

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOOD

BY

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Prefatory Abstract

This Thesis discusses the nature of "good", as it exists and in its character as the goal of human action. I seek to show the integral relations of "good" within the world-order and its wider cosmological context.

In the Introduction, I discuss the epistemological orientation of my approach and give an account of Husserl's epistemology. This leads to preliminary discussion of ontological structures of consciousness and description of the manifestation of "good" in "good-feeling".

In Section 1, I describe the phenomena of good-feeling in their relations to the structures of consciousness and experience.

In Section 2, I give expositions of the works of Kant, Hegel and Sartre with respect to "good" and criticize phenomenologically.

In Section 3, I begin with an account of Scheler's theory of value and love, followed by criticism. This leads up to my presentation of my theory of "valour", using this term in a technical sense of my own adoption, meaning one's sense of personal value. This involves the "politics" and "pathology" of valour and its relations to mutual love, sexual attraction and, finally, morality.

In the Conclusion, I firstly recapitulate my findings regarding "good" so far. Following this, I present what in my view "a priori ontology" can establish concerning the being and nature of "good".

In the final Appendix, I extend my discussion into what, epistemologically speaking, is the province of speculative metaphysics. Here I suggest and outline a world-view which expresses the changing relations of human beings and their "good" in relation to the wider context of the cosmos and its "good". This draws heavily on the works and insights of Rudolf Steiner. From his indications concerning social organization, I finally focus on proposing a concrete direction for the present human good.



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Note regarding terminology and conventions used in this thesis:

I think I should alert the reader to my use in the text of a number of technical terms, several having been given their technical usage by phenomenological philosophers and a few by myself, particularly "valour". I have given explanations of the meanings of these terms in my text.

I have preferred generally not to refer to persons indefinitely as he/she, him/her, his/hers but rather have used the plural as an indefinite singular, hence: they, them and their, etc.

In typing my text, up to the end of Section 3 I usually have made gaps to separate paragraphs, but not for the conclusion.

The Philosophy of Good

Introduction

I

My project for this thesis is to give a philosophical account of "good". I have chosen "good" as my theme because it has become, for me, a key for understanding some issues of the relationships of human beings to each other and the world and of what it is to be a human being. "Good" has taken on this importance for me and it is my hope that, in my exposition, I can show what and how "good" is and how it relates to all else that is. It is in these latter relations that I wish to show how "good" can answer some "why" questions of existence.

The structure of my presentation is designed, first of all, to show my method of procedure and how I propose to justify my claims of the truth of the contents of my thesis. On this basis I shall give an initial account of how "good" is primarily manifest, followed by a progressive examination of a number of philosophers, in critical response to whom I wish to elaborate relations and structures of "good". Leading on from these discussions of other philosophers, which culminate in the issues of "good's" relations to "value" and "love", I shall develop my theory of a central human need for "valour".

Built on these foundations, my Conclusion will recapitulate my findings to allow my fullest positive exposition of "good". In the final Appendix, I present an account of my overall world-view of the wider relationship of humanity in its cosmic situation, to show how I think "good" is ultimately incorporated in the totality of being.

This leaves me, at this stage, with the problem of a starting point.

My solution to the problem of a starting point is this. I cannot undertake a radical work of fundamental philosophy, preparatory to and as the context for my philosophy of good, within the scope of this thesis. So I shall be working from some presupposed fundamental positions. In adopting these positions, I shall be drawing, critically, upon works of other philosophers which I regard as authoritative. I shall outline the arguments for and reasons for my adoption of these positions in this introduction. Whilst this will not allow for my giving a thorough-going justification of them, it should indicate how such justification could be given.

## II

Firstly, my presupposed positions concern my approach, or orientation, or method of procedure with respect to the problem. This is integrally connected with the theory of knowledge, the epistemology I shall employ.

Epistemology functions both negatively and positively. Its negative function is to be a critique of knowledge and belief, as commonly and generally held, an identification of the unfounded assumptions of daily life and an expose' of where those beliefs are false or unreliable. Its positive function is to identify what can be known certainly and reliably - ie what constitutes founded or evident knowledge.

Furthermore, on the basis of what it thus establishes, it can prescribe valid courses of inquiry for the advancement of knowledge, for knowledge which knows the scope of its validity.

This positive epistemology, by virtue of its function, serves to found metaphysics. I mean "metaphysics" in the sense of its being "first

science" or "science of the sciences", ie as the science of reality in general and as a whole, of the totality of being. Hence it is the science of being, "ontology".

Metaphysics or ontology has two orientations or approaches to being which, figuratively, are to appraise it from opposite ends. The first "end" is that of what epistemology establishes as being able to be known certainly and reliably. It is the province of a priori knowledge. It is that being which does not have to await adventitious experience to be apprehended and cognized. The task of ontology, in knowing being in general, a priori, is to establish the general structures of being, of the modes or ways-of-being of what is or can be, of entities.

The second "end" of being that metaphysics approaches is that of the whole or totality of being. This is the province of speculative metaphysics. It attempts to comprehend the whole of being comprised by all entities, the structure of whose modes of being it has been able to establish in its a priori approach. The comprehension it is seeking is that of what being is absolutely, unconditionally and concretely.

Speculative metaphysics approaches its object by thought. It is synthetic, in that it thinks being and entities together in unity. It is not a given unity, but a synthetically thought, a posited unity. The entities and modes of being thought in this unity are speculatively examined in their relations to the posited whole. This speculative process of thought is dialectical, in that in each synthetic holding together of whatever is regarded provisionally as a whole, the working through of relations pertaining to that whole reaches a limit. Then the provisional whole is found wanting, relatively abstract and lacking concreteness, in terms of relations to what lies outside itself. This requires a new holding together, a new synthesis and a new working through.

Going back to the positions I shall be presupposing, these will concern results of a priori ontology, results correlative with what is first established by positive epistemology.

The questions and establishments of speculative metaphysics will concern the "other end" of my thesis: the situating of "good" in the whole of being. I have reserved my discussion of this for the final Appendix. But here, by way of introduction, I feel I should give the reader an anticipatory insight. The speculative cosmology which I shall present is not an original production of my own metaphysical speculation. It is my own in that it expresses what I ultimately believe and think. But I have been led to this view by others. It is through their reports of experiences and insights, and interpretations thereof, which they claim have given them direct access to and evidence of the more ultimate nature of being, as a whole and in its fundamental relations.

Specifically, I shall present and discuss the cosmological world-view elaborated by Rudolf Steiner. He presented his vision as the result of his own authentic spiritual-scientific research. This was based on his own experiencing through perceptual powers beyond those commonly and ordinarily available to human beings today. For him, his research was a priori, in the sense that it was not subject to the contingencies of his particular given experiences of the world-process. What he consulted was "there", a priori. It is, according to him, on principle accessible to all human beings, were they given appropriate perceptual powers.

In relation to this, however, I am not in Steiner's position. I do not presently possess such powers. What he reports, I have not been able to directly experience myself. I cannot confirm it. Thus, for me,

it remains speculative. I can only present this world-view as how the totality of being may ultimately be, and how I think "good" relates ultimately to this. To this I can only give and discuss what are my reasons for having been led to think and believe that this is so.

My approach and orientation to philosophy in general and in particular to the philosophy of good is through the phenomenology of consciousness. Consciousness is the milieu through which all beings and the whole of being are known and have any meaning or significance. The universe, as investigated by the physicist, is only "there", ie manifest, by virtue of consciousness. Phenomenology operates according to the slogan "to the things themselves". Thus phenomenology aims to approach consciousness in an unprejudiced way, without presuppositions, suspending judgment so that it can encounter and study all that is given in and through consciousness in its own terms, as it manifests itself from itself, without prior interpretation. My orientation to consciousness connects closely with the epistemology which I regard as authoritative, namely Husserl's.

Husserl was the founder of modern phenomenology.

### Husserl's Epistemology

### III

He saw philosophy's task to be to provide the sciences with a "grounding on the basis of absolute insights, insights behind which one cannot go back any further". (1)

This, if possible, he thought could only be achieved as the result of a radical criticism of knowledge and belief. Any rigorous body of knowledge, any philosophy or science, if it does not rest on such

insights, will be unable to claim any greater validities for its assertions and findings than could be claimed by any common prejudice.

In his "Cartesian Meditations" (2) Husserl outlined his method of procedure, based on Descartes' "Method of Doubt" as employed in his "Meditations" (3). Husserl described how any serious philosopher must, "once in their life", withdraw and attempt, within themselves, to refuse to accept any belief, any science but to reject and rebuild those beliefs as their own authentic science or philosophy. This being Descartes' project, it was, however, not his personal, private affair but, rather, "the prototype for any beginning philosopher's necessary meditations, the meditations out of which alone a philosophy can grow originally". (4)

Husserl described Descartes' employment of the "Method of Doubt" in his "Meditations": (5)

I, the meditator, question all that I had hitherto believed to exist with respect to its dubitability and will not give acceptance to any belief that has any possibility of being doubted. All common sense belief is found dubitable. Only I, the meditator, qua thinking ego, remain. Even if the world of my belief is pure illusion, I remain, as the being subject to illusion.

But if Descartes had arrived at grounding certainty, what came out of it? Husserl said that the natural and positive sciences have not turned to, nor employed, the foundation which Descartes had provided for them. On the other hand, in philosophy, the "Meditations" had proved to be a turning point. The going back to the ego cogito had inaugurated the philosophical turn from naïve objectivism to the recognition of the primacy of subjectivity, of consciousness.



Descartes, Husserl argued, had failed to appreciate the significance of his epistemological reduction to the Ego Cogito. He did not realize the immense field which its self-evidence offers to investigation and which he had brought to light. Instead, he was influenced by what Husserl called a "Scholastic prejudice", that the Ego Cogito constituted an indubitable axiom,

"a little tag-end of the world" (6),  
from which, in conjunction with other axioms and perhaps inductively grounded hypotheses, he could deduce an explanatory "world science". This led to his "fateful" step of regarding his Ego as a "substantia cogitans", a starting point from which he could make causal inferences securing certainty for the otherwise dubitable. But the Ego Cogito, the indubitable subject of its thoughts, the indubitable subject for whom there is a dubitable world, cannot turn up as an object, amongst others, in that dubitable world, causally related to its objects.

The course which Descartes erroneously took was to seek to deduce, from the foundation of the Ego Cogito, the certainty of all clear and distinct perceptions - that is - ideas and beliefs about the objective world. To this end, he used his purported proof of the existence of God. But his 'proof' was by a fallaciously circular argument which runs: .....God, as the perfect being, could not cause us to be deceived in what we perceive clearly and distinctly. But we have a clear and distinct idea of God, therefore God exists. God, since perfect..... From God's ratification of our clear and distinct ideas, Descartes purported to deduce the objective existence of nature as a duality of finite substances, mind and body, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. (7)

Thus Descartes, having reached the epistemological turning point, did not achieve philosophy's radical grounding of knowledge in subjectivity. Here it should be noted that the "subjectivity" which can serve this

epistemological function is "transcendental subjectivity", using the term "transcendental" in the Kantian sense: In the "Critique of Pure Reason" (8) Kant defined the term "transcendental" thus:

"I entitle TRANSCENDENTAL all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible A PRIORI". Thus transcendental subjectivity is the subject as it can be known a priori, as the condition for the speculative development of knowledge.

Husserl argued that, in so far as the path of transcendental subjectivism had been followed, an adequate and final form of philosophy had not been reached. He saw the philosophy of his time as being in a state of fragmentation and divergence and that the philosophical grounding of science and knowledge was a task yet to be undertaken. This was what he, himself, sought to realize throughout his life. In founding modern Phenomenology, Husserl sought to establish and develop it as the genuine philosophy and philosophical method. In several of his major works, eg "Cartesian Meditations", "Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology" and "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" (9), Husserl tried to express the fundamental themes of phenomenology.

In his "Cartesian Meditations", he proceeded under the aegis of his epistemological guiding idea starting with uncriticized belief in one or another of its typical forms. Methodologically, he focussed on judgment, characterizing it as that in which something is meant, and meant as such-and-such, in which it is supposed that something exists, with such-and-such characteristics (10). To this **presumptive** judgment he contrasted the form of judgment where its truth is in question, when it is a question of having evidence, when the "something" is not just "meant" but present itself. In evidential judgment, what is is seen intuitively, itself. Evidence has degrees of perfection.

For instance, in scientific induction, verifying evidence for its judgments is gained in adventitious experience, being only ideally perfectible, in infinitum.

Husserl contrasted with this the evidence whose perfection is of a different order - the apodictic. This form of evidence has no degrees of perfection. Apodictic evidence is absolutely indubitable because it is perfectly self-evident. It itself is intuitively before consciousness, just as it is.

These methodological reflections to the end of finding founding certainty in knowledge produced the principle of the necessity of a grounding in apodictic truth. Armed with this principle, Husserl began his criticism of belief. He proceeded by a series of progressively radical "suspensions-of-judgment", or "parenthesizings" of belief, in search of that which would withstand the demand for self-evident apodicticity.

This brought him to the axial point of his inquiry - the self-evidence of consciousness, the Ego Cogito, understood in the transcendently reduced sense of being pure of any non-self-evident, presupposed qualifications or determinations - such as being the counterpart of a living body.

This was the turning point because he saw this as the starting point of a whole, unexplored and infinite field of inquiry, one which was to be the subject of a new science - Phenomenology, or as he more specifically called it - "Transcendental Phenomenology" (11). The "transcendental" implies that, unlike the empirical sciences, it is an a priori science, one whose evidences are already self-evidently accessible to the inquirer.

Husserl also distinguished this science of consciousness from any sciences concerned with understanding what is actually the case in particular instances. It is not concerned with the actual facts of particular consciousnesses, but with the universal structures of consciousness, as essential possibilities. To these, facts are merely illustrative.

From this point, in the "Cartesian Meditations" and his other introductory works, Husserl proceeded in clarifying exposition of consciousness's most general structures. In other works, he conducted more detailed and specific inquiries into parts of the field, particularly in the phenomenology of logic.

The most general structure which he deduced was that of its "intentionality". Consciousness is always consciousness-of-something. It is always given in relation to something to which it is in some sense directed, something "other", something "over-against-it", something, in this sense, objective, but which is, nevertheless, something correlative with the being-consciousness-of-it. Thus inquiry into consciousness must be directed to the two "sides" or "poles" of this relationship, and to the nature of the relationship itself.

#### IV

Here I am going to digress from my exposition of Husserl to discuss differences which were raised by two major philosophers who took phenomenology as their avenue into philosophy, namely Heidegger and Sartre.

Heidegger criticised Husserl on grounds analogous to Husserl's criticism of Descartes. This was that he had not been radical enough in his phenomenological "going-to-the-things-themselves" and so remained trapped by the suppositions and formulae of the

philosophical tradition. In particular this criticism applied to his characterization of consciousness, in its intentionality, as having subjective and objective "poles", this seeming to imply, to Heidegger, that Husserl meant that the being, the existential structure of consciousness is something subjective, "res cogitans", meant in the traditional sense of "subjectivity" as understood in the tradition (12).

Heidegger argued that philosophy, proceeding phenomenologically, should concern itself primarily with the being of beings, ie that it should be phenomenological ontology. His analyses led him to the view that the being of physically appearing things, of physical nature in general, which he described as "extantness", a "being-to-hand", "Vorhandenheit" or "Vorhandensein", could only be explicated in terms of the being of beings for whom anything is extant or to-hand, namely the "Dasein", whose mode of being he characterized as "existence". (Incidentally it was these formulations which gave rise to the term "Existentialism"). The Dasein is consciousness. Heidegger was at pains to prevent its presupposition as being-subjective in the traditional sense. In his "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (13), he said

".....but to ask whether and how the being of the subject must be determined as an entrance into the problems of philosophy, and in fact in such a way that orientation toward it is not one-sidedly subjectivistic."

Further on he said (14)

"the sole characterization of intentionality hitherto customary in phenomenology proves to be inadequate and external."

Further still he said (15)

"Transcendence is a fundamental determination of the ontological structure of the Dasein."

Heidegger argued that, whereas in the philosophical tradition

"transcendent" being had referred to that objective being over-against consciousness, it is really consciousness itself which, with regard to those things, is transcendent. Furthermore he argued that this "being-transcendent" is the active being of "transcendence", in its active directing of itself towards those objects, this being the teleology inherent in its intentionality.

Sartre, in "Being and Nothingness" (16), also recognized transcendence as the fundamental ontological structure of consciousness, transcendence being the unity of knowledge and action, describing the being of consciousness as "being-for-itself" and as being, in its being, a pursuit of being. This once again recognized the teleology inherent in consciousness's intentionality.

Notwithstanding their differences with Husserl, both these philosophers nevertheless recognized the importance of intentionality, as a structure, for the interpretation of the being of consciousness. I do not agree with Heidegger that Husserl took the traditional philosophical prejudice and presupposition about the nature of subjectivity into his philosophical analysis of consciousness. It is simply that his "way-in" to the problem is different from Heidegger's, but none the less valid. In this context, that of providing an epistemological grounding, I prefer to take my lead from Husserl, whose project of penetrating through unacknowledged prejudicial assumptions to a presuppositionless grounding I regard as pre-eminently correct.

V

I shall now return to Husserl's identification that inquiry into the field of a priori knowledge offered by consciousness must be directed to the two "poles" of consciousness, the subjective and the objective, with the proviso that these terms be taken void of preconceptions.

Husserl described the subjective side as having two "moments". One is sensory flux, its material "having", whose receipt is passive, and the other is that of the active subjective processes in which objective meanings are constituted or formed - in other words - intended.

On the objective side, there are the object forms intended - considered purely as the ideal correlates of the object-forming processes, "objectivations", without transcendent reference.

In specification of consciousness's structure under its intentional form, Husserl took perceptual consciousness to be its primary mode, epistemologically. He regarded the structures of perception to be presupposed to and exemplificatory for other modes of consciousness such as the moral or the evaluative (17). NB this is not to say that a concrete consciousness can consist solely in perceptual consciousness. In perception, the typical form of its objects is that of actual individual things, believed certainly to be because of their presence to the percipient.

But what is believed to be actually present in perception, what, intentionally speaking, is "meant" as actually being present, greatly exceeds what is given in perception, its apodictic content. Typically individual objects are seen in profile, presenting only a side or a face. Moreover the manifold given to intuition (to use Kant's terminology) is a stream of ever-changing sensory material. This requires, on the subjective side, a general form of sense-making activity, which is unifying synthesis. It is this synthesis which allows what is not actually given in perception, to be meant, ie to have the meaning as being actually present along with what is actually given in the perception.

Husserl described identification as the fundamental form of synthesis. This form is first encountered in the all-embracing synthesis of internal-time - ie under the form of the order of successive occurring of its content.

This he described as necessary for the synthesis of objective unities, as the condition of their "constitution" in consciousness. The object has the unity of identity with itself, in the belonging-together of its appearances in its unity. The appearances can be separated, successive or simultaneous, but it is the belonging-together of all these appearances as appearing in the unity of the consciousness united in internal-time which allows their being differentially embraced in the unity of the object.

In cognition, itself considered as part of the field of a priori, apodictic, knowledge offered by consciousness, Husserl gave geneological priority to the naive pre-cognitive, pre-predicative - in other words - pre-logical objects of belief, This is the field of objective meaning (suspending judgment on its truth, falsity or degree of certainty) which is the product of the straight-forward, unreflective sense-making activity of consciousness, prior to thought, cognition and reason in their logical senses.

What I have so far described of Husserl's explication of the structures of consciousness corresponds to what I earlier described as positive epistemology, Consciousness, the being who knows, is explicated in how it arrives at what it knows and believes, and correlatively the forms of the objectivity which it constitutes.

The next major structure of consciousness which Husserl tried to explicate was that of the meaning of the ego, of the ego-cogito-



cogitatum intentional structure, considered transcendently of course. The ego is only abstractly separable from the processes which make up the self's life. It is the form of their identity, their belonging-together in the same unity of being. But the ego is not this form empty and passively as though the walls of a container. It is constantly developing and changing by virtue of its activity, by what it wills. It is constantly characterized by being the voluntary agent, the motivational "seat" for what it wills, habitually and contingently.

Concretely, as ego, I am the unitary totality of my conscious life. I am my history of willing, valuing, believing, judging, acting in general and my whole experienced sensory givenness, together with the whole history of my world of belief, considered in its pure ideality as what I believe and have believed.

Here my discussion of Husserl's epistemology runs into the questions of what I shall be presupposing as findings of a priori ontology. What I see as the greatest significance of Husserl's epistemology is the insight that all knowledge of being, all truth, is possible by and founded on the being of, the existence of consciousness.

This recognition of consciousness-in-its-own-right, as something with its own reality, giving itself self-evidently to inquiry is, I believe, an important and necessary key for our self-understanding and self-realization as human beings. For one thing, it releases us from, and allows us to transcend, the bondage of the physiocistic interpretation of reality, the pervasive and restrictive prejudice of Western science and thought, in which consciousness is interpreted as something not really real, as a mere epi-phenomenon of supposedly really real physical processes, especially in the brain.

Another major prejudicial preconception of the being of consciousness is its interpretation as being analogous to the being of physical things. Descartes' distinction of mind and body as *res cogitans* and *res extensa* treats the being of consciousness as substantive being. Thus the *Ego Cogito* is interpreted as a logical subjectum, as the equivalent of the subject term of a proposition, which is determined, predicated by its cogitationes, its thoughts. Thus in the Synopsis to his "Meditations", Descartes said (18):

"..... while the human mind is not similarly composed of any accidents, but is a pure substance. For although all the accidents of mind be changed, although, for instance, it thinks certain things, wills others, perceives others, etc, despite all this it does not emerge from these changes another mind" (18).

As substances, the being of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* is equivalent. Both Heidegger and Sartre explicitly denied this latter conception and sought to phenomenologically expose its untenability. Heidegger, for example, said in "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (19):

"Modern Philosophy made a total turnabout ..... and started out from the subject, the *Ego*. ....it will be expected that ontology ..... interprets the concept of being by looking to the mode of being of the subject ..... But this is precisely what does not happen."

How did Husserl treat this question? In his "Ideas: ..." (20), he said:

"The theory of categories must begin absolutely from this most radical of all distinctions of being - being as consciousness [*res cogitans*] and being as being that 'manifests' itself in consciousness, 'transcendent' being [*res extensa*]" and again "Between consciousness [*res cogitans*] and reality [*res extensa*] there yawns a veritable abyss of meaning" (21).

Heidegger quoted this passage to suggest Husserl's lack of ontological

radicality, as I noted before, but again, as I said previously, the difference reflects their different ways into the problem and that the passage, contrary to Heidegger's view, demonstrates that Husserl was being ontologically radical, on epistemological grounds.

Husserl described consciousness, transcendental subjectivity, as the only absolute concretion, meaning that it is the universe, the all-embracing milieu, in which all possible sense, or meaning, is found. As he said (22):

The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely - nonsense.

And further, he said (23):

Genuine theory of knowledge is accordingly possible only as a transcendental-phenomenological theory, which, instead of operating with inconsistent inferences leading from a supposed immanency to a supposed transcendency (that of no matter what "thing in itself", which is alleged to be essentially unknowable), has to do exclusively with systematic clarification of the knowledge performance, a clarification in which this must become thoroughly understandable as an intentional performance.

These passages have a strong epistemological significance in expressing Husserl's views. He shows that consciousness as the one who knows cannot escape its being-consciousness. No objectivity, no true being,

can be known, can evidently be, outside of its relationship to the consciousness in which it is known. To suppose something unknowable is nonsense because it could have no possible meaning.

The sense in which transcendental subjectivity is the only absolute concretion is precisely in its being the "universe of sense".

Absolutely no meaning, of the essence of "meaning", can be outside its relationship to consciousness. Consciousness in the sense of transcendental subjectivity is the absolute field of all knowledge of being. Any objectivity, any being, any world, is one for consciousness. This only circumscribes their sense or meaning to the extent that, as sense or meaning, they are constituted in consciousness, for consciousness.

It is now perhaps appropriate for me to give a more detailed account of how Husserl conceived how meanings, in their many different modes and forms, are constituted in consciousness and the activity of consciousness in constituting them.

In the field of all objects meant, is the issue of the being or non-being of what is meant, of the truth or falsity of what is meant.

This establishes the relationship between the constituting consciousness and the objective meaning it constitutes of reason and unreason.

When truth or correctness pertain to the constituting activity, being can truly apply to what is meant. As Husserl said at (24):

Reason refers to possibilities of verification; and verification refers ultimately to making evident and having as evident.

These considerations relate to what I discussed earlier in Husserl's regarding perception as being consciousness's primary mode. He said (24):

..... evidence denotes ..... the quite pre-eminent mode of consciousness that consists in the self-appearance, the self-exhibiting, the self-giving, of an affair, an affair-complex (or

state of affairs), a universality, a value, or other objectivity, in the final mode: "itself there", "immediately intuited", / "given originaliter".

For the Ego, for the intending consciousness, this means, according to Husserl, that its intentional object, that which as meaning it is constituting, is something the Ego is with itself, having direct "viewing" and insight into it. This points to what Husserl called an essential "fundamental trait of all intentional life" (25), which is that in constituting meaning, consciousness is either itself its object-giving evidence, already, or has a tendency to changing such that it has evidential givenness of its object. For consciousness to be able to assert that the meaning it constitutes, the object it intends, is truly so, it must be able to point to a verificational experience in which its object itself is evidentially given.

What is meant needs this relation to evidential givenness, but, once achieved, once verifiable by reference to such an experience, it can be meant and it can abide in its potentiality of verification.

The sense, what is constituted, in the act, the intentional process of meaning, is generally something built up progressively. In his "Ideas, ... .." (26), Husserl described this process. To begin with, the central nucleic meaning is intended, in an unfulfilled sense and progressively a series of evidential experiences fulfil, build up and augment the core meaning. This is a process of synthesis in which the different experiential phases are united into being of the object meant. In this process, what is presently meant, built on and around the central meaning, consists in "layers" where previous activity of intending the object, with whatever degree of evidence, what Husserl called "noeses" are included in the object as meant,

the "noema". Here an example may help clarify this description. I am remembering my cat of a few years back. I can imaginatively picture him in a typical setting - the garden. I picture his tabby coat, seen in a number of perspectives. I remember when, frightened, he ran up a tree in the garden and caused great problems to be retrieved. I can remember him sitting on my lap, purring, or curled up asleep in front of the fire. As can be seen, a great wealth of meanings are built up around the central object. In that body of meaning, a large part consists of my experiences, my feeling and attitude towards him, my consciousness of him as much as what was objectively intended by me of him in those experiences.

Returning to Husserl's exposition of the structures of consciousness, in his characterization of the concrete Ego, he described it as a "Monad", after Leibniz, in its being taken together, as Ego, with having a surrounding world continually "existing for me" (27). Husserl argued that the belief that there is an objective world, a nature, which is one and the same for all, transcendent in the sense that its being is believed not to be dependent upon consciousness to be, is contingent upon, and presupposes, belief in the existence of other selves. Nature, in this sense, exists objectively for an inter-subjective community of Monads and this is implicit in its meaning. Thus its being, in the sense of its quiddity, its "whatness", is not absolute but subject-relative, since its being, qua meaning, is constituted by subjectivity, for subjectivity.

The subjective community itself exists for each monad as that of which it believes itself to be a self-subsistent member. But the being of each monad is not subject-relative for each other member of the community, but absolutely for itself. They are relative to each other through the medium of the objective nature which exists as one and

the same for, and relatively to, each one of them. What is more, the community is supposed to be one and all-embracing, for were any possible member believed to be outside the community, its being-believed would include it in the community.

VI

This brings me to the point where, having accepted the realm of transcendental subjectivity, the phenomenological field of consciousness, as the epistemological ground and foundation for my inquiry in the philosophy of good, I must interrogate the field for the grounding phenomena of good.

Having said this, I find I cannot draw directly upon Husserl's analyses to identify these phenomena, nor, incidentally, those of Heidegger or Sartre.

My criticisms of Husserl in this respect go back to what fundamental essential structures are to be found in the being of consciousness. I think he failed to portray an all-important essential structure concretely enough.

This concerns sensory or material self-existence - feeling - aesthesia - , as it is in its own right, in what are its distinct essential characteristics. Husserl said that the phenomenology of the material side of the stream of consciousness is a separate, subordinate field of inquiry (28). It is that which provides a content to enter into the intentional "tissue" - to fill in the otherwise empty forms of intentional objects. It is that, in perception, which provides the sense of actuality of the objects perceived. The other side of the stream of consciousness, that of its "noetic" (from "noesis", Husserl's term for making sense of and forming sensory material into intentional objectivity) active disclosure and bestowal of meaning upon that of which it is consciousness, is what Husserl regarded as Phenomenology's

superordinate field of inquiry, to be interpreted teleologically in its function of constituting the objective field (29). However, I feel that this relegation of the material content of consciousness does not do justice either to what it is or to its relation to the whole of what consciousness is.

The sense-making, object-forming, intentional activity of consciousness does not just arise spontaneously, ex nihilo, for no reason - it is motivated. That it is motivated can be seen in it as it gives itself. Husserl's ascription to it of the teleological function of constituting its objective field is inadequate to describe and explain the structure of its motivation. The concrete phenomenon of consciousness has a teleological structure. It pursues ends. What are "ends"? I need to clarify this. In relation to consciousness, an "end" is an intentional objectivity. It belongs to the objective, ideal, "noematic" (30) pole of consciousness, the correlate of its intentional activity. But it differs from the perceptual or cognitive object. The end is something which consciousness projects, "puts-forward", as that which it is seeking to realize, or make actual. It is a meaning with a peculiar essential structure. It is envisioned, believingly, as a possibility, in the sense that whatever presently is can be changed such that the end comes-into-being. It is further characterized by the envisioning of its realization through the agency, in some way however directly or indirectly, of the conscious subject who projects the end. As meaning, the "end" can vary from extreme vagueness or obscurity to great clarity and distinctness. It can be intended in varying degrees of implicitness or explicitness.

Consciousness's sense-making activity is only intelligible in the light of its having ends. Using Heidegger's formula of the being of consciousness (the Dasein) being, in every case, "mine" (31), what



essential character of my having and pursuing ends gives this activity intelligibility as such? Most fundamentally (or, perhaps, ultimately) it is my anticipation of a satisfaction in the realization of the end. This is an aspect of meaning, however implicit or explicit, vague or clear, recognized or unrecognized, always included in the end-meaning. But the satisfaction pertains to the sensory or material content of my experience. It consists in my really living and having better feeling or aesthesia than I would have experienced, were I to have not sought to realize the end, whatever it particularly is. But what is my "good" and how is it "better" in the end-realization?

In "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (32), Heidegger, discussing Kant on moral personality, described pleasure, in the widest sense, as not only desire for something and pleasure in something but also always enjoyment - the subject experiences themselves as enjoying. In general the essential nature of feeling is not only feeling for something but at the same time it makes feelable the feeler themselves. In feeling, is a mode of becoming-revealed-to-oneself. Heidegger said (33):

"What is phenomenologically decisive in the phenomenon of feeling is that it directly uncovers and makes accessible that which is felt, and it does this not, to be sure, in the manner of intuition but in the sense of a direct having-of-oneself. Both moments of the structure of feeling must be kept in mind: feeling as feeling-for and simultaneously the self-feeling in the having-feeling-for".

In order to talk about the material content, the material "having-of-itself" of consciousness, I should like to give my own preliminary account of the being of consciousness. Consciousness in the sense of its always being "mine" is self-being. This self-being exists as the most concrete and, in a sense, as previously discussed, absolute

form of being. Self, in its being, involves its relation to what is other than itself, and I term this relationship "being-transcended". Self, consciousness, in existing is transcended. "Otherness", "transcendent being" is an integral given of self-existence.

I asked "what is my good?". It is involved in my material self-existence, my self-feeling, and also my being-transcended. I have referred to this material content of conscious existence as "sensory". But this is solely to identify what I mean as the phenomenal range included in "material content". "Sensory" should not here be taken as meaning "delivered by the senses". To do so would be to presuppose the nature of human reality, which should, itself, be a meaning generated by consciousness's activity in relation to its being-transcended. Unfortunately the sensory phenomena included in the range are identified by reference to the senses or the body - ie the visual, hearing, smelling, taste, the tactile and the supposedly general senses of bodily awareness, kinaesthesia and coenaesthesia. The point is that these phenomena, considered phenomenologically without prejudice and presupposition are feeling. They are both self-feeling and self-being-transcended.

Self-feeling-being-transcended is always characterized by its degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness, its goodness or badness. It is central in the material stream of life since, however it varies, whatever its different forms of content, it partakes of different degrees of good-feeling or bad-feeling.

By the nature of this quality of feeling, consciousness takes an attitude towards it - it wants good-feeling, it avers bad-feeling. In existing (using the verb transitively) its being-transcended, consciousness seeks to change what it itself is in that sense - to change its givenness. The changing of its givenness could be described

as the self's pursuit of identity with itself, of being one with itself in the sense of its self-feeling being wholly good without the alien bad-feeling from which it is in flight.

Terminological note:-

In this last paragraph, I have used the term "avers". I am making a technical use of the term, of my own adoption, in which I mean it to relate, etymologically, to the associated terms "aversive" and "aversion". By the verb "to aver", I mean the opposite of, the negative to the meaning of the verb "to want".

I should like at this stage to return to Husserl's way of approaching these phenomena, to clarify how my phenomenological description differs from his. In the "Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution" of his "Ideas ....." (34), Husserl discussed "The Constitution of the Spiritual World" (35) and he identified "Motivation as the Fundamental Law of the Spiritual World" (36). By "spiritual world" he meant "the world of consciousness for consciousness", or the "personal world", or the "world of the self for itself". He contraposed the constitution of this world to the constitution of the "world of material nature". At (37), he said:

..... the surrounding world is not a world "in itself" but is rather a world "for me", precisely the surrounding world of its Ego-subject, a world experienced by the subject or grasped consciously in some other way and posited by the subject in his intentional lived experiences with the sense-content of the moment. ....

To begin with, the world is, in its core, a world appearing to the senses and characterized as "on hand", a world given in straightforward empirical intuitions and perhaps grasped actively. The Ego then finds itself related to this empirical world in new acts, eg, in acts of valuing or in acts of pleasure and displeasure.

In these acts, the object is brought to consciousness as valuable, pleasant, beautiful, etc, ..... When I hear the tone of a violin, the pleasantness and beauty are given originally if the tone moves my feelings originally and in a lively manner, and the beauty as such is given originally precisely within the medium of this pleasure, and similarly is given the mediate value of the violin as producing such a tone, insofar as we see it itself being played and grasp intuitively the causal relation which is founding here.

Clearly, Husserl recognizes and refers directly, here, to the phenomenon of materially given feeling-quality, namely as "pleasure". "Pleasure" describes the satisfaction, the good-feeling to which I am alluding. He shows how the felt pleasure is objectivated into being constitutive of the beauty of the music and value of the violin. Furthermore, the motivational involvement of good-feeling in object constitution is seen. Husserl's description of the constitution of the surrounding world as a world "for me", corresponds, I think, to my description of myself, as Ego, as consciousness, "being-transcended". But does he, in relation to this world's being "given in straightforward empirical intuitions", recognize that its transcending "otherness", as constituted meaning, is mediated by its co-given relation to consciousness's feeling-content, as being in some degree good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant? At (38), Husserl said:

Opposed to the active Ego stands the passive, and the Ego is always passive at the same time whenever it is active, in the sense of being affected as well as being receptive, .....  
From the properly subjective ..... we must now distinguish, on the one hand, the objective, that over and against which the Ego comports itself actively or passively, and, on the other hand, the

material substratum of "stuff" upon which this comportment is built.  
..... Running backwards through the strata of the constitution of the thing, we arrive finally at the data of sensation as the ultimate, primitive, primal objects, no longer constituted by any kind of Ego-activity whatsoever but, in the most pregnant sense of the term, pregivennesses for all of the Ego's operations. They are "subjective", but they are not states or acts of the Ego; rather, they are what is had by the Ego, the Ego's first "subjective possession".

Husserl sets things out very clearly here. But he does not here identify, in the "material substratum", in the "stuff", in that which is "my" first "subjective possession", what, essentially, pertaining to that which is most originally given, first motivates my interest and moves me to object-constituting, sense-making activity. Further on, he said (39):

Objects experienced in the surrounding world are at one time attended to, at another time not; and if they are, they exercise a greater or lesser "stimulation". They "arouse" an interest and, in virtue of this interest, a tendency to turn towards them. This tendency then freely unfolds in the turning, or else it unfolds only after counter-tendencies weaken or are overcome, etc. All this is played out between the Ego and the intentional object. The object exercises stimulation, perhaps by virtue of its pleasing appearance.

Husserl here demonstrates motivation as the rule for intentional life, for all active relations of subjectivity to the objectivity which exists "for me". He shows the relationship of "being-pleased" (good-feeling) in this essential teleological structure. It would seem consistent with what he has said that it is implicit that the same teleological structure and relation of good-feeling applies to what is original

for intentional life, namely the activity of object-constitution, as the limiting boundary of motivation and the intentional life. But Husserl has not explicitly expressed such a recognition. Nor did he make the relation of good-feeling to motivation a thematic object of investigation, elaboration and explication, as I am presently trying to do.

## VII

This leads me to reflect about why this is so. In my view, Husserl has been instrumental in producing a very major philosophical advance, which is that of recognizing the Ego cogito, or subjectivity, or consciousness as a field of inquiry in its own right. Moreover, he identified its investigation as being epistemologically pre-eminent and saw that its field of possible investigation is all-embracing and practically infinite. Husserl saw in this immense field, those possible themes of phenomenological investigation and elucidation to which he devoted his lifetime's work. I cannot comment on the particularity of his motivation to his major themes, except to say that they could only be particular and limited. That the theme of good-feeling was not pursued in his investigations is not particularly surprising. In comparison, my own modest philosophical endeavours have had the benefit of Husserl's elucidations and insights. As I said at the beginning of this Introduction, I have chosen "good" as this thesis' theme, because, as I see it, it can provide answers to the "why" questions of existence. But anything I can demonstrate in this respect will necessarily be, as cognitive achievement, limited. And I must recognize, in full humility, that whatever insights I may produce, will only be limited "drops" in relation to everything unrealized in the "universe of possible sense". This means my insights can only be partial. They cannot be wholly concrete. I cannot give them wholly adequate qualification nor set definite limits to their fields of applicability and validity. Overall then, I must recognize my limited power in

relation to truth. Whatever phenomenological self-evidence I may be able to claim for my insights, my power of description, meaning and making-sense remains a limited one. However categorically I may assert any of my particular positions, they are nevertheless haunted by my limited power in relation to truth. I hope that in recognizing this, the reader will excuse the form of my assertions if, sometimes, they have a dogmatic or didactic air!

In relation to my themes of "good" and, subordinately, "good-feeling", if I ask, for example, why consciousness, in relation to its actually given experiential content, is moved to intentional, object-constituting, sense-making activity, I can answer: "because it is good". And I can go on in descriptive elucidation of what I mean to talk about relations of "good-feeling", etc. But if I go on to ask "why is it good?", I run up against the limits of the intelligibility that my treatment of "good" can insightfully demonstrate. I could perhaps reply that it is good because reality or being is so constituted, but this adds nothing - it really says: "because it is!". I do not know what further insight is possible, nor what possible evidences there are beyond those available to myself. I must accept my limitedness. I will end this interlude of reflection here, and return to my discussion of "being-transcended" and "good-feeling".

### VIII

Consciousness "avers" (in my sense) bad-feeling. It is the self's finding itself alienated from itself which is the root, the primary "moving-point" of its activeness. Itself, in its immanence, is given alien otherness. In its being it is transcended. It cannot at will, simply and by itself, make its experiential self-content wholly good. For example:- Suppose I wake up with a headache. I cannot will it away "just like that". I can act on it - take tablets, act so as not to exacerbate it, etc. But what this signifies is that the headache's condition transcends me.

Finding that one can only improve one's experiential content in relation to an imposed condition is what produces for consciousness the meaning that there is transcendent being.

Here of course, I am speaking epistemologically. I have reached this juncture of trying to describe how, in the immanence of my own being, I come to constitute, to believe, that there is being transcending, ie, beyond and outside, my being, through the phenomenological epistemological procedure of suspension of judgment in respect of all my non-self-evident existential beliefs. It is in answer to my question "how do I know that there is any being transcending my being?" (or perhaps "how can I know?") that I can answer, from what remains in immanent self-evidence, what gives, and is constitutive of, "transcendent being". But I cannot point to actual particular experiences in which such a constitutional realization of belief occurs. I find myself, in making these investigations, already laden with a multitude of beliefs and theses about transcendent being, whose actual origins are obscure. It maybe that my consciousness, in its unfolding and development in the course of my life, already has had at its disposal a body of pre-constituted beliefs and existential understandings, obviating the need for my own original constitutive sense-making. However, from the epistemological point of view, such beliefs are not themselves evidence for what they believe. I must still find what is constitutive of and motivational for such beliefs in what consciousness itself gives.

What can I know, a priori, of the ontological structure of "transcendent being"? Of all the constitutive beings of the being which I find transcending myself, the most general division is that between the "selfhood", in the sense of consciousness, of other beings, in other words "other selves" (though not necessarily human selves)



and materially apparent "things", beings in the sense of being physically objective for consciousness.

What individual, individuated things are for "me", for the subjectivity which is consciousness of them is constituted by the attribution to them of parts of the content of "my" own transcending givenness, as their appearances. In their "whatness", they are understood in terms of what they mean for, their possibilities for, "my" own good experience. This latter level of meaning is found in the fact that everything which transcends me, which is objective for me, is caught up in my motivations, my ends, these involving relations of good-feeling. Their teleological involvement, in whatever form of value they may have for me, be it instrumental utility, aesthetic, etc, leads to the constitutive building of their layers of meaning beyond their mere subject-relativity for myself. Their inter-subjective, universal properties, those of the totality of their actual and possible appearances to any experiencing subject in general are constituted. Beyond this are constituted the complex of internal and external relations to themselves of all other beings and of the whole of transcendent being. It is in these latter relations that the means reside for me, or negatively, there is resistance to my will, in my pursuit of my ends involving them, through which I can realize my own good experience, in my possibilities of changing my actual relations to them.

The selfhood, however, of beings who are, in some sense, other selves, is not constituted, as meaning, by the attribution of parts of "my" self's given content in the course of the other's being experienced. Physical appearances are not constitutive of selfhood. Rather, other selves are understood as sharing that same essential selfhood with myself, finding themselves as, and being in relation to, their own

being-transcended. They are consciousnesses, with their own "surrounding worlds" (to use Husserl's expression), having, essentially, their own teleological relationship to their worlds. Other selves are "there", objectively, for me, transcending my being. But I only indirectly perceive their selfhood as being so, through the medium of objective things. I perceive their power, in my transcending world, to alter and influence the transcending condition of my existence, for better or worse. The fact that other selves, in their being, do not merely, or principally, exist "for me", but whose being is centred on their being for themselves, in being consciousnesses, means they have a radically different existential status for me from that of "things". Other selves have their own good. Their "own good" is something that directly affects my own good. Their "own good" "matters", one way or another, to myself.

These descriptions of the meanings of the being that transcends "my" being deal with its actuality, its presence, its actually being there transcending my being. But their teleological relations to myself of instrumentality, of being-aesthetically-pleasing, etc, or of "mattering", have a time dimension. Instrumentality relates to relations in time in which the realization of my ends and my good experience can come about. My concern with others' "own good" involves not just the present moment but their good lived across time.

Furthermore there is constituted a meaning of "good", which is of its existing transcendently in the objective world. "Good" exists objectively in the value of things, for example, being "good-for-me" or in beings "mattering" for their own sake, in their being "good-in-themselves". I am only here outlining these relations, preparatory to their treatment in Section 1, The Phenomenology of Good-Feeling.

Returning to the being of physical reality, what it is, its quiddity,

its phenomenality and complexes of relations, are subject-relative. But is that it is, its ipseity, subject-relative? Does being-for-consciousness, relative-being, totally account for and exhaust its being? Surely, in its being-relative, there must be a being which is its own, for it not to be absorbed wholly in the being of the consciousness to which it is relative.

Sartre, for example, in "Being and Nothingness" (40), argued that the being of phenomenal existents is, in-itself, "transphenomenal", meaning that its being-in-itself, in absolute indifference, is the condition of its phenomenal being-for and relatedness-to consciousness.

This is certainly one possibility. It is an "obvious" answer to the "scandal" of what is physically transcendent for consciousness. It could simply be itself, substantially, with its inhering determining laws, determining its possibilities of appearing-to and being-for consciousness. But this is not the only possibility, it is not necessarily so. The attribute of absolute, indifferent, identity with itself is postulated. It is an (admittedly possible) meaning conferred on it by consciousness. This indifferent being-in-itself is a hypothetical limitation of its possibilities. As hypothesis, in the absence of contrary evidence, it may be justified for the sake of speculative theorizing. But it is not a given of a priori ontology.

Another possibility is that in its being which is its own, in-itself, it is not indifferent, totally "compressed" in its own being. There could be a "self-awareness", a being-for-itself, in what is in-itself. By "self-awareness" I do not necessarily mean self-consciousness in any reflexive sense. Self-awareness, in complexes of selfness and otherness could be the being which is its own (ie self-being) of the physically transcendent being which transcends consciousness in its being.

This question, which reflects on the nature of reality as a whole, is something which cannot be settled by a priori ontology, at least, not by that which I can perform. However I do regard it as ultimately important, something as far as I am concerned to be approached by metaphysical speculation. On it hangs the question of the "good" pertaining to that which transcends consciousness. For if a being is in itself indifferent, its "being-good" can only be for the consciousness which it transcends. But if it exists, in some sense, for itself, its "being-good" is something in itself, of itself and for itself, which as such "matters" for the consciousness whose being it transcends. I shall be discussing these metaphysical relations at the "other end" of this thesis, in the final Appendix.

To summarize my findings so far with respect to the phenomena of "good", good, or the phenomenal range belonging to good, exists in consciousness as a characterization of its material content, of its being-transcended, as a quality of feeling. This quality of feeling is an essential moment of consciousness's teleological structure. This points out to me the importance for this thesis of phenomenologically investigating motivation. I need to try to make activity, aims and ends intelligible and to show what "good" is, how it is constituted, beyond the existence of good- or bad-feeling in individual consciousnesses.

The Philosophy of Good

SECTION 1      The Phenomenology of Good-Feeling

What phenomena give good-feeling and what are their range?

In my Introduction (page 13), I gave an account of Husserl's description of the "subjective side" of consciousness having two "moments", one being its material "having". He further specified consciousness's structure, under its intentional form, as being, in its primary mode, "perceptual consciousness". Further on in my Introduction (page 24), in my own fundamental description of consciousness, I said that self-feeling-being-transcended is always characterized by some degree of good-feeling or bad-feeling.

What does it mean to say that perception is consciousness's primary mode? This description distinguishes perception from other possible modes of consciousness. I referred earlier to the modes of moral and evaluative consciousness. Other modes are imaginative consciousness, dreaming consciousness and thinking consciousness. Why is perception, in relation to these other modes, primary?

Is it that, in any existing consciousness, considered concretely without abstraction from what is given, perceptual consciousness is always present? What constitutes consciousness's being-perceptual? This is an area of complexity, of ambiguity and of different meanings attaching to the same expression.

I should like to deal first with what I shall call "perception-proper". This is the apprehending consciousness which is directed to the apprehension of what it is apprehending. Here the phrase "apprehending a criminal" can serve as a clue to the meaning of "apprehension":-

it is to "catch-hold-of", to "secure", to "capture". This mode of consciousness has the intentional structure of the perceiver who is perceptually consciousness-of what is perceived and this act establishes the "perceivedness" or "being-perceived" and the objectivated meaning of what is perceived.

Here the general structure of consciousness can be typically seen. There is the "subjective side" with its "moment" of having a passively received content and its "moment" of sense-making, object-directed activity. On the "objective side" there is the objectivated meaning of what it is perceiving and of its factual actuality (ipseity).

But this is far from the whole picture of a concrete consciousness. It is hard to conceive of a purely perceiving consciousness. Such a consciousness would only be concerned with effecting the perceivedness of its objects - or, more correctly - its objective field. But consciousness as a rule does not simply perceive for the sake of the perceiving. The teleology of perceiving relates to the wider teleological field of the conscious agent and its perceiving is "for" or "as-means-to" the realization of the agent's ends.

How does this compare to other modes of consciousness? When there is consciousness in any of these other modes, is perception-proper always present? Does the general intentional form of there being two related moments in the "subjective side" always apply?

What about the case of dreaming-consciousness?

In the time that one is dreaming, it is "as though" one is perceiving. One believes that one is awake and living in and through the dream events and involved in a waking-life which can involve any other

mode of consciousness - pursuing ends, willing, valuing, having a moral perspective, imagining and even dreaming! But awakening dispels this dreaming world of belief in the "as though", quasi modes of consciousness.

What is the difference? When one goes to sleep "perchance to dream", there is as a rule a general quieting of the senses, a drastic reduction in the general level of sensory awareness and a withdrawal from object-directed consciousness involving perception-proper as a basic structure. What establishes the difference between dreaming and waking is the upsurge of sensory content and its motivation of object-directed perceptual consciousness.

How then is dreaming given itself? The problem of a phenomenological "going-to-the-dream-itself" is that when one does this one is not dreaming and one has to remember dreaming. The ideational activity directed to establishing the essential a priori structures of dreaming consciousness is restricted to what one can remember of dreaming, which leaves an open possibility of dreaming or other modes of consciousness beyond what can be remembered.

But that one can remember dreaming is, itself, significant. Dreaming is itself given. Consciousness lives its dreaming. Furthermore, in so far as it can remember its dreaming, it apprehends itself dreaming. In a sense it perceives itself dreaming. But this perceiving is not perceiving in the sense of perception-proper. In apprehending its dreaming, in dreaming, the consciousness is not directed apprehendingly towards its dreaming. The dreaming consciousness is directed to its objects in whichever "as though" modes of consciousness it is operating. If it reflects, if it turns its attention to itself, it is in an "as though" mode.

The primary mode of a dreaming consciousness is "as though" it were perceiving. It is "as though" it is having a sensory flux, "as though", through this it perceives a transcending, objective world. Its "as though" content in dreaming is not nothing. Similarly, within dreaming, the consciousness is acting. It is motivated and it experiences feeling qualities with degrees of good- or bad-feeling.

The non-directed perceiving of dreaming is a consciousness of dreaming which does not make the dreaming the object of the consciousness. It is, to use Sartre's terminology (1), a non-thetic or non-positional self-consciousness. In consciousness's intentional structure, it belongs to the "subjective side" - it has its dreaming, it lives its dreaming. In remembering dreaming, the dreaming becomes its thematic object, but this is only possible because of its self-perception in dreaming.

This mode of self-perceiving applies to all modes of consciousness. Consciousness, in existing, is self-disclosing. It gives itself to itself. Adapting Sartre's terminology (2), it-exists-itself (using the verb transitively); in existing, in whatever mode, it perceives itself, directly, not as its thematic object. This non-thetic-self-perception corresponds to what, in the philosophical tradition, is described as the self-apperception which accompanies every object-directed perception, indeed every object-directed consciousness.

This apperception corresponds to what Husserl called the all-embracing synthesis of internal time (3). But is not this synthesis the condition of possibility for all intentional consciousness-of?



Does it just happen, of necessity, or is consciousness responsible for doing the self-synthesising? And what is this self, as synthesised, if not a meaning for consciousness? Can this meaning for consciousness be in any sense other than as its intentional object?

Here I can only attempt phenomenological description.

The meaning which one generates for oneself, through one's all-embracing self-synthesis, is a sense of oneself which one does not posit, in the synthesising which generates it, as one's intentional object, as one's "thesis", but nevertheless it is a sense which one has as an intentional content of one's consciousness. It is of the same nature as everything which one retains, which one knows in the sense of being able to be "brought to mind" as intentional object. As such, its mode of being is ideality, since it is not a content in the sense of consciousness's having-of-itself, or existing-itself.

But whilst the synthetic meaning is ideal in this sense, the lived-experience synthesised, the self-given-self-existence, is a real "subjective-side" content and so not ideal.

I must now return to the question which I posed at the beginning of this section. Why is perception, in relation to other modes of consciousness, primary?

Firstly, all consciousness, in existing-itself, is self-perception or apperception. The meaning of itself brought about by its all-embracing self-synthesis is a meaning correlative with the meaning of its being-transcended, that it is not what is other-than-itself.

Secondly, its synthesis of self-meaning and other-meaning is motivated by its being-transcended, giving rise to perception-proper. No other mode of consciousness can exist without there being, in the proper sense, perceptual consciousness. For example, an evaluative consciousness can value some object not perceptually present to consciousness but intended in the consciousness. The meaning that it exists and is of a certain value is something which consciousness could not synthesize for itself without some prior access to the object, directly or indirectly, through perceptual consciousness.

The next question I want to pose is:- Is consciousness always "self-feeling-being-transcended"? If it is, then I can say that consciousness is always characterized by some degree of good-feeling or bad-feeling!

For all consciousness, considered concretely, which one can make the object of inquiry, my foregoing analyses suggest that there is a content which has some degree of good-feeling or bad-feeling as characteristic. However there is a possibility of consciousness existing, having itself, but failing to retain itself, such that it can subsequently be made consciousness's thematic object. For example, when a consciousness "goes to sleep", one cannot be sure either that it remains being consciousness in some sense and mode, or that during sleep it can cease being consciousness. Similarly, there may be unretained modes of consciousness accompanying waking consciousness. Consequently I must leave the question of unretained consciousness open.

But as I say, for all knowable concretely existing consciousness, it exists-itself having a self-content characterized by some degree

of good-feeling or bad-feeling. I say "concretely", since it can be questioned whether the feeling accompanying a mode of consciousness belongs to that mode itself.

Take, for example, imaginative consciousness. Let us suppose that one is imagining what it would be like to do something - say - play a musical instrument. One pictures oneself, as bodily person, engaged with the instrument, performing the actions necessary to create some music, and one hears the music in one's "mind's ear".

But imagining this activity and imaginatively creating an auditory content is, itself, a real activity of consciousness, in which it intends its imaginary objects. It provides itself, intentionally, with a quasi-sensory content of what it is imagining. But the full intentional object of the imagining is the meaning. Just as, in perception-proper, what is believed to be actually present, exceeds greatly what is given in perception (see Introduction, page 13), so, in an imaginative consciousness, what is intentionally meant greatly exceeds the quasi-sensory content which consciousness imaginatively intends and gives itself. Just as in perception the content signifies the meaning, so also in imagination the quasi-content has the same function.

However the content, in imagining, just as in dreaming, has the character of being "as though". It is not nothing, but it does not have the transcending force and otherness of what is given in perception-proper. Nor are one's feelings (in imagination) affected in the way that they are by one's perceptual situation as imposed condition. In imagining intending, part of its meaning is its imaginary character. One is not affected by imagined feelings, in the way that one is in having feelings themselves.

This said, in my view imagination is, nevertheless, an activity of consciousness, which is motivated and so ultimately intended to realize good-feeling. Whilst the associated feelings lived during imagining can fluctuate from bad-feeling to good-feeling, insofar as they are realized through the teleological structure to which the imagining pertains, The feelings are really-felt and self-perceived or apperceived by the subject engaged in imagining. But this feeling is nevertheless outside the imaginary field and so does not belong to that mode of consciousness.

The upshot of all this is my contention that for all "knowable" - that is - "self-retaining", concretely existing consciousness, there is some degree of good-feeling or bad-feeling. So to the opening question of this section I can say that all phenomena of concretely existing consciousnesses are phenomena giving degrees of good-feeling or bad-feeling.

The second half of that opening question asked: what is the range of good-feeling?

In my introduction (page 24) I described the material, "sensory" content of consciousness's "self-feeling-being-transcended" as always being characterized by good-feeling or bad-feeling, in some degree. The content can be classified into visual material, hearing, smell, taste and touch on the one hand and coenaesthesia and kinaesthesia on the other. This division reflects a psychological distinction between "extero-perception" and "intero-perception". This distinction is an empirical one made by psychology which, because epistemologically speaking it is not a radical philosophical distinction, is one laden with uncriticised presuppositions, particularly about the nature of bodily existence, the physical

world and the relation of mind or consciousness to them. Thus the latter two senses are taken to be internal senses of bodily awareness whilst the others are taken to be senses of the external physical world.

