Peace from Below:
Developing Inter-Ethnic Dialogue among Citizens
for Bottom-up Conflict Transformation in Bosnia

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Abstract

Intrastate conflict in recent years between identity groups with ethnicity, religion, language or tribe is very protracted and difficult to prevent, manage or settle. As it can cause chaos within and beyond its borders, protracted intrastate conflict is one of the major security concerns in the contemporary world. The international community applies various policy tools of third party intervention to deal with this problem. This study focuses on third party attempts to develop dialogue between the citizens across the dividing lines of protracted intrastate conflict. While intervention targeting the elite politicians in the state in conflict, often through the conventional diplomatic measures of negotiation or mediation, is referred to as first-track intervention, intervention for dialogue among the citizens can be considered as a part of second-track intervention: that is, efforts to construct peace from below.

Although the approach for top-down conflict transformation represented by first-track intervention is important and potentially effective, it is often insufficient in dealing with protracted intrastate conflict. One such example is Bosnia where a peace agreement was reached in 1995 but the societies and the citizens in the country are still segregated and polarised. The necessity for bottom-up approaches has been clearly recognised in the Bosnian context of conflict transformation, however, international bottom-up strategies have not been so successful.

Using some case studies in the Bosnian context, this thesis examines inter-group dialogue development among citizens as a potentially effective bottom-up approach. The main question to be asked is whether or not and how developing inter-group dialogue among citizens in the divided societies can practically contribute to transforming protracted intrastate conflict. The examination of the cases shows that inter-group dialogue among citizens can contribute not only to reconciliation between the individuals participating in dialogue but also to the generation of bottom-up conflict transformation in some practical ways.

Acknowledgements

Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgements

List of Maps, Tables, Figures and Appendixes

Introduction

Peace is something built for people as well as by people. Peace needs to be felt by ordinary people in their daily lives, at the same time, they need to actively pursue it and not just passively wait for it to happen. In this sense, it is not convincing that peace can be built solely upon political bargaining between a handful of political leaders who sometimes use wars as a means for gain. It is in fact difficult to construct sustainable peace in this way as has been distinctly observed in severe intrastate conflict in recent years. Intrastate conflict in recent years between communal groups with exclusive identities such as ethnicity, religion, language or tribe is very protracted and difficult to prevent, manage or settle. Threats and violence directly target ordinary citizens. Not only does severe intrastate conflict cause tremendous human misery and loss of life, it consumes the whole population including ordinary citizens and leads to prolonged polarisation or segregation in the societies.

The protracted features of severe intrastate conflict have been analysed under various names such as 'protracted social conflict'[1], 'ethnopolitical conflict'[2], 'international-social conflict'[3], 'new wars'[4], 'wars of the third kind'[5], civil war, communal conflict, ethnic conflict, or more simply internal or intrastate conflict. In this study such conflict is referred to as 'protracted intrastate conflict'. Despite the conventional emphasis on interstate conflict during the Cold War, most of the wars that have occurred all over the world since the end of the Second World War are not

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[1] Edward E. Azar, 'Protracted Social Conflicts: Ten Propositions', in Edward E. Azar and John Burton (eds), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1986, pp 28-39.

[2] Ted Robert Gurr, *Minority at Risk: Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*, United State Institute of Peace Press, 1993.

[3] Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict*, Polity Press, 1996.

[4] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Policy Press, 1998.

[5] E. Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind, Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries*, University of California Press, 1988. Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

interstate but intrastate conflicts.[6] Intrastate conflict is one of the most serious security concerns in the contemporary world. Severe intrastate conflict causes not only internal chaos but also leads to enormous numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees beyond the borders, which poses a serious threat to regional stability and global security.

The end of the Cold War brought an opportunity for the international community to seriously consider and engage in tackling the problem of protracted intrastate conflict. However, the international community seems to have struggled with this challenge, being ill-equipped in the 1990s as existing conventional rules and norms in international politics were designed to deal with inter-state issues not intrastate conflict. But more significantly, dealing with protracted intrastate conflict turned out to be far more complicated than just settling conflicts of interest between the disputants or stopping war. Conflict is protracted, violence is difficult to control, and the situation remains volatile even when a cease-fire or peace agreement has been achieved. The population is distrustful and suspicious and often remains deeply divided into exclusive communal identity groups, which deters reconstruction and reconciliation in the state. Conventional approaches of negotiation, mediation and other kinds of diplomatic tools fall short of the task of constructing peace on the ground.

The international community applies various tools of third-party intervention to deal with the problem of protracted intrastate conflict. In order to transform such protracted conflict peacefully, it is important to involve the whole population including the ordinary citizens in the process. While the intervention targeting elite politicians, often through the conventional diplomatic measures, is described as the first-track, the sort of intervention focusing on the citizens is considered second-track. This thesis focuses on third-party intervention that attempts to develop inter-group dialogue among the citizens in the states suffering from protracted intrastate conflict. The main question to be asked is whether and how developing inter-group

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[6] See Holsti, op.cit., p 281. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.34, no.3, 1997, pp 339-358.

dialogue among the citizens in the divided societies can practically contribute to a transformation of protracted intrastate conflict.

There are two major points of importance in this question. First, the question acknowledges the role of citizens in the process of conflict transformation. All the citizens are inevitably involved in protracted intrastate conflict as the conflict is between the groups featured with exclusive identities. All the citizens are categorised into either of the identity groups and they can be exposed to intimidation or threat from the other identity group(s) in their daily lives. Once this evolves into open war, the citizens are deliberately targeted by such strategies as ethnic cleansing, mass murder and rape. The communities and human relations are broken, and people are filled with suspicion and distrust of one another. As the citizens have willingly or unwillingly taken part in protracted intrastate conflict, it is necessary to involve them in the process of transforming conflict or building peace.

Second, the question prescribes the use of dialogue in transforming protracted intrastate conflict. Protracted intrastate conflict is a complex phenomenon caused by various problematic factors in the political, economic, social and even cultural spheres inside and outside the state. While it is certainly important to tackle these factors where possible, it is not feasible to eliminate all these factors and at the same time new problems can always emerge as no society tend to be static. Conflict can exist anywhere and anytime regardless of its extent, so that people in the end need to deal with it, preferably by non-violent means. Theoretically dialogue and communicative interaction in a constructive manner can be an important tool for transforming conflict. Dialogue is communicative interaction in a constructive manner and different from discussion, debate or argument in which people present their views and convince others. In dialogue difference is respected rather than denied. Dialogue does not necessarily lead to an agreement but a better understanding of each other.

The sort of intervention on which this study focuses receives far less attention compared with the first-track intervention, that is, the conventional third-party intervention including negotiation, mediation or arbitration. One of the main reasons for this is an underlying assumption of the first-track intervention that only

the top-level elite politicians can effectively divert the process of conflict and generate the full-scale construction of peace among the population. It is undeniable that this sort of top-down approach is very important and potentially effective. Nevertheless, it has been proved insufficient in dealing with protracted intrastate conflict. For example, despite the commitment by the international community including the European Union and West European states, many cease-fire agreements have broken down in the Bosnian conflict between 1992 and 1995. In the Middle East, deep and persistent mistrust between the Israeli and the Palestinian citizens has significantly jeopardised the peace process agreed at a high political level in 1993. It is evident that the citizens will not necessarily always follow the lead of the political elite.[7] A reconsideration needs to be given to the perception that the citizens under the extreme situation of protracted conflict are helpless victims or passive followers of violence or severe polarisation and do not have either the will or ability to do anything about it. They are certainly one of the major actors in the dynamics of conflict and its transformation. Despite the lack of attention to the second-track in general, intervention with a bottom-up purpose or building peace from below, appears to have considerable importance for the transformation of protracted intrastate conflict.

Using some case studies, this thesis examines dialogue development among citizens as a potentially effective bottom-up approach. The second-track intervention can be conducted with the purpose of inter-group dialogue among citizens and such practice certainly exists although the content of their activities are not widely known. Many cases go unreported as people who engage in bottom-up conflict transformation are practitioners working at the grass-roots level who do not necessarily have a habit of presenting their work publicly or academically. It is certainly of some interest to examine particular cases as an external observer and place their practice into a bigger picture of the overall process of the transforming of protracted intrastate conflict. The case studies in this thesis are drawn from Bosnia, a state that has experienced protracted intrastate conflict with extreme violence in the

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[7] Elise Boulding, *Building a Global Civil Culture*, Syracuse University Press, 1990. C. Alger, 'Creating global visions for Peace movements', in Elise Boulding et al. (eds.), *Peace Culture and Society*, Boulder: Westview, 1991, p 245.

early to mid-1990s and maintained deep divisions among the population since then, even though it received major international intervention after the end of the war in 1995.

It needs to be noted that the focus on a bottom-up approach here is not to dismiss the importance of top-down approaches in the transformation of contemporary protracted intrastate conflict or to insist upon the replacement of the top-down approach by the bottom-up approach. Rather, it is to suggest the significance of the complementary role of the bottom-up approach to the top-down approach in transformation of protracted intrastate conflict.

Theory on the Use of Dialogue in Protracted Intrastate Conflict

The bottom-up intervention in protracted conflict is not a well studied subject. It was in the 1990s that the potential of the bottom-up approach in the transformation of protracted intrastate conflict started to attract the serious attention of the international policy makers and second-track intervention became more widely accepted as a legitimate subject of study than it had previously.[8] Since then a few significant works have been produced and it is important to mention some of the works here.

For the study on the second-track intervention in recent years, John Paul Lederach has pioneered the field and proposed peace building from below. He convincingly argues that we need to incorporate intervention targeting the citizens in conflict areas who do not necessarily have governmental connections or direct influence on policy-making into the whole picture of strategic conflict transformation operation.[9] Not necessarily focusing on dialogue in a narrow sense, Lederach who is himself a scholar-practitioner has shared his experience and expertise of working with the citizens in some conflict areas mainly in South America and Africa.[10] Saunders suggests looking at 'the public peace process' where

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[8] It should be noted that there are significant works prior to the 1990s including Azar and Burton (eds), op. cit.

[9] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

[10] John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, Syracuse University Press, 1995.

citizens engage in dialogue to change conflictual relationships and create peace practices in various conflict situations. Recognising the citizens outside the governments as political actors who can contribute to democratic governance, he articulates a theory of dialogue intervention for the citizens called 'sustained dialogue' with its methodology including principles and stages of its progress.[11] Judith Large has produced an intensive study on second-track intervention in the war-affected areas of Former Yugoslavia, especially in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia.[12] She analyses the practice of the second-track intervention in the area comprehensively with the topics ranging from aid and therapeutic work to mediation, facilitation and training.

Here it is also important to mention some works on dialogue facilitation. The use of dialogue in conflict transformation is not a particularly new idea and a rich literature on dialogue facilitation can certainly be found in the academic field of conflict resolution. Dialogue facilitation in a broader sense can be considered as face to face activities between disputants of a particular conflict in communication, training, education or consultation on conflict and related issues to promote the building of peace, justice and equality.[13] Theory of dialogue-related intervention has developed over the years, referred to by various terms such as 'facilitated conflict resolution', 'interactive problem-solving', 'third party consultation', 'collaborative, analytical problem-solving', 'interactive conflict resolution', 'sustained dialogue' or more generally 'facilitated dialogue' or 'facilitation'. In practice dialogue should be considered as an aspect of those approaches, nonetheless, they are considered to be facilitation of dialogue in general terms.

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[11] Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflict*, St. Martin's Press, NY, 1999.

[12] Judith Large, *The War Next Door: A Study of Second-Track Intervention During the War in the Ex-Yugoslavia*, Hawthorn Press, 1997.

[13] Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, Syracuse University Press, 1997, p 9. This loose idea of dialogue is explained by Fisher as 'Perhaps this is because dialogue- the respectful exchange of information and the creation of shared meaning-flows naturally into conflict analysis-deeper probing of causes and dynamics beneath the espoused issues. Conflict analysis naturally flows into problem-solving -the creative search for innovative directions and the development and the choice of options to address issues. Given these methods are overlapping and often occur simultaneously in the same intervention, it is not surprising that the conceptual representation of practice often mix them as well.' (Ronald J. Fisher, 'An Overview of Interactive Facilitation Methods: Dialogue, Conflict Analysis and Problem-Solving', Draft Paper, *Conducting Dialogues for Peace, A Symposium on Best Practice*, United States Institute of Peace, November 12, 2002, p 16)

One of the original contributions of dialogue facilitation for conflict resolution is the strategic use of problem-solving. Problem-solving workshops facilitate face-to-face communicative interaction between disputant parties, usually in the form of a week-long meeting in an informal, often academic setting where conflict is re-analysed as a shared problem to explore alternative courses of action to coercion as well as new options for mutually acceptable and self-sustaining resolution.[14] Facilitating communicative interaction in face-to-face encounters of party representatives is expected to lead towards mutual understanding of the conflict causes or recognition of conflict and the obstacles to its resolution, ultimately creating relationships between the participants.

Most of the rich literature on dialogue facilitation can be considered to have been developed originally from problem-solving methodology. No universal models for the ideal problem-solving process have yet been developed, because this sort of facilitation needs to be designed with reference to the specific characteristics of the particular conflict.[15] Despite this, the problem-solving methods conventionally hope to influence official policy-making, negotiation and the course of conflict, by involving disputant leaderships or non-official but influential figures from the disputant parties who ideally have close contact with them. In the other words, used as the informal, backstage pre-negotiation function for official, high politics, the use of dialogue in the conventional facilitation can be regarded as a part of first-track intervention.

Previous studies on the skills or techniques of problem-solving and other methods are applicable for dialogue intervention for citizens, however, the relevance of those works to this thesis is rather limited. The use of dialogue as the political back channel can be seen as a part of a top-down approach rather than as the bottom-up approach on which this study intends to focus. In addition, most of this rich

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[14] Christopher R. Mitchell, 'Problem-solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution', Denis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester University Press, 1993, p 79. About the problem-solving approach, C. R. Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*, Pinter, 1996. John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts: A Handbook*, Lanham/MD, University Press of America, 1987.
[15] Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution, The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Policy Press, 1999, p 50.

literature on the skills for dialogue facilitation commonly discusses for the facilitators and organisers about how and what to do or not to do for effective organisation of dialogue facilitation between the disputant parties. As Mitchell points out, much of the literature 'takes the form of handbooks or manuals that list rules or sets of instructions on how to conduct a successful exercise, rather in the manner of a simple cookbook'. [16] This study is concerned with the effect of intervention aiming to develop dialogue among the citizens within the process of overall conflict transformation and it is not intended to discuss how to facilitate dialogue among the citizens in detail.

It would be fair to say that a bottom-up intervention for transformation of protracted intrastate conflict still remains understudied. This study attempts to make a modest but hopefully significant contribution to enrich the literature in this field.

Overview and Structure on the Thesis

Having the theoretical development of the bottom-up approach for conflict transformation as its background, this thesis examines the international practice of conflict transformation or peace building operations in Bosnia from a bottom-up perspective. Bosnia has been a large-scale experiment for an internationally designed and managed post-war state reconstruction. Although it has been nearly 10 years since the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia has not become a success story as yet. The peoples are still divided, feeling distrustful of one another and an international presence is still required to contain possible violence. Nevertheless, international interest in Bosnia has been considerably reduced since the mid- to late 1990s when it was once the centre of international attention. Bosnia is not a timely or popular topic of discussion in international politics any more. However, I believe that one of the major problems with the international practice of peace building operations in recent years clearly emerges in an examination of the Bosnian context, the predominantly top-down international approach and the lack of effective bottom-up measures. Therefore, it would be important to re-examine the Bosnian conflict and the international practice of third-party intervention in the Bosnian context.

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[16] Mitchell, op. cit., 1993, p 83.

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Subsequently, cases of inter-group dialogue facilitation efforts are examined to see if and how those efforts lead to a practical contribution to the conflict transformation process or possibly in the course of the conflict. In the Bosnian context, the efforts of dialogue development among the citizens seem to present a potential approach to tackle the problem. Dialogue intervention at the citizens' level is primarily aimed at breaking down psychological barriers and promoting reconciliation, with the distant hope of some eventual positive effects on the public opinion. But a detailed examination reveals that it could lead to much more.

The target areas of the projects in the case studies are not only Bosnia, but also other areas in the Former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the analysis on their affect is not necessarily extended beyond the Bosnian context of conflict transformation in order to avoid the risk of making a too simple equation to the other contexts. Also it should be stated that I myself am not a part of the organising or management team of those projects. I believe that an external evaluation on the projects would be useful in order to recognise the legitimate value of those efforts in the overall process of conflict transformation as the impact of those projects is often self-claimed.

In terms of information gathering, it needs to be stated that no field research in Bosnia has been conducted for this study. This is partly because of financial constraints but also because the inter-group dialogue seminars facilitated by two projects of cases studies are not currently operating in Bosnia. One of the two projects has held its dialogue seminars not in Bosnia or anywhere in the Balkan region but in Norway, one which I have personally attended. The other project has already ceased its operations in Bosnia at the time of writing. Two case study projects were relatively well documented and I was able to directly interview some of the project organisers and the participants and also correspond with them and others via e-mail. Although field research in Bosnia would have been ideal, it was not considered essential. Prior to this research, I have visited Belgrade and Vojvodina in Serbia and Zagreb and Western and Eastern Slavonia in Croatia including Vukovar as a participant of a study tour in 1995 and as an intern for a locally operating international NGO in 1996. Although the visits were not directly related to this research, the experience of meeting with and listening to local people

including refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia provided useful background information for this research.

This thesis starts with an exploration of the theory of protracted intrastate conflict in recent years and conflict resolution/transformation. Chapter 1 examines the potential factors that cause intrastate conflict. The analysis of the causes shows the complexity of the phenomenon of intrastate conflict and demonstrates that protracted intrastate conflict is far more than a clash of interests between identity groups. The chapter indicates difficulties in the task of conflict transformation. Chapter 2 reviews the theory on conflict and conflict resolution, which leads to an introduction of the idea of conflict transformation, that is, comprehensive social change to transform protracted conflict peacefully. Dialogue is also identified as a potentially effective tool for conflict transformation in this chapter. Chapter 3 discusses third-party intervention for protracted intrastate conflict. Considering the scope of intervention by the layers of the population such as the elite level, the middle-range level and the grass-roots level, it is apparent that academic works on intervention are concentrated on the elite, high political level, which indicates the prevailing idea of top-down conflict transformation. However, as this chapter argues, the features of recent protracted intrastate conflict seem to suggest that a bottom-up approach is not only possible but also rather important or maybe even essential.

From the fourth chapter onwards, this thesis looks at the Bosnian context of conflict and conflict transformation, and subsequently at two cases of dialogue intervention among the citizens of Bosnia. Chapter 4 provides the background information on Bosnia and its conflict, tracing the path to and the process of Yugoslav disintegration and the subsequent wars. In addition, this chapter examines the restrictive conditions in the political environment for the citizens and their civil activities in Bosnia. In Chapter 5, the international practice of intervention in Bosnia is overviewed and the bottom-up strategies of the international community in particular are examined and their effectiveness considered. Chapter 6 looks into the general third-party practice of the second-track intervention in Bosnia especially that intended to contribute to developing inter-group dialogue among the citizens.

In Chapters 7 and 8, two international efforts to facilitate inter-group dialogue among the citizens in Bosnia and surrounding countries are examined. As far as those case studies are concerned, they are not intended to represent the typical intervention for dialogue among the citizens in the area, region or other parts of the world. In fact, the ways to facilitate inter-group dialogue among the citizens in conflict areas are so diverse that it is not possible to present any case as a formula of practice. The choice of these two projects for the detailed examination are indeed based on the criteria drawn out from the theoretical argument on dialogue as well as the practical observation on international practice in Bosnia in the previous chapters. Additionally it should be stated that data availability did affect this choice. This sort of intervention targeting citizens is usually conducted by small organisations or institutions with a limited number of staff, which poses considerable difficulty to the research on these cases in terms of collecting documents and other materials. The two projects are relatively well-documented, and at the same time, I was very fortunate to gain the cordial cooperation of people involved in those projects.

Chapter 9 summarises the Bosnian context of conflict transformation and findings from the case studies. Furthermore the chapter considers the effect of dialogue intervention among the citizens on the overall conflict transformation of protracted intrastate conflict in Bosnia and its applicability to other parts of the world. The Bosnian context of conflict transformation demonstrates that the bottom-up approach can be not just complementary to the top-down approach but rather an essential part of conflict transformation processes, as conflict transformation needs to progress among the whole population. This concluding chapter suggests that inter-group dialogue development among the citizens in the divided societies can be an effective bottom-up approach.

Chapter 1 The Complexity of Contemporary Intrastate Conflict: The Causes of Conflict

Introduction

Contemporary intrastate conflict is so protracted that it is difficult to manage and resolve. It is easy to re-ignite even when it once seems settled. One of the reasons for its protraction is that conflict can be attributed to multiple causes rather than to a single cause. The 'causes' here refers to the problematic factors that contribute to the occurrence, continuity or escalation of conflict. An issue claimed by disputant parties in a conflict may be only one of many factors significantly affecting the course of that conflict. This complication of various factors creates the phenomenon of contemporary intrastate conflict. In order to manage and resolve intrastate conflict efficiently, it is important to understand the complexity of conflict expressed in the diversity of factors. The variety of potential causes would show the range of problems to be dealt with in the process of conflict transformation.[1]

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the causes of contemporary intrastate conflict in order to picture the complex phenomenon of protracted intrastate conflict in recent years. In spite of enormous difficulties, some scholars have engaged in the causes of conflict analysis.[2] However, there are some problems in their studies that require attention. One of the major problems is related to the issue of how to deal with the human aspect of conflict, rather than the substantive aspect. As conflict occurs and develops in interactions between human beings, the course of conflict is affected by collective or individual attitudes as well as by the behaviour of those involved. However, there are significant difficulties in incorporating the human aspect of conflict into the analysis because the human aspect of conflict is far less manifest than the substantive aspect.

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[1] The term 'conflict transformation' is chosen to be used here instead of the more conventional 'conflict resolution'. See Chapter 2 for the reasons for this.

[2] Michael E. Brown, 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, 1996, MIT Press, pp 571-601. Denis D. J. Sandole, *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era*, Pinter Publishers, 1999.

If the outline excludes the problems of the human aspect, variables would be easy to understand but it would be too simplistic to convey the complexity of protracted intrastate conflict. Without considering the human aspect, it seems difficult to explain the madness of the brutal ethnic cleansing in Bosnia or the genocide in Rwanda or the considerable difficulty in dealing with contemporary intrastate conflict. However, if the outline includes all the human aspects ranging from inter-group relations to decision-makers' personalities, the outlined variables would be more precise but too complicated and difficult to understand. Different approaches belong to different disciplines. If we try to incorporate all the different stresses within one discipline including the interference effects of other disciplines, 'the resultant theory would be so complex that it would be little use in analysis.'[3] Including too many aspects diminishes their value.

Also we obviously need to be aware of the danger of putting too much emphasis on certain human aspects. The attribution of conflict to a single and simple cause such as 'historical hatred' or 'bad leaders' as observed in media coverage is very misleading. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the human aspect of conflict plays an important role and needs to be taken into consideration as a part of the causes of conflict.

Regarding the previous works on the analysis of conflict causes, I have identified two further problematic points. One is that outlined variables appear randomly. The reason why those factors are chosen to be presented as conflict causes is unclear in these studies, so outlined variables are introduced without context. The other is that outlined variables are treated separately. According to Brown, his outline of variables is the result of summarising the 'collected wisdom of the ages',[4] but the variables seem independent of each other. This is also misleading because often those variables or causes of conflict are related to and interact with each other.

I devote most of this chapter to conflict analysis and attempt to put the results of my analysis into a series of variables at the end. In doing so, the complexity and interaction of causes, which may not be obvious in the outline, is described. The human aspect is also carefully examined in the analysis. Based on

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[3] Keith Webb, *An Introduction to Problems in the Philosophy of Social Science*, Pinter, 1995, p 2.
[4] Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown (ed.), op. cit., p 13.

the assumption that the tension between disputant parties within the state develops through the process from conscious identification of collective identity (polarisation), to collective actions (mobilisation), to violence, the causes of conflict are analysed accordingly from the background environment, underlying causes and proximate causes.

While some states can deal with the problematic factors non-violently, violence develops in other states ultimately becoming protracted intrastate conflict. The attempt to outline causes is chosen here for its comprehensiveness as well as its simplicity. In this chapter firstly, the background of polarisation is investigated by considering the types of state that induce solidarity of identity groups. Secondly, I analyse political, economic, social and cultural conditions which can drive identity groups to mobilisation. Thirdly, I examine factors that cause conflict to escalate towards the outbreak of serious violence. And finally, at the end of this chapter, an attempt is made to outline conflict causes on the basis of conflict analysis.

1.1 The Background to Intrastate Conflict: The Weak State
The Weakness of the State

Contemporary intrastate conflict occurs between identity groups. Such groups are formed under various collective identities such as class, occupation, ideological, ethnic or religious identity.[5] In some states, identity groups form strongly-tied communities in order to protect their needs and interests. In other states, identity groups simply remain social or cultural categories.

The formation of an identity group is usually for the protection or promotion of its members' collective interests. Therefore, the polarisation between identity groups within the state indicates that the state is unable to protect or promote the collective interests of the population. In other words, the state is weak. In most cases, what are at stake in recent internal polarisation are not simply interests but needs.[6] These needs are often referred to as basic human

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[5] An identity group is also called an 'ethnic group' or 'communal group'. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Westview Press, 1994, p 190.
[6] Edward E.Azar, 'Protracted Social Conflicts: Ten Propositions', in Edward E. Azar, and John Burton (eds), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1986, pp 28-39.

needs, that is, something necessary for a person to be a human being, ranging from the most material needs to the most non-material needs.[7] The state that fails to address such needs of its population is called a 'weak state', a 'failing state' or a 'quasi-state'.[8]

State strength is often measured in terms of military power or economic capacities, however, these capacities do not necessarily express the whole picture of state strength. For example, the junta with a strong military force can be considered strong in a sense, nevertheless, the fact that it governs with its military strengths but without popular support from all citizens, brings its actual state strength into question. In Burma or Myanmar, the junta takes control of the state's politics, but the citizens' movement for democracy has apparently undermined the authority of the government and the stability of the state. State strength needs to be met from something more than military or economic power.

In order to examine the details of state strength, it would be helpful to consider the state theoretically in terms of its functional components such as state sovereignty, institution and physical existence.[9] Firstly, the state refers to the sovereign authority. State sovereignty has two aspects; external juridical statehood and the internal capacity for self-government. This means that the state needs to be accepted as a source of identity and the arena of politics from outside as well as inside. In other words, the state needs to have its authority recognised internationally. At the same time it needs to be recognised by its nationals as having legitimate authority to govern them. This functional component has another important domestic aspect. Within state boundaries, existing social organisations have to recognise and respect each other's existence and right to be governed equally as a state's citizens. It is a matter of the attitudes and practices of the individuals and groups within the state towards each other and ultimately

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[7] Edward E. Azar, 'The Analysis and Management of Protracted Social Conflict', in Vamik D. Volkan et al. (eds.), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*, Lexington Book, 1990. Johan Galtung, 'International Development in Human Perspective', John Burton (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, Macmillan, 1990, pp 301-335.
[8] Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[9] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London, Harvester Wheatshead, 1991. Holsti, op.cit. Zartman, op. cit., p 5.

towards the state.[10] Secondly, the state refers to an institution. The state is a tangible organisation responsible for decision-making and execution. It includes the system of government, such as executive, legislative and judicial bodies, the bureaucracy, laws and norms. Lastly, the state refers to its physical existence, that is, territory, population, resources and wealth within the territory. The state should have a specific territory and population and the ability to maintain or protect itself.

These three functional components are all important for state composition; they are closely related to one another and it is difficult for them to function separately. With such connections, a problem in one component is very likely to cause problems in other components. For example, if the state institution is ineffective, the state may have difficulty in maintaining the legitimacy to govern. If the state legitimacy is in doubt, the state does not have the power and resources to construct or maintain effective institutions. This means that the ineffectiveness of institutions can contribute to the lack of legitimacy and vice versa. This legitimacy or 'right to rule' has to be distinguished from the popularity of the government.[11] Even though the population may wish to replace the government, this does not necessarily mean people are denying the state's underlying ideas.

This vicious cycle of negative effect between each component is applicable to most of the state components, however, it needs to be noted that there are some exceptions. Due to the recent international environment, the issues of external juridical statehood and territory are less affected by the other factors. The external jurisdiction is respected as the international norm in recent international practice, except in the extreme case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. In terms of the territory issue, although there are still a few border disputes between states in the world, their number is low. Overall, it would be appropriate to consider the existing state boundaries as relatively stable, apart from the cases of secession.

Despite this most of the other factors in the three components have a strong influence on each other, so that weakness in one component is most likely

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[10] Holsti, op. cit., pp 87-90.
[11] Buzan, op. cit.

to result in the weakness of all. The features of a weak state can be described as the lack of political and social integration and institutional, economic and technological underdevelopment. [12] The weak state with those features is incapable of protecting or promoting the basic human needs of the whole population, so that polarisation is likely. When this inability escalates it sometimes results in a phenomenon called 'state collapse' which refers to a situation where the structure, authority, law and political order of a state have fallen apart. [13] Although the extent of the lack of integration and underdevelopment varies in each state, those features are generally observed in Third World states and the states that belong to the former Communist bloc. A considerable number of internal armed conflicts have recently been recorded in these areas. [14] This seems to suggest that weak states are fertile ground for protracted intrastate conflict.

The Roots of State Weakness

The phenomenon of the weak state is observed mostly in developing countries, namely, in the areas of the Third World and the former Communists bloc. The weak state can be seen as a developmental problem. The formation of a state as a cluster of political institutions is a lengthy and gradual process.

Today's so-called developed states consolidated their current stability through trial and error. It is often said that the modern sovereign state system originated in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, more than 350 years ago. If we take that for granted, developed states have taken a long time to construct state unity, effective institutions and stable boundaries. [15] In addition, the long and gradual process has never been peaceful. It was a forceful integration process

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[12] Edward E.Azar, op. cit., 1986, pp 28-39.
[13] I. William Zartman, *Collapsed State: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynner Rienner Publishers, 1995.
[14] Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflict, 1989-98', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 5, 1999, pp 593-606.
[15] For a consideration of the creation of national identity, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Community: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised edition, Verso, 1991. Also Joel S. Migdal 'Integration and Disintegration: An Approach to Society –Formation' in Luc van de Goor et.al. (eds.), *Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States*, Macmillan Press, 1996, pp 91-106.

that required enormous sacrifices of human rights and even lives. [16] The industrialisation of warfare has also been an important factor in creating national identity and effective institutions, because conducting war requires the most large-scale and organised collective action of human activities. Consequently, the developed states have achieved a relatively stable civil society in which the whole population formally shares equal rights and citizenships.

In comparison, most of the states in the Third World have had their independence for less than half a century while the states in the former Communist bloc have only been sovereign for just more than a decade. Although a simple comparison in the length of state formation periods may be too casual, it would be a fair view that those developing states are still in the process of state formation. However, the period of time is only one factor of development; the weakness of these states can be attributed to various conditions in the historical background of their formation. Here these conditions are analysed in the context of the Third World and the former Communist bloc respectively.

The States in the Third World

One of the reasons why many Third World states are weak is due to their shared historical background.[17] Most of them were colonised states in the past and have only have achieved their independence less than half a century ago. The proliferation of the modern state-system from Europe to the rest of the world was through imperialism, sometimes in the form of colonialism or sometimes by the threat of being colonised unless people unify themselves. Some lands were divided into sections by artificially drawn borders simply for the sake of the imperialist governors' convenience. Others that managed to avoid becoming colonies were urged to establish themselves as states under the pressure of colonisation. After the Second World War, those colonies, almost corresponding to the Third World today, became independent according to those given borders that never had any historical meaning prior to the imperial governance. The

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[16] Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State Making', in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton University Press, 1975.

[17] This is emphasised by many scholars. For some examples see, van de Goor, op.cit. Brian L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992. Georg Sørensen, 'An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and Cooperation', *Review of International Studies*, vol.23, no.3, 1997, pp 253-269.

vulnerability of the state boundary in Africa is indicated in the fact that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was urged to reaffirm the existing borders in the charter, as it states 'we …[are] (d)etermined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states'[18]. The former colonies became the 'states' regardless of pre-existing social boundaries including the distribution of ethnic and tribal groups.

During the struggle for independence, people within the colonial state were consolidated by the sense of 'national liberation' from colonial governance. Since independence, it has been often the case that the post-colonial state failed to achieve effective statehood and the sovereignty was simply surrendered to them in the process of decolonisation. The solidarity that was once present during the struggle for independence disappeared. Colonial rulers used 'traditional' authority structures for mediating between the coloniser and the colonised during their governance, which maintained ethnic and tribal identities through groups being ruled in part through their own native institutions.[19] As traditional collective identity has remained a strong social force during and after the colonial area, people in the post-colonial states do not necessarily share a newly created national identity. [20]

The colonial background also seriously affected state institutions.[21] After independence, the institutional system brought in during the colonial period has continued to be in place. Such institutional systems were often inadequate for the newly independent state. As a consequence of this institutional deficiency, state power was concentrated in the hands of a strong political leadership in order to maintain state integrity. It was often the case that the strongmen abused such power to enrich themselves and their own ethnic or tribal groups. As the individuals in power would behave in their own interest rather than that of the state, economic growth and development were hindered by such corruption.

During the Cold War, the strongmen were supported by foreign capitalist states in order to prevent the expansion of communist revolutions. Such external

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[18] The OAU Charter at http://www.oau-oua.org/oau_info/charter.htm
[19] Mohammed Ayoob, 'The Security Predicament of the Third World: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective', in Job (ed), op. cit., 1992, p 72.
[20] Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Society and Weak States: State-Society relations and State Capabilities in the third World*, Princeton University Press, 1988.
[21] Sørensen, op. cit.

support kept the strongmen in power, so that the development of state institutions remained weak and underdeveloped. After the Cold War, the threat of communism dissipated and the support from outside states ceased. Without external support the strongmen quickly lost power and control, and many states were left vulnerable having their weaknesses exposed. The above scenario would be more or less applicable to many states in Africa and certain states in Asia such as Afghanistan and Bangladesh.

It needs to be noted that this scenario is not fully compatible with the conditions in Third World states in Central and South America. The states in Central and South America share different historical backgrounds from their African and Asian counterparts. The indigenous population of the American Continent severely decreased after the arrival of Europeans in the 16th century and in large part was replaced with immigrants. Nevertheless, these states in Central and South America were dominated by authoritarian regimes and are still very much in the process of development. Those states have the features of the weak state despite the differences in the process of the state formation and the lesser extent of their state weakness compared to the post-colonial states in Africa and Asia.

The States in the Former Communist Bloc

In addition to the Third World, weak states are found in the former Communist bloc. Naturally those states are not categorised as post-colonial, however, their experience of Soviet control bears some resemblance to that of western colonialism.

Tsarist Russia, the predecessor of the former Soviet Union, was a multi-ethnic empire because of its imperial expansion through violent conquest and wars with indigenous peoples and neighbouring states.[22] Through such a history, the Soviet Union inherited civil strife from the beginning. The Soviet Union was officially organised as a federation of republics each identified with a so-called 'nationality' which did not necessarily constitute a majority of the population. Some ethnic groups constituted a minority in their own territories without

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[22] Matthew Evangelista, 'Historical Legacies and the Politics of Intervention in the Former Soviet Union', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), op. cit., 1996, p 108.

appropriate recognition. In extreme cases, some identity groups such as Tatars or Jews, were displaced from their own territory.[23] The ethnic groups that were minorities were often politically and culturally disadvantaged. The boundaries between those republics, often today's state boundaries, were artificial or arbitrary. The character of the Soviet domestic political system, highly centralised, authoritarian and repressive, had restrained the potential for intrastate conflict until recently. In the mid-1980s, the Soviet leadership started the reform of its hypercentralisation and the political opening resulted in the break-up of the Soviet Union into 15 separate states. Although the break-up was relatively peaceful, those states include a considerable number of ethnic minorities. The states often adopt ethnicity as their national identity, one that ethnic minorities do not share. Under such circumstances, ethnic minorities are alienated within the state boundaries.

Although the former Soviet state had broken up, the state institutions of the Communist era remained in place in many newly formed state institutions. The old institutions were far from effective, and also undermined by corruption. Aside from such legacies of the Communist system as the failed controlled economy and disrupted economic and technological development, the majority of the states have suffered a dramatic drop in production and economic growth, increased poverty and a declining standard of living.

A similar tendency is observed in some of the Eastern European states. During the Cold War era, the population was united under the communist ideology. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the states have applied ethnic identity to national identity, which raises the problem of ethnic minorities within a country. Economic and technological conditions have also been disrupted. In more fortunate cases, the states fragmented peacefully, as seen in the "Velvet Divorce" break-up of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In other cases, ethnic tension still remains or has resulted in serious confrontation such as in the former Yugoslavia.

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[23] Stephan D. Shenfield, 'Armed Conflict in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union', in Thomas G Weiss (ed.), *The United Nations and Civil Wars*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1995, pp 36-37.

Many states in the Third World and the former Communist bloc obviously have the features of a weak state. They suffer from a lack of political and social integration as well as institutional, economic and technological underdevelopment. For the weak state, sovereignty has only external juridical meaning without the substantial capacity for self-government. Such sovereignty is called 'negative sovereignty', compared with 'positive sovereignty' which means the capacity for self-government and having an external juridical sense. The phenomenon of the weak state is a consequence of many factors in the historical process of state formation.

The International Environment

The phenomenon of the 'weak state' has existed since the concept of statehood emerged. Throughout history, the existence of states was subjected to evolutionary selection process, in other words survival of the fittest. In the past the weak states had been dealt with through 'conquest or annexation'.[24] If the states were incapable of maintaining themselves, they were either conquered or annexed by stronger neighbours. However, 'conquest and annexation' is no longer an acceptable method in the contemporary world as seen in the international reaction to Kuwait's invasion by Iraq in 1991.

The international community has more or less regarded the existing international boundaries as fixed, and usually gives legitimacy to the existing state even though it is incapable of serving the common good of the population. As a result, weak states are left as fertile grounds for protracted intrastate conflict. In addition, various international norms such as the self-determination of peoples, human rights and democracy are imposed on weak states that simply have neither the capacity nor the means to achieve them.[25] The problems are institutionalised within the international system without offering the means for solution. In the contemporary world, the weak states remain vulnerable and helpless until they collapse.

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[24] Mohammed Ayoob, 'State-Making, State-Breaking and State Failure: Explaining the Roots of "Third World"', in van de Goor et.al.(eds.), op. cit., 1996, p 82.

[25] Details of this argument are Ibid., pp 67-90. Mohammed Ayoob, 'State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure', in Chester A. Crocker, et.al.(eds), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, pp 37-51.

In summary, the weak state is characterised by a lack of political and social integration, in addition to institutional, economic and technological underdevelopment. The environment of the weak state conditions often stems from developmental problems, deeply rooted in the contradictions of the international system. Collective identity can be a main source of group solidarity in the contemporary weak states, because it can serve as a social force to protect collective interests while the state is incapable of doing so. In any case, this environment is highly problematic because it generates polarisation and further confrontation between identity groups.

1.2 Substantive Conditions for Intrastate Conflict

The environment of the weak state seriously affects the whole population. Its economic and technological underdevelopment restricts the absolute amount of material supply to the population. In addition, the political and institutional problems cause unequal distribution that deepens social cleavages.

The advantages and disadvantages are often firmly institutionalised within the political, economic and social system, creating advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The border between these groups does not always coincide with the lines between identity groups. However, the environment of the weak state is unstable and the borderlines between advantaged and disadvantaged tend to mirror the lines between the identity groups.[26] Inequality in the weak state is often defined with the division between identity groups, therefore, substantive inequality can be the underlying problem that brings identity groups from general polarisation to more serious confrontation.

This section looks at substantial conditions causing inequality within the state. Based on the assumption that inequality comes from insufficient resources and distribution problems, the factors affecting resource scarcity and conditions creating unequal distribution are analysed. The analysis of unequal distribution includes not only unequal resource distribution but also distribution of political and social power, that is, the unequal access to the power of controlling resource distribution.

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[26] Horowtiz explains the details of it in the case of ethnic group relations. See Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, 1985, pp 16-51.

Resource Scarcity

There are four main factors that affect resource scarcity: economic problems, environmental changes, demographic changes and population growth. Although each factor is introduced separately, these factors are not independent from one another but interact with each other in complex ways.[27]

Economic problems may include unemployment, inflation and stagnant productivity. This could create social frustrations, tensions and economic deprivation. Such conditions provide an ideal breeding ground for conflict. High unemployment becomes problematic especially when the unemployed are educated people.[28] This situation could occur in the process of development. Although there are more opportunities in education for the population, fewer jobs are available for them. Frustrations among the educated youth often lead to collective movement and serious unemployment conditions often assume an important role in conflict. Stagnant or deteriorating economic growth produces high unemployment and inflation. The lack of investment or the exhaustion of natural resources reduces industrial productivity. Economic reforms do not guarantee the reversal of the problem, but rather, they could contribute to the problem in the short term. This is clearly the case in Eastern Europe, the states of the former Soviet Union and parts of Africa. The transition from a centrally planned economy to market-based economic systems has created enormous economic problems and considerable dissatisfaction among populations.[29]

Environmental changes currently observed include greenhouse gas induced climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, degradation and loss of good agricultural land, degradation and removal of forests, depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, and depletion of fisheries.[30] Although greenhouse gas induced climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion do not have much immediate impact, the long-term consequences posed by these two

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[27] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict', *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1991, pp 76-116. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994, p 5-40. Homer-Dixon proposes the concept of 'environmental scarcity' caused by three sources: environmental change, population growth and equal resource access, and analyses the relationship to conflict. His work covers a wide range of issues related to scarcity.

[28] Sandy Gordon, 'Resources and Instability in South Asia', *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 2, 1993, p 73.

[29] Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown (ed.), op. cit., 1996, p 19.

[30] Homer-Dixon, op. cit., 1994, p 6.

factors almost certainly exist. Other factors could have more direct impact. Hauge and Ellingsen have demonstrated the positive relations between this kind of environmental change and conflict in the empirical examination of data.[31] Environmental change could directly contribute to resource competition such as land ownership. Such resource competition induces confrontation between various population groups and resource scarcity also affects the economy's general productivity.

Population growth affects the balance between supply and demand. The rate of population growth has been high in the Third World, however, the rate of economic growth could not match that of the population growth. Under such circumstances, material scarcity can be brought about by population growth only, as absolute amount of material remains the same irrespective of the population growth. In a state where resources are already exhausted by exploitation and the majority of the population is suffering from poverty, the states simply could not afford to feed the whole population. Certain research has indicated the states with high population density suffer from higher risk of domestic conflict.[32]

Demographic changes caused by either refugees and/or migrants on a large scale could also be a factor for domestic instability.[33] The influx of refugees and migrants imposes a strain upon the social services and physical infrastructure in the receiving states. It creates resentments between the population and the immigrants and it could also alter economic relations and the balance of political power between different identity groups in the areas. Such tension would pose significant security concerns, especially for the fragile developing states.

The intrastate conflict caused as a result of resource competition, demographic change and population growth has been observable in the separatist movement of the Assamese.[34] One of the significant causes of the movement was their frustration provoked by the widespread migration of 'land hungry' Bengalis, who originated from the dry, poor and heavily populated province of

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[31] Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, 'Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, no. 3, 1998, pp 299-318.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Refugees' or migrants' movements as security concerns are considered in Gil Loescher, *Refugee Movements and International Security*, Adelphi Papers 268, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992.
[34] Gordon, op. cit., pp 72-73.

Mymensingh in Bangladesh. The Bengali migrants were seen as a cause for the increase in unemployment among the Assamese.[35]

It is debatable how much impact these factors of resource scarcity in fact have upon intrastate conflict. Some have suggested that they are far less important than economic and political factors.[36] On the other hand, most have agreed that resource scarcity indeed has some impact on armed conflict.

Unequal Distribution: Discrimination

Unequal distribution is attributed to either institutional fault or discriminatory public policies and social practices that create or maintain inequalities in the material well being or political access of the population. Here unequal distribution which results from economic, political and cultural discrimination are discussed. The high degree of inequality in those conditions can be considered, in effect, to be a form of human rights abuse.[37]

Economic Discrimination

Unequal distribution in the economic field includes substantial material inequality and the general social and political conditions responsible for creating and maintaining these inequalities. In other words, it refers to the extent to which people are systematically excluded from access to desirable economic goods, conditions or positions that are supposed to be open to the whole population. An example of such conditions could be seen in Kosovo after the Yugoslav President Milošević revoked its autonomous status in the late 1980s. As a result, only Serb speakers were given positions in the police, courts, education and the civil service, despite the fact that the Serbs are the minority in Kosovo and the majority of the population are Albanians whose mother tongue is Albanian. Economic discrimination can be recognised in the vast differences in living

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[35] Gordon points out that it is not simply because Bengalis have taken the jobs of Assamese but because there was no educated Assamese middle class when the Assamese bureaucracy was expanding.

[36] Hague and Ellingsen, op. cit. A sceptic of the role of resource scarcity in violent conflict is Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Armed Conflict and The Environment: A Critique of the Literature', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, no. 3, 1998, pp 381-400.

[37] The degree of income or resource inequality can be referred to the Gini index. (About the Gini index, see at http://www.panix.com/~dhenwood/Gini_supplement.html or http://www.agnesscott.edu/aca/depts_prog/infor/math/leslie/gini.htm)

standards. This includes low income or poor housing, unequal access to resources such as land and capital, unequal economic opportunities and limited access to education, especially higher education. Income inequality is conventionally regarded as a factor in class conflict.[38] However, since identity group members share customs or values that significantly affect their daily lives, they often belong to the same classes or occupations. In this sense, economic factors can generate not only revolutionary rebellion but also intrastate conflict between identity groups.

Unequal access to resources, capital and economic opportunities can be politically or socially imposed by public policies or social practice. For example, the development process in Iraq during the Hussein regime has been controlled and designed mainly for the economic benefit of the dominant groups rather than for the benefit of the people whose traditional lands and resources were being exploited. The Mosul oil fields are predominantly located in the Kurdish region, but the Iraqi government had consistently refused to give a share of the oil revenues to Kurdish regional governments for their development.[39] Another example of discriminatory social practice affecting the economic dimension can be found in Northern Ireland. The Roman Catholics were disadvantaged in terms of housing or jobs, compared to the Protestants. According to Coughlan, the Protestants have long taken privileged positions in the better off industries because they tended to use the informal network of job market information and recruit Protestants rather than Roman Catholics.[40]

Limited access to education leads to another unequal distribution since higher education creates better employment opportunities. By restricting others from education, identity groups can stabilise their privileges, because less educated people have little choice but to be content with low paid menial jobs.

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[38] For example, see Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, University of California Press, 1991.

[39] Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Westview Press, 1994, p 99.

[40] Reed Coughlan, 'Employment opportunities and Ethnicity in Northern Ireland: the Differential Impact of Deindustrialization in a Divided Society', S.W.R.de A. Samarasinghe and Reed Coughlan(eds.), *Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict*, Printer Publisher, 1991, pp 48-73. For different view on this issue, Paul Compton, 'The Conflict in Northern Ireland: Demographic and Economic Considerations', in Ibid., pp 16-47.

Political Discrimination

The distribution of political power is important, because individuals and groups who possess such political power can often gain privileged access to goods and increase their welfare.[41] In other words, political power provides the means to control the distribution of resources and institutionalise the unequal status between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

Political discrimination means that group members are systematically restricted in their enjoyment of political rights. For example, a ban on public speech and demonstrations are a common indication of political discrimination. Often, such discrimination is allied with other human rights abuses. Whether political discrimination exists or not is often reflected in public policies. For instance, the limiting of the participation of certain groups in politics and their access to political office would further indicate the presence of political discrimination; as would their having proportionally fewer group members in offices, the civil service, or higher-ranking police and military positions.[42]

The extent of political discrimination is related to the type and fairness of the domestic political system. Gurr and Harff categorise domestic political systems into four types: institutionalised democracy, autocracy, the populist and the socialist state.[43] Institutionalised democracy is the system which guarantees political and civil rights for all citizens and multi-party politics, and limits the executive's power constitutionally. Autocracy is characterised by concentrated political power in the executive shared by a small number of political elites, the restriction of civil rights and political participation and few or no political parties. The populist state is between democracy and autocracy and displays political instability. The socialist state, as in China, features single party domination of power, political participation being allowed only within the party, and limited political and civil rights.

Gurr and Harff argue that political discrimination is observed in autocracy and the socialist state, with the potential for it in the populist state. With such discriminatory conditions in these political systems, the legitimacy of

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[41] David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: The Origin and Management of Ethnic *Conflict', International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1996, pp 41 –75.
[42] Gurr and Harff, op. cit., p 88.
[43] Ibid., p 89-90.

the system as a whole could be called into question over time. This is because some sections of the population are inadequately represented in government, the courts, the military, the police, political parties, and political system.

Cultural Discrimination

Cultural discrimination is the condition under which people are systematically restricted in their enjoyment of their own culture. It may not directly affect resource distribution, nonetheless, it reinforces the institutionalised and customised status of being a member of the advantaged or disadvantaged group.

Cultural discrimination is recognised in unequal educational opportunities, legal and political constraints on the use and teaching of ethnic languages, and restrictions on religious freedom. In an extreme case, the government attempts to assimilate minority populations into the majority group. For example, the Chinese government has undertaken a programme to bring large migration of the Chinese population into occupied Tibet.[44] The on-going Chinese policy in Tibet since the 1950s is a prime example of what can be seen as a form of cultural genocide. Another example involves the Kurds in Turkey. Until 1990, they were officially referred to as Mountain Turks and prohibited to teach, write or publish in their own language.[45]

Substantial inequality is only one aspect of conflict generation. The extent to which resource scarcity and discrimination motivates identity groups to take collective action in order to improve their group status is difficult to measure. Based on his quantitative research, Gurr suggests political and economic disadvantages are more likely to motivate group mobilisation than environmental or demographic changes. [46] He also suggests that social and cultural factors remain distant forces for collective action in comparison to economic or political factors. In any case, the conditions of substantial inequality

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[44] Brown, 'introduction', in Brown (ed.), 1996, p 21.
[45] Gurr and Harff, op. cit., p 37.
[46] Ted Robert Gurr, *Minority at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press, chapter 5, 1993.

should be seen as indicators or underlying causes for potential ethnic conflict, regardless of the difference in their impact.

However, people do not necessarily react to the unequal conditions they face. Throughout history, we can find many examples of aggrieved and disadvantaged communities having accepted their unjust treatment passively. Certainly, one of the main reasons is that the disadvantaged groups are often too weak to take collective action against those in power.[47] The significant difference in power resources between the groups reduces the disadvantaged group's expectation of success in their collective action and thus deters them from undertaking it for fear of retribution.

Alternatively, inaction of the disadvantaged groups can also be explained by the concept of relative deprivation.[48] Relative deprivation refers to the relationship between the actual status and the prospects. Individual groups have their own perceptions of what appear to be reasonable and legitimate expectations. However, those perceptions or expectations may in fact differ from what comparable groups are enjoying and what is available to the groups and their members in terms of material, cultural and political satisfactions.[49] This means that the disadvantaged do not react unless they realise the extent of their deprivation or inequality.

While relative deprivation certainly explains why some disadvantaged groups have never been mobilised in history, it should note that such likelihood diminished in recent years due to the rapid advance in communication technology. The invention of the mobile phone and the internet has revolutionised global interaction and made much more information widely available. This plays a significant role in changing the perceptions of populations around the world. The whole phenomenon of growth in the intensity and extent of international interactions called globalisation enables disadvantaged groups to appeal for outside support even though they themselves are too weak to take

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[47] Walter Korpi, 'Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, 1972, pp 1569-1578.

[48] The relative deprivation's original argument is that people's discontent about unjust deprivation is the primary motivation for political action. However, this is much debated. See S. G. Brush, 'Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 40, no. 4, 1996, pp 523-545.

[49] This explanation of relative deprivation is from Milton J. Esman, Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics*, Cornell University Press, 1994, pp 29-30.

collective action. For this reason, globalisation and modernisation are sometimes mentioned as the origin of some recent conflicts. Those changes in the contemporary world have increased the likelihood of disadvantaged people taking action, so that objective inequality becomes a more direct factor in ethnic mobilisation. On the other hand, the concept of relative deprivation injects another factor, in addition to objective inequality, which is that of human psychology.

1.3 Group Psychology of Intrastate Conflict

As discussed, objective inequality by itself is not sufficient to trigger the serious violence that leads to protracted intrastate conflict. As violence brings costly disruption and human misery to already fragile states, there should be a reason for the eruption of violence rather than settlement through negotiation. As a triggering cause, human behaviour or psychology seems to play a major role among the causes of intrastate conflict rather than objective conditions. Here, the psychological factors are examined in intra-group and inter-group interactions.

Intra-group Interactions

Although substantial inequality typically lies at the bottom of intrastate conflict, the attitude of identity groups toward the situation is generated by the interactions between the mass and their leaders. The vicious attitude of identity groups necessary for the outbreak of violence requires a hostile mass and contentious leaders.[50]

Mass hostility is attributed to the combination of rational grievances and irrational emotions. As mentioned previously, inequality in substantive conditions does not always occur along the lines of collective identities, although this is likely to be the case. It is essential that grievances resulting from inequality be defined according to collective identity in order for conflict between the groups to emerge. Repressive control and human rights abuses brought about by unjustified use of force intensify rational grievances and anger among the disadvantaged people while it may reduce the potential for political

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[50] Stuart J. Kaufman, 'Spiraling to Ethnic Conflict: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War', *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1996, pp 108-138.

mobilization by disadvantaged groups at a time.[51] Human rights abuse can stir up the irrational emotions of the disadvantaged.

While the role of rational grievance in intrastate conflict has been recognised in the study of conflict causes, the role of irrational emotions has been relatively overlooked until recently. Nevertheless, the grievances are sometimes based on the subconscious and emotional rather than the conscious and rational level. Although it is possible for identity groups to pursue their interests peacefully through legitimate political channels, it is difficult to achieve through peaceful means in the weak state which does not have the ability to arbitrate between identity groups or to provide credible guarantees of protection for the groups. Without such guarantees, identity groups feel fear for their present and future securities.[52] The fear, non-rational emotion, can play an important role in the violence in protracted intrastate conflict.

Some argue that ethnicity can be a relatively stronger source of identity than other communal identities because ethnicity normally penetrates deep layers of socialisation, experience, emotion and pride.[53] Ethnicity is described in the sense of kinship, such as blood, family, brothers, sisters, mother, forefather, ancestors or home.[54] Ethnic groups can be defined as being 'composed of people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on shared experiences and cultural traits, such as lifeways, religious beliefs, language, physical appearance, religion or residence, traditional occupations, and a history of conquest and repression by culturally different peoples.' [55] Outward appearances, language, surname, dress, occupation, public or private records as well as local and social knowledge could easily identify the ethnicity of an individual in the local communities.[56] As it is virtually impossible to change an individual's ethnicity, fear among group members in ethnic conflicts is often deep-rooted and extreme.[57] Ethnic identity can be considered 'hard' identity compared to other identities such as the ideological, because ideological identity

[51] Gurr, op. cit., 1993, pp 128-9.
[52] Horowitz, op. cit.; Stuart J. Kaufman, op.cit.; Lake and Rothchild, op. cit.
[53] Esman, op. cit., p 15.
[54] Walker Connor, 'Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 16, no.3, 1993, pp 373-389.
[55] Gurr and Harff, op. cit., p 190.
[56] Horowitz, op. cit., p 146.
[57] Ibid., p 140.

is convertible but ethnic identity is often not.[58] As conversion of all opposing group members is not possible, the ultimate purpose of ethnic violence is their elimination. In the discourse of ethnic conflict, people are obliged to manifest their ethnic identity because their oppositional feelings accumulates and protection is only available from their own ethnic group as they fear their personal security. The ultimate fear of an ethnic group is extinction although this may sound irrational. Not being involved is not an option due to security concerns as conflict deepens. For example, there were some people who called themselves 'Yugoslavs' rather than 'Serbs', 'Croats' or 'Muslims' before the war in Bosnia. Most of them were born within an inter-ethnic marriage, but they were forced to claim their ethnicity either as Serb, Croat or Muslim, usually that of one of their parents' because of their security fears.

