by the hand of the ruler but by the will of their hearts, which turns a populace into a nation and a territory into a state'.[108]

State- and nation-building in the FSU can be compared to the same processes in Western Europe between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. In some ways, Ukraine resembles post-revolutionary France or post-unification Germany where in both cases the new state inherited a territory with considerable regional differences. Ukraine will be successful in its efforts at creating a nation-state if it can condition loyalties to the new state and its capital city, Kyiv, rather than to the FSU, Russia, or Moscow. At the same time, Ukraine must maintain sub-regional identities in the *oblasts* such as Odessa and Donbass in much the same manner as Alsace-Lorraine and Bavaria, within a larger framework that is founded on citizenship. The successful creation of a Ukrainian national identity will require careful planning on the part of the central government, and special consideration will have to be given to the eastern and southern regions where the Ukrainian *ethnos* is less developed. In comparison to western, central, and northern Ukraine, the *ethnos* is at a more advanced stage because the Ukrainian national consciousness is much higher. This can be demonstrated by the 1994 Presidential election where candidates Kravchuk and Kuchma won by large majorities in their respective home regions, and in the 1999 Presidential election where Kuchma, the 'pro-West' candidate, won by a landslide in western Ukraine (see election analysis in Chapter Four).

Western perspectives on Ukraine including the previously discussed 'great divide' debate have often described the ethnic divisions in Ukraine along highly simplistic lines. These analyses would suggest that the state is threatened along nationalist terms, or that there is a situation of a 'Russified' eastern and southern Ukraine fronting the 'nationalistic' western, central, and northern parts. Still, any credible analysis of Ukraine has to set aside such assumptions, as this would in effect overlook the reality of the ethnicity question. Although western Ukraine possesses a higher national consciousness that other areas of the state this has not been translated into mass support for extreme paramilitary groups (such as UNA-UNSO) seeking to overthrow the central government. In turn, the 'Russified' eastern *oblasts* have not shown much enthusiasm for separatism or for a return to Russia, although this has occurred to varying degrees in Crimea, as discussed above. As described earlier in this chapter, no *oblast* in Ukraine has an ethnic Russian majority, but a large number of the eastern and southern regions do have a majority of Russophones. This large number of Russophones does have ramifications often in the form of calls for the devolution of the Ukrainian state to a federal structure, or closer economic and political integration with the CIS or in a Russia-Belarus union. This foreign policy preference is most evident in Donbass, Luhansk, Odessa and Mykolaiv.

In defining national identity, Smith reminds us that components of national identity include myths and memories, common ancestry and history, the formation of a shared public culture based on language, religion and customs. Also necessary is some sense of political community, however tenuous, as well as the delimitation of a compact historical territory and homeland and the unification of local economic units into a single economic unit based upon the homeland.[109] It is also 'the feeling of belonging which provides national cohesiveness'.[110] This aspect of national identity is subjective and therefore, is difficult to

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[108] Extracted from President Kuchma's speech on the fifth anniversary of Ukraine's independence, *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 29 August 1996.
[109] Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 9.
[110] Walker Conner, 'Beyond reason: the nature of the ethno-national bond', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 16, no. 3, 1993, p. 383.

define and nearly impossible to measure. What can be concluded from this discussion is that language is only one aspect of national identity. It cannot be assumed that because a considerable portion of the population in Ukraine is Russophone that this necessarily translates into *loyalties* to Moscow over Kyiv. To make this assumption is to attribute the difficulties associated with the creation of a Ukrainian national identity to linguistic factors only. Further, to attempt to assess the foreign policy orientation of a state's population by using only one aspect of national identity, or language, will only lead to inaccurate conclusions, such as those predictions made by Wilson and Arel[111] about Kuchma's likely course of action. After Kuchma's election in 1994 it was argued that Ukraine was headed for a 'return to Eurasia', not on the basis of the economic crisis, but due to 'national sentiments'. Because the new President was from eastern Ukraine, and particularly because he was a native Russian speaker, married to a Russian, and from eastern Ukraine, it was assumed that he would favour closer economic and political ties to Russia and the CIS. In reality, Kuchma behaved like a pragmatist seeking to normalise relations with Russia and integrating only insofar as closer ties would benefit Ukraine economically.[112]

Paradoxes in Ukrainian identity

The question of Ukrainian national identity was studied primarily abroad in the US, Canada and France by a number of specialist historians, linguists, and social anthropologists. This led to a division of research traditions in Ukraine and abroad. No methodology has yet been developed in Ukraine for social research (except for sociology) which is commensurable with Western models. Therefore, methodologically the issue of Ukrainian identity was studied more intensively outside Ukraine where there was less of a need for it. Simply transferring the Western approach will not work as Ukraine is still dominated by the Marxist-reductionist approach, a highly moralising form of analysis in which there is no room for research into national self-identification, national character, and national ways of running the economy (see Chapter Two of this thesis for elaboration). In the West, research on national identity has been primarily theoretical and does not have any influence on the state policy of the countries where the Ukrainian diaspora reside. Moreover, the research does not have any 'national soil' beneath it.

This chapter has argued that Ukraine has not developed a national identity since independence, and it is now becoming apparent that most all of the problems which Ukraine is facing in foreign and domestic policy, economics, state-building and democracy boil down to the problem of national identity in some form or another. Progress in forming this identity will determine the pace and direction of Ukrainian modernisation. This conclusion is suggested by the example of Ukraine's closest neighbours. In Poland a sense of national identity has emerged from the outset of its place in Europe and the direction of its foreign policy determined the subsequent place of reform and entry into Western institutions (i.e. NATO and the EU). The same is true of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Furthermore, even in those countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova which have a weakened sense of national identity (due to the influence of Western Christianity and Turkish rule) and where the pace of reform is slow, progress is still faster and at a lower cost than in Ukraine, which shows the slowest progress among East European countries on a wide range of indicators.[113] What is happening in Ukraine is an imitation of reforms in the absence of cultural and ontological preconditions for reforms, and among those preconditions is an absence of a national identity.[114]

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[111] See Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, 'Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?' in *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 32, 19 August 1994, p. 12, and A. Wilson, 'The nationalist agenda: external affairs- untying the Russian knot', in *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 173-193.

[112] The political and economic relationship between Ukraine and Russia will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter four of this thesis.

[113] Including the economy, privatisation, state-building, corruption, and the rule of law.

[114] Volodymyr Zviglyanich, 'Ukrainian identity and challenges of modernity', *The Jamestown Monitor*, 3 March 1999, no. 5, part 3.

Multiple identities

The establishing of a Ukrainian national identity is further complicated by the existence of several identities in Ukraine, including Ukrainian, Russian, Soviet (in eastern/southern Ukraine), pro-Western/Europe (western Ukraine), pro-CIS/pan-Slavic union (eastern/southern Ukraine), and various regional identities. It is an open question as to which identity dominates and subsequently drives Ukraine's foreign policy. Other factors, such as perceptions outside of Ukraine coming from international sources will influence how Ukraine sees itself (i.e. part of Europe or Eurasia). Although the Ukrainian executive has firmly stated its desire to integrate with European structures, figures from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has shown that Ukraine is far from achieving this goal. In the EBRD's Transition Report, the GDP of Ukraine in 1998 constituted only 37 per cent of its GDP in 1989, while Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary were at 118, 103, 100, 97 and 95 per cent, respectively.[115] Therefore, it can be concluded that the gap between Ukraine and its neighbours is widening. As Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have joined NATO, their identities will become more 'European' as opposed to East or Central European, and Ukraine is under threat of marginalisation from Europe, thus encouraging the state's identity to lean more toward Eurasia.

Addressing the economic crisis is a key starting point to the solidification of a Ukrainian national identity. Ukraine is the only post-communist state that has lost more than half of its economic potential in peacetime with no national disasters to explain the loss. For example, during the Great Depression in the US, American GDP fell by only 30 per cent in comparison with one-third in Ukraine.[116] A protracted and deep decline in the national economy diminishes self-assurance and the feeling of economic security. This presents a particular impediment for Ukraine's national identity that has only barely begun to form. It should be clear from this discussion that Ukraine's national identity has not yet been defined. This section has attempted to highlight the fundamental challenges to the forming of a national identity including the lack of a methodological basis for identity study in Ukraine, the emergence of multiple and competing identities among the regions, and the economic crises.

CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to what was assumed in 1993, the sources of stability in Ukraine are stronger and more varied, although the dangers posed by the internal challenges are clearly still evident. However, this relatively stable situation does not mean that the work of state-building is complete or that Ukraine's independence has been solidified.

It has been discussed in this chapter why it is problematic to categorise Ukraine as a state or society that is clearly divided into two halves- the pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia factions, respectively. Further, the evidence has shown that it is erroneous to use linguistic factors as a primary indicator of one's political orientation in Ukraine; if that were the case, Leonid Kuchma would favour closer ties to Russia and Oleksandr Tkachenko, Chair of the *Rada*, would be a defender of Ukrainian statehood. Divisions in Ukrainian society are not so clear-cut as perhaps once thought at the outset of Ukraine's independence.

Above all this chapter has sought to identify the domestic sources including institutional factors and legacies that shape, influence, and ultimately help to determine the orientation of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. These factors include institution-building, party politics and political factions, the state of the economy, regionalism, and Ukraine's under-developed national identity. It has been argued that the state of the Ukrainian economy is the most profound threat to the state's independence, particularly in comparison with regional divisions along ethnic, cultural, or other lines. It is quite possible that the Ukrainian state has not yet been put under the kind of pressure that would break it. However, although ethnic and regional diversity, a weak state structure, and shortsighted

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[115] *Financial Times*, 24 November 1998.
[116] Ibid.

political leadership are factors which could exacerbate a future crisis, economic factors are clearly the most crucial domestic factors which have the potential to undermine the progress made thus far in terms of sustaining an independent Ukraine.

This chapter has also given consideration to the various political parties and their foreign policy perspectives. It was established that the Ukrainian legislature has limited leverage over foreign and security policy decisions in legal or constitutional terms. The *Rada* is essentially limited to the drafting of general principles or guidelines of foreign policy; whereas, it is the President who has the right and responsibility of determining and implementing Ukraine's overall foreign and security policy decisions. However, as will be shown in the following chapters, in response to highly charged external developments (such as Kosovo), both branches of government claim the right to speak for Ukraine's foreign policy, which clearly demonstrates an institutional enigma.

However, the most arduous tasks for Ukraine undoubtedly lie in the state's efforts in terms of economic and institutional reform. The Ukrainian government must make advancements toward consolidating its statehood and transforming its economy into a market-oriented economy, while adhering to social-democratic principles. Only then will Ukraine have the necessary foundation to develop a stable, consistent, relatively predictable foreign policy which is capable of outlasting the individuals currently wielding power.

The following chapter will focus on the dynamics of political evolution in Ukraine and particularly how this evolution affects foreign policy in practice. The analysis will concentrate on shifting party and electoral fortunes in Ukrainian domestic politics, and will analyse what the elections and the main issues of those elections have told us about Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy. Specific attention will be given political orientation and foreign policy perspectives of the various political groups with the analysis focusing on how those ideologies have been manifested in actual foreign policy decisions.

This chapter will build upon the discussion of the previous chapter in which the institutional developments and legacies that have affected the formation of the Ukrainian nation-state and its foreign policy were presented. The focus will now turn to the dynamics of political evolution in Ukrainian domestic politics, giving specific attention to how this evolution affects Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy. The concentration will be on the shifting party and electoral fortunes that have been evident since Ukraine's independence. The issues and outcomes of the parliamentary and presidential elections will be analysed, including a discussion of what those election results tell us about Ukraine's foreign and security policy. Opinion polls of the Ukrainian electorate will also be included in this chapter so as to show the gap between societal preferences and Ukraine's foreign policy orientation.

This chapter will commence with an analysis of how the Constitution and Ukraine's foreign policy works in practice, paying particular attention to the division of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. The Constitution is a useful starting point as a state's constitution is traditionally viewed as the fundamental legal document that serves to guide policy and process. However, it will be shown that foreign policy is variable according to the wishes of the individuals wielding power. In a young state such as Ukraine where nation- and state-building is presently underway and foreign policy goals and national interests have not been clearly demonstrated or sustained over a long period of time, there is room for a subjective interpretation of those goals among Ukrainian policy-makers. Yet, this chapter will also highlight that despite this subjective element, Ukraine's foreign policy has been relatively consistent under Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma. This continuity, moreover, is partly attributable to domestic factors and partly due to external developments. This chapter will focus on the domestic factors that have contributed to the continuity in Ukraine's foreign policy orientation and the following chapter will concentrate on Ukraine's external relations in the same regard.

THE CONSTITUTION AND UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PRACTICE

As discussed in the previous chapter, power is divided between the executive and legislature, as defined by the Constitution of Ukraine. The *Verkhovna Rada* is limited to determining the principles of domestic and foreign policy, but also decides whether Ukraine should both grant and receive loans from foreign states and international organisations. The President, on the other hand, in accordance with Chapter V, Article 106 of the Constitution, is responsible for representing the state in international relations, administering the foreign political activity of the State, conducting negotiations, and concluding international treaties. However, on occasion, the parliament has attempted to take a more active role in influencing the direction of Ukraine's foreign policy. For example, the *Rada* vetoed President Kuchma's decree 'On the Creation of Financial-Industrial Groups', which were specifically aimed at building a financial-industrial conglomerate with Russia. *Rada* deputies were against this decree for fear that Ukraine's economy would come under Russian control. Further, when the Russian *Duma* claimed Sevastopol as a Russian city, the *Rada* was quick to respond calling such acts 'threats to European security' and an infringement on Ukraine's territorial integrity. Parliament also began to discuss the expulsion of all Russian troops (Black Sea base) from Ukraine as a response to the *Duma's* statement.[1]

It is also worth discussing the potential influence that the Parliamentary Chairman has over the direction of Ukraine's foreign policy so as to highlight the subjective element of policy formulation in Ukraine.[2] In July 1998 Oleksandr Tkachenko, head of the

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[1] Nordberg, pp. 73-74.
[2] See analysis which follows and also Chapter Six.

conservative Peasants Party, was elected as the *Rada's* new Chairman, replacing the influential Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz. Tkachenko's actions in this post are worth mentioning as an example of the often-contradicting statements from the legislative and executive branches regarding Ukraine's foreign policy. As a leftist politician, Tkachenko has traditionally been against privatisation, and has supported closer ties with Russia, Belarus and the CIS. He has stated his belief that Ukraine should become a full member of the CIS since it was one of the founders, and Tkachenko has supported Ukraine's accession to CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (CIS IPA) which occurred in March 1999.[3] President Kuchma, conversely, has spoken against Ukraine's full membership in the CIS, and only favours closer ties with the CIS insofar as such co-operation is beneficial to Ukraine in the economic sphere. There seems to be some confusion in the legislature as to whether the executive branch, specifically the Foreign Ministry, has the authority to 'shape Ukraine's foreign policy', as Tkachenko spoke out against the MFA's statements concerning Ukraine's readiness to support any way of resolving the Kosovo conflict, and that it would support the decision reached by NATO.[4] Speaking in favour of one policy or another is normal practice; however, Tkachenko has gone so far as to negotiate a deal with Russia that essentially cajoled Ukraine into the CIS IPA which was against the wishes of the executive (see Chapter Five).

Considerable discrepancies have also been evident in the executive branch itself and even between Foreign Minister Tarasyuk and President Kuchma over Ukraine's position *vis-à-vis* NATO. Tarasyuk, former ambassador to NATO and the Benelux countries, has a very clear pro-West ideology. He was actively involved in the drafting and negotiating of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, has pursued closer ties with the EU, and has been a great supporter of Ukraine's independence. However, he has on occasion made rather undiplomatic comments about Ukraine's desire to join NATO which have ignited discord between the executive and legislative branches, particularly among the opposition parties in the *Rada*. For example, at a conference held in Kyiv in May 1998, Tarasyuk stated that 'integration into Trans-Atlantic structures is one of the priorities of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry; it agrees with its national interests'.[5] Such statements, while perhaps acceptable in his former posts, are problematic as Foreign Minister, particularly as the cornerstone of Ukraine's foreign and security policy has been one of balance between Russia and the West based on multi-vectoralism or non-alignment.[6] President Kuchma reproached Tarasyuk over his statements in what were said to be 'fatherly tones'. Soon after, the Foreign Ministry, eager to rectify the situation, issued a statement stressing that Ukraine's position towards NATO was not changing.[7]

Despite the explicitness of the Constitution, conflict regularly occurs between the executive and legislative branches over the division of power in the sphere of foreign policy. Therefore, it may come as a surprise that Ukraine's foreign policy has been relatively consistent since independence. As discussed in Chapter Five the major changes between Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma were not the *objectives* as regards foreign policy, but rather the *tactics* to achieve those objectives. Kuchma preferred not to treat Russia as a potential adversary, as Kravchuk had, and instead favoured the development of pragmatic, bilateral relations based on the mutual respect of two sovereign states. Still, it should be noted that Ukraine's foreign policy course is by no means set. It can be argued that Ukraine's foreign policy orientation may not outlast the individuals who are presently in a position of authority, which also serves to demonstrate the highly subjective nature of Ukraine's foreign and security policy (see also Chapter Six).

Neutrality/non-bloc status and the Constitution

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[3] 'Parliament speaker wants Ukraine to be full CIS member', *ITAR-TASS*, 28 September 1998.
[4] 'Ukraine Foreign Ministry stand on Kosovo criticised', *ITAR-TASS*, 9 October 1998.
[5] Oksana Kramarchuk, 'Friend of the West adept at making foes', *The Kyiv Post*, 21 August 1998.
[6] At least in the short-medium term, although permanent neutrality or non-bloc status is not included in the Ukrainian Constitution- see discussion below.
[7] Kramarchuk, op cit.

Despite the rhetoric that is often heard in Ukrainian diplomatic speeches and in various forums regarding Ukraine's 'neutral' foreign policy orientation, this policy is not to be found in the Constitution of Ukraine. Therefore, one may assume that such principles are either used selectively, depending on external and internal developments, or that 'neutrality', 'non-bloc status', or Ukrainian 'impartiality'[8] exist as general guidelines or underlying assumptions of Ukraine's foreign policy orientation. Perhaps Ireland would be a comparable example. Irish neutrality is viewed as a general principle which serves to guide the country's foreign and security policy, but has not been formally or legally incorporated into the Irish Constitution.[9] For Ukraine, adhering to a non-aligned status in its foreign and security policy has served to provide the government with the necessary breathing space in its state- and nation-building efforts. Ukraine has been able to fend off pressures to join the CIS security structures, while at the same time, has developed closer political and military contacts with the West and its institutions. This policy of pragmatic neutrality should thus not be viewed as a permanent, but rather as a temporary solution, lasting only as long as the present geopolitical and domestic circumstances dictate the appropriateness of such a policy.

THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES: DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY

The pro-West executive

The executive branch of the Ukrainian government, headed by Kuchma, has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy previously described in this chapter as 'integration with Europe, co-operation with Russia and the CIS', while attempting to carry out economic and political reforms on a domestic level to safeguard Ukrainian statehood. Kuchma sought to 'modify' Ukraine's official foreign policy priorities in early 1999 in preparation for the October Presidential election in an attempt to attract the centrist vote.[10] He explained that Ukraine's foreign policy should be neither pro-Western nor pro-Russian, but should be 'pro-Ukrainian'[11], although he has not attempted to detail this policy to Ukrainian citizens, which might suggest that this policy is not really anything new.[12] Foreign Minister Tarasyuk has consistently advocated a pro-West foreign and security policy for Ukraine. Tarasyuk stated that the most important foreign policy interests of Ukraine are the deepening of Ukraine's strategic partnership with the US and Russia, the strengthening of co-operation with the states of CEE, and the continuation of the course toward the integration into European and Trans-Atlantic security structures. Speaking at a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in January 1999, Tarasyuk said that the admission of East European countries, including Ukraine, to NATO and the EU would create a 'dual bastion of democracy'. He also noted that Kyiv views the enlargement of NATO as strengthening stability and democracy in Europe.[13]

In addition, the MFA has advocated the creation of a 'safe zone of peace and stability' around the state. When discussing Kyiv's bilateral ties with neighbouring states, Tarasyuk emphasised Ukraine's foreign policy is aimed at 'unity and reconciliation with Poland', as well as with 'traditionally friendly and warm relations with Hungary, a search for compromises and an active regional co-operation with Romania and Moldova, a long-time partnership with Turkey, mutually-advantageous economic co-operation with Belarus, new

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[8] Ukraine's foreign policy was described to this author as a policy of 'impartiality' in an interview with Andriy Veselovskiy, Head of Policy Planning and Analysis of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, Ukraine, 19 October 1999. Impartiality was defined as being 'unbiased, unprejudice, and fair'.

[9] For example, Ireland's leaders can subjectively interpret this 'neutrality' principle, which can change over time. Ireland is a member of the UN, the EU (and its Common Foreign and Security Policy), is an observer in the WEU and in NATO. Ireland is also considering joining NATO's PfP programme.

[10] Which he included the promotion of social welfare, individual freedom, marked by good relations with Russia.

[11] Viktor Zamyatin, 'The new geopolitics as a chance for Ukrainian self-determination', *Kiev Den*, 27 March 1999, p. 3.

[12] As explained to the author by a member of the European and Trans-Atlantic Integration Department of the MFA who spoke in an unofficial capacity stating that this pro-Ukraine policy is only rhetoric and will not bring even a slight change in the official policy, 18 October 1999, Kyiv, Ukraine.

[13] See interview with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, 'Foreign Minister on integration into Europe', *Holos Ukrayiny*, 26 March 1999, p. 3.

prospects in relations with Slovakia, and of course, strategic partnership with Russia'. According to Tarasyuk, the setting up of an international consortium for transporting and processing Caspian oil, which is now being discussed with Poland, should serve as a vivid example of such co-operation.[14] Tarasyuk has even gone so far as to say in June 1996 that all of Ukraine's neighbours are its 'strategic partners'. The Foreign Minister has made clear that among the top policy priorities for Ukraine is integration into European and Trans-Atlantic organisations, development of bilateral interstate relations, and multilateral diplomacy. Ukraine is aspiring to be a member of the EU, in particular, and therefore, has sought a 'political and institutional *rapprochement* with the organisation.[15]

The leftist-dominated legislature

As the MFA has been struggling to convince the West of the state's desire to integrate into European and Trans-Atlantic structures and to play a role in the settlement of disputes in southern Europe, *Rada* Chairman Tkachenko has encouraged a rethinking of Ukraine's relations with European and Trans-Atlantic institutions (particularly with NATO following Kosovo), and has consistently advocated a pro-Russia foreign and security policy for Ukraine.

The appointment of Tkachenko can be seen as an indication of the dominant leftist thinking of the Ukrainian legislature in the late 1990s. Tkachenko, sometimes referred to as 'Ukraine's Lukashenka'[16], has used the military actions taken by NATO in Kosovo as a means to drum up support in the *Rada* for a re-orientation of Ukraine's foreign and security priorities. Moreover, public opinion seems to favour Eurasia at times. According to polling of the public, roughly 70 per cent of the Ukrainian population is oriented toward strengthening collaboration with Russia and the CIS in various areas, and not more than 20 per cent consider it necessary to expand ties with NATO and Western structures.[17] These figures demonstrate the presence of anti-West sentiment in the Ukrainian population with which the left has sought to capitalise on, particularly leading up to the 1999 Presidential election.

Speaking at the 13th plenary session of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, Tkachenko even went so far as to proclaim that 'Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy is decided by the parliament'.[18] But this is not so according to the Ukrainian Constitution (see Chapter Three). The parliament determines the basis of foreign policy while the president 'represents the country in international relations, manages the foreign activities of the state, holds negotiations, and endorses Ukraine's international interests'.[19] Nonetheless, as previously mentioned Tkachenko successfully cajoled Ukraine into the CIS IPA in March 1999.[20] Moreover, he helped to organise a highly publicised conference in Kyiv in June 1999 aimed at propelling Ukraine into a Slavic union with Russia and Belarus. Attended by Ukrainian, Russian, Belarusian, and Yugoslav high-ranking diplomats, the interparliamentary conference 'Belarus, Russia, Ukraine: Experience and Problems of Integration', was organised under the auspices of the CIS IPA. The purpose of this meeting was to announce their joint aim of deepening economic integration, harmonising the legislation of the potential 'Slavic Union' member states, and discussing prospects for development of the Russian-Belarusian union. Tkachenko began by stating that 'independence brought to Ukrainians, as well as to Russians and Belarusians, a tangible decrease in standards of living, an abrupt recession of economic development, and a noticeable deterioration of defence ability. Hearing the head of the legislature and

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[14] 'Tarasyuk wants surrounding 'safe zone', *Moscow Itar-Tass*, 10 June 1999.
[15] 'Ukraine favours deepening dialogue with NATO', *Moscow Itar-Tass*, 10 June 1999. See Chapters Five and Six on Ukraine-EU relations.
[16] In reference to the outspokenly anti-West Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
[17] Tatyana Ivzhenko, 'Ukraine will not be joining NATO in the next ten years', *Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 February 1999, pp. 1-2.
[18] Mariya Fedorova, 'Ukraine to revise relations with NATO over war in FRY', *Moscow Itar-Tass*, 3 April 1999.
[19] See Articles 85(5) and 106(3) of the Constitution of Ukraine, adopted on 26 June 1996.
[20] Ukraine is only *de facto* a member of CIS having never signed the Charter, which makes its accession to the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, the legislative body of the CIS, legal nonsense.

presidential candidate blame the economic disarray on independence of the state certainly should send a worrying signal to the great majority of Ukrainian politicians who support Ukraine's independence.[21]

According to the Ukrainian MFA, the executive branch of government was informed about the conference by the organisers only a few hours in advance. Presumably, the executive was not informed ahead of time because the slogans of closer co-operation and integration between Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus were used as the disguise for unconstitutional plans not only to review the multi-vector foreign policy course, but also to drop Ukraine's independent statehood.[22] However, this conference, although laden with rhetoric, had little if any effect on Ukraine's foreign policy course, which demonstrates that the legislature is relatively weak in this sphere.

Ironically, on the same day as this conference was held, Tarasyuk received a delegation from the North Atlantic Commission, NATO's Interparliamentary body, in Kyiv. He affirmed Ukraine's number one priority which is integration into key Western institutions, but also pointed out that Ukrainian policy is presently handicapped by serious differences between the executive and legislative branches regarding the country's future.

Ukraine's current leadership appears incapable of deciding between, for example, the Polish and Belarusian models as regards foreign policy orientation. Consequently, a number of voices claim to speak in the name of Ukrainian foreign policy. Kuchma's foreign policy goals are often seen as ambiguous. Those of the Speaker of the *Rada* are distinctly pan-Slavic, while the MFA has adopted a clear pro-European/West integration stance. Because of these competing perspectives on a domestic level, the Ukrainian government, after nearly a decade of independence, has been unable to clearly and unequivocally determine and define its national interests. The Ukrainian government's only coherent strategy thus far has been to play on the West's eagerness to see real economic and political reforms entrenched in democratic values to help secure the state's independence. The Kuchma administration has leveraged Ukraine's geopolitical importance to the West (which incidentally is characteristic of buffer states as discussed in Chapter Two), safe in the knowledge that despite flouted conditions, Ukraine will get most of what it has been promised. This is a classic Soviet tactic executed by skilled practitioners which is to ask for much more than they expect to receive, and Ukrainian diplomats continue to use this tactic, particularly when dealing with NATO and the EU.[23]

Ultimately what distinguishes Ukraine from Belarus and Russia in the sphere of foreign policy is the pivotal role the *Verkhovna Rada* plays in attempting to influence Ukraine's future course. In 1991 Russia envisioned a model of development for the states of the FSU based on a strong President and a relatively weak Parliament. The result in Belarus has been a movement toward autocracy. Ukraine, on the other hand, went a different route, building into its Constitution a reasonable balance and separation of authority between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government based on democratic principles. The *Rada*, although not generally viewed as a catalyst for reform, did in fact lay the foundation for democracy in Ukraine.[24] As discussed in Chapter Three the *Rada* proclaimed sovereignty then independence for Ukraine. It also approved a Constitutional Accord to diffuse tensions with the executive, and later passed a new Constitution in 1993 (which President Kravchuk vetoed). Thus, it is difficult to argue that the legislature of Ukraine is anti-democracy and anti-independence, but perhaps is reacting to the negative socio-economic conditions or even geopolitical circumstances which include a fear of being left in a no man's land between an expanded and pro-active NATO (in the military sense) and an increasingly disgruntled Russia.

PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

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[21] Research Update, Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research (UCIPR), Kyiv, Ukraine, vol. 5, no. 130, 14 June 1999.
[22] Ibid.
[23] As explained to this author in numerous interviews with NATO and EU officials, October 1999, Brussels, Belgium.
[24] See Chapter Three of this thesis.

The parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994

The first round of the Ukrainian parliamentary elections on 27 March 1994 produced a turnout of 74.7 per cent. Although only about a quarter of the candidates declared which party they were standing for, the final results showed the most popular groups were the communists and the independents. The communists dominated the left, and together with the independents, held 86 of the total 118 seats; the others were shared by the Peasants (18 seats) and the Socialist Parties (14 seats). The moderate nationalists who won 35 seats included *Rukh* (20 seats), the Ukrainian Republican Party (8 seats), the Congress of Ukrainian Nationals (5 seats), and the Democratic Party of Ukraine (2 seats).

Three months later on 26 June and 10 July 1994, the presidential elections[25] were held in accordance with the law 'On the election of a President of Ukraine', initially adopted by the *Rada* on 5 July 1991. The *Rada* changed this law on 1 March 1994 by a vote of 251:0 with 71 abstentions.[26] The law outlined equal opportunities for all persons in terms of nominations, campaigning, publicity, and treatment by official bodies, institutions, and organisations. Further, any person who was 35 years or older, who had the right to vote, and who had resided in Ukraine for ten years could be nominated. All candidates should know the state language (although no proficiency test is administered), and should not have entered the Presidential race on more than three previous occasions. Finally, no discrimination on the basis of ethnic, social, political, occupational, religious or property status would be tolerated.[27]

The election issues of the 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections included first, the desire of the eastern and southern *oblasts* to have Russian as the second official state language. Second, the future of the Ukrainian state was still in question at that time. Thus, a major foreign policy issue focused on the state of Ukraine's relations with Russia and the CIS. Kravchuk was viewed as pro-statehood, pro-West, and anti-CIS, at least insofar as Ukraine's accession to its security structures. Kuchma, on the other hand, was seen to favour the enhancement of co-operation with Russia, the continued use of the Russian language in Ukraine (but not necessarily as a second state language), and the introduction of real economic and political reforms.

In the first round of voting Kravchuk and Kuchma led in 16 and 11 electoral districts respectively. The overall distribution of votes for the top contenders was as follows:

Leonid Kravchuk:	37.72 %
Leonid Kuchma:	31.27 %
Oleksandr Moroz:	13.4 %
Volodymyr Lanovyi:	9.32 %
Valeriy Babych:	2.39 %
Ivan Pluishch:	1.29 %
Petro Talanchu:	0.54 %

As no candidate received more than 50 per cent of the vote in the first round, a second round was necessary. In the second round, Kuchma won by a margin of seven per cent: [28]

Leonid Kuchma:	52.1 %
Leonid Kravchuk:	45.06%

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[25] For a detailed account of the Ukrainian presidential elections, see Taras Kuzio, 'Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994', in the *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, London: Frank Cass Journals, vol. 12, no. 2, June 1996; and Kataryna Wolczuk, 'Presidentialism in Ukraine: A Mid-Term Review of the Second Presidency', in *Democratization*, vol.4, no.3, Autumn 1996.

[26] Yaropolk Kulchyckyj (ed), *Repeat Voting Presidential Election Guide*, Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1994.

[27] See Taras Kuzio, Kravchuk to Kuchma: 'The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol. 12, no. 2, June 1996, p. 118.

[28] Ibid, pp. 130-1.

The eastern and southern *oblasts* clearly supported Kuchma as he was seen to be more pro-Russia/CIS integration, and the central, western, and northern regions largely supported the 'anti-Russia/CIS' Kravchuk (refer to Table 3).

Table 3: Preference by *Oblast*: 1994 Presidential Election

Oblast	Number deputies in *Rada*	Majority voted for Kravchuk	Majority voted for Kuchma
1.Donetska	47		+
2.Dniepropet.	34		+
3.Kharkivska	28		+
4.Luhanska	25		+
5.Kyiv	23	+	
6.Lvivska	23	+	
7.Odesska	23		+
8.Crimea	23		+
9.Zaporizhska	18		+
10.Vinnitska	17	+	
11.Kievska	17	+	
12.Poltavska	16	+ in 1st round	+in 2nd round
13.Zhitomirs.	13	+	
14.Sumska	13		+
15.Khmelnyts	13	+	
16.Cherkaska	13	+	
17.Iv-Frank	12	+	
18.Chernyhiv	12		+
19.Kirovohr	11	+ in 1st round	+ in 2nd round
20.Mykolayiv	11		+
21.Khersonska	11		+
22.Zakarpat	10	+	
23.Rivenska	10	+	
24.Ternopils	10	+	
25.Volynsk	9	+	
26.Chernivet	8	+	
UKRAINE	450		

Source: Grigory Nemyria, 'Regionalism: An underestimated dimension of state-building in Ukraine', in R. Sakwa (ed), *The Experience of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, Macmillian Press, 1999, Chapter 5.

Kuchma was elected president in the second round of voting in July 1994 with only a slight majority over his rival. Many tactical differences were immediately evident between the two presidents. Although both leaders were committed to Ukraine's independent statehood and territorial integrity, Kuchma's 'pragmatism' had replaced Kravchuk's 'romanticism', particularly as regards relations with Russia and the CIS. Kuchma had an alternative set of priorities, which included political and economic reforms and a normalisation of relations with Russia, which were viewed as essential for the state's survival. The major policy changes between Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma can be summed up as a radical distancing strategy from Russia/CIS, an emphasis on nation-building, and an absence of a plan for economic reform under Kravchuk, to a combination of pragmatism toward Russia/CIS and an initiation of economic reforms under Kuchma.

Kuchma's inaugural address aroused much protest from the national democrats in the *Rada*. He pledged to give Russian the status of an official state language and spoke of the need to normalise relations with Russia as a strategic power when he stated that:

> Historically, Ukraine is a part of the Eurasian economic
> and cultural space…Ukraine's self-isolation, its voluntary

107

refusal to fight actively for its own interests in the Eurasian space, was a serious political mistake, which, first of all, harmed our national economy. We should not simply be present among the CIS, but we should influence policy-making in the commonwealth and actively develop our own interests.[29]

The reaction to this speech was so hostile that Kuchma has since avoided making reference to Ukraine as a Eurasian (as opposed to a European) state. In this sense, the 'Eurasian space' is traditionally viewed as economically and politically subservient to Russia.