Can the sensory material of each of these "senses", separately, be characterized as having a component of good- or bad-feeling?

a) Vision - aesthetics

When we see something beautiful or, alternatively, ugly, these experiences are accompanied by good-feeling or bad-feeling. But this is in relation to what is seen - ie to the intentional object rather than to the visual sensory material - and the good-feeling is not a component of the visual. On the other hand one can experience - say - a painfully bright light. Clearly this relates to the material sensory input, occasioned or seemingly caused by it, without the mediation of meaning. But the painfulness differs from the visual material itself and belongs, rather, to coenaesthesia.

b) Hearing

One can have pleasant and unpleasant sounds, harmony, discordance, beautiful melody, ugly cacophony, etc, but these relate to synthesized sound and objectivated meaning. Noise can be painfully loud, again a relation of intensity seeming to cause bad-feeling without the mediation of meaning, but the painfulness not belonging to the auditory material itself.

c) Taste and Smell

In these cases there is greater ambiguity. Tastes are immediately pleasant or unpleasant without the mediation of meaning. Similarly smells can be immediately pleasant or disgusting. In the case of

taste the good or bad-feeling element seems to be a component of the taste itself, though having wider feeling ramifications. With smell it is less clear whether the good or bad feeling belongs to the olfactory material itself. "Disgust", in the sense of gustative revulsion, indicates that coenaesthetic feeling, located in the digestive region is occasioned.

d) Touch

Touch can be immediately pleasant or unpleasant, for example, in the senses of hot and cold, roughness, tickles, etc. But here again it is ambiguous since touch occurs at the boundary between "inner" and "outer" sense and so, if for example, I touch something hot with my finger, I get a burning pain in my finger. Hence good or bad tactile feeling can be assimilated to coenaesthesia.

e) Kinaesthesia

With this "inner" sense of bodily movement, there certainly are conditions of bodily movement which give rise immediately to good or bad feeling qualities. For instance the activity of running can occasion aches, pains, soreness, etc. But these feelings are coenaesthetically located, not components of the feeling of movement itself.

f) Coenaesthesia

This indeed seems to be the "seat" of good- or bad-feeling.

i/ Location

As already said, psychology regards coenaesthesia as the "inner" sense of bodily-awareness. This is such that a whole range of material belonging to this sense can be differentially distributed so that it is attributed to the spatially distributed parts of the body.

How is this distribution achieved?

The feelings differentially distributed are originally distinct from each other. The attribution of any of them to a bodily location presupposes, as it were, a "body-map". But this indicates the meaning, the ideality, of the location of the feeling. The location is intended; it is something not given but interpreted. This interpretation is an objectivation of and relating of the feeling as "stemming from" a part of the body, achieved by associations, correlations and comparisons.

ii/ Ambiguously-, metaphorically- or non-located good- or bad-feelings

In the foregoing discussion, I distinguished feelings immediately felt from feelings arising through the mediation of meaning. The former feelings generally are locatable. Thus the pain of the "painfully bright light" is said to be in the eyes, the excessively loud noise in the ears, the foul smell in the nose, the pleasantly sweet taste in the mouth, etc. But can one locate the delight in seeing a beautiful vista, the poignant beauty of a haunting melody, grief at the death of a friend or the sense of triumph in completing a difficult task? Emotional feelings like joy and sorrow are often attributed to the "heart" and again one can feel disgusted at someone's behaviour and describe this as a "gut-feeling".

In these cases, the attribution is achieved in the same way as the other locations of feeling. But it is a loose and ambiguous attribution. Qualitatively different feelings can be occasioned through the same event of meaning, so, for example, feelings otherwise objectivated as being heart palpitations, when they arise in connection with some emotional state, can lead to the attribution of the whole feeling content associated with that state to the heart.

Again, the heart, having been identified with types of feeling and emotion, is then involved in metaphorical attribution of feeling as in " I love you with all my heart", etc. Beyond these forms of location, many different feelings occasioned through events or states of meaning, have no associations or correlations which would make them locatable. For example, the feelings of happiness, euphoria, horror. Yet these feelings exist. They belong to consciousness's total qualitatively good- or bad-feeling content.

At the beginning of this discussion of coenaesthesia, I described its seeming to be identifiable as the "seat" of good- or bad-feeling. In one sense, this identification is a formal objectivating decision. I think it is appropriate to define coenaesthesia to mean the whole province and range of good- and bad-feeling experienced in consciousness. This being meant in the phenomenological sense of feelings as phenomena, as they manifest and give themselves, rather than in any interpreted sense - eg as psychological data, interpreted in terms of their being believed to arise in some way from the body.

In the analysis of taste, I said that good- or bad-feeling appeared to be a component of taste itself. But I think it is reasonable to regard this as a special case of coenaesthesia, to allow the term to embrace all good-, bad-feeling content.

In these descriptions, I have talked of "senses", the "body", etc. This was in order to identify and differentiate the feeling contents to which I was referring. But I do not mean to interpret or make or impute presuppositions as to origin or causation.



So far this discussion of range has covered the question of the occurring of good-, bad-feelings with the descriptively distributed types of sensory content, arriving at the descriptive assertion that it belongs essentially to coenaesthesia as a type of sensory content. But this does not exhaust the question of range. Previously I have described there being different degrees of good- and bad-feeling and it is this possibility of variation of feeling that I have yet to discuss.

There is a range of feeling quality from good to bad, passing through a mean point which can be described as neutral. As I said previously (Introduction, page 24), consciousness wants good-feeling and "avers" bad-feeling (see note on "avers", page 25). Its attitude to feeling in the neutral state is indifference.

On either side of the mean, the differences in good- and bad-feelings are in their intensities. The stronger the intensity of a good-feeling, the more strongly consciousness wants it - either to continue to feel it if doing so already, or to realize that strength of feeling if it apprehends the possibility of doing so. Similarly the more intense the bad-feeling, the more one seeks to negate it, to make it not be, and the more one seeks to deny its actual occurrence, if the possibility of its occurring is apprehended.

But it is the nature of the quality of feeling, in-itself, its being, in its range between the best and the worst, which is the reason for consciousness wanting it, or avering it. I have described it in terms of these relationships since they are a means of evoking the sense or meaning of good/bad-feeling. The limiting terms "best" and "worst" are not meant to imply finite, or, at least, definite

limits to the scale of intensity of good-feeling or bad-feeling. Rather they, representationally, are the indefinite, ideal limits of "movement" along the scales on either "side" of the mean, "away" from the mean.

There is a further aspect of the range of good-feeling, as experienced in individual, concrete consciousnesses. This is of the multiple, that is to say - differentiated - occurring of feelings, in differing degrees of intensity, for good or bad, in one concrete consciousness. For example, one can feel happy, be delighting in the realization of some end one is pursuing, hear ugly, discordant noise, have a pleasant taste "in one's mouth", a pain in one's foot and a "warm glow" in one's cheeks, etc, all at the same time, whose sensory content is given in a multiplicity of feelings and degrees of feeling, all together at the same time. How these coexisting mixed feelings relate to each other and how the self relates to their coexistence I shall discuss later in this section.

NB Rather than continually referring to the "degrees of good- and bad-feeling", I shall now refer to the ensemble of these feelings in their range from good to bad as "Good-feeling".

How does Good-feeling, as a content of consciousness, relate to the whole of consciousness, both in its "subjective side" of having a "sensory" content and of intentional activity, of "making-sense" and pursuing ends, and its "objective side" of intentional objects, of meanings and of ends pursued?

At the end of my Introduction (page 34), I asserted that Good-feeling is an essential moment of consciousness's teleological structure.

By my phenomenological descriptions, I hope to show the intelligible relatedness of consciousness's ends and projects to what it can realize as its existential, lived content.

In the discussion of Heidegger and Sartre with respect to "intentionality" as a fundamental structure of consciousness and of their conception of "transcendence" (Introduction, pages 11, 12), their difference of view from Husserl's concerned their wanting to conceive the intentionality-structure concretely in unity with consciousness's teleological structure.

How does the structure "consciousness-of-something" embody the pursuit of ends? In its "being-consciousness" there is a moment of its "having-of-itself", of the actual living of its sensory material content. This always presents a coenaesthetic element of Good-feeling. As I said earlier (Introduction, page 24), it is this, in not-being-wholly-good which gives "otherness" and which is a "being-transcended". It is this which, logically, is the origin of activity, of sense-making, of intending and of the attempt to change the given in favour of ends projected to be realized. It is the "seat" of motivation, the "moving-point". I call it the "logical origin" of consciousness's activity, because it is its fundamental "reason", its "raison d'etre". It is as such a necessary though not sufficient condition of consciousness's self-movement. It is a necessary "moment" of the whole structure of teleology which is consciousness's intentional structure in the "pregnant" sense.

Consciousness is intentionally directed to objects. In this holding of objects before itself, there is a cognitive element. In knowing, or in holding beliefs, there is a corresponding characterization

of the intentional objects held in the acts of knowing or believing, which is their character as known or believed to be. Intentional objects are essentially meanings - not acts of meaning, but the meant, as such. The cognitive element of objective meaning divides between the factual element of what is actually the case, what states of affairs, in whatever respects, actually obtain, and the quiditive aspect of objects, of what and how they are (their determinations).

The cognitive element of intentionality is essentially related to the teleological element, which is that of the projection of ends. The "end" is just as much an intentional object as any cognitive objective meaning. But the character of its projection, of its "being-thrown-forward", indicates its character as "that-to-be-realized", to be brought into existence in the future ahead of consciousness. In projecting ends to be realized, consciousness actively enters into their realization. In relation to the end, the cognitive intentional content identifies the presently existing state of affairs which the end seeks to change in its favour. The quiditive character of the state of affairs is cognized in terms of how it can be altered and of what can be used to bring about the realization of the end.

This process of going beyond the presently actual state of affairs towards what consciousness projects to realize is what Sartre called "transcendence" (4). Consciousness in its intentional structure is neither a merely contemplative or observational knowing of the world, nor, emptily or blindly an activity directed towards the world - it is concretely a unity of knowledge and action.

The place and necessity of Good-feeling in this structure is that

in its consciousness of the present, consciousness finds itself not-being-wholly-good; it experiences a present dissatisfaction and foresees, projects, that change in the state of affairs whose realization would improve its Good-feeling. The projected change is not only what would realize an improvement in its Good-feeling, but also that which it senses is within its own power to realize.

Earlier, in talking about the occurrence of good-feeling, I distinguished its immediate occurrence from its being occasioned by or through the mediation of meaning. This is an important distinction which allows for the descriptive division of Good-feeling into primary and secondary.

By "primary" Good-feeling I mean that directly occurring and transcending feeling whose being-felt enters consciousness, happens to it without the mediation of consciousness's activity and of what it meaningfully intends, but which, rather, is originally motivating. These feelings are associated with what are commonly and loosely conceived as "needs". I am not at this stage concerned with this latter conception as such, but rather, I wish to use it as a "clue" to clarifying what I essentially mean by "primary" Good-feeling.

"Needs" in this sense are such commonly identified things as that for food, for physical comfort, for protection from the environment and, presented negatively, to avoid pain and to avoid harm. What all these have in common is that the consciousness of the "need" arises negatively, through a privation of good-feeling or the aversive presenting of bad-feeling, "Needs" present as needing to be satisfied and they give rise to the projection of ends whose realization will satisfy the felt needs.

With regard to the distinction of "secondary Good-feeling" as feelings which arise through the mediation of meaning, this is initially subject to a quibble:- Surely all Good-feeling is immediately and directly experienced and, in its occurring, transcends consciousness? Yes, in this sense, but nevertheless some Good-feeling, in its immediacy, will have been anticipated in prior consciousness. As anticipated, it falls under a pre-existing teleological structure of being-desired or being-averred. Indeed one possible accomplishment of consciousness is to live with virtually no "surprises" and being "prepared" for all experiences. Yet such a consciousness would not have escaped or eliminated "primary" Good-feeling in the sense of need, but rather has orientated itself to the presenting of the needs, by which it is nevertheless transcended.

But some Good-feeling, anticipated or not, does not simply occur, of itself, in the primarily transcending structure of need. This feeling is occasioned by and is related to that of which consciousness is conscious in intending it, in whatever mode of consciousness that might be.

For example: One is listening to a melody. This means that one is retaining and synthesizing the sounds one is hearing, and anticipating (protending) the sounds to come, where the form and content of the synthesized melody is the intentional object meant in the consciousness. Now a sequence of notes just previously anticipated are actually heard in the auditory content received, giving a fulfilment to the experience of the melody. This fulfilment is experienced as a moment of satisfaction, of pleasure in the melody.

This is the sort of thing I mean by "secondary" Good-feeling, in that consciousness-of-the-melody was a necessary condition for the having of the satisfaction.

Looking at this range of phenomena in more general terms, it becomes clear that all meaning intended by consciousness will have Good-feeling associated with it, as part of the "subjective side" lived-experience of the intending consciousness.

For example: Through news media and from other sources, one has a grasp of world events, as one interprets, as one believes and as one is led to believe they are. Now this view of them will have a definite relation to one's own life. Certain things one will care more or less about. Some events will produce a sense of foreboding. Others will be pleasing, amusing, tiresome or productive of sorrow. Whatever the objective meaning or complex of interrelated objective meanings one intends, this consciousness has a definite affective character associated with these meanings.

This affective material is itself, to some degree, objectivated and becomes constitutive of part of the meaning intended. Thus, eg, wars natural disasters, etc are objectively "terrible" events. This affectivity of one's world-consciousness applies across the board to all that of which one is conscious. It means that all intentional items are situated within intended teleological structures.

For example:- Going back to my last example, what does analysis of the world-events producing the sense of foreboding reveal?

Suppose that there is a military build-up in some part of the world, in which the country where one lives is involved, and it seems likely that a war will be started. One's foreboding is part of one's

anticipatory consciousness of what events may ensue. One feels that terrible, tragic things may happen and that one would, if one could, prevent them from happening. This is a teleological structure, one whose end is to prevent the terrible from happening. If the anticipated events are to happen, one anticipates that one's experience of them will be bad - i.e. lived and felt badly. In relating to these anticipated-as-possible future events, one's present experience is actually negatively affected, producing the structure of wanting to prevent the events occurring. If one were to prevent these events from occurring, one's future experience would not contain the anticipated bad-feeling. In so far as, in aiming to prevent the events occurring, oneself, one sees a real possibility of preventing them, to some degree, there is an actual lessening of the bad-feeling in one's present consciousness.

Another aspect of one's feeling in the face of the possible events is one's sense of culpability. If one does not act, so far as one is able, to prevent the occurring of the events, then one feels guilty that one has let them happen. Thus one's acting to do something also lessens one's present bad-feeling through the sense that one has done what one can.

However, in relation to these events on the world-stage, one's individual power to do anything about the events is miniscule. So one's bad-feeling in their face is little relieved by one's doing what one can. The sense of this impotence can produce other feeling changes, belonging to what are described as "mood" and "emotion". Two possible emotions one might feel in the face of the events are anger and sorrow. A mood which one might enter in their face is depression.



Anger. If one becomes angry in the face of the events, this could be because one feels, on the one hand, a terrific imperative to try to stop the events and, on the other hand, a sense of frustration and impotence in their face. This promotes an intensity of bad-feeling, in the immediate, which is "bursting" for release. One effect of this "pressure" of bad-feeling is to produce a distortion in one's intentional consciousness of the events. They become coloured as immediately and hatefully negative to oneself and one's anger can erupt in expressing and doing violence to that part of the world which is one's interface with the dreaded events, however tenuous. Thus, eg, one may go and shout at an army convoy or put a brick through an embassy window, etc.

Sorrow. One may become sorrowful if one's sense of powerlessness in this particular case is the dominant sense one feels in the face of the events. The badness of the events to come cannot be acted upon - they have to be suffered like a wound, like a state of constant pain. Again an intentional distortion of world-meaning is motivated. It takes on an impositional character of implacable negativity. One's sorrow motivates one to adaptations of one's life-activity to lessen or minimize the enduring painfulness of one's consciousness of the situation. One may avoid lively, active involvement in life and with other people; one may try to surround oneself with peace and tranquility and withdraw from those involvements which remind and reinforce one's consciousness of the impending events.

Depression. Moods, in relation to emotions, are more lasting dispositions. One could become depressed in the face of the impending events as a result of the sense of powerlessness. Here the intentional distortion of the world takes on a more profound character. One enters a state of apparent or felt "teleological collapse". One's

sense of powerlessness extends from the originally motivating impending events to being a characterization of the world in general. It becomes seemingly impervious to whatever changes one might try to make to improve it and to realize satisfaction in one's life. It becomes universally frustrating and indifferent to one's existence. One simply has no faith that things can get better, no hope, no prospect of being able to realize satisfaction and happiness for oneself. This pain, This "nausea" (after Sartre,(5)) of existence motivates one to life adaptations where one may "shut down" the vitality of one's living in an attempt to reduce the overall aversity of one's aesthesia.

Note. These descriptions aim to present and evoke the phenomena, rather than to give theoretical interpretation to them or geneological explanation.

I shall leave the analyses stemming from my example here and return to a more general discussion. What are the essential feeling relations involved in the general teleological structure of the realization of ends?

Any project, however specific, vague, general or particular, moves or is moving from the present toward some future state-of-affairs which it projects to realize through the employment of whatever means are available to the projecting agent, the individual consciousness in question. Now the end-to-be-realized, however characterized, is always, in relation to the projecting agent, in some sense, a "good" or good. This good relates to the present state of affairs in which the agent is situated. The good-to-be-realized, in relation to this, is always better, as anticipated, than the state of affairs would have become, were this particular modifying realization not attempted.

The present consciousness in which the end is projected is always, in some sense, unsatisfactory. One is conscious that it could be better. One's present Good-feeling, as noted earlier (page 48), comprises a multiplicity of feelings, good and bad, relating to the complex composition of one's consciousness. Even confining consideration to the issue of what is involved in the teleological projection of any particular end, the present feeling associated with it is multiple or differentiated rather than simple, though this feeling is not discretely separated in its givenness. The particular state-of-affairs-to-be-altered of the project is in some way unsatisfactory, aversive. It may be directly aversive, in the sense of "primary" Good feeling, of need. Or it may not, presently, in and of itself, be so. Yet one's present consciousness, in that it is looking forward in anticipation of what may happen, thereby mediating its immediate content, can occasion "secondary" Good-feeling as a present content. Thus even when it is presently, in-itself, not unsatisfactory, if it foresees future dissatisfaction, that is sufficient to produce a present dissatisfaction. This present dissatisfaction is the necessary condition for the projection of the end. The anticipating, forward-looking consciousness looks toward what are the possibilities what would otherwise happen, to produce the best, most satisfactory outcome. In projecting the end and thereby entering actively into its realization, the present consciousness alters its immediate aversive content for the better. This is because it is conscious, in anticipation, of the good-to-be-realized, of the better-than-otherwise feeling to be lived, to be experienced.

In the course of the realization of the end, as one "moves" towards it, as its gradual realization becomes more and more effected, one

presently experiences an increasing good-feeling, which culminates in the achievement of the realization, when the end is actually present and the good-in-anticipation is actually lived.

In the realization of ends there is a relativity of good- and bad-feeling where the relations of "better" and "worse" are decisive. The structure of relative alteration of Good-feeling applies to all realizations of ends including where, for example, because of circumstances, the end to be realized will not produce what, in itself, is a positive satisfaction, but rather will reduce and minimize dissatisfaction. Here the dissatisfaction when realized is still "good", relatively speaking, as it is better than the degree of dissatisfaction which would otherwise have been experienced, had the end not been projected and realized.

Returning to the multiplicity of Good-feeling in one concrete consciousness, how are the distinct feelings related and how do they affect each other?

Each feeling can be situated within its own specific teleological structure. Now these structures coexist. So are they united in a whole, or atomistically separate or in some other relationship? to begin with, they coexist in one consciousness, so they are co-intended. What they necessarily have in common is that their intentional ends are for the good of that one consciousness. Thus they mutually implicate one another, since the good to be realized in one respect may affect or influence the good in another. Now the relations of coexisting pursuits of ends can be either harmonious or disharmonious. They can augment, amplify, assist and support one another. But they can also be mutually incompatible, destructive and contradictory. Of course, between these extremes of positive

and negative coexistence, there is a mean neutral state where coexisting ends affect one another neither positively nor negatively.

The fact that they interact positively or negatively means that they become factors in the intentional/teleological structures of each other. In that one structure of end realization assists - in other words - is a means to the realization of another, means that the agent, having grasped that there is this interaction, will intentionally try to be conscious of their relationship and to unite them in an optimizing, embracing project. Here the question of their relative importance to each other is decided by the related question of the intensity of Good-feeling to be realized and its duration.

The Good-feeling felt now in anticipation of Good-feeling to be realized, has its own present intensity, which is itself an index of the motivational strength or weakness of the project as a whole. Its present intensity is greater, a) the more certain the intending consciousness is of achieving the realization, b) the more intense the good-feeling to-be-realized is anticipated to be and c) the greater the anticipated duration of the good-feeling to be realized.

In cases where coexisting projects are mutually destructive, this once again makes them factors as "negative means", as resistances, to each other's realization. The agent, consciously intending each project, will be motivated, by their destructive interference, to try to become conscious of their negative interrelation, and will again unite the projects to minimize their mutual contradiction. Here again, intensity of good-feeling will be the deciding factor of what is perceived of the interfering projects to optimal benefit.

To attempt to clarify and illuminate these analyses, I shall now

discuss another example, and investigate what can be further revealed:

Here I am sitting at my desk writing my thesis. This is part of one overall activity, ie teleological structure, which has been in existence for a long time and which will continue for some considerable time to come. It is an activity conducted intermittantly with quite long time intervals between main periods of activity working on it. Even when, as now, I am working on it intensively, I may work on it only two to three hours each day. But the 2 - 3 hours may be time scattered across the day, work proceeding in fits and starts. In between times of actual writing, I may be involved in thinking about it, but for large intervals, I do not have it explicitly in mind at all. But the overall project is still there, whether I am actively engaged in it or not, and the project is still in the process of realization, it is still intended, even when I am not directing myself to it at all. It is in the background of my consciousness and, intentionally speaking, as part of the meaning background in my life, it contributes to the qualitatively good aesthetic content of my experience in all my nows.

But in this now, it is most definitely foreground and proceeding actively. My writing is flowing quite well. I have a definite sense of excitement in thinking and writing, as immediate and proximate partial ends are constantly being fulfilled. Each sentence is, itself, in one sense, an end-in-itself whose completion, whose achievement, is itself an end realization yielding definite good-feeling of greater or lesser intensity. If I am troubled by a verbal formulation, the frustration of my continuing flow produces a stab of ill-feeling, of anxiety, of tension, which is overcome and compensated for by a pleasure of realization once the thought-impasse has been overcome and the project realization allowed to continue. At these moments

of hiatus of thought and writing, I may temporarily withdraw from writing, go and get a cup of tea, distract myself, and relax my mind from its concentration on the issue under pen. Here the intensity of ill-feeling in frustrated thought has interacted with another project, that of the gustative satisfaction and comfort of the cup of tea, which, comfort taken, satisfaction felt and relief taken from the prior tension, allows me to return to the work refreshed and with renewed vigour and hopefulness of being able to continue. But now an impinging "physical" aesthetic content, part of my whole experiential content, distracts my attention away from my work to my feet, which have "pins and needles". In fact, that I have had "pins and needles" has been in the background of my consciousness, but has not interfered with my writing. However its intensity of negative aesthesia has increased to such a pitch that its relief, as a project, becomes more important to me, at this immediate moment, than continuing to write. So I get up and walk around, relieve the pressure that had been restricting my blood circulation, and I effectively reduce the intensity of negative aesthesia so that it falls into the background of my consciousness again. I resume writing. But now a muscle in my arm is aching from the physical act of writing. Again I break off for a few minutes.

I have stretched my arm, walked about, replenished my cup of tea, been to the loo and I would have been ready to resume writing, but during this interval another factor, another present project has intervened: I felt a strong hunger pang and I distracted myself into getting my breakfast. Now this immediate project itself belongs to an overriding, temporally more enduring and more extensive project. For the past few days I have been dieting and I have devised myself a schema of permitted eating across the day. In this case of my breakfast, I have not done

what I might otherwise have habitually done - made toast - but had a bowl of cereal instead, in accordance with my diet principles. But I have observed that usually, across the day, the intensity of my gustative desires, together with the comfort-value of eating substantially, increases significantly relative to the feeling value of keeping to my diet. Towards the end of the day, I frequently compromise the success of my diet project through indulgence in immediate gustative and "comfort" satisfaction, whose intensity, in the immediate, distorts my diet-consciousness and leads me to do what contradicts my diet project.

Having quelled what presented negatively as a hunger pang, and having experienced positively a gustative satisfaction in eating my breakfast, That activity and immediate project has terminated and its associated aesthesia has dropped into the background of my consciousness. Again I resume writing, with renewed pleasure in this activity. Whilst the good-feeling realized by this activity and project is in the foreground of my consciousness, nevertheless there is a wide, multiple range of background feelings coexisting with it. My diet project, as conformed to and not infringed by my breakfast, remains intact and its intentional meaning continues to provide a low level of background good-feeling in its continuing realization. My "pins and needles" is still there, "buzzing" negatively in the background, but presently insignificantly.

But now my consciousness of the passage of time produces a new disquiet in my background consciousness, increasing in negative intensity, which relates to the fact that my day's timetable, my time-structure of other projects, activities, realizations of greater or shorter duration, and of greater or lesser importance, means that I must



soon suspend writing and get on and do other things. This gives a qualitative "discolourization" to the pleasurable consciousness of getting on with this writing, since it threatens to disrupt things when it is going well and gives me the anxiety that I may not be able to resume so effectively this chain of thought after the interruption. Now I begin to lose the thread of my descriptions. I go back, reread and decide that it is time to wind up the descriptive content of the example, to try to capitalize on what insights it gives.

I have illustrated my assertions about coexisting projects and their relative effects on one another. What I should like to draw out from the "diet" part of the example are considerations about to what extent we are "masters" of our aesthesia, projecting and realizing good experience with which we are identified, which is self-realization, and about the converse. This is that we are transcended by the occurrence of Good-feeling, that it happens despite our will, our projection of ends, and as such is integrally part of what is alien and other than ourselves. "Need" is an expression of this alien otherness. It is the structure of our dependence and the condition in relation to which we are only relatively free to act and make of ourselves what we will.

Take, for example, my thesis. Why am I doing it? In its realization I foresee a value - a value of itself, the realized document, and a value for myself as the creator of the document. That realization of value, now, across the whole course of the realization and in the consumation of its achievement, realizes my good experience, my lived, living and to-be-lived good-feeling. But is this possibility of creating a value and thereby realizing my own good experience something which I myself created, spontaneously, out of my own power

to do so, or was the possibility something given from beyond myself? Surely the meaning of the value is something which my consciousness has objectivated, intended. But that objectivation was a making-sense of both my being-transcended and of what transcends me as condition of my existence. The projection of value was also a projection of my own existential possibility. This making-sense is for my own "transcendence", in the Sartrean sense described earlier, in which I create myself, engage in my own self-realization, by "overcoming" and changing what is other-than-myself in the direction of my favour, producing that with which I can identify.

As I said in the Introduction (page 24), the drawing of the line between myself and what is other than myself is decided by the limit of that with which I identify at its interface with that from which I am alienated and hold myself different-from.

So the value foreseen to be realized is originally something which I need, in order to be that which I wish to be, and this need, in its peculiar character, is something which I make-sense-of in terms of my relations to what transcends me.

Returning to what I earlier described as "Primary" Good-feeling and as "need", I think I can now better clarify its relation to "meaning", to "secondary" Good-feeling and to the sense in which there is a mediation by the consciousness of meaning.

Feeling, as felt, is immediate and as such it proclaims a need, or a satisfaction, or a relative satisfaction of need. All Good-feeling, in its range from good to bad, transcends consciousness in its having a given condition of being. Consciousness directs itself to realizing

good-feeling and away from experiencing bad-feeling, by means of its consciousness of its relation to what transcends itself.

"Secondary" Good-feeling is derivative of "primary" Good-feeling, since it is ultimately as conditional as the latter, but it arises in the course of the transcending activity of consciousness in its use of its condition, its situation, to promote its own good experience.

The "value" referred to indicates the area of meaning which arises out of consciousness's objectivation of Good-feeling, and which produces the objective meanings of "good", "bad", "evil", "right", "wrong", "value", etc.

The Philosophy of Good

SECTION 2      Exposition and Criticism of the works of Kant, Hegel  
and Sartre with regard to Good

Towards the end of the previous section, my consideration of the phenomena of Good-feeling turned to those which are related to meaning and belief about the world, which relate to the sense made of the experienced data of Good-feeling, in terms of objectivated meanings of what is "Good", "Bad", "of Value", etc.

Hence in this section I am going to deal with how various philosophers have treated and conceived the question of what Good is in an objective and universal sense. I shall first expound their views and then subject them to phenomenological criticism.

SECTION 2

Part 1 Exposition and criticism of Kant's view of Good

A) Exposition

In this exposition, I shall begin by trying to describe how Kant conceived "knowledge" and the "real", and their relation, drawing on his "Critique of Pure Reason" (1). I shall use this to set the context for his various conceptions, in different senses, of "Good", which I shall describe drawing principally on his "Critical Examination of Practical Reason" (2), but also on his "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals" (3). His various conceptions are of good in experience, discussed in terms of pleasure and pain, of good as the quality of, and aim of, morally motivated action, good's distinction from evil, and finally good as the "Summum Bonum", the highest or greatest possible good, the ultimate and unconditional goal of all moral action.

1. Kant's view of knowledge and the real

In the Critique of Pure Reason (4), Kant said

"But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience".

He added that even empirical knowledge is not necessarily something given or supplied by experience, just by itself (experience meant by Kant as sense experience, intuition, sensory perception, as being affected through the senses by external objects). He was suggesting that there is no knowledge without the active participation of the mind in producing that knowledge and was thereby denying the "tabula rasa" image of the mind passively being sensibly impressed with knowledge.

He distinguished empirical from pure knowledge (5). The former is dependent upon and (logically at least) posterior to empirical intuition, whereas the latter is independent of the objects of the senses and prior (logically) to any particular experiences.

For Kant, experience is of the real. In it knowledge is in immediate connection with its objects through the subject being sensibly affected by them (6). At the same time, by being affected, the experiencing mind appears to itself as empirical subject. But the known reality of objects and subject is for Kant only a limited and conditional reality. This empirical reality, the reality of phenomena, of appearances, is not reality-in-itself, not absolute reality (7).

Of what things are absolutely, we can only form ideas, and these ideas are of "noumena" - objects of the intellect. Realities, known phenomenally, can only be known as they are in themselves, formally, without content, as "something X", ie - that they are absolutely but not what they are absolutely. Kant also described noumenal things-in-themselves as "supersensible" (8), implying that what they are as phenomena, as known sensibly, relates, in some subordinate way, to what they are absolutely and that the realities of phenomena and noumena do not belong to totally different realms.

For Kant knowledge itself, as such, belongs to and arises through the mind's "faculty" of knowledge, whose empirical knowledge is dependent upon the mind's "capacity" of sensibility, divided into inner and outer sense (9). But the mind's faculties, capacities, etc., are not known empirically. They are objects, or concepts of objects, belonging to what Kant called pure knowledge, belonging to the "faculty" of understanding. In pure knowledge, the mind spontaneously produces its objects, it thinks them. Thought objects, described generally, are concepts. Whilst such knowledge is said to have originated with experience - with the mind's being affected provoking it to cognitive activity, it is, nevertheless, in a major sense, independent of experience. Kant argued that any concept can be thought, and so exists as possibility of being thought, prior to the experience of any object corresponding to such a concept. But concepts which are in this sense prior to experience, are, when they are of objects which can be directly experienced, called empirical concepts by Kant (10).

Pure knowledge, on the other hand is, for Kant, a knowledge for which the concepts are sufficient, without receiving any empirical content, to provide real knowledge. This knowledge, moreover, has the characteristics of strict necessity and universality (10). But it is still mediately related to what can be experienced. The necessary truth of these pure concepts depends upon the supposition of the actuality of the objects of experience in general. Kant deduced them on that assumption so that, eg, the "understanding" was deduced as that unity in which the pure categories of understanding inhere, the categories having been more directly deduced from the assumption of the actuality of the objects of experience (11). Thus the reality of pure knowledge has the same sense as the reality of empirical knowledge. Its strict necessity should in no way be taken as an absoluteness of real knowledge. The mental faculties, etc, are characteristics of empirical subjects. Absolute reality, though for Kant it cannot be known as such, is a supposition on which empirical knowledge rests its relativity.

In the Transcendental Dialectic (12), Kant introduces concepts bearing a different relation to experience from those already discussed. These are ideas of "reason", another mental "faculty" identified by Kant. He described these concepts, whilst being pure, as problematic. This is because they cannot be deduced from or related to the actuality of experience so as to endow them with real a priori knowledge. The ideas can only be known as concepts, as thought creations. Kant's procedure was to show that nevertheless these ideas have a necessary role in regulating the theoretical employment of the understanding. This role is one of unification. It is because scientific theories want, validly, to be able to make universal and unconditional (i.e. categorical) claims of the type "All A are B" where B is not analytic of A. Reason's ideas serve as goals of completeness and absoluteness of knowledge, for the theoretical unification of knowledge through its progressive augmentation by experience.

For Kant, the concept of the immortality of the soul is necessary for the goal of theoretical knowledge bringing itself to completeness in an eternity of experience. Likewise the concept of freedom is necessary for the idea of a cosmological totality, for that requires that the cosmos came-to-be spontaneously. Finally the concept of God as intelligent creator of the cosmic totality is necessary for the consistency of that idea - of a unified totality governed by a rational natural law (13).

Kant argued in addition that these principal ideas of pure reason, immortality, freedom and God, have another proper regulative role or function. This is not for theoretical knowledge but for "practical knowledge", in that they provide the basis for the possible perfection of certain actions. He described this in the Critical Examination of Practical Reason.



2. Kant's view of pleasure, pain, good, evil and the Summum Bonum

At the beginning of the Critical Examination of Practical Reason (14), Kant introduced another item belonging to the mind's inventory of faculties - the faculty of desire. Through this faculty, particular individual subjects will and act towards the realization of particular objects or states of affairs, in order to achieve particular personal pleasures in experiencing those realizations. He called this form of motivation "self-love" and its form of causality empirical - i.e. that "All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (15). The will of the agent, in being so determined is, for Kant, not free but impelled by empirical conditions. This has two sides, objective and subjective. Objectively, the will is determined (its mind is made up) by the practical principle of how, subject to empirical causality, the desired object is to be realized. Subjectively, the will is determined by what Kant called a subjective maxim, which relates what is to be realized to the particular pleasure of the subject to be realized in so doing. The pleasure is a subjective phenomenon and is indifferent to what in particular is experienced objectively. The object to be realized can be anything whatever, provided it serves as means to the empirical subject's pleasure. Thus it is dependent, in being made an end to be realized, upon what the individual subject finds, in the course of its experience, will give it pleasure.

Pain is a comparable motivation to pleasure, under the faculty of desire, in which the subject seeks to avoid the realization of particular objects or states of affairs, in order to not realize experiences of pain or displeasure, which would otherwise have eventuated.

Over against motivation through self-love, Kant argued that an agent's will can be determined, caused to act, by another form of causality - freedom. No empirical condition influences, through pleasure or pain, the will in

so acting. Instead the will is determined by what Kant called a practical law, a formal idea given to the subject by its reason, which says "do your duty". The fact that subjects, practical agents, are and can be so motivated, proves, according to Kant, the reality of freedom, which theoretical knowledge could not. This practical knowledge, moreover, is of the subject as it is in-itself, absolutely, not of it as it is caused to be in experience.

The teleological structure of this form of willing is radically different from that of desire. Under this structure, objectively, a free (moral) will has an end to be realized. But rather than its being a possible and definite object or state of affairs to be realized, it is what the agent would realize, were that to be within its power. It acts, in so far as it can, to realize its end and, in so doing, acts in accordance with its duty. It need only satisfy the formal criterion of being for the sake of doing its duty. Nothing is materially dependent on the object actually realized or to be realized for duty to have been done. The end is logically posterior to the motive of duty. The specific formal characteristic of the object of a moral will is that it is a good and something which any rational agent, so willing, would make its end. The will to do good is at the same time the will not to do evil, not to realize an evil object or state of affairs.

Kant also described a subjective side of the teleological structure of moral action. This, similarly, could not depend upon a pleasure to be realized in experience. It consists in an effect on the pleasure experienced by the subject. This effect is said to diminish the subject's pleasure in self-gratification from self-love. This effect, seen negatively, he called "humiliation". Positively, he called the feeling produced by willing morally "respect for the law", which, though logically posterior to so willing, supports the subject's resolve in acting morally.

Kant also discussed good in its relation to moral motivation in his "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals". At (16) he said:

It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.

and (17):

A good will ..... is good through its willing alone - that is, good in itself.

When the will is determined to act, either under self-love or duty, it rationally must accord with an objective principle or condition. Kant described this as its being subject to an "imperative" which he said is expressed by an "ought" (18). If the imperative is in order that something further (in experience) is realized, then it is "hypothetical" (19).

But for a "good will" Kant said (19):

.....; if the action is represented as good in itself and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical.

He formulated the command of the categorical imperative thus (20):

'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'.

In other words one should only will and act in a way in which one can at the same time also will that anyone else would will and act in the same way. One's action should be "universalizable". Furthermore, agents are universally subject to the categorical imperative to will morally. Everyone should do their duty.

In "The Philosophical Theory of Religion" (21), Kant described "evil" as the tendency to act in contradiction to the

motive of duty, from motives of self-love. But he described the will to do evil as something motivated under freedom, a choosing not to do one's duty. Therefore it is not something "impelled", as are the motives of desire. An example would be to take pleasure in deliberately harming another. (See discussion of "evil" in my Conclusion, Part 2).

Notwithstanding the moral agent's empirical limitation, good, for Kant, is what the agent wills to be realized and he argued that it therefore must be possible for it to be realized, even if one, as moral agent, does not have its realization within one's power. In acting morally, one would know that one has realized good to the extent that one could. But this is not an empirical knowledge, for whatever the empirical outcome, good must have been realized as a necessary effect of moral action. Thus in moral practice, good in an absolute sense is realized and, in being practically known, unconditional noumenal knowledge, impossible theoretically, is achieved.

In the *Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason* (22), Kant introduced the concept of the *Summum Bonum*, the highest or greatest possible good. It directly relates to the concept of good in the sense just described. It is for all moral action, all practical reason, the ideal goal to be realized. Just as theoretical knowledge wants to achieve an unconditional and perfect knowledge and is guided by the idea of such knowledge, moral action seeks to realize an unconditional good - the *Summum Bonum*. Kant also argued that it must not just be an ideal, but ultimately realizable.

In specifying the *Summum Bonum*, Kant said that it contained, as its supreme condition, determination of the will by the moral law. In containing this condition, the *Summum Bonum* itself as object could be said to determine a moral will. As concept it contains supreme virtue and, conditional on that, perfect happiness. Kant described their relation as that of cause and effect. This set him the problem of showing how perfect happiness could be the effect of supreme virtue. Happiness (pleasure) was supposed to be empirically

caused. His solution was to say that virtue could be the indirect cause of happiness through there having been an intelligent creator of nature as a whole. This creator could have created it such that noumenally existing virtue is necessarily productive of happiness in experience. He went on to argue that not only does the possibility of such a connection exist but that the connection actually exists. As evidence, he cited the feeling of self-contentment that accompanies moral action or being virtuous. For him this feeling is not empirically determined and it is not itself capable of motivating moral action. Rather it is realized in practice and the agent can be aware of it in self-consciousness as acting. He likened this feeling to the state of "bliss", the unconditional contentment of the supposed supreme being.

So where does this leave the Summum Bonum? It is that which, by the categorically imperative form of obligation, the will must realize. This "must" for Kant makes it necessary that the Summum Bonum be realizable, since it bears the "must" within itself as its supreme condition, operative on every rational agent. It demands, firstly, that it should be realized as a state of supreme virtue, a state in which all agents are perfectly rational and their wills homogeneously good. Secondly, conditional on the first, it demands the perfect happiness of every rational and virtuous agent. Kant's reason for the Summum Bonum containing perfect happiness stems from virtue being, besides moral strength of will, a worthiness for happiness (see discussion of "valour", Section 3). A perfectly virtuous agent deserves to be perfectly happy. The greatest possible good would therefore include the complete fulfilment of deserved happiness. "Good" in relation to the Summum Bonum is what any particular moral agent is aiming to realize in any particular morally motivated action. As such it contributes to the goal of the realization of the Summum Bonum.

B) Phenomenological Critique

Firstly, Kant's points about knowledge beginning with experience but not necessarily arising out of it, his restriction of "experience" to being "sense-experience", and his distinction between pure a priori knowledge and empirical knowledge need to be taken to task and the issues clarified.

In the first place, there is in experience "direct contact", a real relationship between subject and object, or the subject and its world, what Heidegger conceived as the Dasein's "Being-in-the-world" (23) and which I have conceived as consciousness's "being-transcended" (Intro. p24).

But it is important to be clear that this real relationship, a relationship in consciousness, a content of consciousness, is not itself a relationship of knowledge, at least not in the sense that I am talking of knowledge. However this real relationship is fundamental to the coming-to-be of knowledge.

Immediate knowledge in experience is (originally) an achievement of the conscious subject who acts under the motivation of what it is given, of what its material content actually is, to make sense of it to realize a meaning. This intentional activity, in relating its experiential content synthetically with other experiential givens, is such that the content becomes imbued with significance. It is the meaning, the signification, which is the "known" in experience, the "cogitatum", the object of knowledge.

Thus the real relation between (or perhaps in) the being of both subject and object should not be confused with the relationship between the

knower, qua knower, and the known, qua known, which is knowledge-creating activity or achievement on the part of the knower and ideality on the part of the known. This distinction between the real relationship in consciousness and the latter knower-known relationship means that knowledge is not restricted in its being to the immediacy of actual particular experience. Cognitively achieved meaning is retained as what the subject knows. It can be re-awakened (or made explicit) for the subject as the already-known signification of what is subsequently given in its experience.

Thus, for example, what is phenomenally given to me as a patch of yellow visual material toward the right of my visual field is already known and familiar to me as being a plate, which meaning, which significance, is re-awakened every time I see or use it.

Furthermore, since the cognitive relation is not the experiential relation of being-transcended, there is no question of the knower changing what is known by knowing it (24).

The above considerations concern what Kant called empirical knowledge. Now for him the occasion of knowledge is intuition, when a pre-existing concept in the understanding is fulfilled by a content of sense-experience. thus, for him, whilst the "understanding" retains concepts, it does not retain knowledge, the latter only being in the event of experience.

This makes his conception of "pure knowledge" problematic. Whilst pure knowledge for him requires its relation to experience in general to be real knowledge, yet there is no event-criterion given by Kant to distinguish its knowledge-actuality as intuition. Is it knowledge when consciousness explicitly thinks pure concepts? Yet conceived as

something known a priori, it would seem that pure knowledge is known all the time. Is this then a constant pure a priori intuition?

It is not clear that Kant is employing the same conception of knowledge for both pure and empirical knowledge. In any case, his conception, particularly in respect of empirical knowledge, is again problematic for what it excludes. If knowledge is only real in its contact with its objects through sense-experience, then this excludes all the givens of conscious experience, in whatever mode, except the sensorially given. So - what of self-knowledge? Kant's supposed "capacity" of inner sense gives, according to him, the experience of existing phenomenally, through the synthesis of the sensory manifold, under the form of time (succession). If this is the sole manner in which the subject's existence is directly experienced, all its other knowable characteristics must, according to his arguments, be deducible, either from particular experiences or from experiences in general (in his sense).

This, I think, is just wrong. We know our being, our minds essential characteristics and capabilities directly, as cognizable meanings of particular experiences or of experiences in general, seen, or taken, or attended to under a teleological schema seeking self-knowledge, in some form or another.

Kant excluded from self-knowledge all phenomena of consciousness, save its passive sensory givens. He excluded the phenomena of the active, willing, cognizing and transcending self. Other, non-empirical self-knowledge, namely "pure" and "transcendental" knowledge, is for Kant deducible a priori from empirical knowledge in general, being known with strict necessity.



But when I will something, I experience myself willing it. When I think something, I experience thinking it. These are directly apprehensible phenomena of consciousness, excluded by Kant from knowledge.

The central implication and entailment of Kant's position is that, assuming the synthesized, categorially determined, believed objects of the natural world are as we suppose them to be, then consciousness, the self, the experiencing subject, must have the characteristics which he transcendently deduced.

It seems to me that Kant has put the cart before the horse. Whilst, psychologically, we have, or can have, a certainty of natural belief about the world, that belief can be doubted. But consciousness, in being identical with its appearances, its phenomena, gives itself just as it is. Self-existence is self-evident, self-affirming and indubitable. Whereas the appearances of physical things are such that they refer to incomplete and, on principle, incompletable series of appearances of those objects, and the objects are consequently such that future appearances can always change or modify our beliefs about just what exactly those objects are.

Thus the theoretical grounding, the a priori sense of the possible truth of our speculative beliefs about the world must rest on what can be known certainly about the being of consciousness, and not vice versa.

The next problem with Kant's epistemology which I wish to take up is that of his phenomenon/noumenon distinction (25): As I described earlier (page 68), for him, phenomena, phenomenal being, are all that can be known. But this knowledge is only of a relative being which consists in being limited to the possibilities of appearing. The being of phenomena is therefore relative to the subjectivity to which it can appear.

In contradistinction from this knowable but relative being, Kant postulated "noumena", absolute being-in-itself, lying beyond appearances. But for him we cannot know absolute being, but only form the problematic concepts, ideas of it which he termed "noumena".

From the way that he has set up this problem, it seems that Kant assumes that there is a quiddity, a 'whatness' that belongs to being in its unconditional absoluteness, but that is simply unknowable (26).

But as Vladimir Solovyov said (27):

".....indeed, if we were to suppose an entity which in no way asserted or posited any objective content, which did not represent anything and was not anything either in or for itself or for another, we could not logically admit that such an entity had any being at all ....."

In the Introduction (pages 32,33), I distinguished what something is, its quiddity, from that fact that it is, its ipseity. The event of phenomenal givenness of any object, in terms of knowledge, gives more than its phenomenal content. It is that it exists. This is the meaning of what consciousness experiences in being-transcended (page 24).

It does not, however, make sense to posit an unknowable content for the being of a particular object, since to be a content, it must be knowable. It offends the very meaning of something's 'whatness' for that not to be capable of being known. Similarly the meaning 'that' something exists, is a meaning that rests on the knowability of what that something is.

Thus to conceive what anything is, absolutely and unconditionally, should not be conceived in terms of its having unknowable content. But is its being exhaustively conceivable in terms of what for Kant is phenomenally knowable?

For anything which transcends some particular consciousness of it, its phenomenal appearances in sense-perception are what, in Solovyov's terms, it posits for another. The conceivable meaning of these appearances is that of the total possible series of its appearances giving, positing, itself for another. But a further conceivable possibility of what-it-is is also given, that of what-it-is, what it posits, in and for itself. In giving itself to itself, howsoever this self is constituted, it produces a knowable content.

What of Kant's "ideas of pure reason" (Page 70)? Are their objects, as Kant supposes, incapable of being known in any sense?

Let us consider what is characteristic of these ideas and why they are conceived. Kant conceived them as regulative ideas whose purpose is to assist the endeavour of theoretical knowledge to achieve completeness and absoluteness of knowledge.

This corresponds to what I described in the Introduction (page 3) as the province of speculative metaphysics. This is the attempt to comprehend and conceive the whole or the totality of being. I very much concur with Kant that the object or one of the objects of this enterprise is to unite knowledge and understanding in one coherent whole, that one is seeking the best possible grasp upon reality as a whole.

The problem with knowing the objects of the ideas in Kant's sense is that the concepts include in themselves what would be the adequate givenness of their objects. Thus, if to know the objects, is to know them adequately, then we, as mundane down to earth conceivers, have no hope of knowing them. But these objects have a knowability in principle, and we can know them, if only inadequately.

It seems to me that in thinking about reality, being, we do need an all-embracing idea of the whole or totality, which will include and encompass all particular realities in the content of that whole. The fullest, most concrete conception of any object needs to see that object in its relations to the whole of which it is a part. Now, just as the conception of any particular part of the whole cannot, at the same time, claim an adequate or unconditional givenness of that part in experience, nor then can the whole. What the part can claim is a limited, definite givenness in experience, such that future experience has the possibility of altering, falsifying or nullifying the particular object as conceived. Just so, the conception of the whole, in so far as it imputes a definite character to that whole, will only have received limited confirmation through experience, and will be

subject to the same vulnerability as the conception of the part.

But the idea of the totality can recognize this and, rather than presupposing the nature of what will be in exceeding the givens of experience, can conceive the totality as being "whatever-it-is," has-been and will-be". Under this open, uncommitted conception of the totality of being, all particular knowledge would at the same time be knowledge of the whole.

Kant, as described (Page 70), thought the concept of God, as intelligent creator of the cosmic totality, necessary for the consistency of that idea, conceived as a unitary totality governed by a rational natural law (28).

Before criticising this position, I shall give a brief exposition of Kant's argument for it:

In the section of the Critique of Pure Reason on the Transcendental Ideal (29), Kant talked of empirical objects being subject to the principle of complete determination: If all the possible predicates of things are taken together with their contradictory opposites, one of each pair of contradictory predicates must belong to each thing. Considered in this way, the thing is seen in relation to the sum total of all possibilities. He described this concept of the sum-total of all possibilities as being of an individual object, which is itself completely determined. As such it is not just an idea but an Ideal of pure reason.

Things conceived transcendently are thought in terms of their possible content. The sum-total of all possibilities is a transcendental substrate from which any particular thing, conceived

transcendentally, can have its concept drawn, all its affirmative predicates belonging to it, and all its negative predicates limiting and excluding all other predicates in the sum-total. The substrate, itself, is thought materially as the sum of all affirmation, as the whole of reality, as an "Omnitudo Realitas" (30).

Kant further described this Ideal of an object containing all reality as being the possibility of all things from which all particular things derive and as being a concept of a thing-in-itself, being, as completely determined, an "Ens Realissimum". He said, at (31),

"The object of the Ideal of reason, an object which is present to us only in and through reason, is therefore entitled the primordial being (Ens Originarium). As it has nothing above it, it is also entitled the highest being (Ens Summum); and as everything that is conditional is subject to it, the being of all beings (Ens Entium)".

If the essential basis of the concept of this Ideal is (to use Kant's terminology) "hypostatized", then the primordial being can be determined through the concept of the highest reality - as a being that is one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc - ie God.

In a note at the end of this section (32), Kant said

"This ideal of the ens realissimum, although it is indeed a mere representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then hypostatized; and finally, by the natural progress of reason towards the completion of unity, is, as we shall presently show, personified. For the regulative unity of experience is not based on the appearances themselves (on sensibility alone), but on the connection of the manifold

through the understanding (in an apperception); and consequently the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a supreme understanding, and therefore in an intelligence".

I have tried to give the gist of Kant's move from the omnitudo realitas to its being the Divine Intelligence. So, wherein lies the necessity, if there is any?

He argues from what the conception of the cosmological whole, the whole of reality must include in order to be adequate to its object. The point about the inclusion of the understanding's self-apperception recognises that all knowledge of reality involves the creative work of intelligence and its supreme completion in highest unity would indeed be the greatest act of a supreme intelligence.

He has established what is necessary for a supreme and holy knowledge. Such a knowledge would indeed be a divine achievement.

But does reality itself demand this? No - reality is manifest, knowable in what Kant calls the "manifold of intuition" and in the being of consciousness. Reality can be what it is and does not demand that there should ever be a theoretical completion of knowledge. The intelligent creator is responsible for knowing what it knows but not for creating what it knows. What it creates is knowledge, not reality!

Thus in conclusion on this issue, I agree with Kant that any conception of the whole of reality, "omnitudo realitas", must include the whole concrete being of consciousness, which he refers to in this respect as creative intelligence. But I can find no necessity to conceive this whole as itself being one, supreme,

creative intelligence, responsible for creating itself and all the reality it knows.

I now want to move on to criticizing Kant's theory of motivation, and of its teleological structure, particularly in his distinction between the motives of self-love and duty, and his theory of the being of Good.

To do this I shall set out an example of a number of interconnected actions, motivated in various ways, and by its subsequent analysis, I hope to make clear my criticism of his positions.

#### Example

Cycling home one afternoon I see a strange sight:- a car coming from the opposite direction has crossed to the wrong side of the carriageway, mounted the pavement and come to rest. In the driving seat there is a man who is convulsing - he is having an epileptic fit. I dismount and go over to the car. 3 or 4 other passers-by have also gathered round the scene. One man reaches into the car and switches the engine off. Comments are passed: "He could have killed someone .....", "What the hell's the matter with him?". I contribute to the discussion: "He's just had an epileptic fit".

One of the bystanders takes it upon herself to go to the local police station, as it happens only a few yards away, to get assistance. In the meantime, the driver stops convulsing and sinks into a state of deep unconsciousness. At this point I assume a somewhat authoritative role and say to the others "we ought to put him into the coma position or else he might swallow his tongue" and I ask one of them to go to the other side of the car to help me turn him onto his side, in the prescribed position, which we do.



Soon after, a policeman arrives on the scene and inquires of us what has happened. We tell him about the event and I inform him about the man's fit. He radios for an ambulance. After about three minutes of unconsciousness, the driver begins to regain consciousness. He struggles in a clumsy, unco-ordinated way to regain his seat in the driving position. When he is back in the seat, the policeman speaks to him: "Excuse me Sir, may I have your name and address?". He is rather startled when the driver does not respond directly to his question but instead speaks in a loud and anxious voice: "Mummy!".

I now intervene and inform the policeman that very often people are very confused and disorientated on recovering from epileptic fits. But he persists in his line of questioning, though less surprised at the driver's disjunctive responses, being incoherent or wanting his "mummy".

Two minutes later, the ambulance arrives and an ambulanceman comes over to the car to assist the man into the ambulance. Between us we move his legs round out of the car door so that he can stand up, and help him to his feet. He can stand, but is very unsteady. I support him with what I intend to be a comforting and protective arm round him and, together with the ambulanceman, walk him over to the open doors at the rear of the ambulance. We ask him: "Can you get up into the ambulance now, please?".

But this seems wrong and frightening to him - he feels coerced against his will by us. He turns away from the ambulance and tries to struggle free from our grasp, saying " ... no ... no ...". At this point the ambulanceman speaks sharply to him saying "get into the ambulance and sit down and stop being so difficult". Immediately after,

I say to him, trying to be reassuring, "we're just taking you somewhere you can rest until you're feeling better - it'll be O.K., don't worry" and once again try explaining, this time to the ambulanceman, about post-epileptic confusion.

We manage to coax the driver into the ambulance, the ambulanceman now being more conciliatory. I get out, the ambulanceman remaining sitting with the driver, and the ambulance drives away.

The policeman makes a final comment to the onlookers before everyone disperses about their business: " .....he's lost his licence!".

#### Analysis.

As a first provisional description I would say that my actions during the course of the incident were morally motivated, though not purely so. Likewise the motivation of the other passers-by who got involved in the incident. It is more questionable what, if any of the motivational factors of both the policeman and the ambulanceman were moral in character. Onlookers, who regarded the incident as a bizarre spectacle, clearly were not morally motivated.

The issues in Kant's theory which I wish to criticize by means of the analysis of this example are these:

- a) Is he correct in his radical distinction of the forms of motivation of self-love (desire) and duty (morality)?
- b) Is the end, the "good-to-be-realized" in any morally motivated action logically posterior to the sense of duty, the "categorical imperative" and, conversely, is self-love posterior to the end motivated through desire?

c) What is the validity of the intentional, objectivated meanings of good which Kant has produced or employed?