Negative stereotyping of other opposing identity groups, the history of conflict and the use of symbols further reinforced this fear. The stereotyping of other groups fuels the hostility among people towards stereotyped groups. Accepting assigned psychological positions of 'us' and 'them' in the inter-group relationships, individuals overstate the goodness of their own group while vilifying others.[59] As the negative impact of stereotyping, the group tends to interpret the behaviour of others according to their stereotypes. Consequently, the other groups always look threatening. Problematic history between identity groups contributes to fear and hatred. When the tension between identity groups becomes high, each group is likely to remember past problematic incidents, such as genocide or severe oppression. Those histories are expressed in mythic terms and glorified or remembered as tragedies. The tales of myths and tragedies are passed from generation to generation. Also, symbols can be used to fuel hatred between different groups. For example, the Croatian government adapted the symbols of the wartime Ustashe regime that committed the genocide upon the Serbs.[60] This incident enormously enhanced the fear factor among the Serb population on the verge of the secession.

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[58] Chaim Kaufman, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1996, p 141.
[59] Horowitz, op.cit., pp 167-171. Lake and Roschild, op. cit., 1996, pp 53-54.
[60] James D. Fareson, 'Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict', in David A Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, Princeton University Press, 1998, p 119.

While those factors of mass non-rationality can become a driving force of conflict escalation, the role of contentious leaders in the violent outbreak of intrastate conflict cannot be underestimated.[61] Their part in the development towards violence is as important as that of the masses. Leaders take major responsibility for guiding the identity group as they: articulate their values; define collective interests, set strategies and manage relations with outsiders, while keeping an eye on rebellion within their own group. Leaders who lead identity groups to violence are generally characterised as contentious or belligerent. The motives behind contentious leaders are usually two types: they are extreme nationalists or ideologists, and they pursue personal power.

Leaders can have a strong influence on the preconditions for mass hostility. They translate domestic inequality as the dividing line between identity groups, and claim that other groups are responsible for the inequality. Leaders can interpret undesirable behaviour of the others as being due to their evil 'character' regardless of the real intention, and thereby create the enemy image.[62] To some extent, leaders can manipulate mass fear or anger.

Having said that, the mass chooses the contentious leaders based on their rational calculation of their collective interests not just through irrational emotion. In this sense, the contentious leaders require some degree of mass hostility in order to take the leadership of the groups. Another important condition for the rise to power of contentious leaders is political space where they can act or appeal to group members. The availability of political space, or 'political opportunity', depends on the conditions in the existing state rules and practices of repression of political activities and access to institutions.[63] Unless there is a certain degree of political opportunity, it is unlikely that conflict will intensify into violence. This point is shown by the fact that conflict has difficulty in manifesting itself publicly in the weak state under a strong authoritarian regime, despite the potential problems of economic, political and social conditions under such a regime. Therefore, conflict is more likely to emerge

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[61] Esman, op. cit., p 33.
[62] Janice Gross Stein, 'Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution', in Chester A. Crocker et. al. (eds.), op. cit., p 96. Chaim Kaufman, op. cit.
[63] Sindy Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 1998, chapter 5. Esman, op. cit., p31-32.; Gurr, op. cit., p129-130.

when the authoritarian regime declines or is in transition to democracy.[64] Democratisation, the process of expanding political participation, certainly provides political opportunity for contentious leaders. Or threatened elites may themselves become contentious leaders, when they face the danger of a collapse of their domination, using nationalist appeals to gain legitimacy or support from the people and opposition leaders. This kind of elites' behaviour inevitably provokes the other groups' mobilisation. The recent outbreak of violence in Zimbabwe is one such example. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe appealed to the nationalism of the black population by attacking the wealthy white population, who are descendants of Western colonialists. He appealed for a Zimbabwe free from colonialism, but his intention seemed rather to gain sufficient popularity to win the coming democratic election as a part of democratisation. Given political space and the presence of mass hostility or the preconditions for it, the mass will have the reason and means to respond to extremist appeals by the contentious leaders.[65]

These factors in intra-group interactions - mass hostility and contentious leaders - are to some degree dependent upon each other. For intrastate conflict to move towards violence, both factors are required.

Inter-group Interactions

All these factors above, however, may not be sufficient reason for identity groups to engage in a bloody war as war is still a costly and risky gamble: people are killed; factories, farms, and cities are destroyed; industries and economies collapse and everything may end up in rubble and ashes. Considering the possible destruction and devastation which violence brings, negotiated settlement would seem a far preferable alternative for all identity groups. The reason why negotiated settlements still fail can be fundamentally attributed to distrust between disputant groups possibly manifested as three kinds

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[64] Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. Nevertheless, some suggest that democratisation does not always result in conflict, but can proceed peacefully. (Renée de Nevers, 'Democratization and Ethnic Conflict', in Michael E. Brown(ed), op. cit., 1993, pp 61-78.) Quantitative analysis of the relation between conflict and regime type shows the democratising states prone to conflict. (Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, pp5-38.)

[65] S. Kaufman, op. cit.

of problems in the negotiating process: information failure, commitment problems and the security dilemma.[66]

Information failure refers to the situation which arises when disputant groups are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement through negotiation due in part to private information and incentives to misrepresent such information.[67] Private information is inside information about their own military capacities and willingness to fight that others do not know, and negotiators may misrepresent such information in order to gain a better deal. However, it may create a situation in which groups cannot share the necessary information to bridge the bargaining gap between them. As a result, the groups may gradually come to see war as an unavoidable route. For example, when one group exaggerates their military capacities in order to drive for a more favourable demand, the other group may regard such bargaining as impossible to agree and give up the negotiations altogether.

The commitment problem refers to situations in which mutually beneficial agreements are unattainable because of the lack of credible commitment to make peace by the disputants. In effect, it would undermine the credibility of the leaders and groups. The negotiated settlement is a contract; if one group regards the other as unable to carry out their part, the attempt for agreement seems worthless. For instance, in Northern Ireland, the parties agreed the power-sharing agreement outlined in the Good Friday Agreement of April 1999. But one year later, the power-sharing collapsed following the withdrawal of the Unionists who felt that the IRA had not made sufficient progress towards its decommissioning of weapons.

The concept of security dilemma which originated in international relations is expanded by Posen to the study of intrastate ethnic conflict.[68] The precondition for the security dilemma is domestic anarchy, which can be caused by the collapse or weakness of the central government. Under this condition, identity groups are required to protect themselves since they cannot rely upon the

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[66] James D. Feason, 'Rationalist Explanation for War', *International Organization*, vol.49, no.3, 1995, pp 379-414.; James D. Feason, op. cit., 1998, pp 107-126.; Lake and Rothchild, op. cit., 1996.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Barry R. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', in Michael E. Brown (ed), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, 1993, pp 103-124.

central government for their security. Consequently identity groups build up their defence individually. The problem inherent here is that the difference between military forces for defensive use and those for offensive use is difficult to distinguish. One group enhances its defence for its own security, and the other groups may perceive this as a threat to their security. Then they, in turn, enhance their defensive capacity, which invokes further increases of the original group's defence capacity. This vicious circle known as the 'security dilemma' deteriorates inter-group relations.

A fundamental difficulty in the negotiations between the identity groups in protracted intrastate conflict is distrust between them. As the negotiation, especially in the situation of ethnic conflict, includes identity issues that are difficult to compromise and harder to bargain over, it becomes complicated. The three factors mentioned here arise from this basic relationship of distrust between groups, and if relations deteriorate further, they may cause identity groups to resort to violence.

Psychological factors contribute to the occurrence and maintaining of intrastate conflict. Another factor to be mentioned as a cause of the protraction of conflict is the effect of actual violence as the eruption of major violence seriously jeopardises the relations between groups. Once serious violence breaks out, distrust and hostility between groups increase dramatically, which becomes a significant factor in maintaining conflict. For example, in the most extreme situation of ethnic conflict, cruel strategies of ethnic cleansing including the genocide or rape targeting civilians in order to increase the fear and make people flee from the area. Distrust and hostility between the groups increases enormously, both sides escalate their conflict behaviour and continue to fight. Literally it leads to the situation of 'violence breeds violence'.

1.4 Outside Factors

Factors outside the state borders could also be causes of conflict. One potential cause is the flow of refugees, which brings enormous strains on the receiving state. It can possibly induce tension between identity groups within the receiving state. However, whether it develops into serious conflict or not is dependent upon the domestic conditions of the host state. In this sense, these

outside factors may be considered as secondary or catalytic rather than as the primary causes of conflict.

Alternatively, outside factors could contribute significantly to maintaining the conflict once it has broken out. In particular, financial assistance from outside plays a significant role in prolonging the conflict, as productive activity collapses in conflicting states, their economies are shattered by violent conflict.[69] The disputants find it increasing difficult to finance their arms. Although they can finance themselves from various sources such as looting, robbery, hostage-taking, 'war taxes' and the illegal trade of drugs or diamonds, these limited sources of income can be eventually exhausted. Without external financial sources, it is not possible for disputants to continue fighting. This kind of war economy is a crucial factor in the maintenance of contemporary intrastate conflict.

External assistance can take the form of remittances or direct assistance from group members abroad, assistance from foreign governments, or humanitarian assistance. Although humanitarian assistance is obviously intended for vulnerable parts of the population, it is often the case that disputants divert parts of such aid for their use by imposing 'custom duties' on the aid delivered. Apart from financial and material support, foreign states can give political assistance by publicly expressing their support to particular disputants or by not condemning particular disputants' conflict behaviour.[70]

Another outside factor is mercenaries. Mercenary soldiers are either individuals on contract to particular fighting units or they belong to mercenary bands. They are heavily armed and highly trained individuals who share little or no interests in the state or group for which they fight. Fighting is their means to earn a living; therefore, there is rarely an incentive for them to end the conflict.[71] Often they have an interest in profiting from the natural resources in the area,

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[69] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Polity Press, 1999, Chapter 5. M. Dufield, 'The political Economy of Internal War', in J. Macrae and A. Zwi, *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, Zed Books/Save the Children, 1994.

[70] An example of this has been recognised in the relationships between Russia and Serbia throughout the wars in the Balkan in 1990s.

[71] Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, *Civil War, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution*, Pluto Press, 1998, p 55.

such as diamonds, gold and oil and some even have an incentive to maintain the conflict. Recently, mercenary activity has become a very organised business.[72]

Conclusion

There are many possible causes of intrastate conflict. The environment of the weak state generates polarisation; substantive inequality creates the factors for group mobilisation and the psychological state of the identity groups tends to trigger violence. However, it is always possible that the underlying causes can become the proximate causes and the proximate causes can become the underlying causes. For example, a sudden change in an underlying cause with the presence of proximate causes can trigger the event of major violence. The Sri Lankan government's policy of making Sinhalese the sole national language in 1956 caused deep resentment among the Tamil minority and sparked a civil war that continues today.

There has been much argument over which are the most important causes of violent eruption. Of course, some factors have a relatively stronger impact than others, however, each alone does not have much impact on the occurrence of violence. The factors of resource scarcity alone do not necessarily result in violent conflict. Or the emergence of a contentious leader without substantial inequality is unlikely to lead to the eruption of major violence. The causes of conflict often bring about and reinforce each other, so that there is little point in identifying one cause of eruption of violence. Besides, the absence of major violence in the course of conflict does not necessarily indicate that there has been no destruction in the intrastate conflict. Serious human rights abuse can be found even in the absence of a major break-out of violence. Therefore, the effort of searching for causes of intrastate conflict should be focused upon finding a set of causes rather than finding one or two primary causes.

The causes of intrastate conflict outlined in this chapter are summarised in Table 1.1. The table displays the potential causes of intrastate conflict, that is, the range of problems to be dealt with in the process of conflict transformation. However, the causes outlined here should not be taken as exhaustive and definitive variables. Different conflicts have different causes. Some unique

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[72] Kaldor, op. cit., pp 94-5.

factors that are not mentioned here may need to be taken into account when conflicts are analysed individually. Also it should be noted that conflict causes are subject to change throughout the entire process of conflict. Some factors would escalate or recede while others would appear or disappear from the process.

Having seen the potential causes of intrastate conflict, what is distinctive about them is their multiplicity and deep-rootedness. Multiplicity of causes suggests that there is no single method to deal with the whole phenomenon of intrastate conflict. It indicates, furthermore, the necessity for a comprehensive approach. Different parties in the international and the domestic arena need to engage in conflict transformation by using different methods. As there is no governing body of intervention in intrastate conflict, difficulties exist in coordination between parties as well as methods. The deep-rootedness of causes, on the other hand, suggests the need for fundamental change in the societies and that intervention in intrastate conflict needs to be a long-term engagement apart from the responsive actions of conflict management. The multiplicity and deep-rootedness of the causes of conflict suggest the complexity of contemporary intrastate conflict and the enormous challenge of intervention. The next chapter discusses how to deal with such complex phenomenon.

Table 1.1   Causes of Contemporary Intrastate Conflict

The Background of Ethnic Conflict
The Weak State
The lack of political and social integration and institutional, economic and technological underdevelopment

Underlying Causes: Substantive Inequality
Resource Scarcity
   Economic Problems
   (Unemployment, inflation and stagnant productivity…)
   Environmental Change
   (Degradation and loss of good agricultural land, degradation and removal of forests, depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, and depletion of fisheries…)
   Demographic Change
   (Refugees, migrants…)
   Population Growth
Unequal Distribution
   Economic Discrimination
   (Differences in living standards, unequal access to resources, unequal economic opportunities, limited access to education…)
   Political Discrimination
   (Public policies limiting political participation, low participation in politics, proportionally few group members in elective offices, the civil service, or higher-ranking police and military positions…)
   Cultural Discrimination
   (Unequal educational opportunities, constraints on the use or teaching of languages, constraints on religious freedom…)

Proximate Causes: Psychology of Ethnic Conflict
Intra-group Interaction
   Mass Hostility
   -Rational grievance
   (Unequal substantial conditions, Repression/Human rights abuse…)
   -Non-rational emotions: Fear for the Future (Fear of Ethnic Extinction)
   (Stereotypes, history of conflict or use of symbols, myths…)
   Contentious Leaders
   (Existence of political opportunity…)
Inter-group Interaction
   Distrust
   (Information failure, commitment problems, security dilemma…)
   Violence, Destruction by Violence

Outside Factors
   Political Support by Outside States, War economy, Mercenaries…

Chapter 2   How Does Intrastate Conflict Need to be Dealt With?
Problems and Approaches

Introduction

How should protracted intrastate conflict be dealt with? Before considering this question, it is important to understand the problem to be overcome in the phenomenon of protracted intrastate conflict. The problem here does not refer to the causes of conflict seen in the previous chapter. The causes of conflict are all the problematic factors to be tackled in the societies for they potentially contribute to the occurrence or escalation of intrastate conflict; nevertheless, those factors are not conflict itself. Regardless of their extent, those factors can and do exist in any kind of states and societies but do not always lead to protracted intrastate conflict. Intrastate conflict is practically the opposing relationships between groups of people within a state. The very fact the groups are in severe conflict indicates the existence of a fundamental problem in the relationships between the groups. This is because there are various parties with opposing interests, opinions or ideas in almost any state, but not all states develop serious intrastate conflict. Here it is important to understand the exact problem with the relationship between people in intrastate conflict. With a precise understanding of the problem, the way in which intrastate conflict should be dealt with can be discussed appropriately.

The purpose of this chapter is to address the problem expressed in the phenomenon of protracted intrastate conflict and to consider how to deal with it in reflection of the understanding of the problem. In this chapter, firstly, the fundamental problem of intrastate conflict is reconsidered beyond its causes. Secondly theories of conflict resolution are introduced and reviewed regarding the previous argument on the problem in intrastate conflict. Theoretically, the approach towards conflict is categorised into two types: conflict management and conflict resolution. Some argue that these two are incompatible with each other while others suggest that they are complementary. Either way, these two theories show clear differences in their approach towards conflict. Also critical theory suggests the problematic aspects in these approaches and provides an indication on how to deal

with conflict. Lastly, the concept of conflict transformation is proposed and it is argued that dialogue is one of the important tools for conflict transformation in the last section of this chapter.

2.1 Protracted Intrastate Conflict Beyond Causes
What Are We Trying to Solve?

Protracted intrastate conflict is a complex phenomenon caused by many factors in the political, economic, social or cultural spheres of the societies inside as well as outside the state. It is important that those causal factors can be dealt with in one way or another, possibly with the help of third parties such as international organisations, regional organisations, other states, non-governmental organisations or even individuals. While it is important to tackle the causes of conflict where possible in principle, as they potentially contribute to occurrence or escalation of intrastate conflict, it needs to be remembered that those factors are not conflict itself. The individual causal factors do not necessarily cause protracted intrastate conflict on their own. It is apparent that those factors seen in the previous chapter do exist even in societies or states without serious intrastate conflict. Also total elimination of all causal factors is unfeasible. The causes here simply contribute to creating the phenomenon of protracted intrastate conflict.

This poses the questions of what exactly is the problem with protracted intrastate conflict and what exactly are we trying to solve here. The answer to these questions seems simple; conflict. However, conflict as a problem to be solved is not as straightforward as it seems and this is not only concerned with intrastate conflict. Generally conflict is regarded as bad or destructive. On one hand, the term 'conflict' is often used in association with violent confrontation or war. In recent years, mainly in the media, the term 'conflict' is used for describing intrastate or civil wars. Generally conflict is regarded as destructive or even bloody, and considered as something to be avoided or prevented. On the other hand, the term conflict is also used for describing family disputes or the psychological states of individuals. Conflict in this sense is not necessarily characterised as bad or good, destructive or

constructive. Confusion over the use and meaning of the term 'conflict' illustrates the difficulty in identifying the problem.

Academic peace and conflict research has searched for a more precise definition of conflict.[1] However, there are differences in the exact definition of conflict regarding its relations with peace. What is peace and what is conflict? Peace can mean the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war, or can mean cohabitation in harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, harmony and love.[2] The former view of peace is called 'negative peace', and the latter 'positive peace'.[3] Also there is a question of whether conflict means a clash of interests, or includes a much broader range of situations such as social injustice. The former sense of conflict refers to a particular situation in which parties or individuals have incompatible goals.[4] The latter includes not only a pure clash of interests but also situations of injustice created by the social structure even though there is no physical violence and confrontation.[5]

Regardless of those confusing differences, there are also some basic principles agreed among researchers. First, conflict is a dynamic process. Conflict usually refers to an entire process of confrontation between groups or individuals rather than the occurrence of one violent incident. Violence may occur in one of the phases of conflict but not all, therefore, violence or war is not equal to conflict.[6] Situations in one conflict can vary over time in terms of its intensity, as can the causes and the engaging parties. Second, the phenomenon of conflict, in one form or

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[1] The difference of perspectives on conflict by three academic field, strategic studies, conflict research and peace research is in A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: the Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and Peace Researcher', in John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, Macmillan, 1990, pp 71-98.

[2] Kenneth E. Boulding, *Stable Peace*, University of Texas Press, 1978, chapter 1, pp 3-30.

[3] Adam Curle, *Making Peace*, Tavistock Publications, 1971.

[4] This view is mainly taken by so–called the North American pragmatist school, including Kenneth E. Boulding.

[5] This view is mainly taken by the European structuralists, including Johan Galtung and Adam Curle.

[6] Violence is expected to occur at the most intensified stage of conflict. See Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, United States Institute of Peace, 1996. Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, 'The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 28, no. 1, 1991, pp 29-42. Also the table of 'The structure of conflict and nonconflict' in Kenneth E. Boulding, op. cit., 1978, p 9.

another, is an inevitable and ever-present feature of societies and social interaction.[7] As every society involves a number of people with differences in thoughts, beliefs, customs or interests, it is natural that they have different goals, facing various situations. A society without any kind of conflict is lifeless, in a way a dead society; it does not seem plausible in reality.[8] It is more reasonable to consider that conflict is inevitable in any kind of society. Lastly, conflict can be constructive as well as destructive. While conflict can develop to become a danger leading to destruction, it can also be an opportunity for change, possibly for improvement. As people redefine their interests according to the change of the situation in their societies, those interests can become incompatible at any time. However, conflict does not necessarily have to lead to destruction such as violence, rather, conflict can be a chance to create a new environment in which all people can readjust to be better off.

From those basic features of conflict, we can understand that conflict itself is not always a problem to be resolved. Intrastate conflict is not necessarily destructive and not equal to intrastate war. In fact, conflict is quite a usual state in group relations within a state where people exist with different interests, ideas, or opinions, so that complete termination of conflict is not feasible. Intrastate conflict is not necessarily a problem itself but may need some control in order not to become destructive.

What Causes Destruction

As violence is a manifestation of destruction, the intensity of violence has been regarded as an important indicator to recognise when conflict becomes destructive. Practically it is often the case that protracted intrastate conflict gets international attention when it reaches serious stages, that is, the point at which violence breaks out or is about to break out. Also a certain amount of academic attention has been paid to the degree of violence, especially when third party intervention is discussed. This tendency is seen in the popular and important debates,

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[7] C.R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, Macmillan, 1981, p 7.
[8] Ibid., p 8.

such as on the use of force by the international community in intervening in intrastate conflict at the violent stage.

Obviously violence in intrastate conflict, harming or killing people, is a serious problem that should be prevented or stopped. However, it needs to be remembered that non-violent intrastate conflict can be as destructive as the violent. In a more inclusive perspective on violence, Johan Gultung provides three conceptual categories: direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence.[9] Direct violence is what we generally term 'violence', referring to a particular action or actions taken by somebody directly towards its victims, in other words, harming people through such means as killing, torture, rape or imprisonment. Structural violence is harm to people caused by distorted social structures.[10] Structurally caused uneven resource distribution, limited political participation or power, and unequal opportunity for education are examples of this sort as discussed as the causes of conflict in Chapter 1. These do not hurt people directly or instantaneously but eventually affect their lives. Structural violence indicates the process that results in the harming of people. Cultural violence is any aspect of culture that can be used to legitimise direct or structural violence. It can be identified in terms of religious, ideological or linguistic symbols. Myths often become an enforcer of cultural violence.[11] Not culture as a whole, but some aspects of it can be culturally violent. Compared with the other types of violence, cultural violence is difficult to recognise, because culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on and dulls us into seeing exploitation or repression as normal.[12]

Direct violence is apparently destructive and needs to be prevented or mitigated in intrastate conflict. Although the concepts of structural and cultural

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[9] Galtung typified violence with a wide definition as an 'insult to basic human needs, and more generally to *life*' and classifies four kinds of basic human needs: survival, well-being, identity and freedom. Johan Galtung, *Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, SAGE Publications, 1996, p 197. Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 27, no. 3, 1990, p 292.

[10] A criticism of Kenneth E. Boulding, 'Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies', in John Burton and Frank Dukes (eds.), op. cit., pp 38-9.

[11] For example, Nazi Germany claimed the Aryan supremacy over all other races, especially the Jews and justified their brutal behaviour towards them. Serbs claim their rights to govern Kosovo, based on their history of the tragic battle fought there which has been told in mythic terms to mobilise ethnic nationalism.

[12] Galtung, op. cit., 1996, p 200.

46

violence are profoundly controversial, they demonstrate that there is intrastate conflict potentially destructive to people and their lives without manifestation.[13] For instance, East Timor had suffered under repressive Indonesian governance from 1975 with few reported large-scale violent incidents until 1999. However, there was serious human rights abuse of the East Timorese by the government. It was reported that East Timorese women had been forcibly sterilised or given contraceptive drugs while they were under anaesthetic in the hospital.[14] Or having been told they were to be vaccinated the whole schools of girls in East Timor have been injected with contraceptive drugs, including the internationally banned drug, Depo Provera.[15] This sort of birth control can be seen as one form of genocide even though no death had ever been recorded. If we refer only to the escalation of physical violence, the intrastate conflict in East Timor would never be seen as destructive until the major outbreaks of violence after the referendum in 1999. Another example can be found in Tibet under Chinese domination. The Tibetans have been suffering forceful integration policies by the Chinese government; however, the Tibetan struggle for independence is not violent because of their strong belief in Buddhism. Even though little violence is observed in Tibet, destruction has been certainly brought into the Tibetans' lives.

A background of destruction without manifest expression is power asymmetry between the disputant parties. Power has various dimensions depending on its sources,[16] but here, power can be considered as an ability to get what one wants or the ability to dominate others. When the relations between groups are uneven, human rights abuse is very likely to be found. Theoretically, both types of relationship, even and uneven or academically described as symmetric and

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[13] For criticism of those concepts, see for instance, C.R. Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, Gower Publishing, 1981, pp 19-20. Structural violence on psychological needs, for example, results from value-deprivation. There are no objective criteria to distinguish one's needs and desire. For some less obvious cases, the problem emerges of what criteria can be used to measure the existence and degree of structural violence, by an external observation or the people involved. A similar problem persists with cultural violence.

[14] At http//:www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/8715/timor/women.htm

[15] Ibid.

[16] The details in Kenneth E. Boulding, *Three Faces of Power*, Sage Publications, 1989.

asymmetric,[17] can be peaceful as well as unpeaceful.[18] But the asymmetric relations are far more problematic in nature. In asymmetric relations, it is far more difficult to achieve peaceful relationships because the essence of a peaceful but asymmetric relationship is 'that the smaller or weaker partner is helped' by the stronger parties 'to develop his potentialities'[19], so that the weaker contributes to the development of his strength as a result. One of the examples of such asymmetric relations is the relationship between parent and child. The relationships between parent and child can be peaceful if parents support their children and encourage their development. Parents can learn something from the relationships with children, so that both can develop. The relationship between teacher and student is another example. The peaceful relationship largely depends on the role the parent or teacher, the stronger, takes. In reality it may be rare that the stronger is supportive of the potential of the weaker in human relations. The stronger tends to hinder the weaker's development because the stronger sees the weaker's growth as a threat to themselves or their interests. It is more likely that the stronger takes advantage of being strong and exploits the weaker. This can be justified by various forms of culture such as myth, religion and legend. Asymmetric power relations between groups are fixed in their structure and confirmed by some aspects of culture. In unpeaceful asymmetric relations, the weaker party's efforts to assert or achieve its interests would encounter suppression of the stronger party. Therefore, even though order or absence of violence may prevail on the surface, human rights abuse is very likely to found. This is the state of 'negative peace'.

In order to transform these unpeaceful relationships into peaceful ones, it is necessary to have a fundamental change of social structure and perception, which can only be achieved by a concession from the stronger party and the empowerment of the weaker party. With any social change conflict is the inevitable consequence regardless of its scale as mentioned previously. Intrastate conflict is, therefore, an

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[17] Kumar Rupesinghe, *Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution*, Pluto Press, 1998. Hugh Miall et.al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution, The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Policy press, 1999, pp 12-4. William Zartman (ed.), *Elusive Peace*, The Blookings Institution, 1995.
[18] Adam Curle, op. cit., 1971, pp 9-18.
[19] Ibid., p 16.

inevitable part of the process of transforming unpeaceful asymmetric relationships to peaceful ones. Unless the stronger party is willing to offer concessions, which is highly unlikely in reality, conflict becomes seriously protracted. The weaker party may be pushed to have no choice but resort to extreme measures such as direct violence in order to make their claim heard.

Power asymmetry in the relationships between groups seems plausible as the problem expressed in intrastate conflict. However, we have to remember two points. First, not all asymmetric relations are unpeaceful. This means that asymmetric relations do not necessarily develop into conflict. Second, some kinds of asymmetry between people always exist and it is impossible to balance all power differentials. Complete power symmetry is practically impossible to achieve.

The argument above clearly illustrates that the potential conditions for serious conflict do exist in any kind of society all the time; it is not feasible to attempt total termination of those conditions. It appears that the most serious problem in protracted intrastate conflict lies in the very fact that people are not dealing with conflict in a non-violent manner when it emerges.

2.2 Theories of Conflict Resolution

Conflict Management

The phenomenon of serious intrastate conflict needs to be dealt with in an appropriate manner. Conflict management is one of the proposed theoretical approaches to deal with such protracted conflict. Seen in the methods of arbitration or mediation, conflict management aims at settling conflict through dealing with the issues in dispute by bargaining. In the conflict management approach, conflict is considered a clash of interests, so that what matters here are the issues claimed by the disputant parties in conflict. The third parties use threat and reward in order to gain concessions because a simple tool of negotiation is often not enough. This is regarded as the conventional approach of diplomacy or international relations. Conflict management is perceived as more or less essential especially for dealing with intrastate conflict at the violent stage, because a quick solution is needed to deal with the situation. However, it is also evident that this type of approach does not

necessarily provide a solution for protracted intrastate conflict. A quantitative analysis shows the clear tendency that most of the armed conflict terminated through negotiated settlements resulted in the breakdown of agreements and the re-occurrence of violence.[20] Many scholars have attempt to clarify causes of unstable settlement in different ways leading to various conclusions; however, most of them seem to have agreed in recognising the continuity of serious tension or confrontation within the state and indicating the necessity of continuous strong commitment by third parties.[21]

It is pointed out that conflict management fails to challenge the power politics base due to its dependency on the use of threat and reward tactics for gaining concessions.[22] Settlement means balancing power between disputant parties often by adding the power of a third party in such forms of threat or reward. However, the state with serious intrastate conflict suffers from various problematic factors in their political, economic, social and cultural spheres. With the background of original power asymmetry, the balanced power with third parties' intervention in such a state is unlikely to hold in the long term.

It is inevitable that there is reliance on conflict management approaches in any acute crisis situation due to human lives being put at risk. However, conflict management does not address either the underlying causes of conflict or the problematic nature of the societies where conflict has not been dealt with non-violently. Conflict management may be able to achieve negative peace, however, the approach of conflict management inevitably has its limits.

Conflict Resolution

The other proposed theoretical approach towards protracted intrastate conflict is conflict resolution. The conflict resolution approach places an emphasis

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[20] Roy Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil War: 1945-1993', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, 1995, pp 681-90.

[21] Ibid. Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*, United States Institute of Peace, 1996. Calonine A. Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 43, no. 1, 1999. Roy Licklider (ed.), *Stopping Killing: How Civil Wars End*, New York University Press, 1993.

[22] Vivienne Jabri, *Discourse on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*, Manchester University Press, 1996, p 155.

on improving the relationships between disputant parties. As this approach regards conflict as subjective, it is considered that improving the relationships and increasing understanding between the disputants would lead to a mutual agreement on the issues in dispute. Burton describes conflict resolution as 'the transformation of a relationship in a particular case by the solution of the problems which led to the conflictual behaviour in the first place'.[23] From the perspective of the conflict resolution approach, the problem lies in the relationship between parties, so that conflict is merely an expression of the relationship problems.

The conflict resolution approach in practice is described as a facilitative approach as it attempts to facilitate between the disputant parties. This type of approach is typically represented by one of the intervention tools, so-called problem-solving workshops. Problem-solving usually take the form of a week-long meeting of the representatives of the parties of conflict in an informal, often academic setting. Problem-solving attempts the re-analysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the generation of alternative courses of action to coercion, alongside new options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution, involving an agreement and a new relationship between the adversaries.[24] This type of approach places an emphasis on communicative interaction between the parties. Facilitating communicative interaction in a face-to-face encounter of party representatives is expected to lead towards mutual understanding of the conflict causes or recognition of conflict and the obstacles to its resolution. The third party's role here is as convener, facilitator, moderator and source of ideas for the adversaries. Ideally, problem-solving involves individuals who have influence on the disputant parties' policies. Then, the results of the problem-solving, such as new ideas, perspectives or understanding on conflict and its resolution, or even a draft of the agreement, will be hopefully reflected in the official policy of disputant parties in the preferably near future to contribute to mitigation or termination of conflict.

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[23] John W. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*, vol. 1, Macmillan, 1990, p 3.

[24] Christopher R. Mitchell, 'Problem-solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution', Denis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester University Press, 1993, p 79. For the problem-solving approach see C. R. Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*, Pinter, 1996. John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts: A Handbook*, Lanham/MD, University Press of America, 1987.

Being a critical force to the theory and practice of conflict management which focuses on the issues in dispute rather than disputants' relations, conflict resolution becomes an alternative approach to work for positive peace by going beyond settling the issues in dispute by using power. However, some problematic aspects have also been pointed out in conflict resolution approach. According to the critiques, this type of approach does not challenge the existing order, system or structure which generates conflict in the first place.[25] What underlies the manifestation of protracted intrastate conflict is a power asymmetry between the parties that is generated and sustained by the systems, structures or institutions in the societies. Some critiques argue that the facilitative approach does not give much consideration to power asymmetry between parties.[26] Or rather, the facilitative approach seems to believe that as long as communicative interaction is restored and encouraged, the parties themselves will eventually reach mutual understanding on the nature of conflict and revise their power asymmetry voluntarily.[27] But this may be difficult to implement in practice. The party with power would naturally prefer to maintain the status quo and continue to enjoy their privileges; and so are unlikely to be willing to encourage changes that would reduce their power. The conflict resolution approach does not necessarily address the power issue, moreover, it may even reinforce the power asymmetry by taking the existing social order, system or structure that constitutes asymmetry for granted.[28]

As seen in the problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution brings in another dimension by introducing the subjective aspects of conflict. However, the approach also seems problematic because it does not necessarily take account of power asymmetry embedded in the social system or structure. With the deteriorated state of relationships as a major problem in intrastate conflict, the approach of conflict resolution seems to fail to note the fact that the relationships are greatly subject to the influence of the power factor.

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[25]   Jabri, op.cit. A. B. Fetherston, 'Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no.1, 2000, pp 190-218. Joseph A. Scimecca, 'Theory and Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Contradiction in Terms?', in Sandle and van der Merwe (eds),op. cit.

[26]   Jabri, op.cit. Fetherston, op. cit.

[27]   See Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, op. cit., 1996, p 54.

[28]   Jabri, op. cit.

Implications of Critical Theory

While the conflict management and conflict resolution approaches have some problematic aspects, it seems that both approaches have faced a common problem from different directions, that is to say the power issue. On one hand, conflict management would not overcome this issue because it is closely linked with the use of power. On the other hand, conflict resolution would not offer a solution on its own by turning a blind eye to the asymmetric power relations between disputant parties represented in existing social structures and systems. The power issue, therefore, appears to be a dilemma for third party intervention.

To overcome this, some conflict resolution critiques suggest a hypothetical social space free from coercion or threat of coercion.[29] Such a social space allows the ideal communicative interaction in which people could question and argue without feeling any kind of threat. Even the social structure or normative system needs to be open for question and argument, which is often difficult in practice because those who represent the interests of stronger people can pose a threat to the weaker people whether they intend to do so or not. Communicative action has to be bounded to argument free from coercion or manipulation. People argue to convince others by using only force of argument not by power of any other sort.[30] Fetherston, with reference to Habermas, describes communicative action as 'a means of intersubjective dialogue between a community of actors which enables them to reconstruct common understandings of their lifeworld and therefore renew the shared basis for culture, social integration, and socialization that underlie a mutual existence.'[31] The issue of power should not be a problem in this communicative action because the space itself is detached from its influence but at the same time, the justification of power structures is to be discussed. This is the ideal speech situation.

As critical theory has its roots in the other theoretical approaches, it does not provide a practical alternative approach to dealing with protracted intrastate conflict

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[29] Ibid. Fetherston, op.cit. Both Jabri and Fetherston refer to Habermas' 'theory of communicative action', in Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, (Translated by F. Lawrence), Cambridge, Polity, 1987.

[30] Jabri, op. cit., p 164.

[31] Fetherston, op. cit., p 212.

effectively. Nonetheless, critical theory indicates that the problem lies in the way people interact with each other. The way people interact with each other when they face difference between themselves decides whether or not conflict escalates to becoming protracted. The communicative action described above can be regarded as a potential means for renegotiating the bases of mutual existence for the disputants. However, the ideal space of communicative action hardly exists in reality. The proposition indicated in critical theory does not seem feasible in the practice of intervention. How the idea can be reflected in intervention is to be considered further.

2.3 Conflict Transformation and Dialogue
Conflict Transformation

Rather than how we should engage in intervention, the proposition drawn from critical theory seems to provide an indication of what we hope to achieve through the overall intervention. The proposed communicative action is where people question and argue without receiving coercion or threat. The communicative action here must be bounded to argument that proceeds using only logic to convince others. Social structures and normative systems that involve power asymmetry can become the subjects of debate. Whether the power asymmetry can be modified or not, the system or structure in question can establish legitimacy by going through the discussion and being accepted with a mutual understanding. Therefore, conflict would not develop into violence. Hypothetically, by having the space with ideal speech conditions, the societies should be able to handle conflict without allowing it to cause too much destruction.

However, it should be admitted that the social space for communicative action free from coercion or the threat of coercion drawn from the theoretical argument is indeed hypothetical. There are problems in achieving the ideal speech conditions in real societies. Communication between people is likely to reflect power relations regardless of the extent, because it occurs in the context of the relationships between them. In a communication space, people tend to consider who they and their counterparts are, including their social positions, nationalities, gender,

race, tribe or religion, all of which inevitably affect their communicative action consciously or unconsciously. Therefore, a space of communicative action cannot be totally independent from social structure and system. Also the maintenance of the space for such communicative interactions is problematic because the social structures and systems change as the surrounding environment alters over time. Those changes continuously occur and potentially affect the space for communicative interaction.

Although a space with ideal speech conditions would never possibly be perfected, a culture of respecting such communicative interactions needs to be cultivated within the societies. Any society has peaceful and unpeaceful aspects. The societies need to be at work continuously generating and maintaining more peaceful aspects, in the light of the changing social structures and systems. In the societies with protracted intrastate conflict unpeaceful aspects overwhelm peaceful aspects for several reasons. Peaceful transformation of the societies with intrastate conflict can be recognised as a shift from a 'war culture' to 'peace culture'.[32] The process of transformation is best-described by Lederach's explanation of 'peacebuilding' that

> 'transforms a war-system characterized by deeply divided, hostile, and violent relationships into a peace-system characterized by just and interdependent relationships with the capacity of finding non-violent mechanisms for expressing and handling conflict. The goal is not stasis, but rather the generation of continuous, dynamic, self-regenerating processes that maintain from over time and are able to adapt to environmental changes. Such an infrastructure is made up of a web of people, their relationships and activities, and the social mechanisms necessary to sustain the change sought. This takes place at all levels of the society.'[33]

Activating and enhancing remaining peaceful aspects in the society should contribute to ideal speech conditions although they would never be perfected. The overall efforts to cultivate peace culture in order to transform conflict peacefully are

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[32] John Vasquez, *War Puzzle*, Cambridge CUP Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1993. Johan Galtung and Carl G. Jacobsen, *Searching for Pace,: The Road to TRANSCEND*, Pluto Press, 2000. Peace culture and war culture does not indicate an entire culture but aspects of culture but has peaceful aspects as well as unpeaceful aspects. (Galtung, op. cit, 1990, p 291. Galtung, op. cit., 1996, p 196.)

[33] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p 84.

described as 'conflict transformation'.[34] Being the Although the more popular term to be used, 'conflict resolution' tends to concentrate on specific issues in dispute. 'Conflict transformation' is more comprehensively considers how the environment around conflict needs to be transformed. Therefore, the process the societies with protracted intrastate conflict towards the ones whereby conflict is handled with non-violent means would be better-described as conflict transformation rather than conflict resolution.

Operations of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, which are considered part of the conflict transformation process, are described as peacebuilding.[35] In practice, it is often the case that most of the agencies working on peacebuilding are apparently working towards establishing liberal democracy and market economy in war-shattered states. However, it is in fact problematic to consider that the process of conflict transformation would lead to a certain political and economic system. In some societies liberal democracy and market economy would be able to provide the infrastructure to secure the space with ideal speech conditions; however, it may not be necessarily applicable to all the societies in the world. The required systems and structures for ideal conditions vary depending on its social and cultural backgrounds of the societies. In addition, as Lederach mentions, social systems or structures, including political or economic system, are subject to change over time according to changes in the environment. What needs to be preserved is the space where people interact without being subjected to coercion, threat or manipulation. The political, economic or social systems, structures or institutions are there to support the creation and restoration of the ideal conditions but are not the purpose itself. In addition, practically speaking, democracy and the

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[34] Conflict transformation is a relatively new term used in the literature dealing with conflict. (For example, Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), *New Developments in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, Sage, 1991. Adam Curle, *Tools for Transformation*, Hawthorn Press, 1990. Louis Kriesberg, et.al., (eds.), *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation*, Syracuse University Press, 1989. Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), *Conflict Transformation*, Macmillan, 1995.)

[35] Although there are various definitions of peacebuilding proposed, peacebuilding here means simply reconstruction and reconciliation of the society in general. For various definitions, see Charles-Philippe David, 'Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?: Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1999, pp 25-41.

market economy are indeed a double-edge sword.[36] The market economy encourages competition and liberal democracy promotes public expression of conflicting interests. Implementing market democracy in a state that has experienced intrastate conflict is extremely difficult not only because the state has a recent history of violence but also because it typically lacks the capacity for resolving internal dispute peacefully. Therefore, simply introducing the system of liberal democracy or market economy to the state should not seen as either a solution to protracted intrastate conflict or the purpose of conflict transformation.

Conflict transformation should not be considered a blueprint 'solution' but the process, which is promoted by all efforts, to develop aspects of peace culture in the societies suffering from protracted conflict. What matters are not political institutions or the economic system but reconciliation of broken and hostile relationships between people within societies.

A Tool for Conflict Transformation: Dialogue

In societies ideally, there should be a space where people are able to exchange their ideas and opinions over their differences in a constructive manner without imposing upon one another. Practically speaking, however, it would not be possible to establish and maintain such ideal speech conditions especially in the societies with protracted conflict because of power relations. As creating the ideal social space for communicative action is not quite feasible in practice, the point here seems to be how people interact and communicate with each other under given circumstances rather than whether we can create the social space free from coercion or manipulation.

Communicative interaction certainly seems important for promotion of conflict transformation. Communicative interaction is not always constructive as it can be used destructively or violently against other people without using direct violence. However, the exchange of communicative action can be constructive. Here the focus should be on dialogue, a specific kind of constructive communicative

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[36] Ibid. Ronald Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1997, pp 54-89.

57

interaction, because it is close to the communicative interaction in ideal speech conditions described in the critical theory.

Dialogue is much more than just communicative interaction or conversation. While ordinary conversation tends to become communicative interaction of 'talking to each other', dialogue can be appropriately described as the interaction of 'listening to each other'. Dialogue is a process of honest and genuine communicative interaction between people leading to deeper understanding. Dialogue is the exchange of ideas and views between people, not their imposition on each other. Although people may not agree with others' viewpoints, everyone is entitled to have his or her own view. Therefore, in dialogue, individuals' viewpoints are presented not to be judged or criticised but to be acknowledged and understood by others. Dialogue does not necessarily lead to an agreement, however, people recognise differences with respect and attempt to find a common ground. Dialogue is intersubjective interaction in a constructive manner. The features of dialogue are distinctive compared to some other forms of communicative interactions such as discussing, debating, persuading or arguing. Those communicative interactions are described as an 'adversarial approach' by Saunders, as they tend to argue for a solution to problems by attacking others' points of view and defending one's own.[37] While it can be constructive, communicative interaction in an adversarial approach narrows peoples' view. Also in order to win 'solution wars', communicative interactions of adversarial approach can become a strategic bargaining process rather than an honest exchange.[38] Dialogue, on the contrary, opens up new views, enlarging perspectives for people to absorb and deepen understanding of each other, setting aside assumptions and prejudice built upon their experience.

The problem expressed by the phenomenon of violent intrastate conflict is the fact that conflict has not been dealt with by non-violent means in the societies. Based on this understanding of the problem in protracted intrastate conflict, developing a culture of dialogue in the societies should make some sort of contribution to overcoming intrastate conflict. However, it is not easy to implement

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[37] Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflict*, St. Martin's Press, NY, 1999, p 82-85.
[38] Ibid.

dialogue as a means of non-violence in the society to deal with intrastate conflict, because violence has been tolerated as a means of handling conflict. Nevertheless, conflict transformation, the process to overcome destructive intrastate conflict, can be basically seen as a two-fold process of deconstructing violence and constructing peace.[39] Developing dialogue in the situation of protracted intrastate conflict can contribute to both ends as dialogue can be an alternative means to violence in dealing with intrastate conflict, and at the same time, it can be infrastructure of the future for the societies based on a culture of dialogue not the use of violence.

Conclusion

There are many problematic conditions potentially contributing to the occurrence and escalation of intrastate conflict. While those are to be tackled individually, it is impossible to terminate all the problematic conditions in the societies. Also there are always various parties with opposing opinions or ideas relating to problematic conditions having conflict of interest in a state while not all of them develop destructive intrastate conflict. Then the point is how to deal with the differences and conflict as it emerges without letting it become destructive. The fundamental problem expressed in the phenomenon of protracted intrastate conflict is that the opposing groups of people are not dealing with conflict by non-violent means.

The examination of the theories of conflict resolution indicates the problem of power issues in the relationships between the disputants. Although hypothetically the social space for communicative action free from coercion, threat or manipulation would offer a means of non-violence to handle conflict, creating such a space would not be possible in practice due to the inevitability of power relations between human beings. Therefore, the focus needs to be shifted from a space to people. It is possible to activate and cultivate peace culture in the society to contribute to creating such conditions, while the perfect space would never be achieved. Peace culture can and should be embedded in the way people think, behave, act and interact, that is, in the

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[39] Murray Thomson, et.al., *Local Initiatives for Peace: Community-level Conflict Resolution,* 1998. (Available at http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/)

59

human mind and human relationships. The society's capacity to handle conflict by non-violent means depends on whether people can interact in a constructive manner under given circumstances. Conflict should be dealt with by non-violent means. The overall process of societal change of cultivating such peace culture in order to transform conflict peacefully is described as 'conflict transformation'. Conflict transformation in a state with protracted intrastate conflict is a process of reconciliation transforming broken and hostile human relationships with protracted conflict to relationships that are able to handle conflict non-violently.

Dialogue, a form of communicative interaction in a constructive manner, certainly appears to be an appropriate non-violent means to handle conflict. Dialogue is a constructive way to interact and refers to the exchange of ideas and opinions between people without imposing them onto each other. Dialogue is a process of understanding, which enables people to respect differences and find common ground In order to promote conflict transformation in societies with protracted intrastate conflict dialogue seems an important potential tool for conflict transformation.

Chapter 3   Intervention in Divided Societies and Dialogue

Introduction

The fundamental problem expressed by the phenomenon of violent and protracted intrastate conflict is that conflict is not handled non-violently. How then can external parties contribute to peaceful transformation of protracted intrastate conflict? In order to do so, external parties or third parties can intervene in conflict by using military, political, economic and social means. Attempts by third parties to change the dynamics of conflict are generally called third-party intervention or simply intervention. Theoretically dialogue has been identified in the previous chapter as a potentially appropriate tool to deal with conflict, however, it needs to be clarified that the dialogue at issue here is not a form of intervention applied by third parties but a tool for conflict transformation applied by the disputant group members. Third parties can only provide opportunities and create the appropriate environment for disputants to have inter-group dialogue as they intervene.

Dialogue has indeed been seen as an important means to tackle intrastate conflict. Various forms of dialogue, such as training, seminars, meetings or problem-solving workshops, are facilitated in societies divided by intrastate conflict and there are significant works on dialogue development. This rich literature on dialogue facilitation focuses on how to develop dialogue in the communicative interaction between disputant parties. The problem-solving approach, in particular, has been intensively studied.[1] The literature discusses the points for the facilitators on what or how to act, or what kind of environment they should provide for participants. Mitchell suggests that much of the existing literature about the problem-solving workshops 'takes the form of handbooks or manuals that list rules or sets of instructions on how to conduct a successful exercise, rather in the manner of a simple cookbook'.[2] In other words, those

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[1] John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*, University Press of America, 1987. W. Ury, *Getting Past 'No': Negotiating With Difficult People*, Bantam Books, 1991. Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem Solving Approach*, Pinter, 1996.

[2] Christopher R. Mitchell, 'Problem-solving exercises and theories of conflict resolution', in Denis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester University Press, 1993, p 83.

works focus on how to facilitate dialogue in a space for communicative interaction between disputants' members.

In order for conflict transformation to occur in intrastate conflict, dialogue needs to be implemented in societies as a means to deal with conflict. Indeed, implementing dialogue needs to be started from facilitating dialogue in interactions between peoples one by one until it prevails in the whole society. However, as far as facilitating dialogue in protracted intrastate conflict is concerned, often problems lie in bringing people from both sides of the conflict into communicative interaction in a constructive manner. Interaction between the peoples in protracted intrastate conflict is violent exchange whether physical or verbal, and they often refuse to communicate with each other in any other way. Therefore, careful consideration needs to be given on how to bring the peoples together for communication and further dialogue in the setting of protracted intrastate conflict.

This chapter considers how intervention can contribute to inter-group dialogue in the situation of protracted intrastate conflict. First of all, three levels of the population affected by conflict - the elite level, the middle-range level and the grass-roots level - undergo character analysis as they reflect the patterns of interaction and the targets of intervention. Second, there is an examination of two types of intervention efforts. These are the top-down approach or the bottom-up approach depending on whether the effect of intervention is intended to penetrate the population downwards from the elite level to the grass-roots level or upwards from the grass-roots level to the elite level. Then the relative lack of study on the bottom-up approach and the necessity of the approach are discussed. In addition the practicality and feasibility of working with people in a war-zone needs to be assessed. Thirdly, there is an analysis of how third parties can contribute to inter-group dialogue among citizens. Finally, the criteria of evaluation on the bottom-up intervention efforts for dialogue are discussed in order to pave the way to the case studies in the following chapters.

3.1 Three Levels of Population: Patterns of Interaction

The population affected by intrastate conflict can be categorised into three levels: the elite level, middle-range level and grass-roots level.[3] These three levels of population can be seen as major patterns of interaction among the population polarised under collective identities in intrastate conflict. Those patterns of interaction also indicate the targets of intervention. Cross-level interaction between groups, such as between the elite level in one group and the middle-range or grass-roots level in the other group, may exist. However these kinds of interaction would be far less likely and would not be appropriate grounds on which dialogue can be set up due to the clear asymmetry between the levels. Here these three levels are examined individually for their distinctive characters as are possible intervention efforts to construct peace at each level.

Elite Level

The elite level is composed of key political and military leaders, or in other words, decision-making leaders. The number of people who belong to this level is a very small proportion of the whole population. They are leaders of the government and of opposition movements involved in conflict. These people are the spokespersons of disputant groups and represent the interests and needs of the group members. They undertake great responsibility and are under enormous pressure from their own group members over their positions and perceptions on the issues relating to conflict. Concurrently they are expected to have power and influence on the group members. In reality, how much influence they have on all the group members varies from one group to another, but the elite level is expected to influence the largest proportion of the members, compared to the other two levels, namely the middle-range and grass-roots level. It is possible for the elite level to generate or divert the course of conflict and provide the opportunity to start working for the full-scope construction of peace. The leaderships do not have much flexibility in their behaviour because they are supposed to represent the interests of all group members and the media closely covers their behaviour.

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[3] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, pp 37-55.

The aim of the intervention focusing on this level is to achieve a negotiated settlement between disputant groups and pave the way for further conflict transformation. The process does not occur voluntarily in protracted intrastate conflict because the interests of all disputant parties are so complicated. Leaders are supposed to act for their group interests but sometimes also act for their personal interests. The media attention they receive certainly limits the concessions they can make as the legitimacy of their positions depends on their capacity to protect the group interests. Third parties intervening at this level attempt to promote the process by identifying the disputant groups and their leaders, getting them to the negotiation table and bringing them to agreements. Third parties use a simple method of persuasion but it is often insufficient. Alternative tools of intervention with the power to compel parties to reach an agreement include positive as well as negative sanctions; often described as the carrot and stick approach. As a result, intervention at this level is conducted on the power political base, so that it tends to take the conflict management approach.[4] Intervention efforts at this level are well covered by the media and studied considerably in the field of international relations.

Middle-Range Level

The middle-range level is considered to comprise leaders in the societies with intrastate conflict, but whose positions are not necessarily connected to the political structure of disputant groups.[5] The number of people in this level is not so large but is more than that of the elite level. Middle-range leaders include people who are highly respected as individuals in the communities, or who occupy formal positions of leadership in sectors such as education, business, culture, agriculture, or health. Lederach mentions the middle-range leaders as being religious leaders, well-known scholars, influential businessmen, indigenous leaders and so on, however, this clarification may cause a slight confusion where religious leaders in the religiously featured disputant parties are the elite political decision-makers. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to regard the middle-range leaders as the influential figures in the communities who are not top political leaders but cultural or social leaders, the advisors of the top

[4] Refer to Chapter 2.
[5] Ibid., p 41-42, 46-51.

political decision-makers or low-ranking politicians. On one hand, the middle-range level leaders are connected to ordinary people and understand their problems in their lives, but are not overwhelmed by the burden of these problems. On the other hand, middle-range leaders are also likely to be known by the elite level leaderships and the opinions of the former may possibly influence them. As their position is not based on political or military power, their judgement is not bound to political calculations. They are not in the spotlight of public attention and thus have less limitation on their behaviour. The middle-range leaderships have the potential to work as intermediaries between the elite level and the grass-roots level.

As this level occupies the unique position of having relatively close connections to both the elite level and the grass-roots level, middle-range leaders can become a key for creating an infrastructure for conflict transformation.[6] In other words, the effect of intervention at the middle-range level can effectively penetrate both the elite and the grass-roots population. Indeed the concept of the middle-range level population was proposed by Lederach relatively recently and there is not much systematic analysis of intervention at this level. Generally the middle-range level does not seem to be paid much academic attention except in the intensive work on the problem-solving approach targeting this level. However, the middle-range level certainly needs to be recognised as a part of the population on which intervention efforts can work. The middle-range level population has the potential to perform a valuable role for conflict transformation.

Grass-Roots Level

The grass-roots level refers to the mass, the foundation of the society. Many of the substantial inequalities that cause conflict to be generated are felt at this level but people do not necessarily recognise them according to a line between identity groups. Inequality is defined according to the dividing lines between identity groups by the elites and becomes the dividing lines between disputants groups. The line goes across the community, splitting ordinary people, the grass-roots level population, into hostile groups. As conflict deepens, conflict

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[6] Ibid., p 46.

is felt at first hand at this level. The grass-roots population experience division, hostility and hatred. They struggle for daily necessities such as food, shelter or safety to survive through conflict. They can be so preoccupied with survival that they may not be able to see the whole picture of the conflict. Therefore, while some may positively participate in conflict by resorting to destructive behaviour towards the people in the other group(s), most of the grass-roots population may not react much but just passively accept conflict and the dividing lines.

A particular feature of this level is the massive number of people. Regarding intervention, a comprehensive programme for reaching all of them would be difficult. As intervention tools are likely to be employed locally towards communities or exclusively towards a limited number of people, intervention efforts at this level are not usually expected to make an immediate or comprehensive impact on the course of conflict. Therefore, intervention at the grass-roots level is unlikely to directly contribute to the urgent control of violence at the stage of war or crisis.[7] Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to eliminate intervention at the grass-roots level throughout the entire process of conflict even during the highly escalated phases. For example, there are ways to deliver humanitarian aid and emergency assistance to the grass-roots population during the war phase. Even though there are restrictions on working in conflict areas in such a phase, intervention at the grass-roots level is possible and has great potential to play a part in conflict transformation.

3.2 Intervention and the Population
The Top-down and The Bottom-up Approach

Lederach suggests seeing the population affected by conflict in a pyramid figure.[8](Figure 3.1) From the bottom, the foundation is the grass-roots population which is the most numerous, the elite level is at the top which is the least numerous and the middle-range level is between the elite and grass-roots level. Each level has unique characteristics and displays a potential role for conflict transformation. In principle third parties can and should work on all levels of the population because ultimately conflict transformation has to happen in the societies as a whole.

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[7] For an exceptional case, refer the case of Somalia, see Ibid., pp 52-3.
[8] Ibid., p 39.

Figure 3.1 The Population Affected by Intrastate Conflict

Top Political
Decision-Making Elite

Elite
Leadership

Few

Cultural/Social leaders
Political Advisors
Low-Ranking Politicians

Middle-range
Leadership

Affected Population

Grass-roots
Population

Many

Source: John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p 39.

Theoretically third parties can work to facilitate dialogue between the disputant groups at any level of the population, however, some characteristics of the population levels certainly affect its probability. Intervention at the elite level can be considered as intending to influence the decision-making process of the disputant parties, conducted in such forms as official negotiation or mediation by the representatives of third states or international organisations or through positive or negative sanctions. This is known as first-track intervention or diplomacy. Communicative interactions may be held between elite leaders of disputant parties, however, these are unlikely to become dialogue in the official interactions. Leaderships are the official representatives of group interests and needs and their behaviour is closely monitored. Compromise on group interests and needs can seriously undermine their legitimacy as leaders within their own groups. Under the circumstances, the purpose of negotiation becomes to gain as much as possible for their own group by any possible means rather than to seek a mutually acceptable solution through dialogue.

