The Role of Conflict Analysis in Conflict Resolution:

Reflections on International Mediation

The Case of Angola

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Abstract

In face of the growing number of armed conflicts worldwide and their increasing complexity, conflict resolution theory development is an imperative. That such an imperative has already resulted in the development of a number of specific methodologies for the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts is very positive in a conflict landscape constituted by wars which are structurally different. However, only a fraction of 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind' have benefited from the application of these new and innovative approaches to conflict resolution. The 'Clausewitzian universe' continues to exert its influence and 'conflict resolution' at the international level ostensibly remains characterised by dispute settlement processes, achieved through the use of international negotiation tools such as bargaining. 'Conflict resolution' remains overwhelmingly about power brokerage between groups in conflict.

Nevertheless, 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind' are notoriously resistant to such 'resolution' methods and in some cases they have contributed to their very protractedness. Why should contemporary conflicts be so fundamentally incompatible with resolution by negotiation and bargaining? Equally important, what are the reasons behind practitioners' insistence on such processes, when they have repeatedly proven inadequate in the resolution of current wars?

At the root of this problem is the issue of conflict analysis. Understanding these two different issues requires a discussion of the assumptions upon which conflict resolution theory has been developed and the underlying beliefs of practitioners involved in conflict resolution. Conflict analysis and the way armed conflicts are explained have been at the root of both the development of conflict resolution theory as well as underlying actions towards conflict resolution. It is only through the wider application of adequate conflict analysis to the practical world of conflict resolution and diplomacy that processes which emphasise the facilitated analysis of underlying, also termed structural, sources of conflict will be achieved.

Dedications

In memory of Dr Calheiros Veloso,
A friend without whom this thesis would have been
Merely a dream in a young student's imagination.
With all my heart, I thank you.

To my parents, Francisco and Ana,
Always supporting and encouraging,
Never doubting.
Thank you mom and dad
For making this possible.

To Salwa Kelidar,
My partner,
For believing, patiently, in me.

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Introduction

What does 'conflict resolution' mean? Is conflict resolution a truce, an armistice, a cease-fire or a power-sharing agreement? Or should resolution entail a fundamental change in the relationship between conflict groups, reconciliation and perhaps, forgiveness? More importantly, where do the different meanings ascribed to conflict resolution come from? In a world where armed conflicts rage unabated with catastrophic human and material consequences, the development of conflict resolution theory and practice is an imperative. This imperative has been recognised by numerous conflict resolution theorists, resulting in the development of a number of specific methodologies for the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts. However, only a fraction of these conflicts have benefited from the application of these new and innovative approaches to conflict resolution. In fact, deeply rooted in the world of traditional diplomacy, 'conflict resolution' at the international level remains a synonym to processes of dispute settlement, achieved through the use of international negotiation tools such as bargaining. In practice, 'conflict resolution' in is overwhelmingly about power brokerage between groups in conflict.

Nevertheless, contemporary armed conflicts are notoriously resistant to such 'resolution' methods. In addition, dispute settlement has in some cases contributed to the very protractedness of contemporary wars. Why should this be so? Are contemporary conflicts so fundamentally different that centuries-old approaches to the resolution of war between states become irrelevant or inapplicable? And why would practitioners insist on processes, which have proved inadequate in the resolution of current wars?

In these early days of the twenty-first century, war remains a very serious problem. The global conflict panorama reveals an increasingly complex and growing variety of intra-state wars, terrorism, episodes of genocide and regime sponsored democide and politicide. Paradoxically, while the increased relevance of the questions raised above should be self-evident in face of the growing number of conflicts worldwide, it is compounded by fact that contemporary conflict resolution theory has dramatically improved, an improvement that has not translated into the practical world of conflict resolution. In fact, today's conflict resolution practitioner has at his or her disposal a variety of detailed approaches tailor-made for the realities of contemporary armed conflicts. Understanding the reasons behind the unwillingness or inability of practitioners to use such methodologies is therefore critical. That

such understanding should begin by a discussion of the assumptions upon which conflict resolution theory has been developed is clear. Moreover, it is neither a question of discussing resolution approaches in a vacuum nor of debating the theoretical advantages of one methodology versus another. At the root of the development of conflict resolution theory in the last three decades is a radical change in the way current wars are understood, based on a fundamental revision of the parameters of conflict analysis. In fact, as will become clear from the chapters to follow, the development of conflict resolution theory has ostensibly and inextricably been an offspring of the development in conflict analysis itself.

Part One of this thesis is therefore dedicated to 'Conflict Analysis'. We begin by providing an introduction to contemporary armed conflicts through a statistical overview as well as a preliminary discussion of global trends in the occurrence of armed conflicts. This discussion highlights the current preponderance of violent conflict within states and the most salient characteristics of present wars. In addition, some of the most common causes of contemporary armed conflicts, their regional incidence and average duration are examined. From this introductory survey, the proposition that contemporary conflicts, variously termed as 'new wars', 'wars of the third kind' or 'protracted social conflicts', are a different phenomenon when contrasted with classical inter-state wars is debated. An ontological discussion of the 'structural transformation of war proposition' is then attempted by contrasting it with the postulates of the 'Clausewitzian Universe', locus *par excellence* of the conventional also called traditional approach to war.

This discussion emphasises the elements that make contemporary wars structurally different and highlights the concern that underlies the 'structural transformation of war' proposition. The inability to properly assess and deal with current wars stems from a 'mental map' that conceptualises war as a legitimate and regulated contest between distinctively designated, organised and marked armed forces of two or more states for political purposes. In fact, as Chapter 2 makes clear, such 'Clausewitzian' understanding of war remains strongly imprinted in the normative regulation of war (the international laws of war), the practices of statesmen and foreign policy officials in the prevention, management and resolution of armed conflicts, in international organisations as well as in some academic circles, in particular strategic studies and last but not least at the root of realist and structuralist approaches to international relations.

From an analytical point of view, current wars pose specific challenges for which both international law and the realist and structuralist approaches to international relations are inadequate. As a result, Chapter 3 probes for an adequate analytical platform that, surpassing some of the limitations imposed by the 'clausewitzian universe', would incorporate the fundamental changes in the type of conflict units, goals and behaviour and the types of issues

involved in contemporary conflict. Drawing on two of the most recent conflict analysis types, this chapter discusses 'ethnic conflicts' and 'resource-wars' and inquires about the relative merits of singling out 'root causes' as regards a better understanding of contemporary conflicts.

This discussion will lead to our final chapter on conflict analysis. Because wars have multiple causes located at various levels of the social spectrum, it is crucial to look at different levels-of-analysis for an understanding of war and armed conflict. The wars of today are not just a matter of states and governments, politicians and general staffs, regimented armies and high strategy, national interest and national pride. War today is overwhelmingly fought within and for the state itself, by groups against other groups or against incumbent regimes. It is organised and spontaneous at the same time. It violates by its very existence the legal framework that states created to regulate this destructive activity. In this chapter we focus on explaining contemporary conflict through using various levels of analysis, from the individual to the international. Within such a framework, although the analyst may begin his analysis by concentrating on a particular analytical level, all levels of analysis must be looked at to explain the occurrence of any particular conflict.

Part Two of this thesis centres on the development of what many authors and practitioners have qualified as 'normative' conflict resolution. Are there obstacles to the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts through negotiations based on bargaining and concession convergence processes? By discussing the underlying analytical assumptions of conflict resolution in theory and practice, Chapter 5 presents two competing approaches to conflict resolution: bargaining and problem-solving. We discuss the limitations and inapplicability of 'power-brokerage' approaches characteristic of diplomacy and international negotiation to current wars. Moreover, although negotiated settlements may result in a temporary cessation of hostilities, such as in the negotiation of truces and cease-fires, the resolution of complex identity related issues characteristic of contemporary conflicts as well as the psychological and social elements that result from the occurrence of conflicts themselves demand approaches that surpass bargaining and power brokerage. The specific meaning of 'problem-solving' within conflict resolution is explained through the work of John Burton, Herbert Kelman, Ronald Fisher and John Groom, among others. Based on a fundamental change in the way contemporary conflicts are analysed, this approach represents a paradigm shift with the potential to influence all areas of peacemaking and conflict resolution, introducing new norms and a new way of approaching the recurrent problem of war.

Nevertheless, while the theoretical development of problem-solving as an overarching approach to the resolution of conflict is very advanced, as evidenced by its theoretical incorporation in traditional approaches as well as in the creation of new methodologies, its

use in the resolution of armed conflicts is for the most part still marginal. There is therefore a wide gap between theory and practice.

In the practical world of conflict resolution, the gap between theory and practice must be assessed through the analysis of specific instances of resolution. Consequently, we focus on mediation theory and practice to inquire the extent to which the two competing approaches to conflict resolution are present. If resolution processes are often a direct result of the way conflicts are analysed, are mediators affected in their procedural choices by their own perception and analysis of the conflicts they are involved in as 'benign' third parties?

This question is the overall theme of the case study. We chose three instances of mediation of the Angola conflict in order to uncover the extent of such influence. The detailed analysis of these three mediation processes is intended to provide a practical glimpse of the role of conflict analysis in mediatory activity. This relatively unstudied aspect of mediation is critical for it helps us understand retrospectively one of the possible ways by which different conflict analysis' frameworks impact on actions that intermediaries may take in resolution processes, clarifying the inextricable and bi-univocal relationship between conflict analysis and conflict resolution.

Part One: Conflict Analysis

Chapter 1. Contemporary Armed Conflict in Perspective

1.1. On Current Wars: A Statistical Overview of Contemporary Armed Conflict

> ...moreover, despite arguments that war has become obsolete, and incompatible with the global nature of the modern world economy with its reliance on international trade, investment and currency flows, and, more prosaically, claims that the troubles of the post-Cold War have been exaggerated, there is little sign that states and rulers have learned from the failures of the past. These failures are the ultimate deterrent, but a tendency to explain away defeats ensures that this deterrent is too weak...[1]

> IKEDA: The twentieth century has in a sense been an age of unprecedented tragedy resulting from two global wars, revolutions, counter-revolutions and the cruel totalitarianism of Nazism and Stalinism. As the century draws to a close, *we all face the serious problems of evaluating the period that has gone before and determining the course we must follow in the years to come* [my emphasis].[2]

When A.J. Longman borrowed Zbigniew Brzezinski's expression *'the century of megadeath',* in a paper destined to explore current trends and causes of armed conflicts around the world[3], he knowingly echoed what most statistical and conflict monitoring studies have concluded in one manner or another: that the twentieth century has been the bloodiest century in the history of mankind. In his study, Brzezinski had concluded that a staggering 87 million people had been *consumed* by the 'politics of organised insanity', of which almost one third were young men who perished in the names of nationalism and ideology.[4] Yet, when compared with Eric Hobsbawn's findings pointing to an estimated 187 million victims of war worldwide in this century alone, Brzezinski's statistics for the *'century of megadeath'* must be considered conservative at best.[5] For Hobsbawn too, the twentieth century was an *'age of catastrophe'* as he adequately explains in his poignantly entitled book 'The Age of Extremes: the Short Twentieth Century'.[6]

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[1] Jeremy Black. Why Wars Happen. Reaktion Books, Guildford, 1998.

[2] Johan Galtung and Daisaku Ikeda. Choose Peace, a Dialogue Between Johan Galtung and Daisaku Ikeda. Pluto Press, London, 1995, p.53.

[3] A.J. Longman. Downward Trend in Armed Conflicts Reversed.
<http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/Newsletter81/in_its_search_for_root_causes_of.htm>

[4] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control. Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1993, p.7 as cited in A.J. Longman. Op. cit., p.2.
<http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/Newsletter81/in_its_search_for_root_causes_of.htm>

[5] Eric Hobsbawn, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991. Michael Joseph, London, 1994.

[6] Ibid.

To date the most comprehensive long-term estimate of human casualties caused by political violence is provided by Rudolph Rummel.[7] This author estimates that while 33 million people have perished in actual battle, the combined albeit conservative estimate for direct and indirect casualties stands at 203 million for the first 87 years of the twentieth century.[8] These projections are the result of the incorporation of direct conflict casualties as well as casualties resulting from what this author terms *democide*.[9] The inclusion of the 'democide' category of political violence allows us to assess the human cost of some of the worst episodes of political violence in the twentieth century.[10] In fact, as pointed out by Jongman and Schmid, while 'the storybook of war is one of a clash of two hierarchically structured organisations of officers and soldiers fighting and killing each other for the defence and interests of their states', the fact is that 'war as a clash of two armed forces is not the biggest problem of collective violence. Rather genocide, politicide ('mass killings for political reasons') and democide are the chief killers'.[11]

Brzezinski's *'century of megadeath'* and Hobsbawn's *'age of catastrophe'* are unfortunately not historical metaphors. As will be seen throughout this thesis, war and armed conflict are ubiquitous, ever present, lurking at every corner, waiting to strike. The landscape of contemporary armed conflict reads like a horror story, of which the following words present but a glimpse,

> ...over one million dead and up to 50 million people surviving as anonymous refugees in tents and shacks far from their homes; illiterate eight-year-olds in battle fatigues clutching AK47s, learning to kill from mercenaries paid in pockets full of precious stones; countless amputees, victims of cheap landmines covering wide tracts of land across every continent; thousands of

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[7] R.J. Rummel, 'Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No1, March 1995. See also R.J. Rummel, Statistics of Democide, Genocide and Mass Murder since 1990. Charlottesville, University of Virginia, Center for National Security Law, School of Law, 1997.

[8] A.P Schmid and A.J. Jongman point out that had Rummel 'taken the higher estimates he found among the 8,200 estimates of domestic violence, genocide and mass murder he surveyed, compared and evaluated, he could have reached a figure of above 300 million deaths'. A.P Schmid and A.J. Jongman. 'Mapping Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Human Rights Violations', in World Conflict & Human Rights Map 1998, PIOOM- Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, The Netherlands, 1998.

[9] Democide is defined as the intentional killing of people by governments excluding the killing of those with weapons in their hands or those killed as a result of military action. Democide includes mass murder, genocide and other types of government killing. Genocide is defined according to Article 2 of the Genocide Convention of 1948 as 'acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group'. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of this disturbing topic refer to Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, 'A Brief History Ethnic Cleansing', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, Summer 1993.

[10] By approximate number of fatalities these are: the Soviet Union (1917-1987) with 62 million, Communist China (1949-1987) with 35 million, Nazi Germany (1933-1945) with 21 million, the Chinese Kuomintang regime (1928-1949) with 10 million, Mao's guerrilla period in China (1923-1949) with 3 million, the Cambodian Khmer Rouge (1975-1979) with 2 million, the Japanese imperialist period (1936-1945) with 6 million, and Turkey (1909-1918), Vietnam (1945-1987), Poland (1945-1948), Pakistan (1958-1987) and Tito's Yugoslavia (1944-1987) all below the 2 million fatalities threshold.

[11] A.P Schmid and A.J. Jongman. 'Mapping Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Human Rights Violations', in World Conflict & Human Rights Map 1998, PIOOM- Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, The Netherlands, 1998.

'rape' babies, born into a world where nobody wants them- these are the realities of war and conflict in the 1990s.[12]

Presenting an overview of the occurrence of violent armed conflict must be attempted with reference to the various authoritative statistical studies that track the number of conflicts currently on-going in the world, their characteristics and casualty statistics.[13] Recognising that statistics on the occurrence of violent armed conflicts, their dynamics, characteristics and direct and indirect casualties can at best be good estimates, and aware that conflicts are classified differently by each of the monitoring projects chosen, we begin by presenting a broad picture of current worldwide occurrence of violent armed conflict.

According to Interdisciplinary Research Programme on the Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOMM), which focuses on violent conflict, gross human rights violations and large-scale humanitarian emergencies, in the period from mid 1997 to 1998, there were 16 on-going high intensity conflicts, 70 low intensity conflicts and 114 violent political conflicts.[14] For the period considered, the preponderance of high-intensity conflicts were located in the African continent. These included Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia-Eritrea.[15] One high intensity conflict raged in Europe, in Turkey; one in Latin America, Colombia; one in the Middle East, Iraq. Asia was the theatre of six high-intensity conflicts, among others, in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, India-Pakistan, Burma, and India. The estimated number of casualties resulting from these conflicts amounted to a high

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[12] Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. Civil Wars, Civil Peace. An introduction to Conflict Resolution. Pluto Press, London 1998, p.1.

[13] There are several ongoing conflict monitoring projects. Among these: the widely used annual register by Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg under the joint research programme on the dynamics of conflict at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) whose conclusions are published yearly in SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute); the Interdisciplinary Research Programme on the Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOMM) based at Leiden University; the AKUF Project based in Hamburg and the Armed Conflict Report issued by Project Ploughshares. Within governmental agencies we highlight the United States National Intelligence Council's list of current ongoing humanitarian emergencies. The Forum for Early Warning and Emergency Response (FEWER) listed in March 1998 ten projects based in academic institutions (North America and Europe), four projects within NGOs, three projects in regional IGOs (the European Union, the Organisation of African Unity and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and three in the United Nations family, although there is the much lamented demise of the United Nations' Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). Yet, this list could in fact be larger, incorporating many more Non-Governmental Organisations that are relief oriented (CARE, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, OXFAM).

[14] High Intensity Conflicts (HICs) are defined as resulting in 1,000 or more deaths from armed conflict, but not necessarily wars with battlefield deaths, in a twelve-month period. Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) are armed conflicts involving 100 or more, but fewer than 1,000 fatalities in a twelve-month period. At this level of conflict, violence is mainly characterised by terrorist/guerrilla attacks, assassinations, bombings and acts of sabotage, sometimes in communal contexts with little or no state involvement. Violent Political Conflicts (VPCs) are defined as situations with less than 100 recorded fatalities. These include post-armistice situations with a residual low level of violence; protracted minor terrorist or guerrilla campaigns kept in check by the authorities; border conflicts with sporadic violent incidents and new emerging situations of conflict which might escalate to higher levels of violence. A.P Schmid and A.J. Jongman. 'Mapping Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Human Rights Violations', in World Conflict & Human Rights Map 1998, PIOOM- Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, The Netherlands, 1998.

[15] With ten high intensity conflicts in the past 25 years, Africa has been the hardest hit continent, suffering casualties ranging between 3,800,000 and 6,800,000 people and an astounding 155 million people directly or indirectly affected by war.

estimate of 89,100 war-related deaths to a low of 72,600 war-related deaths.[16] Five of these high intensity conflicts surpassed the 10,000 annual casualty figure. These were Algeria, Afghanistan, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda and Sudan. In addition, a critical finding of this study revealed that the average duration of current high intensity conflicts is in the region of thirteen and a half years.

Below the high intensity level, PIOMM found 70 ongoing 'low intensity conflicts'. Half of all low intensity conflicts were located in sub-Saharan Africa, while a number of countries were the theatre of multiple low intensity conflicts, including Congo/Zaire, Colombia, Burma, Pakistan, Nigeria, India and Uganda. These 70 low intensity conflicts resulted in a combined death toll of approximately 10,000 victims during the period considered. At a lower level of violence, PIOMM registered a total of 114 on-going violent political conflicts.

At the University of Uppsala in Sweden, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg maintain a conflict monitoring project which provides long-term statistics concerning trends and dynamics in the occurrence of violent armed conflict globally. This conflict register is especially important as a result of this long-term focus, a task for which PIOMM is not suitable due to its relative recent existence.[17] Yet, one should be aware of the fact that because Wallensteen and Sollenberg's definition of armed conflict requires that one of the parties be a government[18], the overall number of armed conflicts is reduced when compared to PIOMM's findings.[19] Furthermore, while conflicts are also ranked according to levels of fatalities, in this particular case only battle-related deaths are considered.[20] Cross comparisons between registers must therefore be made with care bearing in mind the different assumptions and operative definitions made at the start of each project.

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[16] However, their cumulative fatality total is calculated at a low of 4,732,000 casualties and a high of 5,307,000. Not incorporated in these statistics were other high intensity conflicts that had de-escalated or terminated. If combined with the sixteen on-going high intensity conflicts in the period considered, the cumulative death toll of current and recently de-escalated and terminated high intensity conflicts reaches a staggering total of 7 to 8 million people.

[17] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. See for example Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, 'Major Armed Conflicts', in SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Chapter 1, p.17-30, Oxford University Press, 1997. Their conclusions and findings are also published annually in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook as well as in a yearly article on the Journal of Peace Research.

[18] Armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility, which concerns government and/or territory and where the use of force between two parties, or which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle related deaths. Wallensteen, P. and M. Sollenberg. 'Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996', in Journal of Peace Research, 34(3), 1997, p.354.

[19] We have seen above that PIOMM's data-set includes not only conflicts in which a government is one of the parties, but in addition incorporates instances of inter-communal conflicts.

[20] 'War' is defined as a situation where there are more than 1,000 battle related deaths during a particular year, 'intermediate armed conflict' as a situation where there is more than 1,000 battle related deaths during the course of the conflict but fewer than 1,000 in a particular year and finally, 'minor armed conflicts' where the number of battle related deaths during the course of the conflict is below 1,000. Combined, the categories of war and intermediate armed conflict form the category of major armed conflict. Conflicts are then further divided into conflicts about government and conflicts about territory. Ibid. p.339.

When in 1989 the Berlin Wall came down signalling the end of the Cold War, it had been widely anticipated that, with the end of politico-military bipolarity, threats to international peace and security would be substantially reduced. It was thought that developed and former communist worlds alike would benefit from a reduction in strategic and tactical nuclear arms production, procurement and deployment, heralding what came to be known as a 'peace dividend' to be diverted to increasing social welfare in the countries concerned.[21] The final triumph of the neo-liberal democratic model was seen by some as evidence of the *end of history*, its adoption throughout the world its corollary.

However, the first evidence that this could not be the case came in the form of the instability that followed the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. The crumbling of the Soviet Empire saw conflicts hitherto concealed erupt around issues of government and self-determination, ethnic division and territorial disputes. In fact, the peaceful example set by Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Revolution' was an exception rather than the rule in a Cold-War transition characterised essentially by turbulence and instability.[22] In addition, the end of superpower patronage strongly affected other regions, where client movements became devoid of their support. These included Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and many others.[23] As Rupesinghe *et al* point out,

> ...the 'small wars' and conflicts that had often been created and *contained* [sic] within the wider power relations of the US and USSR were now unchecked, and the result was the spread of violence and the emergence of disparate groups, ostensibly fighting in the name of ideology, religion or ethnicity, but seeking to finance their operations through local taxation, plunder and pillage.[24]

The turbulence and instability that characterised the end of the Cold War may be partially assessed by the exponential increase in the number of United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as a fundamental change in their characteristics. As Michael Brown points out,

> ...only five peacekeeping operations were under way in early 1988, but twenty-one have been undertaken since then. Thirteen of these twenty-one and nine of the most recent eleven operations were directed at internal conflicts. The number of personnel assigned to UN

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[21] The much hyped 'peace dividend' that would be created after the end of the Cold War has so far proved an illusion, since the total percentage of GNP in most countries devoted to arms purchase continues to be relatively very high. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has increased the risk of a nuclear war due to the crumbling of control systems of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

[22] The former Yugoslavia erupted in a vicious civil war, still reverberating in Kosovo and Macedonia; conflict erupted between Moscow and the former Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan; and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabah; and within the Russian republic over Chechnya.

[23] To this respect, Michael E. Brown posits that 'those who had high hopes in the early 1990s for the international community's conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution capabilities have been chagrined by the international community's inability to prevent, stop, or resolve most of the violent internal conflicts that raged in the early 1990s: In Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Burma, Georgia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan (...) as a result, the euphoria of the early 1990s has given way to frustration and, for some, disillusionment in the mid-1990s...'. Michael E Brown. Op. cit. p.10.

[24] Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. Op. cit. p.8.

peacekeeping operations has increased by a factor of ten since 1988: from around 7,500 to 75,000. [25]

Let us look closely at the available conflict statistics for the period following the end of the Cold War. Wallensteen and Sollenberg found that during the period from 1989 to 1996 there were a total of 101 armed conflicts in 68 different locations, involving a total of 254 parties or cluster of parties of which 71 were internationally recognise states. Dynamically, the authors uncovered a positive overall downward trend in armed conflicts during the period 1989-1996, although there was a peak increase from 1989 to 1992 and then a marginal increase in 1996. The graph below, adapted from Wallensteen and Sollenberg's data, reveals the downward tendencies uncovered for the period under consideration:

Figure 1[26]



Moreover, the majority of conflicts responsible for the increase and peaking in 1992 began after the Cold War and had ended or had been contained by the end of 1996. A critical finding was that of the 101 armed conflicts during the period 1989-1996 only six were inter-state conflicts. While the number of minor armed conflicts increased from 1995 to 1996, the number of wars stabilised at 1995 levels, which led the authors to conclude that major armed conflicts are becoming a rare occurrence. Also crucial is the finding that,

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[25] Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p.10. Furthermore, from traditional peacekeeping operations which relied on the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, United Nations operations have become progressively multi-functional, involving diverse interventions such as cease-fire supervision, the demobilisation of military forces, the return of refugees and the provision of humanitarian assistance, the design and supervision of elections, the coordination of support for economic reconstruction and development. Critically, United Nations peacekeeping operations may now involve coercive action, understood as peace enforcement.

[26] Based and adapted from P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg. Op. cit. Please note that a combined figure per type and location for the whole period is not provided since this register inputs data on a yearly basis so that a combined figure would risk counting the same conflict several times.

> ...only 4 of the 19 major armed conflicts recorded in 1996 originated during the eight-year period, whereas the origins of the remaining 15 date from years before the period studied, and in a few cases even from the 1950s and 1960s...[27]

As to the regional incidence of post Cold-War conflicts, Asia and Africa have been the two regions most affected by armed conflict from 1989 to 1996 as highlighted in the table below. The following Table allows for a general comparison of the incidence of conflict types per region:

Table 1:

Armed Conflicts by Regions, 1989-1996 [28]

Level of conflict	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Europe								
Minor	1	2	4	5	4	2	2	0
Intermediate	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	0
War	0	0	1	2	4	1	1	1
Number of Conflicts	2	3	6	9	10	5	5	1
Middle East								
Minor	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Intermediate	3	4	3	4	5	2	2	3
War	1	1	3	1	1	2	1	1
Number of Conflicts	4	6	7	7	7	5	4	5
Asia								
Minor	7	5	5	7	6	6	5	7
Intermediate	6	7	5	6	5	7	6	5
War	6	6	6	7	4	2	2	2
Number of Conflicts	19	18	16	20	15	15	13	14
Africa								
Minor	4	7	7	8	4	6	3	9
Intermediate	2	1	1	0	4	5	4	3
War	8	9	9	7	3	2	2	2
Number of Conflicts	14	17	17	15	11	13	9	14
America								
Minor	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
Intermediate	2	1	3	0	1	3	3	2
War	3	3	1	3	2	0	0	0
Number of Conflicts	8	5	5	4	3	4	4	2

Asia stands out in each individual year as the region most affected by the scourge of war, with the exception of 1991 where Africa suffered one conflict more than Asia.[29] While being the region most affected by all types of conflict, Asia is not the region suffering the greatest incidence of war, being supplanted by Africa in 1989, 1990 and 1991. In all other years both regions suffered the same number of wars with the exception of 1993 when Asia had four wars as opposed to Africa's three. The preponderance of Asia when all types of conflict are taken into account is a result of the large numbers of intermediate armed conflicts raging in

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[27] Ibid. p.340.

[28] Adapted from from P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg. Op. cit. p.341.

[29] The discrepancy in this result as compared to PIOMM's findings, can only be justified by the different definitions adopted for each register, namely the prerequisite in this case that one of the parties to a conflict must be a government.

the region. Nevertheless, Asia experienced a downward trend in the numbers of wars (i.e. high intensity conflicts), which combined with the relatively stable number of intermediate armed conflicts in the period points to a general de-escalation in armed hostilities.[30]

According to the data provided by Wallensteen and Sollenberg, Africa had a substantial decrease in the incidence of war, from eight wars in 1989 and nine in both 1990 and 1991, to three in 1993 and two wars in 1994, 1995 and 1996. However, the authors highlight that 'the most troubling development was in Africa, which had a marked decrease in 1995 but a corresponding increase in 1996'.[31] Conflicts that had been dormant escalated markedly in the forms of minor and intermediate armed conflicts. Two new conflicts were added: Zaire and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

For the period under analysis, the conflicts in Bosnia Herzegovina, in Nagorno Karabakh and Georgia stand as the most deadly wars in Europe. On the other hand, as a result of the fact that few new conflicts have been initiated in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts remained relatively consistent throughout the period. Nevertheless, the invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, momentarily increased the number of wars in 1991 for the region. The most worrying developments referred to the conflict in Iraq over Kurd autonomy/independence; the civil war in Lebanon which reached the level of war in 1989 and 1990, and the conflict in Turkey which reached the level of war from 1992-1996.

From the above one can conclude that, in fact, for the period between 1989 and 1996 violent armed conflict decreased in absolute terms. But how can this decrease be properly equated in the long term? A long-term perspective capable of contextualising these post-Cold War trends may be found in the most recent long-term survey of armed conflicts by Ted Robert Gurr and his team, based at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management.[32] Their latest report documents an increase in the total magnitude of violent conflict from the 1950s to the 1980s and then a sharp decline after the Cold War ended in 1991. This sharp decline is in line with both Prof. Wallensteen *et al* and PIOMM's 1998 analysis.

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[30] It should be noted that Asia was also the stage for one of only two inter-state conflicts recorded in 1996, that between India and Pakistan. In the war category, the civil war in Afghanistan stands out, as well as the conflict over Kashmir. Also the Philippines and Sri Lanka experienced conflicts at war level, while other conflicts reached this level at some stage in the period considered such as Cambodia in 1989, Indonesia in 1990, Myanmar in 1992 and Tajikistan in 1989 and 1990.

[31] P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg. Op. cit. p.340.

[32] Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla. Peace and Conflict 2001: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy. Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, 2000.
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/peace.htm>

The main component of this trend is not international conflict between sovereign states, but a long-term rise (1950-late 1980s) and short-term fall (post-Cold War) in violent conflict within societies. Colonial wars of independence were but a small component of the long-term trends identified. What the authors term 'societal conflicts', or non-international, represented roughly three times the magnitude of interstate war during most of the last half century and increased six-fold between the 1950s and the early 1990s.[33] The Center for Systemic Peace, working closely with Gurr, provides us with the following graph for global warfare totals in the period 1946-1999:

Figure 2 [34]



The tendency demonstrated above is confirmed by the long-term framework adopted by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). The IISS has found that violent conflict within states increased steadily after World War II reaching a peak in 1991 and then declining

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[33] These trends and comparisons were constructed from a catalogue of every major episode of violent conflict from 1946 to 2000. Magnitudes were determined by rating each conflict on a 10 point scale that takes into account its deaths, dislocations, and physical damage. Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla. Peace and Conflict 2001: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy. Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, 2000, p.8. <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/peace.htm>

[34] Center for Systemic Peace. Global Conflict Trends. September 20, 2000. <http://www.members.aol.com/cspmgm/conflict.htm>

markedly until 1998.[35] The fact that internal conflicts have declined in numbers for much of the last decade is often attributed to the fact that 'the end of the Cold War eliminated the superpower rivalry that fuelled many societal conflicts' therefore opening up 'opportunities for peacemaking by the UN, regional organisations, and political activists in war-torn societies'.[36] Consequently, the end of bipolarity is considered the main factor contributing to the reduction in the number of violent armed conflicts in the post-Cold War period. A similar argument is often found as regards the reduction in the occurrence of conflicts between states, a downward trend confirmed by Miall *et al* using Kalevi Holsti's data-set.[37]

However, the end of the Cold War is also regarded as a catalyst permitting if not directly causing the eruption of numerous conflicts, especially in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as in other regions, where superpower patronage was paramount. As pointed out by J. David Singer, 'while the conventional wisdom sees the level of regional and communal war as something new- permitted, if not catalysed, by the end of superpower confrontation- the evidence suggests otherwise'.[38] The Center for Systemic Peace clearly summarises this 'perception problem' in the following terms,

> ...the illusion of stability imposed by the frigid ideological mindset and sterile politics of the Cold War's political entrepreneurs seriously distorted collective perceptions of societal and systemic dynamics and trends in armed conflict and violence during the contemporary 'decolonisation' period...contrary to popular myths, it was the Cold War period that was characterised by increasing incidence and magnitudes of political violence, mostly' civil wars', that gradually decimated large areas of the world, seduced fragile political relations into hostility and chaos, led many newly emergent and some long-established states to the brink of structural failure (and beyond)...the Cold War 'image' lent a curious patina of civility and stasis that served as the perfect cover for the subterranean ravages wrought during the Third World War.[39]

However, downward projections in the occurrence of armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War have been seriously questioned by developments in the last three years of the century. In fact, a worrying escalatory trend has been uncovered by J. Longman[40] as well as

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[35] In the 'Military Balance 1999-2000', IISS lists a total of 70 major wars in the 1945-1999 period resulting in 4,574,000 battle related deaths. Of these 70 wars, 33 are still on-going and the IISS estimates that in the year up to August 1, 1999, about 110,000 people died in these ongoing wars, while a cumulative figure of 3,684,000 is given for these wars since their beginning. I.I.S.S. The Military Balance 1999/2000. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999 as cited in A.J. Longman. op. cit., p.3.
<http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/Newsletter81/in_its_search_for_root_causes_of.htm>

[36] Gurr *et al.* Op. cit. p.11.

[37] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.28 based on Kalevi .J. Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.24.

[38] J. David Singer. 'Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.35.

[39] Center for Systemic Peace. Op. cit., p.3-4. J. David Singer corroborates this assertion by saying that these tendencies have 'been with us for nearly half a century' and that they went unnoticed because 'most of us living in the 'First' and 'Second' worlds were too preoccupied with the senselessness of our own confrontation to notice the death and destruction going on elsewhere'. J. David Singer. Op. cit. p.35.

Wallensteen and Sollenberg[41], among others. In fact, Wallensteen *et al* point to a short term rise in the number of conflicts in 1998 when five new conflicts erupted in Kosovo, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal and the interstate border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Furthermore, 1998 witnessed the escalation of five other conflicts, namely, Angola, Northern Ireland, Tajikistan, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Rwanda. J. Jongman further clarifies the issue as new data relating to the 1996-1999 period is inputted into PIOMM's conflict register. Table 2 below charts the evolution in number and occurrence of violent conflict in this most recent period:

Table 2:

Number of Armed Conflicts between 1995 and 1999[42]

	Mid 1995	Mid 1996	Mid 1997	Mid 1998	Mid 1999
HICs	22	20	20	16	22
LICs	39	31	59	70	77
VPCs	40	44	45	114	151
Total	101	95	124	200	250

As can be seen above, in mid 1999 twenty-two HICs were being fought throughout the world, a number that rose to twenty-five by November 1999 revealing a sharp increase by nine conflicts against 1998 figures. Equally disturbing is the steady growth in both low intensity conflicts and violent political conflicts. Low intensity conflicts have been increasing from a low of 31 in 1996 to a high of 77 in mid 1999. Violent political conflicts, on the other hand, have also increased dramatically, from a low of 40 in 1995 to a very perturbing 151 in mid 1999.

Recent statistical monitoring points to the fact that the decline in the occurrence of violent armed conflict witnessed in the early 1990s may unfortunately be a short-term development. Both SIPRI and PIOMM have concluded that, as a result of developments in the last two years of the decade, a strong increase in the number of conflicts can be established, revealing an escalation trend.[43] Aware of these developments, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan underlined in his 1999 report on the work of the organisation that 'what had seemed a gradual but hopeful trend towards a world with fewer and less deadly wars may have halted'. Furthermore he points out that 'in terms of violent conflicts, the most worrying development in 1998 was a significant increase in the number of wars' which is

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[40] A.J. Longman. Downward Trend in Armed Conflicts Reversed. , p.4.
<http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/Newsletter81/in_its_search_for_root_causes_of.htm>

[41] P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg. 'Armed Conflict, 1989-1998', in Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 1999, p.593-606.

[42] A.J. Longman. Downward Trend in Armed Conflicts Reversed. , p.4.
<http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/Newsletter81/in_its_search_for_root_causes_of.htm>

[43] Please refer to last section p.11 and 12. For an in-depth analysis of recent trends see P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg. 'Armed Conflict, 1989-1998', in Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 1999, p.593-606 and also A.J. Longman. Downward Trend in Armed Conflicts Reversed. , p.4.
<http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/Newsletter81/in_its_search_for_root_causes_of.htm>

'particularly troubling because the incidence and severity of global warfare had been declining since 1992- by a third or more according to some researchers'.[44] This would severely question the assumption that the end of the Cold War as made the world a 'safer place'.

In conclusion, what are the main tendencies or trends that come to light from the statistics discussed above? The first identifiable trend, as was seen above, refers to the fact that the total magnitude of violent armed conflict has increased from the 1950s to the 1980s then declined sharply after the Cold War ended in 1991, fluctuated between escalation and de-escalation during the 1990s and is now on an escalation phase. This macro-tendency is amply evident in the graph concerning 'Global Warfare totals 1946-1999' produced by the Center for Systemic Peace in the previous section.

The second main substantive finding or identifiable trend, relates to the question of what types of conflicts are responsible for the increase noted. From the discussion above, we found that this increase is not produced by classical inter-state conflicts, but by a long-term rise (with fluctuations) in violent conflict *within societies*, termed by Gurr *et al* as *'societal warfare'*. In fact, 'societal warfare' was 'roughly three times the magnitude of interstate war during most of the last century and increased six-fold between the 1950s and the early 1990s'.[45]

A third critical finding regards the fact that the vast majority of fatalities in today's armed conflicts are civilians. In actual fact, some registers point to a proportion of approximately 84% of civilian casualties in contemporary internal conflict.[46] This disturbing trend is also emphasized by the United Nations Secretary-General in the following terms,

> ...moreover, the impact of wars on civilians has worsened because internal wars, now the most frequent type of armed conflict, typically take a heavier toll on civilians than inter-state wars, and because combatants increasingly have made targeting civilians a strategic objective. This brutal disregard for humanitarian norms- and for the Geneva Conventions on the rules of war, whose fiftieth anniversary we recently commemorated- also extends to treatment of

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[44] United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/54/1), 1999. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report99/toc.htm>

[45] Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla, Op. Cit., p.8. See also J David Singer. 'Peace in the Global System: Displacement, Interregnum, or Transformation?', in The Long Post-War Peace , Kegley (Ed), Harper-Collins, 1991; and Charles King. Ending Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 308, London, 1997.

[46] Ibid. Figures based on P. Wallensteen & M. Sollenberg. 'Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996', in Journal of Peace Research, Vol 43, No3, 1997, p.339. And also M. Cranna (Ed), The True Cost of Conflict, EarthScan, London, 1994. Hugh Miall and his colleagues point out that 'according to UNICEF figures, whereas only 5 percent of the casualties of the First World War were civilians, by the Second World War the proportion had risen to 50 percent, while "as the century ends, the civilian share is normally about 80percent- most of them women and children". Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.32, based on J. Grant, The State of the World's Children, UNICEF, New York, 1992.

> humanitarian workers, who are all too frequently denied access to victims in conflict zones or are themselves attacked.[47]

The deliberate targeting of sectors of the civilian population has become increasingly used as a combat tactic in contemporary warfare.[48] In September 1999, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mary Robinson, described this state of affairs in the following way:

> ...civilians are no longer just victims of war today. They are regarded as instruments of war. Starving, terrorising, murdering, raping civilians- all that is seen as legitimate. Sex is no defence, nor is age; indeed women, children and the elderly are often at greatest risk. That is a strange, terrible state of affairs in the year after we commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[49]

These tactics are most evident in the practice of 'ethnic cleansing', involving the deliberate killing of people of a different ethnic background, driving them from their homes by terror and atrocities. This tactic was widely used by both Serbs and Bosnians during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and epitomized by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, where close to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred by extremist Hutus. And these are simply the most publicised cases. According to research undertaken by Barbara Harff, since 1945 there have been nearly fifty episodes of genocide and mass political murder targeted at more than seventy different ethnic and religious minorities and causing a total of at least 9 million and as possibly as many as 20 million civilian fatalities.[50]

The targeting of civilians as well as the difficulty in distinguishing civilians from military troops are inextricably related to some of the structural aspects characterising contemporary conflict. This will be fully developed in the next section when the concepts of 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind' are discussed. For the purposes of this part, it suffices to say that in a great number of cases, the majority of fighters are young males, some of them teenagers and even children.[51] As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between violent

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[47] United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/54/1), 1999. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report99/toc.htm>

[48] Kumar Rupesinghe *et al* point out that 'In Sudan, over a ten year period, 200,000 civilians died, compared with 3,000 "soldiers". Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. Op. cit.p.2.

[49] Mary Robinson, 'There must be accountability for East Timor's ordeal', in International Herald Tribune, September 9, 1999 as cited in A.J. Longman. Downward Trend in Armed Conflicts Reversed. , p.1 <http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/Newsletter81/in_its_search_for_root_causes_of.htm>

[50] As cited in Ted Robert Gurr. 'Minorities, Nationalists and Ethnopolitical Conflict', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996.

[51] Again we quote Rupesinghe *et al,* 'in Liberia, since the beginning of the civil war in 1989 up to the tentative peace agreement of 1996, an estimated 6,000 children were recruited as combatants' and that 'globally, an estimated 200,000-250,000 children, girls as well as boyes, are fighting wars today'. Ibid. p.2. For example, in 1996 'up to 50 million people were estimated to be displaced within their own countries or were scattered abroad as refugees'. Statistics based on FAO's Emergency Activities, 22 April 1994 that can be found at <http://www.fao.org/FOCUS/E/disaster/default.htm>. According to Ted Robert Gurr's Minority at Risk Project, at the

crimes and acts of warfare a situation worsened by the general increase in the privatisation of security with the spread of private security supply firms. The following graph captures the extent of the dramatic effects of contemporary warfare in terms of refugees and displaced populations:

Figure 3[52]



The seriousness of the situation is highlighted by Kumar Rupesinghe *et al* in the following terms: 'the displacement of mass populations, held at the mercy of militias in refugee camps, is no longer a consequence of conflict; often it is a crucial part of the overall objective'[53] while United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) posits that internal conflicts generated 18.2 million refugees and 24 million displaced people in 1993.[54] Furthermore, the violation of human rights globally is especially acute since '50 years after the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at least 141 states violate human rights and that for most of the people of the world the Declaration is meaningless'.[55]

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beginning of 1995 there were about 23 million internationally recognised refugees and another 27 million were internally displaced. The great majority of these people were fleeing from civil wars, interethnic rivalries and campaigns of mass murder and ethnic cleansing.

[52] U.S. Committee for Refugees, as cited in Center for Systemic Peace, op. cit. p.7.

[53] Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. Civil Wars, Civil Peace. An introduction to Conflict Resolution. Pluto Press, London 1998, p.2.

[54] As cited in Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.32. See also Charles King. Ending Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 308, London, 1997, p.16.

[55] According to Amnesty International Report, 1998.

The fourth trend uncovered by the monitoring and statistical study of violent armed conflict relates to the issue of conflict causes or *conflict aetiology*. This is perhaps the most controversial issue relating to contemporary warfare. Indeed, although the majority of registers concur on the fact that the vast majority of contemporary conflicts are of an internal nature, they do not agree as regards the causes or issues underlying the use of violence. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, for instance, divide conflicts as to whether they are about government or territory based on two main types of incompatibility: concerning government (type of political system, replacement of central government, change of its composition) and/or concerning territory (incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, secession or autonomy).[56] Probing deeper into what they term *'societal conflicts',* the authors at the Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management, divide these conflicts into political and ethnic conflicts. Although a comprehensive discussion of both types is not made, these authors do alert the reader for the fact that,

> ...the distinction between political and ethnic war is difficult to draw precisely because some conflicts have elements of both. Insurgencies in Afghanistan, Guatemala, and Uganda have all drawn support from particular ethnic groups- the Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbecks in Afghanistan, Mayans in Guatemala, the Acholi in Uganda- but since their leaders were fighting mainly to seize control of the state, we categorise them as political rather than ethnic wars.[57]

Nevertheless, these authors highlight the quest for national and indigenous self-determination, *ethnic conflict*, as the fundamental cause of contemporary warfare.[58] These conflicts have 'spiked sharply upward at the end of the Cold War' although they had been 'building in frequency since the late 1950s doubling between 1970 and the early 1980s'.[59] Gurr *et al* found that while both ethnic and political conflicts have had a similar upward path up to the 1980s, ethnic conflicts increased dramatically after 1980 while violent political conflicts levelled off. In fact, Gurr's earlier work at the Minorities at Risk Project[60] had found that approximately one sixth of the world's population identifies with politically active cultural groups and that there are 268 politically significant national and minority peoples in the larger countries of the world. Furthermore, the project uncovered that nearly 100 national and minority peoples took part in serious, violent conflict at some time between 1945 and 1990. Sixty of these conflicts were fought over issues of group autonomy and lasted at least a

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[56] Wallensteen, P. and M. Sollenberg. 'Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996', in Journal of Peace Research, 34(3), 1997, p.354.

[57] Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla, op. cit., p. 10.

[58] Gurr considers that 'ethnopolitical conflict has been the world's most common source of warfare, insecurity and loss of life for several decades'. See Ted Robert Gurr. 'Minorities, Nationalists and Ethnopolitical Conflict', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.54.

[59] The authors found a total of 68 territorially-concentrated ethnic groups that have waged warfare for autonomy or independence at some time since the 1950s and that more than a third of them continue to fight for greater self-determination at the beginning of 2001(i.e. Somalis and Oromo in Ethiopia, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Chechens in Russia), while around 54 are doing it using political means. Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla, Op. Cit., p. 15-16.

[60] Minorities at Risk Project, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.

decade and at the beginning of 1996 there were more than forty violent ethnopolitical conflicts under way.

Researchers at PIOMM also provide insights into this fourth trend. In fact, they predict that present-day self-determination movements will continue to be the main contributors to state failure. In answering the question *'what were they fighting for?'* Schmid and Jongman refer to the work of Christian P. Scherrer, whose main conclusions we have adapted in the graph below:

Figure 4[61]

Frequency of Different Types of Armed Conflicts, 1985-1994



From the categories above, we can observe that for the period considered, close to half of all violent armed conflicts are classified as ethno-nationalist (43%). The second most frequent type is formed by anti-regime wars or political and ideological conflicts (20%), followed closely by inter-ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts (14%). Classical inter-state wars represent merely 12% of all violent armed conflicts in the period considered. Consequently, it is possible to identify a fourth trend relating to the aetiology of contemporary warfare. The vast majority of on-going violent armed conflicts are seemingly about self-determination aiming for independence, autonomy, secession or the control or participation in government. As varied as issues in conflict may be, the vast majority of conflicts assume identity as their fundamental

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[61] Adapted from Christian P. Scherrer, in Ethno-Nationalismus im Weltsystem. Agenda Verlag, Munster, 1997 as cited in A.P Schmid and A.J. Jongman. 'Mapping Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Human Rights Violations', in World Conflict & Human Rights Map 1998, PIOOM- Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, The Netherlands, 1998.

'gravitational pole' in that the majority of groups involved in contemporary armed conflicts define themselves on the basis of their identity, whether of a national, ethnic, religious or cultural character. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the pages below, there are a myriad of other possible issues causing and fuelling violent armed conflict. Frequent conflict issues may include disputes arising over control of natural resources or economic power; attempts to gain geopolitical or economic advantage or to fend off a strategic move by an adversary; territorial disputes, etc. More frequently conflicts are of mixed types and have multiple causes and issues. The problem of conflict causes and issues will be returned to in later pages when we discuss conflict types and typologies, in particular in chapter three below.

In addition to the identity question, two macro-level aetiological trends have been identified in the literature. The first regards the identification of current macro-economic conditions fuelling conflict. Rupesinghe and Anderlini consider that three broad economic factors have since the 1980s contributed to the increase in armed conflict worldwide. These include the stagnation and protracted income decline in poor and middle-income countries contributing to social disturbances (i.e. the cases of Algeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Lebanon); unequal growth and unequal distribution of resources in cases of accelerated economic growth (i.e. Mexico and South Africa) and finally structural adjustment policies and changing distribution of resources, that although in some cases had beneficial macro-economic effects, in many cases had unprecedented consequences for the most vulnerable.[62] Gurr *et al* also establish a strong correlation between violence and societal development: 'for the last half century at least, societies at low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies'.[63]

The second macro-level trend refers to the impact political transitions from autocracy to democracy may have on the occurrence of violent armed conflict. The question of regime transition refers specifically to the relationship between regime type and the occurrence of violent conflict. Statistically, as recently as 1994, democracies have outnumbered autocracies by more than two to one from a reversed situation only two decades ago. Schmid and Jongman consider this a very positive development and say that 'there is reason for hope'.[64] This is based on the 'democratic peace proposition', which postulates that the less democratic a state the more severe is its domestic violence and its proneness for foreign violence.[65]

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[62] Rupesinghe *et al*. Op. cit. p.32-33.

[63] For an in-depth discussion of the correlation mentioned please refer to Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla, op. cit., p.12.

[64] Schmid, A.P. and A.J. Jongman. op. cit. p.2.

[65] Kant's Perpetual Peace remains the foundation text for the correlation between democratic internal structures and 'pacific unions'. For an in-depth up to date discussion of the Democratic Peace Theory see among others R. Cohen 'Pacific Unions: a Reappraisal of the Theory that 'democracies do not go to war with eachother', in Review of International Studies, Vol.20, 1994; C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace', in International Security, Vol.19, No2, 1994, p.5-49; C. Lynch, in 'Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International

Gurr and his team extensively explore the connection between type of political regime and the occurrence of violent conflict. This work is then further developed at the Center for Systemic Peace. The results obtained show the extent to which democracies are substantially less prone to violence than autocracies. Gurr *et al* posit that 'democratic governments are better able to accommodate ethnic and political demands for reform and more likely to negotiate settlements of societal wars'.[66] Yet, critically, most studies point to situations of transition from one regime to another as the most propitious to violent armed conflict. Transitions from autocracy to democracy are particularly risky situations. This is confirmed by all the studies reviewed in this section.

A fifth trend uncovered by the previous discussion regards the average duration of contemporary violent armed conflict. PIOMM established an average duration of 13.5 years for the 16 on-going high intensity conflicts in 1998, a trend confirmed by Wallensteen and Sollenberg.[67] In this regard, Gurr *et al* consider that 'the average duration of the 25 armed self-determination conflicts still being fought at the end of 2000 was 22 years and their median duration 17 years.[68] This is a very important trend for as will be discussed below, the longer the duration of armed conflicts the more resistant they are to either containment, settlement or resolution.

The final trend to be deduced from the available statistics refers to the regional incidence of violent armed conflicts. Researchers at PIOMM, are cautious in their conclusions as to zones of peace and zones of conflict saying that 'all this seems to suggest that there are few zones of peace and many zones of conflict'.[69] Researchers at the University of Maryland, on the other hand, found that there are two major zones of crisis: the African crisis zone and the Central Asian crisis zone. In the Central Asian zone five countries are submerged in conflict,

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Law', Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.8, 1994; J. Macmillan, in 'Democracies Don't Fight: a case of the wrong agenda', Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, no3, 1996, p.275-299; R.J. Rummel, in Power Kills. Democracy as a Method of Non-Violence, New Brunswick, Transaction, 1994, and finally B. Russett *et al* , in 'Raymond Cohen on Pacific Unions: a response and a reply', Review of International Studies, Vol.21, no3, 1995, p.319-325.

[66] Their conclusions were that: a) democratic polities had ongoing violent conflict in average of nine out of every 100 years and less than one chance in 100 of a new outbreak of violent conflict in any given year; b) autocratic polities had ongoing violent conflict in 15 of 100 years and two chances in 100 of a new outbreak of violent conflict in any given year. Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla, op. cit., p.12. This same conclusion is reached by Schmid, A.P. and A.J. Jongman. op. cit. p.2.

[67] 15 out of 19 major armed conflicts surveyed date from before 1989 in some cases going back to the 1950s and 1960s. For a discussion of the protracted nature of contemporary conflicts refer to, *inter alia*, Christopher Mitchell, 'Protracted Internal Conflicts', in Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars, I. William Zartman (Ed), Syracuse University Press, New York, 1992.

[68] Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla, op. cit., p. 18.

[69] A.P Schmid and A.J. Jongman. op. cit. This concern with regional distributions of conflict phenomena is also highlighted by Miall *et al* in the following terms, 'many commentators agree that with the ending of the Cold War regional patterns of conflict have become all the more significant. There have, therefore, been efforts to compare characteristics of conflict from region to region. At the heart of such studies lies the attempt to provide a reliable statistical basis for distinctions such as those between 'zones of peace' and zones of war'. Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. cit. p.28.

including Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Georgia. The authors considered that 'armed conflict is pervasive throughout the region' and that 'none of these countries has the institutional means or resources to deal effectively with it'[70]. As regards the African crisis zone, these authors considered that 'African countries face the greatest challenges to peace and stability' but that 'there are important differences within the region'.[71] Moreover, long-term trends for sub-Saharan Africa show that the ethnic and political conflicts that initially erupted at the demise of colonialism in the 1960s have persisted in a steep upward trend, having only decreased since 1990, when some of the conflicts were settled or contained (e.g. Mozambique, South Africa). Major wars continue to disrupt this region despite international efforts at their resolution. Included in these are the conflicts in Sudan, Angola, Somalia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone. West Africa presents a situation with mixed characteristics. Here too there are several good examples, namely to Senegal, Mali, Ghana and Benin. Furthermore, although there was a sharp decrease in ethnic war in Africa after the Rwanda genocide in 1994, it may be early to assume that there has been a decisive reversal in the trend. Among some of the reasons given for this state of affairs in Africa is the fact that most democratic transitions in Africa have failed as a result of the limited resources available and the low level of development of most African countries. Finally, there was relatively little international effort spent to promote solutions for these African conflicts when compared to the resources devoted to other regions.

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[70] Ibid.

[71] While in the 'broad middle belt of Africa' virtually every country is embedded in a volatile mix of armed conflict, unstable political institutions and limited resources creating a potentially crisis-ridden neighbourhood, in Southern Africa, amidst several on-going conflicts, there are examples of positive situations, including South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall with Deepa Khosla, op. cit., p. 18.

1.2. The Structural Transformation of War? New Wars and Wars of the Third Kind

> ...my central argument is that, during the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of organized violence has developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one aspect of the current globalised era. I describe this type of violence as 'new war'[72]

> ...the symbolic manifestations of war transformation are clear: in wars of the 'third kind' there are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honours, no *points d'appui* , and no respect for the territorial limits of states.[73]

> ...the great majority of wars since 1945 have been Low Intensity Conflicts. In terms of both casualties suffered and political results achieved, these wars have been incomparably more important than any others.[74]

As a result of the trends identified above, contemporary armed conflict has provoked an intense debate as to the proper way to define, understand and explain the various forms it assumes at present. Three authors have in the last decade contributed to a clearer understanding of contemporary conflict, introducing the debate on the structural transformation of war proposition. These authors are Martin Van Creveld and his 'The Transformation of War'[75], Kalevi Holsti and the book 'The State, War and the State of War'[76] and finally Mary Kaldor widely known book, 'New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era'.[77] For all three authors, post-1945 wars assume radically new forms and development patterns as well as being fought for different reasons and goals. As a consequence, these authors recognise and acknowledge that conventional approaches to the study of war are inappropriate as both analytical as well as policy guide tools. This and the next sub-sections are intended to discuss the structural transformation of war proposition through a discussion of these authors' attempt to redefine and reconceptualise the phenomenon of war.

Moreover, while Martin Van Creveld uses the concept of 'low intensity conflicts' to describe the prevailing form of armed conflict in the second half of the twentieth century, Kalevi Holsti endorses and further develops Edward Rice's concept of 'wars of the third kind' to describe the 'prevailing pattern of post-1945 wars'.[78] Mary Kaldor goes a step further and considers

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[72] Mary Kaldor. New & Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.1.

[73] Van Creveld, The Transformation of War . Free Press,1991, p.206 as cited in K.J. Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.36.

[74] Martin Van Creveld. The Transformation of War . Free Press,1991, p.25.

[75] Martin Van Creveld. The Transformation of War . Free Press,1991.

[76] Kalevi .J. Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

[77] Mary Kaldor. New & Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999.

[78] The concept of 'Wars of the Third Kind' was originally developed by Edward Rice in his Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988. Due to the more recent and up

that the types of organised violence that developed during the second half of the twentieth century are in fact 'new wars' that, although having a characteristic 'political nature' are qualified as 'new' as a form of distinguishing them 'from the wars which could be said to be characteristic of classical modernity'.[79] As a consequence what are the main characteristics of 'new wars', 'wars of the third kind' and 'low intensity conflicts'?

Mary Kaldor points to the goals of 'new wars' as being ostensibly 'about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars'.[80] This is because, in the context of globalisation, ideological and/or territorial cleavages of an earlier era have increasingly been supplanted by an emerging political cleavage between cosmopolitan values (inclusive, universalist and multicultural) and the politics of particularist identities, a result of the growing divide between those who are part of global processes and those who are excluded.[81] In addition, although the end of the Cold War is not seen by Mary Kaldor as the main cause of these 'new wars', some of its consequences 'contributed [to them] in important ways'.[82] Ranging from ethnic politics to nationalist movements claiming for independence or secession, the vast majority of groups engaged in contemporary armed conflicts define themselves on the basis of their identity, whether of a national, ethnic, religious or cultural character. More importantly, identity becomes *the* fundamental gravitational pole for groups involved in contemporary conflict, in contexts generally characterised by the 'erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state' and therefore 'the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate organised violence'. In fact, the growth in identity politics is attributed to the vacuum created by the absence of forward-looking projects and the failure of 'other sources of political legitimacy' such as socialism or the nation-building rhetoric of first generation post-colonial leaders. As a result of this fundamental change in

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to date analysis provided by Prof. Holsti we will base our discussion on his approach to the concept, developed in his The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

[79] Mary Kaldor. Op. cit. p.2. As will be discussed in the pages below as well as in the next sub-section both Mary Kaldor and Kalevi Hoslti build heavily on Van Creveld's thesis on the 'transformation of war'. To this respect Holsti considers Van Creveld to be 'among the first to recognise that the Clausewitzian eighteenth and nineteenth century concept of war- which I have called 'institutionalised war'- is not only fast-fading, but is inappropriate as both an analytical and policy guide to those who must think and respond to violence that concerns ideology and/or nature of communities rather than state interests'. Kalevi .J. Holsti. Op. cit. p.36.

[80] Defining identity politics as claims to power on the basis of particular identities: national, clan, religious or linguistic, Kaldor considers that 'identity politics' differs because although all wars have involved in one way or another a clash of identities 'earlier identities were either linked to a notion of state interest or to some forward looking project- ideas about how society should be organised'. Mary Kaldor, Op. Cit., p. 6.

[81] Although having their roots in the so-called 'low intensity conflicts' of the Cold War period, this new type of conflict must be understood 'in the context of the process of globalisation', which is defined by Mary Kaldor as 'the intensification of global interconnectedness- political, economic, military and cultural'. The intensification of globalisation during the 1980s and 1990s contributed to 'new wars' in a fundamentally contradictory nature, 'involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversification, globalisation and localisation'. Mary Kaldor, Op. Cit., p. 3, 6.

[82] Among these Kaldor highlights the availability of surplus arms, the discrediting of socialist ideologies, the disintegration of totalitarian empires, the withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes. In this sense, globalisation provides clues both for the understanding of this phenomenon while also allowing for the development of appropriate strategies of intervention able to mitigate or avoid its occurrence. Mary Kaldor, Op. Cit., p.4.

conflict goals, Mary Kaldor establishes a firm distinction between 'new wars' and the wars of the past in that today's wars are not about interest of state or foreign policy but about the very composition of states and their governance, especially the role that ethnic, national or religious groups within multi-ethnic/national and religious societies will play. [83]

In a similar way, Kalevi Holsti locates the causes of 'wars of the third kind' in the 'fundamental quarrels about the nature of communities and the problems of state-building' in a world where communities 'have adopted the mystique of statehood as the ultimate and final political format'.[84] Being not about foreign policy, security, honour, or status but about statehood, governance, and the role and status of nations and communities within states, the wars of the late twentieth century are also considered by Holsti to be a different phenomenon. More frequent within rather than between states, this author posits that 'new and weak states are the primary locale of present and future wars' and that consequently we can understand contemporary war better 'if we explore the birth of states and how they have come to be governed'.[85]

Consequently, as a result of the realisation that there has been a fundamental shift in the aetiology as well as the goals underlying the occurrence of war, a common thread cuts through Van Creveld, Mary Kaldor and Kalevi Holsti's work. In fact, for all three authors warfare itself has suffered a critical structural transformation and consequently contemporary armed conflict (i.e. post-1945) must be considered a different phenomenon. The structural transformation of war is adequately encapsulated by Van Creveld's definition of 'low intensity conflicts'. This author says that,

> ...the term itself appeared during the 1980s but it aptly describes many previous wars as well. The principal characteristics of low-intensity conflict (LIC) are as follows: first, they tend to unfold in 'less developed' parts of the world; the small-scale armed conflicts which do take place in 'developed' countries are usually known under a variety of other names, such as 'terrorism' (...) Second, very rarely do they involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is a question of regulars on one side fighting guerrillas, terrorists, and even civilians, including

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[83] In fact, in many countries the weakening of state-structures has involved among others: economic and social decline; decline in state revenues; the spread of criminality, corruption and inefficiency; growing of organised crime and the privatisation of security as well as the emergence of para-military groups. Ibid. p. 4. See the excellent study by Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and London, 1990.

[84] Kalevi J. Holsti. Op. cit, p.16-18.

[85] Ibid. p.xi-x. Centring on the aetiology as well as the internal character of contemporary warfare, Christopher Clapham for example developed a typology of insurgency to reflect the evolution of these mostly internal conflict types over time and in different circumstances. He referred to *liberation insurgencies* (the goal is the achievement of independence from colonial or minority rule); *separatist insurgencies* (representing the aspirations and identities of particular ethnic groups or regions within an existing state, either by seceding or pressing for an autonomous status); *reform insurgencies* (seeking radical reform of the national government) and finally *warlord insurgencies* (directed toward a change in leadership and control of the resources available to the state and not so much to a change in policy, ideology or patterns of patronage). Christopher Clapham. 'Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies', in African Guerrillas, Christopher Clapham (Ed), James Currey, Oxford, 1998, p.6-7.

> women and children on the other. Third, most LICs do not rely primarily on the high technology collective weapons that are the pride and joy of any modern armed force.[86]

This structural transformation is evident from a number of factors. First and foremost, contemporary wars do not typically have a precise beginning since in the vast majority of cases there are no formal declarations of war that would indicate the initiation of hostilities. The consequences of this are robust if we think that for instance, 'in both Algeria and Vietnam, to say nothing of the West Bank, the first limited uprisings were at first dismissed as simple banditry that 'the forces of order' would suppress easily enough'.[87] In addition, contemporary armed conflicts conspicuously lack definitive battles, decisive campaigns and formal endings and 'typically last for decades'.[88]

Second, in the way they are conducted, these wars are fought by loosely knit groups of regulars, irregulars, cells, and not infrequently by locally-based warlords under little or no central authority. As Van Creveld points out, 'very rarely do they [LICs] involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is a question of regulars on one side fighting guerrillas, terrorists, and even civilians, including women and children on the other'.[89] Contrary to traditionally organised vertical hierarchical military units typical of classical warfare, para-military units, local warlords, mercenary groups and even criminal gangs are highly decentralised. An important consequence of this is that in this new type of organised violence the distinction between war (understood as violence between states or organised political groups for political motives) and organised crime and large-scale violations of human rights is largely blurred.

A third factor concerns the way 'new wars' are financed. In this regard, contemporary armed conflicts develop within what Kaldor terms the new 'globalised' war economy. In contemporary conflicts, so called 'war economies' are highly decentralised and only a fraction of the population participates directly in the war. This participation is usually undertaken amidst high unemployment scenarios characterised by heavy dependence on external resources, a decline in domestic production and physical destruction coupled with interruptions in normal trade and taxation mechanisms. These factors force parties in conflict to finance themselves either through plunder and the black market or external assistance by diasporic communities,

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[86] Martin Van Creveld. Op. Cit., p.20.

[87] Ibid. p.57-58.

[88] Kalevi J. Holsti. Op. Cit., p.20.

[89] Martin Van Creveld. Op. cit. p.20. Furthermore, contemporary wars are tactically fought with a mixture of guerrilla warfare, terrorism and counter-insurgency. They are not fought for the capture or control of territory as in conventional or regular war, in that 'the aim is to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity (and indeed of a different opinion)' through the use of means such as mass killings, forcible resettlement, as well as political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation. Mary Kaldor, Op.Cit. p. 8.

support from neighbouring governments or illegal trade in arms, drugs or valuable commodities.[90]

Finally, an important characteristic of contemporary warfare is complexity. Moreover, complexity is an important dimension of 'new wars' because in the vast majority of cases there are several and varied factions involved as well as a multitude of external parties which may provide consultation, funding, technical support and in many cases direct military involvement and assistance. In their structure, dynamics as well as consequences, 'new wars' have conspicuously been characterised by a high degree of complexity. As Roger Beamount points out, 'in Vietnam (1956-1975) and Afghanistan (1979-1989), varying levels of outside support were layered on the tangled cross- threads of factionalism, the media, mercenaries, vendors and international relief agencies'.[91]

1.3. Old Wars and the Clausewitzian Universe[92]

> ...what we tend to perceive as war, what policy-makers and military leaders define as war, is, in fact, a specific phenomenon which took shape in Europe somewhere between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, although it has passed through several different phases since then.[93]
>
> ...the Clausewitzian Universe rests on the assumption that war is made predominantly by states, or to be exact, by governments.[94]
>
> ...My basic postulate is that, already today, the most powerful modern armed forces are largely irrelevant to modern war- indeed that their relevance stands in inverse proportion to their modernity. If this is correct, then the reasons must be sought on the conceptual level as represented by modern strategic thought.[95]

Let us now consider the ontological grounding for conceptualising contemporary armed conflict as an entirely different and new phenomenon. Moreover, the critical ontological

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[90] As pointed out by Le Billon, 'with the end of the Cold War and the resulting sharp drop in foreign assistance to many governments and rebel groups, belligerents have become more dependent upon mobilising tradable commodities, such as minerals, timber or drugs, to sustain their military and political activities. As local resources gain importance for belligerents, so the focus of military activities becomes centred on areas of economic significance. This has a critical effect on the location of conflicts, prompting rebel groups in particular to establish permanent strongholds wherever resources and transport routes are located...war economies, including commercial activities tend to shift from an economy of proximity, to an economy of networks [which] involve mostly private groups (including international organised crime groups, transnational corporations, and diasporas)...beyond financing a conflict, the exploitation and commercialisation of natural resources can also help armed groups to develop an extensive and diversified support network, which integrates all people having an economic stake in the exploitation of resources'. Philippe Le Billon. 'The Political Economy of Resource Wars', in Angola's War Economy. The Role Of Oil and Diamonds, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p.30.

[91] Roger Beaumont. 'Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions', in Small Wars, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard D. Lambert (Ed), WM. J. Olson (Special Editor), Volume 541, September 1995, p.27-28.

[92] We borrow Martin Van Creveld's 'Clausewitzian Universe' expression. Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War. The Free Press, New York, 1991, p.33.

[93] Mary Kaldor. Op.cit. p.13.

[94] Martin Van Creveld. Op. cit. p.49.

[95] Ibid. p.32.

element informing the concepts of 'new wars', 'wars of the third kind' and 'low-intensity conflicts' is based on their distinction from and opposition to concepts of war drawn from an earlier era. While Mary Kaldor develops the concept of 'new wars' in order to distinguish these wars from the wars characteristic of classical modernity, Hoslti contrasts his definition of 'wars of the third kind' with what he terms 'institutionalised wars' and Van Creveld develops the concept of 'low-intensity conflict' or 'non-trinitarian war' in opposition to the traditional *Clausewitzian* definition of war.

What we now term the conventional, traditional or 'Clausewitzian' concept of war was developed in the opus 'On War' written by Carl von Clausewitz between 1819 and 1831.[96] Clausewitz is in fact considered by many to be the father of modern thought on war and the book 'On War' is reputed to be 'arguably the greatest exponent of modern war'.[97] As Van Creveld points out, 'among military theorists, Clausewitz stands alone. With the possible exception of the ancient Chinese writer SunTzu, no other author has ever been remotely as influential, and indeed to this day his work forms the cornerstone of modern strategic thought'.[98] Let us look more closely at the clausewitzian definition of war, for as will become clear from the discussion below, clausewitzian thought is not simply relevant for an understanding of the historical development and structural transformation of the practice of warfare. Moreover, the *'clausewitzian universe'* permeates contemporary thought on war and armed conflict in various ways, influencing strategic thought, diplomacy, and also international relations in the study of war.[99] Therefore, the concepts of 'new wars', 'wars of the third kind' and 'low-intensity conflicts' intend to shift academic and policy debate and practice by redefining contemporary armed conflict.

Carl von Clausewitz defined war as 'an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will', its essence being 'fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war'. [100] Conceptualised as a social activity, war is 'moulded by social

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[96] Bibliographical Note 1: Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). Leading Prussian military theorist. Took part in the Napoleonic Wars as officer in the Prussian, and for a time, the Russian armies. For a discussion of Carl von Clausewitz's life and work refer to Peter Paret. 'The Genesis of On War', in Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Eds and translators), Princetown University Press, Princetown New Jersey, 1989, p.3-27. Martin van Creveld considers that 'to appreciate Clausewitz's contribution to the understanding of war, his work has to be seen in its proper context, a context provided by the late European enlightenment and the age of reason. Vom Kriege is mainly deductive in character: starting from first principles, the nature of war and the goal that it serves, the book seeks to progress step by step towards the most important question of all- namely, how armed conflicts ought to be conducted'. Martin Van Creveld. The Transformation of War. The Free Press, New York, 1991, p.35.

[97] Mary Kaldor. Op.Cit. p.13.

[98] Martin Van Creveld. Op. Cit. p.34.

[99] In the pages below we will discuss the way by which Clausewitzian, also called traditional approaches came to constitute the prevailing framework informing decision-makers, diplomatic practitioners and academics in their analysis and particularly in their approach to the resolution of contemporary violent armed conflicts.

[100] Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Book One, Chapter One. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Eds and translators), Princetown University Press, Princetown New Jersey, 1989, p.75 and p.127. Also quoted in Mary Kaldor. Op.cit.

relationships - by the type of societies by which it is conducted, and the kind of government which that society admits'.[101] War in the clausewitzian sense is composed by a 'trinity' of elements, in Clausewitz's own words being,

> ...more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.[102]

War in the Clausewitzian sense is therefore a contest between distinctively designated, organised and marked armed forces of two or more states for political purposes.[103] As a regulated practice, the waging of war involved a formal declaration (usually after an ultimatum or an incident) after which combat would begin leading either to a stalemate or a military defeat for one or more parties involved, understood as states. A formal armistice would then ensue, opening the way for the negotiation of a preliminary peace, including withdrawal arrangements and then, a final peace would be negotiated. 'Old Wars' typically had beginnings, middles and ends.

Nevertheless, how did this concept of war evolve, in what way is it constituted and finally why did it come to permeate the thought on war so significantly? Although an exhaustive analysis of this issue is beyond the limited scope of the present study, being extensively discussed elsewhere[104], a number of observations are pertinent. War as a practice, in the Clausewitzian formula of a contest between distinctively designated, organised and marked armed forces of two or more states for political purposes, mirrored practically and theoretically the rise and development of the modern state in Europe. In fact, as Van Creveld points out, 'the dominant form of government in Clausewitz's own time, and as far into the future as he could see, was

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p.15. Later in this work, Clausewitz also says that 'War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed- that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts'. Op. cit. p.149.

[101] Martin Van Creveld. Op. Cit. p.35-36.

[102] Carl Von Clausewitz. Op. Cit. p.89.

[103] Clausewitz's famous dictum adequately portrays the importance he attaches to the eminent political nature of modern war: 'war is merely the continuation of policy by other means. We see therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means'. Ibid. p.87.

[104] There is a considerable number of authors and works that comprehensively explain the evolution of war and of the thoughts on war in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteen centuries. For an in-depth discussion of this and related matters refer among others to John Kegan's 'A History of Warfare' and the selected bibliography at the end of his work; Kalevi Holsti's 'State, War and the State of War' especially chapters 2 and 3; Mary Kaldor's 'New and Old Wars', especially chapters 2. For a full development of nineteenth century thought on war refer to the original *On War* by Carl Von Clausewitz. Finally, on the question of the contemporary relevance of Clausewitz thoughts, refer to the chapters by Michael Howard, entitled 'The Influence of Clausewitz' as well as Bernard Brodie's 'The Continuing Relevance of *On War*' chapters included in Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Eds and translators), Princetown University Press, Princetown New Jersey, 1989, p.27-45.

the state'.[105] In this sense, that organised violence should only be called 'war', 'if it were waged by the state, for the state, and against the state was a postulate that Clausewitz took almost for granted, as did his contemporaries'.[106]

As a consequence, contemporary approaches to the transformation of war emphasise this symbiotic relationship between the evolution of the modern state and the evolution of modern war. As Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse point out,

> ...it has become popular in recent years for analysts to relate accounts of the evolution of modern warfare to accounts of the evolution of the modern state. The key qualitative turning points are seen to be, first, the emergence of the so-called sovereign dynastic state in Europe, heralded by Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, second, the coming of the principle of popular sovereignty and national self-determination from the time of the American and French Revolutions, and third, the bipolar stand-off at great power level after 1945...[107]

A brief look at the development of modern war seems appropriate. Before Napoleon's campaigns, armed forces were usually composed of professional and mercenary soldiers led and paid by monarchs or noble officers and were associated with 'the domestic monopolisation and reorganisation of military force by sovereigns and its projection outwards to create the relatively formal patterns of early modern inter-state warfare in place of previous more sporadic, localised and ill-disciplined manifestations of organised violence'.[108] Gradually, the great variety of political formations in Europe, such as kingdoms and republics, dukedoms and independent religious communities, gave way to the overarching and universalising format of the nation-state. This was accomplished among other things by the progressive monopoly of legitimate force within the state and the development of military capabilities able to sustain the state's external threats in an era of highly disputed territorial sovereignties and adventurous foreign campaigns such as that of Charles V leading to the Treaty of Westphalia, Louis XIV and later, Napoleon's campaigns.

While the wars characteristic of Europe's Middle Ages had political purposes including rearranging political units, the creation of Empires, the alteration of a state's territory, the guarantee or assertion of personal rights of property or succession, 'war as an instrument of state policy is a relatively new form of organised violence'.[109] Furthermore, during the Middle Ages, the right of sovereigns to wage war was regulated by the Catholic Church, whose

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[105] Martin Van Creveld. Op. Cit. p.35-36.

[106] Ibid. p.36. Clausewitz is therefore not alone in the belief nor is he the first to consider that war is the business of the state and the state only. Yet, his discussion of this issue on 'On War', essentially a book on strategy, formalised theoretically this conception of War.

[107] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.68.

[108] Ibid. p.68.

[109] Kalevi J. Holsti. Op. cit, p.2.

theological precepts guided sovereigns on the prerequisites for the waging of just war as well as provided for punishment if these precepts were not respected (ultimately leading to excommunication). In fact, the regulation of the waging and conduct of war within Christian theology constitutes the first attempt at distinguishing between types of war.[110] Moreover, the right to wage war (*jus ad bellum*) was gradually considered a legitimate exercise under certain circumstances, namely as a last resort by a legitimate authority (a prince, or in the modern sense, a state), with a just cause and reasonable probability for success. In later developments of the 'just war tradition', norms restricting the rights in war (*jus in bellum*) were developed, in particular that the means employed should be proportional to the ends aimed for as well as the principle that in war, the killing of non-combatants or civilians is not permissible.

In Europe's post-1648 state-system these customary limitations to the waging of war were progressively abandoned while a growth in the development of rules related to the conduct of hostilities occurred.[111] During the XVII and XVIII centuries war and the institutions supporting it evolved through stages to create a highly regulated activity, with the very specific purpose of sustaining and advancing the interests of the state, and only undertaken as a political tool when diplomacy failed to negotiate conflicting claims and objectives. Reflecting the Enlightenment principles of reason, moderation and calculation, the legitimation and regulation of war, was based on strict etiquette, standardised tactics, uniforms and formal and informal rules of the game.[112] It was in this context that Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)[113] defined war as a legal condition between juridical equals requiring a formal declaration, an act which in fact sets aside 'normal' international law and announces that a special set of laws on warfare will govern the relations between belligerents imposing limitations in the way those contending by armed force may behave.[114]

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[110] It is here that one is able to find the first clearly formalised distinction between wars, and one which is 'still accepted after more than a thousand years', that between just and unjust wars. Through the works of St. Augustine in the fifth century and St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, what we now term 'Just War Doctrine', became the prevailing normative framework for the waging of war being later incorporated in modern international law, through the works of early theorists such as Grotius and Vattel, as will be discussed below. See Michael Akehurst. A Modern Introduction to International Law, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1985. For a contemporary discussion of 'Just War Theory' refer to among others, Michael Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars, Harper Collins Publishers, London, 1992; James Turner Johnson. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981; and R Norman. Ethics, Killing and War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.

[111] Michael Akehurst. A Modern Introduction to International Law, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1985. Portuguese Translation under the title 'Introdução ao Direito Internacional', Livraria Almedina, Coimbra, 1985, p.282.

[112] The rationalisation of war and its legitimation as a socially acceptable practice under the control of the State gradually allowed and justified the development of permanent standing armies. A new legitimacy to wage war had gradually surfaced, based on the secularisation of the right to wage war. War became the sole prerogative of the state and claims of just-cause by non-state actors could no longer be pursued through violent means.

[113] Bibliographical Note 2: Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Dutch theologian, jurist, philosopher and historian. Regarded as the father of international law, although a number of predecessors, especially Vitoria, equally deserve that honour. Wrote widely on theology and Dutch jurisprudence as well as international law. The above passage is adapted from The Law of War and Peace (1625), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1925. Also cited in John A Vasquez. The War Puzzle, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.18.

The revolutionary character of the French Revolution and Napoleon's European advance radically changed some of the characteristics of war as it was conceptualised, planned and fought out. During the Napoleonic wars, tactics changed dramatically from limited campaigns with limited political purposes to great campaigns of annihilation. To this respect, Van Creveld points out that,

> ...between 1793 and 1815 a new form of war arose which smashed the *ancien régime* to smithereens. In the process, the organisation of armed conflict, its strategy, and command- to mention but a few features- were all transformed beyond recognition. More important still, the scale on which war was waged also increased dramatically, and, above all, so did the sheer power with which it was waged.[115]

Interestingly, the radical transformation in warfare brought about by Napoleon provoked an intense debate, in many ways similar to our contemporary debate on 'new wars'. As Peter Paret points out,

> ...the most important task that faced Prussian soldiers in the opening years of the nineteenth century was to come to terms intellectually and institutionally with the new French way of warfare. Within one decade the resources that France mobilised for war had risen to unprecedented levels. The number of soldiers now available to her generals made possible campaigns that accepted greater risks, brought about battle more frequently, spread over more territory, and pursued political goals of greater magnitude than had been feasible for the armies of the ancien régime...*for theorists of any nationality it was even more difficult to recognise Napoleonic strategy and tactics as a historical phenomenon, inevitably subject to change,* rather than as the ultimate in war, a permanent standard of excellence for war past, present, and future...[my emphasis].[116]

What the above implies is that in 'On War', Clausewitz himself was trying to make sense of the structural changes that the institution of war had experienced under Napoleon.[117] In fact, Clausewitz's much criticised shift away from the rationalistic and abstract concept of *absolute war*[118] to the concept of the 'dual-nature of war' which differentiated between total war (waged with the aim of completely defeating the enemy in order to destroy him as a political organism

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[114] To this respect, John Vasquez makes the following comment 'Grotius did not simply define war as it appeared historically in his day, but defined the institution of war; he defined war as an institutional fact within the existing system (and global culture) of early-seventeenth-century international law. His definition demonstrates that definitions do not just uncover phenomena but create them. However, it should be also be clear that Grotius does not start *de novo*; he inherits an ongoing activity and tries to shape and push this raw material to fit an ideal. The ideal type, if sufficiently influential (as was Grotius analysis) can take on a life of its own. John A Vasquez. The War Puzzle, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.18.

[115] Martin Van Creveld. Op. Cit., p.36.

[116] Peter Paret. 'The Genesis of On War', in Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Eds and translators), Princetown University Press, Princetown New Jersey, 1989, p.9-10.

[117] As van Creveld points out '...his [Clausewitz's] entire thought can only be understood against the background of the very great historical changes which took place in front of his eyes; in one sense, indeed, it represented an attempt to understand and interpret those changes (...) Like many of his generation, he was trying to understand the secret of Napoleon's success'. Martin Van Creveld. Op. Cit. p.36 and p.63.

