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Education and London Missionary Society

policy in their Cape and Bechuana missions

from 1800 to 1925.

A thesis presented for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department  
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at Canterbury.

by

JOHN GOULSTONE GEORGE

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## ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with the origins and implementation of the London Missionary Society's educational policy in southern Africa during the nineteenth century. Education is understood in this context to comprehend not only formal schooling, but informal processes of acculturation for African peoples in mission stations and institutions, including the political activity of missionaries facilitating such transformations. This definition is in line with general objectives of Protestant mission education (the Edinburgh Missionary Conference, 1910 - the Burton Commission, 1922 - Goodall, 1954), which were intended to foster personal evangelisation; to produce indigenous Christian leaders; to develop just, moral communities of Christian converts.

Van der Kemp, the first L.M.S. missionary leader was "sui generis" but his Khoi (Hottentot) policy was adapted by John Philip (Cape Superintendent from 1821-1854), a "developer" and humanitarian imperialist. Philip advocated formal schooling and informal acculturation of Khoi peoples, so that, occupying "buffer" states (the Kat River Protectorate and Griqualand), their newly-acquired Christian values, and entrepreneurial attitudes could filter through to the African peoples beyond. To clarify Philip's strategy, two L.M.S. proselytising traditions - here termed "dialectic" and "dialogic" - are analysed.

David Livingstone, inspired by John Philip, perceived that Tswana society had to alter radically if it was to accept in any viable way the missionary message, however, Robert Moffat's Bechuana Mission was culturally conservative, apolitical and evangelical. Formal schooling there was weak, Tswana resistance to Christian evangelisation continuous. The Moffat Institute, Kuruman, failed to galvanize schools or the Mission, and John MacKenzie (first Principal of the Moffat Institution) became professionally involved in colonial politics in his wish to advance humanitarian imperialism for Mackenzie was convinced L.M.S. expansion could occur only in the wake of white colonisation in the region.

From mid-century onwards, socio-economic changes altered southern and northern Tswana society. Demand for mission education increased, but L.M.S. mission education was underfunded as well as devoid of a purposeful executive. Northern Tswana chiefs, particularly Khama III of the Bamangwato, wanted their chiefly power to survive the impact of cultural revolution and strove to control the Christian Church to effect this. W.C. Willoughby, Palapye missionary, subsequently first Principal of the L.M.S. Tiger Kloof Institution, Vryburg from 1904, encouraged formal education and saw, as did previous "dialogic" missionaries, education, particularly industrial education, in a "tribe/nation context." Political conflicts with Khama focused his concerns for Tswana cultural adaptation.

In terms of the general objectives of Protestant mission education noted above, it can be concluded that in Southern Africa L.M.S. formal schooling varied in quantity and quality; the society neglected training African leaders until late in the century, so curtailing its potential educational influence; but there existed among a number of influential L.M.S. missionaries an effective, practical concern to create a just, moral "nation" of converts - adapted to white values and appropriate economic activity - within a humane colonial integument.



## PREFACE

I would like to thank the librarians of the following institutions for their assistance: Christ Church College, Canterbury; the University of Kent at Canterbury; the School of Oriental and African Studies, London; St. Augustine's College, Canterbury; Rhodes House, Oxford; the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham. I am indebted to the Principal and Governors of Christ Church College, Canterbury, for a sabbatical year. My special thanks are due to Professor David Birmingham of the University of Kent at Canterbury for his kind supervision and lively encouragement.

To continue on a more personal note. I looked initially into the L.M.S. archives to establish half-remembered memories of childhood conversations about a great-uncle - my paternal grandmother's brother - the Revd. William Hopkyn Rees, who had been a pioneer missionary for the Society in Chi Chau, Northern China, from the eighteen-eighties onwards. Born in Cwmavon, South Wales in 1859, he, like many of his missionary contemporaries, came from a working-class family and possessed no formal qualifications. In Chi Chau, he witnessed with his family, the violent Boxer Uprising, his letters to the Society providing a valuable historical record and narrative structure to the complex events. He then taught at the Peking United Theological College, where his skills in spoken and written Chinese involved him in the revision of the translation of the Old Testament into Mandarin; eventually, he succeeded Timothy Richard as Secretary of the Christian Literature Society of China. When ill-health forced his return to Great Britain in 1921, he became, until his death in 1924, Reader, then Professor of Chinese at S.O.A.S.

Hopkyn Rees enjoyed direct evangelising in the streets and gospel halls of Northern China, where his 'hwyl' and command of the vernacular were used to good effect. Nevertheless, this was not the core of his mission strategy, as his respect for Chinese culture convinced him that the only way forward was by a dialogue between this oriental heritage and the newly-arrived Christian Gospel. The proper name for this dialogue was education. This view of mission advance in India and China was shared by other mission personnel, as well as the L.M.S. Directorate, and the Society committed a considerable portion of its resources to schools and colleges; so much so, that at one time, more radical evangelising opinion within the Society, thought too much money was being spent on this branch of mission work. Generally speaking, however, teaching and preaching were seen as mutually supportive processes, and many, along with Hopkyn Rees, gave themselves to both.

From this family research, the value of education in evangelising became a useful concept, but there was so much archival material available that some geographical selectivity became necessary. The Cape, Caffraria and Bechuana missions of the L.M.S. in Southern Africa became more and more attractive as a study, not only because of the charismatic leadership in the field, but because of the complex challenges and resonances - political, cultural, ideological - that existed there.

This study's early chapters attempt to look at the Congregational background of the L.M.S. and educational policy of the Society in other parts of the world, in order to provide some sort of touchstone for its Southern African activities.

Mission problems inevitably varied in different parts of the world,

but a conviction that schools were important was shared by the L.M.S. African agents. It is true that one group of these missionaries, - (they have been termed 'dialectic' in this study) - saw spiritual awakening and a conversion experience as more valuable in African converts than intellectual enlightenment, but even they supported schools in their mission. Certainly people of the calibre of van der Kemp, John Philip and David Livingstone considered schools and training institutions vital for the L.M.S.'s effective expansion.

Schools policy is not only of concern 'per se', for this aspect of the Mission's function can cast an oblique, but revealing light on a host of other policy issues - how the L.M.S. and its agents viewed African cultures and peoples; how they saw the role of a foreign mission in an alien culture; evangelising strategies; pre-suppositions about European Civilization and Christianity in mission confrontation in Africa; political rights of converts in a white, colonial society; mission and Empire; even the nature of Christian beliefs themselves. Both areas - school/education policy and the assumptions that such a policy unearths - are worthy of study.

Some comment on the time-distance dimension of this study is relevant here, for both are considerable. Over a hundred years and many hundreds of miles are involved - from van der Kemp to Khama; from Bethelsdorp to Serowe. It is almost inevitable that such a broad focus will reveal weaknesses in coverage, and even comprehension, of specific issues at specific times; but, hopefully, the reward should be generous, as it should be possible to make some sensible judgements upon an important Missionary Society's response over a substantial period of time and place to its tasks. We should expect some answers to queries about the

L.M.S. evangelising policy in southern Africa during this time - policy origins, growth, their implementation and adaptation to different circumstances and so on.

I would like to thank my wife and children for sharing my mission concerns over the years with affectionate forbearance. Well may they have cried on many occasions, "What are the Griquas, Coranas and Xhosa to us, and what are we to the Griquas, Coranas and Xhosa?", but they didn't. I hope they think my task and their silence was worth while.

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#### NOTE

Material from the London Missionary Society archives is designated by box, folder and wallet. For example, Box 21, folder 3 and wallet B is given as 21/3/B. The correspondent, residence and date are added whenever possible and relevant.

The two Missions examined in detail are those of the CAPE and the BECHUANA.



## CHAPTER ONE

### Origins and background of the Society

.... "It is declared to be a fundamental principle of the Missionary Society, that our design is not to send Presbyterianism, Independency, Episcopacy or any other form of Church order and Government (about which there may be difference of opinions among serious persons), but the glorious Gospel of the blessed God, to the Heathen...."

- from the Fundamental Principle  
of the London Missionary Society,  
adopted at the first annual meeting  
in May, 1796.

Founded in 1795, the London Missionary Society emerged from the intense yet amorphous Evangelical revival that characterized the religious life of British Protestantism during this period and, like the other Protestant Mission societies of northern Europe and north America, it expanded steadily with modest success in Africa, China, India and some of the Pacific islands. As the nineteenth century elapsed, these mission bodies became integral parts of domestic Protestantism to be nurtured by funds and personnel from respective denominational groups - Congregational, Wesleyan Methodist, Primitive Methodist, Baptist, Scottish Presbyterian, Anglican and so on.

It would be inaccurate to think of such missions in narrow ecclesiastical terms for more than just spiritual factors were involved in their foundation and sustenance. Many of the leaders and everyday supporters were involved in banking, trade and commerce and were politically literate. Not only that, but the Evangelical revival was playing an important part in the British Anti-Slavery movement, and the political muscles that the abolitionists were flexing were not going to be easily relaxed. When the Slave Trade was abolished, it was natural that the moral indignation that had been aroused would find other channels in which to flow, and one of these channels was African missions. African missions became extensions of the abolitionist polemic, and the re-settlement of the slaves and their families, their material and spiritual well-being in their African homelands became an area of evangelical concern and activity. Thus it was that the missionary factor became an active element in the political as well as the spiritual life of the nation, and the Exeter Hall lobby - Exeter Hall was the Strand assembly hall where Protestant missionaries were commissioned and publicly feted - became a significant political pressure group in the early nineteenth century.

One of the characteristics of the mission theology of the majority of L.M.S. agents in the Cape was the incorporation into it of secular and material considerations, that at first sight would seem irrelevant. For example, to pioneer missionaries like John Philip and David Livingstone, a Christian mission that did not insist on the civil liberties and political rights of their converts in a White Settler community was unthinkable. Such a comprehensive mission theology was specifically expressed in phrases such as "humanitarian imperialism" and "Commerce and Christianity".

L.M.S. missionaries such as John Philip, David Livingstone and John Mackenzie supported the expansion of the British Empire in southern Africa provided that the mission converts were protected in law against attacks on their freedom by the Boers and White Settlers. In their writings, these humanitarian imperialists saw a just and Christian British Empire as the best guarantee for mission expansion, and as a protection for the acculturation of their African converts. But Christian mission not only comprehended politics, it comprehended commerce as well. "Commerce and Christianity" (or "Bible and the Plough") was also an important part of L.M.S. advocacy in the Cape and southern Africa. Tribalism had to be destroyed, and replaced by European commerce, and all that went with it, especially a European middle class life-style and set of values. The L.M.S. argument was that it was only on such a basis of personal civil liberty, political obligations and middle class expectations, that Christianity could survive and propagate. In this process, formal education in their mission schools, and informal education in mission communities, had a significant part to play.

The Baptist Missionary Society was founded under the guidance of William Carey at Kettering, in October, 1792, and native Protestantism had taken its first step on a long journey. The Congregational movement

was not slow to follow, and quite soon there were popular stirrings in favour of overseas missions in their churches. In June, 1793, the Warwickshire association of ministers opened a fund for mission causes, and it was the medium-sized Midland towns, with the London congregations joining later, who supplied the financial base for early London Missionary Society activities. It was the ~~w~~<sup>e</sup>wakening of this Midland Congregational support later on in the nineteenth century that helped to precipitate the L.M.S. cash crisis.

After consultation in 1794 with Robert Steven of the Scots Church, Covent Garden, and John Hey of Castle Green Independent Church, York, Dr. David Bogue of Gosport had an article published in The Evangelical Magazine in September of the same year. In spite of an apparently irrelevant title, - "To the Evangelical Dissenters Who Practice Infant Baptism" - it was an appeal to the Congregational Churches to turn their attention, as the Baptists and Anglicans had already done, to the 'conversion of the heathen'. A meeting was held on September 21, 1795, at the Castle and Falcon, Aldersgate Street, in the City of London, to plan a Mission Society. Its constitution was adopted the next day, September 22, in the Countess of Huntingdon's Chapel, Spa Fields.<sup>(1)</sup>

At first the L.M.S. had identity problems. R.W. Dale, the Congregational historian, was critical of the fact that the denominational identity was slow in coming, and that the L.M.S. "was satisfied with fellowship of an accidental and precarious kind". It is difficult to know how serious the claim was in the Society's Fundamental Principle that it was not its task to export overseas any particular form of church government

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(1) R.W. Dale: History of English Congregationalism (1907) p.600 and Richard Lovett: History of the London Missionary Society: 1795-1895. Two volumes. Volume I p.3-26. (Subsequently cited as Lovett).

including "Independency". The title of "London" added in 1818 seemed to compound its interdenominational nature, as the fact that one of the Society's earliest and most active Directors was Thomas Haweis<sup>was</sup>, an Anglican rector from Northamptonshire. Nevertheless, all the early publicity for funds and support were realistically aimed at Christians sympathetic to the Congregational beliefs that surrounded the Society's birth - Scottish Churches in England, the Countess of Huntingdon's connexion, and Welsh Calvinistic Methodists. The loose, federal nature of Congregationalism probably helped this initial slowness in linking the L.M.S. and Congregationalism closer together in the early days.

External pressures accelerated the slow tendency of the Society to acknowledge its roots. Practical mission activities - recruiting personnel, organising the bureaucracy, fund raising - all made the sharp identifying of support groups necessary, and this had occurred forty years or so after the Society's establishment. A Report of the Society's 1866 Committee stated that the loss of financial support to the Society was caused to some extent by the loss of Anglican, Scottish Presbyterian, Irish Presbyterian and Welsh Calvinistic money, for these denominations now had their own missions. (1) Ecclesiastical realism had reared its head at last. It is perfectly true that cooperation between Protestant missions occurred. For example, John Philip, the Society's resident Director in the Cape in the early nineteenth century, invited the Paris Evangelical Society to Basutoland, and defended its interests there subsequently. On the domestic front, missions exchanged subscription lists and there were consultations between Mission Secretaries. On the whole, however, it was each mission for itself, and it was incumbent upon the individual denomination to finance, support and

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(1) Lovett: vol. II p.689 and following.

encourage its own Societies in a spirit of righteous competitiveness.

Congregationalism had long lost its earlier title and spirit of Independency, and had been influenced by the Evangelical revival, which had modulated its traditional nature and membership. The nature and extent of this modulation is uncertain, but even before it had been thus influenced, there had been a declination from the great Independency theology and culture of the Commonwealth period. The Congregational membership of the late eighteenth century was restrained in its life-style, but still maintained substantial interest in theology, politics and "intellectual pursuits of a severer kind". (1) When the Evangelical revival brought into Congregationalism the newly-converted working class people, the traditional supremacy of the old order was challenged. These "men and women from the farm and factory, the street and shop" injected into a staid, stuffy atmosphere a warm, evangelical zeal which showed itself in vital preaching and charismatic public worship. Both Peel and R. Tudur Jones were convinced that the resultant leaven had potential, and that the movement contained within itself both traditional studious virtues as well as revivalist zeal. R. Tudur Jones also made the telling point that the emphasis the new working class membership placed on education in Sunday Schools and Congregational day schools strengthened the older concern for things of the mind. (2)

At home, Congregationalism became the front runner in the race for educational improvement, despite the fact that its "voluntary principle" i.e. its refusal to accept direct government aid, cost it dear. When the Congregational Board of Education was formally constituted to expand their

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- (1) R.W. Dale: History of English Congregationalism p.590
- (2) Albert Peel: Three Hundred Years : A History of the Congregational Union of England and Wales (1831-1931).p.25 and  
R. Tudur Jones : Congregationalism in England:  
1662-1962. (1962) p.162 and following.

schools, it raised over £173,000 in the period from 1843 to 1859 nationally, apart from money raised and spent at a local level.<sup>(1)</sup> It was only in the 1860's that their effort to finance their own schools collapsed and Congregationalists backed the 1870 Forster Act and the principle of State funding of schools.

The marks of such influences can be seen in the L.M.S. in Southern Africa and elsewhere. The basic principle of the 'independence' of each Congregation of worshipping Christians and the authority of the Minister was built into the organisation of their mission stations, and never challenged. If the missionary was hard-working and effective, the principle was rewarding. But if the missionary was lazy, indifferent and uncooperative he was difficult to remove. In the early Cape particularly, the L.M.S. missionaries constantly objected to any senior missionary acting as Superintendent. They balked at Vanderkemp's arbitrariness and equally complained of John Philip's attempts to develop common policy over the whole Cape mission field. The only system of consultation accepted was that by District Committee to which all the Society's missionaries belonged, as of right. The minutes of these Committees were forwarded to the Foreign Secretary in London who communicated in turn with the Committee's chairman. An 'independent' system of mission government bred highly individual agents, and District Committee meetings could be charged with a good deal of ill-feeling. David Livingstone was never at ease with the Bechuana District Committee, and the authoritarian direction of it by his father-in-law Robert Moffat did not help matters. Later in the century, the same District Committee was riven with argument as the founding of the Moffat Institution at Kuruman caused endless acrimonious debate.

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(1) R.W. Dale: A History of English Congregationalism. p.662

The main control of affairs from London was financial, and apart from a strong, masterful Foreign Secretary like Tidman, policy was decided in the mission field. With the charismatic early pioneer missionaries, policy was not even debated in the District Committee, but shaped by such agents individually. John Philip, David Livingstone, Robert Moffat, John Mackenzie and W.C. Willoughby knew the value of personal 'apologias' and publicized their views on policy and mission expansion to great effect. In fact David Livingstone's and Robert Moffat's books brought them considerable fame. It is ironic that in spite of a defence of ecclesiastical freedom and 'independence' this study ends by considering the L.M.S. Bamangwato Church, totally controlled by Chief Khama III, and thoroughly Erastian..

Many of the Society's missionaries had working class backgrounds. Livingstone, Moffat, James Read - Vanderkemp's assistant - are pioneer examples from the Cape. In China, Robert Morrison and Griffith John are other examples. A quick glance through the L.M.S. missionary<sup>y</sup> lists, later in the nineteenth century, shows that this tendency persisted. Overseas mission work became to nonconformists of all denominations an opportunity to shake off the shackles of educational deprivation, as well as lack of professional opportunity. These L.M.S. agents came from the influx of working class men and women into Congregationalism at the turn of the eighteenth century. It is remarkable how, with little education and poor cultural backgrounds, they developed skills and aptitudes of a high order in the more socially fluid world overseas. They learned languages, translated, negotiated successfully with a wide variety of colonial administrators and indigenous rulers, and contributed sizeable amounts of cash and resources. One secular consequence was that mission children and grandchildren improved their social rank and status. The Moffat dynasty in Southern Rhodesia is one example of a process repeated many times on a smaller scale.



The Evangelical tradition of teaching and worship was represented in the L.M.S. by Robert Moffat, and such followers as John Brownlee. Moffat's accounts of his services in Kuruman in the first decade of his ministry have details of scenes of evangelical fervour, and even a small revival, with all its accompanying intensities. These revivalist manifestations died out, and as the Mission continued Moffat demanded from his flock more and more evidences of their faith. Church membership eventually became dependent on a long period of moral testing. The Cape Khoi Christians had a strong tendency to fervent prayer and praise. When the Moravian visiting Superintendent Latrobe went to Pacaltsdorp in the 1820's he complained about the 'Keening' of the Khoi congregation and recommended more controlled worship. Newly arrived missionaries of the L.M.S. disliked the Vanderkemp liturgical style at Bethelsdorp. They considered discipline in church lax, the services being noisy and the Lord's Supper irregularly celebrated. This was because Vanderkemp was a leader who preferred congregational self-expression and a style of worship more in accord with African, rather than middle class European, culture. Khoi preachers were emotional and intense, as were L.M.S. converts in Madagascar. On the whole, apart from the early days of Robert Moffat, such enthusiasm was frowned upon. It was discouraged, as well, because such charismatic worship tended to undermine white control of the mission.

The 'voluntary principle' in education proved unfortunate for the L.M.S. When the Cape colonial authorities decided in mid-century to offer financial help to mission schools, the Society had to refuse. There were one or two exceptions to this, but in such instances the L.M.S. agents acted illicitly. The Methodists and Scottish Presbyterians had no such qualms, and their schools and colleges benefitted consequently from such help.

Congregational tradition and the bitter experience of the first missions to the Pacific combined to make the L.M.S. insist its mission agents should be as educated as possible. A mission overseas should be planned, sensibly run and soundly financed, with the missionary able to expound the Christian faith intelligently and effectively. "Faith" missions, that is missions more inspirational and instantaneous, were not considered. Edward Irving, the minister of the Metropolitan Caledonian Church advocated such a policy in May, 1824, in an L.M.S. sermon. For good measure, he condemned the 'prudent' approach of the Society to missions; nevertheless, prudence prevailed.<sup>(1)</sup>

Recruitment was regularized, and candidates for mission training had to submit pictures/photos of themselves, as well as answer searching questionnaires before being interviewed. Dr. Waugh, Chairman of the Examinations Committee of the Society, expressed official policy to the education of their missionaries, when he noted how much he disliked "the idea of sending forth ignorant men and novices to propagate the faith of Christ among the heathen."<sup>(2)</sup> This need to educate their missionaries was further impressed upon the Society when contacts were made with the civilizations of India and China. An interdenominational gathering of 1820 had heard the Methodist leader Jabez Bunting argue that potential missionaries should know "what the heathen are, what modes of address suit them." Bunting went on to suggest that all missionaries should be taught History, natural philosophy, astronomy and geography.<sup>(3)</sup> Lovett, the

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- (1) D. Rosman: Evangelicals and Culture. p.29
- (2) Lovett: vol II p.643-5
- (3) D. Rosman: Evangelicals and Culture. p.215

earliest official historian of the Society was an advocate of educated missionaries too. He deplored the "godly men who understand mechanic arts" obtaining preference over the intelligensia, and who wasted so many of the Society's resources in the early years. Missionaries should be disciplined, properly trained, and not go out to the mission field with skills enough only "to make wheelbarrows and plant turnips."<sup>(1)</sup> The early mission agents sent to the Pacific had been unsuitable, and in the Cape, the L.M.S. had incorporated personnel from smaller German and Dutch societies. The English of these people was poor, organisational talents minimal and moral standards lax. Certainly one, Sedenfaden, had criminal tendencies. The Rev. George Thom, an early Society missionary in the Cape, was a proponent of English middle class standards of dress, behaviour and education and was most critical of the way the L.M.S. missionaries fraternised with converts and failed to fit in with polite Cape society: Gosport Seminary existed to develop "a certain discipline of mind" and all the Society's Cape missionaries should have attended it. He caustically added that tradesmen who became missionaries should be "theologically competent or settlers."<sup>(2)</sup> The Gosport seminary for domestic theological students was founded by David Bogue in 1789 with financial help from George Welch, a London banker. In 1800, £500 was offered to the Society's Directors for starting a missionary academy, so the money was given to Bogue to enrol missionary students at the Seminary as well. Gosport then began to produce more missionaries than ministers for the home Congregational church.<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) Lovett: vol I p.46 and 73

(2) 5/3/C George Thom to L.M.S. Cape Town. February 16, 1813

(3) Lovett: vol I p.73 and R. Tudur Jones: Congregationalism in England. 1662-1962 p.178.

The London Missionary Society conceived of itself as an educating agency as much as anything else. From its earliest years, the Society was a means of 'raising' - to use their favourite word - the cultural and educational, as well as the spiritual life of its converts. Lovett noted that the Society Directors in 1829 concluded their Society was "a Bible Society, a Tract and Book Society, a School Society, and a Civilization Society, as well as a Society for Preaching the Gospel."<sup>(1)</sup> Moreover, in a printed appeal for funds in the early 1820's, of the eleven objects for which sums of money could be subvented, four were connected with education, and three were for general cultural purposes.<sup>(2)</sup> The school statistics from their various missions were recorded in official publications from earliest years. In 1823, the number of children in the Society schools in various parts of the world were: South Sea Islands: 3,700; Ultra Ganges and East Indies: 6,125; Africa and the African Islands: 2,095.<sup>(3)</sup>

Protestant missions - the most notable exception was the China Inland Mission - saw schools as a significant part of their activity, and the London Missionary Society shared this view.

The L.M.S. in the early and mid-nineteenth century had mission stations in the Southern Pacific, Southern Africa, Madagascar, India and China. In all of these locations their elementary schools had a curriculum of reading and writing (mainly in the vernacular), arithmetic, simple Bible Study and exposition of Christian doctrine. Their primary schools, in spite of the name, were more advanced and added to the previous simple curriculum some subject teaching such as geography, history and more advanced study

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- (1) Lovett. vol II p.651
- (2) L.M.S. Report about 1823. p.25 (Africa: Personal: Box 3. John Campbell Papers at the School of Oriental and African Studies. L.M.S. Archives)
- (3) Ibidem

of the Bible and study of Christian doctrine. More emphasis was placed on teaching English, although this policy varied. Primary Schools were usually at an important mission post, directed by a European teacher. Sometimes there were 'feeder' schools attached to more advanced secondary institutions, which trained their students to become teachers, evangelists and even taught some practical skills. Primary schools were thus means whereby older pupils, even adults, could start a course of education that would lead to a paid job or minor vocational qualification. The L.M.S. in Africa had only one effective Secondary institution. This was Tiger Kloof at Vryburg, British Bechuanaland, and it did not come into existence until the early twentieth century. India, China and Madagascar had a number of excellent Secondary institutions and had them from early or mid nineteenth century. Moreover, only Tiger Kloof taught mechanical and practical skills, such as carpentry, plumbing, bricklaying and light engineering. Teaching staff, finance, and general allocation of resources for L.M.S. schools were controlled by the relevant District Committee, and policy was discussed in these meetings, with pressure groups having their say.

The practical advantages to the Society of running its own schools were many. Schools attracted families and the community to use them, particularly when the skills of literacy, numeracy and European Christian culture were advantageous to commercially adept groups. In the Cape this was very true of the Khoi and Griqua peoples. In Southern Africa the problem that usually restricted school expansion was the inertia of a rural population who saw no point or purpose of schooling in a static, agricultural society. Such indifference bred absenteeism and poor school rolls. But if the L.M.S. schools were popular, they ensured the next generation would be sympathetic to the Society's cause, and act as a Christian leaven. The rapid expansion of schools and training in the Cape Khoi's Kat River Protectorate is a good example of this. Moreover, a successful school could

justifiably request financial contributions from the local people for teachers, supplies and buildings so that the missionary presence could be enhanced. Since in Africa the church building usually doubled for the school, the missions were twice blessed, as maintaining or improving schools meant doing the same to the church structure.

Looking generally at the L.M.S. presence in all its mission fields in the mid to late nineteenth century, European political and cultural pressures increased. Consequently education became more prized, and in India and China especially, there was a local demand for more and better education, as well as a more secular curriculum. Local government, colonial or quasi-independent, made funding dependent on mission curricula becoming more secular. Such a period of rapid change and expansion caused trauma within the L.M.S. In early twentieth century India, academic and professional demands on the Society's advanced colleges became so intense that some were of the opinion that the Society's colleges were now only secular agencies. But, in spite of this minority, but strongly felt, opinion, the L.M.S. maintained its colleges and hospitals in the hope that the "vast reservoir of goodwill" would indirectly influence a pro-Christian sentiment. Direct evangelism through colleges and hospitals was negligible. An experienced campaigner in 1930's India noted only 3 conversions of Indians to Christianity in colleges in a decade, and then the 3 conversions were adversely commented upon in the local press. (1)

A crucial difference between the L.M.S. attitude to education in Africa and Asia was that in Africa there was concentration on elementary education but a prolonged indifference to secondary education and provision for a 'Native Agency'. For any mission to survive and grow, it was essential that it tried to educate the brighter converts to become active, professional

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(1) Conversation with Henry Lefever, Emeritus Professor of Mission, Selly Oak, and L.M.S. Missionary in India in 1930's. 11 July, 1983.

members of the Mission, as teachers, evangelists, catechists or even pastors. The Cape and Bechuana Missions failed to do this effectively until the early twentieth century, and missionaries in these areas complained about the weakness for eighty years or so. But in India and China, secondary institutions had a good deal of money and resources spent on them. There were other reasons why the L.M.S. in India and China concentrated on higher education. Educational levels in these countries were already high, and it was felt that it was strategically more effective to concentrate on the 'literate' of such vast populations. Nevertheless, the policy does show the low regard in which the L.M.S. held the cultural levels and academic potential of Africans. An Anglo-Chinese College in Malacca was founded in 1826, yet the first successful secondary institution in Africa was Tiger Kloof, Vryburg, founded in 1904!

It will be valuable at this stage to look at the official view Protestant missions took of education and its role in a policy of evangelism. This can best be done by looking at a series of Commissions whose purpose it was to examine and publicise mission progress.

The World Missionary Conference of 1910 at Edinburgh was the first conference to bring together a variety of Protestant bodies, European as well as American, to consider common issues of evangelisation, and to attempt to establish a consensus of modern theology and practice. Education was an important item of debate, and three relevant functions of education in a context of mission activity were noted. The purpose of education was to see that the individual could read the Bible and that his mind was trained; education was, secondly, to help train Christian leaders; and, finally, education was to assist the local culture to withstand external secular socio-economic pressures. (1)

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(1) World Missionary Council Report 1910. (Edinburgh) There were no L.M.S. representatives at this Conference.

A decade later, a survey of mission education in China by the Burton Commission came to a similar conclusion about the functions of education. Enumerated these functions were that education should help in personal evangelisation; then, it was the job of schools to help instruct preachers and teachers and native mission personnel. This function could be extended to social evangelism that would remove poverty, sickness and legal inequality. Finally, it was education's function to assist in permeating the non-Christian community with Christian ideals. (1)

The L.M.S. were not directly involved in the Edinburgh Conference or the Burton Commission, but their educational objectives were similar. Norman Goodall in his official history of the Society repeated the previous three objectives of mission education with little variation. Mission education was for personal evangelisation, to instruct the local community in Christian ideals, and to encourage leadership. (2) The particular problem of education in Africa was its content. The Edinburgh Conference preferred a balance between book and industrial training, - "An over-industrialized training would be as ineffective as an over-bookish one" - but the L.M.S. emphasis was heavily bookish until the founding of Tiger Kloof. (3) Durant Philip's brief try at secondary education at Hankey as well as Mackenzie at the Moffat Institution, Kuruman contained no 'industrial' elements whatsoever.

However, the Le Zoute Missionary Conference, Belgium, in 1926 threw all such attempts at literary-industrial balance in mission education into

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- (1) A study made by the Education Commission representing Mission Boards and Societies working in China. (New York. 1922) Chairman: Ernest Burton
- (2) Norman Goodall: A History of the London Missionary Society, 1895-1945 (1954). p.458
- (3) World Missionary Conference, 1910. (Edinburgh). Africa Section: p.169



the melting-pot.<sup>(1)</sup> Education, mission or otherwise, exists in a cultural context and cultural values change when political and ideological pressures vary. Hitherto, Protestant missions had aimed, as best they could, for a balance in their educational provision between the literate and practical, as well as the individual and communal good. Now, due to a variety of changing factors - white settler opinion in Africa; the policy of European colonial powers; race theories; financial and commercial considerations - old and traditional nineteenth century mission ideals were no longer going unchallenged. The Le Zoute Conference took a sharp about turn, taking its inspiration from the work of the American sociologist of Negro culture, Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones, particularly his "The Four Essentials of Education." Jones' educational themes were based on studies he had made of the American negro, and particularly the training institutes set up for them at Hampton and Tuskegee. Consequently Jones was heavily a cultural "preserver", and put communal, practical needs before the personal aspirations of the individual. Specifically, Jones' "simples" were the primacy of health and sanitation and the use, appreciation of the environment. His other two educational "simples" were that due emphasis should be placed on household, home and recreation. The Le Zoute Conference became totally obsessed by these new sets of values, and its conclusion echoed Jones almost word for word .... "hygiene and health should be emphasized .... Agriculture and industry should be taught in the classroom .... the value of recreation should be taught by both practice and precept." The training of a limited number of scholars, noted the Report, was secondary to elementary education.

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(1) The Christian Mission in Africa: A Study based on the work of the work of the International Conference at Le Zoute, Belgium, September 14 - 21, 1926 by Edwin W. Smith. 1926.

But Jones had not only made his mark by having his philosophy of education adopted in the Le Zoute Conference. In 1922 he had produced the Phelps-Stokes Report which was a survey made by him and a small committee, under the auspices of an American philanthropic foundation, of some missionary schools and colleges in Africa. In spite of much data, the whole report was an elaborate defence of Jones' cultural 'preserver' assumptions. Education in Africa, the Phelps-Stokes Report insisted, should be adapted to fit Africans for an agricultural and culturally static society, and with no 'literary' pretensions. Education should be a practical process of fitting Africans to work on the land, improve their community health and develop simple industrial skills.<sup>(1)</sup>

Jones had derived his policies directly and honestly enough from Negro experience in America, but white colonial opinion in East and South Africa was only too glad to seize on an educational policy that postulated a limited social and economic future for Africans and, indirectly, defended their own entrenched privileges. 'Garveyism' in America and the West Indies, as well as incipient African nationalism further emphasized the need for a policy that dampened down the hopes of younger, educationally ambitious Africans.

The traditions of L.M.S. educational policy in Africa were far better reflected in Victor Murray's "The School in the Bush", a spirited and delightful defence of traditional African Mission education.<sup>(2)</sup> Murray's attack on the 'preserver' philosophy of Jones and Le Zoute was based on its weakest link, namely that Jones had exported to Africa a philosophy of education developed in America for a black minority culture. Murray

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(1) Phelps-Stokes Commission Education in Africa: A Study of West, South Equatorial Africa by the African Education Commission, under the auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund. (New York. 1922)

(2) Victor Murray: The School in the Bush (1929). p.299; 308.

argued that Jones' philosophy postulated a 'static' culture, and that it attempted "to avoid the conflict between the new and the old by avoiding as far as possible contact with the new." Murray, like the Society's pioneer missionaries John Philip and David Livingstone, was a 'developer', and saw no future in any approach to schooling in Africa that, deliberately or not, ignored it. The 'deep South' ideals of a traditional rural society had very little in common with the older, more dynamic nineteenth century concept of "Christianity and Commerce".

Further criticism of Jones' conservative determinism was provided a few years later in Oldham and Gibson's "The Remaking of Man in Africa"<sup>(1)</sup>. Its tone was one of holistic optimism - "if religion...is true, it claims the whole man...rational, divine and social" - and attacked Jones in a more mystical way. The authors, Oldham especially, saw African society, under European guardianship, evolving successfully to the levels of contemporary European society, and saw higher education as crucial in this acculturation process. "We cannot be content that the church should aim at less in Africa than it had accomplished through its Christian colleges in India and China."<sup>(2)</sup> A point that L.M.S. Directors might have found embarrassing. Overall, however, both the evolutionary theology of Oldham and Gibson, and Murray's more down-to-earth defence of 'developer' education were in accord with the L.M.S. educational tradition that African tribalism had to change, and that the new society, imitating European cultural models, had room for individual self-fulfilment and advance.

Even more recent secular historians have never doubted the importance that schools played in mission advance in Africa. Bundy's

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(1) J.H. Oldham and B.D. Gibson: The Remaking of Man in Africa. (1931)

(2) Ibidem. Chapter VIII. African leadership. p.86 and following.

study of Cape peasants noted how important informal relationships between them and secular employers were in transmitting ideas, but schools and mission stations were undoubtedly crucial focii of social change.<sup>(1)</sup> A more specific study of the L.M.S. in the Cape by Crehan also concluded "the primary object of these schools was to inculcate the children with the Christian (and capitalist) virtues of industry, obedience, decency, modesty, etc." Crehan's comment needs modification as far as Bethelsdorp School under Vanderkemp was concerned, but is otherwise a sound generalisation.<sup>(2)</sup>

Rodney's more comprehensive critique of colonial Africa is equally adamant that British colonies did better than the French ones in education "largely because of missionary initiatives rather than the British government itself." The two factors that Rodney noted stimulated mission schools have already been indirectly noted, and these were the absence of British settlers, and the presence of a cash-crop or a mining economy that encouraged schools to train Africans and encouraged Africans to self-improve.<sup>(3)</sup> Illustrations of Rodney's last point are numerous in the L.M.S. archives, and one specific example might be taken. Eiland's Post was an L.M.S. mission station in the northern Cape. In the mid nineteenth century commercial development locally made education suddenly attractive and relevant. Ex-pupils got jobs as teachers,

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(1) Colin Bundy: African Peasants and Economic Change in South Africa, 1870-1913, with particular reference to the Cape.

(D.Phil. Oxon. 1976) p.53

(2) Kate Crehan: Ideology and Practice: A Missionary Case: The London Missionary Society and the Cape Frontier : 1799-1850

(South African Research in Progress: Collected Papers: 4).

(3) Walter Rodney: How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London. 1972) p.266; 290.

storesmen or were recruited into the local militia.<sup>(1)</sup> Similarly commerce made Kat River and Griqualand educationally alive, as we shall see in a later chapter.

It would show the nature and purpose of L.M.S. schools in Southern Africa if, finally, mention was made of Mabel Shaw's school at Mbereshi, Northern Rhodesia. Mabel Shaw deliberately ignored previous L.M.S. educational philosophy, and instead of destroying African tribalism and traditional custom, she wanted to blend these with Christian ideals. Therefore, school discipline, ceremonial, teaching and the curriculum were integrated..... "the school is seen as a 'tribe'....the school is a tribe in miniature, bringing a life centred around an invisible chief, trying to obey his law - it is a community of loyalty, of interest, of work and play". Mabel Shaw's school was 'sui generis' and her policy of advocating what can only be called a 'heightened' tribalism, with Christian overtones, unique, and not at all in the mainstream of L.M.S. school policy in Africa.<sup>(2)</sup>

This introductory survey of L.M.S. school policy and practice especially in Africa can conclude by taking the purposes of Mission education as outlined by the Edinburgh Conference, the Burton Commission and Norman Goodall - conversion of the individual, training Christian leaders and permeating the community with Christian ideals - and see how far, in general terms, the L.M.S. lived up to them. In the Cape, mission education aimed at teaching African children literacy and numeracy, and instructing them in the Christian faith. This education of children and

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(1) 27/4/B W. Ross to L.M.S. 18 November, 1852. Eiland's Post, northern Cape.

(2) Mabel Shaw: God's Candlelights : An Educational Venture in Northern Rhodesia, Mbereshi. p.53. (1932).

adults and their self-fulfilment was completely ingrained in mission policy. Any failure was the result of incompetence, lack of resources and money, and not of purpose. Secondly, the L.M.S. had a poor record in Southern Africa as far as training African personnel for mission service was concerned. The lack of a 'Native Agency' was one that greatly affected their mission work and progress as the nineteenth century advanced. Thirdly, the strength of the L.M.S. in Cape education was unquestionably the way its pioneer missionaries fought for the liberties, civil rights and tribal dignity of the black African, particularly the Khoi. It was this insistence by these pioneer missionaries on the rights of the non-whites that caused colonial officials, white settlers, Boers, and British politicians, not to mention some supporters and Directors of the L.M.S., to brand their activities, and indeed their whole mission, as overtly and excessively 'political'.

CHAPTER TWO

London Missionary Society schools and colleges  
in the Pacific, Madagascar and Asia

"Thus does the son of a Malacca peasant derive  
an enlightened education, denied to the son of  
the Emperor of China."

- Charles Marjoribanks M.P. on a visit  
to the L.M.S. Anglo-Chinese College,  
Malacca. 1828-9.

Some consideration of L.M.S. education in other parts of the world in the nineteenth century will help put their work in schools and colleges in Southern Africa into some sort of perspective. The Directors and Foreign Secretaries had to apportion resources against a background of world demand; moreover, as the century proceeded, there were serious financial problems facing the Society. As African agents were pressing for more financial support, claims were reaching London headquarters from the Indian and Chinese mission fields. The support of education by the L.M.S., in fact, was a sign of how important they considered their various mission fields and their educational needs and potential.

Mission historians of previous generations were much blunter than modern commentators when it came to passing cultural judgements. For Lovett, the "Civilized peoples" of the world "belonged to the Ultra Ganges countries, and Northern and Southern India", whilst, "the South Sea Islands and Africa"....."were uncivilized parts of the world".<sup>(1)</sup> This judgement was, on the whole, shared by the L.M.S. Directors and senior personnel, and far greater educational provision was made in Asia because of their greater populations,

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(1) Lovett. volume I p.43



advanced religious systems and educational standards. From 1836 to 1865, the "gradual increase of expenditure in those countries the vastness of whose populations justly demands the chief attention of the Church", was reflected in terms of hard cash. In the South Seas, South Africa and the West Indies the 1836 Quinquennial average was £27,993, which decreased in 1861 to £25,021. Conversely, the money granted to India and China in the same period increased from £27,991 to £36,336. (1)

It was to the Pacific, more specifically to Tahiti (or Otahete) that the L.M.S. first turned their missionary attention. In the early days of the Society, choices were made on a mixture of mariners' romances and sheer guesswork. In 1795, a memoir of one of the earliest Directors, Dr. Haweis suggested that the climate, the way of life and accessibility made the island a suitable place on which to open a mission. (2) The early attempts at settlement were disastrous, but when these problems had been solved education was an integral part of mission work. In many ways, the educational problems of the Society's Pacific settlements were minimal. The training of mission teachers and preachers became paramount and proceeded apace, so the Pacific mission's 'native agency' was successful and made the demands

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(1) Lovett. volume II p.694-5

(2) Lovett. volume I p.119

on European personnel that much less. Secondly, the institutions of higher education blended their curricula with the cultural demands of the islanders who were, in the main, farmers, fishermen or engaged in inter-island commerce. Moreover, the institutions provided cheap accommodation for the students' families who continued to cultivate and trade. These institutions were never totally self-sufficient, but the running costs were little. There was close integration of education and life-style between the institutions and local communities, reducing cultural tensions and making mission work much more a part of the islanders' life.

An institution for training local teachers was founded at Rarotonga in 1839 in the Cook (Hervey) Islands. It was called the Takamoa Theological Institution, and its first Principal was Aaron Buzacott, one of the Society's Pacific pioneer missionaries. Between 1839 and 1893, over 490 men and women were trained there.

A few years later, a need was seen for a trained native ministry and the Malua Institution was founded in Samoa in 1844.<sup>(1)</sup> This institution tried to become self-sufficient in food, as it possessed over 100 acres of fertile land that the students farmed. Its coast

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(1) Lovett. volume I p.352-389

was also extensively fished by them. Students' families lived with them at Malua, and helped with the practical work. Dr. Turner, the first Principal, in his 1859 Report detailed its curriculum which consisted of Scripture history and exposition, writing, arithmetic, geography, astronomy, natural history and English. In the first twenty five years of its existence 543 men, 395 women and 205 boys had been educated there. This was a considerable body of students to have trained. Not only that, but the cost had been most reasonable. The policy of self-sufficiency pursued by the institution meant that the average cost between 1860 to 1870 to the L.M.S. was £1,000 a year. Self-sufficiency was matched by one of integration with Polynesian culture, for the institution maintained the communal life-style of a Polynesian village. This was possible because there were no European settlers and no pressure from the small local European commercial concerns. The institution's curriculum was not only broad academically but included plantation work, carpentry and allied crafts. For the more able students there was Old and New Testament Studies, "natural philosophy" and some German language work, as there were some local German traders. A network of elementary schools supported the work of these colleges. (1)

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(1) Norman Goodall: A History of the London Missionary Society  
1895 - 1945 p.357 and 397.

Madagascar was classified by Lovett in cultural terms with the "uncivilized" section of the world, but its response to L.M.S. educational initiative was impressive. So was the quality and size of its higher mission colleges. Early statistics are approximations, but they monitor the rapid expansion of schools on the island. In 1828, there were 35 schools in Imerina, the central province of Madagascar, and one school on the south-eastern coast of the island. These schools had 30 teachers and 2,300 scholars. From 1830 to 1835, ten to fifteen thousand children went through the Society's schools in Madagascar, and by 1895, there were 181,000 children in attendance. (1)

L.M.S. expansion in Madagascar during the nineteenth century was impressive both in its quality and quantity. It was, unquestionably, the great success story. Malagasy civilization was based on a prosperous rice-culture and external trade, and its lively, commercially-minded population accepted Protestantism, European technology and commercial practice with equal alacrity. The earliest L.M.S. missionaries in the island helped the people manufacture soap and gunpowder!

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(1) Bonar A. Gow: Madagascar and the Protestant Impact : The Work of the Protestant Mission 1818 - 1895. p.241; T.T. Matthews : Thirty Years in Madagascar.(1904) p.399; James Sibree : Fifty Years in Madagascar. (1924) p.143.  
Goodall : Op: Cit. p.480. footnote 2.

The L.M.S. mission expanded even during a period of enforced banning, and it was not long before the central government, based in Imerina, controlled the new Christian church and its schools. Missionaries became involved in local and national politics, and Church and School became integral parts of the Malagasy civil structure. For example, L.M.S. mission school children were conscripted 'en masse' when required, and the parish registers used to assess forced labour responsibilities.

The central government controlled the L.M.S. theological college and its Normal College at Tananarive just as it did their local schools. The L.M.S. theological college was founded in 1870 and originally intended for ministerial students who would eventually work in the community as pastors and evangelists. In spite of this intention, the college became a comprehensive college of higher-education, admitted young upper class men, and taught not only English, Law and History, but Astronomy, Physics and even a series of Open lectures on popular Science. From 1869 to 1909, over 700 men were accepted as students, the secular element going directly into the Civil Service.

The L.M.S. Normal College was founded in 1862 by Charles Stagg to train teachers for the Malagasy schools of the L.M.S. It ran a three year course in reading, writing, composition, geography, school management and algebra. Students here, as well, studied in order to enter the Civil Service or trade and commerce.

Not only were the Malagasy population prepared to accept European Christianity and capitalism, their indigenous religion had no priestly class, so L.M.S. Christianity became grafted rapidly onto local leaderless religious groups. Indigenisation was thus early and thorough, and explains why Christianity expanded, even when L.M.S. missionaries were absent from the island. Education was central to this process of acculturation, and was swept into the government's centralising tendency and need for bureaucratic efficiency. Malagasy capitalist entrepreneurs were, without exception, Christian, and capitalist aspirations identified with Protestant Christianity.

When the L.M.S. decided to explore the possibility of a Mission to China, the problems confronting it were daunting. The population of the Chinese mainland was vast and its culture - language, religious traditions and bureaucracy - elitist and complex. Moreover, there was a more practical problem - its foreign attitude was xenophobic and Europeans not welcomed. The mission to the East was originally called Ultra Ganges, and Robert Morrison, their first Chinese agent, was instructed most carefully to "acquire the Chinese language, and translate the Sacred Scriptures. To teach and preach were not in its immediate contemplation".<sup>(1)</sup> Evangelising zeal was here tempered by a realistic sense of what one man, even a man of Morrison's calibre, could do.

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(1) Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Robert Morrison D.D. Compiled by his widow. Two volumes, London, (1839) vol. I, p. 68  
(Afterwards cited as Morrison Memoirs.

Robert Morrison came from a Northumberland working-class family, and spending one year in the L.M.S. Hoxton Academy and a briefer period at Gosport, settled in Macao in 1809, where he worked as a commercial translator for the East India Company. He had studied Chinese texts at the British Museum, and been assisted by a Chinese national in London, but this time at Macao and Canton increased his fluency and skill in Chinese. After immense application, Morrison produced an Anglo-Chinese Dictionary and with some assistance from his colleague, Milne, produced a Chinese Bible in 1819. In the circumstances, his complaints of migraine are understandable.

To Morrison, education was the core of mission. This was not only because he was such a polymath, but, because the elitist structure of Chinese government was crowned provincially by the scholar class of mandarins, converting such an educated leadership to Christianity seemed to be the obvious way to expand. Targetting evangelical effort at the millions would be a futile activity. Consequently, Morrison founded the Anglo-Chinese College, Malacca, the earliest and one of the most prestigious colleges run by a Protestant mission body. The prospectus of the college struck the Morrisonian tone: "the plan of the college does not exclude any branch of human knowledge; nor any one of the circle of the Sciences."<sup>(1)</sup> In practice, the college was

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(1) Morrison Memoirs. vol. II p.47

instructed to teach "Chinese classics; to read and understand the Christian Scriptures; to read and write the English language; History, Geography, the use of Globes, Logic, Philosophy, Theology - Natural and Revealed etc"; a little more specific and still impressive. What Morrison wanted his college to attempt, was to monitor a massive cultural exchange between Chinese and European civilizations.

On February 23, 1819, the L.M.S. Directors accepted these "Liberal proposals" for a college, and reaffirmed their support of Morrison and Milne as principal members of the "Provisional Committee of the Ultra Ganges Missions". This reaffirmation was because a group of more recent missionaries had been critical of the grandiose plans of the two men for the Mission, and their overall control of strategy.<sup>(1)</sup> The foundation stone of the college was laid on November 11, 1818, by a Colonel Farquhar, Commander of the British troops at Malacca. The L.M.S. gave £500 to the college, Morrison £1,000 from his savings as an East India Company employee, and 4,000 Spanish dollars came from private commercial sources. Both Morrison and the L.M.S. had publicized the commercial advantages that came from such an institution in language-teaching and making business contacts.