Although Kuchma received support from the radical left the *Rada*, he very soon showed signs that his instincts were anti-communist and pro-economic and political reform. Therefore, by late 1995 the radical left parties were accusing the new president of having betrayed his election promises. Having only received a small electoral majority, Kuchma was forced to seek compromises on contentious questions in order to build up domestic support for reform. He certainly could not ignore the wishes of 12 million voters or 45 per cent of the electorate who voted for Kravchuk.[30] Unlike his predecessor, Kuchma was successful in building an all-Ukrainian pro-reform consensus, and even managed to gain an overwhelming support from western Ukraine, which ironically had voted against him in the first round based on the assumption that he was pro-Russia.

Upon Kuchma's successful election as president, he inherited Prime Minister Vitalii Masol from Kravchuk. After Masol resigned in March 1995, Yevhen Marchuk became acting Prime Minister until he was made the official Prime Minister in June. Marchuk accepted that his role would be subordinate to the President's. However, the battle between the President and the Parliament over spheres of authority continued. Kuchma accused the *Rada* of blocking his attempts at economic reform, while *Rada* deputies accused Kuchma of wanting to rule the country as a dictator. Kuchma finally tried to put an end to the confrontation in June 1995 when he announced a new referendum on trust in the president and trust in the parliament. In a frantic parliamentary effort to avoid a referendum, 240 deputies along with Kuchma signed a 'constitutional treaty' intended to regulate the spheres of authority until a new constitution was signed. The agreement was a compromise, and awarded the President the power to initiate decrees and appoint ministers, which was more power than he had, but less than what he wanted. The idea was simply to reduce the tensions between the two sides until the new constitution would come into force in 1996.[31]

It should be evident from the discussion in this section that Ukraine's foreign policy orientation was an important issue of the 1994 elections in Ukraine and clearly influenced the outcome. It should also be clear that although Kuchma campaigned as being pro-Russia/CIS, there were few radical differences between Kravchuk and Kuchma in terms of their foreign policies. Both have adhered to a pro-West foreign policy aimed at Ukraine's accession to European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. This topic will be discussed more extensively in the following chapter on Ukraine's external relations, but it is important to make the point at this stage so as to highlight the continuity of Ukraine's foreign policy orientation from the Kravchuk to Kuchma administrations.

The 1998 Parliamentary Elections: Foreign Policy Priorities of the Political Parties

The election programmes of the parties and blocs having won seats in the 1998 Parliamentary election contained the following provisions with regard to their foreign and security policy orientation, and are grouped according their similar political ideologies (right-centre-left):[32]

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[29] *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 July 1994, as cited in Taras Kuzio, 'Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian presidential elections of 1994'.
[30] *Vechimyi Kyiv*, 15 July 1994.
[31] See Chapter Three for the historical background of the drafting and signing of Constitution of Ukraine.
[32] This data was taken from the report on The Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine which was carried out and published in 1998 by the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (CPCFPU), a Kyiv based think tank.

People's Rukh Party- 9.40 % of votes resulting in 50 mandates. 'The foreign policy of Ukraine shall be based on the principles of economic, political, and military integration into Europe. At the same time we shall insist on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Ukraine, obtaining Ukraine's share in the ex-USSR's assets. Equal and mutually beneficial relations with all states shall safeguard Ukraine from turning into a 'raw appendix' of developed countries and the market of low-quality imported output.'

People's Democratic Party- 5.01 % of votes resulting in 72 mandates. 'International credits are not a gift. We should take them only on conditions beneficial for Ukraine…We should not have losses bargaining with foreigners. National interest is the crucial point! Our market is not a world dump! Ukrainian aircrafts, rockets, tools, vessels, and a lot of other things can and must be sold abroad at profitable conditions…We should stay in the world market…We should have more partners, good and various!…The energy sector is a national security problem…Our foreign policy should be based exclusively on Ukraine's national interests. We shall maintain its multi-vector character, granting priority to friendly relations with neigbouring states, first of all with CIS countries, a gradual integration of Ukraine into the European and world community, international and regional organisations, active participation in armed conflicts, supporting of NATO's transformation into a collective security system.

Election bloc 'Ukraine, Forward!'- 1.74 % of vote. 'To carry out external economic policy aimed at the market's protection from imported goods. We propose a real way towards a civilised European community where each state is an equal participant of the integration process, NOT a 'bridge', 'cordon sanitaire', or 'geopolitical fence'.'

Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine- 4.01 % of votes resulting in 30 mandates. 'Granting high priority to domestic manufacturers, protection of domestic markets,…lowering of Ukraine's dependence on foreign energy resources, strengthening of sovereignty, integrity, and inviolability of Ukraine's territory, strengthening the authority of our state in the world,…strengthening of Ukraine's army which would not make the country's defensive capacity vulnerable. We speak against Ukraine's economic dependence on other states.'

The Green Party of Ukraine- 5.44 % of votes resulting in 25 mandates. 'We suggest to arrange a Green summer Olympiad in Ukraine. We propose to form a permanent Ukrainian detachment of the UN peace-making forces of the officers retired during the reduction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukraine should be a non-aligned and neutral state.'

Party 'Reforms and Order'- 3.13 % of vote. 'The state should acquire a niche and an own 'national face' in the world community and achieve an important role in the political architecture of the new Europe through Ukraine's joining the UN Security Council as a representative of the interests of the Central European countries and through co-operation with regional collective security structures and the CIS countries.'

Electoral bloc of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Peasants' Party 'For the Truth, for People, for Ukraine!'- 8.56 % of votes resulting in 30 mandates. 'Sovereignty, security, and equal partnership!..The Disgusting practice of dictates of international finance institutions regarding Ukraine should be stopped;…the unjustified import of food should be stopped;…a beneficial export of agricultural produce to the countries of the CIS and other countries should be provided;…the foreign policy should be in the interest of the state, we should not let Ukraine turn into a colony, a NATO appendix. We should develop good-neighbourly, fraternal economic and political relations, first of all, with the Slavic world, Russia, Belarus, and other states.'

All Ukrainian alignment 'Hromada' Party- 4.68 % of votes resulting in 41 mandates. '…Protection of interests of the domestic manufacturers and consumers should be guaranteed. Renovation of the lost market positions in the CIS countries and a gradual expansion to new international markets are the urgent task. We shall by all means stimulate

the development of export-oriented production branches…Adherence to integration into the world and European structures, development of strategic partnership with the USA and friendly relations with the CIS countries, especially with Russia.'

Communist Party of Ukraine- 24.65 % of votes resulting in 120 out of 413 elected deputies. 'Ukraine should join a voluntary union of fraternal peoples!…Throw away the own and the strange ownership…Ukraine is rapidly turning into a 'banana republic' having no future, into a puppet of NATO and financial structures of the West…The domestic manufacturer shall be protected from foreign interventionists.'

Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine- 4.05 % of vote resulting in 16 mandates. 'Ukraine should be protected from colonisation. Our programme is oriented at protection of the domestic markets and manufacturers. An urgent denunciation of the agreement with the IMF and proscription of all advisors from international financial institutions from Ukraine is obligatory. Russia and Belarus should be recognised to be strategic allies of Ukraine. The Charter on a Distinctive Co-operation with NATO should be denounced!'

The timely, peaceful, and the 1998 democratic elections of Supreme *Rada* deputies is an important aspect of the political transformation that is taking place in Ukraine. The Communist Party was clearly the most successful of the parties (receiving nearly 25 per cent of the vote); however, what is important to note as regards foreign policy is that Ukraine's image and involvement in world and European affairs was given priority, with a focus on more qualitative concerns. These concerns can be divided into two categories: generally objective ones which are connected with the condition of the Ukrainian society and political preferences by the voters, and subjective ones, regarding the functioning of the legal sphere and the actions of the leading political forces.

Several very interesting developments as regards the parliamentary elections should be noted. First, the process of evolution in the state's domestic politics has affected the Ukrainian leftist parties. One very visible sign of this is in the election manifestos. The left (Socialists and Progressive Socialists, Hromada, and Agrarians) supported Ukrainian statehood and independence. Thus, one can conclude that there has been a growth in pro-statehood sentiment within the Ukrainian left. They are not against the West *per se,* but rather they have expressed opposition to organisations such as NATO and the IMF, which in their view, reduce Ukraine to a 'colony' of the West. Second, it is interesting to note that political developments in Ukraine were operating according to logic very peculiar to other countries in CEE such as Hungary or Poland. The left-wing force's positions grew stronger; the Communists now have more mandates that any other political party (but not the majority). The main left-wing forces still have a large support from the population because they are carriers of the Orthodox Communist ideology, yet they actually have no constructive economic or social programme. The politically amorphous party in power is the left's main opponent. The left as a whole blames Kuchma for the economic crisis and also for the worsening of Ukraine's attractiveness as an international partner, particularly as regards the development of economic and political ties with Russia and the CIS.[33] Furthermore, the leftist Hromada Party formerly led by Pavlo Lazarenko, who was accused of stealing millions of dollars from the Ukrainian government and is currently seeking asylum in the US, has made it his personal crusade to topple Kuchma, still harbouring resentment for his sacking of Prime Minister in 1996. Lazarenko's ideologies have left his party aligned with leftist groups who are also opposing Kuchma's government.[34] But what should be pointed out as regards the left's gain in the 1998 parliamentary election is that the results were most likely not so much a reflection of a vote for a return to communism, a revival of the USSR, or integration with Russia and Belarus, but rather a vote *against* the current extremely negative socio-economic conditions. Logically speaking, how can Ukrainians be concerned with foreign policy if they are in the midst of a day to day struggle for survival?

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[33] "The Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine', Centre for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, 1998, p. 4. Copy in author's possession.
[34] Greg Bloom, 'Time for no change', *The Kyiv Post*, 9 October 1998.

The estimations of the general results range from pessimistic to moderately optimistic. The former are grounded in the quantitative gain of the leftists forces' achievements (the Communists and Socialists), and the latter are grounded on the fact that the formal majority of votes which were given to political parties stressing the need for tangible reforms. It is also evident that in the Supreme *Rada* there has been neither a stable majority nor a clear opposition. Instead, a balance has formed in the same way as in recent years according to the logic of inter-faction relations and agreements between the various political leaders. What is clear is that all parties, regardless of their rhetoric and political ideologies, advocate a concentration on Ukraine's national interests first and foremost, and none favour total integration with Russia and the CIS (at the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty. Moreover, only a few advocate closer co-operation with Russia and the CIS as Ukraine's primary foreign policy goal.

It should be clear from this discussion that as part of the evolution process in Ukrainian domestic politics, there has been a pro-statehood movement within the Ukrainian left. This is evidenced both by the growth of centrist parties and by a movement in the left towards greater pragmatism, which resembles the movement in the Ukrainian executive from Kravchuk's nationalist 'romanticism'- or staunchly anti-Russia/CIS- to Kuchma's pragmatic approach to Ukraine's relations with Russia. In the section below on the 1999 Presidential elections and foreign policy orientations of individual candidates, this argument will be strengthened by focusing on the change and evolution of prominent Ukrainian politicians (particularly Moroz) as regards their foreign policy stances. But first, it is necessary to consider the issues which affect the Ukrainian public the most during the elections, including to what degree society is affected by the state's foreign policy orientation, as well as to determine to what degree public opinion influences Ukraine's foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Perspectives and Public Opinion

Participation in political parties and civil groups in Ukraine remains modest. Opinion polls conducted since the early 1990s show that only a minority of Ukrainians belong to political parties or even know of their manifestos. In one opinion poll, only ten per cent of those surveyed expressed an interest in politics whatsoever.[35] However, this low perception of politics is deceptive. The highest political involvement is largely found in western Ukraine, where national consciousness is higher, and where national democrats are particularly influential. Further, the influence of national democratic opinion over Ukraine's foreign policy is also reflected in the structure of the policy-making community in Kyiv. The city hosts few official or independent institutes or think tanks, independent newspapers[36] and journals[37] which do not promote a Eurasian orientation, although there are a few.[38] Further, outside Kyiv there are regional lobbies in favour of economic co-operation with Russia and the CIS, but political-military integration remains the goal of the Communists and the Civic Congress.[39]

However, democratically oriented civic groups and political parties which advocate Ukraine's full integration with Russia and the CIS are faced with a difficult challenge. Eurasian or CIS integration has been associated with the revival of a new union with Russia and Belarus, or even a return to the USSR. Support for such groups are easily condemned as unpatriotic and treacherous and such ideologies are normally associated with the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Civic Congress, the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms, and with policy-makers including *Rada* deputies/presidential candidates such as Oleksandr Tkachenko, Petro

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[35] 'Foreign policy attitude of the population of Ukraine: 1996 Public Opinion Polls', Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.

[36] Examples are *Den', Vseukrainskiye vedomosti, Kievski vedomosti,* and *Zerkalo Nedeli.*

[37] Such as *Politychna Dumka* and *Politolohichna Chyttania.*

[38] Such as the East-West Institute, the Centre for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, the Europe Foundation, the International Centre for Policy Studies, and others. Most of these think tanks are reliant upon Western funding.

[39] Taras Kuzio, 'The Domestic Sources of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', paper prepared for the conference entitled 'Ukraine and the New World Order', University of Ottawa, March 1997. Paper in author's possession.

Symoneko (leader of the Communist Party), and Natalia Vitrenko (leader of the Progressive Socialists Party).

Still, the Ukrainian population's rather amorphous attitude to foreign policy is reflective of this period of socio-economic instability. Further, it is indicative of the political, economic, and identity transition that is taking place as discussed in Chapter Three. Much of the population, particularly those who are experiencing this 'triple' transition, as well as the elderly generation, will rely on past memories and are more likely to exhibit nostalgia for the former USSR. Further, in the Donbass region of Ukraine, this identity is seen as the Soviet (not ethnic) identity that some citizens have given themselves since the disintegration of the USSR.[40] According to one poll, three types of foreign policy orientations were identified among the Ukrainian population: post-Soviet (those who desire for closer integration with the CIS structures), Western (those who favour closer co-operation with Western institutions such as NATO and the EU), and those in favour of a course which would rely on one's own resources (those who are supportive of non-bloc status or neutrality).[41] In 1996, 20 per cent of the population supported a pro-Western course while another 20 per cent supported a reliance on one's own resources. Closer co-operation with the CIS was most strongly backed in eastern and southern Ukraine, but many viewed the CIS mainly as a vehicle to help the state to deal with its economic crises. Still, only one-third of those polled supported Ukraine's full membership in the CIS economic union. A majority of the respondents in this poll had a positive view about Western assistance to Ukraine. Attitudes toward the EU remain positive, yet less than half of the population knew much about the organisation. As regards NATO, about one third of those surveyed back the country's membership now or in the future.[42] Moreover, a different survey found that the support for Ukraine's membership in NATO now or in the future was as high as 89 per cent.[43]

It seems from the above surveys that the Ukrainian population is largely not that opinionated in foreign policy and has presumably little knowledge about foreign policy in general. This is most likely because the population's main concern is day to day survival. What is clear is that there is not an overall favouritism for closer political integration in the CIS as only the eastern and southern *oblasts* supported this course of action. Socio-economic matters undoubtedly capture the attention of the population, which can explain the favourable attitude towards Western economic assistance, and the fact that one-third of those polled favoured economic union within the CIS.

Some analysts have concluded that the Ukrainian state is fragile, thus basing their conclusions on various opinion polls conducted in eastern and southern Ukraine about local attitudes to the state's independence and foreign policy orientation. However, Kuzio gives three reasons why these views cannot be translated into concrete programmes. First, there is largely an absence of a civil society in Ukraine. Second, local elites in power tend to back the status-quo. Finally, the socio-economic crises have meant that the population as a whole is pre-occupied with daily survival. Greater support for ties to Russia and the CIS exist mainly in the eastern and southern *oblasts*, as demonstrated in the table below, where a Ukrainian national identity was never allowed to develop.

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[40] See Taras Kuzio, 'Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 2, no. 4, Winter 1996.

[41] Foreign policy attitude of the population of Ukraine: 1996 Public Opinion Polls', Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine.

[42] In a different poll conducted by the US Information Agency, 39 per cent supported Ukrainian NATO membership, with 18 per cent opposed. See *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 29 October 1995.

[43] *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 February 1997.

Table 4: Ukraine's Foreign Policy Orientation (per cent)

	Kyiv	West	Centre	East	South	Crimea	Avg
CIS	35.6	17.1	44.4	48.4	50.3	36.7	40.7
Russia	8.9	11.5	19.6	19.0	11.9	35.6	17.5
Baltic-Black Sea	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.9	3.1	1.1	1.7
West	16.7	29.0	11.8	8.8	10.1	2.2	13.4
Self	17.8	24.3	12.2	9.2	11.9	6.7	13.2
Region	5.6	5.6	1.8	4.9	3.8	4.4	4.2
Other	6.7	1.9	1.9	2.5	0.6	1.1	2.4
Don't know	7.8	11.5	11.5	8.0	12.6	12.2	9.5

Source: Taras Kuzio, 'The Domestic Sources of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', p. 54

Although it is clear from the above table that the regions of eastern and southern Ukraine desire to maintain ties with Russia and the CIS, this public support rarely goes beyond that of economic issues and the desire to maintain personal contacts (an example is support for visa-free inter-CIS travel). Another poll where Ukrainians were asked which countries they would like to see as Ukraine's partners (they could choose more than one answer), 50 per cent chose Russia, 48 per cent chose the CIS, Western Europe, the USA and Central Europe received 35, 21, and 17 per cent respectively. Yet, when asked about attitudes to political-military integration with either the CIS or NATO, the following results were gathered:

Table 5: Regional Attitudes to Political-Military Integration in the CIS (per cent)

	Neutrality	NATO	CIS
Kyiv	42	33	9
North	44	15	9
Central	45	21	12
North East	61	8	14
North West	44	23	10
Dnipro	35	20	15
West	47	45	1
South West	49	14	14
South	40	20	18
Crimea	24	13	20
Donbass	24	14	14
Average	41	20	13

Source: Taras Kuzio, 'The Domestic Sources of Ukrainian Foreign Policy', p. 54

It is shown here that political-military integration into the CIS is the least popular and support for neutrality or non-bloc status is the most desirable from those surveyed. Even in Crimea and Donbass regions, which both have a sub-ethnic Russian population, support for full integration into the CIS was still low. As public opinion favours Ukraine's non-alignment, which is traditionally a more centrist view, it is easy to see why more centrist parties have appeared in the late 1990s and also why the left has generally shifted more towards the centre-left/centre in their political ideologies (i.e. pro-statehood).

The 1999 Presidential Election: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Priorities

According to a SOCIS-Gallup poll of 1,200 respondents taken in September 1999, 72 per cent stated that the foreign policy course of the new president of Ukraine should be a balanced policy, or 'active and constructive in all trends, taking account of Ukraine's interests'. Thus, the idea of a multi-vector foreign policy enjoys sufficient support among the Ukrainian population. On the other hand, supporters of the pro-Western foreign policy

orientation number only eight per cent, while advocates of the pro-eastern vector in foreign policy are even less numerous comprising only five per cent of those polled.[44]

Moreover, very important to note is the fact that the issues of the 1999 election differed substantially from the issues which dominated the 1994 election. For example, in 1999 the continued existence of an independent Ukraine was not in question, and none of the presidential candidates advocated Ukraine's accession to any bloc or institution that would require Ukraine to relinquish its sovereignty to another authority. Further, the status of Russian as a second official state language was no longer an issue. Russian is even taught as a foreign literature in most of Ukraine. Russophones no longer challenge Ukraine's national symbols, particularly the Ukrainian flag, which was an important issue in the 1994 election. Moreover, there was no support for Russia to become a second titular nation within the territory of Ukraine. Finally, foreign policy in general was not a dominating issue as it was in 1994. The Russia factor was less of an acute question after the State Duma and Federation Council ratified the Ukrainian-Russian Friendship and Border Treaties in December 1998 and February 1999 respectively (see Chapter Five). Thus, the loss of Ukraine's independence was no longer an issue to be decided in an election as many feared in 1994.

Both geopolitical factors in Europe (i.e. NATO enlargement, Kosovo) and domestic factors in Ukraine and Russia (the economic crisis) have helped to bring about these election-issue changes. Kuchma's pursuit of a 'balanced' or multi-vector foreign policy has won the support of the electorate, and to some extent, has stifled both the radical anti-West and anti-Russia sentiment in the government. Yet, because of the deteriorated socio-economic situation, the public by and large feels disconnected from foreign policy, seeing no tangible benefits of favouring one policy over another.

The Candidates

On 15 May 1999 several Ukrainian political parties officially announced their candidates for the October presidential elections. Among those were Leonid Kuchma, the incumbent, who was nominated by the Popular Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Social Democratic Party; Oleksandr Moroz, who was nominated by the Socialist Party, which he leads. His candidacy was also supported by the Social Democratic Party. Petro Symonenko, leader of the Communist Party, was nominated by his own party. Natalia Vitrenko was also nominated by her own Progressive Socialist Party. Former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk was proposed by the Social Democratic Union, the Rural Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the Christian Popular Union. Finally, each wing of the now split *Rukh* nominated its own candidate: Hennadii Udovenko and Yuriy Kostenko. Although there were 13 candidates altogether, the following section will summarise only the foreign policy perspectives of the most prominent candidates in terms of three categories: right, centre and left (nationalists, centrists, and pan-slavists, respectively). I will also point out those candidates who were ideologically between political spectrums (such as centre-left). As the foreign policy stances of the Ukrainian political parties have already been summarised in Chapter Three, this section will focus on key individuals with the aim of demonstrating the general shift towards the centre of the political spectrum, and the leftwards movement of the national idea as discussed throughout this chapter.

The Reformist right

The parties on the right of the political spectrum in Ukraine generally favour to varying degrees: 1) Ukraine's co-operation and eventual integration into Western economic and security organisations; 2) reform along economic, political, and social lines; and 3) limiting ties with Russia and the CIS to economic co-operation.

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[44] See Monitoring Report of the Centre for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, September 1999.

Hennadii Udovenko

Leader of one wing of *Rukh*[45], Hennadii Udovenko is a leading contender from the right. Udovenko counters the statements made by those who favour Ukraine's accession to the Russian-Belarusian union by stating, 'I stress that this kind of union of three will not bring us, the citizens of Ukraine, a higher living standard; on the contrary, it will exacerbate the situation for many years to come. The claim that the union will make it possible to resolve all issues is absolutely false.'(…) Moreover, when speaking in 'geopolitical tones', Udovenko asks,

> Have the Communist leaders, who are urging us to form such
> a union, stopped to think whether Russia really wants this union?
> Let me assure you with full responsibility for what I say: no, it
> does not need any kind of union with us; it simply wants to
> dominate us. For without Ukraine, Russia cannot be a superpower.
> History has confirmed this many times. And that is why we
> must not ignore this lesson![46]

Yuri Kostenko

Leader of 'the other *Rukh*' which split from the main party in March 1999, Yuri Kostenko is a firm believer and representative of the right-wing ideology and the national democratic movement. According to his supporters, Kostenko's strengths include the absence of Communist Party experience in the past, consistent democratic views, political integrity, and the longest terms in successive governments in Ukraine. He was Minister of the Environment for five years and was praised for his 'steadiness in defending the society's environmental rights'. Kostenko's campaign agenda does not seem to offer any original pledges. He suggests there is a need to create conditions for the development of enterprise as a condition for carrying out economic reforms.[47] Kostenko is not as outspoken as the other candidates on foreign policy although he advocates closer co-operation with Europe and the US. Thus, if Kostenko or Udovenko has been elected president, we could have expected the following as regards Ukraine's foreign policy:

I.   A stronger pro-Western and pro-NATO orientation
II.   A cooling off of relations between Ukraine and Russia (but dependence on energy resources from Russia would force them to behave pragmatically)
III.   A more active establishment with GUUAM[48] countries in an effort to decrease dependence on Russian energy sources
IV.   A progressive and continuous advancement towards membership in NATO and the EU
V.   Attempting to pressure Russia to define the status of its military units stationed in Crimea
VI.   Continued co-operation with international financial organisations

Centre-right

Leonid Kuchma, the incumbent who was nominated by the Popular Democratic Party, has proclaimed that in spite of demands by the various political forces to make the current foreign policy 'pro-Russian to the point of renewing the FSU, or pro-Western to the point of entering NATO, it is and it will be only pro-Ukrainian'.[49] Clearly, this statement is evidence of Kuchma's desire to avoid choosing the West or Russia, while at the same time, downplaying the multi-faceted approach to Ukraine's foreign policy. Kuchma has indeed

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[45] This wing of Rukh was previously headed by Vyacheslav Chornovil until his death in the summer of 1999.
[46] 'Presidential Candidate Udovenko Interviewed', *Lviv Za Vilnu Ukrayinu* (in Ukrainian), 2 March 1999, pp. 2-3.
[47] Report entitled 'Yuri Kostenko and the Ukrainian National Democratic Movement: Chances for Revival', Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research (UCIPR), vol. 5, no. 134, 12 July 1999.
[48] Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, respectively. See Chapter Five.
[49] 'Kuchma: Foreign policy only pro-Ukrainian', *Kiev UNIAN*, 11 March 1999.

sought a more balanced approach to foreign policy in order to attract the political support from the centre, centre-right, and centre-left parties. Still, Ukraine has not turned away from NATO or the EU, and by the same token, has not downplayed its relations with Russia. In fact, it can be argued that the Kuchma administration has intensified its relations with both the West and Russia. For example, the Ukrainian executive has looked favourably upon the first wave of NATO enlargement, which occurred in March 1999, while at the same time, Ukraine acceded to the CIS IPA in the same month as NATO's first enlargement. Kuchma has portrayed himself as the only candidate able to defeat the 'Slavophile' left which he claims is not only a threat to the reform process, but also to Ukraine's independence (ironically, Kuchma himself was accused of being anti-reform and a threat to the Ukrainian state in the 1994 Presidential elections). Therefore, with Kuchma's successful election we can expect the following relatively unchanged foreign policy course:

I.   Continued international support for the present course
II.   An increase in the volume of credits issued by the IMF and World Bank for the restructuring of the energy-intensive sectors of the Ukrainian national economy
III.   A continuance of the integration processes with European and Trans-Atlantic structures
IV.   Initiating a more intense co-operation with GUUAM
V.   The exhaustion of the multi-vectoral policy in new geopolitical conditions

Yevhen Marchuk
Although Social Democratic Union candidate Yevhen Marchuk's opinions on Ukraine's geopolitical role in East-West relations differ somewhat from Kuchma's, they are clearly founded along the same general principles (pro-Ukrainian statehood, pro-reform). Marchuk characterised Ukraine's geopolitical position as follows:

> History is not going to offer us a geoeconomic cornucopia. We are not Europe, which we immediately realise whenever we attempt to break through to European markets. We are Ukraine, independent and neutral. Neither external nor internal factors will let us chance the status quo. Based on this (realisation) we should define our strategic interests. Our real interests at this stage cannot coincide with European, American, or Russian ones'.[50]

Marchuk favours a foreign policy for Ukraine that is 'equidistant, moderate, and focused on national interests'. Furthermore, he has expressed concern over the Kuchma administration's foreign policy trends including what he terms as the 'wait and see policy' and he used of the idea of 'bridge, buffer and link' to describe Ukraine's geopolitical role between West and East as he believes that this approach 'replaces an active and often conflicting search for foreign markets and the development of a corresponding foreign policy strategy'.[51]

Marchuk has highlighted five reasons why Ukraine should not seek to be a bridge or link between the West and Russia.[52] His arguments are worth mentioning because they reinforce the theme of this thesis in many respects. He asserts that with Poland's accession to NATO and the EU, and Belarus's integration into a union with Russia, there will be no 'linking elements', thus the role of 'middleman' will be minimised. Second, direct contacts between the leaders of Western Europe and Russia are so close on both bilateral and pan-European levels that it is hard to imagine a situation where Ukraine's effective mediation could be warrented (and the West prefers to deal with Russia directly, and not through a middleman such as Ukraine). Third, the development of multifarious co-operation between Russia and the Euro-Arctic region has encouraged a 'northern direction' which plays the role of bridge, linking dialogue between Russia and the rest of Europe. Fourth, in the opinion of high-ranking US officials, the role of geographical, trade, and cultural bridge is already

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[50] See statement by Ukrainian Supreme Council Deputy Yevhen Marchuk, 'Marchuk views foreign policy priorities', *Kiev Den*, 26 March 1999, pp. 4-5.
[51] Ibid.
[52] See also theoretical discussion of buffers and bridges in Chapter Two

assigned to Turkey. Fifth, the mediation/bridge role in recent years has been fulfilled by France, Germany, and Italy, and in addition, there is the Russia-NATO Council, which can be utilised as a mechanism to enlist the mediation role of Russia when appropriate (although during the Kosovo crisis Russia boycotted all links in that forum).[53] Nonetheless, Marchuk explains that the grey zone of European security does exist, as exemplified by the events in Yugoslavia. He argues that if Yugoslavia had been a close ally of Russia, NATO would have not dared to 'discipline' it using military methods. Marchuk believes that Kosovo is the result of the geopolitical games played by the world's leading powers and that NATO's military action will attract sympathies for the Serbs and increase anti-West sentiment. Had Marchuk been elected president, his foreign policy course may have included:

I.   A continuation of the principal foreign policy directions
II.   A continuation of pragmatic relations with the CIS and Russia
III.   The maintenance of relations with Eastern neighbours at the appropriate level
IV.   Continued co-operation with the IMF
V.   A greater movement towards Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU

The Centrists

In the 1999 Presidential campaign, none of the prominent candidates fell strictly in the centre of the political spectrum, although some candidates are moderate in relation to right and left (i.e. Kuchma and Marchuk/centre-right, Moroz/centre-left).

Centre-left

Oleksandr Moroz
Former Speaker of the *Verkhovna Rada* (1994-1998) and leader of Socialist party Oleksandr Moroz was the strongest candidate of the left until mid 1999 when his dubious financial connections were exposed to the now disgraced Pavlo Lazarenko, former Prime Minister and leader of the Hromada party. But Moroz continues to have a high profile as former Chairman of the *Rada*, and has successfully created an image of a moderate left-centre candidate who is pro-statehood and neither anti-Western nor excessively pro-Russian. The image he is attempting to cultivate is that of other post-communist leaders in CEE. Moroz is a prime example of a politician who has pragmatically shifed from the far left towards the centre of the political spectrum.

Moroz has quite markedly been drifting away from pure socialism in the direction of the West European model of social democracy to gain the support of some centrist and centre-right parties. On the topic of Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation, Moroz stated that Ukraine should not move eastwards or westwards, but should in fact move upwards. Ukraine must seek to lessen its dependency on foreign credits by using its own resources including the highly skilled population, by taking the experience from the West in the economic and social spheres, and by working vigorously to attract foreign investment. Further, as regards Russia-Ukraine relations, Moroz believes that the two states are the closest of neighbours and are fated to work together as brothers. Yet in this relationship, Ukraine should not compromise one gram of its sovereignty to Russia or any other country or organisation. When discussing Ukraine's response to a pending Russian-Belarusian union, Moroz made a distinction between 'pan-Slavicism as an idea' and a 'union of Slavic countries'. He supports the former, the idea that 'fellow Slavs should band together to defend the rights of their cultural and ethnic family'; however, he does not support the creation of a Slavic Union, which he feels is an emotional reaction to the events in the Balkans and to the continued global adjusting to a world which is no longer bipolar.[54]

Moroz is commonly associated with the 'soft left', lying somewhere between the Social Democrats/Hromada on the right, and the Communists and Progressive Socialists on

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[53] Y. Marchuk. 'Marchuk views foreign policy priorities', op cit.
[54] Remarks made by Oleksandr Moroz, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, DC, 27 April 1999.

the left. He typified this kind of soft-left ideology in his famous quote: 'anyone who does not pine for the USSR has no heart, and anyone who tries to re-establish it has no head'. Pragmatist socialists like Moroz are less hostile to the process of European integration, oppose Ukraine's membership of any military bloc and remain evasive about the Russian-Belarusian union. From an administration headed by Moroz, we could have expected the following foreign policy agenda:

I.   A halt by the IMF and World Bank in the financing of the Ukrainian economy
II.   Movement in the direction of neutrality/non-alignment and away from the NATO-Ukraine partnership
III.   Intensification of the integration processes within the CIS framework
IV.   Continued co-operation with GUUAM to promote Ukraine's leadership role in the region
V.   Transforming Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy to a 'multi-level' one, with socialist countries in Europe having top priority

Leftists

Although the leftist parties have different names and hold different tactical positions, they are the true bearers of the communist ideology. They generally converge on the following points: 1) a negative attitude towards denationalisation and privatisation; 2) an ardent dream to set up a new union with Russia in opposition to the 'European course' and contacts with NATO; and 3) a passionate desire to make the Russian language the official state language of Ukraine.

Oleksandr Tkachenko
Rada Chairman and Peasant Party presidential candidate Oleksandr Tkachenko was more nostalgic about the revival of the former USSR than Moroz, which has lead him to make positive statements regarding the Russian-Belarusian union. Tkachenko views this union as a stepping-stone to the revival of the former USSR, though he does not advocate Ukraine's loss of independence in a new union of this type. Tkachenko has been frustrated at the pro-West/European foreign policy course pursued by the Kuchma administration and has attempted to use his leverage in the *Rada* to re-orient Ukraine's foreign and security policy towards Russia and the CIS and away from NATO, the IMF, and (to a lesser extent) the EU. An administration led by Tkachenko could have resembled the following:

I.   A greater emphasis on the eastern vector of Ukraine's foreign policy including the adoption of agreements on military -political co-operation with the CIS
II.   A worsening of relations between Ukraine and NATO, the EU, the IMF, and World Bank
III.   Ukraine's joining the customs union of the CIS
IV.   Bringing in Western and Russian companies to create joint business ventures with Ukrainian companies
V.   Support for Russia and Belarus's foreign policy

Petro Symonenko
Unlike the soft or pragmatic leftists, Petro Symonenko, who was nominated by the Communist Party of Ukraine, has long attacked Ukraine's dealings with international financial institutions. Slavophiles like Symonenko are more openly hostile to the West, including international financial aid organisations such as the IMF. According to Symonenko, Ukraine has been transformed into the West's semi-colony or protectorate through a 'tightening of the IMF's debt garrotte' and the 'brutal interference' of international financial institutions. Ukraine should, therefore, join the Russian-Belarusian union as the country has already effectively become a 'buffer' for NATO.[55] However, Symonenko was

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[55] Speech given by Petro Symonenko to the *Verkhovna Rada*, *Holos Ukrayiny*, 23 May 1998.

forced to moderate his views leading up to the second round of the election (as he was Kuchma's opponent) as an extremist to the right or the left had little chance of beating the 'centrist' Kuchma. Under the leadership of Symonenko, Ukraine's foreign policy may have included:

I.   The joining of a union with Russia and Belarus (as an associate member)
II.   Fomentation of anti-Western sentiments which will undermine trust in Ukraine among international organisations and individual states
III.   A worsening or breaking off of ties to IMF and the World Bank.
IV.   A cooling of relations with Central Europe- mainly Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as new NATO members
V.   The drafting and approval of long-term treaties with Russia

Natalia Vitrenko

Often described as the 'Iron lady of progressive socialism' and compared to Russian politician V. Zhirinovskiy, Natalia Vitrenko, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU), was clearly the most hard-line of the left-wing candidates. Vitrenko's foreign policy priorities included denouncing all ties with the IMF, enhancing the strategic partnership with Russia and Belarus (through equal partnership so as not to compromise Ukrainian sovereignty), creating a joint CIS collective security system, and a general orientation toward Russia and 'Eurasia'. However, when it comes to 'returning to the family of brotherly peoples of the USSR', she believes that a union with Russia would not be timely, but would not rule out such a union in the future. She argues that a new union with Russia would be possible on the basis of a 'new quality of the union'.[56] Vitrenko's PSPU is even too radical for confirmed left-wingers like Communist leader Petro Symonenko (not least due to her ultra-radical proposal to limit citizens' election rights). Under Vitrenko, Ukraine's foreign policy would change radically and might entail:

I.   The breaking off of relations with the IMF, NATO and most other Western political and financial institutions as well as a rolling back of relations with individual Western countries
II.   Closer economic relations with Russia based on a policy of flexibility
III.   The fomentation of anti-Western sentiments in Ukrainian society accompanied by a cultivation for the pan-Slavic idea
IV.   Integration on some level with Russia and Belarus

It can be concluded from the above discussion that in 1999 Ukraine's Presidential candidates faced many directions in terms of their foreign and security policy orientations, yet all supported Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. This multi-directional characteristic of Ukrainian politicians is thus reflected in Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy. Under Kuchma, Ukraine has followed a pragmatic approach with respect to Russia and the CIS. Russia is no longer portrayed as the negative 'Other' as it was during the Kravchuk era, but as one of the three strategic directions of Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy. However, Kuchma has advocated a 'pro-Ukraine' policy that is pragmatically pro-European, while other prominent presidential candidates such as Moroz and Tkachenko, have supported a 'pro-Ukraine' course which is pragmatically pro-Eurasian. It was, therefore, likely that following the October elections, Ukraine would continue domestically on its current slow path of reform, and externally as an active neutral or non-bloc state whose foreign policy would depend upon the ideologies of the new administration.