[118] In his early writings Clausewitz repeatedly stated that violence is the essence of war, and that War itself always demanded the fullest mobilisation of resources and their most energetic exploitation. Peter Paret believes that 'his insistence on extremes during the Napoleonic era, resulted, of course, not only from logic but also from the historic situation'. Peter Paret. Op. Cit. p.20.

or to force him to accept any terms) and limited wars (waged for limited aims such as to acquire territory in order to retain the conquest or to bargain with the occupied land in the peace negotiations) is evidence that this author was aware of the fundamental changing nature of warfare.[119] In this sense, and for our purposes, it becomes imperative to recognise that the definition of war as a legitimate contest between states is itself 'historically and culturally based'.[120]

The state's primacy in waging war was gradually enshrined in both international law and practice. This is most evident after the 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna that established the 'Concert of Powers' in Europe. From the Treaty of Paris and the Declarations of the Congress of Vienna we obtain the first modern attempts to control the use of armed force between states, which henceforth would have to be sanctioned by the Concert of Great Powers. A vast number of international treaties and agreements, most of which date from after 1859 (the battle of Solferino) and 1907 (the Second Hague Conference) codified these ideas and converted them into positive law, as will be discussed in the next chapter. At the same time, the growing complexity in the waging of war and the developments in arms production produced the need for an analytical discourse or 'a strategic theory which could provide the basis for a shared discourse about war through which war could be organised'.[121]

By the end of the nineteenth century the first peace movements were born and became increasingly active. Nevertheless, they could not prevent the gigantic scale of destruction caused by the First World War, in a sense the first time war was truly *absolute* or total in the Clausewitzian terminology. The vast mobilisation of human and material resources poured into this total war slowly corrupted the distinction between public and private, military and civilian and combatant and non-combatant. By demonstrating that in 'total war' whole societies are mobilised, the First World War produced a puzzling development by which 'modern conditions had rendered it imperative that politics be made the continuation of war, now understood as a national struggle for survival with no holds barred'.[122] Nevertheless, war continued to be thought of in a clausewitzian sense as a regulated practice and a legitimate instrument of state policy albeit subject to political, judicial and ethical considerations. This is

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[119] Peter Paret posits that 'Clausewitz came to the recognition of the dual nature of war largely by way of historical study, which convinced him that limited conflicts had often occurred not because the protagonists' means precluded greater effort or their leadership had faltered, but because their intentions were too limited to justify anything more. In the face of historical evidence, theory had to be corrected...History, too, was marked by constant variety, not subject to patterns...*Each period existed for itself, not as part of a grand scheme, and could be understood only on its on terms* [my emphasis]...Like military theory, history had no lessons or rules to offer the student, it could only broaden his understanding and strengthen his critical judgement'. Ibid. p. 23.

[120] Kalevi J. Holsti. Op. Cit. p. 1. See also John Kegan. A History of Warfare. Pimlico, London, 1994, p.5.

[121] This initially referred to the development of military doctrines and what we now know as 'standard operating procedures', such as the Clausewitzian theories of attrition and manoeuvre, his trinitarian conceptualisation of war, and his novel introduction of emotions and sentiments, which he termed *genius,* as fundamental variables in war, as well as the theoretical and policy-oriented development of concepts such as *balance-of-power* and alliance theory.

amply demonstrated by the enshrinement in the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the aftermath of the First World War, of restrictions to the use of force, limiting its exercise to self-defence, enforcement of League sponsored sanctions and conflict resolution in cases where the League itself is powerless. Far from banning war as a practice, these restrictions further reinforced the legitimacy of war as an instrument of state policy.

The Second World War further crystallised the idea that war was primarily if not exclusively a prerogative of states. This was an era of unprecedented mass mobilisation for war (even by World War I standards). The total nature of this conflict further contributed to the erosion of the distinction between soldier and civilian enshrined in international law. Armed violence against civilians, through the use of heavy bombers on both sides of the war, as well as atrocities and deliberate starvation of populations on all sides were acceptable military tactics, their condemnation by international treaties and obligations notwithstanding. Today, the United Nations, created in 1945 with the primary function of maintaining international peace and security between States, reinforces the exclusive legitimacy of states to use armed force in collective or individual self-defence and in the enforcement of collective sanctions, as will be discussed below.

The advent of nuclear weapons did not alter this perception. In fact, Cold War strategic thinking, and diplomatic and policy practices of the post-1945 period have been for the most part based on ideas that derive strongly from the modern European experience contained in what we termed the 'clausewitzian universe': balances of power, hegemony, alliances, deterrence, power projection, and a whole range of other geopolitical concepts. Even though 'the advent of nuclear weapons and the military stand-off between the Soviet and Western blocs rendered major interstate war unviable (with a few exceptions at lower levels)'[123], military strategy continued to search for an adequate war fighting doctrine that would enable the nuclear super-powers to fight a war without causing Armageddon.[124] In this sense, although the possibility of a conventional war between the major powers was very unlikely in a nuclear setting, defence establishments continuously prepared for it. The 1950s saw such doctrines as 'massive retaliation' and 'brinkmanship' be developed in the United States. During the 1960s and 1970s the vast majority of strategic authors developed doctrines that moved away from nuclear stalemate to consider a re-introduction and redevelopment of conventional forces in the nuclear age. These included such concepts as 'flexible options', 'surgical strikes' and 'escalation dominance'. The Kennedy's administration 'flexible response' doctrine adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1967 was in fact based on the

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[122] Martin Van Creveld. Op. Cit. p. 46.

[123] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.69.

[124] This led, according to Martin van Creveld to 'consider ways and means by which conventional forces could operate in such a war and still survive, let alone retain their combat power. In the United States, at any rate, the introduction of 'tactical' nukes during the 1950s led to the so-called 'pentomic era...'. Van Creveld. Op. Cit. p.7.

need for continued preparation for conventional war as if the threat of nuclear escalation did not exist.[125]

Conclusion

An initial concluding observation is that war and armed conflict have in fact changed structurally if our basis for comparison is the modern European (Western) experience of war. It is important to introduce this caveat for, conspicuously absent from the previous discussion was the occurrence of war in contexts other than the European. An important consequence of this relates to the inapplicability in practice of the 'Clausewitzian' condition of war in non-European contexts, and particularly in areas where states did not exist, at the very time that Clausewitz was writing his 'On War'.[126] In this sense, a definition of war as an inter-state phenomenon conducted by distinctively designated, organised and marked armed forces of two or more states for political purposes, not only lacks relevance at present but it also obliterates most cases of war throughout history. Because *trinitarian war* is in historical terms a recent phenomenon, and was unknown to most societies during most of history becoming increasingly scarce today, one could say that this type of war 'is not war with a capital W but merely one of the many forms that war has assumed'.[127] Nevertheless, contemporary thinking on war is deeply related to the modern European experience of war. It is therefore critical to distinguish today's wars from the condition defined by Grotius, Clausewitz and nineteenth century strategists. In fact, there is a wide and fundamental difference between the current wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Colombia or Kosovo and European wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Our second conclusion relates to the way the clausewitzian understanding of war came to permeate and underlie contemporary thinking on war. Our discussion did not exhaust this issue but simply located the ontology of such approaches to armed conflict and war on early nineteenth century strategic thought, namely the work of Carl von Clausewitz. Purposively left out of the discussion was, on the one hand, the role of International Law in the regulation of armed conflicts, and on the other hand, the theoretical contributions made by International Relations scholars, in particular of a realist and neo-realist orientation. Both of these influences will be dealt at length in chapter 2 below. At this stage, of particular importance is

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[125] The consequences of this were unparalleled. As van Creveld points out, 'the doctrine led to massive investments as successive generations of surface ships, submarines, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery tubes, fighter bombers, and attack helicopters were phased out while other, newer and much more expensive, took their place'. Ibid. p.13.

[126] In fact, in the colonies, European troops acted as if what they were waging was not war but campaigns of conquest, submission and at times anihilation, not distinguishing between chiefs, warriors, women and children.

[127] Van Creveld. Op. Cit., p.57.

the realisation that the 'clausewitzian universe' still persists, to the extent that Holsti considers it to remain the most used 'mental prototype' of war at present:

> ...our ideas about war- its sources, nature, and solutions- come from the European and Cold War experiences. When we think of it either as a practice or as the object of study, clausewitzian conceptions of armed combat to support or extend state interests remain in our minds...the clausewitzian conception of war as organised combat between the military forces of two or more states fits our mental maps naturally because it reflects the predominant forms of great-power warfare within modern (post-1648) European civilisation at least until World War II...[128]

In fact, a vast number of government officials, diplomatic practitioners, military leaders as well as some academic experts continue to operate under the assumption that 'war' is or should be subject to the rules of what we have termed the 'clausewitzian universe'. In fact, it permeates contemporary strategic thought (and as a consequence the operation of Defence establishments in Europe and North America), diplomatic practice and international relations, and is enshrined in multiple sources of International Law such as the Charter of the United Nations and a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties between states. However, either informed by International Law or political conviction, the attempt to understand and deal with the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts by using such lenses can prove at best misleading at worst catastrophic.

There are three main consequences of this. First and foremost, the clausewitzian concept of war, be it the original or some later derivative, is increasingly unable to provide adequate insights into the causes, processes and consequences of present-day armed conflicts. As Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse point out, we are witnessing,

> ...a pattern of post Cold -War conflict which is seen to bear little resemblance to European wars in the era of the dynastic state or to the 'total wars' of the first half of the twentieth century. If anything, they resemble earlier medieval wars in their lack of differentiation between state and society, soldier and civilian, internal and external transactions across frontiers, war and organised crime. [129]

There seems to be a wide agreement on the fact that the legalistic as well as political realist approaches are, as will become clearer from the next chapter, inadequate for the analysis of contemporary armed conflict. In the words of Holsti 'the key question is: given that most wars since 1945 have been *within* [sic] states, of what intellectual and policy relevance are concepts and practices derived from the European and Cold War experiences that diagnosed or prescribed solutions for the problem of wars *between* [sic] states?[130]

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[128] Kalevi J. Holsti. Op. Cit. p. 14.

[129] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.29.

[130] Kalevi J. Holsti. Op. cit. p.14. This is a critical question for depending on the answer one suggests, it may result in discarding the whole paraphernalia of mainstream analysis of inter-state war, the great bulk of which has been produced since 1945 on the basis that it has been largely irrelevant to the actuality of most post-1945 conflicts. Hugh Miall *et al* believe this is a sweeping argument. Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. cit. p.70. Martin van Creveld's opinion is that 'If any part of our intellectual baggage deserves to be thrown overboard,

The second consequence has to do with the fact that the clausewitzian conception of war has strongly contributed to the way armed forces are structured and their standard modes of operation defined. And in fact these structures are not limited to Europe and North America. In this respect, Van Creveld points out that 'the armed forces of these states [United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact], particularly of the two superpowers, have long served the rest as models and, indeed, as standards by which they evaluate themselves'.[131]

Finally, the 'clausewitzian universe' produces implications in terms of conflict resolution approaches and methodologies. As will be discussed at length in chapters five and six below, negotiation and mediation are to a large extent informed and affected by the prevailing 'Clausewitzian' analysis of conflicts. It is often argued in the literature that mediator failure at the international level is related to an over-reliance on bargaining and 'power brokerage' traditionally characteristic of a realist approach to international relations. In fact, taking conflict as an inevitable fact in an international environment characterised by anarchy and a constant search for power by its most important constituents (states), such an approach to conflict resolution applies conventional conflict management techniques imported from diplomacy and international negotiation to the resolution of internal conflicts. Yet, although negotiated settlements may result in a temporary cessation of hostilities, such as in the negotiation of truces and cease-fires, the resolution of complex identity related issues characterising contemporary conflicts as well as the psychological and social elements that result from the occurrence of conflicts themselves demand approaches that surpass bargaining and power brokerage. We will return to these issues in chapter 5 and 6 below.

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surely it is not the historical record but the Clausewitzian definition of war that prevents us from coming to grips with it'. Van Creveld. Op. Cit. p.58.

[131] However, as a result of the structural transformation of warfare witnessed since the end of the Second World War, both nuclear and conventional military power are increasingly unable to prevent, contain or manage the vast majority of internal conflict raging throughout the world. It is in this sense that van Creveld rightly points out that 'the notion that superior weaponry in itself can prevail is misleading (...) The cold, brutal fact is that much present-day military power is simply irrelevant as an instrument for extending or defending political interests over most of the globe; by this criterion, indeed, it scarcely amounts to 'military power' at all. (...) In fact, there are solid military reasons why modern regular forces are all but useless for fighting what is fast becoming the dominant form of war in our age. Perhaps the most important reason is the need to look after the technology on which the forces depend. (...) Designed as they are for conventional war, the command-structure of modern armed forces tend to be too tall, battle procedures too cumbersome'. Ibid. p.29-30.

Chapter 2. The Classification of Armed Conflicts

Introduction to Chapter 2 and 3

> ...What are we to call these conflicts? Current terminology includes 'internal conflicts' (Brown, ed, 1996), 'new wars' (Kaldor and Vashee, eds, 1997), 'small wars' (Harding, 1994), 'civil wars' (King, 1997), 'ethnic conflicts' (Stavenhagen, 1996), 'conflict in post-colonial states' (van de Goor et al., eds, 1996) and so on, as well as various expressions used by humanitarian and development NGOs and international agencies, such as "complex human emergencies' and 'complex political emergencies'...[132]

> ...nothing is as central to the explanation of any phenomenon as the kind of typology we use to identify and discuss it and the factors that allegedly lead to it...if decision-makers look at an incipient ongoing armed conflict and, in response to some common but ill-formed typology, hasten to treat the problem as if it were purely or largely ethnic or territorial or ideological, when it is in fact more complex and multi-dimensional, they might easily opt for a highly inappropriate policy response.[133]

Having discussed the main aspects relating to the structural transformation of warfare proposition and debated the contrast between 'old' and 'new' wars, the next two chapters will discuss armed conflict classifications, conflict types and conflict typologies. Our main purpose in these chapters is to review the literature in order to answer the following questions: To what extent has the 'clausewitzian universe' permeated contemporary conflict analysis and classification? Are there analytical conflict types and typologies that go beyond the limitations imposed by such universe? What conflict types are there for distinguishing between contemporary conflicts and what are their fundamental assumptions?

At this juncture, one could presumably ask: what is the relevance of such a discussion for a thesis whose main focus is conflict resolution and in particular international mediation? We believe that it is very important. As Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse rightly say, 'adequate conflict analysis- *polémologie*, to borrow the French terminology- has, from the start, been

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[132] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.66.

[133] J. David Singer, 'Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.36-38.

seen as the essential pre-requisite for normative conflict resolution'.[134] Vivienne Jabri also makes the inter-relationship between analysis and resolution explicit in the following words,

> ...resolution always involves at one and the same time the analysis of conflict, of core issues, of centrally concerned parties, and of affected others who may be deployed to facilitate the mediator's task. Analysis informs practice and such analysis is in itself influenced by the third party's social context, which contains value systems, particular readings of history, access to resources, and institutional set-ups which differ from third party to third party and impact upon their effectiveness.[135]

Recognising that at the root of contemporary conflict analysis is the question of conflict classification, conflict types and conflict typologies, we will dedicate the pages below to a discussion of a number of analytical frameworks. Moreover, an initial approach to the issue of conflict classifications and typologies reveals as Jung, Schlichte and Siegelberg point out, 'when it comes to typologies and definitions... the approaches are as numerous as the scholars, and their results diverge to such a degree that the state of the discipline can be described as atomistic but not as cumulative'.[136]

The existing profusion and variety of different approaches to classification, types and typologies of violent armed conflict and war by different monitoring projects, academics, policy-makers and the press reveals great diversity and at times conflicting perceptions of the fundamental aspects and structural elements that must be taken into account when defining and distinguishing between contemporary armed conflicts. Moreover, as will be discussed below, because conflict types and typologies ultimately rely on axiomatic definitions, fundamental differences in classifications may be a result of competing interpretations of the fundamental aetiology or some other critical aspect of violent armed conflict and war. Furthermore, as John Vasquez rightly warns, 'identifying wars of a special type...is still a far cry from a typology of war'.[137]

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[134] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.65.

[135] Vivienne Jabri. 'Agency, Structure and the Question of Power', in Paradigms, Vol.9, No.2, Winter 1995. Dennis Sandole reinforces this by saying that ' In order to prevent or otherwise deal with violent conflict and war, we must know something about the underlying factors: their identities, sequences, relative weights, combination, and interaction. We require, in other words, theory which would enable us to explain these processes, not only as an otherwise noteworthy academic objective, but as a prerequisite to attempting to manage, control, prevent, or otherwise deal with them'. Dennis J. D. Sandole. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era. Pinter, London and New York, 1999, p.4.

[136] Dietrich Jung, Klaus Schlichte and Jens Siegelberg, 'Ongoing Wars and their Explanation' in Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.50. Hugh Miall *et al* make a very similar point by saying that 'the overall state of current conflict typology is in a state of confusion' and 'there are as many typologies as analysts, and the criteria employed not only vary, but are often mutually incompatible'. Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.29.

[137] John A Vasquez. The War Puzzle, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. p.64.

At present it is possible to effortlessly identify a multitude of classifications, individual types as well as typologies of armed conflict and war. As was quoted at the beginning of this introduction, Miall *et al* raise the timely question of what we should call conflicts which are differently called 'internal', 'new', 'small', 'civil', 'ethnic', 'post-colonial', etc. In fact, this already vast list could be extended to include 'resource-wars', 'religious wars', 'state-failure wars' or 'economic wars'. In fact, conflict types and typologies may be based on the juridical status of the conflict parties, the observable levels of violence used in the conflict, the parties' capabilities, the distribution of capability between belligerents or the nature of the issues in conflict (conflict causes or aetiology), with the latter being considered the 'most frequently invoked typology'.[138] In this sense, while some typologies differentiate between types of wars, others merely distinguish between degrees of war. More often than not, conflict typologies result in hybrid combinations of several of these aspects.

Moreover, different classifications and typologies rely on specific sets of variables, in Singer's parlance *dimensions,* as diverse as the conflicts their purport to explain and classify. As a result, in surveying the literature on these issues one opening observation is pertinent. Approaches to classification, types and typologies are more often than not strongly related to the particular point in time they are developed in, reflecting the concerns and prevailing frameworks of the day and are strongly related with what their authors perceive as the most important characteristic of a particular conflict at a particular moment in time. In the same way that Clausewitz distinguished between total and limited wars as a result of his experience during the Napoleonic campaigns and his historical study, so contemporary approaches to classification are strongly connected to perceived types of conflict existing at present.

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[138] J. David Singer. 'Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to Explanation'. Op. cit. p.41.

2.1. Armed Conflict Classification under International Law

> ...I shall define it [war] as any situation of large-scale deadly violence between anonymous or political subgroups, and for the most part there is little ambiguity. How we subdivide wars into international war, revolutionary wars, wars of national identity and so on raises many problems, but the categorisation of the basic phenomenon is not unduly difficult. The definition of war is essentially behavioural, but only a legal pedant would insist on legal declarations, a definition which would exclude many acts of violence in this century.[139]

In the previous pages we considered that the 'clausewitzian universe' of inter-state wars continues to strongly influence contemporary international relations even though the vast majority of present day conflicts are not classical inter-state wars. We also considered that this influence is strongly determined by the way in which International Law, in particular the International Laws of War as well as the practice of international organisations, impacts in the analysis and resolution of contemporary armed conflicts. As will become evident from the pages below, this influence is not merely academic, but has important juridical consequences, not least concerning the extent to which the International Laws of War apply to non-international (i.e. internal) conflicts.

International Law, and in particular the International Laws of War, evolved in tandem with the evolution of the European modern state and the customary practice of inter-state wars. During this period, as was previously pointed out, the juridical definition of war was straightforward: conducted by states, war was initiated with a formal declaration (which would trigger the application of customary laws of war) and would end with the signature of a peace treaty defining the basis for future relations between belligerents. In addition, International Law gradually took upon itself the responsibility of regulating the practice of warfare *per se* as well as to provide the means to restore peace when it is suspended. As O'Brien points out, 'in the absence of higher international authority to enforce it, international law is a law of the nations, by the nations, and for the nations.[140]

In fact, that this should be so is partly a result of the sharp juridical differentiation between the internal order of a state, where the state is sovereign and possesses the monopoly of coercion, and the external order of states, where there is no overarching authority and states are in theory equal.[141] Therefore, the regulation and prevention of inter-state war was seen as

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[139] Michael Nicholson. Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.16.

[140] William V O'Brien. 'The Rule of Law in Small Wars', in Small Wars, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard D. Lambert (Ed), WM. J. Olson (Special Editor), Volume 541, September 1995, p.37.

[141] To this respect, Derek Bowett points out that 'this results from the basic proposition of the equality of states which, in effect, means that the internal politics and internal conflicts within state A are the concern of state A alone and give rise to no right on the part of state B'. Derek W Bowett. 'The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defence', in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, John Norton Moore (Ed), the John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p.41.

fundamental for the maintenance of international peace, especially after the devastating effects of the two World Wars.[142]

The International Laws of War evolved in two complimentary strands in an attempt to set the standards for both the conduct and the initiation of war. These two strands grew from the customary distinction between *'jus ad bellum'* and *'jus in bellum'* alluded to above. They are referred to today as respectively 'War-decision Law', i.e. the regulation of the recourse to armed force, and 'War-conduct Law', i.e. the regulation of belligerent practice in the conduct of war.

We have previously discussed the way by which the enormous scale of suffering and destruction caused by the First World War radically altered public opinion towards war. The creation of the League of Nations in 1919 represents the first collective effort to prevent and avoid for future generations a repetition of the events of 1914-1918.[143] However, because the covenant of the League only partially limited the right of states to wage war, it was seen by pacifist opinion as incomplete. Efforts to outlaw all forms of aggression continued and one such effort was the Kellog-Briand Pact of 27 August 1928, which formally condemned war as a means for the resolution of international conflict, outlawing it as a political instrument in relations between states. Paradoxically, 63 States had ratified this treaty by 1939, the year the Second World War began.

In the aftermath of the Second World War the United Nations was created with the primary function of maintaining international peace and security. To this respect, its famous Article 2, paragraph 4, prohibits 'the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state'.[144] For some authors, Article 2 (4) coupled with the principal of

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[142] The regulation of war is termed in International Law the International Laws of War. Likewise, International Law codified a number of procedures intended to prevent and peacefully resolve conflicts, such as arbitration, negotiation, good offices, fact finding and mediation. These will be dealt in more detail in part two of this thesis.

[143] As was previously noted, the Covenant of the League of Nations imposed restrictions to the use of force, limiting its exercise to self-defence, enforcement of League sponsored sanctions as well as in cases where the League itself is powerless. While representing the first attempt at limiting war, the Covenant intrinsic state-centrism reinforced the notion that war was politically, juridically and ethically an inter-state phenomenon.

[144] According to O'Brien, Article 2 (4) 'codifies all of the efforts since the establishment of the League of Nations after World War I, including the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928, to 'outlaw' war as an instrument of policy'. William V O'Brien. 'The Rule of Law in Small Wars', in Small Wars, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard D. Lambert (Ed), WM. J. Olson (Special Editor), Volume 541, September 1995, p.38. It must be highlighted that article 2(4) uses the expression *force* rather than war. According to Michael Akehurst, the term *force* has a technical meaning in International Law although it is somewhat imprecise. Nevertheless, the choice of the term *force* allows for the possibility that States may begin hostilities without being technically in a state of war. This has profound legal consequences due to the fact that *war* triggers the application of the International Laws of War whereas *force* does not. In this sense, article 2(4) applies to all uses of force irrespective of whether technically this use of force constitutes war. Michael Akehurst,. A Modern Introduction to International Law, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1985. Portuguese Translation under the title 'Introdução ao Direito Internacional', Livraria Almedina, Coimbra, 1985, p.271. An additional Resolution clarifying article 2 (4) was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on the 14 December 1974. This resolution defined aggression in the following terms: 'Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State'. For a discussion of this refer to Jean Touscoz. Droit International, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993. Portuguese Translation under the title 'Direito Internacional', Publicações Europa-America, 1993, p.359.

non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state, provide the single most important criteria for defining international conflicts. In this sense, the breach of Article 2 (4) by a state would constitute an international conflict.[145]

Nevertheless, the Charter defines two exceptions to the prohibition of 'the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state'. The first exception is codified in article 51, which recognises the 'inherent right' of individual or collective self-defence 'if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations'.[146] Individual or collective self-defence is to be carried out until the Security Council takes all necessary measures to restore peace and security. This exception has at times created great ambiguities in determining whether a State's claim of its right to self-defence is legitimate or not (for example, the US invoked legitimate self-defence in its intervention in Vietnam; both Israel and its Arab neighbours have also claim their right of self-defence as a legitimate basis for their actions).[147] The second exception concerns the possibility of the Security Council engaging in military enforcement against threats to peace under article 41 and other provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter as well as calling on regional organisations (article 53) for 'enforcement action under its authority'. These exceptions reinforce the prerogative of states to use armed force in collective or individual self-defence and in the enforcement of collective sanctions.

At present, together with customary law, these codified provisions form the bulk of 'War-decision Law' in that they consist of prescriptions concerning the possibility of states to recourse to armed force and intervention. International Law has taken therefore the responsibility to regulate any recourse to armed force that may jeopardise directly international peace in the same way that in the internal juridical order, provisions are made to prohibit the illegitimate recourse to violence by actors within the borders of a state.[148]

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[145] This is the case with Derek Bowett's definition of international conflicts as 'a delict by state A which arises from a breach of Article 2 (4) or the duty of non-intervention which also constitutes a threat to the security of state B'. Derek W Bowett. Op. Cit. p.39.

[146] To this respect, Derek Bowett posits that 'provided the threat is actual or imminent, leaving B no alternative choice of means, B may invoke the right of self-defence to justify reasonable and proportionate measures to safeguard its security: this, in essence, is the right of self-defence. In addition, if the situation created by A's breach also constitutes a threat to the security of state C, C may engage in similar measures to safeguard its security: this, in essence, is the right of collective self-defence, where B and C act in concert'. Ibid. p.39.

[147] Opinions diverge to this respect. For example, Jean Touscoz considers that article 51 in fact limits the cases where individual or collective self-defence may be invoked. Only licit in cases of armed aggression (and no other type of aggression), it cannot be used preventively, it must respect the principle of proportionality and finally it may assume a collective form. Jean Touscoz. Droit International, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993. Portuguese Translation under the title 'Direito Internacional', Publicações Europa-America, 1993, p.362. For an opposing view, see *inter alia* I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963 and also Derek W Bowett. 'The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defence', in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, John Norton Moore (Ed), the John Hopkins University Press, 1974.

[148] A parallel is therefore assumed between the role of institutions in the internal order of states in the maintenance of law and order and the role that international institutions such as the United Nations and in particular the Security Council should play in the inter-state system. The organisation of collective security is therefore a by-product of the juridical regulation of the use of armed force between states.

Consequently, because these provisions apply only to inter-state wars, they are inapplicable to the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts. Let us look at some fundamental assumptions of 'War-decision law'. Strongly rooted in the 'clausewitzian universe', 'War-decision Law' is therefore not originally intended to regulate wars within state borders. As a result, attempts at using it in such circumstances have proved controversial at best. This is particularly true in terms of United Nations' Security Council enforcement actions [under chapter VII of the Charter] in that 'in International Law there are no norms that prohibit civil wars with perhaps the only exception being the use of force to block the legitimate exercise of self-determination'.[149] In fact, a similar problem occurs when one tries to apply 'individual or collective self-defence' as a legal justification for 'war' within state's borders. Non-international armed conflicts more often than not begin as 'wars claimed to be civil wars by one side and international wars by the other', in which case it becomes 'difficult to define the 'self' that has the right to self-defence and the right to solicit collective self-defence'.[150] In addition, article 51 of the United Nations Charter seems to indicate that aggression, in the form of 'an armed attack', requires a conventional attack across international borders.

Conflicts other than conventional inter-state wars pose very specific problems. For example, there are numerous forms of indirect aggression that may affect to such an extent a state that it has the right to invoke individual or collective self-defence.[151] This in turn raises one of the most pressing problems in international relations: the regulation of intervention, especially military intervention in the affairs of another state. In fact, as was mentioned earlier, non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is generally held to be a basic principle of international law. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to regulate the right to intervention and as it stands, intervention is permitted under four circumstances: by treaty right; by invitation of a sovereign state; intervention to protect the lives of nationals and other aliens in clear and present danger in a state whose government is unable or unwilling to safeguard these foreigners and finally, humanitarian intervention to save a population from repression or genocide practiced by its own government or due to state-failure or state-collapse.[152]

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[149] Michael Akehurst. Op. Cit. p.298.

[150] William V O'Brien. Op. Cit. p.40.

[151] Among these we may highlight the support and incentive to revolution in another state through the provision of sanctuaries and bases for insurgency; material and financial support to insurgency by neighbouring States, etc.

[152] Humanitarian intervention is an important emerging concept in international war-decision making law. True humanitarian intervention requires states to accept the costs and risks of military intervention, even in the absence of compelling national interests, for the purpose of rescuing a people from tyrannical regime or from chaos. As demonstrated in the multinational interventions in Somalia in 1992-93, the belated multinational interventions in Rwanda in 1994, the erratic course of the United Nations, and interventions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the former Yugoslavia, humanitarian intervention does not attract many willing volunteers.

Derek Bowett considers some of these problems when attempting a definition of 'internal conflicts'. This author considers internal conflicts to be 'those occurring within a state and in which there is no lawful involvement by another state in the sense of a breach o Article 2 (4) or the duty of non-intervention'. Furthermore, 'in this type of conflict there is, basically, no right of intervention for any outside power and no occasion for any exercise of a right of self-defence'.[153] Yet, such a definition is not applicable to many present day conflicts, which have strong trans-national components. One tends to agree with O'Brien when he posits that 'contemporary international law-decision law is in a transitional state'. In fact, while clearly defining international conflicts, it does not provide an unambiguous or equivalent demarcation of armed conflicts of a non-international character.[154]

What about the second strand of the International Laws of War, namely 'War-conduct Law'? Are we able to locate in it a precise differentiation between international and non-international conflicts that would allow us to better understand contemporary conflict types? In the face of the overwhelming importance of armed conflicts within state borders, it is increasingly the case that war between states, in the classical juridical sense, is merely a particular type of violent armed conflict. The question of the application of 'War-conduct law' to non-international wars has therefore been intensely debated.[155]

As was discussed in the previous pages, 'War-conduct Law' is formed by a large body of international law purporting to regulate the conduct of hostilities in war. This regulation is subject to three customary principles: those of military necessity, humanity and chivalry. Nevertheless, as in *'jus ad bellum'* there are several obstacles to full compliance by belligerents, not least the fact that here too, the law was 'promulgated with the model of conventional interstate warfare in mind, a model irrelevant to modern conflicts'.[156]

Let us briefly look at 'War-conduct Law' in terms of the conduct of hostilities, also known as the Hague Laws.[157] We have pointed out that these contributed to a growing body of international law concerning the conduct of war: as regards the treatment of prisoners, the sick and wounded as well as non-combatants; as regards the concept of 'military necessity'

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[153] Derek W Bowett. Op. cit. p.41.

[154] William V O'Brien. Op. cit. p.41.

[155] For an in-depth discussion see *inter alia*, Howard. J Taubenfeld. 'The Applicability of the Laws of War in Civil War', in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, John Norton Moore (Ed), the John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p.499-518. And, in the same volume, Richard R Baxter. 'Ius in Bello Interno: The Present and Future Law', in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, John Norton Moore (Ed), the John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p.499-518.

[156] William V O'Brien. Op. Cit. p.42.

[157] We have already mentioned the Peace Conferences held at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 which codified numerous treaties dealing with the rules in war. Also the Geneva Conventions of 1864, the St Petersburg Declaration of 1864, the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the London Conference of 1908.

and the definition of weapons and tactics that are permitted, etc. While these rules have not always been respected, they have contributed importantly to a delineation of what constitutes legitimate warfare as well as the boundaries within which unsparing force can be applied. In addition, further legislation has been approved dealing with the prohibition of certain kinds of arms in war, namely toxic gases and bacteriological warfare.

The brutality that characterised the Spanish Civil War and public outrage at the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians especially by German and Japanese forces during World War II, led to a major revision of all major protective treaties[158] resulting in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.[159] These Conventions are relevant for the purposes of finding a definition of non-international conflicts within International Law. In fact, until 1949 all main treaties governing the conduct of warfare applied only to war between states and had no bearing on civil wars, with the exception of situations where the government of a state resisting insurrection recognised the belligerency of the rebels. In such a situation, as was for example the American Civil War, the conflict is treated as an international one for the purposes of the application of the International Laws of War.

Although in all four Geneva Conventions, general rules applicable to international armed conflicts were defined[160], it is important to highlight that they extend some essential principles of protection to 'armed conflicts not of an international character' thereby, as Taubenfeld points out, 'making them applicable, for the first time by treaty, to civil wars, although scholars had for two centuries insisted that this was so'.[161] The controversial issue regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions to conflict of a 'non-international character' entailed considerable arguments[162], in particular as regards the question of reciprocity and standards

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[158] According to Howard. J Taubenfeld, 'prisoners of war received protection under the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions and under the Geneva Convention of 1929. In addition the sick and wounded at sea were protected by Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, revised in turn by the Geneva Convention of 1949. Howard. J Taubenfeld. 'The Applicability of the Laws of War in Civil War', in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, John Norton Moore (Ed), the John Hopkins University Press, 1974, p.500.

[159] These are: The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and finally, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

[160] They included the prohibition on the taking of hostages; executions without regular trial; torture, cruel and degrading treatment; reprisals on protected persons and forced renunciation of Convention protection. The Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Wartime provided special protection for the wounded, children under fifteen, pregnant women and the elderly; there is to be no discrimination on racial, religious, national on political grounds. Furthermore, this Convention prohibits torture, collective punishment, reprisals, the unwarranted destruction of property, the forced use of civilians for an occupier's armed forces. Finally, the Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War includes a pledge to treat prisoners humanely, feed them adequately and allow for relief supplies to reach them.

[161] Howard. J Taubenfeld. Op. Cit. p.501.

[162] According to Richard Baxter, 'the draft treaties approved by the XVIIth International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm and submitted to the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 contained a common provision to the effect that: "In all cases of armed conflict not of an international character which may occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, each of the adversaries shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present Convention". The broad sweep of this stipulation proved to be too much for the majority of the states represented at the Diplomatic Conference. A compromise formula- that the entire convention would be applicable to

to be demanded of insurgents so as to include them within reach of international norms. Nevertheless, a compromise was reached in the form of Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Short of making applicable the entirety of all four Conventions in cases of 'armed conflict not of an international character', Article 3 makes applicable to these conflicts general principles of humane treatment and prohibition of discrimination to persons not taking part in the hostilities, including combatants that have laid down their weapons or are sick, wounded or under detention. Furthermore, Article 2, also common to all four Conventions, defines the scope of application of the Conventions 'to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them'.

Nevertheless, the closest Article 3 comes to defining 'non-international' conflict is by saying that it is an 'armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties'.[163] Not surprisingly, Baxter points out that 'the deceptively simple expression, 'armed conflict not of an international character', has not proven easy to apply to the multiplicity of circumstances under which violence may break out in a state'.[164] In particular, it is very difficult to classify a conflict as either international or non-international when there is involvement by a third state or several third states, which is the case in the vast majority of present day armed conflicts.[165]

In addition, there is another problem with the application of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. We have been considering situations that although of a non-international character (i.e. internal) are characterised by unmistakable high levels of hostilities. Yet, as we know, conflicts of an internal character can be very different in terms of the levels of hostilities they entail. Ranging from full-scale warfare of a conventional type; to public demonstrations

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internal conflicts only if there had been a recognition of belligerency by the de jure government or if the insurgent faction exercised de facto governmental functions- failed of adoption'. Richard R Baxter. Op. C it. p.519.

[163] Yet, as Howard Taubenfeld points out, 'in internal conflicts, experience has shown that governments will commonly deny that Article 3 of the 1949 Convention is applicable; they *do* consider their opponents to be traitors and criminals. Moreover, it also appears that insurgents often refuse to consider themselves bound, particularly when using terrorism, which they consider an essential technique as a weapon. (...) Difficulties are clear; rebels are faced by a dilemma. Will they not lose if they fight 'conventionally', if they are obliged to give up terror, subversion, and secrecy? Yet governments certainly will not observe rules that their opponents ignore. (...) The difficulties to as well as the challenges to legal scholars to develop acceptable rules are clear. Even with broader, clearer, more generally known rules, there is no certainty that governments and their internal opposition will, short of the availability of an external policing authority, inevitably be persuaded to abide by the restraints in what they consider to be life-or-death issues'. Howard. J Taubenfeld. Op. Cit. p.517.

[164] Richard R Baxter. Op. cit. p.521.

[165] Classifying a conflict as international or non-international is in the case of external involvement very difficult. On the one hand, it is widely accepted that a government facing insurgency may solicit external assistance which may entail the use of military force by the third party. On the other hand, a third party (i.e. a state) that aids an insurgency against a lawful government is intervening in the affairs of the state where the hostilities are carried out and can therefore be in breach of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. More importantly, as Baxter points out, 'these characterisations of the conduct of the external participation proceed on the comfortable assumption that is possible to identify which is the lawful government and which is the insurgent faction. That simply cannot be done in many circumstances'. Ibid. p.525.

that may turn into riots; to communal disorders or coups d'etat; to terrorism, among others, there are many degrees in the magnitude of 'non-international' conflicts. And, in this sense although efforts were made at clarifying Article 3, namely defining precise criteria for the recognition of belligerency, the Diplomatic Conference could not agree on the proposals for clarification of the applicability of Article 3. In fact, while compromise was reached on the widest application of Article 3, no consensus was possible as to the application of Article 3 to what are, in comparative terms, conflicts of a 'non-international character' with lower levels of violence.

Nevertheless, there were further attempts at clarification of the meaning of 'non-international' conflict.[166] For example, the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts in its Article 1(4) re-defined international wars as all 'armed conflict between States or armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination'. This had important implications in that these conflicts (i.e. anti-colonial/national liberation wars) were to be considered for all purposes of the application of the Protocol and perhaps of the International Laws of War as a whole, as international wars.[167] In this sense, Richard Baxter points out that,

> ...if a 'war of national liberation' is defined in these terms [referring to UN GA Resolution 2597], such a conflict may range from an attempt to throw off colonial rule to resistance activities by the local populace against a belligerent occupant. The concept being amorphous as it is, cannot fail to provoke controversy.[168]

What this shows is that there is an increasing tenuous juridical basis for distinguishing between international and non-international armed conflicts. In fact, as we have pointed out, most contemporary armed conflicts within states tend to become internationalised through the action of groups that may be located outside the borders of the state or that may benefit from aid given by external states and other actors. The 1977 Geneva Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts demonstrates this difficulty when, in Article 1, it defines non-international armed conflicts as those which 'occur in the territory of a State, between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed

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[166] *Inter alia*, see United General Assembly Resolution 2597 (XXIV) of December 16, 1969, which requested the Secretary General to carry forward the study he had initiated on the adequacy of the existing conventions and on the need for new treaties giving 'special attention to the need for protection of the rights of civilians and combatants in conflicts which arise from the struggles of peoples under colonial and foreign rule for liberation and self-determination and to the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions ad rules to such conflicts'.

[167] Interestingly enough the interpretation of anti-colonial wars or wars of national liberation as international wars was coincident with both Communist and Afro-Asiatic states' positions.

[168] Richard R Baxter. Op. Cit., p.521.

groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations'.[169]

We can easily see how difficult it is to operationalise such a definition. Moreover, when we attempt to apply 'War-conduct Law' to non-international armed conflicts difficulties abound. The very first one is the definition of the status of belligerency in internal conflicts. The International Laws of War that regulate inter-state war are clear in attributing belligerency automatically to any state that is at war. Yet, as concerns insurgents in non-international armed conflicts, they must demonstrate that they possess a degree of organisation and significant military capabilities and prospects to warrant subject status under the laws of war.[170] Furthermore, there is a second aspect related to the means and methods of warfare. While the two Protocols adopted in 1977 favour an application of previous *'humanitarian'* legislation to non-international and non-conventional types of wars, here too the difficulties of application are apparent. First and foremost is the question of defining who, in these non-international armed conflicts, is a combatant.[171] This is a critical question, since it triggers the application of all other provisions, namely dealing with the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian populations. In fact, the requirements needed for the attribution of a combatant status are of obvious difficult if not impossible application in the vast majority of current armed conflicts. In fact, armed forces in civil wars or mixed-civil/international wars are often unable or unwilling to meet these requirements. Guerrilla movements and insurgent groups rely for the most part on covert action and therefore are not willing to be identifiable by using particular uniforms or insignias, as well as carrying arms openly. Furthermore, they do not conduct their operations in accordance with war-conduct law.

Moreover, there is such a high degree of emotion and intensity of feelings in internal conflicts that some of these issues loose their meaning all together. The assumption the belligerents in civil wars are to provide for adequate medical services to ameliorate the condition of the sick and the wounded neglects the fact that the vast majority of contemporary groups involved in armed conflict do not possess such organisational capabilities. Equally, the provisions of

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[169] Jean Touscoz. Droit International, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993. Portuguese Translation under the title 'Direito Internacional', Publicações Europa-America, 1993, p.371.

[170] This is not a straightforward question as may be witnessed by the variety of groups that at current are involved in armed conflicts. International Law is in this respect, as was previously highlighted, at best confused. While the 1977 Geneva Protocol I could be invoked in situations of anti-colonial, anti-occupation and self-determination struggles, the Geneva Protocol II makes it very difficult to give belligerency status as a result of the conditions it specifies: if parties possess an organised command and exercise control over a part of the territory and carry out sustained and concerted military action.

[171] This issue had been regulated by the Hague Convention IV of 1907 and further developed in the Geneva Protocols of 1977. From both instruments one is able to define some of the requirements needed for the attribution of a combatant status. These included, in the 1907 Convention, that a combatant be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; that a combatant wears a uniform and possesses a fixed distinctive sign recognisable from a distance; that combatants carry their arms openly and conduct their operations according to the laws of war. In the 1977 Protocols it was considered that a combatant should wear a uniform, carry a distinctive sign or insignia and carry arms. It also considered as combatants those who, although not wearing a uniform, openly carry arms.

'War-conduct Law' that deal with the belligerent occupation of territory, namely the obligation of the occupation force to ensure security, minimal public services and relief measures for the civilian population present in that territory, is also a practical *mirage* in contemporary armed conflict.[172]

In conclusion, not only is it difficult to precisely differentiate between international and non-international armed conflicts using the vast provisions of the International Laws of War, but it is equally difficult to apply these same provisions to contemporary armed conflicts. Moreover, as regards the possibility of compliance with the standards defined in these provisions it must be pointed out that these rules are of extremely difficult sanctioning. Yet, the international responsibility of states, individuals and groups who violate these obligations and are therefore subject to penal responsibility in cases of Crimes Against Humanity and Crimes of War, is clearly stipulated. As Michael Akehurst posits,

> ...it is frequent for authors to consider that the erosion of the traditional Laws of War that occurred during the two world wars will continue in future conflicts. Nevertheless, it is possible that the development of nuclear weapons may have the indirect and paradoxical effect of re-establishing some of the traditional norms...yet these considerations are not valid in terms of 'civil wars', or 'semi-civil' or 'semi-international' such as the war in Vietnam.[173]

Nevertheless, the Laws of War are frequently invoked by actors involved in the analysis as well as the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts. Highly developed and showing a strong degree of sophistication in the regulation of 'clausewitzian' inter-state wars, the provisions of International Law offer us a contradictory and highly controversial picture of conflicts of a 'non-international character'. Yet, that they are in a transition phase at present constitutes a positive development.

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[172] Yet again, these provisions, contained in the 1907 Hague Convention IV and the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention are based on a model of war that presupposes that the belligerent occupation regime is a result of conventional forces' displacing the enemy from part of its territory.

[173] Michael Akehurst. Op. Cit. p.290.

2.2. International Relations Theory and Neo-Realism: Big Wars versus Little Wars

We will now turn to the very classification of war and armed conflict, yet one that has strongly influenced contemporary thought and practice as regards armed conflicts, perpetuating the tenets of the 'clausewitzian universe'. This classification, which distinguishes between systemic or world wars and all other wars (so-called small) was developed by International Relations theorists, in particular of a realist and neo-realist orientation,

So-called systemic, global or world wars have until recently attracted the major part of scholarly attention and study of international conflict, both within the field of International Relations as well as Strategic Studies. Why this should be so is not surprising and is mainly due to two factors, one of a practical nature and the other of a theoretical nature. Firstly, on a practical nature, the traumatic experiences of two World Wars demonstrated that these wars produced far greater and graver consequences than other wars, both in human as well as material costs. The growing focus on 'big wars'[174] may be located within a strong normative orientation that permeated the post-1945 period, a result of attempts by academics and policy makers to understand such occurrences hoping 'that a better understanding of the causes of these wars will increase the possibility of preventing them'.[175] The second factor, and one which will require further explanation below, refers to the dominance of the realist and neo-realist theoretical orientations within the field of International Relations theory and practice, and its consequences as regards the study of war and armed conflict.

In the conclusion to chapter one above we had pointed out that 'traditional' or clausewitzian analysis and conceptualisation of war came to permeate and strongly determine contemporary thinking. While we centred on early nineteenth century strategic thought, we had purposively left out of the discussion the contributions that International Relations authors, in particular realist and neo-realist, have made after 1945 to the prevalence of the traditional or clausewitzian concept of war in the understanding of the phenomenon. And, although it is beyond the scope of this study to present an in-depth discussion of the realist and neo-realist paradigms in the study of international relations, subject of an extensive debate, a number of observations are pertinent. These considerations will allow us to better perspectivate the 'big war versus little war' typology.

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[174] To paraphrase the title of a fascinating volume dedicated to the topic 'Big Wars, Little Wars- A Single Theory?', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990.

[175] Jack Levy. 'Big Wars, Little Wars, and Theory Construction', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.219. See also William R Thompson. 'The Size of War, Structural and Geopolitical Contexts, and Theory Building/Testing', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.186.

Firstly, it should be pointed out that it is a common assumption that political realism has been the most widely used analytical theory of International Relations in contemporary scholarship and in policy circles.[176] Realist political thought is as old as political thought itself. In fact, the writings of ancient Chinese philosophers such as Han Fei-tzu, Ancient Greek precursors and influences such as Thucydides, and the writings of Renaissance authors like Niccolo Machiavelli are considered the classical heritage of realism. Equally, Thomas Hobbes gave anthropological pessimism its first general theory in the work 'Leviathan', defending powerful and centralized authority in domestic politics and defining the state of nature has man's prior-to-society state. This state of nature, inherently a condition of war of everyone against everyone, is according to Hobbes the anarchy in which states relate, for there is no superordinate power to impose order. However, it is important to note that this important heritage of the realist school was not comprehensively built into a general theory until the second half of the twentieth century. Perhaps more importantly, while for many centuries political realism constituted a guide for practice in relations between states, in its contemporary form realism must be understood as a reaction to the so called Idealism that dominated international politics in the aftermath of the First World War.[177]

Nevertheless, contrary to the predictions and assumptions of the idealists, war broke out with unparalleled consequences. The inability of the League of Nations and as a result, of international law to prevent it discredited the 'idealist' posture of the inter-war period and led to a re-emergence of realist thought. E.H. Carr's 'The Twenty Year's Crisis' (1939) initiated a strong critic of 'idealism' and called for a true science of international politics based on the reality of international life and not on some ethical approach to what international phenomena should be.[178] By 1948, political realism (in its international approach) was theoretically

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[176] According to Keohane, 'for over 200 years, what Hans J. Morgenthau dubbed 'Political Realism' has constituted the principal tradition in the analysis of international relations in Europe and its offshoots in the New World...Writers of the Italian Renaissance, balance of power theorists, and later adherents of the school of *Machtpolitik* all fit under a loose version of the Realist rubric. Periodic attacks on realism have taken place; yet the very focus of these critiques seems only to reconfirm the centrality of Realist thinking in the international political thought of the West'. As cited in Robert Keohane. 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond', in Neorealism and its Critics, in R. Keohane (Ed), Columbia University Press, New York, 1986. Also see John A. Vazquez, The Power of Power Politics: a critique, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1983.

[177] Among others, the contributions of President Woodrow Wilson delineated the idealist orientation. He considered that democracy was the main guarantor of peace and that totalitarianism was the main cause of war. In his addresses to the American Congress on the 2nd of April 1917 ('The world must be safe for democracy') and on January 8 1918 ('The Fourteen Points') he defended the idea that it was possible to establish a set of institutions that by their very structure would force nations to act peacefully. By using reason humans could overcome such problems as war. For instance, all mankind was seen to have a common harmony of interest. In a 'nascent world community' a system of peace could be established. These ideas were embodied in the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and in subsequent emphasis on international law, arbitration, disarmament, collective security, and peaceful change. Among the major scholars who contributed to this view we find *inter alia* Alfred Zimmern, S.H. Bailey, Philip Noel-Baker, and David Mitrany of the United Kingdom as well as James Shotwell, Pitman Potter and Parker T. Moon of the United States. According to John Vasquez 'the idealist phase was important in terms of institutionalizing the field and creating the emphasis on peace and war'. John A. Vazquez, The Power of Power Politics: a critique, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1983.

[178] Others besides Carr were reacting in the same manner, and the realist paradigm began to be codified. Writers like Frederick Schuman ('International Politics', 1933), Harold Nicholson ('Diplomacy', 1939), Reinhold Niebuhr ('Christianity and Power Politics', 1940), Georg Schwarzenberger ('Power Politics', 1941), Nicholas Spykman ('America's Strategy in World Politics', 1942) and Martin Wight ('Power Politics', 1946).

developed for the first time in the work of Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Politics Among Nations'.[179]

Morgenthau considered that the subject of a science of International Politics should be the behaviour of states because they are the principal actors in the international scene. States will constantly act to protect their interests and so must constantly maximise their power. Mirroring the classics, and borrowing from Hobbes, Morgenthau considered that there is a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics. The decentralized and anarchic system of international society makes domestic politics different from international politics. Consequently, the 'hard-core' of the realist research program may be defined *a la Keohane* as being composed of three main assumptions: the state centric assumption[180]; the rationality assumption[181] and finally, the power assumption.[182] As regards the explanation of war, political realism relies on the inter-play between these assumptions, especially the consideration that conflict is inevitable in an anarchic international system.

During the 1950's and 60's the so-called 'behavioural approach' to the study of International Relations attempted to introduce a more systematic and scientific way of testing explanations in international relations, but did not challenge the fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm. This approach was more concerned with questions of methodology in International Relations, particularly the need for the use of scientific methods in the testing of hypothesis in international relations. Moreover, what became known as the 'structuralist' or 'neo-realist' approach was introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his book 'Theory of International Politics'.[183] In this work, Waltz attempts to bring some scientificity to realism by introducing the notions of system and structure in the study of International Relations. For our purposes here, the neo-

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[179] Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1973. According to John Vasquez, realism's appeal was that it accounted for 'the anomaly of World War II in terms of power politics. Hans Morgenthau best expressed, promulgated, and synthesized the work of these [realist] writers. Because his Politics Among Nations was so comprehensive, systematic, and theoretical, it became the exemplar of this group'. John A. Vazquez, The Power of Power Politics: a critique, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1983.

[180] States are the most important actors in world politics. Robert Keohane. 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond', in Neorealism and its Critics, in R. Keohane (Ed), Columbia University Press, New York, 1986. See also Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, MacMillan Publishing Company, New York, Second Edition, 1993, p. 35.

[181] World politics can be analysed as if states were unitary rational actors, carefully calculating costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility, under conditions of uncertainty and without necessarily having sufficient information about alternatives or resources to conduct a full review of all possible courses of action. Morgenthau explicitly acknowledges that the assumption of rationality was not descriptively accurate but could be 'tested against the actual facts'. With it, supposedly the analyst could infer actions from interests and thereby construct an explanatory theory of behaviour. Robert Keohane. Op. Cit. See also Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. Op. Cit. p. 35-36.

[182] States constantly seek power. This is in terms of the ability to influence others and obtain resources that can be used to exercise influence. States calculate their interests in terms of power, whether as end or as necessary means to a variety of other ends. International relations is a struggle for power not only because of the inherent logic of a competitive realm such as world politics, but also because of the 'limitless character of the lust for power which reveals a general quality of the human mind'. Robert Keohane, Op. cit. See also See also Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi. Op. cit. p. 35-36.

[183] Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1979.

realist paradigm is where we find the 'Big War versus Little War' classification.

Kenneth Waltz's main concern as regards International Relations theory, both in its traditional (idealist and realist) as well as its behaviourist approach, regards the excessive preoccupation with the study of states and statesmen, elites and bureaucracies, and sub-national and trans-national actors. Kenneth Waltz regards these concerns as revealing a fundamentally reductionist orientation in the study of international politics. As a consequence, he warns that reductionism drifts the analysis of international politics to 'subsystem' variables making it impossible to understand world politics in their entirety and in particular international war.[184] In fact, in Waltz's opinion, the repeated failure of attempts to explain international outcomes analytically- through examination of interacting units- strongly signals the need for a systems approach.[185] In this sense, a systems approach must demonstrate how the system level is distinct from the level of the interacting units; why changes at the unit level produce less change of outcomes than one would expect; why patterns of behaviour recur as well as be able to explain the resistance systems may show in response to the unpredictable acts of states. In sum, a systems theory must develop explanatory and predictive power as regards continuity as well as change across systems, not within them.[186]

Because Waltz's structuralist theory departs from the idea that a system is composed of structure and interacting units, it purports to explain the way by which the organization of a realm *per se* acts as a constraining and disposing force on its constitutive units. What this means is that an exclusive attention to individual attributes of states, for example, will not be capable of explaining and predicting outcomes because the actions taken by states in the international system are limited to a large extent by the structural arrangement of that very system. Defined as the arrangement of the units as well as by the principle of that arrangement, the structure of the international system possesses its own variables, distinct from the variables of the units, and these variables create patterns of behaviour among units by the constraints imposed on them.[187]

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[184] In his words, 'if the aims, policies, and actions of states become matters of exclusive attention or even of central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level, and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can logically be made'. Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1979.

[185] Kenneth Waltz says 'and yet, though causes are specifically assigned, we know that states with every imaginable variation of economic institution, social custom and political ideology have fought wars. More striking still many different sorts of organizations fight wars, whether those organizations be tribes, petty principalities, empires, nations, or street gangs'. The logical conclusion is that even if some causes of international outcomes are located at the level of the interacting units, 'since variations in the presumed causes do not correspond very closely to variations in observed outcomes, one has to believe that some causes are located at a different level as well'. Ibid.

[186] In this sense, although explaining change it does not question the basic foundation of the system or even propose a critical analysis of it. Robert Cox considers that it is 'no accident that this tendency coincided with the Cold War which imposed the category of bipolarity upon international relations and an overriding concern for the defense of American power as a bulwark of the maintenance of order'. Robert W Cox. 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', Neorealism and Its Critics, in Robert O. Keohane (Ed), Columbia University Press, New York, 1986.

[187] Within the international system, the ordering principle of structures is that of coordination, since international systems are by nature decentralized and anarchic. He justifies the orderly principle of an unorderly realm by

Consequently, being units of international political systems, states are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform, but remain like units living in relations of coordination in an anarchic realm. Waltz says that 'to call states like units is to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit. States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them'. In this sense, the basic distinction among units (states) is their capability for performing similar tasks. This distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute but rather a system wide concept since changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units provoke changes in the structure of the system.

The 'Big War versus Little War' classification is strongly rooted in this systemic approach to international relations. While at first glance one would be led to believe that the definition of a systemic (global or world) war is a function of the size, severity or magnitude of such conflicts, this is not the main theoretical argument at the root of this type's definition. In fact, as Thompson points out, 'if the criteria for distinguishing 'small' from 'big' are inductively determined attributes of war such as the number of people killed or the length of time people spend killing one another, I seriously doubt that we will advance our understanding about war onsets per se by distinguishing between big and small bloodletting events'.[188]

More importantly, the theoretical underpinning of such definition of systemic/global/world wars is the belief that their consequences change the international system. These wars are said to fundamentally alter the international system, 'rearranging political and social institutions in ways that are much more consequential than the cumulative impact of many lesser conflicts'.[189] It is because of this that this approach to classification can be said to be strongly rooted in the structuralist or neo-realist approach to the study of international relations.

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comparison with microeconomics where the market (order) is formed from the self-interested acts and interactions of individual units. The core units in political systems are the primary political units of an era, be they city-states, empires or nations. Survival is perceived has the prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have. In a world were the security of states is not assumed, survival is taken has a ground of action rather than a realistic assumption.

[188] William R Thompson. 'The Size of War, Structural and Geopolitical Contexts, and Theory Building/Testing', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.183. Importantly for our purposes here, Thompson later points out that 'to say that we might not learn that much from an inductive analysis of war size indicators is not the same thing as saying that we might not learn a great deal about the magnitude or severity of war. The problem is that it is quite rare for our theories of war to be directly concerned with these types of concepts. More commonly, theories on the causes of war are concerned about such phenomena as shifting power distributions, alliance structures, and system stability. Or, they may focus on national attributes- population changes, great power versus small powers, democratic versus authoritarian regimes, the links between internal and external conflict'. Ibid. p.184.

[189] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 'Big Wars, Little Wars: Avoiding the Selection Bias', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.160.

Systemic wars are armed conflicts fought among the major states in the system. They are different, proponents of the differentiation argument posit, due to the purpose or effort put into the war and the resulting impact or subsequent severity it has on the global political, economic and social system as well as on the domestic systems of individual participating states. At the root of the distinction between 'big and small wars' is the notion that the consequences of big wars fundamentally change the international system. As Thompson points out, 'systemic wars are special. They constitute rare events with momentous consequences'.[190] Kugler succinctly summarises the literature's definition of systemic, global or world wars in the following way,

> ...a major war is a very intense struggle that threatens the core territory of contending, fully involved great powers and revolves around disputes over the leadership of the international order (Organski and Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Midlarski 1988; Thompson, 1988). Mercifully, such wars are rare. Heavy casualties and large material destruction are frequently associated with major war, but do not suffice to identify them (...) Major wars are serious confrontations waged to re-establish relationships among the great powers that dominate the international system and which produce direct threats to the core territory of the participants..[191]

Although there is no agreement between authors on the precise number of such system-altering conflicts, the Peloponnesian War, the Macedonian War, the Thirty Years' War, the War of Spanish Succession, the French Revolutionary Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II stand as often mentioned examples of such wars.[192] The proposition that these wars represent system-altering events is present, albeit in somewhat different ways, in Robert Gilpin's hegemonic war theory described in his 'War and Change in World Politics'[193], Organski and Kugler's structural transition theory in 'The War Ledger'[194] or William Thompson's global wars theory developed in his 'On Global War'[195]. This argument has

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[190] William R Thompson. 'The Size of War, Structural and Geopolitical Contexts, and Theory Building/Testing', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.196.

[191] Jacek Kugler. 'The War Phenomenon: a Working Distinction', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.202.

[192] Manus I Midlarski. 'Systemic Wars and Dyadic Wars: no Single Theory', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.173. To this respect, J. Kugler posits that 'Midlarski (1988) and Gilpin (1981) argue that only these three [Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II] are true major wars. Thompson (1988) concurs but suggests that a good case can be made for the Crimean War. Levy (1985) again agrees and shows, in addition that Modelski, Wallerstein, Doran, Farar and Movat also concur. Toynbee is at odds because, like Modelski, he aggregated World War I and II into a single event (Levy, 1985). (...) Depending on the criteria used a maximum of 9 and a minimum of 3 major wars were waged in the last 200 years'. As cited in Jacek Kugler. 'The War Phenomenon: a Working Distinction', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.204.

[193] Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981. In this book, Gilpin says that 'the most important consequence of a hegemonic war is that it changes the system in accordance with the new international distribution of power' and that these types of war 'becomes total in and in time is characterised by participation by all major states and most of the minor states in the system', p.198. See also Robert Gilpin's 'The Theory of Hegemonic War', in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

[194] Organski, A.F.K and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980.

[195] Thompson, William R. On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1988.

generated a substantial body of literature both arguing for and against the systemic change proposition.[196]

One of the proponents of a clear-cut distinction between systemic and non-systemic wars is Manus Midlarski. His proposition is in many respects similar to that of Modelski and Thompson's 'long-cycle' approach referred to in earlier pages, as well as with the power transition theory of Organski and Kugler. Midlarski bases the need for a theoretical distinction between systemic and non-systemic wars on four arguments. Firstly, this author makes an interesting analogy between mass or social revolutions and systemic wars and between coups d'etat and non-systemic wars.[197] In the same way that social revolutions are phenomena radically different from coups d'etat due to the extensity and depth of participation, so too systemic and non-systemic wars may be differentiated along these lines.[198] Secondly, Midlarski considers that the causes of systemic wars are fundamentally different from those of 'small' wars. For this author, both systemic wars and social revolutions have a very complex aetiology quite different from the single-cause aetiology of the coup d'etat or of dyadic wars. These types also require a considerable gestation period, which again distinguishes them from mere dyadic wars, even of the most serious consequences for the participants involved such as the 1979-1989 Iran and Iraq war.[199] Finally, because the category of systemic war allows for the creation of two distinct sub-categories (structural and mobilisation war) and because the nature of the international system itself is such that the

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[196] As Jacek Kruger says, 'Why then do we so assiduously study these very rare manifestations of war? One reason is their impact on the international system. Major wars impose massive trauma on the international structures and frequently mark the end on one leader's era of dominance and the beginning of another. Consider the three major wars on which all analysts agree. The Napoleonic Wars coincided with French retreat from dominance in the world system. World War I marks the end of 'Pax Britanica'. World War II prevents the imposition of 'Pax Germanica' and insures the rise of 'Pax Americana'. Thus, major wars are studied because they frequently mark massive changes in the international system that extract a very high price from all societies involved'. As cited in Jacek Kugler. 'The War Phenomenon: a Working Distinction', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.204.

[197] Midlarski uses Theda Skocpol's definition of social revolutions as 'rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures (...) accompanied and in part carried trough by class-based revolts from below', and the underlying theoretical separation of these processes from other sorts of conflicts (i.e. rebellion, turmoil, coup d'état, terrorism, civil violence and unrest) by means of the combination of societal structural change with class upheaval and political with social transformation. Refer to Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.

[198] Manus Midlarski justifies this analogy on the basis of the considerable developments in the study of mass or social revolutions by social scientists. In fact, this distinction is assumed in the major academic works on social/mass revolutions, *inter alia*, Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution, Vintage, New York, 1965; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.

[199] To this respect Midlarski says that, 'these are among the most general conclusions emerging from comprehensive studies of social revolutions and systemic wars. Their structural isomorphism is not only suggestive of similarities in the structure of explanation of revolutions and systemic wars but also most important for our purposes here, these structural elements constitute distinctions between these two forms of pervasive conflict, on the one hand, and much more simpler forms such as coups an dyadic wars, on the other. Coups or war between two nations can begin with a simple movement of military forces of only one state in the domestic instance two in the international. This is certainly not true of the more complex aetiology of social revolutions and systemic wars'. Manus I Midlarski. 'Systemic Wars and Dyadic Wars: no Single Theory', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.175.

growth in constraints over time can eventuate a systemic war, a theoretical distinction between systemic and non-systemic wars must be made. [200]

Yet, the 'strict separation' between systemic and non-systemic wars has its fair share of opposition. The main critic of such differentiation is Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, more known for his 'expected-utility theory of war'.[201] Bueno de Mesquita's main argument against such differentiation is that, in his own words,

> ...how can the myriad of small wars compare in their causes to these great, hegemonic struggles? If there is a category of wars fought to alter the fundamental rules and structure of the international system; fought to promote a vision of a new world order, then surely these are particularly worthy of our study and attention. The problem with this perspective is that almost without exception the consequences of such wars- knowable only after the fact- bore little or no relationship to the motivations or intentions of the combatants at the outset of the conflict. The great, global wars of history have rarely been initiated because a great power decided to confront one world vision with another...[202]

Bueno de Mesquita's critique is powerful indeed. There are a number of rival hypothesis regarding the causes and consequences of big wars, namely hierarchical equilibria, differential growth rates and dissatisfaction with the status quo as central factors in the initiation of such system-altering conflicts and not necessarily the desire by major powers to alter the system. Second, 'not only is there considerable disagreement about the appropriate set of explanatory variables, but even the taxonomic criteria for the dependent variable is not established'.[203] Furthermore, making use of his expected-utility theory of war, Bueno de Mesquita posits that if decision-makers could anticipate the high costs to be incurred in such systemic wars 'then they would surely prefer to reach a negotiated settlement of their dispute without resorting to violence'.[204]

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[200] According to this author, 'it seemed clear to me that these were two very different kinds of war. In the first of these [structural] a long time period of gestation, as it were, is required for the structural war to begin. The emergence of inequalities, envies consequent upon them, alliance formations, alliance memories, overlaps in conflict structures, and changes in the balance of power all feed into the onset of the structural war. In the instance of the mobilisation war, no such lenghty processes need take place. It is the mobilising leader in the form of a Philip of Macedon, Louis XIV, Napoleon or Hitler who makes the key decisions regarding war or peace within a relatively short time period, in contrast to the much longer gestation of the processes preceding a structural war and the absence of any single mobilising leader almost entirely responsible for the war's onset. The period between a structural and mobilisation war witnesses a power interregnum s the result of the material exhaustion of the principals during earlier structural war, which in turn 'invites' the aggressive entry of the mobilising leader into the international arena'. Ibid. p.176-177.

[201] This theory is developed in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. The War Trap, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981.

[202] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 'Big Wars, Little Wars: Avoiding the Selection Bias', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.161.

[203] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 'Big Wars, Little Wars: Avoiding the Selection Bias', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.168. This is a point also highlighted by Thompson: 'there is considerable disagreement within historical-structural analyses of systemic war. Scholars disagree on what drives change in the system. Often, they seem to disagree about what system it is that they are analysing. They diverge on which actors have counted the most. They dispute which wars most deserve the systemic war label'. William R Thompson. 'The Size of War, Structural and Geopolitical Contexts, and Theory Building/Testing', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.186.

[204] Bueno de Mesquita relies on the rational-choice model of decision-making in his theory. He says that 'the prospective loser, foreseeing a disastrous outcome, would be better off yielding without a fight whatever must be given up in the end while saving the human and material opportunity costs that war forces them to bear. The prospective winner, foreseeing that the war will be extraordinarily costly, will prefer to accept benefits without fighting

Moreover, there is an additional argument corroborating the opposition against such differentiation. This argument relates to the fact that concentrating on 'Big' wars alone will prevent an understanding on why and how 'small' wars develop into system-altering conflicts, or if such evolution is indeed possible. The main question here seems to be, as Bueno de Mesquita puts it, 'what makes big wars different, *ex ante* [sic], from other wars?'.[205]

Between these two seemingly irreconcilable positions, there are authors who attempt to create a middle-ground with the intention of retaining the richness of insights of the two opposing views as regards the construction of a typology differentiating between systemic, global or world wars and non-systemic or dyadic wars. While William Thompson and Jack Levy consider that 'it all depends on the theoretical question to be answered'[206], Jacek Kugler points out that,

> ...should war be studied as a single phenomenon or as diverse manifestations of a related phenomena? It may well be that all wars stem from similar causes. It may also be that, like cancer, some wars emerge from economic causes, others from ethnic differences, still others from religious or ideological disagreements. Major wars may share some but not all characteristics with total and limited wars, or may be a distinct strand driven by particular systemic conditions. I see no reason why research on war should not be specialised. Such a division of labour still allows the study of war in general and permits scholars to trace the escalation of major war from its origin in crisis.[207]

The classification discussed here creates issues not dissimilar to the juridical typology discussed in the previous sub-section. There is a considerable degree of ambiguity in the proposition of a differentiation between 'Big and Small wars', in particular as regards the question of which variables must be taken into account to substantiate such a distinction. Is this differentiation based empirically observed characteristics of the war in question, such as size [i.e. number of actors involved], duration or magnitude as some authors posit? Or is such a distinction based on the consequences of such wars? Is the common sense observation that such a classification would rank wars according to some kind of measurement correct? More importantly, how are we to choose between different approaches to such a differentiation?

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that are less than the gross benefits it expects to gain by fighting so long as the lesser benefits exceed its expected net gains from a war in which large costs must be subtracted from its gross benefits'. Idem, p.163.

[205] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 'Big Wars, Little Wars: Avoiding the Selection Bias', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.168.

[206] Jack Levy. 'Big Wars, Little Wars, and Theory Construction', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990. And also William R Thompson. 'The Size of War, Structural and Geopolitical Contexts, and Theory Building/Testing', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.183.

[207] Jacek Kugler. 'The War Phenomenon: a Working Distinction', in International Interactions, Randolph M. Siverson (Editor) and Manus I Midlarski (Guest Editor), Volume 16, Number 3, 1990, p.212.

And while such a classification recognises that an understanding of global wars is critical in the explanation of long-cycles in international relations, such a great concentration of efforts on one type of war leaves a considerable incidence of other types of war to be explained. This is what Thompson means when he says that 'to allocate so much attention to a very small number of wars is not very helpful in accounting for the origins of war- either in general or even in terms of those wars that are conceivably most influenced by the context of system change'.[208]

[208] Idem, p.188.

Chapter 3. Beyond the Clausewitzian Universe:
Conflict Analysis and the Search for Conflict Types and Typologies

Introduction

> ...the ending of the Cold War has led to an important shift in the world attention away from its prior obsession with ideological conflict and the threat of nuclear annihilation to focus on an 'other' reality plagued by sectarian conflict and warfare...*ethnic warfare became the hot topic in the 'afterglow' years immediately following the Cold War's demise as a virtual cornucopia of these seemingly intractable (and previously 'invisible') social identity conflicts exploded onto the world scene and captured the public and policy eyes and imaginations* [my emphasis]...[209]

> ...recent studies, most notably by the Post Conflict Unit at the World Bank, have sought to portray wars as driven essentially by economic agendas, particularly those conflicts in the developing world...The head of the team has subsequently claimed that statistical analysis supports the interpretation that economic agendas appear to be central to the origins of many civil wars....Although not exclusively so, *this approach has been collated into that of 'resource wars', sometimes put forward as reflecting a 'new' type of war* [my emphasis]...[210]

The assumptions supporting the realist and neo-realist explanation of war coupled with the difficult if not impossible applicability of the International Laws of War to the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts, encouraged the search for new theories and analytical approaches that could surpass the limitations imposed by the tenets of the 'clausewitzian universe' of inter-state wars. In fact, unfruitful attempts by theorists and practitioners to apply the 'clausewitzian' blue-print indiscriminately to the variety of present-day armed conflicts, prompted the search for the fundamental elements that could explain the occurrence of war at levels other than the inter-state, in an attempt to understand why these conflicts happen, what they are about and what can be done to prevent them and in worst case scenarios, manage, settle or resolve them. After all, the post-1945 world has been stage to an increasing number of non inter-state conflicts and these need explanation.

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[209] Center for Systemic Peace. Op. Cit. p.1, 12.

[210] Jakkie Cilliers. 'Resource Wars- a new type of insurgency', in Angola's War Economy. The Role Of Oil and Diamonds, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p.2.

The statistical preponderance of violent conflict within states with strong 'identity' based aetiological components has focused the attention of theorists and practitioners to the causes of contemporary conflicts. A paradigmatic example of this may be found in Samuel P. Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations Theory'. In his words,

> ...it is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological nor primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural...Conflict between Civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. [211]

Such focus on the fundamental causes of contemporary wars has equally produced a vast number of so-called 'loose cause-based typologies of conflict' such as the one by Christopher Clapham referred to above or that developed by Rupesinghe *et al*, which distinguishes between resource-based conflicts, conflicts over governance and authority, ideological conflicts or identity-based conflicts.[212] In fact, the plethora of aetiological conflict types and typologies is evidence that the most frequently invoked conflict types are those based on the perceived causes of conflict. And within these, as Singer points out, 'all the usual suspects are found: territory, ideology, dynastic legitimacy, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, markets, dominance, equality, and, of course, revenge'.[213] It is to a sample of such approaches that we now turn. In this sense, the pages below will critically discuss the assumptions underlying two of the most widely used aetiological conflict types, ethnic conflicts and resource-wars, in an attempt to investigate the extent to which contemporary conflict types surpass the limitations imposed by the 'clausewitzian universe'.

Yet, before proceeding further, we should note that when it comes to aetiological conflict types there is no consensus in the literature and as a result, disagreements are as heated as they are varied. As will be discussed below, given that aetiology refers explicitly to the phenomenon of causation, it entails a probe into causes and reasons behind the occurrence of phenomena under analysis. Hence, we believe as Harry Eckstein, that although 'the "essential nature" of a subject must ultimately determine its conceptualisation', one should be aware that 'the issue of aetiology is the problem on which theoretical approaches now differ the most, especially if we include in it the problem of why political violence takes different forms'.[214]

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[211] Samuel P. Huntington in "The Clash of Civilizations?", in Foreign Affairs, vol.72, n-3.

[212] Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. Civil Wars, Civil Peace. An introduction to Conflict Resolution. Pluto Press, London 1998.

[213] J. David Singer, 'Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.38.

[214] Harry Eckstein, 'Theoretical Approaches To Explaining Collective Political Violence', in Handbook of Political Conflict, Ted Robert Gurr (Ed). P.137.

3.1. A Critical Discussion of the 'Ethnic Conflict' Type

> ...the drive towards ethnic-national self-determination is one of the greatest challenges facing the international community in the 1990s. From the Balkans to Burma, from the Caucasus to the Horn of Africa, communal groups are asserting claims to self-determination by force. The conflicts which result are the cause of most of the current civil wars.[215]

> ...many internal conflicts are not driven by ethnic grievances at all, but by power struggles, ideological crusades, and criminal agendas. In short, the 'ancient hatreds' explanation for the causes of internal conflict cannot account for significant variation in the incidence and intensity of such conflict. It is not a good explanation of why conflicts break out and escalate in some areas but not in others...the problem with 'ancient hatreds' theorising is not that historical grievances are irrelevant but that a single factor is said to be responsible for a wide range of developments. To put it in more formal methodological terms, a single independent variable is said to govern a wide range of dependent variables. This is asking a lot of any one variable of factor.[216]

We will begin by looking at ethnic conflict. As Timothy Sisk points out, 'scholarship and journalistic reporting on ethnic conflict have ballooned since the end of the Cold War, reflecting the experiences of the era and the new challenges that ethnic struggles have created for the international community'.[217] In fact, that ethnic conflict became in the beginning of the 1990s 'the most fashionable term and last resort to explain contemporary social conflicts', is not difficult to understand.[218] The demise of the Soviet Union and the eruption of conflicts in the former USSR and Eastern Europe coupled with the continuation as well as eruption of new conflicts in the 'Third World' and in particular in Africa, made redundant previous aetiological conflict analysis' types such as 'class conflicts' and 'ideological wars', or the more prosaic types such as 'proxy wars' and 'small wars'.

To the surprise of the many who believed that with the end of the Cold War a new window of opportunity was created for the swift resolution of many armed conflicts around the world, this situation created a difficult paradox. For if the end of the Cold War and therefore of superpower engagement (perceived to be at once the catalyst and the main cause for the maintenance of these conflicts) did not contribute to resolving but a small number of conflicts, while many others raged on and new ones erupted, what were these conflicts about? Why were they still raging on? And equally important, how to explain the many new armed conflicts that mushroomed in various regions around the world? These questions required from

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[215] Kamal S Shehadi. Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 283, London, 1993, p.3.

[216] Michael E Brown. 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p. 572-573.

[217] Timothy D Sisk. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.11.

[218] Dietrich Jung with Klaus Schlite and Jens Siegelberg. 'Ongoing Wars and their Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.61. To this respect, Dietrich Jung *et al* point out that 'since the end of the Cold War, the slogan 'ethnic conflict' does not only appear more and more often in the media, but also in the discourse of social science'. Ibid. p.60-61.

academics, policy makers as well as the press a new approach to conflict explanation and classification.

To explain such armed conflicts, analysts turned to the groups in conflict and their claims in order to establish what these conflicts were about.[219] A shift of focus occurred. Turning away from the systemic level, which presupposed a high degree of systemic determinacy upon what in the recent past was defined as 'proxy' or 'small' wars, analysis began looking at local actors and local situations in an attempt to understand what the conflicts were all about. What they found, as was previously pointed out in chapter one, was that the vast majority of groups involved in on-going violent armed conflicts claim to be fighting for self-determination (whether aiming for independence, autonomy, secession or the control or participation in government) and most importantly that, as varied as issues in conflict may be, the vast majority of conflict groups assume *identity* as their fundamental 'gravitational pole'. Identity is generally conceptualised by groups in contemporary armed conflict as of an ethnic, national, religious or cultural character.

The paradox began unravelling. While we are witnessing an increase in the processes and pace of globalisation, an opposing centripetal force in the form of fragmentational particularism is increasingly visible.[220] It is at the level of explaining this fragmentation (especially when entailing violent expression) that the concepts of 'ethnicity', 'ethnic group' or 'ethnic conflict' are located. This reflects the fact that 'ethnic and cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenisation are not two arguments, two opposing views of what is happening in the world today, but two constitutive elements of global reality'.[221] The notion that globalisation produces simultaneously integration at a global level and fragmentation at a local level is highlighted by Gurr, who posits that the current trend in ethnopolitical conflict is in fact 'best understood as an indirect consequence of global processes of modernisation' characterised by the growth of the modern state and the state system, the development of a global economic system and finally the communications revolution.[222]

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[219] It should be pointed out that the need for explanation is not merely academic. As Shehadi points out, 'government officials and international civil servants worldwide are seeking to respond to the challenges posed by these claims, while international organisations are trying to mediate an end to these conflicts and alleviate the humanitarian disasters they create'. Kamal S Shehadi,. Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 283, London, 1993, p.3.

[220] This paradox is discussed by Eriksen in the following terms: 'An important reason for the current academic interest in ethnicity and nationalism is the fact that such phenomena have become so visible in many societies that it has become impossible to ignore them. In the early twentieth century, many social theorists held that ethnicity and nationalism would decrease in importance and eventually vanish as a result of modernisation, industrialisation and individualism. This never came about. On the contrary, ethnicity and nationalism have grown in political importance in the world, particularly since the end of the Second World War'. Thomas Hylland Eriksen. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives. Pluto Press, London, 1993, p.2.

[221] Jonathan Friedman. 'Being in the world: globalisation and localisation', in Global Culture, Mike Featherstone (Ed), Sage, London, 1990, p.311.

[222] Ted Robert Gurr. 'Minorities, Nationalists and Ethnopolitical Conflict', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.55, 62. Interestingly, Thomas Eriksen reminds us that 'in the early

While variously defined as ethnic, ethno-political, inter-tribal or, in the usage of the Center for Systemic Peace 'sectarian'[223], is it possible to find a common thread in the meaning and definition of an '*ethnic*' conflict type? What do we mean when we attribute the 'ethnic' classification to conflicts as varied as Bosnia Herzegovina, the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, the civil war in Angola or the complex situation in the African Great Lakes region?[224]

There are two main albeit opposing approaches to explaining ethnic conflict. The first is the primordialist approach, which explains ethnicity in terms of inherited group behavioural characteristics that some scholars would argue are biologically based.[225] The second is the instrumentalist approach, which argues that ethnicity is contextual, fluid, negotiable, and a function of structural conditions in society. Although these two seemingly opposing views may at first sight appear academic, 'the extent to which scholars see ethnicity as immutable and innate versus socially constructed influences beliefs about the type of political systems that can best ameliorate conflict along ethnic lines'.[226]

For the primordialist approach, ethnicity is taken as 'a fixed characteristic of individuals and communities'.[227] An essential extension of the bond that unites kinship, ethnicity is inescapable and inevitable in the sense that 'ethnic group identities flow from an extended kinship bond, sharing common behaviours and transmitting across generations basic norms

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twentieth century, many social theorists held that ethnicity and nationalism would decrease in importance and eventually vanish as a result of modernisation, industrialisation and individualism. On the contrary, ethnicity and nationalism have grown in political importance in the world, particularly since the Second World War. Thirty-five of the thirty-seven major armed conflicts in the world in 1991 were internal conflicts, and most of them- from Sri Lanka to Northern Ireland- could plausibly be described as ethnic conflicts'. Thomas Hylland Eriksen. Op. Cit. p.2.

[223] Center for Systemic Peace. Op. Cit., p.2.

[224] Following Jung *et al*, the increased attention devoted to ethnicity in recent years does not imply agreement on the definition of the phenomenon. As these authors point out, 'The slogan 'ethnic conflict' is an inexact expression. It seems that neither anthropology nor any other human science has developed a scientific usable definition of 'ethnicity', so all groups can be covered by this term, linguistic groups as well as groups of common descent or religious communities'. Jung, Dietrich with Klaus Schlite and Jens Siegelberg. 'Ongoing Wars and their Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.60. For an up-to-date bibliographical list of literature on ethnic conflict see Timothy D Sisk. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996; and the bibliographies in Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1994 and especially Michael Brown (Ed), Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1993.

[225] See *Inter alia,* Pierre van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon, Elsevier, New York, 1981.

[226] Timothy D Sisk. Op. Cit. p.13.

[227] David Lake and Donald Rothchild. 'Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Global Conflict', in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Eds), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998. The primordialist approach is developed by, among others: Harold Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Harper and Row, New York, 1975; Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, St Martin's Press, New York, 1993 and Anthony D Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Basil Blackwell, New York, 1986.

and customs, or ethnic culture'.[228] This leads authors within the primordialist approach to consider that ethnic identity is a distinct and superior form of identity. The consequences of such an approach as regards the development of the 'ethnic conflict type' are powerful: ethnic conflicts become a very specific type of conflicts whose characteristics are typically not relevant to other social, political, or economic conflicts. Taking ethnic divisions as inevitable, rooted in inherited biological traits and reinforced by centuries of past practice now beyond the ability of individuals or groups to alter, the primordialist approach sees 'conflict as flowing from ethnic differences and, therefore, not necessarily in need of explanation'.[229] This is because, for primordialists, 'few other attributes of individuals or communities are fixed in the same way as ethnicity or are necessarily as conflictual'.[230] The link between ethnic groups and territory is an often cited example of the specific nature of ethnic conflict. In this regard, Stuart Hall considers that identity becomes a crucial variable relating to contemporary forms of political movements by its 'pivotal relationship to a politics of location'. [231]

At the opposing end of the spectrum, the instrumentalist view approaches ethnic identity in a very different light. Far from primordial, ethnicity is here conceptualised as 'a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites to obtain some larger, typically material end'.[232] According to Timothy Sisk, instrumentalists argue that ethnic identities,

> ...wax and wane, contingent on a wide variety of variables, including the capacity and skills of political entrepreneurs who can effectively mobilise groups for collective aims and articulate beliefs about common ancestry and destiny...some instrumentalists (alternatively known as structuralists) suggest that ethnic identity is socially constructed, often created or de-emphasised by power-seeking political elites in historically determined economic and social arrangements.[233]

The instrumentalisation of identity by actors (the basic tenet of instrumentalist approaches) presupposes that more than an immutable factor, identity is amenable for social construction, manipulation and is therefore influenced by the same patterns that characterise group mobilisation at other levels and for different purposes.[234] In fact, as Vivienne Jabri points out,

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[228] Anthony D Smith, 'The Sources of Ethnic Nationalism', in Michael Brown (Ed), Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1993, as cited in Timothy D Sisk. Ibid. p.120.