My first awareness of the event, as I approached, was seeing the car in a strange position, half on, half off the pavement, diagonally. It produced a twinge of a vague demand in me - I might be called on to act - something might be wrong which I could help. Following this I saw a number of people gathering round the scene which led me to interpret the event as an accident. Then I saw, through the windscreen, that the driver was convulsing. This was what determined me to intervene. It brought a body of signification into play for me: Having worked for sometime with a number of people, several of whom were subject to epilepsy in its various forms, I had come to feel that I knew and understood the condition. Moreover I had a sense that most others are largely ignorant of it and do not know how to act appropriately in its respect. This meant to me that the driver's fit nominated me as the person on the scene most likely, immediately at least, to be able to intervene appropriately.

So what was the teleological structure of my motivation at this stage and how should it be logically ordered? Elements I can analyse are these: Consciousness of "something-wrong", consciousness of the possibility of doing something to right it, having the end of righting it so far as within my power to do so and feeling a demand to right the situation. This written order of presentation is arbitrary. Do any of these elements have temporal priority? No - they were all concurrent. Is there logical priority in the relation of any element to any of the others in the sense of being "the condition of the possibility"?

I needed to be conscious of "something-wrong" in order to feel the

demand to "right" it, to seeing the possibility of righting it and to make righting the situation my end. It seems to me that these latter three elements are part and parcel of one another and mutually dependant. Feeling the demand to right the situation and making it one's end to right the situation is necessary to the conscious seeking out, the seeing in the situation the possibility of righting it. At the same time, it is this seeing of the possibility of righting the situation which is necessary to the actualisation of the demand to act and which gives specific content to the end as what has to be done.

I shall analyse my seeing of "something-wrong" more closely. As I saw the unusual physical configuration, obliquely in my path, I saw in it something which drew my attention. This was a meaning, a signification which it had for me - something realized in a very vague unspecific form - that it mattered, was important or that at least it might matter, it might be important. This occasion of meaning reflects what was at that time my pre-established body of knowledge and values. The car as object has a level of meaning which is its relation to human life - as tool, as artifact and as container of or possible container of a living human being. The car seen in its unexpected position signified not only that it might be unexpected and problematic for others, but that it might reflect an unforeseen misfortune for its human occupant.

My pre-existing values, in valuing others and in willing that harm to others should be avoided or alleviated, were implicated in my seeing the possibility of harm to another as "something-wrong". In the structure of my motivation, it is not clear that the consciousness of "something-wrong" has logical priority over the question of moral will, moral motivation. My pre-existing values indicate a pre-existing moral will, or "good will", dormant but there, awaiting the call to action. But this will,

in its teleological structure, has an end, albeit an open and indeterminate end, the end to do good and correlatively to right wrong, whenever the necessity (or, perhaps, the opportunity) arises. In perceiving the event, my moral will, which, previously, was implicit, potential and relatively abstract, became explicit, actual and concrete. What I conclude from this is that my implicit moral will was necessary to my seeing "something-wrong" in the event, but that this seeing "something-wrong" was necessary to the actualization of my moral will.

How does this relate to and throw light on Kant's distinction of two radically different forms of motivation? In Kant's treatment of the issue, it turns on the question of what determines the will to act and whether the end of the action, that-to-be-realized, is prior or posterior to the determination of the will - the "making-up-of-its-mind" to act.

I shall now use the example to analyse what I regard as non-moral activity. Prior to the incident, I was homeward-bound on my bicycle. My immediate anticipation was being able to cease the effort of activity, have a cup of coffee and relax. In a longer term horizon, though, my going-home was necessary to and motivated for the satisfaction of my basic daily needs of food, sleep and shelter.

I suppose Kant would call this sort of motivation "determined by self-love", and regard my action as determined by empirical conditions, as something occurring under his category of causation, something not freely chosen by myself but to which I was impelled.

But is the structure of my motivation in this really so very different from my being morally motivated? Just as my will was "determined" by an

implicit pre-established moral will, is it not also the case that it was also "determined", implicitly, by a pre-established and habitual "self-love", this being in the process of actualization at the time?.

It seems to me that there is indeed a common motivational structure for the two types of motivation and that their differences reside in the different natures of what they essentially try to achieve.

In my non-moral motivation exemplified, the needs to which it related present aesthetically, are felt as bodily dissatisfactions. In so far as my activity related to the satisfaction of those needs, must I accept that it was not freely chosen activity? It would seem that the nature of a felt dissatisfaction dictates that one is necessarily motivated to end the dissatisfaction or, expressed positively, to realize a satisfaction in fulfilling the want created by the dissatisfaction.

But particular dissatisfactions occur as part of a whole body of feelings, together with numerous other dissatisfactions. Ideally, one is motivated to end all dissatisfactions but, in reality, the means to ending one dissatisfaction will frequently contradict possible means to ending another dissatisfaction. Such instances make a choice of activity, in ending dissatisfaction, necessary. Such choice involves choosing to suffer in certain respects, for the sake of ending suffering in other respects. One's body of feeling presents as a condition in relation to which one's choice of action is directed, seeking what, overall, is anticipated to be the best result. I think it is a fairer description to call this conditioned choice of action "freedom" than to describe the action as empirically caused. It is the "manifold of feeling", the condition of the action, which is empirically caused.

I have argued that there is a common motivational structure for the two essentially distinguished types of motivation, whose distinction I have accepted, at a descriptive level, but which I have not yet clarified as to how they differ, how they are related and in how they relate in a concrete consciousness. But first I have omitted consideration of an important aspect of moral motivation, which is its feeling content.

In terms of my example, at the moment I perceived "something-wrong", I felt a twinge of disquiet - a negative bad-feeling. This bad-feeling was something which happened to me, not something directly "caused" through my "freedom". It was occasioned by my consciousness of "something-wrong". Was I in any way responsible for this? As I have said previously, seeing "something-wrong" implicated my pre-existing, implicit moral will and my body of knowledge and values. These consisted in a general consciousness, of which concern for others and their well-being was a part. Now, whilst I had adopted and chosen this attitude, it was nevertheless a choice made in relation to a feeling-condition. It is that, in general, and as part of its meaning, I experience harm to others as negative, as my own bad-feeling. Given this consciousness, this feeling-relation, I am not free not to so will. This non-freedom is experienced as the moral imperative that one must act against the objective bad, in so far as this is possible. If one does not so act, then one necessarily will experience a moral negation. I shall deal with the objectivated meanings associated with this feeling in greater detail later in this Thesis, in discussing "valour".

The different types of motivation, with their bad-feeling content, differ essentially in what they seek to achieve. On the level of objectivated meaning, "good will" seeks to realize what is objectively

and universally good. "self-love", on the other hand, is directed to realizing the self's own good. The meaning of what is objectively good in the universal sense relates to the objective meaning of one's own good. For the former "Good" involves the good of others and their relations. But the meaning of "another's good" is something understood as their own good, and their own good is understood, objectively, as being constituted in the same way as one's own good. What is more, moral motivation can involve one's own good, but only in so far as it is involved in what is universally good, as one's consciousness perceives it.

What I have said about the pre-established dispositions of a consciousness to will both morally and non-morally, means that concretely, these dispositions coexist in any one concrete consciousness. Is this possible without conflict or contradiction? One's own good may or may not entail, as condition for its realization, the negation of the good of others and of what is universally good. In being motivated for one's own good, its criterion is the consciousness of one's own good it realizes. In so far as one's own good is conceived and pursued without regard for the good of others, then, in so far as one also wills morally, one is liable to contradict one's moral aims in the pursuit of one's own good.

But in willing morally, one aims to not contradict what is good, universally. Thus one's moral consciousness would tend to make one consider one's other activities in its light, and so to become consciousness of any contradiction in one's own activity between the moral and the non-moral. However, as discussed in the previous section on the phenomenology of good feeling, intensity of good-feeling in any particular respect can disrupt the congruity of one's teleological field of ends and motivate activity which contradicts



other projects. In so far as one is conscious that one has acted against what one wills morally, one will experience a moral negation. But this can be outweighed by the intensity of pleasure in the other respect.

Nevertheless, consciousness of contradiction of one's moral aims by one's non-moral aims does motivate one to try to adapt the latter to conform with the former.

Also, in a concrete consciousness, these motivations are intermingled and admixed. Returning to the example, my motivations during the incident were, I think, moral, but not wholly so. In being amongst the small group of people focusing a common concern on the car driver, I not only saw what needed to be done, but also saw that I was the person in the group who knew what to do. I felt a pleasure in my relative potency, in the valuableness which I felt I possessed in contra-distinction to the others. This aspect of the self-valorization which I achieved through my involvement in the incident I would describe as "inauthentic". It rested on my idea of others valuing me in proportion to the extent of the good I could do in the situation, rather than for my good will in attempting to do what I could, to whatever extent. In fact what this analysis shows is that the motivation to the feeling just discussed actually contradicted my moral motivation, and motivates (now) a humiliating moral negation. Overall, during the incident and immediately afterwards, despite suffering moments of anxiety, personal affront, etc, I would say I enjoyed my part in it. I left the scene feeling pleased that I had done what I could, the inauthentic pleasure just mentioned, pleased to have had, gratuitously, some excitement, an adventure which was immediate food for conversation and which I could subsequently "dine-out" on.

I think I am now at a point where I can summarize my answers to questions a) and b) posed earlier:

- a) Whilst I think Kant's distinction of the two types of motivation is valid, his view of the will being "determined" by "freedom" in the case of one and by "empirical causality" in the other is not. My analysis shows that the essential difference of the types of motivation resides in that one seeks to realize what is universally good, whereas the other seeks to realize the self's own good.
- b) Pursuing-an-end is an integral part of the teleological structure of any motivation. Therefore that-to-be-realized, whether indefinite or definite, implicit or explicit, is neither prior nor posterior to the motivation but "part and parcel" of it.

This brings me to question c) on Kant's meanings of good:

Kant's notions of pleasure and pain correspond to the range of phenomena which I called "Good-feeling". In his saying that, subjectively, the will is determined by a subjective maxim which relates what is to be realized to the subject's pleasure in the realization, Kant appears to be recognizing that one's good-feeling is objectivated as the objective meaning of being one's own good. However as he had no conception of consciousness's intentionality, he was not able to distinguish the direct phenomena of consciousness itself as feeling from the objectivated meanings which consciousness produces and employs teleologically.

Consequently he was unable to conceive how good-feeling, lived in experience, enters into the meaning of the good which a good will wills. His view that a moral will is determined a priori by a formal practical law, corresponds to my description of having a pre-established disposition to will morally, where that will is

implicit. Whereas Kant regarded such a will as being a noumenal good-in-itself, I would describe such a will, in any concrete instantiation, as being, objectively, a value and universally good, but for real reasons connecting the particular with the whole of reality, as known empirically. Moreover, what connects such a concretely existing will with the whole of reality, is its end, be it indeterminate; implicit and potential, or determinate, explicit and actual. In the former form it expresses an attitude that it will act to realize what is universally good, in the real world, when it can. The latter form expresses it when it is actually engaged in doing so.

Kant did recognize that there is a pleasure in moral action and I would agree that moral action does not aim at realizing such a pleasure but rather the objective good that demands to be realized. But I would argue nevertheless that the meaning that it must be realized objectivates a real content of consciousness which is the "disquiet" felt in a confrontational moral call to action. This is an essential motivational factor which should be recognised as "part and parcel" of a moral will. These remarks apply similarly, to what he described as the "humiliation" diminishing a subject's pleasure in self-gratification. This corresponds directly to the example of "humiliation" which I described in relation to my example!

What Kant described as an evil-will aims, implicitly or explicitly to do what is objectively and universally bad or what is contradictory to what is universally good. Under my analysis, this would share the common motivational structure of "good-will" and "self-love", differing in what it attempts to realize. Now the evil to be realized is something that would realize a satisfaction for the evil-willed agent. This is again "part and parcel" of the

motivational structure. Interestingly here Kant did recognize this as a being motivated by self-love, though he argued that it was not an empirically determined self-love but a free will choosing to do evil, and, in so doing, acting in self-love. Logically extending back this formulation to good-will would make his conception of the latter closer to mine!

In Kant's conception, moral action necessarily realizes good, in a non-empirical sense, whatever the empirical outcome of the action. This means for him that the moral value of an action cannot be compromised by consideration of the actual empirical consequences. However I, on the contrary would argue that the objective and universal value realized by an action must be evaluated and assessed in terms of the changes in reality actually effected. Nonetheless a good-will, in itself, remains universally good, however effective or ineffective it is in what it achieves, because, in so far as it is a good-will, it is trying to realize what is universally good. A good-will would, in conformity with itself, be concerned to evaluate the effect of its action in order to optimize its effectiveness.

Kant's conception of the Summum Bonum is an idea similar to his "omnitudo realitas". As object he conceived it as the supreme goal of moral action. However, unlike the omnitudo realitas, Kant conceived that it must be realizable, for otherwise the good which he insisted must be realized, unconditionally, by any moral action, could not be so characterized unless it can be conceived as contributing to the Summum Bonum.

I, on the other hand, would like to form an indeterminate, open conception of the Summum Bonum. Let whatsoever would be its

realization, be its realization! But I do recognize the need for this idea in the practical reason that guides moral activity. The Summum Bonum is, logically, what all moral activity aims to realize since the latter aims to realize what is good, universally. This means that a moral will must, to be consistently good, seek the best possible knowledge of reality, in terms of how selves' own good, and the relations of these goods, exist in it, in order to grasp how the whole of reality is not universally good. This grasp of reality in terms of relations of good and bad is necessary to project, as end, what would be the best possible state of reality (Summum Bonum). On the ground of this conceived supreme end, moral will in any concrete circumstance projects the good which it is within its power to realize, in conformity with this supreme end.

This is not to say that in fact, and in practice, moral agents in general have any particularly conceptually clear idea of the context of greater good to which their particular realization of good is oriented, nor that they understand the problem in this way. Nevertheless, in terms of the sense of the meaning of what they are doing in any moral agent's consciousness, there is at least a vague ground of greater possible good to which their action relates.

The Philosophy of Good

SECTION 2

Part 2 Exposition and Criticism of Hegel's Conception of Good

A) Exposition

I shall talk about Hegel's philosophy as a whole and his philosophical method before discussing his conception of good. I shall discuss the latter drawing mainly on his "Philosophy of Right" (33).

I shall be discussing Hegel's development and expression of his concept of the "Idea of Good", culminating in comparison of this with Kant's "Summum Bonum" and Hegel's criticism of Kant in this and related respects.

Finally I discuss Hegel's treatment of the issues of "Evil" and "Pain".

1. Hegel's Philosophical Method and Philosophy in General

I should like to talk about Hegel's philosophy as a whole. It can be described as "Absolute Idealism". A fundamental presupposition of absolute idealism is that of the ultimate identity of knowledge, being and truth. This is to say that these three belong together as one, related to each other such that knowledge is the truth of being, being is the truth of knowledge and truth is the mediating relationship which unites knowledge and being such that truth characterizes knowledge of being and the being of knowledge. At (34), Hegel said:

" .... truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the agreement of a thought content with itself."

Whilst this schema of knowledge, being and truth is highly abstract and obscure, I am nevertheless introducing it since this relational structure is to be found written through the whole of his philosophical work.

Describing his work more concretely, of two of his major works: The "Phenomenology of Spirit" and The "Science of Logic" (35), Hegel regarded the latter as being a continuation of the former, both together forming a philosophical whole. Of his other major works, particularly "The Philosophy of Right" and the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences" (36), the former can be seen as both an elaboration and re-statement of knowledge and theoretical positions encompassed in the first two works referred to and as his principal work developing his moral/ethical philosophy. The "Encyclopaedia" was a concise, systematic exposition of the whole of his philosophy, embracing all that was treated more elaborately in the other works. What he aimed to do by these works, ultimately, as he said in the Preface to the "Phenomenology of Spirit" (37), was to give philosophy the form of "science", meaning to change it from being "the love of Knowledge" to being actual knowing - concrete and systematic knowledge.



Unified by the postulate of absolute idealism, in these works Hegel conceived reality as a unitary totality, as a whole, bearing all differences and all distinctions within itself. In the course of the works, he traced the development, the generation of knowledge into its becoming the Absolute Idea. This is, for Hegel, the absolute, ultimate reality, in which knowledge is no longer different from, or other than being, but united with it. In the Absolute Idea, knowledge has overcome its difference from being by the inclusion of that difference from being within itself. Put another way, knowledge, by including itself in its object, includes its object in itself. Hegel's conception of the unity of knowledge and being denies many other metaphysical positions, but particularly Descartes' mind/body dualism and Kant's phenomena/noumena distinctions (see my discussions of the latter positions, Introduction, page 16 and Section 1, pages 68,80).

These preliminary descriptions are still highly abstract and obscure. I do not believe that in the scope of this thesis I can do justice to Hegel's philosophical genius, but I must try to outline some picture of the structure of his work, so that what he says about good can be seen in the overall context.

Describing again the two works, the "Phenomenology of Spirit" and the "Science of Logic", in the first, Hegel traced the development of knowledge from "immediate consciousness", ie from some supposedly primordial state of sensory awareness, up to absolute knowledge, the state of consciousness in which knowledge has become "science". In the second, he took the generated "science" of the first as his presupposition. In the Introduction to the "Science of Logic", Hegel conceived his progressive exposition in the work as following the internal generation of distinctions within the "concept" (the "concept" being knowledge in scientific form, for Hegel) as it, the "concept", spontaneously develops itself, becoming progressively determined - ie



becoming progressively content-filled and concrete as knowledge, as opposed to more limited, one-sided, abstract knowledge. The culmination of the process is the Absolute Idea. For Hegel, the Idea is the subject-object, ie it is the synthesis of the "concept" with what it conceives, with its content and, by this synthesis, by this identification, it becomes concrete or (perhaps I should say) more concrete. For the Idea, itself, in the work, has a development culminating in the Absolute Idea, the ultimately, absolutely, concrete - reality itself.

But what can this mean? When Hegel asserts, talks of, writes and describes the Absolute Idea, that Idea itself, as conceived, is not suddenly present, all-pervading, omniscient and omnipotent - it is thought, that is all. So, in reality, all we have is the concept of the Absolute Idea. So who or what, then, is the Absolute Idea?

Presumably God, the Divine Being. We, as existing subjects, can only aspire to know and be the Absolute Idea - aspire to unite ourselves in or with God. Having said this, if Hegel's concept of the Absolute Idea is to be conceived as being God, it is not "God" as traditionally conceived.

I shall now move on to discuss Hegel's philosophical method. In his works, the "concept", at any particular degree of development, whatever its conceptual content or object, at whatever particular point in the course of the work, is described as spontaneously and progressively determining itself. This is pictured as belonging to a total process culminating in the Idea.

So what is the nature of this process of the becoming, the generation of the Idea, and how does it proceed? It is not, as one might be misled to think, an empirical and temporal process. In other words, it does not correspond with world-history. On the contrary it is a logical process, the method of this process being Hegel's "dialectic".

What it describes are the stages through which thought or consciousness must necessarily pass in order to arrive at any particular stage of the "concept". The dialectical principle which necessitates the progression of the "concept" is that whatever it posits, ie whatever is its content at that stage belongs together with its opposite or negative in a greater or further conceptual unity. It is the mediating overcoming of this opposition which constitutes the "concept"'s advance. In other words, the mediation consists in what is formerly outside the concept, in opposition to it, being included in the concept by its conceiving of the opposition and hence including that relation, as conceived, in its total conceptual content.

I have given this contextual description since Hegel's discussion of "good" and associated issues is both situated within the overall scheme of his philosophical works and is dialectically generated according to his philosophical method. But unfortunately, the descriptions to this point are still abstract and obscure. So to finish this introductory section, I shall try to exemplify the dialectical process:

In the natural attitude of consciousness, nature - the physical world and all physical entities of which it is comprised, are conceived as independent, self-subsistent entities, outside and wholly other than consciousness. But when it conceives this relationship, which relationship is implicit in its first conceptual opposition of itself to the world, consciousness realizes that the natural, physical, phenomenal, appearing world is, in fact, the world-for-consciousness and that it has been conceived abstractly and one-sidedly in its conception as being independent of the consciousness in which its being becomes manifest. The recognition that the natural, physical world is, in being the world-for-consciousness, one side of a relational whole, represents a dialectical conceptual advance.

2. Hegel's Conception of Good

In his "Philosophy of Right" at (38), Hegel gives his conception of the Idea of the good. Here it should be noted that as he is conceiving it as Idea, it has the conceptual elevation of the subject-object, where the concept, considered as subjective activity, has united itself with and included within itself the being, the objectivity it is conceiving. Hegel said:

"The good is thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aim of the world."

To make sense of this, it needs unpacking. What does he mean by "freedom"? In his Introduction to the "Philosophy of Right", at (39) he said:

"The basis of right is, in general, mind ("Geist" otherwise translated as "spirit" - my note); its precise place and origin is the will. The will is free, so that freedom is both the substance of right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, the world of mind, brought forth out of itself like a second nature".

As I understand this, the will is free and its freedom is realized in the coming-to-be of what it wills, by virtue of so willing it.

Hegel described this operation of the freedom of the will in his Teleology, contained in the "Science of Logic" (40). In the teleological process, consciousness, or mind, or spirit, as will, first conceives or intends its end-to-be-realized, which, in the initial stage, exists only subjectively, as intended-to-be-realized. Consciousness, having already, to some extent, conceived external nature both externally mechanically and internally chemically, then employs some part of external nature as its means and, with what Hegel called "the cunning of reason", the means, by virtue of its own nature, effects the realization in external nature of what was willed to be

realized. But the existence of the end, realized in external reality, is not what really constitutes the realization of the end (!). The realization of the end consists in what Hegel called the "objective-return" of the concept. This is the experience, the actual consciousness, in which consciousness meets, in reality, that which it had formerly only conceived to be realized. Here the "concept" meets and is united with its content. It is fulfilled; it is realized. This then, surely, is "freedom realized" and is the good.

But can what Hegel meant by the good be the good realized by any individual consciousness or subject in any individual, particular realization of an end? On the contrary, he described the good, the Idea of the good, as "the absolute end and aim of the world". At (38), he also said:

"The good is the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular will".

What I think he is saying here is that the concept of will, in its fullest sense, needs subjective embodiment for it to exist concretely and to be realized as Idea. For this it is necessary for particular existing consciousnesses to self-consciously will according to the universality of the concept of will. The point of willing according to the concept is the recognition that this gives to all other individuals in their needs to freely will and realize their ends, likewise in accordance with the concept. The effect of this is that anything willed which infringes the freedom, the right of others, actually contradicts the concept of will and so is excluded by willing according to the concept.

Consciousness, in the state of relatively blind willing, in which it is involved in the satiation of naturally given impulses and desires, is relatively un-self-conscious and it does not relate what it is doing to the wider human context of its consequences upon others.

Thus for Hegel, the development of freedom from this relatively blind willing, towards the realization of the Idea of will, the Idea of freedom and the Idea of good, is a process of its becoming more real, more concrete and more perfect.

This process of transition from blind willing into moral willing had, in previous philosophy, been described as a process of restriction of freedom. In the Introduction to the "Philosophy of Right", at (41), Hegel cited Kant saying:

" ..... restriction which makes it possible for my freedom or self-will to co-exist with the self-will of each and all according to a universal law" (Introduction to Kant's "Philosophy of Law"; misquoted by Hegel).

Hegel criticized this as containing the view, popular since Rousseau, that what is fundamental and primary is the will of a single person, in their own, private, self-will. He argued, on the contrary, that what should be primary is the instantiation of the universal will (the rational will) in the particular individual.

So far established is that the good, as expressed in the Idea of the good, for Hegel, is the unity of the concept of good (the subjective side) with the existence of good in reality (the objective side).

Also at (38) in the "Philosophy of Right", Hegel said:

"In this unity, abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing and the contingency of external fact, have their independent self-subsistence superceded, though at the same time they are still contained and retained within it in their essence".

What this means is that in the dialectical development of the concept, each item said to have had its independent self-subsistence superceded, was, at certain stages, the concept itself, but that in the further development of the concept towards concreteness, those stages have become moments, or as it were "sides" of the concept, needing to be

taken together in their dependence upon and relativity to each other.

So what are these items and why are they included in good? By "welfare" Hegel meant the actual lived satisfaction which any agent realizes in the course of realizing any particular end. At (42) in the "Philosophy of Right", he said:

" ..... but the subject, .... , has in his end his own particular content, and this content is the soul of the action and determines its character. The fact that this moment of the particularity of the agent is contained and realized in the action constitutes subjective freedom in its more concrete sense, the right of the subject to find his satisfaction in the action". Hegel criticized as "an empty dogmatism of the abstract understanding" (43) the view that the worth of an action should only reside in its being willed and attained, holding the abstraction from the element of satisfaction to be a falsification, producing a view of morality as "nothing but a bitter, unending, struggle against self-satisfaction, as the command: 'Do with abhorrence what duty enjoins'" (44).

Hegel's "abstract right" resides in the formal relations necessary between particular individual personalities with respect to the external world. At (45) he said:

"The imperative of right is 'be a person and respect others as persons'".

He said that abstract right only commands unconditionally (ie - "categorically") in the negative: "Do not infringe personality and what personality entails" (46). The immediate embodiment of the relations of abstract right is property. It is the individual's power to dispose, to realize their end, and it depends on all other individuals respecting that individual's property right.

What the subject knows and the "contingency of external fact", in any particular case, are conditions of what good can be realized.

At (47), Hegel said:

"Welfare without right is not good. Similarly right without welfare is not the good; .... Consequently, since the good must of necessity be actualized through the particular will and is at the same time its substance, it has absolute right in contrast to the abstract right of property and the particular aims of welfare. If either of these moments becomes distinguished from the good, it has validity only in so far as it accords with the good and is subordinated to it".

Given, or assuming, the "absolute right" of good as the "absolute end and aim of the world", Hegel argued that

" .... the subjective will has value and dignity only in so far as its insight and intention accord with the good" (48).

What Hegel means by the "subjective will" is the constitutive subjectivity of the whole of the subjective side of willing in reality, the will embodied by what he called the "world-mind" ("world-spirit") (49). He said that the subjective will

" .... ought to make the good its aim and realize it completely, while the good on its side has in the subjective will its only means of stepping into actuality" (48).

Here Hegel's concept of the Idea of good comes closest to Kant's concept of the Summum Bonum, the highest or greatest possible good (See discussion on pages 74-5, 98-9). The Summum Bonum, for all moral action, all practical reason, is its ideal goal to be realized. Kant held that for it to be the goal of moral action, it must not only be ideal but, ultimately, realizable.

Notwithstanding this conceptual closeness between Kant and Hegel, Hegel nevertheless criticized Kant's conception of the Supreme Good, in the "Encyclopaedia, Logic" (50), for his failure to conceive this "final cause" or "end" of the whole of being as objective reality or truth.

At (51), he said:

"But in the postulated harmony of nature (or necessity) and free purpose - in the final purpose of the world conceived as realized, Kant has put before us the Idea, comprehensive even in its content. Yet what may be called the laziness of thought, when dealing with the supreme Idea, finds a too easy evasion in the 'ought to be': instead of the actual realization of the ultimate end, it clings hard to the disjunction of the notion from reality".

Later, at (52), he said:

The harmony is then described as merely subjective, something which merely ought to be, and which at the same time is not real - a mere article of faith, possessing a subjective certainty, but without truth, or that objectivity which is proper to the Idea". Much of Hegel's criticism of "previous philosophy", particularly his argument for the inclusion of "welfare" in good, had Kant in mind. His comments quoted on page 108 (53) are particularly critical of Kant's one-sided view of the good will residing abstractly in the motivation of duty.



3. The Issues of Evil and Pain

In the "Phenomenology of Spirit", Hegel talked about "evil" in his section on "Revealed Religion" (54). In talking about the "fall" described in "Genesis", he said that the story is a pictorial representation of consciousness becoming self-consciousness; self-consciousness being experienced in the "shame" of Adam and Eve. He said that this self-consciousness was the condition of the possibility of both good and evil, but that its first tendency is towards evil: Consciousness, having discovered itself, makes all else "other-than-itself" and so concerns itself solely with its self-interest, closed off from all other interests and antipathic to others' interests. At (55), he said:

"Evil in general is self-centred being-for-self .....".

Returning to the "Philosophy of Right", at (56), he said:

"The evil will wills something opposed to the universality of the will, while the good will acts in accordance with its true concept".

He wanted to resolve the question of the origin of evil, which, it should be remembered, is in the context of his theological metaphysical world-view. He wanted to show that the development of consciousness into its first level of self-conscious freedom necessitated both the possibility of evil and of good. He said, again at (56), that the problem of evil's origin could be put in the form:

"How does the negative come into the positive?".

Here, the "positive" refers to God's creation. Now this creation is evolving humanity, the developing consciousness represented by the "concept". Hegel said that the concept, by its very nature, demands that negativity be rooted in the positive since it

" .... has it in its essence to differentiate itself and to

posit itself negatively" (56).

What this amounts to saying is that human evolution, the evolution of the "world-mind", could not proceed towards its final form, the realization of the Idea of good and the Absolute Idea, without the possibility of and the existence of evil (see remarks on page 91 about the role of negation and opposition in the self-development of the concept).

In the "Science of Logic", in the section on the "Idea of Life", at (57), Hegel talks of "pain":

"This process begins with 'need', ..... First the living being determines itself, in so doing posits itself as denied, and thereby relates itself to an 'other' to it, .....; but secondly, it is equally not lost in this loss of itself .....; thus it is the urge to posit this 'other' world as its own, as similar to itself, to sublimate it and to objectify itself. .... (it) has the form of objective externality, and as it is at the same time identical with itself it is absolute 'contradiction'. ..... since, all the same, it is absolute identity in this disharmony, the living being is for itself this disharmony and has the feeling of this contradiction, which is 'pain'. Pain is therefore the prerogative of living natures; ...., that this their negativity is for them, and that they maintain themselves in their otherness. It is said that contradiction is unthinkable; but the fact is that in the pain of a living being it is even an actual existence".

Hegel said that from the explicit disharmony of pain began the "need" and the "urge" to overcome this and for consciousness to become explicitly identical with itself, in other words for it to identify with its experiential content. This then, again, refers to the teleological process, inherent in consciousness and the "concept", with "pain" as its essential impetus and good as its result.

B) Phenomenological Critique

My criticisms in this section in fact go beyond mere phenomenological criticism and express some views on Hegel's formulations whose justification I shall argue for later in the thesis. They are expressed here since they respond to the content of Hegel that I have discussed, particularly my final remarks about retribution.

I do not want to attempt criticism of Hegel's overall metaphysical position here. I would describe it as a form of spiritual monism. However I would say that such a belief about the overall nature of reality requires specific evidence, specific reason to believe that it is so, to justify the belief. I do not think that the rational exposition of the development of consciousness in relation to the world necessitates, of itself, that particular overall metaphysical unity which Hegel gave it. Indeed, it seems that Hegel took that position as his presupposition.

I shall first consider the good taken as "the absolute end and aim of the world". Does this require that the world be conceived as a single self, realizing itself as its own end? It may be a misleading appearance of the way Hegel set things out, in talking, for example, of the "world-mind", that suggests that he thinks of the world's self as a single, self-conscious, self-determining entity. If that is what he means, then, as I said of his metaphysics, he has presupposed it and given no supporting evidence to justify it. But this may be a misinterpretation of what he is saying. The good can be conceived as the absolute end and aim of the world without conceiving world reality as a single self-for-itself in the sense I have just suggested. It can be conceived as the spiritual totality of all concrete individual selves, past, present and future. The good then exists in and through their existence.

Now, according to Hegel, the condition of an individual self's existence being concretely the existence of good is that the satisfaction which it realizes for itself should be willed and realized in accordance with the universal concept of the will.

Here again, my attitude to this depends upon which particular interpretation of what he is saying I take. Is any particular realization of satisfaction only constitutive of the good if it is in accordance with the concept of will? What, for Hegel, counts as being in accordance? He seems to be saying that the satisfaction must itself be willed as something universally good and justified. I, on the contrary, though, would suggest that particular satisfactions can be universally good and justified, and so constitutive of the good, even though not self-consciously willed as such. There is a realm of satisfactions realized through what Hegel, at (58), in the "Philosophy of Right", called "natural willing". These are the satisfactions of naturally felt needs, desires and impulses where consciousness is not conscious of itself as freedom nor as itself being responsible for its effects upon others. I would say that such satisfactions can be contingently either good or bad, depending on how they actually affect the good and the conditions of the good of others. This is because I regard actual, lived satisfaction (or pleasure, happiness, good-feeling) as the "stuff", the material content of what good is. But for this good-content to be universally good, ie for it to belong to the good, it must not, in the effects of its realization, be destructive to any other justified good.

In the light of what I have just said about the material content of good, I think I should here discuss Hegel's account of "pain". He says that the experience of consciousness's internal contradiction, that of existing confronting an alien yet essentially related external world, is lived as pain. He says that it is the contradiction, the

being denied by what is other than itself which gives living consciousness the urge to overcome the contradiction, to make the world its own and to identify itself with the world.

But I think that Hegel has reversed the proper conceptual, logical order of the phenomenological generation of rationality. For surely it is the lived experience, the actual feeling of pain, of dissatisfaction, which is the original phenomenon of the "urge", the "moving force". For pain is inherently aversive. Surely it is in consciousness's finding its experiential content aversive that the meaning of the alien otherness of the world is generated. It is at the same time felt as a need to make its experiential content good and to identify with it (see discussion in my Introduction, pages 23-25.

Returning to the sphere of satisfactions realized through self-conscious willing, I do agree with Hegel that they are only constitutive of good if they are willed in accordance with the universality of the concept of will ( in Hegel's terms). As I understand this, it entails a recognition of the freedom of the will being essential to consciousness's self-realization. It is no more essential to one's own conscious existence than to any other's.

In self-consciousness, not to will according to the concept is to will the essentiality of one's own satisfactions whilst denying, implicitly or explicitly, the essentiality of others'. The tendency of such willing is always to do harm to others' good, by negligence, indifference or actual negation. Since such willing is always liable to realize wrong, or do evil, it constitutes, objectively, a bad state of affairs, needing to be changed for the better for good to prevail. Hegel's doctrine of "retribution", in the "Philosophy of Right" (59), recognizes this, holding that punishment negates wrong existing in the criminal's will and hence restores the criminal's rational status.

But there is something I find deficient in Hegel's conception of both evil and wrong. It seems Hegel regarded them as residing in the will of the evil-doer or wrong-doer. But as I have argued analogously, with respect to good, there is a "stuff" of evil and wrong, which should be regarded as being as much constitutive of the essence of evil and wrong as is the will of the evil- or wrong-doer. This is the actually-suffered:- the bad-feeling, dissatisfaction, displeasure, unhappiness or just the privation of good-feeling, which is the evil-done or wrong-done. It is what is suffered by those who have evil or wrong done to them.

Bad-feeling (not the attitude but the experiential content) is something which, in itself, is aversive. Yet it is not necessarily evil or wrong. These terms relate the bad-feeling to being the responsibility of the evil- or wrong-doer. Bad feeling may be necessary in order that good can prevail, but evil and wrong simply should not be. They need to be undone, counteracted and negated.

I think that retribution should not just consist in returning, or attempting to return, the will of the criminal to righteousness but that the righting of the wrong also needs the undoing of the harm done, in other words the restitution of the offence, which, being the criminal's responsibility, should fall to that person in some measure, commensurate with their power or ability, to make the restitution.

This brings me to my final point. It seems that Hegel felt that the fairly abstract negation of the criminal will was sufficient to "honour the criminal". However it seems to me that in so far as one is seeking to change the criminal will, it is to effect that recognition of the value and sameness of others, with specific reference to those harmed. It seems to me that the criminal bearing responsibility for making the restitution also has the value of promoting such necessary recognition of others (see my discussion of "evil" in my Conclusion, (pages 280-285)).

The Philosophy of Good

SECTION 2

Part 3 Exposition and Criticism of Sartre's Work with respect to Good

A) Exposition

I shall begin by presenting Sartre's direct expression of his view of good contained in an appendix to his "Cahiers Pour Une Morale".

Following this I move to discussing positions more implicit in his "Being and Nothingness", in the context of more general portrayal of his ontology.

I conclude this exposition with consideration of his views expressed in a lecture published as "Existentialism and Humanism".

Sartre's view of good, as with Kant and Hegel, is intimately related to his moral philosophy and his conceptions of those issues. It is, moreover, deeply bound up with his philosophy in general, his phenomenological ontology of human existence and later his analysis of the relations of human "praxis" in the making of human history.

In his lifetime, Sartre never completed the work on Ethics, further and complementary to "Being and Nothingness", promised at the end of that work (60). In fact, during his lifetime, Sartre published very little explicitly devoted to his moral thought. Nevertheless he had done a great deal of writing for such intended expression. These writings fell into two distinct groups. First were his writings in the immediate post-World War 2 period, in the period of development of his thought directly relating to what he had expressed in "Being and Nothingness. But later he reappraised his positions in relation to Marxism and reinterpreted and re-expressed his thought explicitly in terms of dialectical or historical materialism and he again wrote at length but never finished his later work on morality.

Since his death, his "Cahiers Pour Une Morale" or "Notes for an Ethics" have been published (61). These were immediately post-war writings. He said he would not permit their publication during his lifetime, because he had decided, at the time of writing them, not to complete them, and it remained open to him, whilst he lived, either to take them up again, with a view to completion, or else to take up a position in relation to them, which would then show them as a stage in the development of his thought. But he would permit their publication after his death, since then they would be qualified by their incomplete development and it would be up to the reader to interpret where his thought, at that time, would have led him.(62).



I shall draw both on this unfinished work and try to trace ethical implications in his published works "Being and Nothingness" and "Existentialism and Humanism" (63), to make an explicit interpretation with respect to his view of good, in the earlier period.

Even in the unfinished "Cahiers", Sartre wrote very little directly expressing his view of good. However there is an appendix in the work as published, in which Sartre does directly talk about good (64).

He said that good is such that it ought-to-be-done, signifying that action, "praxis", aims to realize good in whatever it is particularly aiming to realize. Good does not exist outside the act which produces it. He said a "Platonic good" existing in itself and by itself is meaningless:

Le Bien doit être fait. Cela signifie qu'il est la fin de l'acte, sans aucun doute. Mais aussi qu'il n'existe pas en dehors de l'acte qui le fait. Un Bien platonicien qui existerait en soi et par soi n'aurait aucune signification. (65).

He said that good is that towards which we necessarily direct our transcendence, that it is the intentional object (noema) of that particular intending activity (noesis) which is "the act" (praxis).

Le Bien est nécessairement ce vers quoi nous nous transcendons. Il est le noème de cette noèse particulière qu'est l'acte (66).

For Sartre, good has the same ontological constitution as consciousness/subjectivity which is that it never is, in itself, but has constantly to be produced, realized and made-to-be. Moreover its becoming, its realization is one with the self-realization that subjectivity effects. He said that good is subjective in that it must always emanate from a subjectivity and cannot impose itself on subjectivity from the outside.

But at the same time it is objective since, in its universal essence it is rigorously independent of the subjectivity from which it emanates. The act which produces good is originally a choice of good.

Subjectif en ce qu'il doit toujours émaner d'une subjectivité et ne jamais s'imposer à elle du dehors, il est objectif en ce qu'il est, dans son essence universelle, rigoureusement indépendant de cette subjectivité. Et, réciproquement, un acte quel qu'il soit suppose originellement un choix du Bien (67).

Because it is at once both subjectively produced but objectively independent, some people, Sartre argued, confuse good with its relating to the degree of effort expended in its realization and that they think that by making more effort, in itself, reflects more value on themselves for their good-deeds. He said this is to confuse the means for the end. What matters is to do-good, howsoever this is achieved.

Our awareness of our responsibility for good is an awareness of its fragility. It is never made, substantial, but always put in question, always having to be produced. With one's death, the good for which one is responsible is destroyed.

In choosing and intending the good which I seek to realize, I necessarily choose myself and project what I want to be. Reciprocally I can never choose myself without choosing the good which defines me.

Elle se choisit en choisissant le Bien et ne peut faire qu'en se choisissant elle ne choisisse le Bien qui la définit.(68).

For Sartre, the objectivity of good must be understood in its "difficulty", its authentic challenge, for the individual subject (see passage quoted overleaf, ref. (69)). It is not something that can be collectively established in consensus, inauthentically endorsed by what "they" think. My responsibility is to choose the good that I seek to realize, in the face of hostile or merely diverse choices and projections of good by others. Universally, good can never be defined

as the synthetic totality of good sought to be realized by the human totality. That totality is perpetually "detotalized", perpetually provisional, in the making, arrested along the way. Good must always be defined by its relation to the subjectivity who chooses it in the face of others. The ought-to-be of good resides in its being my responsibility, something I cannot evade by reliance on the other. I cannot rely on others to realize the good which I choose, for their choices may not be for "good" as I choose it to be.

Sartre's concern with mundane choices of good is that they are generally made inauthentically, in ontological error, in what for him is the false belief that there is an unequivocal good "out there", for which one is not ultimately responsible. He, on the contrary, is concerned to show that an authentic choice of good must recognize its agent's responsibility for the choice, in the ontological necessity of choosing and realizing its good and itself in that act. To recognize this freedom and responsibility poses the difficult problem of choosing oneself as freedom and of making freedom one's end and good. At the end of the Appendix he said:

..... cette projection et constitution d'une liberté qui se prend elle-même pour fin. C'est pourquoi, bien qu'il soit beaucoup plus avantageux de vivre sur le plan de la liberté qui se prend pour fin elle-même, la plupart des gens y ont de la difficulté...

(69).

I shall now move to interpreting what are more implicit indications of Sartre's view of good contained in "Being and Nothingness", which I shall prepare by some opening remarks about his ontology.

For Sartre, consciousness is consciousness as spontaneous self-creating activity. This self-creating activity is carried out in relation to the presence of being-in-itself of which it is consciousness. In this relation, consciousness makes itself be by not-being the in-itself to which it is present. This not-being is a relation internal to the being of consciousness, which is such that it lacks being-in-itself. This internal relation is phenomenally manifest as desire.

Self-creating activity as a perpetual lack of being-in-itself is a teleological structure of the being of consciousness, in which consciousness seeks to go beyond the present state-of-affairs which it has made itself not-be, by being consciousness of it, towards the realization of ends, which it projects as lacking. From this, Sartre produced the following formulations: Consciousness lacks being-in-itself; In being-in-itself there is a lack; and the sought, the projected realization of ends, in which lacking being would be united with existing being-in-itself - this synthetic totality is lacked, or "the lacked". It is this absent totality, the lacked, which for Sartre is "value" (70).

Ultimately it is what consciousness seeks to be: it seeks self-identity, to be one-with-itself, to be its own value or, in Sartre's formulation, to be for-itself-in-itself, in which form it would be a self-cause, founded in itself - the ens-causa-sui or God (71). Were it to effect this realization, it would no longer have to perpetually create itself by not-being being-in-itself, since it would be-itself, its own affirmation. Yet it would be consciousness, without being a lack of being.

For Sartre, this pursuit of being, this fundamental choice of value, is

something whose realization is an impossible ideal and its pursuit is what he refers to in ascribing absurdity to human existence - a being which makes itself be by pursuing an impossible ideal - seeks to be what it cannot be. This is because, for Sartre, consciousness can only be by not-being the in-itself, by not-being its own foundation.

Now consciousness does pursue and realize possible ends. But each realization becomes what is and becomes constitutive of the ground on which consciousness re-creates itself as a lack, pursuing further ends. For Sartre these actual realizations take place within the structure of the pursuit of the ideal, and in so far as consciousness is seeking, through them, to attain the impossible ideal, none of them count, since none of them, actually, can in any way contribute to the realization of that ideal.

Value has come on the scene as a correlative of the being of consciousness. It is not in-itself, but is dependent upon consciousness to make it be in its own not-being the in-itself. Now for Sartre, consciousness, in the actuality of its pursuit of being, is freedom. When consciousness is reflectively aware of its being as freedom, that it is not its own foundation, and that it is responsible for the being of value - altogether that it is responsible for itself, it experiences what Sartre calls "anguish", which is manifest as a sense of uneasiness in the face of being responsible.

Sartre said that man could take two possible attitudes in being anguished in the face of responsibility and freedom - acceptance or rejection. In the former, he would assume responsibility for his being, and be authentically, knowing that the ultimate value which he projected to realize himself as being, is his own responsibility, not something

which could be given him or prescribed from without. In the latter attitude, he would take flight from responsibility, taking a negative, denying attitude to his being free and responsible. Sartre termed this attitude, severally, "inauthenticity" and "bad faith", a condition in which one believes pleasant untruths, and denies unpleasant truths, by a refusal to give evidence its proper import, a hiding from the implications for oneself, others and the world of one's beliefs and actions.

In his conclusion to "Being and Nothingness", on its ethical implications, Sartre left it an open question whether human beings can be authentically and can take their being-as-freedom as their fundamental value, or whether the members of humanity are stuck with inauthentically pursuing an impossible ideal (72).

What then, in Sartre's terms, is the relation of value and good? It must be noted that his descriptions are very formal. If consciousness is a pursuit of being and projects and chooses, fundamentally, that being, that value which it seeks to be, what is the good that it chooses in relation to this? Is it the same as value? The "rigorous independence" and objectivity of good would seem to preclude it from being the self's own value for itself. And yet it is related. For Sartre, good is realized and exhausted in the act and actuality of its realization. What the act of realization realizes, is what, objectively, is the good for the subjectivity realizing it. But this good, albeit "transcendently out-there", is not and cannot be (like subjectivity itself similarly cannot be) in-itself. It can only be by being made-to-be. Correlative with the good-out-there-in-realization, is the good which characterizes the act of realization itself. This self-good, apprehended, is constitutive of the value-sense experienced by the self. Now, ontologically

and possibly, the value which one seeks to be can only reside and can only be in the realization of oneself which one effects for oneself but never in-itself and which is perpetually in need of re-creation. For Sartre, good for consciousness is on the level of meaning - it is intended. But its realization is in and through the act which also intends it. More concretely, this intentional choice of good is a choice of good for, and in the face of, all others. The role which the other person takes is to objectify, for oneself, one's act of good-realization and what it realizes as good. In its existing for the other, one's act and what it realizes is conferred an existence outside oneself and one's subjectivity. The transformation of conditions that one's act effects is a reality for the other and thereby materially affects the other's projection of value and good. This objectification, by the other, of the good that one projects and realizes, also produces a value-sense for oneself, as agent, in the sense of its "being-there" for the other, regardless of what the other actually thinks of its value.

Notable for its absence in Sartre's conception is that for him there is no lived "content" of good. This is forced on him by his ontological distinction between on the one hand the active spontaneity of the being of consciousness and, on the other hand, the being-in-itself of the phenomenally appearing world of which it is consciousness.

I shall not criticise at this stage but will move to expounding the views Sartre expressed in "Existentialism and Humanism" (73).

Now published as "Existentialism and Humanism", this was a lecture which he gave in 1945, largely as a response to a great welter of negative criticism which his existentialism, as expressed in the not long published "Being and Nothingness", had received. He felt that these criticisms were made in ignorance and non-understanding of his work and misinterpretation of its implications. He sought to show that Existentialism is a positive philosophy for humanity, not a philosophy of despair or absurdity, in the sense that those terms are popularly understood.

Subsequently the lecture was published, something which he had intended, but was circulated to a far wider public than he had intended, which meant that a lot of people read it as a manifesto for existentialism rather than seeing it in its context. The context was answering criticisms arising from the text of "Being and Nothingness", and that it was given at a time when he had not yet worked through the ethical implications of that work, at least not in depth and detail. The lecture pre-dates the Appendix from the "Cahiers".

The lecture's principal message was that man, when he recognizes that his existence is freedom, and that therefore his being is what he chooses to be, should so choose in good faith and be authentically. This particular use of the term "authentic" comes from Heidegger in "Being and Time" (74). The original German word is "Eigentlich" and is etymologically connected with "eigen" meaning "own". In Heidegger's sense, authentic being is to realize one's life by choosing to be one's own self, rather than acting in the alternative mode of being "inauthentically", which for him characterizes most choices. These are made in the condition of "average everydayness", in which the agent assumes the attitude of being "Das Man", one of the "they", in the false



security of the choice having the pseudo-universality of being what "they" choose. Authentic choice is in recognition that its value is its own, and is the agent admitting self-responsibility.

This conception is reminiscent of what Hegel said in the "Philosophy of Right" of willing in the moral attitude, which is only when it is in self-consciousness, when it chooses itself as its own object, as it is to be universally for all (75).

Sartre said that man being responsible for himself means that at the same time he is responsible for all men. In acting, man not only wills his particular being but also an image of himself as he believes man ought universally to be. That is to assert the universal value of what he has chosen. We can only choose for the better and that can only be so if it is better for all (76).

In further clarification, he defined the ethical meaning of three of his key terms: "anguish", "abandonment" and "despair".

Anguish (77) characterizes consciousness's recognizing the ontological basis of its determination of value, in freedom. Since value can only exist universally for all through its being chosen, one's own choice of that universal value is in question before others. For Sartre, the responsible choice, made in anguish, must be able to answer the question "what would happen if everyone did so?". This is like Kant's formulation in the "Groundwork.." (78) "act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature". In other words "only do that which if everyone did so of natural necessity, a universal value would be realized". This recognizes that for a value to exist universally, it must be chosen as such for all, placing responsibility for it unavoidably upon the agent.

Abandonment (79) translates Sartre's french term for Heidegger's term "Geworfenheit" meaning "thrownness", referring to man's being thrust into existence. For Sartre, it meant that man is not free not-to-be-free. One is thrust into existence as freedom, with its concomitant responsibility, But no agent, no God, did the thrusting. It is an original contingency, not something of necessity for some purpose. One is therefore without excuse and can only deny responsibility for one's actions in bad faith.

Despair (80) describes the attitude of one who chooses without hope of achieving the impossible self-synthesis of one's being-for-oneself with the in-itself as value.

Sartre described his view of the certainty of the cogito as meaning that the other's existence is just as certain as one's own and that others are discovered as a condition of one's own existence (81). One cannot be anything for oneself unless others recognize one as such. Through the other, individuals' choices of values become in a sense universal since, in principle, they are intelligible to the other as of value to the particular individual. But this existential universality of the value is not as of something given, but is through someone's perpetual creation.

Sartre morally condemned inauthentic choice, choice made in flight from freedom, in bad faith, on the grounds that freedom, when it is seen as the foundation of value, must be willed in the choice of any realizable value. He said:

Those who hide from this total freedom, in a guise of solemnity or with deterministic excuses, I shall call cowards. Others, who try to show that their existence is necessary, when it is merely an accident of the appearance of the human race on earth - I shall call scum (82).

Concretely, human beings exist as freedom in community. Each person's freedom is wholly dependent, as condition, upon the freedom of others. Thus one should will the freedom of others at the same time as one's own, which is to choose authentically and responsibly, in good faith.

From the lecture can be seen that Sartre has affirmatively answered the question left open at the end of "Being and Nothingness" - one can choose one's freedom as a realizable fundamental value. He further said that the person, concretely existing in community, should make all freedom their value. Since authenticity is the condition of projecting that value, one should will to be, authentically and that one's own being as freedom should be a universal value for all.

B) Phenomenological Criticism

In his appendix on good, Sartre was dealing with it phenomenologically, but very formally or abstractly. In saying that it is the "noema" of that particular "noesis" that is "the act" (for which latter expression I prefer the technical term "praxis", which Sartre employed in his later work "Critique of Dialectical Reason" (83), meaning the concrete activity of individuals or groups, immersed in the world specifically realizing projected ends), he recognizes the intentionality of good as a meaning for consciousness. The terms noema and noesis are from Husserl in his "Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology" (84). Noema means the intentional object as such, in its ideality, suspending judgment on any real reference. This is the correlation of consciousness's intending activity: noesis. Sartre is saying that all concrete human activity engaged in the world is aiming to realize what in some sense is good.

But he has not here clarified distinctions in the senses of good that may be intended and realized. The good with which he seems to be dealing is that which means intended as good-for-all or universally good. He has not distinguished this from more particular egotistical "goods", nor from good conceived as pleasure, need, etc. He may have done so elsewhere, but his failure to have clarified these distinctions makes it difficult to be quite sure what he is saying.

As I said earlier (page 125), his phenomenological description of good allows no content of good - what I have earlier described (in Section 1) as "Good-feeling". It seems to me that by this omission, he does not allow himself to make sense of the intending of good, its objectivation, its being put forward as a meaning which, in terms of consciousness as knowledge, it apprehends and which, as end, is that to the realization of

which consciousness directs its transcendence. The question is what makes this meaning and this motivation intelligible. I contend that this is Good-feeling and that Sartre, in failing to identify it or even recognize it, as it is as a reality of the being of consciousness, cannot make the intending and projection of good explicitly intelligible. This is not to say that we need find discussions of good, without this insight, unintelligible. We intuitively grasp and can see what is being referred to. It is simply that we cannot make that meaning clear to ourselves.

I shall now move to criticising in relation to the issues raised in "Being and Nothingness", starting with a general criticism of his ontology to show how this affected his conception of value.

Sartre's ontological formulations define consciousness as a being which is not identical with itself (85) - which is, insofar as it is not itself and which is not-itself, insofar as it is. This definition is determined by the definition of being-in-itself which consciousness has been defined as not being. Being-in-itself is defined as identical being in the sense of A=A (as opposed to alternative senses or formulations of identity, eg that which Heidegger described in "Identity and Difference" (86) ). The import of these formulations is that consciousness cannot be self-identical or in-itself. Moreover it can only be by not being being-in-itself and hence its being is seen as posterior to being-in-itself, as something which arises as an original and contingent upsurge from being-in-itself.

Here I should like to make a Husserlian criticism of Sartre, which is this: In doing his ontology, he remained to some extent in what Husserl called the "natural attitude", meaning that he did not totally detach himself from, or suspend judgment upon his natural, certain, unquestioned, "common-sense" beliefs about the world and reality. This suspension, the phenomenological reduction, is what is necessary to "go to the things

themselves" and to judge what they are, without prejudice, from their phenomenal manifestations, ie what they show themselves to be, from themselves.

But Sartre effected the suspension to some degree. It enabled him to see that what the things of the world are, phenomenally, is dependent upon the being of consciousness to disclose them as such. In their phenomenality, they are relative to consciousness, subject-relative. But those phenomena are not produced by consciousness spontaneously from itself. In being conscious of them, consciousness is transcended by them. This means that their being is beyond consciousness, "transphenomenal" (87), and is the condition of their appearing to consciousness.

Thus far so good, but here Sartre introduced a prejudice into what is otherwise phenomenally manifest - he claimed that the being of phenomenal things, before their disclosure to consciousness, is inert, lifeless and undifferentiated. He went on to say that it simply is, that it is in-itself and that it is what it is. This move was crucial, because it allowed him to define consciousness in relation to that being. Admittedly, Sartre's view, as developed from his preceding argument and descriptions, seems very obvious. I myself, when I first read "Being and Nothingness", accepted his formulations as self-evidenced by the phenomena under discussion. But then it conformed with an underlying structure of the world view which I held - that being is fundamentally material. It seems to me that Sartre had not seriously questioned that underlying structure of his own world-view.

I now think that one can make no claims about the being of the world which confronts consciousness, prior to its disclosure by consciousness,

prior to its appearance to and relativity to consciousness, save that it is. And its priority is a logical one, for consciousness. In other words, it is not an absolute priority. The priority of that being is with respect to its phenomena, not with respect to the being of consciousness - namely that it be, in order to appear. Nothing indicates that the being of that which, for consciousness, is other than itself, is a temporally prior condition for the being of consciousness. They are given together. Insofar as the world-for-consciousness is, consciousness is, just as much, in its own right.

On the question of Sartre's contention of the non-identity of consciousness, I think that there is a false move in Sartre's formulations. He represented consciousness's being as that being which makes itself be by not being the being-in-itself to which it is present. In discussing nothingness, he described consciousness as the being by which nothingness comes into the world, on the ground of being (in-itself). At (88), he said

The being by which nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in its being, the nothingness of its being is in question. The being by which nothingness comes to the world must be its own nothingness.