1999 Presidential Election Results

In the first round of the Presidential election on 31 October the results were as follows:[57]

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[56] 'The Iron Lady of Progressive Socialism', Research report of the Freedom House Partnership for Reform in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research (UCIPR), 31 May 1999.
[57] Results of the US-Ukraine Foundation, report of 10 November 1999.

Leonid Kuchma: 36 %
Petro Symonenko: 22 %
Oleksandr Moroz: 11 %
Natalia Vitrenko: 11 %
Yevhen Marchuk: 8 %
Yurii Kostenko: 2 %
Henadii Udovenko: 1 %
Voter turnout: 70 %

Almost immediately after the first round, Kuchma declared his intention to work with all political forces which supported pro-Ukraine positions. On 10 November Kuchma appointed Yevhen Marchuk, his former Prime Minister whom he fired in 1995, to the post of Head of the National Security and Defence Council, arguably the second most powerful position in the country, thus removing his long-time supporter and friend, Volodoymyr Horbulin, from this post. Adding Marchuk's eight per cent to Kuchma's 36 per cent was surely viewed as the means for Kuchma to secure a victory in the second round.[58] In the second round held on 14 November 1999 the results were as follows[59]:

Leonid Kuchma: 56.31 %
Petro Symonenko: 37.76 %
Voter turnout: 74.79 %

In both rounds the voter turnout was equal to or greater than 70 per cent, thus suggesting a high level of national consciousness among the Ukrainian population (see Table 6).

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[58] Since again as in 1994, no candidate secured more than 50 per cent of the vote in the first round which made the second round necessary.
[59] *The Washington Post*, 15 November 1999.

Table 6: Results of the Second Round of the Presidential Elections

Oblast	Leonid Kuchma		Petro Symonenko	
	# of votes	%	# of votes	%
Ivano-Frankivsk	859,839	92.30	41,769	4.48
Ternopil	713,025	92.18	37,308	4.82
L'viv	1,609,092	91.55	91,175	5.19
Zakarpattia	607,551	83.82	73,437	10.13
Rivne	527,111	76.92	116,648	17.02
Election centres abroad	10,336	76.24	2,384	17.59
Volyn	443,724	75.73	110,843	18.92
Chernivtsi	375,996	73.21	110,069	21.43
Kyiv city	790,392	64.84	317,567	26.05
Kyiv region	554,682	57.59	338,224	35.12
Dnipropetrovsk	1,180,736	56.36	798,302	38.10
Odessa	581,688	53.09	441,608	40.31
Donetsk	1,394,219	52.98	1,084,781	41.22
Khmelnytskiy	445,143	50.94	366,795	41.97
Sevastopol	94,710	50.17	82,479	43,69
Zhytomyr	337,567	48.81	312,174	45.13
Sumy	407,513	48.54	363,773	43.33
Kharkiv	754,049	46.75	747,681	46.35
Mykolaiv	300,881	45.90	322,225	49.16
Zaporizhia	473,731	44.83	525,042	49.69
Crimea	433,843	43.97	505,355	51.22
Kherson	267,271	41.88	337,438	52.88
Luhansk	598,522	40.74	791,408	53.87
Kirovohrad	235,490	40.33	310,149	53.11
Cherkasy	317,598	40.01	415,120	52.25
Chernihiv	290,231	37.49	435,544	56.25
Poltava	355,382	35.20	582,249	57.66
Vinnytsia	346,885	34.06	601.464	59.02

The Ukrainian Observer, 19 November 1999, Issue 22/1

According to the data, Symonenko won in 10 regions: Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Crimea, Kherson, Luhansk, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Poltava, and Vinnytsia. Kuchma won in the remaining 18 regions and never dropped below 34 per cent in any one region. Symonenko had the highest of his results in some of the southern and eastern regions, but the vote was not clearly divided between west-east-south camps.

Kuchma scored 70 per cent in all seven *oblasts* in western Ukraine[60], with Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk supporting Kuchma with over 90 per cent of the votes cast.[61] Symonenko edged Kuchma in some of the eastern and southern *oblasts*, but Kuchma was not beaten badly in any one *oblast*. Kuchma's rather decisive victory over the communist Symonenko testifies that extremists will not fare well in Ukrainian politics. This is hardly surprising. Kuchma portrayed himself as a moderate, a pragmatist, but clearly tilting to the right of the political spectrum. Symonenko, on the other hand, was firmly rooted in the

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[60] Incidentally, in the 1994 election where Kuchma stood against Kravchuk, Kuchma received a mere three-five per cent of the vote in these three *oblasts*.
[61] See weekly newsletter, Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine, Centre for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, 13-19 November 1999.

leftist camp. The regional disparities were also not surprising. Kuchma had the highest support in western Ukraine simply because of his opponent. Had Marchuk, Udovenko, or Kostenko made it to the second round, the results would have been significantly different, and not in Kuchma's favour. In the end, the western *oblasts* had to choose between a moderate and a leftist; hence Kuchma was overwhemlingly the favoured candidate.

The Elections of 1994 and 1999: A Comparison of the Issues

When comparing the issues and manifestos of the Presidential and Parliamentary candidates during the 1994, 1998, and 1999 elections, it is apparent that the national idea has evolved leftwards. The leftist parties in the 1998 and 1999 elections have become pro-statehood, even in the case of radical leftist candidates such as Vitrenko, who would prefer to see Ukraine seek some type of union with Russia and Belarus, but based on a union of three sovereign states. The Ukrainian left has evolved into a more pragmatic bloc over the past five years. They may still be anti-IMF and anti-NATO (mostly as a result of the negative feelings generated by the Kosovo conflict), but they are by and large pro-Europe (EU, OSCE, Council of Europe), and have taken on more centrist viewpoints. The changing views of Moroz from a hard-core leftist to a 'soft leftist' as discussed above, is a good example of this evolution. Even CPU leader Symonenko was forced to moderate his views regarding Europe, although he remained staunchly opposed to Ukraine's involvement with NATO and the IMF.

Thus, in this process of political evolution in Ukraine, foreign policy has tended to play less of a role in the October 1999 elections than it did in 1994. This time only three of the 13 Presidential candidates- Udovenko and Kostenko from *Rukh*, and Vasyl Onopenko from the Social Democrats- advocated a radical pro-Western orientation, but they all come low in the polls, having a combined vote of less than four per cent. Taking the other extreme, three of the candidates- Symonenko, Vitrenko, and the lesser-known Oleksandr Bazyliuk, head of the Slavic Unity Party scored higher with over one-third of the vote. All three of these candidates advocated Ukraine's membership in some kind of union with Russia and Belarus. Nonetheless, the 1999 election has proven that no extremist either from the far right or the far will be elected President. Ideally Kuchma wanted to meet Symonenko (which he did) or Vitrenko in the second round as both candidates were not regarded as moderate leftists (unlike Moroz, for example).[62]

The second round gave voters a clear choice between the anti-communist Kuchma and the communist Symonenko. In the March 1994 and March 1998 parliamentary elections, the vote for the leftist candidates was not higher than 40 per cent and in the presidential election of 1999, a total of five leftist candidates increased this total to 45 per cent. Therefore, it was doubtful whether Symonenko would have been able to increase this total high enough to beat Kuchma in the second round. Further, many moderate voters who backed leftist candidates in the first round either backed Kuchma, seen as the lesser of two evils, or did not bother to vote.[63]

Compared with the 1994 elections, relations with Russia and the status of the Russian language did not really factor in as important issues. Ukraine and Russia have signed and ratified both a treaty on friendship and co-operation and a treaty solidifying their respective state borders.[64] Further, Ukraine's independence was no longer in question, although the issue did resurface in the second round as Symonenko supports Ukraine's membership in the Russian-Belarusian union.[65] Seven out of 13 candidates backed Kuchma's vaguely defined 'multi-vector', neutral, non-bloc, or impartial foreign policy, and only the three candidates from the right supported Ukraine's membership in NATO and the

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[62] Taras Kuzio, 'A dirty election campaign', in *Oxford Analytica*, October 1999, and 'Ukrainian presidential elections: 31 October and 14 November 1999', *Oxford Analytica*, 19 November 1999.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Signed in May 1997, ratified in December 1998 and February 1999.
[65] Although he was forced to modify his standpoint and stated that any such step would have to be approved by the *Rada* in a referendum requiring a two-thirds majority.

EU. Moreover, and very important, the Russia factor could not be used by the left as it was in 1994 because the Russian executive backed Kuchma.

The presidential election has become a precursor to the pragmatism of Ukraine's foreign policy. Compared with the 1994 election where there was a clear dividing line between the candidates who championed integrative processes within the borders of the post-Soviet space and those who advocated a pro-Western foreign policy, the 1999 Presidential election illustrated the modernisation of the election programmes of the presidential candidates in the sphere of foreign policy. Even the leftist candidates, affirming their pro-Russian/ CIS orientation, have been forced to reassure the West that they would not radically alter Ukraine's foreign policy agenda if elected (as Moroz, in particular has done).

Therefore, in the aftermath of the election it is unlikely that a radical alteration either towards the West or towards Russia/CIS in Ukraine's foreign policy orientation will take place. The foreign policy consensus which has emerged within Ukraine since 1992 is likely to be maintained and is supported by nine of the 15 candidates, including Moroz and even Tkachenko. This consensus seeks to balance Ukraine's economic interdependence with Russia through political and security co-operation with the West in a non-bloc and active neutrality status.

CONCLUSIONS

As explained in this chapter, several features have marked Ukraine's foreign policy orientation in both the executive and legislative branches: evolution, pragmatism, and continuity. This chapter has shown the differing perspectives in the executive and legislative branches as regards foreign policy, paying particular attention to debates and issues which have emerged surrounding the parliamentary and presidential elections. However, the vast majority of Ukraine's politicians share one important viewpoint- they are pro-statehood, and are by and large against joining any organisation which would lead to Ukraine to compromise its sovereignty and independence. Although on occasion there has been some discrepancy over which branch of government is responsible for determining Ukraine's foreign policy course, overall, Ukraine's foreign policy has evolved to meet both internal and external challenges, and with this evolution, continuity in foreign policy has become apparent.

The continuity of Ukraine's foreign policy has been highlighted as a stabilising factor in securing the existence of the Ukrainian state. This chapter has discussed the movement in the Ukrainian left towards a more moderate approach to foreign policy. Moreover, a moderate or centrist foreign policy course is supported by the majority of the Ukrainian population, and therefore, candidates who hold radical left or radical right viewpoints are unlikely to be successful in presidential and parliamentary elections.

This chapter has also examined the dynamics of political evolution in Ukrainian domestic politics and has sought to determine how this evolution, including the elections, has affected Ukraine's foreign policy. To this end, a few points can be made. First, the national idea in Ukraine has evolved leftwards as evident in the pro-statehood stances of the leftist parties and the growth of centrist parties. Second, Ukrainian politicians tend to be more moderate in their foreign policy views, moving towards the centre of the political spectrum, but still tilting pragmatically (not radically) towards Russia or the West. Moroz, Tkachenko, and Symonenko are all examples of politicians who have moved from the left to centre/centre-left in favour of Ukrainian statehood.

So in essence, what does this evolution, and the elections, tell us about Ukraine's foreign policy? First of all, the leftwards evolution of the national idea and the increase in the number of centrist political parties is testimony that the Ukrainian state is indeed modernising. Second, as a majority of the Ukrainian population clearly favours moderate candidates who advocated a 'balanced' foreign policy, radical extremist candidates will not fare well. Third, foreign policy was not a major issue in the 1999 Presidential elections as it was in the 1994 elections because of two reasons: Ukraine's independence was not at stake and perhaps more importantly, Ukrainian society was preoccupied with the issues of day to day survival, and as such was relatively disconnected from foreign policy.

In Chapter Five the discussion will turn to the development of Ukraine's international and regional relations with key states and institutions, building upon the points made thus far regarding Ukraine's foreign policy. This chapter is divided into three main sections with ensuing subsections. In section one, the success, failures, and trends of Ukraine's relations with key Western political and economic institutions are analysed. Section two examines Ukraine's relations with Russia and the CIS, paying particular attention to the developments resulting during the Kuchma administration. Section three focuses on Ukraine's dynamic regional relations and argues that regional co-operation in CEE is an important element of state- and nation-building for the post-communist states of the FSU. Similar to other post-communist states located in the 'grey zone' of European security which have not been included in either the fast or slow tracks of the NATO enlargement and EU expansion processes, Ukraine appears to be relying on the development of regional ties as a means to enter 'Europe' through the back-door, or through extensive ties with its neighbours, particularly with Poland.

Chapter Five: Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy Orientation: 1991-1999

As a state geopolitically situated in the 'grey zone' of European security, Ukraine has often found itself in a difficult position *vis-à-vis* its neighbours. Ukraine has extensive relations with the West and its institutions, with Russia and the CIS, and also is developing its relations within the region of CEE. Ukrainian elites are obliged to consider the interests of their neighbours when formulating their foreign and security policy. Thus, President Kuchma has sought to normalise relations with Russia and the CIS and to secure Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the region, while simultaneously attempting to convince Western states and institutions that it is following a foreign policy course of 're-joining' Europe.

Analysts who choose to view Ukraine as straddling a European-Eurasian dividing line often refer to Huntington's theory on the 'Clash of Civilisations', as described in Chapter One.[1] But this perspective is problematic because of the difficulties in defining cultural borders, East and West, and geopolitical divisions in Europe. If 'returning to Europe' refers to the political, economic, and legal institutions of Western Europe[2], then it is appropriate to think of this new East-West division as between Poland and Ukraine as Poland has joined NATO, is a frontrunner for EU membership, and lies at the edge of the frontier. 'Eurasia', on the other hand, should then refer to Russia and the CIS, or those which have little chance of joining Europe's economic, political, and security structures in the medium to long term. Neither Kravchuk nor Kuchma have favoured reintegration with Russia or the CIS; however, as a matter of economic necessity, Kuchma has been more pragmatic as regards relations with Moscow. The Ukrainian government is generally limited in its flexibility in foreign relations and because of the sheer size and geopolitical location of Ukraine, a decisive move in any direction (i.e. toward Russia or the West) would be most disturbing to both sides.

As discussed in Chapter Two, negatively sovereign states such as Ukraine will normally seek closer political, economic, and military ties with states and institutions that share their ideologies and practices. This is especially the case if the state in question perceives itself to be threatened (militarily, politically or economically) by another entity. However, this perceived threat may at times encourage the 'threatened' state to become more politically engaged just as Kuchma has done, rather than to plead for security assurances from more capable regional organisations. Realistically speaking, Ukrainian elites are aware that the likelihood for full accession to NATO and the EU in the short to medium term is minimal, if not impossible. To this end, it is in Ukraine's interests to engage in pragmatic relations with all its neighbours in this difficult period of economic and political transition.

Preceded by a brief discussion of 'weak' states and the seeking of security, this chapter will discuss and analyse Ukraine's international and regional relations in the context of Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy. The chapter is divided into three main sections with subsequent subsections. The first section will survey Ukraine's political, economic and military relations with the West, specifically with European and Trans-Atlantic institutions including NATO and its partnership structures, the EU, WEU, Council of Europe, OSCE and Western financial institutions (IMF and World Bank). The next section will focus on Ukraine's relations with Russia and the CIS and the policy changes that have taken place from the Kravchuk to Kuchma administrations. Next, Ukraine's regional relations in CEE will be considered. It will be argued that the Kuchma administration in particular has concentrated its efforts on the deepening of

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[1] Andrew Wilson used this argument in his presentation at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 3 October 1997.
[2] Which is how this thesis defines 'Europe' in Chapter One.

regional integration with key states (such as Poland) and in new sub-regional organisations (such as BSECO and GUUAM) as a means of integration into Europe through the back-door. As the development of Ukraine's regional ties are not nearly as threatening to Russia as its bilateral ties to NATO (and the US) for example, this chosen path to 'Europe' is Ukraine's less controversial and most realistic option.

'WEAK' STATES AND THEIR QUEST FOR SECURITY

The protection of the inhabitants of a state from attack by the military of another state has been universally perceived as one of the major functions of every government. No matter what other functions are legitimate practices, protection of its own population has priority. However, there has always existed an inequality among countries as to their ability to provide this protection. Weak states simply do not have the means to protect themselves from the military or economic onslaught of stronger states. Sometimes geographic location or topography has been of assistance but even given those natural defences, weak or threatened states have traditionally been forced to seek assistance from more powerful states for their protection. This in turn has presented another problem for weak states: whether to join an alliance with its neighbours or adhere to a policy of neutrality/non-bloc status? Also important to consider is if the alliances are powerful, might this be an invitation for them to take advantage of the weaker state's vulnerable position?[3]

In every period in history weak states have been faced with this dilemma and have often pleaded neutrality. However, as the Belgians learned in 1914 and 1940 and the Cambodians in the early 1970s neutrality only works so long as the more powerful states accept and respect the policy and are not interested in extracting resources from the neutral.[4] In the case of Ukraine the government has adhered to a policy of neutrality, non-bloc status, or *impartiality*[5], thus seeking a working relationship with the West, including NATO partnership structures (without ruling out future membership), detachment from the Tashkent Collective Security Agreement, while still being involved in the economic structures of the CIS. Ukraine seeks a normalisation of relations with Russia based on bilateral negotiations (indicating a desire to bypass the CIS) and limiting these relations to the economic and political spheres. However, as stated above, in order for neutrality to work for the 'neutral', its neighbours must accept the policy. As discussed below and in Chapter Six a neutral Ukraine would be both a permanent source of irritation to Russia and an unreliable partner for the West. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine Ukraine as a neutral or non-bloc state in the long term, but perhaps only in the short to medium term until significant progress is made in economic and political reforms.

Weak states such as Ukraine which are also in the process of nation- and state-building will normally seek to enlist international support, even if only 'symbolic' support. For example, Ukrainian diplomats have been looking for 'positive signals' from NATO and the EU as regards Ukraine's chances for future membership.[6] In 1999 such positive signals have not materialised and are not forthcoming.[7] States such as Ukraine which are in the throes of economic and political reform and whose domestic institutions are somewhat unstable will seek to obtain external support for their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. This is particularly the case if the state in question feels threatened by a powerful neighbour. Since independence Ukraine's two major foreign policy goals have been to obtain security guarantees from the world's most influential powers and institutions and to secure its territorial integrity.

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[3] Marshall Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers*, New York: Collier-Macmillian, 1972, pp. 273-4.

[4] See Chapter Two on buffer states and neutrality

[5] As described to the author in an interview with Andriy Veselovskiy, Head of Policy Planning and Analysis, Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, Ukraine, 19 October 1999.

[6] In the case of the EU, Ukraine was looking for the possibility of full membership in the future it was able to meet the criteria set forth in the Copenhagen meeting of EU foreign ministers. This point was made to the author on numerous occasions during meetings with Ukrainian officials in the MFA, and at the Ukrainian Missions to the EU and NATO.

[7] As told to this author informally by an EU official in DG1A on several occasions in November 1999.

In December 1994 Ukraine gained the political support of the world's nuclear powers in return for the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In July 1997 Ukraine and NATO signed a Charter establishing a distinctive status for Ukraine (although the Charter did not specify a security guarantee- see below). Ukraine's goal of securing legal recognition of all its borders to protect much of what it gained from post-war territorial changes occurred in May 1997 when Russia and Romania concluded a border treaty with Ukraine.[8] As a weak state with a somewhat precarious autonomy, Ukraine must continue to seek ties with more powerful actors so as to protect the agreements that have already been reached and ultimately to obtain a security guarantee from the West.

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST: UKRAINE'S CO-OPERATIVE NATURE

President Kuchma has sought to obtain external support for his 'four-pronged transition' encompassing political reform, marketisation, and state- and nation-building[9] while continuing Kravchuk's policy of establishing closer ties to the West. Although Kuchma had a more realistic approach to Russia and the CIS, this did not dampen his desire to orient Ukraine's foreign and security policy westwards. Ukraine has indicated its willingness to participate in organisations that promote permeability and transparency. Ukraine's domestic reform programme is supported by the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, the EBRD, the G-8, and bilaterally by key Western states such as the US, Germany, and the UK.

However, in return for supporting Ukraine's independence Western governments and institutions expect and often demand to voice their thoughts as to how Ukraine should proceed in its post-communist transformation process. This is not to say that international advice is always helpful; on the contrary, often it is counter-productive. Western policy pursues an across-the-board approach to the post-communist states without paying particular attention to their distinct histories, cultures, and structural differences. Also the added challenges of state- and nation-building of the states of the FSU which is not as evident in the rest of CEE were largely overlooked. Western aid packages favour the 'shock therapy' approach including stringent economic reform initiatives. But it should be questioned as to whether such radical change is possible in countries that lacked modern states and established institutions?[10] Western policies and reform packages were by and large devoid of any long-term visions and were fraught with stipulations to which Ukraine must adhere.[11] Also, Ukraine is obliged to profess its desire to develop relations with 'Europe' as a prerequisite for receiving economic support. Western institutions have thus had little leverage over those states in the FSU which are not actively seeking western financial assistance, security guarantees, or support for their sovereignty and independence (Belarus, for example).

Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Ukraine's short-term goals for its relationship with NATO can be summarised in three points: 1) active participation in all PfP and EAPC activities that do not require membership; 2) implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Charter signed in 1997; and 3)

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[8] Russia and Romania were the two remaining states which had not yet concluded a border treaty with Ukraine.

[9] Kuchma's 'four-pronged transition' was specified by Volodymyr Cherniak to the VI Congress of Rukh, 29 December 1995 and by Foreign Minister Udovenko to the Royal Institute of International Affairs on 13 December 1995, as cited in Taras Kuzio, 'The Sultan and the Hetman: Democracy Building in Belarus and Ukraine in a Grey Security Zone', Unpublished paper prepared for a research project at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 16 December 1997. Copy in author's possession.

[10] For a comprehensive answer to this question, see Bill Bradley, 'Eurasia letter: A misguided Russia policy', in *Foreign Policy*, no. 101, Winter 1995.

[11] Such as the transformation to a market economy, privatisation of many industries, and the requirement that democratic governmental regimes must be in power.

the attainment of assurances that the possibility of NATO membership at a later date is not ruled out.

During a visit to Washington in November 1994, newly elected Ukrainian President Kuchma expressed great scepticism regarding NATO's plans for enlargement to a selected few states in CEE. In December of the same year, Oleksandr Tsvetkov, the leader of the Analysis Department of the Ukrainian MFA, said that he could see nothing but harm for Ukraine in an enlarged NATO.[12] However, in May of 1995 a back-door reassessment took place when US President Clinton visited Kyiv to discuss the issue of enlargement. Kuchma surprised many of his observers when he stated that he believed NATO to be the guarantor of security for Europe and as such, Ukraine would no longer oppose the process. During this time, Ukraine was rapidly stepping up its relations with Poland and Kuchma's change of policy towards NATO reflected the conviction that enhancing its partnership with neighbouring countries and with the US would be a way to achieve political and economic support for Ukrainian independence. The official position from 1995 is that Ukraine favours a gradual enlargement of the Alliance that does not lead to a new division of Europe. The government has indicated its fear that too hasty an enlargement of NATO before Ukraine had a chance to successfully initiated economic reforms might solidify the state's role as a buffer between a disinterested West and an unpredictable Russia. As Kuchma has stated, 'the problem (of new dividing lines) does exist and it troubles us from the point of view of this new splitting of Europe'.[13]

Ukraine initially made its support of NATO enlargement contingent upon the guarantee that no nuclear weapons would be stationed on the territory of the new member-states and indeed the government felt it had the right to make such a statement as it had voluntarily given up its own nuclear arsenal.[14] But US and NATO circles hinted that the proposal of a CEE nuclear free zone should not be pushed.[15] Although officially NATO had no plans to station nuclear weapons on the territory of its new members, it reserved the right to do so in the future if necessary.

While expressing caution about the pace of enlargement, Ukraine has shown a strong interest in expanding co-operation with Western military organisations, particularly with NATO, within the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP). Ukraine became the first CIS affiliate to join this programme and has been the most active and enthusiastic participant among the CIS affiliates. Ukraine has participated in numerous PfP exercises, including *Co-operation Bridge* in Poland in September 1994, *Spirit of Partnership* in the Netherlands in October 1994, *Peaceshield* in Ukraine in May 1995, and *Co-operative Partner* in the Black Sea in September 1995. In June 1996 some 1600 troops from nine countries participated in *The Shield of Peace* which was held in western Ukraine. Another PfP exercise, *Co-operative Neighbour*, was also held in western Ukraine in June 1997, and *Operation Sea Breeze*, a joint naval exercise with Ukraine and other Black Sea states and Western leaders, was held off the coast of Crimea. In September 1998 Ukraine and for the first time Russia participated in the PfP exercise *Peace Shield*. In 1999 a series of PfP naval exercises under US auspices were held in the Black Sea, which sometimes included computer-simulated war games.

Initially, Ukraine was slow in developing its relations with NATO due to differences of opinion within the Ukrainian leadership, but since 1995 Ukraine's co-operation with NATO has grown significantly. In September 1995 in Brussels the North Atlantic Council upgraded Ukraine's status in PfP by using the 16 + 1 formula, a status previously only granted to Russia. Further, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Udovenko presented a far-reaching draft agreement to NATO's Secretary-General which called for:

- the development of a special partnership between Ukraine and NATO;

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[12] Tor Bukkvoll, 'Ukraine and NATO: The politics of soft co-operation', *Security Dialogue*, Autumn 1997, p. 363.

[13] 'Ukraine 'troubled' by possible new divide in Europe', *Reuters*, 16 October 1998.

[14] Thoughts expressed to the author in an interview with Oleksandr Chalyi, First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, 6 September 1998, Halki, Greece.

[15] Bukkvoll, p. 364.

- regular bilateral consultations with NATO (in 16+1) and *ad-hoc* consultations on issues of special mutual interest;
- joint co-operation in non-proliferation, arms control, defence economy, environment, science and technology;
- the opening of Ukrainian diplomatic and military missions and a special NATO Information Centre in Kyiv as well as establishing special joint working groups on a permanent basis;
- locating some permanent NATO bodies within the framework of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)[16] and PfP in Kyiv and holding occasional NACC/PfP sessions in Ukraine;
- regular bilateral visits of high-ranking Ukrainian and NATO officials, including visits by the Ukrainian Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Staff to NATO Headquarters and SHAPE (Ukraine has a liaison officer at SHAPE in Mons)[17]

In March 1996 Kuchma went one step further by stating that the future of Ukraine does not necessarily have to be as non-aligned country, thus not excluding Ukraine's possible membership in NATO in the future.[18] Speaking in June 1996 Foreign Minister Udovenko, while astounding many Russian diplomats present, stated that Ukraine might strive to get 'associate status' in NATO.[19] Udovenko's remarks warranted clarification, particularly in light of the diplomatic storm that ensued. Therefore, the Head of the NSDC, Volodymyr Horbulin, claimed that Udovenko's remarks had been misinterpreted.[20] He rightly clarified that NATO documents do not allow for 'associate status'. However, it was also suggested that because the Washington Treaty was written in a different historical context and because the nature and structure of the Alliance was changing, NATO might in the future allow for associate partners.[21]

As regards Ukraine's draft proposal to NATO that envisaged a 'special partnership', NATO was ambivalent on the matter. NATO's mode of thinking was that if the partnership agreement was too far reaching, Ukraine would have nearly the same status as Russia, thus reducing the likelihood of reaching an agreement with Russia on NATO's pending enlargement.[22] NATO Secretary General Javier Solana travelled to Kyiv in April 1996 to discuss the matter with Kuchma and concluded that although NATO should develop 'very deep and absolutely special relations with Ukraine', there was little support among the member-states for signing a formal charter with Ukraine as was planned for in the case of Russia.[23] In November 1996 Ukraine sent a revised draft proposal for this special partnership but again, the alliance members found it to be too specific and legally binding. Finally, at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 an agreement was approved, but was of a much less specific nature in comparison with the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

The NATO-Ukraine Charter

Signed on 9 July 1997 the *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine* received virtually no opposition among the participants. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the partnership between NATO and Ukraine was still to be based on mutual co-operation, respect each other's roles in European security, and most importantly, implied no legal or military obligations. The Charter was, nonetheless, a great

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[16] Now the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).
[17] F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Ukraine's balancing act', *Survival*, Summer 1996, vol.. 38, no. 2, p. 148.
[18] *Zerkalo Nedely*, 23-29 March 1996, no. 12.
[19] *Zerkalo Nedely,* 29 June-1 July, no. 26.
[20] Bukkvoll, p. 364.
[21] Remarks made by Ihor Kharchenko of the MFA, in *Holos Ukrainy*, 27 June 1996.
[22] As explained to the author in an interview with Robert Hunter, former US Ambassador to NATO, Washington, DC, 27 October 1998
[23] *Zerkalo Nedely,* 6-12 April 1996, no. 14.

psychological achievement for the Ukrainian government, having been given special recognition similar to that of Russia, which demonstrates NATO's commitment to building a partnership specifically with Ukraine.

The Charter was first initialised by the leaders of all NATO member-states and Ukraine at the Sintra Ministerial in Portugal in May 1997, two months prior to the public unveiling at Madrid. The Madrid Summit was intended to give the Charter the 'pizzazz' that it did not receive at Sintra.[24]

In his opening statement at Madrid, Kuchma declared his conviction that the Charter is a clear piece of evidence that the new security architecture based on openness and partnership is being steadily constructed on the European continent. Kuchma made reference to the importance of developing strong and positive ties between NATO and Russia in saying that 'I cannot but mention such an important event in the development of international security as the conclusion of the Russia-NATO Founding Act'.[25] Further, he stated the 'Ukraine has made its choice and is ready together with the NATO member-countries and the partners of the Alliance to take an active part in the construction of the secure future for Europe, and thus for the whole world'.[26]

The first section of the NATO-Ukraine Charter refers to 'building an enhanced NATO-Ukraine Relationship' at the highest political level. It mentions the progress achieved by Ukraine and encourages further development of its democratic institutions, implementation of economic reforms, and its desire to join Western institutions. Further, the Charter states that NATO is convinced that an independent, democratic, and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in CEE and the continent as a whole. Also, NATO and Ukraine share the view that the opening of the Alliance to new members, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, is directed at enhancing the stability of Europe, and does not intend to create a new dividing line.[27] The document also reaffirms Ukraine's commitment to carrying forward its defence reforms and to strengthening democratic and civilian control of the armed forces and NATO pledges its support for these efforts (though the specifics of this support are not enunciated).[28]

Areas of consultation and/or co-operation between NATO and Ukraine are also defined, as are practical arrangements for such consultations outlined. Consultations will cover issues of common concern such as: 1) political and security related subjects, specifically the development of Trans-Atlantic security and stability, and the security of Ukraine; 2) conflict prevention, crisis management, and humanitarian operations; 3) nuclear, biological, and chemical non-proliferation; 4) disarmament and arms control issues; 5) technology transfers; and 6) combating drug trafficking and terrorism. Consultation and co-operation will take place in the forums of joint seminars, joint working groups, and other co-operative programmes.[29] In addition, NATO and Ukraine will explore co-operation in military training including PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory, and NATO will continue to support the Polish-Ukrainian joint peacekeeping battalion and the promotion of defence co-operation between Ukraine and its neighbours.

Further, as proposed in September 1995, a NATO Information Centre (NIDC) was established in Kyiv, which is the first of its kind in CEE.[30] The NIDC is expected to help to eliminate any negative stereotypes that NATO holds with Ukrainian citizens and also to serve as a mechanism for which NATO can gain information about

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[24] Interview with Ambassador Hunter, op cit.

[25] Opening statement by the President of Ukraine, H.E. Leonid Kuchma, at the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, Madrid, 9 July 1997.

[26] Ibid. By this statement, especially in reference to Ukraine's *choice*, Kuchma appears to be indicating that Ukraine's future lies in Europe and in European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. Thus, one might easily make the assumption that Ukraine does indeed intend to seek membership in European and Trans-Atlantic structures. However, as will be discussed throughout this chapter, Ukraine is not in the economic or political position to do so at the time of writing.

[27] See the text of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, section 1.

[28] See section 2 of the NATO-Ukraine Charter

[29] See sections 3 and 4, points 5 and 6 of the NATO-Ukraine Charter.