Apart from official negotiation, there are unofficial third-party attempts at intervention to facilitate dialogue between disputants to provide the intermediary function in unofficial channels.[9] This is undertaken in order to assist formal and

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[9] Maureen Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, *Unofficial Diplomats*, Columbia University Press, 1977.

official negotiation. There are good examples of unofficial diplomacy in the conflict between Israel and Palestine or the civil war in Mozambique.[10] This type of intervention often takes the form of problem-solving workshops.[11] For a problem-solving workshop, third parties provide a venue to unofficial representatives from disputant groups in an informal setting that allows interaction to reanalyse their conflict as a shared problem. Participants can exchange their opinions on their relationship, conflict and possible solutions in the informal setting. Third parties offer assistance to broaden the perceptions of participants, to deepen their analysis of the problem and their innovation in seeking solutions. The methodology of problem-solving is technically applicable to any level of population, nevertheless, the sort of problem-solving of academic interest targets relatively high profile individuals in the disputant parties. In those cases, those workshops strategically facilitated do not necessarily aim to replace formal negotiation but act as an unofficial, pre-negotiation function. Having little obligation to own group members or political calculation, their participation tends to become as individuals rather than as the leaders of the groups, which encourage flexibility or creativity. Problem-solving can enable the parties to be 'ready for the table'.[12]

This kind of unofficial intervention possibly targets individuals in either the elite level or middle-range level and it is not necessarily regarded as part of the first-track intervention. Nevertheless, along with the first-track, official high-political, intervention, unofficial diplomacy attempts to promote conflict transformation from the elite as far as it aims to influence decision-making at a high-political level. Therefore, whether official or unofficial, or targeting the elite or middle-range, the intervention in which the third parties work on to influence the elite level politicians and their decision-making can be categorised as the 'top-down' approach for conflict transformation. This rests on the hope

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[10] Jane Corbin, *Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Israel and the PLO*, Bloomsbury Books, 1994. Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994.

[11] Burton, op. cit., 1987. Mitchell and Banks, op. cit., 1996.

[12] Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, 'The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention', *Journal of Peace Studies*, vol.28, no.1, 1991, p 30. For the transcend method, see Johan Galtung and Carl G. Jacobsen, *Search for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND*, Pluto Press, 2000. Also the Transcend Network website, http://www.transcend.org

that the elite leaders will go on to initiate conflict transformation among the whole population.

Intervention towards citizens can be generally considered as second-track intervention or diplomacy. The second-track here is defined by Montville as 'unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in the ways that resolve their conflict'.[13] Conventionally the unofficial or informal nature is stressed when it comes to second-track intervention. However, the line between official and unofficial or formal and informal is not so clear. Instead of stressing official or unofficial, the second-track is better to be seen as complementary to the top-down approach in its emphasis on change from 'below', that is, conflict transformation among the citizens. Second-track intervention aims at overall change of the societal environment for ordinary people. The intervention targeting the citizens can be the 'bottom-up' approach because third parties can work with the citizens hoping that they will play an important role in conflict transformation. (Figure 3.2)

Figure 3.2   Influence of Intervention on the Population: Top-down and Bottom-up

-Intervention's expected influence on the population
is VERTICAL.
(from the elite level to the grass-roots level.)

-Intervention's expected influence on the population is VERTICAL as well as HORIZONTAL
(from the grass-roots level to the elite level)

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
[13] Joseph Montville, 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy', in Vamik Volkan et al., *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work, Volume II*, Lexington Books, 1991.

In fact, dialogue seems more likely to happen at the citizens' level than at a high political level. Even though dialogue can be facilitated between high politicians unofficially in such spaces as problem-solving workshops, it is often the case that the outcome would not be reflected in official channels. On the contrary, the citizens' level seems to have the potential to develop dialogue as people without political status are likely to carry less restrictions in the space for dialogue and the communicative interactions between them are less likely to be strategic interactions. Also intervention efforts at the citizens' level can work for dialogue even in the difficult setting of intrastate conflict where people tend to withdraw from constructive interaction altogether let alone dialogue. In such situations intervention at the citizens' level can promotes constructive interaction in general that possibly leads to the deconstruction of psychological barricades sustained by stereotypes, destructive myths or exaggerated enemy image of the counterparts, and further dialogue. [14]

As conflict transformation should proceed in the societies as a whole, both the top-down and bottom-up approaches should work complementarily for conflict transformation. The intervention at the elite level often attracts public interest, as we see in intensive coverage by the media. Academic work on third-party intervention has also been concentrated on those of top-down approach in the field of international relations or diplomacy. By comparison, intervention towards the citizens has received far less attention and interest. Although a handful of scholars have recognised the importance and potential of social movement by ordinary people in the global or national process of politics or economy, [15] and much of the writing about intervention at the citizens' level is by practitioners rather than theorists. [16] The bottom-up approach for conflict transformation has been a relatively missed out area of research comparing to the top-down approach.

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[14] Stephan Ryan, 'Peacebuilding Strategies and Intercommunal Conflict: Approaches to the Transformation of Divided Societies', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1996, p 221.
[15] Adam Curl, *Tools for Transformation*, Hawthorn, 1990. Elise Boulding, et.al. (eds), *Peace Culture and Society*, Westview Press, 1991. R.B.J. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds: Struggle for Just World Order*, Boulder, 1988.
[16] For an exceptional work, Judith Large, *The War Next Door: A Study of Second-Track Intervention During the War in Ex-Yugoslavia*, Hawthorn Press, 1999.

The Bottom-up Approach in Protracted Intrastate Conflict

In fact, it seems practical to focus on the top-down approach for conflict transformation. A bigger impact on the dynamics of conflict could be expected by the intervention efforts on a small number of people at the high political level if they are successful, rather than by those at the citizens' level. Indeed, intervention of the citizens' level is not seen as making an immediate and big impact on the course of a conflict. The size of the population is so great that a comprehensive effort seems impossible and individual efforts within each community seem almost meaningless. However, the importance of the bottom-up approach appears greater for conflict transformation in the context of recent protracted intrastate conflict than in the context of a classic war between states. Unlike inter-state conflict –the conventional form of war– current protracted intrastate conflict has features that greatly affect third-party intervention[17]

One of those features is the decentralised organisation of the disputant groups. In the classic war, internal organisation was typically hierarchical. On the contrary in recent intrastate conflict, for example, fighting units include a disparate range of paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, mercenary groups and regular armies.[18] This decentralised internal structure of disputants limits the effect of top-down intervention because the settlement agreed between the political leaderships of disputants does not immediately or necessarily penetrate the whole population. Large recognises the difficulty of the top-down approach and a potential of the bottom-up approach in recent conflict, suggesting '(t)he multiplicity of divisions and cleavages rendered classic 'third party' role conceptions of intervention less useful than (…) intervenors who have complementarity in building up social structure and supporting local initiatives'.[19]

The other feature is the methods of warfare. Protracted intrastate conflict is about identity politics that can resort to population expulsion or ethnic cleansing through the strategies to exploit 'fear and hatred' including mass killing, forcible resettlement, a range of political, psychological and economic

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[17] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Policy Press, 1998. Judith Large, op. cit.
[18] Kaldor, op. cit., p 8.
[19] Large, op. cit., p 88.

techniques of intimidation.[20] Civilians are intentionally targeted so that the number of refugees and displaced persons has increased dramatically in recent intrastate conflict. Kaldor suggests that the ratio of military to civilian casualties in war was 8:1 at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century but now that ratio has been almost reversed.[21] In the 1990s the ratio of military and civilian casualties is 1:8. What this means is that ordinary people are very much involved in intrastate conflict whether they are willing or unwilling.

Also in practice, the top-down approach seems to have been limited use in recent protracted intrastate conflict despite the commitment by the international community. Many cease-fire agreements broke down in the Bosnian conflict during 1992 and 1995 in spite of the efforts by the European Union and West European states. On the Middle East Peace Process after the Oslo Accord in 1993, severe violence has broken out among the citizens, which has significantly jeopardised the peace process itself.

While it is obvious that conflict transformation also needs to occur at the ordinary people's level as well as at the top political level, the top-down approach does not seem sufficient to induce further processes at the grass-roots level. Protracted
 intrastate conflict breaks down relationships not only between the disputant groups but also between the individual citizens as conflict and its effects profoundly penetrate the societies. With an atmosphere of hostility, intimidation and suspicion, healing of severely broken-down relationships does not occur automatically. It is necessary to adopt the approach for bottom-up conflict transformation. In fact, in order to promote overall conflict transformation, the bottom-up approach targeting citizens is essential.

Feasibility of the Bottom-up Approach: Practical Difficulty and Effectiveness?

Although the bottom-up approach seems necessary for conflict transformation, the practical feasibility of bottom-up intervention in protracted intrastate conflict needs to be considered. There is a persistent belief that it is impossible and inappropriate to work for peace with people in conflict situations,

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[20] Kaldor, op. cit.
[21] Ibid.

especially in a war-zone. There seems to be a danger and a practical difficulty for third parties to go into a war-zone to have contact or work with people. Also it is considered that the lower level population are not susceptible to third-party intervention because people are so overwhelmed by their own survival in the chaos created by war that they cannot afford to act for or even think about working for peace and conflict transformation. Therefore, the citizens have not been expected to play a major role in conflict transformation. Intervention at the lower level of the population tends to be regarded at best as a part of the reconstruction in the relatively stable environment of a post-war phase.[22] Those would be the main reasons why the bottom-up approach has not been pursued much in theory and practice.

However, it is a misunderstanding to consider the bottom-up approach completely unfeasible. Firstly it is evident from various kinds of second-track intervention in practice that there are some ways to approach them even in the war phase of conflict. For example, humanitarian aid and emergency assistance are at work even during the war situation connecting to ordinary people. The main aim of these intervention efforts is to provide basic necessities such as food and shelter to people living in conflict areas or refugees. Based on humanitarian grounds, the intervention effort has not traditionally been considered to influence the context of conflict. However, it has recently started to be realised that aid and assistance can in fact influence the context of conflict.[23] For example, one group gets more aid than the other, which may reinforce the context of conflict. Or in order to get aid to the destination, aid agencies are forced to pay war taxes which are used to buy weapons, and as a result, may reinforce violence. Aid agencies usually seek to be neutral, but in reality the impact of their aid turns out not to be neutral. The fact that humanitarian aid and emergency assistance can influence the context of conflict for the worse illustrates that it can also influence for the better. In other words, aid and assistance can harm as well as support conflict transformation. Humanitarian aid and assistance are one of the examples of external parties being able to reach people in a conflict situation. There are

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[22] Intervention strategies illustrate this, see Fisher and Keashly, op.cit. and Nicola Ball, 'The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies', in Chester A. Crocker et.al. (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press, pp 607-622.

[23] Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace –or War*, Lynne Rienner, 1999.

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certainly ways to connect external parties and people living under conflict. Apart from that, some other intervention efforts such as peace education or conferences should be possible without compromising the security of workers, depending on the situation of the conflict areas. Also there is a possibility to take some people out of the area for conferences or academic courses.

Secondly, it would be also be a misunderstanding to consider the whole population as completely involved in conflict or passively accepting conflict as their fate. There are local initiatives by ordinary people even in the war-zones. Here are examples of the efforts made by local individuals or communities in the severe conflict areas.

> 'In Somalia during the height of the war, a number of villages unilaterally decided they did not want to participate. It was not their battle. They defined their boundaries as an area without war, a "pocket of peace." If people came into these areas to recruit young men to fight, the community would expel them. In one case the community arrested the war recruiters, tried them, and executed them for violating the local laws.'[24]

> 'In Bosnia a few men sat together in the early days of the war. The conversation turned to the war, and they agreed that they could not support the ethnic division their leaders preached. They started a citizen's forum in one of their homes and called a public meeting to see if anyone else felt as they did. Over 2,000 people came to the first meeting. In just over a year the membership grew to over 15,000 people.'[25]

The examples demonstrate that there have been some efforts to promote peace, and conflict transformation among people even at the war stage of conflict. This illustrates that people living in intrastate conflict are more than capable of thinking and acting for peace. As third parties can reach people in one way or another, ordinary people have the potential to take an important role in overall conflict transformation. The bottom-up approach is feasible and deserves further study.

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[24] Ibid., p 28.
[25] Ibid., p 26.

3.3 Dialogue among People and Conflict Transformation
Intervening for Dialogue at the Citizens' Level

The second-track intervention in general attempts to tackle the social, economic and psychological environments of ordinary people that contribute to the occurrence and maintenance of conflict. It is very difficult to have a typology of the second-track intervention. Nevertheless nine categories of second-track intervention suggested by Large are the most diverse and inclusive, although we need to note that even Large herself admits those are far from comprehensive.[26] The categories are aid, advocacy,[27] communications, education and training, facilitation, mediation and negotiation, reconstruction, therapeutic work,[28] and witness[29]. As the categories of second-track intervention suggest, the intervention efforts have specific operational purposes, such as rebuilding houses, providing peace education to children or distributing food or mediating in local disputes. Nevertheless, most of the intervention at the citizens' level has ways to contribute to developing inter-group dialogue among the citizens regardless of their operational purposes. Therefore, setting operational purposes of individual projects aside, the second-track intervention as a bottom-up approach must consider working for positive interactions between hostile peoples that potentially develop to dialogue on the conflict they face. As the vast majority of people belong to the grass-roots level and the broadness of the scope of intervention including the social, economic, and psychological spheres of people's lives, the idea of the bottom-up approach can be reflected in the various means of second-track intervention.

Third parties can provide training for dialogue skills. Dialogue requires certain skills or techniques of communication which are studied as interpersonal skills in the field of psychology.[30] Use of language is one of the important skills, because the way we speak can cause hurt and pain for others as well as ourselves. It is important to express our ideas, opinions and thoughts without judging,

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[26] Large, op. cit., p 67.

[27] Advocacy refers to campaigning against certain unjustified treatments to people.

[28] Such as psycho-social programme dealing with war trauma.

[29] Observation and documentation of events related to human rights abuse or atrocity of war.

[30] For example, Marshall B. Rosenberg, *Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Compassion,* Puddle Dancer Press, 1999. Skills for dialogue have something in common with some of those for negotiation and bargaining. W. Ury, op.cit. Ronald Fisher, William Ury with Bruce Patton, *Getting Yes, Negotiation Agreement without Giving In,* Hutchinson, 1982 and second edition, Business Books, 1991.

evaluating or blaming others, in order for dialogue to occur. The emotion or feeling can be expressed by speakers, however, they need to be distinguished from the facts. Also there are important skills for listening. Listening in dialogue is listening not just to hear or to argue but to understand. Quick responses or short questions appropriately inserted by listeners sometimes help not only listeners themselves to understand but also speakers to clarify their own points. The skills for dialogue are not only limited in verbal communication but include other kinds of communication skills such as gesture and body language. In the situation of intrastate conflict third parties can provide opportunities to learn and train on those skills for people in the forms of seminars or educational courses. Focusing on dialogue itself or on some other themes such as human rights or democracy, the use of communication skills and dialogue in the seminars or courses can be learned or practised simply in general interpersonal contexts or in the context of intrastate conflict they have faced.

While dialogue training is a useful approach for bottom-up conflict transformation, it would be a mistake to think that people in the conflict situation have been completely ignorant of the skills for dialogue. On the contrary, they are often able to use those skills in their daily lives with their families and friends without realising it. However, it becomes far more difficult to use those dialogue skills in communicative interactions with other groups in conflict as their group relationships have so deteriorated as a result of protracted intrastate conflict. Third party involvement for dialogue skill training encourages people to engage in dialogue by having them conscious about the use of those skills possibly in the context of real conflict. Therefore, dialogue skill training is not necessarily teaching people what to do or how to do it but is a reminder of the skills and their use.

Third parties can contribute to inter-group dialogue by providing spaces for it. The problem-solving workshop is one form of the intervention used for this purpose. Although the problem-solving workshops are suggested for the middle-range level population, problem-solving itself is a form of intervention hoping to facilitate dialogue and is applicable for all levels of the population. Therefore, the purpose of the problem-solving workshops is not for perceiving an immediate solution of conflict but for facilitating inter-group dialogue. Third parties can support the existing institutions or structures such as media,

education, churches and arts to become spaces for dialogue.[31] In fact, these spaces are used for making war by promoting distrust or hostility to the other group(s) in protracted intrastate conflict rather than for developing dialogue. However, it needs to be pointed out that those spaces can be used for promoting constructive interaction and dialogue.[32] Also some small communicative interaction between individuals, such as exchange of e-mails or contact at market places sometimes exists even under the circumstances of violent conflict,[33] and can be nurtured and supported.

However, it should be noted that there are difficulties in providing spaces or skills for dialogue in the situation of protracted intrastate conflict. The setting of protracted intrastate conflict, polarisation between disputant groups in the societies and the emergence of militarised units, tends to prevent dialogue or constructive interaction in general.[34] Interaction between the peoples in protracted intrastate conflict is often featured with physical and verbal violence and constructive interaction is rare. The psychological barriers, for instance, distrust or even hostility to the people in the other group(s), build up as conflict becomes protracted and personal grief for their loss caused by conflict deepens. Distrust would be fuelled by created stereotypes, myths or enemy and dehumanised images of others. Third parties may be required to provide some facilitation according to the needs of people in the space for dialogue. There would also be pressure from their own group members, especially from the extremists, not to communicate with the other peoples. Moderate individuals who are ready to engage in inter-group dialogue can be under threat of elimination or ostracism from their own communities and labelled as traitors. Even under such circumstances, there are people who dare to take the risk of participating in opportunities for dialogue. Third parties must be especially aware of this potential risk for the participants and the confidentiality may need to be carefully considered in some cases.

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[31] Stephan Ryan, op. cit., p 220.
[32] About media, Johan Galtung, 'Peace Journalism', available at <www.transcend.org>. About education, Adam Curle, op. cit.
[33] Anderson describes the existence of markets where people gather with their homegrown wares and the attempt to set up a computer room for inter-group contact by e-mail. (Anderson, op. cit., p 25.)
[33] Stephan Ryan, op. cit., p 220.
[34] Ibid.

Third parties can explore the shared interests of the disputants to provide occasions for constructive interaction and further dialogue. Although ideally inter-group dialogue should cover the themes relating to intrastate conflict, it is difficult due to psychological barriers to other peoples and pressure from their own communities. When the relationships between the groups have deteriorated too much, face-to-face encounters between peoples may not lead to dialogue but only result in the exchange of verbal violence. In the polarised situation of protracted intrastate conflict, people naturally develop rules of conduct not to discuss controversial topics in inter-group interaction. Inter-group dialogue in this setting is not self-help, so intervention to create opportunities to work for mutual interests would provide legitimate reasons for people to constructively communicate with the other groups even though it does not directly lead to dialogue on conflict. The potential spheres of mutual interest include trade, health care and social welfare. The psychological barriers are eased by constructively interacting with the other group(s) and basic trust between them can be constructed or reconstructed as a prelude to dialogue. When there is a common interest that requires cooperation between the peoples, third parties can create opportunities for constructive interaction and dialogue between the peoples by bringing them to work together for those shared interests. Therefore, the efforts for inter-group dialogue can be made through various forms of second-track intervention.

Evaluation Criteria for Bottom-up Intervention

As was seen above, the citizens have potential to be an important key for the promotion of conflict transformation. In the previous chapter dialogue was suggested as an important tool for conflict transformation. Based on these theoretical understandings, here the question is whether equipping ordinary people with dialogue as a tool to handle conflict indeed promotes transformation of protracted intrastate conflict. In order to pursue an answer to this question, it is necessary to examine some actual intervention efforts for inter-group dialogue development among the citizens in the divided societies. But prior to the case studies, consideration must be given as to how those intervention efforts can be evaluated. The difficulty in evaluating the intervention efforts is a common

problem concerning all forms of third party intervention.[35] The phenomenon of conflict has subjective and objective aspects. Evaluation of an intervention effort would be feasible if the effort makes an objective difference to the course of conflict, although there is still a difficulty in evaluating the relationships between implementation of the intervention effort and the difference supposedly made by it. The effect of an intervention effort on subjective aspects, such as individuals' perception, is also difficult to measure.

The difficulty in evaluation seems greater with an intervention approach aimed at the citizens because the difference it might make would be much smaller and often remain only in subjective aspects. For example, a mediation effort at the high political level may be able to make a concrete difference in the course of conflict, such as a peace deal or cease-fire, even though how much that particular mediation effort has contributed to it would be, precisely speaking, still in question. However, as far as an intervention effort targeting the citizens is concerned, its effects, whether they are subjective or objective, are unlikely to make any direct impact on the course of conflict on its own. The effect of the intervention efforts at the citizens' level is very difficult to measure.

Before considering how to evaluate the bottom-up intervention efforts, it is helpful to see the criteria used for evaluating the problem-solving workshops. The problem-solving workshops are an intensively studied form of intervention also used among the citizens as a bottom-up approach. Some sets of criteria are proposed to evaluate the practice of problem-solving. Kelman suggests two elements of evaluation regarding the ultimate goal of workshops.[36] One of them is change of individuals including an improvement of their attitude and an addition of new orientations as a result of workshops. The other is the influence of these changes on the policy process. As a similar set of criteria, Mitchell presented 'internal effectiveness' on the participants and 'external effectiveness' on the course of conflict.[37] Mitchell develops this further and clarifies three

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[35] For example, about the difficulty in evaluating mediation outcome, see Jacob Bercovitch, 'Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice', in William I. Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen J. (eds), *Peace Making in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp 125-153.

[36] Herbert C. Kelman, 'The Problem-solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution', in R.L. Merritt (ed), *Communication in International Politics*, University of Illinois Press, 1972.

[37] C. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

possible levels of effect; impact, output and outcome.[38] An impact is on actual participants in the workshops, and can be recognised as an alteration in their perceptions, images and attitudes, changes in their expectations, and new perception of options and opportunities. Workshops may result in wholly altering the manner in which participants view the situation facing them and their parties. An output from the workshops can be seen in whether the participants gain specific ideas or proposals, agreed principles or some sort of report with them back to their own parties for consideration and future action. An outcome is a long-tem effect on the actual conflict itself, seen in diminishing levels of violence or coercion, clear change in the policies of the adversaries, or initiating some formal continuation of the dialogue started as a result of the workshops. Those criteria are for the evaluation of problem-solving workshops in particular, but provide a guideline for the evaluation of bottom-up intervention for inter-group dialogue.[39]

The purpose of the intervention efforts concerning inter-group dialogue development among the citizens is ultimately the implementation of dialogue in the societies in order to handle conflict. Nevertheless, it should be clearly stated that dialogue cannot necessarily be seen as a victory in its own right as far as the transformation of a particular protracted intrastate conflict is concerned. The intervention efforts need to be also measured by the extent to which facilitated inter-group dialogue or constructive interaction contributes to a practical addressing of the structural aspects of the conflict.[40] It would be too ambitious especially for intervention among ordinary people to aim to affect the course of conflict directly. Therefore, from the perspective of bottom-up conflict transformation, an intervention effort should be evaluated in terms of how much it contributes to facilitating dialogue where people can discuss their asymmetry they perceive problematic and factors causing the conflict they are facing.

From this perspective on the role of dialogue and Mitchell's criteria for problem-solving evaluation, the evaluation criteria for bottom-up intervention efforts are proposed as follows:

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[38] Mitchell, op. cit., 1993, p 82.
[39] Ibid. Also Ronald J. Fisher, op. cit, pp 187-212.
[40] Stephan Ryan, op. cit., p 226.

- The impact on people targeted by the project. Does the intervention effort bring any change to perception or attitude towards the people in the other group(s) or problems between them?
- The output of the project. Does the intervention effort produce anything concrete, such as statements, collaboration systems or plans for future action that would contribute to conflict transformation? (No matter how small it is).
- The outcome of the project. Does the intervention effort have any long-term effect on the societies to transform conflict and its causes?

The point of evaluation is not measuring success or failure but looking at how intervention for dialogue among people can contribute to conflict transformation, that is, exploring the potential of the bottom-up approach.

Conclusion

Dialogue is a means of dealing with conflict non-violently. Dialogue is not a form of intervention applied by third parties but a tool for conflict transformation applied by disputant groups' members in the situation of protracted intrastate conflict. Third parties need to consider how they can contribute to develop inter-group dialogue when they intervene in various forms. Intervention targets the population affected by intrastate conflict. The population can be considered as layers such as the elite level, the middle-range level and the grass-roots level, expressed by a triangle according to the number of people belonging to each level. Those levels also represent the major patterns of interaction between disputants in which inter-group dialogue can be facilitated. Whichever level of the population third parties originally engaged in to develop dialogue, intervention ultimately intends to influence the whole population. The attempts to affect the population from the top political decision-makers to the rest of the population can be recognised as the top-down approach because it expects conflict transformation to be preceded by elite initiative. The intervention efforts targeting the citizens are considered as the bottom-up approach, with the hope that conflict transformation will be promoted by the citizens' initiative.

While there is much academic research on the top-down approach, work on the bottom-up approach is scarce. However, in practice, conflict

transformation for recent protracted intrastate conflict proceeded by elite initiatives has faced difficulties. Here can be seen the importance or even necessity of bottom-up in transformation of protracted intrastate conflict. In addition, dialogue is more feasible among the citizens rather than interaction at a high political level because they are free from political calculation or the restrictions borne by leaders. In addition, the citizens' level is open for third parties to access even during extreme political deadlock. It would be worthwhile to examine and discuss some cases of bottom-up attempts in the subsequent chapters, as intervention of the bottom-up approach requires more study in order to clarify its role in conflict transformation.

Chapter 4   Disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia: Politics, Conflict and Citizens

Introduction

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a multi-ethnic state currently known as Former Yugoslavia, had undergone disintegration in the early 1990s. The process of disintegration became violent and a series of intrastate wars broke out between the ethnic groups in the region. The wars caused extensive destruction; towns and villages were destroyed, vast number of civilians were killed, injured and lost their homes. Although the wars ended, regional conflict has remained complex and persistent over the years. The case studies in the later chapters describe and examine the third party attempts to develop dialogue among the citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This chapter draws out the context in which these attempts of the case studies should be analysed.

With ethnic cleansing strategies and genocide, the war in Bosnia became intense total war involving the whole population. Initially the ethnic hatred and ancient hostility between the ethnic groups suggested as a main cause of conflict seemed to explain the intensity of violence and cruelty of war strategies in conflict accompanied with Yugoslav disintegration.[1] However, subsequently a portrait of Bosnia featuring ethnic tolerance and coexistence has started to be drawn out convincingly by some regional specialists who are more familiar with the local background.[2] The latter view tends to put the blame of war onto the local politicians. As a practical point, it is also suggested that one of the reasons why wars quickly spread was the Yugoslav national defence system, largely relying on territorial defence based on the experience of partisan operation during the Second World

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[1] This was a popular view in media coverage of the Bosnian war. Also see Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghost: A Journey Through History*, St. Martin's Press, 1993.

[2] Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, third edition, Penguin, 1996, chapter 5. Robert Donica and John V.A. Fine, *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, Hurst, London, 1994. Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, *Bosnia The Good, Tolerance and Tradition*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2000.

War.[3] Under this strategy, many non-soldiers were trained for partisan warfare and the use of light weapons such as small arms, mortars, light artillery, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles that were produced in the country mostly self-sufficiently. The hardware and training for war was already there. Either way, they do not seem to fully explain why Bosnia has gone though such extreme protracted conflict.

This chapter considers how the citizens in the Former Yugoslavia acted or reacted to the politics of ethnic confrontation and war. It does not seem plausible that all citizens supported this violent process, having lived together within the framework of the Former Yugoslavia for decades. Therefore, the question is whether or not the citizens endorsed the violent process as inevitable. If the answer to this question is 'no' a further question needs to be asked: Why did the citizens not act against it?

This chapter becomes the background information to the disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia, the accompanying violence and the citizens who have been inevitably involved in the process. Firstly, it describes the history and people of the Former Yugoslavia and its move towards disintegration, including the development of ethnic conflict. Secondly, it reviews the process of wars and spread of violence in the region. In the last part of this chapter the involvement of the citizens in the process are reconsidered.

4.1 The Former Yugoslavia: From Establishment to Disintegration
Territory and Peoples

In southeast Europe on the Balkan Peninsula, the South Slavs were brought together as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes at the end of the First World War in 1918. This was the origin of the Former Yugoslavia. Prior to the establishment of the kingdom, the northern part of the territory was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman-Turk Empire dominated its southern part as the kingdoms of Montenegro and Serbia until 1699. With the

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[3] Paul Rogers, 'Giant-Killer dogs of war', *Guardian*, August 17, 1992. Large, *The War Next Door: A Study of Second-Track Intervention During the War in ex-Yugoslavia*, Hawthorn Press, 1997, pp 114-5.

historic background of being a place where the Western culture and the Eastern culture met, the peoples with historical and cultural differences lived in the state of Former Yugoslavia.[4]

During the Second World War, Yugoslavia experienced a civil war. The ethnic divisions in the country were exploited by outside powers to gain control of the state. The Croatian nationalist government supported by the Axis powers engaged in a campaign of persecution, expulsion and execution of the Serb population who had previously been dominant in the country. As the Croatian regime started to lose control as the war came close to its end, a significant number of Croats suffered from revenge attacks by the Serbs and other opponents. In 1945 the communist-led resistance movement known as the Partisans gained control of the state and established the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia under the strong initiative of the Partisan leader, Marshal Tito. The country was renamed as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of eight entities: six republics including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia and two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo within Serbia.[5] The six peoples in Yugoslavia, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slovenes and Muslims[6] were recognised as historical-territorial communities. There were also minorities of Albanians, Hungarians, Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians, Turks, Italians, Roma and Vlachs within the state. Those minorities had been guaranteed their cultural rights to exist as ethnic groups within Yugoslavia.[7] Although the republics and provinces in the state were attributed to six major ethnic groups and two major minority groups, Albanians and Hungarians, their distribution was not necessarily confined within the borders between the republics. In fact, internal borders between the republics were very controversial. There have been

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[4] For historic details, Stephen Clissold (ed.), *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, Cambridge University Press, 1966.

[5] See the map of the Former Yugoslavia, at the end of this chapter, p 101.

[6] Muslims, who are descendants of the Slavs who converted to Islam during the fourteenth century when Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the Ottoman Empire, acquired the status of a political community for the first time with the 1963 constitution.

[7] Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, The Brooking Institution, 1995, p 31.

many border disputes, including ones between Croatia and Slovenia over the Istrian Peninsula, between Serbia and Macedonia over their common border, between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina over much of the Bosnian border, and between Croatia and Serbia over Vojvodina and Krajina.[8] In Yugoslavia no ethnic group was more than a regional majority. No republics or provinces were ethnically pure.[9] Due to demographic changes over the years, the ethnic composition in all entities became more mingled. Apart from Kosovo, the ratio of majority ethnic groups in the population has decreased while that of the minority groups has increased within the entities. Nevertheless, the peoples in Yugoslavia had managed to live together within one single state until 1990.

Background Conditions for Conflict: Some Underlying Causes

There was always a concern that ethnic or national divisions could pose a serious problem to the integrity of the Former Yugoslavia since its establishment in 1945. As an initial attempt to introduce the 'new Yugoslav socialist culture' for the population[10] failed, federalism was implemented. The Federal Executive Council worked as a federal government above the six republics and two autonomous provinces. The Federal Executive Council consisted of representatives from the republics and provinces as well as the head of the communist party. This means that the Federal Executive Council was the highest decision-making body in the Former Yugoslavia under the one party system in which the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was the sole authorised political party. In order to avoid any single ethnic group having political dominance over the state, decisions needed to be based on consensus of the members of the council. In other words, the entities practically had a veto on all political decisions of the state. The federal government was responsible for their common market such as monetary and trade policy, defence and foreign affairs. Although the six republics and two autonomous provinces were placed under the federal government, they retained their own constitution, economic

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[8] Ibid, pp 31-2.
[9] The census of the population in the Former Yugoslavia, Ibid.
[10] Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia*, third edition, Westview Press, 1992.

sovereignty, judiciary and autonomy over education. As the entities owned major productive assets, they contributed a portion of their revenue to the federal budget. Additionally the federal government raised its own revenue directly from custom duties and sales tax. The federal budget was used for defence, foreign affairs, veterans' pensions and supporting funds for less developed regions.

The balance between the federal government and the federation members, the republics and the autonomous provinces, was fragile.[11] In fact, Yugoslav domestic politics was based on the tug and pull between states' rights and the power of the federal government. Under the charismatic leader Tito the political system was carefully designed to maintain the balance between the state and the entities and attempts to promote national interests were heavily restricted. However, when Tito passed away in 1980 the balance was seriously challenged by deteriorating economic conditions.

In 1980 some 800,000 Yugoslavs, which accounted for more than 13% of the population, were out of work, and more than 700,000 people were working abroad.[12] Between 1980 and 1989 the Yugoslav economy was stagnant despite several reform attempts. This stagnation had led to a steady rise in the unemployment rate.[13] This economic stagnation was not only caused through domestic systemic fault in the domestic economy but also through fundamental changes in the international environment, such as the oil crises and worldwide economic depression. The annual inflation rate was rising steadily by approximately 50 % every year and the soar in 1988 triggered a notable drop in GDP since 1989.[14] By the end of 1984, the population living below the poverty line increased from 17% to 25 %.[15]

As a consequence of the national economic decline, distribution inequality between the entities became distinctive. The northern part of Yugoslavia, namely Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina, were well industrialised and economically developed compared to the underdeveloped south, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia-

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[11] Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991*, second edition, Indiana University Press, 1992, p xv .
[12] Ramet, op. cit., 1992, p 52.
[13] Woodward, op. cit., P 54.
[14] Ibid, p 54-5.
[15] Ibid, p 52.

87

Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. The richest entity Slovenia recorded almost full employment while the poorest, Kosovo, recorded more than 50 % unemployment.[16] According to the 1988 data, Slovenian GNP per capita was more than seven times that of Kosovo.[17]

There were clear economic gaps between the regions and the federal government provided financial support to less developed entities. Supporting funds, originally collected from republics' and provinces' revenue, were provided from the federal budget to the less developed. In short, the federal government redistributed financial resources between the entities. This reinforced discontent among the entities with the federal system. More developed regions felt that they were giving away a part of their income to less developed regions and less developed regions felt that they were exploited by the developed. Developed regions attempted to reduce their share in the federation funds and less developed regions pushed to receive more supporting funds. Because all federation members practically had a veto, it became extremely difficult for the federal government to draw up the federal budget. Economic decline accompanied with the original fragility of the political balance between the entities led to the serious political erosion in the late 1980s.

The Emergence of Ethnic Politics

With this background of economic decline, extensive decentralisation was proposed to enable Yugoslavia to regain its functions. As the federal members demanded greater political rights, the legitimacy of federalism as a political system started to erode. The foundation for Yugoslavia's eventual disintegration was laid, yet the consequence was not imminent at this stage.[18] Previously the rise of ethnic nationalism had been seen in areas such as Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo in the

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs, 'International Actors and Social Policy Development in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Globalism and the "'New Feudalism'"', *Journal of European Social Policy*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1998, pp 97-115.

[18] Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92*, Verso, 1993. Ivo H. Daalder, 'Fear & Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia', in Michael E. Brown, *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, The MIT Press, 1996, p 40.

history of the Former Yugoslavia but these were sporadic and not regarded as posing a serious problem, except in Kosovo.[19]

However, in the late 1980s, the problems in Yugoslavia were intensified as ethnic nationalism was brought into federal politics. As the ideology of communism eroded and was taken over by ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe,[20] the federal politics in the Former Yugoslavia also started to be coloured with ethnic nationalism. In Serbia, Slobodan Milošević used the Serb ethnic nationalism to gain political power in the late 1980s with the background of state economic crisis and people's frustration.[21] Serbia led by Milošević vigorously sought to extend its power, claiming its right to speak out not only for Serbia but also all Serbs in Yugoslavia. The power of two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, was largely reduced and the two provinces more or less became integrated into Serbia. The ambitions of Milošević and Serb nationalism calling for a Greater Serbia were a threat to the other entities.[22] Milošević's emergence in Yugoslav politics and the rise of Serb nationalism stimulated the ethnic nationalism not only of Albanians in Kosovo but also of the other peoples in the Former Yugoslavia. Resisting the Serb ambition for greater power in federal politics, Slovenia and Croatia proposed the compromise of confederation, an association of sovereign states. Serbia rejected the proposal. During this period, the international community paid little attention to the situation of Yugoslavia in the changing international environment and strategic priority as the Cold War ended.

The introduction of the multi-party system to replace the communist party domination was proposed and granted at the 14th party conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1990. Subsequently, multi-party elections were held and nationalist parties won in all six republics. Slovenia and Croatia escalated their claim from greater political rights to full sovereignty, however, it needs to be noted

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[19] For the rise of nationalism in 1980 see Aleksandar Pavković, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*, second edition, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, pp 85-99.
[20] Januz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality, Politics, Organizations, and Parties*, Armink, NY: M.E. Shape, 1993.
[21] For politics in Serbia see Robert Thomas, *Serbia under Milošević: Politcs in 1980s*, Hurst and Company, London, 1999.
[22] V.P. Gagnpon Jr., 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia', *International Security*, vol.19, no. 3, Winter 1994/95, pp 130-166.

that both republics did not necessarily intend to become completely independent states at this stage.[23] At this point, the Slovenian population favoured autonomy within the framework of Yugoslavia and Slovenian political leaders were not yet determined to pursue complete independence. The republics attempted to resolve the situation through political negotiation but failed to produce any mutually agreeable solution. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared their independence, which became the starting point for the series of violent conflicts in the Balkans.

4.2 Wars in the Balkans since 1991
Slovenian and Croatian Independence Wars

After the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, violent clashes occurred along the Slovenian border between the Slovenian Army and the federal army (Yugoslav People's Army or YPA) whose personnel were mostly Serbs. This war lasted only for ten days or so and remained on a small scale. Nevertheless, the use of force by the federal government as an attempt to defend its territorial integrity was a final push for Slovenia to complete independence. After this, there was no way of going back.[24] With the mediation of the European Community (EC), the war ended soon in Slovenia.[25] Nearly 90 percent of the population in Slovenia were Slovenes and the minorities were small in numbers, even the largest minority group, Croats, constituted less than 3 percent of the population.[26] Slovenia's separation from Yugoslavia caused neither a major concern to the other ethnic groups in the Former Yugoslavia nor a major ethnic problem within Slovenia.

In Croatia, however, there were serious minority issues especially concerning the Serbs who comprised about 12 percent of the population. Before and after the declaration of independence, violent confrontation occurred between police,

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[23] Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, Boulder, Westview, 1993, p 90. Mark Thompson, *A Paper House, the Ending of Yugolavia*, Hutchingon Radius, 1992, chapter 1.

[24] Paul Stubbs, *'Nationalisms, Globalisation and Civil Society in Croatia and Slovenia'*, Paper presented to Second European Conference of Sociology 'European Societies: Fusion or Fission?', Budapest, September 1995.

[25] For details, Gow, op. cit., chapter 3.

[26] Demographic data are from Woodward, op. cit., unless noted.

paramilitary groups and citizens in ethnically mixed towns near the Serbian and Bosnian borders. The Serbs in Croatia feared becoming a minority as Croatia declared its independence and its celebration of ethnic nationalistic images.[27] Serbs in Croatia escalated their demand from political rights as a minority to the right of self-determination. Sporadic violence became open civil war between the Croatian authority and the Serb population within Croatia supported by the YPA. After a few months of war, Croatian Serbs had gained control of approximately one-third of Croatia's territory, including areas of Eastern and Western Slavonia and Krajina, through "ethnic cleansing" campaigns forcibly expelling the Croat residents from Serb-held areas. The cease-fire was agreed by the related parties in 1992, followed by the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops. The war in Croatia brought severe destruction; many people were dead or displaced, and often became refugees, towns and villages were destroyed.

The end of the war in 1992 did not necessarily bring a political solution for the minority problem in Croatia. After four years of stalemate, and in the shadow of the war chaos in neighbouring Bosnia, the Croatian Army managed to quickly recapture Serb-occupied Western Slavonia in May 1995 and the much larger Krajina region in August 1995. Croatian reprisals against Serbs were reportedly widespread as more than 100,000 Croatian Serbs fled or were forcibly expelled from Croatia to Serb-held areas of Bosnia or Serbia.[28]

The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Concerned at the Serbian intervention in the war in Croatia, the EC member states attempted to internationalise the conflict in Yugoslavia by recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.[29] However, this recognition resulted in the creation of extremely difficult circumstances for the remaining states in Yugoslavia,

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[27] The Croatian government adopted the symbols of the wartime Ustashe regime which persecuted the Serb population and murdered tens of thousand of them during the Second World War.

[28] http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/croserbs.htm

[29] For more on this, see chapter 5. Also, Lenard J. Cohen, op.cit, Chapter 8. Stephanie Anderson, 'EU, NATO, and CSCE Responces to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture', *European Security*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1995. Marc Weller, 'Current Development: The international Response to the dissolution of The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 86, no.3, 1992.

especially Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia is the most ethnically mixed area in Yugoslavia; the largest ethnic group were Muslims, more than 40 percent, the second were Serbs, about 30 percent, and third were Croats, less than 20 percent of the population. Slovenia and Croatia's separation from Yugoslavia brought Bosnia two choices, either staying in the framework of Yugoslavia which was likely to be Serb dominant or becoming independent.[30] As Bosnia moved toward the latter choice, the war became inevitable because Bosnian Serbs supported by Serbia were strongly against Bosnian independence and Bosnian Croats encouraged by Croatia declared their secession in their part of Bosnia. In March 1992 sporadic eruptions of hostility in Bosnia developed into a civil war. The recognition of Bosnian independence by the EC member states and the United States in April 1992 did not stop war but rather escalated it despite their expectations.[31] The war in Bosnia created massive chaos domestically and internationally. The largest number of refugees within Europe was recorded since the Second World War. The strategies for ethnic cleansing including the mass murder or mass rape of women and so many civilian casualties were reported. Constant diplomatic efforts to stop violence were made by the Western powers mainly European Union member states. In spite of these many cease-fire agreements were broken and international intervention achieved very little until 1995.

At the end of 1995, the peace accord, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina more widely known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, was agreed at last with US mediation. According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a single state including two entities, the Federation for Bosnian Muslims and Croats occupying 49 percent of the land, and the Republika Srpska for Bosnian Serbs occupying 51 percent. Peacekeeping troops were sent to maintain order. At this point, diplomatic efforts by the international community to end war can be seen as successful in Bosnia. However, the continuation of segregating policy to contain violence resulted in preserving the

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[30] Woodward, op. cit., p 193.
[31] Details about recognition, Woodward, op.cit., pp 189-198. Gow, op. cit., chapter 4.

divisions in the societies and depriving opportunities for reconciliation.[32] Ethnic nationalism still remains one of the major poles in Bosnian politics.[33] Order is enforced by the international presence and conflict between ethnic groups in Bosnia seems persistent at a latent level.

The Kosovo Conflict and Macedonia

After the Bosnian war, the area of potential danger was Kosovo.[34] Kosovo had been an autonomous province within Serbia in the Former Yugoslavia until it was gradually integrated into Serbia in 1980. Kosovo has been the least developed region in the Former Yugoslavia and Albanians who form the majority of the Kosovar population had suffered from economic neglect and discrimination, forced assimilation and emigration and political disenfranchisement. While the rise of ethnic nationalism in the other areas within Yugoslavia started to be seen publicly in the late 1980s, the struggle between oppression by the authorities of the Kosovar Albanians and their nationalism had begun far earlier.[35] During the years of war in the Balkans following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosovar Albanians managed to strengthen their network of parallel political, administrative, cultural and financial institutions and to establish full control over the province.[36] In 1997, the situation in Kosovo became unstable as some Kosovar Albanians resorted to military means to support their demands that had escalated to independent state of Kosovo in 1998. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a paramilitary unit of Kosovar Albanians, started to engage in war with Belgrade.[37] As Belgrade countered with the brutal strategies of ethnic cleansing to drive the Albanians out of Kosovo, the international community stepped in. However, its attempts to mediate failed to stop

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[32] For example, International Crisis Group(ICG), 'Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Year After the Peace Agreement', IGC Balkan Report, no. 80, Sarajevo, 28 October 1999.

[33] ICG, 'Election in Bosnia and Herzegovina', IGC Balkan Report, no. 16, Sarajevo, 22 September 1996.

[34] For a history of Kosovo see Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, Papermac, 1998.

[35] For Human right abuse in Kosovo, Ibrahim Berisha (eds.), *Serbian Colonization and Ethnic Cleansing of Koova: Documents and Evidence*, 1993.

[36] The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned*, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp 42-50.

[37] The KLA grew out of a group formed by Kosovar Albanians in the Diaspora, Ibid., p 45 and 51.

the violence in Kosovo.[38] At the break-down of the peace talks in Rambouillet, the international community decided to use military means. In spring 1999, NATO started a bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo which lasted 70 days. Although the bombing campaign managed to force the Serbian Army to withdraw, the war in Kosovo left open the question of the long-term status of the province, as well as that of the security of the local minority Serbs who were subjected to a policy of ethnic cleansing by the Albanians upon the end of the war.

After the war in Kosovo, problems arose in Macedonia. As the Former Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1990, Macedonia declared its independence. The Albanian minority in Macedonia had posed a problem and the Macedonian government invited the United Nations Protection Force troops to secure domestic order, so that major violence was avoided initially.[39] However, the UN Security Council failed to authorise extension of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia in 1999 due to a Chinese veto. Upon the withdrawal of UN troops in 2000, sporadic violence by the Albanian rebels started to emerge at the Kosovar border and became a serious security threat in Macedonia. The situation in Macedonia continued to be critical until summer 2001 when a peace deal was agreed by all political parties and the Albanian rebels agreed to disarmament. As a peace plan brokered by NATO officials offered ethnic Albanians greater recognition, crisis point in the conflict in Macedonia was avoided for the time being.

4.3   The Citizens and Politics

Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Relations among the Citizens

Ethnic relations had been sensitive issues in the politics of the Former Yugoslavia since its establishment. The delicate balance between the entities in the federation was the major agenda in the former Yugoslav high-politics, which gives us an impression that the whole population was involved in the fragile or somehow confrontational ethnic relations. However, this impression was in fact misleading

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[38] Ibid., pp 131-162.
[39] Alice Ackermann, 'The Former Yugolav Republic of Macedonia- Relatively Successful Case of Conflict Prevention in Europe', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 27(4), 1996, pp. Alice Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia*, Syracuce University Press, NY, 2000.

94

because relations between federal entities did not necessarily reflect the ethnic relations on the ground. Although the Former Yugoslavia consisted of 6 republics and two autonomous provinces that were characterised by their ethnic nationality, the geographic distribution of the peoples in the territory was highly complex. The borders between the nations in Former Yugoslavia could not define ethnic distribution of the population because of various historical backgrounds in the Balkans.[40] Migration beyond national and international borders has been active in the Balkans over centuries in such forms as seasonal labour, travelling merchants or nomads. Also in the former Yugoslavia economic migration abroad or to the other republics was usual practice.[41]

Nonetheless, the ethnic identity of individual citizens was linked with federal politics. Unlike in other states of the communist bloc, ethnic pluralism was officially recognised within the political system of the Former Yugoslavia as it had existed as a federation of ethnically featured nations. Citizens' ethnic/national identity was politicised as the ethnic composition of the population was reflected in federal politics.[42] The ethnic or national identity of the citizens was self-proclaimed and registered in the census and official documents. Citizens had also a right not to register their ethnicity or nationality. The census directly affected all federal activities such as appointments to public office, distribution of federal investments or representation at cultural festivals, through an ethnic quota system, that is, proportional representation of individuals by constituent nationalities. Therefore, the citizens' ethnicity was closely connected to politics in the Former Yugoslavia.

However, it is not so clear whether the citizens themselves regarded their ethnic identity as such a political matter. For example, the ethnic identity of 'Muslim' was not recognised until the 1963 constitution. In the 1971 census when for the first time the option of 'Muslim' was added, many Muslims in Bosnia chose to identify themselves as Muslim rather than Yugoslav which they had claimed previously. But those 'Muslims' would rather have considered themselves as

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[40] Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, Macmillan, 1994, Chapter
[41] Woodward, op. cit., p 37.
[42] Ibid., p 36.

95

Bosnian, which was not included in the options.[43] Some people preferred to call themselves Yugoslavs rather than their ethnic identity. Approximately 14 percent of the Yugoslav population, more than 3 million in the population of 22 million in 1980s, were born in ethnically mixed marriages or were themselves married to someone with a different ethnic identity.[44] Some of the children born in mixed marriage choose to claim themselves as Yugoslavs and others claimed either of the parents' ethnicity. Brothers or sisters from the same parents could claim different ethnic identities. One of the reasons why ethnic identity did not seem politicised among the population was due to the social environment in the Former Yugoslavia. While political expression of nationalities was strictly banned, cultural expression of nationalities was constitutionally guaranteed as a political commitment to multiethnic coexistence. As the right of cultural expression of ethnic identity, the use of their own language in public forums was guaranteed as was having their own newspapers and other media, the formation of cultural associations and the right to be educated in their own languages.[45] The peoples did not necessarily need to claim their rights politically to guarantee their expression of ethnic identity. Clear politicisation of ethnic identity emerged in the Former Yugoslavia when the disintegration started.[46]

There are different views on the inter-ethnic relations among the Yugoslav population. On one hand, there is a view that the inter-ethnic relations among the citizens in the Former Yugoslavia have been always problematic as seen in the high politics in the Former Yugoslavia. This view was emphasised in the journalism coverage of ethnic hatred and ancient hostile history as war intensified.[47] On the other hand, some regional specialists on the Balkans have presented a view of harmonious ethnic relations in the region, especially in Bosnia.[48] Many communities were ethnically mixed but it hardly caused ethnic tension in the communities. Children had studied at school together and played together without thinking of their

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[43] Ibid., p 36.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid, p 37.
[46] An exception is Kosovar Albanians.
[47] For example, Kaplan, op. cit., 1993.
[48] Glenny, op.cit., chapter 5. Donica and Fine, op.cit. Mahmutcehajic, op. cit.

ethnic difference.[49] There were a number of cases of inter-ethnic marriage, which would not have been possible without the peoples sharing social lives and a mutual acceptance of communities.[50]

It has been suggested that peoples in Bosnia had lived next to each other, sharing their lives for decades regardless of their different ethnic backgrounds. While this kind of assimilation seemed true in some cases, a more diverse and mixed but realistic portrait of the Bosnian citizens emerged recently.[51] Bringa, an anthropologist who lived in a rural area of Bosnia for her research, recognises the state of assimilation in the urban area, cities like Sarajevo witnessed by the most of regional specialists who portray a tolerant and coexistent Bosnia. But she also saw a different Bosnia. She describes:

> '...in rural areas...people did know the ethnoreligious family background and affiliation of their neighbors and schoolmates from the village and neighboring villages. ...While in the village people of different ethnoreligious backgrounds would live side by side and often have close friendships, they would rarely intermarry. In some neighborhoods they would not even live side by side and would know little about each other. And while some families would have a long tradition of friendships across ethnoreligious communities others would not. In towns, especially among the urban-educated class, intermarriage would be quite common, and would sometimes go back several generations in a single family. Here the socio-economic strata a person belonged to was more important that was his or her 'nationality'.[52]

The ways in which people lived with others from different ethnic and religious backgrounds seemed to vary between urban and rural areas, from one village to another, from one neighbourhood to another, or one family to another as well as generation to generation.

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[49] Informal conversation with a refugee from Mostar, Belgrade, Serbia, February 1995.

[50] Kosovo was an exception. In Kosovo where the communities were more segregated inter-ethnic marriage was very rare. (Informal conversation with Ženaide Kuci from Prishtina, in Lillehammer, Norway, June 2001.)

[51] Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village*, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1995. Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton, Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*, Hurst & Company, London, 2002.

[52] Bringa, op. cit., p 4.

Distinguishing oneself from one another did not suggest that they resented each other. Generally, the citizens would consider their inter-group relationships in Bosnia 'cordial'.[53] After all, peoples did live together within the framework of the Former Yugoslavia for decades. Until spring 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia took a practical step forward to independence, the peoples had maintained reasonable relationships even in such places where the relationships were later completely destroyed due to the wars.[54] The peoples were highly mixed in geographic terms so that Bosnia was called the 'Mosaic State'. Even during the Bosnian war, a hope to preserve peace in some communities remained until the last moment when the army arrived at their doors.[55] Ethnic nationalism had never become a major pillar in politics among the citizens until the disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia. The ethnic politics in the Former Yugoslavia had not necessarily been reflected among its citizens.

Political Environment for the Citizens and Civil Activities

Ordinary people in the Former Yugoslavia have inevitably been involved in the process of high politics from ethnic tension to wars. However, it is doubtful whether the process of high politics has expressed the citizens' will on the verge of the war. In other words, it is hardly convincing that all citizens truly wished to achieve independence or prevent it at any cost to ethnic co-existence. There were some anti-war movements in the Former Yugoslavia. At the end of 1991 the charter of the Anti-War Campaign was signed by 79 groups and organisations and about 500 individuals throughout the Former Yugoslavia.[56] Important as it was, it was hardly a big trend among the citizens. While the citizens were certainly manipulated by intense propaganda towards ethnic confrontation to some extent, it is hard to believe that all the citizens carried away the process towards war with extreme violence without any doubt or hesitation. The question arising here is why they were carried along without expressing disagreement or showing their doubts.

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[53] Bose, op. cit., p 15.
[54] Glenny, op. cit. .
[55] Bringa, op. cit., p xviii.
[56] Large, op. cit., p 28.

A passive attitude to the political or social issues among the citizens has been recognised in most of the states in the former communist bloc with totalitarian regimes that repressed political activities of the population. Under repression most of the citizens avoid politics completely, that is, 'the de-politicization of human discourse and the emancipation of social communication from ideological burden imposed by the ruling power'[57]. Repression of alternative political ideas or political activities is so severe, that people develop a habit of not talking about politics or engaging in any political movement. The Former Yugoslavia had often been seen as an exception, due to the unique form of socialism system called 'self-management' and ethnic federalism. However, this is now disputed.[58] The effect of the regime on the population was assumed to be somewhat similar to that of the regimes in the other communist states, if not the same.

Outside the communist frameworks, citizens' political activities were quite regulated in the Former Yugoslavia. Criticism of the authorities and its policies was barely tolerated. Any 'verbal attack' on the government, even jokes, was a criminal offence under the Yugoslav penal code.[59] According to Amnesty International, in 1980 553 people were charged with political crimes and they were sometimes treated harshly.[60] As an extreme case, Goli Otok is a notorious prison which practised the torture and killing of the political prisoners called 'cominformists', suspected sympathisers with the Soviets and against governmental policy to distance Yugoslavia from Stalinism after 1948. Ethnic nationalism was also the target of suppression. While cultural expression of ethnicity was permitted, the Yugoslav constitution prohibited 'propagating or practising national inequalities and incitement of national, racial, or religious hatred or intolerance'.[61] The nationalistic movement among the population encountered strict control by the authorities.[62] A lot

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[57] Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements in The Soviet Bloc*, Routledge, 1990, p 4.

[58] Large, op. cit., pp 116-7.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia: Prisoners of Conscience: An Amnesty International Report*, Amnesty International, 1982, p 7.

[61] Yugoslav constitution in 1974 quated in Ibid, p 37.

[62] It is known that Franjo Tudiman, the first President of Croatia in 1991 and a Croatian nationalist, had been arrested and imprisoned because an interview he gave to foreign journalists was regarded as nationalistic 'propaganda' by the Yugoslav authority in 1972.

of people in Kosovo where Albanian ethnic nationalism was persistent were persecuted. Small eruptions of ethnic nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia were also suppressed. The organisation of demonstrations, the writing of certain slogans, leaflets and poems that were regarded to promote ethnic nationalism were held to be a crime. Those controls were felt by the citizens in their daily lives.[63] Teachers were beaten by policemen in front of students or imprisoned because of their expression of their own opinions. Students too were exposed to such harsh treatment. Parents of a child who made innocent but politically incorrect remarks in his classroom were summoned by the principal and given a caution, or worse, exposed to physical violence.