I would argue that consciousness, in the discovery that in its being, it is being-transcended, exceeded by that which it is not, should not be conceived as its being its own nothingness, as not-being-itself. I can accept that in being revealed to itself, consciousness is revealed as not-being-other-being. But it is neither revealed as being other-than-itself nor as not-being-itself. As I discussed in my Introduction, (page 24), consciousness, the self, pursues being wholly identified with the content of its consciousness, in the sense of that not being alien and aversive. But whether, in its intentionality, in its being consciousness-of-something, it can or cannot identify itself with that

"something", it nevertheless, in its being, is itself. It is self-identical.

I think that Sartre, in looking at consciousness negatively, as not being the world, failed to focus closely enough upon the phenomena of what consciousness is, itself, considered in its own right. By insisting that consciousness must make itself be, by not being the world, he would allow it no positive or real content which is in any sense its own. He expelled from consciousness the sensory material, the everchanging flux of experience (Kant's manifold of intuition), through which it perceives the world, including its own body. This was despite his having described the "taste" of human existence as "nausea" in his novel by the same name (89) and in "Being and Nothingness", he seemed to recognize a content to consciousness, in the guise of "factual existence", whilst at the same time strenuously denying that there could be any real content (90):

"Coenaesthetic affectivity is then a pure, non-positional apprehension of a contingency without colour, a pure apprehension of the self as a factual existence. This perpetual apprehension on the part of my for-itself of an insipid taste which I cannot place, which accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, and which is my taste - this is what we have described elsewhere under the name of Nausea".

Returning to the being of value, as with my criticism of his discussion of good, Sartre cannot make value intelligible in terms of consciousness's teleological structure of the projection and realization of ends, since his view lacks consciousness's dimension of "having". As I described in Section 1, consciousness's coenaesthetic content is always to some degree aversive or satisfying. In the changes which consciousness seeks to realize in the world of which it is consciousness, it seeks, at the same time, to realize its own being, in



the mode of having, as better. Value can then be seen as an objective field before consciousness, that of what, in being realized, would be good for consciousness. This field of value is, it is true, correlative to and dependent upon the being of consciousness. Also, corresponding to Sartre's formulation, the field of value extends beyond what consciousness can see as actually realizable, the latter affording finite changes for the better in its sensory having, into a realm of ideality - that which, were it possible, would offer consciousness ultimate satisfaction, bliss, a state in which it would no longer have to pursue its better being.

I shall now move on to raising a number of questions in relation to Sartre's ethical position in "Existentialism and Humanism", that one should choose one's being as freedom as one's fundamental value; that that value should be a universal value; and that one should at the same time choose all others' freedom-being as one's value.

Do human beings, in their willing, their choices, in the fundamental area of what they think is the meaning or the value of their lives, choose, in the first instance, to be something ideal and unattainable? Does the increase in knowledge brought by the reflective awareness that one's being is freedom, necessarily mean that one would abandon all ideality in what one seeks to be?

Here one encounters the problem of generalizing about consciousness, about human reality and of ascribing to it universal structures. Do individual's choices cohere in a unitary whole which is their total choice, along the lines of the concept of the Unity of the Understanding, as used by Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason" (91) ? Sartre's notion that all concrete projects of any individual are grounded in a fundamental project, seems to presuppose that. But individuals can hold contradictory

beliefs and pursue associated contradictory projects. What is not possible, is that contradictory beliefs be held simultaneously together in one explicit thesis. They cannot be co-intended. Under the circumstances of an attempt to do so, contradictory content of belief would be annulled. But such annulment requires that belief be seen to be contradictory.

Also it is not clear that persons are realizing themselves according to a fundamental value-choice at all stages of their lives. I cannot see that babies would be able to make such a choice of their being. Likewise it seems to me that persons whose lives are taken up with and dominated by the struggle to satisfy basic material needs, do not necessarily reach a position where a fundamental choice of being becomes an issue.

When persons do make a fundamental choice of their being in some concrete fundamental project, eg: to be a writer, or an engine driver, or a priest, etc, do such choices carry implications which extend them into the realm of ideality, along the lines of Kant's postulates of pure practical reason (92)? Could not Sartre's for-itself-in-itself be otherwise represented as freedom, God and immortality?

Here the making of impossible choices becomes more plausible. In adopting such choices of value, in the first instance, one tends to be unclear about why such projected ways-of-being hold such value for oneself and about what in one's experience has led to one's particular adoption of value. Later insight into one's major existential choices can sometimes show up unrealistically ideal beliefs and aims, such as, for example, the belief that there is an absolute witness who endorses and guarantees one's values. Coming to an awareness of one's being as freedom, and of one's responsibility for one's choices, could expose falsity in former choices.

My next question concerns whether knowledge, recognition of one's ontological status necessitates that one projects to be a realizable value. Here the question of authenticity or good faith is involved. This attitude takes truth, as such, as its end and value, as opposed to narrow instrumental considerations. In this attitude, an entailment of one's recognition of one's condition as freedom would be willing to be a value as freedom. But is authenticity a condition of the recognition of this condition? It seems to me possible that a true recognition in this respect does not preclude falsity, in the mode of bad faith, of self-deception, in other respects.

Hegel's "willing in the moral attitude" involves the recognition that the condition of one's freedom is its recognition by others, and that that depends on one's own recognition of other's freedom. Thus one wills the other's freedom as a condition of one's own (93).

But this is not the same as Sartre's formulation of the issue.

For Hegel, consciousness can in this sense be unfree. It

can be denied its power to dispose, to concretely act in the world towards the realization of its ends. But in

Sartre's ontological sense of freedom, consciousness cannot not be free. It seems to me that the recognition and valuing of other's freedom in the moral sense is for the sake of the other's good, their good experience, lived as good-feeling. It recognizes that that is promoted by their free self-realization. It seems to me that Sartre confounded the basis in consciousness of the recognition of the other's freedom as condition for one's own and others' good. He could not show the necessity he sought for choosing to realize oneself as a universal value. His ontology of freedom makes the choice of freedom, in that sense, superfluous.

It seems to me a general problem of Sartre's ethics of the earlier period under discussion, is that it did not sufficiently deal with the

question of human social being, of the nature and implications of consciousness of others and of being with others, coexisting, concretely, in society.

It may well be that Sartre saw that his ontology of consciousness dealt with human reality too one-sidedly in not fully expressing the social dimension. This may have contributed to his motivation for his major reappraisal and re-interpretation of his philosophy in terms of Marxism. But I shall not deal with his later moral thought in the scope of this thesis.

To conclude this section, I shall return to interpreting Sartre's positions in terms of his view of good.

He saw good residing, fundamentally, in relation to freedom. Making freedom one's end is to recognize that the condition of good is free self-realization. I think this is how he saw matters, despite the inconsistency pointed out above between freedom conceived in the absolute ontological sense and freedom conceived relatively as a reflection of the relations between people concretely in society.

Furthermore, in his view, the value of free self-determination must be a value for all. A universal, that is, objective good, as a meaning to be actually realized, has as its condition that in its being intended, it intends the free self-determination of all. This points out the intentional ideality of good. In this it is doubly abstract: It is an abstract characteristic of the whole or concrete real end intended to be realized and it is abstract in that it is what would-be were its conditions fulfilled. Otherwise it remains, in the course of the realization otherwise effected, unfulfilled and merely intended.

But Sartre could not translate this possible fulfilment of good in terms of what consciousness actually and in reality can realize for itself as the "goodness" (good-feeling) of its lived experience. For Sartre, the realization is effected and exhausted in the realizing act in which good is intended in the end to be realized. Thus objectively, there is no criterion of efficacy in the realization of good. Sartre's good, like Kant's, resides in a "good-will" (94) !

Similar considerations apply to Sartre's conception of value. He regarded it, notwithstanding its evanescent non-substantiality, as being realizable. He answered in the affirmative, the question posed at the end of "Being and Nothingness", that one can pursue and realize a fundamental choice of oneself as value, when that choice is for oneself as freedom and not as an unrealizable ideal. The particular values one seeks to realize: objectively - in changing particular states of affairs, are realized in the changing, but are exhausted in the process and cannot remain with the state of affairs outside and beyond the activity of realization. Subjectively - the realizing activity does realize value for oneself, and this really contributes to the realization of oneself as the end one seeks to be, providing that end is to-be-freedom. Otherwise it realizes a value which in fact could never contribute to the impossible ideal, but which is nevertheless really lived in the act of realization intending the value. But whatever one's fundamental choice of value and being, one can always experience self-realization as value-realization, although this may be experienced in bad faith and false belief.

So far as these latter formulations of value for Sartre go, leaving aside the omission of Good-feeling, I have no dispute with Sartre. But in the next section, I shall develop my own theory of value and "valour".

SECTION 3      Theory of Value, Love and "Valour"

Leading on from the considerations arising from Sartre's conception of value, I shall, in this section, begin with an exposition of Scheler's theory of value and love. I shall follow this by phenomenological criticism to serve as the basis for developing my own theory of "valour", value and love.

I am using the term "valour" as a technical term with a meaning which differs from its usual meaning, although it is, I think, related to that meaning. What I mean by "valour" is one's sense of being-of-value. It is one's sense of personal value, the sense of personal worth, of self-esteem. It is that sense of "being-in-oneself, for-oneself" of which Sartre says we are in pursuit, in our fundamental project of being or of value.

Part 1      Scheler's Theory of Value and Love

Max Scheler was a contemporary of Edmund Husserl, who applied, in his own way, a phenomenological approach to philosophy to understanding many of the phenomena of human existence. His interests may be divided up under different headings such as "metaphysics", "sociology", "religion", "human feelings", "ethics", etc, but generally they all reflect aspects of his principal object of concern - humanity.

Scheler's major work in which he developed his theory of value is "Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values" (1). In a related work, "The Nature of Sympathy" (2), he dealt theoretically with 'Love'. I shall start with a quotation from "Formalism ...." (3):

..... there is a type of experiencing whose "objects" are completely inaccessible to reason; reason is as blind to them as ears and hearing are blind to colours. It is a kind of experience that leads us to genuinely objective objects and the eternal order among them, ie, to values and the order of ranks among them. And the order and laws contained in the experience are as exact and evident as those of logic and mathematics; that is, there are evident interconnections and oppositions among values and value-attitudes and among the acts of preferring, etc, which are built on them, and on the basis of these a genuine grounding of moral decisions and laws for such decisions is both possible and necessary.

To clarify this, one must bear in mind that he is conceiving consciousness phenomenologically, in its intentionality. Consciousness is directed towards some object or objects and some objective field, as background, to which they belong. Consciousness intends whatever are its objects and objective field through specific acts of consciousness which place the objects before consciousness. In the intending of its objects, consciousness will always have some mode of belief in them, relating to their reality/ideality and whatever senses in which they may exist independently of their being-intended. How does this relate to Scheler's assertion of the experience of values? In saying that reason is blind to them, he clearly wishes to deny that there is an intellectual intuition of values. Values are not the objects of intellectual acts - they are not thought-objects,

the results of thinking and judging. He is saying that values are directly perceived. They are perceived through feeling. But he distinguishes the intentional "feeling-of-something" from mere feeling-states. At (4), he said:

All specifically sensible feelings are, by their nature, states. They may be "connected" with objects through the simple contents of sensing, representing, or perceiving; or they may be more or less "objectless". Whenever there is such a connection, it is always mediate. The subsequent acts of relating which follow the givenness of a feeling connect feelings with objects.

But at (5), he said:

However, the connection between intentional feeling and what is therein felt is entirely different from the above connection. This connection is present in all feeling of values. There is here an original relatedness, a directedness of feeling toward something objective, namely, values.

And at (6):

It is not externally brought together with an object, whether immediately or through a representation (which can be related to a feeling either mechanically and fortuitously or by mere thinking). On the contrary, feeling originally intends its own kind of objects, namely, "values". Feeling is therefore a meaningful occurrence that is capable of "fulfilment" and "non-fulfilment".

Again (7):

In this case, ie, in the execution of feeling, we are not objectively conscious of feeling itself. Only a value-quality comes upon us from within or without.



This implies that values can objectively exist in reality, that there are "value-facts", meaning that philosophy's famous fact/value distinction is a false dichotomy. Such value facts may be perceived, for example, when, on meeting someone, one feels immediately that they are sympathetic, or friendly, or repulsive. It is a presence of value-quality which one immediately apprehends in the event, rather than its being the result of thinking or reasoning about it. It is not arrived at by mediate inference.

So, are values to be thought of as being qualities of things, in some way analogous to colours, or perhaps, the utility of things? But if that were the case, the perception of values would depend upon the perception of the physical things to which they belong. Scheler rejected this view. He claimed that there is an independence in the perception of values in relation to the objects which are their bearers. at (8), he said:

The ultimate independence of the being of values with regard to things, goods, and states of affairs appears clearly in a number of facts. We know of a stage in the grasping of values wherein the value of an object is already very clearly and evidentially given apart from the givenness of the bearer of the value.

In talking of the bearers of values, he said (9):

A good is related to a value-quality as a thing is to the qualities that fulfil its "properties". . . . ., a good represents a "thinglike" unity of value-qualities or value-complexes which is founded in a specific basic value. "Thinglikeness", not "the" thing, is present in a good.

"Good", as terminologically used by Scheler in this context, refers to any real object which is, and in respect of its being, the bearer of a value. At (10), he said:

It is only in goods that values become "real". They are not yet real in valuable things. In a good, however, a value is

objective (whatever the value may be) and real at the same time. There is a genuine increase of value in the real world with any new good. Value-qualities, however, are "ideal objects", as are qualities of colours and sounds.

For Scheler, the feeling of values, in its intentionality, is possible without the co-perception of objects to which they belong. In this case, the values, as the intentional objects of the value-feeling, are independent, ideal entities. Thus when I think, in their absence, about person X, I feel, hence perceive, their value, though X is in no other way perceptually present to me.

For the objective intuition of values, Scheler claimed that there is an a priori, yet non-formal or material form of their being experienced. Of the a priori in general, he said (11):

We designate as "a priori" all those ideal units of meaning and those propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content .....

If we call the content of such an "intuition" a "phenomenon", such a "phenomenon" therefore has nothing at all to do with "appearance" (of something real) or "illusion". Intuition of this kind, however, is "essential intuiting" [Wesensschau], or, as we may call it, "phenomenological intuition" or "phenomenological experience". "What" this intuition gives cannot be given to a lesser or greater degree, comparable to a more or less exact "observation" of an object and its traits. Either this "what" is intuited and, hence, "self-given" (totally and without subtraction, neither by way of a "picture" nor by way of a "symbol"), or this "what" is not intuited and, hence, not given.

With this passage, Scheler launched a strong criticism and rebuttal of Kant's view of consciousness, of his epistemology and in particular of his view of the a priori and the formal. He had already remarked that

Kant "did not know of a "phenomenological experience" " (12). Kant, in his view, had not justified the truth of his categories and concepts by an a priori intuitive exhibiting of the facts giving them. Rather he had resorted to describing his categories as functional laws of thinking, necessary for real knowledge to arise through the experienced manifold of intuition. At (13), Scheler rejected Kant's view of the function of synthesis:

Only this completely mythical assumption that the given is a "chaos of sensations" which must be "formed" by "synthetic functions" and "powers" leads to such curious suppositions.

The thrust of his criticism is the assertion that the a priori contents of the objects of experience are given, intuitively evident in the experiences, meaning that the whole given content, is not merely Kant's "manifold of intuition", taken, or presupposed to be a disordered chaos, but is given as a meaningful objectivity.

At (14), he said:

But without this erroneous presupposition ..... there is no need for such a hypothesis and hence no need for an interpretation of the a priori as a "law of functions" of such organizing activities. The a priori is, then, the objective structure of the large areas of experience itself to which certain acts and functional relations among them "correspond", without its having been "brought into" or "added to" this structure by such acts.

One of Scheler's aims in these passages was to show that the a priori of cognition is not intrinsically formal and thought-created or constructed, but factually given from reality. As he said above, it is the structure or structures of experience. As a priori, it is, or can be, self-evident in any experiences, not conditioned by those experiences adventitious content.

But it is also clear that Scheler viewed these matters somewhat differently from Husserl. For Husserl, there is a real content of consciousness, a flux of "sensory" material, or "stuff", in relation to which consciousness's intentional activity is constantly "making-sense" (see my discussion in my Introduction). This sensory flux is for him the given of our natural, world-directed consciousness. However its being given is not the intentional content of that experiencing. In his "Logical Investigations" (15), Husserl distinguished the flux as real content (which he later termed by the Greek word "hyle") from what he designated as the "intentional content" of consciousness. This "intentional content" is the objective content intended by consciousness. It is the objective pole of consciousness, the noematic, ideal correlate of consciousness's subjective, real pole, that of its conative, objectivating, sense-making, intentional activity and of its hyletic content.

In his phenomenological reflection, the "phenomenological experience" referred to by Scheler, Husserl's object of inquiry was consciousness itself, in which the essential structures of the being of consciousness are self-evidently "seen". For both Scheler and Husserl, this reflective experience provides an a priori content of knowledge, which is "non-formal" or "material" in Scheler's terms. However, for Husserl, this seeing of essences (Wesensschau), is the achievement of the activity of "ideation", in which the essential meanings are seen in and through a variety of contents intended imaginatively in the phenomenological reflection. For Husserl, these contents are necessarily synthetically held together, in order that the unitary essential meanings may be seen in their series. Thus for Husserl, such cognition is achieved mediately through original ideation,

whereas for Scheler it is immediately given. However, in "Formalism .....", it does not appear that Scheler recognized this difference from Husserl. I shall return to these issues in my critical part following.

Returning to discussion of the value a priori, for Scheler, in the a priori intuition of values these "ideal units of meaning" (11) are given in feeling. Now this feeling is intentional and is not itself intended as "feeling-state" (4,5). Thus he would attribute the "that-which-is-felt" to the intentional, ideal meaning content of the value itself. In the context of the real perception of values in relation to "goods", the value-perception is prior and, relatively speaking independent of the perception of the bearers and the values perceived do not vary with changes in the given substrates. For example, if my friend, valued in their friendship, tells me to "get lost", nevertheless the self-same friendship value remains for me. It is just that my former friend no longer instantiates that value. In their personhood, they have ceased to be that particular "good".

This example can serve for further clarification of Scheler's position with regard to cognition and synthesis in the distinction of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. For him, for the experiential cognition of things, states of affairs and goods, which is a posteriori, synthesis is necessary. At (16), he said:

For, according to the essence of a good, its value does not appear to be situated upon a thing; on the contrary, goods are thoroughly permeated by values. The unity of a value guides the synthesis of all other qualities of a good - other value-qualities as well as those which do not represent such qualities, such as colours and forms in the case of material goods.

Thus, according to Scheler's view, the value-meaning "friendship" is apprehended prior to the perception of "my friend" and guides my synthesis of the qualities that I apprehend pertaining to my friend. now these "qualities" are themselves apprehended as "ideal units of meaning" and their synthesis consists in their being combined into the meaning of the objective, real, presence of my friend, endowed with such and such qualities. Being told to "get lost" means my perception of "my friend" alters to "my former friend" and is "haunted" by the value-quality "friendship", whilst this still guides the altered perception. The implication of this is that what I know a posteriori is a meaning synthesis of a priori ideal meanings given in the experience. He rejected, as previously described, the view that the "units of meaning" were themselves originally produced by synthesis of what he referred to as "the simple matter of intuition" (17).

Moving now to how Scheler conceived values themselves, of particular significance is that he regarded "good" and "evil" as values ("good" should be distinguished from the "goods" referred to earlier). At (18), he said:

The value "good" - in an absolute sense - is the value that appears, by way of essential necessity, on the act of realizing the value which (with respect to the measure of cognition of that being which realizes it) is the highest. The value "evil" - in an absolute sense - is the value that appears on the act of realizing the lowest value. The value which appears on the act which is aimed toward realizing a higher or lower, as viewed from the initial value-experience in every case, is relatively good or evil.

Thus for Scheler, good and evil are values pertaining to morality, relating to the value of acts realizing values, where the latter are related to one another in terms of their being higher or lower.

At (19), he gave his axioms for a non-formal ethics of values:

- I 1. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value.
  2. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value.
  3. The existence of a negative value is itself a negative value.
  4. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value.
- II 2. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a positive value in the sphere of willing.
  2. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a negative value in the sphere of willing.
  3. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a higher (or the highest) value in the sphere of willing.
  4. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a lower (or the lowest) value in the sphere of willing.
- III The criterion of "good" ("evil") in this sphere consists in the agreement (disagreement) of a value intended in the realization with the value of preference, or in the disagreement (agreement) with the value placed after.

The relation of good and evil to the relativity of values, in respect of one another, being higher or lower, introduces another aspect of Scheler's theory which is of fundamental importance. It is that all values are related to each other in an objective hierarchical order.

In the whole scale of values, he distinguished four value-modalities (as he called them), themselves hierarchically ordered in

relation to one another. To each of these modalities, a range of hierarchically ordered values belongs. The value-modalities, in ascending order, are: 1/ Sensible Values, of the Agreeable or Disagreeable, 2/ Vital or Life Values, 3/ Spiritual Values and 4/ Holy Values (20).

Sensible values are those of the range from the agreeable to the disagreeable, those of directly sensibly experienced pleasure and pain. Within these value objects, one can distinguish the things, the physical realities, which produce the agreeable or disagreeable feelings and the pleasure or pain feelings themselves as states of the value-subject. A further distinction of things as sensible values is between their being directly pleasure or pain producing, and their having utility as means to the production of pleasure and pain.

Vital values concern one's good as a living-being at a general level, in other words, one's well-being. Scheler described these values as ranging from the "noble" to the "vulgar". Vital states corresponding to this modality are such as health, disease, aging, weakness, strength, vigour or heartiness. "Goods", correlative to these vital states, might be, for example, as relatively "noble", health foods as the components of a healthy diet, whereas junk foods would be the "vulgar". This serves to distinguish the values of this modality from those of the former, since the components of a healthy diet are not always the most immediately agreeable.

Spiritual values concern one's valuation of human persons, one's aesthetic values and one's valuing true knowledge, as such. These values are given in spiritual-feeling and acts towards others such as love or hatred, friendship, where one's preferences are distinguished. Scheler held that, as with the relation of vital values to sensible values, the latter should be sacrificed to the former - ie values of



a lower modality should be sacrificed to those of a higher modality; hence that vital values, such as health, should be sacrificed, if necessary, in favour of spiritual values such as treating others as values-in-themselves.

The highest modality, of holy values, ranging between the holy and the unholy, are values which, for Scheler, appear with objects pertaining to the absolute - in other words - to do with God. Feeling states belonging to this modality range between blissfulness and despair. Objects and practices to do with this modality are valued in their relation to religious observance and worship.

What is the evidence that establishes the hierarchical order of the modalities and their ranges of values?

For Scheler, the objective singular ordering of values is

..... apprehended in a special act of value-cognition: the act of preferring (21).

Thus the ranking of values is not something logically deducible but something given a priori, pre-logically and non-formally. However he qualified this by saying

One must not assume that the height of a value is "felt" in the same manner as the value itself, and that the higher value is subsequently "preferred" or "placed after". Rather, the height of a value is "given", by virtue of its essence, only in the act of preferring. Whenever this is denied, one falsely equates this preferring with "choosing" in general, ie, an act of conation (22).

Thus "preferring" is a cognitive apprehension. One value is felt to be higher than another. At (23), Scheler said:

The "height of a value" is "given" not "prior" to preferring, but in preferring. Hence, whenever we choose an end founded in a lower value, there must exist a deception of preferring.

This possibility of "deception of preference" helps to explain another distinction made by Scheler, which is that it is not the being-preferred which alone determines the height of a value. He said (24):

..... this height is nevertheless a relation in the essence of the values concerned. Therefore, the "ordered ranks of values" are themselves absolutely invariable, whereas the "rules of preferring" are, in principle, variable throughout history .....

What this amounts to saying is, I think, that there is one truth of the objective essential nature of values and of their ordered mutual relations of height. Historically, different cultures have cognized this one truth, according to their "rules of preferring", to a greater or lesser extent, better or worse and with more or less "deception of preferring".

But values are, according to Scheler, given, in relation to their being relatively higher or lower, in acts of preference. He elaborated this by talking of the relation of "preferring" to "feeling" in the intuition of values and their ranks (25):

Since all values stand essentially in an order of ranks - ie, since all values are, in relation to each other, higher or lower - and since these relations are comprehensible only "in" preferring or rejecting them, the "feeling" of values has its foundation, by essential necessity, in "preferring" and "placing after". .....

..... Only those values which are originally "given" in these acts can secondarily be "felt". Hence, the structure of preferring and placing after circumscribes the value-qualities that we feel.

From this, Scheler found it necessary that we ask if there are a priori essential interconnections between the ranking of a value and its other essential qualities. He answered this by describing just these essential interconnections which show why values are essentially higher or lower.

Thus values are higher the more they are enduring in time and lower the more they participate in extension and division. They are also higher the less they are attached to particular vehicles through which they are preferred and felt. Relatively, lower values are founded in higher values. To exemplify these distinctions, take the pleasure experienced in a "sensible" value, such as the gustative satisfaction realized in eating a favourite meal. Now the pleasure, the value-feeling realized in this is itself conditional upon higher order vital values. If one is in a good state of health, the pleasure in eating is likely to be greater than if one were in a poor state of health. Again, with the question of extension in time, love, for example, endures, whilst sensible pleasures come and go in succession. When a value is divisible, eg a loaf of bread, the more who share it, the less the value for each individual (26).

Scheler contrasted with the divisibility of goods bearing sensible values those that are the most extreme opposite, such as the "holy", of "cognition", the "beautiful", etc. He said that the latter have a completely different character. For example, a work of art, a work of "spiritual culture" (27) is not only indivisible, but is "communicable without limit" and can have the positive character of uniting people in the recognition of its value.

Again, Scheler distinguished a relativity of higher or lower values with respect to what he called the depth of contentment associated with them. The more centrally important that a value is to a person, and the more deeply experienced and important is that person's possible contentment in relation to the value, the higher the value. He distinguished "depth" from "degree" of contentment. One may be greatly satisfied in a lower value, eg a sensible, pleasure value, yet, more deeply, be dissatisfied or discontent with regard to the absence of fulfilment in a higher value. Indeed Scheler described the putatively pathological

process which can be recognized in indulgence in the pleasures of lower values, a taking comfort but which is a futile attempt to fulfil a deeper discontent (28).

The summatory distinction that Scheler drew in the order of ranking of values lies in the essential relativity of some values, of how they stand in relation to those other values he called "absolute values" (29). In one dimension of this relativity, it resides in the values' relation to the capacity to experience them. Thus sensible values can only exist for sentient beings and vital values only for living beings. In contrast, he described those values as "absolute" which have previously been distinguished as belonging to the modalities of "values of the person" and "holy values". For Scheler, these do not possess the former "relativity". How could he conceive this to be the case, given that, within the terms of his own argument, the human being perceives and thereby knows these non-relative, absolute values? It is because he conceived them as being independent of the mediacy of the sensibly perceived physical world. For him they are perceived directly and immediately without dependence upon contingent structures of the physical constitution of the human being. It is this independence from physicality, then, which allows Scheler to call these values absolute. But the question still remains how, if these values are nonetheless perceived, differentially, through feeling, are these feelings to be distinguished from sensory feeling. It is that "spiritual" feeling is detached from and unconditioned by the feeling-states of sensory pleasure and vital well-being, which latter values are essentially states of the living subject.

Scheler also identified a second relativity of values, that of values and "goods". Goods, as bearers of values are, themselves, valued differently in different societies and at different times and vary in the acts of preference or relative rejection directed to them at

different times. For example, food tastes vary with prevailing custom and practice, fashion, etc. I am sure that in Britain many more people like food cooked with garlic than was the case thirty or forty years ago.

All the above enumerated distinctions represent a rationalization of essential interconnections and they are not, as already said, the evidence giving the distinctions.

I mentioned the issue of the cognitive objectivity of "preferring" as opposed to the wilful or conative subjectivity of "choosing", earlier. This relates to what is contained in Scheler's axioms for a non-formal ethics of values, with regard to the values "good" and "evil" attaching to acts that will the existence of relatively higher or lower values. For Scheler, the moral value of acts consists, and is manifest in, the realization of higher values over lower values. As he said (30), of the moral value "good":

.....it is located, so to speak, on the back of this act, ....  
But how can one (subjectively) choose a value which (objectively) one cognitively places after another value? According to Scheler's presentation of the distinctions, vital values are, for example, objectively higher than sensible values and the latter should therefore be subordinated to the former. Yet subjectively one can choose satisfaction in a sensible value - eg - the pleasure of drinking or gluttony over the more enduring value of the vital value: health. How is this possible? For one thing, different people will have different levels of awareness of values, grasped essentially. Secondly, whilst value-intuition, in acts of preferring and value-feeling, gives the essential difference of the modalities of value and their relations of subordination, it is nevertheless possible, motivationally, for the intensity of pleasure, in partaking of one value of a lower modality, to overwhelm the relative intensity of displeasure in the non-fulfilment or negation, at the same time, of a value of a higher modality. In the former of these possible ways, one has what might be called either

"inadequate value cognition" or what Scheler called "deception of preferring". But in the second, latter way of possibility, choice is against preference. It is this latter possibility which makes morality possible. Otherwise one could only choose in the objectivity of preference, and not against the value-order. Then "good" and "evil", in Scheler's sense, could not appear. Notwithstanding this dependence, though, the moral relations of the values "good" and "evil" are themselves determined a priori in essential relation to the value-ranks.

As part of his criticism of Kant's moral philosophy Scheler wished to show that ethics should be founded in the non-formal or material existence of values, not in the formal motivation, or good-will, to act in accordance with duty, to do what one "ought". He rejected the view that good consists in acting in accordance with duty. At (31) he said:

Whenever we speak of an ought, the comprehension of a value must have occurred. Whenever we say that something ought to happen or ought to be, a relation between a positive value and a possible real bearer of this value, such as a thing, an event, etc, is cointuited. That a deed "ought" to be presupposes that the "ought" is grasped in the intention of the value of the deed. What we are saying is that this ought is based essentially on a relation between value and reality, not that ought "consists" in this relation.

In further clarification of "ought" and its relations, Scheler distinguished what he called the "ideal ought" from the "ought of duty". At (32) he said:

The first kind of ought is contained in the proposition "injustice ought not to be"; the second, in "Thou shalt not do injustice". Thus "ought" is founded in values and it relates to Scheler's ethical axioms such that "good" ought to be realized and "evil" ought not. Agents ought to act to the realization of higher rather than relatively lower values.

Having founded his ethics on the absolute objective basis of values, how did Scheler explain the many and historically different moral systems and their correlative "rules of preferring"? In so far as these systems deviate from the objective value order and hence change the moral relations pertaining to the relative willing and acting towards values, Scheler held that such systems embody false belief and perverted perceptions of values in their rankings.

In his work "Ressentiment" (33), Scheler employed the concept of resentment. The term "ressentiment" is a loan-word from French, which Nietzsche first introduced as a technical philosophical term (34). In French, it means "resentment" or "grievance". An obsolete meaning of the term is the recurrence of an old pain or a sudden twinge of painful remembrance and this indicates the etymological root of the word which analyses to "re(s)-sentiment". It is this character of indicating the repetition or return of old feeling which, I think, led Nietzsche and later Scheler to adopt resentment as a technical term.

Scheler used the term to identify a type of human attitude which essentially relates a number of specifically different emotions and attitudes. These are: resentment, grievance, jealousy, envy, scorn, spite, vindictiveness, rancour, revenge, hatred, malice, the impulse to detract and "Schadenfreude" (joy at another's misfortune). I am sure there are others besides (35).

The process which Scheler described as leading to resentment is, firstly, the existence of an emotionally negative attitude towards another or others, combined with a situation of impotence, or a sense of impotence, residing in not being able to express, expend and resolve the negative feeling-attitude. This impotence, this inability to directly express the negative attitude leads to its being repressed by whomsoever is concerned. It is this repression of the inexpressible emotion which leads to what Scheler called the "psychic dynamite" (36) that is resentment.

One of the characteristics of this process is the hardening of what are, relatively speaking, ephemeral emotionally negative attitudes towards others into a more lasting disposition to view those others negatively. Another characteristic is the tendency of the object of the negative emotion to be generalized. There is a shift away from viewing one individual or group of individuals negatively to having a disposition of resentment against a wider more generalized class of people, all seen in the same negative light.

In relation to the value-order, the attitude of resentment is liable to seek to reverse the value-order, to pull down higher values and to elevate lower values. Particularly in relation to the ordering of the values of the person, resentment is a reactive attitude which might be found in an individual person comparing, for example, what is objectively a higher value held by another to their own feeling of having a lower personal value, in some degree and respect. This sense of having a lower, an inadequacy of, personal value, is exacerbated, in the "pain" of inadequacy, by the comparison. This motivates the desire to pull down the higher value, to deny it that status and to see it differently, to alleviate the pain of inadequacy. At (37) Scheler said:

The formal structure of resentment expression is always the same. A is affirmed, valued and praised not for its own intrinsic quality, but with the un verbalized intention of denying, devaluating, and denigrating B. A is "played off" against B.

Scheler took the view that relationships of resentment could be held and expressed collectively on a social level. One social grouping of people could collectively take a negative, value-order distorting attitude to some other grouping or groupings, expressing this in a culturally generalized morality system. One example would be the social institutionalization of anti-Semitism in pre-Second World War Germany.

These theories of value and resentment are closely connected with Scheler's theory of love, which I shall now discuss.



Scheler's Theory of Love

From his discussions of love, it is clear that he regarded love as the fundamental human attitude. At (38) he said:

..... love was thus always the primal act by which a being, without ceasing to be this one delimited being, abandons itself, in order to share and participate in another being as an ens intentionale. ..... Thus, love is always what awakens both knowledge and volition; indeed, it is the mother of spirit and reason itself. ....  
Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans. The fulness, the gradations, the differentiations, and the power of his love circumscribe the fulness, the functional specificity, and the power of his possible spirit and of the possible range of contact with the universe.

As fundamental, Scheler regarded the attitude of love as a pre-condition responsible for value-cognition. At (39) he said:

The actual seat of the entire value-a priori ..... is the value-cognition or value-intuition that comes to the fore in feeling, basically in love and hate, .....  
These functions and acts supply the only possible access to the world of values. It is ..... in the felt and lived affair with world ....., in preferring and rejecting, in loving and hating, ie in the course of performing such intentional functions and acts, that values and their order flash before us!

In Scheler's view "love" is not a feeling, either as a feeling-state or as the function of value-feeling. He described it as an "act" and a "movement" (40). Love is thus an irreducible spontaneous act which, in effect, opens human beings to the feeling of values in relation to the world of realities.

The spontaneous act that is love is essentially related to values, in what Scheler called "a unique attitude towards objects of value" (41).

Love refers to

Objects inasmuch and insofar as these possess value. It is never values we love, but always something that possesses value (41).

In other words it is "goods", the bearers of values, which are the objects of love. Love relates to the positive existence of value.

What uniquely characterizes the act is that it is a movement from lower to higher values. Scheler said (42):

For love is that movement of intention whereby, from a given value A in an object, its higher value is visualized. Moreover, it is just this vision of a higher value that is the essence of love.

The movement is towards the potential value seen in the object, towards the object's ideal paradygm. It is difficult to clarify just what Scheler means in these respects. It would seem that the envisioning of higher value, relative to the given, is to will the existence of that higher value and to make it an end to be realized. But Scheler denied that interpretation (43):

It has already been emphasized that love and hatred do not represent acts of conation. It is precisely the element of 'uneasiness' in conation which is increasingly expunged from love and hatred, the more definite, pure and lucid they become. Nor do they contain any consciousness of something 'to be realized'.

Love sees in its beloved object a higher value, potential in it, which is its ideal paradygm. But what makes this a movement towards the higher value, if it is not a movement of realization, of becoming?

Scheler emphasized that the higher value is not empirically latent in the object, but its ideal possibility (44). Love is thus prior to the contingency of empirical conditions of realization. Its inherent tendency to enhancement of value is, as Scheler described:

..... an appointed goal, an objective ideal challenge to a better and more beautiful fulfilment of the whole (44).

Scheler described this as a creative force to the existence of higher value. I think that what Scheler was at pains to distinguish regarding the essential nature of love is that as attitude it is the a priori precondition of what transpires actually in the concrete unfolding of real events in real lives. As such, it cannot itself be conditioned by its occurring in the course of events in the manner of particular projects, dissatisfactions and the willing of particular ends to be realized. It is, as it were, an overriding intention, one, in the light of which, any particular projects, willing and ends relative to beloved objects, would take shape. So love is not dependent on the realizing or finding of higher value for its object in reality. Otherwise it would be either, on the one hand, constantly dissatisfied ( this is what I think Scheler meant by 'uneasiness'), or, on the other hand, extinguished in the actual realization of the higher value. Perhaps this is summed up by Scheler saying:

..... love itself, in the course of its own movement, is what brings about the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object ..... (45).

Love, as it were, without manifest effort, inspires a self-production of, a living-up-to higher value in the object:

..... love is that movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature (46).

In relation to love, hatred, which is conditional upon love as that through which values appear, is essentially an act and movement relative to values in the opposite direction to that of love. It envisages lower value, seeks to 'demote' values. It is destructive to the existence of value (44).

Just as value, as such, appears through love, so does the objective hierarchically ordered realm of values as a whole. This macrocosm of values is mirrored in love. The image, found in the subject of love, the microcosmic reflection of that value-order which is objective for the subject, is what Scheler called the "ordo amoris". Just as with (in my interpretation) Scheler's position regarding the objective existence of the value-order, that there is one truth of that value-order, so there would be one true image of the value-order, that belonging to the all-knowing, all-loving being, to God. This ideal ordo amoris would serve as the norm for human subjects. Scheler said (47):

However, the highest thing of which a man is capable is to love as much as possible as God loves them and in one's own act of love to experience with insight the coincidence and intersection of the divine and the human act at one and the same point of the world of values. The objectively correct ordo amoris becomes a norm only when it is seen as related to the will of man and as commanded to him by a will.

In a footnote, Scheler pointed out that this does not depend on the assumption of the existence of God. "God" represents the ideal subject.

Just as different individuals, cultures and societies have different "rules of preferring" for the value-order, so do they have different ordo amoris. As Scheler put it (48):

Whoever has the ordo amoris of a man has the man himself.

A person's ordo amoris is the "crystallization formula" for their moral being (48). Distortion and falsification of ordo amoris can be, as discussed in relation to values, an effect of resentment. Hatred is a consequence of false love.

Scheler distinguished varieties of false love. He said one would be subject to "metaphysical confusion" (49) in loving something value-relative as though of absolute value. Such would be the falsity of

loving, of idolizing, a 'graven image' as though it were itself the divine being represented. Another such falsification would be to love a person, an absolute value, not as an end-in-itself but as a means, in other words as a relative value.

Hatred is manifested in another variety of false love. Its relation, as the antithesis of love, to false love is, according to Scheler, that it is a reaction to (50)

..... a violation of ordo amoris ..... Man cannot hate unless he sees the bearer of what is commonly considered a non-value take or pretend to take over the place which belonged to a bearer of a value in that objective order in which things are assigned their position in the scale of worthiness of love; or unless a good of lower rank takes over the place of a good of higher rank (and conversely).

This means that it is not necessarily the direct responsibility of the one who hates for the disorder of the ordo amoris. It may, for example, reside in the prevailing "rules of preferring" of the society in which that person finds themselves. Nevertheless, the person reacts to the violation of their own ordo amoris. Thus it may either be due to the person's own false love, or others' false love, that a reaction of hatred ensues.

Returning to love in its original sense (not false or disordered), it has an overall summatory tendency. This is that, in its inspirational creativity and in its promotion and pursuit of higher value, it is a movement towards the absolute value "good", the highest good or summum bonum.

Part 2 Phenomenological Criticism of Scheler's Theory

I shall start with the general epistemological question of perception, intuition and evidence. As discussed in the Introduction, I take Husserl's view that a firm, reflected-upon, examined knowledge should be founded in what can be known certainly and self-evidently; that consciousness provides a source of such knowledge. Thus in examining claims to knowledge, one should look at the consciousness in which that knowledge is claimed to be found.

Scheler claimed both that we directly perceive the existence of values in the world and that there is an a priori intuition of what values essentially are, in their ordered relations to one another. Now what characterizes perception, in the sense of my conception of "perception -proper" as described on Page 35, is the immediate, real presence of its objects. But in the perception of physical objects in the world, the objects which are immediately and intuitively present are not, in the "now" moment of perception, wholly and adequately given. Their self-evidence is inadequate. They are given, as Husserl says, in profiles. But through what is phenomenally given in this way, one intuitively grasps the meaning of the presence of the object as a whole. Its whole possibilities of being perceived, all around, in all perspectives, are indicated as the significance of the perceptual material content as sign. But the intuitively grasped meaning of the object's perceptual presence is something which, as meaning, has been previously constituted. The meaning is achieved in perceptual synthesis of given material across time. The meaning, thereafter, is, in its intentional ideality, known a priori.

How does this compare to Scheler's conception of the perception of

values? He claimed an intuitive givenness for them in value-feeling, so what is given in value-feeling? The feeling itself is characterized by its degree of good-feeling or bad-feeling, as felt quality. But concretely it also belongs immediately to an intentional structure of consciousness in which it intuits value-meaning. The value-meaning can belong to an immediately present perceptually given state of affairs, but it need not. Such a bearer of value-meaning can be aimed at in thought or imagination, just as well, for the value-feeling and value-perception to take place, as previously described in an example (page 147) But is there a constituted value-meaning in the object (perceptually present or not) which gives rise to the value-feeling or is it the givenness of the value-feeling which, originally, gives rise to the value-meaning of the object?

If pre-constituted value-meaning is responsible for the production of the value-feeling, then it would throw responsibility for the having of the value onto the subject, who, in having previously constituted the meaning would have imparted to it its value-significance, in the light of the subject's ends. This relation of value-meaning giving rise to value-feeling can be seen for example in relation to culturally and inauthentically valued objects, such as "fast cars", "large houses" and "designer clothes". In such cases, the value-meaning perceived is a "borrowed" value in that it is the value that others, or "they", accord the object. For the perceiver, issues of status and personal value are translated into the value of the object, in its power to allow the perceiver to feel those values. But clearly, such valuing is a superstructure, built on more original, authentic valuing.

Borrowed value and received value preferences nevertheless relate to original experiencing, with a basis of givenness, in which the value-meanings were constituted. In such constituting activity,

value-feeling is "made-sense-of"; it is synthetically related into a particular form of meaning which is the value-meaning.

Here my differences with Scheler's theory come to the fore. They concern epistemological issues of the "given", the "self-evident" and the involvement of the activity of consciousness in relation to these. For Scheler, the a priori nature of the experience or perception of values consists in their apprehension as ideal value-meanings, through value-feeling. For him the value-meaning is something held intentionally before consciousness in immediate intuitive and self-evident presence. In this presence, the meanings' objective ideality is recognized by Scheler and its a priori recognizes that this presence is not dependent upon the contingent real presence of the object. In this context I want to ask what then is the existential status of values and on what their presence to consciousness depends. Firstly, as objects, values are intended. This intending of the value-meaning is something which I would describe, phenomenologically, as an activity of consciousness. The existential status of the value-object is part of its meaning-content. Now I would describe consciousness's intentional activity as essentially belonging to a teleological structure. It seeks a particular realization, which realization will achieve a particular satisfaction for consciousness. Applying this to the intention of values, what does it seek to realize and what are the conditions of the satisfaction (good-feeling) it can achieve? Take for example what, for Scheler, is a vital value, "health". I would describe the a priori apprehension and intention of the value-meaning "health" as a cognition. As act of knowing, it seeks to realize that achievement and actual state of consciousness which is knowing "health", knowing what it is. This realizes the satisfaction inherent in all knowing, which belongs to the relation of "knowing" to the activity of a conscious being, in the world, described in my



Introduction (pages 11,12) as "transcendence". This is that "knowing" is an essential moment of transcendence, the power of going beyond present conditions of existence towards those conditions and that self-realization one seeks to realize. But the value "health", like all other values is, according to Scheler, given through value-feeling. What feeling-content is given and how is it constitutive of the value-meaning? It is good-feeling felt in the cognitive apprehension of "health" as being-good-for the one intending it and, more universally, for all human and vital beings. The good-feeling, really experienced as a content of the sensory givenness of the particular consciousness, is, in the intentional activity, objectivated as belonging to the meaning of the value. But other parts of the meaning are not so given. The meaning "vital being" is intended by consciousness from what it already knows. the meaning "harmonious state of functioning of the organic whole which is a vital being" is also co-intended. The meaning of the relation of this state to those other states of functioning from which the healthy is distinguished is also co-intended. The whole as value-meaning is apprehended in the meaning context of its relation to other values. A field of a priori essential cognitions of being is brought into the meaning content. But all the aspects of the value-meaning, really given or intended from what is already known, are brought together and combined in the value-meaning. I have described this as ideational synthesis and as an achievement of consciousness mediated by that synthesis. Scheler, however, denied that there is any such synthesis, which he described as "mythical". I feel he has misconstrued the relationship of consciousness to what it essentially knows. In my Introduction, I introduced my conception of the being of consciousness in the respect of its "being-transcended" (page 24), and I distinguished within perception the particular form "perception-

proper" (Section 1, page 35). Through "being-transcended", the meaning arises for consciousness of the world being objectively "there" for consciousness. In perception-proper, what is "there" for consciousness is apprehended. The character of "being-transcended" is that consciousness is given its content, rather than producing its own content. Now for Scheler, values are constitutive of the a priori structure of the world. I feel he has not demonstrated how consciousness is transcended by them and he has not described their perception-proper. For me, values transcend consciousness through their transcending power of determining a content in consciousness of "Good-feeling". This is in the context of essential relations to particular forms, types and structures of reality (eg the functioning of vital being), whose co-apprehension belongs to the perception-proper of the values, either a priori or, really, in the perception of "goods". Where I differ from Scheler is in my phenomenological epistemology in my view that what consciousness knows, a priori and a posteriori, is its achievement of a body of meaning which it itself produces in making-sense of its being-transcended, of what it is given. Now the given is self-evident, but this does not exhaust what for consciousness is self-evident. What it itself intends, as objective meaning, of whatever type, is in this sense, as intended, self-evident. Now Scheler has suggested that the objective a priori presence of values as "ideal units of meaning" is their being-given, self-evidently, from the world, and he denies that any activity of object-forming or meaning-synthesis is necessary. I think I have shown in the above discussion that it is. I think Scheler confused intentional self-evidence with that of the given.

Notwithstanding this though, I agree with Scheler that the content of value-meanings can be brought to a self-evidence of givenness.

Moreover, what constitutes this content which can be brought to self-evidence is there, objectively, a priori, as essential possibility of objective reality, of the world. It is just that I insist that the

cognitive apprehension of the value-order and the ranking of values requires ideational synthesis.

To try and express the foregoing more succinctly, the point I am making is that values do not present themselves simply, from their objectivity, needing only to be directly and immediately apprehended. Admittedly, their ideal meanings are apprehensible a priori. But this is because the meanings consist in the essential relations constituting the possibilities of values existing in the world of realities. As such, their being-seen is not as a given content, constitutive of consciousness's being-transcended, but are meanings intended and brought before consciousness by consciousness itself. What is given, in the transcending sense, in the perception of values, is their affective content of feeling. This content is related essentially to the other ideal constituents of the value-meaning.

What then is the essential meaning-character of value, as such? As I noted in relation to the value "health", it is the character of "being-good-for". The "being-good" is given in the affective content, the Good-feeling that essentially belongs to values. It is the "what", "how", "why" and "wherefore" of the "being-good-for" which gives particular values their specific meaning-forms.

Returning to the value "health", it is one which in its generality covers a wide range of more specific values. Its essential meaning-character of "well-functioning-of-a-living-being" can be "good-for" its bearer and others in wide-ranging respects. Its broadest respect is its being-good-for all purposes of, all projects, aims and self-realizing activities of its bearer. So far as human beings are concerned, it represents the optimal state of being able to act which the person has, in so far as that is dependent upon the person's living body. Health enhances the good-feeling that a person can experience to the degree that it is dependent upon the living body.

The experience, knowledge and perception of the value, "health", is not necessarily directly lived in being-healthy. Health, as a value, can be aimed at as a goal, from a state of unhealthiness. Even in having health, it can still be of the character of an end, as something to be actively promoted and maintained. In being projected to be realized, the idea of health is nevertheless perceived and felt, in the projection. Healthiness, in this case, is not necessarily felt, but the value of health is felt and experienced in actual good-feeling.

Health, as value, can be objectivated to mean not only "being-good-for" its bearer, but as something objectively good, good for all. Within the value "health", there are relations to other values, i.e. to the bearing it has on anything else that is "good-for" its bearers or others.

This relates to the issue of the objectivity and hierarchical ordering of values. For Scheler, the cognitive apprehension of values in relations and distinctions of preferring and placing-after is the original form in which values are given and that this founds the feeling of values. I shall not reiterate my differences with Scheler concerning the relations of givenness and of the activity of consciousness in cognitive apprehension. Rather I would like in this respect to demonstrate concurrence. This concerns value-cognition as an instance of general relations of cognitive apprehension. In cognition, "beings", of whatever existential status, come to be known. In this process, something "x" is both identified as being itself and distinguished from all other beings. What "x" is, all its positive characteristics, are attributed to it in acts distinguishing these from those of other beings and in establishing the essential relations of "x" to other beings. This applies to value-cognition and confirms the correctness of attributing primacy to the establishment of relations

of preferring and placing-after.

But what of, in Scheler's terms, the relations of the wilful subjectivity of "choosing" on the one hand as opposed to the objectivity of "preferring"? I think these revolve around issues of what I have called "being-good-for". When I choose something, when I aim to possess, consume or realize something, I make that my end and, in that respect and context, that "something" is "good-for" me. This establishes the "something" as a value, in a subjective sense, in an individually relative sense. It is my contention that this subject-relativity is an essential relation which pertains to all "being-good-for", to all value, regardless of what other senses of subjectivity or objectivity may pertain to the same. Here I depart from Scheler's view in my conception of value. Value as object-meaning is, in my view, established in its relation to the subjectivity intending it, in its being-valued. It is on this meaning ground that other relations of subjectivity and objectivity, of universality and truth of value meanings are to be distinguished.

When something that is good for me in a narrow sense is, at the same time, bad for others, in a more widely judged, universal sense, then it is only, and subjectively, a value for me, not an objective value but, rather, objectively, a disvalue. This value, good for me in one narrow sense, can, when seen in the light of what, objectively, is my good in an overall sense, be seen as bad for me. My egoistic valuing of something for myself, against the good of others, demeans my moral being and harms me in that sense.

In the sense of "being-universally-good-for", what is good for myself can be seen-as, in the same way, being good for each and every other person, eg health, and, hereby, objectivity of the value is established. There are many possible permutations of these relations, but in each case,

a judgment as to the ultimate subjectivity or objectivity of the value can be made.

The value-order ranges from the supremely, unconditionally valuable at the "top" or highest level of value, to the most contingently and conditionally valuable, at the lowest level.

For example, the value of health can be seen as conditional, in relation to other values, in a number of ways. For instance, my health, whilst a value for me, can be a disvalue for others. This could be in my being, through my health, enhanced in the efficacy of my being bad-for-others, if that were to characterize my praxis, for others.

And again, the value of one's bodily well-being might be a disvalue, if promoted above some other, more important, spiritual value of the person, not dependent on individual bodily well-being. For example, it has been documented, by Simone de Beauvoir (51) and others, that Sartre, when he was writing his "Critique of Dialectical Reason", worked furiously and for long hours, to get it written, produced and finished, to the serious detriment of his health. Now it is arguable that, for the benefit to humanity of the spiritual value of that work, it was right that Sartre's health, a vital value, was subordinated to it.

From these considerations, I concur that values, when conceived in the sense of their "being-universally-good-for", are ideally and objectively related to each other in a unitary hierarchical order, as Scheler proposed.

One further issue is that of the distinction of relative from absolute values. It seems to me that there is a certain validity to this distinction. It relates to their perception. Relative values depend for their meaning on the physical constitution of the human being or sentient beings and are perceived in that context. Scheler's "siritual" and "holy" values relate to personality - the spiritual being of the human being and to whatever spiritual beings there may be beyond human beings. Now it seems to me that these latter values are

perceived in relation to a spiritual context, which is meant, as real, in just the same way that physical reality is meant. But this spiritual reality is given (if indeed it is given) differently. Whilst it may be given through physical perception, the physical perceptual material is not itself constitutive of the spiritual being meant in the perception. The outcome of the above is that spiritual values "of the person" and holy values, in the sense meant by Scheler, are borne by spiritual beings as bearers, just as sentient and vital values exist, physically borne in "goods". Therefore the issue of relativity or absoluteness of values is otherwise related than in Scheler's account. In the hierarchy of values, all values stand in relations of being higher or lower relatively to one another, save the summatory, supreme and, in that sense, unconditional value, the "good".

Discussion of spiritual beings introduces objects from the realm of what is beyond that of a priori ontology. Whilst the spiritual being of human personality, as consciousness, is self-evidently accessible to itself in its particular being and essential structures, that of other consciousnesses, given through physical perception, is not self-evidently given, in the sense of what can be consensibly pointed to and identified as giving spiritual being itself. Similarly, spiritual entities beyond human personality, holy beings, etc, can not be pointed to and identified in consensual perception. Hence their discussion belongs to issues of speculative metaphysics, which I have reserved for the final part of my Conclusion. There, how spiritual beings may be directly perceived and apprehended will be discussed.

Something that similarly crosses the boundary of a priori ontology towards speculative metaphysics is the issue of the ontological relatedness, through value-feeling, of values on the one hand and of the consciousness, in which they are felt, on the other hand. For consciousness, in its being, is transcended by values, and they, on

their part, are manifest and have their being through consciousness. How ultimately these distinguished beings are united and share existence is a matter of speculative metaphysics.

With regard to the issues of non-formal ethics, the axioms for such an ethics, of moral values riding on the back of the value hierarchy, of the necessity, for there to be morality, that one can choose against the value-order, and that "ought" is grounded in values, I am generally in agreement with Scheler. He has given a different formal description to the phenomena of morality and "good", and organized his exposition of their formal relations and structures, differently from that account of them which I shall later elaborate in my Conclusion.

However, I think the different accounts are compatible. Where I differ from Scheler in these respects concerns what I term "Good-feeling". I have already argued for the constitutive essentiality of Good-feeling in what "good" is. Notwithstanding Scheler's recognition of the role of feeling in the perception of value, he did not identify the relation of feeling to the "being-good-for" of values.

I shall discuss resentment in the course of my following discussion of Scheler's theory of love.

Is love indeed that fundamental attitude in whose light willing and cognition take their origin? Is it, as "act" and "movement", the pre-condition of all value-cognition? Perhaps I can answer the first in answering the second question. Thus is love, concretely, that irreducible spontaneous act, effecting, ideally, a value-enhancing movement? Does not love, concretely, include a moment of feeling-content and a moment of relating to intentional meaning, the objectivity to which it is directed? I do not wish to dispute with Scheler that an act, of consciousness, as such, is an irreducible spontaneity. An act announces itself and exists in its performance. However it does not exist self-sufficiently as such but only in abstraction from that to which it essentially relates. There is an intelligibility to the act



which can be explicated. Essentially, an act is motivated. It belongs to a teleological structure. The specification of its teleological structure in particular concrete circumstances is what will give any particular act its intelligibility. The agent, the "actor", moves, through the act, towards the realization of their end. Thus so for the act that is love.