[30] It is interesting to note, however, that the Centre actually officially opened on 7 May 1997, two months prior to the Madrid Summit decisions. Furthermore, employees of the Centre have been granted diplomatic status which demonstrates the high political status accorded to this office

Ukraine.[31] Ukrainian citizens have been reported as being roughly 30 per cent in favour of NATO, 30 per cent against, and the remainder is undecided (after Kosovo these figures changed dramatically).[32] Although the NIDC does not have the task of seeking to directly affect public opinion, the office provides information to the public such as press releases, the *NATO Review* journal, and other general information about the organisation.[33]

The overall aim of the NIDC is to facilitate awareness of NATO and its mission and values in Ukrainian society and to work with the Ukrainian MFA and MOD to foster greater co-operation between Ukraine and NATO. The NIDC receives hundreds of proposals from academics, NGOs, the media, the MFA, the MOD, and the Ministry of Emergencies and is thus under immense pressure to organise seminars, conferences, and other activities.[34] This office is complemented by NATO's Military Liaison Office to Ukraine that was also established by the Charter. The Mission, which opened on 23 April 1999 (during the height of the Kosovo conflict), is housed within the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence in the Partnership for Peace Co-ordinations Centre. Unlike the NIDC office, the Military Liaison Office, consisting of two individuals- one military and one civilian- views its purpose as essentially reactive, that is, to do whatever the Ukrainian government wants as regards developing its relationship with NATO. This office was purposely established within Ukraine's PfP building so that the liaison team would be readily accessible to the MOD staff in order to facilitate Ukraine's direct contact with NATO personnel.[35]

On the practical side regular meetings at the highest political level will take place at mutually agreed intervals. As NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an 'evolving, dynamic process' and to ensure they are developing this relationship and implementing the provisions of the Charter, the North Atlantic Council will meet with Ukrainian representatives twice annually under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. The Charter also establishes a crisis consultative mechanism that will serve as a forum that Ukraine can consult if it perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

It is interesting to note the behind the scenes negotiations that took place as the parties were attempting to draft and conclude a document that would be acceptable to all parties. First of all, for NATO member-states as well as for Ukraine, the semantics were particularly challenging. Ukraine favoured referring to the document as a 'strategic' partnership, but NATO rejected this because the term 'strategic' could imply a military obligation. Further, the term 'Charter'[36] was accepted by Ukraine yet only after it was rejected by Russia.[37] Second, in previous drafts Ukraine's negotiators tended to ask for far more than they could expect to receive, falling just short of an Article Five military 'guarantee' which tended to irritate NATO officials.[38] Third, there were considerable delays in Ukraine's response to NATO's earlier proposals, a fact which justified NATO's priority of the Founding Act with Russia, though a 'Russia first' policy was neither surprising nor problematic for Kyiv.[39]

NATO's hopes and expectations for the Charter varied among member-states from perhaps 'window dressing' to something a bit more, falling short of any legal

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[31] 'Ukraine is NATO information territory', *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, no. 19, 11 June 1997.

[32] Ukrainians were naming the US as the country that posed the greatest threat to Ukraine (39%) with Russia a far-behind second (15 per cent). Some polls had pubic opinion against NATO as high as 75%. See occasional report , 'Public opinion in Ukraine', Centre for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, April 1999, Kyiv, Ukraine.

[33] As told to this author in a personal interview John Karwatski, Assistant Director and Projects Manager of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine, 24 March, 1998.

[34] Interview with Natalie Melnyczuk, Director of the NIDC, Kyiv, Ukraine, 22 October 1999.

[35] Interview with LTC George Bachman, Military Liaison Officer, NATO Liaison Office to Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, 21 October 1999.

[36] The term 'Charter' was proposed jointly by Boris Tarasyuk, who at this time was the head of Ukraine's Mission to NATO, and Robert Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, as told to this author in an interview with Ambassador Hunter on 27 October 1998, Washington, DC.

[37] Negotiations for the NATO-Russia Founding Act were taking place during the same time frame.

[38] Which actually is not a guarantee in the strict sense. The idea is that if a NATO member-state is under threat or militarily attacked, NATO collectively will assess the situation and take appropriate action.

[39] Informal discussions with Ambassador Robert Hunter and Ukrainian MFA official in Halki Greece, 9 September 1998.

commitments. Yet, this document does indeed go further. The Joint Commission, the Ukrainian representation in Brussels (at NATO and EU), and the other informal contacts that have been created now provide Ukraine a more direct access to NATO and as such cannot be reduced to statements of positive intentions which ultimately do not amount to much. NATO envisages that the partnership with Ukraine will help to transform the relationship from an adversarial to a co-operative one.[40] It was intended to lay the foundation for the development of further co-operative efforts and to build trust and mutual understanding between NATO and Ukraine on diplomatic, institutional, and civil levels.

Although it is correct to say that a number of practical agreements have resulted from the Charter, the wording is rather vague at times, and realistically speaking, commits NATO to very little beyond an obligation to meet Ukrainian officials biannually (without any set dates for these meetings). The NATO Information Centre will, furthermore, be as much for NATO's benefit as for Ukraine's. Educating the citizens of Ukraine about NATO's role in European security from a positive perspective should help to ease the difficulties associated with enlargement from a societal level. However, the moral commitment and psychological reassurances that the Charter bestows upon Ukraine at this difficult period of nation- and state-building should not be underestimated. Such reassurances are crucial elements of confidence building for a quasi-state in an awkward geopolitical position in which threat perceptions can and often do dominate the foreign and security policy agenda. The pledging of NATO's support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity is a vital mechanism that can encourage Ukraine to be more proactive in its foreign relations.[41] However, only time will tell whether the NATO-Ukraine Charter was only intended to perpetuate some sort of distinctiveness about Ukraine or whether it was seen as a significant step for Ukraine towards membership in the Trans-Atlantic institution, although most evidence would suggest the former as NATO has not even hinted that full membership is in Ukraine's future.

Still, the provisions of the Charter have facilitated Ukraine's direct access to NATO officials on many levels. As explained by one Ukrainian official, there are now four diplomatic points of contact between NATO and Ukraine:

I)   The Mission of Ukraine to NATO;
II)   Military representatives of both parties;
III)   The NATO Information and Documentation Centre;
IV)   The NATO Liaison Office to Ukraine.

Greater co-ordination among these offices is desired, although the level of contact between them is improving. Further, there are now four forums of contact which meet on a regular basis: A) the NATO-Ukraine Commission; B) the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform; C) the Working Group on Civil Emergencies; and D) the working groups in the scientific sphere. However, within these groups long-term goals still need to be established by both parties and positive statements of intentions are not enough of a basis with which to deepen co-operation.[42]

Kuchma's Programme on Co-operation with NATO

Ukraine has responded to the challenges and opportunities made available by the NATO-Ukraine Charter. In November 1998 Kuchma issued a special decree approving Ukraine's partnership with NATO in the framework of PfP. *The National Programme of Co-operation Between Ukraine and NATO for the period up to year 2001*, drafted by an interagency committee, outlines Ukraine's activities with NATO in the spheres of

[40] Ibid.
[41] Refer to discussion below on Ukraine's relations in East Central Europe, especially as regards 'GUUAM'.
[42] Interview with Kostiantyn Morozov, Deputy Head of the Mission of Ukraine to NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 14 October 1999.

foreign policy, military security, airspace control, information technologies, research and industry, space exploration, nuclear non-proliferation, the environment, standardisation, civil emergency planning, and the combating of terrorism and drug-trafficking.[43]

Kuchma' described the new decree as the most far-reaching of all existing programmes of co-operation between NATO and individual partnership countries. This is the first time such a comprehensive document has been drawn up in Ukraine and is unprecedented for countries participating in PfP. The following are the objectives of the National Programme:

- To reach by the end of 2000 implementation of basic tasks determined by the Charter;
- To deepen co-operation within the framework of EAPC, Ukraine-NATO Commission, and PfP Programme;
- To serve as a basis for developing an annual Work Plan for the Implementation of the Charter and Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) as well as an instrument to provide their complete and qualitative fulfilment;
- To promote the establishment of closer relations between ministries and other central bodies of state executive power of Ukraine involved in Charter implementation with relevant NATO structures;
- To create an effective mechanism for informational support of co-operation with NATO.[44]

The decree specifies that the co-ordination and control over the implementation of the Programme, the formation of the above mentioned Work Plan, and the implementation of the provisions of the Charter and IPP is to be provided by the President of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, which are under the authorisation of the State Inter-Agency Commission of Ukraine-NATO Co-operation. The responsibility of the MFA will be to elaborate upon conceptual principles of relations with NATO, make recommendations to the President and the NSDC, and to organise and implement the work of the ministries and other bodies of executive power involved in the Work Plan. Therefore, this Programme and its future is the sole responsibility of the executive, thereby excluding the legislature.

Kuchma's decree was intended to build upon the provisions of the NATO-Ukraine Charter which includes the development of crisis consultative mechanism, the co-operation of Ukraine's ministries with relevant NATO structures, and the promotion of regional co-operation in order to ensure Ukraine's involvement with countries which have recently joined NATO. The issuing of this Programme is indicative of the value the Ukrainian executive holds on the improvement of the quality and quantity of ties with NATO in the political, military, economic, and scientific spheres. Kuchma's decree is yet another lucid example of Ukraine's desire to integrate with the Trans-Atlantic organisation at some stage in the future.

NATO/US-Ukraine military co-operation

The US and UK[45] in particular have established far-reaching bilateral military contacts with Ukraine through the 'in the spirit of PfP' (ISO PfP) programme. The following section will discuss these rather extensive multilateral and bilateral military ties as further evidence that NATO countries are heavily involved in helping to bring the Ukrainian military up to Western standards. The focus will be on ISO PfP operations carried out between the US and Ukraine as they are the most extensive in the bilateral

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[43] 'Ukraine adopts Programme of co-operation with NATO', *Itar-Tass*, 10 November 1998.
[44] See section one of the *National Programme of Co-operation between Ukraine and NATO*.
[45] The first UK-Ukrainian peacekeeping operations codenamed 'Cossack Express' were held at the Yaroviv military training ground on 17 September 1999. At the same time, British-Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping exercises codenamed 'Cossack Steppe were held at the Nowa Demba proving ground in Poland.

sphere.[46] It is the goal of this section to highlight the dynamic development of military ties between Ukraine and the West and to draw some conclusions as to whether these activities support or contradict Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy.

Since the origin of the bilateral military contacts programme there has been a dramatic increase in activities: from 50 in 1995 to 119 in 1999, with 120 events planned for 2000 and 2001. These activities include annual military contact events[47], organised conferences, security and humanitarian assistance, and PfP exercises. Bilateral military exercises between the US and Ukrainian militaries have been carried out under Peace Shield (army exercises) and Sea Breeze (maritime exercises), with Peace Shield linked to NATO's (PfP) Co-operative Neighbour and Sea Breeze linked to NATO's (PfP) Co-operative Partner. Areas of focus for the year 2000 include interoperability[48], military medicine, education, professional development, defence tactics, special operations, and interagency co-operation. US military forces have also identified challenges to the development of this relationship and these include planning and execution, co-ordination in a broad sense, passport and visa restrictions, funding procedures, and the integration of engagement programmes.

The 1999 Peace Shield exercises, the multinational computer-simulated war games, occurred in August 1999 at the Yavoriv training ground near Lviv. These exercises have been carried out at this training ground since 1995, but the training tasks have been very different, ranging from training to deal with natural disasters to suppressing an interethnic conflict.[49]

Further, the PfP exercise Co-operative Partner-99 was held in June 1999 and hosted by Romania and for the first time in Ukraine's co-operation with NATO, the country's Defence Ministry declined to take part in the naval manoeuvres in the Black Sea. Initially thought to signal a possible change of Ukraine's policy towards NATO, the decision not to participate was attributed by Defence Minister Kuzmuk to the need to prepare for Ukraine's participation in the KFOR peacekeeping activities. Three Ukrainian ships, which had been expected to arrive, were already on their way to the exercise area when they were suddenly recalled to the Sevastopol base.[50] Observers immediately began to speculate whether Kuchma's decision to recall the ships was a political tactic aimed at winning the support of the Ukrainian left given the upcoming Presidential election. However, it is anyone's guess as to what was the motivation behind the Ukrainian government's decision not to take part in the PfP exercise. All that is clear is that Ukraine's foreign policy is a balanced one and Kuchma's decision was viewed positively by Russia.

Another interesting dynamic to the NATO/US-Ukraine partnership includes the State Partnership Programme (SPP), a joint project which began in 1993 between the US National Guard and the Uniformed Ministries of Ukraine (including the Ministry of Emergencies, the Ministry of Defence, the National Guard[51], and the Border Troops), under the auspices of the ISO PfP programme. SPP's goals are to promote regional stability and civil-military relationships in support of US policy objectives by: 1) fostering democratisation by subscribing to the idea that, in a democracy, the military is apolitical and subordinate to civil authority; and 2) using the force in peacetime, so that citizens gain by using their part-time force for emergencies in support of civil authorities. The SPP has allowed for interaction in social and economic as well as

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[46] Information regarding ISO PfP exercises was supplied to the author by LTC Frank Morgese, US European Command (EUCOM), Stuttgart, and Major Joe Knowles, Kansas National Guard, at the conference entitled, 'Ukraine, NATO and European Security', which was part of a larger conference entitled, 'NATO: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow', held at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the University of Kansas, in Lawrence, Kansas, 9-11 September 1999.

[47] Including the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)/Military Liaison Team (MLT), ISO, special operations, high-level visits, educational exchanges, and the State Partnership Programme.

[48] Interoperability of logistics, supplies, command, control, communications, and computers, battle staff procedures, and air defence.

[49] 'Ukraine's Kuzmuk discusses Kosovo at Peace Shield-99', Kiev UT-3 Television Network, 5 August 1999.

[50] 'Kuchma decision on NATO exercise linked to elections', *Moscow Kommersant*, 18 June 1999, p. 4.

[51] Kuchma issued three decrees on 15 December 1999, one of which effectively liquidated the National Guard program as well as several other executive organs. Kuchma's decree intended to reduce the number of executive organs from 89 to 35. See 'Kuchma decree abolishes ministries, national guard', *Kiev UNIAN*, 15 December 1999.

military spheres. Moreover, the SPP serves as Eastern Europe's 'bridge to America' by involving citizen soldiers and the American public. SPP's value is in its ability to focus attention of a small portion of the US Department of Defence (DoD) on a single country or region that supports US government policies.

The Kansas and California National Guards are assigned to Ukraine and work as partners to accomplish the previously mentioned goals though visits to Kansas, California, and Ukraine. These Familiarisation (FAM) visits allow Ukrainian military and civil authorities to visit the US to learn about how the National Guard provides military support to the state. These visits also serve to familiarise Ukrainian guests with American culture and it is hoped that both forces will develop long-term personal relationships with which to build longer-term working partnerships. The Kansas and California National Guard members also travel to Ukraine to exchange information and ideas, although less frequently than the Ukrainians come to the US.

As to the implications for Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy, Ukraine's bilateral and multilateral military relations with the West seem to be consistent with the government's chosen foreign policy course. So long as such activities are not viewed as a preliminary stage to bringing Ukraine into NATO in the short to medium term or have the potential to dramatically alter Ukraine's balanced foreign policy, such military activities should not prove problematic. However, problems arise for Ukraine's foreign policy when such closeness to NATO and its partners encourages Ukraine to choose sides between NATO and Russia, as discussed below.[52]

Challenges to the NATO-Ukraine partnership

According to NATO and Ukrainian officials, there are several barriers to the facilitation of NATO-Ukraine co-operation. The first is economic. Frequently the Ukrainian MOD has been forced to cancel its participation in certain activities with NATO because of a lack of adequate funding. Ukraine seems to expect NATO/US to pay the bulk of the expenses in the various military and non-military exercises and often cannot cope with their share of the financial burden. However, according to one member of the Ministry of Emergencies, the Ukrainians place an extremely high value on their co-operation with NATO on a multilateral level and particularly with the US on a bilateral level. Enthusiasm and even politics is not a barrier, but money can be a tricky issue.[53] Another significant challenge according to one prominent NATO official is the complete disorganisation in government. The problem is with the Ukrainian bureaucracy which he described in the following manner: 'There are busy cooks in the kitchen, the food is there, but dinner never arrives'.[54] In other words, there is a lot being discussed, but few tangible results are evident. A third challenge is the residual anti-NATO sentiment in the Ukrainian population, particularly after the Kosovo War, and a fourth is that there is still limited knowledge of Ukraine in the West. Yet another challenge has to do with resistance within the Ukrainian MOD to establish closer ties with NATO. This has to do with several factors including the MOD's bureaucratic inertia, a fear of losing jobs rather than having a strategic vision, and habits of heart and mind (i.e. still picturing NATO as an adversary).[55] But overall, there is no actual *plan* for Ukraine's integration into European and Trans-Atlantic structures, there is only an *idea* and ideas have not had the effect of stimulating the desired level of reform in Ukraine.[56] Still, according to one Ukrainian official, perhaps there is the beginnings of a plan (such as Kuchma's decree as discussed above), and still no clear conception in

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[52] For example, during the Kosovo War NATO asked Ukraine to refuse to allow Russia overflight to reinforce their troops at Pristina Airport in Serbia. Ukraine briefly sided with NATO and against Russia (see below).

[53] Interview with Sergey Khomchenko, Deputy Head of the International Department, Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies, Kyiv, Ukraine, 19 October 1999.

[54] Interview with Christopher Donnelly, Special Advisor to the Secretary General for Central and Eastern European Affairs, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 14 October 1999.

[55] Interview with Colonel Leonid Golopatyuk, Chief of Department, General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Kyiv, Ukraine, 18 October, 1999.

[56] Interview with Christopher Donnelly, op cit.

the Ukrainian government as to what it takes to achieve membership in NATO and the EU.[57]

The affects of the Kosovo crisis on NATO-Ukraine relations

The Kosovo crisis was in fact the first serious disagreement between Brussels and Kyiv since Ukraine's independence.[58] On 24 March 1999, the day after NATO's bombing campaign began against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Ukraine's parliament exemplified a rare display of unity in adopting by a vote of 230 to 46 to recommend that Kuchma repeal the country's non-nuclear status allowing Ukraine, which once owned the world's third largest nuclear arsenal, to rearm.[59] However, that was the extent of their agreement. The communist and socialists wanted the nuclear weapons to direct them at NATO; the nationalists wanted to point them at Russia. But despite the differences on the status of nuclear weapons, what is important to note is that *Rada* deputies unilaterally agreed to oppose NATO's decision to bomb Serbia. One day after the bombing began Ukrainian Foreign Minister Tarasyuk was quoted as saying:

> It is with deep anxiety and concern that reports about
> NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia have been received in
> Ukraine. Adhering to the norms and principles fixed in
> the UN Charter, Ukraine believes that the use of military
> force against sovereign state is unacceptable without the
> sanction of the Security Council of the UN- the only
> body authorised to make a decision directed at maintaining
> international peace and security.[60]

Moreover, on 23 April 1999, after fourteen unsuccessful attempts in four weeks, the *Verkhovna Rada* adopted a resolution against NATO's military actions against Serbia.[61] In this resolution the *Rada* questioned Ukraine's entire relationship with NATO and as a consequence, it required Kuchma to submit the state's programme on co-operation with NATO (as discussed above) to the parliament for re-consideration. The *Rada* also required that Kuchma submit all acts that have established a legal basis for Ukraine's co-operation with international organisations. Moreover, Kuchma was encouraged to take an active role in attempting to mediate in the conflict. However, unlike the previous draft that did not pass, this resolution contains neither the provision on suspending all co-operation with NATO nor does it recommend that Kuchma should dismiss the ideologists of the pro-NATO course (including Tarasyuk, among others) from office.[62] Moreover, earlier drafts called for the recalling of Ukraine's Permanent Mission to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, for the suspension of the activity of the NIDC[63], and for an end to Ukraine's participation in the PfP Programme. The *Rada* only condemned NATO's military actions in Kosovo and stated that Ukraine should immediately stop dismantling its nuclear missile silos. Still, these resolutions should only be seen as a recommendation to the executive in foreign policy[64] and Kuchma

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[57] Informal interview with official from the Ukrainian MFA, 3 December 1999.

[58] See Jennifer D. P. Moroney, 'The NATO-Ukraine partnership: Challenges and opportunities after Kosovo', in *Analysis of Current Events*, September/October 1999, vol. 11, nos. 7-8.

[59] See 'Ukraine to re-examine non-nuclear status after strikes', *Kyiv DINAU*, 25 March 1999, and Charles Clover, 'Kosovo swings Ukraine's political pendulum further East', *The Kyiv Post*, 28 April 1999.

[60] *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 11 April 1999, as cited in Volodymyr Zviglyanich, 'The crisis in Yugoslavia and 'Ukraine 2010': International dimensions of internal policy in pre-election Ukraine', *Jamestown Monitor*, 5 May 1999.

[61] Barely amassing the minimum required vote of 42 to 26 with 6 abstentions

[62] See the Occasional Report, 'Ukraine-NATO: The Supreme *Rada* Resolution', Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, April 1999.

[63] 'Ukraine may decide on rupture of relations with NATO', *Itar-Tass*, 20 April 1999.

[64] According o the Constitution adopted in 1993, the parliament determines the basis for foreign policy but the president implements it. See Chapters Three and Four of this thesis.

made it clear that any resolution passed by the parliament calling for drastic changes in relations with NATO would not be implemented.[65]

Kuchma did follow the *Rada's* recommendation to mediate in Kosovo since mediation in the solution of international conflicts is considered to be an indicator of the state's political importance. If mediation produces concrete results, the rating of the mediating state's international standing should therefore increase.[66] Since independence, Ukrainian elites have expressed their desire to play this role. Kuchma's first attempts to mediate in Kosovo came at the encouragement of Western leaders, particularly by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien.[67] Kuchma sent Foreign Minister Tarasyuk and Defence Minister Kuzmuk to Belgrade to attempt to organise a meeting with President Milosevic. However, no concrete results were produced illustrating two important points: neither NATO officials nor Milosevic was willing to employ Ukraine's diplomatic efforts, reflecting the reality that Ukraine's role as mediator was not taken seriously.[68]

At the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999 Kuchma again attempted to mediate in the Kosovo conflict.[69] Kuchma, who attended the Summit despite the disapproval of his Russian and Belarusian counterparts, proposed a three-stage plan for peace: 1) Serbia would halt its military operations in Kosovo, withdraw its military forces in Kosovo, and create conditions for the return of refugees under the observation of international peacekeepers[70], while at the same time, NATO halts its bombing campaign; 2) peacekeepers are to oversee the return of refugees and an OSCE humanitarian mission is to manage their orderly return and quartering; and 3) a peace conference on the Balkans is to be convened in a neutral country such as Ukraine.[71] Again, Kuchma's peace plan for Kosovo was 'politely dismissed' by NATO members who preferred the involvement of Russia. Perhaps the preference for Russia's mediation efforts stemmed from the belief that somehow Russian, having a 'special relationship' with Serbia, would be more successful in a mediator-type role. A further motivation was NATO's desire to contrive a positive role for Russia, thus avoiding Russia's military involvement in the conflict on the side of Serbian President Milosevic. In any case, NATO's fixation on Moscow was obvious. The primary goal of NATO was to 'get Russia on board' rather then 'keeping Ukraine on board'. The Ukrainian government's mediation efforts were thus pushed to the sidelines possibly to the detriment of a settlement of the conflict and perhaps also to the NATO-Ukraine partnership.

It is clear that the Kosovo crisis has had a considerable impact on Ukraine's internal politics which is indicative of how external events, particularly tensions between Russia and the West, are often replicated in Ukraine on a domestic level.[72] Kosovo has both highlighted political divisions in Ukraine and brought about a short-lived consensus. NATO's military action triggered a discussion in the *Rada* about re-evaluating the state's entire foreign policy course (i.e. away from the West). Pro-Russian forces in Ukraine have used the Kosovo crisis to push their own agenda for the state's foreign and security policy. For example, Symomenko, leader of the Communist Party, called for an immediate reconsideration of Ukraine's relationship with NATO and stated: 'if we do not make a decision on the alliance, that may entail a change in relations with Russia...Ukraine's co-operation with NATO complicates Kyiv's relations with the CIS and especially with Russia and Belarus'.[73]. But Kuchma sought to maintain the high-level of contact with NATO and has been unwilling to even slow

[65] 'Ukraine not to change relations with NATO', *Moscow Interfax*, 6 April 1999.

[66] 'Kyiv's possible mediation in Belgrade eyed', *Kyiv Zerkalo Nedeli* (in Russian), 29 March 1999, p. 2.

[67] 'Kuchma, Canada's Chretien discuss Kosovo crisis', *Moscow Interfax*, 25 April 1999.

[68] 'Ukrainian ministers deliver Kuchma offer to Milosevic', *Moscow Interfax*, 27 March 1999.

[69] Kuchma's peace plan was also presented to the UM General Assembly on 20 April 1999. See 'Kuchma Kosovo plan presented to UN', *Kyiv Intelnews*, 20 April 1999.

[70] Who must receive the mandate of the UN Security Council

[71] See 'Kuchma on peace plan for Kosovo crisis', Interview with President Kuchma (in Ukrainian), *Kyiv Uryadovyy Kyryer*, 15 April 1999, p. 1.

[72] Refer to theoretical discussion on 'omni-balancing' in Chapter Two

[73] 'Kosovo crisis deepens political divisions in Ukraine', *STRATFOR's Global Intelligence Update* (obtained through FBIS), 26 March 1999.

progress made with NATO and other Western institutions such as the EU and IMF. Nevertheless, NATO's actions in Kosovo resulted in the alignment of Ukraine's nationalists with the state's pro-Russian faction in promoting a Ukrainian position which essentially was identical to Russia's. But while the nationalists have taken the side of the pro-Russian camp it should be pointed out that if support for the Serbs has the potential to lead Ukraine towards integration with Russia on any level, the nationalist pendulum in Ukrainian politics will almost certainly swing back to the West.

Ukraine's mixed messages are a reflection of the shifting balance between the state's three factions: leftists, nationalists, and centrists.[74] If the political alliance between the leftists and nationalists had solidified this would move Ukraine's foreign policy closer to Russia and the CIS. However, this did not happen. The clearest example of Ukraine's westward orientation took place on 12 June 1999 when Kyiv briefly closed Ukrainian airspace to Russian aircraft attempting to reinforce their troops at Pristina airbase in Kosovo. Such a move proved to be too much for Moscow which immediately launched a campaign to reverse Ukraine's trajectory. During a meeting with Yeltsin in July, Kuchma reaffirmed Ukraine's strategic partnership with Russia, while declaring neutrality at the core of the state's foreign policy. The meeting dealt with Ukraine's short-lived decision (only a matter of a few hours) to deny its airspace to Russia, thus clearly aligning with the West and following the lead of Hungary and of Bulgaria and Romania (two supposedly neutral countries) while reportedly stunning Russian observers.[75] Russia discovered that Central Europe is far from being a neutral buffer zone and is *de facto* under NATO's control and for a few hours it appeared as if Ukraine had also aligned with NATO against Russia. As a result Moscow is now very suspicious of neutrality.[76] Further, Kyiv's decision caught both Russia and NATO off-guard. Russia reacted quickly and with an outcry, while NATO and the US in particular were very slow with forthcoming praise or support. This event clearly highlights that fact that the West is not prepared to respond quickly to extraordinary events in Eastern Europe.[77]

The Kosovo crisis, particularly the way it is resolved in the coming years, will be a test not only of the NATO-Ukraine partnership, but also of the reality of the new European security system. NATO's actions have also forced Ukraine to more clearly define and perhaps even re-evaluate Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy. Kosovo has also forced NATO to come to terms with its new role as a collective security organisation including a new pro-active policy as regards out-of-area operations, rather than being a reactive, defensive alliance as it was during the Cold War era. Kosovo will also be a test of Ukraine's own sense of itself as a European country and of its ability to deal with the rising disagreement with the West without derailing its pro-West foreign policy.

Ukraine and the European Union (EU)

In addition to NATO Ukraine has also sought ties with other European institutions, including the EU. In June 1994 Ukraine became the first CIS country to sign a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) with the EU. The PCA laid out a broad framework defining the EU's relations with Ukraine and outlined specific areas for practical co-operation. Reflecting the growing appreciation of Ukraine's importance, the EU approved the Common Position (November 1994) and the Action Plan (December 1996) pledging to support Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, its democratic transition, economic stabilisation, and integration into

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[74] Or those who support either a balanced foreign policy or neutrality

[75] However, according to this author's informal discussion with the US EUCOM's Ukraine desk officer and with a Ukrainian MFA official, the author was told that Ukraine's decision was inconsequential because Hungary and Bulgaria had decided to close their airspace with Russia, thus the route to Serbia was already obstructed with or without Ukraine's compliance.

[76] See 'Ukraine struggles now for neutrality', *STRATFOR 's Global Intelligence Update*, 15 July 1999.

[77] Interview with Major Joe Knowles, Co-ordinator, State Partnership Programme (with Ukraine), thoughts communicated by e-mail on 10 November 1999.

the world economy. In June 1996 the European Council upgraded Ukraine's status to 'an economy in transition', thus providing for greater access of Ukrainian goods to the EU market. The EU also granted Ukraine most-favoured nation status. The two sides began to discuss the closure of Chernobyl as well as the possible establishment of a free trade zone in 1998, which would depend upon Ukraine's progress in initiating market reforms. However, unlike the EU's agreements with the Baltic States the accord with Ukraine made no mention of possible future membership.

Overall the EU's financial assistance to Ukraine has been modest. At the end of 1994 the EU provided a balance of payments loan to Ukraine of 85 million ECU ($105 million). In June 1995 the EU signed an interim trade agreement with Kyiv which put into effect the trade provisions of the PCA. Ukraine also received $5 billion in foreign financial aid for stabilisation and debt rescheduling. The EU only pledged 85 million ECU in credits and 60 million ECU of that total was deducted for food imports in 1992.[78] Nearly two-thirds of Ukraine's exports consist of chemicals, metals, agricultural products and textiles which are regarded by the EU as 'sensitive goods' and are subject to various restrictions, including anti-dumping measures. Such restrictions have made it difficult for Ukraine to gain access to the EU market and consequently, to reduce its economic dependency on Russia.

The EU's primary concern as regards Ukraine has been the issue of nuclear safely, specifically the closure of Chernobyl. In June 1994 the EU proposed a plan to close several of Chernobyl's reactors and to help Ukraine replace the generating capacity lost through this closure. The plan called for assistance in restructuring Ukraine's energy sector, including the implementation of energy saving measures.[79] The EU committed 700 million ECU to the closure of Chernobyl. However, Ukraine rejected the offer and demanded compensation far in excess of what was being offered by the international community. Finally, after months of tedious negotiations, the European Commission, the G-7, and Ukraine signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in December 1995, thus undertaking a mutual commitment to closing Chernobyl by the year 2000. But while the EU (and Germany in particular) was trying to persuade Ukraine not to construct any new nuclear reactors, Ukraine blames the EU for its unwillingness to allocate the promised funds in a timely manner. Yet, despite these setbacks both parties continue to pursue an active dialogue in the framework of the EU-Ukraine Co-operation Council as established under the PCA.

Evidence of Ukraine's 'dynamic' approach to the development of relations with the EU became clearer after the coming into force of the PCA in March 1998 when the Ukrainian section of the Council for Issues of Co-operation Between Ukraine and the EU as well as the National Agency for Development and European Integration were set up by a presidential edict.[80] Special units for co-operation with the EU were consequently established in several Ukrainian ministries. At the first meeting of the Council, Prime Minister Pustovoytenko issued a statement on Ukraine's desire to achieve the status of associate member of the EU.[81] Following the first meeting of the Council in June 1998 a strategy of Ukraine's integration into the EU was approved by Kuchma.

Proceeding a Council of Ministers meeting in October 1998 a EU-Ukraine summit was held and a joint communiqué was passed in which the state of bilateral relations between the parties was characterised as 'strategic and unique'. Moreover, the Ukrainian MFA enumerated the country's short-term goals and expectations regarding its relations with the EU:

[78] Larrabee, 'Ukraine's balancing act', p. 153.
[79] Ibid, p. 154.
[80] Interview with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, 'European integration as an element of the national idea', *Kyiv Uryadovyy Kuryer,* 2 March 1999.
[81] Associate membership involves a lower tax regime for export to the EU. To gain this status, countries must be judged by the EU to have a mostly market economy. The Baltic States and most former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe gained associate membership status in the early 1990s, while Ukraine was refused. When Ukrainian officials asked for this status in June 1998, EU officials rejected the application, calling it 'rather premature', and instead asking Ukraine to focus on living up to commitments made in the PCA.

- Practical implementation of the EU-Ukraine PCA;
- Negotiations to create an EU-Ukraine free trade zone;
- An upgraded status for Ukraine as an associate member of the EU;
- Ukrainian participation in the work of the conference of EU members and candidate member-states;
- Measures to mitigate the trade losses that Ukraine stands to incur when its western neighbours, Poland and Hungary, become full members.[82]

President Kuchma has stated that EU membership is an 'absolute priority' adding his hopes that Ukraine's partnership with the EU will soon transform into associate membership.[83] However, as explained by one EU official, Ukraine cannot even think of achieving associate member status before fulfilling its end of the PCA.[84]

Another quandary in EU-Ukraine relations concerns the reinforcement of a new eastern frontier that will lie on the Polish-Ukrainian border. Kuchma has expressed concern about EU pressure on Poland to introduce a visa requirement for Ukrainian citizens.[85] Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski reiterated his opposition to the introduction of visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens in stating that: 'the creation of new divisions in Europe will not serve the interests of Europe and if we seal the EU's eastern border we shall in fact have to deal with the new division in Europe'.[86] However, a penetrable Polish-Ukrainian border is not a desirable prospect for West Europeans because of illegal migration and traffic of narcotics and contraband. It is certain that when Poland joins the EU its present relatively open-border with Ukraine will be no more. The EU's Schengen Agreement will force Poland to introduce visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens that will no doubt have a negative influence on cross-border movement and on trade.

Foreign Minister Tarasyuk has characterised relations with the EU as a very important area of the MFA's work, but he also pointed out that it is possible to speak seriously about integration only on the basis of bringing the internal legislation, standards, and industrial policy to the European level.[87] A number of organisational measures in 1998 were aimed at implementing Kuchma's decree on Ukraine-EU relations[88] as well as implementing the provisions of the strategy of Ukraine's integration with the EU. But some setbacks occurred in 1998. Ukraine was twice rejected as an associate member by the EU Council of Ministers in 1998, first at the Luxembourg Summit in June, and second at the Vienna Summit in October (see Chapter Six).

Nevertheless, some optimism should also be expressed with the EU's *Common Strategy on Ukraine* that was adopted in December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. This document was intended to give new impetus to the development of EU-Ukraine ties by calling for, among other things, the establishment of a regular dialogue between EU institutions and Ukraine (by way of the Ombudsman) and between Ukraine and Troika, the setting up of a European news network on Ukrainian television (*Euronews*), training courses in criminality and environmental issues, and the possibility of free-trade based on the implementation of all PCA requirements. However, this document was viewed by Ukrainian officials as somewhat disappointing as no provision was made for the state's eventual full membership in the EU.

Economic problems have contributed greatly to the EU's growing sense of ambivalence with Ukraine. In 1998 and 1999 the EU was increasingly disappointed with the slow pace and results of Ukraine's transition, the inconsistency of its economic policy, and the state's inability to comply with the PCA. Although the EU continues to

[82] 'Kyiv sets specific goals for relations with the European Union', *The Jamestown Monitor*, 15 October 1998.

[83] Nathan Hodge, 'Kuchma curries European favour, aid', *The Kyiv Post*, 20 October 1998.

[84] Informal discussion with Dr. Fraser Cameron, Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, Washington, DC, 28 November 1999.

[85] Poland has already imposed a visa requirement for citizens of Russia and Belarus.

[86] 'Ukraine 'troubled' by possible new divide in Europe', *Reuters*, 16 October 1998.

[87] 'Foreign Minister on policy, results', Interview with Borys Tarasyuk in *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 February 1999, pp. 4-5.