[229] David Lake and Donald Rothchild. Op. Cit.

[230] Ibid.

[231] Stuart Hall & Paul du Gay. Questions of Cultural Identity. SAGE Publications. London. 1996

[232] David Lake and Donald Rothchild. 'Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Global Conflict', Op. cit. The instrumentalist approach is used by, *inter alia*, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1975; Donald Rothchild, 'InterEthnic Conflict and Policy Analysis in Africa', in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 9, Number 1, January 1986 and Paul Brass (Ed), Ethnic Groups and the State, Croom-Helm, London, 1985.

[233] Timothy D Sisk. Op. cit. p.12.

[234] Instrumentalist approaches to identity do not attempt to make any distinction between ethnic identity and other types of identities, for example political affiliations. For instrumentalists, ethnic identity or ethnicity becomes a 'label or set of symbolic ties that is used for political advantage' being no different from interest groups or political party affiliation. This assumption allows for comparison and lesson learning to other types of conflicts. David Lake and Donald Rothchild. 'Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Global

identity is the essential link between the individual and mass mobilisation for conflict, whether it is identity with the group, community or state where representatives decide on the use of force as a means of handling conflict.[235]

Moreover, identity and particularly its relation to the eruption of so-called 'ethnic conflicts' is best understood halfway between primordialism and instrumentalism. In fact, as Sisk points out, 'analysts of ethnic conflict increasingly agree that the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches to ethnic identities are not mutually exclusive and can in fact be describing different sides of the same coin'.[236] In this sense, by conceptualising ethnic identity as both primordialist and instrumentalist we are better placed to understand its role, importance, development and dynamic nature in armed conflict situations. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, such an approach questions notions such as 'root causes' and 'ancient hatreds' that often appear collated to the explanation of 'ethnic conflict'.

Nevertheless, is it theoretically possible to simultaneously include elements of both primordialism and instrumentalism in the analysis of ethnic identity and by extension ethnic conflict? In fact, the question of whether ethnicity is primordial or instrumental or if it is both may be approached through the lenses provided by the so-called 'structurationist approach'. This theoretical tool as suggested by, *inter alia*, Anthony Giddens argues that there is a constitutive duality between social agents and social structures in that 'the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and outcome of the practices which constitute those systems'.[237] In this sense, social structures (i.e. ethnic groups) are conceptualised as inseparable from the very activities of their agents, becoming not the rigid metaphysical entities that orthodox primordialists claim but structures that are inherently discursive and dynamic.

Conflict'. The authors add that 'if politisised ethnicity is not inherently different than other forms of political manipulation, ethnic conflict should not necessarily be different than other conflicts based on interest or ideology'.

[235] Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996. In this respect, Jung *et al* point out that 'cases such as the war in the Chittagong Hills (Bangladesh) or the war on the Philippine Island of Mindanao clearly illustrate that conflicts are fought under the guise of cultural differences whereas the causes of these conflicts are much more complex. The economic marginalisation of regions- perceived by inhabitants as internal colonialism- political manipulation and the absence of functioning political systems promote the ethnic interpretation of social conflicts. However, wars do not break out merely because there are different ethnic groups'. Jung, Dietrich with Klaus Schlite and Jens Siegelberg. 'Ongoing Wars and their Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.61.

[236] Timothy D Sisk. Op. Cit. p.13.

[237] Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979, p.69. For a in-depth development of this theory see also Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1984; Alexander E. Wendt, in 'The agent-structure problem in international relations theory', International Organisation, 41, 3, summer 1987.

Within the field of International Relations, the structurationist approach is strongly identified with the work of Alexander Wendt[238] while in Conflict Research the pioneering application of structurationism to conflict analysis is the product of Vivienne Jabri in her book 'Discourses on Violence'.[239] For our purposes here, it is precisely in the relationship between actors, their discourses as well as their actions that the question of identity and therefore of ethnic identity recurs. If identity and by extension ethnic identity is above all characterised by opposition or difference, meaning that *my* identity (ies) is (are) formed in opposition to what it is (are) not, we must locate the understanding of this type of agency through the practices that constitute and reinforce such interpretations.[240]

What the above implies is that the focus of enquiry should not be towards an uncritical and transparent notion of the 'ethnic group' (the subject) as the author of social practice (for our purposes 'ethnic conflict'). Nevertheless, it should not imply the abandonment or abolition of the ethnic group as a subject.[241] This is particularly relevant in conflict analysis because it allows for a dynamic interpretation of events and is particularly useful in terms of understanding the formation and evolution of conflict groups through patterns of mobilisation.

The above discussion makes clear that 'constructivist' approaches such as those proposed by Sisk and Lake and Rothchild are rooted in structuration theory. In fact, the latter conclude that 'ethnicity is not something that can be decided upon by individuals at will, like other political affiliations, but is embedded within and controlled by the larger society' and therefore it can only be understood within a 'relational framework'.[242] This takes us closer to Timothy Sisk's idea of ethnic identity as both an individual's primary ontological need while at the

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[238] Alexander E. Wendt, in 'The agent-structure problem in international relations theory', International Organisation, 41, 3, summer 1987. According to Wendt, the structurationist approach tries to avoid the negative consequences of what he terms the individualistic approach' rejection of generative structures as metaphysical (which we can easily equate to the primordialist approach to ethnic conflict); and on the other hand, it differentiates itself from Structuralist approaches on the grounds that 'social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they govern'.

[239] For an in-depth discussion of structuration theory and its application to conflict see Vivienne Jabri, 'A Structuration Theory of Conflict', in Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.54-90.

[240] Timothy Sisk points out interestingly that 'what is most important is not whether ethnic group identity is innate and fixed or contrive and manipulable, it is that members of an ethnic group *perceive* [sic] the ethnic group to be real (Esman1994; Stavenhagen 1994). Perceptions are critical in understanding the extent to which intergroup relations can be peaceful or violent'. Timothy D Sisk. Op. Cit. p.13.

[241] If one followed this route how would for example Kenyan politics be explained? According to Stuart Hall, 'the discursive approach sees identification as a construction, a process never completed- always in process. It is not determined in the sense that it can always be won or lost, sustained or abandoned. Though not without its determinate conditions of existence, including the material and symbolic resources required to sustain it, identification is in the end conditional, lodged in contingency. Once secured it does not obliterate difference.... The total merging it suggests is, in fact, a fantasy of incorporation...Like all signifying practices, it is subject to the play of *différance*. It obeys the logic of more than one. And since as a process it operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of "frontier effects". It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process'. As cited in Stuart Hall, 'Who needs Identity?', in Questions of Cultural Identity, Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (Eds), SAGE Publications, London 1996.

[242] David Lake and Donald Rothchild. 'Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Global Conflict', Op. cit. For a discussion of the relational approach see, among others, Milton Esman, Ethnic Politics, Cornell university Press, Ithaca, 1994.

same time a constructed, strategic and positional one. Furthermore, 'ethnicity is multifaceted and fluid' in that 'not only may any single individual possess more than one identity characteristic, but the boundaries of group identity can change dramatically over time'.[243]

Nevertheless, for the purposes of critically discussing the 'ethnic conflict type' two critical questions remain unanswered. The first regards the operation, or in other words, the processes by which identities and in particular ethnic identities are formed. The second regards the patterns of inter-ethnic group relations and more specifically the ways in which ethnic identities are mobilised towards violent conflict.

In the formation of identity and in particular ethnic identity discourse plays a fundamental role. In fact, Foucault's psychoanalysis had emphasised the fact that subjects are eminently produced through and within discourses that determine their positions through so-called rules of formation. In this regard, Stuart Hall considers that Foucault's introduction of aspects of power in the formation of identity (his shift from an archaeological to a genealogical method) and the consequent conceptualisation of discourse itself as a regulative and regulated formation, brings us closer to understanding how subjects are constituted in historically specific discursive practices and normative self regulations. [244] But does this mean that the formation of ethnic identity is an ostensibly ad-hoc and case specific process or are we able to find general patterns across cases?

In this regard, Judith Butler makes a powerful case that *all* identities operate through exclusion, through a discourse that constructs an outside that ultimately is fundamental in constituting the self.[245] This author considers that,

> ...identifications belong to the imaginary; they are phantasmatic efforts of alignment, loyalty, ambiguous and cross corporeal cohabitions, they unsettle the I; they are the sedimentation of the We in the constitution of any I, the structuring present of alterity in the very formulation of the I. Identifications are never fully and finally made; they are incessantly reconstituted, and as such, are subject to the volatile logic of iterability. They are that which is constantly marshalled, consolidated, retrenched, contested and on occasion, compelled to give way.[246]

Using Abrams and Hogg's social identity theory Vivienne Jabri adds that an individual's social identity is in fact constructed through comparison with other individuals and groups, the individual's desire for positive self-evaluation providing the motive for differentiation between

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[243] Timothy D Sisk. Op. Cit. p.13.

[244] As cited in Stuart Hall, 'Who needs Identity?', in Questions of Cultural Identity, Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (Eds), SAGE Publications, London 1996.

[245] See Judith Butler, Gender and Trouble, 1990 and also Bodies That Matter, 1993.

[246] Judith Butler, Gender and Trouble, 1990.

the in-group and the out-group.[247] This differentiation between self and other has early origins in the life cycle of the individual and provides the basis of social differentiation in later social interaction.[248] Hence, in direct opposition to the ways they are constantly involved, identities are constructed through, not outside difference, entailing the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the other that the positive meaning of identity can be constructed. In this sense, the unity which primordialists treat as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure.[249] Moreover, such processes of 'construction' relate to the invention of tradition as much as to tradition itself.[250] In this regard, Gellner's definition of nationalism as being 'not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness...but [that it] invents nations where they do not exist' is famously re-written by Benedict Anderson who replaces the word invention (i.e. fabrication) with the word 'imagining' and 'creation' to demonstrate that these processes are not necessarily 'false'.[251] In this sense, the cultural continuity with the past which is emphasised by ethnic ideologists and national historians is not all make believe and manipulative invention of the past.

As in all other forms of identity, 'ethnic groups' develop through contact and interrelationship, to the extent that Bateson has considered that 'to speak of an ethnic group in isolation is as absurd as to speak of the sound from one hand clapping'.[252] Because 'ethnicity' comes about through group contact with each other and 'ethnic groups' must entertain ideas of each other

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[247] D. Abrams and M. A. Hogg (eds), Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances, as cited in Vivienne Jabri, Op. Cit., p.124.

[248] According to Tajfel and his colleagues, individuals compare and evaluate the groups to which they belong, striving for positive evaluation of their own group- and of themselves, as members of that group. Interaction is extremely important and contingent since agents monitor the identities they negotiate in social interaction. Tajfel. Differentiation between Social Groups, 1978 as cited in Peter Du Preez. Op. cit.

[249] Because of this, identities are never singular but multiple; never unified but fractured. Because they arise from the narrativisation of the self, language becomes a central component in the production and reproduction of identity. The necessarily but somewhat fictional nature of these processes in no way undermines their discursive, material or political effectivity, even if the belongingness is partly in the imaginary as well as the symbolic.

[250] In a similar way nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and by implication it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders. The distinguishing mark of nationalism is by definition its relationship to the state. A nationalist holds that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not demand command over a state. When the political leaders of an ethnic movement make demands to this effect, the ethnic movement therefore by definition becomes a nationalist movement. Benedict Anderson definition of nation as an 'imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign' stresses that nations are ideological constructions seeking to forge a link between the self-defined cultural group and the state, and that they create abstract communities of a different order from those dynastic states or kinship based communities which pre-date them. For an in-depth discussion of the issue of nationalism and ethnicity refer to *inter alia*, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London, 1983,1991; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1983. See also Anthony D Smith, Theories of Nationalism, Duckworth, London, 1983; Anthony D Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. For an initial discussion of nationalism in former colonial regions see, among others, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A derivative discourse?, Zed Books, N.J., 1986 and also Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 4th Edition, 1994.

[251] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London, 1983,1991, p.6.

[252] Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: a necessary unity. Glasgow, Fontana, 1979, p. 78, as cited in Thomas Hylland Eriksen. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives. Pluto Press, London, 1993, p.9.

as being different, ethnicity is in fact an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group.[253] But if this is the case where should we draw the boundary between ethnic groups and other groups?

Manning Nash has proposed as the lowest common denominators for all ethnic groups the metaphors of 'bed, blood and cult' in that ethnic groups consider themselves as biologically self-perpetuating and endogamous, have an ideology of shared ancestry and have a shared religion.[254] The definition of ethnic group proposed by Timothy Sisk leads us to consider that these groups are mobilised on the basis of identity based on shared perceptions of common origin that may be built around religion, culture, language, race or caste. Nevertheless, Thomas Eriksen warns that it is 'misleading to state simply that ethnic groups are identical with cultural groups and that shared culture is the basis of ethnic identity'.[255] Therefore, it may be misleading to state simply that shared culture is the basis of ethnic identity.

In fact, arguing against those anthropologists who identify ethnic groups with cultural units, Frederik Barth stressed that such definitions of the ethnic group assume that boundary maintenance is unproblematic and may imply racial and cultural difference, social separation and language barriers, in a word, spontaneous and organised enmity.[256] A focus on the cultural uniqueness of ethnic groups wrongly presupposes cultural coherence or in other words the existence of such a thing as a definable cultural unit. To this respect, in a recent book on the relationship between culture and agency, Margaret Archer points to the *'myth of cultural integration'*,

> ...One of the most deep-seated fallacies in social science...[the] assumption of a high degree of consistency in the interpretations produced by societal units.[257]

Accordingly, this myth is responsible for an archetype of culture defined as 'the perfectly woven and all-enmeshing web, perfectly integrated as a system and in which every element was interdependent with every other'. Archer provides a powerful critic of traditional anthropology's concept of culture as an integrated whole composed of strong and coherent patterning[258] and considers that a commitment in advance to cultural coherence,

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[253] Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (Eds), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1975, p.1 as cited in Thomas Hylland Eriksen. Op. cit. p.12.

[254] Manning Nash, The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1988.

[255] Thomas Hylland Eriksen. Op. Cit. p.36.

[256] Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press, 1969.

[257] Margaret S Archer. Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.2.

[258] For an in-depth discussion of this issue refer to Margaret S Archer. Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

> ...blinds us to the possibility that social change may occur through the replacement of an inconsistent doctrine or ethic by a better one, or through a more consistent application of either. It equally blinds us to the possibility of, for instance, social control through the employment of absurd, ambiguous, inconsistent or unintelligible doctrines.[259]

In this sense, a critical approach to culture *per se* is consistent with the constructivist approach to identity and by extension 'ethnic identity'. In this regard, Clifford Geertz's concept of culture, for example, critically separates concrete behavioural patterns (the observable 'stuff' of culture: customs, usages, traditions, language, habit clusters) from the set of control mechanisms for the governing of behaviour. And in fact, Geertz considers this set of control mechanisms to be themselves *Culture.* As he says,

> ... believing with Max Weber that Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning.[260]

But what does it mean? Perhaps the concept of 'world view' might clarify this issue. According to Mary E. Clark, culture is first of all a world-view, meaning that the same, identical set of information will be interpreted and stored differently by persons from different cultures and that therefore,

> ...none is necessarily wrong in any scientific sense; each holds part of what is "out there" in reality, but they are different snapshots of that reality, emphasising different parts of it, and valuing those parts in different degrees. [261]

By separating concrete behavioural patterns from the set of control mechanisms for the governing of behaviour, the human behaviour aspect of culture becomes essentially symbolic action. If culture is the internal mapping of external information, where language, art or technology, myth or ritual, customs and traditions act as symbolic action, 'the analysis of such forms and such communities is ingredient to interpreting it, not ancillary'. This is what Geertz refers to as thinking ethnographically: describing the world in which it makes whatever sense it makes. Consequently, faced with a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures (superimposed, knotted into one another, strange, irregular and inexplicit) the ethnographer and by extension the conflict researcher must above all interpret behaviour. In this way,

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[259] Ernest Gellner. 'Concepts and Society', in Rationality, Bryan R. Wilson (Ed), Oxford, Blackwell, 1979, p.36.

[260] Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures, London, Fontana, 1993. This author adds that 'man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms and since our central nervous system grew up in interaction with these control mechanisms, it is incapable of directing our behaviour or organising our experience without the guidance provided by them...such symbols are thus not mere expressions, instrumentalities, or correlates of our biological, psychological and social existence; they are prerequisites of it'.

[261] According to Mary E. Clark's interesting remarks, 'World Views are the basis of cultures. It is now widely agreed that cognition involves the internal mapping of external information, and this mapping process is an abstraction. Since we cannot possibly deal with all the information impinging upon our senses, we necessarily select what we choose to store. From this selective process, over time, we build up an interpretation of our environment'. Clark, Mary E. 'Symptoms of Cultural Pathologies', in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, Dennis and Hugo van der Merwe (Eds), Manchester University Press, 1993, p.44. p.45.

ethnography becomes the interpretation of social discourse taken in its most general way, 'the interpreting involved consists of trying to rescue the said of such discourse from its perishing occasions and fix it in perusable terms'.[262]

As a result it becomes crucial that the conflict researcher critically analyses situations that may be described by participants or outsiders as 'ethnic conflicts'. This entails understanding that although a basic human need, identity is to an extent fluid, malleable, constructed and negotiable. It also entails understanding the discourses that reinforce claims by 'ethnic groups' of cultural coherence resulting in the fact that, in armed conflicts where an ethnic element is present, everyone is automatically labelled a combatant simply by belonging to one ethnic group or another. As Lake and Rothchild posit 'while ethnicity is robust, the turn to violence still needs to be explained'. [263]

A critical and constructivist approach to ethnicity and ethnic conflict must therefore problematise ethnic groups and their boundaries as ontologically critical for the individual but essentially a social product and a social construction. In fact, in Abner Cohen's political perspective on ethnic group formation we find that because social interaction and organisation are essentially dual phenomena (comprising aspects of utility and aspects of meaning) ethnicity is essentially an organisational form, which exploits this duality for particular ends. Ethnic ideology has an immediate appeal because it offers answers to the questions of origins, destiny and ultimately the meaning of life. However, ethnicity must also have a practical function in order to be viable: a particular form of informal political organisation where cultural boundaries are invoked so that the group's resources or symbolic capital can be secured.[264] In fact, this approach is coincident with that of Ted Gurr who adds an economic element by considering that while cultural identity may be stronger and more enduring than most other collective identities (i.e. ideological or class), it is most likely to provide the basis for political mobilisation and conflict when it provides the basis for invidious distinctions among peoples (inequalities among cultural groups in status, economic well-being, access to political power), that are deliberately maintained through public policy and social practice.[265]

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[262] Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures, London, Fontana, 1993. Furthermore, clinical inference, a method proposed by Geertz, relies on a set of signifiers (symbolic acts) and attempts to place them within an intelligible frame. This doesn't mean that it is necessary to create *a* priori definitions, or to depart with the need for generalisations across cases. It is true that clinical inference seems more plausible as an ethnography method than any deductive method which begins with a set of observations and attempting to subsume them under a governing law. The primordial objective is describing a certain culture by doing thick description therefore by trying to describe symbols within the context they appear in.

[263] David Lake and Donald Rothchild. Op. Cit. They add that 'constructivist accounts of ethnic conflict are generalisable, but only to other conflicts that are also based on socially constructed groups and cleavages. This includes clan, religious, regionalist, or nationalist groupings but excludes class and other material-interest based conflicts more likely founded on individual attributes.

[264] Abner Cohen, Two Dimensional Man, Tavistok, London, 1974.

This aetiological conflict type must be therefore put into perspective and critically evaluated. As David Lake and Donald Rothchild point out,

> ...Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, 'ancient hatreds' and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy. Nor did the Cold War simply uncork ethnic passions long bottled up by repressive communist regimes. Despite their widespread acceptance in the current political debate, poor diagnoses such as these lead to equally poor prescriptions...by itself, ethnicity is not a cause of violent conflict...[266]

In conclusion, the discussion above seriously questions the widely held view that contemporary armed conflicts, the vast majority of which are internal, are 'ethnic conflicts' driven by 'ancient hatreds'. In fact, although such an approach may be pervasive, it is simplistic and ultimately unsatisfying. It surely is the case that historical grievances, long-standing feelings of resentment coupled with deep-seated desires for revenge have played important roles in many armed conflicts that have raged in the post-Cold War world- namely, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, many other groups- Ukrainians and Russians, Czechs and Slovaks, French-speaking and English - speaking Canadians, Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand - have historical grievances, ethnic grudges, and less than benign images of each other, but they have abstained from killing each other in large numbers.[267]

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[265] Ted Robert Gurr. 'Minorities, Nationalists and Ethnopolitical Conflict', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.63. To this regard Peter Worsley considers that 'cultural traits are not absolutes or simply intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide identities which legitimise claims to rights. They are strategies or weapons in competitions over scarce social goods'. As cited in Thomas Hylland Eriksen. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. Pluto Press, London, 1993.

[266] David Lake and Donald Rothchild. 'Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Global Conflict', Op. cit. Timothy Sisk also refers to the role of leaders in the following terms: 'a common thread that runs through most analysis of ethnic conflict is the presence and role of ethnic entrepreneurs, political leaders who articulate beliefs in kinship bonds and common destiny and who mobilise and organise groups to press group claims. Ethnic entrepreneurs may be perceived as benign interest aggregators that serve a critical representative function, or as manipulative and exploitative power seekers that mobilise on ethnic themes for their own individual aggrandisement'. Timothy D Sisk. Op. Cit. p.17.

[267] See to this regard Michael E. Brown. 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p. 573.

3.2. Resource Wars? The 'Greed versus Grievance' debate

> **Grievance**: *n.* a real or fancied cause for complaint.
> **Greed**: *n.* intensive or excessive desire, especially for food or wealth.[268]
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> ...at what point does the proliferation of 'hunches' add confusion or avoid critical issues in the field? Does yet another study that finds some statistically significant relationship between ecological [i.e. attribute and relational] variables and the incidence or some other characteristic of war help develop theory?...for the most part, the causes of war...remain as obscure as ever. Modern research has left a trail of uncertainty, partial clues, contradiction, and continued mystery...[269]
>
> ...the age is forever searching for the philosopher's stone, the magic formula, which, mechanically applied, will produce the desired result and thus substitute for the uncertainties and risks of political action the certitude of rational calculation. Since, however, what the seekers after the magic formula want is simple, rational, mechanical, and what they have to deal with is complicated, irrational, incalculable, they are compelled...to simplify the reality of international politics and to develop what one might call the 'method of the single cause'.[270]

At the other end of the aetiological spectrum a number of recent studies have sought to portray contemporary wars as driven essentially by economic agendas, particularly those conflicts in the developing world. As Jakkie Cilliers points out, although not exclusively so, this approach has been collated into that of 'resource-wars' and is sometimes put forward as reflecting a 'new' type of war.[271] While the role of resources on the on-set and continuation of violent conflicts has been the object of study for many decades, until recently studies have for the most part centred on the role played by scarcity or relative scarcity of resources as prime triggers of violence, both at the individual as well as the collective level. Yet, recent studies have focused on resource appropriation *per se* as the fundamental underlying cause of a vast number of present day conflicts, in radical opposition to a so-called 'grievance' approach, which as the one discussed in the last sub-section, would highlight issues of identity and self-determination as underlying the occurrence of contemporary wars.

A strand of the 'resource-war' hypothesis has recently become known as the 'greed theory' of conflict, giving rise to the so-called 'greed versus grievance debate' and the development of a 'resource-war' conflict type. Moreover, 'greed theory' has been the product of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler.[272] The 'greed versus grievance' debate finds its originality and current

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[268] Oxford Reference English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1995, 1996.

[269] Kalevi Holsti, 'Ecological and Clausewitzian Approaches to the Study of War: Assessing the possibilities', Paper presented at the 30th Anniversary Comvention of the International Studies Association, London, 1989.

[270] Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs Power Politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.95 cited in Dennis J. D. Sandole. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era.Pinter, London and New York, 1999, p.7.

[271] Jakkie Cilliers. 'Resource Wars- a new type of insurgency', in Angola's War Economy. The Role Of Oil and Diamonds, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p.2.

[272] For a collection of Paul Collier's articles, as well as access to the World Bank's Policy Research Project entitled 'The Causes of Civil War, Crime and Violence' refer to <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/civil.htm>. See the very interesting collection of essays in Mats Berdal and D Malone (Eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO, 2000 in particular I de Soysa's article 'The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?'. See also M Berdal and D Keen, 'Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil

popularity on the fact that it is centring on the role that resources, by and of themselves, play as the main objectives of groups engaged in civil war, in clear opposition to so called traditional 'grievance' approaches.[273] Groups engaged in violent conflict would therefore not be primarily motivated by grievance of any sort (i.e. ethnic discrimination or historical animosities) but essentially driven by economic agendas and therefore by greed. In its original formulation, Collier *et al* defined the 'greed hypothesis' in the following terms,

> ...the discourse on conflict tends to be dominated by group grievances beneath which inter-group hatreds lurk, often traced back through history. I have investigated statistically the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict since 1965, expecting to find a close relationship between measures of these hatreds and grievances and the incidence of conflict. Instead, I found that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil wars get going. Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance.[274]

The 'greed hypothesis' was first developed in a January 1998 paper entitled 'On the Economic Causes of Civil Wars'.[275] Collier and Hoeffler use a model based on expected-utility theory under the premise that 'rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion'.[276] Using statistical regression methods to test four independent variables (per capita income, natural resource endowment, population size and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation) the authors found that 'higher per capita income reduces the duration of civil war and the probability of its occurrence' and that the predicted duration of civil war is found to be much shorter if income is higher. This leads them to conclude that 'civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low income countries'.[277]

Wars: Some Policy Implications', in Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol 26, no 3, p.795-818. Another interesting perspective on 'resource wars' can be found in J Fairhead, 'The Conflict over Natural and Environmental Resources, in The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies: War and Displacement id Developing Countries, EW Wayne, F Stewart and R Vayrynen (Eds), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. Also D Keen, 'Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars', in International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No 320, Oxford University Press, 1998. Also see the already quoted Dietrich Jung with Klaus Schlite and Jens Siegelberg. 'Ongoing Wars and their Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.50-63.

[273] The proposition is that groups engaged in civil wars (i.e. rebel organisations) have as their main objective the capture of resources in resource-abundant situations. This approach finds its resonance in contemporary analysis of conflicts in resource-rich countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

[274] Paul Collier. Doing Well out of War, Paper prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London April 26-27 1999. The World Bank, 'The Economics of Crime and Violence' Project, Washington DC, April 10, 1999, p.1. <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/econagenda.htm>

[275] It should be pointed out that in this article the authors do not conceptualise or define a 'resource-war' type as such but solely investigate 'whether civil wars have economic causes'. Nevertheless this article represents Collier's early expression of what later became known as the 'greed hypothesis'.

[276] Not dissimilar to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility theory. Methodologically, as was previously pointed out, the authors use statistical and probabilistic analysis (mainly probit and tobit regressions) and claim that the results obtained through these methods support and confirm the assertion that economic agendas are central to the origins and continuance of many civil wars. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. On Economic Causes of Civil War, The World Bank, 'The Economics of Crime and Violence' Project, Washington DC, January 1998. <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/cw-cause.htm>. Also published in Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 1998, p.563-73. p.0.

[277] In this sense, 'the higher is per capita income on an internationally comparable measure, the lower is the risk of civil war'. The authors interpret this 'as being due to the effect of higher income on the opportunity cost of rebellion'. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. On Economic Causes of Civil War. p.7,9.

As regards natural resources, the authors concluded that 'the possession of natural resources initially increases the duration and the risk of civil war but then reduces it'. This is interpreted as being 'due to the taxable base of the economy constituting an attraction for rebels wishing to capture the state'. On the other hand, a high level of natural resources diminishes the probability of war due to the enhanced financial capability of the government and hence 'its ability to defend itself through military expenditure'.[278] In terms of population size, the authors found that 'countries with larger populations have higher risks of war and these wars last longer'. Nevertheless, while in large population countries the risk may be a function of a desire for secession, one should bear in mind that according to the model, population size also affects rebel movements' coordination costs. Therefore the effect of population size is said to be 'ambiguous'.[279]

Finally, as concerns ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, Collier and Hoeffler found 'perhaps our most interesting result'.[280] Contrary to popular and academic perceptions, the effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation is said not to be necessarily conflict enhancing in that 'highly fractionalised societies are no more prone to war than highly homogeneous ones'. In fact, the risk of civil war 'arises when the society is polarised into two groups' because polarised societies have around a 50% higher probability of civil war than either homogeneous or highly fractionalised societies.[281] In conclusion, Collier and Hoeffler claim that 'between them, these four variables make a substantial difference to the chances of civil war' and that they 'investigated several other variables but found the above formulation to be robust'.[282]

These conclusions were crystallised by Collier into the 'greed hypothesis' put forward in a later paper entitled 'Doing Well out of War',

> ...discussion of civil conflict is dominated by the narrative of grievance....The evidence on the causes of conflict does not really support this interpretation. The objective factors which might contribute to grievance, such as income and asset inequality, ethnic and religious divisions, and political repression do not seem to increase the risks of conflict....the evidence on the causes of conflict points to economic factors as the main drivers of conflict. The combination of large exports of primary commodities, low education, a high proportion of young men and economic decline between them drastically increase risks. Greed seems more important than grievance... [283] [284]

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[278] Ibid. p.7, 9.

[279] Ibid. p.7, 9.

[280] The authors measure ethnic diversity through the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation which measures the probability of two randomly drawn people being from different ethnic groups developed originally in the Atlas Naradov Mira, Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR, Moscow, 1964.

[281] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. On Economic Causes of Civil War. p.7, 8.

[282] Ibid. p.8, 9.

[283] Paul Collier. Doing Well out of War, Paper prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London April 26-27 1999. The World Bank, 'The Economics of Crime and Violence' Project, Washington DC, April 10, 1999, p.14. <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/econagenda.htm>

With these words, the 'greed versus grievance' debate began. The possible effects of 'grievance' were statistically put to the test. Grievance was tested through the following independent variables: rapid economic decline, inequality, political repression, political transition and finally ethnic and religious fractionalisation. Collier found that a 'prior period of rapid economic decline increases the risk of conflict' in that 'growth gives hope, while rapid decline may galvanise people into action'. A significant finding was that 'inequality, whether measured in terms of income or land ownership, has no effect on the risk of conflict'.[285] As concerns political repression, the results were ambiguous. Collier found that a fully democratic society is safer than a partial democracy but that these effects are moderate and only slightly significant. However, political transitions increase the risk of conflict. As regards ethnic and religious fractionalisation, the same results as above were confirmed. Collier's conclusions were as ground-breaking as they were controversial. In his words,

> ...*the grievance theory of conflict thus finds surprisingly little empirical support*. Inequality does not seem to matter, while political repression and ethnic and religious divisions have precisely the opposite of their predicted effects...rebellions based purely on grievance face such severe collective action problems that the basic theories of social science would predict that they are unlikely to occur... [my emphasis].[286]

In terms of measuring a 'greed' factor, Collier considers that it must entail more than just asking belligerents their reasons for fighting because 'those rebel organisations which are sufficiently successful to get noticed are unlikely to be so naive as to admit to greed as a motive'.[287] This is due to the fact that 'narratives of grievance play much better with this [the international] community than narratives of greed'. Nevertheless, a narrative of grievance by itself can serve a rebel organisation in attracting more people and new recruits. This leads to the conclusion that 'even where the rationale at the top of the organisation is essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievance'. Because of this, the approach taken to measure 'grievance' relies not on public statements by rebel leaders (for example) but on the inference of 'motivations from patterns of observed behaviour' in order to 'determine patterns in the origins of civil war, distinguishing between those causal factors which are broadly consistent with an economic motivation, and those which are more consistent with grievance'.

The measurement of 'greed' is then refined to include the weight of primary commodity exports in a country's gross domestic product as an independent variable in its own right.

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[284] Ibid. p.14.

[285] Nevertheless, the author points out that inequality is obviously related to economic growth and therefore an indicator to bear in mind. Paul Collier. Doing Well out of War. p.5.

[286] Paul Collier. Doing Well out of War. p.6, 11.

[287] Paul Collier. Op. cit. p.1-2.

Collier found that the 'presence of primary commodity exports massively increases the risks of civil conflict'.[288] In addition, the cost of attracting recruits to rebellion are measured in terms of both the 'proportion of young men in the society' as well as the 'endowment of education'.[289] In this regard, while a high proportion of young men increases the risk of conflict, 'if we double the proportion of young men its effect can be offset by increasing the average educational endowment by around two months'. In fact, 'each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by around 20%'.[290] This leads to the conclusion that,

> ...the greed-based approach to conflict would argue that it is the underlying economic conditions which create the risk of conflict. Some societies will have repeated conflicts, not because of the cumulative legacy of the desire for vengeance, but because war is profitable for some groups.[291]

In fact, although the costs of civil wars on an economy are particularly high (on average as much as a 2.2% decline in growth per annum), there are a number of possibilities for enrichment and profit allowing 'various identifiable groups [to] do well out of war'.[292] There are several cases where this may happen: war enhances the opportunistic character in business affecting business practices; it increases criminality, affecting 'asset-holding' and forcing people to send their assets abroad; markets become disrupted, information is unreliable and costly and as a result competition breaks down, leaving only a small number of economic agents to monopolise entire sectors of the economy usually in a predatory fashion. There is also the problem of increased rent-seeking predation on trade both from rebels and government officials.

Expected-utility theory as applied to this particular focus of research stems from the proposition that rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion as was previously mentioned. First, it should be emphasised that this is not the first time that expected-utility has been used in the field of conflict research.[293] The extensive

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[288] For example, 'a country which is heavily dependent upon primary commodity exports, with a quarter of its national income coming from them, has a risk of conflict four times greater than one without primary commodity exports'. Ibid. p.5.

[289] Paul Collier. Doing Well out of War. p.5.

[290] Ibid. p.5.

[291] Paul Collier. Doing Well out of War. p.6, 11.

[292] Paul Collier. Op. cit. p.6.

[293] The earlier expression of expected utility analysis stems from Von Neumman and Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour , Princeton University Press, 1944. As pointed out by Michael Nicholson in 'The Conceptual Bases of the War Trap, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No.2, June 1987, p.357, 'these authors demonstrated a set of postulates about behaviour which if followed would mean that actors behave in circumstances of risk as if they were maximising the expected value of some defined concept of utility'. Expected-utility theory as regards the occurrence of war was developed by Bueno de Mesquita in his The War Trap, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981. Further reading on this issue may be found in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 'A Catch to Moul's Catch, or Why Great Powers Act as Expected by Utility Maximisers', International Interactions, 13 (2), 1987, p.177-181; also in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 'The War Trap Revisited', American Political Science Review', 1986. Also R. H. Harrison, 'War and Expected Utility Theory', World Politics, 40, 1, 1984.

literature on the evaluation of expected-utility theory as regards armed conflict and war provides powerful arguments against over reliance on this theory.[294] A strong argument against it is that at the root of expected-utility theory is the rational-choice model of decision-making. As was demonstrated by Thomas Schelling in his seminal book 'Strategy of Conflict', rationality is a very ambiguous concept, something which can easily be attested in such game-theory exercises as 'chicken' or the 'prisoners dilemma', where conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information abound.[295] Recognising the limits of the rationality assumption, the majority of empirical research in the study of conflict has adopted a 'modified rational actor model'. According to Vivienne Jabri,

> ...it is 'modified' since it incorporates subjective expected utilities, recognising the potential diversity of conflict goals which may range from the economic to the ideological, and of subjective probabilities influenced by misperceptions, information distortion and ideological biases...Such factors as misunderstood signals, perceived changes in the balance of advantage between the protagonists, prior relationships, and the input of allies and interested others could, either singly or in combination, influence the course of a conflict and behaviour therein.[296]

A 'cognitive rationality' approach would seem to be more adequate to the analysis of violent conflicts in that it incorporates 'the nature of preferences that parties in conflict express, the dynamic processes involved in changes of preference orderings and the interactive nature of the life cycle of a conflict' taking the complexity of conflict situations into account.[297] Michael

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[294] See *inter alia*, Michael Nicholson. Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1992; Stephen J Majeski with David J. Sylvan, 'Simple Choices and Complex Calculations: A critique of the War Trap', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1984, p.316-340. Although looking at inter-state wars, Majeski and Sylvan provide a ciritque of expected-utility *a la* Bueno de Mesquita which can be translated to the current discussion: the assumption that 'there are only two possible outcomes of a war: wins or losses. Draws, partial or incomplete defeats, moral victories- all are excluded as possibilties...by all accounts...Sadat was not aiming at a quantitative victory over Israel in 1973; rather his aims were to show the Israelis that they could not take Egyptian inferiority for granted and to avenge national honour for the debacle of 1967'. Op. cit. p.318. For a summary of Nicholson's critique see Michael Nicholson, 'The Conceptual Bases of the War Trap', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13, No.2, June 1987, p.346-369.

[295] Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1960. See also Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.62-65. Most importantly in as regards a discussion of rationality is the fact that such an assumption does not critically evaluate the origins of the desires and beliefs that an actor possesses. As Jabri points out, 'the focus of investigation is 'how' an actor best achieves her or his goals irrespective of the origins or merit of these goals'. Jabri refers to Elster's 'broad theory of rationality' which seeks to 'inquire into the genesis of desires and beliefs and incorporates within its framework both psychological and operational processes within a decision-making model that is more broadly conceived'. Furthermore, Jabri points out that 'to uncover the causes and origins of conflict requires investigations of the issues and preferences which lead to incompatibility between actors' as well as 'an understanding of the salience of some issues over others and perceptions not only of the utility of particular courses of action but also of the legitimacy of these actions'. This 'broad theory of rationality' requires an analysis of actors in conflict as 'situated entities', 'involved in a conflictual or mutually incompatible relationship with another entity and where ongoing antagonistic actions and reactions produce new elements to the conflict as it continues through its cycle. It is an interactive situation where the desires and actions of one have implications for the other'. Ibid. p.62.

[296] Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.14. In fact, as Charles King points out, 'in prolonged armed conflicts, belligerents analyse costs and benefits according to two rather different sets of criteria. The potential benefits of continuing to fight tend to be analysed prospectively, while the potential costs are normally viewed retrospectively'. Charles King. Ending Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 308, London, 1997, p.43.

[297] For a discussion of this approach see Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.57,58 as well as O. Holsti, 'Crisis Management', in Psychological Dimensions of Conflict, B. Glad (Ed), Sage, London, 1990. This author posits that 'cognitive constraints on rationality include limits on the individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate information about the situation; an inability to generate the entire set of policy

Nicholson provides an extensive discussion of the concept of rationality as applied in conflict situations.[298] The following quote adequately describes the '*paradoxes of rationality*',

> ...in much of the analysis of international conflict, particularly that which looks at it as the rational pursuit of goals, violence is viewed as a means to achieve particular ends: it is regarded purely instrumentally...the use of violence is considered a cost, but one which might reasonably be borne in order to attain particular ends...the cool Clausewitzian view of human motivation is a useful first approximation for the analysis of international behaviour, somewhat akin to the economists' assumption of profit maximisation as a device for explaining business behaviour. However, as a more general approach to human motivation, in particular when violence is relevant, it is *seriously flawed* [my emphasis]. People's attitudes to the use of violence are often ambiguous, ambivalent and complex, and one cannot treat violence simply as an unambiguous cost.[299]

Collective action theory is explained in the work of Charles Tilly, in particular as regards the on-set of revolutions.[300] Political elements are central to Tilly's approach: it is the continuous power struggle between those who have decision-making power, and those who have not, that is at the base of political action. Tilly considers that 'the passage from individual interests to collective decisions' involves a confluence of shared interests that must be organised and mobilised, in possession and use of adequate resources. Collective political action, including collective violence, will occur if there is sufficient opportunity for it, yet, not solely economic opportunity.

A further criticism of the 'greed theory' is of a methodological nature. Nicholson terms this 'sin number 2', part of 'six of the commonest objections to the social-scientific approach to the analysis of conflict'.[301] This sin refers to the fact that 'the social scientist forgets that statistics require the oversimplification of data, and the forcing of events into common classifications, when it is the differences which are most conspicuous'.[302] While this is a problem that frequently arises in the social sciences, in the particular case of the proposition of a 'greed

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alternatives; fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each option; and an inability to order preferences for all possible consequences on a single utility scale'. This approach to rationality seems to be especially applicable in situations of crisis. Michael Nicholson in his excellent Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict considers that in situation of crisis there is a 'warping' of rationality because by its very nature, an international crisis produces deviation from the normal patterns of behaviour and by consequence, strongly affects decision-making. To this respect see Michael Nicholson, 'International Crisis: the Warping of Rationality', Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[298] Michael Nicholson. Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1992, particularly chapters 3,4,5,6 and 7.

[299] Michael Nicholson. Op. cit. p.104-105. Jabri also questions the rationality assumption in her application of structuration theory to the phenomena of violent conflict. She specifically assumes that 'our understanding of violent human behaviour cannot simply be based on instrumental rationality but must situate the agent, or acting subject, in relation to the structural properties which render war a continuity in social systems'. Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.3.

[300] Charles Tilly. From Mobilisation to Revolution, Reading Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1978. As Collier *et al,* albeit twenty years earlier, Tilly also conceptualised violent political action as a matter of tactical and strategic choice, dependent on cost-efficiency calculations by groups intended on pursuing violent tactics in the achievement of their goals.

[301] Michael Nicholson. Op. cit. p.227.

[302] Ibid. p.228.

theory' of conflict, oversimplification may lead to misleading results, for example, the non-incorporation of data relative to distributional aspects within the case studies analysed. The unavailability of such data prompted Collier and Hoeffler to rely on per capita income as one of the independent variables. As mentioned above, this leads to the conclusion that higher per capita income reduces the duration of civil war as well as the probability of its occurrence and that as a result civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low-income countries. Yet, by excluding distributional aspects in their analysis these authors are neglecting the fundamental role that the distribution of resources (hence inequality) within countries and between individuals and groups plays as a source of grievance. This goes against a substantial body of literature that focuses on so-called relative deprivation approaches as well as rank disequilibrium and status inconsistency approaches as causes of armed conflict.

The relative deprivation approach was developed by James Davies [303], the Feierabends, and Ted Robert Gurr[304] to explain individual and group violence. This approach places the relative sense of deprivation as the most important factor in creating grievances and mobilising people for conflict behaviour. At the heart of individual and groups' grievances is the idea of un-realized expectations.[305] Political violence results from an intolerable gap between what people want and what they get: the difference between expectations and gratifications.[306] This discrepancy is a frustrating experience sufficiently intense and focused to result in either rebellion or revolution. Additional causal variables are introduced because aggression 'must be politicised if it is to appear as collective political violence'. These causal variables are: the belief in the utilitarian justifiability of violence and protest (attitudes and beliefs that justify aggressive action, because it is expected to help people achieve their political goals, provide utilitarian motivational incentives), and the belief in their normative justifiability (attitudes and beliefs that justify aggressive political actions, because it is intrinsically right or proper, provide motivational incentive for such behaviour).[307]

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[303] James Davies, 'Toward a theory of Revolution', in American Sociological Review, 27, 1962, p.5-19. See also James C Davies, 'Aggression, violence, revolution and war', in Handbook of Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues, J. N. Knutson (Ed), Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1973.

[304] Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970. See also A. R. Oberschall, 'Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil', in Journal of Development Studies, 1969, p.5-23. For a case-study application, D. Birrel, 'Relative Deprivation as a Factor in Conflict in Northern Ireland', in Sociological Review, 1972, p.317-343.

[305] It should be pointed out that relative deprivation theories do not only refer to economic deprivation. Crucially, several political scientists writing of relative deprivation locate it at the political level. Among them Vilfredo Pareto places deprivation at the political level: a sort of political relative deprivation based on the insufficient co-optation of competing members of the non-elite, ultimately causing the decline of status quo elites. Gaetano Mosca and Emile Durkheim also tackled the problem of relative deprivation situated at the political level. Samuel Huntington, for example, locates violent political action and revolution at the level of the political sphere: within a context of rapid socio-economic modernisation, people are mobilised and induced to enter the political arena, and if their demands are not properly channelled, aggressive modes of behaviour may be taken.

[306] Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970, p.24. Relative deprivation as conceptualized by Ted Robert Gurr arises when an individual does not attain what he thinks is justifiable due to him. It is a mechanism that produces frustration of sufficient intensity to motivate people to engage in political protest and violence. Accordingly, Ted Gurr states that 'the greater the deprivation an individual perceives relative to his expectations the greater his discontent; the more widespread and intense is discontent among the members of a society, the more likely and severe is civil strife'.

While deprivation, either relative or absolute [308] is no guarantee that groups will pursue their goals using violent behaviour[309], its focus on distributional aspects provides an additional and plausible explanation as regards triggering mechanisms of violence. Similar to the absolute deprivation approach is the so-called resource-scarcity approach. In diametric opposition to the 'greed theory', this approach views resource-wars as a 'violent expression of a distributional conflict associated with the paucity of resources', not as the expression of greed motivated groups.[310] To this respect, Michael T Klare points out that,

> ...all of these phenomena - increased competition over access to major sources of oil and gas, growing friction over the allocation of shared water supplies, and internal warfare over valuable export commodities- have produced a new geography of conflict, a reconfigured cartography in which resource flows rather then political and ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines.[311]

The reductionist nature of the 'greed theory' is noted by Cilliers in the following words:

> ...although war may have both *intended* (i.e. planned) and *unintended* economic consequences, any analysis that seeks to reduce the study of extensive social conflict to a single determinant should be treated with care. War profiteering, or the economic benefits that may arise during a conflict, is not a new phenomenon but as old as war itself. Historically, economic considerations have been an important *cause* of wars, commercial agendas (the profits made during war) have often served to *perpetuate* conflict, and motivations to prosecute

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[307] Harry Eckstein. 'Theoretical Approaches To Explaining Collective Political Violence', in Handbook of Political Conflict, Theory and Research, Ted Robert Gurr (Ed), New York, Free Press, 1980, p.144, 145.

[308] Absolute deprivation approach considers the effects of the absolute magnitude of deprivation on the occurrence of conflict. The work of Dahrendorf, for example, emphasises that absolute deprivation in several dimensions of groups' existence leads to homogeneity and facilitates group interaction and the likelihood that deprived communities view themselves as a collective entity. Yet, as pointed out by several authors, absolute deprivation is not automatically related to the occurrence of violent conflict. Among these authors, Cantril highlighted that absolute deprivation forces people to concentrate on their daily survival rather than revolt. As Kriesberg points out, 'severe deprivation may make people despair of changing the conditions, and, as accommodation to such despair, even the self-recognition of collective discontent may not occur'. Louis Kriesberg. Social Conflicts. 2nd Edition, Prentice-Hall Inc, 1973, 1982.

[309] See for example Cantril's (1965) experiments with a ten-step ladder scale to measure discrepancy between expectations and actual achievements. Also Bowen's (1968) test of Cantril's ladder and his conclusion that there is no relationship between present or future standing on the ladder and a measure of protest orientation. Also Muller´s and McPhail´s experiences as well as Walter Korpi's. Korpi for example stresses the importance of the capability or relative power of the parties involved in that 'the process of acquiring control over power resources is seen as a necessary condition for the capacity to contend for privileges'. In this sense, the relative deprivation hypothesis is not capable by itself of explaining violent conflict behaviour. In fact, important variables such as prevalent policies in the social system, legitimacy of the elites, power capabilities of the parties involved, alienation, external interference and support for one of the contending parties, historical factors and trends must be considered. W. Korpi, 'Conflict, Power, and Relative Deprivation', in American Political Science Review, 1974, p.1569-1578.

[310] Philippe Le Billon. 'The Political Economy of Resource Wars', in Angola's War Economy. The Role Of Oil and Diamonds, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p. 23. So-called scarcity-of-resources approaches consider poverty as a fundamental cause of contemporary conflict. Global and local economic inequality is at a high point when for example one knows that the world's 50 poorest nations (20% of the world's entire population) account for less than 2% of global income and there is stagnation and protracted decline in income due to years of stagnant economic growth. Furthermore, soil impoverishment, land scarcity and overuse, over population and deforestation also contribute as potential causes of conflict.

[311] Michael T Klare. 'The New Geography of Conflict', in Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2001, p.52. This author adds that 'Just as a map showing the world's tectonic faults is a useful guide to likely earth-quake zones, viewing the international system in terms of unsettled resource deposits- contested oil and gas fields, shared water systems, embattled diamond mines- provides a guide to likely conflict zones in the twenty-first century...A better analysis of stresses in the new international system, and a better predictor of conflict, would view international relations through the lens of the world's contested resources and focus on those areas where conflict is likely to erupt over access to or the possession of vital materials'. p.52-53.

> war also *change* over time. But economic considerations have not always predominated and can seldom be used as single-factor explanations.[312]

Therefore the resource-war type, product of 'greed theory', does not seem to allow for a comprehensive understanding of contemporary on-going armed conflicts.[313] It does point to crucial aspects concerning the probable role that a number of variables may have in the on-set of armed conflicts and therefore should be taken into account by the analyst. In this sense, while not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of contemporary armed conflicts, it does highlight conditions that may facilitate or constrain the choices that groups make in the pursuit of their goals. Vivienne Jabri reinforces this when she says that,

> ...war is (a) a multicausal phenomenon, where different causal sequences may apply to different conflict situations, and (b) a result of decision-making paths which, far from suggesting rationality as defined by strict criteria of consistency, point to the view that rationality is bounded by institutional roles and established norms which impact upon the informational and analytic loops which actors may go through prior to the onset of war.[314]

The general claim that 'greed' is the prime cause of war must be rejected. And in fact, this conclusion seems to be confirmed in Collier and Hoeffler's latest article on this issue. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War' contains an interesting development pointing to the incorporation of both 'greed' and 'grievance' in a combined model.[315] The authors move away from both concepts of 'greed' and 'grievance' introducing the less controversial notions of preferences and constraints.[316] The concept of preferences and constraints drastically changes the nature of the 'greed versus grievance' debate.[317] Nevertheless, the authors maintain their focus on 'the economic' rationale of civil war implied in expected-utility: 'both a greed theory and a universal grievance theory predict that the risk of rebellion is increasing in the opportunities for rebel finance'. While constraints-based theory is referred to in the shorthand of 'greed', the

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[312] Jakkie Cilliers. 'Resource Wars- a new type of insurgency', in Angola's War Economy. The Role Of Oil and Diamonds, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p.2.

[313] To this regard, the words of Chris Mitchell come to mind: 'if certain conflicts within a society are regarded as stemming from ineradicable human qualities such as greed or envy then they are defined as sins, crimes or social deviance, and are 'managed' by coercion or punishment and the imposition of law-and-order policies through deterrent police forces'. C. R. Mitchell. The Structure of International Conflict, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.33.

[314] Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.65.

[315] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and Grievance in Civil War, The World Bank, 'The Economics of Crime and Violence' Project, Washington DC, January 4, 2001.
<http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm>

[316] In this occasion the authors actually say that 'the assumption that rebellions are motivated by greed is merely a special case of the focus upon constraints' in that 'an alternative constraints-based theory is that of universal grievance: all countries might have groups with a sufficiently strong sense of grievance to wish to launch a rebellion'. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Op. cit. p.3.

[317] There are important differences in both a constraints-based theory and a preferences-based theory of conflict. For example, if we take the universal grievance approach (defined here as a constraint) one will inevitably conclude that the extortion of primary commodity exports offers the best way for rebel organisations to grow to achieve the size and scale they need to undertake a civil war. Extortion than becomes a vehicle, a means to an end. On the other hand, if we take the 'literal greed interpretation', 'the extortion of primary commodity exports will occur where it is profitable' and 'the organisations which perpetrate this extortion will need to take the form of a rebellion'. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Op. cit. p.3.

authors recognise that, in contrast to preference-based theories, 'they do not necessarily literally imply that the motivation for rebellion is exclusively, or even primarily, financial'.[318]

For our purposes, a number of important conclusions stem from this paper. A focus on the constraints that rebel organisations face to mount a credible and effective rebellion is critical for the understanding of the on-set and maintenance of rebellion. By looking at the effects that changes in the levels of different types of constraints have on the probability of war occurrence, a clearer understanding of conflict life-cycles may be achieved. The first constraint considered refers to the size of rebel organisations in that 'only large rebel organisations generate casualties on the scale which defines civil war'.[319] For this, rebel groups must mobilise people, as well as secure a large number of weapons. They must raise finance either through extortion, donations from diasporas or support from hostile governments. Following Collier's earlier work, rebel groups' extortion is said to happen primarily through the plundering of primary commodity exports, for the same reasons defined above. Furthermore, rebel organisations face coordination costs quite different from those that governments face.[320]

A new variable is introduced in the form of the role of diasporas as a potential source of income for rebel movements. The authors conclude that a large diaspora considerably increases the risk of further conflict. Yet, while the size of the diaspora may 'simply be proxying the intensity of conflict', 'the substantial effect of the diaspora on the risk of conflict renewal is indeed due to its financial contributions to war start-up'.[321] In addition, relating to the level of expenditure of rebel groups is the presence of 'accumulated physical, human and organisational capital' from previous conflict. This means that the presence of guns, people who know how to use them and a 'quiescent' organisational network will lower the costs of renewed rebellion. The authors found that 'in our sample, the conflict episodes were twice as likely in countries which had had a previous conflict since 1945 as in those which had been peaceful'.[322]

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[318] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. p.3.

[319] Please note that the authors are still using Singer and Small's 1982 definition of civil war referred to above. To this respect see J. David Singer and Melvin Small. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars: 1816-1980, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1982. And also J. David Singer and Melvin Small. Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (Computer file), Ann Arbor, Michigan, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1994.

[320] As Collier and Hoefller posit, 'the government army has two advantages over a rebellion. It can spend many years building a sense of unity, whereas if a rebel force fails to achieve unity quickly it will presumably perish. Additionally, the government can use the powerful rhetoric of nationalism: with this imagined identity already occupied, a rebellion cannot afford diversity'. Ibid. p.7.

[321] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. p.13.

[322] Ibid. p.7. Regression analysis confirmed this result. Yet, introducing in the model the length of the peace period measured in months since the end of the last civil war, the authors found that 'the longer the peace period the lower the risk of conflict'. Because of this the authors conclude that 'the peace period is a more precise measure of the effect than is the previous war dummy'. Ibid. p.12.

Turning to 'grievance-rebellion', the authors focus now on preferences to inquire the extent to which 'the initiation of rebellion [is] determined by differences in objective grievances'. Here the authors look at inter-group hatred, political exclusion and vengeance. The authors did not find that inter-group hatred is greater in fractured societies than in homogenous ones. As before, the crucial variable is polarisation.[323] Regarding political exclusion, the authors used Ted Gurr's Polity III data set and concluded that 'there is a very large difference in the extent of democracy between conflict societies and peaceful societies: on average, conflict episodes are preceded by a democracy score less than half that which precedes peace episodes'.[324] They also investigate on the role of ethnic dominance (when one ethnic group constitutes a majority, but not an overwhelming majority), where they found insignificant results. Marginalisation of the poor, which may be inferred by a high degree of economic inequality, also showed no significant results in that 'a survey of fifteen violent civil conflicts concludes that 'wars today are rarely started by the poor and marginalised people united in battle as an expression of their deep-seated striving for a just society'.[325]

In conclusion, confirming the importance of both 'constraints-based theory' and 'preferences-based theory' as regards the 'Greed versus Grievance hypothesis', Collier and Hoeffler posit that the 'aim of our econometric tests is to arrive at an *integrated model which gives an account of conflict risk in terms of all those constraints and preferences which are significant* [my emphasis]'.[326] They conclude that 'while the greed model is superior, some elements of the grievance model are likely to add to its explanatory power' and that therefore they propose to 'investigate the combination of the two models'. In fact, the authors actually find that statistically, the combined model is superior although several variables are completely insignificant.[327]

The statistical findings discussed above are certainly important as regards understanding some of the factors that affect the probability of the occurrence of armed conflict. The role of income, natural resource endowment, population characteristics, ethnic and religious fractionalisation, education levels, geography, as well as previous conflict are all factors that,

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[323] In line with J. M. Esteban and D. Ray, 'On the Measurement of Polarisation', Econometrica, 62(4), p.819-851 and M. Reynal-Querol, Religious Conflict and Growth: Theory and Evidence', London School of Economics and Political Science, mimeo, 2000. A non-monotonic result was found leading to the conclusion that 'highly fractionalised societies are no more prone to war than highly homogeneous ones' while polarised societies have around a 50% higher probability of civil war than either homogeneous or highly fractionalised societies. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. On Economic Causes of Civil War. p.7, 8.

[324] Ibid. p.9.

[325] Based on Mary B Anderson, Do no Harm, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. p.10.

[326] For a complete description of the methods used please refer to Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. p.10.

[327] Ibid. p.15.

either as preferences or constraints, affect the likelihood of war. In particular, natural resources can strongly affect the probability of armed conflicts, their duration, course and impact. While this has been historically the case, it is particularly relevant at present, due to reduction in foreign assistance to governments and rebel groups as a result of the ending of the Cold War. Philippe Le Billon points out that 'belligerents have become more dependent upon mobilising tradable commodities, such as minerals, timber or drugs, to sustain their military and political activities'.[328]

This has important tactical consequences in the conduct of hostilities in the sense that resource-rich areas become increasingly more important and therefore the focus of both incumbent authorities and rebel movements tends to be there centred. It changes traditional guerrilla tactics, from relying on mobility, to the establishment of strongholds. It also affects the economies of the countries where resources play an important part in armed conflict through the criminalisation of resource exploitation, the development of extensive war-economy networks and therefore the possibility that armed conflicts in some countries become strongly intertwined with the control and maintenance of these exploitation networks. Economic interests may in this way overcome political ones, sustaining conflicts that may be profitable for some individuals and groups. As Billon rightly puts it, it may even 'involve accommodation between opposing factions who find a mutual benefit in a 'comfortable military stalemate', leaving the territory and its population under a no-war-no-peace situation'.[329] As a consequence, resource exploitation by groups in conflict may affect the chances for resolution.

While all of these are important factors in the analysis of contemporary armed conflicts, they are not the only variables involved in the vast majority of on-going civil wars. The role of resources and therefore of a resource-war type must be properly equated with the very many other factors that characterise and affect contemporary armed conflicts. As was previously discussed, identity politics in the form of ethnicity and nationalism are crucial factors in contemporary conflicts.[330] As Nicholson rightly puts it,

> ...the initial insights of statistical analysis into the causes come from examining the correlations between variables to see whether they move together and if so how. Simply finding a

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[328] Philippe Le Billon. 'The Political Economy of Resource Wars', in Angola's War Economy. The Role Of Oil and Diamonds, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p. 28.

[329] Ibid. p.30.

[330] Furthermore, as Vivienne Jabri points out 'whether a contention over issues and desired outcomes is carried out violently or through non-violent modes of interaction is dependent on a number of factors related to the issues at stake, the relationship between the parties, resources available to the parties, the ideological disposition of the parties, and the impact of the social environment'. Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996. We will deal with these factors at length in chapter 3 below.

relationship is not the same as identifying a causal relationship, but it does gives us some idea of where to start our theorising.[331]

Conclusion to Chapter 2 and 3

In the opening remarks to chapter 2 above we pointed out that approaches to typologies and classification are in fact as numerous as the various authors that discuss them. The over-reliance on axiomatic definitions at the root of conflict types and typologies reveals above all competing interpretations of the fundamental aspects of violent armed conflict and war. Conflict types vary from 'internal conflicts', 'new wars', 'small wars', 'civil wars', 'ethnic conflicts', 'conflict in post-colonial states' and 'complex political emergencies'. In fact, the list could be extended to include 'resource-wars', 'religious wars', 'state-failure wars', 'economic wars', etc. Conflict typologies may be based on the juridical status of the conflict parties, the observable levels of violence used in the conflict, the parties' capabilities or the distribution of capability between belligerents and the nature of the issues in conflict (conflict causes). While some typologies differentiate between types of wars, others merely distinguish between degrees of war. Furthermore, approaches to classification, types and typologies are more often than not time-bound in that they are strongly related to the particular point in time they are developed. In chapter 2 above we selected two different approaches to conflict classification: the first stemming from International Law and distinguishing between international and non-international war; the second, discussed within International Relations, differentiates between systemic and non-systemic wars. In chapter 3, we discussed two of the most used aetiological conflict types at opposing ends of the aetiological spectrum: ethnic wars and resource-wars.

In this sense, we discussed the many difficulties involved in classifying a conflict as either international or non-international using legal arguments even though this typology is widely used in diplomacy, international organisations and the media. Likewise, we presented the systemic/non-systemic (or Big and Small) typology and questioned whether it is possible to theoretically distinguish between them. As aetiological types are concerned, it should be noted that while conflict types such as 'ethnic conflict' or 'resource-war' types are important in that they highlight important causes of particular conflicts, if such types are attributed simplistically, uncritically and *a posteriori* without proper research, they may hinder understanding of a particular situation and seriously compromise resolution efforts. Consequently, and for the purposes of the questions that guided this discussion, it should be pointed out that it has been possible to find discreet conflict types that purport to distinguish between contemporary conflicts or define a particular type. However, we found them to be

[331] Michael Nicholson. Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.146

strongly reductionist in the over-reliance on single-factor explanations. The discussion of their fundamental assumptions revealed the incomplete nature of such classifications as regards the multitude of aspects that characterise contemporary war. Useful therefore for particular cases, but incomplete as general analytical frameworks.

Attempting to answer the question 'Is there a need for a typology of war? ', John Vasquez posited that such question relates to the theoretical assumption of whether war is a single phenomenon with an identifiable set of causes regardless of time and place or whether war includes different phenomena. At the root of Vasquez approach to the question of classification is the differentiation between types and typologies which purport to explain war regardless of time and space *(nomothetic or behavioural approaches)* and types and typologies that purport to explain war according to the specific time and place or historical conditions they occur in *(ideographic or substantive approaches)*.[332] Ideographic or substantive approaches see the specific time and place in which a war occurs (i.e. the historical conditions) as the most critical factor in explaining war. For example, this approach to classification would include all the above variations of cause-based typologies. Ethnic, religious, resource/economic, ideological based definitions of conflict inevitably purport to explain war according to the specific time and place or historical conditions it occurs in. According to Van de Goor *et al* 'a more ideographic, individualistic approach' will focus primarily on the 'regional or local context'.[333]

There is a reason to believe that because ideographic or substantive typologies are historically determined, they 'investigate the causes of war by trying to identify *when* [sic] war will occur rather than asking *whether* [sic] it will occur'.[334] This is evident in the statistical and probabilistic approach of the 'greed theory' developed by Paul Collier *et al.* The ethnic-conflict type discussed is also of an ideographic nature in that it tends to focus on when wars will occur because it relies on explaining and differentiating wars on the basis of the reasons given for fighting them. In this sense armed conflict is classified on the basis of the goals or issues characterising a particular conflict in a specific moment in time, with specific attention given to the historical determinants of a particular situation. This approach to classification would include all the above cause-based typologies as well as goal-oriented typologies differentiating between, for example, national liberation wars or imperial/colonial wars.

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[332] John A Vasquez. The War Puzzle, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. To this respect see W. C. Burrell and G. Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, Heineman, London, 1979. This distinction recurs in the literature on war and conflict. Among others see Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.4.

[333] Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.4.

[334] John Vasquez. Op. Cit. p.62.

One of the fundamental problems with substantive classification resides on the fact that in analysing contemporary conflict, the unavailability of in-depth data and analysis concerning both historical determinants and contemporary developments forces analysts to over-rely on the information provided by the parties themselves or secondary information based on what the parties to a violent conflict want to make public, at times with the objective of deliberately influencing the outside world.[335] This reliance on how conflict groups themselves describe their situation is amply evident in the shift observed and noted repeatedly in previous pages from classifications of certain conflicts as primarily ideological during the Cold War, to primarily ethnic or identity based shortly after the collapse of bipolarity.

As a result, classifying conflicts on the basis of their causes is at minimum controversial. As Van de Goor *et al* point out, this approach to typology 'is controversial because of the complex and dynamic nature of most conflicts. A factor can rarely be singled out as the root cause of a specific armed conflict'.[336] Nevertheless, the unrelenting search for 'root' causes of conflict has produced and still produces the majority of conflict classifications both in the form of individual and discreet types or full-blown typologies.[337] Referring to civil wars, Charles King posits that,

> ...in civil wars, however, elucidating root causes can be problematic. The basic issue at stake in most internal conflicts is contested sovereignty: two or more groups view for the right to decide the territorial configuration or governmental structure of the state. But in thinking about what actually drives the fighting and what impediments stand in the way of a negotiate settlement, the belligerent's own hortatory statements about the roots causes of the dispute may be a red herring.[338]

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[335] This problem had been pointed out by Collier when he recognised that 'those rebel organisations which are sufficiently successful to get noticed are unlikely to be so naive as to admit to greed as a motive'.

[336] Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). Op. Cit. p.5. Van de Goor's thoughts on this matter come to mind, 'these weaknesses...especially apply for attempts to construct a typology according to causes of conflict. Firstly, the causes of conflict are hardly ever monocausal. It would thus be wrong to speak of, for example, ethnic, religious or civilizational conflict. Secondly, the causes of armed conflict cannot be known prior to serious investigation. Labelling conflicts wrongfully beforehand could thus result in inadequate measures in the field of conflict management or resolution'. Ibid. .5. This very same argument is put forward by Vivienne Jabri in the following words: 'the history of human political violence has shown that we cannot produce monocausal explanations of war. Studies which concentrate on assumed innate human characteristics fail to account for the societal factors which are implicated in what is essentially an interactive and dynamic process. Similarly, investigations which link attributes of the international system such as balances of power, not only produce contradictory findings, but seem to negate human decision-making and psychological processes in the onset of war in specific circumstances'. Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.3.

[337] The search for the crucial factor that causes conflicts was most recently evident in a Queen Elizabeth House working paper by Frances Stewart. With the intention of analysing 'the "root" causes of complex humanitarian emergencies', this author finds that horizontal inequality coincident with group identity is 'the fundamental source of organised conflict'. Frances Stewart. 'The Root Causes of Conflict: Some Conclusions', Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper Number 16, University of Oxford, June 1998, p.1.

[338] Charles King. Ending Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 308, London, 1997, p.43.

As exhaustive as substantive classifications may attempt to be, they are ultimately incapable of creating types for all possible conflicts in the present or adequately predict all forms of future conflicts. As Vasquez points out,

> ...historical classifications [i.e.substantive] have to date been insufficiently theoretical. They do not identify the characteristics that are most significant for determining why the wars have different causes; they merely state that the differing goals and policies of actors (...) lead them to fight different kinds of wars.[339]

The substantive approach to classification focuses on the goals as expressed by the parties involved in conflict and through these on the causes and historical conditions that produce them. It is unquestionable that for the purposes of understanding conflict motivations a focus on the historical context is important. Yet, although discreet substantive types may provide insights into the motivations that guide groups in conflict as well as the way by which parties to a conflict frame their own struggle they do not allow for an understanding of conflict dynamics which may involve radical changes of goals and tactics. This is especially the case with cause-based typologies of conflict. When applied to long-duration conflicts, aetiological types reveal their artificiality and subjectivity.

Let us now turn to classification approaches that purport to explain war regardless of time and space. These are called nomothetic and behavioural and are 'based on the presumption that a general, universal applicable theory on conflicts does exist'.[340] They classify armed conflicts irrespective of their time and place, usually in reference to systemic conditions such as the number of actors, their nature or their capabilities. One of the earliest attempts at a universal typology was developed by Lewis Richardson who differentiated wars according solely to the number of participants on each side. Richardson was interested in explaining the differences between dyadic wars (only one actor on each side) and wars with multiple parties. As Vasquez points out, 'his analysis is relevant because he makes it clear that the sheer number of participants, regardless of their power, can be an important factor in distinguishing different types of war'.[341]

The most common nomothetic and behavioural classification is based on the nature of the participants and their political power rather than the number of participants.[342] As was discussed in chapter 2, this is a result of both the focus of international law as well as the assumptions of the realist paradigm in the study of international relations. To this regard, J David Singer and Malvin Small developed what is perhaps the most influential typology of

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[339] John Vasquez. Op. Cit. p.64.

[340] Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). Op. Cit. p.4.

[341] John Vasquez. Op. Cit. p.60.

[342] Ibid. p.60-64.

violent armed conflict and war. This typology is typical of the behavioural approaches to the study of conflict that developed during the 1950s and 1960s. The classification Singer and Small used for the development of the Correlates of War Project, a widely acclaimed statistical study of international conflict, was based on the juridical status of the social groupings that are protagonists in violent armed conflicts (i.e. the nature of the participants).[343]

The Correlates of War typology defined 'interstate war' as the first type of war, that between the 'dominant actors in the global system', that is states. Interstate wars were defined as sustained armed conflict between at least two states on each side of the war, resulting in a total of 1,000 or more battle-deaths.[344] As was pointed out above, inter-state conflict has been the 'major focus of traditional students of 'international relations', capture the most historical attention, employ the most advanced technologies, and produce the greatest impact throughout the global system'.[345] The second type of armed conflict was defined as 'extra-systemic wars' which involve a member of the interstate system on one side of the war, resulting in an average of 1,000 battle related deaths per year for system member participants, against the forces of a political entity that has some of the characteristics of states but 'is usually less developed economically and politically and does not enjoy diplomatic recognition'.[346] And, in its original formulation, 'extra-systemic wars' would include two further sub-types: 'imperial war', involving an adversary who is an independent political entity but does not qualify as a member of the interstate system because of limitations on its independence or on any of the necessary conditions defined for statehood; and 'colonial war', where one of the parties was a colony, dependency or protectorate composed of different ethnic groups and located at some geographical distance or peripheral to the centre of government of the given system member, usually known as 'wars of national liberation'.

In his later work, Singer retains the original distinction between 'interstate wars' and 'extra-systemic wars' but adds two new types of non-interstate conflicts, that of 'civil conflict' (similar to extra-systemic wars but encapsulating insurgent or revolutionary groups within the recognised boundaries of a state).[347] He also adds a fourth type, that of 'increasingly complex

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[343] J. David Singer and Melvin Small. The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1972.

[344] This is evidence that, although based on a juridical criterion, Singer and Small's typology also resorts to the level of battle-related casualties as a benchmark for the inclusion of a particular conflict in the data base.

[345] J. David Singer, 'Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to Explanation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.43.

[346] J. David Singer. Op. Cit. p. 43.

[347] A civil war in Singer's and Small's (1982) typology is based on four dimensions. First, on of the primary actors in any conflict identified as a civil war must be the national government in power at the time hostilities begin. Secondly, the concept of war requires that both sides have the ability to inflict death upon each other. As a rule of thumb Singer

intra-state wars' in former colonial states (where the challenge may come from 'culturally defined groups whose members identify with one another on the basis of shared racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or kinship characteristics).[348]

As was discussed in chapter 2 above, classifying contemporary conflicts by using the status of the parties involved produce strong inconsistencies because present-day conflicts include a myriad of different parties far from the model of the unified government of a territorial nation-state (some conflicts are devoid of such element all together). Furthermore, the transnational aspects of contemporary conflict make it very difficult to establish whether a particular conflict is purely intra-state or involves, for instance, neighbouring countries. This seems to have been Singer's concern in developing the 'complex intra-state wars'. He asks,

> Whom do we identify as the protagonists in these increasingly complex intra-state wars? ...they will typically be culturally defined groups whose members identify with one another on the basis of shared racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or kinship characteristics. And given the different bases of shared identities, it makes sense to think of them as *affinity* groups and *identity* groups or *communal* groups, rather than the more restricted conventional 'ethnic' groups[349].

It should be pointed out that, although behavioural approaches strive for de-contextualisation or a-historicity, they engender specific problems of their own. As pointed out by Vasquez, such approaches place 'emphasis on who, how and over what the war is fought, rather than on the foreign policy that led to the war, the reasons for which different parties entered the war, or the consequences of the war'.[350] As Van de Goor *et al* highlight, this typology is not free of other shortcomings in that 'any juridical typology, the COW [Correlates of War] typology included, is neither logically nor empirically exhaustive'. Furthermore, these authors say that 'as can be learned from history, every historical period presents new types of actors in a dispute, a situation which implies that 'every time such a new actor emerges, a new category has to be invented and added to this typology'.[351]

An immediate criticism would highlight the fact that the emphasis on a-historicity is itself misplaced since, ultimately, by differentiating conflicts on the basis of the status of the parties (a distinction which is itself historically rooted in the modern state system and incorporated in modern international law) behavioural and nomothetic typologies may not avoid the pitfalls of

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and Small (1982) define that in a civil war the stronger forces must sustain at least five percent of the number of fatalities suffered by the weaker forces. This rule enables them to distinguish genuine war situations from massacres, pogroms and purges. Thirdly, significant military action must take place. Only civil wars that resulted in at least 1,000 battle related deaths per year are included in the data-set. This figure includes civilian as well as military deaths. Fourthly, the war must be internal to the country'.

[348] To this respect see J. David Singer, op.cit., p.43-45 and also Hugh Miall *et al*. Op. Cit., p.29-30.

[349] J. David Singer, Op.Cit., p.47.

[350] John Vasquez. Op. Cit. p.63.

[351] Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.5.

history as much as their proponents wish. Second, if purely behavioural, these typologies will not successfully incorporate differentiating factors such as the issues in contention, goals of the parties or policy choices, which are extremely relevant in the understanding of any particular conflict. Attempting to conceptualise different types of conflict irrespective of where and when they happen to develop, nomothetic approaches,

> ...Like most positivist efforts, [they] can be faulted for assuming that wars, regardless of previous history, are more or less caused by the same set of variables. Marxists or students of history like Organski (1958) and Modelski (1978) would want a typology of wars that would recognise that the type of war a political unit could initiate would vary greatly depending on its own and the system's economic and historical development...[352]

However, by conceptualising conflict in an abstract form, these typologies uncover fundamental structural aspects related to the origins, development and termination of violent armed conflicts, such as escalation and de-escalation processes, the likelihood of outbreaks of hostilities and tendential use of violent behaviour by parties in conflict. Another very useful nomothetic typology is that which distinguishes armed conflict in terms of its size, magnitude or severity. The first author to deal with a classification based on the size of war was the pioneer Lewis Richardson.[353] The question of war 'size' has been approached by different angles: that of the number of people killed, the amount of physical destruction or the combined number of both killed and injured people. Michael Nicholson points out that while there are strong objections as regards using the amount of destruction to infer war size in that 'it is very difficult to measure' due to 'the difficulty of getting raw data and then of evaluating them', as regards number of people killed, 'a death occurring in 1870 and one in 1940 are more obviously comparable'.[354] Several authors have therefore developed and used casualty figures as the basis for typology building. Richardson for instance created a logarithm of casualties and termed it 'magnitude' of war.[355] Singer and Small termed it 'severity', which is the terminology adopted by Michael Nicholson as well as by this present work.

There are many advantages to using war size, severity or magnitude as components of a typology. In fact, the severity of war in terms of its human casualties is present in the vast majority of conflict register discussed in chapter 1. It is given a substantial role in the Correlates of War typology to the extent that only conflicts with more than 1,000 deaths are included in the data-set. It is present in both SIPRI's and PRIO's hybrid typologies to be discussed below. This should in fact be the case because above all war consists of fighting

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[352] Ibid. p.61.

[353] Lewis Fry Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Pittsburg, Stevens, 1960.

[354] Michael Nicholson. Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 149.

[355] See Lewis Fry Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Pittsburg, Stevens, 1960.

and killing and from the perspective of the social scientist 'our prime interest is in the fact that a large-scale, violent conflict involving deaths took place'.[356]

The incorporation of casualties' levels in a working conflict typology is in our view extremely important. Yet, it poses serious empirical challenges. Assessing conflict intensity by relying solely on battlefield casualties might prove misleading and at times confusing.[357] In fact, if one of the fundamental structural characteristics of contemporary conflicts is the deliberate target of civilians, any typology solely based on battle-related deaths is bound to provide a mere glimpse of reality. As pointed out by Rupesinghe *et al* 'in 1995 although the estimated deaths in Burundi were as high as 50,000, the actual conflict was not defined as 'war' [by SIPRI], because there were few direct military engagements'[358]. In fact, the inaccuracy of estimates of war deaths is also a product of conscious misrepresentation by actors involved.[359] Nevertheless, by providing valuable information regarding the humanitarian consequences of any particular conflict it gives some indication of conflicts' processes of escalation and de-escalation and therefore of conflict dynamics.

From the above discussion it is easily noted that hybrid typologies which include elements of both a substantive and a nomothetic approach are the most valuable for the understanding of contemporary conflicts.[360] In this sense, general approaches to classification can be combined with more particular and issue/case-specific approaches. From the review undertaken above we found that for the purposes of analysing contemporary armed conflicts the most useful typologies are those which mix elements of both a behavioural nature and a substantive nature. In particular those which combine a status of the parties typology with a severity criterion. Among other examples, researchers at SIPRI use a mixed typology by resorting to a mixture of different elements including the status of the parties involved; the levels-of-violence involved as well as the causes of conflicts. As was earlier pointed out,

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[356] Michael Nicholson. Ibid. p.149. This author says that 'the distinction between, say, revolutions, civil wars and international wars are important, of course, even from the point of view of the social scientist, but ignoring these distinctions may also be revealing, and the size criterion effectively does this'.

[357] There is no agreement between authors as to the casualty criterion. While Lewis Richardson for example includes in his definition of magnitude all military deaths no matter from what cause as well as all civilian deaths directly attributed to hostile action, Singer and Small limited their data set to battle deaths only, excluding civilian deaths. A similar disagreement informs the SIPRI typology (only battle related casualties) from the PRIO typology.

[358] Kumar Rupesinghe *et al* . Op. Cit. p.26.

[359] In terms of what deaths should be counted, Nicholson points out that 'we could include just military personnel killed in battle pr who died of wounds; or all people killed as a direct result of warfare; or all those who died as a result of the war, including the indirect deaths due to disease which can be legitimately attributed to the war'. He then says that, 'which grouping we take is to some extent arbitrary. What is important is that we are consistent and explicit in our selection methods throughout'. Ibid. p.150-151.

[360] As pointed out by Goodhand and Hulme 'classical analytical frameworks...are being put aside for more eclectic frameworks. These draw heavily on social and cultural theory, blend different theoretical traditions together to analyse different situations, relate conflict to development and point to the inherent unpredictability of conflict processes and outcomes'. J. Goodhand and D. Hulme. 'From wars to complex political emergencies: understanding conflict and peace building in the new world disorder', in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, p.13.

armed conflict is defined by SIPRI as a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of force between two parties, or which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle related deaths. In a first instance, this definition clearly points to issues or causes of conflict as it stems from the basic differentiation between conflicts about government (type of political system, replacement of central government, change of its composition) and conflicts about territory (incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, secession or autonomy). On the other hand, the requisite that one of the parties must be the government of a state introduces the status of the parties' criterion in the definition. Furthermore, for Wallensteen and his colleagues the intensity of violence is measured by battle-only casualties. Armed conflicts are ranked accordingly: war (more than 1,000 battle related deaths during a particular year); intermediate armed conflict (more than 1,000 battle related deaths during the course of the conflict but fewer than 1,000 in a particular year) and minor armed conflict (number of battle related deaths during the course of the conflict is below 1,000).

In conclusion and for the purposes of the present thesis, classification of conflicts and more importantly phases within a single conflict should firstly be based on their severity, in line with PIOMM's analysis. For example, when classifying the conflict in Sri Lanka today we would say firstly that it is a high intensity conflict and not that it is an 'ethnic conflict' or a 'secessionist conflict'. If we were classifying the conflict in Northern Uganda we would say that it is a low intensity conflict. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the casualty criterion is more important than classifying a conflict according to particular cause or goal involved.

Chapter 4. The Multi-Level Nature and Dynamic Life-Cycles of Contemporary Armed Conflict

4.1. Revisiting the 'Level-of-Analysis' Problem

> ...whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system. He may, for example, choose between the flowers or the garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or the forest, the houses or the neighbourhood, the cars or the traffic jam, the delinquents or the gang, the legislators or the legislative, and so on...The responsible scholar must be prepared to evaluate the relative utility- conceptual and methodological- of the various alternatives open to him, and to appraise the manifold implications of the level of analysis finally selected.[361]

> ... in any real situation behaviour must be the result of factors from all levels.[362]

> ...most researchers accept in theory the arguments of Kenneth Waltz (1959) and others that variables operative at multiple levels must be examined to account for war, yet a considerable 'proportion of the studies continue to employ single independent variables' (Holsti, 1989a, p.4).[363]

In an essay entitled 'The theoretical deficit in the study of war', Thomas Cusak reminds us that although 'war remains a major social problem', it is reassuring to know that 'in the last few decades a significant number of political and other social scientists have devoted considerable effort to the study of its causes and consequences'[364]. Yet, far from being unified, the study of armed conflict and war (still) remains strongly fragmented between more or less rigid disciplinary boundaries and within and across disciplinary boundaries we find competing and contradictory paradigms based on different normative groundings, a myriad of at times conflicting research programmes and finally, studies that are divided by level-of-analysis based approaches. These factors concur both for the atomistic character of findings

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[361] J. David Singer. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations', in The International System. Theoretical Essays. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Eds), Princeton University Press, 1961. Reprinted by Greewood Press Publishers, 1982, p.77.

[362] John Paul Scott, Aggression, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p.2. Quoted in Dennis J. D. Sandole. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era. Pinter, London and New York, 1999.

[363] Dennis J. D. Sandole. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era. Pinter, London and New York, 1999, p.7.