Even though some might still argue that this environment in the Former Yugoslavia was not as bad as in the other communist states, it was bad enough to prevent political participation by the citizens through the organisation of civil movements or associations. The environment did not completely deter the citizens from thinking or even acting politically. Although limited within a strict framework, Yugoslav high politics did provide some spaces for the grass-roots population to express their opinions during the era of the Former Yugoslavia. The citizens were permitted to participate in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, that is, the communist party. As non-governmental bodies, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People, a traditional Communist 'United Front', attracted a 15 million strong membership.[64] The other social mass organisations including youth and women's organisations collectively belonged to the Alliance in order to avoid taxes or assets imposed on the organisations that did not belong to the Alliance.[65] Outside the framework there were some visible civil activities but they were mostly cultural, such as rock music, for instance.[66] In fact, it was considered that rock music conveyed political messages and political allusions in the Former Yugoslavia.[67] Under the circumstances with no alternative political parties and few places for

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[63] For some examples, see Large, op. cit., pp 116-7. Also some were directly heard by myself from people from the Balkans at the seminar discussions at Lillehammer, Norway, in June 2001.
[64] Bruce McFarlane, *Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics and Society*, Pinter Publishers, 1988, p 53.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs, op. cit., p 106.
[67] Ramet, op. cit., p 81.

political public debate, rock music was a communicative tool for the public.[68] Rock musicians were well aware of this role. Nevertheless, it needs noting that censorship of the expression of opposition to or criticism of the established political order was practised.[69] There were other civil movements that could contain political or social messages. In Slovenia, certain forms of radical mental health and community work, as well as work on children's rights and the development of campaigns about violence against women, were important civil initiatives in the 1980s.[70] Also there were some examples of anti-war initiatives throughout the Former Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s as mentioned above.[71] Nevertheless, rather than become united to become voices of political alternatives by themselves, these initiatives tended to define themselves as 'antipolitical', avoiding becoming political.

While the restrictive environment indeed hindered the civil initiatives from developing to convey political messages and created a relatively passive attitude towards politics among the citizens, this did not necessarily mean that people were completely politically inactive in Former Yugoslavia. Dan Smith, who has much experience of working with people from the Former Yugoslavia,[72] regards the political culture among people in the Balkans as rich in the sense that people are very much interested in political issues and knew and discussed them a great deal. According to his personal view, people in the Balkan states have a culture of 'sitting around and complaining, analysing and speculating' on politics 'but not organising and doing things'.[73] In fact, many private discussions on political issues routinely occurred in such forms as after-dinner talks at someone's house or chats in cafes.[74] Nonetheless, the word 'politics' needed to be avoided whenever it would be.[75] It was hardly possible for people to engage in public debate politics or political activities

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[68] Ibid, pp 81-2. Rock music was also monitored.

[69] Large, op. cit., pp 117-8.

[70] Paul Stubbs, 'Social Work and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Globalisation, Neo-feudalism and the State', Article published in *International Perspectives on Social Work*, Pavilion publishers, 1999, p 8.

[71] Large, op. cit.

[72] Dan Smith is the former Director of the Peace Research Institute, Oslo and has been engaging in the project of training programmes for the people from the Balkan states since 1995. The details of the project are in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

[73] Interview with Dan Smith, Oslo, Norway, 14th June 2001.

[74] Thompson, op. cit., p 122.

[75] Large, op. cit., p 116.

101

except through involvement in the communist party. The repressive environment discouraged people from publicly participating in politics, so that they discussed it as third-party critics or possibly victims who do not have the power or means to affect politics.

The observation above brings out two characteristics of the citizens in the Former Yugoslavia regarding politics. Firstly, the citizens are more than capable of organising themselves to publicly state their concerns or hopes. Secondly, the citizens are interested in and alerted to political and social issues. However, the repressive political environment deterred these characteristics from developing into political civil activities as a constructive critical force towards governmental policies in order to make the government and politicians accountable. The citizens were hardly able to claim the ownership of the state let alone hold any control on high politics in their own country.

The Effect of Wars on the Civil Politics in Bosnia

The governmental repression of the citizens' political activities collapsed as the Former Yugoslavia disintegrated. However, rather than liberating citizens' political activities, the war in Bosnia has added some serious complications to the political environment for the Bosnian citizens.

Firstly the war deepened and confirmed the ethnic divisions among the Bosnian population so that the mid- and post-conflict environment is far from ideal for them to have a constructive public discussion on ethnic politics and other social issues. Due to the traumatic experience of the war and intense nationalistic propaganda, enemy images towards the other ethnic groups has become persistent. The citizens generally lack trust in the media that was formerly controlled by the state of Former Yugoslavia and abused by nationalist propaganda during the war. As the distrust in the media among the citizens is persistent even towards the foreign media including the BBC or ABC which are generally considered neutral, they lack trustworthy sources of information to prompt them to change their hostile

perceptions of the other peoples.[76] In this hostile environment, there is a risk that anti-nationalistic ideas or opinions could be regarded as collaboration with enemies and betrayal of their own group. Those conditions have made it difficult for the citizens to be politically active in non-nationalistic ways within their communities. In a broader context there are few opportunities to break down those psychological barriers due to firmly fixed ethnic segregation. During the war ethnic segregation was promoted by ethnic cleansing strategies. Furthermore, the separation of the peoples is confirmed and maintained by international segregating policies with the presence of peacekeeping troops developed after the war. The inflow of aid and resources is unevenly split between the Federation and Republika Srpska which caused feeling of unfairness among the citizens.[77] There are few chances for people to work for reconstructing inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia so that open discussions on ethnic issues or ideas for political alternatives to ethnic politics have been difficult to develop under the circumstances.

Secondly, the interventionist approach by the international community has created an irregularity in the relationships between the state and the citizens, which hinders civil participation in politics. After the war the international bodies supporting and monitoring the reconstruction and democratisation of Bosnia were given considerable power to intervene in Bosnian state and local politics.[78] The international community has exercised this power in order to control ethnic nationalism, however, this practice created the situation whereby the international community runs the state of Bosnia instead of the elected Bosnian politicians driven by ethnic nationalism. Practically the governance for the Bosnian citizens is not by the Bosnian politicians or institutions but by the internationals. As a result, civil participation in the Bosnian politics does not have any effect on actual Bosnian civil

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[76] People's distrust of the media see, Ibid. as well as from informal conversations with the members of the Group 15 for the Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' at Fridtjof Nansen Academy in Lillehammer, Norway, June 2001.
[77] Ramet, op. cit.
[78] The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled in Dayton 21 November 1995 signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.

life. They would rather be better off appealing to international civil servants in Bosnia than to local politicians.[79]

Lastly, many skilled workers, who could potentially become civil leaders, have left the country or been sucked into the international presence in Bosnia. The effect of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from April 1992 to December 1995 was huge on the population, as more than 200,000 people were killed and over half of the population were displaced within or out of the country.[80] In the devastation after the war, the future was not promising for people even those with special skills. Since the war, the phenomenon of 'brain drain', the drain of skilled workers into foreign countries, has been pronounced in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also skilled workers are attracted to the better-paid jobs created by the large presence of international organisations including NGOs rather than working locally to reconstruct their communities. For example, instead of teaching children, teachers leave school to become simple translators for international NGOs because of the better pay. Skilled workers often become leaders among the ordinary people. The absence of those people within their communities significantly affects bottom-up initiatives and the future of the state.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the background and the process of Yugoslav disintegration as it unfolded in the early 1990s. As the political and economic problems piled up on the state, its disintegration could have been seen as an inevitable result. However, it was not necessarily inevitable that the process became violent. Nonetheless in reality, conflict between the ethnic groups developed into violence. The warfare was extremely severe and brutal especially in Bosnia. Although the major violence has ceased in the region today, conflict and ethnic nationalism still remains persistent.

The image of total war and deep-rooted historic hatred between the ethnic groups as presented by the media misleads us to an assumption of civil support for

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[79] Roberto Belloni, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 2, 2001, p 172.
[80] Deacon and Stubbs, op. cit., p 106.

wars and violence among the population. In fact the citizens of the different ethnic identities have lived together, whether separated or mixed, for decades within the Former Yugoslavia. It is not plausible that all citizens were willingly carried away by the radical ethnic nationalism. But unfortunately, the citizens have hardly acted against ethnic nationalism either.

The political passiveness among the citizens seems to be attributed to the civil political environment in the Former Yugoslavia. In the Former Yugoslavia, little space was allowed for the citizens' political activities outside the framework of the communist party. Nevertheless, it needs to be remembered that the citizens of the Former Yugoslavia including Bosnia have been aware of political and social issues in their country and are capable of organising social movements, although they had little chance to use their knowledge and capacity politically. As the war ended and the communist system ceased, there should be more chance for the citizens to take part in constructing the future of Bosnia. However, there are factors in the post-war political environment that are rather discouraging for civil participation in politics. This is a major concern for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement discussed in the next chapter.

Former Yugoslavia

AUSTRIA

Balaton

HUNGARY

Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint independent state, but this entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the United States.

SLOVENIA
★LJUBLJANA

ZAGREB

ROMANIA

Vojvodina
(autonomous province)

CROATIA

Slavonia

● Novi Sad

Krajina

BELGRADE

BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

Serbia

Dalmatia

SARAJEVO ★

Adriatic
Sea

Montenegro

Priština ●
Kosovo
(autonomous province)

BULGARIA

PODGORICA ★

★ SKOPJE

ITALY

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

ALBANIA

0   50   100 Kilometers
0   50   100 Miles

GREECE

737886 (R00472) 2-96

Map 4.1 The Former Yugoslavia

106

Chapter 5   Third-Party Intervention in Bosnia:
Search for the Bottom-up Conflict Transformation

Introduction

As the Former Yugoslavia faced political turmoil and disintegration, and Bosnia faced ethnic tension and wars from the early 1990s, the international community has attempted to deal with the situations effectively. The international intervention has worked at various levels, from the high-political to the grass-roots level. This chapter is an overview on interventions by the international community with a specific focus on second-track intervention.

Only recently the potential and importance of second-track intervention in this conflict started to gain recognition. Before and during the Bosnian war from 1992 to 1995, it is fair to say that not much second-track effort was made for bottom-up conflict transformation. In the post-war reconstruction, however, the international community came to realise the necessity of bottom-up conflict transformation in order to create stability and real peace in Bosnia. A major emphasis has been put on the civil and social reconstruction in the peacebuilding operation. Civil society-building became an important project in the operation in order to promote reconciliation among the citizens and to encourage them to participate in the politics of Bosnian reconstruction. Considerable resources are put into the civil society-building programmes.

This chapter describes the process whereby the international community came to realise the necessity of bottom-up conflict transformation and to seriously engage in second-track intervention in Bosnia. This process has not yet concluded. In spite of the efforts and resources by the international community, the attempts for civil society-building did not produce the expected results. The citizens routinely elect ethnic nationalists to political power, passively accept ethnic politics and remain divided. Therefore, this chapter firstly overviews the second-track intervention in Bosnia and subsequently critically assesses the bottom-up attempts in Bosnian post-war peacebuilding. Finally, disappointing outcome of the international civil society-building programmes is reconsidered in terms of not only various conditional factors in the Bosnian context of

peacebuilding but also the suitability of the international strategy itself for the bottom-up conflict transformation.

5.1 Intervention until the Dayton Peace Agreement
International Diplomatic Efforts to Prevent and Stop War

Since the process of disintegration in Former Yugoslavia became violent in 1991, severe war in Bosnia continued until 1995. The international community attempted to manage the crisis in one way or another through diplomatic means during this period. Some aspects of international diplomacy may be possibly seen as successful. However, most are regarded as questionable, lacking coherence, common purpose and commitment among the international community.[1]

In summer 1990, warnings from diplomats, scholars and intelligence agencies had already brought the international community's attention to the threat of the violent disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia. Having pursued 'a more Westernised alternative model of communism' to the Soviet model, Yugoslavia had been of strategic importance for the West during the Cold War.[2] However, as the Cold War ended, the domestic situation of Yugoslavia was no longer a serious concern for the major powers. Still, in June 1991, when violence broke out as the state disintegrated, the European Community (EC) started to take the initiative in crisis management. Although the Former Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic importance, the Yugoslav crisis could ultimately pose security problems in Europe. At the same time, the EC in the transitional period towards the European Union was eager to prove itself in dealing with a European security problem without US assistance. In addition, no one else was ready or willing to engage in the Yugoslav crisis. In the post-Cold War environment of 1991, the US was not only uninterested in taking an active role in European security but was also preoccupied with the military operation in the Gulf War in 1990-1.[3] The Gulf War practically disabled the United Nations in the Yugoslav crisis as the military operation against Iraq was conducted under the framework

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[1] James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, Hurst & Company, 1997, p 260.
[2] Ibid., p 25.
[3] Trevor Salmon, 'Testing times for European political cooperation: the Gulf War and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992', *International Affairs*, vol.68, no.2, 1992.

of the UN.[4] Other international or regional bodies whose nature and function were predicated on the Cold War were in the phase of adaptation to the post-Cold War environment, so that they were not yet equipped to deal with such events occurring in the Former Yugoslavia.

As violence broke out after the unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, the EC started mediating efforts in Yugoslavia.[5] The EC's efforts managed to pave the way to a cease-fire and agreements on Slovenia by July 1991. However, they failed to stop the war in Croatia and to deliver the agreement on the future of Yugoslavia in November. From this point, the UN took over peace talks and the UN special envoy Cyrus Vance started to lead negotiations, while the EC continued their political groundwork with the Yugoslav republics using diplomatic means. Despite a commitment on collective intervention as the EC, the EC member states started to show differences in policy preference, which caused incoherence in their intervention effort.[6] The difference between the EC member states was demonstrated in the recognition of independence of the republics. Germany was eager to recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, believing that would stop the war. Meanwhile states such as France and the United Kingdom were sceptical of such moves. The Badinter Arbitration Commission assessed the independence of each republic and concluded that Slovenia and Macedonia could have their independence recognised but that Croatia and Bosnia had problems such as minority issues or lack of a national consensus. Despite the recommendation by the Commission and the hesitation of some members, the states of the European Union (EU, changed from the EC by the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991) recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992.[7] Although a cease-fire and the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia was

[4] Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, The Brooking Institution, 1995, p 158.
[5] For the details on the initial international response to the break-up of the Former Yugoslavia see Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, Westview, 1993, Chapter 8. Stephanie Anderson, 'EU, NATO, and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture', *European Security*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1995. Marc Weller, 'Current Development: The international Response to the dissolution of The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 86, no.3, 1992.
[6] Salmon, op.cit. Patrick Moor, 'Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia', *RFE/RL Report*, 24 January 1992.
[7] As part of Common Foreign and Security Policy for European integration, the hesitant states were carried away by the strong German initiative on this issue.

agreed with UN mediation in January 1992, the EU's decision to recognise the independence of certain republics destroyed the principle for an overall settlement of the Yugoslav conflict and the creation of a framework for future relations.

The stage of serious conflict moved to Bosnia after that. The EU and UN initiated the negotiation in Bosnia between three major ethnic groups, Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The UN, neither its member states nor the Secretariat, was unlikely to make a major commitment. At one point the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia was discussed as a possibility but was dismissed as the situation was not suitable.[8] As the situation in Bosnia became horribly deteriorated, the UN continued to maintain a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo which originally had the mandate for a peacekeeping mission in Croatia. UNPROFOR was helpless in acting against violent conflict in Bosnia decisively, and then engaged in a humanitarian role. UNPROFOR undertook the mission to deliver aid in various parts of Bosnia with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The mission meant sustaining populations under siege and putting a brake on 'ethnic cleansing' whilst waiting for a break-though from international diplomacy. While the UN was trying political means for solutions, NATO more forcefully attempted to influence the course of conflict as it conducted air-strikes on the Serbs who were overpowering the other parties. Until 1995 many cease-fire agreements were broken and no peace agreement was reached despite various attempts in international diplomacy.

The Second-Track Intervention during War: Humanitarian Aid

In Bosnia, some attempts at second-track intervention were conducted even during the war between 1992 and 1995. The major form of intervention was the delivery of humanitarian aid such as food and medicine. As three-quarters of Bosnia was under siege, the working environment for aid workers was harsh and often dangerous. The leading agency of relief operations was the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), taking responsibility for logistics, transport

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[8] Gow, op. cit., pp 91-2.

and securing access.[9] Other UN agencies and NGOs wishing to work with it in this relief operation were required to secure agreement and accreditation with UNHCR. As 'implementing agencies', NGOs need to agree to the principles of neutral humanitarian assistance and some operational obligations, then they become entitled to logistic and programme support, transportation and UNPROFOR protection. In 1994 UNHCR was in association with more than 60 agencies in Bosnia and about 40 of these were categorised as NGO implementing agencies.[10] UNHCR reached general agreements

on access for humanitarian aid with the governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo) and Bosnian Serbs (Pale). However, in practice, despite those written agreements, objections by local militia leaders frequently delayed convoys and confiscated parts of aid from convoys at their checkpoints or blockades. It is estimated that 30-40% or sometimes even 75%, of aid was taken by the militias.[11] A significant amount of humanitarian aid in Bosnia was diverted to the military. NGOs not accredited with UNHCR had to work on their own and consequently their operations could be relatively high-risk. Despite the risk, there were small NGOs and some well-established NGOs working outside the UNHCR umbrella. With some exceptions, NGOs' work was concentrated in physically secure and less politically sensitive areas. As a result, the geographical distribution of NGOs in the region was uneven. Although declaring themselves to be neutral, humanitarian aid agencies including UNHCR and NGOs could not help effectively thereby indirectly contributing to the continuation of conflict.[12]

There was some evidence of other forms of second-track intervention, apart from humanitarian aid. As an intergovernmental effort, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was deployed in Bosnia.[13] Working as an aid agency, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was also

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[9] Mark Duffield, *The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid*, Occasional Paper 2, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, March 1996, p 37. Mark Duffield, *Complex Political Emergencies with Reference to Angola and Bosnia an Exploratory Report for UNICEF*, March 1994, p 67.

[10] Duffield, op. cit., 1994, p 68.

[11] Ibid., p 69.

[12] From mid-1990s, it has been debated how humanitarian aid can affect conflict for better or worse. See details for Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1999.

[13] Ryan Grist, 'Upgrading Paper: Managing Complex Intrastate Violent Conflict with Tools of Non-Violence', presented at the Upgrading Seminar at Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, June 6, 2000.

engaged in monitoring of violations of international law on human rights.[14] There were agencies working for the most vulnerable people affected by war. For example, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Rescue Committee engaged in psycho-social work from 1992. While conventional NGOs' programmes were simply of benefit to immediate beneficiaries, UNICEF's psycho-social programme was unique in the sense that it was designed to develop within the existing educational and medical structures.[15] Involving preliminary training for teachers to work with war-affected children, creative activity and association was considered to be effective for local psychologists and teachers. This contributed to not only healing psychological wounds of the vulnerable people but also preserving some civil structures and connections during war. There are local NGOs or civil associations supporting people to overcome their traumatic experience or engaging peace actions, and some international agencies provided financial support to them.[16]

Despite those examples above, the major form of intervention remained simple humanitarian aid during the Bosnian war. On one hand, it was because much relief distribution and delivery was within the UNHCR framework whose principles required aid agencies to confine themselves in simply providing basic input during war.[17] The principle of neutrality prevented international agencies from using their opportunities to reach the citizens creatively for the promotion of conflict transformation. However small the means of delivering aid can influence the course of conflict. Nevertheless, the humanitarian aid operation in Bosnia during the war did not seem strategically conducted as a part of the bottom-up approach. On the other hand, the NGOs wishing to establish projects in Bosnia under the UNHCR umbrella needed to get clearance from the political authorities. As the needs were greater and operations were fewer, Bosnia was relatively free of control.[18] However, the political authorities in Bosnia engaged in the war could restrict the NGO operations clearly opposing their policies. Under the circumstance of segregation and authoritative restriction, it is assumed

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[14] ttp://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.isf/iwpList74/AA791454DD34E07FC1256B660058F758
[15] Duffield, op. cit., 1994, pp 79-81.
[16] See Inger Agger in collaboration with Sanja Vuk and Jadrabka Mimica, *Theory and Practice of Psycho-social Projects under War Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia*, ECHO/ECTF, Zagreb, 1995.
[17] Duffield, op. cit, 1994, p 44.
[18] Ibid., p 74.

that the second-track intervention of bottom-up approach had only a limited operational sphere.

Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that some second-track interventions used in the bottom-up approach had the opportunity to work with Bosnian citizens outside of Bosnia. Because of the war, many citizens were forced to leave home and became internally displaced people or refugees beyond the borders. Although the international agencies' major work was relief operation due to the urgency of the massive refugee problem in the neighbouring countries, some attempts to apply the bottom-up approach had already been made inside and outside Bosnia during the war. However, they were only a small part of the overall operation of the second-track intervention.

5.2 The Dayton Peace Agreement
Contents of the Dayton Agreement

After three and half years, the three ethnic groups in the Bosnian conflict finally agreed to end the war. The peace accord was discussed and agreed at Dayton, the US air base, on November 21st and formally signed in Paris on 14th December 1995. The major reason why the peace talks in Dayton successfully ended the war despite the failure of all the previous peace talks and plans was considered to be the US's decision to commit itself in this negotiation and peace process.[19] The agreement is called the 'General Framework Agreement for Peace' or the 'Dayton Peace Agreement'. The Dayton Peace Agreement is very different from any sort of peace treaties in modern times in some respects.

The Dayton Agreement is a two-page document with 11 annexes.[20] These annexes provide the detailed plan to reconstruct Bosnia as a unified state. Annex 1 and 2 are concerned with military related issues that are applicable to a conventional peace treaty. Annex 1, divided into two sections, 1-A and 1-B. Annex 1-A is concerned with military aspects including the cessation of hostilities, the redeployment of forces and the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Annex 1-B refers to measures for regional stabilisation such as confidence building and security measures and regional arms control principals.

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[19] Gow, op. cit., p 307-315.
[20] The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/dayton.htm

Annex 2 is the agreement on inter-ethnic boundary and related issues. Under this part of the Dayton Agreement, the boundary line between two entities in Bosnia, the Muslim-Croat Federation occupying 49% of the territory and the Serb entity, Republika Srpska, taking 51% was confirmed.

Annexes 3 to 11 are concerned with non-military aspects and consist of five-sixths of the whole Dayton Agreement. The annexes cover a wide range of issues for the social reconstruction of Bosnia. Annex 3 is the agreement on elections. The organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was appointed in a supervisory role and given power of regulation and control over the election process. Annex 4 is the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina with details about allocation of responsibility between state institutions and entities', and a power-sharing arrangement between entities within state institutions. Annex 5 is the agreement on arbitration to solve disputes between the entities. Annex 6 emphasises human rights, establishing the Commission on Human Rights which consists of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber. Annex 7 addresses the issues related to refugees and displaced persons including repatriation of refugee and displaced persons and establishment of the commission. Annex 8 is the Agreement on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments. In Annex 9 it was agreed that the Commission on Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations be established. The commission is to examine public corporation between the entities in areas such as utility, energy, postal or communication facilities. Annex 10 gave the UN High Representative power and responsibility to co-ordinate international institutions and to facilitate the parties in Bosnia on the implementation process of the Dayton Agreement. Finally, the Annex 11 establishes the International Police Task Force to provide civilian law enforcement with respect for human rights and fundamental freedom.

Unlike a conventional peace treaty only dealing with military issues such as a cease-fire, arms reduction and boundary settling agreement, the Dayton Agreement includes far more issues as seen above. The Annexes 1 and 2 only are applicable to a conventional peace treaty and the annexes from 3 to 11 address the issues necessary to reconstruct the state of Bosnia. They comprehensively cover a variety of issues and draw out plans to reconstruct political, economic, judicial, social and cultural spheres of the state. The majority of annexes in the Dayton Agreement are not related to ending hostilities, that is traditionally the

role of a peace agreement, but to provide the detailed blueprint for a united and democratic Bosnia. With the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia became an ambitious experiment of internationally sponsored political engineering.

Analytical Perspectives: The Absence of a Bottom-up Approach

While the Dayton Agreement was successful in putting an end to the atrocity of three and half years of warfare, it has been debated whether the agreement laid a sufficient foundation as a guide for constructing democratic Bosnia from the post-war situation.[21] Preserved as a single multi-ethnic sovereign state in the agreement, Bosnia is clearly divided into two entities under the decentralised federalism. The agreement can be read and interpreted in very different ways on this point. Decentralised federalism can be seen as a stepping stone towards a more centralised and united state and at the same time can also be seen as an expression of rejection towards integrationist or assimilationist objectives of national federation.[22] As the Dayton Agreement was the best compromise available between Bosnians and Croats, between the three major ethnic groups in Bosnia and the international community,[23] the existence of the state of Bosnia is an artificial and intentional product. Therefore, the agreement does not necessarily assure if Bosnia would be a single state in any meaningful sense in the future.

Paris refers to the background of the post-conflict peacebuilding operations all over the world after the Cold War as 'liberal internationalism'. Liberal internationalism is the assumption that the foundation of lasting peace in war-shattered states is market democracy, that is, liberal democracy and a market economy, the Western model of politics and economics.[24] This perspective seems applicable to the case of Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement certainly includes a reconstruction plan for political institutions with the democratic election as a main theme, further to be supplemented with policies for promotion of a market

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[21] Daniel Kaufman, 'Self-Determination in a Multi-Ethnic State: Bosnians, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs' in Džemal Sokolović and Floriam Bieber (eds.), *Reconstructing Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Ashgate, 2001, pp 31-61.
[22] Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton, Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*, Hurst & Company, London, 2002, pp 91-3.
[23] For various parties views, Rory Keane, *Reconstructing Sovereignty: Post Dayton Bosnia Undercovered*, Ashgate, 2002, p 70.
[24] Ronald Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', *International Security*, Fall 1997, vol. 22, no. 2, pp 54-89.

economy. However, liberal internationalism is seen as being seriously problematic as a strategic principle for reconstructing conflict-suffering divided societies. According to some scholars including Paris, the liberal democracy and market economy in fact encourage conflict and competition.[25] Liberal democracy encourages the public expression of conflicting interests in order to limit the intensity of such conflicts by channelling them through peaceful political institutions before they turn violent. The market economy obviously increases not only competition but also possible conflict as it creates economic inequalities. Bringing market democracy into the divided societies after protracted intrastate conflict sharpens confrontation and conflict, so that it can further destabilise the societies instead of stabilising them. Nevertheless, the Dayton Agreement contains details on constitutional arrangement and reconstruction of political institutions while social reconstruction or reconciliation hardly makes an issue.

Whether foreseeing difficulties in implementation or not, the international community secured far-reaching power over Bosnia through the agreement. The heavy presence of international institutions in the implementation process is clearly noticeable throughout the accords. International bodies mentioned in the agreement to support implementation include NATO, OSCE, the UN, UNHCR, the European Court of Human Rights, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Council of Europe, UNESCO, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Those international bodies are to supervise as well as control the transition of Bosnia to a self-governing democracy. (Table 5.1) In fact, the peace agreement was a treaty between the Bosnian parties themselves and not a treaty between the international community and the Bosnian government.[26] Along with the disputant parties in Bosnia, the neighbouring states of Croatia and Serbia were bound to the Dayton Peace Agreement as the signatories, while the international institutions overseeing the implementation process were not. The agreement is very clear in terms of limiting Bosnian self-government while it provides little guideline for extension of the international mandates. Therefore,

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[25] Ibid. Charles-Philippe David, 'Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?: Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1999, pp 25-41.
[26] David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, second edition, Pluto Press, 2000, pp 51-52.

there is not much restriction on the powers the international community can exercise over Bosnia. Consequently, the Dayton Agreement provides legal foundations for the international community to intervene in practically every sphere of Bosnian affairs.[27]

Table 5.1 Dayton Peace Agreement Annexes

Annex	Area of Authority	International Body
1-A	Military Aspects	NATO (IFOR/SFOR)
1-B	Regional Stabilisation	OSCE
2	Inter-Entity Boundary	NATO (IFOR/SFOR)
3	Elections	OSCE
4	Constitution	UN High Representative
Article IV	Constitutional Court	European Court of Human Rights
Article VII	Central Bank	IMF
5	Arbitration	
6 Part B	Human Rights Ombudsman	OSCE
Part C	Human Rights Chamber	Council of Europe
7	Refugees & Displaced Persons	European Court of Human Rights
8	Commission to Preserve National Monuments	UNESCO
9	Commission on Public Corporations	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
10	Civilian Implementation	UN High Representative
11	International Police Task Force	UN

Source: The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 'Table 2.1 The Dayton Annexes' in David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, Pluto Press, 1999, p 45.

It was not so surprising that many Bosnians regard the Dayton Agreement as an external imposition.[28] Experiencing three and half years of war, the population were exhausted and divided. Although the majority of the population was categorised into either of three disputant parties, Muslims, Serbs or Croats, internal structures of those disputants groups were not necessarily firmly unified under their political leaders but rather fragmented. Therefore, the Dayton Agreement as a reconstruction plan of Bosnia signed by a few politicians with

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[27] Roberto Belloni, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 2, 2001, p 164.
[28] Chandler, op. cit., p 43.

external mediation was somewhat distant from most of the Bosnian population. In fact, the agreement as a reconstruction plan is rather hollow in promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation among the Bosnian citizens. The post-war constitutional structure drawn from the Dayton Agreement did not encourage local initiatives for peace.[29] In other words, as far as the Dayton Agreement is concerned, the Bosnian citizens are not expected to take a major role in the process of conflict transformation. In this sense, the Dayton Agreement can be regarded overall as a top-down attempt at conflict transformation. The implementation process is therefore challenged by various difficulties.

Post-Dayton: Problems of Implementation

The implementation process of the Dayton Agreement was not as smooth and easy as had been initially hoped. There are two distinctive evidences of implementation difficulty. Firstly this can be observed in the elections held in Bosnia after the agreement. The Dayton Agreement was an ambitious attempt to create a new state of multi-ethnic democracy that was not a product of popular consensus or popular involvement.[30] For this reason, the state-level election scheduled to be held in September 1996 for the first time after the agreement was crucial in order to restore the ownership over the new state to its citizens. Then the multi-ethnic and democratic Bosnian state pictured in the agreement based on the idea of the international community would be officially granted and taken over by Bosnian citizens. However, problems had already emerged at the preparation stage of the election. The political environment in Bosnia was far from appropriate for free and fair elections.[31] After the three and half years of war chaos and large scale demographic change, conducting voter registration and making lists of eligible voters turned out to be extremely difficult. Due to the atmosphere of intimidation, practical barriers between the entities and controlled media, a fair election campaign was not possible. In the end the election results gave a substantial popular mandate to the three main nationalist parties: the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)

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[29] Belloni, op. cit., p 164.
[30] Chandler, op. cit., p 43.
[31] International Crisis Group(ICG), 'Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *ICG Bosnia Report*, No. 16, 22 September 1996.

and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).[32] Practical complication in holding elections and the nationalist parties' domination continued in the general and municipal elections in the following years.[33] The election results did not contribute to promoting integration but to maintaining polarisation of the population.

Secondly the other noticeable stalemate in the implementation is concerned with the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. By the end of the war approximately 2.2 million people became refugees or internally displaced. Although UNHCR suggested that a total of 610,920 refugees and internally displaced persons, 27.8% of all displaced, completed 'return' by August 1999, the majority of these 600,000 returnees did not return to pre-war home but some sort of temporary accommodation such as the homes of relatives or friends or the illegal occupation of properties.[34] In addition, most of the return was to the areas where returnees belong to the ethnic majority. On the contrary, the number of minority returns, people returning to the areas where a different ethnic group retains military control and the population majority, represents about 6% of all those displaced to be refugees or internally displaced persons by war.[35] Considering that the majority of displaced were originally from the areas now controlled by other ethnic groups, this figure of minority returns, only six percent, emphasises the difficulty of this operation.[36] In November 1999 the number of displaced Bosnians still seeking permanent solutions was reportedly 888,300 including 68,000 refugees and 820,300 displaced persons.[37] The reason

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[32] Chanlder, op. cit., pp 69-78. M. Kasapovic, 'Parliamentary Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Election Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1997, pp 117-21.

[33] International Crisis Group, 'Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement', *ICG Balkans Report*, no. 80, Sarajevo, 28 October 1999, pp 11-18.

[34] IGC, op. cit., October 1999, pp 32-3.

[35] The number varies. According to UNHCR, the number of minority return during 1996-99 is 127,721(5.8%).(UNHCR GIS Unit OCM BiH, *Total Minority Returns in/to BiH From 1996 to 30 June 2002*, UNHCR, 30 June 2002.) Belloni suggests the number of 132,275 or less than 7%. (Belloni, op.cit, p 166.) Independent Bureau For Humanitarian Issues, *Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998*, UNDP, 1998, p 89.

[36] According to the Federation, 65.85% of displaced persons within the areas controlled by the federation fled or were expelled from the areas of Republika Srpska. (Independent Bureau For Humanitarian Issues, op. cit., p 88.)

[37] Figure 1, Estimated of Refugees and Displaced Persons Still Seeking Solution in the Balkans, November 1999, in GAO(US General Accounting Office), *Balkan Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability*, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 2000, p 43. Other sources support the number roughly. (ICG, op. cit., October 1999, p 69. Independent Bureau For Humanitarian Issues, op. cit., p 89.)

of difficulty in their return suggested considerable problems in overall implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

International supervision of the Bosnian transition to peace and democracy was mostly supposed to end by the state and entity level elections in September 1996. However, the mandate of the transitional international administration was extended for a further two years 'consolidation' period' and then extended indefinitely in December 1997. Despite internationally supervised and ratified elections, Bosnia was regarded as not democratic enough to resume its self-governance by the international community. In practice Bosnia remains divided.

5.3 Civil Society-Building: Bottom-up Conflict Transformation?
Failure of Official Aid: Growing Expectation to Civil Society

The international community has struggled to implement the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement but has been ambitiously committed to sort them out. In order to promote the multi-ethnic Bosnia, the international community has been engaged in the reconstruction of devastated infrastructure and homes, the set-up of power-sharing political institutions and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Considerable resources are allocated to Bosnian reconstruction. The cost of peacebuilding is US$9 billion annually.[38] The large part, US$7 billion, was for maintaining an international military presence. Nevertheless, the funds allocated for the reconstruction programme and economic rehabilitation in Bosnia has been worth approximately $1,200 per person which is rather generous, compared to the Marshall Plan's $275 at today's prices.[39]

However, the international assistance has had little effect in promoting reconciliation and multi-ethnic societies.[40] For example, despite 200 million euros assistance from the European Community to Mostar, a divided city, there are problems in implementing the Dayton Agreement and it remains almost

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[38] Belloni, op. cit., p 165.

[39] Ibid. Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs, 'International Actors and Social Policy Development in Bosnia-Hercegovina: Globalism and the 'New Federalism', *Journal of European Social Policy*, vol.8, no.2, 1998, p 103.

[40] GAO, op. cit. ICG, op. cit., October 1999. ICG, *Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Anatomy of Hate and Fear*, ICG Report no. 73, 2 August 1999.

completely divided.[41] Although destroyed houses were rebuilt all over Bosnia, many are left empty or illegally occupied in the absence of their rightful owners. 150 homes have been repaired with EU assistance in the village of Goles which used to be a peaceful community of Serbs and Muslims in Central Bosnia, but only 20 families had returned by 1999.[42]

The international assistance for state reconstruction is often channelled through international NGOs and local elites, however, it seems that the presence of the international organisations and NGOs diminished the political responsibility among local leaders to promote civil and social reconstruction.[43] Unsatisfied with the election results, the international community increasingly takes an interventionalist role in local politics. Because of the international intervention, the local leaders would not need to take responsibility for running their country and communities let alone contributing to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. As the international humanitarian aid industry was largely replaced by the local public sector, the development of local capacity and further development of governmental responsibility in social policy has considerably been hindered.[44] As a result, rather than promoting reconciliation, the local authorities were left to obstruct the return of refugees and displaced persons. The motivation for this obstruction varies from simple racism, a genuine need to protect the displaced in the properties of potential returnees, to black market and local mafia with widespread corruption among the local authorities. In this environment, there has been hardly any progress in reconciliation between the ethnic groups and the state is still almost completely divided.

It has become apparent that economic incentive and power-sharing in political institutions does not provide enough grounds for reconciliation among the population. The international community, expecting a quick withdrawal from Bosnia, was forced to find an alternative and longer-term approach. As state reconstruction can be seen as the process of democratisation, civil society is

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[41] ICG, *Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress*, ICG Balkans Report no. 90, 19th April 2000.
[42] Stephen Gary and Phillippe Deprez, 'EU millions go to waste in Bosnia: Rebuilt houses are left empty', *The Sunday Times*, 7th March 1999.
[43] Belloni, op. cit., p 166. ICG, op.cit., October 1999.
[44] Belloni, op. cit., p 165.

increasingly considered important for democratic consolidation.[45] The civil society is defined as the associational sphere of interest groups which stands between the private sphere such as the family and market economy, and the public sphere such as the state and government.[46] Civil society-building appeared appropriate not only as an alternative to traditional infra-driven reconstruction but also as a clear, comprehensive and long-term strategic purpose of the peacebuilding operation.

The basic assumption of civil-society development strategy by the international community can be summarised into two points.[47] First, civil society is regarded to have the potential for moderation, tolerance and pluralism among the Bosnian citizens. Associations and networks for broad public interests are considered to cut across ethnic cleavages so that the development of civil society is expected to contribute to the healing of the wounds of war as well as promoting peace.[48] Second, building a civil society is considered to lead to civil empowerment. The civil society is the middle ground between individuals and state that can limit the exercise of state power. What is expected here in Bosnia is that the citizens be the counterpower against the ethnic nationalist political leaders.

The expectation to civil society development grew in creating the democratic and multi-ethnic Bosnia as the situation on the ground seemed to be in stalemate.[49] The term, civil society, became fashionable in the humanitarian and development programmes of the international community. The strategy of civil society development can be seen as an attempt to incorporate the citizens of Bosnia into the process of conflict transformation. Apparently the civil society

[45] About democratisation and civil society, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner(eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, second edition, The John Hopkins University Press, 1996. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problem of Democratic Transition and Consolidation-Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

[46] Larry Diamond, 'Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no.3, 1994, pp 4-17. Chandler, op. cit., p135.

[47] These two points in fact originated from two different versions of 'civil society argument' in theory on democratisation, that is, the ways in which civil society contributes to democracy. It is considered that the two versions are not necessarily congruous. For more, Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, 'The Paradox of Civil Society', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, no. 3, 1996, pp 28-52.

[48] Belloni, op. cit., p 168.

[49] Peace Implementation Council, *Reinforcing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina-The Way Ahead, Annex: The Peace Implementation Agenda*, Annex to the Madrid Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, 1998, p 25.

development is a potential bottom-up approach for conflict transformation which was exactly missing in the Dayton Agreement.

NGO Building...Service delivery?

Civil society development is considered strongly related and often equal to NGO building. The NGO community in Bosnia has been growing since the war and local NGO development became a popular theme of work among international NGOs operating in Bosnia.[50] Although it is difficult to know the precise number of NGOs operating in Bosnia, due to varied definitions of the NGO itself, some numbers are available. Smillie suggests that there would be several hundred associations including football clubs, youth associations and others predating the war. In 1996, it is estimated that the number of international NGOs in Bosnia was 156 along with 98 local NGOs.[51] Another source suggests that there were 240 international NGOs in the same year.[52] In 2000, the number of international NGOs was 173 and that of local NGOs 365 according to statistics from the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) Bosnia-Herzegovina.[53] Many of those were small or relatively unknown along with most of the major international NGOs including Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE and Medicins san Frontières. The international NGOs started to work in Bosnia after the breakout of the war. Most local NGOs were established since 1993 with some starting to organise themselves during the war. The number of local NGOs dramatically increased as the war ended. Nevertheless, the drastic quantitative growth of the local NGO sector in Bosnia did not necessarily lead to a strong civil society.

The vast growth of local NGOs in Bosnia was largely due to the strong support by the international community. Many local NGOs have been established by the international NGOs or remain of their presence after their withdrawal.[54] The international community provides funding for them on their projects. While

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[50] Dave Bekkering, *The World of Bosnia-Hercegovinian NGOs*: *An introduction into the world of B&H NGOs and B&H NGO assistance*, second revised edition, UNDP Gornji Vakuf, Bosnian NGO Development Unit, March 1997/ September 1997.
[51] Ian Smillie *Service Delivery or Civil Society?: Non Governmental Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, CARE Canada, 1996. The number of 156(INGO) and 96(LNGO) was according to International Council of Voluntary Agencies(ICVA) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[52] According to the Federal Government, in Smillie, op. cit.
[53] http://www.icva-bh/eng/directory.htm
[54] Smillie, op. cit. Stubbs, op. cit, 1997.

the international donors' support to local NGOs was clearly intended to contribute to a strong, pluralist, socially integrated civil society in Bosnia,[55] the concept of civil society has never seemed to be clearly understood by the international community in the Bosnian context.[56]

Rather than constructing civil society the international community's commitment to NGO development in Bosnia seems to have created a competitive market place in which local NGOs are forced to reproduce the categories, assumptions and practices of foreign donors in order to survive.[57] Local NGOs are heavily dependent on the international donors particularly in terms of funding. In order to gain funding local NGOs become merely convenient implementing agencies for changing priority of the international donors. Obviously such donor-driven local NGOs are not firmly rooted in their communities.[58] As a result, these local NGOs fail to interest the majority of the citizens or encourage their participation, or to make the citizens already participating in them feel empowered.[59] A further concern related to NGO building is that local NGOs inevitably compete with each other for funding instead of building cooperative community and networks among themselves. Uneven international support in the region also contributed to uneven geographical distribution of local NGOs. NGO growth has been far faster in the Federation than in the Republika Srpska. According to a survey in 1997, roughly less than 5 % of the money that the international community spends on Bosnia and Hercegovina went to the Republika Srpska and the rest went to the Federation.[60] The disproportion within Republika Srpska itself was also clear in 1999 as 134 NGOs operated in the western part while the eastern part, the 'internationally neglected'[61] area due to the nationalistic hard-liners in power, had only 50.[62] The

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[55] Smillie, op. cit.

[56] Some definitions. CARE 'refers to the many organisations, institutions, activities and forms of association that give expression to the diverse interests, convictions and objectives of a committed citizenry'(Aida Bagić and Paul Stubbs, *CARE International Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia Civil Society Development Programme*, An Independent Evaluation, CARE, 2000.)

[57] Paul Stubbs, 'Nationalisms, Globalisation and Civil Society in Croatia and Slovenia', Paper presented to Second European Conference of Sociology 'European Societies: fusion or Fission?', Budapest 30 August – 2 September, 1995. (http:www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/066htm)

[58] Smillie, op.cit. Stubbs, op. cit, 1997.

[59] Gordana Katana, *NGOs in Republika Srpska Bashful Support of the Regime*, AIM Banja Luka, 20 September, 1999.(www.aimpress.org.)

[60] Bekkering, op. cit., p 78.

[61] Belloni, op. cit., p 174.

[62] Katana, op. cit.

NGOs are concentrated in urban areas while far less NGOs operate in rural areas.[63]

Although the Bosnian NGO community can be expected to become a key part of an associational base, that is, civil society. Civil society building measured by counting the number of civil initiatives and NGOs is 'unsatisfactory since it fails to address the relational nature of civil society: to the state, to globalisation, and nationalism'[64] as Stubbs suggests. In reality, local NGOs in Bosnia became a cheap substitute for social welfare activities rather than strong civil society. This in fact contributes to maintaining *de facto*, the power in the hands of the nationalist elite of the Bosnian state and local politics. Despite the increase in the number, the local NGO community has not became strong social fabric but remained weak, vulnerable and fragmented. Under those circumstances, the NGO community in Bosnia would hardly contribute to promoting tolerance and pluralism or civil participation in affairs of the Bosnian state.

International Support for Local Advocacy Groups : The OSCE Approach

Instead of dealing with a whole NGO sector in Bosnia, some international attempts for civil society-building have focused on more specific activities of local NGOs such as their advocacy role. The development of the political role of local NGOs was not considered a priority at the initial stage of the Dayton implementation. As international support for local Bosnian NGOs focused on humanitarian aid and service provision did not produced strong civil society as seen above, the focus of international community started to focus on supporting local advocacy and human rights groups for civil society development. The local NGOs' advocacy role was considered to be important 'as a balance to government structures'[65] and 'to hold public officials accountable for their actions'[66]. Also local NGOs representing broad public interests were assumed to lead to pluralism.

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[63] Some attempts to balance geographical distribution have been made since then. (Belloni, op. cit., p174)

[64] Stubbs, op. cit., 1995.

[65] Peace Implementation Council, *Reinforcing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina- the Way Ahead, Annex: The Peace Implementation Agenda*, Annex to the Madrid Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, Madrid, 16 December 1998, p 25.

[66] Ibid.

The international community encouraged local individuals and groups to take an active role in advocacy. In order to improve the working environment for local NGOs, practical steps were taken for creating a legal and institutional framework in cooperation with locals and internationals.[67] International donors provided funding to projects by local partners in the field of advocacy or human rights. Technical support such as training on organisation and management of NGOs, and advice on agenda setting or networking was provided for local advocacy or human rights NGOs.

On one hand, many international agencies support the advocacy role of local groups in the short-term approach by allocating resources; beginning from funding selected local projects and ending with a monitor report on how the funding is spent. On the other hand, there are examples of long-term developmental approach taken by some international agencies including OSCE. Considering that the sign of successful civil society-building is when the local NGOs begin to develop their own political voices, the OSCE established the Democratisation Branch separated from the Human Rights Branch which previously had had close working relationships with local NGOs at the end of 1996. The Democratisation Branch has engaged in the development of local advocacy groups through the three-stage process; first, by identifying targeted individuals or groups who are open to external support and influence, and then beginning to network them with local NGOs and external providers; second, by providing training and building a civil society agenda; and third, by mobilising active NGOs as political voices in the domestic and international environment.[68]

The attempts by OSCE can be seen successful in the sense that they produced local NGOs and their networks and associations actively taking an advocacy role and political involvement, such as Circle 99, the Tuzla Citizens' Forum and the Citizens Alternative Parliament and Coalition for Return.[69] Those NGOs and associations took up politically sensitive issues and initiated inter-entity activities. However, the OSCE attempt has failed to fulfil own expectation that those grass-roots groups and associations to be a counterpoint to the ethnic politics by the Bosnian elite, because a persistent problem remains in the

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[67] Belloni, op. cit., p 171.
[68] Chandler, op. cit., p 139-144.
[69] Ibid., p 143

citizens' participation in those NGOs and their work. For example, an OSCE Democratisation Branch officer pointed out that the Citizens Alternative Parliament, the Shadow Government and the Coalition for Return were basically the same twenty people.[70] Those people are intellectuals of the urban middle class who have good relations with their colleagues across inter-entity borders but are not well connected to ordinary people.[71] Those NGOs crucially lack popular support from the citizens. Therefore, the civil society associations funded and supported by the OSCE and other international agencies with the focus on advocacy are somehow distant from the majority of Bosnian citizens.

5.4 Reconsideration on Civil Society-Building in Bosnia
A Question on the Capacity of Bosnian Citizens

After a few years of efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement, the international community inevitably recognised the difficult reality of the Bosnian peace process and democratisation. The international attempts of the bottom-up approach, civil society-building, have not produced the expected results. The peoples in Bosnia seemed still passive to politics, and sceptical and hardly interactive with each other. Civil society-development supported by the international community has fallen far short of achieving pluralistic and participatory civil society. The international community has been required to reconsider its attempt for civil society-development.

There are various interpretations of the unfavourable outcomes of the international community's civil society-building in Bosnia. One of them is the problematic claim that the Bosnian people are incapable of rational political behaviour. The Bosnian elites are regarded as not having the necessary skills to effectively present political alternatives and appeal them to the citizens. While those problems among the elites could be overcome by providing training and aid, more serious problems are considered lying among the Bosnian citizens in general.[72] Firstly the Bosnian citizens are seen to maintain an ethnic mentality. The citizens passively accept prejudices, stereotypes or enemy images of the

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[70] Ibid., p 149.
[71] Zoran Jorgakieski, the OSCE Democratisation Branch Coordinator for Dialogue and Reconciliation, in Ibid., p 150.
[72] Ibid., p 146-9.

other peoples, which hinders rational political judgement. Secondly, it is thought that the Bosnian citizens are either unaware of or unfamiliar with their roles in creating democratic society due to the feudalistic governance that preceded the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Chandler points out that the analogies often tend to see uneducated and ignorant peasants as the symbol of ordinary people in Bosnia.[73] Based on this view, Bosnian people are basically not capable enough to run the democratic institutional framework prepared by the international community. Lastly, the Bosnian people are too traumatised to make rational political choices. Bosnian people suffer from mistrust, isolation, demoralisation and anger, experiencing extensive human rights violation during the Former Yugoslav one-party governance and during the war. Therefore, they are damaged to make rational political choice.

From these understandings, Bosnian people are concluded that they cannot make political choices rationally with their own judgement. If we accept this view it would be natural that the international community's attempt for civil society-development has not been successful. Moreover, the bottom-up approach itself would be nonsense in the Bosnian context of conflict transformation.

Other Explanations

Some scholars have reasonably criticised the patronising view of the Bosnian people mentioned above.[74] They claim that the citizens of the former Yugoslavia including Bosnia had extensive education provision and a relatively high level of involvement in local political and civic life prior to the war.[75] They provide some alternative explanations for the factors that hindered civil society-development in Bosnia.

First, extreme security concern is persistent among the Bosnia citizens. Although ethnic conflict remains, the situation in Bosnia is at least maintained without major violence. The citizens are afraid of change, so that they rather prefer maintain *status quo* to risk everything they have for change. Second, the

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[73] Ibid., p 147.

[74] Ibid. Belloni, op. cit.

[75] Chandler, op. cit., p 152. Bruce McFarlane, *Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics and Society*, Pinter Publishers, 1988. Paul Stubbs, 'Social Work and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Globalisation, Neo-feudalism and the State', Article published in *International Perspectives on Social Work*, Pavilion publishers, 1999, p 8. Judith Large, *The War Next Door: A Study of Second-Track Intervention during the War in Ex-Yugoslavia*, Hawthorn Press, 1997.

power-sharing institutions in Bosnia seem to hinder facilitation of pluralism and civil participation in Bosnia. Under the Dayton Agreement, the Bosnian political institutions at all levels have an ethnic quota in order to guarantee the representation of the three major ethnic groups as well as minority protection.[76] However, this Bosnian version of power-sharing provides no incentives to the politicians to appeal to cross-ethnic voters. Therefore, it contributes to the maintenance of ethnic politics and the existing ethnic order.[77] This institutionalised ethnic politics creates fragmentation of the societies not pluralistic and participatory civil society. Lastly, the interventionist approach by the international community has obstructed the growth of a self-governing capacity in Bosnia. Regarding the lack of accountability of Bosnian political representatives, the international regulation has been imposed on Bosnian political life and self-government has been extensively denied at state as well as at local levels. As a result, the local politicians are required to be accountable towards the international community not to their own citizens. For the local organisations and associations, the advocacy role of civil society would be better exercised by appealing to the international civil servants in Bosnia rather than the local politicians.[78]

From those explanations, it would appear that the problematic conditions hindering the development of civil society are created by the international community to a large extent. It seems that the international community's attempt at civil society development was destined to produce little result at least in this environment.

Policy of Civil Society-Development as Bottom-up Approach

The arguments about civil society-building in Bosnia reflect different factors in the Bosnian conflict transformation and their plausibility is in fact debatable. While the argument of Bosnian people's incapacity seems an arrogant and patronising suggestion, the critical perspectives on the international policies remain focused only on the high political level. All arguments attribute the result

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[76] Chandler, op. cit., Chapter 3. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[77] Belloni, op. cit., p 172.
[78] Ibid.

of civil society-building attempt to conditional factors in the Bosnian context. The civil society development in Bosnia is considered ineffective not because of the strategy employed by the international community but because of the given conditions in post-war Bosnia, such as the capacity of Bosnian citizens, severe security concerns, institutional frameworks created by the Dayton Peace Agreement or heavy-handed international control imposed on Bosnia. In other words, the international community's own attempt to build a civil society has never had its effectiveness or appropriateness as a bottom-up approach for conflict transformation questioned. Even though the conditional factors in the Bosnian context certainly have hindered international efforts for bottom-up conflict transformation in one way or another, it would also be important to reconsider international community's civil society-building strategies from the bottom-up perspective.

Having civil society-building as an important policy, the international community has never seemed to clearly understand the concept of civil society in the Bosnian context. In general civil society refers to the realm of autonomous voluntary organisations in the public sphere as an intermediary between the state and private life where those groups attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.[79] Civil society is indeed considered to carry out an essential role in a democratic polity and expected to perform a complex range of functions for democratic consolidation: checking and limiting the power of the state; stimulating political participation; developing a democratic culture of tolerance and bargaining; creating additional channels for articulating and representing interests; generating cross-cutting cleavages; recruiting and training new political leaders; improving the function of democratic institutions (as through election and human rights monitoring); widening and enriching the flow of information to citizens and producing support for coalitions on behalf of economic reform.[80]

Building a public sphere with such complex functions is an extremely complicated matter, especially in a war-torn divided state. While civil society encourages and reinforces such democratic habits, behaviour and action by citizens, the accumulation of such civil habits, behaviour and action itself creates

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[79] Diamond and Plattner, op.cit., p xxii. Linz and Stepan, op. cit., p 7.
[80] According to Diamond and Plattner, op. cit.

130

a functioning civil society. Therefore, civil society is as much a product as the cause of such democratic practice or democratic culture.[81] It may be possible to secure the public sphere for potential civil society by arranging appropriate legal frameworks for interest groups or movements. At the same time, it is not possible to force people to behave in a certain way in the public sphere for *voluntary* associations and actions. If and how the sphere can develop to function as lively and strong civil society ultimately depends on the citizens themselves as individuals or as groups in terms of how to act, interact and relate to one another. But in the societies with protracted intrastate conflict peoples are divided with suspicion, distrust and even hatred lying between them.

Civil society-development strategies in Bosnia seem to demonstrate a lack of understanding of the complexity of its task on the part of the international community. An increase in local associations and networks does not automatically mean that they increase civil participation or generate connections across the ethnic divisions as the Bosnian societies are so segregated. In fact most of the local NGOs remain mere aid deliverers to the citizens. Although international support for advocacy groups has more specifically intended to encourage the citizens to participate in Bosnian politics, their advocacy has failed to involve the majority of the citizens. For civil society organisations to attract public interest and participation, values and public interests may need to be generated and articulated by the citizens themselves in the local context. The international community seems to have reflected their expectation in the strategy of supporting advocacy groups by choosing which individuals or groups to support. Those individuals and groups chosen for the support were expected and guided to carry out important and critical functions for democratic governance of the state as 'responsible' citizens from the perspective of the international community. In addition, it needs to be remembered that cultivation of democratic political culture of tolerance to opposition and dissent, compromise and bargaining does not happen in a short period of time.

Instead of feeling empowered or encouraged, the Bosnian population regarded civil society-building programmes by the international community as rather alien.[82] During the Former Yugoslavia era, the citizens demonstrated their

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[81] Larry Diamond, 'Three Paradox of Democracy', in Diamond and Plattner (eds.), op. cit., p 120.
[82] Ibid., p 169.

rich culture and capacity; by hosting the Winter Olympic Games in 1980s at Sarajevo with hospitality, or by social development through state welfare systems. The Bosnian people rightly consider themselves intelligent and well-educated. For them, civil society-development imposed by the international community, the idea that people from outside try to civilise them, is in fact nothing more than bizarre. The international programmes of civil society-building did not encourage or empower the citizens of Bosnia but rather confused them.

The international community engaged in civil society-building for the bottom-up conflict transformation, with the purpose of promoting civil empowerment and participation and encouraging tolerance and pluralism in the societies. Although trying to reach out ordinary citizens, the strategies for civil society-building by the international community failed to involve the Bosnian citizens in the process of conflict transformation. The policy of civil society-building in Bosnia would not necessarily be a mistake but may be misleading. Instead of civil society-building policy, strategies for bottom-up conflict transformation may be better presented by two points of initial concerns in the implementation, how to promote civil tolerance and pluralism and how to encourage civil participation in political and public issues. But the matter of how to do so is still open to question.