[88] The full title for the decree is *'Securing the Implementation of Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation Between Ukraine and the EU and the Improvement of Mechanisms for Co-operation with the EU'*.

recognise the political importance of working with Ukraine to ensure its transition to democracy and a market economy, the EU's policy actions do not reflect this recognition which has led to a political contradiction between declarations and real policy on Ukraine. While the Ukrainian government continues to look to the EU for positive signals, the EU claims it is not prepared to send such a signal at this time. One main problem is that many EU officials, consciously or subconsciously, continue to link Ukraine with Russia. Trying not to alienate or irritate Russia, the EU has been reluctant to establish closer ties with Ukraine than it has with Russia, despite the fact that Russia has not declared EU membership as its official goal, while Ukraine has. It has become evident in the late 1990s that the EU still lacks a clear vision on Ukraine.[89] Thus, it may be concluded from the above discussion that the very real barriers to EU-Ukraine relations are not only economic and political but also psychological. The EU clearly continues to view Ukraine as outside Europe and in Eurasia.

Ukraine and the Council of Europe

Ukraine achieved another important breakthrough in November 1995 when it became a member of the Council of Europe (CE).[90] The CE recognised the progress that Ukraine had made in creating a pluralistic democracy and respecting human rights. However, relations between Ukraine and the CE have been tense over the death penalty issue and in December 1997 the CE's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) threatened to suspend Ukraine over this issue. Upon Ukraine's accession to the CE, PACE had put into place a moratorium on executions. The Assembly warned the Ukrainian authorities that it would take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with commitments entered into including the non-ratification of the credentials of the Ukrainian parliamentary assembly delegation at its next session in January 1998.[91]

In June 1998, January 1999 and again in June 1999 Ukraine managed to avoid CE suspension even though this was the recommended course of action of the monitoring committee and PACE.[92] The rapporteurs and the committee are mandated to assess new member countries' performance in harmonising internal legislation to European standards and since 1995, Ukraine has fulfilled 32 of the 42 PACE commitments. The CE still wants Ukraine to amend the criminal and civil codes, complete the reform of the judiciary system, adopt legislation on the operation of political parties, ratify the European Charter on regional and minority languages, and abolish the death penalty.[93]

Kuchma had assured the CE that his moratorium on executions, which effectively abolishes the practice of capital punishment, would be strictly observed. However, according to Kuchma the *Rada* refused to implement the moratorium.[94] Opinion polls show that most Ukrainians oppose a ban on the death penalty, which explains why the *Rada* has refused to act. Former Parliament Chairman Moroz told CE representatives that the death penalty is simply too popular with voters for parliamentarians to vote against it.[95] However, the CE decided to allow Ukraine to remain a member of the organisation, provided that Kuchma pardoned the more than 250 prisoners on death row and that then abolished capital punishment for good.[96] In the months leading up to the October 1999 Presidential election, Kuchma was caught in

[89] Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'The European Union and Ukraine: The need for a new vision', Policy paper based on the study of the current state and prospects of relations between the EU and Ukraine, The East-West Institute (Kyiv), July 1999. Copy in author's possession.

[90] Ukraine joined the CE after Moldova but ahead of Russia, whose application was still being considered.

[91] See Resolution 1112 (1997) and report by the Rappoteur, Renate Wohlwend, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Document 7974 on the 'Honouring of the commitments by Ukraine to introduce a moratorium on executions and abolish the death penalty', 23 December 1997.

[92] Ukraine is the first country to have its membership in the CE in jeopardy, let alone be suspended.

[93] 'Council of Europe reprieves Ukraine', *The Jamestown Monitor*, 30 June 1999.

[94] REF/RL Daily Newsline, 10 and 24 December 1997.

[95] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 8 December 1997.

[96] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 27 January 1998.

the crossfire between CE demands to abolish capital punishment and political pressure at home to break the moratorium.[97]

Ukraine remains a member of the CE at the end of 1999 but clearly its future membership is in question. Moreover, Ukraine's dubious standing with the CE has affected the development of its relations with other European organisations including the EU.

Ukraine and the Western European Union (WEU)

In addition to relations with the EU, Ukraine has actively sought ties with the WEU. However, this has been limited to a regular exchange of visits and the sharing of some insensitive information. In the Kirschberg Declaration of May 1994 the WEU Council of Ministers agreed to grant associate partner status to those countries that were about to conclude association agreements with the EU. Included were six East European states and the three Baltic States, but not Ukraine, on the grounds that these states were considered potential future EU members whereas Ukraine was not. The Ukrainian government argued that it should be granted associate partner status; however, its neutrality policy and membership in the CIS are regarded as incompatible with WEU membership. But the WEU has missed two critical points. First, Ukraine does not claim to be a neutral state in the strict sense and this policy of neutrality is not to be found in its Constitution. Second, Ukraine is only *de facto* a member of the CIS having never signed the CIS Charter. Therefore, the basis for disqualifying Ukraine from associate membership of the WEU needs to be re-examined.

At the October 1998 Council of Ministers meeting in Vienna the MFA re-stated its aspirations for associate membership of the WEU.[98] However, the lack of enthusiasm on the part of WEU/EU member states has become clear and as such Ukraine's crucial place in European security is not being matched by practical steps to assist its economic, political, and military transition.

Ukraine and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

At the meeting of the CSCE (then called the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) in January 1992 Ukraine and other CIS states were admitted to the organisation.[99] At the OSCE meeting in December 1994 Ukraine and Estonia led the opposition to Russia's demand for an OSCE mandate for Russian peacekeeping operations in the FSU.[100] In May 1996 the Ukrainian delegation to the OSCE proposed that the fears of the non-aligned countries which would not be invited to join NATO in the short term could be alleviated with the extension of security guarantees to these countries through the OSCE.[101] But the proposal for an extension of security guarantees did not win much support from other OSCE member-states.

There is an OSCE Mission to Ukraine that serves as an instrument of conflict prevention and crisis management. The mandates generally calls for the establishment of contacts to local representatives and the further strengthening of dialogue between the parties concerned, but are adjusted to the specific situation in the region where the mission is deployed. In April 1992 the CSCE sent missions to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus to monitor human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Specific to Ukraine was the concern over the Black Sea Fleet and its nuclear capabilities, the situation in

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[97] Particularly as regards the well-publicised case of serial killer Anatoly Onoprienko who was convicted of fifty-two murders.

[98] 'Kyiv sets specific goals for relations with the European Union', *The Jamestown Monitor*, 15 October 1998.

[99] In 1999 there are 56 members and Ukraine has been among the most active and vocal of the new participants.

[100] Keesing's Record of World Events, News Digest for December 1994.

[101] See John Borawski, 'The OSCE: In search of co-operative security', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 27, no. 4, December 1996, p. 405 for a comprehensive discussion on this topic.

Crimea, economic reform, the Chernobyl disaster, and the signing of the CFE Treaty.[102] The OSCE has also sent recommendations to the government of Ukraine, particularly on Crimea. In May and June 1995 following the OSCE Round Table discussions Max van der Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, recommended that the Crimean Tatars be allowed to retain their allocated 14 seats in the Crimean parliament. [103] The OSCE continues to be involved in Crimea as a mechanism for managing the potentially dangerous tensions that have emerged between the Ukrainian government and Crimea.[104] Further, the OSCE has been involved in election monitoring in Ukraine as well as the other FSU states.

Support received from Western financial institutions

Ukraine has received several relatively low-interest loans from international financial institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the G-8 Group of Industrialised Countries. The IMF, however, continues to play the dominant role in providing financial support for the balance of payments for post-communist such as Ukraine. The IMF has the dual role of providing such support and encouraging economic reform by attaching stringent conditions to its loans.

Ukraine has received financial support for two main programmes: Kuchma's economic reform package and the closing of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The following is a general overview of the financial support and key dates on which Ukraine has received assistance from Western financial institutions.

- 10 July 1994- The G-7 group of industrialised nations pledged US $200 million to aid Ukraine with the closure of Chernobyl. The IMF announces the possibility of further financial assistance of $4,000 million.
- 19 October 1994- The *Rada* approved Kuchma's ambitious economic reform package[105] that called for mass privatisation of land and property, agricultural reform, radical reductions in state subsidies, and tax cuts.
- 26 October 1994- The IMF pledged $371million to support Kuchma's economic recovery programme.
- 23 December1994- A World Bank loan of $500million was issued to Ukraine.

*Since Kuchma initiated his economic reform package in 1994 the World Bank and the IMF have committed a total of $3.4 billion in loans. In 1996 the EU provided $250 million, the EBRD $80 million, the US $170 million and the Export-Import Bank of Japan $180 million.[106]

- 21 March 1997- There was a delay in the *Rada* passing its annual budget which hindered the release of the IMF loan of approximately $2.5-3.1 billion.
- 20 November 1997- An international conference of 50 countries convened in New York to discuss how to raise the $760 million that is needed to close Chernobyl. The conference participants pledged $39 million to Ukraine to aid in the replacement of two Chernobyl reactors.[107]

[102] Report of the CSCE Rapporteur Mission to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, CSCE Communication no.126, Prague, 7 April 1992.
[103] Prague Office of the Secretariat of the CSCE, 'Recommendations to the Government of Ukraine', 14 June 1994, Reference no. 2415/94/L.
[104] See Chapter Three for a comprehensive discussion of the relations between Kyiv and Crimea.
[105] As discussed in detail in Chapter Three of this thesis.
[106] John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 3, May/June 1996, p..59.
[107] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 20 November 1997.

- 27 November 1997- The IMF released part of its loan of $103 million to Ukraine in two tranches because of Kyiv's renewed commitment to speed up structural reform, particularly in areas of privatisation and deregulation.[108]
- 29 December 1997- Ukraine received only $50 million of an IMF standby loan overall totalling $542 million because Ukraine's economic performance was lagging. GDP had fallen by approximately four per cent in 1997, an improvement from the 10 per cent decline in 1996, but still placing Ukraine near the bottom of post-communist states in terms of economic growth.
- 27 February 1998- The EBRD decided not to fund eight of the 13 projects aimed at the construction of two new reactors at Chernobyl that would facilitate its permanent closing. The projects were previously approved by the G-7 in 1995. However, in March 1998 the EBRD now planned to send only $30 million to the Chernobyl Fund.[109]
- 21 May 1998- The World Bank announced it would loan $200 million to Ukraine to modernise and improve the central heating system in Kyiv; however, this loan was placed on hold until Ukraine makes more progress in economic reform.[110]
- 18 June 1998- President Kuchma announced that he would issue a package of economic decrees to steer the country out of its financial crisis. The decrees were intended to lower the current 20 per cent VAT, to simplify tax procedures for small businesses, to raise the minimum wage, and to introduce a fixed-rate tax on agricultural products. This action was taken in response to the IMF's decision to withhold its $2.5 billion loan.[111]
- August 1998- An IMF mission visited Kyiv and announced that it would recommend the approval of a $2.2 billion low-interest loan to Ukraine. The IMF's ambitious programme aimed to promote economic growth and consolidate the recent gains in tax stabilisation, strengthen fiscal and monetary institutions, launch efforts aimed at administrative reform, rationalise the size of the budgetary organisation, adopt transparent privatisation procedures, reduce government involvement in economic activity, and reform the energy and agricultural sectors.[112]
- 18 February 1999- Upon US Secretary of State Albright's recommendation, Congress decided to release funds totalling $195 million in aid allotted for 1999. Albright reported to Congress that Ukraine had made sufficient progress on economic reforms to warrant the release of funds from the Freedom Support Act.[113]
- 26 March 1999- The IMF made the decision to release the next traunche of the $2.2 billion loan to Ukraine totalling $153 million.
- 30 March 1999- The World Bank announces that it will grant Ukraine $110 million worth of loans.

It is imperative that economic reforms continue and that monetary outlooks continue to be positive in order for Ukraine to attract foreign investment as well as financial support from Western financial institutions. Although the West's support is desperately needed, there is no guarantee that it will continue. Western reluctance has been demonstrated by the refusal of the EBRD to contribute further financial support and the hesitation of the IMF and World Bank to release further tranches of pending loans. This trend is likely to continue in the short to medium term until further progress is made in economic reforms.

On the surface it might appear that Ukraine is headed for a return to Eurasia due to the country's general lack of progress in economic reforms. In the following section the prospects for such a scenario will be considered beginning with a description of the foreign policy differences between Kravchuk and Kuchma.

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[108] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, see endnote by Robert Lyle, 'Ukraine is out of capital markets: was it pushed?', 9 December 1997.

[109] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 17 March 1998.

[110] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 23 May 1998.

[111] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 18 June 1998.

[112] Volodoymr Zolotnycky, 'IMF support eases Ukrainian debt crisis', *The Kyiv Post*, 4 August 1991.

[113] 'Focus-Albright approves '99 Ukraine Aid of $195 million', *Reuters*, 19 February 1999.

RETURN TO EURASIA? UKRAINE-RUSSIA RELATIONS SINCE 1991

Kravchuk to Kuchma: A new pragmatic approach to Russia

Many differences as regards political ideologies were immediately evident between Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma. Although both leaders were committed to Ukrainian statehood and independence, Kuchma's 'pragmatism' has replaced the 'romanticism' of his predecessor. Kuchma's priorities include political and economic reforms that are essential for the country's survival. Kuchma's agenda was radically different, but not in the way his supporters from Moscow and eastern and southern Ukraine had expected. Kuchma did not intend to return Ukraine to a new Russian empire, camouflaged as a 'union' or 'CIS confederation'.[114]

When comparing Kravchuk to Kuchma, Dmytro Tabachnyk, Head of Kuchma's administration, stated:

> If I were asked, what is the main difference between
> the new leadership and the one before it? I would say
> that the period of romanticism is over. The new government
> will be approaching solutions to all problems from the
> pragmatic position of common sense and the economic
> value of the decision which is made.[115]

President Kuchma immediately made a number of changes in Ukraine's foreign policy orientation:

- Ukraine would no longer look upon economic co-operation with Russia and the CIS as an unfortunate necessity, but rather as an urgent requirement in light of the close economic interdependence inherited from the FSU.
- Ukraine will continue to rule out political and military integration within the CIS although bilateral co-operation with the military-industrial complexes of Russia and Ukraine should be regarded as beneficial. Ukraine was also interested in raising its profile within the CIS by helping to mediate in local conflicts such as Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
- Urgent steps needed to be taken to 'normalise' relations with Russia. However, this 'normalisation' could only take place on the basis of equality, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs, and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- Ukraine would continue to search for alternative sources of energy supplies in order to reduce its dependency on Russia.
- Ukraine would continue to integrate within the European and world communities by aspiring to join international organisations (such as the GATT, EU, CEFTA, CEI) and to diversify its foreign trade.
- Ukraine has prioritised relations with the West by overcoming the two main obstacles that have affected their development between 1992-1994: Ukraine's lack of commitment to reform and nuclear disarmament.
- Ukraine would energetically seek to expand its exports of arms.[116].

Furthermore, the following proactive policies were intended to aid the Ukrainian government in achieving these objectives:

- Ukraine would not allow itself to be coerced into obligations that infringed upon its national interests.

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[114] Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine: Back from the brink', Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 13-14.
[115] *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 October 1994.
[116] Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine Under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation, and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine*, London: Macmillian Press, 1997, pp. 183-184,

- Ukraine would co-operate with the CIS and with those countries that hold similar interests in international affairs.
- Relations with Russia were to be based on good neighbourly co-operation and equal partnership.
- Priority would be given to the signing of a large-scale inter-state treaty with Russia, finalisation of the division of the Black Sea Fleet and to the terms of the lease of Ukrainian naval bases as well as regulation of Ukraine's energy debts.[117]

Thus, Kuchma preferred to treat Russia less like an adversary and more like a business partner in which a relationship built on co-operation, trust, and mutual respect would bring about positive economic as well as political changes. But at the same time Kuchma refused to bow to Russian pressures, for example, in signing the Tashkent Collective Security Agreement, or in other suggestions put forward by Moscow for closer political or military ties with the 'near abroad'.

Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Ukraine's approach to the CIS has been a combination of Kravchuk's scepticism and Kuchma's economic pragmatism.[118] The Ukrainian government's policies of neutrality, non-bloc status, and opposition to political or military integration within the CIS framework remained more or less in tact.[119] Ukraine's involvement in the economic sphere of the CIS has not been at the expense of co-operation with the West. As one official expressed, Ukraine 'will not lean this way or that; Ukraine will stay where it is, according to its destiny, history, and geography.[120]

The Ukrainian executive has been reluctant to sign several CIS agreements in recent years which have had the potential to bring about closer political and economic integration. Ukraine's involvement with the CIS has been described as 'fake participation'. As discussed earlier the Ukrainian parliament has refused to ratify the CIS Charter making it not *de facto* a CIS member. As no associate member status exists, Ukraine's involvement with the CIS has been defined as merely that of a participant.[121] Ukraine's understanding of its status within the CIS has led the government to co-operate only in those areas which are of interest; therefore, Ukrainian representatives need not attend every meeting or contribute to the funding of every multilateral effort.

Ukrainian policy-makers have also opposed the formation of permanent multilateral CIS institutions, instead preferring normal diplomacy, including bilateral talks and ad-hoc solutions. The suspicion is that permanent institutions would come under the control of Russia. Further, Ukraine is against a CIS-wide customs union because this is seen as a means for Russia, the largest industrial producer in the CIS, to protect its market and to continue to produce inferior goods and limit the selection of foreign products. Finally, although technically a member of the joint air defence system, Ukraine is against the formation of permanent military structures in the CIS and seems to participate in this 'organisation' only because it does not work. In other words, the costs of membership (co-operation with Russia/CIS by exchanging information among the various ministries) are lower than the costs of non-membership (increased pressure from Russia that could come in many forms).[122]

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[117] Ibid.

[118] Ukraine co-operates with the CIS in the economic sphere out of necessity, thus reflecting the realisation that the CIS the main market in which there is a demand for Ukrainian goods.

[119] See Roman Solchanyk's report on Kravchuk's relations with the CIS before, during and after the Minsk Summit of 1992, 'Ukraine and the CIS: A troubled relationship', in *RFE/RL Research Report*, 12 February 1993, vol. 2, no. 7.

[120] As expressed by Dmytro Tabachnyk, Ukrainian Presidential Chief of Staff, as he was preparing for President Kuchma's official visit to Washington, DC in November 1994, in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 October 1994.

[121] Taras Kuzio, unpublished paper entitled, 'Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM'.

[122] Victor Chudowsky argued this point in Chapter Six of his dissertation, 'Ukrainian foreign policy in the Kuchma era: Domestic and international determinants', University of Connecticut, 1998.

This sceptical/pragmatic approach to the CIS was exemplified at the CIS Summit in January 1996. The CIS adopted a flag, an emblem, and also created a new body, the CIS Council of Internal Affairs Ministers, following the creation at earlier summits of similar bodies composed of foreign and defence ministers. Ukraine, however, did not participate in the discussions on CIS symbols, joint military operations, or the customs union. Kyiv continued to oppose the evolution of the CIS into a supra-state structure as a confederation or a federation that would resemble the former USSR. Many CIS member-states made clear their intention to use the customs union as a stepping-stone to a future currency union based on the Russian ruble, which would naturally reduce the economic sovereignty of the states involved. Following this logic, Ukraine refused to join the Russian-Belarussian-Kazakh-Kyrugyz Customs Union[123] established in March 1996. Ukrainian leaders were wary of Moscow's 'hidden' plans to turn the CIS into a military union in opposition to NATO.

Kuchma officially was in favour of the CIS as a consultative council to provide a forum where member-states can meet, exchange ideas, ask questions, and receive some answers. In other words for Ukraine the CIS would ideally be a 'glorified talking shop'. There is still no mechanism for implementing decisions adopted by the CIS- all 910 of them.[124] Therefore, Ukraine prefers to develop bilateral relations with its neighbours rather than through the multilateral framework of the CIS.

Ukraine has also to a limited extent co-operated with Russia in the military sphere, which was necessary, given that Ukraine inherited the world's third largest nuclear arsenal from the former USSR. Both the West and Russia were determined not to allow Ukraine, Belarus, or Kazakhstan to retain nuclear weapons. Ukraine was the only one of the three states that slowed the process of relinquishing nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling and chose not to immediately sign START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties, as mentioned in Chapter One. However, relations in the military and technical sphere have improved since these early tensions concerning nuclear weapons. Russia has been interested in forging closer bilateral military relations with Ukraine in an attempt to confront the West over issues such as the CFE Treaty, NATO enlargement, as well as the Bosnia and Kosovo crises. Yet, it seems that Russia may have abandoned its attempts to cajole Ukraine into the CIS military bloc and has instead concentrated on developing bilateral ties.

Ukraine joined the CIS Joint Air Defence Agreement in February 1995 despite some reservations.[125] The Ukrainian Republican Party immediately condemned this decision stating that Ukraine's accession to this agreement means actual rejection of its non-aligned status, renunciation of an important part of its political sovereignty, and entry into a military union. They claimed that Russia had not hidden its aim of using it as a vehicle to promote closer political and military integration of the CIS.[126] Many observers believed that Ukraine's decision to join the Air Defence Agreement came as a result of the state's economic crisis. However, Ukraine's accession may have been due to Kuchma's support for Industrial Financial Groups, which aimed to rescue key industries, especially those in aircraft production. It was the general opinion of the administration that membership in this Agreement did not infringe upon Ukraine's sovereignty because each member would continue to administer its own anti-aircraft forces.[127]

Accession to the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and implications

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[123] On 22 January 1998 at the CIS Customs Union Summit (members mentioned above), the discussion was on the possible establishment of a joint customs tariff, co-ordination of their tax systems, forming a transport union, and on unified transit tariffs. But the four members failed to reach agreement on the proposal to create a 'common economic space', modelled on the EU. Yeltsin was quoted as 'absolutely supporting closer integration among the four members'. See RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 22 January 1997.

[124] Ukraine signed only 130 of them by mid 1998 and the *Rada* has only ratified 30 of them. See DINAU, 14 July 1998.

[125] The Agreement includes all CIS affiliates, except for Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Turkmenistan.

[126] See comments by Colonial-General Viktor Samsonov in *Interfax News Agency*, 14 February 1995.

[127] Kuzio, *Ukraine Under Kuchma*, p. 219.

Another example of the Ukrainian government's pragmatic attitude to Russia and the CIS has been exemplified in the March 1999 decision to accede to the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly (CIS IPA) which was established in 1992. Despite bitter opposition from nationalist forces in the *Rada*,[128] 230 of 450 deputies voted in favour of joining the CIS IPA. Thus, *Rada* Chairman Tkachenko had succeeded in his intensive lobbying efforts to convince a majority of deputies to vote for Ukraine's accession to the IPA.[129] The Ukrainian government was acting on the basis of a tactical understanding with Moscow, offering this 'symbolic satisfaction' in return for the Russian *Duma*'s ratification of the interstate treaty with Ukraine which had long been delayed.[130]

Ukraine's participation in the CIS IPA has appeared puzzling to outside observers because Ukraine is not a fully-fledged CIS member, thus making its membership in the IPA legal nonsense. So how then can a non-member of the CIS be a member of its legislative body? According to one MFA official, Ukraine's decision to join this body was merely a quid pro quo (in exchange for the *Duma*'s ratification of the Russia-Ukraine Friendship Treaty- see below) a symbolic decision- a political promo- and nothing more.[131] The CIS IPA is a relatively powerless organisation, a talk-shop or a forum for 10 of the 12 CIS member-states (excluding Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to discuss common economic and political concerns. Furthermore, the IPA rarely meets and has no real power with its main aim being to harmonise the legislative work of the national parliaments. Even current members do very little to co-ordinate their national legislation.[132] Therefore, perhaps what is most significant is Ukraine's decision to join the IPA reflects the ambiguities of the state's foreign policy by highlighting the fact that both the legislature and executive often claim responsibility for determining the state's foreign policy as discussed in Chapter Four.

A new *rapprochement*? The Black Sea Fleet Accords and the Friendship Treaty

On 31 May 1997, the day the agreements were signed, Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma issued a statement describing the BSF Accords and the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation, and Partnership as marking a new chapter in the more than 200-year history of the hero city of Sevastopol and the BSF and an important landmark in the fraternal ties of the two nations.[133] The lumping together of these agreements came as a surprise to observers for two reasons. First, although Yeltsin was expected to sign the Friendship Treaty, only a few senior Ukrainian officials actually believed that the BSF issue would be finally resolved. Second, the greater of the surprises was Moscow's acceptance of earlier proposals that were rejected in October 1996. The May agreement authorised the leasing of Crimean facilities to Russia also resolved two issues: mutual payments and the division of infrastructure, where previously Moscow had proposed a gradual working out of these issues over the course of implementation.[134]

Also included in the accords was a package of several economic agreements which may on the surface appear advantageous to Ukraine. However, the Treaty also contains provisions that are intended to move Ukraine's economy closer to Russia and thus, risks damaging Ukraine's ties to European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. It is important to discuss the political and economic consequences of these Treaties to get a sense of the implications for Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy. First of all, Crimea,

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[128] 'Ukraine MPS vote to join CIS parliamentary group', *Reuters*, 3 March 1999. And for a detailed discussion the of ramifications of Ukraine's accession to the IPA, refer to 'Consequences of joining CIA IPA weighted', *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 6-12 March 1999, pp .2 and 4.

[129] See O. Tkachenko's 18 December address to the Russian *Duma*, *Holos Ukrainy*, 22 December 1998.

[130] 'Ukrainian Parliament joins Interparliamentary Assembly, *Jamestown Monitor*, 4 March 1999.

[131] Interview with Andriy Veselovskiy, Head of Policy Planning and Analysis of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, Ukraine, 19 October 1999.

[132] Katya Gorchinskaya, 'Leftists win symbolic CIS vote nearly brawl before vote to tighten Ukraine's ties with ex-Soviet countries', *The Kyiv Post*, 4 March 1999.

[133] James Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine *rapprochement*? The Black Sea Fleet Accords', *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 33.

[134] Vladimir Pritula, 'Will the premiers divide the Black Sea Fleet?', *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 2 November 1996, p. 4.

Sevastopol, and the BSF have been legally recognised as Ukrainian territory. Also, Russia officially declared that the obstacles to receiving state supplies of fuel, such as tariffs and energy cuts that Ukraine has endued from Russia were artificial. Thus, the barriers to normal trade have been cleared and subsequently, Ukraine's burden of debt to Russia has been reduced. As for military and economic agreements, Russia will lease the port of Sevastopol for twenty years with the option of renewal for another five years. During the first twenty years, Russia is supposed to transfer its share of the BSF to its naval base in Novorossisk. The principle concession to Ukraine was the right to refer to Sevastopol as the headquarters of the Ukrainian navy. Russia has agreed to pay a rent of $97.7 million per annum for the facilities at Sevastopol. It was also agreed that Ukraine would repay its debt of $3 billion to Russia within ten years and that Russia would reduce this debt by $200 million in compensation for 'fissile material'.[135] But the settlement on the sum of $97.7 million was in Russia's favour as Ukraine was originally seeking $423 million per annum.

Also in Russia's favour were the provisions to establish a co-ordinated structural policy in the economic sphere which included the promotion of Russian-Ukrainian joint financial industrial groups, the development of joint defence and space products, and the establishment of a joint energy concept which would promote the supply and transport of Russian oil and gas. The co-ordinated structural policy specifically can be viewed as a means to initiate closer CIS integration as it could lead Ukraine away from market-oriented structural reform of its economy.

But in these Treaties some inherent contradictions can be found which has led to mutual misunderstandings on several issues. Article 6 of the Treaty on Friendship states that both sides will not participate in alliances which are oriented against one another, yet in theory, once Ukraine's borders are solidified, it is free to seek membership in NATO, for example. The *Duma* thus delayed ratification of the Treaties due to its suspicion of the progress of Ukraine's ties to NATO, whereas the *Rada* ratified almost immediately and with a near consensus.[136] Further, in the clause referring to crisis management both states are expected to consult one another as they work to manage possible threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. But for Ukraine the only possible threat along these lines can come from Russia, thus this clause is inherently skewed and does not serve much purpose for Ukraine.[137]

Nevertheless, if the normalisation of relations with Russia had been Ukraine's primary foreign policy goal, then the economic accords might have been viewed as a success. But because Ukraine has always pursued a parallel or primary goal which is integration into Western economic and political structures, the agreement may have taken Ukraine one step back. The economic agreements attached to the BSF accords should help to resolve the issue of debt but at the cost of preserving, and even strengthening Russia's position as a creditor.

Still, the settling of the territorial question of ownership of Crimea and Sevastopol has been a landmark achievement for the Ukrainian government. Such reassurances are not only substantive but also carry a great psychological importance, particularly at this difficult time of state- and nation-building. The conclusion of these Treaties is a clear example of the value that a negatively sovereign state such as Ukraine places on securing its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Perceptions of threat still evident?

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[135] This later sum has been calculated by offsetting the cost of tactical nuclear weapons removed from Ukraine ($450 million) against the cost of Russian oil and other products supplied to Ukraine ($250 million). See Keesing's Record of World Events, News digest for May 1997, p. 41659.

[136] While the Ukrainian *Rada* ratified the agreements on 14 January 1998 by a vote of 317 to 27, The Friendship Treaty (not the BSF) was not ratified by the Russian *Duma* until 25 December 1998 (by a vote of 244 to 30 in favour) and by the Russian Federal Council (upper house) on 12 February 1999. See 'Corrected-Russian *Duma* ratifies pact with Ukraine', *Reuters*, 25 December 1998, and 'Ukraine hails Russian ratification of key pact', *Reuters*, 17 February 1999. The *Rada* then ratified the agreement with Russia's minor changes on 24 March 1999.

[137] Interview with Oleg Kokoshinski of the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, 24 March 1998.

Speaking in Kyiv on 28 August 1997, Kuchma announced two 'changes' in the direction in Ukraine's foreign and security policy. He stated that Ukraine does not intend to join NATO structures although he would not rule out closer co-operation with the Alliance. The President also declared that Ukraine would not be bound to the provisions of the collective security treaty signed in 1992 by seven members of the CIS.[138] Instead, Ukraine will seek to improve relations with individual countries, including Russia, as a means of promoting its security and well being'.[139] This policy contradicts Kuchma's previous declarations that Ukraine's strategic goal was to join NATO at some stage in the future. Perhaps it can be argued that threat perceptions have triggered a response from Kuchma in which a re-emphasis of Ukraine's non-bloc status has been necessary. However, it can also be argued that Kuchma was simply responding to geopolitical developments and also to mounting tensions between the US and Russia. Ukraine's foreign and security policy stances depend greatly on the external environment, particularly on the ideologies of Russia's leaders and if there is a shift to a more hard-lined approach to Ukraine. But Kuchma's statements do reflect three broader changes across the region. First, it was no coincidence that the President's remarks came only one day after US troops landed in Crimea to carry out the 'Sea Breeze' PfP exercise. These manoeuvres were seen by Ukrainian officials as reaffirming Western support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kuchma's declarations have allowed Ukraine to stake a position which is that of closer ties with NATO but not permanent membership, while simultaneously seeking to improve relations with Moscow. Second, Kuchma's 'shift' represents the collapse of the CIS as the organisation relevant to the security needs of its member states. Kuchma took a step towards demonstrating that the CIS was close to its grave not by withdrawing his country's affiliation, but by stating that Ukraine would not be giving preference to bilateral ties with Russia as opposed to multilateral relations within the CIS forum. Thus, Kuchma was attempting to put into practice the principles agreed in the BSF Accords as he emphasised the importance of bilateral ties. Third, Kuchma's statements reflected a normalisation of relations between Kyiv and Moscow. They also highlight a growing willingness on the part of Russia to view Ukraine as an independent state and on the part of Ukraine to view Russia as something other than an enemy.

In the previous sections of this chapter the prospects for both Ukraine's 'return to Europe' and 'return to Eurasia' have been considered. However, in the following section an additional yet complimentary scenario will be discussed which is that of returning to Europe by way of regional co-operation within CEE. An examination of the policies of the Kuchma administration will help to provide an explanation as to whether or not this is the intention of the Ukrainian government, and why closer regional co-operation may be the only alternative for Ukraine at this time.

UKRAINE AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: PARTNERSHIP WITH A GOAL

Perhaps the intensification of regional co-operation in CEE may be Ukraine's most viable foreign policy option. In this period of state- and nation-building where real economic reforms have yet to materialise, it can be argued that Ukraine can neither return to Europe nor Eurasia, but rather must pursue a balanced policy of closer ties with Western actors and institutions and co-operation with Russia for economic and political purposes.

In the academic literature it is often stated that Ukraine is pursuing a foreign policy which is indicative of its desire to integrate with 'Europe' while still maintaining a multi-vector dimension. This section questions whether the enhancement of Ukraine's regional ties can be viewed as having the overall goal of rejoining Europe or in other words, does the Ukrainian executive seek to enter Europe through the back-door by way of regional co-operation? According to Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, regional

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[138] See endnote by Paul Goble, 'A state outside a bloc', RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 2 November 1997.
[139] Ibid.

structures should harmonise their activities towards the goal of European integration.[140] Therefore, regional co-operation and integration into Trans-Atlantic and European structures can thus be viewed as part and parcel of the same strategic foreign policy.

The basis for regional relations

From the outset of its independence Ukrainian leaders have pursued the international recognition if the state's geopolitical identity as a Central European (as opposed to Eurasian/CIS) state. Placing emphasis on its relations with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, Ukraine has been eager to be portrayed as a Central European nation within the larger European continent. Having achieved this recognition, Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity would be more solidified, thus allowing for a distancing from Russia and a diversification of its international relations. Further, neighbouring states were seen as the 'gateway to the West' and Kyiv counted on their support in its efforts to establish links with Western states and institutions. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Ukraine has placed great importance on maintaining friendly relations with its closest geographical neighbours in CEE, specifically Poland.[141]

Yet, Ukraine's neighbours also pursued the development of positive relations with Ukraine having the view that an independent and stable Ukraine served their interests in regional security. Another important motive for co-operation between Ukraine and other CEE states was the desire to protect the rights of their national minorities living within the territories of neighbouring states. According to the 1989 census, Ukraine's total population of 51.5 million included 219,000 Poles, 160,000 Hungarians, and 135,000 Romanians.[142] Hungary in particular has had a strong desire to protect its national diaspora; therefore, immediately after Ukraine's independence Hungary and Ukraine signed a declaration aimed at guaranteeing the rights of national minorities and supporting the preservation of their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious identities.

Border agreements signed

During 1992 and 1993 three bilateral political treaties on friendly relations and co-operation were signed between Ukraine and its neighbours. These included the Ukrainian-Polish Treaty in 1992 and the Ukrainian-Hungarian and Ukrainian-Slovak Treaties in 1993. These Treaties have renounced mutual territorial claims, recognised the inviolability of existing borders, and guaranteed the rights of existing minorities. The agreements between Ukraine and Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia have formed the basis for the development of positive political and economic relations in the region.