[364] Thomas R Cusak. 'On the Theoretical Deficit in the Study of War', in The Process Of War. Advancing the Scientific Study of War, Stuart A. Bremer and Thomas R. Cusak (Eds), Gordon and Breach Publishers, Amsterdam, 1995, p.191.

and the incommunicability of competing approaches but most importantly for the lack of integrative knowledge accumulation.[365]

As will be seen below, there is no subject in the social sciences more contentious than the causes of violence and war. Multidisciplinary attempts to answer the questions of 'Why is war thought? Why is war fought?'[366] have produced different results and at times 'irreducible discrepancies' between explanations and most importantly incommunicability between approaches. The lack of integrative development referred to above is particularly acute when it refers to overarching frameworks for the analysis of contemporary armed conflict phenomena in all its complexity and varied forms. This is especially limiting for the researcher-analyst whose objective may be the development of knowledge in a particular aspect of violent armed conflicts, such as this study's effort at theoretical development of mediation as a tool for the resolution of armed conflicts.

In fact, in many instances the conflict researcher finds him or herself obliged to devote a considerable time either on original conflict analysis theory development, or in a less costly but equally time-consuming fashion, on the development of an eclectic framework made of 'bits and pieces' of other theories and frameworks. This process bears a striking resemblance to the assembly of a quilt through the collection of pieces, patches and patterns of particular importance for the overall theme chosen. Yet, neither direction is simple or straightforward and both contain potential pitfalls and at times serious limitations, all too common for the social scientist. For the purposes of the present study, we have opted for the latter approach. In this sense, while not developing an original and full blown analytical conflict theory, the following pages and the remainder of this Part One will attempt the *construction* of an analytical conflict framework capable of approaching armed conflict as complex, multi-level and dynamic phenomena.

The origins of violence and war have been discussed at length within the field of international relations as well as more recently in conflict research and peace studies. The concern in explaining why violence occurs is nevertheless a much older human activity. We find this concern in ancient China as well as in European classical civilizations. We find it in medieval

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[365] Reviews of the 'state-of-the-art' can be found in *inter alia* John Vasquez's assessment of quantitative international relations research in 'Statistical Findings in International Politics: a Data-Based Assessment', International Studies Quarterly, No. 20 (2), 1976, p.171-218 as well as his 'The Steps to War: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings', World Politics, No. 40, 1987, p. 108-145. Also Kalevi Holsti, 'Ecological and Clausewitzian Approaches to the Study of War: Assessing the possibilities', Paper presented at the 30th Anniversary Convention of the International Studies Association, 1989, London as well as his 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, which are the Fairest Theories of All?', in International Studies Quarterly, No. 33 (3), 1989, p.255-61 and his Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

[366] These famous questions were raised by conflict research pioneer Quincy Wright in his masterpiece A Study of War, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1966, p.20. Also quoted in Jabri, Op. Cit. p. 3.

Europe as well as the philosophers of the Enlightenment.[367] Traditionally, the causes of war and the conditions of peace have been studied either from a philosophical perspective or from a historical point of view focusing on each case's uniqueness. In fact, it is only relatively recently that these subjects have been theorised about in a general way.[368]

Within the field of International Relations, the discussion of the causes of war has generally tended to follow what is termed a 'level-of-analysis' orientation.[369] In this section we will discuss the applicability of the 'levels-of-analysis' framework for an understanding of contemporary conflicts as well as providing an initial discussion of the concept of 'levels-of-analysis' itself. As will be seen below, these two very different but complementary dimensions of the 'level-of-analysis' problem require some clarification, although for the purposes of this thesis we will devote more attention to the analytical capability of the 'level-of-analysis' approach as applies to contemporary conflicts rather than the more theoretical ontological discussion of the suitability of a levelled approach to the *international realm* or the theoretical suitability of each of the levels chosen. In this sense, while analytically, a 'level-of-analysis' approach should 'be evaluated in terms of their usefulness in generating theoretically important and empirically valid hypothesis to help us understand the dynamics of global politics [in our case armed conflict]', we should also point out that there is more to a 'level-of-analysis' approach then mere analytical capability.[370]

Moreover, as a tool for the analysis of international relations, the 'levels-of-analysis' framework has dominated theory for several decades. Yet, as Buzan points out, while 'the work of several generations of academics has been shaped by it to such an extent that it is

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[367] In fact, the discussion of the fundamental nature of men and its impact on the aetiology of violent armed conflict has produced an immensely rich body of literature throughout the ages. From the Greek classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, to the religious writers of the Middle Ages, to late eighteenth century observers of the French revolution such as Rousseau and Burke to nineteenth century writers such as Hegel or Kant, the quest for the essential nature of man has been un-relentless.

[368] As pointed out by Nicholson, 'grand theories of war have appeared as features of grand theories of society, but the analysis of war has taken the form of detailed analysis of particular wars, rather than the analysis of war as an aspect of human behaviour in a way analogous to that in which economic behaviour is analysed'. Michael Nicholson. Conflict Analysis. The English University Press, London, 1970, p.19.

[369] For an in-depth discussion of the development of the level-of-analysis problem in international relations refer to *inter alia,* Barry Buzan. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered', in International Relations Theory Today, Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Eds), Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995. Also J. David Singer. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations', in The International System. Theoretical Essays. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Eds), Princeton University Press, 1961. Reprinted by Greewood Press Publishers, 1982; W. B. Moul, 'The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited', in Canadian Journal of Political Science, 61 (1), 1973, p.494-513. For an application of this framework in the discussion of the leading theories of international conflict refer to among others, Jack S Levy. 'Contending Theories of International Conflict: a Level-of-Analysis Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996; and also Dennis J.D. Sandole's 'Paradigms, theories, and metaphors in conflict and conflict resolution: Coherence or Confusion?', in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application, Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Editors), Manchester University Press, 1993

[370] Jack S Levy. 'Contending Theories of International Conflict: a Level-of-Analysis Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.4.

now crucial to an understanding of a good deal of the discipline's theoretical discourse', in reality, 'within the discipline the literature on levels as an idea in its own right is remarkably thin considering the huge impact that the idea has had on the way international research is conducted'.[371]

The main reason for this state of affairs is that the 'level-of-analysis approach' possesses two very different, if complementary dimensions. In fact, there is no agreement on what 'levels-of-analysis' are supposed to represent because of 'a widespread failure to distinguish between sources of explanation and objects of analysis', a disagreement which gave this approach the appropriate term of 'the level-of-analysis problem'.[372] The 'level-of-analysis approach' became a 'problem' in international relations theory partly because it has been indiscriminately used as a tool to classify and discuss independent variables that explain the occurrence of war at various levels of the social spectrum (i.e. variables at the individual, state or system levels) as well as used to discuss and identify the dependent variable or the type of entity whose behaviour is to be explained (i.e. questioning the adequacy of the choice of levels, for example, as well as the usefulness of a levelled approach).[373]

Looking at the development of the idea itself may provide a number of clues. What later became known as 'levels-of analysis'[374] was originally proposed under the term 'images of international relations' by Kenneth Waltz in his very influential 'Man, the State and War'.[375] Endeavouring what in essence was an epistemological discussion[376], Kenneth Waltz suggests that an appropriate way to discuss and critically evaluate the multitude of approaches and theories on the causes of inter-state war was to divide them in terms of where along the social spectrum they locate the fundamental nexus of war causality. Within

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[371] Barry Buzan. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered', in International Relations Theory Today, Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Eds), Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 215 and p.202.

[372] Barry Buzan. Op. Cit. p. 198.

[373] To this respect see Jack S Levy. 'Contending Theories of International Conflict: a Level-of-Analysis Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.4.

[374] After the publication of 'Man, the State and War', the shift from 'images of international relations' to 'levels of analysis' was essentially a result of two authors: J. David Singer. 'International Conflict. Three Levels of Analysis', in World Politics, Review Article, Volume 12, Issue 3, April 1960, p.453-461 where Singer replaces the term 'images' with 'levels'. In the first page of this review article this authors conflates both terms by saying that 'the treatise under review is a commendable exception to our tendency to 'bootleg' assumptions, consciously or otherwise, into our research and teaching; as such, it is a welcome and valuable addition to the literature of what many of us view as a nascent discipline. But Prof. Waltz's book is more than that; it is, in effect an examination of these assumptions, which find their way inevitably into every piece of description, analysis, or prescription in international political relations. These assumptions lead into, and flow from, the level of social organisation, which the observer selects as his point of entry into any study of the subject. For Waltz, there are three such levels of analysis: the individual, the state and the state system'. Op. cit. p.453.

[375] Kenneth Waltz. Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1959.

[376] Epistemology understood as 'the theory of knowledge especially as regards its methods and validation'. Oxford Reference English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1995, 1996.

the vast literature on the causes of war, Waltz identified three main orientations as regards what for each of the authors discussed was the critical cause of war. Terming these orientations 'images of international relations' Waltz divided the extensive literature under discussion into three headings: the 'individual image', the 'nation-state image' and finally the 'state-system image'.[377]

Therefore, authors who emphasised that war was a product of human nature would be included in the first image or level[378]; authors who highlighted that war was a product of the nature of states were included in the second image[379]; finally, authors for whom the nature of the international system (the system of states) was the main factor causing war were included in the third image.[380]

As a consequence, in its original conceptualisation, 'images of international relations' as an analytical framework was epistemologically driven and about ordering and critically examining the underlying assumptions and logical consequences of approaches to the knowledge of the causes of war (stemming from various disciplines) in terms of whether the individual, the state or the international system were privileged as primary sources of explanation.[381] As an effort

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[377] In Waltz's own words, 'Where are the major causes of war to be found? The answers are bewildering in their variety and in their contradictory qualities. To make this variety manageable, the answers can be ordered under the following three headings: within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system'. Ibid. p.12.

[378] Waltz's 'first image analysts' approach international conflict at the microscopic level. Among some of the authors reviewed, Waltz considered as pessimists (taking human nature as immutable and unmodifiable) Augustine and Spinoza, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau. In his review article Singer points out that the pessimists accept 'man's fixed and unchanging capacity for evil, [and] they tend to view domestic and international violence as the inevitable by-products of human existence, mitigated only by the fear of overwhelming coercive authority'. Within the optimist camp Waltz discusses the behavioural sciences and their fundamental premise that it is possible to change men. He discusses anthropologists such as Leighton and Margaret Mead; psychiatrists and psychologists such as Allport, Miller and Cantril and sociologists such as Cottrell and Bernard. Waltz's is rather critical of the optimism of first image analysts. According to Singer 'Waltz finds his major source of grievance in the behavioural scientists' naiveté and ignorance of the political context within which individuals develop their values and attitudes or seek to realise their ambitions'. J. David Singer. 'International Conflict. Three Levels of Analysis', in World Politics, Review Article, Volume 12, Issue 3, April 1960, p.454-455.

[379] Waltz's 'second image analysts' base their analysis of the causes of war in the nature of states stemming from their political institutions, modes of production and distribution, the type of elites and the characteristics of the population. Waltz evaluates the claims of Marxism and the international socialist movement in order to critically evaluate the second image possibilities. Among others he looks at Hobson revisionism and Leninist Imperialist theory. J David Singer is highly critical of Waltz's approach to second level analysts. He says that 'moreover (and Waltz fails to note this), the belief that there are good and bad states not only does nothing to help solve the problem of war, but helps to assure that when war comes, it will be fought in a crusading, ideological, and hyperbolic fashion...'. J. David Singer. 'International Conflict. Three Levels of Analysis', in World Politics, Review Article, Volume 12, Issue 3, April 1960, p.458.

[380] 'Third image analysts' root the causes of war in the nature of the international system, where no automatic harmony exists and where anarchy is paramount in relations between states. Third image analysts consider that the absence of an effective power or authority at the international level capable of regulating conflicts between states is at the root of international conflict. Waltz chooses Rousseau as his 'third image analyst'. He looks at balance-of-power as a normative and prescriptive requirement for national survival. Contrary to Rousseau, Waltz does not believe that world government is attainable in practice. Interestingly, Singer considers that 'in the conviction that the world's people and their states are not ready for supranational institutions they [Waltz and Morgenthau] are joined by almost all of their colleagues in the field; and in this conviction they unwittingly discard the third level of analysis and embrace the futile simplicities of the first and second image'. J. David Singer. Op. cit. p.459.

[381] To this respect, J. David singer posits that 'what the author attempts here is an examination of the assumptions which lead an observer to select one of these three levels of analysis, and the theoretical and conceptual results which eventuate from such a selection. His major concern is that of ascertaining which level offers the most fruitful approach to answering the question: what are the sources and causes of war?'. J. David Singer. Op. cit. p.453.

to critically discuss and evaluate a large number of approaches to the causes of war, the apparently simple framework developed in 'Man, the State and War' did not attempt a discussion of the suitability of a levelled approach *per se* or for that matter the choice of 'levels' or 'images' as appropriate objects of analysis in and of themselves as regards an understanding of international relations.[382]

Nevertheless, although in 'Man, the State and War' the author undertakes no serious ontological discussion of the very concept of 'levels-of-analysis'[383], it must be recognised that the use of such a framework implies an underlying ontological stance, even if not objectively stated.[384] In fact, one of the reasons for the current confusion as regards 'levels-of-analysis' (i.e. are levels-of-analysis sources of explanation or objects of analysis in and of themselves?) stems from the tendency in international relations theory to conflate 'Man, the State and War' both with Singer's review article[385] and his now famous 1961 article entitled 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations'[386], as well as more importantly with Waltz's own structuralist theory developed in his 'Theory of International Politics'.[387] As will be discussed below, a great part of the discussion around 'levels-of-analysis' in International Relations develops around the introduction of systemic analysis, greatly a result of the works mentioned, to the study of international relations.

Both of Singer's articles as well as the ground-breaking book by Morton Kaplan 'System and Process in International Politics' introduced the second and perhaps more important dimension to the 'level-of-analysis' approach as regards international relations' theoretical development. This second dimension of the 'level-of-analysis' has become critical as regards international relations theory because it focuses on the levels themselves as the 'objects' of analysis. If we take Buzan's definition of levels of analysis as being about 'how to identify and treat different types of location in which sources of explanation for observed phenomena can

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[382] Waltz says that 'one may seek in political philosophy answers to the question: Where are the major causes of war to be found? The answers are bewildering in their variety and in their contradictory qualities. To make this variety manageable, the answers can be ordered under the following three headings: within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system...these three estimates of cause will subsequently be referred to as images of international relations, numbered in the order given, with each image defined according to where one locates the nexus of important causes'. Kenneth Waltz. Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1959, p.12.

[383] Note that the same applies to both Jack Levy and Dennis Sandole.

[384] In fact, there is no serious ontological concern throughout 'Man the State and War' and nowhere in the book does Waltz discuss ontologically the concept of 'levels-of-analysis' as well as its constituents as objects of analysis in their own right. A careful reading of this work will reveal this.

[385] J. David Singer. 'International Conflict. Three Levels of Analysis', in World Politics, Review Article, Volume 12, Issue 3, April 1960, p.453-461.

[386] J. David Singer. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations', in The International System. Theoretical Essays. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Eds), Princeton University Press, 1961. Reprinted by Greewood Press Publishers, 1982. In this article, Singer provides the first ontological discussion of 'levels-of-analysis' discussing two of the levels that he considers the most important: the international system level and the national state.

[387] Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1979.

be found' we are at this juncture in the identification, and therefore ontological stage, because it concerns 'the number and type of entities that are thought to actually exist in the international system'.[388] According to Moul, this ontological dimension of the level-of-analysis sees levels as being about 'different units of analysis' while the other (referred to previously as epistemological) dimension sees them as being about 'the types of variables that explain a particular unit's behaviour'.[389]

This ontological dimension of the 'levels-of-analysis problem' permeated the field of International Relations, traditionally concerned with the causes of war, following the attempt by the behavioural movement during the 1950s and 1960s to apply scientific methods in an effort to encourage a more scientific positivist approach in the discipline. Waltz, Singer and Kaplan's introduction of system as a level in its own right was perceived as a positive step towards scientificity and more importantly it gave international relations a *niche* increasing 'the distinctiveness of international relations as a field'.[390] Morton Kaplan and J. David Singer gave the initial impetus to what later became known with the publication of 'Theory of International Politics'[391] by Waltz, as the neo-realist or structural realist approach.[392]

Kenneth Waltz's 'Theory of International Politics' represented an effort to bring some scientificity to realism, through the introduction of the notions of international system and system structure in the study of International Relations while retaining the nucleus of the realist research program. Furthermore, of more relevance for the present thesis are the

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[388] Barry Buzan. Op. cit. p.202 and p.199. To this respect Jack Levy points out that 'the level-of-analysis concept is sometimes used in a different way, to refer not to the independent causal variable but instead to the dependent variable- that is, to the type of entity (individual, organisation, state or system) whose behaviour is to be explained'. Levy, Jack S. 'Contending Theories of International Conflict: a Level-of-Analysis Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.4.

[389] W. B. Moul, 'The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited', in Canadian Journal of Political Science, 61 (1), 1973, p.495. Also quoted in Buzan, Op. Cit. p. 203.

[390] Recognising the 'nit fit between the idea of levels, and the natural division of the subject matter into individuals, states and system' the next step on the 'level-of-analysis' problem was precisely two interrelated questions: how many and what levels and also the criteria according to which these levels should be defined and differentiated. Buzan, Op. Cit. p.201, 202.

[391] Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1979.

[392] Morton Kaplan's 1957 'System and Process in International Politics' and J David Singer's influential article 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations' both contributed to the incorporation of this framework in mainstream International Relations Theory. Kaplan's 1957 'System and Process in International Politics' launched the discussion and development of system types based around the patterns in the distribution of power as well as the configuration of alliances with a bias towards the dominance of the state level. Three years later, Singer's 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations' attempts a discussion of the ontological aspects of the level of analysis framework focusing on the 'more widely employed levels of analysis: the international system and the national sub-systems'. J. David Singer. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations', in The International System. Theoretical Essays. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Eds), Princeton University Press, 1961. Reprinted by Greewood Press Publishers, 1982, p.78. Interestingly, this author refers to Waltz's 'Man the State and War' in this article in the following terms which reinforce the perspective held here that this book was mainly an epistemological effort: 'an important pioneering attempt to deal with some of the implications of one's level of analysis, however, is Kenneth Waltz, *Man the State and War*...but Waltz restricts himself to a consideration of these implications as they impinge on the question of the causes of war'.

consequences that structural realism/neo-realism have in terms of the study of the causes and types of war, in particular the limitations of this approach when dealing with contemporary armed conflicts. As our discussion of the 'Big Wars versus Little Wars' typology in chapter 2.2. above made clear, structural realism is the *locus* of the 'Big War versus Little War' typology. Yet, for all the explanatory power of such theory as regards system altering conflicts[393], the very premises of structural realism limit its applicability to the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts, which are, as was mentioned previously, fought within state borders and not classical inter-state wars.[394]

Because neo-realism takes as the primary aim of a systems theory to explain changes across systems, not within them, it does not take into consideration the study of states and statesmen, elites and bureaucracies, and sub-national and trans-national actors but privileges systemic level explanations. States are taken as 'like-units' of international political systems, and are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform but solely in their abilities to perform them.

Yet, for the purposes of contemporary conflict analysis are 'levels-of-analysis' useful and if so, in which of their dimensions? We believe that both dimensions are equally important. Ontologically, most scholars accept at least three levels (although many variations have been suggested): the individual (often focused on decision-makers), unit (usually state, but potentially any group of humans designated as an actor) and system. As Buzan rightly points out 'the important issue in international relations theory is which units of analysis and which sources of explanation tell us more about any given event or phenomenon'.[395] It has become obvious that contemporary events in international relations must be explained with more than just structural causes. While structural determinism resonated with the Cold War parameters in which world politics functioned and in particular Waltz's focus on the number of major powers in the system and his defence of bipolarity as a stable and desirable structure, contemporary international relations requires from the analyst an increasing understanding of what goes on at other levels of the social spectrum.

What about the contribution of the epistemological dimension to 'levels-of-analysis' in particular as regards the study of the causes of war? Does 'Man, the State and War' provide positive insights in the analysis of contemporary armed conflicts? Or was it simply a very

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[393] As was previously seen, the theoretical underpinning of such definition of systemic/global/world wars is the belief that their consequences change the international system. These wars are said to fundamentally alter the international system, 'rearranging political and social institutions in ways that are much more consequential than the cumulative impact of many lesser conflicts'.

[394] Nevertheless, a promising research programme has been developed around the effects of system change (i.e. the end of the Cold War) on the occurrence of contemporary conflicts.

[395] Barry Buzan, Op. Cit. p.212.

important attempt to critically review in a single book the extensive literature on the causes of war by using 'levels-of-analysis' as an organisational 'device'? We believe not. There is another and perhaps more important epistemological contribution of this work to the understanding of the causes of war, particularly relevant to the current form that armed conflicts assume. This contribution is often overlooked in the literature in part due to the indiscriminate application of the criticisms voiced against neo-realism/ structural realism to this earlier work, as was pointed out earlier.[396]

The critical contribution of 'Man, the State and War' concerns Kenneth Waltz's proposition that all three images are crucial for an understanding of the causes of war. In his own words, 'some combination of our three images, rather than any one of them, may be required for an accurate understanding of international relations...in other words, understanding the likely consequences of any one cause may depend on understanding its relation to other causes'.[397] That a consideration of all three images is of critical importance is clearly revealed by the following passage: 'so fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two'. In fact, he says that 'the vogue of an image varies with time and place, but no single image is ever adequate' and that the result of a focus on a single image may 'distort one's interpretation of the others'.[398]

Waltz recognised the fact that war and armed conflict have more than one cause and that 'causes can be found in more than one type of location'.[399] While the analyst may start from one of the levels identified, the need for taking into account all three images is critical in that 'the prescriptions directly derived from a single image are incomplete because they are based upon partial analyses. The partial quality of each image sets up a tension that drives one toward inclusion of the others'.[400] This observation strongly resonates with our criticisms of both the ethnic conflict type as well as the resource-war type.

It has been pointed out by several authors that 'Man, the State and War' provides a 'devastating critique of the first two [images] and concludes that any explanation of war must

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[396] Besides Levy, Buzan and Sandole a notable exception as been Edward E. Azar. See his The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Theory and Cases. Darmouth Publishing Company, 1990, p.6.

[397] Kenneth Waltz. Op. Cit. p.14.

[398] Manus Midlarsky provides us with insights into this problem: 'whether consciously or unconsciously, investigators generally focus on one level or another as a necessary demarcation of research boundaries. I will take no position on the utility of one or another of these levels of analysis because, as we shall see, all have a major contribution to make, but in different ways'. Manus I Midlarsky, Introduction, in Handbook of War Studies, pp.xiii-xiv, Manus I Midlarsky (Ed), The University of Michigan Press, 1993 Originally published by Unwin Hyman, 1989.

[399] Barry Buzan. 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered', in International Relations Theory Today, Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Eds), Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 198.

[400] Ibid. p.186.

recognise that it is a product of social formations and more specifically the anarchical inter-state system'.[401] Yet, although this may be a conclusion that can adequately be deducted from Waltz's 'Theory of International Politics' it does not apply to 'Man, the State and War'. Because Waltz's concern is with inter-state war he does emphasise the crucial importance of the third image considering that this image represents 'the framework of action' for states and so 'makes clear the misleading quality of such partial analysis [individual and state level] and of the hopes that are often based upon them'.[402]

In this sense, while the third image should be taken as 'a theory of the conditioning effects of the state system itself'[403] if the structure of the state system (in the sense of institutionalised restraints and institutionalised methods of altering and adjusting interests) 'is to be called cause at all, it had best be specified that it is a permissive or underlying cause of war'.[404] Consequently, the structure of the state system does not directly cause war between two states because 'whether or not that attack occurs will depend on a number of special circumstances- location, size, power, interest, type of government, past history and tradition- each of which will influence the actions of both states'. As a result, 'these special reasons become the immediate, or efficient, causes of war. These immediate causes of war are contained in the first and second images' and 'variations in the factors included in the first and second images are important, indeed crucial, in the making and breaking of periods of peace- the immediate causes of every war must be either the acts of individuals or the acts of states'.[405] In this sense,

> ...the third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict the results.[406]

Singer regards this last quote as the closest Waltz gets to successfully interrelating the three levels of analysis. He goes on to say that, 'true as this may be, and granting that this trichomotisation is a somewhat artificial device, we are still confronted with a question of genuine theoretical and policy importance: at which level are we to begin in an effort to

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[401] Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.8-9.

[402] Kenneth Waltz. Op. Cit. p.230.

[403] Waltz very clearly states that 'we still have to look to motivation and circumstance in order to explain individual acts'. Ibid. p.231.

[404] Ibid. p.231-232.

[405] Ibid. p.232. The role of the international environment as a permissive cause is important because immediate causes do not provide sufficient explanation for the wars that have occurred. This distinction between underlying and efficient causes is fundamental in our own analysis and will be developed below, in section 4.2.

[406] Kenneth Waltz. Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1959, p.238.

discover- and subsequently mitigate- the causes of war?'.[407] Yet, although the importance of multi-level analysis has been established, a central problem remains: 'if two or more units and sources of explanation are operating together, how are their different analyses to be assembled into a whole understanding'?[408]

As a consequence, although we have established the importance of multi-level analysis, we are still lacking a method to weight factors and variables operating at different levels as well as the subsequent reassembling of the analysis into a coherent whole, for we lack the appropriate means to weight these same variables in the analysis of any real situation. Dennis Sandole recently attempted to develop an 'empirical version of Waltz' in his book entitled 'Capturing the Complexity of Conflict'.[409] This author sets out to develop a model explanation that emphasises dynamics and the interplay of variables at different levels over time, aiming for integrative cumulation of existing multilevel theories of conflict.

Sandole's multi-level, multi-dimensional framework includes 'the decision-making, societal, and trans-societal levels', corresponding to Waltz's individual, state and international (and inclusive of North's, 1990, global ecological) levels. Such framework is developed 'in response to the fragmented, bivariate nature of quantitative studies of war' as 'a multi-level map and pretheory of variables operative at the trans-societal, societal, and decision-making levels that may be relevant to the initiation and escalation of violent conflict and war'.[410] The resulting multi-level framework or map can be seen in the table below:

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[407] J. David Singer. 'International Conflict. Three Levels of Analysis', in World Politics, Review Article, Volume 12, Issue 3, April 1960, p.460.

[408] Barry Buzan, Op. cit. p.213. Note that an exception to this as been, as was pointed out above, 'structuration theory'. Jack Levy for example says that 'it is logically possible, and in fact often desirable, to combine variables from different levels of analysis in causal explanations. Independent variables from one level can be used to explain dependent variables at another level, and variables from several levels can be combined in an explanation of a single dependent variable'. Jack S. Levy. 'Contending Theories of International Conflict: a Level-of-Analysis Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.4-5.

[409] Dennis J. D. Sandole. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era. Pinter, London and New York, 1999.

[410] Dennis J. D. Sandole. Op. Cit., p.18 and p.178.

Table 3: Sandole's Multi-Level Framework[411]

I. Decision Making Level	II. Societal Level	III. Trans-societal level
A. Personal (attributes of decision makers) 1. Biological/ physiological dimension 2. Psychological dimension 1. Dogmatism 2. Authoritarianism 3. Political cynicism 4. Personal Cynicism 5. Political Efficacy 6. Need for achievement 7. Need for affiliation 8. Need for Power 3. Physical/ material dimension **B. Spatial/ temporal dimension (attributes of decision-making group)** 1. Size dimension 9. Sub-systemic environmental complexity 2. Structure dimension 3. Stress dimension 10. Temporal overload	**A. Social** 1. The social system and its recent behaviours 2. Social distance from other societal actors 3. Social relationships with other societal actors 4. Recent outgoing and incoming behaviours with respect to other societal actors **B. Political/ Legal** 1. The political/legal systems and their recent behaviours 11. Domestic instability 2. Political/legal distance 3. Political/ legal relationships 4. Recent outgoing and incoming behaviours **C. Economic** 1. Economic system and its recent behaviours 2. Economic distance 3. Recent outgoing and incoming behaviours 12. Relative economic status 13. Relative economic deprivation **D. Defence** 1. The defence system and its recent behaviours 2. Defence distance 3. Defence relationships 4. Recent outgoing and incoming behaviours 14. Manifest distrust 15. Change in manifest distrust 16. Bellicosity 17. Changes in bellicosity 18. Alliances 19. Aggressive attacks 20. Changes in aggressive attacks 21. Attack victim	**A. Human made environment** 1. Societal actors a. Total number and distribution by type 22. Systemic environmental complexity b. Types of inter-societal subsystems and systems c. Stability 23. Systemic attack contagion 2. Transsocietal actors a. Organisations (1) Governmental (2) Non governmental b. Groups **B. Natural Environment** 1. Natural resources 2. Climate

[411] Dennis J. D. Sandole. Op. Cit. p.19, 20.

This author investigated the role of variables located in different levels throughout the life cycle of conflicts, which he divided in three successive periods: early, intermediate and late stages of a conflict systems' development.[412] Hypotheses on relationships between independent variables and five dependent (conflict) variables are developed and then tested through their measurement over time using data generated by a particular type of gaming-simulation, the Prisoners' Dilemma Simulation or PDS.

Sandole found that 'across the early, intermediate and late stages, there is an increasing trend toward societal-level primacy, followed by various degrees of decision-making dominance in second and third place. The trans-societal level is primary across the three stages for only one of the four foreign conflict models: alliances. Accordingly, Waltz's hypothesis has been explicitly supported in only some cases: for the four foreign conflict models at the early stage and for the 'alliance' models across the three stages, as well as for the 'manifest distrust' model for PDS 1-5 combined'.[413] The interpretation of these findings reinforces the view that, not only are all levels important, but that their importance changes throughout a conflict's life cycle.

The results obtained show a clear trend from trans-societal dominance at the early stages of a conflict model, to societal dominance by the late stage. Societal variables and trans-societal variables are both important in the intermediate stage although societal variables achieved dominance in three of the models for the intermediate stage. Furthermore, Sandole found that as societal actors in the PDS moved across developmental stages they were,

> ...characterised less by environmental- and more by *self-stimulation* of conflict, thereby reinforcing Most and Starr's (1989) claim that different theories and models might apply to phenomena occurring under different conditions (e.g. stages of development) and at different levels of analysis, and that a focus on *process* might be more useful than one on *static* events, attributes, and structures.[414]

In terms of the decision-making level, although this level achieved primacy in only one case, Sandole points out to the fact that 'we cannot dismiss as negligible the fact that psychological factors appear in 40 percent of the models: in one case as the most potent dimensions and in three other cases as the second most potent dimension'. Furthermore, one should not lose 'sight of the possibility...that certain high-potency independent variables may enter a model

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[412] In Sandole's words: 'the stepwise procedure was then used to develop models for each of the dependent variables for each of the three developmental stages...in addition to exploring possible differences between the aggregated and disaggregated models, one objective here was to test Waltz at different levels of development: when systems were relatively youthful, when they were into their 'middle years', and when they were mature...'. Ibid. p.74-75.

[413] Ibid. p.78. The author also notes that the trend towards societal level dominance was constituted by particular variables, namely the variables of "lagged aggressive attacks', 'lagged distrust', 'lagged bellicosity' for the corresponding models. He therefore points out that 'it was not only the societal level but apparent *self-stimulating/ self-perpetuating conflict processes* which developed into a dominated trend across the three stages...'. Ibid. p.79.

[414] Dennis J. D. Sandole. Op. Cit., p. 179.

only because other variables, like the psychological ones, have been brought into the relational system'.[415] This conclusion is extremely important opening the way for the observation that '*it is not only the static identification of what variables might be worth looking at -conflict-as-startup conditions- but also the identification of dynamic processes that might overtake these static startup conditions: conflict-as-process* [my emphasis]...[416]

In this way, a critical finding of this study regards the need to distinguish between *conflict-as-startup conditions* and *conflict-as-process.* The trend found across the three stages of conflict system's development of self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes is extremely important in evaluating the relationship between different variables located at different levels through time. 'Conflict-as-startup conditions' is seen to generate 'conflict-as-process', and 'once process comes to characterise conflict, it does not matter how (or when) the conflict started'. As a result, 'different start-up-conditions can lead to the same process (initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance', a condition defined as *equifinality.* [417]

Conflict-as-process means that after some point in the conflict cycle (be it during escalation or controlled maintenance), conflict itself may become the main source of its own continuation and protractedness. Lund refers to this in the following terms: '*once some level of significant violence has begun* [sic], it is prone to escalate because an interactive process of attack and retaliation leads to a self-perpetuating cycle'.[418] This distinction is critical in the sense that over time 'conflict-as-process' may be more important than 'conflict-as-startup conditions'. Yet, even though the process might drive the conflict, 'if the conflict is undergirded by long-term start-up conditions...even if conflict-as-process were to cease...it might be resurrected unless the conflict-as-startup conditions were dealt with meaningfully for all concerned...when previous process interacts with, blends into, and strengthens conflict-as-startup conditions, conflict-as-process is always ready to be rekindled'.[419]

From the point of view of conflict resolution this distinction has produced a 'two culture problem' considered by Sandole to have immense consequences:

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[415] Ibid. p.104.

[416] Ibid. p.109-110.

[417] Ibid. p.129. Furthermore, the author says that 'what is important to realise here is that, although parties to conflict may wind up killing each other, they may have come to that point from different 'startup conditions' (equifinality)'. Ibid. p.112.

[418] Michael S Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1996, p.133-34.

[419] Furthermore Sandole adds that 'meaningful' here means, for example, the satisfaction of the parties' *procedural, substantive, and psychological* interests' and that, consequently, 'conflict-as-startup conditions can remain in the long-term memories and folklore of the actors concerned, surfacing from time to time through the various modes of cultural expression (e.g. songs and stories): "buttons" to be pushed in the event that certain conditions are present (e.g. unemployment, minority groups as candidates for scapegoat status, collapse of political or other systems)'. Ibid. p. 133 and 130.

> ...as in the treatment of phobias and anxiety/panic attacks, each of which, like our conflict-as-process, can take "on a life of its own" (Mathias, 1994), there is a version of the "two culture problem" operative here. There are those in the field (e.g. conflict analysts, peace researchers) who concentrate on conflict-as-startup conditions, as psychoanalysts do in the treatment of phobias, while there are others (e.g. conflict resolution theorists/researchers, facilitators, conciliators, mediators) who concentrate on conflict-as-process, as cognitive therapists do in the treatment of phobias.[420]

It is necessary therefore to concentrate on process as much as on start-up conditions and 'in a way which connects it to start-up conditions'. In terms of conflict resolution theory, 'it should take into account conflict-as-process as well as conflict-as-startup conditions, with the recognition that, over time in the development of any particular conflict system, the emphasis may shift from startup to process as the dominant driving force...although *practice* must concentrate initially on process, subsequently it should deal with the startup conditions as well'.[421]

Nevertheless, a final comment seems appropriate. Although submitting these findings to a thorough validation assessment, Sandole warns that these conclusions should not be taken as 'law-like' regularities and makes a great effort to highlight the fact that these findings 'did not result in the discovery of any 'laws' of violent conflict and war'. Above all, and for our purposes here, Sandole's findings reveal two very important requirements for conflict analysis. First, in the analysis of any particular conflict it is crucial to weight variables located at different levels-of-analysis in different stages of a conflict cycle's development. In this regard, more than law-like regularities, what the results of the PDS experiment demonstrate is that the impact of different levels-of-analysis varies during the duration of any particular conflict. Second, this experiment revealed that there are important elements, which result from a conflict's development and contribute to its perpetuation. As will be seen in the next section, the distinction between start-up-conditions and process-conditions is critical for it introduces the need to incorporate into conflict analysis and consequently resolution, variables resulting from violent conflict itself.

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[420] Ibid. p.131.

[421] Ibid.

4.2. The Multi-Level Nature and Dynamic Life-Cycles of Armed Conflicts: Towards a Contemporary Analytical Framework

> ...there is no single cause of a conflict. Nor is there often any single precondition for sustainable peace. Different factors vary in importance, and reinforce or neutralise each other. The analysis of the situation must therefore include assessing the relative importance of the different indicators and their inter-relationship.[422]

In the pages above we considered that both the ontological as well as the epistemological dimensions of 'level-of-analysis' are equally relevant for the analysis of armed conflict. Following the position of several academics, we accepted three initial ontological levels of analysis: the individual (often focused on decision-makers), unit (usually state, but potentially any group of humans designated as an actor) and system levels. Epistemologically, we discussed the need for approaching the causes of war bearing in mind that any one conflict will have more than one cause and that causes can be found in more than one type of location. Consequently, single-cause or single factor explanations of war over-simplify a very complex social phenomenon and should therefore be avoided.[423]

Following the assumption of multi-causality, we confirmed that methodologically it is crucial to dynamically look at different levels of analysis to explain war and armed conflict. The need to dynamically evaluate the importance of different levels throughout a conflict's life cycle is therefore a methodological requirement if anything like a comprehensive understanding of a particular armed conflict situation is to be achieved. Therefore, is not sufficient to statically identify operating variables worth looking at (what Sandole termed conflict-as-startup conditions) but also, and perhaps equally crucial, to identify the dynamic processes that may overtake these static startup conditions (conflict-as-process).[424] As was previously discussed, conflict processes themselves introduce added variables that contribute to the protractedness and escalation of violent conflicts.

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[422] Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). Conflict Analysis and Response Definition. Abridged Methodology, London, April 2001, p.7. http://www.fewer.org/research/index.htm

[423] Vivienne Jabri points out that 'the history of human political violence has shown that we cannot produce monocausal explanations of war'. Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.3. Referring to internal conflicts, Michael Brown adds that 'it must be emphasised that the best scholarly studies of internal conflict are powerful precisely because they do not rely on single-factor explanations. Instead they try to weave several factors into a more complex argument'. Brown, Michael E. 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p.574.

[424] In this regard we discussed how psychological variables operating at the individual decision-making level contribute to the development of self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes in their own right, becoming an important source for the continuation and protractedness of any given conflict. As was pointed out earlier, this distinction between 'conflict-as-process' and 'conflict-as-startup conditions' was considered fundamental if conflict resolution efforts are to be successful. As regards conflict resolution it is therefore necessary to concentrate both in conflict-as-process as well as conflict-as-startup conditions. This will be dealt at length in the next Part, dedicated to conflict resolution.

That the identification of a conflict's 'start-up conditions' is critical is evidenced by the gradual incorporation into mainstream conflict analysis of what are variously termed 'underlying causes'[425], 'structural dimensions or sources of latent and open conflict'[426], 'structural components'[427], 'structural factors' as will be seen below.[428] This has been particularly the case in the field of conflict early warning systems, confirming our assertion that single-cause explanations of violent conflict and war should be avoided.[429] In fact, contemporary conflict analysis has found that conflicts tend to develop in environments characterised by structural factors, which 'form the pre-conditions of crisis situations, such as systemic political exclusion, shifts in demographic balance, entrenched economic inequities, economic decline and ecological deterioration'.[430]

In the last chapter we purposively left unanswered the following question raised by J David Singer: 'at which level are we to begin in an effort to discover- and subsequently mitigate- the causes of war?'.[431] If, following Waltz, Scott, Levy and Sandole, explanations located at different levels should be added together and assigned relative weights in relation to any given analysis, the choice of an initial analytical level seems to be related primarily with whether that particular level, in the words of Buzan, tells the analyst more about any given event or phenomenon. More importantly, while the analyst may start from one of the levels identified, it is crucial to take into account all other levels. In this sense, at what level do we begin when analysing contemporary armed conflicts?

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[425] See for example, Michael E. Brown. 'Introduction', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p.1-33. As well as his 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p. 571-603.

[426] Jonathan Goodhand, with Tony Vaux and Robert Walker. Guide to Conflict Assessment, United Nations Development Programme/ Department for International Development, Third Draft, Unpublished, September 2001, p.11. For these authors, structural analysis entails looking at the long-term factors underlying violent conflict.

[427] See Charles King. Ending Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 308, London, 1997, p.29.

[428] Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). Conflict Analysis and Response Definition. Abridged Methodology, London, April 2001, p.3. http://www.fewer.org/research/index.htm. See also The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Risk Assessment Indicator Definitions. November 2001, p.4. http://www.fewer.org/research/index.htm

[429] Among others, see for example the work developed by the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), FAST (Swiss Peace Foundation), the Clingendael Institute or the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. For a useful comparison of the methodologies used by these projects refer to The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Methodology, Data Descriptions, Data Sources. November 2001. http://www.fewer.org/research/index.htm

[430] See Susan Ampleford with David Carment, George Conway and Angelica Ospina. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: Risk Assessment Template. Draft Version, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, FEWER, August 2001, p.4. http://www.fewer.org/research/index.htm

[431] J. David Singer. 'International Conflict. Three Levels of Analysis', in World Politics, Review Article, Volume 12, Issue 3, April 1960, p.460.

That analysis of 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind' should begin at unit level by looking at conflict groups themselves is clear.[432] Because for the majority of groups involved in the increasing number of 'new wars' or 'wars of the third kind', identity, whether of a national, ethnic or religious character is presented as the basis for struggles for self-determination aiming for independence, autonomy, secession or the control or participation in government, this suggests that, following Edward Azar, 'the most useful unit of analysis in PSC [protracted social conflict] situations is the identity group- racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others'.[433]

According to Miall *et al*, Edward Azar was one the first conflict researchers that from the early 1970s was 'arguing for a radical revision of prevailing Clausewitzian ideas'.[434] His definition of 'protracted social conflict' to describe the majority of armed conflicts that had 'become more easily identifiable throughout the world' embodies this 'radical revision':

> ...these situations, which we have called 'protracted social conflicts' possess several unique properties. The focus of these conflicts is religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity, which in turn is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for security, communal recognition and distributive justice. While domestic, regional and international conflicts in the world today are framed as conflicts over material interests, such as commercial advantages or resource acquisition, empirical evidence suggests that *they are not just that* [my emphasis].[435]

The PSC concept, in many ways similar to the concepts of 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind' as can be easily confirmed by the above definition, represents an attempt to move away from the traditional 'clausewitzian' assumption of a distinction between internal and external conflicts by considering that 'many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterised by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors'. In addition, Azar recognises the importance of multi-level analysis by suggesting that while 'the study of domestic conflict has also been dominated by theories addressing different levels of causation', for many conflicts currently active in the world 'there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets'.[436] In sharp

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[432] To this respect Ronald Fisher posits that 'it follows that the central unit of analysis in protracted social conflict is the *identity group* [sic], defined in ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, or other terms, for it is through the identity group that compelling human needs are expressed in social and often in political terms. Furthermore, communal identity itself is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs for security, recognition, and distributive justice.' Ronald Fisher. Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p.5.

[433] Edward E. Azar, 'Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions', in Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, J. Burton and Frank Dukes (Eds), MacMillan Press Ltd, 1990, p.147,148 from Edward E. Azar, 'Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions', in International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, E. Azar and J. Burton (Eds), Lynne Rienner Publishers, England, Boulder, CO, 1986.

[434] Miall *et al* say that 'for Edward Azar...the critical factor in protracted social conflict (PSC), such as persisted in Lebanon (his own particular field of study), Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia, Israel, Sudan, Cyprus, Iran, Nigeria or South Africca, was that it represented 'the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation (1991, 93)'. Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.70.

[435] Edward E. Azar. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Theory and Cases. Darmouth Publishing Company, 1990, p.2.

[436] Ibid. p.6.

contrast to Collier *et al*'s 'greed' theory of conflict discussed in chapter 3.2. above, Azar hypothesises that,

> ...the source of protracted social conflict is the denial of those elements required in the development of all peoples and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation in the processes that determine conditions of security and identity, and other such developmental requirements. The real source of conflict is the denial of those human needs.[437]

Following John Burton's approach to the centrality of 'basic human needs' in conflict theorising[438], Azar considers basic needs such as security, communal recognition and distributive justice as primordial and therefore non-negotiable, emphasising the fact that these needs are expressed around religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity. He clearly recognises that the problem resides in framing contemporary conflicts in terms of material interests, such as commercial advantages or resource acquisition, while empirical evidence suggests that 'they are not just that'. Consequently, Azar's PSC concept incorporates both primordialist and instrumentalist approaches to identity, as was discussed in chapter 3.1.[439]

Nevertheless, parties or groups must firstly be constituted. In order to understand the processes by which groups form some sort of collective entity and become conscious of that through sharing a measure of grievance and dissatisfaction defining oppositional goals that offer redress, a behavioural or interactional approach to conflict dynamics is needed. [440] In this regard, the groundbreaking work of conflict reseacher/sociologist Louis Kriesberg is relevant. In his now classic 'Social Conflicts', Kriesberg introduces a behavioural perspective by looking at 'social conflicts as social relationships'.[441] In his words,

> ...social conflicts are social relationships. This means that at every stage of conflict the parties interact socially; each party affects the way the others act, not only as each responds to the others but also as each may *antecipate* [sic] the responses of the others. Even the ends each party seeks are constructed in interaction with adversaries.[442]

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[437] Edward E. Azar, 'Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions', in Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, J. Burton and Frank Dukes (Eds), MacMillan Press Ltd, 1990, p.146 from Edward E. Azar, 'Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions', in International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, E. Azar and J. Burton (Eds), Lynne Rienner Publishers, England, Boulder, CO, 1986.

[438] To this respect see *inter alia* Burton, John W. Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, A Handbook. University Press of America, Boston, 1987. As will be discussed in Part Two of this thesis, at the root of John Burton's 'facilitative problem-solving' approach to resolving conflicts is human needs theory. In his words, 'the theory of human needs, which was built on the work of Maslow and others, stressed values that could not be curbed, socialised or negotiated, contrary to earlier assumptions (...) as these needs of security, identity and human development are universal, and because their fulfillment is not dependent on limited resources, it follows that conflict resolution with win-win outcomes is possible'. Ibid. p.16.

[439] This is evident by Azar's definition of community in the following terms: 'community is a term used as a generic reference to politicised groups whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural 'identity' characteristics'. Edward E. Azar. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Theory and Cases. Darmouth Publishing Company, 1990, p.7.

[440] See C. R. Mitchell. The Structure of International Conflict, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.33.

[441] And up-dated version of this book can be found in Louis Kriesberg. Constructive Conflicts. From Escalation to Resolution. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York, 1998.

[442] Louis Kriesberg. Op. Cit. p. 21.

A dynamic analysis of conflict phenomena is therefore central to Kriesberg's sociological approach to conflict. Most importantly for our purposes, a dynamic approach allows us to move beyond the identification of static conditions underlying conflict occurrence to considering how conflict-processes themselves affect, shape and determine the course of particular conflicts. As was previously pointed out, Sandole suggested that three successive conflict stages periods characterised a conflict systems' development (early, intermediate and late stages). Uniting these three stages were self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes considered to be extremely important in evaluating the relationship between different variables located at different levels through time, to the extent that this author considers that 'once process comes to characterise conflict, it does not matter how (or when) the conflict started'. Conflict-as-process is characterised, in Sandole's opinion, by a quasi-deterministic spiral where reciprocal and 'imitated increases' in the capability to wage war contribute to the initiation and perpetuation of war.[443] To this respect, Christopher Mitchell posits that,

> ...over time, the behaviour of the opposing party may appear to become, in itself, sufficient reason for continuing and intensifying one's own conflict behaviour, often producing an analogous impact on the attitudes and subsequent behaviour of the adversary... Conflict behaviour therefore may become the source of future conflict attitudes and behaviour, irrespective of any future development of mutually incompatible goals.[444]

If factors besides 'start-up conditions' become part of conflict cycles, it is necessary to probe into the dynamic processes of conflicts themselves. Vivienne Jabri talks about the 'war mood' that takes hold when conflicts escalate towards violence,

> ...once violent destruction of the enemy and its valued resources comes to define a relationship, the rules of the game or the rules of 'everyday life' change. Behaviour that is unacceptable in peacetime becomes legitimate in times of war. Specifically killing, torture, rape, mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing and the creation of concentration camps are explained by such terms which essentially state that while war goes on we must expect such occurrences, or simply not be surprised by them.[445]

According to Louis Kriesberg, conflict lifecycles are composed of seven different stages. These are (1) underlying basis (or the objective bases for a conflict); (2) conflict emergence

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[443] This represents in fact Sandole's attempt at a general theory of conflict. He considers that the more involved in this process the actors become, the more they will tend to overperceive and overreact to threatened and actual assaults on needs even in cases where their capabilities have been reduced. This will further the spiral and increase the probability of generating 'negative self-fulfilling prophecies'. These negative self-fulfilling prophecies may be reflective of self-stimulating/ self-perpetuating conflict processes as well as action-reaction processes, or a combination of both. Action-reaction processes can operate independently of self stimulating/ self-perpetuating conflict processes but over time in protracted conflict situations will probably give rise to the latter (a 'culture of violence'). These can then either operate independently of action-reaction processes or encourage their development, such that action-reaction processes can be viewed as a special case of self-stimulating/ self-perpetuating conflict processes. To this respect see Dennis J. D. Sandole. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era. Pinter, London and New York, 1999, p.128-129.

[444] C. R. Mitchell. The Structure of International Conflict, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.52.

[445] Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p.6.

(when parties realise they have incompatible goals); (3) initial conduct (the initial way in which adversaries pursue their conflicting aims); (4) conflict escalation (intensity and scope of the struggle escalates); (5) conflict de-escalation (intensity and scope of the conflict de-escalates); (6) termination and finally (7) outcome.[446] This can best be seen in figure below:

Figure 5: Kriesberg's Stages of Social Conflicts[447]



This dynamic model of conflict phenomena is important because it emphasises and helps understand processes of interaction and interdependence between stages. The seven stages are highly interdependent and there is considerable interaction between them while each stage depends on its predecessor while at the same time being influenced by expectations regarding a future stage. Therefore, the sequence of stages in a conflict is not fixed or pre-determined.

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[446] This approach is intended to provide 'a framework for analysing all kinds of disputes, struggles, fights, and contentions'. It concentrates on the development and course of specific social conflicts. Nevertheless, not all conflicts go through all these stages and if they do they might not go through every stage, nor will they necessarily follow the exact sequence of stages proposed. Louis Kriesberg. Op. cit. p. ix.

[447] Adapted from Louis Kriesberg, Social Conflicts. 2nd Edition, Prentice-Hall Inc, 1973, 1982, p.321.

This model emphasises five crucial aspects of conflicts: the purposefulness of adversaries based on subjective rationality, the mixed character of each struggle, the importance of interaction, the significance of non-focal parties and finally, the variety of means by which conflicts are conducted. In addition, this model for conflict cycles rests on the assumption that any particular situation will be the result of many interlocked conflicts, even when, in conflict situations, the focus tends to be on one issue or conflict considered to be the primary or focal one. Understanding the existence of multiple and inter-locking conflicts, helps explain how focal conflicts escalate and de-escalate. In fact, the existence of multiple inter-locking conflicts produces the interconnections between different stages in the sense that each conflict is part of a larger one and each one is accompanied by several others so that every conflict unit may be on a particular stage in the main conflict but on a different stage on other related non-focal conflicts.

In this way, because the analysis of any particular is not limited to one single issue that may be considered the focal one, it therefore avoids, as was discussed in chapter 3, conflict classifications and interpretations solely on the basis of a single salient issue. Such a dynamic profiling of conflict phenomena helps clarify Sandole's 'conflict-as-process' as a variable in its own right. Firstly, as may be seen in the figure above, processes of anticipation and feedback affect each conflict stage, creating interconnection and interdependence between stages. Nevertheless, anticipation (the way later stages affect earlier ones) is complex and at times difficult to assess. For example, a conflict group's anticipation of the kinds of modes it will be able to use in the pursuit of goals strongly determines goal-formulation, thereby influencing the awareness of conflict by other potential conflict groups. On the other hand, processes of anticipation relating to the possibility of escalation or de-escalation are strong influences in the choice of a mode of conflict behaviour. Groups and parties to conflicts have some idea of the consequences of pursuing their goals by using particular behaviours. Similarly, groups and parties to conflicts base their choice of modes of behaviour also in anticipation of a particular outcome. Furthermore, because conflicts are 'continuous and interlocked, events at a later stage in one conflict provide information to partisans who are also at an earlier stage in another related struggle'.[448] The result of this escalation process then feeds into the larger conflict influencing the choice of whether to escalate or de-escalate the focal conflict.

Processes of anticipation and feedback in conflict cycles are the vehicles for what Sandole termed self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes. The way by which feedback and anticipation create self-stimulating/ self-perpetuating processes may partially be explained by the 'presence of elements of realist belief-systems', in that 'we can assume that 'men' [decision-makers] think of conflict in *Realpolitik* terms'. In this way, 'realist belief-value systems play a major role, via the insidious dynamic of the *negative self-fulfilling prophecy*

[448] Louis Kriesberg. Op. Cit. p. 321.

[sic], in sustaining the very conflict systems which are the concern and subject matter of realists and others- consequences which may be counter-productive and independent of the conscious intentions of the actors concerned'.[449]

In this way, defensive actions may be interpreted as a threat (so-called 'security dilemma'), which helps create counteractions and conflict spirals.[450] Furthermore, a permanent characteristic of conflict processes is what is know as 'misperception', particularly, as Levy points out referring to inter-state conflict, 'misperceptions of the capabilities and intentions of adversaries and third states'.[451] Misperception also affects the way parties view themselves. As Mitchell points out,

> ...the self-reinforcing nature of much human inter-action has led many writers to talk of conflict situations leading to the development of *malign* or *benign* spirals, and to emphasise that the experience of a situation of major goal incompatibility between parties predisposes them to enter into a *malign spiral*, from which it is difficult to escape. Escalation becomes easy, de-escalation difficult...many factors contribute to malign spirals. As Phillips has argued, the major factor in such spiral is the inter-active effect of the parties' behaviour and the major determinant of a party's decision to continue the spiral rather than reverse it lies in the previous behaviour directed at it by the opposing part... often conflict behaviour can be explained by the previous behaviour experienced from an adversary.[452]

In addition, a spiral may represent conflicts that are interlocked in a continuous series. The outcome of a particular conflict becomes the starting point for another conflict. The figure below represents a conflict spiral developed by Louis Kriesberg.

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[449] Dennis J. D. Sandole. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict. Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era. Pinter, London and New York, 1999, p.104-105, 80. As Jack Levy points out, 'in the realist world view, assumptions of an inherently conflictual world and uncertainties regarding the present and future intentions of the adversary lead political leaders to focus on short-term security needs and on their relative position in the system, to adopt worst case thinking, to engage in a struggle for power, and to use coercive threats to advance their interests, influence the adversary, and maintain their reputations'. Jack S. Levy, 'Contending Theories of International Conflict: a Level-of-Analysis Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.5.

[450] To this respect, see *inter alia*, John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, chapter 5.

[451] Jack S. Levy, 'Contending Theories of International Conflict: a Level-of-Analysis Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p.5. For an in-depth discussion of this issue refer to Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1976. Also Michael Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[452] C. R. Mitchell. Op. cit. p.63, 65. To this respect see Philips, W.R. 'The Dynamics of Behavioural Action and Reaction in International Conflict', in Peace Research Society (International) Papers, XVII, 1970. Also M. Deutsch. 'Conflicts; Productive and Destructive', in Journal of Social Issues, XXV (1), 1969.

Figure 6: Kriesberg's Conflict Spiral[453]



Starting from the unit level, a conflict group's characteristics such as size, composition and in particular ideological outlook are critical helping explain their choice of a particular approach to conflict (conflict behaviour). A group's size, its norms of participation, its experience with previous efforts at redressing grievances are important characteristics to take into account. Conflict groups exhibit different 'degrees of organisation' as well as different 'boundary clarity'. In this sense, while a state will have clear and demarcated boundaries, an ideological or ethnic group may present a lesser degree of boundary clarity. This is relevant is terms of understanding how and on what basis participants in different conflict groups are mobilised and organised for conflict behaviour. The same applies to the degree of organisation, which varies immensely from one group or potential conflict party to the next. In fact, the degree of organisation of a conflict group also helps explain recruitment, both actual and potential, as well as variations in the position of leaders.[454] It is therefore critical to understand how conflict groups are formed, what their perceived grievances are, how they formulate their goals and finally how they pursue their goals.

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[453] Louis Kriesberg. Op. cit. p.322.

[454] As Kriesberg points out, 'continuously organised conflict groups enjoy a mobilisation advantage over emergent conflict parties, as is the case between governments and protesters or revolutionaries'. Louis Kriesberg. Op. Cit. p.92. This had been pointed out by Collier *et al* in chapter 3.2.

Likewise, issues in contention also partly explain the *complexity* of armed conflicts, in that they may be perceived as being realistic or unrealistic by the parties involved. In fact, issues have characteristically a mixture of realistic and unrealistic components and in all conflicts 'realistic and unrealistic components are both present'.[455] For example, a notable feature of many armed conflicts is that 'parties involved often disagree on what the conflict is 'really' about, one side defining the issues as being a set of (to them) salient problems, the other claiming the actual core issues as something completely different'.[456]

Furthermore, the explanation for groups' disputes and conflicts is rooted in their relationship. The sense of group identity and group discontent is strongly associated with the type of relations that groups and parties have with each other. Parties or groups to a conflict have varying degrees of integration between them in that they might have a close relationship or not communicate at all. Within existing relationships, conflicting issues may constitute only a fraction of the overall issues present, but they may also constitute the core of the relationship. As was previously noted, all conflict situations have a mix of conflicting interests and co-operative ones and it is very rare that to find a pure zero-sum conflict.[457]

In addition, differences in the way parties perceive their power in relation to their adversary as well as the resources they have available strongly affect their relationship and may in some instances be themselves the basis for a potential conflict situation.[458] Differences in power affect the way parties formulate goals, anticipate consequences of their actions and eventually conceptualise possible outcomes of their actions and interactions with other parties in conflict. Conflict groups also vary immensely in the resources they have at their disposal to use coercive, rewarding, or persuasive inducements. As was pointed out in chapter 3.2. the operative concept here is 'subjective rationality' because there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding parties' evaluation of their power relative to their opponents which strongly affect a party's evaluation of the costs of using force or even organising to do so (Collier's 'coordination costs' mentioned earlier).

Finally, another major variant in the relations between conflict groups is the social system that they constitute or to which they belong. The social context in which the parties to a

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[455] For a discussion of 'realist' and 'unrealist' components of conflict issues refer to Louis Kriesberg. Op. Cit. p.5.

[456] C. R. Mitchell. The Structure of International Conflict, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.44. Furthermore, Mitchell adds that 'the existence of opposing definitions of 'what the conflict is about' implies that one way of gaining one's own goal in such conflict is to influence the other party so that the latter accepts one's own way of regarding what issues are in conflict. Hence, a common tactic for gaining an advantage in a dispute is to have one's own way of regarding what issues are in conflict'. Ibid. p.44.

[457] Louis Kriesberg. Op. cit. p.8.

[458] Large power differences, for instance, can be in themselves a source of grievance to the less powerful. At the same time, they can deter overt expression of the grievance. Yet, if power differences are small suggesting that perhaps the distribution of valued resources is fair, one of the parties may misjudge its power and think a marginal advantage can be obtained with only a little effort.

conflict exist is not only a source of their discontent but also helps provide the criteria for evaluating conditions and possible changes. The formulation of goals is therefore channelled by the contexts within which the contending parties exist and strongly rooted in the prevailing ways of thinking in that particular context, affecting how parties view their situation and the possible solutions to their conflicts. Within the group's context, an important aspect characterising relations between antagonists is the degree to which conflict regulation is institutionalised. Kriesberg highlights this in the following way,

> ...if there are generally supported and well-understood procedure for handling disputes, matters of possible contention tend to be viewed as competitive, and not conflicting, or as part of a larger exchange relationship, and not simply as a zero-sum relationship.[459]

If the social context in which the parties to a conflict exist is both a source of their discontent as well as the channel for their actions, it is important to move up one level from the conflict group's level. In fact, as pointed out by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Edward Azar's protracted social conflict concept emphasises that 'the sources of such conflicts lay predominantly within rather than between states' with four clusters of variables identified as pre-conditions for their transformation to high levels of intensity: communal content, deprivation of human needs as the underlying source, governance and the state's role as the critical factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity group needs and finally, international linkages.[460] While analysis focused in the first instance on identity groups, moving a level up to 'state level' is necessary for 'it is the relationship between identity groups and states which is at the core of the problem'.[461]

From Figure 5 above depicting Kriesberg's 'stages of social conflicts', 'objective' conflict situations are the starting point for conflict processes, being therefore structural to them and underlying disputes while persisting regardless of the parties' own awareness of them. In the literature, opinions diverge to the extent to which parties should actually be aware of having incompatible goals so that a conflict can be said to exist.[462] We agree with Kriesberg and others and take the subjectivist view in that a social conflict only emerges when the parties come to believe they have incompatible goals. Nevertheless, there are objective conditions in

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[459] Ibid. p.105.

[460] To this respect see Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. cit. p.70. Also the original development of this in Edward E. Azar. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Theory and Cases. Darmouth Publishing Company, 1990, p.7-12.

[461] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.73.

[462] These range from subjective interpretations of conflict, such as the ones proposed by Lewis Coser and Kenneth Boulding, who believe that the parties themselves should be aware of the incompatibility of their goals; to objectivist explanations of conflict for which it is not necessary that the parties have the awareness that they are in conflict. If an observer detects an incompatibility even though the parties are unaware of it, then we are in presence of an objective conflict. See Lewis A Coser. The Functions of Social Conflict, Free Press, New York, 1956 and also Kenneth E Boulding. Conflict and Defense. New York, Harper and Row, 1962. A paradigmatic example of an 'objectivist' view of conflict may be found in Johan Galtung's definitions of 'structural violence' and 'negative peace'. In this regard see Johan Galtung's Essays in Peace Research (6 volumes), Christian Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1975-1988.

the conflict environment which underline disputes between conflict groups. These conditions are the underlying conditions of social conflicts because they 'underlie and generate beliefs regarding incompatible aims'.[463]

The 'objective' conditions underlying conflicts are extremely important in any particular conflict analysis. Ultimately their importance resides in the fact that they create *'cleavages'* in the social spectrum, understood as the basis in which people organise themselves in collectivities. In this sense, cleavages can be based on nationality, culture, ethnicity, religion, ideology, class, regionalism, etc. Cleavages are therefore the basis for collective identity in its varied forms while being at the same time the product of objective conflicts. Coupled with an 'objectivist' analysis of underlying conditions that may generate conflict processes between groups it is also necessary to study the conditions that are more likely to be considered conflicting by the participants themselves.[464] Any theory of conflict must explain what those conditions are and why parties come to perceive that they have incompatible goals or why they do not.

Consequently, the analysis of the conditions underlying conflict, as was previously noted variously termed in the literature as underlying causes, conflict-as-startup conditions, or structural components), must be considered jointly with the 'permissive' or 'proximate' causes and triggers causing conflict emergence, that is, the stage when parties become aware that they have incompatible goals, thereby transforming what were underlying factors into manifest issues. This is important for while cleavages are at the basis of group awareness and group formation, manifest conflict issues are fundamentally a product of group interaction and inter-group relations since conflict emergence depends on a group possessing a shared sense of grievance or dissatisfaction which is channelled towards another party or group held responsible for the situation. To this respect, identifying some of the great strengths and weaknesses in the literature on internal conflict, Michael Brown rightly says that,

> ...first, it is impressive in its discussion of the permissive conditions that make some places prone to violence, but it is weak when it comes to identifying the proximate causes of internal conflict...we need to think about how these two sets of factors interact, and how they can be integrated into a more comprehensive framework for analysing these issues.

As was previously pointed out, the environment where the majority of contemporary armed conflicts are fought is the state. Furthermore, following Azar in believing that 'governance and the state's role' are the crucial element in the fulfilment of group's needs, we must now turn to

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[463] Louis Kriesberg. Op. Cit. p.23.

[464] As highlighted by Louis Kriesberg 'to analyse the basis of conflicts, we shall consider the conditions underlying the possible social conflicts from the perspective of outside observers. But the validation of the analysis must be found in the thoughts and actions of the people in those conditions. It is they who do or do not create a social conflict from the underlying conditions'. Louis Kriesberg. Op. Cit. p.28.

the state level in order to understand both the underlying as well as the proximate conditions underlying conflict occurrence. Because our focus is now at the level of the state, Michael Brown's approach to 'underlying conditions' and 'proximate causes' of 'internal conflict' seems appropriate as a general framework for looking at these conditions. This framework is presented in the figure below.

Table 4: Underlying Causes of Internal Conflict[465]

Underlying Causes		Proximate Causes
Structural	• Weak States • Intra-state Security Concerns • Ethnic Geography	• Collapsing States • Changing Intra-state Military Balances • Changing Demographic Patterns
Political Factors	• Discriminatory Political Institutions • Exclusionary National Ideologies • Inter-Group Politics • Elite Politics	• Political Transitions • Increasingly Exclusionary Ideologies • Growing Inter-Group Competition • Intensifying Leadership Struggles
Economic/Social Factors	• Economic Problems • Discriminatory Economic Systems • Modernisation	• Mounting Economic Problems • Growing Economic Inequities • Fast Paced Development and Modernisation
Cultural/ Perceptual Factors	• Patterns of Cultural Discrimination • Problematic Group Histories	• Intensifying Patterns of Cultural Discrimination • Ethnic Bashing and Propagandising

As was discussed in chapter one, the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts occur in under-developed countries that may be undergoing rapid modernisation processes or political transitions as well as in countries characterised by state weakness and state decay. In fact, state-weakness as been pointed out by many analysts of internal conflict as a main source of contemporary conflict.[466] The problem of weak and failed states should be looked at from the perspective of political legitimacy as well as whether they possess institutions of government capable of exercising control over the population and totality of the territory under their

[465] Adapted from Michael E. Brown. 'Introduction', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p.14.

[466] To this respect see *inter alia* I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colo., 1995.

jurisdiction.[467] The question of legitimacy and efficiency are particularly acute. As pointed out by Van de Goor, Rupesinghe and Sciarone, 'the phenomena of weak or failed states in the 'Third World' should thus be related to the intra-state relations and the capacity of the state- the central government- to keep to the path of state-formation'.[468]

In addition, problems of state weakness seem to be endemic to under-developed, former colonial countries. Countries with colonial backgrounds, arbitrary setting of boundaries by external powers, lack of social cohesion, recent emergence into juridical statehood and under-development are potentially vulnerable to conflict. In such situations, processes of state-building are inevitably conflictual and the potential for conflict is furthermore exacerbated by attempts at nation-building. Comparing contemporary processes of state-making and nation-building with the modern European experience, Mohammed Ayoob points out that 'national states that have performed successfully over a long period of time and therefore knit their people together in terms of historical memories, legal codes, language, religion, etc., may evolve into nation-states or at least provide the necessary conditions for the emergence of nation-states, but they are not synonymous with the latter'.[469]

Situations characterised by colonial legacy and what Azar termed 'weak societies' (disarticulation between state and society), are viewed by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse as 'associated with the prevalence of conflict, particularly in heterogeneous states where no overarching tradition of common and juridically egalitarian citizenship prevails'.[470] Explanations focusing on colonial legacies highlight that the post-colonial predicament, as expressed by attempts at post-independence nation-building, is among the main causes of contemporary warfare. This predicament would for example include power structures devised by former colonial rulers, usually reliant on unified structures controlling a diversity of regional peoples or ethnic and tribal groups; situations where the former colonial

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[467] In this regard see Joel S Migdal. 'Integration and Disintegration: An Approach to Society Formation', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.92. Also Mohammed Ayoob. 'State-Making, State-Breaking and State Failure', in Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.69. And Youssef Cohen, Brian R Brown and AFK Organski, 'The Paradoxical Nature of State-Making: The Violent Creation of Order', American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, no.4, 1981. Also Charles Tilly in 'War-Making and State-Making as Organised Crime', Bringing the State Back In, Peter B Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

[468] Luc Van de Goor with Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (Eds). Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States. The MacMillan Press Ltd, London and New York, 1996, p.9. See also R. Jackson, Quasi-States, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

[469] Mohammed Ayoob. 'State-Making, State-Breaking and State Failure', Op. Cit. p.70. For an in-depth discussion of this issue see K.J. Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996, in particular chapter 3 and 4.

[470] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.86.

power actively supported a particular ethnic group; or the power vacuum created after hasty decolonisation leading to competition for power, control of natural resources and territory amongst rival parties, peoples or ethnic groups.[471] To this respect Rupesinghe *et al* point out that,

> ...in Africa particularly the struggle for independence, dominated by the mixed urban population, concentrated on the black-white divide. Inter-tribal differences, were, in effect, overlooked as people joined forces in the fight against colonialism. But colonial systems of governance relied on a unified central structure controlling a diversity of regional tribal groups. As colonial power ebbed away, competition for central state power amongst rival tribes intensified. Democratisation and individual freedoms were never allowed to flourish so long as the power of regional native authorities and national politics was split along tribal lines. In effect, strong patron-client relations, akin to traditional power structures, developed at the national level...[472]

In situations where state structures are unable to provide for the satisfaction of basic needs (physical security, access to political, economic and social institutions, acceptance of communal identity), individuals tend to revert to alternative means in the fulfilment of their needs. We have seen above that self-awareness as a collectivity, a pre-determinant of group formation, depends on the existence of cleavages that serve as the basis for collective self-identification and organisation. In addition we discussed how these cleavages and divisions may be based on nationality, ethnicity, ideology, class, religion, age or gender, etc. Jack Snyder, for example, relates the development of ethnic nationalism to situations 'when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people's basic needs and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available'.[473] State-weakness and state collapse compel individuals and groups to provide for their own needs. As Brown points out,

> ...if the state in question is very weak or if it is expected to become weaker with time, the incentives for groups to make independent military preparations grow. The problem is that, in taking steps to defend themselves, groups often threaten the security of others.[474]

As was discussed in chapter 3.2., Paul Collier *et al* found that in fact, it is not the number of different ethnic groups in a particular state that will increase its proneness to violent conflict and war but that this propensity increases with polarity. In this sense, contrary to prevailing analysis of ethnic conflict phenomena, the risk of violent conflict increases in proportion with the increase in polarity, not in relation to the absolute number of ethnic groups. Whether or not a conflict escalates to the point where violence is used is more related to the political

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[471] See K.J. Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996, chapter 4, p.61-81.

[472] Ibid. p.9.

[473] To this respect see Jack Snyder, 'Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State', in Survival, vol.35, no.1, Spring 1993, p.12. As Michael Brown points out, 'when state structures weaken, violent conflict often follows. Power struggles between politicians and would-be leaders intensify. Regional leaders become increasingly independent, and, if they consolidate control over military assets, virtual warlords. Ethnic groups which had been oppressed by central authorities are more able to assert themselves politically, perhaps by seeking more administrative autonomy or their own states'. Michael Brown. Op. Cit. p.14.

[474] Michael Brown. 'Introduction'. Op. Cit. p.15.

system, and in particular to the degree to which institutions of government are discriminatory or based on exclusionary ideologies. As Edward Azar points out,

> ...most states in protracted social conflict-laden countries are hardly neutral' in that 'political authority tends to be monopolised by a dominant identity group or a coalition of identity groups' and 'these groups tend to use the state as an instrument for maximising their interests at the expense of others...the means to satisfy basic human needs are unevenly shared and the potential for PSC increases.[475]

An analysis of the political system is therefore crucial if a complete understanding of a conflict situation is to be achieved. The type of regime and political system, its ideological underpinnings, the legitimacy and representativeness it enjoys, strongly affect patterns and types of relations with other societal actors. Authoritarian, repressive, exclusionary regimes are naturally more likely to create dissent and therefore increase the propensity for conflict. The ideological underpinnings of a regime affect the way in which it relates to the various societal groups as well as the way in which conflicts are resolved. Exclusionary regime ideologies based on ethnic, religious, political and class distinctions contribute to the discrimination of sectors of society, by preventing the 'state from responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents' and therefore increase discontent.[476]

Two other factors are important when looking at the political system of any particular society. These are the patterns of inter-group politics and elite politics. Elite politics in particular have been viewed as an underlying as well as proximate cause of many contemporary armed conflicts. This line of reasoning looks at the ways in which political elites often promote conflict 'in times of political and economic trouble in order to fend-off domestic challengers'.[477] Analysing patterns of contemporary African politics, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz defined the 'instrumentalisation of disorder' paradigm in the following terms:

> ...in brief, it refers to the process by which political actors in Africa seek to maximise their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty and sometimes even chaos which characterises most African polities. Although there are obviously vast differences between countries in this respect, we would argue that what all African states share is a generalised system of patrimonialism and acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high level of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a lack of institutionalisation, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a universal resort to personal(ised) and vertical solutions to societal problems.[478]

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[475] Edward E. Azar. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Theory and Cases. Darmouth Publishing Company, 1990, p.10.

[476] Edward E. Azar. Op. Cit. p.11.

[477] Michael Brown. 'Introduction'. Op. Cit. p.18.

[478] Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works. Disorder as a Political Instrument, The International African Institute, James Currey, Oxford, 1999, p.xiii, xix. To this respect see also Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly, Longman, London and New York, 1993.

Economic factors are also crucial underlying and proximate causes of contemporary armed conflict. We have referred to theories of relative deprivation, 'greed' motivated rebellions and the role of rising expectations in chapter 3.2. above. As Miall *et al* rightly point out, 'in the economic sphere, once again few would dispute Azar's contention that PSC tends to be associated with patterns of underdevelopment or uneven development'.[479] Rapid transitions amidst poverty and social exclusion, high unemployment and at times heavy dependence on single-commodity exports, potentiate vulnerability to armed conflict. In addition to distributional conflicts within societies associated with resource-scarcity, the existence of natural resources that may be easily extracted and traded (timber, minerals, oil) may potentiate the vulnerability to conflict. As Michael Brown points out,

> ...unemployment, inflation, and resource competitions, especially for land, contribute to societal frustrations and tensions, and can provide the breeding ground for conflict. Economic reforms do not always help and can contribute to the problem in the short term, especially if economic shocks are severe and state subsidies for food and other basic goods, services, and social welfare are cut.[480]

Economic factors are particularly acute when they are associated with patterns of discrimination between groups. The perception by some groups that there are strong unequal economic opportunities and access to resources, as well as vast differences in standards of living between groups, will contribute to a sense of grievance. In addition, rapid modernisation processes may increase the conflict vulnerability of a particular society by causing profound structural changes, migration and urbanisation, among others.[481] These patterns of discrimination also affect groups culturally and socially. Access to education, recognition of minority languages and costumes, social stereotyping and scapegoating based on cultural and social characteristics of groups all contribute to deteriorating the relations between different social groups and increase the propensity for conflict.

We have seen that a dynamic approach to conflict phenomena is critical for a complete understanding of the relation between multi-level underlying and proximate causes of violent conflict. In fact, after realising that they have incompatible goals, parties to a conflict must decide which action to take and initial conduct to follow. In this regard it is crucial to consider the role that group's leaders play in the choice of tactics and strategies. Brown highlights this when he says that 'although many internal conflicts are triggered by internal, mass-level factors, the vast majority are triggered by internal, elite-level factors' adding that 'in short, bad

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[479] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.86.

[480] Michael Brown. 'Introduction'. Op. Cit. p.19.

[481] Ibid. p.18-20. As regards the vast topic of conflict and development see, *inter alia* and as an introduction, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968 as well as his 'Civil Violence and the Process of Development', in Civil Violence and the International System, Adelphi Paper No.83, London, IISS, 1971. Also the classic Why Man Rebel by Ted Robert Gurr, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1970 and Saul Newman, 'Does Modernisation Breed Ethnic Conflict?', World Politics, Vol. 43, No.3, April 1991.

leaders are the biggest problem'.[482] Consequently, looking at the decisions and actions of domestic leaders and elites, simultaneously an individual as well as a group variable, is critical to understand the proximate causes of conflicts. Whether leaders based their actions on ideological bases (concerning the organisation of political, economic, and social affairs in a country); whether their actions are essentially a result of power struggles among competing elites that may or may not result in assaults to state sovereignty, the role that individual leaders and elite groups play on the on-set and escalation of disputes is undeniable. As pointed out by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse,

> ...the gist of the critique is that a focus on international level (contextual), state level (structural) and conflict party level (relational) types of analysis may make conflict appear to be a natural or even inevitable process, and fails to lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of the individuals and elites who are usually responsible...a comparison between the leadership roles of Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjam in Yugoslavia and those of F.W. De Klerk and Nelson Mandela in South Africa may demonstrate the force of this point.[483]

Nevertheless, leadership and elite's roles are themselves constrained by a number of factors. First and foremost, there is the degree to which there is conflict regulation in the system to which they belong. If rules and behaviour for dealing with conflicts are institutionalised and more critically internalised by parties, they will generally comply and follow prescribed solutions, as was discussed previously. Furthermore, as was previously pointed out, the choice of which behaviour to undertake is strongly dependent on the available resources and tools at the disposal of parties for the pursuit of particular goals.

If parties chose behaviour characterised by coercion, escalation, understood as 'movement towards greater magnitude of conflict behaviour', ensues. Several dimensions of magnitude must be distinguished, in that the increase in magnitude may relate as much to the intensity of feelings of animosity, hostility or hatred, as to overt and objective behaviour in the way by which goals are pursued as well as the extent of participation in that behaviour.[484] Relations between adversaries in a violent conflict are strongly affected by socio-psychological mechanisms such as fear, hatred and suspicion. As parties suffer the consequences of conflict behaviour they become increasingly suspicious of the adversary, and raise barriers of communication. In fact,

> ...as a fight escalates, the means of waging the struggle tend to become more and more removed from the underlying conflict. In this sense, the conflict may be considered to have increasingly 'unrealistic' components. One could also argue, as the partisans are likely to do,

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[482] Michael Brown. 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p. 575.

[483] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.89, 90.

[484] Louis Kriesberg. Op. cit. p.165. For an in-depth discussion of escalation see C. R. Mitchell. The Structure of International Conflict, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.60, 61.

> that the objective conflict has shifted, that the adversaries have more at stake in the fight as the way of waging it has escalated.[485]

Besides these social-psychological mechanisms, a number of other factors seem to promote escalating behaviour: the characteristics of the conflict party; organisational developments within conflict units; changes in relations between adversaries and finally, changes in the parties' environment (i.e. intervention). Analysis should therefore consider changes in conflict groups once coercive and violent means are adopted. Organisationally, the operational control and in some cases strategic orientation shift to elements within the unit who are responsible for conducting conflict behaviour, represents a change which might contribute to further escalation and at times to leadership struggles. In fact, more militant factions may question de-escalation efforts for example and put into question more moderate leaders.

Finally, conflict analysis must also take into account the regional as well as international levels and the ways in which they affect particular conflicts. This is what Edward Azar called 'international linkages', one of the four main clusters of variables contributing to the occurrence of protracted social conflicts.[486] As Michael Brown points out, 'although neighbouring states and developments in neighbouring countries rarely trigger all-out civil wars, almost all internal conflicts involve neighbouring states in one way or another'.[487] Third-party involvement towards the escalation or de-escalation is therefore critical as regards the analysis of the vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts. In this way, third parties may escalate a fight by supporting contending parties, or de-escalate a fight through attempts at a peaceful or co-operative resolution of the situation.

It should be noted that the effects of the regional level on the occurrence and development of a particular armed conflict should be looked both from the perspective of the possible impact that a conflict has on its neighbourhood, through processes of 'spill over' and 'contagion', as well as the actions and policies that neighbouring states have in regard to the conflict. In this sense, an analysis that takes both processes into account seems the best way forward. On the one hand, the effects that conflicts have on neighbouring states may include refugee flows, economic problems (disruption of regional trade, communications, and production networks), military issues (the use of a neighbouring state's territory for the trans-shipment of arms and supplies; the use of a neighbours territory by rebel groups as bases of operations

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[485] Louis Kriesberg. Op. Cit. p.174.

[486] Edward Azar considered two main models of international linkage: economic dependency (limiting the autonomy of the state; distorting the patterns of economic development and therefore exacerbating denial of the access needs of communal groups) and political military client relationships with strong states (where patrons provide protection for the client state in return for the latter's loyalty which may result in the client state pursuing both domestic and foreign policies that are disjointed from or contradictory to the needs of its own public). To this respect see Edward E. Azar. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Theory and Cases. Darmouth Publishing Company, 1990, p.11, 12.

[487] Michael Brown. 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict'. Op. Cit. p.590.

and sanctuaries; the launch of attacks from neighbouring states) and therefore contribute to regional instability. On the other hand, neighbouring states also may intervene in these conflicts through defensive and protective interventions, opportunistic interventions, as well as more benign involvement such as humanitarian intervention and peace making interventions.[488]

Finally, contemporary conflict analysis must look at the international/global dimension. As was discussed throughout this Part, and in particular in chapter 1.1. and 1.2., contemporary wars are strongly affected by processes of globalisation of a political, military, economic and cultural nature. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR and the resulting discrediting of socialist [and other] ideologies, the withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes and the availability of surplus arms have had strong impacts on the occurrence of armed conflicts in many parts of the world. Present-underlying geopolitical conditions are important as underlying causes of contemporary armed conflict, in that conflicts that existed or were created during the Cold War but were held in check and maintained by superpower patronage, erupted after the collapse of communism as a result of the void opened by the demise of the Soviet Empire. Conflicts in eastern and central Europe, central Asia and in some parts of Africa would be considered a result of the collapse of a bipolar international system. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse highlight three interlinked trends that at a global level point to systemic sources of contemporary conflicts,

> ...deep and enduring inequalities in the global distribution of wealth and economic power; human induced environmental constraints exacerbated by excessive energy consumption in the developed world and population growth in the undeveloped world, making it difficult for human well-being to be improved by conventional economic growth; and continuing militarisation of security relations, including the proliferation of lethal weaponry...[489]

We conclude this Part, dedicated to conflict analysis, with the following quote from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, which adequately summarises our main findings throughout the previous pages:

> ...the research has clearly indicated which factors are important in the study of violent conflict. The nature of the conflicts has been conceptualised and contextualised. Conflicts are historical, dynamic and multi-dimensional, they have multiple causes and consequences of which a number are unexpected and unintended. They also involve a multitude of actors and have to be approached from different levels of analysis and intervention...[490]

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[488] For an in-depth discussion of the regional dimension, see the excellent chapter by Michael Brown. 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. CSIA Studies in International Security, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London, 1996, p. 575.

[489] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Op. Cit. p.78.