Conclusion

The international community started to engage in the conflict in Bosnia before the war started. Nevertheless, their efforts failed to prevent and stop the severe violence and the war continued for three and a half years. During that period, various third parties intervened in Bosnia in the first-track as well as the second-track. Under the war conditions the second-track intervention did not seem to have used their opportunities effectively for bottom-up conflict transformation. The peace agreement was reached at the end of 1995, nevertheless, it was soon realised that the Dayton Peace Agreement was not enough to bring stability and peace in Bosnia. Ethnic nationalists were elected to political power, and little progress and considerable difficulty was seen in the return of refugees and displaced persons. As the absence of the bottom-up approach in the Dayton Agreement emerged, the international community tried

to fill the gap with attempts at civil society-building including providing official aid, NGO building and support for advocacy groups. However, those attempts did not produce the expected results. Ethnic politics and difficulties in the return of refugees and displaced persons remain and above all Bosnia is divided.

The potential and importance of second-track intervention has started to be recognised in recent years and the Bosnian conflict and post-war peacebuilding coincides with this process. Therefore, Bosnia was an experimental case in a sense. After a few years of aid supply, NGO building and civil society-building efforts by the international community, the situation in Bosnia seems to be stagnated. Although some of the reasons for this can certainly be attributed to those given factors in the Bosnian context to some extent, the awkward questions still need to be asked about the international bottom-up policies and strategies: has the international community applied appropriate policies and strategies for bottom-up conflict transformation? Whatever the reasons are, the fact is that the international strategies for civil society-development have failed to be effective bottom-up measures in Bosnia. The international community cannot just find the means to help the generation and promotion of bottom-up conflict transformation.

It would be easy to give up on the bottom-up conflict transformation altogether, blaming the incapacity of Bosnian citizens and conditional factors in the Bosnian context of conflict transformation. However, the current situation in Bosnia seems strongly appealing the necessity of bottom-up conflict transformation. The following chapters study the attempts of dialogue promotion among the citizens in Bosnia. It is an exploration for another way which may possibly provide a clue to find a solution.

Map 5.1   Bosnia-Herzegovina

Chapter 6 Third-party Practice for Dialogue Development among the Citizens in Bosnia

Introduction

It is generally believed that dialogue is a way to work for peace. Many intervention agencies and individuals call for more dialogue in the situation of protracted intrastate conflict. The leaders of the disputant parties are urged to engage in political dialogue to solve problems and build peace. Dialogue among the citizens is also considered important for constructing overall peace and stability. While dialogue is a widely used term and generally considered important in building peace, there is no agreed format for the third parties involved on how to work for dialogue in the environment of protracted intrastate conflict. In addition, it is not clear how much practical and substantial work is indeed conducted for dialogue.

This chapter discusses the practice of second track intervention for dialogue in Bosnia in order to specify the sort of intervention this study examines further out of the variety of practice. Obviously not all second track intervention operates specifically with the purpose of dialogue and many international agencies operating in Bosnia claim to emphasise dialogue in their operations but their practice varies widely. It is not possible to find a clear and common definition or use of dialogue from those various practices of second track intervention. This study sees dialogue as genuine communicative interactions between people designed to increase mutual understanding and to widen their views; this is unlike discussion, debate, argument or persuasion that narrow their views aiming to produce agreement.[1] Therefore, it is not appropriate to include all intervention practice claiming to relate to dialogue into the examination of this study.

The first section of this chapter attempts to clarify the intervention for dialogue development among the citizens regarding the specific understanding of dialogue in this study. And in this light some forms of intervention practically used for developing dialogue in Bosnia are identified. Secondly the intervention practice of dialogue development is outlined with some examples of practical

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[1] See Chapter 2.

work for dialogue in the divided societies. Although some positive impact on the citizens can be observed in these cases, the effect of dialogue development on overall conflict transformation is not clear-cut. Also diversity of practice suggests that it is neither possible nor useful in some cases to evaluate the dialogue aspect of their operation. Some specification is necessary to examine the effect of dialogue development. Therefore, lastly, regarding outlined practice, some consideration will be given for further examination of some cases.

Overall it is surprising that not much practical intervention has been conducted for real dialogue among the citizens in Bosnia. Nevertheless, there are some international agencies conscious of developing dialogue among the citizens while they operate. Dialogue among the citizens is simply considered to promote general reconciliation, however, some practical bottom-up effect seems possible regarding the Bosnian context of conflict transformation.

6.1 Developing Dialogue among Citizens in the Divided Societies
Dialogue in the Practice of Third-Party Intervention

Third parties attempt to bring dialogue into various aspects of their operation in Bosnia as dialogue is generally considered good. Despite the stress on dialogue, its use confusingly varies. Apart from problem-solving methods, there does not seem any agreed practice in terms of what dialogue indeed is, between whom and on what issue dialogue should be held, how dialogue should be organised or facilitated, and what dialogue is practically supposed to achieve. Dialogue is not a form of intervention but just a means of communication, specifically referred to genuine communicative interactions leading to better understanding but not necessarily an agreement in this study. However, in practice, the term 'dialogue' does not necessarily refer to such a specific type of communicative interaction but is often used very loosely to describe simple communication, discussion or debate.

In practice the ways third parties utilise dialogue and what they are supposed to achieve are diverse. Some stress the use of dialogue for personal trauma-healing in psycho-social programme by international agencies.[2] This kind

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[2] Inger Agger in collaboration with Sanja Vuk and Jadrabka Mimica, *Theory and Practice of Psycho-social Projects under War Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia*, ECHO/ECTF, Zagreb, 1995.

of dialogue use can be inter-group, intra-group or even on a personal basis. Some agencies attempt to facilitate dialogue within the disputants parties. Intra-group dialogue can be facilitated to reassess their own group position and needs as a preparation for further inter-group dialogue.[3] Or intra-group dialogue can be used to open up the communication between citizens and their political leaders.[4] Adding confusion, the international agencies stress use of dialogue for their operational efficiency. Dialogue between international donors, between agencies on the field, and between them and local people is stressed for effective, coordinated operations meeting local needs. For example, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) works in Bosnia to support networks, information-sharing and effective advocacy in order to coordinate their policies through dialogue between local and international NGOs and other agencies.[5] In the long run, all those efforts for dialogue by the international bodies may make an indirect contribution to creating the culture of dialogue in the divided societies. Such dialogue, though important in its own right, is not relevant here because the possible contribution of those efforts on transforming protracted intrastate conflict would be almost impossible to predict and evaluate.

The major interest of this study lies in the effect of dialogue development on the transformation of on-going protracted intrastate conflict. For that end, dialogue ultimately needs to contribute to address the very relations and issues between the disputant parties. Therefore, the subject of our examination here should be specified to the sort of intervention aiming at genuine interactions across ethnic border or the conflict lines, that is, inter-group dialogue. Despite many claims to work for 'dialogue', practical third-party efforts for genuine inter-ethnic dialogue for citizens are surprisingly limited in Bosnia.

Developing Inter-group Dialogue in the Second-Track Intervention

Then it needs to be considered what kind of second-track intervention can contribute to development of inter-group dialogue. Nine categories of second-track intervention suggested by Large include aid, advocacy, communications,

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[3] Daniel Serwer and George Ward, 'Promoting Ethnic Co-existence in Kosovo Through Dialogue', A Draft Paper, *Conducting Dialogues for Peace: A Symposium on Best Practice*, United States Institute of Peace, November 12, 2002.
[4] Ibid.
[5] ICVA's website at http://www.icva.ch/cgi-bin/browse.pl?doc=about

education and training, facilitation, mediation and negotiation, reconstruction, therapeutic work, and witness.[6] Those categories are the scopes for third parties to reach out to the citizens and at the same time, can be used for promoting positive interactions and dialogue between the segregated populations. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) engaged in reconstruction of the health sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Peace Through Health (PTH) programme in collaboration with the Department of International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom.[7] Combined with WHO's health sector development work and DFID's conflict resolution mandate, PTH is a concerted and intensive attempt to address the fundamental obstacles to peace including polarisation, manipulation of information, discrimination, centralisation of power and authority, isolation or violence through health sector development. Health is a common interest of all ethnic communities in Bosnia and PTH has created opportunities of constructive interaction in implementing a wide range of cross-entity or cross-division activities related to the health issues. Their activities included the regular meetings of the Ministers of Health from both entities, inter-entity workshops for health issues, training for medical professionals, and supporting a regional physicians' association. However, it must be noted that this kind of practice is not necessarily common in the second-track intervention in Bosnia since it requires particular skills to manage communications and relations between people and supporting individuals and communities with consideration for the psychological aspect. Simply handing out food and rebuilding schools and hospitals requires less sophistication and less long-term commitment and such operations are good for fund-raising.[8]

The primary objectives of the second-track operations are not always on promoting constructive interaction or inter-group dialogue, while it is important for the international agencies to be aware that the way in which they proceed with their operation can contribute to positive interactions between people belonging to opposing parties in conflict. Even though with their operational

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[6] Judith Large, *The War Next Door: A Study of Second-Track Intervention During the War in ex-Yugoslavia*, Hawthorn Press, 1997, p 67. Also see Chapter 3 in this thesis.
[7] WHO Field Team in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'WHO/DFID Peace Through Health Programme: A Case Study', September 1998. (http://www.who.dk/document/e67081.pdf)
[8] David Last, 'Organising for Effective Peacebuilding', in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, Frank Cass, 2000, p 85.

purpose elsewhere, whether those third-party efforts of second-track intervention produce positive interactions and dialogue across the conflict line in practice is a secondary consequence and often uncertain, let alone the effect of possibly developed inter-group dialogue. Having the focus on inter-group dialogue in this study, it seems reasonable to concentrate on examining the third-party intervention that particularly works for the facilitation of communicative interactions and dialogue between the citizens from different disputant groups. From an observation of international practice of intervention dealing with inter-group communication and dialogue in Bosnia, certain forms can be recognised being used in such way. Those are training seminars or workshops, conferences, children's or youth programmes, communication, community centres, religious dialogue and instrumental/negotiation use. In the next section, each form is examined with some example cases.

These forms are not suggested as a comprehensive typology of dialogue intervention but extracted from an observation on third-party practice in Bosnia. In addition, these forms of dialogue intervention are not completely independent from each other, but rather they are often closely related to one another. For example, community centres can organise workshops or seminars, or religious dialogue may take forms of community centres, training seminars or conferences. Despite the disparity and incomprehensiveness, the examination in the next section gives us an idea of some ways for third parties to work for inter-group dialogue development among the citizens in the divided societies.

6.2 Practice of Third-Party Intervention for Dialogue in Bosnia
Dialogue Related Intervention: Seven Forms
Training Seminars and Workshops

In Bosnia there are a number of training seminars or workshops for citizens on such topics as conflict resolution, democracy, peacebuilding or human rights. While the main theme of the seminars and workshops is to provide the citizens with knowledge and skills related to those topics, some of those occasions are made to be opportunities for inter-group dialogue by involving different ethnic groups. The training aims to transfer the skills of information finding, conflict analysis, human needs theory, perception and cognition,

listening, empathy, self-disclosure, mediation, negotiation or problem-solving.[9] The training itself has some controversial aspects. While the participants may learn those skills and techniques in the training, it is questionable how much practical use those skills could have for the participants in the given socio-political context.[10] Under the real conditions of limited resources and social structure including asymmetric power relations, practicality of the skills and techniques taught in simplified contexts of training is debatable. Taking the cultural background of the conflict areas into account, it is also questionable how much those skills mostly originated from the Western culture are applicable in the local context.

A handful of the many training seminars and workshops are more conscious of the potential for inter-group dialogue in their spaces of gathering. Some seminars and workshops are committed to providing a safe and suitable space for dialogue, and others put an emphasis on dialogue as one of the subjects of trainings or exercises. Stressing dialogue in the training involving individuals from different ethnic groups on such topics as conflict resolution, democracy, peacebuilding or human rights is likely to lead to an exchange of views and ideas on real issues and problems between the opposing groups in the Bosnian conflict. Dialogue does not necessarily result in agreements on the issues or solutions to the problems. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the possibility of alternative means to deal with conflict instead of violence. People attending the multi-ethnic training with a focus on dialogue are not just passive trainees but become involved participants. Regarding the controversy related to validity of training, training with an emphasis on dialogue would be more likely to reflect the practical context in which conflict has happened.

The examples of the training seminars and workshops for dialogue include the Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' run by Norwegian organisations and the Project DiaCom (Dialogue and Community Building in Bosnia) by the Karuna Center

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[9] Judith Large, 'Conflict Resolution Training: Purpose and Content, Introductory Talk', *CCTS News Letter 8*, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, undated.
(http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts8/training.htm)
[10] Mark Duffield,, *The Symphony of Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid*, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Occasional Paper 2, 1996. Large, op.cit., 1996, chapter 5.

for Peacebuilding, a non-governmental organisation in the US. The Norwegian initiative for dialogue in the Balkan started in 1995. The programme takes the form of academic seminars targeting the future leaders from the area of the Former Yugoslavia. Bringing participants from the Balkan states to Lillehammer, a small town in the Norwegian countryside, the seminars are organised and designed to provide knowledge or skills related to democracy, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution as well as to provide an opportunity for the participants to meet and talk to people from different ethnic groups.[11] In the seminar with multi-ethnic participants dialogue is emphasised as a subject to learn and as a useful means of communication in interaction with others. Apart from skills training, the project aims for the deconstruction of psychological barriers or enemy images towards the opposing groups by face-to-face encounter and dialogue. Each seminar lasts for considerable lengths of time, three weeks for the shortest and more than two months for the longest. During the long stay in a quiet location, interactions between the participants become intensive in and outside the seminar room, which results in strong relationships beyond the ethnic boundaries. The some participants in the seminars of this programme later started to work for dialogue in their own communities by themselves.

The Project DiaCom is a series of workshops on dialogue skills, conflict transformation and reconciliation facilitated by the Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, a US non-governmental organisation with partnerships with local individuals.[12] Initially with an invitation from a local individual in 1996 the Karuna Center facilitated the psychosocial workshops for Muslim women in Sanski Most, a small Muslim city in the Bosnian Federation, in trauma healing and later skill-development for NGO organisation to help reconstruct their communities. Subsequently the Karuna Center was requested to facilitate face-to-face encounter between the Muslims and Serbs from the nearby city of Prijedor, a Serb held city in the Republik Srpska in 1998. This development occurred from

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[11] Nansen Academy, Information 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution': A Dialogue Training Programme at the Fridtjof Nansen Academy Lillehammer, Norway, informal information paper.

[12] About the project, Paula Greene, 'For the Future to Be Possible: Bosnian Dialogue in the Aftermath of War', *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, vol. 16, 2000, pp 441-450. The webstie of the Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, (http://www.karunacenter.org)

the request by the Muslim women in Sanski Most who wanted to see former Serb friends, neighbours and colleagues now living in Prijedor.

Two cities where previously Muslims and Serbs resided not separately but mixed, with a small percentage of Croats alongside. During the Bosnian war 1992-1995, however, the Muslims in Prijedor were either killed or forced to flee from the city by 'ethnic cleansing', while Serbs lived in Sanski Most needed to flee to Serb controlled Prijedor for safety. The atrocities in this area during the war included some of the worst in Bosnia such as torture, murder, rape, starvation, destruction of houses and other properties like the other areas in Bosnia. Additionally concentration camps were reported to have existed in Prijedor. Many Muslim participants in the Karuna Center's seminars are in fact survivors of those camps.

The Serb women in Prijedor contacted by the Karuna Center were hesitant to attend the meeting because they were concerned how they would be greeted by their Muslim friends in Sanski Most. Despite the concern, some Serb women from Prijedor agreed to come to the face-to-face dialogue. The meeting facilitated by the Karuna Center was an emotionally overwhelming encounter for the participants from both sides. At this meeting the idea of the project to work with Muslim and Serb educators in order to reconstruct communities and influence the next generation was conceived. With endorsements from the Ministers of Education of the two entities, the Federation and Republik Srpska, the Project DiaCom facilitated 3-5 day seminars with about 20 participants three times a year from 1998 to 2002. The workshops were for educators, women and community leaders with the purpose of inter-ethnic dialogue and community building focusing on these two cities in the Northwest part of Bosnia. Some teachers participating in the seminars started to teach about dialogue and tolerance to children in their classrooms, which created a better environment for minority or returning refugee students.[13] Facilitator training was also offered for 6 Muslim and 6 Serb educators who are long-term participants of the seminars.[14] At the final year of the Karuna Center's commitment in the area, local DiaCom

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[13] Arie Farnam, 'Hard Work of Getting Along: Muslim and Serb Teachers Sit Down Together to Confront the Divisive Legacy of War', *Christian Science Monitor*, August 14, 2001.

[14] Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, 'Project Diacom: Bosnia - March 2000'.

facilitators formed and registered as the only North Bosnian bi-communal NGO working in both entities to develop their dialogue project.[15]

Both training projects put an emphasis on inter-group dialogue in which the participants explore the issues and problems by themselves, while the trainers and facilitators maintain their supporting role. Many of the participants in the seminars of these two projects felt positive about the experience of inter-ethnic dialogue. Some of them were so inspired that they started work in their local communities.

Conferences

Conferences can be another form of intervention utilised for inter-group communication and dialogue. A number of conferences have been convened by the international actors on a variety of topics on Bosnia such as reconstruction, promotion of democracy, reconciliation, multi-ethnic tolerance and justice. The conferences on Bosnia do not necessarily aim for inter-group dialogue among the citizens of Bosnia although though their participants sometimes include them. In fact, most of the conferences seem arranged for the international community or elite politicians with the purpose of policy-making on Bosnia. For example, the United States Institute of Peace(USIP) hosted an international conference, 'A Dialogue on Bosnia in the Balkans: Exploring Regional Approaches to Peace' in 1998, inviting international and regional policy-makers, specialists and practitioners to discuss strategies for engaging in stabilising and normalising regional relations for its peaceful future.[16] Even though dialogue is stressed, it is often the case that only a handful of Bosnian citizens take part in those conferences. Yet, some conferences are more focused on the citizens and issues of their concern in Bosnia.

Here is one example. The Project on Justice in Times of Transition of the Foundation for a Civil Society of the Harvard University in US convened the 'Conference for Associations of Families of Missing Persons in the Former Yugoslavia' in December 1997 at Budapest, Hungary.[17] The three-day

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[15]Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, 'Peacebuilding on Action, Newsletter 2002'.

[16] At http://www.usip.org/oc/BIB/talkbalkans.html

[17] The Project on Justice in Times of Transition, Conference for Associations of Families of Missing Persons in the Former Yugoslavia, December 11-13, 1997, Budapest, Hungary available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/justiceproject/icmpreport.htm

conference brought together family association representatives from across the former Yugoslavia in order to give the opportunity for them to work together and perhaps agree on actions in an effort to reach the ultimate goal of finding their missing loved ones. The conference was held in Hungary not anywhere in the Former Yugoslavia with the aim of removing the family members from the sites of former conflict to a neutral space. Prior to the conference, the family associations had only limited contact between each other even though they work under similar conditions for the same purpose. This was due to not only poor resources and lack of information about other associations but also because some hostility or suspicion remained between the peoples after the wars. The organisers attempted to create an environment in which people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro with different ethnic backgrounds would begin to open their minds to the possibility of working with former enemies. The tensions between the participants ran high at the beginning of the conference and discussions were sidetracked by accusations against specific ethnic groups and discussion of the issue of war crimes. Some international speakers with similar experience from Kurdistan, Chile, South Africa and Guatemala, helped the participants to focus on the common purpose of finding missing family members and encouraged cooperation to work for this common purpose. Outside conference contents, the welcoming dinner at the historic Gundel restaurant in downtown Budapest became the first opportunity of informal interaction among the family representatives and the international speakers. This dinner proved to be a very important step in opening lines of communication between the family members and contributed to the process in the conference. During the conference, the international speakers who had first-hand experience of having missing family members shared their experience. There are considerable difficulties in finding loved ones. It takes a long time, for example, the search for disappeared started in Guatemala since 1984 and now still continues. Many of the missing would be already dead but the truth may never been known. Finding how they died is also traumatising and the truth is often very painful and difficult to accept. With such strong input by the international speakers, people gradually engaged in interactions and dialogue with others regardless of their difference in the ethnic backgrounds. They started to work together identifying the common needs and developing strategies of their

144

future work. The conference generated informal interactions as well as connection between family members of missing persons across the conflict lines in the Former Yugoslavia region including Bosnia.

Children's and Youth Programme

There are numerous programmes targeting especially children or young people in Bosnia and some of those aim at facilitating inter-ethnic communication and dialogue. The young generation in Bosnia was hurt and traumatised by the wars. They need to be healed and nurtured so as not to repeat recent history. While the forms of second track intervention for dialogue individually introduced in this chapter can also involve the young generation, there are other forms especially targeting youth such as peace education, play groups, summer camps, international exchange, youth radio or magazines and cultural events of art and music. Not all these youth programmes are carried out in a multi-ethnic context. However, youth programmes can possibly provide opportunities for the young generation to meet and communicate across the dividing ethnic lines as the young generation is considered relatively less resistant to interaction with the other ethnic groups than adults.

UNDP/UNV Projekt Izgradnje Povjerenja (PIP) is a youth-oriented project implemented by the UN Volunteers Programme and the United Nations Development Programme (UNV/UNDP). For three years until 2002, the project has held more than 10 summer camps called Multiethnic Summer Camps "Youth for Peace" for the Bosnian youth.[18] In 2002, three camps were organised and gathered about 180 youth from 15 towns throughout both entities in Bosnia. The curriculum is to foster personal development and conflict-resolution skills in a relaxed and non-threatening environment. Activities of the summer camps are facilitated by local workshop facilitators and sports trainers. Those camps aim to lead to long-term networking between youth as individuals and groups in communities all over the country and across the entity separation.[19]

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[18] 'Youth for Peace' Multiethnic Youth Summer Camps in July 2002, July 11, 2002. http://www.undp.ba/shnews.asp?idItem=8

[19] The words by Henrik Kolstrup, UN Resident Coordinator of Operational activities for Development and UNDP Resident Representative, Ibid.

There are exchange programmes involving youth not only from the Bosnian entities, but also from other countries. Evolved from a project of the German organisation "Aktion Suehnezeichen/ Friedensdienste e.V." (ASF) (Action Reconciliation Service for Peace[20]) to a local organisation in Mostar, Mladi Most (The Young Bridge) supports youngsters to participate in international exchange programmes in Germany, Spain and France.[21] Mostar is a divided city between the east and west, and there is little communication and contact between different parts of the town. By participating in those exchange programmes, the youth in divided Mostar have a chance to meet and exchange opinions with the youth of different ethnic groups from the other side of the city. They learn about the host country and about their own country and city as they introduce them to others.

Communication

International individuals and agencies have provided assistance or support to the Bosnian citizens with their inter-group and cross-entity communication that could help them to engage in dialogue. Communication tools such as computers are provided to schools and community centres, so that people can keep in touch with friends in the other ethnic groups. Broadcasting instruments are provided to independent and non-nationalistic radio and television stations. It is considered important to strengthen alternative media with balanced and accurate news, information and analysis, regarding the background that media was used for nationalistic propaganda during the war. There are some international efforts to provide training for local journalists. For example, Alternative Information Network (AIM), which supports the network of independent journalists in the Balkan region, has offered 'Interregional Journalism Workshops' for the generation of younger journalists with multi-ethnic participants and lecturers from the region.[22] The workshops contributed to the network and contact across dividing lines and open up communication between individuals.

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[20] For information, http://www.asf-ev.de/english/ http://www.asf-ev.de/english/

[21] From the Mladi Most's website at http://www.mladi-most.org/

[22] Alternative Information Network (AIM), 5W: Interregional Journalism Workshop – Osijek, information leaflet.

There is a quite unique attempt at inter-group communication and dialogue through media in Bosnia. 'Resolution Radio', originating from the idea by an American, Kenneth Clark, is a call-in radio talk show in Bosnia.[23] The programme has hosts trained in conflict resolution with guests representing multiple sides of the issue at hand and pursues the twin goals of generating positive options for action and creating a 'safe' place for Bosnians of all ethnic groups, guests and audience to interact honestly and respectfully.[24] As a project of Common Ground Productions (CGP)[25], 'Resolution Radio' operates with support from various international bodies including the United States Institute for Peace, Conflict Resolution Catalysts,[26] USAID, OSCE and UNHCR. UNHCR funded especially for a version of the program 'Jednostavno Zena' (Simply Women), focusing on issues important to women. The Resolution Radio broadcasts weekly from Sarajevo to the whole area of Bosnia on the Free Elections Radio Network (FERN) created by OSCE while Jednostavno Zena is produced locally in six different venues across Bosnia; Tuzla, Mostar East, Mostar West, Banja Luka, Bihac, and Sarajevo. It is claimed that the project produced some visible achievement; generating discussions among the guests on and off the air and sometimes dialogue.[27] After less than a year, CGP and its partner InterMedia Productions was producing seven programmes per week in five cities.[28]

This particular project had problems too. One evidence is the lack of live callers to the programmes; considered partly due to the unreliability of the inter-entity phone line. Nonetheless, the hard truth is that the programme was on Radio FERN which was labelled "that foreigner's network", despite its national reach and its effort to use Bosnian talent and programming.[29] Even though, it does not necessarily deny the potential of this kind of efforts in media for inter-

[23] Kenneth Clark, 'The Network: Resolution Radio', Interaction Newsletter, vol. 9, no. 2, Summer 1997. (http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~nicr/resources/newsletter/radio.htm)
[24] Sheldon Himelfarb, 'Bosnia: Searching for Common Group on Radio', in http://www.usip.org/pubs/pworks/smock20/chap11_20.html
[25] CGP is the media operation wing of Search for Common Ground, a non-governmental organisation based at Washington DC, US.
[26] CRC is a non-governmental organisation based in the US. Refer to p 139.
[27] The special edition in Mostar generated dialogue between Muslim and Croat journalists which led to the agreement to hold weekly joint press conferences and issues-oriented conversation well after the show was off the air. (Sheldon Himelfarb, op.cit.)
[28] http://www.mediate.com/tan/0398/newsfront_0398htm
[29] Himelfarb, op.cit.

ethnic communication and dialogue as more localised approach of this project Jednostavno Zena showed some promising signs.[30]

Community Centres

There are some attempts by the international agencies to establish community centres in cities and towns in Bosnia to help the citizens to rebuild their communities. The community centres can provide practical services as well as safe spaces for the citizens. Community centres can offer skills training in languages, computers or craft, training on conflict resolution, mediation and facilitation service, counselling for refugees, displaced persons, women and children, and material supply necessary for those services and other citizens' activities. Community centres can also be used as spaces for the citizens to organise the activities such as a discussion groups, children's play groups, youth activities, recreational activities and cultural events. Some community centres in Bosnia take a role to promote interactions between the different ethnic groups. Primarily most of the communities in Bosnia had ethnically mixed populations, however, due to the war, Serbs who had lived in the area of the Bosnian Federation fled to the Republika Srpska and Muslims and Croats who had lived in the Republika Srpska fled to the Federation. Since the end of the war, refugees and displaced persons started to go back original home or nearby cities and towns. However, the peoples are still divided, the cities and towns are segregated between the different ethnic groups. Under this environment, the community centres can be safe houses for the citizens from the different ethnic groups to gather and talk to each other.

The Conflict Resolution Catalysts (CRC), a non-governmental organisation based in the US, has established community centres as a part of a long-term grassroots-based peacebuilding project in 1996.[31] One is in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska and the other is at Ilidza, a suburb of Sarajevo in the Bosnia Federation. Both served for a variety of activities mentioned above, at the same time, worked for promotion of inter-ethnic interactions through their

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[30] Ibid. Clark initially tried his idea of Resolution Radio aired from a small city station in Sarajevo for two month, once a week from November 1995 before he involved international bodies. He described the result was 'fantastic', having good guests and *many* calls. (Clark, op. cit.)

[31] http://www.crcvt.org/previous.html

148

programmes in their communities. There are also interactions and exchanges between the two centres.[32]

Located very close to the border of Republika Srpska, the Ilidza Center seemed to put emphasis on multi-ethnic work from the beginning than the Banja Luka Center did. The centre had local staff with different ethnic backgrounds and organised outreach programmes for bringing people from nearby neighbourhood in the Republika Srpska.[33] The programmes have included activities of common interest such as computer or English class, a housing discussion group, a women's group, a youth group and a human rights group. The centre provided safe transportation for people from the areas in the Republika Srpska to those programmes at the centre in the Federation. The Banja Luka Center focused primarily on youth and multi-ethnic work was a secondly purpose. Nevertheless, a radio station set up in the centre, as one of the programmes attracted youth of all ethnic groups.[34] Youth from different ethnic groups worked side by side in running the station which mostly aired musical programmes.

Partly due to CRC's mandate to foster local sustainability and ownership and partly due to the lack of funding, the two community centres were handed over to locals to become independent during 1997 and 1998. While its evaluations clearly recognised some positive impact of the community centres becoming communal points for the citizens, the centres have achieved little in inter-group interaction due to the early withdrawal of the CRC.[35] However, its evaluation concluded that the credibility established by the community centres with local people especially in Banja Luka could be seen as a key asset and basis to promote inter-ethnic dialogue.[36] Currently the Banja Luka Center still remains as 'Youth Communication Center Banja Luka' and its programme themes include peacebuilding and democracy development.[37] In addition, the youth radio

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[32] Bruce Hemmer, 'Bottom-up Peace Building in Bosnia', *PARC News*, Spring 1997.
http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/hemm6275.htm
[33] ODR Associates, *Conflict Resolution Catalysts (CRC): Mott Foundation Assessment of CRC Programs in Bosnia*, Boulder Colorado USA, September 1998.
[34] Ibid., p 3.
[35] Ibid. It is suggested that CRC's early withdrawal realised the local citizens' anxiety on durability and commitment by the internationals although the reason is assumed to be financial. Also see Paul Stubbs, 'Peace Building, Community Development and Cultural Change: Report on Conflict Resolution Catalysts' Work in Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina', Draft, May 1997.
[36] ODR Associates, op.cit., September 1998, p 7.
[37] Youth Communication Center Banja Luka's website at
http://www.okcbl.org/index.asp?lang=en

station is still broadcasting as 'Radio Balkan' with the aim of empowering of youth potentials, advocating their needs, issues and interests through its interactive role in offering and exchanging information in the region.[38]

Inter-Religious/Inter-Faith Dialogue

It is often suggested that religion can be a sphere for dialogue to be promoted. In Bosnia people's religion and ethnic identity coincide for the majority of the population; Roman Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Islamic Muslims. In the Bosnian conflict, religion was used by the political leaders of the ethnic groups to justify and promote political and military aims of the war.[39] Nonetheless, religious communities fundamentally share values such as tolerance, reconciliation and love for neighbours.[40] On those bases, it is considered that dialogue between the religious communities in Bosnia is possible. Moreover, inter-religious dialogue is thought to be possibly effective to overcome distrust and suspicion between the ethnic groups.

Many international religious leaders appealed to the religious communities in Bosnia for dialogue during and after the war. Some practical attempts were also made for inter-religious dialogue such as organising inter-religious conferences, meetings or theological discussions. The World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), a non-governmental organisation and a coalition of international religious leaders working for inter-faith cooperation worked with Bosnian religious communities. WCRP has identified four major religious communities in Bosnia; Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Islamic and Jewish communities.[41] As WCRP gained trust from each religious community through the background work since 1993, it started facilitating communication between the leaders of the religious communities that

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[38] The Radio Balkan website at http://www.okcbl.org/info.asp?area=1&lang=en

[39] Paul Mojzes (ed), *Religion and the War in Bosnia*, Scholars Press, 1998. G. Scott Davis, *Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia*, Routledge, 1996.

[40] Potential of religion for peace, Edy Korthals Altes, *Challenge to Religions from Confrontation to Cooperation*, Conference Paper, 50th Pugwash Conference on Eliminating the Causes of War, Queens College, Cambridge, 3-8 August 2000.

[41] For information on WCRP's work in Bosnia and elsewhere, http:// www.wcrp.org

150

had very limited communication with each other since the war started.[42] Their effort led to the meeting of the senior leaders of the four religious communities in 1996 for the first time since the outbreak of the war. As a result of the meeting, four religious communities jointly issued the 'Statement of Shared Moral Commitments' in June 1997.[43] The statement articulates the moral principles, including mutual respect, cooperation and common living, shared among the religious communities. At the same time, their intention to form the Inter-religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina (IRC) was announced for practical steps towards social reconstruction by multi-religious collaboration. With cooperation from the WCRP, IRC is promoting religious collaboration through working groups of legal experts and religious education, various youth activities, radio programmes, publications, workshops, seminars and conferences.[44] For example, WCRP with IRC held leadership training seminars for youth who are potential leaders within their communities to encourage dialogue and to address the role of youth in democratic civil society. One seminar was especially for students from three religious communities who will be priests, imams, muftis and bishops in the future. Another kind of seminar was held in 1998 under the title of 'The Right to Freedom of Religious Practice' to gather religious scholars from each of the religious communities and secular experts in human rights with the purpose of examining religious freedom in Bosnia. The seminar created an opportunity to re-establish dialogue among religious scholars who lost touch due to the war and to make a connection between the religious and secular spheres in Bosnia.

Another example of inter-religious dialogue is 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former

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[42] For brief description of work, Ibid. Also Joseph R. Truesdale IV, *The Development of the Interreligious Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Program activities of the WCRP Field Office in Sarajevo: A Brief Chronology of Major Events from 1993-2000*, Commissioned by the World Conference on Religion and Peace, September 2000. For the more details, WCRP, *White Paper for he World Conference on Religion and Peace*, September 2000.

[43] Statement of Shared Moral Commitment, singed by Dr. Mustafa Ceric (head of the Islamic Community, Jakob Finci (President of the Jewish community), Vinko Cardinal Puljic (Archbishop of Sarajevo and president of the Conference of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Metropolitan Nikolaj Mrda (in the name of and with the authorisation of Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle).

[44] For analysis of the 'WCRP model' for inter-religious dialogue, Interreligious Cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Proven Model of Partnership, a paper provided by WCRP, undated. For details of WCRP activities, Truesdale IV, op. cit.

Yugoslavia' by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a non-governmental research institute based in Washington D.C., United States. Although this takes the form of training, the project includes participants of different ethno-religious orientation. In the three-four day seminar, dialogue between the participants is not only one of the main purposes of the project but its use is encouraged throughout the seminar process. Unlike the conventional form of inter-religious dialogue, the participants are not necessarily top leaders of religious communities and dialogue is personal between them rather than as representatives of their religious communities. The religious aspect of these seminars helped the participants to share personal experience of suffering and hard emotions with people from the other ethno-religious groups, which created personal bonding between the participants and promoted reconciliation.

Instrumental /Negotiational Use

Some see dialogue as instrumental, a means to possibly contribute to produce a tangible result. Instrumental use of dialogue is often found in mediation and negotiation at high politics in such forms as problem-solving workshops. In Bosnia some international agencies provide the citizens mediatory support to deal with disputes in the communities on the reconstruction process. Dialogue facilitation is one of the methods in mediatory support. The problems to be dealt with include the return of refugees and displaced persons, property rights, and job related problems.

This instrumental use of dialogue seems to be different from other forms of intervention presented above. Instead of regarding dialogue as something to be promoted in general, dialogue here is brought in as an instrument in negotiation or mediation with a specific aim to achieve something concrete. The very fact that dialogue is used to reach a result on certain issues may affect the prospects of dialogue. Firstly having a personal immediate interest at risk on the mediation or negotiation, the parties may be reluctant to engage in dialogue with opponents. Secondly, the intention to produce a tangible result could cause some pressure on the interaction for dialogue between parties in such forms as timeframe or incentive use of positive and negative sanctions by third parties. Although those are not always the case, potential jeopardy in instrumental use of dialogue needs to be noticed.

The International Mediator for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska is authorised by the entities in Bosnia to act on their half to assist in the formulation of the interim municipal and cantonal assemblies and take necessary actions to facilitate implementation of the process.[45] Christian Schwarz-Schilling and his team have carried out this role providing mediation services to deal with the problems emerge on the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. Mediation is used as medium where parties can come around the table to discuss issues of their concern. One of the major problems the Mediator deals with is the issues on the return of refugees and displaced persons to the places of origin.[46] Return of refugees and displaced persons needs a safe environment with established institutions such as joint police and administrations, the physical presence of elected and appointed representatives including councillors and assemblies, and instillation of the idea of property rights and basic rights of former residents to return. The Mediator's tasks are versatile including analysing the situation on the ground, identifying problems and related parties to the problems, listening to all views, suggesting possible solutions for the related parties and monitoring the progress in implementation of the agreements reached by the parties. While the pressure from the international community is utilised especially in dealing with the obstructionists, the Mediator does not apply forceful measures to comply as the mediation require willingness for the parties to engage in the process. The Mediator himself uses the tool of dialogue in the communication with the parties and encourages opening dialogue between the related parties, for example, between local authorities and leaders of returnees for taking concrete steps to their return.[47] Working with local authorities and the citizens at the community level, the International Mediator has provided practical help to solve the real problems on the ground in the Dayton implementation, at the same time, demonstrated to the Bosnian communities how to protect their interests through a democratic process.

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[45] The Mostar Agreement, 18 May 1995. Initially the International Mediator's role was limited within the Federation, however, the role was expanded to Republika Srpska in 1997. Also for the general information about the International Mediator, see the website, http://www.international-mediator.de

[46] Christian Schwarz-Schilling, International Mediator for the Federation and Republika Srpska: General Report on Mediation in Bosnian and Herzegovina 1996-2001.

[47] International Mediator for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, *Trip Report 1/98*, 8-17 March 1998.

As Another example, Conflict Resolution Catalysts (CRC) developed the Neighborhood Facilitators Project (NFP). In NFP, the joint local/international citizen teams of 'neighborhood facilitators' based at public drop-in centres and also worked in mobile teams in the field offer a range of personal/group support and conflict resolution integrated services and activities available to all citizens.[48] Some local people were given intensive skills training for conflict resolution or mediation alongside the international facilitators. The main objectives of the facilitator were providing psychological support and reducing fear, building trust and relationship and creating honest and confidential communication to illuminate positions and underlying interests in cases of conflict, and finding creative solutions. The facilitators dealt with the problems such as economic needs, job discrimination, and return of refugees and displaced persons. The facilitators carry out various functions such as counsellor, information provider, protector, advocate or mediator and facilitation of dialogue between related parties to the problem is one of their methods. In July 1998 after only four months in operation, the NFP was unfortunately suspended due to lack of funds, therefore, an evaluation of this particular project is not feasible.

6.3 Effect of Dialogue Development
General Analysis on Dialogue Intervention

Seen above are seven forms of intervention related to promoting inter-group interactions, communication and dialogue among the citizens observed in Bosnia. It needs to be noted that this kind of intervention for inter-ethnic interaction and dialogue is only a small part of overall second-track practice. The added example cases demonstrate how dialogue development is practised in their projects.

Apart from having dialogue in their scope, the examples clearly display various differences. The targeted sectors of the population vary. Some target civil leaders such as leaders of NGOs and communities or teachers due to the strategic purpose to affect the whole societies effectively. Some focus on the victims of conflict such as refugees, displaced persons, women, youth and children help the most vulnerable sectors of the societies. The children's and youth programmes

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[48] http://www.crcvt.org/neighborhood.html Also, Last, op.cit., p 92.

also expect the young generation to create tolerant and pluralistic societies in the future. And some projects are based on communities of certain kinds such as religious or occupational, or in certain places such as towns and villages. The issues on dialogue also vary. In some projects, communication and dialogue is on specific issues sometimes related to the conflict and others attempt to encourage more general interaction and communication.

It is not easy to recognise the common practices in those various attempts. As dialogue is voluntary action, third parties in the operation tend to concentrate on providing the citizens with spaces and opportunities for dialogue. Some provide further facilitation as required. Dialogue itself is one of the purposes in those projects apart from the instrumental use. Regarding the segregated situation in Bosnia after the difficult experience of war, it is considered important to provide those opportunities for the citizens. Their main focus is on providing safe spaces for inter-group interactions and communication hoping to develop dialogue.

Dialogue is generally believed to lead to better understanding and reconciliation between the peoples. According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia is divided into two entities with a border and the peoples are also divided. There is limited cross-entity movement, limited progress in minority returns and limited inter-action between different ethnic groups in the societies. Due to the longstanding exposure to nationalistic propaganda, the citizens have developed the tendency of avoiding the media, which has led to a lack of accurate information on the conflict, on the other peoples and often on their own people.[49] In those segregated societies where there is little interaction between the ethnic groups, distrust and suspicion of each other remains high. Facilitated constructive interaction and dialogue between the citizens from the different ethnic groups would be rare opportunities to see and talk to each other and learn about the other peoples and their own people.

The brief description of various third-party attempts seen above is, however, not enough to illustrate some important points on the effect of inter-group dialogue. Firstly it is not clear how people engaged in inter-group dialogue deal with difficult feelings including personal grief and pain, as well as distrust

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[49] Farnam, op.cit. Also from my informal conversation with various people from the Balkan states.

and hostility towards the other groups. Secondly it needs to be examined how the local communities perceive or react to those third-party attempts and local individuals who decided to engage in inter-group dialogue. If there is any obstruction or risk of it in the communities, it is important to see how it is dealt with. And most importantly, it is far less clear what should happen after inter-group dialogue is successfully hold between some citizens in Bosnia except the instrumental use that hopes to contribute to the mediation and negotiation result. The example cases claim to have made some personal conversion such as change or moderation of their views and opinions among their recipients. Some cases managed to contribute to networking or creating personal connections across the ethnic lines. All dialogue could contribute to the transformation of conflict in the long term as it promotes dialogue culture by practising dialogue in the divided societies. It is also assumed that facilitation of inter-group dialogue in Bosnia possibly has some effect on bottom-up conflict transformation. Yet, it is not clear how all those intervention efforts for dialogue and their effects would contribute to the actual transformation of protracted intrastate conflict.

A Question on the Practical Contribution to Conflict Transformation

Findings from the analysis above are far from satisfactory in order to assess potential effect of inter-group dialogue development among the citizens on conflict transformation. Their precise effect is often difficult to measure and it may be 'wrong-headed' to judge effectiveness in the short-term as some suggest.[50] Nevertheless, if intervention for inter-group dialogue among the citizens in the divided society is to be legitimately recognised for its practical role in bottom-up conflict transformation, it is necessary to demonstrate its effect more convincingly than just hopeful thinking. A closer analysis of the cases is necessary to clarify the possibility of dialogue intervention for overall conflict transformation.

The following chapters examine two projects among the various projects briefly described above; Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' by the Norwegian organisations and the inter-faith dialogue project 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People

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[50] Reflecting on Peace on Practice, Dialogue Oriented Peace Efforts, Reflecting on Peace on Practice: Issue Papers, April 2001.

and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia' by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Those projects are chosen for further examination here for both strategic and practical reasons. As the strategic reasons, firstly the case studies need to not only be the projects to bring individuals with different ethnic backgrounds in one place but also to facilitate the stage of communicative interactions for dialogue to occur as this study focus specifically on dialogue. Secondly with the understanding of dialogue as genuine communicative interactions, the projects should have participants as individual capacity not as representatives of the ethnic groups to claim and argue their group interests. Thirdly the projects are to provide some settings for communicative interactions and dialogue particularly concerning conflict between the peoples in Bosnia and their ethnic relationships. And finally, the projects should not be just one-off events but maintain certain continuity. Those points for selection are suggested in order to specify the sort of projects that genuinely work for inter-ethnic dialogue with potential of maximising its effect. It also needs to be mentioned that the feasibility of data collection affected the selection. The kind of the projects mentioned in this chapter is often conducted by small organisations or institutions with small number of staff although they are efficient. As they are often very busy with their work, it is difficult for them to spare time for sharing information on their projects with external people with research interests like myself. As far as the projects of case studies are concerned, help from some people in these projects enable me to collect enough data for a close examination.

The projects of the case studies happen to take the form of training seminars, however, it needs to be noted that there are clear differences between those seminars for inter-ethnic dialogue and many other seminars or workshops facilitated by various international agencies in Bosnia. The majority of the seminars and workshops held for Bosnian citizens are training for either conflict resolution skills or NGO development. Conflict resolution training generally aims to teach some theory of conflict and practical skills to deal with conflict. Conflict resolution training is controversial itself.[51] Every conflict is different and has its own context. There is a question whether the idea of conflict

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[51] Judith Large, op.cit, CCTS News Letter 8.

resolution and its skills originated from the Western culture can be applied universally or not.[52] Naturally its applicability is also questioned in the Bosnian context. The trainings for NGO development is something completely different, aiming to build technical capacity of local NGOs. It teaches how to write project proposals, setting agenda or managing the financial aspect of NGOs. Either way, the clear difference between the training seminars in the case studies and the majority of trainings provided to the citizens of Bosnia by the international agencies is that the latter focuses at teaching skills or knowledge but not necessarily developing inter-ethnic dialogue.

The two projects in case studies are examined especially on its practical contribution to the transformation of the Bosnian conflict. Evaluation criteria for dialogue intervention among the citizens are previously proposed in Chapter 3 as follows:

- The impact on people targeted by the project. Does the intervention effort bring any change to perception or attitude towards the people in the other group(s) or problems between them?
- The output of the project. Does the intervention effort produce anything concrete, such as statements, collaboration systems or plans for future action that would contribute to conflict transformation?
- The outcome of the project. Does the intervention effort have any long-term effect on the societies to transform conflict and its causes?

In order to examine how developed inter-group dialogue can contribute to the process of conflict transformation, careful analysis on the third point of the criteria is essential.

Conclusion

Although many agree that dialogue is important in societies suffering from serious intrastate conflict, only a little practical effort has been made by the international agencies to develop it among the citizens in Bosnia. This chapter outlined those international efforts for dialogue in some forms observed in

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[52] For culture question and conflict resolution, see Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, 'Conflict resolution in intercultural settings: Problems and Prospects', Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe(eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester University Press, 1993, pp 131-145.

Bosnia. The example cases demonstrate various and sometimes innovative ways to develop inter-group dialogue in the divided societies. Some cases have claimed to have positive impact on individuals and groups, including moderation of views and attitude towards the other ethnic groups or some tangible joint work such as statement, common understanding on issues or plan for action. However, further effect on the societies and conflict and the process of conflict transformation remains unverified.

In order to assess the overall effect of intervention the context of Bosnian conflict transformation needs to be taken into account. As seen in the previous chapter, the Dayton Peace Agreement has failed to provide strategies for bottom-up conflict transformation in Bosnia. The international community has struggled to fill that gap in the implementation process despite their efforts. In its policy of civil society-building the international community is probably right to identify the problem of bottom-up conflict transformation in Bosnia as the lack of civil tolerance and political participation by the citizens. Therefore, the policy for civil society-building seems appropriate in its intention to address those factors among the Bosnian citizens while its strategies are questionable as seen in the fact that the attempts have produced little result. Regarding the problems of conflict transformation in Bosnia, the question is whether development of inter-ethnic dialogue among the citizens can possibly make any practical contribution for conflict transformation. Much closer and more long-standing analysis on the case studies in the following chapters attempts to find an answer.

Chapter 7 Case Study I: A Norwegian Initiative for Dialogue on the Former Yugoslavia and Its Development

Introduction

In 1995 when Bosnia was still at war, an attempt to bring the citizens from the war-torn societies of the Former Yugoslavia together was started at a small school in Lillehammer, Norway. The origins of this initiative interestingly go back to 1994. At first glance, it is difficult to recognise any connection between Lillehammer, a town located in the peaceful Norwegian countryside, and the Former Yugoslavia suffering with a bloody war. However, there is certainly something in common between Lillehammer and the capital city of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, both being host cities of the Winter Olympic Games. In the early 1990s when Lillehammer looked back on past games for references as preparation for the event, the tragic transformation of Sarajevo from the cheerful host in 1984 to a city under siege was realised. This tragedy prompted the Lillehammer communities to set up a campaign called 'Lillehammer Olympic Aid'. During the event, the campaign raised 70 million NOK which was channelled to good use via humanitarian aid organisations such as the Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid.[1]

In July 1994 Inge Eidsvåg, the director of Fridtjof Nansen Academy in Lillehammer at that time, visited Sarajevo to view the reconstruction of the paraplegic centre at the Kosevo Hospital financed by Lillehammer Olympic Aid. It was before the Dayton Peace Agreement and the devastated condition of the city left him with very strong impressions that he still clearly remembers today. Being a compassionate man, he was compelled to think if there was anything he could do. As he has been working as a teacher, he believed that the way he could contribute to peace would be though education.[2] On his return to Norway, he started to work out the structure of a training programme for the youths of the Former Yugoslavia to learn about democracy, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution. Bosnia was still at war and all the Balkan states were in chaos at that time. It was impossible to initiate any seminar or academic course on the ground.

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[1] Donna Issac, 'PRIO/Nansen Dialogue: A Case Study of Democracy Training and the Balkan Dialogue Project', Reflection on Peace Practice Project, a joint project of the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. and the Life and Peace Institute, October 2000, p 7.
[2] Informal conversation with Eidsvåg in June 2000, Lillehammer, Norway.

Therefore it was decided the seminar should take place at the Nansen Academy. Based on an idea that peace should be constructed from the bottom-up, the aim was set on strengthening individuals who live in a conflict area and those who actively work for peace in the area. The Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid offered their support to the programme and also an application for financial support was granted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Later on the PRIO was invited to the steering committee and the concept and the structure of Nansen Dialogue was established. After careful preparation, in September 1995, 14 people, mostly from Bosnia, were brought to the first seminar for dialogue training programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' at the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer.

Rather than targeting elite politicians, the dialogue training programme was designed for future leaders in various sectors of the societies. The programme currently continues and the seminars are held every year. Over the years, the project of the seminars has gone though various changes and modifications. Nevertheless, the project still brings people in conflict together for inter-ethnic dialogue. Some previous participants in the seminars also started to work for dialogue in their own region and communities after the seminars, establishing regional dialogue centres with support from the Norwegian institutions and organisations. Recently the programmes and activities focusing on the region that originated from this Norwegian initiative are comprehensively called the 'Nansen Dialogue Project', involving Norwegian institutions and organisations in terms of funding and other resources.

When it comes to Norwegian intervention in protracted conflict, the Oslo Channel in the Middle East Peace Process is better known. That was also an attempt started by a Norwegian civilian to provide a space for some people from Israel and Palestine to discuss a solution. However, the Norwegian initiative for dialogue examined in this chapter is fundamentally different from the one in the Middle East Peace Process. The Oslo Channel can be seen as an intervention of a top-down approach type because it eventually attempted to bring high political individuals in dialogue and influence policy-making of disputant parties. In comparison, the Lillehammer dialogue-training programme is an intervention of the bottom-up approach. It aims to provide a dialogue space not for politicians

but for the citizens, hoping that they become promoters of conflict transformation.

This chapter examines the process that a series of the dialogue training seminars in Lillehammer has developed into the Nansen Dialogue Project in its current shape. This case is an illustration that an attempt by third parties to create an opportunity for dialogue between non-political individuals from the different parties of conflict can produce certain affects on individuals and possibly on their societies. The examination and analysis of the project in this chapter is based on reports, unpublished papers related to the project and interviews with project coordinators and consultants along with my personal experience of taking part of the three-week Lillehammer training seminar in June 2001. I am well aware that having been a participant may disturb my objectivity as a researcher on this project. Although this was the 15th dialogue seminar in Lillehammer since 1995, the seminar was the first to focus on people with one particular occupation, teachers. This three-week seminar was short in time and different in focus compared to the previous 14 seminars and others held subsequently, therefore, it was by no means a 'typical' example of the seminars in Lillehammer. Taking these points into consideration, I still believe that my experience as a participant and a member of the group in the seminar is rather useful because the analysis of this kind of project must have not only objective but also subjective perspectives.

7.1 The Nansen Dialogue structure and the Nansen Dialogue Project
Structural Relations and Concept of the Nansen Dialogue

The Nansen Dialogue Project including the training programme in Lillehammer operates under the umbrella of the Nansen Dialogue. The Nansen Dialogue refers to a pedagogical concept as well as a cooperative structure between some Norwegian humanitarian organisations and academic institutions. As a concept the Nansen Dialogue aims to empower people living in conflict situations to contribute to peaceful conflict transformation, and the democratic development with promotion of human rights. The focus is to provide a neutral and open space where people in conflict can meet face to face for dialogue in order to break down psychological barriers and increase understanding each others' positions, interests and needs. (Appendix 7.1 Nansen Dialogue mission statement) The Nansen Dialogue also refers to a cooperative structure between

four Norwegian organisations and institutions: the Norwegian Red Cross, the Norwegian Church Aid, the Fridtjof Nansen Academy and the Peace Research Institution for Peace, Oslo(PRIO). (Appendix 7.2) Each member organisation may initiate and implement projects under the concept and structure of the Nansen Dialogue with the Steering Committee's approval. The Steering Committee including the representatives from each member organisation and other independent members[3] monitors and evaluates the projects under the Nansen Dialogue.

Some projects stressing dialogue as an important tool for conflict resolution have been in operation under the Nansen Dialogue. The target areas of the projects are not necessarily limited to the Balkan or the Former Yugoslavia but include other areas in conflict such as the Middle-East and Northern Ireland. For example, under the Nansen Dialogue, Norwegian Church Aid initiated the Peace Boat Project which brought young people from various areas in conflict, such as Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa together onto a ship to provide an opportunity for dialogue. Having said that, the area of the Former Yugoslavia remains the major region targeted by the projects of the Nansen Dialogue so far and the Nansen Dialogue Project forms the major part of it.

Actors in The Nansen Dialogue Project

The Nansen Dialogue Project mainly consists of two parts; the dialogue training seminars at the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer and the dialogue centres scattered over the Balkan region.

Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' is facilitated by the Fridtjof Nansen Academy at Lillehammer in Norway. The Nansen Academy was founded in 1938 as a protest against the political developments, the rise of fascism and Nazism, in Europe.[4] Aimed at defending human dignity and rights becoming a meeting ground for people of different cultural, religious and political background, the school had a

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[3] For example, Professor Bernt Hagtvet in the University of Oslo has been a committee member as an independent member with his academic knowledge in political science.

[4] Nansen Academy, Information 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution': A Dialogue Training Programme at the Fridtjof Nansen Academy Lillehammer, Norway, informal information paper.(to be referred as 'Information Paper' below.) The Nansen Academy is named after Fridtjof Nansen who is a famous Norwegian explorer, scientist, diplomat, politician, humanists and a Nobel Peace Prize winner.

focus on peace education.[5] In recognition of its contribution to the promotion of peace and tolerance, the Nansen Academy received an honourable mention of the UNESCO Prize for Peace Education in 1998.[6] The school has facilities for academic environment including lecture rooms, a library, basic accommodation, a dining room and certain computer facilities in the peaceful surroundings of Norwegian countryside. The Nansen Academy has overall responsibility for the dialogue training programme pedagogically and administratively while the other organisations in the Nansen Dialogue provide support in terms of finance and other resources.

Nansen Dialogue Centers (NDCs) in the Balkan are the other important part of the Nansen Dialogue Project fallen under the responsibility of the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) during the period of 1999-2003 until it handed over to the Nansen Academy.[7] Founded in 1959, the PRIO is one of the oldest institutions of its kind and has been a pioneer of peace research. The PRIO worked as the project management headquarters for all NDCs in the Balkan since the establishment of NDCs. The main responsibilities included administrative work, monitoring and funding. Eight dialogue centres in the region set their own operational goals in consultation with the PRIO and the donor. The PRIO monitored activities of all the centres according to individual operational goals that submitted with the grant application, so that the PRIO has managed relations with the donor. Although the PRIO controlled overall management of NDCs, the relationships between the PRIO and NDCs were based on mutual trust and all centres enjoy a large degree of autonomy on their management.[8] Each NDC is expected to become a more independently functioning unit, carrying out all managerial functions by themselves including fund raising. While maintaining strong ties between one another and the Norwegian side, the Field Support Office was opened in Zagreb in July 2001 to help this process of transition from

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[5] Donna Issac, op. cit, 2000, p 6.
[6] Steiner Bryn and Inge Eidsvåg were awarded Amelie Laksow's Human Rights Prize in 1999 for the project's contribution to the promotion of human rights.
[7] Although the Nansen Dialogue Project was called 'Balkan Dialogue Project' during the period when PRIO was the administrator, the project is mostly called Nansen Dialogue Project throughout this thesis in order to avoid confusion.
[8] In an interview with Ivar Evensmo, the project coordinator of Balkan Dialogue Project and PRIO, Oslo Norway, 14th June 2001. Nansen Academy, 'Annual Report 2001 "Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution": A Joint Project: Nansen Academy. Lillehammer, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Red Cross'. (to be referred to as 'Annual Report 2001' below)

dependence to interdependence.[9] By the end of 2003 the project management of NDCs was taken over from the PRIO by the Nansen Academy. From the beginning of 2004 the Nansen Academy project management takes all the responsibility of the Nansen Dialogue Project including administration of the NDCs and the Nansen Network.[10]

The other two organisations, the Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid, involved in the Nansen Dialogue structure, do not directly engage in the operation of the Nansen Dialogue Project. The Norwegian Red Cross is one of Norway's oldest and largest humanitarian organisations with abundant experience of working in conflict areas and the world-wide network through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Norwegian Church Aid is also an expert organisation in humanitarian work, human rights, peace and reconciliation with a certain network in the Former Yugoslavia. While they exercise little direct influence on the management of the Nansen Dialogue Project, the Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid have certainly taken supportive roles for the project as required with those capacities.