However, the absence of such a treaty between Ukraine and Romania was problematic. The tension stems from the President of Romania's renouncing of the 1961 Soviet-Romanian border treaty, while at the same time demanding that the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact be condemned in a Ukrainian-Romanian bilateral treaty. But in 1996 when Romania had a chance of being included in the first wave of states invited to join NATO, negotiations with Ukraine were given priority. As NATO required that perspective members be free from territorial disputes, Romania was under pressure to conclude a border agreement with Ukraine which it did in June 1997.[143]

[140] Interfax, 10 September 1995.
[141] Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine and Regional Co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe', *Security Dialogue*, 1997, vol. 28, no.3, p. 348.
[142] Ibid, p. 360.
[143] However, several issues were put on hold for two years which included the status of Serpents' Island in the Black Sea since it was handed over to the Soviet Union by Romania in 1948 and consequently became part of Ukraine when the Soviet Union collapsed; the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black Sea believed to be rich in oil reserves; and the demarcation of the border which currently runs along the Romanian bank of the Danube River delta. See Michael Shafir, 'Breakthrough in Ukrainian-Romanian relations?' RFE/RL Newsline, 22 February 1999.

The beginning of regional co-operation of post-communist states

It should be mentioned that parts of Ukraine are included in the Carpathian and *Buh* (or Bug) Euroregions. The Carpathian Euroregion includes border areas of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia, while the *Buh* Euroregion encompasses the Volyn region in Ukraine and four of Poland's provinces. Euroregions are particularly important for promoting cross-border agreements in the economic and cultural spheres. They are examples of multi-faceted and multi-functional regional organisations that were not set up for security purposes. The Euroregions not only have bolstered various economic, political, and cultural ties between countries and peoples, but have also facilitated the creation of more closely integrated regional organisations such as those discussed below.

The Visegrad group, the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), and the Central European Initiative (CEI)

Following the break-up of the discredited and ineffectual Council for Mutual Economic Relations (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact, the countries of CEE sought new ways in which to regenerate their co-operation in the region. Such co-operation was viewed as a way to enhance regional stability, to facilitate solutions to common problems encountered in the process of state- and nation-building in some and in the transition to democracy and market economies in others, to strengthen the position of CEE states *vis-à-vis* Russia, and to promote integration into Western institutional structures.[144]

With these goals in mind several regional organisations were formed including the Visegrad group, the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), and the Central European Initiative (CEI). Ukraine views its involvement with these organisations as a means to promote its Central European identity and to participate in a forum where states could discuss their problems and concerns, enhancing their ability to develop collective measures to deal with these problems. However, regional co-operation failed to become a priority among CEE states and during 1993-94 many of them gradually shifted emphasis to bilateral contacts with each other and with the West. It is important to note that this change in CEE was a reaction to NATO's and the EU's shift from a 'regional' to an 'individualist' approach to CEE states. Thus, the more economically and politically developed states in CEE tended to view regional co-operation as a possible impediment to accession to Western institutions.

Ukraine, on the other hand, remained active in the region. Having declared itself a non-nuclear and non-aligned state, Ukraine signed several bilateral agreements on (limited) military co-operation with its neighbours and the first of these was signed with Poland in February 1993. This agreement promoted military exchange programmes and the sharing of military training facilities in each other's territories. In May 1993 a similar agreement was concluded between Ukraine and Hungary. However, Ukraine's efforts to intensify co-operation with the Visegrad group and CEFTA was hindered due to Kravchuk's proposal to create a CEE 'zone of stability and security' which would include Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Austria- all CEE states *except* Russia. The proposal was presented in 1993 but naturally did not generate a positive response from other CEE leaders.[145] The concern was that the development of regional security organisations would hinder their accession to NATO and the EU. CEE leaders were against the creation of a security grouping between NATO and Russia that would have

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[144] Pavliuk, p. 349.

[145] This proposal came after the Kravchuk-Yeltsin summit in January 1993 in Moscow in which the Russian president announced that his country would be ready to guarantee the security and integrity of Ukraine and defend her against nuclear attack. Kravchuk naturally was alarmed and dead against Yeltsin's proposed security guarantees for Ukraine. See *Keesings Record of World Events*, January 1993.

the affect of reducing their chances to accede to Western structures while turning the region into a permanent 'grey zone' of security and prosperity. Also, CEE leaders sought to avoid both alienating Russia and being drawn into a potential Ukrainian-Russian dispute. The proposal was also unattractive to the West as NATO's plans for enlargement were quickly gaining momentum. As a result of all of these factors, Kravchuk dropped the idea for the time being.

During 1993-94 some CEE states also became increasingly concerned about Ukraine's internal instability, stance on nuclear weapons[146], and the effects that an unstable Russia-Ukraine relationship would have on the region. Thus, after two years of independence, Ukraine found itself in virtual isolation. The West failed to formulate a clear policy on Ukraine beyond nuclear weapons and instead tended to view Ukraine as a rogue state, or as a barrier to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Europe. Furthermore, Ukraine's delay in implementing economic reforms increased its political and social instability and therefore, widened the gap between itself and other CEE countries. As a result, Ukraine's neighbours began to perceive it as a threat to their own security.[147]

Upon Kuchma election in 1994 relations between Ukraine and its CEE neighbours did not initially improve because as discussed in this chapter, Kuchma's primary focus was on normalising relations with Russia, not on developing ties in the region. Kuchma was fixated on securing financial support from the West for his economic reform programmes. At the same time Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were encouraged by the notion of the inevitable enlargement of NATO.[148] Energised by the prospects of expeditious integration, the likely candidates preferred to intensify relations with NATO and sought not to burden themselves with an unpredictable and unstable East, including Ukraine. Although on the surface CEE states recognised the importance of an independent and stable Ukraine, they took little notice of Ukraine's role in European security. As noted by a senior official in the Ukrainian MFA, 'it was 'NATO's speedy enlargement plans which disrupted the very idea of regional co-operation'.[149]

During the spring of 1995 relations between Ukraine and neighbouring countries began to improve. This improvement was resultant of Ukraine's new domestic and foreign policies as well as the shift in the West's policy towards Ukraine. Kuchma's initiation of economic reforms combined with Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prompted a positive response from Western states and institutions. Further, Ukraine had altered its official policy on NATO enlargement from favouring 'an evolutionary process' to outright support so long as new dividing lines in Europe are not created. Ukraine's support for NATO enlargement also facilitated the improvement of its relations with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Poland in particular has been supportive of Ukraine's role in European security. Polish leaders have stressed not only the need for a special partnership between NATO and Russia, but also between NATO and Ukraine. Poland successfully lobbied for Ukraine's membership in the Council of Europe in the fall of 1995 and has also supported Ukraine's accession to CEFTA.[150] Again with the support of Poland and the other Visegrad members, Ukraine was granted membership in the CEI.[151] Ukraine has also pledged its strategic goal to integrate into European and Trans-Atlantic structures with priority given to full membership in the EU, but at the same time, Ukrainian officials realise that this is a distant goal. Kyiv has, therefore, adopted a foreign policy approach

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[146] Ukraine's neighbours were particularly about Ukraine's refusal to sign START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[147] Pavliuk, p. 352.

[148] The Visegrad group was further encouraged by the December 1994 decision of NATO foreign ministers to undertake a study on 1995 on enlargement. NATO has published this study on enlargement, December 1995. Copy in author's possession.

[149] See Pavliuk, p. 352, on his interviews conducted between October and December 1995.

[150] Although it remains to be seen how important groupings such as CEFTA are in light of the likely upcoming of EU expansion. Its members are sure to leave the organisation upon their accession to the EU.

[151] Ukraine is particularly interested in CEI in terms of the development of European transit corridors

that calls for integration into Western institutions by way of using its regional ties in CEE as a stepping-stone.[152]

Leading up to the Madrid Summit in July 1997 NATO was trying to accomplish several ambitious yet conflicting goals which included: 1) rewarding the new democracies of CEE by inviting them to join NATO; 2) avoiding the creation of new dividing lines in Europe which would further alienate Russia; and 3) ensuring that those states not invited to join would not be left in a security vacuum. While searching for a comprehensive solution to this problem the West began to encourage further regional co-operation and indicated that the development of closer political, economic, and other ties was not contradictory to relations with the West and could even facilitate integration into NATO and the EU. In this regard the new Polish-Ukrainian, Hungarian-Slovak, Hungarian-Romanian, Ukrainian-Romanian, and Polish-Lithuanian *rapprochements* have become important elements of the enlargement process and to stability in CEE.

Ukraine looks further eastwards

The Ukrainian government, particularly under President Kuchma has sought to extend its scope of regional relations beyond its closest neighbours and has promoted the deepening of ties with countries to the east in the framework of the Baltic Sea States Council (BSSC), the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation (BSECO)[153], and GUUAM.

As regards BSSC, Ukraine is not a member but, nonetheless, has participated in the organisation's formal meetings. In 1998 Foreign Minister Tarasyuk was invited to take part with the status of an observer. Ukraine, on the other hand, is a founding member of BSECO which in September 1998 became a fully-fledged institution with a legal status, charter, and decision-making abilities. Ukraine's main incentive for developing closer ties with states to the east particularly with BSECO can be seen in the government's desire to reduce its energy dependence on Russia by developing alternative routes for transporting oil and natural gas from the Caucauses and the Middle East that bypass Russia.

The 'GUUAM' Sub-regional Organisation

President Kravchuk's proposal for a 'zone of stability and security' in CEE as well as the energy transportation routes were not Ukraine's only attempt at creating regional security and economic organisations that would exclude Russia. Meeting in October 1997 the presidents of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova issued a joint presidential communiqué registering their shared strategic interests as part of the framework for the development of the TRASECA transportation corridor (the EU's main transport route avoiding Russia).[154] Ukraine later joined with other GUUAM members and Turkmenistan in co-ordinating ship and rail transportation to avoid the payment of taxes imposed by Russia on Central Asia.[155] Although GUAM (before Uzbekistan joined) members repeatedly insisted that the organisation was not directed against any state, the Russian media described the group as 'united by their complaints against Russia', and further stated that it would evolve into an anti-Russian regional group.[156] During NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in April 1999 when Uzbekistan

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[152] See section below on returning to Europe *vis a vis* regional co-operation.

[153] Members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Albania, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Georgia, Greece, Russia, Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey.

[154] See Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, 'The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 51, no. 3, May 1999.

[155] Infobank, 13 February 1998.

[156] *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 2 December and *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 3 December 1997.

acceded to the group (where it was renamed GUUAM),[157] the five presidents affirmed their intention to deepen political and economic ties and increase co-operation both on a bilateral basis and within regional organisations. The formal and public presentation of GUUAM as a sub-regional organisation appears to be an indication of the direction in which the CIS is moving. Although the CIS has other sub-groups including the Russian-Belarussian Union, the quadripartite Customs Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia) and the Central Asian Union, GUUAM, on the other hand, represents those states which have sought to maintain Russia at a distance and have opposed CIS supra-national structures.

One of the main ideas behind GUUAM was to lessen the effects of the possible creation of new dividing lines in Europe. Thus, Tarasyuk argued that as NATO and the EU were expanding eastwards Ukraine and the other GUUAM members should seek to prevent themselves from being defined outside Europe and thereby within Russia's sphere of influence in Eurasia.[158] GUUAM members are united on several goals:

- to deprive the right of the CIS to represent them in international organisations;[159]
- to remove the CIS as a regional international organisation;
- to oppose the right of the CIS to resolve armed conflict within the CIS;
- to recognise the impossibility of reforming the CIS because any reforms would encourage Russian hegemony within the CIS;
- to recognise Russia and CIS failure to resolve ethnic conflict within the CIS;
- to prevent Russia from using economic leverages to obtain strategic objectives;
- to promote GUUAM members' desire to integrate into European and Trans-Atlantic institutions;
- to support those states advocating a minimalist role for the CIS and independent development outside its confines;[160]
- to foster a shared pro-Western orientation, mistrust of Russia, and the desire to profit jointly from the export of part of Azerbaijan's Caspian oil via Ukraine and Georgia.

For Azerbaijan and Georgia, dissatisfaction with Russia's track record as a mediator in the Karabakh and Abkhaz conflicts provided additional motivation to form this sub-group.

Moscow has accused the West and the US in particular of providing the impetus for GUUAM as part of a strategy to accelerate the erosion of Russia's influence in Ukraine and in the Caucasus. The West, however, has reacted to this accusation by conveying this unequivocal message to GUUAM: Don't rock the boat. NATO will not support any organisation that is directly or indirectly aimed at alienating Russia.[161] NATO members were especially concerned about Russia's reaction to GUUAM given the anticipated difficult period of negotiations over NATO's planned eastward enlargement. Therefore, during the spring and summer of 1997 the presidents of the member-states prudently denied that GUAM (again, minus Uzbekistan) was directed against any one state, stressing that the accords concluded were purely economic in nature. However, at the GUAM meeting in November 1997 the primary topic of discussion was regional security. A co-ordination of the member's security policies within the parameters of NATO's PfP programme was suggested, proceeding from the formula '16+4' (referring to NATO's 16 members plus the four GUAM states). It was concluded that the strengthening of quadrilateral ties between GUAM members should proceed parallel to those states' integration into European and Trans-Atlantic structures.[162]

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[157] 'In post-Soviet alphabet stew, GUAM to become GUUAM', *Associated Press* (obtained through CNN World News online) 19 April 1999.
[158] *Financial Times*, 11 September 1999.
[159] In this regard GUUAM members believe that CIS officials should not have the status of international civil servants with diplomatic status.
[160] Taras Kuzio, 'Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM'.
[161] As per interviews with members of the US Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, October 1999.
[162] RFE/RL Daily Newsline, 26 November 1997.

The Ukrainian government has supported the idea of institutionalising the GUUAM organisation which would provide a forum for discussing common concerns among the members as well as initiating new programmes of co-operation. In July 1999 Tarasyuk unveiled a proposal which included the following elements:

- Setting up a permanent 'GUUAM' co-ordination office in each of the five member-states. These offices would oversee multilateral political, economic, and security co-operation among the members. Once created, the five offices would hold regular general meetings in the capital cities of the member-states;
- Combining efforts to promote transportation projects for Caspian oil and natural gas to Central Europe and submitting joint initiatives in this regard to Western countries and investors;[163]
- Seeking to institutionalise the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia by placing it under the mandate of the UN or the OSCE. Since its inception in 1994, that operation has been purely a Russian one under the pro-forma CIS mandate that lapsed in 1998.[164]

At the end of 1999, GUUAM remains a relatively informal alignment. Its chances of long-term survival depend on two key factors. The first is whether Russia reacts with paranoia to the construction of new political, economic, and security alignments in Europe from which it is excluded. The second is whether the choice of route for the main export pipeline for Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's Caspian oil could drive a wedge between GUUAM members.[165]

It can be argued that without at least one strong, developed state as a member, the grouping is doomed to fail. Yet, if for example Turkey, Poland or even Iran (because of the oil interests) were to be invited to join then perhaps the grouping would become a more dynamic and successful organisation capable of both financing its projects and having the political weight to see those decisions implemented.[166] Further, because GUUAM members are all somewhat vulnerable to internal secessions and because the possibility for Russia to influence them is high (although decreasingly), they need a more stable member of the organisation to counter this unsteadiness, or at least a new and dynamic impetus.

The arrival of GUUAM is important because it sends the signal that the CIS is, to all intents and purposes, a dying body badly in need of burial. The decline of the CIS and the rise of GUUAM is a reflection of the incompatibility of the domestic efforts of nation- and state-building that is taking place within most of the non-Russian states of the CIS and attempts at close integration on the part of Russia and Belarus. Moreover, Ukraine's participation in GUUAM draws several conclusions about its foreign policy. First, Ukraine's leading role in GUUAM is a reflection of its desire to boost its international prestige and to take a more active role in regional issues which directly affect its security and national interests. Second, GUUAM membership enables Ukraine to band together with countries in the region which share in its desire to co-operate closely with Western institutions. Third, GUUAM provides the forum for discussing and concluding agreements in the energy sector which if implemented, will lessen Ukraine's dependence on Russia while simultaneously moving the state away from Russia's sphere of influence in Eurasia.

Returning to Europe *vis-à-vis* regional co-operation?

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[163] Tarasyuk's proposal supported the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine-Poland route for the pipeline.

[164] 'Major Ukrainian initiative in GUUAM', *The Jamestown Monitor*, 7 July 1999.

[165] Under US pressure, Azerbaijan has been opting for the southern route to the Turkish terminal at Ceylan, while the remaining three favour the transport via Georgia's Black Sea coast, and then by tanker to Odessa and westwards through Ukraine.

[166] Interview with Volodymyr Pekarchuk of the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, Kyiv, 24 March 1998.

For negatively sovereign states such as Ukraine and others in CEE the general trend has been to build regional economic, political, and to a lesser extent military organisations with countries which are also pro-West and pro-reform (such as CEFTA, GUUAM, BSECO, CEI). However, one tactic utilised by the Ukrainian government has been to seek to integrate with Europe through the back-door through sub-regional co-operation and with the support of the more advanced CEE countries, particularly through its partnership with Poland.

CEE states have tended to use regional co-operation as a means to achieve membership in Western institutions. However, as selected CEE countries have been invited to join Western organisations or given the prospect thereof, the tendency has been to shift from multilateral to bilateral relations with Western institutions and key Western states. The priority among these states has been to scramble to get on board the 'NATO cruise-liner'[167] which often comes at the expense of deepening regional co-operation. Although the West has tended to follow a more individualised approach to CEE states, it appears that the West has been encouraging the development and intensification of regional relations in CEE so long as these arrangements do not irritate, offend or alienate Russia.[168]

The Polish-Ukrainian partnership is one such linkage that is supported by the West. Poland serves as Ukraine's sponsor in terms of integration with the West, perhaps similar to Germany's sponsorship of Poland into NATO and the EU. Poland successfully lobbied for Ukraine's accession into the Council of Europe and continues to be Ukraine's most fervent supporter for membership in NATO and the EU as well as Western and regional trade organisations (i.e. WTO, CEFTA). Poland has also seen advantages to enhancing its partnership with Ukraine. Poland has sought to secure both a stable eastern border as well as a buffer between itself and Russia. The Polish-Ukrainian *rapprochement* will prove a vital testing ground between future 'ins' and 'outs' of the NATO and EU enlargement processes. One clear example is the Polish-Ukrainian joint peacekeeping battalion in Kosovo. Further, Poland serves as the ideal back-door entrance for Ukraine to the West following a period that would allow Ukraine to make significant progress in economic and political reforms.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has surveyed the range of actors with which Ukraine has sought to develop its political, military, and economic relations. The Ukrainian government has been intensely developing its international ties particularly with the West but also with Russia and in the region. Ukraine is actively seeking to be recognised as a CEE state which is worthy consideration for membership in Western institutions. The Kravchuk and Kuchma administrations have both sought to establish Ukraine's European identity; however, they have differed in their political tactics.

Ukraine has been obliged to seek closer economic, political, and security ties with actors in CEE which share in its ideologies regarding European integration. But in determining if Ukraine's regional ties are seen as a stepping-stone to European integration one should first consider what Ukraine would gain as a member of CEFTA, CEI, GUUAM, BSSC, BSECO, and in a wider context, the Council of Europe, WTO, OSCE and NATO's PfP. The answer is confidence and experience in foreign relations, economic, political, and military support (in the form of training), an established identity as a truly European nation, support for its negative sovereignty and in time, a solidified place in the international community. Thus, one can conclude that it would be beneficial for Ukraine to seek to enter Europe through the back-door by way of regional co-operation, particularly when full-membership in most Western institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the WTO is not realistic in the short to medium term.

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[167] Jennifer D.P. Moroney, 'The Sinking Ship Syndrome in European Security', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 28, no. 3, September 1997.
[168] Unlike the GUUAM organisation and Kravchuk's proposal for a 'CEE zone of security and stability' proposal, both of which exclude Russia.

Still, the signing of regional border agreements with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, and Russia are significant for Ukraine in the sense that its territorial integrity is now more or less guaranteed by its neighbours. It is crucial to have non-disputed borders as regards eventual membership in NATO and the EU. Also, the signing of the BSF and Friendship Treaties with Russia was a momentous event that settled the long-term dispute over the ownership of the BSF and the territory of Crimea. The resolving of these internal and external issues serve as confidence building measures which have bestowed upon the Ukrainian government greater flexibility in its foreign relations.

Ukraine's relations with both Russia and the West have become more complicated and intertwined. Both directions of Ukraine's foreign relations must be viewed through the lenses of the larger geopolitical picture in terms of developments in Europe. Ukraine and Russia cannot simply re-establish old historic ties while dismissing the geopolitical changes that have taken place. Likewise, Ukraine-West relations must take into account developments in Russia-Ukraine relations.[169]

Drawing on theoretical and empirical arguments advanced in this chapter as well as earlier chapters, Chapter Six will analyse the extent to which the emergence of a new East-West frontier influences Ukraine's foreign and security policy orientation. It will discuss both internal and external factors that serve as barriers to the development of a predictable, consistent, and clear foreign policy. The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section one defines and examines the frontier concept and seeks to demonstrate how an East-West frontier in Europe influences Ukraine's multi-vector foreign and security policy. Particular attention will be given to both the period leading up to the October 1999 Presidential elections as well as to the events in Kosovo (and Ukraine's response). Section two will be more analytical, and intends to place the debate in a wider context, first by surveying the 'successes and failures' of Ukraine's foreign policy followed by an examination of the affects of the processes of globalisation on frontiers. Also discussed is the institutional problems of Ukraine's foreign policy or the lack of an objective mechanism that would serve to guide Ukraine's foreign policy. It will be suggested in this chapter that although Ukraine has few alternative options available, its multi-vector foreign policy hinders the state's international standing and credibility as such a policy is not entirely trusted by Russia or the West.

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[169] As discussed in an informal meeting with Grigory Nemryia, Soros Foundation, Kyiv, Ukraine, 25 March 1998.

Chapter Six: Re-defining the Frontier of Europe: Frontier Dynamics and Ukraine's Foreign Policy Orientation

According to some scholars we are living in a world where state borders are becoming increasingly obsolete. This view holds that international borders are becoming so permeable that they no longer fulfil their historic role as barriers to the movement of persons, goods, and ideas. This suggested withering away of the strength and importance of international borders and frontiers is linked to the predicated demise of the nation-state as the primary unit of authority in international relations. Further, the supposed passing of the nation-state is linked to the weakening of political, social, and cultural structures and institutions. As a result, the role of individuals in these structures is called into question, particularly in terms of their identities and loyalties. Working alongside the reduction of influence of traditional power apparatuses is the rise of the new politics of identity[1], in which the definition of citizenship, traditionally referring to nation-state identities, now incorporates a new political significance, such as gender, ethnicity, race, occupation, among others, which struggle for control of the scholarly political imaginations of the contemporary world. These processes are thought to be intensifying, shifting the ground upon which nation-states once stood, changing the framework of national and international politics, creating new categories of transnationalism, while increasing the significance of images about the relevance of 'other' world cultures in our everyday lives.[2]

GLOBALISATION AND EUROPE'S FRONTIERS

As discussed at a high-level conference in Kyiv in 1999, Volodymyr Horbulin, then Head of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, described two contradicting forces that are clearly evident in the New World Order- fragmentation and globalisation. Ukraine is caught both geopolitically and geoeconomically in the middle of these forces. As a consequence, Ukraine is faced with two choices: whether to follow the Western path towards openness, democracy, and a market economy, or whether to run the risk of economic and political isolation from the West.[3]

The term 'globalisation' seems to imply that all frontiers will eventually be effaced. However, it has been a goal of this thesis to highlight the seemingly self-evident proposition that the processes of globalisation, transnationalism, and the shrinking of borders and frontiers are only one slant on international politics in the post-modern world. Definitions of 'political', which in modern times emphasises notions of self, gender, ethnicity, profession, class, and nation underestimates the role that the state continues to play in the everyday lives of its citizens. Post-modern analyses often fail to query the degree to which the state maintains its historically dominant role as an arbiter of control, violence, order, and organisation for those whose identities are being transformed by world forces.[4] Such analyses are also shortsighted as regards accounting for the sustained influence that borders, boundaries, and frontiers have on policy.

As pointed out in Chapter One, the role of frontiers in contemporary political life has seldom been explicitly analysed by political scientists. Anderson explains that this is partly because boundary effects on the behaviour and values of the populations enclosed by them are difficult to assess, let alone measure. Attempts to measure them seem shallow and usually produce obvious results that derive directly from the

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[1] In contrast to the old politics of the bounded nation-state

[2] Thomas M. Wilson, Hastings Donnan (eds), *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 1.

[3] Remarks made at the conference entitled, 'The New World Order in the 21st Century: The Tendencies and European Dimension', at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine, 18 October 1999. Author in attendance.

[4] Ibid, p. 2.

assumptions upon which they are based. Perhaps more importantly, there are differences of viewpoints about frontiers in the historical and political science literature.[5] Some historians and political scientists tend to regard the characteristics and functions of frontiers as dependent on the internal organisation of societies and the way in which political power is exercised in the core regions of the state. Debates between realist, pluralist, interdependence, and Marxist theorists arise out of differing views regarding the nature of states. Frontiers are thus thought of as entities whose role and function is dependent on the characteristics of the state. However, for others, including political geographers, the characteristics of the frontier are fundamental influences on the way a society develops and on the political options available to it.[6]

I tend to agree with the viewpoint of the political geographers and further suggest that border issues are back on the Europe's political agenda. Many internal borders have been upgraded or in some cases downgraded into external political frontiers, while other state borders in Europe have diminished in political, military, and/or economic significance as selected countries have been invited to join key Western institutions. Yet, for those states that have been left outside of the enlargement process, geopolitical instability has been connected to people's perceptions of security and identity and in this regard, political borders and frontiers in CEE are still problematic and warrant further study and analysis. As House notes, 'there is an urgent need both for empirical and comparative studies of a dynamic nature for frontier (border) situations, whether those involve confrontational or co-operative relationships, and for a more coherent set of theoretical frames within which to study such situations'.[7]

The old concept of the frontier has returned at a time when the enlargement of NATO and expansion of the EU is seen, rightly or wrongly, as the necessary next steps in the geopolitical reorganisation of the continent, placing the fate of those countries which have not been invited to join the 'clubs' in jeopardy. From the Baltic to the Black Seas, a kind of *Mitteleuropa*, an in-between Europe, is reviving, whose fate will be decided outside the region in Brussels, Washington, Moscow, Berlin, and perhaps London and Paris.

This chapter will analyse the extent to which the emergence of a new East-West frontier influences Ukraine's multi-vector foreign and security policy orientation. I will draw on empirical evidence and theoretical arguments and perspectives advanced in earlier chapters and will argue that the new East-West frontier does not have the character of a linear boundary, but rather resembles a broad under-organised zone. Further, it is suggested that a kind of 'frontier mentality' has been internalised by Ukrainian policy-makers in terms their attitudes toward the country's foreign policy. This mentality also appears to have become internalised in other areas of policy such as the economy and energy sectors and the Russia factor as demonstrated, for example, in the creation of sub-regional organisations such as BSECO and GUUAM (see Chapter Five).

As discussed in Chapter Two, there is a wide-range of factors (international and domestic) which seek to influence Ukraine's foreign policy orientation. Therefore, an approach to the study of Ukraine's foreign policy must include systemic or structural factors and also should take into account broad subjective or behavioural factors such as nationalism, national identity, nation-building, party politics, and personalities of leaders. Scholars such as David have criticised international relations theory which distinguishes between internal and external factors. David has attempted to show how less capable states engage in a 'dual balancing act' on a domestic and international level.[8] He argues that Third World states often lack the ability to resolve disputes that arise within their borders and because there is no strong consensus or integrated society capable of inhibiting conflict within the state, these countries reinforce the anarchy of

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[5] Malcolm Anderson, 'European frontiers at the end of the twentieth century', in Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter, 1998, p. 3.

[6] Ibid, pp. 3-4. See also Chapter Two on buffer states and the geographer's perspective.

[7] As cited in JRV Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, p. 159.

[8] See David's theory of 'omni-balancing' in Steven David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Re-alignment in the Third World*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

international politics. Thus, international politics is replicated in the domestic political debate. Indeed one can easily point to instances where tensions between Russia and the West have been replicated on a domestic level in Ukraine (such as NATO enlargement and Kosovo[9]). On a broader level, this situation has been illustrated by Huntington who views Ukraine as straddling the faultline between the Catholic and Orthodox traditions and is thus in danger of constantly being pulled into two different directions by the opposing forces.[10]

Given that the meaning of the word Ukraine in English is 'borderland', it will be very interesting to see how a nation-state can be built in this border/frontier situation with old pieces of the Russian, Austrian, and Polish empires. It is important to analyse the dynamics and effects that being part of this frontier or border region has on a state's foreign and security policy orientation. These same questions can be posed to Belarus as the lack of a Belarusian national identity is a contributing factor to its intent to unify with Russia.[11] For Ukraine, Belarus and other post-communist states of the FSU, escaping buffer-zone status as discussed in Chapter Two is certainly desirable, but it is not yet clear whether this is possible.

This chapter discusses both the internal and external factors in Ukraine that serve as barriers to the development of a predictable, consistent, and clear foreign policy. A thematic approach is used in the chapter, and the various interwoven themes make several assertions. First, Ukraine's foreign policy is highly subjective as exemplified both in the decision-making process and the lack of clearly defined national interests. Second, Ukraine has followed a 'third way' or neutral stance in its foreign relations, a course which in Ukraine's case lacks substance, goals, and direction. Third, because Ukraine is geopolitically and domestically constrained, the government has no choice but to continue with Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy of co-operation with Russia and the CIS, integration with Europe, and participation in regional organisations, even though such a policy is detrimental to the state's international image.

Structurally, the chapter is divided into two main sections with subsequent subsections. The first section defines and examines the frontier concept and seeks to demonstrate how the East-West frontier affects Ukraine's foreign and security policy. The term frontier will be conceptually 'unpacked' to identify the various components as well as to show how it will be utilised in this chapter. Second, the term will be operationalised to show how a 'frontier mentality' is reflected in Ukrainian policy-makers attitudes towards specific foreign policy objectives. Particular attention will be given to events of 1999 so as to include both Ukraine's response to the Kosovo crisis and the period leading up to the Presidential election. Section two will be more analytical and intends to place the debate in a wider context, first by surveying the 'successes' and 'failures' of Ukraine's foreign policy and diplomacy in its multi-vectoral context, followed by an examination of the influence of globalisation on frontiers. It will be suggested that the multi-directional foreign policy is becoming problematic for the Ukrainian government, although it has not yet been invalidated, and is unlikely to be in the short to medium term. However, both internal and external dynamics, particularly as a result of Kosovo, have been pushing the Ukrainian government towards a rethinking of its current foreign policy. The Ukrainian government has been forced to devise new responses to new challenges in a changing security environment in CEE. Ukraine may not need to make an absolute choice between Russia and the West, but Ukrainian elites have been strongly encouraged to at least determine specific longer-term goals for how the state will respond to European and Trans-Atlantic institutions and to Russia at present and in the future.

THE EAST-WEST FRONTIER IN EUROPE

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[9] Both of these issues have fueled the ongoing debate between the nationalists and leftists for a pro-Europe or pro-Eurasia foreign policy.
[10] See Chapter One of this thesis.
[11] Which in economic terms, is too expensive for Russia but in political and military terms, can perhaps serve as a counter to an enlarged NATO and expanding EU.

Defining and re-defining the 'frontier'

This section examines the extent to which a new frontier is being created along geopolitical and geoeconomic lines in CEE between those states which have been included (as members or prospective members) in European and Trans-Atlantic institutions and those which have not. During the Cold War, the East-West frontier was clearly defined as NATO countries on one side and Warsaw Pact countries on the other. At the dawn of the new millennium, the new features and defining characteristics of 'Europe' and 'European security' are in the process of transition. The majority of states in CEE desire to be members of the 'civilised' and democratic world, which includes specifically Western economic, political, and security institutions. However, it is becoming evident that not all of CEE will be invited to join until perhaps years into the future which is due to difficult economic circumstances, military forces which are not up to Western standards, and also to the geopolitical environment, particularly as regards uncertain relations between the West and Russia.

As discussed briefly in Chapter One, an earlier meaning of the term frontier was military, or a zone that faced an enemy. However, in more contemporary usage, a frontier has referred to the precise line where (political) jurisdictions meet, but has also signified a region or a broad zone where domestic and international issues converge. Prescott[12] explains that subsidiary organisations can be created within political frontiers. These organisations include marches[13], buffer states[14], and spheres of interest and influence. Buffer states have been constructed in frontiers when two strong neighbours have desired to reduce the likelihood of conflict between them.[15] Some European colonial powers have employed neutral zones to serve the same function as buffer states. For example, in 1887 Britain and Germany separated their interests in Togoland and the Gold Coast by a neutral zone which was located north of the convergence of the Dakka and Volta rivers. The concepts of spheres of interest and spheres of influence developed during the nineteenth century when European powers were establishing actual and potential claims to parts of Asia and Africa. During the Cold War, this terminology has been utilised extensively by the US and the USSR referring to interests in Western and Eastern Europe, and by the US in reference to interests in Latin America. Both concepts are a means of reserving a portion of territory from the political intervention of another state. A sphere of interest is seen as a less significant claim than a sphere of influence, which suggests that the former becomes the latter when there is a threat of rivalry from another state.

As Anderson notes, all political authorities and jurisdictions have physical limits. But where the limits are located and the purposes they serve influences the lives of all the people separated by frontiers. Frontiers may take the form of a terrestrial borderline delimiting one state, like a landed estate, separating it from the territory from which it does belong. Such a border can have different appearances and features. It may have the character of an insurmountable obstacle to everyone who wishes to enter or leave such as desert, body of water, high mountains or other geographical feature. It can also be created by artificial means including walls, barbed-wire fences, watchtowers, land mines, or shooting devices and manpower as was the case before 1990 of landlocked Czechoslovakia in relation to Western Europe. At the other extreme, frontiers can fade into abstract lines that stand out neither in the landscape such as the borders between the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, and France[16], nor in the cultural separation along state borders between France, Luxembourg, and Germany.[17]

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[12] Huntington, p. 48.

[13] Defined as a border territory organised on a semi-permanent military system to defend a frontier.

[14] Refer to extensive discussion of historic and contemporary buffer states in Chapter Two of this thesis.

[15] An example could be Britain's strategy in the Indian subcontinent which involved the maintenance of a system of small, weak states between British India and Russia, France, and China.

[16] As a result of the EU's Schengen Agreement which allows for border crossing without formal customs or passport checks

[17] Peter-Christian Muller-Graff, 'Whose responsibility are frontiers?' in M. Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter, 1998, pp. 11-12.

Contemporary frontiers can be analysed, and in normative political theory, criticised, in the same way as other political institutions and processes. As this thesis has suggested, frontiers are not simply lines on maps where one jurisdiction or political authority ends and another begins; they are central to understanding political life. Examining the justifications of frontiers often raises crucial, even dramatic questions concerning citizenship, national identity, political loyalty, exclusion, inclusion and of the ends of the state.[18] In this regard frontiers between states are both institutions and processes. As institutions they are established by political decisions and regulated by legal texts. The frontier is thus a basic political institution by which no rule-bound political, economic, or social life in complex societies could be organised without. This earlier characteristic of frontiers is embodied in public international law.[19] When a state collapses, the agreements concerning its frontiers remain in force. Frontiers are thus regarded as prior to the reconstitution of a state and are recognised to be a prerequisite for that reconstitution. Frontiers also define, in a legal sense, the identity of individuals as the conditions for claim to nationality and exercise of rights of citizenship are delimited by it.[20] The same questions which philosophers have asked about all institutions may be asked about frontiers: are they needed? What purposes do they serve? How can they be justified? The answers will naturally vary according to historical circumstances as different kinds of frontiers existed before the modern nation-state.