But the above appears to contradict what Scheler said. In the passage which I quoted (43), he denied that love and hate "represent acts of conation" in which there is consciousness of "something to be realized". As I said in interpreting Scheler in these respects, love (and hate) does not have the character of particular projects in the course of life but of an overriding intention. It is an attitudinal pre-condition, on a more general level, according to which specific projects conform. On the most general level, this is what constitutes what Scheler calls the person's "ordo amoris". Thus far I am in agreement with Scheler and I concur with the distinction he draws regarding the nature of love's tendency to the enhancement of value. However it seems to me that love, as act, still falls within a teleological structure, that it has an end to be realized and a fulfilment thereby. But it is, relatively, an overriding structure. The end that love seeks to realize does differ from what more specific projects seek. As Scheler says, love does not have that "unease" arising from that on which it would depend, were its condition of realization the realization of the higher value envisioned in what it loves. Love finds a degree of fulfilment in the envisioning of the possibility of higher value, itself. Just as cognition has its teleological structure, its realization in the cognition achieved and, to that extent, is willed, so love, in its dimension of envisioning higher value in the value it cognizes, is conative. But it is not exhausted in that envisioning. Love does have a further dimension of fulfilment, which is that of the actual realization of higher value in its beloved object. But the form in

which it seeks this further realization is, or can be, as Scheler describes. It is the will that the beloved object, itself, should "live up to" its higher possibility of value. There is a dependency of the realization of higher value on the valued object itself. It is not directly within the power of the one who loves to effect the envisioned higher value. It has the character of ideality that Scheler describes. This is recognised by the love-agent in the form "patience". This relieves the further dimension of realization of "unease".

The above discussion has been very general. "Love" is a term which covers a very wide range of attitudes and of corresponding objects and values. If love is indeed as Scheler describes it, "the mother of spirit and reason itself", then its ranges are all-embracing! Love, in one sense, may not be love at all, in another. I have disputed that love's characters of "act" and "movement" are the essence of love, though I recognize them as constitutive of that essence. So what is the essence?

It seems to me that the character of value-enhancing movement is one built on a more fundamental essential characteristic. This is the character of love finding its object "lovely". As such, love is an intentional structure of consciousness and also includes specific love-related feeling-states. In this conception, its "act" character is only an abstract moment of what love, concretely, is. I think love is better conceived as a consciousness, with all its essential structures. The unity of the moments of the consciousness which is love can be described as its "transcendence", mentioned earlier and discussed (Introduction page 11) as a teleological unity of knowledge and activity. In finding what it loves, lovely, consciousness has a particular attitude and active relation towards it. Now the subject needs to have the loveliness of the value, in feeling, to find it lovely, to love it. An aspect of its end in loving its object, is the satisfaction, the enhancement of its good feeling which would be realized were its

object to live up to envisioned higher value. What this value-enhancement specifically means for the love-object, depends, as with the relations of value-choice and value-preference, on the subjectivity or objectivity of the love, on the selfishness or unselfishness with which the object is loved.

In the extreme of selfish, subjective love, the subject wishes to have the love-object for itself - it wishes to possess its love object for the sake of its own good-feeling in having it. It seeks to enhance its love-object's value in the sense that the object thereby realizes greater good-feeling for the subject. In the other extreme of unselfish, objective love, the attitude of the subject to the love-object, is that of regarding it as an end-in-itself, something whose own being-good is objectively and universally good. In so far as the loved value-object is an ideality, what would be good, this love aims that it should be in reality, not for the sake of the subject's having of it for itself but for the sake of its own being. Nevertheless, in the teleology of this aim, it is this end which realizes good-feeling for the subject. The "horizon" of this objective valuing, in love, is its seeking, for the sake of the love-object, the optimal enhancement of its value in reality.

In its further dimension beyond its envisioning of higher value, love can range from being unfulfilled to being fulfilled. In being unfulfilled, love feels the absence of the greater loveliness which would belong to its object were its envisioned higher value realized. The feeling-content in unfulfilled love differs from that realized and experienced in fulfilled love. In the latter, one feels the higher value in the mode of having it. The higher value exists, it is a reality for the love-subject. This teleological structure of love fulfilment participates in the formal essential relations of feeling under teleological structures as described in Section 1 (page 58). A greater complexity of the relation of love and values concerns the

question of the existence or non-existence of the value in reality. Scheler said that love relates to the positive existence of value. But if love is the pre-condition of value-cognition, and that cognition, as of essential possibilities, is prior to and independent of the perception of the bearers of values, then the love-attitude can relate to values as such, independently of their positive existence. But nevertheless, as I see it, love for a value seeks its positive existence and is fulfilled in the positive existence of the value, in having the value. In so far as the value exists, love seeks its ideal fulfilment in higher value. Thus love has in these respects two levels of fulfilment. Further complexity arises in connection to consciousness of the existence of value, where its "being-good-for" is in some sense not for the one perceiving it. Here relations of selfish and unselfish love operate. Take for example, a sentient value, a loaf of bread. Agent X is conscious of its existence. X would "love" to have it, for it to be X's possibility and power to consume it. But that possibility is denied X - X cannot afford it. It is not a value, not "good-for" X in a selfish sense. In that sense X does not love it. However, in existing, the loaf is a value which exists for others, it can be consumed. It is "good-for" in an objective sense and X can love it unselfishly.

I think that in these possible relations to values, the opposite attitude to love, hate, can be found intelligible. I think it does include those relations which Scheler described as a "violation of *ordo amoris*". Perceiving but not having or not possessing a value leaves open the possibility of not loving and projecting the having of the value. But perceiving the value in the first place, and recognizing it as such, distinguished comparatively with other values, is something achieved through value-feeling, and there is a good-feeling content which relates to the possibility of having the value and its envisioned higher value. If, for whatever reason, one finds one cannot have the

value, that in a selfish sense, then one can project not-having-the-value as one's end instead. But not-having-the-value must, in this sense, itself be a value, yielding a good-feeling content. To do this one needs to suppress the value-feeling originally experienced in perceiving the value. To prefer "not-having-the-value" to the value as originally seen, means the latter must be placed after. Its value must be demoted. The attitude which wills this is hate, a movement opposite to that of love. Hating the value seeks to avoid the pain felt in not having it.

Further to his account of hate, Scheler discussed and described the negative, devaluing attitude and process of resentment. He applied this particularly to the attitudes which may be adopted in value comparisons between the value of other persons and one's self-value. Interpreting in Scheler's terms, in one's overriding, but particularly characteristic of one's individuality, attitude of love towards the world, including oneself, one perceives one's own value (relatively truly or falsely) through value-feeling. The feeling-content involved in the value-meaning of oneself, for oneself, is a combination of feeling arising, as with value perception in general, both in relation to the primary element of authentic self-constituted value-meaning and the secondary inauthentic element of extraneously constituted value-meaning. In other words it combines what one recognizes for oneself and what one believes through what others think.

For Scheler, resentment can arise when the self-value felt by the resentment subject is weaker by comparison with that pertaining to others (the resentment-object). But why should this be? Why should one's own sense of lack of value take, for its solution, need the remedy of pulling-down others' value?

There are several possibilities of combinations of relations here. Values are not felt in isolation, but comparatively with others, as Scheler says, in relations of preferring and placing after.

Notwithstanding a positive feeling of being of some value, if one feels that value as less than another's, then one's consequent being "placed after" can in fact be felt painfully as a relative disvalue of oneself. Ressentiment is a possible solution. Envisioning a possibility of lesser value in the other can relieve to some degree the pain felt. A further possibility is that in bad faith or self-deception, one re-constitutes the other's value as lower, compared to oneself. However, such a falsification has the disvalue for oneself of its devaluation of the veracity of one's whole worldview.

An account of these relations can also be given in terms of "ordo amoris" and its violation. For someone to resort to resentment is itself reflected in their ordo amoris. Paradoxically, not to accept one's being, in some sense, of lesser value than another, is to assert that one should be of greater value. In one's ordo amoris, one values oneself, as such, more highly than others. It asserts a self-love, an egotism, above other-love, altruism. In accordance with their ordo amoris, the resentment-subject may represent the value of the other as, in effect, something-which-should-not-be-so-high, something which the other person does not deserve, as something which is unfair. Whereas, objectively, in truth, value is its own justification - it is just as good as it is, and that is its value! Similarly, in constituting self-value-meaning, the resentment-subject may constitute self-value as a privation of value, as something-which-should-be-higher, as something unfair, regarding themself as a victim of injustice. Once again, this would be a falsification of belief, since in the objectivity of value-cognition, what is really the other's and really one's own value, is something independent of the personal moral responsibility and subjectivity of the one who so values.

These issues of what a value actually is, compared to what people believe it to be, the value they accord it, concern how an individual's ordo amoris, or a particular culture's general ordo amoris, deviates

and is different from the ideal, objective, *ordo amoris*. Scheler, in his presentation of resentment, clearly regarded the attitude, in its negativity, as always morally bad, always unjustified. However, in his discussion of hate, it is less clear that he held the same for hate as he did for resentment. What would be the moral status of a reactive attitude of hatred, occasioned, as in Scheler's description, by a violation of *ordo amoris*, in the circumstance where the *ordo amoris* in question accords with the ideal *ordo amoris*? In this case, the violation could consist in some value being valued too highly, in comparison to other values, by some other person or people. Would not the hatred, in seeking to pull down the over-exalted value to its correct level, be a moral act, in willing the correct value-order? Scheler's account seems to suggest this. If that is what he meant, I must disagree. As argued above, a value is what it is. The attitude of love, in its greatest application, seeks to enhance the whole hierarchy of values towards its optimum ideal possibility, expressed in its supreme value, good. Now a value being overvalued by others is not the fault of the value itself. However good it is in reality and in relation to other values, it does not deserve to be worse and every existent value would be better for instantiating higher value. In perceiving wrongful overvaluing by others, an attitude born of love for the existence of values should direct itself to the acts of overvaluing, the acts violating *ordo amoris*, themselves. These represent what Scheler called "negative values" in his axioms for non-formal ethics and, as he said there, the non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value. In other words, love towards values, in seeking to correct the overvaluing, is actually creative of value in seeking to eliminate negative value. Hatred is only destructive and never justifiable.

In these contexts, however, I very much concur with Scheler that the issues surrounding the need for a sense of self-value are deeply involved

in the taking of negative attitudes to others, in false belief and falsification of belief about oneself and others. I have discussed some possible relations in which these occur, above, but there is a great range of possible attitudes and belief surrounding issues of personal value. For example, a person may feel valueless, when, in fact, that person has great value. Frequently this would involve the mediation of others who inauthentically impart to the person that sense of valuelessness.

I shall now move to discussing these questions in the next part of this section.



SECTION 3

Part 3 Theory of "Valour"

What I mean by "valour" is something which I think should be recognized as a fundamental human need, though I think this is not generally and explicitly recognized. This need is for a sense of one's own personal worth or value. The need is satisfied in having a sense of being optimally of value. There seem to be several different ways of describing, expressing and naming this sense. It is something which as phenomenon is severally described, recognized and spoken of, but without its recognition as the fundamental need of which I speak. I shall try to enumerate as many of these different ways as I can, to evoke a preliminary sense of this phenomenon and its scope.

Thus "valour" is a sense of being-of-value, of being-of-worth, of being valued for oneself. It is a sense of one's substantiality, of one's necessary or non-accidental being, a sense of "de jure" existence, of being justified in one's existence, of existing by right. It is a sense of self-esteem, of human dignity, of honour or being honourable, of worthiness, of being personally recognized. Valour, as a need, is something pursued for a sense of "being", in the sense that Sartre identified a fundamental human project of "being", for a sense of being, substantially, in-oneself-for-oneself, as self-foundation, "causa sui" (see pages 122-124 in Section 2). A subordinate component of the sense is **is that of security, of being loved and cared for.**

In my brief discussion of "need" and "primary Good-feeling" in Section 1 (Pages 51/2), I described the latter as being that directly occurring feeling which happens to consciousness, without the mediation of consciousness's active involvement in intending meaning. Does the need for valour present itself in Good-feeling in a manner which fits this description? Does the immediate presenting of a lack of good-feeling,

of bad-feeling, with a particular form, circumstances and relations of occurring, give rise to the constitution of the meaning of a lack of personal value (or whatever meaning might be constituted for the feeling), or, alternatively, does the intention of personal-value-meaning give rise to the value-feeling presenting as lack? As with my analyses concerning value-feeling and value-meaning in Part 2 of this Section (page 165), it is the primarily given feeling which gives rise to the meaning.

What sort of need is valour? How is it related to or situated amongst other human needs? It is not within the scope of this Thesis to develop a comprehensive theory of needs, so I shall only sketch an outline. Human needs can be conceived and set out in a hierarchy, ranging from the most basic "necessary" needs up to the least essential, most circumstantially contingent needs (or "wants"). There again, along the lines of Scheler's hierarchy of values, needs can be ranged on an evaluative hierarchy, from the grossest, most earthy, material or physical needs, to the subtlest, most ethereal, spiritual needs.

Starting with the former hierarchy, there is a popular description of basic needs as being for food, clothing and shelter - ie for bodily comfort. Food is not needed as an end-in-itself but as a means to gustatory satiety. Likewise clothing and shelter are means to shorter or longer term senses of personal comfort. The point about the shorter or longer term introduces another aspect of needs, which is that greater or lesser awareness of the conditions of satisfying particular needs itself expands or limits the extent of those needs. Ie when one is aware of the condition of satisfying a need, the condition itself becomes needed as means and joins with the direct means in relation to the sense to be realized. These greater implications of needs are such

that they become interconnected and related to the wider means to the satisfaction of other needs, sometimes obscuring just exactly what something or some state of affairs is wanted or needed for.

After basic needs one might place sexual need. In one sense this can be seen as a need for sexual bodily satisfaction. But the phenomenon of sexuality presents a far more complex set of interrelated needs, with dependencies for satisfaction operating either way to the related needs. Sexual need is related in a major way to the need for valour, and sexual personal relations involve the satisfaction, or want of satisfaction of both needs.

Thus I would place valour next in this hierarchy. Here a conflict arises between the two themes for ordering the hierarchies. In one sense valour is more basic than sexual need, because it is, as I believe, one common to the whole of humanity, whereas bodily existence is possible without the experiencing subject necessarily having sexual feeling as such, narrowly conceived in its limitation to bodily sexual organs. In the other, evaluative sense, again narrowly conceived, sexual feeling is specifically related to bodily existence, whereas valour is something whose meaning relates to the human spiritual personality. The basic needs arising from bodily dependency are of course common to all humanity. Valour, however, is a dependency, first and foremost, upon relations to other people and only secondarily dependent upon bodily conditions. As a dependency upon relations to others, it varies, as need, according to the degree of awareness of and insight into others. **What can be seen is that valour is a central need of the human being, serving to integrate the other needs.**

Over and above the needs so far described, one might place aesthetic, moral and spiritual needs. There are differing reasons for placing them over and above the others. For one thing, one can survive, in a directly

bodily sense, without these needs having to be satisfied, or even, necessarily, presenting themselves. For another, they are concerns of human beings particularly when not preoccupied and dominated by the basic needs. A differing reason is that the satisfaction of these higher needs, in addition to the satisfaction of basic needs, gives a greater sense of overall satisfaction or contentment with life. Once again all these latter needs relate more or less directly or indirectly to the need for valour, and to all other needs. Much elaboration of these considerations is possible, but I shall break off here.

Returning to the nature of valour, I should like to talk about how the need presents itself and how it can be satisfied. As already noted, needs vary according to the degree of development of the awareness or consciousness of the subject. The variations in the nature of and need for valour also correspond, more or less closely, to the subject's historical development of personality through the various stages of life between birth and death \*.

\* This is not to presuppose that incarnate life, between birth and death, is the "all" of the actual being or existence of consciousness belonging to the individual human subject. It is simply that this is all of which I can authoritatively speak, whilst in the domain of a priori ontology.

Valour is, as I have described, one's sense of one's personal value. It is one's relatively true or false perception of one's own value, to express this in Scheler's terms. But this "perception" is not "perception-proper", as I described in Section 1, (page 35). I describe this as a "sense", because this perceiving of self-value does not generally or primarily intentionally posit self-value as its thematic object. As I described previously (page 38) this is a non-thetic or non-positional self-consciousness. It is of the same type as the self

-apperception which produces what Husserl called the all embracing synthesis of internal time (52). As I described (page 39), this self-value-perception, although it does not posit the self-value as its intentional object, nevertheless produces the sense of self-value as an intentional meaning-content, which, as meaning, is ideality for consciousness, not the direct being or existing of consciousness itself.

I have described valour as originating in the givenness of feeling, under particular conditions, giving rise to the constitution of the sense. But this does not express the complexity of this constitution, as the stages in the generation of meaning actually "feed-back" and affect actual feeling-content, which then, as datum, becomes constitutive of further degrees of meaning. This common characteristic of the process of generation of meaning is described essentially and in general by Husserl in his "Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology" (53).

Thus it is that valour, as a need, is dependent upon relations to others and varies according to the degrees of awareness of others. The relations to others which affect valour vary according to essential changes in relations to others which occur correlative to the various stages of life.

The earliest and necessary stage of relatedness that every human being experiences or passes through, is that of relatively complete dependence on others for the satisfaction of one's needs. The fact of others being essentially involved in the satisfaction of one's needs, in this form of relation, gives others an essential corresponding meaning, which relates to the self's, the subject's valour-sense. It is that in the expression to and satisfaction by others of one's needs (primarily basic needs), one receives a response from others which produces relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the needs expressed. If others fail to adequately

meet one's needs, and if that failure, rightly or wrongly, is perceived as their voluntary failure, their lack of concern to satisfy one's needs, then this gives rise to the meaning that they do not accord oneself the personal value or worth of being adequately satisfied. This meaning-content presents as a valour-deficit in the uncertainty which this produces for one's anticipation of future satisfaction of one's needs, this time-dimension being rooted in one's present dissatisfaction.

This meaning is the component of dissatisfied valour which is a sense of insecurity, of not being loved and cared for, intrinsically for oneself. The counterpart of one's dependence is, teleologically, to be confident in the satisfaction of one's needs by others. For this confidence one needs a sense of being valued and recognized as of-value, unconditionally. This sense, if satisfied, is that one is, in-oneself, simply by being, a value, an end-in-oneself. I think that this need for a sense of being intrinsically valuable, is an essential component of the whole possible sense of valour, whatever other changes and augmentations of the sense may arise with changing relations to others.

Generally, in the course of life, as one's consciousness develops, so does one's power to dispose of oneself as one wills. It is a movement from dependence on others towards independence and self-determination. As these relative states change, so do relations with others change, in their valuing, or conferring value on, oneself. Support of love, which once, ideally would be given unconditionally, become conditional. This comes about because, in becoming able to do for oneself what formerly was provided or performed by the supporting other, one is seen to be able, to that extent, to be responsible for oneself. This division in what was formerly unilaterally the responsibility of the other also divides the conferring of value by the other to oneself. Here one's valour sense

is confounded by the ambiguity between what is meant by the other and what the other's acts mean to oneself. The tendency is that when one is able to be responsible for oneself, the other will confer valorizing responses to the extent that one assumes such self-responsibility.

Thus in passing through the stages of development of one's life, from a necessary dependence through degrees of possible independence, one's valorization, as one perceives oneself in one's relationships to others, changes from being something principally received through and dependent on the attitude of others to its being something which it is within one's own power to achieve. It is then also dependent upon oneself in the relations one establishes for oneself in being self-responsible, or not, and in being dependent upon others, or not.

Of course valorizing relations are not one-way but form a complex web of interdependence between the members of social ensembles. Relations of valorization can be reciprocal - in being valorized by the other, I can value the other, who in turn values being-valued by me, and so on.

The process of becoming relatively less dependent and more self-responsible also develops one's responsibilities as a moral agent. One's conditional value for being self responsible is experienced as an increasing demand that one's value for others should be so objectively and universally. one feels a need, for valour, to live up to one's moral responsibilities, as one sees them.

In acting morally, as one believes, there are two extremes of the sources of possible valorization. One extreme is that of dependence upon "what others think". This is the position of inauthentic belief where one relies on the authority of others for one's sense of the value

of one's moral actions and of one's personal value for performing them. The other extreme is self-valorization through one's self-assessment of the value of the act and what it achieves. This is the position of authentic belief. In taking one's own assessment as the **paradigm** of true belief, one believes that ideally, others, were they to see matters as one, oneself, does, would recognize and confirm the same value. In the limiting case of authenticity, one is liable to experience what Heidegger called "Angst" and Sartre called "anguish" (54), one's self-doubt in the face of one's own responsibility for the value which one has realized, without the comfort of being able to accept uncritically the confirming judgment and valorization of actual others. In general moral activity takes place under the condition of the agent's belief falling between the two extremes. Agents experience valorization both through what they believe the value of their acts to be and through what they believe the value of their acts for others, and others' reciprocal valorization, to be.

I shall discuss the relationship of morality and valour more fully later. Beyond the valour relations pertaining to the satisfaction of basic needs, and those to the realm of moral responsibility, there is a further area of human activity involved in the achievement of valour. It consists in those activities which are not required by the demands of creating one's material existence, where what one does is freely chosen for the value produced, for the value to oneself of the result of one's activity and of creating that result. Typically, works of art and recreational activities fall within this realm.

Valour can be achieved through these activities in a number of ways. For example, in creating a work of art, one's product is something which one sees as not just being of value for oneself, but of being of value



in a universal, objective sense. One is valorized as being the creator of such a value. As with one's moral valorization, this is achieved between the two extremes of dependence on what others think or self-reliance on one's own assessment. In the latter case there is also a superceding value for oneself in one's free creativity, which is the value of being independent of the judgment of others and autonomous, which value, in one's being so autonomous, is self-valorizing.

In valour involving being-valued by others, it follows that there is a dimension in human relations of valuing and valorizing others. This raises the question of how valuing others relates to one's own need and sense of valour.

In the first place, there is the giving of unconditional love and support, in the situation of the valued person being wholly dependent. Is this a question of the recognition of certain necessary relations of reciprocity? These are relations where one sees that one's own present powers to be self-responsible and to take responsibility for the dependent person, has depended, for its possibility, upon oneself once having been cared for unconditionally, when it was one's own "turn". One also sees that, if people and communities were not to recognize the need for such unconditional valuing, no life-development to relative independence, responsibility, self-determination and autonomy would be possible.

An alternative possibility to that of the recognition of necessary relations of reciprocity, would be the direct intuition of the value of the dependent person and, correlatively, of the categorical demand that they be loved and cared-for. In either case, of rational recognition or of immediate intuition, one's own personal value and valour are in question and necessarily implicated. One is valorized, within the

possible extremes of source, insofar as one discharges and fulfils one's responsibility to dependent others.

Mutual relations of valuing also pertain between relatively independent people. One values the other person for assuming self-responsibility, for, were persons not to do so, the whole functioning of the human community would collapse. This necessity to oneself of others, so far as possible, assuming self-responsibility places a responsibility on oneself to recognize the value of this assumption of self-responsibility and to support and encourage it. One's own valour is, or should be, from an objective standpoint, implicated in how well one gives valorizing support and encouragement to others in these respects. These latter relations are some of those particularly involved in what I am going to discuss next, issues of what I shall call the "politics" and "pathology" of valour.

#### The Politics and Pathology of Valour

In my discussion of the need for valour, I situated it within schematic hierarchical conceptions of human needs. One significant facet of the need for valour is that it is involved in relations to the issues of satisfaction of all the other needs and of human relations in the satisfaction of those needs. What this entails is that valour, itself, is an extremely important human need.

The significance of this importance is that the issues of what will fulfil one's need for valour, necessarily will have an extremely important role in how one shapes the course of one's life and what one seeks to do in the world. I say the "politics" of valour because, in its importance, it deeply influences the human relations of individuals and social groupings of people. Again, I speak of the "pathology" of

valour because, arising from the human relations involved in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the need for valour, are many of the forms of negativity, destructiveness and self-destructiveness in human activity, related to the perversion, misconstruction and misunderstanding of wherein value and valour lies.

On the level of the need for a sense of being valued unconditionally, which I regard as fundamental to having a sense of personal security, that one is loved and cared-for, the satisfaction and fulfilment of the need typically comes during that period of life in which one is dependent upon others for the satisfaction of one's needs. But the relative failure to achieve this sense at this stage in one's life is liable to have a crucial effect on how one will live one's life thereafter.

If the unconditional sense is fulfilled, one is liberated, as one develops one's self-responsibility and self-determination, to shape one's life according to one's relative abilities and the possibilities one sees arising from them for further enhancement and strengthening of one's sense of being a valuable member of the human community, conditionally, for how one lives in relation to others.

The valorization that one gains or can gain under this condition of relative liberation from the need for a fundamental sense of security, is relatively less important than the painfully felt need for valour if that fundamental sense is lacking.

But if the need for the fundamental sense persists, if it is not satisfactorily fulfilled, then it will persist as a constantly motivating and dominating factor, until such time as it is finally fulfilled.

The effect of its persistence as a need is to make one's total need for

valour figure dominantly in the totality of one's motivation. Thus it heavily conditions what one feels one must do and realize oneself to be in the world.

Before I begin describing the effects that the persistence of the need produces, I wish to make a clarificatory note. It is that I am not advancing a psychological theory regarding the origins and causation of valour deficits and their effects. Rather I am trying to give phenomenological description and illustration to these issues, to show the essential relations of valour and how it is constitutive of what good is. Having said that the failure of fulfilment of the need for a sense of being of value unconditionally occurs in the period of life in which one is relatively dependent, I do not intend this to be regarded as necessarily and exhaustively so. It is an empirical generalization advanced for descriptive rather than theoretical purposes. It is possible that a person could pass through that stage of life, already "endowed" with a fulfilled sense of being of value unconditionally, and never experience that sense being in doubt, despite the vicissitudes of nurture. Alternatively, it is possible for someone to begin life already with a sense of valuelessness, something that presents as an extraordinary need, relatively unresponsive to the valorizing nurture which aims to fulfill it. But it is not generally so.

One possible effect is that a person who in age and capabilities is adult will be unable to feel and envisage themselves as an adult in relation to others. In these relations, this person will want them to act responsibly on their behalf, remaining unnecessarily dependent, as the "being-taken-responsibility-for" is a powerful way of being valorized.

On the other hand, the need can motivate people to adopting the converse

role of trying to be responsible for others when they do not need it, and of surpressing their will to be independent. Such unnecessary relations are artificially contrived to give the party who is being pseudo-responsible a sense of their being necessary and so valuable to the pseudo-dependent party.

Another possibility is that one is motivated to quite stupendous efforts and labour to gain others' recognition conferring a sense of valour. Many works of genius can be seen as resulting from the desparate necessity for their creators to create things of value and affirm their own value thereby.

Sartre, in his major, biographical work on Flaubert, "The Family Idiot" (55), tried to demonstrate the intelligibility of Flaubert's neurosis, his "passivity", and of the origins of his literary passion and genius. This centred around analysing Flaubert's relationships with his mother, father and brother. Of his relationship with his mother, Sartre argued that she had nurtured and tended to him, in his early infancy, in a very cold and uncaring fashion. Though he had not suffered physical discomfort, he had not received affirmation of himself as a valued person. Sartre argued that the effect of this was Flaubert's, as child or infant, relative disinterest in everyday, empirical life, preferring to live for a large part in a world of his imagination. His relationship with his father had not compensated for his mother's coldness, though Sartre argued that in his later infancy, Flaubert had experienced what Sartre termed a "golden age" in his relationship with his father, in which time his father would sit him on his knee, read him stories and give him affirmation. But at the age of seven, that period of positive relationship was quite shockingly terminated. Flaubert had by then not **learned to read** or write, and at his age this offended familial and particularly father's

expectation of the son as a bearer of the lineage. He was given the negatively valued role of being the family idiot and made to feel inessential by the rest of the family. For Sartre, this was the root of Flaubert's neurosis and the origin of his literary project and creativity, attempting through imaginative phantasy to be the value which he could not feel himself to be in reality.

I have talked earlier (pages 157/8, 179-181) about Scheler's use of the concept of resentment to describe and explain negative human attitudes and destructiveness. I shall now present an example of how resentment could be generated and I shall analyse it to show the involvement of valour and its pathology.

Suppose for example that one is a member of a group of academic students, competing for a particular academic prize or honour. One believes oneself to be, easily, the most academically gifted and proficient member of the group. But in the **adjudication** of the competitively produced works of the group, one is placed second to someone whose work one regards as definitely inferior to one's own.

This provokes one's negative response of anger, whose object is, on the one hand, the adjudicator and, on the other, the person placed first. The anger is because one feels one has suffered a wrong, or an injury, and it first focusses on those held responsible for it. The nature of the wrong one feels one has suffered is that the superiority of one's academic giftedness has not been recognized, and so one has been denied an honour, a value, which was anticipated and believed to be rightfully one's own.

Now there are a number of possible ways in which the anger could be expended and used up, leaving one without a negative attitude:

One might reappraise one's work and see that it was not as good as one had first supposed. Failure to gain the honour would be seen as one's own responsibility and one's outwardly directed anger would give way to some attitude to oneself expressing one's injured pride. Or one might see that, despite, as one believes, an error of judgment by the adjudicator and one's failure to receive the honour, that it was in the nature of the situation that such an error could be made. The situation is such that where another judges, their judgment can be different from one's own and that it is a condition of the possibility of one's achieving the honour that it might go to another and in that eventuality it would still be a fair competition. One's anger would dissolve in seeing that one had not, in fact, been wronged.

But, let us suppose, these solutions to one's anger are blocked: One's reconsideration of one's work reconfirms one's original judgment of its superiority. One refuses to see, or is blind to the fact, that the conditions of the academic competition make it a fair one, despite one not receiving the honour which, rightfully, was due to oneself. The wrong, in one's perception of the situation, the injury suffered, remains and one is frustrated in one's will to right it. One feels impotent in the face of an implacable, wrong-imposing situation.

So what is it now which would convert the specifically directed emotionally negative feeling into resentment? Firstly, one might feel victim not just of a passing wrong, situated in time, one which has been, but is no more, but of an enduringly wronging negative judgment which denies or denigrates one's personal value, as such. This would imply to oneself that the others responsible for the passing of this negative judgment, on the one hand the adjudicator, on the other the candidate elevated, are making the judgment as a lasting, dispositionally

adopted negation of oneself. To oneself, this would make them seem more essentially imbued with their negativity, their denial of one's personal value. Furthermore, in the situation's having produced a negation of oneself which one cannot resolve, one might come to regard it as a typical situation, essentially producing negation. The roles of the persons in the situation would become generalized in the expectation of them producing personal negation. The resentment, were it so generated, would thus encompass in its object the whole class of the people who would fulfil those roles ( academic competitors and academic judges), all seen as in some sense "bad" or "evil", as they would have the essential tendency to pass unjust, negative judgments on oneself.

How is resentment, as a pathological outcome, linked with the need for valour, as illustrated in this example? Why, in the first place would one have been competing for an academic prize? In producing the piece of academic work, one would be likely to be motivated to try to create something capable of being recognized as being of universal value, something not just of value for the creator, or for some others, but something, created, which has a value in its own right. This value would inhere in what the work contained for others, perhaps aesthetically, or in the field of human understanding, or in whatever particular field of possible value with which it happened to be concerned. The particular content would relate to one's life-history in terms of what has for oneself become one's particular interest or area of possible expression, giving oneself one's particular power and possibility of self-expression and self-realization through the work.

Now the self-realization, just alluded to, is a concomitant, as possibility, of that of creating a value through the work. This self-realization is



that of creating a value-for-oneself in being the creator of the value which inheres in the piece of work. The awareness of this, for oneself as creator, is a motivational strand in the creative activity producing the academic work, in that the activity, to some degree, satisfies one's need for valour.

Secondly, there is the question of the competition for the academic honour. Here one is attempting to gain a recognition from others that, relatively, one's work is better than the works produced by other competitors. One benefits from the sense of "objectification" which the others-who-judge give to one's belief in the value of what one has created and concomitantly one's valorization for creating the work.

But another possible satisfaction one might feel is that in feeling of-greater-value than some, at least, of the other competitors. In these respects of the competition and the prize, the competitor, oneself, is valorized inauthentically - in terms of what others think is the value of the work and of oneself for creating it, rather than this being one's own assessment of the value created and an authentic sense of achievement. on this level, the valorizing satisfaction which one can gain from the competition depends upon those who judge the competition, in that what they think of the work judged will determine the value one will feel. This reflects one's lack of trust in the veracity of one's own judgment and hence one's want of affirmation from others.

Moving to the involvement of valour in the exemplified generation of resentment, itself, there is firstly the contradiction of one's own evaluation of one's work by the adjudicator. The satisfaction derivable from producing the work depends on both authentic and inauthentic evaluations. One only trusts one's own judgment so far. Yet contradiction

of one's own judgment has made one not only disappointed, but indignant. One feels denied a sense of personal value which one deserves, although the conferring of this sense is at the discretion and disposal of the adjudicator. This exposes a contradiction in one's attitude as resentment-subject. For denying the validity of the adjudicator's judgment would imply the denial of its damning effect, yet one has nevertheless felt the latter. One is trying to have it both ways! But, undoubtedly, one's sense of one's own personal value is very heavily dependent upon what others think of or feel about oneself (or what one thinks they think!). The resentment which one directs towards the adjudicator and the victorious competitor and, later, other comparable people, originates in the frustration of one's project of achieving valour and the attribution to others of responsibility for causing this "injury". Could this in any way be justified?

Unless the adjudicator does, in fact, adopt an a priori negative attitude to oneself, it is wrong to feel the affront that one does. In so far as one wants to be valued by others, and is frustrated in this want, this being besides the value of achievement which one feels authentically, it can be fair to judge that the other does not properly recognize one's value, so far as one does in fact live up to that value.

But one would be wrong to expect affirmation from others according one value for what one has done, when one does not live up to that value. This is different from others according one intrinsic value, which is independent of one's relative value. In this example, one's contradictory attitude, sense of injury, etc, most likely reflects one's personal valour deficits for the unconditional sense of value, but which one is trying to fulfil by means of conditional valorization.

These examples of the generation of negativity and destructiveness arising from the misplaced pursuit of valour, together with the structures previously examined of the presentation of the need for valour, show that what are inextricably involved with the sense are human relations with other people. Of these, the most important are those in which people are most intimately and closely involved with each other. I have outlined the dependency/responsibility relations, typically found most intimately between parents and children. What I have yet to discuss is the involvement of valour in the intimate relationship between two adult people of "mutual love" and it is to these issues which I shall now turn.

#### Love, Sexual Attraction and Valour

To establish what is the "love" involved in "mutual love", I need to examine what love is more generally. Love is an enormously widely used term having many different meanings in those uses. In discussing Scheler's theory of love, earlier (pages 176-178), I argued that "love" should be regarded, concretely, as a consciousness, with all its essential structures - feeling, intentionality, the projection of ends and activity to realize those ends. Love essentially involves what consciousness, the human being, values. Just as value-preferences are more or less subjective or objective, so love is more or less selfishly or unselfishly (selflessly) motivated. I shall discuss the structure of selfless love later when I discuss the relation of morality and valour. Both selfish and selfless love are involved in what I shall discuss now, the relation of "mutual love".

An essential moment of mutual love is that of loving another person. It is an intentional feeling, a feeling which one has towards that other person. Of itself, it is not exclusive - one can love any number

of other people. As intentional feeling towards the other person it is actively an attitude and activity towards that person. In this, one needs the other person. The other is in the relation of value as being-good-for. Needing the other is, in a sense, a need to "have" the other, to possess them. One wants the "certain something", that which, in the other person, one's "beloved", engenders one's love, to be constantly there. The nature of the "certain something" will determine what can be the means to its possession. By possession, I do not mean, in this sense, the proprietorial enslavement of the other!

The intensity of the feeling involved is, in one direction, conditioned by the strength of the need for the other person and in the other direction it determines what is the strength of the need. The quality of the feeling ranges from bad to good, depending on the degree of fulfilment of the need, from the empty yearning of unrequited love to the joyful contentment of fulfilled love.

But love, in this relation, is not just a having, a taking of, or from, the other. It is also a giving of love to the other. Acting to this end yields a satisfaction which is not identical with one's feeling of love towards the other person in one's needing them, though these strands of feeling may become one as moments of one's whole love-feeling in respect of the other person. The giving of one's love can relate to one's feeling of love for the other in the form of its being a direct reciprocation - a return to the other for what one has, or takes, in feeling love towards them. One is attempting to give the other what one feels is due to them, either due universally - that is - in a moral sense, or due from oneself for reasons pertaining just to the personal relationship.

But what one wills to give the other can exceed what is due reciprocally.

The gift of love can aim, as in Scheler's account, to enhance, raise the value seen in the beloved person.

What can the other person's "certain something", which engenders one's feeling of love and one's active giving of love, be?

Here is a list of possible factors:-

- 1/ The mere fact of the person's existence as a human being, as a centre of needs and -wants.
- 2/ The other's animate body, apprehended in its sensual or sexual possibilities for oneself.
- 3/ The person seen as being factually and actually accorded a certain value and status by other people.
- 4/ The person's possible value to oneself in relation to providing for one's material existence.
- 5/ The person's objective value or morally evaluated value - what one sees as their universal value through their own adopted values and through what they are doing with their life.
- 6/ The other person's love in its being directed to oneself or in its possibility of being directed to oneself.

These factors are inter-related. For example, wanting the other's love and loving them for it will in turn depend on what it is about them that one values in the first place, which makes their love worth having.

In loving the other, one values them, for what they are, which essentially consists in what they have and in what they do.

If loving another person, beyond the pure relation of "selfless love", is both a giving and a taking and, in mutual love, something where love is exchanged reciprocally and where one's giving is the other's receipt and vice versa, then what are the structures of this mutuality and how,

particularly, are valour and valuing the other involved in this? When mutual love involves a sexual relationship, what is involved in one person being sexually attracted to the other?

Sexual attraction, like love, is an intentional feeling whose object is the other person. Part of the person's being-an-object is their living body, seen in its sexual possibilities for oneself. In this respect, the other holds the possibility of physical sexual satisfaction for oneself through bodily sexual contact. A component element of this are the actual physical characteristics of the other person's body: whether they are male or female and, in one's beholder's eye, whether they are beautiful or ugly, with pleasing or not sexual characteristics. But this seeing of the other person as sexually attractive through what they physically are, is not the same as having a qualitative datum in one's experience, which would be unequivocally what it is. The seeing is an act of perception, an intentional meaning.

A person's attractiveness for their maleness or femaleness invokes a whole body of pre-existing meanings for oneself not given in the factuality of that particular distinction. What strikes one as beautiful or not, in the other's appearance, though an immediate apprehension, is the result of the pre-conditioning of one's aesthetic sensibility through the mediation of other people's aesthetic values. Similarly, particular cultures tend to value particular sexual characteristics more or less highly and the pre-apprehension of such values can affect how pleasing one finds those characteristics.

But the person's body is not the whole person seen as object of sexual attraction. The person's spiritual or immaterial self is seen through their physical body as signification in what comprises the intentional

meaning, and this can have a specifically sexual value which renders the physically perceived factors relatively insignificant by comparison in the person's sexual attractiveness.

In finding sexual satisfaction with the other person, factors outside sexuality condition what can be experienced sexually. Sexual need, as a bodily felt dissatisfaction which can be satisfied by sexual activity, differs from the basic needs for "food, clothing and shelter" arising out of hunger and bodily discomfort. The latter needs arise and present themselves in the day to day course of one's life and one is more or less impelled to satisfy them. Whereas, to a certain extent, sexual need, manifesting as felt dissatisfaction, and so sexual desire, arises from one's awareness of the possibility of sexual satisfaction, as for example, in seeing another person as being possibly available to oneself. Involved in the availability is the other person's being attracted to oneself, or their possibility of being attracted to oneself. Part of their attractiveness is likely to lie in their being attracted to oneself and, again, their being-attracted will be affected by one's own attractedness to them. The value to oneself of the other person's being-attracted lies not only in its effect on their sexual responsiveness to oneself, but also that for oneself it realises a particular meaning - that of one's own value for the other person.

Both in the course of and in the culminatory consummation of sexual activity, the intensity of the pleasure experienced is conditioned not just by bodily facts of sexual need but by the satisfaction felt in the meaning for oneself of the sexual activity, in how, at the same time, one finds the experience valorizing. One's feeling of love for the other intensifies sexual satisfaction and, conversely, the latter intensifies one's feeling of love. This illustrates one way in which the sexual side of love is

involved with and itself affected by other factors, in the very midst of its sexual expression.

Outside the intensity of feeling in sexual activity, one's feeling of love towards the other still bears the element of sexual attraction. As I have already said, the feeling of love can be generally described as valuing the other person. I would contend that, in mutual love, an important part of the value which the other person has for oneself is in their capacity to impart to oneself a sense of one's own personal value.

Valuing the other, in general terms, divides between valuing for universal reasons, ie valuing the person as an end-in-themselves who is, morally, valuable - a value for all - and valuing for personal reasons where the other's value relates to their personal relationship with oneself. Thus valuing the person's sexuality can transcend one's valuing them through their sexual attractiveness. Their sexuality can be valued for itself, in its being-good for the other person, in so far as that being-good is considered to be universally good. Such valuing of their sexuality would be part and parcel of one's general moral valuation of that person.

One's personal valuing of the others sexuality can go beyond the value of one's sexual satisfaction. One can value the fact of the sexual relationship, in its being something which one has, which one thinks other people would value. This gives it for oneself a quasi-objective, quasi-universal value, and one can, through this, experience an inauthentic valorization, one where one feels personally of value because one has what one believes other people would value.

Another meaning of the sexual relationship which one can value is



that the other person values oneself. The fact of this can yield either or both an authentic and an inauthentic valorization. An authentic valorization through this meaning would be to feel of value to the extent that one sees that one is of value to the other person. An inauthentic valorization would be through a quasi-objectification of one's value, as in the case above - one's having-value-in-the-other-person's-eyes is itself quasi-objective and at a further level the possible observation of that by **yet others strengthens its quasi-**objectivity as a sense for oneself. This sexual valorization can relate just to one's sense of one's sexual value. But the sexual relation can be a bearer, an expression, of the whole love **relationship and one can be** more wholly valorized through it.

In passing from an authentic valorization towards being valorized inauthentically, what enters into the meaning is what one regards as the other person's value, this itself being reckoned authentically or inauthentically. This is because the other person's value will augment the value of their valuation of oneself. In other words, one feels more valuable oneself by virtue of being valued by a valuable person!

Now I want to consider what is involved in valuing the other person beyond or outside their sexuality and what relates directly or indirectly to it. Previously I said that in general this relates to what the other person has and to what the person does.

The person has their body. Outside its sexual value, this may be valued for its beauty, strength, health, etc, and, at one remove, for its quasi-universal value in these respects.

One can value the other person for their possessions, their worldly wealth. In so far as, in the relationship, the other person puts these at one's disposal, they will possess instrumental value, value as means, for oneself. But in relation to the other person the possessions can be a quasi-objectification of the other's value - a measure of the other's supposed substantiality, standing and value in the eyes of others.

The person may be valued for their capacities and abilities, for what they presently can do and potentially may be able to do. The person can be valued for their attitudes, beliefs and values. These relate to the active side of what the person is because they determine the ends which the person will pursue, what the person aims to make themselves be.

The person can be valued for their personal power. What I mean by their power, as opposed to their capacities or abilities, is their power in relations to and in comparison with other people within society. In general, it is a power which the person has by virtue, at least in part, of their being recognized in the power by other people and such recognition can be formally instituted.

An example of this is someone's job, such as being managing director of a company, having a decision-making power denied others and recognition of a presumed additional social value thereby, reflected in that person's salary.

In valuing the other person for having such power, one needs oneself to recognize the value and legitimacy of that power. In so far as one does this, its value for oneself can be a vicarious sharing of the value of that power, in that the recognition given to the other person by others is felt to rub off and to be extended to oneself, by virtue

of one's relationship with the other person.

A subtle distinction from the vicarious sharing is the value one feels for oneself, in one's own right, in being in relationship with the powerful person and in having their recognition of oneself.

From a universal perspective, what the person does can have a value either just for themselves or else beyond themselves for others and, in the limiting case, a moral value, a value for all. For oneself to value what the other does, there are three possibilities: Either what they do only has a value for oneself in addition to its value to themselves, or what they do has a value for others but is not done for the sake of its being universally valuable, or what they do is universally valuable and aims to be so.

Underlying the person's possibility of being valued for what they have and for what they do is their possibility of being valued just for existing, in their personhood as a centre of needs and wants.

How can these things for which one can value the other person be valorizing for oneself?

**V**aluing the other person, just for existing, is something which one can feel is every person's right and hence necessary that one recognize this value, for one's own moral standing as a valorous person.

As with its sexual valuation, valuing the other person's body, in the context of the mutual relationship, can be indirectly valorizing, in the inauthentic mode, in the reflection that someone with a valuable body values oneself, this enhancing the value one feels for oneself through

being so valued. The other's valuable capacities and abilities can produce an indirect valorization of a similar kind.

The other person's attitudes, etc, divide between those towards the world and other people and those towards oneself. The former involve their likes and dislikes, interests, relative preferences and their moral values. In valuing the other person for these, this will tend to depend on some harmony between their likes and dislikes and own's own. Here an inauthentic valorization can be experienced through the quasi-objectification of meaning of the value or disvalue of what one particularly likes or dislikes.

Valuing the person for their moral values can be valorizing in so far as one identifies, oneself, with these values and hence the other's attitudes in these respects strengthen one's own moral resolve and can improve one's inner morale.

What one can value in the other person's attitude to oneself again divides between their personal preferences and their moral attitudes. Once again one can experience an inauthentic valorization if feeling that their regard for oneself signifies that other people would similarly value oneself in the same respects. One can value the other person's favorable moral attitude to oneself in that it confirms, it strengthens, the value one feels for oneself by virtue of one's own moral dispositions and activities.

What the other person does is very much the actualization of what is potential in their attitudes. Their degree of success in realizing what they are seeking to achieve can be a factor in the value one accords them for what they do.

The possibility here arises of what the other person is doing being to a common end with what one is oneself doing. In harmony, what the other person does will amplify the success of one's own activity. Conversely, in disharmony, it can be destructive to one's success, one's achievement.

Valuing what the other person does is not tied to the time that they are actually doing it. It is just as much a question of valuing what they have done and will do. Of course, the more distant the activity to come, the less definite it is of coming to fruition and the more provisional the value that can be accorded the person by virtue of it.

With activities in common, these do not need to be at the same time and place - they can concern different things conducted in different places, but united by their common end. Such a community of activity, frequently involved in relationships of mutual love, is "making a living". A division of labour is united by the making of a living for both parties and, of course, children and dependents.

Depending on circumstances, such mutual support in the face of and in satisfying one's recurring basic needs can be a very powerful motivation to valuing the other and, conversely, it is a source of valorization from the other in one's being necessary to them.

What the other person does independently of oneself - ie either not to a common end, or not directed by the other to being for oneself, can be valued like the person's attitudes. Say it produces something which one values, oneself, then the person is valued for producing that value. Additionally one can be inauthentically valorized in one's making an act of association or identification, where one "basks in the glory" which the other person has attracted to themselves.

What the other person does directly towards oneself is their most direct expression of valuing oneself. This one values for the good it does oneself and one values the other for being good to oneself. Whichever of one's needs are satisfied in receipt of the other person's ministrations, be they basic material, aesthetic, sexual or whatever, the good one is done resounds in additionally, at the same time, satisfying one's need for valour, since part of the meaning of what the other person does in these respects is their valuing of oneself.

A very important part of what the other person has and does in one's own personal respect is that of intimacy. This revolves around a personal knowing of the other in which the other person makes themselves open to oneself, lets their emotions, feeling, motivations and generally their close, intimate life be accessible, be known, without the levels of masking and concealment which make these things "private" in one's average everyday intercourse with other people.

Those things which one normally keeps private are those where one feels most vulnerable to harm from others in their knowing them, in having access to them and being able to cast judgment of one sort or another upon them. One feels one may be ridiculed, belittled, embarrassed, spurned or morally condemned through them.

Thus when the other person makes these things accessible to oneself, this is an act of trust, expressing what they believe or feel about oneself. For oneself it means being specially privileged with respect to the other and that one has a special meaning for them. In the being -open, the other's intimate life is shared as they, at the same time, share in one's own intimate life and one values this sharing. In one

way it is an objectification and substantialization of one's intimate life, having the meaning of justifying one's life at this level, of letting it stand.

So what is the value to oneself of the other person allowing one intimate access? It reflects what one is for the other person, valued for one's intimate trustworthiness to themselves and for one's being valorizing to them in letting their intimate life stand and one is, by the same token, valorized.

Now I want to move on to talking about the active side of loving the other person, in relation to valuing and valorization. Here it is a question of what one intends to achieve through one's acts of love. I have already described this as the giving of one's love and as one's attempting to give the other person what is their due.

So - what does one give? Essentially one gives value. One gives to the other person the knowledge of their valuableness to oneself. But one's intention goes beyond this. One seeks to impart to the other not just knowledge but a sense of their valuableness to oneself. In other words, one is seeking to valorize them, to honour them, and this is done in an awareness of the other's need for a sense of their personal valuableness and it is a recognition of their right to such a sense.

In this sense, the giving of what is due accords with Scheler's conception of one's act of love promoting a movement in the direction of higher value. By one's encouragement of the other, one seeks that they shall have a better experience of self-valour and that they have and express a higher value of themselves for others and oneself.

Given that this is what one intends to do, it is, at the same time, something one feels one needs to do. Giving one's love satisfies the need, so what is the need? It is a need, at one level, to be justified, to be "all-right" in the eyes of the other. But one's need can go deeper than this, more than a need for personal recognition, in its being a need for the other person's love. Here one's gift of love is giving what it is of oneself that is necessary to one's being worthy of the other's love. One's act is then, in this sense, self-valorizing, in one's making oneself be-of-value, of worth to the other.

But it seems to me important, in understanding this analysis of the relationships involved in the act, the gift of love, that the self-valorization be seen as at one with the object, the intention of the act, which is the valorization of the other. The valorization of the other should not be seen as mere means to one's self-valorization. It is essential to the act that one sees the other person as an end-in-themself. But, having said this, I think I need to make a further point, which is that valuing the other as an end is not necessarily a moral valuation, or at least, not a purely moral valuation. For one may **exalt** the other person wrongly, or too highly. One may value them and reflect value on oneself for things which are not universally, not objectively, not truly valuable. It may be for things which in those senses **are evils**.

What are the forms that the gift of love can take? As with valuing the other, which involved what the person is, one's gift involves what one oneself is, in terms of what one has and what one can do. One has one's body with its capacities, and one's external possessions, one's property, which is both directly one's power to dispose, an extension of one's power to act and, reflectively, a measure of one's substantiality, one's



inauthentic, quasi-objective worth - one's worth in the eyes of others, of the "they". One's gift of what one has can both be a making available of it to the other, a putting it at their disposal, and an honouring of them with one's "worth" by virtue of it.

What one can do determines the extent of what one can give to the other, of what one can bring into being for the other. Particularly where it is a case of providing for one's and the other's material existence, in some form of collaboration to that common end, the extent of one's "gifts" will determine one's gift to the other. This can have a direct bearing on the degree of one's valorization of the other, of one's own value to them, of the valorization one receives from them and of one's self-valorization. Perhaps I should add "but not necessarily so", since it can be the degree of one's giving-what-one-can which the other can value, rather than the actual extent or magnitude of the gift.

Finally, one's gift can include intimacy. In letting the other share one's intimate life, one valorizes them for their trustworthiness and is oneself valorized through their giving substantiality to one's intimate life, their letting it stand and have validity.

This concludes what I wish to say specifically about the relationship of mutual love, except to say that obviously, all the possibilities which apply for the one person in relation to the other, apply for the other person, in their turn, in relation to oneself.

Now I want to set the relationship of mutual love in its context of only being part of **the** life of the parties to it, and to assess its possible importance in the person's whole life - in relation to one's whole field of life-goals and of needs.

A relationship of mutual love is one way that people can go a long way towards satisfying their needs for valour, on shorter or longer term bases, or perhaps longer-term through this form of relationship, but factually in having a succession of different such relationships.

On the level of the need for unconditional valour and in its involving dependency/responsibility relations between the parties, when this fundamental need remains unfulfilled for oneself, one route which one can attempt to take for its fulfilment is through the relationship of mutual love. One way, discussed previously, is that one may attempt to be excessively and unnecessarily dependent upon the other person in the relationship.

To fulfil one's unfulfilled need at this level, one may, pathologically, be pursuing extravagant life-goals. One may try to harness one's partner in mutual love to these goals. Frequently this can prejudice the value of the relationship for the other party, unless their own goals happen to harmonize or they have complementary needs.

Such a possible complementarity of needs arises in the relation of dependency and responsibility. The relationship can be valorizing to the responsible party through their being necessary or quasi-necessary to the dependent party. In so far as the party being dependent need not be so, the responsible party may resist the loss of valorization through the dependency of the other resulting from the dependent person assuming greater self-responsibility. The resisting can be by suppressing the dependent party's becoming responsible. This want of dependency on the one part will be complemented by the other party wanting to be excessively dependent.

In the process of becoming responsible for oneself and so conditionally valued and valorized the final or optimal limit of the process is never the achievement of a total or absolute independence and self-responsibility (except perhaps if one extends the process in some spiritual transcendence of the limiting conditions of human existence).

Rather people achieve peaks of relative independence and self-responsibility in a context of human inter-relations in which all are in some way inter-dependent. In providing for basic needs people socially have joined forces and are thereby mutually beneficial to and necessary to each other. Idealizing these relationships, a form of reciprocity occurs where parties make or let themselves be responsible for other parties in respect of things where the others could be responsible for themselves, but in exchange for which the other parties will themselves be additionally responsible for the first parties in other respects for which they could be responsible themselves. Ideally, in these relations, a mutual valuing and valorization will occur, resting on the parties' recognition of their mutual lightening of the burden of existence.

Beyond interdependence in the face of material needs, individuals are liberated into a realm of freedom in which what they choose to do is not towards the satisfaction of those needs but rather in fulfilment of personally felt needs for self-realization to be a value for others and for oneself. Here it would seem that the possibility of doing or creating something that is valuable, in so far as the person perceives that possibility, creates their need, for their sense of personal value, to be thus active and creative.

But feeling such a need is not necessarily the case. Valour-distortions can occur where people have, effectively, been over-valorized, where

they have an undue sense of their personal value. Such people can feel so full of personal value that they are motivated to do little or nothing that is actually valuable, being quite content with a life of idleness.

How does the relationship of mutual love, and the need for the benefit of such a relationship, fit in this context of interdependence before basic needs and freedom for self-realization and self-valorization?

Most people feel the need for such relationships, but it is not something everyone must feel. Many choose a greater independence and a devotion of their lives to ends which do not include a special particular other person, especially valued. These people nevertheless show the common human need for valour. It is simply that they seek the fulfilment of the need without a relationship of mutual love.

But for those who do seek such a relationship, it is obviously of major importance to them in satisfying their need for valour. The need can be satisfied both in respect of one's being responsible and sharing responsibility with the other in the face of life's necessities and also in respect of one's free self-realization, in that the other person can, by identifying with one's life's pursuits, both amplify the realization and give it immediate objectivity as witness and confirmation of its value. Love can give one a reason to be, give one a deep-seated sense of one's necessity and justification for existing and make one feel deeply secure and contented.

From an objective perspective the issues of valour not only concern individuals' legitimate needs and needs for valour, but also the issues of their being, in reality, optimally of value in a universal, objective sense. This raises the issues of morality and valour which I shall discuss next.

Morality and Valour

Morality, or the field of morality, is obviously integrally connected with what Good is. This being so, it is something which I wish to describe and give theoretical form to in the course of the discussions of my Conclusion concerning the questions of what "good" is, to produce my general theory of good. I do not wish, at this stage, to pre-empt these discussions, but it is nevertheless necessary for me to discuss moral factors at this stage in valour's involvement with them and to this extent I shall have to presuppose certain aspects of morality, which will be dealt with theoretically later.

In my discussion of Scheler's theory of value and love, moral issues arose in relation to value. It concerned, first, the objectivity of values and, next, the objectivity of their hierarchical ordering. In Scheler's theory, morality concerns the value of human choices and preferences for values in relation to other values. Choices have moral value when the chooser prefers relatively and objectively higher values to lower values and lower values are subordinated to higher values.