Morrison wanted his college to make Malacca the "Athens of the East". Malacca was chosen as the centre since this was the most important city beyond India under British control at the time. No land was available in Canton or Macao. The college was flourishing by 1820 with the number

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(1) Morrison Memoirs vol. I p.539



of pupils varying from twenty to sixty. Milne was the first Principal. In the first class Geography, Astronomy and Mathematics were studied; in the second class Chinese; in the junior class, elementary Chinese and English. There was an active college press, religious instruction and daily services. When Charles Marjoribanks, the M.P. for Perth, visited the college in 1828 he noted that 30 students could read the Bible in Chinese and English, "and had attained considerable proficiency in Arithmetic, Geography, the use of Globes and general History."<sup>(1)</sup> Gradually, however, the ambitions of Morrison to make it some mini-University disappeared, and the majority of students - Chinese - were using the college to learn English to help them in their business careers. The college subsequently moved to Singapore, then Hong Kong.

In spite of its decline to a language school, the college had significance. It was established very early in L.M.S. history, had a broad, liberal curriculum and managed to recruit successfully. It did not fulfil the heady hopes that Morrison had for it. A decade earlier, Morrison had requested from the L.M.S. a botanical assistant, for "although the study of His stupendous work - human redemption - be the immediate object of the Christian missionaries; the Work of Creation... forms also a part of their Study". Morrison thought that the form of

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(1) Morrison Memoirs. vol. II Pages 52, 59, 61 and following

evangelism best suited to China was based on a comprehensive form of higher education aimed at the intelligensia. He considered natural and revealed religion as an interaction, and therefore the L.M.S. were "justified in bestowing all the attention to literature and science which their immediate pursuits, and their health and pecuniary means, will admit of."<sup>(1)</sup> In a minor way, Morrison's approach was that of Matteo Ricci at the Imperial Court at Peking - looking for some dialogue on the highest possible level between East and West; attempting to show the Chinese intelligensia not only a new faith, but the distinctive world-view of Europe.

This emphasis on higher education was continued in China by the Protestant missions. Against the vast population of China the figures for pupils in all Protestant mission elementary schools were insignificant; in 1877, there were 5,917 children in attendance, and in 1915 just 170,000.<sup>(2)</sup> Such statistics explain why American and Protestant missions saw the primary schools as of less importance than developing higher colleges. The L.M.S. concurred in this opinion, until it was challenged by Griffith John, one of its most successful and vigorous agents, who had opened a mission station in 1861 at Hankow, Central

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(1) Morrison Memoirs. vol. II p.82

(2) K.S. Latourette: A History of Christian Missions in China. p.623

China. In his youth, he had been a popular, inspirational preacher in South Wales, and he adapted this approach to the urban Chinese of Hankow. He deliberately ignored formal education as a means of evangelisation and concentrated on street preaching, with popular mission services. "This has been a preaching mission from the beginning," he wrote, .... "We believe that God can change the heart of the grown-up heathen, and that it is by no means necessary to get hold of the child in order to make a Christian of the man."<sup>(1)</sup> This was a direct challenge to education as a process and a strategy, and Griffith John maintained this stance for years. His attitude, however, changed. Once his Mission became established, and an evangelising nucleus formed itself, he had to concern himself with formal instruction in order to develop the Christian intelligences of his converts. But there were external pressures brought to bear which Griffith John was sensible enough to act upon. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese government were convinced that their "open door" policy to the West meant that they would have to embrace Western education, and mission education must, therefore, be supported. For these two reasons, Griffith John placed more emphasis on formal education in his mission, and by the turn of the century, his Hankow Mission boasted a high school, a divinity school and, a little later, Normal and medical schools.

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(1) W. Wardlaw Thompson: Griffith John. p.177

It was the Baptist Missionary Society's Timothy Richard who regarded higher education as the only basis of any reasonable mission expansion in China. In 1884, he suggested that the Protestant missionary societies should found a high-class college in each of the eighteen provincial capitals of China, but this was rejected by his own society. Also rejected was his enthusiasm for science and scientific experiments, and his willingness to explore the possibilities of an eclectic religion developing from a Christian-Buddhist dialogue. His opponents pointed out that by the turn of the century, only half of Protestant mission staff in China were involved in direct missionary work.

In October, 1871, Richard became Secretary of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese - later called the Christian Literature Society of China - which had interdenominational support. Richard's ambitions for mission higher education were partially fulfilled in 1902 when a University was established in Shansi Province with the help of a £100,000 fine levied on the Province after the Boxer uprising. Richard was the University's first Chancellor, and Moir Duncan, of the L.M.S., the first Principal.

The L.M.S. commitment to higher education in China was considerable. There was their College in Hong Kong; the Anglo-Chinese College at Shanghai, revitalized in 1903 as Medhurst College; the Hankow educational complex initiated by Griffith John, noted above, and the Tientsin Anglo-Chinese College, founded in 1902, by Dr. Lavington Hart. From 1911 to 1918 it was awarding degrees in Arts, Science and Engineering.

India presented the L.M.S. with the same problems of educational strategy. The population of India was vast, the social structure hierarchic and inflexible, and the indigenous religion sophisticated and theologically complex. Once again it was, in practical terms, impossible to dent popular opinion in any significant way, so the pattern adopted was to develop as far as possible an elementary school system, and to cap this by higher institutions, as well funded and staffed as money would allow. As in China, too, higher education responded to secular demands, so that the L.M.S. found more and more of its resources sucked into non-evangelising channels.

In 1851, the Society founded the English Institution, Madras, which had five hundred scholars by 1870. In 1847, the L.M.S. opened the Anglo-Vernacular School at Bangalore, which had, by 1859, almost four hundred pupils. Another higher institution was reopened in 1868 at Vizigapatam, and the most prestigious, the Bhowanipore Institution at Calcutta, under A.F. Lacroix in 1837.<sup>(1)</sup> The imbalance between converts and the number of students enjoying an L.M.S. education became more and more obvious. By 1895, there were, for example, twelve schools attached to the Calcutta Mission with 666 scholars; the Bhowanipore Institution itself had 2,000 students, yet there were only 600 church members.

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(1) Lovett. vol. II p.109; 131; 173

This imbalance which ran through the whole L.M.S. Mission in India caused concern, and drove the authors of the 1895 Report to reconsider the objectives of the Mission:

"The original aim of our institution was evangelistic, to win Hindus for Christ by means of a sound Christian education. As the Christian community at Bhowanipore gradually attained importance, our institution came to be of considerable value also as a training school for young Christians. Yet this long remained subordinate to the primary aim. It is now, however, becoming daily more possible to evangelize .... by simpler means than the educational method ....."<sup>(1)</sup>

This was the crucial problem in both India and China, and to a lesser extent in Madagascar. As soon as secular agents saw the value of mission higher education, it was used, and Missions found it difficult both to retain some portion of Christian content in the curriculum, as well as balance growth of such institutions with more direct evangelism.

Attendance at Bhowanipore Institution peaked at the turn of the century, and by 1909 teaching to degree standard ceased, and

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(1) Lovett. vol. II p.185

most of the science work given up. Bhowanipore became an Intermediate Arts College with instruction to the First Arts examination of Calcutta University. This was lost in 1915, and its training department for Secondary School teachers in 1918. The L.M.S. Directors remained convinced that the severe financial claims of the Institution had weakened the more direct evangelistic work of their Calcutta Mission. By 1895, three other institutions had been downgraded to second-rate colleges - Ramsey College in Almoral; Wardlaw College in Bellary; and Scott College in Nagercoil. This was due to a combination of factors - higher standards of education were being demanded by the secular authorities and the L.M.S. finances had become quite seriously depleted.

Elementary schools were at the base of the L.M.S. educational structure in India, but the situation was similar to China, and their significance in such a huge population inevitably small. In the Travancore Mission in 1870 there were 4,000 boys and 800 girls in its schools. By 1895, in the Madras Mission, there were 12 schools with 900 scholars. These schools varied in quality. The Cuddapah District Report of 1890 condemned overall standards in its elementary schools because of lack of missionaries and poor quality teachers.<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) Lovett. vol. II p.60; 143; 170

It was impossible for the L.M.S. to redeploy their resources in India. A strong group of supporters wished such a change in policy, but the L.M.S. stuck to its conviction that education was basic to mission evangelism. The 1906 Deputation to India advocated complete cooperation in educational matters with the government, and the 1913 Deputation, whilst suggesting economies, insisted that education, in the broadest sense, should be maintained. The 1922 Deputation adopted a similar stance. "Christian education", concluded Goodall, "is no appendage but belongs to the central fibre of a Mission's life."<sup>(1)</sup>

How did Southern Africa fit into the world pattern of L.M.S. educational provision as outlined above? In terms of Lovett's rough divisions, Southern Africa was part of the "uncivilized" world, as were the inhabitants of the Pacific. But this simplistic division of the non-European world into two sections was invalid in the Cape, for the L.M.S. there had targetted their evangelism efforts almost totally at the Khoi (Hottentots as they were then known, and who later merged into the Cape Folk). The L.M.S., unlike the Methodists, did not concern themselves with the white settlers and only marginally with the black Africans in their Caffrarian Mission in the far eastern Cape. The Khoi in the western Cape were being rapidly urbanized, and in the rest of the Cape slowly accultured - they engaged in

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(1) N. Goodall: A History of the London Missionary Society 1895 - 1945 p.462



some trade and transporting; worked on white farms; joined Cape regiments and were slowly becoming educated and Christian.

It was this process, the L.M.S. was committed to accelerate, and did so by settling Khoi in their institutions (large farms, in fact) in the eastern Cape such as Pacaltsdorp, Bethelsdorp and Theopolis. This generalized process of education was recognised in the Cape, and such institutions went under the general name of "schools". The Khoi at their L.M.S. institutions lived, worked and worshipped in family units, although complete autonomy from the surrounding white agricultural economy was difficult. There were churches and schools in these institutions to complement "formally", the "informal" education of living with white missionaries, and absorbing and assimilating their Christian virtues and capitalist outlook.<sup>(1)</sup>

Nevertheless, in spite of this work, particularly the design of John Philip to use a Christianized and commercialized Khoi to transmit these virtues to the other indigenous groups in the Cape, the L.M.S. Directorate distrusted their agents' estimates of Khoi intelligence, application and cultural potential. Elementary education for them was satisfactory enough, but no secondary or "native Agency" was set up. There was the half-hearted effort by Foster and the over-academic initiative by Durant Philip, John Philip's son, at the Hankey Institution, Eastern Cape, but nothing permanent or effective. The

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(1) Walter Rodney: How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. p.263. Rodney notes how mission stations taught in this "formal" and "informal" way.

Khoi never managed to convince the L.M.S. London authorities that they could bridge the gulf between a "Polynesian" and an "Asiatic" level of civilization. As we shall see, there was very strong evidence that they could have done so. The Khoi fell between two cultural stools - they had been too Westernized and influenced by White Settlers to need the Polynesian-type institutions of higher education that were integrated to a Pacific rural, underdeveloped economy; on the other hand, the Khoi were still a way off from the 'high' cultures of India and China. The L.M.S. missionaries in the Cape were convinced the Khoi could have been helped more, over an extended period, to fulfil in educational and general cultural terms these higher aspirations, but their pleas went unheeded.

Further north among the Tswana people, the L.M.S. had different problems. The Tswana were pastoralists and their flexible, resilient tribal structures and social patterns had not succumbed either to the 'mfecane/difaqane' or Voortrekker interference. Moffat's Kuruman mission enjoyed limited success among a people who were migrant and indifferent to Christianity. As pastoralists, too, they saw little purpose in Mission Schools that taught literacy and numeracy and nothing of any practical worth. Gradually, White trade and commercial interests expanded north along the "missionary road" that the Tswana occupied. Telegraph and railway, as well as gold and diamond mining in the area, accelerated the pace at which the Tswana had to change. Christianity was the inevitable accompaniment of such cultural expansion, and they accepted it.

But the L.M.S. Bechuana Mission had a weak school system, inevitable with such a slow rate of expansion. Nevertheless, determined not to delay a 'native Agency' here, as they had in the Cape, the Moffat Institution was founded at Kuruman but sadly collapsed, mainly because few suitably educated candidates presented themselves. When the Tiger Kloof Institution finally opened its doors for training evangelists, teachers, and technical instruction in 1906, it had taken the L.M.S. over a hundred years to open a secondary institution and train Africans to work as teachers, evangelists and pastors. For most of the nineteenth century, Southern Africa was seen primarily as more suitable for elementary education.

CHAPTER THREE

The foundation of the London Missionary Society  
in the Cape

"they (the inhabitants of Bethelsdorp) could sing and pray ...  
but none were really better for all this specious appearance".

- Travels in Southern Africa:

Henry Lichtenstein (1817)

"they appeared to be a respectable and religious native peasantry ...  
obviously progressing ....."

- Narrative of a Residence in South Africa:

Thomas Pringle (1820)


The early days of missionary expansion were difficult for the London Missionary Society. The idea of missions overseas was novel for Protestant groups, and ambitions far outran practical knowledge. Objectives were not clarified sufficiently, and the day-to-day problems of settling agents in different parts of the world led to blunders. The first L.M.S. missionaries in the Cape were given no instructions at all on how to proceed, and were left to pursue any policy that they thought would be most effective. Evangelical zeal was blended, in all parts of the mission organisation, in a bizarre way with the romance of "distant lands", a shrewd business sense and the inevitable 'crackpot' scheme - in 1798 the Directors were seeking confirmation of the whereabouts of a mythical lost Welsh tribe in North America, presumably to pursue and evangelize them.

On September 24, 1796, the Duff, furnished solely with L.M.S. missionaries, sailed from Portsmouth to Tahiti, landing there on March 5, 1797. Most of the agents defected. The Duff's second voyage in 1798 was just as unfortunate, for it was captured by the French, and the majority of the missionaries on it accepted a severance payment when they were returned to England by their French captors. Lovett noted disapprovingly that these missionaries had little education and training, and had been selected for overseas service on very poor criteria.<sup>(1)</sup> The perseverance of the L.M.S. Directors and supporters did not weaken, and in a few decades there were modest successes, and stations were stretched around the world - by 1820, the L.M.S. had four stations in the South Seas; 6 in the Ultra Ganges; 9 in India; one station in Mauritius,  
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(1) Lovett. vol I. pp.63-4

MAIN L.M.S. STATIONS:

C. 1850



one in Madagascar; 4 in the West Indies and 15 stations in Africa. The last figure does include mission stations that were small, and manned by only one native agent.

It is difficult to say why it was decided to send missionaries to the Cape in 1799. The British occupation of the Cape in 1795 may have brought the Directors' attention to it, and its strategic importance may also have been considered, as it was on the increasingly important sea route to India and China. The Moravian Brethren who had links with the L.M.S. had just revived their own mission in the Cape, and this may have been taken as a propitious sign. Probably the decision was precipitated by the offer of service to the Society of an admirably qualified Dutchman, Johannes Theodorus van der Kemp (or Vanderkemp), who ultimately served the Society there from March, 1799, when he was fifty two years of age, until his death in Cape Town in December, 1811. Van der Kemp arrived there with three other L.M.S. Missionaries - J.J. Kircherer from Utrecht, and two English artisan agents, Edmunds and Edwards. Van der Kemp's period in the Cape was crucial to the whole mission in Southern Africa; his approach to evangelisation and his strategy marked indelibly the future course of the Society in that continent.

Van der Kemp's life and background are important in an assessment of him and his influence on the Society's early activities in the Cape. He was born in Rotterdam, studied at Leyden University, which in the eighteenth century was full of British students, and famous for its

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faculties of theology, medicine and law. Van der Kemp served as a military engineer and officer in the Netherlands Dragoon Guards, then left to study medicine at the University of Edinburgh. These dramatic changes of direction in his professional and personal life were characteristic of Van der Kemp. After qualifying as a doctor, he returned to Holland to practice medicine, and to develop his interests in theology. He could read and write a number of European and classical languages, and later in life showed a similar facility with African tongues. He wrote commentaries on the Bible and a long cosmological tract in Latin called Parmenides. His polymathic cast of mind was compounded by an impractical nature, and his reputation among contemporaries in the Cape as an overcerebral, remote 'Hamlet' figure has basis in fact. His early life had been, by his own accounts, one of debauchery and licentiousness, so these strong physical and intellectual drives resulted in a complex personality. His later "saintliness" was achieved at great personal cost.

Another significant element in his life was his support for the "social outcast", an attitude unusual for a person of his class and background. This sympathy for the disadvantaged, as a young Dutch officer, brought him into conflict with the military authorities, a tendency that continued in his later life as he championed the Cape Khoi against the civil injustices they endured. His career took a final turn in early middle age. His wife and child were drowned in a boating accident, and he underwent a profound spiritual experience. It was in the aftermath of this trauma, that he offered himself for service with the L.M.S. and,

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after careful scrutiny, he was accepted. The L.M.S. had recruited a man of brilliant intellect and ardent spirituality. But just as important for the future of the Mission was his radical political views, personal tensions and strong individuality.<sup>(1)</sup>

It would be helpful at this juncture to look at the social fabric of the Cape before evaluating van der Kemp's response to the mission needs he perceived. Who inhabited the Cape, when the L.M.S. opened its mission?

The people to whom the L.M.S. eventually addressed themselves were originally called, by the Dutch, Hottentots; the Bushmen, a smaller and less important group, also received some attention from the mission. The Hottentots are now called Khoi (or Khoikhoi) and the Bushmen, the San. The division between them is characterized by the fact that the Khoi were pastoralists, and the San hunter-gatherers, but their relationship was more complex. Linguistic evidence shows some hybridization between the groups, and a Khoisan culture of sorts existed in some areas. From 1652 onwards - the date of the Dutch founding of Cape Town - a 'decline' in Khoi culture occurred, caused by loss of economic and cultural autonomy, - the Bushmen fade out of Cape politics after sporadic raids on the northern frontier in the late eighteenth century.<sup>(2)</sup>

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- (1) A.D. Martin: Dr. Vanderkemp (1931) and J. Philip: Researches in South Africa illustrating the Civil, Moral and Religious Condition of the Native Tribes. (1828) 2 volumes. vol.I. p.133 (Subsequently cited as Researches)
- (2) Richard Elphick: Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa. p.237-8.

The Khoi became subsequently a "client" group of the Dutch settlers, and a vital source of labour on White farms. There were small groups of independent Khoi on the eastern frontier, but vital Khoi culture depended on groups which reacted with White colonials. The opinion of Khoi culture as corrupt and degenerate was gleaned from the superficial judgement of Europeans 'en route' for India, as they observed the Khoi urban poor of downtown Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. The evidence of L.M.S. resident agents, in the main, plus independent reports on L.M.S. Cape Khoi schools, all witness to an adaptive, intelligent people. John Philip who knew the Khoi better than anybody, denied their lack of intellect and memory, and blamed the alleged degeneracy as the result of "intercourse with Europeans".<sup>(1)</sup>

On the northern frontiers of the Cape, remote from White influence and any governmental control, the Khoi became grafted onto other communities. Khoi interbred with runaway black slaves, black Africans, and whites to produce a coloured population known as Bastards, until William Anderson, the first L.M.S. missionary in the area, renamed them the Griquas. Griqualand proper stretched from Griquatown, on the northern Cape frontier, near the confluence of the Moder and Orange rivers, along the latter river to Bethulie, at the confluence of the Caledon and the Orange rivers. The Griquas dressed as Europeans, became Christians and enjoyed a modestly flourishing economy based on farming and horse - and cattle - dealing: they were superb horsemen, excellent 'shots' and spoke the 'taal' or simplified

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(1) John Philip. Researches vol. I Preface. page XI

Dutch. Some contemporary Cape observers reckoned they were, potentially, a more dangerous frontier enemy than the Xhosa on the eastern frontier. Most Griquas formed around the Kok and Waterboer families; others joined the more aggressive 'raider' groups, such as the Corannas and Bergenaars.

The Xhosa people were one of the Nguni peoples of Southern Africa, and were in contact, often violent in the nineteenth century, with the Boer cattle ranches on the eastern border. Other Nguni groups, who formed a crescent, from the Swazi people who inhabited the north eastern part of the Cape, down to the Xhosa, on the Cape's south-eastern coastline, were the Zulu, Mpondo, Thembu and Mpondomise. The Xhosa were cattle people, with small intricate cultural groups, and bore the brunt of white settler pressure on the Cape's eastern frontier in the nineteenth century.

The white people in the Cape who did not farm were traders, merchants, military and government officials. The professional, liberal element was enriched in 1820 by an influx of British settlers into Albany. Few of these British settlers remained on their farms, however, as farming here was different from the occupation as practiced back home in the British Isles. They drifted, over the years, into the local towns and became shopkeepers and small traders.

In the western Cape were the 'akkerboers' or prosperous Dutch farmers whose small 'dorps' such as Paarl and Tulbagh with communities of 3,000 or so dependent on farming, and selling their produce to the markets and visiting ships of Cape Town. The Dutch farmers on the northern and eastern borders were the 'trekboers' whose existence depended on the tough cattle economy of the frontier. It was this constant search for grazing and water that brought

these 'trekboers' into conflict with the frontier Xhosa who were cattle people, anxious to defend their grazing rights from the incursions of the whites. The result was the constant mutual harassment of the two groups in what was termed the First, Second and Third Kafir Wars from 1779 to 1799. So instead of looking at these border conflicts simply in racial terms, Neumark has shown that it makes more sense to see them as two groups of cattle people, indissoluble parts of the Cape cattle economy, and the Cape Town and western Cape markets, determined to establish their livelihoods. The antipathies of the 'trekboer' and Xhosa were as much based on economic conflict as on racial tensions.

The 'trekboers' were not 'romantic' wanderers, and the Xhosa saw the advantages of supplying the needs of a White society. It is true that the 'trekboers' disliked government interference in their 'free-wheeler' life style, nevertheless they spoke the 'taal', paid some taxes, and depended, as did the Xhosa, on Cape needs to sell their meat, cattle and cattle-products.<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) S. Daniel Neumark: Economic Influences on the South African Frontier 1652 - 1836 p.94 onwards (1957)

Van der Kemp's Bethelsdorp

At first, Van der Kemp thought it was his task to preach to the Xhosa who lived beyond the Cape eastern frontier, but in spite of visits there and conversations with Ngqika, a Xhosa Chief, the political and military situation was too dangerous. His last visit was in 1801 with James Read, an artisan missionary who had just come to the Cape, and was one of the few survivors of the disastrous mission to the South Seas. Van der Kemp and Read found the Khoi at Graaff-Reinet favourably disposed to their message, so they decided in July, 1802, to settle in Botha's Farm, near Algoa Bay, with a 100 or so Khoi. The violence in the area as well as the British withdrawal from the Cape, forced the two men and their followers to retreat to the nearby Fort Frederick, while Botha's Farm was burned in the subsequent fighting between Xhosa and 'trekboer'.

The new Batavian administration, under Governor Janssens, considered the re-establishment of an L.M.S. institution in a favourable light, and van der Kemp and Read, again with Khoi followers, settled in an adjacent, equally infertile site, and called it Bethelsdorp. The 'trekboers' strongly opposed the settlement at Botha's Farm, for reasons which can be imagined. The 'trekboers' were enjoying a relatively free hand in hiring and treating Khoi labour, and they regarded missionaries as potential spies and liberal intruders. The only solution for them was to see that Bethelsdorp remained a reservoir of Khoi labour, and at the same time a dumping ground for Khoi who were too old or otherwise unemployable. Undoubtedly, the Batavian

authorities agreed with the economic desirability of this 'trekboer' estimate; but there was a bonus, for such a centre as Bethelsdorp could be seen as a political reward for those Khoi who had not taken up arms and help settle and pacify them. Such an opinion falls very much into line with Majeke's view of Bethelsdorp: that it was part of a Batavian 'divide-and-rule' policy in removing the politically radical Khoi of Graaff-Reinet there, and neutralising them with missionary teaching.<sup>(1)</sup>

To the L.M.S., Bethelsdorp and similar institutions were the way forward for their Mission in the Cape. Van der Kemp and Read had designated the Khoi as their evangelistic target, and for such a people in contact daily with white Cape society, the institution - as the Moravian Brethren had shown - was an acceptable medium of acculturation. Formally, at Bethelsdorp, such a process would be advanced by the church and its school; informally, by teaching the Khoi trades, encouraging them to spend their money in the Bethelsdorp shop, dress in European clothes, live in European-style houses and adopt the middle class virtues of hardwork, honesty, punctuality, and so on. The institution, as such became basic to L.M.S. strategy in the Cape, and John Philip, who was critical of much of van der Kemp's management, still maintained that it was vital to the Society's success. In fact, Philip attempted to revitalize and increase its acculturizing tendencies.

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(1) Nosipho Majeke: The Rôle of the Missionaries in Conquest. p.10. (1952).

The institution was not an invention of the L.M.S.. The Moravian Brethren had developed them over the years in the Cape. Basically, these institutions were large farms where Khoi could live and work and worship in a pleasant, agreeable Christian community. Their life and conduct were supervised by resident white missionaries. The Moravian Brethren had refounded Genadendal, near Swellendam, in 1792, and Groeneklof was added in 1818. In 1823, there were 2,130 Khoi at Genadendal, and engravings of the institution in Latrobe's book show buildings of style and elegance, with gardens, arbours and pleasant walks. The community clearly enjoyed a good standard of living. But most importantly, Genadendal and Groeneklof were exemplars of practical efficiency and political quietism.<sup>(1)</sup> Caricatured by radicals as "tutelage", contemporary conservatives and later historians such as Theal and Cory approved of such attitudes, and argued that the inculcation of such passive virtues was the prime function of such mission stations. Such approval for Genadendal and Groeneklof were quite different from the bitter taunts of Jacobinism and radicalism they levelled against Bethelsdorp.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) C.I. Latrobe: Journal of a visit to South Africa in 1815 and 1816.  
(1818. Reprinted in Cape Town, 1969).

(2) George McCall Theal: History of South Africa from 1795 to 1872 (1915)  
vol. I. p.229

G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa (1910). vol.II p.407

Because van der Kemp and James Read became committed to defend the Khoi, it was inevitable that their mission had to take a political stance. In their report of 1804 to the L.M.S., the two missionaries complained that they had written to Governor Janssens saying:

"that our consciences would not permit us any longer to observe the hard article of the settlement granted to our institution, by which we are recommended to encourage the voluntary engagement of the Hottentots into the service of the colonists, on account of the cruelty and injustice with which those who entered into service were treated, without any justice being done to them by magistrates."<sup>(1)</sup>

Because of the above attitude by the two L.M.S. agents and the British occupation of the Cape, Governor Janssens ordered the missionaries to Cape Town in April, 1805, and they remained there for a year. But the matter did not end there. Ordinances had been passed by Lord Caledon in 1809 - and later by Sir John Craddock in 1812 - which attempted to protect the Cape Khoi from any exploitation by their Boer employers, and it was decided that these grievances could now be publicly aired in a legal way. Circuit courts had been set up in 1811, since any local courts examining grievances could not be relied upon to give independent arbitration. In this process of arraigning the Boers for their alleged misdemeanours, van der Kemp and Read gave the Khoi every possible help. Doubtlessly,

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(1) L.M.S. Annual Report of 1804 (Quoted by Andrew Ross: John Philip (1775 - 1851) Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa. p.43)



many of the cases of cruelty and ill-treatment brought against the Boers were the results of Khoi vengefulness; many of the cases lacked supporting evidence. But in spite of these blemishes, the Black Circuit of 1812 - as this particular circuit became known in Cape folklore - was an important milestone in Cape politics, for it showed, with evidence from other sources, the unpleasant degree of ill-treatment that the Khoi workers on the frontier had suffered at the hands of the Boers for so many years. The 'trekboers' were not monsters, but the hard life of the frontier and the lack of any official way of complaining against cruelty, combined to make working conditions on the frontier inhumane.

In the present context, there were two serious consequences for the L.M.S. The whole Boer community were shocked at the fact that their Khoi employees could accuse them publicly, and stir up so much trouble. The L.M.S. were now regarded as Khoi supporters, and never forgiven for this attack on the Boer character and probity. Later on, the L.M.S. was never allowed to expand into the Boer republics, and Boer opinion was ever ready to accuse the mission as a body, and later, individuals such as Philip and Livingstone, as the L.M.S. maintained its defence of Khoi and African civil rights. Secondly, the L.M.S. in the Cape were now committed more than ever to support the Khoi, both in Institutions and outside them. This obligation was one which they could renege on only with the greatest difficulty. Moreover, this defence had to be done over a broad front that was not only political, but religious and cultural as well. Accepted opinion in the Cape was that van der Kemp was the arch-villain who started the

"legalized robbery by Kaffirs, Hottentot rebellion, the abandonment of the colony by hundreds of its worthy Dutch inhabitants."<sup>(1)</sup> Theal was equally caustic. Bethelsdorp was a nest of idlers and van der Kemp an incompetent academic.<sup>(2)</sup>

It is no surprise that recent work on van der Kemp and Bethelsdorp has attempted to revalue favourably such "colonial" opinions of the man and his institution. Ross, in a recent study of John Philip, argued that from 1806 onwards, Bethelsdorp produced skilled, small-time Khoi entrepreneurs... "technical skills were imported to the Khoi - salt-making, carpentry, wagon-making and wagon-driving."<sup>(3)</sup> Crehan in a more sociologically orientated study of the L.M.S. in the Cape, was convinced that van der Kemp and Read wanted a radical transformation of Khoi life, and that such a transformation was essential for them.<sup>(4)</sup>

No doubt the Khoi learned new skills and attitudes at Bethelsdorp, but it is the contention of this study that such change under van der Kemp was minimal, and that the thrust of acculturation at Bethelsdorp during his period of control was slack and indifferent. The pace of change could have been speeded up considerably if the leadership had been so inclined.

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- (1) G.E. Cory: Op: cit. vol.I p.111
- (2) George McCall Theal: Op: cit. vol. I p.58
- (3) Andrew Ross: John Philip (1775-1851): Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa. (1986). p.44.
- (4) Kate Crehan: Ideology and Practice: A Missionary Case The London Missionary Society and the Cape Frontier: 1799-1850.  
(South African Research in progress: Collected Papers: 4).

The ethos of Bethelsdorp at this time was "preserver" rather than "developer", and whereas van der Kemp and Read were politically adventurous, Bethelsdorp was organisationally lax. Evidence for this early period of Bethelsdorp's existence is thin; the annual reports were generalized and written with an eye on publication; regular communication had not yet established itself, and van der Kemp was an introvert who preferred to keep his own counsel. Most of his writing was Biblical commentary or devout. But the evidence that does exist - actual or inferred - shows Bethelsdorp as an ineffective focus of social change.

In this context, a further glance at van der Kemp's personality will be helpful. The caricature of him as an impractical academic is overdrawn, but unlike his successor John Philip who came from a Scottish industrial background and had there aggressively fought his way into a managerial position, van der Kemp came from an upper middle class background with no first-hand experience of dynamic economic change. His scholarly awareness of change in ancient and classical civilization probably disposed him to view such processes as inevitably gradual, and more significant and lasting for this gradualness. In Bethelsdorp, van der Kemp made attendance at school optional, and allowed the Khoi to dress and behave in any way they liked. Compulsoriness, as Read noted of him, was alien to his character. His own life-style, was by no means an advertisement for European middle class "mores" - his clothes were simple, his eating habits frugal, and his home a small, thatched hut. A further examination of the man will confirm the above comments. Van der Kemp's conversion experience

after his family tragedy was intense. His own account even mentions a period of blindness. He saw this tragedy as divine retribution for his early licentiousness, and his exile to the Cape, his dwelling with a primitive people in a semi-desert and harsh personal 'regime' an extended form of self-punishment. Such a personal condition was not one to make him encourage a social or cultural revolution for the Khoi under his charge. His austere loneliness was temporarily mitigated by his marriage at the age of sixty to a very young Malagasy girl. Not only did it cause some scandal, but was a dreadful mis-match which led to further self-castigation and a desire to restart his life, once more, in Madagascar. Personal tensions do not completely negate action, but in van der Kemp's case, such tensions, added to his cultural views and introversion, all militated against him developing an institution that was committed to self-improvement and the acquisition of entrepreneurial skills. Philip who respected van der Kemp's scholarship and saintliness, termed him fairly a "theorist and visionary".<sup>(1)</sup>

Contemporary evidence points to the fact that Bethelsdorp was a Khoi institution. And this, when all the bile is removed, is what Cory and Theal are saying. Van der Kemp and Read both married native girls and raised native families, and inevitably their sympathies inclined more and more towards their adopted culture. George Barker, a contemporary L.M.S. missionary in the Cape, noted the relationships at Bethelsdorp were not "white", and that the missionaries were not living apart from the Khoi. There were, Barker obliquely noted, South Sea "problems" and illicit

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(1) Philip Papers: Rhodes House: Mss. Afr: 5,216 ff 1-268

Philip to ? Colonel Bird. May, 1819

liaisons with native girls. Whatever the significance of the "moral" judgement, the cultural one was evident. Bethelsdorp was too Khoi.<sup>(1)</sup> Moffat's public comments about Bethelsdorp were courteous, but privately he abhorred the "Khoi" atmosphere. He could not comprehend the marriages of van der Kemp and Read, and denigrated the institution as a "seat of crime".<sup>(2)</sup> Moffat was the archetypal 'detached' missionary, who preferred a strict master/convert relationship, and as rapid an eradication of African customs as possible.

The Bethelsdorp environment and buildings were Khoi, too. Latrobe, the Moravian Superintendent visited Bethelsdorp just after van der Kemp's death, and as well as commenting on the site ("barren, desolate, unpromising desert"), noted that most of the buildings were small, that the mill was useless, the smithy and carpenters shop not used, and that the school and printing office had only been recently built.<sup>(3)</sup> Lichtenstein's description of Bethelsdorp emphasized the fact that the buildings were all thatched huts in the Khoi style. Some European buildings were added later in 1817, and then these were built by missionaries and not by the Khoi. J.G. Messer, a resident Bethelsdorp missionary, was critical of L.M.S. publicity in Britain that said the Khoi had done this work. The L.M.S. exaggerated both the progress made at Bethelsdorp and van der Kemp's saintliness.

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- (1) 7/5/C G. Barker on "Bethelsdorp". Theopolis. November 25, 1818.
- (2) I. Schapera (ed): Apprenticeship at Kuruman : Moffat to Alex Moffat  
Lattakoo. January, 1823. p.68
- (3) C.I. Latrobe Op: cit. p.205

The Khoi, protested Messer in an angry letter to the L.M.S., had neither the inclination nor the money to construct European-style buildings.<sup>(1)</sup>

The slow advance of education in the Bethelsdorp school at this period confirmed the easygoing approach that characterized other activities in the institution. Van der Kemp had a high regard for education, and before he settled in Graaff-Reinet with the Khoi, he had tried to evangelise among the Xhosa and a school was part of this process. His diary note for December 17, 1799, was "I began to keep, twice a day, a reading and writing school in the Kaffir and Dutch languages, with eleven pupils of different nations."<sup>(2)</sup> His first residential institution for the Khoi at Botha's Place, settled in March 7, 1802, had a school, a church and printing office that produced the Cape's first book, a spelling book.<sup>(3)</sup>

Van der Kemp never made school attendance compulsory. Read, subsequently defending his friend and colleague, said voluntary attendance at Bethelsdorp was the order of the day as "we did not like to make instruction a burden."<sup>(4)</sup> Consequently progress at the school was slow. Khoi children were unquestionably intelligent and there was an abundance

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- (1) 4/7/A J.G. Messer to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. January 1, 1818
  - (2) Robert Godlonton: The Irruption of the Kafir Hordes (1836):  
p.23, following.
  - (3) A.D. Martin: Op: cit: p.118
  - (4) 5/3/A Read answers criticisms of Bethelsdorp. January 25, 1814

of disinterested opinion to prove this.<sup>(1)</sup> An attempt was made to train older Khoi men as missionary agents, but this came to nothing after the initial burst of enthusiasm. Hardcastle, the then L.M.S. Foreign Secretary, approved and authorized the engaging of teachers to instruct these candidates.<sup>(2)</sup> John Philip noted critically that this initiative had come to nothing, but not because the Khoi were incapable of being instructed.<sup>(3)</sup> When this slackness was challenged, there was an immediate increase of attendance and enthusiasm. This occurred when a Mrs. Smith, a fifty-five year old widow took over the school when van der Kemp and Reed were away in Cape Town during 1806. Her discipline and vigour worked wonders and she, also, opened a "school of industry" (probably for sewing and other domestic chores).<sup>(4)</sup> Both van der Kemp and Read taught at the Bethelsdorp School, but it became progressively clearer that the formalising of the post of mission schoolmaster had become essential.<sup>(5)</sup> The decision to do this was taken finally in 1808.<sup>(6)</sup> It was decided that the schoolmaster was

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- (1) Box 7. "The children come little short of European children in their advancement", wrote E.G. Hooper from Bethelsdorp on November 10, 1817 to Lord Somerset, the Cape Governor.
- (2) 3/4/B. Hardcastle to van der Kemp and Read. June 17, 1807.
- (3) Philip Papers. Rhodes House. ff 1-268. John Philip to L.M.S. Directors. June 14, 1820.
- (4) Philip: Researches. vol.I p.106
- (5) 3/2/B. J.G. Ulbricht to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. March 12, 1806.
- (6) 3/5/C. Annual Report of Bethelsdorp. 1808.

to be in complete charge of "all reading, writing, arithmetic and singing", but was to exercise this duty under the other brethren. In the hierarchy of mission posts, that of schoolmaster did not rank very high. It was well below that of senior missionary or pastor, and below evangelists and preachers as well. Consequently, to an ambitious young agent, a schoolmaster's position was merely a step on the way up the promotional ladder, and that was why the job specification given here was so tight. A schoolmaster was badly needed at Bethelsdorp to save the school from chaos, yet at the same time his position as a junior member of the Bethelsdorp hierarchy was emphasized - "under the other brethren". Further job specifications were made - the mission teacher had to attend school regularly, maintain the curriculum hitherto employed, but in return the schoolmaster had a vote in the Institution's policy-making process, and was free to preach in the Mission Church.<sup>(1)</sup> Just after van der Kemp's death, Read introduced the "Lancaster Plan."<sup>(2)</sup> The Lancasterian or "British" monitorial system, as it was variously called, was a system whereby older children (monitors), after instruction from the teacher, would then teach small groups of pupils what they themselves had just learned. The advantage was that large classes could be instructed by one teacher, and thus save money for the school; the disadvantage was that it called for specialized material and careful analysis of pedagogic

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(1) 3/5/C Annual Report of Bethelsdorp, 1808

(2) 5/4/B J. Campbell. September 27, 1814



principles and methods. The plan failed, as much else did. The problem was compounded by the fact that after van der Kemp's death, such discipline as did exist among the missionaries collapsed completely, and there was no agreed work plan. Poor organisation in the Institution was mirrored by poor planning in the schoolroom.<sup>(1)</sup> When John Campbell and John Philip made their official and private report on Bethelsdorp in 1820, a decade after van der Kemp's death, they noticed books unused, ploughs rotting, and "the school was regarded with indifference."<sup>(2)</sup>

But strong and determined school discipline brought handsome rewards. Monro re-introduced the 'Lancasterian' plan of 'systematic' teaching, but only managed to implement the monitorial reading system, as there was an overall lack of equipment. Monro's enthusiasm and leadership increased the number of children on the roll to 251, and obtained an average daily attendance of 120. He stimulated a competitive spirit among his Khoi pupils, and was convinced that with improved resources the children "would bear comparison with any other European children, at least in ordinary requirements."<sup>(3)</sup>

To collect suitable material for his school, Monro exercised considerable ingenuity. Slates were brought in from the L.M.S. sister institution nearby at Theopolis. Reading books were "leaves of the worn out Bibles etc. formerly used in the school and pasted ..... on boards using them in place of systematic cards." That even a section of the monitorial system worked

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(1) 7/4/D. F.G. Hooper to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. June 25, 1818

(2) 8/1/D. Memorial of John Campbell and John Philip. (Received on May 20, 1810)

(3) 8/5/D. J. Monro to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. December 12, 1822

so well is a tribute to Monro's determination and skill.<sup>(1)</sup> He achieved a success that Bethelsdorp never did under van der Kemp.

By 1836, hard times once again returned to Bethelsdorp. There was frontier unrest, and the attendance of adults and children had fallen at school. Monro's carefully established monitorial system collapsed, and parents had to leave the Institution to find work, and, naturally, took their children with them. Kitchingman, Monro's eventual successor, turned this tide of misadventure. His 1846 report gave statistics that were to mark the apogee of formal success for education at Bethelsdorp. Kitchingman, like Monro before, had the enthusiastic support of John Philip, the L.M.S. Cape Superintendent, who thought mission schoolmasters were more important than the other mission agents. The attendance at the adult school was upward of 60, most of whom could read. There was an attendance of 60 plus in the infant school, with 92 on the books of the Day School. Of these children, 42 could read English as well as Dutch. 31 children did arithmetic, and 29 elements of Geography. But irregular attendance was still the major problem, and Kitchingman told the parents .... "how they discourage their offspring, and to state to them how they discourage the hearts of the teachers."<sup>(2)</sup> Economic circumstances controlled school attendance. When there was a drought, scarcity of food and salt and

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(1) 9/2/A J. Monro to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. January 24, 1824  
(2) 22/2/E J. Kitchingman Bethelsdorp Report, 1846

low transport rates, as in 1849, attendance at both the infant and the junior schools dropped to between 30 and 50.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mission schools were important to van der Kemp, but both his supervision of Bethelsdorp and its school showed an untidy approach, an absence of a consistently applied strategy to change Khoi awareness and make them acceptable sections of a Cape becoming increasingly commercialized and white-dominated. Such acculturation of the Bethelsdorp Khoi that did occur under van der Kemp was sporadic. There is an absence of authenticated opinion from van der Kemp on his theories of cultural change. However, he was a student of classical and ancient cultures, and we may safely assume that he viewed such processes as being gradual, and that the change occurring in such a way would be more durable and humane. What is beyond presumption, however, is that van der Kemp was indifferent to material progress, lacked practical interest in improvements in Khoi agriculture, business acumen, housing, and so on. Moreover his introverted personality and academic 'mien' made him a 'scholar gypsy' figure, a remote leader, so that such slow change in the Khoi was inevitable.

All this was compounded by his genuine appreciation of Khoi traditional values. His gentle manner even allowed them to worship in the Institution's chapel in a free, non-liturgical way. Then his marriage and Read's marriage to native girls made their ties with the Khoi even more profound, especially as both van der Kemp and Read had children and lived, with in-laws, in

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(1) Philip Papers. Rhodes House. ff 1608-1730. Report on Bethelsdorp. January 3, 1844.

Khoi homes. Later on in the Society's history, David Livingstone exhibited a similar sensitivity to African values, but whereas van der Kemp was, by instinct, a 'preserver', Livingstone came to different conclusions, and worked to destroy African tribalism and replace it by "Christianity and commerce".

Later L.M.S. institutions may be charged with forcing African converts to adopt capitalist virtues in order that a white settler civilization should prevail, but this process in van der Kemp's Bethelsdorp was more ambiguous. Such acculturation as did occur - the Khoi acquiring some mechanical and intellectual skills - was irregular and happened more in spite of rather than because of institutional policy.

#### Van der Kemp's Mission

Traditionally, the Society's Cape Mission from van der Kemp's death in 1811 until Philip's arrival in 1819 has been seen as something of a limbo - the end of one generation and the beginning of a more vigorous period under younger missionaries. The main interest inevitably becomes prurient for it is focussed on the skeletons that rattled heavily in the L.M.S. cupboard, particularly James Read's suspension by the Society in 1817 for adultery.

But under all these moral accusations made by George Thom and his supporters was a deeper cultural contention - the immorality and ineffectualness of the Society's Cape Mission was due to the fact that it was infected by "Khoiness", and the critics wanted a Mission that was in every sense more European. Bethelsdorp was Khoi in spirit, outlook and

appearance; the position the Mission had taken on the issues of the 1812 Black Circuit had linked it irretrievably with the Khoi cause; and this pro-Khoi sentiment was also abroad in their Mission as a whole. Van der Kemp's spirit still brooded over the whole enterprise, and manifested itself in ways that Thom and his supporters disliked - slack relationships between missionaries and Khoi leading to marriages and dubious liaisons; no theological cohesiveness in the Mission; poor Church discipline and order; political "republicanism" (i.e. radicalism), criticism of Cape government policy.

Thom's ideal was the Mission Robert Moffat was soon to establish at Kuruman, a mission whose values were white, middle-class, "respectable" and whose conduct was "detached" from native converts.

Van der Kemp was not, by age or disposition, interested in authority and bureaucracy. Ross has stated that he accepted the position of superintending missionary with reluctance before he went to the Cape.<sup>(1)</sup> There is, however, contemporary evidence that this did not occur, and that his position of authority was nebulous indeed. Lovett noted an official resolution was made as late as December 16, 1811 - the day before van der Kemp died, ironically - "that Dr. Vanderkemp be appointed Superintendent or inspector to the Society".<sup>(2)</sup> Also in the Philip Papers (Rhodes House)

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(1) Andrew Ross: Op: cit: p.38

(2) Lovett. vol.I p.517

there is a transcript which noted that on February 11, 1811, Hardcastle and Burder, senior L.M.S. personnel wrote to van der Kemp from London, urging him to take over the Superintendency ... "owing to difficulties with and irregularities of remote missionaries ... instructing the children ... promoting industry among the natives ... knowledge of the useful arts and laying among them the foundations of social order".<sup>(1)</sup> So even as late as 1811, there was doubt as to the exact nature of the post, and whether he had, even reluctantly, accepted it. Inevitably, the authority that he sometimes needed in the course of his duties in the Cape was consequently arbitrarily defined and exercised, thus causing resentment among his fellow missionaries. Melville expressed both the contemporary opposition to this arbitrariness as well as the whole idea of superintendency when he wrote to the L.M.S. .... "no missionary who studies his Bible will submit to this mode of government, especially when he remembers the arbitrary powers that Vanderkemp and Ross assumed to themselves and the sad effect of this power".<sup>(2)</sup> The result of van der Kemp's nolo episcopari attitude was a Mission of uncertain control.

With van der Kemp's death in 1811, an explosion of mutual recriminations was only a matter of time. James Read was vulnerable, since he represented

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(1) Philip Papers. Rhodes House. MSS. Afr. 5,216 ff 1-268

(2) 8/1/D Melville to L.M.S. December 18, 1819

the 'old order', and had initiated the Black Circuit. Younger missionaries had arrived at the Cape determined to establish themselves professionally by attacking what they considered to be the poor standards of their superiors. White colonists, as well, were prepared to encourage, for all they were worth, such criticisms so that the L.M.S. in the Cape would adopt a less radical and more middle-of-the-road policy. James Read was the obvious target for attack.

James Read (1777-1852) was a missionary who moved on the periphery of Mission affairs, and a recent reassessment has been long overdue.<sup>(1)</sup> He was an artisan agent who had sailed on the Duff to Tahiti on the first L.M.S. Mission, but had extricated himself from the disaster with his probity intact. He had not the scholarship nor charisma of van der Kemp, Livingstone, or Moffat, and the L.M.S. publicity machine was not over-keen to draw attention to him. At Bethelsdorp, he was overshadowed by his superior, and after his marriage in 1803 to a Khoi girl, and activity on behalf of the Khoi employees on the eastern border, his radical pro-Khoi sentiments made him an embarrassment to official L.M.S. opinion in London. In 1817, accusations of adultery were made and he was suspended by the Society. But Read had already proceeded north to Dithakong (later Kuruman) to work at the Mission there. Moffat disliked him, and further accused him of having illicit relations with Mrs. Hamilton. Whether this was true or not is difficult to prove, but it seems very likely that the root cause of Moffat's dislike of Read was his pro-native attitude at

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(1) Christopher Saunders: James Read: towards a reassessment. Collected Seminar Papers No: 21. (University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies)

Dithakong and political stance at Bethelsdorp. Read now had Khoi children as well as a Khoi wife, and completely associated himself with his adopted people. After a period at Bethelsdorp once more, as a menial artisan missionary - probably to purge himself of his moral lapse - he was sent by Philip to be resident L.M.S. missionary at the semi-autonomous Kat River Protectorate. The Khoi were insistent that he should be their missionary, and the other government 'official' missionary made little headway.

Read, even more than van der Kemp, was the incarnation of the L.M.S. Cape Mission in these early years. He identified himself completely with Khoi sentiments and culture, and shared his faith and its concomitants on their rather than white man's terms. The Mission was Khoi, and he rejected the draconian imposition of alien behaviour and values from a "superior" culture upon it.

Not - and here van der Kemp would agree - that he objected to the gradual acculturation of his people. As we shall see in a later chapter, he ended his life as a missionary teacher with his son James Read, junior, at the semi-autonomous Kat River Protectorate where Khoi education reached a standard of excellence that surprised everybody. But there, acculturation was in Khoi time and under Khoi control.