[490] Douma, P., Frerks, G. and Goor, L. van de. Major Findings of the Research Project 'Causes of Conflict in the Third World': Executive Summary. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. Conflict Research Unit. Occasional Papers, 1999. <http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/pdf/execsyn.pdf>

Part Two: Conflict Resolution

Chapter 5. Two Approaches to Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Foundations of Bargaining and Problem Solving

5.1. A 50% Solution? Diplomacy and International Negotiation[491]

> ...en effet, devant toute situation de conflit, nous avons le choix entre deux options: celle de l'argument de la force (la guerre) ou celle de la force de l'argument, c'est-a-dire le dialogue ou la négociation'.[492]
>
> ...negotiation is considered to be the management of people through guile, and we recognise guile as the trademark of the profession...our appreciation of guile goes back a long way.[493]
>
> ...however, negotiation is not limited to international affairs. It takes place everywhere where there differences to conciliate, interests to placate, men to persuade, and purposes to accomplish...There are some private matters which, by the confrontation of passions, the friction of characters, and the difference in the parties' way of thinking, become so embroiled that their successful resolution requires as much art and skill as a treaty of peace between the greatest of powers.[494]

Conflict resolution has been differently conceptualised in theory as well as diversely applied by practitioners. As a result, a wide variety of methods and approaches exist for the resolution of armed conflicts. The fact that the expression 'conflict resolution' is interchangeably used to refer to activities ranging from diplomacy, negotiation or mediation; from deterrence and intervention strategies to legal and judicial approaches, from power bargaining to facilitative problem-solving, is evidence of this.[495] The variety and increasing sophistication of resolution

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[491] The title of this sub-section, 'The 50% Solution', is borrowed from I. William Zartman. 'Introduction', in The 50% Solution, I. William Zartman (Ed), Anchor Books, New York, 1976

[492] Javier Perez de Cuellar, 'Preface', in Issa Ben Yacine Diallo, Introduction a l'Etude et la Pratique de la Négociation', Editions Pedone, Paris, 1998.

[493] Gilbert R. Winham. 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, October 1977.

[494] Fortune Barthélemy De Félice. 'Negotiations, or the Art of Negotiating', in The 50% Solution, I. William Zartman (Ed), Anchor Books, New York, 1976. Translated from Dictionnaire de justice naturelle et civile: Code de l'Humanité, ou la Législation universelle, naturelle, civile et politique comprise par une société de gens de lettres et mise en ordre alphabétique par de Felice, Yverdun, 1778.

[495] See Ronald J. Fisher. Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p.10.

approaches is emphasised by William Zartman[496], while Richard Solomon considers that the existence of the 'great many approaches and methods for understanding, managing, and ultimately settling conflicts' is a 'product of the increasing complexity of international conflict as well as the growing experience of the international community in interventions in support of resolving intrastate or regional conflicts'.[497] Nevertheless, while natural and crosscutting complementarities may be found between the various conflict resolution methodologies, they evidence a degree of conflict 'in underlying assumptions, preferred values, chosen methods of influencing others, and definitions of peace', as Ronald Fisher points out.[498]

In the modern period, 'conflict resolution' at the international level has essentially been understood as a matter of inter-state dispute settlement, its preferential instrument that of diplomacy and international negotiation. A much older activity, exercised among the empires of China, Egypt, Persia, Greece and Rome, the practice of diplomacy evolved to become the method of choice for managing the relations between political units, in all their wide-ranging variety ranging from political relations, to trade, from military issues such as alliances to cultural exchanges. The management of disputes and ultimately the avoidance of war as the 'continuation of policy' for the resolution of conflicts of interest between sovereigns have been at the centre of diplomatic activity. Charles Thayer's definition of diplomacy as mediating *'not between right and wrong but between conflicting interests'* is a case in point.[499] As Rupesinghe *et al* posit, 'good diplomatic practice is about seeking alternative avenues of dispute resolution and compromise, so as to ensure consensus amongst all parties'.[500]

From the fifteenth century onwards, diplomatic practice became a highly specific and institutionalised activity for the management of inter-state relations through the establishment of permanent diplomatic relations and embassies, the development of recognised conventions of diplomatic practice and diplomatic immunity, as well as diplomatic protocol and ceremony.[501] In an age of heightened political, military and economic competition, permanent diplomatic missions also became intelligence gathering instruments for states and political units, and diplomats increasingly seen to use stratagem, opportunism and deception

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[496] This author says that 'on the edge of the millennium, the methods of conflict have been more brutal and the methods of conflict resolution more sophisticated than ever before'. I. William. Zartman. 'Introduction: Toward the Resolution of International Conflicts', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds), United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.3.

[497] Richard H Solomon. 'Foreword', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds), United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997.

[498] Ronald J. Fisher. Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p.10.

[499] Cited in Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss. Controlling Small Wars. A Strategy for the 1970s, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1970, p.283. Also see Charles Thayer, Diplomat, Harper, New York, 1959.

[500] Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. Civil Wars, Civil Peace. An Introduction to Conflict Resolution. Pluto Press, London 1998, p.96.

[501] To this respect see Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, Routledge, London, 1995.

to advance their rulers interests. These practices were to an extent accepted as a result of the reciprocal nature of diplomatic relations. Moreover, diplomatic practice in post-Westphalian Europe was based on the assumption that conflicts of interest between states were amenable to negotiation and that war, as an instrument of policy, should be a last resort.[502] After all, although considered a plausible policy option, war should be pursued only legitimately and when all other avenues had been exhausted. If war became the inevitable policy option, an essential question underlined its use: 'how the enemy might be forced to surrender and failing that, *what sort of bargain might be struck with him to terminate the war* [my emphasis]'.[503]

That disputes and conflicts between states should be viewed as the result of the inevitable clash of interests between like-units operating in a competitive but limited environment (one of the basic tenets of what later became known as the realist paradigm in the study of international relations) is evidence that 'conflict resolution' at the inter-state level was conceptualised through the extrapolation of the domestic 'law-and-order' framework characteristic of the European nation-state. Within the domestic order of states, competition, disputes and ultimately conflict between individual citizens were considered a corollary of individual liberty, accommodated as an inevitable attribute of organised political life. Within the state, the individual citizen is subject to the law and conflicts are kept within definite bounds, set either by the law, by generally shared moral precepts, special rules of the game, or prescriptions emanating from governing authorities. In this sense, each type of conflict in the domains of both private and public life is regulated by a cluster of controlling norms, rules, and sanctions. What is permitted and what is not are clearly defined, as are the punishments when the law is not respected. Essentially, the underlying logic of such system is to 'narrow irreconcilable positions to the dimensions of justiciable controversies so as to render them capable of resolution by a court of law'.[504]

At the international level, characterised by the absence of an overarching authority to enforce, police and manage the activities of equally sovereign states, ostensibly unequal in terms of their power (however defined), the extrapolation of the internal 'law-and-order' model relied strongly on the element of trust compounded by the threat of war. Because conflicts of national interest were considered inherent in the very notion of political unity at the internal level and independence at the international level, the extrapolation of domestic 'law-and-

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[502] To this respect see chapter 1.3 above.

[503] Fred Charles Ikle. Every War Must End, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1971, p.17. To this respect Cohen points out that 'the relevance of negotiation in the transition from war to peace is self-evident: the choreography of the exchanges, implying mutual recognition and acceptance after the dislocation and alienation of war, may be no less momentous than the content of the settlement itself'. Raymond Cohen. Negotiating Across Cultures, Revised Edition, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1991, 1997, p.9.

[504] To this respect see Adda B Bozeman. Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities. Princeton University Press, 1976.

order' principles resulted in a value system as well as practice based on the belief that international quarrels, whether acute or lingering, should be settled if at all possible and that such settlement would be more readily attained if governments resorted to the methods of discussion and negotiation practised in domestic constitutional processes. Resolution was therefore a synonym to settlement.

The final result of such process, as in the 'legal brief' within the internal order, was the conclusion of international treaties or 'intergovernmental accords' through diplomacy and international negotiation. An extension of the western law of 'contract', at the root of this juridical instrument is the vital element of trust, the *'pacta sund servanda'* which constitutes a pillar of Roman and therefore Western Law. In the same way that individuals are presumed capable of making promises and abiding by commitments, states, too, are held to compliance with contractual norms. It is telling that the Law of Treaties, which constitutes the core of modern International Law, evolved logically as an international extension of the Western law of contract. As Bozeman posits,

> ...to break one's word, betray a trust, violate an agreement, deceive the other deliberately, or enter into negotiations under false pretences or for illegal objectives, are activities that have customarily been viewed as immoral, whatever their actual legal connotations and consequences may be in personal, corporate, or other kinds of human relations. It was natural, therefore, that these fundamental convictions should also have entered the Occidental systems of international law, diplomacy, negotiation, and conflict resolution. Together with the legal and ethical connotations carried by the idea of peace, they go a long way toward explaining why diplomacy is commonly supposed to serve the cause either of adjustment or of peace.[505]

Moreover, law, morality, experience, and expediency contributed to the expectation that successful negotiations were meant to result in agreement, and that, as Cardinal Richelieu of France argued almost four centuries ago, the wording of an agreement should be so precise and unambiguous as to leave as little scope as possible for misunderstanding or evasion, since after it was signed and ratified it would have to be observed in all its provisions. In view of these multiple factors, it is not surprising that the treaty should have emerged as the major and most trusted instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes between states, and diplomatic negotiation the preferred method to bring it about.[506] As Raymond Cohen points out,

> ...diplomatic negotiation, in its strict sense, consists of a process of communication between states seeking to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome on some issue or issues of shared

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[505] Ibid.

[506] Nonetheless, if such approach failed, states could always resort to that last instrument of policy, War. As was discussed at length in chapter 1.3. dedicated to the 'Clausewitzian Universe' this 'policy instrument' was highly regulated and itself subject to the law, in this case, what later became known as 'the laws of war'. As was previously pointed out, the international laws of war clarified the circumstances that make it a just and necessary endeavour and what the privileges and obligations are for the victor, the vanquished, and the neutral. Furthermore, it regulated how prisoners, civilians, ambassadors, and other categories of persons are to be treated. Finally, it defined the formalities required if war is to be properly initiated or brought to a close. Consequently, the negotiation approach was embedded in the practices of inter-state war endings as well. The extrapolation of the internal 'law-and-order' paradigm was therefore complete.

> concern. On the spectrum of diplomatic activity it is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the simple exchange of views and, on the other hand, from the practice of coercive diplomacy by which one party attempts to impose its wishes unilaterally. In an anarchic environment without any overarching authority that can resolve disputes and allocate resources among contending powers, it may be useful to think of negotiation as the primary mechanism for achieving peaceful and legitimate change. [507]

In this sense, in a 'realist' worldview where the inevitability of conflict is a permanent feature of the anarchical nature of the international system, the purposes of 'conflict resolution' are rationally limited to managing and settling disputes between states. Yet, that the vast majority of inter-state conflicts in the modern period ended by the defeat of one side and the victory of another, shows the intrinsic limitations of such procedures once war was under way. Under these circumstances, resolution was indeed synonym to either military victory (and the subsequent imposition of the victor's terms) or a settlement arrived at through a truly negotiated compromise (in rarer occasions). Underlying such logic several assumptions were paramount: the inevitability of conflicts between states pursuing their national interests in an anarchic environment; the need to preserve the overarching stability of the system (balance of power); the belief that state's interests are negotiable and amenable for settlement. In this sense, Kleiboer considers the rationale of international conflict management in a realist perspective as 'prudent statecraft'. In her words,

> ...although conflict management is desirable to the extent that it is aimed at maintaining the system as a whole, the anarchical structure of the international system makes it virtually impossible to completely resolve the roots of conflict. In a balance of power system, conflict management can only be aimed at achieving settlement, for example, by the containment of conflict, particularly the minimisation of its destabilising effects, including the escalation of violence and war in vital areas.[508]

Within a paradigm that views conflict as more pervasive than cooperation [509], conflict resolution becomes essentially a matter of crisis management characterised by a power-brokerage approach to settlement and a method of choice in international negotiation. Based on government-to-government communication through special representatives, negotiation

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[507] Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures, Revised Edition, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1991, 1997, p.9. A similar approach can be found in Gerard Nierenberg's words: 'the nature of negotiation can be summarised as a means of peaceful intercourse between sovereign states, a method of avoiding serious conflicts arising from the clashing of political or economic outcome, which is to the reasonable satisfaction of all parties concerned'. Gerard Nierenberg, Duty to Negotiate, Swedish Institute of International Law, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1978, p.44.

[508] Marieke Kleiboer, The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998, p.43. In this respect John Burton adds that 'traditional means of settling disputes and conflicts follow from a framework that attaches importance to the preservation of institutions, to the socialisation of the individual into certain behaviours, to the role of power in relationships, and to the application of elite norms. Courts, arbitration, bargaining, negotiation and the employment of force are the pragmatic consequences of such power and institutionally-oriented framework'. John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention. Centre for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, St. Martin's Press, 1990, p.27.

[509] As Hopmann points out, realists are generally sceptical about the potential for cooperation in an anarchic system, believing that it is usually restricted to short-term collaboration to achieve immediate interests'. P. Terrence Hopmann, 'Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-Solving', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard Lambert and Alan Heston (Eds), Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell (Special Editors of this volume), Volume 542, November 1995, p.28.

developed largely as an extension of a state's decision-making in the international sphere, and as Kremenyuk points out,

> ...since the partners at negotiations had the same function, it was the problem of choosing the proper negotiating strategy and convincing the other side to accept it that was at the heart of the negotiation process.[510]

Consequently, negotiation at the inter-state level was thought of and practiced as an adversarial and competitive encounter where representatives of states and governments attempted to achieve and maximise their interests by striking an agreement through direct bargaining and concession making. Terrence Hopmann posits that,

> ...the bargaining approach focuses primarily on states as represented by a group of negotiators who have specific national interests to be achieved. Generally these interests are assumed to be fixed and unitary, and the diplomat's task is to try to maximise those national interests through negotiation. These interests are mapped on the bargaining situation as static preferences, and the outcome of the negotiation may be evaluated largely according to the amount of utility produced for the state. Bargaining tactics are assumed to be largely competitive: states make commitments to reinforce their offers and demands; they manipulate information to disguise their true preferences and their actual alternatives to agreement in order to gain settlements that are unilaterally favourable to their own interests; they issue threats and promises concerning rewards and punishments...they forgo agreements that will produce benefits greater than the status quo or their next best alternative to an agreement, if their potential competitors are perceived to be gaining more than they from the agreement.[511]

Moreover, since the end of the Second World War international negotiation as a practice has grown exponentially as regards the type of issues it deals with as well as developed as an area of study in its own right.[512] In fact, such is the widespread use of negotiation that Arthur Lall considered in 1966 that this is an 'era of negotiations'[513], while Zartman followed Dahl in emphasising the fact that negotiation has become one of the basic processes of decision-making.[514] This growth is evidenced by an increase in the number and type of issues as well as the type of negotiators. At present, negotiation is used in a wide range of issues that transcend the political aspect of relations between states and has encompassed economic

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[510] V. Kremenyuk, 'The Emerging System of International Negotiation', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991, p.22.

[511] P. Terrence Hopmann, Op. Cit. p.29-30.

[512] Good introductions to the development of negotiation as a field of study can be found, *inter alia*, in the excellent collection of essays in V. Kremenyuk, International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991. Also see: I. William Zartman. 'Introduction', in The 50% Solution, I. William Zartman (Ed), Anchor Books, New York, 1976 as well as his 'Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process', in Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, I988; Also Daniel Druckman, 'Negotiating in the International Context', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds), United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997. A classic study of negotiation may be found in Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice, Columbia University Press, New York, 1966.

[513] Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice, Columbia University Press, New York, 1966, p.1. To this respect Cecilia Albin points out that 'negotiation is the principal means of collective decision-making, rule-making, and dispute settlement in international relations'. C. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.

[514] See I. William Zartman, 'Introduction', in The 50% Solution, I. William Zartman (Ed), Anchor Books, New York, 1976. As well as Robert Dahl, 'Hierarchy, Democracy and Bargaining in Politics and Economics', in Research Frontiers in Politics and Government, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1955.

issues, trade agreements, environmental disputes, among others.[515] In addition to the more conventional issues such as security, boundaries or trade relations, negotiations today have become in some instances permanent forms of diplomatic activity in recognised and established locations. Furthermore, besides states, which continue to prefer the practice of international negotiation for the management of disputes, new actors such as international organisations, transnational corporations and social movements have emerged.[516]

That negotiation remains the decision-making method of choice at the inter-governmental level is evidenced by the bilateral exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union over the 1948-49 blockade of Berlin, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis or the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Negotiation is also used between allies and members of inter-governmental organisations as a method of decision-making, as well as between foes, as was the case with the NATO-Warsaw Pact discussions in the 1970s over mutual and balanced force reductions. Negotiations may be bilateral as well as multilateral. Recent multilateral negotiations have included the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the negotiations leading to the Single European Act as well as the Maastricht Treaty within the European Community, the talks that led to the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion as well as the discussions that resulted in the Rio Declaration on the protection of the global environment.[517] In some instances, increasing international interdependence has created issues which can only be resolved at the international level such as international security, economic development and the environment. As Kremenyuk points out, the most important and prominent dimension of international interdependence relates to matters of security. In his words,

> ...the national security of any country in the present era is inseparable from the security of others- there can be no security for one country if it threatens the other's security. The only

[515] As Kremenyuk posits, 'the fact that the number of international negotiations is continually growing does not need serious substantiation. The existing sources of information give enough evidence that the real number of negotiations has steadily increased since World War II'. V. Kremenyuk, 'The Emerging System of International Negotiation', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991, p.23.

[516] The fact that both the United Nations Security Council as well as the General Assembly constitute permanent negotiations is a case in point. In fact, as Rupesinghe *et al* point out, the United Nations has contributed to changing the nature of traditional diplomacy: 'the presence of permanent delegates at the UN headquarters in New York has influenced traditional bilateral diplomacy and new 'open' diplomacy. On the one hand, by virtue of being in close proximity delegates have the opportunity of strengthening both formal and informal contacts. The existence of delegations at the UN has provided an essential and convenient means of attempting to resolve disputes and open channels of communication...the formation of other UN agencies, particularly in the fields of health, social welfare, culture and education, further expanded the boundaries of traditional diplomacy to incorporate a good deal more than just political manoeuvring'. Kumar Rupesinghe with Sanam Naraghi Anderlini. Civil Wars, Civil Peace. An Introduction to Conflict Resolution. Pluto Press, London 1998, p.96.

[517] For these and other examples see Daniel Druckman, 'Negotiating in the International Context', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds), United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.81-83. To this respect Gilbert Winham points out that 'it is commonplace to observe that the world is becoming more interdependent- and one symptom of this interdependence is the fact that complex political and economic problems are increasingly handled at the level of international negotiation rather than exclusively at the domestic level. Today, negotiators function as an extension of national policy-making processes rather than as a formal diplomatic representation between two sovereigns'. Gilbert R. Winham, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, October 1977, p.89.

> possible solution of the security problem is common security, which can be attained through a comprehensive and logical system of international negotiations.[518]

The growth in the practice of negotiations has been closely followed by an exponential increase in its study. Academic approaches to the study of negotiation have taken different views on the fundamental questions concerning the essence of negotiation: under what conditions are negotiations most likely to succeed; how are negotiated outcomes achieved or obtained; why did the negotiation result in a particular outcome or agreement; how are negotiations best conducted. And although the answers to these questions have been bewildering in their number as well as their variety, they reveal a similar definition of what negotiation as a process is, as will be seen below.

It is common in academic approaches to negotiation theory and practice to divide them in terms of the focus of each approach. The resulting 'paradigms of negotiation' have included historical, behavioural, structural, strategic or game-theoretical and processual also called concession-convergence approaches to the study of negotiation.[519] Historically, the study of negotiation has essentially been viewed as a matter of developing case-study descriptions of singular negotiations as a way to perfect the practice of negotiation. Negotiations were considered a suitable topic for historical investigation and a vast number of studies concentrated on the analysis of specific cases of negotiation. In addition to the age-old historical approach, the study of negotiation also focused on the necessary characteristics that negotiators should have as a prerequisite for negotiation success. Within the spectrum of negotiation theory, this approach has been termed the 'behavioural approach' because negotiation success is considered to be inextricably linked to the skill and personality of the negotiator.[520] Early examples of this approach are, as Zartman posits, 'the great diplomatic treatises of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment' representing 'manuals of good conduct for successful diplomats, encouraging them to firmness and suppleness and other appropriate skills'.[521] The essence of negotiation as conceptualised in this light is captured by Winham in the following words:

> ...negotiation is an enduring art form. Its essence is artifice, the creation of expedients through the application of human ingenuity. The synonyms of the word 'art' are qualities we have long since come to admire in the ablest negotiators: skill, cunning, and craft. We expect negotiators

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[518] V. Kremenyuk. Op. Cit. p.27.

[519] For an overview of different models of negotiation see *inter alia* I. William Zartman, 'Introduction', in The 50% Solution, I. William Zartman (Ed), Anchor Books, New York, 1976; as well as Zartman's 'Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process', in Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, I988. Also V. Kremenyuk,in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991, in particular chapter 6.

[520] See for example, the classic by Fortune Barthelemy de Felice's Negotiations, or the Art of Negotiating, 1778 as well as Diplomacy by Sir Harold Nicolson. More recent analysis of this approach can be found in J.Z. Rubin and B. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Academic Press, New York and London, 1975.

[521] I. William Zartman. 'Introduction', in The 50% Solution, I. William Zartman (Ed), Anchor Books, New York, 1976, p27-29.

> to be accomplished manipulators of other people, and we applaud this aspect of their art when we observe it in uncommon degree. [522]

Nevertheless, historical or retrospective analysis of negotiation processes as well as behavioural prescriptions for negotiators are insufficient for the development of more theoretical aspects of negotiation.[523] The development of so-called structural approaches, on the other hand, brought to the study of negotiation the theoretical question of knowing the extent to which elements other than personality traits could play a role. These elements were termed 'structural aspects' of negotiation processes (e.g. parties' resources; power; composition and numbers).[524] In the 'structural' view, negotiation outcomes are explained by the relative distribution of elements of power such as material resources, political clout as well as ability between negotiating parties. Within this approach, the notion of BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) is crucial as a measure of effective power in negotiation for it establishes a party's security-points in the negotiation process (outcomes to be obtained without negotiation). In William Zartman's opinion, structural explanations, whether drawn from the strength, number, or goals of the parties, remain highly attractive because they permit theoretical prediction of outcomes. In his words, 'structural analysis of negotiation is diverse and all encompassing...structural elements provide the framework for analysis, from which other elements, such as processes, behaviours, and tactics, follow. The possibilities of insightful analysis are endless'.[525]

If the structural approach to negotiation privileged the distribution of elements of power as the main factor determining negotiation outcomes, game-theoretical also called 'strategic' approaches to negotiation processes focus on understanding and predicting the element of

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[522] Gilbert R. Winham, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, October 1977, p.87.

[523] As Terence Hopmann points out, 'the topic of international negotiation has been treated by scholars and practitioners of the diplomatic art for centuries, at least since Francois De Calieres in 1716 and Fortune de Barthelemy de Felice in 1778. It has been only since about 1960, however, that the systematic study of negotiation has begun to push the analysis of this fundamental process in international relations beyond a set of ad-hoc case studies or the presumption that diplomacy is not more than an art form. The underlying assumption of the traditional case approach is that each and every negotiation is unique, an no meaningful generalisations about the process can be derived. Others treat negotiation as an art to be mastered only by experience diplomats who develop a subjective understanding of the process that cannot be conveyed in a meaningful way to those who are unitiated in the intricacies of the art form. Neither approach treats negotiation as a topic that can be analysed in a systematic and generalizable fashion'. P. Terrence Hopmann, 'Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-Solving', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard Lambert and Alan Heston (Eds), Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell (Special Editors of this volume), Volume 542, November 1995, p.25.

[524] I. William. Zartman, 'The Structure of Negotiation', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991. See also Zartman's 'Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process', in Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, I988. Description of structural approaches to negotiation may be found in, *inter alia*, P. Swingle, The Structure of Conflict, Academic Press, New York and London, 1970; J.Z. Rubin and B. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Academic Press, New York and London, 1975 as well as in William Zartman, 'The Structure of Negotiation', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991.

[525] I. William. Zartman, 'The Structure of Negotiation', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991.

choice as a determinant of negotiation processes and outcomes.[526] The application of game-theory methodologies to the study of negotiation processes in experimental settings is privileged by this approach since the element of choice is considered critical in explaining and predicting negotiation outcomes. In game-theoretical approaches to negotiation, skill and power are purposively abstracted from the analysis, and indeed the parties are considered to be interchangeable, each making the same choice in the same situation under the assumption of rationality.

Finally, what later became one of the fundamental approaches to negotiation, the 'concession-convergence approach', is characterised by a focus on the bargaining process itself. This approach looks at negotiation as a challenge-and-response encounter, and rather than focusing on initial inputs such as power or characteristics of the parties to a negotiation, concentrates on the analysis of moves in negotiations, and the succession of offers and counter-offers themselves as crucial determinants in the negotiation process.[527] Within this approach, the analysis of the comparative calculations that parties to a negotiation make of their own costs versus those of their opponents is emphasised. Through the analysis of bargaining patterns, this approach intends to predict which party will concede and how much until the final point of convergence is reached. In such approaches notions such as security points, end points as well as concession rates are taken as critical variables.

This brief overview of what we now call 'traditional approaches' to negotiation illustrates that the systematic study of negotiation has been characterised by a detailed approach to the negotiation process. Different authors and traditions focus on different aspects of the negotiation process (i.e. behaviour and characteristics of negotiators; structure and power attributes of parties to a negotiation; bargaining and concession making) in order to understand how negotiation success comes about. Yet, there is a more important aspect underlying the traditional study of negotiation. In fact, even though the first systematic studies of negotiation had the potential for transforming the age-old practice of negotiation, the reality

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[526] See I. William Zartman. 'Introduction', in The 50% Solution, I. William Zartman (Ed), Anchor Books, New York, 1976, p.25-28. Interesting applications of game-theory to decision-making in negotiation may be found in Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1960 as well as his Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966. See also Anatol Rapoport, Two Person Game Theory, Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor, Mich, 1966; and W. Siebe, 'Game Theory', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991.

[527] Within this tradition we may suggest Ann Douglas, 'The Peaceful Settlement of Industrial and Intergroup Disputes', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 1, 1957 as well as G. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977. For an in-depth discussion of the bargaining process refer to, *inter alia*, J. Cross, 'Negotiation as a Learning Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978. For the operationalisation of bargaining behaviours using bargaining process analysis see Charles E. Walcott and P. Terrence Hopmann, 'Interaction Analysis and Bargaining Behaviour', in The Small Group in Political Science: The Last Two Decades of Development, Robert Golembiewski (Ed), University of Georgia Press, 1978.

was that negotiation-as-bargaining 'became the dominant approach to the topic of international negotiations in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s'.[528]

In fact, early negotiation theory was based on the theory of non-zero-sum, or mixed motive games (where parties have both competitive and cooperative options available). This theory emphasised the fact that negotiations should not be conceptualised as zero-sum bargaining encounters, but rather as situations where parties seek 'the realisation of a common interest where conflicting interests are present'.[529] Yet, as Hopmann posits,

> ...even though these early works treated negotiations as a mixed-motive game, almost from the beginning they began to divide into those approaches that emphasised the competitive nature of the negotiation process- namely, the effort to advance the interest of the nation relative to its rivals- and those that highlighted the more cooperative effort to enlarge the joint interests of both parties simultaneously. Even though the theory of non-zero-sum games allowed for mutual benefits, both Schelling and Ikle noted that parties had to protect themselves from being exploited by others in a prisoner's dilemma situation.[530]

Irrespective of the particular focus of each approach, the competitive, adversarial and bargaining aspects of negotiations were privileged, as negotiations were conceptualised as situations where two or more parties to a dispute exchange concessions through bargaining, in an environment characterised by imperfect information. While Fred Ikle's definition of negotiation emphasises the mixed motive nature of a process that is geared towards the realisation of common interest[531], the competitive and bargaining assumption has become the conventional understanding of the process of negotiation, as evidenced by Issa Dialo's survey of the common meaning of negotiation found in several French language dictionaries as being 'une serie d'entretiens, de demarches, qu'on entreprend pour parvenir a un accord, pour concluire une affaire'.[532]

More importantly, as pointed out by Winham, the practice of negotiation remains rooted in the idea that 'the positions of the parties are juxtaposed at opposite ends of the continuum, and if an agreement is to be reached, it is through a process of compromise and

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[528] P. Terrence Hopmann, 'Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-Solving', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard Lambert and Alan Heston (Eds), Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell (Special Editors of this volume), Volume 542, November 1995, p.26. For a critique of traditional approaches see also I. William Zartman, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978. Also I. William Zartman. 'Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process', in Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, I988, p.31-37.

[529] Fred Ikle. How Nations Negotiate, Harper and Row, New York, 1964. This common assumption is also present in Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict in 1960 and Anatol Rapoport's Fights, Games and Debates also in 1960.

[530] P. Terence Hopmann, 'Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-Solving', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard Lambert and Alan Heston (Eds), Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell (Special Editors of this volume), Volume 542, November 1995, p.26.

[531] In his words, 'explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of common interest where conflicting interests are present'. See Fred Ikle. How Nations Negotiate, Harper and Row, New York, 1964, p.31.

[532] Issa Ben Yacine Diallo, Introduction a l'Etude et la Pratique de la Négociation', Editions Pedone, Paris, 1998, p.19.

convergence' with the consequence that 'concessions are a crucial step in this process'. This partially justifies the fact that 'the strategy of concession making has been a major focus of studies of negotiation and bargaining'.[533] To this regard, Bertram Spector posits that 'there is only one element common to all types of negotiation, no matter how diverse they may be in content or procedure. Persons, in the role of negotiators, are required to communicate positions, make demands and concessions, respond to changing signals, and arrive at outcomes'.[534] This is reinforced by Hopmann's view that,

> ...empirical research generally reveals that bargaining behaviours are used more frequently in international negotiations than is problem-solving. This may be explained by the dominance of the realist paradigm in international relations, within which most diplomats are socialised. Since diplomats generally construct their image of negotiations in terms of bargaining, it is hardly surprising that these behaviours should be prevalent in actual negotiations.[535]

What are the implications of such assumptions about negotiation as regards the resolution of armed conflicts? At the international political level, negotiation has historically been regarded as the ideal method available to states to settle their conflicts and in cases of war to agree on truces, armistices, cease-fires and peace agreements.[536] In the modern European 'clausewitzian universe' of inter-state wars, negotiation was used to end a great number of them, including situations where one side capitulated. Furthermore, even though diplomacy tended to break down between states at war, once the belligerents realised that this 'instrument of policy' could no longer fulfil their objectives, they would signal their willingness to return to 'normal' political procedures, that is the bargaining table. After all, Clausewitz himself postulated that the most important aspect of war is the degree to which it accurately reflects political objectives. Nevertheless, moving to the negotiation table was never an easy decision, as Fred Ikle found in relation to World War I and World War II, as well the Algerian War of Independence or the Korean War.[537] Yet, once this move was done the machinery of bargaining and concession making coupled with the application of leverage could begin. According to the rules of this game, what one party wins the other must loose since gains are perceived in absolute terms. The maximisation of interest leads realists to argue, as Hopmann points out, that it makes a difference if both parties to a negotiation are better off for

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[533] See Winham. Op. cit. p.100.

[534] B. Spector, 'Negotiation as a Psychological Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978, p.55.

[535] P. Terence Hopmann, 'Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-Solving', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard Lambert and Alan Heston (Eds), Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell (Special Editors of this volume), Volume 542, November 1995, p.24.

[536] In this respect see Sydney D Bailey, How Wars End. The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-1964, Volume I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.

[537] Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1971, p.84-105. As this author points out 'in many wars, government leaders vehemently oppose negotiating with the enemy as long as the fighting continues. They may have various reasons for this attitude: they may think an offer to talk would signal weakness to the enemy; they may be concerned that their soldiers and citizens would slacken their war efforts in the belief that peace was near; they may fear that the enemy would offer some conciliatory proposals, which would be hard to reject but fall short of their war aims. Finally, they may anticipate that to raise the question of how to conduct the negotiations would stir up deep conflicts with their allies'. Ibid. p.85-86.

'if one gains more relative to the other, then this may put the relative loser at a strategic disadvantage that could do it serious harm over the long run'.[538]

Negotiation remains privileged as an approach to the resolution, we should say settlement, of armed conflicts at present. This is evidenced by article thirty-three of the Charter of the United Nations which states that 'the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice'. As Sydney Bailey points out,

> ...although the means of settlement listed in the Charter are not in order of importance, it is not surprising that negotiation should come first, since it is *par excellence* the means that is normally used 'first of all'. Moreover, even when an issue has become acute enough for it to be submitted to the Security Council, it is *natural* for members to ask if all the possibilities of direct negotiation have been exhausted. If armed conflict has broken out, the first impulse of the Council is to call for the fighting to stop, but the second impulse is nearly always to encourage the parties to negotiate.[539]

What this reveals is that, as was pointed out in earlier pages, article thirty-three reflects the assumption held by the founders of the United Nations that the conflicts that matter and would matter are those between sovereign states (the organisation's members) and that these conflicts should first of all be settled through methods of discussion and negotiation by the parties themselves. Should negotiation fail, such mechanisms as inquiry, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement can be resorted to, or failing that, the Security Council (under Chapter VII of the Charter) may consider a member's actions to be a threat to or breach of peace or an act of aggression and apply economic and military sanctions. In this sense, all other methods will be tried only if and when negotiations fail. What the drafters of the Charter did not anticipate was the growing number of 'wars of the third kind', in their first materialization as 'wars of national liberation', and were therefore ill prepared to face the analytical and practical problems posed by these conflicts, in particular the application of the relevant dispositions of the Charter. That twenty years after the founding of the United

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[538] P. Terence Hopmann, 'Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-Solving', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Richard Lambert and Alan Heston (Eds), Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell (Special Editors of this volume), Volume 542, November 1995, p.33. Accordingly, 'the goal is to win in the negotiation at the expense of the other party, by remaining firm while they are flexible and offer compromise. Once the opponent has begun to slide down the slippery slope of compromise, the hard bargainer may sit fast and achieve an optimal agreement that also represents high relative gains. Even if the opponent remains inflexible, the hard bargainer would prefer to remain firmly committed to self-interested positions and risk suboptimal agreements or even no agreement at all rather than be led into an agreement in which the opponent is not gullible'.

[539] Sydney D. Bailey, How Wars End. The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-1964, Volume I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, p.158. In fact this author adds that 'in the cases within the scope of this study, the Security Council favoured such negotiations, often offering the assistance of the President of the Council, the Secretary-General, or a subsidiary organ'.

Nations the need was felt for a study group to review the actual operation of United Nations provisions for the peaceful settlement of international disputes is recognition of this.[540]

Moreover, the use of bargaining-type negotiations in the resolution of armed conflicts of a non-international character has proven highly unsuccessful. As Charles King points out,

> ...the intensity of violence and the derivative grievances which it [civil war] can produce present particular problems to those interested in ending the conflict via negotiations. In fact, statistically, negotiated peace between belligerents has been a relatively rare outcome despite the international community's interest in promoting the settlement of sub-state conflicts at the bargaining table.[541]

Paul Pillar has found that whereas over two-thirds of all inter-state wars waged since 1800 have ended via negotiations, only about one-third of civil wars have been settled in a similar manner. Roy Licklider has studied the post Second World War period and found that only about a quarter of civil wars have ended via negotiations. On the other hand, Stephen Stedman found that, when colonial wars and other conflicts with a substantial international component are eliminated, the figure for negotiated settlements stood at only 15%. Chaim Kaufmann has studied 'ethnic civil wars' and concluded that only 8 of 27 such conflicts since 1944 have ended in a negotiated settlement that did not lead to the partition of the state.[542] Furthermore, as pointed out by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 'civil wars ended by negotiated settlements are more likely to lead to the recurrence of armed conflicts than those ended by military victories'.[543]

The bargaining approach to negotiation is highly ineffective as a method for the resolution of 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind'. This situation seems also to be the case with other traditional means of 'conflict resolution' imported from the domestic domain such as judicial settlement and arbitration. Because both of these processes result in a decision taken by a single deciding party who 'aggregates conflicting values and interests into a single decision',

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[540] David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Report of a Study Group on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (London, 1966). Sydney Bailey recognises this problem and says that 'historically, war has been thought of as a military contest between sovereigns. The UN structure was largely predicated on the assumption that international disputes would be disputed between states...a major problem of the United Nations has been that international peace has often been endangered by the aspirations and actions of entities rather than states, and that the Organisation is so constructed that its organs prefer to deal with states rather than with dissident political organisations, insurgent groups, liberation movements, communal minorities, and the like'. Sydney D. Bailey, How Wars End. The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-1964, Volume I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, p.20-21.

[541] Charles King. Ending Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 308, London, 1997, p.24.

[542] Ibid. To this respect see Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983; Roy Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993', in American Political Science Review, Vol. 89. No. 3, 1995; Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1991; and Chaim Kaufmann, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', in International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996.

[543] Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999, p.154. Based on Roy Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993', in American Political Science Review, Vol. 89. No. 3, 1995

they are hierarchical in nature and 'one side has all the power to make the decision and the parties before him can only avail themselves of the means of persuasion, to reason, plead, and promise in order to affect the decision'.[544]

In fact, if the vast majority of post-1945 armed conflicts have been conducted by groups bent on some form of self-determination, are these conflicts amenable for settlement through concession/convergence or the bargaining of interests at the negotiating table? In other words,

> ...is there a hypothetical point of compromise between those intent on maintaining the territorial integrity of the state and those bent on secession? What is there to negotiate when political purposes are so fundamentally incompatible? Can communities within states dedicated to the exclusion or marginalisation of 'minorities' (and sometimes of majorities) be persuaded suddenly to stop fearing those who have excluded or murdered them?'.[545]

5.2. The Promise of Problem-Solving:

The Facilitated Analysis of Underlying Sources of Conflict

> ...the nature of internal conflict works against the component conditions for a ripe moment for negotiation...if the parties do become involved in negotiation, usually through the insistent efforts of a third party, they continually look for ways of seizing an opportunity to escalate their way out of the stalemate, convincing the other party of their basic bad faith.[546]

> ... traditional means of settlement, such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, deal solely or primarily with surface interests and positions and do not directly address underlying needs and values. Attempts to translate needs into interests simply to fit the method of intervention make situations worse. In addition, traditional methods often employ leverage in its various forms of persuasion, inducement, normative pressures, or coercion in attempts to gain or force a settlement. Under these conditions, not only are settlements difficult to obtain from the parties, but they are unstable over time. In addition, the traditional methods of conflict management are devoid of the means of deeper analysis on which to base the resolution of the conflict...[547]

In the pages above we found that, as the traditional 'conflict resolution' method of choice, international negotiation has been highly ineffective in the resolution of 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind'. While it should be noted that each contemporary armed conflict is to a degree idiosyncratic and therefore that generalisations should be made with care, adversarial based attempts at their resolution as evidenced by traditional approaches to negotiation have not only been unsuccessful, but even when an agreement is achieved, it proves to be more

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[544] I. William Zartman, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978, p.70.

[545] Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.195.

[546] I. William Zartman, 'The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts' in Stopping the Killing. How Civil Wars End, Roy Locklider (Ed), New York university Press, New York and London, 1993, p.27.

[547] Ronald Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p. 32.

unstable than situations resulting from outright victory of one side. In the words of John Burton,

> ...the traditional view was that conflicts within and between societies are necessarily win-lose, and for this reason are most efficiently settled by judicial, law and order or some other process that authoritatively divides the cake. These processes were easily understood, and easily, if not successfully applied. Twenty years ago it was becoming apparent that deep-rooted conflicts, whether between persons or nations, could not be resolved just by legal or coercive means...[548]

This leads us to a fundamental question: what should 'conflict resolution' as applied to contemporary armed conflicts entail? Is resolution achieved through truces, armistices or cease-fires? Or should it entail a fundamental change in the relationship between conflict groups leading to reconciliation and perhaps forgiveness? Surely if we understand conflict resolution to be the cessation of hostilities between conflict groups who agree on a formal cease-fire then the record of negotiated outcomes may not appear to be that ineffective (e.g. the cases of Colombia, Yemen and Sudan). If we take conflict resolution to be characterised by compliance with agreements brought about by successful negotiations between belligerents, then the cases of Namibia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, South Africa, Mozambique and Guatemala must be considered positive achievements of negotiations. Yet, we must take Charles King's advice that determining when a 'civil war' has come to an end may be a perplexing enterprise. Identifying 'conflict resolution' with 'war ending' must be questioned since it 'depends on rather arbitrary criteria, and those criteria in turn depend on the differing perceptions of belligerents, the interests of external powers, and the conventions of analysts and academics engaged in the study of warfare'.[549] As Tidwell posits,

> ...resolution means many things to many people...to some, resolution simply means an end, and therefore conflict resolution means merely the end of conflict. Thus for some, resolution may include such things as victory in battle, an opponent simply vanishing, or other such conclusive events. For others, resolution means a very specific kind of an end to conflict, where the means and methods are prescribed to be non-violent, participatory and voluntary. In most conflict resolution literature it is the latter that has gained the greatest attention.[550]

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[548] John W. Burton. Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, A Handbook. University Press of America, Boston, 1987, p.vii.

[549] Charles King. Ending Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 308, London, 1997, p.19, 22. This author adds that 'despite the many books and articles on 'conflict resolution' and a growing body of work on 'war termination' in both inter- and intra-state conflicts, there has been little agreement on precisely what either of these phrases means or on how to determine when large-scale armed conflict- whether within or between states- has come to a definitive end'. Ibid. p.21. In a recent volume on how civil wars end, Roy Licklider for example, considers that 'we classified a civil war as ended when the level of violence had dropped below the Small-Singer threshold of 1,000 battle deaths per year for at least five years'. Roy Licklider. 'How Civil Wars Ends: Questions and Methods', in Stopping the Killing. How Civil Wars End, Roy Locklider (Ed), New York university Press, New York and London, 1993, p.11. In fact, the variety of formats of recent war-endings compounds to the difficulties in generalisation. The negotiation of cease-fires has been crucial in Cambodia, while in Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua talks on ending these wars began before cease-fires were agreed. In South Africa, for example, a power-sharing formula was adopted while in Angola, such formula ultimately contributed to the renewal of the war in 1992. In Guatemala an extremely comprehensive framework peace agreement was signed and interim accords on several issues implemented before a cease-fire was signed.

[550] Alan C. Tidwell, Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution, Pinter, London and New York, 1998, p.147.

The realisation of the inherent inadequacy of the adversarial as well as authoritative nature of traditional approaches to the analysis and resolution of armed conflicts (among others) prompted a radical revision of these methods and their underlying assumptions, resulting in the development of 'conflict resolution' as a discipline in its own right. Departing from the assumption that, as was mentioned in earlier pages, there are sufficient commonalities between conflicts at all social levels to allow for generalisation and theory development, 'conflict resolution' as a discipline has been enriched by contributions from international relations, organisational and management science and also alternative dispute resolution (ADR). While it is beyond our purposes to provide an exhaustive account of this vast field, a number of observations, in the gist of a most cursory of outlines, are in order.[551]

Important to understand the fundamental paradigm shift brought about by the field of 'conflict resolution' are the early works of pioneers such as sociologists Georg Simmel[552] and Lewis Coser[553] who, inspired by Marxist thought, introduced the idea of a positive function to conflicts through the comparative and transversal study of conflicts at various levels of the social spectrum. Morton Deutsch, a social-psychologist took that idea further by differentiating between constructive and destructive conflicts, centring on the role of interaction, (mis)perception, self-fulfilling prophecies, cognition and awareness of actors involved in conflicts and introducing the suggestion that conflicts are essentially a subjective phenomenon. For the purposes of conflict resolution Deutsch introduced the novel proposition that 'many destructive conflicts between nations, groups and individuals result from their lack of skills related to the procedures in constructive resolution'. This author emphasises the link between analysis and resolution, considering that the key to resolving conflicts is the 'correction of perception'. At the centre of all conflicts, misperception is a result of 'impoverished communication, hostile attitudes, and over-sensitivity to differences' which 'lead to distorted views that may intensify and perpetuate conflict'.[554]

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[551] Introductions to the field of conflict resolution may be found, *inter alia*, in Alan C. Tidwell, Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution, Pinter, London and New York, 1998; also Hugh Miall with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, 1999.

[552] Simmel put forward the idea that conflict may be functional in that it can actually be an integrative and socialising process for conflict groups. Furthermore, he considered that while conflicts may end in compromise or victory of one side, there are conflicts that, as a result of the subjective beliefs of parties must rely on processes of conciliation for their resolution. In this regard, see Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Inter-Group Affiliations, The Free Press, New York, 1955.

[553] In his seminal work The Functions of Social Conflict, Coser further developed the idea that conflicts may serve specific and useful social functions, such as maintaining social relationships, creating new norms and institutions as well s stimulating the economic and technological realm. Coser also questioned the assumption that all conflicts should be resolved, focusing on the outcomes and results of both functional and dysfunctional conflicts. In this regard see Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968.

[554] See Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict, Yale University Press, New Haven , 1973 and Morton Deutsch, 'Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution', in New Directions in Conflict Theory, Raimo Vayrynen (Ed), Sage, London, 1991.

Deutsch's proposition that in order to resolve conflicts parties must develop the skills that will enable them to have a more accurate perception of the conflict they are involved in was further developed by conflict resolution pioneer John Burton. In fact, the work of Burton established conflict resolution as a specialised while multi-disciplinary field of study and introduced a new paradigm in the study of international relations, the *world society* approach.[555] Rejecting the realist assumption that international relations are characterised by a constant search for power by political units (i.e. states), Burton uses the so-called 'human needs approach' to emphasise that, in fact, the satisfaction of basic human needs is the primary source of human behaviour, and therefore, of conflict.[556] The paradigm shift as regards approaches to conflict resolution was born and with it came the first real challenge to the 'clausewitzian' analysis of war.

Moreover, Burton considers that at the root of any conflict is an unsatisfied need, and that the statements made by parties in conflict reveal not their needs but interests that if achieved will satisfy their needs.[557] The pursuit of basic needs gives rise to what Burton defines as 'deep rooted conflict' similar in inspiration as well as in scope to Edward Azar's 'protracted social conflict' described in earlier pages. These conflicts are not based on negotiable interests and positions, but underlying needs that cannot be compromised such as the fundamental and universal needs for identity and participation, consistency, security, recognition, and distributive justice (Burton) or the need for security, distinct identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation (Azar).[558] In order to get at these needs, conflict resolution ought not to be based on power bargaining through processes of concession/convergence but should entail the 'facilitated analysis of the underlying sources of conflict situations by the parties in conflict' and encompass 'the process whereby institutional and policy options are

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[555] To this respect see, *inter alia*, John Burton, World Society, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972; also Burton's 'Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy', in Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application, Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Editors), Manchester University Press, 1993. M. Banks, Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations, Michael Banks (Ed), St. Martin's Press, New York, 1984. Also A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, The Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher', in Conflicts: Readings in Management and Resolution, John Burton and Frank Dukes (Eds), George Mason University, MacMillan Press, 1990, p.74-82.

[556] In this regard see John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention. Centre for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, St. Martin's Press, 1990, p.36-47.

[557] In his development of the 'basic human needs approach' Burton builds on several sources, namely Maslow's theory of human needs as well as Paul Sites' Control: The Basis of Social Order. For an in-depth discussion of this approach see *inter alia*, John W. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979 and Edward Azar and John Burton (Eds), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, Brighton and Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 1986. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is developed in his Motivation and Personality, Harper and Row, New York, 1970. Vivienne Jabri problematises this approach as regards structuration theory in her Discourses on Violence, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 119-145.

[558] See for example Ronald Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p.5-6. This author adds that 'the concepts of protracted social conflict and deep-rooted conflict are compatible with the approach taken to understanding inter-group and international conflict by the interdisciplinary field of applied social psychology...the humanistic value base of this approach holds that both individuals and groups have undeniable needs for identity, dignity, security, equity, participation in decisions that affect them, and control over their destiny'. Ibid. p. 6.

discovered that meet the needs of the parties' that in combination will 'establish the basis for a resolution of the conflict'.[559]

At the root of the *Burtonian* approach to conflict resolution is the distinction between 'disputes' and 'conflicts'. While 'disputes' concern negotiable and tangible interests that are amenable for settlement, 'conflicts' concern basic needs and are therefore not amenable to negotiation, coerced settlements or containment. Consequently, the processes of 'conflict resolution' should be developed not for the settlement of disputes about interests but for the resolution of conflicts about needs, and consequently be geared towards dealing with non-negotiable interests. In fact, conflict resolution in the *Burtonian* sense entails a specific methodology of conflict resolution. This methodology was initially termed 'controlled communication workshops' and is now more widely known as the 'analytical problem-solving workshop approach'.[560]

This approach brings together high-level representatives of groups involved in violent conflict in private, informal discussions in the presence of an impartial third party panel of social scientists.[561] Furthermore, it is specifically developed for so called 'deep-rooted', intractable conflicts where fundamental human needs are at stake. This approach has been further enriched by the contributions of Leonard Doob, Herbert Kelman, Stephen Cohen, Edward Azar, Ronald Fisher and John Groom among others. Doob's theoretical development and practical application of human-relations training to intergroup and international conflict resolution, for example, introduced the idea that by learning about themselves and their relations with others (human interaction), actors involved in conflict would be better equipped to create innovative solutions to their conflicts.[562] Herbert Kelman's efforts to develop a social-

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[559] John W. Burton. Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, A Handbook. University Press of America, Boston, 1987, p.7.

[560] In his words: 'we are moving from the traditional approach of power bargaining, negotiation, and the settlement of disputes to another approach which is problem solving. This involves a searching analysis of goals and interests. This analysis leads to the discovery of agreed options so that resolution of conflicts is possible'. John W. Burton. Op. cit. p.11.

[561] As Fisher points out, 'the role of the third party in controlled communication is therefore radically different from traditional methods of mediation and arbitration that seek to persuade, verify, or judge. The panel's role is to help explain the origin and escalation of the conflict through analysis and comparison with other conflicts...the essential role of the panel is to control communication to create a non-threatening atmosphere in which the participants can examine their perceptions and misperceptions about the conflict and about each other, and then jointly explore avenues for analysing and resolving the conflict, partly through the development of common functional interests. Due consideration must be given to the identification of the parties and the issues in the conflict, to the selection of representatives and their relationship with their principals'. For an introduction to this approach refer to *inter alia*, Ronald Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, Chapters 1-4. Also Herbert C Kelman, 'The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996.

[562] Leonard Doob's theorising can be found in Leonard Doob, The Pursuit of Peace, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn, 1981. For a practical application of Doob's 'human relations training' see Leonard Doob, Resolving Conflicts in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop, Leonard Doob (Ed), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970. As well as Leonard Doob abd W. J. Foltz, 'The Belfast Workshop: An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 17, 1973 and his 'A Cyprus Workshop: Intervention Methodology During a Continuing Crisis', in Journal of Social Psychology, No. 98, 1976.

psychology of international relations lead him to consider the application of methods of social-psychology to the analysis and resolution of conflict, believing that the innovative 'workshop approach' was essentially a social-psychology method that implied that changes at the level of the individual would reverberate at the level of policy making processes, impacting on the political macro-level.[563]

In fact, this author's contributions to the interactive conflict resolution approach are very important, namely as regards the maturity of the idea that problem-solving must be the root of conflict resolution itself, an assumption which strengthened the shift in approaches to conflict resolution.[564] For John Burton, the conceptual separation of 'problem-solving' and 'dispute settlement' had led him to distinguish between processes of conflict settlement, conflict management and conflict resolution. While settlement may be reached by a 'power-bargaining situation' (dispute settlement) such as for example a court's decision of settling a dispute, 'resolution' is not the result of a compromise or an enforced solution but, as was previously pointed out, a result of the 'analysis of the total situation by the concerned parties to meet all their needs'. Conflict management, on the other hand, entails 'wider application', ranging from deterrence strategies to propaganda, in an attempt 'usually by the status quo party to the dispute, to avoid escalation of the conflict while maintaining control without giving way'.[565]

Herbert Kelman's application of the problem-solving workshop methodology to the Middle East conflict convinced him that rather than an isolated effort at conflict resolution, this approach should fundamentally be a complement to negotiation, and that it should be used particularly in pre-negotiation processes.[566] The originality of Kelman's approach to conflict resolution resides therefore in the idea that problem-solving workshops are not meant to

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[563] For an earlier development of Herbert Kelman's thoughts on the social-psychology of international relations refer to Herbert Kelman, International Behaviour: A Social-Psychological Analysis, Herbert Kelman (Ed), Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1965. See also Ronald Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p.62.

[564] Herbert Kelman has produced a vast number of books and articles on these topics. Among others, his approach may be found in his 'The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution', in Communication in International Politics, R.L. Merritt (Ed), Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1972; also 'An Interactional Approach to Conflict Resolution and Its Application to Israeli-Palestinian Relations', in International Interactions, No. 6 (2), 1979; and in his 'Informal Mediation by the Scholar-Practitioner', in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin (Eds), MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1992. His recent writing have included: 'Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving', in International Negotiation, Vol. I, No. I, I996; 'Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds), United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997 and finally 'The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach', in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Reponses to International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamella Hall (Eds), U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996.

[565] To this respect, see *inter alia*, John W. Burton. Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, A Handbook. University Press of America, Boston, 1987, p.8.

[566] The idea of complementarity is also highlighted by Christopher Mitchell, who emphasises that controlled communication is not meant to substitute negotiations in international conflict resolution, but should be conceptualised as a preparatory and supplementary method. In this regard see Christopher Mitchell, 'Conflict Resolution and Controlled Communication: Some Further Comments', in Journal of Peace Research, No. 10 (1), 1973, p.123-132.

replace negotiations, but that they should be conceptualised as a parallel complement to negotiation processes. But what kind of negotiation is implied in Kelman's idea? Is he thinking of the realist power-bargaining approach or is negotiation conceptualised differently?

As a result of the work of Burton, Kelman and others, problem-solving has grown to become an overarching approach to conflict resolution, representing a fundamental shift in the theory (and in some instances, the practice) of conflict resolution, one in which the workshop format represents but one possible example of its action component.[567] The underlying logic of problem-solving is in fact a macro-level overarching methodology with strong implications for conflict resolution in general, and specific methodologies in particular.[568] In addition, while problem-solving has benefited from contributions from various fields, in particular management science, it should be emphasised that within the conflict resolution tradition problem-solving implies more than just the achievement of 'win-win' outcomes through the creative solution of problems. In fact, at the root of problem-solving in the field of armed conflict resolution is the fundamental idea that problem-solving is meant to change relationships between parties in conflict.

In this sense, and in direct opposition to power-bargaining, a problem-solving approach to conflict resolution will consider the relationship between the parties as the central unit of analysis. Because conflict is viewed as a shared problem in the relationship between antagonists (which always contains both competitive as well as cooperative elements), negotiation is and should be primarily concerned with transforming that relationship. In fact, in his latest work, Kelman recognises that 'negotiations oriented towards problem-solving are more likely to generate integrative solutions' essentially in violent conflicts because 'in deep-rooted conflicts that raise issues of identity and group survival, only agreements that address at least the core needs of both parties can produce a stable, peaceful outcome'. In this sense, the ultimate goal of negotiation within a problem-solving framework is to transform the relationship between the parties and not merely to produce a 'minimally acceptable political agreement, but to provide the basis for a stable, long-term process and cooperative, mutually enhancing relationship that contributes to the welfare and development of both societies'.[569]

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[567] It should be noted that problem-solving as a philosophy of conflict resolution has had strong inputs from other fields, most notably management science. The early works of May Parker Follett for example, or the publication by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton of the now classic The Managerial Grid have introduced the language and philosophy of 'problem-solving' in management and are widely used in the private sector, in labour-management disputes, among others.

[568] As Kelman posits, 'I find it difficult to pass up the opportunity of spelling out the broader implications of interactive problem solving for the macro-processes of conflict resolution. I have always viewed interactive problem solving as a general approach to conflict resolution- indeed to international relationships as a whole- of which problem-solving workshops are the prototypical but not the only manifestation'. H. Kelman, 'Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving', in International Negotiation, Vol. I, No. I, I996, p.102.

[569] Ibid. p.100, 101.

The theoretical development of alternatives to traditional methods of 'conflict resolution' has closely followed the analytical and procedural assumptions of problem-solving as a macro-level approach to the resolution of conflicts. In the field of international negotiation, for example, the notion that negotiations are straightforward bargaining processes of the type caricatured by Winham is being increasingly questioned.[570]

The increasing complexity of international relations is transforming negotiation from a relatively low-key and tendentiously undisclosed endeavour between discreet diplomats to a process where large bureaucracies are involved both in exerting pressure as well as, in complex multilateral negotiations, in the composition of negotiation teams *per se*. Consequently, international negotiation is expected to not only resolve specific disputes between states and other actors in the international system but increasingly to reduce complexity by achieving 'through negotiated agreement, a structure that will limit the free play of certain variables in the future'.[571] As a result, negotiations will increasingly include elements of regime building around specific issues rather than simply dispute-settlement between parties (thereby focusing more on process rather than outcome). The model of negotiation as dispute settlement is being re-evaluated to allow for the inclusion of the crucial elements that inform and allow for such regime-building results.

As regards the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts, several authors have contributed to a clearer understanding of the role that an enlarged conceptualisation of the negotiation process may play. Contemporary negotiation theory has incorporated the 'problem-solving' approach in an attempt to surpass the assumption that negotiations are only dispute-settlement processes, characterised by zero-sum outcomes and simply about dividing finite 'values' or 'resources' between adversarial parties. Surely, there are many instances where 'the items under negotiation are well enough established through prior agreement to enable concession/convergence concession bargaining to take place'.[572] Nevertheless, as Winham points out,

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[570] The idea that negotiations follow a straightforward succession of events of the type ' in day 1, one party, Arthur, made a public statement as to the firmness of his resolve if the forthcoming negotiation. On day 2, his counterpart, Bill, published a response. On day 3, Arthur made a persuasive case and Bill responded with a threat; an actual offer (which amounts to a demand) was put on the table by Arthur on day 4, and so on. This went on until some date at which the two sides reached agreement'. B. Spector. 'Negotiation as a Psychological Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978, p.36.

[571] To this respect see Gilbert R. Winham, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, October 1977, p.94. As Albin points out, negotiation can bring about new and needed solutions to shared problems and it is used not only to produce agreement on a division of values but also to establish and reform institutions, regimes and regulations. See C. Albin, 'The Role of Fairness in Negotiation', in Negotiation Journal, July 1993 as well her Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.

[572] I. William Zartman, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978, p.77.

> ...the principal problem for most contemporary negotiators is not to outwit their adversaries, but rather to create a *structure* out of a large mass of information wherein it is possible to apply human wit. The classical diplomat's technique of the management of people through guile has given way to the *management of people through the creation of system and structure*...in past eras it was fashionable to describe negotiation as art, and art it continues to be, but it is now more akin to the art of management as practised in large bureaucracies than the art of guile and concealment as practised by Cardinal Mazarin.[573]

Contemporary negotiation theory has shifted the focus on division to a focus on exchanges as well as the creation of *win-win* solutions through 'problem-solving' with the aim of transforming relationships of parties in conflict. By highlighting important processual elements such as the search for acceptable solutions, the development of common perceptions and definitions of the situation as prior and tendentiously more important for the vast majority of issues under negotiation today than the 'exchange of concessions', contemporary negotiation theory has moved away from the 'distributive' concession/convergence conventional approach. The increasing complexity in the number and types of issues subject to negotiation is prompting a revision of the tenets of the traditional distributive approach (e.g. zero-sum nature of issues in conflict; parties viewed as adversaries; competitive strategies) and a consideration that, in fact, negotiations should include integrative and problem-solving elements. Integrative 'problem solving' negotiation is above all a process by which a solution to a common problem is arrived at, and in this process, a new set of relationship rules may be established serving as benchmarks for the resolution of future conflicts.

Therefore, in addition to focusing on the processes of negotiation as the 'tabling of an opening position, and the movement (or convergence) toward a compromise position through step-by-step concessions'[574], contemporary negotiation theory also focuses on the processes by which parties arrive at *common perceptions* and *definitions* of their particular situation as well as the processes by which parties search for acceptable solutions.[575] Recent developments in the study of negotiation such as Gulliver's or Druckman's 'integrative analysis'[576] and William Zartman's own 'formula-detail'[577] model of negotiation represent

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[573] Gilbert R. Winham, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 1, October 1977, p.89.

[574] See Winham. Op. cit. p.96-97.

[575] For example, Daniel Druckman and P. Terence Hopmann consider that the outcome of a negotiation on an international issue is generally determined through the process itself'. Daniel Druckman and P. Terence Hopmann, 'Behavioural Aspects of Negotiations on Mutual Security', in Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War, Paul Stern, Jo. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Philip Stock and Charles Tilly (Eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 1989.

[576] To this respect see P. H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, Academic Press, New York, 1979 as well as D. Druckman, 'Stages, Turning Points and Crisis', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 30, 1986.

[577] See I. William Zartman, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978. For a later development of the 'formula-detail' approach see also I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982.

important steps in this direction. Zartman's 'formula-detail' model of negotiation, relies on the basic premise that,

> ...rather than a matter of convergence through incremental concessions from specific initial positions, negotiation is a matter of finding the proper *formula* and implementing *detail* [sic]. Above all, negotiators seek a general definition of the items under discussion, conceived and grouped in such a way as to be susceptible of joint agreement under a common notion of justice. Once agreement on a formula is achieved, it is possible to turn to the specifics of items and to exchange proposals, concessions and agreements. Even then, details are resolved most frequently in terms of the referents which justify them and give them value rather than in their own intrinsic value.[578]

Zartman's analysis of a number of negotiations convinced him that rather than an exchange of concessions towards a point of convergence, they represented the search for a formula, a referent principle that allowed for detailed items and values to be derived.[579] This is reinforced by Cecilia Albin's definition of negotiation, which incorporates both distributive as well as integrative elements:

> ...negotiation is a joint (as opposed to unilateral) decision-making process in which parties with at least partly *opposing interests* arrive at a mutually satisfactory *agreement* through the exchange of concessions and/or problem-solving. So negotiation is about *modifying and reconciling competing interests*, and finding new solutions which meet at least some of these (most important) interests. It normally includes both dialogue with discussion based on merits and principles, and competitive bargaining with the use of tactics such as threats and promises.[580]

Herbert Kelman's latest work on the subject reinforces this theoretical shift. In fact, this author considers that 'interactive problem-solving' should become an empirical while normative metaphor for negotiation itself. In his words,

> ...this metaphor is meant to *describe* negotiation- to propose that interactive problem solving is, in essence, what negotiation is all about. In practice, however, it is quite often the case- certainly in official international negotiations- that the process in which the parties engage deviates substantially from what is implied by this metaphor. *Under the circumstances, the metaphor takes on a prescriptive function: it becomes a way of formulating what negotiation ideally ought to be about* [my emphasis].[581]

Recent studies of conflict resolution have focused not only on the moment parties begin to negotiate but also on the conditions and processes that prompt parties to consider the possibility of negotiations in the first place.[582] These have included a focus on the triggers and

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[578] Ibid. p.77.

[579] See I. William Zartman, 'Negotiation as a Management Process', in The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications, I. William Zartman (Ed), Sage Publications, 1978, p.80.

[580] This definition of negotiation is given by Dr Albin in her course on 'Conflict and Conflict Resolution' at the University of Reading, United Kingdom. For a development of Albin's ideas on negotiation see C. Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.

[581] H. Kelman, 'Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving', in International Negotiation, Vol. I, No. I, I996, p.99.

[582] See for example, J. Gross. Stein, 'Getting to the Table: the Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Prenegotiation', in Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation, J. Gross Stein (Ed), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, I989. Also Harold Saunders, 'We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of the Pre-Negotiation Phases', in Negotiation Journal, July 1985. And I. William

reasons behind parties' decisions to negotiate as well as ways to facilitate parties' movement towards the negotiation table. Numerous unsuccessful attempts to bring groups in conflict to the negotiating table have led to the consideration that the inclusion of pre-negotiation and other 'interactive conflict resolution' processes is critical. Therefore, as an approach directed at relationship transformation, problem-solving conflict resolution includes various 'micro-level' methodologies. As Fisher points out,

> ...most of these methods of nonviolent conflict resolution have also been identified as forms of 'unofficial diplomacy' by Berman and Johnson (1977) and more recently as 'track two diplomacy' by Montville (1987) to distinguish them from 'track one', or official diplomatic, that is, government-to-government interaction...track two diplomacy denotes various informal, unofficial forms of interaction between members of adversary parties that attempt to influence public opinion, develop strategies, or organise resources towards the resolution of the conflict.[583]

In fact, the processes by which parties to an armed conflict decide to negotiate are critical for they represent the first step in overcoming violence. By deciding to 'negotiate on negotiations' parties are, in principle, producing an initial commitment to the peaceful resolution of their dispute.[584] The processes of pre-negotiation, largely forgotten in the literature on negotiation, have therefore been reintroduced as a fundamental step in an enlarged concept of negotiation, in order to understand what for some authors is in fact the most difficult stage in negotiation processes, the *diagnostic* phase. [585] As Janice Stein posits, pre-negotiation has the potential to be,

> ...an effective strategy of risk management, especially for leaders whose principal purpose is a negotiated agreement. It can permit the parties to reduce uncertainty and to manage complexity at lower levels of risk than a formal commitment to a strategy of negotiation would allow. Leaders who agree only to explore the option of negotiation can begin to assess the intentions and objectives of other parties without public commitment to a process of negotiation. A process of pre-negotiation also allows leaders to make preliminary judgements

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Zartman, 'Pre-Negotiation: Phases and Functions', Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation, J. Gross Stein (Ed), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, I989.

[583] Ronald Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p.9. For an in-depth discussion of 'track two diplomacy' see J. Montville, 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: The Case for Track Two Diplomacy', in Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, J. W. McDonald and D.B. Bendahmane (Eds), Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Washington DC, 1987 as well s the recent development of the 'multi-track' concept in L. Diamond and J. McDonald, Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis, Iowa Peace Institute, Grinnell, Iowa, 1991.

[584] As Janice Stein points out, 'the beginning of the process of prenegotiation is generally marked by a turning point in the relationship between the parties, an event or change in conditions that triggers a reassessment of alternatives and adds negotiation to the strategies of conflict management that are seriously considered'. J. Gross. Stein, 'Getting to the Table: the Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Prenegotiation', in Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation, J. Gross Stein (Ed), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, I989, p.231. For a discussion of crises and turning points in the process of negotiation, see Daniel Druckman, 'Strategies, turning points and Crises: Negotiating Base Rights, Spain and the United States', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 30, June 1986.

[585] See for example, I. William Zartman, 'Pre-Negotiation: Phases and Functions', Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation, J. Gross Stein (Ed), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, I989. As Stein posits, 'in all cases, definition of a problem, although not shared diagnosis, and a search for options constituted the first two phases of the process of getting to the table. The placement of the commitment to negotiate in the sequence is more troublesome'. J. Gross. Stein, 'Getting to the Table: the Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Prenegotiation', in Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation, J. Gross Stein (Ed), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, I989, p.251.

> about the bargaining ranges and reservation points of others, again without publicly committing themselves to a negotiation....prenegotiation is attractive as well because it promises lower exit costs than formal negotiation does. Leaders make a commitment to explore negotiation, not to negotiate. [586]

In conclusion, the development of conflict resolution theory and practice has stemmed largely from a radical revision of the parameters of conflict analysis. As was pointed out in earlier pages, the development of conflict resolution theory and method by such authors as Deutsch, Burton, Azar, Kelman and Fisher among others, is rooted in the realisation that traditional power bargaining approaches are not suited for 'deep rooted conflicts' or 'protracted social conflicts', and therefore for 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind'. The fact that in their vast majority these are conflicts about identity and self-determination introduces elements that are not amenable to concession-convergence type bargaining, since such conflicts are not based on negotiable interests and positions. The realisation that in order to tackle the specific challenges of contemporary armed conflicts conflict resolution methodologies should entail the facilitated analysis of underlying sources of conflict is evidence that resolution methodologies must first and foremost depart from analytical assumptions and frameworks about armed conflicts.

Consequently, problem-solving as an overarching approach to the resolution of armed conflicts relates to multi-level conflict analysis in important ways. As regards 'conflict-as-process' variables, for example, Kelman's application of the problem-solving workshop approach demonstrated that groups in conflict must undertake the type of direct interaction provided by a problem-solving setting so that mutual acceptance can be achieved and relationships transformed.[587] In fact, the analytic nature of 'problem-solving' is an ideal method for dealing with the subjective elements ingrained in conflict processes, such as perceptions, fears, suspicions and ultimately get at the underlying needs of conflict groups. By improving communication and empathy in a non-adversarial setting, 'problem-solving' (in the form of workshops or any other method) may pave the way for a common definition of the situation allowing for 'the differential valuing and costing of objective differences and alternative goals and means over time, such that a conflict that is irresolvable at one point is resolvable at another'.[588]

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[586] J. Gross. Stein, Op. cit. p.239-241.

[587] See Herbert Kelman, 'Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance', in International Security, No. 3 (1), 1978, p.162-186. Ronald Fisher adds that 'Kelman maintained that the only way to move towards negotiations was through successive approximations to overcome the barriers and to slowly create adequate mutual reassurance' and that 'this communication would follow a problem-solving approach allowing for the emergence of new ideas and mutual trust leading to the increased reassurance necessary for negotiations to begin'. Ronald Fisher, Op. cit. p.68, 69.

[588] Ronald Fisher, Op. cit. p.31. To this respect Kelman posits that 'I have consistently stressed that problem-solving workshops must not be confused with negotiations as such...I have been equally strong in arguing, however, that workshops are closely linked to negotiations and that they play an important complementary role in all stages of the negotiation process: in the prenegotiation phase, where they can help create a political atmosphere conducive to movement to the table; in the negotiation phase itself, where they can help overcome obstacles to productive negotiations and in framing issues that are not yet on the table; and in the post-negotiation phase, where they can

In this sense, a problem-solving approach to processes that are a complement to the direct, official interaction between parties in conflict are critical for an exploration of the overall shape of a solution that would meet the criteria specified above, namely: that the outcome will address the fundamental needs and fears of groups in conflict to the extent that these groups feel that they own the outcome; that it transforms the relationship between parties in conflict so that mechanisms of communication and problem solving are internalised to deal with future conflicts before they escalate. This is particularly relevant for contemporary armed conflicts because 'only integrative solutions of this kind enable the parties to move from a relationship in which each sees the other as blocking the fulfilment of its own needs to one in which they actively work toward promoting the fulfilment of both sets of needs'.[589] As Roy Licklider points out,

> ...rather than a single pattern whereby civil violence is ended, it seems more useful to conceive of the termination of civil violence as a set of *processes* in which there are certain *critical choice* points. Selections at these points form *alternative strategies* of conflict termination. The identification of these strategies is clearly a major goal for future research.[590]

Yet, a central problem remains unanswered. While the theoretical development of problem-solving as an overarching approach to the resolution of conflict is very advanced, as evidenced by its theoretical incorporation in traditional approaches as well as in the creation of new methodologies[591], its use in the resolution of armed conflicts is for the most part still marginal. There is therefore a wide gap between theory and practice. As Kremenyuk points out, echoing the normative implication of Kelman's metaphor,

> ... the overlapping of these developments with the persistence of the traditional approach creates impasses and deadlocks and results in widespread discontent among theoreticians and practitioners.[592]

If, as Kelman has pointed out, it is often the case that the resolution processes parties engage in deviate substantially from what is implied by the problem-solving metaphor, evidencing the continued prevalence of a realist 'power-brokerage through bargaining' approach typical of conventional inter-state dispute resolution processes, under what

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contribute to implementation of the negotiated agreement and to long-term peace-building'. H. Kelman, 'Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving', in International Negotiation, Vol. I, No. I, I996, p.102.

[589] H. Kelman, 'Negotiation as Interactive Problem Solving', in International Negotiation, Vol. I, No. I, I996, p.105.

[590] Roy Licklider. 'How Civil Wars Ends: Questions and Methods', in Stopping the Killing. How Civil Wars End, Roy Locklider (Ed), New York university Press, New York and London, 1993, p.18.

[591] See Ronald Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse New York, 1997, p.9. For an in-depth discussion of 'track two diplomacy' see J. Montville, 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: The Case for Track Two Diplomacy', in Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, J. W. McDonald and D.B. Bendahmane (Eds), Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Washington DC, 1987 as well s the recent development of the 'multi-track' concept in L. Diamond and J. McDonald, Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis, Iowa Peace Institute, Grinnell, Iowa, 1991.

[592] V. Kremenyuk, 'The Emerging System of International Negotiation', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991, p.23.

circumstances are we able to introduce a problem-solving orientation to parties that signal an interest in peacefully resolving their conflicts? The next chapter will provide a possible answer to this problem by exploring the critical role that intermediaries in a mediatory capacity may play in choosing conflict resolution strategies and tactics as well as suggesting substantive proposals for resolution.

Chapter 6. International Mediation: The Role of Conflict Analysis in Mediatory Activity

6.1. Mediation and the Resolution of Armed Conflicts

> ...the challenges of the post-Cold War era, with its increased uncertainty, its sudden change in many of the accepted rules of the game, and the proliferation of intense ethnic and other identity-based conflicts, will no doubt require us to resort to mediation even more often than we have in the past. *Mediation may well be the closest thing we have to an effective technique for dealing with conflicts in the twenty-first century* [my emphasis].[593]

In the last chapter we found that the application of dispute settlement tools characteristic of a 'clausewitzian universe' of inter-state wars has not only been unsuccessful, in some cases it has contributed to the very protractedness of contemporary wars. More importantly, we found that whereas the theory and methods of conflict resolution have dramatically improved as a result of a radical change in the analysis of contemporary armed conflicts, in practice we are still faced with the overwhelming application of bargaining and concession-convergence type processes in the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts.

Moreover, although a number of methodologies have been specifically developed for tackling the problems of 'new wars' and 'wars of the third kind', resolution processes tend to deviate substantially from what is implied by Kelman's problem-solving metaphor since most parties to conflicts are usually uninterested in engaging in such processes. In order to go beyond some of the obstacles highlighted in the previous chapter, various authors have looked at factors that may enhance the possibilities of peaceful conflict resolution. Among these, attention has been focused on triggers and reasons that prompt conflict groups to consider resolving their conflict through peaceful means. Stalemates, impending defeats and crisis situations, turning points and so-called ripening, as well as perceptions of threats and opportunities have merited considerable attention.[594] In this respect, paramount interest has

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[593] Jacob Bercovitch. 'Mediation in International Conflict: an Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques. Zartman, I. William and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds). United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p.127. See Stevens, 1963, p.131.

[594] In this regard see among others, I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Edition, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1989; Christopher Mitchell, 'The Right Moment:

been given to the activities of third parties in assisting as well as encouraging conflict groups to peacefully resolve their conflicts. And within the range of third party activities, mediation, widely regarded as the most common form of third-party intervention at the international level, has received centre stage.[595] As Jacob Bercovitch, a leading mediation theorist points out,

> ...given the potentiality of omnipresent conflict, a limited range of widely accepted conflict handling procedures in the international environment, and the unwelcome reality of destructive conflict, it is hardly surprising that so many actors in international politics are keen to so something to facilitate peaceful interactions. What they can do best is offer their mediation services.[596]

As old as the practice of negotiation, mediation and related intermediary interventions have in the last three decades benefited from a considerable growth both in practical application as well as theoretical development. Today, mediation is used extensively in various areas ranging from labour-management relations, community-level conflict resolution, public policy as well as family disputes, among others. At the international level, particularly as regards the resolution of armed conflicts, mediation has been increasingly used and this development more than any other has prompted a strong growth in research as well as the creation of numerous courses in academia specifically dedicated to the subject.[597] Moreover, while the systematic study of mediation began with a number of pioneering theoretical and empirical works three decades ago[598], it has grown immensely to encompass a vast number of dedicated and in-depth theoretical works as well as more practical oriented case-study analysis and 'how to' manuals.[599]

Nevertheless, as was the case in negotiation theory, there is no consensus on precisely what constitutes mediation since it may incorporate other modes of intermediary activity such as good offices, conciliation and fact-finding, making it the 'most versatile of intermediaries roles'

Notes on Four Models of 'Ripeness', in Paradigms, Vol.9, No.2, Winter 1995; Karin Aggestam, 'Reframing International Conflicts: "Ripeness" in International Mediation', in Paradigms, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1995.

[595] There are several studies of the incidence of mediation in the resolution of international conflicts. We suggest two recent ones: Kalevi Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th Edition, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1983 as well as Jacob Bercovitch, 'International Dispute Mediation', in Mediation Research, The Process and Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention, Kenneth Kessel and Dean G. Pruitt, Joey-Bass, San Francisco, 1989.

[596] Jacob Bercovitch, 'The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations', in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Eds), MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1992, p.10.

[597] As Mitchell and Webb point out, a major reason for 'the development of interest in the subject of international mediation during the 1970s has been the high profile use of this technique by political leaders and decision makers in dealing with some of the protracted and intractable conflicts that erupted or repeated during the decade...it seems to have been the case that the activities of Secretary of State Haig in the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, of Lord Carrington over the struggle in Zimbabwe, of President Carter at Camp David, of Philip Habib in the Lebanon and particularly of Dr Kissinger in a series of initiatives, shuttles and dramatic wheelings and dealings in the Middle East, all contributed to making the study of intermediaries and mediation both publicly fashionable and of scholarly importance'. C.R. Mitchell and Keith Webb. 'Mediation in International Relations: an Evolving Tradition', in New Approaches to International Mediation, C.R. Mitchell and Keith Webb (Eds), Greenwood Press, WestPort, CT, 1988, p.8.

[598] In this regard see for example O. R. Young, Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967; John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication, Macmillan, London, 1969. For a contemporary approach see K. Kressel and D. Pruitt. Mediation Research, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1989.

while seemingly evidencing a stronger and deeper degree of involvement by the third party.[600] Consequently, are there any characteristics or facets that make this activity unique?

In the spectrum of peaceful conflict resolution methodologies mediation exhibits a number of unique characteristics that distinguish it from other modes such as, for example, negotiation, or authoritative modes of conflict resolution (e.g. arbitration and adjudication). First of all, mediation involves the accepted 'benign intervention'[601] of a third party. In common with arbitration but not adjudication, mediation depends on prior agreement by parties to a dispute, whether the proposal to mediate comes from the potential mediator, from the parties themselves or from a third party. Secondly, although there is the intervention of a third party, the decision-making power ultimately remains in the hands of the disputants. This aspect more than any other grounds the ultimate decision in some form of negotiation between disputants and partially explains the general perception that mediation is an extension of and a complement to the negotiation process, as will be discussed below. In addition, even though a mediator might exert pressure on conflict groups to agree on particular aspects (at times referred to as 'mediation with muscle'), its role is ultimately to 'assist disputants in making their own decisions' and 'reaching a mutually acceptable outcome'.[602] Thirdly, in marked contrast to adjudication and arbitration, the outcome of a mediation process is not binding on the disputants.[603] These three initial characteristics of mediation have led several authors to consider that mediation is essentially a non-coercive, nonviolent and, ultimately, nonbinding form of intervention. Finally, an important and peculiar characteristic of mediation relates to the fact that in order to facilitate the dyadic interaction between parties in conflict, 'mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources and interests of their own' because 'mediators have their own assumptions and agendas about the conflict in question'. [604]

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[599] See for example, the famous Getting to Yes by Roger Fisher and William Ury, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1981.

[600] As Touval points out, 'intermediaries are differentiated according to the roles they perform. A conventional distinction is among the performance of good offices, conciliation and mediation, *corresponding to the degree of involvement in the negotiations* [my emphasis]...intermediaries who confine themselves mainly to technical aspects of helping the adversaries to communicate with each other, such as providing a meeting place or transmitting messages, are described as performing good-offices. If they also try to modify the parties' image of each other and to influence them to make concessions by clarifying to each his opponent's view and the bargaining situation that both face they are regarded as engaged in conciliation. Intermediaries who also make suggestions pertaining to the substance of the conflict, and seek to influence the parties to make concessions by exerting pressures and offering incentives are called mediators'. Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982.

[601] As Keith Webb points out in benign intervention 'the aim is to end or ameliorate a conflict'. Keith Webb, 'Third Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars. A Preliminary Approach', in Paradigms, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1995, p.1.

[602] Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998, p.7.

[603] Both Young and Mitchell distinguish between third parties who impose a settlement on the parties (arbitration, judicial settlement, powerful third party who imposes a settlement) and third parties who intervene with the aim of achieving a compromise settlement of issues in conflict between disputants. In this regard see Vivienne Jabri, Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, p.7.

[604] Jacob Bercovitch. 'Mediation in International Conflict: an Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques. Zartman, I. William and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds).

At the level of international conflict resolution, mediatory activity has been defined as peaceful or benign intervention by an intermediary in a conflict situation, contingent on the acceptance by conflict parties, with 'the stated purpose of contributing towards its abatement or resolution'.[605] According to Fisher and Keashly, mediation at the international level involves pacific interventions by credible and competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working towards a *negotiated settlement* on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of alternatives and in some cases the application of leverage.[606] The following definition by Vivienne Jabri encapsulates the variety of mediation practice and provides an initial glimpse of some of the activities and factors involved in this conflict resolution methodology:

> ...intermediaries are parties who intervene, or are invited to intervene, with the stated objective of achieving a settlement between the conflicting parties. They are also acceptable in such a role by the parties (Touval, 1982, p.4). The intermediary's functions include the facilitation of communication between the parties and influencing parties towards changing their positions in order to make agreement possible. The intermediary may facilitate concessions from the parties by clarifying the issues in conflict, by helping the parties withdraw from commitments and by reducing the cost of concessions, that is, generally providing incentives for concession-making. The mediator may offer compromise formulae and substantive proposals.[607]

Of relevance to our present topic, opinions diverge as regards the effectiveness of mediation in cases of protracted conflict. Kressel and Pruitt, for example, consider that high-intensity disputes characterised by past and present severity coupled with strong hostility and feelings of anger, are unlikely to experience successful mediation.[608] In a systematic multivariate analysis of the effects of dispute characteristics on the success of mediatory activity, Bercovitch and Lengley concluded that 'high fatalities encourage further hostility and contentious behaviour, and these diminish the likelihood of mediation effectiveness'. In addition, they add that,

> ...dispute complexity, which in any event is associated with lengthy, protracted conflicts and higher fatalities, also appear to be incompatible with successful mediation. Our results suggest

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United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.128. This author points to the fact that 'the reality of international mediation is that of a complex and dynamic interaction between mediators who have resources and an interest in the conflict or its outcome, and the protagonists or their representatives...in any given conflict, mediators may change, their role may be redefined, issues may alter, indeed even the parties involved in the conflict may and often do change'. Ibid. p.130.