Although outside of the Nansen Dialogue structure, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has taken an important part in the Nansen Dialogue Project as the major financial source of the projects. Despite Norway having no direct interest, the MFA was interested in intervening in the Balkan conflict. The situation of the Balkan states could well affect the security of the whole of Europe and the other regions on which Norwegian national security is based in the MFA's view. The MFA's support for the Nansen Dialogue Project is due to the background of shift in foreign policy within MFA after the Oslo Accord in 1993. Regarding the bottom-up approach as the key for long-term sustainable peace, MFA started to have an interest in the intervention targeting the grass-roots citizens.[11] Financial support was granted to the Lillehammer dialogue seminars in 1995 and additional funding was made available for NDCs in 1999.

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[9] Ibid.
[10] Nansen Network, 'Nansen Network – Interethnic Dialogue and Peacebuilding: Annual Report 2003', Nansen Academy, 2003. (to be referred as 'Nansen Network Annual Report 2003'.)
[11] In Isaac, op. cit, 2000, p 4. From her interview with Jan Braathu, Adviser on South-East European Affairs, MFA.

Financial support for NDCs was not at all inexpensive, however, the MFA recognised that the Nansen Dialogue Project was an experimental case worthy of investment.[12] The MFA had confidence in people who would carry out the NDC project, because the MFA has had close relationships with PRIO which administrated NDCs and their networks though various other projects in other parts of the world.[13] The NDC project would be undertaken by the organisers and the participants of the Lillehammer seminars who MFA had already been worked for a few years. In addition, the MFA reinforced their view on the bottom-up approach at the time of the funding application. The timing when the project for regional dialogue centres developed was just after the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo. The case of Kosovo seemed to prove that such intervention by force would not bring a solution to the conflict. The MFA saw the Nansen Dialogue Project as an alternative approach with potential.

7.2 Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' in Lillehammer, Norway
Project Description of the Dialogue Seminars

The dialogue training programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' is an academic course. The period of each seminar varies from three weeks to ten weeks. The participants are brought together mostly from the area of the Former Yugoslavia and stay mostly at the Nansen Academy during the course. The seminars are designed to provide knowledge or skills related to democracy, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution as well as to provide an opportunity for the participants to meet people from conflicting groups in their war-torn divided societies.[14] A wide range of teaching and learning methods are used including lectures, tutorials, exercises, discussions, case studies, presentations, skill training and practice. Through those academic works dialogue is emphasised as an important tool in dealing with conflict. The participants are encouraged to listen to each other's experiences and views on

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[12] In 2001, the estimated budget was 20 million NOK or over £1.5 million. MFA granted 15 million NOK out of 20million. (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo(PRIO), 'Balkan Dialogue Project, Grant Application for Year 2001, Dialogue and Reconciliation in Former Yugoslavia'.)

[13] Interview with Dan Smith, Consultant of the Balkan Dialogue and PRIO, Oslo, Norway, 14th June 2001.

[14] Nansen Academy, 'Information Paper'.

conflict so that they can understand each other's position, interests and needs and think together about the practical solution for the issues. Nevertheless, the seminars are not intended to become either an arena for negotiation or an attempt at the unofficial diplomacy seen in the Oslo Channel that paved a way to official peace agreement in Middle East in 1993.[15] In other words, the project was not part of a top-down intervention but it is intended to empower the citizens with the knowledge, stills and networks in order to encourage their participation in building peaceful and democratic societies.

The majority of the participants come from the whole territory of the Former Yugoslavia – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia including Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo. In addition, a small number of Norwegians and people from other countries who had an interest in the Balkan conflicts and dialogue work have taken part in the seminars. The people targeted as potential participants are those who have prospects to be future leaders in the various sectors of the society, such as the judiciary, education, health, media, public administration, political parties or NGOs. The participants are required to have a good command of English because all the classes are given in English. They are approximately 20 to 45[16] years of age and need to have the will to work for the better future of their society. The participants are expected to actively participate and learn in all the classes throughout the seminar.

The Concept of Dialogue Seminars

From the beginning the seminars have undoubtedly provided rare opportunities for people from the Former Yugoslavia with different ethnic backgrounds to get together and discuss the problems they faced. Nevertheless, the project has gone through considerable modification in its focus since the programme started in 1995. Initially the main aim of the seminars was to educate people about the subjects described in the programme title so that the emphasis was on passing knowledge onto the participants. For instance in the first seminar held in winter 1995, 40 lecturers gave lectures on the subjects to the participants

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[15] About the details of the Oslo Channel, see Jane Corbin, *Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Israel and the PLO*, Bloomsbury Books, 1994.
[16] Recently it is set at 40 years old, while this age criteria seems to be flexible on individual cases.

for a period of ten weeks.[17] However, from the reaction and criticism of the participants, it became clear that this focus was not quite appropriate. The organisers and lecturers realised that the participants were far more intelligent and knowledgeable than they had first assumed, while psychological barriers among people towards 'the other sides' are persistent. The psychological barriers or 'enemy images' as Steiner Bryn, the Project Director of the programme, calls them, are not only caused by the experience of conflict, but also reinforced by extreme nationalistic propaganda, the shortage of reliable information,[18] the segregated nature of the societies, and additional separatism practised by the international presence in some parts of the region. After reflection on the first year of the project, the focus of the project has shifted to breaking down enemy images and creating a space for dialogue between the participants.

Dialogue is an important theme in the seminars. Dialogue is presented as an exchange of ideas or opinions without imposing them on each other. It does not necessarily lead to agreement because the differences are respected rather than denied or rejected. Therefore, although dialogue increases understanding, it does not necessarily create harmony. The concepts of active listening and non-violent communication are brought in as important skills for dialogue and the use of these skills is encouraged and practiced in exercises and discussions throughout the seminar. Dialogue is clearly distinguished from debate or argument which are intended to convince others and sometimes force an agreement.

Setting the focus on dialogue, the seminars do not necessarily facilitate dialogue itself but create an appropriate environment for dialogue. The dialogue training seminar is designed based on an idea that the dialogue space should be characterised by four components: educational, social, physical and cultural aspects.[19] This pedagogical idea proposed by Bryn, the project director also

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[17] Nansen Academy, Schedule of the Group 1, Unpublished paper.

[18] I heard from quite a few people from the Former Yugoslavia that they try not to expose themselves to the news at all because they do not want to by influenced by propaganda. They are sceptical about the reliability of not only local media but also the foreign media, such as BBC, ABC or CNN which is generally regarded as neutral from the Western perspective.

[19] From my personal lecture note at the lecture by Bryn in June 2001.

working as a facilitator and lecturer, suggests that all those four components need to be present in order for dialogue to take place.[20] (Figure 7.1)

Figure 7.1 The Dialogue Space

<div align="center">

Academic Components

Social Components | Dialogue | Cultural Components

Physical Components

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
Source: My personal lecture notes at the lecture by Steiner Bryn in June 2001. Inger Skjelsbæk and Dan Smith, 'Dialogue in Practice: Reflections on a Dialogue Project with Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo', A Draft Paper, August 2000.

It is undeniable that the educational aspect in the dialogue training seminars is very rich. The subjects are taught through various approaches. For example, Bryn lectures on cultural identity by using the example of Norwegian identity. He explains that Norwegian identity is very much created in order to distinguish itself from that of Sweden since independence from Sweden. The lecture demonstrates that ethnic or national identity is very little to do with who people are, how they think and feel. Each seminar is programmed with slightly different modules. Nevertheless, some regular lectures and workshops in recent seminars are a conflict analysis of the case of the Former Yugoslavia, conflict management workshops, Human Rights workshops, Theatre Workshop on conflict resolution, lectures on democracy and the history of the Balkan region. The classes take creative and provocative approaches to the subjects and include many discussions or exercises. The academic content of the programme has a

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[20] Nansen Academy, 'Report autumn 1999 - autumn 2000 "Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution": A Joint Project: Nansen Academy, Lillehammer, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Red Cross', p 4-5. (to be referred as 'Report autumn 1999-2000')

very good reputation and is certainly enjoyed by the participants.[21] Dialogue is included in most of the lectures and workshops as a topic itself or an important tool in the exercise and discussions.

For a social component, the compact space of the Nansen Academy and the town of Lillehammer make a significant contribution. During the stay at Nansen Academy the participants see each other not only in the classroom but also in the dining room, library, or smoking area. Lillehammer is a small town so that people see each other when they walk along the main street for their free time. Apart from those given factors, the parties and drink sessions are organised to strengthen the social aspect. Sometimes parties are organised at some of the project organisers' homes providing opportunities for the participants to socialise. It is interesting to see people from the different parts of the Balkans and with different ethnic backgrounds enjoying singing and dancing together with pop music from the Former Yugoslavia. There are also occasions to get together with Norwegian students and people living in or out of Lillehammer.

For a physical component, activities using the natural environment of Lillehammer are often included in the schedule. The activities such as hiking, country skiing, football or swimming are available. Or participants can play with snow in the school yard, making snowmen or throwing snowballs at each other. Those are often optional but they seem to be good occasions for some participants to release their energy during intense academic work or serious discussions.

As a cultural component, the participants are introduced to Norwegian culture. The participants have opportunities to visit museums or schools, attend concerts of classic or jazz music, watch ballet and perform music instruments by themselves. In the 15th seminar in which I participated, a piano concert was organised as one of the seminar participants happened to be a famous pianist in the Former Yugoslavia. Not only the seminar participants and people in the Nansen Academy, but also local residents were invited to this concert. There are occasions of interaction with Norwegian students or some from other countries. Trips to Oslo or Bergen, the capital and the second largest city in Norway

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[21] From the reference to written evaluation by the participants, the observation at the seminar of the Group 15 and also my personal experience of attending the seminar.

respectively, are included in most of the seminars. Those excursions are organised to reinforce all educational, social, physical and cultural aspects.

Additionally it is useful to mention six principles suggested for organisers and facilitators of the programme as a guideline. They are neutrality, 'it is not enough to be right', 'there are always more than two sides in a conflict', humour, creativity and 'from positions to interests'. (Appendix 7.3) Those principles are to maintain the integrity of the seminars as a safe space as well as stimulating the process of dialogue. Currently the dialogue training seminars are organised with the purpose of providing the human space for dialogue under those principles.

7.3 Development from the Dialogue Training Programme
Dialogue Training Programme in Lillehammer

Since the programme started in 1995, 23 seminars had been held by the end of 2003 and over 300 people participated in the training seminars. The project has continued to hold seminars in 2004. The initial 8 seminars held during 1995 and 1998 were ten-week seminars. Since 1999, the length of the seminars varies, the longest was 10 weeks and the shortest was 3 weeks.[22] Initially held as 10-week seminars, variations in length of the seminars are partly because of a practical difficulty for participants to obtain such a long leave from their work. The other reason is that the organisers now consider that the seminars can be held in the shorter period of time with the same content.[23] The recruitment of the participants was conducted through the international presence in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia, such as the International Red Cross, the Norwegian Church Aid and the Helsinki Committee. Those organisations have offices in the region with a number of local staff working for them. Initially there were difficulties in recruiting the participants. However, having enjoyed the experience of the seminar themselves, previous participants recommended the

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[22] There are exceptions. The 18th seminar titled as 'Seminar for Regional Cooperation' was held in April 2002 only for 18 days aiming to strengthen the cooperation especially between NDCs in South Balkan: South Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia. The participants from the region were all seminar alumni, most of them are also NDC staff, as well as staff from Nansen Dialogue Project management in Norwegian side. (Nansen Dialogue, Annual Report 2002, "Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution": A Joint Project: Nansen Academy, Lillehammer, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Red Cross'.) The 22nd seminar, held for a week in June 2003, was specifically for the young politicians or local political leaders from South Serbia. (Nansen Dialogue, 'Annual Report 2003'.)

[23] Interview with Heidrun Sørlie Røhr, the Pedagogical Coordinator of the project, Lillehammer, Norway, June 2001.

programme to their colleagues, friends, and families. The programme eventually gained a good reputation locally, so that recruitment became easier.

Most participants are from all over the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. About 30% of the participants are from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and about 20 % are from Kosovo, while participants from Slovenia are less than 1 %. (Table 7.1[24]) This statistic indicates the project's focus on the areas with high potential for conflict, on-going conflict or clear division after conflict. From 2001, as the project sees Serbia as a strategic focus,[25] the number of the participants from Serbia is on the increase. Ethnic orientation of participants is not necessarily stated in the participants' list, however, the careful consideration for ethnic quota in each seminar is given by the organisers at recruitment and selection of participants.[26] Although unintentional, command of English as one of the recruitment criteria leads to the seminar participants being of certain standards. Initially the organisers also looked for hard-liners as well as moderates, however, it turned out that most hard-liners, often strong nationalists, rarely speak English.[27] People who fulfil requirement of English were those with moderate and liberal ideas and a certain level of education. Among over 300 participants, almost half are university students ranging from undergraduate to research students. Being students, the majority of them have work experience in local and international organisations including NGOs, as project coordinators or translators. Some have more specifically worked as professional specialists such as journalists, government officials or political advisers to a political party. Apart from students quite a few are teachers and NGO workers. Some of the NGO workers have worked as specialists such as engineers, social workers or psychologists. Others include lawyers, judges or journalists. Except young politicians in the early days of their political careers, people with high political profiles are excluded from the potential participants because they are considered unlikely to change their mind or attitude due to the risk that can be entailed.[28]

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[24] See p 192.

[25] Serbia is in a transition process after the fall of Milosevic. The assassination of Prime Minister, Zoran Djindic in March 2003 and the low turnout in the general elections and victory of the right wing parties in 2003 indicates the persistent and serious obstacles for vibrant, pluralistic and tolerant societies in Serbia.

[26] Informal conversation with Vanja Pestoric, the Project Coordinator, Lillehammer, Norway, June 2001.

[27] Eidsvåg, op. cit.

[28] Ibid.

Having the willingness to enter into dialogue with people with different opinions and ethnic backgrounds is later included in the participant selection criteria.

The Networks and the Follow-ups

There is always a question of what would happen after the participants return home from the seminar. It was hoped that the participants would work within their own communities by using what they learn in the seminars. The participants who are going back to their communities are just like a few drops in the whole ocean. It was a question of how they can work for dialogue, democracy, human rights or peaceful conflict resolution in the divided societies with protracted conflict.

There was no clear expectation on how the participants should work on those issues in their own communities,[29] nevertheless, one thing specifically intended after the seminars was development of the networks of people to overcome traditional cleavages.[30] Through weeks of intense interaction, the participants naturally develop personal relationships with others in the seminar. It was hoped that these relationships would remain strong and develop further by conjoining those of the previous seminar participants. For this purpose, follow-up activities are regarded as essential from the beginning. The dialogue-training programme can only tackle a handful of people living in the area of Former Yugoslavia. As it is so exclusive the organisers of the programme consider that 'it is almost irresponsible' to send people back home without any sort of after-care.[31]

The follow-up measures are conducted on an individual as well as on a collective basis. On the individual basis, Bryn, the project director, initially took a major part in the follow-up. He occasionally travelled to the Balkan region. He used to visit the region after the participants went home in order to interview

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[29] Ibid.

[30] A draft paper ' Information "Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution", 3-month Training Programme at The Fridtjof Nansen Academy, Lillehammer, Norway, 31/1-22/4 1996', in Rapport Democrati, Menneskerettigheter og Fredelig Konfliktløsning, August 1995-Juni 1998, Lillehammer, 20. juni 1999. [Report: 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' – A Collaborative Project of Nansen Academy, Lillehammer, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid. Autumn 1997-Spring 1999, Lillehammer, Norway, 20 June 1999. (to be referred as 'Report Autumn 1997-Spring 1999')]

[31] Interview with Steiner Bryn, the Project Director, Lillehammer, Norway, 9th June 2001.

potential participants for the next seminar. After a few seminars in two or three years, he started to be invited to give lectures and facilitate workshops in the region as a part of activities that some of the seminar alumni organised. Using those occasions, he visited them and other alumni at their home, workplace or even neighbours to 'have a chat with them'.[32] It is assumed that visits by Bryn have given practical and psychological support to people who have the will to work for dialogue in their communities in one way or another.

The collective approach is follow-up seminars for all alumni held almost every year from 1996 to 2000. All those who participated in the dialogue training seminars in Lillehammer – the alumni – were invited to the follow-up. It was held at Budapest in 1996, at Lillehammer in 1997, at Igalo, Montenegro in 1998, and at Ohird, Macedonia in 2000. At the second follow-up in June 1997 in Lillehammer for the participants of the initial 4 seminars, people clearly showed strong endorsement to create the networks of all alumni of the dialogue seminars. Because the dialogue-training programme was an on-going project, the network was obviously intended to expand as more people went through the training at the seminars. More details about the networking and their project planning were discussed in regional groups. Regarding geographical distribution and access to communicative facilities, contact persons were chosen in each regional group in order to activate the networks.[33] For the third follow-up seminar almost 60 out of 88 alumni came to Igalo Montenegro in 1998.[34] In the regional group discussion some groups simply decided to keep contact, while others had more concrete plans to take action.[35] During this follow-up in 1998 and the follow-up in 2000 in Ohid, Macedonia, the direction of all the regional activities developed dramatically through the establishment of dialogue centres in the region.

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Nihad Mesic, 'Proposal of Bosnian Group at the Follow-up Meeting of the Project Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution', A draft paper, Lillehammer, Norway, June 2, 1997. and Nansen Academy, 'Summery of the CMMs Discussion Group on the Network and Future Work with the Participants of the Nansen School Democracy Project', in Nansen Academy, 'Rapport Democrati, Menneskerettigheter og Fredelig Konfliktløsning, August 1995-Juni 1998'.[Report: Democracy, Human Rights and peaceful Conflict Resolution, August 1995-June 1998. (to be referred to as 'Report August 1995-June 1998' below)]

[34] One of the reasons of some people's absence in this seminar seemed to be attributed that it was held in June, the exam season. (Inger Skejelsbæk, 'Report from Kosovo dialogue meeting, 28 May – 1 June 1998, Kosovo dialogue meeting reunion, 1 June – 3 June 1998 and Democracy, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution – Follow-up III of the Lillehammer Course, 3 June – 7 June 1998, June 1998, in Nansen Academy, 'Report Autumn 1997 – Spring 1999'.

[35] Ibid.

From 1996 to 2000, the use of the networks and the follow-up seminars was evolved by the alumni. The organisers held the follow-up seminars in order to maintain the networks, however, there has been no intention of instructing the direction of networks and future activities in the regions during the period perhaps except friendly advice when requested. The follow-up provided the opportunity to come together time to time but the future of the networks has depended on the alumni themselves.

Kosovo Dialogue Seminars at Herzeg Novi

The first practical movement in the region by the alumni occurred in 1997 in Pristina, Kosovo's capital. Previous participants of the dialogue seminars in Lillehammer started to work to facilitate dialogue seminars between the Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. The ethnic relations between the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have been seriously problematic for decades if not hundreds of years. At the end of the 1990s, there was a serious concern that war would break out in Kosovo because of heightened ethnic nationalism under the influence of the Bosnian war. In these circumstances, two people from Pristina met in Lillehammer at the third seminar from January to March 1997. During the ten-week stay in Lillehammer, Snezana Popovic and Arjeta Emra, a Serbian and an Albanian respectively, developed friendships. Undertaking the training, Popovic and Emra discussed the issues surrounding Kosovo in and outside the classroom Despite many disagreements, they realised the war would be inevitable while both sides, Albanians and Serbs, maintain their positions and refuse to listen to each other.[36] Because both come from the capital Pristina, they started to think what they could do locally. Kosovo has been a segregated society of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs; they lead separate social and cultural lives and they rarely intermingle, let alone talk to each other over the problems in their ethnic relations. The possibility of dialogue between these two groups seems impossible but in great need. Popovic and Emra felt so inspired by the academic contents of the seminars and the humanistic environment in Lillehammer, that they considered the possibility of recreating some of it in Pristina. During their stay in Lillehammer, they discussed feasible ideas and established some contact with

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[36] Interview with Snezana Popovic, Field Coordinator of the Balkan Dialogue and PRIO, Oslo, Norway, 14th June 2001.

Norwegian Church Aid and the foreign ministry to realise these ideas in the future.[37]

On their return to Pristina they contacted former participants of the Lillehammer seminars in Pristina and started to have regular meetings mostly at the local office of Norwegian Church Aid. Norwegian Church Aid not only put its facilities at their disposal but also provided facilitation for the initial meetings. The meeting group called themselves the 'Nansen Group' and planned to invite some key lecturers in the Lillehammer seminars such as Bryn and Dan Smith, the Former Director of PRIO and the lecturer of conflict analysis, to give lectures for both Albanians and Serbs. In June 1997 at the second follow-up seminar in Lillehammer, the Nansen Group Pristina discussed the plan with Bryn and Smith and confirmed their support. Then they made the project proposal and fixed the financial arrangement for the project with Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Red Cross on their return to Pristina. The plan of lectures developed into a seminar as it progressed. The seminar was planned to take place in November 1997 and it was decided to hold it in Herzeg Novi, a coastal town in Montenegro, as the situation in Kosovo became too tense to have such seminars locally.

During the autumn the Nansen Group members worked on recruitment for the coming seminar in their own communities but found it rather difficult. The distrust between the two ethnic communities in Pristina is so persistent that the idea of a seminar with people from the other side was not so easily accepted by either of the communities. The Nansen Group members could have easily been labelled as 'traitors'. In order to demonstrate the fairness of the seminar and to gain the trust of people, prominent figures in the communities such as people in the Ministry of Interior, police and the parliament were invited. The individuals in the Nansen Group had to put their personal reputations on the line and use connections in their own communities to recruit people. There had been no dialogue between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs, so that this would be the first attempt of this type.[38] There was a risk for the Nansen Group members that they could lose their reputation or even to be stigmatised in their

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[37] Ibid.
[38] There were some dialogue initiated but only in the Albanian community and there was some dialogue between Albanians and Serbs but they are not people in Kosovo but in Serbia.

own communities in case the seminar should go wrong.[39] Popovic, who recruited in the Serb community, recalls that the belief in her own inspiring experience of inter-group encounter at Lillehammer made her continue the recruitment despite the difficulties she faced.

In spite of the great concern, the members worked hard for recruitment and found ten people from each community who agreed to participate in the seminar. It was rather an unusual arrangement to have an equal number of people from both communities in Kosovo where there is an ethnic quota for everything including elections, university entrance, and job availability according to the percentage of the population in the area. Although Albanians constitute the majority and Serbs the minority of the population in Kosovo, the Nansen Group members decided that both sides should be equally represented in number at the space for dialogue based on the understanding that the ethnic quota system has caused feelings of unfairness among people in Kosovo.[40] In November 1997 the participants took a long bus ride to Herceg-Novi, 400 km away from Pristina for the three-day dialogue seminar was started.

With an emphasis on dialogue, this three-day seminar took more or less the form of conventional problem-solving workshops compared to the seminars in Lillehammer.[41] As time was limited the contents needed to be concentrated and intensively focused on issues and problems in Kosovo. The seminar was a very rare occasion for all participants to talk with 'the other side' about conflict and politics relating to Kosovo facing the critical situation.[42] Overall, the participants took part in all the sessions positively and engaged in inter-ethnic dialogue despite many disagreements between them. The seminar ended with setting out the common view on what was needed to stop total war in Kosovo. Again, however, this seminar was not intended to directly influence the situation

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[39] The xenophobic attitude towards foreigners were stronger in the Serb Community rather than in the Albanian community. This was mostly due to the propaganda from Belgrade that the international community were anti-Serbs. (Vemund Aarbakke, *Mutual Learning: Facilitating Dialogue in Former Yugoslavia*, PRIO Report 2/2002, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2002, pp 38-40.)

[40] Popovic, op. cit.

[41] For details on the Herceg-Novi seminars, see Dan Smith, 'A Dialogue Meeting on Kosovo Hercig-Novi, Montenegro, 21-24 November 1997, Organised by the Nansen Group, Pristina, 28/11/97', in Nansen Academy, 'Report Autumn 1997 – Spring 1999'. Inger Skjelsbæk and Dan Smith, 'Dialogue in Practice: Reflections on a Dialogue Project with Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo', A Draft Paper, August 2000.

[42] Ibid.

or politics in Kosovo but aimed to create a meeting space for Albanians and Serbs, and facilitate dialogue between them to foster the idea of peaceful conflict resolution.[43]

After the seminar, the organisers recognised that the reaction from the participants towards the seminar was very positive. Having seen a positive reaction, a few more seminars and one occasion for reunion were organised until the start of NATO bombing in Kosovo in March 1999. The basic contents of the seminars were similar each time, apart from some slight modifications such as the topics pf discussions according to different reactions by the participants as well as the changing political situation in Kosovo.[44] In terms of the recruitment, the good reputation of the first seminar attracted people willing to participate in the seminars. The strategic recruitment for the first seminar brought the attendance of some prominent figures in the communities, which seemed to have assured the reliability of the seminars. There was even a waiting list of a couple of hundred people or so for participating in the seminars especially after the cease-fire in November 1998.[45] Although it is assumed that some people wanted to participate in the seminars with a wish to get away from the tense situation on Kosovo for a while rather than to engage in dialogue, the demand for dialogue opportunities among the Kosovar was obvious at the verge of armed confrontation. Dan Smith, one of the facilitators in the seminars, points out a shortage of dialogue in Kosovo.[46] As conflict was building up in the severely segregated societies of Kosovo, people seemed to have felt the potential of dialogue to avoid war at that crucial moment.

The Pristina Nansen Group was very unique in Kosovo at that time, in the sense that it was the only local group organised by the local people where Albanians and Serbs work together on the equal basis. There were local groups of either Albanians or Serbs but not both. The organisations where Albanians and Serbs worked together were not local but governmental or international organisations. As the project went well during the period from 1997 to 1999, the

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[43] Ibid.
[44] The reports of the seminars, see Inger Skjelsbæk, op.cit. Skjelsbæk, and Smith, op.cit.
[45] According to Dan Smith's recollection at the interview.
[46] Ibid.

Nansen Group in Pristina became well-known to local people. The group received more offers of funding from diverse donors than it actually needed.[47]

A few months prior to the war, the Nansen Group started to work on the other projects including ideas of setting up an internet cafe and library. On 1st of March 1999 the Nansen Group moved out from the office of Norwegian Church Aid to open its own office, the Nansen Dialogue Center (NDC) in Pristina. However, as the bombing started in March 1999, all the staff of the NDC in Pristina were forced to flee Kosovo and all activities were ceased at this stage.

Nansen Dialogue Centers (NDCs)

The attempt of the dialogue seminars in Kosovo obviously didn't prevent war from breaking out and NDC in Pristina was forced to close down due to the bombing. However, the project of Kosovo dialogue seminars is not necessarily seen a failure by the seminar facilitators but considered to have been too little too late to prevent war.[48] In any case, the attempt did not make a clear impact on the Kosovo conflict. Nonetheless, the attempt had influence not inside but outside of Kosovo in an unexpected way; the NDC in Pristina became a model for and further work by the alumni in the other areas in the region.

The alumni of the seminars in Lillehammer had strong networks so that people soon become aware of the attempt by fellow people in Pristina and inspired by it. They wanted to have their own dialogue centres in their communities. The feasibility of dialogue centres was discussed between the network members and Bryn, the project director of the programme in Lillehammer, regarding the locations: Belgrade in Serbia, Skopje in Macedonia, Podgorica in Montenegro and Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar in Bosnia. Confirming the plan to establish dialogue centres in those places and reopening in Pristina, Kosovo, the PRIO was invited to join the project. In summer 1999 the PRIO and the Nansen Academy sent a joint application to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financial support for the project of four dialogue centres in the region. It was just after the NATO bombing and it became apparent that bombing did not solve problems; ethnic hostility and hatred among the

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[47] Potential donors include Norwegian Foreign Ministry, the Westminster Foundation, Department for International Development of the United Kingdom(DFID).
[48] Interview with Steiner Bryn and Dan Smith.

Kosovar population remains high and the divisions in the society were deepened and confirmed by the segregating policy with the presence of an international peacekeeping force. The MFA saw the project of dialogue centres stressing dialogue and reconciliation as a possible alternative approach in order to create local long-term capacity for peace.[49] Bryn and Smith visited the MFA to discuss the project several times. The application for funding was granted and came though in autumn. As four centres in Belgrade, Skopje, Podgorica and Pristina started to operate at the end of 1999 to the beginning of 2000 and three more in Bosnia followed in summer 2000. Also another centre was opened in Osijek, Croatia in September 2001. Furthermore, the alumni from Mitrovica in North Kosovo, a divided city between Serbs in the north and Albanians in the south, have formed a group 'Nansen Dialogue Mitrovica'. The group has developed to organise some multi-ethnic activities in the city. In addition, the alumni from Presvo, a city in Southern Serbia near the borders of Kosovo and Macedonia, work in the 'Center for New Visions Presvo' (CNV), a local NGO operating to promote human rights, tolerance, peace and peaceful conflict resolution.[50] CNV has developed close cooperative relationships with Nansen Dialogue Project and the Nansen networks.

The staff in the centres were all alumni of the dialogue seminars. On the process of NDCs' establishment, the staff were brought to Lillehammer again for the general training, the work ethics, programme development training and strategic development training.[51] Now the alumni work in their communities all over the Balkan region with 7 centres called the Nansen Dialogue Center (NDC) and the re-opened Pristina office which was initially called the 'Kosova Initiative for Democratic Society' (KIDS) and currently called the 'Kosovan Nansen Dialogue' since the merger with the Mitrovica Nansen Group.

Each centre works for the issues such as inter-ethnic dialogue and democratisation, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution locally from

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[49]Steiner Bryn et.al., 'Project on Dialogue and Reconciliation in Former Yugoslavia, A Project Sketch', in Nansen Academy, Report Autumn 1997- Spring 1999. Interview with Bryn, op.cit.
[50] CNV is a local NGO established in 2001. (http://www.cnvorg.com/)
[51] Ibid. The seminar for the staffs of Nansen Dialogue Centres in Belgrade, Podgorica, Pristina and Skopje were held on 21st February – 10th March 2000 in Lillehammer. Another for NDCs in Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Mostar, Pristina and Podgorica was held on 20th November to 1st December 2000. Strategic seminar for all the staffs of the NDCs was held on 2nd –11th December 2000, at Lillehammer. (From Nansen Academy, Report Autumn 1999-2000.)

different angles according to the local situation and needs. On its establishment, the Belgrade centre focused on 'reconciliation with the West' regarding the difficult working conditions for NGOs and lack of trust among people in Serbia towards the European states after the bombing in 1999. Currently NDC Serbia has started more ambitious projects of inter-ethnic dialogue in the various areas in Serbia such as Vojvodina, South Serbia and Sandzak Region.[52] The NDC Skopje works for Macedonian-Albanian dialogue. The centre has faced the extremely tense situation and probing about its role as the tension between the ethnic groups rose in 2001.[53] The NDC Podgorica started from dealing with the national division on the issue of independence of Montenegro from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the federation with Serbia. As Montenegro where the opinion on the separation of Montenegro from Serbia is completely divided, it is important to create opportunities for dialogue on this issue and others in order not to repeat the examples of violent conflict in the neighbouring states. Three centres in Bosnia are under relatively stable working conditions, although the societies are apparently segregated. In Mostar where ethnic communities are clearly divided by a river, the centre works for the Croat-Muslim dialogue and promotion of democratic values. The Banja Luka centre works for Serb-Muslim dialogue regarding the return of Muslim refugees through seminar, workshops and round table. The Sarajevo centre oversees Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole and takes a coordinating role. All three centres include promotion of inter-ethnic dialogue as their aim. The NDC Osijek started working for dialogue between Croats and the minority Serbs in Eastern Slavonia.

Unlike the other centres, the office in Pristina was not called a 'dialogue centre' but the 'Kosova Initiative for Democratic Society' (KIDS) after the re-opening due to security considerations. All the Serb alumni of the Lillehammer seminars left Kosovo along with the most of the Serb population who were driven out after the war in 1999. Therefore, KIDS had Albanian staff only at the re-opening. Now only a small number of the Serbs population remains in Kosovo and Albanians constitute the vast majority in Kosovo. The idea of reconciliation

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[52] Nansen Network Annual Report 2003, p 19.
[53] For the details, see Donna Issac, 'Skopje Nansen Dialogue Centre: Response to Conflict', Report from a visit to Macedonia, April 2001, a paper prepared for International Peace Research Institute, Oslo(PRIO), May 2001.

and dialogue tend to receive strong rejection from the Albanian population especially because of the 'ethnic cleansing' attempt by Belgrade before and during the war. Therefore, the centre is operating under difficult working conditions. While KIDS was obliged to work mostly with the Albanian population for building respect for democratic thinking and civil society in Kosovo, the alumni from Mitrovica, a city divided between Serbs and Albanians in the northern Kosovo, started to work for inter-ethnic dialogue locally. This Nansen Group in Mitrovica and KIDS merged in 2003 to became the 'Kosovan Nansen Dialogue' and the centre now maintains multi-ethnic team and organises various multi-ethnic activities over Kosovo.

As the dialogue centres were established locally, local perception and reaction to them and their activities needed to be given serious consideration. Although engaging in inter-group dialogue does not mean compromising or collaborating with the other groups, or betraying their own group, there is a risk to be perceived in that way. The project of training seminars in Lillehammer was not so visible locally because the seminars held far away in Norway and the number of alumni was too small in the local population to be considered of any importance in the local communities. However, as NDCs were established and the project became more visible in the local communities, the NDCs and the alumni can be at risk of being exposed to the pressure in their own ethnic communities, such as threat or intimidation from the ethno-nationalistic extremists or ostracism in the local communities. The project management and NDCs were aware of this risk, therefore, they regarded it as important to work with political parties and actors.[54] The project management and NDCs maintain contact with the local authorities and political actors, and inform them about their activities. NDCs sometimes invite the individuals from the authorities or the political parties to take part in their events such as the seminars, discussions or roundtables. All those efforts of being open is to demonstrate that the project is not to undermine the politicians or authorities or not to tell them what to do but to create the opportunities for dialogue in order to increase understanding in the societies.

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[54] Interview with Smith.

All centres organise a variety of activities including seminars, workshops, dialogue meetings, roundtables, dealing with problems in societies, to contribute to the development of civil society development and other skills. Some of them are given in English by the foreign facilitators invited from the seminars in Lillehammer, and others are given in local languages by locals. Training for trainers is also an important activity. The more seminars or workshops that can be provided in local languages, the wider a range of people are involved.

Current Nansen Dialogue Project and Its Future Direction

The Nansen Dialogue Project has developed in two parts: the dialogue training programme in Lillehammer and Nansen Dialogue Centers in the region. The seminars in Lillehammer still continue but some tasks related to the project management were passed to the NDCs. First, the recruitment for participants in the Lillehammer seminars is currently undertaken by NDCs. NDCs deal with the applications and conduct interviews with potential participants. Secondly and more importantly the follow-up is now the task of NDCs. After a follow-up seminar in 2000, at Ohrid, Macedonia, there is no plan for a follow-up seminar for all alumni. The follow-up at Ohrid was a very active follow-up seminar because the whole networks had started to move in a certain direction, that is, towards NDCs.[55] By that time, four NDCs had already started to operate and the other 3 were about to start. 108 participated in the follow-up out of a potential 165 alumni. However, there were more than 200 alumni in 2001 and the number is constantly increasing so that it is difficult to organise the seminars for all.[56] Also because the follow-up seminar focuses on NDCs, there is not much need or point to include the alumni who do not relate to the NDC activities in the follow-up seminars.[57] With the focus for the future on the development of NDCs, follow-up seminars are replaced by the seminars for all NDC staff and network meetings.[58] For individual follow-up, it is now impossible for Bryn to visit all the

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[55] For the details of the follow-up seminar in Ohrid, see 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' Fourth Follow-up Seminar.

[56] The expense for follow-up seminars was paid by the organisers.

[57] Sørlie Røhr, in interview.

[58] The staff seminar was held in Budapest in July 2001. (Nansen Academy, Annual report, 2002.)

alumni individually for follow-up because of the large numbers involved. The individual follow-up for the alumni is currently undertaken by NDCs.

While a part of the tasks of the seminar management in Lillehammer was passed on to NDCs, the main purpose of the Lillehammer seminars is now set on strengthening NDCs and developing local networks in the region. With this strategic purpose, now the recruitment for the Lillehammer seminars reflects the needs of NDCs. [59] People who are expected to take part or who are already active in NDCs are recruited for the Lillehammer seminars. Also some recent seminars are held with the specific objectives regarding new developments on the ground. For example, many of the participants in the 23rd seminar were from Sandzak and South Serbia, the areas where the NDCs are extending their activities.

With a principle of inter-ethnic dialogue, democratic values and human rights, NDCs are moving towards more independently sustainable units dealing with their own financial management. At the same time they maintain strong connections with the international partners as well as with each other. NDCs organise various activities and projects individually and jointly with other NDCs and local actors. The regional network has been developed and now mentioned as the 'Nansen Network'. The overall project management headquarters was at PRIO until the end of 2003 and now all the administrative responsibility was handed over to Nansen Academy and a new project management office was set up in Oslo.[60] NDCs and Nansen Academy are becoming equal and indispensable partners in the Nansen Dialogue Project.

7.4 An Evaluative Consideration of the Dialogue Seminars in Lillehammer
The Impact on Participants

The impact of the dialogue training seminars on participants can be considered in terms of the change in the participants' perception and attitude towards the other peoples or problems between them causing conflict. Despite the difficulty of evaluating those changes, it seems certain that the experience of the dialogue seminars in Lillehammer has brought some changes to the perceptions and attitudes of many participants in one way or another.

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[59] Nansen Academy, Annual report, 2002.
[60] Steiner Bryn and Heidrun Sørlie Røhr, 'Nansen Dialogue Network 2004', Nansen Academy.

It is quite clear that most of the participants have had positive feelings on the seminars overall. Bryn, who previously carried out the individual follow-ups by visiting alumni at their home and now occasionally visits NDCs in the region, claims that he recognises the positive feedback from most of the participants. They came together in Lillehammer and had a good time regardless of their ethnic/national differences.[61] The high number of people who turned up to four follow-up seminars between 1996 and 2000 also indicates that many participants have good memories of the original seminars in Lillehammer, although it was assumed that some people might simply have regarded the occasions of follow-up as a short holiday.[62]

As to more direct reaction from the participants in the seminars, we could refer to the evaluation written by them at the end of each seminar. It should be noted that this evaluation is for the organisers' use for improving the content of the seminars. Because this evaluation does not necessarily share the evaluation criteria with this research and the questions given in the forms are sometimes abstract and slightly changed each time, systematic analysis by referring each question is neither possible nor useful. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to grasp some clues from the frank comments given by the participants in the evaluation.

The evaluations of the participants in the group 10-15 are available.[63] They are rather abstract and patchy but some indications seem to exist in their comments. First, most of the participants claimed that they have learned to appreciate different perspectives on conflict in general or conflict in the Balkans. They all felt the academic contents of the seminars, such as conflict theory, the history of the Balkans and conflict analysis of the Yugoslav break-up, helped to demonstrate the various ways of looking at conflict and its causes. Learning about the Balkan conflict from an objective perspective was a refreshing experience for the participants, as they come from an environment filled with propaganda, misinformation and prejudice. Some indeed stated that they had changed their perspectives on the current conflict in the Balkans and others stated that they became aware of different perspectives or ideas regarding conflict. In

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[61] Interview with Bryn.

[62] It should be mentioned that the travel expenses of the participants for the follow-up seminars were paid by the organisers. (Sørlie Røhr, interview.)

[63] Unfortunately, the written evaluations by the participants of previous groups are not well stored due to the change of the coordinators over the periods.

fact, quite a few people claimed to *gain* different angles, views or ways of thinking about conflict rather than to change their perspectives. One participant in the Group 14 wrote 'in my country (region), war (is) caused (by) lack of communication, discrimination, depression, underdevelopment and environmental problems'.[64] The dialogue training seminars do not necessarily change people's opinions, ways of thinking or positions regarding conflict, but they bring people to realise that there are other angles on issues, and that these are themselves perfectly legitimate. This change in understanding on conflict is rather practical and appropriate more than a complete change of their perceptions.

Regarding attitudes towards conflict, we can assert that there was an important impact on the participants. The training programme seems to be successful in bringing people to think that they can do something to handle conflict peacefully. In the lectures and workshops, theories are explained at practical levels, which shows that it is possible for ordinary people to work for democracy, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution in their daily lives.[65] This encourages and motivates the participants to use those ideas and skills at home, workplaces and their communities. Eric Cleven, a facilitator in the 'Center for Conflict Management' who undertakes 'Human Rights Workshops' in the Lillehammer seminars, suggests empowerment has a lot to do with motivation, and explains it as something to bring people from 'I cannot' (helplessness) to 'I can' (self-confidence).[66] By this essence of empowerment in the academic contents, the participants' passive attitude towards conflict has generally changed. Snezana Popovic, who is one of the initiators of Kosovo Dialogue seminars, recalls that she never dreamed that she could organise such a project by herself when she arrived in Lillehammer for the training seminars.[67] The establishment of NDCs demonstrate the empowerment factor of the seminars.

Secondly there is an indication of the impact on perceptions or attitudes towards other peoples. It seems that the participants' perception and attitude

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[64] From a written evaluation by one of the participants in the 14th seminar.
[65] From my personal experience at training seminar and informal conversation with other participants.
[66] My personal lecture notes of Eric Cleven, the Center for Conflict Management, in his workshop, at Nansen Academy in June 2001.
[67] Popovic, op .cit.

towards people from the other ethnic groups seems to have been generally modified, if not resulting in firm change. Related to this change in perception or attitude towards other peoples, questions were asked whether participants really have listened to the other people. Most of the participants answered that they become better at listening to different point of views, or the angles and opinions of other people. Some claim that they realised the importance of listening to others. This is indeed an important point. In the tense situation of conflict, people on opposite sides of a conflict rarely talk to each other, especially about their views or opinions on conflict, so that the psychological barriers to the other sides are persistent. Regarding the background from which most of the participants come, the fact that they have listened to others and learned from their perspectives can be seen as a sign of a deconstruction of previously dehumanised images. A participant in Group 11 states 'I have learned that

I can find a (the) same language with the people that I think I would never like to meet'.[68] Also quite a few people state that they felt ethnic/national backgrounds had nothing to do with values or the personality of individuals. In a participant's words, 'difference in ethnicity does not exist among people in the Balkan(s)', 'people from (the) Balkan(s) have a lot in common', and 'people are all equal and the same'.[69] They found far more similarities as human beings than differences with peoples from the different ethnic groups.

However, not all reaction by the participants was positive. Approximately 2-3 people in each group claimed that there were issues that they hesitated to bring up in the groups such as war crimes, war responsibility, forgiving, Kosovo, Macedonia, ethnic relations and political conflict in the Balkans. From my experience in Group 15, I could see some clear divisions in the group members, apparently attributable to ethnic differences. Some people had difficulties befriending with other members who belong to 'the other side(s)' due to collective and individual experience of ethnic conflict.[70] Others were scared of the reaction s/he might receive when they tried to associate with people from another community. Unfortunately, those divisions did not necessarily seem to

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[68] From a written evaluation by one of the participants in the 11th seminar.

[69] From the written evaluations by the participants.

[70] Informal conversations with some of the participants in the Group 15, Lillehammer, Norway, June 2001.

have been overcome by the end of the three-week seminar. However, two points need to be noted here. First, as this 15th seminar was a teacher's seminar aiming to provide skills for the teachers to use in classrooms, the main focus was different from the usual seminars previously and subsequently held. Second, this was one of the shorter seminars among others. It can be assumed that previous longer seminars would have a better chance in constructing relationships. Pedagogical Coordinator, Heidrun Sørlie Røhr claims that the divisions in the group 15 were the clearest of all among the number of seminars she has organised as a member of the project management.[71] Also when problems in the relationships among the participants deepen, the organisers take measures, talking to the participants individually or creating an occasion to talk about the problems with all of them.[72] Therefore, my observation in Group 15 could not necessarily be considered as typical occurring in the seminars. Rather, it seems to indicate that overcoming psychological barriers or breaking-down 'enemy images' towards other side(s) is in fact a long and difficult process. It is a reminder that not all the participants in the training programme always make an indisputably beneficial impact in this sense.

Nevertheless, generally the impact of the training programme on the participants can be considered positive. There is no doubt that the training programme has provided an opportunity to encounter people of the other side as fellow human beings.

The Output of the Seminars

The output of the seminars is recognised in something concrete that has been produced as a result of the seminars. The output of the dialogue seminars can be recognised as two-fold. One is the networks of alumni that are intended from the first stage of the project. The other is completely unexpected, the plan for Kosovo Dialogue seminars.

People related to the Nansen Dialogue Project, not only the alumni of the seminars in Lillehammer but also the organisers and lecturers, have created strong networks. The strength of the networks seems evident from the number of people coming back to the follow-up seminars or the quick spread of the idea of

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[71] Email correspondence from Heidrun Sørlie Røhr, 4th May 2004.
[72] Interview with Bryn.

Dialogue Centers from Pristina to other parts of the region. In fact, creating networks of people beyond national or ethnic borders was the only clear intention by the organisers from the beginning of the project. In the peaceful and humanistic atmosphere of the Nansen Academy, intense interaction between people during their stay often creates strong bonds between the participants. These emotional bonds between people continued into the organised and functional networks. However, this was not an automatic process because emotional bonds between people tend to fade away as time passes and without seeing each other. Here the follow-up seminars held almost every year between 1996 and 2000 have taken on important role. The follow-up seminars revived the contacts and bonds developed in Lillehammer. Also people were introduced to the other alumni and created new bonds by sharing their experience in Lillehammer. By having follow-up seminars nearly every year, friendships between people successfully continued and expanded further by incorporating people who newly experienced the training seminars every year. As a result the networks became stronger and wider.

The Kosovo Dialogue Seminars can also be regarded as a major outcome of the training seminars in Lillehammer. Two individuals, Snezana Popovic and Arjeta Emra, who initiated the seminars in Kosovo, came up with the idea and already started to work on the project planning and practical matters during their stay in Lillehammer for the seminar. This initiative was completely unplanned or unexpected by the organisers, however, they were more than willing to support it as much as possible. The project of the Kosovo Dialogue seminars itself would be a very interesting subject of research for dialogue development in conflict situation, as conflict in Kosovo was seriously intensified during the period from 1997 to 1999, when the several Kosovo dialogue seminars were held. [73] Unfortunately this is not within the scope of my research here due to the restriction of time and space. Nevertheless, it is certain that the Kosovo Dialogue Seminars were an effort to provide an opportunity for the citizens in serious conflict to see the people from the opposite side of the conflict and talk about the problems between them in an honest manner. The seminars were rare but eagerly wanted opportunities for people in Kosovo although the violent break-up of the

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[73] There are some written materials on Kosovo Dialogue Seminars such as Skelsbæk and Smith, op.cit., 2000. Smith, op. cit., 1997.

189

conflict in Kosovo was not prevented. Here it needs to be emphasised that the project of Kosovo Dialogue seminars can be seen as an output of the dialogue training seminars in Lillehammer, initiated by people who were very much inspired by the seminar.

The Outcome: Potential Long-Term Effects

Outcome can be analysed in the long-term effect on the societies. Since 1995, more than 300 people have undertaken the training programme in Lillehammer. In Bosnia the divisions between the peoples are institutionalised and inter-ethnic interaction itself is very rare. In the other conflict areas, such as Kosovo and Krajna in Croatia, the societies are segregated so that inter-ethnic dialogue on conflict is also very rare. There is little doubt that the seminars themselves are rare opportunities for the participants from those conflict situations to meet with people from the other groups in conflict and have dialogue on conflict and its causes. However, the number of people who participated in the programme is only a handful compared to the whole population in the Balkans. Although generally the seminars are appreciated by most of the participants, it could not possibly be known how all of them use what they learn in Lillehammer after going home. Some would attempt to work for inter-ethnic dialogue in their communities, and others would try to use mediation skills at home or in their workplaces. Or some might not have done anything at all. Obviously it is difficult to track down each individual and his or her action and its effect on the societies. A hopeful assumption is that all efforts made would contribute to developing a dialogue culture in the societies, no matter how small they are. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to evaluate how much the project of dialogue training seminars in Lillehammer has influenced the divided societies as a whole.

Despite difficulties in evaluating overall outcome, Nansen Dialogue Centers (NDCs) in the region do demonstrate their visible presence. NDCs are still constantly developing after a few years of full operation and the influence of their presence and activities in the societies is yet to a certain extent unknown. In addition, they have different operational purposes and have made different progress in their development. There are difficulties in generalising about all

NDCs and their activities, however, it is not impossible to describe some of the common features in the operations of NDCs.

NDCs are NGOs by local people for local people. There are so many NGOs in the Balkan states, especially Bosnia and Kosovo, but many of them are branches of international NGOs or created by them. The management of these NGOs are often by some international staff and handed over to the locals at the withdrawal of the international NGOs. In contrast, NDCs are established based on the will of locals who are alumni of the Lillehammer seminars and operated by them from the beginning. Most of the staff went through dialogue training in Lillehammer, then work ethics, project development training and strategic development training. NDCs and the Network has been under the supervision of the project management of the Nansen Dialogue Project in PRIO and currently in Nansen Academy, now having the project management at Oslo, since the handover at the end of 2003.[74] These NDCs have been financially supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, NDCs undertake project planning and coordination or strategic development with a large extent of autonomy. The relationships between the project management and NDCs are based on mutual trust between the Norwegian side and staffs in NDCs and active alumni that have been constructed over the years. Because they have been established and operated by the locals with consideration to the local context, NDCs are likely to remain after the withdrawal of direct international support. This is something unique, as compared to international NGOs which withdraw from the area after a few years or NGOs created by external sources which collapse or fade away after the withdrawal of international personnel.

All NDCs have developed to focus on the promotion of inter-ethnic dialogue, reconciliation as a key element of conflict prevention and sustainable peacebuilding.[75] In the Balkans although the peoples have lived next to each other for a long time, different ethnic groups have maintained different cultural values. Inter-ethnic dialogue is still much needed for establishing common ground firmly in the societies. Lectures, workshops, round tables and discussions are organised at NDCs. The facilitators from the Lillehammer seminars are often invited but at the same time training for trainers is also active. Training local

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[74] The new project management office was opened at Oslo in June 2004.
[75] Nansen Network Annual Report, 2003.

facilitators is important because more lectures and workshops can be given by locals in their own languages to expand local participation regardless of their command of English. In addition, it is assumed that the lecturers and facilitators who are familiar with local customs and the ways of thinking can appropriately introduce and develop the concepts of inter-ethnic dialogue, reconciliation and other somewhat western expression of democratic values such as human rights or peaceful conflict resolution in their own culture. Democratic culture can thus be cultivated in their own contexts and implemented more firmly in their societies.

NDCs tackle people's attitudes towards NGOs and civil activities. In general people in the Balkans are not well aware of the roles of NGOs and civil activities in society. Some simply do not have knowledge about NGOs and their work. Others even feel distrust or dislike towards NGOs. For example, people's reaction towards NGOs is observed as 'very negative and a little xenophobic' in Serbia.[76] One of the reasons for this is that people in Serbia are ignorant of NGOs and their activities. Another is distrust among people towards the West in general after the NATO bombing in 1999. In Serbia, NGOs are regarded as being closely related to the West. NDCs are working on informing about their existence and activities to the public in order to improve these negative images about NGOs and civil activities and to create a move participatory attitude among people.

NDCs have worked to take part in the networks of NGOs, civil activities and people in the region to develop them. NDCs are working for creating cooperative relations with other NGOs in their communities and some have already established connections with major NGOs in the area and operated some joint projects. Becoming a part of the local networks of NGOs and civil activities can create a better working environment. At the same time, NDCs have still maintained close relationships with each other and their operational management, although they are basically independent from one another. There are cooperative work between NDCs beyond borders including the joint dialogue seminars in Bosnia and Montenegro or Kosovo and Macedonia.[77] As a recent development, the Monitoring and Evaluation team was established in 2003 with people from six NDCs, namely Belgrade, Banja Luka, Osijek, Sarajevo, Mostar and Skopje,

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[76] Personal correspondence via e-mail with Jelena Lengold, Project-coordinator of NDC Belgrade on 7th September 2001.
[77] Nansen Network Annual Report, 2003, pp 22-24.

in order to assess the applicability of their work in practice to the value they intend to pursue, and to evaluate their effect in promoting those values. NDCs also work to create and maintain the networks of individuals, including alumni of the dialogue training programme in Lillehammer and people who participated locally in NDCs' activities. As previously mentioned, the alumni of the Lillehammer seminars have already formed strong networks over the last few years. The number of participants in local NDCs' activities varies from a few tens to a few hundreds, depending on the scale of the projects. The staff of NDCs reckon that they have mostly received positive reaction from the participants in the NDC projects so that many of the participants stay in contact.[78] Combining those networks together, the networks of the individuals related to NDCs are maintained and expanded. The networks between NGOs and individuals would contribute to the creation of closer and stronger social fabrics.

While NDCs consider inter-ethnic dialogue as an important theme in their work, the extent of their engagement varies among them. Some NDCs actively encourage and promote inter-ethnic interaction and dialogue in their projects. Three NDCs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar, have a relatively better working environment for inter-ethnic dialogue now, after the elapsing of a few years since the war ended. NDC Montenegro also has better conditions, maybe because Montenegro has not experienced war in recent years. These NDCs actively pursue inter-ethnic dialogue through workshops, round tables or seminars. The joint dialogue seminars by some NDCs mentioned above are an example of this sort. But for the others, taking up inter-ethnic dialogue as a theme of their projects is sometimes accompanied by difficulties because of the local situation of ethnic relations. In Pristina, KIDS initially could not work on inter-ethnic dialogue between the Albanians and the Serbs firstly because there were not many Serbs remaining in Kosovo after the crisis in 1999. Secondly interactions between the Albanians and the few remaining Serbs were practically impossible due to the segregative policy of KFOR. And another reason is that

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[78] Correspondence by e-mails with Dragana Sarengaca(co-ordinator at the NDC Banjaluka) on 10th September 2001), Jelena Lengold (project-coordinator of NDC Belgrade) on 7th September 2001, Nebojsa Savija-Valha (Project Coordinator at NCD Sarajevo) on 11 September 2001, Daliborka Uljarevic (Coordinator at NDC Montenegro) on 11 September 2001, Dina Cernobregu (Coordinator at KIDS) on 11th September 2001, Vladimir Maric (Project Co-ordinator at NDC Mostar) on 6th September 2001.

distrust and hatred of the Serbs was still too persistent among the Albanians after the recent tragic experience of persecution and ethnic cleansing by Belgrade. The situation was regarded as still too dangerous for KIDS to start working for inter-ethnic dialogue at its establishment in 2000.[79] Nevertheless KIDS has foreseen inter-ethnic dialogue as an important part of their work. As Kosovan Nansen Dialogue after the merger with Mitorovica Nansen Group, now it is committed in various inter-ethnic projects, including inter-ethnic dialogue seminars, inter-ethnic peacebuilding program with youth and cross-border seminars. The youth programme is especially focused in Mitrovica, the divided city between the north, Serbs and the south, Albanians.[80] In Serbia ignorance and distrust of NGOs is prevalent among people, so that it was initially regarded as inappropriate to take up this sensitive issue of ethnic relations. Now having established firm trust among people, NDC Serbia has recently started the concrete projects for inter-ethnic dialogue all over Serbia.