The Rev. George Thom was the spearhead of the attack against the L.M.S. Cape Mission. George Thom arrived in the Cape in 1812 on the way to India. He stayed, and after his unsuccessful challenge to the L.M.S., took the pastorate of a Dutch church at Caledon in 1818. Both Lovett and Ross



saw them as an opportunist, and the latter saw Thom's actions as threatening "the continued existence of the work of the Society in South Africa."<sup>(1)</sup>

But whether Thom was fishing in troubled waters is besides the point. In spite of his intentions, honest or otherwise, or whether the Synod he called was "irregular" or not, Thom had a very good case to put. The case was that the Mission was disorganised, disliked by most of the white colonists in the Cape, and by throwing all its resources behind the Khoi, had become dangerously eccentric. The whole of the Cape Mission, Thom argued, had "made too free" with the Khoi, and the ideal of a middle-class principled Mission subverted. "Indeed," he continued, "the loss of that sense of dignity of character which is attached to the name missionary in England is little understood here ... I mean that dignity, moral purity, faithfulness to one another." It was the loss of this bourgeois "detachment" that had plunged the Society in the Cape into a moral abyss. The Mission personnel were ignorant, "Bethelsdorp an eye-sore" and Read "should remove from it."<sup>(2)</sup> There were other issues as well. There was a lack of coherent doctrine and church practice because of the aversion to their Cape Mission of agents from other denominations. Moral laxity and theological obscurantism were the order of the day.<sup>(3)</sup> The Mission should be thoroughly cleansed and re-started.

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(1) Lovett. vol.I p.535-6. He called Thom "a well-meaning but highly opinionated man". and Ross: Op: cit. p.50.

(2) 7/1/C. George Thom to L.M.S. Cape Town. April 19, 1817.

(3) Philip Papers. Odds 5. 1/1D. George Thom to L.M.S. January 25, 1817.

Thom had sufficient support from other Society agents in the Cape to hold a Synod in the "Orphan House, Cape of Good Hope" on August 12, 1817. Comments that the Synod was "irregular" are neither here nor there, as, presumably, those who attended would have replied that the Mission under van der Kemp was equally "irregular". Anyhow, feelings were running so high that some sort of general meeting of agents was both necessary and valuable. (1)

The Synod accusations against the system that was operating were comprehensive. The agents vehemently agreed that the Society's Cape Mission had neither any discipline nor authority, and the support given to the Black Circuit had meant that the Society had fallen foul of the Cape Government. Thom's point that the missionaries had been "too free" was echoed, and the Synod disconnected four of the Society's agents - Verhoogd, Wimmer, Bartlett and James Read because of moral laxity. The suspension of James Read, the most important of the group, was confirmed by an L.M.S. printed circular on October 27, 1817. Another missionary, Schmelen, was reproved. These changes must not be seen merely in the light of righteous moral indignation. It could be argued that the minor agents were secondary figures and unimportant anyhow. The main issue at stake was the larger cultural one, namely that a British overseas mission had allowed itself to accept standards and values that were 'native' and not 'strict', that there had been too much fraternizing with converts and no strict imposition of 'white' moral standards.

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(1) 7/2/C. Proceedings of the Missionary Deputies held at the Orphan House, Cape of Good Hope. August 12, 1817.

Read's fall seemed to presage a change of direction for the whole Mission and Thom could not help rubbing salt into the wounds. "I look upon the fall of J. Read", he wrote to the L.M.S., "as a judgement on Directors for setting up a man so high as he was". Not only had he fallen into moral obloquy, but the whole "Cape Mission policy" was wrong, and against the spirit of Congregationalism.<sup>(1)</sup> The missionaries at the Orphan House Synod unanimously thought that the only way to prevent such a radical Mission from raising its horrid head again was to return to Congregationalist principles, and make each missionary at each mission station independent, and solely responsible for the conduct of affairs there; consultation between missionaries, certainly, but no external pressure on a particular agent from a supervisory missionary. Policy would be decided by committee - a committee of agents (from town) and missionaries (from the country areas) both chosen by a general meeting.<sup>(2)</sup>

Thom might have been the leader, but there were many who supported his attack on the 'ancien régime'. The younger missionaries who had but recently arrived in the Cape were shocked at the mare's nest that had been uncovered and the idea of van der Kemp being de facto or de jure, "a ruling Missionary". Both morality and pride had been dealt severe blows,

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- (1) Philip Papers. Rhodes House. MSS Afr. S. 216. ff 1-268. Minutes of the L.M.S. Cape Town Conference. August 12, 1817. Thom's comments on the Minutes.
  - (2) 7/2/C. Thom to L.M.S. Directors. August 29, 1817. Thom's comments upon the Orphan House Conference.

and their complaints in letters back to London, they said, never noticed.<sup>(1)</sup> Bethelsdorp, in spite of the glowing accounts appearing regularly in Mission magazines in Britain, was no longer immune from criticism. Evans noted that religious observances there were far from strict, and there was poor observation of the Sabbath; children attended the Sacraments, which were too frequently celebrated; Baptism was attended with little signs of grace, and people were speaking out in church.<sup>(2)</sup> The Khoi were controlling the Bethelsdorp worship in a manner which best suited their traditions, and the young missionaries disliked this trend.

1817 was the year of crisis for the L.M.S. in the Cape. Would the opinions of the disaffected missionaries be heard alongside the complaints of the Cape officials and settlers, or would the L.M.S. try and re-dress matters from within? The latter course was adopted, and in sending out Campbell and Philip, the L.M.S. were backing as impressive and shrewd a couple as possible, to clear up the mess. Thom and the "irregular" Synod had shown the metropolitan authorities the intensity of feeling of Cape supporters against the old ways, now it was up to the two Scotsmen to re-establish the Mission. The mavericks were defeated, and Thom, Taylor and Brownlee resigned in 1818, and Evans in 1819. (Evans and Brownlee subsequently re-joined the Mission).<sup>(3)</sup>

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- (1) 7/5/C. Evans and Messer to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. December 7, 1818
  - (2) 7/2/A. Evans to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. May 20, 1817.
  - (3) 7/5/B. Resignations from Cape Town, Paarl and Duivebhoek River respectively : September-November, 1818.

The re-establishment of the L.M.S. Mission is a problem to be dealt with in the next chapter, and a profitable way to finish this one is to take a closer look at the Khoi themselves. Van der Kemp and Read's sterling defence of Khoi culture and civil rights has been seen already. Philip maintained this attitude during his superintendency, and in his "Researches" insisted that intellectually and morally Khoi were equal to the Europeans. Philip, too, would insist that the L.M.S. institutions ("houses of refuge" to use his phrase) would be basic to future strategy. Nevertheless, there were substantial anti-Khoi opinions expressed by important people in the L.M.S. hierarchy which may well have revealed their true judgement of the Khoi, and explained why the Society was unable or unwilling to train Khoi to a higher level ('a native Agency'). This training at secondary level would have been admirably suited to Khoi abilities and aspirations, for their educational development at the Kat River was impressive. Foster, who was sent to the Cape specifically to train Khoi children, noted in private correspondence to the L.M.S. that the Khoi ... "have not generally that judgement and that stability of character which would enable them to acquit themselves, as instructors, wholly to the satisfaction of the Society".<sup>(1)</sup> Ellis, a senior L.M.S. visiting official echoed this opinion some decades later when he opposed theological training for the Khoi because of their absence of "piety and talent" and was sure that "close mental application is so alien to native habits".<sup>(2)</sup> A few years before,

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(1) Foster to Directors: August 8, 1828 (Quoted in J. Sales: Mission Stations and the Coloured Communities of the Eastern Cape: 1800-1852.p.93)

(2) L.M.S. private report, 1855. (J. Sales. op.cit. p.132)

Freeman visited the Hankey Institution in the Eastern Cape and gave his opinion that "there is little ultimate development beyond the early stages. Mind then seems to become stagnant .... no further progress is made". (1) Freeman adamantly opposed the creation at the Hankey Institution of any higher training facility for the Khoi.

Whatever van der Kemp did or did not do, his embracing of the Khoi cause and his willingness for them to develop, within a Christian and European integument, at their own pace, meant that the destinies of the L.M.S. and Khoi were to be forever locked together. Philip essentially was to fine tune this process and wherever the L.M.S. expanded in the Cape the Khoi were a crucial part of their Mission.

It could be argued that, in this symbiotic relationship, Khoi culture enjoyed a late flowering, after the battering they had received in the early years of their contacts with the Dutch Cape settlers. Not that their vitality was limited to within this missionary relationship. In the "Servants War" of 1799 they drove the 'trekboers' out of the Uitenhage district. Coloured levies fought for the colony in the Xhosa wars of 1819, 1835 and 1846. Previous to that the Khoi had formed the Hottentot Corps of 500 under Batavian rule, and it continued in service until 1817. Other Hottentot groups divided into three bands under Boesak, Klaas Stuurman and Hans Trompetter, and taken refuge among the Amandhlambi in the


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(1) J.J. Freeman: A Tour of South Africa (1851) p.57

Zuurveld.<sup>(1)</sup> It was the way the Khoi adapted to the challenges of the white civilization of the Cape under the aegis of the L.M.S. that proved the mettle of their worth. As Bethelsdorp developed, there occurred a mini-wave of Khoi cultural imperialism. Some Khoi left Bethelsdorp in 1814 and settled at a nearby L.M.S. institution called Theopolis. From here, groups went to Toverberg and Hephzibah to settle in communities among the Bushmen. In 1816, the Khoi were the most substantial racial element who had settled at Kat River on the eastern frontier, where they began to develop their agricultural and commercial skills, along with their educational potential to an impressive level. In 1806, another Khoi group had settled on the borders of the northern Cape where they intermarried with other black, white and coloured groups to form the Bastards. This group was further settled by a pioneer L.M.S. missionary called William Anderson, and renamed by him the Griquas. In name and social organisation, the Griqua people owed much to the L.M.S., and Griqua cultural and religious influence made a significant impact on the northern borders. It was the settling of the Griquas and their subsequent adaptation which stimulated John Philip to produce his theory of "buffer states" whereby the culture of the white Cape could filter into the regions beyond to effect drastic changes on African tribal life there. Certainly, the Kuruman Mission of Moffat owed much to the spiritual priming it received from Griquatown Christianity.

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(1) Journal of African History: 17. p. 143. (Tony Kirk review of Jane Sales: op: cit.)



JULI, BURCHELL'S "FATHERFUL HOTTENTOT" (FROM BURCHELL'S ORIGINAL)



It is difficult to tease out an individual biography from the mass of fragmented information available to us about the Khoi. However, the story of Cupido Kakkerlak has been reconstructed in such a way, and demonstrates significant elements of this Khoi/L.M.S. interrelationship.<sup>(1)</sup> Kakkerlak was converted to Christianity by van der Kemp in 1801, and settled down in Bethelsdorp with his family, becoming literate and numerate. He eventually took on the unpaid and difficult task of missionary among the Kora people, with James Read his mentor and supporter. For six years he laboured among the Kora people at Mabotee, a mission station the L.M.S. acknowledged for awhile. But the L.M.S. were not prepared to train or organise Khoi Christians like Kakkerlak for mission work, so that after Read's fall from grace, Moffat dispensed with his services peremptorily in 1823. Earlier in his life, Kakkerlak has been talented enough to supervise arrangements for John Campbell's journey all the way from the Cape into Namaqualand via Klaarwater (Griquatown) and Dithakong. Now he was to spend the rest of his life, as a vagabond missionary, travelling about the northernmost parts of the Cape in a tattered ox-wagon.

The career of Kakkerlak encapsulated the success and failure of L.M.S. policy towards the Khoi. The L.M.S. could convert and educate a man to become a determined, enterprising missionary, yet the Society failed to capitalize on such committed devotion by training Kakkelak, and Khoi like him, to become their official agents. The will to do so was just as lacking as the organisational resources. The convictions of pioneer-

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(1) V.C. Malherbe: The Life and Times of Cupido Kakkerlak. (Journal of African History. 20. No:3. pp 365-378).

missionaries like van der Kemp and Philip, as well as the existence of vital Christian Khoi/Griqua settlements, were insufficient to convince the L.M.S. Directorate that the Khoi were adaptable enough to benefit from both higher education and training for them to share, as equal partners in the Society's activities. So far must the Khoi be educated, they said - and no further. Official L.M.S. attitudes were more reflected in Moffat's opinion of the Khoi, as he dismissed Kakkerlak from his duties and condemned the Khoi's rough evangelism, because it was "in the highest degree detrimental to the cause".

CHAPTER FOUR

John Philip : 1819 - 1851

"Strong as my impressions were in favour of civil and religious liberty, I may say I never knew what oppression was til I came to Southern Africa."

John Philip : Fragments of an Autobiography

p.3



JOHN PHILIP : 1819 - 1851.

Van der Kemp, the child of Rousseau and John Philip the child of Adam Smith, is a helpful comparison between the two pioneer missionaries of the Society in the Cape.<sup>(1)</sup> Van der Kemp as the reclusive scholar-saint and Philip, the hard-nosed missionary politician have become stereotyped figures over the years, but they nevertheless serve to illuminate the two traditions in the early activities of the Society in southern Africa. As we have seen in the last chapter, van der Kemp was not at all anxious to stimulate the Khoi into becoming a commercially aggressive people; he was temperamentally unsuited to such a course of action, valued their traditional culture, and was, indeed, by his marriage and family more part of Khoi rather than of Dutch or British colonial culture. On the other hand, John Philip was a cultural imperialist. A thorough going "developer", he believed that evangelisation of the Khoi should be accompanied by their rapid initiation into a European culture and economy, and thus transform Khoi life for the better.

In spite of such differences, the mission of both van der Kemp and Philip had important similarities. Firstly, Philip became grateful that he had inherited the L.M.S. institutions from his predecessor. Before leaving England, Philip did not like the idea

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(1) Peter Hinchliff: The Church in South Africa. p.25

of separating the Khoi into special places for work and worship, but changed his mind after experiencing Cape life: "If they do not put their institution in repair, all will be lost", he wrote back to London a year after living in the Cape.<sup>(1)</sup> From then on, Philip was a constant advocate of the value of these Institutions as places of defence and acculturation for the Khoi. When, towards the end of his life, the L.M.S. wanted to sell off the Hankey Institution piecemeal to individual Khoi, Philip strenuously opposed the idea. His "grand design" was to develop the talents and aspirations of the Khoi in the protective environment of such places as Bethelsdorp, Theopolis, Caledon, Pacaltsdorp and Hankey, until they could become an integral part of the new, white-controlled society that was emerging at that time in the Cape. But Philip did not want the Khoi to be merely "an integral part" of the new society, he wanted them to be a vital part. Philip saw the Khoi evolving in the following three stages. First, they had to 'advance' from the 'brute' existence they had endured in the pre-white stage of Cape society, when they were primitive pastoralists. The second stage would be into the 'civilized' commercial society, that had developed in the more affluent parts of the Cape - the result of trade, commerce, a prosperous 'cash-crop' agriculture, and the attendant trades and professions that went along

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(1) Philip Papers: Rhodes House. ff 1-268. Philip to L.M.S. Directors via Dr. Robertson of India. 1820?

with this prosperity. This would be the limit to which a secular society could advance. But the Khoi were not being initiated into commercial life only, but Christianity as well. Therefore, as converted Christians they were to proceed into a third liberal stage of civilization that was the result of an enlightened Christian conscience. The Khoi, in Philip's plan for them, would be a leading moral element in a materially advanced Cape. But this future for them depended on the stimulation of institutions, such as Bethelsdorp.

A second similarity between van der Kemp's mission and John Philip's was that both missions were overtly "political". Philip's reasons for engaging in politics, and the exact connotation that can be applied, in this instance, to the term "political", will be examined later in this chapter. But Philip never queried the moral rightness of van der Kemp in drawing public attention to Khoi grievances, or attempting to correct them by means of the Black Circuit. Philip increased the intensity of the L.M.S. participation in political activity, as well as doing so more adroitly. Van der Kemp and Read confronted the Boer farmers head-on in open court whereas Philip went to England to see that the laws were changed to favour the Khoi. Philip never met van der Kemp, but became a supporter of his friend and colleague James Read, in spite of Read's fall from grace and adoption of a Khoi way of life. In fact, Philip was instrumental in getting Read appointed as the Society's missionary on the Kat

River, in response to repeated Khoi requests.

John Philip's background was very different to that of van der Kemp. A recent study of Philip has detailed what is known of his early life.<sup>(1)</sup> Born in Kircaldy in 1775, the son of a moderately prosperous and educated handloom weaver, Philip became the manager of a Dundee spinning mill while still a young man. Philip's Scotland was undergoing great social and industrial changes. Agriculture and industry had expanded in Lowland Scotland and the north east of England, leading to the creation of a hardworking and confident middle-class. Moreover, this young industrial revolution was still one of promise and had not yet developed the social and ideological conflicts of the middle and later nineteenth century. In cultural terms as well, Scotland was undergoing a revolution or rather a renaissance. The Moderates - laymen and ministers who after the Act of Union dominated Church and State - produced the "Golden Age" of the Scottish Enlightenment. These cultured literati developed a love of learning and virtue; humanitarianism; a respect for hardwork and material improvement, and an aversion to slavery and other forms of inhumanity.<sup>(2)</sup> This industrial prosperity

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(1) Andrew Ross: John Philip (1775-1851) Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa. (1980) Especially Chapter three.

(2) Richard B. Sher: Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate literati of Edinburgh. p.8 (1985)



and cultural renaissance was supplied with a sharp cutting edge - an evangelical revival headed by the Haldane brothers, Robert and James. This group actively supported overseas Mission, and were keen open-air preachers and evangelizers at home, as well. Such was the background that shaped Philip's outlook, and made him a product of this vital period of Scottish history. Philip's writings, letters and strategy in the Cape repeatedly show how much he had absorbed the political and cultural assumptions of that particular place and time. What were the convictions upon which Philip erected his mission policy in the Cape?

Philip believed that material progress and hard work would result in greater happiness as well as an increased ability to absorb the Gospel. To put it into a phrase, good Christians "got on" in life. Better living and working conditions, more personal wealth were not 'carnal', but could be used as a means of grace; material progress and Christian enlightenment were different sides of the same coin. Philip was convinced, also, that education was not only valuable per se, but was the way of encouraging people to seek social and cultural advance, and assist them to an intelligent Christian faith. All his life, Philip had an absolute detestation of racial discrimination, and opposed any trespass on the civil liberty of any tribe or group. This was coupled with a conviction that non-white groups in the Cape, such as the Khoi and Griqua, had tremendous social and cultural potential and were existentially the equal of whites. To bind

together all these convictions was the determination that participation in the political dialogue was crucial, if this world-view was to be promoted and defended.

Philip left the world of industry determined to become a minister. He was advised to study at the Hoxton Academy, London, which was run by the English Congregationalists. He ministered in Newbury, Bucks, in 1802/3 and in 1804 was called to serve at George Street Congregational Church, Aberdeen. His ministry prospered and his influence in the town and region increased. In 1810, he became an honorary Doctor of Divinity of Princeton University and Columbia University, New York.

A fragment of autobiography, ignored until now, showed what two elements in his character Philip regarded as most important.<sup>(1)</sup> The first element of his character that he regarded as being worthy of note was an ingrained dislike of oppression .... "the tales of the covenanters and their sufferings .... imputed to my heart the spirit of civil liberty". His second characteristic was the value he placed on education, not only for personal enlightenment, but for stimulating 'Christian devotion' and relating Christianity intelligently to the contemporary scene. He was dissatisfied with the curriculum and standard of education he had received at Hoxton Academy, as it

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(1) School of Oriental and African Studies: Reserved Collection Q.26  
Typescript of Fragments of an Autobiography of Dr. John Philip,  
Superintendent of the L.M.S. in South Africa, 1819-1851.  
(Original MSS in the Library of Parliament, Cape Town).

contained insufficient literary and scientific matter. Philip believed that philosophy, science and the humanities were neglected so much at mission colleges that they led to narrow-mindedness and intellectual torpor. Education was the leaven to produce social change, and lively interactions between belief, Christian living and thinking. Education without Christian beliefs produced unpleasant competitiveness and "honour, sinful enterprise, ambition, intrigue". Philip continued by quoting, with approval, Robert Boyle's opinion that religion could only prosper if more attention was paid to education - a theme Philip returned to often, when discussing mission strategy in the Cape. Education and culture were essential to Christian souls or they would be plunged into a brute state. The Scotsman noted such occasions in a Cape context: "When I was in the Interior in 1819 I met with many instances of the suddenness with which a people who have been once civilized may be rebarbarized by the want of improving society, schools and the ordinances of religion." (1)

When Philip arrived in the Cape in 1819, the fortunes of the Society's mission were at a low ebb. Thom and seven missionaries were in a state of rebellion, and threatened to publish condemnatory evidence about the moral laxity of their fellow agents. Thom was trying to force the Society to give him the task of clearing up the mess. Firm government was needed, and he brushed aside all

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- (1) Philip Papers: Rhodes House. ff 1-268.
- (2) Ibid. ff 1-268. Philip to wife. June 5, 1820. Also Philip to ? 1820.

objections in Congregational theology to "Superintendency", and the Directors stood behind his refusal to delegate any of his authority.<sup>(1)</sup>

The assumption of authority in the Cape by Philip was not as contentious as van der Kemp's, but it made Philip enough enemies in the process. His technical title was that of Resident Director, but whatever the title, his job was unambiguously that of Superintendent. Since the title was shrouded in so much argument, it is small wonder that the practical functions were never spelled out. But, as a minimum, it would involve the following: corresponding with the Directors and Foreign Secretary in London; managing the finances and resources of the Cape mission; relations with the Cape administration; appointing and placing of missionaries; general management of mission stations and schools; visiting the stations; development of an overall policy of evangelistic expansion.

The Moffats, husband and wife, were first in the queue of dissenters to such a role. The nature and exercise of such power was necessarily corrupting, and Philip had caught the disease.

"We have conceived him as intoxicated with ambition", Mary Moffat thought.<sup>(2)</sup> Robert Moffat objected to the political nature of

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(1) Ibid. ff 1-268. Philip to Directors. Cape. June 23, 1843 and Directors to John Philip, London, July 20, 1830.

(2) Isaac Schapera: Apprenticeship at Kuruman. p.281. Robert Moffat to J. Smith, Lattakoo.

Philip's mission, and eventually both missionaries agreed to a truce. "The affairs of the Mission, except church discipline, are under his direction", wrote Moffat in 1823.<sup>(1)</sup> Ultimately it was the non-political, more direct personal evangelism of Robert Moffat that won the support of the L.M.S. Directors, but that was in the 1840's when Philip's Mission was in decline.

The Moffats were not the only critics of Philip's powers. Objection to the post of Superintendent was active for years, and detracted a lot from Philip's attempts to galvanize his Mission's schools and present an active, united front to the Mission's secular enemies. As late as 1844, an eulogium presented to Philip for his work on behalf of the Society in the Cape was emended by seven missionaries, because they objected to "Superintendency" as a method of church government, and preferred missionary committees because they were more democratic and effective. "Superintendency" they noted, "is opposed to our views of the word of God on such subjects .... it is contrary to avowed principles of Dissenter whether Congregational or Presbyterian." The seven missionaries were frightened that the assumption of total control by a 'Superintending' missionary would corrupt Philip, and it would take away the need of other missionaries trying to cultivate "good feeling and union among the brethren."<sup>(2)</sup> After Philip's death, Moffat and Calderwood

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(1) Ibid. p.69. R. Moffat to A. Moffat, 1823

(2) 20/3/A. Notes on a Memorial of Missionaries to the Directors of the L.M.S. Signed by 7 missionaries. Umxelo. October 10, 1844.

pressed for local committees to run the Mission, and the Directors accepted the recommendation. So Philip's successor was only an 'agent' (he controlled the correspondence and managed the finances), and his effectiveness came from the "affection of the brethren" rather than from any authority granted him by the Directors.<sup>(1)</sup> Such friction was an obstacle to Philip in an already overburdensome post. His travels around the Cape were wearying and time-consuming, his only administrative help came from his wife; he was the author and recipient of an immense correspondence, and was never too busy to write longer defences of his policies to private or public individuals. On top of all this work, he was an erstwhile working pastor in a Cape Town church that disliked his political opinions.

At the time of Philip's arrival in the Cape, the Society's mission stations there were divided into three grades. Most important were the institutions or family settlements where Khoi lived, worked and worshipped, supervised by the Society's white missionaries. The L.M.S. institutions were Bethelsdorp, near Port Elizabeth in the eastern Cape (founded in 1802); Caledon, originally called Zuurbrack, near Swellendam (founded in 1811); Pacaltsdorp, originally called Hoogte Kraal, 300 miles east of Cape Town (founded in 1813); and Theopolis, near Bethelsdorp (founded in 1814). Then there were the Mission stations within the Cape which included Stellenbosch, Tulbagh and Cape Town itself. Finally, there was the small station on the

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(1) 34/2/B. Thompson to L.M.S. Hankey November 4 1866

eastern frontier - Kaffraria (later King Williamstown); and others on the northern frontier of the Cape - Lattakoo (later called Kuruman, the base of the Society's expansion into the interior), Bethesda, Peace Mountain (originally Afrikaaner's Kraal), Hephzibah and Griquatown (formerly Klaar Water).

Soon after his arrival, Philip made a quick survey of most of these stations and institutions for his own satisfaction, and his later report noted their condition at that time. The state of the schools in both institutions and stations was poor, and most of the European missionaries were not alert to the problem, or very interested in the educational process. There were, in fact, schools conducted by untrained native agents, and in the whole of the Cape Mission only 200 children attended school. The Cape Town station had some day schools; Theopolis and Bethelsdorp were in a poor condition; Pacalt was dead, and Pacaltsdorp was still finding its feet; at the Caledon Institution, the agent Seidenfaden was behaving atrociously; Peter Wright, Philip's favourite agent, was working hard and profitably at Griquatown. (1)

Pacaltsdorp and Theopolis might be taken as examples of the range of work the L.M.S. institutions did. To the L.M.S. authorities, Pacaltsdorp was the perfect institution, and "came nearest to the ideal of the founders of the Society as to what a station should be." (2)

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(1) 15/3/C. John Philip Report. London. October 6, 1837

(2) Lovett I. p.562

Pacalt was a sincere evangelist with exemplary pastoral gifts, and until his death there were no labour conflicts in his Institution. This was not only due to the politically passive approach of Pacalt - more resembling the Moravians than the traditional L.M.S. policy in this respect, - but also to the fact that the institution was not in the eastern Cape, and the labour pressures of the 'trekboers' absent. In 1817, there were 300 Khoi and liberated coloureds in the Institution. It was a 'scattered situation', where wheat and gardens were farmed, there were 400 cattle, 70 sheep, 15 horses and an annual tax of 426 rix-dollars. The official report of 1817 concluded, "the progress of civilization is very encouraging".<sup>(1)</sup> Latrobe, a Moravian superintendent whose visit to Pacaltsdorp was in 1815, was impressed with the instruction given and the charm of the site. "The cottages are placed in regular rows. The gardens are well laid out, and the Hottentots, both by precept and example, taught diligently to attend to the rearing of garden produce of various kinds." The worship was too influenced by Khoi culture for Latrobe's delicate ear, and he objected to the "jarring sounds" he had heard during a service, at which over 100 people attended. Pacalt explained that it came from a conviction of sin, but this did not carry much weight with the visitor.<sup>(2)</sup> After Charles Pacalt's death in 1818, the institution had a succession of excellent senior agents; J.G. Messer until the end of 1821, and the veteran missionary William Anderson

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(1) Published Report of the L.M.S. Directors. 1817. p.23

(2) C.I. Latrobe: Journal of a visit to South Africa in 1815 and 1816



from Griquatown until 1852. There were talented schoolmasters at the Institution as well. Rogers Edwards who went later to Lattakoo (Kuruman), and Thomas Edwards, were two such people. The natural vitality of the school may have been increased because of the slaves attending, who were keen to improve such social status as they had. Messer's report of 1830 reported: "the children in school have made this year good progress in learning, particularly in writing and ciphering. Since the Sunday School had begun, the poor slaves came from every quarter being desirous of learning".<sup>(1)</sup> By 1830, there were 300 people on the Pacaltsdorp site, the majority attending church, and the mission school was still flourishing. More children attended school at Pacaltsdorp than in the nearby town of George, although George had a population of over 700.<sup>(2)</sup>

Around 1850, adverse economic circumstances combined to strangle the vitality of Pacaltsdorp. Although the slaves had been freed, social advance in the western Cape was now virtually impossible and class and colour lines had firmly set. Education became a pointless activity. Atkinson, the senior resident missionary noted: "the people will employ their children at work, especially the boys, as soon as they are able to do anything."<sup>(3)</sup> Conditions deteriorated, and seven years later

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(1) 8/2/E J.G. Messer to L.M.S. Pacaltsdorp. December 29, 1830

(2) Philip Papers: Rhodes House. ff 1-265. January 25, 1830

Philip's Report.

(3) 4/6 Atkinson to L.M.S. Pacaltsdorp. July 18, 1849

Atkinson confessed that his Khoi residents were too few and too poor to support a schoolmaster and ... "as the Society has prohibited its agents from receiving aid from the Government, and declined supporting the school from its funds, I really cannot see any prospect of improving our educational development." (1) So

Education was seen by the Pacaltsdorp Khoi as an irrelevant activity, as far as obtaining a livelihood was concerned, and it came to an end. But the eastern Cape still offered some chances for the Khoi to advance. The presence of a large black population and 'trekboers' made life not only more unpredictable, but offered opportunities to trade and farm, absent from the western Cape. Moreover, the eastern Khoi had traditionally been more politically active and socially ambitious.

Theopolis was an extension of Bethelsdorp. It was founded by the Khoi under the L.M.S. missionaries Ulbricht and Bartlett, and was a part of the explosion of Khoi mini-imperialism that included populating the Kat River Protectorate and settling in Griqualand. George Barker was the senior missionary from 1821 to 1836, and Christopher Sass from 1830 to 1849, when it was abandoned because of civil war on the eastern frontier. Sir John Cradock granted the land by letter of February 12, 1814, to John Campbell, the L.M.S. itinerant Superintendent. Cory researched the site ruin on the Kasonga river,

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(1) 30/2/B. T. Atkinson to L.M.S. Pacaltsdorp. December 15, 1856

and discovered separate houses and gardens near a stream, a missionary's house and a church 15 feet by 30 feet.<sup>(1)</sup> Education was important to the Khoi at Theopolis. George Barker reported 220 children on the books in January, 1824, but there was no school room.<sup>(2)</sup> A school room was opened in June, 1824, but the school materials were poor. The school, however, flourished and the Lancasterian system was introduced with some modifications. Then the unforeseen disaster occurred, namely the appointment of a missionary-teacher called Doyle. He was an incompetent, his seven children ran wild around the institution, but, ironically, because of his large family, he was paid £130 a year, and thus the highest paid L.M.S. missionary in the Cape. "In 1825," noted Philip with understandable chagrin, "we had no school equal to it at any of our stations. In 1830 it did not deserve the name of school."<sup>(3)</sup>

The school slowly improved under a teacher who shared Philip's sense not only of the importance of education in itself, but of its value in the process of evangelisation. Thomas Edwards' philosophy of education was Philip's own: "Preaching the Gospel cannot have that effect upon an untutored mind, that, it would have upon a mind enlightened and expanded, and disciplined by the influence of useful practical knowledge." By this time, the average attendance at the

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- (1) G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa i p.283 and following pages.
- (2) 9/2/A. G. Barker to L.M.S. Theopolis. January 22, 1824
- (3) 12/1/A. J. Philip to L.M.S. July 3, 1830

Theopolis School had returned to 44, and the Sunday School to 44. As well as reading and writing, History and Geography was added to the curriculum; simple and complex multiplication, which caused the children difficulties. The hindrances, Edwards added, were the perennial ones of children being needed to cultivate the land, and the fact that children did not read after leaving school.<sup>(1)</sup>

Philip has received a critical historical press. Missionary apologists have tried to excuse his political involvement in the Cape, and Cape historians have regarded him as the arch-villain of all the liberal critics of the Cape Settlement. Godlonton, editor of the 'Grahamstown Journal' castigated Philip as the uncritical champion of the "coloured classes" who maligned the character of the white colonists .... "everything has been made subservient to one particular object, and the natural result is, that a most false and partial estimate has been made, and submitted to the public by him, of colonial character."<sup>(2)</sup> This attack on Philip's mission was orchestrated by subsequent colonial historians and became ingrained into Cape mission historiography. Theal's condemnation has a similar tone to Godlonton's, and is severe on the political nature of Philip's work.<sup>(3)</sup> Cory

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(1) 15/2/A. Thomas Edwards. Theopolis. December 17, 1836.

(2) Robert Godlonton: A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope : 1834-5 (Grahamstown. 1835, Reprinted Cape Town. 1965). P.105

(3) G.M. Theal: History of South Africa. 1. P.505.

maliciously suggested that Philip had supported the wrong coloured group. Rather than back the "Hottentot, who had a natural incapacity to develop", Philip should have championed the doughty Kaffir instead.<sup>(1)</sup> Agar-Hamilton was the most thorough of all Philip's critics, for he damned the L.M.S. enterprise from start to finish. The missionaries, argued Agar-Hamilton, were narrow-minded artisans after their own advancement, and Philip's "Treaty State system" - his idea of creating buffer zones of Cape Folk between White Cape territory and the black African hinterland - "would have turned the whole interior of South Africa into a missionary preserve."<sup>(2)</sup> One cannot but wonder whether a recent semi-official report of correspondence between John Philip and the Wesleyan Methodist Superintendent in the Cape, William Shaw, was not part of the continuing official feud against Philip. The letters are technical, and serve only to show Philip in a difficult diplomatic situation, trying to condemn 'commando' raids against the frontier tribes.<sup>(3)</sup>

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- (1) G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa ii p. 370, footnote
- (2) J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton : The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers  
: p.102
- (3) William Shaw: A Defence of the Wesleyan Missionaries in Southern Africa. (1839) Reprinted 1976 by the State Library, Pretoria.

Macmillan's liberal defence of Philip has been recently restated by Ross. Philip was seen, by both historians, in the favourable light of defending the political rights of non-whites, the lone voice of freedom in an otherwise sour, racist society, and the would-be architect of a multiracial Cape.<sup>(1)</sup> The other noteworthy commentary on Philip prior to Ross, was Galbraith's evaluation of him en passant when analysing imperial policy in the nineteenth century Cape. Galbraith's assessment that Philip "has been credited with greater political influence than he possessed. He first contributed to this exaggeration, and his enemies have helped to perpetuate it," is part of Galbraith's general thesis that the shaping of South Africa was due to the impersonal operations of 'the Exchequer mind', based on decisions made remotely in London, and that Cape personalities, Mission or otherwise, had a minor part to play in such a process. Philip's denigration was part of a wider anti-personality line of argument.<sup>(2)</sup>

An attack from the radical wing on Philip is provided by Majeke's interpretation of Philip's policy, which he saw as the liberal-humanitarian edge of a bourgeois drive, in the Cape, to liberate the Khoi, in order to allow them to move onto the open market to be employed and summarily exploited. Philip, according to Majeke, was the representative of the new commercial economy that had come to the Cape to dislodge the "feudal" Boers, as well as shame the incompetent

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(1) For example, W.M. Macmillan: The Cape Colour Question: A Historical Survey (1927);  
and Andrew Ross: John Philip (1775 - 1851). Mission, Race and Politics in South Africa (1980)

(2) J.G. Galbraith: The Reluctant Empire: British Policy and the South African Frontier: 1834-1854 (1963)

aristocratic governor, Lord Somerset. (1)

The weight of this historiographical criticism of Philip is concentrated on one issue: the 'political' nature of Philip's mission. Why, in what<sup>er</sup> sense the term 'political' is used, was Philip's mission political? And how did its political nature integrate with the spiritual and cultural aspects of his mission?

A study by Gailey attempted to pinpoint Philip's conversion to political activity. (2) Gailey argued that this crisis for Philip occurred in 1821, when his private note to the Cape Governor, Sir Rufane Donkin, about malpractices committed by the civil authorities on the Bethelsdorp Khoi, was publicly exposed by the Governor and rebutted. Philip then felt compelled to take up the political cudgels to defend both the Khoi, and his own action in taking Sir Rufane Donkin into his confidence. But whereas this might have been the occasion of Philip's entry upon the political stage, Philip was not the kind of man to enter upon a course of action as the result of injured pride. There were other similarly superficial reasons that could have made Philip engage in politics. The 1820 settlement, as well as the increasing importance of commercial life in the Cape, meant that more professional people had emigrated there, and the feudal atmosphere of the Cape was being modified. Moreover, political support for Philip

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(1) Nosipho Majeke: The Rôle of the Missionaries in the Conquest (1952)  
Pages 8, 14, 15 and 18 in particular.

(2) Harry J. Gailey, jr: John Philip's Rôle in Hottentot Emancipation  
(Journal of African History. 3. (1962)  
pp 419 - 433.

was appearing. Thomas Pringle's Narrative of a Residence in South Africa was pro-Philip, as was John Fairbairn's South African Commercial Advertiser.<sup>(1)</sup> The first blood Philip drew as a political activist was in the struggle for press freedom against the severe censorship laws of the Cape Government. This activity of Philip led directly to the 1823 Commission of Inquiry against Lord Charles Somerset, the then Governor, and the setting up of an Advisory Council formed in 1825 which the Governor was obliged, in future, to consult. But the political sources of Philip's mission lie deeper. By temperament, conviction and cultural conditioning, Philip saw that the civil state of the Khoi had to be founded on a just civil basis, and that this basis did not exist in the contemporary Cape. The Ordinances of November, 1809, and April, 1812, had been called the 'Hottentot's Magna Charta' and intended superficially to protect Khoi, but, in fact, the reverse was the case. The Ordinances stated that the Khoi had to have a fixed place of abode, and passes if they wanted to move from place to place. More than that, there existed by then, a legal right by which employers could retain Khoi children on a ten-year apprenticeship as servants, thus binding the children's families as well. Even a conservative historian such as Cory agreed that the 1821 forced labour charges against the landdrosts of Uitenhage and Albany were in all probability true.<sup>(2)</sup> But apart from Philip's insistence on legal equality for Khoi in the eyes of the law, went another and more radical belief that the Khoi, other Africans

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(1) Thomas Pringle Narrative of a Residence in South Africa (London. 1835). Africa Collectanea. Cape Town. 1966. vol. xx. John Fairbairn became Philip's son-in-law.

(2) G.E. Cory: Op. cit. II. p.413-4



and their progeny had a 'natural capacity' that was not one whit inferior to the whites. Philip, more than any other contemporary, had a long and intimate knowledge of Khoi achievement and potential, and his assertion of their ability was constant and never modified. The following excerpt is a trenchant statement of Philip's belief in the intelligence of all Africans; there are many other examples of a similar nature in his private and public correspondence.

.... "it appears to me that the natural capacity of the African is nothing inferior to that of the European. At our schools, the children of Hottentots, of Bushmen, of Caffres, and of the Bechuanas, are in no respect behind the capacity of those of European parents."<sup>(1)</sup>

Most profound of all, in Philip's missionary theology, was the belief that Africans, just as much as white people, were children of God and equal in His love. This belief was shared, just as fiercely, by van der Kemp and David Livingstone. In fact, the basic commitment of all three pioneer missionaries was complete to both these articles of faith - the Africans' natural intelligence and their infinite worth.

So it did not take a personal insult from Sir Rufane Donkin or some liberal encouragement to make Philip a political missionary; he was one by birth, and saw that the political injustices the Khoi

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(1) John Philip: Missionary Herald. vol. xxiv. 1833. p.414  
(Quoted in Ross. op.cit. p.95).

endured were sufficient reasons for him to politically support them. But what made Philip more disliked than any other missionary was that he conducted his campaigns against traditional injustices outside the Cape; giving his views maximum publicity in Europe, and trying to influence parliamentary opinion in London, thousands of miles away from the actual problems. This was not playing fair, and Philip was now regarded in the Colony as the 'enemy within'. His activity in London was traitorous, and evinced a deep and widespread dislike which exists to this day.

Philip went to England in April, 1826, determined to expose the civil injustices that existed in the Cape. He made a lengthy statement to a committee of L.M.S. Directors explaining the issues and his own position. There can be no doubt that their ignorance on these matters was considerable, and it is a tribute both to Philip's eloquence and their integrity that support was forthcoming in the contest ahead. Nevertheless, not far below the surface in Blomfield Street - the L.M.S. London headquarters - there was disquiet at the course their Cape Mission was continuing to take. Van der Kemp was an eccentric Dutchman, and the Society had managed to conceal it. But those were early days; the present situation was quite different. Philip was technically an L.M.S. Director, a senior person with considerable abilities and influence, yet he was pursuing a political campaign with as much zeal as van der Kemp, and ten times the skill. As the next decade passed, the other L.M.S. Directors found Philip's strategy more and more distasteful, and Philip's resignation later

was only just avoided. Philip was well aware of this lack of support, and noted it bitterly on many occasions. The Society's Directors saw that their only hope of uncontentious, peaceful expansion in southern Africa was by means of Robert Moffat's Mission at Kuruman. It was outside a 'settler' community, non-political and evangelically direct and simple. Why did the Directors more and more neglect Philip? There was a combination of reasons. They genuinely did not understand how extremist politics had become involved with an evangelising activity; Moffat's move into the hinterland - a 'garden' community and simple preaching - seemed more relevant than the polemics that emerged from Philip's embattled situation in the Cape. Moreover, the L.M.S. like the Missionary Societies depended on the pennies of the ordinary Churchgoer and accusations of political radicalism from Cape administration and settlers was bad publicity. On the whole, the pioneer missionaries were of the Whig-liberal persuasion, and the L.M.S. Directorate - ministers, business men, bankers and members of the professional classes - were Tories, who wanted Establishment respect.

In 1827, Philip helped present a Memorial to the Colonial Office surveying once again the situation of the Khoi in the Cape. To assist matters further, in 1828 his Researches in South Africa was published in which he made a vigorous statement of British responsibility for the condition of the Khoi, and of ways in which this condition could be improved. The idea that this book was just an anti-Boer polemic was just another example of Boer paranoia.

On July 15, 1828, Philip's prompting resulted in Buxton's

recommendation to the British Parliament that the Cape's indigenous populations should enjoy the "same freedom and protection as are enjoyed by the other free people of that Colony whether English or Dutch", and this was passed there by public acclamation. The 50th Ordinance was passed independently in the Cape by the Governor-in-Council two days later, which also granted the Khoi this equality. But Philip was not satisfied. On his insistence both the Parliamentary motion and the Cape Ordinance were made permanent by an Order-in-Council of January, 1829.<sup>(1)</sup> Critics of Philip have used the passing of the 50th Ordinance in the Cape to show that the colonists there could have solved their own problems if they had been left to themselves. But Philip was perfectly well aware that an Ordinance that was passed by the Governor-in-Council could be just as easily repealed in that way. So legal permanence for Khoi rights was important in case they would be, once again, eroded. In fact, a Vagrancy Ordinance against the Khoi was passed by the Legislative Council in the Cape in 1834, but rejected by the Crown. Philip's fear of a return to the bad old days was very real. As Thomas Hodgkin, a member of the Select Committee on Aborigines noted, the 50th Ordinance without the Order-in-Council of the Home Government "would not have been worth the paper on which it was written."<sup>(2)</sup>

We have seen how Philip's temperamental and religious instincts coalesced with his Scottish upbringing to make him both a missionary

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(1) B.P.P. Report of Select Committee on Aborigines. 1836 vii 5414



and a political activist for Khoi rights. To Philip, both tasks were part of the same ethical drive. Now it would be helpful if Philip's unified vision of Mission was put into the larger missionary context of the Cape, for it would show how his fellow missionaries views compared with his own. Not only that, but a fresh angle could help us see how his view of education fitted in with his political ideology and the processes of Khoi acculturation.

Lipner, in a recent article has discussed two possible approaches to mission activity, and placed the two attitudes into theological perspective.<sup>(1)</sup> Defining the Gospel as "the good news or euaggelion Christians see proclaimed in the New Testament" and culture, "the medium - the living situation, language, imagery, myth, signs and ritual - through which the good news is received, experienced, expressed, communicated and transmitted" .... Lipner noted two responses in this juxtaposition, which he termed the "dialectic" response, and the "dialogic" response. In the first response, culture and the Gospel are seen to be in perpetual conflict for the Gospel is "from above" and culture "from below" or, in metaphorical terms, Jerusalem, the source of holiness, having nothing to do with Athens, the source of wisdom. "The overall view", Lipner argued, "of culture here is negative: culture is exploited and deprecated, not respected

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(1) Julius Lipner: Being One, Let me be Many :Facets of the Relationship between the Gospel and Culture.  
(International Review of Mission: vol. LXXIV:  
No. 294 April, 1985)

and nurtured.<sup>(1)</sup> Now there was a significant group of L.M.S. missionaries in the Cape who reflected this attitude. They saw evangelising as non-political, and emphasised personal salvation and holiness. They did not want to incorporate European cultural contact into the faith they were proclaiming, and had little respect for the African cultural forms they were trying to eradicate. Although this group were prepared to use mission schools, education was purely utilitarian and came second to their main object, namely a lively Christian faith. They saw the Gospel as a narrow, spiritual message, and expression of the wider issues of life - in politics, ideas, intellectual concepts - of much lesser consequence. For them, culture, whether European or African, was an irrelevance in the proclamation of the Christian faith.

Charles Pacalt's direction of his institution had strong elements of this simplistic evangelicalism, and this was true as well of the attitudes of George Barker, John Brownlee, William Calderwood, George Thom and Robert Moffat.

Calderwood joined the L.M.S. in 1838, and disliked James Read's strong identification with Khoi culture. Calderwood was appointed

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(1) A recent study has shown that domestic evangelicals found the arts difficult to reconcile with their faith. (Doreen Rosman: Evangelicals and Culture. p.246 .... The failure of even the most cultured evangelicals to reconcile their enjoyment of the arts with their faith reveals how substantial a schism still remained between evangelicalism and culture").

as a Kaffrarian magistrate, and this position was very suited to his remote, "official" relationship to his Khoi converts and their way of life. Calderwood's attitude was that of George Thom and Robert Moffat, who were conscious of their own professional, white, middle-class status as well as considering Khoi culture with indifference. In Calderwood's correspondence, there are many critical references to "Kafirs" and "Hottentot" at the Kat River Settlement, and Calderwood was suspicious of the whole scheme. His open criticism of the experiment annoyed Philip, and they exchanged several harsh letters. (1)

Another member of the 'dialectic' group was the L.M.S. Cape Missionary George Barker, who disliked the political slant to Philip's mission policy: "It would have been better if he had had nothing to do with the settlers, and for all, if that Society had not been made a political thing of ....." (2) Barker conceived of mission work as having a spiritual dimension only, and his opposition to Philip's political involvement in Khoi rights was constant. George Thom, as we have seen in the last chapter, thought

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(1) W.M. Macmillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton (1929) P.239 n.1 and Philip Papers: Rhodes House: ff 1317-1607. Calderwood to Johnstone : 29/X/44  
Calderwood to Philip: Blinkwater 18/XII/44.

(2) J. du Plessis: A History of Christian Missions in South Africa (1911) P.429. Appendix II. Note H.

that L.M.S. agents should preach and teach European moral values and impose them on African converts rather than consort with traditional African beliefs. Thom's commitment to a European culture was superficial, and he saw the benefits of Christianity for the Khoi as the rigid adoption by them of a middle class European code of morals, with the white missionary playing the part of a detached instructor. John Brownlee, the Kaffrarian missionary, resigned from the Society on the issue of 'moral laxity', and there can be no doubt he was shocked by the revelations of the illicit liaisons with Khoi. But, 'moral laxity' was also the coded phrase which signified, as well, his dislike of the van der Kemp-Read fraternization policy which was expressed most of all in van der Kemp's and Read's marriage to native girls and nurturing of African families. Brownlee saw religious experience as of more significance than an educational one. He advocated manual labour for the African, and thought that acquiring such skills should be part of the training of "native agents". More significantly, Brownlee was firmly of the opinion that education should play a secondary role in the mission; pure religion was more important. "Education seems only to accompany or rather to follow religious feeling; where the parents and children are indifferent to religious instruction, any attempt to instruct the latter has been in almost every sense abortive."<sup>(1)</sup> When

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(1) Basil Holt: Greatheart of the Border: A life of John Brownlee, Pioneer Missionary in South Africa. (King williamstown 1976) P.107. Letter to Tidman, L.M.S. Secretary, 24 March, 1844 and P.111. To Ellis, L.M.S. Secretary. August 6, 1841.



Moffat came to the Cape as a young man, he wanted to work in the Kaffrarian Mission with Brownlee, as they were firm friends and shared similar views on evangelisation.