[605] Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982, p.4.

[606] See Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly. 'The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation Within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention', in Journal of Peace Research, No.28, No. 1, 1991. Saadia Touval adds that mediation has to be understood has a form of third party intervention in conflict for the purpose of resolving that conflict through negotiation. In this regard see Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982.

[607] Vivienne Jabri, Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, p.8.

[608] K. Kressel and D. Pruitt, 'Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation of Social Conflict', in Mediation Research, K. Kressel and D. Pruitt (Eds), Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1989.

> that dispute duration also as a strong inverse relationship with successful mediation, but only when it combines with fatalities and complexity. [609]

Fogg confirms the above findings suggesting an inverse relationship between dispute complexity and effective mediation. Yet, on the other hand, Jackson considers that mediation is most successful when conflict intensity is high, a finding which is also supported by Young.[610] In this regard, Raifa considers that 'greater complexity creates greater opportunities for trade-offs, sequencing, and packaging, thus enhancing the chances for successful mediation'.[611] Above all, this shows that the impact of conflicts' characteristics on the effectiveness of mediation is insufficiently understood.

A cursory review of the literature on mediation reveals a systematic understanding of mediatory and related intermediary activity. Based on actual descriptions and empirical examinations of mediation cases, a large number of studies have developed theories as well as policy prescriptions in an effort to increase the efficacy of mediation.[612] In addition, large-scale comparative studies of different cases of international mediation have contributed to the formulation and testing of propositions about effective mediation in different situations and contexts as well as about the conditions under which mediation can be made to work better.[613] Additional avenues for research have included the more theoretical distinction between mediation and related processes of third party intervention, such as arbitration, adjudication, conciliation and good offices, among others.

Nevertheless, as noted by Marieke Kleiboer, mediation analysis has been dominated by the search to 'discover 'golden formulas': crucial conditions for achieving mediation success,

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[609] Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley. 'The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37 No. 4, Sage Publications, December 1993, p.675. Yet, in a later work, Bercovitch considers that 'mediation is particularly appropriate when a conflict is long, drawn out and complex; the parties own conflict management efforts have reached and impasse; neither party is prepared to countenance further costs or loss of life and finally when both parties are prepared to co-operate tacitly or openly to break the stalemate. Jacob Bercovitch. 'Mediation in International Conflict: an Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques. Zartman, I. William and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds). United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.127.

[610] See E. Jackson, Meeting of Minds, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1952 and also Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967.

[611] R. Fogg, 'Dealing with Conflict', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, No.29, 1985 and H. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1982 as cited in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley. 'The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37 No. 4, Sage Publications, December 1993, p.677.

[612] See for example, Jeffrey Rubin, Dynamics of Third Part Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East, Praeger, New York, 1981. Also Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982; Hizkias Assefa. Mediation of Civil Wars. Approaches and Strategies- The Sudan Conflict, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1987; Vivienne Jabri. Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990; Stephen Chan & Vivienne Jabri. Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (Eds), MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1993.

[613] See for example Saadia Touval and William Zartman. International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and William Zartman (Eds), Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1984.

which could be transformed into policy prescriptions'.[614] Similarly to behavioural approaches to negotiation, there are numerous works dedicated to the attributes that different types of mediators (from individuals to organisations) should have and it has become widely recognised, albeit not consensually, that specific mediator characteristics and attributes are key to mediation success. A known disagreement in the literature, for example, as been related the question of impartiality as a requirement for successful mediation. Whereas traditionally, impartiality was thought of as a fundamental requirement[615], more recently authors such as Saadia Touval and William Zartman have questioned the impartiality assumption pointing to cases where it was critical for the success of mediation processes.[616] Likewise, Jabri moves away from the assumption that 'third parties acting as intermediaries are necessarily disinterested in the substantive content of the conflict and may even be biased towards one of the parties', and uses the term 'interested intermediaries'.[617] Nevertheless, a number of mediator's characteristics are considered necessary for successful mediation. As Touval points out,

> ...skill and personal qualities appear in many lists of the desired qualities of mediators. Two kinds of skills are relevant. One is *expertise about the conflict, the context within which it is waged, and the parties involved.* The other is experience in conflict resolution in general. Useful personal qualities include tact, intelligence, persuasiveness, humility and patience [my emphasis].[618]

In the spectrum of conflict resolution methodologies, mediation has been traditionally conceptualised as a complement to negotiation. Jacob Bercovitch pointed out recently that 'the most helpful approach to mediation links it to a related strategy- negotiation- but at the same time emphasises its unique features and conditions'.[619] After all, it is thought, the

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[614] Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998, p.11. This search for the 'golden formula' has in fact dominated the literature. Saadia Touval says that 'case studies, whether discussing labour disputes or international peacemaking, usually seek to explain the success or failure of intermediaries' efforts and draw lessons from their experiences' and that 'because of this preoccupation with the effectiveness of third party intervention, the theoretical literature carries a distinct prescriptive strain'. Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982, p.3.

[615] In this regard see for example Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises , Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967; Fred S. Northedge and Michael Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects, Europa Publications, London, 1971 as well as O. Young, 'Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on third parties', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.37, 1993. Also Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor, Mediation, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1984. As Cristopher Moore points out, mediation entails 'the intervention of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement'. Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1986, p.6.

[616] Saadia Touval and William Zartman. International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and William Zartman (Eds), Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1984. In fact, in what amounted to the theoretical challenging of 'the commonly held assumption that mediators, to be effective, must be impartial', Touval posits that 'if we regard mediators as bargainers, they need not be impartial; indeed, being perceived as biased may sometimes be an asset, enhancing the mediator's bargaining power with both sides in a conflict'. In this regard see Touval, Saadia. The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982.

[617] Vivienne Jabri, Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, p.2.

[618] Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1982, p.17.

resolution of conflict between disputants should be first of all a result of the parties' own interaction through negotiation. Following this assumption, mediation at the international level has been often conceptualised as a complement, indeed a tool, to enable the successful completion of negotiation processes. In this regard pioneer mediation theorist Young considered mediation to be 'any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship, and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself'.[620] That mediation should be understood as an activity to facilitate and complement negotiation processes and in fact as 'an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process' leads Bercovitch to conclude that,

> ...mediation is, at least structurally, the continuation of negotiation by other means...mediation is, above all, adaptive and responsive. It extends the process of negotiation to reflect different conflicts, different parties, and different situations. To assume otherwise is to mistake wishful thinking for reality.[621]

However, if there is a consensus that a mediator's main function is to make interaction between two or more parties possible, there is a wide disagreement as regards what in practice this implies. While in his early work Zartman emphasised that 'mediation is by its nature an intermediate structure that threatens a full triad but seeks only to complete the dyadic interaction between the parties'[622], Vivienne Jabri suggests that,

> ... such intervention transforms a basically dyadic bargaining situation into a three-cornered relationship, or a triad, where the third party can no longer be assumed to be an outsider.[623]

We agree with Jabri in considering that 'third parties taking up the intermediary role may be *interested* [sic] in the substantive content of the conflict and may even be biased towards one of the parties'.[624] The dyadic interaction between two parties is therefore transformed into a triangular relationship. In fact, this follows Saadia Touval's recognition of the inherent political nature of mediation, in the sense that although mediation has the specific purpose of 'abating or resolving the conflict', mediators have their own interests in engaging in such processes and by their very presence transform the bargaining structure from a dyad to a triangle.

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[619] Jacob Bercovitch. 'Mediation in International Conflict: an Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques. Zartman, I. William and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds). United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.127.

[620] In this regard see Oran Young, the Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967, p.34.

[621] Jacob Bercovitch. 'Mediation in International Conflict: an Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques. Zartman, I. William and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds). United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.127.

[622] I. William. Zartman, 'The Structure of Negotiation', in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. V. Kremenyuk (Ed), Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and Oxford, I991, p.72.

[623] Vivienne Jabri, Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, p.9.

[624] Vivienne Jabri. Op. cit. p.9.

Furthermore, such transformation of a basic dyadic interaction is reinforced by the fact that 'mediators may often suggest compromises and may negotiate and bargain with adversaries in an attempt to induce them to change their stance'.[625] As will be seen below, this is a very important dimension of mediation processes and one that helps in part explain the reasons behind mediators' strategic and tactical methodological choices. The position taken here is that a mediator actually transforms the dyadic nature of negotiation processes into a triadic structure not necessarily as a result of its role in facilitating communication between the parties and clarifying issues, but more importantly, by suggesting formulae, bargaining with the parties and promoting its own interests.

It is important to identify and recognise some of the achievements in mediation theory discussed above. They have provided us with an in-depth understanding of this intermediary activity, a broad menu of factors that may affect the outcomes of international mediation and crucial insights into the conditions under which these factors play a role. The multiplicity of research projects on international mediation undergone during the last three decades has unequivocally made for considerable advances in developing/testing hypotheses that might explain how mediation success comes about. From studies looking at the development and evolution of mediatory practice, such as the one conducted by Levine, who analysed the major mediation initiatives undertaken to deal with inter-state disputes during the period 1815 to 1960[626]; to comparative studies focusing on the variety of mediators such as individuals, states, international organisations or churches, the topic of mediation has decisively became mainstream in international relations in the last two decades. This growth is also evident in other areas where mediation is used, as the excellent review by James Wall and Ann Lynn published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution makes clear.[627]

Yet, a number of problems remain unanswered. As was previously discussed, the development of conflict resolution theory has stemmed largely from a radical revision of the parameters of conflict analysis. In order to deal with the peculiarities of contemporary wars we have seen that conflict resolution methodologies must entail the facilitated analysis of underlying also termed structural sources of conflict and therefore their development departs from analytical assumptions and frameworks about armed conflicts. In this sense, we believe that mediation presents one possible avenue for the development of such approaches because intermediaries in a mediatory capacity have the potential to incorporate (or fail to

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[625] Saadia Touval and William Zartman. 'Introduction: Mediation in Theory', in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and William Zartman (Eds), Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1984, p.7.

[626] E. P. Levine, 'Mediation in International Politics: A Universe and some Observations', in Peace Research Society (International) Papers, No.8 (18), 1972.

[627] James A. Wall and Ann Lynn. 'Mediation: A Current Review', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1993, p.165, 166. Nevertheless, this review also shows that the theoretical development of mediation at the international level is to an extent separated from developments in mediation at other levels, namely community mediation, labour-management mediation or family mediation.

incorporate) a problem-solving orientation in their choices regarding mediation strategies and tactics as well as substantive proposals. Yet, as will be discussed in the sub-section below, such *potential* is a function of the mediator's own ideas about the conflict and ensuing perceptions on the possibilities for its resolution as well as being limited by the parties' own perceptions about their conflict relationship, and consequently the limits of relationship transformation. In order to understand these links, we must therefore examine the relationship between a mediator's assumptions and expectations, his or her conduct of the mediation process, and ultimately, the assessment they make of the outcomes of such process. Among others, this will involve a discussion of the basis for mediatory involvement; of mediatory choices regarding tactics and strategies during mediation processes and finally, of mediator's assessment of outcomes.

The remainder of this chapter will therefore deal with some of the theoretical aspects of this problem. The proposition that a mediator's analytical assumptions about a conflict under mediation are important determinants of the decision to mediate, of the chosen tactical as well as strategic procedural moves and of a mediator's assessment of outcome will then be empirically tested in the next two chapters. This will be done through an in-depth analysis of the various mediation processes that have attempted to resolve the conflict in Angola. Ultimately, if confirmed, this proposition will highlight the need identified throughout this thesis for more articulated conflict analysis frameworks as well as a deeper understanding of the links between analysis and resolution processes, if adequate approaches for the resolution of contemporary conflicts are to be developed.

6.2. Mediators *not* in the Middle:

Assessing the Role of Conflict Analysis in Mediatory Activity

> ...while many methods of resolving conflict exist, they are limited by the world in which they operate.[628]
>
> ...the underlying problem seems to be that the mediation literature has developed largely on its own, virtually disconnected from the mainstream of international relations thinking and the normative debates about the role of conflict in the international system...It was concluded that if we want to assess international mediation in a more coherent way...we should bring normative discourse back into mediation analysis.[629]

In the pages above we considered that the way in which third parties involved as 'benign intermediaries' define and analyse the conflict they are mediating is a relatively unstudied, albeit crucial, aspect of mediatory activity. Its importance stems from the fact that this aspect of mediation processes clarifies possible ways by which conflict analysis assumptions impact on approaches to conflict resolution and, as a consequence, the outcomes of such processes. In addition, this aspect of mediation can assist us in understanding why, despite the unsuccessful application to contemporary conflicts of dispute settlement tools characteristic of a 'clausewitzian universe' of inter-state wars, such processes are still used. Nevertheless, is it ultimately possible to investigate the extent of such influence? And what would the empirical indicators be in an activity usually kept behind close doors with very little empirical evidence available? These are the concerns of the pages to follow.

Moreover, while this critical dimension of mediation processes has been largely ignored in the international mediation literature, other fields of mediation theory and practice have addressed some of these problems, demonstrating that to a large extent, studies of mediation at the international level have developed largely divorced and unaware of the advancements in the study and practice of mediation at other social levels. For instance, some of these issues have received attention in a recent powerful critique of the 'problem-solving approach' to mediation by Robert Bush and Joseph Folger.[630] For clarification purposes we should briefly note that what these authors define as 'problem-solving' is fundamentally different from Burton or Kelman's problem-solving paradigm as defined in the field of conflict resolution and described above. In fact, Bush and Folger base their critique on the management-science definition of problem-solving, which as will be seen below, does not have the relationship of parties in mind at the centre of conflict resolution.

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[628] Alan C. Tidwell, Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution, Pinter, London and New York, 1998, p.6.

[629] Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998, p.184.

[630] A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger. The Promise of Mediation. Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1994, in particular Part One, Chapter 3 'Solving Problems: The Limits of Current Mediation Practice'.

In their book 'The Promise of Mediation', Bush and Folger embark on a powerful critique of the managerial approach to problem-solving as practiced and conceptualised by a vast number of American mediators. These authors propose an alternative and radically different approach, that of 'transformative mediation', emphasising the potential of mediation to transform relationships and therefore similar to Kelman's 'problem-solving metaphor'. Granted that these authors are focusing on mediation processes at the level of labour, community, divorce, family and inter-personal disputes, they nonetheless provide us with important insights as regards a clearer understanding of the relationship between mediators' analytical assumptions and the conduct and outcome of mediation processes. In fact, Bush and Folger found that

> ...what mediators actually do suggests that, when they operate under the mandate to define and solve problems, mediators cannot help but influence the process and outcomes in ways that tend, paradoxically, to defeat the spirit and purpose of problem-solving altogether...[631]

These authors found that mediators actively influence resolution processes in three substantive ways. First, early in the process, mediators tend to decide what the case is all about and label the dispute in a way that seems recognisable and manageable; secondly, mediators often influence settlement terms in clearly directive ways; finally, mediators tend to drop issues that cannot readily be handled within a problem-solving approach. These findings are particularly important because they are based on a number of empirical studies of mediatory activity. For instance, the tendency of mediators to label a conflict in a 'global and tangible' way while ignoring historical background, chronologies of events and expressions of frustration and anger has been confirmed empirically by Shapiro, Drieghe, and Brett's extensive study of labour-management mediation.[632] Bush and Folger's own experience of mediation convinced them that this is a consequence of a specific interpretation of the problem-solving approach, by which mediators are focused on 'diagnosing' the problem and identifying a set of specific issues as well as underlying needs that will help achieve such diagnosis. More importantly, these authors found that to achieve this, 'mediators use a number of strategies- specific moves during the process- to shape arguments, frame proposals, and influence outcomes' because, 'mediators direct their moves primarily toward the creation and acceptance of settlement terms that solve problems'.[633] At times, these

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[631] A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger. Op. cit. p.64.

[632] See D. Shapiro, R. Drieghe and J. Brett, 'Mediator Behaviour and the Outcome of Mediation', in Journal of Social Issues, No. 41 (2), 1985. These authors found that 'early in labour grievance mediations, mediators ask themselves what kind of case or problem is in front of them, so that they can begin formulating possible solutions' and that 'mediators tend to consult a repertory of case patterns they know in order to make a 'quick cognitive evaluation of the potential outcome of a case'. As cited in A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger. The Promise of Mediation. Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1994, p.64.

[633] That this finding has been corroborated by a vast number of empirical studies of various types of mediation (other than international) must be taken into account. Among others, in the field of divorce mediation: J. P. Folger and S. Bernard, 'Divorce Mediation: When Mediators Challenge the Divorcing Practices', in Mediation Quarterly, No. 10, 1985; in the field of parent-children mediation: J. A. Lam, J. Rifkin and A. Townley, 'Reframing Conflict: Implications for Fairness in Parent-Adolescent Mediation', in Mediation Quarterly, No. 7 (1), 1989. Also see W. Felstiner and L.

strategies are used to challenge parties' own preferences for settlement as well as their willingness to reach agreement. In this regard, in order to reach 'settlement terms that solve problems', mediators use what Greatbach and Dingwall call 'selective facilitation' (basically keeping control over what gets discussed), indicating that 'the mediator is working with notions of what kind of settlement would be desirable (a favoured outcome) and what kind of settlement would be undesirable (a disfavoured outcome) and seeks to guide the interaction accordingly'.[634] Accordingly,

> ...in mediation, there is a documented tendency for the third party to drop certain types of issues and thus influence the way problems typically are defined. Like the pattern of mediator behaviours just discussed, this pattern also involves mediator influence over the final settlement, but it is influence over the way problems get defined in the first place...the tendency to drop issues that cannot be treated as tangible problems is noted in other analysis of mediation practice and is consistent with our own observations of mediators in community, landlord-tenant, divorce, and juvenile mediation programs (Silbey and Merry, 1986; Lam, Rifkin and Townley, 1989).[635]

In this sense, the dropping of issues that appear to the mediator to be intangible (for example relational issues) confirms the fact that what mediators are often aiming for is a swift 'solution' to the specific, identifiable and tangible common *problem*. Moreover, the mediator will try to find issues that are readily addressed as problems and that lend themselves to definable and objective parameters and concrete arrangements or exchanges and if he or she finds issues of a relational or an identity nature which are difficult to address in such 'problem-solving' towards concession-convergence format, he or she will readily 'drop these issues'. Yet, although mediators' inclination to avoid or drop these dimensions of parties' problems may seem sensible from a management science problem-solving point of view, it does little to transform parties' relationships, the basic tenet of problem-solving as it is defined in the conflict resolution field, as was discussed above.

Nevertheless, findings such as these, even though stemming from the practical use of mediation in contexts other than the international, pose some interesting and challenging questions for mediation as a tool for the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts. First and foremost, as was emphasised in previous pages, 'problem-solving' within the field of conflict resolution (stemming from the works of Burton, Azar, Kelman or Fisher) emphasises and prioritises changing relationships through the facilitated analysis of structural sources of conflict and is therefore fundamentally different from the way management science defines the term. For our purposes here, what is important is the finding that mediatory influence is

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Williams, 'Mediation as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution', in Law and Human Behaviour, No. 2 (3), 1978 as well as the more recent J. Shailor, Empowerment in Dispute Mediation: A Critical Analysis of Communication, Praeger, Westport Conn, 1994.

[634] D. Greatbach and R. Dingwall, 'Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators', in Law and Society Review, No. 23, 1989 as cited in A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger. The Promise of Mediation. Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1994, p.66.

more often than not dictated by underlying assumptions held by mediators about the conflict itself, about the limits of conflict resolution as well as the mediator's own interests in the process and its outcome. In addition, as the above makes clear, such factors are at the centre of mediators' choice of procedural strategies and tactics during the mediation process. In this sense, a mediator chooses specific moves during the process largely based on its own perception of the situation, whether through shaping arguments or framing proposals, directly influencing or dictating outcomes, or controlling communication as well as the type of interaction between parties. Let us return to the international mediation literature. How has this literature answered the fundamental question concerning the factors which influence the choice of mediatory techniques and strategies?

First and foremost we should emphasise that there is considerable multi-disciplinary work developed on mediation techniques *per se*, as evidenced by Wall and Lynn's comment that 'the literature from the past decade indicates that mediators apply about 100 techniques to the parties' relationship, to the parties themselves, and to the parties' relationship with others'.[636] Nevertheless, the closest mediation literature comes to explaining the link between mediators' assumptions and their choice of tactics during mediation processes is the general understanding that a mediator's choice of different techniques is highly situation-dependent as regards the type of conflict, the characteristics of the parties, the history of their relationship, etc. In addition, mediators' procedural choices are also considered to be a function of their specific goals: whether it is the mediator's intention to influence the parties' relationship (perceptions and communication), manage power between disputants, propose specific agreement terms or expand the agenda. In this sense, procedural choices are to a large extent dependent on what mediators themselves want to achieve and a mediator may 'fine-tune various approaches to fit the particular negotiation'.[637]

Secondly, we should note that it is not our aim to add to the vast and substantial work developed around the decision of a third party to mediate. In this sense, so-called 'mediation determinants' (factors which influence a third party's decision to mediate) are sufficiently albeit not consensually understood. In fact, from the first systematic studies of mediation the

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[635] A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger. The Promise of Mediation. Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1994, p.67, 68.

[636] Perhaps the best know technique typology is that developed by Kressel and Pruit which considers the existence of reflexive tactics such as developing rapport with the disputants; substantive tactics which deal directly with the issues in dispute (including suggestions by the mediator) and contextual tactics which assist the parties in finding their own agreeable solution. In this respect see James A. Wall and Ann Lynn. 'Mediation: A Current Review', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1993, p.167 as well as Mediation Research, Kressel, K. and D. Pruitt (Eds), Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1989. See also Wall and Lynn. Op. Cit., p.167.

[637] James A. Wall and Ann Lynn. 'Mediation: A Current Review', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1993, p.165, 166. The literature on these aspects is vast. Nevertheless, we can suggest W. L. Ury, 'Strengthening International Mediation', in Negotiation Journal, No. 3, 1987 on steps taken by mediators to negotiate; on reframing of issues see for example the excellent chapter by B. Sheppard, K. Blumenfeld-Jones and J. Roth, 'Informal Third-partyship: Studies of everyday conflict intervention', in the already quoted Mediation Research, Kressel, K. and D. Pruitt (Eds), Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1989.

question of knowing what prompts third parties to become involved as mediators has been frequently addressed in the literature. From traditional rational-actor approaches to whether potential mediators consider their assistance to be useful to the parties or whether mediators feel that there are potential benefits to be gained by mediating, are all factors that have received considerable attention. In an often-quoted typology, Christopher Mitchell considers that an intermediary's decision to mediate is a function of the rewards it expects to get, which may include process rewards, achievement rewards and settlement rewards.[638]

In this regard, Jabri's approach to the patterns of third-party decision-making in response to conflict situations provides the most comprehensive framework to date as regards the factors which influence a third party's decision to take up the role of intermediary.[639] In addition, as Jabri emphasises, these same factors continue to be operative during the mediation process itself, constantly shaping and influencing intermediaries' decisions on tactics. This being the case, it is important to consider some of these factors alongside mediators' analytical assumptions about a conflict situation. The factors suggested by Jabri as components of a third party's decision to become an intermediary are: (1) the value attached to perceived possible outcomes to the conflict; (2) the likelihood that the third party could influence the outcome to the conflict; (3) the likelihood that the third party could influence the outcome best by taking up one role as compared with other strategies available to it and (4) the value that the third party attaches to the role itself as opposed to any costs that may derive from it. These components of a third party's decision are considered to be dynamically affected by the conflict's characteristics (issues, parties, relationships, intra-party factions, patrons and overlapping conflicts); the negotiation system's conditions; the third-party's related interests as well as process-related interests; the third party's set of preferred outcomes; the third party's constituency and influence potential and finally, in cases of collective mediation, the motives for its use.[640] This can be seen in the table below:

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[638] See for example C. R. Mitchell, 'The Motives for Mediation', in New Approaches to International Mediation, C.R. Mitchell and Keith Webb (Eds), Greenwood Press, WestPort, CT, 1988; Keith Webb, 'Third Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars', in Paradigms, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1995. In this regard, John B Stephens adds that these factors may include: 'decisions by the leaderships of each adversary concerning the specific mediation initiative; the acceptability of the proposed mediator; the degree of antagonism between the belligerents or changing conditions in the field of conflict; existence of pre-conditions for negotiation (low or decreasing probability of attaining conflict goals through coercion; decreasing value of conflict goals relative to the direct costs of pursuing those goals; some common or compatible interests between adversaries; and flexibility by each leadership to consider negotiation'. John B. Stephens, 'Acceptance of Mediation Initiatives: A Preliminary Framework', in New Approaches to International Mediation, C.R. Mitchell and Keith Webb (Eds), Greenwood Press, WestPort, CT, 1988.

[639] Vivienne Jabri, Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, p.17-23

Table 5: Factors Influencing Third Party Tactical Decisions[641]

Conflict Characteristics	Issues in conflict Relationship between the parties The presence of factions Patron input Overlapping conflicts	
The Negotiation System	Inter-Party Factors	Each party's set of preferred outcomes Balance of relative advantage between the parties The parties options of discontinuing the negotiations The parties respective stakes in the negotiation The degree of communication between the parties
	Intra-party factors	Whom the negotiators represent The position of dominant factions in the negotiation Level of support for the negotiating party
	Party-patron factors	A patron's set of preferred outcomes A patron's stake in the negotiation process A patron's level of support and commitment to its client
The Third party's conflict-related interests	Linked to: The issues and parties in conflict Issues and parties in overlapping conflicts Relationship with other third parties in the conflict environment Relationship with intra-party groups and factions	
Third party's process-related interests	Benefits which may arise from taking the role of intermediary: To avoid other reactions To influence the outcome to the conflict To ensure own control over the settlement To gain future influence with the parties or patrons To exclude other third parties influence or to compete with it To gain credibility To gain prestige and approval To go along with one's allies	
Third party's set of preferred outcomes	Third parties' preferences for outcomes to the conflict and position on specific issues in the negotiation	
Third party's influence potential	Material resources Status resources Relationship with adversary and other third parties to the conflict Personnel-specific resources	
Third party's constituency	Relevant if third party's constituency or groups within it are interested in the conflict	
Intra-coalition situation	The level of intra-coalition cohesion The distribution of influence potential The degree of communication and consultation among members	

[640] Ibid. p.17

These factors and their dynamic inter-relationship must therefore be taken into account when analysis of mediators' choices of strategies and tactics is concerned. Naturally these choices are dependent on the agreement of the parties in conflict to accept them and, in addition, they continue to be operative during the mediation process itself, constantly shaping and influencing intermediaries' decisions on procedural moves. In this sense, the mediator constantly re-evaluates the perceived possible outcomes to a conflict, the value attached to each possibility as well as the extent to which it is able to influence the parties in the direction of a particular outcome. Besides, we can also posit that the interests of the mediator as well as its capabilities partially determine procedural choices during mediation. As Wall and Lynn emphasise, mediators' choices are 'influenced in part by the mediator's past experience, instruction as a mediator, expectations about the probable success of different techniques and so on'.[642] A mediator's cultural background, his or her training and the existence of rules and standards that regulate mediatory activity are factors that contribute to decisions and procedural choices. In this regard, Shapiro *et al* have found that mediators tend to draw heavily on their past experience and ask themselves 'what outcomes are possible in this dispute?' and then choose their techniques accordingly, a conclusion which echoes Bush and Folger's study cited above.[643]

Yet, of critical relevance to our topic, is Jabri's recognition that *'conflict characteristics form the context and provide the boundary within which the third party functions'* [my emphasis]. If conflict characteristics define the context and boundaries of intermediary activity, then following Bush and Folger, one should bear in mind that conflict definitions and conflict characteristics are to a large extent labelled by the third party acting as a mediator. The pressure on mediators to develop relatively unproblematic definitions of conflict requires a difficult if not impossible synthesis of the often contradictory analysis of the various parties in conflict, of an external party (such as an international organisation or an interested third party), of international law as well as the mediator's own appreciation and analysis. Yet, for the purposes of expediency, mediators are compelled to label a conflict in a way that is amenable for problem-solving, in the managerial usage of the term, or settlement in Burton's usage. Consequently, the choice of strategies and tactics during mediation processes inevitably follow mediators' underlying analysis and evaluation of conflict characteristics and it would therefore be logical to consider that a mediator's reading of conflict characteristics and the limits of conflict resolution ultimately contribute to determining procedural approaches during resolution processes. A mediator's reading of conflict characteristics is therefore

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[641] Adapted from Vivienne Jabri. Op. Cit. p.31, 32.

[642] James A. Wall and Ann Lynn. 'Mediation: A Current Review', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1993, p.162.

[643] D. Shapiro, R. Drieghe and J. Berret, 'Mediator behaviour and the Outcome of Mediation', in Journal of Social Issues, No.41, 1985.

partially revealed by procedural preferences during mediation processes as well as by the way the mediator defines the situation.[644]

Nevertheless, mediators' analytical assumptions are elusive and difficult to grasp in an objective way and mediation is more often than not an activity kept behind close doors, where communication about the process to the outside world is restricted and therefore very little empirical evidence is made available. This partially explains the need for inferring mediators' analytical assumptions from an analysis of the reasons for their involvement, the way mediators define the situation or conflict they are mediating and, more importantly, by the choices made concerning procedural tactics and strategies. As was previously pointed out, the tendency of mediators to decide what the case is all about and label the dispute in a way that seems recognisable and manageable; their influence on settlement terms that 'resolve' those issues as well as the dropping of issues that cannot readily be handled are important indicators of the sort of assumptions a mediator holds as regards the conflict in question as well as the inherent limits of conflict resolution. Such factors are at the centre of mediators' choice of strategies and tactics, whether they concern the shaping of arguments or the framing of proposals, a direct influence on outcomes, or the pursuit of the mediator's own interests.

Finally, an additional research avenue as regards mediators' analytical assumptions may be found in what Marieke Kleiboer has termed 'outcome assessment'.[645] This author considers that the mediation literature has focused excessively on process analysis in detriment of developing standards for assessing and evaluating mediation outcomes, which would require a normative debate on, *inter alia*, a mediator's conflict analysis approach. As was previously discussed, mediation theory has focused extensively on the study of mediation processes with a view to developing theories of 'successful' mediation. Outcome assessment, on the other hand, would deviate from the mediation process itself to centre on the types of norms, expectations and performance standards used by third parties to determine whether they have been successful in their attempts at conflict resolution.

As will be seen in the case-study analysis, information concerning mediation processes is rare, and for the most part only released after some sort of outcome is achieved. It is usually after the achievement of some form of agreement that mediators come to the fore and comment on the process they were involved in. This also applies for when a particular mediation effort fails in that, contradictory accounts as well as evaluations of the process are voiced by the actors involved, including mediators, parties to the conflict and the media. Yet,

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[644] As Wall and Lynn point out, a 'mediator's reading of the conflict, the mediator's culture, their training, as well as the context and mediators' ideology, determine the techniques employed in mediation'. See James A. Wall and Ann Lynn. 'Mediation: A Current Review', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1993, p.165, 170.

[645] See Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998.

the literature on mediation has paid little or no attention to a serious development of outcome assessment. For Bercovitch, for example, the evaluation of outcome is simply a matter of subjective and objective criteria. While subjective criteria refers to parties' or mediators perceptions about which goals have been achieved through mediation as well as if a desired change has taken place[646], objective criteria rely on substantive indicators that can be demonstrated empirically involving 'observations of change and judgements about the extent of change as evidence of the success or failure of mediation'.[647] Consequently, subjective evaluation of mediation outcomes refers to the number of objectives reached[648] taking the mediator's as well as the parties' objectives to be the crucial benchmark for effectiveness[649] while objective criteria would include indicators such as the signature of an agreement, a cease-fire or even the commitment to further talks.

Moreover, it appears that the difference between subjective and objective criteria of outcome assessment is purely based on who actually does the assessment: in the subjective case, the parties involved including the mediator; in the objective case, an external party. This is reinforced by the fact that there are no commonly agreed benchmarks or as Bercovitch calls them 'substantive indicators' that would allow for an impartial, non-subjective assessment. In addition, we have seen that the presence of a mediator transforms a basic dyadic relationship (in two-party conflicts) into a triadic relationship and, as a consequence, the third party must be taken as an interested, influential party to the conflict. Therefore, differentiating between subjective versus objective criteria on the basis of the nature of the actor that makes the assessment confuses rather than clarifies the issue. Furthermore, a cursory review of mediation outcome assessment as done by mediators and conflict parties reveals the

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[646] This author posits that according to the subjective criteria 'mediation has been successful when the parties express satisfaction with the process or outcome of mediation, or when the outcome is seen as fair, efficient or effective...fairness of mediation, satisfaction with its performance or improvement in the overall climate of the parties relationship cannot be clearly demonstrated, but they are undoubtedly consequences of successful mediation. They are subjective because they depend on the assessments of the parties in conflict. Even if a conflict remains unresolved, mediation-of any form- can do much to change the way the disputants feel about each other and lead, however indirectly, to both a long term improvement in the parties relationship and a resolution of the conflict. Jacob Bercovitch. 'Mediation in International Conflict: an Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice', in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques. Zartman, I. William and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds). United Sates Institute of Peace, 1997, p.147, 148.

[647] As regards an objective criteria, this author says that 'one can consider a particular mediation effort successful if it contributed to a cessation or reduction of violent behaviour and the opening of a dialogue between the parties. Or, one can call a mediation successful when a formal and binding agreement that settles the conflict issues has been signed. Evaluating the success or failure of international mediation in objective terms is a relatively straightforward task...on the face of it, objective criteria seem to offer a perfectly valid way to access the impact, consequences, and effectiveness of international mediation'. Ibid. p. 148.

[648] See for example L. Susskind and E. Babbitt, 'Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective Mediation in International Disputes', in Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin. MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1992, p.31.

[649] See for example Saadia Touval and William Zartman. 'Introduction: Mediation in Theory', in International Mediation in Theory and Practice, Saadia Touval and William Zartman (Eds), Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1984, p.14.

overwhelming prevalence of subjective criteria.[650] As Kleiboer posits, 'success and failure are construed, rather than discovered' and that 'they are a matter of idiosyncratic and political judgements, interpretations and labelling'.[651] Bercovitch's own proposal for distinguishing between degrees of success is evidence of this, when he considers that any particular mediation is:

> ...fully successful when it is given credit for making a great difference to or settling a dispute. It is partially successful when its efforts initiate negotiations and some dialogue between the parties. Mediation success is limited when it achieves only a cease-fire or break in hostilities...[652]

What this suggests is that, it is theoretically impossible to develop 'objective' criteria agreed by all (parties involved, mediators, external parties) for assessing mediation outcomes. Yet, recognising this should not invalidate a normative debate concerning the parameters of mediation outcome evaluation. On the contrary, such a debate is precisely what permits us to investigate intermediaries' perceptions and underlying analytical assumptions concerning a particular conflict situation. In this sense, rather than an obstacle, in combination with a serious consideration of the factors emphasised by Jabri and quoted above, the assessment of outcome by involved intermediaries allows us to have additional clues as to their expectations as well as underlying conflict analysis frameworks.

Consequently, and in the context of the present thesis, what would such normative debate entail? Outcome assessment in the *Kleiboerian* sense requires the investigation of intermediaries' expectations of non-forceful, third party interventions in complex and protracted armed conflicts. It therefore deals with third-party normative assumptions about armed conflicts in general as well as expectations regarding the limits of conflict resolution itself. In addition, such normative debate would require a discussion of the parameters by which mediatory performance may be evaluated involving, among others, establishing the parameters of mediation success.

In fact, Kleiboer's central tenet on 'The Multiple Realities of International Mediation' is that the kinds of theoretical and empirical statements that exist in mediation literature derive in large part from conflicting frames of reference held by analysts and theoreticians. For Marieke Kleiboer, these frames of reference are the four main paradigms of international relations

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[650] This is patently evident as regards the parameters of evaluation. As Marieke Kleiboer posits, do we evaluate after the signing of an agreement or take implementation into account? What kind of temporal perspective must we have in mind? What about the inevitable change over time concerning judgements about mediation? What of the spatial dimension in the sense of defining the boundaries in estimating and assessing the outcome as well as the scope of a particular mediation effort? Equally important from whose perspective do we evaluate outcomes? In this regard see Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998.

[651] Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998.

[652] Jacob Bercovitch and J. Theodore Anagnoson with Donnette L. Wille. 'Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations', in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, p.9.

theory, namely realism/neo-realism; political psychological theories of international conflict; the critical theory/human needs approach and finally, structuralist theories of international relations. Because each one of these paradigms of international relations generates a specific set of answers concerning the nature of international politics and the rationale of conflict management/resolution, they ultimately have opposing answers to the question of the ultimate essence of international mediation. Different paradigms generate different explanations about what happened and why in the course of a conflict and consequently, each paradigm is capable of theoretically explaining mediators' expectations about what mediation may at best achieve as well as being able to provide mediators with coherent standards for assessing mediation outcomes.

Applied to an understanding of intermediaries' assessment of mediation outcomes, a normative discussion is extremely important for it helps us understand the underlying assumptions at play in mediation processes. Although strongly rooted in International Relations theory rather than conflict analysis *per se*, Kleiboer provides us with additional clues as regards mediators' role in the outcome of mediation processes, and in particular it helps us understand the implications that assumptions about conflicts have in determining the reasons for mediatory involvement, the way mediators define the situation or conflict they are mediating and, more importantly, the choices made concerning procedural tactics and strategies. Having described in Chapter 5 above the two main paradigms of conflict resolution, namely the bargaining power-brokerage approach and the problem-solving towards changing relationships approach, and the way they relate to analysis frameworks, we will conclude this chapter by looking at some of the elements of Kleiboer's analysis that will allow us to adequately interpret the assessment of mediation outcomes by intermediaries.

From Chapter 5 above we discussed how the power brokerage/ bargaining model of conflict resolution has resulted largely from historical and customary diplomatic practice and was later incorporated theoretically by realist and neo-realist thought.[653] As was previously pointed out, within this tradition, the conflicts that matter (i.e. inter-state) must be dealt with to maintain the stability of the system. Conflict resolution becomes therefore a matter of 'dispute settlement' since it is not possible to permanently remove the causes of conflict. Consequently, the best that can be achieved by way of intermediary activity is a settlement in which the parties arrive at a negotiated compromise that reduces the intensity of the conflict below levels that could threaten the stability and balance of power in the system.

As regards tactics and skills, the tendency within this approach is to use bargaining and concession/convergence, as was discussed at length above. In this sense, the mediator will

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[653] In addition to chapter 5, see also chapters 2.2. as well as 4.1. above.

intervene with a stated commitment to a particular outcome to the conflict as well as a specific framework for the settlement process. Communication between the parties is not seen as a priority and in fact, the emphasis may be on communication between mediator and protagonists. In addition, the mediator should have a strong degree of control over the formulation of proposals, reflecting the mediator's standpoint on particular outcomes. In fact, within this paradigm, the crucial resources of the mediator are considered to be power and the skills to use it in inducing conflicting parties to settle their disputes. Furthermore, the mediator may specify conditions of acceptance of a particular outcome, and in so doing may force his or her own positions on particular issues by using threat and reward tactics to induce concessions leading to a settlement. Not surprisingly, major powers are thought to be the most likely candidates for mediation. Neutrality is not only of secondary importance it may even be an undesirable pre-requisite since possible mediators have their own interests in mind when undertaking a mediation initiative. As Kleiboer points out,

> ...resources and capabilities, as well as the strategies and tactics by which they are employed, are crucial for mediation effectiveness...if we consider parties' motives for accepting mediation...we see that disputants look primarily for leverage in mediators, not evenhandedness. More important than the attitude toward the parties is the mediator's resources and ability to induce the conflicting parties to constrain their aims and tactics, to break through stalemates, and to 'persuade' opponents to settle. Power is what makes mediation successful.[654]

More importantly, the assessment of mediation processes is generally carried out on the basis of their conflict-containing impact (reduction of violence) as well as the re-establishment of the balance of power within the status quo. And while there are no agreed standards for the evaluation of mediation within this tradition, since what is important for the system may not be from an actor's perspective, the benchmark for success is the reduction in the risk of war so as to 'keep the nature of the interactions in the system within acceptable parameters'.[655] From an actor's perspective, successful mediation is often considered to be the achievement of the interests of the states involved since 'states are likely to evaluate mediation in terms of its effects on their opportunities to defend their national interests'.[656]

On the other hand, a problem-solving towards relationship transformation approach to conflict resolution would look at the mediation process in a very different light. In this regard, and as a result of her concern regarding a normative discussion of mediation theory and practice in terms of paradigms of international relations theory, Marieke Kleiboer separates the 'mediation as problem-solving approach' from what she calls 'mediation as restructuring relationships' (stemming from a critical theory/human needs approach to international relations). We have discussed at length in Chapter 5.2. the very specific meaning that, within

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[654] Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998, p.44.

[655] Ibid.

[656] Ibid. p.44.

the conflict resolution tradition, 'problem-solving' has acquired. At the root of Burton, Kelman and Fisher's theorising is the idea that 'problem-solving' is a transformative process that should focus on the relationship between parties. Consequently, without attempting a merger of two main paradigms of international relations theory, what are the relevant aspects that the underlying norms of such paradigms offer in the understanding of mediation processes and in particular the evaluation by mediators of the outcomes of their actions?

Within the political problem-solving approach, international conflict is thought of as contingent, a result of psycho-political dynamics that exist in the relations between multiple policy-making actors, acting on behalf of states. And, as a consequence of the fact that policy makers are part of complex, multi-layered environments (i.e., relevant political parties, pressure groups, public opinion), misperceptions and mistrust between political and bureaucratic elites and institutions are often the source of conflict. In this approach, 'elite decision making can be seen as a form of problem solving' and therefore 'the interaction between states and other actors can be conceptualised as a dynamic interplay between systems of decision making'.[657] Conflict is a result of perceived incompatibilities between policy elites' respective goals and values. The roots of conflict are therefore subjective and situation-specific, based on the images and perceptions elites have of their national interests as well as those of their adversaries. Therefore, because conflict is to a large extent socially construed, a complete resolution of conflict (taken to be a fundamental change of attitudes and behaviour of parties resulting in a trust-based peaceful and stable interstate relationship) becomes possible. The key challenge to conflict resolution is to prevent conflict spirals from occurring or to effectively transform them into spirals of de-escalation.

Conflict resolution becomes a process through which decision-making is influenced to avoid spirals of escalation and enable crisis containment (influencing elites' worldviews, enemy images and policy preferences) because, as we have seen at length in Chapter 4.2 above, 'from a decision-making perspective, many conflicts have built-in escalation mechanisms that cause them to get out of control'. Since the goal is to break the escalation spiral, 'information, analytical, and communication skills and a commitment to peace are vital, as well as an acute awareness of the political environment in which the parties operate and what impact this may have upon their behaviour'.[658] Breaking the escalation spiral requires 'influencing the decision-making process of parties involved' in the sense of offsetting 'biases and misperceptions that drive elites toward escalation' so as to 'enable a more balanced

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[657] In this regard, Kleiboer posits that, 'rather than being homogeneous and unitary, actors in the international system tend to be complex entities consisting of different parties who often disagree among themselves about the definition of their national interests and how can these be best promoted. Rather than simply assuming rationality we need to study how and why the leaders and agencies that formulate and implement policy make choices and take action. Marieke Kleiboer. Op. Cit. p.51.

[658] Ibid. p.53, 83.

consideration of the situation'.[659] Understanding the forces present in policy making, that is, the organisational and political context of the conflict, is a fundamental requirement for any would be mediator within this perspective.

Within the political problem-solving paradigm, successful mediation must be viewed in the short as well as the long-term. In the short term, the principal objective should be the reduction or containment of escalationary conflict cycles, that is, conflict settlement. As procedural tactics and strategies are concerned, this requires that the mediator communicates 'intensively with the parties' political leaders' as well as foster 'greater flexibility in their thinking and judgement'. However, in the long-term this approach privileges a more fundamental solution to the conflict through influencing the decision-making processes of actors. To achieve this, the mediator needs to have considerable knowledge about the conflict and 'understand the forces inside and around high-level policy groups', in particular the psychological, organizational, and political factors. As Kleiboer points out, 'only elites' worldviews, enemy images, and policy preferences may be influenced in the mediation process...the organisational and political context in which political leaders are embedded is an important source of constraints on their behaviour'.[660] In conclusion, provided the mediator has the knowledge, ability and commitment to undertake what was described above, any significant actor on the international scene can act as mediator (i.e. states, individuals, international organisations).

In fact, and bearing in mind our discussion of the 'problem-solving' approach in the conflict resolution tradition, Kleiboer's 'political problem-solving' model of mediation encompasses many of the aspects that a problem-solving towards changing relationships implies. As a result, it is not clear why Kleiboer would have separated her 'political problem-solving' model from the 'restructuring relationships' model. Granted that we are not implying the conflation of the human needs approach in international relations theory with political psychological theories of international relations, we nevertheless believe that at the level of conflict resolution theory, the 'restructuring relationships' model is a continuation and deepening of the 'political problem-solving' model.

This is a result of the fact that the model 'mediation as restructuring relationships' is based on the belief that actors are motivated by the desire to fulfil a number of basic human needs, as was discussed in chapter 5.2. above. Marieke Kleiboer considers that within this tradition contestation and violence directed at changing the political system are the main strategies of change adopted by discontented groups, who because they feel permanently left out,

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[659] Ibid.

[660] Ibid. p.57.

unrecognised, or unrepresented, 'will come to perceive prevailing relationships and institutions as illegitimate and will be motivated to change them.' In this sense, as was highlighted in the discussion of the 'problem-solving approach' to conflict resolution, beneath the surface of manifest conflict behaviour it is necessary to uncover the underlying issues which usually remain hidden in power-bargaining and adversary behaviour. The resolution of root causes of conflict is possible and preferable to pragmatic political settlement. And this can only be achieved through a deeper understanding of the motivational dynamics driving conflict groups. And in this, the third party plays a crucial role by helping to create an appropriate setting (informal workshop setting) and assisting the parties to debate and explore their conflict, without commitment or the necessity to arrive at solutions. Finally, within the 'restructuring relationships model' mediation success lies 'in the ability of participants to influence the official decision making process, either directly or through inducing the parties to educate themselves and one another through the exploration and mutual recognition of the essential community needs underlying and driving the surface conflict over specific material interests'.[661]

[661] Ibid.

Chapter 7. Overview of Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Angola

7.1. Introduction: The War that Ended Three Decades of War

> ...Angola presents a terrible, shocking paradox. One of the best resource endowments in Africa has been associated not with development and relative prosperity, but with years of conflict, economic decline and human misery on a massive scale. Few countries present such a stark contrast between economic potential and the state of their populace.[662]
>
> ...Angola finds itself in an apparently eternal political and economic crisis. The potential of the nation has never been realised, and the Angolan population is in deep social disarray. Signs of better times- peace agreements, democratisation, and economic liberalisation- have appeared, only to disappear again. *The Angolan people have developed an elaborate set of survival strategies and an ability to persevere, but the odds against real development and improvement in their living conditions are high.* [my emphasis].[663]

One of the most serious and protracted high-intensity conflicts in Southern Africa has come to an end. In fact, six months have passed since Jonas Savimbi, the leader of Angola's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was killed in an ambush by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) in the eastern Moxico Province. The events that followed the death of UNITA's historic yet highly controversial leader have startled most observers of this 27 year old civil war partially because, even though Savimbi himself had for a time been viewed in several quarters as the main reason for this conflict's intractability and his 'removal' essential for a peaceful resolution, no one was quite prepared for the pace at which the Government of Angola and UNITA were able to sit at the negotiation table and agree on a detailed cease-fire agreement. In fact, the pace with which the military leaders of the FAA and the FALA (UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) were able to produce and agree on a comprehensive cease-fire after just two weeks of negotiations in the town of Luena (Moxico Province) has been interpreted as an early yet unmistakable evidence that Jonas Savimbi himself was the main 'stumbling block' to peace in Angola. This has reinforced the view that if in the absence of the 'Savimbi factor' the military leaders of both parties were able to put a stop to the war, the historically elusive goal of a political agreement and reconciliation between the government of Angola and UNITA might, after all, be a realistic possibility.

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[662] Tony Hodges. Angola From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism. African Issues, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute & The International African Institute, James Currey, Oxford, 2001, p. 1.

[663] Inge Tvedten. Angola Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction. Westview Press, Oxford, 1997, p.139.

However, a closer look at recent developments in Angola reveals a very different picture. In reality, the pace at which the two historic enemies managed to 'resolve' their conflict is primarily a result of the balance of forces on the ground, which gives the Angolan Armed Forces a degree of leverage against UNITA that it has not enjoyed in the past. Actually, although the Angolan government has shied away from public triumphalism, from a purely military perspective the signs that the Angolan Armed Forces' eastern advance ('Operation Restauro') has been a success are unmistakable. The government of Angola won the war against UNITA and this, more than any sincere commitment to peaceful resolution or reconciliation by the belligerents, goes a long way to explaining the fast pace with which a cease-fire was concluded and a peace process set in motion.

In fact, the conditions prevailing at the Moxico negotiating table mirrored the highly asymmetrical situation on the ground. More to the point, severely weakened in the past two and a half years by the FAA's eastern advance, and seriously limited in its external relations by the United Nations imposed sanctions regime, UNITA had by the end of 2001 lost the bulk of its conventional forces and was forced to resort to small-scale guerrilla incursions reminiscent of its early days. Consequently, several factors must be considered in the explanation of the swift end to this often considered classical textbook case of 'complex, deep rooted and protracted conflict'. UNITA's impending military defeat, UNITA's leadership crisis caused by the death in battle of Jonas Savimbi and other prominent UNITA leaders and finally, UNITA's awareness that this could be its last opportunity to secure a political and legitimate role in a democratic Angola are critical factors. Moreover, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) undeniable victory over a severely weakened UNITA must be considered at the centre of this conflict's ripeness for resolution.[664]

It was in this context that military commanders from both sides achieved in a fortnight the very difficult task of drafting a 'Memorandum of Understanding' covering the modalities of a cease-fire and defining in detail all aspects related to the quartering and demobilisation of UNITA's military forces. On 4 April, in a historic ceremony attended by more than 4,000 people and held in the Angolan Parliament in Luanda, this 'Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol' was signed by the two Chiefs of Staff (FAA's General Armando da Cruz Neto and UNITA's General Abreu Muengo Ucuatchitembo 'Kamorteiro') as well as by the Chief of the United Nations Mission in Angola and the Ambassadors of the 'Troika' of observer countries (Portugal, the United States and Russia). Following the signature and under the watchful eye of an unusually relaxed President Dos

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[664] For an in-depth discussion of these issues refer to, *inter alia*, João Gomes Porto with Richard Cornwell and Henri Boshoff. Death of Savimbi renews hope for Peace in Angola. African Security Analysis Programme Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies,26 March 2002 as well as João Gomes Porto. Angola at DD+040. Preliminary

Santos, the two military commanders embraced each other 'as brothers' symbolically reflecting the wishes of some 12.8 million Angolans who have long wished for peace in a country that has been devastated by three decades of civil warfare.

Moreover, the process that began with the signature of the 'Memorandum of Understanding' has largely been carried out according to the objectives agreed by the parties as regards the resolution of 'all outstanding military issues under the Lusaka Protocol'. Consequently, the Government of Angola and UNITA unequivocally reiterate the validity of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol as the primary legal and political framework for peace in Angola. In this sense, the current quartering, disarmament and demobilisation process (the re-integration of ex-combatants is yet to begin) corresponds to one aspect, albeit a critical one, of what one could term in a generic sense, the Angola Peace Process. Consequently, given the context in which the cease-fire agreement was achieved and the lessons learned by previous Angolan attempts at conflict resolution, it would be premature and perhaps irresponsible to judge the extent of positive developments within this latest 'Peace Process' solely on the basis of compliance with the military commitments agreed in Luena and ratified on 4 April. This should not be taken to imply that there is a possibility of return to war in Angola. In all but the most unrealistic scenario-building exercises is the possibility of a return to large-scale war in Angola discussed. In fact, for the first time in decades, the majority of analysts, policy-makers (both Angolan and foreign), donors, non-governmental organisations and humanitarian agencies agree that this time a return to war by UNITA is not only unlikely, it is a logical impossibility.

While both the government and UNITA have demonstrated a strong public commitment to peace, reconciliation between the two former adversaries has been largely confined to the institutional structures created by the 'Memorandum of Understanding'. To be sure, confidence-building through conciliatory statements and practical gestures are an important part of rebuilding trust and dissipating what has been a long and deep climate of suspicion between the two parties. In this regard, emphasis should be given to the President's swift and unilateral declaration of a cease-fire soon after Savimbi was killed in action. Following this, on 14 March the President announced a '15 Point Peace Plan' that included the halting of offensive military activities, guaranteed a 'blanket amnesty' covering all individuals involved in the war and a comprehensive re-integration programme for all demobilized soldiers. The President's peace agenda also promised a rapid approval of the new Constitution currently being discussed in Parliament, which will define the necessary conditions for elections to be held. The announcement of this plan assured UNITA that it would not just be treated as *'the loser'*, paving the way for the negotiations that followed in Moxico Province between the military delegations of the government and UNITA. In addition, the government has shied

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Assessment of the Quartering, Disarmament and Demobilisation Process. African Security Analysis Programme

away from openly claiming victory, repeatedly stating that in this war 'there are no winners or losers'.

Outside the realm of public statement and in terms of practical action designed to achieve the difficult and elusive goal of 'national reconciliation', the institutional framework designed to implement the 'Memorandum of Understanding', and in particular its Joint Military Commission (JMC), remains the only body where the two former adversaries officially meet and negotiate. However, this structure's mandate is very specifically related to the promotion and application of the 'Memorandum of Understanding', and therefore only deals with aspects of a military nature.[665] Consequently, while unquestionably having an important role in confidence-building between the military leaderships of both sides in that its members are top military officers of the FAA and FALA (UNITA's armed forces), the JMC lacks the mandate and format that would allow for true national reconciliation to be discussed.

The fact that, several timetable revisions notwithstanding, the current quartering, demobilisation and disarmament process has been largely observed should therefore not be taken as definitive and conclusive proof that the Angolan Peace Process is moving, unhindered, at the speed of light. The successful completion of this process, in itself a task of enormous proportions indicates at best that the Angolan Peace Process is taking its first steps. Taken as one among several of the conditions necessary for sustainable peace in the short and medium term in Angola, the resolution of the military aspect does not in itself guard against the potential pitfalls that may undermine the successful completion of the Peace Process in Angola. As pointed out in the 2002 United Nations System Common Country Assessment for Angola,

> ...while the war has unquestionably been the single most important constraint on development, as well as the immediate cause of the humanitarian emergency, other factors, of an institutional and policy-related nature, have exacerbated the serious situation experienced by Angola's people. The new situation therefore requires two types of action. The first is a series of peace-building measures in the short to medium term, aimed at promoting national reconciliation, demilitarisation and recovery. Second, however, there is an urgent need for policy reforms and institutional measures, including measures regarding the management and allocation of public resources, in order to address the other deep-seated problems that have contributed to the situation of economic malaise, widespread poverty, high mortality and social exclusion.[666]

These challenges are as great as they are varied and the direction taken at this juncture will once again depend on the will of Angola's political, economic and military elites. Many

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Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 04 June 2002.

[665] The Joint Military Commission (JMC) has the responsibility of promoting and overseeing the application of the 'Memorandum of Understanding'. The JMC is headed by a military representative of the government (president and executive member) and a military representative of UNITA (executive member). As Permanent Observers, the JMC includes a military representative of the United Nations as well as a military representative of each of the 'Troika' of observer countries (Portugal, United States and Russia). In this regard see João Gomes Porto. Angola at DD+040. Preliminary Assessment of the Quartering, Disarmament and Demobilisation Process. African Security Analysis Programme Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 04 June 2002.

analyses of the conflict in Angola begin by presenting the paradox encapsulated in the words quoted at the beginning of this section. This paradox pertains to the fact that although Angola is a country with incredible potential, it finds itself unable to escape the vicious circle of war, poverty and underdevelopment which have resulted in a humanitarian situation of catastrophic proportions. Here is a country that is often considered to have all the necessary conditions to become an economic powerhouse in the Southern African region, yet has never become it. In fact, far from it, successive cycles of armed conflict as well as economic mismanagement, have placed Angola in 146th place out of 162 countries in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index for 2001.[667] And even this most alarming of ranks is considered conservative by several analysts not least of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).[668]

The United Nations Human Development Report 2000 estimated Angola's population at 12.8 million with a growth rate of approximately 2.9 and an estimated urban population of 32.9% in 1998. The vast majority of the population is displaced as a consequence of the war and has tended to concentrate in the cities, creating a situation that is at present described as a humanitarian catastrophe. In fact, estimates for internal displacement point to anything between 2.8 and 4 million people, that is a third of the total population, as being internally displaced at present. The 2001 HDI report presents an even bleaker picture. Life expectancy at birth stands at 45 years, infant mortality at 172 (per '000), adult literacy as a percentage of over 15's stands at 42% and school enrolment as a percentage of the total school age population standing at a mere 23%.[669] The same applies to a health service that is in a state of collapse with virtually no functioning infrastructure in many provinces and strong reliance on foreign non-governmental organizations for the provision of even the most basic services. Access to basic services is extremely poor with 62% of the population having no access to clean water and 60% without access to sanitation, in a country where malaria, cholera, acute diarrhea, respiratory diseases and measles are the main cause of death. HIV/AIDS is still not a big issue in Angola with low infection rates of around 2.1%, mostly as a result of the isolation that the war has imposed.

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[666] United Nations System in Angola. Angola: The Post-War Challenges. Common Country Assessment 2002, p.iv.

[667] United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2001. It should be noted that the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite of the following indicators: life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment and GDP per head.

[668] The EIU authors note a slight improvement from last years' 160th position out of 164 countries. Nevertheless, they also point out that 'the improved result is counter-intuitive to the generally deteriorating conditions of social welfare in Angola, as indicated by extensive anecdotal evidence from UN and non-governmental organisations. One explanation is that the Human Development Report depends on official, government sources for its data. Regardless of small relative movements, however, by the HDI's own measures, Angola's indicators of social well being such as health and education, are unmistakably around the bottom of the world league tables'. See Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report (August 2001): Angola. London, 2001, p. 21-22.

[669] United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2001.

Furthermore, the war has seriously affected the road and rail link infra-structure in Angola as well as made a large proportion of fertile agricultural areas inaccessible. A road network that totaled 75,000 km in 1994, of which 8,000 km are asphalted is in a state of disrepair making it very difficult and highly dangerous to transport people and goods by land. The same applies to the rail network, one of UNITA's favorite targets during the civil war. Port facilities are still operating, in Luanda, Lobito and Namibe, catering for an economy that is highly dependent on imports following the collapse of the domestic manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Transportation by air has become the only viable connection for humanitarian aid delivery as well as for the oil and diamond industries.

For the last three decades, what was once a diversified economy (Angola produced surplus coffee, sisal and cotton for export; had a growing light industry as well as a strong mining sector) has been gradually destroyed as a consequence of almost uninterrupted war and bad policy choices at central level that have resulted in escalating macro-economic instability. According to the EIU, Angola has 2.1% of real GDP growth and a consumer price annual inflation of 325%. The bulk of Angola's GDP is however related to the off-shore oil industry which contributes with 60.3% of GDP, according to 1999 figures. And both the oil sector as well as the diamond sector have grown exponentially in the last thirty years, making Angola one of the largest diamond producers and the second biggest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. The oil sector in particular has benefited immensely from a number of new discoveries placing Angola in the coveted position of having the largest reserve growth in the world and first place among the world's top 15 oil finders.[670] Production forecasts for 2001 are of 755.000 barrels per day, for 2005 1.4 billion barrels per day and for 2008, 1.8 barrels per day, placing Angola among the world's top producers of oil.

Nevertheless, although Angola's oil sector has operated with considerable success for the last three decades and has been relatively unaffected by the war, the growing revenues of the oil sector have not trickled down to the society as a whole, having been used to finance the war effort in detriment of all other areas. Controversy surrounding extra-budgetary spending and lack of transparency in public finances and particularly in the oil business have prompted strong international pressure from bilateral donors as well as the 'Bretton Woods Institutions' (World Bank and IMF) for greater transparency in public finances.

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[670] A vast number of oil companies are involved in Angola's oil business, and side by side with the *'supermajors'* (Total Fina Elf, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum, Texaco and Shell), we find a large number of *'independents'* (ENI, C-T, BHP, Ranger, Conoco, Ocean, ROC, PetroGal, among others) as well as a number of NOCs (National Oil Companies). Coupled with an important number of new discoveries, the opening of the Girassol field has substantially increased production levels. In addition, the projected construction of a new refinery in the coastal city of Benguela with a forecasted production of 200 million barrels per day has created new opportunities and excitement around this very lucrative and dynamic field. Furthermore, the government's intention of developing natural gas exploration with the construction of a LNG (liquefied natural gas) terminal in Luanda has made LNG a very attractive business opportunity for foreign investors.

While the oil industry has consistently grown, the formal economy in Angola has progressively shrunk, and is at present largely dysfunctional and stagnated. As a consequence, the informal economy and therefore non-regulated sector has grown exponentially. A paradigmatic example is the largest open-air market in Africa, the 'Roque Santeiro' located just a few miles from the centre of the capital city, Luanda. And this is where the paradox as well as the challenges lie, for Angola possesses an unparalleled natural resource endowment in the form of fertile and varied agricultural lands, rich fishing and forestry resources, large reserves of oil, gas, diamonds, iron ore and gold, as well as a strong hydroelectrical potential. As Tony Hodges points out,

> ...if these resources were managed properly, Angola's economy would be among the most dynamic in the developing world. Its people would be amongst the best fed, best educated and healthiest on the African continent'.[671]

7.2. Overview of Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Angola

> ...to view the Angolan civil war merely as a product of East-West rivalry or of South African bids for regional hegemony is to misunderstand or to deny the real nature of the origins of the conflict. *At the heart of that conflict was a struggle for power* and ultimate responsibility for the civil war must rest with the parties...[672]

> ...Angola's conflict is being depicted as a 'resource war'...this view of the war in Angola, however accurate, does not take into account the important underlying causes of the conflict. Angola's ongoing tragedy is also the result of the dominant politico-military forces' reluctance to share power and wealth within an inclusive multi-ethnic and multi-racial political system...these cleavages, however, were only partly the result of deep animosities caused by class or racial differences reflecting colonial society or even the ideological differences reflecting Cold War allegiances. At a deeper level, *the divisions between the nationalist groups were caused mainly by ethnic differences predating colonialism* [my emphasis].[673]

> ...the Angolan conflict was a civil war with ethno-regional and politico-ideological dynamics, rooted in the nature of Angolan society and the historical development of rival Angolan nationalist movements. It was also a proxy war between the Cold War superpowers and a 'front-line' theatre in the sub-regional conflict between militant African nationalism and the apartheid regime in South Africa.[674]

The next two chapters will discuss at length the key instances of mediation of the Angolan conflict, both in its inter-state and internal dimensions. These mediation processes resulted in the most important framework peace agreements between the belligerents: the 1988 New York Accords, the 1991 Bicesse Peace Agreement and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. The pages below are meant to provide an overview of the conflict so that the three sections on the

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[671] Tony Hodges. Angola From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism. African Issues, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute & The International African Institute, James Currey, Oxford, 2001, p. 1.

[672] Fernando Andresen Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict. MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. xiii and p.196.

[673] Assis Malaquias. 'Ethnicity and conflict in Angola: prospects for reconciliation', in Angola's War Economy. The Role Of Oil and Diamonds, Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000, p.95.

[674] Saferworld. Angola: Conflict Resolution and Peace-building. Report co-ordinated and edited by Simon Higdon, Saferworld's Conflict Management Researcher, September 1996, p.3.

mediation processes to follow can more easily be contextualised. This historical overview will follow the framework defined in chapter 4 and therefore will take into account the various analytical levels which help us understand this protracted high-intensity conflict.

Explanations of the various cycles of war in Angola have been characterised by strong divergences. Moreover, while there seems to be no disagreement in the usage of a classical international law typology ('nature of actors') according to which Angola is thought to have experienced three different types of conflict in the last forty years (anti-colonial war, interstate regional war and civil war) there is profound disagreement on the causes underlying this protracted conflict. In addition, while for some authors these were separate conflicts, for others, such as Rothchild and Hartzell, these conflicts have in fact existed concurrently and 'what began in the early 1960s as a struggle by Angolan nationalist movements against the colonial power, Portugal, had become by the time of Angolan independence in 1975 a war with both interstate and intrastate dimensions'.[675] The phase of national liberation from colonial rule aside, analysis of the post-independence conflict evidence that far from a common and shared understanding of the causes of this conflict there is a marked analytical discrepancy. Was the Angolan post-independence war a result of the nature of Portuguese colonialism or was it a direct result of Cold-War politics and superpower involvement and consequently a 'proxy war'? Are there elements intrinsic to Angola or the parties involved which would point to a strong 'internal' core to this conflict such as class, education, ideology or ethno-linguistic allegiance? Was the Angola conflict a 'resource war' where predatory elites were primarily motivated by the illegal appropriation of natural resources or an 'ethnic war', fuelled by elements of an ethno-linguistic and regional nature?

Interestingly enough, all of the above have been given as reasons for the Angolan conflict. In fact, early writings on the Angolan nationalist struggle during the 1950s and 60s emphasised the role that class and education, as well as ethno-linguistic and regional factors played in the development of different and opposite anti-colonial movements. The emphasis on these factors is not surprising because even though the anti-colonial movements faced a common enemy in colonial Portugal, they revealed from an early stage strong cleavages, which prevented them from forming a unified anti-colonial front. In fact, during the colonial war (1961-1974) there were several instances of actual armed confrontation between the liberation movements. As Tony Hodges points out,

> ...even during the war against Portugal, the leadership of the three main Angolan movements proved unable to mount a united front, and at times fought each other. This seriously

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[675] Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell. 'Interstate and Intrastate Negotiations in Angola', in Elusive Peace. Negotiating and End to Civil Wars, I. William Zartman (Ed), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1995, p. 176.

> weakened the anti-colonial movement, which by the early 1970s was little more than a minor irritant to the Portuguese.[676]

Moreover, d uring the last twenty years of colonial rule, three distinct streams of Angolan nationalism crystallised in three liberation movements. These were: the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola); the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and finally UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). According to John Marcum, class, ethno-linguistic affiliation and regionalism were the main determinants in the original development of these streams. In this sense, the MPLA corresponded to a Luanda-Mbundu stream, representing the second largest ethno-linguistic group in the country. With a predominantly urban leadership and orientation, the MPLA was to a large extent a creation of mestico (mixed race) and assimilado intellectuals from Luanda, who had a strong tradition of political affirmation going back to the late nineteenth century.[677] The MPLA was formed in Luanda in 1956 as an off-spring of the Angolan Communist Party, mirroring to a large extent the political polarisation between right and left that characterised the situation in Portugal itself. In fact, Marxism had penetrated the Portuguese colonies because opposition to Salazar' regime found a relatively safer ground in the colonies.[678] In fact, from 1948, the Portuguese Communist Party was able to establish an Angolan Committee in Luanda and began training local activists in Marxist doctrine and anti-colonialism. It was in this context that the Angolan Communist Party (PCA, Partido Comunista de Angola) was born in October 1955.[679] The PCA extensively spread the Marxist doctrine and created hundreds of mobile libraries and clandestine schools. According to the same account, as other nationalist movements began to form and coordination and control over them became difficult, the 'young Marxists of the former Communist Party, the leaders of the PLUA, and other patriots rapidly founded the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola ', the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) in December 1956.[680]

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[676] Anthony Hodges. Angola From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism. African Issues, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute & The International African Institute, James Currey, Oxford, 2001, p9.

[677] See, *inter alia*, Jill Dias. 'Angola', O Império Africano 1825-1890 Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa, Joel Serrão and A. H. de Oliveira Marques (Direcção), Editorial Estampa, 1998.

[678] As Marcum points out, 'during the late 1940s and early 1950s a small but active number of anti-Salazarists of Marxist persuasion began to organise and proselytise in the city'. John Marcum, in The Angolan Revolution Volume 1, The Anatomy of an Explosion (1959-1962), The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969, p.17.

[679] See Mário de Andrade, "Et les colonies de Salazar?", Democratie Nouvelle, Vol. 14, Nº9, Sept, 1960. According to Mário de Andrade, a prominent figure in the nationalist struggle, a number of young Angolans dedicated to Marxist thought were determined to create 'clandestine political organisations of a revolutionary character designed for the conquest of independence'.

[680] See Mário de Andrade, "Et les colonies de Salazar?", Democratie Nouvelle, Vol. 14, Nº9, Sept, 1960. There is some controversy over these allegations. Guimarães considers that 'already at the birth of the MPLA, the competitive pressures of legitimisation wielded an overwhelming influence. These pressures to endow the movement with an internal and external validity are also the driving force behind subsequent alliances made by the movement, not only to help it fight colonialism, but also to legitimise its identity vis-à-vis its rivals. Fernando Andresen Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict. MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 45. In this regard see also John Marcum, Op. Cit. p.29. Also MPLA, "Dez Anos de Existência, Dez Anos de Luta em Prol do Povo Angolano", Dar es Salaam, Feb.4, 1967.

What later came to be known as the FNLA, on the other hand, represented the Bakongo nationalist stream. The Bakongo are the third largest ethno-linguistic group in Angola and populate the extreme north-west of the country, the Zaire and Uige Provinces of Angola. This area was less influenced by Portuguese culture and politics, and retained a strong individuality, a result of the special status that the kingdom of the Kongo had historically enjoyed vis-a-vis the Portuguese.[681] In this region, anti-colonial feelings ran deep. By the 1950's, a group of Bakongo royalists, known as the Matadi group, began thinking about the revival of the kingdom of the Kongo. Banned by the Portuguese authorities from political activity, the Matadi group moved to Leopoldville, where political activism was flourishing among Angolan Bakongo emigrants. From 1949, Manuel Necaca, a Bakongo that had been secretary to the Kongo king Dom Pedro VII, began canvassing for political organisation amongst the Bakongo population living in Leopoldville with the help of his nephew Holden Roberto[682]. Famously, the group led by Necaca petitioned the United Nations in 1955 for the Kongo to be placed under the authority of the United Nations in the form of a trusteeship of the United States of America, requesting that the United States send a 'mission of inquiry' to investigate conditions inside the Kongo and put themselves on record as opposing Communist penetration into their country. [683] In July 1957 the Leopoldville and Matadi groups decided to merge and establish a formal organisation, under the name Union of the Populations of Northern Angola (UPNA, Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola).[684]

Yet, because of its ethno-linguistic undertone and its aim of ressurecting the kingdom of Kongo, the UPNA was advised by George Houser[685] as well as Ghana's political elites to focus on liberation for Angola as a whole. Subsequently, Roberto circulated a manifesto in the name of the Union of the Populations of Angola (UPA, Uniao das Populacoes de Angola) calling for the national liberation of Angola.[686] To this respect Guimarães states that,

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[681] Although nominally an independent kingdom until the end of the nineteenth century, when the Portuguese secured vassalage at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the Kongo was in reality controlled and maneuvered by the colonial administrations and especially by the Catholic Church. For the colonial authorities, the kingdom of Kongo had been useful for political control and for the recruitment of forced labour for the cocoa plantations of Cabinda and Sao Tome and Principe. Kongo kings and and loyal chiefs were effectively recruiting agents for the Portuguese colonial administration. In this regard see

[682] Holden Roberto was born in Sao Salvador in 1923. He went to Leopoldville in 1925 with his family. He worked in Leopoldville, Bukavu, and Stanleyville, where he first met Patrice Lumumba. He also met Cyrille Adoula at an early age.

[683] John Marcum, Op. Cit., p. 61-62.

[684] Unsurprisingly there is some controversy concerning the birth of the UPNA in a similar way to that of the MPLA. The pressures of legitimation and worthiness seem to work here as well. John Marcum points to the "Memorandum Presented by the National Liberation Front to the Commission for the Reconciliation of Angolan Nationalist Movements at Leopoldville" of July 15, 1963. This memorandum says that the UPNA was founded on July 10 1954 by "Angolan emigres who had taken refuge [in Leopoldville] as a result of the deplorable living conditions prevailing in Angola. Ibid. p.63.

[685] Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa, or ACOA.

[686] Cited in John Marcum. Op. Cit., p.67. In its statutes the newly created UPA was described as 'a political organisation formed for all Africans originally from Angola, without descrimination as to sex, age, ethnic origin or domicile' aimed at installing a 'democratic regime for peasants and workers' within an independent Angola.

> ...it was in the light of exchanges with those major anti-colonial figures that Roberto is said to have decided that the separatist nature of the UPNA should be cast aside in favour of a total Angolan identity. The name of the group was changed to UPA, and the reference to northern peoples dropped in order to impart a broader appeal... Yet the UPA remained in all substance what it had been before, a pressure group designed to induce the Portuguese to admit reforms, and capable of operating only within the range of BaKongo cultural loyalties.[687]

Meanwhile, UPA's history is inextricably linked with developments in the Congo. In fact, when riots began in Leopoldville, the Belgian colonial authorities reacted with massive arrests, including the arrest and extradition of hundred of Angolan émigrés believed to be involved in the rioting. UPA leaders saw this as a good opportunity to infiltrate Angola and establish nationalist 'cells' that would later launch the rebellion of the 15 of March.[688] In addition, the Belgian government authorised the legal constitution of political parties in June 1959, and moved swiftly to grant independence to the Congo. Also divided along ethno-linguistic lines, out of the three main anti-colonial parties in the Congo, only one had truly a nationalist perspective and programme, the National Congolese Movement headed by Patrice Lumumba.[689] Lumumba was elected Prime Minister in May 1960. However, Lumumba's Africanist tendencies and non-alignment soon became incompatible with both Belgium's and American interests in the Congo. And as a result, on 17 January 1961, with CIA complicity, Lumumba was assassinated.

During this turbulent period, Roberto launched an internal UPA campaign to give the UPA a broader political and diplomatic base. He opened the leadership of the UPA to other ethnic groups in order to form a more nationally representative ethnic leadership. In addition, the UPA began its activities in earnest, opening a new office in Leopoldville, and launching a campaign of pamphlets in several languages including the major vernacular languages of Angola. Internationally, Roberto continued his campaign to raise awareness of the nationalist struggle for independence. He again visited Tunis and Addis Ababa to lobby as an observer at the Second Conference of Independent African States (June 14-24 1960). Upon returning to Leopoldville after an almost two year absence he was received as a victorious general by the exiled Angolan community.

Both the MPLA and the UPA gradually adopted a violent character. This was inextricably linked to the nature of late-colonialism in Angola and in particular the totalitarian nature of Salazar's regime, which worsened when in 1957 the International Police for the Defence of

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[687] Fernando Andresen Guimarães, Op. Cit., p.49.

[688] These claims were made in GRAE, Ministry of Information, "Memorandum Presented by the National Liberation Front to the Commission for the Reconciliation of Angolan Nationalist Movements at Leopoldville", July 15, 1963. Cited in John Marcum. Op. Cit. p. 71.

[689] The other two main parties were regionally based, the Alliance des Bakongos (Abako), headed by Joseph Kasavubu and the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga, headed by Moise Tshombe.

the State (PIDE) was installed in all colonies. By denying political expression and representation to indigenous political parties, the colonial regime conditioned their development, driving them underground and increasing their sense of grievance.[690] In fact, following early unsuccessful attempts at negotiation with the colonial power by all nationalist movements, violence in the form of armed national liberation became the means of choice for all three nationalist parties. In such environment, the option for Angolan nationalists was clandestinity, exile and insurgency warfare.

In the United Nations, Portugal's role in Africa was increasingly under scrutiny and criticism. Secretary General Hammarskjold sent in 1956 a routine note stating that, under Article 73e of Chapter XI of the UN Charter, Portugal was obliged to report the status of its 'non-self-governing territories'. Salazar replied to the United Nations Secretary General saying that 'Portugal does not administer territories that would be included in the category specified by article 73'.[691] The Portuguese African territories were in fact 'overseas' provinces, which according to the 1951 Constitutional revision had become integral Provinces of Portugal.

The United States supported Portugal's claims, by stating that each member state was competent to make its own determination. Furthermore, the US continued to supply Portugal with military assistance.[692] The tacit agreement behind this procurement was that, although not for direct use in the colonies, in the event of necessity Portugal could use this equipment there. When Eisenhower visited Lisbon on 19 May 1960, he reinforced the US friendship and support of Portugal by saying,

> ...in coming to Portugal I feel once more that I am visiting old friends. Since the founding of the United States, relations between the two countries have been happy. From the outset we have worked together without a single difference of opinion. Today, as a member of the United Nations and as a partner in NATO, we continue to work together in the common cause of peace and justice for all men. [693]

The Angola war of independence began in this context, in the form of three separate armed uprisings in 1961. The first rising began in January in the Province of Malange, growing out of a strike by cotton workers, to which colonial authorities reacted with mass arrests and repression. On 15 March northern Angola became the scene of a major insurrection by large

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[690] In this regard, Pelissier emphasises that Portuguese colonialism was 'en pleine verdeur' and that 'elle vit son 'age d'or'. Rene Pelissier. La Colonie du Minotaure: Nationalismes et Révolts en Angola (1926-1961). Pelissier, Montamets, France 1978. As Guimarães points out 'in fact, colonial repression in Angola may have helped to define the radical political character of the anti-colonial movements'. See Fernando Andresen Guimarães. The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict. MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p.31.

[691] United Nations General Assembly Records (GAOR), Letter of November 8, 1956. United Nations archives. As cited in José Freire Antunes. Kennedy e Salazar, o leão e a raposa. Difusão Cultural, 1991, p.36-37.

[692] In fact, between 1953 and 1960, Portugal obtained $287.4 million in military assistance, representing 43% of Portugal's total military expenditure during that period.

[693] George Wright. The Destruction of a Nation. United State's Policy Toward Angola since 1945. Pluto Press, 1997, p.31.

numbers of Bakongo farmers joined by local plantation contract workers. In this uprising, the farmers targeted civilians and murdered and mutilated white, creole and assimilated black men, women and children which they regarded as agents of the Portuguese. Following this, in the morning of 4 June, several hundred MPLA supporters attacked Luanda's main political prison killing seven colonial police officers. The reaction of the colonial authorities was brutal: forty MPLA supporters were machine-gunned and the rest either surrendered or fled. Following this uprising, European settler mobs rampaged through the city's shantytowns, killing thousands of Africans and Creoles. MPLA exiles could do little but stand helplessly while the disaster took its course. Portuguese troops were stationed in the North, and Air Force planes with NATO equipment bombarded settlements in the frontier districts of Congo, Kwanza Norte and Malange. The Portuguese reacted with massive bombing, killings and arrests, under counter-terrorism tactics. A stream of refugees, as much as 150,000 poured into Congo Leopoldville before the end of the year.

After the northern uprisings, the MPLA began an international offensive to increase support for the movement and re-launched its campaign for a common front. The MPLA also increased its pressure on other anticolonialist forces to bring pressure on Portugal's allies notably the United States and Great Britain, and also West Germany, pushing for a diplomatic and economic boycott against Portugal. In April the MPLA approached the UPA, ALIAZO and the MLEC (Mouvement de Liberation de L'Enclave de Cabinda) with a draft proposal for a common front to be entitled Front de Liberation de L'Angola (FLA). The idea was to unite but not merge all Angolan nationalist movements and eventually create an Angolan government in exile. However, the UPA showed no interest in creating a common front with the MPLA.

Within the UPA, the immediate aftermath of the rebellions called for increased discipline and resources, both financial and military. Roberto began sending young military cadres to train in Tunisia at FLN bases. A solid military wing to the UPA political activities began to be created. Roberto also strenghtened the UPA with the creation of a labour union able of organising and bring together Angolan emigre workers, and in this fashion increase international awareness of working conditions in Angola, integrate Angolan workers in the wider unionist movement and also obtain funds for the UPA. Thirdly, Roberto created a relief organisation capable of coping with the massive influx of Angolan refugees through the provision of medical supplies and care and social relief work. In addition, the new Congolese Premier, Cyrilla Adoula, was a close friend of Roberto.

As evident from the above, from the very beginning of the armed struggle for independence a pattern of two party intra-revolutionary rivalry became salient. This rivalry would dominate the

struggle for independence and be at the root of the civil war that followed.[694] It is therefore possible to say that the Angolan civil war of 1975 began in Léopoldville in 1962. In fact, as pointed out by Guimarães, 'it was increasingly clear that a rivalry was emerging in Angolan nationalism, one that would dominate the anti-colonial war and beyond.[695]

After it claimed the 4 February attacks, the MPLA moved its headquarters Guinea Konakry to Léopoldville. Here, under a core leadership (Mário de Andrade, Lúcio Lara and Viriato da Cruz) it organised its first military force that was trained in Morocco. In Léopoldville, the MPLA began consolidating a network of international contacts and support. These included the Soviet Union, Mario de Andrade's links to French intellectuals and political circles, Angolan students campaigning in Belgium, Brazil, Italy, Netherlands, Scandinavia, the UK and both East and West Germany. Within the African context, the MPLA consolidated its support amongst the radical Casablanca states (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic) and began approaching the leaders of newly independent French speaking countries.

On March 27 1962, Roberto announced the formation of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola or FLNA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola). A week later, he announced that a Government of the Angolan Republic in Exile (later renamed Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile), the GRAE, had been established.[696] This was a pre-emptive act intended at guaranteeing the predominance of the UPA/FNLA as the true nationalist front in face of growing MPLA activities and efforts to build a constituency at the expense of UPA's traditional Bakongo following. From the moment the FNLA and the GRAE were formed, any attempts at creating a front which would unite the MPLA and the FNLA would be fiercely opposed by Roberto with the argument that a front had already been established and that the MPLA could, if it wanted, join it.