Frontiers are part of political processes with four defining dimensions.[21] First, they are instruments of state policy because governments attempt to change to their own advantage the location and the function of frontiers. Although there is no simple relationship between frontiers and inequalities of wealth and power, government policy on frontiers is intended to both protect and promote the interests of populations or groups protected by the frontier. Second, the policies and practices of governments are constrained by the degree of *de facto* control that they have over the state frontier. The inability of governments in the modern world to control much of the traffic of persons, goods, and information across their frontiers is changing the nature of states and by extension, of the frontiers themselves.

The third dimension of a frontier depicts them as markers of identity, usually national identity, although political identities may be larger or smaller then the nation-state. Thus frontiers, in this sense, are part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of the people and the natural unity of the territory. These 'imagined communities' to use Benedict Anderson's terminology[22] are now a universal phenomenon and have deep historic and cultural roots, and are linked to the most powerful form of ideological bonding in the modern world which he sees as nationalism. Myths of such unity can be created or transformed rapidly during wars, revolutions, or political upheavals. Fourth, the 'frontier' is a term of discourse. Meaning is given to both frontiers in general and to particular frontiers, and these meanings change from time to time. 'Frontier' is a term used in law, diplomacy, and politics and its meaning varies according to context. In scholarly works in the fields of anthropology, economics, political science, history, geography, law, and, sociology its meaning changes according to the theoretical approach used.[23] For people who live in a frontier region or whose daily life is affected by the rules that govern the frontier, the dominant mental images of the frontier may be of a barrier or junction.[24] On the other hand, West Europeans, for example, might look upon the same emerging frontier in CEE as a safeguard against political, economic, and social instability.

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[18] See Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 1, and M. Anderson, 'European frontiers at the end of the twentieth century', in Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, 1998, pp. 4-6.
[19] See the 1978 Vienna Convention on State Succession.
[20] M. Anderson, pp. 4-6..
[21] M. Anderson and E. Bort, *The Frontiers of Europe*, p. 5.
[22] B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York: Verso Publishers, 1991.
[23] M. Anderson, *Frontiers: Territories and State Formation in the Modern World*, p. 2.
[24] R. Strassoldo, *From Barrier to Junction: Towards a Sociological Theory of Borders*, 1970, Gorizia: ISIG.

All frontiers have a psychological component. Individuals have a concept of bounded personal space and invasion of that space without invitation or consent will often provoke an emotional response of anxiety or even hostility. Governments and their ruling elite are sensitive to intrusions into that bounded space and to threats, real or imagined, that result from such an intrusion. The more closed the frontier, the stronger has been its influence as a practical and symbolic threshold and the stronger the belief that strict control of the frontier is essential to the maintenance of their power and authority. Examples include the Cold War Iron Curtain, the imposed frontier between Israel and its Arab neighbours, the partition line separating Greek and Turkish Cyprus, and the partition between North and South Korea.

As regards their justification, the question that has yet to be addressed is what human purposes do frontiers serve? Evaluations of the frontiers vary, ranging from viewing them as essential and precious protection, to accepting them as a fact of life, to considering them as a tiresome and arbitrary constraint, to outright hostility toward their existence. Liberal-pacifists have condemned frontiers as instruments for turning into enemies those who would prefer to live in harmony and for helping to maintain historic hostilities when the causes for them have disappeared. Another view in the western liberal tradition is that frontiers are essential for ordered constitutional politics, the preservation of citizenship rights, and the maintenance of community. Liberals and Marxists may agree that boundaries are made and manipulated in order to ensure a certain power distribution but Marxists, holding to the primacy of class struggle over any other form of conflict, contend that frontiers are transitory instruments for upholding particular forms of class domination. Without frontiers most liberals and conservatives would agree that politics would be inconceivable and that international relations in its current sense would disappear.[25] The 'concept of the political', according to Schmitt's argument, is unintelligible without the notion of 'friend and foe', and thus of the boundaries between them.[26]

'Frontierland' versus 'borderland'

It is important to make the distinction between the terms 'frontier' and 'border' in order to clarify what sort of entity is being analysed. As noted in Chapter One the term border has a double meaning. On one hand, borders may be seen as ends or barriers and on the other as passages, filters, or gateways between contiguous systems. A 'boundary' normally refers to a line of delimitation or demarcation. 'Borderland' refers to the transition zone within which the boundary lies.[27] English is not unusual for having more than one term. French also has four- *frontiere, front* (exclusively military), *limite, marche* (as in English)- with only *frontiere* denoting an international frontier. Spanish has three- *frontera, marca, limite*; and German has only one term in common usage which is *Grenze*.[28] Throughout this chapter, 'frontier' is the term used to refer to international boundaries in a wider regional sense, although it is common for Western authors to use the terms (frontier, border, and boundary) interchangeably.

Some fundamental questions should now be asked. First, when is a border not a frontier and when is a frontier not a border? Simply put, a border is not a frontier if there is a clear and definite line of political, economic, cultural division between states, nations, organisations, and cultures. A frontier is not a border when, for example, organisations or cultures overlap and there is no clear line of division. Thus, frontier is a much more comprehensive term than is border and as a result, more difficult to identify and analyse. Second, do states rigidly apply their laws at the boundary or border or do states combine or moderate policies to minimise the adverse effects of the border region or frontier on the inhabitants? Ukraine, in this frontier region, has attempted to deal with this situation in two ways: 1) by advocating a multi-vector foreign policy by

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[25] Ibid, p. 8.
[26] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976.
[27] Prescott, p. 14.
[28] M. Anderson, p. 10.

simultaneously concentrating on improving relations with the West and Russia, and 2) by seeking to expand and diversify its relations with regional and sub-regional organisations that are not dominated by Russia (i.e. BSECO, GUUAM, CEFTA). Finally, how does the presence of a border or frontier influence the development of policies of adjacent states and institutions? Using inductive reasoning, this question will be dealt with below using Ukraine as a case study.

The discussion to this point has attempted to define the 'frontier' in a more contemporary sense. In the following section the concept will be operationalised by exploring the linkages between the frontier and Ukraine's foreign and security policy. I will be seeking answers to the following questions: what transpires in the widening political space that is the frontier? What issues sustain the politics of the frontier? Have structures evolved that differentiate the frontier from the political space on which it is encroaching as it is widening? Or is the frontier differentiated by a lack of mechanisms in a structure-less geopolitical space through which authority is exercised? Such questions are not so easily addressed for many reasons, not least because we are taught to think of domestic and international politics as separate phenomena. Thus, it is often difficult to conceive of the existence of higher structures and processes that supersede national authorities.

The 'frontier mentality' and Ukrainian policy-makers

Since independence it has become apparent that Ukraine's policy-makers have been highly conscious of the state's geopolitical position between Russia and the West and have allayed fears of being caught in a grey or buffer zone of European security. Having expressed this fear to Western officials, Ukrainian elites have demonstrated their preoccupation with the state's geopolitical position, which is reflected in both their foreign policy attitudes and also in policy itself. Thus, it can be said that these policy-makers have adopted a kind of 'frontier mentality' in their foreign policy attitudes and decisions.

Other scholars have discussed the effects of the widening frontier on individual states, and policy-makers within the frontier by focusing on the specific components of the domestic political structure. Rosenau has argued that the frontier has influenced the constitutional structure of many governments. He states that the processes of globalisation have 'infused the subsoils of all political systems with some of the same ingredients', including secessions to unification and aspiration for autonomy to those for integration.[29] Further, whenever basic constitutional arrangements have surfaced on political agendas, the central concern has been the creation of effective authority in response to the widening frontier where none has existed previously (such as in the creation of regional organisations), where a prolonged period of time has elapsed since an effective authority structure was present (as in the two Germanys, Koreas, and Chinas), or where the existing structures are deemed pernicious and in need of replacement (as in countries that have transformed their governments from communist to democratic).[30] Rosenau's explains that *most constitutional changes that have occurred in states situated within a frontier have been more or less in response to the frontier itself.* Thus, Ukrainian elites are tasked with the creation of an effective regime which is capable of responding in an appropriate and timely fashion to the dynamics resulting from the widening of the frontier.

Ukrainian policy-makers are aware of the challenges brought about by the country's geopolitical position between East and West and have actively sought to lessen the chances of being isolated from the West, as well as nurturing its often tenuous relationship with Russia. Taking into account the internal and external constraints, the proceeding section will consider Ukraine's foreign policy objectives and will seek to analyse the extent to which Ukraine has been successful in terms of meeting its foreign

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[29] James N. Rosenau, *Along the Foreign-Domestic Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 239-240.
[30] Ibid.

policy objectives. It will be argued that it is perhaps more appropriate at this stage to speak of success in terms of Ukraine's diplomacy rather than of success in foreign policy.

In order to create an accurate picture of the foreign policy activities of the Kuchma administration, it is important to make a distinction between the diplomatic achievements of the Ukrainian executive branch, particularly the MFA, and the results of the state's foreign policy achievements. But in order to determine if Ukraine's foreign policy goals have been achieved, we first need to identify them and then to proceed to compare and contrast those goals with both the concluded and implemented decisions. When referring to 'diplomatic achievements', activities such as the quantity of visits of Heads of States and foreign and defence ministers and other formal international exchanges, the quantity and quality of documents and agreements that were signed, and other relevant diplomatic exchanges will be considered. Internal and external circumstances will be taken into account without factoring in the results of those high-level visits or the agreements that were actually implemented (as implementation this thesis considers to be a foreign policy rather than a diplomatic achievement).

THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY

There are numerous ways to measure a state's success in terms of foreign policy. One way is to start with the positive: in relation to the goals, what practical achievements were made? What were the results? Which policies were actually implemented and how many remain on paper? A separate, but related question is where does foreign policy originate- in society or the state? Another way to measure the degree of success in foreign policy is to start with the negative: did the Ukrainian government make any mistakes? How many of the agreements reached was not implemented? Roughly the same questions can be asked of Ukrainian diplomacy, but in a slightly different format: what types of diplomatic activity took place (i.e. meetings between heads of states, foreign and defence ministers) and in what forum? Which agreements were signed and in what context? More detailed questions requiring a greater degree of analysis could also be asked: does the foreign policy appear to be deliberate and predictable? Is there an overall strategy? Is there a mechanism in place for guiding foreign policy decisions? Does the state have clearly defined objective national interests that have been demonstrated with consistency? This next section will address such questions, though not in any particular order. But first it is necessary to return to the discussion of Ukraine's official foreign policy objectives, beginning with the multi-vector foreign policy as discussed in previous chapters, and to critically analyse the status of those objectives in relation to actual achievements in Ukraine's foreign policy.

Ukraine's 'multi-vector' foreign policy revisited

As discussed throughout this thesis and particularly in the preceding chapter, Ukraine's official foreign policy as explained by the MFA is integration with Europe, co-operation with Russia and the CIS. Kuchma's multi-vector policy has had the aim of restricting Ukraine's activities within the CIS to economic affairs, thus minimising its involvement with CIS security structures, while at the same time promoting Ukraine's 'Europeanness'. However, Ukraine has not always been able to balance the two priorities with equal consideration. Depending on both the internal and external political climates, the Ukrainian government has leaned pragmatically at times towards the West and at other times towards Russia.[31] The questions that should now be asked after nearly a decade of Ukraine's independence are the following: is this multi-faceted foreign policy sustainable, particularly in light of the rapidly changing security environment in Europe? Is this policy an adequate one for an independent state at the dawn of the new

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[31] See Chapter Five.

millennium, and is such a policy not detrimental to international prestige, and by extension to Ukraine's national security? Finally, is there evidence to suggest its continuance? This author believes that Ukraine's foreign policy could be in the midst of a rethinking which is a result of events in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, particularly Kosovo, which has shaken the political fence upon which Ukrainian policy-makers have comfortably sat. However, it should be emphasised that because Ukrainian elites must perform a 'dual balancing act' on a domestic and external level, a radical re-orientation of its foreign policy in the short to medium term is highly unlikely.

Re-examining Ukraine's foreign policy goals: Do the achievements meet the expectations?

Ukraine-Russia

As Chapter Five has discussed the normalisation of relations with Russia has been a key foreign policy goal of Ukraine since 1994. The Ukraine-Russia Friendship and BSF Treaties of May 1997 were an important development in terms of a new pragmatic relationship between the two fraternal countries. For Ukraine, the recognition by Russia of Ukraine's sovereignty within existing borders is of considerable significance, as was the recognition of the port of Sevastopol in Crimea as a Ukrainian port. In this case, clearly the Ukraine-Russia treaties signify success in Ukrainian foreign policy, although it should be restated that Russia will maintain a military presence in Crimea by leasing the port of Sevastopol from Ukraine for at least twenty years.

Ukraine-NATO

The development of relations with NATO has been another foreign policy priority of the Kuchma administration. The signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter was without doubt a significant achievement for Ukrainian diplomacy and foreign policy. Relations with NATO are far more advanced than with other Western institutions (such as the EU), and the NATO-Ukraine Charter provides ample room for an enhancement of those ties in the political, economic, and civil-military spheres. Nevertheless, NATO does not appear to have a comprehensive policy towards Ukraine beyond short-term objectives such as using Ukrainian bases as a training facility, encouraging Ukrainian participation in PfP exercises, and expressing a willingness to hold biannual talks with the Ukrainian government in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Therefore, according to one analyst, in the absence of clear-cut guidelines and policy objectives, individual departments conduct their programmes with NATO in an 'uncoordinated ideological vacuum'.[32] Moreover, Ukraine does not have a long-term plan for integration into European and Trans-Atlantic organisations and there is only a rather vague idea of what the future of the NATO-Ukraine partnership should look like.[33]

Ukraine-European Union

The MFA declared in April 1998 that an immediate foreign policy goal was to gain associate member status of the EU.[34] In June adopted its *National Strategy for Ukraine's Integration into the EU*, which fixed full membership in the EU as Ukraine's long-term strategic goal. In December 1999 at the Council of Ministers summit in Finland the EU adopted its Common Strategy on relations with Ukraine. Ukrainian policy-makers had

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[32] This topic was discussed at the conference, 'Ukraine: Continuing Challenges of Transition', sponsored by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State and the National Intelligence Council, Washington DC, 30 June 1999.
[33] Interview with Mr. Christopher Donnelly, Special Advisor to the Secretary General of NATO for Central and Eastern Europe, NATO Headquarters, 14 October 1999.
[34] See Chapter Five, section on Ukraine-EU relations.

hoped that this document would breathe new life into EU-Ukraine relations, perhaps on the same level as the NATO-Ukraine Charter, thus providing a clearer perspective how to develop closer relations between the two including the possibility of full or at least associate membership in the future. Yet, after numerous attempts during 1998 and 1999, Ukraine has still not achieved associate member status. According the EU officials, this decision was primarily due to Ukraine's inability to fulfil the obligations set forth in the PCA (see Chapter Five).[35]

Despite some progress in the political sphere, on the whole relations between the EU and Ukraine have advanced rather slowly, particularly when compared to relations with NATO, and are faced with a number of practical problems as well as other serious challenges of an economic nature. First, there are several trade disputes that both curtail further growth bilaterally and lead to mutual accusations. The EU has accused Ukraine of not meeting WTO entry requirements specifically of excessive certification requirements, discriminatory excise duties, unexpected increases in tariff rates, and other protectionist measures. Ukraine, in turn, has criticised the EU for imposing restrictions and limiting quotas on Ukrainian textiles and applying anti-dumping measures against Ukrainian chemicals and steel, thus practically closing the EU market to Ukrainian products. Further, although substantial in terms of quantity, EU financial assistance has been far from meeting the country's needs or expectations (compare 823 million Euros of TACIS money to Ukraine with 2,024 million Euros allotted to Poland between 1990-99 under the PHARE programme).[36]

Relations with the EU are more difficult than with NATO because of several factors. First, as mentioned previously many EU members are still not willing to deal with Ukraine as an independent entity separate to Russia, or at least not willing to develop closer ties with Ukraine than it has with Russia.[37] Indeed it is not even clear if the EU views FSU countries such as Ukraine as part of 'Europe' because of their history, culture, and geographic location. Ukraine, in this case, is the equivalent of Turkey in the eyes of the EU, doomed to remain on Europe's periphery. Consequently, it is difficult for them to see Ukraine as a future member of the EU if Russia is not invited to join. Second, Ukraine's progress in economic reform has not been consistent and thus, Ukraine has not been viewed as a potential member of the EU.[38] Third, Ukraine's co-operation/integration with the EU would require extensive economic, legal, and social obligations which go much deeper and are more varied than the requirements for joining NATO. On the other hand, Ukraine's co-operation/integration with the EU is not controversial, either domestically or externally (from Russia), in comparison with NATO for obvious military and political reasons. Therefore, in many ways it is difficult to see why the Ukrainian executive has not placed nearly as much emphasis on trying to improve the state's standing with the EU as it has with NATO. Perhaps this focus will change in the aftermath of NATO's military actions in Kosovo and the negative opinions this action has generated on a domestic level in Ukraine.

Overall, mutual misunderstanding, disappointment, and even frustration have marked EU-Ukraine relations. Each side still has little knowledge of the other, and it is clear that the two see the future of their relationship quite differently. While Ukraine has declared its intention to become an EU associate member and its ambition to become a full-member, it has not fulfilled its obligations under the PCA, and as a consequence, the EU has not included Ukraine in either the 'fast-track' or 'slow-track' group of future members. The perception among Ukrainian elites is that the EU applies double standards to Ukraine as the economies of some of the slow-track group were not as

[35] Comments related during interviews with Dr. Fraser Cameron and Klaus Schneider, European Commission, DG1A, 12 October 1999.

[36] See report by Oleksandr Pavliuk entitled, 'The European Union and Ukraine: The need for a new vision', Policy paper published by the East-West Institute (Kyiv, Ukraine) on the study of the current state and prospects of relations between the EU and Ukraine, July 1999.

[37] Despite the fact that Russia has not declared EU membership as its official goal while Ukraine has.

[38] T. Kuzio, 'Ukraine: Strategic options and obstacles', paper presented at the conference, 'Ukraine: Continuing Challenges of Transition', sponsored by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State and the National Intelligence Council, Washington DC, 30 June 1999. Copy in author's possession.

strong as Ukraine's (those in southern Europe, for example).[39] This has lead to the belief that the door to the EU is effectively closed for Ukraine, whatever its performance might be, and that for the EU, 'Europe' ends where the FSU (with the exception of the Baltic States) begins. In addition, Ukraine's neighbours to the west, which will soon become EU members, will have to introduce stricter regulations and visa requirements to secure their eastern borders. Most problematic in this respect is the effect this will have on Polish-Ukrainian relations, which has become the most promising and dynamic in the region. For the millions of Ukrainians visiting Poland each year, Polish economic achievements are the best indication of the need for continued reform in Ukraine. Imposing new restrictions on travel between Ukraine and Poland will more than likely have a psychological effect on Ukraine, its people, and its reform-minded European-oriented political forces, thus reinforcing the solidification of the new East-West frontier.

Ukraine's regional relations

As discussed extensively in Chapter Five Ukraine's foreign policy has been most active in relations with key states in the region such as Poland, and with regional organisations such as BSECO and the anti-CIS GUUAM alliance, both of which are based on the desire to find alternative routes to Russian energy supplies. Further, members of GUUAM view the CIS as a vehicle to promote a 'civilised divorce' of the FSU and also as a means to support their integration into Europe. GUUAM members support several ideological positions: combating separatism, searching for alternative energy routes, integrating in the world community, and establishing closer ties with NATO and the EU. Ukraine is the leading member of GUUAM and a prominent member of BSECO. Ukraine's successful participation in these organisations and the diversification of its activities in the region has helped Ukraine to promote its foreign and security policy objectives by lessening the state's dependence on Russian energy supplies, increasing its ties with those states which share similar pro-West ideological views, and subsequently, strengthening the state's international standing. However, the West has been apprehensive in its support of Ukraine's regional ties with GUUAM, thus reflecting the desire not to provoke or alienate Russia. Therefore, in the absence of clear and positive signals from the West, it is possible that the development of new regional organisations and the deepening of existing ones might be stifled.

Obtaining assistance from international financial institutions

Another of Ukraine's foreign policy goals as discussed extensively in Chapter Five has been to obtain support from Western financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the EBRD. But the pertinent question is has Ukraine received the level of support sought with respect to its declared goals? One specific goal has been to obtain Western financial assistance to repair and eventually to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. However, at the end of 1999 Chernobyl is still in operation and only minor repairs have been made. Although declarations of support have been extensive (from G-8, EBRD, and other sources) in the midst of Ukrainian demands for international assistance, support to the level desired by the executive has not been attained. The IMF, on the other hand, has steadily been releasing tranches of its promised loan, with only minor interruptions along the way. Still, there has been little if any talk of actual debt forgiveness or at least for debt rescheduling for Ukraine, although there has been such talk in the case of Russia.

Other foreign policy goals

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[39] This perception was allayed to the author on numerous occasions during interviews with Ukrainian officials in the MFA in Kyiv and in the Ukraine Missions to the EU and NATO, Brussels, Belgium.

Ukraine has also made known its desire to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and to join the WTO and the CEFTA. But the idea of Ukraine achieving a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is ludicrous. There are several more influential regional powers that are much more likely to achieve this status ahead of Ukraine (i.e. Germany, India). As one might expect, Ukraine has made no headway as regards a permanent seat in the Security Council, although it has managed to be included in a rotation cycle with several other states. Ukraine will share this temporary seat without having the prospect of obtaining a permanent seat.

As regards other foreign policy goals, it is evident that the task of accession to the EU must be preceded by that of accession to the WTO and to a lesser extent, CEFTA. The Ukrainian government has viewed joining the WTO as a short-term goal that would be an instrument for attaining its long-term goal of European integration. After joining these organisations the way towards participation in international commercial, economic, and other regimes will become more open for Ukraine. But Ukraine will not be invited to join any of these organisations until significant progress is made in terms of economic reforms, including taking the necessary steps toward increasing privatisation, integrating into the world market, and curtailing the ever-increasing problem of corruption.

Another of Ukraine foreign policy goals is the desire to serve as mediator in certain conflicts in Eastern and Southern Europe. The most recent case has been the Kosovo conflict as discussed in Chapter Five. However, this role of mediator between 'East and West' and in the region has not become a reality as the West continues to be preoccupied with Russia often at the expense of relations with Ukraine.

In general, it can be concluded from the above discussion that the overall level of international guarantees for Ukraine does not correspond to the expected one. In many cases, the various treaties and other international agreements have not been fully implemented and remain as political or economic declarations on paper. Why is this so? This thesis has argued that one reason is because the mechanisms of analysis, development, adoption and realisation of foreign policy are not yet fixed (thus remain subjective), and are unlikely to be fixed until real economic and institutional reforms begin to materialise. As a result, the present 'mechanisms' do not promote continuity or cohesion in foreign policy decision-making. *This mechanism must be worked out in order to provide the basis for consistency in foreign policy decisions that would at least correspond to the expected level.* Ukraine has not achieved the desired level of security guarantees from military and economic international organisations. Ukraine has not concluded an association agreement with the EU, has not joined the WTO, and is unlikely to in the near future, has not been taken seriously as a mediator in conflicts in Southern and Eastern Europe (as Kosovo has clearly demonstrated). Moreover, Ukraine has not received the desired level of financial support needed to address immediately pressing issues such as the closure of Chernobyl. Finally, Ukraine does not yet have consistent, determined foreign policy objectives or clearly defined national interests capable of outlasting the governmental regime currently wielding power. However, these operational problems should not come as a surprise to observers given Ukraine's geopolitical position, as well as the precarious internal political and economic circumstances that have been discussed throughout this thesis.

Has Ukraine's foreign policy been a success?

The discussion above would seem to indicate that Ukraine's foreign policy has not been successful overall. But there is another side to the equation that must be qualified. This perspective becomes clear when one compares foreign policy goals with actual concrete results. In this regard 1997 was undoubtedly the most successful year for Ukrainian foreign policy. One need only mention the Russia-Ukraine Friendship and BSF Treaties and the NATO-Ukraine Charter as evidence of this success. However, the NATO-Ukraine Charter did not correspond to Ukraine's goals or expectations because it did not

have a legal foundation and did not provide any military guarantees. Still, the Charter with NATO should be considered a major foreign policy and diplomatic achievement, particularly when taking into account the domestic circumstances.

One of the more positive features of Ukraine's foreign policy in 1998 included the diminution of its multi-vector character. One could argue that there has been an evolution from this multi-directional foreign policy towards a determination of actual strategic directions of foreign policy and this direction has undoubtedly been Europe-oriented. Perhaps not to the extent of full integration with Western institutions, as this is highly unlikely at this stage, but rather in regards to the development of dynamic relations with these institutions.

In Chapter Four it was argued that Ukraine may be attempting to integrate into 'Europe' through the back-door, or through regional and sub-regional organisations such as GUUAM, BSECO, CEFTA, and even through contacts with certain 'fast-track' states in Central Europe. During 1998 and 1999 there has been an increase in Ukraine's activities within regional organisations such as BSECO and GUUAM and also with individual states such as Poland. Ukraine also clearly demonstrated in Kosovo its willingness to take part in multinational peacekeeping forces and to work with its neighbours by contributing troops and hardware to the Polish-Ukrainian battalion.

However, because Ukraine's national interests have not been clearly defined and demonstrated, its foreign policy actions aimed at advancement towards European and Trans-Atlantic integration have not been convincing and thus, are not always taken by the West as credible. Such statements of intentions *vis-à-vis* co-operation and eventual integration with 'Europe' are often seen purely as declaratory in nature because the economic and political conditions are far too unstable to convince Western partners of any long-term objectives. Further, on many occasions, it has not been clear which agency or individual in the Ukrainian government is in charge of the state's foreign and security policy orientation. Is it the President? Foreign Minister? Speaker of the *Verkhovna Rada*? As discussed in previous chapters the foreign policy views of Ukrainian elites have often seriously conflicted. There is a more subjective element to Ukraine's foreign policy decision-making than in most western liberal-democratic states because Ukraine has not yet clearly defined its national interests in an objective manner. Therefore, it is most difficult to make predictions as to the future direction of Ukraine's foreign policy beyond the short to medium term.

Ukraine's dynamic but problematic diplomacy

Despite internal weaknesses and a wide-range of external challenges, Ukraine has registered a number of impressive diplomatic achievements since 1994. The Ukrainian government has had to juggle various foreign policy challenges, including an unstable and unpredictable Russia to the east, unsteady neighbours to the north and south (Belarus, Moldova, and Romania) and expanding NATO and EU blocs to the west. Ukrainian diplomacy has been successful in securing border treaties and treaties of friendship and co-operation with all its neighbours, namely Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova, Belarus, and Romania.[40] Ukrainian diplomacy was also exercised in full measure in the negotiations and conclusion of the NATO-Ukraine Charter. Although Ukraine did not achieve all of its expectations, the document was nonetheless a great political and psychological breakthrough. Further, although Ukraine has not yet concluded an association agreement with the EU, Ukrainian diplomats has been actively trying to secure this status by initiating meetings and conferences with the appropriate EU agencies to discuss this topic, and they have for the most part conducted negotiations in a very professional and timely manner.[41] Moreover, given the dismal domestic

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[40] Although in the case of Romania there is still some dispute over the ownership of the oil-rich continental shelf in the Black Sea.
[41] Interview with Fraser Cameron, Foreign Policy Analyst, European Commission (DGIA), Brussels, Belgium, 8 March 1999.

economic situation, it should be clear that Ukrainian diplomatic achievements in some cases are even remarkable.

However, there are many cases where Ukrainian diplomatic tactics have not coincided with their Western counterparts and it can even be said that both sides are not talking *to* but rather *around* each other. For example, it was mentioned in Chapter Five that Ukrainian diplomats tend to ask for far more than they actually expect to receive both in political and economic terms. This has tended to strain NATO-Ukraine relations and has led to a situation where NATO has become irritated and dismissive of Ukraine's requests. According to one official Ukrainian diplomats are always looking for money and instead of requesting a certain figure, they push it by asking 'how much is available?'[42] But these are old Soviet tactics that will not disappear until there is a change in their mentality. Until Ukraine becomes more 'Westernised' in terms of setting goals and the means to achieve those goals, there will continue to be discrepancies on both sides as regards diplomatic tactics.

When viewing Ukraine's diplomatic efforts against the backdrop of the negative domestic conditions, Ukraine's diplomacy can be viewed as successful. The MFA is one of the few departments of the state able to maintain an active dialogue with other states and institutions. During 1998 and 1999 Ukrainian diplomacy began to move beyond its previous reactive nature to take on a new proactive role. In several cases, policy was actually planned. Particularly after the appointment of Borys Tarasyuk as Foreign Minister in April 1998 Ukraine's foreign policy became more aggressive, not only in its westward orientation, but also towards its neighbours in the region.

Whether Ukraine will be able to maintain this degree of 'success' in terms of diplomacy remains to be seen because diplomacy in its present form includes persons (subjective element) but no mechanisms (objective element) or set national interests. Thus, we will see so-called 'achievements' in actions fulfilled, documents signed, visits of heads of states and foreign ministers, and other governmental elites, but with few obvious and tangible results. This is why it may be more appropriate to speak of success in terms of Ukraine's diplomatic objectives rather than of success in foreign policy.

Problems of functioning and adopting foreign policy decisions

There also exists an inherent contradiction in the manner that foreign policy decisions are adopted which serves to further highlight the subjective element of Ukraine's foreign policy. Ukraine follows a communist method of functioning even though it is no longer a communist state. The mechanisms of linkages between foreign policy and society are as follows: decisions are taken, according to the decisions a treaty is concluded, and according to the treaty instructions are given to various departments for the purposes of implementation (thus the process has a narrowing effect- see Figure 2 below). In the West the process of adopting foreign policy decisions is typically like this: the party in power works out a decision which corresponds to the interests of those having voted for it and the decision is passed through the legislature to provide it with the necessary financial component. Next, the decision is implemented and an agreement formalising the interests of those having launched it is concluded.

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[42] Interview with John Hoag of the US Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 12 October 1999.

Figure 2: Adoption of Foreign Policy

Ukrainian Model   Western Model

Process of decision implementation

Thus, Western politicians are more accountable for their decisions as the linkages between foreign policy and society are much closer than in Ukraine. Clearly in Ukraine the political pyramid is put on its peak and can easily teeter or even fall at any moment- to the left, right, East or West. Moreover, in the West, the protocol for adopting foreign policy decisions includes taking into account recommendations from a network of scientists, researchers, and other academics that often have a profound effect on policy outcomes. However, in Ukraine and the other post-communist states, those outside of government have far less of an input into the process. A so-called 'expert' who is appointed by the presidential administration will collect information from think tanks, other organisations, and individuals, but typically will pass on only those opinions which coincide with the ideology of the present administration. Thus, the collection of information that contrasts with the policies of the presidential administration is usually either overlooked or completely disregarded.

It was mentioned above that there is also an inherent contradiction in Ukraine over who is responsible for determining the present and future course of Ukraine foreign and security policy. Although according to the Ukrainian Constitution the President bears this responsibility, outspoken officials from the legislature have also attempted to influence Ukraine's foreign policy orientation.[43] It is difficult to imagine this happening in western liberal-democracies where the Speaker of the US House of Representatives or the Speaker of the House of Commons in the UK claims responsibility for foreign policy. So why is this a common occurrence in Ukraine and the other post-communist states? One reason is because the only politicians that generally are heard are the ones who are speaking loudly and radically. Another reason is because of the lack of clearly defined national interests and foreign policy objectives that are commonly agreed among the executive and legislative branches of government. The *Rada* did attempt to put this mechanism in place when it passed the *National Security Concept of Ukraine* on 16 January 1997.[44] However, this resolution has not yet been operationalised. Further, as discussed above, because there is no mechanism in place to guide Ukraine's foreign policy, it is not surprising that Ukraine's most prominent politicians have attempted to influence foreign policy. In light of the above discussion one might conclude that Kuchma's multi-vector policy is also no longer an appropriate means to achieve the desired foreign policy goals.

Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy: The only option?

The continuation of Kuchma's multi-vector policy is problematic because of the following six factors.[45] First, the majority of elite and public opinion in Russia continues to regard an independent Ukraine as a temporary phenomenon. The Russia-Ukraine Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation has not been transformed into anything resembling a true partnership due to continued mutual misperceptions. Second, the

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[43] See Chapter Four.
[44] Basically, this document advocates the multi-vector foreign policy of 'integration with Europe, co-operation with Russia and the CIS'.
[45] The first four factors were advanced by T. Kuzio in his report, 'Political and economic prospects for Ukraine in 1999', Oxford Analytica, January 1999. The subsequent factors are advanced by this author.

priority of many of Russia's elites has been to cajole Ukraine into the pending Russia-Belarus union. During the Kosovo War there was a growing momentum in the left for Ukraine's participation in this union, particularly in light of the perceived lack of adequate financial support from the West. Perhaps the first step towards the re-orienting of Ukraine's foreign policy has been taken in lieu of Ukraine's recent decision in March 1999 to become a member of the CIS IPA.

Third, Ukraine's intentions to openly integrate with the EU and unofficially to join NATO remain declarations not backed by concrete steps in terms of economic, political and institutional reform. At the same time, the EU has ruled out CIS countries, including Ukraine, for potential membership or even associate membership for the time being. Also, NATO's publicly declared 'open door' policy does not seem to apply to Ukraine and other CIS states because of Russia's adamant objections. Fourth, in 1999 Ukraine has found itself increasingly constricted geopolitically between two forces: a more hard-lined policy from Russia (due to NATO's actions in Kosovo) to the east, and an expanded and preoccupied NATO to the west.

Fifth, as discussed in Chapter Five, the Kosovo military conflict resulted in a leftist drive to radically alter Ukraine's westward orientation as demonstrated by *Rada* debates ranging from re-arming Ukraine with nuclear weapons, to halting Ukraine's participation in NATO programmes such as PfP, to breaking off diplomatic ties by recalling Ukraine's permanent mission to NATO in Brussels. Although this movement as initiated by the left did not materialise, it has demonstrated that the parliamentary forces in Ukraine can unite, which perhaps in the future will be more enduring, particularly if certain emotionally charged issues present themselves. Sixth, the continuation of this multi-vector policy is problematic due to the creation of new dividing lines in Europe which have become more clearly defined in 1999 as a result of NATO enlargement to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

Moreover, a study on Russia-Ukraine relations conducted by the (US) Global Intelligence Update (GIU) concluded that Ukraine's multi-vector policy is no longer a viable option. [46] According to the GIU, Ukraine can no longer sit on two chairs. The report asks whether the West will benefit from the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russia-Belarus union? The authors conclude that the answer is 'no' because the only driving forces of such 'unification' and the only argument that underlines this study is a perception about the incapacity and inferiority of the Russian Federation. The conclusions of the report are that if Ukraine turns away from the Russia-Belarus union, Russia's viability will be reduced to zero. It is reports such as these that impose tremendous pressure on the Ukrainian government to make a strategic geopolitical and geoeconomic choice between two and only two options- Europe or Eurasia.