The leader of what we have characterized the "dialectic" group was Robert Moffat. Like Brownlee, he was an artisan, and maintained that the Gospel message was a spiritual message with no cultural overtones. His mission at Kuruman was concerned mainly with direct evangelisation, with little emphasis on education. The school system, when Moffat was in control of the Bechuana Mission, was poor, and it remained so. As a professional gardener, he emphasised the value of agriculture, and the construction of an impressive irrigation system which utilised the 'Eye of Kuruman' - a vast natural spring - turning his mission site into a prosperous and fertile community. The whole of the mission was to 'preserve' the traditional style of life of the local population, although Christianity was meant to transform their spiritual lives. There was no attempt made at cultural development or adaptation, and when this was coupled with tribal migration and commercial development to the east and south-east, Kuruman became a backwater. Ironically, it was at Kuruman that the L.M.S. decided to found the Moffat Institution in Moffat's memory. The Institution was intended to be a secondary school, and an evangelists' and teachers' training establishment. However, the poor mission elementary school system meant that few suitable candidates came forward, and the Moffat

Institution collapsed in a few years.

Moffat understood that his mission strategy was not the political and cultural one of van der Kemp, Philip and David Livingstone, his son-in-law. He sometimes took refuge in vituperation and had little sympathy with missionaries who did not share his views. He condemned the 'dialogic' approach succinctly in an article he wrote in 1883.

"Much has been said about civilizing savages before attempting to evangelize them. This is a theory which has obtained an extensive prevalence among the wise men of this world ..... We ourselves are convinced that evangelization must precede civilization.... the Christian missionary, the only experimentalist, has invariably found that to make the fruit good the tree must first be made good."<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) J.S. Moffat: The Lives of Robert and Mary Moffat (1886) p.387.

(The quotation is taken from an article he wrote for the November, 1883, edition of "Leisure Hour").

The 'dialogic' group of the Society's Cape missionaries, in Lipner's twofold division of approaches to evangelisation, saw the relationship between "culture" and the "Gospel" as not being inimical but complementary<sup>(1)</sup> They regarded the interaction between the Gospel and culture as meaningful, each reflecting on the other, and helping the convert make religious and secular sense of the world. Such missionaries were van der Kemp, David Livingstone, James Reid, and later in the century, attached to the Society's Bechuana Mission, John Mackenzie (Kuruman) and W.C. Willoughby (Tiger Kloof). But the archetypal 'dialogic' missionary was John Philip himself. It is true that in this interaction between the Gospel and culture, these missionaries interpreted the culture in terms of the "preferred culture" i.e. the culture of Western Europe, and in this sense - apart from the pro-Khoi van der Kemp - could be accused of cultural imperialism. Nevertheless, if they did regard their own Western Christianity as superior, they had no contempt for African cultural forms, and their "preference" involved a desire to share the "benefits" of their own culture generously with African converts.

As cultural and humanitarian imperialists, this group wanted to change the beliefs, way of life, aspirations, social and personal drives of all their convert groups, completely. Education would play a crucial part in this transformation; education conceived both as the formal training of a mission school and the absorption of fresh cultural values informally by living and working in the Society's institutions and mission stations.

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(1) See, also, Andrew Ross: Philip. p.219 .... "one group with a pietistic interpretation, the other with a deep belief in its direct social implications" and ... "there is a deep disagreement over the humanity of the Black Person".

The "dialogic" group of missionaries not only hoped for spiritual revivalism to be kindled in the breasts of their converts, but other cultural interactions as well - intellectual stimulation in school and in reading habits, entrepreneurial activity; changes in dress and home life; in personal and family needs; self-help, honesty, hardwork, thrift and other examples of capitalist virtues. Conversion to Christianity must be expressed in a desire to get on materially and in the adoption of European intellectual cosmologies. There is an interesting example of such an evaluation, made by David Livingstone in 1842 when he observed some children in the mission infant school in Kuruman, run by Mrs. Rogers Edwards. "The parents of the school children", noted Livingstone, "look brighter than their fellows ... and it is nearly as great between them and their children. Indeed, the intelligent expression of countenance visible even to strangers, and their amount of knowledge, would almost lead one to fancy they belonged to another species."<sup>(1)</sup> The development of "another species" was exactly what this 'dialogic' group of missionaries wanted to see evolve.

There are other ideological consequences from this attitude. Not only was education important to such missionaries, but it was essential that they engaged in politics so that the L.M.S. could establish and defend the civil rights of its converts. Political debate was not an optional extra; it was part of their evangelism task. So just as education assisted the process of internal change - spiritual and intellectual - political engagement protected the social and civil life of the new African Christians. Inevitably, "tribe" or "nation" became just as

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(1) I. Schapera: Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence 1841-1856.

David Livingstone 6. J.J. Freeman. Kuruman

July 18, 1842

important a word as 'individual' when conversion was discussed by missionaries like Philip, Livingstone, Mackenzie and Willoughby. Of course, the missionary had to address himself as an evangeliser to the individual, but tribal/national dimensions had to be considered when and as the Gospel spread. One of the reasons why David Livingstone left the L.M.S. was the Society's insistence that preaching to the individual African must take precedence over his own wish to see the spread of Christianity in Africa in wider commercial and geographical terms. Half-a century later, W.C. Willoughby, the L.M.S. Missionary to Khama III of the Bamangwato expressed it... "the modern missionary knows that he can act upon the community only through the individual, but he is out for the salvation of the community - the redemption of tribe and nation". (1)

Philip and the "dialogic" group of L.M.S. missionaries possessed the following ideological characteristics: strong support of mission schools; political activity to defend Africans against undue white settler and white colonial pressures; advocacy of the expansion of the British imperium, as the best way to accelerate cultural change and, at the same time, defence of new emergent African groups. Such convictions are reflected in the professional lives of the people in the "dialogic" group. Van der Kemp and James Read were keen educationalists and supported the Khoi by political action; David Livingstone developed his policy of "Commerce and Christianity" with Philip's help and was an ardent supporter of schools and a "native Agency"; John Mackenzie was

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(1) W.C. Willoughby Papers. Selly Oak Colleges Library, Birmingham.  
Box F. File 698

the first (and last) Principal of the Moffat Institution at Kuruman and an eloquent publicist, in the press and on the public platform, for the extension of British control in Bechuanaland; W.C. Willoughby was first Principal of the Tiger Kloof Institution, Vryburg, and a shrewd political tactician in his struggle with Khama.

This "education-politics" axis was noteworthy in John Philip's life. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to his concern for schools, and the next chapter to his political defence on behalf of Khoi and Griqua cultural initiatives.

Philip believed that educational progress and material improvements went together; therefore, not only did he stimulate school at Bethelsdorp - as we have seen in the last chapter - but he did his best to destroy the more relaxed regime of van der Kemp. He introduced the trading firm, Messrs. Kemp, into Bethelsdorp to stimulate Khoi commercial activity. So Kemp bought goods from the Khoi, and sold them clothes and other domestic necessities. Messrs. Kemp were well pleased with their annual turnover of thousands of rix-dollars a year. <sup>(1)</sup> Money, civilization and work were not 'carnal' things, insisted Philip in his written address to the Khoi, but were seen by the world as the 'beneficial effects of mission.' Moreover, the "advantage which an improvement in their homes, and in their industry, and mode of living, could afford to their friends, in pleading their cause .... "meant the 'new' Bethelsdorp could be a useful political counter. Education was the stamp of approval on a whole

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(1) 2/2/B Odds 5. Philip. July 5, 1825.

process of material as well as spiritual amelioration, and gave an 'efficient and permanent character' to their missionary work, and children's education improved the lot of children, and beneficially influenced their parents. (1)

It is easy to interpret all this, as evidence that Philip was over-secular. Philip's approach was essentially religious, and he just refused to accept the distinction between the religious and secular aspects of life. He repeatedly noted in his Researches, and in correspondence, that evangelising without a religious base would make any missionary "lay it aside in despair". (2)

Philip had difficulty implementing his educational plans. His mission field was huge, his administrative support nil, his own missionaries in the Cape unreliable and the Directors of the Society increasingly inconstant as the years passed. The reports he made of his Cape Stations were full of comments and criticisms about the schools. Philip's concern for African children was not theoretical and distant; when his guard was down, he showed his deep emotional attachment to them and their educational progress. In January, 1841, Philip had paid a visit to the Bushman station of Philipton in the northern Cape. In the early morning, as his wagon trundled along

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(1) Philip: Researches ii p203, 213.

(2) Philip: Researches ii p355-6 Andrew Ross: John Philip and David Livingstone Critics of Imperialism. Collected Papers of the University of York (2). 1979. Ross emphasized the Enlightenment influence on Philip. Richard Sher's recent study of the Scottish 'literati' has shown that the Scottish Enlightenment had a substantial religious content.

the recently-freshened "veldt" he wrote a brief report on the school there, to his wife in Cape Town. In spite of years of public vilification, he rejoiced that the Bushmen had managed to settle in such a pleasant spot. Even greater joy was his because of what he had just seen in the vital Bushman school. True, it was short of books, but the native teacher had attempted to circumvent this problem by having the children memorize a Scripture catechism. Philip then went on to explain how he had forgotten the value of such a method, and commended the young teacher's skill. Philip's heart as well as head was involved with his drive to educate young African Christians.<sup>(1)</sup> To all parents and tribal chiefs he met, his advice was always: "You have a school, and the best thing you can do is to send your children to school."<sup>(2)</sup> Certainly, within five years of his taking over control of the Cape Mission, the schools improved. The figures are obviously guesswork, but an independent witness assessed in 1825 that there were 600 adults in Sunday Schools, and 3 to 4,000 children learning to read the Scriptures in them. The Lancasterian system had been introduced into the day schools, and the system had succeeded, particularly at Theopolis.<sup>(3)</sup>

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- (1) 18/2/B. Philip to wife. Philipton. January 9, 1841.
  - (2) B.P.P. Session 1836. vol. VII Report from Select Committee on Aborigines. Paragraphs 4650 following. Evidence of John Tzatzoe.
  - (3) 9/3/4 W. Miller (independent witness) to L.M.S. January 27, 1825.



Schoolmasters were vital to a healthy system of Mission schools. Philip could not emphasize enough their importance to a good mission station, more important in many ways than the senior agent himself. In a letter to Rogers Edwards who was moving from Pacaltsdorp to Theopolis, Philip pointed out the importance of the young teacher's future role ..... "in such a situation you will have the morals, the religion, the future character and condition of the whole Hottentot population of this important Institution under your forming hand."<sup>(1)</sup> To another young person with 'sentimental' ideas of being a missionary, Philip wrote in 1822 that the first duty at Bethelsdorp was schoolmastering. He was welcome to preach, but his first duty was to the rising generation as a teacher.<sup>(2)</sup> Schoolmastering on a mission station was often seen as a step up the promotional ladder, a fact which Philip well knew, and annoyed him. In reality, Philip saw schools as establishing cultural progress along with other material advances. Missionaries should not, he argued, see evangelisation in too 'spiritual' a way. They should not consider "every thing connected with the industry of the people and their civilization, as carnal things, altogether foreign, and even alien to the propagation of the Gospel".<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) 2/2/B. Odds 5. Philip Papers. Philip to Rogers Edwards.

Graaf-Reinet. August 7, 1825.

(2) Philip Papers. Rhodes House. ff 1-265.

(3) 2/3/B. Odds 5. Philip to Hankey. Layton. September 9, 1826  
and 15/3/C. Letter of Mrs. Philip. October 5, 1837.

In 1830, Philip wrote a long letter to the Society's Directors stating how important good schoolmasters were to the general health of the Mission. He was convinced that their institutions could be improved by the action of hardworking and inspired teachers. To increase the mission's overall awareness of the importance of their schools, it would be sensible to encourage the missionaries to send their own children to these schools, and let them be educated with African children. Schools were the pivot on which the Mission turned ..... "to be able to do anything efficiently I must have schoolmasters; we must raise the whole body of the people by this means ...." Philip was ready to adapt Richard III's despairing cry: "I am almost ready to say my kingdom for a schoolmaster."<sup>(1)</sup>

But his colleagues gave the schools low priority. In 1830, only one missionary, Helm, helped with teaching, and Philip told missionaries bluntly as he travelled around the Cape .... "I would not ... give one missionary schoolmaster for six missionary gentlemen."<sup>(2)</sup> Yet after seven years of such argument, he had made little progress with them for "there are many of them that do not even now assist me much in the work."<sup>(3)</sup>

His station reports are full of assessments of the mission schools.  
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(1) 12/4/B. Cape Town. Philip to L.M.S. January 14, 1830.

(2) Ibid.

(3) 15/3/C. Philip to L.M.S. London. October 6, 1837.

His most thorough journey around the Cape resulted in his Directors' Report of 1830.<sup>(1)</sup> In the Hankey Institution of the Eastern Cape, founded in 1823, there were 50 children in the Day School, and 50 adults in the Sunday School; in Bethelsdorp, 107 children were on the books and the average attendance was from 60 to 70. The total number of children on the Bethelsdorp estate were 201 and "many have made considerable progress in reading, writing and arithmetic". An infant school had just been established. For the 130 men and 133 women at the institution, an evening school was provided, and a School of Industry for teaching sewing to the women. There were small schools at Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Grahamstown. At Pacaltsdorp, there was a day school of 109 children plus an early morning school for adults and children who then went out to work. At Caledon, there was a Dutch school with an average of 70, and an English school with one of 24. Evan Evans the Welsh founding missionary of Paarl had died, but the station school still served 20 slaves and free coloured people. Philip had done as much as any person could to revitalize and expand these Cape mission schools. In practice, the schools never developed into the effective places that Philip would have liked them to become.

His ideals for such schools in 1821 had been much grander. He even thought a college for training and higher education would be financially helped by the Cape government: "I have the countenance of the Governor to my plans and the thing is becoming every day more popular among the respectable inhabitants."<sup>(2)</sup> His subsequent political

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(1) 12/2/A Philip Report. 1830.

(2) Philip Papers: Rhodes House. ff 1-268. John Philip to the Rev. John Murray of Aberdeen. April 12, 1821.

activities quickly ruined this ambition. From this 'higher' school, noted Philip, future missionaries could be recruited, and Dutch children attend, too. Then, a Director of L.M.S. schools should be appointed: "a young man bred up in a school where the British system has been successfully cultivated, and whose sole business must be the organisation of the schools." This director/inspector would visit each station school every six months and help "raise up young Hottentots as school masters."<sup>(1)</sup>

Initially, the Society's Directors were fully behind Philip's plans to develop schools in their Cape Mission. In 1820, they transmitted several administrative resolutions to Philip, two of which were concerned with schools: one resolution said there should be a Schoolmaster in each station, and the other wanted a missionary appointed as an overall organiser for their schools.<sup>(2)</sup> The Foster episode brought a touch of unpleasant reality to both Philip's and the Directors' ambitious plans.

William Foster arrived in the Cape in October, 1825, with authority to organise the mission schools. Philip had sailed for England to take his case for the protection of the Khoi to Parliament, so Foster was without effective supervision. Philip had already informed his agents in a circular letter before he had sailed, that Foster's task was to run a seminary for missionaries' children, and

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(1) 8/1/D Campbell and Philip Memorial, 1820

(2) 8/2/B Resolutions of the Directors of the Missionary Society.  
July 24, 1820.

train up Khoi children to be schoolmasters. Foster would, also, be adviser to all the other mission schools as well.<sup>(1)</sup> The Directors were just as specific. Foster's job was to educate the missionaries' children at Hankey and instruct "pious and intelligent Hottentot youths .... as native Teachers", and "that these two objects should be united under the Superintendence of the same person".<sup>(2)</sup> In spite of accepting the post, Foster was prepared to teach white children under protest, and had serious reservations about whether Khoi had sufficient ability to be trained as teachers.

In 1826, Foster moved to Bethelsdorp from Hankey. He disliked Hankey, and was not enamoured of Bethelsdorp. Reading between the lines, it seems he was given little co-operation by the resident agents, and his organisational plans were confused. After a period at Bethelsdorp, he became convinced that the Khoi did not have the requisite moral qualities to make them suitable schoolteachers....."they have not generally that judgement and that stability of character which would enable them to acquit themselves, as instructors, wholly to the satisfaction of the Society."<sup>(3)</sup> The Directors were aggrieved. They

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(1) Missionary Letters and Journals, 1817 to 184, from the Brenthurst Collection, Johannesburg - The Kitchingman Papers (edited by le Cordeur and Saunders). Johannesburg, 1976 p.81 (Subsequently quoted as the Kitchingman Papers).

(2) L.M.S. Outgoing Letters. Box 1. Directors to Philip. July 18, 1823

(3) 11/2/A. W. Foster to L.M.S. Bethelsdorp. August 8, 1828

replied that the removal of this 'instability' was one of the reasons why Foster had been sent out. They urged him to instruct Khoi youths and white missionary children together, and insisted he reconsidered his strategy.<sup>(1)</sup> Foster did, and returned to England.

The ostensible cause of his return was his wife's ill-health, but his subsequent analysis of his experiences revealed deeper causes.<sup>(2)</sup> He placed the main blame for his failure to initiate any worthwhile educational advance on delays by the Society's bureaucracy, and personality clashes at Bethelsdorp. (Presumably there were personality clashes at Hankey as well). He noted the fact that he taught white children from July, 1826, to September, 1827, at Bethelsdorp for six hours a day, and he wanted to teach Khoi youths - probably separately - but Miles, a senior Bethelsdorp missionary, had objected. But on the central issue of teaching Khoi and European children together, Foster was adamant that it could not be done. Moreover, in the practical situation at Bethelsdorp, Foster was convinced that giving the Khoi their own separate "seminary" would "elate" them, so advocated a separate class attached to a white seminary. Philip complained after he had returned to the Cape that Foster had wanted "an Academy and College of Natives", and not to teach white children at all.<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) L.M.S. Outgoing Letters. Box 1. L.M.S. Directors to the Rev. W. Foster. London. July 13, 1879.

(2) 12/3/A. W. Foster. Guildford, Surrey. November 2, 1830.

(3) 12/4/B. Philip to L.M.S. Cape Town. January 14, 1830.

Foster's probable plan, in so far as he had one, was that he should be the Principal of a Khoi seminary that did not instruct at too high a level, and that if he had to teach white children, this should be done separately. Undoubtedly, his opinion of Khoi potential declined after his arrival in the Cape, and there is through all his correspondence an unpleasant element of racism.

Superficially, it seemed as if the Foster disaster had not dented the Directors' keenness for schools' progress in the Cape. Just after receiving Foster's letter defending his return to England, they communicated with Philip and sent him their plans for education - a pale reflection of his own of 1820. They were convinced "a knowledgeable Inspector of Schools" was necessary, as was the introduction of the Lancasterian system, and a Central School with a qualifying teacher residing there. They were even enthusiastic for a Christian Seminary, but "this shall be on a limited scale, and at little expense as possible." There would be infant schools at all stations as well.<sup>(1)</sup> But gradually, the consequences of Foster's failure sank in. Two years later, the Directors could not even send Philip a schoolmaster.<sup>(2)</sup>

Philip's natural enthusiasm still remained. He was convinced even as late as 1830 that the Society would finance the "seminary" to the tune of £1,500, which was a wild improbability.<sup>(3)</sup> Strategically, he was still of the opinion that the Mission could never advance in the

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(1) L.M.S. Outgoing Letters. Box 1. Directors to Dr. Philip.  
December 8, 1830.

(2) L.M.S. Outgoing letters. Box 2. Directors to Dr. Philip.  
June 16, 1832.

(3) 12/1/8 Philip. June 14, 1830.

Cape without education. Good schools for Khoi and white children would mean a plentiful supply of suitable candidates for the 'seminary', and some of those would become missionaries and serve in the Cape. He saw two strategic weaknesses - good schoolmasters were needed and Khoi must be trained as teachers and evangelists or "we will be like the Moravians, dependent on Europe."<sup>(1)</sup>

There were plenty of plans, but the reality was dismal. Why was this? There were practical reasons why the school plans were unfulfilled. Foster was a poor choice for the job of Director. His views and those of his Directors were at variance. Moreover, because of Philip's absence from the Cape, the other missionaries there were not inclined to put themselves out to help somebody they considered an interloper. Philip, even before Foster's arrival, had little resources, money or personnel to improve school services, and was very much a one-man-band trying to rouse support for his plans. But it was in London that the deep root of the trouble lay. No major decision to build and found a college to promote a "native agency" was ever taken, and even finance for the already modest provision for the mission schools was difficult to come by. The Society made such a commitment later in the century at Kuruman and Vryburg, but were not prepared to do so for the Cape Khoi. Not that they did not see the value of "higher education" at this time, for Morrison's Anglo-Chinese College at Malacca was modestly

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(1) 12/4/B Philip to L.M.S. January 14, 1830



flourishing, and such a course was clearly the way forward for the Society in India and China. In the Cape, Moffat's mission at Kuruman was their favourite, and it is easy to see why.

The Moffat Mission was more evangelical and direct, and developing in a more obviously "primitive" mission area. It was far preferable to concentrating on the political hotbed that was Philip's Cape Mission. And here was the strategic rub. Even more so that the Directors' adverse judgement on the 'natural capacity' of the Khoi, or even the vitality of Moffat's mission, was their constant distrust of Philip's political activities in the Cape, and this was an effective stranglehold on any educational or any other substantial developments in the Cape.

In 1826, Philip had addressed the L.M.S. Directors for three hours on Cape issues, but his support from them was nominal. Philip noted dismally this swing of interest away from Cape matters. "Africa has been entirely lost sight of at the Mission Board ... I was at a loss to say whether I could be more useful to Africa at the Board or in Cape Town."<sup>(1)</sup> Philip continued his mission, but from the mid-1830's onwards, the Directors were not going to back up any activity of his substantially. True, India and China were of increasing global importance, but the political nature of Philip's programme upset them. In April, 1844, Philip was so disheartened, he threatened to resign. It was only the support of Cape agents and some supporters in London that frustrated the move. "I cannot conceal", he wrote to the Directors

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(1) Kitchingman Papers. Philip to Kitchingman. Cape Town.

March 2, 1838. p.197

"from myself that the respect for my judgement in the Mission House in Bloomfield Street has latterly been in the reverse ratio of the opportunities I have had of framing sound conclusions on every subject connected with our Missions."<sup>(1)</sup> It was in this lack of support from the Directors' at home that was effectively stopping his plans for progress in schools and a "seminary" from going forward.

This weakness was further exposed when the Cape government began to involve itself in education. The first state grant to mission schools was given in 1841. By 1844, there were 21 state-aided schools with a total enrolment of over 3,000 pupils. A few of these schools were L.M.S. schools, although it was a basic principle of congregationalism that no such aid should be accepted. In fact, the Congregationalist Voluntaryist movement in Britain had, as its main tenet, the fact that their own schools should be totally self-financed. Consequently the majority of L.M.S. Mission Schools were hamstrung, and unable to accept state aid. A few L.M.S. Schools in the Cape got around this problem by technically declaring themselves "independent" of their Mission, but this dubious manoeuvre aroused anger among some mission personnel. By 1860, there were 123 state-aided schools with more than 141,000 children on their books.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Philip Papers, Rhodes House. ff 1317 - 1607. Philip to Directors. June 26, 1843.

(2) Colin B. Collins: South Africa's First 300 Years of Schooling (History of Education Quarterly : vol 23 : No.3 Fall. 1983. New York University). and Ernest F. Dube: The Relationship between Racism and Education in South Africa (Harvard Educational Review. February 1985).

The great advance in government help for education in the Cape came after the debilitating 1850-1853 war. The governorship of Sir Harry Smith, like those of his predecessors, was primarily a military one, but his successor, Sir George Grey saw things differently. He was acquainted with the literature about the education of the British "industrial classes", and had experience of the New Zealand Maoris. He regarded education as a humane and positive way to direct the aspirations of the indigenous population to ends more in line with official colonial plans. The problems of the Cape were now, not only simple military ones, but the more complex ones of training the indigenous populations to master new technical and commercial skills. It was time for government intervention.

In 1853, Sir George Grey had his special despatch on colonial education circulated, and when he became Cape Governor two years later he began to implement it by financing African mission schools from Schedule D of the colonial revenue.<sup>(1)</sup> His emphasis was on industrial education, and the attempt to "civilize races emerging from barbarism" by turning them into a "settled and industrious peasantry". Over the period 1855-1863, about £55,000 was given to the Glasgow Missionary Society's Lovedale, founded in 1841 - a college similar to the L.M.S.'s 'seminary' ideal - , and four other mission training institutions. The main object was for these institutions to develop their industrial

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(1) R. Hunt Davis, jr. 1855-1863: A Dividing Point in the Early Development of African Education in South Africa. (Collected Seminar Papers: No: 18 vol. 5. October, 1973 - March, 1974. Societies of Southern Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries).

training facilities. Since the L.M.S. had no such institution, once again no funds were forthcoming from the Cape government. It was inevitable that out of this unwillingness to develop its schools in the Cape, and reluctance to spend money, there came the call for complete disengagement. A letter to the Directors from the Rev. W. Elliott, a one-time assistant of Philip, had been published by them in Evangelical Christendom in June, 1848. The letter euphemistically suggested a "wise reform" of the Cape Mission, with the implication, hurting Philip very much, that their Institution had become pauperized, and should be sold in freehold lots to individual Khoi. Whether this move at L.M.S. disconnection was part of a growing colonial movement, once again, against Xhosa and Cape Folk rights is debatable, but Philip strongly attacked L.M.S. policy. Ellis visited the Cape in 1855 on a cost-cutting exercise, and Moffat and Livingstone had been vociferous for years for L.M.S. withdrawal from the Cape. The Missionary Institutions Act of 1873 saw the commencement of transferring the Institutions' freehold to the individual inhabitants, but long before this the Cape Mission was in sharp contraction.

Philip's plans for education, important to his wider strategy of Khoi acculturation, were frustrated by practical impediments - poor resources and indifferent agents - but more by the considered policy of the Society's Directors not to support a Mission they thought too contentious and politically committed. Also, there is evidence that they considered the Khoi nation as unable to benefit from education beyond the elementary stages. In the next chapter, a closer look will be taken of Philip's political stance on the northern and eastern frontiers, and the partial redemption of his cultural and educational ideals in Giqualand and Kat River Settlement.

CHAPTER FIVE

Philip's Frontier policy, the Kat River Settlement  
and Griqualand

"At the settlements you discover the Hottentots in a new situation. They are the proprietors as well as the cultivators of the soil. They walk erect, they feel that the fruits of their industry are secured to them. They entertain you and converse with you like men".

- John Philip, March 15, 1832

"The progress which has been made by the Griquas during the short period of 36 years is perhaps greater than has ever before occurred in any community constituted of materials such as theirs was in 1801".

- Andrew Smith's Journal of his expedition  
into the Interior of South Africa :  
1834 - 1836. p.36

Philip's Cape mission policy can be considered in two inter-related ways. First, the 'internal' aspect, which was his wish for Khoi cultural advance, protection of their Cape civil rights, and their education in his Mission's schools. The substance of this chapter, however, is the 'external' aspect, namely his intervention in the Cape's frontier politics, and in particular, his involvement with the coloured settlement in Griqualand, on the northern frontier of the Cape, and with that of the Kat River, on the eastern frontier. Both of these aspects of Philip's policy were intimately connected, for the whole purpose of Khoi acculturation - the 'internal' aspect - was to see that the Griquas and the Kat River Khoi should transmit their newly-acquired Christian values, commercial skills and capitalist virtues to the tribes of black Africans adjacent to their respective frontiers. They would form, as it were, 'buffer states' assisting peaceful cultural interaction between white and black. As Philip stated before the Parliamentary Aborigine Committee in London: "The people .... who have acquired any portion of the civilization of Europeans without losing their sympathy with their uncivilized brethren, would unite the uncivilized tribes by internal bonds, and operate in preventing collisions from taking place between them."<sup>(1)</sup>

The system of 'buffer states', went Philip's argument, would be an easier way of managing frontier conflicts, for the Xhosa

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(1) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines ..... 1836. paragraph 5327.

eastern frontier of the Cape - the crucial one in expansion, and the most volatile - had been traditionally dealt with in a military way. Military patrols would tour the boundary lines of the eastern Cape, and punish summarily any Xhosa infringement, real or alleged, of Cape territorial sovereignty and settler property, particularly cattle-theft. Much worse than direct military reprisals were the white vigilante farmers, sometimes assisted by their Khoi employees, who formed themselves into commando groups to cross into Xhosa territory to seize back stolen cattle, and pillage, burn and kill for good measure. Xhosa reprisals were equally fierce and inevitable. The "Kaffir Wars" so-called, were, in fact, only intenser forms of this cattle-raiding and counter-raiding that took place most of the time. Justice was not an issue, and white frontier policy a matter of simple military pragmatism. In the apportionment of guilt for this state of intermittent bloodshed, it was inevitable that the "Kafir" bore the major load. No amount of calls for a just look at the pressures on Xhosa grazing-land by Philip and his fellow missionaries had any effect, apart from labelling the missionaries concerned as radicals and "republicans". But beyond such personal calumny and "anti-Kaffir" lobbying, Philip could see that a military frontier policy was not only cruel, but basically absurd. Any realistic policy, so Philip and his supporters' argument went, had to accept the fact that both frontiers, particularly the eastern one, was economically and culturally dynamic, and that drawing arbitrary lines and protecting them by force-of-arms was doomed to failure.

The eastern Cape frontier was particularly an area of lively white-black interaction. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, a regular and profitable traffic of ivory and cattle had developed between the communities, and White farmers had travelled deeply into Xhosa territory. Horses and ox-wagons gave mobility, and the region between the Kei and Gamtoos rivers had been a melting-pot of Xhosa, Khoi and San for centuries.<sup>(1)</sup> There were many factors which stimulated this trans-border intercourse - the spread of Christianity, the lure of adventure and hunting - but the main one was economic. As Neumark has shown, the eastern frontier was vitalized by an exchange economy, linked with local and foreign markets, based mainly on the white colonist-Xhosa cattle trade. Khoi shepherds and herdsmen manned the white colonists sheep and cattle and, involved in the process, were African farmers, way beyond the arbitrary political boundaries of the Cape. This vigorous farming commerce was at the base of this dynamic eastern frontier expansion. Cape Town and Port Elizabeth stimulated this activity not only because of their own need for meat and cattle products, but because they were suppliers of such goods to foreign ships.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) See Oxford History of South Africa: vol.1 (Co-operation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier : Monica Wilson. p.231 following); Andrew Ross: Philip p.123-145; Macmillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton. p.86, following.

(2) S. Daniel Neumark: Economic Influences on the South African Frontier : 1652-1836. p.94 and following; p.172.



Consequently, an official response to this commercial activity in the form of a rigid frontier system, was found to lead to conflict and dissatisfaction. Early on, the Batavian authorities had modified a strict frontier policy somewhat, with a passport system. After the second British occupation of the Cape, frontier policy went through a series of variations which attempted to formalize the very fluid situation that prevailed: first, there was the initial policy of expulsion to the Kei river, as advocated by Governor D'Urban in 1835; then, this policy was followed by that of Glenelg and Andries Stockenstrom who entered into treaties with the Xhosa chiefs between Keiskamma and Kei rivers; finally, the phase of annexation of "Kaffraria" in 1848, with the Xhosa chiefs as "agents", advised by white magistrates.

Philip saw that the commercial vitality of the eastern frontier, far from being an obstacle to political progress, was advantageous. Certainly, a military solution would never work: "10,000 troops will not be sufficient to defend its extended frontiers", and such a policy was morally obnoxious, as it fostered racial tensions and civil unrest. To Philip, the exchange economy of the eastern frontier was an ideal basis for his policy of cultural osmosis, for the Khoi - great intermediaries between the two frontier groups in their jobs as interpreters, mission agents, farmworkers, traders and carriers - would "teach them ("the Caffres") that their true interest is to be peace with the colony, and folly of resistance, raise them above stealing, and fit them for coming under the colonial government."<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) Philip Journal and letter: Tour of 1830 and Kaffirland. (Quoted in Macmillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton : p.79)

The problem, as always with Philip, was to translate his policy into reality. Doing this, was inevitably difficult.

The most obvious reason for this was because Philip was always an unofficial adviser. Arguments about his exact influence on individual officials and overall government policy often ignore this fact. Philip owed any power he possessed to his own charisma, prodigious first-hand knowledge of Cape problems, his missionary allies in London, and his network of agents and correspondents throughout the colony. But only for a brief period under D'Urban was Philip allowed a direct say in frontier affairs. D'Urban sent Philip in August, 1834, probably as an unofficial emissary, to the eastern frontier. Whilst there, tensions arose, and late in 1834, the Sixth Frontier War began. When D'Urban visited the frontier, he came down heavily on the side of a policy of "powder and ball", and was critical of Philip's attempts at objective analysis of the situation. By May, 1835, Sir Harry Smith had annexed all land between the Keiskamma and the Kei rivers, naming it Queen Adelaide Province. Thousands of Mfengu (or Fingoes) - refugees from the 'mfecane' and from the Hlubi, Bhele and Zizi chiefdoms of Natal - became British subjects and occupied land around Fort Peddie and Alice.

In spite of these hostilities, Philip was sufficient of an optimist to believe that a just frontier policy would be master-minded, but D'Urban's May Proclamation put all the blame for the war on Xhosa aggression and looked for military solutions only. Philip, his mission agents and colleagues from the Glasgow Missionary Society

insisted that the war was the result of the consistently unfair treatment of the Xhosa; but, strong as these protests were, it was unlikely that they influenced the Colonial office in the decision they then took. The Glenelg Despatch of December, 1835, ordered that Queen Adelaide Province should be vacated, and the frontier returned to that of 1834. At the same time, Andries Stockenstrom, a "liberal" Boer, was appointed Lieutenant Governor of the frontier zone.


This pro-Xhosa turn of events incensed the white colonists, and they blamed Philip, the evangelical lobby in Britain and the people who had appeared before the Aborigines Committee in London - James Read, father and son, Tsatsoe, and Andries Stoffels. Philip, although he had lost the confidence of D'Urban, objected just as strongly as the colonists to the Glenelg Settlement. Superficially, this might appear a strange reaction, but it must be remembered that Philip was an imperialist, albeit an humanitarian one, and he saw the just administration of the frontier, responsible directly to the British Parliament, as the best safeguard of colonist-Xhosa relations on the frontier. Queen Adelaide Province, as Philip saw it, was ready for British occupation, and as a consequence British Cape culture would be one step nearer the African people on its frontiers. Already these people were beginning to show promise of future acculturation: "The Caffres," Philip wrote to the Aborigines Committee, "have got among them the rudiments of civilization, they have tolerably correct notions of the value of property, their artificial wants are multiplying, and their industry will increase along with them ... it is necessary only to furnish

them with security which is needful to stimulate industry and facilitate the labours of missionaries to convert them into peaceable and useful neighbours, or good subjects."<sup>(1)</sup>


There had been some tradition of settlements in Cape history, although not a very significant one. In 1820, 4,000 British immigrants had settled in Albany; in 1835, the Mfengu were placed along the frontier from the Keiskamma mouth to the Tyhume valley. But in 1829, the London Missionary Society became directly involved, for the Cape Governor, Sir Lowry Cole, allowed "Hottentots and Bastards" to settle at the Kat River on land from which the Xhosa Maqomo and followers had been expelled; also, Griquas had begun to coalesce on the northern frontier as a lively Christian community in the 1820's, and the Cape authorities began to recognise them officially. The last two communities were, indirectly or directly, L.M.S. inspired, and both developed commercially and culturally to such an extent, that Philip was justified in wishing for a more comprehensive implementation of his frontier policy.

The Kat River Settlement was government-sponsored, but the Khoi, the main inhabitants, were nurtured at the Society's Bethelsdorp and Theopolis institutions. Philip saw to it that the Kat River experiment received good publicity, and he visited it, on this account, with prominent Cape people. Philip played the part of the distant, but ever-protective parent, content to receive first-hand information on all that happened there from James Read, who, with his half-Khoi son, were L.M.S. agents there, by popular demand

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(1) Appendix Paper by Philip to the Select Committee of Aborigines, presented as evidence on 15 June, 1836.



KAT RIVER SETTLEMENT: 1829 - 1851.



of the Khoi settlers. Griqualand, on the northern frontier, was different. The Griquas were racially heterogeneous, a loose confederation of peoples under the chieftaincies of the Waterboer and Kok families, with peripheral groups of Coranas and Bergenaars. By name, culture and religion, the Griquas were the product of the Society's pioneering activities in the north of the Cape. The L.M.S. agents in Griqualand were important as educators, organisers and external contacts, although the Griquas emphasized their autonomy by expelling at regular intervals missionaries of too authoritarian a tendency. Nevertheless, both the Khoi on the Kat River, and the Khoi-Griqua of Griqualand had similar communal drives. They were, with some minor differences, pastoral and arable farmers who actively traded with neighbouring racial groups; their Protestant Christianity gave them cultural unity and self-identity, as well as underpinning their work-ethic, property-owning individualism and desire for political autonomy. Above all, both communities wanted to establish themselves, on their own terms, within the white Cape's economic and cultural embrace.

These two groups went some way in demonstrating that Philip's "frontier policy" was a viable alternative to a frontier of perpetual commando. Instead of military conflict, the Kat River Settlement and Griqualand offered a frontier which could help to knit together racially and culturally different groups into something approaching Philip's ideal - a just, multiracial Cape. These two communities must now be examined in more detail. The Khoi and the Khoi-Griqua had been nurtured by the L.M.S. and now they, and the Philippine policy they encapsulated, were going to be put to the test on an aggressive borderland. How would they manage?

The Kat River Settlement was a government venture, created in 1829, when Andries Stockenstrom, Commissioner-General of the Eastern District of the Colony, arranged for the settlement of "free persons of colour" in fertile territory along the upper reaches of the Kat River and its tributaries, approximately a hundred miles north of Grahamstown.<sup>(1)</sup> Just before 1819, the land was occupied by the followers of Ngqika's eldest son, Maqomo, and the expulsion of his group was to have dire consequences later in the Settlement's history. There can be no doubt that the Settlement was a positive attempt by the colonial government to spike Philip's guns, for Sir Lowry Cole said Philip "... it is to be feared, is more a politician than a missionary."<sup>(2)</sup> Stockenstrom saw the Kat River as a defensive wall against the Xhosa, just as Philip did, and part of Stockenstrom's social policy was that the Settlement should become a home for dispossessed Khoi. Both of them, too, saw that when the Khoi at Kat River would "obtain possession of the soil", they would become arbiters of their own destinies to a much greater extent than ever before.<sup>(3)</sup>

The L.M.S. had nothing to do officially with the Kat River Settlement, and Philip was diplomatic enough to keep his distance.

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- (1) Missionary Letters and Journals, 1817 to 1848, from the Brenthurst Collection, Johannesburg. The Kitchingman Papers. (edited by le Cordeur and Saunders) Johannesburg, 1976 p.129. (Subsequently quoted as The Kitchingman Papers)
- (2) W.M. Macmillan : Bantu, Boer and Briton p.72. footnote 3.
- (3) Andries Stockenstrom: Select Committee on Aborigines: paragraph 2325.

But emotionally Philip and his mission society were deeply involved in the whole experiment. The L.M.S. had a previous connection with the Kat River for Joseph Williams, one of their pioneer missionaries in the eastern Cape, had established the first permanent mission among the Xhosa, on the banks of the Kat River, in 1816. As early as November, 1819, Philip had noted the territory as being one of potential mission expansion.<sup>(1)</sup>

But the connection between the L.M.S. and the Kat River Settlement was primarily one of people rather than place. The settlers at Kat River were, as Philip expressed it, "the flower of the Institutions". Whatever plans Stockenstrom and Sir Lowry Cole had for the Kat River Settlement, the heart and soul of it was L.M.S. through and through. The official returns of December, 1829, said that the initial establishment of Khoi consisted of 243 men, 187 women, 451 children, 369 horses, 2,614 cattle, 8,227 sheep and goats, 58 wagons and 22 ploughs.<sup>(2)</sup> Each Khoi location had from four to six thousand acres each, and there were two or three villages in each location. Each family, consequently, received one allotment of from four to six acres, with common pasturage. The grantees of this land were to build a cottage and cultivate the soil within five years. The main families had cattle, and the land, on the whole, was well-cultivated. The Khoi, to assist in their farming processes,

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(1) Kitchingman Papers: Philip to Barker. 12 November, 1819

(2) Cory. ii. p.384. (Pringle reckoned they were 210 families altogether. Narrative .... p.255).



built over 20,000 yards of irrigation canals.<sup>(1)</sup> Even Cory's commentary on the Settlement was favourable. The Kat River Khoi, he wrote, were a "better class of people of Bethelsdorp and Theopolis together with some of the discharged soldiers of the Cape Hottentot Corps and others who had accumulated a little property in the service of the farmers..." the only potential weaknesses that Cory saw was that government policy was effected "as cheaply as possible", hence there was only a field-cornet and no magistrate to administer justice; food support was negligible, and there were "idle and dissolute" gathered on the borders.<sup>(2)</sup> Cory had, in fact, put his finger on two, ultimately fatal, weaknesses of the Kat River Settlement - other racial groups and economic pressures.

Other tribal groups drifted to the settlement, and created not only racial tensions but overcrowding. James Read, senior, foolishly extended his mission activities to incorporate other tribal groups. He wrote to a home supporter that there had been .... "an addition to our church of upwards of fifty .... some Hottentots, some Caffres, some Bushmen, some Fingoes, some Mantatees."<sup>(3)</sup> Calderwood, an anti-Read missionary noted "Caffre-Hottentot" tension in his Blinkwater School. A recent estimate of "Mfengu" refugees at

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(1) Pringle: Narrative ... p.255

(2) Cory. ii p.384; 450.

(3) Philip Papers. ff 175/6. Letter from James Read to Miss Hillyard, Bedford. Philipton. 3 July, 1834. p.142.

Kat River put them as high as 1,500.<sup>(1)</sup>

More importantly, there were internal and external economic pressures. From the first, it had been difficult for the Khoi to receive credit. Godlonton recorded such an incident. On 10 November, 1831, a sale of farming stock was held north of the Kat River: "To this sale a great number of persons from the Kat River resorted, and, as they possessed but little property, the auctioneer, before commencing the sale, announced publicly that all purchases made by them was (sic) to be paid for in cash before delivery". Other farmers at the sale were allowed credit.<sup>(2)</sup> To this internal problem of lack of cash to replenish animals and implements, was added the fact that adjacent land-hungry white farmers cast envious eyes on Khoi land, for the introduction of the merino sheep in the 1840's meant that commercial sheep farming became profitable. The Cape woollen industry expanded and immigrants and landowners switched to it. Moreover, the employment of Khoi from the Kat River became a necessary proposition for surrounding white farmers. Both tribal and economic pressures contributed to the War of the Axe, and the "Hottentot rebellion" of 1851 led to the confiscation of all Khoi land and the destruction of the Settlement.<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) Kitchingman Papers. p.189

(2) Godlonton. Narrative of the Irruption of Kafir Hordes etc...p.97

(3) Tony Kirk: The Cape Economy and the Kat River Settlement: 1846-1853. p.227. (In Marks and Atmore (eds): Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa. 1980)

To the Khoi themselves, the Kat River Settlement was a measure of their self-esteem and the extent to which they had absorbed the "commerce and Christianity" of Bethelsdorp and Theopolis. This independence and statement of their identity was shown from the first. They called the James Reads to lead their spiritual and cultural life. When the government sent the Rev. W.R. Thomson from Tyhumie, where he was a Glasgow Missionary Society missionary and government agent, as an official missionary to the Kat River, his Church was virtually ignored.

Contemporary evidence is overwhelming about the vigour of the Khoi response to the challenge of the Kat River Settlement. The land was well cultivated, extensive irrigation works constructed, and surplus agricultural produce sold to the local military and other commercial outlets. The Khoi on the Kat River underwent the same process of becoming successful peasant farmers as the Mfengu of the Ciskei.<sup>(1)</sup> The crime rate was low and their borders safe to cross, and becoming commercial farmers made them as "covetous and litigious" about land and water as any other set of colonists.<sup>(2)</sup> Enterprise and competition had developed among the Khoi to such an extent that a class system had developed instead of the old "Hottentot Classlessness".<sup>(3)</sup> Not surprisingly, their

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(1) C. Bundy: African Peasants and Economic Change in South Africa, 1870-1913, with particular reference to the Cape.

D.Phil. Oxon. 1976. page 13 and 66.

(2) Stockenström: Select Committee on Aborigines para 1,387.

(3) Kitchingman Papers James Read to Philip. Bethelsdorp.

16 November, 1835.

demand for education was insatiable. The comment by Sir Harry Smith, the then Governor, was typical: "This is a failure! then the whole world is a failure"<sup>(1)</sup>. Stockenstrom was the most pleased of all the government officials, as he shared Philip's wish to see Khoi "possession of the soil" leading them to independent nationhood. He, also, saw how much better an autonomous group of Khoi were to the passive sort, in the Moravian institutions.<sup>(2)</sup>

The "liberals" in the Cape rejoiced at the success of the Kat River Settlement. Fairbairn considered the experiment a complete success, and pointed out that no criminal charges were coming before the circuit judge. There were no resident doctors, nor magistrates at first, but an abundance of schools and chapels. In Fairbairn's opinion, only "infamous mismanagement" on behalf of the government could prevent it from being the best bulwark of the frontier, full of loyal subjects.<sup>(3)</sup> But if the increasing independence of the Khoi pleased the "liberals", it only distressed the more conservative missionaries. Calderwood, like Moffat, disliked the overfriendliness of the Reads with the Khoi, and regarded all movement towards their autonomy as dangerous. Calderwood protested that the Read's influence on the Khoi would spread to the neighbouring Xhosa, and his discussion with the military on such issues brought

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- (1) J.J. Freeman: A Tour in South Africa. p.158
- (2) Stockenstrom: Select Committee on Aborigines. p.2,325
- (3) Philip Papers: ff 266-552. Fairbairn to Pringle. Cape Town. 11 October, 1832.

him into disfavour with Philip. Calderwood joined the L.M.S. in 1838, but was never comfortable with the Cape Mission under Philip, so he left, and took up an official position as a Kaffrarian magistrate.<sup>(1)</sup>

When Freeman, the visiting L.M.S. official met the Khoi at Kat River, the Khoi had a flourishing Auxiliary Committee that discussed matters germane to their social and political development. They had composed a charter of objectives, the main ones of which were: the liberty and progress of coloured people depended on the support of their own mission teachers; the Gospel must be spread into neighbouring regions; an independent "native press" that would provide them with their own papers and magazines; good schools for children; and a core of coloured power in a new African Parliament.<sup>(2)</sup> The charter is not sophisticated or long, but showed how clear the Khoi were both in the analysis of their cultural needs, and their determination to press them upon the L.M.S.. Because the Khoi owned land and were left to their own devices, education became the key to further cultural advance. There is enough evidence to show that the Kat River Settlement became one vast school.

As James Read wrote in 1835: "the people expressed the greatest anxiety to have their children well educated ... Nothing can raise the Hottentots but raising their minds. The mind will then raise

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(1) Philip Papers: ff 1317 - 1607. Calderwood to Philip.

Blinkwater. 18 December, 1844

(2) J.J. Freeman: A Tour in South Africa p.160, and following pages.

the body and suggest to it artificial wants".<sup>(1)</sup> At Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, the Khoi had been enthusiastic for education - in spite of attendance lapses caused by economic necessity -, but now the drive for schools was even keener. Philip was not exaggerating when he noted that when the English colonize they build first an Exchange, the French a theatre, the Portuguese a Church: "When Hottentots colonize from our Missionary Institutions, the first thing they do is to commence a school."<sup>(2)</sup>

In 1836, a decade and a half after its foundation, there were twelve schools in the settlement with 700 scholars taught in English and Dutch. The subjects taught included arithmetic, geography, English history, Scripture history, mathematics, reading, writing, and even elementary astronomy.<sup>(3)</sup> James Read, junior, had attempted to redress the L.M.S.' culpable lack of provision for the training of teachers by opening a Normal School at Philipton, to which practising teachers went, one day a week, for in-service training. They met for instruction from him on Wednesdays when the teachers continued their studies in Dutch and English History, English, Roman and Natural History, arithmetic and some Greek. In the evening, they had lessons on "Evidences of Christianity". James Read, junior, wrote: "I am quite sure that in the absence of collegiate advantages

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(1) Kitchingman Papers: p.158 James Read to Philip. Bethelsdorp.  
16 November, 1835.

(2) 12/2/B. Philip's Report on the Kat River Station: 1830

(3) James Read: Select Committee on Aborigines, paragraph 5089

this is the only way at present to improve our native Agents."<sup>(1)</sup>

The Directors supported Philip when he engaged "native Schoolmasters" on the Kat River, but they thought he should insist "that all the local expenses incurred immediately for the benefit of the people should, as far as practicable, be borne by the people".<sup>(2)</sup> When the Kat River Settlement was at its zenith, Read said that the schools there were self-supporting.<sup>(3)</sup> The L.M.S. as a parent body were reluctant to contribute any money at all to the Schools, but sums of money were given to help the Khoi both from the colonial government, and from missionary friends in England. James Read, junior, could write of the Schools' expenses in 1848 that ... 'the usual sum spent on schools at the Kat River ... about £280-10, which being divided among 15 schoolmasters amount(s) to £18-10 each. But of the £280 etc. £70 was annually given by the government which leaves £210-16-8. But of the £210-16-8 allowed by the L.M.S. £105 is contributed by private friends in England."<sup>(4)</sup> There can be no

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(1) 17/2/J. J. Read, junior. Philipton. 3 November, 1840.