Regarding inter-ethnic dialogue, NDC Skopje has faced the most complex situation in summer 2001. The ethnic relations between the majority Macedonians and the minority Albanians have been problematic in Macedonia and the tension between the two ethnic groups seriously rose after the Kosovo crisis in summer 1999. Newly established NDC Skopje has organised various dialogue programmes including dialogue seminars, community dialogue and media workshops. The participants have included Macedonians, Albanians and Turks who are the second minority in Macedonia. Some programmes did not necessarily address ethnic issues, however, they certainly created opportunities for inter-ethnic dialogue.[81] Regarding the tense situation in Macedonia, those projects were carefully designed in order not to 'backfire'[82] to NDC Skopje and not to do any harm to conflict itself. However, a staff member at NDC Skopje stated the working conditions in summer 2001 as;

'Most of them (people in the community) phone in the office (of NDC Skopje) and support our 'multiethnic course', but lately you might say

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[79] Correspondence by e-mail with Dina Cernobregu (Coordinator at KIDS) on 11 September 2001.
[80] For more information, the KIDS' website, http://www.kids-kosova.org/
[81] Isaac, op. cit, 2001.
[82] Ibid, p 4.

that we are getting more and more label(l)ed as traitors, from the extremists from both Macedonian and Albanian community, or mainly people who seek military solution for the current conflict.'[83]

This expresses the difficulty in working on inter-ethnic dialogue at the local communities in a conflict situation, although the situation in Macedonia has fortunately regained relative stability at least on the surface.

Despite differences of progress between NDCs, their existence in the Balkans can be considered as a contribution to the long process of implementing a dialogue culture in their societies.

Conclusion

The Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution' is an attempt to provide a space for inter-ethnic dialogue for the citizens in the conflict situation of the Balkans. This attempt by Norwegians is unique among the third parties' efforts of its kind because it has produced visible results such as the Kosovo Dialogue Seminars and the establishment of Nansen Dialogue Centers (NDCs), although these have never been concretely intended. The actual long-term effect of these results, now the Nansen Dialogue Project as a whole, in their societies is difficult to evaluate. In addition, the project itself is constantly evolving. However, NDCs can be regarded as signs for potential long-term effect, that is, social change. There are various reasons for those positive results but I would like to mention some points in particular.

Firstly holding the dialogue seminars in Lillehammer rather than somewhere in the Balkan region contributed to creating a secure dialogue space. The initial decision to hold the seminars in Lillehammer was due to practicality. It was not feasible to organise a seminar in the war-zone of Bosnia where most of the participants for the first seminar were from, and the Nansen Academy could provide appropriate facilities including accommodation, catering facilities and classrooms. Unexpectedly the peaceful environment of Lillehammer calms down participants who have suffered from traumatic experiences of war and helps to

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[83] Reply to my e-mail from NDC Skopje on 11th September 2001.

get their objectivity and sensibility back. Having the seminars in the quiet and humanistic environment far away from the region secured the space for dialogue.

Secondly the length of the seminars contributes to the strength of the relationships between the participants. Apart from some two- to three-week seminars with some specific focuses, the project has held many long seminars in their length varies eight to ten weeks, which is unusual for this kind projects. The participants spend time together during the seminar period at the same accommodation on the small campus in a small town. The interaction between the participants naturally becomes intensive through stimulating workshops, discussions or lectures during their long stay, which brings out disagreement on difficult issues such as conflict, culture, gender or even personality differences. Use of dialogue, which is encouraged in the academic content, must have helped the participants to deal with the disagreement. At the same time, the seminar organisers have time to work on the group dynamics by challenging or encouraging the participants to enter more sensitive issues or share personal feelings or emotions. As a result, so that their relations become intimate and lasting ones.

Thirdly the high quality of the academic content of the seminars has greatly influenced the participants. The feeling of empowerment created by the lectures and workshops is remarkable. The participants are often necessarily not politically distinctive people in the Balkans. The contents of the seminars and the atmosphere of Nansen Academy inspired the participants feeling helpless into believing that they can contribute to peaceful transformation of the current conflicts in Balkan in various ways.

Fourth, the continuity of the project is worth underlining. The Lillehammer dialogue training programme is an on-going project. The project is expanding in the sense that more seminars have been held in recent years. Also another kind of continuity needs mentioning in the follow-up. Although the participants finish the training in Lillehammer, the follow-up efforts are continued by the organisers or the alumni who are involved in NDCs.

Last but not least, we can emphasise the development of cooperative relations and strong networks of the interveners, Norwegian institutions, organisations and individuals, all of whom have contributed to sustaining the project and its progress throughout. Four bodies in the structure of the Nansen

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Dialogue have different specialities. As humanitarian organisations, the Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid have mobility in the conflict areas and the networks with other of NGOs. As a school, the Nansen Academy has a humane environment and the capacity for dispensing humanistic education. As a research institution, PRIO has academic knowledge and practical experience in conflict and intervention. Different kinds of agencies complimentarily work for the project. In addition, the Nansen Dialogue Project has maintained good relations with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA), the main financial source of the project. The MFA is familiar with the content of the seminars and well informed of the development of the project.[84] MFA has observed the project with great interest; Norwegian officials often visited the Nansen Group in Pristina until its closure due to NATO bombing and currently visit all NDCs whenever they are in the region. The MFA foresees financing NDCs at least for a few years more unlike the habitual financial aid provided for a year or so. Close relations and contact between the Norwegian agencies relating to the project have become a strong foundation for maintaining and developing the project.

It is also important to have a critical perspective on the project. Dialogue training programme is not a panacea for everybody and everything. Dialogue does not always occur between everyone participating in the seminars. Sometimes the attitude of the participants remains reserved during the seminars in order to avoid confrontation with others and not to 'make things awkward'.[85] One of the participants in Group 15 simply said that 'I wanted to say a lot of things to what the others said in the classroom. But we are only staying here for a short while so I do not want to have an argument. I just want to enjoy it while I am here.'[86] The participants indeed regarded it a good holiday as all their expenses for travel, accommodation, food and a little spending money are paid for them, given consideration of the price differences between Norway and the Balkan states. While most of the participants seem to have made good use of the seminars by learning something subsequently, some participants retained their

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[84] One of the lecturers in the initial phase of the Lillehammer seminars, Jan Braathu, later took a job as a senior officer in MFA.
[85] From informal conversation with the participants in Group 15 and evaluation of the other groups. E-mail correspondence with Sørlie Røhr on 4th May 2004.
[86] From informal conversation with one of the participants.

reserved attitude in the communication with the other participants. Some alumni subsequently lost touch with the networks. In the end, break-down of psychological barriers and development of personal relationships tends to depend much on the individuals in the groups and on the degree of trust they gain in each other.[87]

Even though the participants used this opportunity to have dialogue with other people, its application to the actual hostile inter-ethnic context of their own communities is another story. Because the seminars are held far away from home, the experience there can seem detached from the reality at home. The deconstruction of enemy images may occur among individuals attending at the seminars, however, collective enemy images of the other groups may not be so easily broken down facing the real situation in the local communities.

There are some slight concerns that the future direction of project development and expansion of the project may limit the potential of the project. Now the focus of the Nansen Dialogue Project is on NDCs in the region and the participants of the Lillehammer seminars are hoped to relate to NDCs in their home town after the seminars. No follow-up seminars for all alumni are planned in the future and individual follow-up is now the responsibility of the NDCs, so that the connection to the networks of the Lillehammer alumni would be through NDCs. The NDCs so far have maintained the networks between each other. However, this is not much support for individual connections formed in Lillehammer beyond borders, which seem likely to be lost. Also there is a concern that alumni who are not involved in NDCs' activities may fall off from the networks.[88] As the Balkan Dialogue Project stresses NDCs, flexibility, one of the original features, seems to be diminishing. In other words, there is a risk that the project focus on NDCs could hinder other kind of ideas to develop among the participants and alumni of the Lillehammer seminars.

Other concerns relate to changes in the dialogue training seminars themselves. One visible change in the seminars is the length of the seminars. As the seminars have varied in length, a few shorter seminars have been noticeable in recent years. One of the reasons why they are still held in Lillehammer rather

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[87] E-mail correspondence with Sørlie Røhr.
[88] It should be noted that some follow-up efforts are made. For example, an opportunity of gathering was organised for the alumni of the 15th seminar in July 2004.

than somewhere in the Balkan is due to the aim of providing a secure space for dialogue and to create human bonds. In this sense, shortening the seminar period cannot be recommended. The shorter the seminar is, the more reserved the attitude the participants exhibit. It is questionable whether the bonds between them and their experiences can be strong enough to motivate them to do something in their own communities after the seminars.

Also there is a slight concern in the seminar management. There is no doubt that the seminars are still well organised and coordinated. However, sometimes management of human relations between the participants is required when divisions between individuals become so distinctive especially related to their ethnic backgrounds. Bryn, the project director of the seminars, has taken a role by providing facilitation when needed. [89] However, now he is heavily involved in the overall Nansen Dialogue Project, being a facilitator or a lecturer at NDCs and taking a consulting role for them. He is so busy and travels very often to the Balkans that it is doubtful whether he could spend sufficient time with the participants in Lillehammer to provide delicate care.[90] It is not certain whether this will affect the overall project or not and this concern may be well unfounded as Heidrun Sørlie Røhr, Pedagogical Coordinator, and Vanja Petoric, Project Coordinator for the programme, are present most of the seminar period and constantly interact with participants and monitor the seminars at Nansen Academy.[91] Nevertheless, he is quite a character and it would be a pity if the dialogue training programme loses his human touch.

There is little doubt that the programme has provided a rare opportunity for most of the participants not only to gain knowledge on conflict or skills on its peaceful transformation, but also to meet and talk with people from the other side(s) of conflict face to face. The project has resulted in many of the participants starting to work for social change by themselves in their communities after the seminar, which is in itself a remarkable achievement. It is unknown whether the process will be self-sustainable, however, it is certain that

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[89] Interview with Bryn.

[90] 'Schedule for Steiner Bryn', in Nansen Academy, Annual report autumn 1999-2000.

[91] The Project Management is well aware of this concern and discussing the take appropriate measures. For example, Erik Cleven of Conflict Management Center replaced Bryn for one whole seminar in early 2004, as Bryn was away for another commitment. (E-mail correspondence with Sørlie Røhr.)

the continuity of efforts by the interveners has provided adequate support for the process.[92] So far the project can be regarded as having a positive effect on conflict transformation. Nevertheless, it requires a further observation to see the effect of this project on bottom-up conflict transformation in Bosnia.

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[92] As the requirement of the 18th seminar of 'regional cooperation' seminar suggests, it seems to have proven that some timely intervention may still needed. (Nansen Academy, Annual Report 2002)

Map 7.1 The Location of Nansen Dialogue Centers (NDCs)

AUSTRIA

Ljubljana
SLOVENIA

HUNGARY

Pecs

Zagreb

Osijek

VOJVODINA

ROMANIA

Novi Sad

CROATIA

Banja Luka

Bihac

BOSNIA
AND
HERZEGOVINA

Tuzla

Belgrade

Pale

SERBIA

Sarajevo

YUGOSLAVIA

BUL.

Adriatic
Sea

Moster

MONTENEGRO

Mitrovica

Pristina

KOSOVO

ITALY

Dubrovnik

Herzeg Novi

Podgorica

ALBANIA

Skopje

The Balkan States
The main political divisions of
the former Yugoslavia.

MACEDONIA

GREECE

Table 7.1 Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution: The Seminar Participants' Place of Residence

	Bosnia	Kosovo	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Croatia	Slovenia	Refugees	Others	Total
Group 1 (Autumn 1995)	9	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	13
Group 2 (Winter 1996)	5	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	1	16
Group 3 (Autumn 1996)	4	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	3	14
Group 4 (Winter 1997)	5	3	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	14
Group 5 (Autumn 1997)	6	3	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	15
Group 6 (Winter 1998)	8	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	16
Group 7 (Autumn 1998)	5	4	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	12
Group 8 (Jan.-Mar.1999)	2	8	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	15
Group 9 (Sep.-Nov. 1999)	6	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	12
Group 10 (Nov.-Dec. 1999)	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	0	1	14
Group 11 (Jan.-Feb. 2000)	1	3	1	4	3	0	0	0	1	13
Group 12 (Mar.-Apr. 2000)	3	3	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	13
Group 13 (Sep.-Nov. 2000)	6	0	0	1	2	1	0	2	0	12
Group 14 (Jan.-Mar. 2001)	3	0	0	1	2	4	0	0	0	10
Group 15 (June 2001)	6	3	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	17
Group 16 (Sep.-Nov. 2001)	3	3	2	0	2	1	0	0	1	12
Group 17 (Jan.-Mar. 2002)	5	3	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	14
Group 18 (April 2002)*	0	7	4	0	3	0	0	0	N/A	14
Group 19 (Sep.-Dec. 2002)	0	6	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	13
Group 20 (Feb.-Apr. 2003)	4	6	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	14
Group 21 (Apr.-May 2003)	6	2	2	1	1	2	0	0	1	15
Group 22 (June 2003)**	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
Group 23 (Oct.-Dec. 2003)	1	2	4	2	2	2	0	0	2	15
Total	90	67	55	28	35	22	2	2	17	318

*It needs to be noted that the seminar for Group 18 was not the conventional seminar of this project but with the strategic purpose of promoting regional cooperation in the South Balkan area, namely South Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The seminar was participated by the staff of NDCs and some alumni in the areas, and the Balkan Dialogue Project Management team in the Norwegian side.

**Group 22 was a one- week seminar specifically for the politicians from South Serbia.

Source: Nansen Academy, Annual Reports from 1995-2003

Appendix 7.1 Nansen Dialogue Mission Statement

•**NANSEN DIALOGUE** will, through applying the ideas and skills of dialogue, empower people who live in conflict situations to contribute to peaceful conflict transformation, and democratic development with promotion of human rights.

•**NANSEN DIALOGUE** is marked by the wish to provide a neutral and open space where the different actors in a serious conflict can meet face to face in truthful and honest communication. The aim is to breakdown enemy images, as well as to increase understanding of each other's positions, interests and needs. Facilitators and lecturers try to stimulate the cognitive analysis of the conflict itself and the experience of "the other's" position. The focus is s not on who is right or the most guilty, but on how to build respect for democratic principles, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution for future improvement of society. These principles are to be an alternative political organisation to national chauvinism and ethnic loyalty.

Appendix 7.3 Guidelines for Dialogue Facilitators

1)Neutrality

Facilitators are not to take sides, nonetheless, to create a safe space, it is important to set out certain rules and standards such as respect for democratic principles and human rights as well as intolerance to glorification of violence.

2) It is not enough to be right.

On conflict, plenty of materials in both written and lived history can be found to justify the groups' claim in all sides. Therefore, if one group's claim is right does not necessarily mean the other groups' claim is wrong. Instead of focusing on who is right, for example, to possess the territory historically, focus should be on how to build a common future that gives everybody equal rights and opportunities.

3) There are always more than two sides in a conflict.

Conflict is not just fought between two hostile parties, but the dynamics affected by other so-called 'third-parties' including various international bodies with various different interests.

4) Humour

Even in extreme conflict situation, people can joke about serious issues surrounding them. Those sense of humour including black humour can be a survival skill under circumstance.

5) Creativity

Since it is often the case that people get stuck in their own unique solution to the conflict, to exercise the mind in alternative solutions is important part of dialogue work.

6) From position to interests.

Focusing on interests instead of rigid positions such as official line of group policies through dialogue, it is easier for people to see that they actually have more common than they think.

Summarised from *'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution': A Joint Project: Nansen Academy. Lillehammer, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Red Cross, Annual Report autumn 1999-autumn 2000,* 2000, pp 5-7.

Appendix 7.2 The Structure of the Nansen Dialogue

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
                    │     Nansen Dialogue Steering Committee            │
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        │              │                  │                  │              │
┌───────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐
│ Norwegian     │ │ Fridtjof     │ │ Norwegian Red    │ │ Peace Research     │
│ Church Aid    │ │ Nansen       │ │ Cross            │ │ Institute,         │
│ (NCA)         │ │ Academy      │ │ (NRC)            │ │ Oslo (PRIO)        │
└───────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └────────────────────┘
        │                │                                         (1998-20032)
┌───────────────┐       │
│               │  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Peace Voyage  │  │              Nansen Dialogue Project                     │
│               │  │  ┌──────────────────┐              ┌──────────────────┐  │
└───────────────┘  │  │ Dialogue Training│              │ Nansen Dialogue  │  │
                   │  │ Programme        │   ┌────────┐  │ Centers          │  │
                   │  │ "Democracy, Human│ ◁ │Funding │ ▷│ (NDCs)           │  │
                   │  │ Rights and       │   └────────┘  │                  │  │
                   │  │ Peaceful CR"     │              └──────────────────┘  │
                   │  └──────────────────┘                                    │
                   └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
                              │ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA)│
                              └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
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
Chapter 8   *Case Study II*: An Attempt of Inter-Religious Dialogue – The CSIS Project in the Former Yugoslavia

Introduction

Religion has often been considered a contributor to the escalation of conflict rather than as a promoter of peace and conflict transformation. In history war and violence occurred in the name of religion and many recent intrastate conflicts are also fought between peoples with different religious beliefs. Although it may be problematic to assert religion to be a major cause of conflict, it would not be deniable that religion can contribute to the escalation of conflict, as it is used to manipulate and mobilise people towards war. Unfortunately, Bosnia is one of those conflicts in which religion plays a negative role, although the degree of its contribution is much debatable.[1]

Despite the negative record of religion's contribution to conflict or maybe because of it, it is relatively recent that the role of religion as a promoter of peace and conflict resolution has begun to be recognised.[2] Religions are considered to appeal to people deep in their minds and fundamentally share the basic value of peace or love to human kind. Religious people started to realise their potential as a catalyst of conflict transformation and peace and the importance of working with

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[1] Apart from the statements signed by the leaders of religious communities in Bosnia calling for an end of war and cessation of ethnic cleansing, religion's role in ending hostility was very limited. For more, see Douglas Johnston and Jonathan Eastvold, ,'Religion in Bosnian Conflict', in Harold Coward and Gordon Smith (eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding (the unofficial title)*, SUNY Press, Forthcoming. (obtained at http:// www.icrd.org/docs/Bosnia.html) (accessed 27 May 2003) Paul Mojzes (ed), *Religion and the War in Bosnia*, Scholars Press, 1998. G. Scott Davis, *Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia*, Routledge, 1996. R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, Chapter 2. Larry A. Dunn, 'The Roles of Religion in the Former Yugoslavia', *Religion in Eastern Europe*, Volume XVI, Number 1, February 1996. Alexander Mirescu, 'Religion and Ethnic Identity Formation in the Former Yugoslavia', *Religion in Eastern Europe*, Volume XXII, Number 1 February 2003. (The articles in *Religion in Eastern Europe* are available at
http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/03index.html)
[2] For example, Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds.), *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, NY, Oxford University Press, 1994. Edy Korthals Altes, Challenge to Religions form Confrontation to Cooperation , WG3 Proffered Paper, 50th Pugwash Conference on Eliminating the Cause of War, Queens College, Cambridge, 3-8 August 2000. Appleby, op. cit.

people from other religions to utilise its potential.[3] In fact religious actors are active in the field. While the most visible work is that of developmental programmes and humanitarian assistance by many religiously oriented NGOs, there is more ambitious and practical work for conflict transformation in the religious sphere such as reconstruction, education and training, preventive diplomacy, election monitoring, mediation, non-violent protest, and advocacy for structural reform and by providing or withdrawing moral legitimacy.[4] Overall, those efforts can be categorised as 'religious peacebuilding' and have recently attracted academic attention.[5]

Inter-religious/faith dialogue is generally regarded as being of importance in religious peace efforts. Inter-religious/faith dialogue is dialogue across religious divisions but not necessarily dialogue about religion, religious topics or questions. The latter dialogue is applied even in peace time with the purpose of deepening understanding and building trust and cooperative relations between different religions.[6] In the specific context of protracted conflict in recent years, inter-religious/faith dialogue is considered useful for peaceful conflict transformation. This is because fault lines between disputant parties are often characterised by difference of ethnic identities, including religious beliefs. Inter-religious dialogue functions as inter-group dialogue between opposing groups. The methods of inter-religious/faith dialogue have been applied in conflict areas such as the Middle-East, Northern Ireland, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Balkan region.

In Bosnia, three major ethnic groups in conflict apparently have different religious beliefs; Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslims. There, inter-religious dialogue is practically inter-ethnic dialogue and inter-religious dialogue is one of the major forms of dialogue development by third parties. In this chapter one of the third-party attempts to facilitate dialogue between people with different religious beliefs from Bosnia and other areas of the Former Yugoslavia are examined. Although third-party attempts at inter-religious dialogue in Bosnia are given an initial overview at first in order to grasp the general practice of inter-

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[3] Edy Korthals Altes, op. cit.
[4] Appleby, op.cit., p 211. David Smock, 'Faith-Based NGOs and International Peacebuilding', *USIP Special Report*, no. 76, 22 October 2001.
[5] Appleby, op.cit. Johnston and Sampson, op.cit. USIP, op. cit.
[6] For some examples, see Korthals Altes, op. cit.

religious dialogue, this chapter does not necessarily aim to discuss the role of religion in conflict transformation. Among the diverse practices, the case examined in this chapter is not typical of what is known as inter-religious dialogue or third-party practice as seen in Bosnia or elsewhere in any way. Rather, having inter-religious dialogue as a theme, the attempt aims to bring religious people who are not at the top-level of the religious hierarchies into personal communication with people from the other religious groups. Therefore, the case can be examined as one of the attempts for inter-ethnic dialogue.

8.1 Inter-Religious Dialogue and Conflict Transformation in Bosnia
Practice of Inter-Religious/Faith Dialogue in Bosnia

The most visible kind of inter-religious dialogue is the facilitation of dialogue between high-level religious leaderships in order to influence the hierarchies of the religious communities. This is the most conventional practice of inter-religious dialogue, aiming to produce a joint action on behalf of peace, such as joint statements. Because those are high-level interactions in the religious sphere, this sort of inter-religious dialogue is called the 'elite leadership model'.[7] There are some efforts for inter-religious dialogue of the elite leadership model in Bosnia. For example, from the mid-1990s the World Conference on Religion and Peace(WCRP) facilitated dialogue between the leaders of the four major religious communities in Bosnia; Roman Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, Muslim and Jewish communities. This dialogue led to the joint issue of the 'Statement of Shared Moral Commitment' and the establishment of the Inter-Religious Council to promote further inter-religious cooperation in 1997.[8] Also in the same year the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a closed-door meeting for the Bosnian religious leaders with United States Ambassador Swanee Hunt in Vienna.[9] The Appeal of Conscience Foundation

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[7] Appleby, op. cit.
[8] WCRP, *Interreligous Cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Proven Model of Partnership*, WCRP, undated. Joseph R. Truesdale IV, *The Development of Interreligious Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Program Activities of the WCRP Field Office in Sarajevo: A brief Chronology of Major Events from 1993-2000*, Commissioned by the World Conference on Religion and Peace, September 2000.
[9] WCRP, White Paper , unpublished draft, undated, p 15.

also sponsored several conferences between the religious leaders in Bosnia and nearby countries and managed to issue the declaration.[10]

There are efforts for inter-religious dialogue at less high-level personnel in the religious hierarchies. Those efforts in Bosnia did not necessarily wait for the official religious collaboration by the high-level religious leaders mentioned above. Some efforts predated manifestation of the official inter-religious joint actions. They are in various forms. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the US conducted a project of conflict resolution training for religious people in the Former Yugoslavia since 1995. Although some seminars are with participants from a single religious community, others are designed to create the opportunities for inter-religious encounter with an emphasis on dialogue. USIP organised a conference titled 'Religion and the Future of Intercommunal Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslavia' in 1997, gathering scholars, clerics, journalists and others. The participants included the representatives from various religious communities in the area of the Former Yugoslavia and the conference was intended to encourage dialogue among the religious communities and to discuss the future of religion and inter-religious relationships in the areas of the Former Yugoslavia including Bosnia. Also there have been study groups on religious issues and questions or scripture and sacred text to be opportunities for inter-religious dialogue. WCRP sponsored a forum bringing together human rights scholars and theologians to discuss the right to freedom of religious practice in 1998. This multi-religious gathering resulted in the publication of some papers and journals.[11] Another example is the unique project 'Pontanima' Choir by Face to Face Interreligious Service in Sarajevo.[12] This project is initiated and managed by locals not by third parties, but it is worth mentioning here because of its unique approach to inter-religious dialogue and reconciliation. The choir was founded in 1996 at Sarajevo, composed of people from all faiths. The choir has performed music from the Christian (Catholic,

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[10] Arthur Schneier, 'Religion and Interfaith Conflict: Appeal of Conscience Foundation', in David R. Smock (ed.), *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002, pp 105-114.
[11] See details for WCRP's website about its project in Bosnia.
(http://www.wcrp.org/RforP/TEXT_INDEXPAGE.htm)
[12] http://www.progressive-bih.com/ociuoci/english/ponta.htm

Orthodox and Protestant), Jewish, Islamic, and Far Eastern religions. The choir gradually developed to perform different religious music, with the principles and standards of ecumenical dialogue.[13] Having endured through difficult times, Pontanima regularly performs in Sarajevo and has held more than 125 concerts throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and been to international concert tours in several other counties all over the world.[14]

Does the Practice of Inter-Religious Dialogue Really Mean Dialogue?

Inter-religious dialogue is one of the major focuses of third-party efforts for inter-ethnic dialogue development in Bosnia. Nevertheless, what is called 'inter-religious/faith dialogue' is diverse in its practice. It can take such forms as meetings, conferences, seminars, workshops, trainings, study groups or activity groups. Facilitation of inter-religious dialogue can also have various purposes, targeting any parts of religious communities. The elite leadership model seems the most conventional practice in third-party intervention. Because it targets the top of the religious hierarchies, wide and effective influence on the religious communities and general population can be expected. In fact, those dialogue efforts at high-level in Bosnia, though symbolic, seem to have laid the stable foundation of further constructive interactions between the religious communities.

While the so-called 'inter-religious dialogue' of the elite leaderships admittedly has made some contributions for conflict transformation and peacebuilding in Bosnia, it can be assumed that the actual communicative interactions between individuals might have been quite diplomatic and tactful rather than open and frank.[15] In those settings people are required to take part in the interactions as the representatives of the religious communities rather than the individuals from different ethno-religious communities. Certain disputed topics may be avoided or interaction may become bargaining in order to gain greater control on

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[13] For details of its development, see http://www.peacevox.com/spoken_music_pontamina.htm
For some participants' view at http://www.charitywire.com/00-01425.htm
[14] The choir has visited Austria, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Italy and the United States.
[15] David Steele, 'Contributions of Interfaith Dialogue to Peacebuilding in the Former Yugoslavia', in Smock (ed.), op. cit, p 77.

the outcomes. Therefore, it is doubtful how much interactions between religious leaders in inter-religious dialogue of elite leadership model were real dialogue beyond diplomatic exchange or bargaining. Obviously that is not necessarily something to criticise as various projects have different purposes. Nevertheless, it appeared to be that what is generally described as 'religious/interfaith dialogue' overall does not necessarily mean what this study means by dialogue, that is, genuine communicative interaction in a constructive manner.

The efforts for less high-level inter-religious dialogue show more variety in their approach, so that it would be inappropriate to discuss them in a comprehensive manner. Among those efforts, this chapter chooses to examine the project of conflict resolution training for religious people by CSIS. This project is unique as inter-religious dialogue in the sense that the seminars attempted to facilitate dialogue between the individuals with different religious beliefs without letting the focus slip away from inter-group relations, conflict, or related issues. Its religious orientation indeed affected the operation of the project and the methods of the seminar management, nonetheless, dialogue at each seminar in this project was never meant to be interaction between the religious communities unlike the conventional inter-religious dialogue. Another important point that needs to be mentioned is that the project was not a one-off event but continued for a certain period of time. Therefore, the CSIS project for inter-religious dialogue fulfils the criteria of the case studies set out in Chapter 6.[16] Although the project widely covered not only Bosnia but also the other areas of the Former Yugoslavia, this analysis will especially focus on its progress in Bosnia.

8.2 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia'
The Background of the Project

The project 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia' was initiated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a non-governmental research institute in

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[16] See pp 146-7.

Washington D.C., United States.[17] Established in 1962, CSIS is a non-partisan public policy institute dedicated to policy analysis and impact on international issues on interdisciplinary basis. The institute is committed to generating strategic analysis, exploring contingencies, analysing policy options, exploring contingencies and making policy recommendations over a wide range of global policy issues in such fields of international politics, economics, security and governance. Practically CSIS's overall work is three-fold; by generating strategic analysis through fostering scholarship, by convening policymakers and leaders from government, the private sector and academics, and building structures for policy action to mobilize government and private sector leaders into concrete action.[18] The CSIS is a well-established institute and its alumni include distinctive scholars as well as diplomats and policy makers.[19]

The project 'The Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia' is part of CSIS's Preventive Diplomacy Program. In the early 1990s, the CSIS conducted research on the role of religious actors in the peaceful conflict transformation.[20] This scholarly examination led to the Preventive Diplomacy Program started in 1994 at CSIS with Joseph V. Montville, an expert of track-two diplomacy, as the Program Director.[21] In this vein, the project of conflict resolution training for religious people in the former Yugoslavia became one of the first projects undertaken by the Program.

Supervised by the Program Director, the project was practically designed and managed by the project director David Steele.[22] Steele himself is a religious person with work and research experience in the area of the Former Yugoslavia prior to working for the project. He holds a PhD in Christian Ethics and Practical Theology and being an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ. Apart from the

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[17] General information, refer to its website http://www.csis.org/
[18] 'How Does CSIS Implement This Mission?', http://www.csis.org/html/csismiss.html#implement
[19] The alumni includes Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, and Ehud Barak, the former Israeli prime minister. The list of distinctive alumni is available at http://csis.org/html/alumni/index.html
[20] The result of this research was published as Johnston and Sampson (eds.), op. cit.
[21] CSIS, 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia: A Project Proposal for the McKnight Foundation', 20 June 2000.
[22] Steele is one of the contributors in Johnston (ed.),op. cit.

research as CSIS, he had worked on the Balkan Peace Initiative under the auspices of the Mennonite Central Committee and the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden. During this previous assignment, he had already been engaged in facilitation of interfaith dialogue in the region of Former Yugoslavia. He collaborated with a team of people inside and outside CSIS in the project. The project also has strong official and unofficial support from the experts in conflict resolution training and inter-religious dialogue.[23] Douglas Johnston, the executive vice president of CSIS, was very involved in assisting the project team to assess its performance. The members of the steering committee for the project included the conflict resolution experts from Eastern Mennonite University, such as John Paul Lederach and Cynthia Sampson, and Gerald Shenk, a theologian who has lived and studied in Bosnia and Croatia.

The preparation work for the training project for religious people in community-building and conflict resolution was started in 1994, in the areas of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the situations that the memory of war and suffering was still fresh or on-going, distrust between the religious communities in the region was considerably high. Therefore, the credible contact in the religious communities in the areas was considered important for the initiation of the project. Local religious leaders and communities were informed and brought to support the initiation of the project. In addition to making local contacts, some other preparation work was necessary including designing seminar agendas according to the local context and needs.

Project Description/Design

The project is a series of training seminars in conflict resolution and problem-solving, targeting especially religious people and community leaders in the Former Yugoslavia. Each seminar is usually a three-day event held in the areas, initially Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and later Montenegro, Kosovo and

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[23] David A. Steele, 'Status Report: {PRIVATE }Conflict Resolution Training for Religious Representatives from the Former Yugoslavia', August 8, 1996. (to be referred as 'Status Report, 1996' below.)

Macedonia, attended by approximately thirty participants in each time.[24] Most of the seminars are intended to be inter-religious including participants from different ethno-/ religious orientation.

The project is designed to promote healing and reconciliation among religious people in order to reconstruct inter-group relations and provide skill trainings to implement concrete projects for peacebuilding and community-building. The seminars are categorised as either Level 1, 2 or 3 according to their content intending to address one of the strategic purposes; reconstruct the inter-group relations, skill training of problem-solving and communication, and assessment of the role of religious communities in peacebuilding in their societies.[25] The level 1 seminar is designed to assist the participants in healing the relationships deteriorated by the experience of war and ethno-religious nationalistic hostility, and in promoting reconciliation across ethno-religious lines. The participants are encouraged to share their personal experience of suffering through storytelling. While all of their diagnosis, conclusion or perception is not necessarily accepted, sensitive and compassionate attention is given to legitimate emotions such as pain, grief for loss, anger, fear for present and future and hope expressed in their stories. Then, the more analytical approach is brought in to deconstruct stereotypes of 'others' and to start re-humanising them. The participants consider the basic human needs of own group and those of others through role play to identity values, concerns, fears and intentions of other groups. In addition, the issues such as acknowledgement of wrong doing and wrong attitude of own groups, forgiveness, and justice are addressed. The level 2 seminar provides trainings for the religious people to develop skills of communication and problem solving, and to discuss concrete peacebuilding projects to implement. In the seminars the real issues and problems in their societies are brought out, the participants map out the needs, interests or fears of concerned parties, and discuss possible solutions and concrete plans for action. The level 3 seminar is to help people assess the ways in which religious communities can assist their societies. In the seminar it is discussed how the religious communities can offer

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[24] CSIS, op. cit, 2000, p 5.
[25] Ibid.

support to the societies to face the issues of structural change in order to facilitate civil society initiatives in reconciliation and justice. The primary format of all seminars involves small group discussion with exercises designed to stimulate creative interaction between the participant interactions. Presentations by the facilitators are to stimulate the interactions further by bringing in critical aspects of inter-personal and inter-group dynamics from the fields of psychology, social anthropology, and theology.[26] Throughout the seminars regardless of their levels, religious ritual and traditions are to be utilised to constructively express their grief and promote healing.

Selection of the seminar participants is an important aspect of the project design. There are some criteria for determine the participants.[27] Firstly potential participants need to be interested in interfaith dialogue, reconciliation and peacebuilding as it is expected that committed people learn more and influence others when they return to their communities after the seminars. Second the project considers people who belong to so-called 'middle-level' in the hierarchies of their religious communities as potential participants. The 'middle-level' is understood as the religious leaders in the local communities but not highest of their religious hierarchies. This level of people are considered able to influence their communities upwards as well as downwards. Thirdly the representation of the participants in the seminars is made close to that of their societies, although consideration is given not to make the minority participants so small that they feel intimidated. Fourthly half of the participants are to be clergy and half are to be laity that should include as many women as possible. The project perceives that laity, especially women, are more open and ready to sharing own experience. Finally members of religious hierarchies are to be consulted for the recruitment of the participants. They are asked for recommendation although no one religious community has been allowed to have predominant influence over the participants' selection.

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[26] CSIS, Seminar With Catholic Church In BiH, information paper, October 1997.
[27] David Steele, 'Inter-Faith Dialogue as a Means to Healing and Empowerment of Religious Communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina', Draft Paper, Conducting Dialogue for Peace: A Symposium on Best Practices, November 12 2002, p 7. (to be referred as 'Draft Paper' below)

8.3 Development of the Project

Development of the Seminars

The first seminar was held at Bizovac, Croatia, in February 1995. Since then more than 35 seminars have been facilitated in the areas throughout the Former Yugoslavia.[28] Initially having started in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, the project geographically expanded to Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro over the years. The seminar was originally planned as a two- to three-day event but it was extended to three to four days.[29] The number of participants in each seminar varied. Usually having about 30 participants, some of them attended only a part, by sessions or by day, of the 3-4 day seminars.

At the beginning of the project, much more background work was needed than expected including building contacts, designing seminar agendas and developing the CSIS staff and local consultants into a smooth functioning team of facilitators. Some of this work needed to continue for the duration of the project. Although the project had already achieved some support from parts of the local religious communities by the time the project started to hold seminars, the efforts to gain more local recognition and involve more regional and sectarian parts of the local religious communities needed to be continued.[30]

The project structures had gone though various modifications over the years. Instead of the initial project design of the three-level seminars, the five-tiered approach was developed from relationship building, identity formation, problem-solving, leadership training and examination of the role of religious communities in peacebuilding in their societies. (Figure 8.1) As the main practical focus was on problem-solving where people identify and develop models of conflict resolution for dealing with local disputes, the seminars were supposed to step up from the relationship-building in level 1, problem-solving in level 2 and bringing out commitment from the religious communities in level 3 in the initial three-level plan. However, in practice it turned out that much more time was needed to help people

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[28] About the groundwork for the geographical expansion, see 'David Steele Travels to Yugoslavia during Elections', *Preventive Diplomacy News*, CSIS, December 2000.
(http://www.csis.org/prevdip/news_0012.htm)
[29] Steele, Status Report,{PRIVATE } 1996.
[30] Ibid.

215

cope with loss and grief, fear, and anxiety accompanied with the war and the problems in the post-war situation.[31] After the initial few seminars it became clear especially in Bosnian that it was not feasible to move the seminars from the relationship-building stage to the problem-solving stage as quickly as the organisers hoped.[32] This is also expressed in the fact that a planning meetings to be held prior to the seminars turned out generally not possible for people in Bosnia. For most of the people, there were hardly any occasion for inter-religious gathering since the beginning of wars. Due to the psychological barriers that existed between peoples, coming together with the other peoples just to plan for the seminars was unrealistic so that the consultation with locals before the seminars needed to be conducted in some other ways.[33]

Figure 8.1   CSIS 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia': Change in Approaches

Three-Level Approach

Five-Tiered Approach

Level 1: Relationship Building

Level 2: Problem-Solving

Level 3: Religious Community and
Peacebuilding

1)Relationship Building
2)Identity Formation(Single Confessional)
3)Problem-Solving
4)Leadership Training
5)Religious Community and Peacebuilding

As a result, about two-third of the seminars held were the relationship building seminars referred to initially as Level 1 seminar. Although not originally planned, several single-confessional seminars mainly focused on identity formation were facilitated with the recognition of the need to step back and examine the internal dynamics of each religious community.[34] The single-confessional seminar was introduced in the project at the request of various local religious organizations

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[31] Appleby, op. cit., p 243.
[32] Steele, Status Report,{PRIVATE } 1996{PRIVATE }.
[33] Ibid.{PRIVATE }
[34] Steele, Draft paper, 2002, p 5. CSIS, op. cit, 2000, p 7-6.

related to the project.[35] With the participants from the same religious tradition, the single-confessional seminars on such issues as identity formation and dynamics of conflict reached out to more conservative people in the religious communities who are yet reluctant to take part of inter-religious events.[36] The difficulty of the relationship building seemed also to have affected the problem-solving seminars applicable to Level 2 seminars in the initial project structure. Even in the problem-solving seminars part of the relationship-building seminar was repeated and expanded. Although this is partly for the benefit of some first-time participants who are new to the seminar of this project[37] it seems to indicate that the relationship-reconstruction aspects required to be elaborated further beyond the first seminars. Also two international seminars for the participants from Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia were held in Hungary at Pec, in November 1996 and at Mohac December 1997 for the purpose of leadership training.[38] The first seminar had more than 50 participants and generally aimed to enhance the accuracy of perceptions among the participants from different countries. The second one was more specifically for developing the local capacity to take initiatives locally with a small number of participants. And finally the seminar to examine the religious communities' potential role for peacebuilding and social transformation is applicable to the Level 3 seminar in the initial project design. This was considered to be a further extra step from the problem-solving. However, in fact, there was only one seminar held in Croatia in March 2000 throughout the entire project.

The seminars themselves are conducted as a participatory process by the participants not just a process instructed by the facilitators. The relationship building seminar is unique in its methodology starting from an exchange of people's own experiences in order to deal with the sense of victimisation caused by the war and conflict. Through 'storytelling' the participants are given an opportunity to tell their

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[35] CSIS, 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, A Project Proposal for the C. S. Mott Foundation', December 10, 1996. (to be referred as 'Project Proposal, 1996' below.)
[36] Steele, Draft paper, 2002, p 14.
[37] Ibid, p 16.
[38] Ibid., p 17-19.

own stories and suffering that are acknowledged by the others.[39] This dialogical exchange helps the participants to deal with their own trauma, which becomes a crucial starting point for stepping towards reconciliation and reconstruction of inter-ethnic relationships. The initial facilitators' tasks included providing sensitive and compassionate attention to legitimate emotions of loss or grief and creating a safe space for this dialogue to occur. The facilitators did not have much problem in promoting this initial process as the religious people are relatively familiar with facing people's emotions, rather than 'playing mind or word games', in such a space for dialogue.[40] The sharing here is considered not just with people present but also with their god.[41] The fact these seminars were religiously oriented may have made the process more feasible. This dialogue oriented methodology is utilised beyond the relationship building seminar.

Throughout the project, a small number of enthusiastic people were repeatedly invited to successive seminars because it was believed that they would be a catalytic influence on first-time participants.[42] As the project evolved support from these people became invaluable for the further development and expansion of the project.

From Follow-Up to Local Capacity Building

The seminars were designed to get the participants to discuss real problems, possible solutions and potential roles the participants themselves can practically take for those solutions. Some participants in fact took some initiatives by themselves in the local communities after the seminars. Follow-up measures were essential to nurture those local initiatives to flourish. However, admittedly follow-up was not done effectively at the initial stage. For example, the possible formation of the religious mediation team for a new joint water system between the Muslim community of Fojnica and the Croat community of Kiseljak was discussed at the

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[39] Empathic listening is considered essential for the reconciliation process. Smock, op.cit.
[40] Steele, Draft Paper, p 9.
[41] Ibid., p 9. Steele, in Smock (ed), p 77.
[42] Steele, Draft Paper, p 7.

seminar in Bosnia 1996.[43] Despite promised funding and genuine interest in the idea, it was never implemented. The reason was considered to be the lack of personnel locally present with time and expertise to effectively follow up and support people with the ideas.

Because the project was led by the international team, the local presence turned out to be important regarding the follow-up and implementing aspects. The project maintained local consultants in the target areas from the early stage. Initially, the task of the consultants was to build up a network of religious people, encourage their participation in the seminars, assist implementing the seminars, locally present the results of the seminars to both religious and secular organisations, coordinate the visit of the CSIS staff and implement action plans discussed at the seminars.[44] Later, the consultants themselves developed to be a strong local capacity and worked for follow-up through making telephone calls to the seminar alumni, organising meetings and providing the necessary resources for developing relationships or on action plans.[45] Gradually some enthusiastic local supporters for the project formed core groups and strengthening this existing local capacity became significantly important for the project .

The two leadership training seminars can be considered a response to those needs. These international seminars had originally been planned at the beginning, but abandoned due to the lack of funding. Nevertheless, they were revived by the encouragement from the local consultants to help them establish regional ties. The first seminar was attended by 50 people from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, with representatives from most of the major religious communities.[46] The seminar was conducted in a similar manner and agenda to the conventional relationship-building seminar in this project, aimed at deepening understanding between people as individuals. The second seminar was more focused with the small number of 18

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[43] Steele, in Smock (ed.), 2002, p 85. The municipal leaderships could not agree with the issues due to distrust and suspicion caused from the experience of severe violence in 1993-4 in the area.
[44] Steele, Draft Paper, 2002, p 23.
[45] Steele, in Smock (ed.), 2002, p 85.
[46] David A. Steele, 'Status Report: Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia', July 25, 1997. (to be referred as 'Status Report, 1997' below)

participants.[47] The participants included local CSIS consultants, the local staff of partner organisations and committed alumni of the previous CSIS seminars. The seminar provided them with the training to be facilitators. The local consultants and supporters of the project became a major asset for the project. The strategic objective had shifted from providing local religious people with training in conflict resolution, reconciliation and peacebuilding, to developing local capacity to provide trainings by themselves.

Strategies of Indigenous Capacity Building

The project hoped the seminar participants would carry out constructive functions in the reconstruction of their communities after the seminars by solving specific problems, promoting positive values or healing, or helping and encouraging communication between the peoples. Although the facilitation of seminars remained the main activity in the project, the activities for local capacity building developed to be another important part of the project over the years.

As the project progressed and expanded, two specific strategies for local capacity building were developed; institution building and the development of working groups. The idea of institutional building developed at the seminar alumni's gatherings over coffee in Serbia after the seminar at Valjevo in December 1997.[48] The purpose of this kind of meeting was simply to develop relationships between seminar alumni further as a part of follow-up activities, not focusing on specific project implementation. Nevertheless, the committed group of seminar alumni eventually developed the idea of forming an organising committee which resulted in the creation of an institution, the Inter-Religious Center(IRC) in Belgrade. The IRC was officially registered as a NGO in April 2000 with Marijana Ajzenokol, the former local consultant of CSIS, as the director. A similar institution building process was also initiated in Bosnia. Having this development on the ground, strengthening these NGOs and initiating new ones in the other areas became one of the pillars for the indigenous capacity building strategies of the project.

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[47] Steele, Draft Paper, 2002, pp 17-19.
[48] Steele, op. cit., in Smock (ed.), 2002, pp 85-7.

The initiation of mission oriented working groups was the other strategy for local capacity building.[49] Working groups were formed to explore or implement creative options for concrete problems according to the interests and concerns of seminar participants. The issues proposed by them included refugee return, corruption, minority rights, alternative media, religious input in the education system and economic development, formation of inter-religious councils and inter-religious work teams for vulnerable populations including the elderly and children. Initiation of those working groups was sought in the areas where the project had already cultivated trusting relationships with local individuals though seminar facilitation and some working groups took root in the areas of Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo.[50]

After 7 years of work, the CSIS project in the Former Yugoslavia ceased at the end of 2002 as the CSIS previously decided to discontinue its Preventive Diplomacy Program where the project was based. The Project Director, Steele, has been seeking an alternative host institution to continue the project, although the move has not yet been finalised.[51] At the end of the project in 2002 the NGOs newly established in Serbia and Bosnia became fully operational under the locals and have already initiated several of their own projects. In Croatia in the initial few years of the project, the project managed to train and equip local staff in the organisation in Eastern Croatia at the Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights in Osijek that worked with the project in partnership. While this increased the range of the particular NGO's activities, this NGO had a specific geographical focus and was not suitable to take over the work of the project.[52] Instead, a plan to create a new institution in Zagreb was proposed by the seminar alumni. The idea was explored, however, it never reached fruition.[53]

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[49] CSIS, op. cit., 2000, p 8.
[50] David Steele, Final Report on Project titled 'Conflict Resolution Traning for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia', Submitted to the McKnight Foundation, CSIS, 2nd December 2002, p 2. (to be referred as 'Final Report, 2002' below)
[51] Ibid.
[52] The Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights is currently continuing their work in peace building, promotion of human rights and conflict resolution methods. See their website at http://www.canter-za-mir.hu
[53] Steele, Final Report, 2002, p 11.

In Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, where the project started later than in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, some local initiatives originated from the seminar participants, but they seem to have been left relatively vulnerable when the project ceased. Nevertheless, there are also some promising possibilities. In Montenegro, a coordinating group was established and worked on the implementation of some specific project proposed at the seminars or has proposed potential projects, although there was not enough time to develop the networks necessary for the creation of an inter-religious centre. The former CSIS consultant has attempted to continue the project under the auspices of ANIMA, a local partner organisation for the CSIS project.[54] In Kosovo some working groups took root. Apart from that, one of two local consultants was interested in continuing the project by either developing a new NGO or finding an existing institution where the project can be based, however, the prospect has not yet proved promising.[55] In Macedonia the project had difficulty in working due to the lack of funding and the volatile situation in 2001. Nevertheless, the working groups established were interested in continuing their dialogue in possible inter-faith events. In addition, the Presidential office of Macedonia has proposed that Steele develop a conflict resolution project for local community leaders of all ethnic groups in Macedonia.[56]

8.4 Development in the Case of Bosnia
Development of the Seminar Work in Bosnia

Having seen the overall progress of the project, here the operation in Bosnia is intensively examined. In Bosnia initial contacts were through two Franciscan priests from Sarajevo who themselves were committed to inter-faith reconciliation and cooperation.[57] The project director, Steele, travelled to Sarajevo in October 1994 to attend a conference on religion and nationalism. At the conference, Steele met Father Marko Orsolic, the director of a Bosnian interfaith organisation 'Zajedno (Together)' who later invited Steele to meet many leaders in the Sarajevo religious

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[54] Ibid., p 12.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Steele has worked for the political leaders in Montenegro to build a peace accord. CSIS, *Preventive Diplomacy News*, December 2000.
[57] David Steele, Draft paper, p 6.

222

communities. Another was Father Ivo Markovic. Having known him prior to the assignment of CSIS, Steele met Franciscans throughout Bosnia with his help during the trip. Also a good relationship was established with the host institution of the conference, the Academy of Science and Arts in Sarajevo. As the Academy had hosted an inter-religious event prior to the conference and had Muslim leadership at that time, this secular institution became an important partner to host the very first seminar of the project in 1995. The contacts were developed further to local individuals, religious communities as well as to international personnel operating on Bosnia.

The contact and support for the project expanded geographically over Bosnia, which enabled the seminars to be held in wider geographical areas. Eventually five organizations functioned as official cosponsors of the project; Zajedno (the International Center for Promotion of Interreligious Dialogue, Justice, and Peace), the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Sarajevo, the Kiseljak office of CARITAS (a Catholic relief agency), the Franciscan Order and the Prelom Media Center in Banja Luka.[58] Also some other organisations including Mercy Crop International, an international relief organisation, provided strong support for the project in Bosnia. Contact was extended to government officials, journalists, UN troops, OSCE, women's groups, anti-war activists, mental health workers, educators and humanitarian relief workers.[59]

During 1995-2002, 14 seminars held by the project included participants from Bosnia. There were seven relationship building seminars in Bosnia and two problem-solving seminars held in Bosnia and Kosovo. One of the problem-solving seminars was held in Kosovo with one-third of the participants from Bosnia and the other two-thirds from Kosovo.[60] Also three single-confessional seminars were held, one each for Catholic, Muslim and Serbian Orthodox communities. In addition to those seminars, there were two international seminars in Hungary which were participated in by some people from Bosnia. The time and location of the seminars

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[58] CSIS, 'Conflict Resolution Project for Religious People in the Former Yugoslavia', unpublished paper, undated.
[59] David A. Steele, 'Final Report: Conflict Resolution Training for Religious Representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovin'", July 30, 1997. (to be referred as 'Final Report, 1997' below)
[60] This seminar had 11 participants from Bosnia and 24 from Kosovo.

held can be found in Table 8.1. The contents of the seminars are as described in the previous section in this chapter but the necessity of stressing dialogue in order to overcome personal trauma and fear of meeting others seemed more crucial in Bosnia that in the other areas.

Table 8.1 Seminar Schedule in Bosnia: 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia' by CSIS

DATE	LOCATION	THEME
25th-27th April 1995	Sarajevo	Relationship Building Seminar
10-12th October 1995	Visoko	Relationship Building Seminar
27-30th May 1996	Fojnica	Problem-Solving Seminar
11-14th November 1996	Pec(Hungary)	International Leadership Training
17-19th October 1997	Kiseljak	Single-Confessional Seminar on Identity Formation(Catholic)
5-8th December 1997	Mohac(Hungary)	International Leadership Training
30th June-2nd July 1998	Bihac	Relationship Building Seminar
23-25th April 1999	Zavidovic	Relationship Building Seminar
28-30th September 1999	Bugojno	Relationship Building Seminar
3-5th March 2000	Sipovo(RS)	Relationship Building Seminar
2-4th April 2000	Brcko	Relationship Building Seminar
9-11th October 2000	Visegrad(RS)	Single-Confessional Seminar on Identity Formation (Serbian Orthodox)
3-5th April 2001	Sarajevo	Single-Confessional Seminar on Identity Formation (Muslim)
12-14th June 2002	Vushtrri(Kosovo)	Problem-Solving Seminar

All locations are in the Bosnian Federation unless stated. (RS: Republika Srpska)

The project operated with the principle of collaboration with locals. In addition to local organisations or institutions, contact with local religious hierarchies was maintained as support from them was regarded as considerably important. Initially contacts in Bosnia were made with all of the religious communities in Sarajevo, Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish; with a few Protestant communities in Central Bosnia; with Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim communities in Banja Luka; with Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim and Protestant communities in Tuzla; and with Muslim and Catholic communities in the northern region of

Orasje.[61] The project had an initial difficulty in extending to Republika Srpska, because it could not gain cooperation from the Serbian Orthodox Church.[62] Nevertheless, the project eventually obtained the cooperation of Serbian Orthodox Bishop Hrizostom, which did open up the opportunities in Republika Srpska. Eventually the project managed to gain support from the entire Muslim and Catholic leaderships, and some of the Serbian Orthodox bishops, which provided legitimacy to the project. The seminars were held with the hosts of local institutions or individuals, which seemed to have contributed to feelings of local ownerships of the project.

The locations of the seminars in Bosnia were chosen with careful consideration of various factors, including the security situation, accessibility and the preference of the host religious community. Initially the choice of the location was largely affected by the local security situation and possible travel arrangement for the participants because Bosnia was still at war. The second seminar, for example, was held during the war at a school in the Muslim community of Visoko which is only a few hundred meters from the border with the Republika Srpska and one town away from the heart of Croatian-controlled territory in Central Bosnia.[63] After gaining support from a part of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Republika Srpska, Serbian Orthodox Bishop Hrizostom agreed to host two seminars. In the later period 1998-2000 the seminars were held in the locations along with the border between the Federation and Republika Srpska with the aim to facilitate between the peoples from the both entities.

Although planned to be held in the later stage of the project during 2000-2, none of the Level 3 seminars on the commitment of religious communities to peacebuilding and conflict transformation was held in Bosnia after all. This was partly because of the lack of funding and partly because of the Center for Religious Dialogue (CRD) that began to focus on other kinds of activities rather than seminars during the last phase of the project.[64]

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[61] Steele, Status Report{PRIVATE }, 1996.
[62] Ibid., p 20.
[63] Steele, Draft Paper, p 8.
[64] Steele, Final Report, 2002, p 2.

Local Capacity-Building

In Bosnia the core group of supporters for the project was developed from the first seminar held at Sarajevo in 1995 when Bosnia was still at war. They were repeatedly invited to the following seminars. Follow-up seems to have become not only the task of consultants but also of the participants themselves.

In the seminar at Visoko in October 1995, there was an idea for 'organizing the seminar into a formal organisation which would make plans for assisting a postwar Bosnia'.[65] By mid-1997, the CSIS project team started to seriously consider the establishment of a new institution that could continue the work of the project such as conflict resolution training in cooperation with Mercy Crop International.[66] Under the direction of Landrum Bolling, Mercy Corps International conducted several problem solving workshops for its own indigenous staff, municipal leaders and outside monitors and developing an inter-ethnic engineering team to work on a variety of projects throughout Central Bosnia. Mercy Crop also supported local religious communities to promote inter-religious cooperation. The important connection between the CSIS project and Mercy Crop was that they shared local consultant Vjekoslav Saje. As a local consultant of CSIS as well as a consultant on infrastructure development with Mercy Corps International in Sarajevo, Saje was well trained through Bolling's workshops and the seminars by the project and came to assist the facilitation of the seminars.

There were several strategic reasons for the project developing a new institution locally in Bosnia.[67] First, local people were considered better to carry out such trainings rather than international personnel as they are familiar with own cultural background. Second at the time of this decision, no existing institution seemed adequate to carry out the ecumenical conflict resolution seminars for religious people who are not at the top level of the religious hierarchies. While secular institutions were hardly interested in targeting religious communities for

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[65] David A. Steele, Status Report, {PRIVATE }1997.
[66] CSIS, 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People From Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia, A Project Proposal for the McKnight Foundation', June 25, 1997. CSIS, 'Institutional Development for Conflict Resolution Training Among Religious People and Institutions in Bosnia & Herzegovina: A Project Proposal for The United States Institute of Peace', December 24, 1997.
[67] Ibid.

such training, most religious institutions were sectarian by definition and it was considered difficult for them to gain the necessary ecumenical posture for the inter-religious events. Also for the institution to carry out work of the project, it was necessary to gain the credibility to work effectively in both the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic. It was difficult for existing institutions.

At the end of 1998 the project director Steele and the group of local supporters decided to initiate a NGO 'Center for Religious Dialogue'(CRD) which was registered in December 1998 in the Federation and in May 1999 in the Republika Srpska. The group of local supporters which included people from all major religious communities was developed into the advisory board and Saje, the local CSIS consultant, became the Project Director of this new NGO. Since its establishment, CRD worked with CSIS on the project of the inter-religious seminars, gradually taking over administrative responsibilities of the project and co-sponsoring the seminars. After the three-year transitional period, it became independent from CSIS and started to initiate its own projects. For example, with its own local staff CRD led a seminar on conflict resolution for Sarajevo Phoenix, a local women's organisation in March 2001.[68] Or in cooperation with other American NGOs, CRD organised Summer Camps in Sipovo and Banja Luka.[69] Also CRD took part in 'Millennium Rainbow of Mostar', which consisted of the projects of cultural and educational events brought a variety of young theologians in dialogue with people from different traditions and professions.[70] CRD currently continues its work in Bosnia.