I described objectivity, in these respects, as being the meaning that values have when they are not just valuable for oneself, not just subjectively good for oneself, in the immediacy of the moment, but that they are good-for-all, universally good and independent of mere relatedness to one's subjectivity. Now what is, abstractly, the same value, can, depending on circumstances, be objectively valuable in one instance and only subjectively valuable in another, in which, objectively, it is a disvalue. Here, what concretely decides a value's objectivity or subjectivity, are its relations to other values involved in the circumstances, depending on whether the choices observe an objective ordering of value-preferences.

I described the essential meaning-character of value as that of "being-good-for". As such, value figures in the teleological structure of motivation. All activity, all projection and pursuit of ends involve value in that what is sought to be realized is of value to the agent, is good for and realizes satisfaction for the agent. But for this pursuit of values, this motivation, to be moral, the values must be chosen and preferred in their objective subordination to one another and be chosen for, in this respect at least, their objectivity as values.

These considerations consequently raise the issue of moral motivation. What are its structures? Such motivation seeks to realize moral ends, ends which are universally good and objectively of value. This implies moral will. By this I mean what Kant called "good will" (described on Page 73), the will to do what is universally good and right and which is "good" for so willing. Presupposed to moral motivation is moral consciousness. As a consciousness, it is intentional, and the concrete structure of its intentionality is that of "transcendence", a unity of cognitive meaning, the projection of ends and realizing activity. Cognitively, such consciousness perceives its situation in the light of issues of what is good or bad, and is seeking to realize what is good.

Moral consciousness partakes of degrees, or expresses a certain **level of achieved** awareness. In its moral perception, it only has a certain degree of awareness of the relations of how the components of the situation are good for all the individuals in the situation and so how the objective value relations pertain in the situation. To the degree that one's moral perception allows, in willing morally, one is seeking to realize greater value and produce a greater universal good. Moral will also expresses moral need. This need

presents as an intentional feeling, something with the same structure as value-feeling, discussed earlier (Pages 142,147). One feels, relatively, a certain disquiet, dissatisfaction, in the face of awareness of how that of which one is conscious is not wholly good, objectively speaking, and also to the degree that one is aware of one's own possibility, through one's activity, to improve the situation, to rectify to some degree, what is wrong with the situation.

The awareness involved is not necessarily an explicit and self-aware consciousness. In perceiving something wrong with the situation, one is not necessarily aware of what structures and relations pertain in the situation which make it wrong, bad, not-wholly-good. But intuitively it nevertheless realizes that meaning. The character of degree of awareness and of relative degree of insight into one's moral feeling places a further dimension on moral need, which is the need to know-better. For one is aware that the limits to one's knowledge of and understanding of why situations are morally unsatisfactory, limits our power to act effectively for the good.

In one's moral awareness of situations, there is an interface between what presents as moral need, and a province of possibility which I would call of moral freedom. This is, objectively, the province of situations where, in the relations of individuals' goods and of the objective pertaining of values, wrong, as such, demanding rectification, is not present. Nevertheless one perceives how one's acting to realize higher values can promote a greater overall good. In so morally acting, when not subject to moral need in the sense I have described, one is exercising moral freedom.

Uniting activity conducted either in the face of moral need, or in

moral freedom, is the underlying attitude of the moral agent which I have previously referred to as selfless love. This attitude expresses care, concern and solicitude for the well-being of others, for others' own-good. In this attitude and its expression, the good-feeling experienced in what it realizes is only realized through its having the character of realizing good for others, of doing good.

Whilst selfless love is involved, to some extent, in mutual love, the involvement of the satisfaction of personal need in the latter, and also the possible distortions of value-ordering arising pathologically within mutual love, mean that selfless love is in general only an abstract, one-sided aspect of mutual love.

The attitude of selfless love regards others as ends-in-themselves. This is a valuing which belongs to Scheler's value-modality of values of the person - spiritual values. As values, persons are more complex than vital or sensible values, because selves have their own good, lived for themselves as good-feeling and also their personal value is not only an issue for one who values them but also for themselves, lived as valour.

In the attitude of selfless love, the other person is seen, firstly, as being intrinsically valuable, just for existing. This is not a quantifiable value with degrees which can be compared, it is a value which is just the same which applies equally to all other persons, intrinsically, by virtue of existing.

Secondly, the person is seen as having a peculiar and definite value in respect of what they are. Now personal quiddity, "whatness", is not anything predetermined, but something involved in a process of becoming,



of self-realization. The value of what the person is, in this sense, depends on their way of self-realization with regard to other people and to everything else which may be regarded as being of value as end-in-itself. To a degree, it depends on, takes stock of the person's degree of moral consciousness and their moral activity. In other words, the person's value in this respect depends on the person's concrete relations with others and with the world.

But selfless love is additionally a gift of love, which, in loving another person, seeks to do good for that person. At the level of intrinsic valuing, the person's own good, for themselves, is valued intrinsically as a good-in-itself, in so far as the person's own good does not violate others' good such that in an objective sense the former's own-good is not-good. Selfless love intends to promote the enhancement of the person's justified own good experience and in concrete activity towards the person, aims to realize changes such that the person will experience enhanced satisfactions.

With respect to the person's peculiar value, their value for what they have made themselves, in relation to others, once again the attitude of selfless love desires something further. It seeks to enhance the person's peculiar value. In other words it intends that the person should have better concrete relations with others and with the world - that they live their life in better concordance with others' good and that they should expand their moral consciousness. This intention is characterized by its direction of improvement, of enhancement, but it has an open, unlimited horizon. Concretely, one would project and act towards realizations which actually could enhance the person's value in relation to the situation pertaining.

But this enhancement of the person's value also involves their own-good, this being considered in connection with others' own-good. The act of love is not something which only, or even principally, acts on the person externally. It is something which approaches and engages the person's consciousness - their self. Enhancing is also an encouraging and a supporting. The valuing expressed in the gift of selfless love makes the person aware that they are valued and it seeks to give them an appropriate sense of being-of-value. In other words, the valuing seeks to be valorizing.

The person's enhanced value, though, will not only be experienced as a benefit to themselves through their enhanced valour-sense, in the satisfaction that that holds. It will also be experienced as a better relation to others and the world - as a greater general satisfaction in life. Moreover, it will itself be something universally good, something good for the world in general.

I shall now move to discussing the subjective pole of the intentional structure of selfless love. I have already made the distinction of moral need and of moral freedom, as involved in this attitude. Moral need can be experienced as the so-called "categorical imperative" or what Heidegger called "the call of conscience" (56). In other words it is the sense in which one feels one ought to act in certain ways.

As promised on page 93, I can now show my phenomenological grounds for the way in which my account of "ought" differs from Kant's. For Kant, The "ought" is, as it were, something which "speaks" to oneself from without. It commands by virtue of the objective principle and, in the case of the categorical imperative, of the universal law, relating to one's action. Kant does not recognize the moment of feeling belonging to what I have described as the "subjective pole" of the experience.

Concretely, the feeling pertaining to the "ought" relates to the meaning seen in whatever situation is in question. It is these together which speak to oneself from within, in the "call of conscience".

How and why does one's consciousness of issues of value, of good and bad in situations, involve the sense that one must act morally for the good? In perceiving some bad state of affairs, where there is "something wrong" with the situation, one perceives oneself in connection with the situation, as a real part of the situation, as an agent. In other words, one perceives oneself as a power, in relation to the situation, to change the situation, to right, to some degree, what is wrong with it. Now this self-perception is something likely to be implicit and non-thematic in the consciousness of the situation. It is likely to form part of the background of the object of such a consciousness. But in this case it is still nevertheless perceived. It is still part of the whole meaning of the situation as perceived, but it does not figure thematically in the perception. It is, as it were, "apperceived", in the Kantian sense, with the perception.

But one's self-perception as moral agent, in the face of such a situation, can be made the object of explicit consciousness - it can be made to figure thematically in the perception. One's action can be organized around one's relation, as agent, to the situation. This can be its primary theme and it can, only secondarily, focus on the rectification of what is wrong in the situation.

Now I have reached the point where the involvement of valour with moral motivation and selfless love can be made explicit. For one's consciousness of oneself as being morally responsible in the situation, in being a moral agent, implicates one's personal value. One perceives that not-to-act would be to diminish one's personal value, since not to act would be to take on some responsibility for the wrong in the situation continuing to exist. This "virtual" diminution of one's

personal value, in culpability, is an element of dissatisfaction felt together with the bad-feeling relating to what is wrong in the situation as a whole. In acting morally towards rectifying what is wrong, one realizes a **satisfaction**, an element of which is that which one feels in maintaining one's valour-sense. In other words, part of the moral activity is self-valorization.

Such a situation, as described, of one's being an agent in a position to act to rectify "something wrong", abstracts from one's whole field of motivations. One's whole field of concerns and interests is also "there" at the time of one's contingent moral motivations arising out of the situation. Very often, conflicts of motivations, "mixed feelings", occur, between one's directly moral motivations and one's motivations not directed to the moral, but nevertheless capable of being morally evaluated. Often these conflicts involve issues of valour. Furthermore these issues involve the authenticity or inauthenticity of one's valorization, and the range of possibilities between the extremes.

But there is another range of possibilities concerning one's valour. This range is from one's valour-sense reflecting one's true, objective and universal value, through degrees of falsity and "subjectivity" of belief, to the ideally negative limit of one's valour-sense having no corresponding value in reality. Generally, one's valour-sense will lie between the extremes of authenticity and inauthenticity of source and will bear some truth and some falsity.

Here are some of the possibilities of mixed motivations in the regards of morality and valour, with examples:

- a. A conflict between an authentic moral motivation and a selfish motivation not involving valour. Eg - one is hungry and on one's way home for what one anticipates will be a delicious and satisfying supper. Driving along a deserted country road, one finds a motorist who is stranded by having run out of petrol. The nearest phone, and the

nearest garage, are a number of miles away. One is motivated to help the motorist, in their misfortune, which one can do by driving to the garage and returning with a can of petrol. But, having promised to do this and, after setting off towards the garage, one's anticipated supper looms before one's eyes and one thinks "I could easily just go on home - after all - no-one would know". Against the moral dissatisfaction **occasioned by the stranded motorist's hardship, one's personal** devaluation in one's own eyes through responsibility for the motorist's hardship and the devaluation one feels in the eyes of the motorist in realizing that one has "ratted" on them, is pitted the anticipated satisfaction in the more immediate consumption of the meal. What will decide, as in the other cases, are the relative intensities of the conflicting feelings in the moment of choice.

b. A conflict between a moral motivation and a selfish motivation involving valour. Eg - take the previous scenario, save that it is later in the day and one is, instead, on the way to one's club for a pint and a few games. Recently, one has won an away-tournament for the club. In one's anticipation, one will be lauded for one's achievement, other members will be generally congratulatory and one expects to be "boosted" and "made-up". The conflict now is between the moral dissatisfaction and sense of personal devaluation as before, against the satisfaction of the valorization expected as the returning "conquering hero" (this assumes that getting the petrol would make one too late for the club).

c. An authentic motivation combined with a motivation to "dine out" on inauthentic valorization arising from one and the same action in response. This is the situation where one might perform the ostensibly moral act because others will think that one is "good". Eg - in one's workplace, a colleague has had an accident and is in hospital. A collection is taken amongst the staff. In genuine sympathy for the



colleague, one is motivated to contribute, to offset their suffering. However, one is not at all fond of them, so one is not moved, on these grounds, to give more than a token contribution. But, on the other hand, a generous contribution will gain approval and respect from one's other colleagues, so - how much will one give?

d. A morally justified motivation to do something for oneself, inhibited by the sense that others disapprove, which would produce a valour depreciation for oneself. Eg - as one works in a high-stress occupation, and also is anyway thoroughly neurotic, one has bought an initiation in Maharishi's transcendental meditation technique, in the hope of having a means to achieving greater personal equanimity. The practice of T.M. requires one to sit and meditate for twenty minutes, twice a day, in private, in peace and quiet. But one has a difficult work schedule, where the only time available for one's afternoon meditation is during the coffee-break. Generally, staff congregate in a convivial staff room, gossip, socialize and interact during the break. They would perceive one's going off to a place of solitude away from them as being, at the very least, stand-offish and unfriendly and this would produce bad-feeling towards oneself - one would be less esteemed by one's colleagues. One is torn between achieving a greater detachment from the stress of work and being less well regarded by others at work.

In my talking of valour as a need, it seems to me that in the phenomenon of this need, there is a tension between the need in the sense of wanting to receive valorization, love from others and the need in the sense of wanting to give love, to be-of-value. It seems to me that the way this tension works out in reality depends on the degree of fulfilment of the need in these two respects. Here also, the boundary between what I called moral need and moral freedom is involved. In moral freedom,

one selflessly gives love, freely. Yet one is nevertheless motivated to do so, and this in the context of one's whole field of **motivations**. There is a satisfaction for oneself, in doing so, and a privation of satisfaction in not doing so. In a sense, for the satisfaction, one needs to so act. In so acting, one enhances one's personal value through bringing greater value, or good, to the world.

In this realm of freedom, in this realm of looking for satisfactions not arising from the impelling negativity of feeling presenting as one's needs, one's choices amongst possible satisfactions are determined finally by the intensity of satisfying feeling anticipated and if one chooses to freely give love, that will be where one's greatest satisfaction lies.

In the course of one's life, given that, or once that one's sense and want of personal value for oneself, intrinsically, is fulfilled and, in so far as its continuing being-fulfilled is not in question, the actively motivating part of one's need for valour passes to what one makes of oneself, to how one lives one's life. One's possibilities in this respect depend on one's level of achieved and discovered ability and also on one's level of awareness. Awareness is not just a simple matter of an accretion of knowledge whose horizon is ignorance, the unknown, It also is limited and affected by false belief and received belief and opinion, where what is believed does not have the authority of one's direct insight and awareness. Awareness has its frontier not only with the unknown but also with one's body of unauthenticated beliefs, true or false.

Valour, as a need, increases with one's ability and awareness, since the more one can do, the greater value one can be. Being aware of



one's possibility of being-of-greater-value, compared to the value-one-is, ~~can create a~~ valour need to live up to the optimum value one can be. I would contend that as the margin of valour moves with the margin of value-ability, so deepens and expands the quality of the satisfaction it realizes. Hence, in so far as one ever has possibilities of improving one's ability and value, so is there ever an open possibility of greater valour satisfaction.

But one's being-of-value is a relationship with others which is reciprocal - the more valuable one is, the more one is likely to be valued by others, the more one feels supported and fulfilled by their love. This receipt of love supports and encourages one's giving of love, in that the more one has an excess, or superabundance of love, the more one needs to give love, to feel worthy of the love one receives.

The person who has reached this heightened state of valuableness, who has the satisfaction of a great, fulfilled valour, in my technical sense of the term, now becomes recognizable as the valorous person, in the traditional sense. In the latter sense, this is the virtuous person who gives of themselves for others, whose inner sense of worth allows their selfless courage in the face of danger to themselves and to others.

Valour, in the traditional sense, ascribes to the valorous person a great value for their courageous deeds. But I believe, implicit in its meaning, is the recognition of the valorous person's inner disposition - their strength of heart, their morale, their inner courage and fearlessness. Traditionally conceived "Valour" is, in a sense, the ideal of "Valour", as I have used the term - its optimum paradigm.

The Philosophy of Good

Conclusion: General Theory of Good

Part 1 Survey and Recapitulation of my Findings with Regard to  
Good, up to This Stage

My first approach to "good", in this Thesis, has been to inquire how, originally, it is phenomenally manifest and how, in this sense, it exists.

In my Introduction, I sought to show this in terms of the epistemological principles I am employing and in relation to the findings of the a priori ontology given epistemological grounding thereby. According to this, "good" is originally given and exists in the feeling content of consciousness. I described "good", in this sense, as it exists in individual consciousness, as "Good-feeling".

In Section 1, I inquired into the phenomenology of Good-feeling. I tried to show how, concretely, Good-feeling is related to the structures and givens of consciousness. It is integrally connected with consciousness's teleological structure, with its projection of ends and realizing activity. Good-feeling presents in a primary sense as need. As such, it presents itself in particular ways which transcend consciousness and "move" it to try to make sense of its occurring, its givenness, so as to be able to act effectively to realize better, more satisfactory, Good-feeling. It also presents in a secondary sense, in which its occurrence is through the mediation of the consciousness, the intentional meanings "beheld" by the subject for whom this form of Good-feeling is occurring. Such meanings, originally, are generated on the basis of the occurring of primary Good-feeling. This led me, at the end of this section, to ask what

meanings are produced, "objectivated", in the making-sense of Good-feeling. This raises the issue of what "good", "bad", "evil", "right", "wrong", "value", etc are beyond the sense of good's direct existence in Good-feeling.

In Section 2, I moved to examining and criticising how certain philosophers, Kant, Hegel and Sartre, have dealt with these questions.

I described Kant's various conceptions of good in the context of how he conceived knowledge and the real, criticising them accordingly. He conceived "good" as what a moral agent wills to be realized. This has a double sense. In the first it is what the agent wills should be, notwithstanding whatever empirical limitations there may be to what the agent actually can realize. In the second sense, it is that which is necessarily realized, through the agent willing and acting morally. It is the good will of the agent, as such, which is the bearer of the good. In either sense, good is conceived as an absolute reality, something supersensible, unconditioned by phenomenal relativity. He described the form of motivation of moral will as its being determined to act through the causality of freedom and that, in freedom, the will is determined to act by the form of duty. He counterposed this form of motivation to that of the will under what he called the faculty of desire, and "self-love", in which he conceived the will as being caused, "impelled" to act, by natural necessity, to realize its own pleasure and satisfaction.

Kant also conceived what he called the "Summum Bonum", as the highest or greatest possible good. It is the ideal, ultimate goal of all moral action. He argued that it must, ultimately, be realizable. Its supreme condition is the "free will" of moral agents, in which the will subjects itself to act according to the form of duty. Under this condition, the concept contains supreme virtue and, conditional on that, perfect happiness. Kant conceived virtue, on the one hand, as

something which is unconditionally in itself, whereas on the other hand, happiness is empirically caused. He conceived their mutual inclusion in the concept as being possible by there having been an intelligent creator of nature as a whole.

My criticism of these conceptions of good first concern his distinction of the forms of motivation between moral motivation and "self-love".

Whilst I admit that the distinction, itself, is valid, I deny the validity of Kant's distinction that the will is determined by "freedom" in the one case and by "natural necessity" in the other. My analysis shows that the distinction lies in the ends sought to be realized. The one seeks to realize what is universally good, whereas the other seeks to realize the self's own good. Both partake of a common teleological structure, in which "that-to-be-realized" is neither prior to nor posterior to the motivation, but "part and parcel" of it. On the questions of Kant's meanings of "good", I criticised him for having no conception of consciousness's intentionality, which meant that he could not distinguish the direct phenomena of feeling from the objectivated meanings that consciousness produces and employs teleologically. In turn, this meant that he was not able to conceive how Good-feeling, phenomenally lived, enters into the meaning of the "good" that a good-will wills.

I would describe the predisposition of a moral will as its preparedness to realize what it regards as being universally good, in the real world, when it can. This raises the question of what I conceive as being universally good and how Good-feeling is related to it. At the stage of my criticism of Kant, I briefly described the meaning of the objectivity of good in the universal sense as something that relates to the objective meaning of one's own good. One's own good, assessed subjectively for oneself, is constituted, firstly by what one directly lives as Good-feeling. But more concretely, it consists in one's

relation to the world of things and other people, in terms of how it holds the possibility of one's Good-feeling in living and acting in relation to it. But one's own good is a reality lived in the world, which, objectively, is as much a reality for others as it is for oneself. What is universally, objectively good involves the good of others and their relations. But the meaning "another's good" is something understood as their "own-good". Another's "own-good" is understood, objectively, as being constituted in the same way as one's own "own-good".

On the question of Kant's regarding a good will as being a noumenal "good-in-itself", I had criticised Kant's phenomenon/noumenon distinction for its suggestion that there could be an unknowable content of characterization or determination of noumena. In my conception, what any particular good-will is consists in what it self-evidently gives itself as being, both for itself and for others. Thus I described a good-will as being, in any concrete instantiation, objectively of value and universally good, but for real reasons, connecting the particular will in question with the whole of reality, knowable in its phenomenal manifestation. What connects good-will with the whole of reality is its end of doing and realizing good, and it is in this that its value and goodness reside.

But notwithstanding this, I criticised Kant's view that moral action necessarily realizes good, in a non-empirical but real sense, whatever the empirical outcome of the action. In my view, what any action realizes, willed morally or otherwise, must be evaluated in terms of the changes in reality actually effected, to determine what good it actually does and how and in what ways and to what extent it is universally good.

So far as Kant's conception of the Summum Bonum is concerned, I agreed that for the practical reason needed to guide moral activity, there is

a need for such a concept, to represent the ultimate goal of moral action. For a moral will must, to be consistently good, seek the best possible knowledge of reality, in terms of how selves' own-good, and the relations of these goods, exist in it, in order to grasp how and in what respects the whole of reality is not universally good. This grasp of reality in terms of relations of good and bad is necessary to project, as end, what would be the best possible state of reality (Summum Bonum). In any concrete circumstance, any moral will needs to project its concrete particular ends in conformity with this supreme end. However I disagreed with Kant's conception of the Summum Bonum as a completely determinate and determined idea which must ultimately be realizable. I think the supreme good should be conceived openly and indeterminately, which lets whatever supreme good can eventually and ultimately be realized, and so concretely exist, be that supreme good.

I described Hegel's treatment of "good" in the context of a preliminary description of Hegel's philosophical method and general metaphysics.

In ( 1 ), he conceived the Idea of good thus:

The good is thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aim of the world.

What he meant by "freedom realized" **embodies, in this sense, the** conception of the will being free, and that its freedom is realized in the coming-to-be of what it wills. But this is not sufficient. He also said ( 2 ):

The good is the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular will, meaning that for good to exist in reality, the concept of will as "freedom realized" needs concrete embodiment in actual wills, and that such willing needs to be in accordance with the concept. Willing according to the concept is necessary to the Idea of good as "freedom realized" in that such willing recognizes that all other individual

wills, for their own good, need to freely will and realize their ends, likewise in accordance with the concept. Under this condition of being willed in accordance with the concept, oneself and other selves are liberated in one's own-good, and others' own-good, being constitutive of the Idea of good, of what is objectively and universally good. In this form, own-good is not constrained or compromised by its being, from the objective standpoint, "wrong".

Willing, itself, in the development of consciousness, passes from a state of relatively "blind" willing, satisfying naturally given impulses and desires, towards relatively self-conscious willing, in accordance with its concept.

Hegel criticised others, particularly Kant, for conceiving the movement from blind to self-conscious willing as a process of restriction of freedom, whereas he regarded it as a process enabling greater concrete realization of freedom, greater good.

Of the Idea of good, he further said (3):

In this unity, abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing and the contingency of external fact, have their independent self-subsistence superceded, though at the same time they are still contained and retained within it in their essence.

In other words, as the conception of good reaches the level of concrete fulness of the Idea, its abstractly and separately conceived components become concretely conceived in the unity of the Idea, as sides or moments related and dependent upon one another.

The inclusion of "welfare" in the Idea is a recognition that the individual subject must find their own satisfaction in willing morally, in "willing according to the concept".

"Abstract right" expresses the necessary formal relations between particular individuals, expressed in the imperative "be a person and respect others as persons". This is found in property rights in which

one's power to dispose depends on others' recognition of these rights.

For Hegel, "good", as the "absolute end and aim of the world", has an absolute right to be. Hence every concrete will that in reality is constitutive of the Idea of good (4)

....ought to make the good its aim and realize it completely, while the good on its side has in the subjective will its only means of stepping into actuality.

Here Hegel's concept of the Idea of good comes closest to Kant's conception of the Summum Bonum, which nevertheless did not prevent Hegel from criticizing Kant's conception. His criticism was that Kant's Idea, supposedly conceiving the supreme existence of good in reality, does not have the objectivity of truth, but leaves it as something which "ought-to-be", as a mere article of faith, notwithstanding that Kant had conceived it as that which must be realizable.

Hegel conceived "evil" as that which has self-consciousness as its condition. In becoming self-conscious, the subject makes, in the initial stage of the dialectical development of this awareness, all else "other-than-oneself" and so concerns oneself with one's self-interest. "Evil will" wills one's own good in opposition to "willing in accordance with the concept". One does not recognize others' good as the condition of one's own. Nevertheless Hegel recognized that "evil", as something to be overcome, is necessary to the realization of good.

He conceived "pain" in relation to his conception of the Idea of life, as something arising in a process beginning with "need". Through need, one conceives oneself as denied and posits an "other" world over against oneself, yet which is nevertheless one's own world which one exists together with in objective reality. So conceived, this "disharmony", this "contradiction" is live in oneself and is experienced as pain. This produces one's urge to overcome this "self-contradiction" to become explicitly self-identical.



My criticisms of Hegel's positions questioned how he conceived the "world" of which "good" is its "absolute end and aim". Were he to be conceiving it as a single supreme self or "God", I have not found that epistemologically demonstrated or justified as conception. However I could accept what may have been Hegel's conception, that of the world being the unitary and unifying spiritual totality of all concrete, individual selves, by whom the good exists.

I argued, contrary to Hegel, that it is possible for good to be realized, though not "willed in accordance with the concept".

Contingently, the pursuit of one's own good, without regard for the good of others, need not be destructive of others' good. When this is the case, one's own good, judged from an objective perspective can be justified and be constitutive of what can be conceived as being universally good. Having said this, not to will "according to the concept" always bears the danger of the agent, so willing, doing harm to others and to others' good. Furthermore, in so far as one's consciousness has risen to the level of being able to will "according to the concept", then not to do so would be either culpably neglectful or wilfully perverse, for one would then be willing the essentiality of one's own satisfaction, but the inessentiality of others'. Hegel's conception of retribution revolves around this issue. The criminal will is one that actually infringes others' rights and realizes some wrong. I concur with Hegel that the wrong must be righted, to promote what is good. However, for Hegel, to do this, it is only necessary to negate, to punish, the criminal's ill-will, thereby "honouring" the criminal by restoring them to the "good-status" of "willing according to the concept". But in my conception of the issue, what is necessary is that the harm-done, the wrong-suffered needs to be restituted, in addition to rectifying the criminal's will, for wrong, concretely, to be righted. Furthermore, I think what would

tend to promote the criminal's recognition of "right", would be the negation of their will by having to act to undo the wrong for which they were responsible.

On the issue of pain, I believe Hegel conceived it in reverse order. In my conception, it is the occurrence of bad-feeling, pain, which produces the meaning of non-identity with one's self-content and produces the urge to overcome the felt-contradiction such that one can identify with one's experiential content.

Sartre conceived "good", in a universal sense, as that which, for any conscious agent, ought-to-be-done. He denied that there could be a "Platonic Good", existing in itself and by itself. Good does not exist outside the act, the "praxis", which produces it. But good characterizes, necessarily, the intentional object of any praxis. It is that towards which one necessarily directs one's transcendence. What one aims at is necessarily "good" for oneself. For Sartre, good, like consciousness, never is but has to be made-to-be. It is subjective, in that it is always produced by a subjectivity and is never something that subjectivity find imposed on itself from outside. On the other hand it is objective, since, in its universal essence, it is "rigorously independent" of the subjectivity which produces it. The praxis which produces good is a choice of good, but a choice made by oneself as individual agent, for all, and in the face of all others. In the necessity incumbent on oneself to choose what good shall be, rests one's responsibility for the good that one chooses. This poses a difficulty for every agent. It cannot be established in consensus, endorsed by what "the other", "they", think. There is no unequivocal good "out there" for which, ultimately, one is not, oneself, responsible.

In Sartre's general ontology of consciousness, he regarded it as something whose being is a spontaneous activity of producing itself, in

relation to what it is not, in relation to what transcends itself and which it negates and transcends by going beyond its given condition towards what it projects itself to be. Sartre would not allow consciousness, in his conception of its being, any content, any dimension of having itself, of existential content. He admitted a "facticity" of consciousness, a consciousness of existing factually, but that this facticity is always negated and perpetually "gone-beyond" by consciousness. This differs from my own ontological conception of consciousness and it is a major source of my differences from and criticisms of Sartre.

He conceived value on the basis of his ontology. In its transcendence, consciousness, in not being the being-in-itself of which it is consciousness and to which it is present, actively makes itself be, in relation to its situation. In this relation, consciousness, for Sartre, lacks being-in-itself and projects, in relation to the situation it confronts, the missing fullness of being, the "lacked". The "lacked", projected to be realized, is "value" and Sartre defined it as an impossible ideal - the missing synthesis of consciousness's own being-for-itself with the particular situational being-in-itself, such that there is no lack of being.

Value, in this formulation, has an evanescent unobtainability, which, paradoxically, maintains its being, in this mode, for consciousness, since it can never be exhausted in actual realization. Sartre defined consciousness, in its relationship to the world, as freedom. For him, morality, the proper pursuit, for any individual, of what one chooses and regards as truly good, is fundamentally possible, for any individual, on the basis of recognizing that one's own being, and the being of all other persons, is freedom. This means relinquishing the fundamental project to be, substantially, in-oneself and, instead, projects to be-in-freedom, that one values one's being in the need of

perpetual self-recreation. This recognition entails, for any individual, that one should not only make one's own being-as-freedom one's value, but also the being-as-freedom of all other persons. Value for Sartre, then, is essentially the value of persons and is involved both in the sense of self-value that one realizes for oneself and in the value one accords others in their self-realization of their being-as-freedom. Good, in relation to this, is a formal characterization. The act, praxis, the choice of one's being, is, at the same time, a choice of good, in that what it chooses, objectively, has the character of being the good and, subjectively, one's act is, for oneself, the doing of good, of the ought-to-be-done.

My major criticism of Sartre is his exclusion of Good-feeling from good. This meant that he could find no real basis for value, nothing in which its realization could consist, and likewise good, for him, could only be a formal characterization of the act and of the projected ends of consciousness. He could find no criterion for the being of good in reality, save for the valuing of freedom. Sartre's ethical thought, of the earlier period, in its formalism and in its consideration of the human individual, divorced from one's social existence, lacks the social dimension and the issues, for every individual, of coexisting concretely in society. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this criticism, I do concur with Sartre that one should live authentically, to the extent that one is able, that one should assume self-responsibility for one's actions in the world and that, in pursuing one's own good-being, one should pursue the good-being of all others.

In Section 3, I opened by describing Scheler's theory of value and love. Scheler advanced the view that values are directly perceived in what he called value-intuition. Value-intuition is through value-

feeling. Values, for Scheler, coexist in an objective hierarchy in relation to one another such that they are mutually subordinate or superordinate. He distinguished four value modalities: sensible values, vital values, spiritual values and holy values. The former two modalities are relative values, relative to life and bodily existence. The latter two values are values of the person, which Scheler regarded as absolute and non-relative to the conditions of bodily existence. Morality and moral values, for Scheler, consist in the observance of the objective value order in moral agents' choices of and preferences for values in relation to one another. He accounted for distortions of the value-order, in subjective preferences, by his conception of "ressentiment", which is essentially a negative human attitude which seeks to devalue some values, and elevate others, such that their value order is reversed.

Scheler regarded love as the most fundamental human attitude, defining the human being as a "being who loves". Love, for him is purely an act of consciousness and not, itself, a feeling. He regarded it as that through which value-feeling and the perception of values, in relation to the world, is possible. Love, in this view, is essentially a movement from lower to higher values. In valuing persons, love seeks to elevate their personal value.

Hatred, as the opposite of love, as attitude, seeks to bring about the contrary movement from higher to lower values. Correlative with the objective order of the hierarchy of values, Scheler conceived that there is an "Ordo Amoris", which is that ideal order of love which would value according to the objective hierarchy of values. Distortion of this value-order, false perception of and belief in the relative order of values is what is responsible for hatred and negative attitudes.

Love, in this conception, is the attitude and activity of consciousness

which wills and seeks to realize the highest possible value for the world. In relation to this, the categorical "ought" is not just a formal demand, but one which says values should be realized and promoted such that the highest possible value, overall, is realized. Scheler, in other words, presents a concrete ethics.

I criticized Scheler's conception of value-intuition for its not seeming to include the dimension of the intentional constitution of value-meaning, its "objectivation" in the making sense of the data of value-feeling. I proposed that "value" has an essential meaning-character of "being-good-for" and that the issues of subjectivity or objectivity of value-preferences can be decided in terms of the relations of "being-good-for-oneself" to "being-good-for-others" of the particular value in question. Objectivity consists in the value being, in some sense, "good-for-all". I accept Scheler's view that there is an essential hierarchical ordering of values, which ranges from the supremely, unconditionally, valuable at the "top", to the most contingently, and conditionally valuable, at the "bottom". On the issue of the relativity or absoluteness of values, I take the view, contrary to Scheler, that the value of the person do have real bearers, in the world, which are the spiritual being of persons and their relations to each other and with the world.

In my view, love, concretely, is a consciousness, which bears the teleological-intentional structure of "transcendence". In this view, the more fundamental structure is that originally of love finding its object "lovely". On this foundation, love seeks to enhance the loveliness of what it loves, to move it, in Scheler's terms, towards being a higher value. Selfish love seeks to do this for its own sake, whereas selfless love seeks to do this for the sake of the whole and to produce what is universally and objectively a higher value. The valuing which takes place in the light of this attitude of love, can be

fulfilled or unfulfilled. It is fulfilled when the one who loves has, in some sense possesses, their love object. The value is felt as existing concretely, either narrowly selfishly and subjectively for the valuer or more selflessly and objectively for all. Usually **this form of loving** and valuing takes place in a complex of motivations between the limiting extreme cases. In unfulfilled loving and valuing, the value is projected to be realized and possessed in some concatenation of the subjective/objective relations discussed above. the feeling content of unfulfilled love/valuing differs from that of the fulfilled kind. Whilst the value is felt, in its ideality of meaning. The valuer does not have the feeling-content of having the value in its sense of "being-good-for". What is felt is the anticipation of its "being-good-for", were it realized and possessed.

In my interpretation of the phenomenon of hatred, it is the difference in feeling-content between unfulfilled and fulfilled valuing/love which holds the clue to hatred's **move** to devaluation and destruction of value, as, in effect, a negative or reversed love. Hatred is seen in one typical instance as arising for value comparison between the value perceived to belong to another person and one's own personal value. In perceiving the other having or possessing a higher personal value than oneself, one experiences the lack of that value in oneself. In hatred, instead of aspiring to raise one's own personal value, one seek's to pull down the value of the other, by viewing them negatively, to avoid the pain of their appearing as of higher value in the comparison. This discussion led me into my theory of "valour".

Valour, in my technical sense, is, in my view, a fundamental human need, that for a sense of personally being-of-value. A subordinate but essential part of this sense is that describable as a sense of security, of being loved and cared for and that one is of value, intrinsically.

As a need, it is less primitive than one's basic human needs for bodily comfort. It is not dependent upon one's bodily conditions, but upon one's relations with other people, mediated by the world. It is closely related to sexual needs, which are more primitive in their being related to bodily conditions, but less basic in that not all must experience sexual need, whereas all experience the need for valour. Beyond these needs are found aesthetic, moral and spiritual needs.

The nature of the need for valour changes and varies with the person's historical development. It is felt and perceived, but not generally as a thematic object of one's consciousness but rather "apperceived". As a meaning, it is generated originally from feeling in relation to one's life-circumstances. In its being related to one's relations with others, the need varies according to essential changes in these relations, which generally correspond to one's stage of life, eg child, adult, etc. One originally experiences relations of dependence on others, which change in the course of one's development as one gradually assumes responsibility for oneself and one becomes relatively independent. In the initial stage, one is valued, in one's dependence, more or less intrinsically, and the sense of being valued intrinsically is imparted in the manner that others discharge their responsibility for oneself in one's being-dependent. One becomes valued more conditionally as one becomes capable of being self-responsible. Correlatively, one moves from being dependent for valorization upon others, to being relatively able to be self-valorizing - to realize oneself more or less as a value and to feel more or less valuable through one's own achievement. Valorizing relations are not one-way but form a complex web of interdependence between the members of social collectivities. One's source of valorization is a field of relations with others in which, in one extreme, in authentic belief one is responsible for one's own belief in



one's personal value. In the other extreme, one would be subject to inauthentic belief in depending on "what others think" for one's beliefs as to one's personal value.

One's valuable and potentially valorizing activity firstly concerns one's satisfaction of one's own basic needs and one's involvement in the satisfaction of others' basic needs. Beyond this there is a realm of free creativity for which one can be-of-value, valued and valorized. A further dimension of one's personal being-of-value is that of valuing and valorizing others, in recognizing and according value to others. The need for valour has a major significance in the way people shape their lives and in the wider social relationships which reflect this need and human attempts to fulfil it.

There is a "pathology" of valour. In being faced with this need and being unable, satisfactorily, to fulfil it, people can be led to many of the forms of human destructiveness and self-destructiveness. Eg in relations of dependence/responsibility, the dependent person may try to remain dependent, for the sake of the sense of being valued unconditionally. Similarly the responsible party may suppress the becoming-self-responsible of the dependent party, in order to still be necessary and valuable to the dependent party. When the need for the unconditional sense-component of intrinsic value is unfulfilled in that stage of one's life of relative self-responsibility, it can distort one's life-activity into the pursuit of the missing sense. In resentment one may try to overcome one's sense of inadequacy of personal value by trying to bring down other peoples' personal value.

The involvement of valour in human relationships is greater, the more closely involved are the persons so related. A very important human relationship, which has a degree of intimacy that greatly involves valour, is that of "mutual love". This relationship is not just a straightforward reciprocity of love by each party,

taking the other party as love-object. It is something that involves a complex of motivations and attitudes between the parties, some but not all of which are forms of love. The love relation from one party to the other can involve forms of love ranging from the extremes of selfish to selfless love. It involves a taking and giving of love. The "taking" involves the "having", the possessing, in some sense, the value of the other and the receiving of their love. The giving involves one's will to enhance the value of the other, to give that person their due and to be of value, "lovely" to them. In this relation of mutual love, it generally involves one's own and the other person's sexual being. Beyond this each party is of value for and to the other in complex ways, and this is very much involved in the relations of valuing and valorizing the other, and of being valued and valorized by the other.

What valour ultimately hinges upon is the actual value one has, as a person, in an objective and universal sense. This means that valour is importantly involved in the field of morality. Just as love, concretely, is a consciousness, so, for any moral agent, one's morality and being-moral is a consciousness. In moral consciousness are found the structures of moral motivation, moral will, moral ends, moral perception, moral need and moral freedom! The underlying attitude of the moral agent, as such, is selfless love, which seeks to promote others' own-good and personal value in the universal, objective sense. It involves, firstly, valuing other persons intrinsically and unconditionally, in other words, as ends-in-themselves. Secondly, persons are valued in a particular and definite value for what they are. This value depends on the person's ways of self-realization with regard to others and in respect of everything in the world that mediates these relations. Moral consciousness, as knowledge, depends on the degree of awareness of how the components of

the situation confronting any particular moral consciousness are good for all the individual "ends-in-themselves" in the situation and of how objective value-relations pertain in the situation. In willing morally, one is seeking to realize greater and higher value and to produce a greater universal good. One's moral motivation springs from finding the situation not wholly good and from seeing one's possibility of righting, to some degree, what is wrong. Valour presents as an issue for oneself, as moral agent, in relation to one's possibility of acting morally. One feels one ought to act. Not to act would be to diminish one's personal value, since failure to act would be to take on some responsibility for the wrong in the situation continuing to exist. This part of moral action is self-valorization.

With concrete human persons, issues of one's valour are involved in mixed and sometimes conflicting motivations, such that, eg one's moral self-valorization may be compromised by one's feeling and seeking to be valorized by others for what, morally, is bad, reflecting disordered value-preferences of those who so value.

Over and above human relations of interdependence and their involvement with valour, is a realm of freedom, in which love is given freely for the greater good and value it realizes and in which one can freely create oneself as a value. One's being-of-value is a relationship with others that is reciprocal, in that the more valuable one is, the more one is likely to be supported by being valued and valorized by others.

The culmination of this process of attainment of personal value is the truly valorous person, who possesses valour both in my technical sense and in its traditional sense, the latter, as it were, being the ideal of the former. In this sense the valorous person's inner disposition is strength of heart, morale, inner courage and confidence.

Conclusion: General Theory of Good

Part 2 What A Priori Ontology can Establish of the Being and  
Relations of Good, Value and Morality

First I need to outline the senses of these terms. "Good", as has emerged, has a number of meanings and forms of usage. Kant and Hegel proposed a supreme form of good, Kant's Summum Bonum and Hegel's Idea of Good, the absolute end and aim of the world. I shall refer to good, in this sense, as "the Good". Subordinate to this is "good" as what I have conceived as "being universally and objectively good". In this conception, typically what consciousness has as its object is some situation or state of affairs, which is seen and judged in terms of how and to what extent it is universally good. Concretely, whatever is seen in these terms is likely to belong in a wider teleological-intentional objectivity which includes the end, projected to change the object for the better, towards being more universally good. Judging this relation of "being-universally-good" can be applied to a wide range of objective situations, viewed in a wider or narrower gaze, regarding the objectivity more or less concretely or abstractly. Thus a person's actions may be concretely judged in terms of what they intend and what they concretely realize and change in the world. Alternatively, the judging could be limited to what the person wills to realize and the character of their intention.

Being "bad" has a correlative sense of some object, situation or state of affairs being judged, universally, as being bad.

"Right" refers to what "ought-to-be" and "what-ought-to-be" is that which is universally good.

Correlatively, "wrong" is "what-ought-not-to-be", which is that which is judged either and alternatively as "not universally good" or, universally, as "bad".

"Evil" refers, primarily, to "evil will" and, correlatively, to the "evil" embodied in states of affairs, brought about by the operation of "evil will". It is what is universally judged as "being bad", but additionally as "being bad through evil will". The intent of evil will is characterized by its intention to do, be and realize what, judged objectively and universally, is bad. This can have the weaker sense of "sin of omission" or the stronger sense of "sin of commission". In the weaker sense, it is a will to do what serves the agent's own good, for the agent's own good-feeling, in deliberate exclusion of consideration for others' good and of what is or would be universally good. This negligence holds the agent's own good to be essential whilst according no essentiality to others' good. In the stronger sense, evil will is that which sets out deliberately to harm others and to be destructive to others' own-good, to the extent that there is no good reason to do so, no overriding reason why to do so would be good, despite the harm suffered.

"Value", as I previously outlined, has the essential character of "being-good-for". Value has the character of applying to particular objects, which, subject to individualizing identification, are valued. What is of value, under this general form, can be any real object or state of affairs, evaluated and valued more or less concretely or abstractly. But additionally there is another **form of objectivity** of value, which is the body of ideality which bears the essential value-meanings, upon which Scheler based his theory of value. This form of objectivity is what one might call a "hybrid" bearer of meaning. What I mean to distinguish is that these meanings do not have the pure conceptual ideality of the concepts of values, as such. These are the values which, in Scheler's account, are intuited prior to their possible real instantiations. What distinguishes this intuition is that its value-objects are given in value-feeling. This content of value-feeling, as I previously described, is objectivated into being

constitutive of the ideal value-meanings, which means that as meanings, they are of the "ideal-real". Thus for example, when reading a book containing what one knows is a fictional account of possible events, the recounting of love, beauty, emotional poignancy, etc, will give rise to really experienced value-feelings in the reader which relate to the portrayed values in their fictional ideality.

"Morality", or the "field of morality", is that to which all the just previously outlined belong. However morality belongs, primarily, to the individual human being and moral agent. It pertains to the individual person's relation to "good", "the Good", "value", their own "Good-feeling", etc. It includes "pure practical reason", the body of criteria which can guide action that aims to do, be and realize what is universally good.

Having given these formal outlines of the terms, I now need to ask in what being universally and objectively good consists. Good is primarily phenomenally given, actually existed, in "Good-feeling", meaning the whole phenomenal content of the feeling range between the extremes of good- and bad-feeling. Good-feeling, in itself, is only an abstract moment of the whole, self-given, existential content of the concrete reality of any consciousness. By "existential content", I mean both consciousness's "material" or "sensory" content, which it has, which occurs to and for it and by which it is "transcended", and the content of its own activity and active processes, which it produces from itself and which is its own self-expression and self-realization. Concretely, Good-feeling has specific manners of occurring, together with what else transcends consciousness in its occurring, and the whole of its transcending content is made-sense-of, through consciousness's activity, producing the correlative province of intentional ideality of meaning, of that of which consciousness is conscious. Concretely, the occurring of consciousness's Good-feeling is

also affected by that of which it is consciousness, whether or not the being consciousness of "that" is in the direct mode of perception, involving its direct presence "in person" to consciousness. Altogether, through the complex of relations of the occurring of its Good-feeling, and of the meanings produced in relation to it, consciousness produces a body of meaning relating to its Good-feeling, which expresses, intentionally, that of which it is consciousness as the "wherefore" of its own good. Overall, this body of meaning expresses consciousness's own grasp of its relation to the world, to the whole of being, in terms of its own good. Within this whole grasp are a number of dimensions and degrees of specification. In the immediate focus of present consciousness will be the projected ends that it is actually in the process of realizing, these consciously beheld in the light of its own-good to be realized in the immediate process of realization. But to this, there is a background of consciousness, whose horizon is the limit of what consciousness knows, which has a time-dimension stretching from the immediate future which it "protends" in its intentional focus, into its longer-term consciousness of the possibilities of its own good, which intentionally, is a content which can "temper" and affect its immediate content of "Good-feeling". One's own-good and, subordinate to that, one's own Good-feeling, need not and generally does not figure explicitly in the meaning-content of that of which consciousness is cognitively aware, nor in that of what it is seeking to realize or has realized. But consciousness is, nevertheless, in Sartre's terms, non-thetically or non-positionally aware of its own-good and its own Good-feeling. The latter are, as it were, apperceived.

A major component of the world-reality, the whole of being, of which consciousness is consciousness, is the existence of other consciousnesses, of other people. An important aspect of this being of others, for oneself, is that each, as consciousness, has their own total

teleological relation to the world, orientated to their individual own-good. This teleological relatedness of others to the world has major implications for one's own teleological relation to the world. Others' projects have the possibilities of being, in varying degrees, destructive to or complementary to one's own projects. Thus others' own-good, concretely expressed in their projects, becomes an important factor in relation to one's own good. It produces a province of meaning of "good" beyond one's own good. Primarily, that "good" exists and is existed as others' own Good-feeling, but concretely it relates to each's and everybodys' relation to the world in its holding the possibilities for their own-good.

Discovered in the meaning of the world and in the particular meanings **contained therein, understood in its relation to one's own good, are its relations to others' good.** The changes that one seeks to bring about in the world, in one's projective pursuit of one's own good, necessarily imply having some effect, for better or worse, upon others' good. At the same time, the world, as condition of one's own good, is discovered as constantly subject to others' activity and self-realizations, in which what they do concretely affects and alters the world as condition for oneself. Hence one's own good is constantly vulnerable to the projects of others and compromised **thereby.** One's own transcendence at once both transcends and is transcended by others' transcendence. One's existence is vitally involved with the existence of others, one's own-good coexists with others' own-good and each is involved as condition of the other. To be able to transcend one's existential condition effectively towards one's own good self-realization, one must necessarily countenance the requirements of others to do the same for their own good and one requires that others recognize one's own need.

Awareness of the existence of others gives an additional depth to the



meaning of the world beyond its meaning as world-for-oneself and as one's own existential transcending condition. It is that it is the world for all other consciousnesses, for which it is, necessarily, their condition. Here the meaning of "universality" and of "objectivity" in its universalistic sense is integrally involved. There is a subordinate sense of "objectivity" which is of the individually produced intentional objectivity of the objective meanings objectivated by consciousness's intentional sense-making activity, as such. The deepening of meaning is that what is "there", in the world, is "there" in the sense of its being its self-same self for all, and in this sense it is independent of the particular individual consciousness of what is there. Its being is universally the same for all. Its objectivity, in this sense, is what it is, as the same, for all, independent of any particular relations to any particular subjectivity. "Universality" has an additional province of meaning, which does not presuppose the inter-subjective community of objective meaning, but which is itself "deepened" by the inter-subjective content of its being meant. This is the province of "essential universality". Essential meanings, such as "man", "horse", "beauty", "colour", etc, whether the essences of concrete particulars or of abstract moments, are universal in their self-sameness for all their actual and possible **instantiations** in reality. They are additionally universal in the former sense in being self-same for all consciousnesses, all subjectivities.

Knowledge of universal meaning is knowledge of truth. Truth, what is true, is true for all. True knowledge, as consciousness, can be called, as suggested by Heidegger (5), "being-in-the-truth". It is a mode or form of being, for the human subject, which (presupposing the meaning "being universally good" which I am in the process of establishing and elucidating) is better than the alternative mode "being-in-untruth".

This universal relation to truth for human inter-subjectivity is what I would describe as the "ethic of truth". By this I mean that truth is universally a value. Firstly, the truth of what any objectivity is, for any subjectivity, what one needs to know, one's optimum means, to most effectively realize one's ends in changing what truly is, for one's own good. Involved in the objectivity, the knowable truth, for oneself, in its inter-subjectivity, are all the concrete relations which oneself has with others and which affect what one seeks to realize. The next dimension of truth goes beyond the being-of-objectivity-as-means for any subjectivity. It is the dimension of its being, beyond its objective being for others, for itself. In this mode, being is lived reality, self-existed. This is the being of subjectivity, for itself. In so far as oneself, as conscious subjectivity, is consciousness of other subjectivity, existing objectively for oneself, the objective being of that other subjectivity has the dimension of being-for-itself. Other subjectivity has its own good and its own truth relation to objectivity as means to its own good. This universalizes the truth of objectivity for oneself. Its being as means for others is part of its truth for oneself. Others' own-good, their being-for-themselves, is part of their truth for oneself. The recognition of others' being-for-themselves, of their need for their own-good, their teleological relatedness to the world, gives them the dimension of being, for oneself, "ends-in-themselves", that they "matter", not just for oneself as means to one's own ends, but to themselves, for themselves, for their own good, for their own realization of ends, for their self-realization.

In this last passage I have found it necessary to use the concept of "being universally good", whose character and clarification I am presently trying to establish. This illustrates a point which I would like to make, which is that I am not advancing a psychological theory of a geneological causal sequence in the generation of the

meaning of this concept. The sequence of my exposition is for my convenience in "unfolding" what is contained in the concept, and how the various layers and components of meaning are related to one another. I am not suggesting that consciousness of inter-subjectivity, or of the transcending world, is necessarily empirically temporally posterior to one's being consciousness, as such, nor that consciousness of good, existing beyond own-good or good-feeling, is likewise posterior to consciousness of the latter.

The meaning of "good", discovered in relation to the world as that of one's own good, in the consciousness of and recognition of the being-for-themselves of others, takes on the dimension of being beyond one's own good, as good-for-others.

Objectively, for the inter-subjective community, own-goods coexist and each own-good comes into relation with and affects others, through the mutual involvement of own-goods with the same world and participation in each others' objectivity. Cognizing these relations has "being-universally-good" as organizing concept and, in a sense, as its "end". "Being-universally-good" is, itself, a judicative criterion by which one can assess the effects and interactions of coexisting own-goods in the praxes of their realizations. This, in turn, is seen in the light of "the Good", as supreme end (here presupposed, but to be elucidated later). But subordinate to, and constitutive of "being-universally-good", are the relations of own-goods, in respect of how they affect one another, for better or worse. Individual own good has a structure of involvement with the world, organized about the essential hierarchy of needs, as discussed in Section 3, in relation to valour. Basic needs are more fundamental, more necessary of fulfilment, than "higher" needs. These relative importances of ends in fulfilling needs in realizing own-good, for any individual, are reflected in the relations between own-goods. Everyone needs to be able to satisfy

their most "necessary" basic needs. In needing this, all need the recognition of this need by others and all need to recognize this need in others. Each person, in their involvement with the world, both needs to be allowed to satisfy their basic needs by others so ordering their own involvements to allow that and, conversely, each person needs to so order their involvements to allow others their possibilities of satisfying their basic needs. This corresponds, in some sense, to Hegel's conception of the necessity of willing according to the concept of freedom - the recognition that one's own freedom, one's ability to satisfy one's basic needs, is dependent on others and that theirs' are dependent upon oneself for one's own part. Thus a preliminary criterion for one's active involvement with the world, realizing one's own good, to be universally good, is that it not infringe what is necessary for others' own good, in the province of their satisfaction of "necessary" basic needs. Similarly, for any objective situation to be, and to be judged, as universally good, its necessary condition is that all persons should be allowed, in so far as human inter-relations, in connection with the world, hold the possibility, to satisfy their basic existential needs.

Further up the scale of needs, needs become, relatively speaking, less "necessary". One can live without their being satisfied, though one may find, in so far as these needs are not satisfied, that life is not worth living! In these respects, considerations of the necessary satisfaction of basic needs must take priority over the possibilities of satisfying higher needs. If, for oneself, the condition of one's satisfying higher needs were the suppression of others' possibilities of satisfying basic needs, then for one to go ahead and satisfy one's higher needs, on this condition, could not be considered to be universally good. On the proviso that basic needs are allowed, by human relations, to be universally satisfied, so far as the material

situation permits, the fulfilment of higher needs can be universally good, depending on how one fulfilment interacts with others' possible fulfilments of their needs in these respects. Here what determines the **relations** being universally good are considerations of what would be an optimal balancing of persons' own-good in self-realization. The more one's more necessary needs are in want of fulfilling, the more others' less necessary needs should be sacrificed, to the degree that their fulfilment would restrict the satisfaction by oneself **of the** more necessary needs, for these relations to satisfy the criteria for being universally good.

Beyond the satisfaction of basic needs, I have argued that the most important human need is that for "valour" and that this, ultimately, is a need to actually be of value to the optimum degree that one can. On the one hand, human existential conditions and inter-relations, for objective situations to be universally good, need to allow each to optimally satisfy their need for valour. On the other hand, every human agent, for their valour, their sense of being-of-value, to be a true sense and for their self-realization in its respect to be universally good, they need to actually be of value, in a universal sense, which reflects their praxis promoting, so far as their own necessary needs permit, the enhancement of others' own-good in so far as that is universally good.

In one's good detaching from that realized in connection with the demands of needs, it enters a realm, relatively speaking, of freedom. Here, since **in** acting in this province, one is still acting in the world and affecting the conditions of others' good, the question of one's good, realized in this province, being universally good, depends on how it relates to others' good. A good realized for oneself, over and above anything "necessary", can, in so far as it is not derogatory to others' relatively necessary good, be considered universally good, even though it contributes nothing positive to others' good. Such

own-good, "free gratis", luxury good, can be seen as a justifiable "bonus", reward for one's effort otherwise exerted in being of value and promoting others' good. But such realization of "gratuitous" own-good, takes place not only in relation to others' own-good at the present, but in the context of one's life considered extended across time and of its effects on others across time. If, in this context, what is objective for oneself, in the state of the world, is not universally good, then, in so far as one does not act, within one's capacities, in one's realm of free activity, to realize oneself as value and to counteract the "not-being-universally-good", the wrong existing in one's sphere of influence, one's activity, for failing to attempt to do what is in one's power to rectify the wrong, is not universally good. What is free in one sense is subject to valour-need in another.

To summarize these findings so far, what is universally good, in any particular circumstance or situation, is, firstly, conditional on every person's basic needs being met and fulfilled, so far as the world-context permits, and so far as optimally contrived human relations allow.

Secondly, over and above this, that human relations in the fulfilling of relatively less necessary needs, should allow each to optimally realize their own good in these respects. Thirdly, that in the realm of freedom for self-realization that lies beyond the sphere of existentially imposed need, all persons involved should optimally realize themselves as of value to the whole community and that all should act, in so far as they can, to counteract the situation not being universally good in the preceding respects.