(2) L.M.S. Outgoing Letters. Box 2. Directions to Philip.  
London. 24 September, 1833.

(3) Kitchingman Papers p.195. Read to Kitchingman. 19 December, 1837

(4) Odds 3. 1/2/C. Freeman Deputation. Philipton. 1848.

doubt that even without such help, the Khoi were fully prepared to pay for their children's education, as were the Griqua.

In the commercially competitive society that the Kat River had now become, the supply of teachers became a problem. In a mildly 'booming' economy, there were other lucrative jobs for the youngsters to take. As James Read commented: "Our schoolmasterships are not very lucrative situations, but I think they are comfortable places for respectable young Hottentots."<sup>(1)</sup> Unfortunately, "respectable young Hottentots" tended to think otherwise. Freeman thought that the Khoi teachers' salaries were too low, and James Read's experience proved Freeman's point. In 1837, he complained that he had trained 29 schoolmasters, but only 3 were now still employed by him as teachers. 17 teachers had resigned in succession on account of the smallness of their salaries.<sup>(2)</sup> By the end of the 1840's, the law of supply and demand operated, and salaries were increased. "We find", James Read commented again "that the sums which had been mentioned in England are found after awhile to be to (sic) small. We cannot get them to work for it. We had to give £20 to several, and even more, who were not satisfied with that. The one at the Bushman station - who was receiving £20 a year has left his work because he got no more, and the one at ..... Tidmanston and the other at upper Blinkwater ... gets £30."<sup>(3)</sup> Read's own family  
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(1) Ibidem

(2) L.M.S. Freeman Deputation. Odds 4. 2/1/B J. Read.  
(Date? after 1837)

(3) L.M.S. Freeman Deputation. Odds 4. 1/4/4 Philipton.  
25 June, 1849.



contribution to the teaching profession was impressive. Two of his children had the management of the senior school, two children of the infant school, he taught, and James Read, junior, who had studied in Cape Town, was Superintendent of all the Kat River schools.<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1834, of the twelve schools, four were infant schools. The teachers were an English woman, Miss Lyndall, and Miss Buchanan, the latter, a Swedenborgian who visited Kat River in 1832, and stayed several weeks to instruct the Misses Read in infant methodology. By 1837, there were 700 children at the half-yearly examination. By 1840, there were 1,100 children under instruction, and by 1841, there were 19 schools including 5 infant, and 3 beyond the boundaries of the Settlement.

Not only numbers attending are impressive; all evidence points to schooling of good quality. European opinion was united in praise for the Kat River Schools. Stockenstrom, admittedly an interested party, looked on as the schools "continue in extent and efficiency."<sup>(2)</sup> A diplomatic and military visit in 1837 to the public half-yearly examinations resulted in golden opinions, and Sir John Wildie, the Chief Justice of the Cape, noted the excellence of James Read, junior's, Normal School.<sup>(3)</sup>

Unfortunately, for the Kat River Settlement and Philip, forces were combining to destroy Khoi independence. The Settlement was surrounded by Xhosa who were dissatisfied at losing land to the Khoi,  
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- (1) Kitchingman Papers. J. Read to W. Ellis. Philipton. 3 July 1834  
p.142
- (2) Pringle: A Narrative of a Residence in South Africa. London 1835.  
(Africa Coneetanea series. Cape Town. 1966. vol xx) p.260
- (3) Kitchingman Papers: J. Read to Kitchingman. Philipton.

19 December, 1837. p.185 and John Philip: Select Committee on Aborigines paragraph 5413.

and continued white expansion. Racial tensions and the war of 1834-5 caused economic distress to the Khoi and the Reads were removed to Grahamstown by a suspicious government, as they had been accused of complicity in the uprising.<sup>(1)</sup> In the War of the Axe (1846-47), Read and his family actively helped the colonial authorities in their war against the Xhosa, and Andries Botha raised 900 males from the Settlement to fight in the campaign. But White and official opinion was firmly setting against the Khoi. Biddulph, an anti-Khoi white settler, was appointed magistrate by Sir Henry Pottinger, and wrote a damning report on the whole project which received considerable publicity. The new Governor of the Cape, Sir Henry Smith, replaced Biddulph with an equally antagonistic magistrate, Thomas Bowker. John Philip, by now old and infirm, tried to counter this adverse publicity with the help of data about official mismanagement at the Settlement from James Read, junior.<sup>(2)</sup>

Not surprisingly, official condemnation and economic distress caused by the War of the Axe led to the "Hottentot Rebellion" of 1851, although only a minority of the Khoi took part. Kat River and Freemantone were destroyed, and Andries Botha, a leading Kat River settler, was tried and found guilty of treason for joining the rebels. James Read died in May, 1852, and Philip predeceased him the year before. It is significant that the last Mission

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(1) Philip Papers. ff 675-894. Philip to Directors, after 1835 war.

(2) Andrew Ross: Philip. page 202, and following pages.

evidence from the Kat River was concerned with schools. In 1848, James Read noted to the Governor that some 17 of their schools had been destroyed in the recent fighting. The people were quite prepared to pay the teachers as well as take responsibility for the schools and teachers' houses, but ... "in their present reduced circumstances any assistance your Excellency can give us will be most acceptable."<sup>(1)</sup>

Just as the Kat River Settlement was the fulfilment of John Philip's hopes for coloured people on the eastern frontier, so was Griqualand on the northern frontier. The Kat River Settlement had been destroyed by a combination of factors: the racial conflicts and tensions between the white colonists and the Xhosa; the hardening of official colonial attitudes against the Khoi caused by racialism, and envy of their fertile land; and the inability of the Khoi, in spite of their military support of the Cape establishment and rapid cultural advance, to become part of White Cape society. Would the Khoi-Griqua be more successful in the north?

Philip's account of the origins of the Griquas in Griqualand was unfair. Trying to impress the members of the Select Committee, he said that, .... "in the year 1800, when Mr. Anderson went among the Griquas, .... they were a herd of wandering and naked savages...." It was true that the Griquas were the first Cape peoples to respond to the stimulation of a foreign mission body so thoroughly. They

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(1) L.M.S. Odds 3. Freeman Deputation: 1848-50. 1/2/C. Appeal of James Read to Sir H. Smith for money to build schools.

Philipton. 15 June, 1848.


were the group that first convinced Philip of the possibility of such a group being cultural intermediaries; Stockenstrom's comment about them - "Now that these people are in that state to enable us to treat with them, I attribute altogether to the domesticated state to which they have been brought by the labours ..... of the missionaries" - was accepted by most fair-minded Cape observers.<sup>(1)</sup>

The protection, development and attachment of the Griquas to the Cape became an essential part of Philip's frontier policy. The Great Trek worried him in this respect, for he was convinced that Boer expansionism in the north would stultify Griqua development, even absorb them. Events showed that his fears were well founded. His journey to the north in 1841-42 with James Read, confirmed his worst fears, and Philip tried to stir up Cape fears of Mzilikazi, pointing out that a sympathetic Griqua nation, with their horses and firearms, could form a defensive shield in the north. There was little likelihood of an official settlement of Griquas as there had been of Khoi in the Kat River Settlement, but Philip wanted the next best thing for them, namely, the .... "Government guaranteeing and legalizing to them according to colonial usages, their rights to their lands and all the privileges of British subjects".<sup>(2)</sup> Napier, took soundings, and in November, 1843, a treaty was signed with Adam Kok. Kok was to get £100 per annum, and £50 per annum to the L.M.S. A similar treaty had already been signed with Waterboer in


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(1) Andries Stockenstrom: ibid: paragraph 1074.

(2) Philip to Napier : 25 August, 1842. (Quoted in Ross: Philip. p.166).



1. SOUTHERN AFRICA c. 1850



ROUTE OF GRIQUA TREK (AFTER ROSS)

1834. As far as direct political intervention was concerned, Philip had done his best. What now remained was for him to stimulate via his agents, Griqua culture and commercial ambitions so that they could play their role in expanding Cape Christianity and capitalism along the "missionary road" to the north.

The Griquas were descendants of the early Boer frontiersmen; remnants of Khoisan tribes; escaped slaves from the wine and wheat farms of the South West Cape, and of African tribesmen isolated by war.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1815, they changed their name from "Bastards" to Griquas at John Campbell's insistence, taking their name from the Khoi tribe Chariguriqua, north of Cape Town.

Because of the evangelising of the L.M.S. and their contact with their immediate neighbours, particularly the 'trekboers', the Griquas had adopted Christianity and engaged in commercial activity within the Cape economy. Their addiction to political independence came from their ancestral origins, and farming life-style on the remote northern edge of the Cape. They ultimately adopted a loose political organisation under the Kok and Waterboer family captaincies. Expert with horse and firearms, at least one contemporary commentator thought they were potentially more a threat to Cape safety than the more numerous Xhosa on the eastern frontier. All attempts by the colonial authorities to stop trade with them in gunpowder, firearms and brandy failed.<sup>(2)</sup> The Griquas secured slaughter cattle for the

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(1) Robert Ross: Adam Kok's Griquas: p.1

(2) R. Godlonton: A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes unto the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope 1834-5. (Grahamstown. 1965 reprint) p.180

Cape, and bred horses as a side-line. Official policy in the Cape had not great plans for them, but strategically their use was obvious. Their life between the African and Cape cultures showed itself in their appearance. They spoke both Dutch and Hottentot, and an early visitor described them as having light skins .... "the dress of the men consists chiefly of a leather jacket, waistcoat, and trousers ..... shoes .... all of their own manufacture ....." The women had petticoats and hankies over their heads, and families lived in stone-built houses in their small towns, and wooden huts in the country.<sup>(1)</sup> They were intelligent, politically shrewd and accepted their new Christian faith in a lively way.

The first Griqua community formed itself around the towns of Hardcastle, Danielskuil, Boetsaap and Campbell. William Anderson, the L.M.S. pioneer missionary arrived among the Griquas in 1801, and in 1804 founded Klarwater, later Griquatown. Anderson was austere in personal habits, strict with his flock, perhaps over strict. He introduced monogamy and a settled agriculture, and Christianity undoubtedly became the prime means of Griqua acculturation. Both Andries Waterboer, "Keptyn" of Griquatown from 1820, and Hendrick Hendricks, who for 25 years conducted the administrative business of Philippolis as secretary, were all L.M.S. educated. But this does not mean that the Griquas were passive in their adoption of a European life-style and a Christian cosmology. In the early days of the mission, James Read was sent to Griquatown, after the 1817 adultery

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(1) J. Leyland: Adventures in the Far Interior of South Africa  
(1846. Cape Town Reprint. 1972). p.33.

scandal. Anderson, Moffat and Philip were critical of his period there, because he sympathised too much with Griqua aspirations, and wish for independence from their spiritual monitors. As Philip angrily wrote: "I am sorry to say that the greater portion of the evils of Griqua Town have been occasioned by Read ..... has loosened the attachment of the people from their own teachers, ... given rise to a spirit of insubordination incomparable with the existence of law and order". What was "insubordination" to Philip and Anderson, was to the Grikwas a desire to conduct their own affairs. The whole relationship of the L.M.S. to the Griqua was marked by their Griqua insistence on making their own decisions, and not being boxed in by the L.M.S. (1)

But Griqua independency easily spilled over into a state that could approach banditry. In 1822, there was in Griqualand a vigorous community of Grikwas, Korannas, Hottentots, Bushmen and Bechuanas. Melville was appointed a government agent there, to give the community semi-official recognition. But the more turbulent elements wanted to break out of the civilized constraints of an incipient, commercial Christian state. Philip was at hand to see that the Grikwas would not destroy themselves in an expensive disunity. Philip called a meeting of the various groups to Griquatown, where a section under Adam Kok decided to break away. ("After questioning them and asking them under whom they wished to stand, a portion said under Dam, .....

(1) Philip Papers: ff 1-268. Philip to? 1820: Ibid: ff 1-268. Philip to Burder. 28 September, 1819: Apprenticeship at Kuruman Moffat to Philip. 6 March, 1820.



a portion under Waterboer. Dr. P. advised Waterboer to be still and let them live so").<sup>(1)</sup> Not content with releasing the inter-tribal tensions, Philip then saw to it that the followers of Adam Kok were suitably settled. Some of the breakaway group joined the "banditti" on the Orange River, others, the Bergenaars, followed Kok into exile to Campbell, then Backhouse, and finally to be settled by Philip in 1826 at Philippolis, which he had founded three years before, for the Bushmen. Not surprisingly, the new community at Philippolis was even less compliant than the one left at Griquatown under Waterboer. In the 25 years between the founding of Philippolis and 1850, there were 7 missionaries in residence, and all were forced to leave apart from Peter Wright.<sup>(2)</sup> And even in the purged Griquatown in 1843, Solomon could write to Philip that the Griquas there "resent any advice and interference in their temporal affairs on the part of missionaries."<sup>(3)</sup>

Philip used the same strategy with Griqualand as he had with the Kat River Settlement. He gave the inhabitants as much independence as he could, but kept a watching-brief. He used the best missionary agents he could get hold of - Peter Wright was his favourite - and kept in touch with internal developments. As far as external political

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(1) Andrew Smith's Journal page 287. Griquatown, 1822. (Cape Town, reprinted, 1975).

(2) Philip Ross: Adam Kok's Griquas. p.44

(3) Philip Papers : ff 1317-1607. Solomon to Philip. Griquatown.

relations were concerned, the treaties signed between the Cape and the Kok and Waterboer captaincies were the surest way Philip could devise to protect the Griquas, and, at the same time, allow them freedom to develop. Philip's action in protecting an amorphous Christian nation on the northern borders of the Cape was undertaken for two reasons. Firstly, a state was the best way to protect and foster the Christian Faith, for Philip, like Livingstone, saw salvation in a tribal rather than in an individual context.<sup>(1)</sup> Then, the Griqua nation would be the means of filtering Christian morals and aspirations to the black African tribes beyond the frontier; the same process as he envisaged for his Kat River Settlement, and the Xhosa beyond.


Just as on the Kat River, education was the cultural basis seen to be of value by the population in their drive towards acculturation, and it was utilized as such. The statistics of the Griquatown and district schools varied, but overall, they were impressive in number. There is no evidence as to the quality of education, and there was no Normal School to train local mission teachers as at Kat River.

In 1819, the Griquatown School consisted of 160 scholars, with modest achievements.<sup>(2)</sup> Attendance fell in the next few years to 63 children. The missionaries, in answer to printed queries about the state of the missions, thought that the main impediments to education were the fact that Griqua parents were "wanderers", and

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(1) "For what can a missionary do for the salvation of such a people if he has no means of bringing them together to receive the first elements of Christian instruction or of keeping them together till those instructions give rise to the formation of a society which will give a permanent footing for the Gospel, with all the apparatus of printing and schools..." Letter of Philip to Government. (quoted: W.M. Macmillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton. p.48)

(2) 8/3/A J. Campbell MSS. 1820



A CORANA CHIEF (FROM BURCHELL ORIGINAL)

consequently indifferent to their children's education.<sup>(1)</sup> The "monitorial system" was adopted, but it was beyond the power of the teachers to implement it, probably due to lack of instruction in the required skills, and deficiency of resources. Philip was determined that the mission should be as strong as possible, so he sent Peter Wright there, to improve matters. Philip considered Griquatown as one of the most important of his stations because of its importance on the way north, as well as the need to develop Griqua nationhood.

Wright, like Philip, thought education important to mission expansion. In 1831, he wrote to the L.M.S. Directors: "I fear that hitherto too little attention has been paid by the missionaries in general in Africa to the School department of our stations, and till we take a greater interest in this all important matter and throw aside the pernicious opinion that our time and talents are too valuable to be wasted in giving children the first elements of knowledge, it is in vain for us to effect great things."<sup>(2)</sup> Like Philip, Wright disliked the indifference of other agents to schooling, and saw a sound and lively school system the basis of future advance. Wright practiced what he preached, and soon there was a much healthier complexion upon school statistics. By 1836, there were 300 children in the Griquatown schools, and adults were learning to read, as well.

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(1) 9/2/C Griquatown. 2 August, 1824. Answers to printed queries.

(2) 12/4/D. Griquatown. 1 December, 1831. Peter Wright.

If out-stations were included, the attendance figures soared even higher, and there were "upwards of 800 children under regular instruction." At Mathebe town, there were 125 children and a great number of adults, "all making astonishing progress."<sup>(1)</sup>

This progress was maintained, and the statistics available from the missionaries, show that this very high percentage of children in school, persisted. In 1840, the : children numbered about 800, but Wright complained that the native teachers needed training, and were not as effective as he would have wished.<sup>(2)</sup> This weakness was noted by Philip in his station reports of 1842. His solution was to train the "native teachers" that worked in the out-stations in the Head Station at Griquatown itself, but the administrative arrangements were not possible for the overworked Wright.<sup>(3)</sup>

Before Wright went off to Philippolis, he made a final report, and the school figures had maintained their momentum. There were 949 children in the Griqualand schools, and although the 22 "native teachers" were not trained, they were "men of genuine piety, possessing good natural talents, and a knowledge of the scriptures that has surprised us." Most significantly of all, all costs for the schools were defrayed by the native Griqua church, and by Mr. Wright.<sup>(4)</sup>

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(1) 15/1/D. Griquatown. 10 December, 1836. Peter Wright.

(2) Box 17. Griquatown. P. Wright and I Hughes. 20 September, 1840

(3) 18/5/C Griquatown. 1842 Station reports. J. Philip

(4) 18/3/A Griqualand. 20 May, 1842

Once the schools had been organised and encouraged, Wright's missionary successors tried to maintain the levels of attendance they had inherited. Hughes' report of two years later noted that out of a Griqualand West population of 3,000 people, about 500 children attended the 10 day schools, two of which were in Griquatown itself. The Griquatown schools did the most advanced work: English, some arithmetic, Geography and History. In the out-station schools, there was simple reading in Dutch and Sechuana, but above all, the social training that the ordered life of a school with its European ethos demanded: "...such...discipline is absolutely needful to bring the land to habits of activity, punctuality, cleanliness and insubordination (sic)." Hughes noted, too, with gratitude, that Andries Waterboer, the Griqualand West 'Kaptyn' - himself an ex-L.M.S. teacher - was completely behind the educational efforts of the L.M.S. to educate his people. (1)

The report of 1849 noted a falling off of children in attendance at school to around 500, but this was still an impressive total. (2) Like the Kat River Khoi, the Griquas of Griquatown, thought education was a means of establishing themselves within the economic structure of the Cape. The stimulation and organising ability of Wright was all that was needed to show how committed they were to their schools.

The Griquas under the Adam Kok captaincy, based further east

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(1) 22/1/A Griquatown. I. Hughes. 25 January, 1844

(2) Freeman Deputation. Odds 4. Box 9. 1849. Griquatown.

in Philippolis, were, by nature and origin, far more intractable than those under Waterboer at Griquatown. The "Dam Kok" Griquas found the settled community of Griquatown and environs far too oppressive, and the majority of them after they left Griquatown, went eastwards and settled around Philippolis, as farmers. Their lack of compliancy and remoteness meant that their education was less thorough, and there is less archival material available. In the 1850's, this breakaway group was prospering, along with their neighbours in the Orange Free State, as they bred the merino sheep for wool. This new found wealth led to the development of independent farmers, along with a rural proletariat; a similar social stratification to that which occurred on the Kat River.

Kok Griqua concern for their independence made them suspicious of visitors in case they were surveying the land for the Crown, or to annexe to Waterboer.<sup>(1)</sup> Their ideal of a sympathetic missionary was one who was sensitive to these fears, and who was politically active and culturally sympathetic - just like the Reads on Kat River. A Philippolis missionary should be of ...."Strict piety, an impressive preacher and one who can go about the whole neighbourhood to preach, who would take a similar interest in promoting education to what is done in Kat River, and one who would assist in improving the internal constitution into the English and Christian model as the South Sea missionaries do, and also who .....

(1) Andrew Smith's Journal of his expedition into the interior of South Africa/1834-1836. (edited by W.F. Lye). Cape Town reprint: 1975. p.31

would help us in our co-operation with the colonial Government."<sup>(1)</sup>  
In the Philippolis reports, there is a feeling of undirected liveliness which the L.M.S. on the whole, failed to harness. In 1860, the annual subscription of the Kok Griquas was £62, but resources were always poor, and there was no training provided for out-station Griqua teachers.

In the early 1830's attendance at the Philippolis schools-day and Sunday - never topped 80, and the usual problem of children being absent from school because of harvest work was deplored. This problem was compounded by two others. Since the population was scattered, out-schools were necessary, and an itinerating missionary was needed to see that the young teachers in these schools were given practical direction in their work. This was not possible.<sup>(2)</sup> Also, there was a shortage of Bibles, hymn-books and spelling books in spite of generous Griqua subscriptions to the L.M.S., in 1840, of £57-14-0.<sup>(3)</sup>

Philippolis was strategically even more important than Griquatown, for Boer incursions into the territory were frequent, and the L.M.S. needed to defend the territorial and cultural integrity of the Kok Griquas. Philip recognised this and moved Peter Wright across from Griquatown to Philippolis to revive the station, and organise it, as he had so successfully done in Waterboer's country. Unfortunately, Peter Wright died in April, 1843, soon after he had taken up his new position. Nevertheless, four years  
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- (1) Odds. 7/3/B. (Quoted: Robert Ross: Adam Kok's Griquas. p.78)
- (2) 12/2/A. Dr. Philip's Report of 1830 and 5/1/E. T. Atkinson. Philippines. 14 November, 1836.
- (3) Incoming letters. George Schreiner. Philippolis. 28 December, 1840.



later saw a revitalized school system. The Philippolis day school had 120 children in attendance; there were two outstation schools, where Griqua teachers instructed 100 children in each. There were 5 minor schools with over 150 children in total attendance. These 370 or so children were educated with the help of a £50 Colonial government allowance, and by Griqua money. There was no cost at all to the L.M.S.; yet again, the perceived need for some training of the young local teachers was ignored.<sup>(1)</sup>

A good example of Griqua independence asserting itself, occurred during Vanderschalk's pastorate. Vanderschalk came from the Cape and was totally unprepared for the sturdy individuality of the Griqua congregation. His letters about the Griquas are critical of their "disrespect", and reading between the lines of his correspondence, the mutual frustration must have been considerable. He arrived in Philippolis in August, 1844, discovering that school organisation was high on the Griqua list of priorities. They had already recruited, independently, three teachers and wanted Vanderschalk to be a Supervisor "to see whether their schoolmasters do their duties." Vanderschalk did not particularly relish being told what his job was, but he agreed to itinerate, and to teach at the Philippolis school.<sup>(2)</sup> He found increasingly that being forced to teach and control the other teachers circumscribed his efforts excessively ...."it is directly rumoured about, that I came as a

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(1) Philip Papers: ff 1317 - 1607. Report by Thomson from Philippolis. 15 November, 1844.

(2) 25/1/C. Vanderschalk to Freeman. Philippolis. 9 July, 1850.

schoolmaster among them, while held by them in very great disrespect."<sup>(1)</sup>  
The Griquas wanted a superintending teacher, but Vanderschalk wanted to do other things, so he resigned his post.

As on the Kat River, external pressures on the Kok Griquas grew more severe. The Boers were not allowed to buy Griqua land, but they took out very long leases which amounted to the same thing. The importation of brandy ('Cape Smoke') had a debilitating effect on many Griquas, and it became clear that something had to be done to save what remained of Griqua national integrity. In 1859 it was decided to trek to Kokstad in East Griqualand (originally called Nomansland) where, once again, the L.M.S. provided cultural support. Education remained important to the remnant, and one of the last letters from the Kok Griquas to the L.M.S. noted that in 1881, the head school in Kokstad was attended by 100 Griqua pupils, and that there was a government grant of £150 to support their pupil teachers.<sup>(2)</sup>

What were the consequences of Philip's strategy? Ironically in 1853, Khoi were allowed to vote for the Lower House of an elected Legislature in Cape Colony, although the turbulence of the previous decade made many ineligible even on a low property franchise. Undoubtedly Philip's constant support of Khoi rights helped this move, although the practical politics of Khoi enfranchisement were complex, and the result of racial and social tensions peculiar

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(1) 25/1/E. Vanderschalk to L.M.S. Philippolis 29 October, 1850.

(2) 41/2/D Dower to Thompson. Kokstad: East Griqualand.

24 October, 1881.

to the Cape at that time. As a straightforward mission supervisor, Philip was relatively successful. He organised L.M.S. resources and personnel prudently, encouraged mission schools, and united other Protestant mission bodies, such as the Paris Evangelical Society to expand in the Cape. His effectiveness in the larger political and cultural context is more questionable.

His philosophy of mission derived from convictions tempered by the Scottish Enlightenment and the spirit of early British industrialisation. Briefly, his ideal for the Cape was a society based on liberal political rights for all races, sustained by a prosperous agricultural-commercial economy in the European capitalist style, and an educated population motivated by Christian principles. Cape expansionism should, according to him, never forget that paradigm. To this end, the destiny of the Khoi-Griqua were central to his thinking. Their acculturation by formal schooling and informal contact with white missionaries in Institutions was designed to "raise their civilization" so that they could transmit to African groups their new values. It is true that Philip underestimated the resilience of traditional African religion and culture, as did David Livingstone, and it meant that ultimately his policy would have been frustrated. But what of its effectiveness as far as the Khoi-Griqua were concerned?

Philippine theory and practice came together on the viability or otherwise of the Khoi-Griqua frontier communities. We have seen how they ended; the Kat River Settlement was dissolved (along with

the Theopolis Institution), although only a minority of Khoi joined the "Hottentot Rebellion" of 1851, the Waterboer Griquas declined, and the Kok Griquas scattered. Yet there were positive achievements, and Philip's policy would have been capable of a modest fulfilment if Boer and Cape opinion had not been so antagonistic. The tribal communities established their political autonomy, they engaged in commerce with neighbouring groups, and became acculturated in religion, dress, language and thought to a significant extent. Moreover, school statistics are practical markers of their progress - many children went to the L.M.S. Mission Schools on the Kat River and in the two Griqua Communities; enough money was subscribed to support these schools; local teachers came forward to teach, and at the Kat River, teachers were well-trained without any L.M.S. intervention. To this extent, at least, Philip's belief in Khoi-Griqua natural capacities was justified.

CHAPTER SIX

The Hankey Institution and the Caffraria Mission

"Every year only illustrates the one great blunder that we as a society have made - no Institute to raise up pastors and evangelists and schoolmasters".

Birt to L.M.S. Peelton,

October 1877

The Society's evangelising policy in the Cape was initiated and controlled by John Philip. He had consolidated the early instinctive reactions of van der Kemp and James Read to the Cape situation, particularly the work of those two at the Khoi residential institution, and directed the Society's efforts in a way which gave an ideological and practical thrust to Cape work. This will be recapitulated briefly in order to evaluate more precisely the Society's condition in the period after Philip's death.

As we have seen, Philip's mission theology was derived from the cultural background of the Scottish enlightenment and Congregationalism, blended with his youthful experience of Scottish industry. It must be remembered that Scottish (indeed, British) industrialisation was still in its 'optimistic' stage, and was producing fresh wealth and an ambitious, enlightened, frequently devout, middle class. Philip advocated this amalgam of the entrepreneurial spirit and Christianity in the Cape, and his humanitarian zeal perceived that it was the Khoi-Griqua group that should absorb this spirit of individualism; thus, the accultured Khoi-Griquas would not only act as a leaven upon other non-European communities in the Cape but would spread their influence among the adjacent peoples in the northern and eastern frontiers. This Khoi-Griqua group was to be encouraged in every way possible; its political integrity protected in law; its economic vitality stimulated. Life in the residential institution of the Society was to be the informal means to manage this change, and education the formal way.

So much for Philipine theory. What about practice? This was the second stage of his policy. The Kat River Settlement and Griqualand would be tests of the authenticity of the Khoi-Griqua cultural

transformation; Philip did not directly intervene in these subsequent developments, but the communities showed plenty of vitality. The Khoi-Griqua led by L.M.S. converts, valued their political autonomy, following a programme of education and commercial activity which was comprehensive and lively. Both communities were determined to become a part of the white Christian Cape. External forces combined in the end to destroy these fragile independences, but this does not invalidate either the correctness of Philip's convictions, nor the Khoi-Griqua efforts at acculturation.

Before leaving Philip, some suitable coda to his work can be supplied by examining generalised but pertinent criticisms of humanitarian missionaries in the Cape.<sup>(1)</sup> The authors make three main points; first, that missionary evangelism was contradictory in that its revolutionary support for African groups was allied to support of white capitalism and its expansion in the Cape; second, that the peasant prosperity encouraged by the Cape missionaries was later frustrated by white control over the political machinery; last, that missionaries advocated the annexation of African lands. How valid are these comments, as far as the L.M.S. in the nineteenth century Cape, is concerned?

We have already distinguished the 'dialectic' and 'dialogic' groups within the L.M.S. agents. The 'dialectic' group - missionaries such as Robert Moffat, Calderwood, Brownlee - had a low opinion of African culture, resisted any sort of 'political' Gospel, and preferred to note differences between African and European rather than a common

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(1) Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore: The Imperial Factor in South Africa (In European Imperialism and the Partition of Africa. (p. 105-139. edited E.F. Penrose, 1975).

humanity, unlike the 'dialogic' group. Moreover, the "dialectic" group, preferred an African culture that remained rural and distinctive rather than exhorting such people to enter into trade, a cash-economy and work in white capitalist enterprises. Moffat, significantly, constructed a garden, - admittedly a well-watered and efficient one - at Kuruman! To this extent, the criticism of Marks and Atmore is wrong; but it is right in fact that "dialogic" Philip, and his group, strongly advocated the adoption of capitalism as the only way for indigenous people to survive and to adapt themselves to the new cultural demands being made on them in a changing colonial society. The article quotes Galbraith noting that evangelicalism and humanitarianism 'did not attack the immutable laws of economics'.<sup>(1)</sup> But Philip had only experienced eighteenth and early nineteenth century capitalism, whose early benefits of wealth, improved living conditions and some cultured leisure outweighed, at that moment in time, incipient exploitation, unemployment and 'the iron law of wages'. The yoking together of religion and capitalism in missionary policy - expressed in phrases such as "Commerce and Christianity" or "the Bible and the Plough" - was seen as a way to establish Christianity in a bourgeois, prosperous environment that would at the same time protect the new faith and ameliorate African life-styles. Perhaps the contemporary advocates of such a policy were naive, but they were certainly not malign. As the decades passed, and white colonialism developed exploitative and racist overtones, the latent conflict between religion and European capitalism became more and more exaggerated and deadly. Philip and Livingstone may well have looked in horror at the later excesses of

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(1) Ibid, p. 117



the 'Scramble' and post- 'Scramble' period; and later proponents of the L.M.S. humanitarian imperialism such as John Mackenzie and W.C. Willoughby had to adapt their creed.

The second criticism concerned mission support for peasant prosperity which was later destroyed by white settlers. The purpose of the L.M.S. institutions was to 'protect' Khoi development, and Philip was a supporter of them until his death. Philip supported, too, the Khoi individual, particularly in his advocacy of the 1828 50th Ordinance. But, ultimately, Khoi and Griqua had to come of age and compete in the larger, competitive society of a white Cape, and such economic forces inevitably had free play. Only a total theocracy would have given these nations any further economic protection.

Finally, a defence of the humanitarian missionaries' support of annexation is necessary. To the L.M.S., annexation implied the 'pax Britannica' in preference to the restrictions and tutelage of white colonial farmers; it was, also, intended to defend African people outside the Cape, particularly the Tswana, from Boer expansionism in the north, as well as the social dislocation and political trickery caused by the migration of trader, hunter, freebooter, mining companies and expansionists such as Rhodes. Imperialism, backed by a British Parliament open to liberal and Christian pressures, was preferable to the coarser exploitations of the Colonial Whites.

After Philip's death, the Society's policy in the Cape shrank to compromises, plagued by lack of funds, and the Society's unwillingness to commit itself to improving schools or training local agents. There were global and local reasons for withdrawal from the Cape. The Society was engaged in a massive task to evangelize India and China,

and all this, as its general income was in decline. It was decided that funds available for Africa should be used to expand activities northwards via Moffat's Kuruman. Moreover, Philip's mission had never been popular in London. There also existed a thin, but influential and persistent vein of mission opinion that the educational potential of the Khoi-Griqua was limited, and more money should not be wasted on developing educational provision for them.

All these strands united after Philip's death, and the Society's work in the Cape went into a slow, irreversible decline. Two areas of work highlight this decline in L.M.S. activity - the Hankey Institution and their Caffraria Mission. Agents working in these areas complained of neglect, and the period is a winter's tale of declining resources and missed opportunities. The Directors "caveat" in their 1856 report showed they were aware of the serious consequences of such a move; "these principles (i.e. of independence for their Cape stations) may be applied prematurely, and the advantages received by years of labour be precipitately sacrificed", but once the process started it became impossible to stop.<sup>(1)</sup> Not that missionaries like Robert Moffat and David Livingstone wanted the process reversed. Even before Philip's death, Moffat's voice in the Society's Cape counsels was a loud one; now it was the sole one. He wanted the Cape to look after itself, as he had always disliked its political and economic message; now, Kuruman would be centre stage in the Society's plans. David Livingstone owed much to Philip - personally and ideologically - but he saw the Cape as "civilized" - to use the contemporary missionary word - and

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(1) Lovett, i. p. 574

wanted the Society to push on with him to more distant challenges. In all this 'grand design', Caffraria was ignored, although the social changes in this area made it one of the most potentially fruitful of all African mission **fields**. Besides, Bechuanaland was a more 'dramatic' part of Africa to write up in mission magazines, and preach about as well, a fact of which the publicity-conscious Directors were not unmindful.

The slow and painful surgery began even before Philip's death. In 1845, Tidman, the Foreign Secretary, informed Philip that there had been a deficit of £9,000 per annum in Cape expenditure over the previous seven years, and economies were essential. Tidman gave examples of overspending - educational expenditure on Paarl in the Western Cape, one of the Mission's oldest stations was £239 in one year whilst only £32 had been contributed; Buffalo River - £205 spent on it, with only £4.3.2 contributed. He put the Directors' case in a nutshell when he noted to Philip; "while they (the Directors) entertain a deep sense of the importance of education, the Directors do not feel at liberty while they are unable to meet the cry of perishing millions in the East...to appropriate to such small communities so large a sum as the salaries of schoolmasters etc....". From 1840 onwards, Tidman concluded, only £5,000 would be spent on Southern Africa.<sup>(1)</sup>

Not only that, but direct grants from private sources in England given directly to education should be stopped.<sup>(2)</sup> By 1850, approximately

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(1) Odds 3. Freeman Deputation; 1848-50. 1/4/A. Tidman to Philip, 7 December 1845

(2) Odds 3. Freeman Deputation; 1/1. Freeman's Instructions from the Board, 13 November, 1848

a fifth of this sum (911.p.a.) was given to the Society's Cape Mission Station schools.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1855, William Ellis, who had been Foreign Secretary from 1833 to 1841, visited the Cape to report on the institutions. The real reason for his visit was to accelerate the independence of the Cape Mission Stations, as well as to urge them to be self-supporting.

Whatever the rights or wrongs of the Society's decision on a slow withdrawal, this did not prevent the mission agents there disputing the course of action. The leader of the group was <sup>the</sup> Rev. T. Durant Philip, the younger son of John Philip, who was for most of his professional life the Society's senior agent at the Hankey Institution in the eastern Cape. Durant Philip, like his father, saw education as the strategic lynch-pin of any worthwhile evangelising activity, and throughout his career constantly and consistently opposed the reluctance of the L.M.S. to commit itself to school expansion, and the founding of a training system for a 'native agency'.

The L.M.S. introduced in 1855 into the Cape, a policy of self-dependence which virtually turned the L.M.S. into a Pastoral Aid Society. So in order to preserve their mission schools from collapsing completely, missionaries had to accept Cape government grants-in-aid, "which are sufficient to attract the services of any but very incompetent persons". The petitioners further noted that the missions were advancing daily, but "our ordinary schools are sinking in character, and we have no high training Institution or Seminaries for the

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(1) 25/3/C. 1850. Expenditure of L.M.S. Schools.

preparation of a Native Agency.<sup>(1)</sup> Their despair can be measured by this acceptance of government funds, for such a move was anathema to traditional Congregationalism, striking at its theological roots of the independence and spiritual autonomy of each worshipping group of believers. The L.M.S. constantly warned against the acceptance of such State funds.<sup>(2)</sup> By 1873, only the Hankey Institution was in receipt of any grants from London. To support the Mission agents thus bereft, the Evangelical Voluntary Union was formed in the Cape in 1859, and the Congregational Union there in 1877.

There were other reasons as well why the L.M.S. had begun to drag its feet in financing its Cape activities. Even before the period of financial stringency, there was an undercurrent of opinion within the L.M.S. that cast doubts on the educational potential of the Khoi-Griqua people. We have already noted Foster's doubts in this matter; also the qualified tones of the 'dialectic' group of L.M.S. missionaries about African natural capacities. These opinion were enhanced when the L.M.S. contacts with the 'advanced' cultures of China and India developed, and secular racial theories seeped into Blomfield Street. An example of official denigration was shown by Ellis. In his 1855 Report, already referred to, such opinions as "Christian society among the coloured people of the Colony is not sufficiently advanced to acquire a permanent *character*" and "close mental application is so

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(1) 32/4/4. T.D. Philip and other missionaries, February 1861.

(2) Lovett ii, p. 681. Item 4, for instance, of the 1894 Committee Report stated that the L.M.S. could never receive any government grants-in-aid.

alien to native habits...that we could not feel sanguine as to their becoming efficient teachers" must have carried weight with the Society's Directorate. Freeman, on the other hand, was favourably disposed towards Khoi at Hankey, and he wrote about Hankey in the same tones as he used of the seminaries of China, India and the South Seas. (1)

The Hankey Institution was on the Gamtoos river in the eastern Cape, about 60 miles due west of Bethelsdorp. It was purchased by the L.M.S. for £1,500 in 1822. (2) It was about 4,100 acres in extent, having as its first European missionary J.G. Messer who was in residence from 1823 to 1831. In 1842, William Philip, the elder son of John Philip was the senior missionary, and John Philip himself resided there; the Philip family, father and sons, were strongly identified with Hankey, and it became their own particular redoubt from which they fought their battles not only with the Cape whites, but the L.M.S. Directors as well. William Philip embarked on an ambitious irrigation project at Hankey; after the L.M.S. had pledged iron pipes for the Institution, a tunnel was blasted through a hill from the higher to the lower section of the Gamtoos river. Unfortunately, in July 1845, William Philip and his son were drowned in the river, a personal blow from which John Philip never recovered. Durant Philip, his brother, who had turned down a good post at the prestigious South Africa College to work with his father at Hankey, succeeded, and remained in charge of Hankey until 1876. John Philip died in Hankey and was buried there in August 1851.

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(1) J.J. Freeman; A Tour in South Africa, p. 49

(2) Lovett i, p. 564

Thus the Hankey Institution was strongly associated by personalities with the Philip family, and Durant Philip's enthusiasm for its advancement was both personal as well as professional. He tried to establish a training institution there for the Khoi, but the attempt was a failure. The prolonged effort at such a venture, highlighted the problems the L.M.S. had in the Cape after John Philip's death.

A training institution to establish a 'native agency' for the Cape Mission had been suggested regularly since the mission's inception by van der Kemp. Not only would such an institution establish a way for converts to advance into Mission Service, but it would, also, decrease the dependency of the mission on European missionaries. Van der Kemp outlined a plan - never fulfilled - whereby converted Khoi *itinerated* as preachers, worked on the land, and acquired evangelistic skills, and attached all the while to the church at Bethelsdorp.<sup>(1)</sup> Its simplicity attracted Philip, but later he conceived much more grandiose plans for training Khoi converts in the Cape. The most successful attempt at training indigenous teachers for the Cape mission - both in number and quality - was done by James Read, junior, on the Kat River. There were other minor attempts at training in an attempt to compensate for a proper system. For example, in 1823, Philip placed four boys from Theopolis with Matthews, a Methodist minister at Salem. Edward Williams began a similar course for boys from Hankey, Kruisfontein, Uitenhage and Theopolis. But an unequivocal commitment by the Directorate to the training of African teachers and evangelists peaked with Foster's ignominious attempts at training; the next official initiative would be in the Bechuana mission.

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(1) Philip: Researches i, p. 110

Durant Philip was the wrong person at the wrong place at the wrong time. He had been trained for mission work in India, but his health was poor, so he went to the Cape to work alongside his father. He was a graduate, and his main interest was education. Unfortunately, his lack of experience and his wish to impress his father made him produce plans for an institution at Hankey that were far too academic. Besides, the L.M.S. refused to spend any extra money on Hankey education, so the institution was effectively still-born. There had always been a school at Hankey, but the Khoi parents were poor and they wanted their children to work in transport or on the land. In 1829, there were 74 children at school, and four years later an infants school was added. But attendance was never impressive, and fell four years later to 40 children.<sup>(1)</sup> Durant Philip was not satisfied only with a school, and soon after he had taken control of Hankey sent to the Directors his plans for a Khoi Seminary there. These plans consisted of over 30 pages of closely written text which outlined a wide ranging curriculum, heavily academic, and concluded with the purported academic and spiritual consequences of this for his pupils. Some youthful intellectual arrogance, plus lack of experience in the Cape, had made him produce a curriculum that would have tested the intelligence and commitment of any comparable white group; its exhaustive demands made it similar to the curricula of the older nonconformist Dissenting Academies, and probably Durant Philip got his basic, overall plan from some of these.<sup>(2)</sup> His projected curriculum was in two sections;

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(1) 14/2/D J. Melvill, Hankey Report of 1834

(2) 22/2/B T.D. Philip, 8 October, 1846. Cape Town.



one portion would be devoted to an extensive examination of Scripture and theology, and the other to History, Philosophy, the Strict Sciences and Medicine. Each of these units was broken down further, and annotated in some detail. The purpose of this curriculum, so Durant Philip's submission went, was to train the mind, and to develop in the Khoi students rural excellence and Christian and social independence. No mention was made of library resources or extra teachers, and the Directors made no comment upon it.

Durant Philip then attracted some Khoi pupils to the Hankey Institution and began teaching; numbers never exceeded twenty and there were no special buildings constructed. Freeman alone of the London bureaucrats supported Durant Philip. He considered his seminary to be "a most important branch of service", that was "redeeming the character of our Institutions in the Colony".<sup>(1)</sup> By 1850, the estimated expenses of the Hankey Institution were £512.12.8, the amount spent on education was - six young men who cost £180 in total to educate, and who received annual allowances of £30 each.<sup>(2)</sup> This was a generous portion of the overall sum granted to the Institution. One can only suspect that, over the years, the daily grind of teaching began to modify Philip's extravagant ambitions, a note of reality crept into his letters. In 1850, he wrote that he taught one, Malagar Kumere, a Fingo teacher, only Scripture and "English/Caffre" translation, commenting....."for I think a smattering of science is peculiarly apt to puff up its possessor. I make of course a distinction

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(1) Odds 4. 2/4/6. Freeman Deputation. 25 August, 1849. Freeman to Tidman

(2) Odds 4. 2/1/B Freeman Deputation.

between a smattering and a thorough education."<sup>(1)</sup>

Why did Durant Philip's seminary fail? There was, first, the curricular problem. How "academic" should such courses of instruction be? Was the purpose of the institution to transfer 'en bloc' a European university course, or should the relevant mission aim lower and include professional training (for would-be African-teachers, evangelists and so on) an industrial training (plumbing, carpentry, bricklaying, stone masonry etc)? Durant Philip, and his generation of missionaries, came down heavily on the academic side. John MacKenzie, the Principal of the L.M.S. Moffat Institution at Kuruman - as we shall see later - insisted on an academic curriculum, although there were additional training courses for teachers and evangelists as well. On the whole, even at Kuruman, the emphasis was academic. It was only when Tiger Klof was founded in the next century did the academic curriculum change considerably, and the industrial, professional training become a genuine incorporation.

But the conflict between academic and professional education was not only an L.M.S. problem. There was a significant conflict on this issue in the Lovedale Institution of the Glasgow Missionary Society at the same time, in the eastern Cape.<sup>(2)</sup> The Lovedale crisis was precipitated by James Stewart's arrival in 1867 on to the Lovedale staff. He disagreed with the curricular objective of pure academic excellence which Principal Govan had - educating the African

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(1) 25/4/A T.D. Philip, 8 June, 1850. Hankey.

(2) R.H.W. Shepherd, Lovedale South Africa: 1824-1955 (Lovedale Press, 1971) p. 27 and following.

achievers to as high a level as possible. Dr Stewart's position was radically different. His educational aim was to produce teachers and to do so he wanted Latin, Greek and French jettisoned from the timetable. The Committee of the Glasgow Missionary Society which controlled Lovedale, decided in February 1869, to support Stewart's more realistic policy, and advocated teaching in the vernacular in the lower school; sacrificing the classical languages; and stiffening the Arts course with more overtly Christian instruction. Durant Philip, like Govan, had wanted to impose on students with short, spasmodic primary education much too academic courses of instruction.

The second reason for Durant Philip's failure can be found in the social conditions prevailing in Hankey and the surrounding areas. The mid-1840's was a period of unrest for the district. The Khoi War of the Axe of 1846 had created local distress, and Khoi were involved in the fighting on the white or Xhosa side. The Kat River had seen its men conscripted into the levies. Inevitably, such tensions were not at all conducive to the success of an academic Institution such as Durant Philip had founded. Not only that, but the Hankey Khoi were the section of their people who had not migrated to the Kat River, and were, by nature, unenterprising. They were angry at L.M.S. attempts to privatise Hankey, and refused to buy their individual plots from the Society. And, in spite of Durant Philip's arguments, the L.M.S. were not going to fund the Institution, so it never, in fact, got off the ground.

Like Philip "père", Durant Philip was a "dialogic" missionary. To him education was the most important way to 'improve' Khoi life, and such an 'improved' material lot was a sign of grace: or, as he

wrote to the Directors..."the Station that a people occupies in the scale of civilisation is in my opinion of no small importance, insomuch as these are the fruits by which God is greatly glorified in them before the eyes of the world". Significantly, this opinion by Durant Philip was in the same letter that announced to the Directors his father's death at Hankey the previous year. For, to both John and Durant Philip, the entrepreneurial spirit was a symbol of spiritual vitality.<sup>(1)</sup>

Whatever Durant Philip's theology of mission was, the Directors' were obdurate in their refusal to alter their strategy and put more money into the Hankey Institution. Durant Philip's protests continued. The Society's withdrawal from Cape education, he noted in 1860, "has worked very prejudicially to the Missions".<sup>(2)</sup> He went further, and in 1867 had a printed condemnation of the Directors circulated which stated the consequences of L.M.S. policy with bleak directness: "Good EDUCATION has almost ceased as an instrumentality in South Africa by the London Missionary Society. The Congregations are unable to support an efficient schoolmaster in addition to their minister. The schools have thus fallen through....."<sup>(3)</sup> The protests fell on deaf ears.

The Directors then decided on a move which accelerated the demise of Hankey as it had been. They decided to "privatise" the institution

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(1) 27/2/B. T.D. Philip to L.M.S. Hankey, 19 May, 1852.

(2) 32/D T. Durant Philip to L.M.S. Hankey, 30 July, 1860

(3) 34/3/A T.D. Philip, Hankey, January, 1867

by selling <sup>it</sup> off piecemeal to its Khoi occupants. Durant Philip tried to protect the small group of seminarians he was managing to instruct, by suggesting the L.M.S. should either give the twenty students money to rent cottages for themselves or give them £30 per annum each and a housed teacher. This course of action was rejected, so Durant Philip, after twenty years in the Society's service, resigned in 1876 and became a minister in a Graaff-Reinet Church. The "privatisation" policy at Hankey led to the Khoi inhabitants becoming anxious, panic-stricken, and ultimately, sullen and un-cooperative. Even the more well-to-do Khoi jibbed at the offer of purchase and general despondency descended on the Institution and Khoi and European missionaries alike. <sup>(1)</sup> Durant Philip's seminary was never large, and was only maintained by his enthusiasm and concern; most of Hankey's general funding must have found its way into the Institution's coffers as it could hardly have survived for such a long time, in straitened times.

The bitterness produced by Hankey's piecemeal sale was illustrated by the refusal of Philip's associates to accept an educational grant, the £2,500 that the enforced land sales eventually produced. Durant Philip had some personal satisfaction towards the end of his life as he, in addition to his pastorate at Graaff-Reinet, took up a part-time lecturing post at Lovedale. Its success must have made him, on occasion dream of what might have been, if L.M.S. policy had been different. If Lovedale had succeeded, why not the Hankey Institution?

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(1) 38/2/B D Philip to L.M.S. 30 September, 1875

Durant Philip's missionary career was a sad postscript to that of his more illustrious father's. John Philip's concerns in education and cultural advancement for the Khoi were similar to those of his son, but his life was lived against the broader political horizons of the early Cape, in expansionist times. Durant Philip witnessed the Cape Mission contracting; the eastern Cape, particularly, became a scene of racial violence, and the Society's participation of less and less importance. The Hankey Seminary, in particular, was doomed to be a small, underfunded institution with little educational impact, and it continued to be so after Durant Philip's departure. In 1899, it became a Dutch-speaking school for the Khoi. In 1901, there were 11 students attending, living in a recently finished school house which had cost the Society £600.