The GIU report postulates that Ukraine's quick admission to NATO is in the interests of both Europe and Russia because there are only two short-term prospects: either Ukraine's eastern and southern borders become NATO borders or Russia will lapse into its old imperial routine with all ensuing consequences for itself and CEE. Ukraine's 'third way', 'finlandisation', or its existence as a neutral and non-aligned state is impossible according to this scenario. Whereas Finland was psychologically alien to Russia, the predominantly Orthodox Ukraine, which is culturally and ethnically tied to the Russia, simply cannot belong to nobody. Some analysts have suggested this 'third way' option so as to allow for the breathing space to concentrate on domestic reforms at home. [47]

However, long-term neutrality is not an option for Ukraine because the territory is of strategic importance to both Russia and to NATO. Neutrality has only been seen as a means to keep Russia, Belarus, and the CIS at a comfortable distance, while allowing for the development of closer ties with the West. A neutral Ukraine, moreover, would be a permanent irritant for Russia and a source of instability in Europe. Russia has not been given reason to trust the intentions of those post-communist states claiming to be

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[46] 'US study on Russia-Ukraine relations', Global Intelligence Update (GIU) in *Kiev Den*, 24 February 1999, p. 3.

[47] Argument made by Taras Kuzio in his unpublished paper, 'Domestic obstacles to Ukraine's integration into Europe' which was presented at the conference 'Ukraine and the EU- Economic Reality and Political Vision', Kyiv, Ukraine 17-18 May 1999.

neutral. An illustration of this point can be found in the events surrounding Kosovo. Russian officials were reportedly stunned when NATO managed to persuade Romania and Bulgaria (and even Ukraine for a brief time), non-NATO members and supposedly neutral, to close their airspace to Russia. Moscow thus discovered that CEE is far from being a neutral buffer zone, is effectively coming under the control of NATO (see detailed discussion in Chapter Five).

It is clear that the Kosovo crisis has had an impact on Ukraine's domestic politics. It has deepened political division in Ukraine as regards the state's foreign policy orientation (i.e. pro-Europe or pro-Eurasia), but at the same time, has bought about a consensus, albeit only temporarily. *Rada* deputies unilaterally opposed NATO's actions in Kosovo, calling the operation an 'act of aggression against a sovereign state'. Kosovo triggered an emotional response in the *Rada,* but these debates were relatively short-lived, particularly once a cease-fire was called, which serves to demonstrate that Ukraine is unlikely to drastically re-orient its foreign policy in any direction, regardless of external circumstances. Yet, Kosovo is equally likely to have an influence on the development of NATO-Ukraine relations, as has already become evident in the cancelling of various information visits of Ukrainian representatives to NATO Headquarters,[48] and in Ukraine's luke-warm participation in PfP exercises in the Black Sea in the summer of 1999.

The main problems with Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy can be summarised as follows: such a policy is not completely credible domestically or externally because it does not breed consistency, predictability, or reliability. Moreover, as clearly demonstrated in the Kosovo conflict where Ukraine's mediation efforts were not taken seriously, such a policy is detrimental to a state's international prestige, and thus reduces its ability to influence broader international as well as regional relations. Still, as discussed throughout this thesis, Ukraine has no other tangible option but to continue with its multi-vector policy to its own detriment because of domestic and geopolitical factors. Overall, this policy is a reflection of its manoeuvring amongst both external and internal circumstances, including the frontier, and is also an attempt at finding a compromise between the range of foreign policy preferences of Ukrainian elites.

Foreign policy and national identity

At the root of the debate over Ukraine's foreign policy choice belies a profound struggle within the Ukrainian nation to identify itself and its place in the world- a world which it only feebly comprehends and poorly understands Ukraine. It is now becoming clear that practically all the problems facing Ukraine in foreign and domestic policy, economics, state structure, and democracy come down to the problem of national identity. Progress in forming this identity will determine the subsequent pace and direction of Ukraine's modernisation. This conclusion is suggested in the cases of Ukraine's neighbours. In Poland, where a sense of national identity and an understanding at the outset of its place in Europe and of the direction of its foreign policy determined the pace of reform and by extension Poland's entry into Western structures. The same can be said of Hungary and the Czech Republic, and to a lesser extent, Slovenia and Estonia. Conversely, in countries with a weak sense of national identity including Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova progress is slower in terms of introducing and operationalising market reforms. However, even in these countries, progress is much faster and carries with it a lower cost than in Ukraine, which shows the slowest pace among CEE countries in terms of economic reforms, privatisation, corruption, state building, and the rule of law.

Globalisation and the changing nature of frontiers

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[48] Interview with Vladyslav Yasniuk, Head of NATO Division of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 28 June 1999.

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the process of globalisation cultivates conditions of increased state interdependence and thus, fosters the shrinking of international borders and frontiers in many areas of the world. Moreover, globalisation seems to imply that all frontiers will eventually be eliminated as the potential forces of interdependence, transnationalism, universalism and the notion of a world society are realised.

According to Rosenau, we are so accustomed to thinking of domestic and international politics as separate playing fields that is it difficult to conceptualise of any structures and processes that may be superseding them in a new field of play. The frontier is in some respects an under-organised domain consisting of fragile sources of legitimacy, while in other respects clearly defined structures of authority can be discerned. Put differently, Rosenau explains that the frontier sometimes takes the form of a market, sometimes appears as a civil society, sometimes resembles a legislative chamber, often is a crowded town square, occasionally is a battlefield, increasingly is obstructed by an information highway, and usually looks like a several-ring circus in which all of these activities are unfolding simultaneously. Given this diversity, it is not so much a single frontier, but rather a cluster of diverse frontiers in which background becomes foreground, time becomes disjointed, nonlinear patterns predominate, organisations bifurcate, societies implode, regions unify, markets overlap, and issues of identity, territoriality and the interface between long established patterns and emergent orientations dominate the political agenda.[49]

Rosenau's response is to treat the frontier as becoming ever more rugged and thus, as a widening field of action where world affairs unfold, and where domestic and foreign issues intermesh, converge, and become indistinguishable within a seamless web. The new conditions that have widened the frontier cannot be explained by a single source. The informational revolution and other technological advances are major stimulants, but so is the breakdown of trust, the shrinking of distances brought about by the processes of globalisation, the proliferation of new organisations, and the fragmentation of old ones, the integration of the regions, the surge of democratic practices, the cessation of intense hatreds, and the revival of historic animosities, all of which serve to provoke further reactions which add to the complexity.[50] This is the new politics of the frontier. The Kosovo conflict has clearly demonstrated this fact. The political, economic, social, and military developments in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe will continue to attract scholarly attention well into the next millennium, particularly those states that have currently been excluded from membership in European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. In short, the presence and endurance of frontiers points to a new way of thinking about how global politics unfolds. Where earlier epochs had their central tendencies and orderly patterns, the present epoch derives its order from contrary trends and episodic patterns. As Rosenau explains, leaders are now beginning to understand, emotionally and intellectually, that unexpected events are commonplace; anomalies are normal occurrences; minor incidents can all too easily mushroom into major outcomes; fundamental processes trigger opposing forces even as they expand their scope; and what was once transitional may now be enduring.[51]

Globalisation carries with it the ability to increase the proximity of what was previously a distant dispute or problem. In other words, globalisation, interdependence, and the shrinking of borders closes the distance between states and regions, often propelling previously uninvolved entities into a conflict. Realising the reality of the situation, it is logical to assume that zones of stability and security should be cautiously expanded, but in some cases it is desirable to retain a certain distance from high-conflict zones by maintaining the frontier as a buffer region. Globalisation in this sense seems to be having the opposite effect in CEE. The frontier is not softening; in fact it appears to be hardening.

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[49] James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Global Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 6-7.
[50] Ibid, pp. 4-7.
[51] Ibid, p. 7.

CONCLUSIONS

The question that arises from the previous discussion is will the frontier continue to widen and the inherent contradictions on which its worldview rests continue to persist or will new institutions and boundaries eventually emerge and settle into place as the basis of another epochal transformation wherein the politics of the frontier becomes the politics of normalcy?[52] I tend to agree with Rosenau's assertion that the latter scenario is more likely. As the frontier widens, so will it manifest the creation of unaccustomed political institutions and arrangements. This can be exemplified by the creation regional and sub-regional organisations and institutions such as GUUAM, BSECO and others in the frontier in which their task is the creation of institutionalised security or political 'normalcy', while at the same time, providing a forum which helps them to lessen their dependence on Russia and at the same time moves them closer to Europe.

This chapter has sought to demonstrate how the emergence of a new East-West frontier has influenced Ukraine's foreign policy orientation. The first half of this chapter made several assertions. First of all, border issues are back on the political agenda in Europe with the enlargement of the West's institutions to a selected few states in CEE. The concept of frontier has returned at a time when the enlargement of NATO and expansion of the EU are seen as the necessary next steps in the geopolitical reorganisation of the continent. But for those states that have been excluded, perhaps in some cases only temporarily, governments and society alike are tending to equate geopolitical instability with perceptions of security and identity. Thus, in this regard political borders and frontiers in CEE are still problematic and warrant further study and analysis. Second, Ukrainian politicians are facing all directions in terms of their foreign and security policy orientations, which is reflected in the state's multi-directional foreign policy position.

The second half of this chapter surveyed the 'successes' and 'failures' of Ukraine's foreign policy and diplomacy and argued that it may be more appropriate to speak of Ukraine's achievements in diplomacy rather than in foreign policy. It was suggested that Ukraine's approach to foreign relations, its multi-vector policy, is no longer a viable option that serves to foster the improvement of Ukraine's international standing. Kosovo has clearly demonstrated that this policy has weakened external perceptions of Ukraine as a reliable partner to both the West and Russia. Ukraine's chosen 'third way' option of neutrality is problematic for this very reason. It was also argued that there presently is no objective mechanism in place for establishing concrete national interests which would serve to guide foreign and security policy in Ukraine. As a result, foreign policy decisions are subjective and changeable which in turn makes Ukraine a rather unattractive and unreliable partner for the West, Russia, and also in the region. Further, the foreign policy decision-making process has not been institutionalised in the same way as in the more developed states in Central Europe and in the West, which further exacerbates the problem of subjectiveness of Ukraine's foreign policy. Therefore, Ukraine should focus its efforts on economic and political reform, and state- and nation-building. Making progress in these areas will serve to improve Ukraine's international standing as a stable and reliable partner. It should be clarified that Ukraine need not make a strategic choice between Russia and the West; indeed it cannot at present due to both external and internal circumstances. Still, Ukraine should decide how it will respond to developments in a global and regional context, as well as determine how to create its image and preserve it, and in this context, follow a foreign policy course guided by set national interests that is appropriate for Ukraine.

Throughout this chapter, the processes and effects of globalisation on geopolitical and geoeconomic frontiers were discussed. Whereas globalisation and interdependence have tended to soften frontiers and borders in many regions of the world[53] by closing the distance between states and increasing the likelihood for collision

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[52] Ibid, p. 8.
[53] Examples are the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, and the WTO

and collusion between them, globalisation has to a large degree had the opposite effect in Europe. The enlargement of NATO and the expansion of the EU to selected states in CEE has served to create a new division in Europe which has indirectly resulted in the creation of a grey zone of European security and prosperity. As the distance between the entities in CEE closes, the likelihood for conflict between them increases, thus increasing their political, economic, and cultural 'distance' from Western Europe, thereby reducing their chances for accession to the West's institutions in the short to medium term. But Western states and institutions have attempted to allay fears of those states presently left outside the enlargement process by working with them in multilateral and bilateral forums and by increasing co-operation in the military, political, scientific, and technical spheres. However, the West has yet to develop clear objectives with regard to Ukraine, and as a result, assistance and co-operative efforts have not met the expectations of either side.

The emergence of a new security environment in Europe will more than likely create new political and cultural frontiers perhaps as some analysts contend along the lines of Huntington's 'clash of civilisations'. Those countries which are ethnically Slav and religiously Orthodox would be the 'natural' allies of Russia, whereas those countries which are religiously Catholic are linked to the Holy Roman and Habsburg Empires would align with the West. For the time being, CEE is bound to remain, in Bort's words, a 'difficult frontier' at the very least. It will be the terrain of political quicksands on which the Europe to come will have to be built.[54]

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[54] Eberhard Bort, 'Mitteleuropa: The difficult frontier', in M. Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds), *The Frontiers of Europe*, London: Pinter, 1998, p. 101.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

One task of this thesis has been to examine the dynamics of political evolution in Ukrainian domestic politics and to determine how this evolution has affected Ukraine's multi-vector foreign and security policy. According to the evidence and analysis set fourth in this project, it has been determined that Ukraine's foreign and security policy can be characterised as subjective, pragmatic, and evolutionary but also marked to a large degree by continuity.

First, as regards the subjective factor Ukrainian elites have not been able to clearly define the state's national interests because there is no objective mechanism in place which serves to guide Ukraine's foreign policy, and also because there is a vast discrepancy among elites as to foreign policy preferences. Chapter Six argues that there is an inherent contradiction in the manner that decisions are adopted which serves to highlight the subjective nature of Ukraine's foreign policy. For example, in the West the protocol for adopting foreign policy decisions is for political elites to consult a network of outside experts including scientists, researchers, and academics. However, in Ukraine and the rest of the FSU, those outside government have far less of an influence over foreign policy. In practice, a so-called expert is appointed by the President who is tasked with collecting information from think tanks, other organisations and various experts. Yet in practice, the President's appointee typically will only take account of those opinions that correspond with those of the administration. Thus, advice which conflicts with the wishes of the executive is either overlooked or disregarded altogether.

Second, as discussed throughout this thesis and particularly in Chapters Four and Five, Ukraine's foreign policy has become more pragmatic. President Kuchma has sought to establish a more business-like relationship with Russia, which is based on the enhancement of direct bilateral ties as opposed to utilising the multilateral forum of the CIS. This pragmatic approach is supported by the realist and neo-realist views as discussed in Chapter Two.

Third, Ukraine's foreign policy can also be thought of as evolutionary. When analysing the issues of the 1994, 1998, and 1999 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, it is clear that there has been a movement among the leftist parties toward supporting Ukrainian statehood and opposing the state's membership in any international organisation which would serve to compromise its sovereignty and independence. Thus, it can be said that the national idea in Ukraine has evolved leftwards. Oleksandr Moroz and Oleksandr Tkachenko are examples of politicians who have changed their ideological views from a left to centre-left position in support of Ukrainian statehood.

Overall, there has been a movement in the left towards a more moderate approach to foreign policy which is exemplified in the pro-statehood stances of the left, the rise of centrist parties, and in the fact that radical viewpoints, either pro-West or pro-Russia, are not popular among the population. It should, therefore, have come as no surprise that moderate Kuchma won the 1999 Presidential election in a landslide over radical Communist leader Symonenko. As compared to the 1994 election, a more recent trend is for Ukrainian politicians to tilt pragmatically towards either the West or Russia, while maintaining a centrist approach to Ukraine's foreign policy.

Fourth, despite being evolutionary, Ukraine's foreign policy has also been marked by continuity. Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma have both pursued a pro-West foreign policy. The most notable difference, however, has been their tactics to achieve the same goal of integration with Europe. It is not surprising that Ukraine's foreign policy has been skewed towards the West given that its foreign policy is highly subjective and dictated by the state elite. Overall, Ukraine's foreign policy has evolved to meet both internal and external challenges, and with this evolution, continuity in foreign policy has become apparent. This continuity has been seen as a key stabilising factor in securing the existence of the Ukrainian state.

So in essence, what does this evolution and continuity tell us about Ukraine's foreign policy? First of all, the leftwards evolution of the national idea and the increase in the number of centrist political parties is testimony that the Ukrainian state is modernising. Second, as most of the Ukrainian population favours moderation or a balanced approach to foreign policy, those candidates who supported a radical re-orientation in favour of the West or Russia did not fare well in the 1999 Presidential election. The public tended to support candidates who advocated a non-bloc or neutral status for Ukraine that is pragmatically pro-West (i.e. Kuchma, Marchuk). Third, foreign policy was not a major issue in the 1999 Presidential elections as it was in the 1994 elections. This is due to the fact that Ukraine's independence was no longer at stake, but perhaps more importantly Ukrainian society was preoccupied with the issues of day-to-day survival and as such was by and large disconnected from foreign policy.

This thesis, furthermore, affirms in Chapter Two that the manner by which Ukraine achieved its independence has affected the state's ability to realise and pursue its foreign policy goals. Established political and financial institutions were not in place prior to Ukraine's independence as in Scotland, for example. Moreover, there was no prolonged period of national struggle such as in Ireland, and no deeply rooted national identity capable of giving impetus to the development of a Ukrainian foreign policy. There was also a scarcity of myths, traditions, and national heroes with which to identify. A mere transfer of authority from the central authority to the peripherals (i.e. Moscow to Kyiv) achieved Ukraine's independence. Resulting from a lack of practical experience, Ukraine's political and financial institutions do not function as equivalent institutions in the West. They are highly bureaucratic, disorganised, and operating within the realms of a quasi-state and quasi-nation inherited from the Ukrainian SSR.

The influence of domestic forces on Ukrainian foreign and security policy have also been analysed extensively in Chapters Three and Four. It was suggested that the interplay between the domestic institutions plays a key role in the formulation of Ukraine's foreign policy agenda. Chapter Three established that the legislature has limited leverage over foreign and security policy decisions in legal or constitutional terms. The *Rada* is essentially limited to the drafting general of principles or guidelines of foreign policy, whereas the President has the right and responsibility of determining and implementing Ukraine's foreign and security policy decisions. However, in response to highly charged external developments such as Kosovo and perhaps NATO enlargement, both the legislative and executive branches of government have claimed responsibility for Ukraine's foreign policy which clearly demonstrates an institutional enigma.

Chapter Four has sought to identify the domestic sources including institutional factors and legacies that shape, influence, and ultimately help to determine the orientation of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. These factors include institution-building, party politics and political factions, the state of the economy, regionalism, and Ukraine's under-developed national identity. However, the most profound threat to the Ukraine's independence is the state of the economy. Although ethnic and regional diversity, a weak state structure, and shortsighted political leadership are all factors which could exacerbate a future crisis, the state of the economy is the most crucial domestic factor which has the potential to undermine the progress made thus far in terms of sustaining an independent Ukraine. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Three, linguistic and cultural differences in Ukrainian society are not causes for widespread concern because the majority of those who affiliate themselves historically, ethnically, and linguistically with Eurasia (USSR/Russia/CIS) do not wish to reintegrate politically or economically with Russia.

Ukraine in the Frontier

This thesis has investigated the extent to which Ukraine's international and regional relations are influenced by the state's geopolitical position between Russia and the West. It has been

suggested that a new East-West frontier is emerging between those states that have been invited to join key Western institutions (NATO, EU) and those which have not. This new frontier may be developing along the lines suggested by Huntington, though perhaps a modified version of his thesis which takes new structural and behavioural factors into consideration.

This thesis contends that the definition of what constitutes a modern frontier is in the midst of change; it is widening and narrowing, while simultaneously undergoing erosion with respect to many issues, and reinforcement with respect to others. The frontier, as such, resembles a 'third level' of analysis- it is neither the domestic arena, nor is it solely the international arena. It is a place where crucial political developments unfold, and where domestic and foreign politics come together. Thus, taking these 'frontier dynamics' into consideration is crucial in understanding the realm from within which Ukrainian foreign and security policy is operating.

It argued that Europe's frontier is differentiated by a lack of mechanisms in a rather structure-less geopolitical space through which authority is exercised. Although some regional structures and institutions have begun to emerge and develop a basis for exercising authority in various sectors such as energy and regional trade relations (BSECO/GUUAM), the frontier is still a rather under-organised geopolitical space. The group of states between Russia and the West continues to be prone to instability along political, economic, and cultural lines as Bosnia and Kosovo have clearly demonstrated. This instability is caused both by the existing ethnic or other divisions in society and by the frontier's lack of superseding political or economic institutions in comparison with the West.

Due to the processes of globalisation, transnationalism, and interdependence many regional frontiers in the world are softening and in some cases even disappearing, as globalisation has tended to reverse the inclination to solidify borders. However, this thesis has argued that the opposite is occurring with respect to the division in Europe. It has been suggested that a new East-West frontier has emerged in lieu of NATO enlargement and EU expansion to include a selected few states in CEE. Chapter Six demonstrates how the notion of the East-West frontier has often been internalised in many aspects of Ukrainian politics: from foreign policy, to defence policy, to the economic and energy sectors. The presence of an East-West frontier in Europe which consists of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, states, societies, and cross-border working relationships has created a new dynamic in the region which indeed carries implications for the way in which we view international relations. The frontier has thus brought about a new level of analysis that includes the convergence of domestic and international politics in the widened geopolitical space that is the frontier.

Ukraine's Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory

Ukraine's foreign policy and international relations theory has been discussed in this thesis from two perspectives: the realist/neo-realist approach and the domestic politics approach. First, the realist/neo-realist school that asserts that a state's foreign policy is driven by the distribution of power among states is problematic for studying Ukraine. It cannot be determined by either Waltz's or Walt's arguments as to with whom Ukraine should seek to ally. Should it balance against the stronger alliance (NATO) and thus side with Russia? Or should it balance against the greater threat to its sovereignty and independence (with NATO, against Russia)? Moreover, should Ukraine seek to bandwagon with Russia? Its geographic proximity and relative weakness in relation to its much larger neighbour suggests that it should bandwagon. But Ukraine has pursued a pro-West foreign policy and has done everything possible to ensure that the CIS remains only a 'talking shop' with no real power or authority. Also, the CIS does not serve the cause of sovereignty and legitimacy for Ukraine. Along with the fact that centralised institutions give the appearance of attempts at restoration of a Moscow-based empire, there are other good reasons why Ukraine should not integrate

further with the CIS. A CIS customs union, central banking system, unified mass media, and a unified energy complex are not in Ukraine's interests because they would tie Ukraine to a disintegrating economic and political space. Ukraine's participation in the defunct Tashkent Security Treaty, an alliance clearly positioned in opposition to NATO, is also not in the state's best interests as this would destroy its relationship with Central and Western Europe and with the US.

In addition, realist/neo-realist theory is also problematic because it does not take account of the possibility of a neutral or non-bloc status as a means for a state to secure its survival. Also, while these theories present a clear set of foreign and security policy options, realism/neo-realism does not explain Ukraine's pro-West foreign policy which is pursued even at the risk of aggravating Russia. Moreover, it appears that states have often behaved more co-operatively than the theory of structural realism dictates, and most of the time without suffering as a result.[1] For example, as discussed in Chapter Five, Ukraine has actively sought to improve its regional ties through its participation in several regional organisations including CEI, CEFTA, BSECO, GUUAM as well as with key regional actors such as Poland.

Second, theories of domestic politics which suggest that political developments within countries determines foreign policy are also not entirely appropriate as an explanation for Ukraine's foreign policy. Although this perspective takes into account subjective factors such as economic constraints, the type of constitution, social and historic ideas, other crucial factors such as nationalism, national identity, party politics, and personalities of leaders as driving forces in foreign policy have been overlooked. These factors should nevertheless be considered because in Ukraine as well as in other FSU states foreign policy is directed and dictated by the interests of the state elite. Overall, Ukraine's foreign policy is the product of domestic as well as geopolitical forces and is intertwined with a domestic political struggle between the executive and legislative branches and between the right and left political parties. Thus, given the wide-range of factors which serve to influence Ukraine's foreign policy orientation, neither realism nor theories on nationalism and foreign policy within the domestics politics school is appropriate for Ukraine. One should, therefore, look to theories on foreign policy-making that incorporate both domestic and international factors which tend to have a greater explanatory ability.

Other models such as David's theory of 'omni-balancing' as discussed in Chapter Two have sought to bring together these two schools of thought in terms of incorporating both structural and behavioural factors. Foreign policy in the Third World, as David understands it, is a battle on two fronts simultaneously: domestic and international. David asserts that international politics is often replicated on a domestic level in these less capable states. One can easily point to instances such as NATO enlargement or the Kosovo conflict where tensions between Russia and the West have fuelled the domestic debate in Ukraine. Moreover, Ukrainian foreign policy is intertwined with a domestic political struggle among the state elite themselves, specifically between the Ukrainian left and the nationalist right. Thus, in the case of Ukraine and other post-communist states one must consider both structural and behavioural aspects of international relations theory to understand how their foreign and security policies are formulated as well as to account for shifts that may occur as a result of Ukraine's tilting between a pro-West or pro-East orientation.

Ukraine's Foreign Policy: Success or Failure?

In Chapter Six of this thesis a distinction was made between Ukraine's achievements in foreign policy and the government's successes in diplomacy. Making this differentiation allows for a more accurate picture of both the activities and policies of the Ukrainian government and also of the external response to those activities and policies. Along these

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[1] Rosecrance and Stein, pp. 12-13.

same lines it is also important to take into account both the quantity and quality of diplomatic activity in order to contemplate the priorities of Ukrainian diplomats as well as to consider how their tactics compare to their Western counterparts.

The priorities of Ukrainian elite as regards foreign policy have first and foremost been to secure the state's sovereignty and independence. Ukraine's pursuit of establishing ever-closer ties to Europe and the US reflects this fact as Russia is seen as the only entity which is capable of threatening Ukrainian sovereignty. Although there is no doubt that Ukraine's geopolitical position between Russia and the West has had a considerable influence over the direction of its foreign policy, this thesis has sought to demonstrate that this is not the whole story. Ukraine's foreign policy is highly subjective, and as such, is susceptible to change with regard to whoever is wielding power in the executive. However, at the same time, Ukraine's foreign policy has not experienced a change from its multi-vector orientation because of the need to balance between two foreign policy extremes. *Thus, it seems clear that Ukraine's foreign and security policy is a direct result of both the existing internal vagueness and the lack of clearly defined national interests and the need to compromise among the internal and external forces.*

This project has measured Ukraine's 'success' in foreign policy in relation to decisions that were actually implemented. The rationale for this comparison is that the states of the FSU, particularly in the CIS forum, have tended to conclude treaties and other agreements with one another, but even years later most of these agreements remain on paper. Chapter Five has examined Ukraine's relations with Russia, the US, NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the IMF and other states and institutions and Chapter Six concluded that the overall level of international guarantees does not correspond to the expected one. Ukraine has not been offered the prospect of joining NATO, has not achieved associate member status of the EU, has not joined the WTO, and has not received the desired level of support from the IMF, World Bank, or EBRD. By and large, agreements such as the PCA with the EU have not yet been fully implemented. One plausible explanation for this is that the mechanisms for analysis, development, adoption, and realisation of foreign policy are not yet fixed, and thus remain subjectively determinable. These mechanisms, moreover, are unlikely to be fixed until real economic and institutional reforms begin to materialise.

Still, Ukraine has concluded border treaties with all its neighbours, has developed a dynamic and multi-faceted relationship with NATO, and has an extremely enthusiastic core of diplomats who actively and purposely engage the West and its institutions in multilateral and bilateral forums. Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to make promises to the West as regards implementing economic and political reforms, but for the most part these reforms have not materialised. This has led to a situation where Ukrainian policy-makers have lost credibility in the eyes of their Western counterparts. There is no doubt that Ukrainian policy-makers and diplomats have a goal in mind- which is Ukraine's accession to the EU, WTO, and perhaps NATO. However, Ukrainian diplomats do not seem to have a clear picture of how to achieve these goals. As stated previously, there is no actual *plan* for Ukraine's integration into European and Trans-Atlantic structures- there is only an *idea*, and ideas have not had the effect of stimulating the desired level of reform in Ukraine.[2] The Ukrainian elite does not have a clear conception as to what it takes to achieve membership in Western institutions.

As NATO, EU, and Ukrainian officials have expressed to the author privately, Ukrainian diplomats are still thinking in terms of a Soviet mentality. They ask for far more than they expect to receive in the hopes of achieving a compromise. However, in the process Ukrainian diplomats end up aggravating and alienating their Western counterparts, thus knocking the level of trust and respect back one further step each time this tactic is used. It is the author's impression after conducting numerous interviews that Western and Ukrainian officials are often talking not to but rather around one another, and they approach their diplomatic negotiations from entirely different perspectives. For example, Ukrainians

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[2] Interview with Christopher Donnelly, Special Adviser to the Secretary General, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 14 October 1999.

look for and even demand 'positive' signals from the West, insisting that such a signal would propel economic reforms in Ukraine. However, for the West, it is a matter of putting the cart before the horse. Western diplomats, particularly in the EU, are not willing to provide this positive signal for Ukraine's eventual membership until reforms are well underway and beginning to exhibit signs of real progress. For the EU this means the fulfillment of the PCA, the fundamental legal document which serves to guide the EU-Ukraine relationship.

Other factors that help to determine the degree of success of Ukraine's foreign policy include the following:

1) Types of agreements concluded and subsequently implemented
2) The deliberateness and predictability of Ukraine's foreign policy
3) The determining of an overall foreign policy strategy
4) The presence of objective national interests which have been demonstrated with consistency

Clearly, Ukraine has been successful in its diplomatic efforts, particularly in 1997 with the conclusion of the Friendship and Co-operation Treaty with Russia and with the NATO-Ukraine Charter. Certainly at times Ukraine's foreign policy has been both deliberate and predictable. However, because Ukraine does not have in place an objective mechanism for determining, pursuing, and realising its foreign policy goals and national interests, no overall strategy can be deduced. Still, Chapter Five argues that Ukraine's regional relations is part of a grander strategy which is integration into Europe. The Kuchma administration in particular has concentrated its efforts on the deepening of regional integration with key states such as Poland and in sub-regional organisations as a means of integration into Europe through the back-door. Particularly as the development of Ukraine's regional ties are not nearly as threatening to Russia as, for example, its ties to NATO and the US, this path to 'Europe' is Ukraine's less controversial and more realistic option. Ukraine has sought economic, political, and security ties with actors in CEE that share in its ideologies regarding European integration. Ukraine's could certainly gain confidence and experience in its foreign relations by enhancing its regional partnerships. It is, therefore, possible to conclude that it would be beneficial for Ukraine to seek to enter Europe through the back-door by way of regional co-operation, as full-membership in key Western institutions is not realistic. But at this time enhancing the state's involvement within CEFTA, BSECO, GUUAM and with key regional actors can really only be viewed as part and parcel to achieving a foreign policy *goal*, but without an overall *plan* of how to achieve that goal. The plan should come in the form of the introduction and carrying out of large-scale economic reforms.

Ukraine's foreign policy has tended to follow a 'third-way' or neutral foreign policy course. However, neutrality is not a long-term option for Ukraine because its territory is of strategic importance to both Russia and NATO. If Ukraine essentially serves as a buffer state, as discussed in Chapter Two, both sides would have to be committed to the maintenance of Ukraine's non-aligned and sovereign status. Perhaps the West is, though it is doubtful that if the geopolitical environment continues to favour the West that Russia will remain committed to recognising the independence of Ukraine. As the events of Kosovo have demonstrated, CEE is far from being a neutral buffer zone. Following in the lead of Romania and Bulgaria, two supposedly neutral countries, Kyiv also briefly sided with NATO by denying Russian aircraft access to Ukrainian airspace to reinforce their troops at Pristina airbase in Kosovo. Russian elites were astonished to learn that CEE- including Ukraine- is effectively coming under the control of NATO. Still, one might question whether Russia has both the resources and the will to try to re-gain control of Ukraine. For Ukraine, neutrality has only been a means to fend off Russian pressures to develop closer political and military relations.

Moreover, this third-way, neutral, impartial, or multi-vector policy, or however one chooses to characterise it has been detrimental to Ukraine's international standing and prestige. This thesis is critical of Ukraine's multi-directional foreign policy, although it is

184

acknowledged that Ukraine has few other options but to pursue good relations with both the East and the West. This may appear to observers as a rather amorphous policy, which Chudowsky describes as a 'neither here nor there' policy because the country cannot determine whether it wants to be a part of Europe or Eurasia. But Ukraine needs Europe for the sake of modernisation and Russia for the sake of a market, and must have amicable relations with both sides for the sake of its security. However, such an approach to foreign policy does not serve to advance Ukraine's image as a reliable and credible partner in its international and regional relations. Overall, this policy is lacking in substance, goals, and direction. Ukraine is often not taken as a serious and capable actor by the West or its neighbours. This fact was exemplified by the West's blasé attitude towards Ukraine's proposal to mediate in the Kosovo conflict. NATO was clearly fixated on enlisting Russia's mediation efforts and was more concerned with keeping Russia on board rather than bringing in Ukraine.

Globalisation, Frontiers, and Ukraine

As discussed throughout this thesis the processes of globalisation cultivates conditions of increased interdependence and as such, reduces the significance of national borders and frontiers in many areas of the world. Globalisation implies that all frontiers will eventually be erased as such political forces of interdependence, transnationalism, universalism, and the idea of a global society are realised.

This thesis looks upon the East-West frontier in Europe as an under-organised domain that consists of states with fragile sources of legitimacy and sovereignty. Rosenau conceptualises the frontier as becoming ever more rugged and as a widening field of action when domestic and international issues converge and world affairs unfold. Many conditions have served to widen the frontier including technological advances, the proliferation of new regional organisations and the fragmentation of old ones, the integration of the regions, and fact that globalisation has reduced the proximity between foes and has thus provided the foreground for the revival of historic animosities leading to conflict based on nationalism and ethnicity. The presence and endurance of frontiers points to a new way of thinking about how world politics unfolds. It is neither the national arena, nor international arena, but rather a combination of the two with added dynamics.

Because the geopolitical space between Russia and the West resembles an under-organised zone of instability, it is logical that more capable institutions should seek to expand their influence into a strategically and economically crucial region with the goal of having a stabilising effect. However, the expansion of key Western institutions into CEE has also had a destablilising effect. States such as Ukraine and many of the other 'outs' have been preoccupied with attempting to convince these institutions, especially the EU, that Ukraine should be considered a potential member. Ukrainian elites have engaged in an overzealous campaign with the West in an effort to win economic and political support that they feel will eventually allow Ukraine to rejoin Europe. However, this effort is in vain because Ukraine has not prioritised economic and institutional reforms. Western institutions will continue issuing political statements of positive intentions without backing such statements with real substantive programmes. Indeed the West will not be interested in Ukraine until the government has fully implemented the provisions of various agreements and has made considerable progress aimed specifically at economic and institutional reform.

Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy is a reflection of the state's need to maneuver among both the internal and external forces. Although this policy has not instilled the kind of confidence in Ukraine as a reliable partner for the West, Ukraine's historical legacy and the present geopolitical conditions in CEE suggest that this multi-vector foreign policy is most likely the state's only option in the short to medium term. Since independence, Ukraine's elites have been both pulled and pushed by domestic and external circumstances. But despite this constant tug-of-war, one very important factor is evident. Although not

united in their perspectives on Ukraine's foreign policy course, the state's leaders, regardless of their political ideologies, support Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. Ukraine's active co-operation with the West, Russia, and in the region is testimony to the state's desire to secure its place and to establish its role in the international community in the midst of arduous economic and geopolitical realities.

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