8.5 Evaluative Consideration for the Bosnian Case

The Impact on the Participants

It can be regarded that this project for religious people was itself a major achievement simply to bring people from the different ethno-religious backgrounds

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[68] CSIS, 'Significant Breakthroughs in the Former Yugoslavia: Update on Conflict Resolution Training Among Religious Communities', Preventive Diplomacy News, April 16, 2001. (http://www.csis.org/prevdip/news_0104) Steele, in Smock (ed.), p 88.
[69] Steele, Draft Paper, p 21.
[70] Vjokoslav Saje, 'Center for Religious Dialogue Activities and Future Steps Regarding the Dialogue between Different Religious Communities in Bosnia and Hercegovina', Journal of Ecumenical Studies, vol. 39, no. 2, 2002, pp 210-212.

in Bosnia to face to face communication especially on the issues of conflict and their experience. Since the beginning of the war there had not been an inter-religious gathering like this seminar for most of the participants.[71] The organisers were requested by the local organizations and many seminar participants to continue and expand the project, which suggests that the project was generally appreciated.[72] The participants invited to the seminars were originally interested in inter-faith dialogue, so are people with relatively liberal ideas and unlikely to be ultra-nationalists. Nevertheless, in the environment of violence, suspicion, intimidation and hatred, it would have been extremely difficult for even liberal people not to be affected by the stereotypes, propaganda or prejudice. The seminars were opportunities to break such prevailing views.

The project organisers claim to have certainly recognised the attitude changes of the participants from the observations during the seminars and from the written evaluation provided by the participants at the end of the seminars.[73] This claim by the organisers can be considered reliable, because much was expressed by the participants during the seminars. The religious orientation of the seminars allowed the participants to be open and expressive about the realisation on their own misperception, misunderstanding and mistakes. Therefore, it is quite possible that awareness of alternative views, perceptions, ways of thinking among the participants, if not changes in their attitudes, is visible to the project staff and facilitators.

Although limited, some information on written valuation by the participants is available. With the reference to the comments on the Visoko seminar, there are many positive remarks by the participants.[74] The participants generally enjoyed the experience of the seminar where they met and talked with people from the different ethno-religious backgrounds and learned something new. A few people clearly stated that the stereotype or prejudice they had towards the other ethnic/religious groups was broken down during the seminar. One commented that '(i)t was very

[71] Steele, Status Report{PRIVATE }, 1996.
[72] CSIS, Project Proposal, 1996.
[73] Steele, Draft Paper, p 19.
[74] CSIS, 'Comments from the Visoko Evaluations', attached document, undated. This is a collection of the quotation from the participants' written evaluation.

228

effective because of the degree of openness we all reached at the end. We came with prejudices; in the seminar we scratched them, shed them a bit'.[75] Some felt also motivated. One participant stated that '(w)e are not alone in our understanding, wishes and work, ...being together during this seminar gives new motivation to try and continue the work'.[76] The other commented '(i)t helped me very much to realize that I should not focus on my grief too much, because there are always who suffered more, so it is very important to help others'.[77] One of the local consultants considered that 'the three-day seminar succeeded in demonstrating that the rebuilding of some kind of a community is possible, and that the renewal of inter-religious talks is actually very probable'.[78]

Another record of participants' evaluation is available from the international seminar in Pec, Hungary.[79] Although this was an international seminar with the participants from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, the evaluation of the participants on this seminar can be considered sufficiently suitable for assessment here as the seminar contents were not much different from the other non-international seminars in the domestic environment. Most of the people who took part in this evaluation found that seminar generally helpful and stimulating. 21 out of 22 people answered that they would recommend their colleagues and friends to participate in this seminar, and 21 out of 23 answered that they gained the new understating of religious or ethnic groups other than their own. One participant commented that '(m)any experiences (of the other participants) which I heard helped me a lot.', feeling 'the spirit of acceptance[80]' The other felt that he or she had experienced 'that act of reconciliation'.[81]

All the seminars, the relationship building seminars especially, are designed to bring the participants to reassess their perceptions after creating basic trust and bond among the participants by sharing personal experience. Putting an emphasis on

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Sandra Kristic, Report on the Seminar held in Visoko, November 10-12, 1995.

[79] CSIS, Workshop Evaluation: Pecs, Hungary, November 1996.

[80] Ibid. Although the original quote is 'the spirit of *acception*'(Italic added), the word is replaced here as 'the spirit of *acceptance*', assuming its meaning.

[81] Ibid.

how having a faith helped the participants to get through hardships of war, dialogue through storytelling seems to have created and strengthened bound between the participants as the fellow believers and sufferers rather than as the peoples in serious conflict. The analytical approach from basic human needs brings people different perspectives. During the seminar in Sarajevo in 1995, an imam from Zepa expressed that he recognised the same survival needs of the Serbs who shoot his Muslim people when he remembered histories of the Serbs suffered at the hand of Muslims.[82] Although he still felt disgust towards the atrocity inflicted on his fellow Muslims, he became aware that the act of aggression could come from very humanly needs. In this way, the aggressors whom he regarded as evil were humanised in his mind. Usually it is difficult for people to admit inhumane behaviour or wrong-doing by their own ethnic/religious group members. However, such exercises as stepping into the shoes of another groups in identifying their values, concerns, fear or intentions seemed to have helped the participants to understand one another better and to reconsider their own groups' attitude and behaviour towards other groups in reflection. At the seminar in Zavidovici, the Serbian Orthodox participants admitted that their fellow Serbs had killed and maltreated civilians, destroyed the properties including religious buildings and demonstrated a lack of compassion toward the suffering of other ethnic peoples. The Muslim groups acknowledged that some of their people had committed atrocities and that the lack of trust had hardened the attitudes of many Muslims toward the other ethnic groups. The Catholic groups admitted that there had been a flourishing of nationalism and chauvinism among their people and their church had failed to separate itself from Croatian nationalism.[83]

Also the method of 'appreciative inquiry' was used effectively. In the appreciative inquiry, the examples of good behaviour and actions are stressed and elaborated in order to create the appreciative environment. In the single-confessional seminar for the Muslim at Sarajevo in 2001, the initially conversation was held on the terrible suffering of Bosnia and the Muslims including a story by an imam from

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[82] Ibid, p 11. Steele, in Smock (ed.), p 80.
[83] Steele, Draft Paper, p 12.

Srebrenica whose 41 family members were killed in the massacre. As the participants felt sadness and helplessness, the appreciative inquiry approach was brought in by asking the participants to refer to positive and encouraging stories from the past. The imams from the cities of genocide could share the stories about multi-religious life and mutual respect before the war such as helping each other to build local mosques and churches.[84]

While those stories above demonstrate a part of changes in the participants' perceptions and attitudes during the project, it needs to be noted that there were certainly some difficulties in facilitating the inter-religious seminars in the context of Bosnian conflict. For example, at the seminar in Fojnica just after the war, some Catholics registered for the seminar failed to turn up due to the fear of travelling to the Muslim community in the extremely tense atmosphere on the ground.[85] In the international seminar at Pec, Hungary, the Serbian Orthodox Bishop from Sabac came to the seminar to give a speech and stayed only one hour, which generated much negative feelings among the Bosnian participants. This reaction by the Bosnians precipitated the negative responses on the part of those from Serbia, even though that group was primarily non-Orthodox.[86] Or during another seminar, a Serbian Orthodox bishop was very offended when the staff of the Muslim restaurant served him last at lunch.[87] He felt the occurrence was an intentional insult. The facilitators needed to work with the participants dealing with their emotions on such occasions. These incidents demonstrates how fragile the inter-group relationships during and after the war in Bosnia were and how much the facilitators needed to work with care and skill to manage the seminars. Also in the seminars it was often the case that the participants were not positively taking part in some sessions such as brainstorming. The sessions needed to be stimulated and the facilitators with expertise in other conflict areas became helpful by bringing ideas in from other contexts.[88]

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[84] Saje, op. cit.
[85] Steele, Draft Paper, p 16.
[86] Steele, Status Report{PRIVATE }, 1997.
[87] Ibid, p 24.
[88] Ibid, p 25.

The Output of the Seminars

The seminars produced the output in such forms as concrete action plans discussed at the end of the seminars. Obviously not all plans were put into practice, nevertheless, some were successfully implemented after or even during the seminars. There are some examples. In the seminar at Sipovo the problem of wide-spread corruption was identified and the question of how to address this issue was discussed. The seminar participants requested the news media be invited, so that they could call people against corruption. The interviews by the journalists occurred on the last day of the seminar and the participants and leaders explicitly challenged political and religious leaders to address the problem and called upon the citizens to resist colluding with corruption.[89] The interview were aired by the Bosnian Serb TV on prime time. The discussion group on refugee return in the problem-solving seminar at Fojnica later made the practical contribution to safe return of refugees. The head imam of Fojnica successfully advocated for the return of Croatian refugees and also worked in mediating disputes between the returnees and their neighbours.[90] Some other participants in the seminars later performed the observer role by accompanying refugees and displaced persons to prevent violence as they returned to their homes.[91] As a concrete and symbolic effort to bridge the ethno-religious divisions, the seminar in Bihac was concluded with the Serbian Orthodox Bishop of Bihac-Petrovac leading the delegation of the seminar participants including ones from the other religious communities to the Mufti of Bihac for the first time since the war.[92] While there are some successfully implemented action plans from the seminars, one needs to be reminded that more could have been achieved, had there been effective follow-up measures.

Some inter-ethnic and religious networks built among the participants can also be considered output of the seminars. It is not clear how strong or to what extent the networks remained after the seminars as there was no collective follow-up measures for all participants. Nevertheless, some individual connections certainly

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[89] Steele, Draft Paper, p 20. Steele, in Smock, p 74.
[90] Steele, Draft Paper, p 17. Steele, in Smock, p 74. CSIS, Project Proposal, 1996.
[91] Steele, Draft Paper, p 4. Steele, in Smock, p 74.
[92] Steele, Draft Paper, p 5.

232

have remained. Especially the groups of enthusiastic supporters for the project formed after the first seminar in Sarajevo became an informal vehicle for the project operation.[93] Expected to be a catalytic influence on the new-comers for the seminars, those people were repeatedly invited to the seminars. This strategy assumed to have contributed to maintaining connections between the supporters and between them and the project, securing their further involvement in the project. These people provided support to overall operation of the project including follow-ups. They were later joined by some Serbian Orthodox priests from the Republika Srpuska and became members of the advisory board for the newly established institution, CRD.[94]

The Outcome: Potential for Long-Term Effect

Although the project ceased at the CSIS in 2002, the effect of the project on the societies is still not easy to measure. Nevertheless, it would be possible to consider that the remaining local institutions, the Center for Religious Dialogue in the Bosnian case, can be a potential to contribute to social change in a long term. CRD aims at bringing people from the different and the same faith and traditions together to discuss the issues for reconstruction and sustainability of the multi-religious/ethnic communities.[95] CRD has grown to have the capacities to take a large responsibility in organising the CSIS seminars in the last phase of the project and already started its own work independently. Apart from the seminars with CSIS, CRD has implemented some projects previously mentioned.

Although there is provision for further workshops and projects on such issues as refugee return, corruption, development of inter-faith newsletters and establishment of local chapters of the inter-religious council,[96] the future direction of CRD is not so clear. It needs to be noted that the most of the CRD's projects so far are collaboration with some other organisations rather than initiating a project on its own. This does not necessarily seem to suggest the weakness in the capacity of CRD but indeed seems to indicate its unique potential as a contact point between existing

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[93] Steele, Draft Paper, p 23.
[94] Steele, in Smock, p 88.
[95] Saje, op. cit.
[96] Ibid. About Inter-religious Council in Bosnia, refer to Truesdale, op. cit.

religious institutions, that is, the hierarchical structures of each religious community in Bosnia and between religious and secular organisations. The CSIS project had intensive networks with international and local institutions and individuals, so that CRD could relatively easily locate itself within the networks. Being a part of such extensive networks itself is a strong asset. Nonetheless, CRD is yet to build credibility in the overall local religious communities. CRD has acquired recognition and support for its intention and work from the entire Muslim community, however, fail to do so in a part of the Roman Catholic community in Herzegovina and a part of Republika Srpska namely the Serbian Orthodox community.[97] Whether how much and what kind of long-term effect CRD can have on the Bosnian societies still remains to be seen depending on its future development.

Above all less visible but the most valuable asset for potential long-term effect by the project seems to be the individuals empowered by the project. The participants of the project are not necessarily the highest of its religious hierarchies but many of them are leaders or respected persons in the local communities. If the seminars affected those people in the ways they think and behave by introducing the concept of reconciliation and conflict resolution and providing practical skills in the inter-religious/ethnic context, that can be a potential influence on other people in their communities. Some have already started their work. For example, some of the former CSIS consultants actively engaged in peace work in their communities. The former consultant in Sarajevo, Saje, now works as the CRD Director and helped to negotiate the creation of the Inter-religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina in his personal capacity.[98] Being a Catholic himself, Saje gained the personal trust of the Serbian Orthodox Church leader in Bosnia, Metropolitan Nikolaj. By the end of the project, he effectively assisted the seminars and now works with Steele in leading some seminars in the other areas of the Balkan region.[99] Having participated in the Sarajevo seminar, Dr. Said Hukovic, the Former President of the Academy of Science and Arts in Sarajevo, presented conflict resolution theory to the Bosnian Social Democratic Party in the week following the Sarajevo seminar and later wrote

[97] Ibid.
[98] Steele, in Smock (ed.), p 86.
[99] Steele, Final report, 2002, p 7. Steele, Draft Paper, p 23.

234

a book on conflict resolution based on the materials provided at the seminar.[100] He remains active in working on those topic. Father Ivo Markovic, who has been related to the project from the beginning, works as the director of Face to Face Interreligious Service in Sarajevo with the project of the multi-religious choir 'Pontanima' mentioned earlier in this chapter.[101] The experience of the inter-religious seminars has encouraged and empowered some people to start or continue their work for peace, reconciliation, conflict resolution or dialogue in their communities of Bosnia.

Conclusion

Over the years, the CSIS's training project for religious people in the Former Yugoslavia evolved in various ways. One of the modifications was the focus. At the beginning, the project strategically aimed to empower religious people by equipping them with problem-solving skills in order to deal with practical problems in the inter-ethnic/religious context in their communities with the hope of affecting and ultimately mobilising the religious communities. However, in the early phase of the operation, it became clear that the relationship building across the ethno-religious divisions was the key point for the further steps of the project. The reconstruction of inter-ethnic/religious relationships was started from dealing with individuals' psychological aspects including anger, grief or fear, by sharing personal experience and suffering caused by the conflict and wars. It is evident that dialogue was an effective tool for the promotion of this process. Through dialogue, personal tragedy was heard by those who belong to the other ethno-religious groups and the pain was acknowledged by them. Inter-group dialogue certainly contributed to bringing healing and reconciliation between the peoples at the seminars and creating the relationships across the ethnic and religious divisions among the participants. This relationships become the foundation on which they can work together for common purposes regardless of the differences in their ethnic and religious origins.

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[100] Steele, Status Report, 1997, p 8. Steele, Draft Paper, p 20.
[101] Website, http://www.progressive-bih.com/ociuoci/english/ponta.htm

235

The fact that the seminars were religiously oriented seems to have contributed to the promotion of the relationship reconstruction. Each seminar was an event that lasted only for three to four days. It is often difficult to facilitate the intense and constructive interactions enough to rebuild working relationships between deeply divided and traumatised peoples from the environment of violence, hatred and distrust in such short space of time. It is likely that the participants behave diplomatically or maintain reserved attitude in the seminar of short duration. However, the CSIS seminars managed to open up the participants as they share their difficult emotions and feelings with people of different faith and ethnic background. It seems that this was made possible partly thanks to the well-structured seminar contents and the skilful facilitation and partly due to the fact that the participants were religious people. As religious people tend to face hard emotions by themselves, the participants might find it relatively easier to get involved in sharing their own and others' feelings and emotions than secular people usually find. Also the participants, assumed to have relatively liberal ideas as they were interested in inter-faith dialogue, would be able to form bonds with others as the fellow believers despite their differences in religion.

In operational terms the CSIS project without having a local office with its own field staff heavily relied on the various local institutions, individuals and international presence in Bosnia. This situation forced the project to take considerable time to build connections with individuals and institutions locally. In addition, the local connections effectively increased the transparency of the project to the local communities and demonstrated its fairness. This point seems to have contributed to creating the relatively tolerant local environment for the seminar participants and their participation in the seminars, and possible initiatives they might want to take later on. And later these connections resulted in the extensive networks for the project that are passed onto CRD.

The continuity of the project also needs to be mentioned. The CSIS project continued to hold the seminars for seven years from 1995 to 2002, which is a considerable period of time for this kind of the projects. Admittedly the follow-up activities were not conducted as well as it should. Nonetheless, most of the people

236

forming the core group in Bosnia attended the first seminar in Sarajevo and they are repeatedly invited to the subsequent seminars. This strategy created the feeling of continuity for those people, which led to the consolidation of the core group and further the development of CRD and local networks.

The termination of the project at CSIS in the end of 2002 seems too early especially in the areas where project expanded later, namely, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. Even in Bosnia, although the local institution was established and remains in the area, the project would have been worth continuing regarding the situation in Bosnia where the societies still remain divided. The discontinuation of the project in the end was mainly due to a change of priorities within the US-based CSIS with the background of growing concern on the terrorists threat and related wars, not necessarily due to the consideration that the work in the Former Yugoslavia was completed or local capacity was well established or developed. Having continued for seven years, the CSIS project should probably be considered as a long-term project compared to some other international projects. However, whether it was enough for the work of conflict transformation and peacebuilding in the divided societies or not seems still to be in question.

Map 8.1 **The Location of the Seminars: CSIS 'Conflict Resolution Training for Religious People and Community Leaders from the Former Yugoslavia**

Chapter 9 Conclusion: Inter-Group Dialogue among the Citizens and Transformation of Protracted Intrastate Conflict

Introduction

Recent severe intrastate conflict is a complex phenomenon. Protracted intrastate conflict deeply divides the country under the name of exclusive identity characterised by ethnicity, religion or tribe involving the whole population. Conflict can become so intense that it causes tremendous destruction and human misery within and out of the state possibly threatening further regional and global security.

Unlike conventional interstate conflict, recent protracted intrastate conflict deeply penetrates societies and people's minds through intensive nationalistic propaganda or cruel strategies of violence against civilians. Achieving a peace accord agreed between the political leaderships does not necessarily produce peace on the ground. The process of conflict transformation among the citizens does not progress automatically in deeply divided societies just because the peace agreement is signed by their high-level politicians. Here it is necessary to involve the whole population essentially including the grass-roots citizens in order to transform protracted intrastate conflict. Bosnia is one such example. Providing appropriate support for building peace at the citizens' level has great significance for the overall promotion of the process. Some attempts have been made towards a bottom-up conflict transformation in Bosnia, nevertheless, the international policy makers do not seem to have found an effective approach so far. The major question is how to promote conflict transformation among the citizens.

This research has pursued the question as to whether inter-group dialogue among the citizens in the divided societies suffering from protracted conflict could contribute to the promotion of conflict transformation. While inter-group dialogue can be facilitated among the citizens strategically as a part of the background work for official negotiation at the high political level, this research has specifically focused on dialogue that aims to promote bottom-up conflict transformation or to build peace from below. Two case studies in this thesis have shown that the facilitation of inter-group dialogue among the citizens could have far more effect

than just promoting general reconciliation between individuals. This chapter analyses how inter-ethnic dialogue among the citizens contributes to overall conflict transformation in Bosnia, and more specifically considers whether dialogue among the citizens offers a solution to fill the gap in the international practice of conflict transformation or peacebuilding in Bosnia.

First of all, reconsideration is given to the analysis of the case studies. The general findings of the two case studies are comparatively presented and their potential effect on the societies and on the process of conflict transformation is discussed. Secondly the international approach for conflict transformation in Bosnia is summarised and critically reviewed. Thirdly reflecting the findings from the case studies, the international peacebuilding operation in Bosnia is reconsidered. In the final part of this chapter the applicability of dialogue approach for bottom-up conflict transformation in other contexts in other parts of the world is briefly discussed.

9.1 Inter-Ethnic Dialogue among the Citizens: Findings from the Case Studies
Different Approaches towards Inter-Ethnic Dialogue

Two cases examined in this study are the projects of inter-ethnic dialogue facilitation among the citizens to promote reconciliation and understanding. Although both projects happen to take the form of training, they are not typical of it. It needs to be noted that many workshops or seminars have been facilitated for the Bosnian citizens with the purpose of skills training, mostly either on conflict resolution or on NGO development, but they are not necessarily intended to be an opportunity for inter-ethnic dialogue. The projects of the case studies were originally started as seminars for skills training but they quickly came to realise the importance of their role as an opportunity for inter-group dialogue. As a result, the inter-group dialogue became one of the major focuses in both projects. Having the focus of inter-group dialogue among the Bosnian citizens and the form of training seminars in common, there are considerable differences between these two projects. Among various differences, both projects have their own unique features that contributed to effective inter-group dialogue development.

The most unique feature in the Norwegian project is that each seminar is held for a long period of time in a location far away from the states where most participants originate. Conventional training seminars or dialogue events usually last for a few days as seen in the CSIS project for inter-religious dialogue. Compared with that, the Norwegian seminars last for at least three weeks usually over two months. This is far longer than other seminars of this kind. Also the seminars are held in Norway, far away from the Former Yugoslav states. The training or dialogue seminars are conventionally held in the countries where the participants reside or in neighbouring countries. Seminars for the citizens from the conflict areas held in third countries are often with the participants from various different states from all over the world and not from any one specific state or region.

As far as the dialogue aspect is concerned, the long seminars in the Norwegian programme contributed to the formation of stronger relationships between the participants. The long seminars allow the relationships to develop gradually and naturally between the participants, while the academic contents of the seminars and various social and cultural activities stimulate the development. Bringing out the participants from their own setting of conflict, daily struggle and the atmosphere of distrust in the Balkan region to the new environment of peaceful Scandinavian countryside contributed to refreshing and opening their minds to new and different ideas or views. They shared the same accommodation during the period, which led to intense interactions and strong relationships between the participants.

As the Norwegian seminars were not held locally unlike the inter-religious dialogue seminars, the project did not necessarily require local networks except for some connections with the Norwegian organisations operating in Bosnia for the initial recruitment. Apart from the networks of the seminar alumni, the Lillehammer project did not create strong local networks on the ground until Nansen Dialogue Centers (NDCs) started to develop. The local initiatives developed from the programme including NDCs needed to cultivate the networks with other local NGOs, individuals or local authorities by themselves. Nevertheless, it should be

mentioned that concerted efforts have been made subsequently to develop regional networks.

The most distinctive feature of the CSIS inter-religious seminars is the way the project utilised its religious orientation. Unlike the conventional inter-religious dialogue, the seminars did not necessarily aim to facilitate dialogue between the religious communities or discussions on religious topics. The seminars were rather intended to encourage dialogue between individuals who have different religious beliefs so that the participants were not limited to clergy but included laity. As the people's religious identity coincides with ethnic identity among the population, this project of inter-religious seminars seemed to have more elements of inter-ethnic dialogue than those of conventional inter-religious dialogue. Nonetheless, the religious orientation of the seminars contributed to the effective operation of the project.

The religious feature of the seminars encouraged people to share their honest emotions with others, which contributed to building trust and strong bonds between the participants in a short period of time compared with the Norwegian seminar. Within a few days these seminars enable the participants to open up hard emotions and deal with sensitive issues related to the Bosnian conflict. The religious aspect of the seminars helped the participants to engage in the process. As an inter-religious event, the project made considerable effort to work with the local religious communities. As a result, the project could present itself as a collaboration with locals rather than work conducted by some internationals parachuted in with academic interests or other agendas. The endorsement and support by the local religious communities certainly contributed to local acceptance for the project and must have protected the project itself and the participants from potential attack, obstruction or intimidation by local extremists.

The inter-religious project has built up intensive networks with international and local individuals and organisations in Bosnia. In order to hold the seminars locally in Bosnia and nearby countries without having a field office on the ground, cooperative local relationships were essential. While the project needed to spend considerable time to build connections on the ground, it later became an asset for the

local capacity developed from the project in the sense that they can easily become a part of such cultivated local networks.

Although not the only form of bottom-up intervention, training seminars and workshops are an effective form of inter-group dialogue development among citizens in divided societies. The two projects of the seminars took very different approaches in various aspects of their operation, nonetheless, both of them have been successful in bringing people into inter-ethnic dialogue.

Inter-Ethnic Dialogue as Personal Experience

As ultimately dialogue is a personal experience, the impact of the experience is on individuals. Most of the participants in the seminars facilitated by the two case study projects are favourable about their experience, whatever their reasons. The attitude of participants is generally cautious at the beginning, moderate in general, often reserved, occasionally friendly and even open and frank by the end. Some said that they learnt something new, some said that they got to know new people and made friends, and others said they found the whole experience of inter-ethnic dialogue refreshing. There were certainly emotional eruptions or hidden feelings, nevertheless, the participants generally perceived their experience of the seminars and inter-ethnic encounter as surprisingly pleasant and positive.

As the societies are segregated in Bosnia, there are limited opportunities for citizens to communicate with individuals who belong to different ethnic groups. The two projects have provided rare spaces for direct encounter and opportunities for genuine communications among the citizens across the dividing lines. As the participants directly see and talk with people from the other ethnic groups about sensitive issues such as ethnic relations and conflict in Bosnia or personal experiences and feelings, they started to see the other peoples as individual human beings rather than collectively as hostile groups. At the same time, their opinions, views and emotions being heard and acknowledged by those people helps the participants to overcome trauma and promote healing. Dialogue leads to a breaking down of the psychological barriers such as evil enemy images, prejudices,

stereotypes of the other ethnic groups, which is the essential first step towards reconciliation.

From the examination of the case studies, it appears that inter-group dialogue gives more impact than just the break-down of psychological barriers. The experience of inter-group dialogue has such an impact on individuals that some of them are motivated to take practical steps for further dialogue or reconciliation in their local communities. Although it is not possible to resort to psychoanalytic examination here, two points can be made from the observation of the cases regarding the way in which inter-ethnic dialogue affects the participants to take some action.

Firstly inter-group dialogue leads to a realisation that alternative means to violence can be possible even in severely problematic inter-ethnic relations. Inter-group dialogue is an experience where people work with those from other groups with different views and ideas. The impact of those experiences could be extraordinary on the citizens in Bosnia. Dialogue does not necessarily produce harmony or agreements between the participants. However, dialogue is the process that leads to an acceptance of other perceptions, ideas, opinions or views with respect but not necessarily agreeing with them. The very experience of inter-group dialogue demonstrates that it is possible to work together with people from different ethnic groups and that there are alternatives to violence and war for solving problems or dealing with difficult issues. The war and violence, which brought so much suffering and loss to the population of Bosnia, was not necessarily inevitable.

Secondly inter-group dialogue facilitated by the projects has brought people to think not only about the present situation and problems in their communities and Bosnia but also about the future including how problems need be solved or the situation improved. Dialogue is a participant-oriented process where people need to positively participate in communicative interactions by listening to others in order to understand them and by talking to others in order to be understood by them. Dialogue facilitated by the two case study projects brought the participants to face difficult and sensitive issues in the real Bosnian context. The participants express their own ideas and in return others ask why and how. Through this interaction, the

participants examine their own ideas more closely and reconsider them from different perspectives. Inter-group dialogue gets people involved in analysing problems and situations and exploring possible solutions or other possibilities by themselves. The participants' attention is brought to bear on their future through this process. How do they want their future to be? What will their community be like after 10 or 20 years from now? Do they want to live in the same way as today in the segregated societies filled with suspicion, quiet hostility and intimidation? They come to realise that there is a necessity for them to act to change their societies and to participate in the process of conflict transformation if they want the future to be different from today. Awareness among the individuals has become the foundation for collective or individual civil actions, that is, the motivation to work against nationalistic trends of an aggressive nature towards construction of their own better future.

All positive impacts, nonetheless, do not materialise instantly. It is a long process. The two projects in the case studies took different measures to maintain the process. In the Norwegian project, each seminar is long. Religious dialogue had more conventional three to four-day seminars but repeatedly invited some potentially active individuals. Sometimes the facilitators had to directly deal with passive attitudes or predominant feelings of powerlessness among the participants who had faced difficult realities in Bosnia. In both projects, follow-up work was continued in order to refresh the memory of inter-ethnic dialogue experience and the networks or connections formed between the individuals. The follow-up work effectively provided people with feelings of continuity in their dialogue experience.

Taking Action: The Development of Civil Initiatives

The main interest of this study lies in examining how inter-group dialogue development among the citizens can contribute to the overall process of conflict transformation. In this vein, the outcome of the project, that is, whether the projects have any long-term effect on the societies to transform conflict and its causes, requires a major assessment. However, the assessment is difficult because the effect of inter-group dialogue development on the transformation of protracted intrastate

conflict can be recognised in many ways. The individuals who took part in dialogue may have changed or modified their views, opinions, perceptions and adjusted their attitude. These effects are important in their own right for the social change in the long term but individual changes are so minute in the relation to the whole population and it is not possible to measure such effects. Regarding the context of the Bosnia conflict transformation discussed above, the most noticeable potential effect of inter-group dialogue in the case studies is the development of some civil initiatives.

Some civil activities initiated by the participants of inter-ethnic dialogue in the case study projects were not necessarily premeditated developments. Although their expectation was not so specific, both projects hoped to produce something positive through their efforts for dialogue. The two projects took very different approaches on this point. By conveying their own agendas including democracy, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution and by passing on some skills of conflict analysis and resolution, the Norwegian dialogue seminars have concentrated on providing the participants with the time and safe space to reflect on their own and develop their own ideas. Limited in time in comparison, the inter-religious dialogue seminars took a more direct approach, dedicating the final session of the seminars to discuss plans for the future and possible actions. But neither of the projects could force people to do anything if they did not wish to do so after all. Especially it has to be noted that even though many of the inter-ethnic dialogue participants were inspired by their experience, getting into practical dialogue and reconciliation work in the local communities after the seminars is a different matter. It requires people not only with strong motivation but also with the will and courage to take such actions regarding certain personal risks in working for dialogue or reconciliation in the polarised and war-experienced communities. But it is proved that the experience of dialogue seminars have given the participants enough motivation. Some of the participants proved that they possess more than enough ability to take concrete action in a difficult environment.

While it is amazing that some of the participants in the inter-ethnic dialogue have come up with ideas and generated some civil initiatives locally, it needs to be

remembered that it is important to provide continuous and timely external support for those ideas to flourish in practice after the seminars. In order to sustain the memory of dialogue experience among the individuals and to maintain and create old and new connections with the fellow alumni, follow-up measures are vital. Providing practical support is important as many participants lack connections, networks, financial and other resources to start practical work in their communities. Also careful consideration needed to be given to the protection of the local individuals working for the initiatives within the local context. The projects of the case studies have worked to secure the support and acknowledgement from the existing institutions such as the local authorities, political parties and religious communities in order to avoid possible attack from the ethnic nationalists or local extremists.

The seminar alumni's initiatives in the local communities were started mostly voluntarily and developed though intensive consultation with the international personnel in the projects. One of the local initiatives developed from the inter-ethnic dialogue was the establishment of the local NGOs. These NGOs are only a few among hundreds of local NGOs in Bosnia, but they were initiated by locals and are now operated by locals. They are not just created for the convenience of the international agencies to implement their plans of peace process or democratisation. Developed by the local people, these NGOs have their own belief and message to convey to the local communities and have the networks of seminar alumni supporting their work. The local networks can be considered as the base of their support, their so-called 'constituency', that many local NGOs established to take over the work of the international NGOs do not have. Working on such issues of peaceful conflict resolution/transformation, democracy, human rights, reconciliation and dialogue, the NGOs are open to people from any ethnic and religious backgrounds with multi-ethnic staff. In addition, although not much mentioned here, some of the alumni of inter-ethnic dialogue seminars started to work individually in their communities, among neighbours or at home, initiating their own projects, using their skills of mediation and conveying the idea of dialogue. Each effort may be small on its own, but it cannot be denied that these

247

individual efforts are certainly the practical steps for bottom-up conflict transformation.

9.2 International Attempt for Conflict Transformation in the Bosnian Context
Post-War Bosnia: The Dayton Framework

While it has become clear from the case studies that inter-ethnic dialogue among the citizens can have a positive effect in the divided societies, their true meaning in the process of conflict transformation needs to be considered in the given context, that is, the process in Bosnia. The original overall conflict transformation plan in post-Dayton Bosnia can be considered a vision of so-called 'liberal internationalism'[1] through the implementation of liberal democracy and market economy. Having achieved containment of violence and constitutional arrangement through the Dayton Agreement, the democratisation of political institutions and the introduction of the market economy was assumed to accomplish a single multi-ethnic, democratic and peaceful Bosnia in one or two years. It was expected that elections held 10 months after the agreement would expel ethnic nationalist politicians and send democratic ones to power to ensure this process. In no time refugees and displaced people would go home. However, this scenario was never realised. Time after time, ethnic nationalist politicians collect the majority of the votes and the repatriation of refugees and displaced people is practically obstructed or hindered by an atmosphere of intimidation. Several years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, the societies remained segregated and the polarisation by ethno-religious identity persists in Bosnia. International peacekeeping troops and transitional international administration were forced to stay in the region far beyond the initial mandate.

The difficulties in Bosnian conflict transformation may be attributed to the vision of liberal internationalism itself. As some critiques suggest, political and

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[1] Ronald Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', *International Security*, Fall 1997, vol. 22, no. 2, pp 54-89.

economic liberalisation generates destabilising effects in war-torn states.[2] Liberal democracy encourages the public expression of conflicting interests in order to deal with them before they turn violent. The market economy obviously increases not only competition but also possible conflict as it creates economic inequalities. Bringing market democracy into the divided societies with protracted intrastate conflict sharpens confrontation and conflict because the mechanism of peacefully resolving internal disputes has not been functioned well in these societies. The critiques do not necessarily oppose the principle of liberal internationalism but call for a more controlled and gradual 'strategic liberalisation' as no appropriate alternative seems available.

What seems more problematic with liberal internationalism is the risk of the simple equation that transformation of protracted intrastate conflict can be achieved by a certain political and economic system. It is obviously too simplistic to consider that the promotion of political and economic liberalisation can create a democratic peaceful state out of a war-torn state. The international community seems to have underestimated the task of conflict transformation in the state affected by protracted intrastate conflict. Even in the post-war phase, conflict transformation or peacebuilding should not be considered in terms of just political institutions, economic systems or elections. In Bosnia liberal democracy was mainly introduced as the political system and institutions. It was evident that such strategies are not enough. The situation on the ground such as the ethnic nationalists' victory in the elections and a persistent division among the population suggests that approaches for grass-roots reconciliation or bottom-up conflict transformation is not just important but indeed essential. As the initial Dayton framework lacks a vision of bottom-up conflict transformation, the strategic implementation of the peace process became a key for the overall of conflict transformation in Bosnia.

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[2] Ibid. Charles-Philippe David, 'Does Peacebuilding Build Peace?: Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 1, 1999, pp 25-41. Michael Pugh, 'Peacebuilding and Spoils of Peace: the Bosnia and Herzegovina Experience', *Comparing Experiences with State Building in Asia and Europe: The Cases of East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo*, Council of Asia Europe Co-operation (CAEC), 5/12/00. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Policy Press, 1998.

Civil Society-Building: What Does It Mean in Practice?

Having supplied a large amount of resources for rebuilding houses and infrastructure, it became clear that such physical reconstruction did not promote reconciliation among the population in Bosnia. The international policymakers were urgently required to consider its bottom-up strategy. The problems with bottom-up conflict transformation in the Bosnian context identified by the international community can be summarised in two points.[3] One is the lack of tolerance and the persistent polarisation between the ethnic groups among the population. The other is the passive attitude towards ethnic politics among the citizens. With regard to these problems, the policy of civil society-building was subsequently proposed in the implementation process.

The proposition of civil society-building as the bottom-up policy in Bosnia seems reasonable and convincing. However, the international community failed to give much consideration of how in practice to build a healthy civil society. Civil society generally refers to the realm of autonomous voluntary organisations in the public sphere as an intermediary between the state and private life where those organisations attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests while being tolerant to each other.[4] Theoretically it is suggested that a lively and healthy civil society contributes to democratic consolidation because it can be a counter-weight to the state or ethnic nationalist politicians in the Bosnian case and a source of civility such as tolerance and pluralism among the population. In practice the international community's strategies for civil society-building in Bosnia were mainly focused on local NGOs. It was expected that NGOs would promote civil participation in communal issues in the local communities and in the state and overcome ethnic cleavages by generating other various public interests that can be shared by people belonging to all ethnic groups. The number of local NGOs dramatically increased after the end of the war

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[3] Peace Implementation Council, *Reinforcing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina-The Way Ahead, Annex: The Peace Implementation Agenda*, Annex to the Madrid Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, 1998, p 25.

[4] Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, second edition, The John Hopkins University Press, 1996, p xxii. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problem of Democratic Transition and Consolidation-Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, 1996, p 7.

and financial and practical support were offered to strengthen local advocacy groups. The international community was committed to civil society-building, however, those strategies failed to bear the expected results. In other words, despite the international community's efforts, ethnic nationalist parties have been voted for the power and the population remained polarised.

While the focus on local NGOs may not necessarily be wrong, civil society-building should not be considered simply as the creation of local NGOs, associations or networks, as many have warned.[5] Whether civil associations in the public sphere collectively become a functioning civil society or not depends on how the citizens as individuals and groups behave, act and interact with each other. The healthy function of civil society requires a pluralistic participatory political culture among the population. Building such a civil society in a war-suffering, divided state with broken human relationships like Bosnia is extremely difficult and the international community never seems to understand the complexity of their task. Establishing more NGOs does not necessarily create a lively civil society let alone generate tolerance, pluralism or participation among the citizens in states with protracted intrastate conflict.

The strategy of local NGO development simply increased their number but most of them are just humanitarian aid deliverers for the citizens of Bosnia and they are left vulnerable after the international NGOs and donors' withdrawal. The strategy of supporting local advocacy groups strengthened those groups with the specific political orientation but failed to attract public interest, let alone civil participation. In the end those strategies for civil society-building did not reach the Bosnian citizens. The international community was unable to find an effective bottom-up approach for conflict transformation.

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[5] Ian Smillie, 'Service Delivery or Civil Society?: Non Governmental Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Care Canada, 1996. Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs, 'International Actors and Social Policy Development on Bosnia-Herzegovina: Globalism and the "New Federalism"', *Journal of European Social Policy*, vol.8, no.2, 1998. Mark Duffield, *The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid*, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Occasional Paper 2, 1996. Judith Large, *The War Next Door: A Study of Second-Track Intervention During the War in ex-Yugoslavia*, Hawthorn Press, 1997.

9.3 The Bosnian Conflict Transformation and Inter-Ethnic Dialogue among the Citizens

Reconsidering Bottom-up Conflict Transformation in Bosnia

Developing inter-ethnic dialogue among the citizens is not a popular practice in third-party intervention in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the analysis of the case studies seems to cast light on an important point in bottom-up conflict transformation which has been the major difficulty in the international operation for peacebuilding in Bosnia. One of the civil initiatives developed as a direct or indirect result of inter-ethnic dialogue in the case studies is the local NGOs, which may not seem so special because many local NGOs were established in the post-war Bosnia. But the NGOs developed from the inter-ethnic dialogue have successfully maintained and developed the support from the local communities while the NGOs or civil associations promoted by the international civil society-building strategies have failed to attract the citizens in Bosnia. There seems to be an important difference between them.

The NGOs established from these inter-ethnic dialogue projects are unique in the sense that they were established by the initiatives of local people and are now operated by locals. These NGOs are based on the principles such as dialogue, democracy, human rights and reconciliation not because they are dictated by the internationals but because they themselves want to do it. At the inter-group dialogue seminars, there was some input of those concepts brought by the facilitators and organisers. But in the process of dialogue, the participants have digested the input, personalised it and further articulated it to make their own understanding through their interactions with others. Those concepts are localised in their context though the dialogue process and the concepts are something the seminar alumni want to convey to other people in their communities. In order to work in their communities, people formed the groups which take the form of NGOs. The important point is that the alumni involved in these NGOs because they have a message they believe in and they want to deliver to their communities. The continuous international support is undeniably important for those developments in terms of funding and other

resources. However, the NGOs have the causes to believe, which is the motivation to continue their work in a long term.

The importance of this point may become clear by reconsidering the NGOs and local associations developed through the international strategies for civil society-building. It is not surprising that the simple increase in number of local NGOs did not promote civil participation and pluralism among the citizens as those NGOs remain just aid deliverers, vulnerable and heavily dependent on international donors. The strategy for local advocacy group development was a more specific and direct approach to the purpose of encouraging the citizens to take part in Bosnian politics and to shape their own future. The strategy was implemented in such ways as arranging the legal framework and the working environment for local NGOs, and providing funding or training for potential individuals or groups who are open to receive external advice and support. The international bodies in fact managed to guide some local NGOs to take an active role in advocacy, take up politically sensitive issues and even initiate inter-entity activities. Nevertheless, these local NGOs failed to attract support from the majority of the citizens maybe because of the fact that these advocacy groups and their activities are not something that genuinely comes out from the Bosnian citizens themselves, although those groups are run by locals.

With the blueprint of a multi-ethnic and 'democratic' Bosnia, the international bodies seem to develop the certain expectation of what the Bosnian citizens should think and how they should behave. The international community's so-called civil society-building programmes reflected that expectation by selecting particular individuals or groups to support. While the support for advocacy groups was rightly intended to involve the citizens in Bosnian politics, those individuals and groups chosen for support were guided to carry out their expected role as 'responsible' citizens from the perspective of the international community. One of the reasons why those advocacy groups failed to encourage the citizens for participation may be because they are not based on the genuine concerns, beliefs or hopes of the Bosnian citizens. Civil society-building in Bosnia seems an attempt at

bottom-up conflict transformation with the top-down logic, promoting uniformity towards the politically right choice rather than practising pluralism.

NGOs and civil associations in a locally meaningful sense should basically start from individuals or groups who are motivated by their own concerns and hopes for the state or societies on the diverse issues they care about or believe in, and develop themselves in the way they think best. That becomes the cause for continuity of their activities and the generation of citizens' participation. Without that foundation in the local context, a NGO would be merely a nicely packaged but empty box, even though staffed by local individuals.

Why Dialogue Matters for Bottom-up Conflict Transformation

The examination of the internationally-led Bosnian conflict transformation process in the post-war phase, known more commonly as 'peacebuilding', clearly demonstrates the lack of an effective bottom-up approach in the international policies despite its necessity. The original Dayton frameworks failed to cover much of the civilian aspect of state reconstruction and mostly relied on financial aid and physical reconstruction. The following policy of civil society-building was an attempt to remedy the situation as it developed. Despite the intention, the strategies for civil society-building have failed to appeal to the majority of Bosnian citizens and generated no pluralism, tolerance or civil participation.

In a sense, it is a fair view that post-war peacebuilding in Bosnia is a process of democratisation, therefore, civil society is an important component for its purpose, democratic governance. However, it would be a mistake to consider that the international community could bring it along the civil society with the system of democracy such as democratic elections or political institutions through the Dayton Agreement and the international regulation. The core of civil society is a democratic political culture of civil participation, tolerance, pluralism, respect for human rights and respect for one another. Such a culture, which can also be considered as a peace culture, needs to be implemented among the population as individuals in their thinking. It cannot be just taught like knowledge or skill but needs to be nurtured in the local context. That is why it is important to work with local citizens though a

bottom-up approach with a bottom-up rhetoric in order to cultivate such culture. The healthy and vibrant civil society would not be something that the internationals can build by some clever strategies but an end result of a flourishing democratic culture as an accumulation of people with democratic thinking. The transformation from the societies suffering from protracted intrastate conflict to the ones with a democratic political culture does take time and considerable effort by the local people ideally with international support according to the local needs.

Developing inter-group dialogue among the citizens can help to promote democratic political culture in a local context but is not a conventional or typical theme on which their parties focus in Bosnia and perhaps elsewhere. In fact, the international environment is not necessarily favourable to this kind of effort. The segregating policies by the international community in post-war Bosnia and Kosovo have hindered efforts for inter-group interaction and dialogue rather than supporting them.[6] Dialogue work among the citizens requires considerable time but many projects lack long-term funding. The majority of the second-track intervention is aid delivery and reconstruction that requires less sophistication and durability in the operation and appeals more to the international donors because of the visible result they can produce. As dialogue and reconciliation work among citizens requires long-term commitment and hardly produces immediate and concrete results immediately, it does not attract international donors to provide funding especially in the long term.

The international attempts examined here as case studies are the exceptional third-party efforts but demonstrate that dialogue among the citizens across the dividing lines can bring out much from individuals and could even lead to their concrete actions for expanding peaceful and democratic culture. Dialogue among citizens does not just change things overnight but can do so little by little. Targeting the vast mass of the citizens is daunting and seems utterly useless or inefficient. Nonetheless, dialogue work matters in so far as it reaches out to the citizens and becomes an opportunity for them to start thinking and behaving differently. As constructive interaction and dialogue among ordinary citizens across the divisions is

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[6] Steiner Bryn, Project Director of Dialogue Training Programme 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution', informational communication, Lillehammer, Norway, June 2001.

an experience of pluralism and tolerance, it contributes not only to general reconciliation in a vague sense but also to enhancing democratic practice and enriching peace culture in the societies. Without this bottom-up process, democratic and peace culture does not take root in the societies that have suffered from protracted intrastate conflict. Bosnia seems static with the persistent deep ethnic divisions.

It must be remembered that dialogue should not necessarily be expected to lead to certain solutions such as the creation of a multi-ethnic state, or certain results, such as establishment of local NGOs or civil associations. This study examined two cases of inter-ethnic dialogue that managed to produce local NGOs and some visible civil initiatives, however, they are not necessarily here to be a model of dialogue work. There are various other ways to contribute to inter-ethnic dialogue not only training seminars or workshops. This study happened to examine in the case studies but some other examples were seen in Chapter 6. Not all constructive interaction or dialogue among the citizens lead to any concrete results or certain solutions to the problems as third parties may wish. Most may not have such a concrete development. It is possible that by developing dialogue, third parties can promote the importance of dialogue, respect to each other and their human rights regardless of their differences in the ethnic, religious, linguistics or cultural background. However, what would come out from the dialogue process is up to the people participating and surrounding conditions. A third party should not try to lead people to their expectations. Most importantly, dialogue matters in conflict transformation of protracted intrastate conflict not because it may produce something but because it generates the democratic process of civil deliberation.

9.4 Applicability to Other Contexts
The Relevance of Inter-Group Dialogue among the Citizens

A simple transference from one context to another is not at all appropriate when it comes to the bottom-up intervention, because each conflict and conflict transformation process is different from others in terms of issues in conflict, various surrounding conditions, disputant groups' characters, third-parties' characters and

especially the local cultural backgrounds. The world has also changed dramatically from the late twentieth century to the early twenty-first century; the collapse of East and West confrontation, the North-South problem, the progress of globalisation and the war on terror. Nevertheless, it would not be so unreasonable at least to discuss the possibility that inter-group dialogue development may have relevance to some other contexts of conflict transformation apart from Bosnia because this study has not discussed the methodology of dialogue facilitation but the potential role of inter-group dialogue among the citizens in the transformation of protracted intrastate conflict, or peace from below. This discussion is not necessarily based on empirical studies, so that it is indeed wide open to criticism.

Bosnia is not necessarily a typical conflict in the contemporary world. However, serious domestic instability including intrastate conflict was one of the major security concerns in the post-Cold War era. The recent protracted conflicts consume the whole population and deeply divide the citizens and communities. The Bosnian conflict is one of many such protracted conflicts in which the citizens and communities are segregated and polarised. In this kind of conflict the bottom-up conflict transformation is far more significant than conventionally thought.

For example, in the long-standing Middle-East conflict, the Oslo peace process drawn out though the painstaking official and unofficial negotiation between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships began to derail as the Israeli citizens elected a hard-line government after the assassination of Israeli Prime Minster Rabin. The successive civil insurgencies among the Palestinian population have deteriorated the peace process further. There is little interaction between the Israeli and Palestinian citizens and distrust between them is considerably deep. At the moment, in the Middle East local efforts for inter-group dialogue is hindered and almost squashed as

the situation worsens on the ground.[7]

Some point out that the history of Bosnia is repeating itself in Kosovo where the crisis reached its height in 1999 with the Albanian uprising and the ethnic cleansing directed by Belgrade followed by the NATO bombing. Kosovo is now under heavy international regulation to promote reconstruction in the frameworks drawn out from the negotiation at Rambouillet to carry the 'spirit of Dayton'.[8] Kosovo remains with deep divisions between its peoples and is generally considered a repetition of the post-war Bosnia.[9]

In states with protracted intrastate conflict or serious insurgence, a top-down process which is not followed by the grass-roots population is often destined to face a stalemate. This does not mean that the top-down approach is wrong or unnecessary but that such an approach needs to be complemented by bottom-up approaches. It needs to be remembered that there are some people who still believe in dialogue and reconciliation under horrific circumstances of conflict, violence and intimidation while others resort to acts of revenge and retaliation. Both kinds of people need support in such ways that they can explore other possibilities by themselves. There seems to be relevance for inter-group dialogue work among the citizens in the given population.

The operation of the two projects in the case study started in the late stages of war and has continued into the post-war phase. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that the bottom-up intervention for inter-group dialogue can be conducted in pre-, mid- and post-war phases as far as practical conditions including the security

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[7] Noah Salameh, a Palestinian peace activist and the Director of the Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR) in Bethlehem, regularly sends out e-mails about the situation on the ground and his daily struggle under the Israeli military siege to his wide list of international and regional contacts. I have been receiving his e-mails for at least the last two to three years. His e-mails are not necessarily an analysis of the situation but his personal account of living under the siege. In one of the e-mails, for example, he described the helplessness and sadness he felt when the curfew was imposed and he had to explain to his little daughter why she could not go out to play with her friends. In his e-mails, he honestly confesses the difficulty of maintaining hope under the circumstance and the feeling of overwhelming despair. Nevertheless, he is determined, continuously believes in nonviolence and coexistence and continues his peace and reconciliation work. (Salameh can be reached at the following email address ccrr@palnet.com or salamehn@hotmail.com)

[8] Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 1999.

[9] For example, David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, second edition, Pluto Press, 2000, pp 200-211.

measures for interveners as well as local recipients can be managed. There are many other states in political and economic transition that have struggled with protracted conflict between peoples. Along with political settlements or constitutional arrangements to protect the minorities in such states, the international community urges those states to take the measures for democratisation among the population and to encourage building a civil society. Inter-group dialogue work among citizens would be relevant in such states and third parties possibly make contribution.

The form of the training seminars for conflict resolution is apparently useful in terms of keeping the focus on the problems of intrastate conflict and inter-group relationships, as seen in the case studies. However, it would be neither appropriate nor practical to suggest it as a single model of dialogue development due to the diversity in the characters of conflict and cultural factors. Relevance of dialogue work in a variety of forms seems to potentially exist and it seems worth exploring in some other contexts.

Some Propositions

Although I am well aware of the risks of ignoring the cultural context of each conflict, here I would like to suggest three simple points in working for the promotion of inter-group dialogue among citizens in divided societies. They are not about how to develop inter-group dialogue but rather related to the attitude of interveners informed by the examination of case studies. Those suggested here are sensibility, flexibility and persistence.

Firstly, sensitivity to the local culture and the specific context of particular conflict is essential in the bottom-up intervention. While all sorts of intervention require sensitivity, the bottom-up intervention especially requires it as it associates with the citizens more directly and the intervention itself is often an inter-cultural encounter. Even for knowledgeable facilitators, it is not possible to always know how local people think, behave or act facing various conditions and situations. The international personnel going into a local context need to be sensitive to people's reactions and have an attitude of learning from interaction with them as Lederach

259

suggests.[10] Facilitators need to work with local people in a space of inter-group dialogue because they too are the participants.

Secondly it is important for the facilitators and organisers to be flexible. Along with sensitivity, the interveners need flexibility to adjust their approaches towards inter-group dialogue regarding the local contexts. In a space for dialogue, some control may be necessary in order to have interactions constructive. Nevertheless, dialogue is a process contributed by all people present and not just one guided solely by the facilitators. As issues in dialogue can develop or flow from one to another, adjustment is necessary, depending on the participants' needs or the development of the situation on the ground. Also what inter-group dialogue would lead to depends on the participants, surrounding conditions and local cultural contexts. In the case studies, inter-ethnic dialogue developed to local groups that later take the form of NGOs. But that would not always be the case in other contexts or circumstances. Nothing concrete may seem to be produced after inter-group dialogue in other places. Or dialogue between some peoples in one context may take more time to make any impact than in another context. But it is important for the interveners to have flexibility in providing appropriate consultation and support when it is required according to the needs of the local people.

Lastly persistence is of great importance in working for inter-group dialogue among the citizens as a bottom-up approach. For inter-group dialogue to be effective, it is better not be a simple one-off event. The relationships and ideas need to be nurtured and possibly expanded over time. The intervention for inter-group dialogue itself should ideally continue for a certain period of time in order to reach out more people and expand relationships. But more importantly it is essential to take some measures to maintain contact between people. No matter how much participants are impressed by the experience of inter-group dialogue, they go back home in their divided societies. The experience can be easily forgotten if no follow-up measures are taken. It does not have to be official follow-up events but it can be informal meetings or individual contacts between people and facilitators or

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[10] John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, Syracuse University Press, 1995.

organisers of projects. Also continuous support for local capacity is often necessary once it has started to take some shape.

Conclusion

It has been nearly a decade since the end of the Bosnian war. With the Dayton Peace Agreement the international community has been committed to reconstructing a multi-ethnic democratic Bosnia. The Dayton framework for post-war peacebuilding in Bosnia can be fairly regarded as a predominantly top-down approach for conflict transformation. The necessity to promote bottom-up conflict transformation soon became apparent in its implementation process and the bottom-up strategies were improvised under the policy of civil society-building. Nevertheless, the international community mostly failed to bring the citizens into the process of conflict transformation seen in this thesis. The international bodies including OSCE have applied further measures to encourage the Bosnian citizens to take part in the democratisation and peacebuilding process. Nevertheless, the passive attitude among the population seems persistent. Despite the amount of effort and resources poured into it, Bosnia still remains divided and the population is segregated. The elections in May 2002 demonstrated the continuously worrying state of Bosnia with the victory of the ethnic nationalist parties and a low turnout of 54.68% which had dropped from 64.4% at the 2000 election.[11] The problems in Bosnia have piled up with not just ethnic politics and segregation of the population but other issues including widespread corruption, lack of jobs and the illegal occupation of houses related to the return of the displaced persons and refugees.

The Bosnian context of conflict transformation clearly demonstrates the importance of bottom-up process and the lack of effective strategies for it in the overall international practice of intervention. Many people say that the future of the country must be decided by people of Bosnia themselves. But the question is how to bring them to make a choice for their future. Useless though each effort for inter-ethnic dialogue among the citizens may seem, bottom-up conflict transformation in

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[11] 23rd Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, October 23, 2002. (http://www.ohr.int.)

protracted intrastate conflict would be truly generated by engaging with the citizens as individuals. Inter-ethnic dialogue gives those individuals in a conflict situation an opportunity to talk and think about the problems in their communities and state. In Bosnia the two attempts at inter-ethnic dialogue among the citizens in the case studies have demonstrated a very unique insight into the citizens' potential. People need to come to realise that they should create their own future by themselves and that they are capable of work for it.

There is no such thing as a panacea for contemporary protracted intrastate conflict. Dialogue work among the citizens is only one of many approaches towards conflict transformation of such conflict. But inter-group dialogue development among the citizens can provide an opportunity for them to take part in conflict transformation. If a handful of people start to think differently, things can change. Once people take the first practical step, more people will join. That is how the bottom-up conflict transformation starts. Inter-group dialogue potentially generates this process. In a protracted intrastate conflict that consumes the whole population, a bottom-up conflict transformation is essential along with a conventional top-down process.

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