Thus the school proceeded modestly. The schooling itself was free and a £12.p.a. charge was made for boarding. The senior resident missionary at the turn of the twentieth century was Walton, who with his wife, did all the teaching and superintending at the school. Walton knew that the L.M.S. would never increase any grants to his school, and realised his and the school's future lay with the Cape Congregational Union. After a report to the L.M.S. for a "courteous official introduction to the Congregational ministers of the colony", Walton was, by 1902, a member of the Congregational Union Education Committee. This body subsequently funded a tutor to help Walton at an annual cost of £200; in the same year the school was educating 5 coloured and 7 African students. (1)

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(1) 60/4 Walton to Thompson, Hankey, 24 October 1902

The Caffraria Mission of the L.M.S. was an extension of the Cape Mission, and it never established itself because of the L.M.S. decision to expand northwards and to restrict funds to its Cape work. Nevertheless, the Caffraria Mission, in spite of its low-key work and absence of leaders of the calibre of van der Kemp and Philip, exhibited a variety of strategic problems that make it a valuable study.

John Williams was the first of the Society's missionaries to work among the Xhosa on the Cape's eastern frontier. He reached Ngqika's people in 1816 and died two years later. The most important of these pioneer Caffraria missionaries who established himself firmly was John Brownlee, although Brownlee initially had wanted to join his friend Moffatt at Kuruman. Moffatt and Brownlee held similar views about evangelisation and education; they both had working class backgrounds and had no formal education to speak of. Both belonged to the 'dialectic' school of mission, that considered evangelisation primarily as a narrow spiritual rather than a more comprehensive cultural process. Brownlee was a rigid moralist, and in 1819 had resigned from the L.M.S. because of the moral scandals involving James Read and some of his colleagues. He objected, too, on theological grounds to the superintendency role that John Philip had assumed. Brownlee had wanted far stronger action taken by the Society against agents such as James Read who had "lapsed"; he felt, too, that better financial provision should be made to the widows and orphans of deceased agents. Therefore, he went to work for the government as an official missionary, in June 1820, in the Tyhumie valley; he rejoined the

L.M.S. in 1826 and inaugurated an important Mission station at Kingwilliamstown.<sup>(1)</sup>

The other L.M.S. Mission Stations in Caffraria were settled as follows. Henry Calderwood inaugurated the Blinkwater station in 1839. Previously, Calderwood had been at the Kat River with the Reads, and found himself opposed to the Read's inclination to idealize Khoi achievements and aspirations. Philip and he had also crossed political and ideological swords. His mission outlook was similar to that of Moffat and Calderwood; another "dialectic" missionary in fact. Moffat, Brownlee and Calderwood were the core of their group in Southern Africa. Calderwood left the Caffraria Mission subsequently, and became a successful government agent in the region. Henry Kayser moved into Caffraria in 1827, and Richard Birt, originally at Umxelo, moved to the larger station at Peelton, where he remained until his Jubilee in 1888.

Another factor that inhibited L.M.S. expansion in Caffraria was the tendency for the area to flare up in colonist-Xhosa warfare. After the sixth Kaffir War in 1835, there was some L.M.S. sympathy for the causes of the Xhosa peoples, but subsequent insurrection involved the destruction of a good deal of mission property both at the Kat River and in Caffraria itself. During the War of the Axe, the L.M.S. missionaries in Caffraria had to flee in March, 1846. Brownlee fled to Fort Peddie; the Kaysers to Balfour; the Birts to Somerset and Calderwood to Fort .....

(1) Charles Pacalt Brownlee: Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History and other papers. (University of Natal Press, 1977) and Basil Holt: Greatheart of the Border: A life of John Brownlee (Kingwilliamstown, 1976)



Beaufort. The mission buildings in Kingwilliamstown were, once again, burned down.

The irony of L.M.S. withdrawal was that the profound cultural and social changes of the last hundred years or so on the eastern frontier were now increasing in intensity, and the potential for mission expansion in Caffraria was considerable. The L.M.S. mission agents were aware of the extent and rewards of the area; so, also, were the Methodists. A recent study of Methodist evangelisation in South east Africa has outlined Christian expansion among Nguni in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand.<sup>(1)</sup> The acculturation of Nguni Christians ("Kholwa") inhabiting Methodist mission stations in that region was thorough and relatively rapid. They began to build upright houses, wear European style clothes, worked the plough on the land, and planted crops of maize, cotton, coffee and sugar. This process - as with the Khoi and Griiqua - made the 'Kholwa' very keen on their children's education, and the Methodist missionaries found it impossible to deal with the demand. ("Nothing so clearly distinguished the "Kholwa" from the heathen in South east Africa as their hunger for education").<sup>(2)</sup>

Moreover, this white military and political pressure on the Xhosa was compounded by immigration by groups of Africans, and it was usually the case that such people adopted the "mores" of the dominant - and in this instance, the white-cultural group. In 1835,

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(1) N.A. Etherington: Preacher, Peasants and Politics in South east Africa - 1835-1880. African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand. (1978)

(2) Ibid. p. 128; 131; 133; 178

16,000 Mfengu made formal entry into the Cape, crossing the Kei with D'Urban's permission. The main body entered Gcalekaland, and prospered. They worked on the white farms, invested money in tools and wagons, and became allies of the British; they helped, too, on the imperial side in the frontier conflicts.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sir George Grey's governorship (1854-61) saw an attempt to intensify integration between black and white both in terms of land and culture. Grey wanted the Xhosa to be "a part of ourselves, with a common faith and common interests, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue".<sup>(2)</sup> Such an attempt to institute white-owned farms in the area, as well as encouraging the adoption of white cultural values stimulated the violent response of the Xhosa, in the cattle-killing of April, 1856 to May 1857. This national suicide not only had political significance, but it had cultural overtones as well, for it illustrated to what extent, over their years of contact, Christian and Xhosa cosmology had inter-reacted; not only that, but this syncretism was vital enough for Xhosa protest and frustration to express itself vehemently through it.

Almost 85% of Xhosa men killed all their cattle and destroyed their corn in obedience to Nongqawuse's prophecies. About 400,000 cattle were slaughtered, and 40,000 Xhosa subsequently died of starvation. The resistance of the Xhosa people to 80 years or so of white pressure

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(1) Colin Bundy: African Peasants and Economic Change in South Africa, 1870-1913, with particular reference to the Cape.

(D. Phil, Oxon). p. 487

(2) Quoted in T. R. H. Davenport: South Africa: A Modern History, p. 101

was broken by themselves. Monica Wilson was convinced that: "the symbolism was rooted both in ancient notions of the shades...and in Christian teaching of the Apocalypse". Peires has elaborated further, and attempted to prove that the cattle-slaughter was believed, by the Xhosa participators to be a means of causing regeneration, the re-creation of Creation, as well as the arrival of the Christ-like expected Redeemer, Sifusa-Sibanzi, the Broad-Chested One.<sup>(1)</sup> Xhosa and Christian theology had permeated one another to a remarkable degree; both L.M.S. and Methodist missionaries confirmed the extent to which the population were amenable to Christian evangelism. Formal conversions to the L.M.S. were generous, and school attendance at the Society's schools far outstripped the figures of the Bechuana Mission. Why, therefore, did not the L.M.S. sustain pressure in the Caffraria Mission? Some reasons have already been noted; L.M.S. disillusion with the 'political' mission of the Cape; a growing feeling that the Cape was now "domesticated" enough to look after itself; pressure to expand via Kuruman, and the fact that the Methodists had committed themselves strongly to Caffraria.<sup>(2)</sup> Moreover, the L.M.S. had never targetted their work on colonists, unlike the Methodists who had worked among black and white indiscriminately

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- (1) Monica Wilson: Co-operation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier: (Oxford History of South Africa: volume I 1969) and Journal of African History 28 (1987) J.B. Peires: The Central Beliefs of the Xhosa Cattle-Killing.
- (2) Lovett i. p. 567: "As the Wesleyan Society began to throw so much energy into their Mission work in Kaffraria the London Missionary Society was able to gradually withdraw from the Stations it had occupied there, and concentrate its efforts upon Bechwanaland and Matabeleland"

although not without problems of conscience.

Most of the L.M.S. agents in Caffraria were sure that schools and education to train African pastors, evangelists and teachers should become part of their strategy. Like the Cape and Bechuana Missions, however, the Caffraria Mission had its "dialectic" group who did not give education such primacy. Brownlee was one such. He valued evangelism of a direct and forthright kind, and a personal conversion experience, far more than education. He did support some modest training for a "native agency" but stressed the industrial element in such training. Brownlee did not want to acculture Xhosa trainees to such an extent that they would adopt a European system of values; Xhosa trainees should keep a substantial core of their own culture, even if they had acquired European skills. Also, the provision to train such people should be modest, so that the Africans would not become detribalised: "the thing might be accomplished almost without additional expense...You need not be alarmed that we are proposing anything of the dignified nature of a College. To make young gentlemen of a few Caffre youths selected for the purpose referred to, would be altogether out of the question".<sup>(1)</sup> Brownlee wanted skilled "Cape youths" but not educated, and certainly not Europeanised ones. Mechanical and agricultural training at the Seminary would be helpful, and, in the cultural sense, perfectly harmless. Brownlee expressed the cultural position of the "dialectic" missionaries when he explained that: "education seems only to accompany or rather to follow religious .....

(1) Basil Holt: Op cit. p. 106 (Letter from Blinkwater by Brownlee and others to L.M.S. 12 April 1841.)

feeling; where the parents and children are indifferent to religious instruction every attempt to instruct the latter has in almost every instance been abortive".<sup>(1)</sup> In other words, spiritual regeneration must occur within the personality, before education can be absorbed in a worthwhile way. Spirit had precedence over intellect.

Communications from the Caffrarian agents to London were spasmodic; the Mission was never the object of any policy development, and was considered by the Directorate as a bit of a backwater. Nevertheless, the data that is available shows that it was a Mission with considerable potential for expansion. In 1860, there were nearly 1,000 children in the Knapps Hope and Kingwilliamstown schools. Funds were sparse, so money was raised locally.<sup>(2)</sup> However, a lack of training facilities for African teachers meant that these educational opportunities could never be seized. For example, in 1862 since there was no teacher in the Kingwilliamstown school, only half of the £105 grant was used. Kayser was a supporter of mission schools, and it was inevitable that his overall view on their provision in the Caffraria Mission was depressing. Kayser thought it was the job of education "to enlighten and civilize" - a comment Brownlee would never have made - and this should particularly be the case in Kingwilliamstown, the "capital" of Caffraria. However, the poor school facilities there was making it "the most backward of the Mission Stations". Kayser was annoyed at Brownlee's statement that parents should educate their own children

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(1) Basil Holt: ibid, p. 111 and 18/2/A Brownlee to Ellis

Kingwilliamtown, 6 August, 1841

(2) 32/1/D. Henry Kayser to L.M.S. Kingwilliamstown, 11 June 1860

and only send them to "Sabbath School"; Kayser argued that, on the contrary, the whole of Caffraria was crying out for schools and some parents were even moving to areas where their children could have better educational opportunities.<sup>(1)</sup>

The ... acculturation and urbanisation proceeding steadily in Caffraria was noted by the Society's agents there. In 1860, a letter outlining the need for education to cope with such social changes was sent to the L.M.S. Directorate by all the missionaries, except Brownlee, who, obviously, must have thought that their analysis was incorrect.<sup>(2)</sup> The letter noted the great movement of people from the Kraals to the towns, and how money was needed to instruct such people..."the civilized and Christian portion of the people are very desirous of obtaining education for their children" The "heathen" children needed education as well. Most significantly, education had social value, for the employment prospects for trained youths - as teachers, in commerce or government service - in the area were considerable. Brockway was training young Africans in Peelton, but more money was needed from the Society to put education on a sound base. This analysis concluded practically by requesting £150 p.a. for five years which would help, among other things, to fix African teachers salaries at £24.p.a. "The Kafir Mission", the letter concluded, "was never so full of promise as now...if the youths are not educated our churches will be long ere they become self-supporting". But this promise was to remain unfulfilled, and the L.M.S. saw its strategic

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(1) 32/3/C Henry Kayser to L.M.S. Kingwilliamstown, 17 March, 1862

(2) 32/1/C Birt, Kayser, Brockway, Kayser Senior to L.M.S.

Peelton, 22 May, 1860

future northwards, out of the Cape.

Birt, like his colleague Kayser, made education the core of his evangelisation policy. When he wrote to the L.M.S. in November, 1844, for a schoolmaster he defended his priorities by explaining why he placed such emphasis on this choice: "I would like to welcome him who would count it a privilege to do anything to help forward the Kingdom of Christ..who is thoroughly impressed with the fact that education must be the main instrument, in connection with the Gospel, for the raising of His people".<sup>(1)</sup> Birt was convinced that the people of Caffraria wanted to be educated because they were urbanized and bored. Birt's work in schools effectively commenced after the destruction of the Peelton Station in 1850, and the return there in 1853 of about 400 refugees. Brockway became eventually the Peelton schoolmaster and the school prospered under him. Later, the Rev. W. Rubusana became the schoolmaster, and he had considerable success in sending students to Lovedale.<sup>(2)</sup>

Like the true "dialogic" missionary that he was, Birt saw education as the main way of advance in Caffraria: "the more substantive Christian work which will stand and prove lasting is that where the educational department is aided, as well as the preaching". The tragedy was the lack of resources and effort to reap the harvest that was clearly there; in 1873, he noted that the average attendance at the Peelton School

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(1) 20/3/B R. Birt to L.M.S. Umxelo, 14 November, 1844

(2) Charles Pacalt Brownlee: Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History and other papers. (University of Natal Press: 1977; facsimile of 1916 edition). p. 365 and following.

was 75, whereas there were - on his estimate - 78,000 people in the locality who were as yet untouched by the Society's missionaries or teachers.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Society made a small start in girls' residential education. Notices about such provision were publicized in 1842, and Birt thought a Girls' Boarding School would provide valuable service. The boarding element would enable the teachers to concentrate their efforts on education and evangelisation, for the girls would be detached from their own culture yet guarded from undesirable outside influence.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Peelson Girls' School was revitalized and re-opened by a Miss Sturrock, and £400 was needed to repair the building and extend it to accommodate 40 girls. Miss Sturrock was a poor administrator, eccentric and allegedly 'intemperate'. The school, nevertheless, came directly under her control, not under the District Committee of the Caffraria Mission as was usually the case. Consequently, conflict arose between Birt and Miss Sturrock. The £500 granted to Miss Sturrock was spent on schoolrooms not on boarding facilities for the girls. Her other financial disbursements were equally extravagant, and intensified personal animosities within the Caffraria Mission.<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) 37/2/D Birt to Whitehouse, Peelson, 27 October, 1873

(2) 18/3/B Birt to L.M.S. Umxelo, 16 March, 1842

(3) 39/2/A Birt to L.M.S. Peelson, 26 March, 1877 and

39/2/C Birt to L.M.S. Peelson, 7 August 1877



The failure of the Hankey Seminary was understandable, for it was academically overambitious and directed towards a population that was too poorly educated to benefit from it. Moreover, the constant military tensions in the area did not help matters. A more practical industrial curriculum would have been more relevant and given the Institution a better chance of success. The case of the Caffraria Mission was different, for here was a region of considerable missionary potential, in the throes of cultural change; all evidence shows the L.M.S. would have prospered if it had committed more resources to the area. The "dialogic" group - missionaries such as Birt and Kayser - saw this to be the case, and clamoured for more schools. But a strategic decision had been taken at a higher level and never rescinded; the Caffraria Mission was deprived of resources, money and personnel and condemned, for virtually all its existence, to minor status.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE BECHUANA MISSION

1. Moffat at Kuruman
2. John Mackenzie and "humanitarian imperialism"

"The people (the Bechuana) have become settled; - they have been raised in civilization and intelligence, as a consequence of the religious teaching of your missionaries. They are...more than half-civilized. They have the feelings and aspiration of civilized Christian men".

Sir Bartle Frere to L.M.S. June 13, 1879

1. Moffat at Kuruman

The Society's expansion northwards from its Cape base not only altered the geographical emphasis of the mission, but its strategic one as well. The Cape mission had involved the L.M.S. in political and ideological conflicts for which it was not prepared, and did not like; John Philip had thrown all the Society's might - or as much as he could muster - in defence of Khoisan legal and political rights in a 'settler' community that had resisted such activity. The result, for the Society, had been a high political profile, and public opprobrium in the Cape and Britain. Basically, the L.M.S. Directorate did not consider this to be the main purpose of an evangelical missionary Society, and there are indisputable signs of their gradual loss of confidence in the main cultural thrust of Philipine policy. It was inevitable that Robert Moffat's mission further north became the geographical and theological centre for the Society's extension in Southern Africa.

There were other reasons why the Bechuana mission was the mission of the future. Robert Moffat's conception of evangelization was apolitical and spiritual; his suspicion of African culture was matched with an evangelical zeal that wanted Christian conversion to lead his converts to follow a simple farming life. The Kuruman farms in the remote north, Moffat's own considerable charisma and publications, presented to the world a mission that the Directors found far more palatable than the aggressive politicking of the Cape. Strategically, too, a better case could be made for expansion into the "dark interior" rather than spending more time and money in working in a developed Cape.

Who were the people into whose lives the L.M.S. came? The southern Tswana lived in the early nineteenth century in what is today the northern Cape Province of South Africa, bordered by the southern Kalahari and the Orange and Vaal rivers. (1) This dry region is traversed by the Ghaap limestone plateau (4,000 - 4,5000 feet above sea level) which generated many springs, especially the "Eye of Kuruman", which the L.M.S. eventually controlled. During the early period of the Southern Tswana's confrontation with the Society they were hunter/pastoralists, and bred cattle for subsistence and social reasons. They subsisted chiefly on game, milk, goat and sheep meat, "veldkos" (wild foodstuffs), and sorghum, pumpkin and beans. Southern Tswana households were organised into family groups, which were the social bases of the wards; the wards were autonomous, but were formed either into villages or centralized towns. Consequently, all chiefly power was based on a firm, active democratic structure, and mutual consultation was basic to the whole Southern Tswana political process. In the 1800's, southern towns could be sizeable (there were 15,000 people centred in Dithakong), and there is reason to believe these towns formed a 'confederation' of Tlhaping, Rolong and Tlharo peoples, which grew weaker as white commerce and culture penetrated the region.

"Mephato" (or age-regiments) cut across such a structure and strengthened chiefly power, but the main cultural problem the L.M.S. confronted were the post-adolescent initiation ceremonies - "bogwera" (for boys) and "bojale" (for girls). Such activities emptied the Society's schools at certain times of the year and were taken by most

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
(1) Kevin Shillington, The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana: 1870-1900 (1985) Braamfontein, South Africa), p. 4 onwards.

mission agents - certainly by Robert Moffat - as a mark of the strength of indigenous heathenism. Revival of such practices as the century advanced were usually a sign of Tswana cultural revivalism and support of chiefly power. It was only David Livingstone who saw the value of these "rites of passage", but his defence of them to the L.M.S. Directorate was not appreciated.

During this early period of the nineteenth century, arable production by the southern Tswana was erratic, and was not essential for their survival. In fact, Moffat's farms at Kuruman were deliberately aimed to undermine the traditional pastoral, collective nature of southern Tswana agriculture in order to produce the missionaries ideal of independent, small-scale farmers. The Society's opposition to cattle-rearing among all the Tswana peoples, persisted all through the century. There are many agents' letters extant welcoming rinderpest, the cattle disease whose visitation killed hundreds of thousands of beasts. Moffat's attack on cattle-rearing was strengthened by the introduction of firearms, which destroyed game, and made arable farming increasingly necessary.

The cattle in Southern Tswana society were owned by the wealthy who compounded their wealth by engaging in trade; mainly beads and "sibilo" (a cosmetic ore), and later ivory and arms. Poor grazing and the social effects of the 'difaqane' accelerated population drift, and Moffat's Kuruman suffered seriously from depopulation.

The earliest white contact with the Southern Tswana had been made by the explorers Truter and Somerville, who visited Molehabangwe, Son of Mothibi, at Dithakong ('old Lattakoo') in 1801.



A TLHAPING NAMED CHAASE. (FROM BURCHELL'S ORIGINAL WATERCOLOUR)

The Tlhaping ('Bachapin' or 'Fish People'), the southernmost tribe of the Tswana, were visited by Lichenstein<sup>t</sup> in 1805, and Burchell in 1812, although the Dithakong he visited had been re-built since Lichenstein's visit. On June 24, 1813, the Rev. John Campbell, an itinerating senior agent of the Society, entered Dithakong, and met Mothibi a few weeks later. Mothibi was not welcoming, mainly because he saw the L.M.S. intrusion as an expansion of Griquatown influence, as well as an attempt to change Tlhaping life. On February 11, 1816, Evans and Hamilton, L.M.S. agents, entered Dithakong, and yet again Mothibi was reluctant to allow the missionaries to evangelise, so they returned to their Griquatown base. However, later in the year a permanent mission was established there by James Read and Hamilton, who worked there together until July, 1820, when Read was removed during Campbell's second visit there with Robert Moffat.<sup>(1)</sup> The reason for Read's removal was ostensibly his unacceptable behaviour with Hamilton's wife, and Read's previous behaviour would support such a supposition. Nevertheless, Read's whole evangelising style - "brotherly" and egalitarian - would have upset the more formal Moffat; Read's association with van der Kemp at Bethelsdorp was another reason why Moffat wanted his influence at Kuruman quickly terminated. John Philip, who appreciated Read's work at Bethelsdorp and later at the Kat River Settlement, was convinced that the Dithakong station had gone to the bad. Ebner, another Society agent, had engaged in trade, whilst Albrecht, a Read supporter, had mismanaged the finances. Worse

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(1) Peter Becker; The Pathfinders, pp. 120-168 and

Isaac Schapera: 'Apprenticeship at Kuruman': Introduction.

than this tale of mismanagement, was the fact that Read's relaxed mission style was not the most effective style in a community that had experienced little contact with whites, and had its own strong cultural traditions. (1)

Hamilton was alone at Dithakong until May, 1821, when Robert Moffat arrived upon the scene once again. Campbell and Philip were both convinced that the talented Moffat's future should be devoted to the Tlhaping of Chief Mothibi, and indeed, from then onwards, their destiny and Moffat's became intertwined. James Read had encouraged Mothibi to remove his town of Dithakong ('old Lattakoo') to 'new Lattakoo' in June, 1817, which became known as Kuruman. This removal was located at Maruping, ten miles east of the present Kuruman. In 1825, Moffat persuaded Mothibi on another removal to its present site at Seoding, seven miles from Maruping, and three from Kuruman. It was this site that Moffat developed into his famous agricultural centre. (2)


Moffat's first years at Kuruman were difficult. The 'difaqane'

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(1) Philip Papers: ff 1-268. Philip to Burder, September 28, 1819

(2) "Lattakoo" was the anglicization of "dithako" (Dithakong) which meant "at the stone walls" or "at the town". (A. Sillery: The Bechuanaland Protectorate, p. 8). Principal Tlhaping centres that are of present concern are: Dithakong (pre- 1802 under Molehabangwe); Kuruman 'Eye' (1802-6); Dithakong (1806-17, under Mothibi after 1812); Maruping (1817-25, Mothibi); Koning (Mothibi's town in 1825); Kuruman (Mothibi 1825); Dithakong (Mahura's town; 1825-1839); Taung (from 1839) - K. Shillington: Op. Cit: p. 15)





LAFKOO, THE TUHAPING CAPITAL IN 1811-1812 (FROM A BURCHELL ORIGINAL)

made itself felt by turning the southern Sotho horde (called by contemporaries the "Mantatees") on the Tlhaping and Tlharo, so that the Griquas came north to help defeat these invaders in the 1823 Battle of Dithakong. This help, although welcome to Moffat, was embarrassing, too, for Moffat was jealous of Griquatown's pre-eminence in the region, and disliked any spread of their influence further north. More trouble broke out for Moffat in 1827 and 1828, when the "Bergenaer Griquas" - out-and-out "bandits" - turned on their erstwhile Tswana friends and plundered the locality. Beyond their northern borders, the settling of Mzilikazi's militaristic Ndebele gave everybody an unpleasant fright.

What was the nature of Moffat's mission at Kuruman? Here, Moffat set up his arable farms, and thereby challenged, in a powerful and insidious way, Tswana pastoral agricultural traditions. As Moffat described it..."In removing to our present station the interests of the Bechuanas has been carefully studied, as well as that of the Mission, and it has been remarked by competent judges....that we have been most successful in our choice of the situation...The ground... has been divided into three lots for missionaries and nine for men who may be employed in the service of the Mission". Most significantly, Moffat added that "civilization...must originate and depend on the culture of the ground".<sup>(1)</sup> Arable farms and gardens were to be the basis of his mission; his training as a gardener and talents in irrigation and general husbandry produced by 1834 in Kuruman 500 acres of farmland and missionary gardens that produced abundant

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(1) Isaac Schapera: Apprenticeship at Kuruman, p. 188

vegetables and cereals, supported 700 sheep and goats, 1,500 cattle and sustained over 727 workers and family members, The significance of this settlement was not ignored by the L.M.S. for from its earliest days Moffat was allowed to communicate directly with the L.M.S. Directors, only sending copies of such letters to Philip.

The nature of Moffat's Kuruman settlement confirmed his own "dialectic" convictions, namely that Tswana traditions were worthless and had to be disregarded. His mission ideal was a static community of converts, freed from chiefly control, whose agriculture was based on the plough and the garden, thus encouraging individualism, the nuclear family, and allowing Christian missionaries the maximum access to educate and evangelise. This arable alternative proposed by Moffat was a "preserver" one and deliberately ignored the inevitable commercial and economic changes that were affecting Southern Africa and which Philip in the Cape and Livingstone on a broader scale, saw as Africa's salvation. After 1850, Tswana agriculture did adopt a more arable pattern - assisted by firearms exterminating game - but over a longer period migrant labour, to the mines and white farms, and general trade were changing the social structure. In a few decades, Kuruman was to become a religious and cultural backwater.

Contemporary missionary opinion, egged on by L.M.S. publicity, saw Kuruman as a missionary rural idyll, but this representation is to a large extent cosmetic, as its impact was considerably less than that claimed for it. One reason for the mission's lack of success has already been discussed - Moffat's insistence on a static community based on arable farming and this being subsequently overtaken by rapid economic change. There were others. Moffat was unable to

break the structure of Tswana tribal conservation. The flexible structure of Tswana society was able to absorb with varying success, external cultural challenges. Even the conflicts generated by the impact of mercantile and mining capitalism were not all simple victories for the whites. As Dachs has noted, Sotho-Tswana authority coped well with mission, trade and British-Afrikaner nationalism.<sup>(1)</sup> And when change eventually became inevitable, a shrewd political manipulator, like Chief Khama of the Ngwato, saw that his own authority was incorporated in the new Christian-capitalist policy coming into being. As we shall see when we look at school statistics in Moffat's mission, Dach's assertion that Tswana resistance to Christian evangelisation was considerable, is substantiated. Another reason for Moffat failing to expand significantly at Kuruman is the depopulation that occurred there. Kuruman ceased to be the home of the Tlhaping in 1825, and the population decreased from about 8,000 to two or three hundred in 1832, most of these being composed of different sections of the Sotho-Tswana, Kgalagadi, Ndebele and Southern Sotho. There is contemporary evidence to support such an opinion.

Moffat himself noted that the majority of the inquirers at his evening classes were "strangers" dependent on his gardens, and not the more affluent who lived off their flocks.<sup>(2)</sup> These people, he continued, were industrious, but poor...the "Batlaping, Batharo, Barolong, Bashuto, Bakwena, Bakalahari, and Matabele". There were vagrant

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(1) Anthony Dachs: Missionary History - A Conflict of Interpretation (Southern African Research in Progress: Collected Papers 2: Centre for Southern African Studies)

(2) K. Moffat to his father: February 18, 1928, Lattakoo (John S. Moffat: Lives of Robert and Mary Moffat, p. 136)

groups, victims of the 'difaqane' and rural poverty and, as such, ripe for conversion. Nevertheless, they were poor prospects on which to build an expanding Mission. As Christian converts they would either wander off or have insufficient social status to attract further converts. Mary Moffat, too, noted the presence of these 'devout strangers'... "among the poor persons (chiefly strangers) who live in the mission ground, there are some pleasing indications... they are quite regular in their attendance on the means of grace".<sup>(1)</sup> Their son, John Smith Moffat, noted this fact, too, and was detached enough from the situation to assess the significance of vagrants from other tribes upon his father's Mission. There was "a mixed community of refugees from the interior tribes" at his father's station and they "were drawn...by feelings which gave them a disposition open to missionary influence".<sup>(2)</sup> John Smith Moffat assessed that a group of people displaced and emotionally distraught would generate feelings at religious gatherings as they sought solace and comfort in sympathetic surroundings. He was right and there was a "marvellous awakening" in 1829 but such a revival did not communicate itself to anybody outside the Mission. The Mission never fulfilled the promise to L.M.S. or Robert Moffat anticipated; in 1856, the Kuruman patriarch wrote to his son... "it is a time of ebb with us, and has been for some time past".<sup>(3)</sup>

The early history of the schools in the L.M.S. Kuruman district

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- (1) Philip Papers: ff 458-459 Mary Moffat to Mrs Wingley, December 18th, 1828
  - (2) John S. Moffat: The Lives of Robert and Mary Moffat, p. 145
  - (3) Ibidem, p. 300

reflected the weakness inherent in Moffat's mission. The schools not only had to cope with a migrant population, but their curriculum was literary-religious in the main, which the Southern Tswana farming population had no reason to adopt. Moreover, the traditional rights of "bogwera" and "bojale" would empty the schools for significant periods, making teaching difficult. John Campbell's early estimation that the Southern Tswana were ripe for education failed to take into consideration Tswana conservatism and the difficulty of providing a more palatable curriculum.<sup>(1)</sup> Moffat saw Tswana resistance to mission education in much more simplistic terms. He denied that they had any religion themselves, ("Their religious system, like those streams in the wilderness, which lose themselves in the sand, had entirely disappeared") and was convinced "the circumcisions" were the work of the Devil, as was their educational intransigence.<sup>(2)</sup>

Attendance at the Kuruman school in 1820 was about 20, and the evening school was active as well, "'til the circumcisions began, when I lost all my scholars". Even bribes of beads and buttons were unsuccessful in boosting attendances.<sup>(3)</sup> By 1825, there had been little improvement in attendances at the Kuruman school..."23 attend, composed of Bechuanas, Hottentots, two Bushmen and two Mantatees. They are all taught English, excepting five..."<sup>(4)</sup> The next year

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(1) 8/3/A John Campbell; north east and west of New Lattakoo,  
July 9, 1821

(2) Robert Moffat: Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa, p. 244

(3) 8/2/B. Hughes? Lattakoo, July 12, 1820

(4) I. Schapera: Apprenticeship at Kuruman, Journal, March - November,  
1825, p. 191

showed a similarly poor record, but Moffat's response to such lack of response was the one that "Satan still maintains his throne in the heart of the natives", and that the local people were too concerned about guns and horses. (1)

The Kuruman school was taken over by Rogers Edwards, an artisan missionary, who later came into personal and professional conflict with Livingstone. Rogers Edwards was a missionary disciple of Moffat and he viewed schools as providing a basic literacy for the Tswana children so that they could then read the Bible. Schools were not seen by either Edwards or Moffat as a means of intellectual enlightenment, and both placed religious conversion far ahead in importance. "Parents", wrote Edwards, "care nothing about education...til they feel the value of their own souls". The comment of a true "dialectic" missionary. Edwards obtained slates and arithmetic lessons for the Kuruman school, but found it impossible to implement the "British system of education" which was based on the monitorial system. Such a system would have demanded quite a structured method of lesson preparation, as well as instructing school monitors; Edwards was not competent to perform such tasks, and was not interested in doing it, anyhow. As with most mission schools, instruction took place in the Church, for which a £10 p.a. rent was paid. The core of Edwards' school curriculum was limited to learning to read the Bible; writing and arithmetic were only touched upon, for "they do not value arithmetic and writing and make no use of them when they leave school and soon forget all except .....

(1) Ibid., R. Moffat to Mr and Mrs Moffat, snr. Lattakoo, February 6, 1827.

reading". (1) Edwards' response to the southern Tswana neglect of education was stoic. The L.M.S., he defensively argued, could not object to people "labouring for bread" and the children would take what they needed from school in their own good time. (2) In defending this lack of educational advance, Edwards was defending as well the poor rate of expansion of the whole Bechuana Mission; he took refuge in the bland hope that the Tswana would see the error of their heathen ways, become Christian, then welcome a simple literacy for their children. (3)

The most perceptive of Moffat's critics was his son-in-law, David Livingstone. Livingstone, with other mission supporters and administrators, never doubted Moffat's sincere commitment, but he viewed the Bechuana Mission's slow progress with concern. His own restless, radical personality had been attracted by John Philip's theology and a total cultural and political mission; this, combined with his disapproval of Moffat's costive evangelicalism, and his personal experiences of setting up mission stations in the surrounding county, began to make him doubt the effectiveness of orthodox mission work.

Livingstone arrived in Kuruman in 1841 and stayed there until 1843. At Kuruman, there was a congregation of 350 souls, but under Moffat's strict ecclesiastical discipline, there were only 40 regular communicants. This was after 20 years of hard work, during which Moffat learned Sichuana, translated, built, farmed and travelled with exemplary energy.

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(1) Rogers Edwards from Lattakoo/Kuruman, 14/5/D; 14/2/F; 15/2/D  
May - July, 1835-1836

(2) H/3/D Rogers Edwards and P. Hamilton, Kuruman, September 12, 1840

(3) 18/3/A; 22/1/A July, 1842 - November, 1846



The constant thread which ran through Livingstone's mission thoughts was the value and transforming power of education. We have already seen (page 109 of this study) Livingstone's pleasure at the way in which Tswana children and parents were changed by intellectual stimulation and he like the other "dialogic" missionaries, worked for the ideal of "hearts imbued with poetry" and "minds capable of being stored with knowledge". Livingstone considered spiritual regeneration as part of a process that involved intellectual enlightenment; his mission career showed the stress he place on schools, and attempts to found a "native agency" and thereby educate older students.

Livingstone made three attempts - after his initial stay at Kuruman - to found his own mission; with the Bakgatla at Mabotsa (1844-5); the BaKwena at Chonwane (1845-7), and again with the Bakwena at Koloberg (1847-1851). At Mabotsa, Rogers Edwards who was his co-missionary there, finished a small but substantial school. "On its completion the native assistant Mebaloe and I commenced the instruction of the children, and though we found them exceedingly shy at first we by degrees overcame their fears".<sup>(1)</sup> Attendance at the school was irregular, and varied between fifty and five. Mabotsa showed the other side of Livingstone's personality - the half-hidden wish for glory and fame. In writing up his Mabotsa experiences, Livingstone chose to ignore the contribution Rogers Edwards had made to the enterprise. Rogers Edwards objected to such treatment, and Livingstone

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(1) I. Schapera: Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence,  
D.L. to Arthur Tidman, Mabotsa, December 2, 1844, p. 60.

attempted to confuse the issue by accusing Edwards and his wife of not attending to him properly after his near-fatal encounter with the lion. Already, Livingstone's impatience with the formal restrictions of mission regulations and colleagues was gathering momentum, until he broke away as missionary explorer and adventurer, to "itinerate".

At Chonuane, a school was the first thing that they built, "50 feet by 20 feet". This was finished in less than two months and Livingstone "set systematic instruction fairly under operation under Paul and his son Isaac".<sup>(1)</sup> In his third settlement at Koloberg, his appreciation of education matured further. "While still engaged in cutting wood for a temporary dwelling, the chief, without a single suggestion from us, intimated his intention to erect the school". There were many individuals who were ready to learn to read and write, and his letters contain analyses of the learning problems these 'Bakwains' encountered.... "they seem to experience considerable difficulty in the mental effort required to join letters into words... they remark, if I should give them medicine which would enable them to conquer the difficulty, they would gladly drink it". The chief Seehele particularly impressed Livingstone, and the missionary had to explain exhaustively sections of the Moffat translation of the New Testament to him. (2)

Reflecting on his own problems at Mabotsa, Chonuane and Koloberg and Moffat's slow progress, Livingstone began to appreciate the many

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(1) Ibid., D.L. to Arthur Tidman, Kuruman, March 17, 1847, p. 96

(2) Ibid., D.L. to Tidman, December 30, 1847, Koloberg, p. 111-112

obstacles to the expansion of the Gospel. He valued Tswana cultural institutions, but came to see that tribalism, as an entity, would always frustrate progress, apart from the occasional individual conversion. Environmental pressures, too, - drought, crop failure - restricted mission work. (1)

Philip, Livingstone's argument went, was correct after all. If cultural and environmental limitations prevented the spread of the Gospel, such restrictions would have to be removed. The "gentle" way forward would be that of trade and commerce, which would dissolve conservative African tribalism. What would be the precise advantages of commerce in Africa? It would knit together African society in trans-tribal bonds..."the promotion of commerce ought to be specially attended to, as this, more speedily than anything else, demolishes the sense of isolation which heathenism engenders, and makes the tribes feel mutually dependent on, and mutually beneficial to, each other"; the slave-trade would be abolished (an aim which became more and more the crux of Livingstone's ethical thinking) and Africa would be flung open to world influences... "my own observations on this subject make me extremely desirous to promote the preparation of the raw materials of European manufacturers in Africa, for by that means we may not only put a stop to the slave-trade, but introduce the negro family into the body corporate of nations, no one member of which can suffer without the others suffering with it". (2)

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(1) Ibid., D.L. to Tidman, Koloberg, May 26, 1849, p. 127 and  
D.L. to Thompson, Kuruman, September 30, 1852, p. 221

(2) David Livingstone, Travels and Researches in South Africa (1857)  
(Harmsworth reprint, 1905, pp. 19-20)

Inevitably, Livingstone supported the idea of the "pax Britannica" and an Empire which would supervise, justly and humanely, such a cultural metamorphosis; above all, an Empire which would defend all its subjects "civil rights".<sup>(1)</sup> On this issue, Livingstone went further than Philip and supported, in defiance of the L.M.S. agent, Calderwood, the Khoi in the 1850-52 War, writing a series of unpublished articles for the British Quarterly in which he put the Khoi-Xhosa case, arguing that fighting to defend homes and families was a sign of humanity.<sup>(2)</sup>

Tidman, the foreign secretary of the L.M.S. wanted Livingstone to advocate "higher" education in the Bechuana Mission, as it was only by educating and training Africans that the Mission could perpetuate itself. "From the increasing importance of Native Agency" he wrote to Livingstone in 1845 "it was discouraging to learn that not a single appointment could be made in the Bechuana County, even when the funds were offered for the purpose.,.we trust you will make a point of bringing it, at an early period, under the special notice of the brethren".<sup>(3)</sup> Tidman short-circuited the official channels of the Mission because he doubted Moffat's enthusiasm for education, and because he placed great faith in Livingstone's intelligence and

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- (1) John Philip, Missionary Researches: Introduction, p. XXVI
- (2) A. Ross, John Philip and David Livingstone: Critics of Imperialism, (Southern African Research in Progress: Collected Papers 2, University of York, 1975)
- (3) Isaac Schapera, Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence: Tidman to Livingstone, December 3, 1845 p. 85 and Tidman to Livingstone, January 29, 1843, p. 29

drive. The reaction of the other members of the Bechuana District Committee was predictably sharp. Moffat himself, Hughes, Inglis and Solomon accused Livingstone of raising the matter of the native agency merely because "he wished to appear well with the Directors". Livingstone "felt a pang" at this rebuff, and knew that a young novice pushing a cause such as education in such seasoned company was not going to do the cause or the proposer much good.<sup>(1)</sup> The gossip clearly put Livingstone in the wrong, and Mrs Philip wrote to her husband saying that L.M.S. support for Livingstone was pointless, as there was nobody suitable to train anyhow.<sup>(2)</sup>

It was this worrying deficiency that Tidman wanted redressed. He wrote again to Livingstone in 1847 to support Livingstone in his stance in favour of a "Native Institution", adding that Ashton, a senior colleague of Moffat's, had been appointed to recruit and train suitable candidates. Nothing came of this either; elementary education was poor, converts few, and suitable candidates for either Ashton or anyone else, did not come forward.<sup>(3)</sup>

Livingstone's Kuruman apprenticeship was relatively brief, but his approach was one that was marked by a respect for African culture, yet at the same time support for commercial forces and

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(1) Ibid., Livingstone to Tidman. Kuruman, 17 March, 1847, p. 100

(2) Philip Papers, ff 1317-1607. Mrs Philip to Dr Philip, Cape Town, April 18, 1845

(3) I. Schapera, Livingstone's Missionary Correspondence, Tidman to Livingstone, London. September 6, 1847

humanitarianism imperialism that would change completely the indigenous social structure. Education had to be encouraged, too, so that the processes of change should be properly directed. Livingstone was the Mission's historical link between the Philippine strategy, and that to be subsequently advocated in the Bechuana mission by Mackenzie and W.C. Willoughby.

It is convenient at this point to follow the history of the Kuruman and District schools to the end of the century. In 1880, a ten-year report on them was made. There had been expansion, but the general educational level was sickly. Basic faults were poor organisation, no training of African teachers, lack of funds and bad salaries. The whole educational mass grew separately like a poorly fermented dough. There were main schools attached to the missions at Morokweng, Ganyesa, Meiping, Batlaros and Maruping to the north and north-west of Kuruman; at Danielskuil, Tlose, Hamohera, Dibeng and Langbeng on the south and west of the town; at Lanshwe, Langwe and Manyiding on the east. The teacher at Kuruman school earned £12 a year, and the others much less. All the teachers in the Kuruman Missionary District had to earn extra to supplement their income.

For statistical purposes it must be remembered that the main mission schools noted above were supplemented by smaller village schools. These are not often mentioned, and it is obvious attendance at them was spasmodic, the general level of instruction low, and the teaching basic. For example, at Likhatlong (or Digkatlong) there were seven such village schools in addition to the main central one. In 1860, all these Likhatlong schools combined, had 330 scholars on their books, with three native teachers and four school masters.<sup>(1)</sup>  
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(1) 32/1/A W. Ross. Likhatlong, October 19, 1860

Probably other mission stations in the Kuruman District did not have so many village schools, for Likhatlong, was a successful mission station. It had flourished for a decade previously to this, and its agent Helmore, who died tragically with most of his family as he attempted to establish the Makololo Mission, conducted it excellently. Leyland, a secular, independent observer, was impressed on his visit there both with the numbers attending divine service and their obvious spirituality.<sup>(1)</sup> If we average 200 children for each of the fourteen centres, the Kuruman and District schools in 1860 educated, at a low level, about 2,800 children.

Bechuana missionaries like Hepburn and Mackenzie thought the Kuruman work would be a useful springboard to greater efforts further north. Other observers - more down to earth - saw serious flaws in the Mission's schools, and the overall pattern of recruitment, standards, lack of training tends to confirm that opinion. John Smith Moffat, Robert Moffat's son, thought the Mission's schools were poor, and the Institution - to be discussed later - doomed to failure, as the standard of education of its few recruits was low.<sup>(2)</sup> Brown, a missionary colleague, agreed with J.S. Moffat's estimate, and considered the lack of constant supervision of village schools as a crucial weakness. By the end of the century, the level of education

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(1) J. Leyland, *Adventures in the Far Interior of South Africa:*

(1846, 1972, Cape Town reprint, p. 224

(2) 38/3/C Moffat to Mullens, Kuruman, September 7, 1876

(3) 50/1/D Brown to L.M.S. Kuruman, May 13, 1893

56/3/B Richardson's Inspection of Bechuana Schools, 25 Sept, 1899, Vryburg

(Those who passed simple tests in appropriate subjects)

<u>School</u>	<u>Roll</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Arithmetic</u>	<u>Dictation</u>
Motito	56	41	14	1	0
Kuruman	52	50	18	17	16
Batlaros	44	50	33	7	6
Maruping	12	10	2	1	3
Likhathong	30	27	22	4	1
Barkly West	42	24	25	7	10
Taung	200	108	25	5	5



among these schools continued at a poor level, and even a sympathetic inspection could not hide deficiencies of teacher quality and poor, often non-existent resources: (1)

Motito: There were 56 children on the roll, and there were present, on inspection, 28 girls and 13 boys. 7 could read the New Testament and 7 others knew the alphabet. There was no attempt made to teach Grammar, English or Geography. The teacher was poor.

Kuruman: There were 26 girls present and 24 boys. The general level of education, like the teacher was poor.

Batlaros: There were 30 girls and 20 boys in attendance. 7 read the New Testament, and 19 knew the alphabet. The teacher was better.

Maruping: There were 7 girls and 3 boys in attendance. Two read the New Testament

Barkly West: 25 children in attendance and only a few Tswana

Likhatlong (Dikgatlong); 21 girls and 6 boys in attendance.


A poor level of teaching and learning.

Taung: 4 do the alphabet, 7 do syllables. Most do simple sums.

Richardson's comment was that the missionaries were battering against popular inertia and irregular attendance. J. Tom Brown, one of the L.M.S. missionaries agreed with this, and added sickness

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(1) 56/3/B. Rev. James Richardson. Report on Chief Schools of Bechuanaland. Vryburg, September 25, 1899



• MOROKWENG (S)

MOTITO

GHAAP ESCARPMENT

• BATLARS (S)  
• MARUPING (S)  
• KURUMAN (S)

• NAMUSA

• TRUNG (S)

• TLOSE (S)

HAARTS RIVER

• DANIELSKUIL (S)

• LIKHATLONG (S)

• BARKLY WEST (S)

SEVRIE RIVER

CAMPBELL

• KIMBERLEY

• GRIQUOTOWN

ORANGE RIVER

KURUMAN MISSIONARY DISTRICT  
FROM 40/4/A . TEN YEAR  
REVIEW. 1890.

AND OVER 1,200 metres = ≡

AND OVER 1,500 metres = ▩

(S) = SCHOOLS ATTACHED.

50 MILES  
4 KM

and poor harvests as other factors in preventing better schooling. Brown's general opinion was that the whole system had more or less ground to a halt, and the Society's "education is at a standstill in most of the towns".<sup>(1)</sup> The Society attempted to galvanize itself into action, and in 1892 the Bechuana District Committee passed a resolution to pay 'native teachers' in out-stations £24.p.a., and to place a European teacher in the main Mission Station, with the added task of inspecting and helping these out-station teachers.<sup>(2)</sup>

Why did this poor situation exist? A prime factor was the indifferent organisation of the L.M.S. in the mission field. Democratically, the District Committee functioned well; Sometimes, too well; argument and invective resulted from the free expression of opinions. But each missionary was responsible for the organisation of his own Station and surrounding area, and any incompetence was difficult to correct. Also an agreed policy, whether on schools or anything else, was difficult to implement. Charismatic personalities like Philip, Moffat and Livingstone gave leadership and inspiration, but this was no substitute for an effective bureaucracy. An added problem in the Bechuana Mission was the fact, that, from the start, education had not been made a critical target. Robert Moffat and Roger Edwards had built and supported schools, but the curriculum had been a basic Bible literacy-test that was low-key and stultifying. When it became clear that the Mission was not expanding, education was

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(1) 56/2/A. J. Tom Brown to L.M.S. Kuruman, June 16, 1899

(2) 54/2/A Bechuana and Matebeleland District Committee.  
Mafeking, 24-26 August, 1892.

singled out as a potential stimulant to growth, so the Moffat Institution for "higher" education was founded. There was, consequently, an ill-advised jump in educational standards, and the candidates who came forward were of poor quality. As well as this, the Moffat Institution spent most of its existence producing preachers not teachers, and these were of far less immediate value.

The Southern Tswana, unlike the Khoi, Griqua and Xhosa peoples did not see education as a means of social and cultural progression. They were dependent on poor harvests and working for white employers outside the reserves. Even before the rinderpest epidemic of 1896, the Tlhaping economy was not viable, unless they could earn outside their reserves. Two areas of strong L.M.S. influence at this period were Taung and Kuruman. The Taung reserve had plenty of land under cultivation; a decade of good rainfall and money sent back from the diamond mines - but the prosperity was fragile. 1887 saw the loss of 800 cattle and there was a lack of ploughs and good veld to fall back on when rains failed. Similarly, at Kuruman, agricultural prosperity was declining and wage labour was essential, particularly money earned at Kimberley. In such hard times chiefs were supported and Mankurwane, Tlhaping Chief of Taung (1869-92) attempted to revive circumcision rites and disliked L.M.S. control of churches. (1)

So L.M.S. education was constricted not only because of internal organisational weaknesses but also because the Southern Tswana, dependent on a spasmodic agricultural prosperity, suffering from male depopulation and, traditionally suspicious of an alien religious

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(1) K. Shillington, Op. Cit, p. 207-210

organisation, did not set great value on the education offered it.