Internationally, as a result of the close relationship that the MPLA had with the Casablanca group, the GRAE was forced to approach the less ideological Monrovia group for African recognition and support. The exception was Algeria, from which Roberto still had support. There was an intense competition for Algerian support, now that it had gained independence. However, the MPLA gained an obvious advantage when in November it annouced that it was organising a local party office in Algiers and recruiting Algerian volunteers to fight in Angola, a result of Mario de Andrade's close ties to Ben Bella. The Algerian FNL (National Liberation

[694] As Marcum points out, 'by late 1962 and early 1963 the MPLA and FNLA (...) had become locked into a two-party contest for revolutionary ascendancy. Each of the movements sought to eclipse its rival by achieving a decisive advantage in each of three overlapping spheres of intranational competition: external relations, internal political functions, and military functions. Marcum, Op. Cit., p.9.

[695] Guimarães, Op. Cit., p.57.

[696] The idea to form a government in exile was inspired on the Algerian experience.

Front) had been instrumental in UPA's training by the Boumedienne-led group in Tunisia while Ben Bella's faction trained the MPLA cadres in Morocco.[697]

In July 1964 the GRAE's Foreign Minister resigned in a sensational style. This man was Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, an assimilated African from the Bié district of central Angola of Ovimbundu descent. In fact, the appointment of Jonas Malheiro Sidonio Savimbi, an Ovimbundu, first to the post of UPA's Secretary General and then as the GRAE's Foreign Minister had been clear moves by Roberto to counter accusations of tribalism. Dissatisfied with Roberto's leadership, Savimbi accused him of being a United States puppet and privileging his own family and his own ethnic group, the Bakongo, by giving them prominent posts in the GRAE. In addition, he disagreed with Roberto's liberation strategy, believing that a true liberation movement should base itself inside the country and complemented military actions with intensive political recruitment.

In March 1966 Savimbi announced the formation of an entirely new organisation, UNITA (União para a Independência Total de Angola). Savimbi was joined by supporters from the eastern and southern regions, notably from the Lunda and Chokwe ethno-linguistic groups who were also disappointed with their role in the existing liberation movements. For these Angolans, the formation of UNITA ended their perceived second-class status within the MPLA and the FNLA. From early on regional and ethnic loyalties took an increasingly significant role in Angola's political and military life. [698]

In this sense, while Angolan proto-nationalism and localised political activity were products defined to a great extent by the geographical location and relative individuality of the main ethno-linguistic groups in which they took shape, other factors such as ideology and class, education and religion were crucial in the make-up of the modern nationalist parties. Their different ethno-linguistic and regional roots notwithstanding, all three liberation movements adopted pan-Angolan aspirations, campaigning on the basis of the national integrity of Angola in territorial and demographic terms. As pointed out by Guimarães,

> ...While undoubtedly present in the Angolan conflict, especially in pinpointing the identity of the rival constituencies and when used to draw upon loyalty, ethnicity does not seem to be able to completely explain the origins of the conflict...other equally important influences such as race,

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[697] Guimaraes points out that, 'in this way, the matrix of Angolan rivalry was superimposed on an Algerian one. When Algeria became independent in July 1962, competition between the two Angolan movements was stepped up in order to gain exclusive favour with the new regime in Algiers. (...) The emerging rivalry between the Angolan nationalists was becoming a wider continental issue and official Algerian policy was to pressure both the MPLA and the FNLA to form a common front of Angolan nationalists. Guimaraes, Op. Cit., p.61.

[698] During his stay with the FNLA Savimbi had made important contacts later to prove crucial to UNITA: Ahmed Ben Bella (first President of independent Algeria); Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasser; Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; Co Liang, one of China's leading agents in Africa, who was working as a Hsin-Hua News Agency correspondent in Ghana and would provide Savimbi with the Beijing connection for the training of his own guerrillas.

> education, personality clashes and basic political choices must be looked at to understand the roots of the civil war. [699]

Politically, the MPLA increased its links with the USSR, from which it obtained weapons for the war against Portugal. In 1967, the MPLA made an important change of strategy deciding to concentrate on eastern Angola and opening a new front on the border with Zambia. Senior MPLA officers moved from Brazzaville to Lusaka and training camps were set up in Zambia and Tanzania.[700] Eventually, during the turbulent years of independence (1974-1975) and with the assistance of Soviet weaponry, advice and training and thousands of Cuban troops, the MPLA would take power in Luanda. The Cubans would become a critical factor with repercussions both in the internal development of the civil war, and the escalation of the regional interstate war with South Africa. After consolidating its hold on power in the capital and the other main cities, the MPLA established a one party state and in 1977 officially adopted Marxism Leninism as its guiding ideology. It retained its strategic alliance with the USSR and other parts of the Soviet bloc until the demise of Communism at the beginning of the 1990s.

In July 1974, two months after the fall of the fascist regime in Lisbon, the II Provisional Government in Lisbon promulgated Constitutional Law nº 7/74, which recognised the right to self-determination and independence to the colonies. The government in Lisbon decided to transfer power to the 'sole and legitimate representatives of the territories subject to de-colonisation, their liberation movements'. Following this, the FNLA and UNITA attempted the formation of a joint front to negotiate with Portugal (excluding the MPLA), which led to a meeting in September 1974 in Cape Verde between Portugal's General Spínola, Zaire's President Mobutu and the leaders of UNITA, the FNLA as well as Daniel Chipenda a factionist within the MPLA. Spínola's purpose was to avoid a Marxist MPLA from taking power in Angola by giving some leverage to the other movements.

The leaders of the three movements would meet only once, on 5 January 1975 in Mombassa, Kenya. In this meeting Neto, Savimbi and Roberto promised to end hostilities and signed a tripartite agreement setting out a united approach for the forthcoming constitutional negotiations with the Portuguese government. Under pressure from Jomo Kenyatta, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity, the three leaders and Portugal met and signed the Alvor Agreement on the 15th of January 1975. This agreement recognised the three

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[699] Fernando Andresen Guimarães, Op. Cit., p.34.

[700] By 1970 the MPLA was receiving more aid from the African Liberation Committee of the OAU than was the FNLA, on top of its considerable assistance from the USSR and its East European satellites. The MPLA had indeed made progress from an urban based predominantly Creole intellectual group to a functioning guerrilla force.

liberation movements as the 'sole legitimate representatives of the peoples of Angola' setting the independence date for the coming 11th of November.[701]

However, fighting re-emerged in Luanda in February 1975 when MPLA factional troops controlled by Daniel Chipenda, defied MPLA control over the capital. In fact, all three parties moved to gain military advantage on the ground, supported by external patrons and fuelled by growing arms supplies. The FNLA, backed by Zaire and receiving economic and military aid from the United States, moved troops to northern Angola. The MPLA, despite being worn down by factional infighting, secured control of Luanda and by May was fighting UNITA in the South. The OAU again appealed for talks, and brought the three leaders together in Nakuru (Kenya) on the 21st of June 1975. Nevertheless, by July 1975 the fighting had escalated with the MPLA driving the FNLA from Luanda and UNITA leaving for sanctuary in the southern part of the country. On the 22nd of August 1975, the Portuguese government suspended unilaterally the Alvor Agreements claiming that the parties had violated it.

On the 11 th November 1975 the MPLA declared unilaterally the independence of the People's Republic of Angola. The momentum was derived from an additional infusion of Cuban troops and a decisive victory over the FNLA (supported by direct South African Intervention and US covert assistance) just miles outside Luanda. Regional legitimacy for the MPLA government was promptly negotiated within the OAU. A radical shift occurred from the Addis Ababa summit of 10-12 January 1976 (in which 22 member states recognised the MPLA has the legitimate government of Angola while 22 other member states defended the urgency of a cease fire and the creation of a national unity government) and the February summit in which 41 of the 46 member states recognised the legitimacy of the MPLA government. According to John Marcum,

> ...Angola emerged as a single state from the human tragedy of civil war that might have stalemated and left the country divided into three ethnic states (Bakongo, Mbundu, Ovimbundu) and the Cabinda enclave.[702]

As Rothchild points out, while 'the conflict in post-independence Angola definitely became a civil war, a conflict rooted in the intrastate realm' the movement's external ties 'made this also a confrontation with an interstate dimension, one with implications for Southern Africa and the East-West rivalry'.[703] Consequently, in addition to their political and ideological differences, the

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[701] The agreement required that a transitional government be formed with responsibilities to set up an election process and an integrated national army before the independence date. The provisional government was to be composed by three ministers from each movement and Portugal who would appoint a High Commissioner that would act as mediator. Concerning the formation of a single army the agreement established a total of 24.000 men, to be pooled equally from the three liberation movements. During the interim period this army would be complemented by a 24.000 strong Portuguese troop contingent.

[702] John Marcum, in 'Angola', in Southern Africa: the Continuing Crisis, Gwedolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (Eds), Indiana University Press, 1982.

[703] Daniel Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 1997, p.117.

ambition of their leaders and their ethno-linguistic allegiances, competition for foreign assistance added an important dynamic to the Angolan conflict. With the ascendancy of the MPLA after independence, the FNLA was unable to continue its guerrilla activity because of lack of popular support outside the northern regions. By 1979, the fighting was concentrated away from the northern homelands of the Bakongo, and many of those who had fled to Zaire returned home.

Meanwhile, Savimbi focused on creating economic, social and political instability in the central highlands in order to make it virtually impossible for the MPLA to achieve its nation-building project in large parts of Angola. By the early 80's this policy was proving successful, in part because South Africa's military interventions, while helping UNITA to ward off attacks by the MPLA, were sufficiently infrequent so as not to alienate the local inhabitants.[704] UNITA reverted to guerrilla war, with assistance from South Africa and (from mid 1980s) the United States, relying for the most part on light infantry forces backed up by artillery, air defence and anti-tank units. South Africa provided substantial support to UNITA and on several occasions South African forces staged armed incursions into Southern Angola to attack SWAPO bases, disrupt communication lines and weaken the Angolan government's resolve to assist SWAPO and the ANC. In addition, the apartheid regime in South Africa saw the MPLA government as an enemy, because it provided bases and other assistance to the African National Congress (ANC), as well as the guerrillas of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) fighting for independence in neighbouring Namibia. From 1986, the Reagan administration provided sophisticated military assistance to UNITA, including supplies of Stinger ground-to-air missiles, as part of its global strategy of arming 'anti-Communist' insurgent movements fighting against Soviet allies in the Third World.

Partly because of these external factors, which reinforced and escalated the fighting, efforts by the international community to bring about peace did not start until a favourable external context for peace making was created by the changes in both South Africa and the former Soviet Union.[705] The first step towards detente in Angola came at the end of the 1980s, as the Cold War ebbed and the white minority regime in South Africa sought ways of extricating itself from both Namibia and Southern Angola. In December 1988, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa

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[704] In fact, UNITA's continuing strength among the peasants slowly undermined the administration of the MPLA in the highlands. While causing economic havoc in MPLA controlled Angola, UNITA set out to build a new society in the desolate lands which the Portuguese had called 'lands of the end of the earth'. From the time of its expulsion from the central highlands UNITA increased its propaganda campaign to convince the Ovimbundu and their leaders that the future rested with Savimbi. In what has become known as *Terras Livres de Angola* (Free Lands of Angola), UNITA gradually expanded its area of control to include an even larger non-Ovimbundu population base. UNITA used the Ovimbundu leadership to recreate the Protestant village structures and to convince the Chokwe, Lunda and other peoples of the region that UNITA was the real state authority. At its 1986 congress in Jamba, then designated as the capital of *Terras Livres*, UNITA boasted that over 3000 delegates attended from all over Angola, including representatives of the army, the churches, the women's and youth movements, and not least the villagers.

[705] See Saferworld. Angola: Conflict Resolution and Peace-building. Report co-ordinated and edited by Simon Higdon, Saferworld's Conflict Management Researcher, September 1996.

signed the New York Accords, under which Cuba promised to withdraw all its forces from Angola whilst South Africa pledged to hold elections in Namibia. The withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola took place between January 1989 and May 1991 and was monitored by a small mission of unarmed United Nations military observers, known as the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). In this sense,

> ...the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the South African retreat from Namibia, the growing international cooperation between the USA and the USSR and the military stalemate between the Angolan government and UNITA, created propitious conditions for serious negotiations to begin on the settlement of the Angolan conflict.[706]

As will be discussed at length below, talks between the Angolan government and UNITA began under the good offices of the Portuguese government and with both the USA and the USSR 'encouraging' compromise. The talks came to a successful conclusion thirteen months later with the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accords in May 1991. Portugal, The United States and the Soviet Union - the 'Troika of Observers' which had facilitated the peace talks- were given observer status and the United Nations' Security Council offered the parties the possibility of keeping in Angola the existing mission that was verifying the withdrawal of the Cuban troops in order to supervise the cease-fire, under the denomination UNAVEM II.[707] A transition period was foreseen in order to set up a new impartial Angolan army, and to organise free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, the final objective of the Peace Accords.

However, initial euphoria surrounding the mutual observance of the cease-fire, soon gave way to apprehension:

> ...the cease-fire held but implementation of critically important parts of the Accords proceeded months behind schedule. The most serious shortcomings were: the slow progress in confining the UNITA and government troops to assembly areas and barracks; the collection of arms; the formation of the new unified armed forces (FAA); the demobilisation of surplus troops.[708]

The elections, which took place on 29 and 30 September 1992, went ahead in extremely unstable conditions. In a high turn-out poll on what were Angola's first democratic elections, the MPLA won an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly with 54% of the votes compared to 34% for UNITA and 12% for the minor parties. José Eduardo dos Santos won 49.6% of the votes in the presidential contest, against 40.1% for Jonas Savimbi and 10.3% for other candidates. However, UNITA claimed widespread fraud and accused the government of 'stealing the elections'. Following a fraud investigation in which UNITA participated, the United Nations declared that the elections had been 'generally free and fair'.

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[706] Ibid.

[707] UN Security Council resolution 696 (1992), 30 May, 1991.

[708] Saferworld Op. Cit.

Nevertheless, UNITA refused to accept the results, withdrew its generals from the high command of the FAA and mobilised its forces. Angola slid back into war and even the UNAVEM II presence could not prevent the Peace process quickly degenerating into what became the most serious and bloody phase of the civil war. In fact, the period of resumed conflict in 1992-1994 was to prove even more destructive than the preceding 16 years of fighting. For the first time major cities were engulfed in the conflict and at its height, more than 1000 people a day were dying as a direct result of fighting or because of war related hunger and disease. Between October 1992 and November 1994 as many as 300,000 people (almost 3% of the total population) are thought to have died as a result of fighting. By 1994 one third of the population required humanitarian assistance, over 2 million people depended on food aid for survival, 1.25 million were internally displaced and 300,000 were living in neighbouring countries as refugees.

By mid 1994, the war stood at a standstill. The government recaptured many of the areas it lost to UNITA in 1992-93, and the situation was presenting the characteristics of a hurting stalemate. For UNITA, continued war would have meant the loss of further territory, and it had no longer any realistic prospect of gaining power by military means. On the government side, the prospect of a renewed rural guerrilla that could last for years, the forging of a cease fire agreement seemed the only possibility. On the 20 November 1994 the Lusaka protocol was signed. Both the MPLA and UNITA were put under heavy diplomatic pressure to end the armed conflict since neither was capable of defeating the other.

The Lusaka Protocol envisaged a form of power sharing to promote national reconciliation. By providing for UNITA's participation in a 'government of unity and national reconciliation', assigning important ministerial and other posts to UNITA, and one of two new vice-presidential posts to Jonas Savimbi, the Lusaka Protocol attempted to redress the 'winner-takes-all' formula of the Bicesse election framework. In this sense, it provided for the 70 UNITA deputies elected in the 1992 elections to take their seats in the National Assembly, and for the participation of UNITA officers and troops in the national armed forces. An important measure was that the Protocol also provided for administrative decentralisation and the holding of elections for local officials. Furthermore, the mandate as well the size of the UN peacekeeping operation in Angola, now renamed UNAVEM III were considerably enlarged. UN Security Council resolution 976 (1995) of February 1995, authorised the establishment of UNAVEM III and approved the deployment of up to 7000 peacekeeping troops, in addition to 350 military observers and 260 police observers. UNAVEM III was to have a far-reaching mandate.[709]

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[709] It would have direct responsibility for a wider range of monitoring and verification tasks in the military field, UN troopswere to control the UNITA quartering areas and take custody of UNITA weapons, becoming directly involved in the process of disarming UNITA troops.

Nevertheless, at the end of 1999, with repeated delays and the unwillingness of Jonas Savimbi to abide by his commitments under the Lusaka Protocol, war in Angola started again. This last phase of the war, with extreme humanitarian consequences due to the extensive usage by both sides of a 'scorched earth policy', was only brought to an end last February with the death in battle of Savimbi.

Chapter 8. Resolution through Bargaining? Power-Brokerage Mediations of the Angolan Conflict

8.1. American Linkage Strategy and the 1988 New York Accords: Settling the Inter-State Dimension

> ...it would have been difficult for Angolans of either the MPLA or UNITA persuasion (the FNLA had ceased to matter by the early 1980s) to escape this stark geopolitical context, even had they wished to. It served to shape their options, to define their hopes and fears (of support, abandonment, betrayal), and to limit the possibility of genuinely independent, non-aligned Angolan behaviour.[710]

> ...the linkage formula that emerged in 1981 should thus be understood at several levels. It was first, our attempt to mould a feasible and attractive settlement package. Linkage, at its first level, was an exercise in American strategy, motivated by the desire to advance American interests. But at the second level, linkage was also an inherently logical formula, which addressed the underlying interests of the parties - defined narrowly as Angola and South Africa, but broadly also as the Front Line States, SWAPO, the other Namibians, other interested African states such as Congo and Zaire, our Western allies, the Cubans, the Soviets.[711]

In 1988, thirteen years after Angola became independent and seven years of complex and protracted negotiations later, the external dimensions of the Angolan conflict were settled by the New York Accords. These Accords represented a breakthrough in the resolution of the inter-state and regional dimension of the Angolan conflict because South Africa, Angola, Cuba and the United States agreed on Namibian independence according to resolution 435, complete and phased withdrawal of the 50.000 Cuban troops and withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.

While most analysts agree that the degree of external involvement in the Angolan conflict required that this dimension 'be resolved and removed before the parties could resolve the core internal conflict'[712], the underlying logic of 'linkage' as a formula for conflict resolution and the fact that negotiations based on concession-convergence lasted close to a decade remain contentious issues. In addition, the reciprocated escalation in hostilities (and corresponding external support) that accompanied every stage of the negotiations leading to the New York Accords are considered to be at the root of the obstacles that would later surface between the

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[710] Chester A Crocker. High Noon on Southern Africa. Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1992, p.52.

[711] Ibid. p.72.

[712] I. William Zartman, 'Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts', in Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, I, William Zartman (Ed), The Brookings Institution, 1995, Washington D. C, p.5.

Angolan government and UNITA in the resolution of the internal conflict. In the pages to follow we will analyse the negotiation process that resulted in the New York Accords. Our main sources for this section are the memoirs of the leading mediator of this process, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker.

A number of factors at different levels have been considered as critical to explain the breakthrough achieved in New York in 1988. On a systemic level, the Soviet-American *detente* and the resulting cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the resolution of regional conflicts through negotiations rather than 'proxy' wars, is considered as having permitted the success of the American 'linkage' initiative in Southern Africa. Internally, the government of Angola considered this breakthrough to have been an inevitable result of the 'massive defeat' of the South African Army at Cuito Cuanavale. On a regional level, there were those who considered that the military stalemate on the ground had reached a point where both Angola and South Africa reached the conclusion that the war was becoming too expensive in material resources and manpower. In this regard, Colin Legum's comments elucidate the complexity of the reasons that made the Agreement possible,

> ...single causes can never explain why bitter adversaries should decide, from one month to the next, to stop fighting and to work out some acceptable settlement whose terms were available for years past. The likeliest explanation for the agreement to end hostilities in Namibia and Angola is that all the causes listed above contributed collectively to creating the necessary climate for peace talks, and that none of them can be singled out as *the* major cause. Certainly one crucial element was the appearance of a *deus ex machina* in the shape of Gorbachev, who threw the Soviet Union's support behind the American mediation effort. 'Timing' as Chester Crocker explained, 'is the essence of all negotiations'.[713]

Mediation Determinants

American policy towards Angola had been deeply scarred by the events of 1975-76 and, as a result, Washington did not recognise the regime in Luanda or establish diplomatic relations with Angola until 1993.[714] The polarisation that resulted from the events of 1975-76 in Angola prompted official American disengagement through a congressionally imposed ban on US military aid to any Angolan armed group. Adopted originally for one year in December 1975, this ban was extended in 1976 by the 'Clark Amendment'.[715] Paradoxically, although there had been official government disengagement, American oil companies gradually consolidated

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[713] Colin Legum. 'The Southern Africa Crisis 1987-88. The Making of a Kind of Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1987-88, Colin Legum, Marion Doro (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1989, p..A4. Also Worldnet, 19 December 1988.

[714] In terms of East-West relations, the circumstances in which the MPLA had come to power in Angola had in fact signalled both the demise of superpower detente as well as 'the end of an era in which Africa had been buffered from the direct effects of superpower competition' bringing 'Africa into the mainstream of global politics'. See Chester A Crocker. Op. Cit. p.51.

[715] Although there were attempts at a repeal of such ban during 1977-78, there were no substantial alterations of the legislation with the exception of the 1980 House and Senate review. Yet, this was more of a cosmetic in nature, since it permitted US military aid only if authorised in advance by a congressional floor vote.

their position in Angola, headed by Gulf Oil and including Texaco, Mobil, Cities Service, Getty and Marathon. In fact, these companies were by 1980 already producing the main share of Angolan oil, which goes a long way to explaining American strategic interests in this southern African country.

By the early 1980s, the American State Department had developed a renewed interest in Southern Africa. Its positive role in contributing to the successful independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 by supporting the negotiations at Lancaster House contributed to strengthen the Africanist orientation within the American foreign policy establishment. In addition, America was a lead player in the 'Western Contact Group', formed with Britain, France, Canada and Germany to negotiate the extremely difficult question of Namibia's independence from the Republic of South Africa. This group had seen its April 1978 'Western Settlement Proposal' for Namibia endorsed as Security Council resolution 435 in September 1978.[716]

At the root of American foreign policy towards Southern Africa were geopolitical interests, and as Chester Crocker points out, 'countering Soviet-Cuban adventurism was a primary concern'.[717] The United States considered Angola to have become the 'flagship of Moscow's Southern Africa policy, a staging point for supporting and influencing not only the MPLA regime but the SWAPO and ANC guerrilla movements as well'.[718] As Donald Rothchild posits, the Americans were, 'seeking to "end the cycle of violence in the area", "undercut Soviet influence" in Angolan affairs, bring independence to Namibia, and facilitate a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola'.[719]

As a matter of fact, the Soviets were deeply engaged in Angola as the principal military and political patron of the MPLA regime in Luanda. This patronage included the provision of military equipment, security support and military advisors. The MPLA depended strongly on

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[716] This proposal envisaged a United Nations presence of up to ten thousand civilian and military personnel, which would gradually replace South African administrative control and responsibility for law and order. This United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) would guarantee all parties' interests, namely SWAPO, other internal parties operating in Namibia, South Africa as well as neighbouring states. Furthermore, it would create acceptable conditions for an electoral campaign and organise and supervise 'free and fair elections'; assure the repeal of discriminatory laws and the release of political prisoners; arrange the return of war refugees; monitor the Namibia-Angola border against infiltration; monitor the conduct of the local police, the confinement to base and scheduled departure of South African forces from Namibia, and the demobilisation of local, South African controlled territorial forces and monitor and maintain the cessation of hostilities between the various forces. For an in-depth discussion see Vivienne Jabri. Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990.

[717] Chester A Crocker. High Noon on Southern Africa. Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, p.64-65, 1992.

[718] Ibid. p.52-53.

[719] Cable from Secretary of State, Washington D.C., to American Embassy, Nairobi, January 12, 1984, p.7 (National Security Archive); Information Memorandum, Chester A. Crocker to Deputy Secretary, March 8, 1984, p.2 (National Security Archive); and U.S. Department of State, *United States Policy Toward Angola,* document prepared for Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 16, 1975, p.2 (National Security Archive) cited in Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 1997, p.119.

this patronage for it lacked the human resources both at administrative as well as military levels necessary to secure power and ward off the threat that was coming from UNITA and South Africa. In return, it used oil-revenues to cover the costs of this patronage:

> ...devastated Angola suddenly became a major buyer of arms; in a peak year such as 1984, Angola ranked seventh among worldwide arms importers, just behind Syria and Libya, and well ahead of India and Japan. Some $4.5 billion of arms were supplied to Angola in the first ten years of its independence, nearly 90 percent from the USSR...in sum, by 1981 the destiny of Angola was caught up in a powerful legacy of East-West conflict. [720]

Moreover, during the period 1980-1991, the majority of the MPLA government's arms imports came from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. These imports represented 4.7% of total Soviet arms exports, its value at constant 1990 prices around 7.7 billion USD making the MPLA government the eight major importer of Soviet arms.[721]

South Africa was also heavily involved in the conflict in Angola. Deeply critical of Western policy towards the region, particularly towards Zimbabwe and Namibia[722], the overriding priority of South Africa was the security of the white minority regime against the drive for self-determination and anti-colonialism, both within South Africa as well as in neighbouring states. The strategy adopted to face this 'total communist onslaught' on South Africa was to 'maintain along its borders a boundary of friendly states that would, in their view, 'sterilise' the possibility of external or 'communist' instigation 'infecting' the internal South African situation'.[723] This was particularly the case with the advent of Marxist regimes in neighbouring Angola and Mozambique, which by allowing ANC bases to operate, posed a direct threat to the white minority regime.

South Africa had justified its 1975 incursion as necessary to protect its investments along the Cunene river. Nevertheless, its continued intervention in the Angolan conflict on the side of both the FNLA and UNITA became a top priority for a white regime who hoped to 'produce a moderate government in Angola which, in turn, might deny SWAPO bases and retain Angola as part of the cordon sanitaire'.[724] South Africa was therefore seriously concerned that

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[720] Ibid.

[721] Alexei Izyumov, "The Soviet Union: arms control and conversion- plan and reality", in Arms Industry Limited, Herbert Wulf (Ed), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.128.

[722] Western conduct in Angola in 1975-76 coupled with British and American diplomacy in Rhodesia did not please the regime in Pretoria. South Africa's support to UNITA had begun shortly after the MPLA gained control of Luanda in 1974. Yet, as pointed out by Fernando Guimarães, 'the overwhelming significance of the intervention of South African in the Angolan Civil War was not military but political'. Fernando Andresen Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1998, p.121 and 122.

[723] Ibid. p.126.

[724] According to Guimaraes, 'for South Africa, helping UNITA to consolidate its positions in Southern Angola made sense. A friendly UNITA would provide a buffer between Namibia and any hostile Angolan government that might emerge. Furthermore, when the Americans also turned to UNITA in June, Pretoria came into line with Washington's Angolan policy (...) Finally, as an additional benefit of supporting UNITA, Savimbi allegedly provided information on the location of SWAPO bases in return for South African help'. See Guimarães, Op. Cit., p.132.

resolution 435 would not only mean the loss of a mineral-rich and strategic buffer zone without any compensation (Namibia) but also that a United Nations' led transition would favour SWAPO. Pretoria preferred an 'Angola-first' approach to Namibian independence, which would decrease the threat that the Cuban presence could play in bolstering SWAPO. In addition, Zambian normalisation of relations with the MPLA regime in 1976 and the ensuing expulsion of UNITA's personnel from its territory further entrenched the perception that there could be an expansion of communist influence in the region. The same applied for Zaire, which while still supporting UNITA, had recognised the MPLA regime in 1978.

Before Ronald Reagan's inauguration, a transition team under Secretary of State Haig began a policy review to determine whether Southern Africa was a serious arena for American foreign policy. The team quickly realised that the best way to go forward was to strengthen resolution 435 in view of the unrealistic prospect of abandoning it or openly supporting South Africa. At the end of March 1981, President Reagan approved a version of the policy review, which provided Crocker with, in his own words, a 'mandate for the next eight years'.[725] The concept of 'linkage' became the epicentre of American strategy for the region. Linkage was a concept that 'was simple and clear: Namibian independence should be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Specifically, the implementation of Resolution 435 would be tied to implementation of a schedule for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola'.[726] In this sense, the final goal of linkage would be a Cuban withdrawal timetable defined in terms of phases and benchmarks in the United Nations' Namibia plan which included specific dates and numbers for the withdrawal of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) from Namibia.

American linkage policy was based on the realisation that there was considerable interdependence between the various wars in Southern Africa, and that therefore a regional solution was needed. The view was that the wars involving SWAPO, the SADF, the Angolan forces, the Cubans and UNITA as well as the Angola-based ANC guerrillas were all highly interconnected.[727] Furthermore, Washington considered that the resolution of the internal conflicts that raged in the region (Angola, South Africa) as requiring first and foremost the removal of their inter-state dimension. Only then would reconciliation within states be achieved.

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[725] The proposal described a best case scenario: the drafting of a democratic constitution before elections in Namibia; internationally guaranteed neutrality for Namibia; Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola as well as political reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA; the avoidance of noisy UN debates and strains with allies; improved relations with both South Africa and the other African states; and multiple setbacks to the Soviets and Cubans in the region.

[726] It is interesting that Crocker considers that the issue of linkage actually originated in Luanda, and that 'long before the Reagan victory of 1980, Angolan leaders had recognised the connection between Namibian and Angolan events' and 'had made it clear in public and diplomatic channels that Cuban forces would depart only after a Namibian independence settlement under Resolution 435, thereby defining the South African presence in Namibia as the rationale for retaining Cubans'. Chester A Crocker. High Noon on Southern Africa. Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1992, p.67.

[727] Ibid. p.68.

The Mediation Process: procedural and tactical aspects

> ...on the face of it, the American mediation role was fatally flowed. It was seeking to mediate in a triangular conflict with a government which it did not recognise (the *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* [MPLA] regime in Luanda), a regime with which it was in a state of open hostility (Cuba), and a regime in Pretoria which openly mistrusted Crocker and had lost faith in Reagan...[728]

The initial strategy devised by the mediation team under Crocker was to keep an equidistant stance towards all parties involved, so that America could become the main pivotal actor in a play involving a complex number of players: Angola, South Africa, the Western Contact Group, the Front Line States, SWAPO, the Cubans and, last but not least, the Soviets. In his memoirs, the mediator considers that the team was faced with several procedural options for mediating the 'intractable logjam' that Southern Africa represented. All the options considered by the team were strongly rooted in classical concession-convergence approaches to international negotiation and consequently depended on bargaining and power brokerage to be effective. Mediation was here practically conceptualised as a complement to negotiation.

Some of the tactics discussed included: engineering a 'split-the-difference' compromise; seeking a procedural solution (i.e. elections or arbitration); exploring compensatory payments or side deals to alter the position of one or more parties; modifying the agenda and redefining or restructuring the issues in dispute. The mediation team finally decided on the latter option, which involved restructuring the issues in dispute and an alteration of the agenda. To achieve this, the team decided to attempt to break down the problem into pieces and go after them systematically (solving some, redefining others, handling the remainder by trade-offs between them).[729] The 'realist' nature of the whole exercise is clear when Crocker emphasises that,

> ...the logic just described was based on cold realism and careful analysis of the region itself. It matched the hardball, geopolitical instincts and the conceptual style of the new administration. In linkage, we had a simple yet elegant strategic concept, backed by our always ample supply of strong convictions...[730]

Not surprising, as will be seen below, such a grand negotiation scheme depended on a number of conditions, which would have to be simultaneously present: a reasonable degree

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[728] Colin Legum. 'The Southern Africa Crisis 1987-88. The Making of a Kind of Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1987-88, Colin Legum, Marion Doro (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1989, p.A4.

[729] Moreover, this had been the procedural tactic used by the Contact Group following the adoption of resolution 435. In this sense, the team would attempt to change the structure of the issues in conflict, by increasing their number and tying them together into a larger agenda. This tactic would increase the size and complexity of negotiations, as well as the number of relevant parties. Opting for a 'sustained and nimble diplomacy' based on a defence of negotiated and evolutionary change, the mediation team would need to strengthen American relationship with leaders throughout the region without regard to race and ideology. For an in-depth discussion of this issue see Vivienne Jabri. Mediating Conflict. Decision-Making and Western intervention in Namibia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990.

[730] Ibid. p.70, 71.

of stability in the underlying regional balance of power (both in reality and in the perception of leaders); a stalemate in the immediate military equations on the ground; the strength, confidence, and coherence of leadership in key capitals so that each could take big decisions within the same timeframe; the diplomatic skill to make the linkage formula come to life and finally, an acceptable forum or mechanism so that the parties could communicate, maintain contact and bargain.[731] That these negotiations took almost a decade is therefore not surprising.

Linkage of this magnitude meant that all parties had to agree on a formula that was highly controversial. South Africa, Angola, the Cubans, the Frontline States had strong divergences on the causes of the regional conflict in Southern Africa. At the heart of each player's positioning were strong security concerns, in particular for South Africa and Angola. In a concession-conversion type approach, Cuban troop withdrawal represented the necessary 'carrot' to a regime that had refused to negotiate on Namibian independence and furthermore was highly suspicious of Western intentions and United Nations involvement. It was only by mid-1982 that Crocker was able to secure South African agreement in principle and launch what he termed the Angola 'track' of the strategy.

At the same time that Crocker and his team were busy convincing all players involved of the benefits of 'linkage', the South Africans escalated their intervention in Angola seriously complicating the situation. On 23 August 1981, Pretoria mounted a major incursion into Angola, involving between 4,000 and 5,000 men and termed 'Operation Protea'. This operation was justified as an anti-SWAPO raid of Namibian bases in Angola, aimed at destroying them and disrupting the infiltration routes used by SWAPO for its own periodic incursions into northern Namibia. Although the Americans called for an immediate withdrawal, they vetoed a United Nations' Security Council condemnation of the raid.

The Western Contact group became gradually opposed to the American linkage policy. In fact, although there was broad agreement on Namibian independence through resolution 435, there was strong disagreement concerning the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal. The Contact Group was rigged by confusion as regards the status of linkage since the 'Angolans had publicly rejected the concept of linkage soon after they heard about it in 1981; the Front Line States, Soviets, Cubans, and others supported that position'.[732] France was the first to publicly announce that Cuban withdrawal was not the concern of the group and that in fact the group's work had finished. The Contact Group would eventually disintegrate when on 7

[731] Ibid. p.72.

[732] In fact, 'feeling the heat, Angola and its FLS partners- backed by the Soviet block and radical non-aligned states- had mounted a vocal campaign attacking linkage and rejecting the 'false sense of optimism' emanating from Western quarters. Much of the heat was directed at the Contact Group in hopes of breaking it up, leaving the United States isolated and under pressure to back down. Ibid. p.121, 123.

December 1983 France pulled out saying that the Group should remain inactive 'in the absence of any ability to exercise honestly the mandate confided to it'. Canada followed suit. As Crocker says, 'the Group's work as a negotiation entity for Namibia was completed. However, its impending dissolution was a psychological and public relations blow- useful ammunition in the hands of critics and adversaries of our efforts'.[733] The Front Line States also opposed linkage and gradually stopped being an important player in the overall negotiations.

American engagement with the Angolan government was therefore necessary. However, on a practical level, the mediator noted that the Angolans lacked the most rudimentary grasp of U.S. political reality, but that equally 'the lack of official US presence in Luanda prevented us from gaining firsthand mastery of the MPLA's byzantine modus operandi'.[734] Furthermore, contrary to American perceptions of the MPLA as a cohesive and strong movement, the mediation team found a 'weak and fragmented regime, unaccustomed to negotiating on its own behalf':

> ...our main problem lay rather in substantially misconstruing our negotiating partners. We knew that we were not dealing with an African strongman, but we also knew that dos Santos' position in mid-1983 was stronger than it had been two years earlier. What we failed adequately to recognise was the depth of fear and indecisiveness from which he had started and the distance still to go before Angolan leaders could serve as valid negotiating partners on gut issues of war, peace, and survival...above all, we underestimated how frightened dos Santos and his team were by the world they lived in.[735]

In fact, it was President Dos Santos who signalled to Washington that he wanted to initiate bilateral discussions on 'all problems of common interest that fall into a bilateral framework and which could lead to the normalisation of relations between the two countries'. The initial meetings were attended by Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge who conveyed to the Americans that the government was prepared to meet bilaterally, as a 'gesture of good faith', despite the absence of official relations between the two countries. In the American arsenal of inducements or 'carrots', normalisation was promised as the logical result of a regional settlement. Also important was the extension of Export-Import Bank credits for development of Angola's offshore oil resources where US firms already played a substantial role.

Perceptions at this point are extremely important for a full understanding of the situation. Both the South Africans as well as the Angolans overstated their positions in an attempt to gain leverage in the negotiations with the Americans. The mediator also exaggerated its own leverage: 'we too exaggerated our own leverage as mediators, imagining that we could

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[733] Chester A Crocker. Op. Cit. p.178.

[734] Chester A Crocker. Op. Cit. p.136-137.

[735] Ibid. p.166.

simultaneously cool off the war, channel the South Africans toward cooperative behaviour, twist Angolan arms on Cuban withdrawal, and create space for UNITA.[736]

Contacts between the Americans and Angolans continued with a number of missions to Luanda by American officials to meet directly with Dos Santos. The Walters-Wisner mission met with dos Santos and presented a cease-fire proposal, conveying to the Angolan President that the South Africans were ready to announce a date for the implementation of resolution 435 but that Pretoria demanded that Angola make a concrete commitment to Cuban withdrawal. The South Africans would wait until Angola could produce a withdrawal schedule after their final departure from Namibia (at independence, which would be seven to twelve months after implementation). They also assured Dos Santos that they Washington had no plans to aid UNITA and that America would provide $7.5 million in humanitarian aid to Angola via the ICRC. On a second mission to Luanda to meet with Dos Santos, during August 1982, Wisner informed the MPLA leadership that the US was prepared to establish a 'liaison office' in Luanda once a settlement including Cuban withdrawal was in progress.[737] Wisner also brought with him a document entitled 'Procedural Framework'. The idea was that rather than a bilateral Angolan-South African treaty, the MPLA would supply the US with a confidential written commitment concerning a schedule for Cuban withdrawal and reiterate its support for resolution 435. A parallel assurance would be given by the South Africans as to their intention to implement and abide by resolution 435, to refrain from using force against Angola, and to respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

However, negotiations with Washington were producing strains within the Luanda regime. In part, this was a result of escalation of hostilities in the southern Cunene Province where the SADF had mounted another round of attacks. Nevertheless, Washington was able to keep the channel of communication open with Luanda, with the help of the British who supplied both their people and communications equipment. In his second mission, Wisner encountered 'fears and scepticism in Luanda': the MPLA wanted further assurances, especially explicit South African commitment under guarantees by third parties that it would cease all support for UNITA. Yet, the Americans pointed out that the South Africans would not provide a public abandonment of an ally. Nevertheless, the Angolans had for the first time agreed in principle to consider Cuban withdrawal during the implementation period. On the other hand, the South Africans also agreed to the 'Procedural Framework' concept and SADF units began to pull back.

Nevertheless, the Angolans did not go public on their discussions with Washington and soon reverted to criticising the linkage concept within the Front Line States and also at the United

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[736] Ibid.

[737] Ibid. p.198.

Nations' General Assembly, to a large extent a result of Soviet and Cuban pressure not to cooperate with Western diplomatic initiatives. The Angolans continued to shift their views on many matters, and the negotiations became entangled in detail and procedural matters concerning a possible cease-fire. Crocker believes that these changes reflected changes in Dos Santos power, pointing out that he,

> ... cut down to size the primary factions within the apparat- the so called 'internationalist' clique, representing the party's mestizo and Marxist intellectual wing, and the black nationalist faction (sometimes termed the Catete group, after the home town of key figures), whose 'Africanist' leanings had to do with jobs, race, and rivalries going back to the liberation struggle. Dos Santos shuffled, removed, or discredited some key representatives, while avoiding the risk of party purges that could provoke a coup-d'etat. He used the December 1982 meeting of his recently enlarged Central Committee to create a carefully balanced politburo...Dos Santos persuaded the December 1982 party meeting to grant him 'special powers' to act within the context of an 'overall emergency plan'. Special committees on economics and defence and security were established under presidential appointees.[738]

These changes had important consequences on the negotiations. Crocker points out that 'we had long realised that Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues was the man we should be working with in Luanda'.[739] 'This was a man who knew where to find the levers in the bureaucratic and military machinery of Luanda' Crocker says.[740] He headed the negotiations from March 1983 to April 1987. In any sense, it was only by October 1984 that the Angolans put together a bid.

Yet, factions within the regime began attacking strongly the negotiations with the Americans in face of an escalation in the war during 1983. In fact, this escalation in hostilities prompted the Soviets to increase their aid to the MPLA regime and the Cubans to complete a series of parallel defence lines around modern firebases and air defence facilities in Cunene Province. The impressive gains that UNITA made during 1983 and its public relations campaign with journalists being invited to visit and travel with UNITA, were seriously compromising the negotiations. UNITA had doubled in strength and was venturing into areas outside its Cunene stronghold, namely the central plateau. Using classic guerrilla tactics, UNITA was threatening Huambo and other strategic towns, was in effect controlling Moxico Province and began attacking the northern Province of Malange. Yet, as the mediator noted at the time, 'to extrapolate that a UNITA victory lay around the corner ignored all battlefield logic. Savimbi's strategy was to maximise pressure for a political deal with Luanda.[741] Luanda retreated and the politburo decided not to proceed any further in the negotiations. The mediator points out

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[738] 'Kito' as he was known, was one of only four lieutenant colonels in FAPLA, had held a range of top security positions, was a politburo member, and was now serving as Interior Minister, headed the party's control commission and was acting president whenever dos Santos was away.

[739] Ibid. p.159.

[740] Furthermore, Kito had led the Angolan team that negotiated with the South Africans in 1977-79 and the Contact Group. He also masterminded the resolution of all major security issues with the Mobutu regime in Zaire. With the nomination to head the negotiations, 'Kito' was effectively acting as Foreign Minister. He was also close to the Mozambiqueans who were also helping the negotiations.

[741] Chester A Crocker. Op. Cit., p.173.

that 'Dos Santos had chickened out, going along with a sceptical majority. Kito had lost control of the negotiations. Bitterly disappointed he sent us a terse message of regret...[742].

On 6 December the SADF mounted 'Operation Askari', a five-week operation that included air sorties as far as 200 miles north of the Namibian border and ground action 125 miles into Angolan territory. It was the largest SADF operation in Angola since 1981, and appeared to be aimed both at pre-empting SWAPO incursions and at distracting the MPLA and Cubans from their anti-UNITA counter-offensives. Facing a military dilemma and wishing to explore the possibility of reaching a cease-fire and disengagement agreement with South Africa the Angolans once again approached the Americans for a bilateral meeting in Cape Verde, after four months of no contacts. The Americans realised that more important than continuing to pressure on 'linkage' and resolution 435, was to reach a bilateral cease-fire agreement. The three parties finally met in Lusaka after under the good offices of Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda. As to procedural aspects of these meetings, the mediator points out that,

> ...We had worked out a scenario in which delegation heads would arrive after two days of 'preparatory' work among political and military experts. Kaunda held preliminary bilateral sessions with each delegation upon arrival to hear its assessment, gauge the mood, and offer his support. This enabled him to remain informed without committing him to any substantive role. It was both logical and helpful that he would defer to us as broker and mediator between Luanda and Pretoria, rather than trying to insert himself directly into the substance. The broad outline of a deal had been prepared before anyone arrived in Lusaka, but a lot more hard work was required during the 'preparatory talks'. Our 'working level' team...quickly discovered that three-way meetings were a bad idea. Angolan and South African representatives would not say anything useful to each other in our presence, and they refused to meet without us. But by engaging these wallflowers in separate rooms, the American team discovered that they were eager to come up with something concrete. The problem was that they had no mandate to propose anything! It fell to us to define the formula, sell it to each side, and then help them hammer out the plan for putting it into action.[743]

There were a large number of issues to be discussed including the strengthening of the fragile peace on the ground; the definition and establishment of a new military regime in the salient of Angolan territory being vacated by the SADF; and the exploration of ways to extend the parties commitments beyond the first thirty days. The parties finally agreed and signed the Lusaka Accord on the 16th February 1984. The Accord created the new security regime by defining a no-go zone for SWAPO and Cuban forces in a large area of the Cunene Province thereby creating the conditions for a SADF withdrawal from the area. The outcome of the Lusaka negotiations were assessed in the following way by the mediator:

> ...Lusaka was a sweet success, which quickly bolstered our fortunes in Africa, Europe, and Washington...the Lusaka Accord had a range of consequences. It eventually cleared the way for unprecedented progress in the main negotiation by creating conditions in which Luanda finally came forward with its first Cuban withdrawal proposal...Yet there were also perverse

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[742] Ibid. p.176.

[743] Ibid. p.195.

> consequences: the Angolans and South Africans were unduly 'comfortable' with a limited deal that made the status quo less costly.[744]

Yet, some observers consider that because the Lusaka Agreement failed to address a number of critical issues, it had let what appeared to be a ripe moment pass. William Zartman, who analysed the delays in implementation of the Lusaka Agreement argued that the disengagement process dragged on and when the thirty-day period, which had been postponed to start on the 1 March, was over, the Joint Commission was still inside the Cunene Province. Joint patrols had actually clashed with SWAPO units and modest SADF units remained within the salient. In fact, the final pull-out of the SADF from the area would not occur before April 1985.[745] As a result, Zartman considers that, despite some gained momentum, the mediator was 'unable to accelerate the process, unwilling to give substance to deadlines, and unready to nail down agreement already reached'.[746] This author considers that while acting as a communication facilitator and formulator, the United States failed to strengthen its manipulation role through the usage of leverage.[747]

Negotiations continued with the Americans for the next three years dominated by the difficult issue of 'linkage', in particular the specific aspects of Cuban troop withdrawal. The Americans used a number of enticements: they announced that the Export-Import Bank credit sought by Gulf Oil and Sonangol had been approved and President Reagan had agreed to inform the MPLA of America's readiness to recognise the regime in Luanda once agreement had been reached on a Cuban withdrawal schedule. Furthermore, the Americans made clear that once these issues were resolved, they were ready to work for negotiated political reconciliation within Angola. Finally, in mid October 1984 the MPLA was able to present a chronogram timetable, a restated statement of principles and a new Angolan-Cuban joint declaration.

On the ground, a major offensive was launched in 1985 by the FAPLA against UNITA's south-eastern strongholds. This offensive halted in September 1985 at Mavinga, when SA Air Forces intervened in support of UNITA. A new offensive by the FAPLA was expected after the end of the rainy season (October to April), and this served as the rationale for a fundamental

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[744] Ibid. p.196-198.

[745] The mediator thinks that the delays in implementation were due to the fact that neither side had a powerful incentive to move the commission swiftly to the border. From their part, the SADF wanted to maximise the use of joint patrols aimed at SWAPO and refuse to move south before incidents were properly investigated. Furthermore, the South Africans delayed the whole process by imposing a demand for the creation of a follow-on mechanism that would pick up where the Joint Commission left when the border was reached and demanding that its charter be discussed before the commission reached the border. The Angolans, for their part, were also benefiting from delaying the whole process. On the one hand it enable Luanda to deflect US pressure to get on with the principal negotiation and also allowed Luanda to publicly criticise Pretoria for not complying with the schedule thereby gaining a diplomatic advantage against South Africa.

[746] I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, 2d ed, Oxford University Press for Council on Foreign Relations, 1989, p. 225.

[747] I. William Zartman, in 'Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts', in Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, William Zartman (Ed), The Brookings Institution, 1995, Washington D. C. p. 21.

shift in American policy towards UNITA with the US Congress voting favourably for direct assistance to UNITA, assuming an 'open interventionist role'.[748] The State Department finally yielded to conservative pressures both at the White House and Congress that demanded military support for UNITA and 'increasing conservative pressures in the US were made to persuade the Administration to break off all contacts with the MPLA and to come out fully in support of UNITA'.[749]

According to Legum, the mediator 'was clearly gambling on the fact that the Angola regime was too weak to break off negotiations with the US, whose intermediary role it continued to see as crucial to any progress that might be made in achieving a settlement over Namibia which was essential if the SA Army were to be removed from Angolan territory'.[750]

Externally, the MPLA government sought reassurances from the Soviet Union and Cuba for increased support. Top-level meetings between Angolans, Soviets and Cubans took place on 27 January 1986, and included the presence of the Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and the Defence Minister Marshall Sergei Sokolov. Dos Santos also went to Moscow to attend the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and then three months later on a four-day official visit from 6-10 May 1986. Both the Soviets and Cubans assured Luanda of their continued support, and Mikhail Gorbachev said that 'we are standing and will continue to stand firmly and unswervingly by our commitments' referring to the Angolan-Soviet friendship treaty signed in 1976 and that 'no one should have any doubts on this score'.[751] Castro declared on 7 February 1986 that 'we are prepared to stay in Angola ten, 20 or 30 more years if need be'.[752]

In addition, relations with Portugal improved significantly. Although we will discuss this issue in detail in the next section, relations in previous years had been strained by UNITA's high profile in Lisbon. However, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva 'took steps to improve relations' and

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[748] A change of policy that was, according to Legum, 'spelt out in detail by Chester Crocker in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 19 February 1986'. See Colin Legum. 'The Southern Africa Crisis 1986-87. An Embattled Republic of South Africa versus the Rest of the Continent', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, Colin Legum, Barbara Newson, Ronald Watson (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1988, p.A19.

[749] Legum, Op. Cit. In addition, Legum points out that, '*Stinger* ground-to-air missiles were installed around Jamba and other UNITA bases in southern Kuando Kubango. In the event, the awaited FAPLA offensive towards Jamba failed to materialise. This appears to have been only marginally, if at all, due to the arrival of the sophisticated *Stingers*. The key factor was the expectation that, as at Mavinga in September 1985, the SA Air Force would intervene in support of UNITA if the FAPLA posed a real threat to the rebel redoubt in the extreme south-east'. See also Colin Legum. 'Angola', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, Colin Legum, Barbara Newson, Ronald Watson (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1988, p.B623.

[750] Colin Legum. 'The Southern Africa Crisis 1986-87. An Embattled Republic of South Africa versus the Rest of the Continent', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, Colin Legum, Barbara Newson, Ronald Watson (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1988, p.A20.

[751] AED, 10 May 1986.

[752] ANGOP News Bulletin, No26, 17 February 1986.

'Luanda seemed keen to reciprocate, probably out of concern at its growing isolation in the Western world and because it wanted increased Portuguese aid (and debt rescheduling) to help cope with its balance of payments difficulties'.[753]

Meanwhile, UNITA appealed for peace talks with the government, with a view to setting up a 'government of national unity', continuing the line it had taken since the break-up of the Alvor Agreements in January 1975. Yet, the government remained adamant in its refusal to accept peace talks. As Legum points out, 'in a speech to mark the eleventh anniversary of independence, on 11 November, President dos Santos was unequivocal on this matter: 'The People's Republic of Angola has stated repeatedly that it will not negotiate with the UNITA puppets. All veiled or open attempts at mediation to this end are a waste of time'. Referring to UNITA's attempts to legitimise its call for talks and a coalition government by reference to the Alvor Accord, the President said that 'the so-called Alvor Accord has lapsed and must rest in peace in our archives'.[754]

A number of reasons can be singled out for such unambiguous rejection of talks: deep rooted distrust as a result of two decades of inter-movement rivalry and conflict; UNITA's alliance with the racist apartheid regime; the fact that compromise with UNITA would have entailed betraying the MPLA's Marxist-Leninist principles and its support to the liberation struggles in Namibia and SA; the fear that Savimbi's personal charisma and ambition, in a context where popular disillusionment with the MPLA poor post independence performance was high, would lead him to try to use a coalition government as a stepping stone to total power.[755]

This was the context within which contacts between the government and the Americans were resumed in April 1987, after an 18 month long suspension. The Angolan and American delegations met during 14-15 July. This was the first of a series of 36 meetings involving the Angolans, Cubans, South Africans and Americans, bilaterally, trilaterally and altogether. On 10 August, the Angolan government announced a new proposal 'concerning a general accord to be signed by all parties directly interested -namely, Angola, SA, Cuba and SWAPO - under the aegis of the five permanent members of the SC'. This proposal was the result of direct talks between dos Santos and Castro in Cuba held on 30 July- 2 August. President Dos Santos wanted to 'get the stalled talks going again' and a quid pro quo move on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal, with the inclusion of both Cuba and Angola on the negotiations over Namibia.[756] Nevertheless, the presence of Cuban troops was considered a bilateral issue

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[753] Colin Legum. 'Angola', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, Colin Legum, Barbara Newson, Ronald Watson (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1988, p.B623.

[754] Ibid. p. B.624.

[755] Colin Legum. 'Angola', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, Colin Legum, Barbara Newson, Ronald Watson (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1988, p.B625.

[756] Ibid. p.A8.

between Angola and Cuba, and although the eventual withdrawal of Cuban troops may be accepted in principle, it cannot at this time be the subject of negotiations'[757].

In terms of the internal conflict, the MPLA government continued to rule out any compromise with UNITA, declaring that it saw no solution to this problem.[758] The latter half of 1987 witnessed an increment of the fighting and a further escalation of the international aspects of the conflict within a regional context of extreme instability. The large offensives for Mavinga and the siege of Cuito Cuanavale were launched in October 1987 led by the FAPLA under Soviet command. Mavinga was extremely important because it opened the way to Savimbi's headquarters at Jamba. Yet, the Government forces encountered sharp resistance from UNITA, supported by South African ground forces and air power and failed to capture Mavinga. The failure to capture Cuando Cubango Province had forced the MPLA government to begin considering de-escalating its regional war with South Africa. Only then could it effectively deal with UNITA.[759]

Negotiations resumed in earnest in early 1988, when the mediator visited Luanda and, for the first time, had meetings with both Angolans and Cubans. The issues of both SA and Cuban troops withdrawal was discussed and a State Department spokesmen claimed that, for the first time, Havana had agree to withdraw all its troops from Angola as part of a regional settlement. These moves at the negotiating table were followed by further escalation, including the arrival of fresh Cuban forces and the construction by the Cubans of two airfields in the south, as well as an increase of FAPLA's strength at their new base at Cuito Cuanavale. The combined FAPLA/Cuban force was able to stand the SADF's attempts at capturing Cuito Cuanavale, inflicting a humiliating defeat to the South Africans. This battle evidenced an important change in the balance of strategic forces (Cuban's air superiority combined with FAPLA's ability undermined South Africa's pretensions to military invincibility in the area). The conflict had escalated dramatically, and all parties involved considered the costs to be too high: a stalemate was reached once again.

The last phase of the talks formally began in London on 3 and 4 May 1988. The mediator acted as chairman and representatives from the four governments were present, with the exception of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and UNITA. Added leverage came from the concerted action of the American and Soviet administrations. Crocker met with Anatoly Adamishin (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) on the 18-19 May in Lisbon and discussed how they 'might add further impetus to the process of settlement and what role the

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[757] Ibid. p.A24.

[758] Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 1997, p.121.

[759] Zartman, 1995.

US and the Soviets can play to support a negotiated solution'.[760] At a higher political level, the summit between Reagan and Gorbachev also dealt with this issue and they agreed to deal collectively with Angola as a regional conflict to be settled by negotiations and also that they would persuade each of 'their' sides to accept the need for peaceful negotiations, fixing a target date by which an agreement should be reached, the tenth anniversary of the adoption of security council resolution 435.

The next phase of the peace talks was held from 23-25 June in Cairo and was a very difficult one, in which both SA and Cuba tested 'each other to the limit' amidst a very difficult and harsh atmosphere. The novelty of these talks was the presence of an observer from the USSR. The opinion was that the intervention of the Soviet official in meetings with the Angolan and Cuban delegations was crucial in the change of tone, allowing the remainder of the talks to be held in a very positive atmosphere. Legum considers that three main factors contributed to turning the Cairo meeting from a seeming failure to a greater potential for success: the military factor (the fact that Cuba showed its commitment to an even larger battlefield role if necessary to keep up the momentum of the negotiations, while SA had reappraised its military options in the light of the experience at Cuito Cuanavale); second, the soviet presence for the first time on the sidelines of the talks emphasised to all parties the shared commitment of the superpowers to finding a settlement; thirdly, a general acceptance that the testing-out period of purely rhetorical statements had exhausted itself, and that the next phase required a constructive effort to write down in precise terms the principles for a settlement on which all the parties could agree[761].

This constructive approach was continued and the general principles agreed at Cairo were finalised in New York in early July 1988. These principles, entitled 'Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South Western Africa' were made public on 20 July after having been endorsed by Pretoria, Luanda and Havana. The next step was the operationalisation of the agreement. All four parties met in Geneva from 2-4 August 1988 in order to reach agreement on the implementation of the agreement. Crocker later praised the delegates for the 'spirit of no losers, an ingredient that must be there if there's to be success' with Pik Botha saying that all parties should 'emerge winners if peace and stability are to be established'.[762]

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[760] Colin Legum. 'Angola', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1986-87, Colin Legum, Barbara Newson, Ronald Watson (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1988, p.A13.

[761] Colin Legum. 'The Southern Africa Crisis 1987-88. The Making of a Kind of Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1987-88, Colin Legum, Marion Doro (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1989, p.A15.

[762] SWB, 22 July 1988.

Although the American team hoped for a successful conclusion of the agreement by the 1st of November 1988 in order to give the Reagan administration a diplomatic victory at the close of his administration, details about the phasing out of the Cuban contingent in Angola could not be agreed upon. The parties met on 10 November in Geneva to try to address this problem. Crocker engaged with his Soviet counter-part, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoly Adamishin to speed up the process. Finally, on 12 November SA agreed to the Angola-Cuban scheduled plan for troop withdrawal. Only precise timetables were now needed. On the 13 December, the three parties, SA, Angola and Cuba finally signed the four-point Brazzaville Protocol setting 1 April 1999 as the date for implementing Resolution 435, and agreeing for a phased withdrawal over 27 months from the date of the Cuban withdrawal. In addition, they agreed on an exchange of war prisoners and, in a separate protocol, to set up a Joint Commission (SA, Cuba, Angola, the US and the USSR, and later to be joined by an independent Namibian government) to 'facilitate resolution of any dispute over either the interpretation or implementation of the tripartite agreement' plus an agreement for the United Nations to set up an independent verification system of the withdrawal of both Cuban and SA troops from Angola[763].

Finally, on 22 December 1988, the New York Accords were signed in the form of two separate treaties, at a ceremony presided by the US Secretary of State, George Shultz with the participation of Anatoly Adamishin and the UN Secretary General.

Outcome Assessment

There is no doubt that the 'New York Accords' substantially decreased the complexity of the situation in Southern Africa. In fact, having been strongly opposed to the concept of 'linkage', South Africa and Angola ended up being the main beneficiaries. South Africa secured its most important foreign policy priorities, the withdrawal of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola as well as the slowing down of the campaign in the US, Canada and Western Europe for greater sanctions. Furthermore, this agreement ended a war which was becoming increasingly more costly, especially in human terms, and unpopular within South Africa itself. For their part, SWAPO was evidently a winner in that it secured their independence through the implementation of SCR 435.

Yet, there were a number of important issues deliberately left out and not touched upon by the agreements or by the parties during the negotiations. In fact, several important issues were deliberately left out as regards the situation in Angola: UNITA's possible reconciliation with the MPLA regime and US aid to that movement. As Legum posits, 'the major issue left unresolved by the Angolan/Namibian agreement is the debilitating conflict between the MPLA

[763] Colin Legum. 'The Southern Africa Crisis 1987-88. The Making of a Kind of Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1987-88, Colin Legum, Marion Doro (Editors), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1989, p.A17-18.

Government and Savimbi's UNITA'.[764] In fact, while South Africa's support for UNITA had been discussed and brokered in the negotiations, the United States kept a free standing on the issue and had made it clear that Washington would continue to support the movement until the USSR stopped its support of the MPLA regime.

Moreover, while the internal factor had been present in the minds of the mediator and the parties to the negotiations, it was seen as an internal, indeed domestic concern of Angolans. Yet, although the withdrawal of foreign troops definitely reduces the regional conflict, as long as external actors back up internal factions the internal conflict in Angola would remain. In fact, during the mediation, a number of obstacles further contributed to the delays in achieving an agreement. Most important within these was the fact that the US was actively arming UNITA while playing the impartial card. As Legum rightly says,

> ...encumbered by these lack of credentials required of an 'honest broker', Crocker appeared to many to be the least likely to succeed. Yet, succeed he did. His success was not because any of the parties to the conflict trusted him: perhaps, like Bismark, they did not believe there was such a person as a 'honest broker'; but all of them needed Crocker to lead them out of an impasse that, in different ways, had become intolerable for each of them.[765]

Consequently, at every difficult stage of this eight-year long mediation, external parties increased their support, escalating the conflict. This was true for the Americans and the South Africans, the Soviets and the Cubans. It is therefore not possible to conceive of this long and drawn out peace process without relating it to developments on the battlefield. A strong and inextricable relation between both levels was ever present, dominating perceptions and defining agendas.

The above discussion made clear that external pressures were an extremely important factor in the successful conclusion of the New York Accords. The tacit co-operation between the Americans and the Soviets had effectively pressured their 'clients' to work constructively. In this sense, the extent of superpower influence certainly facilitated the negotiation process.[766] Finally, at the very end of this process, the mediator was also faced with the 'need to give President Reagan and the Republicans a major diplomatic victory in the run-up to the 1988 presidential elections'.[767]

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[764] Ibid. p.A7.

[765] Ibid. p.A4.

[766] Rothchild, Op. Cit. p.121-122.

[767] Legum, Op. Cit., p.A3.

8.2. Portuguese Mediation and the 1991 Bicesse Accords: A 'Winner Takes All' Approach to Conflict Resolution

> ...as the Cold War ebbed, many sought to mediate in Southern Africa...often under US observation, if not loose leadership, coalitions of mediating powers drove the search for peace onwards. Of these, Italy played a major role in the Rome talks that lead to agreement to end hostilities and hold elections in Mozambique. It was Portugal, however, that played a major role over Angola...after a year of though negotiations under Portuguese mediation, and with constant pressure from the US and whatever pressure the Soviet Union could muster, the MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Peace Agreement. They had done so under great duress.[768]

When the external elements were settled by the New York Accords, the way was open to attempts at resolution of the internal conflict in Angola. The withdrawal of the 50.000 Cuban troops, which began in January 1989 and had ended by May 1991, was monitored by a small mission of unarmed United Nations military observers, the United Nations Verification Mission (UNAVEM). South African and American pledges to end support to UNITA coupled with the MPLA's realisation that Soviet economic and military aid was no longer guaranteed created what seemed to be a new incentive for direct negotiations between the belligerents. Nevertheless, the optimism that followed the signature of the New York Accords was to a large extent external to the both the MPLA and UNITA.[769] In fact, Rothchild considers that the belligerents' perceptions of one another remained relatively fixed largely because the external elements fuelling the conflict kept on exercising their pressure, notably South African and American continuing support to UNITA. [770]

The momentum created by the New York Accords was seized by President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, who stepped in to help reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA. To this effect, Mobutu called for a meeting of the Heads of State of Angola, Gabon and the People's Republic of Congo in August 1988 to discuss reconciliation in Angola. Parallel to this, Mobutu pressed for low level contacts between officials from both the MPLA and UNITA. In these meetings, despite both sides signalling the possibility of moving to formal negotiations, mistrust and suspicion prevented the belligerents from agreeing on an agenda. On 16 May 1989, a Conference of Regional Leaders was held in Luanda and Mobutu secured official recognition in his role as the mediator. From this high-level meeting, a 'Seven-Point Angolan

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[768] Moises Venancio and Stephen Chan. Portuguese Diplomacy in Southern Africa 1974-1994. The South African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Southern Africa Series, October 1996, p.74.

[769] This partially explains the perception, highlighted by Moisés Venâncio, that 'around the independence of Namibia the general idea that seemed to emerge was that the Angolan conflict would be negotiated in Geneva under American mediation...For a number of reasons it was adamantly refused by Luanda. Firstly because the United States mediation was seen as partial to UNITA; secondly, because the Geneva forum was viewed as providing even more international credibility for UNITA and lastly because the MPLA envisaged a scenario where the soviets, with their need for a rapprochement with the United States, might use pressure on the MPLA as a demonstration of their friendship towards Washington. Moisés Venâncio, in 'Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-91', in Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan & Vivienne Jabri (Eds), The MacMillan Press LTD. London, 1993.

[770] Donald Rothchild. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 1997, p.124.

Peace Plan' was endorsed by eight African Heads of State. Yet, the MPLA government continued to insist on not recognising UNITA, insisting on Jonas Savimbi's exile and the integration of UNITA's civilian and military components into the MPLA-led one party state. Savimbi's reaction was predictable: he strongly criticised the MPLA government plan, insisting on the re-enactment of the Alvor agreements and calling for multiparty elections in the country. Savimbi was convinced that neither side was capable of a military victory and therefore a political settlement was the only logical alternative.[771]

In fact, these meetings under Mobutu revealed first hand the level of antagonism and suspicion between the belligerents, evidenced in their positions and demands. Moreover, while the signature of the New York Accords contributed to the de-escalation of the regional aspects of the conflict, the core internal conflict in Angola had escalated. It had become evident that reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA was going to be an extremely difficult achievement. Mobutu pressed for a follow-up meeting in June 1989 at Gbadolite, inviting an impressive array of African heads of State. The mediator wanted the belligerents to meet and negotiate face to face. In this effort, Mobutu had the support of the United States, UNITA and South Africa.[772]

Gbadolite's relevance was however of a symbolic nature in the sense that it was the first direct encounter between the two leaders, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi.[773] At the end of the meeting, the mediator announced that the belligerents wanted to end the war and achieve national reconciliation, and that they had agreed on a cease-fire agreement to become effective on 24 June 24 1989. In addition, Mobutu confirmed that a commission to prepare the plan for national reconciliation in Angola would be established and chaired by himself.

However, in an unexpected development, both parties denied all these achievements. In fact, President Mobutu's declarations had not been formally agreed by the parties and neither had they been written down. Procedurally, the mediator had committed a serious mistake in assuming that his own interpretations of what had been discussed should stand. In fact, both the MPLA and UNITA's delegations had left the summit with total different interpretations of what had happened. On the one hand, the government delegation was convinced that Savimbi agreed on temporary exile and the dissolution of UNITA's military and civilian elements within the MPLA structure. On the other hand, Savimbi refuted these commitments continuing to insist on the establishment of a multiparty system and free and open elections.

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[771] Donald Rothchild. Op. Cit. p.126.

[772] See Moisés Venâncio, in 'Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-91', in Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan & Vivienne Jabri (Eds), The MacMillan Press LTD. London, 1993.

[773] According to Rothchild, 'in situations where state softness, persistent conflict among parties, ethnic groups and regions, and personal animosity are involved, highly conflictive negotiations such as those conducted at Gbadolite are likely to achieve only symbolic results'. Ibid. p.128.

Meanwhile, the pattern that had surfaced during the protracted negotiations leading to the New York Accords, whereby external patrons increased their support at critical junctures, including escalating hostilities, continued to operate. In fact, although this was a very sensitive phase representing the beginning of negotiations, both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to supply arms to both sides while exerting pressure on their clients at key junctures to keep the peace process on track.[774] In addition, fighting resumed in August with large-scale offensives by both parties. And although Mobutu tried again for another series of meetings with regional leaders, he had lost the trust and confidence of both belligerents. The Gbadolite process had become deadlocked and Mobutu was unable to summon sufficient political will to bring the disputing parties to a settlement. A new approach to the negotiations became imperative.

Mediation Determinants

> ...the acceptance of Portuguese mediation by all involved was due to a number of reasons. Above all Portugal shared the same language and culture with both belligerents which facilitated understanding among all three in any negotiations, and, as one Angolan diplomat added, after the United States and Soviet Union, Portugal was the next most closely associated party to the realities of the Angolan conflict. Importantly Portugal's lack of sufficient power to significantly alter international events became an invaluable asset in being accepted as mediator, for it meant that it could not alter the correlation of forces that were determining the negotiations.[775]

The reasons for Portuguese mediation of the Angolan civil war have been discussed in detail by Moisés Venâncio and Stephen Chan.[776] For Venâncio, it was a 'calculated move which explored an opportunity to enhance a priority area of Portuguese foreign policy - Africa'. In fact, a successful mediation would enhance Portugal's stance of becoming *interlocuteur priviligié* between Lusophone Africa and the European Union.[777] In terms of what Mitchell considers as 'settlement rewards', the Portuguese involvement would create new opportunities for the business community, and the expected rewards were certainly plentiful:

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[774] In fact, according to Rothchild, 'the United States combined both negative and positive incentives to move the Gbadolite process ahead. Non-recognition and continued military aid to the insurgents (an estimated $50 million) were both seen as means of placating key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as pressuring the Angolan government to accept the peace process'. In this regard see Donald Rothchild. Op. cit. , p.127 based on Herman J. Cohen, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (unedited, unofficial), Alderson Reporting, Washington, May 3 1989, p. 26.

[775] Ibid.

[776] In this regard see Moisés Venâncio and Stephen Chan. Portuguese Diplomacy in Southern Africa 1974-1994. The South African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Southern Africa Series, October 1996; as well as Moisés Venâncio, in 'Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-91', in Mediation in Southern Africa Stephen Chan & Vivienne Jabri (Eds), The MacMillan Press LTD. London, 1993.

[777] Cited in Moisés Venâncio, in 'Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-91', in Mediation in Southern Africa Stephen Chan & Vivienne Jabri (Eds), The MacMillan Press LTD. London, 1993.

> ...moreover a peaceful Angola with the possibility of becoming one of the richest countries in southern Africa greatly would increase Portugal's position within Europe.[778]

In addition, peace in Angola was also a sincerely desired goal within Portuguese society and therefore constituted a sensitive internal political question. In addition, that at the time the US and USSR favoured countries other than themselves to mediate conflicts where the superpowers clashed contributed to the momentum towards Portuguese mediation. The US also pressured Luanda into the *rapprochement* with Lisbon in an attempt to lure Angola back towards the West.

Portugal's mediation of the Angolan conflict presents an interesting case where there is a substantive modification of the nature of the relationship between the mediator and the parties involved in conflict. While for very different reasons, in many respects the Portuguese government faced difficulties similar to those that the American administration faced in developing a trusting relationship with the MPLA regime in Luanda. In this sense, the complex process that resulted in the Portuguese government's involvement as principal mediator of the conflict between the MPLA regime and UNITA can be considered as a direct result of an overall improvement in the relationship between Lisbon and Luanda. In fact, accepting Portugal as official mediator required a long process of confidence building measures.[779]

Relations between Lisbon and the parties in conflict since Angola's independence had been dubious and at times partial. In 1985, when Cavaco Silva became Prime-Minister of Portugal his first step was to attempt to resolve the inherent friction existing between the two countries. This friction was largely a result of the decolonisation process and the controversial Alvor Agreement, which established the terms and dates of Angolan independence. The MPLA interpreted the withdrawal of Portuguese sovereignty representatives as a rebuff to its legitimacy. In fact, when the MPLA made its unilateral declaration of independence, the provisional Portuguese government did not recognise it immediately. In addition, the MPLA government considered the Soares government to support and be partial towards UNITA. As Venâncio posits, 'Portugal's refusal to recognise the MPLA government in Angola ushered in a new period of separation from Africa. It would take a long while before Africa and Portugal

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[778] Cited in Moisés Venâncio, Op. Cit.

[779] Confidence and trust are fundamental requisites for the acceptance of a mediator by the parties in conflict. John B. Stephens, "Acceptance of Meditation Initiatives: a Preliminary Framework", in *New Approaches to International Mediation*, C.R. Mitchell and Keith Webb (Eds), refers to several of these factors that influence decisively the acceptance of mediation initiatives: "...decisions by the leaderships of each adversary concerning the specific mediation initiative; the acceptability of the proposed mediator; the degree of antagonism between the beligerants or changing conditions in the field of conflict; existence of pre-conditions for negotiation (low or decreasing probability of attaining conflict goals through coercion ; decreasing value of conflict goals relative to the direct costs of pursuing those goals; some common or compatible interests between adversaries; and flexibility by each leadership to consider negotiation...".

healed the wounds left by decolonisation.'[780] In addition, the regime in Luanda viewed with extreme suspicion the fact that UNITA was increasingly allowed to use Lisbon as a second base for its activities. The acceptance of Portuguese mediation was therefore a process that required time, as will be described below.

In March 1990, a military stalemate was reached when government forces attacked Mavinga attempting to reach UNITA headquarters in Jamba. UNITA was able to sustain the government's advance once again largely as a result of renewed South Africa and American assistance.[781] This support to UNITA was denounced on 3 January by the Angolan Ambassador to the United Nations, who accused the American Administration of partiality in the conflict.[782] This was followed by a concerted Soviet attack on American foreign policy towards Angola, and Yuri Yukalov, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, publicly stated that the main reason for the continuation of the conflict in Angola was the external interference in the internal affairs of Angola.[783]

At this time, Portuguese Secretary of State for International Cooperation, Durão Barroso was in Angola for a 24-hour visit. In an interview to the official government's newspaper, Jornal de Angola, he considered for the first time the possibility of the Portuguese government playing a role in the peace process. The Secretary of State made it clear that Portugal would not get involved as a way to 'rehabilitate a certain diplomatic role' nor as a 'mission of diplomatic exhibitionism'. Barroso considered that 'no country in the world after Angola itself, wishes as much as Portugal peace for Angola'. The Secretary of State made clear that the Portuguese government did not want to replace President Mobutu in his mediation role. In an appraisal of the peace process, Barroso posited that the search should be 'not only for an African solution, but an Angolan solution'.[784]

A few days later, President Dos Santos attempted to clarify the role of Mobutu as mediator considering that it was necessary to define the limits of the mediator's actions, but that such delimitation should be agreed within the context of the 'Committee of Eight' for peace in Angola. In terms of a possible role for the Portuguese government, the President considered that the current Portuguese government has had a 'very correct, constructive' position regarding Angola.[785]

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[780] Moisés Venâncio, in 'Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-91', in Mediation in Southern Africa Stephen Chan & Vivienne Jabri (Eds), The MacMillan Press LTD. London, 1993.

[781] Margaret Joan Anstee. Orphan of the Cold War, The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93. MacMillan Press LTD, 1996, p. 10.

[782] Jornal de Angola, 3 January 1990.

[783] Jornal de Angola, 5 January 1990.

[784] Jornal de Angola, 7 January 1990.

[785] RTP1, as cited in Jornal de Angola, 9 January 1990.

The Portuguese media interpreted this interview as a possibility for greater Portuguese involvement in the peace process. Merely a few days from Cavaco Silva's visit to the United States, President Dos Santos declarations were taken as giving the Portuguese Prime Minister the role of 'spokesperson for the Angolan government and its new proposals for peace in Angola'.[786] In fact, American President George Bush and Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva met on 11 January and the situation in Angola was among the subjects discussed.[787] The two Presidents had a detailed exchange on Angola, acknowledging that they had a different interpretation on how the Angolan cease-fire broke down and on how the goal of national reconciliation could best be achieved.[788] More importantly, the statesmen recognized that 'there is increased military danger in Angola', and agreed that both countries should continue to be deeply involved in the search for a solution. [789]

In the press conference that followed the meeting, Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva expressed optimism in relation to the developments of the peace process in Angola commenting that his government was not willing to assume a mediatory role but could 'assume a technical or diplomatic advisory role after a cease fire has been implemented'. [790] On a substantive level, the Portuguese Prime Minister considered that peace in Angola could

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[786] Jornal de Angola, 10 January 1990.

[787] In fact, a senior American administration official told reporters on 10 January that there is 'a coincidence of interests' between the United States and Portugal on settling the Angolan civil war. 'I think there is agreement', the official said, 'that the real priority now -- which has real regional implications -- is to try to bring about this national reconciliation' between Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas and the formerly Marxist government. United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Bush, Cavaco to Discuss Angolan Reconciliation'. File Identification: 01/10/90, PO-303; 01/10/90, AE-304; 01/10/90, AF-310; 01/10/90, AR-331; 01/10/90, PX-304; 01/10/90, EU-303; 01/10/90, NE-314. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[788] American interpretation of political events in Angola, is evident from the following: 'the people of Angola have known virtually no peace or freedom since their country became independent of Portugal in 1975. At that time, power was seized by a group known as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA. The MPLA established a Marxist-Leninist regime in the capital, Luanda, backed up by Cuban troops and massive supplies of Soviet weapons. The MPLA effort to deny self- determination to the Angolan people has been fought by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA. Angolan self-determination has long been an important goal of U.S. foreign policy. Support for this goal has been demonstrated both by President George Bush and by his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Early last year Bush wrote to Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, to assure him of continued U.S. aid until national reconciliation can be achieved. Last June, Dr. Savimbi met in Zaire with Eduardo dos Santos, head of the MPLA. The meeting was organized by Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko with the participation of 18 African nations. The two sides in the Angolan war agreed to a cease-fire. Shortly thereafter, the cease-fire broke down, but the recent MPLA attack is the most serious offensive since before the June agreement...these actions come at a time when UNITA is prepared to agree to a cease-fire and unconditional negotiations. The United States calls on the MPLA and the Soviet Union to stop the offensive immediately and to concentrate instead on the peace negotiations that President Mobutu has been mediating. Only negotiations between the Angolan parties can end the conflict and bring self-determination to the long-suffering people of Angola'. United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Editorial broadcast by the Voice of America January 11', File Identification: 01/11/90, TX-401; 01/11/90, AE-408; 01/11/90, AF-409; 01/11/90, PX-402; 01/11/90,EX-402;01/11/90,NX-402. Product Name: Wireless File; VOA Editorials. 11 January 1990. http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[789] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Article on Portugese Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva's visit with President Bush at the White House', File Identification: 01/11/90, AE-404; 01/12/90, AF-504. Also reported by Jornal de Angola, 16 January 1990. http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[790] As reported in the Jornal de Angola, 16 January 1990.

in fact be achieved without a multi-party system, in that 'it is possible to find ways to hold elections in Angola without it meaning a multi-party system'. In addition, the Prime Minister considered that the United States should recognise the Angolan government.[791] Interestingly enough, it was after the meeting with President Bush that Cavaco Silva lifted a 30-year ban on Savimbi's entry to Lisbon.[792]

The Portuguese analysis of the situation was clarified by Durão Barroso's comments reinforcing Cavaco Silva's idea that 'it is an erroneous attitude to pretend that the only acceptable political regime model is that of a multiparty democracy', considering that there was no multiparty system in Southern Africa and that out of the 160 members of the UN only a tiny minority practices that system.[793] Not surprisingly, the Angolan President praised 'the great contribution of the Portuguese government towards the attainment of a just and durable peace in Angola' and on 21 January sent a message to the Portuguese Prime Minister highlighting the friendship ties and bilateral cooperation between the two peoples and governments.

Meanwhile, America's deputy assistant secretary of state Warren Clark Jr. attempted to clarify American's policy towards Angola. He told journalists that the United States supported a political solution to the war, one in which 'no one will be the victor and no one will be the vanquished' and that there was 'no military solution' to the conflict. The United States had 'no personal ambition' in Angola, and 'no enemies in Angola, and the purpose of our policy is to encourage the two parties in the search for peace'. Procedurally, Clark urged that negotiations take place out of the public arena in that 'it is much better if the two sides meet in private with a mediator to really attempt to negotiate the differences'. Nevertheless, Clark recognised that 'it is more difficult to enter into a negotiation, to accept a cease-fire, when you are right in the thick of military operations and warfare'.[794]

On 24 January, American diplomacy took a step forward with a visit by Herman Cohen (US Under Secretary of State for African Affairs) to Luanda where he met with President Dos Santos, with External Relations Minister Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem 'Loy' and the Chief of Staff of the FAPLA, Lieutenant General Antonio dos Santos Franca 'Ndalu'. Cohen stressed

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[791] As reported in the Jornal de Angola, 16 January 1990.

[792] Colim Legum. 'Angola. Between War and Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record 1990-92, Colin Legum (Editor) and Ronald Watson (Indexer), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1992.

[793] Jornal de Angola, 16 January 1990.

[794] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomatic Query, 'US Committed to Angolan Peace, Clark Says', article on WORLDNET interview of Deputy Assistant Sec. of State Warren Clark, by Charles W. Corey USIA Staff Writer, File Identification: 01/22/90,AE-105;01/23/90,AF-206. ProductName: Wireless. FileProductCode: WF. 22 January 1990.
http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

once again the intention of the American Administration in doing anything possible to promote the cause of peace.[795]

On the ground, Angola was under some of the fiercest fighting in 14 years of civil war. [796] The MPLA's success was largely a result of air superiority, considered by one analyst to be 'a well-trained, prestigious force with sophisticated aircraft. At Mavinga 14 MiG-23 planes attacked Unita positions with fragmentation bombs, supported by Sukhoi ground attack aircraft. The latest model Sukhoi-25 was delivered from the Soviet Union only last year, in keeping with a pledge by President Gorbachev to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos that the Soviet Union would maintain arms supplies to the government so long as the US continues to supply Unita'.[797] Paradoxically, while the American administration claimed that it was searching for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, President Bush repeatedly emphasised that American support for Savimbi would continue.[798] According to Keesings Record of World Events,

> ...Implicit confirmation of government successes came with Savimbi's statement on UNITA radio on March 5 that he was ready to accept an immediate ceasefire, under the mediation of Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko, provided the government abandoned its military gains of the past two months. Savimbi said that the ceasefire should be followed by direct talks between UNITA and the government, followed by the formation of a transitional government. The onset of the rainy season brought a halt to the government's south-eastern offensive. [799]

On 2 March, President Eduardo dos Santos gave indication, for the first time, that he was not satisfied with Mobutu's mediation. In a speech to Angola's People Assembly, he said that the internal difficulties in the Committee of Eight had forced Angola to conclude that 'although valid, that is not the only way that can take us to the realisation of our objectives. There are other ways which we are exploring and that we will make known later'.[800] During the

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[795] Jornal de Angola, 26 January 1990.