There are some other more peripheral considerations which should be integrated with the preceding ones, to express more fully and concretely what would be universally good. This concerns the province of ends-in-themselves, of beings which exist through self-awareness

as beings-for-themselves, beings which have and live their own good. This is not limited to human beings. On the one side of self-existence beyond being human, are the possible, putatively supposed, higher spiritual beings:- "Archangels", "Angels", etc and higher, overriding forms of existence in which human beings may participate, ultimately, "God". In so far as their good is involved with and affected by human own-good and activity, then, in so far as they have needs and, conversely, have value and do good for humanity, then there is a demand on human individuals, in so far as they can, to recognize those beings and respond to them their due, for universal good to prevail. Obviously, epistemologically speaking, the existence of such beings, in not being self-evidently manifest to cognizing human agents, is a matter for "speculative metaphysics". But so far as a priori ontology goes, in so far as they exist and their needs relate to the human world and are affected by human praxis, then for any situation which includes them the fulfilment of their own-good should be allowed due scope, for such a situation to be universally good.

On the other side of human self-existence are other beings in the world which self-exist and have their own good. This is recognized principally in animal existence. Animals have needs, feelings and their own good, which "matter". These should be taken into account, in the context of limitations imposed by the requirements of the satisfaction of human needs. Anything humanly perpetrated, which gratuitously offends against animal good and animal well-being, for sport, fun, pleasure or whatever, cannot be universally good. Beyond animal self-existence, are other forms of possible self-existence and possible self-feeling of own-good. Such are vegetable life, cellular life, mineral existence **and any other subordinate existence.**

Once again these considerations pass into the realm of speculative metaphysics concerning what may or may not self-exist. The point is that so far as, in reality, they do have self-existence, that self-

existence and own-good should be recognized and optimally, in the context of all other good, be duly let-be, for whatever includes them to be universally good.

On the basis of this conception of "being universally good", in what can "the Good", the supreme end and aim of all activity which aims to realize what is universally good, consist? Earlier, in relation to Kant's conception of the Summum Bonum (pages 98/9), I argued that its conception, as the supreme regulative idea of pure practical reason, should be conceived openly and indeterminately, letting the supreme good consist in whatever it must. But this freeing of the concept from any demand for its complete and total determination, was a practical consideration of the situation of the conceptualizing cognizer, who brings a limited finite knowledge to bear on an infinite being, bearing all conditions, known and unknown, within itself. Having said this, a priori ontology can still impute a necessary structure to its concept, on the basis of what it can establish with regard to good. Later, beyond this, speculative metaphysics can suggest further possible synthetic structures and divisions of reality, of its nature as a whole, possibly affording further enlightenment with regard to "the Good".

So, what is the end, aim or goal for the being of the Good? First and foremost, it is that it should be wholly and totally good. Like all ends, it is ideal in the sense that it is that projected, put forward, ideally, by consciousness as that-to-be-realized, in the teleological-intentional structure of its transcendence. But the unique character of the ideality of the Good is that it represents the ultimate fulfilment of all projects of all consciousnesses, of all spiritual beings, striving, out of their selfness, for an unconditional state of perfect good and being, a state of perfect or absolute self-identity, in which all being-transcended is itself overcome, transcended in one whole of being.



Notwithstanding its ideality, nevertheless essential to it is that it is projected to be realized. It must be possible. It represents that fulfilment of possibility of good which leaves no possible good, nothing unfulfilled, outside itself. What is the sense of this possibility? It is that which, for consciousness, in its foreseeing projection, could be. It is that for which consciousness can actively strive, and is that for which consciousnesses have strived, do and will strive, through belief in its possibility. This belief also involves not being aware of any block or barrier to its ultimate realization which would mean its impossibility, that it could not be in that form. But the position, the situation, of any concretely cognizing and projecting human consciousness, now, in the present, is that whatever one concretely projects and is concretely engaged in realizing, though conceived as contributing to one's ultimate goal of the Good, inevitably falls short of achieving that goal. This reflects the gross imperfection of the human condition and the finitude of individual human capacities and knowledge.

The finitude of human knowledge means that there are senses of possibility and impossibility beyond what human consciousness foresees could be. Out of the unknown, unsuspected forces, unsuspected realities, could be so constituted to limit, to restrict the possibility of what consciousness, in its limited foresight, limited knowledge, believes possible. But one nevertheless knows that the unknown holds these possibilities. The unknown's conditioning of the Good is included in its conception. The Good represents the ultimately possible, known and unknown in its possibility. Now it becomes possible to arbitrate, from the point of view of a priori ontology, on the dispute between Kant's conception of the Summum Bonum and Hegel's conception of the Idea of Good. Hegel's accusation towards Kant's conception was that it left the Summum Bonum's ultimate realization as

a "mere article of faith". Hegel asserted that, unlike his own Idea, it lacked truth and actuality, beyond mere possibility, in its conception. Hegel contended that the dialectical necessity, worked through and contained in the generation of the Idea of Good, necessitates its ultimate actual being in reality and hence truth, as true knowledge of being. But what must be asked of this is where does it leave the dimension of the unknown? Hegel, as finite philosopher, as finite scientific cognizer of Being, could not justifiably claim absolute knowledge of Being as represented to be in the "Absolute Idea", including in itself the Idea of Good. The "truth" of the Idea of Good is projected, put forward, ideal, putative truth, which properly should belong to the suggestions and postulations of speculative metaphysics, not to the body of actual truth knowable by a priori ontology. It may well be that from the point of view of eternity, from some non-humanly-relative position, the Good actually and really is, as, Platonically (6) the Divine "light" of the world, and is absolutely knowable as such. But from this human perspective, within reality, that, and the ultimate realization of the Good must remain an article of faith, of rational belief. It cannot be known as ultimately realized by a priori ontology, as "transcendental knowledge", in Kant's terms. In other words, I think that, in this respect, Kant's conception established a truer knowledge than Hegel's!

(see discussion on pages 109/110).

What then are the a priori knowable conditions of the possible being of the Good? In the first place, to be, it must be realized. This confirms Hegel's position, quoted on Page 109 (7):

....., while the good on its side has in the subjective will its only means of stepping into actuality.

This means that it requires for its realization the concerted activity of all concretely existing wills, of all consciousnesses. It requires all acting in harmony with one another, such that no-one **who is**

acting and realizing own-good can either negatively affect other own-good or be negatively affected by the realization of other own-good. All activity of such a character requires a definite characterization or determination of the wills which intend it. It requires, universally, consciousness to be such that it "wills according to the concept", in Hegel's terms and is "good will", in Kant's. But as I argued earlier, in relation to Kant's conception, (page 98) such formal determination of the will, whilst necessary to realize what is universally good, it is not sufficient, of itself, to guarantee optimal realization of good. The latter also depends on the level of knowledge and insight of the consciousness willing to realize it. Thus for the supreme realization of good, the goal of consciousness seeking to know better, which I briefly discussed in relation to "valour" (page 221), must universally have found its supreme realization in a total adequacy of knowledge. Such knowledge would be, in Hegel's terms, the absolute knowledge represented by his conception of the Absolute Idea. In Kant's terms, such knowing would know what he called the "Ideal of Pure Reason", being, as cognitive object, totally determined, containing all reality, the "Omnitudo Realitas". Such supreme knowledge would have to be totally universalized in all consciousnesses, all being in this sense, as Kant expressed it, "Divine intelligences", all being, for themselves, wholly good and wholly identified with the whole of being. In other words, each and every "Divine intelligence" would be wholly identified with each and every other Divine intelligence.

Now I can discuss this in terms of Sartre's conception of every individual's fundamental project, to be, substantially, as consciousness, "in-itself", in his terms and thereby to be the "Ens Causa Sui", the self-cause, or "God". Sartre described this as an absurd pursuit of an impossible ideal, unless consciousness recognizes itself and all other selves as freedoms, which never are, in-themselves,

but which must produce themselves in relation to their existential condition. I have criticized his ontology in these respects (page 133). What I wish to draw out now is how his descriptions and representations of what consciousness ultimately seeks to be are in concordance with mine. The identity which consciousness seeks to achieve bears all difference within itself. Yet that with which it identifies itself, all other being, is, at once, both different from and the same as itself. Consciousness has the character of being "monadic", as Husserl described the concrete Ego (see Introduction, page 20). Now the realization of the supreme Good should not be regarded as a completion of activity, ending and exhausting itself. That would indeed be absurd. That would be the end of the world, a collapse into nothingness. Rather, the realization should be seen as a state of supreme activity, maintaining the supreme being of Good. Consciousness's structure of being in relation to what is other than itself, of being, in its being, "being-transcended", would, in the supreme realization of its own-good and of the Good, be maintained in itself, but perpetually as itself transcended, as overcome in its existential negativity and otherness. Thus in this respect Sartre is right: Consciousness should, as its supreme end and fundamental project will itself to be as freedom, constantly producing and recreating itself. Similarly he is correct that good, to be, must be done, produced and cannot exist without its active production. Here the limit of our concordance is reached.

I must now ask how the identified-with otherness-for-consciousness must be constituted in the being of the Good. Activity has as its condition that in relation to which it acts. For the being-in-realization of the Good, I have already described how it requires the concerted activity of all "monads" in harmony with one another. This harmonic activity must maintain and perpetuate a constant harmonizing in its transcending conditions (different for each and every "monad" due to their unique "perspectives" on the whole). This harmonizing

of all consciousness's existential conditions would consist in the all-embracing totality being wholly and optimally good, lived in wholly optimal pan-good-feeling. This pan-good-feeling would be a state of absolute "bliss". In such an absolute state, all self-realizing of good-feeling would have to realize, beyond itself, optimal other good-feeling and all other such realization would have to amplify, optimally, own good-feeling.

This means that a priori ontology can prescribe, for self-realization of own-good, that, seen in its longest-term interest, out of the eternal perspective of the being-in-realization of the Good, that its own best interest, its own greatest good, lies in acting for the greatest possible harmony and harmonization, for the good of the whole. The value of harmony, for any individual self-realizing consciousness, can be phenomenologically "read" from the world. This differs from Leibniz's notion of "pre-established harmony", a construct logically necessitated by the structure and terms of his metaphysics, according to which God had so formed the world that its substances "agree" with one another (8). Rather the harmony is not "pre-established" but must be produced by each and every consciousness, "monad", acting to produce its optimal own-good through and for others' own-good, in order to promote the realization of "the Good". Nevertheless the optimizing tendency of the harmony of goods does require, as its condition, that being be such that it is "harmonizable". It is given, discovered, to be so.

To round off this discussion of the Good, as the ultimate goal of all moral activity, the state of perfect bliss towards which all achievement of "being universally good" contributes, I should like to express this in terms of Scheler's account. This is to say that its "being-in-realization" would be a state of universal love in which all are promoting the greatest possible value of the whole and the whole would be "ens amans".

"Value" in essentially meaning the "being-good-for" applying to particular objects or states of affairs, abstractly or concretely, ideally or in reality, ranges from what is valued subjectively for one's own good, excluding consideration of others, to what is of value universally and objectively. In this latter characterization, it applies to what is universally good and relates to the Good. A value, in this sense, in so far as it exists, is universally good. Experienced ideally, such value consists in what would be universally good and as such is a end to be realized. Thus, in these terms, the ultimate value, the ultimate end to be realized, is the Good.

Now I shall move to considering the field of morality and specifically what is involved in individual being-moral. Whilst I have described the meaning of "being universally good" and of the Good, as end, what I have not yet focussed my descriptions on are the essential phenomena, given in individual experience, which lead agents to self-realize in the mode of being-moral. This is apart from my remarks on the phenomenology of "something-being-wrong" in my criticism of Kant (page 93) and on the structures of moral consciousness in my discussion of valour (page 224/5). **This question arises because in moral consciousness, one is not only conscious of others' good and of the issues involved with the conditions of others' and one's own-good, but one is motivated to promote the good of others and what is universally good.**

Schopenhaur (9) based his moral theory on compassion. According to him, human beings, in experiencing the suffering of others, suffer themselves and that therefore their moral motivations are to overcome and end this self-suffering through trying to allieviate the suffering of others. This led him to a position of metaphysical monism in which he conceived selves, whilst being distinct entities in the phenomenal, physical world of appearances, as being in reality, subjectively united

in a whole "self" of reality, such that the phenomena of compassion consist in selves experiencing themselves as united with other selves. Scheler, in his "The Nature of Sympathy" (10), strongly criticized Schopenhaur's view. He argued that Schopenhaur had confounded the phenomena of compassion or sympathy. He identified these as a distinct type of feeling within a range of feeling-states generally describable as "fellow-feeling". No doubt these feelings are involved with and in some respects and senses are the value-feelings which he identified in respect of value. He distinguished four types of fellow-feeling and said that Schopenhaur's confounding of the phenomena had consisted in treating the four types as being the same, covering-over important differences. His four types are: 1. Community of feeling, 2. Fellow-feeling proper, or "Sympathy", 3. Emotional identification and 4. Psychic contagion. 1,3 and 4 are cases where a form of identification takes place between the one who feels and the others "fellow-felt". For example, a case of psychic contagion would be in the supporters of one side, in the crowd at a football match, collectively roaring approval, disappointment or anticipatory excitement. They are united in sharing the same feelings towards the varying states of the game, but none are being self-consciously in sympathy with the others, though their feelings are very much conditioned by and moulded by the feelings of others. But in sympathy proper, according to Scheler, one takes the feeling of the other (in my terms - their own Good-feeling) as one's intentional object, such that one's sympathy is a project of sympathy in relation to having constituted and intended the meaning of what the other is feeling, towards its alleviation, in so far as it is bad, and towards its promotion, in so far as it is good. Essential to this relation is the otherness of the other and the distinct individualities of oneself and the other, in contradiction of Schopenhaur's form of monism.

Whilst I accept Scheler's distinction of the phenomena of sympathy from

those of the other forms of fellow-feeling, the former phenomena belonging generally to the moral phenomenon of willing the good of others, there is still the problem of accounting for why, in being aware of others and their feelings, their Good-feelings matter to oneself and one is motivated to promote their good in accordance with what is universally good.

In one's being-transcended, through the constitution of meaning and in intentionally having the constituted meaning of the being of others, one is presented, in feeling, with the value of others' good. The perception of the value-meaning of persons, whose constitution I discussed in Section 3, when criticizing Scheler's theory (pages 164-169), involves a self-content of being-transcended, of feeling related to others' good. Others' suffering is experienced in bad-feeling. Others' good-feeling is experienced in one's own good-feeling. The occurrence of these feelings, in the relationship of consciousness of the feelings of others, reflect the nature of the being of human consciousness. It suggests that there is a real connection between the being of other selves and one's own self, but mediated by the meaning-ideality of intentional consciousness of the other. Nevertheless, the self-feeling-of-the-being-of-the-other, establishes an ontological relatedness of selves, in the same manner that one's being-transcended, in general, establishes an ontological relatedness of oneself with what is other-than-oneself. Thus much can be established by a priori ontology. But this is limited in its scope, because certain other phenomena, contingently and not essentially given in self-experience, in relation to consciousness of others, deny that the feeling phenomena of moral consciousness must always occur. For instance, in psychopathology, some persons are encountered, known as "psychopaths", who appear or seem to be unable to feel the value of others, and appear to be only motivated by "self-love". Is this a phenomenon, as with the phenomena of "ressentiment" which I discussed in relation to Scheler and to



valour, of the falsification of value-perception and misconstruction of the value-order? I cannot attempt an explanation here. But what it does indicate is an inadequacy of a priori data, precluding a priori certainty of knowledge with regard to the nature of ontological relatedness of selves and of the whole of being. That must be a matter for speculative metaphysics to address.

What one can say is that, when one is presented with the phenomena of good, when one is objectively consciousness of what good is universally, what only can decide oneself that one must be moral, and will and act morally, are the feelings that one oneself actually experiences in relation to such awareness. In a strange way, this confirms Sartre's doctrine of authenticity. One must choose, one must decide for oneself. No objective, universal reason can determine one to be moral. Only one's own reason, springing from the self-existing of one's own feeling, of one's own good, can lead oneself to determine oneself to be moral.

But if one chooses oneself to be moral, in what does this being-moral consist, as a characterization of one's own being, rather than as a characterization of what one seeks to effect in the world? First of all, being-moral concerns one's whole existence. For example it would deny the meaning of the project of being-moral to - say - aim to be moral on Tuesdays and Fridays, but not the rest of the week! It means that one must will that everything one does, everything for which, in one's life, one is responsible, should be able to be judged as "being universally good". Such self-determination is to be "virtuous" and, in so far as one achieves this, one objectively is "virtuous". Virtue, being virtuous, consists in so living one's life that there is a balance maintained between one's own good and others' good such that one's own good can be regarded as universally good and that one's life contributes to, harmonizes with and enhances other good towards its

being universally good. Virtue can be specified and classified into particular virtues. For example, Plato, in "The Republic" (11), proposed that the human soul is trifurcated - has a threefold division into what might be called "soul-zones" of 1. Knowledge, 2. "Thumos" or "fight" or "spirit", meaning one's personal self-assertiveness and willingness to "stick up for oneself", and 3. Desire or the desires. Each of these zones has, in his account, its own virtue. The virtue of knowledge is "Wisdom", that of thumos, "Valour" and that of desire, "temperance". He also proposed a fourth virtue, "justice", which consists in the person, the "soul", balancing its three zones in harmony with one another. Aristotle, in his "Nicomachean Ethics" (12), went further and proposed, for the virtues, his doctrine of the "mean", in which each specific virtue, and virtue in general, consists in a balance, a mean, between the extremes of excess in one direction, and deficiency in the other. At this point I do not wish to take up the metaphysical aspects of their theories but rather to use their descriptive content as a means to fill-out in what being virtuous consists.

The soul-zone of "desire" corresponds, one imagines, to Kant's "faculty of desire". To it I would apportion all the needs, basic and less basic, with their possible satisfactions or realizations of good-feeling, arising from what are intentionally objectivated and made sense of as bodily appetites. Whilst the term "desire" can be applied outside such needs and wants, I think it appropriate, in drawing classificatory distinctions, to limit it thus in this context. As I said earlier in discussing the conditions of "being-universally good", each person's satisfaction of their needs of this sort, in relation to the world which is there as common condition with others, implicates others and their satisfaction of their needs. In regard of others, one's pursuit and realization of one's own satisfaction of these needs should be such that a balance is reached, that one's involvements with

others and with the world allow all others with whom one is involved to achieve the same level of self-satisfaction of these needs as oneself. But the satisfactions possible in these areas also implicate the whole body of conditions of one's own good. One's possibilities of finding satisfaction and pleasure, immediate good-feeling, in these respects, may exceed what one needs, viewed from the longest-term consideration of one's own good. What will, in its immediacy, realize quite intense pleasure, can, in its longer term effects on one's life mean suffering and displeasure. Thus for one's own good, one needs to balance one's fulfilment in respect of these needs, with the whole body of one's own good, judged in a long-term perspective. Thus temperance, being virtuous in these respects consists in balancing one's good in these respects both with others' good and with the whole of one's own good. In terms of its being the mean, one side of its imbalance is that of excess. In respect of others, this would consist in taking too much from the world and in negatively restricting others' possibilities of adequately fulfilling their needs. In respect of oneself, it consists in over-indulgence, in focussing on the good of the moment and neglecting to judge the effect of what one does on the rest of one's life. On the side of deficiency, it is not quite so obvious what is wrong with taking less than one needs. In respect of oneself, to neglect one's immediate, short-term needs, beyond dissatisfaction immediately suffered, can produce longer-term harm to one's whole good. For example, neglecting one's physical comfort can render one vulnerable to illness, not eating sufficiency can lead to deficiency-disease, loss of vitality, etc. In respect of others, failure, in relation to those others, to express an involvement with the world, in balance with those others' interests, which would adequately satisfy one's needs, represents oneself falsely. This is either in respect of what one needs, or in respect of one's intrinsic personal value, in not

maintaining that one's needs in these respects, in balance with others', should be met. Such falsification harms others in its tendency to lead others into false beliefs and attitudes towards oneself. Here one detects an overlap with the provinces of wisdom and valour. Overall, the effect of insufficient regard for the satisfaction of one's needs, ranging from the basic level, in harming one's whole good, harms one's whole possibility of realizing oneself as being universally of value. This would have the effect of depriving others of the otherwise possible levels of valuableness of one's life.

The soul-zone of "knowledge" presumably corresponds to Kant's "faculty of knowledge". To it belongs one's whole body of cognitive achievement. Its general value is firstly for one's own good, in that it represents the extent of one's hold on the world, on reality and it expresses, as means, one's capacity to transcend one's given conditions towards one's ends. Secondly, from the universal, objective point of view, it represents the extent of one's capacity to pursue what is universally good, towards the Good. Its virtue, wisdom, represents an optimum knowledge. Here a relativity of virtue becomes apparent. For there is an ideal of wisdom, corresponding to the knowledge represented as the all-knowing necessary as condition for the being-in-realization of the Good. However the virtuous wisdom possible from the present human perspective is situationally limited and confronts an "unknown", generally beyond present human capacities to know. In this context, wisdom represents a relatively optimal knowledge, one where one has one's best possible grasp of one's own good, in which this knowledge is integral to its having the dimension of being one's best possible grasp of one's relations with **others**, one's grasp of what is universally good and one's grasp of how to optimally realize oneself as universally of value.

The side of deficiency, away from the mean, is, for this virtue, unproblematic. For the less one knows, the less one's capacity to

effectively employ means to realize one's own good and to realize what is universally good and of value. Moreover, the less one knows, the more one is liable to do what is contrary to one's own good and also what is bad and wrong, universally considered, because of the pitfalls of error and false belief. Here one is reminded of Descartes' doctrine of error in his "Meditations" (13), in which he proposed that error arises because the will is infinite, but knowledge is finite. The truth of this resides in that, in pursuing one's own good, however it is good or bad, considered universally, one's choices are determined, in the immediacy of experience, by the intensity of good-feeling relating to the possible realization projected. One acts in the direction of one's best good-feeling, which is open-ended - "infinite" in Descartes' terms. But one does so in the condition of relative ignorance, of limited "finite" knowledge. This means that particular good-realizations, focussed-on and thereby realizing good-feeling, are seen in a limited light in which effects and consequences upon oneself, the world and others are left out of account and so do not themselves contribute a teleologically motivating content of feeling which could constrain or modify the balance of Good-feeling in which the choice of action is made. Thus one can "headstrongly" pursue more immediate, more intense good-feeling, in the folly and error of its longer-term damage to one's own good and its realization of what is bad or wrong in the world.

The side of excess is more problematic to characterize in its fall away from virtue. How can there be too much knowledge? One can certainly think of people who are "too clever by half", or "very clever, but very stupid". Perhaps even, after Descartes, an "evil genius". What these descriptions indicate is an imbalance in the knowledge of the knower in question. In the case of the person who is both clever and stupid, it would seem that the person's very extensive development of knowledge in one field or area of life, sits incongruously with

their relative ignorance and lack of ability in another. It also suggests that there was an excessive concentration on the acquisition of knowledge in the one area, which stunted the appropriate development of knowledge in other respects. The person who is "too clever" is so in relation with the others who find that person "too clever". Here the imbalance of knowledge reflects the person being excessively able to pursue their own good to the detriment of that of the others. That the person has excessive power relative to others is not only an imbalance of power between persons but an imbalance in the person's body of knowledge itself. For their pursuit of their own good to the detriment of others' indicates either insufficient knowledge or falsified belief regarding the relation of self's own-good to others' good in what is universally good and a corresponding lack of concern for others' good. Likewise the "evil genius" is someone using excessive knowledge to exalt themselves, not only in excluding others' good from consideration, but through active harming, through negativity to and destructiveness of others and their good. Such a person is objectively bad or evil and a negation of the universal goodness of virtue. Their knowledge reflects a falsity of belief in not recognizing the intrinsic value and the conditional value of other persons, whilst making an absolute value of their own being and own-good.

The soul-zone of "thumos" (a rough rendering of Plato's Greek word), is that of "self-assertiveness" or "spiritedness" and it entails consciousness or awareness of oneself. It is the expression of will, the character of wilfulness, be that "good will" or not! It is of active pursuit of one's interests, of one's own-good, in general, in relation to the world and to others. Correlatively, it includes the dimension of awareness of others' being-for-themselves and their interest in relation to the world, to others and to oneself. It is the province of one's self-expressive vigour or forcefulness in pursuit of one's own ends in relation to and in the face of others and the world. An organizing factor of one's concern with one's self, with one's being in general,

is one's need and self-concern for a sense of being-of-value, for "valour" in the sense that I have employed the term.

The virtue of this zone is "valour" in the traditional sense of the term, or "courage". It represents one's optimal being, as value, for all, through one's self-expressive activity in the world. It expresses the attitude of love, in the selfless sense. Perhaps I should clarify this latter term. Its selflessness should not be taken to imply a denial of oneself and one's interests in favour of others. Rather it expresses that the focus of concern is not oneself but concern for all. In this one expresses concern for oneself, but only as one member of the whole, balanced with the interests of others. Being-courageous, in one's self-asserting the value of all whose lives one is in a position to affect, in one's existential situation, is generally understood and is most clearly seen when one asserts or defends that value in the face of some danger. For example, following an earthquake, supposing there are people trapped and injured in collapsed buildings, one would be courageous if one were to enter into a building and attempt to rescue people, despite the danger of death or injury to oneself and to those others through possible further collapse. One would be identifying one's own interests with those of the others in taking on the same danger to oneself that they face and through seeking to overcome the danger to all, by rescue, rather than just self-centredly avoiding the danger oneself. In so doing, one radically asserts human value, in risking self-destruction for the sake of others.

In general, "valour", in the sense of moral-courage, is most obviously seen in the face of some adversity or other, in upholding universal human values and what is universally good in the face of those forces and tendencies which would deny them. But there is also a non-reactive or non-responsive, positively expressive form of this virtue, which consists in expression, in any particular circumstance

in which no adversity is present, of that love towards others that asserts their and all human value, universally. What distinguishes this attitude is that it chooses to so act in the possibility of not so acting, in the possibility of choosing, instead, one's self-satisfaction, more narrowly viewed, excluding, to some degree, consideration of others. In this situation, the "adversity" is oneself, in one's possibility of disregarding others for the sake of one's desires or own-good in some other respect. The possible involvement of "desire" shows the interconnectedness of soul-zones. The person expressing love and upholding universal human values, is valorous, judged universally and objectively. But that person is also likely to experience a fulfilling sense of personal value, for themselves, "valour" in my technical sense. In this circumstance one's valour would be a strong inner morale, supporting and encouraging one's loving upholding of human values, in the face of whatever adversity one encounters.

The side of deficiency, away from this virtue, can be described as cowardice or moral-cowardice. In the face of danger, one prefers one's own good, in the avoidance of possible harm to oneself, over the good of others which one could uphold at the risk of personal harm. In general, it consists in choosing oneself and one's own good, rather than the good of others in the respect of its being rightfully theirs. Cowardice corresponds to the condition of valour-pathology in which the person, experiencing a lack of sense of personal value, particularly in the intrinsic sense, excessively pursues or asserts their own personal value, in the face of and to the detriment of the value of others.

The side of excess is that of "rashness" or "foolhardiness". This consists in acting towards the good of others, excessively, in negligence towards one's own due good. For example, in the earthquake situation, cited earlier, one might express one's concern to excavate



and evacuate others from the collapsed building, in such a hasty, frenzied fashion, that one's actions cause a further collapse on one's own head and needlessly throws away one's life. In doing this, one has permanently deprived all others of the value of one's existence and of one's power to do good in the world. One has undervalued one's life in its context of the social whole. In circumstances other than that of common danger or adversity, that excessive devotion to others in which one fails to adequately assert the value of one's own life is, effectively, to invite others to undervalue oneself and hence do wrong to oneself. Similarly it would tend to undermine the universality of human value, in letting oneself be afforded, by others, less than is one's due in life. These latter remarks tie in with what was said of the deficiency side away from the mean of temperance and once again reflect the interconnectedness of the soul-zones, as distinguished by Plato. They constitute together a higher unity, in which the person's being-moral, being virtuous, altogether, can be considered.

For this unity of the person, embodying the threefold articulation of the aspects or "zones" of personal existence, Plato proposed the virtue of "justice". So, in what does justice consist? It presupposes that, in each zone considered separately, virtue prevails. Thus it must consist in how the zones inter-relate. In the whole person they need to complement one another. They need to coexist congruously so that each benefits and amplifies the value of the others in harmonious balance. Each, in its own respect is also a means to the other zones in their respects and in that relation there is an optimum point of balance. Thus the pursuit of knowledge, balanced in itself as wisdom, enlightens both one's self-satisfaction in attaining the objects of one's desires and one's self-expression as being-of-value in the world. But in the whole of one's life, beyond a certain degree, what one devotes to knowledge can take away from the

fulfilment of one's needs, in balance with the needs of others, and so depress one's possible well-being, itself means to one's whole good. Likewise it can take away from one's self-investment in the world, pursuing, realizing and upholding what is universally valuable. Similarly, one's well-being, realized through the satisfaction of one's needs, temperately balanced, contributes both to one's pursuit of knowledge and to one's self-assertive pursuit of value. But on one side of an optimum level, relatively less well-being would limit one's capacity to attain wisdom and hamper one's self-realization as a value. On the other side, devotion to one's well-being, however temperately balanced, can detract from one's devotion to self-realization in the other respects. Finally, one's self-realization in being, universally, a value, has an optimum possibility in harmony with one's sufficient well-being in one respect and wisdom in the other.

But the demands of justice for overall virtuous being-moral, for oneself, do not just consist in one's being balanced in relation to one's personal existence considered in the sphere of one's own-good. It also demands that one be optimally balanced in one's relations with others in the world. One's optimal self-realization, as a value, balanced with one's temperate satisfaction of one's needs and pursuit of wisdom, should be such that, in relation to others, it optimally promotes others' good, that again residing in their optimal being as value. Justice, being-just, demands that one should promote the possibility of all people being adequately able to satisfy their needs, that one should promote the possibility of all being able to gain knowledge and develop wisdom and that one should promote the possibility for every person to realize themselves as being optimally of value.

These then, judged from a universal, objective perspective, are the requirements incumbent on any individual to lead a morally good life. But viewing persons collectively, in social unity, raises further questions regarding what is optimally good. For the moral

considerations apply to what is possible for each individual in their circumstances. Justice, though, is not just an individual virtue, but is something which, on a social level, can exist objectively, to varying degrees, in the concatenation of human relations in the social whole. The social institution of Law as a mediation of face to face relations between individuals in relation to the world can promote and serve as a universal means to the promotion of the objective existence of justice. Law would need to promote the same as it is incumbent on individuals to promote in order to be just.

Law, as universal means, in prescribing possible human relations, for the promotion of what is universally good, is concerned with right and wrong. Law, to the end of justice, to the end of what, universally, is the condition of the possibility of social existence being universally good, should seek to establish rights, the concrete instantiation of what is right, of what ought to be, in human relations and in what are individual human being's possibilities. At the same time, Law should seek to prohibit crimes, the concrete instantiations of wrong, of what ought not to be in human relations and in individual human being's possibilities.

"Evil", in its primary sense of "evil-will", is not just a deformation, a state (in general, the usual) of human imperfection, in relation to being-moral. It is its antithesis. I described its formal characteristics in the weaker and stronger senses, earlier. As what is willed, evil is motivated. As the antithesis of what is universally good, as wrong, both in the will and in what it realizes in the world, it ought not to be and it ought to be negated. On the social level, Law, in terms of its universal means, ought to negate evil. As I argued in relation to Hegel's theory of retribution (pages 115/6), it ought to seek to retribute the wrong suffered as the result of evil acts and to negate the evil-will of the "criminal" to attempt to motivate that person to will what is universally good and to recognize

their crime as such. To that end I proposed that responsibility for the restitution of the wrong should be borne by the criminal, to the extent that that itself is in balance with what is just, including the good of the criminal. But the demand for restitution, in so far as, justly, it is beyond the capacity of the criminal to retribute, should be prescribed by the law for the community to retribute.

Returning to the evil-will as such, as essential possibility, it is a given of a priori ontology. As discussed in relation to hatred, resentment and human destructiveness in general (pages 180-2, 196-201), one essential possibility of the motivation of evil-will is the non-fulfilment of the need for valour, for a sense of being-of-value, intrinsically. This offers a clue to the possibly effective universal means which Law, or individuals, could apply to counteract and attempt to negate evil-will. What one wills reflects one's consciousness, what one knows and what one believes. It reflects the degree that one lives "in-the-truth" and the degree one lives "in-untruth". It also reflects the existence of one's needs, desires and wants, and the degree that these are fulfilled or unfulfilled. Thus in considering the motivation of evil-will, all these factors need to be taken into account. So in the case of the evil-will resulting from an unfulfilled need for valour, that becomes an organizing theme around which to make the evil-will intelligible, in the context of all the factors involved.

I shall first take the weaker, "sin of omission" sense of evil-will. For example, in the house in which one lives, live a number of other people, each, including oneself, having a room of their own, whilst sharing other facilities. One of the other occupants owns and possesses a sophisticated "hifi" unit, whereas one does not, oneself. The ownership of the hifi is a property right, enshrined in the law and generally socially recognized. Let us assume, for the sake of this example, that the context of the ownership makes it a perfectly

just and fair power to dispose on the part of the owner. One enjoys friendly relations with the hifi owner and, having been invited into their room to listen to records, is aware of the presence and ownership of the hifi. This leads one to devise a plan and, at an opportune moment, to execute it. One takes the hifi unit, goes into town with it and sells it to a second-hand dealer. With the proceeds one buys cigarettes, sweets and some cans of beer, which was the possibility one saw as potential in the other occupant having the hifi unit. In analysing this event, I shall start with one's consciousness, what one knows and believes in willing and committing this act. One is aware of the other person as a person and, in being friendly with them, affords that person some recognition of their needs as a person. One is aware of the value of the hifi to the owner. One is aware of the externally instituted property-right. One is aware of the social exchange-value of the hifi. But one is not strongly aware of or affected by the injury one causes the hifi owner through the theft. Awareness of the possible harm to oneself in offending against the law produces one's sneaky guile in executing the theft. But neither the thought of the other's hurt, nor the reflection of the danger of such non-recognition to oneself and one's own property rights, produces much awareness or feeling in oneself.

Turning now to one's body of needs, etc, and their relative fulfilment, one experiences oneself being afforded an existence by the world, by the community of other people, but little else. One's basic needs are met, but only just. One has "food, clothing and shelter". One has no job and so one's needs are met from state benefits. One's education has taught one some basic living skills but gives one little hope of getting a job and being able to achieve self-fulfilment beyond one's basic existence. One is relatively isolated as a person, having little in the way of expressed care to oneself and only superficially civil/

friendly relations with people living in the same house. In this situation, one feels little valued. One is insecure in that one is beholden to the state and what it deems it will afford oneself for one's existence. It is not directly within one's power to provide for oneself. Moreover, in this state of dependence, one is only afforded a limited personal recognition, a limited existence. One's social condition is such that one cannot see an avenue of self-realization, of valuable fulfilment in which one feels one has human dignity. This is experienced painfully as a lack. In this lack, which one feels but little understands, one's awareness and recognition of others is deficient. In not feeling oneself valued and recognized in existential rights affording oneself the possibility of a fulfilling life, one's consciousness of others is such that one does not see that they need a fulfilling life and need certain conditions, instituted recognitions and rights, in order to coexist with others and their needs, or at least one only feels this vaguely. In not sensing one's own value as a person, one fails to recognize it in others.

This then provides the context of one's project of committing the theft. One foresees the short-term possibilities afforded and can feel, in anticipation, the comfort and pleasures one can provide for oneself. Against this, the motivating force, the feeling in the face of the danger of punishment, also awareness of harm to the other, is relatively weaker and allows one to commit the act. I have called this a "sin of omission" because, whilst it is a positive act causing harm to another person, it was not motivated to the end of harming the other person, but rather for one's short-term satisfaction and comfort, an assertion, as it were, of one's own value. One's awareness of the effect of one's action on the other is weak.

Before I try to analyse how this can be counteracted, I should like to advance a second example, of the stronger case of the "sin of commission", of the active intention to harm another. Let us take the

same scenario as for the preceding example, only this time, instead of stealing the hifi, one goes secretly into the other's room, with a jug of water, and pours it into the hifi unit so as to ruin it and render it inoperable.

In this case, one's objective is to harm the other. It is an act of malice or spite, a form of resentment. One perceives the other person being afforded an existential life-value in their owning, having the property-right over the hifi and in thereby being able to realize satisfaction for themselves. But one's perception of the other in this relation does not produce in oneself a recognition of their personal value and their right to personal self-satisfaction and to their own good. In perceiving the person, one brings no pre-existing attitude of love to bear on the person, nor is one generated. Rather its antithesis, a form of negativity or hatred, to a degree, is motivated.

One perceives the other's being-valued against one's own sense, relatively speaking, of not-being-valued. This one experiences as unfair. Why should the other be afforded the value, have the satisfaction of and pleasure in owning the hifi, when one, oneself, cannot? This hurts! And who is responsible for this hurt to oneself? Why - it is the other person! One is motivated to end the hurt and one's means to do so, one perceives, is to harm the other in the respect of their hurting oneself and, thereby, to "pay them back"! Deprived of the use of the hifi, the other lacks the "unfair" dimension of value and cannot have the pleasure which one cannot oneself have. Honour is satisfied!

Here one sees the generation of false value-belief in the perception of the other, leading to the act of negativity. For, in reality, the other person could not be held responsible for one's poor sense of personal value. Nor should they have been denied their satisfaction in the hifi. One's deficient valour-sense was generated in the

concatenation of one's life-circumstances across time.

How can the generation of such evil-will and its correlative commission of wrongs be counteracted? In the social conditions in which the institution of Law can operate, its prescription of and promotion of rights needs to comprehend the general and universal conditions wherein lie the possibilities of the whole good of each and every member of the social ensemble. On the general, "constitutional" level, Law should provide for every individual member of society, the right to the conditions in life that give them the possibility of leading a satisfying and fulfilling life, in so far as these conditions are collectively possible. Thus every individual member of society should be afforded the objective recognition, in that aspect and part of life in which one is dependent, that one is intrinsically valuable. This is a basic condition of human equality, of sameness. Property rights should be so formulated that their distribution is such that all can engage effectively with the world, within the **constraint of individual capabilities, both for the** satisfaction of basic needs and for one's needs beyond this, within the limits of collective possibility. Beyond basic needs all need conditions allowing for a fulfilling life in which one can realize oneself objectively, for all, as a value. Conditions allowing individuals to develop their consciousnesses and personal powers to be self-responsible, this as means to the former requirements, should be constitutionally enshrined.

Away from the social institution of Law, it is incumbent on every individual to uphold human value, to love and to provide a loving environment to others. There is only one **justifiable** human attitude and that is Love. In the words of Bob Dylan (14):

Love is all there is, it makes the world go 'round,

Love and only love, it can't be denied .....



Appendix: Speculative Metaphysical Suggestions Regarding the  
Meaning and Structure of the Whole of Being and  
How Good is Integrated in this Whole

I

At this stage, I need to talk about my intention and purposes in writing this final part of my Thesis. In my Introduction I outlined my view of philosophy having two "ends", those of the approach through a priori ontology and of that through speculative metaphysics (page 3). Of metaphysics or ontology I said I regard either as the fundamental scientific discipline, science of the sciences, dealing with reality or being as a whole and in general. It can provide the fundamental senses or meaning-axioms of the specific sciences.

Using a phenomenological method, I have sought to show, as fully as possible in the domain of a priori ontology, what "good" essentially is. This relies on that self-evidence which, on principle, any person can discover for themselves by turning to their own experience. But during the course of my presentation, I have a number of times indicated essential possibilities, themselves a priori, which refer to matters whose nature and truth are beyond what I can phenomenologically demonstrate.

Some of the issues which I deferred for consideration in this part are:

- a) Whether entities identified as lifeless physical things have a being which is their own, conscious self-existence in some form of complexes of relations of selfness and otherness (pages 33/4).
- b) Whether the whole of being, Kant's "omnitudo Realitas", "Ens Realissimum", "Ens Originarium", "Ens Summum" and "Ens Entium", is God,

a Divine creative will, intelligence and substance of all that is (pages 83-6). Similarly with Hegel's "spiritual monism" of the "Absolute Idea" (page 113).

- c) Whether there are higher spiritual entities than human beings - angels, archangels, etc (page 260).
- d) Whether consciousness and hence "own-good" pertains to plant, cellular and mineral beings (page 260).
- e) Whether and in what way different selves, consciousnesses, are ontologically related to one another. In other words can the being of one consciousness be constitutive of another (pages 269/270)?

I talked of my speculative metaphysics approaching its objects of consideration by thought (page 3). I want to think about the realities and entities concerned with "good" and in relation to the whole of being embracing "good". My investigations have principally concerned human beings. I now wish to consider human beings and their "good" in the context of the whole of reality, of the human "cosmic" environment. Whilst I have referred, briefly, to possibilities of relations of "good" beyond human relations in the human world, I wish to indicate where my speculative thoughts and beliefs lead me, showing how I conceive this overall context of "good" and how it transcends the human world.

Whatever I postulate or suggest in this area will belong to the realm of possible truth, which encompasses the whole province of the unknown and uncertain beyond what can be known certainly, a priori. I cannot vouchsafe from the self-evidence of my own experience the truth of what I shall put forward. However, as I sought to show in my discussion of Husserl's epistemology, truth is a question of evidence (pages 8/9). Hence to believe that particular possible states of affairs are, in fact, true, without these possibilities being directly confirmed by evidence as actualities, one needs indications of possible evidences which would give one "reason to believe".

Our dubitable beliefs about our human relations to the Earth and its

wider cosmic environment, our "world-views", rest on such evidential indications. I mentioned the scientific induction of the specific sciences (page 9). In this form of theoretical speculation, hypotheses, ideal "pictures" or conceptual formulations of how particular structures of being may be related, are put forward. Then subsequent, a posteriori experience is interrogated to see if it conforms to the postulated relations. Now this conforming of experiential data to scientific hypotheses is evidential indication of the sort which I have just discussed. But it is imperfect evidence. The conforming to pictured conceptual formations is not proof-positive that these relations pertain in reality. It can indicate that it is possible that they pertain and that it is probable that future experience will likewise conform. It can provide confidence to act on the assumption of the truth of the hypotheses.

## II

I must similarly look for evidential indications in support of my metaphysical speculations. The world-view which I shall presently expound is one to which I have been led by a series of such indications. These in fact changed my previous convictions which corresponded to the atheistic materialism of physical science. In our present Western cultural milieu there are two predominant, different but related world-views.

The first is that of physical science. It believes that ultimately everything consists of matter and that everything can be understood in terms of relations of fundamental "particles" of matter - molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles, etc. In this world-view, even human consciousness is believed to be capable of being accounted for by physical relations, by brain processes, biochemistry, etc. In support of this world-view is the weight of the tremendous successes of the

physical sciences in the last two hundred years or so, with their practical proofs and demonstrations. This was instrumental in determining my former world-view.

The second major world-view is that promulgated by conventional orthodox Christian religion. According to this, God has created the universe, humanity and the world. God is the ultimate spiritual Being, standing outside the physical universe. Nearly 2,000 years ago Jesus-Christ was born, the Son of God, to save mankind. God, the Divine Being, is pictured as a trinity, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Obviously there is very much more to this world-view which I cannot go into here.

The point I wish to draw out is how these two world-views co-exist and what led me to opt for the former rather than the latter.

The scientific world-view is proud of its "proofs" and "empirical verifications" of its hypotheses, which are frequently elevated in conviction to being scientific "laws", such as the so-called "Law of Conservation of Mass and Energy". These defy disbelief.

In contrast the Christian world-view relies on very different sources. There is the religious tradition carried down by the Churches and there is the "Word of the Lord", the content of the Bible. These speak authoritatively of how things stand, with a weight of pre-existing belief, reverence and authority in support. But those concerned with this body of beliefs, generally, do not engage in a scientific manner in challenging the exclusions, axioms and truths or otherwise of the contrary scientific world-view. It is as though the Christian world-view wishes to co-exist with the scientific. This coexistence is to include the spiritual realm, outside the physical world, belief in the spiritual resting on the traditional teachings and the authority of the Churches.

In the context of these predominant world-views and in the absence of any especial religious experiences - of spiritual feelings, intuitions or insights - I was led to ask "how can I know that there is a God? .....

..... an afterlife?", etc. No evidences were produced and I was offered nothing with a power of conviction comparable to the supports of the scientific world-view.

But I was eventually led by a chain of "evidential indications" to my present world-view which, I believe, transcends and makes sense of the two world-views which I have just sketched. To begin with, existential phenomenology brought me to a recognition of experience, of conscious existence, in its own right as that which can be understood and investigated in its own terms, rather than its being interpreted through its physical correlates. It also led me to question the epistemological bases of otherwise firmly held scientific beliefs. Subsequently I encountered a great number of varied and different accounts of experiences, of phenomenally given events, whose contents did not belong to the consensible experiences of everyday life. In isolation, I could dismiss or rationalize away such accounts, maybe regarding them as hallucinatory, phantasied or just plain mistaken. However, their accretion brought me to a point where the "reason to believe" which they provided exceeded my reluctance to abandon the security provided by my former world-view. They led me to believe that there is a spiritual realm, that not only does the physical not exhaust reality, but that physical reality is to be understood in terms of the spiritual.

### III

In my Introduction (pages 4/5) I alerted the reader to the fact that for this final part I shall be drawing heavily on the works of Rudolf Steiner. Having been led by a large body of works and of accounts of spiritual reality to change my world-view, I feel I should explain why I am concentrating on Steiner's "spiritual science". Steiner's

is the largest body of works presenting an integrated account, by a single author, that I have encountered. Steiner wrote a considerable number of books elaborating spiritual science and, in addition, in the early part of this century, up to his death in 1924, he gave in excess of 6,000 lectures, many of which have been published as lecture cycles. This extensive body of reference has allowed me to compare much of the content of other accounts of spiritual reality.

For example, Carlos Casteneda wrote a series of books progressively detailing his initiation in a Yaqui Indian way of Knowledge, in sorcery, gaining occult experiences, powers, insight and wisdom (1). I have been fascinated to discover many parallels between his accounts and Steiner's.

Again, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi in his "Commentary on the Bhagavad-Gita, Chapters 1-6" (2), talks of the spiritual reality underlying this world and purports to find support for the practice of his Transcendental Meditation technique, as a means of gaining access to that world. In his respect, I found Steiner's book "The Occult Significance of the Bhagavad-Gita" (3) gave me insight into the conditions surrounding the origination of the "Gita", allowing my ability to make critical assessment of ~~the~~ validity of Maharishi's reliance on that source of authority.

When Steiner began his elaboration of Spiritual Science, he founded the German section of the Theosophical Society. As a result of subsequent differences, he broke away from the Theosophical Society and founded the Anthroposophical Society. Having read a number of Theosophical works, by Blavatsky, Besant, etc (4) and by comparison having read Steiner's "The Occult Movement in the Nineteenth Century" (5), I was able to interpret critically the former in the light of the latter.

The consistency and integrated inter-relatedness of Steiner's writings and his many-sided approaches to his subject have encouraged me to have

confidence in his accounts. But over and above this, what inspires my confidence is the fact that Steiner authentically conducted his researches himself. His claims and descriptions regarding spiritual reality were, by his own account, the results of his own supersensible observation and experience. He did not rely on the written occult tradition, nor on such means as non-insightful but supposedly revelatory pronouncements through mediumistic deposition. I find the authenticity of his accounts a strong evidential indication to believe in their veracity.

#### IV

Rudolf Steiner was an extraordinarily gifted person who claimed an awareness of and direct perception of spiritual reality in other, higher worlds, or planes, or dimensions of reality, not accessible to our everyday, physical perception of reality. As already noted, he founded the anthroposophical movement in which he sought to conduct and disseminate the results of spiritual scientific positive research into the whole realm of "supersensible" spiritual reality to be put at humanity's disposal for its further guidance. More profoundly, he was promoting a more general and greater degree of spiritual awareness and understanding throughout humanity. This was in his recognition that this is needed to better guide and enlighten human praxis and human relations in evolutionary progress towards a greater overall good.

#### V

On the above basis, the most general and fundamental postulation which I wish to make is that reality is, in its being, primarily spiritual, as a whole and in its particularity, diversity and individualisation. By "spiritual" I mean that this primary being has the character of active, self-disclosing, openness of being, the character of

Self-moving-self-feeling-self-existence, of consciousness.

To further specify and elaborate the descriptive picture of this postulation in sketchy outline, drawing on Steiner's indications: the spiritual cosmos is hierarchically ordered and organized.

At its source or origin is the trinitarian Godhead. This interpenetrates and subsumes all other being, which has issued from its original creativity. "Descending" from the Godhead are nine hierarchies of spiritual Beings, which again all interpenetrate and interact.

"Beneath" these hierarchies are the human realm, the animal, plant and mineral realms. These all interpenetrate and are interpenetrated by the spiritual hierarchies and the Godhead. Human beings are a medium through which different hierarchies of Beings can achieve interaction.

From this can be seen that in this constant interaction and interpenetration of beings, there is an exchange and reciprocity, a mutuality of co-existence whereby the whole, and all constitutive beings, are involved in a process of evolution, and in which there is a mutual interconnection and interdependence of "own-good". Humanity benefits and evolves with the activity within of the spiritual hierarchies and Godhead, and they in turn benefit, or suffer, through the activities of human beings.

Of his perception in spiritual realms beyond the ordinary powers of perception and what is accessible through "sensible" perception, of his "supersensible" insight or "clairvoyant" vision, Steiner was not claiming powers beyond those possible for any other human being.

Whilst extraordinary, these powers are possibilities for all human beings. Steiner described a course of activity whereby these powers may be developed and, thereby, knowledge of the "higher worlds" achieved (6). I must recognize that, however, in so far as what I am describing as possible structures of reality, are my recounting of descriptions given by Steiner, I do so on the authority of his grounds



supporting his claimed insights and knowledge, rather than on the basis of my own insight and experience of direct evidence. Thus in my exposition, it is expression of what I believe, notwithstanding the rational grounds for my believing, in what lies beyond my direct experience and is what, for myself, is capable of refutation.

My objective now is to present a picture of the spiritually conceived cosmos and of the essential relations within it of humanity, to try to evoke a sense of its nature. But what one needs to bear in mind is that to draw this picture I can only use images from the common province of ordinary experience, yet these images are employed to suggest what exists beyond the forms of this experience, analogically as it were. So what is hoped is that the meanings, senses, evoked are like what one would experience were one able to see directly into these realms.

Of the relation of humanity to the cosmos, Steiner spoke of the "macrocosm" and the "microcosm" (7). He cited Goethe, in "Faust", calling the whole cosmos "the great world" and the human being "the small world". Steiner pictured the human being, in our present state of being, as having distinct senses which are relatively static zones. He distinguished twelve senses. In contrast to these relatively fixed zones he pictured there being relatively mobile, dynamic

life processes, like breathing, which permeate and move through the sense-zones. He distinguished seven life processes. At (8), he said

The zones of the twelve senses can be seen as a kind of human zodiac. Flowing through all these sense-zones are the seven life processes: breathing, warming, nourishing, secretion, maintenance, growth and reproduction.

He spoke of the microcosm mirroring the macrocosm. Thus he likened the twelve senses to the fixed constellations, whilst the mobile life

processes move through them like the motion of the planets relative to the constellations. At (9), he said

So we are justified in speaking, let us say, of the forces of secretion being in the sphere of the sense of sight, .....  
.....- just as we speak in astronomy of Saturn being in the Ram or of the Sun standing in the Lion.

Steiner was suggesting that macrocosmic processes influence and are reflected in the corresponding microcosmic processes, giving credence to astrological conceptions,

In his work "Occult Science an outline" (10) Steiner gave his most comprehensive account of the nature of humanity, the relation of humanity with the evolution of the world, the relation to higher worlds and the present and future evolution of the world and of humanity. This work is a successor and continuation of the account given in his work "Theosophy" (11) which he sub-titled as "An Introduction to the Supersensible Knowledge of the World and the Destination of Man".

In "Theosophy", in speaking of the essential nature of human beings (12), he described the human being as partaking of threefold division into body, soul and spirit. The human corporeal nature partakes of three forms of existence, mineral, plant and animal. Through mineral existence, the human being is related to everything visible. Through plant-like existence one is related to all beings that grow and propagate their species; through animal existence to all those that perceive their surroundings. But there is a fourth, distinctly human form of corporeal existence, relating to the finer, inner construction of the nervous system and especially the brain.

To one's soul nature, Steiner ascribed the body of sensory material, which is uniquely one's own, through which one perceives the outer world. Related to this is the body of feeling (Good-feeling in my terms) and thirdly, the province of the human will, from which,

out of the inner soul nature, the soul expresses itself outwardly in its voluntary activity. The soul nature, as it were, stands at the heart of the human being, receiving, on the one hand, what is physically perceived from without or through and in relation to one's physical body, which, in having its own nature, confronts the soul with natural necessity.

But on the other hand there is additionally one's spiritual nature, For one thinks about one's perceptions and voluntary acts. Thinking belongs to one's spiritual nature. Through thinking one gains knowledge of the world. But one's thinking also applies to one's acts and through this thinking one gives some form of reasonable coherence to one's life. In this the issue of the value of one's actions in relation to one's worth as a person, gives organizing direction to one's acts. In one's thinking, one voluntarily subjects oneself to the laws of thought, for the sake of correct knowing and acting. This, for Steiner, expresses one's essential spiritual nature.

Thus far in his descriptions of essential human nature, Steiner has not gone beyond what corresponds to what is phenomenologically self-evident. Beyond this point he began to describe what is "supersensible".

In talking about the distinctive organization of the human physical body, Steiner introduced the conception of what he called the "etheric" body, a body of formative forces. The presence of etheric forces are what distinguish the living from the non-living. Thus in a purely physical, lifeless entity, for example a quartz crystal, its mineral form of organization comes from the physical forces inherent in the silicon and oxygen combined in it. The etheric body of formative forces is what is present in any living being which prevents its collapse into a purely physical or mineral form of existence. This body of formative forces is different for each species of living being.

The form of each is propagated through inheritance, in the passage of the germ cells from one being to the next, containing the body of etheric formative forces. The distinctive form of organization of the mineral structures of the human physical body owes this form to its distinctive etheric body. The forms of organization resulting from the interaction of physical and etheric in the human being owe their forms to what is, in a sense, the "purpose" of the human being. Organized around the brain and nervous system, it is uniquely adapted to enable thinking. At the moment of death, the human physical body dissolves into the lifeless mineral world. Likewise, the etheric body dissolves into the etheric world.

Thus the first level of supersensible reality introduced by Steiner is that of bodies of formative forces which interact with physical reality in living beings. These forces also have a distinct world in which they exist when not specifically giving form to living beings. One's etheric body and the etheric world are not perceptible by physical sense organs. Rather they are perceptible by a specific, "higher", sense organ, itself supersensible.

Like one's physical body, the etheric body is still external to one's inner, soul being. Steiner distinguished the soul activity expressed in the meaningful self-having of one's body of sensory material, as the "sentient soul", a human member, once again, supersensible, perceivable by another specific "higher" sense organ, itself supersensible. The activity of the sentient soul depends entirely on the etheric body, in conjunction with a properly-formed physical body. The supersensibly perceived sentient soul, though limited by the physical body, extends itself beyond and is somewhat greater than the physical body. Steiner distinguished the sentient soul from what he called the "soul body". This latter is that part of the sentient soul that is united with the etheric body in the physical body exerting a limiting force on the sentient soul.

In this linkage of the sentient soul with the physical body through the etheric body, it is a finer part of the etheric body which is united with the sentient soul, whereas the coarser part of the etheric body is united with the physical. Similarly dependent upon the physical, through the etheric, alongside its sensory experience, the sentient soul experiences feelings of desire, aversion, impulses, instincts and passions, that part of "Good-feeling" which is bodily dependent.

As already said, the soul nature stands between and interacts with, on the one side, the physical body and on the other, thinking - the spirit. In the human being, the activity of thinking first serves the sentient soul. It reflects on what is otherwise instinctive and impulsive and one finds the means to gratify one's feelings. As sentient soul, one is related to animals, which also experience sensory contents, impulses, passions and instincts. But animals respond and act in relation to these immediately, having no dimension of independent thought with which to transcend them. In thought's permeation of the sentient soul, the soul is raised and actually membered in a higher power, which can be called the intellectual soul. This intellectual soul permeates the sentient soul. The higher perception which has the organ of perception capable of supersensibly perceiving the soul perceives the intellectual soul as a separate member entity **contrasting** with the mere sentient soul.