In March, 1870, Robert Moffat left Kuruman forever after fifty years at the Mission. It was not surprising that Moffat's strong personality and patriarchal style of leadership produced frustration in the other missionaries. The missionary who suffered most under Moffat's dispensations was William Ashton. The help he gave to Moffat when he translated the Bible into ~~Sidama~~ was never fully acknowledged, and his sensible criticisms of Moffat's management of Mission education unanswered.<sup>(1)</sup> Moffat was the "great" leader, and the publicity he received and gave himself was not to be adversely affected. Ashton's career was sacrificed to his more famous colleague. Even after Moffat's departure, Ashton was not treated justly. His experience and seniority were ignored, and Moffat's missionary son - John Smith Moffat - was given the senior Kuruman ~~apost~~ post. This succession led to great acrimony within the Mission and John Smith Moffat became the object of considerable animosity. The Mission was divided, and when the Moffat Training Institution was founded, it, too, became involved in the dispute.

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(1) Lovetti, p. 599-601

2. John Mackenzie and 'humanitarian imperialism'

Given the general level of education in the Bechuanaland Mission, it is a surprise that it was here that the L.M.S. decided to establish their long-awaited place of 'higher' education. Livingstone, prompted by Tidman, had already made overtures to the Mission Committee, and in 1849 William Ashton had begun to train a few Tswana teachers. According to Robert Moffat, in fact, Ashton started some form of training for local youths as early as 1831, on his own initiative. (1)

What promoted the L.M.S. to take the initiative in 1869, when it asked the Bechuana District Committee to advise it on new methods of progress, was the poor expansion of the Mission under Moffat. Their recommendation was for a training institution for teachers and schoolmasters, although, at first, the training policy was for the production of preachers and evangelists. The main problem, as ever, was money, but Moffat's retirement proved a suitable occasion to launch an appeal in England, and Bristol (£1,000) and Nottingham (£200) supporters of Robert Moffat provided a practical tribute to his work. (2)

The Institution was ultimately a disaster and closed. The official reasons given in Lovett's commentary was that the population in the Kuruman District, where it was based, was sparse; the 'natives indolent'; and the exhausting dispute between John Smith Moffat and his colleagues

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(1) Robert Moffat: Missionary Labours, p. 590.

(2) Mackenzie Papers: Personal Box 3, folder 2. Rev. D Mullens,  
June 24, 1871.

that split the Mission.<sup>(1)</sup> John Smith Moffat, one of Moffat's sons, had been a private missionary, and there can be little doubt that his appointment in 1870 as senior official agent at Kuruman was due to favouritism. This was bad enough. What was worse was that he saw the policy of 'higher' education - the purpose, size, and "style" of the intended Institution - in a very different way from the rest of the L.M.S. agents. This difference of policy catalysed other unpleasanties - jealousy of his preferment, thwarted ambition and general frustration at the Directors' policy. But the fundamental reason for the Institute's collapse was that the basic education provided by the L.M.S. in the region was so poor. This was the basis of Douglas Mackenzie's defence of his father, along with his argument that the L.M.S. Directors had little appreciation of the qualities demanded of a good teacher. He gave us an example of this lack; - Dr Joseph Mullen's statement in 1875 to the Bechuana Committee that English missionaries should not be wasted as teachers; therefore, John Mackenzie would work at Shoshong, as well as teach at Kuruman - novice training, Mullens adding, was not at all exhausting.<sup>(2)</sup>

A resolution for a theological institution or seminary, to be called the Moffat Institution, was adopted by the Bechuana District Committee at Molepolole on August 29, 1871, and accepted by the Society's Directors in London on February 26, 1872. The institution was founded at Shoshong with John Mackenzie as tutor, and its declared purpose was to supply "native pastors and evangelists",

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(1) Lovett, i p. 606

(2) W. Douglas Mackenzie, John Mackenzie: South African Missionary and Statesman (1902) p. 179

a change from the original purpose. There would be teaching in the vernacular, with the Bible as textbook; theology, philosophy, geography, and Church history and government would, also, be part of an ambitious curriculum.<sup>(1)</sup> Almost everything about the Institution caused an argument among the Bechuana missionaries - foundation, site, building and function. J.S. Moffat wanted Molepolole to be the permanent site because the population there was denser, food easier to obtain and the Sechuana language purer, but he was ultimately overruled by his colleagues.<sup>(2)</sup> By 1872, there was a temporary building at Shoshong which consisted of "a classroom, a store room and five students houses having two rooms each". At the Bechuana District Committee of April 1874, it was decided to found and develop the insitution at Kuruman rather than at Shoshong.

Moffat not only disagreed on the siting of the institution, he also disagreed on its function. He wanted the institution to train schoolmasters rather than preachers, as he thought the "Bechuanas hold forth" enough already. More importantly, he considered the supply of trained African teachers for the Mission schools of over-riding importance and erecting a seminary in his father's name to train preachers angered him. He found the building far too grand, and the general student life-style proposed, immodest. The building itself was commenced in 1875 with John Mackenzie, the intended Principal as "master-builder, having Messrs Ashton, Wookey and now

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(1) Mackenzie Letters: Personal, Box 2, folder 2

(2) 37/3A J.S. Moffat to Whitehouse, Kuruman, August 19, 1874



Brown to consult with when necessary". It was completed in January,  
 (1) 1879. But Moffat's main objection went to the heart of the failure  
 of the Institution, in the years that followed. He saw the Mission  
 school position as poorly resourced, so he thought the institution  
 should be linked far more with the local schools, responding to  
 their simple needs, rather than becoming a superimposed, excessively  
 academic Seminary. "The manner", he wrote to the Society's Directors  
 "in which the project is being carried out is utterly alien from all  
 my ideas of right, I consider that money is being so uselessly  
 lavished, my opinions seem to be so at variance with those of the  
 Bechwana Committee and unfortunately of my Directors too...."  
 He considered the whole project "a sinful extravagance" and was  
 refused access to all building accounts by Mackenzie.<sup>(2)</sup> Such a situation  
 could not continue, and in June 1877, he moved to Molepolole. Over  
 a decade later, J.S. Moffat was even more convinced of the rightness  
 of his evaluation. Schoolmasters were needed far more than preachers,  
 and a "grassroots" strategy needed whereby work should be concentrated  
 on the village schools and the mission stations, until "someday  
 a centre will reveal itself around which your higher educational work  
 will grow naturally."<sup>(3)</sup> The L.M.S. and the Bechuana District  
 Committee had a more splendid vision, and an expensive folly was the

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- (1) 37/1/A Mackenzie to Mullins, July 10, 1872; 37/3/A Moffat  
 to Whitehouse. August 19, 1874; 39/B/1 Mackenzie to Mullins  
 May 25, 1877
- (2) 38/3/B J.S. Moffat to L.M.S. July 5, 1876, Kuruman.
- (3) 49/2/B J.S. Moffat to Thompson, Palapye, September 25, 1892

result. The Moffat Institution, far too academic and remote from the modest needs of the Mission schools, was imposed on the region and it never managed to correct this fault in spite of later desperate changes in the curriculum, and adding a boys' high school to the original foundation.

The first report on the institution for the 1872-3 session, before the building was complete, was disheartening. Four men were admitted to the course in April 1872; Khukwe (from Shoshong); Diphukwe (from Kuruman) and Motsawe and Ranochane (from Molepolole). Only two of these students could read English fluently, yet they wanted to study Hebrew and Greek. They had studied the Old Testament for a year, and were preparing for the New Testament.<sup>(1)</sup> To improve recruiting, the Moffat Institution School was opened in 1877.<sup>(2)</sup> It was clear that the educational standard of candidates was so poor that some way of improving this had to be found. In 1881, there were 22 boys in their pre-Institution school studying Sechuana, English, Arithmetic and Geography at what was considered a satisfactory standard.<sup>(3)</sup> The Directors did not agree, and Mackenzie, not for the last time had to write a long letter to them to defend the school for "the Directors are much disappointed that a higher position has not been gained".

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(1) Mackenzie Papers. Personal, Box 2, File 7. Report of  
1872-3 Session

(2) 31/1/D Brown to L.M.S. Kuruman, December 28, 1877.

(3) 41/B/3 Report from Kuruman, May 19, 1881


Mackenzie insisted that the students were good, but that their cultural opportunities had been hitherto limited; true, the standard was low, but then the school was 'preparatory' and would improve. Sechuana was taught in the institution, but it was essential to teach English in the school, even though it was expensive, for commercial reasons..."to learn English, and to be able to read documents and accounts is one great reason which has induced Bechwana parents to pay for the education of their boys". His defence concluded with a plea for financial support, and expansion; namely, the appointment of a lady teacher for the school, and a printer and agriculturalist for the Kuruman Mission Station itself. (1)

From 1872 to 1881, the total number of students who had entered the Moffat Institution were 21. 8 were working as evangelists and 1 was a schoolmaster. By 1892, after two decades of indifferent existence, the Institution was at a low ebb. Of the five students that Roger Price examined, two were "deplorably backward. Neither of them would read a chapter or a hymn". Even worse than the low academic standard was the poor spirituality there. In 1893, the Bechuana District Committee was looking for native agents everywhere except in the Institution because "there is no desire for or enthusiasm of any kind on behalf of missionary work among the men in the Institution here...."(2) By 1893 only 27 had been educated

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(1) 40/1/0 Mackenzie to Directors. Kuruman, August 26, 1879

(2) 49/1/C Report of the Theological Seminary. Moffat Institution by Roger Price to the Bechuana District Committee, May 3, 1892 and 50/1/A Wokey to L.M.S. Kuruman, January 10, 1893.

BECHUANALAND WARS: 1881-1884



at the Institution, and by 1896 of the six who had just finished the course, none could be placed in useful mission work because of low funds.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Boys School at Kuruman was independent technically of the Institution, but its purpose was to bolster up, in numbers and quality, candidates who it was hoped would leave it, to go into mission training at the Institution. By 1881, there were 19 boys in the school, 12 of whom were paid for by their parents. The students were of poor academic quality, and were taught the three R's and English. The resignation of John Brown the Headmaster in 1881 precipitated a crisis, and he was followed in 1885 by J. Tom Brown, a man who was not by choice or instinct a teacher. In September, 1892, the Bechuana District Committee analysed at some length the problems of the school. The complaints from missionaries were many, the Tswana did not appreciate the school; the literary curriculum was irrelevant as most of the children became either cattle-herders or wagon-drivers after they left school, lack of African teachers for elementary schools meant a poorly educated group of potential students. Therefore, a radical decision was taken - the Boys School would become a normal School for teacher training, a function that J.S. Moffat had requested for the Moffat Institution from the start. A recruiting drive for European teachers was initiated as well, and trained "native" teachers salaries were increased to a £15-£24 p.a. scale.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) 53/2/A Report of the Theological Seminary by Roger Price,  
Annexe to Bechuana District Committee Minutes, May 1896

(2) 49/2/B Bechuana District Committee, Vryburg, September 29-30, 1892.

The combination of J. Tom Brown's lack of natural teaching ability and proposed change of purpose, finally killed the school off. Discipline was extremely difficult to maintain, probably because high standards were being demanded from children, whose expectations and background were varied. He confessed that discipline was maintained "only at the expense of a great deal of constant rebuking and pain". The 1892 Report on the school noted that 14 children had left in 2 months from a total school roll of 22. Of this number leaving, four had been expelled for insubordination, and Bathoen, the chief at Kanye, had demanded the release of another five. The school was in a state of collapse. J. Tom Brown went on furlough in 1895, and the school was closed, never to open again. The headmaster, omitting his own lack of talents, blamed the Bechuana for not wanting to be educated, the absence of any openings for them when educated and general indifference of his mission colleagues to education. (1) The Moffat Institute itself closed down in 1898.

To any contemporary Bechuana agent coldly contemplating the future, prospects seemed bleak indeed. The slow advance of Robert Moffat's mission had been succeeded by expensive educational initiatives that had failed dramatically. What was to be done? The growth point was supplied by John Mackenzie, the Principal of the Moffat Institution. Like John Philip and David Livingstone, Mackenzie was

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(1) 49/1/6 Report of the Kuruman Boys' School by J. Tom Brown, Bechuanaland District Committee Minutes. Taung, 1892.  
50/1/B Brown to L.M.S. February 15, 1893; 50/2/D Brown to L.M.S. November 20, 1893.

Scottish and a "dialogic" missionary. He saw the work of the London Missionary Society as not only comprehending founding and manning schools, but trying to create a just political state in which Tswana society could acculturate, become British and hence Christian. Like all "dialogic" missionaries the macro-situation (political) was inter-related to the micro one (educational). John Mackenzie had none of Philip's diplomatic skills or Livingstone's charisma, but in the demanding context of southern Tswana politics, during a period of hectic change and severe black-white confrontation Mackenzie tried to advocate a just humanitarianism, and wanted to protect Africans from the worst excesses of colonial rapacity. That such a course of political action would accelerate Christian evangelisation need not be regarded as a cynical or conspiratorial plot.

John Mackenzie was posted as the Society's missionary at Shoshong in 1862, and went to Kuruman in 1875 where he became the first Principal of the Moffat Institution. The uprising in the Orange river area, and the 1878 Griqua rebellion led to the besieging of Kuruman when the Institution became a place of refuge for local whites and their supporters as well as a centre of opposition to the rebels.<sup>(1)</sup> Colonel (later Sir Charles) Warren met Mackenzie during his relieving expedition, approved of Mackenzie's opinions, and encouraged him to take a more active part in settling the region.

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(1) Background in Anthony Sillery: John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland, 1971, (Cape Town); Kevin Shillington: The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana: 1870-1900, 1985 (Braamfontein); A.J. Dachs: Missionary Imperialism: the Case of Bechuanaland, J.A.H. 1972, pp. 644+

Mackenzie doubtlessly found this response flattering, and in 1879 inquired of the Society's Directors if he could take up a part-time Commissionership for the colonial authorities along with his direct mission work. He found, he wrote, in his letter of explanation to London, no incongruity "for a minister to make a stirring political and necessarily 'party' speech during the week, and to lead the devotions and spiritual meditations of his people on a Sunday". The Society did indeed find it incongruous and turned down his request, even though Sir Bartle Frere himself, the Governor General of the Cape Colony and the High Commissioner, wrote to the L.M.S. requesting Mackenzie's release to help reduce "the anarchy and all the horrors of a state of chronic warfare".<sup>(1)</sup>

The Society's stance was dictated by two factors. They considered the Moffat Institution post a critical one, which demanded a full-time missionary. Also, they had traditionally avoided all direct political involvement in colonial matters, and disliked Mackenzie following the paths of Philip and Livingstone. John Mackenzie was determined not to miss this opportunity, and in 1880 he resigned from the L.M.S. In 1884 he was for six months Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland and in 1882<sup>(2)</sup> and 1885-91 organised campaigns in Britain to extend imperial control in Bechuanaland. Before detailing Mackenzie's political career, it would be helpful to look at his political principles in more depth.

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- (1) 40/2/A Mackenzie to Whitehouse, Kuruman, September 25, 1879 and 40/1/C Sir Bartle Frere to Mullins, Government House, Cape Town, June 13, 1879.
- (2) John Mackenzie: Austral Africa, Losing it or Ruling it, being incidents and experiences in Bechuanaland, Cape Colony and England, (1887)



Mackenzie accepted the fact that economic and political change was inevitable, and, as a "dialogic" missionary, tried to see that such change among Africans would be completed as humanely and positively as possible. Whereas Philip, in the Cape, saw commercial change as the vital area, Mackenzie's acculturation process was based on land. Tswana society had to move from a "broken-down feudalism" to support prosperous, individual farmers. This meant an end to a traditional cattle-based agriculture, and serious modification, but not a total obliteration, of the chiefly politics. A collective cattle culture would have to change into one of individual entrepreneurial peasant farmers. To make sure this change developed..."a Central Government would secure them in possession of their cultivated lands, their flocks and their herds....they would be willing to pay taxes".<sup>(1)</sup> In particular, this administrative approach would be far better than the rough imposition of change, mis-handled in Griqualand West and leading to rebellion. This new prosperous Tswana peasantry could be supported at first by "officers of the metropolitan government immune to ungenerous colonial influences." As land rights would be given to both black and white farmers, there would inevitably be a conflict of interests, "when one class of farmer had to legislate for another and unrepresented class". So an imperial bureaucracy was essential; Mackenzie, again like Philip and Livingstone, was in a humanitarian sense, an imperialist.<sup>(2)</sup> The land given to Tswana

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(1) John Mackenzie: Austral Africa, Vol ii, p. 97

(2) John Mackenzie: Nineteenth Century, April 1883 (quoted by Anthony Sillery: John Mackenzie of Bechuanaland: 1835-1899)

farmers would not be transferable or saleable for a period of ten years in order to protect them from "land sharks" who had worked on the Griquas. If some had insufficiently improved their holding, they could sell the land and become farm workers.

Dachs and Shillington adopt a mildly critical tone towards Mackenzie. The minor charge is that he was an "amateur politician" who was sucked into the maelstrom because of vanity. At best, he was stupid; at worst, a "front-man" for a more devious professional. But the main charge and the most damaging, was that Mackenzie saw imperialism as a vehicle for his own society's expansion, and encouraged this process, therefore, for selfish reasons: Bechuanaland is best British because it can then the more easily become Christian. Shillington goes even further and noted that Mackenzie's support for African interests was only valid within a limited imperial situation. (1)

Mackenzie was conditioned by the contemporary socio-economic situation of rapid northwards expansion from the Cape. Like other "dialogic" missionaries, humanitarian imperialism went hand-in-hand with Christianisation, both were mutually related and depended on each other. Mackenzie's philosophy of expansion was a generous one, and recalled Philip's prolonged defence of Khoi, Khosa and Griqua rights. The tone

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(1) Kevin Shillington: Op. cit., p. 154. footnote 24. "The idea that Mackenzie was primarily a protector of African interests to which European Settlement must come second has been erroneously supported..." He goes on to quote Mackenzie as wanting "to see the spreading of Europeans placed on a right basis".

of both Dach's and Shillington's commentary is unfair. Mackenzie may have been vain, but he was no closet racist or ruthless colonialist. His chief fault was that this romantic imperial optimism took no account of the ruthless strength of <sup>South</sup> African merchant and mining capitalism, but in this, Philip and Livingstone were equally guilty.

Mackenzie's respect for African rights was never challenged by a contemporary, whilst such opinions as... "there is nothing in the superstitions or the customs of these tribes to disqualify them from exercising their right as subjects of the Queen, when education enables them to do so..." can be repeated many times. (1) Certainly within contemporary Southern African white society, he was a radical on "native rights" and this, apart from other factors, destined him for a brief political career. When he wrote to his Directors in 1879 explaining his ideas on land tenure for the Tswana farmer, he added, justly of his plans, "The Directors can have little idea how fully in the teeth of all South African maxims is the above simple scheme". (2)

Mackenzie had a good deal of practical experience of Tswana society, and his consequent plan for their acculturation was not lacking in common sense; the only factor he omitted was the ruthlessness of Afrika ner "freebooters" and mining entrepreneurs. What he wanted was something as follows; he wanted the "spread of whites" to be regulated so that Africans could re-establish themselves on their own

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(1) John Mackenzie: Austral Africa, Vol ii, p. 456 (Quoted by Anthony Sillery, Op. cit., p. 50)

(2) 40/1/C Mackenzie to Directors, June 3, 1879

land; he was convinced that the chiefs would support a colonial "lead" on African land tenure if they retained their arbitration rights; certainly, they would pay taxes to support such colonial governmental policy. Mackenzie summarized this positive, humane policy in "Austral Africa" in the phrase "Respect private property". Whether such a policy could be implemented was another question, but one can hardly blame John Mackenzie for wanting to try it out. (1)

Mackenzie had experience of Griqualand West politics, and, in many ways, his land policy had been shaped by the disasters that had occurred there. In 1871, imperial intervention there had been precipitated both by fear of the Afrika ner ambitions in the region and the Cape Government's anxiety to control the new mining wealth of the region. Merchant speculators, also, directly intervened, by manipulating rival claims to the diamond fields, thus blunting southern Tswana initiatives in the Harts-Vaal region from 1867 onwards. (2)

The challenge of diamonds caused an economic ferment within the communities themselves as well. Some chiefs such as Luka Jantje, Botlasitse and Morwe preferred to maintain a traditionalist stance for they saw new wealth as potentially dangerous to their chiefly power; others, such as Jantje, Mothibi and Mankurwane were attracted to individual rewards rather than communal well being, and joined others of their own tribes who were profiting as hunters, traders and large

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(1) John Mackenzie: Austral Africa, Vol ii, p. 97

(2) K. Shillington: Op.cit., p. 44

farmers. This new ethic of personal prosperity centred around the L.M.S. Kuruman Mission. It is true that sections of the Southern Tswana rose in arms against these alien pressures in 1878, but they were destined from the start to be defeated. In 1880, the Crown Colony of Griqualand West was annexed to the Cape with severe consequences for the inhabitants. The commercial pressures of diamond mining plus the strict political controls of the new government spelt the effective end of traditional chiefly authority in the area. Locations or reserves were established, and taxes were imposed and machinery for their collection instituted. These events impressed yet more on Mackenzie how necessary it was to have a change of heart, before colonisation further north took place.

Mackenzie took the campaign for humanitarian imperialism to England. His first campaign for imperial protection of African rights against white commercial aggrandizement commenced in 1882. During this period the British government was embroiled with Ireland and Egypt; moreover, there were plans afoot for the re-annexation of Basutoland and the restoration of Cetshwayo to Zululand. Mackenzie helped found in 1883 the South African Committee which was a mixture of trade, merchant and 'straight' political interests. Founder members included Sir Robert Fowler, T.F. Buxton, and W. McArthur, M.P. Lord Mayor of London and a Cape Merchant.

Meanwhile, at the end of 1881, Kruger himself with du Toit and General M. Smit were in London engaged in talks to modify the 1881 Pretoria Convention. The British Government agreed that the Transvaal

border could be moved further westward into Rolong and Tlhaping territory - as far as the "road to the north" in fact; and that the rest of Bechuanaland would come under some ministerial form of British protection. At this juncture it seemed reasonable to invite John Mackenzie to become Deputy Commissioner<sup>-er</sup> for Bechuanaland, and this Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of the Cape, did in February 1884.

The problems facing Mackenzie were those he had encountered in Griqualand West, namely diamond mining accelerating the economic changes that trade and hunting had commenced. The market for cattle, cultivated produce, and above all wood and labour for the mines had developed; in 1880, about £50,000 of British goods were exported into southern Bechuanaland, whilst some £100,000 of produce was exported in the same year. Significantly, migration of labourers had begun, and in the 1870's and early 1880's increasingly large numbers of southern Tswana moved to Kimberley - a small, but significant sign of rural decline and social dislocation.

Pressure on land and the growth of personal wealth led inevitably to tensions within the social fabric, and the Bechuanaland civil wars of 1881 were a sign of this. Unwisely, some African chiefs called in white mercenaries from the Transvaal to help. These mercenaries were mostly substantial Transvaal landowners, who called themselves "volunteers" (or "Vrijwilligers" in Dutch) and demanded land as a reward for their efforts. The direct result of their intervention were the founding of the independent republics of Stellaland and Goshen. The "independent" republic of Stellaland was established by them, with Vryburg as its centre, and van Niekerk as administrator. Tlhaping residents

were summarily ejected, and their farm titles redistributed. The "republic of Goshen" was more strongly resisted by the Rolong further north, and effective white occupation was confined to Roøigron on the Transvaal boundary.

Mackenzie's foray into this morass of conflicting greeds was disastrous. A contemporary noted that a middle-aged missionary with a ghost patrol of police was not likely to make much of an impact on the "vrijwilligers" or the Cape interests carefully watching Mackenzie's every move. When Mackenzie arrived at Taung in May 1884, he was faced with the worst possible "fait accompli" namely the territorial claims of the "vrijwilligers" to Tlhaping land difficult to disprove, and his proclamation that the area was under British jurisdiction falling on deaf ears. Mackenzie went north to Mafikeng where the Rolong were holding out; his message of support was mocked by a massive cattle raid by the Goshenites. Quite soon, the whole area was seething with violence, distrust and cattle-raids; Robinson had no option but to recall Mackenzie to Cape Town. The ex-missionary anticipated the reason for his recall and resigned his post late in 1884.

The failure of Mackenzie to make an impact in the region was due to a variety of reasons. He had a pathetic police force to help him restore order, and his inexperience of colonial rough-and-tumble compounded this disadvantage. There were other reasons, too. With underground mining developing at Kimberley, its prosperity depended more on wood for fuel, and labour from Southern Bechuanaland. Rhodes needed to protect these necessities from Transvaal occupation,

and the humanitarian wanderings of an erstwhile missionary was not an activity Rhodes was accustomed to support. In fact, the whole tenor of Mackenzie's philosophy - the protection of African land-rights - was one that sent shivers of apprehension up and down the spines of the colonial "landsharks". Rhodes succeeded Mackenzie as Deputy Commissioner in 1884, a sufficient comment on the way British policy in the areas was veering. Rhodes called immediately for military help when Kruger backed the two republics, and in January, 1885, Sir Charles Warren moved in, with Mackenzie close on his heels. The whole episode was a re-run of the previous expedition into the Kuruman area. The region south of the Molopo river was annexed as British Bechuanaland, and a British Protectorate was declared on the region south of latitude 22°S and bounded by 20°W, the Transvaal and Cape Colony. Mackenzie stuck to his principles in spite of his brief and inglorious period as Deputy Commissioner, and in the next few years continued his publicity campaign in England to merge the young Protectorate into a larger Bechuanaland.

Mackenzie's humanitarianism had not abated in the slightest and he continued his fight for his colonial principles <sup>privately</sup> as well as publicly. In his optimism lay his weakness; at the Moffat Institution he had hoped for a successful period of secondary training in spite of the poor educational infrastructure of the mission. In politics, too, he advocated an "imperial" Bechuanaland without taking sufficient note of the aggressive mining and mercantile capitalism that so strongly influenced British colonial policy.

It was ironic that the missionary humanitarian who wrote to the



colonial office expounding his views on Bechuanaland policy was countered by a pragmatic administrator in the form of John Smith Moffat, his ex-Kuruman colleague, and now a successful Colonial official. John Smith Moffat had regarded himself as the victim of unjustified prejudice at Kuruman and in 1879 he resigned from the L.M.S. He entered Government service first as a resident magistrate in Basutoland, and he subsequently became assistant commissioner north of the Molopo river, resident in Matabeleland, Palapye, and finally a Taung magistrate. His pragmatic, low-key approach to education at Kuruman where he advocated better primary schools and a modest Institution, was reflected in his political assessments of Bechuanaland as well. He was an advocate of the art of the possible; the visionary expansionism of Mackenzie appalled him.

Mackenzie's correspondence with the Colonial Office in 1889 neatly counterpointed these two missionary and imperial ambitions. Mackenzie wanted a 'large' Bechuanaland, by which he meant colonial control of the region in parallel with white expansion. He accepted the expansion northwards of Europeans ("Governments can and ought to guide it and control it; they cannot stop it; and on the whole it is not for the interests of any class that it should be stopped"), but group advantage, particularly the Rudd Concession (which John Smith Moffat had helped to negotiate) he detested. He went on<sup>in</sup> his letter: "It is one thing that English capitalists should have a good investment: it is a higher and more necessary thing that the diamond and gold mines of a country should be so worked as to raise the body of the people in the

country into easy and honourable circumstances.<sup>(1)</sup> John Smith Moffat's reply was detailed, and to the point. Moffat noted: the British protectorate exercised to the Zambezi was minimal, and consequently, imperial ambitions for it should be curbed; chiefs could contract with mercantile companies if they so wished (a defence, perhaps, for his own part in the Rudd concession); development of both parts of Bechuanaland would cost £60-100,000 p.a. and so private merchant companies were the best way forward - such companies "would leave us territorial or judicial rights, and could be left to make its own terms with the chief. On the issue of "private" capital, Moffat's and Mackenzie's opinions were irreconcilable. Mackenzie considered the imperial mission as semi-divine; to J.S. Moffat expansion was expensive, so it was best left to those who had the money, and profit-motive to inspire them. "In the hands of a trading company... the opening of Matabeleland would be speedy and violent", wrote Mackenzie. Not so, replied J.S. Moffat; the alternative was too expensive for the government to afford. Anyhow, the territory was far from "splendid". Smith would have been a saint not to relish such a riposte.<sup>(2)</sup>

Mackenzie supported the "dialogic" policy of Livingstone and Philip in Bechuanaland - namely encouragement of change for Africans, that was directed by education and protected by liberal ethical principles of

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- (1) British Parliamentary Papers: Africa 45: C 5918 (Mackenzie to Colonial Office, April 1889, Number 78)
- (2) B.P.P. Africa 45: C5918 (Comments by John Smith Moffat, Number 116)

government. There were, of course, considerable differences between Mackenzie's role and background and those of his pioneering predecessors. His political landscape was more restricted, possibly more violent and racist; moreover, his personal part in colonial affairs was minor. He was essentially an amateur politician and sooner or later would have been destroyed by Cecil John Rhodes and his henchmen. Moffat "père's" narrow evangelicalism counterpointed Philip's more robust mission policy; in the same way, J.S. Moffat provided a more pragmatic realism both in education and politics compared to Mackenzie's headier approach. J.S. Moffat saw mission and imperial expansion as a piecemeal process; his long service with the colonial government reflected his willingness to adapt to immediate, and sometimes, sordid pressures.

Mackenzie's idealism can be considered ineffective. Nevertheless it could be argued that Mackenzie was the fore-runner of later L.M.S. successes. His work at the Moffat Institution gave the Society a valuable list of "do's and don't's" to heed, as they established the Tiger Kloof Institution. Mackenzie's insistence on humanitarian principles in southern African imperial expansion gave later credibility to the L.M.S. defence of Khama, Sebele and Bathoen against the predatory British South Africa Company in 1895, when they almost suffered Lobengula's fate. To this extent, Mackenzie had maintained and extended a valuable tradition.

## Chapter Eight

### The Northern Tswana and the founding of the Tiger Kloof Native Institution

"There used to be an idea that the sole duty of the missionary is to labour for the salvation of souls; but that idea died of senility. R.I.P. The modern missionary knows that he can act upon the community only through the individual, but he is out for the salvation of the community - the redemption of tribe and nation".

W.C. Willoughby.

An L.M.S. deputation visited South Africa in 1883 to assess the Society's work. The <sup>reports</sup> first section was concerned with their Cape churches, which were attended mainly by black Africans. Town churches in places such as Paarl, Oudtshoorn, and Uitenhage had congregations keen to have their children educated, but the remoter village churches, along with their smaller schools, were socially not very stimulating. The Report targetted two major errors in previous L.M.S. policy in the Cape - their churches had been granted independence too soon, and no provision had been made to train a 'native' ministry. Both faults stemmed from the L.M.S. reluctance to spend more money than they needed to in the Cape, and to the reluctance of agents in the field to push for training, with a continued vigour that would have impressed the L.M.S. Directorate. The later attempts to build training institutions in Kuruman and Vryburg compensated in some way for this serious educational defect in the Cape. The £2,500 proceeds of the sale of Hankey land had been given to L.M.S. Cape churches to build some sort of theological seminary, but the gift was too late. By now the Lovedale Institution was well established, and it sucked in all potential ministerial trainees regardless of their denomination, because of its success and excellent resources. Similar economies, the Report went on, had stunted "Caffraria" and its future was uncertain. The Report's second section dealt with interior towns such as Barkly West, Griquatown and Likhathong, which were "full of drifting natives" - the industrial revolution in the interior had loosened cultural ties and stimulated demands for an African migrant labour force. In Bechuanaland, the Moffat Institution and its satellite boarding schools were of poor standard; Molepolole

had an excellent school, whilst political intrigue was rife at Khama's town of Shoshong. It was in their Bechuana Mission that the L.M.S. saw the future expansion, and the next decades were to see if they had learned anything from their mistakes in the Cape.<sup>(1)</sup>

The peoples grouped in the Bechuanaland Protectorate were northern Tswana. The five most important tribes - with populations in excess of 10,000 - were the Ngwaketse in the territory's south; the Kwena and Kgatla in the centre; the Ngwato - the largest group - in the north; and the Tawana around Lake Ngami, in the north-west. The Kgatla were relatively new arrivals from the Transvaal, whereas the other four groups had originally been a single entity ruled by a Kwena Chief. These tribes had assimilated conquered groups, but the ruling stock were all Tswana speaking and their social structures were similar. Each tribe was territorially and politically independent, living in sizeable towns with "wards" (or suburbs), of people of common descent. On the outskirts of the towns were cultivated "gardens", and farther away - sometimes several hundred miles -cattle-posts, maintained by men and their male offspring. Each tribe had a ruling hereditary chief who was lawgiver and the controller of economic and religious life. Under these chiefs were local rulers with lesser powers. Popular assemblies of varying degrees of importance were regularly summoned, which were fundamental parts of Tswana political structure.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Willoughby Papers, Box 7, File 474. Deputation to South Africa - September, 1883 to April, 1884. Report of W. Wardlaw Thompson.


(2) For the above outline cf: Isaac Schapera: Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and Social Change: 1795-1940. (1970) pp. 3-7

The previous chapter of this study has shown in greater detail how British paramountcy was proclaimed over the region occupied by these chieftains, in the region north of Molopo, in 1885. In the same year was created the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland, South of this region which, subsequently, in 1895, was incorporated into the Cape Colony. It was in July of 1895, that the L.M.S. were called upon to defend the northern Tswana, for Frank Rutherford Harris, the Secretary of the British South African Company, went to see Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, in London to obtain the transfer of the Protectorate to the Company. To defend their peoples and themselves from such a fate, Khama (the Ngwato Chief), Sebele (Kwena) and Bathoen (the Ngwaketse paramount), with the encouragement of Sir Henry Lock, the territory's High Commissioner, and the L.M.S. went to London to conduct a campaign against the takeover. The group, with W.C. Willoughby as senior accompanying L.M.S. agent, visited over thirty towns and cities in England, and public meetings were held to support them. The Colonial Office was flooded with petitions and resolutions in their defence, and the L.M.S. gained humanitarian sympathy as the Chiefs' advocate.

Joseph Chamberlain decided that the Chiefs should maintain possession of their reserves so he continued imperial protection and authorised an imperial officer to reside with them. The balance of the Protectorate - 100,000 square miles and a railway strip - was to go to the B.S.A. Rhodes was angry, although he had gained power over the Protectorate territories of Lentswe, Ikaneng and Montshiwa. (1)

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(1) Paul Maylam: Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British. Colonisation, Collaboration and Conflict in the Bechuanaland Protectorate 1885-1899. (Westport, 1980) p. 161 and following.



MAP OF BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE



The relationship between the protecting power and the three victorious Tswana Chiefs was formalised in the Chamberlain Settlement of 1895; the relationship between Khama and Great Britain was regarded as so special that on Khama's death in 1923, press speculation was that the Protectorate was terminated.<sup>(1)</sup> The November, 1895, award had defended the three Chieftains from the full blast of Rhodes' rapacity, but it had left them in a difficult situation, for they were surrounded by B.S.A. territory in the west, north and east. In fact, if the Jameson Raid had not destroyed Rhodes' credibility, the B.S.A. Company would have been able to take over the Bechuanaland Protectorate as they had Matabeleland. This vulnerability of the award was quickly spotted by John Mackenzie, now retired to Hankey in the Cape. In a letter to Wardlaw Thompson, the old campaigner welcomed Willoughby's success, but was nervous about the B.S.A. territorial proximity on Khama's western flank.<sup>(2)</sup> The Jameson Raid in December, 1895, was launched from the railway strip that Chamberlain had granted to the B.S.A. Company, so the Imperial Government was forced to rescind this award. Permission for the Company to administer areas of the Protectorate was similarly withdrawn. The Tswana were, ironically, saved from Rhodes by the Jameson Raid.

The L.M.S. Bechuana Mission was modestly successful by the 1890s. There was a Christian community of Africans that totalled about 8,000 and a baptised Church membership of half that number. There were 60

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(1) Quentin Neil Parsons: Khama III, The Bamangwato, and the British with Special Reference to 1895-1923. University of Edinburgh Ph.D 1973, p. 127.

(2) 53/5/A J. Mackenzie to Thompson, Hankey, 6 January 1896.

African teachers and preachers, but they had received very little training. Their 34 schools were of low educational achievement, and there were 13 European missionaries to serve their 7 residential stations. Kuruman, an important station, was being by-passed by road and railway; two hundred miles away to the north-east was Kanye; Molepolole forty miles to the north of Kanye; and Palapaye one hundred and eighty miles north east of Kanye. Four hundred miles north west of Palapaye was Lake Ngami, where Hepburn attempted, and ultimately failed, to establish a mission. 100 miles east of Kuruman was Taungs, and their southernmost station - 130 miles south-east of Kuruman - was Barkly West. Three of these seven missionaries were seasoned campaigners - John Brown (Taungs), James Good (Kanye), Roger Price (Kuruman) - with over 30 years service each; never had the challenges to the Bechuana Mission been so severe.

The major challenge to the region was an economic one, for after the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867, and the subsequent development of Johannesburg, the call of industry - directly in labour demands, and indirectly, in services - became more and more insistent. The economic change that occurred in the Bamangwato region over which Khama III (c. 1835-1923) ruled is indicative of the change that occurred over the whole territory.<sup>(1)</sup> The one important difference between the Bamangwato<sup>(2)</sup>, and the other Tswana tribes was that Khama exercised

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(1) Q.N. Parsons: Economic History of Khama's Country in Botswana: 1844-1930. Chapter V. The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. ed: Palmer and Parsons, 1983)

(2) "Ngwato" are pure ethnic descendants of the "Ngwato". "Bamangwato" are nationals from all racial groups.

strict control over their economic and political life. From the 1850's onwards trade had developed in his country between his people and the whites particularly in karosses, copper wire, cattle, ostrich feathers, and supplying hunting expeditions. From 1875 onwards, Khama introduced reforms that included liberalisation of the indigenous system of feudal cattle renting, the inalienability of land, a ban on liquor and rigid personal control on all trade and credit. His kingdom was cashing in on its position between north and south trade, with Shoshong - the chief Ngwato town until 1889 when it moved to Palapye - an emporium of trade between the Cape, Natal and the 'Zambesian region'. In the 1870's and 1880's, the annual value of ivory that came south via Shoshong was £200,000. Khama launched his own company, the Bechuanaland Trading Association to profit from the consumer demands which the British South Africa Company was stimulating. Economic benefits during this expansionary period were shared by the large cattle-barons, wagoners and cultivators; telegraph workers earned good salaries and wealth spread down the social scale prompting cash sales in clothes, tobacco and entertainment.

The most significant difference between the northern Tswana and southern Tswana peoples, was that, although Khama's autocracy was unique, the northern Tswana preserved ties between chief and people to a much greater degree. L.M.S. missionaries constantly complained of the strong political opposition of the northern Tswana chiefs, whilst their conflict with Khama himself merits special treatment later. In spite of this impressive attempt by the chiefs to maintain tribal integrity and their own positions, the pressures on their

peoples were considerable. The Bamangwato economy plunged into recession in 1896 because of the rinderpest pandemic, when almost all of the Bamangwato cattle were destroyed. The construction of the Mafeking-Bulawayo railway in the 1896-7 period helped Khama, but from 1905 onwards even he could not prevent the recruitment of his people for the Rand gold mines.

What was the social position facing the L.M.S. then? They were evangelising and teaching in communities that were slowly being changed by white political, economic expansion, and - as in the Cape during Philip's time - they occupied the cultural interface; their religion and education were vital items in the processes of cultural change that were taking place. The economic vitality of the northern Tswana had produced an affluent upper class which had moved rapidly from first cattle-owning and cattle-selling into the newer businesses of waggoning and commerce as well. These groups accepted a new found life-style in which Christianity and education formed an important part and naturally they made demands on L.M.S. resources and goodwill whilst insisting that they themselves should play a major part in controlling L.M.S. policy and influence.

The L.M.S. had to meet this challenge particularly in the Bamangwato country, not only from the aristocratic groups who were beginning to enjoy their new prosperity and power, but from Chief Khama himself. Khama's policy was partially based on his using the L.M.S. to protect himself from all internal political enemies and to see that the L.M.S. did not usurp his own sovereign position in Church as well as in State. Whatever socio-cultural changes occurred within his State, Khama was determined his chiefly powers would survive.



KHAMA III OF THE BEMANQWATO IN LONDON: 1895

His success in this policy mark Khama out as a political leader of considerable ability indeed. The L.M.S. problems resolved themselves into four categories - they lacked a dynamic schools policy including capital investment; northern Tswana chiefs defended their tribal authority with considerable vigour, Khama clashing for a long period with Hepburn and Willoughby; the development of the L.M.S. Mission Church into an Erastian organisation; the establishment, after a hundred years, of the Tiger Kloof Native Institution, Vryburg.

Khama was the most effective of the northern Tswana chiefs in political acumen and perspicacity. Just as he used the L.M.S. as a cultural ally, so he based his policy on imperial goodwill. As Simon Ratshosa noted, "Khama had always regarded the British Empire as a great protection and a sure rock".<sup>(1)</sup> The letter Khama wrote, in conjunction with Sebele and Bathoen, to the Colonial Office before their 1895 visit, stated that not only did they want protection from the British South Africa Company, but also against their own families and the ravages of alcohol. The letter wanted the Colonial Office's help to establish unambiguously the chiefs' authority, by supporting their ban on alcohol, allowing them to collect the hut tax themselves, and supporting sanctions against younger brothers who founded dissident groups.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Simon Ratshosa: "My Book on Bechuanaland Native Custom etc"

(1931 Typescript, Rhodes House MS. Afr S. 1198 (3)).

(2) British Parliamentary Papers. C 7962, XL 1895. Correspondence relative to...Khama, Sebele and Bathoen to C.O. London, 24 September, 1895.

Khama's political skills were allied to a theocratic absolutism that made him intolerant of white or Bamangwato opposition.<sup>(1)</sup> He disliked education as it stimulated individuality, and he was insensitive to the kind of education that his people needed. When Wardlaw Thompson, the L.M.S. Foreign Secretary, suggested a move from a literary to an industrial education, Khama was not conscious of the implications of such a change. It was left to Sebele, the Kwena chief, to observe at the Tiger Kloof opening in 1904 that "if we are taught only from books, and are not taught wisdom, how shall we live...how shall we get light if we are not taught the ways and means by which white people live?"<sup>(2)</sup> As Price, one of the L.M.S. agents observed, Khama regarded education as a direct threat to his kingly absolutism, and wanted "his people taught the word of God only", as he wanted everybody to be "loyal subjects of Khama".<sup>(3)</sup>

James Hepburn was the first missionary to bear the brunt of Khama's defence of his own political powers and the integrity of his people's traditional social structure. This was a task that Hepburn was emotionally and intellectually quite unsuited for. His edited letters - Twenty Years in Khama's County<sup>(4)</sup> - show him to be a pious, slightly unbalanced


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(1) Isaac Schapera: Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and Social Change: 1795-1940 (1970) p. 187 following.

(2) J. Mutero Chirenje: Chief Kgama and his Times 1835-1923. The Story of a Southern African Ruler. (1978), p. 54.

(3) 53/1/A Price to Thompson, Kuruman, 10 January, 1896.

(4) Rev. James Hepburn: Twenty Years in Khama's County and Pioneering among the Batwana of Lake Ngami, told in letters edited by C.H. Lyall, (London, 1895)



REV. J.D. HEBBURN : LMS PALAPYE MISSIONARY



man, quite unsuited for the rough and tumble of Khamaian politics. Hepburn arrived in Shoshong in 1871, a town he disliked intensely, and he was recalled by the L.M.S. in 1892, after pressure exerted by Khama. His conflict with Khama crystallized around two issues - his work in Lake Ngami, and his building of a large church at Palapye.

The Lake Ngami mission of Hepburn exhibited two important factors in his strategy - his evangelical zeal which no practical considerations modified, and his dislike of living in Shoshong and being involved in the politics of the Bamangwato capital. Lake Ngami was 400 miles to the north west of Palapye, and Hepburn regarded his mission there as an extension of the Bamangwato Church. Although Khama had encouraged some kind of "decentralisation" of his people to keep out the white settlers, Hepburn's initiative would have been outside Khama's control, and Hepburn was not the kind of missionary to ask royal permission before engaging on such a quest. The opposition Khama expressed was dismissed by Hepburn as "pagan", and he went on with his work. He and his family left Shoshong in April, 1877 and arrived at Yanana (Lake Ngami) in June; "we crossed the river with our wagons and outspanned under the large trees close to the town". Between 1877 and 1886, Hepburn made four journeys to Lake Ngami, and the popular response appeared to be genuine and welcoming. The mission was regarded as an extension of the Bamangwato Church; indeed, two of the workers were Khukwe and Diphukwe, who had trained at the Moffat Institution. In March, 1881, a "native agency" in the Ngamiland Church was set up, the Tswana people being requested to give financial support. This "decentralisation" move by Hepburn, subsequently led to a serious division in the Bamangwato Church, for Hepburn "dissidents" gathered

around Raditladi, the half-brother of Khama, to challenge Khama's church headship; in March, 1895, they also appealed to the L.M.S. Directors to evangelise the population of the Tswapong Hills. Willoughby supported Khama, but J.S. Moffat and John Brown of Taungs were in favour of the evangelisation suggestion.

Schools played a part in Hepburn's mission to the Tawana, but he was of the "dialectic" school, seeing education as primarily a species of spiritual awakening, not a distinct intellectual process. Like Robert Moffat, Hepburn considered education in moral and spiritual terms. Writing of the early Tawana converts, he noted, "they have been taken hold off by an irresistible desire to be taught. If asked to give a reason for this desire, they would most likely find no satisfactory explanation. Shall we conjecture wrongly if we put it down to the working of that free and might Spirit, which bloweth where it listeth?"<sup>(1)</sup> This was not the kind of language Livingstone had used when the children and adults he taught developed their intellectual faculties. Hepburn was far more at ease attempting to build his Shoshong church, a task that meant his schools languished for a long time.<sup>(2)</sup>

The decline of the Ngamiland church was due to a combination of factors. Khukwe paid great attention to a group of Makaba (Bakoba or Yei) ex-slaves who had remained faithful to the L.M.S. in spite of Matabele raids. However, Moremi III, the Tawana Chief, reverted to

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(1) Rev James Hepburn: Op. cit., p. 50

(2) 42/2/B Hepburn to L.M.S. Palapye, 24 October, 1890.

heathenism partly out of personal predilection, partly out of fear that Hepburn was Khama's agent. Moremi publicly renounced his Christianity in 1886 making Hepburn flee for his life. Hepburn became convinced that political enmity between Moremi and Khama was such that the Lake Ngami mission could no longer be worked by the Bamangwato church.<sup>(1)</sup> By 1900, only Khukwe was left from the old L.M.S. mission. Peter Gaeongale was appointed there in 1899. In 1900, Shomolekae, who had worked among the Yei since 1892, became head of an independent Ngamiland Church.<sup>(2)</sup>

If the issue of the Ngamiland Church soured relations between Hepburn and Khama, the building of the L.M.S. church at Palapye ruined them. Hepburn's stance on church authority among the Bamangwato was a simple one; the church was completely independent of Khama's authority. Khama's conception of himself as head of the tribal church and state was condemned by Hepburn, out of hand: "He is not conscious of the clear distinction I have always maintained between his own proper Chieftainship and the Kingship of Christ in the Church of Christ".<sup>(3)</sup> Increasingly, Hepburn saw the erection of his Palapye Church as tangible evidence of his own correctness on theological principle, and some indication of his stand against Khama's implacable dislike of him. Unfortunately, in this situation, Hepburn did not have the total support of his colleagues. They

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(1) 42/2/A Lloyd to L.M.S. Kanye, 7 July, 1980

(2) Q.N. Parsons; Diss.cit., p. 205

(3) 42/2/A Hepburn to Lloyd, Palapye, 2 June, 1890

had already been frightened at Hepburn's stand on the independence of the Ngamiland Church, and they soon realized that his second conflict with Khama was affecting his judgement and commonsense. His intense evangelical zeal compounded by emotional stress and overwork, made him, at one stage, contemplate leaving the L.M.S. and setting himself up as a private missionary. His communications with the L.M.S. became sporadic, and his relationship with his colleague, Lloyd, strained almost to breaking point. Lloyd had been appointed to assist Hepburn in 1884, and Hepburn's paranoia made him refuse Lloyd's request to support Lloyd's intended marriage to another agent's daughter. In 1890, he had broken with the Bechuanaland District Committee ("Why should I write to the Committee when they have treated me disgracefully? treated me as if I were a dog"). Lloyd, sent to moderate Hepburn's increasingly eccentric responses, could stand it no longer, and voluntarily withdrew from Palapye in 1890. In 1892, he was of the opinion that Hepburn's behaviour at the Taung Bechuanaland District Committee meeting signified a complete mental breakdown.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Church was finally built at a staggering cost of £3,000 and it held nearly 1,000 people. It broke Hepburn's health and eventually cost him his career. Hepburn's constant demands had been for financial help from the Bamangwato,<sup>(2)</sup> but even more ominous was the fact that Hepburn had demanded work to be done on the building without Khama's permission. A letter to the L.M.S. Directors, dictated by Khama, criticized Hepburn's attitude of..... "let the Church come out from the (authority of) the Chief". Diplomatically, the letter asked

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(1) Willoughby Papers, Box 12, File 804

(2) 49/1/A Lloyd to Wookey, Palapye, 13 January, 1892.

for Lloyd to replace Hepburn, so that he could "be our teacher out of love".<sup>(1)</sup> The pressure on the L.M.S. increased and on Hepburn; in 1892, Hepburn, a broken and dying man, was recalled by the L.M.S. from Palapye. Khama in an unusual token of generosity, offered him a gift of £1,000 for all his work among his people, but Hepburn refused it.