[796] UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was at the time visiting Portugal where he arrived on Jan. 27. Due to the military situation, he abruptly returned on Jan. 30, cancelling plans to travel to other west European countries. In what was his first visit to Portugal since 1975 the date of Angola's independence, Savimbi held discussions with President Soares and with Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva- the latter in his capacity as leader of Portugal's ruling Social Democratic Party and not as head of government.

[797] As reported in The Guardian, 01 Feburary 1990. It should be noted that before the New York Accords the Angolan air force rarely ventured deep into Unita territory for fear of retaliation by South African planes which regularly violated Angolan air space to defend Unita positions. With Cuba and South Africa effectively out of the war, the Angolan air force was now used to its full capacity.

[798] Voice of America reflected the American government line with an editorial on the 8 of February 1990 which stated that 'the MPLA has been trying for 15 years to crush UNITA and has failed in every attempt so far...Yet despite the MPLA regime's massive expenditure of the blood and treasure of the Angola people, UNITA continues to resist the regime's efforts to impose a one- party dictatorship. *UNITA has demonstrated its willingness to agree to a cease-fire and to pursue negotiations leading to a settlement. The Luanda regime has responded with more shooting*...Cuban troops, Soviet arms, and MPLA military offensives *will not resolve the issues that divide the Angolan people*... Those issues can only be resolved through direct negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA. *The United States stands ready to assist the parties in such talks, since Angolan self-determination has long been an important goal of U.S. policy* [my emphasis].

[799] Keesings Record of World Events, Angola Entry, Volume 36, June 1990.

[800] As reported in Jornal de Angola, 3 March 1990.

celebrations of Namibia's independence on 21 March, President Dos Santos met American Secretary of State, James Baker. The talks included a nine-point peace plan presented by Mr Dos Santos to Mr Baker, which called for a ceasefire and direct talks with UNITA.[801]

At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union began talks on a possible joint strategy towards Angola. In Windhoek, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker spent more than three and one-half hours in private discussions. 'What's happening here in Namibia, we both agree, is a good example of what can happen when the Soviet Union and the United States cooperate' Baker told reporters at the end of their meeting. Shevardnadze said that 'we can also cooperate on Angola, Afghanistan and in other regions as well'.[802]

On 5 April, Jornal de Angola announced the realisation of a mini-summit to discuss inherent questions of the Angolan Peace Process to be held the next day in the archipelago of S. Tome e Principe to 'find a solution to break the current impasse in the negotiation process'.[803] The next day, Venancio de Moura (Vice Minister of External Relations) declared that 'the Angolan Government is willing to negotiate with UNITA, but with the condition that foreign countries stop their interference in Angola's internal affairs'.[804] On 8 April, President dos Santos finally stated that the mediator role played by Zairean President Mobutu would not be necessary. The President considered that 'the contacts he has been having in the last few weeks with North American, South African and Portuguese authorities and pointed out that in his understanding 'these contacts allow us to entertain the possibility of direct contacts with UNITA based on the principles proposed by the government of the Popular Republic of Angola'.[805]

The issue of direct negotiations continued to be aired in the press. Vice Minister for External Relations, Venâncio de Moura, said that direct talks between the government and UNITA

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[801] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, ' US Pressing for Cease-Fire in Angolan Civil War'. By Russell Dybvik, USIA Diplomatic Correspondent, 20 March 1990. File identification: 03/20/90, PO-201; 03/20/90, AE-201; 03/20/90, AF-207; 03/20/90, EU-205; 03/20/90, NE-207. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF. http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[802] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Shevardnadze Assures Baker Soviets Won't Use Force', Secretary of State and Soviet Foreign Minister discuss Lithuania and Angola before attending Namibia's independence celebrations. By Russell Dybvik, USIA Diplomatic Correspondent, 20 March 1990. File Identification: 03/20/90, PO-214; 03/20/90, EU-204; 03/20/90, NE-218; 03/21/90, AE-309; 03/21/90, AF-304; 03/21/90, AR-307; 03/21/90, EP-324. Product Name: Wireless File. http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[803] Jornal de Angola, 5 April 1990.

[804] Yet, I contrast with such conciliatory language, the Minister went on to say that while 'the Angolan authorities look to explore as much as possible the dialogue route because they don't believe that a military solution is the best one to achieve peace' the 'armed bandits seem not to understand this language. Their actions of terror and sabotage are felt with a high intensity in recent times, a symptom that they are not interested in talks which search for a peaceful solution to this conflict'. Jornal de Angola, 6 April 1990.

[805] Jornal de Angola, 8 April 1990.

would begin that month, probably in Portugal. 'During this month, representatives of the Angolan government and UNITA elements will meet to discuss the internal problem' he said, adding that 'for the Angolan government, peace can be negotiated anywhere, when parties are sufficiently engaged towards an objective'. The Portuguese reacted swiftly, considering that this willingness coupled with the indications given by UNITA's Political Bureau of recognition of the government of Angola, were very promising.[806]

From 'Good Offices' to Mediation: procedural and tactical aspects

The first exploratory meetings were held in Évora, Portugal, on 24 and 25 April. Under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, this meeting was intended to explore the possibilities of direct talks between the parties. UNITA described these exploratory talks as 'extremely positive', and announced the cessation of 'all hostile propaganda against the Luanda government and its leadership'. While UNITA had recognised President Eduardo dos Santos as head of state, it continued to deny the legitimacy of the MPLA government.[807]

Although optimistic, Secretary of State Durão Barroso stated that there were 'deep differences' and that the parties 'are far from a cease-fire'.[808] Confirming that further talks had been set for the first week of May, Durão Barroso clarified that even though 'Portugal has the best conditions in the world of playing a determinant role due to the centuries-old relations', it was not assuming the role of mediator, but simply using its 'good offices' to bring the two sides together.[809] Yet, what exactly was the role that Portugal was playing at this stage? Legum points out that the Portuguese 'won the endorsement of Washington and Moscow for their initiative' and that 'Jose Durão Barroso, was designated as the mediator'.[810] It seems that the Portuguese government was being careful in publicly assuming the role of mediator because of President Mobutu's involvement. Nevertheless, on 15 May, the Angolan government makes clear its position regarding Mobutu's mediation in an editorial on Jornal de Angola. It said: 'President José Eduardo dos Santos could not have acted better... In all truth,

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[806] Nevertheless, the government newspaper considered that such intentions by UNITA should be taken with 'the necessary reservations' because 'UNITA continues to invoke historical events now without any significance, and to use an aggressive and threatening language that betrays its alleged peace objectives'. The possibility of direct contacts are considered to be a realistic possibility but that they should in a first phase 'be held secretly' and 'define the political basis for a cease fire, leading to the attainment of other aspects within the peace plan of the Angolan government'. The editorial claims that these direct contacts are a result of the concrete initiatives of the Angolan government with the governments of the US, South Africa and Portugal and should lead to the removal of all external interference that artificially fuel the Angolan conflict. Jornal de Angola, 12 April 1990.

[807] 'Angola', Keesings Record of World Events, Volume 36, April 1990.

[808] Colim Legum. 'Angola. Between War and Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record 1990-92, Colin Legum (Editor) and Ronald Watson (Indexer), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1992.

[809] Jill Jolliffe in Lisbon for The Guardian, *30 April 1990.*

[810] Colim Legum. 'Angola. Between War and Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record 1990-92, Colin Legum (Editor) and Ronald Watson (Indexer), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1992.

the President, the Government and the MPLA never truly trusted the President of Zaire's mediation: they knew that his objective was no different from that of the north-American administration, particularly that of the CIA'.[811]

The Portuguese Secretary of State visited Luanda and announced on 19 May that another exploratory meeting would be held in Portugal between the Government and UNITA. He considered that the overall spirit of the first meeting was 'sufficiently positive for both the Government and UNITA to consider useful the continuation of these contacts'. Yet, the peace process was very difficult and complex and therefore 'it cannot be precipitated, because the bigger the precipitation the bigger the disillusionment can be'. Curiously, the Secretary of State commented on the increasing role of Portugal in this process in the following terms: 'there are things that are so natural that they do not need to be explained'.[812]

Simultaneously, superpower engagement and pressure continued. A Soviet delegation headed by Yuri Yukalov arrived in Lisbon on the 21 May for a series of meetings on the Angolan peace process. On 6 June, Jeffrey Davidow, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stated that US support for UNITA will continue so that 'a process of national reconciliation and a political settlement can begin in Angola' emphasising that 'as negotiations begin, this is not the time for us to walk away from our support of UNITA so that they would be weakened at the negotiating table. We want a settlement...if that desire exists, then I believe that all other questions, such as the venue of the talks, the shape of the table, and who sits in the room- those become less important.'[813] This same view was expressed by Secretary of State James Baker during a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 12 June. The Secretary of State said that 'there is potential for moving toward peace in Angola as a consequence of United States- Soviet cooperation'.[814]

On the 20 June, returning from a meeting in Morocco with Jonas Savimbi, Durão Barroso stated to the press that peace talks were 'going at a good pace'. The exchange of information that took place during this meeting had made clear the need for both parties to sign an 'agreement on principles'. The Secretary of State admitted that there were 'some points in which they diverged' but that he was carrying a message from UNITA to President Eduardo

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[811] Jornal de Angola, 15 May 1990.

[812] Jornal de Angola, 19 May 1990.

[813] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'US Policy Towards Angola and Mozambique Outlined'. Article on Jeffrey Davidow telepress conference. By Charles W. Corey, USIA Staff Writer, 6 June 1990. File Identification: 06/06/90, AE-308; 06/08/90, AF-504. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF. http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[814] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Baker Cites US-Soviet Cooperation in Africa', 12 June 1990. File Identification: 06/12/90, AE-207; 06/13/90,AF-310. Product Name: WirelessFile. Product Code:WF.
http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

dos Santos would unblock the present negotiations. Durão Barroso considered that the intervention of the Portuguese government in the negotiation process was meant to 'clarify positions' and serve as intermediary between the parties in conflict. 'If there is any merit to us, it will be by helping to devise solutions to take the process to a good conclusion', said Durão Barroso classifying the intervention of the Portuguese government as 'good offices'.[815]

On 13 July, the Angolan Minister of External Relations stated that 'we are convinced that the next round of talks will result in an agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Angola, *since UNITA is being pressured* [my italics] in this way'. The Minister considered that two issues put forward by UNITA remain to be discussed: its recognition as a political party and the planning of a popular referendum to choose Angola's future constitutional system. Nevertheless, it was the government's view that, as a rebel movement, UNITA could not be recognised as an opposition party. 'We will never accept political armies in Angola' he stated, 'and if it is the popular will that a multiparty system be created, than UNITA can develop its activities within a legislative framework to be approved.[816]

A second set of exploratory talks was subsequently held in São Julião da Barra, Lisbon. According to a Voice of America broadcast UNITA presented a set of five principles: mutual recognition of each side's legitimacy; establishment of multiparty democracy and free and fair elections; international monitoring of a cease-fire; formation of a national army and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'.[817] Although this round had been suspended by the UNITA delegation for consultations with its leadership, Durão Barroso considered that there had been agreement on several points related to the principles for achieving peace. The Secretary of State termed this a 'phase of successive approximations', which this time had focused on the principles of a cease-fire. Durão Barroso described the process as 'complex, difficult and long' and added that the two parties supported the existence of a system of guarantees for the agreement to be signed. 'We had never been so close to an agreement. There only remains the last lap'.

The Angolan government pressured the 'mediator' and the Americans for concrete results considering 'the lack of seriousness and concern that UNITA revealed at the last negotiation round', when UNITA interrupted the contacts alleging that there were 'doubts' and stating the need to consult with its leadership.[818] Durão Barroso continued his 'shuttle diplomacy' to

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[815] Jornal de Angola, 20 June 1990.

[816] Jornal de Angola, 13 July 1990.

[817] Voice of America Broadcast, 2 August 1990. United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, ' Editorial: Relief for Angola'. Fifteen years of civil war may be nearing an end in Angola. File Identification: 08/02/90, TX-407; 08/02/90, AE-405; 08/02/90, AF-409; 08/02/90, AR-425; 08/02/90, PX-403; 08/02/90, EX-402; 08/02/90, NX-401. Product Name: Wireless File; VOA Editorials. Product Code: WF; VO. http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[818] Jornal de Angola, 14 July 1990.

increase momentum in the negotiations. He met his Moroccan counter-part, Ahmed Erkaoui, to discuss the Angolan peace process and also Savimbi on 19 July. The Americans also confirmed the visit of a high-powered delegation to Luanda.[819] This delegation was headed by Jeffrey Davidow who expressed total support for the Portuguese government's efforts to bring both parties together in the search for a political solution.[820]

On 26 August 1990 a third meeting between the Angolan government and UNITA was held, under Portuguese 'mediation'. Although this third meeting lasted 5 whole days, there was a lack of any substantive progress, in particular as regards the timing of a ceasefire. In fact, while the Angolan government insisted that a truce be agreed before discussions could take place on a new constitution which would provide for multiparty politics and free elections, UNITA refused to divorce the question of a ceasefire from a consideration of its demands. These included political recognition of UNITA, multipartism and the setting of election dates as well as the formation of a single army. According to Keesings, these talks ended amid mutual accusations in that 'the government claimed that UNITA was stalling whilst awaiting United States congressional discussions on military aid budgets, while, for its part, UNITA alleged that the government was preparing an all-out military strike against its forces along the Angola-Namibia border, using Namibian airstrips with the co-operation of the Namibian government'. As a matter of fact, UNITA, which had unilaterally downgraded the status of its delegation shortly before the talks, further claimed that it had already made concessions including the recognition of the ruling MPLA as a political party, and of President dos Santos as head of state. [821] The American State Department supported UNITA by saying that 'our understanding is that the government has so far not been willing to provide the kind of legal status which would permit UNITA to carry out a full political role in the country' and 'permit it to participate fully in the internal political process'.[822]

While the next round of talks was supposed to begin on September 28, it was reportedly delayed due to the new covert funding bill for UNITA discussed in the US Congress.[823] The

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[819] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'US Delegation to Hold Talks in Angola'. Article on State Department Briefing, 20 July 1990. File Identification: 07/20/90, AE-505; 07/23/90, AF-103. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF.
http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[820] Jornal de Angola, 26 July 1990.

[821] Keesings Record of World Events, Angola Entry, Volume 36, August 1990.

[822] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'UNITA Recognition 'Key Issue' in Angola Talks'. Article on Angola taken from State Briefing by State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher, 12 September 1990. File Identification: 09/12/90, AE-306; 09/13/90, AF-403. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF
http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[823] The Guardian reports that '...the House intelligence committee voted narrowly in secret to approve an estimated $80-$100 million (£43-53 million) for Unita next year. But the Senate intelligence committee has yet to vote, and there is a strong effort being made to force the issue to a debate on the Senate floor, which the Bush Administration is trying hard to prevent', 19 September 1990.

Americans stepped up their assistance considering that 'U.S. assistance to UNITA continues to be a major incentive driving the Luanda regime to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the civil war. As President George Bush has said, the United Sates will continue to provide effective and appropriate support to UNITA until national reconciliation in Angola has been achieved'.[824]

The fourth session of direct negotiations between the MPLA government and UNITA was held near Lisbon from 24 to 28 September. The status of UNITA remained the most difficult issue. Savimbi continued to seek recognition of UNITA as a legal opposition movement as a precondition for signing a cease-fire agreement. For its part, the government continued to reject recognizing UNITA as a legitimate military force, stating only that UNITA could become a political party in the context of the establishment of a multiparty system.[825] Nevertheless, parallel talks on possible cease-fire arrangements and political principles were instituted for the first time during this round.

Of procedural relevance, the United States and the Soviet Union provided political/military experts at technical level, which while not present at the negotiation table, 'consulted with the delegations throughout the talks' and were able to 'offer suggestions that contributed to narrowing differences between the parties'.[826] The presence of Soviet and US experts to offer 'technical' advice on the practicalities of a ceasefire, unquestionably added momentum to the talks. In this fourth round, the mediator proposed the formation of a Joint Political and Military Commission with the purpose of overseeing the transition to a multi-party system and to arbitrate disagreements between the MPLA and UNITA.[827] This commission, to be composed by UNITA and the MPLA with the US, USSR and Portugal as observers, was approved at the negotiation.

In addition, some progress was achieved concerning the logistics of a ceasefire, including agreement on international monitoring procedures. Two joint sub-commissions were formed,

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[824] Voice of America Broadcast, 21 September 1990. United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, ' Editorial: Angolan Agreement may be nearer'. File Identification: 09/21/90, TX-501; 09/21/90, AE-505; 09/21/90, AF-511; 09/21/90, AR-521; 09/21/90, PX-502; 09/21/90, EX-502; 09/21/90, NX-502; 09/24/90, AS-108. Product Name: Wireless File; VOA Editorials. Product Code: WF; VO. http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[825] Keesings, Angola Entry, Volume 36, September 1990.

[826] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Talks last week between the Angolan government and the UNITA rebels failed to resolve the issue of UNITA's legal status once a cease-fire is achieved'. Article on 1 October Department of State News Briefing, 1 October 1990. File Identification: 10/01/90, PO-110; 10/01/90, EP-121; 10/01/90, EU-102; 10/01/90, NE-112; 10/01/90, NA-107; 10/02/90, AR-205. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF
http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[827] Colim Legum. 'Angola. Between War and Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record 1990-92, Colin Legum (Editor) and Ronald Watson (Indexer), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1992.

[827] 'Angola', Keesings Record of World Events, Volume 36, April 1990.

one to examine further 'political principles' and the other to examine military issues and aspects of the ceasefire. The government offer was for a ceasefire and an amnesty for all returning UNITA personnel, who would then be able to organize as a political grouping when the MPLA's promised constitutional changes for a multi-party system came into being. Furthermore, the MPLA accepted that UN food and medical aid could go directly to civilians under UNITA control. Nevertheless, agreement was deadlocked in the political commission, with UNITA refusing to sign the ceasefire before returning to Angola as a recognised political entity.

Internally, the Central Committee of the MPLA met in a special session on October 25-26 in order to endorse a reform programme for presentation to the party Congress scheduled for December 1990. The programme's main points concerned the required 'readjustment' of the Marxist MPLA-PT's theoretical foundations; the introduction of enabling measures for a multiparty system; the depoliticisation of the army; revision of the Constitution; and the drawing up of electoral rolls prior to the holding of a general election. Legislation allowing political parties could be introduced in the first quarter of 1991. A new constitution would follow one year later; elections would be held after a peace agreement had been reached with the UNITA rebels "within a timetable to be defined by experts". A period of three years was thought to be necessary for census-taking and drawing up electoral rolls.[828]

The fifth negotiation round began in Estoril, Portugal, on 15 November and ended on 20 November. Discussions were expected to continue on two draft agreements - one on principles and another on a cease-fire early.[829] According to the mediator the Angolan government and UNITA agreed on 80 per cent of a ceasefire document drawn up by the Portuguese mediating team. The Angolan government had accepted, in principle, UNITA's demand for political recognition, but the details of how and when this would come about remained unresolved.[830]

Lopo Do Nascimento, hitherto Provincial Commissioner for Huíla and a former Prime Minister, was appointed head of the Angolan government's negotiating team in mid-November. This nomination constituted an important development. In fact, during the first four rounds of negotiations both parties sent delegations that were considered second rate

[828] According to Keesings Record of World Events, Angola Entry, Volume 36, November 1990.

[829] United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'US Urges Resumption of Angolan Peace Talks' Russelle Dybvik and John Sedlins USIA Satff Writers. 09 November 1990. File Identification: 11/09/90, AE-503; 11/13/90, AF-204. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[830] According to Keesings Record of World Events, Angola Entry, Volume 36, November 1990.

negotiators and the MPLA failed to send representation of the government or the party, rather sending only political advisers to the President.[831]

While both parties expressed optimism concerning this round, UNITA stepped up its attacks, escalating the conflict.[832] UNITA targeted bridges, water pipes and electricity lines near the capital and destroyed an oil pipeline near Soyo. Meanwhile, the MPLA held its third Congress in Luanda on 4-9 December. Delegates endorsed wide-ranging changes, including the replacement of the party's Marxist ideology by a commitment to 'democratic socialism', and plans for the president and legislature to be directly elected by universal secret ballot, and for a revised constitution which would guarantee freedom of expression, permit the formation of political parties, and end the MPLA-PT's control over the armed forces. The congress also agreed to work towards the establishment of a free market economy, with guarantees protecting private property and foreign investments.

Superpower involvement in the peace negotiations increased after a high level meeting in Houston between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on 11 December. These statesmen 'reviewed the status of negotiations on a settlement of the Angolan internal conflict, which are being conducted through the good offices of the government of Portugal' and expressed 'continued support for the important role played by Portugal'. In addition, 'in the interests of facilitating these efforts, and to advance the achievement of peace and stability in Angola, Secretary of State Baker will meet Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Angola, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will meet Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, in Washington on December 12. These meetings revealed that the Soviets wished to disengage from its external military commitment towards the MPLA regime in Luanda.[833] In fact, the U. S. received *carte blanche* from the USSR to act as it saw fit in the resolution of the Angolan War.[834] Assuming leadership of the process, the Americans acted on the premise that leverage would influence the outcome of the negotiations by the use of a *power or masked muscle* mediation approach.[835] It was also agreed that further consultations would take place in Washington

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[831] In this regard, see Moisés Venâncio, in 'Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-91', in Mediation in Southern Africa, Stephen Chan & Vivienne Jabri (Eds), The MacMillan Press LTD. London, 1993.

[832] See for example, The Guardian, 4 December 1990.

[833] See Donald Rothchild. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 1997.

[834] The MPLA was then clearly told by Washington that American support for UNITA would not cease until a negotiated settlement was reached. This placed the MPLA in a precarious position with the withdrawal of the Cuban troops schedule for June 1991. UNITA was warned that American support would cease if it was the only barrier to a negotiated peace agreement.

[835] Fisher and Keashley's concept of *mediation with muscle* is advanced as a synonym for power mediation. It includes the use of leverage or coercion in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments from the third party to move the antagonists toward a settlement. Ronal J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashley in "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Consultation", Journal of Peace Research, 28, 1, 1991, pp.29-42.

among senior representatives of Portugal, the United States, The Soviet Union, the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, and UNITA, with the aim of promoting the successful conclusion of the forthcoming sixth round of the negotiations in Lisbon.[836]

The following day, senior officials from the US, the Soviet Union, Portugal, the Angolan Government and UNITA met at the State Department. These discussions brought together for the first time representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, UNITA, the Angolan government and Portugal. In these meetings, what would become known as The Washington Concepts Paper was agreed by both parties. It included the following: post-war Angola would be a multiparty state; a cease-fire would be supervised by the United Nations; elections would be monitored by international observers; agreement to a cease-fire would be accompanied by a definite date for elections; all external lethal weapons would end after the signing of the cease-fire agreement; and finally, that a start would be made to form a national army at the start of the cease-fire.[837] 'Significant progress' was considered to have been achieved in these meetings.

Herman Cohen, Yuri Yukalov (USSR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Dr Antonio Monteiro (Chief of Cabinet to Secretary of State Barroso) held a questions session for the Press. All three officials answered several questions posed by reporters. Some of the questions posed are important for the understanding of the significance of the two days of meetings in Washington. Among them we quote:

> Q: Mr Cohen, as we understand it, if there is a cease-fire confirmed, then the United States and the Soviet Union both would cease their supply of, quote, 'lethal materials'?
>
> Mr Cohen: The cease-fire is envisaged as being an agreement between the two sides to refrain from receiving lethal materials from any source. That would automatically require the Soviet Union and the United States to stop deliveries of lethal materials.
> (...)
>
> Q: Was this a negotiating session? Do the two Angolan representatives have authority to negotiate? Or was this an exchange of views, today?
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> Mr Cohen: This was not an official negotiating session- these take place through the good offices of the Portuguese government. This was an exchange of views designed to narrow differences.
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> Q: Were differences narrowed? If so, which ones?

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[836] Joint Statement issued by Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, 11 December 1990. United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Baker, Shevardnadze enter Angola Talks.' 11 December 1990. File Identification: 12/11/90, AE-204; 12/11/90, EU-217. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF
http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[837] Colim Legum. 'Angola. Between War and Peace', in Africa Contemporary Record 1990-92, Colin Legum (Editor) and Ronald Watson (Indexer), Africana Publishing Company, New York and London, 1992.

[837] 'Angola', Keesings Record of World Events, Volume 36, April 1990.

> Dr Monteiro: Yes, some of the differences were narrowed in several areas. Particularly we discussed all- all the political questions that we are discussing for these five rounds. And the only thing I can say there is - as I told in the communiqué- significant progress in all these areas and all the principles that are (sic)
>
> (...)
>
> Q: If I may, a question for the three gentlemen. In which way are we better than we were two days ago?
>
> Dr Monteiro: we are better because we are closer to the agreement. The only thing after the discussion today and after- and I must stress here the important role of the Soviet Union and the USA in preparing this- this closeness- these new steps that we made towards peace. I have- and I would like to remember here when after the third round, the Portuguese government had suggested that USA and Soviet Union join the process as observers, our idea was that they would bring the necessary guarantees- political and military guarantees- that the parties need to real progress. And I'm very glad, and we are very glad in Portugal- Portuguese government is very glad to see that it result (ed). (...)
>
> Q: Do you believe that the parties have now made a determination to take the political decisions necessary to move this forward without no further delays?
>
> Dr Monteiro: I think that between the two parties, there is enormous mistrust, enormous gap of confidence and that's why the role of, as I say, the two superpowers is so important in this moment of process- is to help, to bridge this gap of confidence and I think the parties are creating between them much more confidence then they had before. [838]

Consequently, when the sixth round of talks took place on April 4, 1991, most of the major points of disagreement had already been resolved. The remaining issues included the formation of a unified national army, the dates for a cease fire and for holding multi-party elections, and the international monitoring of the cease-fire. This haggling over the major outstanding issues continued through the remainder of April; then to the surprise of many, the conferees achieved a breakthrough to peace.[839] As Venâncio points out, in a last attempt to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict the observers and the mediators prepared an agenda for negotiations which they presented to both delegations in March. On 4 April a 'non-stop session to peace' was announced that culminated in the signing of the peace accords...The peace plans were agreed on 1 May and both UNITA and the MPLA communicated their official acceptance to the Portuguese government by 15 May with hostilities to cease at midnight on the same day.[840] On 31 May 1991 the Peace Accords were signed.

The Bicesse Accords comprised four documents: the cease-fire agreement; the Washington Document (which guaranteed UNITA's political existence after a cease fire), the Estoril

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[838] Transcript of a briefing on 13 December 1990 by State Department official Herman Cohen, Portugese Cabinet member Dr Antonio Monteiro, and Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry official Yuriy Yukalov after talks on ending fighting in Angola. United States Department of State, International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Query, 'Significant Progress noted in Angola Talks'. 14 December 1990. File Identification: 12/14/90, AE-503. Product Name: Wireless File. Product Code: WF.
http://pdq.state.gov/pdqhome.html

[839] Daniel Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Chapter 5, Constructing a Conflict Management System in Angola, 1989-97., pp.133. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 1997

[840] Ibid.

protocol (six documents covering rules surrounding the elections; the structure of the joint politico-military commission which is responsible for implementing the peace accords; internal security; administrative structures; the structure and integration of a single army; the political rights of UNITA after the cease fire) and an agreement on the basic political principles for the establishment of peace in Angola. At the centre of these principles was the concept that elections would determine the future government of Angola. Fair multi-party elections would be held no later than November 1992. In addition, these accords provided for a cease-fire; the banning of external military assistance to both sides; the release of prisoners; the quartering of UNITA troops; the withdrawal of government troops to barracks; the formation of new unified forces; the demobilisation of surplus troops; the restoration of government administration in UNITA controlled areas; the neutrality of the police force.

Under the Accords, the MPLA remained the legitimate and internationally recognised government, retaining responsibility for running the state during the interim period and for setting the date of elections. This transition period was foreseen so that free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections could be organised. Later it was agreed that the elections would be held on 29-30 September 1992. The whole process was to be overseen by a bilateral Joint Political Military Commission- CCPM. According to Margaret Anstee, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations,

> ...the CCPM was to be the apex of a complex network of joint monitoring mechanisms at every level, in every region, and on every subject germane to the Peace Accords... In keeping with the concept that responsibility for implementing the Peace Accords lay with the Angolans, the only full members of the CCPM were to be representatives of the Government and UNITA, and meetings were to be presided over alternately by each side, with decisions taken by consensus.[841]

The 'troika' was given observer status and the United Nations could participate in the capacity of invited guest. The question of external support was codified in the so-called 'triple zero clause' and both sides agreed on restraining from acquiring lethal material, and the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to cease all supplies of lethal material to any Angolan party as well as committed to encourage other countries to do likewise.[842]

In response to a formal request by the Angolan Minister for External Relations for United Nations' participation, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council and proposed that the mandate of the existing mission in Angola be expanded and prolonged to include

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[841] Margaret Joan Anstee. Orphan of the Cold War. The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93. MacMillan Press LTD, London, 1996, p.12.

[842] The clause states: "The cease-fire agreement will oblige the parties to cease receiving lethal material. The United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and all other countries will support the implementation of the cease-fire and will refrain from furnishing lethal material to any of the Angolan parties."

verification of the cease-fire and of the neutrality of the Angolan police.[843] On 30 May 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 696 establishing UNAVEM II. [844] In addition, on 5 December 1991, the parties finally requested the Secretary General to send UN observers to follow the Angolan electoral process and provide technical assistance. The Secretary General's report to the Security Council of 3 March 1992 proposed the extension of UNAVEM's mandate to cover the elections in the form of 'an operation limited in scale, similar in approach to the United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEM) and the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH)'.[845]

This was an ostensibly limited role for a situation that required, as events would make clear, a much stronger and larger United Nations' presence, including the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Yet, at the root of the decision for such a limited role was a profound disagreement between the parties concerning the nature of a possible United Nations' involvement. As Anstee posits,

> ...UNITA, no doubt on account of its deep mistrust of the Government, had wanted the UN to be entrusted with a major role of direct supervision of all aspects of the process, supported by adequate resources, including contingents of armed UN troops ("Blue Helmets"). The Government, conversely, had been reluctant to see the UN playing any part at all, and had insisted that its role should be minimal, on the ground that a major UN presence, with mandated supervisory powers, would trespass on Angolan sovereignty. The compromise reached was that the UN's role would be merely one of verification...through the mechanisms of the CCPM, thus conferring responsibility for the successful implementation of the Bicesse Accords squarely on the Angolan parties.[846]

Outcome Assessment

When President Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi shook hands over the Bicesse Peace Accords on the 31st of May 1991,a gesture symbolising reconciliation and trust pointing to a new era of peace and reconciliation in Angola, very few people considered the possibility of a return to hostilities. Above all, the Angolan people celebrated the prospect of peace in a country totally devastated by war. The mediators were unanimously in agreement that this had represented a breakthrough, not only for Angola, but for Southern Africa as a whole. The formula adopted in the accords was seen as an ideal to be emulated in other

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[843] Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, S/22627 of 20 May 1991. The Secretary-General's report envisaged 350 military observers to be stationed in UNAVEM's headquarters in Luanda, in six regional headquarters within the CMVF, at each of the 50 troop assembly areas and at 12 critical points as well as in mobile border patrols. This mandate would last from the date on which the cease-fire entered into force (31 May 1991) until the day following the completion of the presidential and legislative elections.

[844] UN Security Council resolution 696, 30 May, 1991.

[845] Secretary General's report to the Security Council, S/23671 of 3 March 1992, paragraph 9.

[846] Margaret Anstee, Op. Cit., p.13.

circumstances . After all, the parties had themselves agreed that elections was the best way to achieve peace and an end to the high intensity conflict that had devastated their country.

However, later events would demonstrate that such an approach considerably increased the stakes for both parties. The 'winner takes all' approach to conflict resolution meant that the formation of the government to be set up after the elections would be the domain of the winner. However, there was no consideration of the possibility of non-compliance. In fact, as will be seen in the next chapter, Savimbi refused to accept the election results and the country slid back into war. The suspicion and mistrust between the beliggerents, which had not been directly addressed during the mediation process had already been evident during the process. As was discussed above, during the first four rounds of negotiations, progress was extremely slow on all questions concerning the eradication of substantive or core conflicting issues. The MPLA continually refused to recognise UNITA, even after a good-will gesture by UNITA's recognition of the Angolan President and Government on the 1st of May 1990. Furthermore, both parties sent delegations that were considered second-rate and the MPLA failed to send representation of the government or the party at all, rather sending only political advisers to the President.

The strong degree of antagonism and suspicion had had inevitable effects upon the negotiations. These were interspersed with all manner of setbacks and changes of position by one side or the other. As a result, the mediation was forced to include the presence of the US and USSR as observers. The hope was that the presence of parties who could put the belligerents under pressure as well as offering incentives would advance the negotiations. And in fact, the peace process received an important impulse after the meeting between James Baker and Edward Shevardnaze held in Washington in December 1990. Portuguese mediation could not have been successful without this superpower pressure. In addition, Portugal was also careful to keep other interested parties such as South Africa and Zaire abreast of all developments throughout the process.

Is the fact that the Bicesse Accords were officially signed by the parties enough to consider the mediation process a success? Anstee considers that,

> ...no reason can justify the indefensible actions by UNITA after the elections, but they make visible the difficulties of any peace process and for the need to, whenever possible, take any necessary measures to compensate the effects of fear and mistrust.[847]

In view of the war that ensured, analysts have highlighted the inadequate mandate and

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[847] Margaret Joan Anstee, "Vencer a Desconfiança é um factor chave para a resolução diplomática de conflitos: lições retiradas das negociações para a Paz em Angola", in Angola, a Transição para a Paz, Reconciliação e Desenvolvimento, Manuel Bravo (Eds), Hugin Editores, Lisbon, 1996

resources assigned to the United Nations' operation in Angola (UNAVEM II) as a major factor that could have been avoided. In addition, the unrealistically short time frame for the completion of the complex military and political tasks required by the Accords and the failure to make the holding of the elections conditional on the prior completion of the military clauses are also pointed out as serious shortcomings. Although blame was directed at the parties, the international community and the peace guarantors involved with the implementation of the Peace Treaty cannot be entirely excused, having failed in a number of ways. A first criticism would be the limited international presence, by which is mainly meant UNAVEM II's size, kept to a strict minimum on the insistence of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. As a result UNAVEM II had too little impact on the parties to be able to solve the potential problems and to respond to incidents during the implementation of the treaty.[848] In other areas also the international community made major mistakes. There was no readiness to provide adequate finance to support the socio-economic side of the peace process in a country with great economic potential.

It is evident that the approach to peace relied on the assumption that compromise upon a settlement, reached through a power-bargaining method, and where mediation was essentially meant to complement direct negotiations between the parties, would be sufficient to guarantee a stable way to peace. The 'winner-takes-all' formula adopted meant that,

> ...the party who would loose the election would loose virtually everything since the elections were based on a winner-takes-all concept. The State was the prize and the looser would be left out at every level, not only from government but also from the economic sector.[849]

It is clear that while this mediation effort included some elements of control by the parties themselves, these were not reached upon by an exploratory process able to tackle the structural causes of this conflict. And although the parties were responsible for the attainment of the conditions in the Accords, it seems somewhat naïve to rely on an agreement reached in so short period of time and solely based on a code of mutual honour (what Anstee calls 'scouts honour') to bring and end to the war in Angola.

> ...the Bicesse Accords were based on the assumption that the protracted conflict between the government/MPLA and UNITA would virtually be resolved by the multiple clauses in the Accords, that after all had taken more than a year to be established.[850]

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[848] Peace keeping must have a mandate and resources which reflect the size and nature of the task. Adopting a myopic approach to UN peacekeeping, the Security Council gave UNAVEM II a mandate and resources that underestimated the enormity and complexity of the tasks that lay ahead. The mandate was expanded in March 1992 under Security Council resolution 747 (1992), when the Security Council gave UNAVEM II responsibility for observing the elections, but again (as with the responsibility for monitoring the cease-fire) the responsibility rested with the parties themselves.

[849] Margaret Anstee, Op. Cit.

[850] Ibid.

Chapter 9. Resolution through Problem-Solving?
The Unfulfilled Promises of Power-Sharing

9.1. United Nations Mediation and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol:
Power-Brokerage masquerading as Problem-Solving

> ...we are the Ovimbundu. We have lived 300 years under the humiliation of the north, under Van Dunem and others. We have had enough. The Ovimbundu are 100 per cent behind me and I am prepared to die for them...Dos Santos is not even an Angolan he is from São Tomé. We cannot live under the mulattos and the Kimbundu.[851]

> ...although Savimbi was no doubt a "spoiler" who had failed to make a credible commitment to the peace agreement, it is also apparent that the very structure for holding the elections, with its two-round, winner-take-all design, contributed to Savimbi's incentive to withdraw from the peace process because it made the stakes of winning exceedingly high.[852]

By 31 October 1992 heavy fighting broke out in Luanda between belligerent groups from both sides. Trapped inside the British Embassy, the UN's Special Representative and the British Ambassador tried to obtain a cease-fire agreement and with the intervention of the United Nations' Secretary General, a cease-fire was verbally secured:

> ...the United Nations has just arranged for a cease fire agreement between President Eduardo dos Santos and Dr Jonas M Savimbi. The cease fire will go into effect on 2 November at 00:01 hours local time and will cover the entire territory of the country...the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Miss Margaret J Anstee, has been instructed to work out the modalities of the cease fire arrangements with the two parties...[853]

The negotiation of the modalities of the cease-fire gave Margaret Anstee, in her position as the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the unofficial role of mediator between the government and UNITA. In fact, in a reversal of the government's position vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Special Representative was asked to continue UNAVEM II's verification

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[851] Telephone conversation between John Flynt (UK Ambassador) and Jonas Savimbi after the fights broke out in Luanda. Cited in Margaret Joan Anstee. Orphan of the Cold War. The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93. MacMillan Press LTD, London, 1996, p.277.

[852] Daniel Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 1997, p.135.

[853] Cited in Margaret Anstee, Op. Cit., p.287.

mission and help establish adequate security and legality conditions in the country. In addition, and more importantly for our purposes, to mediate, with the resumption of the war, the government was convinced that nothing short of a sizeable contingent of armed 'Blue Helmets' would be adequate to the task. For Anstee, the priority at this difficult stage became focused on keeping all channels of communication between the two parties open, in an attempt to avoid a return to all-out war. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, in her mediatory role, Anstee ventured into the more substantive role of formulator.

The government was seriously concerned that these events had been planned for a long time. The first indication it had that this could be the case had come in UNITA's withdrawal from the FAA on 3 October. UNITA's refusal to accept the election results had merely been the next logical step on a plan to take power by force. The President believed that UNITA's acts had been informed by a single objective: to take power at any cost-if possible through the ballot box but if that was not attainable then through armed force.[854] To substantiate its claims, the Angolan government had searched UNITA's premises and found hand-written plans (in the hand writing of Salupeto Pena, Jeremias Chitunda and Abel Chivukuvuku) indicating that UNITA had had a well developed plan to take over Luanda as part of a broader fall back strategy in the event of a loss in the elections. In addition, the government had found various locations throughout Luanda that had been occupied by UNITA and stashed with heavy arms.

The mediator considered that the best approach would take the form of face-to-face negotiations between the two sides rather than 'shuttle diplomacy'. Anstee's priority was to convince the two leaders to meet. A pre-negotiation phase began. General N'Dalu was appointed by President dos Santos to head the government's negotiating team. The General proposed four points for discussion if negotiations were to take place: a general declaration covering the cease fire and Savimbi's commitment to dialogue and renunciation of violence; observation of the principles of the Bicesse Accords; acceptance of the election results; commitment to get the United Nations more closely involved in the presidential run-off elections as well as in helping to bring about the formation of a new government.

While UNITA openly called for negotiations and a stronger involvement by the United Nations, the developments on the ground told a different story. Savimbi's perceptions ran high with mistrust and bitterness, as did his reluctance to meet face to face with the President, alleging security reasons. It should be pointed out that the Government was holding captive several UNITA's generals in Luanda, a city now filled with stories of continued slaughter in the slum areas (musseques), of private vengeance killings by the population at large against

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[854] Conversation between President dos Santos, Mig Goulding and Margaret Anstee on Saturday, 7 November 1992. See Margaret Joan Anstee. Orphan of the Cold War. The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93. MacMillan Press LTD, London, 1996, p.302.

Ovimbundu, and even of suspected UNITA sympathisers being thrown from large buildings. Amidst this highly charged atmosphere, Salupeto Pena and Jeremias Chitunda, two prominent UNITA officials, were murdered.

All efforts were being made to bring the two sides back to negotiations. A breakthrough came on 17 November in a letter from Savimbi to Mig Goulding. UNITA's Political Commission had reached the following conclusions:

> 1. UNITA accepts the results of the - admittedly fraudulent and irregular - legislative elections of 29 and 30 September 12992, to allow for the implementation of the peace process as agreed in Bicesse on 31 May 1991.
> 2. UNITA believes it is of utmost importance that the United Nations be increasingly involved in the peace and democracy process in Angola, and that the United Nations adopts the following positions:
> a) effective participation in the consolidation of the cease fire and the maintenance of Peace, through the dispatch of Blue Helmets to Angola as soon as possible
> b) greater involvement of the United Nations in the organisation and verification of the second round of the presidential elections
> c) ensure immediately that all UNITA leaders in the organisation and sympathisers held captive in Luanda be set free, as UNITA has done in other provinces
> d) guarantee the physical integrity of UNITA's leaders, militants and sympathisers, and that of its installations, in order to avoid a repetition of purely genocidal acts as occurred in Luanda, Malange, Benguela, Lobito and Malange.[855]

Pre-negotiations began under the Special Representative mediation. The first meeting was held in Namibe on the 26 of November. The mediator comments that,

> ...my spirits revived when the two sides met. They fell on one another with cries of joy, warm embraces and enquiries about mutual friends and relations, like brothers after a long separation rather than men who only a short while before had been once more fighting to the death. Months later, after several encounters of this kind, I was driven to the conclusion that the family reunion act didn't mean a thing.[856]

The Namibe meeting resulted in a formal declaration by the parties. In this declaration, the two parties confirmed the full acceptance of the validity of the Angolan Peace Accords as the only means of solving the Angolan problem. In addition, they reiterated the need for an effective application of the cease-fire throughout the national territory and the immediate cessation of all offensive movements. Finally, the parties solicited the extension of UNAVEM II's mandate and called for an enlarged quantitative and qualitative involvement.[857]

However, hopes for a continued dialogue between the parties soon vanished when UNITA captured Uíge and Negage just two days after the declaration. UNITA had already occupied 50 of Angola's 164 municipalities and 40 more were reported to be close to occupation. Violence had broken out in M'Banza Congo, Cabinda and Lubango. UNAVEM was forced to

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[855] Letter from Dr Savimbi to Mig Goulding dated the 17 November 1992. See Margaret Anstee, Op. Cit. p.315, 316.

[856] Ibid. p.325.

[857] Excerpts from the Declaration of Nabime, 26 November 1992.

evacuate from Cafunfo (diamond producing region) where heavy fighting was going on. Savimbi claimed that these attacks were a result of local commanders' own initiative, and a consequence of the inability UNITA had in summoning its highest military officials, some of them held by the government in Luanda. This would become a common justification for UNITA gradual occupation of Angola.[858]

The President carried on with the formation of the first Government of the Second Republic, according to the election results. Dos Santos nominated Dr. Marcolino Moco, an Ovimbundu, as Prime Minister, in a clear attempt to send a message to UNITA and the international community. One Ministerial post (Cultural Affairs) and 4 Vice Ministerial posts were reserved for UNITA. Even amidst such highly charged situation, UNITA accepted these nominations and gave the names of its nominees. In a parallel effort to strengthen its military position, the Government launched a limited military action on 30 and 31 December with air force attacks on N'Dalatando. It had no other choice but to continue to pressure UNITA, since this movement had by the end of 1992 secured control of 104 of Angola's 164 municipalities. In addition, the government distributed arms and ammunition to civilians in the major cities.

The country was emerged in war. Fighting raged in Lobito, Benguela, Cuíto/Bié, Ondjiva and Cuito Cuanavale. UNAVEM began its evacuation,

> ...Virtually all our field stations and regional headquarters were in grave danger, and intimidation and deliberate attacks against our personnel were increasing from both sides, though mainly from UNITA.[859]

Under these circumstances, the President demanded that UNITA withdraw from Uíge and Negage as a pre-condition for negotiations. Both sides finally agreed to meet in Addis Ababa, while UNITA continued to consolidate its military advantage. Speculation was high that UNITA was being supplied with men and arms from South Africa and China. On the other hand, the Government was allegedly receiving added supplies from Russia, and the press reported that Portugal and Spain were supplying the Angolan government with capability and equipment to the police.

The fighting reached Huambo and the casualties ran by the hundreds of thousands. Traditionally an Ovimbundu stronghold, UNITAS' resistance to government attacks was fierce. UNITA's conduct was increasingly viewed as unacceptable and the Secretary General report of 21 January 1993 acknowledged that UNITA had unilaterally removed itself from the Bicesse

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[858] In fact, this was reiterated in a fax dated 1st December, from UNITA's Jorge Valentim and General Chilingutila to Vice Foreign Minister Venâncio de Moura, in which it was stated that UNITA reiterated that the attacks on Uíge and Negage were not ordered or known by the Directorate of UNITA, but the initiative of troops that had no contact with UNITA's directorate. Ibid. p.326.

[859] Margaret Anstee, Op. Cit., p.365.

Peace process and that therefore it should be obliged, by force if necessary, to accept the authority of a duly elected government. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General stopped short of a full accusation, sliding into ambiguity by stating that it was in no way condoning UNITA's defiance of the agreement. In this sense, the Secretary General considered that the peace had derailed as a result of 'the failure, often deliberate, of both parties to implement in full the provisions of the Peace Accords relating to the political, military and police matters or to make the necessary efforts to promote national reconciliation'.[860] In a direct appraisal of the role of UNAVEM, the Secretary General considered that the limited role assigned to UNAVEM II in military matters had 'hampered its ability to correct the drift towards non-compliance, which had already become apparent by late 1991'.[861]

The mediator began exerting pressure for a clear international condemnation of UNITA. Anstee recommended that the next Security Council resolution should condemn UNITA for its three major violations of the Peace Accords: initial rejection of the election results and continued rejection of the UN's certification that the elections were generally free and fair; abandonment of the new Angolan armed forces; seizure of at least four provincial capitals and 105 of 164 municipalities. The Special Representative asked for support for the new government, within the Peace Accords and the democratic process; censure of both parties' human rights abuses and a request to all governments to respect the 'triple zero' clause were also included.[862] This stance from the mediator resulted in serious criticism from UNITA, which accused her of being a government's puppet. UNITA's growing distrust of Anstee would eventually result in the Special Representative's resignation.

On the ground, UNITA continued its advances and it had now taken Soyo, an oil port in the north-western part of Angola. It also destroyed much of Luanda's water supply at Quifangongo depriving the capital of electricity and water. On 26 January there were reports of fighting in Menongue and of UNITA concentrating troops at Catengue for an assault on Benguela.

Some progress was achieved as regards a return to negotiations. An agreement was reached on an agenda comprising the reestablishment of the cease-fire; the implementation of the Peace Accords; the role of the United Nations in these areas and in the second round of presidential elections and the release of prisoners. International pressure was mounting on UNITA. On 29 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 804 which singled out UNITA's triple layer of non-compliance: initial rejection of the election results; withdrawal from the new Angolan armed forces; seizure by force of provincial capitals and municipalities as well as the resumption of hostilities. The 'Troika' of observer countries also exerted pressure

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[860] United Nation Secretary General's Report to the Security Council, S/25140 of 21 January 1993, paragraph 33.

[861] United Nation Secretary General's Report to the Security Council, S/25140 of 21 January 1993.

[862] Margaret Anstee, Op. Cit. p. 378.

on UNITA's leadership, threatening that if it didn't comply they would declare UNITA to be outside the law and would call for international support to the Government. This would result in a reversal of the 'triple zero clause' concerning arms supplies to the Government. The United States in particular adopted a stronger stance as regards its ally, in a bipartisan letter from both Houses of Congress expressing dismay over the turn of events in Angola and urging both American recognition of the Government. Recognition of the government in Luanda would be applied if Dr. Savimbi continued his non-compliance.

The parties began negotiations at Addis Ababa on 26 January. However, UNITA's failed to show up at the follow up meeting and on the ground, hostilities escalated in Huambo, which was finally occupied by UNITA on 7 March. A humanitarian catastrophe resulted from the siege of Huambo, as thousands of refugees attempted to reach the coast.[863] This had obvious implications on the Government's progressively hard stance and the President invoked article 51 of the United Nations' Charter in a letter to the Secretary General, demanding that sanctions be imposed upon UNITA.

International efforts continued and during the months of April and May a progressively discredited mediator pressed for negotiations in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The agenda was established having in mind three items: the cease-fire, the completion of the Bicesse Accords and finally, national reconciliation.[864] These talks resulted in agreement by both sides on an expanded role and size for UNAVEM II.

The efforts of the mediator were concentrated on getting agreement on a 'Memorandum of Understanding' to interpret these preliminary decisions. Nevertheless, delaying the negotiations whenever possible, UNITA's refused to quarter its troops until a peace-keeping operation could be established so that it would not loose the territory under its control. However, both the President and the United Nations Security Council required a cease-fire and some demonstration of good faith before authorising the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping troops. According to Paul Hare, at the time special United States envoy to the Angolan Pace Process,

> ...this position represented a total negation of the accords and revealed itself to be unacceptable to the government and to the mediators, because it did not respect the various UN SC resolutions that had asked for the withdrawal of UNITA troops from the areas

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[863] With resolution 811 humanitarian relief (which was already co-ordinated on an ad hoc basis by UNAVEM) became central to UNAVEM's mandate. Anste remarks that two tasks occupied UNAVEM in this respect: setting up a co-ordinated UN operation capable of undertaking the massive humanitarian challenge and organising the immediate distribution of aid with the two contending parties.

[864] The agenda comprised 9 items in total :a cease fire; completion of the Bicesse Accords; national reconciliation (to include broadened participation by UNITA at the national, provincial and local levels); role and size of the UNAVEM; release of all prisoners/detainees through the ICRC; creation of the necessary conditions to permit emergency humanitarian assistance to all Angolans; definition of the powers of provincial administration; guarantees of the security of people and property; freedom of the press.

> occupied since September 1992...this whole question was related to the issue of legitimacy, because the elections had been accepted by the international community has having been 'in general, free and fair', which meant that UNITA was, in fact, assuming a position of rebellion against the legal government of Angola'.[865]

As pointed out previously, UNITA's suspicion of the mediator created added difficulties in the mediation process. This movement became increasingly verbal and derogatory in its condemnation of the Special Representative, making her role untenable. Margaret Anstee finally requested the Secretary General to be replaced. However, while her replacement was meant to be confidential, the government and UNITA became aware of moves to appoint a successor, which further damaged her credibility and therefore the legitimacy of her mediation. Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, former Foreign Minister of Mali, was eventually chosen as the Secretary General's Special Representative to Angola.

In her memoirs, Anstee believes that the only thing that might have helped an agreement was if she had been able to offer even a token Blue Helmet presence to arrive immediately and provide a symbolic international presence to monitor the initial stages of a cease-fire and act as a moral safeguard for the withdrawal of UNITA troops. While the Security Council did not authorise it immediately, even if it had it would take at least six to nine months before a peacekeeping operation could be deployed. The mediator posits,

> ...the talks collapsed upon UNITA's intransigence and the international community's inability to provide the mediator with even a modest lever that might just have broken the deadlock.[866]

The failure of the talks resulted in a harder stance from the Security Council. It condemned UNITA for its continuation of the war on 1 June 1993 at the same time that it praised the government for continuing in its attempts for a political settlement.[867] In addition, on 8 July, the Troika met in Moscow to analyse the Angolan situation. In a ground-breaking decision the 'Troika' considered that as a result of UNITA's military offensive, the Angolan government had the legitimate right to defend itself and therefore could acquire arms. The Troika also recommended that the SC should consider imposing an arms embargo on UNITA as well as the restriction of travel to UNITA members abroad if this movements positions wasn't altered.

In fact, the Security Council's resolution 851, expressed its readiness to consider the imposition of measures under the Charter of the UN, including a mandatory embargo on the sale or supply to UNITA of arms and related material and other military assistance, to prevent UNITA from pursuing its military action. In addition, it recognised the legitimate rights of the Government of Angola and in this regard welcomed the provision of assistance to the Government of Angola in support of the democratic process. Two months later, with no

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[865] Paul Hare. A Ultima Grande Oportunidade para a Paz em Angola. Campo das Letras,1999, p.42.

[866] Margaret Anstee, Op. Cit., p.489.

[867] United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/834.

improvement in the situation, the Security Council declared that UNITA's military actions constituted a 'threat to peace and international security' and under Chapter VII the SC declared that an arms and oil embargo would be imposed on UNITA.[868] Unless the Secretary General saw that a definite cease-fire had been achieved and that agreement had been reached concerning the implementation of the Bicesse agreements, the Security Council would impose further restrictions on travel and commercial transactions from 1 November. Similarly, in an unprecedented move, the Clinton Administration recognised the Angolan Government and established full diplomatic relations.

By mid 1994 the war stood at a standstill and the situation was presenting the characteristics of a 'hurting stalemate'. Without the need to comply with the 'triple zero clause' the Government's army was greatly strengthened by the purchase of $3.5 billion worth of arms and ammunition. Furthermore, it commissioned the retraining of its forces and critical support services to a Pretoria based security firm, Executive Outcomes. In an effort to recapture many of the areas it lost to UNITA in 1992-93, specially UNITA-held diamond mines and strongholds, the government launched sustained offensives. Nevertheless, the prospect of a renewed rural guerrilla war now coupled with conventional warfare that could last for years forced the government to consider the forging of a cease-fire agreement through negotiations. Savimbi also had to reconsider his position in face of growing international and regional pressures. Under the circumstances, for UNITA, continued war would have meant the loss of recently secured territory. In addition, UNITA's supply of military spare parts and fuel ran low. As Ohlson and Stedman remark,

> ...Concessions in conflict resolution did not spring from political goodwill or moral reassessment; instead, they were a consequence of shrinking manoeuvring space resulting from various pressures and leverages wielded by opponents and third parties'[869].

Nevertheless, the way the negotiations evolved evidenced the degree of mistrust. The negotiations dragged on for almost 12 months and were marked by repeated postponements and wars of words between both parties on all questions. Pre-negotiations began in Lusaka in October 1993 under the mediation of United Nations' Special Representative Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye. According to Hare, 'the objective to be reached in Lusaka was to determine whether there were sufficient basis for formal negotiations to be reenacted'.[870] The government sent Vice-Minister for External Relations Joao Miranda to lead its negotiating team as well as two Generals, Helder Vieira Dias 'Kopelika' and Mario Placido Cirilo de Sa, both considered hardliners within the regime. UNITA sent General Paulo Lukamba 'Gato',

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[868] United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/864.

[869] Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman with Robert Davies, The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa. Brookings, 1994.

[870] Paul Hare. Op. Cit., p.54.

also considered a hardliner within the movement and Jorge Valentim and Eugenio Manuvakola. The two parties remained far apart in their objectives for this new effort. The government wanted UNITA to unconditinally accept the election results and withdraw its troops to the quartering areas in accordance with Security Council Resolution 864. UNITA began by accepting the election results but remained adamant that the government should follow its lead and declare a unilateral cease-fire.

The mediator characterised these negotiations as a never ending table-tennis game, with both parties repeatedly stalling the talks in their refusal to accept each other's demands. In order to advance the process, Beye decided to press both parties simulatenously. UNITA should accept the principle of troop withdrawal and the government should declare the cessation of hostilities so that an adequate climate could prevail for the negotiations. In this pre-negotiation session, UNITA's commitment was secured and a date for formal negotiations set. Hare, who had been present at these pre-negotiations, was impressed with the 'dynamic and deliberative approach that Maitre Beye...brought to the talks'. 'He showed balance in the positions he defended and imposed a vigorous discipline in the process', Hare wrote at the time.[871]

There was a great distance between the government and UNITA, both in substantive as well as psychological terms. The government was deeply suspicious of UNITA's real intentions in the Peace Process, based on UNITA's armed rebellion after the elections. In fact, it was fearful that UNITA's real intentions were to delay and protract the negotiations while building up its military and political capabilities. On the other hand, UNITA was highly suspicious of the government, pointing to the massacres in Luanda as evidence its real intentions. Ultimately, the two parties had radically different expectations regarding what the Lusaka talks should accomplish. While the government wanted an agreement signed, under United Nations and the international community's influence that would lead to the disarmament of UNITA, this movement was interested in guaranteeing its political space, security, and some type of territorial autonomy. Ultimately, the only reason why both parties set at the negotiation table was because neither was able to military defeat the other.[872]

The Americans were strongly behind the mediation efforts of Maitre Beye. Moreover, after several months of 'shuttle diplomacy' and intense effort to bring the parties once again to the negotiation table, Beye finally saw his efforts come to light when the parties met on 15 November 1993 in the official plenary session of the Lusaka Peace Talks. The pre-negotiation phase had provided the mediator with the general principles that would guide the Lusaka negotiations. To this regard, the parties scheduled discussions around: military issues (re-

[871] Paul Hare. Op. Cit., p.55.

[872] Ibid. p.55,56.

establishment of the cease-fire; withdrawal, confinement and demilitarisation of all UNITA military forces; disarmament of the entire civilian population; completion of the creation of the FAA, including demobilization); the police; the United Nations' mandate, the role of 'Observers' and the Joint Commission; national reconciliation and finally, the completion of the electoral process. Substantial work would therefore have to be done to translate these general principles into concrete measures.

The Mediation Process: Procedural and Tactical Issues

The Lusaka process included the United Nations' mediation team and delegations from each of the 'Troika' countries. The United Nations' team was headed by Maitre Beye; the Portuguese delegation by Ambassador Joao Rocha-Paris; the American delegation by Paul Hare and the Russian delegation by Ambassador Yuri Kapralov. The two parties sent different delegations from the pre-negotiation talks. UNITA's delegation was now headed by General Dembo, Vice-President of UNITA, and comprised General Ben-Ben (Chief of Staff) as well as Eugenio Manuvakola, Jorge Valentim and General Paulo Lukamba 'Gato'. This delegation also included Isaias Samakuva (UNITA's representative in London) as well as General Jacinto Bandua. The government's delegation was headed by Fernando Faustino Muteka and included the Vice-Minister for External Relations Joao Miranda, General Helder Vieira Dias 'Kopelika' and General Mario Placido Cirilo de Sa 'Ita'. Muteka's deputy was General Higino Carneiro, who also acted as the delegation's spokesperson.

Like Margaret Anstee, Paul Hare comments that when the two sides met, the 'occasion seemed more like the reunion of brothers long apart then a meeting between two ferocious enemies' and that 'it was surrealist, as if the twenty years of bloody civil war where numerous lives were lost, did not happen'.[873] The American Special Representative comments that the methodology followed in the negotiations was 'aristotelic' and at times difficult to follow. For each topic in the agenda (which later became sections or annexes of the Protocol), the two parties first had to agree on what they termed 'General Principles', following which they would discuss and negotiate on 'Specific Principles'. The final stage involved the operationalisation of the specific principles, which was the most difficult phase. In order to speed up this process, the parties were asked to submit a written appraisal and critique of the points in the agenda, and if possible propose alternative suggestions.

The mediator followed a typical diplomatic negotiation strategy of leaving the most difficult questions for last. Underlying such 'step-by-step' approach is the belief that in this way the mediator can develop confidence and trust between the parties, which eventually leads to an easier negotiation of more difficult questions. Under the guidance of the mediator, the two

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[873] Paul Hare. Op. Cit., p.60.

teams began by discussing and agreeing on the agenda for the talks. The negotiations began on military issues. The military representative of the United Nations mediation team lead these negotiations, aided by the military attaches of the three observer countries. Compared to other issues during the process, these negotiations proceeded relatively smoothly, a fact that Hare considers a consequence of the straightforward nature of military people as compared to politicians. The two parties agreed on the modalities for the cease-fire, particularly the need to cease all hostilities, and on the need for a peacekeeping force to supervise its implementation.

The most difficult issue, as had happen in Bicesse, was the demilitarisation of UNITA. The mediation team wanted to prevent UNITA from keeping its troops ready to return to war. UNITA was highly sensitive to the issue of its demilitarisation, a topic which carried enormous psychological weight within its ranks. The mediator agreed with the Americans in believing that such important question could not be left unresolved, even if it meant the abandonment of the talks by both parties. According to Hare, the 'Troika' of observers was of the same opinion. Eventually, the military questions were resolved on 11 December, leaving only the issue of the size of the future combined Angolan Armed Forces to be discussed.[874]

Repeated delays in the negotiations made the mediator increasingly aware of the impossibility of the conclusion of an agreement before the end of 1993. Two and a half months had passed since the beginning of the Lusaka process, and only two issues had been agreed upon. Hare posits that even though the mediation team kept on reminding the parties that they should increase the pace of the negotiations, 'this pressure produced little results'. In fact, the mediator gave up on the idea of establishing and publicly announcing deadlines for they were never respected. In addition, the Special representative of the United States considers that UNITA 'was the main culprit in the delay of the talks', employing a 'variety of tactics to delay the talks'. He believed that this tactic was meant to 'result in tiredness in the opposition and the mediators...as a way to obtain additional concessions'. Speculation was that UNITA was deliberately delaying the process to gain time and strengthen its forces, with funds from the recently captured diamond producing areas of Cafunfo. In addition, Hare points out that it was common to speculate that UNITA was waiting for the results of the elections in South Africa in order to better access the chances of a return to large scale warfare in the country.[875]

Nevertheless, these two and half months had imprinted a certain routine in the mediation process. The agreement on the military and police issues had given hope to the mediator that other issues could be also agreed and that the parties were not just negotiating as a tactic to

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[874] Paul Hare. Op. Cit., p.67.

[875] Ibid. p.72.

return to war. Procedurally, and with the exception of the opening session and the signature of agreements reached, negotiations were held in small meeting rooms mostly between the mediator and each of the parties. Very rarely did the parties negotiate face to face, and in the most serious meetings only the mediator and the head of delegation of each party met. As Hare points out, 'Beye and the observers used all formats imaginable during the negotiations, depending on their evaluation of the usefulness of each approach at each stage'. Beye 'commanded unequivocally the negotiations' and while the delegations complained at times about his 'iron' tactics and his tendency to impose discipline, they did not question Beye's approach and neither did the observers who supported the mediator from the start. The mediator also supported the 'Troika' and kept it unified.[876]

The negotiations entered the difficult phase of the political aspects while hostilities were escalating on the ground with the government's capture of Ambriz, on the northern coast of Angola, and the bombing of Huambo. On 17 February agreement was finally reached on the 'General Principles' of national reconciliation, which now abandoned the 'winner-takes-all' formula of Bicesse and confirmed the participation of UNITA in a government of unity and national reconciliation. Nevertheless, when the parties set to negotiate the specific principles, they deadlocked on several issues, namely on the specifics of UNITA's participation in government and administrative structures. These questions were of such sensitivity that the mediator decided to leave the two parties to negotiate them on their own, without the presence of anyone else.

However, the parties were not able to achieve any concrete decisions and the mediator was called back to help achieve some sort of agreement. 'The mediators did not have any possibility than to get involved', Hare says, even though they did not want to be involved in proposing a formula on such sensitive matters. The discussions seemed to take a long time when they concerned Ministerial and other central government posts, and proposals and counter-proposals were put forward. The mediator and the observers flew to Huambo to talk directly with Jonas Savimbi to press for a swift resolution of this issue. After this consultation, the negotiations continued with a new UNITA proposal on the table, but no agreement was reached. UNITA continued to insist on the number of posts at municipal and provincial level, in particular the governorship of Huambo, and the government consistently refused to consider UNITA's demands.

The Americans decided at this point to use some leverage to pressure President Dos Santos to consider the revised proposal. To this effect, Beye sent the Angolan President at different times, two letters from President Bill Clinton. He also sent the President a letter from the

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[876] Ibid. p.74.

United Nations' Secretary General. The President was unmoved. In addition, hostilities escalated in the northern Provinces and as a result the mediator and his team were increasingly disappointed with the way that the negotiations were proceeding. Just before the Security Council meeting, Dos Santos instructed his delegation in Lusaka to proceed with minor changes to its stance. And although the changes had been essentially cosmetic, the mediation and the observers had no choice but to agree and propose them to UNITA. The mediator and the observers decided to give these proposals directly to Jonas Savimbi, and the team flew to Huambo to meet UNITA's leader. However, Savimbi did not detract from the governorship of Huambo, a traditional Ovimbundu stronghold.

The mediation had once again reached an impasse. Yet, anticipating this they had thought about the possibility of calling on President Nelson Mandela to intervene. To achieve this, the team went to Pretoria and met Mandela who made himself available to help the process. Nevertheless, UNITA was increasingly disillusioned with the process. Hostilities on the ground had once again escalated with the FAA concentrating in the northern regions while UNITA focused on the south and western areas. In fact, Hare wrote to Washington considering that 'although the two parties are responsible for the resumption of fighting, the government, in my opinion, has the main responsibility in the disaster that we are witnessing because it initiated its 'super-offensive' in the north'.[877] Nevertheless, the Security Council considered the possibility of increasing sanctions on UNITA if the now termed 28 May proposals were not accepted. Hare posits that,

> ...the change in the balance of forces had a direct impact on the progress and substance of the negotiations. While UNITA evidenced little engagement during the initial phase of the negotiations, the government reduced its progress to give more time to its armed forces to conquer additional ground and provincial capitals...in their respective negotiating tactics, each side attempted to present itself as in a superior position...Huambo was a symbol that reflected the relative balance of forces of each side...although advances and the content of the negotiations were fundamentally determined by the dynamics of the battle field, the voice of the international community, demanding the blood shed, helped to create the atmosphere and the end result.[878]

Outcome Assessment

After more than twelve months of intensive negotiations, the Lusaka protocol was signed on 20 November 1994. Although Jose Eduardo dos Santos was there to sign it, UNITA's Jonas

[877] See Paul Hare. Op. Cit., p.99.

[878] Ibid. p.103.

Savimbi did not show up. Hare claims that Savimbi did not show up at the signature of the accords because after a preliminary approval of the Protocol in October 1994, the government had in fact initiated large-scale military operations to conquer several critical cities at the centre of territory controlled by UNITA, namely Huambo. This military campaign was strongly criticised by the international community and the United States, exasperated with the government's disrespect to the Lusaka process. The conditions were humiliating for UNITA, and Savimbi did not want to be seen as being cornered into an agreement that was a true rendition. Eugenio Antonino Manuvakola, the main negotiator signed the accord on Savimbi's behalf.[879]

On the government's side, the Lusaka Protocol was signed by Venancio da Silva Moura Minister of External Relations as well as by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Alioune Blondin Beye. The signature was undertaken in the presence of representatives of the Observer countries (US, Russia and Portugal). The Lusaka Protocol clearly specifies that its adoption is necessary for the conclusion of the implementation of the 'Peace Accords for Angola' signed at Bicesse on 31 May 1991, as well as for the normal and regular functioning of the institutions that resulted from the elections of 29 and 30 September 1992. In this sense, both parties formally re-accept the validity of the 'Peace Accords' as well as all relevant Security Council Resolutions up to that date.[880]

The Lusaka Protocol was based on a balance between two fundamental aspects: the disarmament of UNITA and its transformation as a political party and, the granting of political space to UNITA by guaranteeing its participation in a government of unity and national reconciliation. By reaffirming the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords, the protocol set forth the details of a cease-fire, a second round of presidential elections, demilitarisation, disarmament, the formation of a unified army and national police force, and national reconciliation. The protocol's general principles emphasised the importance of re-establishing central control over the country's security forces while carefully providing confidence-building measures meant to reassure UNITA and its supporters. Only after the quartering of UNITA military forces had been concluded would UNITA generals be returned to the FAA and the selection of UNITA troops for the FAA begin. The mandate as well the size of the UN peace-keeping operation in Angola, now renamed UNAVEM III was considerably enlarged. UN Security Council resolution 976 of February 1995 authorised the establishment of UNAVEM III and approved the deployment of up to 7000 peacekeeping troops. UNAVEM III was to have a

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[879] Ibid. p.20.

[880] The Lusaka Protocol is formed by 10 annexes: (1) Agenda for the Angola Peace talks between the Government and UNITA; (2) Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments; (3) Military Issues I; (4) Military Issues II; (5) Police; (6) National Reconciliation; (7) Completion of the Electoral Process; (8) the UN mandate, the role of the Observers of the 'Peace Accords' and the Joint commission; (9) timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol; (10) Other matters.

much more far-reaching mandate than UNAVEM II [881].

The Lusaka Protocol envisaged a form of power-sharing to promote national reconciliation. By providing for its participation in government, the loosing side was given an important stake in the peace process. As well as assigning important ministerial and other posts to UNITA, the government offered one of two new vice-presidential posts to Jonas Savimbi. The Lusaka Protocol also provided for the 70 UNITA deputies elected in 1992 to take their seats in the National Assembly, and for the participation of UNITA officers and troops in the national armed forces. An important measure was the provision for administrative decentralisation and the holding of elections for local officials.

The international community also helped by giving the initial impetus for fund-raising through a round table conference organised under the auspices of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) in Brussels to gather funds for the reconstruction of Angola and the demobilisation and disarming of troops. By inviting states as well as international organisations, NGO's as well as private enterprises, it was intended to demonstrate and emphasise that the entire international community has a responsibility here and can make an important contribution to Angola's development. And yet,

> ...continuing mutual distrust has been illustrated by the tortuous nature of talks in the Joint Commission and by long delays in implementing key parts of the Lusaka Protocol.[882]

The Lusaka Protocol enjoyed a relative degree of success in its first year, despite numerous delays in implementation. While the cease-fire was respected allowing for a degree of humanitarian relief to be deployed to the close to 3 million people in need, the divisions between the two belligerents continued unabated. In April 1997, the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation was sworn in and UNITA saw 11 of its officials given government posts. UNITA actively maintained a combat ready army, paying lip service to demobilisation and despite United Nations' sanctions was able to secure large shipments of arms paying them with diamonds from areas under its control. According to some sources, UNITA was receiving up to US$400 million a year from the illegal trade in diamonds. By spring 1997, UNITA had not demilitarise and demobilise its troops and the government had not extended control over the totality of the country.

Sadly, Maitre Beye was killed in a plane crash in June 1998. By December 1999, the Lusaka Protocol was officially dead and the war re-started again in Angola. As was discussed in

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[881] It would have direct responsibility for a wider range of monitoring and verification tasks in the military field, UN troops were to control the UNITA quartering areas and take custody of UNITA weapons, becoming directly involved in the process of disarming UNITA troops.

[882] Saferworld. Op. Cit.

chapter 7 above, in an unprecendented development, this latest phase of the war finally ended three decades of high intensity armed conflict in this southern African country.

Conclusion: The Role of Conflict Analysis *in* Conflict Resolution:

Understanding the Obstacles to and the Resolution of Contemporary Armed Conflicts

In the opening pages of this thesis we considered that, in face of the growing number of armed conflicts worldwide and their increasing complexity, conflict resolution theory development is an imperative. That such an imperative has already resulted in the development of a number of specific methodologies for the resolution of contemporary armed conflicts was optimistically evaluated in a conflict landscape constituted by wars which are structurally different. However, only a fraction of these conflicts have benefited from the application of these new and innovative approaches to conflict resolution. As was discussed in the previous pages, the 'Clausewitzian universe' continues to exert its influence and 'conflict resolution' at the international level ostensibly remains characterised by dispute settlement processes, achieved through the use of international negotiation tools such as bargaining. 'Conflict resolution' is overwhelmingly about power brokerage between groups in conflict.

Nevertheless, as was previously pointed out, contemporary armed conflicts are notoriously resistant to such 'resolution' methods and in some cases they have contributed to the very protractedness of contemporary wars. We therefore set out to answer the question of why should contemporary conflicts be so fundamentally incompatible with resolution by negotiation and bargaining. Equally important, we endeavoured in uncovering the reasons behind practitioners' insistence on such processes, when they have repeatedly proven inadequate in the resolution of current wars.

We found that at the root of this problem is the issue of conflict analysis. In fact, we realised that understanding those two different issues required a discussion of the assumptions upon which conflict resolution theory has been developed and the underlying beliefs of practitioners involved in conflict resolution. Conflict analysis and the way armed conflicts are explained have been at the root of both the development of conflict resolution theory as well as underlying actions towards conflict resolution. As was previously discussed, the development of conflict resolution theory has stemmed largely from a radical revision of the parameters of conflict analysis. The realisation of the specific nature of contemporary conflicts prompted the development of resolution methodologies that emphasise the facilitated analysis of underlying also termed structural sources of conflict. That such methodologies, based on problem-solving as an overarching approach to the resolution of violent conflicts, are theoretically very advanced while still only marginally used, emphasise the imperative of explaining why.

This wide gap between theory and practice is most evident in the fact that the resolution processes parties engage in deviate substantially from what is implied by problem-solving. The various chapters on mediation in Angola clearly evidenced the continuing prevalence of a realist 'power-brokerage through bargaining' approach typical of conventional inter-state dispute resolution processes. While, as was previously discussed, intermediaries in a mediatory capacity may play a critical role in 'guiding' conflict resolution in the direction of strategies and tactics that promote such facilitated analysis of underlying sources of conflict, an essential pre-requisite for relationship transformation and therefore sustainable peace, the reality shows that mediators in many occasions view their task as merely a complement to direct negotiation between belligerents. This was evident in Crocker's mediation of the New York Accords, Barroso's mediation of the Bicesse Peace Accords and Maitre Beye's mediation of the Lusaka Protocol. Why?

In the vast majority of cases, the resolution of conflict between disputants is perceived as being, first and foremost, a result of the parties' own interaction through negotiation. In this sense, while intermediaries in a mediatory capacity have the potential to incorporate a problem-solving orientation in their choices regarding mediation strategies and tactics as well as substantive proposals, this potential is a function of the mediator's own ideas about the conflict and ensuing perceptions on the possibilities for its resolution. The ways in which intermediaries analyse a conflict situation is ever present in the reasons for mediatory involvement, of mediatory choices regarding tactics and strategies during mediation processes and finally, of mediator's assessment of outcomes.

Consequently, while the theoretical development of conflict resolution has resulted in advanced and detailed approaches to the resolution of 'new wars' and 'wars of third kind', these developments have not translated into the practical world of conflict resolution because practitioners remain limited by analytical frameworks which regard armed conflicts as disputes about interests amenable to resolution by bargaining.

Yet, contemporary armed conflicts are notoriously resistant to resolution by processes based on bargaining or concession/convergence, such as conventional negotiation, as well as processes reliant on the authoritative decision of an external party, in the form of an arbiter or a judge. Again, conflict analysis is at the root of explaining why. Consequently, in order to understand the obstacles that prevent groups in conflict to come to an agreement by bargaining or submit to a decision by an external party, the application of the 'multi-level' analytical framework developed in chapter four above is fundamental. It is here that the inextricable links between analysis and 'resolution' become clear, demonstrating unambiguously the requirement to think about armed conflicts in the holistic fashion provided by such framework.

At the individual, decision-making level, there are several factors that may constitute obstacles to the resolution of contemporary conflicts by adversarial, bargaining based as well as authoritative means. It has been pointed out by several authors that leaders in 'new wars' are a crucial factor in frustrating negotiated agreements or preventing engagement in negotiation processes. For instance, the commitment of particular leaders to the struggle may create a situation where their personalities and perceptions become intertwined to a high degree with the original objectives of the conflict. In such situations, because the struggle itself becomes indistinguishable from the personal objectives of leaders, the choice to continue hostilities may be based solely on these leaders' perceptions as regards their status and position rather then on the original goals of the struggle. In the Angola case, Jonas Savimbi's continued refusal to abide by agreements he himself undertook is a case in point.

In some cases, leaders might perceive that although the costs of continuing the conflict are extremely high and that a victory is unlikely, a negotiated settlement would constitute an even less desirable outcome. The 'zero-sum' perception or 'all-or-nothing' mentality that pervades contemporary conflicts helps explain choices by leaders that may be considered by outside observers as irrational. This constitutes a serious obstacle in attempts at negotiating an end to such conflicts. In addition, intra-group politics and leadership struggles are also potent obstacles to the negotiation of conflicts. For instance, the way in which bureaucratic politics affect the definition of policies and tactics at the level of an incumbent strongly affect the choices towards the continuation of war or movement towards peace. Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces establishments and the like constitute interest groups in their own right, affecting the development of policy options at the top. This was evident during the negotiation of the New York Accords, where MPLA's more hawkish factions continuously pressured President Dos Santos not to negotiate with the Americans.

At the level of the conflict group, several factors may explain the refusal to end a conflict by negotiation. As was previously noted, a conflict group's characteristics such as size, composition and ideological outlook are fundamental elements in understanding the choices of particular approaches to conflict, including naturally, conflict resolution. Many contemporary conflicts are characterised by high degrees of asymmetry, a condition considered highly unconducive to negotiation. This is particularly the case in situations where the conflict is between incumbent and secessionist groups, as was the war in Angola. As was previously seen, at every stage during the three mediation processes, both parties consistently attempted to increase their leverage in the negotiation table by escalating hostile behaviour, acquiring weapons and stalling. Power-brokerage inevitably leads to the belief that symmetry increases the possibilities for resolution. However, the vast majority of contemporary conflicts do not evidence such symmetry, and consequently, conflict groups increase and escalate

levels of hostilities in the belief that the military situation on the ground will represent the best leverage they can have at the negotiating table. The human and material costs of such escalation are usually catastrophic.

In addition, levels in size and organisation of conflict groups in 'new wars' also differ substantially, and this situation may cause mistrust and suspicion constituting a serious obstacle to conflict resolution through bargaining. The difference in status of conflict groups (both in relation to the way each views its opponent as well as the perceptions of third parties and external actors) affects the willingness of parties to resolve their differences peacefully. In conflicts between incumbent and insurgent groups, for example, the legitimacy enjoyed by governments as a result of international recognition can constitute a serious obstacle since negotiating with insurgent groups would imply recognition of belligerency. As was discussed, at the root of delays in the Bicesse Peace Process was the question of the MPLA's recognition of UNITA as a legitimate movement.

In addition, as was discussed in chapter 3.2. above dedicated to 'resource wars', both conflict groups as well as external groups and neighbouring countries may have a vested economic interest in the continuation of hostilities. An important reason for the intractability of contemporary armed conflict relates, as was pointed out, to the economic incentives for the continuation of violence. This has been observed in many conflicts that have a strong component of natural resource illegal appropriation, as is the case in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, among others.

Moreover, all the factors mentioned above may contribute in isolation or combination to the unwillingness of conflict parties to put down their weapons, cease hostilities and peacefully resolve their conflicts. Nevertheless, is this unwillingness solely related to adversarial, authoritative or concession/convergence approaches to 'conflict resolution'? What is the basic incompatibility that exists between the characteristic form of contemporary conflict and such conflict resolution methodologies?

In conclusion, the type if issues at the basis of a vast number of contemporary conflicts (self-determination aiming for independence, autonomy, secession or the control or participation in government) are not suited for methods which apply a 'split the difference' approach or an authoritative decision. Identity issues (ethnicity, race, nationalism) seem to be more difficult to resolve then economic or political issues, for they provoke deeper levels of commitment and are harder to compromise making second-best settlements unattractive to parties playing for ultimate stakes. In fact, ontological differences in adversaries' views of issues is at the root of conflict intractability. In chapter four we pointed out that understanding specific variables that are produced by conflict processes themselves was critical if a proper evaluation of the

relationship between different variables located at different levels is to be achieved. We followed Sandole in considering that in fact, 'conflict-as-process' may become more important for the purposes of resolution than understanding the conditions prevailing at the beginning of a conflict. In fact, we found two characteristics of contemporary conflicts to be critical in explaining 'conflict-as-process' variables: their long duration and their severity, both highly salient.

The particularly high levels of violence in contemporary armed conflicts has led a number of authors to consider that these conflicts' cycles are characterised more by processes of attack and retaliation on the basis of quasi-deterministic spirals than a result of the 'rational' pursuit of conflict parties' original goals. Feelings of anger, hatred, resentment, fear and desire for revenge as a result of conflict itself constitute in many instances sufficient reasons for fighting. As a result of the reciprocal nature of spirals, these subjective elements constitute strong obstacles to negotiations and the resolution of these conflicts. The 'security dilemma' that results from processes of anticipation of a 'zero-sum' nature adds to the unwillingness of parties to consider negotiation, in particular as regards agreements on cease-fires as well as demobilisation of fighting forces. Again this was evident in the Angola conflict. Without proper guarantees from an impartial enforcement authority and in situations where mistrust is high, conflict parties simply pay lip service to the demobilisation of their combatants, maintaining hidden forces in case the adversary party retreats in its commitment to peace.

In addition, because some of these 'process' elements tend to be stronger in conflicts with a strong identity component, there is an element of irrationality to these conflicts and in many cases a conflict group's motives for continuing the struggle and its assessment of the costs are less a matter of rational calculation and more a question of blind sentiment. As was discussed in chapter 3.2. 'subjective rationality' rather than 'irrationality' must be taken into account in order to understand some of the obstacles to the termination of these conflicts. In this regard, the fact that conflict groups may evaluate a struggle's potential benefits prospectively while viewing the potential costs retrospectively provide clues to the reasons behind their apparent intractability.

Finally, from the point of view of conflict resolution, the impact of 'conflict-as-process' *per se,* strongly alerts us to the 'red herring' that King talked about when referring to 'root causes' presented by conflict groups as justifications for their struggle. 'Root causes' must therefore be placed in context with the numerous other factors that result from 'conflict-as-process', contributing to explaining the unwillingness of parties to resolve their differences through adversarial, bargaining or authoritative processes.

The need for bringing conflict analysis *back in* the debate is clear.

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