Thinking leads one beyond one's personal life. The knowledge and truth which one arrives at with one's thinking have universal significance. They are, as it were, laws of the universe. In the grasping of truth by the intellectual soul, one connects oneself with something whose value is in itself rather than being a transitory event in oneself. This applies likewise to the truly good. One's moral goodness detaches from and is independent of one's inclinations and passions, in as much

as one's soul, rather than being commanded by them, rules them. Moral goodness, in one's nature, has an "eternal" value in itself (corresponding to what I called "universal and objective"), not received from the sentient soul. By connecting oneself, in one's inner being, with the self-existent true and good, one rises above being merely, in one's inner being, sentient soul. As Steiner said (13),

An imperishable light is kindled in it. In so far as the soul lives in this light, it is participant in the eternal and unites its existence with it. What the soul carries within itself of the true and the good is immortal in it. Let us call what shines forth in the soul as eternal, the consciousness soul.

This is a third member of the soul, distinguished in its independence of sentience and impulse. Just as the soul is limited, as it were, from beneath, by the physical organism, so the spiritual works downwards into the soul from above, expanding it, freeing it.

For the seer, in relation to the whole human being, the physical body, as coarsest structure, lies within others that mutually interpenetrate it and each other. The etheric fills the physical body giving it its life-form. The soul body (or "astral shape" as Steiner also here called it) extends beyond this on all sides. Beyond this extend the sentient soul and then the intellectual soul whose extent grows larger the more of the true and good it takes into itself. One who only lived for satisfaction of inclinations and impulses would have an intellectual soul whose bounds would correspond to those of the sentient soul. These seer-seen organizations can be called the "human aura".

In the course of one's development, one comes to the point where one perceives oneself as a distinct entity, as an "I". In one's "I", one unites all one's experiences as a being endowed with body and soul. In regarding one's "I" as one's true being, one may describe one's body and soul as "sheaths" within which one lives and through which

one acts. As one becomes increasingly ruler of one's body and soul, one becomes increasingly independent in one's Egohood, increasingly a free being. For a seer, this is expressed in the aura. The more this is so, the more definitely organized, the more varied and the more richly coloured is the human aura. The "I" is seen as effect, but is, itself, supersensibly invisible. The "I", in letting the thoughts of truth and goodness stream into oneself, as a spiritual light of the eternal, itself becomes **radiant**, vivifying one's aura. As Steiner said (14)

The "I" lives in body and soul, but the spirit lives in the "I". The spiritual, in Steiner's sense, is the eternal. It has nothing to do with becoming or perishing. To the extent that the "I" has admitted the spiritual, one is eternal. To the extent that one dwells in body and soul, one is perishable.

In the spirit living in the "I", it does so as its sheath. It forms and develops the "I". In this form, Steiner called it the "spirit self", because it is the spirit manifesting itself as human being. It differs from the consciousness soul, since the eternally true and good, taken into oneself, is bound up with oneself and individualized in one's "I".

In the "I", just as the physical world is revealed in what is lived as "sentience", so the spiritual world is revealed and made manifest through, or as, "intuition". Intuition is, as it were, spiritual seeing, but should not be identified with supersensible perception. Thus in perceiving, say, a plant, not only physical perception but spiritual intuition operate, in varying degrees, which is reflected in how insightful are the thoughts and conceptions one forms of the plant.

Just as one's "I" is separated from the physical world as an independent being through one's physical body, so the "I", as spiritual being, is separated from the whole spiritual world, in its having, as it were, a "spiritual body", analogically formed from the forces and

substances of the spiritual world. Steiner called the human character of being an independent spiritual being, "spirit man".

The boundary, within which lives the physical body, separating it from the rest of the physical world, is the skin. Yet within the physical world, as independent physical entity, it is still part of the physical world. So is the case with the spiritual world. There is a "spiritual skin" separating the spirit man from the unitary spiritual world in which one lives as an independent spiritual being. Steiner called the spiritual skin, or "auric sheath", the "spirit sheath". This expands with expanding human spiritual development.

Just as the physical body is built up and maintained by the etheric formative forces, so the spirit man is built up by spiritual life forces. Thus corresponding to the etheric body is an etheric spirit in reference to the spirit man. Steiner entitled this spiritual etheric analogue "life spirit". Thus he was able to picture the spiritual nature of the human being as composed of three parts, spirit man, life spirit and spirit self.

For a seer whose clairvoyance penetrates these spiritual regions, human spiritual nature, as the higher truly spiritual part of the aura, is perceptible. Within the spirit sheath, the spirit man, through and as life spirit, takes in spiritual nourishment from the surrounding spiritual world and the sheath can be seen as it expands continually. The human spirit can expand to unlimited extent. The human aura, supersensibly perceptible, thus has two interpenetrating parts, one which is given colour and form by physical existence and the other by spiritual existence, separated by the "I". This is such that the physical is so formed to allow a soul to live within it and the "I" allows the spirit to develop within itself, permeating the soul, the latter having received this goal from the spiritual world.



In the course of this account Steiner has named nine members of the whole human being:

- |                 |                      |               |
|-----------------|----------------------|---------------|
| A Physical body | D Sentient soul      | G Spirit self |
| B Etheric body  | E Intellectual soul  | H Life spirit |
| C Soul body     | F Consciousness soul | I Spirit man  |

In the Earthly human being, as opposed to any of the other planetary incarnations, something to be described later, C and D are in unity, as are F and G, leaving seven members of the Earthly human being:

- |                      |                                    |              |
|----------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1 Physical body      | 4 Intellectual soul                | 7 Spirit man |
| 2 Etheric body       | 5 Spirit-filled consciousness soul |              |
| 3 Sentient soul body | 6 Life spirit                      |              |

Because these distinct members interpenetrate and exert influences upon one another, schematic representation of this sevenfold division of the human being can draw these distinctions differently, to give different emphases and greater meaning clarity. The thinking "I" stands at the centre of the human being, participating in body, soul and spirit. The "I" forms, as it were, a soul kernel, the nub or innermost part of the human being, having the consciousness soul and intellectual soul as its sheaths, whilst for its part being the sheath of the spirit self. That part of the soul which principally related to the physical through the etheric, Steiner redescribed, in line with older terminological usages, the "astral body. The "I" consists in the spiritually worked on and transmuted soul. Similarly, analogically, the spiritually transmuted etheric body is the life spirit and the spiritually transmuted physical body is the spirit man. Thus the membering of the human being can be expressed:

- |                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| 1 Physical body    | 5 Spirit self as transmuted astral body   |
| 2 Etheric body     | 6 Life Spirit as transmuted etheric body  |
| 3 Astral body      | 7 Spirit man as transmuted physical body. |
| 4 I as Soul kernel |   |

Continuing his account, in "Occult Science an outline"(15), Steiner talked about sleep and death. In sleep, the connections between the members of the human being change. "Lying there on the bed asleep" is the physical body supported by its etheric body of formative forces, but not the astral body, nor the "I" (hereafter referred to as the "Ego"). During sleep the astral body and the Ego are making themselves ready for the next waking state. In the sleeping state, the astral body supplies the etheric body, from without, with the archetypal patterns it needs to maintain and sustain the physical body. The astral body, at this time, is within the astral world, from which it draws, like nourishment, the patterns to supply to the etheric body. The astral world is far more extensive than the physical planet Earth. It is an encompassing universe to which other heavenly bodies and other worlds belong, besides the Earth.

Dreaming is a state midway between sleep and wakefulness. The astral body, whilst withdrawn from the physical body, remains, to an extent, with the etheric. The imaginary-like picture images and sequences of dreaming reveal a creative, picture-forming activity, produced by the astral body, which are consciously manifest as soon as it is withdrawn from the physical senses and their input. This highly symbolic picture-forming activity can be likened and contrasted to meaning-finding, sense-making astral activity, that which it responds, in waking perception, to its bodily sensory input. In dreaming it is only very tenuously linked to such direct input and it is just as much connected to its whole field of personal concerns, such as the anticipation of forthcoming events. Dreaming's picture-images, not tied to the verisimilitude of perceptual data, give highly symbolic expression to the traces remaining in its consciousness. For example, one may dream most clearly of lying beside a blazing fire. On awaking, one finds one has become excessively hot due to too many bedclothes! In sleep-proper, such experiences are not possible. One is, in this sense,

unconscious.

Death, too, is a change in the mutual relations of the members of the human being. In death the physical is separated from the etheric body and the former disintegrates. For a while the etheric body is united with the astral body by a force not normally strong enough to overcome the strong binding of physical and etheric in life. In death this force draws the etheric from the physical to the astral. After a few days, the astral body releases itself from the etheric and goes on its way. The etheric body loses its form and dissolves into the etheric world. After death, the astral body, in no longer having its function towards the physical, turns its forces to perceiving its own processes. Whilst still attached to the etheric, it experiences, vividly, the remaining memory of its entire passed life in the form of a present memory tableau, where all the events of one's past life are laid out, as it were, concurrently, rather than consecutively. This is what is recounted by people who have had near-death experiences, trauma in which a brief separation of etheric and physical has occurred, when they have stated "my entire life flashed before my eyes!". Memory, in physical life, has many physical **hindrances** to its clarity and fulness of content. It is a mere shadow of what is seen in the death memory tableau, which is a relatively perfect representation. The memory tableau vanishes as the etheric body gradually loses its form, in fundamental likeness of the physical body. Once this has gone, the astral body has no further reason to hold on to it. Once separated from the etheric, what comes to the fore in the astral body are the results of the Ego's work, in life, in elaborating the spirit self, life spirit and spirit man. This contrasts with the condition of the astral body in sleep. In sleep it is unable to perceive the Ego's spiritual work because, in sleep, the Ego, united with the astral body is wholly tied up with providing patterns of formative force to the physical.

after death and after astral/etheric separation, there still remain connections between the Ego and the external physical world. Cravings persist. These belong to the Ego seated in the consciousness soul, as the result of when the Ego, with its will, has, rather than mastering them, taken into itself the desires engendered in the soul through the physical/etheric nature. When the bodies are laid aside, their engendering of desires is silenced. But the desires live on if taken up by the Ego and, in the spiritual world, it can find no objects to satisfy them. These belong to the "excess" side of temperance. Temperate desire desires in accordance with bodily need. When that no longer presents, the desire ceases. In so far as the Ego seeks fulfilment in the spiritual, it is not frustrated after death. These remarks are not meant to be perjorative to the satisfactions experienced in satisfying physical needs. These are necessary and beneficial to spiritual evolution, according to Steiner. But when desires are cultivated and pursued by the Ego in excess of their proper function of serving the spirit, it creates a disharmony, the perception and experience of which it reaps after death in insatiable cravings. Steiner likened this experience to a parched, burning thirst, enhanced to the encompassment of all particular cravings.

This points out the next stage through which the Ego passes, which is to free itself of these attachments by bringing about a purging and liberation within itself. These cravings are, as it were, burnt up in the "consuming fire of the spirit", ridding one's Ego of all that is unwholesome and destructive. In this period of purification, one lives, in a sense, backwards. All one's misdeeds are re-experienced, in reverse order, in which, this time, one experiences all the bad, all the suffering, that one has previously caused. Arriving back at the moment of birth, all cravings will have been extirpated in the cleansing fire. Now that part of the astral

body which can only live in consciousness of the external physical world is finally laid aside - the third corpse, as it were.

Now an entirely new state of consciousness begins for the Ego, which comes from within. It is aware in the innermost "holy of holies" of its being. The spiritual world would be visible during the period of the consuming fire, were it not obscured by the forms of hideous, demonic creatures which, as it were, feed off the renewing cravings of the Ego. Their forms, during life, are only supersensibly visible. They are the lower beings responsible, during life, for influencing the Ego to self-destructive, unwholesome desires.

After discarding the astral corpse, the Ego is in an environment full of spiritual beings of the same form as itself - spirits, other Ego-beings, what I earlier described as "self-disclosing-openness-of-being". But the Ego brings thither something which is peculiarly its own, a remnant of all that one has experienced in life. Of the memory tableau first experienced after death, a sort of quintessential memory extract remains with the Ego. It is the spiritual fruit, the spiritual content of one's life. This is one's Ego's own inner world. This is one's unique spiritual seed which, received by or "planted" in the spiritual world, now begins to develop under its influence.

The other, influencing beings of the spiritual world affect the Ego by impelling one to represent them to oneself in colour-like images and radiance. Further manifestation in one's Ego-consciousness of other Ego-beings in the spiritual world becomes more akin to sound and harmony. As with the internally manifested colour-radiance, the sound experiences manifesting the other Ego-beings resound in the very heart of one's Ego-consciousness. A yet higher form of spiritual manifestation is the "spiritual word". Other Ego-beings communicate their innermost being within one's own Ego-being. The other lives in oneself and the most intimate companionship is achieved.

Ego-being in the spiritual world should not just be understood as referring to human Ego-being. It expresses a whole range of spiritual beings. This place, the spiritual world, this "being-there", this "Dasein", may, on the analogy of the physical world, Earth, be identifyingly named "Spiritland". Keeping to this geographical analogy, there are a number of "regions" of Spiritland. Three regions may be likened to, and are perceptible, supersensibly as like the physical regions of "solid land", the fluidity of "oceans and rivers" and the airy "atmosphere".

The first region, perceptible as colour forms, is that of the spiritual forces responsible for the organization of physical existence. Thus a crystal, when physically perceived, is recognized as being given its form by the action of invisible forces. But experienced as colour forms, spiritually, are the forming forces, themselves, whereas the formed crystal, itself, is an invisible void about which the forces operate.

The region perceptible as fluidity is that of life, the etheric. In Spiritland it has a certain regularity of distribution, manifested in spiritual sound. The "atmosphere" is that of what in life between birth and death is experienced as sensory content and feeling. In this flowing atmosphere of sensory feeling, sorrow, pain, joy and delight can be likened to the currents, breezes and tempests of the Earthly atmosphere. These are the "spiritual words" that waft through and around the beings of Spiritland.

Further experiences of beings in Spiritland are possible. Manifest as "warmth" are "thoughts". Manifest in this Earthly world are mere shadows of what the full spiritual realities of thoughts are. A "thought" should be thought of as an independent living entity, whose shadow in this world owes its origin to this region of "warmth" in Spiritland. What prevails in the fifth region of Spiritland can be

likened to Earthly light. This is "wisdom", manifest spiritually in its archetypical form. Spiritual beings belong in this region who shed enlightening wisdom into their environment revealing the true being of what they so enlighten.

One's own spiritual seed which one's Ego brings into Spiritland is still united with that part of the astral body which was not discarded as the corpse of one's cravings. Through one's experiences in Spiritland, one's seed germinates, develops and grows, as one is there amidst the formative forces of the physical, etheric and astral bodies. The fourth and fifth regions are home of higher beings who pour in their contribution of creative powers. Together these collaborating beings and forces build oneself, on the basis of one's spiritual seed, as human being, anew.

After a certain lapse of time, one gains a new astral body, one able to live in interpenetrating etheric and physical bodies, and one can now be born again. Until astral re-embodiment, one is witness to one's spiritual re-creation. But thereafter, one's attention begins to turn outwards. The astral demands an outer physical/etheric body. Now one is plunged into unconsciousness, for one can only outwardly perceive when, in the physical world, one's organs of physical perception have formed sufficiently. During this intermediate period, a new etheric body begins to be formed and organized about the astral body. When this is done, one is ready for reincarnation. These last two stages, building the etheric and reincarnation have, as processes, to be directed by evolutionarily more advanced beings, since, at the present stage of human development, one's Ego, by its spiritual activity, has not attained the power of exerting the creative forces of these bodies.

Just before the formation and incorporation of the new etheric body with the astral in preparation for reincarnation, the Ego undergoes a most important event. As with the memory tableau of one's past life, which one re-experienced backwards, encountering, recognizing

and experiencing oneself the suffering for which one was responsible in that life, one experiences, in similar form, a pre-vision of one's life to come. One's personal defects, hindering one's personal development, appear in one's pre-vision as obstacles that must be overcome if one is to advance spiritually. This creates a force which impells the Ego to select life conditions, for one's coming incarnation, in which, through one's deeds, one can right, make good, the wrongs for which one was previously responsible. This is the law of "Karma" or destiny.

In the period in which one is outside the physical world, the Earth continues to evolve. The Earth conditions of one Earthly life will have changed considerably by the time of the next. In this period of time, one works with and is guided by higher spiritual beings in bringing about the transformed conditions on Earth. This work of the dead on the living Earth is, of course, only apparent to supersensible observation.

Conversely, life-events have their effects in Spiritland. Bonds of friendship established on Earth, whose spiritual existence is merely shadowed in their Earthly experience, will in Spiritland, between death and rebirth be experienced in far more intimate communion.

The cycle of reincarnation repeats itself periodically. But this is not an eternal process. Time was when one came from another form of existence into human existence and one will at some future stage pass into a further form of existence.

Thus far I have given a somewhat detailed exposition of Steiner's account of human nature. This is, I hope, to give a "toe-hold" insight into his view of the immense spiritual depths of reality beyond the physical world and our physical awareness. It also indicates, so far as "good" is concerned, that there is a moral order in the cosmos, embodied in its being which, in essence, is spiritual through and through. The picture given of humanity is of an evolutionary progress, individually in the



repeated cycle of reincarnation and generally in the transformations in the whole, essentially spiritual, environment in which the cycle takes place. This process is pictured as being towards a state or condition of being which is relatively more and more perfect in the evolutionary forms achieved of spiritual being and spiritual activity. In other words, the cosmic processes in which humanity is integrally involved are evolving towards "the Good".

Continuing his account in "Occult Science an outline" (16), Steiner talked of the relation of humanity to the evolution of the world. He began by talking of the relation to spiritual being of what is material and substantial. He said that the material evolves out of the spiritual. He likened this to a process of condensation or of densification, in which what is outwardly materially substantial and, in its manifestation as such, closed off, is nevertheless, in its inner being, essentially spiritual. My interpretation of this relates to what I said of the being of physical being, the being which materially transcends consciousness in its being-transcended, in my Introduction, (page 33). Steiner asserts positively what I there suggested as possibility. In this interpretation, all being is, in essence, spiritual being. Spiritual being is Ego-being, selfhood. This should not be understood as human Ego-being, which is a particularization of Ego-being. In its self-disclosing openness of being, spiritual being exists itself and exists its own good, which can be conceived as a form of harmonic vibration, which, in so far as other spiritual being is manifest in its "holy of holies", is directly lived and experienced in its own harmonic vibration. The implication of this, for all spiritual self-being, is that all transcending other-being is, in essence, self-being, which, in self-existing its own good and bad, matters, is of importance, in itself, for itself, intrinsically, and outside itself, extrinsically, in however it enters other self-being

and affects its harmonic vibration of its good.

Materiality or substantiality, in this interpretation, is the "being-closed-off" of other-being. This applies to the physical, etheric and astral worlds, with their contents of bodies and entities. What exists within what is materially closed off, can itself be constituted by complexes of self- and other-being relations for its spiritual components in their mutuality, the whole comprising the complex of interacting forces which give its externally material being its specific properties, form and structure.

Applying this cosmologically, in Steiner's account, the planet Earth has evolved, "condensed", from a cosmic spiritual entity. Its spiritual existence **preceded**, in cosmic history, the first materialization of the spiritual. Now, as physical entity, its appearances as such do not reveal that its guiding and directionary principal, in its evolution, is spiritual.

Whilst I shall not deal with Steiner's descriptions of the formation of organs of, the means to, spiritual supersensible perception, nor the pathways to development of such capacities, their existence I am **referring to in order to give epistemological intelligibility** to the supersensible claims and descriptions here advanced. Similarly I need to point out a further means of knowledge that makes intelligible knowledge of the evolutionary history of the cosmos, and of the further region of development into which the presently perceptible will lead. This means is collectively called the "Akashic Records". Whilst physical conditions disintegrate and are obliterated, the spiritual facts underlying them are not. Traces, which can be perceived as exact images, are left in the spiritual foundation, which are the records just referred to, which record the essence of all that is permanent in the world process, in contrast to the transient forms assumed by matter. Spiritual science can conduct supersensible research and consult these records.

Supersensible research shows that the Earth was preceded by three previous planetary embodiments, with intervening spiritual phases. Human material-spiritual being, in belonging to this planet, has itself passed through these preceding phases which are essential stages in humanity's evolutionary development. The essential members of the present human being, physical, etheric and astral bodies and Ego did not comprise the human being until this fourth, Earth, planetary stage. In the previous planetary stages, the three bodies evolved up to the stage of being able on Earth to receive, to incarnate, the human Ego.

When the present planetary embodiment, Earth, first "condensed" out of the preceding spiritual phase, it brought the seeds of human beings, as evolved physically, etherically and astrally in the previous planetary stage. These then entered into Earth evolution. Earth evolution falls into two parts. In the first, it constitutes a re-embodiment of its previous planetary form, but bearing the fruits of the intervening spiritual period. The human seeds again evolve up to their previously achieved level. This point inaugurates the second part of Earth evolution. In this second overall period, the human Ego becomes unfolded, successively, in physical body, etheric body and astral body, in terms of its self-consciousness and free will.

Steiner called the preceding planetary stages to Earth "Saturn", "Sun" and "Moon". Whilst these are essentially related to the present astronomical entities of the same names, they should not be directly identified with the latter entities.

The oldest of the four members of the human being is the physical body. It existed in its primary evolutionary stage on Saturn. Only after Saturn, on Sun, could it receive an etheric body. Again, on Moon, it received an astral body. Each planetary stage raises each member to a higher evolutionary perfection. Thus on Earth, the physical body is in its fourth stage, whilst the Ego is only in its

first. On Earth, there are beings of mineral, plant, animal and human "kingdoms", all of which manifest in physical corporeality. But there are further beings who do not so manifest, which were on the scene and active in the earlier planetary stages. Amongst these, are beings which exist having no lowest physical member, but have an additional highest member beyond "spirit man".

On Saturn, these beings, together with others, formed what can be likened to a spiritual atmosphere and, through their constant interaction with the physical, their influence was responsible for the evolutionary advance to the next stage. The effect of the interaction was that the Saturn-atmospheric beings expressed their being, their life, in the physical beings, which acted as a kind of "mirror". They received, and mirrored back, influences from these beings in their heavenly environment, sublime beings, who may be called "Spirits of Wisdom". These latter, by this mirroring, were enabled to be conscious of the reflection of their own lives. Prior to the proto-human physical Saturn beings being such that they could reflect the being of the Spirits of Wisdom back to themselves, the former were relatively chaotic. It required the original working down of the Spirits of Wisdom into the Saturn beings to produce the condition allowing the reflection. The Saturn beings were originally sublime spiritual beings who had evolved to the degree of having the character of pure self-expression as human "Will". These "Spirits of Will", worked down on by the Spirits of Wisdom, became "condensed" and organized into a primordial physical condition which can be characterized as a condition of "warmth". This outward physical "warmth" allowed the reflection of the Spirits of Wisdom. Following the achievement of this condition, "Spirits of Movement", whose lowest member is an astral body and who have a yet higher highest member, came into play. Their effect was to produce the reflection of feeling and soul states - the astral.

In the next epoch, "Spirits of Form", cause the reflection, the outward radiation of semblances of individuated beings. Now "Spirits of Personality", whose lowest member is the astral raised to the condition of Ego, cause there to be "personality" reflected from Saturn. These Spirits of Personality, receiving back from physical being on Saturn, in reflection, "will", "life", "feeling", "form" and "Egohood" or "personality", were, in the Saturn period, the human beings, the humanity.

Further evolution, ensuing from this stage, allows yet more advanced beings to intervene with their activity. These are "Archangels", who have an astral body, but one with which, by themselves, they cannot produce or stimulate sensory material and feeling. Working into the Saturn beings activates the astral body and allows them to say, as it were, not "I am", but "My environment enables me to be". They perceive light emanations from Saturn, which give them a sort of picture-consciousness. This marks the beginning of evolution of human sense organs. Other beings, "Seraphim" (Spirits of Love), come on the scene with the Archangels and, being so far advanced, they make use of the nascent sense organs to **transmit** perceptions of Saturn events to the Archangels, whilst themselves receiving nothing, no enjoyment. Such is their "love"!

Yet another form of beings, "Angels", begin to interact with Saturn existence. They have an etheric body which in the play of its forces takes a sort of metabolism into the interior of Saturn. This creates a condition in which "Cherubim" (Spirits of Harmony) can act, transmitting to the Angels a sort of dim consciousness, which is not outer perception, but which regulates the life processes to be in harmony with processes in the outer cosmos. The reflected human forms which this allows the Angels to make use of, in living their own lives, is, in comparison to the life reflected to the Spirits of Wisdom,

greatly enhanced.

To recapitulate concerning this whole Saturn process, what has been recounted are the processes of generation of characteristics which are presently constitutive of "being human". In its materialization, pure, open, spiritual self-being has condensed and become closed off to the outward extent of the planet Saturn. This closure of being was a condition in the intervention of and interaction with the higher beings, in its distinguishing "inner" and "outer", which allowed "reflection-back". The outwardness allowed manifestation to the surrounding spiritual beings. Together with the manifest reflections of their own being, they began to perceive perceptible manifestations of the physical being itself, manifesting in "warmth", "light", "form", "taste" and "sound". The conglomeration of the whole planetary being, together with its spiritual "atmosphere", was, relative to the individualized physical beings reflecting the human form, the macrocosm to their microcosm. The concerted working of all elements of the spiritual gradually developed the human form such that the physical being which was acted on was so elaborated that it could not only reflect the human form and be outwardly perceptibly manifest, but was, in itself, the seed of human self-being, itself possessing a very dim consciousness.

In this human evolutionary process, the higher spiritual beings themselves underwent evolution. Having worked on Saturn, they were themselves enriched and they would gradually turn away, to work, as it were, in other worlds. The Saturn evolution died away into itself and reverted to a period of unmanifest (outwardly) spiritual existence, yet bearing within itself the evolved seed-forms of humanity. These are reborn in the further planetary stages, dying away between them. The whole human evolution will have seven planetary stages of which the present Earth stage is only the fourth. To come are "Jupiter", "Venus" and "Vulcan".

During Sun evolution, a preliminary recapitulation of the Saturn evolution was followed by its own evolutionary progress. But a differentiation in evolving beings commenced between those which remained in the Saturn stage of evolution and those which advanced further.

Again, in Moon evolution, the same differentiation took place in which, besides those which advanced, some remained in the Saturn stage and others in the Sun stage. An event in Moon evolution was a stage at which Moon separated and became a separate entity to a distinct astronomical body, the Sun. Remaining on Moon were the two lower forms and the evolving humanity. On the Sun lived certain of the higher spiritual beings. The relationship of the two heavenly bodies now became akin to that of Saturn with its spiritual "atmosphere", Moon receiving the Sun's spiritual radiance and reflecting it back to the Sun beings.

But a new evolutionary turn of events took place. Certain beings, adapted to the Moon body, possessed the element of Will as a heritage carried forward from the Spirits of Will, which, through its being at their disposal, evolved a life of their own independently of the influences of the higher life taking place on the Sun. These beings existed alongside those beings whose experiences entirely depended on the Sun's influences. There was a state of rebellion, of opposition to the Sun beings. Under these opposing influences, two types and a twofold differentiation of human nature began to develop, with the two natures coming into conflict within the one human being. This conflict worked itself out in phases. The Sun beings would dominate and the more material part of the human being would be thrown off for a while. Then the independent Moon aspect would reassert itself. The whole process generated a great diversity of beings. A real benefit was had from the rebellious beings in Moon evolution, for it had brought human beings to a freer and more independent consciousness.

But during our own Earth planetary stage, these same "rebellious beings" have exerted an influence which is more of a "mixed blessing". At the stage in Earth evolution when the Sun and the Moon had separated and become separate coexisting heavenly bodies, on the Earth's Moon, certain higher spiritual beings who had drawn the Moon away from Earth, exerted evolutionary influences on human development. Human beings now possessed a freer, more independent consciousness. Under the influence of these higher Moon beings, human consciousness could have been harmonized with the Great Universe (Macrocosm), producing a truly mirroring image of it. But under the influence of the rebellious "Luciferian" beings, human beings became masters of their own faculty of cognition. They were not compelled, as of necessity, to mirror the Universe. The source of human control of cognition was the human astral body. This meant that the human Ego, though in reality above the astral, became perpetually dependent upon it. The Luciferian spiritual beings brought Earthly humanity "free will", but with it the possibility of error and evil.

An effect of this was the production of the phenomenon of illness. The human Ego, living in the astral, lived by cravings and passions, not allowing higher spiritual influences to regulate them. Also the cycle of physical life, death and rebirth resulted. The characteristic of Karmic regulation through reincarnation developed. But on rebirth, the human being would lose the pre-sight of the Karmic plan, making the future uncertain, producing the possibility of feeling fear, as a concomitant of the possibility of error.

Under the conditions produced by the influence of the Luciferian spirits, whose influence can be represented by the rubric "temptation", human beings became subject to other negative spiritual influences, these also being involved in the production of fear. Steiner called these beings "Ahrimanic", which spirits were represented by



"Mephistopheles", in Goethe's "Faust". The rubric of the Ahrimanic spirits is "deception".

Through the interplay of positive and negative spiritual influences on humanity, involving the separating out from the Earth planet of Sun, Moon and the other planets, each having a different relation to Earth and a different influence on human beings, the whole of humanity became subject to major differentiations. These are due to different groups of human beings being subject to different balances of spiritual influences. Human beings are more or less "spiritual", reflecting cosmic harmony and more or less "Earth-bound", free and individual but subject to error, evil, disease and fear.

Human Earth evolution is divided into great time epochs. The earliest, the Polarean, was the epoch before the entry of the Luciferian beings and is referred to, in Biblical tradition, as the time of Paradise. The next was the Hyperborean, when Luciferian effects had not strongly unfolded. The third was the Lemurian epoch, in which the Luciferian effects and differentiation of humanity, as described above, took place. This epoch was eventually brought to an end by a stupendous Earth catastrophe, brought about by that portion of humanity most subject to Luciferian influence, whose self-centred Egohood had developed powers which, unharmonized, were self-destructive. Nearly all human beings on Earth were destroyed, but most particularly those who had fallen into error. There were a few survivors, comparatively untouched by error.

These latter inaugurated the next, Atlantean epoch. In this period of evolution, again, a differentiation of humanity took place, related to planetary influences. Also, in the course of life, the cycle of waking and sleeping developed important consequences. When asleep, the human astral body and Ego were in the realm of the higher spiritual beings, described previously, up to the level of the Spirits of Personality.

At this evolutionary stage, one remained, during sleep, united with that portion of the etheric body not united with the physical. With that portion, in sleep, one would perceive the Angels and Archangels. One had poor, indistinct perception of the Spirits of Personality, though, through the effects of the Luciferian influence. Together with the etheric perception of the Angels and Archangels, one also perceived those beings which in their evolution had remained in retarded stages and had not transcended the limitations of (old) Sun and Moon existence. They had consequently had to remain in the astral and spiritual worlds. Under the Luciferian influence, during sleep, humans would draw these into their own souls, these multiplying cravings relating to the forces of growth and reproduction. For human beings, this was a "fall" into the life of the senses. There were some individual humans who avoided this "fall". They used the Luciferian influences for advance rather than being hindered by them. They were enabled to realize a knowledge of the human condition and, in avoiding sensory craving, erred less and less. With the non-physical part of their etheric body, united with the Spirits of Form, they were able to perceive and gain this higher knowledge. They learnt how humanity was led by a sublime Being, who had been the leader in the severance of Sun and Earth. They gained an understanding of this sublime leader of the Sun beings, who is the "Christ" Being. Such human beings were "Initiates".

I shall now move to exposition of Steiner's account in his book "The Spiritual Foundation of Morality" (17). Steiner quoted Schopenhaur from his work on ethics (18):

To preach morals is easy, but to give them a foundation is difficult.

The point Steiner drew from this is the fact that the members of human communities behave morally and regulate their communal life, without this depending on moral reason, whose principles are developed during

life, not being there beforehand, guiding it. Members of human communities find that they have, and indeed need, what may be called "instinctive morality", moral impulses, or inclinations, or motivations. Anyway, in themselves, moral principles would not produce moral motivations.

As just related from "Occult Science", in the Polarian epoch at the beginning of human Earth evolution, human beings were naturally and instinctively morally good, reflecting Divine wisdom. Then came the moral decline, the "fall", as related symbolically in Genesis, with a newly occurring moral regeneration, in which we, at our stage of evolution, are presently participating. Now if human beings were originally good, how was evil possible? In the esoteric tradition, the wisdom of the "Mysteries", available to Initiates, presents human beings as having two possibilities of falling into error and of doing and suffering evil. One route lies in becoming over-immersed in the non-spiritual world and, being caught up in its forces, being weakened, dissipated or destroyed thereby. The other path is that of apathy, of lack of involvement with the world, a hardening and withdrawal of the self. Such a person acts only for themselves, not in harmony with the world. The morally good path lies in the balance of these two tendencies, where one's own good is optimally in harmony with the good of the world. Aristotle, reported by Steiner to have been an Initiate of the Mysteries, presented this in his doctrine of the mean (19).

Human evolution can be pictured as the movement from being instinctively determined in being able to coexist in community, this being dependent on Divine spiritual influences, changing gradually to a state of being free and self-determined, in which self-choice, human beings choose what is good. This is achieved by knowing what is good, by direct acquaintance and understanding, in full conscious awareness.

Steiner set the scene starting with the Atlantean epoch. At the

end of that epoch, there was a geological and geographical catastrophe in which the continental shelf of Atlantis eventually sank beneath what is now the Atlantic Ocean. But this was a physical event reflecting what might be called a spiritual-moral catastrophe, in which part of the differentiated human population, having had access to generalized occult spiritual knowledge, misused it producing their moral degradation and corruption. The differentiated division of the Atlantean population was into seven types or groups, each representing a general level of spiritual-moral development of its members. The general effect of the catastrophe was the migration of survivors to various parts of the globe.

Those in the population who remained spiritually progressive belonged to the highest four groups, with the fifth being, as it were, intermediate. The members of the first four groups were the earliest migrants and reached the Indian sub-continent, together with some of the fifth group. There they formed the four rigidly separated castes, with the fifth group members being the "untouchables". The members of the highest group, the Brahmins, who could interpret the Devas, the sacred texts, gave the developing Indian population its dominant spiritual-moral characteristic of devotionism, the Brahmins being revered in their capacity by the other population groups. The caste rigidity is explained in its original appropriateness to the circumstance that previous dissemination of the sacred knowledge to the sixth and seventh, lowest groups had produced the catastrophe. The caste separation was designed to prevent the reoccurrence of such an event. however it has now long since outlived that appropriateness.

Steiner expressed as a law of human development that it is not possible without differentiations between people and groups of people. The particular development of the Brahmins, for example, can be seen as necessary for the development of particular human qualities, in general

evolutionary terms. The exclusion of groups of people from processes of development at one time does not exclude them from, at some future time, having the same opportunity of self-development. It is just that not all can evolve to the same level at the same time.

We are presently in the fifth post-Atlantean age of human development. Steiner's descriptions were towards showing how the inauguration of this fifth age, the age of European Civilization, with its specific spiritual-moral development, came to be. At the time of the great Atlantean migration, the members of the sixth and seventh, lowest human groups did not migrate as far as the others who had reached the Indian sub-continent. They formed the mass of the early European population. Nevertheless some members of the other groups had remained behind in Europe. However the Brahmin-type people did not reveal themselves as such. They secreted their occult knowledge, covertly exercising a guiding role in society, acting in concert with the second highest group members, the "Warrior" group.

The latter group became the leaders of the early European population, developing in a distinct way in the northernmost lands of Europe - in the Norse, Viking, Scandinavian and Germanic peoples. Now the principal moral virtue which developed in these populations, under the influence and example of members of the leading group, was, unlike the Brahmin-modelled Indian devotionism, was the virtue of "valour".

According to Steiner, this valour manifested in a practically inexhaustible fulness of life. The ancient Europeans of the leading group tended to possess such a wealth of valour, they were overflowing with it. This fulness could even be described as an excess, a surplus superabundance. This resulted in a wasteful squandering - a pouring away of their moral wealth, fitness and ability into the physical world. This was expressed in warlike deeds expended in the service of family, clan or people.

Now early Europeans did not have the virtue of devotionism. The particular event of moral-spiritual evolution of our present fifth post-Atlantean age was that produced when the predominant virtue of valour in the developing European population met with the Christian moral impulse of love for all humanity. The latter was itself a development arising consequent upon the earlier post-Atlantean age in which Indian devotionism predominated. The effect of this meeting was the spiritualization of valour. Steiner described this through the particular instance of the life and influence of Francis of Assisi.

Strange events portended the birth of Francis. People had visions and foretold his coming. His mother felt that her child developing within her was special and she had a vision which suggested that the child should be born in a stable, like the infant Jesus. Events so conspired that she actually did have the birth in a stable. Francis' father was a worldly, successful, wealthy merchant. As a child, Francis was endowed with the characteristics of the old, northern European valour, but superabundantly - he was a spendthrift, squandering his rich father's possessions, giving freely to his childhood friends and companions. They, the youth of Assisi, chose him to lead their warlike expeditions against other Italian towns. Thus he came to adulthood with the initial vocation of chivalrous defence of and promotion of the interests of Assisi.

Prior to one expedition, Francis dreamt of a palace with weapons and shields, which he interpreted as a call to arms. But on the expeditionary journey, spiritual impressions told him he had misunderstood and that he should return to Assisi where he would experience the right meaning. He returned and experienced a sort of spiritual dialogue to the effect that he should turn his outward, physically expressed valour into the inner soul-qualities of mercy, compassion and love, which would truly be his spiritual weapons. This



forced him to a retrospection of his life and he converted his fulness of life into a moral-spiritual fulness. He laid aside or gave away his possessions, his fine clothes, even his necessities and he made a pilgrimage to Rome and placed a large sum of money on the graves of the apostles Peter and Paul. His object in doing this was to demonstrate the want of respect for those who had brought Christianity to Europe.

The major expression that Francis made of his spiritualized moral impulses was the healing and nursing of many of the victims of the great European plague of leprosy. His moral force actually had great healing power and he expressed his mission with no fear of falling prey to leprosy himself. It was now as though he was prodigal of moral force, so much love had he to give. In this expression of love, there streamed from him a moral force or impulse which affected and intermingled with the existing moral forces in the life of Europe, bringing about a real change in the general overall moral disposition of the European peoples.

Steiner went on to give a further depth of analysis and understanding of these events. In the early European development, there was no caste division as in Indian civilization. Rather the division was between leaders and the led, the latter consisting mostly of the "fallen" souls of the Atlantean epoch, who needed, for their own spiritual development, to struggle upwards. This process of recovery from the Atlantean "fall" took a very long time, belonging to the European "Dark Ages". The development came about through the mass of the people having a strong impulse to imitate what they saw demonstrated in the virtuous, valorous expressions and example of those looked up to as tribal leaders and chiefs.

Something else became necessary for European development which, to be understood, needs the distinction between individual spiritual evolution

and race evolution. A soul in one race-lifetime can develop qualities which in a further lifetime suits and can actually find expression in incarnation in the bodily form of another racial type. The slowly improved souls, repeatedly reincarnated in the bodily successors of the Atlantean "fallen" groups, reached the stage at which they could transcend such incarnation and, instead, incarnate in the races developing in Asia. Some reincarnated in the bodily successors of the leading population of Europe and, as time went on, that group grew in numbers, whilst the bodily forms suited to the incarnation of the lower or "fallen" souls tended to die out. However this dying out was not a disappearance into nothing, but rather dissolution into something which then existed in a different form. This dying out of the old bodies took place over a large geographical region. It gradually became inhabited, in its astral environment, by "demons" which represented the products of dissolution, the "putrification" of that which had died out. In belonging to the "spiritual atmosphere" surrounding living human beings, these demonic beings had a sensed presence to and influence on some human beings, affecting them.

When, following the European Dark Ages, Attila the Hun and his Asian hordes invaded Europe, a great number of the population were subject to a state of great terror. Through being in this state of terror, people laid themselves open to demonic influences. The effect of this influence was the great European plague of leprosy of the Middle Ages, which was the consequence both of the state of terror and of exposure to demonic influences persisting from former times.

This was a disaster for the European peoples of that time, which needed to be counteracted. Further spiritual development of the peoples of Europe required that it be removed. Pitted against the disease/demonic results of the unmoral was the moral force expressed by Francis of Assisi. He gathered around him many people who acted in the same way as he, who amplified his expression of moral force.



Steiner gave further spiritual-scientific explanation of how Francis had gained his overwhelming soul power. Buddhism had challenged and influenced Indian caste division. It introduced into Asiatic life, in recognizing in each human being the power to attain the highest possible in being human, the idea that caste division of society was unjustifiable. The human, spiritual Being who reached the height of being the sublime Buddha, was, in that incarnation, after many incarnations in a lower state, in his ultimate incarnation. Thereafter the Buddha spiritual being continued to act in the world, but only by "working down" from the "spiritual heights" he inhabited.

Buddhism continued and spread in Asia. But in a hidden and veiled form it also influenced the spiritual life of Europe. At Colchis, on the shores of the Black Sea, there was an occult school which lasted into the Christian era. It was guided by people who took Buddha's teaching of human equality as their highest ideal. They also received the Christian impulse. The most advanced pupils became clairvoyant, able to perceive supersensibly, sufficiently to perceive Buddha's spiritual being and to directly receive and understand his teachings. Also, their highly developed spirituality had the character of humility, of devotionism, which allowed them to receive the Christian impulse. This latter moral force, in the personalities of any of those individuals, enabled them not only to influence others through their teachings, but also to work directly through their store of moral power. The point of this description was that Francis of Assisi, in his previous incarnation, was a pupil of and highly advanced Initiate of this occult school, a spiritual Being immensely influenced and permeated by the personalities of Buddha and Christ. Thus, as Francis of Assisi, his tremendous moral power of love counteracted and adsorbed the evil substance of the disease demons, effectively defeating the plague of leprosy and bringing a moral transformation to the peoples of Europe.

Spiritual evolution, through moral decline to moral regeneration can also be expressed as a process of development of conscious awareness. This is a development from acting instinctively, in which one is not aware of why one is so motivated, but just feels drawn to act towards the particular end, changing towards acting self-consciously, in being aware of what and wherein lies the value or goodness of one's action, both for oneself and for the world. In the latter degree of consciousness one will have achieved moral freedom and responsibility, in acting towards a clearly seen and understood good.

In talking of the role of Anthroposophy, Steiner focussed on the moral philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. He said that Plato, like Aristotle, his pupil, was an Initiate, in some sense, of the knowledge contained in the tradition of the Mysteries, but that Plato was very reticent and careful in what he would reveal. His doctrine of the trifurcation of the soul and of the associated virtues expressed Mystery wisdom, according to Steiner. Steiner related this, on the metaphysical level, to his description of the soul members of sentient soul, intellectual soul and consciousness soul. He described the capacity of the sentient soul as that of enabling the perception of the objective world. It represents the soul-division of "knowledge" with its virtue wisdom, as the mean between self-concerned apathetic isolation from and lack of interest in the world, on the one hand, and passionate, unmeasured, excessive interest in the world, with a consequent loss of oneself to the world. He described valour as the virtue of the intellectual soul, between foolhardiness and cowardice, this standing at the heart or centre of the soul. He described the consciousness or spiritual soul as the seat of the virtue of temperance, because it is that part of the human being wherein one becomes conscious of the external world through one's physical bodily nature and the latter is also the means whereby one arrives at self-consciousness. On the one side, by excessive self-indulgence, one

cuts oneself off from the spiritual world of concern for others. On the other, self-denial weakens the body and one can become liable to destruction by external world processes.

In spiritual evolution, the formerly instinctive moral virtues are changing to being self-consciously willed and, corresponding to these changes are changes in the human soul and spiritual natures.

Spiritualized formerly instinctive wisdom becomes veracity, the conscious love of truth and, in awareness of the spiritual foundation and creativity responsible for the world, a sense of humility and wonder. Steiner characterized spiritualized wisdom as "faith".

Spiritualized, formerly instinctive valour becomes, as already described, "love", universal love for humanity. The spiritualization of instinctive temperance resides in "conscience", self-conscious self-control.

As an example of these changes, in the third (Egypto-Chaldean) post-Atlantean age, consciousness developed in respect of becoming more aware of and distinguishing, an objective world and, at the same time, developed interests in the things so distinguished. Motivations, pulls of desire developed leading to action expressing and realizing the interests. In having these interests, people had the possibility of falling into error - either through over-involvement or through apathetic lack of involvement. But, on the whole, the virtue of wisdom prevailed albeit in an instinctive unconscious fashion. However by the time of the fourth (Graeco-Latin) post-Atlantean age, wisdom had become non-instinctive, something to be achieved. This was, in effect, the result of the relative distancing of humanity from its environing spiritual world, in which it formerly lived in relation instinctively, having a far greater, though unselfconscious, clairvoyant awareness of other spiritual beings. The distancing involved the objectifying of the world and the development of interests

in the possibilities of the things of the world. The Graeco-Latin age was that of the development of the mental or intellectual aspect of the soul and it can be seen, at the same time, as having given rise to the materialism and closing off of the spiritual, which so much characterizes present day humanity.

But Steiner described our present age as being that of the development of the spiritual aspect of the soul. Already valour has been spiritualized into love for all humanity, the effect of Christ's impulse. Another development has been the growth of self-consciousness, in human beings being aware of themselves as separate self-determining individuals with a concomitant sense of moral responsibility.

Steiner described this development as leading to the future sixth post-Atlantean age in which self-consciousness and self-responsibility become more fully characteristic of the human soul and, as its counterpart, the falling away of instinctive tendencies. He saw Anthroposophy as participating in this movement. On the one hand it is promoting opening to and development of knowledge of the spiritual reality of the world and of the spiritual forces acting on and influencing human evolution. Correlatively, on the other hand, this opening to the spiritual produces a humility and wonder at what is so revealed. This development involves the love of truth and the soul taking on the formerly instinctive character of conscience, once there is the realization that all evil, all departure from the virtuous mean, is both self-destructive and destructive to the world. One realizes that in one's action it is necessary to regard the good of others as integral with one's own.

What is the role of the Christ Being in human evolution? In "Occult Science" Steiner first referred to the "Christ Being" as the highest leading Being of the Sun beings, those spiritual beings in whose "radiance" human evolution was fostered on Earth. Following the influence of the Luciferian spirits, their influence was prevented from

dominating and taking over human development. This prevention was achieved through part of the human etheric body being outside the physical body, subject only to the Sun beings' influence. The human beings who remained most under the influence of the Sun beings, when perceiving with that part of the etheric body separated from the physical body and astral desires, was able to perceive, indirectly, the Christ Being as sublime leader of the Sun beings. These human beings were the Initiates, who cultivated and transmitted their knowledge in special places:- "Oracles".

After the Atlantean catastrophe, a leading Christ-Initiate, with a group of disciples, led the group who established the first post-Atlantean, Indian civilization, age.

In the further course of human development, a Dark Age began, in which human beings became increasingly separated from the spiritual and immersed in the physical Earth. The Ahrimanic influence changed the human experience after death such that the astral body was "shrouded". One was no longer open to the spiritual radiance of the higher spiritual Beings in Spiritland, but, rather, in a world of shades, isolated. Thus in returning to life through reincarnation, no spiritual purification would have been effected. This influence on human consciousness between death and rebirth reflected the degree to which, during the preceding lifetime, particular human beings had been subject the Ahrimanic deception that physical reality is the one and only reality and so were closed to the spiritual world. As Steiner put it (20),

Men who at death are in the power of Ahriman are born again as Egoists.

Moses was a Christ-Initiate of such power that he could foresee and foretell the coming of Christ. The task of the Initiates thereafter became that of enabling human beings to recognize Christ-become-man, when that eventuated. Christ, three thousand, one hundred years after

the beginning of the Dark Age, descended to Earth and took physical form and presence to humanity as the Man, Jesus.

I take up my exposition of Steiner's account now from his book "The Reappearance of Christ in the Etheric" (21). Steiner portrayed the "fall" of humanity as something necessary, in human evolution, for the full development of Ego-consciousness, notwithstanding the consequences of temptation, deception, death, disease, error and evil. It was because, in this Dark Age, human beings could not escape the world of the senses into the spiritual world, that the Divine, sublime spiritual Being, Christ, had to descend into the physical world and come forward as a teacher. Human beings, experiencing the life, death and teachings of Christ, whilst yet on Earth, thereby could gain a connection with the spiritual world, the realm occupied by all sublime higher spiritual beings. Christ's time on Earth was in the middle of the Dark Age. It made possible that some human beings could comprehend that they could live in connection with the spiritual world and that the event of Christ's coming had made that re-connection possible. Human preparedness for the event was as much necessary as the event itself for future human evolution.

After his death on the cross, Christ appeared in the realm where souls between death and rebirth dwelt, suffusing it with spiritual light, dispelling the Ahrimanic shrouding and allowing spiritual development, turning the influence of Ahriman, the effect of the shrouding - namely Ego-consciousness, to the good. Those who can reascend into the spiritual world can carry that value gained from the descent into the physical with them, being both, as Ego, self-consciousness and consciousness of existing in a spiritual order of Being.

The original coming of Christ and his reception was the antecedent condition necessary for a highly important event, developing this century, that described by Steiner as the reappearance of Christ

in the etheric. This is the meaning of the long foretold second coming of Christ. Since his physical death, Christ, who as spiritual Being exists membered in ascending spiritual worlds, has been present as a Being in the etheric world which interpenetrates the physical Earth. What is happening in the present time, beginning this century, is that human souls are incarnating who have undergone sufficient spiritual development to become able to perceive in the etheric world as well as the physical. Now human beings have to "reach upwards" to perceive Christ. Those who achieve this thereafter know Christ within and live in his company. Steiner warned that the materialist mind will conceive of this event as another physical reincarnation of Christ and that a number of persons will, in their "colossal conceit" (22), falsely claim to be the reincarnated Christ.

The slow, gradual unfolding of this event in human evolution and history is barely evident at the present time. We live in an age of immense suffering and destructiveness, wrought by human beings to each other in their interactions. After the calamity of the First World War, Steiner strove to give guidance on the "social question", to show how the circumstances producing such destructive human relations can be avoided. In his book "Towards Social Renewal" (23), Steiner outlined what he saw as needed in social organization to promote the human flourishing, spiritual development and fulfilment of all members of society and to overcome the production of social conflicts, antagonisms and destructiveness.

Present "social organisms" partake of a unitary organization as "states". The modern unitary state is such that control of legal/political life, economic/productive life and spiritual/cultural life is exercised by one unitary executive government. Steiner argued that, contrary to this, what is needed is a threefold division and organization of the social organism, such that there would be three autonomous, self-governing "organs" of social life, each coming under

one of the three rubrics of the French Revolution: "Liberty", "Equality" and "Fraternity". Such organization would countenance the spiritual reality of the human being, concretely. Under the rubric, "Equality", would be the political-rights organization. This would be responsible for all questions of equality of rights and of mutual recognition between members of the community in question. This needs to be organized democratically, with every member of the community being involved, but exclusively deciding issues based on rights-awareness. Within the overall organization of this social organ, Steiner proposed the structure of a "rights-state" with legislative and administrative bodies, such that local political-rights bodies would determine the laws governing these issues in the locality, that groupings of these bodies would determine the laws for the same forms of issues between localities, on the scale of provinces. Bodies co-ordinating legal-rights legislation on a more nation level will again themselves group to decide laws and rights issues at a international level. This underlying constitutional organization would set the overall social conditions according to which the other two social organs and their organizations would operate. But the point is that, subject to those conditions, the framework of rights established by law, the other social organs would be self-organizing and self-managing. Under the rubric "Fraternity", would be the economic organization. This recognizes the interdependence and importance to one another of humanity. Economic associations of all those concerned with any particular sphere of economic life: producers, distributors and consumers, would determine, out of their own specialist expertise, the optimum level of production of commodities or services and set the prices accordingly. Associative co-ordination of economic associations, acting by mutual agreement, could co-ordinate production and distribution up to the world scale.



The third social member, under the rubric "Liberty", would be the spiritual-cultural organization. Self-governing bodies, managed by those directly involved, would organize that sphere of human interaction involved with the promotion of individual creativity, spiritual activity and self-fulfilment. In particular, the provision of education, so essential to the unfolding of individual potentialities of creativity and fulfilment, would be managed and under the control of educators, themselves, those in the best position to judge what should be provided and how best to do it.

The point of this articulation of the social organism into these three social organs is that it frees each, in its own province, to do what it is best able to do. It avoids the destructive possibility of conflicts between their spheres of interest and influence. In the present forms of unitary state, one finds that economic interests distort the function of law-making such that laws are devised to further these interests to the detriment of considerations of human rights and equality under the law. Wars most graphically demonstrate the enormous destructiveness unleashed by having the political power of the state turned to pursuing economic interests. A similar case is where the management of economic production is directed from motives concerned with the political and social rights of those involved with production, rather than from the motives which drive human beings to produce and consume, ie from the motives of having a materially satisfactory existence. When this happens, one finds a lack of initiative and innovation and a stultification of the spiritual creativity and ingenuity which would most effectively drive economic production. Finally, in state provision of and direction of education, one finds the perversion of the vocation of teaching, that loving devotion to others in enabling them to unfold their spiritual capabilities and understanding. Teachers are alienated from this

calling, to serve ends given by the state in service of political and economic interests, ends which do not regard those taught as ends-in-themselves but rather as means to the service of economic interests and political causes.

This threefold articulation does not propose a Platonic Republic (24) with a rigid division of functions between the members of society.

Rather individual people are liable to participate in one way or another in all three organizations. They reflect what are found as distinct articulations, but united, within each human being.

Relating this to my considerations of the articulation of human needs and satisfactions in my discussion of valour (pages 183-6), economic activity relates to the satisfaction of one's basic needs and the securing of one's material basis. It is the province of the satisfaction of desires relating to the physical world. The creation of laws, social instituting rights and, correlatively, prohibiting the infringement of these rights, relates to the need for every individual member of society to be recognized as intrinsically valuable. This recognition would consist in people having equal rights, in so far as they are dependent, to have their basic needs met and, in so far as they are not dependent but able to be responsible for themselves and others, they need to shoulder that responsibility. Also, in this province of need and its corresponding activity standing, as it were, in the centre of human needs and aspirations, it also faces towards the open horizon of higher human needs and aspirations. Laws, in seeking to secure rights, need to promote the conditions under which individuals can equally, optimally pursue their spiritual development, express their creativity and realize themselves valuably. Finally, the instituting of the promotion of spiritual self-realization, the value of human freedom, is that province of the deepest and greatest satisfactions of human beings, in the achievement of spiritual companionship and harmony with the whole of Being.

Steiner criticized Marxist socialist thinking for abstractly regarding the human being materialistically one-sidedly. The consequence of this was the ideological conclusion that social relations are only determined on the basis of economic interests. Thus their vision of a good society to be created centred on the idea that the dissatisfaction and discontent of the masses of the working class or proletariat was primarily an economic discontent, which could be overcome by the seizure of control of the means of economic production and their subsequent control by a workers' state. However this ideology has failed, according to this view, to comprehend wherein lie human needs and aspirations. Steiner expressed the view that what has not been understood as the basis for quite justifiable proletarian discontent and aspirations to radical social change, is the want of, the denial of human dignity in the social relations and conditions of life to which they have been subject. In other words, it is the want of "valour", in my sense of the term. Communist social organization no more satisfies this central human need than does capitalism.

In the concrete human present, when there is human crisis on a global scale and massive human destructiveness, the question "wherein lies the good?" is all-important. There are crises of various kinds in the developed communist states, in the developed capitalist states and in the relatively less developed "Third World" states. A direction for the resolution of these crises and for a truly human social organization, the direction for the human good, lies in the development of the threefold articulation and organization of society.

Introduction

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Section 1

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Section 2

Part 1 continued

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