Although Hepburn had played Khama badly at his own game of confrontation and pressure, the L.M.S. agents realized that Khama's insistence on his authority within the Church was a threat to their position, and it was an attitude that was being echoed through the northern Tswana peoples. At Taung, Brown the veteran missionary, noted the strong independence of the local petty chiefs.<sup>(2)</sup> Moreover, the slightest criticism voiced by missionaries on Khamaian policies was seized upon and disputed with senior L.M.S. officials.<sup>(3)</sup> The Hepburn withdrawal was a serious rebuff to L.M.S. independency and London suggested a committee to inquire into all the circumstances; Khama, not surprisingly, in the light of his opposition to Hepburn, refused the request. His reply was cryptic: "Now the Church is mine. Let all discussion end".<sup>(4)</sup> The Bechuanaland District Committee meeting of May, 1892, saw the problem and minuted the opinion that Khama wanted control

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(1) 49/1/A To the Directors of the Teachers in London, Palapye,  
13 January, 1892

(2) 46/1/A Browne to Thompson, Taung, 12 January, 1889

(3) 47/1/C Khama to L.M.S. Palapye, 11 April, 1890

(4) 49/1/A Hepburn to L.M.S. Wynberg, 23 March, 1892

of ecclesiastical as well as political affairs in his country, and that Khama's attitude was not uncommon: "this spirit prevails throughout the whole of Bechuanaland; that paramount chiefs and minor chiefs are making no secret of the fact that they are going to claim and exercise the right of jurisdiction in ecclesiastical affairs". It was decided to deprive Khama of a missionary for a while, and to control future appointments in the region themselves.<sup>(1)</sup>

The reason for the missionaries' dislike of chiefly independence is obvious enough. Chiefs like Khama controlled church affairs, and thus restricted the activities, options and power of the missionary society. Negative comments such as those of Chirenje on the matter ("L.M.S. agents were not unduly worried by the declining power of the chiefs"... and "British imperial tutelage would enhance their missionary endeavours") are understandable, even though they take a jaundiced view of missionary motivation.<sup>(2)</sup> But there is another interpretation of the missionaries' dislike of chiefly authority which it is only fair to note. This was the professional frustration missionaries experienced when they saw that the cultural and social changes taking place in the region would benefit from the destruction of chiefly power, and be a step nearer to the creation of a modern democratic Christian state. W.C. Willoughby, as we shall see later, was particularly aware of this last process.

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(1) 49/1/C Bechuanaland District Committee Minutes, 3 May 1892

(2) J. Mutero Chirenje: Chief Kgama and his Times. c. 1835-1923.

The Story of a Southern African Ruler. (London, 1978)

p. 22 and 24.

In his view, there was a ground swell of popular Bamangwato opinion moving towards a "Church of Becuanaland" with local branches in all towns and villages - "self-governing; self-propagating" in the Congregational tradition, but this ideal was impossible to achieve if the chiefs countered family challenges successfully and then exercised total control of tribal affairs with increased vigour.<sup>(1)</sup> Willoughby was astute enough to play the diplomat with and for Khama, but missionary opinion was unanimous that the chiefly system was incorrigibly feudal and destined for a welcome oblivion. Missionary bureaucracy found itself frustrated when forward-looking initiatives were banned or modified; in the 1904 District Committee, members, weary of penny-pinching and chiefly factionalism, wrote to the London Directors stating that the Colonial government should take over education and allow missionaries to evangelize. Chirenje's use of this letter to make out that the L.M.S. in Bechuanaland was indifferent to education is true in that increased capital outlay was needed for the L.M.S. schools, and that there had been a strategic failure in not training Africans to become teachers. There was, too, an undoubted feeling among Bechuana agents that education and evangelisation were two independent processes, although in the context of the 1904 meeting the motion passed was as much one of despair rather than conscious policy. Probably, Robert Moffat's stamp on the Mission - simple education and direct personal evangelisation - was still clearly imprinted.

Nevertheless there was an educational infrastructure, weak though it

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(1) Willoughby Papers, Box 5, File 378.

was; Mackenzie had struggled at the Moffat Institution at Kuruman; and Willoughby was to found the Tiger Kloof Institution at Vryburg in 1904. The basis of the problem in the L.M.S. Mission was that the "independence" of each mission station made it impossible to institute more rigorous academic standards in their schools; the indifference of one agent could not be countered by the enthusiasm of another. To this extent Chirenje's judgement is justified.

J.S. Moffat kept a watching brief on the Bechuana mission. Approached by a group of Bamangwato officials after Hepburn's dismissal for a replacement, Moffat opined that one professional person was needed to take total control of education and leave the missionary to get on with the church work: "You need a man here who will take all the school work....of the hands of a man who has the pulpit and the church...You need a man who will take hold of this work with both hands and stick to it".<sup>(1)</sup> Thus Moffat confirmed that executive action was needed to raise the schools to an acceptable academic level.

The man destined to "take hold of this work" was William Charles Willoughby, who succeeded Hepburn at the Palapye Station in 1893. W.C. Willoughby's career with the L.M.S. started un auspiciously. Placed initially at Urambo, near Lake Tanganyika, in 1882, his health broke down and the East African mission itself fell upon disastrous times. After ten years as a Congregational minister back in England, he again entered the ranks of the L.M.S. and went to Palapye. He was a shrewd politician and when Khama, Sebele and Bathoen went to England in 1895 to defend their territory from the British South African Company,

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(1) 49/1/6 J.S. Moffat to L.M.S. Palapye, 3 May 1892





CHIEFS SERELE, BATHOEN AND KHAMA IN ENGLAND, 1895. LMS MISSIONARIES

LLOYD AND WILLOUGHBY IN THE REAR.

Willoughby was given the job in the L.M.S. of accompanying the Chiefs, and being their public relations adviser for the visit. He founded the Tiger Kloof Native Institution at Vryburg in 1904 and resigned in 1914. His next few years in Molepolole were spent in fieldwork for his two books 'Race Problems in the New Africa' (1923) and 'The Soul of the Bantu' (1928) publications which helped him to become Professor of African Missions at the Kennedy School of Mission, Hertford Seminary Foundation, in Connecticut, U.S.A.

Willoughby was aware of the mare's nest he was inheriting from Hepburn at Palapye. Willoughby knew that Khama was a conservative, autocratic chief, so he deliberately attempted to counter Khama's influence on L.M.S. affairs with discrete vigour. Willoughby was just as autocratic as Khama, believing in a "committee of one".<sup>(1)</sup> His visit to London in 1895 with Khama gave them both plenty of opportunity to assess each other's personality. Khama, to Willoughby, was "the thorn-bush incarnate", and Khama accused Willoughby of using the 1895 visit to London as a means of professional advancement. ("I observed a great change come over Olloby (Willoughby) and I could not work with him any longer").<sup>(2)</sup> In outlook and temperament, Khama and Willoughby were well matched.

Willoughby knew that the best way to counter Khamaian autocracy was to make the Palapye Church as strong as possible. When he arrived

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(1) Conversation with A.J. Haile, Willoughby's successor at Tiger Kloof (1914-1945) at Worthing: 25 September, 1981.

(2) J. Mutero Chirenje; Op. cit., p. 67

at Palapye, Church members numbered 200 and by 1898 Willoughby had increased this to 441 as well as making the Church financially solvent. The larger numbers were a measure of Willoughby's success, but even more significant was the stricter ecclesiastical discipline that he imposed. Church members now had to be literate in the Setswana New Testament; the "phalalo" (annual church dues) had to be paid before church rites would be administered. The results of these and other regulations he imposed was that the Palapye Church became financially independent, apart from paying for Willoughby's salary. The Palapye Church was dragged into Khamaian politics in 1897, when Khama accused his son Segkoma of plotting against him; Willoughby was shrewd enough to play this kind of game coolly. Segkoma and his father were supported by powerful factions, and it was not long before Colonel Goold-Adams, the Resident Commissioner, intervened on Khama's side, yet still insisting that Segkoma should be acknowledged as his lawful successor. In January, 1898, a tribal meeting lasted two days, and Khama insisted that Willoughby and the Palapye church should not only support him, but condemn his son's activities publicly. Willoughby refused, and later in the same year attempted a service of reconciliation.<sup>(1)</sup>

Khama was suspicious of the critical independence education fostered, and he always kept a wary eye on its progress. Since Khama refused to have trained teachers from outside his territory, Willoughby's plans to improve the Palapye Schools were impeded.

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(1) 55/2/B Review of Five Years Work at Palapye, 1893-5 by W.C. Willoughby; and Willoughby Papers, Box, 2, Files 100-120. Palapye Review, 1893-8

Yet Willoughby's determination to stimulate the schools and the bouyant desire of the inhabitants to be schooled weakened Khama's opposition to expansion. By 1890, there were 9-10 schools in Palapye, but there was little L.M.S. capital investment to support Willoughby's enthusiasm. On 19 November, 1894, Khama opened for the L.M.S. a large Central school for pupils aged between 4 and 30. In fact the top age was about 19. There was accommodation for 300, and 130 children were accepted immediately. Expansion brought the numbers up to 209 by 1896 with 8 teachers instructing in the 3 R's, Scripture, Needlework, Geography, Domestic Economy and Singing at the elementary stage. The intention was that this school should be a centre of excellence, and that the other Palapye schools "feeders" to it - by 1901, these "feeders" were 11 in number.<sup>(1)</sup> Willoughby was not satisfied with this schools structure; he saw the advantage of the Central School acting as a normal College, but he found the standard of teaching in the "feeder" schools poor, and the £3-£5 salary p.a. atrocious.<sup>(2)</sup> Willoughby may also have disliked the "independent" nature of these "feeder" schools, for such was the Bamangwato drive for education they were prepared to finance their own schools independently of the L.M.S. This "independent" movement in education spread to Serowe, Janye, Selepeng and Molepolole and was noted in the Sargeant report of 1904. The most significant example of this was the Serowe

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(1) 53/1/D Alice Young to L.M.S. 23 April, 1896

(2) 58/3 Willoughby to Thompson, Palapye,  
4 October, 1900.

Public School started by Johnnie, then taken over by, Simon, Ratshosa, which became the "Khama Memorial School" of 1921. This went behind the 'Kgotla' and was private and upper class. Its basic appeal, apart from that of snobbery was that it was a "national" school and anti-L.M.S. (1)

Willoughby's Palapye mission was only the commencement of his L.M.S. work and influence which expanded after his successful visit with the Tswana chiefs to London in 1895. Before an examination is made of his Tiger Kloof Principalship and all that it implied to Tswana education, it would be rewarding to look at his mission theology. Just as Hepburn, his predecessor, had belonged to the "dialectic" tradition of L.M.S. mission - characterized by an apolitical stance, simple evangelical spirituality and an ingrained suspicion of African cultural patterns - so Willoughby was of the "dialogic" school, that numbered among its members van der Kemp, Philip, Livingstone and Mackenzie. Willoughby labelled himself as a "Hunterian" within the Congregational tradition, and John Hunter was an admirer and follower of F.D. Maurice's "Social Gospel". Hunter's ministry<sup>(2)</sup> emphasized the social implications of the Gospel, and Willoughby's idea of mission had a strong social content. Van der Kemp advocated Khoi-settler equality; Philip evangelised within a context of cultural change and political equality for the Khoi; both Livingstone and Mackenzie advocated imperial expansion and African political rights as indispensable

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(1) Parsons: Diss.cit, p. 269 and Rhodes House, MS. Afr. S. 1198(3) p.85. "My book on Bechuanaland Native Custom etc" (1931) by Simon Ratshosa.

(2) Horton Davies: Worship and Theology in England, vol. 1V. p.229-237 John Hunter (1848-1917); Congregational Minister and Liturgist.

to the Gospel's progress. To all of them, education in schools and advanced training was an adjunct to their aculturation process. Willoughby was directly in their tradition. His perceptive scholarship, based on contemporary sociological and anthropological insights updated this tradition; moreover, Willoughby had the unique opportunity of putting his ideals into practice at Tiger Kloof when he became Principal in 1903.

Willoughby's mission strategy depended on a variety of theological and cultural assumptions that he had inherited from his predecessors and subsequently developed and elaborated for himself. His appreciation of Bantu-Tswana "custom" (which to Willoughby mirrored religion, morality and politics) was sincere, in spite of the fact that he forecast and welcomed its future demise, or at the very least significant modification. He deplored the social structure of Tswana life - towns as hotbeds of vice; gardens and cattle-posts that kept children away from school; chiefs who were far too traditional and autocratic.<sup>(1)</sup> Mission education was not only concerned with academic matters, but had the "moral" task of developing a "new" society that was democratic and Christian. The rinderpest epidemic seemed almost like a divine visitation, for it was one step forward in the destruction of Tswana social fabric, and left the way open to individual farmers and entrepreneurs to change living conditions and social expectations. .. "the industry of the people will probably be stimulated now that the earning of money by labour must be looked

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(1) Willoughby Papers: Box 5, File 528 ..."one always finds that all the strings are in his hand (i.e. the chief...) the political machine is controlled by the chief".

to, to supply their wants..."(1)

But if Willoughby's dislike of Tswana social structure and morality was considerable, he appreciated their religious systems. His extant lecture notes and his book "The Soul of the Bantu" were comprehensive examinations of Bantu beliefs, and treated sympathetically taboo-magic, ancestral influences, nature worship and Bantu ideas of a Supreme Being.<sup>(2)</sup> He discussed the missionary approach of the "dialectic" missionaries, and was radical enough to accept some sort of syncretistic African Christianity, rather than wanting a re-application of traditional Latin, German and English Christianity to African needs. Van der Kemp's cultural relativism found an echo with Willoughby. He was convinced that there were religious and ethical factors in the Bantu religion that could be adapted to the demands of Christianity, and it was up to sensitive European Christians to blend these traditions together. "God has been trying in all centuries and in all lands to reach the hearts of His children..."<sup>(3)</sup>

Willoughby prophesied the collapse of traditional Tswana society and tried to forecast what would replace it. Like Philip, Willoughby saw material advance as a sign of a society's progress. This did not mean that material advance was the only criterion, but it was the first step, and an important one. Willoughby defined "race" not in biological terms, but in "grades of civilization" in which material

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(1) 53/1/B: 53/1/D Willoughby to Thompson, February-April, 1896

(2) Willoughby Papers, Box 3, File 179

(3) Ibid., Box 14, unfiled

factors - goods, living conditions, weather - were crucial; as a "race" advanced in such categories, they then came into the forefront of the "world movement".<sup>(1)</sup> This "new" civilization implied "clothing, boots, furniture, houses, agricultural implements, roads, railways...and many other expansive things". Upon such an infrastructure could be placed a "new" African Christian culture, which was adapted to want and need such commodities, as well as having the need and skill to earn them; hard work, enterprise and morality were the keywords of this revitalized civilization. Like the other "dialogic" missionaries, Willoughby considered evangelisation and education as directed towards the "tribe/nation" as well as the individual African. Livingstone had pointed to the futility of working for an individual's salvation, whilst ignoring the comprehensive socio-cultural problems. Willoughby had a similar perspective: "You cannot lift the individual far above the community: in sociology as in astronomy you have to reckon with the tendency of the mass to pull the fragment into its own orbit".<sup>(2)</sup> Willoughby's curriculum for Tiger Kloof and his concept of its place in Tswana society reflected these convictions.

Education, argued Willoughby, was the directing power for such a change,, "it is not a question of whether the missionary should be an educator: he should be nothing else", and education, in this context, was to be interpreted in as generous a way as possible. Education was not "pabulum for the mind". but a moral force that would give purpose to the African exposed to it. Education was to break the traditional African instincts ("anger, fear, envy") and be a means of

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(1) Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Files 30-34

(2) Ibid., Box 7, File 698.



re-shaping the ideals of an agricultural people. (1) Subsequently, Willoughby regretted that to fulfil this purpose, he had not formed an "élite" group of teachers to influence the changing community in the place of the demoralised chiefs. He opined that he should have taken twenty to thirty men and women to "give them all I had to give... Study Bechuana thought and expression and then systematic oral and written instruction in Christian history, theology and ethics"(2) This "élitist" streak found expression, too, in some of the prayers he composed for the Tiger Kloof Prayer Book. (3)

Since Willoughby advocated change, material progress and a vital educational policy, it was not surprising that "industrial education" was an important element in his philosophy. The traditional literary curriculum of the L.M.S. Bechuana schools had made little impact on a people mainly concerned with agriculture. If economic and commercial changes were to have the desired impact on Tswana society, industrial education would be of increasing importance. Thus he saw to it that a wide range of trades such as masonry, bricklaying, plastering, concrete work, carpentry, roofing, painting, plumbing and so on were taught at Tiger Kloof. In an address to some American missionaries, Willoughby spelled out the importance of industrial education. Industrial education "raises the standard of living of everybody", and helped the Tswana towards practical achievements such as "subduing

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(1) Ibid., Box 14, unfiled

(2) A.J. Haile: A Brief Historical Survey of the L.M.S. in Southern Africa, (P.O. Hope Fountain, Bulawayo, 1951)

(3) Conversation with Aubrey Lewis (Headmaster of Tiger Kloof, 1946-1956) in May 1982

the earth; making good wives and mothers". Industrial education showed Africans how their life could be practically improved, with "a higher standard of living all round"; so the individual, in terms of enterprise, ambition and work became valued, and the tribe's material standards improved.<sup>(1)</sup> Willoughby managed to implement this policy at Tiger Kloof, but the majority of the staff continued to prefer the more traditional literary and Bible-based curriculum. Some Bamangwato aristocrats, also, regarded industrial training at Tiger Kloof plebian, and continued to send their sons to Lovedale.

The note that Willoughby sent Thompson on April 9, 1904, was a bench-mark in L.M.S. history in Southern Africa. On the eighth of March of that year, Willoughby had arrived at the Vryburg site for the Institution, with "just a waggon, a brick-sail and two ill-conditioned tents". Thus the Tiger Kloof Native Institution, Vryburg, was born. It was a significant comment on Willoughby's character that in the same note to Thompson, he deplored the fact that he did not have the autonomy to sack European teachers!<sup>(2)</sup>

The successful founding of Tiger Kloof is a narrative which demonstrated the cross-currents of conflict and ambition that existed both in African groups and the L.M.S. itself. The original Principal-designate was the Rev. James Richardson sent out in 1898 specifically for the task. The outbreak of the Boer War disturbed the area, and made planning difficult, so Richardson went to a ministry in East London. His absence meant that he got out of touch with policy matters, and when his suitability was challenged, by accusation of insobriety

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(1) Willoughby Papers, Box 7, File 698

(2) 64/2 Willoughby to Thompson, April 9, 1904.

and that he had falsified damage claims to his property, he washed his hands of the whole business.<sup>(1)</sup>

The moving force for Tiger Kloof was the L.M.S. Directorate, and they were pressuring the Bechuana District Committee for support. In the late 1890's suggestions, plans and letters started flying between London and the Committee about the institution. From this exchange of views, it became clear that the following factors were important: there would be "one" headmaster - that is, a European missionary - in sole charge; the Institution should charge each scholar an annual fee of £5 or more; English should be the language of the institution; there should be good effective assistants wherever it was sited - Mafeking was first mooted - Kuruman was unsuitable; theological and education branches would exist, but priority was to be given to industrial training; the academic and boarding level should be equal to that of Lovedale or Healdtown.<sup>(2)</sup>

Willougby had involved himself in the planning even before his official appointment as Principal in 1903. His comments on all mission policy were always trenchant, and in the initial phases of Tiger Kloof's establishment he excelled himself. He knew exactly what he wanted and how to negotiate for it. Education, he argued, was the only thing that could keep the Tswana going, so the Institution should not be "tin pot", but properly funded and maintained. The industrial element and teaching in English were both vital. There should, too

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(1) 60/3 Richardson to Thompson, 20 August, 1902, Cape Town

(2) 53/1/B J. Tom Brown to Thompson. *Mafeking*. 24 January, 1896;  
53/2/A Bechuanaland District Committee Minutes, 18 May, 1896

be a firm hand at the helm: "I believe in Congregationalism....but I do not believe that it is suitable for the organisation of a school, any more than it is the organisation of an army".<sup>(1)</sup>

Willoughby was authorised to survey the other missionary institutions in Southern Africa, and his report of 1898 helped shape Tiger Kloof.<sup>(2)</sup> He visited the Anglican schools at Healdtown and Keiskamma; the Wesleyan schools at Healdtown and Thaba 'Nchu and the Presbyterian ones at Lovedale and Blythswood. His conclusion was the sombre one that the L.M.S. "are very far behind". Nothing escaped Willoughby's eyes, even to the details of food, sanitation and school uniforms. The debate on Willoughby's report made the Bechuana District Committee resolve that the Institution should be a central boarding school, train teachers, be sited near Vryburg, and that the industrial section should be important. They aimed at an overall intake of 270 students in all sections.<sup>(3)</sup>

The siting of the institution was crucial, as control of the institution went with it. Roger Price the veteran L.M.S. agent, neatly summarized the issues early on in the planning stage, when he wrote that it should not be built "where native thought and feeling and influence are predominant ones". Khama was authoritarian, and Sebele's and Bathoen's lives were unChristian. Moreover, Khama did not like the industrial elements in the new institution's intended curriculum.<sup>(4)</sup> Parsons was convinced that the ultimate refusal

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(1) 53/1/D Willoughby to Thompson, Palapye, 21 April, 1896

(2) 55/1/A Report of W.C. Willoughby on visits to certain native Boarding schools in S. Africa, Palapye, 1 February, 1898

(3) 55/1/A Minutes of the B.D.C. Vryburg, 14 March, 1898

(4) 53/1/A R. Price to Thompson, Kuruman, 10 January, 1896

of the L.M.S. to site the institution in Bamangwato territory soured relations between the L.M.S. until 1916, an example of this being the 1902 "Ethiopian episode" when an article, purporting to be from Khama, was published, offering the African Methodist Episcopal Church-an "Ethiopian" foundation - to take over the schools of his country. (1) Khama denied complicity, but feelings ran high among the Bamangwato. Two years later, A.E. Jennings who had succeeded Willoughby at Palapye wrote that the church at Palapye was still being considered as a place for an "independent" school. (2)

There had, indeed, been negotiations between Khama and the L.M.S. about the site of the old church at Palapye, for an institution. Parsons is of the opinion that Willoughby wanted it, and that the Bechuana District Committee had accepted the site's "adisa" (or loan) in 1902. But these negotiations must have been very tentative for, in 1900, they had acquired the Vryburg site, and it is not credible that the exchanges two years later were very meaningful. In fact, Willoughby might have been negotiating merely as a ploy to talk Khama into accepting the alternative <sup>site at</sup> Vryburg. Certainly the mission evidence extant is adamant that there had been no definite commitment to build on the Palapye site; moreover, if Khama had thought that Willoughby had wanted the site, he certainly never bothered to pursue the matter through official mission channels. (3)

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(1) Parsons, Diss.cit., p. 229; 254.

(2) 64/2 A.E. Jennings to Thompson, Serowe, 3 May, 1904

(3) 64/4 Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the B.D.C. Serowe, 15-27 October, 1904; Parsons: Diss.cit., p. 258.

Kuruman had been geographically disastrous as a site for the Moffat Institution, and it was commonly assumed that building on any Tswana chiefs' land was not only inviting trouble as to a mission's legal property rights but also interference in any educational establishment's affairs. That is why instructions were made to search outside the region, and when Willoughby drew attention to the Vryburg site, most objections seemed to have been answered.<sup>(1)</sup> The site was on a railway line north; and, since it was in British Bechuanaland, well away from any legal or moral pressures that the northern Tswana chiefs might choose to bring upon it, Willoughby, Richardson and J. Tom Brown concluded the purchase of Waterloo farm, vacated by a Boer rebel, for £1,190 in 1900. It was 1,300 "morgen" in extent, situated around the Tiger Kloof railway sidings, seven miles south of Vryburg, in British Bechuanaland. There was an abundance of quarry stone for building, as well as a constant fountain.<sup>(2)</sup>

Retrospectively, A.J. Haile tried to justify the siting of the institution at Vryburg. He accepted that the L.M.S. had promised the northern and southern Tswana chiefs that they would build an institution for them, but said that ultimately the L.M.S. had to ignore Bamangwato territory because the tribal capital moved regularly, and the fact that Khama had refused to give title-deed to the land.<sup>(3)</sup> It was true that the exact definition of the term adisa (loan) was confusing. Khama's cryptic note about legal rights and a potential

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(1) 53/2/C Willoughby to Thompson, Palapye, 29 June, 1896

(2) 58/3 Willoughby, Richardson and J. Tom Brown, to L.M.S, Vryburg, 28 November, 1900

(3) A.J. Haile: The Origins of Tiger Kloof, Duplicated typescript, Worthing, July, 1970. A.J. Haile was Willoughby's successor as Principal.

institution cannot have helped his case very much.<sup>(1)</sup> The L.M.S. Directors could not be blamed if they did not want to commit themselves to spending a considerable amount of money on an institution to whose plots they had only a vague legal title. Whatever the legal situation was, an old hand like Willoughby knew that Khama would control the institution to the utmost of his ability; all negotiation with Khama for Palapye had been window-dressing, of one sort or another. In 1900, the Vryburg site had been purchased, and subsequent discussions with Khama were an exercise in public relations. Khama was angry and maintained his opposition to the institution through other means.

Willoughby, as Principal of the Tiger Kloof Institution, now set about establishing a flourishing school, and the 1912 statistics of the place show how successful he was.

Theological Department	=	10 pupils
Normal Department	=	10 pupils
Scholastic Department	=	74 pupils (elementary and secondary standard)
Industrial Department	=	58 pupils
General Service	=	14

A total of 166 students.

There were 117 Tswana, 24 Ndebele and 25 others.<sup>(2)</sup> This expansion

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(1) "We the Bamangwato say Here is the house, let our children be taught in it, But this house has three conditions, Here they are. We do not sell it, we do not give it, we do not set apart any land for it". B.D.C. Minutes, Palapye, 22-31 March, 1902

(2) Tiger Kloof: The London Missionary Society's Native Institution in South Africa, by W.C. Willoughby, (L.M.S. printed privately, 1912)

developed apace, and by 1920 the statistics of attendance were as follows:

Theological Department	=	11 pupils
Normal Department	=	39 pupils
High School	=	6 pupils
Elementary Department	=	45 pupils
Carpentry	=	21 pupils
Masonry	=	21 pupils
Tailoring	=	21 pupils
Tanning	=	12 pupils
Work School	=	16

The Girls' School, which had been started a few years previously, numbered 71.

Willoughby must have been particularly pleased at the small, static theological department and the expanding, diversifying industrial section. The industrial section pupils of the Tiger Kloof were responsible for erecting their stone building, under the supervision of David Ballantyne, a Scottish stone mason and staff member.

Willoughby's efforts to build a successful, viable institution were bought at considerable personal cost. Autocratic in manner and ill-tempered in style, he found his staff antagonistic to his regime. They formed themselves into a sub-committee, and after helping Willoughby to quell a boys' rebellion that arose ostensibly out of adopting an earth-closet system, were angered at his dismissal of their idea of a

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(1) Willoughby Papers, Box 5, File 383, 23 April, 1920,

A.J. Haile to L.M.S.



Bible College at Tiger Kloof to supply evangelists. Comparing both the quantity and quality of L.M.S. teachers with those from other mission societies made the L.M.S., they complained to London, "the laughing stock of natives and Europeans in this matter". They thought that the L.M.S. had not consistently applied itself to education. As far as Tiger Kloof was concerned, they wanted the sub-committee's role defined in relation to the Principal and the Bechuana District Committee.<sup>(1)</sup> The protest was a red rag to a bull, as far as Willoughby was concerned. He made two points. The industrial section was appreciated by local people and could not be undermined by an attempt to revive the "literary" and theological sections of the curriculum. Above all - shades of the warring factions at the Moffat Institution - there should be rigorous control by the Principal. The District Committee resolution of 1896 had asked for "one responsible man" in charge; if it could not be him, he would willingly stand down. His mock sacrifice had an effect, and his position was supported by the London Directorate.<sup>(2)</sup>

By 1910, there were 105 pupils and it was agreed that "the tide...is running strongly in our favour".<sup>(3)</sup> Inevitably there were curricular problems. The age of the students was high, and overall standards in English and arithmetic were poor.<sup>(4)</sup> Willoughby was

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(1) Odds Tiger Kloof 32. Protest of the Tiger Kloof Sub-Committee to Board of L.M.S., 1906.

(2) Odds Tiger Kloof 32. Principal's objection to Protest, 1906

(3) Odds. Education 1/32. Cullen to Tiger Kloof Sub-Committee Bankly West, 25 February, 1910

(4) Odds Tiger Kloof. 32/1 Report of inspection of August, 1908

experienced enough to concentrate initially on numbers and leave quality to his successor. When A.J. Haile did take over from Willoughby in 1914, the institution's standard was not above Standard VI, and to raise this became a priority.

The most challenging attack on Willoughby came from within the L.M.S. and Khama was undoubtedly behind it. A.E. Jennings, the L.M.S. agent at Serowe, wrote to the London Directorate with a list of complaints against Willoughby and Tiger Kloof. When Willoughby heard of the charges, he insisted that an official L.M.S. deputation should visit the institution, take evidence and issue a report. (1) Jennings alleged that Tiger Kloof was a failure; that this failure was directly attributable to the personality of Willoughby. There were, Jennings admitted, over a hundred students at Tiger Kloof, but these were all in the industrial section and there were no students from Khama's country. Their aristocracy who "paid" for education, still sent their children to Healdtown and Lovedale. Many examples were given of expulsions of students due to Willoughby's foul temper. The core of Jennings' accusations was that the wealthy Bamangwato stayed away, and that a traditional clientele as well as a traditional curriculum had been jettisoned. Willoughby, knowing that Khama had encouraged Jennings in his complaints, fought his corner tenaciously. He agreed that the wealthy Bamangwato regarded Tiger Kloof as "just a cattle post". The Bamangwato aristocracy, Willoughby well knew, had favoured Lovedale where their children had favoured treatment, the trend having been

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(1) Willoughby's papers, Box 7, File 476. Report of the visit to the South African Missions of the Society, November, 1910 - April, 1911, by the Reverend George Cousin, William Dower and Sir Charles Tarring.

started when Segkoma Khama had gone there in 1892. Each expulsion case Willoughby defended in detail, as well as explaining the value of the industrial education. Khama was interviewed by Tarring and Dower; he painted a picture of ill-treated and frightened children, then complimented the L.M.S. on building Tiger Kloof so close to him! Jennings and Willoughby were reconciled and the official report praised Willoughby for his unremitting labours, and excused his outbursts of short-temper.

The conflict between Jennings and Willoughby owed much to personal animosities. Willoughby's haughty manner ruffled many of his colleagues feathers, and Jennings had Khama's support. It was true that Tiger Kloof had not responded to the aspirations of the Bamangwato aristocracy, for they found its industrial curriculum plebeian and demeaning. But there was a more significant cause for conflict. Willoughby had created Tiger Kloof and shaped its ethos and curriculum as a means of acculturing the Tswana - to train them in industrial skills, instil a Christian ethic as well as develop leadership qualities and democratic ideals. He wanted to produce a generation who could move confidently into a rapidly changing twentieth century colonial society, so traditional values and attitudes had to be reshaped. To Khama, however, all change could only be accompanied under his own chiefly aegis, and his traditional role must be preserved as intact as possible. Khama regarded the L.M.S. and the British colonial apparatus as props to his autocracy, and Willoughby at Tiger Kloof was a threat. The contention over the siting of the institution, the Bamangwato boycott of the place, and Jennings' accusations to London, were part of Khama's policy to counter their cultural threat. But Tiger Kloof

flourished in spite of Khama's opposition, and Khama found combating an ideal difficult to sustain. He dropped the Tiger Kloof boycott gradually, and presented a large clock for the institution's tower to seal his reconciliation. In 1915, he opened his Serowe church, built against L.M.S. advice and with the colonial government's help; symbolically the foundations were insecure, and it had to be re-built in 1917 by Tiger Kloof industrial students.

The subsequent academic progress of Tiger Kloof was stimulated by the high standards of the Cape Schools Code. Thousands of pounds were spent converting the institution to electricity, whilst all staff - apart from the headmaster - received the generous Cape salaries. By 1918, the Cape government assisted 2,000 native mission schools to the tune of £230,000 per annum, and the demand was increasing yearly. In the late 1950's, the Bantu Education Act meant that Tiger Kloof had to be abandoned, and the £60,000 received from the Union government was re-invested in Moeding College, Botswana. (1)

By 1911, the statistics for the L.M.S. Bechuanaland mission were as follows. There were 8 mission stations, 150 out-stations, 160 preachers and teachers, 4,910 church members and 2,395 scholars. (2) However, a more accurate commentary on educational problems and quality was provided by James Burns, at the request of Sargent, the Educational Adviser to the High Commission. (3) His examination of the larger

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(1) Conversations with A.J. Haile and Aubrey Lewis; Phelps-Stokes Commission in South Africa, by C.T. Loram.

(2) Tiger Kloof, L.M.S. 1912, The London Missionary Society's Native Institution in South Africa by W.C. Willoughby.

(3) 64/4 Tiger Kloof, December 14, 1904, To the Directors of the L.M.S.

schools was a valuable "quality" test on the decades of L.M.S. educational work in the region. It is the only detailed, objective commentary on these schools that exists.

Kanye - this school was supervised by Lloyd and two native teachers. It contained 22 boys and 138 girls with an average attendance of 55.7. The preponderance of girls was due to the fact that the boys were in the tribal cattle-posts, a constant cause of complaint from the L.M.S. agents. The teaching was partly in English and partly in Sechuana, and some industrial work had commenced. Burn's comment on the general standard of education there was "the order and general discipline of this school is considerably below par".

Gamoshupa - this was one of the veteran missionary Lloyd's out-stations and it had a native teacher. There were only 20 pupils enrolled, and the school only met for 4 months of the year. Burns noted that the work and progress of the school was 'erratic'.

Molepololé - This school was run by Miss Partridge and had 23 boys and 104 girls. Teaching took place in the Molepolole mission church, and there was industrial work commencing. Burns, after visiting Molepolole, went to the small out-stations of Mokhibidu, Gaberones and Khumakwane where there were native teachers employed at schools of, on average, 20 children. Salaries varied from £25 a year to nothing, and the schools met for four hours a day, for 120 days a year. In Burns' opinion the teachers taught as well as circumstances allowed them to.

Serowe - The main school was run by Miss Sharp and four native teachers. There were 39 boys and 71 girls, with industrial work established, and the teaching in English and Sechwana.

Shoshong - the school was under an L.M.S. missionary, and the 60 pupils were taught in Sechwana. At both Serowe and Shoshong there was a strong interest in education. The overall picture that Burns described was depressing. Why was this? Burns' critique of the L.M.S. schools echoed that of the last five decades. There were social impediments such as the boys having to attend cattle-posts and gardens, but there was more to the failure than just that. There was virtually no teacher-training, and only two of the L.M.S. teachers were certificated; added to the lack of certificated teachers was the poor pay and prospects for African teachers. But Burns' most trenchant criticism was the fact that there was no means of controlling the L.M.S. schools in the Protectorate.... "of central authority there is practically none and every school is more or less a law unto itself". There can be no doubt that the Congregational ideal of mission station "independency" and a consequent lack of a unifying Bechuana District Mission executive lay at the root of this. Tiger Kloof itself, as we have seen, was constructed after a District Committee decision, prompted by the London directorate; but its foundation and early years depended on the determined vitality of one man, William Charles Willoughby.

There were further weaknesses which Burns was unable to see. The L.M.S. refused to commit appreciable sums to the Bechuana Mission for education. This was because of its own lack of funds, commitment

to schools and colleges in China and India and conviction that African education was at an elementary stage, and so could be managed on the cheap. In 1900, Willoughby made a request for colonial funding for L.M.S. education, directly to Chamberlain. The Boer War was on, but the Colonial secretary made a promise that the matter would be looked into after cessation of hostilities. In 1903, a government sum of £500 was given to the L.M.S. for their schools, but the civil authorities wanted a policy of 'centres of excellence' to be adopted, and it earmarked the funds for industrial training at such centres as Kanye, Molepolole, Serowe and Selepeng. The government had no time for spreading the money indiscriminately among the smaller station and out-station schools.<sup>(1)</sup>

These problems were compounded by the fact that the Bakhurutse, Bamangwato and Bakwena moved capitals and this involved the L.M.S. in heavy expenditure. Willoughby wanted Cape standards of education to apply to the Protectorate - they did to Tiger Kloof - but the Protectorate authorities were too cost conscious.<sup>(2)</sup>

Another reason for the low academic standard of L.M.S. schools was that the Bechuana Mission had always been primarily an "evangelical" mission, after the spirit of Robert Moffat, its founder. Some Bechuana missionaries - Livingstone, Mackenzie, Willoughby - saw education as a liberalizing, humane, cultural catalyst, but most

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(1) Willoughby Papers, Box 11, File 778, May 1900, 64/1.

Ralph Williams, Deputy Commissioner to Jennings (Serowe).

(2) L.M.S. Personal, Box 6, Willoughby to Resident Protectorate Commission, August 1903.

did not. They were convinced that schools were weak evangelising agencies, an opinion that Willoughby acknowledged in 1912, without rejecting his own philosophy that education in mission should be more than a proselytizing force. Willoughby wrote that L.M.S. teachers were weak direct evangelisers for teaching took up most of their energies, and most teachers were only nominal Christians.

Willoughby's view of mission schools as long term agents of socio-cultural and Christian change was one that other non-'dialogic' agents could share.

All these factors combined - social, financial and cultural - to explain the indifferent progress and depressed standards of L.M.S. schools in their Bechuana mission.



## Chapter Nine

### Education and Evangelisation

"It (colonial education) was not an educational system that grew out of the African environment or one that was designed to promote the most rational use of material and social resources... Colonial schooling was education for subordination, exploitation, the creation of mental confusion, and the development of underdevelopment".

Walter Rodney: How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 241.

"The role of the Mission is to see that the change in native culture, attendant upon social and economic upheaval and European intrusion is a Christian one...We must produce an African Christianity".

W.C. Willoughby.

Education and Evangelisation

Education was an integral part of L.M.S. strategy worldwide, its nature and method of implementation varying with the socio-cultural demands of the particular region. The Society was prepared to establish an institution of academic excellence like Robert Morrison's Anglo-Chinese College if there was a justification for it. Strategically, it was clear that China would never be proselytised unless an attempt was made to engage their cultural elite in a meaningful dialogue; moreover, the East India Company saw the College as a place where language skills could be acquired, and commercial relations with mainland China strengthened. The funding of the Anglo-Chinese College was assisted by private sources, and Morrison gave his own translator's salary to help running costs. The Society's strategy towards India was governed by similar cultural factors, and their higher colleges there formed an important element in their overall policy. It is true that Griffith John in his early ministry, and a group of critical L.M.S. supporters in the early twentieth century were dubious of this approach, but L.M.S. policy in India and China never altered significantly.

In Polynesia, cultural tensions were much less. The European commercial and political presence was much lower key, so that the Society's schools and training colleges were more integrated with traditional values and practices. Advanced colleges were residential; students' families lived on site farming and fishing to make such places financially self-supporting. Also, Polynesian beliefs were easier to adapt to Christian theology, so easing religious tensions.

Southern Africa was somewhere in between L.M.S. Polynesian and Asiatic

strategy. It was true that there was considerable cultural change because of the white presence, but southern African cultural levels and the educational potential of its peoples aroused arguments, latent or more obvious, within the ranks of the Mission's agents. The "dialectic" group generally distrusted indigenous African cultural and religious attitudes, and important agents like Foster and Ellis were convinced that "advanced" education was wasted on the Khoi and Griqua peoples. On the whole, the L.M.S. went along with other Protestant Mission bodies in southern Africa and concentrated on elementary education. In fact, the L.M.S. was about fifty years behind the Anglicans, Methodists and Scottish Presbyterians in successfully funding a higher college. This slow start meant that the L.M.S. in southern Africa had an Achilles heel - they were unable to provide effectively trained teachers for their mission elementary schools.

The three conscious aims of Protestant mission education have been taken to be - to directly assist in evangelising individuals; to train Christian leaders; and to produce an indigenous society of converts who are Christian and collectively acted in a moral, ethical manner. For most of the time in southern Africa, the L.M.S. concentrated on the first, for a variety of reasons - financial, pessimistic cultural assumptions and more worldwide strategic factors. This elementary education was a "Bible-based literacy" which tended not to appeal to rural populations, like the Tswana, whose main concerns were agricultural. However, when white commercial and cultural pressures increased - for example, on the Khoi-Griqua groups in the Cape - the response of such pressured peoples was intense interest in education to protect themselves and their present and future interests. In the Kat River Settlement and Griqualand, the Khoi-Griquas virtually controlled their own schools and showed an

educational dynamism which was remarkable. In all probability, the Caffrarian Mission would have been equally responsive, if the L.M.S. had decided to pour more of their resources into the area. Unfortunately, the African populations on the eastern Cape frontier did not have the ethnic integration of the Khoi-Griqua populations to take control of their own educational destinies. The most successful - statistically - in recruiting pupils for mission schools was the L.M.S. Malagasy Mission. Madagascar had a strong central government and its population developed strong collective commercial drives which meant tremendous enthusiasm for education and Christianity. Church and State there became ideologically and bureaucratically linked, with their respective agencies supporting each other in the acculturation process that proceeded so rapidly in the mid and late nineteenth century.

There were practical reasons, too, why the L.M.S. did not establish training for a "Native Agency" until the 1860's. Early attempts to train elementary school teachers for their mission schools were made by Van der Kemp and Philip. Foster's remit was dogged by practical difficulties and his own personal confusions. The Directors told Philip that they were behind his efforts to found a higher college, but their enthusiasm waned because of Philip's political involvements. Certainly Durant Philip's cries from Hankey for a seminary there, were never entertained seriously by them. When the Bechuana Mission became established, it found favour with the Directors, so that Tidman, the then L.M.S. Foreign Secretary, was prepared to found in this region some institution to train African teachers. David Livingstone pursued the matter on behalf of the Directors, and Ashton, Robert Moffat's second-in-command, did some training in this respect, but the poor elementary school infra-structure

meant that when the Moffat Institution at Kuruman was eventually founded, it was dependent on few and poorly prepared candidates. It was a foregone failure.

Central to the part education played in the Society's strategy was the missiology of its agents. The short-hand terms "dialogic" and "dialectic", have been used to categorise the two groups of L.M.S. missionaries who worked in southern Africa during this period. The "dialectic" missionaries viewed the process of evangelisation in spiritual terms - their attitude was didactic and salvationist. This is not to condemn either their commitment or their devotion. It is, however, difficult to imagine what practical, this-worldly view, they had of the missionary future. By nature, apolitical, they ignored economic factors, tending to see conversion as an end-in-itself, unconnected with any secular reality. Education was a step on the way to a spiritual conversion, and not much else. Robert Moffat, the arch "dialectic" missionary, probably viewed the Tswana future as an extension of his Kuruman mission station - a peaceful, idyllic farming group, the labourers all co-operating in agricultural production, untrammelled by traditional ties of feudal chieftancy, worshipping together on a Sunday. Even more extreme was J.D. Hepburn. His pietism was intense, and his political inflexibility plunged him into a nervous breakdown and paranoia. It would be difficult to imagine what Hepburn would have considered a satisfactory social state for his African converts. His whole energy concentrated on building a large Church, and most of his mission life was spent on the periphery of the Bechuana Mission. He hated the acrimonious political in-fighting that characterized the Tswana capitals; like Moffat, his ideal was for the Tswana to occupy some traditional,

but cleansed and antiseptic rural retreat.

The "dialogic" tradition of the L.M.S. in southern Africa was strong, and developed and adapted itself during the period of this study. These missionaries shared a common set of values. Missionary evangelisation and the Christian faith were seen in an historical context, consequently "dialogic" missionaries had a practical view of the world they wanted to see their converts inhabit. The material world of politics and commerce reacted with spiritual realities, so that their vision of a new Christian world for African converts was, at the same time, more stimulating, comprehensive yet precise. "Dialogic" missionaries encouraged intellectual activity, and involved themselves in politics because a political stance could protect the civil rights of their converts. "Dialogic" missionaries placed their African converts in a socio-cultural context - they were to engage in commerce and agriculture so that they could live prosperously, they were to enjoy the political rights that existed under the British Imperium; ultimately, they could enjoy the "highest" cultural condition of all by forming themselves into a self-subsisting Christian "tribe/nation". In this acculturation process, education was vital to train them in practical skills for the new economic order and to change their aspirations and world view.

It is probable that the "dialectic" tradition represented the more recent Evangelical influx from the 1770's onwards into Congregationalism, while the "dialogic" element sprang from the culturally richer, more invigorating and older Independency.

This study can conclude by looking at a recent critique of mission education in southern Africa, in which Chanaiwa's general analysis of the

creation of a Christian intellectual elite is pertinent.<sup>1</sup> His analysis of the forces making for the creation of this group is similar to that of this study; his group of African humanists - John Tengo Jabavu (1859-1929); Walter B. Rubusana, Congregationalist (1858-1916); Tiyo Soga (1829-1871) and John Langalibalele - were shaped by mission church, school, literature and the intellectual influences of the Aborigines Protection Society. In fact, the group were typical products of "dialogic" missionary influences. It was not the process so much as the result that aroused Chanaiwa's opposition, for this mission-produced African elite..."lived in an experiential educational environment of spiritualism, strict discipline, as well as non-ethnicity, non-racialism and universalism...their education was not just a process of acquiring knowledge; it was also a way of living and feeling". This was exactly what the "dialogic" missionaries sought to achieve, but their encomium would be Chanaiwa's condemnation. For to Chanaiwa, this elite were "alienated", and as a consequence failed to see the "predatory, racist" nature of white colonialism. They lived in an unreal world of "existential humanism", in which the nastier realities of Southern Africa were transcended.

It is pointless to try and effect a compromise between Chanaiwa and the "dialogic missionaries", for their social objectives and intellectual ideologies are world's apart. Agar-Hamilton accused Philip of trying to create a "mission theocracy" in the Cape interior,

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1) Independence without Freedom: the Political Economy of Colonial Education in Southern Africa. (eds. Mugumba and Nyaggah). A.B.C. Cliv-  
Santa Barbara and Oxford, 1980. Chapter 1 African Humanism in  
Southern Africa by David Chanaiwa, pp. 9-35.

to protect converts and Christian ideology, but this is exactly what the "dialogic" missionaries did not want. All of them - from van der Kemp to Willoughby - were aware, in varying degrees, of the need to relate the Christian message to a socio-cultural African reality. To this extent, they were just as much social realists as Chamaïwa is. The problem was, that the reality of southern African colonialism had its negative side of racism, exploitation and violence. Livingstone and Philip caught a whiff of this ugliness, but there was little they could do about it, apart from setting up some antediluvian protective "theocracy".

Yet "dialogic" optimism had some success. L.M.S. strategic indecisiveness and executive weakness in their southern African mission field resulted in a fragile, elementary mission school infrastructure, but the "dialogic" tradition, with Congregational/Independency antecedents, compensated for this, as it incorporated into its comprehensive acculturation process a concept of education that, in an honest and committed way, tried to stimulate and liberate African individual and tribe.



SOURCES : PRIMARY : MANUSCRIPT

1. London Missionary Society Archives, School of Oriental and African Studies, Malet Street, London, W.C.

These are reports, letters, memoranda, District Committee minutes and so on sent by the Society's missionary agents in Southern Africa back to their London headquarters.

2. The John Philip transcripts at Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

Approximately 2,500 leaves of notes made by Professor W.M. Macmillan and his students in the 1920's of Philip archive material, subsequently destroyed by fire at the University of the Witwatersrand. The transcripts, - brief, discontinuous, sometimes on scraps of paper - demand a working knowledge of John Philip's life and concerns for them to be useful.

3. W.C. Willoughby Papers, Selly Oak Colleges Library, Birmingham.

Fifteen boxes of Willoughby's notes, lectures, letters to the London Missionary Society and some scholarly articles. Some of this material is duplicated in the Society's official archives in London. The material is a commentary on Willoughby's activities as a missionary to the Tswana as well as his founding of Tiger Kloof. Even at his most authoritarian, Willoughby's comments are usually succinct and perceptive. There are, as well, lectures and notes on Bantu religion and culture composed by Willoughby at the end of his professional life, when he was Professor of African religion in the Hartford-Connecticut Theological Seminary in the U.S.A.

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